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*Power Structure in An Algerian
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MIZOUNI SOHBI

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Ruth S. Hamilton
Major professor

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POWER STRUCTURE IN AN ALGERIAN
RURAL COMMUNE

by

Mizouni Sohbi

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ABSTRACT

Power Structure in an Algerian
Rural Commune

by

Mizouni Sohbi

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This thesis focuses on the power structure of an Algerian rural commune as encapsulated in the socio-economic formation. The following issues are analyzed in historical perspective:

1. The Popular Assembly of the commune was dominated by the landowning class. The commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.) was deemed to represent the interests of the popular classes. In fact, the social composition included overwhelmingly members of the propertied classes (landowners, merchants . . .) and individuals of petit bourgeois background (teachers, administration employees . . .).
2. The different committees appointed by the Popular Assembly (committees of taxes, of agriculture assistance . . .) were dominated by the merchant and landowning classes. The important agriculture committee theoretically called "committee of assistance to small peasants" did not include any small peasant in its membership. The technical and financial assistance provided by the Societe

Agricole de Prevoyance (cooperative of services and financial assistance) flowed almost exclusively to the landowning class.

The Agrarian Revolution program initiated in 1971 and the class conflict it entailed had strong repercussions on the local peasant class structure and the nature of the local power structure.

1. The trend was toward the progressive elimination of the landowning class from the commune's Popular Assembly to the benefit of the rising local petit bourgeoisie (teachers, employees . . .). Nevertheless, no working class member nor small peasant or cooperative worker was included in the new Popular Assembly.
2. The new Cooperative Agricole de Service et de Commercialisation which replaced the Societe Agricole de Prevoyance was oriented more toward assisting the small peasantry. The grip of the landowning class on the technical and financial assistance levers was to a large extent weakened.

To Amourth's martyrs who died
for Independence and Freedom.

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INTRODUCTION

Algeria experienced one of the bloodiest wars of liberation in history which ended in 1952 after more than 132 years of French settler colonialism. The revolutionary decolonization highlighted by a tremendous popular mobilization, the establishment of self-management on the former settlers' assets in industry and agriculture, popular volunteering in farms and tree planting . . . declined very soon in momentum. In the absence of a viable political, economic and social alternative, post-independence Algeria emerged as a caricature of a revolutionary society. Traditional rural Algeria, which contributed the main base of the liberation war, did not witness any radical change until 1971 when a land reform program was initiated. Hence, despite the all pervasive populism of the post-independence regimes (1962-1971), the rural socio-economic and political structures remained under the grip of the local landowning class.

In this work, the analysis is centered on the power structure of a rural commune. The issues to be examined relate first to the social composition of the Popular Assembly of the commune and to its socio-economic actions and second, to the structures of the agricultural technical and financial assistance. These two issues are analyzed before and after the implementation of the land reform program and are seen within the broader framework of national

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transformations. In the first chapter, some theoretical and methodological questions are discussed to clarify certain implicit assumptions of this work. In the second chapter, the colonial rural structure is described briefly to provide a useful background for the understanding of the subsequent (partial) transformation entailed by self-management. The third chapter discusses the commune's structure and the agricultural policy during the period 1965 to 1971, which was characterized by an alliance between the bureaucratic-technocratic petit bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the landowning class. The presence of the latter class within the state power imposed a rural status-quo and agricultural policies benefiting essentially the landowning class. The fourth chapter deals with the transformations brought about by the application of the Agrarian Revolution Program. These transformations affected first the Communal Popular Assembly from which the landowning class was progressively eliminated and replaced by a locally rising new petit bourgeoisie. And second, the agricultural assistance structures which oriented their action more toward the small peasants.

CHAPTER I

CLASS ANALYSIS AND PERIPHERAL FORMATIONS

The main thrust of this study is the analysis of the power structure in a rural commune in terms of classes. The identification of the dominant social classes at the local level is seen within the broader framework of the national class structure, class alliances and policies.

Class analysis of an agrarian structure of a peripheral social formation raises already at the theoretical/methodological level many complex problems. Of these are the application of class analysis to a peripheral formation, the problem of rural classes and peasantry and problems related to class analysis itself.

Resistance to the application of class analysis lies at two levels:

1. Official denial throughout Africa and particularly Algeria of the existence of classes. Nationalism and nation-building is regarded as a supra-class phenomenon.¹ At the same time, emphasis is put on religion and the specific character, for example, of Islamic societies as irreducible to non-Islamic societies.²

2. Conventional social science teachings supported the rejection of class analysis. Sociology encompasses classes into a broader stratification system of status, ranks and role expectations.³

Nevertheless, stratification analysis never transcends the level of immediate experience and only remains a statistical description that fails to explain the moving forces of society and social dynamics. The criteria--occupation, income, life-style and social status--however important, are only dependent and secondary factors of the fundamental criterion explicated by Marx, that is, property relations.

But, however difficult it may be to make a class analysis of African societies, "the reality of class" as Wallerstein put it, "is not lessened by the very real resistance to class analysis, nor by its rarity as a political phenomenon." While all Marxists agree that peripheral formations are class societies, they disagree on the nature of the articulation of the peripheral class structure with that of the center.

Some Marxists emphasize the dependency over-determination that deprives classes of the peripheral formations of their specific dynamics.* In this respect, Wallerstein holds that "in the peripheral areas of the world economy. . . the primary contradiction is between the interests organized and located in the core countries and their local allies, on the one hand, and the majority of the population on the other."⁴ Samire Amin argues that peripheral social formations have no "internal dynamism of their own," they are over-determined by the world capitalist system. The generalization of peripheral state

*Representatives of this orientation are mainly the dependency theorists such as A. G. Frank, I. Wallerstein and S. Amin.

capitalism merely reflects changes of the center and expresses the emergence process of the petty bourgeoisie as a "transmission belt of imperialist domination."⁵

Emphasis on world system tended to overlook mode of production analysis and henceforth to regard periphery's classes as mere epiphenomena of external processes. "Local allies" or local "transmission belt" classes are not always obvious. This ignores the possible contradictions between periphery's dominant classes and center's classes. This is true of the fiercely nationalistic petty bourgeoisie in Algeria and of a national bourgeoisie as opposed to the comprador bourgeoisie.⁶ Some observers argue that this "distinction is irrelevant in a period marked by increasing interpenetration and internationalisation of capital and consequently dependent capitalisms."⁷ Indeed, this conception does not account for contradictory class interests of periphery's and center's classes.

Indeed, Marxist analysis does not mean mechanistic transposition to peripheral formation of the class relationships characteristic of central capitalism as it developed from feudalism. But, as Arrighi put it, "the analysis of the colonial structures should, so to say, be built into the analysis of the class structures."⁸ I. Shivji wonders how can "the historically determined system of social production (colonial or neocolonial structures) . . . be placed either in a subordinate or a dominant position vis a vis the class structure of that system."⁹

Mode of Production and Class

Marx's treatment of class was incomplete, but Lenin explicated the Marxist definition of classes,

as large groups of people which differ from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor and, consequently, by the dimension and modes of acquiring the share of social wealth of which they dispose. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labor of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.¹⁰

Class determination derives from mode of production analysis. A mode of production being an articulation of specific productive forces and specific relations of production with the corresponding political and ideological structures.* Indeed, a mode of production does not exist in the real sense, in a "pure" state. What exists is a social formation which combines different modes of production of which one is dominant, a "historically determined system of social production." Henceforth, a social formation includes more than two classes. Consequently, any class analysis presupposes an analysis in terms of modes of production. The articulation of modes of production implies the maintenance/destruction of non-capitalist forms of production and of corresponding social and political structures. The expansion of the capitalist mode of production altered precapitalist structures and subordinated them to capitalism's functioning.¹¹

*A class divided mode of production involves basically a two-class structure. Proletariat/capitalist for the C.M.P., Serfs/lords for the F.M.P., Masters/slaves for slavery, etc.

This articulation of modes of production and its counterpart--unequal development--is what is sometimes termed as "dualism." Dualistic theories regard the dichotomy traditional/modern sectors as independent entities evolving at different stages of their development. Self-sustaining growth--hindered by the "backward" sector, is only reached when the latter is incorporated within the modern sector through a set of modernizing means.¹²

Factual evidence, however, shows the opposite: 1) that the "traditional" sector is indeed organically linked to the "modern" sector (reserve of labor force, market exchange), and 2) that the "modern" (capitalist) sector is the real obstacle to the growth of the "traditional" sector because of the transfer of value (rents, unequal exchange, cheap labor force . . .).¹³

Agrarian Structures and Classes

Peripheral social formations are sometimes characterized as agrarian societies* to emphasize the fact that most of their population is rural and that their economy is basically agricultural.

While western capitalist countries underwent a process of proletarianization which transformed their peasantries into industrial working classes, peripheral economies and particularly Africa are still experiencing a peasantization process subsequent to capitalist penetration and destruction of the "communal cultivator" form of organization.

*Conventional social science uses the dichotomy Agrarian/Industrial Society to reject mode of production and class analyses.

Peasantry or Classes?

Peasantry in sociology literature is problematic insofar as it includes different rural classes and strata in one undifferentiated entity. The generally accepted definition of peasantry is Wolf's systematization of the XIX century European rural conditions. His treatment hinges on four criteria: 1) a peasant is a rural cultivator, 2) a peasant manages the exploitation for the market as well as for family consumption, 3) a peasant belongs to a local community larger than the family (even an extended one), and 4) a peasant has a subordinate economic and political position such that a part of production is extorted under the form of rents or taxes. This model has been set essentially in contrast with that of tribal and primitive societies which escape the domination of a central power.

T. Shanin¹⁴, however, contends that Wolf's treatment turns "analytically marginal" any peasant category to which these criteria do not apply. S. Ortiz¹⁵ strongly objects to grouping peasants in one single definition. And, S. W. Mintz¹⁶ observed that for the study of the present problems of the rural world in non-western societies, it is more important to develop typologies of rural socio-economic groupments than elaborate on abstract definition of peasantry. K. Post¹⁷ developed the thesis that the African reality reveals two types of processes tightly linked together. The first is a process of change from the model of "communal cultivator" to that of "peasant." The second is a process of incorporating peasant and communal societies

within the world capitalist system. But, at the same time that Africa experiences a peasantization process because of its deepening integration to the world systems, Algeria has experienced a "depeasantization" process because of the proletarianization, destruction of and internal differentiation of peasant community subsequent to the brutal penetration of capitalism under the form of settler colonialism. Henceforth, as Hobsbawm¹⁸ put it, "beyond a certain point in the socio-economic differentiation of the agrarian population, the term of 'peasant' is no more applicable." Rural class analysis within Marxism remained basically under-developed in contra-distinction with analysis of urban class structures. Insofar as capitalism was essentially an urban-based mode of production, Marxism developed an extensive body of literature pertaining to urban class analysis but only few references to rural classes which had direct relevance to the analysis of capitalist development. Development of rural class analysis emerged, however, in Eastern Europe where the peasant question was crucially posed. Lenin¹⁹ in his analysis of the Russian rural society established a Marxist framework for the study of peasant societies in terms of classes. The determination of classes was predicated upon the identification of three rural modes of production defined by three types of relations of production: 1) feudal relations of production, comprising landlords and share croppers, 2) capitalist relations of production, comprising the capitalist farmer (kulak) and the

rural proletariat, and 3) "the middle peasant" who cultivated his own land but, in Russia, was tied to the commune (mir).

Lenin's broad categories were further elaborated by Mao ste Tung who, in his analysis of China, determined various rural classes using land ownership and farm implement ownership as criteria: landlords, rural capitalist (small because rural capitalism was not developed), petit bourgeoisie (owner-peasants or middle peasants), the semi-proletariat (semi-tenant peasants and poor peasants), the rural proletariat and the lumpen rural proletariat (landless and jobless peasants).

A sharper analysis--using criteria such as standards of living, sources of income and ownership of farm implements--distinguishes sections within these classes. For example, the poor peasants are divided into two sections. One section of the poor peasants owns comparatively adequate farm implements and a proportional amount of funds and practices on the side a little livestock raising; the other section of the poor peasants does not possess adequate farm implements, funds nor sufficient manure and gets most often into heavy debts.

Peasants and Revolution

Many debates revolved around an abstract determination of whether "peasants" in several areas are a basically conservative force or essentially a revolutionary force.²⁰ But, only concrete analysis of both the objective and subjective conditions could determine peasant's

practice for historical experience illustrated peasant's differential position. Marx talked of French peasants--and European peasants in general--as a "sack of potatoes" divided and demobilized, barbary within civilization.²¹ Mao concretely analyzed the forces of revolution in the countryside and appreciated the revolutionary potential of some strata of the peasantry. Amilcar Cabral²² distinguished between "physical force" and "revolutionary force": While the peasantry constitute physically a great force, it is not the great fighting force. E. Wolf and H. Alavi²³ observed that it is the middle peasant rather than the poorest of peasants who is "initially the most militant element of the peasantry." The middle peasant's social perspective is, however, "limited by their class position" in the final analysis. Yet, poorer peasants could carry on the revolutionary process further into structural changes if adequately motivated. It is nonetheless agreed (Moore, Wolf, Alavi . . .) that "it generally requires a rare combination of tyranny and misery to produce a peasant revolt let alone a peasant revolution."²⁴

Agrarian Reform

Land reforms result from a class conflict at the level of the agrarian structure--rural classes--and at the level of the state which engenders a double movement: Break and transformation of the bloc of classes in power and break and transformation of the rural class structure. Change does not necessarily embrace simultaneously both

poles at the same time: Change at one pole could entail repercussions at the other and vice versa. Henceforth, agrarian transformation processes could be summarized in the following typology.²⁵

1. Transformation at the level of the agrarian structure as a result of a peasant revolt or insurrection not followed by a dislocation of the state system. The de facto land reform is then reversed by a state-organized counter-reform or counter-revolution. This is the example of Czarist Russia and XIX century Mexico.

2. Transformation at the level of the agrarian structure followed by a dislocation of the state system. The landowners are eliminated from the state power and a land reform proclaimed. This is illustrated by the 1952 revolution in Bolvaria.

3. Transformation at the level of the state system by the elimination of the landowning class from the bloc of classes in power and transformation of the rural class structure through land reform. This is illustrated by the Egyptian experience of 1953, the Peru Revolution of 1969 and the Algerian Agrarian Revolution of 1971.

4. Simultaneous transformation of the state system and of the agrarian structure. This type is best illustrated by the revolutionary experiences in 1917 in Russia, China, Cuba . . .

The power structure of a rural commune in Algeria cannot be analyzed scientifically without integrating the local class structure within the national dimension which is over-determinant. The local

peasant classes are encapsulated within the broader national class structure and class alliances which dictate the basic social, economic and political policies of the country. The class nature of the central state power is thus decisive in the understanding on how the different national policies have direct repercussions on the local social dynamics and on the nature of the commune's power structure.

Class Analysis of the Algerian Social Formation

The Algerian socio-economic formation has received much attention in scholarly as well as militant circles. A large body of literature deal extensively with different dimensions of the Algerian society and its history. Yet, the character of the Algerian social formation remained very controversial and elusive. A brief review of class analysis of Algeria reveals that Marxist appraisals include characterizations ranging from those defining the Algerian social formation as a transitional formation (toward socialism) to those defining it as a dependent capitalist formation. This stems from the fluctuating social reality and contradictory development which combine progressive elements (nationalizations, national industrialization, extensive education program, free health care, 'workers' control,' land reform . . .) as well as negative aspects (persistent unemployment, emigration, lag of agriculture, deepening of social inequalities, deepening of Algeria insertion within the world capitalist market and hence of technological dependence, lop-sided sectorial development . . .).

Differential emphasis, either on the positive or the negative developments, leads to different conclusions as regard to the class character of the Algerian state and the nature of the dominant class. These analyses could be grouped into two broad categories--the "state bourgeoisie/dependency" thesis and the "petit-bourgeoisie/transition toward socialism" thesis--though both categories exhibit a variety of nuances as regard to the type of analysis, assumptions and evidence . . .

The "State Bourgeoisie/Dependency" Thesis²⁶

The proponents of this thesis argue that a "state bourgeoisie"* constituted as the dominant class within Algeria because of its control of the ownership of the means of production, its leading role in economic organization and surplus-value distribution and its dominant role in political decision-making and elaboration of ideology. The "state bourgeoisie" is regarded as a historical crystallization of several strata and fractions of class (petit and middle bourgeoisies) in post-independence Algeria, especially since 1965. The "state bourgeoisie" is perceived as a class at the super-structural level by its position within the state: the Marxist criterion of property relations which is anchored in the infra-structure is regarded as a juridicial formalism. As a result, this conception does not explain the contradictory developments such as low level of consumption

*This is also called "administrative bourgeoisie", "bureaucratic bourgeoisie", "technocratic bourgeoisie."

imposed on the "state bourgeoisie" through the ceiling wage and limitations on luxury imports, the industrial orientation toward heavy industry and not toward profitable consumer production sectors and, other decisions benefiting the popular classes such as extensive free education which absorbs about 19 percent of the annual budget or free health care . . . Indeed these positive aspects are dismissed either as temporary or techniques of cooptation.

The class content of the Algerian state is thus regarded either as a "globally reactionary"²⁷ regime completely aligned with international capitalism against the popular masses or as a nationalist bourgeois regime²⁸ in process of attempting to secure a place within the imperialist division of labor and which is thus in relation of relative conflict with dependence on imperialism and compelled to broaden its internal social bases to strengthen its position vis a vis international capital. These critiques emphasize the dependence of the Algerian economy on world capitalism. The technological, trade dependence is viewed as an already operating mechanism which imposes on the Algerian economy choices dictated by the requirements of the central capitalist economies. True, these new forms of dependence are potentially dangerous but the socio-economic and political options of Algeria are not dictated to it through mechanisms dependency.

Although, the proponents of the "state bourgeoisie/dependency" thesis provide good analyses of some dimensions of the Algerian social formation such as the industrialization program and its contradictions,

the significance of State apparatus building or the land reform, they fail to account for the dynamics of the internal class structure and for the progressive developments experienced by the Algerian society. Some observers from this perspective noted a sharp exacerbation of class conflicts since 1971 and a noticeable leftward move of the regime. But locked in a dogmatic "state bourgeoisie/dependency" perspective, they either dismissed this trend as a populist-demagogic orientation or accounted for it in a contradictory way that implicitly refutes that thesis. This is illustrated by the following proposition: "Rightist opposition forces the regime to move leftward rather than back down and capitulate to right wing demands."²⁹ The observer did not attempt to specify how can a regime initially defined as a technocratic-bureaucratic bourgeois and dependent regime move leftward and yet under rightist pressure. All in all, this perspective does not provide a framework that takes into account the contradictory developments of the Algerian social formation and/or depicts a fluctuating social reality in terms of social class.

The "Petit Bourgeoisie/Transition Toward Socialism" Thesis³⁰

This thesis holds that Algeria is experiencing a transitional process from a colonial economy to a national and independent economy with a socialist perspective. The "socialist option" does not mean immediate construction of socialism but in a first stage the severance of dependence relationships with foreign capital and the building of

a national economy. In this respect, the nationalizations, the industrialization, the reinforcement of the public sector, the free health care program, democratization of education, the Agrarian Revolution, the "socialist management" of corporations are conceived of as the tasks of national building.

