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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL EFFICACY AMONG ISRAELI YOUTH: BELIEFS
IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS AND POLITICAL
EFFECTIVENESS IN A HYBRID POLITICAL SYSTEM

BY

Jacob Allan Hurwitz

This dissertation proceeds from the view that
political efficacy consists of two beliefs, the belief in
governmental responsiveness and the belief in political
effectiveness, and that an individual's sense of political
efficacy is based on a rational evaluation of the degree
to which the political system is open to influence, and of
the influence he may have. Political efficacy, therefore,
varies between systems according to their structures and
values, and between individuals within given systems
according to their relation to its structure and their
degree of adherence to its values.

It has been argued that the stability of democratic
government may require the beliefs in governmental respon-
siveness and political effectiveness to be congruent. If,
however, a distinction is made between political systems
which emphasize collective interests and those which

emphasize individual interests, it is possible to conceive

Jacob Allan Hurwitz

of a system in which a low belief in political effective-
ness co-exists with a high belief in governmental respon—
siveness, the latter belief referring to the responsive-
ness of governmental officials to collective interests.
Using a typology of political systems deveIOped by David
Apter, it is argued that reconciliation systems (systems
of pyramidal authority, stressing instrumental values)
promote congruence in the political efficacy beliefs,
while in mobilization systems (systems of hierarchical
authority, stressing consummatory values) incongruence is
likely, because in mobilization systems responsiveness is
evaluated in terms of collective interests and effective-
ness in terms of individual interests. Individuals who
accept the systems' collective goals will find a low level
of political effectiveness tolerable.

Israel is discussed as a mobilization-
reconciliation hybrid, in which certain consummatory values
and collective goals are highly important. In comparison
with pre-adults in other democracies (i.e., United States,
Great Britain, Germany, and Italy) Israeli youth were
found to be high in their belief in governmental respon—
siveness and low in their belief in political effective-
ness. Israelis were also high in their support for demo-
cratic norms, which was found to be associated with their
high belief in governmental responsiveness, and relatively

low in support for the party system in their country, which

Jacob Allan Hurwitz

was found to be associated with their low belief in
political effectiveness.

The sample reported in this dissertation consists
of fifth, eighth, and eleventh grade students from Netanya,
Tel Aviv, and Beersheba. In Chapter IV analysis focuses
on ethnic differences, with children of Eastern origin
found to be lower than those of Western origin on indices
of support for democratic norms, belief in governmental
responsiveness, and belief in political effectiveness, and
higher in support for the party system. It is contended
that for Easterners the parties serve, as in other develop-
ing countries, as the primary link to the state, which
tends to explain their high level of support. The role of
socio-economic status, youth movement membership, and
course of study in reducing differences between ethnic
groups is discussed. One finding which emerges from this
analysis is that while Israelis are high in their support
for democratic norms generally, the academic secondary
schools do not sufficiently deal with these norms. This
is a matter of concern, especially considering the lower
support for these norms found among Easterners.

In Chapter V analysis focuses on a typology of
individuals characterized by their level of belief in
governmental responsiveness and in political effectiveness.

Those labeled collectivists (high in governmental respon-

 

siveness, low in political effectiveness) are found to be

most in adherence with the Zionist ideologyr as posited,

Jacob Allan Hurwitz

in contrast to individualists (high in effectiveness, low

 

in responsiveness) who are least oriented to the ideology.
In contrast to findings in other countries, in
Israel no relation is found between support for democratic
norms and support for the party system, and these two
orientations are differentially associated with the two
efficacy beliefs. Those high in their belief in govern-
mental responsiveness are high in their support for demo-
cratic norms, while those high in their belief in politi-
cal effectiveness are high in their support for the party
system. If, as has been argued, the efficaceous citizen
is the democratic citizen, in Israel the reference must be
specifically to those who believe in governmental respon-
siveness. For Israeli youth as a whole, and within the
Israeli sample as well, a low belief in political effec-
tiveness co-exists with high support for democratic norms.
The characteristics which in Israel permit incon-
gruence between the beliefs in governmental responsiveness
and political effectiveness are the products of unique
circumstances, now undergoing change in Israel itself,
and unlikely to be duplicated elsewhere. The development
of national identity preceded statehood and the creation
of a new society in Israel, mitigating the impact of
developmental crises, and Israel is very likely an ex-
ception to the general rule that the beliefs in govern-
mental responsiveness and political effectiveness should

be congruent.

POLITICAL EFFICACY AMONG ISRAELI YOUTH: BELIEFS
IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS AND POLITICAL

EFFECTIVENESS IN A HYBRID POLITICAL SYSTEM

BY

Jacob Allan Hurwitz

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1971

©

Copyright by
JACOB ALLAN HURWITZ

I971

ACKNOWLEDGMENT S

This dissertation could not have been completed
without the advice and assistance offered me from a number
of sources. For financial assistance I am grateful to the
Institute of International Education and the Israeli Minis-
try of Education and Culture for selecting me as a recip-
ient of a Fulbright Study and Travel Grant to Israel, and
to the Political Development Studies Group of the Depart-
ment of Political Science at Michigan State University.

From September 1968 to July 1970, while in Israel,
I was most fortunate to be affiliated with the Department
of Political Science at Tel Aviv University. I am deeply
indebted to the members of that department for their
friendship and intellectual stimulation. I am particu-
larly grateful for the advice and assistance I received
from Professors Alan Arian, Emmanuel Gutmann, Ehud Harari,
Daniel Shimshoni, and Efraim Torgovnik. In addition I
wish to thank Mrs. Elite Olshtein, director of the English
for Speakers of Hebrew project at Tel Aviv University, for
assistance in translating my questionnaire into Hebrew.

I profited from discussions with many individuals in

Israel, as well as from the friendships I was pleased to

ii

have with many Israelis. To all who made my stay in
Israel more enjoyable than it might otherwise have been,
I am deeply grateful.

I would like to thank the Israeli Ministry of
Education and Culture, and the principals and teachers of
the schools used in this research, for their assistance.
I am naturally indebted to their students, my respondents.

I am indeed thankful to the members of my disser-
tation committee for their guidance and thoughtful com-
ments. The advice I received at various stages of this
project from my Chairman, Joseph Schlesinger, and from
Paul Abramson and Robert Melson, was invariably correct,
despite my more than occasional inability to realize so
at the time it was proffered.

To my parents, who have followed the development
of this project with eager interest and support, this
dissertation is dedicated.

All errors in judgment and interpretation are,

sadly, my own.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL
EFFICACY . . C C C C O O O O O 1

II. ISRAEL AS A HYBRID POLITICAL SYSTEM:
PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL STYLE IN
ISRAELI DEMOCRACY . . . . . . . . 25

III. POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF ISRAELI YOUTH
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE . . . . . 61

IV. SUB-GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL
ORIENTATIONS WITHIN THE ISRAELI SAMPLE . 90

V. A TYPOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE ISRAELI
SYSTEM: THE EFFICACEOUS, THE
INDIVIDUALIST, THE COLLECTIVIST,

THE ALIENATED . . . . . . . . . 139
VI. CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . 165
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . 175
APPENDICES
Appendix
A. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX. . . . . . . 183
B. QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . . . . . . 194

iv

10.

LIST OF TABLES

Citizen Competence by Education Level in
Five Nations . . . . . . . . . .

Personal Impotency Among Three Types of
Individuals in Six Middle Eastern
Nations. . . . . . . . . . . .

Belief in Governmental Responsiveness
Among Fifth and Eighth Grade Israelis. .

Responses of Israeli Youth to Items
Concerning Responsiveness of Governmental
OffiCials O I O O O I O I O O 0

Responses of Israeli Youth to Items
Concerning the Political Effectiveness of
Their Parents or Family . . . . . .

Cross-National Responses to Items
Concerning the Belief in Governmental
Responsiveness (Percentage) . . . . .

Cross-National Responses to Items
Concerning Political Effectiveness
(Percentage) . . . . . . . . . .

Average Percentage of Respondents Answering
Efficaceously to Responsiveness and
Effectiveness Items, and Differences
Between the Averages . . . . . . .

Responses of Israeli Youth to Items
Concerning Support for Democratic Norms
(Percentage) . . . . . . . . . .

Cross-National Responses to Two Items
Concerning Support for Democratic Norms
(Percentage) . . . . . . . . . .

Page

63

65

66

68

70

72

75

76

Table

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

Cross-National Responses to Four Items
Concerning Support for Democratic Norms
(Percentage Giving Democratic Response) . .

Cross-National Responses on a Specific
Application of Democratic Rights
(Percentage) . . . . . . . . . . .

Responses of Israeli Youth to Items Concerning
Support for the Party System (Percentage) .

Cross-National Responses to the Statement:
The Conflicts Among the Political Parties
Hurt Our Country More Than They Help It . .

Distribution on Four Indices Among Eighth
and Eleventh Grade Israelis . . . . . .

Distribution of Eighth Grade Israelis on
Four Indices, by Father's Birthplace . . .

Distribution of Eleventh Grade Israelis on
Four Indices, by Father's Birthplace . . .

Level of Support for the Party System, by
Level of Support for Democratic Norms
(Israeli Eleventh Graders) . . . . . .

Distribution of Respondents on Index of
Socio-Economic Status, by Father's
Birthplace. O O O O C O I O O O 0

Distribution of Eleventh Grade Israelis on
Four Indices, by Father's Occupation . . .

Distribution of Eleventh Grade Israelis on
Four Indices, by Father's Occupation,
Controlling for Father's Birthplace . . .

Distribution of Eleventh Grade Israelis on
Four Indices, by Type of Secondary Education

Distribution of Eleventh Grade Israelis on

Four Indices, by Type of Secondary Edu-
cation, Controlling for Father's Birthplace.

vi

Page

78

79

83

84

109

111

113

116

118

119

121

124

125

Table Page

24. Distribution of Eleventh Grade Israelis on
Four Indices, by Membership-Non-Membership
in a Youth Movement, and Controlling for
Father's Birthplace . . . . . . . . . 131

25. Distribution on Four Indices by Youth Move-
ment Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

26. Individuals in Political Efficacy Typology,
by Father's Birthplace, Father's Occupation,
Type of School, and Membership or Non-
Membership in a Youth Movement . . . . . 144

27. Affiliation of Youth Movement Members Among
Individuals in Political Efficacy Typology . 146

28. Responses of Political Efficacy Types to the
Question: "Is Your Family Religious,
Traditional, or Not-Religious?" . . . . . 149

29. Responses of Political Efficacy Types to
Three Items Relating to Zionist Ideology . . 151

30. Distribution of Political Efficacy Types on
the Indices of Support for Democratic Norms
and Support for the Party System. . . . . 155

31. Responses of Political Efficacy Types to Items
Concerning Government, Politicians,
Tolerance, and Constitutionalism. . . . . 157

32. Responses of Political Efficacy Types to
Items Concerning Change. . . . . . . . 159

33. Responses of Political Efficacy Types to Items
Concerning Generational Differences. . . . 161

34. Distribution of Political Efficacy Types on
Index of Political Interest . . . . . . 164

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page
1. A Model of Political Systems Types. . . . 16

2. Types of Political Systems by Efficacy
Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3. Four Types of Individuals in the Israeli
System, as Characterized by Belief in
Governmental Responsiveness and Belief
in Political Effectiveness. . . . . . 141

4. Hypothesized Nature of Support for Demo-
cratic Norms and Support for the Party
System Among Four Political Efficacy
Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

viii

CHAPTER I

AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF

POLITICAL EFFICACY

The concept of political efficacy has received in-
creasing attention and application among political sci-
entists in recent years. Political efficacy, or "the
belief that the ruled in a political system have some
capacity for exercising influence over the rulers,"1
has been found to be associated with such social attri-
butes as education, income, and occupational status, and
such psychological attributes as ego-strength and sense of
mastery over the environment; it has also been said to be
associated with political participation and effectiveness

in non-political experiences.2 But as Abramson points out,

 

1Edward N. Muller, "Cross-National Dimensions of
Pelitical Competence," American Political Science Review,
LXIV, 3 (September, 1970), 792.

 

2See, among numerous others, Gabriel Almond and
Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democragy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1963); Angus Campbell, et al., The
American Voter (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964); V. 0.
Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York:
Alfred E. KnOpf, 1961); Robert E. Lane, Political Life:

 

 

 

 

 

while devoting much attention to the attributes associated
with political efficacy, political scientists have less
often considered the way in which such feelings are
affected by actual political power arrangements.3 This is
a result, in part, of the emphasis most researchers put on
studying modal rather than sub-cultural patterns of re-
sponse, but, moreover, it is a result of the fact that
most researchers study political efficacy within a par-
ticular political system, and are, therefore, less likely
to see the political power arrangements within that system
as constituting a variable.4 It may also be due to some
theoretical ambiguity in the concept of political efficacy
itself.

Lane has written that "Possibly . . . to some

extent the sense of political efficacy relates less to

deeper personality qualities than to the actual

 

Why Peeple Get Involved in Politics (New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1959; and Lester Milbrath, Political
Participation (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965).

 

3Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Politi-

cal Trust among Black Schoolchildren: Four Explanations"
(unpublished manuscript, April, 1971), p. 29. Originally
presented at conference on Political Theory and Social

Education, Michigan State University, February 5-6, 1971.

4Both Jaros and Abramson have made observations

similar to this with regard to the "culture bound" nature
of the major findings in the study of political sociali-
zation. Abramson, op. cit.; Dean Jaros, et al., "The
Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American
Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, LXII, 2
(June, 1968), 564.

responsiveness of the governmental authorities."5 This
seems a strange way to put the matter, as it has not been
suggested that the belief in political efficacy should be
strong in a society governed by an authoritarian, non-
responsive regime. The sense of political efficacy in-
cludes not only the individual's image of himself as
effective, but also his View of the responsiveness of
governmental officials, and it has been argued that the
extent to which an individual is efficaceous should be
taken in part as a measure of how democratic he judges

6

his political system to be. Indeed, even this notion

may be deficient, for problems may well arise when con-
sidering responsiveness as a measure of democracy. As
Rae states:

The more democratic of two institutions may’. . .
produce lower proportionate satisfaction with a given
outcome or with a whole sequence of outcomes. Thus
there is no free—standing deductive relationship be-
tween political democracy and what might be called
"popular responsiveness."7

Thus, as Rae continues, "high consensus with low democracy
may produce higher frequencies of satisfaction, than low

degrees of consensus with high degrees of democracy."8

 

5Lane, op. cit., p. 151.

6Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 257.

7Douglas Rae, "Political Democracy as a Property
of Political Institutions," American Political Science
Review, LXV, 1 (March, 1971), 118.

 

8Loc. cit., footnote 22.

Still, the belief in responsiveness, whether indi-
cating a belief in the democratic nature of the system or
simply satisfaction with governmental outcomes, remains a
judgment of the system, and is essentially related to the
nature of the political system in which an individual
lives. While we may find that various sociological or
psychological attributes of individuals tend to be related
to their level of belief in political efficacy, such
attributes ought best to be conceived of as intervening
variables, differentially applicable to individuals all of
whom share common membership in a given regime, the
characteristics of which provide the basis for their
sense of political efficacy.

Almond and Verba find in their data evidence to
suggest that education "may lead individuals to believe

that they can influence their government, no matter what

 

country they live in (providing, of course, that there is

 

at least some institutional structure to support this

attitude)."9

The proviso is hardly a minimal one; quite
clearly one can distinguish with their data between, on
the one hand, Britain and the United States, and on the

other, Mexico and Italy. The findings regarding Germany

are somewhat less clear. They report the following

 

9Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 209 (emphasis in
original).

differences on their measure of citizen competence by

education for the five nations:10

TABLE 1. Citizen competence by education level in five

 

 

nations.
Primary Secondary
or Less or Above
United States 51% 85%
United Kingdom 53 64
Germany 29 58
Italy 20 37
Mexico 31 49

 

That education makes a difference in each country
is hardly debatable. Nevertheless, the higher-educated
groups in Mexico and Italy are still lower on citizen
competence than the less-educated groups in Britain and
the United States. Although the authors wish to make the
opposite point, the data would seem to confirm that politi-
cal efficacy is primarily a characteristic varying be-
tween political regimes, rather than by education across
systems. Muller has shown, furthermore, that those
Mexicans and Italians who believe in their own ability

to influence government are no more likely than others to

 

loIbid., p. 219, Fig. 1.

believe that the average citizen has that ability,11 evi-
dence that they themselves understand the nature of
responsiveness and effectiveness in their own political
systems, and are responding in accordance with a realistic
appraisal of their own situation within that system.

That better educated people are likely to be in a
more influential position within any given system than
those less well-educated is certainly not inconsistent with
the interpretation that one's sense of political efficacy
is related to the nature of existing power relations. One
need not argue that such individuals are more likely to
believe in their own ability to influence government be-
cause they are more highly educated (or have a higher in-
come, or greater ego-strength); it is probably sufficient
to say that they are more likely to believe in their own
ability to influence government because they have, in
fact, a greater ability to influence government.12

The five countries studied by Almond and Verba

are, of course, a very specific subset of possible

 

llMuller, op. cit., p. 806.

12It is conceivable that more highly educated
citizens would, under certain circumstances, believe less
in their own political effectiveness than would other
citizens, despite the fact that they might have greater
influence in reality, if they did not regard that influ-
ence as commensurate with their status, or if unsuccessful
in attempting to influence certain decisions and policies.
From the data provided by Almond and Verba, and others,
however, this does not appear to be the general case.

political regimes. Lerner has shown that in the Middle
Eastern nations studied by him, efficacy increased with
the level of modernity of the country. Finding that
similar types of individuals (i.e., those labeled tra-
ditionals, transitionals, and moderns) differ greatly in
efficacy from country to country, he observes that the
differences in their environments must be large. The
following table shows the percentage of individuals in
each category reporting that they could do nothing to help
solve the major problems facing their country, because of

what Lerner labels "personal impotency":l3

TABLE 2. Personal impotency among three types of indi-
viduals in six Middle Eastern nations.

 

Traditional Transitional Modern

 

 

 

Turkey 35% 33% 33%

Lebanon 51 35 40

Egypt 63 73 51

Syria 90 92 37

Jordan 52 57 45

Iran 63 100 72
13

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 100, Table 9.

 

Both the Almond and Verba data, and that of Lerner,
would seem to support the view that political efficacy is,
in its most essential aspects, a belief which varies from
country to country. In the Lerner data one sees for most
countries relatively little variation between the groups
as compared with the considerable variation within each
group across countries. It is true that such variation
does not necessarily indicate the effect of political
power arrangements, per se, and this is particularly true
with Lerner's measure of "personal impotency." Neverthe-
less, Lerner interprets the distribution reported here as
showing "what a difference it makes to persons of each
type whether they live in a society that is Opening even
if not yet Open, advancing even if not yet very far ad-
vanced, adaptive to new people in new roles."14

What is suggested here is the need to deve10p an
explanation for variations in the sense of political
efficacy from country to country which takes into account
variations in political structure and predominant values,
and accounts for variations among individuals within a
given country by considering their relation to the politi-
cal structure and value system of that country. Because
of its emphasis on the nature of existing power relations
within a political system this is essentially a structural

approach. It is not unrelated, however, to the political

 

l4Ibid., p. 101.

culture approach, in its consideration of "attitudes toward
the political system and its various parts, and attitudes

"15 of "the

towards the role of the self in the system,
system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values
which defines the situation in which political action

takes place."16

The approach taken here goes beyond a
concern with structural differentiation alone, by stress-
ing the analysis of "fit," or congruence, between certain
beliefs and values and the structure of a political system.
The utility of structural analysis is that it
"reduces the risk of ethnocentrism . . . [and] provides an
orderly way of examining large numbers of cases in order

17

to develop comparative theories." The first stage of

such an analysis is typological, the development of theo-
retical systems in accordance with certain characteristics,

against which concrete systems may be evaluated.18 The

 

l5A1mond and Verba, op. cit., p. 13.

16Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture,"
in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture
and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1965), p. 513.

 

17David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 20; see
also the discussion preceding this, pp. 16—20.

 

18Apter contends that this is the basis of "ideal-
type" analysis, and cites Hempel, who argues that ideal
types can be regarded as significant only if they are
interpreted as theoretical systems, by: "(a) specifying
a list of characteristics with which the theory is to
deal; (b) formulating a set of hypotheses in terms of these

10

second stage involves the problem of meaning, in this case
a determination of the form of political efficacy appro-
priate to, or congruent with, each of the categories of
the typology. The third stage is the derivation of

theories about the data.19

It is this sequence of analy-
sis which I propose to follow, after a discussion of the
concept of political efficacy as it shall be used in this
study.

Political efficacy is regarded here as a belief--
in fact, two distinct beliefs, the belief in the reality
of governmental responsiveness and the belief in personal
political effectiveness. It is possible to speak of
political efficacy as a norm,20 and indeed my conception
indicates the normative aspects of political efficacy in

emphasizing that what is regarded as responsiveness or

effectiveness may well vary from system to system, in

 

characteristics; (c) giving those characteristics an
empirical interpretation that assigns to the theory a
specific domain and application; and (d) as a long-range
objective incorporating the theoretical system, as a
"special case," into a more comprehensive theory." Ibid.,
pp. 18-19. Apter's reference is to Carl G. Hempel,
"Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in
the Social Sciences," in Science, Language and Human
Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
for the American Philosophical Association, 1952), p. 84.

lgIbid., p. 19.

20See especially David Easton and Jack Dennis,
"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political
Efficacy," American Political Science Review, LXI, 1
(March, 196773 25-38, and Muller, op. cit.

ll

accordance with the dominant values Of each system.
Nevertheless, political efficacy is understood as a belief,
to be explained within the context Of those values. We
wish to factor out, as it were, what Sherrill calls the
nonrational elements Of political efficacy, such as ego-
strength, which operate apart from objective circumstances,
and focus on the belief in political efficacy as a
"rational evaluation of the degree to which the system is
an Open one and Of the influence that a person may have,
given his political resources and alternative strategies."21

The concept Of rationality, broadly "the ability
to order preferences and to choose the more preferred

22 is most generally

action over the less preferred,"
applied to goal-oriented behavior. However, a rational

evaluation such as that described above makes rational

 

behavior possible. Dahl, for example, clearly implies the
idea Of rational evaluation as used here, in his expla-
nation, based On the concept Of political efficacy, for
why an individual might not become involved in politics:
An individual is unlikely tO get involved in politics
if he thinks that the probability Of his influencing

the outcome Of events, Of changing the balance Of
rewards by means Of his political involvement is

 

21Kenneth S. Sherill, "The Attitudes Of Modernity,"

Comparative Politics, I, 2 (January, 1969), 207.

22William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A
Theory Of the Calculus Of Voting," American Political
Science Review, LXII, 1 (March, 1968), 27, footnote 7.

 

12

lOw . . . [or] if he believes that the outcome will

be relativelyBSatisfactory to him without his

1nvolvement.
Thus we may say that the very decision to get involved,
prior to any decision about the means tO be employed,
depends on an evaluation Of the probability Of influencing
outcomes or receiving satisfactory outcomes without in-
volvement. It is noteworthy that satisfaction with out-
comes may compensate for any sense Of ineffectiveness held
by an individual. In short, then, the belief in political
efficacy is considered to derive from a rational evaluation
Of existing power relations and the probability Of satis-
factory outcomes.

Muller differentiates between two dimensions of

political efficacy (or competence, as he prefers to call
it): "a general belief that government is responsive to

citizen influence,’ and "a psychological disposition or

feeling Of confidence in one's personal ability to in-

24 The first Of

fluence salient government decisions."
these I shall refer to as the "belief in the reality Of
governmental responsiveness," and the second as the "be-

lief in personal political effectiveness." Muller argues

that the dimensions should be congruent if political

 

 

23Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp.
61, 63.

24

Muller, Op. cit., p. 793. Muller includes a
third dimension as well, "skills necessary for effective
political behavior."

13

efficacy is to contribute to democratic government, and
that incongruities are likely to place stress on demo-
cratic government:

[I]f citizens did not make any connection between the

degree tO which the government was responsive tO the

membership in general and their own confidence in

being able to exert influence, either set Of beliefs

might be more susceptible to fluctuation according to

circumstances Of the moment, thereby introducing a

greater potential for stress, than if beliefs in the

reality Of [responsiveness] buttressed beliefs in

personal ability to exert influence.25

To say, as does Muller, that such congruence
should exist for the stability Of democratic government
is not to say that an individual might not rationally
evaluate responsiveness and effectiveness in an incon-
gruent way. Clearly, it is possible that individuals may
believe themselves to be personally effective and still
not believe in the responsiveness of government Officials
to the citizenry at large, as Muller reports is the case
in Mexico and Italy among those who dO believe in their
own ability tO influence government. It is my intention
to suggest, furthermore, that such incongruence may not
place stress on a democratic government such as that Of
Israel, because Of certain special characteristics Of that
system.
It might appear highly unlikely, at first glance,

that individuals would believe in the responsiveness Of

their government and not in their own political

 

25LOC. cit.

14

effectiveness, a set Of apparently incongruent beliefs
seeming to suggest that the government is seen as respon-
sive, but tO others rather than to oneself. Responsive-
ness, however, refers tO governmental responsiveness to
citizens in general, to what the individual may regard as
the collectivity, and with which he may have a strong
identification. The apparent inconsistency, therefore,
may be reconcilable if we distinguish responsiveness in
terms Of collective and individual rewards.26 A political
system provides both collective and individual rewards,
and individuals within a system have both collective and
individual goals. Thus it is possible that individuals
might regard a government as responsive, emphasizing its
responsiveness to certain collective interests, while at
the same time not believing in their own political effec-
tiveness, and because Of their acceptance Of the collective
goals be quite content with this "inconsistency."

It should be possible, therefore, to distinguish
political systems by the relative emphasis placed in each
on collective and individual goals, and tO hypothesize an
appropriate relationship between the beliefs in respon-
siveness and effectiveness for each such system. Similarly,

it should be possible tO distinguish individuals within a

 

26For a more elaborate develOpment Of this idea,
see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic Of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory Of Groups (New York: Schocken
Books, 1968), esp. pp. 9-16.

 

 

15

given system by the relative emphasis they place on these
two kinds Of goals, and the differential rewards related
tO them. I do not suggest that it is easy to distinguish
between collective and individual goals. I would, how-
ever, suggest that in some systems it is likely that the
belief in responsiveness refers primarily to the satis-
faction Of collective goals, with the belief in effective-
ness referring primarily to individual goals, though the
latter may well be identified with the collective goals.27
The nature Of the political efficacy belief should
vary between political systems according tO the relative
emphasis they place on the collectivity and the individual.
Apter has develOped such a typology Of political systems
stressing degree Of hierarchy and type Of values, and holds
that particular forms Of government are most likely to be
associated with particular principles Of legitimacy. The
Western ideal Of government relies primarily on the liber—
tarian principle, emphasizing liberty (or equity), while
other forms place emphasis on the fulfillment Of potenti-

ality. Thus liberty may be regarded as one principle Of

legitimacy, associated with constitutional representation

 

27In considering the discussion which follows it
should be emphasized that the belief in the reality Of
responsiveness in any system refers to both collective and
individual interests, and that individuals are likely to
regard themselves as effective or ineffective both with
regard to their individual and collective interests. My
contention is, however, that systems vary in the relative
emphasis which they place on these types Of interests, and
the typology developed here reflects that view.

