

## ABSTRACT

### SCOTTISH NATIONALISM: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

By

Roger Alan Brooks

Although a seemingly anachronistic political force in the modern era, nationalism still shapes the lives and destinies of millions of people around the world. This study of Scottish separatism represents an attempt to identify the forces which sustain one example of nationalism today. A recurrent phenomenon in Scotland, nationalism is characterized by a social movement involving a set of demands whose purpose is to advance the interests of one's nation or nationality. Ever since the Act of Union ended her independent national status in 1707, those demands have centered around the issue of political autonomy for Scotland. The history of Scottish nationalism, culminating with the rise of the Scottish National Party in the 1960's, is traced and the positions of British political parties regarding the issue of Scottish government are examined.

Two key theoretical models are presented as potentially explanatory frameworks for Scottish nationalism. The first is derived from causal models of civil strife and involves the hypothesis that a sense of national group relative deprivation among Scots, since it runs counter to generally accepted canons of social justice, produces systemic frustration which finds an outlet in the movement for Scottish separatism. Deprivations may be felt on a number of dimensions of social stratification, and they may be considered short-term or persisting. The study examines the conditions under which each kind of deprivation may be

considered potentially frustrating, and inquires into the linkage between systemic frustration and nationalism.

The second model within which Scottish nationalism is examined relates to social mobility. It is hypothesized that those who perceive their status to be changing in a society will experience status discrepancies which contribute to normlessness, a reassessment of social ties, and an increased propensity to support extremist (including separatist) political movements. Social mobility, defined as the process of moving (up or down) from one status position to another, may have diverse consequences. Whether support for separatism is one of these consequences must depend on the prior existence of a nationalist movement.

These hypotheses are examined in two ways. First, using aggregate data on population, emigration, income, unemployment, housing, health, education, and political opportunities, the status of Scots is examined with reference to Englishmen. These data suggest that Scots generally occupy a status inferior to the English. Wages and health and living conditions are lower than in England; the cost of living and emigration are higher. On the other hand, political and educational opportunities are noticeably superior in Scotland. And deliberate attempts to improve the economic and health status of Scotland have been initiated by the central UK government. Nevertheless, the evidence is thought to be generally supportive of the hypothesis linking relative deprivation and support for separatism.

Second, a public opinion survey was conducted in two Glasgow parliamentary constituencies in March and April, 1970, to test the validity of the hypotheses. Since both hypotheses assume that the observed behavior (support for separatism) is motivated by certain kinds of perceptions or attitudes, a survey of opinions was judged to be the most convenient and



appropriate means of accumulating relevant evidence. A series of questions designed to elicit data concerning the demographic and attitudinal profiles of Scottish nationalists was included.

Support for Scottish nationalism was operationalized in two ways: (1) intent to vote for the Scottish National Party, and (2) support for measures to increase substantially Scottish political autonomy. About fifteen percent of the sample of 308 respondents were SNP supporters, and nearly forty percent favored increased autonomy. The inter-relation between these two measures was judged to be fairly high since nearly ninety-three percent of those who were SNP supporters favored increased autonomy.

Relative deprivation was measured five ways: the respondent's view of (1) the sufficiency of Scotland's parliamentary representation, (2) the relative job opportunities available in Scotland and England, (3) discrepancies between English and Scottish standards of living, (4) discrepancies (and the justness of such discrepancies) between the economic positions of Scots and of Englishmen, and (5) discrepancies (and the justness of such discrepancies) between the "style of living" of Scots and of Englishmen. On each of these measures a majority of respondents was found to possess a sense of relative deprivation. But a strong relationship with support for separatism was found only on the first dimension, the others correlating weakly or differently for the two measures of nationalism.

Social mobilization was measured three ways: the respondent's (1) view of recent changes in his own economic position, (2) expectation of future changes in his own economic situation, and (3) expectation of future changes in Scotland's economic situation. A considerable proportion of the sample was judged to be socially mobile using these criteria.





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Moreover, strong statistically significant correlations were found between nearly all of the combinations of mobility and nationalism measures. Both upward and downward mobiles were strong nationalists.

In conclusion, five factors are judged to influence the level of support for Scottish nationalism. First, the shrinking of the British Empire has removed a significant source of gratification for many Scots. The independence movements found in many British colonial areas may have contributed to the resurgence of the Scottish independence movement. Second, British attempts to join the EEC alienated many Scots because such membership was perceived to worsen Scotland's economic situation and introduce another barrier between the voter and his government. Third, the poor economic situation in Britain in the 1960's led to an expression of general protest with the SNP providing a convenient vehicle in Scotland. Fourth, a sense of relative deprivation, while apparently playing a minor role in directly motivating mass support for separatism in Scotland, does provide residual justification for the nationalist movement and is important as a factor motivating elites. And finally, social mobility seems a major motivating explanation for Scottish nationalism. Upward mobiles may find the nationalist movement a vehicle for self-realization while downward mobiles may consider it a potential means of self-advancement. However, support for nationalism is judged to be an alternative available to the socially mobile only because of the previous four points. It is believed a necessary but not sufficient explanation in itself.



SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:  
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

By

Roger Alan Brooks

A DISSERTATION

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**For Ronnie**



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My initial confrontation with Scottish nationalism came by accident while my wife and I were searching for the offices of an obscure Edinburgh publisher. Seeking directions, we stopped in a local craft shop, where we found the proprietors and some artist friends industriously making signs and placards with patriotic Scottish slogans and with demands to "Free Scotland" or to "Put Scotland First." Learning that we were Americans, and hence fellow renegades from the English, they introduced themselves, answered our questions about the meaning of their signs, and invited us to the annual nationalist rally at Bannockburn Battlefield the next day.

Our curiosity pricked, we decided to attend. Upon arriving we found literally thousands of Scots, many dressed in traditional tartans, gathered for pipe music, songs, and political rhetoric. Under a rugged sky, they approached the monument to Scots hero Robert Bruce, sang and waved placards, and enjoyed the ambience of the friendly crowd. And attracting excitement wherever she went was Mrs. Winnie Ewing, a young Glasgow lawyer, who had recently won a parliamentary by-election in a Labour Party stronghold near Glasgow. Like most of the others present that day, she was a member of the Scottish National Party.

Never having been particularly aware of Scottish nationalism, we wondered who these people were and why they seemed unable to get along with the English. We never found our Edinburgh publisher, but we did come away from Scotland impressed by these earnest people, and

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she, after approaching the monument to Scott with Robert Burns, sang an

determined to return some day to pursue the questions their activities posed in our minds.

Thanks to the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation and the Michigan State University Center for International Programs we were able to return in 1969-70. I am indebted to the people in these organizations for offering encouragement in my pursuit as well as for providing the necessary funding. Special thanks are also due to the members of my dissertation committee at Michigan State University, Joseph Schlesinger (Chairman), Paul Abramson, Harold Johnson, and Frank Pinner, and to the Chairman of the Political Science Department, Charles Press. All offered encouragement, advice, understanding, sympathy, and constructive criticism.

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Karl Deutsch, Harvard University, discussed my research findings, read part of the manuscript, and offered valuable advice. Boyd Shafer,

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |         |
|--|---------|
| Introduction   | p. 1.   |
| Chapter I: Nationalism: The Phenomenon Defined and Described | p. 12.  |
| National Group and Nationality                               | p. 16.  |
| What Is A Nation?  | p. 27.  |
| What Is Patriotism?  | p. 29.  |
| Nationalism  | p. 32.  |
| Chapter II: Nationalism: Frameworks for Explanation          | p. 42.  |
| Problems in Explanation                                      | p. 45.  |
| A Framework for Separatism: Relative Deprivation             | p. 48.  |
| Linking Concepts: Deprivation, Frustration, Aggression       | p. 58.  |
| Support for the Proposition                                  | p. 70.  |
| Separatism and Social Mobility                               | p. 73.  |
| Support for the Proposition                                  | p. 79.  |
| Chapter III: Nationalism In Scotland: The Historical Matrix  | p. 84.  |
| Early Nationalism in Scotland                                | p. 88.  |
| The Act of Union   | p. 90.  |
| Eighteenth Century Nationalism                               | p. 95.  |
| Nineteenth Century Nationalism                               | p. 98.  |
| The Home Rule Movement                                       | p. 101. |
| Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Scottish Renaissance      | p. 107. |
| Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Post-War Revival          | p. 117. |
| Chapter IV: Aspects of Contemporary Nationalism              | p. 126. |
| Who Are The Nationalist Leaders?                             | p. 127. |
| Party Attitudes Toward Scottish Nationalism                  | p. 135. |
| Chapter V: Scotland As A Deprived Region                     | p. 149. |
| Population and Migration                                     | p. 152. |
| Income and Unemployment                                      | p. 158. |
| Housing and Health   | p. 170. |
| Educational Opportunities and Politics                       | p. 173. |
| Conclusion   | p. 178. |
| Chapter VI: The Glasgow Sample                               | p. 180. |
| Sample Population  | p. 181. |
| Selecting the Sample   | p. 189. |
| Interviewing   | p. 191. |