In the conditions of Algeria the main contradiction opposes "reactionary and counter-revolutionary strata" (big landowners, compradore bourgeoisie and the "reactionary wing of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie") to other classes and strata "interested in varying degrees to progressive transformations" (workers, salaried personnel, small and middle peasants, landless peasants, unemployed and small traders). Included in this group are "certain national capitalists" who thanks to their investments minimize Algeria's dependence on imports of consumer goods.³¹ The social dynamics reside basically in the anti-imperialist struggle which requires an alliance between the radical elements of the regime and the socialist left on a broad front united around an anti-imperialist charter and where a renovated Front de Liberation Nationale (the official single party) could play the leading role.³²

The nature of the Algerian state is characterized as globally anti-imperialist with some imperfections due to the infiltration of reactionary and conservative elements within the state and administration, political inconsistency of the radical elements who do not hold a scientific socialist theory. Observers³³ from this perspective,

reject concepts such as "state bourgeoisie" and "state capitalism" to define the class nature of the Algerian state as basically petit bourgeois. This hegemonic petit bourgeoisie is on the other hand undermined by internal contradictions between its nationalist and liberal wings. But the institutional structural locations of these wings are not dealt with. Nevertheless, the character of the Algerian social formation is of a transitional character. It is worth noting that the proponents of this perspective allude minimally to the negative aspects of the Algerian development and especially the new forms of technological dependence and the deepening of Algeria insertion within the international division of labor. The antidote to this dependency is viewed in a closer relationship to the socialist camp. But what is left unexplained is why a radical petit bourgeoisie tends to favor tight relationships with the west. Instead of sharpening the analysis to clearly delineate the contours of the different fractions of the petit bourgeoisie (military, technocratic, bureaucratic . . .) and their actual conflicting interests, the literature of the Parti de l'Avant Garde Socialiste (former Communist party) does not deal directly with the negative developments.

In this respect, the analysis developed by J. P. Durand³⁴ stands as an excellent contribution to the clarification of the nature of the Algerian state and the social contradictions that pervade the Algerian social formation. The thesis of a "dominant class in the

forming" as a contradictory process within the conditions of exacerbated but not generalized class conflicts constitutes a useful frame that transcends both the naive thesis of socialist transition and the dogmatic thesis of "state bourgeoisie/dependency" to account for the contradictory developments and the (sometimes) elusive character of class conflicts.

The frozen conceptions of the non-capitalist road and the dependency theory do not thus account for the contradictory process of class struggle. These openly teleological perspectives are substituted for the analysis of the conjuncture of class struggle.

National Social Formation and Amourth*

The socio-economic and political orientations dictated by the national social structure and the class alliance in power shape the conditions of the existence of the local classes and the nature of the local power structure. National policies help expand certain classes power and set limits to other classes power, because of the highly centralized economic and political structures, because of the voluntarism of the state policies and the uricity of economic and political representation. The local institutions are directly subordinated to and tightly supervised by the upper echelons of the central state apparatus. This is not to say that the local classes have no dynamics of their own. But only that the local classes action

*A fictitious name for the rural commune studied.

is circumscribed within the socio-economic and political boundaries set by national policies. Within these boundaries, the local classes intervention conditions the concrete applications of these policies: selective interpretations of laws, delays in implementation and/or misimplementation . . . a clear dialectics is thus at work.

Amourth, a rural commune in Eastern Algeria, can be regarded as a microcosm of traditional rural Algeria. Its 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants live mostly off the "traditional" agricultural sector. Only three self managed farms employing about 70 workers and four other capitalist farms belong to the "modern" sector. About 9,000 inhabitants reside in the commune's village which provides a few dozen permanent jobs in the local administration and services and casual work in the construction sector for the local lumpen-proletariat. No other outlet--besides emigration to the big cities and abroad--is offered to the increasingly pauperized popular classes. The Agrarian Revolution program had limited effects since only 350 landless peasants out of about a thousand applicants were allotted lands regrouped in cooperative. National policies of industrialization around selected poles of development, sacrifice of agriculture and the non-realization of a land reform (promised since 1956) left unchanged the socio-economic conditions of life for more than 65 percent of the Algerian population. The peasant war of liberation was not followed by a social revolution.

On the opposite, the historical domination of the landed class remained unchallenged in Amourth, as well as in similar traditional rural areas until recently (1975). The history of Amourth both before and after independence tells the story of the Algerian peasant classes.

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CHAPTER II

COLONIZATION - COMMUNE - SELF-MANAGEMENT

In order to grasp the complex social relations prevailing in rural Algeria (class and tribal dimensions), a historical analysis is necessarily in order. A brief study of the pre-colonial and colonial rural structure will provide a useful background to the post-independence agrarian structure which remained basically unaltered.

Pre-colonial Algeria experienced a series of successive invasions and occupations by the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs and Turks. The Turkish rule which lasted for over three centuries (1518 - 1830) was ended by France's colonization of Algeria (1830 - 1962).

Pre-Colonial Algerian Formation

The nature of Algeria's pre-colonial formation is very controversial.* The dominant pre-colonial mode of production was characterized either as feudal, asiatic or communal. Galissot contended that the Algerian pre-colonial formation was a special variance of the feudal mode called "command feudalism." Using the different patterns of property ownership (Arsh, Melk**), Galissot distinguished three types

*L. Valenci defined it as "Asiatic mode of Production," French Administrators called it either Feudal or Communal and Galissot characterized it as "command feudalism". . .

**Arsh refers to a tribal collective form of property and Melk to an individual private property.

of economic formation: 1) the ancient type where Melk property was pre-dominant (Mitidja Valley), 2) asiatic type wherever Arsh property dominated Melk property, and 3) germanic type wherever Arsh is articulated to Melk property as a mere supplement.³⁵ This thesis, however, is based on wrong assumptions as regard to the nature of the property system. Indeed, Arsh system is not a communal property but a part of the tribal land recognized as the private possession of the individual or family who tills it, although it cannot be alienated. On the other hand, the Melk system is a private property acquired by contract but which is not exclusive of community rights (tight restrictions over sale). Moreover, "command fuedalism" does not account for the Turkish colonial superstructure. In fact, pre-colonial Algerian formation "combined fuedal and colonial features" and henceforth it is "reducible neither to the ancient nor to the asiatic or germanic models."³⁶ Besides Arsh and Melk systems and Habus (land donated for religious or cultural purposes), a public domain (a perverted form of the primitive communal property of antiquity) developed. Half of the public domain was appropriated by the Turkish ruling aristocracy (Dey, Beys and their dependents) and worked by the neighboring tribesmen or landless peasants while the other half was conceded to the loyal bureaucracy's staff, loyal tribes which policed the countryside and levied taxes for the Bey (Maghzen tribes) and sometimes to farmers who in return paid a rent.

The internal process of social differentiation was accelerated by the Turkish policies of different tax changes and land allocation. Subsequently, the primitive forms of common labor organizations and cooperation (Asaba, Touiza*) transformed into exploitative relationships. The contracts (plowing association, farming leases, Khamessat . . .) were by no means mutually profitable since they involve a labor and product appropriation by a landed class. In this respect, the Khamessat** system provides that the five factors of production (land, team, labor, instruments and seeds) are of equal value, and henceforth the Khames receive one-fifth of the product for his labor. The Touiza becomes an indirect form of labor appropriation when it involves socially differentiated classes.

The Turkish rule did not penetrate deep into the hinterland. Aside from the cities and their immediate environments, the country was extensively under-administered. The Aroush (plural of Arsh) preversed their social and political structures. This is particularly true for the Berbers (of Aures and Kabylia), well entrenched in their mountains. The Arsh is generally run by a Djamaa, the council of the Arsh which legislates and especially arbitrates the conflicts that may arise within the Arsh.

*Touiza is a form of communal cooperation within the Arsh for activities such as house, bridge or road building and especially harvesting. Able-bodied members perform free labor on the property and are offered a meal at the end. Ashaba involves tribes of farmers and breeders and provides that the caretaker tribe receive half the lamb and wool of the herd owned by the other.

**Sharecropping of one-fifth.

The counterpart of the historical absence of a national central power was a mushrooming of regional and tribal socio-political centers. The socio-economic and political organization remained basically territorial and tribal with no or little federal relationships.³⁷ The multiple tribal revolts under the Turkish rule and during French colonization hardly ever superseded particularistic interests and went beyond the tribe's territorial bonds. Although French colonization was not confronted by an all national resistance, it faced successive and sporadic regional resistance engaged by highly cohesive and powerful tribes.

French Colonization

French capitalist expansion in Algeria confronted pre-capitalist modes (and forms) of production and their corresponding socio-political structures. To establish Algeria as a settler colony based upon a capitalist mode of production, the French settlement policy was contingent upon the destruction of the Arsh property and social structure. Land confiscation proceeded then through violent means and rebel tribesmen were uprooted and confined to unproductive and marginal lands.

Table 1
Land Confiscation

<u>Periods</u>	<u>Number of Hectares Transferred</u>
1830 - 1850	364,341
1851 - 1870	765,000
1871 - 1880	1,245,000
1881 - 1890	1,635,000
1891 - 1900	1,912,000
1901 - 1920	2,581,000
1921 - 1940	3,445,000

Source: M. Bennoune, "Algerian Peasants and National Politics," Merip, 48, 1976, p. 14.

Land laws, by introducing alienable private property both made land a freely circulating commodity, proleterianized peasants and broke down the social-economic bases of the tribe's strength and resistance. Of the destructive laws (1844-46 ordinances, the 1864 Senatus consultum and the 1873 law, amended in 1887), the 1863 Senatus consultum had the most pervasive effect in the dismantling of the socio-economic structure since it aimed at the delimitation of the tribe's territory, the break up of the tribe and the extensive introduction of the individual property among the tribesmen. As a result, 709 tribes were delimited territorially and broken up into 1,196 Douars* (between 1863 and 1938). By 1956, dismemberment affected all but eight tribes out of 801.³⁸ For example, the Haractas** tribe

*Physical territory of tribes or fractions of tribes.

**Name of a Berber tribe whose territory included a large part of Amourth.

was divided into 26 douars. In reality, douars are not homogeneous tribal fractions but encompass segments from different tribal backgrounds. Henceforth, the colonial administrative and municipal organization emerged from the disintegration of the tribe's structures.

The development of the colonial administrative network proceeded to expand and organize French colonization. The French monarchy (ord. September 28, 1847) extended the "loi municipale de 1837" to well developed settlement centers. The second republic (decree of August 16, 1848) following the 1848 constitution which declared Algeria an "integral part of the French territory," provided that all the civil territory be erected into communes. This project was realized later on by the second empire (in December 1866 and December 1868). The then military territory, which included the non-settler dominated areas, was administered by the "Bureau of Arab Affairs" headed by military officers until 1868 where they transformed into "mixed communes." The latter were artificial entities, with no cohesion nor dynamism. They included douars-communes, settler centers and later municipal centers. The "mixed communes" were administered by an administrateur helped by native assistants, caids, and a municipal commission which comprised elected European members and appointed token "muslims" (partially elected later in 1919). Alongside the "mixed communes," the "communes de plein exercice" (full communes organized after the metropolitan model) developed in settler-dominated areas and were administered for the exclusive benefit of the European minority. The native population

was granted few seats and following WWII the maximum proportion was raised to two-fifths of the council seats.³⁹

The socio-economic structures of rural Algeria were distorted and broken up following the expansion of the colonial system. A highly capitalized settler sector which covered 27 percent of the land with a farm average of 125 hectares was articulated to a deeply under-capitalized "traditional" sector located on marginal lands with farm average of 11 hectares. The development of the former accentuates the underdevelopment of the latter which constituted a large pool of cheap labor force, a source of rents and taxes. Moreover, the pauperized rural masses were refused any technical or financial assistance. In this respect, out of about 46 billion of francs of short-term credits the Algerian peasantry received in 1953, about 5.5 billion. For 1952, the "campaign credits" granted to the Algerian peasantry amounted to 16 percent of the total distributed. The "crop financing credits" averaged one percent and little or no "equipment credits" have been granted.⁴⁰ The Algerian "traditional" sector was by no means homogeneous. Colonial penetration to rural Algeria produced both a pauperized peasantry and a native big landowning class which benefited as much as the settlers from land confiscation. The following table illustrates the deep social inequalities of colonial rural Algeria (of the 1950's).

Table 2
Property Distribution

<u>Size (Hectares)</u>	<u>Number of Exploitations</u>	<u>Total/Hectares</u>	<u>% of Exploitations</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
0 -	106,000	40,000	17.0	.5
1 - 10	332,000	1,340,000	53.0	18.0
10 - 50	167,000	3,200,000	26.0	43.0
50 - 100	16,600	1,100,000	2.5	15.0
100 -	<u>8,500</u>	<u>1,700,000</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>23.5</u>
	630,000	7,380,000	100.0	100.0

Source: Le Coz, p. 13 and M. Raffinot, p. 313.

Hence, 70 percent of all exploitations cover only 18.5 percent of the total while 4 percent have 38.5 percent.

The rural bourgeoisie numbered 25,000 owners of farms of more than 50 hectares. This class--a product of capitalist expansion--was basically an absentee owner class which collaborated extensively with the colonial administration while sparing the nationalist camp by providing material support. It thus emerged intact at the independence. The middle peasantry (150,000 to 170,000 farmers owning between 10 and 50 hectares) played an important part in the liberation movement by providing most of its cadres and safeguarding features of the "Algerian personality" (tradition, Arabic language, culture, Islam . . .). The popular classes, on the other hand, included the small peasantry (owning less than 10 hectares and numbering about 450,000 peasants),

the seasonal workers (450,000 persons), the landless and unemployed rural lumpen proletariat (1,000,000 persons) and the rural proletariat (200,000 workers). Sections of the small peasantry, seasonal workers and the lumpen proletariat engage in sharecropping systems, Khames or Khaddara. These classes formed the backbone of the liberation army.

Rural Algeria was largely under-administered, especially in remote and mountainous areas where the sole contact of the local populations with the French administration was through a hated tax-hungry Bachagha or caid. During the way, the F.L.N. (National Liberation Front) established in its strongholds a substitute administration organized after the French one. The F.L.N. emphasized both the political and military dimensions of its organization. The F.L.N. was a para-military (political) organization whose function was to guide and officer the military arm, the National Liberation Army (A.L.N.). The 1956 "Soumam Congress" explicated its guidelines: primacy of the interior over the exterior and of the political over the military. But, the application of these principles experienced many "vicissitudes" due to the impossibility for the political to maintain an autonomous status within the interior which is given also the primary. Indeed, these problems resulted from the character of the struggle and the French counter-insurgency strategy. The "Challe Plan" of 1957 and the "regroupment policy"* undercut the organizational effort of the F.L.N. by depopulating rural and mountainous areas. Henceforth,

*Regroupment villages were built to isolate the liberation army and achieve other economic goals such as labor force reserve and land confiscation.

the political dimension of the F.L.N./A.L.N. was largely reduced to the guerrilla warfare and the A.L.N. outgrew the F.L.N. This process was equally strengthened by the development of the F.L.N. as a front in 1956. The F.L.N.'s program was limited to the commune goal of all tendencies (armed struggle for independence) and thus lacked a clear ideological component. Thereafter, the emergence of a political organization alongside and guiding the military arm (the A.L.N.) never occurred as in China where the Communist Party guided the liberation army and accomplished tasks of political organization and popular education.⁴¹

The F.L.N. did not fill the administrative/political vacuum and thus left the initiative for the local dominant but also patriotic classes (landlords, rural bourgeoisies) to maintain their ideological and political domination in the rural areas. This was reinforced by the fact that these classes provided most of the cadres of the A.L.N.

Colonial Legacy and Communes

At independence, Algeria inherited the colonial administrative structures without the French staff. The administrative apparatus remained a colonial administration whose structures were loose and little diversified. The staff was, however, quickly replaced. The July 19, 1962 decrees set lower recruitment criteria and promoted to higher levels "any functionary or public agent, any administratively

skilled citizen." Henceforth, many of the colonial trained Algerians of the lower categories (C and D) were promoted by default to higher categories (A and B). But, of the 59 Constantine rural communes' general secretaries, only fourteen belonged to category A, 20 to B and 25 to lower categories (C and D).⁴² Theoretically, the "anciens moudjahidine"* and other militants enjoy the privilege and priority recruitment in all categories provided a minimal level of instruction (in French) for the higher categories. The extensive illiteracy in the rural areas confined most of them to the D category and to a lesser extent to the C category. Thereafter, there was not a single general secretary in the 59 constantine rural communes coming from outside the colonial Algerian staff. This is so because most of experienced local militants were Arabic literate while French remained administrative language in the extensively illiterate rural areas. But, of forty presidents of the constantive rural communes, twenty-two were French and thirty-two were Arabic literate. The proportion of illiterate in French is actually bigger for the special commission members.⁴³ In Amourth, the French trained administrative officers occupied all higher levels of the commune's apparatus while the lowest echelon was staffed with war veterans. None of the 12 members of the 1963 "delegation speciale" knew French and had, therefore, to rely on the general secretary and other officers to run the commune's affairs.

*War veterans are included in this category, the urban guerrillas as well as the civil militants (food and medicine suppliers, intelligence . . .). These benefits were extended also to political prisoners.

No wonder as an observer of a constantine rural commune noted that "the differences in attitude, standard of living and lifestyle between the local administrators and clerks and the ruled rural population were very striking."⁴⁴ The highly cynical and petit bourgeois opportunist civil servants had no political or ideological training. Indeed, most of them were products of the "Promotion Lacoste" through which French colonialism attempted to create an intermediate bourgeois stratum between the revolutionary fraction of the F.L.N. and its more moderate but unpopular fraction. As a part of its counterinsurgency strategy, France devised a neo-colonial (economic) plan which included a limited land reform, industrialization and technical-administrative training of indigenous civil servants. The "Promotion Lacoste" civil servants were to substitute for the exclusively French administrative and managerial staff. The class loyalties of these groups (technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie), as M. Lazreg⁴⁵ commented, indeed

affect their performance as civil servants entrusted with the implementation of policies taken by the central government. The bureaucracy's resistance to policies that are deemed to limit the scope of its activity appears in the form of open opposition to the passage of laws, selective interpretations of the latter, delays of decision and/or misimplementation of socio-economic projects.

All these tendencies confirmed the analysis of the Algier's charter (1964) which warned against the bureaucratic bourgeoisie "a new stratum" which rapidly forms in the "administrative apparatus, the state and the economy," and which "by its position . . . may become

considerably more dangerous for the socialist and democratic evolution of the revolution than any other existing social force in the country" (p. 39). ⁴⁶

Traditional Social Structure

The colonization process did not integrate in its administrative system the traditional socio-political structures. Actually, it aimed at the destruction of the traditional structures through the fragmentation of the tribes and the cooptation of the Djamaa institution. This democratic institution became a fiction because of its cooptation by the French and integration of the Douar-communes into the "commune mixte" ruled by French administrators. The Djamaa was in fact replaced by a caidal system where token Algerians called Bachaghas and caids administer the rural population.

Colonization generated a traditionalization process. Parallel traditional structures maintained and even strengthened in the mountainous and remote areas. These populations continued to run their lives avoiding any contact with the French administration. The War of Liberation, in the conditions of the absence of an alternative political organization, reinforced an autarcic contraction (compression) of these populations within family and tribal traditional structures. It is well known in Amourth area that many armed clashes occurred between A.L.N. groups from different tribal backgrounds. The Commune mixte " regrouped different fractions of different tribes. The

post-independence Algerian commune was oriented toward supercession of the traditional structures by melting down the tribal divisions in one homogenous collectivity.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the "delegation speciales" membership reflected the representation of those natural collectivities by appointing a delegate for each tribe or Douar. The five douars of Amourth were represented by one or two delegates in the "delegation speciale." Moreover, a "garde champetre" (rural constable) is appointed as a liaison agent with different mechate. Factors such as material scarcity, unemployment and economic chaos in the rural areas combined with the total absence of a municipal tradition and/or a political organization contributed to a heightened factionalism. Arch politics is very strong and reflects in everyday social relations, especially in the communal elections. The arch constituted originally a fraction of a tribe, delimited territorially by its collective property "arch" lands. This fraction was fragmented following the senatus consultum policy in several patronymics (in 1890). The historical unity of the arch and the consanguineous relations weakened slowly with the dissolution of the collective property and the privatization of land ownership. This privative appropriation engendered conflicts and rivalries between different archs as well as separation between the different patronymics.

