ABSTRACT

A CULTURAL HISTORICAL STUDY OF DOMINATION, EXPLOITATION, AND CO-OPERATION IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

By

Kenneth Delane Jensen

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic and social impact of the Arctic co-operative movement on the Eskimo communities of Canada. In 1959, the first two Arctic co-operatives were incorporated. Within the next decade, twenty-seven more were organized by the Eskimos with the assistance of the Federal and Territorial governments. Their main objectives are to provide a means of encouraging Eskimos to participate directly in the economic development of the Arctic through the promotion of co-operative ownership and enterprise and to provide a method of maximizing economic returns in Arctic communities from local business and enterprise.

The above objectives, formulated by the Co-operative Services Section of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, provide the basis for defining the problem of this study. Is co-op managed resource development an effective method of (1) maximizing economic benefit in the local communities and (2) of promoting Eskimo self-sufficiency in community organization through a greater decision-making role in Arctic development?

Kenneth Delane Jensen

The problem of determining the loci of benefit and decision-making is researched at two levels. First, the study focuses on the evolution of the Canadian Arctic as an extraneously dominated region and secondly, on the evolution of a single village--Pelly Bay in the Central Arctic--where a co-operative was introduced in 1966. From the articulation of these two levels, the region and the village, a comprehensive perspective for evaluating the co-op's potential for rational Arctic development is achieved.

The study found the progress of the co-operatives, when evaluated against the background of the Eskimos' long history of being excluded from decision-making and economic benefit by private entrepreneurs and government agencies operating in the Arctic, to be significant. Through the village co-ops the Eskimos are becoming their own entrepreneurs from the managing and financing of local production to the marketing of finished products.

Yet, despite sizable gains, the Eskimos' future is plagued by their uncertain legal status in relation to recent mineral and petroleum discoveries. The Canadian government, in partnership with the large multinational petroleum and mining corporations is moving rapidly to open the Arctic to the world energy market. Meanwhile the Eskimos are excluded from directly participating in the decision-making and economic benefit of the Arctic's new energy industry.

The study contends that the Eskimo co-ops are the legitimate economic and planning institutions in the majority of the Arctic communities and are the logical bodies to directly particpate in

all phases of resource development. The net effect will be a healthier independent Eskimo population actively participating in the co-operative development of the Canadian Arctic.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The development of Arctic Canada's resources has historically been guided by two contrasting administrative approaches: one favoring the free play of profit motives in a laissez-faire market economy and the other co-ordinating development through formalized government planning.[1] In both approaches, Eurocanadians are the dominant figures, while the Eskimos are depressed and subservient.

Under the laissez-faire philosophy, private developers are allowed a free hand in extracting the resources of a region and in dealing with the Eskimo. What all too often results from this philosophy is the subordination of Eskimo interests to the quest for quick profits by transient whites. In the planned economy, the Federal Government operates in a paternalistic manner, protecting Eskimos from economic exploitation, but excluding them from resource development decision-making.

Against this background, a third approach to development is emerging in the Canadian Arctic--the Arctic co-operative movement.

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[1] See, for further discussion, Jim Lotz, Northern Realities (Toronto: New Press, 1970) and K. J. Rae, The Political Economy of the Canadian North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), Chapter 12.

In 1959, the first two Arctic co-operatives were incorporated. Within the next decade, twenty-seven more were organized by the Eskimos with the assistance of the Federal and Territorial governments. Their main objectives are to provide a means of encouraging Eskimos to participate directly in the economic development of the Arctic through the promotion of co-operative ownership and enterprise and to provide a method of maximizing economic returns in Arctic communities from local business and enterprise.[2]

The above objectives, formulated by the Co-operative Services Section of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, provide the basis for defining the problem of this study. Is co-operative managed resource development an effective alternative to the two traditional approaches in (1) maximizing benefit in the local communities and (2) promoting Eskimo self-sufficiency in community organization through a greater decision-making role in Arctic development?

The Research Design

The problem of determining the loci of benefit and decision-making will be researched at two levels. First, the study will focus on the evolution of the Canadian Arctic as an externally dominated region and second, on the evolution of a single village--Pelly Bay in the Central Arctic--where a co-operative was introduced in 1966.

The village research falls into the category of community studies outlined by Redfield in his seminal works, The Little Community

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[2]Co-operative Services Section, Eskimo and Indian Co-operative Development Programs in Canada (Ottawa: DIAND, 1970), p. 1.

and Peasant Society and Culture. In the Little Community, Redfield suggests three possible justifications for conducting a community study. First, the investigator ". . . may be interested in understanding the history of that kind of community in that part of the world." The focus here is not on one particular community, but on the community type that is characteristic of a region. Second, he may study a small community to ". . . understand a complex nation or region not so much historically as in its contemporary condition." And third, he may ". . . make use of a community as a convenient place in which to study a special problem of general scientific interest." The community is studied, ". . . not to find out all about it, but with reference only to a limited problem stated in advance."[3]

Redfield's second and third justifications support the integration of Pelly Bay into this study. The primary objective is to evaluate the impact of co-operation in the Canadian Arctic. Pelly Bay provides a case study for a more detailed analysis of the themes identified at the regional level. From the articulation of these two scales, the region and the village, a clearer perspective for evaluating the co-op's potential for rational Arctic development will hopefully be achieved.

To answer the questions posed in the problem, a methodology incorporating a strong historical bias and focusing on the variables of decision-making and benefit must be employed in order to contrast the nature of Eskimo involvement under the three developmental

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[3]Robert Redfield, The Little Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 154-55.

approaches. Such a methodological framework has been developed by Horvath in a series of papers exploring the dimensions of the imperialist relationship in culture contact where a power disparity exists between the local and the exotic or external cultural groups.[4]

Horvath begins by defining imperialism as a two dimensional relationship involving both the exploitation and the domination of the people in one place (locality) by the people of another (exotic) place.[5] Exploitation occurs when one group excessively benefits from the relationship or, more specifically, when the people from the exotic place benefit disproportionately with regard to those residing locally. Domination refers to decision-making and occurs when the decisions governing the activities where the two cultures interact are controlled by the exotic population.

Since the loci of both the variables, benefit and decision-making, can vary over time in the relationship between two groups, they are depicted along a local-external continuum. A number of contact situations can then be delimited on a matrix formed by the intersection of points plotted along the benefit-decision-making continuums (Figure 1).

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[4]See Ronald J. Horvath, "Imperialism as Domination and Exploitation," (Unpublished manuscript); Ronald J. Horvath, "In Search of a Theory of Urbanization: Notes on the Colonial City," The East Lakes Geographer 5 (1969): 69-82; and Ronald J. Horvath, "A Definition of Colonialism," Current Anthropology 13 (1972): 45-57.

[5]In Horvath's model, the important difference between colonialism and imperialism is the presence or absence of significant numbers of permanent settlers in the colony from the colonizing power. Colonialism is not an appropriate description of the Canadian Arctic's contact history, for few Eurocanadians settled there permanently.

DIMENSIONS OF IMPERIALISM



Figure 1.--Dimensions of Imperialism.

In the matrix, the classic imperialism relationship occupies the upper right-hand cell. Benefits are excessively external to a locality and the locus of decision-making is similarly not locally based. An extreme form of imperialism would involve the enslavement and plundering of the local people by a conquering group. Such a condition existed in the early Spainsh-Indian conquest society of Latin America.

Labels are assigned to other locations in the matrix as follows. Economic imperialism, the extreme version of which is a puppet government, is depicted by a relationship where the locus of decision-making remains with the locality, but where the benefits are external. Conversely, when the benefits are local, but the locus of decision-making is external, the position is labelled paternalism, with the extreme being altruism. The imperial power cell locates the position of the dominant power(s) within a system of political units, while the cell labelled isolation defines the parameters of a society with only limited sporadic contact with the outside world.

Finally, in the center cell labelled equality, an equilibrium is established on the local-external continuum where benefit and decision-making are rationalized to enhance both populations. The co-operative movement is dedicated to creating the type of relationship envisioned in the equality position.

The arrangement of the cells in terms of delimitations and labels will no doubt meet with disapproval by many on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Some will not want to distinguish between

domination and exploitation, arguing that they go hand in hand, and others will assert that the delimitations need to be changed. For this study, however, the model helped to elucidate the changing relationship between Eskimo culture and the contact agencies infringing upon it during the past century. More specifically, domination and exploitation prove to be analytically separable variables in the changing relationship between the external world and Eskimo culture.

The Nature of Co-operation

Co-operatives offer a number of economic and social organizational advantages that lend themselves to the type of problems the Eskimos face in achieving an equality relationship in Arctic Canada. From an historical standpoint, the co-op is a proven institution for helping uprooted people adapt to a changing society. The modern co-operative movement emerged in the urban industrial environment of 18th century Europe at a time when sweeping social, technical and economic changes left large segments of the laboring class powerless in the face of mill owners, exploitative merchants and unsympathetic governments.

The majority of the early co-ops proved unsuccessful until the founding of the Rochdale Equitable Pioneer Society in 1844.[6] At the time, Rochdale was a small depressed mill town near Manchester, England. The Rochdate weavers lived in crowded quarters without adequate water

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[6]The source for the early struggles of the Rochdale Pioneers is Margaret Digby, The World Co-operative Movement (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1950).

or sanitation. Depressed by low wages, they became plagued with unemployment as the transfer to power-driven looms eliminated the need for handloom weavers. The constant unemployment problem created a system of credit which left the workers indebted to the retailers.

The Rochdale Pioneers utilized the experiences of earlier failures and effectively organized their society around certain operating procedures that have formed the model for co-ops throughout the world. A true co-op will always practice at least four of these procedures.

First, membership is open and voluntary to all who can use the services, provided they are willing to adhere to the co-op's regulations. Second, the member-customers own and control the co-ops on a democratic basis. Each member has one vote to cast in determining the affairs of his society. Voting power is not based on the number of shares a member holds, as is the case with stockholders in a corporation. The one member, one vote practice provides for equal and democratic control of management and risk taking and involves all interested members in decision-making. Third, surplus earnings are distributed to the members on the basis of their patronage. In this way, the co-op rewards the active users of its services, while a fourth practice, that of limiting dividend on member shares, prevents a large shareholder from excessively profiting from the work of the active members.

In addition to these four operating procedures, many co-ops observe other practices that co-operative historians credit to the

Rochdale Pioneers: allocating funds for educational programs, maintaining political and religious neutrality and conducting trade on a cash only basis.

The basic set of procedures practiced by the Rochdale Pioneers serves as a guide for co-ops in countries around the world. They help to give the co-ops their special status as nonprofit business organizations incorporating a distinct social philosophy.

Relation to Previous Research

The literature on Arctic Canada's contact history is extensive, yet as late as 1964, Fried correctly pointed out its major deficiency:

> Despite the fact that such agencies as the Hudson's Bay Company or various missionary groups (we might even include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) were highly disciplined and organized entities, directly and deeply involved in manipulating or controlling native peoples, no broad assessments of their impact on native populations is yet available. Though not organized or disciplined or conscious of any special purpose in contact with aboriginal peoples, whalers, miners, white trappers and traders and various sorts of transient white workers had tremendous impact on local populations--yet for information on such agents of contact, the task of working over travel literature, diaries, biographies, et., is yet to be properly programmed and carried out.[7]

Fried's assessment was followed by Jenness's volume on Canadian Eskimo administration later in 1964 and by Phillip's history of the Canadian North in 1967.[8] Both studies are far-reaching and

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[7]Jacob Fried, "Introduction: Contact Situations and their Consequences in Arctic and Subarctic North America," Arctic Anthropology 2 (1964): p. 1.

[8]Diamond Jenness, Eskimo Administration: II. Canada (Montreal: Arctic Institute of North America, 1964), and R. A. J. Phillips, Canada's North (Toronto: Macmillian, 1967).

provide a wealth of first-hand observations and insights that are invaluable in provoking the types of questions dealt with in Part I.

Two recent studies by Smith and Usher, an anthropologist and a geographer respectively, are concerned with the domination of native people in Arctic Canada.[9] Smith analyzes superordinate-subordinate relationships between natives and whites within the Mackenzie Delta and concludes that the Delta contact culture displays the following colonial characteristics.

1. Outsiders are present chiefly in order to administer, govern and 'development' the area, its resources, and its native people;

2. Outsiders are highly transient--present in the Delta for the duration of the appointment (usually two or three years);

3. Financial and other subsidies are paid to outsiders to encourage their employment in the North;

4. Outsiders form a socially distinct unit, residentially segregated in some Mackenzie Delta settlements;

5. The outsider segment is highly organized, especially in the political sphere--in this case around the massive structure of the metropolitan power (basically the federal government created to administer the area;

6. Settlers or 'new northerns' dominate the entrepreneurial sphere (economic, political, and social).[10]

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[9]Derek G. Smith, "Natives and Outsiders: Pluralism in the Mackenzie River Delta, Northwest Territories, Canada" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge: Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, 1971), and Peter J. Usher, The Bankslanders: Economy and Ecology of a Frontier Trapping Community, 3 vols (Ottawa: DIAND, 1970, 1971).

[10]Derek G. Smith, "The Implications of Pluralism for Social Change Programs in a Canadian Arctic Community," in Pilot Not Commander: Essays in Memory of Diamond Jenness, eds: Pat and Jim Lotz (Ottawa: Saint Paul University, 1971), p. 202.

The accessibility of the Delta, plus its development as a regional administrative center, produced a larger concentration of Eurocanadians than is typical of other Arctic communities. In contrast, Usher's study area, Banks Island, is distinguished by its lack of outside administrators and developers who reside locally. Yet, Usher shows a form of "metropolis-hinterland" domination affecting the daily lives of the Bankslanders. Decisions about the development of the island are constantly being made in distant metropoli such as Ottawa and relayed to regional administrative centers ("intermediate metropoli") for implementation. Usher suggests that ". . . less attention has been given to the impact of this dominance on the hinderland itself, and particularly to the question of whether the relationship is indeed a symbiotic one between equals or a parasitic one more characteristic of imperialism."[11]

A number of observers have spoken of the Arctic co-operative movement in glowing terms, but, to date, only two field studies have been conducted with the co-op as the major focus. In part, this is due to the fact that most co-operatives are only a few years old and have not had time to fully establish themselves in the community.

During the summer of 1964, Arbess conducted the first study of an Arctic co-operative.[12] He dealt with the specific sociological problem of accounting for the ease with which the George River Eskimos

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[11]Usher, The Bankslanders, 3:18.

[12]Saul E. Arbess, Social Change and the Eskimo Co-operative at George River, Quebec (Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1966).

accepted the co-operative. From the literature, he identified eight factors tending to favor the successful development of social organizations. (The theoretical basis for this study is drawn from the literature on rapid social change without disorganization.) Of the eight, four were found to be crucial in the case of George River:

> Factor 1. Where the indigenous people have command over resources and facilities which are regarded as valuable or scarce or both. These may be natural resources, skilled or semi-skilled labour, for example.
>
> Factor 5. Where external catalytic agents exist to stimulate organizational response to changes, responses which are task-specific and desired by the native people.
>
> Factor 7. Where, on the individual level, favourable personal and ideological attributes exist among the indigenous people to provide leadership under changing conditions.
>
> Factor 8. Where the pace of change is controlled by the native population which is motivated to change.[13]

Thus, the primary focus of the George River study is the introduction of a co-operative into an Eskimo community and not an evaluation of the co-operative, itself, as an agent of social and economic change.

A second and more comprehensive study was made by Vallee of the Povungnetuk Co-operative.[14] Vallee's stated objective was to document the impact of the co-operative on the settlement of Povungnetuk. He begins by describing the forms of community organizations, other than the co-operative, in order to trace changes in these different organizational units. From this structural analysis, Vallee discovered factionalism to be a major problem at Povungnetuk.

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[13] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[14] Frank G. Vallee, Povungnetuk and its Cooperative. A Case Study in Community Change (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1967).

The Eskimos' allegiance is divided between the Anglican and Catholic missions, between the Hudson's Bay Company and the co-operative. This cross-cutting of village loyalties retards the development of community solidarity behind the co-operative.

Both of these studies stress the socio-political problems of co-operation. Arbess identifies factors favoring the organization of a community co-operative, while Vallee's analysis illuminates the disruptive affect of village factionalism on co-operative functioning. Both writers provide valuable insights in these areas for comparative purposes.

Lastly, at the village level, the precontact culture of the Arviligjuarmiut Eskimo, residing in the Pelly Bay vicinity, is well-documented by Balikci and Rasmussen.[15] In addition, Balikci's discussion of changes in Arviligjuarmiut socio-economic organization, as a result of exposure to the market economy in the 1930's and 40's, provides an excellent reference for measuring possible co-op related changes at Pelly Bay.[16]

The Significance of the Research

Methodologically, the research is part of an emerging subfield in geography and anthropology attempting to study change in traditional societies within the context of the larger economic and political

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[15]Assen Balikci, Netsilik (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1971), and Knud Rasmussen, Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition, 1921-24 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1931), vol. 8, No. 1-2.

[16]Assen Balikci, Development of Basic Socio-Economic Units in Two Eskimo Communities Bulletin 202 (Ottawa: National Museum of Canada, 1964).

units of which they are a part. The point of departure for this methodological shift is a recognition of the inadequacies of studying social and cultural change within the boundaries of the local societies alone.

This theme was stated most recently in anthropology by Kiste and Ogan, the editors of a new social change series. They emphasize the need for a more comprehensive methodology than has guided earlier change studies.

> Most of the studies focused on change within traditional societies, ignoring or not taking into full account the fact that those societies were inextricably embedded within the framework of large-scale colonial empires or contemporary nation states.[17]

Brookfield brought this problem to the attention of geographers in an article calling for an end to "geographical dualism."[18] Dualism refers to the scale contrasts in geographical research in the Third World. In research conducted at the local level (community studies), inputs from the outside world are naively given, while research based at the national scale (diffusion studies), reflect only a superficial understanding of the complex processes of change within small communities. What is lacking, writes Brookfield, is that "few attempts have been made to bridge this conceptual gulf by setting a particular study within some wider explanatory framework."[19]

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[17]Robert C. Kiste and Eugene Ogan, Forward to Itinerant Townsmen, by David Jacobson (Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Company, 1972).

[18]H. C. Brookfield, "On One Geography and a Third World," Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, No. 58 (1973).

[19]Ibid., p. 14.

A second significant aspect of the research is its potential contribution to the study of co-operation. The Arctic co-operative movement is part of a growing awareness in many areas of the world of the value of co-operative enterprise. In recent years, a distinct change has occurred in general development theory and practice. Increasing attention is focusing on the rural sector of life in developing countries as opposed to earlier strategies devoted to centralized heavy industry in urban areas. The emphasis is now on utilization of local materials, decentralized control, providing employment in rural communities and reversing the population flow to the cities. A development strategy of this kind clearly provides a greater opportunity for the deployment of co-operative ideas.

In 1968, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution 2459 (XXIII) on the role of co-operatives in the Second Development Decade for the Seventies. The International Co-operative Alliance (I.C.A.) responded to the UN resolution by designating the seventies as the Co-operative Development Decade. Plans are being enacted to mobilize the many co-operative organizations throughout the world to stimulate the development of co-operative movements in the developing countries. In conjunction with the renewed stress on co-operation, research is being encouraged on all phases of the movement.

If the co-operative idea is to achieve its promised potential as an effective instrument of development for emerging minorities and classes of peoples, it must be interpreted in its true meaning as

both an economic and social institution. This demand for a more comprehensive methodology is best summarized by Laszlo Valko:

> . . . it is evident that we need a more comprehensive scientific analysis and research method in cooperation, relating to all aspects of its operation as an economic, social, educational, or community development institution. Such a method would determine the correct position of cooperatives in the modern economy.[20]

The significance of the research is inherent in the construction of its design to comply with Valko's demand for a more comprehensive research methodology. The role of the co-operative in community development is evaluated in a comprehensive cultural-historical framework. First, by focusing historically on the twin variables of decision-making and economic benefit, the investigation does not disassociate the common concern with poverty and its many dimensions--illiteracy, malnutrition, unemployment--from an institutional analysis of domination and exploitation in their various forms. Secondly, by focusing on the social and cultural impact of co-operation, the study avoids the danger of measuring the success of the movement by its balance sheets and business turnovers alone.

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[20]Laszlo Valko, Essays on Modern Cooperation (Pullman, Washington: Washington State Uniersity Press, 1964), p. iv.

PART I

THE CULTURAL-HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

CHAPTER II

A PRELUDE TO PART ONE

The Canadian Arctic, despite its neglect by political historians dealing with the process of European imperialism, was subjected to many of the same forces that transformed the traditional economies of Africa, Asia, and native South America. Once the voyages of discovery, which opened America and the East in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, proved successful, Europe became the center of a global mercantile economy with tentacles extending wherever raw materials could be acquired cheaply and manufactured goods marketed profitably.[1]

At first, Arctic Canada escaped this process. The Portugese and Spaniards, who heralded the "age of discovery," concentrated their efforts largely in the southern oceans in the search for precious metals and trade routes. By the close of the sixteenth century, technologically based changes were occurring in Western Europe which shifted the center of power northward and altered the relationship between the emerging industrial nations and the rest of the world.

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[1]The following paragraphs on European imperialism are mainly drawn from J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1902), and R. S. Lambert, Modern Imperialism (London: Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., 1928).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these changes intensified as the British, French, and Dutch applied the new technology of the Industrial Revolution with increasing efficiency in order to transform larger and larger areas of the earth's physical and cultural landscape for the benefit of the powerful few.

Larger ships, combined with the increased knowledge of the world's oceans, made voyages more regular and secure. The Industrial Revolution brought about economies of scale with the mass production of textiles, tools, weapons, and cheap luxuries such as alcohol, ornaments, and tobacco. Once local markets were saturated, these items flowed out of Europe to be exchanged for raw materials to satisfy the appetite created by the exponential industrial growth.

Overseas territories were acquired to supply raw materials and provide markets for home industries. Whenever possible, the indigenous people were pushed aside and white settlers occupied their land. Where settlement on a large scale was not feasible, due to environmental restraints, trading posts were established. Gradually, these trading operations enlarged into territorial dominions over the indigenous peoples.

Canada's indigenous populations were not peripheral to this world-wide trend toward conglomeration. In southern Canada, the Indians became raw material suppliers for the London fur trade economy as early as the 1670's. Later, with fur resources exhausted and the agriculturally skilled European settlers pressing for more open land, the Indians were confined to less productive sites to eke out a miserable existence under the dole of a neglectful government.

In northern Canada, stunted trees give way to the barren lands of tundra and ice, no home for the farmers of Europe. Here the masters of mercantilism employed an alternate strategy to harvest the wealth of the Arctic. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, a small number of adventurous Europeans were successful in establishing an integrated network of trading posts. From this base, dominion was extended over the Eskimo, their land, and the wealth they could be enticed to produce.

Historically, the process was gradual. The Europeans' uncertainty about the commercial value of the land resources combined with the inaccessibility of the ice-locked interior, limited contact with the Eskimo to the coastal areas until the twentieth century. The first contacts were made by the vangards of European mercantilism, the explorers. These men, their voyages sponsored by the commercial interests of Europe, attempted to discover and chart a passage across the top of the Americas to the East. They persisted in this unsuccessful quest for 400 years, dating from John Cabot's pioneer journey in 1497 to Newfoundland and, finally, terminating in Amundsen's navigation of the waters of Arctic North America in 1906.

Although the early explorers did not achieve their goal of discovering a shorter route to the Orient, they did provide information about conditions in the waters of Canada's eastern Arctic. Their navigation charts opened up the Atlantic coast of Canada and their reports of the vast untapped marine resources of these waters attracted the fishing and whaling fleets of western Europe.

The first Europeans to have a pronounced influence on the Eskimo of Arctic Canada were the whalers and fishermen. Beginning in the 1840's, they discovered a profit could be made from these indigenous Arctic dwellers--a profit in the trade of furs and ivory that would offset the losses of a poor whaling season. In addition, the whalers quickly capitalized on the labor of the coastal Eskimo, employing them as fresh meat suppliers and in the whale hunt itself.

In time, the stimulus of great profits in furs attracted men who specialized solely in trading. While the whalers were transient, the new traders established the first permanent European residences among the Eskimo. From these permanent posts, the Hudson's Bay Company transformed the Canadian Arctic into a virtual vassal of London.

In order to maintain year-round trading posts, it was necessary to develop a reliable transportation network that assured a yearly supply of trade articles and foodstuffs. The development of this network was instrumental in opening up the Arctic to other exotic agents. The heavy costs of transport were carried by the profitable fur trade. Thus, when the missionaries responded to the call of the North, they were able to travel on Company ships laden with the year's trade supplies, and at the posts they found shelter in Company buildings.

During the early decades of the twentieth century, the Canadian Government sent a fledgling military institution, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to join the missionaries and traders. The police primarily were sent to assure Canadian sovereignty of the

Arctic islands. Their secondary functions were to protect the Eskimo from the excesses of the whalers and traders and to teach the Eskimo Canadian law.

The establishment of police detachments next to the trading posts and missions completed the exotic take-over. Arctic Canada was now governed by a military administrator, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner, economically exploited by the trader, and educationally and spiritually directed by the missionary.

No wars were fought, nor were large armies marshaled to the Arctic. When the exotic institutions arrived, they possessed a backlog of colonial experience to apply to the contact situation. Earlier lessons of their counterparts in Africa, Asia, and in southern Canada among the Indians taught them that creating dependency was far more effective, in the long run, than aggression and destruction. As a result, the process of domination assumed more humane characteristics than earlier conquests in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. They were tolerant in dislodging the shaman and indirect in extending economic and political domination over the inhabitants. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police cautioned a gradual transition based on mutual trust. The killing of a white man by an Eskimo was not avenged by the massacre of local villagers, but the outcome was the same as in other dominated regions of the world: the creation of a contact society in which the indigenous people had no voice in the decision-making structure directing their lives and left them economically imprisoned by the exotic institutions.

To be sure, there was dissension between these vanguards of Western Civilization in the Arctic; for it would be imposing too great an order on the nature of human institutions to contend that they presented, in all situations, a united front in their domination of the Eskimo. They openly criticized each other's objectives and methods in their annual reports and diaries, but when the European socio-economic system they imposed on the Arctic landscape was threatened, they united to affirm their right of supremacy.

The major proposition presented here is that the dynamic process in which Europeans gained control of Eskimo institutions is revealed only when these exotic contact institutions are viewed from the perspective of integrated extensions of European culture rather than as separate entities competing with one another. Admittedly, as separate institutions, the weights of their individual influences varied in different communities due to historical and ecological circumstances. In certain communities the trader was the dominant, in others the missionary or the police officer; but anthropologists have long recognized the supportive functional integration of institutions within a given culture. An ideological foundation permeates all institutions of a culture justifying the social order and sanctifying stability. The type of society built upon a laizez-faire market economy where individualism and accumulation of private property are encouraged requires a different moral justification from a society built upon co-operation and mutual aid.

The major objective of European mercantilism was to change the organization of the aboriginal economy in order to integrate the

Eskimo into a worldwide market system. But, what economists define as economic behavior is in reality only a vaguely conceived behavioral component of a larger cultural configuration. To change the economy requires the total configuration of the culture to be altered. In this task, the trader's objectives were given moral justification by a mercantile based religion, and with the arrival of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the mode of operation of the market economy was codified by the overt authority of the Canadian Government.

The result of their collective action was a stable equilibrium that gradually evolved during the first half of the twentieth century, in which the dominant exotic institutions jealously guarded their stewardship of the Eskimo. They attacked the disruptive influences of other Europeans whose excesses were totally distructive to all interests. Overly zealous missionaries or police officers who adhered to rigid enforcement of their duties were criticized for dislodging native traditions too rapidly and interfering with the fur trade. Independent traders, who marketed large quantities of alcohol and who were unscrupulous in their dealings with the Eskimo, threatened the established European institutions because they threatened the survival of the Eskimo. Without the Eskimo, there would be no fur trappers, no souls to save, and no Arctic inhabitants through which the government could lay claims to contested territories.

Thus, the history of domination and exploitation in the Canadian Arctic is a process in which a workable equilibrium evolves and is maintained between the disparate populations. The historical

record is clear. If an equilibrium is not reached between the participants in a power disparity relationship that guarantees a minimal level of subsistence to the exploited, the system will not survive. A classical example is the depopulation of native Latin America by the Spanish. Workable levels of exploitation were not established and the human component in the resource base was destroyed resulting in the importation of Africans to work the mines and plantations.

The following two chapters, III and IV, examine the process whereby the objectives and practices of the exotic institutions overlapped to impose a socioeconomic structure upon the Arctic in which the Eskimos were dominated and exploited. In Chapter III, domination and exploitation are dealt with as functions of dependency. The establishment of dependency involves a process that will be called the dependency generating process. This process began in the accessible coastal waters of the Eastern Arctic after 1840, expanded into the Western Arctic at the turn of the century, and finally penetrated the isolated Central Arctic after 1910. The problem will be to trace this process to learn how the exotic institutions contributed to it, and how they used the Eskimo's dependency for their own purposes of domination and exploitation.

Chapter IV analyzes the product of the dependency generating process by employing the concept of a cultural synthesis. Here, the focus is on the resultant socioeconomic arrangements that emerged in Arctic Canada in the early 1930's. These arrangements represent a synthesis of the forces set in motion during the dependency generating process.

