

POLITICAL EFFICACY AMONG ISRAELI YOUTH:  
BELIEFS IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS AND  
POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS IN A HYBRID  
POLITICAL SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL EFFICACY AMONG ISRAELI YOUTH: BELIEFS  
IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS AND POLITICAL  
EFFECTIVENESS IN A HYBRID POLITICAL SYSTEM

By

Jacob Allan Hurwitz

This dissertation proceeds from the view that political efficacy consists of two beliefs, the belief in governmental responsiveness and the belief in political effectiveness, and that an individual's sense of political efficacy is based on a rational evaluation of the degree to which the political system is open to influence, and of the influence he may have. Political efficacy, therefore, varies between systems according to their structures and values, and between individuals within given systems according to their relation to its structure and their degree of adherence to its values.

It has been argued that the stability of democratic government may require the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness to be congruent. If, however, a distinction is made between political systems which emphasize collective interests and those which emphasize individual interests, it is possible to conceive



of a system in which a low belief in political effectiveness co-exists with a high belief in governmental responsiveness, the latter belief referring to the responsiveness of governmental officials to collective interests. Using a typology of political systems developed by David Apter, it is argued that reconciliation systems (systems of pyramidal authority, stressing instrumental values) promote congruence in the political efficacy beliefs, while in mobilization systems (systems of hierarchical authority, stressing consummatory values) incongruence is likely, because in mobilization systems responsiveness is evaluated in terms of collective interests and effectiveness in terms of individual interests. Individuals who accept the systems' collective goals will find a low level of political effectiveness tolerable.

Israel is discussed as a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid, in which certain consummatory values and collective goals are highly important. In comparison with pre-adults in other democracies (i.e., United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy) Israeli youth were found to be high in their belief in governmental responsiveness and low in their belief in political effectiveness. Israelis were also high in their support for democratic norms, which was found to be associated with their high belief in governmental responsiveness, and relatively low in support for the party system in their country, which

was found to be associated with their low belief in political effectiveness.

The sample reported in this dissertation consists of fifth, eighth, and eleventh grade students from Netanya, Tel Aviv, and Beersheba. In Chapter IV analysis focuses on ethnic differences, with children of Eastern origin found to be lower than those of Western origin on indices of support for democratic norms, belief in governmental responsiveness, and belief in political effectiveness, and higher in support for the party system. It is contended that for Easterners the parties serve, as in other developing countries, as the primary link to the state, which tends to explain their high level of support. The role of socio-economic status, youth movement membership, and course of study in reducing differences between ethnic groups is discussed. One finding which emerges from this analysis is that while Israelis are high in their support for democratic norms generally, the academic secondary schools do not sufficiently deal with these norms. This is a matter of concern, especially considering the lower support for these norms found among Easterners.

In Chapter V analysis focuses on a typology of individuals characterized by their level of belief in governmental responsiveness and in political effectiveness. Those labeled collectivists (high in governmental responsiveness, low in political effectiveness) are found to be most in adherence with the Zionist ideology, as posited,

in contrast to individualists (high in effectiveness, low in responsiveness) who are least oriented to the ideology.

In contrast to findings in other countries, in Israel no relation is found between support for democratic norms and support for the party system, and these two orientations are differentially associated with the two efficacy beliefs. Those high in their belief in governmental responsiveness are high in their support for democratic norms, while those high in their belief in political effectiveness are high in their support for the party system. If, as has been argued, the efficacious citizen is the democratic citizen, in Israel the reference must be specifically to those who believe in governmental responsiveness. For Israeli youth as a whole, and within the Israeli sample as well, a low belief in political effectiveness co-exists with high support for democratic norms.

The characteristics which in Israel permit incongruence between the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness are the products of unique circumstances, now undergoing change in Israel itself, and unlikely to be duplicated elsewhere. The development of national identity preceded statehood and the creation of a new society in Israel, mitigating the impact of developmental crises, and Israel is very likely an exception to the general rule that the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness should be congruent.

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IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS AND POLITICAL  
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By

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To my parents, who have followed the development of this project with eager interest and support, this dissertation is dedicated.

All errors in judgment and interpretation are, sadly, my own.

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CHAPTER I  
AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF  
POLITICAL EFFICACY

The concept of political efficacy has received increasing attention and application among political scientists in recent years. Political efficacy, or "the belief that the ruled in a political system have some capacity for exercising influence over the rulers,"<sup>1</sup> has been found to be associated with such social attributes as education, income, and occupational status, and such psychological attributes as ego-strength and sense of mastery over the environment; it has also been said to be associated with political participation and effectiveness in non-political experiences.<sup>2</sup> But as Abramson points out,

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<sup>1</sup>Edward N. Muller, "Cross-National Dimensions of Political Competence," American Political Science Review, LXIV, 3 (September, 1970), 792.

<sup>2</sup>See, among numerous others, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1961); Robert E. Lane, Political Life:

while devoting much attention to the attributes associated with political efficacy, political scientists have less often considered the way in which such feelings are affected by actual political power arrangements.<sup>3</sup> This is a result, in part, of the emphasis most researchers put on studying modal rather than sub-cultural patterns of response, but, moreover, it is a result of the fact that most researchers study political efficacy within a particular political system, and are, therefore, less likely to see the political power arrangements within that system as constituting a variable.<sup>4</sup> It may also be due to some theoretical ambiguity in the concept of political efficacy itself.

Lane has written that "Possibly . . . to some extent the sense of political efficacy relates less to deeper personality qualities than to the actual

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Why People Get Involved in Politics (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959; and Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965).

<sup>3</sup>Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust among Black Schoolchildren: Four Explanations" (unpublished manuscript, April, 1971), p. 29. Originally presented at conference on Political Theory and Social Education, Michigan State University, February 5-6, 1971.

<sup>4</sup>Both Jaros and Abramson have made observations similar to this with regard to the "culture bound" nature of the major findings in the study of political socialization. Abramson, op. cit.; Dean Jaros, et al., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, LXII, 2 (June, 1968), 564.

responsiveness of the governmental authorities."<sup>5</sup> This seems a strange way to put the matter, as it has not been suggested that the belief in political efficacy should be strong in a society governed by an authoritarian, non-responsive regime. The sense of political efficacy includes not only the individual's image of himself as effective, but also his view of the responsiveness of governmental officials, and it has been argued that the extent to which an individual is efficacious should be taken in part as a measure of how democratic he judges his political system to be.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, even this notion may be deficient, for problems may well arise when considering responsiveness as a measure of democracy. As Rae states:

The more democratic of two institutions may . . . produce lower proportionate satisfaction with a given outcome or with a whole sequence of outcomes. Thus there is no free-standing deductive relationship between political democracy and what might be called "popular responsiveness."<sup>7</sup>

Thus, as Rae continues, "high consensus with low democracy may produce higher frequencies of satisfaction, than low degrees of consensus with high degrees of democracy."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Lane, op. cit., p. 151.

<sup>6</sup> Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 257.

<sup>7</sup> Douglas Rae, "Political Democracy as a Property of Political Institutions," American Political Science Review, LXV, 1 (March, 1971), 118.

<sup>8</sup> Loc. cit., footnote 22.

Still, the belief in responsiveness, whether indicating a belief in the democratic nature of the system or simply satisfaction with governmental outcomes, remains a judgment of the system, and is essentially related to the nature of the political system in which an individual lives. While we may find that various sociological or psychological attributes of individuals tend to be related to their level of belief in political efficacy, such attributes ought best to be conceived of as intervening variables, differentially applicable to individuals all of whom share common membership in a given regime, the characteristics of which provide the basis for their sense of political efficacy.

Almond and Verba find in their data evidence to suggest that education "may lead individuals to believe that they can influence their government, no matter what country they live in (providing, of course, that there is at least some institutional structure to support this attitude)."<sup>9</sup> The proviso is hardly a minimal one; quite clearly one can distinguish with their data between, on the one hand, Britain and the United States, and on the other, Mexico and Italy. The findings regarding Germany are somewhat less clear. They report the following

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<sup>9</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 209 (emphasis in original).



differences on their measure of citizen competence by education for the five nations:<sup>10</sup>

TABLE 1. Citizen competence by education level in five nations.

	Primary or Less	Secondary or Above
United States	51%	85%
United Kingdom	53	64
Germany	29	58
Italy	20	37
Mexico	31	49

That education makes a difference in each country is hardly debatable. Nevertheless, the higher-educated groups in Mexico and Italy are still lower on citizen competence than the less-educated groups in Britain and the United States. Although the authors wish to make the opposite point, the data would seem to confirm that political efficacy is primarily a characteristic varying between political regimes, rather than by education across systems. Muller has shown, furthermore, that those Mexicans and Italians who believe in their own ability to influence government are no more likely than others to

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 219, Fig. 1.

believe that the average citizen has that ability,<sup>11</sup> evidence that they themselves understand the nature of responsiveness and effectiveness in their own political systems, and are responding in accordance with a realistic appraisal of their own situation within that system.

That better educated people are likely to be in a more influential position within any given system than those less well-educated is certainly not inconsistent with the interpretation that one's sense of political efficacy is related to the nature of existing power relations. One need not argue that such individuals are more likely to believe in their own ability to influence government because they are more highly educated (or have a higher income, or greater ego-strength); it is probably sufficient to say that they are more likely to believe in their own ability to influence government because they have, in fact, a greater ability to influence government.<sup>12</sup>

The five countries studied by Almond and Verba are, of course, a very specific subset of possible

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<sup>11</sup>Muller, op. cit., p. 806.

<sup>12</sup>It is conceivable that more highly educated citizens would, under certain circumstances, believe less in their own political effectiveness than would other citizens, despite the fact that they might have greater influence in reality, if they did not regard that influence as commensurate with their status, or if unsuccessful in attempting to influence certain decisions and policies. From the data provided by Almond and Verba, and others, however, this does not appear to be the general case.

political regimes. Lerner has shown that in the Middle Eastern nations studied by him, efficacy increased with the level of modernity of the country. Finding that similar types of individuals (i.e., those labeled traditional, transitionals, and moderns) differ greatly in efficacy from country to country, he observes that the differences in their environments must be large. The following table shows the percentage of individuals in each category reporting that they could do nothing to help solve the major problems facing their country, because of what Lerner labels "personal impotency":<sup>13</sup>

TABLE 2. Personal impotency among three types of individuals in six Middle Eastern nations.

	Traditional	Transitional	Modern
Turkey	35%	33%	33%
Lebanon	51	35	40
Egypt	63	73	51
Syria	90	92	37
Jordan	52	57	45
Iran	63	100	72

<sup>13</sup>Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 100, Table 9.

Both the Almond and Verba data, and that of Lerner, would seem to support the view that political efficacy is, in its most essential aspects, a belief which varies from country to country. In the Lerner data one sees for most countries relatively little variation between the groups as compared with the considerable variation within each group across countries. It is true that such variation does not necessarily indicate the effect of political power arrangements, per se, and this is particularly true with Lerner's measure of "personal impotency." Nevertheless, Lerner interprets the distribution reported here as showing "what a difference it makes to persons of each type whether they live in a society that is opening even if not yet open, advancing even if not yet very far advanced, adaptive to new people in new roles."<sup>14</sup>

What is suggested here is the need to develop an explanation for variations in the sense of political efficacy from country to country which takes into account variations in political structure and predominant values, and accounts for variations among individuals within a given country by considering their relation to the political structure and value system of that country. Because of its emphasis on the nature of existing power relations within a political system this is essentially a structural approach. It is not unrelated, however, to the political

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

culture approach, in its consideration of "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system,"<sup>15</sup> of "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."<sup>16</sup> The approach taken here goes beyond a concern with structural differentiation alone, by stressing the analysis of "fit," or congruence, between certain beliefs and values and the structure of a political system.

The utility of structural analysis is that it "reduces the risk of ethnocentrism . . . [and] provides an orderly way of examining large numbers of cases in order to develop comparative theories."<sup>17</sup> The first stage of such an analysis is typological, the development of theoretical systems in accordance with certain characteristics, against which concrete systems may be evaluated.<sup>18</sup> The

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<sup>15</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>16</sup>Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

<sup>17</sup>David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 20; see also the discussion preceding this, pp. 16-20.

<sup>18</sup>Apter contends that this is the basis of "ideal-type" analysis, and cites Hempel, who argues that ideal types can be regarded as significant only if they are interpreted as theoretical systems, by: "(a) specifying a list of characteristics with which the theory is to deal; (b) formulating a set of hypotheses in terms of these

second stage involves the problem of meaning, in this case a determination of the form of political efficacy appropriate to, or congruent with, each of the categories of the typology. The third stage is the derivation of theories about the data.<sup>19</sup> It is this sequence of analysis which I propose to follow, after a discussion of the concept of political efficacy as it shall be used in this study.

Political efficacy is regarded here as a belief--in fact, two distinct beliefs, the belief in the reality of governmental responsiveness and the belief in personal political effectiveness. It is possible to speak of political efficacy as a norm,<sup>20</sup> and indeed my conception indicates the normative aspects of political efficacy in emphasizing that what is regarded as responsiveness or effectiveness may well vary from system to system, in

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characteristics; (c) giving those characteristics an empirical interpretation that assigns to the theory a specific domain and application; and (d) as a long-range objective incorporating the theoretical system, as a "special case," into a more comprehensive theory." Ibid., pp. 18-19. Apter's reference is to Carl G. Hempel, "Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," in Science, Language and Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, for the American Philosophical Association, 1952), p. 84.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>20</sup>See especially David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," American Political Science Review, LXI, 1 (March, 1967), 25-38, and Muller, op. cit.

accordance with the dominant values of each system. Nevertheless, political efficacy is understood as a belief, to be explained within the context of those values. We wish to factor out, as it were, what Sherrill calls the nonrational elements of political efficacy, such as ego-strength, which operate apart from objective circumstances, and focus on the belief in political efficacy as a "rational evaluation of the degree to which the system is an open one and of the influence that a person may have, given his political resources and alternative strategies."<sup>21</sup>

The concept of rationality, broadly "the ability to order preferences and to choose the more preferred action over the less preferred,"<sup>22</sup> is most generally applied to goal-oriented behavior. However, a rational evaluation such as that described above makes rational behavior possible. Dahl, for example, clearly implies the idea of rational evaluation as used here, in his explanation, based on the concept of political efficacy, for why an individual might not become involved in politics:

An individual is unlikely to get involved in politics if he thinks that the probability of his influencing the outcome of events, of changing the balance of rewards by means of his political involvement is

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<sup>21</sup>Kenneth S. Sherill, "The Attitudes of Modernity," Comparative Politics, I, 2 (January, 1969), 207.

<sup>22</sup>William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, LXII, 1 (March, 1968), 27, footnote 7.

low . . . [or] if he believes that the outcome will be relatively satisfactory to him without his involvement.<sup>23</sup>

Thus we may say that the very decision to get involved, prior to any decision about the means to be employed, depends on an evaluation of the probability of influencing outcomes or receiving satisfactory outcomes without involvement. It is noteworthy that satisfaction with outcomes may compensate for any sense of ineffectiveness held by an individual. In short, then, the belief in political efficacy is considered to derive from a rational evaluation of existing power relations and the probability of satisfactory outcomes.

Muller differentiates between two dimensions of political efficacy (or competence, as he prefers to call it): "a general belief that government is responsive to citizen influence," and "a psychological disposition or feeling of confidence in one's personal ability to influence salient government decisions."<sup>24</sup> The first of these I shall refer to as the "belief in the reality of governmental responsiveness," and the second as the "belief in personal political effectiveness." Muller argues that the dimensions should be congruent if political

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<sup>23</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 61, 63.

<sup>24</sup>Muller, op. cit., p. 793. Muller includes a third dimension as well, "skills necessary for effective political behavior."



efficacy is to contribute to democratic government, and that incongruities are likely to place stress on democratic government:

[I]f citizens did not make any connection between the degree to which the government was responsive to the membership in general and their own confidence in being able to exert influence, either set of beliefs might be more susceptible to fluctuation according to circumstances of the moment, thereby introducing a greater potential for stress, than if beliefs in the reality of [responsiveness] buttressed beliefs in personal ability to exert influence.<sup>25</sup>

To say, as does Muller, that such congruence should exist for the stability of democratic government is not to say that an individual might not rationally evaluate responsiveness and effectiveness in an incongruent way. Clearly, it is possible that individuals may believe themselves to be personally effective and still not believe in the responsiveness of government officials to the citizenry at large, as Muller reports is the case in Mexico and Italy among those who do believe in their own ability to influence government. It is my intention to suggest, furthermore, that such incongruence may not place stress on a democratic government such as that of Israel, because of certain special characteristics of that system.

It might appear highly unlikely, at first glance, that individuals would believe in the responsiveness of their government and not in their own political

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<sup>25</sup>Loc. cit.

effectiveness, a set of apparently incongruent beliefs seeming to suggest that the government is seen as responsive, but to others rather than to oneself. Responsiveness, however, refers to governmental responsiveness to citizens in general, to what the individual may regard as the collectivity, and with which he may have a strong identification. The apparent inconsistency, therefore, may be reconcilable if we distinguish responsiveness in terms of collective and individual rewards.<sup>26</sup> A political system provides both collective and individual rewards, and individuals within a system have both collective and individual goals. Thus it is possible that individuals might regard a government as responsive, emphasizing its responsiveness to certain collective interests, while at the same time not believing in their own political effectiveness, and because of their acceptance of the collective goals be quite content with this "inconsistency."

It should be possible, therefore, to distinguish political systems by the relative emphasis placed in each on collective and individual goals, and to hypothesize an appropriate relationship between the beliefs in responsiveness and effectiveness for each such system. Similarly, it should be possible to distinguish individuals within a

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<sup>26</sup>For a more elaborate development of this idea, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), esp. pp. 9-16.

given system by the relative emphasis they place on these two kinds of goals, and the differential rewards related to them. I do not suggest that it is easy to distinguish between collective and individual goals. I would, however, suggest that in some systems it is likely that the belief in responsiveness refers primarily to the satisfaction of collective goals, with the belief in effectiveness referring primarily to individual goals, though the latter may well be identified with the collective goals.<sup>27</sup>

The nature of the political efficacy belief should vary between political systems according to the relative emphasis they place on the collectivity and the individual. Apter has developed such a typology of political systems stressing degree of hierarchy and type of values, and holds that particular forms of government are most likely to be associated with particular principles of legitimacy. The Western ideal of government relies primarily on the libertarian principle, emphasizing liberty (or equity), while other forms place emphasis on the fulfillment of potentiality. Thus liberty may be regarded as one principle of legitimacy, associated with constitutional representation

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<sup>27</sup>In considering the discussion which follows it should be emphasized that the belief in the reality of responsiveness in any system refers to both collective and individual interests, and that individuals are likely to regard themselves as effective or ineffective both with regard to their individual and collective interests. My contention is, however, that systems vary in the relative emphasis which they place on these types of interests, and the typology developed here reflects that view.

(or pyramidal authority) and the idea of "democracy"; potentiality may be regarded as a principle of legitimacy associated with a centrally controlled system (or hierarchical authority), and the idea of "community."<sup>28</sup> From these characteristics Apter suggests two normative types, the secular-libertarian and sacred-collectivity models, and what he regards as their more empirically useful subtypes, the reconciliation and mobilization systems:<sup>29</sup>




FIGURE 1. A model of political systems types.

<sup>28</sup>Apter, op. cit., pp. 12-17.

<sup>29</sup>See ibid., p. 24, Fig. 2; the two cells have been labeled in accordance with Apter's definitions.

The secular-libertarian model essentially accepts society as it is and suggests a framework that will allow modest change over time. It contains a set of presuppositions about the way in which representative government ought to operate: (1) There should not be a monopoly of power. . . . (2) Preferences can be realized within a framework of law in which those exercising power are checked by legal means--by control over the executive, and so on. . . . The sacred-collectivity model is opposed to conditions as they are. It cannot assume, as can the secular-libertarian model, that an educational system, for example, should create a level of understanding of current problems sufficient to support opposing points of view and that opposing views should be tolerated as long as the problems are shared and communications about them possible. . . . It is a system in which consensus cannot be taken for granted but must be built--a directly opposite situation to that obtaining in the secular-libertarian model.<sup>30</sup>

The sacred-collectivity model stresses the ideas of potentiality and community. The collectivity is an ethical, or moral unit, and the morality of the individual is dependent upon that of the system. The model emphasizes the unity, rather than the diversity, of the people. Rather than relying on the free flow of ideas, it focuses on specific objectives, with political and social life directed toward the benefit of the collectivity, rather than that of the individual.<sup>31</sup>

Apter's reconciliation system is one of decentralized pyramidal authority, stressing instrumental, or secular values, which serve as the basis for judging efficiency. The role of reconciliation government is not organizational; it works rather to reconcile diverse

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 33-34.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

interests, mediating, integrating, and coordinating, rather than mobilizing. Its goals are based on information rather than on a vision of the future. The mobilization system is one of hierarchical centralized authority, stressing consummatory, or essentially sacred (though not necessarily religious) values, which serve to give a sense of solidarity to the community, and identity to the individual. In the mobilization system new values are being created and ideology is raised to the level of religion. A mobilization system elevates certain instrumental objectives, such as modernization, or raising per capita income, to the level of symbolic ends.<sup>32</sup>

Reconciliation and mobilization systems differ, then, not only in their relative orientations to the individual and the collectivity, but also in their structural forms, values, bases of legitimacy, and as shall be discussed in the following chapter, their characteristic form of political party. Relying on the notion of political efficacy as a belief based on rational evaluation of outcomes and probabilities within each system, it should be possible to suggest a model of political efficacy in terms of the belief in responsiveness and the belief in effectiveness appropriate to each system.

The reconciliation system should promote congruence in the responsiveness and effectiveness beliefs.

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., passim.

The emphasis in the reconciliation system is on instrumental values, and individual goals and rewards. This follows from the emphasis on liberty, or equity, as the basis of legitimacy, and the role of the system as a reconciler of diverse interests. Responsiveness will be evaluated directly in accordance with individual rewards, with the satisfaction of individual interests; it will be judged by the responsiveness of government to attempts to influence it. The parties in such a system, subject to influence by the citizenry and inclined to seek their cues from the population, should serve to increase the belief in responsiveness and effectiveness. In reconciliation systems which "work," therefore, both beliefs should be relatively high, while in such systems which do not "work," both beliefs should be relatively low. In each case, however, congruence should be expected.

The mobilization system may well promote incongruence in the responsiveness and effectiveness beliefs, because in such systems responsiveness is likely to be evaluated in collective terms, while effectiveness will still be judged from an individual point of view. The emphasis in the mobilization system is on consummatory values, and collective goals and rewards, in accordance with its emphasis on potentiality as the basis of legitimacy, with the system as a mobilizer of the community. Because of its centralized, hierarchical structure it is

less subject to direct response to individual attempts to influence it, nor in fact would such response be truly legitimate, for its efforts are on behalf of the community as a whole. The parties in such a system are relatively insensitive to individual attempts to influence them; it is not their purpose to aggregate, compete, or represent individuals, but to bring to realization an ideology based on potentiality. Thus the responsiveness of the parties may be measured in terms of collective interests, which if satisfied are not truly perceived as incongruent with a low level of personal political effectiveness.

Thus it is possible to construct a typology of political systems relying on the level of belief in governmental responsiveness and personal political effectiveness characteristic of each (see Figure 2, p. 21).

A system perceived as "working" by its members will promote a high belief in responsiveness; this may well be true regardless of the processes by which it functions, so long as outcomes are judged to be satisfactory. Thus mobilization systems, if they "work," that is, satisfy collective goals, and bestow collective rewards, will promote a high belief in responsiveness quite independently of the belief in effectiveness. The emphasis in these systems is on collective goods, and responsiveness can be measured in terms of the satisfaction provided for collective interests. It should, of course, be observed,



Belief in Governmental Responsiveness

High

Low

<p>Working reconciliation systems (e.g., US, UK, Germany)</p>	<p>Non-working mobilization systems (Russia)</p>
<p>Working mobilization systems, or mobilization-reconciliation hybrids (e.g., Israel)</p>	<p>Non-working reconciliation systems; aspiring or alienated reconciliation systems (e.g., Mexico, Italy) ARAS</p>

High

Low

Belief in Personal Political Effectiveness

FIGURE 2. Types of political systems by efficacy belief.

that mobilization systems could be found in each of the four categories. It is not impossible that in a mobilization system individuals will believe in their own personal effectiveness, for governmental officials may be responsive to individual as well as collective interests. Or it may be that while the ideology stresses collective interests, governmental officials are in fact only responsive to individual interests. Or, governmental officials may be relatively unresponsive to individual interests, and incapable of satisfying collective interests. But the crucial point is that mobilization systems present the possibility of acceptable incongruence between the two beliefs, because responsiveness and effectiveness are essentially evaluated by different criteria in a mobilization system, the former in terms of collective interests and the latter in terms of individual interests.

As in most typologies of political systems, Israel is a most difficult case to classify. Israel has been classified as both a developed and developing political system.<sup>33</sup> As shall be discussed further in the next chapter, it has been referred to as "an alternative way

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<sup>33</sup>See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Israel," in The Institutions of Advanced Societies, ed. by Arnold Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), and data on Israel in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

to democracy."<sup>34</sup> Sartori has called its party system "definitely atypical," one which "defies any generalization," and in which "specific cues of comparison are apt to be very misleading."<sup>35</sup> Fein declares that Israel's political system is, if not unique, "more unique than others."<sup>36</sup> Noting the unusual combination of old and new in Israeli society, Amos Elon calls Israel "one of the least 'synchronized' countries on earth."<sup>37</sup> It may be understandable, then, that in terms of the mobilization and reconciliation system classification, Israel represents a hybrid.

Israel's uniqueness, I think, lies precisely in the fact that it encompasses both systems. Apter himself develops an intermediate system of instrumental values and hierarchical authority, which he sees as the most likely form of government for long-term modernization, and it is

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<sup>34</sup>Amitai Etzioni, "Alternative Ways to Democracy: The Example of Israel," in Comparative Politics: A Reader, ed. by Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963, pp. 712-21.

<sup>35</sup>Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. by Joseph LaPolombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 160, footnote 37.

<sup>36</sup>Leonard Fein, Politics in Israel (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), p. 1.

<sup>37</sup>Amos Elon, The Israelis: Fathers and Sons (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 322.

in that category that he places most modernizing nations. Yet, while referring at one point to Israel's "obviously democratic form of reconciliation system,"<sup>38</sup> Apter places Israel alone in the sector characterized by pyramidal authority and consummatory values,<sup>39</sup> a sector elsewhere described as perhaps applicable to theocracies, or feudal systems.<sup>40</sup> I would suggest that Israel represents not so much a third alternative, nor a system somewhere between the two extremes, but in fact a unity of opposites, a theme which I hope to develop in the following chapter.

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<sup>38</sup>Apter, op. cit., p. 135, footnote 18.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 256, Fig. 14. Among the countries Apter refers to as characterized by hierarchical authority and instrumental values are Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan, Thailand, Guinea, Egypt, Indonesia, and Japan and Turkey at an earlier time.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

## CHAPTER II

### ISRAEL AS A HYBRID POLITICAL SYSTEM: PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL STYLE IN ISRAELI DEMOCRACY

In order to understand more clearly the hybrid nature of Israel's political system, it is probably most useful to look at the Israeli party system. The plethora of political parties, their strength, and the scope of their activities are distinguishing characteristics of the Israeli political system, which make it something quite unique among democratic countries, leading one observer to describe Israel's political system as being "of and by, if not for, political parties."<sup>1</sup> An analysis of the role of political parties in Israel will serve to clarify the nature of its political system.