16

(or pyramidal authority) and the idea Of "democracy";
potentiality may be regarded as a principle Of legitimacy
associated with a centrally controlled system (or hier-
archical authority), and the idea Of "community."28 From
these characteristics Apter suggests two normative types,
the secular-libertarian and sacred—collectivity models,
and what he regards as their more empirically useful sub-

types, the reconciliation and mobilization systems:29

SACRED-COLLECTIVITY

 

 

MODEL
Hierarchical Pyramidal
Authority Authority
Mobilization
Consummatory system
values (principle Of
(sacred) legitimacy =
potentiality)
Reconciliation
system
Instrumental (principle Of
values legitimacy =
(secular) liberty, or
equity)

 

 

 

 

SECULAR-LIBERTARIAN
MODEL

FIGURE 1. A model Of political systems types.

 

28Apter, Op. cit., pp. 12-17.

29See ibid., p. 24, Fig. 2; the two cells have
been labeled in accordance with Apter's definitions.

17

The secular-libertarian model essentially accepts
society as it is and suggests a framework that will
allow modest change over time. It contains a set Of
presuppositions about the way in which representative
government ought to operate: (1) There should not be
a monopoly Of power. . . . (2) Preferences can be
realized within a framework Of law in which those
exercising power are checked by legal means--by con-
trol over the executive, and so on. . . . The sacred-
collectivity model is Opposed to conditions as they
are. It cannot assume, as can the secular-libertarian
model, that an educational system, for example, should
create a level of understanding of current problems
sufficient tO support Opposing points Of View and that
Opposing views should be tolerated as long as the
problems are shared and communications about them
possible. . . . It is a system in which consensus
cannot be taken for granted but must be built--a
directly Opposite situation tO that Obtaining in the
secular-libertarian model.30

The sacred-collectivity model stresses the ideas
Of potentiality and community. The collectivity is an
ethical, or moral unit, and the morality Of the individual
is dependent upon that Of the system. The model emphasizes
the unity, rather than the diversity, of the people. Rather
than relying on the free flow of ideas, it focuses on
specific Objectives, with political and social life directed
toward the benefit Of the collectivity, rather than that Of
the individual.31

Apter's reconciliation system is one Of decentral-
ized pyramidal authority, stressing instrumental, or
secular values, which serve as the basis for judging

efficiency. The role Of reconciliation government is not

organizational; it works rather to reconcile diverse

 

30 31

Ibid., pp. 33-34. Ibid., p. 32.

18

interests, mediating, integrating, and coordinating,
rather than mobilizing. Its goals are based on infor-
mation rather than on a vision Of the future. The mobili-
zation system is one Of hierarchical centralized authority,
stressing consummatory, or essentially sacred (though not
necessarily religious) values, which serve tO give a sense
Of solidarity tO the community, and identity tO the indi—
vidual. In the mobilization system new values are being
created and ideology is raised to the level Of religion.
A mobilization system elevates certain instrumental Ob-
jectives, such as modernization, or raising per capita
income, to the level Of symbolic ends.32

Reconciliation and mobilization systems differ,
then, not only in their relative orientations to the indi-
vidual and the collectivity, but also in their structural
forms, values, bases Of legitimacy, and as shall be dis-
cussed in the following chapter, their characteristic form
Of political party. Relying on the notion Of political
efficacy as a belief based on rational evaluation Of out-
comes and probabilities within each system, it should be
possible to suggest a model Of political efficacy in terms
Of the belief in responsiveness and the belief in effective-
ness apprOpriate to each system.

The reconciliation system should promote con-

gruence in the responsiveness and effectiveness beliefs.

 

32Ibid., passim.

19

The emphasis in the reconciliation system is on instru-
mental values, and individual goals and rewards. This
follows from the emphasis on liberty, or equity, as the
basis Of legitimacy, and the rOle Of the system as a
reconciler Of diverse interests. Responsiveness will be
evaluated directly in accordance with individual rewards,
with the satisfaction Of individual interests; it will be
judged by the responsiveness Of government to attempts to
influence it. The parties in such a system, subject to
influence by the citizenry and inclined tO seek their
cues from the population, should serve to increase the
belief in responsiveness and effectiveness. In reconcili-
ation systems which "work," therefore, both beliefs should
be relatively high, while in such systems which do not
"work," both beliefs should be relatively low. In each
case, however, congruence should be expected.

The mobilization system may well promote incon-
gruence in the responsiveness and effectiveness beliefs,
because in such systems responsiveness is likely to be
evaluated in collective terms, while effectiveness will
still be judged from an individual point Of View. The
emphasis in the mobilization system is on consummatory
values, and collective goals and rewards, in accordance
with its emphasis on potentiality as the basis Of legiti-
macy, with the system as a mobilizer Of the community.

Because Of its centralized, hierarchical structure it is

20

less subject to direct response to individual attempts to
influence it, nor in fact would such response be truly
legitimate, for its efforts are on behalf Of the community
as a whole. The parties in such a system are relatively
insensitive to individual attempts tO influence them; it
is not their purpose tO aggregate, compete, or represent
individuals, but tO bring tO realization an ideology based
on potentiality. Thus the responsiveness Of the parties
may be measured in terms of collective interests, which if
satisfied are not truly perceived as incongruent with a
low level Of personal political effectiveness.

Thus it is possible to construct a typology Of
political systems relying on the level Of belief in govern-
mental responsiveness and personal political effectiveness
characteristic Of each (see Figure 2, p. 21).

A system perceived as "working" by its members
will promote a high belief in responsiveness; this may well
be true regardless Of the processes by which it functions,
so long as outcomes are judged to be satisfactory. Thus
mobilization systems, if they "work," that is, satisfy
collective goals, and bestow collective rewards, will pro-
mote a high belief in responsiveness quite independently
Of the belief in effectiveness. The emphasis in these
systems is on collective goods, and responsiveness can be
measured in terms of the satisfaction provided for col-

lective interests. It should, Of course, be Observed,

21

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22

that mobilization systems could be found in each Of the
four categories. It is not impossible that in a mobili-
zation system individuals will believe in their own per-
sonal effectiveness, for governmental Officials may be
responsive to individual as well as collective interests.
Or it may be that while the ideology stresses collective
interests, governmental Officials are in fact only respon-
sive tO individual interests. Or, governmental Officials
may be relatively unresponsive to individual interests,
and incapable Of satisfying collective interests. But the

crucial point is that mobilization systems present the

 

possibility Of acceptable incongruence between the two

 

beliefs, because responsiveness and effectiveness are

 

essentially evaluated by different criteria in a mobili-

 

zation system, the former in terms Of collective interests

 

and the latter in terms Of individual interests.

 

As in most typologies Of political systems, Israel
is a most difficult case to classify. Israel has been
classified as both a developed and developing political

33

system. As shall be discussed further in the next

chapter, it has been referred tO as "an alternative way

 

33See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Israel," in The Insti-
tutions Of Advanced Societies, ed. by Arnold Rose (Minne-
apolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1958), and data on
Israel in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics
Of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1960).

 

 

 

 

23

to democracy."34 Sartori has called its party system
"definitely atypical," one which "defies any generali-

zation,‘ and in which "specific cues Of comparison are

35

apt tO be very misleading." Fein declares that Israel's

political system is, if not unique, "more unique than

36

others." Noting the unusual combination Of Old and new

in Israeli society, Amos Elon calls Israel "one Of the
least 'synchronized' countries on earth."37 It may be
understandable, then, that in terms Of the mobilization
and reconciliation system classification, Israel repre-
sents a hybrid.

Israel's uniqueness, I think, lies precisely in
the fact that it encompasses both systems. Apter himself
develops an intermediate system Of instrumental values and

hierarchical authority, which he sees as the most likely

form Of government for long—term modernization, and it is

 

34Amitai Etzioni, "Alternative Ways tO Democracy:
The Example Of Israel," in Comparative Politics: A Reader,
ed. by Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1963, pp. 712-21.

35Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties:
The Case Of Polarized Pluralism," in Political Parties and
Political Development, ed. by Joseph LaPOlombara and Myron
Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1966), p. 160, footnote 37.

 

 

36Leonard Fein, Politics in Israel (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), p. l.

 

37Amos Elon, The Israelis: Fathers and Sons
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), P. 322.

24

in that category that he places most modernizing nations.
Yet, while referring at one point to Israel's "Obviously
democratic form Of reconciliation system,"38 Apter places
Israel alone in the sector characterized by pyramidal
authority and consummatory values,39 a sector elsewhere
described as perhaps applicable to theocracies, or feudal
systems.40 I would suggest that Israel represents not so
much a third alternative, nor a system somewhere between

the two extremes, but in fact a unity Of Opposites, a

theme which I hope to develop in the following chapter.

 

38Apter, Op. cit., p. 135, footnote 18.

39Ibid., p. 256, Fig. 14. Among the countries
Apter refers to as characterized by hierarchical authority
and instrumental values are Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan,
Thailand, Guinea, Egypt, Indonesia, and Japan and Turkey
at an earlier time.

4°Ibid., p. 25.

CHAPTER II

ISRAEL AS A HYBRID POLITICAL SYSTEM:
PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL STYLE

IN ISRAELI DEMOCRACY

In order to understand more clearly the hybrid
nature Of Israel's political system, it is probably most
useful tO look at the Israeli party system. The plethora
of political parties, their strength, and the scope Of
their activities are distinguishing characteristics Of the
Israeli political system, which make it something quite
unique among democratic countries, leading one observer
to describe Israel's political system as being "Of and by,
if not for, political parties."1 An analysis Of the role
of political parties in Israel will serve to clarify the
nature of its political system.

According to Apter, both the reconciliation and
mobilization systems have a characteristic form Of party.
Characteristic of mobilization systems are parties Of

solidarity, while reconciliation systems are characterized

 

lFein, Op. cit., p. 67.

25

26

by parties Of representation. Parties Of solidarity are:

(l) monopolistic, in seeking to eliminate other parties;

 

(2) directive, in seeking to eliminate grievances in order

 

to overthrow the existing order or, when in power, to bend
the community toward the goals laid down by the party; and

(3) extra-constitutional, in accepting the legal order only

 

when forced to. When in control, the party Of solidarity
makes the state subservient to itself. Parties Of repre-

sentation are: (l) pluralistic, in competing with other

 

parties; (2) representative, in seeking to incorporate

 

divergent views in order tO win the widest following; and

(3) constitutional, in that party action is limited by

 

constitution, convention, and electoral rules.2

Parties Of solidarity and parties of represen-
tation, says Apter, may be regarded as two extremes on a
continuum, with characteristics in between being more com-
mon. Yet Israel's parties would seem to combine the
characteristics of the two ideal types, again not perhaps
best conceived as being somewhere in the middle Of a con-
tinuum, but rather combining the aspects Of the two ex-
tremes. Israel's parties are parties Of solidarity
obliged by circumstances to compete with each other.
There has never been any real Opposition, certainly not a
unified one, so that in some respects Mapai (or the Labor

Party) can be considered monopolistic. For the most part,

 

2Apter, Op. cit., p. 199.

27

however, the characteristics Of monopolistic parties are
better seen in the parties other than Mapai. Israel's
parties originated as directive parties, intending to
create a new order, rather than to work within the frame-
work Of an existing order. Because Of the necessity Of
competition, they do attempt to represent divergent views,
but this remains somewhat secondary to their promotion Of
ideology.3 Finally, Israel has no formal written consti-
tution; while certain constitutional principles dO seem
Operative, they are not binding, and there is no legal
restriction on the legislation which may be passed by the
Knesset.4 The ability Of the Knesset, led by Mapai, to
circumvent the Supreme Court decision in the "Who is a

Jew" case discussed in the following case study will

 

3It is possible to distinguish parties by the ex-
tent tO which they see themselves as representative
parties. Seligman found a move among Knesset members
toward seeing themselves as group representatives, which,
though it has not superseded left-right orientations, is a
new factor Of increasing significance. Mapai and the
National Religious Party Knesset members tend to see them-
selves representing many and diversified groups; Gahal and
the Communists are the least group oriented, tending to see
themselves as representing "the peOple"; several other
parties see themselves as primarily representing one
specific group, such as kibbutzim. See Lester Seligman,
Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press,
1964).

4See especially Jeffrey Albert, "Constitutional
Adjudication without a Constitution: The Case Of Israel,"
Harvard Law Review, LXXXII, 6 (April, 1969), 1245-65;
also Asher Zidon, Knesset (New York: Herzl Press, 1967);
Israel Katz, "The Rights Of the Citizen in Britain and
in Israel," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad,
NO. 9 (1968), 22-39.

 

28

illustrate this point, and hopefully those made above as

well.5

During the early part Of 1970 the recurring issue
Of "Who is a Jew?" was once again prominent in Israeli
politics. In February the Supreme Court had declared that
the children Of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother
could be declared, for purposes Of the Population Registry
Law, as being Jewish by nationality and Of no religion.
This decision was vigorously Opposed by the religious
parties, who defended the Orthodox position that only
persons born Of a Jewish mother, or properly converted to
Judaism, can be considered Jewish, and that Jewish nation-
ality is inseparable from Jewish religion. The view that
Jews constitute a nationality, and not only a religion,
is a central tenet Of Zionist ideology; furthermore,
Israel's first sovereign act was the adoption Of the Law
of Return, which grants every Jew the right Of immediate
citizenship upon arrival in Israel. Thus, any decision,
civil or religious, affecting the definition Of who shall

be regarded as a Jew is Of the utmost significance in

 

5All citations in the following case study are
from The Jerusalem Post, during the period from May 26-
June 16, 1970, specifically: Tuesday, May 26, p. 8;
Friday, May 29, p. 1; Tuesday, June 9, p. 8; Thursday,
June 11, p. 8; Sunday, June 14, p. l; and Tuesday, June 16,
p. 1. Another report Of this incident may be found in
Amnon Rubinstein, "Who's a Jew and other Woes," Encounter,
XXXVI, 3 (March, 1971), 84-93.

 

29

Israeli society.6 Deciding who is a Jew is tantamount tO
deciding who is, or may become, an Israeli, and because
such a decision involves an interpretation Of the guiding
Zionist ideology, raises the most fundamental question Of
a11--what is Israel all about.

The following month, in response to the Court's
February decision, and at the insistence Of the religious
parties, the Knesset amended the Law Of Return, by stating
that a Jew, for purposes Of the Law Of Return and the
POpulation Registry Law, is a person born Of a Jewish
mother or converted tO Judaism. The religious parties
were led tO understand that conversions other than Ortho-
dox would be limited by the prevailing British Mandatory
Law requiring certification for conversion from the head
of the religious community involved, in this case the
Chief Rabbinate, an institution even more committed to
Orthodoxy than the leading religious party itself. The
understanding seems tO have been that conversions in
Israel would have to be in accordance with Orthodox pro-
cedures, while persons converted abroad under modified
conditions would also be acceptable under the Law Of
Return.

In May a new case arose. An American immigrant,

converted tO Judaism by a reform group in Tel Aviv not

 

6 O D
For a report Of preV1ous "Who 18 a Jew" cases,

see S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 311-16.

 

30

recognized by the Rabbinate, applied tO the Interior
Ministry to be registered as Jewish. The Interior Minis-
try, a stronghold Of the National Religious Party, refused
to do so. The February decision had ruled that an Interior
Ministry clerk must register an applicant as Jewish on his
own declaration. The National Religious Party, by refusing
to register the new applicant, was clearly threatening to
leave the Cabinet, a situation which the dominant Labor
Party was most anxious to avoid. The existing coalition
was one Of "National Unity," in which all the major parties
were participants, with a total Of 104 Of the 120 members
of the Knesset. This left in Opposition l6 Knesset
members, who represented no less than six different
parties, ranging from extreme left to extreme right, as
well as extreme religious, hardly constituting a united
force.7

The existence Of a "National Unity" government was

a unique situation in Israel. It had originally been

 

7The number Of parties forming the National Unity
Government depends upon one's interpretation Of "party."
The leading partner was the Labor Party, composed Of the
"Alignment" between Mapai and Achdut Avodah, Rafi--a Mapai
breakaway-party which had returned, and Mapam. This
grouping had appeared for the first time in the 1969
elections, and held 56 seats. The next largest party was
Gahal, an alliance between Herut and that faction Of the
former Liberal Party which had once been known as the
General Zionists. Gahal held 26 seats. The National
Religious Party held 12 seats, and the Independent Liberal
Party held 4 seats. Two Arab parties, both affiliated
with the Labor Party, each holding two seats, were also
in the coalition. A smaller religious party with two
seats was the final member.

31

formed in the days immediately preceding the Six Day War
in 1967, had been held together thereafter as essential,
and renewed after much negotiation following the elections
Of October, 1969. It finally dissolved in July, 1970,
shortly after the present case arose, when the Labor Party
decided to accept the United Nations sponsored cease-fire,
and the right-wing Gahal Party left the coalition. Its
continuation was seriously in doubt at several points in
time, none more imminent than in the present case.

It was, in many respects, precisely to make
possible the eventual acceptance Of a cease-fire unaccept-
able tO Gahal that the Labor Party felt it so essential to
keep the National Religious Party in the coalition. Over
the two decades Of statehood, the dominant Labor Party, in
its various incarnations, had always relied on the National
Religious Party (which had also varied somewhat in
morphology over time) as the central coalition partner--
it was neither left nor right, and was in basic agreement
with the Labor Party on economic and foreign policy issues.

Its raison d'etre was to maintain religious orthodoxy as a

 

prime determinant in civil law, and while it had achieved
less than perfect success in its goal, its accomplishments
had been respectable. Thus, for example, only Kosher food
is served in the army, on Zim cruises and El Al flights;

no public transportation is available in Israel from Friday
sundown tO Saturday sundown (except in Haifa, and if one

counts cabs); a separate state-sponsored religious school

32

system continues to exist, largely under the supervision
Of the NRP, although the other parties no longer directly
control schools as in the pre-state period; one cannot be
born, married, divorced, or buried without the partici—
pation, and sometimes agreement, of religious authorities.
For a party receiving less than 10 per cent Of the popular
vote this is no mean achievement.

Nevertheless, in late May and early June Of 1970
it appeared that the NRP was about to give up its privi-
leged position by refusing to permit the Ministry of
Interior to register a Reform convert to Judaism as Jewish.
The NRP claimed that it was being pressured by rabbinical
circles in Israel, who were being pressured by Orthodox
rabbis in the Diaspora, who in turn claimed that Reform
communities were undermining them there. Thus the NRP
claimed it had no choice; even it if wanted to abide by
the court decision, its worldwide constituency would not
permit it. The Labor Party, though sincerely wishing to
avoid an NRP walkout from the coalition, was nevertheless
not willing to give in on this issue. Striking evidence
for this was seen in the fact that the Attorney General,

a Labor Party appointee, appeared before the Supreme Court
to argue for registration, thus arguing against a govern-
ment Ministry for the first time in the history Of the
State. The Interior Minister had until June 16 to

register the applicant, after which, if he refused to

33

do so, he would be obliged to resign. His party had re-

jected a compromise plan which he had formulated with the
Justice Minister, the Attorney General had argued against
him, and his Options were clear.8

The headlines clearly indicated the development

Of this impending confrontation. On May 26 the Jerusalem

 

Eggt headlined: NRP THREATENS CABINET RIFT OVER CON-
VERSION.9 On May 29 the front-page headline read: SHAPIRO
[the Minister Of Interior] GIVEN 19 DAYS TO SETTLE ZEIDMAN
ISSUE. On June 9: NRP SAYS IT WILL QUIT THE COALITION IF
LAW NOT AMENDED. On June 11: LAST DITCH EFFORT TO PRE-
SERVE NATIONAL UNITY. The latter article reported that

intensive consultations were planned in "an all-out attempt

to keep the National Unity Government intact. Premier

Golda Meir and her closest advisors are trying to find a

formula that would both keep the National Religious Party

 

8Mrs. Meir had forced the Labor Party to compromise
with the NRP by passing the amendment to the Law Of Return
discussed earlier. Neither she nor the party was prepared
to compromise again.

9Alongside this article appeared one headlined:
IMPROPER CONVERSIONS TO BLAME FOR SECURITY SITUATION, which
read as follows: "The Lubavitcher rebbe, spiritual head Of
the Habad hassidim, attributes the 'deterioration' in the
security situation to Israel's recognition as Jews Of 'non-
Jews who were improperly converted tO Judaism.‘ 'Since the
moment it was decided in Israel that non-Jews with improper
conversions to Judaism are also Jews,‘ he said, 'The
security situation has deteriorated and the Russian inter-
vention has escalated . . . he is 'confident the security
situation will improve as soon as the ruling is reversed.‘
He called on the NRP Ministers to leave the Government
unless such a step was taken."

34

from walking out of her government, and also work within
the existing laws. But there seems to be little ground
for Optimism."

On June 14 an article appeared with the headline:
PARTIES RESIGNED TO SEEING NRP QUIT COALITION. While the
article reported that Labor Party leaders had stressed that
under no circumstances would they do anything likely to
undermine the Supreme Court, it reported Mrs. Meir's dis-
tress that "the NRP could consider leaving the Government
at such a juncture in this country's struggle for survival."
On June 16, the aforementioned "19th day," it was all over.
Yet no article was to be found announcing the departure of
the NRP from the government Of National Unity. Instead
appeared the headline:

HELEN ZEIDMAN ACCEPTS ORTHODOX CONVERSION

A threatened coalition crisis over local Reform
conversions was averted last night following an
eleventh-hour decision by American—born Mrs. Helen
Zeidman . . . to undergo a second conversion to
Judaism. . . . Following the ceremony, Mrs. Zeidman
signed a request to the High Court Of Justice. In
it, she asked to withdraw her application for an order
nisi against the Interior Ministry.

The conversion took only a few hours, admittedly
unusual for the Orthodox procedure. But it was carried
out according tO the strictest Halacha Laws, according
to circles close to Rabbi Goren [Chief Chaplain to the
Armed Forces and Tel Aviv Chief Rabbi-elect, who per-
formed the conversion service]. Interior Minister and
NRP leader Haim Moshe Shapiro has recognized Mrs.
Zeidman's conversion by Rabbi Goren and has agreed to
register her and her two children by a first marriage
as Jewish. News of the surprise development was on
the whole greeted with relief in the Knesset lobbies
yesterday. National Religious Party leaders said a
breathing space had been earned tO work out a compro-
mise agreement that would forestall similar compli-
cations in the future. . . . Efforts to persuade Mrs.

35

Zeidman to undergo a second conversion followed Friday's
meeting Of the Labour Party Ministers with Premier Golda

Meir. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan is believed to have
raised the idea that Rabbi Goren could be approached in
an attempt to find a way out of the impasse.

. . . Rabbi Goren is understood to have based his
decision on a saying by Maimonides, that "one should not
be too cumbersome and should not be tOO exact on
occasion, lest one should create a burden and lead a
man tO deviate from good to bad ways." Rabbi Goren
spent most of yesterday morning in a discussion with
Mrs. Zeidman. After becoming convinced Of her sin-
cerity he set up a Rabbinical Court in his army Office
and performed the conversion.

. . . The speedy conversion met with some criticism
within certain NRP circles, especially the younger, more
militant group. Rabbi Goren's decision to step into
the breach was seen as a blow tO the prestige Of the
Chief Rabbinate.

In the Knesset lobby, Deputy Interior Minister Dr.
Yosef Goldschmidt conceded that the Goren conversion
had been carried out very much faster than an ordinary
conversion. This was not contrary to the Halacha, he
pointed out, which allowed for "cases of urgency."

He conceded that Rabbi Goren did not generally
conduct conversions, but pointed out that he possessed
the requisite authority, and was assisted by two other
rabbis. "I assume that a number Of people will ask
questions about the manner and the rapidity Of the
ceremony," he agreed.

The case was reported Officially closed on June 17,
although a group Of rabbis announced plans to petition the
Rabbinical high Court to invalidate the conversion, which
in fact the court did do that day. The action was Of no
practical significance, however, as Mrs. Zeidman received
her identification card, listing her nationality as "Jew—
ish," from the Interior Ministry on the next day. Thus
the speedy conversion Of Mrs. Zeidman made it possible for
the NRP to remain in the Government. Reform conversion,

it had been argued, was insufficient and superficial; only

through Orthodox conversion could one really become a Jew.

36

Yet one wonders if any Reform conversion had ever been so
rapid as the Orthodox conversion performed in this in-
stance.10

The Labor Party, in seeking out such a solution,
and the NRP, in accepting it, had each found a means for
compromising what had been held to be fundamental princi-
ples. The case illustrates both the high commitment Of
Israeli parties to principle, as well as their ability to
rise above principle when events go beyond the intentions
Of the parties. Despite representing a number Of differ—
ent parties, the elites have much in common with each
other, including a distrust Of non-elites. The Zeidman
case illustrates certain key elements in the process and
style Of Israeli politics, and the central role Of politi-
cal parties in that process, parties considerably differ-
ent from those in other democratic countries.

If the understanding of a democratic political
system in the West involves a situation in which govern-
mental power can be transferred from one party to another
in a regularized way, then as Etzioni points out, Israel
clearly presents an alternative way to democracy, not
based on the Anglo-Saxon model for, as he notes:

Among the basic features Of the Israeli government
are a multiple party system and coalition ministries

in which one center party (Mapai) is always present
and always stronger than the other parties. TO leave

 

10Rubinstein refers to this as "a supersonic cere-
mony purporting to be a conversion." Rubinstein, Op. cit.,
p. 92.

37

this party out of the [Government] is simply not a

part Of the accepted procedures Of the system. The

party is one Of the political institutions Of the

country and is identified with the state in the

minds Of many voters.11

The fact that a decade after this was written

Mapai is now the dominant partner in an even larger Labor
Party hardly changes the fundamental point which Etzioni
is making. If anything it strengthens it, for while the
party is now larger, it is still unable to govern without
forming a coalition with other parties, a matter whose
consequences are quite significant. Mapai (or the Labor
Party) has been described by Etzioni as an "institution-

alized dominant center party."12

The Mapai central com—
mittee is really the Israeli center Of power. Yet Mapai's
central committee is not a coordinated decision-making unit,
and Mapai is probably the least monolithic Of Israel's
parties. It is, in fact, the federated structure Of Mapai,
along with the periodic changes in the composition Of the
coalition government in response to voting patterns, which
constitute the central factors in Etzioni's conception Of
Israel as an "alternative way to democracy." Mapai, with
all its power, remains at times too big for concerted
action, "internally weak and highly sensitive to pressures

of various groups."13

 

llAmitai Etzioni, Op. cit., pp. 712-13.

12 13

Ibid., p. 713. Ibid., p. 719.

38

There is much frustration in Israel regarding the
party system, a central contributor to which concerns the
paradox Of Mapai's overwhelming predominance coupled with
its not infrequent impotence. The fragmentation Of
Opposition parties has also served to make Mapai less
accountable than otherwise might have been the case.

Mapai has dominated every government coalition, and be-
cause Of its location at the center Of the political
spectrum, no effective Opposition has emerged; the various
Opposition parties have been incapable Of unifying with
each other, as their differences with Mapai stem from
Opposite directions. During the existence Of the National
Unity Government, for example, it was Mapai that strove to
preserve that arrangement, while the parties from left and
right continually threatened to leave, because Of their
difficulties in co-existing with each other. For Mapai,
having coalition partners from both left and right pro—
tected it from each direction.

