ABSTRACT

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

By

Roger Alan Brooks

Although a seemingly anachronistic political force in the modern
era, nationalism still shapes the lives and destinies of millions of
people around the world. This study of Scottish separatism represents
an attempt to identify the forces which sustain one example of national-
ism today. A recurrent phenomenon in Scotland, nationalism is character-
ized by a social movement involving a set of demands whose purpose is
to advance the interests of one's nation or nationality. Ever since
the Act of Union ended her independent national status in 1707, those
demands have centered around the issue of political autonomy for Scotland.
The history of Scottish nationalism, culminating with the rise of the
Scottish National Party in the 1960's, is traced and the positions of
British political parties regarding the issue of Scottish government
are examined.

Two key theoretical models are presented as potentially explanatory
frameworks for Scottish nationalism. The first is derived from causal
models of civil strife and involves the hypothesis that a sense of
national group relative deprivation among Scots, since it runs counter
to generally accepted canons of social justice, produces systemic frus-
tration which finds an outlet in.the movement for Scottish separatism.
Deprivations may be felt on a number of dimensions of social stratifica-
tion, and they may be considered short-term or persisting. The study

examines the conditions under which each kind of deprivation may be

Roger Alan Brooks
considered potentially frustrating, and inquires into the linkage be-
tween systemic frustration and nationalism.

The second model within which Scottish nationalism is examined re-

lates to social mobility. It is hypothesized that those who perceive

their status to be changing in a society will experience status discrep
ancies which contribute to normlessness, a reassessment of social ties,
and an increased propensity to support extremist (including separatist)
political movements. Social mobility, defined as the process of moving
(up or down) from one status position to another, may have diverse con-
sequences. Whether support for separatism is one of these consequences
must depend on the prior existence of a nationalist movement.

These hypotheses are examined in two ways. First, using aggregate
data on population, emigration, income, unemployment, housing, health,
education, and political opportunities, the status of Scots is examined
with reference to Englishmen. These data suggest that Scots generally
occupy a status inferior to the English. Wages and health and living
conditions are lower than in England; the cost of living and emigration
are higher. 0n the other hand, political and educational opportunities
are noticeably superior in Scotland. And deliberate attempts to improve
the economic and health status of Scotland have been initiated by the
central UK government. Nevertheless, the evidence is thought to be gen-
erally supportive of the hypothesis linking relative deprivation and
support for separatism“

Second, a public opinion survey was conducted in two Glasgow parlia-
mentary constituencies in March and April, 1970, to test the validity of
the hypotheses. Since both hypotheses assume that the observed behavior
(support for separatism) is motivated by certain kinds of perceptions or

attitudes, a survey of opinions was judged to be the most convenient and

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Roger Alan Brooks
appropriate means of accumulating relevant evidence. A series of ques-
tions designed to elicit data concerning the demographic and attitudinal
profiles of Scottish nationalists was included.

Support for Scottish nationalism was operationalized in two ways:
(1) intent to vote for the Scottish National Party, and (2) support for
measures to increase substantially Scottish political autonomy. About
fifteen percent of the sample of 308 respondents were SNP supporters,
and nearly forty percent favored increased autonomy. The inter-relation
between these two measures was judged to be fairly high since nearly
ninety-three percent of those who were SNP supporters favored increased
autonomy.

Relative deprivation was measured five ways: the respondent's view
of (l) the sufficiency of Scotland's parliamentary representation, (2)
the relative job opportunities available in Scotland and England, (3)
discrepancies between English and Scottish standards of living, (4)
discrepancies (and the justness of such discrepancies) between the econ-
omic positions of Scots and of Englishmen, and (5) discrepancies (and
the justness of such discrepancies) between the "style of living" of
Scots and of Englishmen. On each of these measures a majority of respon-
dents was found to possess a sense of relative deprivation. But a strong
relationship with support for separatism was found only on the first
dimension, the others correlating weakly or differently for the two
measures of nationalism.

Social mobilization was measured three ways; the respondent's (1)
view of recent changes in his own economic position, (2) expectation of
future changes in his own economic situation, and (3) expectation of

future changes in Scotland's economic situation. A considerable propor-

tion of the sample was judged to be socially mobile using these criteria.

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Roger Alan Brooks

Moreover, strong statistically significant correlations were found be-
tween nearly all of the combinations of mobility and nationalism measures.
Both upward and downward mobiles were strong nationalists.

In conclusion, five factors are judged to influence the level of
support for Scottish nationalism. First, the shrinking of the British
Empire has removed a significant source of gratification for many Scots.
The independence movements found in many British colonial areas may have
contributed to the resurgence of the Scottish independence movement.
Second, British attempts to join the EEC alienated many Scots because
such membership was perceived to worsen Scotland's economic situation
and introduce another barrier between the voter and his government.
Third, the poor economic situation in Britain in the 1960's led to an
expression of general protest with the SNP providing a convenient vehi-
cle in Scotland. Fourth, a sense of relative deprivation, while appar-
ently playing a minor role in directly motivating mass support for
separatism in Scotland, does provide residual justification for the
nationalist movement and is important as a factor motivating elites.

And finally, social mobility seems a major motivating explanation for
Scottish nationalism. Upward mobiles may find the nationalist movement
a vehicle for self-realization while downward mobiles may consider it a
potential means of self-advancement. However, support for nationalism
is judged to be an alternative available to the socially mobile only
because of the previous four points. It is believed a necessary but

not sufficient explanation in itself.

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SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

By

Roger Alan Brooks

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
.for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1973

 

Copyright by

ROGER ALAN BROOKS

1973

     
   

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For Ronnie

Ho
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My initial confrontation with Scottish nationalism came by
accident while my wife and I were searching for the offices of an obscure
Edinburgh publisher. Seeking directions, we stopped in a local craft
shop, where we found the proprieters and some artist friends indus-
triously making signs and placards with patriotic Scottish slogans and
with demands to "Free Scotland" or to "Put Scotland First." Learning
that we were Americans, and hence fellow renegades from the English,
they introduced themselves, answered our questions about the meaning
of their signs, and invited us to the annual nationalist rally at
Bannockburn Battlefield the; next day.

Our curiosity pricked, we decided to attend. Upon arriving we
found literally thousands of Scots, many dressed in traditional tartans,
gathered for pipe music, songs, and political rhetoric. Under a rugged
sky, they approached the monument to Scots hero Robert Bruce, sang and
waved placards, and enjoyed the ambience of the friendly crowd. And
attracting excitement wherever she went was Mrs. Winnie Ewing, a young
Glasgow lawyer, who had recently won a parliamentary by-election in a
Labour Party stronghold near Glasgow. Like most of the others present
that day, she was a member of the Scottish National Party.

Never having been particularly aware of Scottish nationalism, we
wondered who these people were and why they seemed unable to get along
with the English. We never found our Edinburgh publisher, but we did
come away from.Scotland impressed by these earnest people, and

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determined to return some day to pursue the questions their activities
posed in our minds.

Thanks to the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation and
the Michigan State University Center for International Programs we were
able to return in 1969-70. I am indebted to the people in these
organizations for offering encouragement in my pursuit as well as for
providing the necessary funding. Special thanks are also due to the
members of my dissertation committee at Michigan State University,
Joseph Schlesinger (Chairman), Paul Abramson, Harold Johnson, and
Frank Pinner, and to the Chairman of the Political Science Department,
Charles Press. All offered encouragement, advice, understanding,
sympathy, and constructive criticism.

Many others offered valuable assistance. Richard Rose and Mark
Franklin, University of Strathclyde, and James Kellas, University of
Glasgow, were of inestimable help. All spent valuable time discussing
conceptual problems, going over drafts of questionnaires, and generally
keeping me from making too many stupid mistakes. Humphrey Taylor,
Pamela Shaw-Hesketh, and Violet Macfarlane of the Opinion Research
Centre helped with the survey in Glasgow. J. Peter Bluff and Chris
Hull helped me conduct the pre-test. (0f Chris it must be said that
without his aid, this study could never have been finished since he
retrieved the box of completed questionnaires from a thief.) Donald
Ross, of the Gallup Poll, carried on a lengthy correspondence about the
survey with me even after I had decided to contract for interviewing
with ORG.

Karl Deutsch, Harvard University, discussed my research findings,
read part of the manuscript, and offered valuable advice. Boyd Shafer,

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University of Arizona, discussed the findings with me and made useful
suggestions. And many colleagues at the University of Florida and at
Macalester College bore with me through difficult times and understood
the special problems of completing a dissertation during the initial
teaching years. Manning Dauer, University of Florida, and Dorothy
Dodge, Macalester College, deserve special thanks.

Data processing assistance was generously given by employees and
interns at computer centers at the University of Strathclyde, the
University of Florida, and the University of Minnesota. Jerry Finch,
Columbia University, gave freely of his time in helping to process the
survey data. Additional technical help was given by my student assis-
tants, Robert Rice, University of Florida, and Cindy Cannizzo and
Nick Proepper, Macalester College. And thanks are due to Patricia
Flick, who did the final clerical work, for labouring under my
absurdly authoritarian rule and for working within ridiculous time
constraints.

But most of all I want to acknowledge the help given by my wife,
Ronnie. Mbre than a wife, she has been a typist, a proof-reader, a
research assistant, a colleague, a listener, a counsellor, a comrade,
and an inspiration. She knows the trials, she knows the joys. I owe

her a lot.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter I: Nationalism: The Phenomenon Defined and
Described
National Group and Nationality
What Is A Nation?
What Is Patriotism?
Nationalism

Chapter II: Nationalism; Frameworks for Explanation
Problems in Explanation
A Framework for Separatism: Relative Deprivation
Linking Concepts: Deprivation, Frustration, Aggression
Support for the Proposition
Separatism and Social Mobility
Support for the Proposition

Chapter III: Nationalism In Scotland: The Historical

Matrix

Early Nationalism.in Scotland

The Act of Union

Eighteenth Century Nationalism

Nineteenth Century Nationalism

The Home Rule Movement

Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Scottish
Renaissance

Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Post-War Revival

Chapter IV: Aspects of Contemporary NationaliSm
Who Are The NationaliSt Leaders?
Party Attitudes Toward Scottish Nationalism

Chapter V: Scotland As A Deprived Region
Population and Migration
Income and Unemployment
Housing and Health
Educational Opportunities and Politics
Conclusion

Chapter VI: The Glasgow Sample
Sample Population
Selecting the Sample
Interviewing

vi

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12.
16.
27.
29.
32.

42.
45.
48.
58.
70.
73.
79.

84.
‘88.
90.
95.
98.

. 101.

. 107.

117.

. 126.
. 127.
. 135.

149.
152.
158.
170.
173.
178.

180.

. 181.
. 189.
. 191.

Chapter VI (cont'd.)
Sample Characteristics
Operationalizing Scottish Nationalism
Social Correlates of Nationalism

Chapter VII: Deprivation and Scottish Nationalism
The Perception of Deprivation in Scotland
Nationalism.and Objective Deprivation
Nationalism and Subjective Deprivation

Chapter VIII: Social Mobility and Scottish Nationalism
Social Mobility in Scotland
Nationalism and Social MObility

Summary and Conclusions
Nationalism and the SNP
The Causes of Nationalism.in Scotland

Appendix A: The Glasgow Sample

Appendix B: Public Opinion Survey

Bibliography

vii

p. 197.
p. 200.
p. 212.
p. 217.
p. 217.
p. 224.
p. 229.
p. 235.
p. 236.
p. 242.
p. 250.
p. 251.
p 254.
p. 270.
p. 274.
p. 284.

 

 

 

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15:

LIST OF TABLES

Scots As A Cohesive National Group
Voting Intention in Scotland, September, 1968

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
By Age

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
By Sex

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
By Education

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
Place Educated

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
By Occupation

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
By Previous Parliamentary Election Experience

Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,
By Previous Elective Office Experience

Scotland's Population, 1801-1966

Migration As A Percentage of Population,
Scotland and England and Wales, 1871-1971
By Decades

Average Weekly Earnings of Male Manual Workers,
By Industry, Scotland and the United Kingdom

Average Unemployment In Scotland and Great Britain,
By Percent, In Selected Years

Central Government Expenditures Per Head of
Population in Scotland and in England and Wales,
1966-67

Housing Density in Scotland and in England and
Wales, 1871-1961

viii

. 24.

. 44.

. 128.

. 129.

130.

130.

. 131.

132.

. 133.

. 154.

. 155.

. 161.

. 163.

. 168.

. 170

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21:

22:

23:

24:

25:

26:

27:

28:
29:
30:

31:

32:

33:

34:

35:

Housing Conditions, Dwellings Lacking Certain

Household Amenities, By Percent p.

Scottish Social Characteristics By Various
Subdivisions p

Scottish Parliamentary Election Results; 1955-1970,
By Percent of Vote Cast for Party At Various Sub-

divisions p.

Glasgow Municipal Electoral Results, 1966-1969,
Woodside and Maryhill Constituencies, By Electoral

Ward P-
The Glasgow Sample: Basic Socio-Economic

Characteristics pp.
Perception of Parties' Scottish Policies p.

Scottish Nationalism: Voting Intention at the

Next General Election p.

Scottish Views on the Activities of the Central

UK Government p.
Scottish Views on How Scotland Should Be Governed p.

Constructing the Index of Separatist Sentiment p.

Scottish Nationalism: The Index of Separatist

Sentiment p,

Vote Intention and The Index of Separatist

Sentiment p.
Scottish Nationalism.and Sex p.
Scottish Nationalism and Respondent's Birthplace p.

Scottish Nationalism and Religion p.

Scottish Nationalism and Education, By Age of

Leaving School p.

Perceptions of Deprivation pp.

Possession, Desirability, and Perception of
Others' Possession of Certain Luxury Consumer

Items Among Scots p.
Nationalism and Household Income p.
Nationalism and Per Capita Household Income p.

ix

172.

184.

186.

187.

193-4.

204.

206.

208.

209.

210.

211.

211.
213.
214.

215.

216.

219-20.

222.
225.

225.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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39:

40:

41:

42:

43:

44:

45:

46:

47:

48:

49:

50:

51:

52:

53:

A1:

Scottish Nationalism and Possession of Luxury

Consumer Items p.

Scottish Nationalism and Social Class, By

Occupation p.

Scottish Nationalism.and Perception of Political

Deprivation p.

Scottish Nationalism.and Perception of Occupational

Deprivation‘ p.

Scottish Nationalism and Perceptions of Discrepancies

Between English and Scottish Standards of Living p.

Scottish Nationalism and Perception of Economic

Deprivation p.
Scottish Nationalism and Perception of Life-Style

Deprivation p.
Perceptions of Past Personal Economic Mobility p.
Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility p.

Expectation of Scotland's Future Economic Mobility p.

Perception of Past Personal Economic Mbbility and
Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility p

Perception of Past Personal Economic Mobility and
Expectations of Scotland's Future Economic Mobility,

Among "Scots Identifiers" p.

Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility
And Expectation of Scotland's Future Economic

Mobility, Among "Scots" p.
Nationalism and Union Membership p.
Nationalism and Secondary Group Membership p.
Nationalism and Past Personal Economic Mobility p.

Nationalism and Expected Future Personal Economic

Mobility Po

Nationalism and Scotland's Expected Future Economic

Mobility, Among "Scots" p.

Results of Interviews and Questionnaires Compared vpp.

228.

228.

230.

230.

231.

232.

233.

237.

237.

238.

240.

240.

241.

243.

243.

244.

245.

246.

271-2.

Figure
Figure
Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

LIST OF FIGURES

Decremental Deprivation
Aspiration Deprivation
Progressive Deprivation

Distribution of Personal Incomes Before Taxes,
By Percent: Scotland and Great Britain, 1964/65

Nationalism and Per Capita Household Income

Scottish Nationalism and Social Mobility

xi

. 52.

. 54.

. 54.

. 160.

. 227.

. 247.

INTRODUCTION

The rose of all the world is not for me.
I want for my part

Only the little white rose of Sootland
That smells sweet and breaks the heart.

On May 2, 1967 Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in the House
of Commons the British Government's intention to apply--for the second
time in five years--for admission to the European Economic Community
(EEC). The subsequent enlargement of the European community underlines
broad integrative trends in the world creating new economic, social, and
political entities to challenge the nation-state as the prime focus of
attention and allegiance. It has been asserted that, in Europe at least,
regional integration is proceding apace and that we are witnessing the
nation-building process on a grand scale.

There are, however dissonant chords in this symphony of unifica-
tion. As Wilson announced his cabinet's decision, voters in Scotland--
far to the north of Westminster--were giving unprecedented support to a

political party whose main goal is the break-up of the United Kingdom.

May 2, 1967 was municipal election day in Scotland; and the Scottish

 

1The quotations introducing each chapter in this work are drawn
from the writings of the contemporary Scottish nationalist poet, Hugh
MacDiarmid. [A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, The University of
Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1971; Selected Poems, Penguin Books, Ltd.,
Harmondsworth, 1970.

2Cf. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of EurOpe: Political, Social, and
Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958;
and Leon Lindberg and Stuart A.Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity,
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970.

1

2
National Party (SNP), the only party in Scotland which opposed British
entry to the EEG and supported Scottish separatism from.the United
Kingdom, gained more municipal council seats than any other party in
Scotland. This result, and that of the 1968 municipal elections--when
the SNP gained 100 additional seats--ref1ects important disintegrative
threads running through the social and political fabric of Britain.

The Scottish nationalist movement, of which the SNP is a part,
seeks to secure increased political autonomy for Scotland. For some the
goal is a separate Scottish parliament within the existing political
structure; for others it is complete independence. A recurrent movement
taking varied forms over the past two and a half centuries, the latest
surge of nationalism.centered on the period 1966-1971. It was during
this period that the SNP agitated with some modest successes under the
banner of Scottish patriotism.and self-government.

The British case, then provides evidence of political disintegra-
tion in an era of increasing international cooperation and unification.
While popular and scholarly attention is focussed primarily on the unifi-
cation process in Europe, less visible trends are working in an opposite
direction and may be undermining the very basis of the existing state

system in Europe.1

 

1Cynthia Enloe notes the simultaneous "emergence of supranational
systems" and the "political mobilization of subnational communities"
in Europe. She questions "the utility of using the nation as the chief
reference point for all political investigation" and recalls Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber's prediction that the nation-state in Europe
is giving way to a European unity and a renewed emphasis on sub-regional
identity. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1973, pp. 270-2. Cf. also pp. 125-34.

3

One important criterion for a political community1 is a high level
of unification.2 One might presuppose that the level of unification for
any existing or potential political community can be evaluated in terms
of coexistent integrative and disintegrative forces. One might further
assume that these forces are fluid and that the shifting balance between
them produces varied patterns of expansion and contraction of political
communities. Thus, the rise and fall of empires, nation-states, and
'multi-national organizations could be seen as a function of the relative
potency of integrative and disintegrative forces.

Integrative forces are those tending to unify a group of people.
They may include (1) a common set of values and expectations, (2) an in-
crease in the administrative and political capabilities of the group
(e.g. strong economic growth, unbroken communication links, and a broad-
ening of the political, social, or economic elite), (3) a high degree of
geographical mobility within the group's borders, and (4) a multiplicity
and balance of transactions among group members.

Forces tending to divide a group are disintegrative. They may in-

clude (1) declining group economic, political, or social capabilities,

 

1Etzioni notes that "a community is established only when it has
self-sufficient integrative mechanisms; that is, when the maintenance of
its existence and form is provided for by its own processes and is not
dependent upon those of external systems or member-units. A political
community is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a)
it has an effective control over the means of violence . . .; (b) it has
a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the
allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it
is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority
of politically aware citizens." Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification:
A.Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., New York, 1965, p. 4.

2The terms integration, unification, consolidation, and amalgama-
tion are used almost interchangeably in the scholarly literature. In
this study we will treat unification as the general, overall process--
the net outcome of integrative and disintegrative forces.

 

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(2) closure of the established political elite, (3) thwarting of
expected social, economic, or political reforms, (4) multiplication of
intra-group linguistic or ethnic differences, (5) demands for increased
political participation within the group, and (6) growing external group
responsibilities or commitments.1

At any given time in any society the balance between the integra-
tive and disintegrative forces determines the level of unification in
that society andthe constituent nature of its state system” One impli-
cation of this model is that societies may move from one unification
level to another through a change in only one set of forces. This means,
for example, that a society may proceed to a higher level by increasing
integrative forces while holding constant the extent of disintegration.
Another similar but more significant implication of the model is that it
allows for a simultaneous increase in the levels of both integration and
disintegration while a society proceeds to a higher level of unification.
As long as disintegrative forces are relatively insignificant at the
outset, a small jump toward disintegration can be countered by a larger
jump in the direction of integration with a net unifying effect.

One intriguing aspect of the recent revival of Scottish nationalism
is that it occurred in the context of Britain's attempts to join the
European Community. The model suggested above can account for such
trends of unification in opposite directions. Leaders of the separatist

'movement in Scotland have pointed out that, initially at least, British

entry into the EEC will have far more adverse effects on Scotland than

 

1Karl Deutsch, et a1., Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area, International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, pp. 46-65.

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on England.1 Moreover, opposition to British entry was stronger in
Scotland than in England. Less than 8%.of a sample of Scottish voters
favored British entry into the EEC. This contrasts with the somewhat
stronger support shown in England. One study revealed that 36% favored
British entry.2 Thus the government's efforts to join the European '
community may have had the ironic effect of increasing group differences
within the United Kingdom by feeding the secessionist movements in
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

There is little evidence to support the commonly accepted theory
that the forces of integration predominate naturally over time and that
societies tend to advance from low levels of integration to increasingly
higher ones. Some historians have perceived a developmental sequence in
which social and political unification proceeds, inexorably, from.the
integration of villages and localities to the consolidation of nation-
states, world regions, and finally the whole world. Hans Kohn views the
"age of nationalism”--in which the nation-state is the prime object of
loyalty and allegiance--as a stage preliminary to and necessary for the
broadly integrated "international global order" which he foresees.

But from a comprehensive historical analysis of European political

communities, Karl Deutsch and his associates have concluded that there is

 

1One pamphlet issued by the SNP entitled "No Voice, No Entry" de-
clared, for example, that Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome forbids mem-
ber states from.aiding home industries. "Ship building, coal mining and
the new science based industries could be denied specific Government
help to enable them to become more efficient and to further their expan-
sion. These consequences would be very serious for many sectors of
Scottish Industry."

2
p. 7.

From a poll reported in the New Republic, CLXII, January 24, 1970,

3Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global
History, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1962, passim.

6

no necessarily incremental integrative trend. They discount the notion
that

modern life, with rapid transportation, mass communications,

and literacy, tends to be more international than life in past

decades or centuries, and hence more conducive E0 the growth

of international or supranational institutions.
Even.more significantly, the Deutsch group finds that the growth of
states does not resemble a "snowballing process" in which successful
territorial expansion feeds on itself producing "ever-larger states or
federations."2 Periods of expansion are followed not by more expansion
but rather by disintegration. The Roman Empire grew to encompass most
of the known world, but it did not become permanently established. The
English expanded their political community to include wales, Scotland,
and Ireland close to home and an empire of colonies abroad. But the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have witnessed the disintegration of
that empire. And today even the once-solid unity of the British Isles
is questionable.

Separatism, one manifestation of political disintegration, is the
focus of this study. Nationalist movements seeking to separate contig-
uous regions from multinational states exist in many parts of the

3

world. Prominent examples in Africa include Biafran secession in

 

1Deutsch, et al., 10c. cit., p. 22. Between 1945 and 1955 76
intergovernmental organizations were founded. Between 1956 and 1965,
however, only 56 such organizations were created, indicating an ebbing
of integrative tendencies. J. David Singer and Michael Wallace,
"Intergovernmental Organizations in the Global System, 1815-1964,"
International Organization, XXIV, Spring, 1970. Data compiled by J. S.
Nye and David Handley in J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and
Conflict in Regional Organization, Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
1971, p. 4.

2Deutsch, et al., loc. cit., p. 24.

3The best recent summary and discussion of such movements is Walker
Conner's "Self-Determination: The New Phase," World Politics, XX,
October, 1967, pp. 30-54.

 

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Nigeria, the Congo's separatist Katanga Province, the Eritrean region
of Ethiopia,3 and Black self-determination in South Africa.4 Middle
Eastern Kurds in three nation-states have long struggled for autonomy,5
while bloody conflict occurred when East Pakistan seceded from its

6
sister provinces to the west to form the new state of Bangladesh. And
developed countries, it appears, are no more immune to the phenomenon.

Quebec separatism is familiar,7 but similar movements exist in

 

1Cf. R. K. Baker, "The Emergence of Biafra: Balkanization or
Nation-Building," Orbis, XII, Summer, 1968, pp. 518-33.

20f. C. deBeniparrell, "El Fin de la Secesion de Katanga," Revista
de Politica Internacional, LXVI, March-April, 1963, pp. 149-57.

30f. Duncan G. Cumming, "The Disposal of Eritrea," Middle East
Journal, VII, Winter, 1953, pp. 18-32.

4Cf. A. K. Fryer, "National Self-Determination and the Multi-Racial
State: The Problem of South Africa," Australian Outlook, XIX, August,
1965, pp. 180-91.

 

 

5Cf. I. T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination,"
Middle East Journal, XX, Summer, 1966, pp. 279-95.

60f. Richard D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in
Pakistan," Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII, April, 1959, pp. 48-58; and
Stanley 0. Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan," Pacific Affairs,
XXVIII, June, 1955, pp. 132-44.

 

7Cf. Frank L. Wilson, "French-Canadian.Separatism," Western Political
Quarterly, XX, March, 1967, pp. 116-32; and J. W. Hagy, "Quebec Separa-
tists: The First Twelve Years," Queens Quarterly, LXXVI, Summer, 1969,
pp. 229-39.

 

 

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8
Yugoslavia,1 the Ukraine,2 Italian South Tyrol,3 and Belgium.4 National

secessionist movements are also found in Brittany,5

the Basque and
Catalonian regions of Spain? and of course Wales7 and Scotland.8
Important differences exist among these diverse examples of separa-
tism: Some involve bloody conflict, while others are carried on rela-
tively peacefully. Some are based on language differences, while others

involve ethnic or religious conflict. Most occur in econmmically back-

ward areas within their countries, but some take place in wealthy regions.

 

1Cf. C. E. Bidwell, "Language, Dialect, and Nationality in Yugo-
slavia," Human Relations, XV, August, 1962, pp. 217-27.

 

2Cf. V. J. Kaye, "Political Integration of Ethnic Groups: The
Ukranians," Revue de l'Universite d"0ttawa. XXVII, October-December,
1957, pp. 460-77. Nationalist movements in other parts of the Soviet
Union are covered in V. Stanley Vardys, "How the Baltic Republics Fare
in the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs, LXIV, April, 1966, pp. 217-27.

3Cf. Felix Ermacora, "The MinOrities Problem in South Tyrol," World
Justice, VII, September, 1965, pp. 34-47; and Leonard Doob, Patriotism
and Nationalism; Their Psychological Foundations, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1964.

4Cf. Val R. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in
National Politics," in Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in
Western Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, pp. 147-87.

5Cf. J. E. S. Haywood, "From Functional Regionalism to Functional
Representation in France: The Battle of Brittany," Political Studies,
XVII, March, 1969, pp. 48-75.

60f. Hugh Thomas, "The Balance of Forces in Spain," Foreign
Affairs, XLI, October, 1962, pp. 208-21.

 

 

7Cf. E. Hudson Davies, "Welsh Nationalism," Political Quarterly,
XXXIX, July-September, 1968, pp. 322-32; and Reginald Coupland, Welsh
and Scottish Nationalism, Collins, London, 1954.

8Especially useful are John P. Mackintosh, "Scottish Nationalism,"
Politicalyguarterly, XXXVIII, October-December, 1967, pp. 389-402; and
H. J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, Faber and Faber, London, 1969.

9

But there are similarities and they seem worthy of careful investi-
gation. First, the inhabitants of each separatist region can be dis-
tinguished from other citizens in their country by some ascriptive
criteria. Race, religion, language, and ethnic tradition are a few of
the important distinguishing criteria, but language is by far the most
common. Second, each separatist region can be set aside as a distinctly
identifiable economic or political sub-unit of the country of which it
is a part. Sometimes, as in Bangladesh or Quebec, the region is a
formal sub-unit in a federalist system, but frequently the sub-unit is
functionally delineated. Third, each separatist region is at a level of
economic or political development distinct from.that of the country as a
whole. Usually the region is at a lower stage of development, but
Catalonia and Biafra are examples of regions which have progressed beyond
the general level of the country of which they are a part. In either
case, each region is imperfectly adjusted to the prevailing economdc or
political system. And finally, the published and spoken demands of par-
ticipants in each separatist movement reveal a deep-seated sense of
deprivation. In Catalonia or Biafra the feeling may derive from.a sense
of superiority and thwarted ambition; the Bengali, on the other hand,
may have felt left behind in the process of modernization. Still others
like the Scots or Quebecois may feel the sting of discrimination on many
fronts. But whatever the source of the perceived deprivation, it is
always viewed as a violation of the accepted standards of social justice.

But simply by enumerating the common characteristics of national
separatist movements we cannot claim to have explained those movements.
A full explanation of separatism is clearly beyond the scope of this

study. This is not a definitive comparative analysis of the major

 

 

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separatist movements mentioned above. Neither is it a theoretical
treatise on nationalism, or a philosOphical discourse on nationalist
ideology. What follows is a case study of Scottish nationalism, under-
taken for the purpose of investigating the phenomenon and the social
forces which sustain it. The significant hypotheses examined in this
study, those relating social mobility and deprivation to separatist
activity, are derived from.a broad comparative view of nationalism, But
any conclusions we formulate are applicable only to the Scottish example
and not to the phenomenon generally. We hope, of course, that some of
our conclusions will have relevance to other cases of national separatism,
but since it is the Scottish political experience we examine here, and
since it is a Scottish population from which we have generated social
survey data, our inferences must necessarily be limited in their scope
of application.

Chapter One is a review of the literature of nationalism which both
defines basic terminology and indicates the extent to which the Scottish
separatist movement typifies modern nationalism. Chapter Two examines
various hypothesized explanations for national separatism, focussing
first on the notion that a shared sense of relative deprivation is a
necessary concomitant of separatism.and second On the idea that upward
and downward social mobility in a deprived region promotes support for
separatist activities. Chapters Three and Four discuss in turn the his-
torical development of the nationalist idea in Scotland, the background
and experience of contemporary nationalist leaders, and the positions
taken by Scotland's major political parties on the issue of Scottish
government.

The examination of major hypotheses begins in Chapter Five which

ll

considers the issue of Scottish deprivation in the light of aggregate
economic and political data. Chapter Six is a preliminary discussion
of the sample survey conducted in Glasgow which indicates the basic
parameters of the population studied and the important characteristics
of the sample. Using the Glasgow survey data, the next two chapters
investigate the major hypotheses. Chapter Seven examines the relation-
ship between relative deprivation and support for separatism, while
Chapter Eight focusses on social mobility as a correlate of separatism.
Finally, a brief Conclusion summarizes the findings of the study.

Although Scottish nationalism has not been as dramatic as Quebec
nationalism, nor as deadly as ethnic conflict in Bangladesh or even
Northern Ireland, it remains a significant example of resistance to
integration in this era of growing unification in Europe. It is hoped
that this study can shed additional light on the problems and processes

of unification by examining some of the causes of disintegration.

CHAPTER I
NATIONALISM: THE PHENOMENON DEFINED AND DESCRIBED
He canna Scotland see wha yet
Canna see the Infinite,
And Scotland in true scale to it.

The study of nationalism has fascinated scholars for years. But
just as it is difficult to pinpoint the origin of the phenomenon, so is
it difficult to identify the beginnings of the study of nationalism.
The ideas of nation and nationality have evolved slowly through time,
but by the middle of the nineteenth century they began to take on the
meanings they have today. In his Considerations on Representative
Government, published in 1861, John Stuart Mill wrote:

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality,

if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which

do not exist between them.and any others--which make them

co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people,
desire to be under the same government, and desire that it

should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves,

exclusively.1
The broader concept of nationalism, however, was not dealt with directly
until Gooch produced his study in 1920.2 Shortly thereafter, Hayes pub-

lished his pioneering Essays on Nationalism in which he bemoaned, with

justification, the lack of any "profound treatment of the subject of

 

1John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Rgpresentative Government,
Harper Brothers, New York, 1962, p. 120.

2George Gooch, Nationalism, Swarthmore, London, 1920.

12

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l3
nationalism.in any language."1 Although many scholars have treated the
subject of nationalism in the five decades since Coach and Hayes wrote,
a single, unified body of theory has failed to evolve.2 There are even
disagreements among writers concerning definitions of the key concepts
in this area: nation, nationality, patriotism, and nationalism.
Zetterberg has remarked that "sociologists have spent much energy in
developing technical definitions, but to date they have not achieved a
consensus about them.that is commensurate with their effort."3 This
seems equally true of those studying nationalism.

In addition to historians and political scientists, nationalism has
been of interest to sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, phil-
osophers, and even psychiatrists. In relating the aspects of nationalism
relevant to each discipline, differing terminologies and definitions have
resulted. Additional chaos derives from the disjointed development of
the study of nationalism. The first major impetus behind the study of
the phenomenon was provided by the new political forces in Europe after
World War I. The disintegration of European empires gave rise to a new

concern with national self-determination, the principle of autonomy for

 

1Carleton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, The Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1926, p. 277.

2Today there is a wealth of literature on nationalism.which illus-
trates and analyzes its varied manifestations. Cf. Karl Deutsch and
Richard Merritt, Nationalism: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography, The
MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966. An earlier, but equally useful source book
is Koppel S. Pinson, A Bibliographic Introduction to Nationalism,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1935.

 

3Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3d. ed.,
The Bedminster Press, Totawa, New Jersey, 1964, p. 30.

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14

significant nationalities being incorporated into the allies' war aims.1
.The second fillip was provided by the post-World War II drive for inde-
pendence by the developing nations in Africa and Asia. There was
increased recognition of the right of self-determination by former
colonial peoples and the second phase of nationalism,that dealing with
the liberation of subjugated racial groups, had begun.2 The most recent
stimulus to the study of nationalism.has been the mid-twentieth century
cohesion crisis of the mmlti-national state. Although this crisis began
before the mid-twentieth century, particularly serious and visible prob-
lems involving national separatist movements in this period, e g., in
Quebec, Biafra, and Bengal, have refocussed the attention of scholars on
nationalism.and the sentiments supporting these movements.

These three distinct manifestations of nationalism have aided in
the identification of certain characteristics common to the phenomenon.
Some of these were outlined in the Introduction. However, for the most
part there has been a failure to draw insightful parallels between these
three phases of nationalisnu The terms used to describe and analyze one

phase of nationalism.have been adopted, often awkwardly, for use in

explaining subsequent phases.

 

1Wilson's "Fourteen Points" included several specific provisions
relating to the nationalities question in Europe. Point IX called for
"a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy [which] should be effected
along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Point X advised that
"the people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to
see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity
of autonomous development." Other points dealt with nationality problems
in France, Trukey, and the Balkan states. Supplement to the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents Covering_the Second Administration of Woodrow
Wilson, p. 8421 f. Reprinted in Henry Steele Commager, Documents of
American History, 6th ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1958,
pp.318-9.

2Cf. W. M. Macmillan, The Road to Self Rule: A Study in Colonial
Evolution, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1959.

 

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But this theoretical and terminological confusion also results from
the complex nature of nationalism. The term nationalism has taken on
several shades of meaning. As early as 1926 Hayes identified four dis-
tinct nuances of nationalism. One is the historical process which
establishes national groups as political units and links them uniquely
to the institution of the national state. A second is "the theory,
principle, or ideal implicit in the actual historical process. In this
sense it signifies both an intensification of the consciousness of
nationality and a political philosophy of the national state."1 Third,
nationalism may refer to the activities of political parties involved in
the struggle to achieve statehood for a national group. And finally,
the term may be taken to mean "a condition of mind" which is character-
ized by a supreme loyalty to an existing or potential national state.2
In this study we will be concerned primarily with the latter two meanings
of nationalism--as the activities of a political party and as the senti-
ment of a national group.

This proliferation of meaning and terminology is confusing and
requires that we stipulate a clear set of definitions for national group,
nationality, nation, patriotism, and nationalism, before we can proceed.

This chapter seeks to meet that requirement.3

 

1Hayes, op. cit., p. 5. Cf. also, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism,
Hutchinson University Library, London, 1966.

2

 

Ibid., p. 6.

3A good general definitional guide, one which compares the use of
relevant terms in several of the social sciences, is Louis L. Snyder,

Jhe‘Meaning of Nationalism, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick,
1954.

 

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16
National GrouLand Nationality

Adhering to a definitional distinction made by Karl Deutsch, a
nationality will be taken to mean "a politicized people," i.e. , a
national group trying "to acquire a state or gain political power at the
local, district, or regional level."1 This is an important distinction
but one which has usually been ignored by scholars of nationalism.
National group (or people or ethnic group) has been generally confused
with nationality, resulting in a plethora of conflicting definitions and
meanings. In the following discussion we will try to sort out some of
these meanings and arrive at a workable definition of nationality. When
an author uses terminology which is confusing or which conflicts with
our own, substitutions will be made and noted.

The basic social unit relevant to nationalism, however defined, is
the national group, a social aggregate whose cohesion is fostered by
complementary patterns of social communication. Nationalism as a his-
torical process seeks to institutionalize the national group. National-
ism as a philosophy promotes the notion of national group control of the
state system. Nationalist political parties draw their support almost
exclusively from the national group and generally seek to promote the
interests of that group. And finally, nationalism as a condition of mind
refers to sentiments cannon to the members of a national group.

A national group, like other social groups, is given cohesion by

certain social forces. While there has been little disagreement among

 

1Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide Their
Fate, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1970, p. 71 and p. 87. The term
national group is mine; Deutsch prefers people. Cf. his Nationalism and
Social Communication: An Ingig into the Foundations of Nationality,
2d. ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 96-100.

 

l7
scholars over the notion of the centrality of the national group in the
phenomenon of nationalism, there has been wide disagreement concerning
the nature of cohesive forces within national groups. What constitutes
a national group? What makes it ”hang together"? What makes it differ-
ent from other social groups? Debate over these questions has divided
students of nationalism.

A social group whose boundaries are determined by ascriptive
criteria is said to be "structural." A labor union is structural since
its boundaries are determined by certain objective membership criteria.
Negroes are a structural group since they have physical characteristics,
such as skin color, which more or less objectively delimit them as a
group. North Americans comprise a sturctural group to the extent that
their group is geographically defined. A social group is "non-structural"
if its boundaries are determined by attitudinal criteria. "Hawks" and
"doves" were two non-structural groups in the late 1960's in the United
States. The composition of these groups was based not on any objective
criteria like education; occupation, or eye color, but on opinions con-
cerning America's military involvement in Southeast Asia.

Although it is fairly easy to differentiate in theory between
structural and non-structural groups, problems often arise when we try
to sort out specific social groups. Do Jews form a cohesive social
group because of their common ancestry or because of their shared reli-
gious beliefs? It is possible to view many groups as both structural
and non-structural, possessing both ascriptive and attitudinal forces at
the same time.

The idea of the national group as non-structural, based on the

existence of a "we-feeling" or a common sentiment among its members, is

 

 

 

 

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rust recent in origin but for the most part it has been only in recent
years that this notion has gained wide currency.1 Traditionally, it was
asserted that the national group was held together by certain objective,
even physical, criteria. The idea that language was the root cohesive
fiorce in.nationa1 groups derived from German and Slavic thought at the
end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Perhaps
as a.justification for expansionism, the unity of Germans and later that
(of Slavs was said to be based on common language. Furthermore, it was
felt, as the German philosopher Herder wrote, "a people, and especially
.a noncivilized one, has nothing dearer than the language of its fathers.
Its whole spiritual wealth of tradition, history, and religion, and all
‘the fullness of life, all its heart and soul, lives in it."2 Jungmann,
the Czech philologist and lexicographer, in his article "On the Czech
iLanguage" raised language to a paramount position as the basic cohesive
force. National groups, he claimed, "live by their languages; as many
languages as there are, so many fatherlands exist."3

Many more recent commentators have suggested the central position
of language, and one cannot deny that it plays a key role in many nation-
alist movements. It seems a reasonable proposition, as Friedrich sug-
gests, that "nationalism and the building of a nation are greatly aided

by linguistic community."4 As we shall see in the case of Scotland, many

 

llnfra., pp. 21-2..

2Johann Gottfried Herder, "Briefe zu BefBrderung der Humanitat," in
Bernard Suphan, et al.,(ed.), Sammtliche Werke, 33 vols., Weidmann, Ber-
lin, 1877-1913, XVII, p. 58. Quoted in Hans Kohn, The Idea of National-
jggp, Collier Books, New York, 1944, 1967, p. 432

3Josef Jungmann, "On the Czech Language," written in 1803 and re-
ported in ibid., p. 559.

4Carl Friedrich, Man and His Government, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
New'York, 1963, p. 559.

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19
«if the potent symbols of nationalism.are essentially linguistic expres-
sions--slogans, dialects or accents, literature, and poetry.

But there is a persistent tendency to equate the linguistic group
with the national group. Hayes, for example, thinks in terms of "a
(niltural group of people who speak a common language (or closely related
1dialects) and who possess a community of historical traditions (reli-
gious, territorial, political, military, economic, artistic, and intel-
ilectual)."1 Here, admittedly, language must share its role with common
traditions; and Hayes' broad definition of historical traditions is
inclusive of additional objective cohesive factors.

The listing of several ascriptive determinants of cohesiveness has
been comon, but it has also been indicative of the confusion which
reigns in this area. Znaniecki points out that social scientists tend
to think of a national group as "a collectivity of people with certain
common and distinctive cultural characteristics (language, customs, his-
torical traditions, etc.) sometimes also 'racial' traits and a definite
geographical location."2 But surely all of these characteristics are not
necessary to produce or sustain a national group. The Swiss, for example,
speak at least four languages; Americans, Canadians, and South Africans
do not each possess common historical traditions nor can they claim

common descent. And yet all of these are traditionally described as

 

1Carleton J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, Macmillan Company,
New York, 1960, p. 5.

2Florian Znaniecki, Modern Nationalities, University of Illinois
Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1952, p. xiv. Another, similar list appears in
Hans Kohn, The Idea ‘Of Nationalism, pp. 13-15. Kohn mentions common
descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions,
and religion as potential objective criteria. It is interesting to note

that the very term nationality derives from the Latin, natio, which im-
plies common race or descent.

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20

national groups. Furthermore, as MacIver has noted, "scarcely any two
nationalities seem to find their positive support in the same objective
factors."1

It has been this realization that has led to a refined definition
(If the national group. Traditional ascriptive Criteria, e.g., language,
race, and historical traditions, may still be crucial to the cohesion of
a national group but the key is not the ascriptive criteria themselves
'but rather the effect they have on group interaction. Deutsch has sug-
gested that national groups are held together by "wide complementarity
(sf social communication." He added that "the ability to communicate
more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with the members of
(one large group than with outsiders" produces the conditions necessary
for the existence of a national group.2 Only to the extent that common
ascriptive criteria produce such communication patterns do they become
relevant to the formation of a national group. Hence, the main charac-
teristic which differentiates between the national group and other social
groups is the broad scope of the communication patterns which exists in
national groups.

A Marxist interpretation of this definition would take note of the
parallel between economic class and national group. The study of nation-
alismicompiled by the Royal Institute of International Affairs contended

that "nationalism is clearly related to...other kinds of group feeling in

 

1Robert'MacIver, The Modern State, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1926, p. 123.

2Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 97. Deutsch
calls this a "functional" definition which "differs from.the old attempts
to specify nationality in terms of some particular ingredient." (p. 97)
To this extent it differs from what we have called ascriptive criteria
of national groups. But, as we note below, it is not the same as atti-
tudinal criteria.

 

21
respect of the emotional impulse underlying it."1 But, the report went
cul to state, "it is at the same time differentiated from them in certain
inqxxrtant respects....[T]he nation is...a community rather than an asso-
ciation;...it covers a comprehensive range of human activities instead
of being restricted to a single end."2 Moreover, Deutsch has indicated
that "ethnic complementarity" is to be distinguished from "vocational"
or other complementarity.3 Economic class is too narrow a focus for
delineation of a national group.

Deutsch's notion of complementary communication patterns as the
‘basis for national groups presages the final stage in the evolution of
thought in this area. As Deutsch himself would admit, the existence of
common communication patterns among a group of people is independent of
the content of the communication and of its relevance to group cohesion.
Interaction among people must create a ggpgg of community as well as the
skeletal framework for community. What must be fostered by common
communication patterns is a "we-feeling", a common sentiment, an atti-
tudinal structure encompassing a wide range of subjects.

Although this definitional element is the most recent in an evolu-
tionary chain of development, the idea itself is not new. In 1919,
Pillsbury asserted that membership in a national group "is an affair of
the mind or spirit, not...of physical relationship. The only way to

decide whether an individual belongs to one nation rather than to

 

1Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1939, p. 329.

2Ibid.

3Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 98.

 

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22
another is to ask him."1 More recently Kohn argued that "the most
«essential element [in the formation of a national group] is a living and
.active corporate will."2 If any national group, as a group, is to play
:1 social role, there must be a collective consciousness, a sense that the
‘national group is a socially relevant aggregate.

This discussion should clarify the point that the national group
Inay be viewed either as structural or as non-structural, but that the
essential criterion is non-structural, a sense of shared attributes. In
'brief, a national group is by definition always delimited by non-structural
attitudinal criteria; it usually is, but need not be, also delimited by
structural, ascriptive, criteria.

Nationality is an extension of the concept of the national group.
Idaclver has defined nationality as the "sense of community which, under
the historical conditions of a particular social epoch, has possessed or
still seeks expression through the unity of a state."3 Hertz echoed this
1meaning when he said that nationality is "a community formed by the will
to be a nation."4 As indicated at the beginning of this chapter,
nationality is the politicization of the national group as it strives
to acquire a state.

It is important to note that the definition we use in this study
is directly contradictory to Hayes' claim that a "nationality may exist

without political unity."5 This is true of the national group, however;

 

1W. B. Pillsbury, The Psyghologyiof Nationality and International-
ism, Appleton, New York, 1919, p. 267.

2Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 15.
3MacIver, op. cit., p. 124.
4Hertz, op. cit., p. 12.

SHayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 5.

 

 

 

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23
and the relevance of Hayes' statement is that it fails to distinguish
between national group and nationality.
When a national group becomes political, i.e., when attempts are
made on its behalf to link it to a state structure, it fulfills the
criterion of a nationality. By definition, then, a nationality is always

political and is always based on a national group.

Given these definitions, do the Scots constitute a national group?
A nationality? Scots are generally regarded as a cohesive national group.
One recent survey showed that nearly 80% of all Scots questioned candid-
ered themselves Scottish rather than British.1 In the survey conducted
by this writer, more than 77% of those interviewed felt they had a lot
in common with other Scots. By contrast, only 23% of the same sample
said they had a lot in common with Englishmen. These data suggest that
Scots differentiate themselves as a group from other Britons and that
they consider themselves a cohesive group.

This "we-feeling" among Scots is the result of centuries of inter-
action. Relying on the standard ascriptive criteria to explain this
interaction would be misleading. In terms of language, geography, and
even religion, Scotland has not always been homogeneous. Geographically,
Scotland is divided into three distinct regions: the southern uplands,
the central lowlands, and the Highlands and Islands. Because of the
relative ease in penetrating the two southernmost regions, the Romans,
and later the English, were able to extend their military power and cul-

tural influence into these areas, displacing the traditional Gaelic

‘—

1A survey conducted by Dr. Jack Brand of Strathclyde University for
the Glasgow Herald in April, 1970. These figures are based on the
Glasgow sub-sample of 396 respondents.

24

TABLE 1

SCOTS AS A COHESIVE NATIONAL GROUPa

 

 

 

 

Percent "How much would you "How much do you
who say: say you had in com- think you have in
‘mon with Scots?" common with most
Englishmen?"
A lot 77 23
Some 18 45
Not very much 2 29
Don't know 3 __§
100 ‘Z, 100 %
aN=308

influence. The Highlands and Islands, however, remained substantially
Gaelic until well into the eighteenth century.

The divisions between these two groups was reinforced by language
differences. At the beginning of the eighteenth century approximately
one-third of the Scottish population, most of them.in the Highlands,
Spoke Gaelic.1 Those in the rest of the country, having been anglicized,
Spoke a Scots dialect of English. As Gaelic has slowly died out, the
Population has become increasingly homogeneous from a cultural-linguistic
standpoint. By 1891 Gaelic-speakers numbered only 6.2% of the total
Population, and by 1961, this number had shrunk to 1.5%. But even

tboughGaelic language and culture has drastically declined in the

x

1J. MacInnes, The Evangelical Movement in the Highlands of Scotland,
University Press, Aberdeen, 1951, p. 10.

 

 

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25
Highlands and Islands, the northern mountainous region retains an iden-
tity of its own, having special dialects, different traditions, and dis-
tinctive economic problems.1

Scotland today is predominantly Presbyterian: nearly 55% of the
total church membership is affiliated with the Church of Scotland. How-
ever, there is a sizeable Roman Catholic minority which, in 1959, con-
sisted of more than 25% of the churchmembership.2 Having escaped the
effects of the Reformation in the Highlands, a few traditional pockets of
Catholicism survive in the north and west of the country. But for the
nest part, this sub-group traces its origin to the waves of immigration
from Ireland during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most of this
Catholic population is therefore concentrated in the western areas of
the country, especially in Glasgow. This large religious minority aug-
ments social heterogeneity in Scotland especially because it is concen-
trated in a fairly small region.

Despite these internal differences, there are important objective
criteria which distinguish Scotland and its people The Scottish legal
system is formally and functionally independent of the English, being
based on Roman law rather than common law. This means that the Scots
have separate courts, specially trained lawyers, and often require

3
special Acts of Parliament which relate only to Scotland. The

;

1Cf. James Kellas, Modern Scotland: The Nation Since 1870, Pall
ball Press, London, 1968, pp. 25-35. There have been significant
attempts to revive Gaelic as a national language. In 1906, Stuart
Erskine, proprietor of the nationalist journal Guth na Bliadhna, popu-
larized the slogan, "No language, no Nation." Cf. H. J. Hanham, op.
cit., p. 124.

 

2This represents about 15% of the total adult population in Scot-
land. Kellas, op. cit., p. 71.

3cr. ibid., chap. 6.