According to Apter, both the reconciliation and mobilization systems have a characteristic form of party. Characteristic of mobilization systems are parties of solidarity, while reconciliation systems are characterized

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<sup>1</sup>Fein, op. cit., p. 67.

by parties of representation. Parties of solidarity are:

- (1) monopolistic, in seeking to eliminate other parties;
- (2) directive, in seeking to eliminate grievances in order to overthrow the existing order or, when in power, to bend the community toward the goals laid down by the party; and
- (3) extra-constitutional, in accepting the legal order only when forced to. When in control, the party of solidarity makes the state subservient to itself. Parties of representation are: (1) pluralistic, in competing with other parties; (2) representative, in seeking to incorporate divergent views in order to win the widest following; and (3) constitutional, in that party action is limited by constitution, convention, and electoral rules.<sup>2</sup>

Parties of solidarity and parties of representation, says Apter, may be regarded as two extremes on a continuum, with characteristics in between being more common. Yet Israel's parties would seem to combine the characteristics of the two ideal types, again not perhaps best conceived as being somewhere in the middle of a continuum, but rather combining the aspects of the two extremes. Israel's parties are parties of solidarity obliged by circumstances to compete with each other. There has never been any real opposition, certainly not a unified one, so that in some respects Mapai (or the Labor Party) can be considered monopolistic. For the most part,

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<sup>2</sup>Apter, op. cit., p. 199.

however, the characteristics of monopolistic parties are better seen in the parties other than Mapai. Israel's parties originated as directive parties, intending to create a new order, rather than to work within the framework of an existing order. Because of the necessity of competition, they do attempt to represent divergent views, but this remains somewhat secondary to their promotion of ideology.<sup>3</sup> Finally, Israel has no formal written constitution; while certain constitutional principles do seem operative, they are not binding, and there is no legal restriction on the legislation which may be passed by the Knesset.<sup>4</sup> The ability of the Knesset, led by Mapai, to circumvent the Supreme Court decision in the "Who is a Jew" case discussed in the following case study will

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<sup>3</sup>It is possible to distinguish parties by the extent to which they see themselves as representative parties. Seligman found a move among Knesset members toward seeing themselves as group representatives, which, though it has not superseded left-right orientations, is a new factor of increasing significance. Mapai and the National Religious Party Knesset members tend to see themselves representing many and diversified groups; Gahal and the Communists are the least group oriented, tending to see themselves as representing "the people"; several other parties see themselves as primarily representing one specific group, such as kibbutzim. See Lester Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press, 1964).

<sup>4</sup>See especially Jeffrey Albert, "Constitutional Adjudication without a Constitution: The Case of Israel," Harvard Law Review, LXXXII, 6 (April, 1969), 1245-65; also Asher Zidon, Knesset (New York: Herzl Press, 1967); Israel Katz, "The Rights of the Citizen in Britain and in Israel," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad, No. 9 (1968), 22-39.

illustrate this point, and hopefully those made above as well.<sup>5</sup>

During the early part of 1970 the recurring issue of "Who is a Jew?" was once again prominent in Israeli politics. In February the Supreme Court had declared that the children of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother could be declared, for purposes of the Population Registry Law, as being Jewish by nationality and of no religion. This decision was vigorously opposed by the religious parties, who defended the Orthodox position that only persons born of a Jewish mother, or properly converted to Judaism, can be considered Jewish, and that Jewish nationality is inseparable from Jewish religion. The view that Jews constitute a nationality, and not only a religion, is a central tenet of Zionist ideology; furthermore, Israel's first sovereign act was the adoption of the Law of Return, which grants every Jew the right of immediate citizenship upon arrival in Israel. Thus, any decision, civil or religious, affecting the definition of who shall be regarded as a Jew is of the utmost significance in

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<sup>5</sup>All citations in the following case study are from The Jerusalem Post, during the period from May 26-June 16, 1970, specifically: Tuesday, May 26, p. 8; Friday, May 29, p. 1; Tuesday, June 9, p. 8; Thursday, June 11, p. 8; Sunday, June 14, p. 1; and Tuesday, June 16, p. 1. Another report of this incident may be found in Amnon Rubinstein, "Who's a Jew and other Woes," Encounter, XXXVI, 3 (March, 1971), 84-93.



Israeli society.<sup>6</sup> Deciding who is a Jew is tantamount to deciding who is, or may become, an Israeli, and because such a decision involves an interpretation of the guiding Zionist ideology, raises the most fundamental question of all--what is Israel all about.

The following month, in response to the Court's February decision, and at the insistence of the religious parties, the Knesset amended the Law of Return, by stating that a Jew, for purposes of the Law of Return and the Population Registry Law, is a person born of a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism. The religious parties were led to understand that conversions other than Orthodox would be limited by the prevailing British Mandatory Law requiring certification for conversion from the head of the religious community involved, in this case the Chief Rabbinate, an institution even more committed to Orthodoxy than the leading religious party itself. The understanding seems to have been that conversions in Israel would have to be in accordance with Orthodox procedures, while persons converted abroad under modified conditions would also be acceptable under the Law of Return.

In May a new case arose. An American immigrant, converted to Judaism by a reform group in Tel Aviv not

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<sup>6</sup>For a report of previous "Who is a Jew" cases, see S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 311-16.

recognized by the Rabbinate, applied to the Interior Ministry to be registered as Jewish. The Interior Ministry, a stronghold of the National Religious Party, refused to do so. The February decision had ruled that an Interior Ministry clerk must register an applicant as Jewish on his own declaration. The National Religious Party, by refusing to register the new applicant, was clearly threatening to leave the Cabinet, a situation which the dominant Labor Party was most anxious to avoid. The existing coalition was one of "National Unity," in which all the major parties were participants, with a total of 104 of the 120 members of the Knesset. This left in opposition 16 Knesset members, who represented no less than six different parties, ranging from extreme left to extreme right, as well as extreme religious, hardly constituting a united force.<sup>7</sup>

The existence of a "National Unity" government was a unique situation in Israel. It had originally been

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<sup>7</sup>The number of parties forming the National Unity Government depends upon one's interpretation of "party." The leading partner was the Labor Party, composed of the "Alignment" between Mapai and Achdut Avodah, Rafi--a Mapai breakaway-party which had returned, and Mapam. This grouping had appeared for the first time in the 1969 elections, and held 56 seats. The next largest party was Gahal, an alliance between Herut and that faction of the former Liberal Party which had once been known as the General Zionists. Gahal held 26 seats. The National Religious Party held 12 seats, and the Independent Liberal Party held 4 seats. Two Arab parties, both affiliated with the Labor Party, each holding two seats, were also in the coalition. A smaller religious party with two seats was the final member.

formed in the days immediately preceding the Six Day War in 1967, had been held together thereafter as essential, and renewed after much negotiation following the elections of October, 1969. It finally dissolved in July, 1970, shortly after the present case arose, when the Labor Party decided to accept the United Nations sponsored cease-fire, and the right-wing Gahal Party left the coalition. Its continuation was seriously in doubt at several points in time, none more imminent than in the present case.

It was, in many respects, precisely to make possible the eventual acceptance of a cease-fire unacceptable to Gahal that the Labor Party felt it so essential to keep the National Religious Party in the coalition. Over the two decades of statehood, the dominant Labor Party, in its various incarnations, had always relied on the National Religious Party (which had also varied somewhat in morphology over time) as the central coalition partner-- it was neither left nor right, and was in basic agreement with the Labor Party on economic and foreign policy issues. Its raison d'etre was to maintain religious orthodoxy as a prime determinant in civil law, and while it had achieved less than perfect success in its goal, its accomplishments had been respectable. Thus, for example, only Kosher food is served in the army, on Zim cruises and El Al flights; no public transportation is available in Israel from Friday sundown to Saturday sundown (except in Haifa, and if one counts cabs); a separate state-sponsored religious school

system continues to exist, largely under the supervision of the NRP, although the other parties no longer directly control schools as in the pre-state period; one cannot be born, married, divorced, or buried without the participation, and sometimes agreement, of religious authorities. For a party receiving less than 10 per cent of the popular vote this is no mean achievement.

Nevertheless, in late May and early June of 1970 it appeared that the NRP was about to give up its privileged position by refusing to permit the Ministry of Interior to register a Reform convert to Judaism as Jewish. The NRP claimed that it was being pressured by rabbinical circles in Israel, who were being pressured by Orthodox rabbis in the Diaspora, who in turn claimed that Reform communities were undermining them there. Thus the NRP claimed it had no choice; even if it wanted to abide by the court decision, its worldwide constituency would not permit it. The Labor Party, though sincerely wishing to avoid an NRP walkout from the coalition, was nevertheless not willing to give in on this issue. Striking evidence for this was seen in the fact that the Attorney General, a Labor Party appointee, appeared before the Supreme Court to argue for registration, thus arguing against a government Ministry for the first time in the history of the State. The Interior Minister had until June 16 to register the applicant, after which, if he refused to

do so, he would be obliged to resign. His party had rejected a compromise plan which he had formulated with the Justice Minister, the Attorney General had argued against him, and his options were clear.<sup>8</sup>

The headlines clearly indicated the development of this impending confrontation. On May 26 the Jerusalem Post headlined: NRP THREATENS CABINET RIFT OVER CONVERSION.<sup>9</sup> On May 29 the front-page headline read: SHAPIRO [the Minister of Interior] GIVEN 19 DAYS TO SETTLE ZEIDMAN ISSUE. On June 9: NRP SAYS IT WILL QUIT THE COALITION IF LAW NOT AMENDED. On June 11: LAST DITCH EFFORT TO PRESERVE NATIONAL UNITY. The latter article reported that intensive consultations were planned in "an all-out attempt to keep the National Unity Government intact. Premier Golda Meir and her closest advisors are trying to find a formula that would both keep the National Religious Party

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<sup>8</sup>Mrs. Meir had forced the Labor Party to compromise with the NRP by passing the amendment to the Law of Return discussed earlier. Neither she nor the party was prepared to compromise again.

<sup>9</sup>Alongside this article appeared one headlined: IMPROPER CONVERSIONS TO BLAME FOR SECURITY SITUATION, which read as follows: "The Lubavitcher rebbe, spiritual head of the Habad hassidim, attributes the 'deterioration' in the security situation to Israel's recognition as Jews of 'non-Jews who were improperly converted to Judaism.' 'Since the moment it was decided in Israel that non-Jews with improper conversions to Judaism are also Jews,' he said, 'The security situation has deteriorated and the Russian intervention has escalated . . . he is 'confident the security situation will improve as soon as the ruling is reversed.' He called on the NRP Ministers to leave the Government unless such a step was taken."

from walking out of her government, and also work within the existing laws. But there seems to be little ground for optimism."

On June 14 an article appeared with the headline: PARTIES RESIGNED TO SEEING NRP QUIT COALITION. While the article reported that Labor Party leaders had stressed that under no circumstances would they do anything likely to undermine the Supreme Court, it reported Mrs. Meir's distress that "the NRP could consider leaving the Government at such a juncture in this country's struggle for survival." On June 16, the aforementioned "19th day," it was all over. Yet no article was to be found announcing the departure of the NRP from the government of National Unity. Instead appeared the headline:

#### HELEN ZEIDMAN ACCEPTS ORTHODOX CONVERSION

A threatened coalition crisis over local Reform conversions was averted last night following an eleventh-hour decision by American-born Mrs. Helen Zeidman . . . to undergo a second conversion to Judaism. . . . Following the ceremony, Mrs. Zeidman signed a request to the High Court of Justice. In it, she asked to withdraw her application for an order nisi against the Interior Ministry.

The conversion took only a few hours, admittedly unusual for the Orthodox procedure. But it was carried out according to the strictest Halacha Laws, according to circles close to Rabbi Goren [Chief Chaplain to the Armed Forces and Tel Aviv Chief Rabbi-elect, who performed the conversion service]. Interior Minister and NRP leader Haim Moshe Shapiro has recognized Mrs. Zeidman's conversion by Rabbi Goren and has agreed to register her and her two children by a first marriage as Jewish. News of the surprise development was on the whole greeted with relief in the Knesset lobbies yesterday. National Religious Party leaders said a breathing space had been earned to work out a compromise agreement that would forestall similar complications in the future. . . . Efforts to persuade Mrs.

Zeidman to undergo a second conversion followed Friday's meeting of the Labour Party Ministers with Premier Golda Meir. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan is believed to have raised the idea that Rabbi Goren could be approached in an attempt to find a way out of the impasse.

. . . Rabbi Goren is understood to have based his decision on a saying by Maimonides, that "one should not be too cumbersome and should not be too exact on occasion, lest one should create a burden and lead a man to deviate from good to bad ways." Rabbi Goren spent most of yesterday morning in a discussion with Mrs. Zeidman. After becoming convinced of her sincerity he set up a Rabbinical Court in his army office and performed the conversion.

. . . The speedy conversion met with some criticism within certain NRP circles, especially the younger, more militant group. Rabbi Goren's decision to step into the breach was seen as a blow to the prestige of the Chief Rabbinate.

In the Knesset lobby, Deputy Interior Minister Dr. Yosef Goldschmidt conceded that the Goren conversion had been carried out very much faster than an ordinary conversion. This was not contrary to the Halacha, he pointed out, which allowed for "cases of urgency."

He conceded that Rabbi Goren did not generally conduct conversions, but pointed out that he possessed the requisite authority, and was assisted by two other rabbis. "I assume that a number of people will ask questions about the manner and the rapidity of the ceremony," he agreed.

The case was reported officially closed on June 17, although a group of rabbis announced plans to petition the Rabbinical high Court to invalidate the conversion, which in fact the court did do that day. The action was of no practical significance, however, as Mrs. Zeidman received her identification card, listing her nationality as "Jewish," from the Interior Ministry on the next day. Thus the speedy conversion of Mrs. Zeidman made it possible for the NRP to remain in the Government. Reform conversion, it had been argued, was insufficient and superficial; only through Orthodox conversion could one really become a Jew.

Yet one wonders if any Reform conversion had ever been so rapid as the Orthodox conversion performed in this instance.<sup>10</sup>

The Labor Party, in seeking out such a solution, and the NRP, in accepting it, had each found a means for compromising what had been held to be fundamental principles. The case illustrates both the high commitment of Israeli parties to principle, as well as their ability to rise above principle when events go beyond the intentions of the parties. Despite representing a number of different parties, the elites have much in common with each other, including a distrust of non-elites. The Zeidman case illustrates certain key elements in the process and style of Israeli politics, and the central role of political parties in that process, parties considerably different from those in other democratic countries.

If the understanding of a democratic political system in the West involves a situation in which governmental power can be transferred from one party to another in a regularized way, then as Etzioni points out, Israel clearly presents an alternative way to democracy, not based on the Anglo-Saxon model for, as he notes:

Among the basic features of the Israeli government are a multiple party system and coalition ministries in which one center party (Mapai) is always present and always stronger than the other parties. To leave

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<sup>10</sup>Rubinstein refers to this as "a supersonic ceremony purporting to be a conversion." Rubinstein, op. cit., p. 92.



this party out of the [Government] is simply not a part of the accepted procedures of the system. The party is one of the political institutions of the country and is identified with the state in the minds of many voters.<sup>11</sup>

The fact that a decade after this was written Mapai is now the dominant partner in an even larger Labor Party hardly changes the fundamental point which Etzioni is making. If anything it strengthens it, for while the party is now larger, it is still unable to govern without forming a coalition with other parties, a matter whose consequences are quite significant. Mapai (or the Labor Party) has been described by Etzioni as an "institutionalized dominant center party."<sup>12</sup> The Mapai central committee is really the Israeli center of power. Yet Mapai's central committee is not a coordinated decision-making unit, and Mapai is probably the least monolithic of Israel's parties. It is, in fact, the federated structure of Mapai, along with the periodic changes in the composition of the coalition government in response to voting patterns, which constitute the central factors in Etzioni's conception of Israel as an "alternative way to democracy." Mapai, with all its power, remains at times too big for concerted action, "internally weak and highly sensitive to pressures of various groups."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 712-13.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 713.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 719.

There is much frustration in Israel regarding the party system, a central contributor to which concerns the paradox of Mapai's overwhelming predominance coupled with its not infrequent impotence. The fragmentation of opposition parties has also served to make Mapai less accountable than otherwise might have been the case. Mapai has dominated every government coalition, and because of its location at the center of the political spectrum, no effective opposition has emerged; the various opposition parties have been incapable of unifying with each other, as their differences with Mapai stem from opposite directions. During the existence of the National Unity Government, for example, it was Mapai that strove to preserve that arrangement, while the parties from left and right continually threatened to leave, because of their difficulties in co-existing with each other. For Mapai, having coalition partners from both left and right protected it from each direction.

There is a degree of dissatisfaction with Mapai, stemming both from ideological reasons, and from its performance. Both Arian and Antonovsky note an ideological tension between parties and the population, primarily between left leaders and centrist followers.<sup>14</sup> This is all

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<sup>14</sup>See Aaron Antonovsky, "Political Ideologies of Israelis," Amot, No. 7 (1963) (in Hebrew; English translation in mimeograph form available); and Alan Arian, "Voting and Ideology in Israel," Midwest Journal of Political Science, X, 3 (August, 1966), 265-87.

the more accentuated by a relatively slow turnover in the Knesset.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, the government and bureaucracy are accustomed to having their own way, without effective parliamentary control and interference, and have little tolerance for public criticism--"censure of governmental actions is often furiously branded as disloyalty to the State which ministers and bureaucrats tend to identify with the Government in power."<sup>16</sup>

But whatever dissatisfaction with Mapai may exist, this has not led to increased support for other parties. In fact, the startling thing about Israeli politics is the consistency over time in the electoral results for the parties, despite the changing composition of the population. A key reason for the failure of other parties to benefit from the dissatisfaction with Mapai is the system's tendency to make "irresponsible" parties of them. This is so not only in the sense that because they have little or no chance of winning they are inclined to make promises they

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<sup>15</sup>Elon points out that the average age of members in the first Israeli parliament in 1949 was forty-three; twenty years later the average age in the sixth parliament was sixty-three. See Elon, op. cit., p. 305.

<sup>16</sup>Aharon F. Kleinberger, Society, Schools, and Progress in Israel (London: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 88. Kleinberger continues: "There have been numerous attempts to curtail public criticism, e.g., by means of a law against libel which threatens to restrict freedom of the press, excessive use of security reasons for muzzling the press, pressure on the broadcasting service to stop satirical programmes or to debar unacceptable persons from participation, etc."

could not fulfill, but also in a second sense, somewhat more specific to the Israeli case, as noted by Etzioni. Because Mapai is a constant and dominant partner in governing coalitions,

other parties tend . . . to become irresponsible in the sense that they are ready to bargain about many issues of public interest in order to be included in the coalition and as a price for staying in it. As they have to choose between being an insignificant opposition or a minor member of the coalition, they often choose the latter. . . . Irresponsible politics in turn cause some voters to shift to the major party which "does the job" and manifests responsible leadership. This validates the claim of the Mapai spokesmen that there is no alternative to the party in office. Thus a vicious circle is created: one party remains in office for a long time; this creates irresponsibility in other parties; and this in turn strengthens the position of the party in office.<sup>17</sup>

The parties in Israel originated before the arrival of statehood, and in fact they or their progenitors were organized outside of Palestine itself. We have observed that Israel's party system is not structurally analogous to party systems in Western democracies; neither is the idea of party in Israel based on any Western model. Parties served as the primary means of immigration, with believers coming to settle and develop Palestine in order to fulfill party ideologies. Given the restricted nature of immigration during the Mandate Period, the parties were engaged in intense struggle to see to it that their followers in fact immigrated. During that period the parties developed a network of affiliated institutions,

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<sup>17</sup>Etzioni, op. cit., p. 715.

including schools, youth groups, adult associations, agricultural settlements, and labor exchanges. Even today it is the case that Israeli parties are engaged in activities that would elsewhere be performed by public authorities, or private institutions. The parties have built agricultural settlements and industries; founded schools and clinics; have their own cultural centers, housing projects, sports clubs, banks, youth movements, and publish their own newspapers. In the pre-state period, some of the parties had their own military organizations.

The Israeli citizen confronts political parties at every turn. Through the various institutions of the party, a very real economic and social power is developed over supporters and members, taking the form of political feudalism, which while declining, is far from moribund.<sup>18</sup> It is estimated that one-fourth to one-third of the adult population are actually card-carrying members of a political party, and the majority of voters depend to some extent on particular parties for news, some cultural activities, economic services, and even jobs.<sup>19</sup> Party influence is

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<sup>18</sup>See Amitai Etzioni, "The Decline of Neo-Feudalism: The Case in Israel" (paper presented at annual meeting of American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Mo., September, 1961).

<sup>19</sup>See S. D. Johnston, "Election Politics and Social Change in Israel," Middle East Journal, XVI (Summer, 1962), 309-27. See also subsequent comments in this chapter on patron-client relationships to the party-controlled bureaucracy. The feudalism observed here derives from

reduced in urban areas, which has led to greater campaign efforts in those areas. Obviously, these are the population centers as well, which makes electoral concentration on them easily understandable, but it is not only size which minimizes the attention given agricultural areas during elections; the agricultural settlements tend to be party affiliated, and some kibbutzim are clearly off-limits to other parties.

Fein found it useful to distinguish the party in Israel as electoral competitor and as ideological persuader, calling the former its "party" role, the latter its role as a "movement."<sup>20</sup> Conceived of as a movement, a party is an agent designed to change society, which sees itself as part of an historical process; the tendency for such a party is to be characterized by democratic centralism, as opposed to a pluralistic compromise structure. Such a party is, of course, a party of solidarity--directive, monopolistic, and extra-constitutional. Avineri attributes Israel's non-Western concept of political party as a "movement" to the Eastern European background of the pioneers, holding that the revolutionary

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the pre-state period, during which privileges and services were awarded by party membership. Such a notion can be contrasted with that of the universal rule of law, and the equality of citizens before the law, characteristics of the secular-libertarian model.

<sup>20</sup>Fein, op. cit., especially pp. 67-72.

left-wing parties of Russia at the turn of the century served as models for the Zionist labor parties. These were movements aimed not at sharing power in an established society, but at activating an entire population for the purpose of overthrowing the existing political structure. Israeli labor parties, says Avineri, combine the anti-intellectual romanticism of the populist social-revolutionaries, with their belief in the innate virtues of the people, and the centralist training in party organization and internal discipline characterizing the Bolsheviks.<sup>21</sup>

Much of the character of Israeli politics can only be explained by the Eastern European background of the early pioneers, and the nature of the party system which arose from that background, and which is still largely controlled by those pioneers. These pioneers saw themselves as revolutionaries, but as Dorothy Willner observes, while they rejected what they regarded as the negative aspects of Jewish life in the Diaspora, taking new vocations in Palestine, developing new norms of behavior, new community types, and new forms of organization, the early pioneers in Palestine did not entirely escape their past:

The culture of Eastern European Jewry, and to varying extents that of the larger Eastern European societies,

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<sup>21</sup>Shlomo Avineri, "Israel in the Post Ben-Gurion Era," Midstream, September, 1965, p. 21.

were the cultures in which they had been socialized, and the only ones they really knew. Their basic modes of perception, symbolization, reaction, and interpretation persisted, as did other components of behavior that did not enter the system of conscious values open to deliberate revision. . . . Pervasiveness of belief systems, of the ideologically oriented partisan networks of organizations of partisan commitment; factionalism, fission, and the acrimony of factional dissent --all of these can be related to the Eastern European antecedents of the majority of the pre-statehood immigrants to Palestine and members of the Zionist movement.<sup>22</sup>

Given the Eastern European backgrounds of the founding pioneers, one might wonder why any form of democracy should have emerged at all. Avineri observes that Israel's democratic structure is a product of the political structure of the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine, in which all forms of settlement were constituted by the consensus of the settlers themselves, and were necessarily voluntary and democratic. Yet, given the fact that the native countries of the settlers were not themselves democratic, the propensity towards democracy requires further explanation. Avineri goes back to the tradition of Kehila, the autonomous self-governing community by which the Jews in Eastern Europe were organized. While Eastern European society was organized hierarchically and autocratically, the Jewish community was given a considerable degree of autonomous local control, and was organized on a representative and elective system. In addition Avineri attributes much significance to the

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<sup>22</sup>Dorothy Willner, Nation-Building and Community in Israel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 83-84.



experience within the Kehilot of determining such procedural matters as the nature of the electoral process to be used.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Avineri, op. cit., pp. 19-20. Not all are in agreement that the Kehilot were a democratic experience. Avineri calls the Kehilot voluntary and argues, that without a hereditary aristocracy or hierarchical church, the Jews had no alternative to a representative system, striving for consensus. Sachar, however, maintains that the Kehilot were autocratic, because property qualifications determined the franchise, and refers to the officers as wealthy tyrants who put the burden of taxation on the poorer, unfranchised members of the community. See Howard M. Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History (New York: Delta, 1963), p. 32.

The dominant elites of Israeli society are products of the shtetl culture of Eastern European Jewry, and while they rejected that life, there is little question that many elements of that culture persist in Israel. For example, one finds in Israel a tendency to "placate or alleviate, rather than to control," and the use of intermediaries to achieve one's goals. [See Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, Life is With People (New York: International Universities Press, 1952), pp. 214-238]. Such a "community" orientation is further encouraged by the size of the country, which among elites manifests itself through the existence of predominantly face-to-face relationships.

Louis Hartz has developed the concept of "fragment societies," new societies created from the "fragment" of a larger whole, of which Israel is a prime example. The Israeli pioneers were a fragment of the Jewish population, coming from the Eastern European shtetl life, rejecting that life. While the shtetl disappeared in Europe, in some respects its last and final manifestation is in Israel, where certain aspects of it are institutionalized.

In accordance with Hartz's theory, it is indeed the case that conflict and disagreement in Israel are within certain prescribed boundaries; subsequent waves of immigrants have accepted the dominant ideology in varying degrees, but none have developed a counter ideology. To do so would be almost an anti-Israel act. Thus the fragment is dominant, and the radical guiding ideology has become conservatized.

The result is wide consensus in Israel on a number of matters, but also the existence of elite politics. The consensus, and the sense of collectivity it promotes, furthers the belief in responsiveness of government officials, at the same time that the elite politics, and

The intensity of party politics in Israel is extremely high, partly as a result of the proportional representation system with the entire country as one district, but moreover from historical circumstances of which the proportional representation system is a direct result. This has to do with the nature of Zionism, and its emergence. Zionism emerged as an ideology among a dispersed people having no means of coercion and rewards. Furthermore, it was an ideology in some ways opposed to Judaism, and which had to compete with other ideologies current in Eastern Europe at that time, both within the Jewish population and in the larger society. Thus within the Zionist movement there was ideological intensity, each sub-group seeking to maintain ideological purity, with compromise viewed as sinful deviation.

The effects we have attributed here to the influence of shtetl culture are most pronounced among the earlier pioneers. Post-statehood immigrants from Eastern Europe have tended to be more urban and middle-class, from an environment quite different than that which produced in others such pervasive and intense ideological

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and its associated party system, lowers the sense of personal political effectiveness.

For the "fragment" thesis, see Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964). For a review which attempts to develop a typology of fragment societies, with consideration given to the case of Israel, see Barry M. Schutz, "The Concept of Fragment in Comparative Political Analysis," Comparative Politics, I, 1 (October, 1968), 111-25.

commitment. The native-born are less oriented to the ideologies of the older generation than to Israel itself. They tend, for example, to be less intense in their commitment to Zionism, and even anti-Socialistic.<sup>24</sup> For these, and other reasons, there has been a significant decline in partisan commitment over time, and one of the most basic reasons is the fact that most immigrants in the post-statehood era have not come from Europe, but rather from the Middle East and North Africa. While these immigrants have indeed changed the society, they did not come to do so. Power in Israel is still largely in the hands of the older pioneers, and party politics is almost exclusively their domain.

Nevertheless, Zionism clearly remains Israel's guiding ideology, its central purpose the ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish nation and the creation of a Jewish State. Furthermore, to the elites, and a large segment of the population, the development of socialism is a central ideological commitment. Differences between the parties have centered on their interpretations of socialism, their attitudes toward the Arab states, and the role of religion in the state.<sup>25</sup> Clearly, differences in

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<sup>24</sup>See Alan Arian, Ideological Change in Israel (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve, 1968).