There is a degree Of dissatisfaction with Mapai,
stemming both from ideological reasons, and from its per-
formance. Both Arian and Antonovsky note an ideological
tension between parties and the population, primarily be-

14

tween left leaders and centrist followers. This is all

 

l4See Aaron Antonovsky, "Political Ideologies of
Israelis," Amot, NO. 7 (l963)(in Hebrew; English trans-
lation in mimeograph form available); and Alan Arian,
"Voting and Ideology in Isreal," Midwest Journal Of
Political Science, X, 3 (August, 1966), 265-87.

 

 

39

the more accentuated by a relatively slow turnover in the
Knesset.15 Furthermore, the government and bureaucracy
are accustomed to having their own way, without effective
parliamentary control and interference, and have little
tolerance for public criticism--"censure Of governmental
actions is Often furiously branded as disloyalty to the
State which ministers and bureaucrats tend to identify
with the Government in power."16
But whatever dissatisfaction with Mapai may exist,
this has not led to increased support for other parties.
In fact, the startling thing about Israeli politics is
the consistency over time in the electoral results for the
parties, despite the changing composition Of the population.
A key reason for the failure Of other parties to benefit
from the dissatisfaction with Mapai is the system's tendency
to make "irresponsible" parties Of them. This is so not

only in the sense that because they have little or no

chance Of winning they are inclined to make promises they

 

15Elon points out that the average age Of members
in the first Israeli parliament in 1949 was forty-three;
twenty years later the average age in the sixth parliament
was sixty-three. See Elon, Op. cit., p. 305.

16Aharon F. Kleinberger, Society, Schools, and
Prggress in Israel (London: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 88.
Kleinberger continues: "There have been numerous attempts
to curtail public criticism, e.g., by means Of a law
against libel which threatens to restrict freedom Of the
press, excessive use Of security reasons for muzzling the
press, pressure on the broadcasting service to stOp
satirical programmes or to debar unacceptable persons from
participation, etc."

 

 

40

could not fulfill, but also in a second sense, somewhat
more specific to the Israeli case, as noted by Etzioni.
Because Mapai is a constant and dominant partner in govern-
ing coalitions,
other parties tend . . . to become irresponsible in
the sense that they are ready tO bargain about many
issues of public interest in order to be included in
the coalition and as a price for staying in it. As
they have to choose between being an insignificant
Opposition or a minor member Of the coalition, they
Often choose the latter. . . . Irresponsible politics
in turn cause some voters to shift to the major party
which "does the job" and manifests responsible leader-
ship. This validates the claim Of the Mapai spokes-
men that there is no alternative tO the party in
Office. Thus a vicious circle is created: one party
remains in office for a long time; this creates
irresponsibility in other parties; and this in turn
strengthens the position Of the party in Office.17
The parties in Israel originated before the arrival
Of statehood, and in fact they or their progenitors were
organized outside Of Palestine itself. We have Observed
that Israel's party system is not structurally analogous
to party systems in Western democracies; neither is the
idea Of party in Israel based on any Western model.
Parties served as the primary means Of immigration, with
believers coming tO settle and develop Palestine in order
tO fulfill party ideologies. Given the restricted nature
of immigration during the Mandate Period, the parties were
engaged in intense struggle to see to it that their

followers in fact immigrated. During that period the

parties developed a network Of affiliated institutions,

 

17Etzioni, Op. cit., p. 715.

41

including schools, youth groups, adult associations, agri-
cultural settlements, and labor exchanges. Even today it
is the case that Israeli parties are engaged in activities
that would elsewhere be performed by public authorities,

or private institutions. The parties have built agri-
cultural settlements and industries; founded schools and
clinics; have their own cultural centers, housing projects,
sports clubs, banks, youth movements, and publish their
own newspapers. In the pre-state period, some Of the
parties had their own military organizations.

The Israeli citizen confronts political parties at
every turn. Through the various institutions Of the party,
a very real economic and social power is developed over
supporters and members, taking the form Of political feudal-

18 It is

ism, which while declining, is far from moribund.
estimated that one-fourth to one-third Of the adult popu-
lation are actually card-carrying members Of a political
party, and the majority Of voters depend to some extent

on particular parties for news, some cultural activities,

. . . l9 . .
economic serv1ces, and even jobs. Party influence is

 

18See Amitai Etzioni, "The Decline of Neo-Feudal-
ism: The Case in Israel" (paper presented at annual meet-
ing of American Political Science Association, St. Louis,
Mo., September, 1961).

19See S. D. Johnston, "Election Politics and Social
Change in Israel," Middle East Journal, XVI (Summer, 1962),
309-27. See also subsequent comments in this chapter on
patron-client relationships to the party—controlled
bureaucracy. The feudalism Observed here derives from

 

42

reduced in urban areas, which has led to greater campaign
efforts in those areas. Obviously, these are the popu-
lation centers as well, which makes electoral concen-
tration on them easily understandable, but it is not only
size which minimizes the attention given agricultural areas
during elections; the agricultural settlements tend tO be
party affiliated, and some kibbutzim are clearly Off-
limits to other parties.

Fein found it useful to distinguish the party in
Israel as electoral competitor and as ideological per-
suader, calling the former its "party" role, the latter
its role as a "movement."20 Conceived Of as a movement,
a party is an agent designed to change society, which sees
itself as part Of an historical process; the tendency for
such a party is tO be characterized by democratic central-
ism, as Opposed to a pluralistic compromise structure.
Such a party is, Of course, a party Of solidarity--
directive, monOpOlistic, and extra-constitutional.
Avineri attributes Israel's non-Western concept Of politi-
cal party as a "movement" to the Eastern European back-

ground Of the pioneers, holding that the revolutionary

 

the pre-state period, during which privileges and services
were awarded by party membership. Such a notion can be
contrasted with that Of the universal rule Of law, and the
equality Of citizens before the law, characteristics Of
the secular—libertarian model.

20Fein, Op. cit., especially pp. 67-72.

43

left-wing parties of Russia at the turn Of the century
served as models for the Zionist labor parties. These
were movements aimed not at sharing power in an established
society, but at activating an entire population for the
purpose Of overthrowing the existing political structure.
Israeli labor parties, says Avineri, combine the anti-
intellectual romanticism Of the populist social-
revolutionaries, with their belief in the innate virtues
Of the people, and the centralist training in party organi-
zation and internal discipline characterizing the Bolshe-
viks.21
Much Of the character Of Israeli politics can only
be explained by the Eastern EurOpean background Of the
early pioneers, and the nature Of the party system which
arose from that background, and which is still largely
controlled by those pioneers. These pioneers saw them-
selves as revolutionaries, but as Dorothy Willner Observes,
while they rejected what they regarded as the negative
aspects Of Jewish life in the Diaspora, taking new
vocations in Palestine, developing new norms Of behavior,
new community types, and new forms Of organization, the
early pioneers in Palestine did not entirely escape their
past:

The culture Of Eastern European Jewry, and to varying
extents that Of the larger Eastern European societies,

 

21Shlomo Avineri, "Israel in the Post Ben-Gurion
Era," Midstream, September, 1965, p. 21.

 

44

were the cultures in which they had been socialized,
and the only ones they really knew. Their basic modes
Of perception, symbolization, reaction, and interpre-
tation persisted, as did other components Of behavior
that did not enter the system Of conscious values Open
to deliverate revision. . . . Pervasiveness Of belief
systems, Of the ideologically oriented partisan net-
works Of organizations Of partisan commitment; faction-
alism, fission, and the acrimony Of factional dissent
--all Of these can be related to the Eastern European
antecedents Of the majority Of the pre-statehood immi-
grants tO Palestine and members Of the Zionist move-
ment.22
Given the Eastern European backgrounds Of the found-
ing pioneers, one might wonder why any form Of democracy
should have emerged at all. Avineri Observes that Israel's
democratic structure is a product Of the political structure
Of the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine, in which all
forms Of settlement were constituted by the consensus of the
settlers themselves, and were necessarily voluntary and
democratic. Yet, given the fact that the native countries
Of the settlers were not themselves democratic, the propen-
sity towards democracy requires further explanation. Avineri
goes back tO the tradition Of Kehila, the autonomous self-
governing community by which the Jews in Eastern Europe were
organized. While Eastern EurOpean society was organized
hierarchically and autocratically, the Jewish community was
given a considerable degree Of autonomous local control, and

was organized on a representative and elective system. In

addition Avineri attributes much significance to the

 

22Dorothy Willner, Nation-Building and Community
in Israel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1969): pp. 83-84.

 

45

experience within the Kehilot Of determining such procedural

matters as the nature of the electoral process to be used.23

 

23Avineri, Op. cit., pp. 19-20. Not all are in
agreement that the Kehilot were a democratic experience.
Avineri calls the Kehilot voluntary and argues, that with-
out a hereditary aristocracy or hierarchical church, the
Jews had no alternative tO a representative system, striv-
ing for consensus. Sachar, however, maintains that the
Kehilot were autocratic, because prOperty qualifications
determined the franchise, and refers to the Officers as
wealthy tyrants who put the burden Of taxation on the
poorer, unfranchised members Of the community. See Howard
M. Sachar, The Course Of Modern Jewish History (New York:
Delta, 1963L, p. 32.

The dominant elites Of Israeli society are products
Of the shtetl culture Of Eastern European Jewry, and while
they rejected that life, there is little question that
many elements Of that culture persist in Israel. For
example, one finds in Israel a tendency tO "placate or
alleviate, rather than to control," and the use Of inter-
mediaries to achieve one's goals. [See Mark Zborowski and
Elizabeth Herzog, Life is With People (New York: Inter-
national Universities Press, 1952), pp. 214-238]. Such a
"community" orientation is further encouraged by the size
of the country, which among elites manifests itself
through the existence Of predominantly face-to-face
relationships.

Louis Hartz has developed the concept Of "fragment
societies," new societies created from the "fragment" Of
a larger whole, Of which Israel is a prime example. The
Israeli pioneers were a fragment of the Jewish population,
coming from the Eastern EurOpean shtetl life, rejecting
that life. While the shtetl disappeared in Europe, in
some respects its last and final manifestation is in
Israel, where certain aspects Of it are institutionalized.

In accordance with Hartz's theory, it is indeed
the case that conflict and disagreement in Israel are
within certain prescribed boundaries; subsequent waves of
immigrants have accepted the dominant ideology in varying
degrees, but none have developed a counter ideology. To
do so would be almost an anti-Israel act. Thus the frag-
ment is dominant, and the radical guiding ideology has
become conservatized.

The result is wide consensus in Israel on a number
of matters, but also the existence Of elite politics. The
consensus, and the sense of collectivity it promotes,
furthers the belief in responsiveness Of government
Officials, at the same time that the elite politics, and

 

46

The intensity of party politics in Israel is
extremely high, partly as a result of the proportional
representation system with the entire country as one
district, but moreover from historical circumstances Of
which the proportional representation system is a direct
result. This has to do with the nature Of Zionism, and
its emergence. Zionism emerged as an ideology among a
dispersed peOple having no means of coercion and rewards.
Furthermore, it was an ideology in some ways Opposed to
Judaism, and which had to compete with other ideologies
current in Eastern EurOpe at that time, both within the
Jewish population and in the larger society. Thus within
the Zionist movement there was ideological intensity, each
sub-group seeking to maintain ideological purity, with
compromise viewed as sinful deviation.

The effects we have attributed here to the influ-
ence Of shtetl culture are most pronounced among the
earlier pioneers. Post-statehood immigrants from Eastern
EurOpe have tended to be more urban and middle-class,
from an environment quite different than that which pro-

duced in others such pervasive and intense ideological

 

and its associated party system, lowers the sense Of
personal political effectiveness.

For the "fragment" thesis, see Louis Hartz, ed.,
The Founding Of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1964). For a review which attempts to develop
a typology Of fragment societies, with consideration given
to the case Of Israel, see Barry M. Schutz, "The Concept
of Fragment in Comparative Political Analysis," Compara-
tive Politics, I, 1 (October, 1968), 111—25.

 

 

 

47

commitment. The native-born are less oriented tO the
ideologies of the Older generation than to Israel itself.
They tend, for example, to be less intense in their commit-
ment to Zionism, and even anti-Socialistic.24 For these,
and other reasons, there has been a significant decline in
partisan commitment over time, and one Of the most basic
reasons is the fact that most immigrants in the post-
statehood era have not come from Europe, but rather from
the Middle East and North Africa. While these immigrants
have indeed changed the society, they did not come to do
so. Power in Israel is still largely in the hands of the
older pioneers, and party politics is almost exclusively
their domain.

Nevertheless, Zionism clearly remains Israel's
guiding ideology, its central purpose the ingathering Of
the exiles Of the Jewish nation and the creation Of a
Jewish State. Furthermore, to the elites, and a large
segment Of the population, the develOpment of socialism
is a central ideological commitment. Differences between
the parties have centered on their interpretations Of
socialism, their attitudes toward the Arab states, and the

role of religion in the state.25 Clearly, differences in

 

24See Alan Arian, Ideological Change in Israel

(Cleveland: Case Western Reserve, 1968).

 

25For two interesting attempts tO distinguish
parties in Israel by their programs, see T. M. GOOdland,
"A Mathematical Presentation Of Israel's Political

48

interpretation Of Zionism have existed as well, but Zion—
ism is an ideology shared by virtually all, and if the
intensity with which this ideology has been adhered to
has varied, its content has remained unchanged.26
Zionism and socialism serve as consummatory values
in Israel. Consummatory values, says Apter, are non—
rational in that they emphasize ultimate ends.27 In
Israel, Zionism and socialism as values Often take prece-
dence over what might be regarded as more "Objective"
needs Of develOpment. These larger ends, for example,
have their influence on economic decision-making. Wage
policy in Israel is linked to Socialism, and not to pro-
ductivity; wages are largely determined by such ascriptive
criteria as family size. The Zionist—Socialist ideology
places great emphasis on social integration, a goal which
at times conflicts with needs Of economic development.
For example, economic develOpment requires an educational
system producing elites, but social integration requires
reducing the educational gap between children Of Eastern

and Western origin; economic development requires a slow-

down Of the rising standard Of living, but social

 

 

Parties,’ British Journal Of Sociology, VIII (September,
1957), 263-66; andILouis Guttman, Whither Israel's
Political Parties?" Jewish Frontier, XXVIII, 12 (December,
1961).

26Arian, Ideological Change in Israel.

27Apter, Op. cit., p. 250.

49

integration requires parts Of the population to increase
their standard Of living. Beyond that, an increasing
standard Of living is an incentive to promote immigration
from the West.28
What I have referred to as "consummatory values"
are called by Akzin and Dror "contextual ends," and they
cite Friedmann's remark that:
Contextual ends are represented by social values and
traditions that do not, in themselves, constitute the
immediate Objectives Of planning but are nevertheless
sufficiently vital to make their preservation socially
worth while.29
Consummatory values, or "contextual ends," constitute the
larger purposes Of the state, which nO adequate empirical
standard can evaluate. Where certain consummatory values
are Of such significance as in Israel, they affect all
forms Of decision making. I have pointed out previously
that in a mobilization system certain instrumental values
may be raised to the level Of consummatory values. In
Israel it is not so much the case that an instrumental

value, such as raising per capita income, is transformed

into a consummatory value, as that the need for raising

 

28See discussion Of these matters in Kleinberger,
Op. cit., pp. 103-15, and references cited there.

29John Friedmann, "Introduction: From POlemetics
to Dispassionate Analysis" to "The Study and Practice Of
Planning," International Social Science Journal, XI, 3
(UNESCO, 1959), 327ff., as cited in Benjamin Akzin and
Yehezkel Dror, Israel: High-Pressure Plannipg (Syracuse,
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966): p. 82, footnote
9.

 

 

50

per capita income must be evaluated within the larger
framework Of consummatory values.

Halpern makes a point similar tO this in his com-
parison of Zionism and other nationalist movements. He
contends that "the conquest and unrestricted exercise Of
political sovereignty is the only absolute and uncon-
ditional aim" Of nationalism:

The other major nationalist aims--such as the exclu-
sive control of the land and natural resources, or the
secure establishment Of the national language and cul-
ture--are Often conceived as means, and not only as
ends. The pursuit Of such aims may be deliberately
restricted or suspended for reasons of policy . . .
[but] it seems tO be the very hallmark of a modern
nationalist movement, or Of a new nation, that it
never thinks Of its political sovereignty as subordi-
nate tO other specific ends. . . .

TO this generalization, Zionism is an outstanding
exception. Political sovereignity was not, at all
times without exception, an absolute and unconditional
purpose in Zionism, the end to which all other national—
ist aims were subordinated and all considered as means.
As a general rule, Zionism valued national sovereignty
not for its own sake alone, but also as one of the
instruments needed for the attainment Of other ends
Of the nationalist movement. . . . TO occupy the land
and deve10p the resources of the Jewish National Home
or to cultivate the Hebrew language and restore an
active social and cultural national consensus seemed
at times to have logical precedence and even emotional
primacy over the aim Of political sovereignty: and
Often sovereignty was envisaged as a means subordinate
to those other ends.30

The Zionists had no tangible enemy such as a foreign

colonialist to rally against, and Zionism focused on more

 

30Ben Halpern, "Zionism and Israel," Jewish
Journal Of Sociology, III, 2 (December, 1961), 157—58.
See also Halpern, The Idea Of the Jewish State (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), especially
"Zionist Conceptions Of Sovereignty."

51

abstract and diffuse Objectives. Moreover, the scope of
action Open to the Zionists was narrow. In some ways it
is true that this led, as Halpern argues, tO making the
Zionists more pragmatic and "reasonable" than other
nationalists, allowing them to subordinate the goal Of
sovereignty to other aims. But precisely because the
achievement of sovereignty was not at all times the pri-
mary goal Of the Zionist movement, its attainment left
other consummatory values still to be achieved pre-
eminent.

Though strongly oriented tO certain consummatory
values, Israel is primarily a reconciliation system in
structure. The combination Of Israel's ideological tra-
dition and its political structure have significant conse-
quences in Israeli political life. Among these conse-
quences is a low sense of personal political effectiveness,
for the ideological tradition has led, as Fein ObServes,
tO a "relative insensitivity on the part Of the government
to public Opinion":

It is not that the ideology is antidemocratic in
substance. On the contrary it speaks of radical
democracy. But ideological commitment leads the com-
mitted to believe that they know better. Its common
consequence is an elitist view, in which the committed
see themselves as the enlightened. In Israel, this
view receives significant support from other aspects
Of the system. The electoral system is relatively
insensitive to minor shifts in public Opinion; members
of the Knesset have only weak ties to the heterogeneous
constituencies which might alert them to public feel-
ings, nor is their political future dependent on their
accord with the mass public; there are, in Israel, so

many publics, so sharply demarcated, that "represent-
ing" public Opinion is either a hopeless task or a

52

31

danger to the fragile national consensus. It may
well be that even without ideology the system would
not develop formal channels for communicating the
public will. But it is more likely that one of the
central impediments tO institutional change is the
lack of any powerful pressure to create such channels,
a lack which derives in the first instance from the
elitist consequences Of ideological commitment.32

As noted, the intensity of Israeli politics is

high, yet the Zeidman case illustrates that even issues Of

the highest intensity can Often be resolved, and Often

such issues tend to die down after the event. Because Of

the high intensity at which Israeli politics normally

Operate, there may be a tendency to read tOO much into

these matters. While it is true that ideology is far more

important in Israeli politics than in other Western

nations, it is in part a matter of ritual, and as Fein

Observes, this, too, is a source Of cynicism:

. . . once the dust of battle has settled the com-
batants embrace and walk Off the field together . . .
[and] the citizen must conclude either that the
accusations and counteraccusations, the solemn
commitments and dire warnings, were merely so much

 

31

member has no base independent
election to the party, and has
wishes to be re-elected, he is
allegiance to the party. This
qualified in light Of the fact

Because Of the existing list system, a Knesset

Of his party; he owes his

no other constituency. If he
obliged to give his absolute
statement might be somewhat
that for the most part

Knesset members are in fact the party leadership, so that
the problem is not so severe (for the Knesset member) as
it might appear. But in any event, the effect on the nature

Of representation is unchanged.

32

Fein, Op. cit., p. 224.

53

rhetoric, never meant tO be taken seriously, or that

the political leaders have sold their principles for

a mess Of pottage.33

Party influence is by no means limited to legis-

lative concerns, as has been noted. The various ministries
are controlled by different parties, their price and pay-
ment for participating in the coalition, and have a tend-
ency to become their private domains. Thus, for example,
the National Religious Party has had almost exclusive con-
trol over the Ministry of Interior, and as the Zeidman case
indicates had taken upon itself the decision as to who
would be regarded as a Jew. That party has also controlled
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was established
primarily for international political reasons, as evidence
of Israel's recognition Of the importance Of Palestine for
other religions and her concern for their interests. But
as a consequence of the fact that the Minister has always

come from the religious parties its concerns have been

directed toward the religious courts, Sabbath Observance,

 

33Fein, Op. cit., p. 72. But neither should
ideology be under-emphasized, a point to which I shall
return. One extreme case is reported by Safran, when in
the late 1940's the struggle between Mapai and Mapam was
so great many kibbutzim were split apart. "Whichever
group was in the majority expelled the minority, and in
some cases, sections Of one and the same kibbutz had to
be segregated by barbed wire. Lifelong friendships were
broken, children who had grown together were separated,
families were sometimes sundered, and all over such
issues as whether or not Mapai had sold out to the capi-
talists and whether or not Mapam had sold out to the
Russians." Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963): P.
111.

54

dietary regulations, and religious education, and in
general imposing Orthodoxy on the Jewish pOpulation.34
Similar cases exist for other ministries, any of which
provide both a degree of power as well as spoils for the
party controlling them.

Caiden Observes in Israel a mutual distrust be-
tween governors and governed, deriving essentially from
past experiences Of the population in Russia, Germany,
and Palestine during the British Mandate. The authori—
tarian traits Of the previous regime persisted, with the
consequence that a population largely without experience
in democratic government sought ways around the law and
administration. The Israeli government is highly dis-
cretionary, with few safeguards against abuse. Unable to
appeal bureaucratic decisions, the individual becomes more
dependent on the leniency of the state, which itself be-
comes Open to various kinds Of influence.35

These characteristics encourage protekzia, or

informal means Of exerting influence or Obtaining benefits.

Dror suggests that protekzia fulfills many positive

 

functions, serving to reduce the anxiety and feeling Of

 

34Safran incidentally notes that this ministry has
no parallel in any Western country, although it is fre-
quently found in Islamic states. See Safran, Op. cit.,
p. 155.

35See Gerald Caiden, "Israeli Administration after
Twenty Years," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad,
NO. 8 (1967), 9-29.

55

insecurity Of a person coming into contact with the
. . . 36 . .
administration. This is, of course, only true in the

case of one with pgptekzia, and so long as it flourishes

 

those without such "pull" should feel all the more anxious
than in a system more universally-oriented. Despite

Dror's defense Of the merits Of pgotekzia, Caiden seems

 

closer to the reality in Observing that the public becomes

distrustful Of a system which permits protekzia tO
37

 

flourish.
There is an element in Israeli politics, most
clearly seen in the relations Of individuals to the

bureaucracy, Of what is known elsewhere as clientelismo,

 

 

36Yehezkel Dror, "Nine Main Characteristics Of
Governmental Administration in Israel," Public Adminis-
tration in Israel and Abroad, NO. 5 (1964), 12-13.

37Caiden, Op. cit., p. 22. Protekzia is also dis-
cussed in Yair Carmi, "Favoritism in the Israeli Civil
Service," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad, NO.
9 (1968), 58-64. It should be noted here that with regard
to the concept Of public service in Israel, Officials are
far more likely to see themselves as servants Of the state
than Of the public, and tO see their role as one Of keeping
the citizen in his place. Caiden attributes this charac-
teristic to three traditions which converge: (1) Central
EurOpean--the citizen must be impressed with state power
and majesty; (2) Levantine--disarming courtesy, slow
working habits; (3) chauvinism, according to which the
state knows best. These factors and others lead Caiden
to apply the label "bureaucratic polity" tO Israel, and
to Observe that while characteristics such as these can
be found in all bureaucracies, in "bureaucratic polities"
the remedies are not simply administrative, but involve
deep attitude change--fundamentally towards democracy and
away from authoritarian traits.

56

or clientelist politics.38 While I have emphasized hereto-

fore the ideological nature Of Israeli politics, for those
outside the ideological framework, and for everyone in many
specific transactions, a relationship based on personal
ties is more significant. Interest groups also tend to
become "clients" of a party. By and large we can say that
the party serves as the patron, and in some cases, such

as agricultural villages, this is quite clearly the pri-
mary link to the larger system. For non-political ele-
ments in the society, this system can be used to advantage,
as they are prepared to sell their vote for the satis-
faction Of personal needs by the party.39 Among Eastern-
ers, in particular, this is a not uncommon technique.

In some circumstances such a client—patron relation-
ship may provide a two-way advantage, but it nevertheless
strengthens the role Of the patron, in this case the
political party. Muller Observes that the phenomenon Of

clientelismo may account for his finding that in Italy

 

and Mexico individuals make no connection between their

own sense Of ability tO influence government and the

 

38John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and
Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review,

39Benjamin Akzin, "The Role Of Parties in Israeli
Democracy," in Integgation and Development in Israel, ed.
by S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef and Chaim Adler
(Jerusalem: Israeli Universities Press, 1970), p. 20.
See also Emmanuel Gutmann, "Some Observations on Politics
and Parties in Israel," Indi§_guarterly, XVII, l
(January-March, 1961), 3-29.

 

 

57

receptivity of their governments to influence from the
general membership. Dealing as it does with the satis-

faction Of personal interests, clientelismo "would not

 

encourage members to associate their beliefs in the re-
sponsiveness of government to the members in general with
their perception Of their own ability to influence politi-
cal decisions."4O
If Israel is to be regarded as a reconciliation
system, it is certainly one Of a very special nature.
Factors other than those mentioned here could be considered
as well, such as the degree Of centralization in the
governmental structure, particularly evident in the eco-

nomic sphere,41

but also in the minimal importance Of
local politics and government. With regard tO the latter,
it is noteworthy that the formation Of local governing
coalitions is largely determined by the party central com-
mittees, which trade Off advantages in certain localities

for advantages in others. One might also consider the

degree to which Israel can appropriately be labeled a

 

40Muller, Op. cit., p. 803.

41There is probably no democracy in which the
government has as much influence on the detailed Operations
Of the economy as does the Israeli government, in the ex-
tent to which it owns and Operates a variety Of economic
enterprises, and controls the setting in which private
enterprise functions. For a discussion Of this, see
Kleinberger, Op. cit., pp. 103-15.

58

"garrison state."42 Another Observation would be that

Israel is not an institutionally pluralistic society; there
are no truly effective independent interest groups, all
such groups being party affiliated. The most Obvious
example Of this fact would be in the relation between the
Histadrut (General Federation Of Labor) and the State;
labor disputes are resolved within the party, which con-
trols both the state apparatus and the Histadrut.43
But the essential characteristic, from which many
Of the more specific matters discussed here derive, is the
overriding importance Of certain consummatory values. It
is not only that the Zionist ideology and the struggle for
survival promote a certain conformity in values. Equally
as important is the fact that even those values which are
not shared are likely to be held intensely by their ad-
herents, and the political dialogue to be conducted in

terms Of what are regarded as basic values. Amos Elon

expresses this extremely well:

The word arachim ("values") has always had an im-
portant place in the internal debate. It connotes
near-absolute ideological and moral fixities. Values
are always "basic": "Jewish values," "socialist

 

42See Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in
Israel (London: Cass, 1969), and "The Israeli Army in
Politics," WOrld Politics, XX, 4 (July, 1968), 606-43.