Communes and Self-Management, 1962-1965

Following independence and amidst the summer political crisis, economic and administrative chaos, the decree of March 17, 1956,

pertaining to the colonial martial law, was continued. The decree provides the appointment of "delegations speciales" (special commissions) having the same attributes as the elected municipal council. In the rural communes of the Constantine Department,* the commission members were mostly appointed by the district chief or by the A.L.N. Very few were by the F.L.N.⁴⁸ Following the administrative reform, which decreased the number of communes from 1,525 to 675 because of administration staff shortage, new "delegations specialies" were appointed in May 1963. The selection was contingent upon the three criteria of competence, honesty and national loyalty.⁴⁹ But, the recruitment was basically made within the former commissions whose members were in majority war veterans and former political prisoners. In Amourth, the first "delegation speciale" was formed of nine members mostly from the local dominant classes such as rural bourgeoisie (capitalist farmers or big breeders), construction entrepreneurship or tradesmen.** Following its dissolution in May 1963,⁵⁰ none of the members were appointed to the second "delegation speciale" which included a majority of war veterans and F.L.N. militants from middle class background, either middle peasants (owning 10 to 50 hectares) or retail tradesmen. Later in 1965, most of former A.L.N./F.L.N. militants were granted loans to establish businesses or transportation services . . .

*Department of Eastern Algeria which was divided into 8 districts and 62 communes. Amourth is located somewhere in this department.

**In reality, some of the members run two or three economic activities at the same time (for example; farmer, shopowner and transportation service owner . . .). . .

Self-Management

In a spontaneous revolutionary move, rural and urban workers established workers' self-management on some 1,200,000 hectares of fertile land and 1,000 industrial enterprises. Neither socialism nor self-management were actually parts of the official program of the F.L.N. The ideological influence of self-management socialism on some sectors of the nationalist movement (basically the workers' union - U.G.T.A. - and some militants of the F.L.N. influenced by Fanonism) came as a result of the important role played by Yugoslavia in the Algerian Liberation War both directly by its political and military support and diplomatically by its leading role within the Non-Aligned Movement. Both in its goals, as well as in its organization, the self-management movement imitated Yugoslavia's experience. The new system was institutionalized in March 1963 through the famous March Decrees. The self-management movement had strong repercussions on Algeria's ideology and politics. Commune and self-management were conceived as an integrated unit. Commune was then theoretically tightly articulated to the productive collectivities and especially self-managed farms. Henceforth, the March 22, 1963 decree made provision for the creation in every commune of a "communal council of self-management animation" formed of the presidents of self-management committees, of representatives of the party, workers' union, army and administrative authorities of the commune. This council necessarily chaired by a self-management committee president, had the important

attribution of control over the directors appointed by the state in the self-managed units, but hardly met in fact. Moreover, the F.L.N. central committee, during its June 8 - 11, 1964 meetings, provided the realization of the land reform at the communal level by communal committees of landless and poor peasants.

The social component of the communal council was, however, clearly explicited by the Algier's Charter. The Algier's Charter made the commune articulated to self-management, the essential economic, political and social Algerian institution.⁵¹ More importantly, it provided for a "particular representation of the producers (self-management and cooperative workers)" within the communal council. But, this orientation is contradicted by the heavy emphasis on the role of the state and the party despite the fact that the Algier's Charter itself clearly underlined the weaknesses of the F.L.N. and the bourgeois infiltration of the state apparatus. Moreover, this position remained theoretical insofar as it expressed the voluntaristic orientation of the F.L.N. left fraction at the top, but which did not have its autonomous organization channels to implement its program. In the Constantine department's rural communes, out of 36 communes, more than 25 had no self-management workers in their council.⁵² This holds true for Amourth which has about 70 workers in three self-managed farms, but had no working class member in its council.

Instead of an expansion of self-management to the commune, a bureaucratic excrement contained self-management. Because of its

political and social implication, self-management contradicted the dominant technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie which sought to build an all-powerful state to seat its hegemony and control the economy. Self-management not only co-existed with an intact colonial administrative apparatus but was isolated in a basically hostile environment. At the communal level, the administration and the council were controlled by the dominant classes which represented traditional social structures and which were hostile to self-management and land reform as well. Henceforth, no program of social transformation was on the agenda because of the combined effects of the unchallenged historical dominance of traditional social structures, the political disorganization of the popular rural classes and the relative weakness of a nationalistic bourgeoisie seeking to widen its internal market.

CHAPTER III

CLASS ALLIANCE (1965-1971): COMMUNE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The post-independence period (1962-1964) was characterized by a tremendous political mobilization of the popular masses which culminated in the establishment of self-management, popular militia and campaigns of national reconstruction (agriculture, tree planting . . .). Nevertheless, because of the absence of any serious political organization that channels popular energy toward practical tasks of national building (political structure, self-management, literacy program, land reform . . .), the momentum of the popular mobilization dropped little by little thus opening the way for the emergence of a coalition of the privileged classes that captured state power in June 1965 through a coup-d' etat.

National Class Alliance

The front of classes in power that emerged after 1965 included the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie (in the state apparatus such as F.L.N., government, army . . .), the technocratic petit bourgeoisie (in the public sector), the national bourgeoisie, the petit and middle bourgeoisies of the commercial sector, the middle peasantry and big landowners (until 1972) and the liberal professionals. The alliance of these classes, fractions of classes and strata materialized

both in their presence within the state power (Revolutionary Council, F.L.N. government . . .) and in developments such as containment of self-management, centralization of the state apparatus, code of investments and in the non-realization of a land reform program.⁵³

Briefly, the containment of self-management (its bureaucratization and ultimately its control) enhanced the hegemony of the technocratic petit bourgeoisie over the economy through the development of public corporations, the centralization of the state apparatus increased the political control of the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie by weakening the power of the wilayistes⁵⁴ and the local notables, the code of investments secured the development of a national industrial private sector.

Centralization of the State Apparatus and Commune

The political power or "revolutionary council" was at its beginning undermined by clan rivalries which led to a political immobilism until the civil ministries and the "wilayistes" were excluded respectively in August 1966 and December 1967.⁵⁵ The bureaucratic and technocratic petit bourgeoisie well entrenched in the state and economy and represented in the "revolutionary council" by the majority "clan d'Oudja"* initiated a process of state power centralization by the issuing of the "code communal" in 1967 and the "code de la wilaya" in 1969.

*By reference to the wartime location of Boumediene's group headquarters in Oudja, Morocco.

Commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.)

The program of administrative building intended to reform the colonial administration and to establish a "revolutionary decentralization." An elected "popular communal assembly" (A.P.C.) is entrusted to run the communal affairs and study local problems pertaining to finance, equipment and socio-cultural activities. A municipal type of socialism was evoked but with the containment and cooptation of self-management and the strictly administrative role tailored for the commune, a genuine communal political self-management was excluded. The A.P.C. action was not only restricted to problems of pure service supply such as water conveying, maintenance of public buildings and road maintenance but was tightly controlled by the Sous-prefet (district chief). In Amourth, for example, decisions such as recruitment of a school caretaker, the tax on garbage collecting, or the transfer of an amount of money as small as (\$20) from a rubric of the communal account to another requires the Sous-prefet's approval. On the other hand, important projects have to be sanctioned by the wali (department executive) and the ministry concerned. In any way, the scarce local resources keep the commune tightly dependent on the state for finances.

The "code communal"⁵⁶ provides that the selection of the candidates by the F.L.N. is determined by the following criteria: geographic

and priority representation of Travailleurs* and producers, commitment to socialist revolution, probity, perfect morality, capability, competence and dynamism. The selection proceeds from all socio-professional categories with the exclusion of: 1) those who by their authority in the army, administration, justice or security services could influence the rules of the democratic game and block the harmonious functioning of the assembly, and 2) those whose behavior or social and political situation are incompatible with socialism and revolution.

The economic representation is thus excluded because of the extensive under and unemployment. According to an observer, the "avant-project de code communal" of July 1965 which provides the election of two organs, one of which is exclusively elected by the travailleurs producteurs (direct producers) "would have accentuated the disinherited masses" character of passive citizens."⁵⁷

Elections and Social Composition of the Popular Assembly

Most of the colonial elections were fake and manipulated to sanction the selection by the French administration of token Algerians. The result was: deep suspicion of the Algerian people toward colonial elections and strong emphasis of the national movement on genuine democratic elections in independent Algeria. Since its inception, the F.L.N. referred to "popular and democratic elections" in its charters

*Travailleurs designates loosely any type of wage laborer and anyone who performs a job. It is different from ouvrier, which specifically means worker. The official definition includes in this category the employees as well as the managers and the high-ranking officials. Speaking to the nation's cadres (ministries, prefects, military officers, bureaucrats and managers), Boumediene said, "All of us are travailleurs . . ."

as a fundamental principle of the Algerian Revolution and an inalienable right of the Algerian people. At the same time, the principle of a single "parti" is proclaimed as irreversible. The conciliation between the democratic electoral process and the necessary selection of the candidates by the F.L.N. expressed in the "regle de double" which provides that the number of candidates, two-thirds of whom should be militants of the F.L.N. and/or of its mass organizations, is double the number of seats.⁵⁸ The number of communal delegates to be elected varies with the population of the commune in the following way:

<u>Population of the Commune</u>	<u>Number of Delegates</u>
1 to 5,000 inhabitants	9 members
5,001 to 10,000	11
10,001 to 20,000	15
20,001 to 40,000	21
40,001 to 100,000	29
100,00, to 200,000	39

Source: "Code Communal" in A.A.N., 1967, p. 763.

For the bigger cities, two delegates are elected for every fraction of 50,000 inhabitants.

In 1967, the average communal population was 18,000 inhabitants with more than two-thirds of the communes between 5,000 and 20,000.

<u>Population Size</u>	<u>Number of Communes</u>
0 - 5,000	38
5,000 - 10,000	209
10,000 - 20,000	275
20,000 - 40,000	113
40,000 - 100,000	34
100,000 - 200,000	4
Over 200,000	3
	<hr/> 676

Amourth had between 1967 and 1971 a population averaging 15,000 to 18,000 inhabitants. The number of delegates was 15 for the 1967-1971 and 1971-1975 terms.

The social component of the popular assembly for these two terms is shown in Table 3 and reflects an overwhelming majority of Bourgeois class elements.

Table 3
Amourth's Popular Assembly 1967-1974

<u>Class Background</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. Big landowners and breeders	4	4	8
Big Tradesmen			
2. Middle peasants and breeders	10	8	18
Middle tradesmen			
3. Traditional (small peasantry and small shopkeepers)			
4. New petit bourgeoisie (employees, teachers . . .)	1	3	4
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	15	15	30

Source: Registers of Deliberations of 1967 and 1971

Two remarks are in order here:

1. The geographic and priority representation of the travailleur-producteurs referred to in the "code communal" is totally absent since no workers nor small peasants have been elected.

2. The local notables⁵⁹ do not usually run in local elections. Beside the few who had been appointed in 1962 and 1963, there was not a single notable in the subsequent Popular Assembly. But generally, the local notables invest in their arsh members.

The determination of the social class background of the elected delegates involves many complex factors deriving from the delegates' position vis-a-vis the means of production, as well as arsh loyalties. Using the family class background as a decisive factor in the determination of the individual's class condition, several elected officials who are of a different individual class background are identified as of their family class background. For example, D.B. and M.S. (members of the 1967 Popular Assembly) who actually were respectively accounting agent and elementary school teacher were identified as falling in the "big landowners and breeders" and "big tradesmen" class following their family's class background. Similarly, M.Y., A.K. and B.T. members of the 1971 assembly were included within the big landowners and big breeders class despite their actual individual condition as elementary school teachers.

In the conditions of arsh social organization and factionalism, local politics is basically characterized by vertical cleavages which run across class lines rather than horizontal division of class conflict. Despite the continuing erosion of the arsh structure because of urbanization, emigration, increasing state intervention in local economy (public employment as well as services . . .), arsh loyalty remain a fundamental feature of local politics. This resulted essentially from the relative absence of the state and of the party in the local community's social life: no alternative economic, social and political organizations challenged decisively the existing traditional structures until recently. Thus, arsh politics as a factional conflict involves rival factions which are generally structurally similar, that is, representing similar configurations of social groups. And therefore, as H. Alavi put it, "such conflicts (. . .) do not have an ideological expression, because rival factions, or faction leaders, fight for control over resources, power and status as available within the existing framework of society rather than for changes in the social structure."⁶⁰ The geographic representation of natural communities stipulated by the communal code is translated as Amourth by the representation of the five Douars to which correspond related Aroush. This leads necessarily to arsh politics. The objective criteria of selection becomes a secondary issue beside the arsh loyalty in the inter-arsh competition. Alliances between Aroush form and arsh members are mobilized to vote for the arsh's

representatives who henceforth feel commissioned by their Arouch rather than elected by the commune's population. The arsh representation is instrumental in benefiting the arsh's mechtate (Hamlets) with equipment such as roads, schools and other facilities and providing a casual work for the arsh members. Arsh politics appear as the politics of the dominant classes to secure popular support for their representatives. Henceforth, the ultimate interests of the arsh's leading fraction are as important as the social class condition and interest of the individual delegate for the understanding of the nature of local politics and social relations. In an analogous tribal situation, Amilcar Cabral pointed out "the strong tendency (of the Fula peasants) to follow their chiefs."⁶¹ The socio-political hegemony of the dominant classes is translated in their control over the working committees set up by the communal administration. The "communal committee of direct taxes" of April 1967 was composed of 20 influential landowners and tradesmen, the party coordinator and 3 A.P.C. members. The committee appointed in April 1971 was exclusively formed of 24 landowners and tradesmen. At the same time, a committee of grievances headed by the A.P.C. president and composed of 5 tradesmen, the coordinator of the Parti and a tax comptroller, was set up. This committee supervises tax levying on real estate, commercial and agricultural activities which constitute the main source of the commune resources. The propertied classes are thus directly associated

in the control of their contribution to the commune resources. The propertyless classes are not only excluded from the management of the commune affairs but are subordinated to the dominant classes even in committees which allegedly deal exclusively with their needs. This is illustrated by the dominance of the big landowners over the "agricultural committee for loans to small farmers."

The strong grip of the local dominant classes manifest in their control of the local committees such as the "agricultural communal committee" or "direct tax committee."* These two committees have been directly dominated until 1975 by big landowners and tradesmen appointed by the A.P.C.⁶² The quantity and nature of the resources appropriated by these classes because of their position is little documented. Some factual evidence could, however, be drawn from the commune's archives as to decisions benefiting the dominant classes:

--Renting of a communal land covering 22 hectares to the president of the "Delegation Speciale" who was a big landowner and tradesman (deliberation No. 16 of November 5, 1963).

--Payment of debts amounting to 21,288.60 A.D. to X, a construction entrepreneur who was influential within the former appointed commission (deliberation No. 130 of March 15, 1966).

--Renting of an irrigated land averaging 40 hectares for 8 A.D./ha to X, influential military officer and landowner (deliberation 137 of June 5, 1966).

*Direct taxes in Algeria refers to income, agricultural taxes, business taxes, real estate taxes, as well as taxes for water, garbage collecting. . .

--"Free transfer in the interest of the commune" of a 877 square meter lot in the village center to the profit of the A.P.C. president who built private garages, storage places and house (deliberation 22 of August 22, 1968).

--"Sale by mutual agreement" of a construction lot to X, tradesman and A.P.C. member supposedly for the construction of a "useful hostel which the village lacks" (deliberation 32 of June 12, 1971). A coffee-house instead of a hostel was actually built.

--Allocation of four housing lots of 169 square meters to X, big tradesman and A.P.C. member ("Actes de vente des lots a batir" of October 1972).

Other factual evidences support the articulation of the A.P.C. members' interests and those of the private sector especially in construction entrepreneurship. Decisions of the A.P.C. tend to favor deals with the private sector to undertake public construction rather than invest in the communal enterprise. In this respect, the deliberations provide contradictory justifications for the A.P.C.'s choice. Hence, a deliberation of April 6, 1972 allocates the market of the construction of 40 rural housing units to two professional artisans from neighboring commune (home commune of the A.P.C. president) because of an alleged "absence of a local specialized manpower." Another deliberation (No. 45/74) of November 7, 1974 favored a private entrepreneur who because of "his good morality and perfect solvency would

present all required guarantees to respect the conditions agreed upon," while earlier in September 17, 1974, a deliberation (38/74) emphasized the benefits ("timewise and advantageous conditions") for the commune to realize en regie (communal enterprise) equipment works and later on November 12, 1974 another deliberation (52/74) allocated a market of five classrooms and two housing units to the municipal regie. Despite further emphasis on the benefits of the regie, markets were regularly awarded to private entrepreneurs from the A.P.C. president home commune.⁶³

The national results for the 1967 elections were not officially published. Some results of the 1971 elections show that only one-fifth of the former A.P.C. officials were re-elected and that the majority of the elected is of petit bourgeois background (teachers, small bureaucrats, small traders and middle cadres).⁶⁴ Furthermore, the results of the regional elections to the wilaya popular assembly (A.P.W.) of 1969 could provide some insight as to the selection patterns and to the social component of the elected regional bodies. In May 1969, popular assemblies were elected in 15 wilayate according to a process similar to that of the A.P.C. elections.⁶⁵ These assemblies are granted a financial and administrative autonomy, but they have only a consultative voice over the economic projects presented by the appointed representative of the central power, the wali. Unlike the communal code, which states that "the representation of a branch

of activity means the representation of the workers and not those who own the means of production (big landowners, factory owners. . .), "the wilaya charter does not exclude the representation of any socio-professional category. According to a study of the elections,⁶⁶ the main trend was toward the selection of liberal professionals, senior bureaucrats and organized politicians of the F.L.N. and A.P.C. The category "workers" was one of the least popular. A comparative (rural/urban) analysis shows that the candidates in urban areas tend to be subalterne and senior bureaucrats and liberal professionals while in rural areas candidates are mostly peasants, teachers, members of the A.P.C. and traditional notables. Senior bureaucrats and liberal professionals are favored in big cities, liberal professionals and F.L.N. officials in town and peasants and traditional notables in rural areas.

By and large, it appears that the local and regional assemblies are dominated by middle class and petit bourgeois strata. The slogan "fills d'ouvriers et de paysans" describing the social background of the candidates formulates an official ideal of social promotion but points out also the fact that neither peasant nor workers were actually themselves the candidate or the elements elected. A single wilaya (that of Tiaret) had a relatively high rate of workers' and peasants' candidacy (respectively 12 and 21 percent). Workers' candidacy was far below 10 percent in the other 14 wilayates where the highest rate reached 8 percent in Tizi Ouzou, Oran, Oasis and Sidi Bel Abbes.