<sup>25</sup>For two interesting attempts to distinguish parties in Israel by their programs, see T. M. Goodland, "A Mathematical Presentation of Israel's Political

interpretation of Zionism have existed as well, but Zionism is an ideology shared by virtually all, and if the intensity with which this ideology has been adhered to has varied, its content has remained unchanged.<sup>26</sup>

Zionism and socialism serve as consummatory values in Israel. Consummatory values, says Apter, are non-rational in that they emphasize ultimate ends.<sup>27</sup> In Israel, Zionism and socialism as values often take precedence over what might be regarded as more "objective" needs of development. These larger ends, for example, have their influence on economic decision-making. Wage policy in Israel is linked to Socialism, and not to productivity; wages are largely determined by such ascriptive criteria as family size. The Zionist-Socialist ideology places great emphasis on social integration, a goal which at times conflicts with needs of economic development. For example, economic development requires an educational system producing elites, but social integration requires reducing the educational gap between children of Eastern and Western origin; economic development requires a slowdown of the rising standard of living, but social

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Parties," British Journal of Sociology, VIII (September, 1957), 263-66; and Louis Guttman, "Whither Israel's Political Parties?" Jewish Frontier, XXVIII, 12 (December, 1961).

<sup>26</sup>Arian, Ideological Change in Israel.

<sup>27</sup>Apter, op. cit., p. 250.

integration requires parts of the population to increase their standard of living. Beyond that, an increasing standard of living is an incentive to promote immigration from the West.<sup>28</sup>

What I have referred to as "consummatory values" are called by Akzin and Dror "contextual ends," and they cite Friedmann's remark that:

Contextual ends are represented by social values and traditions that do not, in themselves, constitute the immediate objectives of planning but are nevertheless sufficiently vital to make their preservation socially worth while.<sup>29</sup>

Consummatory values, or "contextual ends," constitute the larger purposes of the state, which no adequate empirical standard can evaluate. Where certain consummatory values are of such significance as in Israel, they affect all forms of decision making. I have pointed out previously that in a mobilization system certain instrumental values may be raised to the level of consummatory values. In Israel it is not so much the case that an instrumental value, such as raising per capita income, is transformed into a consummatory value, as that the need for raising

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<sup>28</sup> See discussion of these matters in Kleinberger, op. cit., pp. 103-15, and references cited there.

<sup>29</sup> John Friedmann, "Introduction: From Polemics to Dispassionate Analysis" to "The Study and Practice of Planning," International Social Science Journal, XI, 3 (UNESCO, 1959), 327ff., as cited in Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror, Israel: High-Pressure Planning (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 82, footnote 9.

per capita income must be evaluated within the larger framework of consummatory values.

Halpern makes a point similar to this in his comparison of Zionism and other nationalist movements. He contends that "the conquest and unrestricted exercise of political sovereignty is the only absolute and unconditional aim" of nationalism:

The other major nationalist aims--such as the exclusive control of the land and natural resources, or the secure establishment of the national language and culture--are often conceived as means, and not only as ends. The pursuit of such aims may be deliberately restricted or suspended for reasons of policy . . . [but] it seems to be the very hallmark of a modern nationalist movement, or of a new nation, that it never thinks of its political sovereignty as subordinate to other specific ends. . . .

To this generalization, Zionism is an outstanding exception. Political sovereignty was not, at all times without exception, an absolute and unconditional purpose in Zionism, the end to which all other nationalist aims were subordinated and all considered as means. As a general rule, Zionism valued national sovereignty not for its own sake alone, but also as one of the instruments needed for the attainment of other ends of the nationalist movement. . . . To occupy the land and develop the resources of the Jewish National Home or to cultivate the Hebrew language and restore an active social and cultural national consensus seemed at times to have logical precedence and even emotional primacy over the aim of political sovereignty; and often sovereignty was envisaged as a means subordinate to those other ends.<sup>30</sup>

The Zionists had no tangible enemy such as a foreign colonialist to rally against, and Zionism focused on more

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<sup>30</sup> Ben Halpern, "Zionism and Israel," Jewish Journal of Sociology, III, 2 (December, 1961), 157-58. See also Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), especially "Zionist Conceptions of Sovereignty."

abstract and diffuse objectives. Moreover, the scope of action open to the Zionists was narrow. In some ways it is true that this led, as Halpern argues, to making the Zionists more pragmatic and "reasonable" than other nationalists, allowing them to subordinate the goal of sovereignty to other aims. But precisely because the achievement of sovereignty was not at all times the primary goal of the Zionist movement, its attainment left other consummatory values still to be achieved pre-eminent.

Though strongly oriented to certain consummatory values, Israel is primarily a reconciliation system in structure. The combination of Israel's ideological tradition and its political structure have significant consequences in Israeli political life. Among these consequences is a low sense of personal political effectiveness, for the ideological tradition has led, as Fein observes, to a "relative insensitivity on the part of the government to public opinion":

It is not that the ideology is antidemocratic in substance. On the contrary it speaks of radical democracy. But ideological commitment leads the committed to believe that they know better. Its common consequence is an elitist view, in which the committed see themselves as the enlightened. In Israel, this view receives significant support from other aspects of the system. The electoral system is relatively insensitive to minor shifts in public opinion; members of the Knesset have only weak ties to the heterogeneous constituencies which might alert them to public feelings, nor is their political future dependent on their accord with the mass public; there are, in Israel, so many publics, so sharply demarcated, that "representing" public opinion is either a hopeless task or a

danger to the fragile national consensus.<sup>31</sup> It may well be that even without ideology the system would not develop formal channels for communicating the public will. But it is more likely that one of the central impediments to institutional change is the lack of any powerful pressure to create such channels, a lack which derives in the first instance from the elitist consequences of ideological commitment.<sup>32</sup>

As noted, the intensity of Israeli politics is high, yet the Zeidman case illustrates that even issues of the highest intensity can often be resolved, and often such issues tend to die down after the event. Because of the high intensity at which Israeli politics normally operate, there may be a tendency to read too much into these matters. While it is true that ideology is far more important in Israeli politics than in other Western nations, it is in part a matter of ritual, and as Fein observes, this, too, is a source of cynicism:

. . . once the dust of battle has settled the combatants embrace and walk off the field together . . . [and] the citizen must conclude either that the accusations and counteraccusations, the solemn commitments and dire warnings, were merely so much

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<sup>31</sup>Because of the existing list system, a Knesset member has no base independent of his party; he owes his election to the party, and has no other constituency. If he wishes to be re-elected, he is obliged to give his absolute allegiance to the party. This statement might be somewhat qualified in light of the fact that for the most part Knesset members are in fact the party leadership, so that the problem is not so severe (for the Knesset member) as it might appear. But in any event, the effect on the nature of representation is unchanged.

<sup>32</sup>Fein, op. cit., p. 224.



rhetoric, never meant to be taken seriously, or that the political leaders have sold their principles for a mess of pottage.<sup>33</sup>

Party influence is by no means limited to legislative concerns, as has been noted. The various ministries are controlled by different parties, their price and payment for participating in the coalition, and have a tendency to become their private domains. Thus, for example, the National Religious Party has had almost exclusive control over the Ministry of Interior, and as the Zeidman case indicates had taken upon itself the decision as to who would be regarded as a Jew. That party has also controlled the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was established primarily for international political reasons, as evidence of Israel's recognition of the importance of Palestine for other religions and her concern for their interests. But as a consequence of the fact that the Minister has always come from the religious parties its concerns have been directed toward the religious courts, Sabbath observance,

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<sup>33</sup>Fein, op. cit., p. 72. But neither should ideology be under-emphasized, a point to which I shall return. One extreme case is reported by Safran, when in the late 1940's the struggle between Mapai and Mapam was so great many kibbutzim were split apart. "Whichever group was in the majority expelled the minority, and in some cases, sections of one and the same kibbutz had to be segregated by barbed wire. Lifelong friendships were broken, children who had grown together were separated, families were sometimes sundered, and all over such issues as whether or not Mapai had sold out to the capitalists and whether or not Mapam had sold out to the Russians." Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 111.

dietary regulations, and religious education, and in general imposing Orthodoxy on the Jewish population.<sup>34</sup> Similar cases exist for other ministries, any of which provide both a degree of power as well as spoils for the party controlling them.

Caiden observes in Israel a mutual distrust between governors and governed, deriving essentially from past experiences of the population in Russia, Germany, and Palestine during the British Mandate. The authoritarian traits of the previous regime persisted, with the consequence that a population largely without experience in democratic government sought ways around the law and administration. The Israeli government is highly discretionary, with few safeguards against abuse. Unable to appeal bureaucratic decisions, the individual becomes more dependent on the leniency of the state, which itself becomes open to various kinds of influence.<sup>35</sup>

These characteristics encourage protekzia, or informal means of exerting influence or obtaining benefits. Dror suggests that protekzia fulfills many positive functions, serving to reduce the anxiety and feeling of

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<sup>34</sup> Safran incidentally notes that this ministry has no parallel in any Western country, although it is frequently found in Islamic states. See Safran, op. cit., p. 155.

<sup>35</sup> See Gerald Caiden, "Israeli Administration after Twenty Years," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad, No. 8 (1967), 9-29.

insecurity of a person coming into contact with the administration.<sup>36</sup> This is, of course, only true in the case of one with protekzia, and so long as it flourishes those without such "pull" should feel all the more anxious than in a system more universally-oriented. Despite Dror's defense of the merits of protekzia, Caiden seems closer to the reality in observing that the public becomes distrustful of a system which permits protekzia to flourish.<sup>37</sup>

There is an element in Israeli politics, most clearly seen in the relations of individuals to the bureaucracy, of what is known elsewhere as clientelismo,

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<sup>36</sup>Yehezkel Dror, "Nine Main Characteristics of Governmental Administration in Israel," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad, No. 5 (1964), 12-13.

<sup>37</sup>Caiden, op. cit., p. 22. Protekzia is also discussed in Yair Carmi, "Favoritism in the Israeli Civil Service," Public Administration in Israel and Abroad, No. 9 (1968), 58-64. It should be noted here that with regard to the concept of public service in Israel, officials are far more likely to see themselves as servants of the state than of the public, and to see their role as one of keeping the citizen in his place. Caiden attributes this characteristic to three traditions which converge: (1) Central European--the citizen must be impressed with state power and majesty; (2) Levantine--disarming courtesy, slow working habits; (3) chauvinism, according to which the state knows best. These factors and others lead Caiden to apply the label "bureaucratic polity" to Israel, and to observe that while characteristics such as these can be found in all bureaucracies, in "bureaucratic polities" the remedies are not simply administrative, but involve deep attitude change--fundamentally towards democracy and away from authoritarian traits.

or clientelist politics.<sup>38</sup> While I have emphasized heretofore the ideological nature of Israeli politics, for those outside the ideological framework, and for everyone in many specific transactions, a relationship based on personal ties is more significant. Interest groups also tend to become "clients" of a party. By and large we can say that the party serves as the patron, and in some cases, such as agricultural villages, this is quite clearly the primary link to the larger system. For non-political elements in the society, this system can be used to advantage, as they are prepared to sell their vote for the satisfaction of personal needs by the party.<sup>39</sup> Among Easterners, in particular, this is a not uncommon technique.

In some circumstances such a client-patron relationship may provide a two-way advantage, but it nevertheless strengthens the role of the patron, in this case the political party. Muller observes that the phenomenon of clientelismo may account for his finding that in Italy and Mexico individuals make no connection between their own sense of ability to influence government and the

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<sup>38</sup> John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV, 2 (June, 1970), 411-25.

<sup>39</sup> Benjamin Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy," in Integration and Development in Israel, ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivkah Bar Yosef and Chaim Adler (Jerusalem: Israeli Universities Press, 1970), p. 20. See also Emmanuel Gutmann, "Some Observations on Politics and Parties in Israel," India Quarterly, XVII, 1 (January-March, 1961), 3-29.

receptivity of their governments to influence from the general membership. Dealing as it does with the satisfaction of personal interests, clientelismo "would not encourage members to associate their beliefs in the responsiveness of government to the members in general with their perception of their own ability to influence political decisions."<sup>40</sup>

If Israel is to be regarded as a reconciliation system, it is certainly one of a very special nature. Factors other than those mentioned here could be considered as well, such as the degree of centralization in the governmental structure, particularly evident in the economic sphere,<sup>41</sup> but also in the minimal importance of local politics and government. With regard to the latter, it is noteworthy that the formation of local governing coalitions is largely determined by the party central committees, which trade off advantages in certain localities for advantages in others. One might also consider the degree to which Israel can appropriately be labeled a

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<sup>40</sup>Muller, op. cit., p. 803.

<sup>41</sup>There is probably no democracy in which the government has as much influence on the detailed operations of the economy as does the Israeli government, in the extent to which it owns and operates a variety of economic enterprises, and controls the setting in which private enterprise functions. For a discussion of this, see Kleinberger, op. cit., pp. 103-15.

"garrison state."<sup>42</sup> Another observation would be that Israel is not an institutionally pluralistic society; there are no truly effective independent interest groups, all such groups being party affiliated. The most obvious example of this fact would be in the relation between the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and the State; labor disputes are resolved within the party, which controls both the state apparatus and the Histadrut.<sup>43</sup>

But the essential characteristic, from which many of the more specific matters discussed here derive, is the overriding importance of certain consummatory values. It is not only that the Zionist ideology and the struggle for survival promote a certain conformity in values. Equally as important is the fact that even those values which are not shared are likely to be held intensely by their adherents, and the political dialogue to be conducted in terms of what are regarded as basic values. Amos Elon expresses this extremely well:

The word arachim ("values") has always had an important place in the internal debate. It connotes near-absolute ideological and moral fixities. Values are always "basic": "Jewish values," "socialist

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<sup>42</sup>See Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel (London: Cass, 1969), and "The Israeli Army in Politics," World Politics, XX, 4 (July, 1968), 606-43.

<sup>43</sup>See Safran, op. cit., pp. 127-46; also Georges Friedmann, The End of the Jewish People? (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 88-114; Margaret Plunkett, "The Histadrut: The General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, II, 2 (1958), 155-82.

values," "Zionist values," "moral values," "national values," "pioneering values," "cooperative values." Parliamentary records are filled with anxious debates over sacred "values," to support or oppose purely technical or administrative measures. To the uninitiated outsider, traffic control, air pollution, foreign travel, or television would seem to lie beyond the scope of formal ideology; less so to those who debate such questions in the Knesset.<sup>44</sup>

Among the most central of Israel's consummatory values is the notion of "unity." This is encouraged by a number of factors, including the Zionist ideology itself, the heritage of Judaism as religion, and the external threat to the state of Israel. A constant tension exists between the value of "unity" and the factionalism in Israeli political reality. But just as it can be shown that the stress on "values" often serves as a mask in what is really a struggle for power, neither the importance of ideology generally in Israeli society, nor the stress on unity, should be underestimated. Throughout the history of the Zionist movement, within Israel and outside, ideology and ideas have played a role of crucial significance. The National Unity Government of 1967-1970 is only the most obvious example of attempts at institutionalizing unity.

Only Israel is described by Apter as a system of pyramidal authority and consummatory values. We have seen that cultural, structural, and ideological factors all

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<sup>44</sup>Elon, op. cit., p. 291.

serve to make Israel a political system of a very special nature, one I would wish to designate a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid, for it combines the aspects of those two systems. The development of certain values associated with democracy and the belief in political efficacy among the youth in such a system is the subject to which we now turn.



## CHAPTER III

### POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF ISRAELI YOUTH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter I shall present the findings from a series of questions asked of a sample of Israeli youth concerning the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness, support for democratic norms, and support for the party system. The Israeli responses will be compared with responses to similar questions asked of youth samples in other countries.<sup>1</sup> Such a comparison should allow for greater clarification of the meaning of the Israeli responses.

Fein has previously reported a strikingly low sense of political efficacy among Israelis, finding that Israeli "moderns" show a very high sense of efficacy about as often as do grade-school graduates in the non-Southern

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<sup>1</sup>The cross-national data reported here is from Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I, 1 (April, 1968), 71-101. See Appendix A for further details on the samples used in that article, and on my own sample.

United States. His explanation for this phenomenon tells a good deal about the Israeli political culture.

The tradition of civic participation through interest groups, so powerful in the American tradition, is hardly developed in Israel. Except for political party membership, which takes on much of the same quality as membership in an American interest group, there are few organizations through which to channel political demands. Nor is public opinion regarded with the traditional American sensitivity to the vox populi. Given the system's ideological propensity, it makes little sense for politicians to seek their cues from the voters. Moreover, no Israel politician is so directly tied to a constituency as his American counterpart. His base of support is not his electoral district, but his party . . . [T]he specifically low rate of efficacy among Eastern immigrants has much to do with their expectations of the political system. To many of them, the very concept of political efficacy is alien. When asked how much control they have over the political world, they are startled: "Of course," they imply, "Governmental officials don't really care what people like me think. Are they supposed to?"<sup>2</sup>

Most findings among pre-adults show that the belief in political efficacy increases with age. This is certainly the central finding in Easton and Dennis' study of the development of political efficacy among American children. Speaking of political efficacy as a norm, they see its early development as an important determinant of the persistence of democratic regimes, providing:

a reservoir of diffuse support upon which the system can automatically draw in normal times, when members may feel that their capacity to manipulate the environment is not living up to their expectations, and

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<sup>2</sup>Fein, op. cit., pp. 142-43.

in special periods of stress, when popular participation may appear to be pure illusion or when political outputs fail to measure up to insistent demands.<sup>3</sup>

Contrary to such findings, however, the responses of Israeli youth would seem to indicate that they learn over time that they have little influence over government decisions and decision makers. For example, Israeli fifth and eighth graders were asked how much they believed the Prime Minister, average Knesset member, or Mayor would care about their opinion if they were to write him a letter--"a lot," "some," or "not at all." The following table shows the responses to these questions:

TABLE 3. Belief in governmental responsiveness among fifth and eighth grade Israelis.

		Care a Lot	Some	Not at All
Prime Minister	5th	59%	32%	8%
	8th	22	51	26
Knesset Member	5th	49	40	11
	8th	19	52	27
Mayor	5th	55	35	10
	8th	30	53	16

<sup>3</sup>David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," American Political Science Review, LXI, 1 (March, 1967), 38.

There is a consistent decline from grade to grade for the notion that governmental officials care "a lot," along with a concomitant increase in the belief that they do not care "at all." If it were only the middle category that increased between the two age levels, we might be justified in seeing this as merely a matter of semantics, but this is clearly not the case. The general pattern seen here is a decline in the political efficacy belief as one is politically socialized in Israel.

A further series of questions was asked of the Israeli respondents, which I have divided into questions dealing with the belief in responsiveness of governmental officials and the belief in personal political effectiveness. The responsiveness questions refer to governmental officials, or to citizens in general. Because the respondents are pre-adults, the effectiveness questions refer to the respondent's parents or family. The distribution of responses to these questions is shown in Tables 4 and 5. It might also be noted that in another question asking whether every vote in an election is important even when many people vote, the Israelis were virtually unanimous in agreeing (93 per cent of the eighth graders, 94 per cent of the eleventh graders).

In order to understand the nature of these responses, it will be useful to compare them with findings reported in the United States, Britain, Italy, and Germany.

TABLE 4. Responses of Israeli youth to items concerning responsiveness of governmental officials.

	5th Grade (N=269)	8th Grade (N=292)	11th Grade (N=1021)
It doesn't matter what the average person does, he can't change the decisions of the government, just as he can't change the weather.			
Agree		34%	25%
Disagree		52	63
Don't know, not ascertained		14	12
In the government there are a few powerful people who run the whole thing without considering us--the average citizens.			
Agree		21	23
Disagree		68	63
Don't know, not ascertained		12	14
Israelis have the chance to express their opinions about the way our country is run.			
Agree		90	88
Disagree		4	5
Don't know, not ascertained		6	7
How much does the simple citizen influence which laws are passed?			
Very much	15%	19	16
Some	50	47	49
Not at all	29	32	33
Don't know, not ascertained	6	2	2

TABLE 5. Responses of Israeli youth to items concerning the political effectiveness of their parents or family.

	5th Grade (N=269)	8th Grade (N=292)	11th Grade (N=1021)
In the decisions of the government what people like my parents think is considered.			
Agree		46%	31%
Disagree		31	45
Don't know, not ascertained		23	24
I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think.			
Agree	52%	33	28
Disagree	21	37	40
Don't know, not ascertained	27	31	33
My family has no chance to influence the government and its decisions.			
Agree	44	49	58
Disagree	30	29	24
Don't know, not ascertained	26	22	19

The comparison will show a rather unique pattern maintaining in Israel. In Tables 4 and 5 the "don't know" and "not ascertained" responses are reported as uncommitted. For each country a notation indicates the direction of change in response to the question from grade to grade.

Table 6 shows that the belief in governmental responsiveness is widespread among Israeli youth. Israelis reject more than do others the notion that a few powerful men are running the government without concern for the interests of the citizenry, and they are quite high (second only to the Americans) in rejecting the idea that the government, "like the weather," is immune to change. They, along with the Italians, are virtually unanimous in agreeing that citizens in their country have the chance to express their opinions. In reporting these cross-national findings with which the Israelis are here compared, the authors of that article were much intrigued by the nature of the Italian response to this question, arguing that the form of expressive (rather than behavioral) efficacy indicated by it very likely serves to greatly minimize alienation:

Even if a strong sense of political efficacy does not take root in terms of the common forms of political participation for a predominant portion of Italian youth, there can nevertheless develop a kind of "expressive efficacy" orientation which reassures the Italian of his political status in giving him the right to speak, complain, or criticize decisions and authorities.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 82.

TABLE 6. Cross-national responses to items concerning the belief in governmental responsiveness (percentage).

a) What the government does is like the weather; there is nothing people can do about it. (Israeli version--It doesn't matter what the average person does, he can't change the decisions of the government, just as he can't change the weather.)

	Efficacious Response					Uncommitted					Non-efficacious Response				
	Disagree										Agree				
	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>
8th grade	66	47	47	34	52	14	6	17	21	14	20	47	36	45	34
11th grade	<u>77</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>25</u>
	up	up	up	up	up	dn	--	dn	dn	--	dn	dn	--	up	dn

b) There are some big, powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing, and they do not really care about the rest of us. (Israeli version--In the government there are a few powerful people who run the whole thing without considering us--the average citizens.)

	Disagree										Agree				
8th grade	74	22	51	35	68	12	17	11	23	12	14	59	37	42	21
11th grade	<u>41</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>23</u>
	dn	up	dn	up	dn	up	dn	--	dn	--	up	dn	up	--	--

c) American (etc.) citizens have the chance to express their opinions about the way our country is run. (German version--In this country one can obtain a hearing before the government.)

	Agree										Disagree				
8th grade	78	53	84	49	90	14	11	6	30	6	8	36	10	21	4
11th grade	<u>82</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>5</u>
	up	up	up	up	--	--	dn	--	dn	--	dn	dn	dn	--	--



To some extent a similar orientation seems operative in Israel, though in contrast to Italians, Israelis also indicate a high sense of the comprehensibility and responsiveness of government in general, as indicated by the other questions above.

Nevertheless, Israelis are far from having a belief in the ability to influence government, even relative to the Italians, as the responses to questions concerning political effectiveness, shown in Table 7, indicate.

The response to question "a" in Table 7 shows a very low agreement among Israeli eleventh graders, and strikingly, the only case among the five nations where agreement declines from grade to grade, sizably at that.<sup>5</sup> The response to question "b" in this table is notable because of the high percentage of uncommitted respondents among the Israelis, indicating considerable uncertainty on this point. This may be understandable, in that the question bridges to some degree the two dimensions of efficacy we have been considering--responsiveness and effectiveness. The questions in Table 6 show that the government is felt to be responsive, but here we see that

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<sup>5</sup>Had the fifth grade United States and Italian respondents been shown, the percentages in these instances would show that effectiveness increases with age in all countries except Israel. Unfortunately, this question was not asked of Israeli fifth graders. The responses previously shown, however, do indicate a decrease from fifth to eighth grade.

TABLE 7. Cross-national responses to items concerning political effectiveness (percentage).

a) My family has a voice in what the government does.  
(Israeli version--In the decisions of the government what people like my parents think is considered.)

	Efficacious Response					Uncommitted					Non-efficacious Response				
	Agree										Disagree				
	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>
8th grade	58	44	32	38	46	28	11	17	14	23	14	44	50	48	31
11th grade	<u>59</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>45</u>
	--	up	--	up	dn	--	--	dn	dn	--	--	dn	up	dn	up

b) I don't think that people in the government care much about what people like my family think.

	Disagree					Agree									
5th grade	61	53	38	34	21	19	24	25	31	27	20	23	37	35	52
8th grade	62	42	43	29	37	20	22	22	23	31	18	36	35	48	33
11th grade	<u>51</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>28</u>
	dn	--	up	dn	up	up	dn	dn	dn	up	up	up	dn	up	dn

when the question refers more specifically to its responsiveness to one's own family, the attribution of responsiveness declines. Interestingly, while at the eighth and eleventh grades the Israelis only exceed the German respondents in disagreeing with the statement in question "b," at the fifth grade level they are markedly the lowest.

Israeli youth are clearly low in believing their parents to be politically effective, and on two of the three questions dealing with effectiveness (see Table 5) there is a decline in the belief in effectiveness with age. The Israeli system seems to produce passive citizens, relatively confident that governmental officials are responsive, but not convinced of their own ability to influence policy. This configuration, I have suggested, may be characteristic of a working mobilization system, or a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid.

The difference between the Israeli respondents and those of other countries reported here can perhaps be seen more concisely if we compare the average percentage of respondents answering efficaciously in both series of questions, and the differences between these averages (Table 8).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>The percentage of individuals answering "efficaciously" on the various questions in each country studied by Dennis, *et al.*, and in Israel, was tallied, and an average computed.

TABLE 8. Average percentage of respondents answering efficaciously to responsiveness and effectiveness items, and differences between the averages.

	8th Grade					11th Grade				
	US	UK	It	Ge	Is	US	UK	It	Ge	Is
Average responsiveness percentage	73	41	61	39	70	67	56	64	48	71
Average effectiveness percentage	<u>40</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>24</u>
Difference between the averages	35	12	33	17	42	30	21	34	21	47

In addition to showing, as we have seen, that Israelis are relatively high on responsiveness and relatively low on effectiveness, this table shows that the differences between the two dimensions are greatest in Israel, a difference which increases with age. The incongruence between the two dimensions is greatest in Israel. The table may suggest some modifications in the model previously developed, showing as it does a degree of incongruence in the United States and Italian samples between the two beliefs. If the notion of "expressive efficacy" as the explanation for the high Italian responsiveness percentage is accepted, then the Italian incongruency disappears. Given that the Americans are relatively high on both dimensions, the incongruence of responses here may be of less consequence. Clearly the belief in responsiveness is in every case higher than the

belief in effectiveness, suggesting that collective interests and governmental legitimacy may serve to raise the former belief in all countries. But the Israeli pattern remains unique. Of the five countries, Israeli eleventh graders are highest on responsiveness, and lowest on effectiveness.

It is argued that the belief in political efficacy contributes to democracy, both in terms of individual attitudes and at the system level. Almond and Verba maintain that the subjectively competent citizen appears to be the "democratic citizen," finding subjective competence related to other democratic orientations.<sup>7</sup> Barnes holds that relatively high levels of political competence are a necessary condition of political democracy, finding one's level of political competence to be directly related to his preference for democratic, as opposed to authoritarian, styles of leadership.<sup>8</sup> Two indicators of the more general democratic orientations of Israelis may be found in their support for democratic norms, and their support for the party system in their country.

A series of standard questions concerning support for democratic norms were asked of the Israeli respondents.

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<sup>7</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 257.

<sup>8</sup>Samuel H. Barnes, "Leadership Style and Political Competence," in Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies, ed. by Lewis J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 78-83.

In Table 9 the responses to these questions at each grade are reported.