|  |         |
|--|---------|
| Chapter VI (cont'd.)                                   |         |
| Sample Characteristics                                 | p. 197. |
| Operationalizing Scottish Nationalism                  | p. 200. |
| Social Correlates of Nationalism                       | p. 212. |
| Chapter VII: Deprivation and Scottish Nationalism      | p. 217. |
| The Perception of Deprivation in Scotland              | p. 217. |
| Nationalism and Objective Deprivation                  | p. 224. |
| Nationalism and Subjective Deprivation                 | p. 229. |
| Chapter VIII: Social Mobility and Scottish Nationalism | p. 235. |
| Social Mobility in Scotland                            | p. 236. |
| Nationalism and Social Mobility                        | p. 242. |
| Summary and Conclusions                                | p. 250. |
| Nationalism and the SNP                                | p. 251. |
| The Causes of Nationalism in Scotland                  | p. 254. |
| Appendix A: The Glasgow Sample                         | p. 270. |
| Appendix B: Public Opinion Survey                      | p. 274. |
| Bibliography   | p. 284. |





## LIST OF TABLES

|           |  |         |
|-----------|--|---------|
| Table 1:  | Scots As A Cohesive National Group   | p. 24.  |
| Table 2:  | Voting Intention in Scotland, September, 1968  | p. 44.  |
| Table 3:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>By Age  | p. 128. |
| Table 4:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>By Sex  | p. 129. |
| Table 5:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>By Education  | p. 130. |
| Table 6:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>Place Educated  | p. 130. |
| Table 7:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>By Occupation   | p. 131. |
| Table 8:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>By Previous Parliamentary Election Experience               | p. 132. |
| Table 9:  | Scottish Candidates for Parliament in 1970,<br>By Previous Elective Office Experience                      | p. 133. |
| Table 10: | Scotland's Population, 1801-1966   | p. 154. |
| Table 11: | Migration As A Percentage of Population,<br>Scotland and England and Wales, 1871-1971<br>By Decades        | p. 155. |
| Table 12: | Average Weekly Earnings of Male Manual Workers,<br>By Industry, Scotland and the United Kingdom            | p. 161. |
| Table 13: | Average Unemployment In Scotland and Great Britain,<br>By Percent, In Selected Years                       | p. 163. |
| Table 14: | Central Government Expenditures Per Head of<br>Population in Scotland and in England and Wales,<br>1966-67 | p. 168. |
| Table 15: | Housing Density in Scotland and in England and<br>Wales, 1871-1961   | p. 170  |

|           |   |             |
|-----------|---|-------------|
| Table 16: | Housing Conditions, Dwellings Lacking Certain Household Amenities, By Percent                                 | p. 172.     |
| Table 17: | Scottish Social Characteristics By Various Subdivisions   | p. 184.     |
| Table 18: | Scottish Parliamentary Election Results; 1955-1970, By Percent of Vote Cast for Party At Various Subdivisions | p. 186.     |
| Table 19: | Glasgow Municipal Electoral Results, 1966-1969, Woodside and Maryhill Constituencies, By Electoral Ward       | p. 187.     |
| Table 20: | The Glasgow Sample: Basic Socio-Economic Characteristics  | pp. 193-4.  |
| Table 21: | Perception of Parties' Scottish Policies  | p. 204.     |
| Table 22: | Scottish Nationalism: Voting Intention at the Next General Election   | p. 206.     |
| Table 23: | Scottish Views on the Activities of the Central UK Government   | p. 208.     |
| Table 24: | Scottish Views on How Scotland Should Be Governed   | p. 209.     |
| Table 25: | Constructing the Index of Separatist Sentiment  | p. 210.     |
| Table 26: | Scottish Nationalism: The Index of Separatist Sentiment   | p. 211.     |
| Table 27: | Vote Intention and The Index of Separatist Sentiment  | p. 211.     |
| Table 28: | Scottish Nationalism and Sex  | p. 213.     |
| Table 29: | Scottish Nationalism and Respondent's Birthplace  | p. 214.     |
| Table 30: | Scottish Nationalism and Religion   | p. 215.     |
| Table 31: | Scottish Nationalism and Education, By Age of Leaving School  | p. 216.     |
| Table 32: | Perceptions of Deprivation  | pp. 219-20. |
| Table 33: | Possession, Desirability, and Perception of Others' Possession of Certain Luxury Consumer Items Among Scots   | p. 222.     |
| Table 34: | Nationalism and Household Income  | p. 225.     |
| Table 35: | Nationalism and Per Capita Household Income   | p. 225.     |