The peasants' candidacy rated more than 10 percent in only five wilayates: Medea 14 percent, Tlemen and Saida 13 percent, and Batna and El Asnam 11 percent. The national percentage averaged 5 percent for workers and 8 percent for peasants.⁶⁷

The F.L.N. Party

The F.L.N. was at its inception neither a class-party nor a front: The F.L.N. was a "parti-nation" through which "the Algerian member of a nation becomes simply synonymous of frontist member of a parti." As mentioned earlier, the F.L.N. had no clear political or ideological program besides the goal of national independence. At the grass root level, the political organization and ideological education of the masses was absent. The radicalization process was henceforth hindered and the local leadership remained basically conservative. Unlike the rural workers who in a spontaneous and revolutionary move took over the settler's estates and established self-management, peasants respected private property, even that of the well-known collaborators and went back to their traditional way of life in isolated mechtate. An observer noted that "at independence, the F.L.N. was not a national political party in any sense, but a heterogeneous alliance. At the top, its leaders were coopted for their political importance, at the base it rested on local notables rather than real militants."⁶⁸ Since independence, the "party" was glorified as a historic concept susceptible to insert ruler and ruled within a

single community but yet rejected as an institution unable to concretize an economic and social project: the official discourse constantly oscillates between a negative pole made of transitory imperfections and a positive pole necessarily referring to a future construction of a strong party. But, all the attempts to rebuild the party have turned fruitless and the party remained basically an unpopular institution. At the commune level, the F.L.N. is isolated: First, its members receive less popular support than the non-F.L.N. candidates and second, when elected its militants tend to sever their relations with the party. The president's evaluation in 1967 is particularly harsh: the party became a "resettlement" place "for individuals who have nothing to do with the party."⁶⁹ As a result, the candidates lack popular support and behave as an interest group rather than representatives of the local population. In a national conference of the A.P.C. presidents of February 5, 1970, the president made a sharp critique of the A.P.C. and severely concluded: "A new A.P.C. will be elected in February next year . . . and our hope is that they will be more representative and more competent than the former ones."⁷⁰ (our emphasis)

In Amourth, the Kasma* has a membership of about 300 militants. Before 1970, there were 200. The "droit historique" (historic right) remains a decisive attribute of membership for the former militants,

*Kasma refers to the F.L.N. organization at the commune level.

war veterans and other A.L.N./F.L.N. auxiliaries. Despite the fact that most war veterans and former political prisoners were granted since 1965 privileges and loans to establish businesses, they remained by the virtue of their past, the leading force within the Kasma. It is worth noting that the latter does not devise a common tactical position for all its members to support the F.L.N. candidates during the elections: the Kasma splits basically around arsh lines in the elections.

Commune's Activities and Population's Demands

Actions and possibilities of a rural commune are quite limited by its scarce resources which essentially are from local taxes and products of the communal domain (land rents, market rights auction and communal housing rents . . .). Resources from industrial activities are not extended to rural areas which are completely deprived of small sized enterprises. Henceforth, the state provides the bulk of the commune's financial resources (Article 265 of the Communal Code) and most of the collective equipments through credits to communal equipment expenditures (D.E.C.) or rural equipment expenditures (D.E.R.). Nevertheless, credit grants are highly centralized since the programs are elaborated at the wilaya level countersigned by exterior technical services and finally sanctioned at the central level by a committee which supervises the D.E.C., D.E.R. and D.I.L. (local investment expenditures), as well as the programs of full

employment. These highly centralized procedures are intended to compensate for the technical weaknesses of the communes which tend to propose punctual projects designed to satisfy the immediate needs of the local population.

The counterpart of this, however, is the deprivation of those communes of any local initiative and the ignorance of the local population's needs on the part of the central state. Henceforth, the development of communal small enterprise is blocked and jobs are scarce for an extensively under and unemployed rural population whose only outlet is emigration to the cities or abroad. Communal jobs are both temporary and limited in number and the local administration and services which provide the only permanent jobs are overcrowded. "Chantiers de chomage"* and construction works employ temporarily few people but roulements** have to be organized to satisfy all the applicants for jobs.

The reform sought to realize a better integration of the local economic and social forces through the transformation of the social relations by making the state rather than the traditional collectivity (Douar, Arsh) the main channel of expression for these forces. But the rural commune, because of its marginal economic role, functions basically as a supplier of services, both social and administrative,

*Temporary actions such as tree planting, canal digging that provide few days or weeks of work for the local unemployed. Usually a rotation is organized to satisfy everybody.

**Rotation.

and not as an integrater of the local economic and social forces which thus remain largely localist in perspective. As long as the social and economic life of the rural population remains centered around the Mechta and the Douar which express a social reality largely marginalized and autonomous from the central state and the local administration, the "local community" and "active communal participation" defined by the "code communal" do not constitute a material reality. The Mechta and Douar form a socio-economic cell and the commune is a provider of social and administrative services.

In the conditions of extreme deprivations and tremendous social needs of the local population, the rural commune has nothing to offer beside Action de Secours, i.e., little financial support (\$10) once a year during a religious celebration and temporary work relief programs. The common opinion is that the commune is not useful if it lacks money and that the elected assembly or the administrative officials ignore rural poverty. The latter attitude is particularly true of the bureaucrats who always complain how "wicked" the peasants are but are never concerned about their pauperization. As relations with administration intensified following the centralization of the state apparatus, rural population's dissatisfaction with the commune parallely increased because of the red tape. Numerous official papers are required for everything* and most of them cost money

*The reasons are twofold: First, Algeria's administration was organized after the heavy bureaucratic French model and second, the local administration served as an all pervasive means of control over any activity of the local population.

except the birth certificate and "family card." However, the communal clerks have even managed to charge the peasants for this since the acquisition of these official documents takes time: a long wait in the queue to submit the application and 24 to 48 hours to get it. Both by its functions and the means used, the bureaucratic administration appears as foreign to the local population. To administer an extensively illiterate population, the communal bureaucracy uses written communication in French and requires numerous official papers which have expiration dates.

Agricultural Policy and Peasantry

Following independence, rural workers and poor peasants (seasonal workers) took over the vacant farms of the settlers and the Algerian collaborators. These classes exhibited a high socio-political maturity and initiative which, despite crucial shortage of means of production and technical expertise, contributed largely to avoid an economic chaos in post independence Algeria. Nevertheless, no land reform program was applied and the popular offensive was blocked because of a set of factors of which the landowning class domination over the state power and the political subordination of the peasantry are the most important.⁷¹ First, the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie of certain sectors of the newly enriched petit bourgeoisie and especially of the big landowning class linked together in family and business networks who infiltrated the state power and the

administration managed to hinder the initiatives of the masses. As a result, self-management was contained and land reform programs were shelved. Second, the peasantry was not able to exert a sufficient political pressure to achieve its demands because of the absence of an autonomous organization. In contrast to the working class (U.G.T.A.), tradesmen (U.G.C.A.), students (U.G.E.M.A.), which organized in autonomous trade-unions, the peasantry was massively mobilized within the A.L.N./F.L.N. structures. Henceforth, most of the peasant cadres either were killed or moved to the urban centers. The observation⁷² about yet another rural community that the loss of peasant experienced organizers and political leaders was strongly felt by the devastated local communities, is equally valid for Amourth which suffered the loss of popular leaders such as A.R. and B.M.

Despite numerous promises of land reform since 1956 (Soummam Congress of the F.L.N.), no decision was taken until November 1971. The agrarian structure remained unchanged despite the fact that the Algerian peasantry formed the backbone of the Liberation Army, that more than 65 percent of the population was rural, that the rural social inequalities deepened and that unemployment and underemployment hit at least two out of three rurals.⁷³

Agrarian Structure

The agrarian structure was characterized by a combination of four farms and/or modes of production: The self-management form of

production, the capitalist mode of production, precapitalist forms and independent middle peasant form . . .

The Algerian agrarian population is thus by no means a homogeneous entity. By the mid- 1960's it comprised the following rural classes:⁷⁴

--The rural bourgeoisie which owned farms over 50 hectares and numbered 25,000 farmers. This class includes absentee owners and capitalist farmers.

--The middle peasantry which numbered 150,000 farmers owning 10 to 50 hectares and included potentially capitalist farmers using seasonal labor, as well as small farmers.

--The poor peasantry including owners of less than 10 hectares, metayers and Khammessa (sharecropping of one-fifth) and which numbered about 650,000 elements and performed seasonal work in the self-management and private sectors (about 200,000).

--The proletariat which numbered about 150,000 in the self-management farm and about 75,000 in the private sector.

--The lumpen proletariat (landless and jobless rurals) numbering about 620,000 elements.

The agrarian structure was characterized by striking inequalities since 3 percent of farmers owned more than 25 percent of the land while 72 percent had farms of less than one hectare and by an extensive unemployment and underemployment since 50 percent of the active population were either unemployed or underemployed.

The relative stability of the polarized agrarian structure is explained by several factors of which emigration, traditional structures and state intervention. Migration to France provided historically the main outlet to an acute poverty. Close to half of the rural population depended on emigrants' remittances for survival in the mid-1970's according to an Algerian estimate.⁷⁵

Of critical importance are the complex social relations which mask the class contradictions. This is related to Arsh structure where the ideological representations are still influenced by ancient communal relations such as the Touiza and the important tribal and religious relations. Some observers noted that all classes may be represented in a single extended family and that tribal loyalties lead to behaviors contradictory to class oppositions.⁷⁶ These complex relations helped the big landowners protect themselves against the risk of a land reform program by resorting to various dodges such as fragmentation of holdings and illegal distribution of property titles among numerous relatives. Henceforth, the number of farmers owning over 100 hectares dropped from 8,488 in 1962 to 4,659 in 1968. In Amourth, fictitious indivision of property was used extensively to hide the land concentration. The analysis of 469 property declarations shows that many properties were claimed indivisible and collectively owned while they were actually individual private properties. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the number of indivisaires (owners of

indivisible property) tends to increase parallely to the size of the property (Table 4).

At the same time, the nature of the activity of the indivisaires suggests that the indivisaires of the property over 20 hectares tend to perform non-agricultural activities (29.6 percent) and to include more children and women as compared with the indivisaires of the

Table 4
Number of Indivisaires per Property

<u>Size (Hectares)</u>	<u>A Number of Properties</u>	<u>B Number of Indivisaires</u>	<u>$\frac{B}{A}$</u>
0 - 5	158	203	1.72
5 - 10	57	178	3.12
10 - 20	100	333	3.33
20 - 40	112	396	3.53
40 - 80	42	192	4.57
80 - 160	27	126	4.66
160 - 320	11	65	5.90
Over 320	<u>2</u>	<u>23</u>	11.50
	509	1,516	

properties below 20 hectares who are active in agriculture (68 percent) and less active in non-agricultural sectors (18.5 percent).

This is illustrated by the following table:

Table 5
Activity of Indivisaires

<u>Size of Property</u>	<u>Agricultural Activity</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Non-Agricultural Activity</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Non-Active*</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total</u>
0 - 5	156		22		25		
5 - 10	118	68.0	36	18.5	24	13.5	100%
10 - 20	211		74		48		
20 - 40	204		121		71		
40 - 80	118		54		20		
80 - 160	72	54.6	32	29.6	16	15.7	100%
160 - 320	33		19		13		
Over 320	11		6		6		

Source: Archives of Agricultural Census (1973) of Amourth.

*It is worth noting that children and women form only 17 percent of the non-active indivisaires of the below 20 hectares properties while they form 67 percent of the non-active indivisaires of the over 20 hectares properties.

A typical example is that of B.R. who owns 344.66 hectares of an indivisible property with 13 co-proprietors of whom four children, two students, five functionaries and only one farmer.

State Intervention in the "Traditional" Sector

Agriculture, in the Algerian strategy of development, was deemed a secondary sector. This reflected essentially the nature of the

classes in power: an industrialist petit bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie which sought to build a strong industrial economy on the one hand and a backward landowning class whose interest in the preservation of the rural status quo. The agricultural policy thus intended to maintain the agrarian structure unchanged and used the agricultural credit as the economic lever which par excellence "contributes to engage efficiently the process of development of this (traditional) sector."⁷⁷

The development of an agrarian capitalism was blocked because of a set of factors. First, the landowning class includes a large number of absentee owners whose annual rents (averaging 200-million of A.D.) were either unproductively consumed or invested in the tertiary sector.⁷⁸ Second, state assistance to the traditional sector was partly used in speculative activities such as livestock breeding rather than in long-term investments to increase agriculture productivity. Third, state control over the prices of agricultural products, set at a very low level, over the agricultural wage (S.M.A.G.) and over the supply of the means of production smoothed the spontaneous workings of capitalist farming. This resulted in a relative absence of internal dynamic and a slow development of capitalist farming which seemingly accelerated in the late 1960's. The "Kulakization" process which the state assistance contributed to through credits and loans ended brutally with the launching of the 1971 land reform program.

Financial and Technical Assistance

Between 1962 and 1965, the state's agricultural effort was practically absorbed by the self-management sector. Small amounts (30-million of Algerian Dinars/year) were allocated to the private sector until 1966. Since 1966, the amount of credits tripled and measures such as tax exemption, debt cancellation and supply of selected seeds were taken in favor of the Petits Fellahs (small peasants). This program intended to minimize the hardships of the small peasantry but had in fact very limited effects since only 15,800 farmers in 1966 and a little over 20,000 in 1967 benefited from it.⁷⁹ But, within the conditions of the national alliance between the bureaucratic-technocratic petit bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the big landowning class, the credits served essentially the interests of the rural bourgeoisie. The "equipment loans" functioned as a classical banking credit, i.e., they were granted only to those who offer guarantees of reimbursement. Moreover, the definition of the "small farmer of the traditional sector" was not clearly specified and was left to the appreciation of the local authorities as well as to the administrative committee of the Societe' Agricole de Prevoyance.*

Until 1970, most of the credit was used as follows:

*S.A.P. were agricultural cooperatives inherited from colonization. Following the launching of the A.R., the S.A.P. was integrated to the CAPCS, i.e., multi-purpose communal agricultural cooperative.

--Loans to middle and big owners who developed speculative livestock raising.

--Acquisition of agricultural machinery by private farmers who established enterprises of agricultural works.

--Division of credits to non-agricultural purposes because of the non-control of the loan use.

--Use by the marginal exploitations to non-agricultural expenditures.

According to an observer, these loans contributed essentially to the mechanization of the middle-sized farms (20 to 50 hectares).⁸⁰ This is confirmed by the general development of the medium and large farms which acquired many tractors. The number of tractors in the private sector increased from 15,000 in 1965 to 24,000 in 1970.⁸¹

Table 6
Equipment Loans to the
"Traditional" Sector 1966-73
(in 000 of Algerian Dinars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Credit Expected	120,000	115,000	118,000	110,000	90,000	60,000	40,000	60,000
Credit Consumer	84,974	112,983	109,965	102,138	54,015	45,399	22,526	12,244
% Consumed Expected	74%	98%	93%	92%	60%	75%	56%	20%

Source: SAP and BNA (quoted in A.A.N., 1975, p. 138).

Furthermore, the agrarian bourgeoisie development is illustrated by its share in milk production. While the "traditional" sector produced

in 1970, about 1.2 million of hectoliters of milk with 300,000 cows, the agrarian bourgeoisie produced about 1.8 million with only 47,500 cows.⁸²

The brutal drop of the credits consumed since 1970 was beside other factors* due to a more precise definition of the recipient (the small farmer). This was followed first by a restriction of loans corresponding to what could really be invested by a small farm and second by a quick decline of the credit consumption. The latter tendency confirms the hypothesis that before 1970-71, the credits were monopolized by the "middle" farmers rather than by the rightful recipients.

Local Peasantry and State Assistance

We have established earlier the dominance of the local bourgeoisies over the communal institutions, especially the A.P.C. By virtue of their economic position and control over local institutions, the rural dominant classes yield most of the resources allocated to the local "traditional" sector by the state.

The Communal Agricultural Committees

These committees are appointed by the executive of the A.P.C. They are generally formed of the A.P.C. president, the S.A.P. director,

*The A.R. generated a brutal drop of the investment in the private sector. See A. Benachenhou in Revue des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques, No. 3, September 1973, p. 634.

the coordinator of the Parti (Kasma), a rural constable and three or four big landowners. The small peasants are excluded. Two of the regular members of these committees are E.A. and S.H. who respectively own 261 and 139 hectares. Sometimes the secretary of the local workers' union (UGTA) is appointed to this committee. Until 1967, the secretary was a propertied travailleur who owned a mechanics garage and a shop. Later on, it was headed by commune employee from a wealthy landowning family. The communal committee studies the applicant's situation and decides the nature and amount of assistance to be granted.

Henceforth, because the credit grant is left to the appreciation of the local committees dominated by the rural bourgeoisies and because the small peasantry is excluded from the decision-making, the credit allegedly granted to the small farmers is, in fact, monopolized by the local dominant classes. Neither the structures (S.A.P.) nor the grant procedures were adapted to the needs of the small peasantry which could not effectively benefit from the credits to develop their farming methods.

Credit and Recipients

Until 1973, the credit was handled by the heavily bureaucratic and ill adapted Societe' Agricole de Prevoyance which was established to meet the requirements of capitalist farming in colonial Algeria. The S.A.P. did not experience any reform, rather the same procedures

were applied indiscriminately to the new social reality composed of several social classes. While the rural bourgeoisies replaced the settlers for the credit grants, the small peasantry remained outside the circuit because of the maintenance of the financial solvency procedure.*

Table 7
Amount of Credit for Amourth

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount in A.D.</u> (\$ = 3.92 Algerian Dinars in 1978)
1968/1969	1,787,558.95
1969/1970	3,023,494.00
1970/1971	600,000.00
1971/1972	1,999,900.00
1972/1973	975,000.00
1973/1974	752,600.00
1974/1975	404,850.86
1975/1976	1,825,706.95

Source: B.N.A. (District Branch).

Of these credits, the small peasantry receives a small amount which consists of little cash and essentially of credits for seeds. Fewer than 500 small peasants out of a couple of thousands were adherers to the S.A.P. and receive an average of five to six quintal of seeds per person and fewer of these recipients were provided with a complete credit for the different agricultural operations such as

*Until 1975, the interest for the short-term credits was 6.38 per cent.

seeds, plough and harvest . . . Although the exact amount of credits distributed to the different rural social classes is not available,⁸³ a rough appreciation could be made from the apportionment of the credits for 1968-1969 and 1969-1970.

Table 8
Distribution of Credits into Categories

<u>Categories</u>	<u>1968/69</u>	<u>1969/70</u>
Seeds	1,050,397.52	1,020,440.00
Plough		422,710.00
Fertilizers	737,161.43	2,964.00

Several explanatory remarks are necessary:

1. As far as the category "seeds" is concerned, about 20,333 quintals (of wheat and barley) were distributed. The 500 small farms of less than 20 hectares could absorb at most 10,000 quintals if those farms average 20 hectares and are granted 20 quintals of seeds (first hypothesis). The 500 farmers get six quintal per person as mentioned earlier, i.e., a total of 3,000 quintal (second hypothesis). In either case, the middle and big landowners receive most of the "seeds."

2. Fertilizers are not utilized by the small peasants. This is illustrated by the fact that at the national level only 9.26 percent of all farmers owning below 10 hectares use fertilizers as compared with 21.87 percent of farmers owning over 100 hectares.⁸⁴ Moreover, this is supported by the fact that locally none of the 600 small

peasants adheres of the C.A.P.C.S. since 1974-1975 used fertilizers despite their availability and cheapness as compared to 1968-1969 period. This is because the small peasants are not trained in fertilizer use. The traditional view was that the fertilizers "burn" the land and seeds.