That Israelis indicate a high level of support for democratic norms is clear before any comparison. A comparison, however, of the Israeli response to that reported on the two questions of this series also used in the Dennis, et al. article shows the high level of support among Israelis even more emphatically (Table 10).

By the eighth grade Israelis are very much in agreement that democracy is the best form of government, and at both the eighth and eleventh grades they show the highest agreement for any country. This is all the more interesting as democracy is not a concept that receives their early attention. Among the uncommitted fifth graders it was clear that many were unfamiliar with the word "demokratia." In explaining the British response to this question, Dennis, et al., conclude that the British political vocabulary does not stress usage of the term "democracy."<sup>9</sup> To some extent such an explanation will also serve for the younger Israelis, who are more likely to have had stressed for them the idea that they live in a free Jewish state, than that they live in a democracy.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless,

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<sup>9</sup>Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 257.

<sup>10</sup>See Lea Adar and Chaim Adler, Education for Values in Schools for Immigrant Children in Israel (in Hebrew), (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University School of Education, 1965), p. 38; this article is discussed in Kleinberger, op. cit., p. 184.

TABLE 9. Responses of Israeli youth to items concerning support for democratic norms (percentage).

	5th Grade (N=269)	8th Grade (N=292)	11th Grade (N=1021)
Is democracy the best form of government?			
Agree	38%	86%	89%
Disagree	15	3	4
Don't know, not ascertained	48	11	7
Is democracy rule by the people?			
Agree	42	87	91
Disagree	18	5	6
Don't know, not ascertained	40	7	4
Is it correct that in the democratic system of government every adult can vote?			
Agree	51	86	80
Disagree	18	10	17
Don't know, not ascertained	31	4	2
Is it correct that in the democratic system every man is given an equal opportunity to improve his social condition?			
Agree	44	64	69
Disagree	19	18	17
Don't know, not ascertained	37	17	14
Is it correct that in the democratic system any man can say things against the government without anything bad happening to him?			
Agree	39	82	79
Disagree	28	15	15
Don't know, not ascertained	33	4	6
In the democratic system when a majority of the people agree on something then the rest of the people should not criticize. Do you agree with this definition?			
Agree	43	32	10
Disagree	25	57	86
Don't know, not ascertained	32	12	4

TABLE 10. Cross-national responses to two items concerning support for democratic norms (percentage).

a) Is democracy the best form of government?

	Democratic Response					Uncommitted					Anti-democratic Response				
	Agree										Disagree				
	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Ge</u>	<u>Is</u>
5th grade	42	26	57	36	38	36	68	23	59	48	19	6	20	5	15
8th grade	58	28	78	58	86	28	64	15	36	11	14	8	7	5	3
11th grade	<u>74</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
	up	up	up	up	up	dn	dn	dn	dn	dn	dn	up	dn	--	dn

b) When most of the people want to do something, the rest of the people should not criticize. (Israeli version-- In the democratic system when a majority of the people agree on something then the rest of the people should not criticize. Do you agree with this definition?)

	Disagree					Agree									
5th grade	9	34	35	21	25	25	15	15	42	32	65	52	50	37	43
8th grade	36	58	44	32	57	26	5	10	31	12	38	36	45	37	32
11th grade	<u>33</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>10</u>
	up	up	up	up	up	up	dn	dn	dn	dn	dn	--	dn	up	dn



to the extent that this interpretation may be valid in explaining the fifth-grade responses, clearly by the eighth grade Israelis are overwhelmingly in agreement with the idea that democracy is the best form of government. Regarding the right of the minority to criticize majority decisions, the Israeli response is extremely high. Only in Israel and Italy do a majority of the oldest group give the democratic response, or do more give the "democratic" response than the "anti-democratic" response. The Israelis are clearly more supportive of this norm than the youth in the other countries shown.

A less extensive comparison is possible for the other questions in this series, but in every case it is clear that the Israelis are high in their support for democratic norms. Table 11 shows the percentage giving the "democratic response to each of the four remaining questions, using findings reported from the United States and Great Britain.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>The findings from the United States are from Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968), Table 13, "Changes by Grade in Concept of Democracy," p. 75. For Great Britain see Paul R. Abramson and Timothy M. Hennessey, "Beliefs about Democracy among British Adolescents," Political Studies, XVIII, 2 (June, 1970), 24; the findings are from a sample of twelve- to sixteen-year-old children, and are reported by type of school rather than grade level. However, even the highest percentages reported are lower than those found among Israelis.

TABLE 11. Cross-national responses to four items concerning support for democratic norms (percentage giving democratic response).

	US	UK	Israel
a) Is a democracy where the people rule? [Israeli version --Is democracy rule by the people? (percentage agreeing).]			
5th grade	36%	--	42%
8th grade	76	31-68	87
11th grade	--	31-68	91
b) Is a democracy where all adults can vote? [Israeli version--Is it correct that in the democratic system of government every adult can vote? (percentage agreeing).]			
5th grade	52	--	51
8th grade	75	43-75	86
11th grade	--	43-75	80
c) Is a democracy where everyone has an equal chance to get ahead? [Israeli version--Is it correct that in the democratic system every man is given an equal opportunity to improve his social condition? (percentage agreeing).]			
5th grade	50	--	44
8th grade	83	43-56	64
11th grade	--	43-56	69
d) Is a democracy where you can say anything against the government without getting into trouble? [Is it correct that in the democratic system every man can say things against the government without anything bad happening to him? (percentage agreeing).]			
5th grade	23	--	39
8th grade	54	35-55	82
11th grade	--	35-55	79

As is well known, general support for democratic norms does not necessarily indicate a democratic attitude in more specific applications.<sup>12</sup> Yet, if we compare one further question asked of the Israeli sample--"Even people who oppose our way of life have a right to be heard"--with a comparable question for which we have cross-national data--"We should not allow people to make speeches against our kind of government"--the Israelis again show themselves considerably more "democratic."

TABLE 12. Cross-national responses on a specific application of democratic rights (percentage).

We should not allow people to make speeches against our kind of government. Democratic response = disagree).  
[Israeli version--Even people who oppose our way of life have a right to be heard. (Democratic response = agree).]

	Democratic Response					Uncommitted					Anti-democratic Response				
	US	UK	It	Ge	Is	US	UK	It	Ge	Is	US	UK	It	Ge	Is
8th grade	62	56	63	49	87	18	11	8	15	7	20	33	29	36	6
11th grade	<u>64</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>7</u>
	--	up	dn	up	up	--	dn	--	dn	dn	--	dn	up	dn	--

<sup>12</sup>See especially James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Basis of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, XXII, 2 (May, 1960), 276-94. Also, among others, Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII (June, 1964), 361-82.

Why the Israeli respondents should be so consistently high in their support for democratic norms is somewhat enigmatic. In a study of education for values in Israeli schools, it was discovered that civic values received relatively little attention, certainly far less than the most prominent value inculcated, that of nationalism. To the extent that concepts which might relate to democracy were discussed, they were dealt with in the context of history, and not directly in terms of civic education for the individual students. The authors noted that concepts such as liberty and equality were not dealt with, the teacher tending to act as though the student already knew them. The study did discover, however, that citizenship values were ranked higher by students than the emphasis given them in the school would have predicted, indicating that the school is not by itself the only factor influencing the values of the pupils.<sup>13</sup>

Social education receives very little attention in the curriculum of Israeli schools. In fact, from the fourth grade on in primary school it receives one hour a week. However, the attention given to social education, or education for good citizenship, is probably best not seen in the curriculum. It is fostered, rather, through student government, class excursions, and a variety of

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<sup>13</sup>Adar and Adler, op. cit.

other activities.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, political discussion is endemic in Israel, if not so much in schools. Certainly the avowed purpose of the state educational system does include the importance of democratic norms:

The object of State education is to base elementary education in the State on the values of Jewish culture and the achievements of science, on love of the homeland and loyalty to the State and the Jewish people, on practice in agricultural work and handicraft, on chaltzic (pioneer) training, and on striving for a society built on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual assistance and love of mankind.<sup>15</sup>

While there is some evidence that the various topics outlined in the State Education Law are given relative importance in the order they are listed, it is nevertheless apparent that whether through the direct role of the school, or more indirectly from the society as a whole, a support for democratic norms is inculcated among young Israelis. This is an important finding, inasmuch as many observers of the Israeli education system have bemoaned the insufficient attention given to such matters. It is true that our questions do not allow us to understand the depth of democratic sentiments among our respondents, but certainly the findings as reported are reassuring.

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<sup>14</sup>See Kleinberger, op. cit., pp. 155-56.

<sup>15</sup>State Education Law, paragraph 2, reprinted in Ruth Stanner, The Legal Basis of Education in Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1963), p. 169.

We see, therefore, that Israelis are high in their support for democratic norms and in their belief in the responsiveness of governmental officials, but low in their belief in personal political effectiveness. I have noted that there is considerable cynicism in Israel relating to the party system, and have suggested that the explanation for the relatively low sense of personal political effectiveness among Israelis lies in an understanding of that system. A number of questions concerned with support for the party system were asked of my sample. That there is disaffection from the party system will be evident in these responses, but it is not suggested that Israelis are opposed to party politics, per se. In fact, over 70 per cent of the eighth and eleventh graders (78 per cent and 72 per cent respectively) believe it is important that every citizen support a political party. Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear dissatisfaction with the existing party system as currently operated. The responses to questions concerning the party system are reported in Table 13.

While the responses show that Israeli youth do not as a group believe that the absence of parties would improve matters, that parties create conflicts where they otherwise would not exist, or that the parties confuse issues more than they clarify them, they most clearly do believe that the conflicts between the parties are

TABLE 13. Responses of Israeli youth to items concerning support for the party system (percentage).

	5th Grade (N=269)	8th Grade (N=292)	11th Grade (N=1021)
The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country more than they help it.			
Agree		61%	66%
Disagree		27	23
Don't know, not ascertained		12	11
Our system of government would work better if we could get rid of the conflicts between the political parties.			
Agree		73	67
Disagree		18	21
Don't know, not ascertained		9	12
The situation in our country would be better if there were no political parties.			
Agree	34%	28	21
Disagree	45	60	58
Don't know, not ascertained	21	12	21
The political parties in Israel create conflicts where in fact none really exist.			
Agree		32	31
Disagree		44	41
Don't know, not ascertained		24	28
The political parties do more to confuse the issue than to clarify it.			
Agree		28	27
Disagree		56	52
Don't know, not ascertained		16	21
Our system of government would work better if there were only two political parties.			
Agree		38	34
Disagree		14	44
Don't know, not ascertained		48	21

damaging, and that eliminating those conflicts would improve matters. It might be thought that such a view would be widespread among young people. To some extent we shall see that this is true, but it is a sentiment even more widespread among Israelis. The following table compares the findings reported elsewhere with my findings, on responses to the statement--"The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country more than they help it."

TABLE 14. Cross-national responses to the statement: The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country more than they help it.

	Disagree					Uncommitted					Agree				
	US	UK	It	Ge	Is	US	UK	It	Ge	Is	US	UK	It	Ge	Is
8th grade	52	31	26	19	27	26	25	14	26	12	22	44	60	55	61
11th grade	<u>59</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>66</u>
	up	--	--	up	dn	up	--	up	dn	--	dn	up	dn	up	up

It is readily apparent that the United States is the deviant case here, whereas in the other countries reported the sentiment that party conflicts hurt more than they help is rather widespread. Given that, however, it is still the case that in Israel the largest percentage of any country is shown agreeing with this statement. This is even more clear if one considers that, among the



eleventh graders, Israelis agree at a ratio of almost three to one, as opposed to the Italian and German responses of slightly under two to one.

In interpreting the German response, Dennis, et al., cite Verba on "the tendency in Germany . . . to seek expert and objective means of resolving conflict rather than allowing the solution to emerge from the confrontation of the competing parties--a tendency to find a non-political rather than political solution."<sup>16</sup> The disaffection of the young in Israel from the older ideologies and the existing parties, their distaste for the older style of political rhetoric (disdainfully referred to as "talking Zionism"), and their preference for getting things done<sup>17</sup> have been frequently noted. The army, in contrast to the political system, is likely to be seen as a more effective model of decision making. To some extent this may be seen in the response to the statement--"The methods of a politician are not important if he gets the rights rhings done"--a statement with which 45 per cent of the eleventh-grade Israelis are in agreement. To some extent, then,

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<sup>16</sup>Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 152, note 144, cited by Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 90.

<sup>17</sup>"Bitzuism,"--getting things done--is, as Fein observes, "one of the more damning epithets of Israel's ideological vocabulary," and one not infrequently directed at the younger generation. Fein, op. cit., p. 56.

the sentiment attributed above to Germany may have its counterpart in Israel, at least among the younger generation.

In interpreting the Italian response, Dennis, et al., conclude that it less likely indicates a rejection of the multi-party system itself than "an expression of disaffection for a system which is unable to effect agreement among the parties."<sup>18</sup> Although Israel has not suffered from the immobility endemic to Italian politics, such a sentiment appears quite strong in Israel. Some support for this interpretation is given by the responses to several other questions. Forty-seven per cent of the Israeli eleventh-grade sample disagree with the statement that most politicians will do the best thing for the state (an increase from 33 per cent at the eighth grade level), and 50 per cent agree that "there is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do after he gets elected; most political parties care only about winning elections and nothing more." And while 53 per cent of the eighth graders feel that it would be beneficial to other countries to adopt the Israeli form of government, only 30 per cent of the eleventh graders agree.

What we see in Israel is not disaffection from competitive politics, but rather from its particular

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<sup>18</sup>Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 91.

manifestation in Israel. The Israeli sees a leadership exerting, as Fein puts it, "near absolute control over political life,"<sup>19</sup> engaging in the most vitriolic fights, proclaiming uncompromisable principles which it invariably finds capable of compromising. The elitism of the parties derives from their ideological backgrounds. While other countries tend to have only one revolutionary party after independence, Israel has been more fruitful. The consummatory values manifested in Zionism, along with the external threat faced by Israel, serve to provide a sense of community and collectivity among Israelis, further enhanced by the often expressed sentiment, "We are all Jews." The fact that it is a small country, whose elites are known, is also an important factor, as is the wide consensus on certain basics. All of these factors promote a belief in the political responsiveness of governmental officials, a belief in the concern of leaders for the public welfare.

At the same time, however, the nature of the party system serves to reduce, or inhibit, the development of a belief in political effectiveness among Israelis. Because of the nature of the electoral system ideologies are represented, but individuals are not; individuals have no representative, representatives have no constituencies. Party elites decide policy, and determine who will be the party's candidates. Local government is of little

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<sup>19</sup>Fein, op. cit., p. 143.

significance, and no local politician is an independent agent; he cannot succeed without reliance on the national party. The party-controlled bureaucracy leads to the growth of protekzia, which may result in developing for some a sense of "subject competence," but certainly not of "citizen competence." While political discussion in Israel is at a very high level, political participation is not, and in many respects citizens lack any experience in democratic politics, either from their life in other countries, or through participation in Israel. All such factors converge to reduce the sense of personal political effectiveness in Israel.

What seems to be missing in Israel is any sense of linkage between elites and masses to the effect that elites should heed public opinion, or that public opinion can influence public policy. With regard to the roles of leadership and followership, the relationship seems somewhat paternalistic. This might be a source of severe strain were Israel lacking its mobilization system characteristics. Israel's leaders have tended to be heroic figures, often recipients of respect and admiration transcending day-to-day political output. It is tolerable to feel ineffective with leaders of such stature, and in a system with over-riding collective goals.

Israel's mobilization system characteristics serve to promote its unique syndrome of responsiveness and



effectiveness beliefs, and make those incongruent beliefs acceptable. But Israel is also a reconciliation system in which individuals develop early a high support for democratic norms, and an acceptance of competitive politics. Naturally, a population of such diverse characteristics as that of Israel should be expected to differ internally in its adherence to these beliefs and norms. In the following chapter I wish to discuss some of the sub-group differences in the orientations dealt with in this chapter. In a subsequent chapter I shall focus particularly on a typology of individuals within the Israeli system, characterized by the nature of their beliefs in governmental responsiveness and personal political effectiveness.

CHAPTER IV  
SUB-GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL  
ORIENTATIONS WITHIN THE  
ISRAELI SAMPLE

Popular commentaries on Israel's successes frequently attribute them to the existence of a homogeneous and unified population. Israeli ideology stresses first and foremost the unity of its people, but in fact Israel's population is extremely diverse. This can be seen politically, when one considers the large number of parties. It can also be seen in terms of religion, where the difference between the orthodox and the more secular elements of the population is probably the most divisive political cleavage in Israeli society.<sup>1</sup> But the most striking factor which differentiates Israeli society, and the one that has perhaps, in the long run, greater potential for conflict than any other cleavage, is that of ethnicity. In this chapter I wish to discuss the different political orientations associated with ethnicity in Israel, and look at

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<sup>1</sup>Alan Arian, "Stability and Change in Israeli Public Opinion and Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXV, 1 (Spring, 1971), 19-35.





the role of socio-economic status, youth movement membership, and course of study in modifying those differences among young Israelis.

The basic ethnic distinction in Israeli society is between Westerners, those of European and American origin, and Easterners, those of Asian and African origin. As of 1968, Westerners constituted 28.8 per cent of the Israeli Jewish population, Easterners 27.2 per cent, and Israeli-born 44 per cent.<sup>2</sup> Friedmann reports, using earlier data from 1962, that the average age of Westerners was then forty-four, of Easterners twenty-six, and of native-born Israelis eight years old.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, an increasingly large proportion of the native-born are children of Eastern parents. By 1962, for example, over half of the Israeli population under the age of thirty were Eastern-born or the children of Eastern immigrants, with the proportion increasing as one goes down the age-scale.<sup>4</sup> To use some more recent figures, of specific relevance to the research reported here, among students in grades one-eight during 1966-67, 31.6 per cent were the children of

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<sup>2</sup>Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, The Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1969, No. 20, p. 44, Table B/17.

<sup>3</sup>Friedmann, op. cit., p. 163. Friedmann's source is Andre Chouraqui, "Israel au carrefour de l'Orient et de l'Occident," in Tiers-Monde, October-December, 1962.

<sup>4</sup>Fein, op. cit., p. 39, Chart II.1.

Western fathers, 59.3 per cent the children of Eastern fathers, and 7.6 per cent the children of Israeli-born fathers. The proportion of Easterners and second-generation Israelis increases at the lower grades.<sup>5</sup>

The differentiation into Eastern and Western is the standard categorization of ethnicity used for official purposes by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, for academic purposes by sociologists, as well as in common parlance. It is, without doubt, the most salient ethnic distinction in Israeli society. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognize that the categorization into East and West is a gross one, likely to be misleading if one

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<sup>5</sup> Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, The Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1969, No. 20, p. 561, Table S/17. Using this table, with data from 1966-1967, the class of students that was at the time of this research, 1969-70, in the fifth grade was 26.2 per cent Western, 62.8 per cent Eastern, and 11.0 per cent second-generation Israeli; the class that was in 1969-70 in the eighth grade was 32.7 per cent Western, 58.8 per cent Eastern, and 8.5 per cent second-generation Israeli. The class that was by 1969-70 in the eleventh grade was 39.5 Western, 53.6 per cent Eastern, and 6.9 per cent second-generation Israeli. As I shall point out further, these percentages do not remain by the high school level, however. In 1968-69, of the total secondary school population, 50.8 per cent were Westerners, 40.3 per cent were Easterners, and 8.9 per cent second-generation Israelis. For secondary academic schools the figures are 60.8 per cent, 29.6 per cent, and 9.6 per cent respectively; for vocational schools 37.6 per cent, 55.4 per cent, and 7.0 per cent respectively. It should be recognized that these figures do not differentiate by grade, and that for eleventh graders the imbalance of Westerners is considerably greater. For a discussion of the school-leaving problem in Israel see Chaim Adler, "Secondary School as a Selective Factor, from a Social and Educational Point of View" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, Hebrew University, 1965).

assumes that all those in either category are of a kind.

As Rivkah Bar Yosef observes:

The accepted definitions of ethnic groups in Israel are, for the most part, groundless. To speak collectively of the "absorption problems of immigrants of Oriental origin," for example, is senseless, since there are no "problems of immigrants of Oriental origin." The absorption problems of the Yemenites differ from those of immigrants from Baghdad, and there is no point in speaking of disturbances of "North Africans": the term "North Africa" embraces different elements, each far removed from the next, including immigrants from Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, villagers from the Atlas mountains, town-dwellers from the suburbs of Casablanca, and merchants from Alexandria. There are no doubt common features in the absorption problems of immigrants from these various countries, but there is room for generalized conclusions only if significant differences are not ignored.<sup>6</sup>

Notwithstanding the caveat that such a classification is an over-simplification, failing to account for wide variation within the groups, to declare that there are no "problems of immigrants of Oriental origin," is no less overstated. As we shall see serious differences do exist between the groups, as categorized, on a wide variety of matters. Most of the Easterners are the product of a traditional society, exhibiting to some degree the characteristics of such a society. Most of them have been influenced by Moslem social and cultural patterns, and the autocratic regimes of those countries from which they have immigrated. As Kleinberger states:

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<sup>6</sup>Rivkah Bar Yosef, "The Moroccans--Background to the Problem," in Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef, and Adler, op. cit., pp. 419-20.

In that traditional society, the extended family and the patrilineal kinship group are the main units of social interaction and cohesion. The individual's feeling of solidarity, sense of obligation, and readiness to co-operate are mainly restricted to his own kinship group, and are not easily extended to persons of different descent, far less to impersonal and anonymous organizations and their rules, laws and authorities. Political loyalty, too, is primarily due to a person's own kinsfolk. Hence, political divisions are, more often than not, based on kinship relations rather than on ideologies or economic interests. In a modern polity like Israel, where parties represent divergent convictions, policies, and interests, this can easily be exploited by them. If an oriental immigrant from a traditional community is offered a position of some power by a party, his whole kinship group (or at least his extended family) will vote for that party.<sup>7</sup>

Kleinberger goes on to discuss the patriarchal nature of such a society, the ascriptive criteria by which it operates, and the low degree of future-orientation, and concludes:

All these characteristics of the traditional society of Oriental Jews reflect the "primitive" mentality of its members which has been conditioned by the prevailing social system. Typical traits of this mentality are lack of rationality and planning, weakness of social and intellectual abstraction, adherence to the familiar and the concrete, magic thinking and superstition, inability to distinguish subjective intentions from objective conditions and formal relations, and the resulting disposition to feel frustrated and personally offended by adverse circumstances, inability to control affects and impulses, etc. These are momentous impediments to scholastic success in a modern, Western-type educational system.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Kleinberger, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Israeli ideology and policy is very much concerned with removing these impediments. In attempting to find solutions to these problems, however, Israeli scholars have been in disagreement as to whether the differences between Easterners and Westerners are to be conceived of as culturally based, or as deriving from the relative status positions of the groups within Israel. The different viewpoints on this question have had consequences with regard to policy-making in the areas of immigrant absorption and integration. One view stresses the cultural differences between the groups, and argues that:

The ability of the absorbers truly to absorb the newcomers . . . depends on their ability to perceive the actual and the potential positive aspects of the "other's" mentality, to relativize their own values and to understand their own limitations by comparing their mentality with the assets of the primitive mentality.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast to this view, with its emphasis on cultural relativity, others have minimized the importance of cultural factors, and tend to deny the existence of culturally distinct ethnic groups. For them the solution does not involve a recognition of the relative values of various cultures, but rather lies in assisting immigrants to adjust to Israeli society. As one of them puts it:

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<sup>9</sup>C. Frankenstein, "The Problem of Ethnic Differences in the Absorption of Immigrants," in Between Past and Future: Essays and Studies on Aspects of Immigrant Absorption in Israel, ed. by C. Frankenstein (Jerusalem: Szold Foundation, 1953), pp. 21-22; cited by Kleinberger, op. cit., p. 52.

Even groups hailing from the same country do not see, in their common origin or in the cultural tradition therein involved, any important or vital social value. All of them, in one way or another, are oriented towards the Yishuv. . . . We cannot speak of respecting the values of a certain group when the group itself has ceased to respect them, or when it has already entered the state of cultural disintegration in its country of origin.<sup>10</sup>

These comments were made almost two decades ago, at which time the more avant garde approach was to deny the existence of cultural differences. The thrust of policy then was towards treating all immigrants as a whole. However, concern grew over the emergence of "two Israels," one Eastern and one Western, and since about 1959 special economic, political, and educational policies have been adopted. This orientation has tended to stress the cultural differences between the two groups, minimizing the socio-economic aspect, and emphasizing ethnic problems and ethnic distinctions. The policy direction with regard to absorption and integration has never been clear, however; this is to some extent because of a conflict between the desirability of specific treatment for a sub-group of the population and the prevailing universalistic ideology. The lack of clear policy in this area was one factor

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<sup>10</sup>J. Ben-David, "Ethnic Differences or Social Change?" in Frankenstein, ed., op. cit.; cited by Kleinberger, op. cit., p. 53.

contributing to the increasing relation between ethnicity and occupational status.<sup>11</sup>

Eisenstadt argues that the tensions and conflicts which emerged between Easterners and Westerners were not the result of insufficient absorption, but rather the products of "partial absorption." Most agencies concerned with absorption focused on the preparation of immigrants for adjustment in Israeli society, and not with continuous help and guidance. In addition, neither informal groups nor political organizations contributed much to the social absorption of immigrants; the former became more and more closed, while the parties, increasingly centralized and bureaucratic, viewed the new immigrants primarily as potential voters.<sup>12</sup>

The concept of partial absorption expresses well the situation of the major proportion of Israel's Eastern population. While for most of them their situation in Israel is better than in their countries of origin, and while in absolute terms their situation has improved while in Israel, the differences between Easterners and Westerners have increased over time. More ominous is the fact

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<sup>11</sup>See S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), pp. 197-200. For a discussion of the educational system's treatment of this problem, see Chaim Adler, "Education and the Integration of Immigrants in Israel," International Migration Review, III, 3 (Summer, 1969), 3-19.

<sup>12</sup>Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 198.

that the gaps within the second generation are even greater than those within the older generation, by such objective measures as income, occupation, level of education achieved, and performance in school. Lissak, studying mobility in Israeli society, has shown that whether measured in terms of occupation, income, or education, Easterners are disadvantaged, with the gaps increasing over time. But the differences are very likely even greater than the indices show, as for example in the case of income, when one recognizes that Oriental families have more children, being nearly 60 per cent larger than families of European origin, whereas the available measure is monthly family income.<sup>13</sup>


We have seen earlier some of the differences in terms of educational enrollment, by looking at the percentage of youths of Eastern and Western origin at different levels of the educational system. Another way to make this point would be to observe that in 1965, of persons in the fourteen to seventeen age group, 59 per cent of the second-generation Israelis were in academic secondary schools, 71 per cent of the children of Western fathers, and only 11 per cent of the children of Eastern fathers.<sup>14</sup> Post-primary education in Israel is neither compulsory nor free,

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<sup>13</sup>Moshe Lissak, Social Mobility in Israel Society (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969), ch. 1, "Changes in the Stratification System in the Fifties and Sixties," pp. 8-44.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 117, footnote 41.





yet over 80 per cent of primary-school graduates are in some post-primary school. About 60 per cent of the entire fourteen to seventeen age group are engaged in some form of education, about half of whom are in academic secondary schools. Only about half of these, however, graduate. Easterners constitute 50-55 per cent of the fourteen to seventeen age group, but as of 1965-66 comprised only 32 per cent of the post-primary school population, and only 23 per cent of those in academic secondary schools, a prerequisite for mobility. Certainly, it is reasonable to assume that by the twelfth grade this percentage has dropped again, so that in academic secondary schools Easterners at the twelfth grade constituted, in the year reported, about 12-13 per cent.<sup>15</sup> The disparity is, of course, even greater at the college level, entry to which requires high school graduation.