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26
educational system is also independent: the curricula, exams, and cri-
teria for advancement differ from.the English. Traditionally, Scottish
education has been more democratic and less dependent on the social class
system.than its English counterpart, although educational opportunities
are approximately the same in both countries now.1
In addition, Scotland has its own system of banking, even its own

2 The Scots have their own

varied versions of the British pound notes.
holidays, their own system of local government, their own polling day

for municipal elections, their own distinct (yet not autonomous)

branches of the major British political parties, their own minister in
the British Cabinet, and for some government services their own adminis-
trative structure. Mereover, there are hundreds of specifically Scottish
organizations, pressure groups and clubs.

These and other factors have combined over a long period to create
a sense of community among Scots, a feeling that they are a distinct and
relevant reference group.

The "union of parliaments" in 1707 joined the kingdoms of Scotland
and England. A century before, the vagaries of the English law of
succession had elevated James VI of Scotland to the English throne,
flaking him James I of England and creating a royal linkage, a "union of

caowns," between the two kingdoms. Before 1603, however, Scotland was

independent, sovereign and free. The existence of political movements

‘

lcr. ibid., chap. 5.

2Each bank in Scotland prints its own currency. The one-pound note
alone has at least fourteen different manifestations, each a different
design, color, and size. Confused by all this, English merchants often
refuse to have anything to do with Scottish currency, to the chagrin of
the traveling Scot, although it is legal tender throughout Britain.

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27
within this body politic today seeking to re-link the Scottish national
group to a sovereign state suggests that the Scots are properly termed

a nationality.1

What is a Nation?

Like national group and nationality, the term.nation has been sub-
ject to varying interpretations. When we use the term in this study it
will mean a group of people organized in a political state. If a nation
is a group of people, a state refers to the formal institutional struc-
ture which serves to organize them, Friedrich describes this relation-
ship when he says that

a state does not consist merely in an institutionalized struc-

ture of power, that is, a system.of rule or government over a

definite territory. Nor does it merely possess a predominance

of legitimate force within this territory, but it calls for a

substructure provided by "a common bond of Sentiment" and

typically manifest in the body of a nation.
A state is not always associated with a nation; but a nation is, by
definition, always associated with a state. This is because the single
characteristic which distinguishes the nation as a social aggregate
faom other similar groupings is its unique relation with the state.
State and nation are "the Siamese twins which Western culture has begot.
...Together they constitute the contemporary political community and its

order."3 The term nation-state, because it combines the two halves of

this couplet, has come into common use to refer to the prime political

4

aCtor .

 

 

1Cf. infra., chap. III.

2Friedrich, op. cit., p. 555.

31bid., p. 547.

4Jean-Jacques Rousseau is generally credited with originating the
Concept .

28

As Minogue asserts, a nation should have some kind of pre-political
unity.1 It is usually coterminous with a national group and possesses a
sense of community based on shared communication patterns. However, the
traditional means of designating the bases for nations are generally mis-
leading. Bryce suggests that common race underlies the nation.2 Taylor
contends that a common territory is the key element,3 while Herder, as
we have seen, opts for language.4 Others assert that common religion or
historical traditions may form the foundation of nationhood.5

Any or all of these may be critical factors in individual cases,
but as with national groups it is important to avoid confusing the thing
itself with its attributes or its correlates. "Nations are neither lin-
guistic nor political nor biological, but spiritual unities."6 Snyder
has simply called a nation "the citizens of a sovereign political

state,"7 but clearly it is more than that. Friedrich comes closest to

the meaning we propose:

1K. R- Minogue, Nationalism, B. T. Batsford, Ltd., London, 1967,
P. 11.

2James Bryce, Race Sentiments as a Factor in Histogy, University of
London Press, London, 1915.

3Griffith Taylor, Environment and Nation, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1936, especially pp. 19-32.

4

 

Supra, p. 7.
5Cf. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 22-24; 27-32.
6Oswald Spengler, quoted in MacIver, op. cit., p. 123.

7Snyder, loc. cit., p. 57.

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29

a nation is any cohesive group possessing "independence" with-

in the confines of the international political order...which

provides a constituency for a government effectively ruling

such a group and receiving from that group the acclamation which

legitimizes the government as part of the world order.1

How does a nation differ from.a national group or a nationality?
The linkage to the state is the key element. All three are cohesive
social groups, each held together by a common sentiment produced by
complementary communication patterns. Both nation and nationality are
politicized. But while the nationality only aspires to become struc-
turally institutionalized, the nation already is. A nation is a
successful or fulfilled nationality.

Scots, then, while constituting a nationality, do not possess

nationhood. It is the drive to become a nation which politicizes the

Scottish national group and makes them a genuine nationality.

What is Patriotism?

Unlike the terms we examined in the preceding sections, there is a
broadly based understanding of the meaning of patriotisnn This consen-
sus extends beyond those with a scholarly interest in nationalism and
related fields and includes laymen, journalists, novelists, and others.

"2 or "love of nation, of its

Generally, we mean simply "love of country,
people."3 Patriotism is not an entity or a social group as are the

nationalgroup, the nationality, and the nation. It is rather a

 

1Carl Friedrich, "Nation-Building?" in Karl Deutsch and William
Foltz, Nation-Building, Atherton Press, New York, 1966, p. 31.

2Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 5. Hayes says that while love
for one's primary groups is instinctive, it must be learned for larger

groups like nations.

3Minogue, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

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30
psychological orientation. Because patriotismiinvolves feelings of
attachment toward an object, it is an affective orientation.1

However, patriotism has been more precisely defined so as to in-
volve something more than simple affect. Often, there is an instrumental
aspect to patriotism. Doob, for example, calls patriotism "the more or
less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of
the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the pres-
ervation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society."2
Because it involves an evaluation of a political object, this conviction
constitutes an evaluative orientation.3 Patriotism is a psychological
concept, a cluster of attitudes, involving both affective and evaluative
orientations to the nationality or to the nation.

Doob's definition, stressing the evaluative side of patriotism,
puesents some problems. He asks whether patriotism is universal and
answers in the affirmative, having assumed that one's psychological
commitment to a nationality or a nation must be either positive (in which
case one is a patriot) or negative ( in which case he is a traitor).
However, it might be more appropriate to View one's commitment as a mix-
ture of positive and negative elements. If these elements were of equal

force, a balancing of the two would produce a net measure of zero patri-

cmism. It may be easier to see how zero patriotism, or apathy toward the

~

1Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define affective orientation as
"feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and perform-
ance." The Civic Culture, Little, Brown and Company, Inc., Boston,
1965, p. 14.

2Doob, op. cit., p. 6.

3Defined by Almond and Verba as "the judgments and opinions about
Political objects that typically involve the combination of value stan-
dards and criteria with information and feelings." Almond and Verba,
lone. cit.

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31
nation, might result if we consider the analogous case of cross-pressured
voters. One possible effect of conflicting attitudes concerning party
loyalty and allegiance is non-voting, or apathy toward the parties and

1 Furthermore, political parochials, those whose cog-

their candidates.
nitive orientations toward the political system.are slight or non-existent,
night lack patriotism simply because they lack knowledge of the entity
toward which patriotism.is directed.2
A second problem Doob fails to deal with concerns the possibility
of dual patriotism, His assumption that patriotism is unidimensional
implies that there is only one object toward which a person is patriotic.
He says that "people are always socialized in groups, one of which is
certain to be recognized as a society with its own distinctive culture."3
[Emphasis mine] In fact there are often two or even more groups which
sake claims on a person's allegiance.4 This is another kind of cross-
pressuring and we might expect it to have effects similar to cross-

pressuring from.other sources. We shall see the extent to which Scots

are subjected to role conflicts and subsequent cross-pressuring as a

 

1Cf. Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter, John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., New York, 1960, pp. 80-88.

 

2Again‘we are using definitions provided by Almond and Verba. A
political parochial is a person whose orientations toward, and expecta-
tions about, the political system "approach zero." Cf. op. cit., 16-17.
Cognitive orientations are defined as "knowledge of and belief about the
political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its in-
puts and its outputs." Ibid., p. 14.

3Doob, loc. cit.

4It is therefore ”possible for two nationalities to clash within the
boundaries of a single state, and indeed, for two nationalisms to overlap
as recently happened in Canada where the all-Canadian nationalism assert-
ing the unity of Canada has been rivaled by the separatist nationalism of
file French Canadians." Carl Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory
.flgd Practice, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 31.

 

 

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32
result of their dual patriotic allegiance to Scotland and to the United

Kingdom.

Nationalism

In order to fully understand and define nationalismlwe have had to
define and elucidate its essential elements: the national group, nation-
ality, the nation and patriotism, Each of these may, in different ways,
play an.important part in nationalism, But because nationalism has been
taken to mean so many different things, we must stipulate our use of the
term.

According to Toch, a "social movement represents an effort by a
large number of people to solve collectively a problem that they feel
they have in common."1 The aspect of nationalism that interests us in
this study can be placed in this category because it involves an effort
on the part of a nationality to separate from an existing state and to
form a nation-state of its own. In 1936 nationalism was described by
Wirth as "the social movements of nationalities striving to acquire,
maintain, or enhance their position in a world where they are confronted
by oppositions or conflict."2 These social movements, or nationalist
movements as we shall call them, are usually led by associated groups--
political parties, interest groups, literary groups, etc. Hence our
interest in groups and group activity.

Social movements also have a psychological dimension. Just as
patriotism involves a cluster of psychological orientations toward the

nationality or the_nation, nationalism--as a social movement--deals with

 

1Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements, The Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1965, p. 5.

2Max Wirth, "Types of Nationalism," American Journal of Sociology,
XLI, 1936, p. 723.

...

..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

33
psychological predispositions, goals, and needs. "Nationalism arises
psychologically when patriotism leads to certain demands and possibly
also to action."1 In this sense, nationalism can be viewed as a "fusion

2 All this implies

of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality."
that nationalism consists of more than a social movement. It is the
sentiment behind the social movement as well.

When we use the term nationalism in this study, then we are refer-
ring to a phenomenon characterized by a social movement involving a set
of demands whose purpose is to advance the interests of one's nation or
nationality. Nationalism in this broad sense includes both the national-
ism of already existing nations--aggressive nationalism4--and that of
nationalities striving to become nations and to acquire a state. This
latter we might term defensive nationalism since it is characterized by

strenuous defense of a tenuous nationality. The nationalism.af de Gaulle

involved the promulgation of programs and policies which were intended

 

1Doob, loc. cit. He goes on to define nationalism as "the set of
more or less uniform demands (1) which people in a society share, (2)
which arise from.their patriotism, (3) for which justifications exist
and can be readily expressed, (4) which incline them.to make personal
sacrifices in behalf of their government's aims, and (5) which may or
may not lead to appropriate action." (p. 6.) It is interesting to note
that in Doob's view nationalism is strictly not a doctrine or a social
movement but a Set of demands.

2Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 2.

3Cf. Snyder, op. cit., chap. IV, ("The Sentiment of Nationalism"),
in which he points out that nationalism "is not an innate instinct, but
rather a socially conditioned, synthetic sentiment. It is a socially
approved symbol in modern society and acts as a response to the group's
need for security and protection. Its realization seems to have become
the supreme ethical goal of peOples on earth. It is a persistent but
not necessarily a permanent mode of behavior." (p. 110.)

4The term "aggressive nationalism" was first used in the Royal
Institute of International Affairs report, op. cit., p. 330.

 

 

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34
to advance the interests of the existing French nation. That of George
Wallace is characterized by a broad program to promote American interests
abroad while maintaining order and propagating symbols at home. Since
both of these examples are cases of movements trying to maintain or
advance the interests of already existing nations, they are aggressive
nationalism.

On the other hand, the Zionist movement (until 1948), because it
included a demand for the establishment of a Jewish state, is an example
of defensive nationalism on the part of a cohesive yet widely scattered
nationality striving to protect its identity and become a nation.
Nationalist movements in Bengal, Catalonia, and Quebec, as well as in
Scotland, are also of this type since they involve demands for increased
autonomy.

This distinction between aggressive and defensive nationalism1
essentially parallels the dichotomy Kohn describes between nationalism

as it originally emerged in the western world and nationalism as it

 

1The distinction has appeared elsewhere in the literature under
different names. Carleton J. H. Hayes, for example, in his article,
"Two Varieties of Nationalism: Original and Derived," in Association
of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland, Proceedings, No.
26, 1928, pp. 71-83, describes an offshoot nationalism which is a
reaction to the traditional nationalist movements.

Wirth, op. cit., p. 729-30, distinguishes between "hegemonic" and
"particularistic" types of nationalism, the former involving a single
nation-state structure and the latter a multi-national structure in
which individual nationalities struggle to control a state apparatus.
"Particularistic" nationalism, which is very close to the type which
interests us in this study, is described more fully below. (Infra.,

p. 39.)

Minogue also makes a distinction between "original" nationalism
("The classic situation was that a nation already existed, fragmented
into a variety of states and principalities. Nationalism was an
attempt to make the boundaries of the state and those of the nation
coincide.") and other types ("Afro-Asian," "macro-nationalism," and
Upeople in search of a home") which we have labelled collectively
"defensive nationalism." Op. cit., pp. 12-16.

 

 

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35

appeared in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. In the former the rise
of nationalism was preceded by the formation of a nation—state; in the
latter, emerging as a protest against the existing state pattern, it
involved a state and a rising nationality which rarely coincided.1

It has often been asserted that nationalism (and here we mean origi-
nal or aggressive nationalism) was introduced to the world via the French
Revolution. Kohn, for example, suggests that "[n]ationalism.as we under-
stand it is no older than the second half of the eighteenth century," and

that its "first great manifestation was the French Revolution."2

There
is some reason, however, to think that this date is rather arbitrary. If
we look upon nationalism as the sentiment of a nationalist movement, it
certainly appeared before the French Revolution. Picking 'up this theme,
Friedrich considers it

more accurate to look upon France as a relative newcomer in
the field, though undoubtedly the second half of the eigh-
teenth century presents a culminating point of nationalism

in France. Yet similar outbursts preceded that of the French,
in England in the middle of the seventeenth century, agd in
Germany in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

In any case, by the beginning of the nineteenth century nationalism had

become a potent force in Europe, having replaced religion and feudalism

 

1For a good discussion of Kohn's distinction, which is primarily
based on historical factors, cf. Snyder, loc. cit., pp. 118-21.

2Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 3. Elsewhere Kohn said that
"nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the
individual is felt to be due the nation-state. A deep attachment to
one's native soil, to local traditions and to established territorial
authority has existed in varying strength throughout history. [His work,
The Idea of Nationalism, is a history of this attachment.] But it was
not until the end of the eighteenth century that nationalism in the
nodern sense of the word became a generally recognized sentiment increas-
ingly molding all public and private life." [Nationalism: Its Meaning

and Histogy, p. 9.]

3Freidrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, p. 35. Cf.
also Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality, Harcourt Brace and

Company, New York, 1955.

36

as the most important factor in men's lives.1
By the dawning of the twentieth century, the ideology of economic

class had come to challenge nationalism as an organizing principle and as

2 Dahrendorf's description of Marx's

a factor determining mass behavior.
model of the class society contains some statements which are almost
paraphrases of those we used above to describe nationalism:
Classes are political groups united by a common interest.3
Parallel with the political organization of classes there grows
up a theoretical class consciousness, i.e., an awareness 02 the
individual's part of the interests of his class generally.
Every class struggle is a political struggle. It is the delib-
erate and articulate conflict between two opposed interests,
the interests, respectively, of preserving and of reyolution-
izing the existing institutions and power relations.
This, then, was a new paradigm which revolutionized the way scholars
and social theorists conceptualized the organization of modern society.

It also revolutionized the manners and methods used by scholars to exam-

ine politics and group life and widely influenced even the ways they

 

1Minogue, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

20f. Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, Weidenfield and Nicolson,
London, 1964, pp. 147-8.

3Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1959, p. 16. Class here is analo-
gous to nationality. NOte the cohesive effect of "common interest" in

both.

4Ibid., pp. 16-17. This is analogous to the community sentiment we
described as patriotism, Cf. supra, pp. 29-31.

5Dahrendorf, loc. cit., pp. 17-18. Nationalities too have been
described as conflict groups. The political aspect of nationalism led
Wirth to develop a typology of nationalism based on the underlying
assumption that any 'typology of nationalism must correspond to the
types of relations of oppositions and of conflicts which characterize
tine relations between the groups." [Wirth, op. cit., p. 724.] In Wirth's
\Riew, nationalities, like classes, are conflict groups which vie with
Glue another for control of state structures and of territories.

37
viewed social behavior. Lenin's view that nationalism was but a tempo-
rary phenomenon (in his eyes an off-shoot of capitalism.which might be
used to further the class struggle) became widely accepted, not in an
ideological sense but simply as a new way of looking at the world.1

This growing interest in class rather than nation as the focus of
popular loyalties, coupled with an apparent trend toward regional and
global international integration, had led to a general discounting of
the importance of nationalism. But the rise of secondary or defensive
nationalism, in Central and Eastern Europe between 1848 and 1918, in
the Third World after World War II, and in some of the more developed
countries in the post-war era, has led to a revival of interest in
nationalism.

Defensive nationalism.has been characterized by responsive patterns
to the traditional expressions of aggressive nationalism. Reacting to
the existing state system and to the permeating effects of older nation-
alisms, national groups in Central and Eastern Europe which had been
subsumed by the old system became politicized and began to make demands
to enhance their political and cultural interests. As Snyder says,
"each new nationalism received its original stimulus from cultural con-
tacts with some older nationalism, and then began to extol the heritage

3

of its own past."2 This occurred fairly early in the Balkans and in

 

1Lenin considered nationalism to be "a by-product of the historical
evolution of capitalism. Owing its origin to it, nationalism was also
doomed to die with it.". Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of
Nationality, Bookman Associated, New York, 1958, p. 28.

 

2Snyder, loc. cit., p. 118.

3Cf. R: W. Seton-Watson's pioneering work, The Rise of Nationalism
in the Balkans, Constable, London, 1917.

 

on

o.

v...-

n‘a'

he,

'a

-o-

‘-

 

 

 

 

 

‘
\

 

 

 

 

 

38
the old Austro-Hungarian Empire,1 but the pattern has essentially been
repeated in post-war Asia and Africa (where the unifying appeal has been
to racial solidarityz), and finally in other developed, mainly European,
countries.

It is in these latter areas that modern nationalism.(i.e., modern
defensive nationalism) finds its most powerful expression. There are
three types of defensive nationalism, each involving a nationality trying
to acquire a state. The first type is called "stateless" nationalism3
since it involves a geographically scattered nationality, one which
strives to become institutionalized in a state but which is prevented
from doing so because of geographical non-contiguity. Examples of this
stateless nationalism include Zionism before its success in acquiring
the state of Israel and Black nationalism in the United States.4

The second type of defensive nationalism.mdght be called "annexa-

tionist"5 since it consists of a nationality seeking to join an already

 

1Cf. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and
National Reform in the Hapsburg Monarchy,71848-l9l8, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1950

2This view has been set forth in Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 233-4.
Walker Conner, however, gives a different perspective, claiming that
there was "a unique feature to the African and Asian independence move-
ments. Although they had been conducted in the name of self-determination
of nations, they were, in fact, demands for political independence not
in accord with ethnic distribution, but along the essentially happen-
stance borders that delimited either the sovereignty or the administra-
tive zones of the former colonial powers. This fact combined with the
incredibly complex ethnic map of Africa and Asia to create, in the name
of self-determination of nations, a host of multinational states." Op.
cit., pp 31-32.

3Cf. Minogue, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

4Cf., for example, Essien Udosen Essieandom, Black Nationalism: A

Search for Identity in America, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.

5Minogue calls this "macro-nationalism” since the nation-state be-
comes enlarged. (Loc. cit., p. 13.)

39
existing state. This is generally because the expectant nationality
feels itself to be part of the nation it seeks to join formally.
Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland, feeling cut off from their
traditional community in the Republic to the south, agitate for a re-
union with Ireland.1 Ryuku Islanders, under American administration
since World War II, have pressed successfully for a reunion with their
fellow nationals in Japan.

The last type of defensive nationalism, that which commands our
attention in the pages that follow, has been called "secessionist" or
"separatist" nationalism.2 In the extreme, when it is successful, it
involves the break-up of the national state although the achievement of
more limited goals, such as increased autonomy for a nationality or devo-
lution from a unitary to a federated system, may also be judged to con-
stitute success. Other forms of nationalism may augment the progress of
integration, but separatist nationalism.represents the opposite trend, a
fragmenting of political structure so that it coincides with the lines
dividing nationalities.

Perhaps more than other forms of nationalism, separatism may involve
violence. Separatist movements in the American South, Ireland, Biafra,
and Bangladesh, to name only a few notable examples, involved bloody con-

flicts during their struggles for autonomy. Other movements have

10f. Richard Rose, The Maintenance of a Divided Regime: The Case of

.florthern Ireland. Paper presented to the Meeting of the Committee on
Political Sociology, session concerning "The Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes," VIIth World Congress of the International Sociological
Association, Varna, Bulgaria, September 18, 1970.

2Wirth calls this "particularistic nationalism." It "characteris-
tically begins with a striving for cultural autonomy or toleration, which,
when the movement makes headway, takes on political significance and
finally develops into the demand for political sovereignty." [Op. cit.,
Pp. 729-30.]

40

experienced limited violence but have remained essentially peaceful, e.g.,
Quebec, Spanish Basque, and Eritrea. And a final category of separatist
'movements, including Scotland, Wales, Brittany, and the Ukraine, have
been violence-free and have worked almost exclusively through formal
legal channels to win their demands. One question which will be consid-
ered is why some separatist movements result in violence when others do
not. Violence is not simply a prior condition to success. Norway, for
example, separated peacefully from Sweden in 1905. Later we shall sug-
geSt some reasons why violence does not always accompany separatist
movements.1

But the main question to which we address ourselves in this study
concerns the motivating factors behind such separatist movements. In
part, as we have suggested, separatism may be considered a response or
reaction to an older, more encompassing nationalism, Scottish national-
ism, for example, can be seen as a response to English nationalism.which,
in the view of many Scots, has always threatened to engulf Scottish
traditions and customs.2 At least this seems a fair starting point for
our investigation. Handman has gone a step further in describing this
response pattern, calling it "oppression-nationalism," since it is char-
acterized by a nationality suffering deprivations at the hands of an
entrenched regime. In his words, "oppression-nationalism” consists in

the system of reactions which is found to prevail in a group

the members of which are exposed to a definite and clear-cut

regime of disabilities and special subordination. These dis-

abilities usually constitute an interference with the life of

the group, and they embrace: efforts to deprive members of

the group of the freedom to engage in all legitimate channels
of economic enterprise and of making a living, unless they

 

1Infra, chap. II.

2Cf., for example, Coupland, op. cit., p. 137.

 

41

desert their group and join the ranks of the dominating and
oppressing group; refusal to grant them full participation in
the political and administrative life of the community; an
attempt to prevent them.from.employing their own language and
developing their own "culture"; a predilection to humiliate
them on every possible occasion and a disinclination to re-
ceive them on terms of social equality when other merits entitle
them to such a reception; and, lastly, constant interference
with their freedom of speech and all forms of public expres-
sion and movement as well as a polity of ruthless repression
of any atteTpt to state their grievances in public, at home
and abroad.

It will be our task in the next chapter to examine these reactions

and their hypothesized causes, and to identify the mechanisms by which

they function.

 

1Max Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism," Political

Science Quarterly, XXXVI, 1921, p. 107-8.

CHAPTER II
NATIONALISM: FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLANATION
I ha'e nae doot some foreign philosopher
Has wrocht a system oot to justify
A' this: but I'm a Scot wha blin'ly follows
Auld Scottish instincts, and I winna try.

The expression of Scottish identity has taken on several different
aspects. The development of a distinctive, patriotic national litera-
ture took shape in the second half of the eighteenth century primarily
with the writings of Robert Burns and Walter Scott. These two writers
gave lyric expression to the variegated Scottish spirit and became lead-
ing literary figures not only in Scotland but throughout the whole of
Europe. The "Scottish Renaissance" of the 1920's and 1930's represented
a continuation of this tradition of patriotic literature, Edinburgh
emerging as one of Europe's leading literary centers. But this patriotic
literary nationalism--cultural nationalism as it has been called--is
only part of the phenomenon that concerns us in this study.

Cultural nationalism.can thrive without its becoming political.1
Bernard has suggested that in its milder and more frequent form national
consciousness produces cultural nationalism, But political nationalimm
results only when that consciousness becomes so strong that the members

of the national group begin to make demands for the unity provided by a

 

1Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 5.

42

43
political state.1 Hence, although there is a complementary relationship
between cultural and political nationalism, they are not the same and
they need not occur together.

The phenomenon we seek to explain, then, is political nationalism--
or, more specifically, defensive separatism as outlined in Chapter One.
Scottish nationalism, as an expression of defensive separatism, has two
distinct, yet closely related, manifestations. The first is a long-
standing sentiment supportive of advancing Scottish interests by increas-
ing the amount of control Scots have over their own political affairs.
This includes not only attitudes and arguments favoring independence for
Scotland, but also those reflecting a less extreme devolution of control
from the present central government in Westminster, e.g., an increase in
the administrative authority of the Scottish Office2 or the establish-
ment of a locally authoritative Scottish parliament with legislative
powers similar to Northern Ireland's Stormont.

The second manifestation of separatism in Scotland is the Scottish
National Party, whose policy, according to its campaign literature, "is
simple: an independent Scotland."3 The activities of the SNP include
agitating for electoral support at both the parliamentary and municipal

levels, publicizing Scotland's case for devolution, and proselytizing on

 

1Luther Lee Bernard, War and Its Causes, H. Holt and Company, New
York, 1944, p. 378.

2"Most of the functions for which the Secretary of State [for
Scotland] is directly responsible to Parliament are discharged through
those principle departments collectively known as the Scottish Office."
Great Britain, Scottish Office, A Handbook on Scottish Administration,
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Edinburgh, 1967, p. 1.

 

3Scotland v. Whitehall, No. l: Winifred Ewingjs Black Book, The
Scottish National Party, Glasgow, n.d. In Chapter IV we suggest that
the SNP policy on Scottish government is not quite this simple.

44
behalf of the separatist cause.

The British two-party system is nearly as strongly entrenched in
Scotland as it is in the rest of the United Kingdom, but the SNP has
scored some remarkable electoral successes over the past decade. Between
1966 and 1968 the SNP emerged as the largest party in Scotland, claiming
the largest membership and having captured a plurality of local council-
lor seats throughout the country. "Safe" Labour parliamentary seats
fell to the SNP in a 1967 by-election (Hamilton) and in the 1970 general
election (Western Isles). And in a survey conducted in 1968 by the
Gallup Poll throughout Scotland the SNP, apparently at the peak of its
popularity, emerged as the most popular choice in a by-election. Table
2 shows that even in a general election the SNP would have received the

second highest number of votes.

TABLE 2

VOTING INTENTION IN SCOTLAND, SEPTEMBER 19688

 

 

 

 

Party By-election General election
Conservative 28% 32%
Labour 24 24
Scottish National 32 27
Liberal 5 5
DK 10 10
NA __1 __2

100 ‘Z, 100 7°
aN=667

Source: Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. and Daily Teleggsph, 1968.

45

Problems in Explanation

 

This chapter will suggest two closely related theoretical frameworks
for explaining defensive separatism in Scotland. In attempting such
explanations we seek to go beyond the citing of specific sources of
separatism in Scotland and to furnish more comprehensive structures
which will be able to include manifestations of the phenomenon generally.
This presupposes, of course, that cases of defensive separatism can be
grouped together and that they have meaning as a class of things over
and above their significance individually. This assumption automatically
rules out that form of explanation which links outcomes to particular
historical events. The secession of the American South from the Union
in 1860, for example, has often been explicated in terms of differences
over the institution of slavery. However crucial that issue may have
been, couching an explanation of the Civil War in those terms does not
contribute to the building of broad comparative theory.

There are two common explanations of separatism which avoid this
problem of specificity. The first holds that nationalism (both aggres-
sive and defenSive) results from, first, a universal tendency for men
to unite in groups and, second, a need to assert group identity and to
dissociate non-members. Hans Kohn has written:

The mental life of man is ES‘EUCh dominated by an ego-

consciousness as it is by group consciousness. Both are

complex states of mind at which we arrive through exper-

iences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego and

the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside

the group.

But while this may be a useful perspective fromehich to view nationalism,

it cannot be said to offer very much in the way of explanation. Why is

 

1Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 11.

46
there a drive to acquire a political state on behalf of the national
group? If the needs are universal, why did nationalism emerge only in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? These questions suggest the
inadequacy of this formulation.

A second common explanation of nationalism is not really an explan-
ation at all but rather an analogy. Many writers have noted the similar-
ity between nationalism and religion as foci of human passions and as
funnels for group emotions. The rhetoric of nationalists, as Minogue
has noted, "is often.marked by a positively religious fervour,"1 and it
must be more than coincidence that nationalism arose in Europe just as
religion was declining. As interesting as these points are, however,
they do not constitute an explanation. They merely beg the question and
make one wonder about the basis of religious emotions.

The explanatory principles purveyed in this chapter, while not
definitive and often contradictory, can meet some of the broader criti-
cisms made of traditional explanations. We will approach the problem
of separatism.in this study from.the perspective of social psychology.
Like other political phenomena, defensive separatism.can be viewed in
behavioral terms. It is easy, even tempting, to view nationalism as an
inanimate process or a nebulous sentiment of same social group. But to
explain separatism without reference to the cognitive orientations which
motivate its proponents would be like trying to explain the workings of
a gyroscope without alluding to certain physical laws. Of course, all
behavior is not motivated behavior. Some of it is random; some of it

is determined by non-cognitive criteria.2 We assume however that

 

1Cf.‘Minogue, op. cit., pp. 144-6.

2Cf. Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse,
Social Psychology, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1965, p. 21.

47
separatism.can be interpreted in terms of purposive or goal-oriented
behavior. In Scotland as elsewhere the proponents of separatism have
reasons for their activities and elaborate justifications for their
attitudes.

An explanation stressing social psychological motives and predispo-
sitions seems particularly appropriate for a phenomenon often described
as a "condition of mind." The very description evokes cognitive ante-
cedents. An assumption we make at the outset is that nationalist party
activities, or support within the electorate for such activities, implies
the prior condition of mind. This assumption will be scrutinized later.

The quest for cognitive antecedents implies a search for causality.
But we have been warned by Popper that "[t]he belief in causality is
metaphysical."1 It involves a never-ending search since every cause has
itself one or more causes and inasmuch as this is not an ontological
treatise, no useful end is served by investigating causality per se.2
Unlike the physical laws which govern the behavior of the gyroscope, no
definitive social laws which control human behavior have yet been dis-
covered. For that reason no specific claim is made concerning the causal
relationship between cognitive orientations and separatism. ‘We shall
observe the nature of relationships and try to determine how representa-
tive our observations are. Our conclusions will be tentative and open.

This does not mean, however, that we shall relinquish all efforts

to utilize an implicitly causal theoretical framework. On the contrary,

 

1Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovegy, Harper and Row,
Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 248.

2Cf. Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1960, pp. 28-9.

 

48
we shall follow Popper's admonition "not to abandon the search for uni-
versal laws and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever give up our
attempts to explain causally any kind of event we can describe."1 Be-
cause both our theoretical frameworks assume a causal relationship
between independent and dependent variables, they are properly termed

causal‘models.

A Framework for Separatism: Relative Deprivation

What are the psychological predispositions which lead a person to
strive for the separation of his national group from the multinational
state of which it is a part? Why should a noted Scottish philosopher
feel "that under the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom
Scotland should have her own Parliament with genuine legislative author-

ity in Scottish affairs?"2

Why should the Scottish recipient of a Nobel
Peace Prize, Lord Boyd Orr, proclaim himself "in favor of a practical,
workable plan for a Scottish National government?"3 Or, more dramatic-
ally, why should writers send almost daily letters to the editors of
Scotland's major newspapers urging independence and occasionally includ-
ing passages like this:

I think myself a moderate man, yet if I had to fight I would

rather fight the English than the Russians or the Germans. In

his heart of hearts there is scarcely a Scotsman.who does not

feel the same, and if it came to that we would last longer
than the Biafrans.

 

1Popper, loc. cit., p. 61.

2H. J. Paton, The Claim of Scotland, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
London, 1968, p. 252.

 

3Froma statement acknowledging his patronage of the separatist
1320 Club, published in Catalyst, December 1967, frontspiece.

4Glasgow Herald, January 27, 1970.

49

The initial hypothesis of this study is that a sense of national
group relative deprivation is a necessary pre-condition for separatism,
National groups may attempt to separate from a multinational state be-
cause of a feeling among members of such groups that they are unjustly
deprived of rewards relative to other national groups within their state.
The essential theoretical preposition is from Ted Gurr's notion that
relative deprivation "is the basic pre-condition for civil strife of any
kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among
members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one
or another form."1

Although Gurr treats relative deprivation as a psychological varia-
ble, it is traceable to reference group theories in sociology. Intro-
duced by the authors of The American Soldier, the term referred to
interruptions in a person's "patterns of expectation."2 No fOrmal
definition was offered, however, and it was left to later theorists to
stipulate exactly what the concept meant. One such scholar, W. G.
Runciman, has said that

a person is relatively deprived when (l) he does not have X,

(2) he sees some other person or persons, which may include

himeelf at some previous or imagined time, as having X

(whether or not they do have X), and (3) he wants X (whether

or not it is feasible that he should have X). "To be without

Y" San, of course, be substituted where relevant for "to have
x."

 

1Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative
Analysis Using New Indices," The American Political Science Review, LXII,
December, 1968, p. 1104.

2Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, vol. 1, "Adjust-
:ment During Army Life," Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1949, p.
125.

3W. G. Runciman, "Problems of Research on Relative Deprivation," in
Herbert H. Hyman and Eleanor Singer (eds.), Readings in Reference Group
Theory and Research, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 70.

 

50
Under this rubric relative deprivation is generated by a person's choice
of reference group. A "comparative reference group" is any group whose
attributes or situation an individual contrasts with his own. A "mem-
bership reference group," on which an individual bases his identity, is
the starting point from which such comparisons and contrasts are made.
The individual who wishes to share the situation of a comparative
reference group, and who conéiders his wants justifiable, is said to be
relatively deprived. The "normative reference group," from.which a
person takes his values and norms, is generally coincident with the
nembership group. However, when an individual feels that he does not
possess the attributes of his normative group relative deprivation
results.

Just as a person may be a male, a Protestant, an auto worker, and a
nember of a leftist political party all at the same time, he may simul-
taneously have several distinct membership reference groups. Conscious
or subconscious contrasts with comparative reference groups goes on at
several different levels. In his role as a member of one group, the
indiVidual may feel deprived while in another he may not. Generally
speaking, the more salient the membership group, the more intense the
sense of deprivation which can result. A female Catholic in Ulster, for
example, may feel little relative deprivation as a female while sensing
extreme deprivation as a Catholic.

When a person's national group becomes salient as a membership ref-
erence group, the potential exists for feelings of national relative

deprivation. This situation ensues when the individual contrasts the

 

1A good introduction to reference group theory is offered in W. G.
Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1966, chap. ii.

51
situation of his own national group with that of another and finds that
the discrepancy violates his sense of justice. Under such circumstances,
the more salient the national group as a membership group, the more in-
tense the sense of national relative deprivation.

As larger and larger proportions of the members of a national group
harbor feelings of national group relative deprivation, the more likely
it becomes that such feelings will manifest themselves in group action.
But it is only by turning to a psychological conceptualization of rela-
tive deprivation that we can understand the mechanics by which deprived
national groups might become politicized and sustain separatist movements.

When a person wants to share the attributes of a comparative refer-
ence group but finds that he is not able to, there is an implicit cogni-
tive contrast between his ideal and his perceived status. It is this
cognitive contrast, specifically, which produces relative deprivation.
Gurr has defined relative deprivation

as actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value

expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which

they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value

capabilities (the amounts of those goods apd conditions that

they think they are able to get and keep).

While this explanation makes no mention of reference group theory, it
does not contradict the sociological definition of relative deprivation.
Perceived deprivation, as an "in the mind" phenomenon, is relative to the

individual's ideal value positions. As a sociological or group phenomen-

on it is relative to the status of a comparative reference group. In

 

1Gurr, loc. cit. These terms are more formally defined by Gurr in
his book,_Why'Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, p.
27, where he specifies that "value expectations of a collectivity are the
average value positions to which its members believe they are justifiably
entitled. Value position is the amount or level of a value actually
attained....The value capabilities of a collectivity are the average
value positions its members perceive themselves capable of attaining."

 

 

 

52

either case it is a discrepancy between what one has and what one wants.

Prior to examining the theoretical linkage between relative depriva-
tion and separatism, we shall explore the various patterns by which rela-
tive deprivation can develop.' The expectations people have about
receiving rewards change independently of the system.by which those re-
wards are allocated in a society. It is not surprising, therefore, that
value expectations and value capabilities often diverge. The degree of
relative deprivation is determined by the size of the discrepancy between
these two elements. Gurr suggests three common patterns by which the
"decremental deprivation" model, illustrated in Figure 1, occurs when a
group's value expectations remain fairly constant while its value capa-

bilities are perceived to decline.

FIGURE 1

DECREMENTAL DEPRIVATION

 

 

 

expectations

I:

o

...q

H

9H

m

o

g D O O
o capabilities
:

7.3

>

t ime

Examples include the effects of progressive taxation on the
wealthy and of regressive taxation on the poor; the loss of
political influence by elites and oppositional groups newly
barred from.political activity; and the decline in status and
influence felt by middle-class groups as the status of working-
class groups increases.

 

11bid., pp. 46-7.

53

These examples illustrate the irrelevance of actual social position to a
sense of relative deprivation. While one might expect feelings of
relative deprivation to arise most frequently among the working class,
they can in fact occur at any rung on the social ladder. Runciman dis-
cusses the relative deprivation felt by the British middle class as they
perceived the erosion of their preeminent position in British society
during the 1930's and 40's.1 Elsewhere he remarks that "there is no
stronger initial reason to expect the resentment of inequality to corre-
late with relative hardship than with relative good fortune."2 Citing a
study of the effects of a tornado on an American community, Runciman
shows how those with moderately severe losses, comparing their fate to
those with very severe losses, can feel less deprivation than those with
minimal losses who compare their fate with people who escaped the tornado's
effects altogether. The decremental model, then, is particularly appli-
cable to groups whose position is less ascendant than it once was.

Gurr's second model, "aspirational deprivation," which is depicted
in Figure 2, is characterized by rising value expectations against a
background of relatively stable Value capabilities. "Those who exper-
ience significant loss of what they have; they are angered because they
feel they have no means for attaining new or intensified expectations."
Examples include demands for independence and rapid economic development
for colonial peoples; the spread of egalitarian ideas in a non-egalitarian
society; and the effects of social mobilization in transitional socie-

ties. The aspirational model seems especially applicable to groups whose

 

1Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, pp. 130-1.

21bid., p. 23.

3Gurr, Why_Men Rebel, p. 50.

position

54

is static in an otherwise changing society.

FIGURE 2

ASPIRATIONAL DEPRIVATION ’

expectations ,

 

value position

capabilities

 

 

The

time

third model Gurr discusses, "progressive deprivation," is a

variation of the second. As illustrated in Figure 3, value expectations

rise at a steady rate while value capabilities rise for a while and

then sharply decline.

value position

FIGURE 3

PROGRESSIVE DEPRIVATION

 
 

capabilities

 
 

 

 

time

Such a pattern is most common in societies undergoing simul-
taneous ideological and systemic change. Economic depression
in a growing economy can have this effect. So can the articu-
lation of an ideology of modernization in a society that has

55

structural inflexibilities thai prevent expansion of value
output beyond a certain point.

De Tocqueville's analysis of the French Revolution was couched in terms
of the progressive deprivation model. He observed that

it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that

revolutions break out. On the contrary it oftener happens

that when a people has put up with an oppressive rule over a

long period without protest suddenly finds the goyernment re-

laxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it.
Civil disturbances which follow this general pattern have come to be
called revolutions of rising expectations. Davies's "J-curve" theory
of revolution is a modern explication of this pattern. Strife is most
likely to occur, Davies asserts, "when a prolonged period of rising
expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of
sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratifications

quickly widens and becomes intolerable."3

Like the aspirational model,
this pattern is most likely to appear in societies undergoing rapid
social change.

There are innumerable additional patterns to which changing expec-
tations and capabilities might conform.4 One set of patterns, the "mini-

mal change" models, suggests a slowly changing, or even a static, rela-

tionship between value expectations and capabilities. Although there

 

11bid., p. 53

2Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution,
trans. Stuart Gilbert, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1955, p. 177.

 

3James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions
as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Hugh
Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr,(eds.), The Histogy of Violence in
America, rev. ed., Bantam Books, Inc., New York, 1970, p. 690.

 

4A good discussion of various theories of revolution is found in
Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Changg, Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
1966, pp. 59-87.

 

56

may be a discrepancy between the two variables, it may be either very
small or it may have developed over a relatively long period of time.

If the gap is large enough to produce a sense of relative deprivation,
it will be felt less intensely than that produced by the three models

of explosive deprivation.1 The result may be a festering sense of being
less well off than one should be, or possibly a sense of resignation or
despair at not being able to achieve one's aspirations. In any case,
these minimal change models differ from the three presented only in the

degree not in the kind of their effects.

According to Max Weber, there are three dimensions of social strati-
fication: class, status, and power.2 Inequalities, and hence a sense of
relative deprivation, can be generated on any or all of these dimensions.
A group may feel deprived in terms of its economic status, its social
prestige, or its political influence. In his attempts to measure the
relation between economic and political deprivation and civil strife,
Gurr devised rough aggregate indices of economic and political discrim-
ination. The former referred to the "systematic exclusion of social
groups from.higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases," while
the latter was defined "in terms of systematic limitation in form, norm,
or practice or social groups' opportunities to participate in political
activities or to attain elite positions on the basis of ascribed char-

acteristics."3 But since relative deprivation is essentially a cognitive

 

1Cf. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold,
Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Graham
and Gurr (eds.), op. cit., pp. 639-40.

2
Cf. his article on "Class, Status, Party," in H. H. Gerth and.CL‘Wright

MillS' (eds-L From.Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1946, pp. 180-95.

3Gurr, "A Causal Model...," P. 1109.

57
phenomenon, such definitions provide only for indirect measures of the
deprivation variables. Survey analysis overcomes this difficulty by
enabling the researcher to measure directly the pervasiveness and the
intensity of feelings of relative deprivation among a population. By
simply asking respondents whether they feel deprived in terms of income
or occupation, for example, relative to some other group, we can establish
the level of relative economic deprivation.

The effects of deprivation which are more or less permanent can be
distinguished from those of deprivation perceived to be temporary. Since
it is easier for a person to endure, temporary deprivation is less likely
to have social effects than permanent deprivation. Gurr distinguishes
between "persisting" and "short-term" deprivation. The former includes
not only economic and political descrimination but the way a national
group was incorporated into the polity1 and a relative shortage of educa-
tional opportunities. The latter, on the other hand, consists of adverse
economic conditions, inflation, taxes, new regime restrictions on politi-
cal participation and representation, and other value depriving policies

recently imposed by governments.2

 

1Deprivation is least intense, Gurr specifies, if a region was
incorporated into the polity by its own request or by‘mutual agreement.
He uses three additional intensity scores, the highest being reserved
for groups forcibly assimdlated into the polity in the twentieth century.
Ibid , p. 1110.

2Cf. ibid., p. 1109. Utilizing aggregate data on strife events in
114 polities between 1961 and 1965, Gurr finds that the two forms of
deprivation differ in their effects on general strife, short-term depri-
vation accounting for 12% or the explained variance in the magnitude of
civil strife, persisting deprivation accounting for 24% when the effects
of other variables are controlled. (p. 1121.)

 

 

in.
5'.

 

 

58

Linkingsgoncepts: Deprivation, Frustration, Aggression

A national group may experience any of the kinds of relative depri-
vation outlined above. Whether or not separatism results from such
feelings of deprivation and how separatism manifests itself presumably
depends on two sets of relationships. The first links deprivation to
frustration; the second ties frustration to separatism,

Referring to collective violence in general, Gurr has stated that
"[d]iscontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the

"1 In the now classic terms of Dollard,

basic, instigating condition.
et al., frustration is "an interference with the occurrence of an insti-
gated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior sequence."2
Although this definition allows for awide variety of frustrating situa-
tions, there are essentially only two general categories--conflicts and
deprivations.3 When people have alternative solutions to problems, or
when they are cross-pressured to behave in different ways, the resulting
cognitive conflict may be productive of frustration since goal directed
activity is interrupted. Similarly, when people want or need something
which is generally supplied either by the external world or by internal
sources and which is not found to be there, the resulting sense of depri-
vation, involving thwarted expectations, may lead to frustration. Al-

though we are mainly interested in deprivation as a source of frustra-

tion, it should be remembered that conflicts, cross-pressuring, or simple

 

1Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 13.

2John Dollard, et al., Frustration and sggression, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1939, p. 7. A goal-response is "an act which termin-
ates in a predicted sequence." (p. 6.)

 

3Cf. Saul Rosenzweig, "A General Outline of Frustration," in Phillippe
R. Lawson (ed.), Frustration, Macmillan_and Co., New York, 1965, pp. 63-71.

59
confusion.may also generate frustration.

Mowrer has pointed out that deprivation is "a taking away or with-
holding of something that has been accepted as a desired objective, with
full appetitive arousal....that frustration can be experienced in full
force."1 Actual deprivations, whether economic, social, or political,
may or may not be perceived by those suffering them, Obviously, depri-
vations which go unheeded will have no chance to affect people's predis-
positions or their subsequent behavior. As Chalmers Johnson has pointed
out, bad social conditions do not cause revolutions; the demands created
by such conditions do.2 One might expect, however, that the greater the
deprivation, the more likely that it will be perceived. A group, for
example, suffering unemployment rates double those for other groups in a
society are more likely to perceive their relative deprivation than if
employment rates were only marginally different. In addition, unemploy-
ment affecting a limited number of industries is less likely to be per-
ceived than that affecting the economy generally. The underlying prin-
ciple at work is that the more poeple who are themselves affected by a
condition, the wider the perception of that condition.

Actual deprivations, of course, need not underlie a sense of depri-
vation.3 Group paranoia, a widespread delusion of persecution, is a
possible outcome of repeated attempts by members of a group to compensate
unconsciously for persistent failures or shortcomings. The distinction

is often made between "objective" or actual inequalities and those which

 

1O. H. Mowrer, "Frustration and Aggression," in V. C. Branham and
S. B. Kutash (eds.), Enoyclopedia of Criminology,‘ Philosophical
Library, New York, 1949, p. 178.

 

2Johnson, op. cit.,p. xiii.

3Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, pp. 10-11.

60
are "subjective" or only perceived.1 Since motivated behavior is based
on perceptions of reality, subjective inequalities are the more directly
relevant of the two.

While deprivation may be a source of frustration, an individual or
group suffering deprivations--even if actual and perceived--need not be
frustrated. It should be apparent from.the above definition that only the
failure to satisfy expectations about rewards or other end-results pro-
duces frustration. A deprivation which is expected and accepted does not
lead to frustration. Moreover, a group conditioned to accept deprivations
will not be frustrated when it experiences them. Members of a slave
class, for example, living in a non-egalitarian society may be taught
over a period of time to accept their subservient social position, and
they may do so without much sense of deprivation and with few attempts
to change their situation. The spread of egalitarian ideas, however,
may alter the degree to which relative deprivations are considered accept-
able.2 Carlyle said:

It is not what a man outwardly has or wants that constitutes

the happiness or misery of him. Nakedness, hunger, distress

of all kinds, death itself have been cheerfully suffered,

when the heart was right. It is the feeling of injustice

that is insupportable to all men....No man can bear it or

ought to bear it.

Runciman echoes the point, noting that feelings of relative deprivation

 

1Cf., for example, Celia S. Heller, Structured Social Inequality,
The Macmillan Company, London, 1969.

2Ideas, of course, play a central role in revolution. Crane
Brinton wrote, "No ideas, no revolution This does not mean that ideas
cause revolutions, or that the best way to prevent revolutions is to
censor ideas. It merely means that ideas form a part of the mutually

 

dependent variables we are studying." The Anatomy of Revolution, rev.
ed., Vintage Books, New York, 1952, p. 52.
3

Thomas Carlyle, "Chartism," Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, vol.
29, in Works, 30 vols., P. F. Collier, New York, 1900, pp. 144-5.

61

are most frustrating when a perceived condition of personal or group
inequality violates norms thought proper or "offends the canons of
social justice."1 It is even arguable that frustration occurs only
when such norms are violated.

An important assumption we have made throughout this discussion
is that both relative deprivation and frustration, concepts usually
applied to the analysis of individual behavior, can be utilized to
explain aggregate behavior as well. It is not always true, of course,
that what is valid at the individual level is equally valid at the
group level. The principles of family financial management, for example,
are largely inapplicable to national budget-making. And what is deemed
"rational" behavior for an individual seeking to maximize the probability
of enhancing his own best interests is frequently irrational when he
perceives himself as one of a group of actors, each with the ultimate
goal of enhancing the best interests of the collectivity.2

However, the social psychological concepts with which we are deal-
ing do not appear to present these difficulties. If an individual can
possess a sense of relative deprivation, why should a group of such
individuals pose any novel problems of interpretation? And why should
group frustration, per se, offer any characteristics dissimilar to those
encountered with indiVidual frustration? In their comparative study of
political violence, the Feierabends devise the concept of ”systemic
frustration" which makes the notion of frustration "applicable to the

analysis of aggregate, violent political behavior within social systems."3

 

1Runciman, 10c. cit., p. 251.

2Cf. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, SchoCken Books,
New York, 1964.

3Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, in Graham and Gurr, op. cit.,
p. 635.

62
They go on to define the concept of systemic frustration in reference
to three important criteria:
(1) As frustration interfering with the attainment and main-
tenance of social goals, aspirations, and values; (2) as frus-
tration simultaneously experienced by members of social
aggregates and hence also complex social systems; and (3) as
frustration or strain that is produced within the structures
and processes of social systems. Systemic frustration is thus
frustration that is experienced simultaneously and collectively
within societies.1
Although persons individually frustrated (or relatively deprived) may

behave differently in groups of like-minded persons, the point made

here is that the concept is the same at both levels.

The second component of the theoretical linkage between relative
deprivation and separatisnr-that frustration can generate aggressive
political activities--has evoked a great deal of scholarly attention.
The fundamental conceptual proposition is that frustration finds an
outlet in aggression. The first formal suggestion that such a rela-
tionship existed between frustration and aggression came in 1917 when
Sigmund Freud noted that "being slighted, neglected, or disappointed"

2 He later

produces mental conflict and a need to express hostility.
found that frustration of satisfactions "may lead to the development of

neurosis" and that "a Fcollateral' damming-up of this kind must swell

 

1Ibid.

2Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," vol. XIV, The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psyshological Works of Sigmund Freud, James
Strachey (ed. and trans.), 23 vols. to date, The Hogarth Press, London,
1953- . Dollard, et al., op. cit., p. 21, interrupts Freud's writings
to imply that "[f]rustration occurred whenever pleasure-seeking or pain-
avoiding behavior was blocked; aggression was the'primordial reaction'
to this state of affairs and was thought of as being originally and nor-
mally directed toward those persons or objects in the external world
which were perceived as the source of the frustration.

 

63
the force of the perverse impulses."1
In the seminal Yale study, Frustration and Aggression, Dollard and
his associates presented the first systemic examination of the propo-
sition that "the occurrence of agressive behavior always presupposes the
existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frus-

"2 Aggression was de-

tration always leads to some form of aggression.
fined in the study as a "sequence of behavior, the goal-response to which
is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed."3 It was not
clear, however, how physically violent the "injury" had to be. The
authors made a distinction between "overt" aggression, "fighting, strik-
ing, swearing, and other easily observed actions" and "non-overt" aggres-
sion, which is "implicit or partially inhibited."4 But they failed to
explore other non-violent manifestations of aggression. We suggest a
more broadly applicable concept of aggression. Since the dividing line
between what is violence and what is not violence is so indistinct,5 it
seems advisable to use a concept which includes hostile intentions,
aggressive attitudes, and certain forms of political deviation. Since
the implicit aim of separatism is to aggress against the integrity of an
existing state, this may be properly included in a broadened definition

of aggression.

Partly because of the narrow definition of aggression utilized,

 

1Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Liveright
Publishing Corporation, New York, 1920, p. 272. Caroline E. Playne
once descirbed nationalism as a "social neurosis caused by the stress
and strain of modern life." (Quoted in Snyder, The‘Meaningsof National-

.EEE: p. 96.)

2Dollard, et al., op. cit., p. 1.

3Ibid., p. 9.
4Ibid., p. 33.
5Cf. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 7-13.

64
critics have held the Yale hypothesis to be an overstatement of the case.
Even one of the original collaborators admitted two years later that the
phrasing of the proposition was "unclear and misleading" and that a
better statement was simply that "[f]rustration produces instigations to
a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation
to some form of aggression."1 As Berkowitz asserts, "practically all
present-day observers of human hostility contend that frustrations gen
produce an instigation to aggression."2 [Emphasis mine] In addition,
however, frustration has been shown to generate resignation and apathy,
regression to a less mature behavior pattern, and displaced aggression in

3 The latter,

the form of hostility, self-aggression, or psychosis.
closely related to non-overt aggression and expressed in similar terms,
was dealt with by the Yale group.

But what determines the outcome of frustration? Several writers
have made a distinction between primary and secondary human needs, the

former relating to physiological functions, the latter to social

functions.4 Deprivation on either dimension will produce frustration,

 

1Neal E. Miller, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," Psycho-
logical Review, XLVIII, 1948, p. 338.

2Leonard Berkowitz, aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 28.

3The same frustration may not even cause all of the members of the
same group to react in the same way. Cf. G. W. Allport, J. S. Brunet,
and E. M, Jandorf, "Personality and Social Catastrophe," in c, Kluckhohn
and H. A: Murray (eds.), Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture,
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1949. For a discussion of frustration as a
cause of regression, cf. Roger G. Barker, Tamara Dembo, and Kurt Lewin,
"Frustration and Aggression," in Lawson (ed.), op. cit.

4Cf., for example, D. M, Levy, "The Hostile Act," Psychological
Review, XLVIII, 1941, pp. 356-61, and A. H. Maslow, "Deprivation, Threat,
and Frustration," ibid., pp. 364-6.

 

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65
but as Mowrer put it, "it is doubtful if any primary drive is ordinarily
strong enough to lead, when blocked or denied, to anger and aggression."1
Aggressive responses derive from.frustration only where inter-personal
social relationships are involved. Yates, in summing up the experimental
findings of others, observes that "aggression is primarily produced by
the frustration of secondary drives, not primary drives, and particularly
by the frustration of social relationships."2 Weber's dimensions of
social stratification--class, status, and power--fall clearly into this
category.

Even so, frustrated secondary drives do not always result in violent
responses. For example, political powerlessness, "the feeling of an
individual that his political action has no influence in determining the
course of political events," has been shown to produce political aliena-
tion and non-voting.3 In his theoretical article discussing the psycho-
logical components of strife, Gurr speculates little on the possible non-
violent outcomes of frustration. His concern is primarily with violent
aggression but he avOids the problem of linking frustration only to vio-
lent aggression by observing curtly "that frustration is all but univer-
sally characteristic of participants in civil strife."4 It may be

inferred from.his writings, however, that two general factors determine

the form of frustration responses. Since the response variable is

 

1Mowrer, op. cit., p. 178.

2
Aubrey J. Yates, Frustration and Conflict, Methuen and Co., Ltd.,
London, 1962, p. 111.

3
Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
New York, 1960, p. 62.

4Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World
Politics, XX, January, 1968, p. 250.

 

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66
assumed to be continuous and since, other factors being equal, it varies
in direct proportion to the strength of the frustration, a weakly felt
frustration will produce a non-violent response. A second factor
presupposes that aggression is learned behavior. Past aggressions may
serve as examples; the absence of such examples may encourage non-violent
responses. -

The way aggression is manifested depends most directly on the scope
and intensity of the frustration. The horizontal scope, i.e., the num-
ber of simultaneous frustrations, will affect the goal of aggression.

A national group frustrated by only a few deprivations may seek merely

to redress these grievances within the existing system, A group suffer-
ing a moderately wide range of frustrations may seek a more general
redress in the form of increased autonomy. And finally, a national group
frustrated on many fronts might be expected to seek independence. The
intensity of frustration, on the other hand, will affect the tactics used
to achieve these goals. Weakly felt frustration may result in generally
non-violent (and probably unorganized) mass protest or in non-violent
elite efforts. Frustrations moderately felt may be expressed through
support for non-system political parties, while intensely felt frustra-
tions might produce violence. In presenting this generalized continuum
of aggression--an extension of Gurr's hierarchies of civil violence1--we
do not intend to suggest that its levels are pure or mutually exclusive.
In fact we would not expect them to be since frustrations are always felt
with differing intensities by different people. But the continuum does
present a suggested sequence of escalation when frustrations increase in

intensity. Doob supports this idea. Beginning with the disclahmer that

 

1Cf. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pp. 10-11.

 

67
aggressiveness "need not inevitably give rise to nationalism," he asserts
that

the amount of aggression to be displaced through nationalism

or some other institution depends in part upon the severity

of the frustration. If people's basic problems are reasonably

'well resolved and, moreover, resolved from their standpoint,

they are less likely to turn to any scapegoat.

Certain intervening variables may, however, mitigate the effects of
frustration. First, the anticipation of punishment or failure will in-
hibit aggression. As Dollard, et al., state, "the strength of inhibition
of any act of aggression varies positively with the amount of punishment
anticipated to be a consequence of that act."2 When such an inhibition
is stronger than the instigation to aggression, aggression, as defined
by Dollard and his associates, does not occur.3 However, frustration
does not simply disappear when there is a threat of punishment or failure.
Rather, there is a readjustment of the goals and tactics of the aggres-
sive response. The expectation that national secession would meet with
failure, for example, would presumably tend to force a less extreme goal
for a frustrated national group. The expectation that the use of violent
tactics would be severely punished might encourage the adoption of a
more peaceful approach.

More severe inhibition of aggression might be expected to push the
response pattern into the bottom-most categories of aggression, into the
region of hostile attitudes, self-aggression, or psychosis. The Yale

group claimed that "[t]here should be a strong tendency for inhibited

aggression to be displaced" from the object causing the frustration to

 

1Leonard Doob, op. cit., p. 264.
2Dollard, et al., op. cit., p. 33.

3Ibid., pp. 36-7.

68
some available substitute.1 Freud had earlier noticed that "there are
very many ways by which it is possible to endure lack of libidinal satis-
faction without falling ill." One "powerful counter-effect to the
effect of a frustration" is a person's "capacity for displacement" and
his "readiness to accept surrogates."2 With reference to a frustrated
national group this means that inhibitions to separate from the current

state structure may bring about various forms of non-overt or self-

directed aggression, like high crime or alcoholism rates.3

The effects of frustration may also be mitigated by a high level
of gratification. Frustrations may decline in salience if an individual
has significant advantages over those in other groups. This general
point was illustrated by Dollard, et a1.:

To reason from economic statistics that one country is more or
less frustrated than another may be correct, but only in res-
pect to the particular frustration which conceivably may result
from the conditions giving rise to those statistics. Since all
frustrations occur within individuals, no one frustration can
be singled out nor from it can one deduce that aggressive behav-
ior inevitably will increase or decrease. Italians may have
less Chianti, but the Italian flag now floats over most of
Ethiopia. Germans may have to deprive themselves of meat and
fruits, but Vienna and Sudetenland are now part of the Reich.
Russians occasionally still have to stand in queues even for
basic commodities, but their country now manufactures articles
that formerly had to be imported. Let no man say, with our
present information, that 2 pudding is necessarily more or less
gratifying than a pageant.

A third factor which might influence the effects of frustration is

the high level of institutionalization in society. Huntington has

 

11bid., p. 41.

2Freud,‘ngeneral Introduction..., p. 302.
3Cf. Dollard, et al., loc. cit., chap. vi.

4Ibid., p. 170.

 

69
defined institutionalization as the "process by which organizations and

"1 Its level is determined by

procedures acquire value and stability.
the average degree of organizational adaptability, complexity, autonomy,
and coherence in a society. The general effect of a high level of insti-
tutionalization is to mitigate frustration and abate overt aggression.
Huntington suggests that stability in developing countries is a function
of changing levels of institutionalization and modernization. If the
pace of institutionalization, or the development of effective systems of
social authority, keeps up with the pace of social mobilization and econ-
omic development, the likelihood of stability is increased. If a gap
develops between the two, however, the chances for stability decline.2
Similarly, Kornhauser has shown how a flourishing structure of independent
groups in a society can preclude the development of "mass society." When
such an associational structure is absent, non-elites are available for
manipulation and mobilization by mass-oriented elites.3

But the real effect of institutionalization may be to alter the
tactics frustrated groups utilize in expressing their aggression. A
structure of groups may facilitate peaceful change by allowing an
acceptably low form of aggression to be expressed within the system.
Gurr has called this "institutionalized displacement" since "participa-
tion in political activity, labor unions, and millenarian religious

movements can be a response to relative deprivation.which permits more

 

1Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1968, p. 12.

2Ibid., p 53-9.

3William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, The Free Press,
New York, 1959, pp. 60-73.

70
or less non-violent expression of aggression."1
It is possible, however, for institutionalization to have the oppo—
site effect of facilitating the expression of overt aggression. Gurr
points out that "one can distinguish at least three modes by which groups
affect individuals' disposition to violence: (1) by providing normative
support, (2) by providing apparent protection from retribution, and (3)
by providing cues for violent behavior.”2 Under the first point he
emphasized that people are more likely to express hastility in cohesive
groups than they are individually. This is because such expressions of
hostility tend to be mutually reinforcing. Second, groups can mitigate
punishment for aggression by providing a shield of anonymity for partici-
pants, by amassing a force capable of repelling retributive actions, or
by providing highly visible leaders who can take on responsibility for
illicit violence. Finally, groups may provide "a congruent image or
model of violent action" which will encourage or permit men to "seize
cobblestones or rope or rifles to do violence to fellow citizens."3

Past involvement of the group in aggressive activities will tend to pro-

duce such images.

Support for the Proposition

Several writers have described nationalism in terms similar to those
we have been using. Snyder has noted, for example, that "[n]ationalism
is in part a psychological response to grave threats of insecurity." A

national group sensing itself endangered, cut off, or deprived will

 

1Gurr, ”Psychological Factors...," pp. 268-9.

2Ibid., p. 272.

31bid., p. 274.

("I

71

develop feelings of inferiority and anxiety. One response to such feel-
ings is to exaggerate the superiority of one's own power, unity, "art,
language, literature, climate, political virtue, even cooking." Boastful
chauvinism, Snyder asserts, is characteristic of all forms of nationalism,

Lasswell has observed that "the demand to be emancipated from an in-
ferior status is one component" of recent nationalist movements. The
nationalistic pattern, he says, "began to appear where disunited groups
which possessed traditions of culture and political unity came to believe
that they were discriminated against in politics, business, language,
worship, and education." Like Snyder, Lasswell refers to the "insecuri-
ties of the community" around which demands for emancipation developed.2

The emphasis on oppression or discrimination as a moving force be-
hind nationalism is a common theme in the literature. Hayes introduced
the notion that any nationality which is not politically independent is
styled "oppressed" or "subject" or even "enslaved."3 More recently,
Minogue has written that "nationalists feel themselves oppressed." They
form a "political movement depending on a feeling of collective grievance
against foreigners."4 Minogue stresses the centrality of collective or
national group grievance. Reference group theory provides an appropriate
framework within which to view such a collective grievance inasmuch as
the national group can be an important normative reference group.

Social psychologists have noted that oppression, or more accurately

 

1Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, p. 97. Cf. also p. 108. Cf.
also Doob, op. cit., chap. l4.

2Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, The
Free Press, New York, 1935, 1965, p. 73.

3Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 5.

4Minogue, op. cit., p. 25.

Nib

 

 

72
the frustration to which it leads, stimulates people to maintain identi-
ties in non-conforming groups such as minority nationalities in multi-
national states.1 From a study of overseas Chinese nationalism, Williams
finds support for this notion, asserting that "under pressure, real or
imagined, a minority may feel threatened and seek security by further
isolating itself from those who are outside its system of social communi-
cation."2 The degree of isolation sought will depend on the strength of
the group and the seriousness of the threat. Another theorist holds that
nationalism.can be explained in part as "a reaction to a denial or threat."
Such reactions involve feelings of national group inferiority and frus-
tration which encourage various forms of aggression against out-groups.
Although this theory is offered to explain offensive nationalism, the
terms of its propositions are conceptually close to those we suggested
for defensive separatism:

Using an equilibrium model similar to that adapted by Gurr, Deutsch
and his associates have suggested that political disintegration results
from the failure of the central government to respond to various kinds
of demands for change. The success or failure of integration depends on
"the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate of claims

and burdens upon central governments as against the growing... level of

capabilities of the governmental institutions of the amalgamated

 

le. Newcomb, Turner, and Converse, op. cit., p. 415.

2Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the
_Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916, The Free Press, New York,
1960, p. 16.

 

 

3Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus, Bd. I: Psychologie und Geschichte,
Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964, p. 27-32.

 

73
political community."1 Political disintegration results either from.in-
creasing the burdens on a political system (by increasing social differ-
entiation or the level of political participation, for example) or from
declining system capabilities (e.g. economic stagnation or a delay in
expected reforms. Frustration is implied as a stage preceding the
observed result.

There is also support in the literature for the notion that the
activities of separatist political parties--the second manifestation of
separatism we noted in Scotlan --derives from frustration. Several re-
searchers have found that voting for extremist parties is correlated
with discontent. Lipset reports an "inverse relationship between
national economic development as reflected by per capita income and the
strength of Communists and other extremist groups among Western nations."2
Kornhauser finds a similar relationship between per capita income in
1949 and the electoral strength of the Communists in sixteen Western
democracies. The rank order correlation between the two variables was

-.93.3

Separatism and Social Mobility

A second theoretical framework within which we propose to examine
separatism in Scotland relates to the concept of social mobility. Al-
though the conceptualization of social mobility differs significantly
from that of relative deprivation, the hypothesized mechanism which pre-

sumably links each to separatism is so similar in both cases that one

 

w

1Deutsch, et al., op. cit., p. 42. Cf. also pp. 59-65.
2Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics,
Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1963, p. 46.

3Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 160.

(fl
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a .

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‘7‘“
, .

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74
seems justified in treating these independent variables together. In the
sections above we discussed the theoretical linkage between perceived
relative deprivation, systemic frustration, and separatism. While the
first hypothesis was couched in terms of the psychological prerequisites
of participation in strife activities, the social mobility hypothesis
bypasses the frustration-aggression linkage, focussing rather on the s
priori inter-relation of groups. But in both cases dissatisfaction is
assumed to antecede separatism,

The concept of social mobility derives from the sociological liter-
ature dealing with social stratification. Social hierarchies involving
dimensions such as class, status, and power, structure society and deter-
mine the condition and circumstances of men's lives. When people change
their location on these hierarchies, they are said to be socially mobile.
The term itself is defined by Lipset and Bendix as "the process by which
individuals move from one position to another in society--positions
which by general consent have been given specific hierarchial values."
Moreover, such movement can carry individuals "to positions either
higher or lower in the social system.”1 When an individual increases
his wealth or status, when he acquires additional political power or a
more prestigeous occupation, he is "upward mobile." When an individual
loses wealth, status, or political power, or when he acquires a less
prestigeous occupation, he is "downward mobile." A complex and socially
dynamic society will include individuals of both types.

Social mobility is frequently measured inter-generationally,

 

1Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in
Industrial Society, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1959, pp. 1-2.

.‘

 

75
comparing the social standing of an individual with that of his par-
ents.1 Alternatively, movement can be measured intra-generationally,
comparing the social position of an individual at one point in time with
that at a later date. Although there is justification for using either
as a measure of social mobility, we use intra-generational mobility in
this study. We are interested in the behavioral consequences of mobil-
ity and it seems reasonable that movement up or down the social scale
within the span of an individual's adulthood may be more intensely per-
ceived (and be more likely to have significant behavioral consequences)
than movement compared to one's parents' position.

Mobility may take place in a society when there is an increase in
the number of high or low statuses, or when there is sufficient social
upheaval to cause an interchange of ranks among individuals.2 Economic
expansion, for example, may create new industries and carry upward a new
class of entrepreneurs, while economic depression may wipe out businesses
and cripple occupations, creating widespread unemployment and enlarging
the group of persons occupying the lowest statuses in a society. Less
frequently, a society may be torn by political revolution which thrusts
to the top a new elite which subsequently is afforded the power and pres-
tige once enjoyed by the deposed. But an interchange of ranks need not
occur only in a revolutionary society. In fact such an interchange on
an individual level is a common characteristic of complex societies.

A third way mobility'uay occur in a society is through the

 

1Cf. William J. Goode, "Family and Mobility," in Reinhard Bendix
and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, and Power, Social Strat-

ification in Comparative Perspective, 2d ed., The Free Press, New York,
1966, pp. 582-601.

 

2Seymour Martin Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, ”A Theory of Social
Mobility," in ibid., p. 565.

a
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76
motivation of individuals. The desire to improve one's condition or
that of one's group or the desire to avoid a decline in position may
motivate one to pursue higher goals. Veblen illustrates this with
respect to consumption:

...[I]t is extremely gratifying to possess something more than

others. But as fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and

becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the
new standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater
satisfaction than the earlier standard did. The tendency in

any case is constantly to make the present pecuniary standard

the point of departure for a fresh increase of wealth; and

this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency....

One notable aspect of motivational mobility is that is does not require
an external catalyst such as economic or political change. Even a
relatively static society might exhibit this sort of mObility.

The consequences of social mobility are diverse and depend on such
variables as the extent of mobility, the number of people affected by
mobility (and the extent to which those people form a cohesive group),
and the cultural context within which movement occurs. One common
effect of social mobility results from the independence of status hier-
archies. An individual or group acquiring additional wealth, for
example, might not move upward on parallel scales of political power, or
prestige. These "status discrepancies" are explained by Lipset and
Bendix:

Every society may be thought of as comprising a number of

separate hierarchies--e.g., social, economic, educational,

ethnic, etc.--each of which has its own status structure,

its own conditidns for the attainment of a position of pres-

tige within that structure. There are likely to be a numr

ber of discrepancies among the positions in the different

hierarchies that every person occupies simultaneously, for,

as George Simmel pointed out, every person maintains a
unique pattern of group affiliations. Mobility merely adds

 

1Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, quoted in
ibid., p. 565.

 

 

it

\I .

 

77

to these discrepancies by creating or accentuating combinations

of a high position in one rank and a low one in another; for

example, a high position in an occupation combined with a low

ethnic status, or a high position in the social-class hierar-

chy (based on the status of people with whom one associates)

combined with a low income.

Although such status discrepancies do not always accompany mobility,
the consequences of discrepancies are in many ways analogous to the
effects of frustration described earlier in this chapter. Turner has
suggested that the personality effects may include stress or tension, a
complication of interpersonal relations, and a general disruption in an
individual's personal value system.2 Each of these contributes to
personal insecurity and complicates the prediction of a person's be-
havior patterns. This anomic situation, in which individuals have
difficulty in reacting to divergent norms, may produce extreme or unusu-
al behavior patterns Durkheim, for example, linked both upward and
downward mobility to increased suicide rates.3 Other studies have
suggested a relationship between mental illness and upward mobility.4

But more interesting and more directly related to our concerns
are the political behavior patterns suggested as correlates of mobility

and status discrepancies. Some studies have found that ethnic prejudice

is related to mobility. Hofstadter has summarized:

 

1Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 64.

2Ralph H. Turner, "Modes of Social Ascent Through Education, Sponsor-
ed and Contest‘Mobility," in Bendix and Lipset (eds ), op. cit., p. 457.

3Emile Durkheim, Suicide, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1951, p. 246-55.
Noted in Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 65.

4Cf. A. B. Hollingshead, R. Ellis, and E. Kirby, "Social Mobility and
Mental Illness," American Sociological Review, XIX, 1954, pp. 577-84 and
A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, "Schizophrenia and Social Structure,"
American Journal of Psychiatry, CX, 1954, pp. 695-701. Noted in Lipset
and Bendix, op. cit., p. 65.

. a
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pi..-

78

Persons moving downward, and even upward under many circumstances,
in the social scale tend to show greater prejudice against such
ethnic minorities as the Jews and Negroes than commonly prevails
in the social strata they have left or are entering.

Greenblum and Pearlin found that both upward and downward mobility were

related to increased prejudice.2 Bettleheim and Janowitz found downward

3

but not upward mobility related to prejudice. But other studies have

failed to uncover such relationships, leaving the issue in some doubt.
Political extremism, a variable closely related to ethnic prejudice,
has also been linked frequently to social mobility. Wolfinger and his
associates have suggested that many upward mobile Americans need to
"affirm their patriotism.and new middle class status by supporting the
radical right."5 Lipset and Bendix assert that status discrepancies

predispose individuals and groups to accept extremist political
views. Thus, the French bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century.
developed its revolutionary zeal when it was denied recognition
and social prestige by the old French aristocracy: wealth had
not proved to be a gateway to high status and power, and the
mounting resentment over this fed the fires of political radical-
ism. Almost the reverse of this process seems to have occured
in Germany during the late nineteenth century: there the
Prussian Junkers maintained their monopolistic hold on the army
and the bureaucracy while the middle-class leaders of German

 

1Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in Daniel
Bell (ed.), The Radical Right, Anchor Books, New York, 1963, p. 91.

2Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and
Prejudice," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., lst ed., pp. 480-91.

3Bruno Bettleheim and Morris Janowitz, "Ethnic Tolerance: A
Function of Personal and Social Control," American Journal of Sociology,
IV, 1949, pp. 137-45.

4Cf. Martin A. Trow, "Right-wing Radicalism.and Political Intoler-
ance,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1957, pp. 110
f. Noted in Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 71; and Melvin M Tumin,
"Readiness and Resistance to Desegretation: A Social Portrait of the
Hard Core," Social Forces, XXXVI, 1958, p. 261.

SRaymond Wolfinger, et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and
Ideology," 111_David*E; Apter (ed.), Ideology-and Discontent, The Free
Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964, p. 278.

n \z- ‘

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K. ..~

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79

industry bought land in order to acquire aristocratic titles
and have access to positions at court and in the government.
As Max Weber observed at the time, no one was as vociferous
in his patriotism and as reactionary in his politics as the
‘man of business who had acquired a title through letters-
patent and who wanted to make people forget his bourgeois
origin. Political radicalization may also occur among social
groups whose social and economic position is in jeopardy.
Franz Neumann has suggested that in a number of European coun-
tries the middle class turned towards the extreme political
right because they felt threatened by downward mobility....
Thus, political radicalism may occur because the status of
social groups is imperiled, as well as because the aspirations

of ascenping social groups exceed their actual status in the
society.

And some have suggested that more moderate reform'movements might be
viewed profitably in terms of discrepancies brought about by social mo-
bility. Hofstadter argues, for example, that early twentieth century
American progressivism.derives largely from the stress of a "status
revolution" which took place in the post-Civil War period. Members of
the old middle-class, the Mugwump type, turned to progressivism
not because of economic deprivations but primarily because they
were victims of an upheaval in status that took place in the
United States during the closing decades of the nineteenth and
the early years of the twentieth century. Progressivism, in
short, was to a very considerable extent led by men who suffered
from the events of their time not through a shrinkage in their
means but through the changed pattern in the distribution of
deference and power.
Support for the Proposition
Although many of these examples suggest that there might be a

linkage between social mobility and nationalism, additional evidence is

even more convincing. In positing a relationship between rapid economic

 

1Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., pp. 268-9. Cf. also Lipset and
Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility," in Bendix’and Lipse’t (eds.), op.
cit., pp. 570-3.

2Richard Hofstadter, Thegége of Reform, From Bryan to F.D.R., Alfred
A. Knopf, New York, 1961, p. 135.

80

development and political instability, Olson notes that a swiftly expand-
ing economy means that some people gain a lot and others lose a lot,
weakening the bonds of class and caste. It also means that

[s]ome rise above the circumstances of their birth and others

fall behind. Both groups are normally declasse. Their economic

status keeps them from belonging to the casfe or class into

which their income bracket would put them:
He stresses that "[b]oth the gainers and the losers from.economic growth
can be destabilizing forces" since "both will be imperfectly adjusted to
the existing order."2 Although these circumstances are most likely to
occur when an economy is changing rapidly, Olson asserts that they can
take place even.when an economy is nearly stagnant. The important point
is that revolutionary or separatist activity may be traced to "those
whose place in the social order is changing."3

Gellner, in developing his own model for nationalism, ascribes the
phenomenon to the uneven distribution of the modernizing effects of indus-
trialism: The uneven impact of this modernizing wave, he says,

generates a sharp social stratification which unlike the strat-

ification of past societies, is (a) unhallowed by custom, and

which has little to cause it to be accepted as in the nature of

things, which (b) is not well protected by various social mechan-

isms, but on the contrary exists in a situation providing maxi-

mum opportunities and incentives for revolution, and which (c) is

remediable, and is seen to be remediable, by "national" secession.4

When reinforced by other distinguishing characteristics which differen-

tiate a region and its people from the rest of a country, regional

 

1Mancur Olson Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," James C.
Davies (ed.), When Men Revolt and Why, A Reader in Political Violence and
Revolution, The Free Press, New York, 1971, p. 217.

 

21bid.
31b1d.

4Gellner, op. cit., p. 166.

81
economic underdevelopment leads naturally, according to Gellner to sep-
aratism: New social and political hierarchies are created by the altered
economic relationships, giving rise to new grievances on all three of
Weber's dimensions of social inequality. Because these new hierarchies
are "unhallowed by custom," they offend those suddenly thrust to the
bottom,and in so many words, violate their sense of justice.

Rokkan suggests that strife--and separatism in particular--may re-
sult from the political mobilization of a state's periphery. "Territor-
ial oppositions set limits to the process of nation-building; pushed to
their extreme they lead to war, secession, possibly even population trans-
fers."1 Defining mobilization as "a process bringing about a steady
increase in the proportion of the territorial population standing in

"2 Rokkan

direct, unmediated communication with the central authorities,
shows that the mobilization of a territorial opposition can have effects
varying from.wars of secession to "intractable heritages of territorial-
cultural conflict."3 This pattern is analogous to Gurr's model of aspir-
ational deprivation discussed earlier since it is likely to be charac-
terized by rising expectations and stable capabilities.

In an attempt to explain the high incidence of political disorder in
developing nations, Huntington has outlined a hypothesis which helps to
link Gellner's and Rokkan's ideas to those expressed by Gurr. Huntington

suggests that the discrepancy between two forms of change--social mobili-

zation and economic development--

 

1Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the
Comparative Study of the Processes of Development, David McKay Company,
Inc., New York, 1970, p. 101. ‘

2Ibid., p. 27.

31bid., p. 101-2.

82

furnishes some measure of the impact of modernization on polit-

ical stability. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media,

all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new stan-

dards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These

experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the

traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and

wants. The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these

new aspirations, however, increases much more slowly than the

aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between

aspirations and expectations, want formation and want satisfac-

tion, or the aspirations function and the level-of-living

function. This generates social frustration and dissatisfaction.

In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index

to political instability.1
Since societies undergoing rapid change are most likely to experience the
discrepancy between social mobilization and economic development, it is
no surprise that transitional countries tend to be more unstable than

2

any other. However, this "gap hypothesis" is equally applicable to
highly developed societies. If social mobilization preceded economic
development, or if an economic decline occurs in an already socially
mobilized society, status discrepancies emerge, frustration results, and
the probability for instability increase. As Huntington and Gurr have
pointed out, modern societies are more likely than traditional societies
to possess the means for accommodating discrepancies before they lead to
instability--they usually have a higher level of institutionalization,

for example--and this is a second reason why transitional societies are

‘more violence-prone.

In later chapters we shall examine the applicability of these two
theoretical frameworks to nationalism in Scotland. Chapters Five and

Seven focus on the relative deprivation hypothesis, while Chapter Eight

 

1Huntington, op. cit , pp 53-4.

2Cf. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, 'in Graham and Gurr (eds.),
op. cit., pp. 653-68.

83
examines the social mobility hypothesis. But first we turn to Scottish
nationalism itself. How did it develop, what forms has it taken, who

are its leaders? The next two chapters focus on these issues.

CHAPTER III

NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND: THE HISTORICAL MATRIX

I canna feel it has to dae wi"me

Mair than a composite diagram 0'

Cross-sections o' my forebears' organs.

...1ike bindweek through my clay it's run

And a' my folks'--it's queer to see't unroll.

My ain soul looks me in the face, as 'twere,

And mair than my ain soul-emy nation's soul!

The Scots have always been preoccupied and vexed with the English.1

Ever since Scotland could justly be called a nation (and perhaps even
before), the peoples who populated the northern end of Britain could be
found spending much of their time defending themselves from the political
and military threat posed by peoples occupying the southern end. England
remained a significant threat to Scotland's sovereignty into the eigh-
teenth century when the two nations formally merged. But this merger,
effectuated by the Act of Union in 1707, merely transformed what had
been a problem of external security into one of defining an internal role
for Scotland. It is around this dilemma that most of the nationalist

debate in Scotland now revolves.

But this problem, so apparent in the thought and writings of influ-

ential Scots, scarcely grazes the consciousness of most Englishmen. The

vagaries of intra-Union relationships, the quandry of establishing a

 

1This theme is examined in Wallace Notestein, The Scot in History:
A Study of the Interplay of Character and History, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1947, chap. XXIX.

 

84

85

viable national group role within the United Kingdom, is of little or no
concern to the majority of the English.1 To most south of the border,
"England" is synonymous with "Britain", and the supreme law of the United
Kingdom is referred to as the "English Constitution". It may or may not
be all right for the Scots or the Welsh to establish their own parliament
to deal with local affairs, but it is unthinkable for many Englishmen to
consider a parallel institution for England. To many, the Westminster
Parliament is the English parliament.

Like many other nations which have undergone fundamental constitu-
tional change, Scotland has experienced a protracted internal struggle
to square old perspectives with new realities. The incomplete integra-
tion of Scotland and England has left a residue of the past on the face
of Scotland's contemporary consciousness. And since the image of Scotland's
present is far less satisfying to many Scots than the image of her past,
frequently bitter debates have raged over the question of Scotland's
proper national role.

The story of nationalism in Scotland is interesting in its own
right. But we trace the outlines of this history in this chapter for
two reasons which relate to this study of Scottish nationalism. First,
a skeletal chronology serves a useful "stage-setting" function. Because
the present derives generally from.the past, it is important to have a
clear grasp of what has gone before. Although we can provide only the

barest essentials of this history here, the works cited in this chapter

 

1An examination of the memoirs of Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan,
and Harold Wilson, to name three examples of contemporary British politi-
cians who ought to be aware of national group tensions, reveals no
awareness of Scottish nationalism beyond the occasional mention of
nationalist candidates in by-elections.

I'I'

86
can flesh out the story to the fullest.1 And second, we relate this
story to clarify the depth of Scotland's identity problem. The changing
circumstances within which Scotland struggles for national survival have
necessitated an on-going redefinition of national identity. We hope to

gain some insight into this recurrent crisis.

Nations which undergo fundamental readjustments of sovereignty gen-
erally possess variegated histories of nationalism.since each shift in
the legal status of the nation will alter the character of demands made
on its behalf. The process of nation-building--entailing a shift of
loyalties from.one entity to another--involves such a baSic readjustment.
Further alterations checker and enliven the quality of patriotic and
nationalist'movements.

Scotland has experienced two such significant modifications in her
sovereign status: national unification, culminating in the eleventh
century, and the union with England and Wales, occurring at the beginning
of the eighteenth century. Attempts to alter the status quo thus estab-
lished have constituted the nationalist movement in Scotland for the past
250 years. But the two changes in sovereignty (particularly the second)
remain the starting point for any analysis of nationalism in Scotland.

Widely separated in time and in surface details, the two events
share several characteristics. First, both changes enlarged the size of
the formal political community. The first created the nation of Scotland
from a relatively heterogeneous cluster of peoples with diverse back-
grounds and custmms while the second formally joined that nation with

England. Second, both changes resulted from outside political pressures

 

1The two most useful histories of Scottish nationalism are Coupland,
op. cit., and, a more recent account, Hanham, op. cit.

Ill

. .
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87

as well as internal integrative trends. A unified Scotland could better
resist military threats from.Scandinavia and England; a unified Great
Britain could better deal with the economic and political challenge of
France. Third, the changes were each gradual, the first lasting nearly
five centuries, the second spanning one century. Finally, while each
was punctuated with violence, the two changes were not effectuated in the _
main by violence. These latter two characteristics are important devia-
tions from the patterns found in twentieth century nationalist movements

in Africa and Asia.1

 

These two modifications of sovereignty were both cause and effect
of changed attitudes. For example, the uniting of the Picts, the Scots,
the Britons, and the Angles, a process whose culmination was reached when
King Duncan ascended to an all-Scotland throne in 1034, could not have
been possible without an evolving sense of interdependence and like-
mindedness among the four peoples. This was partly due to the functional
exigencies of external defense, but also to the increased inter-communi-
cation brought about by the spread of Christianity and the growing
campatibility of customs and habits.2 According to Wilson, "nation-
building is the social process or processes by which national conscious-
ness appears in certain groups and which, through a more or less institu-
tionalized social structure, act to attain political autonomy for their

"3

society. This process of institutionalization in early Scotland pro-

vided for the first time a common focus for the four peoples. A single

 

le. David A. Wilson, "Nation-Building and Revolutionary War," in
Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit.

2J. D. Mackie, A History of Scotland, Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmonds-
worth, 1964, pp. 33-41.

 

3Wilson, in Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit., p. 84.

1.4

pm»

\

88
elite, a single set of symbols, a unified governmental structure, all
served to accelerate the rate of attitude change and to further mold the

self-identity or "national consciousness" of the nascent Scottish nation.

Early Nationalism in Scotland

Before discussing the Act of Union as the second--and in the Scottish
context the more important--modification of national sovereignty, we
need to understand the events surrounding the early development of
nationalism in Scotland. For although the circumstances of nationalism
have changed since the earliest days, the symbols and the fundamental
problem.of dealing with a powerful England have not.

As Hanham has noted, "Scottish nationalism.is as old as the Scottish

"1

nation. But early patriotism, according to Notestein,

was not rooted in reverence for old institutions, nor was it

love for Caledonia stern and wild. It was as yet little more

than a passionate dislike of intruding enemies and devotion

to warriors who had fought against they: It was not yet emo-

tion sublimated into something higher.
The expression of patriotic allegiance to the nation, in song and deed,
can be traced back to the beginnings of Scottish national consciousness.
The early peak of this expression, however, occurred in the first part
of the fourteenth century during the Scottish wars of independence.
Edward the First of England, having failed to win control of Scotland
first through a royal marriage and then through his intercession in the

selection of a new Scottish monarch, turned to military means to extend

English hegemony over the whole of the British Isles. He defeated the

 

1Hanham, op. cit., p. 64.

2Notestein, op. cit., p. 73.

3Cf.‘M. P. Ramsay, The Freedom of the Scots from Early Times till its
Eclipse in 1707: Displayed in Statements of Our Forefathers Who Loved and

Served Scotland, United Scotland, Edinburgh, 1945.

 

:5

.

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Luca

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van.“

89

Scots in 1296 and declared himself King of Scotland. But the Scots
resisted English rule and support grew for the rebel leader, William
'Wallace. Wallace enjoyed widespread support among both common people
and the nobility. But the ensuing armed struggles ended in Wallace's
defeat and death in 1305, whereupon Robert Bruce took up the standard of
Scottish nationalism. Bruce was extremely popular and a claimant to the
Scottish throne. At the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314 Bruce won a
decisive victory over the English. Although conflicts continued after
this, Bannockburn assured Scottish independence for the next three
centuries and continues to serve as a focal point for the Scottish spirit
of independence.

These events inspired the patriotic imagination of Scots. Poets
John Barbour and Blind Harry produced works which apotheosized Bruce and
‘Wallace, placing them highest in the pantheon of Scots heroes. But ear-
lier, in 1320, the Declaration of Arbroath became the first and most
important document of Scottish nationalism: Urging the Pope to recognize
Scottish independence, it read in part,

...so long as an hundred remain alive we are'minded never a

whit to bow beneath the yoke of English dominion. It is not

for glory, riches or honours that we fight: it is for lib-

erty alone, thI liberty which no good man relinquishes but

with his life. .

Over the next three hundred years Scottish independence was inter-
Inittantly threatened by England. In 1513 at the Battle of Flodden Field
the English inflicted a serious blow to the Scots by defeating them on

the battlefield and killing their king. But the long-standing alliance

‘between.Scotland and France preserved Scottish independence for at least

another century.

 

1Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 66.

grad

thrc

90

It is ironic that the Scots lost their national autonomy through a
gradual process which began when their king fell heir to the English
throne. Shortly after James VI of Scotland assumed the title James I
of England in 1603, he asserted his desire to effect the union of the
two nations. In his first speech to the English Parliament he expressed
his hope that

...no man will be so unreasonable as to think that I am a

Christian King under the Gospel should be a polygamist and

husband to two wives; that I being the Head should have a
divided and monstrous Body.1

.And James did achieve a modicum of unity between the two countries. A
common nationality was proclaimed, a common flag was devised--whose name,
the "Union Jack," honored the integrationist king, and there was increased
communication and trade between Scotland and England. But the repeal of
the Border Laws between the two countries was the only significant legis-
lative achievement during James' reign. The door to increased unification

'had been cracked, but the formal Union of Parliaments was not to occur

until the next century.

The Act of Union

After 1690, the Scottish Parliament enjoyed a brief period of sub-
stantial freedom from monarchial control. The crown had declined as a
symbol of unity and the long-standing differences between England and
Scotland, in commerce, religion, and Jacobitism, reasserted their polar-
izing influence. The Scots were eager to reassert their independence,
but in 1700 King William expressed his intention to find "some happy
expedient for making England and Scotland one people." In 1703 the

Scottish Parliament passed three acts which went against the hopes of

 

1Quoted in Mackie, op. cit., p. 191.

.
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91

‘William and his successor, Anne. The "Wine Act" declared Scotland's
commercial independence, the "Act anent Peace and War" was meant to pre-
serve an autonomous foreign policy, and the "Act of Security" threatened
the total dissolution of the Union unless political, religious, and
commercial freedoms were guaranteed by England.

Piqued by the audacity of the Scottish Parliament, the English
chamber retaliated with the "Alien Act" which would have deprived Scots
of the rights of natural-born Englishmen.and penalized their commerce
unless they agreed to Union under a Protestant monarch. The Act also
empowered the monarch to appoint a commission to negotiate a permanent
union. The commission met, drafted Articles of Union, and presented them
to the two parliaments. In 1707, resolving their differences in the inter-
ests of commercial harmony, the two parliaments ratified the Act of Union.1

The main provisions of the Act were (1) "the two kingdoms of England
and Scotland shall...be united into one kingdom.by the name of Great
Britain," with a common flag, a common great seal, and a common coinage;
(2) "the united kingdom of Great Britain [shall] be represented by one
and the same parliament" in which the Scots are to send l6 peers to join
the 190 Englishmen in the House of Lords and 45 commoners to join the 513
IEnglish MgP.s in the Commons; (3) the royal succession shall be vested in
the House of Hanover, with "all papists...exc1uded from and forever in-
capable to inherit, possess, or enjoy the imperial crown"; (4) all subjects
of Great Britain shall have full freedom of trade and navigation, and
'Vthe same allowances, encouragements, and drawbacks," and the same "cus-

toms and duties on import and export"; and (5) all "courts now in being

 

1Cf. George S. Pryde, Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day, Thomas
iNelson.and Sons Ltd., London, 1962, pp; 51-2; and P. Hume Brown, History of
mg, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1909, vol. II, pp. 89-125,

92
‘within the kingdom of Scotland do remain," free from.any appeal to any
EngliSh court.1 A separate act was passed to guarantee the protestant
religion and Presbyterian church government in Scotland.

The objectives of those backing the Union were mixed. Whether or
not it was "primarily an anti-papalist coalition,"2 one of its aims was
to guarantee that Catholics would never return to the throne of Scotland
(and now of England).3 And since it was assumed that "prosperity could
be attained by one country only at the expense of another,"4 commercial
interests wanted to see an Anglo-Scottish commonmarket.5 The "emulation
of English ways and achievements" was thought by many to offer an
alternative to Scotland's economic stagnation.6 These and other objec-
tives were not universally shared, but they do stand out as significant
1motivations for different groups.

Like all great settlements, the Act of Union was a compromise.
Scotland gave up her parliament and sacrificed any notions she might have

‘had about a federal kingdom” In return she received military security

 

1The bulk of the Act of Union is reprinted in Stephen B. Baxter (ed.),
Basic Documents of English History, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1968,
pp. 168-72.

2Douglas Young, "A Sketch History of Scottish Nationalism," in
Neil MacCormick (ed.), The Scottish Debate: Essays on Scottish National-
jygg, Oxford University Press, London, 1970, p. 7.

3Robert Rait and George S. Pryde, Scotland, Ernest Benn Ltd., London,
1934, pp. 74-5.

4Ibid., p. 72.

5Hume Brown suggests that "the nation was ripe for a larger scope
than.was possible under existing conditions. The initiative, the enter-
prise, the intelligence were there in large degree; and only the oppor-
tunity was needed for her to take her place and hold her own in the
rivalry of nations.” [0p. cit., p. 72.]

6R. H. Campbell, Scotland Since 1707: The Rise of an Industrial
Society§ Barnes and Noble, Inc., New York, 1965, pp. 3-5,

93
and broadened economic opportunities. England gave up her exclusiveness
and her desires for a completely Anglicized Scotland. In return she
received a strengthened position vis-a-vis France and a guarantee for the
Hanoverian succession. Despite the unitary form of government created
by the Act of Union, each country retained its distinctiveness. The
religious and legal systems of both countries were maintained, thus pre-
serving significant institutional symbols of separateness.

And yet, the Act was met with a great deal of trepidation in Scot-
land.1 England was still remembered as a frequent enemy and the exces-
ses of Edward I were particularly fresh in the memories of many Scots.
Many thought the Act meant not a co-equal partnership with England, but
a sell-out to England. And this attitude was fueled from England itself.

Even today English historians can write of the Act of Union that
henceforward Scotland was to be represented both in the English

House of Lords and House of Commons, and Scottish members were

give? the right to vote on all questions whether domestic or

not. [My empha31s]

If? Inany prominent Englishmen failed to pay even lip-service to the
notZion of co-equal partnership, it is not surprising that Scots have
lc’tl£§ 'been suspicious of the Act of Union and of the relationship it estab-
ljcsilleed.

It is interesting to note the differing perspectives from which the

‘A(:t: ‘Vvas viewed in Scotland and England. For the Scots, the Act was
Clea~1:~1y of momentous importance. It necessitated a fundamental recon-

s
ideration of the role Scotland was to play in the world. It was clear

 

t

Ilia"t: Scotland could no longer challenge England's economic and strategic
\
‘Vfiajlh 1Therewas organized opposition (cf. Brown, op. cit., pp. 118-22) as

as the spontaneous acts of street mobs (cf. infra, chap. V, p. 176).

2Quoted in Mackie, op. cit., p. 262.

‘

94
hegemony. Scottish commercial leaders became convinced that the revital-
ization of Scotland's economy required political as well as economic
union with England. But this process involved a major shift of focus.
Before 1707 the relevant universe of national activity was the inter-
national system, but after the Act of Union new limits were imposed on
Scotland. It was almost as if a new barrier was built, with London its
keystone, further isolating Scotland from the rest of the world.

But for the English, the Act represented merely a kind of house-
keeping function. It removed annoying mercantile and political barriers
and improved trade relations between Scotland and England. But while it
involved a major constitutional change and a reconstituting of Parliament,
it hardly altered England's position in the international order or the
political elite's perception of England's role in that order. To most
Englishmen the real significance of the Act of Union was that it

achieved the annexation of useful economic and political territory to

the north. Of course, many Scots had a similar opinion about the sig-

n1 ficance of the Act, and to that extent it was opposed in Scotland.

After 1707 the character of nationalism in Scotland was changed.

Altl'lough the new union was generally unpopular on both sides of the bor-

dre (even the English soon wondered whether union with the sullen Scots

w .
as worth the trouble),1 aristocratic and mercantile interests supported

Lt ‘ Opposition to the union was not the same thing as nationalism, but

t
he two were (and still are) closely related. Hence, with the Act of

U
Dion, nationalism lost its edge of respectability. Nationalism and

p
o 11tical realities in Scotland were no longer mutually reinforcing.

tel? 1707, as Rait and Pryde have noted, nationalists "were forced to

\

‘

1Cf. Brown, op. cit., p. 145.

 

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95
Frequently they became

become either sentimentalists or conspirators."
both.

Eighteenth Century Nationalism
But there was little organized activity in opposition to the Union.

Pamphleteers like Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun were active in denouncing

the new relationship just as they had strenuously opposed the Act of

And in 1713 a Scottish attempt to repeal the Act was nar-

Union in 1707.
Even commercial interests were

rowly defeated in the House of Lords.
disappointed since the expected economic improvements did not immediately

:materialize. But large-scale opposition did not develop for almost a

century .
The series of Jacobite Risings in 1708, 1715, 1719, and especially

157li5, while of little importance to Scotland's overall development, did
In attempt-

significantly influence the course of nationalism in Scotland.

21115; to restore the Catholic House of Stewart to a regenerated Scottish

throne, the Jacobites polarized Scotland and confused the nationalist
cause with the explosive religious issue. Calling the Rebellion of 1745
‘1 "£;reat watershed" in the history of Scottish nationalism, Hanham asserts

1:11ait;
by raising the bogy of Celtic domination over Anglo-Saxon Scot-

land it drove the Lowlands unequivocally into support for the
It made the crushing of the Highland clans inevitable.

Union.
And it tainted opposition to the Union of 1707 with Jacobitism”

Arld McLaren writes of the rebellion's after-effects:

With the suppression of the old Highland feudal system of jus-
tice, with the forbidding of the Highland dress and the right

of highlanders to carry arms and, most of all, with the

\
1Rait and Pryde, op. cit , p. 87.

 

2Hanham, op. cit., p. 67.

 

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96
evictions of the Highland people, the old Gaelic dream of a
Gaelic Scotland was finished. It truly was the 'end of an
auld sang.'1
From this point onward the nationalist cause evoked romantic images
of the Bonnie Prince Charles and the glorious struggles of the "Forty-
Five" Rebellion. But is also made the separatist argument even less
respectable than it had been, and it served as genesis for the long—
standing impression among many Scots that the separatist demands were a
Catholic stratagem.2
By the middle of the eighteenth century the restoration of Scottish
independence seemed a hopeless and foolhardy goal. But soon two import-
aunt literary figures, Robert Burns (1759-1796) and Walter Scott (1771-
1£332), were to redirect and to reinvigorate Scottish nationalisms Burns,
nflht>se birthdate is the closest thing the Scots have to a national holiday,
did much to revive the spirit (if not the substance) of Scottish inde-
pendence. In his poems he glorified the Scottish past and carried on the
Patriotic traditions established by Barbour and Blind Harry:
Scots, wha hae wi' Wallace bled,
Scots, wham Bruce has aften led,
Welcome to your gory bed,
Or to victorie.
Now's the day, and now's the hour:
See the front 0' battle lour!
See approach proud Edwagd's power--
Chains and slaverie!

writing in a Scots dialect he did much to shape, he helped to legitimize

the cultural distinctiveness of Scotland.
\_

:LE) 1Maray MCLaren, The Scots, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1951, pp.
‘20; cf. also Brown, op. cit., pp. 325-30.

2This impression no doubt was strengthened by the drawing of paral-

lels with. the home rule movement in Ireland.

3Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 70.

 

in
th.
Vi:

97

But Burns was not much of a political agitator. For the most part
he showed little interest in separatist cults or conspiratorial activi-
ties. The one significant exception was his association with the
Society of the Friends of the People, perhaps the first organized
nationalist group after the Act of Union. The Society, led by Thomas
Muir, demanded universal manhood suffrage and separate parliaments for 5
both Ireland and Scotland. The Society was soon outlawed and in 1793 Muir
was deported to Australia. Muir's trial inspired Burns to write "Scots,

Wha Hae."1 But the main significance of Robert Burns to nationalism

 

 

 

at the turn of the nineteenth century was in the new respectability he
gave the concept by turning its force from the political arena to the
literary realm.