The Federal Government officially recognized the collapse of the fur trapping economy in 1952 after a number of years of severely depressed fur prices and published accounts of Eskimo suffering. Chapter V examines the structural weaknesses of this economy, including the heavy physical and economic burden the Eskimos were carrying to maintain the contact society. The examination goes back to the 1930's to establish the position that the depressed conditions precipitating government action in the 1950's were endemic to Eskimo life two decades earlier.

Chapters VI and VII outline the exotic institution's response to the conditions dramatically brought to public attention in the early 1950's. This response has been largely predicated on development models patterned for Reserve Indians, and has systematically excluded Eskimos from the decision-making relating to the development of Arctic resources.

In the concluding chapter, VIII, the applicability of applying a model of domination and exploitation to the contact history of the Canadian Arctic is discussed with particular reference to the current problems of Eskimo participation in Arctic development and self-sufficiency in social organization. Chapter VIII also serves to integrate Parts I and II. The significance of the co-operative movement must be viewed in the light of the Eskimo's history of subordination to the exotic contact institutions.

CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEPENDENCY (ca. 1840-1930)

Arctic Whalers

The primary step in subjecting the Eskimos to the demands of the mercantile economy was to establish dependency. Here, the whalers played an important role; for it was through their efforts that the dependency generating process was initiated. The process was not the result of an overt policy on the part of the whalers. Rather, it was the consequence of technological displacement. The whalers introduced European manufactured goods, particularly weapons and tools, that displaced the traditional tool inventory of the Eskimos. Within a generation, the Eskimos began to rely on the annual arrival of ships to bring them their means to secure a livelihood.

A Brief History of Arctic Whaling

The history of this initial phase of the dependency generating process is difficult to document prior to the 1840's. Accurate statistics on Arctic whaling from the 1700's and early 1800's are wanting. Apparently, by the later 1500's, a small number of Basque and English crews visited the coast of Labrador for whaling and fishing purposes. This operation was immediately overshadowed during the 1600's by the newly discovered Spitzbergen whaling grounds. Exploitation of

Spitzbergen was so intense that by 1700 the ground was exhausted and interest shifted to distant Davis Strait where whales were reported to be in abundance.

The Dutch, who had monopolized the Spitzbergen whaling industry, were the first to operate on a large scale in Davis Strait. The English whaler, Scoresby, gives some idea of the magnitude of the Dutch operation in Table 1.

TABLE 1.--Dutch Davis Strait Whale Fishery, 1719-1779.

Period	Number of Vessels	Average/Year
1719-1728	748	75
1729-1738	975	97
1739-1748	368	37
1749-1758	340	34
1759-1768	296	29
1769-1778	434	43

Source: William Scoresby, An Account of the Arctic Regions (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable & Co., 1820), 2:156.

The first colonial American whaler is reported to have sailed for David Strait in 1732. Five years later, the Davis Strait fleet from Massachusetts consisted of between 50 and 60 vessels.[1]

During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, international instability severely cut back Dutch and American operations.

[1]Alexander Starbuck, History of the American Whale Fishery (Boston: By the Author, 1878), pp. 168-69.

At the close of the century, the entire Dutch fleet numbered less than forty vessels.[2] This retreat followed the general decline of Dutch commercial eminence. The Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 played havoc with the American fleet forcing it to abandon the Arctic waters of Canada.

British merchants were slow in capitalizing on the whaling industry prior to 1800. However, with the decline of Dutch and American activity, the British stepped in and outfitted the dominant Arctic fleet. In 1830, British whaling vessels in the Greenland and Davis Strait grounds totaled ninety-one.[3]

Eskimo-whaler contacts during the early period of Arctic whaling were sporadic. First of all, the intensity and duration of contact was limited by the demands of whaling. Vessels entered Davis Strait in April and departed by mid-summer. The whalers' major objective was to capture as many of the prized whales as possible and return to Europe before ice blocked their passage. Secondly, the waters of Davis Strait, bordering Baffin Island, and the icefilled Baffin Bay were insufficiently charted until John Ross's 1819 voyage of exploration.

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[2]Walter Tower, A History of the American Whale Fishery (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1907), p. 18.

[3]Howard Clark, "The Whale Fishery: History and Present Condition of the Fishery," in The Fisheries and Fishery Industries of the United States, ed: George B. Goode, vol. 2, sec. 5 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries, 1887).

Farther south, Colonial whalers hunted in Hudson Bay as early as 1764.[4] Also, the Hudson's Bay Company engaged in a limited whaling operation in the Bay during the 1700's. There is evidence to indicate that these whalers were in contact with coastal Eskimos.[5]

Captain John Ross's voyage to Baffin Bay in 1819 provided the whalers with valuable navigation charts. Ross proved ships could work westward through the ice of Baffin Island where whales abounded in the bays and inlets.[6] This discovery, coupled with the declining returns in the accessible northern Atlantic waters by the mid-1800's, shifted the whaling operation deeper and deeper into the straits and bays of the Eastern Canadian Arctic.

Contact between the Eskimos and the whalers became more orderly and routine with the establishment of shore stations to better utilize Eskimo labor and exploit the fur trade (Figure 2). The English whaler, Captain Penny, is credited with establishing the first of these shore-based operations in 1840 at Cumberland Sound. This innovation had a profound influence on the coastal Eskimo for the remainder of the nineteenth century.

Following Penny's example, an increasing number of whalers outfitted themselves to winter in the Arctic where they established

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[4]Alfred Lubbock, The Arctic Whalers (Glasgow: Brown, Son & Ferguson, Ltd., 1937), p. 103.

[5]Lieutenant Chappell, during an 1814 voyage to Hudson Bay, reported the Eskimo of south Baffin Island and Hudson Strait to be well conditioned to the annual arrival of ships and to consider the event as a sort of trading fair. Edward Chappell, Narrative of a Voyage to Hudson's Bay (London: J. Mawman, 1817).

[6]John Ross, Exploring Baffin's Bay (London: Longman, 1819).



Figure 2.--Whaling Stations.
Source: See sources for Tables 1, 2 and 3, Appendix A.

shore stations in the protected harbors along the east coast of Baffin Island and in Hudson Bay.[7] American whalers staked out the Hudson Bay grounds, while whalers from Scotland operated out of the Baffin Island stations.

From these stations, the whalers had access to a large population of Eskimo living on Baffin Island and along the coasts of Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait, Foxe Basin and north to Repulse Bay. During the winter months, the Eskimos were hired to provide fresh meat and clothing for the crews. Their summers were spent manning small boats in search of whales, supplying fresh meat and working the mica mines of Lake Harbour. For their services, the Eskimo received weapons, ammunition, cooking utensils, ornaments, liquor, tobacco, sugar and flour.

The area the whalers exploited was increased by the annual migration inland of the coastal groups to hunt caribou and secure a supply of skins for winter clothing for themselves and the whaling crews. Inland, the coastal Eskimo came in contact with isolated

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[7]The first American station was established in Cumberland Sound when the McClennan landed twelve members of its crew to spend the winter of 1850 among the Eskimos for the purpose of trading and capturing whales and seals. By 1853, the entire crew of the McClennan wintered in Cumberland Sound. Beginning in 1860, the McClennan spent two winter seasons in Frobisher Bay living with the Eskimos in their huts. Clark, The Fisheries, pp. 95-96.

During the winter of 1863, Cumberland Sound was crowded with four Scottish and two American whalers. All employed Eskimos to supply them with fresh meat and to help in the whaling chase. Lubbock, Arctic Whalers, p. 382.

At the peak of Hudson Bay whaling in 1864, fifteen American ships were reported wintering in the Bay. A. P. Low, The Cruise of the Neptune, 1903-04 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1906), p. 277. Given an average of thirty-two men per whaler, the American population in Hudson Bay in 1864 approximated 450 to 500 men.

nomadic bands eager to exchange their native produce for weapons and tobacco. In this manner European trade goods diffused from the coastal whaling stations.

Whaling in Hudson Bay and the surrounding straits and inlets reached its peak in the 1860's and declined soon thereafter until its collapse at the turn of the century. Falling prices, combined with a policy of uncontrolled exploitation by the whaling fleets brought about its ruin. Figure 2 chronicles the decline of whaling in the Eastern Canadian Arctic.

In the western Canadian Arctic, whaling was limited both in time and space. Whalers had been active in the Pacific Arctic for over fifty years before they were forced, in the 1890's by declining profits, to venture beyond Point Barrow into the uncharted waters of Beaufort Sea.

The first vessel to make this voyage, the Grampus, returned to San Francisco in 1891 with a cargo valued at $250,000.[8] Five years after the Grampus, in 1895, fifteen ships wintered in the protected harbors of Herschel and Baillie Islands.[9] Figures on the number of whalers operating in the Beaufort Sea after 1896 are incomplete. A peak was apparently reached around the turn of the century

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[8]A. M. Jarvis, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1909, Appendix K, p. 140.

[9]John Cook, Pursuing the Whale (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926), p. 56.

(Figure 2).[10] In 1906, the demand for whalebone in women's clothing ceased as fashions changed and the price dropped from an average of $4 per pound, during the 1890's, to a low of 40 cents in 1906. Only a couple of ships, primarily outfitted for the Eskimo trade, visited Beaufort Sea after that date.

Beaufort Sea whaling was similar to that of Hudson Bay. The short open water period, combined with the 5,000 mile return voyage to San Francisco made wintering in the ice a prerequisite for a profitable outfit. The Mackenzie Delta Eskimos concentrated on Herschel and Baillie Islands where they were employed supplying food for the whaling crews. The whaling captains utilized Eskimo labor to harvest the fur resources of the Delta by providing steel traps to those who would alter their annual migrations to include trapping.

Eskimo-Whaler Socioeconomic Relations

As an economic enterprise, whaling was exploitative of all concerned except the whaling merchants and senior officers. The regular crewmen often received little more in reward at the end of the whaling cruise than the Eskimo. American crewmen were not paid a standard wage. Rather, they were given a share of the total profits through

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[10] Finnie reports that during one winter (no date given), 23 ships were locked in the ice. Richard Finnie, Lure of the North, (Philadelphia: Mckay, 1940), p. 15.

Inspector Howard's 1906 report places the number of ships comprising the Beaufort Sea whaling fleet at twenty-one. Not all of these vessels operated in the Arctic at the same time. For example, ten ships wintered at Herschel and Baillie Islands in 1906. D. M. Howard, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1906, Appendix D, p. 20.

a method of payment known as the lay system. This system assured the whaling merchant seventy percent of the net profit.[11] The merchants were also able to profit on the remaining thirty percent allotted to the officers and crewmen as most of the men who signed on lacked the financial resources to outfit themselves with clothing and necessities for the long voyage. They were allowed credit for supplies from the ship's store or "slop-chest"--these purchases being deducted from their lay. The "slop-chest" was calculated by the whaling merchants to yield at a minimum 100 percent profit per voyage.[12] The result was that many a whaler returned to find himself in debt to the ship's owner.

The economist, Hohman, summarized the negative nature of the lay system in terms of the allocation of risks:

> Obviously, then, this lay system partially shifted the most distinctive and onerous entrepreneurial function, the bearing of industrial risks, from the entrepreneur to the worker. Instead of the usual situation in which the entrepreneur contracted to pay a definite rate of wages to his workmen and assumed the risks of an industry, a special condition was created under which the whaling merchant materially lightened his financial burden by proportioning his wages bill to the amount of his profits. And obviously the more his risks were decreased in this manner, the more were those of his workers increased.[13]

If the whaling merchants exploited the regular crewmen to inflate their profits, the Eskimos were subjected to an even heavier hand. Some concrete examples illustrate this fact.

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[11] Elma Hohman, The American Whaleman (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), p. 285.

[12] Ibid., p. 250.

[13] Ibid., p. 222.

Entire villages of Eskimos were employed during the winter months to provide fresh meat and clothing for the whaling crews.[14] Their summers were spent manning small boats in search of whales and supplying fresh meat. The Eskimos not fully involved in the whaling activity were equipped with traps and encouraged to bring their furs to the whaling station. In addition, several families of Baffin Islanders were employed in the mica mining operation on Lake Harbour.

Families employed on the whaling ships were issued a weekly maintainance ration of 4 pounds ship biscuits, 1/4 pound coffee, 2 1/2 pounds molasses and 4 plugs of tobacco.[15] Eskimos at the whaling stations fortunate enough to capture a whale were given extra trade goods. A standard procedure, recorded by Superintendent Moodie of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, was to award the Eskimo a whale boat (valued at $120 in the United States) after a catch. The profit of this transaction can be estimated "When it is remembered that whalebone is worth $10,000 per ton, and that a good whale yields from 1,500 to sometimes 3,000 pounds of bone . . . ."[16] Should the Eskimos have an unsuccessful whaling season, they could acquire a whale boat in

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[14]During the winter of 1894-95, Captain Cook reported 200 Eskimo living on Herschel Island. "Those old enough hunted for the crews consumption." Cook, Pursuing the Whale, p. 56.

Even as late as 1903, Low reported that 500 Eskimos were dependent on the whaling stations of Blacklead, Kakerten, and Cape Haven in Cumberlund Sound. Low, Cruise, p. 9.

[15]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, p. 11.

[16]J. D. Moodie, "Royal Northwest Mounted Police Report," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1905, p. 11.

exchange for seventy-five to one hundred musk ox skins, valued at $50 each.[17]

Trade was an extremely profitable enterprise for the whalers. In 1885, Lieutenant Gordon, Commander of the Canadian Hudson's Bay Expedition, observed ". . . the value of trade in musk-ox robes, caribou robes, seal skins, and ivory forms no unimportant part of the profit of the whaling voyage."[18] This fact was seconded in the western Arctic by Captain Bodfish. "Arctic whalers were trading ships as well as whalers, and it was quite on the cards that a good profit might be made in trade even if very few whales were taken."[19]

Just how good this profit could be is evident from a variety of sources. Captain Hadley, a veteran whaler in the Pacific Arctic, states that the stations made from 500 to 1,000 percent profit.[20] In the eastern Arctic, Superintendent Moodie is more specific. From information compiled through his own observations and from conversations with whaling captains he reports:

> Everything owned by the trader is valued at twenty times its price, and everything owned by the native is cut down in value a hundred fold . . . As an example I may quote that 100 primers for '38 or '44 calibre Winchester rifles are considered fair

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[17] Ibid.

[18] A. R. Gordon, "Report on the Hudson's Bay Expedition," in Our Northland, ed: Charles R. Tuttle (Toronto: C. Blackett Robinson, 1885) Appendix, p. 587.

[19] Harston Bodfish, Chasing the Bowhead (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 191.

[20] John R. Hadley, "Whaling off the Alaskan Coast," American Geographical Society Bulletin, 1915, 47:917.

> exchange for a musk ox robe. The primers cost $1.08 per 1,000 in the United States . . . . I may also quote that a 38 cal. single shot rifle and set of reloading tools, worth at the outside $10, is given for fifteen prime musk ox robes. With the robes the hunter is expected, if possible to bring in the head, and a good specimen will realize $50.[21]

During the declining years of whaling, the few remaining ships relied more and more on the Eskimo's labor and produce to supplement their meager catch. For example, in 1904 the whaler Active arrived at its home port in Scotland with 15 tons of mica, 30 musk ox hides, 157 fox pelts and 32 bear skins in addition to its catch of whales.[22] All of these products were the direct result of Eskimo labor.

The value of European and American merchants of whaling and the supplementary Eskimo trade can only be partially indicated. Lieutenant Gordon estimated Hudson Bay yielded $2,193,300 to New England whalers between 1862-1885, for an average of $27,500 per voyage. No mention is made of the contribution of Eskimo trade.[23] Western Canadian Arctic figures are more complete. Inspector Jarvis enlisted the services of several veteran whaling captains to compute the value of whales and furs taken from Beaufort Sea and the Mackenzie Delta. During the period of intense whaling, 1890-T906, $13,450,000

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[21]Moodie, "Mounted Police Report," p. 11. Also as an example of the lucrative musk ox trade, Moodie reported that two ships, the Era and Active, were in possession of 550 skins.

[22]Lubbock, Arctic Whalers, p. 447.

[23]Gordon, Hudson's Bay Expedition, p. 586.

in whale products and $1,400,000 in furs were landed in San Francisco for an average of nearly $1,000,000 per year.[24]

The whalers were in the Arctic to maximize profits from whaling and from the Eskimo trade in the shortest possible time. They were not interested in altering the socio-religious foundations of Eskimo society. As a result, they were seldom in a position where it was necessary to challenge the decision-making powers of the prestigeous hunters and shamen in matters relating to social control within the band.

Nevertheless, in their economic relations with the Eskimo the whaling captains established a model of superordinate-subordinate behavior that set the pattern for later exotic agents to follow. The whaling captains controlled the manner in which exchanges were instituted by arbitrarily establishing the value of goods and services supplied by the Eskimo. Captain Cook related how the hunters who supplied the crews with fresh meat were paid. The game they brought in was credited to them and when the season was over they were told by the captain how much they would receive in trade goods.[25]

The missionary, Bishop Fleming, offers an even more illustrative example of the arbitrary manner in which the captains dealt with the Eskimo. The following example was drawn from his relationship with Captain Murray of the Active.

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[24]Jarvis, "Report of the Mounted Police," p. 140.

[25]Cook, Pursuing the Whale, p. 222.

> He was the old-time whaling captain at his best . . . . He looked upon himself as the father of all the Eskimo with whom he came into contact and they accepted him as such. When the ship arrived the natives came swarming on board, bringing their furs, ivory and blubber and, with the innocence of children, handed these to Murray . . . . He gave each family such things as he felt they required, and not necessarily in proportion to the quantity of fur which any individual hunter had brought in.[26]

The Role of the Whalers in the Dependency Generating Process

Although the whalers were not directly interested in changing the Eskimo's sociocultural life, they clearly initiated the process. They supplied the Eskimos with tools and weapons he could neither repair nor replace without benefiting the whaling operation. Close contact with whalers in the Eastern Arctic for nearly three quarters of a century eroded the Eskimo's traditional independence. As Arctic whaling drew to a close, Low, in a 1906 report, left little doubt that this was the case when he warned the Federal Government of their reliance:

> The natives have for years looked for assistance to the whalers both on Baffin island and Hudson bay. They have quite given up the use of their primitive weapons, and there is no doubt that a withdrawal of whalers would lead to great hardship and many deaths among these people if the Government did not . . . take their place and supply the Eskimo with the necessary guns and ammunition.[27]

And three years later, Sergeant Fitzgerald, commander of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police post on Herschel Island, filed the following report for the western Arctic:

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[26]Archibald Fleming, Archibald the Arctic (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957), p. 164.

[27]Low, Cruise of the Neptune, p. 271.

> This has been the hardest year the natives have felt for a long time owing to the ships not getting in . . . . I issued some of them flour and bacon and tried to give them a square meal about once a week. There were 47 natives on the island, and it was impossible to feed them from our supplies, they would not last two weeks, but we filled their stomachs now and then . . . . This winter they had to eat a number of their seal skins, boiled . . . . It was very hard on the children, they could not go the seal skin and seal oil.[28]

The policy of laissez-faire was firmly implanted during this initial stage of Arctic development which occurred approximately between 1840 and 1900. Government controls of the whaling operation were non-existent, leaving the whalers free to extract millions of dollars in resource annually while the Eskimos became destitute and dependent. The stage was thus set for the next phase of the dependency generating process when new exotic institutions, especially the trader, the missionary and the Royal Mounted Police, entered the Canadian Arctic between 1890 and 1930 to make greater demands upon the biotic and cultural foundations of Eskimo society.

Arctic Traders

The vacuum left by the collapse of whaling was soon filled by a number of trading posts, first in the Hudson Bay region and along the Western Arctic coast between 1890 and 1915, and then into the ice-clogged passages of the Central Arctic during the 1920's.

The London based Hudson's Bay Company was the dominant single trading concern throughout the Canadian Arctic during this phase of expansion, but it was by no means without competitors. Ex-whalers and

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[28] F. J. Fitzgerald, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1910, Appendix K, p. 103.



Figure 3.--Trading Posts, 1890-1940.
Source: See sources for Table 4, Appendix A.

independent traders swarmed into the Western and Central Arctic, and on both the east and west coasts, small, but well-financed fur trading companies vied with the "Bay" for the Eskimos' patronage.

Early Eskimo Resistance to the Market Economy

At this point it is necessary to break the continuity between the collapse of whaling and the rise of the traders and trace the diffusion of Arctic trading posts back to their unsuccessful beginnings. As early as 1718, the Hudson's Bay Company outfitted expeditions in northern Hudson Bay to promote trade.[29] Most of these attempts proved unsuccessful until the 1900's, owing first to the traders' failure to dislodge the Eskimo from his traditional economy, and secondly, to the problem of communication in the vast uncharted expanses of the Arctic.

The failures of these early trading ventures underscore the basic differences between the traders' and the whalers' relationships with the Eskimos. For the whalers, the Eskimo trade was a profitable supplement that was gradually fostered over many years. The main trade items of the whaling stations were weapons, ammunition, and tools. They avoided developing a market for European clothing and food and

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[29]David Vaughan sailed the Hudson's Bay Company supply ship Success north of Churchill River in 1718 to trade with the Eskimos. Kenneth Davies, ed., Letters from Hudson Bay, 1703-40 (London: The Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1965), p. 64.

Henry Kelsey sailed the Success as far north as Marble Island in 1719. he exchanged two Indian slave boys for two Eskimo boys with the intent of teaching them English. Ibid., p. 392.

In a 1738 letter, Richard Staunton, of the company's post at Moose River, refers to an Eskimo slave used as an interpreter on the trading ships in Hudson Bay. Ibid., p. 273.

encouraged the Eskimos to remain dependent on their local food resources. This was also in the interests of the whaling merchants as they relied on the Eskimos to supply warm winter clothing and fresh meat for their crews.

The traders, on the other hand, were wholly dependent upon the fur trade to support their operation. Their profits depended on an intensive fur trade that required the Eskimos to alter the seasonal schedule of their food quest to include prolonged periods of trapping. In return, the trader provided imported food (flour, lard, sugar, and tea) to sustain the Eskimos through the long trapping season when they were unable to devote time to hunting. Of course, the imported food was exchanged for furs and this in turn stimulated more trapping.

The chronicles of the early traders leave little doubt that the Eskimos frustrated their efforts to impose a market economy. For example, in the 1830's, the Hudson's Bay Company established a trading post on the Ungave Penninsula. The two Europeans manning the post, Finlayson and McLean, employed every means at their disposal to entice the Eskimos to become fur trappers. Finlayson notes how "Every useful article in the store was displayed to their view and every encouragement was made to induce them to hunt fur animals, seals and whales."[30] But, Finlayson found the Eskimos to be preoccupied with securing food. When he approached them about trading some of their large quantities of seal oil, they postoned their decision until the fall caribou hunt

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[30]Nicol Finlayson, "Journal of Nicol Finlayson, 1830-1833," in Northern Quebec and Labrador Journals and Correspondence, 1819-35, ed: Kenneth Davies (London: The Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1963), p. 123.

proved successful.[31] McLean, who managed the Ungave post in the early 1840's, until it was finally abandoned, reported similar obstacles:

> The extreme poverty and barrenness of their country, and the pertinacious adherence to their sealskin dress, which no argument of ours could induce them to exchange for the less comfortable articles of European clothing, were insurmountable obstacles.[32]

In 1885, Lieutenant Gordon learned, while in Hudson Bay, that the Hudson's Bay Company rated some of their better Indian hunters to be worth $1,000 per year to a trader, and a good Eskimo hunter to be worth $500.[33] Later observations from Hudson Bay by the Leiths in 1909 offer an explanation for this differential. The Leiths found that the Indian:

> . . . is dependent on the white man for supplies and goes to the post often for them, while the Eskimo loves his independence and has the ability to live away from civilization, many coming to a post only at intervals of four or five years. Many Eskimo women and children never visit a post.[34]

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the majority of Eskimos were secure in their Arctic habitat with only occasional journeys to the trading posts and whaling stations for weapons, ammunition, and tools. Their degree of independence from the trader was based on an ability to secure their food and clothing needs from the local environment. In contrast, the Indians of the plains and northen forests were no longer self-sufficient in animal resources. Their

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[31] Ibid., p. 154.

[32] John McLean, Notes of a Twenty-five Years' Service in the Hudson's Bay Territory (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1932), p. 239.

[33] Gordon, Hudson's Bay Expedition, p. 587.

[34] C. K. Leith and A. T. Leith, Summer and Winter on Hudson Bay (Madison, Wisconsin: Cartwell Printing Co., 1912), p. 46.

long and disruptive association with the trading companies, coupled with the destruction of the great buffalo herds reduced the Indians to dependency.

The Europeans in North American learned early that the productivity of the native populations increased in proportion to their dependence on trade. George Simpson, Governor-in-Chief of the Hudson's Bay Company from 1826 to 1860, expressed his concern regarding the problem of keeping the Indians dependent and "productive" when he wrote:

> I have made it my study to examine the nature and character of the Indians and . . . I am convinced they must be ruled with a rod of Iron, to bring, and keep them in a proper state of subordination, and the most certain way to effect this is by letting them feel their dependence upon us. In the Woods and Northern barren grounds this measure ought to be pursued rigidly next year if they do not improve, and no credit, not so much as a load of ammunition given them until they exhibit an inclination to renew their habits of industry. In the plains however, this system will not do, as they can live independent of us, and by withholding ammunition, tobacco and spirits, the Staple Articles of Trade, for one year they will recover the use of their Bows and Spears and lose sight of their smoking and drinking habits; it will therefore be necessary to bring those tribes round by mild and cautious measures which may soon be effected.[35]

The Undermining of the Ecological Basis of Eskimo Independence

The difficult task of converting the Eskimos into arduous fur trappers was accomplished in a remarkably few years in two ways. First, the process was initiated by a trader-promoted transformation of the traditional Eskimo ecological relationship, and secondly, it

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[35]George Simpson, "Governor Simpson to A. Colvile, Ft. Garry, 20 May 1822," in Fur Trade and Empire, ed: Frederick Meek (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 179.

was carried to its climax by a series of management techniques designed to assure a constant flow of furs to the trading posts.

Between 1915 and 1930, the traders mounted a major campaign to dislodge the Eskmos from their traditional ecological niche. This was achieved by the massive introduction of rifles and ammunition through a liberal credit system. The Eskimos were given weapons by the traders in return for pledging to bring in a specified number of fox pelts in the spring.

At first, the trade relationship seems to have been satisfactory for the Eskimos and was similar to the earlier arrangements made with the whalers. They interrupted their annual cycle only for short periods to secure enough pelts to supply their minimal needs. For the traders, this was only a preliminary stage. To profit, they needed more productivity from the Eskimos, and they achieved this goal by offering them a price for the abundant caribou that served as a basic clothing and food staple along with the seal.

Numerous accounts by police officers, traders, and members of government scientific expeditions provide glimpses of this process as it spread eastward from the Mackenzie Delta into the isolated Central Arctic. During the winter of 1915, Inspector Phillips reported the Mackenzie Eskimos to be occupied hunting caribou and not attempting to secure any quantity of furs.[36] According to Phillips, this situation occurred due to the extremely low price being paid for pelts. The Eskimos still had access to their stable food and clothing base

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[36]J. W. Phillips, "Royal Northwest Mounted Police Report," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1916, Appendix M, p. 189.

allowing them a degree of freedom from the white traders and from the fluctuating nature of the world fur market.

One year later, Inspector LaNauze made several references in his 1916 report about the large herds of caribou and the self-sufficient Eskimos on Victoria Island. The Eskimos supplied their food and clothing needs by hunting the caribou only along the coast, leaving the interior of the island to serve as a vast game sactuary. Unfortunately, when LaNauze concluded his report, he underestimated the power of the indiscriminate use of technology and a market economy to destroy an ecological balance:

> . . . the Barren Land caribou does not yet stand in any great danger of extermination; and as the Eskimo are not at all wasteful in their habits, the importation of rifles will not greatly tend to diminish the numbers of deer.[37]

Even while Inspector LaNauze was writing his journal, the seeds of destruction that would discredit his prediction were being planted by the traders. Rifles and ammunition were distributed among the Eskimos on a massive scale and a bounty was placed on the caribou.[38] Within a few short years, the rifle began to make its impact.

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[37]C. D. LaNauze, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1917, Appendix O, p. 239.

[38]The veteran Hudson's Bay Company trader, Philip Godsell, leaves little doubt that the seventy-five cents per skin value placed on the caribou was indeed levied by some traders as a bounty designed to destroy the herds and the Eskimo's independence.