As Adler points out, in discussing these problems, there is a conflict between educational efforts toward democratization and integration, and the needs of development and elite formation. But there is no denying that the selective nature of the Israeli educational system produces problems both by excluding a large segment of the population from elite positions, and possibly inculcating elitist attitudes in those few who succeed. Its

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<sup>15</sup>Chaim Adler, "The Israeli School as a Selective Institution," in Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef, and Adler, op. cit., pp. 288-95.

role in providing mobility opportunity for young Easterners is minimal. And, as Adler observes, it is logical to assume that "serious tensions threaten any society in which ecological concentration, educational failure, cultural lag, and economic and vocational inferiority, all coincide with ethnic origin."<sup>16</sup>

While there is evidence of vertical mobility in terms of education, occupation, and income, the gap between the groups increases over time, and Westerners are the beneficiaries. They are, in fact, able to skip steps. In discussing these findings, Lissak says:

All in all, the Oriental communities, particularly the new immigrants among them, constitute a very unstable group, because of the encounter between upward and downward mobile groups, and even of groups (at the bottom of the occupational scale) which are static and despair of any possibility of personal advancement. From various points of view, this constellation constitutes an excellent breeding ground for the development of acute tensions, which can be expressed both on an individual and on a collective level.<sup>17</sup>

Israel's ethnic problem is not simply one of social mobility as measured by various objective indices. It is also very much a problem of social integration, and of the subjective feelings of individuals. There is a ranking of ethnic groups in Israel which is a source of frustration and disaffection among lower-ranked groups. To be

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 296.

<sup>17</sup>Lissak, op. cit., p. 44.

identified with a particular ethnic group is a way of being identified with a particular status: "ethnic groups are ranked differentially, and belonging to one or another group has great social meaning. A person's name, his accent, the cut of his clothes, the shade of his skin--all of this (and more) is perceived, catalogued, and therefore reacted to."<sup>18</sup> One's rank, in this sense, is determined by his similarity to the veteran European settlers:

[T]aken as a whole, to be of European descent is widely recognized as lending higher prestige. For example, research conducted in an ethnically mixed housing project showed not only that Europeans in the project ranked highest, and Moroccans lowest, but also that Moroccans concurred in grading themselves low and Europeans high.<sup>19</sup>

Cohen's study of Kiryat Gat, which was concerned with the perception of the village's stratification system by Eastern and Western youth, showed a tendency for Easterners to see a "caste picture," an image of a hierarchy with two groups, differentiated by length of stay in the country and ethnic origin. This image is in contrast to such alternatives as a non-hierarchical, multi-group image in which groups differ in terms of their ethnic origin, or a hierarchical image focusing on economic criteria, alternatives which Westerners were more likely to choose than Easterners. Very likely this caste image describes

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<sup>18</sup>Alex Weingrod, Israel: Group Relations in a New Society (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 39.

<sup>19</sup>Loc. cit.

the view of many Easterners toward the national political system.<sup>20</sup> In another study, concerned with stratification concepts among urban youth, Easterners saw more likelihood of mobility possibilities, while Eastern youth were more pessimistic, with a majority responding that possibilities are either few or non-existent. The study furthermore reported that these images affect mobility aspirations, and suggested that such views are likely to influence expressions of political protest on the political level.<sup>21</sup>

By objective standards as well, the problems of social integration are apparent. For example, although length of residence increasingly replaces the criterion of ethnic origin in regard to inter-group marriage patterns, such marriages remain relatively rare. In terms of residential patterns, the percentage of Easterners in the established cities and in older settlements is much smaller than their percentage in the total population, while in the new cities and new urban settlements the reverse situation

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<sup>20</sup>E. Cohen, L. Shamgar, and Y. Levy, Research Report: Absorption of Immigrants in a Development Town, the Hebrew University, Department of Sociology, 1962, reported in Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 223-26, and Lissak, op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>21</sup>Lissak, "Trends of Occupational Choice Amongst Urban Youth in Israel," the Hebrew University, Sociology Department, 1962 (mimeographed, in Hebrew), reported in Lissak, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

exists. Even within the big cities, the pattern of residential segregation is quite clear.<sup>22</sup>

The differential social situations of Easterners and Westerners have their political ramifications. It must be recognized that ethnicity has not become a crucial political variable in Israel, certainly not in the way that religion is central. Although ethnic lists have been formed for national elections, they have met with limited success, and have not endured. But it is true that at the national level the major parties have different ethnic bases, and in local elections the emergence of ethnic lists is not infrequent. Lissak refers to the phenomenon among Easterners of "conspicuous identification with opposition parties," most observable in the fact that Herut is based mainly on the following of Easterners.<sup>23</sup> Herut is currently the dominant partner in the Gahal alliance referred to earlier, a permanent opposition party except during the three years of the National Unity Government. The fact that Herut receives much of its support from Easterners should not be misconstrued, for it is not the case that most Easterners support Herut; most, rather, identify with Mapai (or the Labor Party).

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<sup>22</sup>Lissak, op. cit., pp. 51-62.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

In addition to this identification with the opposition among many Easterners, the emergence of local ethnically oriented lists is another pattern of protest among Easterners. Such lists may seek their support from all those of the same country of origin, or from Easterners in general. Not infrequently they are the result of an individual's dissatisfaction with his situation within an established party, which he identifies as the problem of his ethnic group. They may be designed primarily for bargaining purposes within one of the established parties. The major parties do not wish to see ethnicity become an issue, and therefore try to avoid the creation of such lists. Still, such lists do emerge in the smaller, ethnically concentrated, communities. The extent to which they are truly an ethnic phenomenon, or merely a ploy in a larger political game, varies with each situation. In discussing the not unrelated phenomenon of split-ticket voting in Israel, Arian and Weiss minimize the role of ethnicity as a causal factor, but it is nonetheless clear that local lists, the existence of which promote split-ticket voting, are often ethnically oriented.<sup>24</sup>

Lissak argues that local elections are a better indication of dissatisfaction than identification with

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<sup>24</sup>See Alan Arian and Shevah Weiss, "Split-Ticket Voting in Israel," Western Political Quarterly, XXII, 2 (June, 1969), 375-89. I am indebted to Professor Efraim Torgovnik for sharing with me his insights on ethnic voting in local elections.

opposition parties, for in such situations the candidates are known and the issues are more concrete. The two phenomena, taken together, along with the occasional outburst of spontaneous protest by Easterners, suggest to him the possibility of a separate political orientation among Easterners developing.<sup>25</sup> The patterns of mobility discussed above indicate that Easterners have not achieved serious bargaining positions, and thus their major strength is in their numbers, which is a source of potential political power.

Lissak holds that the increasing gap between the groups on such matters as income, education, and occupation, with the accompanying disparity in terms of power and prestige, is a potentially dangerous situation, and he observes:

In view of the increasing identity between voting and class-ethnic consciousness, there is no escape from the conclusion that a significant part of these elites has taken the path of political-ethnic-class struggle, either in the framework of opposition parties or in independent ethnic lists. Those relatively mobile on the economic, educational, and occupational levels are the ones who emphasize the political aspect of the struggle; they are extremely disillusioned by the impossibility of translating their achievements into real political power on the one hand and diffuse prestige on the other, and feel, more than others, the relative oligarchization of the power elite of Israeli society. . . . [T]he changes in the stratification system of the Oriental communities have led to the growth of a movement (mainly latent) which demands changes in the whole stratification structure. . . . There is no doubt that the intensification of such an orientation might increase particularistic identifications, focus

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<sup>25</sup>Lissak, op. cit., pp. 75-76, 99-100.



diffuse feelings of deprivation around specific problems and turn latent aggression into open hostility. . . . Symptoms of this trend can already be found now and they might gain more ground with the increasing impatience to shorten the way to key positions.<sup>26</sup>

The likelihood of an increasing identification with ethnicity for political purposes will, of course, depend on a number of factors. If mobility channels become more open, we can expect that this will largely defuse the possibilities. If, however, status positions and ethnicity continue to coalesce, the likelihood of ethnicity becoming a central issue will increase, with the possibility of its exploitation by skillful politicians a very real one. As with all problems in Israel, the solution to this problem lies in the hands of Mapai, both in its governing role, and in its political handling of the problem through recruitment. Beyond that, of course, it will depend on the political beliefs and values of Easterners--on the extent to which they are willing to see ethnicity as an issue, and with regard to the means for solution of social and political problems which they regard as legitimate. Thus their beliefs in responsiveness and effectiveness, as well as their support for the party system and for democratic norms, may be useful in giving an indication of the course which might be taken.

The political orientations of the older generation of Easterners are known to differ from those of Westerners.

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 111.

I have previously pointed to their especially low sense of personal political effectiveness, even within the Israeli context. Fein reports that Easterners tend to "prefer a strong one-man leadership to a competitive party system . . . are relatively insensitive to civil liberties, and they express little interest in politics."<sup>27</sup> He is quick to point out, however, that this is not related to any lowered sense of allegiance, or feeling of alienation from Israel itself. On the whole, the responses of Easterners seem to derive less from any rejection of the political system, than from non-involvement and insufficient experience with democratic politics. Thus the Easterner is not in a satisfactory situation to serve as an effective agent for the inculcation of democratic values, a role which the state through its educational system has attempted to fulfill.

It is to the new generation of Easterners that we would wish to look for evidence on this matter. The older generation is not skilled enough to wage battle, nor does theory suggest that they should be the most likely to feel the deprivation. It is the younger generation, which knows no society but Israel, that has neither standard for comparison nor reason to tolerate a disadvantaged situation. Although those Easterners in secondary school

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<sup>27</sup>Fein, op. cit., p. 114.

represent a distinct sub-set of the Eastern population of their age-group, they may be regarded as the future elite of the Eastern population, perhaps even those most likely to be frustrated subsequently, and there is therefore special interest in their political orientations.<sup>28</sup>

The analysis which follows focuses on the responses of eleventh-grade Israelis. It centers on four indices, the construction of which is discussed in Appendix A: the Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness, the Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness, the Index of Support for the Party System, and the Index of Support for Democratic Norms. It may be useful at the outset to point out the distributions on these indices at both the eighth grade and eleventh grade levels. This is shown in Table 15.

Differences exist between the two grades on the Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness, and the Index of Support for Democratic Norms. In discussing earlier the questions which compose the Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness we have observed the decreasing belief in political effectiveness with age among Israelis. However, while eleventh graders tend to be lower on this index, they are higher on the Index of Support for

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<sup>28</sup>See Appendix A for a discussion of the sample used here, and its limitations.

TABLE 15. Distribution on four indices among eighth and eleventh grade Israelis.

		8th Grade (N=292)	11th Grade (N=1021)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	30%	35%
	Medium	38	36
	Low	<u>32</u>	<u>29</u>
		100%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	42	34
	Medium	39	39
	Low	<u>18</u>	<u>27</u>
		99%*	100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	35	33
	Medium	32	32
	Low	<u>34</u>	<u>35</u>
		101%	100%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	28	36
	Medium	40	36
	Low	<u>32</u>	<u>28</u>
		100%	100%

\*In this and subsequent tables, totals of 99% or 101% are due to rounding.

Democratic Norms. This is true even though we have seen that, as a group, Israelis are relatively high in their support for democratic norms, even at the eighth-grade level. On the indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and Support for the Party System, no differences exist between the two grades.

Among the eighth graders differences exist between children of different ethnic origin on three of the indices, as is shown in Table 16.

While Westerners do appear to be higher on the Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness than Easterners, the difference is not of great magnitude. They are, however, clearly higher in their support for democratic norms than Easterners of their age. As a very large percentage of the Easterners are approaching the end of their compulsory education at this level, this finding is cause for concern. The low level of support for democratic norms among eighth-grade Easterners indicates that they do not become familiar with these concepts at home, nor is the educational system highly successful in making up for this. Since the eleventh-grade Easterners we shall be dealing with constitute a rather specific sub-set of the Eastern population of their age-group, we cannot generalize to those Easterners who do not continue in the educational system, but the finding here suggests that they are likely to maintain a low level of support for democratic norms.

TABLE 16. Distribution of eighth grade Israelis on four indices, by father's birthplace.

		West (N=189)	East (N=102)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	33%	26%
	Medium	38	38
	Low	<u>29</u>	<u>36</u>
		100%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	43	41
	Medium	34	49
	Low	<u>23</u>	<u>10</u>
		100%	100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	33	37
	Medium	26	40
	Low	<u>40</u>	<u>23</u>
		99%	100%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	35	15
	Medium	38	44
	Low	<u>27</u>	<u>41</u>
		100%	100%

Interestingly, on the indices of belief in political effectiveness and support for the party system, the eighth-grade Easterners tend to be higher than Westerners and second-generation Israelis. This is primarily because very few of the eighth-grade Easterners are low on the Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness, and a substantial percentage of the eighth-grade Westerners and second-generation Israelis are low on the Index of Support for the Party System. Based on my previous discussion, it is likely that the differences on both of these indices are evidence less of higher effectiveness in the political system and with the party system among Easterners, than a greater lack of familiarity with the political process among them. The findings would seem to indicate a rather unrealistic appraisal among eighth-grade Easterners, whose parents surely are less politically effective than are the parents of Westerners. In fact, the difference between the two groups is to some extent accounted for by the greater tendency of Easterners to respond that they "don't know" to the questions composing the effectiveness index.

At the eleventh-grade level we see that Westerners and second-generation Israelis are higher on the Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness, as well as on the indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and Support for Democratic Norms. Easterners, however, continue to be higher in their support for the party system. The findings are reported in Table 17.

TABLE 17. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four indices, by father's birthplace.

		West (N=676)	East (N=330)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	38%	29%
	Medium	35	38
	Low	<u>27</u>	<u>32</u>
		100%	99%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	35	30
	Medium	38	42
	Low	<u>27</u>	<u>28</u>
		100%	100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	30	38
	Medium	35	27
	Low	<u>34</u>	<u>35</u>
		99%	100%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	39	30
	Medium	36	36
	Low	<u>24</u>	<u>35</u>
		99%	101%



Although the Westerners are slightly higher on the Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness than are Easterners, the differences are only within the high and medium levels on this index. The considerable decline among Easterners between the eighth and eleventh grade levels is notable, however. They would seem to become more realistic, and more similar to the Westerners in their outlook. Similarly, while a difference still exists between the two ethnic groups on the Index of Support for Democratic Norms, the difference is greatly reduced from that at the eighth-grade level. While they are becoming more realistic, they are also becoming more democratic, it would appear. The difference, already noted, between the two groups on the Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness is even more clear at the eleventh grade. Yet, in spite of this, eleventh-grade Easterners are, like the eighth-grade Easterners, higher in their support for the party system.

One could well expect that the Easterners in particular would be disaffected from the party system. Easterners are in very small number among the party elite in Israel. This survey, in fact, occurred close to an election in which the relative absence of Easterners on the party lists, was, if not an issue, a conspicuous and much commented upon situation. Nevertheless, we see greater support for the party system among Easterners.

This would suggest that for the more modern elements of the population the party system is a source of dissatisfaction because it does not live up to their expectations in a reconciliation system, while for the Easterners the party system serves, as in many developing countries, as the major link to the government itself. It may well be that for many of them Mapai is identified with the state itself. The finding also suggests less familiarity with democratic politics among Easterners, a view supported by their lower ranking on the Index of Support for Democratic Norms.

Nevertheless, it may be that the high level of support for the party system among Easterners contributes to their level of belief in political effectiveness. Given the nature of the Israeli political system, we would expect a belief in political effectiveness to be associated with support for the party system. This, in fact, does seem to be the case, relatively independent of one's belief in the responsiveness of governmental officials, a point to which we shall return in the next chapter. The belief in responsiveness, in turn, tends to be associated with support for democratic norms.

Generally, support for the party system in democratic countries is regarded as akin to a democratic norm itself. For Dennis, et al., the questions used to compose this index are regarded as indicators of a major democratic

theme, that of pluralist democracy, stressing "the maintenance of organized opposing political groups and other means of expression of political alternatives."<sup>29</sup> Among Israelis, however, support for the party system seems to be unrelated to support for democratic norms, as can be seen in Table 18:

TABLE 18. Level of support for the party system, by level of support for democratic norms (Israeli eleventh graders).

		Support for Democratic Norms		
		High (N=368)	Medium (N=371)	Low (N=282)
Support for the Party System	High	34%	32%	32%
	Medium	33	33	31
	Low	<u>34</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>37</u>
		101%	100%	100%

There is clearly no relationship between the two indices. Thus we may say that in Israel lack of support for the party system is not evidence of an anti-democratic sentiment, and disaffection from the party system should not be regarded as evidence of a negative orientation to competitive politics, per se. Neither is support for the party system to be taken as necessarily evidence of a

<sup>29</sup>Dennis, et al., op. cit., p. 73.

democratic attitude. What we find in Israel, taken as a whole, is relatively widespread support for democratic norms, coupled with relatively widespread dissatisfaction with the political party system. Among Easterners in particular, however, there is both greater support for the party system than in the population as a whole, and lower support for democratic norms. In that regard, as in others, they can be differentiated from the larger Israeli society.

Although ethnic origin is the single most useful indicator of socio-economic status in Israel, the latter can also be measured by occupation, and it may be useful to look at the distribution on our indices by that measure. Socio-economic status, as measured by father's occupation, is broken down into three categories, high, medium, and low, with each category approximating an equal third of the sample. In the category labeled "high" are those students who reported their father as being either a professional (16.5 per cent), or owner of a large factory or business (9.4 per cent); the "medium" category includes those who reported their father as a tradesman (e.g., electrician, carpenter, etc.) (13.4 per cent), office worker (e.g., clerk, salesman) (16.1 per cent), owner of a small store (8.5 per cent), or policeman, fireman, or soldier (2.5 per cent); in the "low" category are those who reported their father as a laborer, one who works with his hands (31.1 per cent). Thus in the "high" category



we have 25.9 per cent of the sample, in the "medium" category 40.5 per cent, and in the "low" category 31.1 per cent. The fact that socio-economic status, so measured, is associated with ethnic origin can be seen in the following table:

TABLE 19. Distribution of respondents on index of socio-economic status, by father's birthplace.

		West and Israel (N=672)	East (N=320)
Index of Socio- Economic Status	High	32.3%	14.1%
	Medium	45.1	34.4
	Low	<u>22.6</u>	<u>51.6</u>
		100.0%	100.1%

It is clear that Easterners are disproportionately located in the low category, and disproportionately missing from the higher two categories. Thus any attempt to look at differences by socio-economic status will clearly be diluted by the factor of ethnicity. After first looking at the differences by socio-economic status then, it will be useful to control for ethnicity by socio-economic status.

The distribution on the various indices of political orientations by level of socio-economic status is shown in Table 20.

TABLE 20. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four indices, by father's occupation.

		High (N=263)	Medium (N=414)	Low (N=318)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	40%	38%	29%
	Medium	32	36	40
	Low	<u>29</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>31</u>
		101%	100%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	39	34	30
	Medium	36	43	36
	Low	<u>24</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>34</u>
		99%	100%	100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	32	34	32
	Medium	35	31	32
	Low	<u>33</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>36</u>
		100%	100%	100%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	37	39	32
	Medium	36	36	36
	Low	<u>26</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>33</u>
		99%	99%	101%

No major differences exist between the groups, as categorized by father's occupation, on the indices of Support for the Party System and Support for Democratic Norms, although on the latter index there is a tendency for those of lower socio-economic status to rank low. The differences between the groups are on the political efficacy indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and Belief in Political Effectiveness. The major difference in governmental responsiveness is seen in the low percentage of low SES individuals who rank high on the index. On political effectiveness there is a clear difference at each level of the SES index. Socio-economic status does differentiate the respondents on political efficacy, and particularly on the political effectiveness dimension.

In order to determine the effect of socio-economic status, independent of ethnicity, it is necessary to control for each level of SES by father's birthplace. These distributions are reported in Table 21.

On the Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness there is a tendency, particularly evident among those of low socio-economic status, for Westerners to rank higher. There is very little difference among Westerners at the three levels on this index, although low-SES Easterners are notably different than other Easterners. Although the SES measure differentiates better on the



TABLE 21. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four indices, by father's occupation, controlling for father's birthplace.

	High			Medium			Low		
	West (N=217)		East (N=45)	West (N=303)		East (N=110)	West (N=152)		East (N=165)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	40%	36%	39%	35%	34%	24%		
	Medium	32	31	35	40	40	40		
	Low	<u>28</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>36</u>		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	40	38	34	34	34	27		
	Medium	36	38	42	46	31	40		
	Low	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>33</u>		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%		100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	31	33	31	42	25	38		
	Medium	37	27	32	29	38	25		
	Low	<u>32</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>36</u>		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%		
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	39	31	42	33	38	27		
	Medium	36	36	34	42	39	33		
	Low	<u>25</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>41</u>		
		100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%		101%

Index of Political Effectiveness, as noted previously, low-SES Easterners are again particularly lower than low-SES Westerners on this index. On the Index of Support for Democratic Norms, Westerners are higher than Easterners at each level of socio-economic status; while SES does not seem to differentiate Westerners on the Index of Support for Democratic Norms, low-SES Easterners are lower than other Easterners on this index.

An interesting observation in this table is that Easterners who rank high on socio-economic status are slightly less supportive of the party system than high-SES Westerners. The greater support for the party system that we have previously noted among Easterners is found to be among those ranking low and medium on the SES index. It is very likely this high level of support for the party system that, among medium-level-SES Easterners serves to raise their level of belief in political effectiveness to that of Westerners.

Ethnicity seems to be the primary factor accounting for differences in belief in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness, as well as support for the party system and support for democratic norms. However, low-SES particularly decreases the belief in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness among Easterners, and high socio-economic status among Easterners seems to be associated with the type of disaffection from the

party system rather typical of the Israeli population. The higher the socio-economic status of an Eastern child's parents, the more like children of Western parents will his political orientations be, although Easterners at all levels are less supportive of democratic norms than Westerners. This suggests that support for democratic norms comes not so much as a result of greater experience with the political system but as a result of education, and such education seems insufficient in the Israeli school system.

In order to examine the effect of the Israeli educational system on the development of the orientations considered here, the respondents can be divided into those engaged in academic secondary education and those in vocational education. If the educational system does make a difference, we would expect to see differences between those engaged in the two forms of education, as well as within each ethnic group by type of education. Table 22 shows the distribution of the four indices by type of education, and Table 23 shows the distributions by type of education, controlling for father's birthplace.

Although Table 21 shows that academic students are higher than vocational students on the indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and Belief in Political Effectiveness, vocational students are slightly higher on the Index of Support for the Party System and,

TABLE 22. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four indices, by type of secondary education.

		Academic (N=747)	Vocational (N=274)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	37%	28%
	Medium	35	39
	Low	<u>27</u>	<u>33</u>
		99%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	35	30
	Medium	37	43
	Low	<u>27</u>	<u>26</u>
		99%	99%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	31	36
	Medium	33	30
	Low	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>
		99%	100%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	35	39
	Medium	36	38
	Low	<u>29</u>	<u>24</u>
		100%	101%

TABLE 23. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four indices, by type of secondary education, controlling for father's birthplace.

	Academic		Vocational	
	West (N=516)	East (N=219)	West (N=160)	East (N=111)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	31%	29%	27%
	Medium	34	38	41
	Low	<u>25</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>32</u>
	100%	101%	100%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	32	33	25
	Medium	37	40	49
	Low	<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>26</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	36	31	43
	Medium	35	34	24
	Low	<u>35</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>32</u>
	100%	101%	101%	99%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	38	43	33
	Medium	36	37	38
	Low	<u>26</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>29</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

surprisingly, on the Index of Support for Democratic Norms. Table 22 shows that, among academic students, Westerners are higher than Easterners in their belief in governmental responsiveness and support for democratic norms, slightly higher in their belief in political effectiveness, and lower in their support for the party system; the same differences are found among vocational students, except that there is no difference between the two ethnic groups in their belief in governmental responsiveness. While "academic" Westerners are higher than "vocational" Westerners on the Index of Responsiveness, there is little difference between the two Eastern groups on effectiveness, although there is none between the two Western groups. While the Western groups do not differ in their support for the party system, Eastern "vocationals" are more supportive of the party system than Eastern "academics." Most strikingly, both Eastern and Western "vocationals" are more supportive of democratic norms than their "academic" counterparts.

Experience in academic secondary education may help raise the belief in political effectiveness for Easterners, and reduce somewhat their support for the party system to a level closer to that of Westerners. Being in the two types of educational systems does have an effect on those orientations most associated with one's relation to the political system. It seems quite apparent,

however, that the academic schools do not serve to develop a support for democratic norms. It is true, as noted previously, that Israelis are generally high in their support for democratic norms, but Easterners are lower than Westerners and, it appears, the schools do not alleviate that situation. It may be, in fact, that they serve to make the situation worse, for vocational school students are higher in their support for democratic norms, and it is not likely that this is a result of their school experience.

If not the schools, another possible source for the development of political orientations is the youth movement. Before independence schools in Palestine were run by the various political parties. Following independence the state took over education, but the parties agreed to such educational unification only if they maintained alternative access to students through the youth movements, party sponsored movements which themselves preceded statehood. Although the youth movements are one of several types of organizations in Israel, they are the most significant, with probably one-third of all youth in Israel belonging to a youth movement at one time or another.

Israeli schools are seen as primarily educational institutions, with the youth movement serving more as the inculcator of values. Each youth movement has its own

ideology, although all of them stress Zionism, and in varying degrees pioneering and preparation for life in a collective settlement. Each does have a unique ideological position, corresponding to the political party with which it is affiliated. Betar, for example, affiliated with Herut, is a right-wing nationalist movement; Bnei Akiva is a religious youth movement; Hashomer Hatzair (affiliated with Mapam), is a left-wing movement, placing the most emphasis on kibbutz life. Noar Haoved v'Lomed is affiliated with Mapai, and has a labor orientation, an orientation largely shared by the somewhat more middle-class Scouts. Each movement develops a special style of life, each stresses solidarity to the group, and discourages individual competition.

The youth movements operate outside the family, school, or place of work. The movements have been less successful in their larger goal of transferring urban youth to rural settlements than in promoting idealistic socialism. While intended to serve as vehicles of change, they have come more and more to articulate common values. Eisenstadt points out that in the pre-state period "they constituted a very important--if not the most important--avenue of identification with some of the major collective pioneering symbols of the society."<sup>30</sup> Over time, however, the youth movements tended to lose much of their importance

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<sup>30</sup>Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 256.



for most members, and the differences between the youth movements and the larger youth culture tended to disappear, although it is still evident at the extremes. The youth movements were once the main mechanisms of elite-selection and of the development of orientations toward the major collective values of the society. This is no longer the case, as they have become more and more youth clubs rather than movements, though there is some evidence that they do serve as channels of mobility for some Eastern youth.

While they have lost their central role, clearly a significant proportion of Israeli youth, particularly high school students, are still members. The youth movements do promote collective values. Adler finds that collective value orientations seem to be characteristic for Israeli youth, although youth movement membership emphasizes that trend.<sup>31</sup> Youth movement members do show more moderate occupational aspirations than others, and are more inclined than others to intend to live on a kibbutz, though most expect to do so only for a temporary period. On the whole Adler finds that youth movement members tend to share the same values, though they differ on the "emphasis they put on different elements of the accepted value system of Israeli youth."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Chaim Adler, "A Comparative Analysis of Youth Cultures in Israel" (paper presented to the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Aug. 31-Sept. 5, 1970), p. 13.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

In a study of former youth movement members among university students, it was found that they express more frequently than others the values advocated by the youth movements. These differences were mainly in the area of collective values (e.g., attachment to the country), rather than individual, or status values. Among Easterners, however, former members tended to differ mainly on "individual" rather than "collective" values, with former members displaying higher status aspirations. The authors concluded that youth movement membership fulfills different functions for persons of different ethnic origin, perhaps itself giving to the Easterner a kind of status which it does not give to the Westerner.<sup>33</sup>

Table 24 shows the distribution on the four indices differentiating youth movement members from non-members, and differentiating between Easterners and Westerners within each category. It might be noted at the outset that a smaller proportion of Easterners than Westerners in the sample belong to a youth movement, 19 per cent of the former as opposed to 27 per cent of the latter, a point of some interest in itself.