Walter Scott's writings continued this trend. Perhaps more than any
other individual, Scott, through his novels and ballads was responsible
:ft>1: Scotland's emerging image as a land of craggy beauty, of kilts and
1>élgglaipes, and of highland moors. Hanham writes:

Scott's main achievement was the creation of a new vision
of Scotland, the Scotland of the modern tourist industry.
Scottish story, Scottish dress, Scottish castles, Scottish
scenery, blended together in a romantic vision of a Scotland
inhabited by chiefs and clansmen, over which Scott himself,
the wizard of the north, in some way presided. This was the
‘vision which Scott himself encouraged Edinburgh to live up to
in 1822, when King George IV visited Scotland, the first mon-
arch to do so for more than a century. The gentry dressed
themselves up in fancy tartans and glengarry bonnets, the Lord
humor of London wore a splendid tartan concoction, and even the
'Ring appeared in Highland dress. The visit was an immense suc-
cess, established the kilt as one of the dresses of the gentry,
and gave a boost to the woolen manufacturers who from now on-
‘wards produced ever more elaborate books of tartans. Indeed,

a tartan cult was established which spread across Europe and the
world and came to symbolize one aspect of Scottish culture.
\

1Douglas Young in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 7.

2Hanham, op. cit., p. 70.

9.9;.

Laglt
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98
But unlike Burns, Scott was a convinced unionist. While Burns often
took literary swipes at the English and concentrated on glories which
derived from past battles with the English, Scott was almost exclusively
preoccupied with qualities inherent to the Scots. Becoming a major
spokesman for "Tory romantics," he was never accepted as a nationalist
leader. The main significance of Walter Scott is that he increased the
movement away from political nationalism and into channels which the
established elite found more acceptable. At the same time he helped to

build a national mythology which was to shape the Scottish consciousness

for the next century and a half.1

Nineteenth Century Nationalism

The era of Burns and Scott represented a kind of literary renais-
sairice in Scotland. It was a period during which the focus of literary
attention was shifted from England to Scotland, which claimed not only
the major writers of the day but also the major literary journals
(Edinburgh Review and Blackwood's Magazine).2 But the Scottish literary

tradition of the early nineteenth century had more flavor of a regional
tlléirl a.national literature. It was during this period the term "North
Bri t61in" came to be widely substituted for Scotland. And the almost
't()‘:£11. separation between literary ideals and political realities assured
a non—political phase for nationalism throughout the early part of the
century.

This is not to suggest, however, that political nationalism did not
\
1For a good sketch of the central roles played by Burns and Scott in

 

the shaping of Scottish themes in literature, cf. Kurt Wittig, The Scottish

mtion in Literature, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1958, chap. vii.

2This "Athenian Age" is described by Pryde, op. cit., chap. xv; and
I\Iotestein, op. cit., chap. xxii.

persist.
Ancng 0t
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99
persist. Between 1745 and 1828 a manager for Scotland sat in Westminster.
Among other things his job was to see to patronage for Scots and to
shape legislation affecting Scots. By tradition this position was given
to Scots, but in 1828 the incumbent Tories could reputedly find no qual-
ified Tories in Whig Scotland to take on the job, so the office was uncer-
emoniously abolished. This caused resentment in Scotland and seemed to
vindicate those Scots who had been complaining loud and long of Scottish
neglect.

By 1850 this resentment found a leader in the Reverend James Begg of 5

 

the Free Church. According to Hanham, Begg "wanted to promote a regen-
exration of Scottish life in all its aspects" by reconstituting Scottish
government and by starting a "national revival" of the spirit.1 He
proposed the establishment'of a special Scottish Office with a cabinet-
leaxrel Secretary of State for Scotland and he wanted to increase the num-
bers of Scottish M.P.s in Parliament. If these failed to solve the prob-
]uenml of Scottish neglect, he would support the creation of a special
Scottish parliament to deal with Scottish affairs.

.Although as Hanham admits Begg did not have much direct impact on
t11€3 ¢development of Scottish nationalism, his ideas were picked up and
developed by others. James Grant was one who extended Begg's ideas and
Produced articles detailing Scottish neglect and listing her grievnaces
against England. These grievances included an alleged loss of persons in
sl‘j-liled occupations to England, an inequitable revenue/expenditure ratio
in SCotland, and supposed heraldic irregularities on flags and coinage.

As a result of this political agitation, as well as the "Tory roman-

tiéi sm" made popular earlier, The National Association for the Vindication
\

1Hanham, op. cit., p. 74.

n ~;:tl
Sage»... .

311:3? n
he took
0' the I
fore: dE

100
of Scottish Rights was founded in 1853. Scorned by most prominent
Scottish politicians, according to Ferguson, "it was warmly backed by
most of the town councils in Scotland, by several of the county commis-
sions of supply, and by many professional bodies."1 Moreover, he
suggests, the grievances of the association--paralleling those outlined
by Begg and Grant, both of whom.were members--seemed justified.

The outcome of numerous well-attended public meetings was over
fifty petitions to the government, demanding that Scotland
should no longer be left to the ministrations of an overworked
lord advocate loosely supervised by the home secretary, that a
Scottish secretary should be restored to head a reformed and
separate administration, that Scotland should receive a larger
share of parliamentary representation (71 M.P.s as against 53),
and that she should enjoy a more just proportion of United
Kingdom expenditure.

But it was several years before any action was taken on these de-

mands. Although Conservative legislation was introduced in Parliament

111 1878 to create an Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, it was not
taritzil 1885, after the Liberals committed themselves to the concept of a
53czc>ttish Secretary, that a bill authorizing a Secretary of State for
Scotland was passed.3 Also, Scotland's parliamentary representation was
increased to 60 in 1868 and to 72 in 1885. Hence, with these developments,
Seotland did "obtain some of the substance, without the form, of home rule."4

\ ,

D 1William Ferguson,"Scotland, 1689 to the Present," vol. IV in Gordon
Ronaldson, The Edinburgh History of Scotland, 4 vols., Oliver and Boyd,
dinburgh, 1968, p. 320.

21bid.

t: 3"...[I]t was understood that the Scottish secretary was to be a

t;t‘114y responsible minister; his staff became the 'Scottish Office' and

0: took charge (as nominal vice-president of the Privy Council Committee)

150 the most important department--that of education. At long last, there-

11 1:13, definite provision had been made for the conduct of Scottish busi-
e38 within the Union." [Pryde, op. cit., p. 208.]

l 4R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
936, p. 130.

 

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101

The Home Rule Movement

After 1885 the nationalist cause in Scotland took on new life. A
key factor in this revival was the Scottish Home Rule Association, formed
in 1886 by a coalition of Scottish Liberals, Labour leaders, and Radicals.
One achievement of the SHRA was the steady production of a lively pam-
phlet literature. A close examination of this literature reveals that
an even more significant achievement of the organization was that it
brought together a collection of nationalists with widely divergent back-
grounds and ideas.

Hanham suggests that the home rule movement of the late nineteenth
century consisted of five major groups, each contributing to the pamphlet-
eesring efforts of the SHRA. First, he points to the right wing aristo-
crats, many of whom blamed Scotland's general malaise on the Union. Lord

Bute complained that the Union seemed

to do nothing now but prevent any public Scotch business of

a Parliamentary kind being done at all, to place what is done
or left undone in the hands of English authorities, whereby
inter'alia, public money is unfairly spent (look at the fact
that there is not in Scotland a single arsenal or harbour of
refuge, and that the lives of the Shetlanders were sacrificed
only a short time ago to the absence of a telegraph), to sub—
ject litigants and others to enormous expense in taking their
business to London to be managed by lawyers who do not under-
stand their law, and to drain a lot of the best people and a
lot of money out of the country.1

Bute, a Catholic, thought a national legislature ought to exist for

SC:Otland even if it were controlled by Radicals.
Second, Hanham notes the continuing influence of the "Tory roman-
tics .H

Outstanding in this group was Theodore Napier whose dedicated

activities on behalf of the nationalist cause (petitioning Queen Victoria
\

<1, 1Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 84. Hanhamis discussion of the
lversity of the SHRA appears on pp. 83-90.

on the 1::
lishing .
and alli
otic~in

.
£52133}.

102

on the misuse of Scottish names, wearing early Highland dress, and pub-
lishing a Jacobite journal) apparently embarrassed some of his friends
and allies. Nationalists in this group were driven primarily by patri-
otic--in many cases Jacobite--symbols of Scotland's past. Although the
central position of the romantics was challenged by the 1880's, the emo-
tional content of their appeal sustained them.as a potent force in the
movement.

Third, there was a group of lawyers and businessmen.whose views were
generally to the left of the aristocrats and "Tory romantics." Although
moved in part by nostalgic ideas, the main motivational factors of this
group were utilitarian and economic. The external catalyst in creating
their nationalist views seams to have been the Irish Home Rule movement.

Fourth, Hanham identifies a left-wing radical strain emerging from
the home rule debate of the late 1880's. The best representative of this
group is John Morrison Davidson whose Christian socialist temperament
and "frantic denunciations of kings, bishops, and lords" helped to make
his rather traditional nationalist sentiments acceptable to the left.

Finally, on the left appeared an outright working-class position in
the SHRA. Led by such men as Keir Hardie, R. B. Cunningham-Graham, and
Robert Smillie, the working-class movement in late nineteenth century
Scotland was overlaid with patriotic and emotional themes of nationalism.
Unquestionably this was due in part to the uneven impact the Union was
alleged to have on various social classes in Scotland, but it was also
due to the realization that if home rule were achieved, a recently indus-
trialized Scotland might well be controlled by a working-class party.

As early as 1888, Hardie announced publicly: "I am strongly in favor of

Home Rule for Scotland, being convinced that until we have a Parliament

state

social
ii'tpar
“wads g

. . h
PM .
Irklfllt

103
of our own we cannot obtain the many and great reforms on which I believe
the people of Scotland have set their hearts."1

But it was in the years after the late 1880's that significant sup—
port was mounted in favor of home rule. An alliance of labour leaders
and "home rule" Liberal M.P.s, led by William Gladstone, gained strength
and produced what was nearly the "great watershed" sought by Scottish
nationalists.

While the inspiration for home rule in Scotland was clearly home-
grown, the major impetus for the movement at the end of the nineteenth
century was the "Irish Question." Like Scotland and Wales, Ireland had
long lived uneasily in the unitary British systemt And like the Scots and
Welsh, the Irish had long lists of grievances against the English. But
unlike the others, the Irish found themselves polarized against the English
on the issue of religion. The official protestantism of the British
state clashed with the majority Catholicism of the Irish. The economic,
social, and political discrimination felt by Irish Catholics dwarfs by
comparison whatever difficulties Scottish Presbyterians endured at the
hands of English Episcopalians. While the Constitution recognized the
validity of both the Scottish and English churches (the monarch was the
head of both), it specifically excluded and discriminated against

Catholics.2

 

1From Hardie's Mid-Lanark election address, quoted in Young, in
MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 9.

2One example of the kind of legal discrimination the Irish had to
endure was the Penal Law of 1695 which virtually drove the Catholic Church
underground in Ireland. Catholics were forbidden to vote, to hold offices,
to bear arms, or to enter into the professions. Catholic clergy was out-
lawed and Catholic schools were barred. Edmund Burke thought the law
"well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment and degradation of a peo-
ple, and the debasement in them.af human nature itself." Cf. Donald S.
Connery, The Irish, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968, p. 24.

104

Life in nineteenth century Ireland offered few amenities. After
1845 the Potato Blight caused a famine of immense proportions, resulting
in hundreds of thousands of deaths and massive emigration. By 1900
Ireland's papulation had shrunk to only half of what it was at mid—century.
The Irish, caught between the Scylla of purposive discrimination and
the Charybdis of natural disaster, wanted revolutionary change. The
Irish home rulers, led by Charles Stewart Parnell and John Redmond,
eventually resorted to widespread violence to achieve their goal of inde-
pendence. In the end, of course, they did win their goal for most of
Ireland, but the resistance to home rule that the Irish had aroused and
the bad taste left by the violent tactics of the Irish nationalists prob-
ably caused the failure of the home rule movements in Scotland and Wales.

The chances for "home rule all round" had seemed greatly improved
in 1885 when William.G1adstone, the Scottish leader of the Liberal Party
in Parliament, was converted to the notion of self-rule for Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales. Gladstone apparently hoped that Conservative Party
leaders would see the inevitability of the Irish home rule question and
follow suit. Instead, the Tories remained firmly opposed to all forms of
home rule and anti-home rule Liberals defected from Gladstone's leader-
ship. Parnell, too, who controlled 86 of the 101 Irish votes in Parlia-
ment, thought that the Tories would support home rule. He even urged
English and Scottish Catholics to vote Conservative in the 1885 general
election. But the public disclosure of Gladstone's conversion to home
rule only seemed to strengthen the traditional Conservative opposition to
home rule.

Remaining firmly against all forms of home rule, the Tories voted

against Gladstone's first home rule bill in 1886 (which would have

105

removed Irish M.P.s from Parliament) and his second bill in 1893 (which
would have simply reduced Irish representation to 80 M.P.s while setting
up a separate Irish assembly). The first bill was defeated in the Commons
by Liberal defections; the second was defeated in the Lords. But if the
whole political procedure temporarily dashed the hopes of the Irish home
rulers, it permanently disabled the Liberal Party which, rife with divi-
sions and defections, went into a long decline from.which it has never
recovered. In the 1886 general election the Liberals split into Gladston-
ian and anti-Gladstonian factions, the latter allying themselves with the
Conservatives until 1912. Liberal representation in Parliament fell from
325 in 1885 to just 187 in 1886 (from 57 down to 39 in Scotland). Clearly
Gladstone was having little success in achieving home rule for Scotland
by concentrating on Ireland first.

In the meantime, the first motion specifically for Scottish home
rule was introduced in the House of Commons in 1889 by G. B. Clark, a
Liberal M.P. from.Gaithness who also happened to be vice-president of the
Scottish Labour Party. The motion lost by 200 to 79 (even Scots M.P.s
voted against it 22 to 19) but the measure did better when re-introduced
in 1890, losing by a vote of 181 to 141 (with Scots voting in favor this
time, 26 to 15).1

In 1881 Clark introduced the first "home rule all round" motion and,
while there was little initial support for it, finally a Commons majority
of‘180 to 170 (38 to 20 in Scotland) vote for it in 1884. Only the Tory-
controlled House of Lords prevented the enactment of the measure.

Irish home rule was finally voted by Parliament in 1914, but despite

Asquith's promise that his administration would treat the Irish bill as

 

1Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., pp. 9-10.

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106
the "first installment of home rule all—round,"l there was little serious
consideration of self-rule for Scotland and Wales after WOrld War I. A
Scottish home rule bill, which was in its second reading when hostilities
in Europe began, was never revived. Irish independence resulted in the
permanent exodus from Westminster of more than 80 pro-home rule M.P.s,
dispelling any hope that a majority favoring home rule for Scotland could
be found again.

The Irish question had raised emotions to a high pitch. While it
seems unlikely that, as Rait and Pryde contend, "the demand for Scottish
Home Rule was largely a synthetic and sympathetic response to the Irish
agitation,"2 it is clear that the two parallel movements did affect one
another. For Scottish nationalism the main implication of the achieve-
ment of Irish independence was that separatism was totally discredited.
The violence in Ireland provided an inhospitable atmosphere for a dis-
passioned examination of the Scottish situation. Hence, although the
diverse characteristics of Irish and Scottish nationalism now seem
obvious, the parallels were simply too close. As a result, widespread
support for Scottish home rule disappeared for a generation. Being less
militant (and perhaps less driven by circumstances) than the Irish, the
Scots found their desires for home rule thwarted.

And yet it would be a distortion to belittle the efforts of Scottish
home rulers during this period. After all, they had witnessed a Commons
majority in favor of Scottish home rule. And they had achieved their
objective of establishing a permanent Secretaryship of State for Scot-

land. Moreover, in 1894 the Commons created the Scottish Grand Committee,

 

1Ferguson, op. cit., p. 348.

2Rait and Pryde, op. cit., p. 129.

107
which consisted of all Scots M.P.s plus fifteen others added to maintain
a partisan balance similar to that in the whole House. The SGC was both
an alternative to a Scottish parliament and a means of relieving the
legislative load of Parliament. Although the SGC was firmly opposed by
the Tories as a revolutionary change, its main significance was proce-e
dural and symbolic since it could only deal with the preliminaries of
non-controversial Scottish bills, leaving final authority to the English

1 The Committee disappeared during

controlled majority in Westminster.
the Tory administrations of 1895-1907, but has been (with some exten-
sions of authority and function and changes in formal structure) a perman-

ent fixture of Parliament ever since.

Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Scottish Renaissance

While the onset of World War I may have doused any real hope for
Scottish home rule, it hardly dampened nationalist enthusiasm" In fact,
during the interwar period Scots engaged in some of the liveliest and
most colorful nationalist debates in their history. The issues were
mostly those which had been aired in earlier debates, but now there was
organized dissention in nationalist ranks and the intensity of inter-
necine battles sometimes rivaled that of the anti-English struggle itself.

At the risk of oversimplifying complex internal squabbles, it will
be useful to isolate two broad groups of nationalists during the interwar
period. The first emerged from the patriotic literary tradition of Burns
and Scott but generally espoused explicit and far more extermist political
views than either of theme The second was a group with more nearly prag-

matic views, concerned more with the instrumentalities of achieving home

 

10f. Kellas, op. cit., p. 175.

108
rule than with the political purity of the movement. But if this group
was more firmly rooted in the current realities of Scottish politics, the
literary group was responsible for an important revival of the Scottish
spirit.
The main figure in the often quixotic literary group (referred to

by Hanham as the "fundamentalists"1) was Rauraidh Erskine of Marr who had
been active in the Scottish Home Rule Association in the 1880's and who

was the publisher of the literary review Guth na Bliadhna. Erskine was

 

the main impetus behind the Gaelic political movement which began at the
turn of the century. Hanham identifies a strain of eighteenth century
rationalism in Erskine's thought "which made him wish to create a new
Scottish political system 92 novo. He had come to the conclusion that
the existing system.was a bad one, that the culture of the people had
been debased, and that it must be re-created on a Celtic rather than an
Anglo-Saxon basis."2 Heavily influenced by the rising tide of national-
ism in Europe, especially after the war, Erskine raised the issue of
national self-determination for Scotland. If the Hungarians, Bohemians,
and Irish could claim.sovereignty for their national groups, why not the
Scots? He supported even the national aspirations of the Russians in the
1917 Revolution:
Praise to the Bolsheviks! Honour to the Revolutionaries!

It is the Russian Revolution that has set the Chancelleries of

Europe by the ears, and now bids fair to inscribe in large and

indelible letters on the pages of the great Book of Universal

National Rights certain priceless principles....Self-determin-

ation for all nations....The fabric of the old order is crash-

ing about our ears. Over an angry sea of discord, strewn with

the wreckage of foundered kingdoms and systems of rule, there
rises, in splendid majesty, the sun of Democracy...Hail to

 

1Hanham, op. cit., chap. 6.

2Ibid., p. 136.

109

Democracy! Let us cast from.us our old wet and tattered polit-

ical rags as we should do sodden garments, and bask in the

warmth that the kindly luminary provides us with, rejoicing in

the return of the day of Reason and of Right.

Erskine developed an image of Scotland as an oppressed national group
which by right based in historical and cultural imperatives and according
to the provisions of the League of Nations ought to be liberated.

But Erskine's main organizational contribution was the role he played
in forming (with Thomas Gibson) the Scots National League in 1921. The
League's monthly publication, the Scots Independent, soom became a major
organ of nationalist writings. The basic aim of the SNL was to press for
a scheme of Scottish self-government built on the concept that the
"relationship between Scotland and England must be mutually agreed upon
between those nations acting upon mutual recognition of each other as an
independent nation, and with equal powers."2 Complete independence was
Erskine's goal and he condoned any tactics to reach that goal.

A second major figure in the literary group was the essayist and
poet Christopher M. Grieve, better known to the world as Hugh MacDiarmid.
Among all those who were responsible for the "Scottish literary renaissance,"
including such notable writers as R. B. Cunninghaerraham, Compton
Mackenzie, Eric Linklater, Lewis Grassic Gibbon, and John Maclean, Hanham
singles out MacDiarmid as "the one real man of genius" in the lot and

3 But he played only

a "prophet" of contemporary Scottish nationalism.
a marginal role in organizations like the SNL.

MacDiarmid's main influence was cultural. He once said that

 

1Guth na Bliadhna, XV, 1918, pp. 97-8, quoted in ibid., pp. 136-7.
2Scots Independent, December, 1926, p. 6, quoted in ibid., p. 143.

31bid., p. 148.

110
"literature is the written expression of revolt against accepted things,"1
and he wanted to generate a Scottish rebellion through literature. Re-
cently, in an essay bemoaning the decline of quality writing in Scotland,
MacDianmid looked back on the 1920's and 1930's:

The Scottish Renaissance Movement was begun to raise the

intellectual and aesthetic levels of Scottish poetry and to

establish a place for Scottish poetry alonggide the best

that was being produced in other countries.
And at the center of this "writing for the glory of Scotland" was the
implicit conviction that the best long-run potentiality for Scottish
independence rested in an aroused national consciousness. Grassroots or-
ganizing and even the contesting of elections might have to be emphasized
at some point but both Erskine and MacDiarmid agreed that "[pJurity of
principle should come first."3

One significant outcome of the literary renaissance was the foun-
dation in 1936 of the Saltire Society "to foster the Scottish way of life,"
its arts, crafts, and language. Created "by a group of people who cared
for the culture of Scotland and who wished to see not a mere revival of
the arts of the past but a renewal of the life which made them,"4 the
Society still organizes concerts and lectures, publishes Scottish works
of merit, and provides meeting places for those interested in Scottish

culture. It is ironic that the Saltire Society, the only remnant of the

renaissance era still surviving, was born after the peak of the

 

1M’acDiarmid quoted in Arthur Marwick, The Explosion of British
Society, 1914-1970, The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1971, p. 81.

2Hugh‘MiacDiarmid, "The Need to Raise Our Sights," Catalyst, vol. 4,
no. 3, Summer, 1971.

3Hanham, op. cit., p. 155.

4Coupland, op. cit., p. 393.

111

renaissance had been reached.

The second group of nationalists, who might best be labeled the
"instrumentalists," were more geared to action. In 1917 Roland Muirhead
and Thomas Johnston re-grouped the Scottish Home Rule Association which
had been in limbo since before the war. Although the SHRA was not formally
affiliated with the Labour Party, most of its membership was. By 1918 the
Labour Party had become a major channel for the expression of nationalist
demands and at its annual conference that year a resolution drafted pri-
marily by Sidney Webb advocated a constitutional change toward federalism:

Some early devolution from.Westminster of both legislation and

administration is imperatively called for...along with the

grant of Home Rule to Ireland there should be constituted

separate statutory legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales,

and even England, with autonomous administration in matters of

local concern.

During the Labour Party's first minority government in 1924 an
attempt to pass a Scottish home rule bill was made but before action
could be taken Labour was swept out of power. In 1926 a Scottish National
Convention, sponsored by the SHRA, proposed more far-reaching legislation
which in essence would have given Dominion status to Scotland in the
emerging Commonwealth of Nations. A bill consistent with this proposal
was moved in Parliament in 1927 by James Barr and seconded by Thomas
Johnston, both of whom were Labourites. Although the bill was defeated
by a Tory majority, the effort did bear important fruit. The frustration
of the Parliamentary setback led to the formation in June, 1928, of the
National Party of Scotland.

The National Party was a fusion of the four main nationalist organs,

the Scottish Home Rule Association, the Scots National League, the

 

1Quoted in Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 12.

q

H .

ill.

112
Scottish National Movement (an off-shoot of the SNL which had been formed
by Lewis Spence in 1926), and the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist
Association. Primarily the brainchild of J. M. MacCormick, a young
Glasgow lawyer, the party was a loose coalition between the fundamentalists
and the instrumentalists. Although a "Scottish National Party" that
‘would contest Parliamentary elections was suggested as early as 1903,1
the National Party of Scotland represented the first attempt by a nation-
alists group to place nationalists, qua nationalists, in Parliament.

In addition to fighting elections, the aims of the party as des-
cribed by Lewis Spence (who went to pains to differentiate the party from
his own defunct yet anti-parliamentary Scots National League) were
"self-government for Scotland with independent national status within the
British group of nations, together with the reconstruction of Scottish
national life."2 This was not significantly more radical than the Labour
Party resolution of 1918 or the Barr-Johnson bill of 1927 but it was
sufficiently alarming to Conservatives that they issued a counter-
declaration, backed by leading industrialists, warning of economic dis-
aster for Scotland in the event of separation.3

In a by-election in January 1929 the National Party experienced its
first electoral test, candidate Lewis Spence winning only four percent
of the total vote. The general election of 1929 saw J. M. MacCormick

and Roland Muirhead win less than five percent each in the two seats the

 

1In April, 1903, the nationalist publication Fiery Cross carried the
appeal: "Why do not Scottish electors choose Scottish Nationalists as
their representatives in Parliament, and thus create a Scottish National
Party with a strong leader--a Scottish Parnell?" Quoted in Hanham, op.
cit., p. 133.

2Lewis Spence, "The National Party of Scotland," Edinburgh Review,
vol. 248, 1928, pp. 70-87, quoted in ibid., pp. 152-3.

3Cf. Ferguson, op. cit., p. 378.

113
party contested. But in two by-elections the next year J. M. McNicol and
Oliver Brown won ten and thirteen percent, respectively, of the total
vote in their constituencies. Slowly the party seemed to be making sig-
nificant headway. Oliver Brown even saved his deposit, a moral victory
for any minor party candidate in Britain.

The general election of 1931 showed even more gains but the real
boost to morale was the unexpected victory of Compton Mackenzie over
confident Tory opposition for the largely honorary post of Lord Rector of
Glasgow University. This made the nationalists seem a force to content
with, and the established parties responded with a smear campaign linking
the nationalists to resurgent Catholicism.1

But then internal tensions between fundamentalists and instrumental-
iSts broke out in open fights and the advance of the party was halted.
MacCormick wanted the party to moderate its position on separatism to
attract more voters; the fundamentalists wanted to abandon the electoral
focus and return to ideological purity. Hanham.writes:

Erskine of Marr, clear-sighted as ever, recognized that once

the literary man joined forces with those whose primary interest

was in winning elections, the literary men (who were for him.the
true nationalists) would be thrust on one side....[H]e argued

that, while there was a strong case for greater discipline, it

could only be secured by abandoning the policy of sending members
to Westminster. Purity of principle should come first, and this
meant building up a movement undistracted by the business of
fighting elections.

In a bitter battle for control of the party which included a purge of

close to one-fifth of the total membership in 1933, MacCormick finally

consolidated his position, sacrificing purity for a chance at electoral

¥

lMackenzie was a Catholic. Cf. J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the

fling: The Story of the National Movement in Scotland, Gollancz, London,
1955.

2Hanham, op. cit., p. 155.

ll4
victory.

In 1932 a Scottish Party had been formed by groups of Tories dissat-
isfied with the Conservative Party policy on home rule for Scotland.
Although the Scottish Party did not propose to contest elections, it was
clear from the start that they were interested in working with a reformed
National Party. A formal merger would suit both parties. MacCormick
thought the National Party needed the center-weighted respectability the
Scottish Party and its leadership (including the Duke of Montrose and
Professor of Law Andrew Gibb) could offer. The Scottish Party, on the
other hand, had no hope of becoming a significant force on its own. Hence,
on April 20, 1934, the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party
merged to become the Scottish National Party.

In contrast to the old National Party the Scottish National Party
was moderate and strove for political respectability. While the National
goals boiled down to complete independence for Scotland, the SNP objec-
tives seemed more limited, calling for a separate parliament within the
existing structure of the United Kingdom" The initial statement of goals
read in part:

The object of the Party is Self-Government for Scotland

on a basis which will enable Scotland as a partner in the

British Empire with the same status as England to develop its

National Life to the fullest advantage.

The Policy of the Party for the achievement of that

object is that--

(a) There shall be established in Scotland a Parliament which
shall be the final authority on all Scottish affairs
including Taxation and Finance.

(b) Scotland shall share with England the rights and responsi-
bilities they as Mother Nations have jointly created and
incurred within the British Empire.

(c) Scotland and England shall set up machinery to deal jointly
with these responsibilities and in particular with such
matters as Defense, Foreign Policy, and customs.

(d) The Scottish National Party shall be independent of all
other political Parties.1

 

1Scots Independent, May, 1934, quoted in ibid., pp 163-4.

115

But the new moderate image the nationalities were presenting did not go
down.much better with the electorate. Only three of the eight SNP
candidates in the 1935 general election saved their deposits, SNP propor-
tions of the vote ranging from.a strong twenty-eight percent in the
Western Isles constituency to a humiliating three percent in Greenock.
The East Renfrewshire result (ten percent) was actually worse than the
National Party result in 1931 (fourteen percent).

A reaction to MacCormick's moderating influence set in in 1936 and
slowly built throughout the late 1930's. World War II brought into
focus two issues which further radicalized the nationalists. Although
the party had passed a resolution denouncing "undemocratic" Nazism,
conscription of Scottish soldiers was opposed by many. In 1937 the party
declared itself "strongly opposed to the manpower of Scotland being used
to defend an Empire in the government of which she has no voice" and
although it was mostly ignored after the outbreak of war, it went on to
state that "all male members of the Scottish National Party of military
age hereby pledge themselves to refuse to serve with any section of the
Crown Forces until the programme of the Scottish National Party has been

£u1fi11ed."1

The issue became one around which the members of the
party polarized. Some, like Douglas Young, refused conscription and
were martyrized in prison.

The second issue dealt with the problem of war-time labor. It be-
came the practice of the Ministry of Labour in London to encourage non-
combatants to move to areas where defense production was underway. By

1941 the issue became one of sending Scots girls to do forced labor in

England since there was no work available in Scotland. And by 1944

 

1Quoted in ibid., p. 166.

9..

ML.

116
extreme nationalists claimed the government was transporting "many
thousands of Scots working folk, including young girls far away from
their homeland to forced labour in a foreign land."1

But even before the second issue had fully developed, the SNP was
split in a factional fight that the moderates, including MacCormick,
were to lose In 1942 MacCormick and his friends left the SNP to form
the Scottish Convention, a pressure-group not unlike the old Scottish
Home Rule Association.

Now the SNP had come full-circle. Lacking the moderating influence
of MacCormick, it was again a party dominated by those taking a puriSt
approach to the question of Scottish independence. Led by Dr. Robert
McIntyre, a left-wing populist, the party revived. The party, described

2 did exceedingly well in war-time by-

as "broadly Socialist in outlook,"
elections. Benefiting from an electoral truce between the major parties,
the SNP became a lightning rod for protest against the governing coali-
tion. In a 1944 three-way contest, Douglas Young drew forty-two percent
of the vote for the SNP and in a straight fight in April, 1945, Dr.
McIntyre was actually elected with fifty-two percent of the total poll,
the first Scot ever elected as a nationalist to Parliament. Coming on
the heels of these victories, the results of the 1945 general election
were highly disappointing. Of eight SNP candidates only two saved their
deposits. The SNP seemed to fit perfectly the pattern generally exhibi-

ted by'ndnor parties in Britain: heady successes in by-elections when

‘voters can protest the government of the day rather cheaply, followed by

‘

1From Douglas Young's Appeal to Scots Honour, 1944, quoted in ibid.,
P- 169.

2R. B. MoCallum.and Alison Readman, The British General Election of
lékié, Oxford University Press, London, 1947, p. 252.

117

disappointingly poor showings in subsequent general elections when the
voters' decision may decide not only individual constituency results but
the far more serious matter of which party will form the next government.

Most observers were willing to write off the nationalists as unreal-
istic extremists. Some even claimed that the party "had become almost a
joke."1 But there were others who recognized that, while the SNP could
not reasonably expect to achieve significant electoral successes, the
intensity of feeling connected with the nationalist cause was indicative
of important political undercurrents in British society:

The independent, self-conscious national life and spirit of the

nation is a real thing, its maintenance in present conditions is

a natural desire and a matter of pressing concern, when in this

centralizing age diversity and independence are being sapped

away. The ill success of the SNP may tempt people in England to

under-estimate the anxiety of so many Scots...over the state of

their nation, more especially as the political acumen of

Englishmen becomes somewhat obtuse in dealing with this problem

of a nationality within the United Kingdom, a nationality that

is inferior but not subordinate, an inner lgyalty that has no

counterpart in English regional patriotism.
Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Post-War Revival

The Scottish National Party went into a long decline in the two
decades after the election of 1945. It was a period of some financial
difficulties and much ideological soul-searching. But the more moderate
home rule wing of the nationalist movement was very much in evidence dur-
ing the late 1940's and early 1950's. In 1947 MacCormick's Scottish
Convention called together a Scottish National Assembly which consisted

of a broad collection of Scottish political, social, economic, and

religious leaders. This was a fairly prestigeous group including several

 

1Ferguson, op. cit., p. 388.

2'McCallum and Readman, op. cit., p. 120.

...-

118
M.P.s and peers and their denunciations of "London government" received
a great deal of publicity;winning MacCormick the firm enmity of the Labour
government which took such attacks as anti-Labour.

The real achievements of the Assembly were two-fold. In 1948 it
produced a "Blueprint for Scotland" which called for the establishment of
a Scottish sub-parliament, consisting of all Scots members of the UK
Parliament, which would function as a "Scottish Parliament for Scottish
Affairs."1 But more importantly from a public relations viewpoint, the
Assembly launched a campaign in 1949 to secure public support for a
"Scottish Covenant." This Covenant read:

We, the people of Scotland who subscribe this Engagement,
declare our belief that reform in the constitution of our coun-
try is necessary to secure good government in accordance with
our Scottish traditions and to promote the spiritual and econom-
ic welfare of our nation.

We affirm that the desire for such reform is both deep and
widespread through the whole community, transcending all politi-
cal differences and sectional interests, and we undertake to
continue united in purpose for its achievement.

With that end in View we solemnly enter into this Covenant
whereby we pledge ourselves, in all loyalty to the Crown and
within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything in
our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate
legislative authority in Scottish affairs.2

Within a week 50,000 Scots had signed the Covenant and after six months
nearly a million had signed. Eventually the document had the support of
around two million persons out of an electorate of 3.6 million, but the
return from this effort was slight. Prime Minister Atlee responded by
placing a strong home rule Labourite in the Scottish Office and the cam-

paign confirmed that home rule was a popular concept in Scotland. But

little else was achieved. The Labour government, having said nothing

 

1Cf. Young, in'MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 17.

2Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 171.

119
about home rule for Scotland in its 1945 election manifesto, was kept
busy with more pressing issues of social reform and the whole question
was shunted to the "study" stage out of which it failed to advance before
Labour fell from.power in 1951.

Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, the outlook for the nation-
alists seemed singularly bleak. Aside from the 1950 theft by university
students of the Stone of Scone, an ancient Scottish royal relic, from
its resting place in London, there was little activity and scant evidence
of continuing support for home rule. The Liberal Party in Scotland,
led by Jo Grimond, came to predominate the home rule field, focussing
on both the constitutional and economic arguments for devolution within
the United Kingdom. But the Conservative government and Labour opposition
were almost totally silent. In 1952 the Conservatives had appointed a
Royal Commission to study the constitutional problems of Scotland in the
UK, recommending in 1954 marginal administrative devolution. But sagging
economic conditions in Scotland led to massive swings of votes to Labour
and Liberals in the elections of 1959 and 1964.

Meanwhile, the SNP was beginning to stir again. A new generation
of leaders, less concerned with ideology and more willing to accomodate
a wide spectrum of nationalist viewpoints were coming to prominence. In
1962 William Wolfe, an industrialist and accountant, contested the West
Lothian by-election for the SNP and wound up second, capturing twenty-
three percent of the total vote. In the same year another young national-
ist, Iain MacDonald, a farmer and aviator, took over the SNP national
organization and, with Wolfe, began to develop a network of local grass-
roots organizations, building up membership and increasing the party's

visibility. In 1962 the party had 40 branches with around 2000 members;

120
by 1964 the number of branches was increased somewhat and membership was
up to 8000. The general election of 1964 showed increased gains, with
the party contesting 15 seats (the largest number in its history), saving
three deposits, and winning more than 64,000 votes.

But the general election of 1966 showed even more clearly the extent
of the nationalist revival. In that election 23 seats were contested, l3
deposits saved, and over 128,000 votes won throughout Scotland. The pro-
portion of the vote in individual constituencies ranged as high as thirty-
five percent in West Lothian, twenty-six percent in West Stirlingshire,
and twenty percent each in West Perthshire and East Stirlingshire. While
the SNP of the 30's and 40's seemed to be primarily an urban-based party,
contesting burgh constituencies for the most part, now it was running its
strongest races in county constituencies, where, it seemed fair to sur-
mise, national consciousness was stronger.

Party membership, too, had gone up dramatically; from 20,000 in 1965
to 42,000 in 1966. The party, conducting colorful meetings, was becoming
a vibrant social force particularly attractive to the young, for whom
SNP activities often provided the only recreation in rural areas. Although
the constitutional issue was not ignored in literature and speech-making,
the decentralized character of the SNP national organization allowed for
local differences in policy. In some areas full independence was the
goal, in others a lesser measure of home rule. But whatever stand was
taken, it was generally vague and subordinated to the main issues which
were taken to be Scottish neglect and economic stagnation. As the strength
of the party grew, in.membership subscriptions and in votes, it was clear
that the protest function of the party was becoming increasingly impor-

tant. What had begun as a party emphasizing national consciousness was

121
now being viewed as a potentially viable vehicle of protest.

This dimension of the SNP had been important at an earlier time--in
1945 when the only way to protest the government was to vote for a minor
party--but it seemed to acquire added significance after 1966. The
Gallup Poll showed that for all of Britain support for the Labour Prime
Minister had dropped from.Sixty-three percent at the beginning of 1966
to just forty-seven percent at the end of the year. And satisfaction
with the leader of the opposition also declined; from.forty-four percent
to thirty-eight percent. Part of Britain's.trouble was ecohomic. The
international balance of payments was in the red, the stock market in
decline, and consumer spending down. The extent of disillusionment with
the Labour government was profound. The polls showed that what had been
a fifteen percentage point lead for Labour over Conservative in the
second quarter of 1966 had been transformed a year later into a five
point lead for the Tories.

It was in this context that the SNP contested two by-elections in
1967. In March came Glasgow Pollok, usually a marginal constituency.
SNP candidate George Leslie pulled twenty-eight percent of the vote, came
close to the Labour total, and swung the seat to the Conservatives. It
was a strong showing for the nationalists and seemed to indicate that
they were attracting votes primarily from.Labour. This became even more
obvious a possibility in the second by-election in November. The con-
stituency was Hamilton, an industrial town southeast of Glasgow and one
of Labour's Scottish strongholds. If anything has brought the SNP into

national and even world prominence, it was the Hamilton by-election since

—;

1Gallup Polls and economic indicators reproduced in David Butler and
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, The
Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1971, p. 24.

122

the party won a spectacular victory from Labour with forty-six percent of
the vote.1 This result shocked the established parties, catapulted the
SNP intO‘media prominence, and transformed their successful candidate,
Mrs. Winifred Ewing, a Glasgow Lawyer, into an overnight sensation.

The protest dimension was undoubtedly a key factor. The SNP offered
a convenient vehicle for Labour voters who couldn't bring themselves to
vote Conservative--its appeal was basically left-wing (Mrs. Ewing pro-
claimed herself a Socialist), it was stressing popular economic issues
(and opposition to the Common Market), and it aroused a feeling of national
comradeship in a difficult era. But now that the SNP proved that it
could be electorally viable, could it maintain the support of those pro-
testing Labourites by the force of its nationalistic message? When the
control of Parliament was at stake in a general election, could the
party sustain its appeal? As the disillusionment with Labour increased
in 1968,2 many suggested that the party was headed for widespread general
election victories.3 Indeed, after the municipal elections in May, 1968,
when the SNP gained a total of 100 seats and thirty percent of the vote
around Scotland, it began to look as if the party had become not only

viable but highly popular.

 

1The Labour candidate received 41.5% of the vote and the Conservative
12.5%.

12

2In the second quarter of 1968, satisfaction with Prime Minister
Wilson had dropped to just 29% and the percentage point spread between
Conservative and Labour had widened to more than 25%. (Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., p. 24.)

3Young asserted in 1969: "It is possible that the revived SNP, with
its predominantly young membership, is replacing Labour today as the main
radical force in Scottish politics, as Labour replaced the Liberals be-
tween 1922 and 1924. On recent form, at a general election in 1970 or
1971, the SNP might win a dozen or so seats, perhaps 40 out of the whole
71." (Young, in'MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 19.)

123

There were now nearly 500 branches of the party with a membership
of more than 120,000. While a national poll in NOvember 1967 showed
that twenty-four percent of all Scots intended to vote SNP at the next
general election, the figure had risen to forty-three percent by‘mid-l968.1
Moreover, there was revived talk of an SNP/Liberal Party election pact.
In prior elections, the two parties had tacitly agreed not to run candi-
dates against each other, but now there was firm support from the Liberal
Party, especially from Grimond, for a formal agreement. Such a pact
would have inestimably solidified nationalist support although it would
have diluted the already vague principles of the SNP. In any event, the
pact was never consummated since the SNP had already set for itself the
goal of contesting all 71 Scottish constituencies. And from.the perspec-
tive of 1969 it was easy for the inexperienced SNP leadership to be
blinded by the prospect of success won alone.

But SNP fortunes did not continue onward and upward. By-elections
in Glasgow Gorbals in October 1969 and in South Ayrshire in March 1970,
although both strong Labour constituencies, did not provide the party
with another Hamilton. SNP candidates received twenty-five percent and
twenty percent of the vote respectively. Opinion polls showed a national
decline in the proportion of electors intending to vote SNP in a general
election: from twenty-one percent in January, 1969, to under thirteen
percent in March, 1970.

Going into the 1970 general election, the SNP had fielded the largest
number of parliamentary candidates (65) in its history. But the results

of that election in June 1970 showed that the nationalist electoral

 

le. James Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism," Appendix V in Butler and
Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., p; 455. Kellas' article provides an excel-
lent summary of the post-1966 revival of nationalism.

124

bandwagon had been halted again. Only 22 candidates saved their deposits,
and while one seat was won (the traditionally Labour Western Isles con-
stituency with forty-three percent of the vote), the party received more
than a quarter of the vote in only five other contests. Even the popular
Mrs. Ewing could muster just thirty-five percent to Labour's fifty-three
percent. The total number of voters for the SNP went up to more than
300,000, representing over eleven percent of the Scottish total, but in
the seats the party contested the vote dropped from fourteen percent in
1966 to twelve percent.1

A few commentators proclaimed the death of the SNP and the repudia-
tion of the home rule idea, and indeed in the years after 1970 the party
was to disappear almost from.Sight in the cities. But there was a base
of support for the SNP in the rural areas and the party could take solace
in their local office-holders and in their sole Member of Parliament,
Donald Stewart. They could also claim, with justification, that their
efforts had precipitated the Labour government's 1968 decision to appoint
a Commission on the Constitution, headed by Lord Crowther, to look into
the possibility of changes relating to the constitutional status of
Scotland and Wales.

By 1970 the SNP had managed to break through the general election
barrier, overcoming the suggestion that the party was nothing more than
a protest party viable only in by-elections. And opinion poll data
continued to suggest that while there may have been voter disillusion-

ment with SNP performance in office and a lack of clarity concerning

 

1Cf. ibid., p. 460.

125

the party's programs, support for devolution continued at a high level.1

 

1The National Opinion Poll result for January 1969 showed that only
21% of Scottish voters intended to vote for the SNP while 67% in a survey
done about the same time wanted to see a separate Scottish Parliament.
Cf. James G. Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism," in Butler and Pinto-
Duschinsky, op. cit., p. 455; and National Opinion Polls, Scottish
Government Survey, A Report on a survey conducted by National Opinion
Polls Limited for the Scottish Plebiscite Society, N.O.P. Market
Research Limited, London, 1969.

 

CHAPTER IV

ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM
And 0! to think that there are members 0'
St. Andrew's Societies sleeping soon',
Wha to the papers wrote afore they bedded
On regimental buttons or buckled shoon,
Or use 0' England whaur the U.K.'s meent,
Or this or that anent the Blue Saltire,
Recruitin', pedigrees, and Gude kens what,
Filled wi' a proper patriotic fire!

Political movements consist of leaders, ideas, and a mass of follow-
ers. In a rational world ideas should link leaders to their followers,
but frequently, as we shall see in a later chapter, followers may decide
to follow for reasons quite unrelated to the ideology of the movement.
The "interchangeability of mass movements" suggests that specific de-
mands are less hmportant to masses than the general prospect for some
sort of change.1

But ideas are crucial to the viability of political movements. They
provide a coherent framework within which leaders can appeal to masses
and thereby attempt to bring about the solidarity of the whole And they
provide a means for the self-realization of elites, hence attracting and

2

maintaining effective leadership for the movement. If ideas are of peri-

pheral interest to the followers of mass movements, they are of central

 

1Cf. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, The New American Library,
New York, 1951, chap. iii.

2Cf. David E. Apter, op. cit., pp. 18-21.

126

127
importance to leaders.

This chapter is a brief examination of the leaders of nationalism
in Scotland and of the policies they advocate for changing the government
of Scotland. Because such an examination would have little value without
some point of reference, we shall compare the SNP elite with their counter-
parts in the other major political parties in Scotland. Biographical
data for all candidates in the 1970 general election is used for this
analysis. In the second half of this chapter we shall compare the SNP
program for Scotland with those set forth by the other parties. Official
and unofficial published statements, particularly from the late 1960's,
will be used for this analysis. The aim.of this chapter is to clarify
the status of the nationalists and the context in which their demands are

'made in contemporary society.

Who Are the Nationalist Leaders?

An examination of standard demographic variables reveals that for
the most part SNP candidates for Parliament in 1970 differed only mar-
ginally from their colleagues in the other Scottish political parties.
Using criteria of age, sex, education, occupation, and political exper-
ience, the nationalists stand out strikingly only in terms of the place
their education.was obtained (overwhelmingly Scotland) and the relative
inexperience they have in running for higher political office. Other
differences they share with candidates from.one or more of the other par-
ties. Each of these criteria is examined below.

Except for miscellaneous "other" candidates, the SNP candidates were
on average the youngest in Scotland in 1970. But it is the Labour Party
candidates that stand out as being different from the rest on this age

dimension. Table 3 shows that while the median age for SNP candidates

128
was 39 and that for the Conservatives was 41, Labour candidates had a
median age of 45. The likely explanation for this circumstance relates
to the success of the Labour Party over the past several elections. In
1966 they won 46 of Scotland's 71 Parliamentary contests.1 And success-
ful candidates have a tendency to stand for re-election, closing the
door to younger prospective candidates as bearers of the party's label.
But on balance, the SNP leadership ranks appear somewhat more open to

younger aspirants than the ranks of other parties.

TABLE 3

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY AGE

 

 

 

 

Party
Age Cons. Lab. SNP Lib. Other Total
21 - 35 35.7 25.3 37.3 33.3 38.1 33.2
36 - 50 45.7 43.7 47.8 48.1 47.6 46.1
51 and older 18.6 31.0 14.9 18.5 14.3 20.7
Median Age 41 45 39 41 38 41
N (70) (71) (67) (27) (21) (256)

 

Sources: The Times, Guide to the House of Commons, 1970, The Times
Newspapers.Ltd, London, 1970; and a pre-election series of articles on
Scottish Parliamentary candidates in the Scottish newspaper, The Scotsman.

 

The picture of openness is strengthened if we consider the sex of
parliamentary candidates. Table 4 shows that while fifteen percent of
all SNP contestants were female, only eleven percent of the Liberals,
four percent of the Labourites, and just three percent of the Conserva-
tives were female. This circumstance, however, may reflect the recent
success of Mrs. Ewing in the 1967 Hamilton by-election as much as it does

the openness of the SNP elite ranks to women.

 

1The Conservatives won 20 and Liberals 5.

129
TABLE 4

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY SEX

 

 

 

 

Party
Sex Cons. Lab. SNP. Lib. Other Total
Male 97.1 95.7 85.1 88.9 95.2 92.6
Female 2.9 4.3 14.9 11.1 4.8 7.4
N (70) (71) (67) (27) (21) (256)

 

Sources: The Times, House of Commons; The Scotsman.

In terms of the educational attainment of its candidates, the SNP
seems to rank somewhere between the pattern of the Conservative Party
and that of the Labour Party. Table 5 suggests that the technical
college route to professional advancement is somewhat more frequently
chosen by SNP candidates than by the candidates of other parties.
These facts reinforce the image of the SNP as a party of the "new

class," of the emerging technocratic elites.

TABLE 5

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY EDUCATION

 

 

 

 

Educational Party

Attainment Cons. Lab. SNP Lib. Other Total
Primary 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 14.3 2.7
Secondary 28.6 22.7 26.7 15.4 42.8 25.2
Tech. college/

Adult ed. 7.9 12.1 15.0 0.0 0.0 9.9
University 63.5 57.6 58.3 84.6 42.8 62.2
N (63) (66) (60) (26) (7) (222)

 

Sources: The Times; House of Commons; The Scotsman.

But is is most interesting to note where this education was

130
obtained. SNP candidates were far less likely to have attended school
in England than Conservatives, Labourites, or Liberals. Since there is
no residency requirement for parliamentary candidates, several candi-
dates from these latter parties are not Scots (this is particularly
true of the Conservatives), and there is no particular reason why under
these conditions their education should be Scottish. The nationalists,

home-grown to a man, were almost uniformly Scottish trained.

TABLE 6

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES IN 1970: PLACE EDUCATED

 

 

 

 

Location of Party

last school Cons. Lab. SNP Lib. Other Total
Scotland 67.2 83.8 95.2 52.0 75.0 78.3

England 32.8 13.2 3.2 40.0 25.0 19.5

Other 0.0 2.9 1.6 8.0 0.0 2.2

N (64) (68) (62) (25) (12) (231)

 

Sources: The Times, House of Commons; The Scotsman.

The occupational data generally reflect the findings of the

educational data. Table 7 shows that SNP candidates tend to show up

in the "intermediate" occupations more frequently than candidates of
other parties. Occupations like "sales director," "school teacher,"
"accountant," "engineering manager," are intermediate occupations, and
they often appear in SNP candidate biographies. In contrast, Conserva-
tive biographies frequently mention "company director," "farmer/land-
owner," "insurance broker," and Labour biographies include a more diverse
collection of "journalists," "miners," "union officials," and "research
scientists." SNP candidates include fewer manual workers than are among

Labour candidates (six percent for SNP versus nineteen percent for Labour)

131
but fewer professional non-manual workers than are among Conservative
candidates (fifty-six percent for SNP versus sixty-six percent for
Conservative). This contributes to the "center-weighting" of the SNP
candidates in the technocratic or "new class" occupations as noted

above.