 

 

43See Safran, Op. cit., pp. 127-46; also Georges
Friedmann, The End Of the Jewish PeOple? (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 88-114; Margaret
Plunkett, "The Histadrut: The General Federation Of Jew-
ish Labor in Israel," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, II, 2 (1958), 155-82.

 

59

values," "Zionist values," "moral values," "national

values," "pioneering values," "COOperative values."

Parliamentary records are filled with anxious debates

over sacred "values," to support or Oppose purely

technical or administrative measures. To the uniniti-

ated outsider, traffic control, air pollution, foreign

travel, or television would seem to lie beyond the

SCOpe Of formal ideology; less so to those who debate

such questions in the Knesset.44

Among the most central Of Israel's consummatory
values is the notion Of "unity." This is encouraged by a
number Of factors, including the Zionist ideology itself,
the heritage Of Judaism as religion, and the external
threat to the state Of Israel. A constant tension exists
between the value Of "unity" and the factionalism in
Israeli political reality. But just as it can be shown
that the stress on "values" Often serves as a mask in what
is really a struggle for power, neither the importance Of
ideology generally in Israeli society, nor the stress on
unity, should be underestimated. Throughout the history
Of the Zionist movement, within Israel and outside,
ideology and ideas have played a role Of crucial signifi-
cance. The National Unity Government Of 1967-1970 is only
the most Obvious example Of attempts at institutionalizing
unity.
Only Israel is described by Apter as a system Of

pyramidal authority and consummatory values. We have seen

that cultural, structural, and ideological factors all

 

44Elon, Op. cit., p. 291.

6O

serve tO make Israel a political system Of a very special
nature, one I would wish to designate a mobilization-
reconciliation hybrid, for it combines the aspects Of those
two systems. The develOpment Of certain values associated
with democracy and the belief in political efficacy among
the youth in such a system is the subject to which we now

turn.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF ISRAELI YOUTH

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter I shall present the findings from
a series Of questions asked of a sample Of Israeli youth
concerning the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and
political effectiveness, support for democratic norms, and
support for the party system. The Israeli responses will
be compared with responses tO similar questions asked Of
youth samples in other countries.1 Such a comparison
should allow for greater clarification Of the meaning Of
the Israeli responses.

Fein has previously reported a strikingly low
sense Of political efficacy among Israelis, finding that
Israeli "moderns" show a very high sense Of efficacy about

as Often as do grade-school graduates in the non-Southern

 

lThe cross-national data reported here is from
Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney
Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orien-
tations in Four Western Systems," Comparative Political
Studies, I, 1 (April, 1968), 71-101. See Appendix A for
further details on the samples used in that article, and
on my own sample.

 

61

62

United States. His explanation for this phenomenon tells
a good deal about the Israeli political culture.

The tradition Of civic participation through interest
groups, so powerful in the American tradition, is
hardly developed in Israel. Except for political
party membership, which takes on much Of the same
quality as membership in an American interest group,
there are few organizations through which to channel
political demands. Nor is public Opinion regarded with
the traditional American sensitivity tO the vox populi.
Given the system's ideological propensity, it makes
little sense for politicians to seek their cues from
the voters. Moreover, no Israel politician is so
directly tied to a constituency as his American counter-
part. His base Of support is not his electoral dis-
trict, but his party . . . [T]he specifically low rate
Of efficacy among Eastern immigrants has much to dO
with their expectations Of the political system. TO
many Of them, the very concept Of political efficacy
is alien. When asked how much control they have over
the political world, they are startled: "Of course,"
they imply, "Governmental Officials don't really care
what peOple like me think. Are they supposed to?"2

 

Most findings among pre-adults show that the
belief in political efficacy increases with age. This is
certainly the central finding in Easton and Dennis' study
Of the development Of political efficacy among American
children. Speaking Of political efficacy as a norm, they
see its early development as an important determinant Of
the persistence Of democratic regimes, providing:

a reservoir of diffuse support upon which the system
can automatically draw in normal times, when members

may feel that their capacity to manipulate the en-
vironment is not living up to their expectations, and

 

2Fein, op. cit., pp. 142-43.

63

in special periods Of stress, when popular partici-

pation may appear to be pure illusion or when

political outputs fail to measure up to insistent

demands.3

Contrary to such findings, however, the responses

Of Israeli youth would seem to indicate that they learn
over time that they have little influence over government
decisions and decision makers. For example, Israeli fifth
and eighth graders were asked how much they believed the
Prime Minister, average Knesset member, or Mayor would
care about their Opinion if they were to write him a
1etter--"a lot," Nsome," or "not at all." The following
table shows the responses to these questions:

TABLE 3. Belief in governmental responsiveness among
fifth and eighth grade Israelis.

 

 

Care a Lot Some Not at All
Prime Minister 5th 59% 32% 8%
8th 22 51 26
5th 49 40 ll
Knesset Member 8th 19 52 27
M 5th 55 35 10
aYOr 8th 30 53 16

 

 

3David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's
Acquisition Of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," American
Political Science Review, LXI, 1 (March, 1967), 38.

 

64

There is a consistent decline from grade to grade
for the notion that governmental Officials care "a lot,"
along with a concomitant increase in the belief that they
do not care "at all." If it were only the middle category
that increased between the two age levels, we might be
justified in seeing this as merely a matter Of semantics,
but this is clearly not the case. The general pattern
seen here is a decline in the political efficacy belief
as one is politically socialized in Israel.

A further series of questions was asked Of the
Israeli respondents, which I have divided into questions
dealing with the belief in responsiveness of governmental
Officials and the belief in personal political effective-
ness. The responsiveness questions refer to governmental
Officials, or to citizens in general. Because the re-
spondents are pre-adults, the effectiveness questions
refer to the respondent's parents or family. The distri-
bution Of responses tO these questions is shown in Tables
4 and 5. It might also be noted that in another question
asking whether every vote in an election is important
even when many peOple vote, the Israelis were virtually
unanimous in agreeing (93 per cent Of the eighth graders,
94 per cent Of the eleventh graders).

In order to understand the nature Of these re-
sponses, it will be useful to compare them with findings

reported in the United States, Britain, Italy, and Germany.

65

TABLE 4. Responses Of Israeli youth to items concerning
responsiveness Of governmental Officials.

 

5th Grade 8th Grade 11th Grade
(N=269) (N=292) (N=1021)

 

It doesn't matter what the average person does, he can't
change the decisions of the government, just as he can't
change the weather.

Agree 34% 25%
Disagree 52 63
Don't know, not

ascertained 14 12

In the government there are a few powerful people who
run the whole thing without considering us--the average
citizens.

Agree 21 23
Disagree 68 63
Don't know, not

ascertained 12 14

Israelis have the chance tO express their Opinions about
the way our country is run.

Agree 90 88
Disagree 4 5
Don't know, not

ascertained 6 7

How much does the simple citizen influence which laws are
passed?

Very much 15% 19 16
Some 50 47 49
Not at all 29 32 33

Don't know, not
ascertained 6 2 2

 

66

TABLE 5. Responses Of Israeli youth to items concerning
the political effectiveness Of their parents
or family.

 

5th Grade 8th Grade 11th Grade
(N=269) (N=292) (N=1021)

 

In the decisions Of the government what people like my
parents think is considered.

Agree 46% 31%
Disagree 31 45
Don't know, not

ascertained 23 24

I don't think people in the government care much what
people like my family think.

Agree 52% 33 28
Disagree 21 37 40
Don't know, not

ascertained 27 31 33

My family has no chance to influence the government and its
decisions.

Agree 44 49 58
Disagree 30 29 24
Don't know, not

ascertained 26 22 19

 

67

The comparison will show a rather unique pattern maintain-
ing in Israel. In Tables 4 and 5 the “don't know" and
"not ascertained" responses are reported as uncommitted.
For each country a notation indicates the direction Of
change in response to the question from grade to grade.
Table 6 shows that the belief in governmental
responsiveness is widespread among Israeli youth. Israelis
reject more than do others the notion that a few powerful
men are running the government without concern for the
interests Of the citizenry, and they are quite high
(second only to the Americans) in rejecting the idea that
the government, "like the weather," is immune tO change.
They, along with the Italians, are virtually unanimous in
agreeing that citizens in their country have the chance to
express their Opinions. In reporting these cross-national
findings with which the Israelis are here compared, the
authors Of that article were much intrigued by the nature
Of the Italian response to this question, arguing that the
form of expressive (rather than behavioral) efficacy indi-
cated by it very likely serves to greatly minimize alien-
ation:
Even if a strong sense Of political efficacy does not
take root in terms Of the common forms Of political
participation for a predominant portion Of Italian
youth, there can nevertheless develop a kind Of
"expressive efficacy" orientation which reassures the
Italian Of his political status in giving him the right

to speak, complain, or criticize decisions and authori-
ties.

 

4Dennis, et al., Op. cit., p. 82.

68

TABLE 6. Cross-national responses to items concerning the
belief in governmental responsiveness (percent-
age).

 

a) What the government does is like the weather; there is
nothing people can do about it. (Israeli version--It
doesn't matter what the average person does, he can't
change the decisions Of the government, just as he can't
change the weather.)

 

 

Efficaceous Non-efficaceous
Response Uncommitted Response
Disagree Agree

 

 

fi§§fi§9flflflflefififi§£
8th grade 66 47 47 34 52 14 6 17 21 14 20 47 36 45 34
11th grade 77 58 54 39 63 8 7 ll 8 12 15 35 34 53 25

up up up up up dn -- dn dn -- dn dn -- up dn

b) There are some big, powerful men in the government who
are running the whole thing, and they do not really care
about the rest Of us. (Israeli version--In the govern-
ment there are a few powerful people who run the whole
thing without considering us--the average citizens.)

Disagree Agree

8th grade 74 22 51 35 68 12 17 11 23 12 14 59 37 42 21
IMem4quuiageauaflEflg

EH up 35 up dn up dn -- dn -- up dn up -- --

c) American (etc.) citizens have the chance to express
their Opinions about the way our country is run.
(German version-~In this country one can Obtain a
hearing before the government.)

Agree Disagree

8th grade 78 53 84 49 9O 14 11 6 30 6 8 36 10 21 4
11th grade 82 63 91 58 88 15 7 5 21 7 3 30 3 21 5

up up up up -- -- dn -- dn -- dn dn dn -- --

 

69

TO some extent a similar orientation seems Operative in
Israel, though in contrast to Italians, Israelis also
indicate a high sense Of the comprehensibility and re-
sponsiveness Of government in general, as indicated by the
other questions above.

Nevertheless, Israelis are far from having a
belief in the ability tO influence government, even rela-
tive to the Italians, as the responses to questions con—
cerning political effectiveness, shown in Table 7, indi-
cate.

The response to question "a" in Table 7 shows a
very low agreement among Israeli eleventh graders, and
strikingly, the only case among the five nations where
agreement declines from grade to grade, sizably at that.5
The response to question "b" in this table is notable be-
cause Of the high percentage Of uncommitted respondents
among the Israelis, indicating considerable uncertainty on
this point. This may be understandable, in that the
question bridges to some degree the two dimensions Of
efficacy we have been considering--responsiveness and
effectiveness. The questions in Table 6 show that the

government is felt to be responsive, but here we see that

 

5Had the fifth grade United States and Italian
respondents been shown, the percentages in these instances
would show that effectiveness increases with age in all
countries except Israel. Unfortunately, this question was
not asked Of Israeli fifth graders. The responses previ-
ously shown, however, do indicate a decrease from fifth to
eighth grade.

70

TABLE 7. Cross-national responses to items concerning
political effectiveness (percentage).

 

a) My family has a voice in what the government does.
(Israeli version—-In the decisions Of the government
what people like my parents think is considered.)

 

 

Efficaceous Non-efficaceous
Response Uncommitted Response
Agree Disagree

 

 

 

8th grade 58 44 32 38 46 28 11 17 14 23 14 44 50 48 31
11th grade 59 53 34 50 31 26 12 9 8 24 15 35 57 41 45

b) I don't think that peOple in the government care much
about what peOple like my family think.

Disagree Agree

5th grade 61 53 38 34 21 19 24 25 31 27 20 23 37 35 52
8th grade 62 42 43 29 37 20 22 22 23 31 18 36 35 48 33
11th grade 51 51 56 30 40 23 7 16 19 33 26 42 28 51 28

dn -- up dn up up dn dn dn up up up dn up dn

 

71

when the question refers more specifically to its respon-
siveness to one's own family, the attribution Of respon-
siveness declines. Interestingly, while at the eighth

and eleventh grades the Israelis only exceed the German
respondents in disagreeing with the statement in question
"b," at the fifth grade level they are markedly the lowest.

Israeli youth are clearly low in believing their
parents to be politically effective, and on two of the
three questions dealing with effectiveness (see Table 5)
there is a decline in the belief in effectiveness with
age. The Israeli system seems to produce passive citizens,
relatively confident that governmental Officials are re-
sponsive, but not convinced Of their own ability to
influence policy. This configuration, I have suggested,
may be characteristic Of a working mobilization system, or
a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid.

The difference between the Israeli respondents and
those Of other countries reported here can perhaps be seen
more concisely if we compare the average percentage Of
respondents answering efficaceously in both series Of
questions, and the differences between these averages

(Table 8).6

 

6The percentage Of individuals answering
"efficaceously" on the various questions in each country
studied by Dennis, et al., and in Israel, was tallied,
and an average computed.

72

TABLE 8. Average percentage Of respondents answering
efficaceously to responsiveness and effective-
ness items, and differences between the averages.

 

8th Grade 11th Grade

 

US UK It Ge Is US UK It Ge IS

 

Average responsiveness
percentage 73 41 61 39 70 67 56 64 48 71

Average effectiveness

percentage 4.922.222.2232 2222292122
Difference between the

averages 35 12 33 17 42 30 21 34 21 47

 

In addition to showing, as we have seen, that
Israelis are relatively high on responsiveness and rela-
tively low on effectiveness, this table shows that the
differences between the two dimensions are greatest in
Israel, a difference which increases with age. The in-
congruence between the two dimensions is greatest in
Israel. The table may suggest some modifications in the
model previously develOped, showing as it does a degree Of
incongruence in the United States and Italian samples be-
tween the two beliefs. If the notion Of "expressive
efficacy" as the explanation for the high Italian respon-
siveness percentage is accepted, then the Italian incon-
gruency disappears. Given that the Americans are
relatively high-on both dimensions, the incongruence Of
responses here may be Of less consequence. Clearly the

belief in responsiveness is in every case higher than the

73

belief in effectiveness, suggesting that collective inter-
ests and governmental legitimacy may serve tO raise the
former belief in all countries. But the Israeli pattern
remains unique. Of the five countries, Israeli eleventh
graders are highest on responsiveness, and lowest on
effectiveness.

It is argued that the belief in political efficacy
contributes tO democracy, both in terms Of individual
attitudes and at the system level. Almond and Verba main-
tain that the subjectively competent citizen appears to be
the "democratic citizen," finding subjective competence
related to other democratic orientations.7 Barnes holds
that relatively high levels Of political competence are a
necessary condition Of political democracy, finding one's
level of political competence to be directly related to
his preference for democratic, as Opposed to authoritarian,
styles Of leadership.8 Two indicators Of the more general
democratic orientations Of Israelis may be found in their
support for democratic norms, and their support for the
party system in their country.

A series Of standard questions concerning support

for democratic norms were asked Of the Israeli respondents.

 

7Almond and Verba, Op. cit., p. 257.

8Samuel H. Barnes, "Leadership Style and Political
Competence," in Political Leadership in Industrialized
Societies, ed. by Lewis J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1967), pp. 78-83.

 

74

In Table 9 the responses tO these questions at each grade
are reported.

That Israelis indicate a high level Of support for
democratic norms is clear before any comparison. A com-
parison, however, Of the Israeli response to that reported
on the two questions Of this series also used in the
Dennis, gt_al. article shows the high level Of support
among Israelis even more emphatically (Table 10).

By the eighth grade Israelis are very much in
agreement that democracy is the best form Of government,
and at both the eighth and eleventh grades they show the
highest agreement for any country. This is all the more
interesting as democracy is not a concept that receives
their early attention. Among the uncommitted fifth graders
it was clear that many were unfamiliar with the word
"demokratia." In explaining the British response to this
question, Dennis, gt_31., conclude that the British politi-
cal vocabulary does not stress usage Of the term "democ-
racy."9 TO some extent such an explanation will also serve
for the younger Israelis, who are more likely to have had
stressed for them the idea that they live in a free Jewish

state, than that they live in a democracy.10 Nevertheless,

 

9Dennis, et al., Op. cit., p. 257.

10See Lea Adar and Chaim Adler, Education for Values
in Schools for Immigrant Children in Israel (in Hebrew),
(Jerusalem: The Hebrew University School Of Education,
1965), p. 38; this article is discussed in Kleinberger,

Op. cit., p. 184.

 

 

75

TABLE 9. Responses of Israeli youth to items concerning
support for democratic norms (percentage).

 

5th Grade 8th Grade 11th Grade
(N=269) (N=292) (N=1021)

 

Is democracy the best form Of government?

Agree 38% 86% 89%
Disagree 15 3 4
Don't know, not

ascertained 48 ll 7

Is democracy rule by the people?

Agree 42 87 91
Disagree l8 5 6
Don't know, not

ascertained 40 7 4

Is it correct that in the democratic system Of government
every adult can vote?

Agree 51 86 80
Disagree 18 10 17
Don't know, not

ascertained 31 4 2

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man is
given an equal Opportunity to improve his social con-
dition?

Agree 44 64 69
Disagree 19 18 17
Don't know, not

ascertained 37 17 14

Is it correct that in the democratic system any man can
say things against the government without anything bad
happening to him?

Agree 39 82 79
Disagree 28 15 15
Don't know, not

ascertained 33 4 6

In the democratic system when a majority Of the people
agree on something then the rest Of the people should not
criticize. DO you agree with this definition?

Agree 43 32 10
Disagree 25 57 86
Don't know, not

ascertained 32 12 4

 

76

TABLE 10. Cross-national responses tO two items concerning
support for democratic norms (percentage).

 

a) Is democracy the best form Of government?

 

 

 

Democratic Anti-democratic
Response Uncommitted Response
Agree Disagree

 

 

 

US UK It Ge IS US UK It Ge IS US UK It Ge IS

5th grade 42 26 57 36 38 36 68 23 59 48 19 6 20 5 15

8th grade 58 28 78 58 86 28 64 15 36 11 14 8 7 5 3
llthgrade 1222218219. 22222.12; 1210.22
up up up up up dn dn dn dn dn dn up 35 -- dn

b) When most Of the peOple want to do something, the rest
of the people should not criticize. (Israeli version--
In the democratic system when a majority Of the people
agree on something then the rest Of the people should
not criticize. DO you agree with this definition?)

Disagree Agree
5th grade 9 34 35 21 25 25 15 15 42 32 65 52 50 37 43

8th grade 36 58 44 32 57 26 5 10 31 12 38 36 45 37 32

11th grade 33 47 63 32 86 28 5 6 22 4 38 49 31 46 10

up up up up up up dn dn dn dn dn -- dn up dn

 

77

tO the extent that this interpretation may be valid in
explaining the fifth-grade responses, clearly by the
eighth grade Israelis are overwhelmingly in agreement with
the idea that democracy is the best form Of government.
Regarding the right Of the minority to criticize majority
decisions, the Israeli response is extremely high. Only
in Israel and Italy do a majority Of the Oldest group give
the democratic response, or do more give the "democratic"
response than the "anti-democratic" response. The Israelis
are clearly more supportive Of this norm than the youth in
the other countries shown.

A less extensive comparison is possible for the
other questions in this series, but in every case it is
clear that the Israelis are high in their support for
democratic norms. Table 11 shows the percentage giving
the "democratic response to each Of the four remaining
questions, using findings reported from the United States

and Great Britain.11

 

11The findings from the United States are from
Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Develppment Of Political
Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books,
1968), Table 13, "Changes by Grade in Concept Of Democracy,"
p. 75. For Great Britain see Paul R. Abramson and
Timothy M. Hennessey, "Beliefs about Democracy among
British Adolescents," Political Studies, XVIII, 2 (June,
1970), 24; the findings are from a sample Of twelve- to
sixteen-year-Old children, and are reported by type Of
school rather than grade level. However, even the highest
percentages reported are lower than those found among
Israelis.

 

 

 

78

TABLE 11. Cross-national responses tO four items concern-
ing support for democratic norms (percentage
giving democratic response).

 

US UK Israel

 

a) Is a democracy where the people rule? [Israeli version
--Is democracy rule by the people? (percentage agree-

ing).]

5th grade 36% -- 42%
8th grade 76 31-68 87
11th grade -- 31-68 91

b) Is a democracy where all adults can vote? [Israeli
version--Is it correct that in the democratic system
of government every adult can vote? (percentage
agreeing).]

5th grade 52 -- 51
8th grade 75 43-75 86
11th grade -- 43-75 80

c) Is a democracy where everyone has an equal chance to
get ahead? [Israeli version--Is it correct that in the
democratic system every man is given an equal Oppor-
tunity to improve his social condition? (percentage
agreeing).]

5th grade 50 -- 44
8th grade 83 43-56 64
11th grade -- 43-56 69

d) Is a democracy where you can say anything against the
government without getting into trouble? [Is it cor-
rect that in the democratic system every man can say
things against the government without anything bad
happening to him? (percentage agreeing).]

5th grade 23 -- 39
8th grade 54 35-55 82
11th grade -- 35-55 79

 

79

As is well known, general support for democratic
norms does not necessarily indicate a democratic attitude
in more specific applications.12 Yet, if we compare one
further question asked Of the Israeli sample--"Even people
who Oppose our way Of life have a right to be heard"--
with a comparable question for which we have cross-
national data-~"We should not allow people to make
speeches against our kind Of government"--the Israelis
again show themselves considerably more "democratic."

TABLE 12. Cross-national responses on a specific appli-
cation Of democratic rights (percentage).

 

We should not allow people tO make speeches against our
kind Of government. Democratic response = disagree).
[Israeli version--Even people who Oppose our way Of life

have a right to be heard. (Democratic response = agree).]
Democratic Uncommitted Anti-democratic
Response Response

 

US UK It Ge Is US UK It Ge Is US UK It Ge Is

 

grade 62 56 63 49 87 18 11 8 15 7 20 33 29 36 6

grade 64 77 56 56 9O 18 2 6 11 3 18 21 38 33 7

-- up dn up up -- dn -- dn dn —- dn up dn --

 

 

12See especially James W. ProthrO and Charles M.
Grigg, "Fundamental Principles Of Democracy: Basis Of
Agreement and Disagreement," Journal Of Politics, XXII, 2
(May, 1960), 276-94. Also, among others, Herbert
McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,"
American Political Science Review, LVIII (June, 1964),
361-82.

80

Why the Israeli respondents should be so consis-
tently high in their support for democratic norms is some-
what enigmatic. In a study of education for values in
Israeli schools, it was discovered that civic values
received relatively little attention, certainly far less
than the most prominent value inculcated, that Of national—
ism. TO the extent that concepts which might relate to
democracy were discussed, they were dealt with in the con-
text Of history, and not directly in terms Of civic edu-
cation for the individual students. The authors noted that
concepts such as liberty and equality were not dealt with,
the teacher tending to act as though the student already
knew them. The study did discover, however, that citizen-
ship values were ranked higher by students than the empha-
sis given them in the school would have predicted, indi-
cating that the school is not by itself the only factor
influencing the values Of the pupils.13

Social education receives very little attention in
the curriculum Of Israeli schools. In fact, from the
fourth grade on in primary school it receives one hour a
week. However, the attention given to social education,

or education for good citizenship, is probably best not
seen in the curriculum. It is fostered, rather, through

student government, class excursions, and a variety Of

 

l3Adar and Adler, Op. cit.

81

other activities.14 Furthermore, political discussion is
endemic in Israel, if not so much in schools. Certainly
the avowed purpose Of the state educational system does
include the importance Of democratic norms:
The Object Of State education is to base elementary
education in the State on the values Of Jewish culture
and the achievements Of science, on love Of the home-
land and loyalty tO the State and the Jewish people,
on practice in agricultural work and handicraft, on
chalutzic (pioneer) training, and on striving for a
society built on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual
assistance and love of mankind.15
While there is some evidence that the various
tOpics outlined in the State Education Law are given rela-
tive importance in the order they are listed, it is never-
theless apparent that whether through the direct role Of
the school, or more indirectly from the society as a
whole, a support for democratic norms is inculcated among
young Israelis. This is an important finding, inasmuch as
many Observers Of the Israeli education system have be-
moaned the insufficient attention given to such matters.
It is true that our questions do not allow us to under-
stand the depth Of democratic sentiments among our re-

spondents, but certainly the findings as reported are

reassuring.

 

14See Kleinberger, Op. cit., pp. 155-56.

15State Education Law, paragraph 2, reprinted in

Ruth Stanner, The Legal Basis of Education in Israel
(Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1963),
p. 169.

 

82

We see, therefore, that Israelis are high in their
support for democratic norms and in their belief in the
responsiveness Of governmental Officials, but low in their
belief in personal political effectiveness. I have noted
that there is considerable cynicism in Israel relating to
the party system, and have suggested that the explanation
for the relatively low sense Of personal political effec-
tiveness among Israelis lies in an understanding Of that
system. A number Of questions concerned with support for
the party system were asked Of my sample. That there is
disaffection from the party system will be evident in
these responses, but it is not suggested that Israelis are
Opposed tO party politics, per se. In fact, over 70 per
cent Of the eighth and eleventh graders (78 per cent and
72 per cent respectively) believe it is important that
every citizen support a political party. Nevertheless,
there seems to be a clear dissatisfaction with the exist—
ing party system as currently Operated. The responses to
questions concerning the party system are reported in
Table 13.

While the responses show that Israeli youth do not
as a group believe that the absence Of parties would im-
prove matters, that parties create conflicts where they
otherwise would not exist, or that the parties confuse
issues more than they clarify them, they most clearly do

believe that the conflicts between the parties are

83

TABLE 13. Responses Of Israeli youth to items concerning
support for the party system (percentage).

 

5th Grade 8th Grade 11th Grade
(N=269) (N=292) (N=1021)

 

The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country
more than they help it.

Agree 61% 66%
Disagree 27 23
Don't know, not

ascertained 12 11

Our system of government would work better if we could get
rid Of the conflicts between the political parties.

Agree 73 67
Disagree 18 21
Don't know, not

ascertained 9 12

The situation in our country would be better if there were
no political parties.

Agree 34% 28 21
Disagree 45 60 58
Don't know, not

ascertained 21 12 21

The political parties in Israel create conflicts where in
fact none really exist.

Agree 32 31
Disagree 44 41
Don't know, not

ascertained 24 28

The political parties do more tO confuse the issue than to
clarify it.

Agree 28 27
Disagree 56 52
Don't know, not

ascertained 16 21

Our system of government would work better if there were
only two political parties.

Agree 38 34
Disagree 14 44
Don't know, not

ascertained 48 21

 

84

damaging, and that eliminating those conflicts would im-
prove matters. It might be thought that such a view would
be widespread among young peOple. To some extent we shall
see that this is true, but it is a sentiment even more
widespread among Israelis. The following table compares
the findings reported elsewhere with my findings, on
responses to the statement--"The conflicts among the
political parties hurt our country more than they help
it."