Youth movement members are clearly higher than non-members in their belief in political effectiveness,

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<sup>33</sup>Rina Shapiro and Eva Etzioni, "The Impact of Youth Movement Membership on the Values of Israeli Students," Megamot, XVII (July, 1969) (in Hebrew).

TABLE 24. Distribution of eleventh grade Israelis on four indices, by membership-non-membership in a youth movement, and controlling for father's birthplace.

	Youth-Movement Members			Non-Members		
	All Members (N=245)		All Non-Members (N=776)	All Members (N=495)		All Non-Members (N=268)
	(N=181)	(N=62)		(N=245)	(N=268)	
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	39%	34%	38%	28%	34%
	Medium	36	39	35	38	36
	Low	<u>25</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>30</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	43	42	43	27	31
	Medium	33	35	34	44	41
	Low	<u>24</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>28</u>
	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	36	45	39	37	31
	Medium	31	21	28	28	34
	Low	<u>33</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>36</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	40	34	38	29	35
	Medium	34	29	34	37	37
	Low	<u>25</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>27</u>
	99%	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%

and in their support for the party system. Little difference exists between members and non-members in their belief in governmental responsiveness, or their support for democratic norms. For Easterners the movements do seem to have a greater effect; Eastern youth movement members are considerably higher in their belief in political effectiveness than non-members, at a level equal to Western members, they are higher in their belief in the responsiveness of governmental officials, their support for the party system, and their support for democratic norms.

It appears that the youth movements are successful in developing support for the party system, and in developing a belief in political effectiveness. Moreover, for Easterners, they do seem to develop support for democratic norms, and a belief in the responsiveness of governmental officials. Although only a limited number of Easterners are influenced by the youth movements, those that are seem substantially affected by the experience.

Support for the party system among youth movement members is probably of a different nature than the high level of support we have observed among Easterners. They are closer to the party system by virtue of their membership, and this high level of support is associated with a high belief in political effectiveness. There may well be a significant difference in the nature of the high

level of support for the party system manifested by Eastern youth movement members and that shown for Eastern non-members.

Because of the different orientations of the various movements, it may be possible to differentiate the respondents by the type of movement to which they belong. For that purpose four groups have been formed. The first includes those affiliated with labor or left-wing parties; Hashomer Hatzair, affiliated with Mapam; Noar Oved v'Lomed, affiliated with Mapai, and Machanot Olim, affiliated with Achdut Ha'avodah, all parties joined together in the Labor Party. The second group is Scouts, not party affiliated, but sharing an orientation similar to, though less extreme, than those movements in the first group. The third group includes those movements affiliated with religious parties-- Bnei Akiva, Ezra, and Noar Haoved Hadati. The fourth group includes those movements affiliated with right or centrist parties: Noar Zioni, affiliated with the Independent Liberals; Noar Oved Leumi, affiliated with the Liberals; and Betar, affiliated with Herut (the latter two parties now joined in the Gahal alliance). Table 25 reports the distribution on the indices among youth movement members, as categorized above.

The belief in governmental responsiveness is clearly related to the relative influence of the parties with which the youth movements are associated. Interestingly the Scouts, not affiliated with any party, are

TABLE 25. Distribution on four indices by youth movement trend.

		Labor- Left (N=68)	Scouts (N=69)	Religious (N=76)	Right- Centrist (N=32)
Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness	High	37%	46%	36%	28%
	Medium	41	41	34	22
	Low	<u>22</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>50</u>
		100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	46	46	39	38
	Medium	29	32	37	38
	Low	<u>25</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>
		100%	100%	100%	101%
Index of Support for the Party System	High	35	45	39	31
	Medium	28	26	24	44
	Low	<u>37</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>25</u>
		100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of Support for Democratic Norms	High	34	42	34	50
	Medium	29	39	34	28
	Low	<u>37</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>22</u>
		100%	100%	100%	100%

highest on this index. Nevertheless, it is clear that those in movements affiliated with the dominant coalition partners, the Labor Party and the religious parties, see governmental officials as more responsive than do those associated with the right and centrist parties. The latter group is largely made up of individuals belonging to Betar, a movement associated with the Herut party, which except during the existence of the National Unity Government, has been in perennial opposition. The Labor Party affiliates are also highest in their belief in political effectiveness, along with the Scouts. Though higher than non-members on this index, both the religious and right-centrist movement members are lower than the Scouts and Labor Party affiliates.

Surprisingly, the highest group on the Index of Support for the Party System is the Scouts, a rather inexplicable finding. Among the other movement members, there is little difference between the Labor and Religious groups, with the Right-centrist group slightly more moderate than either of the former; less of them are in the high category, but less of them are in the low category as well. The findings throughout this study on support for the party system would seem to suggest that the topic does have different meanings for different groups. It may well be that both those closest to and farthest away from the political system are the most disaffected, for different reasons.

Most observers would not expect the Right-centrist group to be the most supportive of democratic norms. Herut, in particular, is often considered to be an anti-democratic party. Yet this group, though not entirely composed of Herut-affiliated youth, is strikingly the most supportive of democratic norms, followed by the Scouts. Both the Labor and Religious affiliated youth are actually slightly lower in their support of democratic norms than non-youth movement members. It would appear that the Right and Centrist movements, and the Scouts are most successful in promoting democratic norms. This is certainly an appropriate topic for further study.

We have seen in this chapter that Israeli youth of Western origin tend to be higher than those of Eastern origin in their belief in governmental responsiveness, belief in political effectiveness, and support for democratic norms, while the Eastern youth are more supportive of the party system. We have seen that Easterners of low socio-economic status, as measured by father's occupation, are particularly low in their belief in governmental responsiveness, in political effectiveness, and in their support of democratic norms, while Easterners of higher socio-economic status have a raised belief in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness. Moreover, Easterners of high socio-economic status are more like



Westerners in their level of support for the party system.

One's level of belief in governmental responsiveness and in political effectiveness, and his support for the party system, are evaluations of the system and of one's own relation to the system. In this sense, the higher belief in responsiveness and effectiveness among Westerners, and among those of higher socio-economic status, is understandable. The higher level of support for the party system among Easterners, I have suggested, is probably explained more by lack of familiarity with the system than by success with it, and in their support for the party system they may actually be indicating their support for the state. This high support may also indicate an inability on the part of many Easterners to see alternatives to the existing party system.

Easterners in academic education, and Easterners who belong to youth movements, are more likely to be similar to Westerners in their political efficacy beliefs. Experience with these institutions, and particularly the youth movement, does seem to make a difference for them. However, the difference between the two groups in their support for democratic norms seems to be less affected. If we can assume that support for democratic norms is less a product of experience, and more one of learning, in contrast to the other indices, the evidence seems to

show that Easterners are disadvantaged in learning these norms in their home environment. Nor are these norms developed in academic secondary education. The youth movements do seem to have some effect in developing these norms among Easterners, but Easterners are still not raised to the level of Westerners.

If support for democratic norms is a product of learning, then it seems that the schools must do a greater job of developing these norms among Easterners. This must be done at the primary level, as is particularly evident when we consider the striking differences between Easterners and Westerners at the eighth grade level on this index. For many Easterners this is the only real opportunity they have to develop democratic norms. If in addition to other differences between the two ethnic groups, this difference also develops, the future of Israeli democracy may be jeopardized. It has already been pointed out that the older generation of Easterners is lower in its support for democratic norms and for the institutions of democracy, and when we see this continuing in the younger generation it is cause for concern. This is all the more true when it is realized that the sample reported here involves a specific sub-set of the Eastern population, a sub-set we may expect to be more supportive of democratic norms than other Easterners.

## CHAPTER V

### A TYPOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE ISRAELI SYSTEM: THE EFFICACEOUS, THE INDIVIDUALIST, THE COLLECTIVIST, THE ALIENATED

In Chapter I a typology of political systems was developed, based on the relationship between the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness posited to be "rational" in each system. The purpose of such a typology was to explain variation between political systems in this relationship in accordance with their variation in structure and in values. Israel was found to be a system in which a high belief in governmental responsiveness is associated with a low belief among individuals in their political effectiveness, a configuration which I have argued is a result of Israel's characteristics as a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid. In the Israeli system certain consummatory values are highly important, and serve to promote the belief in governmental responsiveness, emphasizing as they do collective interests. Structurally, Israel is a reconciliation system of sorts, but one which reconciles the interests of centralized,



hierarchical parties. One consequence of this is a low belief among Israelis in their personal ability to influence government.

The typology of political systems suggests an explanation for modal patterns of the political efficacy belief within types of political systems, and an explanation for incongruence between the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness. Within each type of political system we can also differentiate individuals by the degree to which they believe in the responsiveness of government officials and in their own political effectiveness. In Israel the belief in governmental responsiveness should vary with the individual's degree of acceptance of the system's collective goals; his belief in political effectiveness should vary with his acceptance of those goals as his personal goals, or his ability to satisfy non-collective individual interests. We may therefore conceive of four types of individuals in Israel, as shown in Figure 3.

The efficacious individual is one who believes the government to be responsive, and believes himself (or his parents) to be politically effective. Such an individual is highly oriented to the system's collective goals, and tends to identify his personal, individual goals with those of the collectivity. His opposite, the alienated individual, neither believes the government to be responsive, nor does he see himself (or his parents) as politically

## Belief in Governmental Responsiveness

		High	Low
Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	Efficacious	Individualist
	Low	Collectivist	Alienated

FIGURE 3. Four types of individuals in the Israeli system, as characterized by belief in governmental responsiveness and belief in political effectiveness.

effective. Collective goals are not relevant for him, and do not compensate for his belief that he cannot achieve his personal interests through political action.

It is important to note that alienation is considered to be associated with both a low belief in governmental responsiveness and a low belief in political effectiveness. My suggestion is that in a mobilization system, a mobilization-reconciliation system such as Israel's, alienation is not simply associated with a low belief in political effectiveness. An individual low in that belief need not be alienated if he is highly oriented to the system's collective goals. We have seen that, for the Israeli sample taken as a whole, a low belief in political effectiveness is the standard, and there is no evidence that this is indicative of alienation. Thus the collectivist, an individual who believes the government to be responsive but does not see himself (or his parents) as politically effective, is one highly oriented to the collective goals of the system, and who sees his own individual interests as subordinate to, or perhaps

identical with, the collective interests. Such an individual sharply differentiates the system's collective goals from his individual goals.

Neither is alienation simply associated with lack of belief in governmental responsiveness. The individualist does not see the government as responsive because he is not oriented toward the collective goals of the system, but he does see himself as politically effective, because he is able to satisfy his own individual interests. Like the collectivist, the individualist also sharply differentiates his individual goals from the collective goals, but places less emphasis on the achievement of collective interests than on the achievement of his own interests.

Taking the indices of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and Belief in Political Effectiveness, described earlier, I have differentiated these four types in my sample of Israeli eleventh graders. In the efficacious category 186 respondents are located, in the individualist category 49, in the collectivist category 40, and in the alienated category 132. Although these are the extremes within the sample, it needs to be recognized that their differences on these indices are matters of degree rather than of kind. Thus the efficacious and collectivist categories include individuals who believe more in the responsiveness of governmental officials than do the individualists and the alienated, while the

efficacious and the individualists believe more in their parents' political effectiveness than do those in the collectivist and alienated categories. I do not suggest that the differences are between those who do and those who do not have a given belief. Furthermore, if these categories were to be created on a cross-national basis, the collectivist category would be the largest cell in the Israeli sample. Dealing with the Israeli sample alone this is not the result, for that sample has been divided into three levels on each of the indices, but in a sense those designated as collectivists may be regarded as the extreme cases of what is typical for Israelis as a whole.

In order to observe some of the characteristics differentiating the individuals in these categories (besides those characteristics which define them), the relative proportion of individuals in each category by ethnicity, socio-economic status, type of secondary education, and membership or non-membership in a youth movement is shown in Table 26.

Table 26 indicates that Westerners are disproportionately among the efficacious and collectivists and Easterners disproportionately among the individualists and alienated, reflecting the differences we have seen between those groups in the larger sample on the belief in governmental responsiveness. There is a tendency for lower socio-economic-status to be associated with the



TABLE 26. Individuals in political efficacy typology, by father's birthplace, father's occupation, type of school, and membership or non-membership in a youth movement.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
<u>Ethnicity</u>					
West	73%	65%	75%	66%	68%
East	27	35	25	34	33
	100% (N=184)	100% (N=46)	100% (N=40)	100% (N=132)	101% (N=1006)
<u>SES</u>					
High	32	33	28	24	26
Medium	41	46	48	35	41
Low	27	22	25	41	32
	100% (N=184)	101% (N=46)	101% (N=40)	100% (N=129)	99% (N=995)
<u>Type of School</u>					
Academic	80	71	68	75	73
Vocational	20	29	33	25	27
	100% (N=186)	100% (N=49)	101% (N=40)	100% (N=132)	100% (N=1021)
<u>Youth Movement</u>					
Member	31	29	18	17	24
Non-Member	69	71	83	83	76
	100% (N=186)	100% (N=49)	101% (N=40)	100% (N=132)	100% (N=1021)

alienated cell, while those in the higher-SES group are disproportionately among the efficacious and individualists; among the individualists and collectivists there is a disproportion of medium-SES individuals. Academic students are disproportionately among the efficacious, vocational students disproportionately among the collectivists.

The most striking observation is that youth movement members are disproportionately among the individualists, with non-members disproportionately among the collectivists. We have seen previously that youth movement membership does promote the belief in effectiveness more than the belief in responsiveness. Among youth movement members there seems to be a tendency to believe in political effectiveness whether or not one believes in governmental responsiveness, while among non-members there is a tendency not to believe in political effectiveness regardless of one's belief in governmental responsiveness.

If the youth movements do promote collective goals and a belief in governmental responsiveness it is not evident from Table 26, especially when one notes that youth movement members are disproportionately among the individualists. The only possible explanation for this phenomenon would seem to be our knowledge that the different movements have differential influences (see Table 25). This explanation seems to be of some utility.

TABLE 27. Affiliation of youth movement members among individuals in political efficacy typology.

	Efficacious	Individualist	Collectivist	Alienated	Total Sample
Labor-Left	33%	14%	29%	30%	28%
Scouts	34	7	29	22	28
Religious	22	50	43	26	31
Right-Centrist	<u>10</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>13</u>
	99%	100%	101%	100%	99%
	(N=58)	(N=14)	(N=7)	(N=23)	(N=245)

Although cell sizes are considerably reduced, Table 27 shows the youth movement trend among the youth movement members in our typology of individuals.

Although the numbers in these cells tend to be quite small, the table suggests some interesting possibilities. Members of the Labor Party-affiliated youth movements are found to be somewhat disproportionately among the efficacious, and very much unrepresented in the individualist sector; this is also true of the Scouts, a group which promotes values similar to those of the Labor-affiliated youth movements. Members of the religious movements are found to be disproportionately among the individualists and collectivists, and not highly among the efficacious. It would appear that members of these movements are the most likely to differentiate between individual and collective goals. Members of religious youth movements are both more likely to see the government as responsive and their parents as politically ineffective, or the government as unresponsive and their parents as politically effective, than members of other movements. This may stem from differences among members of such movements in the nature of their religious beliefs, and more specifically in their expectations of the government on behalf of religious interests. A disproportionate percentage of the individualists do report their families to be "religious" (20 per cent, the same percentage as

that among the alienated, as opposed to 11 per cent of the efficacious and 10 per cent of the collectivists), while a disproportionate percentage of the collectivists report that their parents are "traditional" (53 per cent, as opposed to 43 per cent, 45 per cent, and 46 per cent of the efficacious, individualists, and alienated, respectively). It is probably the case that those reporting their families to be religious would prefer greater religious influence in government, and therefore see the government as unresponsive. The efficacious are the least religious, 46 per cent claiming that their parents are "not religious" (as opposed to 29 per cent, 38 per cent, and 33 per cent of the individualists, collectivists, and alienated, respectively). The differences among the groups in religious orientation are shown in Table 28.

The members of the different youth movements do have differing orientations toward responsiveness and effectiveness. Of greatest interest is the fact that among the right-centrists we find the lowest proportion of individualists, no collectivists, and a disproportionate number of the alienated. Members of these movements tend not to see the government as responsive, though some of them do see their parents as politically effective. The lower proportion of youth movement members in the collectivist category than might be expected can in part be explained by the absence of members of right and centrist movements from that category, and their greater proportion

TABLE 28. Responses of political efficacy types to the question: "Is your family religious, traditional, or not-religious?"

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
Religious	11%	20%	10%	20%	17%
Traditional	43	45	53	46	44
Not Religious	46	29	38	33	37
n.a.	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	101%	100%	101%	101%	100%



among the individualists and the alienated, a reflection of the fact that the government is in many respects unresponsive to their interests. It is also partly accounted for by those religious movement members in the individualist category, who similarly do not see the government as responsive to their interests.

The seeming lack of difference between youth movement members and non-members on the belief in governmental responsiveness is therefore in part due to the fact that the political orientations of the movements differ, so that the members of different movements rationally evaluate the responsiveness of governmental officials differently. Beyond that explanation may be the fact that the youth movements do not, for the most part, stress wider values different from those of the larger society, so that members cannot be as sharply differentiated from others in the society on their collective orientations, as might once have been the case.

It is nevertheless true that those labeled as collectivists are most strongly oriented toward the society's ideological goals, while those labeled as individualists are least oriented to those goals. Evidence for this can be seen in Table 29, reporting the responses to three questions relating to Zionist ideology.

The collectivists are virtually unanimous in agreeing with the central tenet of the Zionist ideology-- "The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a



TABLE 29. Responses of political efficacy types to three items relating to Zionist ideology.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion.					
Agree	82%	65%	93%	70%	75%
Disagree	16	33	5	25	21
dk, na	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>
	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%
It is the duty of all Jews in the world to immigrate to Israel.					
Agree	74	57	75	72	68
Disagree	15	37	13	19	23
dk, na	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>
	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%
Where would you like to live when you grow up--city, kibbutz, moshav, or development town?*					
City	67	74	62	66	74
Kibbutz, moshav, or development town	<u>33</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>26</u>
	100% (N=115)	100% (N=39)	100% (N=21)	100% (N=85)	100% (N=676)

\*This question was asked only in Netanya, and the total N is therefore reduced.

religion"--a statement with which the individualists are considerably less in agreement. In sharp contrast to the other groups, the individualists are considerably less likely to agree that "It is the duty of all Jews in the world to immigrate to Israel." Similarly, the individualists are least likely to anticipate living on a kibbutz or moshav, or in a development town, with the collectivists very slightly more than others to so anticipate. The efficacious follow the collectivists in their acceptance of the ideology, with the alienated somewhat more likely than the individualists to accept the ideology. The key question in Table 29 is the first, with which collectivists are found most in adherence and individualists least, and in which the groups clearly differ by their belief in the responsiveness of government officials.

It has been argued that political efficacy is a characteristic of the democratic citizen, as has been pointed out in Chapter I. The belief of an individual in his political effectiveness is, however, a product of his relationship to the structure of the system, whatever form that structure may take. An individual may judge himself to be effective, but not regard the system as democratic. Similarly, I have noted previously that there is no necessary relationship between the responsiveness of a system and its democratic nature. However, if responsiveness is considered by individuals to be a trait of

democratic governments, then we may expect that the more one sees his government to be responsive, the more democratic he is likely to be. Thus, in a system where the belief in political effectiveness is low, as a result of structural characteristics, it may well be that the belief in governmental responsiveness is associated with democratic orientations.

We have seen in Chapter III that support for democratic norms is high among Israelis, while support for the party system is relatively low, and I have noted (see Table 18) that support for democratic norms is unrelated to support for the party system. Here I would like to suggest that there is a relationship between the high belief in governmental responsiveness and the high support for democratic norms, as well as a relationship between the low belief in political effectiveness and the low support for the party system. If this is so then we should find relatively high support for democratic norms among the efficacious and the collectivists, and relatively low support for those norms among the individualists and the alienated; we should also find relatively high support for the party system among the efficacious and the individualists, and greater disaffection from the system among collectivists and the alienated. This is presented schematically in Figure 4.

## Belief in Governmental Responsiveness

		High	Low
Belief in Political Effectiveness	High	<u>Efficacious:</u> Democratic norms-- High Party System-- High	<u>Individualists:</u> Democratic norms-- Low Party System-- High
	Low	<u>Collectivists:</u> Democratic norms-- High Party System-- Low	<u>Alienated:</u> Democratic norms-- Low Party System-- Low

FIGURE 4. Hypothesized nature of support for democratic norms and support for the party system among four political efficacy types.

That these hypothesized relationships in fact exist is shown in Table 30.

That the efficacious are high on both indices, and the alienated low, is not surprising. But clearly the two dimensions of political efficacy cut differently, with the collectivists higher than the individualists in their support for democratic norms, and the individualists higher than the collectivists in their support for the party system. It is those who believe themselves (or in this case, their parents) to be politically effective, who are more supportive of the party system. The belief in responsiveness, although widespread among Israelis, is clearly related to support for democratic norms.

These findings indicate that my previous discussion of the low support for democratic norms among Easterners may be incomplete. I then suggested that support for

TABLE 30. Distribution of political efficacy types on the indices of Support for Democratic Norms and Support for the Party System.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
<b>Index of Support for Democratic Norms:</b>					
High	46%	24%	43%	24%	36%
Medium	32	43	35	38	36
Low	<u>22</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>28</u>
	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%
<b>Index of Support for the Party System:</b>					
High	39	37	28	24	33
Medium	36	41	45	28	32
Low	<u>25</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>35</u>
	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%

democratic norms, as distinct from the other orientations, may be derived from learning rather than experience.

Perhaps, however, the lower support for democratic norms among Easterners is also related to their lower belief in governmental responsiveness, a belief itself associated with their less strong identification with the collective ideological goals. This is indeed conjectural, but a possibility of some interest.

The fact that we see here political effectiveness to be related to support for the party system would seem to support my previously stated view that support for the party system is of a different nature among Easterners than Westerners, for their support for the party system tends to co-exist with a lower belief in political effectiveness than that found among Westerners. There is probably a greater tendency among Westerners to identify the state with certain goals and values, while for Easterners the state is identified with certain parties and leaders.

A number of other responses indicate further the differences between our four groups. Thus the efficacious and the collectivists tend to be more confident in the government, less skeptical of politicians, more tolerant of opposition, and more "constitutional," as can be seen in Table 31.

TABLE 31. Responses of political efficacy types to items concerning government, politicians, tolerance, and constitutionalism.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
I usually have confidence that the government will do the right thing. (Agree)	89%	86%	98%	74%	84%
All that politicians do is exaggerate the things that cause division. (Disagree)	80	57	73	58	62
There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he will do after he gets elected. Most political parties care only about getting elected and nothing more. (Disagree)	54	25	40	24	36
Even people who oppose our way of life have a right to be heard. (Agree)	94	84	93	86	90
The methods of a politician are not important any time he gets the right thing done. (Disagree)	59	24	50	45	47
One strong leader would be better for our country than all the laws and talk. (Disagree)	77	55	75	68	70

The tendency of the individualists to agree that the methods of a politician are not important (71 per cent agree), and their greater tendency to believe one strong leader would be better for the country, are indeed striking. If it is true that both the collectivists and the individualists differentiate between collective and individual goals, but in different ways, we see here that there are consequences to the difference. There is a strain of what might be called authoritarianism, or at least Machiavellianism, among the individualists. Lacking an identification with the collective goals, and presumably to some extent with the collectivity as a whole, they are less democratic than others. They support the party system because they are effective in it, not because they are democratic, for as they say, the methods of a politician are not important if he gets the right thing done. Even the alienated do not agree with that, but neither do they support the party system.

The individualists and the alienated seem generally to be more pessimistic, less hopeful, and less prone to change than the efficacious and the collectivists. This can be seen in the responses to a series of statements, all of which differentiate clearly between the high and low responsiveness groups. These are shown in Table 32.

The really striking difference between the groups on the questions in Table 32 is with regard to human nature. A majority of the individualists (65 per cent) and



TABLE 32. Responses of political efficacy types to items concerning change.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
If two people disagree they can usually reach a satisfactory solution by mutual discussion. (Agree)	70%	63%	75%	56%	65%
It's better to stick by what you have than to try new things you can't be sure about. (Disagree)	90	78	98	79	85
You can't change human nature. (Disagree)	59	35	60	42	49
Most people have fixed opinions; there's no use trying to change their opinions. (Disagree)	76	49	73	54	63

the alienated (52 per cent) agree with the statement that "You can't change human nature," while a majority of the efficacious and the collectivists disagree. This is not simply a difference in degree, but a difference in kind. The differences shown in this and the previous table are clearly systematic, and indicate that the belief in responsiveness is associated with a wide range of orientations.

One difference between the groups is in the degree to which they see a generation gap in Israeli society and in their own families. In general eleventh-grade Israelis do see a societal generation gap, though they tend not to see this in their own families. Nevertheless, there are differences between our groups, as shown in Table 33.

The collectivists are the least likely to see a societal generation gap, with the alienated most in agreement that such a gap does exist. But this seems to be, on the part of the alienated, a generalization from their own experience, for they are also the most likely to agree that their opinions differ from those of their parents. In contrast few of the efficacious consider their opinions to differ from those of their parents. Interestingly the individualists are somewhat more likely to see a societal gap than the collectivists, but less likely to differ from their parents. It is also interesting that while the collectivists are almost as likely to differ

TABLE 33. Responses of political efficacy types to items concerning generational differences.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
Problems that seem important to the older generation are not necessarily important to us. (Agree)	69%	69%	58%	74%	69%
My opinions regarding social, economic, and political questions are very different from those of my parents. (Agree)	24	41	48	52	37

from their parents as the alienated, they are far less likely to see a societal gap.

It is somewhat difficult to see in these responses a pattern which would explain the differences between the four groups. A possible explanation may lie in the observation that the younger generation tends to be less ideological than its elders. Thus the alienated especially are disaffected from the society's goals, and from their parents who tend to support those goals, while the efficacious are less disaffected from the society's goals, and in general agreement with their parents. The collectivists are most in agreement with the society's goals, and their tendency to differ from their parents suggests that they may believe they support those goals more than do their parents. The individualists are less supportive of the society's goals than the collectivists, differing from their parents whom they see as more supportive of those goals. Clearly the data does not allow for a definitive answer.

Nevertheless, there is on the whole a consistency to the differences between the four groups. Those high in their belief in governmental responsiveness are more democratic, more tolerant, more positively oriented towards government and politicians, and more favorably oriented to change; those high in their belief in political effectiveness are more supportive of the party system. It

might be noted that the latter are also less interested in politics than the former, as shown in the distribution of these groups on an Index of Political Interest.

Our major concern in all of this, however, is with that group we have labeled as collectivist. We have seen that this group, despite its low belief in political effectiveness, is nevertheless highly democratic, tolerant, positively oriented towards government, politicians, and change, and politically interested. We may, therefore, conclude that in a system such as Israel's an identification with collective goals, rather than a sense of political effectiveness, per se, can serve to develop the democratic citizen. It is no less true, of course, that for those who do not identify with the collective goals, political effectiveness is not itself sufficient to develop democratic orientations in such a system.

TABLE 34. Distribution of political efficacy types on index of political interest.

	Efficacious (N=186)	Individualist (N=49)	Collectivist (N=40)	Alienated (N=132)	Total Sample (N=1021)
High	35%	25%	38%	24%	27%
Medium	39	47	40	30	35
Low	<u>26</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>38</u>
	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

In this study I have attempted to theoretically distinguish two dimensions of political efficacy, the belief in governmental responsiveness and the belief in political effectiveness. It has previously been suggested that democratic stability may require these to be congruent. I have suggested, however, that for political systems emphasizing consummatory values, belief in governmental responsiveness may essentially refer to collective goals, and if these goals are widely accepted a low belief in political effectiveness may be tolerable. We have seen that this configuration is indeed found in the case of Israel, a political system which I have described as a mobilization-reconciliation hybrid.