TABLE 7

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY OCCUPATION

 

 

 

 

Party

Occupation Cons. Lab. SNP Lib. Other Total
Professional/

manag. 65.7 60.9 56.1 66.7 14.3 57.6
Intermediate 22.4 14.5 27.3 25.9 4.8 20.4
Skilled non-

manual 7.5 5.8 6.1 0.0 9.5 6.0
Skilled manual 4.5 10.1 3.0 0.0 19.0 6.4
Partly skill/

unskilled 0.0 8.7 3.0 0.0 47.6 7.2
Econ. inactive 0 0 0.0 4.5 7.9 4.8 2.4
N (67) (69) (66) (27) (21) (250)

 

Sources: The Times, House of Commons; The Scotsman.

 

Finally, the political experience of SNP candidates, while much
more lhmited than the other major candidates in terms of contesting
Parliamentary elections, rather closely parallels the histories of the
other candidates in terms of prior office-holding. Table 8 shows that
only thirty-one percent of SNP contestants had ever stood for Parlia-
ment before, contrasted with fifty-three percent of the Conservatives
and sixty-one percent of the Labourites. This is not surprising given
that the nationalists contested only 23 seats in 1966 and just 15 in

1964. It also reflects the inexperience of the non-incumbent.1

 

1This also explains why Conservative candidates had less experience
than Labour candidates in Scotland.

132
TABLE 8

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970:
BY PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION EXPERIENCE

 

 

Campaign Party,
experience Cons. Lab. SNP Lib. Other Total

Had stood for Parl

before 1970 52.8 60.6 31.3 33.3 14.3 44.1
Had never stood for

Parl. before 1970 47.2 39.4 68.7 66.7 85.7 65.9
N (70) (71) (67) (27) (21) (256)

 

Source: The Times, House of Commons.

But Table 9 suggests that the SNP candidates were not entirely
political neophytes. Although fewer nationalists had held political
office than Labourites, the SNP proportion was equal to that for the
Conservatives. Schwartz' study of SNP local leaders suggested that
the nationalists "had little prior experience in the practice of
politics."1 Clearly, this may have been the case for SNP candidates
standing for office prior to 1968. The municipal election victories
of 1968 and 1969 produced more than 100 potential candidates for
higher office with prior elective experience. A number of these
successful nationalists appeared among the list of candidates standing
for Parliament in 1970.

This outline of some of the significant ascriptive characteristics
of nationalist leaders suggests, then, that while the nationalists tend
to be more youthful, their ranks more open to women, and their occupa-

tional status more white collar/middle class, they do not differ

 

1Cf. John E. Schwartz, "The Scottish Nationaquarty: NOnviolent
Separatism.and Theories of Violence," World Politics, XXII, July, 1970,
p. 496. Unfortunately, Schwartz does not offer comparative data for

the leaders of other parties.

133
markedly from the leaders of the non-nationalist parties.1 On some
dimensions, like educational attainment and occupation, the SNP candi-

dates seem to hold a middle ground between Labour and Conservatives.

TABLE 9

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970:
BY PREVIOUS ELECTIVE OFFICE EXPERIENCE

 

 

 

 

Elective office ~ Party

‘experience Cons. Lab. SNP Lib. Other Total
Some 25.7 38.0 25.4 11.1 4.8 25.8
NOne 74.3 62.0 74.6 88.9 95.2 74.2
N (70) (71) (67) (27) (21) (256)

 

Source: The Times, House of Commons.

This contributes to a picture of the SNP as a "half-way house" for de-

fectors from one major party to another.2 But there is something

 

1In part this may be due to the similar methods used for selecting
candidates in the various Scottish parties. Referring to the Welsh and
Scottish nationalists, Lees and Kimber write: "The nationalist parties
experienced a period of growing electoral support in the late 1960's
which, it seemed, could assume proportions beyond the significance of
by-election victories, even given the failure to improve their parlia-
mentary representation in 1970. In such circumstances the minor par-
ties, aspiring as they do to major party status, and no matter how jus-
tified these aspirations may be, tend to select candidates in ways which
are markedly simdlar to those of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal
parties. Like their larger rivals, both the Communist Party and the
Scottish Nationalists retain the right to veto any candidate chosen by
a local party, but this is an essentially negative control and selec-
tion is basically in the hands of local parties. The Scottish National-
ists also maintain a list of available candidates, who have previously
been vetoed at national level. At the local level the procedures again
tend to be similar, with the initial steps being taken by small Selection
Committees, subject to later approval by'wider bodies representative of
the local membership." John D. Lees and Richard Kimber, Political Parties
in Modern Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1972, p. 91.

 

2Cf. Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 29, 1965, p. 28

 

134
unsatisfactory with this theory as applied to the SNP. Why could the
Liberals not be used as this bridge? They would seem to be the more
logical choice; they are more respectable, and even a viable political
force in some parts of Scotland. Moreover, while there are some major
exceptions,1 there is little evidence that SNP leaders are defectors
from.other parties. Schwartz found that most local leaders were new-
comers to nationalism, sixty-eight percent being SNP members for less
than five years. But only ten percent had been members of other
political parties.2

If the "half-way house" theory has validity in the context of
Scottish nationalisun it is probably in its application to mass voting
patterns. Further investigation into the motives of leaders in joining
and becoming active in nationalist activities would probably reveal
that the ideology of nationalism itself played a central role.

Although such composites are always oversimplifications, the broad
picture of the nationalist leader that emerges from.our biographical
data portrays a young, middle-class professional or technician who has
been active in politics only a few years and whose life has been
shaped predominantly by the contemporary Scottish experience. As one
SNP organizer remarked, "We are not a bunch of yahoos or bomb-throwers.
We are drawn from all walks of life and we are serious about Scotland's

future."3

 

1Winifred Ewing, for example, was once a Labour Party member.
2Schwartz, op. cit., p. 496.

3In remarks to the author, October 1969.

135

Party Attitudes Toward Scottish Nationalism

But how do the proposals for changing Scottish government offered
by the nationalists differ from the non-nationalist position? What
have the major parties proposed regarding the issue of Scottish devolu-
tion? We now turn to a consideration of these proposals.

The program of the Scottish National Party has always been vague
and inconsistent.1 The principles on which it was founded in 1934
were relatively moderate, stressing the goal of a separate parliament

2

for Scotland within the basic framework of the United Kingdom. But

by 1946 the party had swung toward the more extreme demand of complete
independence. The aim.of the party was then proclaimed to be:
Self-Government for Scotland. The restoration of Scottish
National sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic
Scottish Government whose authority will be limited only by
such agreements as will be freely entered into with other
nations in order to further international co—operation and
world peace.3
The tactic chosen by the party was to contest the Scottish Parliamentary
seats under the existing system until a majority of all 71 Scottish
seats were controlled by the SNP. Then
a Scottish Constituent Assembly shall be summoned either

(a) in virtue of an Act of Parliament passed by agreement
with the English members or (b) failing such agreement, by

 

1In February, 1970, a former chairman of the SNP, Arthur Donaldson,
defended the vagueness of the party's policy and warned the party not
to get "too detailed" about what the party planned to do after indepen-
dence is achieved. He explained that details are "subject to too many
possibilities of change." Cf. The Scotsman, February 26, 1970.

2Cf. supra, chap. III, p. 114.

3This and subsequent statements are part of a comprehensive "state-
ment of Aim and Policy Of the Scottish National Party" adopted 7th and
8th December 1946. The section on constitutional policy is brief but
the statement goes into detail on proposed economic and social policies.
The statement is reprinted in Hanham, op. cit., pp. 213-30.

 

136

the Scottish National members acting in terms of the author-
ity conferred upon them by the Scottish electorate.

Although nothing is said about the method to be used for selecting

this Constituent Assembly, it is to frame a Scottish Constitution and
submit it to the Scottish electorate for approval. The party hoped
for a small central government and a method of electing a Parliament
which would take into account "area as well as population...in the
consequent redistribution of constituencies." There was passing refer-
ence to the functions of the Crown (which were to be exercised through
a new Scottish Privy Council) but there were no more details of the
constitutional changes desired by the party.

Although the above policy has remained the official position of
the SNP ever since 1946, significant deviations began to occur in the
late 1960's as the party again became a viable electoral force. In
1968 the party's position on constitutional change was presented in
somewhat less clear language. Calling itself "the democratic party,"
the SNP claimed to seek for Scotland the "freedom and power to rule
herself, reform herself, respect herself." It then went on to explain:

When a clear majority of the Scottish Parliamentary

Seats is held by SNP M.P.s, they will ask the UK Parliament

to set up a Scottish Legislature with full control over all

the affairs of Scotland. Failing such agreement in London,

the SNP M.P.s and any other Scottish M.P.s who care to join

them, will form a Scottish government, loyal to the crown.1
This differed in two major ways from the 1946 statement. First, it
was no longer automatic that a Constituent Assembly (now called a Legis-

lature) would be set up when the SNP controlled a majority of Scottish

seats. In the (likely) event that the British government did not go

 

1"SNP and You: Aims and Policy of the Scottish National Party," 3d
ed., The Scottish'National Party, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1968, p. 72

137

along with SNP demands, the party intended to set up its own Scottish
government. Second, there was no mention of the "restoration of
Scottish National sovereignty." We have to wait for the end of the
statement to clarify the nature of the final goal of the party: "We
want what is normal for a nation--politica1 independence with full
control of our own affairs...."1

The general thrust of this statement was reaffirmed in October,
l969,when Dr. Robert McIntyre, President of the SNP, testified to the
Crowther Commission on the Constitution that the party would be compelled
to declare a unilateral declaration of independence if the Parliament
failed to concede it on the election of a majority of nationalist M.P.s.2
But by December it was not clear that total independence was to be the
final goal. In a policy statement issued by William Wolfe, Chairman
of the SNP, it was declared that while political independence was still
sought, "separatism and isolation are outdated concepts in general and
quite alien to the Scottish character in particular," What the SNP‘
wanted was "an association of states of the British Isles" whose ob-
ject would be "economic cooperation between the member states in econ-
omic, social, cultural, and scientific fields." Even "political
decisions" could be taken by this association, provided "that the con-
sent of all the member states" was achieved.3

This policy revision was trumpeted in much of the sympathetic

Scottish press as a retreat from separatism, a sensible moderation of

policy. And with a general election around the corner such a moderation

 

1Ibid., p. 25.

2The Scotsman, October 1, 1969.

 

3Quoted in The Scotsman, December 11, 1969.

138

of policy could be easily understood. Nevertheless, four months later
in evidence to the Crowther Commission the party was again foursquare
behind complete independence. The party declared "that the right of
Scotland to full self-government is full and unqualified, and that
Scottish national sovereignty is equal to that of any other state."1

The party's election manifesto, issued a month later in May, 1970,
tried to reconcile the extreme and moderate positions. Stressing the
goal of "independence" and "self-government," it denied the authority
of the British Parliament to take Scotland into the European Economic
Community. At the same time, it proposed "to take the initiative in
the formation of an association in British states as a means by which
all of the nations of.the British Isles can co-operate as equals in
achieving mutual progress."2

These twists and turns of policy may have been partly the result
of a conscious attempt to win as many voters as possible to the nation-
alist cause. As Jo Grimond, the leader of the Scottish Liberals, re-
marked, the SNP had a policy for just about everybody who was remotely
for Scottish home rule. He said that the party "spoke in the past of
separation, then of dominion status for Scotland, and now they talk of
a separate country and also of an association.with England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland."3 But the discrepancies were also due to real dif-
ferences within the party, cropping up again as in the past, over the
degree of devolution that realistically could be achieved. Since there

was no consensus on this issue, it is not surprising that a consistent

 

1Quoted in The Times, London, April 8, 1970.
2Quoted in The Scotsman, May 15, 1970.

3Quoted in The Scotsman, December 13, 1969.

139
and uniform policy has not emerged.

In contrast, the Scottish Liberal Party policy on Scottish home
rule remained almost unchanged for eighty years. Although the issue has
been stressed more at one time than another and although individual
leaders have dissented, the party has generally supported the Gladstonian
proposal for a Scottish parliament within the existing structure of the
United Kingdom. Party resolutions in the poSt-war period have reiter-
ated the theme. In 1947 the party conference urged "that the time has
come for the introduction of a Scottish legislature with financial
powers which shall be the final legislative authority for Scottish

affairs."1

In the following year a special conference resolved:
We Scots know our own troubles, but we could solve them.
We must have our own Parliament in Scotland, dealing with
Scottish affairs. At the same time, we must continue to be
represented in the British Parliament which would deal with
matters affecting the whole of Britain, such as international
relations.

This position, "to press for a Scottish Parliament within the framework
of the United Kingdom,"3 was reaffirmed nearly every year through 1970.
In 1961, the British Liberal Party renewed its pledge of support
for its Scottish Affiliate:
This Assembly of the Liberal Parties of Great Britain
urges the early establishment of a Scottish Parliament for
Scottish Affairs, stating its firm belief:
a. That Scotland is a nation, by historical fact,

with separate culture and potential economic
viability.

 

1Resolution passed by the Scottish Liberal Party Conference in
1947. Quoted in Scottish Self-Government: The Views of the ScottiSh
Liberal Party, The Scottish Liberal Party, Edinburgh; 1970, p. 41.

 

2Resolution passed in 1948. Ibid.

31bid., p. 41.

140

b. That the establishment of a separate Parliament
is the practical way to tackle her special
problems.

c. That this would greatly help the work of the
United Kingdom Parliament in World Affairs.

d. That the maximum amount of fiscal power (consistent
with the close co-operation in the United
Kingdom and the Common Market in Europe) is
essential for a Scottish Parliament. To
achieve this:

1. A Scottish Treasury should be responsible
to the Scottish Parliament for the levying
of direct and indirect taxation in Scotland
and should contribute to the United Kingdom
Treasury the Scottish share of Defense,
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expenditure.

2. Customs duties should be levied throughout the
United Kingdom by a joint customs Commission
under the authority of the Joint Exchequer
Board.

3. Excise duties in Scotland should be levied
by the Scottish Treasury.

4. A Joint Exchequer Board should provide the
essential liaison and co-ordination between
the Treasuries.
But in 1970 the Scottish Liberal Party proposals to the Crowther Commis-
sion indicated a possible deviation from this long-standing policy. In
what David Steel, Liberal M.P., insisted was not "a change in the policy

of the Scottish Liberal Party,"2

a program.for "phased federalism" was
outlined. Under this plan, the "first stage" Scottish Parliament would
depend on taxes raised by the Westminster Parliament and would in the
main simply take over the existing functions of the Scottish Office. A

Scottish government, consisting of perhaps fifteen ministers, would

take over for the Secretary of State for Scotland but the Parliament

 

11bid., pp. 41-2.

2Quoted in The Scotsman, April 3, 1970.

141
would not-~until the "second stage"--have taxation authority.

This deviation was primarily the result of growing opposition
from the English Liberal Party to the idea of separate parliaments
within the United Kingdom. It was difficult, they thought, to conceive
of an English Parliament, with control over local English Affairs.1
Hence, the Scottish affiliate was proposing a comprmmise solution in-
volving an experimental period during which only Scotland would have
its own Parliament in hopes that the whole United Kingdom could be fed-
erated at a later date.

But before these slight variations in Liberal Party policy, there
‘was an expressed willingness to cooperate with the SNP. In 1967 the
Scottish Liberal Party conference went on record welcoming

any indication from the leaders of the Scottish National Party

that they are willing, in recognition of the need for both par-

ties to place the national interests of Scotland, before short
term Party interests, to co-operate with the Scottish Liberal

Party to achieve a Scottish Parliament.

Jo Grimond had long sought an electoral pact between the two parties.
His argument was that the two parties were in essential agreement that
Scotland should have its own parliament. He considered it counterpro-
ductive for the SNP to contest those seats which, on past performance,
are better prospects for the Liberals. In addition to the five seats
the Liberals already had, Grimond cited five other constituencieS‘in

which the Liberals were particularly strong.3

 

1Cf. The Glasgow Herald, April 22, 1970.
2

p. 42.

3After the election of 1966 the Liberals held Orkney and Zetland
(Grimond's seat); West Aberdeenshire; Inverness; Roxburgh, Selkirk, and
Peebles; and Ross and Cromarty. In addition, the Liberals were within
striking distance in East Aberdeenshire; North Angus and Mearns; Banff;
Greenock; and Caithness and Sutherland.

Scottish Self-Government: The Views of the Scottish Liberal Party,

142

Some within the SNP, notably David Simpson, an economist and
the party's candidate for Berwick and East Lothian, favored such a
"common front." Presumably the Liberals would at minimum agree not to
contest those constituencies in which the SNP had shown strength in
1966.1 In November 1969 the leaders of the two parties formally met
and discussed a possible pact. Simpson suggested that mutual support
for "the idea of a sovereign Scottish parliament" was sufficient basis
for constituency-level alliances.2 But the outcome of this meeting was
inconclusive and by December the SNP National Council rejected the idea
of a formal national pact between the two parties, explaining that the
Liberal position on Scottish independence was "one of confusion and
constant contradiction."3 Cooperation between the parties at the
constituency level was not ruled out--in fact, the Liberals in East
Lothian had already decided to back Simpson, and the SNP had no inten-
tion of opposing Grimond in Orkney--but the chances for a large-scale
pact for the mutual benefit of both home rule parties were now nil.
Grimond thought it "madness" for the SNP and the Liberals to oppose
each other and divide the home rule vote,4 but there was little sign
of cooperation after this point. In fact, the failure of the electoral
pact may have been the final factor which subsequently pushed the

Scottish Liberals into their revised proposal for "phased federalism."

 

1West Lothian; Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire; West Stirling-
shire; Perth and East Perthshire; Kinross and West Perthshire; and of
course Hamilton.

2Quoted in The Scotsman, November 29, 1969.
3Quoted in The Scotsman, December 8, 1969.

4Of. The Scotsman, December 31, 1969.

143

1 it was the Conservative Party which in

Aside from.the Communists,
1970 proposed the next most radical plan for changing Scotland's govern-
ment. There is not much history to the Tory plan for Scottish devolu-
tion. In fact, for most of the past century the Conservatives have not
even taken cognizance of the existence of a home rule movement in
Scotland. But in 1968 at the national party conference Edward Heath
proposed a "Scottish Assembly" with limited rule-making authority in
purely Scottish affairs. In March, 1970, a Party commission, which had
been appointed to study the Heath recommendations, issued its report.
Alec Douglas-Home, the former Prime Minister and Chairman of the
Commission, indicated that the Heath proposals had merit and should be
enacted. The Commission recommended a parliament to be called the
"Scottish Convention" with two main powers: the ability to summon
Scottish Ministers in the Westminster Government to appear before it,
and the responsibility for dealing with all stages of Scottish legisla-
tion except the Third Reading--which would be handled by Westminster
as usual. The report was inconclusive on the question of the power
of taxation for the Convention, but it indicated that special taxes on

things such as liquor and cigarettes might be a feasible way of raising

revenue for Scotland.2

 

1In its proposals to the Crowther Commission, the Communist Party
of Great Britain advocated a plan similar to the Liberal program: sep-
arate parliaments for Scotland and Wales, with administrative machinery
and financial resources adequate for them.to plan national development.
These parliaments would be elected by proportional representation inde-
pendently of the Westminster Parliament and would have the power to tax
and to deal with areas such as domestic planning, employment, working
conditions, agriculture, transport, fuel and power, housing, education,
health,and culture. Cf. The Scotsman, April 24, 1970.

2Cf. Scotland's Government: A Report of the Scottish Constitutional
Committee, ScOt. Const. Comm., Edinburgh, 1970. Cf. also The Glasgow
Herald, March 20, 1970, and a preliminary report in The Sunday Times,
February 22, 1970.

144

The plan immediately ran into stiff opposition from Conservative
leaders in both Scotland and England, but in May, 1970, the Scottish
Conservative Party officially endorsed it.1 The main advantage of the
proposed Convention would be that it would relieve the work load of the
UK Parliament by shunting the time-consuming preliminary stages of
Scottish legislation to a special body; the main objection to the plan
was that, being an independently elected chamber, there was a good
possibility that a majority of its members might be hostile to the
executive in London. This would create a situation of parliamentary
impasse.

But there seemed little chance of it ever being enacted--even if
one of its main proponents, Edward Heath, was elevated to the Prime
Ministership. Even the Party's election literature for Scotland pub-
lished later in the year gave little space to the new recommendations.
The main thrust of the literature was: "Reform is needed in central
government, which is overloaded," but "we reject separatism and be-
lieve federalism to be impractical."2 All the hullaballoo about home
rule which had encouraged the Conservatives to move in the direction of
devolution in 1968 was simmering down by 1970. In subsequent years,
Heath's Conservative government was not to act on the Home recommen-
dations.

It is ironic that the party least favorable to additional adminis-
trative or legislative devolution in Scotland is the Labour Party.

After decades of support for home rule, the party ceased serious

 

1Cf. The Scotsman, May 16, 1970.

2Tomorrow Scotland, Better with the Conservatives, Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Central Office, Edinburgh, 1970.

145

discussion of the issue as they sensed electoral victory in 1945. By
1958 the Scottish CounCil of the Labour Party was declaring its belief
"in the principle of the maximum.possib1e self-government for Scotland"
provided that Scotland continue its full representation in the British
Parliament.1 From this point, opposition to the idea of Scottish home
rule grew steadily. The 1966 election manifesto indicated that the
party was against the removal from.Westminster of any rule-making auth-
ority relating to Scotland. "Labour respects the differences of culture
and tradition in Scotland," it declared, but "we see the economic well-
being of Great Britain as indivisible."2

In its 1969 statement, the party stressed again "indivisibility"
of Britain:

We believe in Britain. We believe that the voice of
Britain in the councils of the world most not be weakened
in any way. Equally we insist that Scotland's share in that
voice must not be lessened.

Regional policies of real benefit to Scotland can only
be carried through effectively on a United Kingdom basis and
this strengthens our rejection of any proposals that Scotland
should be economically or politically torn apart from the
United Kingdmm.

Whilst we reject complete separation,...we nevertheless
recognize the desire of our peOple for a deeper involvement
in our own affairs. We wish to obtain the greatest possible
devolution consistent with our absolute determination to
retain the maximum.possible influence on the economic and
political policies of the United Kingdom.3

It then went on to explain how local government reform was the proper

response to this desire "for a deeper involvement in our own affairs."

 

1Quoted in Scottish Government: Interim Report, Labour Party
Scottish Council, Glasgow, 1969, p. 1.

2Quoted in The Government of Seotland: Evidence of the Labour
Party in Scotland to the Commission on the Constitution, Labour Party
Scottish Council, Glasgow, 1970, p. 8.

3Scottish Government: Interim Report, p. 21.

146
This theme was reiterated in March, 1970, in the Labour Party's

evidence to the Crowther Commission on the Constitution. After dismis-
sing the idea of separatism on economic grounds, the statement admitted
the need for some change in the "monolithic framework" of British
government. But reform is needed not at the national level, but the
local level. "[T]he reform of local government presents the best and
most immediate opportunity for further devolution of power to Scotland,

"1 In-

and for a parallel strengthening of Scottish local democracy.
corporating the recommendations of the Wheatley Commission on Local
Government in Scotland2 issued in September, 1969, the statement pro-
posed a two-tier structure for local government: seven regional auth-
orities with control over major planning, industrial development, roads,
education, etc., and thirty-seven district authorities with control
over local planning, parks, libraries, licensing, etc. But this plan
involved little or no devolution of administrative authority from the
national government to local authorities. It was a suggestion for
purely internal reforms

On the question of a separate parliament for Scotland, even with
the limited authority of the Conservative's Scottish Convention, the
evidence to the Crowther Commission was unequivocal:

We have considered long and carefully the possibility of a

separate Parliament, Assembly, Council or some other elected

authority with executive or legislative powers covering the

whole of Scotland, and we feel strongly that any such body--

whilst superficially attractive as a short-term palliative to
our problems--would be divisive and would inevitably create

 

1The Government of Scotland..., p. 12.

20f. Scotlandz' Loca 'Governmentheform, H.M.S.O., Edinburgh, 1969;
and, for a brief description, The Scotsman, September 26, 1969.

147

an unfavourable environment for the methods of government
which we require.1

At one point in its presentation of evidence to the Commission the
party spokesman even said he would prefer to see the Tories rule
Britain than see the Scots win complete independence with their own
parliament. The Times reported the session as follows:
Mr. John Pollock, vice-chairman of the party, said a
Scottish Assembly as proposed by the Conservatives would, if
it was to be effective, reduce the effectiveness of Scottish
M.P.s at Westminster, where their voice ought to be heard.

If the assembly was to be purely a talking shop it would not
attract members of any calibre.

Asked by Lord Crowther if the party would change its

view if a Conservative government was elected and remained

in power for as long as 13 years, Mr. Pollock said: "It is

an unlikely hypothesis but even the possibility of a Con-

servative govermment ever ruling Great Britain again would

be preferable to complete independence.
One begins to understand part of the motivation behind this attitude
if one considers that without Scotland sending M.P.s to Westminster,
Labour would have lost the election of 1964. In 1966, Labour sent
26 more MtP.s to Westminster from Scotland than the Conservatives did.

In summary, then, it is clear that the SNP, although presenting
proposals varying in detail, advocated the most sweeping changes in the
government of Scotland. These changes center on the establishment of
an independent Scottish parliament with powers over all affairs of
Scotland. Whether or not complete severance of all ties to England

would be a part of this, however, is a matter of considerable dispute.

The Liberal Party and the Communist Party proposed similar plans for a

 

1The Government of Scotland..., p. 1.

 

2The Times, London, May 5, 1970.

148
Scottish Parliament with limited authority to raise taxes and to legis-
late in areas relevant to Scottish local affairs, matters of international
relations and defense being left under the control of the British
Parliament. The Conservative Party proposed a parliament for Scotland
with even less authority, limited to the consideration of preliminary
stages of Scottish legislation and to the right to question government
ministers. And finally, the Labour Party advocated the least change in
the existing relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom” Re-
jecting the idea of a separate parliament for Scotland, Labour instead
proposed a reform of local government to increase the involvement of

Scots in their own affairs.

CHAPTER V
SCOTLAND AS A DEPRIVED REGION
Was it for little Belgium's sake
Sae mony thoosand Scotsman dee'd?
And never sue for Scotland, fegs!
Wi' twenty thoosand times mair need!

The physical nuances of a landscape strongly influence the dis-
tribution, livelihoods, and well-being of a people. Arid or mountain-
ous land is frequently unsuitable for agriculture; insufficient basic
mineral resources like coal, petroleum, and iron often retard indus-
trial development. As societies industrialize, they become more
specialized, and the character of a nation's landscape makes some areas
appropriate for shipbuilding, others for paper production, still others
for growing cotton, while leaving some regions economically non-
productive.

This geographic influence on economic activity and the placement
of industries may have profound social implications. First, to the
extent that one's occupation or role in the economic system.influences
one's social outlook, geography may correlate with opinions, attitudes,
and even ideologies. If working in the mines or on the docks fosters
left-wing political views, mining towns and port cities may be charact-
erized by significant socialist or communist organizations.1 One need

not accept the Mdrxist notion that all political conditions derive from

 

1Cf. Kornhauser, op. cit., pp. 213-22.

149

150

1

economic relationships to acknowledge that occupation is related to

political attitudes and to political behavior.2
Second, both long-run economic trends and the short-run vagaries
of the market mechanism.have uneven effects in a nation's economy and
‘may affect geographic regions differently. The development of nuclear
power sources may adversely affect areas where coal mining is a domin-
ant economic activity while lowering costs and increasing productivity
in areas which previously had to pay high transport rates for traditional
fuels. In addition, the depletion of a region's mineral resources,
forcing consumers of raw materials to turn to other regions or external
sources, will be felt unevenly in an economy. The typical result of
such circumstances is a rise in unemployment in the region directly
affected.
In a semi-planned economy, short-run variations in demand can also
have a differential regional effect. Industries concentrated in
specific areas can have a potentially harmful effect on their region
should demand for their products fall off. The aerospace industry in
Washington, California, and Florida is a contemporary American example.
A rise in regional unemployment is the expected result.
Hence, in a number of complex ways geography can influence a

society's economic and political systems. But one assumption of behav-

ioral theory is that environmental conditions must be perceived if they

 

1Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 141-4.

2In Britain, for example, 75% of those in "unskilled manual" occu-
pations had a Labour party self-image in 1963 while only 14% of those in
"higher managerial" occupationé identified with the Labour party. Cf.
David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain, Macmillan,
London, 1969, p. 77. For evidence from.France, Italy, and Britain in
the 1950's, cf. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 230-78.

 

151
are to affect human behavior. Boulding suggests that men's "behavior
depends on the image" they have of the‘world.1 If regional variations
within a society are subtle or insignificant, they may not become part
of the image of their society men carry around in their heads. And
behavior cannot reflect conditions which are not perceived.

In later chapters we shall use attitudinal data to construct a
model of the Scottish national image. But before turning to that data,
which is after all only the combined subjective impressions of a
national group, we shall examine aggregate evidence to establish the
empirical parameters of regional economic and political vatiations
within Britain. The predominant Scottish image is that within the
context of the United Kingdom, Scotland is economically and politically
deprived. But as we show in this chapter, the aggregate evidence pre-
sents a highly ambiguous picture. Scotland trails the rest of the
country in some respects but leads in others. In Chapter Two we noted
the distinction between persisting and short-term deprivation. The
former involves economic and political discrimination, the way a region
was brought into the union, and a relative paucity of educational
opportunities; the latter involves recently adverse economic conditions,
taxes, inflation, and new government restrictions on political parti-
cipation and representation.2 These deprivation variables, in addition

to data on population growth and movement, provide the focus for this

 

1Kenneth Boulding, The Image, The University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor, 1956, p. 6.

2Cf. chap. II, pp. 18-19.

152

chapter.1

Population and Migration

Embracing one-third of the total area of the United Kingdom,
Scotland claims only 9.6% of its total population. Like most of the
rest of the world, Scotland's population has multiplied significantly
in the past century and a half, increasing from only 1.6 million in
1801 to an extimated 5.2 million in 1966. Scotland industrialized
during this period, and a great population shift to urban areas trans-
formed the demographic and social character of the country.

As in England, the middle of the nineteenth century was a time of
great economic change in Scotland. "The prosperity of Scotland,"
Cairncross notes, "was built on heavy industries--especially those in

the metal and engineering group."2 With coal a convenient source of

 

1Although the British have a penchant for gathering aggregate sta-
tistics perhaps unmatched by any but the Swedes, the problems of comparing
regions within Britain using such statistics are formidable. In the first
place many data are not centrally gathered. Scotland has traditionally
enumerated its own census, managed its own developmental statistics, and
has been responsible for its own social service data. This means that
information needed to do a comparative study is scattered. Moreover, as a
result, there are variations in the nature of the comparative base. In
some instances Scotland can only be compared to England and Wales. In
others it is necessary to contrast Scotland with the United Kingdom as a
whole, i.e., England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Because we
want to show the relative well-being of Scotland and England, we will use
regional data whenever possible. But due to these irregularities in sta-
istical compilation, we will often be forced to utilize other baseline
data. This will always have the effect of reducing differences and this
should be kept in mind when we use "United Kingdom" or "Great Britain"
baseline data. A third difficulty is that the criteria on which data are
gathered often differ from one region to the next. This is particularly
noticeable between England and Scotland in such areas as finance, education,
and law, since business in these areas is run independently in the two
regions. Whenever these data are non-comparable, we will avoid using them.
For a good general description of the "multi-national regions" of the
United Kingdom, cf. Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, An Irish
Perspective, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1971, chap. ii.

2A. K. Cairncross (ed.), The Scottish Economy: A Statistical Account
of Scottish Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1954, p. 3.

153

power, Scotland soon established world leadership in shipbuilding and
marine engineering, locomotive-building, foundry-work, and the production
of heavy industrial equipment. She built a strong export trade in
textiles, carpets, and whiskey. "From being a poor and backward agricul-
tural country," Cairncross summarizes, "Scotland lept forward to the
very forefront of modern capitalism....."1

Paralleling this process of industrialization was a population
migration from rural areas in the Highlands and southern Borders to the

cities in the central lowland belt.2

In 1801 forty-two percent of the
population lived in the central belt, which includes both Glasgow
(situated near the western coast on the River Clyde) and Edinburgh (on
the banks of the Firth of Forth near the eastern coast). The urbani-
zation of Scotland was largely complete by 1931 when seventy-five
percent of the population lived in this central belt. Migration trends
in Scotland still reveal these centripetal forces, but regional popu-
lation proportions have changed little in the past forty years.3

While in absolute numbers Scotland's population has increased

markedly over the past 160 years, two factors contribute to an image of

stagnation. First, population growth, eSpecially in the twentieth

 

11bid., p. 2.

2For census purposes, the Registrar General divides the country
into four regions. Northern, West Central, East Central, and Southern.
The two central regions separate the Northern and Southern divisions
and combine to make the central lowland belt. This belt consists of
the counties of Dunbarton, Ayr, Renfew, and Lanmark in the west, and
Fife, Clackmannan, Stirling, West Lothian, Midlothian, East Lothian,
and the city of Dundee in the east.

31a 1961, 76% of the population (about half of whom resided within
20 miles of Glasgow's city center) lived in the central belt. Popula-
tion figures are from the decennial census reports which are summarized
in Kellas, op. cit , pp 238-43.

154

TABLE 10

SCOTLAND'S POPULATION, 1801-1966

 

 

 

Total in As percentage of

Census millions England and Wales
1801 1.608 18.1
1851 2.889 16.1
1871 3.360 14.8
1891 4.026 13.9
1901 4.472 13.7
1911 4.761 13.2
1921 4.882 12.9
1931 4.843 12.1
1951 5.096 11.6
1961 5.179 11.2
1966 (est.) 5.188 10.7

 

Sources: Kellas, Modern Scotland: and Central Statistical Office,
Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, London, 1969.
century, has been unsteady. Between 1921 and 1931 Scotland's popula-
tion actually declined slightly and a similar falling off was observed
between 1961 and 1971. Second, as a region Scotland has grown far
less quickly than England. As Table 10 shows, the proportion of Scots
relative to English and Welsh has fallen steadily since 1801. These
factors can be traced neither to lower birth rates nor to significantly
higher death rates in Scotland. In fact Scottish birth rates are
higher than those in any of the other nine Standard Economic Planning
Regions of Britain. Death rates, while slightly higher than the British
average, are still lower than in three other regions.1 Moreover,
births have always exceeded deaths in Scotland.

Scotland's relatively low rate of population growth and its occa-

sional absolute decline in numbers is directly related to emigration.

 

1Edwin Hammond,AnhAnalysis Of RegiOnal EcOnomic and Social Statis-
tics, University of Durham Rowntree Research Unit, Durham, 1968.

155
TABLE 11

MIGRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION,
SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND AND WALES, 1871-1971,

 

 

 

BY DECADES
Difference: Scotland
Decade Scotland England and Wales exceeds England and Wales
1871-81 -2.8% - .7% 2.1
1881-91 -5.8 -2.3 3.5
1891-1901 -l.3 - .2 1.1
1901-11 -5.7 -1.5 4.2
1911-21 -5.0 -1.7 3.3
1921-31 -8.0 - 4 7.6
1931-51 -4.5 +1.9 6.3
1951-61 -5.5 + .9 6.4
1961-71 (est.) -7.6 +1.4 9.0

 

Source: Central Statistics Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics.

The rate of population outflow has always been greater in Scotland
than in England and Wales. Table 11 shows net migration in the two
regions as a percentage of their respective populations. It is appar-
ent that the discrepancy between the regions has increased in the

past fifty years. A report prepared by the Scottish Economic Planning
Board (SEPB) showed that between 1951 and 1968, ninety-two percent of
Scotland's natural population increase was lost through emigration.1
This high rate of population outflow can be seen not only as a cause
of Scotland's slow population growth but also as an important result
of certain social conditions inside Scotland.

The reasons people emigrate frmm their countries are varied. Some

seek relief from racial or religious discrimination; others attempt to

 

1The Report, prepared for circulation amdhg Cabinet Ministers and
senior civil servants, was summarized by the Edinburgh newspaper, The
Scotsman, January 29, 1970. During the latter part of the period
studied the net outflow in Scotland was matched in western Europe only
by‘Malta.

156

escape political oppression. Some respond to economic hardships at
home; others have a vision of unlimited opportunities abroad. A common
thread connecting these motivations is a perception of relative depri-
vation; most people emigrate because they think they will be better
off politically, economically, or socially, than they were in the
first place. They expect emigration to remove inequalities or depri-
vations. And since emigration is such a drastic step, involving
separation from family, friends, and home, such deprivations must be
strongly felt.1

In Scotland, a number of social conditions might underlie the
motivation to emigrate. Some of these will be noted below. The SEPB
report showed that "for Scotland the closest relationship appears to
exist (with a time lag) between the level of net emigration to the rest
of the U.K. and relative unemployment-~especia11y relative male
unamployment--as'measured by the difference between Scottish and Great
Britain percentage rates."2 In addition, the report found negative
correlations between emigration rates on the one hand and income levels,
economic opportunities, and housing conditions on the other. These
factors suggest a strong positive relationship between deprivation and
emigration.

A significant implication of the data in Table 11 is that, since
emigration has been increasing in Scotland, an underlying sense of
deprivation may also be on the rise. This conclusion is unavoidable

if we assume a strong positive linkage between deprivation and emigration.

 

1Cf. Oscar Handlin's description of deprivations and hardships
felt by American immigrants in The Qprooted, Atlantic Monthly Press,
Boston, 1951.

 

2Loc. cit.

157
It is also notable that the two major surges of nationalism.in the twen-
tieth century, the cultural renaissance of the 20's and the political
activity of the 60's,occurred during periods of very high emigration.
While these are but the aggregate effects of behavioral variables and
ought to be treated as indicative rather than conclusive, one reasonable
explanation of these relationships is that emigration and nationalism
are complementary and not mutually exclusive ways of responding to a
single stimmlus--deprivation-induced frustration. One means of dealing
with an unpleasant or frustrating problem is literally to run away from
it. When the emigrant leaves home, he hopes to leave his problems
behind.

In connection with this it is important to know where emigrants go
in order to determine the perceived source of the problems. If Scots
emigrate abroad, we might conclude that England is perceived to be not
much better off than Scotland. If the flow to England is high, England
is seen as a place of escape from.Scotland's problems. Available
migration data shows that emigration from Scotland to other parts of
the United Kingdom.has always been high, but that short-term fluctua-
tions are possible. In 1963, sixty-two percent of those leaving Scot-
land were bound for other parts of the United Kingdom. By 1967 this
proportion had fallen to just thirty-six percent.1 This suggests that
Scots were increasingly regarding their problems to be universal
throughout the Kingdom and not specific to Scotland. England, in other
words, may have ceased to be a positive comparative reference group for

many Scots.

 

lHanham, op. cit., p. 30.

158

Income and Unemployment

There is no official estimate of the total worth of goods and
services produced in Scotland. Since Scotland lacks economic as well
as political autonomy, national income is a hypothetical concept which,
while useful in gauging Scotland's overall economic well-being, is impre-
cise and tentative. Income and production statistics are gathered on
a regional basis in Britain, but it is difficult to calculate Scotland's
share of United Kingdom.property income, national debt payments, and
private company profits since these are computed on a national basis.1
Nevertheless, independent efforts to estimate the Scottish national
income have arrived at similar broad conclusions. Campbell estimated
that real income (in 1938 prices) per head of population in Scotland
rose from 83 pounds in 1924 to 182 pounds in 1948.2 But this absolute
rise was not matched by an increase in the percentage ratio between
real income in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole. With
only minor fluctuations, Scotland's real income per capita remained at
ninety percent of the United Kingdom figure throughout the period studied.

A mmre recent study of the Scottish economy presents an even more
marked contrast between Scotland and the rest of Britain. McCrone found
that Scotland's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1960 was only 8.7% of

the 0.x. tota1.3

 

1A discussion of the difficulties of measuring Scotland's national
income appears in A. D. Campbell, "Income," in Cairncross (ed.), op. cit.,
pp. 47-9.

21bid., pp. 50-1.

3The Gross Domestic Product "measures the output of the Scottish
economy, but unlike national income it takes no account of income re-.
ceived by Scottish residents from elsewhere, nor does it deduct income
arising in Scotland which is paid to shareholders and others living out-
side Scotland...." However, "[SJince the difference between GDP and
national income is very small, this may be taken as a guide to the Scot—

tish standard of living." Gavin McCrone, Scotland's Future: The Econ-
omics of Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp. 12-13.

159

Expressed in terms per capita, measuring the "overall productivity of
the economy," Scotland's GDP was 377 pounds compared to the United
Kingdom's 431 pounds. At that time Scotland's level of per capita
output was only eighty-seven percent of the United Kingdom's level.
Moreover, the Gross Domestic Products for Wales and Northern Ireland
(each about ninety percent of the United Kingdom average) are included
in the total figures and depress the United Kingdom total; were Scot-
land compared to England alone, the differences would be even more
marked.

A comparable discrepancy is discernable in personal income figures.
In 1965 the average annual income for Scots was 853 pounds, only
ninety-one percent of the average English income of 938 pounds.1
Figure 4 reveals the extent to which Scotland's income distribution
deviates from.the national average. Nearly fifty-five percent of all
Scottish incomes are under 750 pounds annually contrasted to forty-
six percent of all British incomes. Two factors contribute to this
discrepancy. First, wages are generally lower in Scotland than for
equivalent work in England. Table 12 shows that for every industry
group but two, the average annual wage in 1967 was lower in Scotland
than in the United Kingdom as a whole. Moreover, the cost of living is
approximately as high in Scotland as elsewhere in the Kingdom. Al-
though in 1967 the average weekly household income in Scotland was
ninety-six percent of that for the whole United Kingdom, expenditures
were more than one hundred percent, indicating that income discrepancies

Iare-not mitigated by countervailing costs.2

 

1Hammond, op. cit., Table 7.1.1 (b).

2Scottish Statistical Office, Digest of Scottish Statistics, No.
33, April, 1969, HMSO, Edinburgh, 1969.

 

160
FIGURE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME BEFORE TAXES,
BY PERCENT: SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1964/65

 

 

 

 

 

Percent
25
1‘
/ Great Britain
/ \L/
I \
\
20 ‘
l
1
a, \
5 \
0
3,15 \
m \
§
:3
w-l
B
3 10 I
a I
w-l
v—l
m
u
o
u
'44
° 5
4.!
I:
o
o
u
m
a.
\
0
.23
IO\ um l0‘ :0 IO\ 1:» H
Hun raox c>q- c>0s c>o~ c>o~ c>o~ C10
0l\ h-q- c>h~ wwox c><- C>O\ C>O\ c»>
'ocv cu ux F~ c>r4 vapa c>q- <3 0
g v-I .-I N In

Annual Income
(in pounds)

Source: Hammond, An Analysis of Regional Economic and
Social Statistics, Tables 7.1.1(a) and 7.1.1(b).

—-— -——-—._~

 

 

5;

\n

161
TABLE 12

AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS OF MALE MANUAL WORKERS,
BY INDUSTRY, SCOTLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1967

 

 

 

 

Industry Weekly Earnings
United Scotland
Scotland Kingdom As Z of
s. d. s. d. U.K.
1. Agriculture, forestry, fishing *3 *
2- Mining and quarrying 412 o 418 9 98.4
3. Food, drink, tobacco 373 1 399 5 94.6
4. Chemicals and allied industries 429 6 430 2 99.9
5. Metal manufacture 416 8 431 6 96.6
6. Engineering and electrical goods 427 9 415 3 103.0
7. Shipbuilding and marine engineering 416 3 433 6 96.0
8. Vehicles 442 3 467 5 94.6
9. Metal goods not elsewhere specified 403 5 411 0 98.1
10. Textiles 340 0 373 2 91.1
11. Leather, leather goods, fur 339 6 363 11 93.3
12. Clothing and footwear 367 10 365 6 100.7
13. Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc. 395 4 428 11 92.1
14. Timber, furniture, etc. 355 0 389 1 91.3
15. Paper, printing and publishing 418 10 478 2 87.6
16. Other manufacturing industries 402 9 419 11 95.9
17. Construction; 400 l 412 0 97.1
18. Gas, electricity and water 372 O 385 9 96.4
19. Transport and communication 385 4 419 0 92.0
20. Distributive trades * *
21. Insurance, banking and finance * *
22. Professional and scientific services * *
23. Miscellaneous services 351 2 355 4 98.8
24. Public administration and defense 294 7 322 10 91.2
All categories except 1, 20, 21, 22 394 4 411 7 95.8

 

adata missing
Source: Kellas, Mbdern Scotland, pp. 244-5.

 

The income gap between Scotland and the rest of the United King-
dom was not always as apparent as it is today. During the first
decades of the century Scotland's wages in many industries were actually
higher than UK averages. A Board of Trade Earnings Enquiry in 1906

revealed that of seventeen industries surveyed, Scottish men received

162

wages higher than UK averages in six. Scottish women received higher
than average wages in nine industries out of eleven.1 But by midcen-
tury Scotland's wage situation had worsened. One example of the extent
of the reversal is the boot and shoe industry where average weekly earn-
ings in 1906 were 30/3 in Scotland and only 26/4 in the United Kingdom
generally. In 1951 earnings in Scotland were up to 126/2 weekly but
those for the UK as a whole passed Scotland at 155/3.2 Similar patterns
are discernable in nearly all industries. Ireland's exit from the union
in 1921 inflated the United Kingdom totals somewhat but not enough to
account for such large differences. There were indications that during
the 1960's wage discrepancies between Scotland and the United Kingdom
were declining. In 1962 the percentage ratio was ninety-three percent,
in 1965 it was ninety-four percent, and by 1967 it had risen to ninety-
six percent.3 But this fluctuation is minor and may be transitory.

The second factor affecting the gap between average incomes in
Scotland and in England is unemployment. Table 13 shows that rates
of unemployment have always been higher in Scotland than in Great
Britain as a whole. In the post-war period, although unemployment has
been generally low, ScOtland's rates have been close to double those
for the whole country. One problem relates to the nature of Scotland's
economy. Leser argues that

The predominance of heavy industry makes Scotland sen-
sitive to economic depression since it is generally the pro-
duction of heavy engineering products that falls off the

most drastically in a slump. In the early 1930's, for example,
unemployment in Britain increased from 10.1% in the camparatively

 

1D. J. Robertson, "Wages," in Cairncross (ed.), op. cit., p. 152.

21bid., p. 167.

3Cf. Kellas, op. cit., p. 245.

163

prosperous years 1927-29 to 20.3% in the worst years of the
slump, 1931-33, while in Scotland the increase was from 11.4%
to 26.2%. Scotland was rather harder hit, and one reason, but
not the sole reason, was that she had specialized in some of

the industries that suffered the biggest increase in unemploy-
ment. No doubt if one were to compare Scotland not with Great
Britain as a whole but with the Midlandscnrthe South of England,
the difference in unemployment rates in the slump of 1932 would
be much greater.

TABLE 13

AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT IN SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN,
BY PERCENT, IN SELECTED YEARS

 

 

 

Great Great
Year Scotland Britain Year Scotland Britain
1923 14.3% 11.6% 1955 2.4% 1.1%
1926 16.4 12.3 1959 4.4 2.2
1927 10.6 9.6 1960 3.7 1.6
1930 18.5 15.8 1961 3.2 1.5
1932 27.7 21.9 1962 3.8 2.0
1935 21.3 15.3 1963 4.8 2.5
1939 13.5 10.3 1964 3.7 1.6
1943 1.0 .5 1965 3.0 1.4
1945 :2.2 1.0 1966 2.9 1.5
1946 4.6 2.4 1967 3.9 2.4
1950 3.1 1.5 1968 3.8 2.4

 

 

Sources: Kellas, Mbdern Scbtland; Scottish Statistical Office,
Digest of Scottish Statistics,
But even more important in the long-run is that two of Scotland's
mainstay industries, mining and shipbuilding, have declined in overall
importance to the British economy. The Central Statistical Office's
Index of Industrial Production shows that during the 1963-68 period
only three British industries showed a decline in production. One was
the leather industry--not particularly important to Scotland--which in

1968 produced ninety-three percent of its 1963 level of output. The

 

1C. E. V. Leser, "Production," in Cairncross (ed.), op. cit., pp.
69-70.

164
other two industries were mining and shipbuilding, the former producing
only eighty-five percent of its 1963 level, the latter eighty-seven
percent.1 Since these two industries together account for almost seven
percent of the total employment in Scotland, this decline in production
can only have inflated Scotland's unemployment figures.

The SEPB report noted above supplied evidence to suggest that
economic deprivations, including unemployment, may be related to emi-
gration. One way to examine this hypothesis using aggregate data is to
see if sub-groups with high unemployment rates are those with high emi-
gration rates. A few examples will shOw that the results are mixed.
First, the geographic regions of Scotland most severely affected by
unemployment are the Highlands and the southern Borders. In.many parts
of the Highlands unemployment runs as high as twenty percent. The
shift from.an agricultural to an industrial economy caused a correspond-
ing shift in population. The relative population decline in these
regions is striking: from fifty-eight percent of the total Scottish
population in 1801 to only twenty-four percent in 1961. Since 1891
there has been a decline in absolute numbers as well. As economic oppor-
tunities increased in the cities relative to the countryside, working
families emigrated to Scottish cities, English cities, and abroad. The
Highlands, the region most commonly differentiated from the rest of
Britain in cultural and historical terms, is one of the regions most
severely differentiated in an economic sense as well.

However, an examination of age groups shows that the relationship

between unemployment and emigration is not general. Unemployment is

 

1Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.
106, 1969, HMSO, London, 1969, p. 146.

165

higher among workers over forty than among those under forty. The over
forty group, making up forty-nine percent of all insured employees,
represent fifty-one percent of all those unemployed.1 But the SEBP
report showed that ramigration. is "concentrated in the key 15-34 age
group and amounted to fifty-five percent of the net loss."2 This dis-
crepancy illustrates the central fact that, while unemployment and
emigration are undoubtedly related, there are intervening variables
which depress the correlation. Ease of mobility probably makes young
people more likely than older people to emigrate. The perception of
opportunities, both at home and elsewhere, is also likely to be a key
factor, but one not necessarily related to one's employment/unemployment
status. The SEPB report itself goes on to contradict the relationship
between unemployment and migration when it finds that sixty-four percent
of Scotland's net loss occurs among persons economically active while
this group makes up only fifty percent of the population as a whole.3
Hanham is probably right when he asserts that emigration is a kind of
safety valve in Scotland since unemployment and its concomitant prob-
lems would have been even more serious had it not been for the ease of
emigration abroad and to the south.4 But the relationship is not simple
and those who emigrate do not appear to be the unemployed.