TABLE 14. Cross-national responses to the statement: The

conflicts among the political parties hurt our
country more than they help it.

 

Disagree Uncommitted Agree

 

US UK It Ge Is US UK It Ge Is US UK It Ge Is

 

8th
grade 52 31 26 19 27 26 25 14 26 12 22 44 60 55 61
11th
grade 59 3O 28 33 23 33 23 17 6 ll 8 47 54 61 66

up -- -- up dn up -— up dn -- dn up dn up up

 

It is readily apparent that the United States is
the deviant case here, whereas in the other countries re-
ported the sentiment that party conflicts hurt more than
they help is rather widespread. Given that, however, it
is still the case that in Israel the largest percentage Of
any country is shown agreeing with this statement. This

is even more clear if one considers that, among the

85

eleventh graders, Israelis agree at a ratio Of almost three
to one, as opposed to the Italian and German responses Of
slightly under two to one.

In interpreting the German response, Dennis, §t_31.,
cite Verba on "the tendency in Germany . . . to seek expert
and Objective means Of resolving conflict rather than
allowing the solution to emerge from the confrontation Of
the competing parties--a tendency to find a non-political

16 The disaffection Of

rather than political solution."
the young in Israel from the older ideologies and the
existing parties, their distaste for the Older style Of
political rhetoric (disdainfully referred to as "talking
Zionism"), and their preference for getting things done17
have been frequently noted. The army, in contrast tO the
political system, is likely to be seen as a more effective
model Of decision making. TO some extent this may be seen
in the response to the statement--"The methods Of a poli-
tician are not important if he gets the rights rhings

done"--a statement with which 45 per cent Of the eleventh-

grade Israelis are in agreement. TO some extent, then,

 

l6Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking Of Politi-
cal Culture," in Political Culture and Political DevelOp-
ment, ed. by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 152, note
144, cited by Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 90.

l7"Bitzuism,"--getting things done--is, as Fein
Observes, "one Of the more damning epithets Of Israel's
ideological vocabulary," and one not infrequently directed
at the younger generation. Fein, Op. cit., p. 56.

86

the sentiment attributed above to Germany may have its
counterpart in Israel, at least among the younger gener-
ation.

In interpreting the Italian response, Dennis,
et al., conclude that it less likely indicates a rejection
of the multi-party system itself than "an expression of
disaffection for a system which is unable to effect

agreement among the parties.ul8

Although Israel has not
suffered from the immobility endemic to Italian politics,
such a sentiment appears quite strong in Israel. Some
support for this interpretation is given by the responses
to several other questions. Forty—seven per cent Of the
Israeli eleventh-grade sample disagree with the statement
that most politicians will do the best thing for the state
(an increase from 33 per cent at the eighth grade level),
and 50 per cent agree that "there is practically no con-
nection between what a politician says and what he will

do after he gets elected; most political parties care

only about winning elections and nothing more." And while
53 per cent Of the eighth graders feel that it would be
beneficial to other countries to adopt the Israeli form
of government, only 30 per cent Of the eleventh graders
agree.

What we see in Israel is not disaffection from

competitive politics, but rather from its particular

 

18Dennis, et al., Op. cit., p. 91.

87

manifestation in Israel. The Israeli sees a leadership
exerting, as Fein puts it, "near absolute control over

political life,"19

engaging in the most vitriolic fights,
proclaiming uncompromisable principles which it invariably
finds capable Of compromising. The elitism Of the parties
derives from their ideological backgrounds. While other
countries tend to have only one revolutionary party after
independence, Israel has been more fruitful. The consum-
matory values manifested in Zionism, along with the ex-
ternal threat faced by Israel, serve to provide a sense Of
community and collectivity among Israelis, further enhanced
by the Often expressed sentiment, "We are all Jews." The
fact that it is a small country, whose elites are known,
is also an important factor, as is the wide consensus on
certain basics. All Of these factors promote a belief in
the political responsiveness of governmental Officials, a
belief in the concern Of leaders for the public welfare.
At the same time, however, the nature Of the
party system serves to reduce, or inhibit, the develOpment
Of a belief in political effectiveness among Israelis.
Because Of the nature Of the electoral system ideologies
are represented, but individuals are not; individuals have
no representative, representatives have no constituencies.
Party elites decide policy, and determine who will be the

party's candidates. Local government is Of little

 

19Fein, Op. cit., p. 143.

88

significance, and nO local politician is an independent
agent; he cannot succeed without reliance on the national
party. The party-controlled bureaucracy leads to the

growth Of protekzia, which may result in develOping for

 

some a sense Of "subject competence," but certainly not
Of "citizen competence." While political discussion in
Israel is at a very high level, political participation
is not, and in many respects citizens lack any experience
in democratic politics, either from their life in other
countries, or through participation in Israel. All such
factors converge to reduce the sense Of personal politi-
cal effectiveness in Israel.

What seems tO be missing in Israel is any sense
Of linkage between elites and masses to the effect that
elites should heed public Opinion, or that public Opinion
can influence public policy. With regard tO the roles Of
leadership and followership, the relationship seems some-
what paternalistic. This might be a source Of severe
strain were Israel lacking its mobilization system charac-
teristics. Israel's leaders have tended to be heroic
figures, Often recipients Of respect and admiration
transcending day-to-day political output. It is tolerable
to feel ineffective with leaders of such stature, and in
a system with over-riding collective goals.

Israel's mobilization system characteristics serve

tO promote its unique syndrome Of responsiveness and

89

effectiveness beliefs, and make those incongruent beliefs
acceptable. But Israel is also a reconciliation system in
which individuals develop early a high support for demo-
cratic norms, and an acceptance Of competitive politics.
Naturally, a pOpulation Of such diverse characteristics as
that Of Israel should be expected tO differ internally in
its adherence to these beliefs and norms. In the follow-
ing chapter I wish to discuss some Of the sub-group
differences in the orientations dealt with in this
chapter. In a subsequent chapter I shall focus particu-
larly on a typology Of individuals within the Israeli
system, characterized by the nature Of their beliefs in
governmental responsiveness and personal political

effectiveness.

CHAPTER IV

SUB-GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL
ORIENTATIONS WITHIN THE

ISRAELI SAMPLE

Popular commentaries on Israel's successes fre-
quently attribute them tO the existence Of a homogeneous
and unified pOpulation. Israeli ideology stresses first
and foremost the unity Of its people, but in fact Israel's
population is extremely diverse. This can be seen politi—
cally, when one considers the large number of parties. It
can also be seen in terms of religion, where the differ-
ence between the orthodox and the more secular elements Of
the population is probably the most divisive political
cleavage in Israeli society.1 But the most striking factor
which differentiates Israeli society, and the one that has
perhaps, in the long run, greater potential for conflict
than any other cleavage, is that Of ethnicity. In this
chapter I wish to discuss the different political orien-

tations associated with ethnicity in Israel, and lOOk at

 

lAlan Arian, "Stability and Change in Israeli
Public Opinion and Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly,
XXXV, 1 (Spring, 1971), 19-35.

90

llL‘l [[I‘ . .

91

the role Of socio-economic status, youth movement member-
ship, and course Of study in modifying those differences
among young Israelis.

The basic ethnic distinction in Israeli society
is between Westerners, those of European and American
origin, and Easterners, those Of Asian and African origin.
As Of 1968, Westerners constituted 28.8 per cent of the
Israeli Jewish pOpulation, Easterners 27.2 per cent, and
Israeli-born 44 per cent.2 Friedmann reports, using
earlier data from 1962, that the average age Of Westerners
was then forty-four, Of Easterners twenty-six, and Of
native-born Israelis eight years old.3 Clearly, an in-
creasingly large prOportion Of the native-born are chil-
dren Of Eastern parents. By 1962, for example, over half
Of the Israeli pOpulation under the age of thirty were
Eastern-born or the children of Eastern immigrants, with
the proportion increasing as one goes down the age-scale.
TO use some more recent figures, Of specific relevance to
the research reported here, among students in grades one—

eight during 1966-67, 31.6 per cent were the children Of

 

2Israel, Central Bureau Of Statistics, The Sta-
tistical Abstract Of Israel, 1969, NO. 20, p. 44, Table
B717.

3Friedmann, Op. cit., p. 163. Friedmann's source
is Andre Chouraqui, "Israel au carrefour de l'Orient et de
l'Occident," in Tiers-Monde, October-December, 1962.

 

4Fein, Op. cit., p. 39, Chart II.l.

92

Western fathers, 59.3 per cent the children Of Eastern
fathers, and 7.6 per cent the children Of Israeli-born
fathers. The proportion Of Easterners and second-
generation Israelis increases at the lower grades.5

The differentiation into Eastern and Western is
the standard categorization Of ethnicity used for Official
purposes by the Israeli Central Bureau Of Statistics, for
academic purposes by sociologists, as well as in common
parlance. It is, without doubt, the most salient ethnic
distinction in Israeli society. Nevertheless, it is
essential to recognize that the categorization into East

and West is a gross one, likely tO be misleading if one

 

5Israel, Central Bureau Of Statistics, The Sta-
tistical Abstract Of Israel, 1969, NO. 20, p. 561, Table
S/17. Using this table, with data from 1966-1967, the
class of students that was at the time Of this research,
1969-70, in the fifth grade was 26.2 per cent Western,
62.8 per cent Eastern, and 11.0 per cent second-generation
Israeli; the class that was in 1969-70 in the eighth grade
was 32.7 per cent Western, 58.8 per cent Eastern, and 8.5
per cent second-generation Israeli. The class that was by
1969-70 in the eleventh grade was 39.5 Western, 53.6 per
cent Eastern, and 6.9 per cent second-generation Israeli.
As I shall point out further, these percentages do not
remain by the high school level, however. In 1968-69, Of
the total secondary school pOpulation, 50.8 per cent were
Westerners, 40.3 per cent were Easterners, and 8.9 per
cent second-generation Israelis. For secondary academic
schools the figures are 60.8 per cent, 29.6 per cent, and
9.6 per cent respectively; for vocational schools 37.6 per
cent, 55.4 per cent, and 7.0 per cent respectively. It
should be recognized that these figures dO not differenti-
ate by grade, and that for eleventh graders the imbalance
of Westerners is considerably greater. For a discussion
of the school-leaving problem in Israel see Chaim Adler,
"Secondary School as a Selective Factor, from a Social and
Educational Point Of View" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Department Of Sociology, Hebrew University, 1965).

 

93

assumes that all those in either category are Of a kind.
As Rivkah Bar Yosef Observes:

The accepted definitions Of ethnic groups in Israel
are, for the most part, groundless. TO speak col-
lectively Of the "absorption problems Of immigrants
Of Oriental origin," for example, is senseless, since
there are no "problems Of immigrants of Oriental
origin." The absorption problems Of the Yemenites
differ from those Of immigrants from Baghdad, and
there is no point in speaking Of disturbances of
"North Africans": the term "North Africa" embraces
different elements, each far removed from the next,
including immigrants from Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia,
villagers from the Atlas mountains, town-dwellers
from the suburbs Of Casablanca, and merchants from
Alexandria. There are no doubt common features in
the absorption problems of immigrants from these
various countries, but there is room for generalized
conclusions only if significant differences are not
ignored.6

Notwithstanding the caveat that such a classifi-
cation is an over-simplification, failing to account for
wide variation within the groups, to declare that there are
no "problems Of immigrants of Oriental origin," is no less
overstated. As we shall see serious differences do exist
between the groups, as categorized, on a wide variety Of
matters. Most Of the Easterners are the product of a tra-
ditional society, exhibiting to some degree the character-
istics of such a society. Most Of them have been influ-
enced by Moslem social and cultural patterns, and the
autocratic regimes Of those countries from which they have

immigrated. As Kleinberger states:

 

6Rivkah Bar Yosef, "The Moroccans--Background to
the Problem," in Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef, and Adler, Op. cit.,
pp. 419-20.

94

In that traditional society, the extended family and
the patrilineal kinship group are the main units Of
social interaction and cohesion. The individual's
feeling Of solidarity, sense Of Obligation, and readi-
ness to co-Operate are mainly restricted to his own
kinship group, and are not easily extended to persons
of different descent, far less to impersonal and
anonymous organizations and their rules, laws and
authorities. Political loyalty, tOO, is primarily due
to a person's own kinsfolk. Hence, political divisions
are, more Often than not, based on kinship relations
rather than on ideologies or economic interests. In

a modern polity like Israel, where parties represent
divergent convictions, policies, and interests, this
can easily be exploited by them. If an oriental immi-
grant from a traditional community is Offered a posi-
tion Of some power by a party, his whole kinship group
(or at least his extended family) will vote for that
party.7

Kleinberger goes on to discuss the patriarchal
nature Of such a society, the ascriptive criteria by which
it Operates, and the low degree Of future-orientation, and
concludes:

All these characteristics Of the traditional society

Of Oriental Jews reflect the "primitive" mentality Of
its members which has been conditioned by the prevail-
ing social system. Typical traits Of this mentality
are lack Of rationality and planning, weakness Of
social and intellectual abstraction, adherence to the
familiar and the concrete, magic thinking and super-
stition, inability tO distinguish subjective intentions
from Objective conditions and formal relations, and the
resulting disposition to feel frustrated and personally
offended by adverse circumstances, inability to control
affects and impulses, etc. These are momentous impedi-
ments to scholastic success in a modern, Western-type
educational system.8

 

7Kleinberger, Op. cit., p. 50.

81bid., pp. 50-51.

95

Israeli ideology and policy is very much concerned
with removing these impediments. In attempting to find
solutions to these problems, however, Israeli scholars
have been in disagreement as tO whether the differences
between Easterners and Westerners are to be conceived Of
as culturally based, or as deriving from the relative
status positions Of the groups within Israel. The
different vieWpoints on this question have had consequences
with regard to policy-making in the areas Of immigrant
absorption and integration. One view stresses the cultural
differences between the groups, and argues that:

The ability of the absorbers truly to absorb the new-
comers . . . depends on their ability to perceive the
actual and the potential positive aspects Of the
"other's" mentality, to relativize their own values
and tO understand their own limitations by comparing
their mentality with the assets of the primitive
mentality.9
In contrast to this view, with its emphasis on cultural
relativity, others have minimized the importance Of cul-
tural factors, and tend tO deny the existence Of culturally
distinct ethnic groups. For them the solution does not
involve a recognition Of the relative values of various

cultures, but rather lies in assisting immigrants to

adjust to Israeli society. As one Of them puts it:

 

9C. Frankenstein, "The Problem Of Ethnic Differ-
ences in the Absorption Of Immigrants," in Between Past
and Future: Essays and Studies on Aspects Of Immigrant
Absorption in Israel, ed. by C. Frankenstein (Jerusalem:
Szold Foundation, 1953), pp. 21-22; cited by Kleinberger,

Op. cit., p. 52.

 

96

Even groups hailing from the same country do not see,
in their common origin or in the cultural tradition
therein involved, any important or vital social value.
All Of them, in one way or another, are oriented
towards the Yishuv. . . . We cannot speak Of respect-
ing the values Of a certain group when the group itself
has ceased to respect them, or when it has already
entered the state Of cultural disintegration in its
country of origin.

These comments were made almost two decades ago,

at which time the more avant ggrde approach was to deny the

 

existence Of cultural differences. The thrust of policy
then was towards treating all immigrants as a whole.
However, concern grew over the emergence Of "two Israels,"
one Eastern and one Western, and since about 1959 special
economic, political, and educational policies have been
adopted. This orientation has tended to stress the cul—
tural differences between the two groups, minimizing the
socio-economic aspect, and emphasizing ethnic problems and
ethnic distinctions. The policy direction with regard tO
absorption and integration has never been clear, however;
this is to some extent because Of a conflict between the
desirability Of specific treatment for a sub-group Of the
pOpulation and the prevailing universalistic ideology.

The lack Of clear policy in this area was one factor

 

loJ. Ben-David, "Ethnic Differences or Social
Change?" in Frankenstein, ed., Op. cit.; cited by Klein-

berger, Op. cit., p. 53.

97

contributing to the increasing relation between ethnicity
and occupational status.11
Eisenstadt argues that the tensions and conflicts
which emerged between Easterners and Westerners were not
the result of insufficient absorption, but rather the pro-
ducts Of "partial absorption." Most agencies concerned
with absorption focused on the preparation Of immigrants
for adjustment in Israeli society, and not with continuous
help and guidance. In addition, neither informal groups
nor political organizations contributed much tO the social
absorption Of immigrants; the former became more and more
closed, while the parties, increasingly centralized_and
bureaucratic, viewed the new immigrants primarily as
potential voters.12
The concept Of partial absorption expresses well
the situation Of the major prOportion Of Israel's Eastern
population. While for most Of them their situation in
Israel is better than in their countries of origin, and
while in absolute terms their situation has improved while

in Israel, the differences between Easterners and Western-

ers have increased over time. More ominous is the fact

 

llSee S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). Pp. 197-200. For a dis-
cussion of the educational system's treatment Of this
problem, see Chaim Adler, "Education and the Integration
of Immigrants in Israel," International Migration Review,
III, 3 (Summer, 1969), 3-19.

 

12Eisenstadt, Op. cit., p. 198.

98

that the gaps within the second generation are even greater
than those within the Older generation, by such Objective
measures as income, occupation, level Of education achieved,
and performance in school. Lissak, studying mobility in
Israeli society, has shown that whether measured in terms
Of occupation, income, or education, Easterners are dis-
advantaged, with the gaps increasing over time. But the
differences are very likely even greater than the indices
show, as for example in the case Of income, when one recog-
nizes that Oriental families have more children, being
nearly 60 per cent larger than families Of European origin,
whereas the available measure is monthly family income.13

We have seen earlier some Of the differences in
terms Of educational enrollment, by looking at the percent-
age Of youths Of Eastern and Western origin at different
levels Of the educational system. Another way to make this
point would be to Observe that in 1965, Of persons in the
fourteen to seventeen age group, 59 per cent Of the second-
generation Israelis were in academic secondary schools, 71
per cent Of the children Of Western fathers, and only 11

14

per cent Of the children Of Eastern fathers. Post-

primary education in Israel is neither compulsory nor free,

 

l3Moshe Lissak, Social Mobility in Israel Society
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969), ch. 1,
"Changes in the Stratification System in the Fifties and
Sixties," pp. 8-44.

14£91§.. p. 117, footnote 41.

99

yet over 80 per cent Of primary-school graduates are in
some post-primary school. About 60 per cent Of the entire
fourteen to seventeen age group are engaged in some form
Of education, about half Of whom are in academic secondary
schools. Only about half Of these, however, graduate.
Easterners constitute 50-55 per cent Of the fourteen to
seventeen age group, but as of 1965-66 comprised only 32
per cent Of the post-primary school population, and only
23 per cent of those in academic secondary schools, a
prerequisite for mobility. Certainly, it is reasonable

to assume that by the twelfth grade this percentage has
drOpped again, so that in academic secondary schools
Easterners at the twelfth grade constituted, in the year

reported, about 12-13 per cent.15

The disparity is, Of
course, even greater at the college level, entry to which
requires high school graduation.

As Adler points out, in discussing these problems,
there is a conflict between educational efforts toward
democratization and integration, and the needs Of develOp-
ment and elite formation. But there is no denying that
the selective nature Of the Israeli educational system
produces problems both by excluding a large segment of

the population from elite positions, and possibly incul-

cating elitist attitudes in those few who succeed. Its

 

15Chaim Adler, "The Israeli School as a Selective
Institution," in Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef, and Adler, Op. cit.,
pp. 288-95.

100

role in providing mobility Opportunity for young Eastern-
ers is minimal. And, as Adler Observes, it is logical to
assume that "serious tensions threaten any society in
which ecological concentration, educational failure, cul-
tural lag, and economic and vocational inferiority, all
coincide with ethnic origin."16
While there is evidence Of vertical mobility in

terms Of education, occupation, and income, the gap be-
tween the groups increases Over time, and Westerners are
the beneficiaries. They are, in fact, able to skip steps.
In discussing these findings, Lissak says:

All in all, the Oriental communities, particularly

the new immigrants among them, constitute a very

unstable group, because Of the encounter between

upward and downward mobile groups, and even Of

groups (at the bottom Of the occupational scale)

which are static and despair Of any possibility Of

personal advancement. From various points Of view,

this constellation constitutes an excellent breeding

ground for the development of acute tensions, which

can be expressed both on an individual and on a
collective level.17

Israel's ethnic problem is not simply one Of social
mobility as measured by various objective indices. It is
also very much a problem Of social integration, and Of the
subjective feelings Of individuals. There is a ranking
Of ethnic groups in Israel which is a source Of frustration

and disaffection among lower-ranked groups. TO be

 

l6Ibid., p. 296.

l7Lissak, Op. cit., p. 44.

101

identified with a particular ethnic group is a way Of
being identified with a particular status: "ethnic groups
are ranked differentially, and belonging tO one or another
group has great social meaning. A person's name, his
accent, the cut Of his clothes, the shade Of his skin--all
of this (and more) is perceived, catalogued, and there-

fore reacted to."18

One's rank, in this sense, is deter-
mined by his similarity tO the veteran European settlers:
[T]aken as a whole, to be of European descent is
widely recognized as lending higher prestige. For
example, research conducted in an ethnically mixed
housing project showed not only that Europeans in the
project ranked highest, and Moroccans lowest, but also
that Moroccans concurred in grading themselves low
and Europeans high.19
Cohen's study Of Kiryat Gat, which was concerned
with the perception Of the village's stratification system
by Eastern and Western youth, showed a tendency for Eastern-
ers to see a "caste picture," an image Of a hierarchy with
two groups, differentiated by length Of stay in the country
and ethnic origin. This image is in contrast to such
alternatives as a non-hierarchical, multi-group image in
which groups differ in terms Of their ethnic origin, or
a hierarchical image focusing on economic criteria, alter-

natives which Westerners were more likely to choose than

than Easterners. Very likely this caste image describes

 

l8Alex Weingrod, Israel: Group Relations in a New
Society (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 39.

 

19LOO. cit.

102

the View Of many Easterners toward the national political
system.20 In another study, concerned with stratification
concepts among urban youth, Easterners saw more likelihood
of mobility possibilities, while Eastern youth were more
pessimistic, with a majority responding that possibilities
are either few or non-existent. The study furthermore
reported that these images affect mobility aspirations,
and suggested that such views are likely tO influence
expressions Of political protest on the political level.21
By Objective standards as well, the problems Of
social integration are apparent. For example, although
length Of residence increasingly replaces the criterion Of
ethnic origin in regard to inter-group marriage patterns,
such marriages remain relatively rare. In terms of resi-
dential patterns, the percentage Of Easterners in the
established cities and in Older settlements is much smaller

than their percentage in the total population, while in the

new cities and new urban settlements the reverse situation

 

20E. Cohen, L. Shamgar, and Y. Levy, Research
Report: Absorption Of Immigrants in a Development Town,
the Hebrew University, Department Of Sociology, 1962, re-
ported in Eisenstadt, Op. cit., pp. 223-26, and Lissak,

op. cit., p. 64.

21Lissak, "Trends of Occupational Choice Amongst
Urban Youth in Israel," the Hebrew University, Sociology
Department, 1962 (mimeographed, in Hebrew), reported in

Lissak, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

103

exists. Even within the big cities, the pattern of resi-
dential segregation is quite clear.22
The differential social situations of Easterners
and Westerners have their political ramifications. It must
be recognized that ethnicity has not become a crucial
political variable in Israel, certainly not in the way
that religion is central. Although ethnic lists have
been formed for national elections, they have met with
limited success, and have not endured. But it is true
that at the national level the major parties have differ-
ent ethnic bases, and in local elections the emergence of
ethnic lists is not infrequent. Lissak refers to the
phenomenon among Easterners of "conspicuous identification
with Opposition parties," most observable in the fact that
Herut is based mainly on the following Of Easterners.23
Herut is currently the dominant partner in the Gahal
alliance referred to earlier, a permanent Opposition party
except during the three years of the National Unity Govern-
ment. The fact that Herut receives much of its support
from Easterners should not be misconstrued, for it is not

the case that most Easterners support Herut; most, rather,

identify with Mapai (or the Labor Party).

 

22Lissak' OE. Cite, pp. 51-620

231bid., p. 76.

104

In addition to this identification with the oppo-
sition among many Easterners, the emergence Of local
ethnically oriented lists is another pattern Of protest
among Easterners. Such lists may seek their support from
all those of the same country Of origin, or from Eastern-
ers in general. Not infrequently they are the result of
an individual's dissatisfaction with his situation within
an established party, which he identifies as the problem
of his ethnic group. They may be designed primarily for
bargaining purposes within one of the established parties.
The major parties do not wish to see ethnicity become an
issue, and therefore try to avoid the creation of such
lists. Still, such lists do emerge in the smaller,
ethnically concentrated, communities. The extent to which
they are truly an ethnic phenomenon, or merely a ploy in a
larger political game, varies with each situation. In
discussing the not unrelated phenomenon Of split-ticket
voting in Israel, Arian and Weiss minimize the role Of
ethnicity as a causal factor, but it is nonetheless clear
that local lists, the existence of which promote split-
ticket voting, are Often ethnically oriented.24

Lissak argues that local elections are a better

indication of dissatisfaction than identification with

 

24See Alan Arian and Shevah Weiss, "Split-Ticket
Voting in Israel," Western Politicalguarterly, XXII, 2
(June, 1969), 375-89. I am indebted to Professor Efraim
Torgovnik for sharing with me his insights on ethnic
voting in local elections.

 

105

opposition parties, for in such situations the candidates
are known and the issues are more concrete. The two
phenomena, taken together, along with the occasional out—
burst of spontaneous protest by Easterners, suggest to him
the possibility of a separate political orientation among
Easterners developing.25 The patterns Of mobility dis-
cussed above indicate that Easterners have not achieved
serious bargaining positions, and thus their major strength
is in their numbers, which is a source of potential politi-
cal power.

Lissak holds that the increasing gap between the
groups on such matters as income, education, and occu-
pation, with the accompanying disparity in terms of power
and prestige, is a potentially dangerous situation, and he

observes:

In View of the increasing identity between voting and
class-ethnic consciousness, there is no escape from
the conclusion that a significant part Of these elites
has taken the path of political-ethnic-class struggle,
either in the framework of Opposition parties or in
independent ethnic lists. Those relatively mobile on
the economic, educational, and occupational levels are
the ones who emphasize the political aspect of the
struggle; they are extremely disillusioned by the im-
possibility of translating their achievements into real
political power on the one hand and diffuse prestige
on the other, and feel, more than others, the relative
olygarchization Of the power elite of Israeli society.
. . . [T]he changes in the stratification system of
the Oriental communities have led to the growth of

a movement (mainly latent) which demands changes in
the whole stratification structure. . . . There is no
doubt that the intensification of such an orientation
might increase particularistic identifications, focus

 

25Lissak, op. cit., pp. 75-76, 99-100.