It has often been suggested that the belief in political efficacy is a characteristic of the democratic citizen. If this is generally so, a qualification is necessary for the case of Israel, where a low belief in political effectiveness co-exists with high support for democratic norms. This is true for Israeli youth as a

whole, and it is true within the Israeli sample as well. Among Israelis it is specifically the belief in governmental responsiveness which is associated with democratic orientations. The belief in political effectiveness is associated with support for the party system. However, no association exists between support for the party system and support for democratic norms, and it seems clear that support for the party system is not itself to be identified as a democratic orientation in Israel, as it has often been interpreted for other countries.

Contrary to findings elsewhere, the belief in political effectiveness among youth Israelis tends to decrease with age. If it is possible to say that political efficacy in Israel provides a reservoir of diffuse support for the political system, the reference must be specifically to the belief in governmental responsiveness. It is this belief which is widespread among Israelis, and associated with the system's legitimacy.<sup>1</sup>

Differentiating young Israelis by ethnic origin we have seen that the belief in governmental responsiveness is higher among Westerners than Easterners. The differences between these groups on political effectiveness are not as great. The Easterners are higher in their support for the party system. It may be, I have suggested, that

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<sup>1</sup>Compare with Easton and Dennis, op. cit.





among Easterners the parties serve as the major link to the system, while among Westerners the state is identified more with values and goals articulated in the Zionist ideology. The Easterners respond more to the "party of solidarity" characteristics of the Israeli parties which they view favorably, while the Westerners respond more to the "party of representation" characteristics, which they regard as unsatisfactory.

If this line of thinking has validity, then the support for the party system found among Easterners is a product of their client relationship to the parties, serving to raise their belief in political effectiveness. They are less concerned with the ideologies expressed by the parties, or that of the state. Consequently their belief in governmental responsiveness is lower than that found among Westerners.

Improved socio-economic status and membership in a youth movement serve to raise the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness among Easterners, both of which have less effect among Westerners. Experience in academic, rather than vocational, education has little effect on the efficacy beliefs of Easterners, although Westerners in academic education are clearly higher in the belief in governmental responsiveness than Westerners in vocational education.

The academic secondary schools seem to have little effect in changing the political efficacy beliefs of

Easterners. These beliefs derive from experience with the political system, and not education, per se. Support for democratic norms, however, may be assumed to be promoted through education, but in fact support for democratic norms is lower among academic students, both Eastern and Western, than among vocational students. It seems clear that greater emphasis in the curriculum should be given to the concept of democracy.

There is evidence that democratic orientations can derive from a belief in governmental responsiveness. The fact that this belief is high among Israelis generally does promote support for democratic norms, but the fact that Easterners are lower on both of these indices suggests the need for giving greater attention to the concept of democracy in Israeli schools. Easterners are disadvantaged in their familiarity with the concept. Considering that our Easterners represent a specific subset of the Eastern population, this problem is surely considerably greater than the data indicate.

Israel faces a number of problems, none greater than the possible development of a confrontation between Eastern and Western segments of the population. Recent events have shown that the emergence of such a confrontation is not at all unlikely. Obviously, the avoidance of this development will depend on the extent to which the problems associated with ethnic difference are resolved. But in the process of solving those problems, it will be

important that the representatives of various interests have a commitment to democratic politics, all the more so if those whose commitment to democracy is less also believe less in the responsiveness of governmental officials, and accept less the consummatory values of the system. Israel's ability to deal with external problems has been augmented by those very characteristics which will help it in resolving its internal problems, if these characteristics are equally found in all segments of its population.

As the importance of ideology decreases in Israel, and as the consummatory values which promote belief in governmental responsiveness become less salient, the nature of the party system will need to change. Greater attention to individual interests will be required. Clearly, these changes are already occurring, though the rate of adaptation may be unsatisfactory to meet particular problems as they arise. Easterners constitute a segment of the population for whom the ideology and its collective goals are less salient, and the satisfaction of their interests must be met before serious problems arise. Those for whom collective interests are less salient require greater satisfaction of their individual interests. That Easterners tend to support the party system, or are at least less disaffected from it than might be expected, will certainly be useful in bringing about required changes.

All this suggests that the characteristics which in Israel permit incongruence between the beliefs in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness are the products of unique circumstances. These circumstances are undergoing change in Israel itself, and the likelihood of their occurrence elsewhere is slim. Israel is very likely an exception to the general rule that these beliefs should be congruent for the stability of democratic government.

The secular-libertarian and sacred-collectivity models delineated by Apter refer to two distinct lines of political theory. Some theorists, notably Rousseau, have tried to link these. Yet, it would seem to be no coincidence that pyramidal authority tends to be associated with instrumental values and hierarchical authority with consummatory values. Modernizing nations may attempt to link hierarchical authority with instrumental values, but the experience of modernization suggests that either the values or the authority structure will likely change.

Israel's linkage of consummatory values and pyramidal authority would seem to be unique. Dorothy Willner suggests that Israel differs from other new states in that in addition to being a new state it is also a new society, and that "the creation of both state and society was made possible and legitimated by the prior existence of an identity rooted in ancient Jewish nationhood and

maintained through religion. . . . "<sup>2</sup> Israel is not a new state originating from an old society. Thus, Willner continues:

The specific factors made possible by the sequence from 'national identity' to 'state' to 'society' seem to include: (1) sufficient centralization of national authority; (2) sufficient resources for generating and maintaining both programs of action and the organizational units for putting into effect and sustaining these programs; and (3) sufficient solidarity among most of the population who joined in the formation of the new society to enable Israel, as a consequence, progressively to realize its national goals."<sup>3</sup>

It has been suggested that political development involves essentially six crises which must be met in order for a society to become a modern nation-state: the crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, integration, and distribution.<sup>4</sup> Pye observes that in continental Europe, and in most new states of Asia and Africa, these crises have tended to appear simultaneously, in contrast to the experiences of England and the United States, and he observes that:

The efforts to raise the standards of living in [Asia and Africa] are in large part related to creating feelings of basic loyalty to the nation, and this procedure raises the question of how stable such

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<sup>2</sup>Willner, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966), pp. 62-66.

states can become if their citizens' sense of identity is tied too closely to the effectiveness of particular policies.<sup>5</sup>

Israel too has its identity crises, which emerges with such issues as "Who is a Jew?" But these crises have little, if anything, to do with loyalty to the state. Precisely because this crisis has not affected Israel, the other crises have been relatively minimal in significance as well. Israel may face the possibility of an integration crisis, but it comes relatively well prepared to meet it. Crises of national identity and integration tend to be much more difficult problems elsewhere in the developing world.<sup>6</sup> They lead much more directly to governmental ineffectiveness or authoritarianism.

It is disheartening to suggest that perhaps other countries can imitate Israel's situation only as the result of war. As Coser has stated, "conflict with out-groups increases internal cohesion"<sup>7</sup> and "defines group

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>6</sup>For discussions of these problems see especially Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States, ed. by Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157; and Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLVIII (March, 1965), 52-64, reprinted in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 551-62.

<sup>7</sup>Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p. 87.

structure,"<sup>8</sup> and it is no coincidence that as an example he refers specifically to the role of anti-Semitism in increasing Jewish solidarity.<sup>9</sup> For Israel as a nation this function has been served by Arab enmity. The historical background of the Jews and of the Zionist movement suggests that Israel might have developed similar institutions and values without the external threat from its neighbors, but if so it is less likely that the same could occur for other nations with different backgrounds.

I have attempted throughout this study to link the concept of political efficacy, usually related to aspects of political participation, with such larger concerns of political science as system structure, normative values, and political development. Hopefully, the interaction between concepts derived from the study of political behavior (micro-politics) and our larger concerns with political systems (macro-politics) can serve to benefit the development of theory in both directions. Ideally, both those whose primary concern is micro-politics and those who focus on macro-politics will find that their orientations are inseparable, with increased understanding in one area depending upon a recognition of the contributions which the other has to make. For this study, clearly, no understanding of the political efficacy

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 110.



configuration in Israel could have emerged without a consideration of the nature of Israel's political system, and of its differences from other systems.

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## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

## APPENDIX A

### METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Israeli data reported here are from my sample of fifth (N=269), eighth (N=292), and eleventh graders (N=1,021), aged 10, 13, and 16 respectively. Data was collected between November, 1969 and April, 1970. The fifth and eighth graders are from Netanya schools, the eleventh graders from Netanya (N=697), Tel Aviv (N=215), and Beersheba (N=109). Obtaining permission to do research in Israeli schools is a troublesome undertaking. In this regard, Kleinberger refers to the "intolerance of criticism . . . reflected in the suspiciousness of the Minister of Education and Culture towards independent educational research, and in his attempt to subject research carried out in schools to censorship by his officials so as to prevent publication of inconvenient facts and conclusions."<sup>1</sup> In doing this research, it was necessary to obtain permission from the Ministry of Education and Culture, then the director of the local school district, and then individual principals, a time-consuming and arduous process.

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<sup>1</sup>Kleinberger, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

It may be of interest to note that the time between my request to the Ministry and approval from the Ministry was ten months.

All this leads to the fact that the findings reported here are not based on a random sample. It is difficult to state how representative the sample is, and in fact it is difficult to know what a representative sample in Israel would look like. Netanya, a city of 60,000, was selected for several reasons. It is urban, and therefore representative of the fact that over 80 per cent of the Israeli population is urban. It is an established city, rather than a development town (that is, its existence pre-dated statehood), with a population mix of persons of Western and Eastern origin. As pointed out in the text, the Israeli high school is a selective institution in which Easterners are under-represented, and primarily to increase the number of Easterners in the sample, additional high schools in Tel Aviv and Beersheba were selected.

The fifth and eighth grade samples include all students in those grades in three Netanya primary schools, each school varying in ethnic composition. For example, among the eighth graders, one of these schools is 65.6 per cent Western, 25.3 per cent Eastern, and 9.1 per cent second-generation Israeli; the second is 54.1 per cent Western, 36.9 per cent Eastern, and 8.1 per cent second-generation Israeli; and the third is 14.8 per cent

Western, 81.5 per cent Eastern, and 3.7 per cent second-generation Israeli. The latter school in particular is composed of those in the lowest socio-economic status category. The eleventh grade sample is a bit more complex: 60.8 per cent of the eleventh graders are Western, 32.8 per cent are Eastern, and 6.5 per cent second-generation Israeli. This clearly does not adequately represent the proportion of Easterners in the population as a whole, nor in the secondary school population as a whole. This is despite the fact that a number of the respondents are from religious high schools, and a vocational school, where the proportions of Easterners are higher than in the academic secondary schools. We cannot know to what extent these respondents represent the secondary school population of Israel as a whole, even less to what extent they represent the total population of their age group. The sample does include all eleventh graders in Netanya during the academic year of 1969-70.

It seems justifiable to say that the sample is, if anything, more likely to be interested in politics, supportive of democratic norms and of the party system, and to believe in governmental responsiveness and political effectiveness, than their cohorts not in school. The respondents come from Netanya, an established city with a sizable Eastern population; Tel Aviv, the country's metropolis; and Beersheba, a development town highly populated by persons of Eastern origin. While they are



representative of much of Israeli society, they do not represent less well-developed areas, where the situation of Easterners is aggravated in many cases by isolation from Westerners. They do not represent at all the rural population, a very small though sociologically interesting section of the population.

For purposes of ethnic comparison Westerners and second-generation Israelis have been grouped as Western, because of the very small number of second-generation Israelis, and the lack of theoretical justification for differentiating between these two groups. The nature of the socio-economic status, type of school, and youth movement differentiations are discussed in the text.

The data used for cross-national comparisons in Chapter III are from samples of American, British, German, and Italian youth, as reported in Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (April, 1969), pp. 71-101. The samples for these countries are described in the original article. In each case there are three age-groups: The American sample involves fifth, eighth, and eleventh graders; the German sample is divided into three age groups--9-10, 11-13, and 14-15; the Italian sample is of 10, 13, and 16 year olds; and the British sample is approximately 8-9, 12-13, and 14-15. Not all

the questions reported in the Dennis article which I have used were asked of Israeli fifth graders. In the comparative tables a notation indicates the direction of difference from the youngest to the oldest group in each country.

Five indices have been constructed for the Israeli sample: Support for Democratic Norms; Support for the Party System; Belief in Governmental Responsiveness; and Political Interest. Each is based on a series of questions, with the respondent receiving two points for a "positive" answer, one point for a "Don't Know" response, or where no answer was given, and zero points for a "negative" response. The respondents were then divided into thirds as nearly as possible, creating for each index a high, medium, and low category.

Scaling was attempted without success. It might have been possible to achieve acceptable scaling had the "Don't Know" and no answers been eliminated, but this was felt inadvisable. The case of no answer is rare, and "Don't Know" was considered a legitimate alternative. A factor analysis was run which indicated, very much in accordance with expectations, which questions composed the indices of Political Interest and Support for the Party System. It also indicated a Political Efficacy factor, in accordance with expectations, and these questions were subdivided into an Index of Belief in Governmental Responsiveness and an Index of Belief in Political

Effectiveness, as these notions are developed in the text. The Index of Support for Democratic Norms follows similar usage elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Timothy Hennessey, "Democratic Attitudinal Configurations Among Italian Youth," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII, 2 (May, 1969), 167-93.

Index of Support for Democratic Norms

Is democracy the best form of government? (Agree = 2)

Is democracy rule by the people? (Agree = 2)

Is it correct that in the democratic system of government every adult can vote? (Agree = 2)

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man is given an equal opportunity to improve his social condition? (Agree = 2)

Is it correct that in the democratic system every man can say things against the government without anything bad happening to him? (Agree = 2)

In the democratic system when a majority of the people agree on something then the rest of the people should not criticize. Do you agree with this definition? (Disagree = 2)

	<u>8th</u>	<u>11th</u>
0=	0	0
1=	1	0
2=	1	0
3=	3	0
4=	1	3
5=	1	10
6=	17	21
7=	17	25
8=	35	145
9=	18	78
10=	89	245
11=	28	126
12=	81	368

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

	<u>8th Grade</u>	<u>11th Grade</u>
High (12 points)	81 (28%)	368 (36%)
Medium (10, 11 points)	117 (40%)	371 (36%)
Low (1-9 points)	94 (32%)	282 (28%)

Index of Belief in Governmental  
Responsiveness

It doesn't matter what the average person does, he can't change the decisions of the government, just as he can't change the weather. (Disagree = 2)

In the government there are a few powerful people who run the whole thing without considering us--the average citizen. (Disagree = 2)

Israelis have the chance to express their opinions about the way our country is run. (Agree = 2)

How much does the simple citizen influence which laws are passed? (Very much=2; some=1; not at all=0)

	<u>8th</u>	<u>11th</u>
0=	0	10
1=	1	16
2=	17	61
3=	22	63
4=	52	142
5=	61	174
6=	50	196
7=	55	269
8=	34	90

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

	<u>8th Grade</u>	<u>11th Grade</u>
High (7-8 points)	89 (31%)	359 (35%)
Medium (5-6 points)	111 (38%)	370 (36%)
Low (0-4 points)	92 (32%)	292 (29%)

Index of Belief in (Parent's) Political  
Effectiveness

In the decisions of the government what people like my parents think is considered. (Agree = 2)

I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think. (Disagree = 2)

My family has no chance to influence the government and its decisions. (Disagree = 2)

	<u>8th</u>	<u>11th</u>
0=	31	144
1=	23	130
2=	68	245
3=	47	154
4=	74	207
5=	17	67
6=	32	74

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

	<u>8th Grade</u>	<u>11th Grade</u>
High (4-6 points)	123 (42%)	348 (34%)
Medium (2-3 points)	115 (39%)	399 (39%)
Low (0-1 points)	54 (19%)	274 (27%)

Index of Support for the Party System

The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country more than they help it. (Disagree =2)

Our system of government would work better if we could get rid of the conflicts between the political parties.  
(Disagree = 2)

The situation in our country would be better if there were no political parties. (Disagree = 2)

The political parties in Israel create conflicts where in fact none really exist. (Disagree = 2)

The political parties do more to confuse the issue than to clarify it. (Disagree = 2)

Our system of government would work better if there were only two political parties. (Disagree = 2)

	<u>8th</u>	<u>11th</u>
0=	17	49
1=	5	29
2=	22	93
3=	13	71
4=	42	115
5=	26	100
6=	47	136
7=	19	95
8=	47	122
9=	11	55
10=	27	95
11=	4	9
12=	12	52

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

	<u>8th Grade</u>	<u>11th Grade</u>
High (8-12 points)	101 (35%)	333 (33%)
Medium (5-7 points)	92 (32%)	331 (32%)
Low (0-4 points)	99 (34%)	357 (35%)

Index of Political Interest

I discuss problems of the state with my parents.  
(Frequently=2; sometimes=1; very rarely=0)

Are you interested in reading and discussing what happens  
in the government? (Very interested=2; somewhat inter-  
ested=1; not at all interested=0)

I discuss with my parents about elections and parties.  
(Frequently=2; sometimes=1; very rarely=0)

I read about politics in the newspaper, and follow the  
news on radio and television. (Most of the time=2; some  
of the time=1; very rarely=0)

I speak with my friends about politics. (Frequently=2;  
sometimes=1; very rarely=0)

11th Grade

0=	7
1=	11
2=	26
3=	58
4=	88
5=	195
6=	185
7=	173
8=	120
9=	103
10=	55

The breakdown into categories on this index is as follows:

	<u>11th Grade</u>
High (8-10 points)	278 (27%)
Medium (6-7 points)	358 (35%)
Low (0-5 points)	385 (38%)



APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

## APPENDIX B

### QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questionnaire includes all questions asked of the fifth, eighth, and eleventh grade respondents. Notations indicate which questions were asked at each grade. Not all questions in the questionnaire were used in the analysis reported here.

## QUESTIONNAIRE

## Part A:

1. Are you a boy or a girl?  
 Boy  
 Girl
  
2. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_
  
3. Do you have any older brothers?  
 Yes, if yes, how many?  
 No
  
4. Do you have any older sisters?  
 Yes, if yes, how many?  
 No
  
5. Do you have any younger brothers?  
 Yes, if yes, how many?  
 No
  
6. Do you have any younger sisters?  
 Yes, if yes, how many?  
 No

7. Mark the two main reasons that cause you to be proud to be an Israeli:

Israelis are the most generous people in the world

Israel is a beautiful country

Israelis can choose their leaders

Israelis have freedom

The government of Israel

Zahal (The Israeli Defence Forces)

8. Which of the following characteristics best describe the Israeli people? Choose two.

Courage

Fidelity

Intelligence

Self-sacrifice

Happiness

Strength

Chutzpah (arrogance)

Questions 9-34 asked of fifth and eighth grades only

9. Choose two from the following list which symbolize best the government in our country.

Police

Voting

Knesset

Prime Minister

Flag

10. Before you are a number of opinions of students regarding the function (job) of the government; what in your opinion is the function (job) of the government?

to prevent wars

to make friends with other countries

to help people in our country

to settle conflicts

to make people obey the laws

to make sure our country is run well

11. Are the following laws or not?

Cars must stop at stop signs yes/ no

It is necessary to brush your teeth every morning yes/ no

It is forbidden to cheat in school yes/ no

It is necessary to arrive on time to school yes/ no

12. Which of the people listed below work for the state? (medina)

the policeman

the judge

the postman

bus driver

13. It is very likely that some of you do not know the meaning of the word government (memshala). If you do not know the meaning clearly, mark an X here. \_\_\_\_\_

14. Disobey means to do something which you are told not to do. Which of the following things is the most wrong?
- not to obey mother
  - not to obey teacher
  - not to obey father
  - not to obey the policeman
15. Which is the most important thing that the policeman must do?
- to make people obey the law
  - to help people in trouble
  - to catch people who break the law
16. If you think that what the policeman tells you to do is not correct, what do you do?
- do what he says and forget it
  - do what he says and afterwards tell your father
  - first do what he says and afterwards ask him why
  - do what he says and afterwards tell him he's wrong
  - don't do what he says

17. Suppose that the teacher needs to send two students to the president to receive a prize for good citizenship. Who in your opinion should he (she) choose? (Mark x beside two students that in your opinion he should choose)

A student who helps others

A student who does what he is told to do

A student who is interested in the way our country is run

A student who everybody likes

I don't know who to choose because I don't know what good citizenship means

18. If the president were to decide to give prizes to the two best citizens (adults) who would he choose (mark two)?

Somebody who votes and encourages others to vote

Somebody who always obeys the laws

Somebody who is interested in the way our country is run

I don't know who to choose because I don't know what a good citizen is

19. Mark with an x how much your parents teach you about good citizenship

they teach me very much

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

20. Mark with an x how much your friends teach you about good citizenship.

they teach me very much

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

21. Mark with an x how much the radio and television teach you about good citizenship.

they teach me very much

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

22. Mark with an x how much the newspapers teach you about good citizenship.

they teach me very much

they teach me a little

they don't teach me at all

23. a) The prime minister works

harder

exactly as hard (as)

less hard

than most of the other people in the state.

- b) The prime minister knows

more

exactly as much (as)

less

than most of the people in the state.



c) The prime minister is

\_\_\_ more honest

\_\_\_ exactly as honest (as)

\_\_\_ less honest

than most of the people in the state.

27. a) A kneset member works

\_\_\_ harder

\_\_\_ exactly as hard (as)

\_\_\_ less hard

than most of the other people in the state.

b) A kneset member knows

\_\_\_ more

\_\_\_ exactly as much (as)

\_\_\_ less

than most of the people in the state.

c) A kneset member is

\_\_\_ more honest

\_\_\_ exactly as honest (as)

\_\_\_ less honest

than most of the people in the state.

28. a) A mayor works

harder

exactly as hard (as)

less hard

than most of the other people in the state.

b) A mayor knows

more

exactly as much (as)

less

than most of the people in the state.

c) A mayor is

more honest

exactly as honest (as)

less honest

than most of the people in the state.

29. Which is the most correct of the three alternatives:

If you write to the prime minister he cares very much about your opinion

If you write to the prime minister he cares somewhat about your opinion

If you write to the prime minister he doesn't care at all about your opinion

30. Which is the most correct of the three alternatives:

If you write to a kneset member he cares very much about your opinion

If you write to a kneset member he cares somewhat about your opinion

If you write to a kneset member he doesn't care at all about your opinion

31. Which is the most correct of the three alternatives:

If you write to the mayor he cares very much about your opinion

If you write to the mayor he cares somewhat about your opinion

If you write to the mayor he doesn't care at all about your opinion

32. If you could participate in elections with whom would you seek advice before voting? Mark the best advisor only.

A friend my age

My parents

My teacher

The television, the radio, and the newspapers

I would decide by myself

I don't know

33. How much did you learn from the elections?

a lot

some

nothing at all

34. I think that what the government does is the best thing.

yes

no

I don't know

Part B: All Grades

1. Is democracy the best form of government?

yes / no / I don't know

2. Is democracy rule by the people?

correct / incorrect / I don't know

3. Is it correct that in the democratic system of government every adult can vote?

correct / incorrect / I don't know

4. Is it correct that in the democratic system every man is given an equal opportunity to improve his social condition? [11th grade only]

correct / incorrect / I don't know

4. Is it correct that in the democratic system every man has opportunities to improve his social condition? [5th & 8th grade only]

correct / incorrect / I don't know

5. Is it correct that in the democratic system any man can say things against the government without anything bad happening to him?

correct /  incorrect /  I don't know

6. In the democratic system when a majority of the people agree on something then the rest of the people should not criticize. Do you agree with this definition? [11th grade only]

yes /  no /  I don't know

6. Is it correct that in the democratic system when a majority of the people agree on something then people shouldn't criticize the decision? [5th & 8th grade only]

correct /  incorrect /  I don't know

7. Suppose some people attempt to influence a decision of the government. In your opinion, what would be the most effective method?

personal connections (including family connections)

letters to officials of the government

forming an organization or group especially for this purpose

by means of a political party

demonstrations [11th grade only]

8. Many people want to be members of the knesset or Prime Minister. Why, in your opinion, do people want these jobs?

\_\_\_ they want to change things that are not good in  
in our country

\_\_\_ they want to become rich and to be important  
people

\_\_\_ in order to keep things as they are in our  
country

9. In what way do these people influence which laws are passed in our country: Very much, a little, not at all

Rich people:

\_\_\_ very much / \_\_\_ a little / \_\_\_ not at all

Prime Minister:

\_\_\_ very much / \_\_\_ a little / \_\_\_ not at all

The police:

\_\_\_ very much / \_\_\_ a little / \_\_\_ not at all

Cabinet ministers:

\_\_\_ very much / \_\_\_ a little / \_\_\_ not at all

The simple citizen:

\_\_\_ very much / \_\_\_ a little / \_\_\_ not at all

Army officers:

\_\_\_ very much / \_\_\_ a little / \_\_\_ not at all

10. Who does the most to run the country?

Prime Minister

Cabinet ministers

the Knesset

the President

I don't know

11. I don't think that people in the government care much what people like my family think.

Yes, I agree

No, I don't agree

I don't know

12. Would you want to work for the government?

yes /  no /  I don't know

13. My family has no chance to influence the government and its decisions.

Yes, I agree

No, I don't agree

I don't know

14. The situation in our country would be better if there were no political parties.

yes /  no /  I don't know

15. Are your parents interested in the news and what happens in the government?

always interested

usually interested

sometimes interested

almost never interested

I don't know

16. I discuss problems of the state with my parents:

frequently

sometimes

very rarely

17. It is desirable that children identify with the same political party as their parents.

yes, I agree

no, I don't agree

I don't know

Part C: 8th grade--questions 1-29  
11th grade--questions 1-50

1. Are you interested in reading and discussing what happens in the government and the things that go on in our country?

very interested

somewhat interested

not interested at all



2. I discuss with my parents elections and parties in the state.

frequently

sometimes

very rarely

3. I read about politics in the newspaper, and follow what happens in our country on radio and television.

most of the time

some of the time

very rarely

4. I speak with my friends about politics.

frequently

sometimes

very rarely

5. Which of the following seem to you to represent the purposes of the state of Israel? Choose the two most important.

ingathering of the exiles

to be a light to the nations

to be a nation like all the nations

to integrate into the Middle East

to become the strongest state in the Middle East

to see that people in our country will be materially satisfied

6. Which of the following is the best definition of Israeli?

a man who lives in Israel

a Jew who lives in Israel

a man born in Israel

a man who lives in Israel and thinks and acts like we do

7. Even people who oppose our way of life have a right to be heard. (Or, even to people who oppose our way of life it is necessary to give to them the opportunity to have their words listened to.) Do you agree?

Yes, I agree

No, I don't agree

I don't know

NOTE: All subsequent questions use same response format.

8. It is important to our state that every citizen support a political party.
9. Israelis have a chance to express their opinions about how their country is run.
10. One strong leader would be better for our state than all the laws and talk.
11. The minority in the state should be free to criticize the decisions of the government.
12. A man shouldn't be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about. Do you agree?
13. It is possible to believe that most of the politicians will do the best thing for the state.
14. In our country family position or money are more important than success as a result of hard work and skill.

15. In the decisions of the government what people like my parents think is considered.
16. There is no discrimination in this country.
17. It doesn't matter what a person does, he can't change the decisions of the government just as he can't change the weather.
18. In the government there are a few powerful people that run the whole thing without considering us--the average citizens.
19. Every vote in an election is important even when many people vote.
20. A political leader is obligated to follow the opinion of his party even when this conflicts with his conscience.
21. A political leader should follow the will of the voters even when this conflicts with the will of his party.
22. Problems that seem important to our parents are not necessarily important to us.
23. My opinions regarding social, economic, and political questions are very different from those of my parents.
24. The conflicts and controversies between the parties hurt our country more than they help it.
25. Our system of government would work better if we could get rid of the conflicts between the political parties.
26. The political parties in Israel create conflicts where in fact none really exist.
27. The political parties do more to confuse the issue than to clarify it.
28. Our system of government would work better if there were only two political parties.
29. It would be to the advantage of other countries if they adopted the Israeli form of government.
30. The methods of a politician are not important any time he gets the right thing done.
31. Voting directly for candidates and not for parties would solve many of our political problems.