"The traders wanted furs. But just as long as there were lots of caribou around, the Eskimo was independent of the trader's hardtack, flour, tea, and sowbelly, and he merely trapped white foxes when he felt so disposed. So, just as the United States Army officer defeated the warlike Plains Indians by encouraging the massacre of the buffalo, so did certain traders . . . deliberately encourage the wholesale slaughter of the caribou herds, the Eskimo's standby . . . to convert him into a trapper, dependent upon the trader and his

On a patrol from Herschel Island to Coronation Gulf, in 1920, Corporal Cornelius witnessed the beginning of an ecological disaster--the wanton slaughter of caribou. Cornelius was surprised to find the great number of rifles distributed among the Eskimos during the short period the traders had been in the area. "Practically every native on the mainland is the owner of a rifle now, and even on the southwest coast of Victoria Island there are but few bows and arrows still in use."[39]

Cornelius observed how the traders encouraged the Eskimos to hunt the caribou for their skins and sinews and he warned his superiors in Ottawa:

> . . . if this wasteful slaughter is allowed to continue, it won't be long before the deer are driven from the country and the natives left unable to get warm clothing for the cold winter months.[40]

In 1922, Philip Godsell, Inspecting Officer for the Hudson's Bay Company, visited trading posts between the Mackenzie Delta and Coronation Gulf during the height of the caribou slaughter. At one post, which supplied a small number of hunters, he learned that 160,000 rounds of ammunition were shipped in for a single season.[41] At another post, Tree River on Coronation Gulf, Godsell found eighteen bales of caribou skins (one hundred skins per bale) all traded in

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store. Philip Godsell, "Is There Time to Save the Eskimo?" Natural History 61 (February, 1952): 58-59.

[39]C. Cornelius, "Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1921, p. 27.

[40]C. Cornelius, "Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1922, p. 45.

[41]Philip Godsell, "Tragedy in the Land of Snows," Forest and Outdoors 34 (October, 1938): 304.

a single season. Most of the skins were fly-blown and practically useless.[42]

By 1924, the destruction of the caribou was well underway in Bathurst Inlet. Inspector Hoare of the Department of Interior visited Bathurst and recorded his conversation with a Hudson's Bay Company trader. The conversation revealed the difficulty of controlling the excesses of the traders.

> Mr. Pardy . . . agreed not to buy any spring killed caribou. I also discussed with Mr. Pardy the advisability of not selling the natives cartridges until the middle of July. He thought that his loyalty to his company would be questioned if he refused to sell cartridges to natives in good standing. Also that it might seriously affect his trade returns as his rivals might use it in an effort to gain his customers.[43]

Later in the report, Hoare provided an important insight into the conflict being waged throughout the Arctic between ecological principles steeped in tradition and the impact of an exploitive economy:

> In the former years the Central or Copper Eskimos used to remain on the sea coast in the spring hunting seals until the ice got rotten, it being a taboo for them to go inland for caribou before all their seal skin summer boots were made, and a good quantity of seal blubber put up for the fall fuel supply. On the coming of the white man with their contempt of customs based on superstition, whether good or evil, the natives were encouraged to break the taboo. Armed with modern high power rifles, they began to go inland a little earlier each year to meet the caribou. At the present time the majority of natives leave off sealing the middle of March, proceed to the Arctic mountains and there take up their stand in the passes.[44]

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[42] Ibid.

[43] W. Hoare, Report of Investigations Affecting Eskimos and Wildlife (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1927), pp. 29-30.

[44] Ibid., p. 37.

By the 1930's, the caribou herds were depleted to such a degree that they no longer migrated to the Arctic Islands and many Eskimo communities would have faced starvation had not the traders provided imported food in exchange for fox pelts. According to available estimates of the caribou population, their numbers were reduced to approximately one quarter of a million in 1970 from an estimated two and a half million in 1900 (Figure 7).[45] Perhaps no other single indicator better measures the transformation of the ecological relationship of Eskimo culture than the decline of the caribou population.

The Techniques of the Market Economy

The arrival of the traders in large numbers after 1915, particularly those of the Hudson's Bay Company, marked a new era in Arctic commerce. Company officials were not content to depend on the traditional economic organization of the Eskimos to provide occasional surpluses. They re-organized the economy to provide large-scale output for the expanding European and North American market brought on by the post World War I prosperity. The Reverend Fleming summarizes the transition in the Eastern Arctic:

> Now that the powerful Hudson's Bay Company had come, there was an immediate change in the entire method of trading. The whole effort of the H.B.C. was to re-direct the thinking of the native. They were not interested in securing whalebone . . . . Instead they began at once to train the Eskimo to think in terms of fox skins and instituted a carefully worked out system to encourage

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[45] By the 1930's, it is estimated the caribou population had been reduced by 22 percent. J. P. Kelsal, The Caribou (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1968), p. 146.

> this. Among other things they substantially advanced the price of fur, carefully explaining to each native that they were now working on a definite business basis, i.e., so many fox skins would bring so much returns and no fox skins would bring no returns.[46]

Several techniques were used to exploit the trade and establish a market economy. Some the Hudson's Bay Company developed earlier among the Indians, others the ex-whaling captains (turned independent traders) developed especially for the Eskimo trade; all were designed to derive maximum profit. The following statement by John McLean, a veteran of the Hudson's Bay Company, applied to all the trading operations:

> The history of commercial rule is well known to the world: the object of that rule, wherever established, or by whomsoever exercised, is gain. In our intercourse with the natives of America no other object is discernible, no other object is thought of, no other object is allowed.[47]

The basis of the trader-trapper relationship was the debt system. The Eskimo was allowed his outfit--his debt--of supplies for the season. The size of the debt the trader would allow depended on the ability of the trapper. When he returned with his furs, he turned them over to the trader who credited them to this debt. As with systems of bondage everywhere, the trapper was seldom able to free himself completely of his debt.

Yearly fluctuations in both the fox populations and in the price of furs on the London fur market contributed to the Eskimo's indentured status. An equally important factor was the system of exchange

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[46]Fleming, Archibald the Arctic, pp. 164-65.

[47]McLean, Twenty-five Year's Service, pp. 327-28.

developed by the Hudson's Bay Company. The monetary unit was a wooden token valued at fifty cents. As the veteran Danish ethnologist, Birket-Smith, points out ". . . such an extremely high minimum unit does not exactly help to make the goods cheap."[48] The tokens never left the trading post. They were given to the Eskimo after his furs were evaluated by the trader and collected immediately thereafter for his purchases. "In this manner," writes Birket-Smith, "the Eskimos are invited indirectly of course, to spend all their money at once, and sometimes they stand cudgelling their brains in order to think of something to buy."[49]

The traders made every attempt to introduce new products into the trade and thus create new demands among the Eskimos. Godsell, while touring the Hudson's Bay Company posts in 1922, noted:

> Nearly all the posts appeared to be overloaded with trading goods, much of them very unsuited to the primitive trade of the Arctic. There were powder and rouge compacts, wristwatches, expensive jewellery, silk underwear and coloured silk bloomers galore; hundreds of pairs of house-shoes, or romeos, all for the Eskimo trade, and enough ammunition on the Lady Kinderslev to start a fair-sized war.[50]

The post managers relied on Eskimo "fur runners" to promote and extend their range of influence thus enabling the traders to utilize the services of the Eskimos too distant from the post to make

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[48]Kaj Birket-Smith, The Caribou Eskimos. Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition 1921-24 (Copenhagen: Gyldeddalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1929), p. 169.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Philip Godsel, Arctic Trader (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), p. 256.

regular visits. This arrangement was particularly effective in the Western Canadian Arctic where the more acculturated Alaskan Eskimos were imported to assist the trader. The "fur runners" were outfitted with a supply of trade goods by the post manager and sent out to distant camps to bring in the season's catch.[51]

The trader shared the whaling captain's disinterest in the Eskimo's community life. When he did interfere in the community, it was to insure greater control of the trade. One particularly efficient strategy used to achieve this end was for the trader to single out band leaders and endow them with presents and special titles such as "camp boss."[52]

The traders promoted the institution of "camp boss" as a means of dealing with the entire band. The power and prestige of the "camp boss" was enhanced by his position as an intermediary between his people and the white trader and by the special gifts and equipment he received from the trader.[53] For example, in the Port Harrison area,

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[51]The traders used "fur runners" for such isolated areas as Victoria Island. Corporal Cornelius ("Report of the Mounted Police," p. 304) met a number of Eskimo "fur runners" there who were employed by traders on the main land.

[52]This method was commonly used throughout the colonial world. In Canada, the Hudson's Bay Company first employed it to increase their control over the Indians. Outstanding hunters were given the title of captain of a certain river and endowed with presents and special clothing to signify their rank. Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 138.

[53]During this time, alcohol entered the trade. Superintendent Constantine discovered: "Liquor was to a certain extent not a straight trade, but in the way of a bonus to chief and influential men on the coast as inducements to bring in their ivory and fur." C. Constantine, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1904, Appendix D, p. 49.

Willmott found that the traders presented the "camp boss" with peterhead boats and whaleboats which first of all guaranteed his loyalty and secondly "Since these boats then became the primary means of summer transportation and hunting, the owner controlled the movements of the camp and assumed a position of considerable power.[54]

The Decline of Co-operative Activities

The establishment of the market economy and its supportive technology produced an Eskimo society with markedly altered ecological relationships both to its physical environment and among its members. Social organization during the pre-contact period consisted of a group of related families joined together in a loosely structured band. The size of the band at any given time depended upon which stage the Eskimos were in as they followed their annual food quest. The general pattern was for twenty to twenty-five families to combine for the winter seal hunt at a favorable site on the sea ice, and then disperse into smaller groups of four to five families for the inland summer caribou hunt.

In addition to their kinship bonds, band members shared voluntary partnerships for the purposes of co-operative hunting ventures and to share larger game. The distribution system combined principles of both reciprocity and redistribution. In the large seal camps, the hunter divided his kill with his sharing partners knowing they would reciprocate when they were successful and his family was in need of

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[54]W. E. Willmott, "The Flexibility of Eskimo Social Organization," Anthropologica 2 (1960): p. 53.

food. For the outstanding hunter, who consistently contributed more to the community than he received, reciprocity was bestowed upon him in the form of prestige through the admiration of his fellow band members.

Redistribution was also practiced in the smaller camps. Here, game was brought to the isumatak, the recognized leader of the camp, and he oversaw the butchering of the animal and suggested who was in need and who should receive the different cuts of meat.[55]

Interwoven throughout the fabric of aboriginal Eskimo social organization was the understanding that survival was based on one's ability to contribute unselfishly to the co-operative activities of the community. This basic survival principle, like the taboos regulating the slaughter of game, was imcompatible with the market economy and the new technology. Armed with the rifle and well supplied with fox traps, the hunter no longer needed to depend on his sharing partners and the extended kin group for his livelihood. The new technology expanded the ecological parameters the individual Eskimo was able to exploit at the expense of the aboriginal cooperative network.

In the trapping communities, the basic production and consumption unit consisted of the individual and his nuclear family. The rifle greatly simplified and individualized hunting. The elaborate techniques employed by all able-bodied members of a band to direct the caribou to selected river crossings where hunters waited in ambush were no longer necessary. The high-powered rifle enabled

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[55]N. H. H. Graburn, Eskimos Without Igloos (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), p. 68.

a solitary Eskimo to kill several caribou from a distance on the open barren ground.

The collaborative effort in sealing, likewise disappeared. In the aboriginal winter sealing camp, groups of hunters co-operated in watching a number of seal holes in the ice and in sharing the kill. But with the rifle, it was possible for a hunter to kill a seal at a distance in open water near the ice's edge. The individual's capacity to secure a supply of food without the assistance of cross-community ties rendered obsolete the necessity to maintain the complex sharing network.

Eskimo-Trader Socio-economic Relations

The monopoly status of the Hudson's Bay Company trader carried with it considerable power, both social and economic, in the isolated Arctic communities. Eskimos dependent on the trader for credit and employment were in no position to challenge his decisions or disregard his advice. Through the allocation of credit, the trader rewarded those who submitted to his authority and accepted his work ethic, while Eskimos who attempted to remain independent, by clinging closely to their traditional livelihood, were publicly ridiculed by the trader for their "laziness."[56]

The trader's monopoly placed him in a stronger bargaining position than the dependent Eskimos. He dominated the system of production by defining the resources the Eskimos could use for trade and

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[56]John J. Honigmann, "Intercultural Relations at Great Whale River," American Anthropologist 54 (1952): 514-15.

by unilaterally setting the value of the resources. He further increased his dominant position by maintaining the superordinate-subordinate relationship with the Eskimos promoted by the whaling captains. This cultivation of superior status was especially true of the Hudson's Bay Company. According to Godsell, the company ". . . made it a practice to keep the natives at a distance in order to enhance their prestige . . . and never were they permitted to sit at the table with the whites."[57]

The benefit derived by the Eskimo from trade was tenuous. The "outfit" of the trader was not sufficient to ward off the always ominous threat of starvation. In fact, in many instances, it contributed to it. While trapping, the Eskimo's diet consisted largely of a flour, baking powder, lard and water concoction called "bannock" and tea. Birket-Smith warned:

> Intensive fox trapping, without simultaneous production of meat and skins for clothing, would be a curse to the Eskimos, and the sooner the Hudson's Bay Company realise that by encouraging such an artificial state of affairs they are in reality destroying their own prospects, the better it will be for all parties.[58]

Birket-Smith's warnings were not unfounded. Superintendent Demers reported eight deaths in a band transported by the Hudson's Bay Company boat from Churchill to Cape Eskimo for the purpose of trapping during the winter of 1911-12. Apparently, these people were not supplied with enough food in the trade outfit for, reported Demers, ". . . they had a hard time for food, but were very successful

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[57]Godsell, Arctic Trader, p. 258.

[58]Birket-Smith, Caribou Eskimos, p. 102.

trapping."[59] The Hudson's Bay Company post at Chesterfield received 3,000 fox furs during the winter of 1912-13. Yet, even in this abundant-harvest season, an Eskimo woman and two children died from stravation.[60] The Rasmussen expedition of 1921-23 reported cases of finding lonely Eskimo trappers dead from starvation while their tents overflowed with furs.[61] Obviously, a profitable trapping season was no guarantee against hunger.

The price established for the Eskimos' products varied considerably across the Arctic. The economic historian, Innis, concluded: "The company has charged what the traffic would bear . . . and the prices of the posts vary with the amount of competition."[62] Limited competition enabled the traders to charge exorbitant prices.

The real profits were made in trading rifles and ammunition.[63] Godsell cited the following examples from the Central Arctic in 1923. A thirty-dollar Winchester sold for twenty white fox pelts (worth

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[59]F. J. A. Demers, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1914, Appendix A, p. 315.

[60]W. C. Edgenton, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper, no. 28, 1914, Appendix B, p. 324.

[61]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, p. 38.

[62]Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, p. 373.

[63]Corporal Doak, of the RCMP, related to Godsell how an independent trader stimulated the rifle trade after it reached the saturation point. Captain Klengenberg, an ex-whaler, inported hard steel ramrods from San Francisco and gave one to each Eskimo in his trade area. The hard steel destroyed the rifling and the demand for new rifles began anew. Godsell, "Tragedy," p. 304.

from forty to sixty dollars per pelt in London), while a two dollar box of ammunition sold for one white fox pelt.[64]

For a brief period in the 1920's, competition was intense in the Mackenzie Delta and in Arctic Quebec between the independent traders and the larger trading companies. The Eskimos, in turn, benefited from higher returns from their furs. However, it was a very short-term gain, for the traders soon appropriated their surplus profits through the sale of "useless luxuries and playthings."[65]

The Role of the Trader in the Dependency Generating Process

The trader was clearly the dominant figure when his activities are viewed in terms of his contribution to the dependency generating process. The market type economy he encouraged destroyed the Eskimos' ecological relationships. Eskimo taboos regulating the slaughter of caribou were undermined by the trader created market demand for hides. The resultant overkill eliminated a major food and clothing source and promoted the Eskimos' dependency on the exotic outposts.

Participation in the market economy destroyed the basic Eskimo social relationships regulating co-operative production and distribution. As a result, the focus of commitment changed from the community to the nuclear family. But, the trader, despite his dominant position, largely disregarded the society he disrupted. He left to the missionaries and Royal Canadian Mounted Police the task of

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[64]Ibid.

[65]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, p. 36.

directing the Eskimos' adjustment to the new ecological arrangements with all their cultural implications.

Arctic Missionaries

The Penetration of Arctic Canada by the Missionaries

Prior to the post World War II period, only two denominations operated in Arctic Canada: the Anglicans and the Roman Catholics. The majority of these missionaries were non-Canadian. The Anglicans were recruited in Great Britain and the Catholics in France and Belgium. The trail they followed was generally one pioneered by the traders; for the traders maintained the only transportation network in Artic Canada. (Compare Figure 4, the diffusion of missions with Figure 3, the diffusion of trading posts.)

A difference of opinion exists between individual clergymen of the two denominations concerning the support the trading companies offered, particularly the Hudson's Bay Company. Early Catholic missionaries found the Protestant dominated Hudson's Bay Company not always responsive to their travel schedules, especially when an Anglican was opening up a new area. Father Lacombe felt "The chief officers [Hudson's Bay Company], few of whom were Catholic, sometimes looked on our arrival and our work with a jealous eye."[66]

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[66]Katherine Hughes, Father Lacombe The Black-Robe Voyageur (New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1911), p. 57.



Figure 4.--Missions, 1890-1940.
Source: See sources for Table 5, Appendix A.

The Anglicans, on the other hand, were very appreciative of the Hudson's Bay Company's support.[67] The Anglican Reverend Cody praised the fur companies for ". . . opening the frontier for missionary work . . . for ruling the savage tribes with a firm hand and . . . for preserving Canada as a British colony.[68] Reverend Fleming, later Anglican Archbishop of the Arctic, credited the "Bay" for providing a stipend of $5,000 per year to get his ministry started among the Eskimos.[69]

The Basis of Missionary Domination

The missionary's power to displace the traditional decision-making process in Eskimo institutions was based on his association with the technologically superior society imposed by the trader and police officer and on the duties he assumed within the exotic superstructure--education and medical care.

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[67]Early Hudson's Bay Company officials were not so favorable to the idea of having missionaries around as is evident in one of George Simpson's letters protesting the presence of a parson:

> . . . the Parson will be the only idle man about the place, and he will have an opportunity of seeing the whole routine of our business which may be converted to an improper use at some future period, or he may feel it a point of Duty to give information of our immoral conduct (according to his doctrine) to people who might afterwards make a handle of it to the injury of the concern. Simpson, "Governor Simpson to," p. 182.

[68]H. A. Cody, Ed., An Apostle of the North: Memiors of Bishop W. C. Bompas (London: Seeley & Co., Ltd., 1908), p. 42.

[69]Archibald Fleming, Dwellers in Arctic Night (London: Sheldon Press, 1928), p. 77.

The missionary's major contestant in the struggle for souls (other than a missionary from a rival denomination) was the Eskimo shaman, the angakok. In his many roles, the angakok served his people as visionary, physician, philosopher and priest. The angakoks were the guardians of the traditional beliefs and taboos which assured the survival of the society, but their power soon dissipated in the new environment imposed by the whites.

The missionary attacked them as people possessed by Satan and used his superior medical knowledge as a tool to combat their influence. The trader, by encouraging the slaughter of caribou, indirectly undermined the angakok's position and aided the missionary in suppressing them. The following statement by an Eskimo interviewed by Rassmussen in 1923 at Back River is particularly revealing regarding this point:

> From those who live further inland than we do (Quernermiut and others) we have heard the rumour that all the beasts we live on are becoming fewer and fewer every year. They are dying out, they are being used up . . . of course the shamans ought to help us with all this. They could do so in the old days, for then they used to go down and see her (Nuliajuk) at the place where she lived under the sea . . . . Only the really great shamans in olden times could do that. Nowadays one lives merely in the memories of all that once was possible! In those times there were only few shamans, but they were very skillful. Now we have numbers of them, but their art is of a small order and only few sensible people believe in their power.[70]

Throughout the Canadian North, the Federal Government continued the policy it inherited from the British Colonial Office of leaving administrative functions in the hands of the fur trade companies. In no two areas was this "do-nothing policy" more evident than in

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[70]Rassmussen, "Netsilik Eskimos," p. 500.

education and health. From the very beginning of colonial rule in Canada, these services were passed off to the Hudson's Bay Company which in turn relegated them to the missionaries. In the hands of the missionaries, these services became avenues for conversion. Bishop Fleming wrote about the value of his medical work:

> Medical work helped a great deal in building up an influence which afterwards became a dominant factor in turning people to Christ. They readily saw the value of proper treatment for disease, and even their conjurers came to the missionaries when suffering. Afterwards many of them reasoned that since the teachers were there to do good, their religion must be good too.[71]

Education remained solely in the hands of the missionaries until the 1950's. Both the Anglicans and Catholics built schools and the Federal Government subsidized them. The content of the subject matter was the domain of the missionary and, as would be expected, religious subjects predominated. In time, control of the educational system became the major means of propagating the faith.

The Role of the Missionary in the Dependency Generating Process

The Christian missionary's role in the expansion of western culture and social institutions is the subject of endless discourse. To some observers, the missionary was a blight on the stability of traditional social organization, to others he provided new meaning and purpose for peoples who experienced the destruction of their

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[71] Archibald Fleming, Perils of the Polar Pack (London: Sheldon Press, 1932), p. 78.

Father Coccola describes the important role played by medical science in his struggle with an angakok at Bathurst Inlet. Raymond de Coccola and Paul King, Ayorama (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955).

societies by economic and military domination. No doubt both assessments are correct.

The early missionaries were dedicated to the cause of improving the Eskimo's chances of survival, not only in the world hereafter, but in this world as well. They introduced medicine and hygienic principles to help ward off the menace of new diseases which contact brought. By learning the Eskimo's language and gaining his confidence, the missionaries helped him interpret the bewildering new environment. Prior to the arrival of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, missionaries fought a lone battle to protect the Eskimos from the abuses of exploitative whalers and traders.

At the same time, rival missionaries dealt Eskimo social solidarity a severe blow through their competition for converts from the same community. The Anglican-Catholic rivalry caused spatial and social segregation among the Eskimos. For example, Gillingham reports the beginnings of such a contest at Coppermine in 1930:

> Where there had been one large family of natives, there were now two cliques, who patronized the church of whichever missionary they liked best. Yet when a native died the bereaved relatives often asked both missionaries to attend and the patient explanation that only one could do this, that they must choose, brought confusion.[72]

By 1938, the competition at Coppermine was such that the rival missionaries were haggling over the dead and near dead to determine in whose cemetary, the Catholic's or the Anglican's, the dead would be buried.[73]

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[72]D. W. Gillingham, Umiak (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1955), p. 185.

[73]Finnie, Lure, p. 97.

At Eskimo Point, population 200, VanStone reported the competition between the two denominations had led to hard feelings on the part of the rival missionaries and was reflected in the behavior of the Eskimos toward community members of the opposing faith.[74] Families spatially segregated themselves in the community based on their religious affiliation. Interaction between the two sectors was limited as both groups maintained separate social halls and prohibited intermarriage, even going to the extreme of maintaining separate cemeteries.

Far more significant than these cases of mission rivalry was their united opposition to the belief system of the Eskimos. They actively contributed to the process that overwhelmed the Eskimos and instilled in their mind the inferiority of their traditional beliefs. The early missionaries, spurred on by the moralistic tenets of their religious training and assured of the truths they possessed by the technological superiority of the civilization they represented, saw little of value in the Eskimos' culture. All agreed that the Eskimos' morals were deplorable, but some went even further.

The pioneer Catholic missionary, Father Duchaussois, found the Eskimos to be "great liars" and "thieves also."[75] Duchaussoi's Anglican contemporary, Bishop Bompas, provides a more graphic description for the parishioners back in London. He compared Eskimo existence to life in a pigsty:

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[74]James VanStone and W. H. Oswalt, "Three Eskimo Communities," Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska 9 (1960: 43-44).

[75]Pierre Duchaussois, Mid Snow and Ice (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1937), p. 351.

> . . . go to the nearest well-to-do farmer, and spend a night in his pigsty (with the pigs of course), and this is exactly life with the Esquimaux . . . . As to the habits of your companions, the advantage would be probably on the side of the pigs . . . .[76]

Bompas is also in agreement with Duchaussois when he notes the Eskimos are "great thieves and soon angry."[77] Bompas, however, does give some credit to these people who survived for over four thousand years in the harshest environment on earth without missionary enlightenment. He found them ". . . capable of attachment and gratitude; and . . . quite free of ill-will."[78] Father Bulliard, who spent fifteen years among the Eskimos, discovered that the more one lives with them the more one is ". . . apt to overlook their charm and simply write them off as thieves, liars and murderers."[79]

Volumes of material written by explorers, enthnographers, police officers and traders can be cited to contradict these opinions. The important point, however, is that these are the written attitudes of some of the leaders of the exotic religious institutions Eskimo culture faced when the missions were being established. They viewed the Eskimos as "degraded pagans" to be remade in the white man's image.

In the economic realm, the missionaries expounded the principles of the market economy that destroyed Eskimo independence. The evidence indicates the Anglicans were more partial to Eskimo participation in the market economy than the Catholic missionaries. The

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[76]Cody, An Apostle, p. 117.

[77]Ibid., p. 105.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Roger Buliard, Inuk (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, Inc., 1951), p. 66.

Anglican Bishop Fleming credits mission instruction with promoting good work habits and honesty in the Eskimo.[80] The converts, it seems, made the best employees and were trusted by the post managers.

How much these differences are rooted in national and religious chauvanism rather than economic philosophy is problematical. Bishop Fleming clearly leaves little doubt of his support for the market economy and his native England when he praises the Hudson's Bay Company and the Eskimos for bringing in one million dollars in furs annually to the London market.[81] On the other hand, Godsell complained that Catholic missionaries encouraged their converts to trade with the Hudson's Bay Company's French owned competitor, Revillon Freres.[82]

Obviously the differences between the two denominations can be exaggerated. No doubt the situation in the Arctic is similar to the debate centering around Weber's controversial thesis on the role of certain Protestant sects in the rise of the spirit of capitalism in Europe.[83]

In conclusion, the missionaries played a different, though in many respects complementary role in the dependency generating process, than the trader. They reinforced the position of the trader in

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[80]Fleming, Archibald the Arctic, p. 128.

[81]Fleming, Dwellers, p. 74.

[82]Philop Godsell, Red Hunters of the Snows (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1938).

[83]M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner, 1958).
R. W. Green, ed., Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and the Critics (Boston: Heath, 1959).

the economic realm and promoted their own supremacy in religion, education, and medical care. They attacked the world view, i.e., the ideological foundations of Eskimo culture. In one missionary's own words on the role of the missions, Reverend Whittaker observed:

> Precept and example, through the power of the Holy Spirit had transformed a one-time ignorant, unmoral, violent, fear haunted people into an industrious, peaceful, clean-living community, of which our government is and will be proud.[84]

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution

> . . . I informed them and all other Eskimo we met on our patrol that we had been sent to visit them by "The Big White Chief." That we were the men who looked after the people, and told them what was right and wrong . . .[85]

So wrote Inspector LaNauze of his first encounter with the Eskimos of the Central Arctic. But, Eskimo society was not without concepts of "right" and "wrong." Like all societies, the Eskimos had established methods of maintaining social order and of rewarding approved behavior and discouraging disruptive behavior. Unlike populous societies, there was less need for their methods to be highly structured and formalized but, nevertheless, they assured the stability of Eskimo culture for centuries before the arrival of the police.

Within the band, the people looked to the oldest active hunters for leadership and advice. Decisions were made only after careful

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[84] C. E. Whittaker, "Recollections of an Arctic Parson," (Ottawa: DIAND, Library, n.d.), p. 13.

[85] LaNauze, "Report of the Mounted Police," p. 198.

consultation produced a community consensus. For this reason, the Eskimos called their leader isumatak, "the thinker." The most powerful force for social control was public opinion and avoidance. In extreme cases the offender, threatening the survival of the community, faced death through communal action or expulsion for a period of time from the community.

The Imposition of Canadian Law in the Arctic

The dependency generating process was well underway before the RCMP arrived in great enough numbers to effect their own changes in Eskimo society. The first two police detachments were established in 1903, and by 1920, only two more had been added to serve all Arctic Canada (Figure 5). Initially, the RCMP's major functions in the Arctic were to assure Canadian sovereignty and to protect the Eskimos, especially in Beaufort Sea, from the whalers and traders. However, they immediately became the sole government administrators in Arctic Canada performing a variety of duties ranging from census taker to welfare officer.[86] Criminal investigations were the least of their duties, but in the course of these activities they made their first impact on the lives of the Eskimos.

To their credit, the early RCMP officers showed a great deal of discretion in their dealings with the Eskimos. If possible, they avoided interfering in community disputes when homocide was not an

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[86]The Northwest Territories Amendment Act of 1905 provided for a commissioner to administer the territory under instructions from the Minister of Interior in Ottawa. Until 1920, the Commissioner was Lieutenant-Colonel White of the RCMP.



Figure 5.--Royal Canadian Mounted Police Detachments, 1900-1940.
Source: See sources for Table 6, Appendix A.

issue. Superintendent Moodie expressed the concerns of the majority of officers in the following statement:

> All superstitions have to be handled gently, and it is worse than useless to attempt to upset old customs in a day. It is a matter of time to change these, and it can only be done by first obtaining the good will and confidence of the natives.[87]

However, the RCMP were in the Arctic to impose a totally alien legal system on the Eskimos and, in the course of their duties, they became figures of absolute authority in the small communities. In the words of VanStone, this authority, at times, could be quite arbitrary:

> Direct control over individual affairs varied with the particular constable stationed in the community. Some appear to have limited their interaction in village affairs to instances where intervention was clearly necessary, while others became minor dictators disrupting family life and making arbitrary decisions that took little or no account of the feelings or thoughts of the individual Eskimos involved.[88]

At first, the police interceded in the Eskimo legal process only in cases of alleged murder. Misunderstandings occurred frequently when traders and missionaries entered Eskimo camps during the first quarter of the twentieth century; the result was the loss of several white lives at the hands of the Eskimos.