|           |  |            |
|-----------|--|------------|
| Table 36: | Scottish Nationalism and Possession of Luxury Consumer Items   | p. 228.    |
| Table 37: | Scottish Nationalism and Social Class, By Occupation   | p. 228.    |
| Table 38: | Scottish Nationalism and Perception of Political Deprivation   | p. 230.    |
| Table 39: | Scottish Nationalism and Perception of Occupational Deprivation  | p. 230.    |
| Table 40: | Scottish Nationalism and Perceptions of Discrepancies Between English and Scottish Standards of Living                           | p. 231.    |
| Table 41: | Scottish Nationalism and Perception of Economic Deprivation  | p. 232.    |
| Table 42: | Scottish Nationalism and Perception of Life-Style Deprivation  | p. 233.    |
| Table 43: | Perceptions of Past Personal Economic Mobility   | p. 237.    |
| Table 44: | Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility   | p. 237.    |
| Table 45: | Expectation of Scotland's Future Economic Mobility   | p. 238.    |
| Table 46: | Perception of Past Personal Economic Mobility and Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility                               | p. 240.    |
| Table 47: | Perception of Past Personal Economic Mobility and Expectations of Scotland's Future Economic Mobility, Among "Scots Identifiers" | p. 240.    |
| Table 48: | Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility And Expectation of Scotland's Future Economic Mobility, Among "Scots"           | p. 241.    |
| Table 49: | Nationalism and Union Membership   | p. 243.    |
| Table 50: | Nationalism and Secondary Group Membership   | p. 243.    |
| Table 51: | Nationalism and Past Personal Economic Mobility  | p. 244.    |
| Table 52: | Nationalism and Expected Future Personal Economic Mobility   | p. 245.    |
| Table 53: | Nationalism and Scotland's Expected Future Economic Mobility, Among "Scots"  | p. 246.    |
| Table A1: | Results of Interviews and Questionnaires Compared  | pp. 271-2. |

## LIST OF FIGURES

|           |   |         |
|-----------|---|---------|
| Figure 1: | Decremental Deprivation   | p. 52.  |
| Figure 2: | Aspiration Deprivation  | p. 54.  |
| Figure 3: | Progressive Deprivation   | p. 54.  |
| Figure 4: | Distribution of Personal Incomes Before Taxes,<br>By Percent: Scotland and Great Britain, 1964/65 | p. 160. |
| Figure 5: | Nationalism and Per Capita Household Income   | p. 227. |
| Figure 6: | Scottish Nationalism and Social Mobility  | p. 247. |

## INTRODUCTION

The rose of all the world is not for me.  
I want for my part  
Only the little white rose of Scotland  
That smells sweet and breaks the heart.<sup>1</sup>

On May 2, 1967 Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in the House of Commons the British Government's intention to apply--for the second time in five years--for admission to the European Economic Community (EEC). The subsequent enlargement of the European community underlines broad integrative trends in the world creating new economic, social, and political entities to challenge the nation-state as the prime focus of attention and allegiance. It has been asserted that, in Europe at least, regional integration is proceeding apace and that we are witnessing the nation-building process on a grand scale.<sup>2</sup>

There are, however dissonant chords in this symphony of unification. As Wilson announced his cabinet's decision, voters in Scotland--far to the north of Westminster--were giving unprecedented support to a political party whose main goal is the break-up of the United Kingdom. May 2, 1967 was municipal election day in Scotland; and the Scottish

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<sup>1</sup>The quotations introducing each chapter in this work are drawn from the writings of the contemporary Scottish nationalist poet, Hugh MacDiarmid. [A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1971; Selected Poems, Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958; and Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970.



National Party (SNP), the only party in Scotland which opposed British entry to the EEC and supported Scottish separatism from the United Kingdom, gained more municipal council seats than any other party in Scotland. This result, and that of the 1968 municipal elections--when the SNP gained 100 additional seats--reflects important disintegrative threads running through the social and political fabric of Britain.

The Scottish nationalist movement, of which the SNP is a part, seeks to secure increased political autonomy for Scotland. For some the goal is a separate Scottish parliament within the existing political structure; for others it is complete independence. A recurrent movement taking varied forms over the past two and a half centuries, the latest surge of nationalism centered on the period 1966-1971. It was during this period that the SNP agitated with some modest successes under the banner of Scottish patriotism and self-government.

The British case, then provides evidence of political disintegration in an era of increasing international cooperation and unification. While popular and scholarly attention is focussed primarily on the unification process in Europe, less visible trends are working in an opposite direction and may be undermining the very basis of the existing state system in Europe.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cynthia Enloe notes the simultaneous "emergence of supranational systems" and the "political mobilization of subnational communities" in Europe. She questions "the utility of using the nation as the chief reference point for all political investigation" and recalls Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's prediction that the nation-state in Europe is giving way to a European unity and a renewed emphasis on sub-regional identity. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1973, pp. 270-2. Cf. also pp. 125-34.



One important criterion for a political community<sup>1</sup> is a high level of unification.<sup>2</sup> One might presuppose that the level of unification for any existing or potential political community can be evaluated in terms of coexistent integrative and disintegrative forces. One might further assume that these forces are fluid and that the shifting balance between them produces varied patterns of expansion and contraction of political communities. Thus, the rise and fall of empires, nation-states, and multi-national organizations could be seen as a function of the relative potency of integrative and disintegrative forces.