106

diffuse feelings Of deprivation around specific

problems and turn latent aggression into open hos-

tility. . . . Symptoms of this trend can already be

found now and they might gain more ground with the

increasing impatience to shorten the way to key

positions.26

The likelihood of an increasing identification with

ethnicity for political purposes will, of course, depend
on a number of factors. If mobility channels become more
Open, we can expect that this will largely defuse the
possibilities. If, however, status positions and ethnicity
continue to coalesce, the likelihood of ethnicity becoming
a central issue will increase, with the possibility Of its
exploitation by skillful politicians a very real one. As
with all problems in Israel, the solution to this problem
lies in the hands of Mapai, both in its governing role,
and in its political handling of the problem through re-
cruitment. Beyond that, of course, it will depend on the
political beliefs and values of Easterners--on the extent
to which they are willing to see ethnicity as an issue,
and with regard to the means for solution Of social and
political problems which they regard as legitimate. Thus
their beliefs in responsiveness and effectiveness, as well
as their support for the party system and for democratic
norms, may be useful in giving an indication Of the course
which might be taken.

The political orientations of the Older generation

of Easterners are known to differ from those of Westerners.

 

26Ibid., p. 111.

107

I have previously pointed to their especially low sense of
personal political effectiveness, even within the Israeli
context. Fein reports that Easterners tend to "prefer a
strong one-man leadership to a competitive party system

. . . are relatively insensitive to civil liberties, and

27 He is quick

they express little interest in politics."
to point out, however, that this is not related to any
lowered sense of allegiance, or feeling Of alienation from
Israel itself. On the whole, the responses of Easterners
seem to derive less from any rejection of the political
system, than from non-involvement and insufficient experi-
ence with democratic politics. Thus the Easterner is not
in a satisfactory situation to serve as an effective agent
for the inculcation of democratic values, a role which the
state through its educational system has attempted to ful—
fill.

It is to the new generation of Easterners that we
would wish to look for evidence on this matter. The older
generation is not skilled enough to wage battle, nor does
theory suggest that they should be the most likely to feel
the deprivation. It is the younger generation, which
knows no society but Israel, that has neither standard
for comparison nor reason to tolerate a disadvantaged

situation. Although those Easterners in secondary school

 

27Fein, op. cit., p. 114.

108

represent a distinct sub-set Of the Eastern pOpulation of
their age-group, they may be regarded as the future elite
Of the Eastern pOpulation, perhaps even those most likely
to be frustrated subsequently, and there is therefore

special interest in their political orientations.28

The analysis which follows focuses on the responses
of eleventh-grade Israelis. It centers on four indices,
the construction of which is discussed in Appendix A: the
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness, the Index
of Belief in Political Effectiveness, the Index Of Support
for the Party System, and the Index of Support for Demo-
cratic Norms. It may be useful at the outset to point out
the distributions on these indices at both the eighth
grade and eleventh grade levels. This is shown in Table
15.

Differences exist between the two grades on the
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness, and the Index
of Support for Democratic Norms. In discussing earlier
the questions which compose the Index of Belief in
Political Effectiveness we have observed the decreasing
belief in political effectiveness with age among Israelis.
However, while eleventh graders tend to be lower on this

index, they are higher on the Index of Support for

 

28See Appendix A for a discussion of the sample
used here, and its limitations.

109

TABLE 15. Distribution on four indices among eighth and
eleventh grade Israelis.

 

 

8th Grade 11th Grade
(N=292) (N=1021)
Index of Belief in High 30% 35%
Governmental Medium 38 36
Responsiveness Low 32 29
100% 100%
Index of Belief in High 42 34
Political Medium 39 39
Effectiveness Low 18 27
99%* 100%
Index Of Support High 35 33
for the Medium 32 32
Party System Low 34 35
101% 100%
Index of Support High 28 36
for Democratic Medium 40 36
Norms Low 32 28
100% 100%

 

*In this and subsequent tables, totals Of

101% are due to rounding.

99% or

110

Democratic Norms. This is true even though we have seen
that, as a group, Israelis are relatively high in their
support for democratic norms, even at the eighth-grade
level. On the indices of Belief in Governmental Respon-
siveness and Support for the Party System, no differences
exist between the two grades.

. Among the eighth graders differences exist be-
tween children Of different ethnic origin on three of the
indices, as is shown in Table 16.

While Westerners do appear to be higher on the
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness than Eastern-
ers, the difference is not of great magnitude. They are,
however, clearly higher in their support for democratic
norms than Easterners of their age. As a very large per-
centage of the Easterners are approaching the end Of their
compulsory education at this level, this finding is cause
for concern. The low level of support for democratic norms
among eighth-grade Easterners indicates that they do not
become familiar with these concepts at home, nor is the
educational system highly successful in making up for this.
Since the eleventh-grade Easterners we shall be dealing
with constitute a rather specific sub-set of the Eastern
pOpulation of their age-group, we cannot generalize to
those Easterners who do not continue in the educational
system, but the finding here suggests that they are likely

to maintain a low level of support for democratic norms.

111

TABLE 16. Distribution of eighth grade Israelis on four
indices, by father's birthplace.

 

 

West East
(N=l89) (N=102)
Index of Belief in High 33% 26%
Governmental Medium 38 38
Responsiveness Low 29 36
100% 100%
Index of Belief in High 43 41
Political Medium 34 49
Effectiveness Low 23 10
100% 100%
Index of Support High 33 37
for the Medium 26 40
Party System Low 40 23
99% 100%
Index of Support High 35 15
for Democratic Medium 38 44
Norms Low 27 41
100% 100%

 

112

Interestingly, on the indices of belief in politi-
cal effectiveness and support for the party system, the
eighth-grade Easterners tend to be higher than Westerners
and second-generation Israelis. This is primarily because
very few Of the eighth-grade Easterners are low on the
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness, and a sub-
stantial percentage of the eighth-grade Westerners and
second-generation Israelis are low on the Index of Support
for the Party System. Based on my previous discussion, it
is likely that the differences on both of these indices are
evidence less of higher effectiveness in the political
system and with the party system among Easterners, than a
greater lack of familiarity with the political process
among them. The findings would seem to indicate a rather
unrealistic appraisal among eighth-grade Easterners, whose
parents surely are less politically effective than are the
parents of Westerners. In fact, the difference between the
two groups is to some extent accounted for by the greater
tendency of Easterners to respond that they "don't know"
to the questions composing the effectiveness index.

At the eleventh-grade level we see that Westerners
and second-generation Israelis are higher on the Index of
Belief in Political Effectiveness, as well as on the
indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and
Support for Democratic Norms. Easterners, however, con-
tinue to be higher in their support for the party system.

The findings are reported in Table 17.

113

TABLE 17. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis On four
indices, by father's birthplace.

 

 

West East
(N=676) (N=330)
Index of Belief in High 38% 29%
Governmental Medium 35 38
Responsiveness Low 27 32
100% 99%
Index of Belief in High 35 30
Political Medium 38 42
Effectiveness Low 27 28
100% 100%
Index of Support High 30 38
for the Medium 35 27
Party System Low 34 35
99% 100%
Index of Support High 39 30
for Democratic Medium 36 36
Norms Low 24 35

99%

101%

 

114

Although the Westerners are slightly higher on the
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness than are Eastern-
ers, the differences are only within the high and medium
levels on this index. The considerable decline among
Easterners between the eighth and eleventh grade levels
is notable, however. They would seem to become more
realistic, and more similar to the Westerners in their
outlook. Similarly, while a difference still exists be-
tween the two ethnic groups on the Index of Support for
Democratic Norms, the difference is greatly reduced from
that at the eighth-grade level. While they are becoming
more realistic, they are also becoming more democratic, it
would appear. The difference, already noted, between the
two groups on the Index of Belief in Governmental Respon-
siveness is even more clear at the eleventh grade. Yet,
in spite of this, eleventh-grade Easterners are, like the
eighth-grade Easterners, higher in their support for the
party system.

One could well expect that the Easterners in
particular would be disaffected from the party system.
Easterners are in very small number among the party elite
in Israel. This survey, in fact, occurred close to an
election in which the relative absence Of Easterners on
the party lists, was, if not an issue, a conspicuous and
much commented upon situation. Nevertheless, we see

greater support for the party system among Easterners.

115

This would suggest that for the more modern elements of
the population the party system is a source of dissatis-
faction because it does not live up to their expectations
in a reconciliation system, while for the Easterners the
party system serves, as in many developing countries, as
the major link to the government itself. It may well be
that for many Of them Mapai is identified with the state
itself. The finding also suggests less familiarity with
democratic politics among Easterners, a view supported by
their lower ranking on the Index of Support for Democratic
Norms.

Nevertheless, it may be that the high level of
support for the party system among Easterners contributes
to their level of belief in political effectiveness.

Given the nature of the Israeli political system, we would
expect a belief in political effectiveness to be associ-
ated with support for the party system. This, in fact,
does seem to be the case, relatively independent of one's
belief in the responsiveness of governmental Officials,

a point to which we shall return in the next chapter.

The belief in responsiveness, in turn, tends to be associ-
ated with support for democratic norms.

Generally, support for the party system in demo-
cratic countries is regarded as akin to a democratic norm
itself. For Dennis, gt_31., the questions used to compose

this index are regarded as indicators of a major democratic

116

theme, that Of pluralist democracy, stressing "the mainte-
nance of organized Opposing political groups and other
means of expression of political alternatives."29 Among
Israelis, however, support for the party system seems to
be unrelated to support for democratic norms, as can be
seen in Table 18:

TABLE 18. Level of support for the party system, by level

of support for democratic norms (Israeli
eleventh graders).

 

Support for Democratic Norms

 

 

 

High Medium Low
(N=368) (N=37l) (N=282)
Support for High 34% 32% 32%
the Party
System Medium 33 33 31
Low 34 35 37
101% 100% 100%

 

There is clearly no relationship between the two
indices. Thus we may say that in Israel lack of support
for the party system is not evidence of an anti-democratic
sentiment, and disaffection from the party system should
not be regarded as evidence of a negative orientation to
competitive politics, per se. Neither is support for the

party system to be taken as necessarily evidence of a

 

29Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 73.

117

democratic attitude. What we find in Israel, taken as a
whole, is relatively widespread support for democratic
norms, coupled with relatively widespread dissatisfaction
with the political party system. Among Easterners in
particular, however, there is both greater support for the
party system than in the population as a whole, and lower
support for democratic norms. In that regard, as in others,
they can be differentiated from the larger Israeli society.
Although ethnic origin is the single most useful
indicator of socio-economic status in Israel, the latter
can also be measured by occupation, and it may be useful
to look at the distribution on our indices by that measure.
Socio-economic status, as measured by father's occupation,
is broken down into three categories, high, medium, and
low, with each category approximating an equal third of
the sample. In the category labeled "high" are those
students who reported their father as being either a pro-
fessional (16.5 per cent), or owner of a large factory or
business (9.4 per cent); the "medium" category includes
those who reported their father as a tradesman (e.g.,
electrician, carpenter, etc.) (13.4 per cent), office
worker (e.g., clerk, salesman) (16.1 per cent), owner Of
a small store (8.5 per cent), or policeman, fireman, or
soldier (2.5 per cent); in the "low" category are those
who reported their father as a laborer, one who works with

his hands (31.1 per cent). Thus in the "high" category

118

we have 25.9 per cent Of the sample, in the "medium" cate-
gory 40.5 per cent, and in the "low" category 31.1 per cent.
The fact that socio-economic status, so measured, is associ-
ated with ethnic origin can be seen in the following table:

TABLE 19. Distribution of respondents on index of socio—
economic status, by father's birthplace.

 

 

 

 

West and
Israel East
(N=672) (N=320)
Index of Socio- High 32.3% 14.1%
Economic Status
Medium 45.1 34.4
Low 22.6 51.6
100.0% 100.1%

 

It is clear that Easterners are disproportionately
located in the low category, and disprOportiOnately miss-
ing from the higher two categories. Thus any attempt to
look at differences by socio-economic status will clearly
be diluted by the factor Of ethnicity. After first look-
ing at the differences by socio-economic status then, it
will be useful to control for ethnicity by socio-economic
status.

The distribution on the various indices of politi-
cal orientations by level of socio-economic status is

shown in Table 20.

119

TABLE 20. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four
indices, by father's Occupation.

 

 

High Medium Low
(N=263) (N=4l4) (N=318)
Index Of Belief in High 40% 38% 29%
Governmental Medium 32 36 40
Responsiveness Low 29 26 31
101% 100% 100%
Index of Belief in High 39 34 30
Political Medium 36 43 36
Effectiveness Low 24 23 34
99% 100% 100%
Index of Support High 32 34 32
for the Medium 35 31 32
Party System Low 33 35 36
100% 100% 100%
Index of Support High 37 39 32
for Democratic Medium 36 36 36
Norms Low 26 24 33
99% 99% 101%

 

120

No major differences exist between the groups, as
categorized by father's occupation, on the indices of
Support for the Party System and Support for Democratic
Norms, although on the latter index there is a tendency
for those Of lower socio-economic status to rank low. The
differences between the groups are on the political
efficacy indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness
and Belief in Political Effectiveness. The major differ-
ence in governmental responsiveness is seen in the low
percentage of low SES individuals who rank high on the
index. On political effectiveness there is a clear
difference at each level of the SES index. Socio-economic
status does differentiate the respondents on political
efficacy, and particularly on the political effectiveness
dimension.

In order to determine the effect of socio-economic
status, independent of ethnicity, it is necessary to con-
trol for each level of SES by father's birthplace. These
distributions are reported in Table 21.

On the Index Of Belief in Governmental Responsive-
ness there is a tendency, particularly evident among those
of low socio-economic status, for Westerners to rank
higher. There is very little difference among Westerners
at the three levels on this index, although low-SES
Easterners are notably different than other Easterners.

Although the SES measure differentiates better on the

121

 

 

 

 

 

 

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122

Index of Political Effectiveness, as noted previously,
low-SES Easterners are again particularly lower than low-
SES Westerners on this index. On the Index Of Support for
Democratic Norms, Westerners are higher than Easterners at
each level Of socio-economic status; while SES does not
seem to differentiate Westerners on the Index of Support
for Democratic Norms, low-SES Easterners are lower than
other Easterners on this index.

An interesting Observation in this table is that
Easterners who rank high on socio-economic status are
slightly less supportive of the party system than high-
SES Westerners. The greater support for the party system
that we have previously noted among Easterners is found
to be among those ranking low and medium on the SES index.
It is very likely this high level of support for the party
system that, among medium-level-SES Easterners serves to
raise their level of belief in political effectiveness to
that of Westerners.

Ethnicity seems to be the primary factor accounting
for differences in belief in governmental responsiveness
and political effectiveness, as well as support for the
party system and support for democratic norms. However,
low-SES particularly decreases the belief in governmental
responsiveness and political effectiveness among Eastern-
ers, and high socio-economic status among Easterners seems

to be associated with the type of disaffection from the

123

party system rather typical of the Israeli population.

The higher the socio-economic status of an Eastern child's
parents, the more like children of Western parents will
his political orientations be, although Easterners at all
levels are less supportive of democratic norms than
Westerners. This suggests that support for democratic
norms comes not so much as a result of greater experience
with the political system but as a result of education,
and such education seems insufficient in the Israeli
school system.

In order to examine the effect of the Israeli
educational system on the development of the orientations
considered here, the respondents can be divided into those
engaged in academic secondary education and those in
vocational education. If the educational system does make
a difference, we would expect to see differences between
those engaged in the two forms of education, as well as
within each ethnic group by type of education. Table 22
shows the distribution of the four indices by type of
education, and Table 23 shows the distributions by type
of education, controlling for father's birthplace.

Although Table 21 shows that academic students
are higher than vocational students on the indices of
Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and Belief in
Political Effectiveness, vocational students are slightly

higher on the Index of Support for the Party System and,

124

TABLE 22. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four
indices, by type Of secondary education.

 

 

Academic Vocational
(N=747) (N=274)

Index of Belief in High 37% 28%
Governmental Medium 35 39
Responsiveness Low 27 33

99% 100%
Index of Belief in High 35 30
Political Medium 37 43
Effectiveness Low 27 26

99% 99%
Index of Support High 31 36
for the Medium 33 30
Party System Low 35 34

99% 100%
Index of Support High 35 39
for Democratic Medium 36 38
Norms Low 29 24

100% 101%

 

125

 

 

 

 

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mm mm mm mm 30s mmmcm>smcommom
sa wm em om sosooz_ seuoosouo>oo
wem was wsm wsa rose as Lesson so xeoes
Asssuzo Loosuzo Aosmnzo Aosmnzo
swam ewes seem some
smc0sumoo> OHEoomom

 

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mo moan mo .moosocw snow :0 mwsoman momma cuco>msm mo cowusnwuumwo .mm msmda

126

surprisingly, on the Index of Support for Democratic
Norms. Table 22 shows that, among academic students,
Westerners are higher than Easterners in their belief in
governmental responsiveness and support for democratic
norms, slightly higher in their belief in political
effectiveness, and lower in their support for the party
system; the same differences are found among vocational
students, except that there is no difference between the
two ethnic groups in their belief in governmental re-
sponsiveness. While "academic" Westerners are higher
than "vocational" Westerners on the Index of Responsive-
ness, there is little difference between the two Eastern
groups on effectiveness, although there is none between
the two Western groups. While the Western groups do not
differ in their support for the party system, Eastern
"vocationals" are more supportive of the party system
than Eastern "academics." Most strikingly, both Eastern
and Western "vocationals" are more supportive of demo—
cratic norms than their "academic" counterparts.
Experience in academic secondary education may
help raise the belief in political effectiveness for
Easterners, and reduce somewhat their support for the
party system to a level closer to that of Westerners.
Being in the two types of educational systems does have
an effect on those orientations most associated with one's

relation to the political system. It seems quite apparent,

127

however, that the academic schools do not serve to develop
a support for democratic norms. It is true, as noted
previously, that Israelis are generally high in their sup-
port for democratic norms, but Easterners are lower than
Westerners and, it appears, the schools do not alleviate
that situation. It may be, in fact, that they serve to
make the situation worse, for vocational school students
are higher in their support for democratic norms, and it

is not likely that this is a result of their school eXperi-
ence.

If not the schools, another possible source for
the development of political orientations is the youth
movement. Before independence schools in Palestine were
run by the various political parties. Following inde-
pendence the state took over education, but the parties
agreed to such educational unification only if they main-
tained alternative access to students through the youth
movements, party sponsored movements which themselves
preceded statehood. Although the youth movements are one
of several types of organizations in Israel, they are the
most significant, with probably one-third Of all youth in
Israel belonging to a youth movement at one time or
another.

Israeli schools are seen as primarily educational

institutions, with the youth movement serving more as the

inculcator of values. Each youth movement has its own

 

128

ideology, although all of them stress Zionism, and in vary-
ing degrees pioneering and preparation for life in a col-
lective settlement. Each does have a unique ideological
position, corresponding to the political party with which
it is affiliated. Betar, for example, affiliated with
Herut, is a right-wing nationalist movement; Bnei Akiva
is a religious youth movement; Hashomer Hatzair (affili-
ated with Mapam), is a left-wing movement, placing the
most emphasis on kibbutz life. Noar Haoved v'Lomed is
affiliated with Mapai, and has a labor orientation, an
orientation largely shared by the somewhat more middle-
class Scouts. Each movement develOps a special style

of life, each stresses solidarity to the group, and dis-
courages individual competition.

The youth movements Operate outside the family,
school, or place of work. The movements have been less
successful in their larger goal of transferring urban
youth to rural settlements than in promoting idealistic
socialism. While intended to serve as vehicles of change,
they have come more and more to articulate common values.
Eisenstadt points out that in the pre-state period "they
constituted a very important--if not 322 most important--
avenue Of identification with some of the major collective

30

pioneering symbols of the society." Over time, however,

the youth movements tended to lose much Of their importance

 

3oEisenstadt, op. cit., p. 256.

129

for most members, and the differences between the youth
movements and the larger youth culture tended to disappear,
although it is still evident at the extremes. The youth
movements were once the main mechanisms of elite-selection
and of the development Of orientations toward the major
collective values of the society. This is no longer the
case, as they have become more and more youth clubs rather
than movements, though there is some evidence that they do
serve as channels of mobility for some Eastern youth.
While they have lost their central role, clearly
a significant proportion of Israeli youth, particularly
high school students, are still members. The youth move-
ments do promote collective values. Adler finds that col-
lective value orientations seem to be characteristic for
Israeli youth, although youth movement membership empha-
sizes that trend.31 Youth movement members do show more
moderate occupational aspirations than others, and are
more inclined than others to intend to live on a kibbutz,
though most expect to do so only for a temporary period.
On the whole Adler finds that youth movement members tend
to share the same values, though they differ on the
"emphasis they put on different elements of the accepted

value system of Israeli youth."32

 

31Chaim Adler, "A Comparative Analysis of Youth
Cultures in Israel" (paper presented to the Seventh World
Congress Of the International Political Science Associ-
ation, Aug. 3l-Sept. 5, 1970), p. 13.

32Ibid., p. 17.

130

In a study of former youth movement members among
university students, it was found that they express more
frequently than others the values advocated by the youth
movements. These differences were mainly in the area of
collective values (e.g., attachment to the country),
rather than individual, or status values. Among Eastern-
ers, however, former members tended to differ mainly on
"individual" rather than "collective" values, with former
members displaying higher status aspirations. The authors
concluded that youth movement membership fulfills differ—
ent functions for persons of different ethnic origin,
perhaps itself giving to the Easterner a kind Of status
which it does not give to the Westerner.33

Table 24 shows the distribution on the four indices
differentiating youth movement members from non-members,
and differentiating between Easterners and Westerners
within each category. It might be noted at the outset
that a smaller prOportion of Easterners than Westerners
in the sample belong to a youth movement, 19 per cent Of-
the former as opposed to 27 per cent of the latter, a point
of some interest in itself.

Youth movement members are clearly higher than

non-members in their belief in political effectiveness,

 

33Rina Shapiro and Eva Etzioni, "The Impact of
Youth Movement Membership on the Values of Israeli Stu-
dents," Megamot, XVII (July, 1969) (in Hebrew).

131

 

 

 

 

 

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mHOQEOZIGOZ mHmQEOZ
ssa ssa
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.ooeseousso

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ImscmuonEoE an .moosocs nsom co mssmman oomum cucm>oso mo casusnsnumso

.wm mqmfifi

132

and in their support for the party system. Little differ-
ence exists between members and non-members in their
belief in governmental responsiveness, or their support
for democratic norms. For Easterners the movements do
seem to have a greater effect; Eastern youth movement
members are considerably higher in their belief in politi-
cal effectiveness than non-members, at a level equal to
Western members, they are higher in their belief in the
responsiveness Of governmental officials, their support
for the party system, and their support for democratic
norms.

It appears that the youth movements are successful
in developing support for the party system, and in develop-
ing a belief in political effectiveness. Moreover, for
Easterners, they do seem to deve10p support for democratic
norms, and a belief in the responsiveness of governmental
officials. Although only a limited number of Easterners
are influenced by the youth movements, those that are seem
substantially affected by the experience.

Support for the party system among youth movement
members is probably of a different nature than the high
level of support we have observed among Easterners. They
are closer to the party system by virtue Of their member-
ship, and this high level of support is associated with
a high belief in political effectiveness. There may well

be a significant difference in the nature of the high

133

level of support for the party system manifested by Eastern
youth movement members and that shown for Eastern non—
members.

Because Of the different orientations Of the various
movements, it may be possible to differentiate the respon-
dents by the type of movement to which they belong. For
that purpose four groups have been formed. The first in—
cludes those affiliated with labor or left-wing parties;
Hashomer Hatzair, affiliated with Mapam; Noar Oved v'Lomed,
affiliated with Mapai, and Machanot Olim, affiliated with
Achdut Ha'avodah, all parties joined together in the Labor
Party. The second group is Scouts, not party affiliated,
but sharing an orientation similar to, though less extreme,
than those movements in the first group. The third group
includes those movements affiliated with religious parties--
Bnei Akiva, Ezra, and Noar Haoved Hadati. The fourth group
includes those movements affiliated with right or centrist
parties: Noar Zioni, affiliated with the Independent
Liberals; Noar Oved Leumi, affiliated with the Liberals;
and Betar, affiliated with Herut (the latter two parties
now joined in the Gahal alliance). Table 25 reports the
distribution on the indices among youth movement members,
as categorized above. .

The belief in governmental responsiveness is
clearly related to the relative influence of the parties
with which the youth movements are associated. Inter-

estingly the Scouts, not affiliated with any party, are

134

 

 

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woos woos woos woos
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-wrosm -uonms

 

.ocmuu ucoEm>OE cusoa an moospcs HSOM co cOHusnsnumso .mm momma

135

highest on this index. Nevertheless, it is clear that
those in movements affiliated with the dominant coalition
partners, the Labor Party and the religious parties, see
governmental officials as more responsive than do those
associated with the right and centrist parties. The
latter group is largely made up of individuals belonging
to Betar, a movement associated with the Herut party,
which except during the existence of the National Unity
Government, has been in perennial Opposition. The Labor
Party affiliates are also highest in their belief in
political effectiveness, along with the Scouts. Though
higher than non-members on this index, both the religious
and right-centrist movement members are lower than the
Scouts and Labor Party affiliates.

Surprisingly, the highest group on the Index Of
Support for the Party System is the Scouts, a rather
inexplicable finding. Among the other movement members,
there is little difference between the Labor and Religious
groups, with the Right-centrist group slightly more moder—
ate than either of the former; less of them are in the
high category, but less Of them are in the low category
as well. The findings throughout this study on support
for the party system would seem to suggest that the topic
does have different meanings for different groups. It
may well be that both those closest to and farthest away
from the political system are the most disaffected, for

different reasons.

136

Most Observers would not expect the Right-centrist
group to be the most supportive of democratic norms. Herut,
in particular, is Often considered to be an anti-democratic
party. Yet this group, though not entirely composed of
Herut-affiliated youth, is strikingly the most supportive
of democratic norms, followed by the Scouts. Both the
Labor and Religious affiliated youth are actually slightly
lower in their support Of democratic norms than non-youth
movement members. It would appear that the Right and
Centrist movements, and the Scouts are most successful
in promoting democratic norms. This is certainly an

appropriate tOpic for further study.

We have seen in this chapter that Israeli youth of
Western origin tend to be higher than those Of Eastern
origin in their belief in governmental responsiveness,
belief in political effectiveness, and support for demo-
cratic norms, while the Eastern youth are more supportive
of the party system. We have seen that Easterners of low
socio-economic status, as measured by father's occupation,
are particularly low in their belief in governmental
responsiveness, in political effectiveness, and in their
support Of democratic norms, while Easterners of higher
socio-economic status have a raised belief in governmental
responsiveness and political effectiveness. Moreover,

Easterners of high socio-economic status are more like

137

Westerners in their level of support for the party
system.

One's level of belief in governmental responsive-
ness and in political effectiveness, and his support for
the party system, are evaluations of the system and of
one's own relation to the system. In this sense, the
higher belief in responsiveness and effectiveness among
Westerners, and among those Of higher socio-economic
status, is understandable. The higher level Of support
for the party system among Easterners, I have suggested,
is probably explained more by lack of familiarity with the
system than by success with it, and in their support for
the party system they may actually be indicating their
support for the state. This high support may also indi-
cate an inability on the part of many Easterners to see
alternatives to the existing party system.

Easterners in academic education, and Easterners
who belong to youth movements, are more likely to be
similar to Westerners in their political efficacy beliefs.
Experience with these institutions, and particularly the
youth movement, does seem to make a difference for them.
However, the difference between the two groups in their
support for democratic norms seems to be less affected.
If we can assume that support for democratic norms is
less a product of experience, and more one of learning,

in contrast to the other indices, the evidence seems to

138

show that Easterners are disadvantaged in learning these
norms in their home environment. Nor are these norms
developed in academic secondary education. The youth
movements do seem to have some effect in developing these
norms among Easterners, but Easterners are still not
raised to the level Of Westerners.