32. Most people have fixed opinions; there's no use trying to change their opinions.
33. I usually have confidence that the government will do the right thing.
34. There is practically no connection between what a politician says and what he does after he gets elected. Most political parties care only about winning elections and nothing more.
35. Discussions and negotiations between people with different opinions can't solve the problem; they only lead to concessions.
36. All that politicians do is exaggerate the things that cause division.
37. Governmental institutions cannot operate without politicians.
38. Politics is not a means of insuring complete harmony but a way of arriving at temporary agreements about policies within agreed-upon rules.
39. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to giving up our principles.
40. If two people disagree they can usually reach a satisfactory solution by mutual discussion.
41. Our state would work better if there were a complete separation of authority between the executive and the legislative, that is the Knesset and the Government.
42. Politics is basically a conflict in which groups and individuals compete for certain aims.
43. Society has the right to tell people how to live their lives. People should follow society even if that goes against their personal judgment.
44. The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion.
45. It is the duty of all Jews in the world to immigrate to Israel.
46. The government of Israel should see to it that public life is conducted in accordance with Jewish religious tradition.

47. Usually when one begins to change things the results will be worse than before the change.
48. Of all the philosophies that exist in the world surely there is one that is correct.
49. You can't change human nature.
50. It's better to stick by what you have than to try new things you can't be sure about.

Part D: All grades, Questions 1-8

1. Where were you born? \_\_\_\_\_

If you are not a native of the country, how long have you been in the country? \_\_\_\_\_

2. In what country was your father born? \_\_\_\_\_

3. In what country was your mother born? \_\_\_\_\_

4. Mark the sentence closest to the occupation of your father (if your father is dead or not working, mark his occupation in the past).

\_\_\_ works with his hands--in a factory, on a machine, works on the land, etc.

\_\_\_ trade worker--electrician, carpenter, plumber, etc.

\_\_\_ office worker ( )--clerk, salesman, etc.

\_\_\_ owns a small store

\_\_\_ policeman, fireman, soldier

\_\_\_ professional--doctor, lawyer, teacher, engineer, manager, etc.

\_\_\_ owns a large factory or other large business

5. Is your family  
\_\_\_religious  
\_\_\_traditional  
\_\_\_not religious
6. Do you belong to any youth movement?  
\_\_\_Yes. If yes, to which one? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_No.
7. Do you belong to another youth organization such as  
"Noar l'Noar"?  
\_\_\_Yes. If yes, to which one? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_No.
8. Do you belong to any sports club?  
\_\_\_Yes. If yes, to which one? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_No.
- NOTE: Remaining questions--11th grade only
9. What do you want to be when you grow up? \_\_\_\_\_
10. Do you want to live in  
\_\_\_a city  
\_\_\_a kibbutz  
\_\_\_a moshav  
\_\_\_a development town

## QUESTIONNAIRE

## Part A:

1. האם אתה בן או בת?

בן \_\_\_\_\_

בת \_\_\_\_\_

2. בן כמה אתה?  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. האם יש לך אחים מבוגרים ממך?

כן, אם כן, כמה? \_\_\_\_\_

לא \_\_\_\_\_

4. האם יש לך אחיות מבוגרות ממך?

כן, אם כן, כמה? \_\_\_\_\_

לא \_\_\_\_\_

5. האם יש לך אחים צעירים ממך?

כן, אם כן, כמה? \_\_\_\_\_

לא \_\_\_\_\_

6. האם יש לך אחיות צעירות ממך?

כן, אם כן, כמה? \_\_\_\_\_

לא \_\_\_\_\_

7. סמן את שתי הסיבות העיקריות הגורמות לך להיות גהה על היותך ישראלי:

הישראלים הם האנשים הנדיבים ביותר בעולם \_\_\_\_\_  
 ישראל היא ארץ יפה \_\_\_\_\_  
 הישראלים יכולים לבחור במנהיגים \_\_\_\_\_  
 לישראלים יש חרות \_\_\_\_\_  
 ממשלת ישראל \_\_\_\_\_  
 צה"ל \_\_\_\_\_

8. אילו מהתכונות הבאות מאפיינות את הישראלי בצורה טובה ביותר, בחר בשניים.

אומץ \_\_\_\_\_  
 נאמנות \_\_\_\_\_  
 השכלה \_\_\_\_\_  
 הקרבה עצמית \_\_\_\_\_  
 אושר \_\_\_\_\_  
 כוח \_\_\_\_\_  
 חוצפה \_\_\_\_\_

Questions 9-34 asked of fifth and eighth grades only

9. ציין שנים מתוך הרשימה הבאה המסמלים יותר מאחרים את המשטר בארץ.

משטרה \_\_\_\_\_  
 בחירות \_\_\_\_\_  
 כנסת \_\_\_\_\_  
 ראש ממשלה \_\_\_\_\_  
 דגל \_\_\_\_\_



10. לפנינו מספר דעות של תלמידים ותלמידות בקשר לתפקיד הממשלה; מהו לדעתך תפקיד הממשלה? (סמן X ליד שני משפטים המבטאים לדעתך את תפקידי הממשלה)

\_\_\_\_\_ למנוע מלחמות  
 \_\_\_\_\_ להתיידד עם ארצות אחרות  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לעזור לאנשים בארצנו  
 \_\_\_\_\_ ליישב סכסוכים  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לגרום לכך שהאנשים ישמעו לחוקים  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לדאוג לכך שארצנו תנוהל כהלכה

11. האם המשפטים הבאים מהווים חוקים או לא?

_____ / כן _____	מכונניות חייבות לעצור בהגיען לסימן "עצור"
_____ / לא _____	יש לצחצח שיניים כל בוקר
_____ / כן _____	אסור לרמות בבית-הספר
_____ / לא _____	יש להגיע בזמן לבית-הספר

12. מי מהאנשים הרשומים מטה הוא עובד מדינה?

\_\_\_\_\_ השוטר  
 \_\_\_\_\_ השופט  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הדוור  
 \_\_\_\_\_ נהג האוטובוס

13. יתכן מאוד שחלק מכם אינו יודע מה פירוש המלה ממשלה. אם אינך יודע בבירור את הפירוש, סמן כאן X . \_\_\_\_\_

14. "אי-ציות" פירושו לעשות משהו שאמרו לא לעשות. איזה מהדברים הבאים הוא הגרוע ביותר? (סמן X לידו)

- \_\_\_\_\_ לא להשמע לאם  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לא להשמע למורה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לא להשמע לאב  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לא להשמע לשוטר

15. מה הדבר החשוב ביותר ששוטר צריך לעשות? (סמן ב-X)

- \_\_\_\_\_ לגרום לכך שהאנשים ישמעו לחוק  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לעזור לאנשים הנמצאים בצרה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לאסור אנשים העוברים על החוק

16. אם אתה חושב שמה שהשוטר אמר לך לעשות לא צודק, מה אתה עושה?  
 (סמן X ליד אחת מהתשובות להלן):

- \_\_\_\_\_ עושה מה שהוא אמר ושוכח מזה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ עושה מה שהוא אמר לך לעשות ולאחר מכן מספר לאביו  
 \_\_\_\_\_ קודם עושה מה שהוא אמר ואחר-כך שואל אותו מדוע  
 \_\_\_\_\_ עושה מה שהוא אמר ולאחר מכן מעמיד אותו על טעותו  
 \_\_\_\_\_ מסרב להישמע לו

17. נניח שהמורה צדיך לשלוח שני תלמידים אל הנשיא לשם קבלת פרס על אזרחות טובה. במי לדעתך עליו לבחור? (סמן x ליד שני התלמידים שלדעתך עליו לבחור)

\_\_\_\_\_ תלמיד העוזר לאחרים  
 \_\_\_\_\_ תלמיד העושה מה שנאמר לו לעשות  
 \_\_\_\_\_ תלמיד המתעניין בדרך שבה מנוהלת ארצנו  
 \_\_\_\_\_ תלמיד המתחבב על כולם  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אינני יודע במי לבחור מכיון שאיני יודע מה פירוש אזרחות טובה

18. אילו הנשיא היה מחליט לתת פרסים לשני האזרחים (המבוגרים) הטובים ביותר; במי היה בוחר (ציין שניים)?

\_\_\_\_\_ מישהו הבוחר ומעודד אחרים לבחור  
 \_\_\_\_\_ מישהו הנשמע תמיד לחוק  
 \_\_\_\_\_ מישהו המתעניין בדרך שבה ארצנו מנוהלת  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אינני יודע במי יבחר כיון שאיני יודע מה זה אזרח טוב

19. סמן ג-א עד כמה מלמדים אותך הורריך על אזרחות טובה

\_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי הרבה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי מעט  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם אינם מלמדים אותי כלל

20. סמן ב-x עד כמה מלמדים אותך חבריך על אזרחות טובה

\_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי הרבה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי מעט  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם אינם מלמדים אותי כלל

21. סמן ב-x עד כמה מלמדים אותך הרדיו והטלביזיה על אזרחות טובה

\_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי הרבה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי מעט  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם אינם מלמדים אותי כלל

22. סמן ב-x עד כמה מלמדים אותך העיתונים על אזרחות טובה

\_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי הרבה  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם מלמדים אותי מעט  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הם אינם מלמדים אותי כלל

23. (א) ראש הממשלה עובד

\_\_\_\_\_ יותר קשה

\_\_\_\_\_ בדיוק כה קשה

\_\_\_\_\_ פחות קשה

מדוב האנשים האחרים במדינה.

(ב) ראש הממשלה יודע

\_\_\_\_\_ יותר

\_\_\_\_\_ בערך אותו דבר

\_\_\_\_\_ פחות

מדוב האנשים במדינה.

(ג) ראש הממשלה הוא

\_\_\_\_\_ יותר הגון

\_\_\_\_\_ בדיוק כה הגון

\_\_\_\_\_ פחות הגון

מדוב האנשים במדינה.

27. (א) חבר-כנסת עובד

\_\_\_\_\_ יותר קשה

\_\_\_\_\_ בדיוק כה קשה

\_\_\_\_\_ פחות קשה

מדוב האנשים האחרים במדינה.

(ב) חבר-כנסת יודע

\_\_\_\_\_ יותר

\_\_\_\_\_ בערך אותו דבר

\_\_\_\_\_ פחות

מדוב האנשים במדינה.

(ג) חבר-כנסת הוא

\_\_\_\_\_ יותר הגון

\_\_\_\_\_ בדיוק כה הגון

\_\_\_\_\_ פחות הגון

מדוב האנשים במדינה.

28. א) ראש העירייה עובד

יותר קשה \_\_\_\_\_

בדיוק כה קשה \_\_\_\_\_

פחות קשה \_\_\_\_\_

מדוב האנשים האחרים במדינה.

ב) ראש העירייה יודע

יותר \_\_\_\_\_

בערך אותו דבר \_\_\_\_\_

פחות \_\_\_\_\_

מדוב האנשים במדינה.

ג) ראש העירייה הוא

יותר הגון \_\_\_\_\_

בדיוק כה הגון \_\_\_\_\_

פחות הגון \_\_\_\_\_

מדוב האנשים במדינה.

29. מה הנכון ביותר כבין שלושת האפשרויות: (סמן ב-א)

אם תכתוב לראש הממשלה הוא יתחשב מאוד בדעותיך \_\_\_\_\_

אם תכתוב לראש הממשלה הוא יתחשב קצת בדעותיך \_\_\_\_\_

אם תכתוב לראש הממשלה הוא כמעט ולא יתחשב בדעותיך \_\_\_\_\_

30. מה הנכון ביותר מבין שלושת האפשרויות: (סמן ב-x)

- \_\_\_\_\_ אכן תכתוב לחבר כנסת הוא יתחשב מאוד בדעותיך  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אם תכתוב לחבר כנסת הוא יתחשב קצת בדעותיך  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אם תכתוב לחבר כנסת הוא כמעט ולא יתחשב בדעותיך

31. מה הנכון ביותר מבין שלושת האפשרויות: (סמן ב-x)

- \_\_\_\_\_ אם תכתוב לראש עירייה הוא יתחשב מאוד בדעותיך  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אם תכתוב לראש העירייה הוא יתחשב קצת בדעותיך  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אם תכתוב לראש העירייה הוא כמעט ולא יתחשב בדעותיך

32. אם יכולת להשתתף בבחירות; עם מי היית מתייעץ לפני ההצבעה. ציין את היועץ הטוב ביותר בלבד.

- \_\_\_\_\_ עם חבר בגילי  
 \_\_\_\_\_ עם הורי  
 \_\_\_\_\_ עם מורי  
 \_\_\_\_\_ הטלביזיה, הרדיו והעתונות  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אני אחליט על דעת עצמי  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אינני יודע

33. כמה למדת מהבחירות?

- \_\_\_\_\_ המון  
 \_\_\_\_\_ קצת  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לא כלום

34. אני חושב שכל מה שהממשלה עושה זה הדבר הטוב ביותר.

כן \_\_\_\_\_  
לא \_\_\_\_\_  
אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

Part B: All Grades

1. האם הדמוקרטיה היא צורת השלטון הטובה ביותר?  
כן \_\_\_\_\_ / לא \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_
2. האם הדמוקרטיה זה שלטון העם?  
נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / לא נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_
3. האם זה נכון שבמשטר דמוקרטי יכול כל אדם מבוגר לבחור?  
נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / לא נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_
4. האם זה נכון שבמשטר דמוקרטי ניתנת הזדמנות נאותה לכל אדם לשפר את מצבו החברתי? [11th grade only]  
נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / לא נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_
4. האם זה נכון שבמשטר דמוקרטי יכל לכל אדם אפשרות לשפר את מצבו החברתי? [5th & 8th grade only]  
נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / לא נכון \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_



5. האם זה נכון שבמשטר דמוקרטי יכול כל אדם לומר דברים נגד השלטון מבלי שיאונה לו כל רע?

נכון / לא נכון / אינני יודע

6. במשטר דמוקרטי כאשר רוב האנשים מסכימים על משהו שאר האנשים לא צריכים לבקר את ההחלטה. האם אתה מסכים להגדרה זו [11th grade only]

כן / לא / אינני יודע

6. האם זה נכון שבמשטר דמוקרטי כאשר רוב האנשים מסכימים על משהו שאר האנשים לא צריכים לבקר את ההחלטה? [5th & 8th grade only]

נכון / לא נכון / אינני יודע

מי שחושב שהמלה "דמוקרטיה" אינה מובנת לו בדיוק, ישמן X למטה:

\_\_\_\_\_

7. נניח שמספר אנשים מנסים להשפיע על החלטת הממשלה. מהי לפי דעתך, הדרך היעילה ביותר?

קשרים אישיים (כולל קשרי משפחה) \_\_\_\_\_

מכתבים לפקידי ממשלה \_\_\_\_\_

הקמת ארגון או אגודה במיוחד למטרה זו \_\_\_\_\_

באמצעות מפלגה \_\_\_\_\_

ע"י ארגון הפגנות [11th grade only] \_\_\_\_\_

8. אנשים רבים רוצים להיות חברי כנסת או ראש הממשלה. מדוע, לדעתך, רוצים האנשים תפקידים אלה?

\_\_\_\_\_ רצונם לשנות דברים שאינם טובים בארץ  
 \_\_\_\_\_ רצונם להתעשר ולהיות אנשים חשובים  
 \_\_\_\_\_ בכדי לשמור על הדברים כפי שהם בארץ

9. באיזו מידה משפיעים האנשים האלה על חקיקת חוקים בארץ: הרבה, מעט, בכלל לא. (סמן ב-X בכל שורה הקשורה באדם או בקבוצה מסוימת)

אנשים עשירים:

\_\_\_\_\_ הרבה / \_\_\_\_\_ מעט / \_\_\_\_\_ בכלל לא

ראש הממשלה:

\_\_\_\_\_ הרבה / \_\_\_\_\_ מעט / \_\_\_\_\_ בכלל לא

המטרה:

\_\_\_\_\_ הרבה / \_\_\_\_\_ מעט / \_\_\_\_\_ בכלל לא

שרי הממשלה:

\_\_\_\_\_ הרבה / \_\_\_\_\_ מעט / \_\_\_\_\_ בכלל לא

האזרח הפשוט:

\_\_\_\_\_ הרבה / \_\_\_\_\_ מעט / \_\_\_\_\_ בכלל לא

קציני צבא:

\_\_\_\_\_ הרבה / \_\_\_\_\_ מעט / \_\_\_\_\_ בכלל לא

10. מי עושה יותר מכל אדם אחר לניהול המדינה?

ראש הממשלה \_\_\_\_\_  
 שרי הממשלה \_\_\_\_\_  
 הכנסת \_\_\_\_\_  
 אנשיא \_\_\_\_\_  
 אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

11. אינני חושב שהאנשים בממשלה מתעניינים במה חושבים אנשים כמו בני משפחתי.

כן, אני מסכים \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא, אינני מסכים \_\_\_\_\_  
 אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

12. האם היית רוצה להיות עובד ממשלה?

כן \_\_\_\_\_ / לא \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

13. למשפחתי אין אפשרות להשפיע על הממשלה והחלטותיה.

כן, אני מסכים \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא, אינני מסכים \_\_\_\_\_  
 אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

14. המצב בארצנו היה יכול להיות טוב יותר לולא היו מפלגות.

כן \_\_\_\_\_ / לא \_\_\_\_\_ / אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

15. האם הוריך מתעניינים בחדשות ובמה שמתרחש בממשלה?

תמיד מתעניינים \_\_\_\_\_  
 בדרך כלל מתעניינים \_\_\_\_\_  
 לפעמים מתעניינים \_\_\_\_\_  
 כמעט אף פעם אינם מתעניינים \_\_\_\_\_  
 אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

16. אני דן על בעיות המדינה עם הורי:

לעתים תכופות \_\_\_\_\_  
 לפעמים \_\_\_\_\_  
 לעתים רחוקות מאוד \_\_\_\_\_

17. רצוי שהילדים יזדהו עם אותה המפלגה כמו הוריהם.

כן, אני משכים \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא, אינני משכים \_\_\_\_\_  
 אינני יודע \_\_\_\_\_

Part C: 8th grade--questions 1-29  
 11th grade--questions 1-50

1. האם אתה מתעניין, קורא ומשוחח על מה שקורה בממשלה ועל הדברים  
 המתרחשים בארצנו?

מתעניין מאוד \_\_\_\_\_  
 מתעניין קצת \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא מתעניין בכלל \_\_\_\_\_

2. אני משוחח עם הורי אודות הבחירות והמפלגות במדינה.

לעתים תכופות \_\_\_\_\_

לפעמים \_\_\_\_\_

לעתים רחוקות מאוד \_\_\_\_\_

3. אני קורא על פוליטיקה בעתון ועוקב אחר המתרחש בארץ ברדיו ובטלביזיה.

רוב הזמן \_\_\_\_\_

חלק מהזמן \_\_\_\_\_

לעתים רחוקות מאוד \_\_\_\_\_

4. אני מדבר עם חברי אודות פוליטיקה.

לעתים תכופות \_\_\_\_\_

לפעמים \_\_\_\_\_

לעתים רחוקות מאוד \_\_\_\_\_

5. אילו מהמשפטים הרשומים מטה נראים לך כמיצגים את מטרותיה של

מדינת ישראל? בחר שני משפטים החשובים ביותר.

קבוצ גלויות \_\_\_\_\_

להיות אור לגויים \_\_\_\_\_

להיות אומה ככל האומות \_\_\_\_\_

להשתלב במזרח-התיכון \_\_\_\_\_

להיות המדינה החזקה ביותר במזרח-התיכון \_\_\_\_\_

לדאוג לכך שתושבי הארץ יהנו משפע חומרי \_\_\_\_\_

6. אילו מהמשפטים הרשומים מטה מהווים הגדרה הטובה ביותר של ישראל?

- \_\_\_\_\_ אדם המתגורר בישראל  
 \_\_\_\_\_ יהודי המתגורר בישראל  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אדם שנולד בישראל  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אדם שהתגורר בישראל וחושב ומתנהג כמונו

7. גם לאנשים המתנגדים לצורת החיים שלנו יש לתת את ההזדמנות להשמיע דבריהם. האם אתה מסכים?

- \_\_\_\_\_ כן, אני מסכים  
 \_\_\_\_\_ לא, אינני מסכים  
 \_\_\_\_\_ אצנני יודע

NOTE: All subsequent questions use same response format.

8. חשוב למדינתנו שכל אזרח יתמוך באחת המפלגות.
9. לישראלים יש אפשרות להביע דעתם בקשר לצורה שבה מנוהלת המדינה.
10. למדינתנו טוב יותר מנהיג אחד חזק מאשר כל החוקים ווודבוריס.
11. המיעוט במדינה צריך להיות בעל אפשרות לבקר את החלטות השלטון.
12. אם אדם לא מבין את הדברים שעליהם הוא מדבר אין להדשות לו לדבר כלל. האם אתה מסכים?
13. אפשר להאמין שרוב הפוליטיקאים יעשו את הדבר הטוב ביותר למדינה.
14. בארצנו חשובים יותר מעמד משפחתי או מצב כספי מאשר הצלחה כתוצאה מעבודה קשה וכשרון.

15. הממשלה מתחשבת בהחלטותיה בדעתם של אנשים כמו הור"י.
16. אין הפליה בארצנו.
17. לא חשוב מה אדם יעשה, אין בידו לשנות את החלטות הממשלה כמו שאין בידו לשנות את מוג האו"ר.
18. בממשלה ישנם מספר אנשים בעלי עמדה חזקה המנהלים את כל העניינים מבלי להתחשב בנו - ואזרחים הרגילים.
19. כל קול בבהירות חשוב מאוד גם כאשר אנשים רבים בוחרים.
20. המנהיג הפוליטי חייב להישמע לדעת מפלגתו אפילו אם הדבר נוגד את מצפוננו האישי.
21. על מנהיג פוליטי לעשות ולבצע רצון הבוחרים גם אם הדבר נוגד את רצון מפלגתו.
22. בעיות הנראות חשובות להורינו אינן בהכרח חשובות גם לנו.
23. הדעות שלי בענייני חברה, כלכלה וכוליטיקה הן מאוד שונות מהדעות של הור"י.
24. הסכסוכים וחילוקי הדעות בין המפלגות מזיקים לארצנו יותר מאשר הם מועילים לה.
25. ממשלתנו יכולה הייתה לפסול טוב יותר אילו אפשר היה להיפטר לחלוטין מסכסוכים בין המפלגות.
26. המפלגות בישראל יוצרות סכסוכים בשטחים בהם בעצם לא קיים כל סכסוך.
27. המפלגות תורמות יותר לבלבול נושא מאשר להבהרתו.
28. שיטת הממשל שלנו היחה יכולה להיות טובה יותר לו היו לנו רק שתי מפלגות.
29. יהיה זה לטובתן על ארצות אחרות אם יעתיקו את צורת השלטון הישראלית.
30. לא חשוב מהן שיטותיו של הוולטיקאי כל זמן שהוא מבצע את הדבר הנכון.
31. הצבעה ישירה בעד מועמדים ולא בעד המפלגות, עשויה לפתור הרבה מבעיותינו הפוליטיות.

32. לרוב האנשים יש דעות מגובשות; אין טעם לנסות לשנות את דעותיהם.
33. בדרך כלל אני מאמין שהממשלה תעשה את הדבר הנכון.
34. אין קשר רב בין מה שפוליטיקאי אומד ומה שהוא עושה לאחר שהצליח בבחירות. רוב המפלגות מעונינות רק בהצלחתן בבחירות ולא יותר.
35. ויכוחים ומשא-ומתן בין אנשים בעלי דעה שונה אינם יכולים לפתור את הבעיה; הם רק מובילים לויתורים.
36. כל מה שפוליטיקאי עושה זה להפריז בדברים שגורמים לפירוד.
37. מוסדות ממשלתיים אינם יכולים לפעול ללא פוליטיקאים.
38. הפוליטיקה איננה דרך להבטחת הדמוניה מושלמת אלא דרך להגיע להסכמים זמניים בנוגע למדיניות מסוימת במסגרת חוקים מוסכמים.
39. מסוכן להגיע לפשרה עם יריבים מדיניים מאוחר ובדרך כלל זה מביא לויתור על עקרונותינו.
40. אם שני אנשים הם בעלי דעות נוגדות - הם יכולים בדרך כלל להגיע לפתרון משביע רצון על-ידי שיחה משותפת.
41. השלטון במדינתנו היה יכול לפעול טוב יותר אילו היתה הפרדה (הפרדת סמכויות) מוחלטת בין הרשות המחוקקת והרשות המבצעת, כלומר הבנסת והממשלה.
42. הפוליטיקה היא בעיקר סכסוך בו קבוצות יחידים מתחרים על מנת להשיג מטרות מסוימות.
43. לחברה יש זכות להכתיב לאנשים איך לחיות את חייהם. על אנשים לציית לחשרה, גם אם הדבר נוגד את טעמם.
44. יהודי העולם מהווים אומה ולא דת בלבד.
45. חובתם של כל יהודי העולם לעלות לישראל.
46. על ממשלת ישראל לדאוג לכך שהחיים הציבוריים במדינה ינוהלו לפי המסורת הדתית היהודית.





47. בדרך כלל כאשר מתחילים לשנות דברים התוצאות תהיינה גרועות  
מאשר לפני השינוי.
48. מכל הפילוסופיות הקיימות בעולם והמדריכות חיי אנוש ודאי יש אחת נכונה.
49. טבע האדם אינו ניתן לשינוי.
50. מוטב להשאיר עם דברים מוכרים מאשר לנסות מצבים חדשים.

Part D: All grades, Questions 1-8

1. היכן נולדת? \_\_\_\_\_  
אם אינך יליד הארץ, כמה זמן אתה בארץ? \_\_\_\_\_
2. באיזו ארץ נולד אביך? \_\_\_\_\_
3. באיזו ארץ נולדה אמך? \_\_\_\_\_
4. סמן ב-x את המשפט הקרוב ביותר למקצועו של אביך (במקרה ואביך  
נפטר או איננו, סמן את מקצועו בעבר).  
\_\_\_\_\_ עובד כפיים - בבית-חרושת, נהג פכונית, משא, עובד  
אדמה וכד'  
\_\_\_\_\_ עובד מקצועי - חשמלאי, נגר, אינסטלטור וכד'  
\_\_\_\_\_ עובד במשרד (שכיר) - פקיד, מוכה וכד'  
\_\_\_\_\_ בעל חנות קטנה  
\_\_\_\_\_ שוטר, מכבה אש, חייל  
\_\_\_\_\_ אקדמאי - רופא, עורך-דין, מורה, מהנדס, מנהל וכד'  
\_\_\_\_\_ בעל בית-חרושת או עסק גדול אחר

5. האם משפחתך

דתית \_\_\_\_\_  
 משורתית \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא דתית \_\_\_\_\_

6. האם אתה משתייך לתנועת נוער כלשהי?

כן. אם כן, לאיזו? \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא \_\_\_\_\_

7. האם אתה משתייך לארגון צעירים אחר כמו "נוער לנוער"?

כן. אם כן, לאיזה? \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא \_\_\_\_\_

8. האם אתה מנהיג לקבוצת ספורט כלשהי?

כן. אם כן, לאיזו? \_\_\_\_\_  
 לא \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: Remaining questions--11th grade only

9. מה ברצונך להיות כאשר תגדל?

\_\_\_\_\_

10. האם תרצה להיות ב-

עיר \_\_\_\_\_  
 קיבוץ \_\_\_\_\_  
 מושב \_\_\_\_\_  
 עיירת פיתוח \_\_\_\_\_