Integrative forces are those tending to unify a group of people. They may include (1) a common set of values and expectations, (2) an increase in the administrative and political capabilities of the group (e.g. strong economic growth, unbroken communication links, and a broadening of the political, social, or economic elite), (3) a high degree of geographical mobility within the group's borders, and (4) a multiplicity and balance of transactions among group members.

Forces tending to divide a group are disintegrative. They may include (1) declining group economic, political, or social capabilities,

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<sup>1</sup>Etzioni notes that "a community is established only when it has self-sufficient integrative mechanisms; that is, when the maintenance of its existence and form is provided for by its own processes and is not dependent upon those of external systems or member-units. A political community is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has an effective control over the means of violence . . .; (b) it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens." Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1965, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>The terms integration, unification, consolidation, and amalgamation are used almost interchangeably in the scholarly literature. In this study we will treat unification as the general, overall process--the net outcome of integrative and disintegrative forces.

[illegible]

(2) closure of the established political elite, (3) thwarting of expected social, economic, or political reforms, (4) multiplication of intra-group linguistic or ethnic differences, (5) demands for increased political participation within the group, and (6) growing external group responsibilities or commitments.<sup>1</sup>

At any given time in any society the balance between the integrative and disintegrative forces determines the level of unification in that society and the constituent nature of its state system. One implication of this model is that societies may move from one unification level to another through a change in only one set of forces. This means, for example, that a society may proceed to a higher level by increasing integrative forces while holding constant the extent of disintegration. Another similar but more significant implication of the model is that it allows for a simultaneous increase in the levels of both integration and disintegration while a society proceeds to a higher level of unification. As long as disintegrative forces are relatively insignificant at the outset, a small jump toward disintegration can be countered by a larger jump in the direction of integration with a net unifying effect.

One intriguing aspect of the recent revival of Scottish nationalism is that it occurred in the context of Britain's attempts to join the European Community. The model suggested above can account for such trends of unification in opposite directions. Leaders of the separatist movement in Scotland have pointed out that, initially at least, British entry into the EEC will have far more adverse effects on Scotland than

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<sup>1</sup>Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, pp. 46-65.

[illegible]

on England.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, opposition to British entry was stronger in Scotland than in England. Less than 8% of a sample of Scottish voters favored British entry into the EEC. This contrasts with the somewhat stronger support shown in England. One study revealed that 36% favored British entry.<sup>2</sup> Thus the government's efforts to join the European community may have had the ironic effect of increasing group differences within the United Kingdom by feeding the secessionist movements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

There is little evidence to support the commonly accepted theory that the forces of integration predominate naturally over time and that societies tend to advance from low levels of integration to increasingly higher ones. Some historians have perceived a developmental sequence in which social and political unification proceeds, inexorably, from the integration of villages and localities to the consolidation of nation-states, world regions, and finally the whole world. Hans Kohn views the "age of nationalism"--in which the nation-state is the prime object of loyalty and allegiance--as a stage preliminary to and necessary for the broadly integrated "international global order" which he foresees.<sup>3</sup>

But from a comprehensive historical analysis of European political communities, Karl Deutsch and his associates have concluded that there is

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<sup>1</sup>One pamphlet issued by the SNP entitled "No Voice, No Entry" declared, for example, that Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome forbids member states from aiding home industries. "Ship building, coal mining and the new science based industries could be denied specific Government help to enable them to become more efficient and to further their expansion. These consequences would be very serious for many sectors of Scottish Industry."

<sup>2</sup>From a poll reported in the New Republic, CLXII, January 24, 1970, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1962, passim.

no necessarily incremental integrative trend. They discount the notion that

modern life, with rapid transportation, mass communications, and literacy, tends to be more international than life in past decades or centuries, and hence more conducive to the growth of international or supranational institutions.<sup>1</sup>

Even more significantly, the Deutsch group finds that the growth of states does not resemble a "snowballing process" in which successful territorial expansion feeds on itself producing "ever-larger states or federations."<sup>2</sup> Periods of expansion are followed not by more expansion but rather by disintegration. The Roman Empire grew to encompass most of the known world, but it did not become permanently established. The English expanded their political community to include Wales, Scotland, and Ireland close to home and an empire of colonies abroad. But the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have witnessed the disintegration of that empire. And today even the once-solid unity of the British Isles is questionable.