3. Agricultural machinery is not used by the small peasants for the ploughing operation for two sets of reasons: first, for the S.A.P. mechanical ploughing of the tiny plots is not efficient especially if they are scattered on a large area since this requires time and money (fuel and wages) or location on stony or mountainous lands. Second, for the small peasants mechanization is expensive since the costs per hectare are larger than the average yield which is about seven quintal in northern Algeria.

We must conclude that all and by and large most, of the credits were consumed by the middle and big landowners who control the institutions, are financially solvent and whose properties are adapted to mechanized farming. A comparative analysis of the C.A.P.C.S.* action for 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 further support the hypothesis that the credits were monopolized by some other recipients.

*C.A.P.C.S. cooperative of commercialization and services established within the framework of the A.R. to replace the S.A.P. and provide services for the socialist sector, the A.R. sector as well as for the individual private sector. An agency of the national bank located within the CAPCS handled the credits since 1974-1975.

Table 9
Seeds Credits to Small Peasants 1974/75 and 1975/76

Year	Number of Recipients	Amount of Credis (in A.D.)
1974/75	612	205,250.86
1975/76	702	347,974.50

Source: C.A.P.C.S. of Amourth

This means that despite a smaller amount of credit⁸⁵ (compare these amounts to the 1968/1969 and 1969/1970 seeds credits mentioned supra), the C.A.P.C.S. provides assistance for more peasants (612 and 702 as compared to fewer than 500.)

Types of Credit Use

The distribution of the credits at the national level was as follows for the period 1966-1973:

Means of production	25%
Livestock	52%
Hydraulic	20%
Fruit tree plants	2%
Building of exploitation	1%

This distribution suggests a strong tendency toward speculative agricultural activity, i.e., livestock raising and establishment of agricultural work enterprises (machinery for rent . . .). Long-term productive investments such as hydraulic, tree plants and other land

improvement or farming facilities (buildings) types of investments are of secondary importance. This tendency is more characteristic of the privileged classes for the following reasons: First, despite the fact that between 1965 and 1970, the number of tractors in the private sector increased from 15,000 to 24,000, a little more than 55 percent of the small peasantry owning less than 10 hectares utilized animal traction and only 18.02 percent utilized mechanic traction.⁸⁶ Second, extensive livestock raising requires a large capital in terms of farm building facilities, pasture resources, livestock food and transportation. This category--livestock--which includes mainly cattle raising for milk and meat production involves capital intensive farming techniques that small peasants are deprived of.

Credit use at Amourth exhibited generally a similar tendency although other types of use were frequent also. Solvent individual farmers were granted equipment loans to mechanize their farms as well as selected seeds and heads of livestock. On the other hand, cooperatives of privates which mushroomed following the credit reform in 1970 received large amounts of credits since no limitation on loans is set when the borrower is a "regularly constituted cooperative." Only few "cooperatives" grouping middle and big landowners and local bureaucrats* developed cattle raising and livestock breeding while no cooperative of small peasants existed.

*Party officials, officials of the war veteran organization and of A.P.C.

The criterion of solvency and the bureaucratic procedures operated a social selection by exclusion of the small peasants although the criterion of solvency is de facto non-operative since the credits granted from 1968 to 1973 were not reimbursed (except for the 1969/1970 where one-third only was reimbursed.) The small peasantry, on the other hand, conceives of the credit it receives (seeds credits essentially) as a social aid rather than as an economic assistance. Perceived as a social aid, the selected seeds were generally consumed since according to them the sowing of grains of such a quality with no technical assistance is pure waste. The financial assistance (in cash) is not used productively (productive consumption) but consumed by the household (reproductive expenditures) during the dead seasons.

Thus, despite a pervasive populist rhetorics, the bloc of classes in power blocked any prospect of rural change until 1971. The agricultural policy (financing, technical assistance, equipment) and the agrarian status quo benefited the big landowning classes. The result was: regression of the agricultural sector, increasing pauperization of the rural popular classes, rapid social differentiation and dominance of the big landowning class over the local institutions and administration.

CHAPTER III

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION: CLASS STRUGGLE AND COMMUNE

The status quo which characterized the agrarian structure expressed a compromise between the different social forces exercising power. This heterogeneous class alliance was undermined by contradictory interests of the petit bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie and the big landowning class as the development program initiated by the former classes clashed with the backward agrarian structures which formed the socio-economic foundation of the latter class.

Industrial Program (1967-1971)

In the Algerian developmental strategy, industrialization was deemed a remedy for the country's underdevelopment problems. The program was initiated by an extensive policy of nationalizations of the most advanced sectors of the economy (banking, foreign trade, natural resources). The public control of the economy provided the Algerian state with means of a centrally planned strategy of development aimed at an "integrated development" breaking with the forms of labor division imposed by imperialism and at initiating the passage from a colonial economy to a national, independent, and modern economy.

This strategy is based on the development model through "industrializing industries" formulated by G. Destannes de Bernis.⁸⁷ According

to G. D. de Bernis, the "industrializing industries" constitute the main force of the advanced capitalist countries and the necessary foundation of any development policy.⁸⁸ From the historical development of advanced capitalist countries and notably by analyzing the decisive role of the steel and energy sectors and their transformation by modern industries (chemistry, electronics . . .), G. D. de Bernis draws two important conclusions that he applies to "underdeveloped countries": 1) A fundamental condition of industrializing industries is to supply the industrializing economy with its product. One cannot develop without inward orientation of industries more often outward oriented. 2) The industrializing countries cannot catch up with the advanced ones which started their industrialization a century ago, unless they skip a certain number of stages and adopt the most advanced processes of production.

Hence, these conditions lead to privileging industries characterized by their large size and their high capitalistic level, utilizing the most sophisticated technology and producing means of production. According to this model, however, the large size of such activities and the "integration" sought supposes a regional development policy. Finally, agriculture is strictly dependent, as an outlet and source of accumulation, on the industrializing industries development.⁸⁹

The industrialist strategy led to a spectacular economic growth. The immediate objectives of the economic planning were globally reached.

The national control over resources has been reinforced and the global investment increased from 12 percent to 30 percent between the pre-plan (67-69) and the first plan (69-73), reached 49 percent in 1976, and 57.84 percent in 1977.

INVESTMENTS 1967-77 (In Million of D.A.)

Pre-Plan 67-69	First Plan (69-73)	Second Plan (74-77)
11,081	27,000	110,000

The realization of the objectives was 82 percent for the pre-plan (including an overcost of threefold for industry and two-fold for housing), around 90 percent for the first plan with a total investment of 34,846 million of Algerian Dinars (instead of 27,000) and the second plan totalled 106,398 million of A.D. of investments. The industrialist orientation of the development planning reflects in the sectoral allocation of investments:

	<u>Pre-Plan</u>	<u>1st Plan</u>	<u>Second Plan*</u>
Agricultural Investment	17.9%	14%	7.3%
Industrial Investment	51.3%	51.5%	51.7%

*These are the revised rates after two years of application (initial rates were 10.9% and 43.5%).

The allocation of industrial investments privileged hydrocarbons and petro-chemistry branch which absorbed 51 percent during the

pre-plan, 42.2 percent during the first plan and "a little half" during the second plan. The development policy led to the emergence of industrial nucleus such as steel industry in Annaba, mechanical industries in Constantine and Rouiba, petro-chemistry in Skikda and Arzew and electrical industries in Tiziouzo and Sidi Bel Abbes. In quantitative terms, about 420 realizations of which 270 factories and 150 infra-structural works entered in activity between 1971 and 1977. Five hundred other projects concerning 350 factories were realized between 1973 and 1977. Production reached 400,000 tons of steel, 400,000 bicycles and motorcycles, 3,000 tractors and some other agricultural material, 500,000 tons of fertilizers, 100,000 tons of petro-chemical and plastic products, 6,000 trucks (or one-third of Algeria's needs).⁹⁰ The number of industrial jobs increased from 164,350 in 1966 to 563,800 in 1977.⁹¹

The industrialist strategy runs into critical contradictions among which are persistent unemployment and underemployment, persistent regional and sectoral inequalities and deepening social inequalities.⁹² These are, however, effects of the main contradiction, i.e., the lag between industrial growth and stagnation/regression of agriculture which led to a critical slowdown of industrial growth.

The "industrializing industries" could not engender an inward oriented national development unless the manufactured products find

a local outlet. G. D. de Bernis, the theorist of the Algerian strategy who pointed out in 1970 the constraints of the ideal model which is fundamentally based on the internal dynamism of the relations between agriculture and industries, denounced the regression of Algerian agriculture and concluded:

If this situation (regression of agriculture) evolves still more, it is excluded that agriculture will become the expected outlet of industry (our emphasis). Industrialization is (thus) questioned in its orientation and in the only single logic it could be conceived in. The recourse to exportation--if possible but most probably unlikely--will save in part the functioning of the (industrial) complexes but the big construction of independence will be shattered to its foundation.

In this respect, there was an important discrepancy between production of the newly built complexes and the demand of industrial inputs by agriculture. In the case of fertilizers while consumption averaged 102,000 tons in 1970-1971, objectives were twice the volume (213,000 tons). For 1972-1973, about 450,000 were to be consumed. At the same time, only the self-managed sector absorbed this production:

<u>1970-1971</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Consumption of Fertilizers</u>
Self-managed Sector	27%	94.3%
Private Sector	73%	5.7%

The same problem faced the tractor complex whose production could not be consumed since the self-managed sector was already mechanized (in 1969 it has half the 50,000 tractors in agriculture), and other production such as pumps and vanes. Bottlenecks appeared in light

industries sector as well. For example, the shoe industry which grew rapidly since the beginning of 1970, witnessed a slowdown due to problems of insufficient demand.⁹³ On the other hand, while the narrowness of the rural market blocked the industrial growth, the stagnating agricultural production affected adversely the dynamic food industry branch.

Moreover, the food imports and subsidies to consumption of agricultural products constituted a heavy burden (20 to 25 percent of oil revenues since 1974) which cut sharply into development plans. The solution to the contradiction (industry/agriculture) could only proceed along two possible paths: either renounce the building of a national independent economy and engage in an outward-oriented industrial growth, i.e., a neo-colonial solution or deepen the anti-imperialist struggle through the transformation of the agrarian structures inherited from colonial capitalism. But either orientation is contingent upon the balance of forces within the bloc of classes in power and has critical implications as to the material foundations of these classes.

The neo-colonial solution developed in social formations where the big landowning class and the campradore bourgeoisie had historically a hegemonic position as in Morocco and Tunisia. In Algeria, however, the conditions of settler colonialism and the revolutionary decolonization (War of liberation, self-management, and nationalization

of foreign trade) curtailed the strength of these classes. The landowning class did not hold a dominant position within the bloc of classes in power to initiate a neo-colonial development. The proponents of the second path progressively constituted a large front which included; the poor peasantry, the national bourgeoisie, the technocratic-bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie and the working class. These classes have heterogeneous interests--the poor peasantry wants land, the national bourgeoisie intends to widen its market, the working class (at least its most conscious fraction) sees in the liquidation of the big landowning class a step toward the elimination of labor exploitation, the petit bourgeoisie (at least its nationalist wing) aims at reinforcing the anti-imperialist state capitalism--but converged toward the elimination of the big landowning class. Nevertheless, the pro-land reform classes have diverging political perspectives as to the magnitude of the land reform, the nature of the social agents of change and the ways to initiate change.

The Agrarian Revolution: Goals and Results⁹⁴

The agrarian revolution charter (November 8, 1971) intended to carry out a global modernization of rural Algeria through the elimination of the latifundium, homogeneization of the legal statuses of landownership by instituting a single type of private property, mechanization of agriculture, absorption of rural unemployment and underemployment, improvement of the rural standard of living and

political and administrative integration of the marginalized peasantry to the existing national institutions.

The program was divided into three phases. The first phase concerns arable communal and state lands which had been previously leased to private farmers and used for pasture; the second phase concerns the absentee landowners by nationalizing the properties over 5 hectares and the resident big landlords by restricting their properties to a manageable size; the third phase concerns livestock breeding by limiting the flock ownership to 300 heads per breeder.* The recipient peasants were to organize in cooperatives while the small landowning peasants could voluntarily join existing cooperatives or establish their own cooperatives.** The production cooperatives in a commune were grouped into a marketing and service cooperative which provides them with machinery, seeds, fertilizer, other services such as repair and transportation and also markets their production.'

The charter used two criteria--size of the property and absence/presence of the owner--to determine the rural stratification. Four categories were thus identified: 1) absentee owners, 2) big land-owning class, 3) small peasantry and 4) landless peasantry. While the absentee owners' property is nationalized, the big landlords'

*and 450 if the household has 2 or more dependent children.

**There are two types of cooperatives: 1) Pre-cooperative associations such as G.M.V. (development groups) and G.A.I. (cooperative of Individuaires), G.E.P. (association of peasant mutual aid) and 2) cooperatives such as C.E.C. (cooperative of joint exploitation) and C.A.P.R.A. (production cooperative).

property is limited but the means of production are not nationalized. The criteria of limitation--because of the regional difference in agricultural productivity was based not on the size but on the potential income which should be equivalent to threefold the income of a permanent worker laboring in a self-managed farm.* The size of the property could reach 150 percent of the ceiling size when the household has dependent children.⁹⁵

The number of nationalized and restricted properties varies from one estimate to another. The official figure put it at 17,000 properties nationalized from absentee owners and 5,000 partially nationalized from big landlords. The total land size was estimated at 632,000 hectares and 769,000 palm trees. These results are quite limited compared to an initial survey which predicted much higher figures for absentee owners (34,096) and potentially limitable properties (25,904). All in all, out of about 930,000 families who could qualify for the Agrarian Revolution, a maximum of 150,000 are expected to benefit actually. In Amourth, the results were as follows:

Table 10
Agrarian Revolution in Amourth

<u>Phase**</u>	<u>Land Size (in Hectares)</u>	<u>Number of Recipients</u>	<u>Number of Cooperatives</u>
First Phase	4,184	149	7
Second Phase	<u>3,490</u>	<u>201</u>	<u>14</u>
	7,674	350	21

*A ceiling size corresponding to three times the income of a self-management worker is thus determined for each region.

**The third phase is allocated an area of about 26,427 hectares.

but of 1,050 applicants only 350 peasants were allotted an A.R. share. As far as the second phase is concerned, three big landowners had their properties limited to 105 hectares and 95 properties (5,130 hectares) of absentee owners had been nationalized. The total figure of expropriated land averages 5,594.46 hectares. The national Agrarian Revolution sector comprised (after achievement of the first and second phase) one-third of the cultivated area in the private sector and about one-tenth of the active rural population. This indicates the magnitude of the process of relation production transformation that lies ahead of the A.R. program, beside the technical problems, social resistance and political opposition that confronted its unfolding.

Agrarian Revolution and Class Struggle

The land reform decision was not generated by pressure from a heightened rural class struggle between the poor peasants and the land-owning class, for class conflicts were beclouded by perverted forms of communalism, strong tribal relations and traditional folk religion ideology. Basically, the decision was to solve the contradiction of the development program rapid industrialization/stagnating agriculture which tended to block the economic expansion of the petit bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. It could be characterized as a "revolution from above decided basically by the petit bourgeoisie. This has far reaching implications as to the nature of the process of change. Briefly it means: First that the process affects the "top" (state power,

apparatus . . .) followed by repercussions at the grassroot level. The rhythm of local change is contingent upon the degree of organization and mobilization of the poor peasants and strength of the landowning class. Second, the ideological and political content of the charter as well as the means used to carry out the A.R. program bear the imprint of the petit bourgeoisie which is by its very nature politically inconsistent.

The Petit Bourgeoisie

A few remarks are in order here as to the characteristics of the petit bourgeoisie. In Marxism, the petit bourgeoisie referred historically to the pre-capitalist forms of small commodity production and circulation. This class is in process of extinction (proletarianization) with the expansion of capitalism in the pre-capitalist sectors. This class is called in contemporary Marxism the traditional petit bourgeoisie to distinguish it from "the new petit bourgeoisie," that is the different social strata such as technocrats, bureaucrats, service employees, professionals, intellectuals . . . which developed with the expansion of capitalism. Some theorists, like Nicos Poulantzas, subsume the "traditional" and "new" petit bourgeoisie in one single class because of some formal political and ideological similarities.⁹⁶ Obviously, two different social groupings structurally located in two different modes of production could not be simply grouped in one class.

Erik O. Wright⁹⁷ developed the concept of contradictory locations (between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie) to characterize the "new petit bourgeoisie" which thus is not a fraction of the petit bourgeoisie. The latter refers exclusively to the pre-capitalist small commodity production and circulation. The error is not whether to call these different social groupings "new" or "traditional" petit bourgeoisie although this may induce some confusion but to subsume them in one single class.

The "traditional" and "new" petit bourgeoisie played a dominant role in Algeria's politics. There was a historical continuity of the dominance of the traditional and new petit bourgeoisies from the leadership of the national movement to the hegemony over the post-independence Algerian state. Moreover, the industrialist/modernist strategy and the emphasis on technical expertise and economism that accompanied it tended to operate a heavy recruitment from the new petit bourgeoisie to decision-making positions. Although members of the state power include traditional petit bourgeois (small traders . . .), it is basically composed of new petit bourgeois members who control the state apparatus and economic institutions. The new petit bourgeois fractions (technocrats, bureaucrats, army officers, intellectuals . . .) do not constitute a politically homogeneous entity. It is divided into two political fractions: a nationalist-populist wing whose core elements were self defined in the 1976 National Charter as "the

revolutionary partriotic elements" (p. 36) and a liberal wing formed of elements who entertain close relations with the national bourgeoisie, the landowning class and compradore elements. Because of its economic and social position, the petit bourgeoisie necessarily oscillates between the main antagonist classes (proletariat/bourgeoisie) and does not have an independent consistent class project.⁹⁸ This is true, however, only when the social contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat polarize the social formation as it happened in Cuba and in Yemen where the petit bourgeoisie was absorbed in a proletarian project or in Egypt where it finally fell to the bourgeoisie. In Algeria, the non-generalization of the class conflicts resulted in a large (relative) autonomy of the state power which gave the petit bourgeoisie a great margin of maneuver vis a vis the main contending classes. Henceforth, despite concessions to both the bourgeoisie and the laboring classes, the petit bourgeoisie still maintains a large class autonomy.⁹⁹ As a result, the petit bourgeoisie's theory and practice manifested in the content of the charter (economist/technicist), the nature of the agents of change (bureaucracy) and ideology of change (national solidarity).

Agrarian Revolution and Ideology

The modernist-technicist ideology which pervades the theory and practice of the hegemonic bureaucratic and technicratic petit bourgeoisie rests on the technocratic myth that modern techniques

and technology constitute the solution to any social problem and lead to socialism--a technocratic socialism. Henceforth, socialism is deprived of its social content and of the social contradictions that accompany it and the socialist project appears illusive in its projected ends (social justice, national solidarity . . .) as well as in its means, i.e., transformation of the production relations and producers' control.