The RCMP sent expeditions to investigate the circumstances surrounding these deaths and to take into custody the individuals clearly in violation of Canadian law. When evidence revealed provocation on the part of the whites, the investigations either terminated or light sentences were recommended. When Eskimos were brought to

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[87]Moodie, "Mounted Police Report," p. 8.

[88]VanStone & Oswalt, Communities, pp. 43-44.

trial, the Canadian Government sent not only judges, but juries as well to the Arctic--at a considerable expense--to assure the Eskimos the right to a trial by jury.[89] This system deprived the Eskimos of judgement by their own peers since the jurymen were selected in southern Canada and not in the Eskimo camps.

The objectives of holding trials in the Arctic were twofold: first, to assure the Eskimos of the fairness of the law and, second, to impress upon them that they were now living under Canadian law and must abide by the decisions of the police. This latter objective was dramatically illustrated in the 1922 hanging of two Eskimo youths involved in a wife stealing raid resulting in the deaths of several Eskimos and, later, those of a police officer and a trader. Word of this display of Canadian authority repidly spread among the Eskimos and eliminated any question of where the locus of power rested in Arctic Canada. After the hanging, Inspector LaNauze reported from the remote Central Arctic that the Eskimos spread the word throughout the North that the police would come to the villages and take away those guilty of crimes.[90]

Summary: The Dependency Generating Process

The first group to have a pronounced influence on the Eskimos of Arctic Canada were the whalers, beginning primarily in the 1840's and continuing into the first decade of the twentieth century. The

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[89] A trial at Herschel Island in 1922 of two Eskimos convicted of murder cost the Federal Government $100,000. Knud Rasmussen, Across Arctic America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 280.

[90] C. D. LaNauze, "The Bathurst Inlet Patrol," RCMP Quarterly, 5 (1937): 26.

whalers initiated the dependency generating process as a result of the technological displacement of traditional tools for those manufactured in Europe and America. Although not an overt policy of the whalers, the dependency generating process was initiated as the Eskimos began to rely on the annual arrival of ships to bring the means required to secure a livelihood. These tools and weapons could neither be replaced nor repaired locally.

Simultaneously, as whaling collapsed in the early 1900's, there emerged a new phase in the dependency generating process with the formation of an exotic subcultural system in Canada's Arctic based primarily upon the trader, the missionary, and the RCMP. Into the vacuum left by the whalers, these three institutions, as shown by the number of trading posts, mission stations, and RCMP detachments, grew rapidly between 1915 and 1928 (Figure 6). Before 1915, these institutions generally were concentrated on many of the same sites where whaling stations were located: Baffin Island and the Hudson Bay-Foxe Basin regions of the Eastern Arctic, and in the Beaufort Sea region of the Western Arctic (compare Figure 2 and Figure 6a).

The rapid diffusion of the exotic institutions between 1915 and 1928 overpowered traditional Eskimo culture. During this period the market economy was firmly implanted and the Eskimos became a dependent people--dependent on the exotic agents to manage their economy, administer their communities, and direct their religious experience.

In the altered environment imposed by forces beyond their control, the Eskimos were no longer self-sufficient in food, clothing,

weapons, tools, and social organization. Their angakoks' and isumataks' positions of influence were undermined and the caribou herds destroyed. Their material survival depended on the market exchange of furs they brought to the trader. The conditions of this exchange were arbitrarily set by the trade interests in Montreal and London. The missionary defined the new system of socioreligious behavior and replaced the angokok as their spiritual leader. The authority of the RCMP officer replaced community decision-making in matters of social control and eroded the institution of the isumatak.



Figure 6.--The Diffusion of Exotic Institutions into the Canadian Arctic Shown by the Institutions Actually Operating During the Times Indicated by the Graphs and Maps.
Source: See sources for Figures 3, 4 and 5.

CHAPTER IV

A CULTURAL SYNTHESIS

Figures 6b and 7 show the initial diffusion of the exotic institutions was complete by the 1930's: the traders reached remote Oscar Bay on Bothnia Peninsula in 1928, the RCMP manned a network of centrally located detachments by 1930, and the missionaries were well established in the Central Arctic by 1935.

A relatively stable Arctic contact society, revolving around the trapping and trading of furs, crystallized at this time. The economic and social organization of this new order represented a cultural synthesis of the forces set in motion during the dependency generating period. The exotic agents consolidated the power they gained through the dependency generating period and worked out accommodations among themselves to assure the stability of the new order. The great majority of the Eskimos, relegated to a subordinate position, eked out a marginal existence following their traplines. Those who worked directly for the exotic agents performed menial non-decision-making tasks as traders' helpers, catechists, and special constables.

Consolidation and Accommodation

A review of Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrates the spatial changes that occurred in Arctic Canada by 1940 as the exotic institutions



Figure 7.--The Cultural Synthesis.
Source: For estimates of caribou population, see footnote 47; for trading posts, mission stations, RCMP detachments, and co-operatives, see Figures 3, 4, 5 and 9.

closed or relocated operations in order to consolidate their control. In the Western Arctic, the RCMP reduced the Herschel Island detachment to a summer outpost and completely closed their operation at Baillie Island. They directed the administration of the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea region from Aklavik, with a small outpost at Maitland. The detachments at Bernard Harbour and Tree River were closed in favor of the more centrally located Coppermine. The addition of the schooner St. Roch, in 1928, provided the RCMP with a floating detachment between Herschel Island and King William Island. In Hudson Bay, detachments were opened at Baker Lake and Eskimo Point to effectively administer the Keewatin region. A new detachment was opened on northern Baffin Island, at Pond Inlet, to complement those at Pangnirtung and Lake Harbour. The Port Burwell detachment was limited to a summer operation and its functions moved to Port Harrison to better serve Arctic Quebec.

The period of rapid expansion followed by consolidation is reflected in the changing strength of the force evident in Table 2.

The missionaries consolidated their position by filling in the remaining gaps in their arctic Diocesses. Missions at Coppermine, Burnside, Cambridge Bay, and Pelly Bay completed the network in the Central Arctic. In Foxe Basin and on northern Baffin Island, missions were opened at Coral Harbour, Repulse Bay, Igloolik, Arctic Bay, and Pond Inlet.

The consolidation of the trading operation is evident from Figures 3 and 7. Federal regulations on trading, combined with the

TABLE 2.--Strength of the RCMP Arctic Branch--1910-1940.

Date	No. of Detachments	Men
1910	2	6
1915	2	8
1920	4	10
1925	10	34
1930	15	44
1935	13	37
1940	11	31

Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Reports (Ottawa: King's Printer), 1910-1940.

Great Depression took their toll of the independent traders and small trading companies, leaving the Hudson's Bay Company to monopolize the trade.[1]

Socioeconomic relations between the Eskimos and the exotic agents, and between the exotic agents, themselves, stabilized. The missionaries and police brought stability and continuity to the contact situation. They viewed themselves as the protectors of the Eskimos and actively co-operated to curb the distribution of alcohol

[1]The first major setback for the independent traders came in 1929 with the passage of a law requiring trading posts to be permanent and operate at least eight months per year. This law put an end to the "floating posts" operated by the independent traders. The "floating post" was a sled or schooner loaded with trade goods which the independent trader used as he moved from one Eskimo camp to another intercepting furs before they reached the stationary posts of the larger established fur companies. The remaining companies, large enough to compete with the Hudson's Bay Company, were unable to survive the Great Depression and the corresponding drop in fur prices.

and the abuses of unscrupulous traders. The elimination of competing traders reduced many of these problems. The missionary and police officer, as well as the established trader, no longer had to contend with the numerous operators of the "floating post," who were transient, difficult to control and unpredictable in their behavior with the Eskimos.

For the Hudson's Bay Company, the decline of competitors strengthened their position to impose monopolistic uniformity on the trapping economy. They co-operated with the missionaries and police to maintain order in the trapping camps and provided limited relief to destitute Eskimos. Relief was incorporated into the Company's credit system and was more in the form of a loan than an outright gift. The elimination of competing traders assured the Company that credit extended would be repaid when trapping conditions improved. Competition among the exotic agents thus became limited mainly to cases where rival missionaries from the same community competed for converts.

Domination-Diffusion Centers

The focal points of the new order were a series of culture contact communities that were well estabished by 1930. They are identified on Figure 8 in terms of their spheres of influence. The dates mark the establishment of the exotic institutions, either in the communities, or in their immediate environs.[2] These communities

[2]The evolution of Pongnirtung is outlined below to clarify the dating procedure. Pongnirtung is located on the north side of



Figure 8.--Domination-Diffusion Centers, 1930.
Source: See sources for Table 7, Appendix A.

are defined in this report as domination-diffusion centers for the obvious reason that they represent the loci of domination in the Arctic and are the centers for the diffusion of Eurocanadian culture.

The boundaries delimit the territory the RCMP effectively controlled through their regular patrols to the trapping camps and smaller trading posts. These patrols are well documented in the annual reports of the RCMP during the 1930's and represent a considerable undertaking. For example, in 1930-31, twenty-six patrols from the Chesterfield Inlet detachment logged 6,579 miles by sled and boat.[3] They ranged from Eskimo Point in the south to Repulse Bay in the north. During the same year, the Baker Lake police covered 4,435 miles in ten patrols throughout the Keewatin District.

Cumberland Sound and is the domination-diffusion center for Central Baffin Island.

(a) Whaling Station - 1840
The English whaler, Captain Penny, established the first station in 1840 in Cumberland Sound. American whalers established stations in the Sound beginning in 1850. Cumberland Sound remained a popular wintering spot for whaling crews throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. (See Figure 2, Location of Whaling Stations.)

(b) Mission - 1894
The first mission was established on Blacklead Island, along the south side of the Sound, in 1894, by the Anglican missionary, Reverend Peck. The mission was moved to Pongnirtung in 1928 and expanded to include a school and small hospital.

(c) Trading Post - 1911
Numerous fur traders located posts along both sides of the Sound beginning in 1911. The Hudson's Bay Company entered the Sound permanently in 1921 and absorbed the competing fur traders by 1923.

(d) RCMP Detachment - 1923
The RCMP billeted a permanent detachment at Pangnirtung in 1923. This detachment's jurisdiction extended over central Baffin Island from Frobisher Bay in the south to Home Bay in the north.

[3]Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Report (Ottawa: King's Printer), 1932.

To a lesser degree, the boundaries represent the missionaries' spheres of influence. The missionary from Lake Harbour, for example, directed the religious activities at Cape Dorset. The missionary at Pangnirtung made periodic visits around Cumberland Sound and north to Home Bay.

In Arctic Quebec, domination was diffuse with well established missions and trading posts in a number of communities. The RCMP detachment at Port Burwell, although established fairly early (1920), was not active in extending police control over the Eskimo communities to the south and west. Apparently, it was not the intention of the RCMP to consolidate control of Arctic Quebec at Port Burwell. Inspector Joy makes this clear in a 1927 report when he notes that Port Burwell ". . . is not one of the detachments from which long patrols are made, its duties having to do with the seaboard."[4]

Port Burwell was phased out in 1936 in favor of Port Harrison on Hudson Bay. However, Port Harrison never became a full-fledged domination center either. Government cutbacks in spending forced its closing in 1938. It was not reopened until 1945. Consequently, no one community emerged as the dominant center in Arctic Quebec during the 1920's and 30's.

Life around the domination-diffusion communities is well documented in ethnographic studies too numerous to cite here. Generally, the Eskimos spent the major part of the year in small trapping camps similar in composition to the summer caribou hunting camps of the

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[4]Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Report (Ottawa: King's Printer), 1927.

pre-contact period. The size of the camps reflected an adjustment to the fur resources of an area and numbered no more than five or six closely related families.

The Eskimo's physical absence from the domination-diffusion communities for long periods of time did not free him from the surveillance and control of the exotic agents. His periodic visits to the trading post to sell his furs and obtain supplies served to reunite the dispersed bands in a manner similar to that of the larger winter sealing camps of the pre-contact times. But, more importantly, from the standpoint of acculturation, these visits served the purposes of the exotic agents.

Religious instruction at the mission intensified during the trading period. The police used these visits to check on the welfare of the Eskimos and to deal with infractions of Canadian law. In addition, as noted before, both the missionary and police made regular patrols to the outlying camps throughout the year.

The monopoly the exotic agents held through their specialties allowed them considerable leverage to interfere at will in aspects of community life incompatible with the socioeconomic arrangement radiating from the domination-diffusion communities. With few exceptions, this leverage was applied to suppress traditional leaders and to discredit the practices of those who would not submit to exotic domination. Dunning, in his survey of social relations in five northern communities, concluded:

> There appears to be a fairly general attitude of superiority with regard to the ethnic people, combined with a tendency to stereotype individual persons as "good" on the basis of their

submission, or "bad" because of their independence or unwillingness to submit to authority.[5]

The Imperial Landscape as a Visual Manifestation of the Cultural Synthesis

The landscape concept has been an integrating theme in American cultural geography since its introduction in the 1920's by Sauer.[6] Landscapes are conceived by geographers as regions with distinctive associations of forms, both physical and cultural. The physical components of the landscape are those naturally occuring forms that have economic or aesthetic significance to man. As such, they represent cultural appraisals of a particular population occupying a region. The cultural qualities of the landscape are the works of man as he arranges and changes his surroundings to meet survival needs. Together, the physical and cultural forms have a unified structural quality and constitute what Houston has defined as ". . . the tangible context of man's association with man and with the surface of the earth's crust."[7]

The cultural synthesis, defined earlier in this chapter by the exotically imposed changes in economy, social organization, and ideology, had its visual manifestation on the landscape as well. Adams, in a perceptive statement in 1941, accurately characterized the domination-diffusion centers as ". . . outposts occupied by

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[5]R. W. Dunning, "Ethnic Relations and the Marginal Man in Canada," Human Organization 18 (1959): 122.

[6]Carl O. Sauer, "The Morphology of Landscape," in Land and Life, ed: John Leighly (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 315-350.

[7]J. M. Houston, The Western Mediterranean World (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1964), p. 2.

invaders from the temperate zone and not spontaneous agglomerations of native peoples.[8] He further noted that this alien nature is reflected in "cultural landscape forms and situation."

The fur trader played the dominant role in the location and evolution of Arctic settlements. Even today, of the approximately fifty population centers in the Northwest Territories, over three quarters were established for the purpose of fur trading.[9] The traders selected sites primarily on the basis of their accessibility by water transportation and their proximity to rich fox trapping grounds. Whether these new settlements coincided with aboriginal subsistence producing areas was of secondary importance.

The annual summer concentration of Eskimo trappers and their families around the trading posts in turn attracted the missionaries and RCMP. The transportation facility maintained by the Hudson's Bay Company was an equally important consideration for the missionaries and police in selecting the traders' sites for their own operations.

The forms of the domination-diffusion communities were produced by the combination of exotic structures and semipermanent Eskimo dwellings that sprang up around the trading posts. Jenness's description of Pond Inlet in August of 1931 is especially appropriate. The settlement consisted of a police detachment (corporal and constable),

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[8]John Q. Adams, "Settlements of the Northeastern Canadian Arctic," Geographical Review 31 (1941): 124.

[9]Peter Usher, Fur Trade Posts of the Northwest Territories 1870-1970 (Ottawa: DIAND, 1971), p. 15.

a Hudson's Bay Company Post (one post-manager and his assitant), two missions, and twelve tents sheltering approximately fifty Eskimos.[10] In communities split by missionary rivalry, the schism was reflected in landscape form by the spatial segregation of Eskimo dwellings and in the maintenance of separate cemeteries.

Landscape changes were also evident in the vast Arctic wastes separating these nodes of commercial activity. Most importantly, aboriginal landscape forms lost their significance in the altered socioeconomic enviornment. The trails followed by the migrating caribou herds to the Arctic islands became deserted throughout the year. Their outlines, carved in the tundra by centuries of migrations, remained only as ecological footnotes to man's destruction. On the Barren Grounds of mainland Arctic Canada, the Eskimos hunted the depleted caribou population in the open with high powered rifles. This technological change had its counterpart in the landscape: the stone cairns, that channeled the caribou to desired river crossings, where hunters waited in kayaks with spears and bows, now maintained a futile vigilance.[11]

Away from the exotic coastal communities, the imprint on the landscape from man's new occupation was visibly evident in the trails he developed. Winter trails, outlined by the trudgings of solitary

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[10]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, pp. 44-45.

[11]The Eskimos designed stone cairns to frighten the caribou into following a course leading to a water crossing where the hunters waited in ambush. The cairns were erected of stones and from a distance give the appearance of a column of men.

Eskimo trappers, marked the extent of their traplines. A series of summer trails, linking the trapping grounds with the coastal trade centers, became engraved in the landscape as the trappers sought supplies and payment for their winter's catch.

When viewed against the vast physical background of the Canadian Arctic, these cultural landscape features appear diminutive, indeed. Nevertheless, they clearly reveal significant ecological information about the relationships that characterized the cultural synthesis.

CHAPTER V

THE COLLAPSE

The Socioeconomic Indicators

The arctic contact society was an economic monoculture dependent for its survival on the production of one commodity--white fox furs. Therefore, it is only fitting that the collapse of the fur market, in 1949, brought a belated realization to a number of government officials in Ottawa that their policy of limited involvement in the Arctic needed a major re-evaluation.

The conditions of collapse were inherent from the beginning of the market economy. The Eskimos could not be integrated into a global economic system and, at the same time, remain insulated from its fluctuations. This fact is obvious from the figures in Table 3. The Arctic boom years of the 1920's followed by the declining prices of the 1930's paralleled larger international economic trends.

The sudden drop in 1948-49 to a low of $8.91 per pelt struck a disastrous blow to the Arctic economy. Even the outstanding trappers could not support their families on such small returns, especially when the price of trade goods increased each year. The market deflated due to a number of factors: the introduction of synthetics, competition from foreign sources, mainly Russian, and the increasing number of fur farms.

TABLE 3.--The Market Value of White Fox Furs--1920-1949.

Years	Average Price	Years	Average Price
1920-23	$38.32	1940-43	$25.99
1924-27	38.67	1944-47	16.58
1928-31	29.99	1948-49	8.91
1932-35	16.86	1949-50	8.45
1936-39	11.76		

Source: James Cantley, "Survey of Economic Conditions Among the Eskimos of the Canadian Arctic," (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Library, 1950), p. 39.

The fact that the collapse was inordinately disruptive for most Eskimo families must be attributed to deeper underlying weaknesses present in the contact society. Poor health and diet, inadequate assistance in times of scarcity, and the absence of any programs by the exotic institutions to provide the Eskimos with alternative opportunities--all these defects were present in the society long before the final collapse in 1949.

For example, between 1940 and 1949, the RCMP Reports document more than twenty different epidemics and cases of starvation throughout the Arctic.[1] The reports also speak of the scarcity of native food, the low fur yields and the deteriorating health of the Eskimos. Tuberculosis was endemic. A medical team on board the S.S. Nascopie administered 1,347 chest X-rays in the Eastern Arctic in 1946 and

[1]Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Reports (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941-1950).

discovered 11 percent of the population suffered from varying degrees of the infection.[2] The Eskimo tuberculosis death rate in 1947 totaled an astronomical 550/100,000 compared to 44.4 for the Canadian population.

The incidence of tuberculosis is an indicator of socioeconomic deprivation. It is strongly related to poor nutrition (particularly protein consumption) and impoverished living conditions. Birket-Smith's unheeded warning to the Hudson's Bay Company, twenty-five years earlier, that "Intensive fox trapping, without simultaneous production of meat and skins for clothing, would be a curse to the Eskimos . . ." was dramatically confirmed.[3]

The contact history of any one area cannot be singled out as typical of all Arctic Canada. However, a closer look at a specific area, such as King William Island, will bring into focus conditions endemic to Eskimo life in the trapping economy. The brief contact history of King William Island demonstrates that the 1949 drop in fur prices was only one of the many reversals suffered by the Eskimos, on a continuum characterized by frequent disasters. Officials were more concerned about the adversity of the 1949 market collapse than they had been about previous misfortunes, the difference being, the post-World War II socio-political climate in Ottawa was more receptive to reports of Eskimo suffering.

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[2]H. W. Lewis and G. J. Wherrett, "An X-Ray Survey of Eskimos," Canadian Medical Association Journal 57 (Oct. 1947): 357-59.

[3]Birket-Smith, Caribou Eskimos, p. 102.

A Case History: King William Island, N.W.T. 1925 - 1938

1925

King William Island was one of the final areas penetrated by the traders. In 1925, when Department of Interior investigator, Burwash, visited the area he found a people displaying "every appearance of perfect health and with every confidence in their ability to garner from the country a living for "themselves and their dependents."[4] They limited the trapping of white-fox furs to the amount necessary to secure their basic necessities. The men informed Burwash they seldom used their rifles on the fall hunt as the caribou could easily be killed with spears while fording the streams or lakes.

1929

When Burwash returned to King William Island in 1929, the Eskimo's methods of living had undergone a material change. In 1925, few Eskimos visited the trading post during the early winter, and the few that did arrive appeared to regard their coming more in the light of a social undertaking. They traded a few commodities, but were not interested in credit. In 1929, Burwash writes ". . . they arrived in some numbers and appeared to take the credit for granted and to consider commodities, of which four years before they had no knowledge, as essential to their well-being."[5]

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[4] L. T. Burwash, Canada's Western Arctic (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1931), p. 30.

[5] Ibid., p. 67.

1934

Jenness has recorded a letter from the local Hudson's Bay Company post-manager to his superior in Winnipeg that stands in stark contrast to Burwash's earlier reports:

> From the point of view of the local Eskimos the past winter was a fearful winter . . . . Although it was the coldest spell of weather I have ever experienced and it was during this period that many of our good customers took what can only be described as severe punishment . . . . Just imagine during such wicked weather being without decent clothing or sleeping skins, and without food or light or heat for days on end . . . . Yet these were the conditions under which a group of some twenty of our trappers, men, women, and children had to live. Their dogs all died of starvation or were used for food and they burned up all their sleds.[6]

When the winter was over, the trader recorded sixteen deaths and four births.

1938

Sergeant Larsen, of the St. Roch detachment described conditions among the Eskimo inhabitants of King William Island in 1938, fifteen years after the trading post was established in the vicinity. In the sealing camps on Rae Strait, east of the island, he discovered about fifty people:

> Their clothing, especially of the older people, was in a condition which is nearly impossible to describe and it is unbelievable that they could live through the coldest part of the winter in their poor clothing. All the snow houses were visited and very few had sleeping skins for the sleeping platforms, as they had been made into clothing for the men in order that they could stay out and attend to the seal holes. The old

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[6]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, p. 51.

> people and especially the women were clothed in old rags of deer-skins which were saturated with oil and dirt . . .[7]

Larsen intended to enforce the game laws that were in effect to preserve the caribou and musk-ox, but upon seeing the condition of the Eskimos, he decided allowances had to be made. He justified his decision by pointing out:

> What little they obtain from the trading companies in exchange for their foxes does not amount to much in the way of food even during the trapping season and when the season is over very few of them have anything else than some ammunition and a few luxuries such as sugar, tea, flour, biscuits, or tobacco . . .[8]

Larsen's discovery that the trapping economy and the meager local food sources could no longer support the Eskimos must have been apparent to the other police officers and the traders throughout Arctic Canada. The Hudson's Bay Company became increasingly stringent with its credit in the 1940's. The RCMP, which in former years only provided emergency aid, now became the major supplier of relief. Studies published in the early 1950's tell the story: between 1945 and 1951 government relief sources provided 53 percent of the Eskimos' income in the Eastern Arctic and 25 percent in the Western.[9]

The Eskimos' Economic Contribution to the Contact Society 1930-1945

The frequent cases of starvation and the high incidence of tuberculosis reported in the 1940's dramatized the phsycial toll the

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[7]H. A. Larsen, "An Arctic Patrol," Royal Canadian Mounted Police Quarterly 5 (1938): 208.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Scott Polar Institute, "Eskimo Affairs in Canada, 1952," Polar Record 7 (1954): 69.

Eskimos paid for their participation in the contact society. On the economic side of the ledger, the Eskimos shouldered an equally heavy burden. Their contribution to the Northern economy in white fox production averaged $950,000 per annum between 1930 and 1945 (Table 4).[10] This is a sizable contribution considering it was made during the Great Depression years.

Fur production supported the trading posts and the far-reaching Arctic transportation network. Government personnel and missionaries used this network to administer their own duties in the Arctic, thus, eliminating the costs of maintaining separate transportation facilities. The processing and marketing of fur products stimulated commerce in Europe and southern Canada. And, finally, the Eskimos provided a secondary market for products emanating from the industrial and agricultural sectors of Europe and Canada.

Prior to 1945, the Federal Government followed a policy of limited involvement and stringent economy in the Arctic. In no area was economy more evident than in Eskimo affairs. The Eskimos supported the meager Federal services they received through a fur export tax levied on each pelt shipped out of the Arctic.[11] Table 5 supports

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[10]Ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of the Canadian white fox harvest is taken in the Arctic by the Eskimos.

[11]The Federal Government initiated a fur export tax for the N.W.T. in 1929. The tax levied on the white fox was first set at $1.50 per pelt. Later, it was reduced to $1.05 in 1935, and to .75 in 1949. During a debate in the House of Commons, it was pointed out that the tax was unconstitutional, as the residents of the Territories were disfranchised in national elections. This constitutional point, however, was quickly passed over and the tax law enacted. House of Commons Debates 1927 17 George V, 1926-27, vol. 2, p. 315.

TABLE 4.--White Fox Production in the Canadian Arctic.

Year	Arctic Quebec	N.W.T.	Total
1930-31	$285,750	$ 971,658	$1,257,408
1931-32	743,755	555,400	1,299,155
1932-33	141,523	513,740	655,263
1933-34	85,857	944,406	1,030,263
1934-35	213,320	789,225	1,002,545
1935-36	275,460	388,455	663,915
1936-37	37,720	277,956	315,676
1937-38	122,620	570,000	692,620
1938-39	194,450	477,000	669,450
1939-40	25,635	251,000	276,635
1940-41	17,620	850,000	867,620
1941-42	254,500	1,318,000	1,572,500
1942-43	388,290	1,695,000	2,083,290
1943-44	69,898	913,000	982,898

Sources: Department of Interior, Annual Reports (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1930-35); Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Reports (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1936-44); Quebec, Annuaire Statistique (Montreal: Department of Statistics, 1930-44), and R. G. Robertson, The Northwest Territories: Its Economic Prospects (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955).

this conclusion for the Northwest Territories. The records of government expenditures directly effecting the Eskimos--health and education--are pieced together and compared with revenues for the fur export tax on white fox pelts.

Between 1930 and 1944, the Federal Government, through the Northern Administration Branch of the Department of Interior and, later, of Mines and Resources, budgeted $655,344 under education and

TABLE 5.--Major Government Expenditures of the Northern Administration Branch on Health and Education Compared with Revenues from the White Fox Fur Export Tax, N.W.T. 1930-31 to 1943-44.

Year	Education Expenditure	Medical Expenditure	Total Expenditures	Revenue from the White Fox Tax
1930-31	$21,787	$10,947	$23,734	$63,369
1931-32	11,676	16,185	27,861	41,655
1932-33	23,189	25,634	48,823	38,531
1933-34	15,660	21,468	37,128	78,701
1934-35	17,115	25,519	42,634	67,085
1935-36	19,828	14,665	34,493	27,195
1936-37	21,484	18,165	39,649	20,847
1937-38	23,110	22,496	45,606	51,450
1938-39	24,206	29,133	53,339	45,150
1939-40	25,992	37,531	63,523	31,000
1940-41	21,422	24,332	55,754	48,300
1941-42	24,696	31,600	56,296	53,550
1942-43	24,728	40,774	65,502	64,050
1943-44	24,688	36,314	61,002	29,400

Sources: Department of Interior, Annual Reports (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1930-35) and Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Reports (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1936-44).

Note: The expenditures listed under education covered grants to the Anglican and Roman Catholic missions for Indian and Eskimo education. Expenditures under the heading, medical, provided grants to mission hospitals and industrial homes and to hospitals in southern Canada for the care of indigent whites, Indians, and Eskimos.

medical headings. During the same period, the two departments collected $660,283 in white fox revenues.

Detailed summaries of expenditures by the departments specifically destined for their Eskimo administration budgets are not available in the annual reports. No doubt there were additional outlays not included under the grants. The salaries of government medical personnel serving the four mission hospitals (who also administered the Arctic's non-Eskimo population) were not included under the medical grants; nor were the limited emergency supplies itemized.

The cost of emergency aid for the Eskimos in the 1930's was minimal if King William Island is representative of other Arctic outposts. According to a letter written in February, 1934, by the Director of the Lands, N.W.T. and Yukon Branch, to the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, the department issued $447.33 in supplies to destitute King William Island Eskimos during the three year period 1933-36.[12] This unjustifiably small sum was not the result of a government oversight, for later in the letter the director states the department's relied policy:

> In dealing with applications for permits to establish posts in outlying districts the Department has stipulated that the applicants must assume full responsibility for the welfare of the natives who trade with them and the destitute natives must be maintained without expense to the Department.[13]

The director failed to point out in his letter that although the government refused to recognize any commitment to the welfare of

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[12]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, p. 54.