Separatism, one manifestation of political disintegration, is the focus of this study. Nationalist movements seeking to separate contiguous regions from multinational states exist in many parts of the world.<sup>3</sup> Prominent examples in Africa include Biafran secession in

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<sup>1</sup>Deutsch, et al., loc. cit., p. 22. Between 1945 and 1955 76 intergovernmental organizations were founded. Between 1956 and 1965, however, only 56 such organizations were created, indicating an ebbing of integrative tendencies. J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organizations in the Global System, 1815-1964," International Organization, XXIV, Spring, 1970. Data compiled by J. S. Nye and David Handley in J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Deutsch, et al., loc. cit., p. 24.

<sup>3</sup>The best recent summary and discussion of such movements is Walker Conner's "Self-Determination: The New Phase," World Politics, XX, October, 1967, pp. 30-54.

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Nigeria,<sup>1</sup> the Congo's separatist Katanga Province,<sup>2</sup> the Eritrean region of Ethiopia,<sup>3</sup> and Black self-determination in South Africa.<sup>4</sup> Middle Eastern Kurds in three nation-states have long struggled for autonomy,<sup>5</sup> while bloody conflict occurred when East Pakistan seceded from its sister provinces to the west to form the new state of Bangladesh.<sup>6</sup> And developed countries, it appears, are no more immune to the phenomenon. Quebec separatism is familiar,<sup>7</sup> but similar movements exist in

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. R. K. Baker, "The Emergence of Biafra: Balkanization or Nation-Building," Orbis, XII, Summer, 1968, pp. 518-33.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. C. deBeniparrell, "El Fin de la Secesion de Katanga," Revista de Politica Internacional, LXVI, March-April, 1963, pp. 149-57.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Duncan C. Cumming, "The Disposal of Eritrea," Middle East Journal, VII, Winter, 1953, pp. 18-32.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. A. K. Fryer, "National Self-Determination and the Multi-Racial State: The Problem of South Africa," Australian Outlook, XIX, August, 1965, pp. 180-91.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. I. T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination," Middle East Journal, XX, Summer, 1966, pp. 279-95.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Richard D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan," Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII, April, 1959, pp. 48-58; and Stanley O. Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII, June, 1955, pp. 132-44.

<sup>7</sup>Cf. Frank L. Wilson, "French-Canadian Separatism," Western Political Quarterly, XX, March, 1967, pp. 116-32; and J. W. Hagy, "Quebec Separatists: The First Twelve Years," Queens Quarterly, LXXVI, Summer, 1969, pp. 229-39.



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Yugoslavia,<sup>1</sup> the Ukraine,<sup>2</sup> Italian South Tyrol,<sup>3</sup> and Belgium.<sup>4</sup> National secessionist movements are also found in Brittany,<sup>5</sup> the Basque and Catalanian regions of Spain,<sup>6</sup> and of course Wales<sup>7</sup> and Scotland.<sup>8</sup>

Important differences exist among these diverse examples of separatism. Some involve bloody conflict, while others are carried on relatively peacefully. Some are based on language differences, while others involve ethnic or religious conflict. Most occur in economically backward areas within their countries, but some take place in wealthy regions.

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. C. E. Bidwell, "Language, Dialect, and Nationality in Yugoslavia," Human Relations, XV, August, 1962, pp. 217-27.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. V. J. Kaye, "Political Integration of Ethnic Groups: The Ukrainians," Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa. XXVII, October-December, 1957, pp. 460-77. Nationalist movements in other parts of the Soviet Union are covered in V. Stanley Vardys, "How the Baltic Republics Fare in the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs, LXIV, April, 1966, pp. 217-27.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Felix Ermacora, "The Minorities Problem in South Tyrol," World Justice, VII, September, 1965, pp. 34-47; and Leonard Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Val R. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics," in Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, pp. 147-87.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. J. E. S. Haywood, "From Functional Regionalism to Functional Representation in France: The Battle of Brittany," Political Studies, XVII, March, 1969, pp. 48-75.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Hugh Thomas, "The Balance of Forces in Spain," Foreign Affairs, XLI, October, 1962, pp. 208-21.

<sup>7</sup>Cf. E. Hudson Davies, "Welsh Nationalism," Political Quarterly, XXXIX, July-September, 1968, pp. 322-32; and Reginald Coupland, Welsh and Scottish Nationalism, Collins, London, 1954.

<sup>8</sup>Especially useful are John P. Mackintosh, "Scottish Nationalism," Political Quarterly, XXXVIII, October-December, 1967, pp. 389-402; and H. J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, Faber and Faber, London, 1969.