Hence, in terms of national and personal income and relative rates

of unemployment Scotland trails United Kingdom averages and presents an

image of a deprived region. Other specific indicators strengthen this

 

1Data are frmm 1966. Hammond, op. cit., Tables 2.1.4 and 2.2.3.
2The Scotsman, January 29, 1970.
31nd.

4Hanham, op, cit., p. 30.

166
image. With 9.6% of the total British population,Scotland claims only

2 and the headquarters of just

7.5% of its cars,1 5.5% of its computers,
4.7% of Britain's 300 largest firms.3
But to say that Scotland suffers deprivation is not to say that
she suffers from.discrimination. In fact the central government has
set up procedures for reducing the economic discrepancies between
England (especially southeast England) and the rest of the United King-
dom. Begun in 1960 and greatly expanded in 1966, government programs
now exist to lure private industry into especially designated "develop-
ment areas" by providing financial incentives in the form of investment
and building grants, training schemes, and general purpose loans.4 The
purpose of such programs is to encourage companies to carry on expansion
in areas other than the southeast, thereby reducing what are euphemis-
tically called the "reserves of manpower" in the development areas.
Being one of these areas, Scotland is a preferred region for industrial

development. Although these programs have thus far met with only

limited success, their very existence, when emphasized by widespread

 

1Hammond, op. cit., Table 6.5.2.

21bid., Table 2.6.2.
3Ibid., Table 2.6.4.

4Included in the program are: (1) The Industrial Development Act
(1966) which provides for long-term.investment grants for new plant and
machinery in certain industries at a rate (40%) double that for the rest
of the country; (2) Local Employment Acts (1960 to 1966) which provide
government premises for rent or purchase, grants of 25-30% for new build-
ings, or general purpose loans for capital assets or working capital;
and (3) the Nucleus Labour Force Scheme which provides assistance for
unemployed local people transferred temporarily to the new place of work
for (additionally assisted) industrial training. The five development
areas, in addition to Northern Ireland, are Scotland, Wales, Merseyside,
NCrth (Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, Durham, and Yorks, North
Riding), and Southwest (Cornwall and North Devon). Cf. Great Britain,
Board of Trade, Government Help fOr Your Business, HMSO, London, 1969.

167
publicity, may relieve the sense of neglect in Scotland.

A second important way the central government seeks to equalize
living standards in Scotland and England is through the system of
direct grants to local authorities. These grants are for use by munici-
palities and counties in sustaining their programs in education, housing,
health, law enforcement, roads, and other services. In 1966-67,
government grants accounted for twenty-eight percent of the total in-
come of local authorities in England and wales and thirty percent of the
total in Scotland. But the size of the Scottish grants in relation to
that for England and Wales indicates even more forcefully the central
government's intent. In 1966-67 the Scottish grant was thirteen percent
of that awarded to England and Wales, about 33 million pounds more
than would be apportioned to Scotland solely on the basis of population.1
Table 14 shows that "identifiablé'central government expenditure per
head of population is substantially greater for Scotland than for
England and Wales.

Long-run economic indicators reveal the extent to which persisting
deprivations are suffered by sub-groups within a society, but short-run
fluctuations in certain sectors of an economy may adversely affect some
groups more than others. The short-run economic situation for Scotland,
however, closely parallels that for the United Kingdom as a whole. The
1956-68 period--both in Scotland and in the whole of Britain--was an
era of inflation, rising taxes, an unfavorable trade balance, and gen-
erally unencouraging economic indicators. The annual rate of inflation

in Britain was more than 3.6% between 1962 and 1968, up from the 2.5%

 

1Central Statistical Office, op. cit., pp. 313-7.

168
TABLE 14

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER HEAD OF POPULATION IN
SCOTLAND AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1966-67

 

 

 

 

England
Scotland & Wales
Service L s d L s d
Roads (including Lighting) 6 6 O 4 8 2
Airports 12 9 4 1
Ports 5 ---
S.E.T Additional Payments 13 1 15 9
Promotion of Local Employment 3 12 1 9 3
Agricultural Support 6 6 0 4 O 7
Agricultural and Fishery Services 1 l9 '4 12 0
Forestry 11 2 l 7
Housing 4 12 1 1 18 4
Environmental Services 15 0 10 7
Libraries and Museums 2 4 4 10
Police 1 18 ll 2 2 5
Prisons 13 1 ll 9
Other Law and Order
(including Fire Services) 15 10 17 8
Education (excluding Universities, etc.) 3 10 2 1 5 3
Universities and C.A.T.s 7 3 4 3 17 5
Health and Welfare 27 3 3 23 2 0
Children's services 6 6 O 5 11 5
Benefits and Assistance 47 13 11 44 14 6
General Rate Deficiency and Equalization
and transitional grants, to Local
Renues, etc. 24 15 1 22 3 2
TOTAL 145 9 10 117 10 9

 

Source: Scottish National Party, Scotland v. Whitehall: Winifred
Ewing's Black Book, Scottish National Party, Glasgow, n.d., p. 9.

rate between 1956 and 1962.1 This inflation rate more than cancelled
the 3.1% rise in the British GNP during the 1962-68 period and helped

to offset the 6;3%'rise in incomes.2 Personal taxes increased

 

1Central Statistical Office, op. cit., p. 354.

2Organization for European Co-operation and Development (OFCD)
figures on GNP reported in David MCKie and Chris Cook, Election '70,
Panther Books Limited, London, 1970; income data in Central Statistical
Office, op. cit., p. 271.

 

169

during the 1962-68 period at an average rate of 12.0% annually, some-
what more rapidly than incomes, placing a heavier burden on taxpayers.1
But most attention during this period was focused on Britain's balance
of payments, a general measure of the country's standing in the inter—
national market. Throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's
international receipts generally exceeded international expenditures.
But between 1964 and 1968 a deficit of 915 million pounds was accumm-
lated, occasioning a 14.3% devaluation of the pound in November 1967.2
Additional evidence that Britain's relative economic position was slip-
ping deals with GNP growth rates. In a study of "Real National Income"
in nine western countries growth rates between 1955 and 1964 ranked
Britain eighth. Germany and Italy grew about twice as fast as Britain.3

But there is little evidence to suggest that Scotland suffered
these short-term economic reverses more severely than the United King-
dom as a whole. The Scottish Family Expenditure Survey in 1965/67
showed that Scottish households paid income taxes and national insur-
ance contributions at a rate only ninety percent of the United Kingdom
average. Given that Scottish household income during this period was
ninety-six percent of the United Kingdom.average, Scots paid relatively

4

less to these funds. In Britain as a whole income taxes rose twelve

percent annually between 1962 and 1968; in Scotland the average annual

rise was under nine percent.5

1

 

Ibid., p. 289.
21bid., p. 256 and p. 268.

3EdwaranDenison, Why Growth Rates Differ: ~POstwar'Experience in
Nine Western Countries, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1967, p. 17.

4Scottish Statistical Office, op. cit., p. 57.

5Ibid., p. 56.

170

Housing and Health

Housing conditions represent another dimension on which economic
deprivation can be measured. As Baird notes, "Scottish housing has for
long had an unenviable reputation and, rightly or wrongly, the Glasgow
slums have widely been regarded as without equal in Western Europe."1
The major problem is overcrowding. More than twenty-two percent of the
Scottish population reside in housing which is officially designated
"overcrowded." In Glasgow the proportion is more than thirty-four per-
cent.2 Density in Scottish housing has always been higher than in
England. Table 15 shows that although the gap has narrowed considerably
since 1911, in 1961 there were still .27 more persons per room in

Scotland than in England.

TABLE 15

HOUSING DENSITY
IN SCOTLAND AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1871-1961

 

 

Persons per room

 

 

Year Scotland England and Wales
1871 1.69 *8
1891 1.62 *
1911 1.45 .95
1931 1.27 .83
1951 1.04 .73
1961 .93 .66

 

3Data not available

Sources: Robert Baird, "Housing," The Scottish Economy, in Cairn-
cross (ed.), p. 197; Hammond, An Analysis Of Regional Economic and
Social Statistics, Table 3.2.3.

 

1Robert Baird, "Housing," in Cairncross,(ed.), op. cit., p. 193.

2General Register Office, Scotland, Census 1961:,SCOtland, Vol. Four,
Housing and Households, Part I, HMSO, Edinburgh, 1966. Housing is over-
crowded by Ministry of Housing definition when housing density is 1.5 or
more persons per room.

 

171
Of all occupied dwellings in Scotland 57.8% have from one to three rooms.
This contrasts with the situation in England and Wales where only 14.5%
are so modest.

Compounding the problem of overcrowding is the generally unfit
condition of many Scottish dwellings. In 1966 it was estimated that
forty-three percent of all Scottish dwellings were of pre-l9l9 vintage
compared to thirty-nine percent in England.2 ‘Moreover, Scottish houses
tend to be more dilapidated, over ten percent being demolished or
closed as slums in the 1955-66 period as contrasted to just six percent
in England and Wales.3 Scotland's industrial cities, especially Glasgow,
often take on the aspect of war-devastation as vacant buildings whose
fabric show the abuse of years and of vandals,' stand in silent
anticipation of the wrecking ball. But house building is proceeding
no faster in Scotland than in England and Wales. In 1962 construction
on .6 permanent houses and flats per capita was completed in England

and Wales, but the rate was just .5 per capita in Scotland.4

Another aspect of dwelling fitness concerns the availability of
common household amenities like running water and toilets. The data
in Table 16 suggests that, while differences exist between the two re-
gions, Scottish dwellings are not appreciably less fit than those in
England and Wales. Glaswegians, however, are somewhat less likely than

Londoners to have hot water or a fixed bath.

 

1Kellas, op. cit., p. 248.

2Hammond, op. cit., Table 3.3.1.
31bid., Table 3.3.2.

4Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest 'o’f Statistics, No. 288,
December 1969, HMSO, London, 1969, p. 91.

 

172
TABLE 16

HOUSING CONDITIONS
DWELLINGS LACKING CERTAIN HOUSEHOLD AMENITIES, BY PERCENT

 

 

Percent lacking in:

 

Central
England Greater London Clydeside
Amenity & Wales conurbation Scotland conurbation
Cold Tap 1.7% .2% 1.4% .1%
Hot Tap 21.0 19.8 20.7 25.4
Fixed Bath 21.7 17.2 26.7 31.2
Water Closet 7.1 .6 2.6 .2

 

Sources: General Register Office, Census 1961, England and Wales,
Housing Tables, Part II; General Register Office, Edinburgh, Census 1961:
Scotland, vol. Four, Housing and Households, Part I.

 

Perhaps exacerbated by generally poor economic conditions, inclu-
ding unfit housing, the level of overall public health in Scotland is
lower than in England. Tuberculosis rates in England and Scotland are,
respectively, 31 and 47 per hundred thousand. Dysentery occurs in
Scotland at a rate almost double, and pneumonia at a rate almost five
times that in England. Life expectancy and infant mortality, two fre-
quently used indicators of the general quality of health care, show
Scotland marginally worse off than England. ‘Males can expect to live
68.7 years in England and Wales, but only 67.0 years in Scotland.2
Twenty-three infants per thousand live births fail to survive the immed-

iate post-natal period in Scotland, while the mortality rate is just

 

1Rates for.1966 as computed from.Gentral Statistical Office, Annual
Abstract..., p. 7 and p. 62.

2Fromlife tables covering 1966-68, ibid., pp. 38-9. The differen-
ces in female life expectancy are even greater: 74.9 in England and
Wales and 73.1 in Scotland.

173
nineteen per thousand in England and Wales.1 But the National Health
Service has responded to these imbalances by providing for more exten-
sive health care services in Scotland. In 1966, for example, Scotland
boasted 122 staffed beds per thousand population while England and
Wales had only 99 per thousand. Scotland had medical and dental staff
at a rate of 5.4 per thousand population contrasted to just 4.3 per

2

thousand in England and Wales. So while housing conditions and

health standards are somewhat deficient in Scotland, the quality of

health care is at least on a par with that in England.3

Educational Opportunities and PolitiCs

A century ago Scottish schools were widely considered superior
to their English counterparts. In the 1860's the Royal Commission on
Schools in Scotland noted this superiority and commended Scottish
schools for their democratic character:

Education has been more generally diffused (in Scotland);
riches have been less rapidly and largely accumulated; and
as a consequence these circumstances have again reacted on
education; have caused the middle classes to value it more
generally than those in England do; and have prevented the
creation of that gulf which exists between men of cultiva-
tion and the middle classes in England, the existence of
which all thoughtful persons, who have had a superior edu-
cation, mmst have deplored.

 

lflbrfiality rateS'for 1966 computed from.uumber of deaths of in-
fants under one year of age. In contrast, maternal mortality rates are
about equal in the two regions.

2Ibid., pp. 59-60.

3This is a sonewhat subjective conclusion. Scotland's advantage
in terms of beds and medical staff per capita probably stems from the
distribution of the Scottish population, much of which is in widely
scattered rural areas. This necessitates a rather low doctor/patient
ratio throughout much of Scotland, and inflates the region's figures.

4From.Burg‘h''S'ohoo1s‘in‘Sc'Otla'n'd' (Pearson's Report) as quoted in
Kellas, op. cit., p. 77.

174

Unlike the English system, Scottish curriculum has been uniform
both within and between schools. As Kellas notes,

[t]he content of Scottish secondary school courses has always

been regarded as a preparation for university. It has thus

been traditional orthodoxy that the same education is given to

all, irrespective of whether the pupil desires, or is able, to

go to university.
This democratic aspect of Scottish school persists. But in same import-
ant respects the Scottish educational system no longer holds an advan-
tageous position with respect to its English equivalent. It is true
that total public expenditure on education is greater for Scotland than
for England. In 1966 expenditure in Scotland amounted to 34 pounds per
head of population, of which just 11 pounds were provided by the central
government; the level of expenditure in England was somewhat lower at
27 pounds per head, of which the central government provided just 5
pounds.2 Moreover, the opportunities for higher education seem on the
surface more widespread in Scotland, with some 488 full—time students
per hundred thousand population enrolled in universities as opposed to
the 221 per hundred thousand in England.3

But what is often overlooked is that a sizeable proportion of
students in Scottish schools are not Scots. In 1961, for example,
twenty-three percent of students in Scottish universities were English

or Welsh. By contrast only .7 percent of those in English and Welsh

universities were Scottish.4 Furthermore, while Scottish schools enroll

 

1Kellas, op. cit., p. 95.

2Computed from data in Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract...,
p. 106.

3

 

Hammond, op. cit., Table 4.3.2.

aKellas, op. cit., pp. 83-4.

175
eighteen percent of all British students, they receive only fourteen
percent of all university spending in Britain.1 These proportions
strongly suggest that Scottish universities are matriculating more than
their fair share of British university students. Because each is
administered separately, other differences, in curriculum, in stepwise
procedures up the educational ladder, and in testing, are apparent
between the Scottish and English systems. These differences, however,
are formal rather than substantive.

Political opportunities seem even more readily available than
educational opportunities for Scots. Enjoying the full rights of Brit-
ish citizenship, Scots experience no significant political discrimination.
Of the 630 Members of Parliament, each representing individual constit-
uencies through the United Kingdom, 71 (more than eleven percent) rep-
resent Scottish constituencies. Were seats apportioned purely on the
basis of population, Scotland would have only 60 representatives. This
means that Scotland has a bonus of eleven votes in Parliament. And
conforming to the national trend of having M.P.s reside in the constit-
uencies they represent, nearly all Scottish M.P.s in the modern era
have been native-born Scots. Although a precise count is difficult,
only about eight MAP-s sitting for Scotland in the 1966 Parliament were
not Scots (eleven percent), while thirteen Scots were sitting for English
constituencies (a scant.two percent of the English total).2

Moreover, Scots seem to have relatively easy access to the higher
British political elite. Of the 48 individuals who served between 1900

and 1968 as Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Foreign

 

lHammond, loc. cit., Tables 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.

2Cf. Dod's Parliamentary Companion, Whittaker and Co., London, 1967.

 

176
Secretary, six were Scots.1 Scottish Prime MinistersiJLthis century
have been Bonar Law, Campbell-Bannerman, MacDonald, Macmillan, and
Douglas-Home.

Equally as important to a sense of deprivation as contemporary
political opportunities is the history of a group's relationship to the
wider political system, particularly the way that a group or region was
incorporated into‘the whole. On this count there is a residue of ill
feelings and a sense of betrayal on the part of many Scots. The union
between England and Scotland came in 1707 as a formal agreement between
two sovereign and equal parliaments. Since Scotland was not brought
into the union through overt military coercion and since the Act of
Union was entered into by mutual consent of the two parliaments, the
specific procedure of unification might not on the surface appear to
be a source of friction and resentment between the two regions. Concern
with what happened two and a half centuries ago is rather limited today,
but opposition to the Scottish Parliament's action in approving the
Act of Union was intense at the time.

When the draft Treaty was presented to the Scottish Parliament

in October, 1706, and its terms became public, it was met with

a howl of execration throughout the land which was, no doubt,

fomented by Jacobites, but which also represented a feeling

that Scotland had been sold to the English.2
While Parliament debated the issue, letters and petitions to M.P.s
urged non-ratification and there was mob violence in Glasgow, Edinburgh,
and Dumfries. But those favoring Union-~mostly those with business

interests armed with promises to specific Members and with 20,000 pounds

05 bribe money secretly made available by the English Treasury--

 

1Cf. David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts:
1900-1967, 2d ed., Macmillaniand Co., Ltd., London, 1968, pp. 59-65.

2Mackie, op. cit., p. 260.

177

convinced a majority of 110 to 69 to accept the Treaty and join with
England.1 Those who consummated the victory were charged with betrayal
by the dissident elements and a general disillusionment with the Union
soon set in when expected economic benefits failed to materialize.

Today political discrimination is a charge frequently heard from
Scottish critics of centralized political and administrative decision-
making in Britain. Except in specific cases these charges are diffi-
cult to substantiate.2 Two representative examples will illustrate
the character of these criticisms. The first deals with the coverage
of BBC television transmissions in Scotland and England. Color trans-
‘missions were begun in November, 1969, throughout England and in parts
of southern Wales, but the bulk of the Celtic fringe, including Scotland,
most of Wales, and Northern Ireland, had to wait until early 1971. The
BBC offered that technical difficulties prevented simultaneous nation-
wide service, but many Scots cited the decision as a typical example
of central government indifference to Scottish sensibilities.3

A second example is afforded by the decision of the Ministry of
Technology in February, 1970, to test-fly the supersonic Concorde over
land. The decision ostensibly reflected concern that an all-sea test
would not allow adequate radar coverage of flights and would be too
distant from emergency air fields. But travelling at a ground speed
twice that of sound, the Concorde would subject the population below

to sonic booms for the full 800 miles of the test route. The area chosen

 

1Ferguson, op. cit., pp 48-53.
2One of the best statements of the case for Scottish independence
is Paton, op. cit. Paton details several examples of neglect or out-

right discrimination against Scotland.

30f. Observer Magazine, September 28, 1969, p. 28.

 

178

for this route ran up the western coast of Britain, touching only
Celtic fringe areas: Cornwall, Wales, Isle of Man, Northern Ireland,
and Scotland. Many in these areas, especially in Wales and Scotland
which were to be most severely affected, complained of being used by
the Ministry of Technology as "guinea pigs” to test public reaction

to regular sonic booms.1

Conclusion

As noted at the outset of this chapter, and as we will see in
Chapter Seven, many Scots have the general hmpression that Scotland
is a deprived region and that the quality of life is not as high as
in England. The consistently high rate of emigration from Scotland to
England appears to confirm this. But by no means do all measures show
Scotland worse off than England, and many of the differences which do
exist can more easily be attributed to chance factors of geography and
economics than to overt discrimination by the majority in England.
Certain highly visible social and economic conditions in Scotland, such
as low wage levels, high unemployment, and poor housing, comprise the
focus of popular concern. Because these conditions are easily perceived
and have a very broad influence, they may weigh more heavily in deter-
‘mining the deprived image of Scotland than those more favorable educa-
tional and political conditions which represent the other side of the
coin.

The deprivations which do exist in Scotland may be sufficient,
when perceived, to induce emigration among those who are mobile. They

may also be sufficient to account for separatist activities in Scotland.

 

le. The Times, February 18, 1970.

179
Schwartz concludes that the absence of systematic discrimination against
the Scots and the mixed deprivation picture serve to mitigate those
activities and to prevent them from crossing the thin line into violent
aggression.1 But the relation between perceived deprivations on the one
hand and separatist activity and emigration on the other hand cannot
be established definitively with aggregate data. Because the linkage
depends on key psychological Concepts, a more detailed examination of
motivations is required. The remaining chapters of this study focus on

survey data which can facilitate such an examination.

 

1Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 511-2.

CHAPTER VI
THE GLASGOW SAMPLE
But there are flegsome deeps
Whaur the soul 0 Scotland sleeps
That I to bottom need
To wauk Guid kens what deid....

Most of the discussion thus far has involved the examination of
evidence which is either historical or aggregate. Much of this evidence
has provided considerable sustenance for the hypothesis linking depri-
vation and support for separatism” But one further step in data-
gathering needs to be taken. Since both of our hypotheses focus on the
behavioral mysteries of support for separatism, we must inquire into
the perceptions, attitudes, and motivations which accompany action.

In the last chapter we sought to describe existing conditions of
stratificatiOn in the United Kingdom and in Scotland. In this and in
subsequent chapters we will examine perceptions of those conditions and
the motivational linkage between attitudes about Scotland and separatist

political activity.1 Most of the data examined in these chapters were

 

1All of this is undertaken in the face of protests by Chalmers John-
son who argues that "attitudes are a notoriously treacherous guide to
what people actually do. Even projective tests of orientations more
subtle than attitudes are open to challenge on this score. Direct be-
havioral observation is a sounder indicator of systemic equilibrium than
the measurement of attitudes by means of questionnaires?" [Revolutionary
Change, p. 148.] But of course it is the behavior that one wants to ex-
plain. "Systemic disequilibrium," the non-synchronization of social val-
ues and environmental factors, is a precondition for that revolutiOnary
or strife behavior, according to Johnson. But it would be a distortion
to measure response in terms of the conditions hypothesized to be necessary
to that response. More meaningful would be the establishment of the
relationship between the hypothesized antecedents and the dependent

 

180

181
generated by a public opinion survey conducted among eligible electors

in Glasgow in late March and early April 1970.

Sample Population

In any survey the population from.which the sample is selected
determines the universe about which generalized conclusions can justifi-
ably be made. Ostensibly any study which claims broad relevance while
utilizing a survey research design ought to employ a sample population
which will allow universal generalizability. Although this is a study
of Scottish nationalism, we would like to say something about the
phenomenon of separatism as it occurs in other places as well. But
because no social phenomenon can be adequately described or explained
on the basis of a single example, any broad conclusions about the gen-
eral question of separatism reached in this study will of necessity be
tentative.

Our sample was drawn from a population of eligible electors in two
Glasgow parliamentary constituencies. This fact makes generalized
comments even about Scotland problematical. Recognizing in advance the
possibility that urban nationalism in Scotland might differ in some
crucial way from rural or Highland nationalism and realizing the short-
comings of a sample population smaller than the relevant universe,
financial constraints prevented the selection of a broader, nation-wide
population. Because of the sensitive nature of parts of the questionnaire
which was to be administered to the sample, it was essential that native

Scots perform the chore of actually interviewing respondents. Although

 

variable, in Johnson's case between systemic equilibrium and strife be-

havior. Because we are assuming that a perception of disequilibrium is

an essential condition if that disequilibrium is to have behavioral con-
sequences, we will focus on the attitudes and perceptions of Scots.

182
these professional costs are somewhat lower in Britain than in the
United States, consultation with representatives of several survey
organizations in Britain revealed that with available funds a sample
of around 300 could be interviewed in an urban area, while one of only
150 could be interviewed in a rural area. It was this consideration
which led to the decision to frame an urban sample population. A
sample size of less than 300 respondents was thought to be too narrow
a base frem which to estimate population parameters and to test the
validity of key hypotheses.

Within the realm of urban Scotland, other considerations were kept
in mind in the selection of a sample population. It was hoped that the
political and social complexion of the population would approximate
that of the rest of Scotland, particularly the urban areas. But even
more importantly, it was essential that all significant subgroups be
present in the population. This was really just a nuance of the first
consideration, but it was emphasized because of the possible importance
of the Roman Catholic minority to the nationalist movement in Scotland.
Conflicting evidence regarding the role of Catholics in Scottish poli-
tics was a compelling reason for the selection of a population which
would include Catholics in numbers sufficient to undertake comparisons
of subsamples of Catholics with subsamples of Protestants.

A final consideration was the extent of nationalist activity present
in various locales. In order to guarantee a substantial subsample of
respondents who were sympathetic to the separatist cause or were partici-
pants in nationalist activities, it was essential that the sample popu-
lation have some history of nationalist activity--operationalized in

terms of Scottish National Party activity. The current revival of

183
political nationalism in Scotland seems strongest in small cities, in
suburban areas, and to a lesser extent in rural areas. But these lack
the ingredient above deemed essential to keep survey costs down, namely
high population density.

Two Glasgow parliamentary constituencies--Woodside and Maryhill--
were chosen for the sample populations with the above considerations in
mind. Located in the northwest quadrant of the city of Glasgow, both
are burgh constituencies with very high concentrations of population.
(See Table 17) Woodside was once the most densely populated area in
Britain. Today it is a fairly transient residential area, with three
important institutions helping to determine the character of its neigh-
borhoods. Glasgow University, with an enrollment of 7,814 students in
1969-70, is ensconced within Woodside constituency. Although largely
a commuter university, a significant number of students reside in the
immediate vicinity. A modest proportion of these students are regis—
tered to vote in Woodside.1 Matched by a.small number of faculty and
staff living and voting in the constituency, this elite contingent lends
a middle-class flavor to some areas of Woodside.

Although having less direct effect on the character of the elec-
torate, two other institutions, the Western Infirmary and the University
Medical School, are located within constituency boundaries. Immediately
adjacent to the University, these two institutions attract a diverse
clientele into the area on daily business. The infirmary serves the
entire western half of the Glasgow conurbation; the renowned medical

school attracts students from throughout the world.

 

1The general election of 1970 was the first in which those between
18 and 21 could participate. Most university students, however, were
registered to vote in the constituency where their parents lived.

184

The Byres Road shopping district bisects the constituency and
serves as a commercial magnet for the northwest quadrant of Glasgow.
To the west of Byres Road lies a mixed working- and middle-class resi-
dential area of private three-story attached houses which includes some
private nursing homes for the aged. To the east lies the University,
the Medical School, and the Infirmary and to the north of these, a
largely middle-class area of two- and three-story private attached
houses, many of which are subdivided into student flats. The consiti-
uency then dog-legs to the north where, across the Great Western Road,
there is a large, highly concentrated area of three- and four-story

private attached houses occupied mainly by working-class families.

TABLE 17

SCOTTISH SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS BY VARIOUS SUBDIVISIONS

 

 

 

Woodside Maryhill Glasgow Scotland
Population (1961) 62,293 69,237 1,054,913 5,179,300
Area (sq. miles) 1.2 6.3 62.1 29,796.0
Density
(pop./sq. mile) ,51,312 10,979 16,995 174
Overcrowded Housing
(% pop. at 1.5 or
more persons/room) 34.1 39.2 34.3 22.4

 

Source: General Register Office, Edinburgh, Census 1961: Scotland.

 

Although most of the housing in the area dates from.the late nine-
teenth century, the condition of the housing varies greatly in the
constituency. A large-scale slum clearance program in the northern
region of the constituency has left ragged holes. Of the total number

of houses standing on Whitsunday in 1968 (21,184) some 6.6% were

185
unoccupied in Woodside while the average for all of Glasgow was just
3.8% unoccupied.1 Most of these empty houses were slated for future
demolition.

The recent political history of Woodside was an important factor
in its selection. (See Table 18) Formed in 1950, the constituency has
generally been considered marginal, returning Conservative members to
Parliament up to the 1962 by-election and from then on being held by
Labour. Liberals have stood twice in the constituency, in 1959 and
again in 1964, receiving eight percent of the total vote on each occa-
sion. The Scottish National Party offered candidates in 1964, 1966,
and in 1970, garnering five, seven, and eleven pecent of the vote re-
spectively. Despite the persistence of the Liberal and Scottish National
Parties, they have consistently lost their deposits.2 But the election-
eering activities of the SNP throughout the 1960's would ensure a high
level of public awareness of the nationalists and their policies.

In addition, SNP activity in annual municipal elections has been
apparent in the constituency. Woodside is divided into three municipal
wards: North Kelvin, Partick East, and Woodside. Reporting electoral
results for 1966-1969, Table 19 shows the extent of SNP support in
Woodside wards compared to Glasgow as a whole. Woodside has generally
been a stronger than average SNP area. This is further evidence that
the SNP candidates are visible in Woodside constituency.

Lying just to the north of WOodside, Maryhill constituency shares

 

1Cf. Corporation of the City of Glasgow, Facts and Figures, City
Chambers, Glasgow, 1969.

 

2A deposit of 150 pounds is required of all parliamentary candidates.
Any who fail to receive at least 1/8 of the total vote cannot reclaim
the deposit. This helps to discourage both "crackpots" and minor parties.

186
TABLE 18

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1955-1970,
BY PERCENT OF VOTE CAST FOR PARTY IN VARIOUS SUBDIVISIONS

 

 

Percent of vote in:

 

 

ElectionLParty Woodside Maryhill Glasgowa Scotland
1955
Labour 43.9% 62.8% 50.6% 46.7%
Conservative 56.1 37.2 48.1 50.1
Liberal --- --- --- 1.9
SNP --- --- --- 0.5
Other --- --- --- 0.8
1959
Labour 43.0 64.0 52.8 46.7
Conservative 49.3 36.0 45.6 47.2
Liberal 7.7 --- 0.5 4.1
SNP --- --- --- 0.8
Other --- --- 1.1 1.2
1964
Labour 45.6 68.4 58.7 48.7-
Conservative 40.4 27.6 38.0 40.6
Liberal 8.3 --- 1.0 7.6
SNP 5.4 --- 0 8 2.4
Other 0.3 4.0 l 5 0.7
1966
Labour 50.6 67.8 60.2 49.9
Conservative 41.8 20.7 35.0 37.6
Liberal --- --- --- 6.8
SNP 7.1 11.5 3.2 5.0
Other 0.5 «-- 1.6 0.7
1970
Labour 47.4 65.7 54.9 44.5
Conservative 41.5 23.0 35.5 38.0
Liberal --- --- --- 5.5
SNP 8.4 11.4 8.9 11.4
Other 2.7 --- 1.1 0.6

 

aIncluding the following constituencies: Bridgeton, Cathcart,
Central, Craigton, Gorbals, Govan, Hillhead, Kelvingrove, Maryhill,
Pollok, Provan, Scotstoun, Shettleston, Springburn, and Woodside.

Sources: F. W. 8. Craig (ed.), British Parliamentary Election
Results, 1950-1970, Political Reference Publications, Chichester, 1971;
and F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British Parliamentary Election Statistics,
1918-1970, 2d ed., Political Reference Publications, Chichester, 1971.

187
TABLE 19

GLASGOW MUNICIPAL ELECTORAL RESULTS, 1966-1969
WOODSIDE AND MARYHILL CONSTITUENCIES, BY ELECTORAL WARD

 

 

 

 

Woodside Maryhill
Election North Partick Glasgow
/Party Kelvin East Woodside Maryhill Ruchill totals
1966
Labour 30.3% 17.1% 36.6% 49.7% 56.4% 39.2%
Conservative 52.8 67.1 57.1 38.4 15.2 46.8
SNP 14.8 13.5 6.3 8.3 23.7 8.1
Others 2.0 2.3 --- 3.6 4.8 5.9
1967
Labour --- 7.8 22.9 41.7 45.5 31.1
Conservative 53.1 59.2 47.6 35.1 16.2 41.8
SNP 41.4 29.1 25.3 21.1 34.8 23.1
Others 5.4 3.9 4.1 2.1 3.4 4.0
1968
Labour 9.0 9.1 20.1 35.8 39.8 25.5
Conservative 48.6 50.4 41.5 23.0 11.4 34.8
SNP 39.8 38.1 36.2 39.3 44.8 35.9
Others 2.5 2.3 2.2 1.9 4.0 3.7
1969
Labour 11.0 6.8 21.3 42.3 50.8 29.1
Conservative 50.8 55.8 59.2 31.2 14.6 40.9
SNP 34.6 32.1 19.6 26.6 29.8 26.2
Others 3.7 5.3 --- --- 4L1 3.8

 

 

 

Source: From annual election reports published in the G asgow
Herald, 1966-1969.
many of Woodsidels characteristics. Its population is highly concen-
trated and the condition of housing is roughly equivalent. But Maryhill
is on the periphery of the Clydeside conurbation and a large part of its
six square miles is rural. The division includes three farms and a
number of small holdings, but nearly all of its 70,000 population is
concentrated in the southernmost one-third of its area. The extreme
southeastern sector is a continuation of the private three-and four-

gtory attached housing working-class neighborhood found in the northern

188
part of Woodside. This housing is generally in very ill repair; the
neighborhood is treeless and littered with rubble and trash.

But moving north, past rail lines, an old barge canal, and some
factory sites, one encounters a small number of detached owner-occupied
houses, beyond which one can see the first of ten public housing estates.
Built since the 1920's and 1930's by Glasgow Corporation and by the
Scottish Special Housing Association, these estates provide somewhat
pleasanter surroundings for their occupants than the older buildings to
the south. Rents in these estates are generally higher than in the
old quarters and many occupants are upward mobile skilled working-class.
The largest and newest of these public housing projects is Wyndford
highrise estates in the west-central part of the constituency, providing
very comfortable conditions for upward mobile working people and middle-
class pensioners.

Unlike Woodside, there is some manufacturing in Maryhill. Among
the industrial establishments are chemical works, a rubber processing
plant, and a fibreglass manufacturer. In addition, there is paper- and
match-making and several light engineering works. But these are insuf-
ficient to meet the employment needs of the resident population, and
just as in Woodside, many people travel to other parts of the city to
get to their jobs. Because public transportation is less readily avail-
able in Maryhill than in Woodside, there is a comparatively higher rate
of car ownership among those who reside in the Maryhill estates.

Politically, Maryhill is staunch Labour. Labour has held the
constituency in all eight elections since World War II, usually by at
least a two-to-one margin over the Conservatives. The SNP ran candi-

dates in 1966 and 1970, getting twelve percent in 1966 and eleven

189
percent in 1970. The SNP vote in municipal elections between 1966 and
1969 shows that, like Woodside, Maryhill is a fairly strong area for the
SNP within Glasgow. (See Table 19.) This visibility factor was essen-
tial in the sample population.

Maryhill is noted for its large Roman Catholic population. A large
portion of the nineteenth century population from Ireland to Scotland
settled in the northwest part of Glasgow where housing was available
and where there was already a small Irish minority. The large Catholic
minority was essential to the sample population if an analysis of the
influence of religion on nationalism was to be successful.

In conclusion, then, Woodside and Maryhill were selected because
they were easily accessible, reasonably representative of urban Scotland,
possessed of social and religious sub-groups thought to relate to the
dependent variable, and because there had been a modicum of nationalist

activity within their boundaries.

Selecting the Sample

To select the sample from the population defined above, the official
Glasgow Register of Electors was employed as a sampling frame. Inclusion
on the electoral rolls is almost automatic in Britain. All persons
over 18 who reside in a conStituency in England, Wales, or Scotland on
the annual qualifying date, October 10, are eligible to be included on
the register. On forms supplied in a house-to-house canvass by the
Registration Officer, each householder is required to indicate which
persons at the residence are eligible. Persons who will turn 18 before
June 15 are also included but are ineligible to vote in elections befdre
the following October 2.

On November 28 a preliminary register is placed open for inspection.

190
Those who are eligible but not included on the list have until December
16 to bring the oversight to the attention of registration officials
Finally, the up-dated and revised Register of Electors, published by
parliamentary constituency, by municipal wards within those constituen-
cies, and by individual polling districts within wards, comes into
force on February 15. The process is repeated annually.1 An almost
complete list of technically eligible electors is produced by this
procedure. For the most part only voters newly qualified to vote in the
constituency--those just turned 18 or those just moved into the area--
are excluded from the register in more than random.frequencies.

The Register of Electors which served as a sampling frame for this
study was published on February 15, 1970. The sample itself was
selected from valid names appearing on the Register, a pre-test was
conducted, and the interviewing began on March 15. This means that
there was a three month time lag between the final enumeration of the
sample population on December 16 and the initiation of the interviewing.
This left some time for movement in and out of constituencies, and hence
for additional discrepancies to arise between the sample population
and the sampling frame. But because the time lag was short and because
most householders move in the late spring or summer, it was assumed
that any such discrepancies would be minor.

A systematic two-stage cluster sampling technique was used for the
actual selection of individuals to be interviewed. This procedure was
particularly appropriate given the organization of the Register of

Electors and given the time and budgetary constraints. The "print," or

 

1A more detailed description is found in R. L. Leonard, Elections
in Britain, D. Van Nostrand Company, Ltd., London and Princeton, N. J. ,

1968, pp. 9-17.

191

list of names, for each polling district is arranged alphabetically by
street name, and on streets by address, making both randomization and
clustering easy. A sample of 430 names was to be selected, from.which
we expected more than 300 completed interviews. It was decided that
43 clusters, each with 120 names, would be selected using a step-interval
cycle which began with a randomly selected number. In the second stage
of the sampling, every twelfth name within each cluster was chosen,
yielding a final sample of 430. Twenty-five additional names were
selected in a similar manner for a pre-test sample.

Cluster sampling yields a large sample size for a given cost,
but since it is not built on the assumption that each unit in the popu-
lation has an equal chance of being selected, it is not random sampling.
In cluster sampling the range of variation of statistics is slightly
greater than in simple random sampling. Hence, statistical tests which
assume randomization will inflate the estimation of significant differ-
ences between sample subgroups. This weakens the power of our tests
somewhat and urges caution when we interpret results of tests like
chi-square. But because we will set no arbitrary "level of significance"
at which hypotheses are accepted or rejected, there is no need to follow
the procedure of applying further tests which assume a larger sampling

1
variance.

Interviewing‘
A questionnaire which had been developed in the preceding months
was administered by the author to the pre-test sample in the final week

of February. The final questionnaire was prepared and sent to the

 

1In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba follow this procedure since
their five-nation study utilized cluster sampling techniques.

192
Opinion Research Centre in London, the organization which had been con-
tracted to perform the actual task of interviewing. The ORC interviewers
were experienced middle-aged women--all native Scots. Interviewing
commenced on March 15 and was substantially completed within three
weeks. Call-backs were made until April 16. Of the total 430 names
issued, 308 (71.6%) were interviewed. A surprisingly large proportion
of the original number had moved to new addresses despite the brief
period which had elapsed since the Register was brought up to date.
This is probably attributable to the rapid pace of urban renewal in
the constituencies under study.

The fourteen-page questionnaire was administered without difficulty.
Interviewing time ranged from 25 minutes to 70 minutes, the median time
being about 36 minutes. A shortened form of the questionnaire was
mailed to those prospective respondents who had not been contacted
successfully for a personal interview, i.e., those who had moved, were
temporarily away, too old or ill, or had refused. An analysis of the
mailed questionnaire showed a slight systematic bias on political
attentiveness and a somewhat larger one on the nationalism variable.
Those in the mailed sample tended to be somewhat more supportive of

nationalism than those in the main study.1

Sample Characteristics

The basic social, economic, and political characteristics of the
sample are presented in summary form in Table 20. These findings are
presented here for two reasons. First, they provide a concise overview

of the survey results, permitting the reader a first glance before the

 

10f. Appendix A.

193

TABLE 20

THE GLASGOW SAMPLE: BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICSa

 

 

 

Number Percent
Sex
Male 140‘ 45.5
Female 168 54.5
Age
18-24 36 11.7
25-34 50 16.2
35-44 51 16.6
45-54 57 18.5
55-64 52 16.9
65-74 44 14.3
75 + 13 4.2
N.A. 5 1.6
Birthplace
Scotland 287 93.2
(Glasgow) (246) (79.9)
England, Wales 8 2.6
Ireland, Northern Ireland 8 2.6
Other 3 1.0
N.A. 2 .6
Religion
Church of Scotland 163 52.9
Church of England 6 1.9
Other Protestant 54 17.5
Roman Catholic 71 23.1
Other or none 9 2.9
N.A. 5 1.6
Age Education Ended
13 or under 11 3.6
14 183 59.4
15 77 25.0
16 15 4.9
17 + 22 7.1
Voluntary group membership
No groups 276 89.6
Some groups 29 9.4
N.A. ' 3 1.0

194

TABLE 20 (cont'd.)

 

 

Number Percent
Occupation
Professional/Managerial 7 2.3
Intermediate 21 6.8
Skilled Nonsmanual 53 17.2
Skilled Manual 70 22.7
Partly Skilled 41 13.3
Unskilled 37 12.0
Economically Inactive 74 24.0
N.A. 5 1.6
Household Income (after taxes)/week
Less than 5 pounds 10 3.2
5-9 pounds 37 12.0
10-14 pounds 44 14.3
15-19 pounds 56 18.2
20-24 pounds 69 22.4
25-29 pounds 28 19.1
30 + pounds 27 8.8
D.K., N.A. 37 12.0
Trade Union Membership
Yes 128 41.6
No 175 56.8
N.A. 5 1.6
Vote Intent (General Election)
Conservative 82 26.6
Labour 157 51.0
Scottish National 44 14.3
Liberal” 5 1.6
None 5 1.6
D.K., N.A. 15 4.9
Changes in Scottish Government
Complete Independence 37 12.0
Separate Parliament 49 15.9
Minor Changes 130 42.2
No Change 64 20.8
D,K., N.A. 28 9.2
Assessment of London Government
Improves Conditions in Scotland 62 20.1
Mixed Views 151 49.0
Better Off Without It 69 22.4
D.K., N.A. 26 8.4

 

3N for all tables = 308

195
detailed analysis which follows. Second, they provide an opportunity
to check the representativeness of the sample. The sample percentages
which appear in the right-hand column of Table 20 are estimates of
population proportions. But, as in any survey there is a small probabil-
ity that the sample does not accurately estimate population proportions.
With simple random sampling there is a known level of risk and accuracy
for a given sample size. The cluster sampling technique complicates
this somewhat because of the potentially distorting effect of clustering.
By clustering the researcher increases his chances of over- or under-
representing certain groups. Since our clusters are geographically
determined, any variable which may be related to geography or to differ-
ent neighborhoods has a higher risk of being mis-estimated than those
which are unrelated to geography. Sampling error is different for each
variable under the cluster technique, causing risk and accuracy to vary.
The following paragraphs will discuss the main sample characteristics
in terms of apparent deviations from population parameters.

SEX: The sample obtains an estimate of 45.5% males and 54.5%
females in the population. This is very close to the census estimate
of 47.1% males and 52.9% females in Glasgow in 1966. Undoubtedly the
sample over-estimates the proportion of females since they are more
likely to be at home when the interviewer calls. Even with several
call-backs and evening visits, working males are traditionally under-
represented in surveys which do not allow substitutions. Of those
answering the follow-up mailed questionnaire, 54.5% were males,
strengthening the hypothesis that they are somewhat under-represented
in the main study.

AGE: A preliminary analysis of the sample respondents suggests a

196
systematic over-representation of electors in the 65-74 year old
category at the expense of those in the 18-24 and 25-34 year groupings.
Table 21 shows the discrepancy between our sample results and the
findings of the 1961 official census in Maryhill and Woodside constit-
uencies. Population estimates for Scotland in 1968 are added for

comparative purposes.

TABLE 21

AGE DISTRIBUTION
BY PERCENT

 

 

Maryhill and Woodside Scotland Census
Age Group Sample (1970) Census results (1961) estimate (1968)

 

18424 11.9% 15.4% 15.1%
25-34 16.5 19.2 16.8
35-44 16.8 16.9 17.1
45-54 18.8 18.4 17.3
55-64 17.2 16.1 16.7
65-74 14.5 9.6 11.2
75 + 4.3 4.3 5.7

 

Sources: General Registry Office, Edinburgh, Census 1961; Scothind
County Report, Vol. One, Part 2, City of Glasgow; Central Statistics
Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1969.

 

There are several possible explanations for this apparent discrep-
ancy. A first consideration is that the census list and the electoral
register are never identical. This is the case for two reasons. First,
the census is taken only every ten years while the electoral register
is updated every year. Hence, nine years separates the age distribution
from the census and that from.our sample. Population changes can occur
over such a time span and it should be noted that in terms of the age

distribution, our sample seems somewhat more representative of Scotland

in 1968 than of Maryhill and WOodside in 1961. It is possible that

197
Scotland's population profile was slightly older in 1970 than in 1961.
Second, the large number of university students present in Woodside
constituency further decreases the correlation between the census list
and the electoral register. While transient students often retain
their official residence at the homes of their parents (thus making them
ineligible to vote at their student residences), they are usually
counted for census purposes at the place of their de facto residence.
Hence the electoral register itself may inaccurately reflect the true
resident population.

Second, young people are more active and less restricted in their
movements than are older persons. They are far more likely to be
absent from.their residence either at work, school, or recreation, when
the interviewer calls. Although interviewers were instructed to make
call-backs, persons who were absent on those occasions (or who could
not even be reached to arrange a meeting time) were not interviewed
and are left out of the sample Most of those in the upper age group
are retired and lack mobility. They are more likely to be at home when
the interviewer calls. In addition, it seems plausible that young
people would have less time for the interview than older people and
would be mare likely to refuse the interview in the first place.

Another closely related possible explanation rests on the hypothesis
that young people are more mobile than older people. Although the sam-
pling frame, i.e., the electoral register, was brought up to date only
three months before the interviewers went out, considerable movement
can occur in such a short period, leaving the sampling frame a less
than perfect list of all technically eligible voters in a constituency.

The results of the follow-up mailed questionnaire confirm the hypothesis

198
that young people are under-represented in the sample because they are
mobile. Of all those under 35 responding to the mailed questionnaire,
forty-five percent were not interviewed because they had moved to a
new address. Of those thirty-five or over, only five percent were not
interviewed because they had moved.

BIRTHPLACE: The sample estimates that 93.2% of the sample popu-
lation were born in Scotland; 79.9% of the total were born in Glasgow.
The 1961 census shows that for Glasgow as a whole, 92.0% were born in
Scotland, while 76.2% were born in Glasgow.

RELIGION: There is no accurate record of religious preferences in
Scotland against which to compare our sample findings. Actual membership
in Scottish churches can only be a rough guide. In 1966 the Church of

1 This is somewhat

Scotland claimed 63.5% of all church memberships.
larger than our sample proportion of 52.9% (or 55.4% when adjusted to
account for those with no religion or whose preference was nOt ascertained).
While just 5.8% of church memberships were with other protestant religions
in 1966, the sample produced an estimate of 17.5% (18.4% adjusted) in

the Woodside/Maryhill population. But this discrepancy is expected

since the area under Study has long been a stronghold of non-conformism.
Finally, Roman Catholics made up 27.9% of church memberships in Scothind
in 1966 but just 23.1% (24.1% adjusted) of the sample respondents.

Since Catholicism is thought to be stronger than average in the sample
population this difference is not easy to explain. But Catholics, due

to the strictures of their orthodoxy, may make up a larger proportion

of church memberships than their actual numbers in the population would

 

1In doing these calculations, one-third of the Roman Catholic
nmmbership total was deducted since it included persons of all ages.

199
lead one to predict.

OCCUPATION: Aside from the large number of economically inactive
individuals in the sample, mpst of whom are housewives, retirees, or
students, the largest single occupational category is that of skilled
manual worker with 22.7% of the sample. Manual jobs as a whole are
held by 64.6% of those currently employed, while nonvmanual jobs are
held by just 35.4% of the total. This reflects the working—class
character of the sample population and exemplifies the class cleavage
in industrial Scotland generally. The 1961 Census in Glasgow showed
that about thirteen percent (compared to our twelve percent) were in
the top two occupational categories. In the skilled group, both manual
and nonrmanual, there were fifty-five percent (compared to our fifty-
four). And in the bottom two groups there were thirty-two percent
(compared to our thirty-four percent).

VOTE INTEREST: The interviewing in Woodside and Maryhill was
completed two months before the 1970 General Election. The unusual
last-week swings in that election upset election predictions based on
surveys conducted even in the last few days preceding the June 18 polling
day. Our survey could hardly serve to predict voting results in Wood-
side and Maryhill two months in advance, but it is interesting to
compare our findings with the actual vote tallies. In Maryhill, con-
sidering only those who said they would vote for a party, sixty-seven
percent said they preferred Labour, eighteen percent Conservative, and
fifteen percent SNP. The General Election results showed Labour had a
final tally of sixty-six percent, Conservative twenty-three percent,
and SNP eleven percent. Most significant changes appear to have occured

in Woodside where in our sample thirty-eight percent preferred Labour,

200
forty-two Conservative, fifteen percent SNP, and four percent Liberal.
As it turned out in the General Election, no Liberal candidate stood,
but an Independent Conservative did, and the seat went for Labour forty-
seven percent, Conservative forty-one percent, SNP eight percent,and
Independent Conservative three percent. One interesting consistency in
these results seems to be that the SNP did rather worse than we might
have predicted from.the survey estimates, but particularly so in Wood-
side where the contest between the two major parties was close. This
is fuel for the argument that the SNP vote is largely a protest. Deviant
voting is high in by-elections because the stakes are not high. One
can register a protest without jeopardizing basic power relationships.
In the same way, a one-sided constituency race in a general election
offers a more propitious opportunity for meaningful yet harmless protest

than does a closely-run affair. This is explored more fully below.

Operationalizing Scottish Nationalism

We have defined nationalism.as a social movement whose participants
are engaged in advancing the interests of their common nationality.
This is an inclusive definition, able to accommodate such diversities
as cultural groups, political parties and organizations with separatist
or devolutionary goals, and the groups of individuals who are sympathetic
to or supportive of the objectives of these groups. The Scottish
nationalist movement has been diverse and fluid, marked by the ebb and
flow of national separatist sentiment and by the rise and fall of both
political and cultural nationalist groups. In the 1960's, as we have
seen, the main organizational manifestation of Scottish nationalism*was
the Scottish National Party, created in 1934 through a merger of the

Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland. Although several

201
additional cultural-political organizations exist, most notably the
fundamentalist 1320 Club, the SNP enjoyed by far the largest and
politically most significant following.