If support for democratic norms is a product of
learning, then it seems that the schools must do a greater
job of developing these norms among Easterners. This must
be done at the primary level, as is particularly evident
when we consider the striking differences between Eastern-
ers and Westerners at the eighth grade level on this
index. For many Easterners this is the only real oppor-
tunity they have to develop democratic norms. If in
addition to other differences between the two ethnic
groups, this difference also develops, the future of
Israeli democracy may be jeOpardized. It has already
been pointed out that the older generation of Easterners
is lower in its support for democratic norms and for the
institutions of democracy, and when we see this continuing
in the younger generation it is cause for concern. This
is all the more true when it is realized that the sample
reported here involves a specific sub-set of the Eastern
population, a sub-set we may expect to be more supportive

of democratic norms than other Easterners.

CHAPTER V

A TYPOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE ISRAELI SYSTEM:
THE EFFICACEOUS, THE INDIVIDUALIST, THE

COLLECTIVIST, THE ALIENATED

In Chapter I a typology of political systems was
developed, based on the relationship between the beliefs
in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness
posited to be "rational" in each system. The purpose of
such a typology was to explain variation between political
systems in this relationship in accordance with their
variation in structure and in values. Israel was found to
be a system in which a high belief in governmental
responsiveness is associated with a low belief among indi-
viduals in their political effectiveness, a configuration
which I have argued is a result of Israel's characteristics
as a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid. In the Israeli
system certain consummatory values are highly important,
and serve to promote the belief in governmental responsive-
ness, emphasizing as they do collective interests.
Structurally, Israel is a reconciliation system of sorts,

but one which reconciles the interests of centralized,

139

140

hierarchical parties. One consequence Of this is a low
belief among Israelis in their personal ability to influ-
ence government.

The typology of political systems suggests an
explanation for modal patterns of the political efficacy
belief within types of political systems, and an explanation
for incongruence between the beliefs in governmental
responsiveness and political effectiveness. Within each
type Of political system we can also differentiate indi-
viduals by the degree to which they belieVe in the
responsiveness Of government Officials and in their own
political effectiveness. In Israel the belief in govern-
mental responsiveness should vary with the individual's
degree of acceptance of the system's collective goals; his
belief in political effectiveness should vary with his
acceptance of those goals as his personal goals, or his
ability to satisfy non-collective individual interests.

We may therefore conceive of four types of individuals in
Israel, as shown in Figure 3.

The efficaceous individual is one who believes the

 

government to be responsive, and believes himself (or his
parents) to be politically effective. Such an individual
is highly oriented to the system's collective goals, and
tends to identify his personal, individual goals with those

of the collectivity. His Opposite, the alienated indi-

 

vidual, neither believes the government to be responsive,

nor does he see himself (or his parents) as politically

141

Belief in Governmental Responsiveness

 

 

High Low
Belief in High Efficaceous Individualist
Political
Effectiveness Low Collectivist Alienated

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 3. Four types of individuals in the Israeli
system, as characterized by belief in govern-
mental responsiveness and belief in political
effectiveness.

effective. Collective goals are not relevant for him, and
do not compensate for his belief that he cannot achieve
his personal interests through political action.

It is important to note that alienation is con-
sidered to be associated with both a low belief in
governmental responsiveness gpd_a low belief in political
effectiveness. My suggestion is that in a mobilization
system, a mobilization-reconciliation system such as
Israel's, alienation is not simply associated with a low
belief in political effectiveness. An individual low in
that belief need not be alienated if he is highly oriented
to the system's collective goals. we have seen that, for
the Israeli sample taken as a whole, a low belief in
political effectiveness is the standard, and there is no
evidence that this is indicative of alienation. Thus the

collectivist, an individual who believes the government

 

to be responsive but does not see himself (or his parents)
as politically effective, is one highly oriented to the
collective goals Of the system, and who sees his own

individual interests as subordinate to, or perhaps

142

identical with, the collective interests. Such an indi-
vidual sharply differentiates the system's collective goals
from his individual goals.

Neither is alienation simply associated with lack

of belief in governmental responsiveness. The individualist

 

does not see the government as responsive because he is not
oriented toward the collective goals of the system, but he
does see himself as politically effective, because he is
able to satisfy his own individual interests. Like the
collectivist, the individualist also sharply differentiates
his individual goals from the collective goals, but places
less emphasis on the achievement of collective interests
than on the achievement Of his own interests.

Taking the indices of Belief in Governmental
Responsiveness and Belief in Political Effectiveness,
described earlier, I have differentiated these four types
in my sample of Israeli eleventh graders. In the effi-
caceous category 186 respondents are located, in the
individualist category 49, in the collectivist category
40, and in the alienated category 132. Although these are
the extremes within the sample, it needs to be recognized
that their differences on these indices are matters of
degree rather than of kind. Thus the efficaceous and
collectivist categories include individuals who believe
more in the responsiveness of governmental Officials than

do the individualists and the alienated, while the

143

efficaceous and the individualists believe more in their
parents' political effectiveness than do those in the
collectivist and alienated categories. I do not suggest
that the differences are between those who do and those who
do not have a given belief. Futhermore, if these cate-
gories were to be created on a cross-national basis, the
collectivist category would be the largest cell in the
Israeli sample. Dealing with the Israeli sample alone
this is not the result, for that sample has been divided
into three levels on each of the indices, but in a sense
those designated as collectivists may be regarded as the
extreme cases Of what is typical for Israelis as a whole.

In order to observe some of the characteristics
differentiating the individuals in these categories
(besides those characteristics which define them), the
relative proportion of individuals in each category by
ethnicity, socio-economic status, type of secondary edu-
cation, and membership or non-membership in a youth
movement is shown in Table 26.

Table 26 indicates that Westerners are dispro-
portionately among the efficaceous and collectivists and
Easterners disproportionately among the individualists
and alienated, reflecting the differences we have seen
between those groups in the larger sample on the belief in
governmental responsiveness. There is a tendency for

lower socio-economic-status to be associated with the

144

 

 

 

 

 

 

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on mm mm so am smnsmzncoz
om ms ms mm sm HmoEmz
ucmEm>oz cusow

Asmosnszoos smmsuszoo Acouszsos smonszoos Ammsuszoos
mm mm mm mm om schsomoo>
mm mm me so om Ossmomod
soocom mo mama

Amomnzowoo lamsuzowoos Aoouzowsos Aoouzowsos Lowsuzowoos
mm so mm mm mm 30s
so mm mo mo so Edsomz
em as mm mm mm rose
mmm

sooosnszsos Ammsuszoos soonszoos soouszoos somsnszoos
mm om mm mm hm ummm
wwo wow wmh wmo wmn ummz
musossnum

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sauce
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.momsmcuuso m.umcumw mp .mmosommu homosmmm smosussom as msmSOs>socs .mm msmme

145

alienated cell, while those in the higher-SE8 group are
disproportionately among the efficaceous and individualists;
among the individualists and collectivists there is a
disproportion Of medium-SE8 individuals. Academic students
are disprOportionately among the efficaceous, vocational
students disproportionately among the collectivists.

The most striking Observation is that youth
movement members are disproportionately among the indi-
vidualists, with non-members disproportionately among the

collectivists. We have seen previously that youth movement

membership does promote the belief in effectiveness more
than the belief in responsiveness. Among youth movement
members there seems to be a tendency to believe in politi-
cal effectiveness whether Or not one believes in govern-
mental responsiveness, while among non-members there is a
tendency not to believe in political effectiveness
regardless of one's belief in governmental responsiveness.
If the youth movements do promote collective goals
and a belief in governmental responsiveness it is not
evident from Table 26, especially when one notes that youth
movement members are disproportionately among the indi—
vidualists. The only possible explanation for this
phenomenon would seem to be our knowledge that the
different movements have differential influences (see

Table 25). This explanation seems to be of some utility.

146

 

 

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woo woos wsos woos woo
msl MMI. ml: .mm: .mmn wmsuwcoouuoosm
sm om mo om mm moosossom
mm mm mm b om muooom
wow wow wow wos wmm soosupooos
OHQEMW Umumcmflad umfl>fluumHHOU #mHHMDmOfiKVflUGH mSOOOMUHmmm
souoe

 

smosussom as msmsps>socH mcofim

.mmOsommu momosmmm

wumosme ucmsm>os coco» mo cosuesssmms .nm msmsa

147

Although cell sizes are considerably reduced, Table 27
shows the youth movement trend among the youth movement
members in our typology of individuals.

Although the numbers in these cells tend to be
quite small, the table suggests some interesting possi—
bilities. Members Of the Labor Party-affiliated youth
movements are found to be somewhat disproportionately among
the efficaceous, and very much unrepresented in the
individualist sector; this is also true of the Scouts, a
group which promotes values similar to those of the Labor-
affiliated youth movements. Members of the religious
movements are found to be disproportionately among the
individualists and collectivists, and not highly among the
efficaceous. It would appear that members of these
movements are the most likely to differentiate between
individual and collective goals. Members Of religious
youth movements are both more likely to see the government
as responsive and their parents as politically ineffective,
or the government as unresponsive and their parents as
politically effective, than members of other movements.
This may stem from differences among members Of such
movements in the nature of their religious beliefs, and
more specifically in their expectations of the government
on behalf of religious interests. A disproportionate
percentage of the individualists do report their families

to be "religious" (20 per cent, the same percentage as

148

that among the alienated, as opposed to 11 per cent Of the
efficaceous and 10 per cent of the collectivists), while a
disproportionate percentage of the collectivists report
that their parents are "traditional" (53 per cent, as
Opposed to 43 per cent, 45 per cent, and 46 per cent of
the efficaceous, individualists, and alienated, re-
spectively). It is probably the case that those reporting
their families to be religious would prefer greater
religious influence in government, and therefore see the
government as unresponsive. The efficaceous are the least

religious, 46 per cent claiming that their parents are not
religious" (as Opposed to 29 per cent, 38 per cent, and
33 per cent Of the individualists, collectivists, and
alienated, respectively). The differences among the
groups in religious orientation are shown in Table 28.
The members Of the different youth movements do
have differing orientations toward responsiveness and
effectiveness. Of greatest interest is the fact that among
the right-centrists we find the lowest proportion of
individualists, no collectivists, and a disproportionate
number of the alienated. Members Of these movements tend
not to see the government as responsive, though some of
them do see their parents as politically effective. The
lower proportion of youth movement members in the col-
lectivist category than might be expected can in part be

explained by the absence of members of right and centrist

movements from that category, and their greater proportion

149

 

 

 

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em mm mm ow oo moosossom ooz
oo oo mm mo mo smc0susomse
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smuoa
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I III! I‘ll-fl III. III

150

among the individualists and the alienated, a reflection of
the fact that the government is in many respects unre-
sponsive to their interests. It is also partly accounted
for by those religious movement members in the individualist
category, who similarly do not see the government as
responsive to their interests.

The seeming lack of difference between youth
movement members and non-members on the belief in govern-
mental responsiveness is therefore in part due to the fact
that the political orientations of the movements differ,
so that the members Of different movements rationally
evaluate the responsiveness of governmental officials
differently. Beyond that explanation may be the fact that
the youth movements do not, for the most part, stress
wider values different from those Of the larger society,
so that members cannot be as sharply differentiated from
others in the society on their collective orientations, as
might once have been the case.

It is nevertheless true that those labeled as
collectivists are most strongly oriented toward the
society's ideological goals, while those labeled as indi-
vidualists are least oriented to those goals. Evidence
for this can be seen in Table 29, reporting the responses
to three questions relating to Zionist ideology.

The collectivists are virtually unanimous in

agreeing with the central tenet of the Zionist ideology--

"The Jews Of the world constitute a nation and not only a

 

151

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152

religion"--a statement with which the individualists are
considerably less in agreement. In sharp contrast to the
other groups, the individualists are considerably less
likely to agree that "It is the duty of all Jews in the
world to immigrate to Israel." Similarly, the individu-
alists are least likely to anticipate living on a kibbutz
or moshav, or in a development town, with the collectivists
very slightly more than others to so anticipate. The
efficaceous follow the collectivists in their acceptance

of the ideology, with the alienated somewhat more likely
than the individualists to accept the ideology. The key
question in Table 29 is the first, with which collectivists
are found most in adherence and individualists least, and
in which the groups clearly differ by their belief in the
responsiveness of government Officials.

It has been argued that political efficacy is a
characteristic of the democratic citizen, as has been
pointed out in Chapter I. The belief of an individual in
his political effectiveness is, however, a product of his
relationship to the structure of the system, whatever form
that structure may take. An individual may judge himself
to be effective, but not regard the system as democratic.
Similarly, I have noted previously that there is no
necessary relationship between the responsiveness of a
system and its democratic nature. However, if responsive-

ness is considered by individuals to be a trait of

153

democratic governments, then we may expect that the more
one sees his government to be responsive, the more
democratic he is likely to be. Thus, in a system where the
belief in political effectiveness is low, as a result of
structural characteristics, it may well be that the belief
in governmental responsiveness is associated with demo-
cratic orientations.

We have seen in Chapter III that support for
democratic norms is high among Israelis, while support for
the party system is relatively low, and I have noted (see
Table 18) that support for democratic norms is unrelated
to support for the party system. Here I would like to
suggest that there is a relationship between the high
belief in governmental responsiveness and the high support
for democratic norms, as well as a relationship between
the low belief in political effectiveness and the low
support for the party system. If this is so then we
should find relatively high support for democratic norms
among the efficaceous and the collectivists, and relatively
low support for those norms among the individualists and
the alienated; we should also find relatively high support
for the party system among the efficaceous and the
individualists, and greater disaffection from the system
among collectivists and the alienated. This is presented

schematically in Figure 4.

154

Belief in Governmental Responsiveness

 

 

 

 

 

 

High Low
Efficaceous: Individualists:
Democratic norms-- Democratic norms--
High High Low
Belief in Party System-- Party System--
Political High High
Effectiveness
Collectivists: Alienated:
Democratic norms-- Democratic norms--
Low High Low
Party System-- Party System--
Low Low

 

 

 

FIGURE 4. Hypothesized nature of support for democratic
norms and support for the party system among
four political efficacy types.

That these hypothesized relationships in fact
exist is shown in Table 30.

That the efficaceous are high on both indices, and
the alienated low, is not surprising. But clearly the two
dimensions Of political efficacy cut differently, with the
collectivists higher than the individualists in their
support for democratic norms, and the individualists
higher than the collectivists in their support for the
party system. It is those who believe themselves (or in
this case, their parents) to be politically effective, who
are more supportive of the party system. The belief in
responsiveness, although widespread among Israelis, is
clearly related to support for democratic norms.

These findings indicate that my previous discussion
of the low support for democratic norms among Easterners

may be incomplete. I then suggested that support for

 

155

 

 

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156

democratic norms, as distinct from the other orientations,
may be derived from learning rather than experience.
Perhaps, however, the lower support for democratic norms
among Easterners is also related to their lower belief in
governmental responsiveness, a belief itself associated
with their less strong identification with the collective
ideological goals. This is indeed conjectural, but a
possibility Of some interest.

The fact that we see here political effectiveness
to be related to support for the party system would seem
to support my previously stated view that support for the
party system is of a different nature among Easterners
than Westerners, for their support for the party system
tends to co-exist with a lower belief in political effec-
tiveness than that found among westerners. There is
probably a greater tendency among Westerners to identify
the state with certain goals and values, while for
Easterners the state is identified with certain parties
and leaders.

A number Of other responses indicate further the
differences between our four groups. Thus the efficaceous
and the collectivists tend to be more confident in the
government, less skeptical of politicans, more tolerant
of Opposition, and more "constitutional," as can be seen

in Table 31.

157

 

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158

The tendency of the individualists to agree that
the methods of a politician are not important (71 per cent
agree), and their greater tendency to believe one strong
leader would be better for the country, are indeed
striking. If it is true that both the collectivists and
the individualists differentiate between collective and
individual goals, but in different ways, we see here that
there are consequences to the difference. There is a
strain Of what might be called authoritarianism, or at
least Machiavellianism, among the individualists. Lacking
an identification with the collective goals, and presumably
to some extent with the collectivity as a whole, they are
less democratic than others. They support the party
system because they are effective in it, not because they
are democratic, for as they say, the methods of a poli-
tician are not important if he gets the right thing done.
Even the alienated do not agree with that, but neither do
they support the party system.

The individualists and the alienated seem generally
to be more pessimistic, less hopeful, and less prone to
change than the efficaceous and the collectivists. This
can be seen in the responses to a series Of statements,
all of which differentiate clearly between the high and
low responsiveness groups. These are shown in Table 32.

The really striking difference between the groups
on the questions in Table 32 is with regard to human

nature. A majority of the individualists (65 per cent) and

159

 

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160

the alienated (52 per cent) agree with the statement that

"You can't change human nature,‘ while a majority of the
efficaceous and the collectivists disagree. This is not
simply a'difference in degree, but a difference in kind.
The differences shown in this and the previous table are
clearly systematic, and indicate that the belief in
responsiveness is associated with a wide range Of orien-
tations.

One difference between the groups is in the degree
to which they see a generation gap in Israeli society and
in their own families. In general eleventh-grade Israelis
do see a societal generation gap, though they tend not to
see this in their own families. Nevertheless, there are
differences between our groups, as shown in Table 33.

The collectivists are the least likely to see a
societal generation gap, with the alienated most in
agreement that such a gap does exist. But this seems to
be, on the part of the alienated, a generalization from
their own experience, for they are also the most likely to
agree that their Opinions differ from those of their
parents. In contrast few of the efficaceous consider their
opinions to differ from those of their parents. Inter-
estingly the individualists are somewhat more likely to
see a societal gap than the collectivists, but less likely
to differ from their parents. It is also interesting that

while the collectivists are almost as likely to differ

161

 

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162

from their parents as the alienated, they are far less
likely to see a societal gap.

It is somewhat difficult to see in these responses
a pattern which would explain the differences between the
four groups. A possible explanation may lie in the
observation that the younger generation tends to be less
ideological than its elders. Thus the alienated especially
are disaffected from the society's goals, and from their
parents who tend to support those goals, while the
efficaceous are less disaffected from the society's goals,
and in general agreement with their parents. The col-
lectivists are most in agreement with the society's goals,
and their tendency to differ from their parents suggests
that they may believe they support those goals more than
do their parents. The individualists are less supportive
Of the society's goals then the collectivists, differing
from their parents whom they see as more supportive of
those goals. Clearly the data does not allow for a
definitive answer.

Nevertheless, there is on the whole a consistency
to the differences between the four groups. Those high
in their belief in governmental responsiveness are more
democratic, more tolerant, more positively oriented towards
government and politicians, and more favorably oriented to
change; those high in their belief in political effec-

tiveness are more supportive of the party system. It

163

might be noted that the latter are also less interested in
politics than the former, as shown in the distribution Of
these groups on an Index of Political Interest.

Our major concern in all of this, however, is with
that group we have labeled as collectivist. We have seen
that this group, despite its low belief in political
effectiveness, is neverthless highly democratic, tolerant,
positively oriented towards government, politicians, and
change, and politically interested. We may, therefore,
conclude that in a system such as Israel's an identification
with collective goals, rather than a sense of political
effectiveness, per se, can serve to develop the democratic
citizen. It is no less true, of course, that for those
who do not identify with the collective goals, political
effectiveness is not itself sufficient to develop demo-

cratic orientations in such a system.

164

 

 

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smuoe

 

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

In this study I have attempted to theoretically
distinguish two dimensions of political efficacy, the belief
in governmental responsiveness and the belief in political
effectiveness. It has previously been suggested that
democratic stability may require these to be congruent.

I have suggested, however, that for political systems
emphasizing consummatory values, belief in governmental
responsiveness may essentially refer to collective goals,
and if these goals are widely accepted a low belief in
political effectiveness may be tolerable. we have seen
that this configuration is indeed found in the case of
Israel, a political system which I have described as a
mobilization-reconciliation hybrid.

It has Often been suggested that the belief in
political efficacy is a characteristic of the democratic
citizen. If this is generally so, a qualification is
necessary for the case of Israel, where a low belief in
political effectiveness co-exists with high support for

democratic norms. This is true for Israeli youth as a

165

166

whole, and it is true within the Israeli sample as well.
Among Israelis it is specifically the belief in govern-
mental responsiveness which is associated with democratic
orientations. The belief in political effectiveness is
associated with support for the party system. However,
no association exists between support for the party
system and support for democratic norms, and it seems
clear that support for the party system is not itself to
be identified as a democratic orientation in Israel, as
it has Often been interpreted for other countries.

Contrary to findings elsewhere, the belief in
political effectiveness among youth Israelis tends to
decrease with age. If it is possible to say that political
efficacy in Israel provides a reservoir of diffuse
support for the political system, the reference must be
specifically to the belief in governmental responsiveness.
It is this belief which is widespread among Israelis, and
associated with the system's legitimacy.l

Differentiating young Israelis by ethnic origin
we have seen that the belief in governmental responsiveness
is higher among Westerners than Easterners. The differ-
ences between these groups on political effectiveness are
not as great. The Easterners are higher in their support

for the party system. It may be, I have suggested, that

 

1Compare with Easton and Dennis, op. cit.

 

lvl ‘ ll

. (I. .l ..Illll[ I

167

among Easterners the parties serve as the major link to
the system, while among Westerners the state is identified
more with values and goals articulated in the Zionist
ideology. The Easterners respond more to the "party of
solidarity“ characteristics of the Israeli parties which
they view favorably, while the Westerners respond more to
the "party of representation" characteristics, which they
regard as unsatisfactory.

If this line of thinking has validity, then the
support for the party system found among Easterners is a
product of their client relationship to the parties,
serving to raise their belief in political effectiveness.
They are less concerned with the ideologies expressed by
the parties, or that of the state. Consequently their
belief in governmental responsiveness is lower than that
found among westerners.

Improved socio-economic status and membership in
a youth movement serve to raise the beliefs in govern-
mental responsiveness and political effectiveness among
Easterners, both of which have less effect among Westerners.
Experience in academic, rather than vocational, education
has little effect on the efficacy beliefs of Easterners,
although westerners in academic education are clearly
higher in the belief in governmental responsiveness than
westerners in vocational education.

The academic secondary schools seem to have little

effect in changing the political efficacy beliefs of

168

Easterners. These beliefs derive from experience with the
political system, and not education, per se. Support for
democratic norms, however, may be assumed to be promoted
through education, but in fact support for democratic
norms is lower among academic students, both Eastern and
Western, than among vocational students. It seems clear
that greater emphasis in the curriculum should be given to
the concept of democracy.

There is evidence that democratic orientations can
derive from a belief in governmental reSponsiveness. The
fact that this belief is high among Israelis generally
does promote support for democratic norms, but the fact
that Easterners are lower on both of these indices
suggests the need for giving greater attention to the
concept of democracy in Israeli schools. Easterners are
disadvantaged in their familiarity with the concept.
Considering that our Easterners represent a specific sub-
set Of the Eastern population, this problem is surely
considerably greater than the data indicate.

Israel faces a number of problems, none greater
than the possible develOpment of a confrontation between
Eastern and western segments of the pOpulation. Recent
events have shown that the emergence of such a confron-
tation is not at all unlikely. Obviously, the avoidance
of this development will depend on the extent to which the
problems associated with ethnic difference are resolved.

But in the process of solving those problems, it will be

169

important that the representatives of various interests
have a commitment to democratic politics, all the more so
if those whose commitment to democracy is less also

believe less in the responsiveness of governmental
officials, and accept less the consummatory values of the
system. Israel's ability to deal with external problems
has been augmented by those very characteristics which will
help it in resolving its internal problems, if these
characteristics are equally found in all segments Of its
population.

As the importance of ideology decreases in Israel,
and as the consummatory values which promote belief in
governmental responsiveness become less salient, the nature
of the party system will need to change. Greater attention
to individual interests will be required. Clearly, these
changes are already occurring, though the rate of adap-
tation may be unsatisfactory to meet particular problems
as they arise. Easterners constitute a segment of the
population for whom the ideology and its collective goals
are less salient, and the satisfaction of their interests
must be met before serious problems arise. Those for whom
collective interests are less salient require greater
satisfaction of their individual interests. That
Easterners tend to support the party system, or are at
least less disaffected from it than might be expected,
will certainly be useful in bringing about required

changes.

170

All this suggests that the characteristics which
in Israel permit incongruence between the beliefs in
governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness
are the products of unique circumstances. These circum-
stances are undergoing change in Israel itself, and the
likelihood of their occurrence elsewhere is slim. Israel
is very likely an exception to the general rule that these
beliefs should be congruent for the stability of demo-
cratic government.

The secular-libertarian and sacred-collectivity
models delineated by Apter refer to two distinct lines Of
political theory. Some theorists, notably Rousseau, have
tried to link these. Yet, it would seem to be no coinci—
dence that pyramidal authority tends to be associated
with instrumental values and hierarchical authority with
consummatory values. Modernizing nations may attempt to
link hierarchical authority with instrumental values, but
the experience Of modernization suggests that either the
values or the authority structure will likely change.

Israel's linkage of consummatory values and
pyramidal authority would seem to be unique. Dorothy
Willner suggests that Israel differs from other new states
in that in addition to being a new state it is also a new
society, and that "the creation of both state and society
was made possible and legitimated by the prior existence

of an identity rooted in ancient Jewish nationhood and

171

maintained through religion. . . . "2 Israel is not a

new state originating from an old society. Thus, Willner

continues:

The specific factors made possible by the sequence from
'national identity' to 'state' to 'society' seem to
include: (1) sufficient centralization of national
authority; (2) sufficient resources for generating

and maintaining both programs Of action and the
organizational units for putting into effect and
sustaining these programs; and (3) sufficient soli-
darity among most of the population who joined in the
formation of the new society to enable Israel, as a
consequence, progressively to realize its national

goals."

It has been suggested that political development
involves essentially six crises which must be met in order
for a society to become a modern nation-state: the crises
of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation,
integration, and distribution.4 Pye observes that in
continental Europe, and in most new states of Asia and
Africa, these crises have tended to appear simultaneously,
in contrast to the experiences of England and the United
States, and he Observes that:

The efforts to raise the standards of living in [Asia
and Africa] are in large part related to creating

feelings of basic loyalty to the nation, and this
procedure raises the question of how stable such

 

2Willner, Op. cit., pp. 3-4.

3Ibid., p. 4.

4See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Develop-
ment (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 19667} pp- 62-66.

172

states can become if their citizens' sense of identity
is tied too closely to the effectiveness Of particular
policies.5
Israel too has its identity crises, which emerges
with such issues as "Who is a Jew?" But these crises
have little, if anything, to do with loyalty to the state.
Precisely because this crisis has not affected Israel,
the other crises have been relatively minimal in signifi-
cance as well. Israel may face the possibility Of an
integration crisis, but it comes relatively well prepared
to meet it. Crises of national identity and integration
tend to be much more difficult problems elsewhere in the
developing world.6 They lead much more directly to
governmental ineffectiveness or authoritarianism.
It is disheartening to suggest that perhaps other
countries can imitate Israel's situation only as the result
of war. As Coser has stated, "conflict with out-groups

7

increases internal cohesion" and "defines group

 

51bid., p. 67.