But there are similarities and they seem worthy of careful investigation. First, the inhabitants of each separatist region can be distinguished from other citizens in their country by some ascriptive criteria. Race, religion, language, and ethnic tradition are a few of the important distinguishing criteria, but language is by far the most common. Second, each separatist region can be set aside as a distinctly identifiable economic or political sub-unit of the country of which it is a part. Sometimes, as in Bangladesh or Quebec, the region is a formal sub-unit in a federalist system, but frequently the sub-unit is functionally delineated. Third, each separatist region is at a level of economic or political development distinct from that of the country as a whole. Usually the region is at a lower stage of development, but Catalonia and Biafra are examples of regions which have progressed beyond the general level of the country of which they are a part. In either case, each region is imperfectly adjusted to the prevailing economic or political system. And finally, the published and spoken demands of participants in each separatist movement reveal a deep-seated sense of deprivation. In Catalonia or Biafra the feeling may derive from a sense of superiority and thwarted ambition; the Bengali, on the other hand, may have felt left behind in the process of modernization. Still others like the Scots or Quebecois may feel the sting of discrimination on many fronts. But whatever the source of the perceived deprivation, it is always viewed as a violation of the accepted standards of social justice.

But simply by enumerating the common characteristics of national separatist movements we cannot claim to have explained those movements. A full explanation of separatism is clearly beyond the scope of this study. This is not a definitive comparative analysis of the major



separatist movements mentioned above. Neither is it a theoretical treatise on nationalism, or a philosophical discourse on nationalist ideology. What follows is a case study of Scottish nationalism, undertaken for the purpose of investigating the phenomenon and the social forces which sustain it. The significant hypotheses examined in this study, those relating social mobility and deprivation to separatist activity, are derived from a broad comparative view of nationalism. But any conclusions we formulate are applicable only to the Scottish example and not to the phenomenon generally. We hope, of course, that some of our conclusions will have relevance to other cases of national separatism, but since it is the Scottish political experience we examine here, and since it is a Scottish population from which we have generated social survey data, our inferences must necessarily be limited in their scope of application.

Chapter One is a review of the literature of nationalism which both defines basic terminology and indicates the extent to which the Scottish separatist movement typifies modern nationalism. Chapter Two examines various hypothesized explanations for national separatism, focussing first on the notion that a shared sense of relative deprivation is a necessary concomitant of separatism and second on the idea that upward and downward social mobility in a deprived region promotes support for separatist activities. Chapters Three and Four discuss in turn the historical development of the nationalist idea in Scotland, the background and experience of contemporary nationalist leaders, and the positions taken by Scotland's major political parties on the issue of Scottish government.

The examination of major hypotheses begins in Chapter Five which

considers the issue of Scottish deprivation in the light of aggregate economic and political data. Chapter Six is a preliminary discussion of the sample survey conducted in Glasgow which indicates the basic parameters of the population studied and the important characteristics of the sample. Using the Glasgow survey data, the next two chapters investigate the major hypotheses. Chapter Seven examines the relationship between relative deprivation and support for separatism, while Chapter Eight focusses on social mobility as a correlate of separatism. Finally, a brief Conclusion summarizes the findings of the study.

Although Scottish nationalism has not been as dramatic as Quebec nationalism, nor as deadly as ethnic conflict in Bangladesh or even Northern Ireland, it remains a significant example of resistance to integration in this era of growing unification in Europe. It is hoped that this study can shed additional light on the problems and processes of unification by examining some of the causes of disintegration.

## CHAPTER I

### NATIONALISM: THE PHENOMENON DEFINED AND DESCRIBED

He canna Scotland see wha yet  
Canna see the Infinite,  
And Scotland in true scale to it.

The study of nationalism has fascinated scholars for years. But just as it is difficult to pinpoint the origin of the phenomenon, so is it difficult to identify the beginnings of the study of nationalism. The ideas of nation and nationality have evolved slowly through time, but by the middle of the nineteenth century they began to take on the meanings they have today. In his Considerations on Representative Government, published in 1861, John Stuart Mill wrote:

A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others--which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively.<sup>1</sup>

The broader concept of nationalism, however, was not dealt with directly until Gooch produced his study in 1920.<sup>2</sup> Shortly thereafter, Hayes published his pioneering Essays on Nationalism in which he bemoaned, with justification, the lack of any "profound treatment of the subject of

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<sup>1</sup>John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Harper Brothers, New York, 1962, p. 120.

<sup>2</sup>George Gooch, Nationalism, Swarthmore, London, 1920.





nationalism in any language."<sup>1</sup> Although many scholars have treated the subject of nationalism in the five decades since Gooch and Hayes wrote, a single, unified body of theory has failed to evolve.<sup>2</sup> There are even disagreements among writers concerning definitions of the key concepts in this area: nation, nationality, patriotism, and nationalism.

Zetterberg has remarked that "sociologists have spent much energy in developing technical definitions, but to date they have not achieved a consensus about them that is commensurate with their effort."<sup>3</sup> This seems equally true of those studying nationalism.