[13]Ibid.

Eskimos in outlying areas, it was not against profiting from these peoples. This conclusion is unavoidable. The King William Island Eskimos traded 4,045 white fox pelts during the 1933-34 trapping season. The government's share of this catch at $1.50 per pelt totaled $6,067.40 from the fur export tax revenues.

Fur trapping in Arctic Quebec is controlled by the provincial government. As a result, the Northwest Territories fur export tax did not apply to pelts shipped out of Quebec. This jurisdictional technicality mattered little to the Quebec Eskimos, however, as they had been contributing to a provincial fur tax since 1917.[14] Between 1921 and 1945, the Eskimos contributed an average of $15,733 per year from their fur sales (Table 6).

TABLE 6.--Revenues from the White Fox Fur Tax in Arctic Quebec, 1921-22 to 1943-44.

Year	Total Revenue	Year	Total Revenue
1921-22	$13,752	1933-34	$ 9,383
1922-23	63,633	1934-35	24,888
1923-24	25,132	1935-36	27,546
1924-25	8,061	1936-37	2,829
1925-26	14,766	1937-38	9,196
1926-27	6,246	1938-39	19,245
1927-28	23,282	1939-40	2,564
1928-29	3,920	1940-41	1,302
1929-30	1,803	1941-42	15,270
1930-31	16,669	1942-43	19,414
1931-32	40,649	1943-44	2,427
1932-33	9,898		

Source: Annuaire Statistique (Quebec: Department of Commerce, 1922-33).

[14] A tax of $1.75 per pelt was levied on the white fox from 1917-1935. After 1935, the tax was reduced to $1.50. Detailed summaries began in the Annuaire Statistique in 1921-22.

The question here, as with the Northwest Territories, is what did the Eskimos receive in return for their contribution to the exotic administration? In the case of Quebec, the answer is simple, they received nothing. Despite the tax revenue, Quebec did not recognize the Eskimos as a provincial responsibility. They categorized the Eskimos as Indians and, therefore, considered them a federal responsibility. The Department of Interior grudgingly contributed to Eskimo welfare while, at the same time, it unsuccessfully attempted to pressure the Quebec government into assuming the responsibility.[15]

These taxes could be viewed as a form of exploitative redistribution. According to Polanyi ". . . redistribution designates appropriational movements toward a center and out of it."[16] This appropriation was exploitative in the Eskimo case in that they had no voice in the government which instituted the tax, i.e., taxation without representation, and because the flow of money remained overwhelmingly within the non-Eskimo imperial subculture. For their taxes, some services trickled down to them: education (in the hands of the missionaries) and medicine (for diseases introduced by exotic peoples and compounded, doubtless, by the abject poverty to which the market economy subjected them).

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[15]Jenness, Eskimo Administration, p. 40.

[16]Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as an Instituted Process," in Trade and Markets in the Early Empires, eds: Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson (New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. 250.

CHAPTER VI

THE EXOTIC RESPONSE: ABANDONMENT OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE

Growth of the Government Sector

The Federal Government's initial response to the Arctic's impoverished population focused rightfully on the critical needs of health, welfare, and education. The percentage of the Eskimos' income supplemented by government assistance programs between 1945 and 1950 was noted in the last chapter: 53 percent in the Eastern Arctic and 25 percent in the Western. Assistance, during that period, was distributed through family allowances for dependent children, old age security, disabled persons allowances, and relief for destitute families.

In the area of health, spectacular gains were made in the battle against infectious diseases, especially, tuberculosis. In 1946, the Department of National Health and Welfare assumed responsibility for the Eskimos from the Department of Mines and Resources. The story since then is one of steadily increasing budgets and expanded and improved facilities.

Jenness pieced together medical expenditures for 1939 and 1962 discovering the bill per Eskimo increased from $4.00 to $288.31, from

a total expenditure of $29,480 to $4,000,000.[1] During the ten-year period, 1953-1963, the Department spent $12,500,000 for hospitalization alone for the 8,600 Eskimo tuberculosis patients.[2]

The net effect of the improved programs is conveyed by the statistics on Eskimo population growth--an increase of nearly four percent a year since the mid-1960's. The infant mortality rate plummeted from 240 per thousand live births in 1958 to 92.3 in 1966.[3] Nevertheless, this tragic statistic remained well above Canada's 1966 national average of 24.6.

The meager expenditures accorded Eskimo education prior to 1945 are compiled in the last chapter. The missions received small Federal grants totaling a few thousand dollars per year. The government failed to set specific curriculum requirements, nor did it inspect or supervise the mission schools in any way. In 1939, the Department of Mines and Resources contributed to the mission education of only 306 white, Indian, and Eskimo children in the entire Arctic.

The Federal Government commissioned an intensive survey of educational facilities in 1944. An inspector of schools was appointed in 1946, and a new policy, implemented in 1947, called for the Federal Government to build and staff schools in the Arctic. By 1950, 8 percent of the school-age Eskimo children (6-16 years) were enrolled.

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[1] Ibid., p. 143

[2] P. E. Moore, "Puvalluttuq. An Epidemic of Tuberculosis at Eskimo Point, N.W.T.," Canadian Medical Association Journal 90 (1964): 1193.

[3] Canada, Education in Canada's North 1960-1970 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1970.

Enrollment increased to 55 percent in 1961 and to 95 percent in 1969.[4]

The drift away from laissez-faire took a major turn in 1953. Government programs, as they took shape, called for the creation of a supradepartmental organization to coordinate and rationalize the activities of the growing number of agencies operating in the North. The Canadian Parliament responded to this need by approving the establishment of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (later reorganized into the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in 1958). Table 7 traces the overall shift away from laissez-faire after the inception of the Department.

TABLE 7.--Government Expenditures in the Northwest Territories, 1953-1969.

Fiscal Year	Expenditures (millions $)	Fiscal Year	Expenditures (millions $)
1953-54	11.2	1961-62	39.1
1954-55	12.2	1962-63	50.1
1955-56	13.8	1963-64	48.0
1956-57	21.0	1964-65	67.0
1957-58	34.4	1965-66	57.6
1958-59	47.2	1966-67	87.0
1959-60	54.3	1967-68	87.7
1960-61	48.3	1968-69	89.4

Source: DIAND, Government Activities in the North (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1953-1969).

[4]Canada, Education in Canada's North 1960-1970 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1970).

Admittedly, the expenditures represent only a crude indication of the Federal investment on the Eskimos' behalf. It is difficult to separate from the total the portion allocated directly to Eskimo administration. Arthur Laing, Minister of Indian Affiars and Northern Development, reported the cost, in respect to Indian and Eskimo peoples, to be slightly over $19 million in 1964-65. This amounts to 28 percent of the government's $67 million budget in the Northwest Territories for that fiscal year.[5] The population in the Northwest Territories, in the mid-1960's, was approximately 29,200 including 10,300 Eskimos, 5,700 Indians, and 13,200 whites.

Resistance by the Traditional Exotic Power Structure

The exotic institutions of long standing in the Arctic, the Hudson's Bay Company the RCMP, and the two religious denominations were not unanimous in their support of the Federal intrusion represented by the expanded social and medical programs. Their spokesman united to maintain the imperial structure by speaking out in support of the status quo, laissez-faire policies of the past.

In 1952, for example, an Eskimo affairs conference was held in Ottawa under the direction of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. The traditional power structure was represented by the General Manager of the Hudson's Bay Company Fur Trade Deparment, the RCMP Commissioner, and the Anglican and Roman Catholic Bishops of the

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[5]Speech by the Hon. Arthur Laing, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, at Yellowknife, N.W.T., 18 January 1967 (Press Release, DIAND).

Arctic. Noticeably absent were Eskimo representatives. Apparently after three decades of mission education and participation in the commercial life of the Arctic, the Eskimos were unprepared--in the eyes of the conferees--to sit as equals at the conference table and make contributions to the solution of problems in their communities.

There are two possible explanations for excluding the Eskimos from this conference, given the history of the contact situation. Either the Eskimos were reduced to such a dependent status they were unable to speak for themselves, or the exotic institutions, in their desire to maintain the feudal-like social structure, purposely excluded them from the decision-making process. The explanations are no doubt interrelated, the first being a smoke screen for the second. The Eskimo's dependence on the exotic institutions served as a rationale for perpetuating the structure.

There is no argument with the fact that the Eskimos were a dependent people. They lacked both strong independent leadership and sufficient knowledge of the political process to manipulate it to their advantage. Even more serious, the inadequate mission education compounded the Eskimos' geographic isolation by segregating him linguistically from the rest of the Canadian population. With few exceptions, the missionaries, police, and traders who understood the Eskimo language, controlled the flow of information both into and out of the Arctic communities. These men, in Mowat's words ". . . were able to set themselves up as the voice of the Eskimo, and to speak for him on all matters."[6]

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[6]Farley M. Mowat, "He would join us but barrier keeps Eskimo out," Northern Affairs Bulletin 6 (Sept.-Oct., 1959): 13.

However, the dependent position of the Eskimos did not justify their exclusion from the conference. Any planned solution to the problems confronting Arctic Canada that would give the Eskimo control of their communities and resources must begin by focusing its attention on their expressed needs and goals. That is, if indeed the goal of the conference was to promote Eskimo autonomy and self-sufficiency, free from the direction of the exotic institutions.

The conferees discussed the difficult economic and social problems confronting the Eskimos. They deplored the deterioration of the moral and physical health of the people and concluded it was due to the following: the decline in fur prices, the rising cost of trade goods, the increasing number of whites in the Arctic, and government social assistance. According to the conferees, Eskimo "independence" was being weakened by the knowledge that government agencies would come to their aid. Their judgment deceptively intimates the Eskimos were independent within the contact culture.

The conferees solution to the problem was predictable: ". . . every effort should be made to encourage the Eskimos to live off the land and follow their traditional way of life."[7] "Traditional," to the exotic agents implied a post-1930 Christianized fur trapper, indebted to the Hudson's Bay Company and dependent on the RCMP to administer his political future.

A few years later, the exotic agents demonstrated the extent they would go to to maintain the "traditional way of life," even if

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[7]Scott Polar Institute, "Eskimo Affairs," p. 69.

it was against the Eskimo's will. As returns from fur trading declined, many Eskimos, no longer able to support their families, moved into the domination-diffusion communities where relief was available. This centripetal tendency was observed at Port Harrison in 1957 by Willmott.[8] However, Willmott reports, it was brought to a sudden halt by the RCMP. The police ordered all Eskimos not employed in the settlement to move out. In all, the expulsion affected fourteen of Port Harrison's twenty-seven households.

L. H. Nicholson, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and a member of the Northwest Territories Council, later defended the expulsion policy in an article in the Hudson's Bay Company publication, Beaver.[9] Nicholson's statements are worth reviewing for they represent the thinking of an influential leader in the North's traditional exotic power structure.

Nicholson begins by correctly pointing out the demoralizing effects on people who concentrate in communities where employment is unavailable. But this reason was not the only one offered for keeping destitute Eskimos out of the communities. In the same paragraph, Nicholson proceeds to offer a second rationale: ". . . nor do we want them gaped at by visitors who will remember the dirt of the shacks and clothing they see and know nothing of the progress being made by other members of the race."[10] (Given the choice of

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[8]Willmott, "Flexibility," p. 52.

[9]L. H. Nicholson, "The Problem of the People," Beaver (Spring 1959), pp. 20-24.

[10]Ibid., p. 22.

starvation on the Barren grounds or being gaped at by visitors, one can assume the majority of Eskimos would opt for the latter.)

Mr. Nicholson's reasoning seems more reminiscent of a junior officer worried about the neatness of his detachment for a forthcoming inspection by a superior, rather than that of a high ranking government official committed to eliminating the complex obstacles that decades of domination and exploitation have placed in the Eskimo's path of independence. His program for keeping the communities clean is equally simple:

> Where there is employment and housing, the Administration should continue to seek and welcome suitable Eskimo workers and their families to such installations and areas. For the rest, keep them away even though it may call for seemingly harsh measures . . .[11]

Unanswered in this program are such crucial questions as how do "the rest" make themselves "suitable," and what is the alternative for those who do not want to become "suitable" for life in the exotically controlled domination-diffusion communities? Will these people simply disappear in the game-depleted interior?

Mr. Nicholson was not alone in voicing support for the expulsion measures. An editorial in Eskimo, the official organ of the Oblete Missionaries, observed ". . . we were particularly gratified to read . . . the address given last January by Mr. Nicholson, the Superintendent of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, whose views coincide with ours . . ."[12]

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[11]Ibid., p. 23.

[12]"Editors Remarks," Eskimo 51 (June, 1959): 4.

Reverend Marsh, the Anglican Bishop of the Arctic, added his support to the traditional position of laissez-faire in a 1959 statement.[13] The Bishop accused personnel of the new government service agencies of destroying Eskimo morals:

> Today, it is people, and they are many, who meet, admire, and yes, even love the Eskimo who, well-intentioned but unwise, are responsible for the Eskimo failing to maintain the high standards which are so admired. These people want to give them houses, give them food and not let them live on native foods . . .[14]

Marsh supports his contention by recalling how well off the Eskimo fur trappers of west Hudson Bay were fifteen years earlier before the initiation of government assistance programs. His recollection, though, does not coincide with the RCMP reports. For instance, in the Eskimo Point district (west Hudson Bay), the RCMP reported fifty percent more deaths occurred than births between 1935-45.[15] From 1940 on, every report warns of the scarcity of native food, the low fur yields, and the deteriorating health of the Eskimos. In 1950, RCMP Commissioner Wood, in support of the relief measures asserted:

> . . . it can be safely said that during the past five or six years, there would have been many more epidemics and much more sickness and deaths amongst the Eskimos had it not been for family allowances and relief supplies.[16]

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[13] D. B. Marsh, "Knowing Our Friends the Eskimo," Northern Affairs Bulletin 6 (Sept-Oct, 1959): 2-4.

[14] Ibid., p. 3.

[15] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Report (1945), p. 63.

[16] Ibid. (1950), p. 62.

Conclusion

The statements by the traditional exotic leaders, beginning with the 1952 conference, suggest two very important conclusions. The first is immediately apparent; the leaders approved authoritarian tactics when necessary to keep the Eskimos out on the Barren Grounds supporting the trapping economy. This type of coercion--to control Eskimo movements in the 1950's--is not surprising when viewed in the perspective of the contact-history. In fact, it was merely a continuation of the arbitrary RCMP domination in Eskimo communities.

The second conclusion is not as explicit as the first, but is no less important. The exotic leaders failed to appreciate the gravity or urgency of conditions in the society they controlled. They doggedly promoted a "traditional way of life" thesis as a condition for Eskimo survival. But, it is a sober fact that life in the post-collapse period was marked by tremendous physical suffering and loss.

The undermining of Eskimo strength did not happen overnight. By the 1940's, the long-term effects of life in the contact society were beginning to make themselves felt. In the early 1950's, with the majority of their population affected by varying degrees of tuberculosis and continually harrassed by recurring epidemics of other infectious diseases, the Eskimos slipped dangerously close to the edge of extinction.

The Canadian photographer, Harrington, added credibility to the written reports of suffering by presenting a compelling pictorial exposé of starvation in the early 1950's. Of his worthy objective, Harrington wrote:

> These pictures would, I hoped, show the outside world what real suffering was. They would also show the strength, endurance, courage and ingenuity of an almost exhausted people. Maybe after seeing them, white men would stop referring to Eskimos as "children: and "incompetents."[17]

What is the explanation for the traditional power structure's resistance to change? In part, the answer was no doubt self-preservation. The exotic institutions maintained a free hand in the administration of the Arctic society. They obviously resented outsiders questioning their prejudiced assumptions about the native peoples' social and medical needs and exposing their failure to manage Arctic resources for the benefit of the fur trappers.[18]

The change of self-preservation alone, however, would be too harsh an indictment. Part of the answer lies in the nature of the contact society itself. The exotic leaders' perception of Arctic conditions, or to apply a geographic concept, their "perception of hazard," was conditioned by a long association with the cyclic feast and famine pattern of Arctic life.

Famine was a recurring natural condition in Eskimo ecology. It stalked the people in aboriginal times and it certainly did not disappear in the contact society. The Eskimos had always survived the

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[17]Richard Harrington, The Face of the Arctic (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1952), p. 248.

[18]A glaring example appeared in the following 1935 Department of Interior report: "The educational requirements of the Eskimo in this region are very simple, and their mental capacity to assimilate academic teaching is limited." William C. Bethune, Canada's Eastern Arctic; its History, Resources, Population and Administration (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1935), p. 55.

attack of this adversary, and in years of plenty, rejuvenated their culture.

The traditional exotic leaders apparently based their 1952 Eskimo policy on this premise of recovery. But, the set-backs of the 1940's were precipitated by more than debits on an ecological ledger. A new adversary, tuberculosis, was in the command position, and even a bumper crop of white fox pelts could not terminate its deadly progression. It sapped the endurance of the people and made recovery impossible without massive medical treatment. It grew to such proportions that in the year 1956, 1,578 Eskimos--one-seventh of the Eskimo population--required hospitalization.[19] In the end, the Eskimo trapper's reward for his loyalty to the contact society was a bed in a tuberculosis sanatorium.

In contrast to the traditional exotic leaders, the education, medical, and welfare personnel who entered the Arctic after 1945 perceived the collapse as a threat to Eskimo survival. They lacked long-term familiarity with the Eskimos' condition and were appalled by the blatant neglect of their government for its Arctic citizens. They counseled Ottawa to assume leadership in launching a comprehensive attack on the region's human problems.

Dr. Wherrett, a tuberculosis researcher, drew attention to the need for a rational consistent government program in 1945: ". . . health cannot be divorced from socioeconomic conditions, and a health programme will fail if, at the same time, efforts are not

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[19]Phillips, Canada's North, p. 220.

made to improve the economic status of these people."[20] Thirteen years later, the Department of Northern Affairs belatedly acknowledged: ". . . Arctic lands will no longer support the traditional hunting and trapping economy of the Eskimos; even less will they support the rapidly growing Eskimo population."[21]

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[20]G. J. Wherrett, "Survey of Health Conditions and Medical and Hospital Services in the North West Territories," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science 11 (1945): 60.

[21]Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Annual Report (Ottawa, 1958), p. 25.

CHAPTER VII

ARCTIC CANADA TODAY: THE EXCLUSION OF ESKIMOS FROM RESOURCE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Today, foreboding parallels exist between the Eskimos' status in the Arctic and that of the Indians in southern Canada a century ago. The Indians participated in the economy as long as the fur trade prospered and competitive alternatives were unavailable in the environment for the Europeans to exploit.

The crucial juncture in Indian-government relations came as agriculture replaced the faltering fur economy. To promote this transition, the government concentrated the Indians on reserves in order to make way for the settlers who possessed the skills to utilize the land in a more intensive and profitable way. Isolation on the barren reserves deprived the Indians of a stable revenue-yielding resource base and prevented them from sharing in the wealth of the new economy developing around them.

Since the collapse of the fur economy, the majority of the Eskimos have, likewise, been without a resource base and their uncertain legal status in relation to recent mineral and petroleum discoveries casts serious doubts on their future ability to gain self-sufficiency. Granted, the large federal outlays recorded in Table 7 improved their material well-being. They came at a critical time when

the Arctic's biological resources could no longer support the hunting and trapping economy. But, these overall expenditures disguise serious inequities in the present allocation of Arctic wealth and opportunity.

The Multinational Corporations, the Federal Government, and the Eskimo

To begin with, the overwhelming fact about northern resource control today is that little has changed since the contact society solidified. Along with the northern Indians, the Eskimos remain on the bottom rung of a hierarchy extending beyond Canadian borders to include powerful multinational corporations.

Historically, the Hudson's Bay Company established the precedent for foreign control of northern wealth. The Company has never been a Canadian controlled operation. The recent transfer of its head-quarters from London to Winnipeg was an organizational move only, for 85 percent of the Company's shares remain in Great Britain.[1]

In the 1960's, the certainty of soaring returns from mining and petroleum precipitated a major land-grab by the multinational corporations, the Federal Government, and interests in the Canadian private sector.[2] Figures 9 and 10 record the intensity of mineral and petroleum claims registered in the 1960's.

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[1]Scott Polar Institute, "The Hudson's Bay Company Moves to Canada," Polar Record 15 (January, 1971): 544:

[2]The value of mineral production in the N.W.T. increased from $17.4 million in 1961 to $124 million in 1970. DIAND, Mines and Minerals North of 60 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 39.

The Canadian Petroleum Association estimates the crude oil reserves for the arctic Islands and Coastal Plain at 43.5 billion barrels, equal to 35 percent of the potential oil reserves of all



Figure 9.--Mineral Claims Recorded-Northwest Territories, 1961-1970.
Source: Canada. Northern Economic and Development Branch, Mines and Minerals North of 60 (Ottawa: DIAND, 1970), p. 40.



Figure 10.--Acreage Held Under Oil and Gas Permit, 1961-1971.
Source: Canada. Northern Economic Development Branch, Oil and Gas North of 60 (Ottawa: DIAND, 1970), p. 14.

Today, the position of the multinational corporations is unchallenged. Seven of the eleven northern mines are foreign-controlled, accounting for 64 percent of the revenues. And 69.1 percent of the 440 million acres in the Yukon and N.W.T. leased for oil and gas exploration are held by international petroleum corporations.[3]

Canadian equity in Arctic petroleum development is concentrated in Panarctic Oils Ltd., a consortium of twenty private companies, and the Federal Government. Panarctic is 70 percent Canadian owned with the government holding 45 percent of the shares. Its total leased acreage numbers 55 million.[4]

According to the government's 1970 oil and gas report, the potentially productive land is now under lease.[5] This fact accounts for the levelling-off of new claims in 1970-71 (Figure 9). The rapidity with which the government released these claims to outside interests is disconcerting in view of its position that the Eskimos have no land or mineral rights. Their constitutional position--defined by the Federal Government--excludes them from ownership of the hunting and trapping grounds they occupied for centuries. The concept of

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of Canada. The potential raw gas reserves for the Arctic Islands is computed to be 260.7 trillion cubic feet or nearly 36 percent of Canada's total. DIAND, Oil and Gas North of 60 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 11.

[3]Courtney Tower, "What's Happened to Our Northern Dream?" Maclean's 83 (May, 1970): 2.

[4]DIAND, "Government Invests Additional $13.5 million in Panarctic Oils," Press Release, Ottawa, 4 February 1970.

[5]DIAND, Oil and Gas North of 60, p. 1.

Indian treaty land does not apply to the Eskimos either; they have no reserves, nor are lands held in trust for them.[6]

Thus, when conflict arises, as it often does, between the two forms of Arctic land-use--exploration and trapping--the trapper must yield to the powerful multinational petroleum and mining corporations. Usher, in a highly publicized report, recently exposed such a confrontation between the Banks Island trappers and two petroleum companies, ELF Oil (French) and Deminex (West German).[7]

The Bankslanders' attempt to protect their trapping grounds from seismic exploration was motivated by a fundamental principle of rational resource development: ". . . if the consequences of development are unknown, they should be determined as far as possible before deciding whether to proceed with the development."[8] But the Eskimos quickly discovered that both the oil companies and the Federal Government were motivated by a desire for quick development.

In his analysis, Usher relates the oil companies' victory to the isolation of Eskimos from the centers of decision-making:

> The companies, armed with legal and technical experts and vast amounts of money, are well versed in the arts of lobbying and persuasion. They are, moreover, well represented in government, by people who have worked in industry, who understand its interests, who move in the same world and share the same basic purposes in life as executives, lawyers, engineers and technicians. The commonality of experience, values and aspirations

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[6]Canada, "The Indian and the Eskimo in the Northwest Territories and Arctic Quebec," Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Poverty, 2nd session, 28th Parliament, no. 14, Part II, 1970, p. 51.

[7]Peter Usher, The Bankslanders: Economy and Ecology of a Frontier Trapping Community, The Community, vol. 3 (Ottawa: DIAND, 1971).

[8]Ibid., p. 49.

> between government and industry personnel is great. The fact that the government is nominally regulating the activities of the oil companies creates a gulf, to be sure, but in no way as vast as that between the government and the trappers. For the trappers are quite unrepresented in government. Their way of life is considered alien and primitive, and even though government personnel responsible for their welfare may be sincere and competent, most have little understanding or empathy with their needs and problems. Real communication between the two parties is almost impossible.[9]

Usher's explanation for the isolation is penetrating. It incorporates the obvious disadvantages occurring from a lack of legal expertise and capital with the obdurate cultural patterns separating the Eskimos from their government and the centers of decision-making.

The Unresolved Question

The Federal Government is sacrificing both Canadian autonomy and the rights of its native citizens for the sake of rapid resource development. This conclusion is a reasonable one to draw from the foregoing discussion on the multinational corporations in the northern economy. The bargaining away of Canadian autonomy is conditioned by hard economic realities. Canada is an underdeveloped region when measured in terms of its favorable population/resource balance. The small population of 22 million can neither generate the capital to sustain large-scale resource exploration and development nor absorb the resultant production through its internal markets.[10] Thus, the government's only recourse, given the high priority it places on rapid and extensive development, is to favorably accommodate the

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[9] Ibid., p. 59.

[10] Oil and gas exploration expenditures have skyrocketed from $11 million in 1960 to approximately $150 million at present. The figure is expected to reach $200 million by 1975. DIAND, Oil and Gas North of 60, pp. 15 & 25.

multinational corporations in return for capital and technology and for access to world markets.

However, is there a positive rationale for the subjugation of native people's rights to the demands of resource development? The Federal Government, through its actions, implies that the answer is yes. Resource administration is guided in part by the premise that northern development will benefit the Eskimos and northern Indians. The goal is to provide a higher standard of living for the northern residents in the form of education, housing, and health improvements. In the words of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "One of the best ways of doing this is to encourage oil and mineral exploration and development, so that these opportunities will be available to our northern peoples on their own grounds."[11]

Whether the resource development envisioned by the government will result in substantial improvement in the standard of living is the unresolved question in the North today, particularly in light of the present level of involvement by native people in the economy. To begin with, statistics on Eskimo and Indian participation in northern commercial activities are not encouraging. Only a few figures on the income differential in the N.W.T. are needed to make this point. Northern whites averaged $2,922 per capita in 1963 compared to $510 for Indians and $426 for Eskimos.[12] In 1968, the Eskimos of

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[11]Speech by the Hon. Jean Cretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to the 1971 Symposium on Petroleum Economics and Evaluation (Dallas, Texas), 9 March 1971, Press Release, DIAND.

[12]DIAND, The Northwest Territories Today (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 53.

the Keewatin Region subsisted on a per capita income of $610.[13] Of this total, $498 is itemized as earned and $112 as unearned in the form of government assistance.

The income differential reflects the absence of opportunities for native people in the economic life of the North, specifically in wage employment and in private business ventures. First, their participation in the wage labor force is limited to unskilled transient positions. In the mining industry, for example, 63 (5.3 percent) of the 1,182 men employed in 1968 were native.[14] Yet, Eskimos, Indians, and Metis make up 63.5 percent of the population in the N.W.T. A similar situation exists in the government services. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Developmnet listed 8,376 full-time employees in 1968--only 764 were Eskimos and Indians.[15]

The Federal Government contends current developments in petroleum will remedy the unemployment situation. According to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 10,000 workers will be employed if major oil fields are opened up.[16] The Minister predicts approximately 4,000 jobs will go to Eskimos and Indians.

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[13]Canada, "The Indian and the Eskimo, " p. 110.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Canada, "Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development," Proceedings of the House of Commons, no. 7, 29 November 1968, p. 132.

[16]Speech by the Hon. Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to the Pacific Northwest Trade Association (Portland, Oregon), 20 April 1970, Press Release, DIAND.

If indeed these jobs do materialize, they will represent at best a very short term gain. The labor demands of oil fields are minimal once the construction requirements are satisfied. In fact, permanent employment will probably level off at 400 once the oil fields are in production.[17] Meanwhile, the native population in the N.W.T. will certainly continue to increase at the current 4 percent per annum rate.

Secondly, native people are unable to share in the management and ownership of the lucrative service industries that have proliferated in the last fifteen years to supply government, military, and resource exploration needs. What's more, with the exception of scattered co-operative successes, the Eskimos' future in this area parallels the dismal wage employment projection outlined above.

Individual Eskimos and northern Indians lack the capital and entrepreneurial skills necessary for establishing businesses to exploit opportunities in the altered northern environment. On the other hand, southern Canadians plus a number of Americans are rapidly filling the void and cashing in on the boom. The Indian Brotherhood brought this problem to the attention of their readers in the case of the flourishing N.W.T. tourist industry.[18] Three of the four main lodges in the Great Slave Lake area are owned by Americans, while the fourth is owned by a southern Canadian. The Brotherhood singled out

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[17]Ralph Hedlin and John D. Hamilton, "The Mackenzie Valley Alternative," Maclean's 85 (July, 1972): 46.

[18]"Frontier Lodge: Tourists Pay $65 a Day, Native Staff Get 50¢ an Hr.," Native Press, 7 August 1971.

the Canadian owned operation for its grossly low salaries. Tourists paid $65 a day at the lodge while the native staff received 50¢ per hour.