6For discussions of these problems see especially
Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in 919
Societies and New States, ed. by Clifford Geertz (New York:
THe Free Press,71963), pp. 105-157; and Myron weiner,
"Political Integration and Political Development," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and SOCIEI
Science, CCCLVIII (March, I965L, 52-64, reprinted in
Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political
Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1966), pp. 551-62.

 

7Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict
(New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 87.

 

173

8 and it is no coincidence that as an example

structure,"
he refers specifically to the role of anti-Semitism in
increasing Jewish solidarity.9 For Israel as a nation this
function has been served by Arab enmity. The historical
background of the Jews and of the Zionist movement suggests
that Israel might have developed similar institutions and
values without the external threat from its neighbors, but
if so it is less likely that the same could occur for
other nations with different backgrounds.

I have attempted throughout this study to link the
concept of political efficacy, usually related to aspects
of political participation, with such larger concerns of
political science as system structure, normative values,
and political development. Hopefully, the interaction
between concepts derived from the study of political
behavior (micro-politics) and our larger concerns with
political systems (macro-politics) can serve to benefit
the development of theory in both directions. Ideally,
both those whose primary concern is micro-politics and
those who focus on macro-politics will find that their
orientations are inseparable, with increased understanding
in one area depending upon a recognition of the contri-
butions which the other has to make. For this study,

clearly, no understanding of the political efficacy

 

81bid., p. 95. 91bid., p. 110.

174

configuration in Israel could have emerged without a
consideration of the nature of Israel's political system,

and of its differences from other systems.

SELECTED BI BLIOGRAP HY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramson, Paul R. "Political Efficacy and Political
Trust Among Black Schoolchildren: Four Expla-
nations." Unpublished manuscript, April, 1971.

, and Hennessey, Timothy M. "Beliefs About
Democracy among British Adolescents." Political
Studies, XVIII, 2 (June, 1970), 239-42.

Adar, Lea, and Adler, Chaim. Education for Values in
Schools for Immigrant Children in Israel.
Jerusalem: The Hebrew University School of
Education, 1965. In Hebrew.

Adler, Chaim. "A Comparative Analysis Of Youth Cultures
in Israel." Paper presented to the Seventh World
Congress of the International Political Science
Association, Aug. 31-Sept. 5, 1970.

. "Education and the Integration of Immigrants
in Israel." International Migration Review,
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. "Secondary School as a Selective Factor, from

a Social and Educational Point of View." Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology,
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. "The Israeli School as a Selective Institution."
Integgation and Development in Israel. Edited by
S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef, and.chaim
Adler. Jerusalem: Israeli Universities Press,

1970.
Akzin, Benjamin. "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democ-
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Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef, and
Chaim Adler. Jerusalem: Israeli Universities
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, and Dror, Yehezkel. Israel: High-Pressure
Planning. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University

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N

176

Albert, Jeffrey. "Constitutional Adjudication without
a Constitution: The Case of Israel." Harvard
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Almond, Gabriel, and Coleman, James S. The Politics Of
the DevelOpinngreas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1960.

 

Almond, Gabriel, and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture:
Political Attitudes and Democracyyin Five Nations.

 

 

Princeton, N.J.: Prificeton University Press,
1963.
Antonovsky, Aaron. "Political Ideologies of Israelis."

Amot, NO. 7 (1963). In Hebrew; English trans-
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Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago:
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Jillil

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Israeli data reported here are from my sample
of fifth (N=269), eighth (N=292), and eleventh graders
(N=l,021), aged 10, 13, and 16 respectively. Data was
collected between November, 1969 and April, 1970. The
fifth and eighth graders are from Netanya schools, the
eleventh graders from Netanya (N=697), Tel Aviv (N=215),
and Beersheba (N=109). Obtaining permission to do research
in Israeli schools is a troublesome undertaking. In this
regard, Kleinberger refers to the "intolerance of criticism
. . . reflected in the suspiciousness of the Minister of
Education and Culture towards independent educational
research, and in his attempt to subject research carried
out in schools to censorship by his officials so as to
prevent publication of inconvenient facts and conclusions."1
In doing this research, it was necessary to obtain per-
mission from the Ministry of Education and Culture, then
the director of the local school district, and then indi-

vidual principals, a time—consuming and ardous process.

 

lKleinberger, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

183

184

It may be of interest to note that the time between my re-
quest to the Ministry and approval from the Ministry was
ten months.

All this leads to the fact that the findings
reported here are not based on a random sample. It is
difficult to state how representative the sample is, and
in fact it is difficult to know what a representative
sample in Israel would look like. Netanya, a city of
60,000, was selected for several reasons. It is urban,
and therefore representative of the fact that over 80 per
cent of the Israeli population is urban. It is an
established city, rather than a development town (that is,
its existence pre-dated statehood), with a population mix
of persons of Western and Eastern origin. As pointed out
in the text, the Israeli high school is a selective
institution in which Easterners are under-represented, and
primarily to increase the number of Easterners in the
sample, additional high schools in Tel Aviv and Beersheba
were selected.

The fifth and eighth grade samples include all
students in those grades in three Netanya primary schools,
each school varying in ethnic composition. For example,
among the eighth graders, one of these schools is 65.6 per
'cent western, 25.3 per cent Eastern, and 9.1 per cent
second-generation Israeli; the second is 54.1 per cent
western, 36.9 per cent Eastern, and 8.1 per cent second-

generation Israeli; and the third is 14.8 per cent

185

western, 81.5 per cent Eastern, and 3.7 per cent second-
generation Israeli. The latter school in particular is
composed of those in the lowest socio-economic status
category. The eleventh grade sample is a bit more complex:
60.8 per cent of the eleventh graders are Western,
32.8 per cent are Eastern, and 6.5 per cent second-
generation Israeli. This clearly does not adequately
represent the proportion of Easterners in the population
as a whole, nor in the secondary school population as a
whole. This is despite the fact that a number of the
respondents are from religious high schools, and a
vocational school, where the proportions of Easterners are
higher than in the academic secondary schools. We cannot
know to what extent these respondents represent the
secondary school population of Israel as a whole, even
less to what extent they represent the total population of
their age group. The sample does include all eleventh
graders in Netanya during the academic year of 1969-70.

It seems justifiable to say that the sample is,
if anything, more likely to be interested in politics,
supportive of democratic norms and of the party system,
and to believe in governmental responsiveness and political
effectiveness, than their cohorts not in school. The
respondents come from Netanya, an established city with a
sizable Eastern population; Tel Aviv, the country's
metropolis; and Beersheba, a development town highly

populated by persons of Eastern origin. While they are

186

representative of much of Israeli society, they do not
represent less well-developed areas, where the situation
of Easterners is aggravated in many cases by isolation
from Westerners. They do not represent at all the rural
population, a very small though sociologically interesting
section of the population.

For purposes of ethnic comparison westerners and
second-generation Israelis have been grouped as Western,
because of the very small number of second-generation
Israelis, and the lack of theoretical justification for
differentiating between these two groups. The nature of
the socio-economic status, type of school, and youth
movement differentiations are discussed in the text.

The data used for cross-national comparisons in
Chapter III are from samples of American, British, German,
and Italian youth, as reported in Jack Dennis, Leon
Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political
Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four western

Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (April, 1969),

 

pp. 71-101. The samples for these countries are described
in the original article. In each case there are three
age-groups: The American sample involves fifth, eighth,
and eleventh graders; the German sample is divided into
three age groups--9-10, 11-13, and 14-15; the Italian
sample is of 10, 13, and 16 year olds; and the British

sample is approximately 8—9, 12-13, and 14-15. Not all

187

the questions reported in the Dennis article which I have
used were asked of Israeli fifth graders. In the com-
parative tables a notation indicates the direction of
difference from the youngest to the oldest group in each
country.

Five indices have been constructed for the
Israeli sample: Support for Democratic Norms; Support for
the Party System; Belief in Governmental Responsiveness;
and Political Interest. Each is based on a series of
questions, with the respondent receiving two points for
a "positve" answer, one point for a "Don't Know" response,
or where no answer was given, and zero points for a
"negative" response. The respondents were then divided
into thirds as nearly as possible, creating for each
index a high, medium, and low category.

Scaling was attempted without success. It might
have been possible to achieve acceptable scaling had the
"Don't Know" and no answers been eliminated, but this was
felt inadvisable. The case of no answer is rare, and
"Don't Know" was considered a legitimate alternative. A
factor analysis was run which indicated, very much in
accordance with expectations, which questions composed the
indices of Political Interest and Support for the Party
System. It also indicated a Political Efficacy factor,
in accordance with expectations, and these questions were
subdivided into an Index of Belief in Governmental

Responsiveness and an Index of Belief in Political

188

Effectiveness, as these notions are developed in the text.
The Index of Support for Democratic Norms follows similar

usage elsewhere.2

 

2Timothy Hennessey, "Democratic Attitudinal Con—
figurations Among Italian Youth," Midwest Journal of
Political Science, XIII, 2 (May, 1969), 167-93.

 

189

Index of Support for Democratic Norms
Is democracy the best form of government? (Agree = 2)
Is democracy rule by the people? (Agree = 2)

Is it correct that in the democratic system of government
every adult can vote? (Agree = 2)

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man is
given an equal opportunity to improve his social condition?
(Agree = 2)

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man can
say things against the government without anything bad
happening to him? (Agree = 2)

In the democratic system when a majority of the people
agree on something then the rest of the people should not
criticize. Do you agree with this definition? (Disagree
:2)

§_g 11th

0= 0 o
1= 1 o
2= 1 o
3: 3 o
= 1 3
= 1 10

= 17 21

= 17 25

= 35 145
9: 18 78
10: 89 245
11: 28 126
12: 81 368

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

 

 

8th Grade 11th Grade
High (12 points) 81 (28%) 368 (36%)
Medium (10, 11 points) 117 (40%) 371 (36%)

Low (1-9 points) 94 (32%) 282 (28%)

190

Index of Belief in Governmental
Responsiveness

 

 

It doesn't matter what the average person does, he can't
change the decisions of the government, just as he can't
change the weather. (Disagree = 2)

In the government there are a few powerful people who run
the whole thing without considering us--the average
citizen. (Disagree = 2)

Israelis have the chance to express their opinions about
the way our country is run. (Agree = 2)

How much does the simple citizen influence which laws are
passed? (Very much=2; some=l; not at all=0)

8th 11th
0= 0 10
= 1 16
= 17 61
= 22 63
4= 52 142
5= 61 174
6= 50 196
7= 55 269
8= 34 90

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

 

 

8th Grade 11th Grade
High (7-8 points) 89 (31%) 359 (35%)
Medium (5-6 points) 111 (38%) 370 (36%)

Low (0-4 points) 92 (32%) 292 (29%)

191

Index of Belief in (Parent's) Political
Effectiveness

 

 

In the decisions of the government what peOple like my
parents think is considered. (Agree = 2)

I don't think people in the government care much what
people like my family think. (Disagree = 2)

My family has no chance to influence the government and
its decisions. (Disagree = 2)

8th 11th
0= 31 144
1= 23 130
2= 68 245
3= 47 154
4= 74 207
5= 17 67
6= 32 74

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

 

 

8th Grade 11th Grade
High (4-6 points) 123 (42%) 348 (34%)
Medium (2-3 points) 115 (39%) 399 (39%)

Low (0-1 points) 54 (19%) 274 (27%)

192

Index of Support for the Party System

 

The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country
more than they help it. (Disagree =2)

Our system of government would work better if we could get
rid of the conflicts between the political parties.
(Disagree = 2)

The situation in our country would be better if there were
no political parties. (Disagree = 2)

The political parties in Israel create conflicts where in
fact none really exist. (Disagree = 2)

The political parties do more to confuse the issue than to
clarify it. (Disagree = 2)

Our system of government would work better if there were

only two political parties. (Disagree = 2)

8th 11th

0: 17 49
= 5 29

= 22 93

= 13 71
4= 42 115
5: 26 100
= 47 136
7: 19 95
8= 47 122
= 11 55
10: 27 95
ll: 4 9
12= 12 52

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

 

 

8th Grade 11th Grade
High (8-12 points) 101 (35%) 333 (33%)
Medium (5-7 points) 92 (32%) 331 (32%)

Low (0-4 points) 99 (34%) 357 (35%)

193

Index of Political Interest

I discuss problems of the state with my parents.
(Frequently=2; sometimes=l; very rarely=0)

Are you interested in reading and discussing what happens
in the government? (Very interested=2; somewhat inter-
ested=l; not at all interested=0)

I discuss with my parents about elections and parties.
(Frequently=2; sometimes=l; very rarely=0)

I read about politics in the newspaper, and follow the
news on radio and television. (Most of the time=2; some
of the time=l; very rarely=0)

I speak with my friends about politics. (Frequently=2;
sometimes=l; very rarely=0)

 

11th Grade

= 7
= 11
= 26
= 58
= 88
5= 195

6= 185
7= 173

8= 120

= 103
10= 55

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

 

11th Grade
High (8-10 points) 278 (27%)
Medium (6-7 points) 358 (35%)

Low (0-5 points) 385 (38%)

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questionnaire includes all questions
asked of the fifth, eighth, and eleventh grade respondents.
Notations indicate which questions were asked at each
grade. Not all questions in the questionnaire were used

in the analysis reported here.

194

195

QUESTIONNAIRE

Part A:

1. Are you a boy or a girl?
Boy

Girl

2. How old are you?

3. Do you have any older brothers?
Yes, if yes, how many?

NO

4. Do you have any older sisters?
Yes, if yes, how many?

NO

5. Do you have any younger brothers?
Yes, if yes, how many?

NO

6. Do you have any younger sisters?
Yes, if yes, how many?

No

196

7. Mark the two main reasons that cause you to be proud

to be an Israeli:

___Israelis are the most generous people in the world
‘___Israel is a beautiful country

___Israelis can choose their leaders

___Israelis have freedom

___The government of Israel

Zahal (The Israeli Defence Forces)

8. Which of the following characteristics best describe
the Israeli people? Choose two.

___Courage
__pFidelity
___Intelligence
___Self-sacrifice
___Happiness
___Strength

Chuthah (arrogance)

Questions 9-34 asked of fifth and eighth grades only

9. Choose two from the following list which symbolize best

the government in our country.
___Police

___Voting

___Knesset

___Prime Minister

Flag

10.

11.

12.

13.

197

Before you are a number of opinions of students re-

garding the function (job) of the government; what

in your opinion is the function (job) of the govern-

 

ment?

to

to

to

to

to

to

prevent wars

make friends with other countries
help peOple in our country

settle conflicts

make peOple obey the laws

make sure our country is run well

Are the following laws or not?

Cars must stop at stop signs yes/ no
It is necessary to brush your teeth

every morning yes/ no
It is forbidden to cheat in school yes/ no
It is necessary to arrive on time

to school yes/ no
Which of the peOple listed below work for the state?
(medina)

the policeman

the judge

the postman

bus driver
It is very likely that some of you do not know the
meaning of the word government (memshala). If you do

 

not know the meaning clearly, mark an X here.

14.

15.

16.

198

Disobey means to do something which you are told not
to do.

(wrong?

Which of the following things is the most

not to

obey mother

not to

obey teacher

not to

obey father

not to

obey the policeman

Which is the most important thing that the policeman

must do?
to make people obey the law
to help peOple in trouble

to catch people who break the law

If you think that what the policeman tells you to do

is not correct, what do you do?

___do what he says and forget it

___do what he says and afterwards tell your father
___first do what he says and afterwards ask him why
___do what he says and afterwards tell him he's wrong

don't do what he says

199

17. Suppose that the teacher needs to send two students
to the president to receive a prize for good citizen-
ship. Who in your opinion should he (she) choose?
(Mark x beside two students that in your opinion he
should choose)

A student who helps others
A student who does what he is told to do

A student who is interested in the way our country
is run

A student who everybody likes

I don't know who to choose because I don't know
what good citizenship means

18. If the president were to decide to give prizes to the

two best citizens (adults) who would he choose (mark
two)?

Somebody who votes and encourages others to vote
Somebody who always obeys the laws

Somebody who is interested in the way our country
is run

I don't know who to choose because I don't know
what a good citizen is

19. Mark with an x how much your parents teach you about

good citizenship

they teach me very much

 

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

20.

21.

22.

23.

200

Mark with an x how much your friends teach you about

good citizenship.

they teach me very much

 

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

Mark with an x how much the radio and television

teach you about good citizenship.

they teach me very much

 

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

Mark with an x how much the newspapers teach you

about good citizenship.

they teach me very much

 

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

a) The prime minister works
___harder
___exactly as hard (as)
___1ess hard

than most of the other people in the state.

b) The prime minister knows
___more
___exactly as much (as)
___1ess

than most of the people in the state.

201

c) The prime minister is

27. a)

b)

C)

more honest
exactly as honest (as)
less honest

than most of the people in the state.

A knesset member works
___harder

___exactly as hard (as)
___1ess hard

than most of the other people in the state.

A knesset member knows
__pmore
___exactly as much (as)
___1ess

than most of the people in the state.

A knesset member is
___more honest
___exactly as honest (as)
___1ess honest

than most of the people in the state.

202

28. a) A mayor works
___harder
___exactly as hard (as)
___1ess hard

than most of the other peOple in the state.

b) A mayor knows
___more
___exactly as much (as)
___1ess

than most of the people in the state.

c) A mayor is
___more honest
___exactly as honest (as)
___1ess honest

than most of the people in the state.

29. Which is the most correct of the three alternatives:

If you write to the prime minister he cares very
much about your Opinion

If you write to the prime minister he cares
somewhat about your opinion

If you write to the prime minister he doesn't
care at all about your opinion

30.

31.

32.

33.

203

Which is the most correct of

If you write to a knesset
much about your opinion

If you write to a knesset
about your opinion

If you write to a knesset
at all about your opinion

Which is the most correct of

If you write to the mayor
about your opinion

If you write to the mayor
about your Opinion

If you write to the mayor
about your opinion

the three

member he

member he

member he

the three

alternatives:

cares very

cares somewhat

doesn't care

alternatives:

he cares very much

he cares somewhat

he doesn't care at all

If you could participate in elections with whom

would you seek advice before

advisor only.
A friend my age
My parents

My teacher

voting? Mark the best

The television, the radio, and the newspapers

I would decide by myself

I don't know

How much did you learn from the elections?

a lot
some

nothing at all

34.

Part

204

I think that what the government does is the best
thing.

yes

no

I don't know

B: All Grades

Is democracy the best form of government?

yes / no / I don't know

Is democracy rule by the people?

correct / incorrect / I don't know

Is it correct that in the democratic system of

government every adult can vote?

correct / incorrect / I don't know

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man
is given an equal Opportunity to improve his social

condition? [11th grade only]

correct / incorrect / I don't know

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man
has Opportunities to improve his social condition?
[5th & 8th grade only]

correct / incorrect / I don't know

205

Is it correct that in the democratic system any man
can say things against the government without anything

bad happening to him?

correct / incorrect / I don't know

In the democratic system when a majority of the
people agree on something then the rest of the peOple
should not criticize. Do you agree with this defi-

nition? [11th grade only]

yes / no / I don't know

Is it correct that in the democratic system when a
majority of the people agree on something then people
shouldn't criticize the decision? [5th & 8th grade

only]

correct / incorrect / I don't know

Suppose some peOple attempt to influence a decision
of the government. In your opinion, what would be

the most effective method?
personal connections (including family connections)
letters to officials of the government

forming an organization or group especially for
this purpose

by means of a political party

demonstrations [11th grade only]

206

8. Many people want to be members of the knesset or
Prime Minister. Why, in your opinion, do people

want these jobs?

they want to change things that are not good in
in our country

they want to become rich and to be important
people

in order to keep things as they are in our

country

9. In what way do these peOple influence which laws are

passed in our country: Very much, a little, not at all

Rich people:

 

very much / a little / not at all

Prime Minister:

 

very much / a little / not at all

The police:

 

very much / a little / not at all

Cabinet ministers:

 

very much / a little / not at all

The simple citizen:

 

very much / a little / not at all

Army officers:

 

very much / a little / not at all

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

207

Who does the most to run the country?
___Prime Minister

___Cabinet ministers

___the Knesset

___the President

I don't know

I don't think that people in the government care much

what people like my family think.
Yes, I agree
No, I don't agree

I don't know

Would you want to work for the government?

yes / no / I don't know

My family has no chance to influence the government

and its decisions.
Yes, I agree
No, I don't agree

I don't know

The situation in our country would be better if there

were no political parties.

yes / no / I don't know

208

15. Are your parents interested in the news and what

happens in the government?
___always interested
___usually interested
___sometimes interested
___almost never interested

I don't know

16. I discuss problems of the state with my parents:
frequently
sometimes

very rarely

17. It is desirable that children identify with the same

political party as their parents.

yes, I agree
no, I don't agree

I don't know

Part C: 8th grade--questions 1-29
llth grade-~questions 1-50

1. Are you interested in reading and discussing what
happens in the government and the things that go on in

our country?
very interested
somewhat interested

not interested at all

2.

209

I discuss with my parents elections and parties in the

state.
frequently
sometimes

very rarely

I read about politics in the newspaper, and_follow

what happens in our country on radio and television.
most of the time
some of the time

very rarely

I speak with my friends about politics.
frequently
sometimes

very rarely

Which of the following seem to you to represent the
purposes of the state of Israel? Choose the two most

important.
ingathering of the exiles

to be a light to the nations

to be a nation like all the nations

to integrate into the Middle East

to become the strongest state in the Middle East

to see that people in our country will be

materially satisfied

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

210

Which of the following is the best definition of Israeli?
___a man who lives in Israel

___a Jew who lives in Israel

___a man born in Israel

a man who lives in Israel and thinks and acts
like we do

Even people who oppose our way of life have a right
to be heard. (Or, even to people who oppose our way

of life it is necessary to give to them the oppor-

‘ tunity to have their words listened to.) Do you

agree?

___Yes, I agree
‘___No, I don't agree
___I don't know

NOTE: All subsequent questions use same response
format.

It is important to our state that every citizen
support a political party.

Israelis have a change to express their Opinions about
how their country is run.

One strong leader would be better for our state than
all the laws and talk.

The minority in the state should be free to criticize
the decisions of the government.

A man shouldn't be allowed to speak if he doesn't
know what he's talking about. Do you agree?

It is possible to believe that most of the politicians
will do the best thing for the state.

In our country family position or money are more
important than success as a result of hard work and
skill.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

211

In the decisions of the government what people like
my parents think is considered.

There is no discrimination in this country.

It doesn't matter what a person does, he can't change
the decisions of the government just as he can't
change the weather.

In the government there are a few powerful people
that run the whole thing without considering us--the
average citizens.

Every vote in an election is important even when many
people vote.

A political leader is obligated to follow the Opinion
of his party even when this conflicts with his
conscience.

A political leader should follow the will of the voters
even when this conflicts with the will of his party.

Problems that seem important to our parents are not
necessarily important to us.

My opinions regarding social, economic, and political
questions are very different from those of my parents.

The conflicts and controversies between the parties
hurt our country more than they help it.

Our system of government would work better if we could
get rid of the conflicts between the political
parties.

The political parties in Israel create conflicts where
in fact none really exist.

The political parties do more to confuse the issue
than to clarify it.

Our system of government would work better if there
were only two political parties.

It would be to the advantage of other countries if
they adopted the Israeli form of government.

The methods of a politician are not important any
time he gets the right thing done.

Voting directly for candidates and not for parties
would solve many of our political problems.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

212

Most people have fixed Opinions; there's no use trying

'to change their opinions.

I usually have confidence that the government will do
the right thing.

There is practically no connection between what a
politician says and what he does after he gets
elected. Most political parties care only about
winning elections and nothing more.

Discussions and negotiations between people with
different Opinions can't solve the problem; they only
lead to concessions.

All that politicians do is exaggerate the things
that cause division. .

Governmental institutions cannot operate without
politicians.

Politics is not a means of insuring complete harmony
but a way of arriving at temporary agreements about
policies within agreed-upon rules.

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to giving up our
principles.

If two people disagree they can usually reach a
satisfactory solution by mutual discussion.

Our state would work better if there were a complete
separation of authority between the executive and the
legislative, that is the Knesset and the Government.

Politics is basically a conflict in which groups and
individuals compete for certain aims.

Society has the right to tell peOple how to live
their lives. People should follow society even if
that goes against their personal judgment.

The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not
only a religion.

It is the duty of all Jews in the world to immigrate
to Israel.

The government of Israel should see to it that public
life is conducted in accordance with Jewish religious
tradition.

47.

48.

49.

50.

Part

213
Usually when one begins to change things the results
will be worse than before the change.

Of all the philosophies that exist in the world
surely there is one that is correct.

You can't change human nature.
It's better to stick by what you have than to try
new things you can't be sure about.

D: All grades, Questions 1-8

Where were you born?

 

If you are not a native of the country, how long

have you been in the country?

 

In what country was your father born?

 

In what country was your mother born?

 

Mark the sentence closest to the occupation of your
father (if your father is dead or not working, mark
his occupation in the past).

___works with his hands--in a factory, on a machine,
works on the land, etc. A
___trade worker--electrician, carpenter, plumber, etc.
___office worker ( )-—c1erk, salesman, etc.

___owns a small store
___policeman, fireman, soldier

professional--doctor, lawyer, teacher, engineer,
manager, etc.

owns a large factory or other large business

10.

Is your family
religious
traditional

not religious

Do you belong to
Yes. If yes,

No.

Do you belong to
"Noar l'Noar"?

Yes. If yes,

No.

Do you belong to
Yes. If yes,

No.

NOTE: Remaining

What do you want

214

any youth movement?

to which one?

 

another youth organization such as

to which one?

 

any sports club?

to which one?

 

questions--llth grade only

to be when you grow up?

 

Do you want to live in

a city
a kibbutz
a moshav

a development

town

Part A:

215

QUESTIONNAIRE

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Part B: All Grades

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7911131111 1:3: 11: 19:5 111-117:: :1: 5:5 :! !:1p1:1 1mm: 11:1 31 0:: .4

[5th & 8th grade only]

:11! !11!: / 11:1 :5 / 11:1

-225

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1:1-:5 x 111:! ,r1!1: 15 111:1: 31!: "3!111:1:1" 3511:: 1:111: !:

 

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[11th grade only] "”333 In“ W,

225

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Part C: 8th grade--questions 1-29
11th grade-~questions 1-50

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229

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NOTE: All subsequent questions use same response
format.

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.:1!1:3 115311: 3:: 31115 111;: 1111111 :!:35 1111119: :! :!5:1:!5 .9
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31:11:: 33513 112:: !so: :1: 1: !11119111: 1::: 1111! :!:1:: 1111:: .14
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231

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.:!1:1: :!:1 :!1111: 11:: :1 11101 :111111 1111!:1: 51: 5:

1111 1:13 11: 15!:: 11115111 11:15 :111'1!115 :!!3 !:!51:3 1!3J:3

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.29

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232

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.:!11:o13 :!p13 311011: mum 31!1!1115 9111: :!!1111

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.:!1113 1.1!:11: 31:15 111:: 1.31:1: 11!1:1 :11 1:11.15 ::1:

Part D: All grades, Questions l-8

?31711 IJ’H

 

111:: 33: 1:1 3:: .1!1:3 1!5! 11!: 3:

 

71!:: 1511 11: 11!::

 

71:: 31511 11: 11!::

 

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NOTE: Remaining questions--llth grade only

7511: 1!:: 31!:5 11111: 3:

 

-: 31!:5 3:13 3::

1”

113'?
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flifl'l ”1",

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