The petit bourgeoisie negates class contradictions and makes the national revolution for the benefit of all classes. The Agrarian Revolution is deemed a national task of solidarity between the landed classes and the landless peasants: the landowning classes were called upon to donate some of their lands. The notables of the regime started the solidarity campaign by giving away their lands following the President's speech (January 21, 1972): donations came from personalities like Zohra Bitat, Belaid Abdesslam, Belhouchet and some 150 officers and non-commissioned officers of the National Popular Army (A.N.P.). By June 1975, 2,500 donations totaling 81,000 hectares were recorded.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the landowning class did not participate massively in the campaign and openly resisted the program. Despite the overt class conflict, the official ideology emphasized that "it did not intend to create class conflicts . . .[and] did not want to pinpoint the enemies of the Revolution as it had been done in other revolutions."¹⁰¹ Developing this idea on many occasions, the President stated on July 2, 1973 that:

one of the great victories of our socialist revolution is certainly the Agrarian Revolution . . . Numerous countries have accomplished land reforms resorting often to force and violence. In the opposite, the A.R. in our country advances and progresses and is being applied on the basis of solidarity between all citizens . . . Thus all citizens have understood that they have a common future and that Algeria should advance as a nation and a whole and not as classes or individuals or groups. The A.R. is a revolution of solidarity and not a revolution of revenge.

Agents of Change: The Bureaucracy

Negating class conflicts and substituting for the concerned classes (poor and landless peasants) to undertake the Agrarian Revolution program, the dominant petit bourgeoisie avoided very carefully the mobilization of the poor peasantry and emphasized the role of the bureaucracy: state apparatus and army. The content of the ordinance of the A.R. explicitly stresses the role of the state. The articles of the ordinance 5 through 12 start as follows: the state allocates, the state favors, the state insures, the state guarantees, the state defines, the state creates, the state prepares . . .

The state operates through the Ministry of Agriculture and its technical services, the wali who decides over the commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.) proposals, the Party which is theoretically represented at these levels and the Army which delegates representatives in these institutions and which provides a supervisor for every

commune, the officier charge de la revolution agraire. The A.P.C. constitutes theoretically the main decision-making center in the realization of the A.R. program.

But the fact that this instrument (the bureaucracy of the F.L.N. and A.P.C.) is overwhelmingly dominated at the provincial and grass-root level by the landowning classes, induced the petit bourgeoisie to seek ways of integrating the poor and landless peasants within the institutions to achieve the A.R. program. This resulted from the growing resistance to the A.R. within the institutions that are supposed to realize it. But initially and within the national solidarity ideology, these landowning classes were curiously expected to implement the A.R. decisions on themselves.

The struggle between the pro and anti-A.R. pervaded all the institutions. At the top (Revolutionary Council, Party, Government), the landowning classes had important positions. In the Revolutionary Council, the presence of K. Ahmed (former Finance Minister and then head of the Party, 1967-1972) who owned about 3,000 hectares, symbolized the class alliance between the landowners and the petit bourgeoisie.¹⁰² The conflict was open since the central power had to resort to the Army to dissuade any opposition in March 1972. The resignation of K. Ahmed (December 1972) transformed the balance of forces at the summit but the provincial and local positions remained practically under the landowners domination since no alternative channel had been created to counterbalance their influence.

The Party (F.L.N.)

From "campaign of reorganization" under C. Belkaeem (1965-1967) to "campaign of restructuration" under K. Ahmed (1967-1972), the party failed to establish a militant organization capable of mobilizing the masses for the national construction. The permanent crisis of the party was deemed a "recruitment crisis and above all a qualitative recruitment, [a] poverty of the ideological inspiration, [an] inefficient propaganda, . . . compromissions (compromising of conscience) with 'bourgeois' elements."¹⁰³ Indeed the party remained a moribund organization which was ironically enough busy with secondary tasks, i.e., establishment of neighborhood committees under K. Ahmed's direct supervision while practically absent in the implementation of the A.R. The A.R. constituted the first single operation where party militants could be geared into an important practical task in contradistinction with the establishment of the national administrative machinery or the industrialization program. Nevertheless, observers reported not only the inexistence of the party in the countryside, but more importantly resistance to the A.R. implementation as in Tiaret or Constantine.¹⁰⁴ The situation was summarized in the A.N.P. paper El Djeich (March 1973) as follows:

multiple factors urgently command the reorganization of the F.L.N. Its structures and methods of work must be renewed. More travailleurs (workers) and revolutionary intellectuals must be brought in . . . A label of revolutionary cannot be put on all rethors of socialism . . . The party functioned as an administrative apparatus with no political efficiency and therefore did not play its part . . . Thereafter the risk of a dangerous as well as threatening political emptiness for the future.

The absence of the F.L.N. was more or less substituted for by the student volunteers who undertook the task of explaining the A.R. charter.

Two processes combined in initiating the student mobilization (for the implementation of the A.R. program): First, the government's will to re-integrate students within the country's political process and ultimately coopte and use the student movement to further its policies. The student union, Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens, was dissolved following the students' resistance to the attempts of the party to control its activities in 1968. And second, the student movement (or at least its most organized elements of the Parti de d'Avant Garde Socialiste - former Communist Party) considered the A.R. program as an important task of national building and a progressive decision to be supported.* The nature of the student volunteering which was ambiguous at first (administration tasks, census activities, literacy agents or political commissars . . .) became clearer when it was defined as a work of political education around the importance of the land reform and the peasant union. The students' tasks were primarily to vulgarize the A.R. charter provisions and the peasant union statutes and secondarily to perform manual tasks.

The student volunteering was institutionalized by the end of summer, 1972, to serve as a "political auxiliary" to the other

*This is in cohesion with the position of the P.A.G.S., that of "critical support" for the regime.

instruments of the A.R. realization. The students' work advanced the enforcement of the A.R. provisions while uncovering the opponents of the A.R. Furthermore, their reports on the A.R. unfolding and their direct relations with the President contributed to short circuit the local and provincial authorities opponents of the A.R. program.

Nevertheless, a new restructuring of the party was necessary if the A.R. was to succeed. As the President put it (February 1973): "The Algerian Revolution has reached a stage of development such that it needs badly resolute support from militants who have faith in revolutionary principles." Although the bureaux de Kasma F.L.N. (office of the F.L.N. organs at the commune's level) were renewed, no change has yet occurred at the superior levels: elections never took place to designate the district, department, or national leaders and no Congress met since 1964. In Amourth, the Kasma coordinator A.D. remained in office despite the fact that he was involved with other influential local militants like T.B., the war veterans' secretary in agricultural venture with grants from the Societe Agricole de Prevoyance (S.A.P.)*. New militants--mostly young teachers joined the Kasma cells but the style of work remained the same. In an informal interview, the Kasma coordinator who was asked about the nature of the problems discussed in the cells--replied that these are the F.L.N. secrets not to be disclosed. To

*This refers to the cooperatives of privates organized in 1970-1971.

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yet another question about his understanding of what a mass organization is, the coordinator flatly said that organization means structuring of people, that is, establishing files for them and providing them with cards. No wonder that none of the local union organization (Kasma, workers' union, women union, youth union or peasant union) works. The organization is not regarded as born out of practice and for practice. The activity of the local militants during the implementation for the A.R. was confined to few tasks: participation to the extended Popular Assembly (A.P.C.E.) meetings and visits to peasants' communities with student volunteers who explain the A.R. charter and perform some manual tasks.

Commune's Popular Assembly (A.P.C.)

The commune in the official discourse is deemed the basic economic, political and administrative cell of the Algerian society. Nevertheless, only its administration dimension is emphasized in practice.¹⁰⁵ In the absence of any parliament or other representative institution, the central power maintained its single direct contact with the "basis" through the conference nationale des presidents d' A.P.C. This conference started in February 27, 1967, as a seminar for the 676 presidents of the A.P.C. and became an annual meeting where the central power exposes its policies and receives reports about the A.P.C.'s activities and their problems. The meetings generally end by the adoption of resolutions pertaining to administrative, financial

and economic questions. Of the latter is the agricultural question which constitutes for most communes, the crucial problem. The second conference (February 7-9, 1968) resolution noted "defects" in the management of the agriculture sector, decrease of its productivity and demanded a land reform program to whose study the communal elected officials should be associated. The third conference (February 5-9, 1969) resolution renewed the demand of a land reform . . . The nature of this land reform is not clear but the demand itself raises some questions. Questions like who actually demanded the land reform and who elaborated the resolutions are not elucidated. First, the reports of the individual communes are synthesized in a report for the whole department (wilaya) whose drafting is tightly supervised by the hierarchical authority. This means that demands that are officially opposed could not filter down.¹⁰⁶ But once more this is to assume a politically homogeneous authority and requires close analysis of the procedures and the political orientation of the supervisors. Second, no information is actually available as to the procedures and resolution drafting nor to the political background of the authors. Nevertheless, the content of 1968 resolutions is not politically consistent. For example, while a land reform is demanded, the workers are paternalistically advised to cease resorting to demands and strikes and work harder.¹⁰⁷

The Commune's Popular Assembly and the Poor Peasantry

The Agrarian Revolution charter made the A.P.C. the central institution in the implementation of the program, choosing to discard proposals for the creation of special committees.¹⁰⁸ But as the resistances to and sabotages of the A.R. program clearly surfaced within the A.P.C. themselves, extended A.P.C. were established on March 16, 1972. These extended A.P.C. (A.P.C.E.) sought to associate representatives of the local "peasantry" to the decision-making process about nationalization/limitation of land property to counterbalance the landowning class dominated A.P.C. The latter could not enforce decisions of nationalization over its own members and did not enforce the important A.R. charter provision that bars big landowners from participating to the decision-making (Article 174 of the ordinance). Now the peasants' unions which were established in 1970 and through which the F.L.N. "structured" about 150,000 peasants, included a majority of middle and big landowners and was unequally distributed on the territory.¹⁰⁹ The unions were open to all strata of the peasantry except the landless peasantry since only the landed peasants are more or less economically integrated to the existing circuits. The unions were corporatist organizations and the landless peasants have no corporate interests to defend.

In the extended A.P.C. (A.P.C.E.) which is composed of the A.P.C. members, delegates of the party, of the War Veterans' Association, of

the Workers' Union, of the Women's Union, of the F.L.N. Youth Organization and of the Peasants' Union, the latter were not representative of the poor peasant strata. The poor peasants were outnumbered.

Indeed, the official interpretation of the provisions dealing with the quorum appertaining to the extended A.P.C. was restrictive. The Article 6 of the Decree 72-108 of June 7, 1972, relative to the agencies of realization of the A.R. program at the commune level reads as follows: "The number of representatives of the local peasant union to the extended popular communal assembly is set at 6 members, in accordance with Article 175 of the Ordinance No. 71-73 of November 8, 1971 . . ."¹¹⁰

Indeed, from the first election of peasants' representatives to the A.P.C.E. emerged "representatives" susceptible of being affected by measures of property limitation. Henceforth, new peasant unions were to be organized and the poor and landless peasants have to be associated to the A.R. program if the latter is to be realized. The process was initiated by the adoption of a project for the National Peasants Union (U.N.P.A.) on March 22, 1972, which was to become the F.L.N.'s rural mass organization.* The U.N.P.A. sought to rely on the poor peasant strata (recipients of A.R. first phase, landless peasants and small peasants non-affected by the A.R.--those affected could join after the achievement of the second phase) and as an

*It is worth noting that although the F.L.N. had full control over the U.N.P.A. at the commune's level (U.P.C.), its authority at the wilaya (department) level is shared with the wali, the central power direct representative (department executive).

immediate objective to replace the former representatives of the peasantry within the A.P.C.E. The peasants' union quickly grew from a membership of 60,000 in June 1973 to 800,000 peasants by the end of the same year.¹¹¹ This restructuring weakened relatively the position of the landowning class within the A.P.C.E. since landowners were excluded following a stricter application of the Article 174 of the Ordinance, which states that officials susceptible of being affected by the A.R. decisions cannot participate in the deliberations of the A.P.C.E. But the student volunteers reported as of September 1973 that in Eastern Algeria "big landowners are in most cases members or responsables of the Peasant Union (U.P.)."¹¹²

Henceforth, far from controlling the operations of the A.R., the National Union of Peasants (U.N.P.A.) emerged in the midst of the A.R. unfolding. The U.N.P.A. was established less to wage an anti-feudal struggle than to constitute an instrument of the petit bourgeoisie to counterbalance the influence of the landowning class that it could not win over to its "national solidarity" ideology. Ironically enough, during the first Congress of the U.N.P.A. (26-29 of November, 1974), where 1,000 peasant delegates gathered, the President announced the end of the first and second phase of the A.R.¹¹³ The official conception of the U.N.P.A. is a corporatist conception since ultimately all "peasants", the recipients of the A.R., the small peasants and the (still) landless peasants, the

self-management workers, and the workers in the private sector to the agrarian bourgeoisie, are entitled to its membership. Moreover, this conception is pervaded by a strong paternalistic ideology illustrated in the following quote from the President's declaration to "Le Monde": "We don't have problems with our peasants, on the contrary, we are doing everything for them."¹¹⁴

Henceforth, the U.N.P.A. was not strong enough to impose the interests of the poor peasant strata and lead a consistent anti-latifundist struggle. Reports confirmed that in many places, potentially nationalizable properties were not expropriated and that the A.P.C.E. did not fulfill their functions.¹¹⁵ This is illustrated by the official extension of the second phase period. Despite the fact that the operations of the second phase were officially declared terminated by June 16, 1975, a President's instruction of January 16, 1976, ordered the A.P.C.E. to establish supplementary lists of owners to be nationalized because the overall results were regarded as limited.¹¹⁶ These limitations stem on the one hand from the domination of the landowning class within the A.P.C.E., not through their physical presence but through their commissioned representatives and on the other hand from the influence of this class within the upper decision-making centers. First, the A.P.C.E. tended to set a high landownership ceiling that benefited big landowners and to emphasize the principle of propriete en indivision a dodge through which big landowners kept

their property intact. An observer noted that some of the big landowners "lost no more than half their holdings (some of which reached 4,000 hectares per owner)."¹¹⁷ Student brigades volunteers observed a strong collusion of interests of the local and provincial officials and the local big landowners. The volunteers' report (about Western Algeria) noted the curious absence of local and provincial officials (presidents of A.R.C.'s, coordinators of the F.L.N. and chiefs of district) in the midst of the student volunteering campaign* as well as the disappearance of numerous property declarations of the big landowners in many communes.¹¹⁸ Second, the upper decision-making centers of which the commission de recours (grievances commission) handed back confiscated lands to their owners.¹¹⁹ These problems are tightly connected with the class nature of the agencies of change and the limited role of and weakness of the U.N.P.A. Despite its numerical weight, the U.N.P.A. remained "absent" in numerous rural areas or land functions as a chambre d'enregistrement.¹²⁰ An observer summarized the U.N.P.A. role writing that it seems "to be more a container of peasants rather than a defender of their interests." And went on to comment that "contrary to these objectives (those listed by the Second Congress of the U.N.P.A. in April 1978 relative to the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the U.N.P.A. role) and others, the U.N.P.A. is not given necessary power to help

*The student volunteers brigades constituted the single instances of militant control over the realization of the A.R. provisions.

peasants" and quoting the local U.P.C. coordinator as saying "we have no power, all we can do is to send reports that are not looked at."¹²¹

This reflects the situation in Amourth where the U.P.C. (communal peasant union) of about 1,000 members strong has no power nor activities besides bureaucratic work of report drafting. The U.P.C., according to the commune's officials, were minimally involved in the A.R. operations of such importance as delimitation of properties on the field. Unfortunately, it is difficult to independently verify the validity of the statement or to study the A.P.C.E. deliberations to make a substantiated argument. Nevertheless, the small peasants who seek assistance from the cooperative of services and marketing (CAPCS) have to be members of the U.P.C. On several occasions, it could be observed in the National Bank Office (agency of the National Bank which takes care of the assistance program) in the C.A.P.C.S. that most of the small peasants seeking assistance (500 to 700 peasants) were compelled to adhere to the U.P.C., since most of the applicants were turned down until they exhibit their U.P.C. membership card and receipt of their payment of membership fees, which is of three Algerian Dinars.

The U.P.C. is not an autonomous organization of the peasants. It is totally subordinated to the party: the leaders must be necessarily F.L.N. members. Still, more the absence of a militant tradition--

in contradistinction with the working class or the student movement-- and its character as a recent superimposed structure made it more an auxiliary agency of the F.L.N. and bureaucracy than a peasant organization. Few examples of how peasant problems are dealt with in Amourth illustrates this point. The first example related to the important problem of the form of cooperative to be established. Despite the lack of a tradition of collective labor or ownership and of peasant resistance and despite provisions of the charter which listed various types of cooperatives, the form of cooperative chosen in Amourth was the most elaborate, i.e., the Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution (production cooperative), based on collective ownership and labor. The decision over the type of cooperative was not taken by the recipients and their U.P.C., but by the A.P.C.E. and the "technical services" of the agriculture ministry. This, however, is not a local phenomenon since about 70 percent of all cooperatives in Algeria are of this type and since the tendency leans toward the transformation of other existing types into C.A.P.R.A. An observer noted that from the 825 cooperatives agricoles d'entraide (C.A.E.C.)* established at the end of the first phase (July 1973), only 601 remained by December 1973.¹²² This voluntaristic tendency to ignore the level of peasant consciousness and skip objectively essential stages of cooperative development, generated problems that beside other factors led recipients

*C.A.E.C.: Cooperative of mutual aid.

to withdraw from the cooperative. Factors such as proximity of industrial centers, initial excessive expectations, long home-cooperative distance, low income . . . contributed to withdrawals. By November 30, 1976, about 8,041 "withdrawals" were recorded (4,885 for the first phase and 3,156 for the second).¹²³ The Department where Amourth is located, 609 peasants withdrew from the cooperatives of whom 63 for Amourth, which counted 350 A.R. recipients (18 percent). The problem was taking alarming proportions and instead of solving the subjective and objective contributing factors, the local authorities including the U.P.C. resorted to coercion to keep the recipients in the cooperatives. Peasants who withdraw are banned from working in other sectors within the commune.

Another example of peasants/U.P.C. and local authorities relationships relates to methods of "mobilization" of the peasants. On one important event--visit of the President in the region--recipients of the A.R. were forced to attend the President's speech because of threats of exclusion from the cooperatives. They were gathered by 3:00 in Amourth village and transported to B. (which is about 37 kilometers away) to welcome the President, who arrived in the afternoon.

Despite these critical shortcomings due to the nature of the social forces which decided and implemented the A.R. program, that is a petit bourgeoisie which sought to balance out its developmental

program but at the same time avoid an autonomous mass movement and a sharpening class conflict, the struggle over the A.R. program delineated a social cleavage within the Algerian society. This is illustrated in the change of the social composition of the A.P.C., particularly in the rural areas.