At Pangnirtung, on Baffin Island, a former Hudson's Bay Company manager established a lodge and fishing camp in 1970. Guests paid $45 per day and have included such individuals as the presidents of General Motors, U. S. Steel, and Rockwell. The local Eskimos serve as guides and kitchen help.[19]

The tourist industry depends on the cultural, biotic, and physical attributes of the Eskimos' and northern Indians' native land. Yet, only in communities with active co-operative societies have these exotically controlled operations been challenged and the native people allowed to derive the total economic benefit from tourism.

A profile of the backgrounds and skills of six of the new northern entrepreneurs is the subject of an article by Carney.[20] These men, through their technical skills and knowledge of the economy have the potential of becoming extremely wealthy from transportation, construction, and resource exploration related contracts. Carney appropriately calls these men the "New Sourdoughs." Their Eurocanadian backgrounds dramatize how little conditions have changed, in terms of access to opportunities in the North, since the first whalers and traders appeared on the scene.

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[19]"Pangnirtung, N.W.T.," Edmonton Journal, 20 October 1972.

[20]Pat Carney, "The New Sourdoughs," Maclean's 84 (May, 1971): 46-50.

When the Eskimos and northern Indians acquire the necessary technical and financial prerequisites to compete with the "New Sourdoughs," they will face a well established commercial structure. Is it realistic to expect future native entrepreneurs to have any better success in entering the established commercial structure in the North than their brethren have had in the white dominated communities bordering the reserves in southern Canada?

So far, the discussion has relied entirely on current economic factors such as income levels, employment rates, and ownership in new industries for an indication of the future role of native people in the northern economy. The scrutiny of these economic indicators offers little assurance that the disparity in access to northern opportunities between native people and whites will change despite continued and even expanded resource development.

There is additional support for this contention that is perhaps even more convincing and indicative of the future prospects for native involvement than the economic measures. From the 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference to the present, native people have been excluded from major policy planning meetings on northern development. The formats from a number of these conferences give the impression the North is an uninhabited region to be developed by whites for the benefit of southern Canadians.

The National Northern Development conferences held in Edmonton since the early 1960's are a prime example. The advisory board directing the sessions is composed of officials from powerful international and southern Canadian institutions: the presidents of

petroleum, mining, transportation, and banking corporations, plus a number of senior govenment and university personnel. The registered delegate rosters from the conferences represent the same interests.

Despite the fact that the agendas have ranged from man in the North to petroleum in northern development, native people were excluded until Chief John Tetlichi addressed the group in 1970. The Chief's message was brief and to the point. The native people need technical education to participate in northern development, but more importantly, education is needed by those who make the decisions that ignore native desires for their land and culture.

> . . . we feel that you in the rest of Canada could also use an education in human relationship. You must also learn that there are Indians, Eskimos and Metis, and they are men just like you and does he not deserve the same break you would give your own brother and the same tolerance you would show any other person?[21]

Chief Tetlichi's appeal for co-operation and understanding in resource development apparently fell on an unresponsive audience. Two years later, in 1972, over seventy leaders of industry, government and academia convened at a ski resort on Mt. Gabriel, Quebec. The Federal Government sponsored the conference to establish guidelines for northern development and the needs of northern people. The rationale offered by the conference planners for the absence of native people was true to their technological credo. They felt

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[21]John Tetlichi, "What Northern Development Means to Northern People," Proceedings of the 5th National Northern Development Conference: Oil and Northern Development (Edmonton, 1970), pp. 68-69.

native people lacked the kind of scientific and technological education necessary to participate in the sessions.[22]

After three days of meetings, the conferees agreed they lacked a sufficient fund of knowledge about the North. This conclusion must have satisfied all interests. One can argue that it provided the representatives from academia with strong arguments for continued research funding, the Federal Government was not pressured to change its vague noncommittal approach to native resource rights, and the multinational corporations were able to continue their resource extraction policies unhindered by specific guidelines recommended at the conference.

The conferees are correct in concluding that more knowledge is needed about the North, but it is not the type of knowledge the Mt. Gabriel group is especially interested in. It is knowledge about how to phase out an exotic power structure with all its modern-day components--industrial, governmental, and academic--and replace it with truly representative indigenous leadership.

There is at the present time, and has been for several years, the native personnel to plan and direct a conference. And one can rest assured their concluding statement would be more constructive and specific than the general one of needing additional exotically controlled and interpreted studies to identify the problems of native people in northern development.

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[22]Edmonton Journal, 17 October 1972.

The hypocrisy of the government sponsored Mt. Gabriel Conference is underscored by the following statement of the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to the Special Senate Committee on Poverty in 1970:

> . . . we have violated one of the central tenets of democratic society: that each individual has the right to the necessary degree of freedom to develop his potential as a human being, in his own way--and this implies the right to make his own decisions . . . . A group brought up in tutelage . . . is denied the opportunity for such growth, and we have impeded such growth among Indian and Eskimo people.[23]

Finally, it is difficult to avoid the racial overtones in the logic of excluding native people because they are not "scientifically" qualified. This logic was challenged by Carpenter twenty years ago, shortly after the 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference.

> Here we perceive the grossest deception which results from a belief in the so-called "natural inferiority" of certain peoples. By this belief we make ourselves unable to learn from them since we consider that they have nothing to teach. Instead of joining with these people in a reciprocal arrangement for a long-range development of the north, we offer them two alternatives: either acceptance into the Canadian community on a level of inferiority, or acceptance on a level of equality after first rejecting all native traditions.[24]

The 1952 Eskimo Affairs conferees apparently made the same decision. But, subsequent events raise serious questions about their judgments and qualifications. They advocated policies based on their own particular prejudices and without adequate information. The people who were most effected by these policies, the Eskimos, were excluded from making an input into the decision-making process. In

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[23]Canada, "The Indian and the Eskimo," p. 10.

[24]Edmund S. Carpenter, "The Future of the Eskimos," Canadian Forum 32 (June, 1952): 55. (author's underlining)

short, Eskimos were dependent on the members of the traditional exotic power structure to interpret conditions in their communities and to establish the guidelines for their future role in the northern economy.

In 1972, a new group of southern Canadians accepted a similar operating procedure while attempting to establish guidelines for future policies. What assurances do the native people have that these conferees are any better qualified than their 1952 counterparts, or that the guidelines they propose will not continue to serve the interests of the multinational corporations and white Canadians operating in the North?

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: THE SHIFTING LOCUS OF BENEFIT AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

The empirical evidence introduced and the conclusions and questions posed in the preceding chapters are organized to direct attention to the underlying cultural-historical processes that create and sustain the relationships of dependence, domination, and exploitation. In this concluding chapter of Part I, these relationships are made explicit in the culture contact model presented in the introductory pages. The objective is to provide an historical basis for the subsequent evaluation of the Arctic co-operative movement.

The evidence presented suggests that domination (decision-making) and exploitation (benefit) are analytically separable dimensions. Particular activities of the exotic contact institutions and different historic phases vary with respect to these dimensions.

Re-examining the activities first, it was shown that whaling and fur trading were primarily concerned with the exploitation of Arctic resources involving the utilization of Eskimo labor and also with the domination of production and distribution decision-making. Domination of the Eskimos by the traders was more intense because of the central role the Eskimos played in fur trapping. The traders

were not content, as the whalers had been, to depend on the traditional economic organization of the Eskimos to provide surpluses. They replaced the largely subsistence native organization with a highly organized market economy by disrupting aboriginal ecological relationships, substituting European post managers for native leadership, and establishing market control. These activities required the trader to have absolute control over production and distribution decision-making. Yet the traders, like their predecessors the whalers, gave low priority to the reordering of aspects of native culture not in conflict with resource exploitation.

The missionaries and RCMP, by contrast, were concerned with the transformation of aspects of the institutional and world view or ideological levels of the Eskimo culture. As such they directly focused their attention on those components of the culture which contained the locus of decision-making and, therefore, their activities relate primarily to the domination dimension. However, some evidence on the flow of tax monies collected from white fox furs suggests an exploitative redistribution existed, even among these institutions, up until approximately 1945.

When the activities of the exotic contact institutions are viewed historically in relation to the domination-exploitation dimensions, the following pattern emerges. Prior to the coming of the whalers, the Eskimos did not exist in a subject relationship to any outside group. In terms of the contact model, the Eskimos were isolated and in the position labelled <u>one</u> (Figure 11). Benefit and decision-making were localized in the Eskimo bands.

DIMENSIONS OF IMPERIALISM



Figure 11.--Dimensions of Imperialism.

Eskimo independence continued during the period of initial European penetration. Contacts with the explorers and early whalers were sporadic and confined largely to the east coast of Baffin Island and Hudson Strait. The method of exchange at these chance meetings was simple bartering of personal belongings between the Eskimos and individual crew members. In practice, neither side had an advantage over the other. The whalers provided the independent Eskimos an opportunity to acquire luxury items such as ornaments, tobacco, and occasionally a useful tool. But, in no way was this trade essential to the Eskimos' survival.

Eskimo independence began to deteriorate after 1840 with the expansion of whaling into Hudson Bay and the widespread adoption of shore stations. Whalers primarily established an economic relationship with the Eskimos, leaving the decision-making apparatus of the Eskimo culture intact. After the collapse of whaling, around 1900, the early traders continued this relationship during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Since this economic relationship overwhelmingly benefited the whaling captains, their financiers, and the traders, the relationship with the Eskimos moved roughly to the position marked two. The locus of decision-making remained largely in the local bands, but benefit tipped heavily in favor of the whalers.

The 1920's marked a critical juncture in the contact history. Simultaneously, as the caribou population declined, the number of missionaries and police rapidly increased, and the Hudson's Bay Company

emerged as the dominant trading concern. The missionaries and police actively undermined local decision-making by imposing changes in the Eskimo social organization and ideology, while the Hudson's Bay Company applied monopolistic regulations to the fur trade thus controlling resource exploitation decisions.

As the 1920's drew to a close, the dependency generating processes climaxed in the cultural synthesis and relationships in the contact society moved into position three. The Eskimos were synchronized to the vagaries of the market economy and to the decisions of the traders, missionareis, and police. Eskimo communities, dependent on the exotic agents to administer their livelihood and guide them in the new socioeconomic environment, had little choice but to accept as absolute the trader's standard of value for furs and trade goods and the missionary's and police officer's models of behavior.

Within this structure, domination was complete. Eskimo communities were fragmented and became devoid of institutions for promoting native leadership and local decision-making which could have enabled them to respond to the increasing demands of the exotic institutions. This development ran counter to the organizational structure of the traditional Eskimo community integrated, as it was, by cross-community rules of co-operation, and governed by equalitarian principles loosely defined by common consent and enforced by communal decision-making.

The heavy economic and physical burden the Eskimos paid to support the contact society attests to the exotic locus of benefit. The central argument to support this contention revolves around the

malallocation of resources and the unequal distribution of misfortune. First, the taxes levied on white fox pelts were not returned to promote Eskimo welfare in the same proportion they were paid, especially during periods of disaster. Secondly, the monopolistic profits of the Hudson's Bay Company during abundant years were redistributed to corporate stockholders in England and not returned to the Eskimo communities. It is true, the Company sustained the trappers during famine years through the "debt" system, but this outlay, like the Federal Government's welfare appropriations, did little to arrest the physical deterioration of the population brought about by malnutrition and inadequate medical care.

With the recognition of the collapse of the fur trading economy in the late 1940's and the abject poverty of the Eskimos, the Canadian government began to modify the flow of benefits through health, education, housing, and welfare programs. These appear to have moved the Eskimos into the cell labelled paternalism. Because of the short duration of this phase and an uncertainty about the precise nature of the money flows, this phase, labelled four, is shown with a dashed line.

The Eskimos are presently benefiting from the large federal expenditures on education, health, housing, and welfare. The cost of these services is well beyond the present meager productive capacity of the Arctic economy. But, at the same time, the Eskimos have limited influence on the decision-makers who direct these programs, and more importantly, on the decision-makers in management

and government who are charting the course of Arctic resource development.

The large bureaucratic structure transported north to administer the numerous government service programs has created a very visible dominance hierarchy in the larger Arctic contact communities. The cultural chasm is especially noticeable in the settlement patterns of communities like Inuvik, Cambridge Bay, and Baker Lake. Government civil servants are set-off from the native population in enclaves of high standard housing. For example, in Inuvik the whites live on the east side in homes and apartments serviced by heat, water, and running sewage. These utilities are not extended to the substandard native dwellings on the west side of town.

It is significant that the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development recently singled out paternalism (qualified with "benevolent") as one of the major weaknesses of the government's approach.[1] However, paternalism must not be allowed to stand as the rationale for a far more complex and dibilitating historical process. Paternalism occupies a small time period--post World War II--in a long contact history which includes imperialism. And the present problems of Eskimo adaptation are more the result of their exclusion from both the benefits of Arctic resource exploitation and decision-making than from the paternalism relationship accompanying the government's tardy arrival after 1945. Certainly, the inadequate services the government grudgingly provided the Eskimos prior to 1945 cannot be accredited to "benevolent" paternalism.

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[1]Canada, "The Indian and the Eskimo," p. 9.

Today, the Arctic contact society stands at a threshold. The future form it will take is clouded by the policies of paternalism and the uncertain role of the Eskimos in resource development. On the one hand, the resource policies of the Federal Government lead to a return of the imperialism relationship of position three, with the Eskimos serving as an unskilled part-time labor force at the convenience of the multinational corporations and southern Canadian entrepreneurs.

Yet, against this somber possibility a vitally important breakthrough has been scored on the co-operative front. The co-op's potential as an institution for involving local people in economic and social development is well documented throughout the world. How it is faring in the Canadian Arctic is the subject of Part II.

PART II

CO-OPERATION IN ARCTIC CANADA

CHAPTER IX

THE ARCTIC CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

Establishment and Diffusion

The beginnings of the Arctic co-operative movement are submerged in the rush of the Federal health and educational activities of the 1950's. These programs rightfully dominated the government's initial attention. The restoring of personal health and vigor to the Eskimos, coupled with a provision for expanded educational opportunities, are the cornerstones of any long-range development program.

Yet, despite gains in health and education, the Arctic economy remained depressed and the Eskimos dispirited. In fact, area economic surveys in the 1950's suggested conditions were deteriorating. One such study of Ungave Bay in 1958[1] by Evans was crucial in convincing government planners to experiment with a community co-op.[2] Evans' report extended beyond the limits of the standard resource inventory to include ways to improve the economic situation. He emphasized Eskimo ownership of new industries and singled out the co-operative as the organization to restore Eskimo control.

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[1]It will be recalled that 1958 is also the year the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources officially acknowledged traditional hunting and trapping activities could no longer support the Eskimo population. See p. 109.

[2]Jon Evans, Ungave Bay: A Resource Survey, 1958 (Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1964).

The following year, 1959, representatives of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources introduced the community co-operative concept to the Ungave Bay Eskimos at George River and Port Burwell.[3] They encouraged the Eskimos to organize fishermen's producer co-operatives to harvest the Arctic char reported in Evans' resource inventory. During this same period, Father Andre Steinmann independently initiated a co-operative based producers organization among the Eskimo carvers at Povungnetuk.[4]

The overall accomplishments of these pioneer Arctic co-ops encouraged the Federal Government to intensify its financial and technical commitment to the movement, while, at the local level, enthusiastic Eskimo co-operative leaders advanced the movement in neighboring villages. Povungetuk, in particular, became the center of the co-operative movement in Arctic Quebec and sent its leaders to a number of villages promoting the advantages of co-operation.[5]

The cause of Arctic co-operation received a major stimulus in the middle 1960's when the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development organized two conferences for the Arctic co-op leaders.

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[3]Saul E. Arbess, Social Change and The Eskimo Co-operative at George River Quebec (Ottawa: DIAND, 1966) and Aleksandrs Sprudz, "Die Kikitaoyak-Genossenschaft in Kanada," Genossenschaft (Switzerland), 10 February 1972 (Port Burwell Co-op).

[4]Frank G. Vallee, Povungnetuk and its Co-operative. A Case Study in Community Change (Ottawa: DIAND, 1967).

[5]Ibid.

The first meeting was held at Frobisher Bay in 1963 and the second at Povungetuk in 1966.[6]

It is impossible to fully evaluate the positive stimulus these two conferences had on the rapid diffusion of Eskimo co-ops in the middle and late 1960's (Figure 12). They obviously helped focus attention on the struggling movement by bringing together Eskimo village leaders from the far reaches of the Canadian Arctic for the first time. The enthusiasm and goodwill generated by the Eskimo participants was carried back to their home villages and to neighboring villages not served by co-ops.

Certainly, the fact that the conferences were held on such a grand scale accomplished a great deal in unifying the movement's goals and in reducing the Eskimos' suspicions about the sincerity of the government's commitment to help; prior to 1963, the movement lacked any structural or ideological unity among the Eskimos. Co-operative information flowed vertically downward from government to isolated village and not laterally from village to village.

In southern Canada, the conferences attracted the attention of the major national co-operatives and the credit unions. Since the 1963 meeting, both the co-operative Union of Canada and the Quebec-based Conseil du la Coopération du Québec have provided technical assistance to improve the efficiency of existing co-ops and to help establish new ones. This assitance is coordinated with an extensive government program designed to stimulate viable co-ops.

The Crucial Role of Government

It is necessary to discuss, in a general way, the relationship between governments and co-operative societies before attempting to evaluate the role of the Canadian Government in promoting Arctic co-operation. National governments, regardless of their political structure and level of development, have certain minimal responsibilities to co-operatives. Generally, these duties begin with the passage of a law embodying the principles to be observed by the co-operative societies. The law is given weight by the appointment of a government co-operative officer who registers the societies and has the authority to oversee their regular audits.

Many governments in the developing world extend much more support and actively foster an environment for the growth of healthy co-ops. They assure the co-ops sufficient operating capital and provide the following supportive services: training for local managers, the loan of government officials to serve as managers until local personnel are adequately trained; loans for the establishment and expansion of co-ops; the preparation of educational materials on co-op principles and procedures; funds for audits and legal services; research to stimulate new economic activities, and the establishment of trading bodies to expand co-operative marketing.[7]

Critics may object that the development of the movement under the sponsorship of the government is inconsistent with the principle

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[7]Central Treaty Organization, Managing and Financing the Marketing Cooperatives (Ankara: Office of the United States Economic Coordinator for CENTO Affairs, 1971), p. 8.



Figure 12.--Eskimo Co-operatives, 1958-1968.
Source: Information compiled by Aleksandrs Sprudzs, Head of the Co-operative Development Section, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Owwawa, 1972.

that a co-operative movement should be voluntary and spontaneous. However, while the ultimate aim should be to develop a movement completely free from official assistance and supervision, there is a strong case to be made for the government to actively assist in the initial stages of development. Indeed, government supported measures are prerequisites to successful co-operation in the areas of the world recently emerging from colonial status, areas where the local population was denied an adequate education and participation in the management of their economy.

The Canadian Government channels its direct support of Arctic co-operation through a special Co-operative Services Section of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Government co-operative departments have proven to be indispensible during the critical inaugural period when new societies are forming among peoples who have historically been politically and economically dominated.[8] In addition to the basic functions of auditing, inspecting and supervising co-ops in the field, the co-operative department is in a position to coordinate government assistance programs and to provide valuable feedback on the acceptance and desirability of such aid.

It is widely recognized that the success of a co-operative department rests primarily on the shoulders of its staff which should be adequate both in caliber and number. In the selection of staff, the Canadian Government fortunately recruited a nucleus of men

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[8]Sheila Gorst, Co-operative Organization in Tropical Countries (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1959), pp. 312-319.

deeply committed to the movement's ideals and with ample cooperative management experience in both Europe and Canada. Had these men not been so well prepared for their task, the diffusion of co-ops in the Arctic would have been considerably retarded, for, throughout its existence, the Co-operative Services Section has been understaffed.

The reasons for this personnel shortage stem from a combination of government economy and the difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified people. During the 1960's, the problems of the co-opeartive advisors in supplying adequate assistance to the movement were further aggravated by the need to provide time consuming accounting services to most of the co-operatives.

In part, the problem of limited personnel was offset by the enlistment of outside help. Missionaries, RCMP Officers, school teachers, and Resource Development Officers contributed valuable service beyond their assigned duties to assure the survival of co-ops in the villages they served. The Co-operative Services Section successfully enlisted the assistance of the national co-operative unions in southern Canada to prepare educational materials and to provide training workshops. However, throughout the uncertain formative period, the most important ingredient contributing to initial success was the enthusiasm of the Eskimos, themselves. Without their ready involvement, the co-operative movement would have stalled regardless of how large a staff the government supporting agency maintained.

Adequate financial support is needed to back the existing organizational and supervisory services, if the movement is ever

to make further progress. Societies, particularly during the formative years, need access to seasonal credit to finance their marketing operations and to grant credit to members. Larger sums of money are required for the acquisition of processing plants, transportation and construction equipment, and for building expansion.

The Canadian Government does provide equipment and loans to help individual co-ops get established or expand their range of activities. The main source of financial aid is available through the Eskimo Loan Fund. A co-op can borrow up to $50,000 for a ten-year term at five percent interest. This amount is sufficient for such small scale ventures as building and stocking a co-operative store or for initiating a handicraft industry. But, it is hardly adequate to meet the capital intensive requirements for establishing an integrated fishing industry, for building tourist facilities of a quality to compete with white-controlled northern resorts, or for the equipment purchases needed to exploit local resources, and to provide adequate co-operative owned transportation facilities. According to a Co-operative Services Section report:

> The lack of adequate financing services had a detrimental effect on certain co-operative operations. For example, the limit on credit available from the Eskimo Loan Fund caused some difficulty in carrying out ongoing activities and in some instances restricted expansion of feasbile and legitimate plans.[9]

The federal financial assistance to co-ops stands in sharp contrast to the subsidies offered private ventures. The Canadian

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[9]Co-operative Services Section, "Eskimo and Indian Co-operative Development Programs in Canada," (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1970), p. 4.

Pacific Railroad received a subsidy of $86 million to build the Great Slave Railroad to the Pine Point mine. Pine Point is owned by Cominco, a Canadian Pacific subsidiary. During the first three years of operation, Cominco made more than $100 million of tax-free profit.[10]

Lotz recently made a meaningful comparison between mining subsidies on Baffin Island and the lack of government support of two struggling Northwest Territories Indian co-ops:

> Despite the world glut of iron ore, the Department stood ready in 1967-68 to help Baffinland Iron Mines come into production with a subsidy of $25 million. At the same time that talk of subsidizing this mine was going on, two Indian co-operatives in the Northwest Territories, at Fort Resolution and Rae, were refused further financial assistance from the government on the grounds that they were costing too much money.[11]

Government equipment loans helped to alleviate the co-op's problem of insufficient capital. The most requested item is the fish freezing plant, costing about $50,000 when installed in an Eskimo community. These plants are in short supply, however, and communities have had to wait several years, after their initial requests, for delivery.

The Arctic co-ops receive additional financial support from government funds that are not reserved specifically for the purpose of advancing the co-operative movement, but rather are appropriated for the general welfare of the entire Eskimo population. For example,

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[10]Graham J. Beakhust, "A Plan to Exploit Canada's North and its Residents," Canadian Dimension 8 (November 1971): 57-59.

[11]Jim Lotz, Northern Realities (Toronto: New Press, 1970), p. 136.

the Federal Government provides a number of municipal services to the Arctic communities. Well organized co-ops have been able to contract these services, mainly water delivery and garbage and sewage pick-up, and thus boost their annual cash incomes.

One of the most successful services initiated in 1965 by the government to advance the co-operatives is the marketing agency, Canadian Arctic Producers Limited (C.A.P.). Prior to this time, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development marketed handicrafts and stone carvings for the co-ops. This arrangement worked well for a while, but the volume gradually outstripped the Department's limited facilities, encouraging the Federal Government to seek other means of marketing. Consequently, it requested the Co-operative Union of Canada to establish C.A.P.; the new agency agreeing to charge the co-ops a commission of 10 percent. In return, the government provided C.A.P. with sufficient funds each year to make up the difference between its operating expenses and the revenues from commissions.

Problems immediately arose in the financial structure of the agency. C.A.P. operated with limited working capital and was unable to pay the co-ops for their products until it received payment from the retailers. A year often lapsed before the co-ops were reimbursed, thus creating a hardship for the Eskimo producers.

The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development remedied the problem of inadequate working capital in 1970 by granting the agency $400,000 for 400,000 preferred shares. The

objectives behind the government take-over of the marketing agency are twofold: to provide funds for faster payment and to restructure C.A.P., so that ownership and control can be progressively turned over to the Eskimos by returning shares based on co-op patronage.[12]

The relationship between the Arctic co-ops and government has changed since 1967. The Federal Government initiated these changes based on the belief that the movement's goals would be better served by a direct relationship between the co-ops and local governments. Therefore, Ottawa has increasingly turned the responsibilities of the Co-op Services Section over to the Northwest Territories and Quebec governments. The result has been to produce two Arctic co-operative movements, separated by white-imposed political boundaries. The effects of this politicalization of the movement is most apparent in the difficulties of federation.

Federation

Successful co-operative movements evolve in the direction of economic self-sufficiency and increasing independence from state aid. These goals are achieved by the organization of regional societies into a federation so the members can retain their local autonomy, but, at the same time, can enjoy the advantages of economies of scale. The pooling of resources and the sharing of services allows the co-ops to take the initiative in important management decisions

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[12]DIAND, Canadian Arctic Producers, a new framework (Ottawa: Mortimer, 1971), p. 7.

and to retain a greater proportion of the economic gains from their productivity for redistribution to the membership.

Economic benefits derive from the bulk purchasing procedures of the federation which enable the member co-ops to considerably reduce the cost of raw materials and finished goods. Thus, through a Federation-controlled marketing agency, the member co-ops improve their marketing position and, correspondingly, the returns from their products.

Purchasing and marketing are two examples showing how the advantages of scale directly bear on the viability of individual co-ops; but, they by no means, exhaust the potential of federation. A federation can maintain its own auditing, legal, and planning services, thereby, freeing itself of reliance on government supervision. Federation-wide planning and coordination, initiated at the local level, is important if the Arctic co-ops are to become independent decision-making bodies for promoting Eskimo welfare.

Despite the eventual necessity of federation, the Eskimos have had mixed success in their drive for union. The concept was first advanced at the 1963 Frobisher Bay Conference of Arctic co-ops. Following the conference, the Co-operative Union of Canada prepared a discussion paper on federation and distributed it to the co-ops prior to the Second Co-operative Conference held at Povungnituk in 1966. The Eskimo conferees at Povungnituk approved a plan for federation with three subdivisions: Mackenzie, Eastern Arctic, and Arctic Quebec and recommended formation at the earliest possible date.

Shortly after the conference, the Eskmos encountered legal obstacles that tended to divide the Arctic co-operative movement along political boundaries imposed on them from the south. The Co-operative Association Ordinance of the Northwest Territories, enacted in 1959, made no provision for federation. Thus, the co-ops in the Northwest Territories, the proposed Mackenzie and Eastern Arctic regions, could not incorporate until the Northwest Territories Council approved the necessary amendment to the ordinance. Whereas, in Quebec, provincial law permitted co-ops to federate and this privilege was interpreted to include the Eskimos.

The Arctic Quebec co-ops, anxious to capitalize on the advantages of federation, struck an independent course in May, 1967, and formed La Fédération des Coopératives due Nouveau Quebec. Since its founding, the Fédération has been an extremely active organization providing an expanding range of services for the member co-ops.[13]

The Fédération has its headquarters at Levis, Quebec, where it maintains a warehouse-showroom and coordinates the transportation network linking the member co-ops with the outside world. Once a year, the Fédération charters cargo ships to transport the year's supply of goods to the co-op stores; on the return trip, the ships carry the Eskimos' products.

In addition, the Fédération serves as a purchasing and marketing agent for the member co-ops, provides auditing services and organizes educational programs for co-op managers. It is currently

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[13]Marybelle Myers, "La Fédération des Coopératives du Nouveau Quebec," We Co-operate 6 (Spring, 1970), p. 5.

promoting a tourist development program and expanding the scope of its educational offerings.

Meanwhile, the Northwest Territories co-ops did not allow the temporary political setback in 1966 to dim their enthusiasm for federation. Co-operative leaders from the Mackenzie and Eastern Arctic subdividions attended regional meetings to work out the details of federation and to pressure the Northwest Territories Council for a change in the Co-operative Association Ordinance. Committees were formed at these meetings to visit Eskimo communities in order to generate understanding and support for federation among the rank-and-file membership.

The Eskimo co-operators were rewarded for their persistent effort on February 11, 1972, when co-operative representatives from the Northwest Territories, meeting at Churchill, Manitoba, signed a memorandum agreeing upon the operating procedures for federation. Once the structure of federation was agreed upon, the Eskimos chose, as their first objective, to provide auditing and business management services to the member co-ops. Future programs include specialized services for bulk purchasing and marketing, tourism, training programs, and assistance in bidding on contracts and in securing the necessary equipment. This final provision would allow individual co-ops to compete with southern Canadian contractors for building projects in their communities.

The Economic Consequences of Arctic Co-operation

Although the majority of the Arctic co-operatives have been in operation less than a decade, their economic impact is already evident. Table 8 serves as a starting point for a discussion of these economic accomplishments.

TABLE 8.--Canadian Arctic Co-operatives: Cumulative Results, 1961-68 (in thousands of dollars).