As indicated in Chapter Four, the specific objectives of the
Scottish National Party have never been particularly clear or consistent.
Seeming to aim for complete independence at one time and for a regional
parliament at another, the SNP position has always been somewhat elu-
sive. But among Scottish political parties, the SNP has been joined
only by the Liberals in taking a consistent stand in favor of increased
autonomy. Moreover, unlike the Liberals, all of the party's central
issues--like inflation, unemployment, and opposition to British entry
into the European Economic Community have been related to the over-
riding imperative of Scottish autonomy.

Since the self-proclaimed aims and objectives of the SNP coincide
with those assumed to be characteristic of a nationalist movement, the
first way of operationalizing the concept of Scottish nationalism.in
this study will be in terms of support for the Scottish National Party.
Specifically, a nationalist is a person who intends to vote for the
SNP in the next general election.

Obviously this entails some problems. As numerous voting studies
have shown, there are an endless variety of reasons that people support
a given political party. An analogous problem is trying to infer
public policy preferences from election results. The easy argument is
that there are too many dimensions to the final choice to allow anything
more than vague generalizations about mass motivations.

The literature on minor parties in two-party systems stresses

202
their protest or educational function.1 Voters dissatisfied with
major parties often use minor parties as vehicles of protest or as
means of emphasizing the importance of particular issues such as pro-
hibition (U.S. Prohibition Party), taxes (French Poujadiste Party), or
foreign policy (Norwegian Socialist People's Party). Hence it might
be possible to view the Scottish National Party as merely the vehicle
chosen by dissatisfied people who happen to live in Scotland to protest
the two major parties, the state of the economy, or British EEC member-
ship. The objectives sought by the SNP might be peripheral in the
minds of SNP voters, or they might be unaware of them.at all. Alterna-
tively,one might view the SNP as an attempt to educate the major party
politicians regarding perceived Scottish deprivations. In this instance,
SNP voters would be aware of SNP policy goals and they would agree with
them.

Unquestionably, the SNP is a protest party. It is "anti-system”
and it attracts adherents on the basis of its challenge to the status
quo. But it represents more than a diffuse protest against the current
state of affairs. There is a widespread perception of the SNP as a
single-issue party whose concerns seldom reach beyond the overriding
objective of securing independence for Scotland. A pilot study done at
the University of Strathclyde in February, 1969, revealed that by far
the most commbn characterization of what the "Scottish National Party
stands for“ is "independence" or "home rule". A few respondents simply

replied "change." The Glasgow sample on which this study is based shows

 

le. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government, Rinehart & Company,
New York, 1942, p. 68;;Wi11iam B. Dickinson, "The American Two-Party
System," Editorial Research Reports, July 29, 1964, p. 555; and V. 0.
Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
New York, 1964, pp. 278-81.

 

203

a similar pattern of responses. Nearly ninety percent of all respondents
think the SNP policy regarding Scotland is "complete independence" or a
"separate parliament” for Scotland. This contrasts with only twenty-
three percent thinking the Conservative Party policy is nationalist,
and just seven percent thinking the Labour Party supports these policies.
(See Table 21). Among SNP voters, fully ninety-five percent think the
SNP policy is either complete independence or a separate parliament.
These characterizations are not far wide of the mark. They generally
parallel the SNP's own statements of aims quoted in Chapter Four.

Secondly, SNP voters do generally agree with the perceived aims of
the party. Seventy-four percent of SNP voters in the Glasgow sample
said they would like to see Scotland achieve complete independence.
Another twenty-one percent desired a separate parliament for Scotland,
while five percent wanted only minor changes. Not one SNP respondent
out of 44 wanted to leave things as they are. Hence, the overwhelming
bulk of SNP voters are aware of SNP policy and are in agreement with it.
While this is not conclusive evidence that these voters would vote for
the SNP because of the party's separatist policies, it is highly sug-
gestive. Of the eighteen respondents who said they voted for the SNP
in the 1966 general election, eleven said they did so "to help Scotland,"
or because "they favor independence.” Only four said they voted SNP as
a protest or because they disagreed with the other parties.

Finally;protest voting per se occurs much more frequently during
by-elections when control of Parliament is not generally at stake than
at general elections. Hence, if SNP votes are largely protest votes,
one would expect far more SNP voters in by-elections. In fact, the SNP

has achieved some of its most outstanding successes in by-elections.

204
TABLE 21

PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIES' SCOTTISH POLICIESa

 

 

 

 

 

Policy Party

Labour 'Conservative SNP Liberal
Complete independence 2.9% 1.6% 70.5% 6.5%
Separate Parliament 4.2 21.1 18.5 30.2
Minor changes 27.6 45.8 1.0 16.9
Leave things as they are 51.0 14.6 1.0 5.5
DK 14.3 16.9 9.1 40.9

aN=308

Of the three M.P.s the party has sent to Westminster, two (Dr. Robert
McIntyre in 1945 and Winifred Ewing in 1967) were elected in by-elections.
Moreover, in ten Scottish by-elections contested between 1959 and 1970,
the SNP received an average vote of 19.7%. In four general elections

in this period, the SNP received an average vote of just 4.9%.

But an analysis of the Glasgow survey fails to reveal a sizeable
bloc of by-election protest voters. While 14.3% of the Glasgow sample
said they would vote for the SNP in a general election, only a few
more, amounting to 15.3% would vote for the party in a by-election. At
least two explanations can be suggested. First voting behavior cannOt
be precisely predicted or explained before it happens, particularly when
that behavior is deviant or unusual. Protest voting is often compulsive
and cannot be detected when a survey researcher asks hypothetical
questions. At any rate, the stimuli present at the polling place are
surely different than those at home long befdre an election campaign is

mounted.

205

A second plausible explanation begins from the perspective of a
basic motivational factor modified on election day by external institu-
tional or mechanical factors. If there is a protest force which works
to increase minor party shares of the vote, there is also an external
set of forces, like electoral laws and the perceived probability or the
minor party being successful, which serves to decrease minor party
vote totals. Beginning with a basic level of intended support (in our
case 14.3% for the SNP), the final level of support depends on a balance
between (1) the propensity of non-supporters to use the party as a
vehicle of protest, and (2) external factors which make a minor party
vote difficult or impractical. One of these latter factors might be
the perception of a close contest between the major parties. In this
case, one might expect a large number of minor party adherents to
choose to vote for one of the other parties where their vote would be
more meaningful in terms of the final outcome. An analysis of the
1970 general election results bears out this expectation. In thirty-
three safe Labour constituencies, the SNP received an average vote of
13.3%.1 In seventeen safe Conservative constituencies, the SNP got an
average vote of 15.8%. In contrast, in the fifteen marginal seats,
the SNP garnered an average of only 8.3%.

A final justification for Operationalizing nationalism in terms of
support for the SNP relates to the fact that inheritance can be excluded
as a significant source of identification with the party. Although
the SNP in its present form was established nearly forty years ago, it

had few adherents until recently. In 1962, after twenty-eight years of

 

1A "safe" constituency is one consistently captured by one party
in every general election from 1955 through 1966. All others are
"marginal."

206

electoral fluctuations, party members numbered only 2,000. Over the
next six years nearly 100,000 members were added to SNP lists. This
recent rise distinguishes the SNP from the long-established parties in
Britain, the bulk of whose supporters, as Butler and Stokes have shown,
have inherited their partisan affiliation. This increases the probab-
ility that SNP supporters were attracted to the party because of its
separatist ideology.

Table 22 shows the voting intentions of respondents interviewed in
the Glasgow sample. The forty-four respondents indicating a preference
for the SNP are, under the rubric of this first operationalization,
classed "nationalists." Those selecting other parties are classed "anti-
nationalists,” while those choosing no party, those indicating indeciSion
concerning party choice, or those for whom this information is not

ascertained are to be excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 22

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:
VOTING INTENTION AT THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTIONa

 

 

 

Party Number Percent
Conservative 82 26.6%
Labour 157 51.0
Scottish National 44 14,3
Liberal 5 1.6
None 5 1.6
DK, NA 15 4.9

 

aN=308

207

The second way we shall Operationalize the concept of nationalism
deals not with expected voting behavior but with the state of mind
which is consistent with separatist ideology. Separatism.is the creed
whose central tenet is the devolution of political control to one or
more subunits of a nation-state. The degree of separatism varies
according to the extent to which the sub-unit(s) in question increase
their autonomy as a result of such devolutionary processes. It is
assumed that paralleling this separatist continuum is a conceptual
continuum onto which can be mapped sentiments ranging from those favor-
ing decreased autonomy for sub-units to those favoring independence for
sub-units. The effective range of this continuum in Scotland is
assumed to be somewhat narrower since the British political system is
essential unitary in nature and a lowered level of autonomy for Scotland
would be difficult to achieve, and no one desires it anyway. In
Scotland the important range of sentiments ranges from those favoring
the status quo, to those desiring slightly increased autonomy (generally
administrative autonomy), to those favoring the establishment of a
Scottish parliament with control over all Scottish affairs except inter-
national relations, defense, and foreign trade, and finally to those
favoring complete independence for Scotland either within or without
the Commonwealth. Although this conceptual continuum is theoretically
continous, these four points seem to represent views which are both
popular and distinct from one another.

Because of the vagaries of the survey instrument as a tool for
measuring attitudes, two independent questions are combined to create
an index of separatist sentiment which will be used as the second means

of operationalizing nationalism in this study. Both questions relate

208
directly to the question of autonomy for Scotland, but one deals in
specifics while the other deals in broad generalities.

Question 3(a) taps the extent of general satisfaction/dissatisfaction
with the existing structural ties between Scotland and the United
Kingdom:

On the whole, do you think the activities of the government‘

in London tend to improve conditions in Scotland or would we be

better off without them?

Table 23 shows the distributions of responses over closed-ended cate-
gories. This shows Scots to be about evenly divided on the general
question of autonomy; about one-fifth express the opinion that Scotland's
fate would be improved without the current ties represented by the
central London government, while an equal proportion believe the status

quo to be beneficial to Scotland's interests. The bulk of the remainder

take an in-between position.

TABLE 23

SCOTTISH VIEWS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL UK GOVERNMENT

 

 

 

 

Number Percent
The government improves
conditions in Scotland 62 20.1%
Mixed views 151 49.0
Scotland would be better off‘
without the central government 69 22.4
DK 26 8.4

308 99.9

 

Question 16(e) taps the specific level of autonomy desired by the

respondent:

209
Four different ways of governing Scotland are talked
about a lot nowadays: complete independence, a separate
parliament for Scotland with control over Scottish affairs,
minor changes like giving more power to the present Scottish
Office, and leaving things the way they are. Which of these
policies is chosest to what you think?
Table 24 shows the distribution of responses over closed-ended categories.
The table shows Scots to be as deeply divided on the question of specific
policies for Scotland as on the general question of autonomy. While
about one-fifth are satisfied with the status quo, about one-fourth
favor additional autonomy for Scotland, either through complete indepen-

dence or through the establishment of a separate Scottish parliament

with control over Scottish affairs.

TABLE 24

SCOTTISH VIEWS ON HOW SCOTLAND SHOULD BE GOVERNED

 

 

 

Number Percent

Complete independence 37 12.0%
Separate Parliament 49 15.9
Minor changes 130 42.2
Leave things as they are 64 20.8
DK, NA _2§. ____g;l
308 100.0

 

The results of these two questions are cross-tabulated to create
the Index of Separatist Sentiment. The main effect of the creation of
the Index is to purify the two extreme positions, pro-status quo and

pro-separatism. Inconsistent respondents--e.g., those favoring inde-

pendence or a separate parliament and thinking that the central

210
government in London improves conditions in Scotland--are relegated to
a central position on the Index, reserving the top and bottom ends on
the Index only for consistent respondents. Table 25 shows the cross-
tabulation of the 259 respondents in the Glasgow sample for whom

responses were obtained on both Question 3(a) and Question 16(e).

TABLE 25

CONSTRUCTING THE INDEX OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT

 

 

 

 

View on how Scotland View on activity of
should be governed central UK government
Better off 'Mixed Improves
without it views conditions n
Complete independence 37
Separate Parliament 47
Minor Changes 120
Leave things as they are 55
n 259

 

 

The resulting distribution on the Index (after combining the
two separatist positions from.Question 16(e) is summarized in Table 26.
The result is a uni-modal distribution slightly skewed in the direction
of separatism,

Throughout this study, unless otherwise indicated the Index of
Separatist Sentiment will be collapsed to three discrete categories.
On the pro-separatist end of the Index the 102 1'3 and 2's (representing
39.3% of the total) will be dealt with together under the shorthand

term "Scotnats." The 81 3'8 (31.3%) will be termed'Neutrals," while

211
TABLE 26

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:
THE INDEX OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT

 

 

 

Number Percent
Pro-separatism 1 34 13.1%
2 68 26.2
3 81 31.3
4 53 20.5
Anti-separatism 5 '_23 .__§;2_
259 100.0%

 

the 79 4's and 5's on the anti-separatist end of the index (29.4% of
the total will be called "Antinats." This step is undertaken to
simplify the analysis and to ensure reasonably large cell totals when

cross-tabulations are attempted.

TABLE 27

VOTE INTENTION AND THE INDEX OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT

 

 

 

 

 

Separatist Vote Intention
Sentiment
SNP Other parties (Labour) (Conservative)
Scotnats 92.7% 27.9% 20.6% 41.4%
Neutrals 4.9 36.3 33.6 41.4
Antinats 2.4 35.8 45.8 17.1
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.9%
N 41 ‘ . _ ',106. ’._ (131) . (70)

 

212

Table 27 shows the extent to which the two measures of nationalism,
one indicated by the respondent's voting intentiOntand the other by his
responses on the separatist index, are convergent. Nearly ninety-three
percent of all SNP voters are Scotnats, while just twenty-eight percent
of other voters fall into this category.. This lends support to the
assumption that the operationalization procedures described above are
valid. It also suggests that to a satisfactory extent using either

measure we are tapping the same underlying trait.

Social Correlates of Nationalism

Before turning to an examination of the main hypotheses of this
study we need to clarify some of the basic social correlates of
nationalism in Scotland. This will aid in better understanding the
separatist mpvement in Scotland and may have heuristic value with respect
to other nationalist movements. In this section we show the inter-
relationship between nationalism and the sex, age, birthplace, religion,
and education of the respondent.

There is some reason to think that the sex of the respondent might
relate to support for separatism, Lipset reports a tendency for males

1 And a study of

to support left—wing or anti-establishment parties.
urban Scottish voting patterns suggests that males are somewhat more
likely than females to be SNP supporters.2 But in our Scottish sample

we find no evidence linking sex and separatism, Table 28 shows that

males support the SNP only slightly more frequently than females. And

 

1Lipset, op. cit., pp. 276-8.

2Anthony Piepe and Robin Prior, "Scottish Nationalismr-A New Kind
of Politics?" Unpublished report, Portsmouth College of Technology,
Portsmouth, England, July 31, 1969.

213

TABLE 28

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND SEX

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sex Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Female 14.3% 85.7% 154 38.3% 35.3% 26.3% 133
Male 16.4 83.6 134 40.5 27.0 32.5 126
N=288 N=259
x2= .51 x2= .31

 

the evidence on the Index of Separatist Sentiment is inconclusive.

Age is a second characteristic we might expect to find related to
support for separatism, In summarizing election studies, Lipset urges
a reconsideration of the popular notion that support for the status quo
increases with age,1 but there is some Scottish evidence, including
our own report in Chapter Four on age differences between candidates
for Parliament in 1970, suggesting that support for separatism is

2 This was strongly supported by the evidence

stronger among the young.
of the Glasgow sample. The median age among SNP supporters was 40,
while that among the supporters of other parties was 48. The median
age among Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment was 46 as
contrasted with 49 among Neutrals and 48 among Antinats. Presumably,
youth are less firmly attached to the established system and more prone
to experiment with novel political issues.

The birthplace of the respondent seems to have little to do with

his attitude toward separatism. Table 29 shows that while Glaswegians

 

lLipset, op. cit., pp. 282-6.

2Piepe and Prior, loc. cit.

214
TABLE 29

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND RESPONDENT'S BIRTHPLACE

 

 

Birthplace Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n

 

 

Glasgow 12.7% 87.3% 228 40.0% 30.2% 29.8% 205
Other parts
of Scotland 21.4 78.6 42 35.1 40.5 24.3 37
N = 270 N = 242
X2 = .15 X2 = .50

 

are less likely to support the SNP than those who were born elsewhere
in Scotland, the Chi Square level of significance does not encourage

a great deal of confidence in the finding. The results on the Index

of Separatist Sentiment are mixed and inconclusive.

The relationship between religion and nationalism is a particularly
interesting problem.because of the divergent popular views on the issue
in Scotland. Non-separatist protestants frequently express the opin-
ion that the nationalist mpvement is a Catholic front. In Chapter Three
we suggested that this trend of thought can be traced back to the early
efforts of the Jacobites to restore the Catholic Stewart line to the
Scottish monarchy. It is no doubt strengthened by contemporary separ-
atist activities by Catholics in Northern Ireland. But surprisingly,
non-separatist Catholics frequently express the opinion that the nation-
alist movement is an ethnocentric protestant movement one of whose
goals is to purge Scotland of the Catholic minority (most of whose
ancestors emigrated from Ireland in the mid-nineteenth century). At
least one study found that Catholics tend to shy away from SNP candidates

at the polls.1

 

11bid.

215

But our survey reveals that there is little difference between
protestants and Catholics in terms of their support for separatism in
Scotland.‘ Table 30 shows that protestants are slightly more amenable
than Catholics to the nationalist cause, but not decisively so. A
more important finding relates to the non-conformist protestants. Among
those prefering the established state church (Presbyterian Church of
Scotland) less than thirteen percent were SNP supporters and less than.
forty percent were Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment. In
contrast, nearly twenty-five percent of the other protestant group were
SNP supporters and close to fifty percent were Scotnats. This seems a
not unreasonable finding since many of the non-conformist protestant
groups in Scotland (particularly the non-conformist Presbyterian sects)
have long traditions of radicalism and opposition to centrally estab-
lished authority. The Church of Scotland is the official established
religion and, significantly, the British monarch is the formal head of

the Church and official "defender of the faith."

TABLE 30

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

 

 

 

 

 

 

Religious Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
preference SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Church of ;,.‘ . .

Scotland 12.6% 87.4% 158 39.7% 27.0% 33.3% 141
Other

protestant 24.6 75.4 61 49.2 30.5 20.3 59
Roman

Catholic 13.4 86.6 67 29.3 41.4 29.2 58

..Ntzié. .. ..N=258
XT=.15 XT=.O9

 

216
And finally, education does not appear to relate strongly to support

for separatism in Scotland. Table 31 shows that support for the SNP is
strong among the middle group,.but that may well be because fifteen is
the recently established school-leaving age and most of those who

claim this level of education are under thirty. As we have already
discerned, this young cohort is prone to support the nationalists.

The relationship does not emerge among this group on the Index of

Separatist Sentiment.

TABLE 31

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM.AND EDUCATION, BY AGE OF
LEAVING SCHOOL

   
 

   

-__._..-.___.

 

...V W__~__~__HH-___..__ _ “__._._____ .‘_‘___-_._"___.-~_.——.m._.

School- Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
leaving age SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n

 

 

 

 

14 or less 15.4% 84.6% 156 38.3% 34.6% 27.2% 162
15 30.2 69.2 53 40.0 31.7 28.3 60
16 or more 10.8 89.2 _31 41.7 16.7 41.7 ._16
N=246 N:258

x2 = .02 x2’= .30

In summary, then, support for separation in Scotland seems to
relate to age and religion, but not to sex, place of birth, or level
of education. In the next two chapters we will examine the relation-

ship between separatism and relative deprivation and social mobility.

CHAPTER VII
DEPRIVATION AND SCOTTISH NATIONALISM
God gied man speech and speech created thocht,
He gied man speech but to the Scots gied nocht....

One of the aims of the sample survey conducted in Glasgow was to
test the theory that a sense of relative deprivation is an explanatory
precondition for the upsurgence of national separatism.in Scotland.
Using aggregate measures of deprivation, we concluded in Chapter Five
that Scotland might be termed inferior to the rest of the UK on
several dimensions. But whether these discrepant conditions are per-
ceived by Scots and play a central motivating role in the nationalist
movement, can only be discerned through the surveying of attitudes and
opinions. Survey research presents its own set of problems and short-
comings. Some, like the operationalization of concepts and the relia-
bility and validity of measures, are common to all forms of systematic
aoCial inquiry; others, like sensitization, the demonstration effect,
and interviewer bias, are unique to the survey technique. Nevertheless,
through the survey we can address ourselves more or less directly to the

question of attitudes and perceptions.

The Perception of Deprivation in Seotland

Ten independent items in the questionnaire administered to the
Glasgow sample dealt with perceptions of Scottish deprivations. The
unmistakable trend among these items supports the hypothesis that an

217

218
awareness of Scotland's inferior status is widespread. In the context
of questions about economic conditions, more than forty-five percent
of the sample felt that English people were doing much better than
Scots, while only fourteen percent disagreed. (See Table 32) An al-
most identical ratio appeared when the question was worded in terms
of "style of living." Almost forty-two percent considered the English
style of living superior to the Scottish. Less than fifteen percent
disagreed. Hence, the group expressing a generalized sense of depri-
vation relative to the English is about three times as large as that
explicitly disclaflming any such deprivation.

On more specific terms, although ratios vary, the same general
relationship emerges between the deprived and the satisfied. Ever
since the union of 1707 the sense of being the minor partner in the
United Kingdom has pervaded the Scottish consciousness. Feeling that
the authority to make decisions about their own destiny rested outside
Scotland, the Scots have long nourished a resentment against the English.
At best the English have been viewed as paternalistic; at worst,
imperialistic. And, in the Glasgow survey, nearly seventy-nine percent
of all respondents agreed or agreed strongly that "It seems unfair that
English people have so mmch say in running Scotland." Only eleven
percent disagreed or disagreed strongly.

Undoubtedly a great deal of the resentment is simply hostility
directed toward the dominant cultural group in Britain. Since Scots
have maintained a sense of community, they find it easier to relate to
and identify with fellow Scots than with the English. While seventy-
seven percent of Glasgow respondents thought they had "a lot" in commOn

with other Scots, only twenty-three percent thought they had "a lot" in

219
TABLE 32

PERCEPTIONS OF DEPRIVATIONal

 

 

"Some people say that English people are Yes 45.5%
doing much better than Scottish people. 'Mixed views 30.5
Do you think this is so or not? No 14.3

DK 9.7

"Some people say that English people have Yes 41.9%
a better style of living than Scottish ‘Mixed views 38.3
people. Do you think so or not? No 14.6

DK 5.2

"It seems unfair that English people Agree strongl 35.7%

have so much say in running Scotland." Agree " * "' 42.97
It depends 8.1
Disagree 10.1
Disagree strongly 1.3
DK 1.9

"In general, how much do you think you A lot 23.1%
have in common with most Englishmen?" Some 45.1

Not very much 28.6
DK 3.2

"How about Scots? How much would you A lot 77.3%

say you had in common with Scots?" Some 17.9
Not very much 2.3
DK 2.6

"Suppose there were some question you Yes 71.4%
had to take to a national government It depends 10.1
office--for example, a tax or social No 6.8
security question. Do you think you DK 11.7

would be given equal treatment? Would
you be treated as well as anyone else?"

"Roads and highways in Scotland are Agree strongly 1.3%
better than those in England." Agree 9.7
It depends 7.5
Disagree 42.5
Disagree strongly 19.5
DK 19.5
"Scottish housing is better than Agree strongly 3.2%
English housing." Agree 17.2
. It depends 10.1
Disagree 41.6
Disagree strongly 13.1
DK 14.9

220

TABLE 32 (Cont'd.)

"On the whole, it is easier to make a
living in Scotland than in England."

"Do you think people like yourself can
get a better paying job in England
or Scotland?"

"Do you think that Scotland should have
more or fewer M.P.s in Parliament, or
do you think that Scotland's repre-
sentation is about right?"

"People in Scotland pay more in taxes
than they receive back in benefits."

"In general, do you think that the
government in London cares about people
like yourself?"

"My children would be better off if
they left Scotland to live in
England or another country."

"I would be better off if I left Scotland
to live in England or another country."

Agree strongly
Agree

It depends
Disagree

Disagree strongly
DK

England

No difference
Scotland

DK, NA

More

About right
Fewer

DK

Agree strongly
Agree

It depends
Disagree

Disagree strongly
DK

Yes

‘Qualified yes

Mixed views
Qualified no
No

DK

Agree strongly
Agree

It depends
Disagree

Disagree strongly
DK

Agree strongly
Agree

It depends
Disagree

Disagree strongly
DK

.3%
14.
22.
33.
11.
15.

(nu-brie

 

aN for all tables = 308

 

221

common with Englishmen. Moreover, fully fifty-seven percent thought
they could identify differences of one sort or another between the Scots
and the English. These figures suggest that somewhere between one half
and three-fourths of all Scots possess a strong sense of national
group identity.

However, there are indications that this hostility runs deeper
than a simple disassociation from the out=group. Although there is a
strong feeling that personal discrimination against Scots by government
offices does not occur (seventy-one percent expressed confidence that
they would receive "equal treatment" when taking a problem to a national
government office), ironically, there is a sense that Scots as a group
do suffer inequities in the British system, For example, sixty-two
percent disagree or disagree strongly that "roads and highways in
Scotland are better than those in England." Just eleven percent express
a positive reaction to that statement. Moreover, nearly fifty-five
percent disagree or disagree strongly that "Scottish housing is better
than English housing." Only twenty percent agree or agree strongly.

Whether because of discrimination of differential economic conditions
there is a widespread perception that economic conditions are better
in England than in Scotland. Only seventeen percent of the Glasgow
sample agree that "it is easier to make a living in Scotland than in
England." Forty-five percent react negatively. And when asked whether
"people like yourself can get a better paying job in England or in
Scotland," more than thffity-four percent choose England while only two
percent select Scotland.

Table 33 shows the proportion of all respondents possessing certain

luxury consumer items. While nearly all respondents own radios and more

222
TABLE 33

POSSESSION, DESIRABILITY, AND PERCEPTION
OF OTHERS' POSSESSION OF CERTAIN LUXURY CONSUMER ITEMS AMONG SCOTS

 

 

 

% saying % saying
% % s most Scots most English
Item. Owning N Wanting N own N own N
Radio 98.4 308 1.6 308 97.1 308 97.4 308
Television 92.2 308 3.2 308 96.8 308 97.4 308
House 24.7 308 60.3 305 28.9 305 60.7 306
Car 16.9 308 59.5 306 55.3 304 71.8 305

Foreign holiday 21.8 308 54.5 308 42.5 307 52.6 308
travel
Spare bedroom. 20.1 308 57.0 307 18.5 307 28.2 308
for visitors
First-class travel 4.5 308 36.0 308 7.8 307 11.0 308
on trains
Private education 6.2 308 31.5 308- 7.1 307 12.7 308
for children

 

 

 

 

than ninety-two percent own televisions, much smaller fractions own
houses (twenty-five percent), cars (seventeen percent), or have foreign
holiday travel (twenty-two percent), and spare bedrooms for visitors
(twenty percent). Only a tiny minority boast private educations for
their children (six percent) or first-class travel on trains (four
percent). But for each itemymentioned, a larger proportion of respon-
dents saw wide ownership in England than saw wide ownership in Scotland.
This was particularly true with houses, cars, travel, and spare bed-
rooms. More than twice as many respondents thought Englishmen could
afford houses, for example, as thought Scots could afford them. And
while seventy-two percent thought Englishmen could afford cars, just

fifty-five thought Scots could.

223

Treating the consumer items as equal and additive, fifty-five saw
no discrepancies between the Scots and the English on any of these items.
Thirty-five percent saw discrepancies on one or two items, and a further
nine percent perceived discrepancies on three or more luxury consumer
items. In other words, forty-four of the respondents felt that the
Scots as a group are deprived relative to the English on at least one
of the eight consumer item.dimensions. Not one respondent felt that the
Scots were better off on any of the eight dimensions.

As stressed in Chapter Five, the Scots do not suffer superficial
political discrimination. With ten percent of the population, they
have eleven percent of the members of the Parliament at Westminster.
And a large number of Scots have reached the highest circles of the
British ruling elite. Nevertheless, there is a distinct perception
that the Scots are not given a fair shake in London. More than forty-
five percent think that "Scotland should have more M.P.s in Parliament"
while an equal proportion think that people in Scotland ”pay more taxes
than they receive back in benefits." These responses illustrate the
lack of confidence felt by Scots in the central government decision-
making apparatus as it relates to Scotland. Almost thirty-one percent
of the sample indicated that they did not think that the "government in
London cares about people like yourself." (See Table 32,)

As expected with such prominent and widespread perceptions of
relative deprivation in Scotland, there is considerable thought given
to emigration. Altogether, nearly twenty percent of the Glasgow respon-
dents would seriously consider emigration. The most popular countries
to which emigration was contemplated were England, Australia, and New

Zealand. Only forty-one percent explicitly disagreed with the statement

224
that they would be better off if they left Scotland to live in England
or another country. An even smaller proportion (thirty-six percent)
disagreed with the statement that their children would be better off

elsewhere. (See Table 32.)

Nationalism and Objective Deprivation

It has already been suggested that the objective conditions of a
person's life are relevant to his behavior only to the extent that
those conditions are perceived by him, Where a relationship between
nationalism and objective deprivations does occur, there is a high
probability that it is due to the awareness of those deprivations. At
any rate it is important to establish the relationship between objective
personal deprivation and support for nationalism, In this section we
will examine the relation between nationalism.and income, standard of
living, and class.

Many writers have noted that there is no easily identifiable re-
lationship between deprivation and discontent. Hoffer refutes the
notion that those who are worst off in society will be the most dis-
contented: "Misery does not automatically generate discontent, nor is
the intensity of discontent directly proportionate to the degree of
misery."1 Table 34 seems generally to confirm this. Although in the
lowest income bracket nationalism.is high and in the highest bracket
nationalism is low, the overall distribution suggests no relation between
nationalism and income. SNP voters have an average income of 15.75
pounds while those supporting other parties have an average income of

16.20 pounds. 'But Scotnats have an average income of 16.40 pounds,

 

1Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New American Library, New York,
1951, p. 33.

225

TABLE 34

NATIONALISM AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

=a, =— ======== ============:_1
Income, in Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
pounds/week SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Less than

L 5 50.0% 50.0% 8 77.8% 11.1% 11.1% 9
L 5 - 9 11.1 88.9 36 27.6 31.0 41.4 29
L10 - 14 11.9 88.1 42 31.6 34.2 34.2 38
L15 - 19 17.0 83.0 53 37.8 42.2 20.0 45
L20 - 24 10.9 89.1 64 36.2 31.0 32.8 58
L25 - 29 33.3 66.7 27 64.0 16.0 20.0 25
L30 and 7.8 92.2 _2§ 26.9 38.5 34.6 ‘_26

over N=256 N=230

X27= .01 Xli= .06 Gamma = -.03
TABLE 35
NATIONALISM AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Income, in Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
pounds/week SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
L l - 2 31.6% 68.4% 19 52.9% 29.4% 17.6% 17
L 3 - 4 21.4 78.6 70 40.3 32.2 27.4 62
L 5 - 7 13.1 86.9 99 35.3 31.8 32.9 85
L 8 - 13 8.9 91.1 56 38.2 27.3 34.5 55
L14 - 32 10.0 90.0 .ng 22.2 66,7 11.1 .__2
, N=254 ‘17 . . N=228
X2: .16 x2 = .60 Gamma =2 .09

 

226

contrasted to the Neutrals' 16.50 pounds, and the Antinats' 16.20
pounds per week. The cross-tabulation between the Index and household
income results in a gamma (G) of only -.03, indicating a very weak
relationship.

However, when income is adjusted to account for household size,
a clearer relationship emerges. Table 35 shows that the lowest income
groups give the strongest support for nationalism, Among those in the
one to two pound category, one-third are SNP voters and more than half
are Scotnats. Figure 5 graphically illustrates the trend: as house-
hold income per capita increases, support for nationalism decreases.
On the relationship between income per capita and the Index, there is
a Kendall Tau C of only .08 but this is significant at the .04 level.
Per capita household income is thought to be a better indicator of
objective deprivation than unadjusted income because it relates better
to the standard of living the household is able to attain. Only the
Chi Square levels of significance urge some caution with this data.

The second measure of objective deprivation deals with the posses-
sion of certain key luxury Consumer items (see Table 33). Here the
relationship with nationalism is the reverse of that described for per
capita household income. As Table 36 shows, except in the category of
five or more items, SNP support increases as the possession of items
increases. The same general trend is found on the Index side, where
just 35% of those in the deprived group are Scotnats while 46% of those
possessing four luxury items are Scotnats. This relationship produces
a Kendall Tau C of -.08 (significant at .03) and a gamma of G = -.11,
indicating that as one moves toward the nationalism end of the scale,

respondents are likely to possess more luxury items. Stated another way,

Percent

Nationalism as a percentage of each income group

50

40

30

20

10

227

FIGURE 5

NATIONALISM AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME

 

 

 

 

Scotnats
SNP
1-2 3-4 5-7 8-13 16-32

Household income per capita, in pounds

 

[Jim/1 'mq urrrouni

b 1 mluwuofT

 

228

TABLE 36

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND POSSESSION OF LUXURY CONSUMER ITEMS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of

items Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment

possessed SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n

2 or less 13.5% 86.5% 141 35.2% 32.0% 32.8% 122

3 17.9 82.1 78 41.6 28.6 29.9 77

4 19.5 81.5 41 45.9 35.1 18.9 37

5 or more 10.7 89.3 28 43.5 30.4 26.1 23
N=288 N=259

X4 = .60 X1 = .85 Gamma = -.11
TABLE 37

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CLASS, BY OCCUPATION

 

Vote Intention ‘

 

ndex of Separatist Sentiment

 

 

 

Class SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
NONMANUAL:
Professional,
Managerial,
Intermediate 11.4% 88.6% 35 36.1% 33.3% 30.5% 36
Skilled non-
manual 14.0 86.0 50 39.1 34.8 26.1 46
(12.9) (87.1) (85) [37.8) (34.1) (28.0) (82)
MANUAL:
Skilled
manual 20.0 80.0 90 42.2 28.9 28.9 83
Partly
skilled,
Unskilled 14.1 85.9 92 37.5 31.2 31.2 80
(17.0) (83.0) (180) [39.9) (30.1) (30.1) (163)
N-272 N=245
x4 = .27 x2 = .98 Gamma = .04

 

 

 

229

Scotnats possess an average of 2.93 items, Neutrals 2.86, and Antinats
2.76. The averages are identical for SNP voters (2.86) and others (2.85).

The third measure of objective deprivation deals with social class
as determined by occupation. Table 37 shows the relationship to
nationalism, Nationalism.is slightly stronger among manual workers than
among non-manual, but the differences are not particularly convincing.
The strongest nationalist group seems to be skilled manual workers among
whom twenty percent are SNP voters and forty-two percent are Scotnats.
The weakest nationalist group is the professional, managerial, inter-
mediate class among whom just éleven percent are SNP supporters and
thrity-six percent Scotnats. The strength of nationalism among the
skilled manual group seems to confirm Hoffer's assertion that "[d]is-
content is likely to be highest when misery is bearable; when conditions
have so improved that an ideal state seems almost within reach."1 It
also coincides generally with the findings of Piepe and Prior that SNP

voting is strongest among skilled and semi-skilled workers.2

Nationalism and Subjective Deprivation

Five measures of subjective deprivation are used in this study.
Only two seem.to relatevin any significant way to support for national-
ism in Scotland. The first, dealing with the respondent's view of
Scotland's Parliamentary representation, is a measure of perception of
political deprivation. Table 38 shows that of those thinking Scotland
under-represented in Parliament, nineteen percent are SNP voters and

forty-seven percent are Scotnats. This contrasts with just nine percent

 

1Ibid., p. 33.

2Piepe and Prior, loc. cit.

230

TABLE 38

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL DEPRIVATION

 

 

View of Scotland's

 

 

 

 

Parliamentary Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
Representation SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Should have

more MP3 19.3% 80.7% 171 47.3% 29.7% 23.0% 165
Representation

all right as

is/should

have fewer

MPs 8.8 91.2 102 23.2 34.9 41.9 6

N6273 N= 51
x2 = .02 xire- .002

 

SNP voters and twenty-three percent Scotnats among those not considering

Scotland under-represented.

Hence, a sense of political deprivation

seems to be related to Scottish nationalism.

TABLE 39

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DEPRIVATION

 

 

Where jobs are Vote Intention

Index of Separatist Sentiment

 

 

easier to get SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
England 19.4% 80.6% 98 46.2% 31.2% 22.6% 93
No difference 11.7 88.3 145 35.7 32.7 42.9 129
Scotland 14.3 85.7 '__1 28.6 31.8 28.6 ___Z
N=250 Na229
Xzi= .28 REV? .46 Gamma = .19

 

Second, there is some indication that perception of occupational

deprivation relates to nationalism.

Table 39 shows that among those

231
thinking jobs are easier to get in England, nineteen percent are SNP
voters and forty-six are Scotnats, while among those thinking jobs
are easier to get in Scotland, fourteen percent are SNP supporters and

just twenty-nine percent are Scotnats.

TABLE 40

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF DISCREPANCIES
BETWEEN ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH STANDARDS OF LIVING

 

 

 

 

 

 

# of luxury items

English have but Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment

Scots lack SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n

0 16.4% 83.6% 158 43.3% 31.9% 24.8% 141

l - 2 12.7 87.3 102 34.4 28.9 36.7 90

3 - 5 17.9 82.1 _2§ 35.7 35.7 28.6 28
N=288 N=259

x2 = .58 x2 = .38 Gamma - .11

 

But other measures of perceived socio-economic deprivation yield
discrepant results. Tables 40-42 show that perceptions of deprivation
need not be associated with support for nationalism using either of
our measures of that variable. Table 40 deals with the respondent's
perceptions of the standards of living of Scots and English. Specifically,
respondents were asked whether they thought most Scots were able to
afford certain key luxury consumer items (see Table 33) and whether
most Englishmen were able to afford them. Of the total sample, no
respondents thought Scots possessed more items than the English, 55.2%
thought there were no differences, and 44.8% thought that the English
had at least one item which most Scots lacked. Table 40 shows, however,

that of those who saw no differences between the possessions of Scots

232
and those of the English, sixteen percent were SNP supporters while
of those who thought the English were much better off (possessing
three to five more luxury items on the average), eighteen percent were
SNP supporters. This relationship is in the right direction but not
significantly. But when we turn to the Index as our measure of
nationalism, the results are even more surprising. While forty-three
percent of the group perceiving no differences are Scotnats, far fewer,
thirty-six percent, of the group viewing the Scots as deprived are

Scotnats. This is not in the predicted direction.

TABLE 41

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

View of Scots' economig/
position relative to /Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
English SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Deprived 1 15.2% 84.8% 112 43.3% 27.3% 29.3% 99
2 8.7 91.3 46 44.2 25.6 30.2 43
3 15.7 84.3 89 30.9 40.7 28.4 81
Not
deprived 4 16.7 83.3 ..lZ 50.0 25.0 25.0 _;g
N=259 N=235
x2 - .60 x7- = .34 Gamma - .05

 

Moreover, Tables 41 and 42 show the same anomalous relationship
between nationalism and perceived economic and life-style deprivation.
Respondents were asked whether they thought the English were doing
better than Scots (or had a better Style of living) and whether they
thought the English ought to be doing as well as they are compared with

Scots (or ought to have a better style of living). Those thinking the

233
English were doing better and deserved to be doing better were classed
as not deprived("4"on the scale), while those thinking the English were
doing better and did not deserve to be doing better were classed as
deprived and placed in the "1" position on the scale. Others fell in
middle positions on the scale. An examination of Tables 41 and 42 show
that there is no systematic pattern to the distribution between

nationalism and perceived deprivation.

TABLE 42

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF LIFE-STYLE DEPRIVATION

 

 

 

 

 

View of Scots' life-
style relative to 1 Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
English SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Deprived 1 12.9% 87.1% 101 39.6% 29.7% 30.8% 91
2 10.8 89.2 74 39.1 23.2 37.7 69
3 20.6 79.4 92 38.8 37.6 23.5 85
Not
deprived 4 28.6 71.4 7 57.2 28.6 14.3 7
N2274 N=252
x2 = .22 x2 = .46 Gamma = -.06

 

The mixed findings of this section suggest that the simple per-
ception of deprivations among a national group, even when coupled
with a notion of justice, cannot adequately explain the existence of a
nationalist movement. Perceived political deprivations do seem.to
correlate with support for nationalism but perceived economic and social
deprivations for the most part do not.

These results suggest that alternative explanations should be

sought to account for national separatism in Scotland. The next chapter

234
will show the extent to which nationalism correlates with social mobil-

ity, another potentially explanatory condition for unrest and separatism”

CHAPTER VIII
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SCOTTISH NATIONALISM
Is Scotland big enough to be
A symbol 0' that force in me,
In wha's devine inebriety
A sicht abune contempt I'll see?
For a' that's Scottish is in me,
As a' things Russian were in thee,
And I in turn 'ud be an action
To pit in a concrete abstraction
My country's contrair qualities,
And mak' a unity 0' these
Till my love owre its history dwells,
As owretone to a peal o' bells.

A second potential source of explanation for nationalism in Scotland
derives from the theory of social mobility. In Chapter Two we outlined
the rationale for linking social mobility with support for national
separatism” When an individual in a complex, stratified society changes
his position on one of the important social strata, such as education,
wealth, or political power, discrepancies frequently develop among his
various status positions. These "status discrepancies" may or may not
involve status hierarchies which are salient to the individual. But
they generally contribute to role confusion, increase anomie in the in-
dividual, and may impel the individual to sever his ties with the estab-
lished order. Although the behavioral consequences of such discrepancies may
vary significantly, the expression of unorthodix political views and par-
ticipation in divergent political activities has been frequently observed.

The presence of a vehicle for the expression of unorthodox political

235

236
sentiments--such as that afforded by a separatist movement--may facil-

itate the political manifestation of such consequences.

Social Mbbility in Scotland

Social mobility is frequently measured in terms of the movement
an individual makes away from the social position of his parents. But
since we are more interested in the short-term perception of mobility
among Scots, we have devised a means of measuring intra-generational
mobility. Three independent items in the questionnaire administered to
the Glasgow sample dealt with perceived or expected mobility. In each
case a large majority of survey respondents indicated that they felt
their position, and that of Scotland as a whole, to be improving sub-
stantially over time. The first item measured the respondent's per-
ception of short-term.change in the family income. After asking the
respondent to estimate his household's income, the interviewer posed
Question 37(b):

How does this compare with your income over the last

five years? Is it higher, lower, or about the same as it

was five years ago?
Table 43 shows that nearly half of all respondents thought that their
economic position was improved during this period. Just seventeen per-
cent thought that their income had actually gone down in this period.

A second item measured the respondent's expectation of future
change in his economic position. Question 15(a) asked:

Do you expect your own earnings to improve, get worse,
or stay about the same over the next five years?

Table 44 shows that a little over half of the sample expected their
income to improve, while only four percent expected their income to

drop. Thirty-eight percent saw no change in the future as compared with

237
twenty-eight percent who said they had seen no change in their income

in the past five years.

TABLE 43

PERCEPTION OF PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

 

 

 

 

Ihose_saying income had: Percent Number
Improved 49.4% 152
Stayed the same 27.9 86
Declined 16.9 52
DK, NA 5.8 _l§
100.0% 308 = N
TABLE 44

EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

 

 

 

 

Those saying earnings will: Percent Number
Improve 52.6% 162
Stay the same 38.3 118
Decline 4.2 13
DK, NA 4.8 ._12

‘99 9% 308 = N

 

. The final measure of mobility relates to the respondent's expec-
tation of future change in Scotland's economic position. QueStion
15(b) asked:

How about Scotland's economic situation? Do you expect

that to improve, get worse, or stay about the same over the
next five years?

238
Table 45 shows the pattern of response for those identifying themselves
as Scots as compared with the entire Glasgow sample. In both cases,
about forty-six percent expected improvement in Scotland's economic
position, while just six percent saw a future decline. Nearly forty-
two percent of both groups expected to see no change at all in the
economic fortunes of Scotland. This proportion is slightly larger than
that perceiving no recent change or projecting no future change in

their own personal economic situation.

TABLE 45

EXPECTATION OF SCOTLAND'S FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY

 

 

 

Those saying Scotland's "Scots" Total

economy will: Percent Number Percent Number

Improve 46.0% 131 45.8% 141

Stay the same 41.7 119 41.6 128

Decline 6.0 17 6.5 20

DK, NA 6.3 18 6.2 19
100.0% 285 100.1% 308 = N

 

 

We have singled out for special analysis those identifying them:
selves as "Scots" since the concept of group mobility to which we refer
below requires the assumption that all individuals analyzed actually
do identify with the group to which we presume they belong. Hence, the
sub-sample we use to examine hypotheses involving group mobility ex-
cludes those Glasgow respondents who thought of themselves as "English"
or "Irish."

One additional observation needs to be made before proceeding.

239
Each of our measures of social mobility deals with perceived economic
or income change. One focuses on the individual's awareness of past
income change, another deals with his expectation of future income
change. The last deals With expectations about the future economic
fortunes of the individual's national group. While this does not allow
us a particularly broad operationalization of the concept of social
mobility, to attempt more would risk stretching the respondent's ability
to detect short-term changes in his status. An individual has solid
opinions about pocket-book issues, but he may have imperfectly formed
images of his changing social prestige, or political power.

How do our three mobility measures relate to one another? Although
it does not seem foreordained that these measures will coincide with one
another, we would expect to find a fairly high correlation among themi
Table 47 shows the interaction between "Perception of Past Personal
Economic Mobility" and "Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mbbility."
We would expect to find that those perceiving past movement would pro-
ject an identical trend into the future. The table shows that about
seventy-three percent of those perceiving past upward movement in their
incomes expect to see a continuance of that trend in the future. And
nearly seventy percent of those perceiving no change in the recent past
expect to see no change in the near future. But among those who thought
their income had declined over the past five years only six percent
expected th see a continued decline. This is about the same proportion
as among those whose incomes had been on the rise and suggests a funda-
mental optimism among respondents about their own future.

But Table 47 suggests that confidence about personal future income

does not carry over quite as strongly to the national group. Among all

240
TABLE 46

PERCEPTION OF PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND
EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Present income as compared with five years ago:

Expect future _ a. Higher Same Lower n
earnings to be:

Higher 107 22 19 148

Same 32 55 28 115

Lower 8 2 3 13

n 147 79 50 276 = N

x2 = .00 Gamma = .50
TABLE 47

PERCEPTION OF PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND
EXPECTATIONS OF SCOTLAND'S FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY,
AMONG "SCOTS IDENTIFIERS"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Present income as compared with five years ago:
Expect Scotland's Higher Same‘ ~"Lower n
economy to:

Improve 79 27 18 124

Stay the same 47 44 23 114

Decline 10 4 l 15

n 136 75 42 253 = N

x2 = .00 Gamma = .22

those who thought their income had gone up recently and who were "Scots,"
just fiftyeeight percent expected Scotland's economic situation to im-
prove in the near future. A similar proportion of those whose incomes

were perceived to be static, thought Scotland's economic situation would

 

241

remain unchanged. And the unwillingness to project downward trend into
the future shows up again as less than three percent of those who
thought they had declining incomes saw a decline for Scotland in the
future.

And finally, Table 48 shows the extent to which expected personal
mobility coincides with expected group mobility. In general, the linkage “4
appears to be very strong, the over-all gamma score being .59. Nearly

sixty-eight percent of those who expect their own income to increase

 

also expect Scotland's economy to improve, while more than seventy-two i
percent of those who foresee no change in personal income expect Scot-

land's economy to stay the same. But following the pattern seen in the

two previous tables, only ten percent of those who project a decline in

their own income also project a decline in the national group economy.

TABLE 48

EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND
EXPECTATION OF SCOTLAND'S FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AMONG "SCOTS"
Expect own future earnings to be:
E ect Scotland's econ to:
XP omy Higher Same Lower n
Improve 95 24 3 122
Stay the same 35 78 6 119
Decline _ _10 6 l 17
n 140 108 10 N=258
x2 = .00 Gamma = .59

In general, these tables confirm our expectations about the inter-

relationship of the mobility variables. Past mobility is highly

242
correlated with future expected mobility and the perception of one's
own fortunes is closely tied to that of the national group with which
one identifies. There is a slight tendency for respondents to be
somewhat more optimistic about the future than past experience would
seem to warrant, and the chances of personal income improvement are

rated slightly higher than the chances of national economic improvement.

. I”

Nationalism and Social Mobility

According to our measures of social mobility, there is a consid-

 

erable sense of movement in Scottish society. Perhaps surprisingly, I“
most of this sense of movement is in the upward direction. Only between

six and seventeen percent of those interviewed in the Glasgow sample

had any feeling of a downward movement. One possible effect of such

widespread social mobility is a general loosening of ties to the estab-

lished order. In perceptual terms this might mean a tendency of the

socially mobile to dissociate themselves from class and caste identity.

Moreover, Kornhauser's "mass theory" suggests that ”the unattached and

alienated of all classes are more attracted to extremist symbols and

1 But there is

leaders than are their class rooted counterparts."
scant evidence in our study to support this contention. Table 49 shows
no significant relationship between union non-membership and support

for nationalism in Scotland. Although non-union members are more likely
to be Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment, they are somewhat
less likely to vote for the SNP.

These mixed results emerge again in Table 50 which shows no statis-

tically significant relationship between alienation from secondary groups

 

1Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 180.

243

TABLE 49

NATIONALISM AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Union Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
Member SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Yes 17.1% 82.9% 123 36.5% 31.3% 32.2% 115
No 13.9 86.1 165 41.7 31.2 27.1 144 ”“
N=288 Né259
x2 = .50 x2 = .67
I.
TABLE 50
NATIONALISM AND SECONDARY GROUP MEMBERSHIP
Group Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
Member SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Yes 22.2% 87.8% 27 29.6% 40.7% 29.6% 27
No 14.6 85.4 260 40.5 30.2 29.3 232
N=287 N=259
x2 = .27 x2 = .37

 

and support for nationalism. Non—group members are slightly less likely
to support the SNP and slightly more likely to be Scotnats on the Index
of Separatist Sentiment.

These results are inconclusive and do not lend support to the
hypothesis linking social mobility and support for separatism. However,
striking results emerge when we examine directly the relationship between
our three measures of social mobility and our two measures of separa-
tism. In five out of the six combinations of variables, we may interpret

our hypothesis as significantly upheld. In the sixth case, it is only

244
partly upheld.