A.P.C.: The Elimination of the Landowning Class

As alluded to earlier, the A.P.C. and F.L.N. Kasmate (plural of Kasma) were under dominance of the landowning class in most rural areas and that they were not particularly enthusiastic about the A.R. program. This led to a campaign of "renovation" of the party and the purging of its most notorious anti-A.R. elements. This move had repercussions on the A.P.C. since some of them were sharply criticized and other simply dismissed as illustrated by the following declaration of the F.L.N.: "The F.L.N. ceased to have confidence in about 90 percent of the A.P.C. Presidents of the Saida, Bechar and Tiaret regions."¹²⁴ But all the A.P.C. could not be dismissed at once and the tendency was toward a future stricter recruitment of the A.P.C. members, i.e., on the communal elections of March 1975 which took place in the midst of the struggle over the Agrarian Revolution program. The theme of the election campaign--"rigorous choice of the candidates"--reflects the tendency toward the elimination of the local notables and other propertied classes from the A.P.C. membership. On March 30, 1975, 23,284 candidates campaigned for the 11,647 seats

of the 691 A.P.C. The new lists included a minority of former members and the socio-professional composition was more "popular," i.e., more representative of the forces supporting the government's policies. Overall, the candidates tended to be teachers, subordinate functionaries, middle cadres and employees of the national corporations. The participation of workers and peasants was still very limited.¹²⁵ This is confirmed by an observation about the social composition of the Constantine* A.P.C. where the candidates list included 28 teachers, 2 students, 9 employees, 13 administrative agents, 3 health employees, 1 medical doctor, 12 employees of national corporations, 5 employees of agricultural services, 4 F.L.N. and mass organizations' officials, 2 journalists, 2 technicians and 3 businessmen. The workers' and peasants' participation is clearly non-existent.¹²⁶

The general trend is thus clearly toward a petit bourgeoisie membership, i.e., the new petit bourgeoisie created by the developmental strategy which is the main social basis of the regime. In rural areas, however, as one observer put it: "Although the economic base of large private landowners has been weakened, they retain greater or lesser political influence in various regions . . ."¹²⁷

In Amourth, the social composition of the 1975 A.P.C. shifted toward the new petit bourgeoisie with a majority of teachers and employees and other strata such as small shopkeepers and middle

*Constantine is the metropole of Eastern Algeria with a population averaging 300 to 350,000 inhabitants.

peasants. Nevertheless, the problem is much more complex since Arsh relations are still quite strong and the F.L.N. militant credentials are not sufficient to win an election and since most of the elected members are from the propertied class and are to a greater or lesser extent commissioned by their arsh's notables. The most significant cases are those of T.C., S.L., and H.H. who are the sons of close parents of big landowners affected by the A.R. program. Others like M.A., R.S., B.C., or D.A. come from influential Aroush of the commune. It is worth noting that no poor peasant or worker is member of the assembly. But the general opinion is that the new assembly is less "rotten" than the former ones. The "revolution from above" of the petit bourgeoisie has reached its goals of eliminating the opponents to its policies, i.e., the landowning class from its institutions and insuring, so to speak, a "petit bourgeoisification" of the latter.

These changes are reflected in the working of the new institutions and especially in the functioning of the agricultural assistance circuits within the C.A.P.C.S. (Cooperative of Services and Marketing).

The Agricultural Assistance Channels and the Poor Peasantry

Within the framework of the A.R., the Cooperative Agricole Polyvalente Communal de Service (marketing and service cooperative) plays a central role in the communal agriculture sector. The membership is mandatory for the A.R. cooperatives and self-management farms and voluntary for individual private farmers who must pay a membership

fee* to benefit technical or service assistance. About 500 to 800 small peasants are actually members of the C.A.P.C.S. The C.A.P.C.S. houses the local Banque Nationale d'Algerie (National Bank) agency which handled financing of the "traditional" since 1975-1976.

Financial Credit

The new circuits seek to control administratively the use of the credits granted to the so-called "individual" sector which includes individual recipients of the A.R., "the private owners affected by the property limitation measure but continuing to exploit personally or in the family framework their remaining lands" and the small peasants non-affected by the A.R.--farming lease and sharecropping being excluded. The tendency seems toward an emphasis over the economic efficiency of the credit. An official document specified that credit grant "must remain within its truly economic frame of encouragement and stimulation for development without leaving room for a permanent assistance mentality."¹²⁸

In an attempt to control the credit use even in its minute details, the B.N.A. established files for applicants. The file has to include:

- A certificate delivered by the A.P.C. attesting that the applicant is a farmer.
- A certificate proving membership in the U.P.C.

*The fee was 15 A.D. in 1974-1975 and 10 A.D. in 1975-1976.

- Identification of the applicant as a physical person (filiation . . .).
- Accurate and detailed situation of the applicant farmer.
- Estimates and results of the previous agricultural year.
- A plan of culture with estimates of charges and product as well as financial needs taking account of self-financing potential . . .

The second step involves a first control by the B.N.A. agent who formulates a judgment based on:

- Honorableness/solvency of the applicant (by consulting lists of indebtedness from the former S.A.P. and present C.A.P.C.S.).
- Object of the credit which must be destined to purely economic actions.
- Possibilities of realization of the plan of culture, and
- Estimate of the amount of credit to be granted.¹²⁹

Of all these conditions, the solvency criterion is of critical importance because it is based on a social selection that excludes the small peasantry. For 1974-1975, only 17 peasants have totally or partially paid back their debts. Indeed, this economist conception could lead to social problems since the small peasantry could not survive without assistance. As long as the agrarian structures are not completely transformed, the credit functions necessarily as a political and social necessity. Henceforth, the conditions of solvency, though still used as a pressure for efficiency, is dropped in practice.

The third step involves the establishment of an individual account for every applicant recording all the operations in order to prevent

any diversion of the credit from "exclusively production ends."

The control is a control of expenditures through the necessary presentation of bills. The credit is provided only for the following operations: buying of seeds or other plants, of fertilizers or pesticides and payment of wages for seasonal labor force.

This bureaucratic mode of control was strongly felt by the small peasantry because the recipients are confronted with many difficulties. For example, the recipients have to get a stub from the B.N.A. agency located in the District Center, which is 40 kilometers away, in order to pay for the services needed. But this requires time and money and the coupons are generally not accepted by the privates who ask for cash payment since the coupon payment induces charges (fare of the trip and tax for the bill) for them.

These bureaucratic problems could be transcended by a decentralized system where the poor peasants could play an active role to make the C.A.P.C.S. an efficient tool of rural development. Despite its present problems, the C.A.P.C.S. financing circuit, in contra-distinction with the former S.A.P. system, is not dominated by the landowning class. The credit is managed by the bureaucratic-technocratic petit bourgeoisie which sometimes takes advantage of its dominant position in the institutions to acquire some credits but the social composition of the recipients shows that only few big landowners and bureaucrats benefit from the credits, the majority being small and middle peasant. The following table illustrates this point.

Table 11
Size of Property of Recipients of a Campaign Credit*
 1975/76 & 1978/79

<u>Category</u>	<u>Size in Hectares</u>	<u>Number of Recipients</u>		<u>Total</u>
		<u>1975/76</u>	<u>1978/79</u>	
1	0 - 10	344	292	636
2	11 - 20	83	140	223
3	21 - 50	21	52	73
4	51 - 100	1	5	6
5	100 & over	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	1
		440	490	

Source: B.N.A. of Amourth's C.A.P.C.S.

The comparison between the 1975/1976 and 1978/1979 recipients indicates a drop in the category 0 - 10 hectares from 344 to 292 recipients and an increase in the categories 2, 3, and 4.

The first hypothesis is that in 1975/1976 in the midst of the unfolding of the A.R. program, peasants tend to under-estimate their property. This could be tested through a comparison of the size property declared by the same person for 1975/1976 and for 1978/1979. Some cases tend to support the under-estimation hypothesis but it was difficult to establish this fact for a sufficiently significant number for lack of evidence.

*The recipients of a seeds credit numbered 612 in 1974/1975, 708 in 1975/1976.

Yet a second hypothesis--real absolute drop in the first category for several reasons of which 1) the small peasants tend to favor cash credit because the energy time and money invested to acquire a credit are outweighed by the inefficiency of the credit use because of non-technical assistance, and 2) solvency condition . . .--could be tested by recording the recipients of 1975/1976 that did not apply in 1978/1979 and compare the drops of the different categories. Once more some cases tend to corroborate this hypothesis but limited data which was not sufficiently systematic does not warrant validation of the statement.

The increase of the number of applicants and recipients of the categories 3 and 4 illustrates the growing insurance of the middle peasantry and the non-affected big landowners that the second phase of the A.R. program was terminated by June 1976 and they are not threatened anymore.

In conclusion, the financing circuit of the C.A.P.C.S. is oriented mainly toward the small peasantry: 427 out of 449 in 1975/1976 and 432 out of 490 in 1978/1979 are small peasant recipients. But the credit as such constitutes a dimension only of the agricultural assistance that could not be realized without technical assistance (plough, harvest, transportation . . .).

Technical Assistance

Because of their size, which does not allow a technical accumulation and an efficient material use, the small properties depend heavily on outside technical assistance for their reproduction. Because of the C.A.P.C.S.'s relative lack of farming machinery, the priority supply of services to the A.R. and self-management sectors and the search for efficient use of machinery, which necessitates a given ceiling of the land size, the small peasantry is confronted with a relative shortage of technical assistance from the C.A.P.C.S. The small peasants plots are too tiny and scattered in remote areas for the C.A.P.C.S. to efficiently use its machinery. The middle and big landowners' properties offer better advantages for the C.A.P.C.S. because they are larger and better located. An analysis of the C.A.P.C.S. machinery use by the private sector for the period January - May 1976 illustrates the monopolization of the C.A.P.C.S. technical services by the agrarian bourgeoisie. Five to six farmers (of whom 4 are consistent users) benefited from most of the services provided by the C.A.P.C.S. to the private sector as shown by the following table.

Table 11
Machinery Use by the Private

<u>Machine</u>	<u># of Users</u>	<u>Time of Use (in hours)</u>	<u>Share of the 5 or 6 Consistent Users</u>
Mowing Machine	15	132	50%
Coover Croop.	9	27	80%
<u>Dechaumeuse</u>	11	47	70%
Dressing Machine (Fodder Bundles)	11	2062	90%
3 Ploughshare	50	472	50%
Caterpillar Tractor	6	49	100%
Regular Plough	6	51	100%

Source: Compiled from records of the machinery supervisor at Amourth's
C.A.P.C.S.

The limited technical action of the C.A.P.C.S. within the small peasantry sector results in a persistent technical dependence of large sectors of the small peasantry upon the agrarian bourgeoisie and notables who possess all the farm implements and who rent them out to the neighboring small peasants--of his arsh and occasionally even to the cooperatives. Some cases seem to fit the following pattern: The agrarian bourgeoisie because of its bureaucratic and family relations and because of the C.A.P.C.S. efficiency orientation uses the C.A.P.C.S. machinery on its lands at low rate prices and

rents out its own implements to the small peasantry whose demand could not be fully met by the C.A.P.C.S. at higher rate prices. The difference of rent between the C.A.P.C.S. and the private varies from 3 to 6 A.D. per hour for a tractor, for example. A relatively similar situation was noted during the summer of 1973 by an observer¹³⁰ of a rural community at Douera near Algiers, where a 30 horse powered tractor was rented 23 A.D. per hour by the S.A.P., 18 A.D./H by the private owners and 13 A.D./H. by the C.A.P.C.S. The limited technical assistance of the C.A.P.C.S. to the small peasantry could not be solely explained by technical factors: lack of machinery (how to explain then that the use of the existing material is monopolized by the agrarian bourgeoisie?) or inefficient machinery use on tiny and scattered plots. The latter argument is not valid since the problem of efficiency could be overcome if effective socio-political organizing of the small peasantry is realized. The small peasant communities could introduce collective demand of services to the C.A.P.C.S. through their alleged organ, the U.P.C. The Faoudj*, whose membership consists of small peasants, could record the needs of the latter during the sowing, plowing or harvesting season and program the operations since the area to be worked would be large enough not to sacrifice efficiency. Neighboring Faoudjs and mechtate (hamlets) could coordinate thus eliminating technical obstacles to mechanical

*Faoudj is the basic cell of the U.P.C. The Faoudj often times corresponds geographically to the hamlets.

farming and enhancing an embryonic form of a future collective cooperation. The problem is thus a basically socio-political problem, i.e., whose interests the C.A.P.C.S. is to serve and the responsibility must be necessarily assumed by the U.P.C. and the F.L.N. Kasma.

The Agrarian Revolution program was carried out in its minute details by the administration bureaucracy. The concerned classes and strata (small peasantry, landless peasantry . . .) did not play any role in the elaboration nor in the implementation of the charter provisions. Their involvement was marginal and accepted only to the extent it counterbalanced the strength of the landowning classes within the decision-making centers and institutions. The Agrarian Revolution was not thus a social revolution that radically transformed the rural social structure but a reform conceived in a narrow technicist-economist sense so as to play the role of outlet for the industrial production. Nevertheless, the Agrarian Revolution program unleashed the long time frozen social dynamics by eliminating traditional social structures. The anti-feudal struggle is in the process of being transcended and this is opening a new stage of class struggle.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The revolutionary decolonization and the mass mobilization that Algeria experienced in the period 1962-1964 did not translate into a global restructuration of the existing social system. The absence of viable socio-political and economic alternatives and especially the absence of a politically-ideologically and organizationally structured party of the popular masses left the hegemony of the traditionally dominant classes unchallenged. Subsequently, the achievements of popular struggles, such as self-management, remained marginal and were ultimately coopted by 1964. Despite socialist rhetorics, the nature of the bloc of classes in power which included the petit bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the big landowning class blocked any radical change until 1971, when inter-class contradictions within the bloc in power shattered the class alliance by the elimination of the landowning class. Until the mid-1970's, the rural class structure remained unchanged and the local social, political and economic and administrative institutions were under the control of the landowning class and merchant class. The local popular assembly, which was theoretically to represent the popular classes, the agricultural services set up to provide technical and financial assistance to the small peasantry were either directly or indirectly dominated by the local notables.

Following the initiation of the land reform program in 1971, the main trend in rural areas, as illustrated by AMOURTH, was toward the weakening of the positions of the big landowning class within the communes. The landowning class was eliminated from the popular assembly whose social composition included more and more members of the rising petit bourgeois strata which constitute the social basis of the regime.

Although the land reform issue opened new horizons for the development of class struggle in Algeria, the political inconsistency of the petit bourgeoisie prevented the emergence of an autonomous mass movement. The Agrarian Revolution was essentially a reform . . . "technocratically offered and controlled, from top to bottom in its rhythms, as well as in the procedures of its application by the administration and party apparatus."¹³¹

The conditions and land reform application-ideology of "national solidarity," implementation and the decisions by the local and provincial bodies that were historically dominated by the landowning class--necessarily limited the participation of the landless and poor peasantry. The latter were associated only to counterbalance the landowning class which did not adopt enthusiastically as expected the "revolution of national solidarity." The subsequent results were quite limited as illustrated by the Amourth's case where only 350 peasants benefited

out of more than a thousand applicants. Despite its restructuration, the financial and technical assistance is still not extended to all the small peasantry because of irrational bureaucratic organization and absence of effective political and economic organization of the small and poor peasantry.

The Land Reform Program has thus initiated an "anti-feudal" struggle led by the petit bourgeoisie. But the popular rural classes' mobilization was carefully circumscribed to a minimal degree. The "petit bourgeoisification" of the local institution that resulted has eliminated the contradiction between the theoretical function and the actual functioning of the (rural) Algerian institutions, that is, the contradiction between the administrative and political institutions set up by the petit bourgeoisie to seat and expand its hegemony and their actual subordination at the grassroot level to the landowning class and traditional interests which tended to block the petit bourgeoisie's program (especially industrialization . . .). The stage of anti-feudal struggle is globally in the process of being transcended.* The conditions of class coalition (petit bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and marginally the working class and poor peasantry) have been superceded by the transformation of the colonial

*Although scores of big landowners escaped limitation or nationalization at this point, the fact that the A.R. charter provides for a constant and continuous supervision of the state and private property, limits to a relatively great extent the margin of maneuvering of the big landowners.

structures. Hence, a new stage of class struggle was in process of development: it is characterized by a new class coalition, new contradiction and new socio-economic and political stakes.

The transformation of the agrarian structures in the peripheral social formations constitutes a condition sine qua non of economic development and of the evolution of social structures. The social dynamics of a land reform refers to a transitional process or a tentative passage from a dominant mode of production to another or from a form to another of a same mode of production. Anti-imperialist land reforms* in peripheral social formations have historically proceeded along two paths: 1) as an element of transition from dependent capitalism to socialism (China, Cuba . . .) and 2) as an element of a tentative transition from dependent capitalism to a self-centered capitalism (Mexico . . .). Nevertheless, within the conditions of imperialist domination, the transition of the second type has historically ended either by the reversal/blocking of the transition (Egypt, Mexico . . .) or by the passage to socialism (Cuba . . .). The magnitude of the social dynamics unleashed by the land reform and the nature of the class coalition that leads the process of transition are decisive determinants as to whether a transition or a reversal would occur. In Algeria, the social dynamics have been contained to a large

*Land reforms which far from lessening the imperialist domination, deepen it. The examples of Brazil and Iran illustrate the case of land reforms expanding and deepening imperialist domination.

extent by turning the land reform into a solidarity campaign and a technical problem. The landless and poor peasantry were poorly organized into corporatist unions and minimally participated to the implementation of the decisions. These forces did not experience any political education and struggle, which constitute decisive weapons against any counter-revolutionary forces. The bureaucratic and technocratic petit bourgeoisie realized the land reform for them. On the other hand, the class coalition that leads the transition--because of its nature (petit bourgeois strata and national bourgeoisie)--does not offer strategically any guarantee for the achievement of the transition.

In the rural communes, and particularly Amourth, the Agrarian Revolution--despite its qualitative and quantitative limits--has weakened the traditional structures and freed the small peasantry from the big landowners' domination. Although arsh loyalty may persist for still a long period, its structural foundations have been largely eroded. In the new conditions, conflicts along class dimensions are expected to replace tendentially factional politics. Experiences of this transformation have been analyzed by some authors in relation to the transformation of the agrarian structures following programs of "green revolution."¹³² As a result of the land reform, the following contradictions could be identified in Amourth:

1. Contradiction between the cooperateurs (cooperative members) and the technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie about important issues such as control over the Plantation Plan, prices of agricultural products and industrial inputs (mechanical material fertilizers . . .);

2. Contradiction between the rural bourgeoisie and rural proletariat;

3. Contradiction between the small peasantry on the one hand and the technocratic and bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie (over the technical and financial assistance) and rural bourgeoisie (over renting of material, loans and debts, etc . . .) on the other hand.

FOOTNOTES

1. Jacques Berque, "L'Idee de Classe," Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologic, No. 38, 1965, pp. 169-184.

2. For Algeria see Ahmed Kaid, (Former Secretary of the F.L.N.) in Contradictions de Classe et Contradictions au sein des masses, Alger, F.L.N.: Central Information, 1971. See also Boumediene's Discours du President Boumediene collected in three volumes.

3. R. Bendix and S. M. Lipsek (Eds.), Class, Status and Power, Clencoe, Ill., 1953.

T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society, New York, 1966.

R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford, California, 1959.

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W. G. Runciman, "Class, Status and Power" in J.A. Jackson (Ed.), Social Stratification, New York, 1968.

4. I. Wellerstain, "Class and Class Conflict in Africa," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 7, No. 3, 1973: 375-380.

5. Samir Amin, Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, 1976, pp. 279 and following.

6. This is illustrated in Egypt by the opposition to the "Open Door Policy" (liberalization measures aiming at dismemberment of the public sector, encouragement to foreign private investments and de-nationalization of foreign trade) initiated by Sadat in 1971, by the national bourgeoisie which presented petitions (signed by 120 national corporations) outlining the dangers of this policy for the national economy since local corporations could not compete with the international capital. See El Yassar El Arabi (Arabic Magazine), January, 1979.

In Algeria, the national bourgeoisie is represented in the anti-imperialist class alliance within the state power. See J. P. Durand, "Contradictions sociales et Alliances politiques" in A.A.N., 1977, p. 123 and M. Lazreg Emergence of Classes in Algeria, especially chapter on "Articulation of Class Interests."

7. Editors of the Review of African Political Economy, No. 3, May-October, 1975, p. 5.

8. Quoted in D. Booth, "Andre Gunder Frank: An Introduction and Appreciation" in Oxaal, I., Tony Barnett and D. Booth, Eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development, London-Boston: Routledge and Paul, 1975, pp. 50-85.

9. I. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

10. Lenin, "A Great Beginning," quoted in R. Stavenhagen, Social Classes in Agrarian Societies, Anchor Books, 1975, p. 28.