Year	Sales (1)	Net Savings (2)	Local Income		
			Purchases from Members (3)	Wages and Salaries (4)	Total Local Income (5)
1961	$ 209	$ 71	$ 15	$ 19	$ 34
1962	416	119	49	54	103
1963	411	47	59	72	131
1964	990	136	168	97	265
1965	1,189	86	469	132	601
1966	1,544	123	529	186	715
1967	2,096	29	665	283	948
1968	2,395	125	707	361	1,068
1969	3,084	341	(not itemized)		1,191
TOTALS	$12,379	$1,077			$5,056

Source: Compiled from information provided by the Co-operative Services Section, DIAND, Ottawa, Canada.

Total sales volume increased from $209,000 in 1961 to nearly $3.1 million in 1969. Net savings during the nine year period totalled a million dollars. Column five records the important gains made by the co-ops in increasing local incomes through wage employment and by purchasing members' products. In addition to direct income, the members have accumulated equity in their co-ops totalling $900,000.

The gains recorded in Table 8 reflect the multipurpose nature of the Arctic co-ops. They perform both producer and consumer functions, incorporating a wide variety of activities (see Appendix B; Canadian Arctic Co-operatives, activities).

Impressive as the economic indicators are, they only suggest to the real changes that have occurred in the organization of the Eskimo village economy and in its relationship to the outside world. These important changes can be pointed out by comparing how the village co-operative economy is organized to solve the economic problems of production, distribution, and consumption with the pre-co-operative arrangements summarized in Part I. The central question revolves around the determination of the locus of benefit and decision-making over these basic economic processes.

During the contact period of intensive fur trapping, the trading monopoly organized the Arctic economy and administered it through their field representatives, the post managers. Administration at the local level was relatively simple; the Eskimos participated only at the primary production stage of supplying raw materials, while the post managers determined the value of the Eskimos' productivity and controlled the distribution of trade goods in the villages. Therefore, through its post managers, the trade monopoly dominated all transactions relating to production, distribution, and consumption between the Eskimos and the outside world.

The weak position of the Eskimo fur trappers in the market economy was reflected in their exclusion from the major profit-making

transactions in the economic process. The larger share of the economic benefits in the market system stem, not from the production of raw materials, but, from transportation, processing, marketing, financing, and management; activities closed to Eskimo participation. The trade monopoly dominated and benefited from these transactions as well as from the marketing of European and Canadian manufactured goods in the Eskimo villages.

The co-operative economy, in contrast, revitalizes local control of economic decision-making and, at the same time, provides avenues for a larger proportion of the economic gains, from the Eskimos' human and material resources, to remain in the Arctic communities. The co-operative organization provides a scope of vertical integration of successive functions under the one management enjoyed earlier by the trade monopoly.

First, the producer's sector of the co-operative provides a locally controlled purchasing body for Eskimo raw material suppliers, primarily fish and furs. Next, a number of co-ops established processing plants for the raw materials, fish packing, and fur garment industries. These plants provide local employment for Eskimo women and for men not engaged in extractive activities. Handicrafts and carving are also part of the processing level of production. The artists produce on an individual basis, securing their raw materials from the co-ops, then selling the finished products back to the co-ops.

In turn, the processed products, plus the raw furs are then shipped outside for marketing. At the present time, the Eskimos

remain dependent on non-co-operative owned transportation facilities to get their products to market. However, this situation may be remedied if the current operation of a commercial cargo plane by the Pelly Bay Co-op proves feasible. At any rate, the economy of scale, represented by the federation, improves the co-op's bargaining position with the transportation companies.

Lastly, the marketing of co-op products is increasingly being handled by the Eskimo-controlled federations; thus, giving the Eskimos direct connections with retailers throughout the world, and, in effect, eliminating unnecessary middlemen. The arts and crafts marketing agency, Canadian Arcitc Producers, has a network of some 700 dealers in eleven countries. Annual sales increased from $60,000 in 1965, when C.A.P. was established to $1.3 million in 1971.[14] If the above co-operative trends continue, the Eskimos will become their own entrepreneurs, managing and financing the whole undertaking from production of raw materials through the sale of the finished product.

The consumer co-ops serving as retail stores in the Eskimo villages, show equally impressive gains. Like the producer co-ops, these consumer operations take over a function previously restricted to the trade monopoly. The positive trend in merchandise sales between 1965 and 1968 is recorded in Table 9.

Economically, the co-ops are successful, both in the growing volume of their transactions and in the degree they enable the Eskimos

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[14]DIAND, Canadian Arctic Producers, a new framework, p. 8.

TABLE 9.--Merchandise Sales of Consumer Co-ops (in thousands of dollars).

Year	Sales
1965	$ 578
1966	688
1967	931
1968	1,326

Source: Compiled from information provided by the Co-operative Services Section, DIAND, Ottawa.

to take advantage of opportunities in their environment, formally controlled by outsiders. They operate in stark contrast to the economic arrangements of the intensive fur trapping period when profits from the trade flowed to stockholders in England. Today, the profits return to the members in the form of cash rebates and in greater equity shares in the co-ops themselves.

Social and Cultural Consequences of Arctic Co-operation

Significant as the economic gains are, they do not overshadow the less quantifiable, but nevertheless, important social and cultural consequences of the co-operative movement. In fact, it is the movement's non-economic potential that inspired Vallee to conclude his review of Arctic co-operation with the following endorsement:

> I am an enthusiastic supporter of the co-operative movement in the arctic and subarctic regions of Canada, not so much because of the economic value of the co-operative, although this is considerable, but more because of its social and psychological value in helping people work away from the disheartening,

> demoralizing status they had in the past, when they looked for their signals from government officials, traders, police and missionaries.[15]

At the local level, the co-ops are the focal points of community-wide decision-making, providing both forums for the discussion of local problems and training grounds for the development of native leaders.[16] These developments, in the direction of greater village integration, suggest that co-operative involvement is offering an alternate form of social organization to the market economy's weakening effect on extended kin structure.

Successful multipurpose co-ops are effectively cutting across generational and sexual lines in their utilization of human resources. In the organization of the Igloolik Co-operative, Crowe found:

> Older people have been able to contribute knowledge and skills to field and handicraft work. The adult management group have learned to handle the mechanical equipment, and young adults with formal training have kept accounts.[17]

Baird and, more recently, Chance have expressed concern about the postiion of the Eskimo woman in the changing Arctic economy.[18]

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[15]Frank Vallee, "The Co-operative Movement in the North," in People of Light and Dark, ed: Maja van Steensel (Ottawa: DIAND, 1966(, p. 48.

[16]Saul E. Arbess, Social Change and the Eskimo Co-operative at George River, Quebec (Ottawa: DIAND, 1966), pp. 46-60: Keith J. Crowe, A Cultural Geography of Northern Foxe Basin, N.W.T. (Ottawa: DIAND, 1969), pp. 102, 108; Graburn, Eskimos Without Igloos, pp. 111-114, and Frank Vallee, Povungnetuk and its Co-operative. A Case Study in Community Change (Ottawa: DIAND, 1967), pp. 54-55.

[17]Crowe, A Cultural Geography of Northern Foxe Basin, p. 105.

[18]Irene Baird, "The Eskimo Woman: Her Changing World," Beaver, Outfit 2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 48-55, and Norman A. Chance, The Eskimo of North Alaska (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), pp. 97098.

Many of her old skills no longer are in demand and, in the majority of the villages, she has not had the opportunity to learn new ones. Co-operative organizations are helping women discover new skills and outlets for their creative talents. For example, the successful Aklavik Fur Garment Co-operative is made up exclusively of women.

At the regional level, the movement is fostering a form of pan-Eskimo solidarity unprecedented in the Canadian Arctic. This solidarity is largely the outgrowth of the two Arctic co-operative conferences held at Frobisher Bay in 1963 and Povungnituk in 1967, plus the numerous district meetings of co-op leaders. No doubt, the recent successes in federation will further enhance this important trend.

The Future: Toward a Co-operative Society

During the initial period of expansion, in the early 1960's, Vallee identified two features common to a majority of the Arctic co-ops which are central to a discussion of the future of the movement.[19] First, whites initiated the ventures and provide sustained impetus and, second, the co-ops are ultimately dependent on government financing and specialized technical services.

The first qualification relates to the process of decision-making. Vallee emphasizes that white guidance is present in the technical aspects of the operations such as accounting, pricing, and in matters whose significance transcends the local community or whose

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[19]Frank G. Vallee, "Notes on the Cooperative Movement and Community Organziation in the Canadian Arctic," Arctic Anthropology, 2 (1964): 45-49.

significance is long-term. However, in the day-to-day local operation, the Eskimos manage their co-ops.

Georgia, a resident of Repulse Bay, recently voiced a strong protest on the issue of Eskimo involvement in co-operative administration. Her main arguments are summarized as follows:

1. Co-ops in the North, for the most part, seem to be government or mission projects trying to show a good set of figures.

2. Most of them are run by professional businessmen from the South.

3. The process of training local people to assume responsibility for their co-op deteriorates into merely hiring local people as casual labor.

4. They are bringing material benefits to the people, but in the process they are blurring, if not destroying, the principle of co-operatives.[20]

At this point in the development of Arctic co-operation, Georgia's criticism must be viewed more as a warning for the future than as an indictment of the movement's progress. The running of viable co-ops requires considerable technical and management training, not available to the Eskimos until the 1960's. The crucial test will come in the late 1970's when a generation of educated Eskimo can be expected to assume full responsibility for the management of the economic and political institutions in their communities. In the meantime, the co-ops serve as significant training grounds in community decision-making for the eventual realization of self-sufficiency in social organization.

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[20]Georgia, "A Critical View of Northern Co-ops and Some Tips on How to Improve Them," News of the North, 10 Feburary 1972, p. 7.

Regardless of whether the co-op managers are Eskimo or white, the most important obstacle to an independent co-operative movement in the future is the matter of economic self-sufficiency. During the 1960's, the co-op made spectacular gains in physical expansion and in member earnings. These gains, however, were buttressed in large part by substantial government expenditures in projects designed to stimulate local economies.

The Federal Government is committed to a long-term program of creating jobs in Arctic communities. Yet, when the saturable carving and handicraft market and the ecological limits on Arctic biotic resource exploitation are evaluated against the rapid rate of Eskimo population growth, it appears unlikely that present projects can be expanded indefinitely to provide employment, nor that self-sufficiency can be achieved without a constant migration of Eskimos to southern Canada.

The limitations of the present productive base clearly puts the economic self-sufficiency issue back to the resource control question outlined in Chapter VII. Presently, it is estimated (before the "Energy Crisis") the Federal Government will eventually receive over $100 million annually from Arctic oil and gas royalties.[21] Here the government has the opportunity to enter into a symbiotic relationship with the Eskimos in the allocation of these royalties based on equality and conceptualized by the center cell in the contact model (Fig. 11).

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[21]A. B. Yates, "Energy and Canada's North: Oil and Gas Regulations," Arctic Digest 5 (June, 1973): 26.

But, the Eskimos' right to directly share in the royalties must first be recognized by Ottawa. This recognition involves the denial of the present policy of paternalism in the federal distribution system. The government must limit its role as a redistributive authority mediating between the Eskimos and the wealth produced by multinational corporations.

The Eskimo co-ops are the legitimate economic and planning institutions in the majority of the Arctic communities and are the logical bodies to directly share in the royalties from future resource extraction. Through consultation with government and private specialists, the co-ops can manage the allocation of resource royalties for the betterment of their communities. The net effect will be a healthier independent Eskimo population actively participating in the co-operative development of the Canadian Arctic.

CHAPTER X

PELLY BAY: PROFILE OF A CO-OPERATIVE COMMUNITY

The Geographical Components: Location, Natural Habitat, and the Cultural Position of the Pelly Bay Region

Pelly Bay, the southwestern arm of the Gulf of Boothia, is located east of Simpson Peninsula in the Northwest Territories (Figure 13). The Bay is 17 miles wide at the entrance and extends southward 65 miles, averaging a width of 15 miles. A chain of small islands cross the northern part of Pelly Bay, from the Harrison Islands in the northwest to Helen Island on the eastern side, blocking the southward drift of pack-ice from the Gulf of Boothia.

The village of Pelly Bay is located on huge Precambrian rock outcrops which run along the southwest coast of Simpson Peninsula at approximately 68° 53' north latitude and 89° 51' west longitude. East of the coastal outcrops, the bulk of the peninsula is composed of a till plain interspersed with numerous lakes. The village is bordered on the north by the Kugajuk River which flows between the rock outcrops into the small island-studded inlet of St. Peters Bay. Thirteen miles south of the village, the Kellet River flows into Pelly Bay.

Pelly Bay lies well within the tundra climatic and vegetation zone. The mean daily temperatures for January and July approximate



Figure 13.--The Pelly Bay Region.

-20°F and 45°F respectively and produce a typical tundra vegetation of hearty shrubs, tufted grass, and lichens and mosses. Yet, despite the greatly restricted season of plant production an adequate land and marine wildlife population is native to the region. Hunting conditions were extremely good in aboriginal times. The Arviligjuarmiut told Rasmussen they knew nothing of hunger and times of distress. Their hunting year was evenly divided between caribou, musk-oxen, seals and salmon, and if one occupation failed they always had another to fall back on.[1]

Both the ringed and bearded seals are available in Pelly Bay, while during the fall the rivers abound with Arctic char, a member of the salmon family. Prior to the introduction of firearms, large herds of caribou migrated to Boothia Peninsula during the summer, and throughout the year herds of musk-oxen grazed on the tundra south of Pelly Bay. Arctic foxes, important in the contact economy, are common near the ice-edge along the northern boundaries of the bay.

The area surrounding Pelly Bay is inhabited by the Arviligjuarmiut (the people of the big one with the whales). The name is derived from a mountain formation whose outline resembles whales on the surface of the water. The name refers singularly to this topographic feature, for whales played no role in the Arviligjuarmiut's subsistence economy.

The Arviligjuarmiut are the eastern branch of the Netsilingmiut, or "people of the seal." In aboriginal times, the Netsilingmuit were a loosely organized group, sharing a common mode of living and freely

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[1]Knud Rasmussen, Report, p. 22.

intermarrying. When Rasmussen first contacted them in 1923, they numbered 259 people, with 54 of this total living around Pelly Bay.[2]

An Historical Overview: The Influence of Geographical and Situational Factors on the Contact History of Pelly Bay

Historically, the vast expanses of sea-ice and tundra separating Pelly Bay from Eurocanadian outposts played an important role in tempering the nature and intensity of contact. Year-round ice conditions in the Gulf of Boothia prevented penetration of Pelly Bay by sea (Figure 14), while overland journeys across the tundra were, and still are, both hazardous and costly.

As a result, the Arviligjuarmiut were spared the disruptive influences of the whalers and early traders. Furthermore, neither the commercial trading interests nor the RCMP have ever established operations at Pelly Bay. The only permanently based Eurocanadian institution operating among the Arviligjuarmiut until the post World War II period was the Roman Catholic mission, founded in 1935.

At the time of Balikci's 1959 field study, Pelly Bay remained one of the most isolated, self-sufficient communities in Arctic Canada with only a minimum of participation in the market economy. Balikci categorized the Arviligjuarmiut's methods of procuring a livelihood as a ". . . transformed subsistence economy . . . characterized by highly successful rifle sealing, net fishing and the absence of systematic trapping with traplines."[3] He credited the peoples' ability to

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[2]Ibid., p. 84.

[3]Asen Balikci, Two Eskimo Communities, p. 60.



Figure 14.--Summer Ice Conditions in Arctic Canada.
Source: Pilot of Arctic Canada (Ottawa: Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, 1968).

live off the land to a number of geographical and situational factors summarized below:

1. The area was remote and the unfavorable ice conditions precluded the establishment of a trading post by the Hudson's Bay Company.

2. Trading was not encouraged as an essential activity. The absence of the Company trader, plus the limited number of imported goods at the mission store did not constitute an important enough incentive to generate an energetic search for a cash income.

3. Game was abundant in the area and the introduction of rifles and nets, which facilitated hunting and increased the game returns, obviated the necessity of importing larger amounts of foodstuffs.

4. Wage employment possibilities either did not exist in the area, or later, when the nearby DEW line site was established did not receive the encouragement of the local missionary.[4]

The unique set of geographical and situational factors operating at Pelly Bay reduced the impact of the disruptive processes associated with the dependency-generating process, the cultural synthesis, and the collapse stages of the contact history. Nevertheless, the encirclement of the region which began in the 1920's by trading posts and police detachments increasingly drew the Arviligjuarmiut into exotic spheres of influence and altered basic ecological patterns (Figure 15).

The establishment of Hudson's Bay Company posts at Repulse Bay, 200 miles southeast of Pelly Bay, and at Simpson Strait on King William Island provided the Arviligjuarmiuts regular access to firearms, ammunition, and iron utensils. When Rasmussen visited them in 1923, he noted important changes in their material culture and hunting

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[4]Ibid.



Figure 15.--Encirclement of Pelly Bay by Trading Posts and RCMP Detachments, 1920-1930.
Source: See sources for Tables 14 and 16, Appendix A.

efficiency. Armed with rifles, the Eskimos killed more caribou and musk-oxen in a few moments than was possible all season long with spears and bows. Rasmussen's account of the destruction resulting from a rifle caribou hunt parallels the ecological disasters reported elsewhere in the Arctic:

> A shout resounded through the camp and, when we all rushed out, we saw the first great herds of caribou coming trotting down over the hills east of the settlement . . . All the men seized their guns and hunting bags, and a moment later they lay concealed here and there among the hummocks that the animals would have to pass. This was the first real caribou massacre of that autumn, and therefore they approached unsuspiciously at the same quick trot down towards the shore, until a deafening volley of rifle fire suddenly checked them all . . . . Shot after shot cracked, animal after animal tumbled over among their terror sticken companions, until the whole cavalcade split up into a number of small flocks as if by prearrangement and galloped back to the interior of the island.[5]

In a few years, the slaughter took its toll on the great herds. By 1930, the caribou no longer migrated to their summer grazing grounds on Boothia Peninsula.[6]

The Arviligjuarmiut were fortunate to have ample seal and fish resources available to offset the reduction of caribou meat. But the scarcity of caribou skins for winter clothing created new problems of adaptation requiring lengthy hunting trips to the interior, south of Pelly Bay, and a growing dependence on imported clothing. The trading post clothing is a poor substitute for the insulated caribou skin garments and is usually worn by the women and children. The men

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[5]Knud Rasmussen, Report, p. 78.

[6]Andrew Macpherson, The Caribou of Boothia Peninsula (Ottawa: Canadian Wildlife Service Report, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1960).

require the protection of the caribou skins in order to spend long hours in the open hunting and checking traplines.

Balikci builds on Rasmussen's 1923 observations to document the long-range consequences of the rifle and the trading posts on the Arviligjuarmiut methods of hunting and their patterns of socio-economic behavior. Briefly, his main thesis is that the introduction of the rifle greatly simplified, intensified, and individualized caribou and seal hunting.[7] The aboriginal methods of communal co-operative hunting disappeared and with them the community-wide reciprocity practices of sharing meat. Furthermore, Balikci found that the trapping and trading of furs, although a limited economic activity at Pelly Bay, contributed to the decline of co-operative behavior.[8] Trapping is an individualistic activity and fur money is never shared except within the nuclear family. The net effect of the individualization of hunting patterns, together with trapping and the individual ownership of imported goods increased the importance of the nuclear family as an economic unit at the expense of the larger extended kin group.

RCMP detachments encircled the Arviligjuarmiut approximately the same time as the trading posts, and Rasmussen's report reveals the Eskimos' early concern about their independence in relation to the police. An Eskimo involved in a village killing related his fears to Rasmussen:

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[7]Asen Balikci, Two Eskimo Communities, pp. 61-74.

[8]Ibid.

> . . . I was told that white men would come up from Chesterfield and take me away to punish me in the white man's way. White men were masters in our country and they would take me home to their own land, where everything would be wild and strange to me.[9]

Another Eskimo discussed the many problems that arise when a man lives the life of a hunter in freedom under his own responsibility. He felt it was necessary to live according to one's own customs, but contact made this difficult and "His countrymen . . . were often apt to have a bad conscience whenever they met white men."[10]

The impact of the RCMP as an agency of cultural change is difficult to assess in the case of Pelly Bay. The above statements indicate an awareness by the Eskimos of the police's ultimate authority in matters of social control. Yet, the geographical isolation separating Pelly Bay from the regional police detachments diminished their impact on the daily lives of the Arviligjuarmiut. Only after 1950, when the RCMP were permanently stationed at Spency Bay, have regular yearly patrols visited Pelly Bay.

The Roman Catholic mission, founded in 1935, is the central Eurocanadian institution in the contact history of Pelly Bay. The resident priest remained the only white inhabitant among the Arviligjuarmiut until a school teacher, hired for the newly constructed government elementary school, arrived in 1962. In the absence of other contact agents, the missionary assumed a dominant position in

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[9]Knud Rasmussen, Report, p. 21.

[10]Ibid., p. 30.

community decisions. In the words of Father Van de Velde, the veteran missionary at Pelly Bay:

> Once a missionary has been accepted and adopted by a tribe, he possesses considerable authority. They will listen to him voluntarily and conform their conduct with his teachings: the adults as well as the children.[11]

The missionary's influence stemmed from his central role in a number of community activities. He performed religious duties, provided medical care, and instructed the Eskimos in the rudiments of formal education and Canadian law. In addition, Balikci singles out the missionary's economic functions as being the highest importance.[12] The mission housed a small trading store in order to reduce the need for long journeys to Hudson's Bay Company posts. The store stocked only the basic essentials: ammunition, iron tools, tea, tobacco, sugar, lard, flour, and imported clothing.

The Arviligjuarmiut were fortunate in their relationship with the evangelizing component of Eurocanadian culture on two counts. First, their community was never fragmented by the competition between rival missionaries residing among them, and second, the resident missionaries, Father Henry and later, Father Van de Velde, wisely used their influence to promote the Eskimos' reliance on local food resouces and to limit their involvement with trapping and the market economy.

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[11]Franz Van de Velde, "Religion and Morals Among the Pelly Bay Eskimo," Eskimo 39 (1956): 16.

[12]Asen Balikci, Two Communities, p. 50.

[13]Henry A. Larsen, The Northwest Passage, 1940-1942 and 1944 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), pp. 32-33

Figure 16.--The Roman Catholic Mission Erected by Father Henry in 1936.

Figure 17. The Present Mission Complex.

Father Henry encouraged the Eskimos to maintain their harpoon throwing and bow and arrow skills by regularly orgnizing contests with prizes.[13] Both missionaries discouraged intensive trapping and trading for nonessential items. In the mid 1950's, when a Distant Early Warning (DEW) site was being constructed 12 miles southeast of the village, Father Van de Velde counseled the Eskimo men not to abandon their hunting cycle for wage employment.

Father Van de Velde's action was well-founded. The disruptive effects of the DEW line upon the Western Canadian Arctic Eskimos are described in a special report by Ferguson.[14] During the construction phase, the diets of the workers' families deteriorated. Eskimo fathers, working full-time, ate at the mess halls while their families relied on expensive imported Hudson's Bay Company food. The Eskimo men performed unskilled tasks and, of course, once the site construction was completed their jobs ended, leaving them to face the difficult problem of readjustment to a subsistence economy with limited opportunities for making a cash income.

Before leaving the historical account, special mention should be made of the Arviligjuarmiut's relationship to the contact model developed in Part I. Because of their isolation and less intensive contact with representatives of Eurocanadian culture, the Arviligjuarmiut never received the full brunt of the imperial process.

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[13]Henry A. Larsen, The Northwest Passage, 1940-1942 and 1944 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), pp. 32-33.

[14]J. D. Ferguson, "A Study of the Effects of the Distant Early Warning Line upon the Eskimos of the Western Arctic of Canada" (Ottawa: Ms. in DIAND Library, 1957).

Throughout the pre-World War II period, they remained on the periphery of the forces of domination and exploitation that penetrated more accessible communities. The cultural synthesis was incomplete because no traders and police resided at Pelly Bay. The Arviligjuarmiut weathered the collapse of the fur economy with only minor disruptions due to their limited involvement in the trapping economy and the ample supply of local food. Besides their conversion to Christianity, the only other major change in traditional Eskimo institutions was the decline in extra-familial co-operation wrought by the introduction of firearms and trapping. Native Arviligjuarmiut institutions of leadership and community control remained intact.

The Modern Co-operative Based Community

Present Status of Pelly Bay

Government sponsored community development programs in education, health, welfare, housing, and wage employment are bringing about dramatic changes in the isolated, self-sufficient Pelly Bay Community Balikci described in 1959. Together these programs are producing changes in the educational attainment, settlement pattern, resource utilization, population, and, most importantly, in the Eskimos' attitudes and expectations about the future status of their community.

To begin with, a majority of the Eskimos under twenty-five can, today, converse in English as a consequence of attending the federal school built in 1962. Prior to 1967, the only permanent buildings in the settlement belonged to the mission and the government. The Eskimos still lived in igloos during the winter and tents in the summer.

Then in 1967, the Federal Government provided Pelly Bay with thirty-two new homes under the Eskimo Rental Housing Project. Rents are prorated on the basis of a family's ability to pay. In 1969, the government located a medical clinic in the community and staffed it with a qualified nurse, thus replacing and expanding the medical services previously supplied by the mission. Cases requiring intensive care are airlifted to Cambridge Bay or Yellowknife where doctors are on duty.

All toll, the addition of the school and medical clinic added three whites to the community. This number, combined with the two priests, one brother, and two nuns serving the mission, brings to eight the number of whites residing in Pelly Bay.

A co-op, introduced in 1966, has become the major institution for economic and social change at Pelly Bay. The first priority of the co-op is to satisfy the immediate, basic needs of the community for an Eskimo-owned retail store and for a producers' co-op to encourage local industry. The retail store or consumers' co-op supplied the community with food and dry goods, while the producers' branch purchases handicrafts from the community artisans and meat, fish, and furs from the hunters.

Currently, the Eskimos through their co-op are venturing into three new areas: commercial air transport, tourism and large-scale commercial fishing. If these activities achieve their expected potential, the economy of Pelly Bay will be totally revolutionized.

Finally, the rapid population growth at Pelly Bay from 120 in 1959 to approximately 200 in 1971 is tangible evidence of the

Figure 18.--The Federal Day School Offering Grades 1-6.

Figure 19.--The Pelly Bay Nursing Station.

Figure 20.--The Koomiut Co-operative Retail Store.

Figure 21. Construction of the New Co-op Retail Store with Office Building in Background.

improvements occurring in health services, education, and the economy. Nearly fifty percent of the population is under fifteen years of age.

Establishment of the Koomiut Co-operative

In terms of promoting Eskimo sufficiency in economic and social organization, the co-op is clearly the most significant development at Pelly Bay. Its economic and organizational structure forms the basis of the modern community.

The Koomiut (people of the river) co-operative was incorporated in August of 1966 after consultation between government co-operative advisors and community leaders. An initial loan of approximately $16,000 by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development's Eskimo Loan Fund provided the early financial backing for the enterprise. At present, every family at Pelly Bay is a member and all decisions are made through the elected board of directors and executed by the co-op manager and his staff.

Co-operative Organization and Administration

The five member board of directors is the pivotal body within the co-op organization. The directors are the spokesmen for the membership in dealing with the co-op's employees, and in formulating policies and assuring that they are carried out.

Each director is elected by the membership for a three-year term. It is the directors' responsibility to consider the members' views and to inform them of decisions made at the weekly board meetings.

The Eskimos feel the weekly meetings are necessary to keep issues from piling up. Once a year, the entire membership meets to hear the directors' progress report on co-op activities, to select replacements for directors whose terms have expired, and to review future plans.

The board is made up of traditional leaders respected in the community for their hunting skills and general leadership abilities. Their average age in 1966 was 47 years, and in 1971, 40 years. The directors' lack of formal education, fluency in English, and in record keeping limits their effectiveness in dealing with certain technical problems of the co-op. Yet, at the same time, these traditional leaders are indispensable in organizing community support for the co-op projects.

The directors are assisted by the secretary-treasurer who is in charge of accounting, correspondence, and the keeping of minutes at all meetings. In the absence of qualified Eskimos, the two village priests, Fathers Goussaert and Lorson have filled this position since the inception of the co-op.

The actual day-to-day operation of the Koomiut Co-op retail store and the purchasing of the members' products is the responsibility of the general manager and his staff. All are young men in their twenties who speak fluent English and have received some vocational training in southern Canada. The general manager, John Ningark, graduated from the three-month program for co-operators at the Western Co-operative College in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

Economic Activities

Since its inception in 1966, the Koomiut Co-operative has successfully expanded its economic activities each year. Table 10 charts the overall growth for the first ten years.

TABLE 10.--Annual Revenues of the Koomiut Co-operative.

Year	Sales	Net Savings	Patronage Rebate
1967	$144,092	$ 3,387	$ 2,582
1968*	233,643	8,168	6,378
1969	191,874	13,067	10,507
1970	243,286	15,845	13,380

Source: Annual Reports of the Koomiut Co-operative.

*The large earnings for 1968 include building supplies in the amount of $70,000 for the new mission at Pelly Bay.

The sales column includes revenues from the major co-op activities: retailing, government construction and service contracts, and the marketing of local products. The retail store is the core activity of the co-op contributing approximately 65 percent of the sales revenues. Retailing is followed in importance as a revenue source by the income from a government contract to supply municipal services to the community. In 1970, the co-op received $48,000 to provide water and fuel oil delivery, garbage pick-up, and sewage disposal for the thirty-two homes built by the Eskimo Rental Housing Project in 1967.