Table 51 shows the relationship between the two nationalism
measures and the past economic mobility of the respondent. The clear
pattern is that both those who perceived themselves to have moved up-
ward and those who perceived themselves to have moved downward are more
likely to be nationalists than those who thought their economic position
has unchanged. More than twenty percent of the upward mobiles and
thifteen percent of the downward mobiles said they intended to vote
for the SNP, while almost forty-eight percent of the upward mobiles and
nearly forty-one percent of the downward mobiles ranked as Scotnats on
the Index of Separatist Sentiment. In contrast, the group perceiving
no change in income strongly supported parties other than the SNP and

were nearly half Antinats.

TABLE 51

NATIONALISM AND PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

 

 

 

 

 

Those saying VOte Intention Index of Separatist Sentflment
income had: SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Improved 20.7% 79.3% 145 47.7% 33.6% 18.7% 128
Stayed same 6.7 93.3 75 25.4 28.2 46.5 71
Declined 13.5 86.5 52 40.9 29.5 29.5 44
N=272 N=243

x2 = .03 x2 = .00 Gamma - .24

 

Somewhat similar results are obtained when we relate the national-
ism measures to expected future personal economic mobility. Table 52
shows again that on both measures of separatism the upward mobiles tend

to be far more likely to be nationalists than those who expect no change.

 

245
TABLE 52

NATIONALISM AND EXPECTED FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Those saying Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment
income will: SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n
Improve 20.1% 79.9% 154 50.7% 25.4% 23.9% 138
Stay same 9.9 90.1 111 26.6 37.2 36.2 94 .
Decline 0.0 100.0 1 30.8 30.8 38.5 13
N: 77 N=245
x2 = .04 x2 = .01 Gamma = .33 ;-

 

Inconsistent results indicate that all of the downward mobiles intend
to vote for parties other than the SNP, although a slightly higher
proportion of the downward mobiles are Scotnats than among the static
group. The very small n for this group of downward mobiles may account
for the discrepancy.

And finally, Table 53 shows that support for separatism.strongly
relates to Scotland's expected future economic mobility among "Scots."
Twenty percent of the upward mobiles and forty-one percent of the
downward mobiles were SNP supporters, while just six percent of those
who saw Scotland's economy in static terms were SNP supporters. Simi-
larly, forty-one percent of the upward mobiles and fully eighty-one
percent of the downward mobiles were Scotnats on the Index of Separatist
Sentiment, while less than twenty-six percent of the static group were
Scotnats. The relatively low n for the downward mobile group suggests
the possibility of some error in the large proportion found to support
separatism.in this group. In any case, the findings mm this table, as

in the previous two, strongly support the notion that mobility relates

246

to support for separatism.

TABLE 53

NATIONALISM AND SCOTLAND'S EXPECTED FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY,
AMONG "SCOTS"

 

 

 

 

 

 

Those saying .

Scotland's Vote Intention Index of Separatist Sentiment

economy will: SNP Other parties n Scotnats Neutrals Antinats n

Improve 20.5% 79.5% 122 45.2% 32.2% 22.6% 115

Stay same 6.1 93.9 115 25.8 35.0 39.2 97

Decline 41.2 58.8 17 81.2 12.5 6.3 16
N=254 N=228

x2 = .00 x2 = .00 Gamma = .11

 

Figure 6 graphically illustrates some of the data in Tables 51 -
53. It shows the percentage of Scotnats in each mobility group on each
measure of social mobility utilized in this study. For upward mobile
groups and for static groups (where sample n's are large) the results
are consistent across all mobility measures. It is only in the down-
ward mobile group (where n's have been shown to be very low, admitting
to the possibility of error) that inconsistencies of degree but not
direction occur.

The interpretation we place on these results needs to account for
the lack of a relationship between group membership and separatism as
well as for the significant relationship noted immediately above be-
tween mobility and separatism" At first this seems a somewhat troubling
discrepancy since social mobility is thought to alienate the individual

from group life as part of the process of realigning him to new

 

"Scotnats" as a percent of each group

100

247

FIGURE 6

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

 

80

60*

40

20 .

 

   
     

Expected
National Group

Economic Mobility ~.-1’

Past Economic
Mobility

I ...—
’ ..‘..
“00“.

V /
Expected Economic
Mobility

——— 2" h " C it '9’

 

 

 

Upward Static ‘ Downward
Mbbile Mobile

248
structures and roles. But this does not seem to be the case in Scotland.
While there may be a tendency for the socially mobile to become declassg,
there is no tendency to reject group life. There are apparently mech-
anisms in this process which help to maintain group ties, despite the
potentially disrupting influence of mobility up or down the economic

hierarchy.

“”7

The conditions which help to preserve group ties among the so-
cially mobile in Scotland may be the same conditions which impel the

mobile in the direction of separatism. In a sense there are two

a

traditions in Scotland, two alternative establishments. The in-
establishment, represented by the present UK system of political unity
and moderation, and the out-establishment, consisting of the separate
Scottish national tradition of autonomy tinged with a streak of radical—
ism" This out-establishment provides a convenient point of stability
in the lives of the mobile. But to reject the in-establishment and opt
for separatism does not necessarily mean that the individual also needs
to alienate himself frmm group life. As we have pointed out, many
groups in Scotland are Scottish groups. Even the national unions have
semi-autonomous Scottish branches. Gurr has suggested that while
social stresses may cause people to alienate themselves from.some kinds
of groups, they may also cause people to attach themselves to groups
under certain conditions. This "institutionalized displacement" most
frequently occurs when other channels of social expression are closed
or inappropriate.1 In Scotland, the out-establishment group structure

apparently provides both an acceptable vehicle for peaceful protest

 

1Gurr, "Psychological Factors...," pp. 268-9. Cf. also supra,
chap. II, pp. 69-70.

249
and a point of psychological stability. This dual role played by groups
and unions may account for the relatively high proportion of nationalists

who participate in group life.

 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The snaw is seekan everywhere: our herts
At last like roofless ingles it has fund,
And gethers there in drift on endless drift,
Our broken herts that it can never fill;
And still--its leafs like snaw, its grouth like wund.--
The thistle rises and forever will!

Scotland lies on the fringe of Europe. She is geographically
isolated and aloof from the hectic exchange of economic goods and politi-
cal ideas which takes place on the continent. Significantly, it is
the physical bulk of England which, like a wedge, separates Scotland
from.the rest of Europe. But like many other fringe areas of the
world, Scotland has sought to defend her identity and importance through
political action. In an era when the nation-state is declining as
a center of political sovereignty and as a point of psychological
reference for its citizens, Scottish nationalism has experienced a
major resurgence. In a decade when a European economic and political
community has taken a step toward realization, an overwhelming majority
of Scots resisted pressures to join and reaffirmed their preference
for home rule.

This study has been an attempt to illuminate the character and
causes of Scottish nationalism” We have traced its history, identified
its leaders, studied its ideology, and sought out its fundamental moti-

vations. We have also inquired into the applicability of two complemen-

tary frameworks to the study of Scottish nationalism” In this final

250

. If

 

251
chapter we will discuss some of the major findings of our inquiry and

consider some of the problems we have encountered.

Nationalism and the SNP
First, although in Chapter One we concluded that the various be-

havioral and attitudinal indicators observed in Scotland were consistent

with the commonly used term "nationalism," we found it difficult to {5
operationalize support for that movement in Scotland. In Chapter Five f
we explained why we felt compelled to measure nationalism in Scotland 3
both in terms of attitudes supporting increased devolution from the I %-

 

central government in London and in terms of support for the Scottish
National Party. We also indicated that while support for the SNP has
fluctuated widely over the years, popular attitudes about Scottish
government have been consistent in their support for a significant
measure of political devolution for Scotland.

But why in the face of popular support for home rule have the
nationalists been unable for sustained periods to mobilize this support
at the polls? Why, to put the question in a Slightly different form,
has the SNP failed to capture decisively the nationalist movement in
Scotland? It may relate to the imperfect qualities of the political
party as a vehicle for protest. As Toch has said, political parties
often "evidence more concern for powerful pressure groups than for

"1 But three more convincing reasons stand out: (1)

needy minorities.
the obstacles presented by the British electoral system, (2) the in-
ability of the nationalists to cooperate among themselves, and (3) a

dearth of strong, charismatic leadership.

 

1Toch, op. cit., p. 220.

252

The general rule has been proposed that "the simple-majority single-
ballot system.favours the two-party system."1 Although it is apparent
that others factors must also be present,2 one could make a very strong
case for the primacy of the plurality system in the hierarchy of causal
factors leading to a two-party system. Minor parties generally find
survival difficult in such systems since victory at the polls depends
so centrally on political credibility, which in turn depends on victory.
In the British system additional obstacles are placed before mdnor par-
ties. Media time is rigidly controlled and equal time provisions ex-
plicitly rejected in favor of a scheme which allots radio and television
time on the basis of the level of electoral support a party has. In
1970 the SNP was given just five minutes of radio and television time
(the same it had in 1966) contrasted to the Labour and Conservative
Parties' fifty minutes and the Liberal Party's thirty'mdnutes.3 These
restrictions didnnot help the SNP but it is unlikely that they were
much of a detriment. The swift rise of the party in the 1967 by-elections
and in the 1968 municipal elections had been closely followed in the
Scottish press and widely covered as "news" on radio and television.

Another obstacle is the deposit requirement. Each candidate must
pay to election authorities 150 pounds, which is forfeited unless he can
secure at least one-eighth of the vote in his constituency. Having
lflmited financial resources, smaller parties often cannot afford to

risk the possibility of losing deposits, so they put up fewer candidates

 

1Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity
in the Modern State, John Wiley &nSons, Inc., New York, 1963, p. 217.

2Cf. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies,
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New York, 1967, pp. 37241.

3Cf. Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., pp. 204-5.

 

253
and foreclose the possibility of winning decisive victories.

But the vagaries of the British electoral system are not alone
responsible for the relatively poor long-term showing of the national-
ist party in Scotland. Indeed, Lipset suggests that the one major
exception to the two-party system rule is in cases where groups can
draw on regional support.1 The Irish nationalists provide a good
example of a regional group which won.major representation in the UK
Parliament in spite of the plurality system,

A second major reason the Scottish nationalists have been unable

 

to win sustained support at the polls concerns the internal organization
of the party. Unlike other British parties, the SNP is fairly de-
centralized. Central party pOlicy is purposively vague and sketchy.
Constituency organizations have final authority over policy questions.
Moreover, constituency organizations are under no obligation to the
national office regarding the selection of candidates. This decen-
tralized feature of the party has contributed to ideological diversity
in party ranks. This is often viewed as an advantage in a moderate,
eclectic party since it may contribute to the long-term.down-playing

of ideology and winning of new converts. But ideological diversity in
a party based on a single emotional issue can have nothing but disin-
tegrative effects. The internecine battles within the nationalist
movement over ideology and tactics (particularly between the Liberals
and the SNP) have generally weakened the movement by reducing public
confidence both in nationalist organizations and in nationalist leaders.

A final explanation for the failure of the Scottish nationalists

 

1Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Natidn, Basic Books, Inc.,
New York, 1963, pp. 293-4.

 

254
to win sustained support relates to the quality of leadership. There
is no question that many qualified Scots have been drawn into the cam-
paign for separatisma The Scottish intelligensia, for example, has
been generally sympathetic if not actively supportive of the SNP and
other nationalist organizations. But the movement has produced no
truly outstanding charismatic leader who can command the loyalty of
activists, attract new support from the masses, and generally personify
the cause. As Lipset has argued, charismatic leadership is indispen-

sable in establishing the legitimacy of an independence movement.1 But

 

Scottish nationalism.and the SNP have not produced a George Washington,
nor even a Charles Parnell. All too often its leaders have been narrow,
vindictive, and self-righteous. And more importantly they have not been
particularly popular figures.

In any case, the language of nationalism has been spoken with many
tongues in Scotland while the political predispositions of a majority
of Scots have not been transformed into concrete political action. Per-
haps more than any other, these two factors have characterized Scottish

nationalism over the past century.

The causes of Nationalism in Scotland

But the central issue of this study has related to the sources of
nationalism in Scotland and the motivations of its supporters. Having
considered aggregate economic, social, and political data, survey data,
and evidence from the historical record, we are now prepared to offer
some conclusions. As we emphasize at the end of this chapter, our

findings are tentative and open, partly because of the limited nature

 

1Ibid., chap. I.

255
of our study and partly because of the often contradictory evidence we
have accumulated. But what we have found has some interesting impli-
cations.

The most fundamental requirements of nationalism are present in
Scotland. At a minimum.nationalism requires the existence of criteria
which delineate a group of people as a national group. We have found
the Scots set apart from other people primarily by geography, language,
customs, and common experience. But just as a mineral resource may or
may not be exploited for an industrial purpose, a national group does
not automatically become politicized in a nationalist movement.

A conclusion which is as unavoidable as it is trivial relates to
the complexity of the phenomenon of nationalism and the futility of the
search for a single "cause." Once a national group has been delineated,
a number of diverse factors may determine whether (and to what degree)
it will become politicized. We set out in this study to determine the
relevance 05 two such factors, a sense of national group relative depri-
vation and group social mobility. But in the context of the Scottish
case, we can easily suggest that other factors bear centrally on the
issue.

At least five factors relate in different ways and to different
degrees to the phenomenon of national separatism in Scotland. The
historical context within which the revival of nationalism has taken
place seems to affect at least three of these factors. First, the twen-
tieth century has been for Britain a period of retreat from empire, a
moving back from world-wide commitments, and a stepping-down from.the
pinnacle of world power. This has both removed a major avenue of self—

fulfillment for Britons of all nationalities in the military, in

 

256
commerce, and in the foreign civil service, and it has instigated a re-
appraisal of the conditions of life at home. For those with ambition
and drive, the Empire may be thought to have served a "safety valve"
function not unlike the role of the frontier in the American experience.
But just as the end of the frontier may in some way have contributed to

American jingoism and imperialism, the "end of empire" may have ushered

I!

in an era of suppressed ambition and pent-up energies throughout Britain.
The loss of the Empire, along with these "advantages," may have removed

one strong tie among the various elements making up the United Kingdom.

 

Moreover, the social reforms of the post-war Labour government,
the increasing willingness of Britain to cooperate and join with EurOpe,
and the revival of Celtic nationalisms in Britain may all share a
common impetus. Each may derive in part from the return to an inward
perspective occasioned by the end of colonialism” The era had produced
a marked affluence at home but after World War I growth rates slowed
down and concern for distributive justice was heightened. World War 11
further weakened Britain's economic and political power and focussed
interest even more directly on internal problems and priorities. Labour's
social and economic reforms of 1945—51 undoubtedly helped to allay
some of the pressure, but efforts in the 1960's to join the EEC may
have helped (at least from.Scotland's perspective) to exacerbate the
problem.

In the Introduction we noted the coincidence between the modern
revival of Scottish nationalism and Britain's movement toward the European
Community. Although it is ironic that integrative and disintegrative
forces can be taking place at the same time in Europe, the evidence

suggests that the former may play a major role in encouraging the latter.

257
Our survey suggested that Scots were almost unanimously opposed to EEC
membership for Britain. Moreover, we have seen that one of the hallmarks
of SNP policy was opposition to EEC membership. But it would probably
be erroneous to conclude that the nationalists in Scotland are simply
ethnocentric parochials. Our survey showed that few Scots would favor
EEC membership for Scotland even if Scotland was independent. But the
SNP has never ruled out EEC membership for an independent Scotland. In
fact, SNP leadership stresses the role Scotland should be, but is pre-
vented by England from, playing in the international system.

Among those surveyed in this study, the conviction was strong that
EEC membership would further isolate Scotland from.the centers of power
by adding another bureaucratic tier. Throughout the 1960's the efforts
of the British government to join the EEC seem.to have contributed both
to disillusionment with the two main parties (especially Labour, the
party in power from 1964-70) and to the general attractiveness of the
SNP (the only party in Scotland opposed to EEC membership).

A third historical factor which seems relevant to the revival of
Scottish nationalism in the 1960's is Britain's short-run economic
situation. Although our sample was too small to produce definitive
results, it does appear that a large number of voters who opted for the
SNP during by-elections between 1966 and 1970 did so simply to protest
the Labour government's handling of the economy. Inflation, balance of
payments problems, and rising taxes were felt throughout Britain, but
the presence of the SNP in Scotland as a party Scots could, in a diffuse
sense, identify with, even though they knew little of its issue posi-
tions, made it a potential vehicle for protest. In England during the

early part of this period it was the Liberal Party which served this

 

258
protest function. Once the viability of the SNP had been established
(perhaps by the strong showing in the Pollok by-election in March, 1967),
the party could attract additional voters (mostly, it seems, Labour
voters) who wanted to withhold a vote from.their own party without

giving one to the main opposition.

These are all powerful arguments and they could be developed fur- 5"
ther. But in a larger sense they beg the question since they are all

explanations purporting to explain the revival of nationalism in Scot-

 

land. The final two explanations, those which received most attention :,
in this study, have more relevance to the residual force of Scottish ’
nationalism although the variables with which they deal (relative depri-
vation and social mobility) are dynamic and can vary considerably over
time.

The evidence presented in Chapter Five yields a general picture
of Scotland as a deprived region. Wages are lower and the cost of living
higher than England. Health and living conditions are less satisfactory
than in England. And, most significantly, emigration rates are high.
Political representation and education are among the few criteria on
which the Scots do not seem to be objectively deprived within the
United Kingdom.

For the most part, these deprivations are accurately perceived by
a majority of Scots. The sense of national group deprivation relative
to England is high. But, surprisingly, the analysis of Chapter Seven
reveals that for at least three out of five measures of relative depri-
vation, no relationship with support for nationalism exists. Only on
the political dimension, where ironically no objective deprivation

exists, does a sense of relative deprivation relate unequivocally to

259
separatism.

The answers to two key questions need to be provided at this point.
Since the hypothesis linking a sense of relative deprivation to support
for separatism.was not strongly supported by the eVidence from the
Glasgow survey, we need to account for the result. And secondly, since
the results are generally at variance with the findings of other re-

searchers who have inquired into the sources of civil violence and

similar phenomena, we need to account for the discrepancy.

At least five factors appear to account for the weak relation found

 

 

between relative deprivation and separatism in Scotland. First, the
public image of the SNP is not positive. A free-response question on
our survey revealed that, among the sample as a whole, positive reactions
to the SNP only slightly outweighed negative responses. Even among
those we classed as Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment,
positive reactions were only a little more than twice as frequently "
given as negative comments. While support for the SNP was only one of
our measures of nationalism, the general lack of confidence in the party
and its leadership undoubtedly affects the attitudes Scots have about
the goals the party seeks. If an independent Scotland would mean gov-
ernment by the SNP, many Scots who might otherwise be expected to
support devolution would rather continue to take their chances under
the present governmental arrangement. It may be, in other words, that
the lackluster image of the SNP does more to retard the growth of
nationalism in Scotland than its organizing efforts do to nuture that
growth.

A second factor affecting the relationship is the expectation of

failure. A Gallup Poll conducted in 1968 showed that just 11.5% of those

260

surveyed thought that the SNP would win "all" or "most" of the Scottish
seats at the next parliamentary election. Another 23.2% foresaw the
SNP winning "about half."1 Our survey showed that nearly sixty percent
of the Glasgow sample thought that life in an independent Scotland would
be "no better" or even "worse” than now. Even among the supporters of
separatism.the sense of futility was more than thirty-six percent.
This evidence of widespread lack of confidence in the nationalist move-
ment may account for the weakness with which those with a sense of
relative deprivation support the separatist cause. If the SNP candidates
stand little chance of being elected, why support them? Why not cast
a vote for the Conservative or Labour Parties where Votes will make a
difference? Moreover, why turn to separatism as a means to redress
grievances if the execution of that policy would mean no change or even
a worsening of the situation? Dollard suggests that when the means to
relieve deprivations are expected to be ineffective, aggressive impulses
will seek surrogate objects of disdain.2 In Scotland we would expect
to find high rates of alcoholism, suicide, and crime, and we do. It
may be that deprivation-induced frustration finds its outlet not in
terms of aggression against the system which is perceived to produce
(or allow) those deprivations, but against substitutes closer at hand.

A third factor which may produce a weaker relationship between
deprivation and separatism than expected relates to the intensity with
which deprivations are perceived. Dollard, et al., stressed that the

strength of the instigation to aggression will influence the form and

 

1Social Surveys,(Gallup Poll) Ltd. and The Daily Telegraph, 1968.

2Dollard, et al., op. cit., chap.iv.

3Cf. Supra, chap. II, pp. 67-8.

 

261
degree of aggression. Weakly felt deprivations will presumably be less
frustrating and, hence, less likely to lead to aggression (or support
for separatism) than more strongly felt deprivations. Schwartz con-
cluded that deprivations in Scotland were of insufficient intensity to
produce violence but were strong enough to account for separatism.1
But his study focussed on nationalist leaders who, it may be surmised,
have a stronger incentive to rationalize their activity by pointing to
Scottish deprivations than those among the general public whose support
for nationalism is more diffuse. The motivations of activists, because
their activity is more intense and involving, may require a more care-
fully thought-out system of justifications to support and reinforce
that activity. Although we have no convenient way of showing whether
and how this discrepancy between elites and masses takes place, weakly
felt frustrations among our Glasgow sample may well depress the
correlation between sense of deprivation and separatism in Scotland.

A fourth factor which may contribute to our result relates to the
possibility that other compensatory factors may mitigate the effects of
a sense of deprivation. Specifically, life in Scotland, while it may
involve suffering deprivations, can also be highly gratifying. And
many of the advantages may be perceived to derive from Scotland's link
with England. More than forty percent of the respondents in the Glasgow
sample saw the bad effects of separating from England in terms of losing
some advantage (usually financial) which derived directly from the
union. Although we suggest above that the declining importance of
Britain's world role may have removed one gratifying aspect of the

union, other political, economic, and psychological advantages may help

 

1Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 511-2.

 

 

 

262
outweigh the sense of deprivation so many Scots express.

Finally, odious parallels between separatism.in Scotland and in
other parts of the world may weaken the expected relationship. The
specter of large-scale civil violence, vividly highlighted by the strife
so close at hand in Northern Ireland, may considerably dampen enthusiasm

for separatism in Scotland. This seems a particularly likely possibil-

" . . "L!

ity if, as we suspect, the deprivations perceived by Scots are felt less’
intensely than deprivations are felt by, say, Biafrans or Ulster Cath-

olics. Any bandwagon effect resulting from.the observation of separatist

 

w..dn‘l‘ J .i 1'}. "o~_0

movements elsewhere (e.g., Quebec, the Basque area, or Brittany) may
be mitigated or outweighed by the violent and undesirable outcomes of
a few. Most Scots, even many who perceive unjust deprivations, appar-
ently feel that it is better to endure the indignities deriving from the
present governmental arrangement than to risk the great suffering that
could accompany a vigorous independence movement. Survey evidence is
limited, but recent events in Northern Ireland may have checked the
revival of Scottish nationalism in much the same way as the Irish
independence movement ended Scotland's hope for "home rule all round"
at the beginning of the century.2
Although some of these factors are merely speculative, there seems
sufficient evidence from the survey to account for the unexpectedly weak
relationship found between perceptions of unjust deprivations and
support for separatism.in Scatland. ‘Moreover, owing to the complexity

of the dependent variable, the apparent multiplicity of relevant inde-

pendent variables, and the inability based on our small sample survey to

 

1Cf. Dollard, et al., p. 170.

2Cf. supra, chap. III, p. 106.

263
determine the relative importance of various independent variables to
different sub-groups, we are forced to conclude that although our
hypothesis is not strongly supported, we have no reason to reject it.
In fact, we suspect that a sense of relative deprivation is an import-
ant aspect of separatism in Scotland and elsewhere. If the mass public
is not strongly or directly motivated by this factor, leaders apparently
are.1 A widespread sense of relative deprivation may form the core
justification for a separatist movement even though it acts as a specific
motivation for only a minority of participants.

The second key question which requires explanation relates to the A

 

discrepancy between our findings and those of the researchers whose
work inspired this study. One shortcoming in the research procedures
used by most theorists of civil strife is that the essential dichotomy
between micro- and macro-analysis is not maintained. For example,
Gurr's hypothesis linking relative deprivation to civil strife rests
explicitly on frustration-aggression theory and, hence, on the perspec-
tive of the micro-analyst. He explains that
[t]he basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological
variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for
civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and in-
tense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater
is the magnitude of strife in one or another form.... The under-
lying causal mechanism is derived from.psychological theory and
evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived
deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a moti-
vating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying
response.

The Feierabends, too, adopt this micro-level perspective, modifying it

slightly by referring to "systemic frustration" as the systemrlevel

 

le. Schwartz, op. cit.

2Gurr, "A Causal Model....," p. 1104.

264

expression of the psychological variable.1 Eulau describes the view-

point of the micro-analyst:

The root is man. I don't think it is possible to say
anything meaningful about the governance of man without talk-
ing about the political behavior of man--his acts, goals,
drives, feelings, beliefs, commitments, and‘Values. Man has

built nations and empires, created customs and
invented symbols and constitutions, made ward,

and peace. Politics is the study of why man finds it neces-
sary or desirable to build government, of how he adapts
government to his changing needs or demands, of how and why
he decides on public policies. Politics is concerned with
the conditions and consequences of human action.

But the measures Gurr and the Feierabends develop to examine their

respective hypotheses are not on this plane of analysis. To measure

institutions,
revolutions

3.1331“ .I'

 

relative deprivation--a psychological variable as Gurr admits--Gurr

looks for patterns of long- and short-term economic and political dis-

crimination. To measure deviant political behavior he looks at the

systemic occurrence of dysfunctional activity. After an initial con-

ceptualization of the variables at the micro-level of analysis, they

become magically operationalized at the macro-level.

inappropriate strategy. Etzioni, inldiscussing the
macro- versus micro-level analysis, remarks that:

Theory construction is a process in which
are "broken down" into abstract components and
on still more abstract levels. While analysis
are universal features of theory-building, the

This seems an

fruitfulhess of

concrete data
reintegrated
and synthesis
number of tiers

among which analysis and synthesis are spread differs signif—
icantly. Much arbitrariness seems justified both in selecting
tiers and in fixing the divisions between them, they need only
be consistent with each other--i.e., what is defined as being
on one level must not be defined in the same theory as being

 

1Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend,

"Aggressive Behav-

iors Within Polities, 1948-1962, A Cross-national Study," Journal of

Conflict Resolution, X, September, 1966, pp. 249-50.

2
New York, 1963, p. 3.

Heinz Eulau, The Behavioraerersuasion'in Politics, Random House,

265
on another. [Emphasis mine.] 1
- Gurr and the Feierabends violate this edict. Their findings--
which rest on the assumption that there is a linkage between the two
levels--are not invalidated thereby, but one is cautioned as to the
difficulties. Where one seeks to explain political phenomena in terms
of motivational antecedents it becomes essential to confine one's
methodological manipulations to the personal psychological level of
analysis. In our study, we used same-level operationalizations for the
major dependent and independent variables. Moreover, where the micro-
level analysis is used for operationalization, it is also used for
initial conceptualization. As we have stressed, we assume that human
behavior does depend in some crucial way on perceptions, attitudes, and
motivations. Hence, the discrepancies between our findings and those
of other researchers in this field may well derive from these diverse

procedures.

The final explanation of Scottish nationalism we examined in this
study related to social mobility. We defined social mobility in terms
of the changes people perceived and expected in their own economic sit-
uation and that of their national group. And we expected to find that
those who were mobile in this sense would be more likely than those
whose position was static to experience "status discrepancies" and to
opt for dysfunctional political modes such as support for separatism.

Our findings, reported in Chapter Eight, were uniform, significant,
and supportive of the hypothesis. We found that for each measure of

mobility those respondents in the Glasgow survey who perceived upward

 

1Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society, The Free Press, New York, 1968,
p. 42.

 

266
or downward movement were far more likely to (1) support the SNP and
(2) favor increased devolution for Scotland than respondents who felt
that time did not affect their economic position nor that of Scotland.
There was considerable variation in the proportion of downward mo-
biles who supported separatism, but the small number who perceived
downward mobility gave us a large error factor in estimating proportions

among this group. Nevertheless, all of the relationships were in the

.v‘nr .6!

directiOn.prédicted.
Olson's prediction that both upward and downward mobiles will be
"destabilizing forces" is generally borne out by this evidence, But we

1 Un-

may be able to go further than he in explaining why this is so.
doubtedly, we can attfibute support for nationalism among the two
dynamic groups to different factors for upward and for downward mobiles.
The easier case to explain is the downward mobile group. Since the
status quo has not been or will not be kind to this group, we may sur-
mise that the stake this group has in the present odder is limited.
Scottish nationalism, with its promise for change and improvement, offers
this group a vehicle for self-advancement.

But the upward mobile group may also view the movement as an in-
strument of change, not change to improve one's economic or political
well-being as much as to offer a means of self-realization. The upward
mobile group may feel the confidence and need to use their new-found
status to affect change in the system.which is to their benefit. But in
addition, the upward group may feel a tinge of resentment against the

Anglicized "in-establishment" Scots who "collaborate" with the English

in.maintaining a status quo detrimental to their own best interests.2

 

le. supra, chap. II, p. 80.

2Cf. Wolfinger, et al., in Apter, op. cit., p. 279.

267
In an independent Scotland the old Anglicized elite might well be re-
placed by a "new technocratic elite," perhaps joined by some members
of the upward mobile group we are discussing.
Finally, it is important to note the linkage between relative
deprivation and social mobility. In Scotland, it is social mobility

in the context of a widespread sense of deprivation that yields support

 

for separatism, As noted above, a sense of relative deprivation plays

 

a role at least in maintaining a residual group of supporters of separ-

atism in Scotland. This makes support for separatism.a viable alterna-

 

tive and a magnet for the alienated and rootless. Hence, the inter-
action between these explanatory factors is an important explanation

in itself.

Although we set out in this Study to "explain" nationalism in Scot-
land and to search out its "causes," we have been able to do this only
to a limited degree. Definitive answers are, of course, elusive. As
Kaplan has noted,

[e]xplanations are often thought to add to our knowledge by
contributing only to its growth by expansion. The idea is
that when something has been explained it is as though we
have conquered a certain amount of territory; a new frontier
has been established, and, except for mopping-up operations,
nothing remains but to continue our steady advance. In an
even more popular metaphor, another trick has been laid in
the edifice of science, which rises ever higher. Such images
imply a finality that explanations do not in fact have; the
openness of laws and theories confers a corresponding attri-
bute on the explanations that they make possible.1

Our explanations are tentative for several reasons. First, they are
only partial explanations. We have been able to explore only a limited

set of independent variables out of the multiplicity of causally-related

 

1Abraham Kaplan, The Cenduct of 1nqurty,*methoddiggy for Behavioral
Research, Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1964, p, 351,

 

268
factors. From different perspectives, any of the intervening variables
we have discussed along the way might be considered a contributing
factOr. Second, our explanations are conditional. They apply only to
certain phenomena and not to others. We have been careful to delbmit
our study and to focus only on defensive separatism in Scotland.

Third, our explanations are inexact. Given that we have offered
valid devices for the prediction of support for separatism, we can only
predict the general parameters of the group exhibiting the trait we
seek. Fourth, the models we have suggested, while they may be applicable
in the general case, are not universally applicable. Deprivation and
nobility may be central motivating factors for participants in separa-
tist movements, but the theory based on that observation cannot account
for the diverse reactions to deprivation and mobility among a population.
Since, given common stimuli, behavior is not uniform, our explanation
of that behavior is indeterminate.

Fifth, our explanation suffers frmm inconclusiveness. It cannot
show why deprivation or mobility'gyat lead a national group to separation,
but rather why it is a likely outcome. Like all motivated behavior,
separatism.is a matter of probabilities. Sixth, we are able to confirm
our theOry only to a limited degree. The existence of contrary evidence
lends to our explanation the character of uncertainty. Seventh, as
Popper noted, every explanation is itself subject to explanation, making
our framework of necessity only intermediate. But to attempt a "full"
explanation would clearly be a never-ending task. Finally, our explan-
ation is applicable to only one level of separatism, that of motiva-
tions; it sheds scant light on other dimensions of the phenomenon, such

as the historical or the ideological.

 

269

The animal of nationalism is so large that a political

scientist can focus upon the organization and structure of a

nation-state or upon its political parties, an economist

upon a country's natural resources or its international

trade, a sociologist upon the origins and ideologies of the

ruling elite, an anthropologist upon the changes in social

organization demanded and produced by nationhood--and all

of them.may be discussing some section of the same elephant.
Our explanations are limited since, as Kaplan says, "[t]here are contexts
of inquiry in which questions arise which it does not even begin to
answer."2

Thus, the explanations we have offered in these pages cannot be
definitive. They do provide a yardstick against which we can measure
our observations, but they are useful in themselves only to the extent

that they lend coherence to our observations. If we have done that,

we have accomplished our purpose.

 

lDoob, op. cit., p. 3.

2Ibid., p. 355. The points stressed above are derived from Kaplan's
discussion of openness in explanation, pp. 351-5.

 

 

APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

THE GLASGOW SAMPLE

A total of 430 names were selected from.the electoral registers
for Woodside and Maryhill constituencies using cluster sampling tech-
niques. The Opinion Research Centre (London) conducted the interviewing
and, making a minimum of three and maximum of five call-backs, produced
a total of 308 completed interviews. The reasons for non-completion

are enumerated below:

Names issued: 430
Dead 1
Moved 39
Not at home 47
Too old or ill 8
Re fused _2_Z_

Interviews not obtained 122
430 - 122 = 308 interviews completed (71.6%)

A shortened form of the questionnaire was mailed to those prospec-
tive respondents who had not been contacted successfully for a personal
interview. It was hoped that any sample bias might be uncovered by
comparing the characteristics of the two sets of respondents. Thirty-
five (28.9%) of the mailed questionnaires were returned. Of those who
had moved from.their original address, fifteen percent responded to the
mailed questionnaire, while thirty-six percent of those who were not at
home when the interviewer called responded. Thirteen percent of.those
who were tOO'old or ill, and fully forty-one percent of those who had

270

 

271
refused to respond to a personal interview sent back the forms.
Table A1 shows how the respondents personally interviewed compared
on several key variables with those answering the mailed questionnaire.

The chi square level of significance is also shown.

TABLE A1

RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES COMPARED

 

 

 

 

Variable Interviews Questionnaires X2 level of
# % # % significance
Electoral
Ward 1 25 8.1% 2 5.7%
2 95 30.8 13 37.1
3 50 16.2 ’6 17.1
4 83 26.9 5 14.3
5 55 17.8 9 25.7 .40
National
Group Scots 285 92.5% 28 80.0%
English,
"Welsh,
Irish 11 3 6 3 8.6
British 7 2 3 2 5 7
Other 5 l 6 2 5 7 .34
Better paying
job
England 106 40.1% 13 44.8%
Scotland 7 2.7 l 3.4
No difft“? ‘0151 57.2 15 51.7 .93
Gov't for
Scotland
Independence 37 13.2% 1 3.0%
Sep. Parl. 49 17.5 21 63.6
Minor change 130 46.4 8 24.2
No changes 64 22.8 3 9.1 .00
Sex
Male 140 45.5% 18 54.5%

Female 168 55.5 15] 45.5 .27

 

 

272

TABLE Al (Cont'd.)

 

Variable Interviews Questionnaires X2 level of
# % # % significance
Attention
to politics

Close 12 3.9% 3 9.1%

Fairly close 101 32.8 17 51.5

Not much 195 63.3 13 39.4 .04
Vote Intent

Conservative 82 29.0% 8 25.8%

Labour 157 55.5 15 48.4

SNP 44 15.5 8 25.8 .40
Occupation

Non-manual 81 26.7% 7 22.6%

Manual 148 48.8 15 48.4

Inactive 74 24.4 9 29.0 .87
Age

18-34 86 28.4% 11 33.3%

35-64 160 52.8 15 45.4

65 and over 57 18.8 7 21.2 .41

 

 

 

These data suggest that the group of respondents who were personally
interviewed were somewhat less likely to call themselves Scots, less
likely to favor significant devolution for Scotland, more likely to be
female, less attentive to politics, less likely to vote SNP, and
slightly older than the group who sent in postal questionnaires. As
we might expect, it is the group we were unable to interview who took
a generally more extreme political position, were more likely to be
male, and were younger.

The data from the postal questionnaires are probably not a very
reliable guide to the true characteristics of the group from which per-
sonal interviews were not obtained. Since they do not derive from a
random sample of this group, these data can only be taken as suggestive

of certain trends. Even so, since the level of significance is so

 

273
convincing, it seems safe to assert that our main sample underestimates
the level of support for Scottish separatism, It also may underestimate
the influence of young males and those who are relatively attentive to
politics. But these difficulties are not judged to affect the validity

of our conclusions.

 

Interviewer's Name .
Respondent's Name .
Address . . .
Time begun . . . . .
Length of intervie
Date .

APPENDIX B

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

. Interviewer's No.

. Time completed .

Good morning/afternoon. I am doing a public opinion survey at the
University of Strathclyde. For this study we need the answers to a few
questions we are asking people all over the Glasgow area.

Q.l(a) First of all, how long have lived here in Glasgow?

(3) And how do you feel about the Glasgow area as a place to live?
Do you like living here or not?

(c) Economically,
or better off

(d) Have you ever

IF "NO" GO TO Q.l(f)
IF "YES" ASK:

(e) Where did you
(f) Have you ever

IF "NO" GO TO Q.l(h)
IF "YES" ASK:

(g) How many times
(h) Have you ever

_I.F "NO" GO TO Q.2(a)
IF "YES" ASK:

do you think that the Glasgow area is worse off
than other parts of Scotland?

lived outside Scotland?

live?

been to England?

have you been to England in the past 10 (ten) years?

visited any other countries?

(i) Which countries have you visited in the past ten (10) years?

274

31*

I. .lrl
I

 

Q-2(a)

(b)

(C)

(d)

(e)
(f)

(8)

(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)

Q-3(a)

(b)

(C)
(d)

275

Most people in Britain say they are English, Scottish, Welsh,
or Irish. Which of these groups would you say you belonged to?

Would you say that you are proud or not so proud about being
, or doesn't it make any difference?

 

In general, hOW'mMCh do you think you have in common with most
Englishmen? Would you say a lot, some, or not very much?

How about Scots? How much would you say you had in common with
Scots?

Are any of your friends or relatives English?

How about the people you work with? Are there many who are
English?

Generally speaking, what differences, if any, do you see between
English and Scottish people?

What are the things you like most about English people?

And what are the things you dislike most about English people?
What about Scots? What are the things you like most about Scots?
And what are the things you dislike most about Scots?

On the whole, do the activities of the government in London

tend to improve conditions in Scotland or would we be better off
without them?

In general, do you think that the government in London cares
about people like yourself?

And who do you think of when we talk about people like yourself?

Suppose there were some question you had to take to a national
government office--for example, a tax or social security ques-
tion. Do you think you would be given equal treatment? Would
you be treated as well as anyone else?

IF "YES" 0R "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.4(a).
IF "NO" OR "DEPENDS" ASK:

(e)

Q-4(a)

(b)

Why do you think so?
There is a lot of talk about "home rule" for Scotland these
days. What do you think people mean by "home rule" for Scotland?

What are your general feelings about "home rule"? Do you favor
it, oppose it, or what?

 

(C)
(d)

Q.5'

(a)

(b)
(C)
(d)
(e)

(f)
(s)

(h)

(i)
(J')
(k)

(1)

(m)

276
Could you explain why you feel that way?

And would you say you held these views about "home rule"
strongly or not so strongly?

A lot of people are talking about Scotland's role in the world
today. When I read the following statements, would you tell

me how strongly you agree or disagree with them? (SHOW CARD 1).
Just mention one of the numbers on this card.

 

F’
CARD 1: 1 Agree strongly ‘—
2. Agree
3. It depends
4 Disagree
L 5 Disagree strongly‘

 

Nowadays it's better to forget traditional Scottish things like
the kilt and the bagpipes.

Scots law should be made the same as Engliéh law.
I generally try to buy things made in Scotland.
The Scottish way of life is just about the best in the world.

It seems unfair that English people have so much say in running
Scotland.

Roads and highways in Scotland are better than those in England.

People in Scotland pay more in taxes than they receive back in
benefits.

On the whole, it is easier to make a living in Scotland than in
England.

Scottish housing is better than English housing.
Scottish education should be kept separate from English education.

In general, it is probably easier for a Scotsman to become a
peer than for an Englishman.

My children would be better off if they left Scotland to live
in England or another country.

I would be better off if I left Scotland to live in England or
another country

IF "DEPENDS," DISAGREE ,',' "DISAGREE STRONGLY" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TOQ.6.
IF "AGREE STRONGLY" OR "AGREE" ASK?

(I!)

Where would you go? What country?

 

Q.6

Q-7(a)

(b)

(C)

(d)

Q.8(a)

(b)

(C)

Q-9(é)

(b)

Q.lO

Q.ll(a)

(b)

Q.12

0.13

277

Do you think Scotland should have more or fewer M.P.s in
Parliament, or do you think that Scotland's representation is
about right?

Now I'd like to ask how you feel about a few issues in the
news these days. First of all, what would you say are the
biggest problems facing Britain at the present time?

Which political party do you think can best handle that problem?
(those problems?)

How about Scotland? What are the big problems facing Scotland
today?

And which political party do you think can best handle that
problem? (those problems?)

How much say do you think Britain has in world affairs these
days?

Do you think that Britain's say in world affairs is smaller or
larger today than it was five years ago?

Do you think Britain should have a bigger say in world affairs
or not?

Do you think that it would be a good idea or a bad idea for
Britain to join the Common Market?

If Scotland were made an independent nation, would you favour
or oppose its joining the Common Market?

Do you think that state welfare benefits are too high, too low,
or about right?

Do you think that big business has too much power in Britain
or not?

And how about trade unions? Do you think trade unions have too
much power in Britain or not?

How do you feel about the death penalty? Would you favour or
oppose a return to hanging?

What do you think about most young people today? Do you think
they have too much freedom or not?

IF RESPONDENT IS NOT COLORED ASK:

Q.l4

Do you think that too mahy immigrants have been let into this
country or not?

Q.15(a) Do you expect your own earnings to improve, get worse, or stay

about the same over the next five years?

 

(b)

(C)

(d)

(C)

Q.l6

278

How about Scotland's economic situation? Do you expect that
to improve, get worse, or stay about the same over the next
five years?

some people say that English people are doing much better nowa-
days than Scottish people. Do you think this is so or not?

Do you think English people ought to be doing as well as they
are doing compared with Scottish people?

Do you think that people like yourself can get a better paying
job in England or Scotland?

Four different ways of governing Scotland are talked about a
lot nowadays: (SHOW CARD 2) complete independence, a separate
parliament for Scotland with control over Scottish affairs,
minor changes like giving more power to the present Scottish
Office, and leaving things the way they are.

CARD 2: l.Complete independence
2.Separate parliament
31Minor changes
4.Leave things as they are

 

 

(a) Can you tell me which of these is closest to the policy of the
Conservative Party?

(b) How about the Labour Party?

(c) And the Scottish National Party?

(d) And which is closest to the Liberal Party?

(e) And which of these policies is closest to what you think?
(Which policy would you favour?)

(f) Have your ideas about this changed in the past five years?

IF "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.l7(a)

IF "YES" ASK:

(g) What did you used to think?
(h) What caused you to change your mind?
(1) And when was that? How many years ago?

Q.l7(a) And now let me ask you what you think might happen if Scotland
became an independent nation. What would be the good effects
if Scotland became independent?

(b) What would be the bad effects if Scotland became independent?
(c) Do you think there would be more jobs or fewer jobs if Scotland

were independent?

 

(d)
(e)

Q.l8(a)
(b)

(C)

(d)
(e)

Q.l9(a)

(b)
(C)
(d)
(e)
Q.20(a)

(b)
Q-21(é)

IF "DON'

(b)

279
Do you think that housing would improve or get worse?

If Scotland were independent, do you think on the whole you
would be better off, or worse off than you are now, or wouldn't
it change things for you?

Some people say that politics and government are so complicated'
that the average man cannot really understand what is going on.
In general, do you agree or disagree with this?

Thinking of the important national and international issues
facing Britain, how well do you think you can understand these
issues? Very well fairly well, or not so well?

How about Scottish issues? Do you think you understand these
very well, fairly well, or not so well?

And local issues? How well do you think you can understand them?
Many peOple we've interviewed have said that they have trouble
understanding political affairs. Which of the reasons on this
list best explains why this happens? (Which is the major reason?)
SHOW CARD 3.
CARD 3: 1. Problems are too complex

2. People don't care or try

3. Those in power don't help people to understand
How much attention do you generally pay to what's going on in
politics when there isn't an election? Would you say that you
usually follow politics very closely, fairly closely, or not
much at all?
Do you read a daily newspaper?
Do you read any Sunday papers?
Any other weeklies or monthlies? Do you read any of them?

Do you ever see a newspaper called the Scots Independent?

Many people don't vote in local or general elections. How often
do you vote in local elections?

How about general elections? How often do you vote in them?

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Conservative,
Labour, Scottish Nationalist supporter or what?

T KNOW" OR "NONE" ASK:

Do you sometimes think of yourself as a little closer to one of
the parties than the others?

Off

 

280

IF "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.22(a)
IF "YES" ASK Q.21(c)

(c) Which party is that?
(d) Are you a strong or a not so strong ?

(e) As far as you remember, have you always thought of yourself as
a ?

IF "YES"OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.22(a)
IF "NO" ASK:

(f) Which other party have you supported?
(g) What was the main thing that made you change from to

(h) Do you remember when you changed to ? (respondent's
present party?

 

Q.22(a) Did you vote in the last general election (1966), or weren't
you able to get to the polls?

IF "YES" ASK:
(b) Which party did you vote for?

(c) What would you say is the main reason you voted for that party?
ASK.ALL:
Q.23(a) If there were a by-election in the constituency tomorrow and
there were four candidates--Conservative, Labour, Scottish
Nationalist, and Liberal--which party would you vote for?

(b) If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would
you vote for?

IF NAMES A PARTY, ASK:
(c) If that party did not have a candidate to vote for, which party
would be your second choice?

ASK ALL:
'(d) Is there any party you would never vote for?

Q.24(a) Dhayodctake an?active part in party work?

IF "NO" GO TO Q.25(a)
IF "YES" ASK:

(b) What do you do?
ASK ALL:
Q.25(a) When you were growing up, which party did your father support?

(b) And which party did your mother support?

 

 

281
Q.26(a) Do you happen to know the names of any Labour Party leaders?
(b) How about Conservative Party leaders? Do you know their names?
(c) And the Scottish National Party? Who are some of their leaders?

(d) Finally, do you happen to know the names of any Liberal Party
leaders?

Q.27(a) Now I'd like to ask if you know what St. Andrew's House is?
(b) What would you say is the job of the Scottish Office?

(c) And do you happen to know the name of the present Secretary of
State for Scotland?

Q.28(a) In the next general election would you say that the Scottish
Nationalist candidate has a good change, a fair chance, or a
poor chance in the constituency?

 

(b) What kind of people would you say support the Scottish National
Party? How would you descirbe them?

Q.29(a) There's a lot of talk nowadays about different social classes.
Would you say you belonged to the middle~class or the working
class.

IF WORKING CLASS, ASK:

(b) As a member of the Scottish working class, do you think you
have more in common with English working class people or Scots
who are in the middle class?

IF MIDDLE CLASS,,ASK:

(c) As a member of the Scottish middle class, do you think you
have more in common with English middle: class people or with
Scots who are working class?
ASK ALL:
Q.30(a) When you make a new friend, how important is it that he is
highly respected by others?

(b) How important is it that he is Scottish?

(c) In making a new friend, which would you say is more important,
that he is highly respected or that he is Scottish?

Q.31(a) Could you tell me which of the things on this card you already
have? (SHOW CARD 4)

282
CARD 4: l A radio
2 A television
3 A house you own
4. A car you own
5. Foreign holiday travel
6 A spare bedroom for visitors
7 First-class travel on trains
8 Private education for your children
In— —

FOR ITEMS NOT OWNED,4ASK:

 

 

 

(b) Would you like to have a ?
ASK ALL:
C (c) Do youuthink most other Scots are managing to afford a ?

(d) And do you think most English people are able to have a ?

Q.32(a) Some people say that English people have a better style of living
than Scottish people. Do you think this is so or not?

(b) Do you think that English people ought to have a better style
of living as compared with Scottish people?

Q.33(a) People who do physical labour to make a living--like factory
workers or mechanics--are often called manual workers. Other
people who make a living--like bank clerks or teachers--are
white collar workers. Here is a list of four different groups
of people. (SHOW CARD 5) Which of these do you feel you have
most in common with?

1'1.'ScotS‘manual
2. Scots white collar
3. English manual
4. English white collar

CARD 5:

(b) And which would be second?
(c) And third?
Q.34(a) Are you married?
(b) How many persons are in your household?

Q.35(a) Which member of your family living here is actually the owner/
is responsible for the rent?

IF "SELF" GO TO Q.36 (a)
IF NOT "SELF" ASK:

(b) Does he (she) have a paid job now? What does he (she) do?
IF UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED, ASK:

(c) What kind of work did he (she) do?

 

283

(d) Did he (she) ever belong to a trade union?
ASK ALL:

Q.36(a) Do you have a paid job now? What sort of work do you actually
do?

IF UNEMPLOYED OR.RETIRED, ASK:

(b) What kind of work did you do?

(c) Have you ever belonged to a trade union?

(d) How about other organizations like social groups, clubs, or
political groups? Have you belonged to any organizations like
that?

IF "YES" ASK:
(e) Which ones?
ASK ALL:

Q.37(a) Which letter on this card best corresponds to your household's
usual weekly income after deductions? (SHOW CARD 6)

 

 

CARD 6: 1. Less than 5 pounds?
2. 5 - 9 pounds ‘
3. 10 - 14 pounds
4. 15~- 19 pounds
5. 20 - 24 pounds
6. 25 - 29 pounds
7. 30 or more poundsJ

 

(b) How does this compare with your income over the last five years?
Is it higher, lower, or about the same as it was five years ago?

(c) Would you say that you are satisfied or not satisfied with your
family's present position as far as income is concerned?

Q.38(a) Can you tell me your date of birth?
(b) Where were you born? (TOWN AND COUNTRY)
Q.39 How old were you when you finished your full-time education?
Q.40(a) What is your religion?
IF GIVES A RELIGION, ASK:
(b) How often do you usually attend church?

Q.4l Sex: male or female.

B IBLIOGRAPHY

 

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Reports

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Party in Scotland to the Commission on the Constitution, The Labour
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