11. Normal Long, "International Colonialism: The Case of South Africa," in Beyond the Sociology of Development.

12. G. M. Meier in Leading Issues in Development Economics, (New York: Oxford, 1964) and A. G. Frank in Latin America: Underdev. or Revolution (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969), mentioned several dualistic theories. A classic model is found in W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1960), the "Social dualism" model was developed by J. M. Bocke in Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies (New York, 1953).

The "technological dualism" was emphasized by Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York, 1959, pp. 325-333) and other authors such as R. S. Eckane in "Factor Proportions Problem in Under-developed Areas" (American Economic Review, September, 1955). The recent theorists of dualism are associated with the diffusion theory. For a review of the basic tenets of this approach, see S. Bodenheimer in The Ideology of Developmentalism, Sage Publications, 1971.

13. R. Stavenhagen in Social Classes in Agrarian Societies, Anchor Books, New York, 1975 and A. G. Frank in op. cit., and in World Accumulation. P. Jalee in the Pillage of the Third World, R. Stavenhagen in "Seven Falacies about Latin America," in J. Petras and M. Bertlin (Eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution. K. Griffin, Under-development in Spanish America, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1969.

For relations between two sectors see: Stavenhagen (1968), Andre G. Frank, J. D. Cockcroft and D. Johnson in Dependence and Under, Anchor, New York, 1972, C. Gonzales, "International Colonialism and National Development," in I. L. Horowitz and Al (Eds.), Latin American Radicalism, New York: Vintage, 1969.

Cardoso and Faletto, "Dependencia Y Desavioello en America Latins," Sautiago, Chile: ILPES (mimeo), D. Johnson, "Domination and Change," mimeo, 1969.

14. T. Shanin (Ed.), Peasants and Peasant Society, Penguin Books, 1971, p. 15.

15. S. Ortiz, "Reflections on the Concept of Peasant Culture," in Shanin, pp. 322-325.

16. S. W. Mintz, "A Note on the Definition of Peasantries," The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1 (1), October, 1973, pp. 91-106.

17. K. Post, "Peasantization in Western Africa," in P. Gutkind and P. Waterman, Eds., African Social Studies: A Radical Reader, Monthly Review Press, 1977.

18. E. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1 (1), October, 1973, pp. 3-22.

19. Lenin in Development of Capitalism in Russia, quoted in H. Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," Journal of Peasant Studies 1, 1, 1973, p. 27.

20. Robert Redfield (in Peasant Society and Culture) said: "In every part of the world, generally speaking, peasantry have been a conservative force in social change, a brake on revolution, a check on that desintegration of local society which often comes with rapid technological change." Frantz Fanon (in the Wretched of the Earth) said: "It is clear that in the colonial countries only the peasantry is revolutionary. It has nothing to lose and everything to gain. The peasant, declassed and hungry, is the exploited one who first discovers that only violence pays."

21. But as R. L. Harris (in "Marxism and the Agrarian Question in Latin America" Latin American Perspectives, Vol. V, No. 4, Fall, 1978) put it "Marx's derogatory references regarding the peasantry were directed at the reactionary elements of the peasantry in certain historical situations and not the peasantry in general or in all historical conjunctures."

22. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, Monthly Review Press, 1969.

23. H. Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties."

24. Colin Leys quoted in J. Saul's "Peasants and Revolution," Review of African Political Economy, #1, August-September, 1974.

25. Michel Gutelman, Structures et reformes Agraires, Paris: Maspero, 1974.

26. This conception is defended by the following selected writers:

C. Leucate, K. Ammour and J. J. Moulin, La Voie Algerienne, Paris: Maspero, 1974

M. Raffinot and J. P. Jacquemot, Le Capitalisme d'Etat Algerien, Paris: Maspero, 1977.

G. Chaliand and J. Minces, L'Algerie Independante, Paris: Maspero, 1972.

M. Bennove, "Algerian Peasants and National Politics," Merip 48, 1976.

P. Rousset, Emigration, Pauperisation et developpement du Capitalisme d'etat en Algerie, Editions Contradictions Bruxelles, 1975.

27. Position of the Parti de la Revolution Socialiste (P.R.S.), of Maoist tendency. Quoted in . . . J. C. Vatin and J. Leca, L'Algerie Politique Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975, p. 454.

28. C. Leucate and al, La Yoie Algerienne.

29. Mahfoud Bennoune, "National Politics and Algerian Peasantry," MERIP, #48, 1976, p. 24.

30. This thesis is upheld mainly by the Algerian Party of Socialist vanguard (P.A.G.S.), former Algerian Community party (P.C.A.) and its sympathizers. The literature on this subject is quite limited. The basic writings representative of this current are: "Front unique ou Parti Unique en Algerie," a pamphlet of the P.A.G.S. reproduced in La Nouvelle Critique (theoretical magazine of the French C.P. of April 1970, pp. 42-46. H. Alley (former member of the P.C.A.) in "classes sociales et socialisme an Algeris," La Nouvelle Critique, December, 1968. A. Akkache in Capitiaux Etrangers et Liberation Economuque, Maspero Paris, 1971, J. P. Durand in "Exacerbation des contradictions sociales et Resserrement des Alliances politiques en Algeris," Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, 1977.

The latter avoids the naive assumption of the socialist transition and offers very interesting analysis based on class struggle. The non-capiatlist thesis usually assumed explicitly or implicitly by the classical community current is absent in J. P. Durant's analysis. The contradictory positions and orientations of the classes and strata in power are explained as the result of a contradiction between a process of formation of a dominant class and a process of exacerbation of social conflicts within the Algerian formation which tend to undermine the former.

31. The "Parti de l'Avantgarde Socialiste" in "Front Unique . . ." La Nouvelle Critique, p. 43.

32. "Message to President Boumediene" in La Voix du Peuple (organ of the P.A.G.S.), November, 1971. Quoted in Vatin and Lcca, p. 411. The call for an anti-imperialist front was renewed in 1975 by the First Secretary of the P.A.G.S. in "From Liberation Front to Construction Front," in World Marxist Review, January, 1975, and in an official statement of the P.A.G.S. in January, 1977, translated by The African Communist, 1977.

The P.A.G.S. regards the National Charter of 1976 as a sufficient political and economic program for the building of a united front. (Statement of January, 1977).

33. H. Alleg and J. P. Durand.

34. J. P. Durand in A.A.N., CNRS, 1977, p. 135.

35. Rene Galissot, "Classification Sociale en Systeme Pre-Capitalistes: L'exemple Algerien," Cahiers du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes, 60, (1968), 25-30.

"Command Feudalism" as opposed to the country-based European model, encompasses both town and country but where the country is subordinated to the town.

36. Marnia Lazreg, The Emergence of Classes in Algeria, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1976, pp. 33 and 35.

For a comparative analysis of the types of pre-capitalist economic formations, see p. 31 and following.

37. Relationships between different fractions of a tribe have been sometimes confused as federative relations between tribes. See H. Kouache, "Colonialism and Rural Change," M. A. thesis, MSU, 1979, pp. 21-24.

38. M. Bennoune, "Algerian Peasants and National Politics," MERIP, #48, 1976, p. 13.

39. "Charte Communale," in Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1967, p. 154, and F. d'Arcy, "L'administration communale dans les communes Rurales du Departement de Constantine," in Essais sur L'Economie de L'Algerie Nouvelle, F. d'Arch, A. Krieger and A. Marill, Eds. Paris: P.U.F., 1965, pp. 6-7.

40. Tami Tidafi, L'Agriculture Algerienne et ses Perspectives de Developpement, Paris: F. Maspero, 1969, pp. 28-29.

41. H. Gourdon, "L'Ordonnance en Algerie," Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1975, pp. 354-355 and W. Zartman, "L'Armee' dans la politique Algerienne," Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (C.N.R.S., 1967, p. 268.)

42. F. d'Arcy, p. 52. The administrative personnel was divided into four categories:

- A. Planning and decision-making positions
- B. Managerial positions
- C. Clerical positions
- D. Subordinate jobs

43. F. d'Arcy, p. 54.

44. M. Bennoune, p. 19.

45. M. Lazreg, p. 191.

46. For some excerpts in English see Ian Clegg, Workers' Self-Management in Algeria. Allen Lane, London, 1971. Appendix 11.

47. A prefect noted in 1963 that: "The guiding principle (of the new reform) should aim at the disappearance of the narrow and particularist tribal spirit, maintained by the former colonial administration, by dropping any criterion pertaining to ethnic considerations. This reform aims at the administrative centralization and should allow a better communication between the local administration and the departmental administration." Quoted in R. Descloities and R. Cornet: 517.

48. F. d'Arcy, pp. 20-21.

49. Note no. 3433 DGAPG/AG of May 27, 1963 of the Ministry of Interior quotes in F. d'Arcy, p. 20.

50. The second delegation speciale was established by the sub prefect on September 2, 1963. The president (K.S.) was replaced by the prefect on September 23, 1963. The membership remained the same (12 members). See Registre des arretes' (decree register), 1962-1969.

51. Algier's Charter (Paragraph 10 of chapter on the state) declares: "The socialist option, the harmonious functioning of self-management, the necessity to hand over real powers to the local collectivities imply a radical administrative reform whose objective is to establish the commune as the base of the political, economic and social organization of the country."

52. F. d'Arcy, p. 23.

53. For a discussion of the containment of self-management/development of national corporations and the code of investments/national bourgeoisie, see Marnis Lazreg, Emergence of Classes in Algeria.

54. Wilayistes referred to the former wilaya war commanders who had a strong authority in their region and who favored a decentralization of power. Wilaya here refers to the military division of Algeria during the war of liberation (5 Wilayate). After independence, it designated the administrative division of Algeria into 15 departments (or Wilayates).

55. T. Zbiri--a former Wilayiste--led in December, 1967, an unsuccessful coup d'etat attempt.

56. See in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1967, p. 758.

57. M. Borella. Quoted in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1969, p. 293.

58. A provision in the "avant-projet" states that whenever the population is not content with the candidates, the abstention could be practiced to bring about a re-evaluation of the composition of the F.L.N.'s list. But, this formula has been rejected by the F.L.N.

59. Notable refers to the socially recognized authority of the Arsh. He derives his authority from the ownership of a large estate and plays a dominant role in the Arsh's economic and social life through money lending, food supply (wheat), agricultural material renting. In the Arsh's social life, the notable in collaboration with other related Arshes' leaders (Djemia) provides advice and settles disputes. His house is usually the gathering place for the Arsh members during religious celebrations.

60. H. Alavi, p. 44.

61. A. Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, p. 60.

62. Deliberation No. 6 of April 22, 1967, and deliberation No. 14171 and 15171 of April 22, 1971.

63. The General Assembly of the A.P.C. explained to me that before 1972 the commune relied upon private enterprises to realize construction projects. Since 1972 the regie communale (communal enterprise) was equipped with enough material means to achieve construction projects. The advantages are: a better control over the realization, choice of construction material, about 40 percent less costly time efficiency and use of local labor force.

64. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.R.N.S., 1971, p. 308.

65. In 1973 new elections took place and in June 1974, the number of Wilayate increased from 15 to 31 following a territorial reform.

66. I. W. Zartman, "Les elections departementales Algeriennes du 25 mai 1969," in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., 1969, p. 311.

67. Ibid., pp. 321-22.

68. Ian Clegg, Workers' Self-Management in Algeria, Monthly Review Press, 1971, p. 119.

69. J. Leca, "Parti et Etat en Algerie," A.N.N., 1968, p. 35.

70. One year later (March 29, 1971), he denounced the presidents and members of the A.P.C. who neglected people's affairs to solely take care of their own in Jean Leca, "Administration Locale et pouvoir en Algeria" in A.A.N., 1971, pp. 211-11 and 219.

71. A. Djeghloul, "Revolution Agrarie at Problemes de transition en Algerie," in Culture et Developpement, Vol. IX, 4, 1977, pp. 590-591.

72. M. Bennoune, p. 16.

73. Ibid., p. 21.

74. M. Raffinot and J. P. Jacquemot, Capitalism d'Etat en Algerie, Paris: Françoise Maspero, 1977, p. 318 and Tidafi pp. 130-135.

75. According to a 1970 UN report, the Algerian peasantry suffered from one of the lowest and levels of caloric food intake in the world--even worse than conditions in India. Jim Paul, "Algeria's Agrarian Revolution," MERIP, #67, May 1978, p. 4.

76. M. Castillo, quoted in Le Coz, p. 7.

77. Algerian official's position quoted in T. Tidafi, p. 153.

78. A. Akkache, "La Condition du development Economique," in Revue Algerienne du Travail, July 14, 1972, pp. 11-19.

79. M. Raffinot and J. P. Jacquemot, p. 319.

80. Ibid., p. 319.

81. Nico Kielstra, "Agrarian Revolution in Algeria," MERIP, #67, 1978, p. 6.

82. A. Djeghloul, pp. 94-95.

83. The S.A.P. keeps the lists "secret." At one time, I was advised by the S.A.P. director not to concern myself with statistical data but rather focus on "real" life.

84. Census of 1973 quoted in Lars Johnsson, La Revolution Agrarie en Algeria, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala, 1978, p. 22. It must be noted that the census does not specify the nature of the land (dry - irrigated . . .) included within the less than 10 hectares category.

85. The price of seeds increased from A.D. 75.75 per quintal in 1974/1975 to 93.75 in 1975/1976.

86. Nico Kielstra, p. 6 and Lars Jonsson, p. 22.

87. G. D. de Bernis in "Industries industrialisantes et contenu d'une Politique d'Integration regionale" Economic Appliquee I.S.E.A., No. 3-4, 1966, pp. 415-473. "Industries Industrialisantes et Integration economique regaionale" Economic Appliquee I.S.E.A., No. 1, 1968, pp. 41-68; "Industries Industrialisantes et Option Algerienne" Tiers Monde, No. 47, 1971, pp. 545-563. For a critique see M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot: 140-147 and K. Ammour, C. Leucate and J. J. Moulin: 109-115.

88. "Industrializing Industries" are those whose fundamental economic function is to engender a multiplier effect, creating new productive activities and supplying them with sets of machinery. Among these "industrializing industries" are the branches which supply others with technical capital (steel, metallurgy, mechanical branches . . .), mineral (fertilizers . . .) and organic chemistry (rubber, synthetics . . .), emergy (non-industrializing in itself but) engendering technical innovation at the level of inputs (petro-chemistry) and output (drilling, pipes) and reducing the production costs of industries consuming heavy energy.

89. K. Ammour, C. Leucate, and J. J. Moulin: La voie Algerienne, Paris: Maspero, 1974, pp. 109-110.

90. Le Monde, January 3, 1979.

91. A.A.N., 1968, p. 341 and A.A.N. 1977, p.

92. For a discussion of these contradictions see K. Ammour and M. Raffinot.

93. D. Bendemered, "La Consommation en Algerie," in Algerie and Developpement, September/October, 1970, pp. 13-19.

94. For a discussion of the content of the charter and results of the A.R. see Annvaire de l'Afrique du Nord since 1971, K. Ammour and al, M. Raffinot and P. Jacquemot, A. Benabdelkrim, M. Bonnoune, R. V. Malder, N. Kielstra, A. Djeghloul, L. Jonsson, T. Smith . . .

95. Article 65 and 67 of the Ordinance.

96. N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, New Left Books, 1977.

97. E. O. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, New Left Books, 1977.

98. Lenin in "La catastrophe imminente et les moyens de la conjurer," quoted in J.P. Durand: 132.

Amilcar Cabral (in Revolution in Guinea) talks about the necessary suicide of the petit bourgeoisie as a dominant class: "the petty bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and the reactionary strata in its country to try to preserve itself as a petty bourgeoisie or ally with workers and peasants, who must themselves take power or control to make the revolution [. . .]. Because if there is a revolution, then the petty bourgeoisie will have to abandon power to the workers and the peasants and cease to exist qua petty bourgeoisie" (p. 70). In either case, the petty bourgeoisie is absorbed in non-petty bourgeois social projects.

99. J. P. Durand: 133-134.

100. A.A.N., 1972, p. 299 and Raffinot: 366.

101. President speech of 2/2/72 before the A.P.C. Presidents.

102. Raffinot: 366.

103. A.A.N., 1972, p. 302.

104. A.A.N., 1977, p. 44.

105. J. Leca in "Administration locale et Pouvoir politique eu Algerie," A.A.N., 1971.

106. In 1968, at a period of self-management containment, the reports of Oran and Tairret, for example, severely attacked self-management and at the same time criticized the policy of Arabization.

107. These statements converge with the attacks of the F.L.N. on the workers' union in 1968 which was allegedly "imbued with out-of-date principles based on a narrow concern with wages, work conditions and class struggle."

108. Boumediene's speech to the Sixth A.P.C. Presidents' Conference (February 21, 1972) in A.A.N., 1972, p. 719. The 1970 A.R. project provided the creation of communal committees were the landless and small peasants would be a majority cited by Raffinot, p. 358.

109. A.A.N., 1973, pp. 363-364.

110. The President's instruction of March 12, 1972, regarded 6 representatives as a "minimum." The participation of the U.N.P.A. members should reach 50 percent of the A.P.C. members. The instruction equally specified that "two-thirds of the representatives of the poor peasants should be landless peasants, those wage laborers or khammes for whom the A.R. not only means a bettering of their lives but also an emancipation from their actual condition." Quoted in A.A.N., 1975, p. 352.

111. A.A.N., 1973, p. 365.

112. Student report about Eastern Algeria, (September, 1973) in El Moudjahid, September 28, 1973.

113. Revolution Africaine, November 29, 1974, cited by Raffinot, p. 358. In the same speech the President declared that the U.N.P.A. should constitute "the real frame within which one million peasants will be structured."

114. Quoted in R. Van Malder: 258.

115. Mohand-Tayed Benamara, "L'elargissement de l'Assemblee populaire communale dans le processus de la Revolution Agraire dans la commune de Tenes." Thesis of Political Science, University of Algiers, 1977. Quoted in A.A.N., 1977, p. 62.

116. Quoted in Raffinot, p. 351.

117. A. Benabdelkrim, "The Agrarian Revolution in Algeria," World Marxist Review, October, 1976, p. 120.

118. Student Report about Western Algeria in El Moudjahid, September 30, 1973.

119. A. Benabdelkrim, p. 121.

120. A.A.N., 1977, p. 76.

121. H. Kovache, "Colonialism and Rural Change in Algeria," M.A. Thesis of Sociology, 1978.

122. Raffinot, p. 343.

123. A.A.N., 1977, p. 561.

124. Revolution Africaine, (F.L.N. Central Organ) of March, 1975. Quoted in Raffinot, p. 372.

125. A.A.N., 1975, p. 437. The observer noted also the low number of female candidates.

126. R. Lambotte in Algerie, Naissance d'une societe Nouvelle, Editions sociales Paris, 1976, footnote on pp. 17-18.

127. A. Benabdelkrim, p. 120.

128. Department of Agriculture Financing (D.F.A.): note de service No. 75/38 of December 4, 1975.

129. Hierarchical centers are involved when the amount is over 20,000 A.D.

--The Director of the B.N.A. agency decides for no more than 20,000 A.D.

--The C.T.A. executive decides for amounts between 20 and 35,000 A.D. and

--The Director of the Group of Chief of the Agricultural Group for 35 to 50,000 A.D.

130. R. V. Malder, p. 261.

131. C. Lancate quoted in M. Bennoune's "Algerian Peasants and National Politics," MERIP, #48, 1976, p. 23.

132. Cited by H. Alair in "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," p. 48.

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