The co-op is making modest gains in the marketing of local products, but revenues are still well below those from retailing and

Figure 22.--Co-op Operated Garbage Disposal Servicing One of the Homes of the Eskimo Rental Housing Project.

Figure 23.--Construction of the Fish Processing Plant in August of 1971.

government contracts. Total revenues paid by the co-op for handicrafts, mainly soapstone and ivory carvings, increased from $13,000 in 1967 to $25,000 in 1970, and have replaced the contact economy occupation of hunting and trapping as a source of cash income. In 1970, thirty-two women and thirteen men sold handicrafts and carvings to the co-op. Individual incomes ranged from less than $100 to a high of $2250. In contrast, twenty hunters and trappers earned approximately $10,000 for their furs and sealskins.

The co-op regularly purchases fish and meat from the hunters for sale in the retail store. This service allows traditional hunters to market their surplus and receive a limited cash income. At the same time, the fish and meat market stimulates consumption of local foods by members of the community who are full-time wage employees.

Sales revenues and economic activities are one way of evaluating the co-op's impact on the community. Equally important is the income generated through the co-op for Eskimo families.

Twelve Pelly Bay Eskimos are classified as full-time wage employees. Five work for various government agencies operating in the community and seven are employed by the co-op. The co-op paid out $26,400 in salaries for its employees in 1970. In addition, co-op related enterprises provide the majority of the cash income--$35,000 in 1970--for the carvers, hunters, and trappers.

The patronage rebate (column 3, Table 10) is another means of distributing wealth through the co-op to the active members. After the co-op's yearly savings are determined, a member receives a rebate

computed on the cash amount of his business with the co-op. Currently, the Koomiut Co-op's policy is to pay a member half his rebate in cash and credit the other half to his share of capital in the co-op. In this way, a member increases the amount of his personal savings in the co-op, while the co-op does not lose the use of the savings for further expansion.

New Directions: Problems and Prospects

The economic accomplishments achieved by the Eskimos through their co-op in the first four years of its operation are considerable, especially when measured against the level of development at Pelly Bay in the 1950's. But, despite these gains, the present sources of cash income are insufficient to keep pace with the greater consumer demands of the Eskimos and their growing population. Therefore, the co-op leadership is working to build a stronger economic base by venturing into new producer activities designed to expand area resource use and to capitalize on the opportunities federation among Arctic co-ops will create.

In 1971, the Koomiut Co-op launched the most ambitious undertaking of any Arctic co-op by purchasing a DC-4 aircraft in partnership with an experienced Canadian bush pilot. The rationale for acquiring a large aircraft is sound. Pelly Bay is ice-bound by the Gulf of Boothia throughout the year and that all trade items were carried by dog-sled from neighboring trading posts. However, with the dramatic changes in economy and lifestyle initiated by government development programs in the 1960's, the volume of freight moving into

and out of Pelly Bay increased considerably, beyond the limited capacity of dog-sled transport. By 1970, the co-op was paying out nearly $50,000 per year to commercial airlines for transportation services.

The economic feasibility of the DC-4 is not based on income from the present transport needs of Pelly Bay alone, although this is an important source of revenue. Rather, the co-op purchased the plane as a means of developing new income sources well beyond the limits of the present economy.

To begin with, commercial fishing remained an untapped resource at Pelly Bay until the fall of 1971. Without a processing plant or an aircraft readily available to fly the frozen fish to southern Canadian markets, all fishing was for local consumption. But today, Pelly Bay has the beginnings of a thriving commercial fishing industry as a result of the DC-4 and the acquisition of a portable fish processing plant loaned to the co-op by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

When in full operation, commercial fishing is expected to provide five months employment, between July and November, for twenty Eskimos: eight in the processing plant, ten fishing, and two hauling in the catch. The co-op estimates the annual gross income from the sale of fish could be as much as $120,000. This estimate is based on the average annual catch in the years prior to 1970 when thousands of pounds of fish were fed to the large dogteams maintained by the Eskimos. Following the introduction of the snowmobile, the dog population at Pelly Bay has dropped from nearly 300 in 1967 to 40 in 1971.

Tourism is another new source of employment and revenue made possible by the co-op owned aircraft. The co-op initiated a sports fishing program in 1971 to coincide with the late summer char run. Fishermen from southern Canada and the United States pay a package price of $1,000 for a week at Pelly Bay. The fee covers round trip air passage between Edmonton, Alberta, and Pelly Bay on the DC-4 plus lodging, food, guides, and motor boats. The co-op expects to be able to accommodate twenty fishermen per week during the eight week period in late summer when sports fishing is especially good. When fully developed, the operation will employ fifteen Eskimos as cooks, maids, and guides.

The sports fishing program will complement the other late summer economic activities at Pelly Bay by helping to maximize the efficiency of the aircraft. Frozen fish from the commercial fishery are flown to Edmonton weekly. The sports fishermen, plus supplies for the co-op store, can be carried on the return flight and thus assure the aircraft full operating capacity both ways.

Finally, the planners at Pelly Bay did not overlook the possibility of the DC-4 serving other co-ops in a federation. The Koomiut Co-op addressed a letter to several neighboring Arctic co-ops in May of 1971 suggesting the advantages in freight savings and in the development of local resources similar to the fishing industry at Pelly Bay that could be realized through the coordinated use of the DC-4.

The purchase of the aircraft and the expansion into tourist and commercial fishing industries are outstanding examples of local

decision-making and determination. The decision to push for the new industries was made independent of government directives.

A commercial fishery had been the dream of Pelly Bay Eskimos for at least ten years prior to its approval by the government in 1971. On several occasions, the Eskimos through their priest, Father Goussaert, requested the Federal Fisheries Research Board to conduct a resource inventory and officially verify the abundant reserves of fish at Pelly Bay and in the surrounding rivers and inland lakes.

The study, when finally approved, coincided with the construction of the fish processing plant in August of 1971. As a result, a meager 25,000 pound quota (2-3 weeks fishing) was imposed on Pelly Bay until the findings of the study could be interpreted. The fisheries Board is operating under the limitations of a small budget, as a recent House of Commons fact-finding committee discovered, and is not totally to blame for the delay.[15] Nevertheless, the poor timing of the study placed a burden on the Eskimos. They had planned on the income from a longer fishing season to help meet the financial obligations of their new aircraft.

Co-op plans to establish Pelly Bay's sport fishing industry have likewise had to be altered to meet government building codes. Unaware of specific regulations regarding room size for tourist quarters, the co-op constructed a frame-tent camp to accommodate twenty fishermen, only to have the structures condemned by government inspectors. But, instead of giving up the program, the Eskimos are responding by moving into summer tents and allowing the fishermen

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[15]Canada, Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 20 April 1972, p. 21.

to occupy their homes. If tourism grows as expected, the co-op intends to build a modern lodge.

The people at Pelly Bay desire to work as equal partners with their government in the management of new commercial ventures. They recognize the need to assure the safety of tourists who visit their community and for scientific management of the fishing industry. These principles are wholeheartedly accepted. What they don't understand is why communication between their community and various government agencies cannot be improved, especially the timing of government decisions to complement instead of retard local initiatives.

Furthermore, the people at Pelly Bay recognize the necessity to succeed in the independent course they have chosen. They are well aware that developments in their community are being closely watched by people in government and industry. The following discussion in the Council of the Northwest Territories between Mr. E. A. Ballantyne, the Territorial Director of Industry and Development, and Mr. W. W. Phipps, a council members, is one such example of the attention Pelly Bay is attracting.

> MR. PHIPPS: One other question while I have the floor. I heard a rumour that the Pelly Bay Co-operative is getting in two private aircraft, DC-4's. Do you know anything about this?
>
> MR. BALLANTYNE: I too, have heard such a rumour, Mr. Chairman.
>
> MR. PHIPPS: Well, if the Territorial Government is backing these co-operatives to a great extent what major control do we have over for instance, co-operatives buying DC-4's?
>
> MR. BALLANTYNE: Mr. Chairman, our backing of co-operatives with the exception of the two that I have just mentioned is not a financial backing at all. By the federal legislation for co-operatives each province or jurisdiction must appoint a supervisor

of co-operatives. This appointment was held by the Federal Government until they transferred it to us. It is now held by an officer in my department. It gives a certain obligatory responsibility in provision of reports, supervising and auditing of their financial records. It does not give us the opportunity to interfere in their own internal arrangements. The opportunity to interfere, other than on an advice basis, is purely confined to those co-ops to which from time to time with Council's authority we have actually provided financial assistance. With reference to the Pelly Bay aircraft we have no right to veto such a thing. They did discuss it with us, we pointed out the financial implications, we also pointed out the implications of the Air Transport Board regulations. It is my understanding that the use of this aircraft will be to move goods which represent part of the stock-in-trade business of two or three of the Arctic coast co-operatives which to some degree are now not being moved. I believe they have, or are preparing to seek, the necessary Air Transport Board authority for it and that Board is really the only agency in Canada that has the jurisdictional rights to approve or not approve their intended use of the aircraft.

MR. PHIPPS: What I can see, Mr. Ballantyne, the Air Transport Committee will have no jurisdiction whatsoever over the aircraft because it is going to be a private aircraft and they only have jurisdiction over commercial aircraft. I think it will be sheer lunacy for any co-operative to venture into a DC-4 operation. One engine is going to cost $30,000 if they lose it, now how many co-operatives are making this kind of money. They can get themselves into very serious financial difficulty, besides I think if you are getting into that type of aircraft operation it is going to cost you 1500 hours a year utilization. They would have to have an income from the aircraft somewhere around half a million dollars a year for this. I cannot see how any co-operative in the Arctic can ever get into such an operation and hope to come out of it.

MR. BALLANTYNE: Mr. Chariman, I can see Mr. Phipps' concern on this. We did hold disucssion with the co-op concerned pointing out some of these financial implications. In the end product though, I have not received official advice of it. I would suggest that they have elected their democratic rights to tell the Government it is none of their business, none of our business, and at that point our legal authority as supervisor of co-ops does not permit us to stop them doing it. I believe there is more than one co-operative involved in it, and the resources of these co-ops are fairly extensive. They of course have asked for and received no backing from the Territorial Government for the acquisition or the operation of the aircraft . . . .

> It is very important that we realize that these co-operatives receive not one penny of assistance from the Territorial Government . . . . A totally independent co-op whether it be at Dorset, Pelly Bay or Holman Island is totally independent of government assistance and we have no more right, legal right or moral right for that matter, to interfere in their internal affairs, than we have in that of any other corporation in the Northwest Territories . . . .
>
> MR. PHIPPS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to the DC-4 for a minute, if I may.
>
> Even though Mr. Ballantyne did say that this Government will not support the co-op financially, I still feel that we are liable indirectly, because if any of these settlements do get into financial difficulty, we will end up paying the welfare. Also, I agree with Mr. Ballantyne, that we cannot say no, but at the same time I think they should be bound to take some advice. I think if you just look at a DC-4 operation, even based on a thousand hours a year, which is about the minimum on that type of aircraft, it is capable of moving fifteen to twenty thousand tons. Now where are they going to get this tonage, I do not know, . . .
>
> Indirectly, I still feel that we are going to be liable to an extent, even if it is in the way of welfare that we would have to pay. I think they should be bound to take our advice to a certain extent.[16]

The above exchange serves to dramatize the importance of Pelly Bay's experiment. At stake is the right of local decision-making and with it the means to achieve a more equitable distribution of the Arctic's wealth for the benefit of local people. The success of Pelly Bay in the management of its economy will have lasting impact in creating a new environment where Eskimo communities can exercise their freedoms to chart their own destinies.

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[16]Canada, Council of the NWT Debates, Session 45, 7th Council, 16 June 1971, pp. 112, 113, 118.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INFORMATION ON THE DIFFUSION OF EXOTIC ESTABLISHMENTS

TABLE 11.--Voyages of the American David Strait and Hudson Bay Fleet, 1846-1904.

Year	No. of Vessels	Year	No. of Vessels
1846	1	1876	1
1847	1	1877	4
1848	1	1878	6
1849	1	1879	3
1850	1	1880	n.a.
1851	1	1881	n.a.
1852	1	1882	n.a.
1853	2	1883	n.a.
1854	1	1884	n.a.
1855	2	1885	n.a.
1856	2	1886	n.a.
1857	2	1887	n.a.
1858	1	1888	n.a.
1859	1	1889	1
1860	10	1890	0
1861	2	1891	1
1862	5	1892	1
1863	9	1893	2
1864	17	1894	1
1865	5	1895	3
1866	16	1896	2
1867	6	1897	3
1868	8	1898	0
1869	5	1899	1
1870	3	1900	1
1871	5	1901	1
1872	3	1902	0
1873	1	1903	2
1874	3	1904	1
1875	2		

SOURCE: 1846-1879--Howard A. Clark, "The Whale Fishery: History and Present Condition of the Fishery," in The Fisheries and Fishery Industries of the United States ed: G. B. Goode (Washington: United States Commission of Fish and Fisheries, vol. 2, sec. 5, 1887), pp. 99-101.

1889-1904--A. P. Low, Cruise of the Neptune (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1906), pp. 277-278.

TABLE 12.--Voyages of the British Davis Strait and Hudson Bay Fleet, 1865-1904.

Year	No. of Vessels	Year	No. of Vessels
1865	23	1885	12
1866	26	1886	8
1867	28	1887	8
1868	30	1888	7
1869	28	1889	3
1870	22	1890	5
1871	21	1891	5
1872	22	1892	5
1873	22	1893	4
1874	19	1894	5
1875	20	1895	5
1876	20	1896	3
1877	13	1897	3
1878	n.a.	1898	4
1879	n.a.	1899	7
1880	n.a.	1900	7
1881	11	1901	6
1882	9	1902	6
1883	6	1903	6
1884	9	1904	6

SOURCE: A. P. Low, Cruise of the Neptune (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1906), p. 277.

TABLE 13.--Voyages of the American Beaufort Sea Fleet, 1980-1907.*

Year	No. of Vessels	Year	No. of Vessels
1890	1	1899	n.a.
1891	2	1900	n.a.
1892	4	1901	n.a.
1893	7	1902	n.a.
1894	14	1903	n.a.
1895	15	1904	6
1896	15	1905	n.a.
1897	n.a.	1906	10
1898	n.a.	1907	0

SOURCE: C. Constantine, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper No. 28 (1904), Appendix D, p. 49; J. A. Cook, Pursuing the Whale (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926), pp. 49, 56, 74; F. S. Fitzgerald, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper No. 28 (1904) Appendix D, pp. 127-128; D. M. Howard, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper No. 28 (1906) Appendix L, pp. 18-20 & (1907), Appendix O, p. 128, and A. M. Jarvis, "Report of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police," Sessional Paper No. 28 (1909), Appendix K, pp. 140, 142.

*Only vessesl reported wintering in Beaufort Sea recorded in totals.

TABLE 14.--Trading Posts Involved in the Eskimo Trade, 1910-1970.

Year	N.W.T.[a]	Arctic Quebec[b]	Total
1910	1	4	5
1915	21	6	27
1920	44	8	52
1925	51	16	67
1928*	81	18	99
1930	73	18	91
1935	61	18	79
1940	54	12	66
1945	54	9	63
1950	44	5	49
1955	40	5	45
1960**	40	5	45
1965	35	4	39
1970	28	4	32

[a]SOURCE: Peter Usher, Fur Trade Posts of the Northwest Territories 1870-1970 (Ottawa: DIAND, 1970), Subregion 38, Regions 4, 5, and 6.

[b]SOURCE: Nelson H. H. Graburn, Eskimos Without Igloos (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), pp. 117-119; Hudson's Bay Company, Beaver (September, 1938), Outfit 269, no. 2; R. H. H. Macaulay, Trading Into Hudson's Bay (Winnipeg: Hudson's Bay Company, 1934), p. 106, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Report (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1931 and 1937).

*Largest number of registered posts.

**Eskimo co-operatives are not included in the totals for 1960, 1965, and 1970.

TABLE 15.--Diffusion of Mission Stations, 1894-1950.

Location	Denomination*	Date Established	Noted
Blacklead Island	Ang	1894	Moved to Pangnirtung in 1928.
Herschel Island	Ang	1894	Closed ca. 1935.
Fort Chimo	Ang	ca. 1984	
Shingle Point	Ang	ca. 1894	Closed 1936 (school).
Port Burwell	Ang	1900	Ang. 1900-04; Morvanian 1904-24.
Port Harrison	Ang	1904	Established after Ang left Port Burwell.
Kittigazuit	Ang	1908	Closed by 1920.
Lake Harbour	Ang	1909	Served Cape Dorset.
Chesterfield Inlet	RC	1912	
Bernard Harbour	Ang	1916	Closed in 1930's.
Aklavik	Ang & RC	1919	RC arrived 1926.
Eskimo Point	RC & Ang	1924	Ang. arrived 1926.
Baker Lake	Ang & RC	1927	
Pangnirtung	Ang	1928	
Letty Harbour	RC	1928	Moved to Paulatuk in 1936.
Pond Inlet	Ang & RC	1929	
Coppermine	Ang & RC	1929	
Cambridge Bay	RC & Ang	1929	Ang arrived 1930.
Coral Harbour	Ang & RC	1930	
Repulse Bay	RC	1932	
Igloolik	RC	1933	
Pelly Bay	RC	1935	
Burnside	RC	1935	
Paulatuk	RC	1936	
Wakeham Bay	RC	1936	
Arctic Bay	Ang & RC	1937	RC arrived 1937.
Holman	RC	1939	
Ivugivik	RC	1939	

TABLE 15.--Continued.

Location	Denomination*	Date Established	Notes
Cape Dorset	RC	1939	Under early Ang influence from Lake Harbour.
Tavani	RC	1941	
Sugluk	RC	1947	
Quartak	RC	1947	
Spence Bay	RC	1950	

*Ang = Anglican; RC = Roman Catholic.

Tabulation

Year	Number of Missions	Year	Number of Missions
1895	3	1930	23
1900	5	1935	25
1905	6	1940	30
1910	8	1945	31
1915	9	1950	34
1920	10	1960*	52
1925	11	1970	56

SOURCE: W. C. Bethune, Canada's Eastern Arctic (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1935) - Eastern Arctic missions in 1934; Henri-Paul Dionne, J'etais Routier en Terre Sterile (Montreal: Rayonnement, 1951) - Roman Catholic missions in Hudson Bay; A. L. Fleming, Dwellers in Arctic Night (London: Sheldon Press, 1928) - Map of Anglican missions; Sydney Gould, Inasmuch (Toronto: Missionary Society, 1917) - Chronology of early Anglican missions; F. H. Kitto, The Northwest Territories 1930 (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1930); D. B. Marsh, Arctic Century (Toronto: Missionary Society, 1957); OMI Missionary Publication, Eskimo 37 (Churchill, Manitoba: OMI, 1955): 15 - Roman Catholic missions in the Eastern Arctic, and Department of Mines and Resources, The Northwest Territories (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948) - Description of settlements in 1947.

*Post WW II developments in the Arctic have led to renewed missionary activity. The trend has been for a number of Protestant groups to locate missions in settlements with established Anglican and Catholic missions. Due to this rapid influx of missionary societies, the figures for 1960 and 1970 represent estimates.

TABLE 16.--The Diffusion of Royal Canadian Mounted Police Detachments 1904-1970.

Location	Operating Dates	No. of Officers when Established	Notes
Herschel Island	1903-35	6	Summer detach after 1935.
Cape Fullerton	1903-22	4	Moved to Chesterfield Inlet in 1922.
Tree River	1919-27	2	Moved to Bernard Harbour in 1927.
Port Burwell	1920-35	2	Moved to Port Harrison 1935.
Pond Inlet	1921-present	2	
Craig Harbour	1922-26; 1933-40; 1951-56	3	No Eskimo inhabitants in area; established for Canadain sovereignty; moved to Bache Peninsula 1926-33.
Chesterfield Inlet	1922-present	2	
Pangnirtung	1923-present	3	
Aklavik	1923-present	5	
Baillie Island	1923-ca. 1931	2	
Dundas Harbour	1923-33; 1946-56	3	No Eskimo inhabitants in area; established for Canadian sovereignty.
Bache Peninsula	1926-33	3	No Eskimo inhabitants in area; established for Canadian sovereignty.
Lake Harbour	1927-present	2	
Bernard Harbour	1927-31	2	Moved to Coppermine in 1931.
Cambridge Bay	1927-present	2	
St. Roch	1928-50	9	Schooner (floating detach), West & Central Arctic; closed 1936-38.

TABLE 16.--Continued.

Location	Operating Dates	No. of Officers when Established	Notes
Baker Lake	1930-present	1	
Pearce Point	1930-34	2	
Coppermine	1932-present	2	
Maitland	1935-38	2	
Eskimo Point	1936-present	2	
Port Harrison	1936-38; 1945-60	1	Closed when RCMP withdrew from Arctic Quebec in 1960.
Fort Chimo	1942-60	1	Closed when RCMP withdrew from Arctic Quebec in 1960;
Frobisher Bay	1943-present	3	
Coral Harbour	1943-47	1	
Resolute	1947-present	1	
Tuktoyaktuk	1950-present	1	
Spence Bay	1950-present	2	
Sachs Harbour	1953-present	1	New community.
Alexander Fiord	1953-present	1	Opposite old Bache Peninsula detach.
Clyde-Cape Christian	1954-present	1	
Great Whale River	1955-60	n.a.	Closed when RCMP withdrew from Arctic Quebec in 1960.
Grise Fiord	1956-present	1	New community.
Inuvik	1958-present	4	New community.
Igloolok	1965-present	1	
Cape Dorset	1965-present	1	

TABLE 16.--Continued.

Tabulation

Detachments		No. of Police Officers	
1900	0	1900	0
1905	2	1905	10
1910	2	1910	6
1915	2	1915	8
1920	4	1920	10
1925	10	1925	34
1930	15	1930	44
1935	13	1935	37
1940	11	1940	31
1945	14		
1950	17		
1955	21		
1960	21		
1965	20		
1970	20		

SOURCE: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Reports (Ottawa: Queen's Printer).

APPENDIX B

THE EVOLUTION OF CENTERS OF DOMINATION AND DIFFUSION IN ARCTIC CANADA

APPENDIX B

THE EVOLUTION OF CENTERS OF DOMINATION AND DIFFUSION IN ARCTIC CANADA

I. North Baffin Island

1. Regional Center: Pond Inlet.
2. Boundaries: Lancaster Sound in the north to Home Bay in the south; northern Melville Peninsula and Foxe Basin in the west.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Arctic Bay, Igloolik, Home Bay, and Clyde.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Pond Inlet Environs:
   a. Whaling Station--Pond Inlet ca. 1950
   b. Trading Post--Albert Harbour 1903
   c. Mission--Pond Inlet 1929
   d. RCMP Detachment--Pond Inlet 1921.

II. Central Baffin Island

1. Regional Center: Pangnirtung.
2. Boundaries: Home Bay in the north and Frobisher Bay in the south (Cape Murchison); Foxe Basin in the west.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Home Bay, Frobisher Bay, and occasionally to the Lake Harbour RCMP Detachment.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Pangnirtung Environs:
   a. Whaling Station--Cumberland Sound ca. 1840
   b. Trading Post--Cape Mercy 1911
   c. Mission--Blacklead Island 1894
   d. RCMP Detachment--Pangnirtung 1923.

III. Southern Baffin Island

1. Regional Center: Lake Harbour.
2. Boundaries: Foxe Basin in the west to Frobisher Bay in the north and east; south to Hudson Strait.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Cape Dorset and Frobisher Bay.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Lake Harbour Environs:
   a. Whaling Station--Frobisher Bay ca. 1845
   b. Trading Post--Lake Harbour and Cape Haven 1911
   c. Mission--Lake Harbour 1909
   d. RCMP Detachment--Lake Harbour 1927.

IV. Northwest Hudson Bay

1. Regional Center: Chesterfield Inlet.
2. Boundaries: Northwest coast of Hudson Bay and Southampton Island; Repulse Bay in the north to Eskimo Point in the south.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Weger and Repulse Bays, Coral Harbour on Southampton Island and Baker Lake.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Chesterfield Inlet Environs:
   a. Whaling Station--Marble and Depot Islands ca. 1860
   b. Trading Post--Chesterfield Inlet 1911
   c. Mission--Chesterfield Inlet 1912
   d. RCMP Detachment--Cape Fullerton 1903.

V. Keewatin

1. Regional Center: Baker Lake.
2. Boundaries: Weger Bay in north; Barren Grounds in west and south.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Padlei Lake in the south, Weger Bay in the north and inland to the Back River.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Baker Lake Environs:
   a. Trading Post--Big Hips Island 1914
   b. Mission--Baker Lake 1927
   c. RCMP Detachment--Baker Lake 1930.

VI. Western Canadian Arctic

1. Regional Center: Aklavik, Subregional Center at Herschel Island.
2. Boundaries: Mackenzie Delta west to Herschel Island and east to Pearce Point.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly throughout the Mackenzie Delta and along the Arctic coast to Pearce Point.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Aklavik Environs:
   a. Whaling Station--Herschel Island 1890
   b. Trading Post--Aklavil 1912
   c. Mission--Herschel Island 1894
   d. RCMP Detachment--Herschel Island 1903.

VII. West-Central Canadian Arctic

1. Regional Center: Coppermine.
2. Boundaries: Arctic coast north to northern Victoria Island; west to Pearce Point, and east to Bathurst Inlet.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Walker Bay, Bathurst Inlet, and Pearce Point.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Coppermine Environs:
   a. Trading Post--Bernard Harbour 1916
   b. Mission--Bernard Harbour 1916
   c. RCMP Detachment--Tree River 1919.

VIII. East-Central Canadian Arctic

1. Regional Center: Cambridge.
2. Boundaries: Arctic coast west to wellington Bay and east to Boothia Peninsula.
3. RCMP Patrols: Regularly to Wellington Bay, Perry River, and King William Island.
4. Dates of Exotic Establishments in the Coppermine Environs:
   a. Trading Posts--Cambrdige Bay 1923
   b. Mission--Cambridge Bay 1929
   c. RCMP Detachment--Cambridge Bay 1927.

SOURCE: The boundaries of the domination-diffusion centers were compiled from: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Annual Report (Ottawa: King's Printer, reports from 1925-1939); for the establishing dates of the exotic institutions, see the diffusion tables, Appendix A.

APPENDIX C

CANADIAN ARCTIC CO-OPERATIVES

APPENDIX C

CANADIAN ARCTIC CO-OPERATIVES

Northwest Territories

Name and Location	Incorporation Date	Activities
KIKITAUYAK Port Burwell	October 28, 1959	Handicrafts, carvings, fishing, furs, retail store
COPPERMINE	September 16, 1960	Handicrafts, carvings, tourism, sealskins
RESOLUTE BAY	October 18, 1960	Handicrafts, carvings, furs, retail store.
GRISE FIORD	December 22, 1960	Handicrafts, carvings, furs, retail store
HOLMAN	January 30, 1961	Graphic prints, textile printing, tapestries
WEST BAFFIN Cape Dorset	March 2, 1961	Carvings, sewing, drawings, retail store
EKALOKTOIAK Cambridge Bay	April 21, 1961	Fishing, handicrafts, retail store
IKALUIT Frobisher Bay	July 6, 1961	Fishing, carving, housing
AKLAVIK	February 4, 1963	Fur garments and other fur products
INNUIT Inuvik	February 12, 1963	Housing
IGLOOLIK	April 25, 1963	Handicrafts, furs, retail store, contracting
KOOMIUT	August 9, 1966	Handicrafts, carvings, fishing, furs, retail store, contracts, air freight
KEKERTAK Gjoa Haven	December 13, 1966	Handicrafts, fishing, furs, contracts
PAULATUK	August 17, 1967	Handicrafts, carvings, fishing
NAUJAT Repulse Bay	January 16, 1968	Handicrafts, fishing, contracting

Name and Location	Incorporation Date	Activities
PANGNIRTUNG	February 8, 1968	Carvings, fishing
KISSARVIK Rankin Inlet	May 10, 1968	Handicrafts, fishing
METIQ Belcher Islands	June 3, 1968	Carvings, eiderdown
NANUK Tuktoyaktuk	July 10, 1968	Fur garments and other fur products
TOOKOONIK-SAHOONIK Pond Inlet	August 11, 1968	Handicrafts, fishing
	ARCTIC QUEBEC	
GEORGE RIVER Port Nouveau	April 14, 1959	Handicrafts, carvings, Char fishery, logging, boat building, retail store
POVUNGNITUK	May 13, 1960	Handicrafts, carvings, graphic art, furs, retail store
FORT CHIMO	January 30, 1961	Handicrafts, Char fishery, freighting, logging
GREAT WHALE RIVER Poste-de-la-Baleine	July 25, 1961	Handicrafts, carvings, retail store
PAYNE BAY Bellin	May 20, 1964	Handicrafts, Char fishery
SUGLUK	April 29, 1967	Handicrafts, carvings
IVUJIVIK	October 14, 1967	Handicrafts, carvings
INOUDJOUAC Port Harrison	October 14, 1967	Handicrafts, carvings

SOURCE: Co-operative Services Section, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa.

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