In addition to historians and political scientists, nationalism has been of interest to sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and even psychiatrists. In relating the aspects of nationalism relevant to each discipline, differing terminologies and definitions have resulted. Additional chaos derives from the disjointed development of the study of nationalism. The first major impetus behind the study of the phenomenon was provided by the new political forces in Europe after World War I. The disintegration of European empires gave rise to a new concern with national self-determination, the principle of autonomy for

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<sup>1</sup>Carleton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1926, p. 277.

<sup>2</sup>Today there is a wealth of literature on nationalism which illustrates and analyzes its varied manifestations. Cf. Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt, Nationalism: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966. An earlier, but equally useful source book is Koppel S. Pinson, A Bibliographic Introduction to Nationalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1935.

<sup>3</sup>Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3d. ed., The Bedminster Press, Totawa, New Jersey, 1964, p. 30.

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significant nationalities being incorporated into the allies' war aims.<sup>1</sup> The second fillip was provided by the post-World War II drive for independence by the developing nations in Africa and Asia. There was increased recognition of the right of self-determination by former colonial peoples and the second phase of nationalism, that dealing with the liberation of subjugated racial groups, had begun.<sup>2</sup> The most recent stimulus to the study of nationalism has been the mid-twentieth century cohesion crisis of the multi-national state. Although this crisis began before the mid-twentieth century, particularly serious and visible problems involving national separatist movements in this period, e.g., in Quebec, Biafra, and Bengal, have refocussed the attention of scholars on nationalism and the sentiments supporting these movements.

These three distinct manifestations of nationalism have aided in the identification of certain characteristics common to the phenomenon. Some of these were outlined in the Introduction. However, for the most part there has been a failure to draw insightful parallels between these three phases of nationalism. The terms used to describe and analyze one phase of nationalism have been adopted, often awkwardly, for use in explaining subsequent phases.

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<sup>1</sup>Wilson's "Fourteen Points" included several specific provisions relating to the nationalities question in Europe. Point IX called for "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy [which] should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Point X advised that "the people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." Other points dealt with nationality problems in France, Turkey, and the Balkan states. Supplement to the Messages and Papers of the Presidents Covering the Second Administration of Woodrow Wilson, p. 8421 f. Reprinted in Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History, 6th ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1958, pp.318-9.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. W. M. Macmillan, The Road to Self Rule: A Study in Colonial Evolution, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1959.

...Winston's "Fourteen Points" included several specific provisions regarding the nationalities question in Europe. Point IX called for adjustment of the frontiers of Italy (Italy) should be effected in accordance with the clearly recognizable lines of nationality. Point X advised that the people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to be safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity for autonomous development. Other points dealt with nationality problems in the Balkan states. Comment to the League and League of the President, Covering the Second Administration of Woodrow Wilson, p. 842. Reprinted in Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History, 6th ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1928, p. 412-4.

\*Cl. W. Macmillan, The Road to Self-Rule: A Study in Colonial Evolution, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1939.

But this theoretical and terminological confusion also results from the complex nature of nationalism. The term nationalism has taken on several shades of meaning. As early as 1926 Hayes identified four distinct nuances of nationalism. One is the historical process which establishes national groups as political units and links them uniquely to the institution of the national state. A second is "the theory, principle, or ideal implicit in the actual historical process. In this sense it signifies both an intensification of the consciousness of nationality and a political philosophy of the national state."<sup>1</sup> Third, nationalism may refer to the activities of political parties involved in the struggle to achieve statehood for a national group. And finally, the term may be taken to mean "a condition of mind" which is characterized by a supreme loyalty to an existing or potential national state.<sup>2</sup> In this study we will be concerned primarily with the latter two meanings of nationalism--as the activities of a political party and as the sentiment of a national group.

This proliferation of meaning and terminology is confusing and requires that we stipulate a clear set of definitions for national group, nationality, nation, patriotism, and nationalism, before we can proceed. This chapter seeks to meet that requirement.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hayes, op. cit., p. 5. Cf. also, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1966.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>A good general definitional guide, one which compares the use of relevant terms in several of the social sciences, is Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954.

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### National Group and Nationality

Adhering to a definitional distinction made by Karl Deutsch, a nationality will be taken to mean "a politicized people," i.e., a national group trying "to acquire a state or gain political power at the local, district, or regional level."<sup>1</sup> This is an important distinction but one which has usually been ignored by scholars of nationalism. National group (or people or ethnic group) has been generally confused with nationality, resulting in a plethora of conflicting definitions and meanings. In the following discussion we will try to sort out some of these meanings and arrive at a workable definition of nationality. When an author uses terminology which is confusing or which conflicts with our own, substitutions will be made and noted.

The basic social unit relevant to nationalism, however defined, is the national group, a social aggregate whose cohesion is fostered by complementary patterns of social communication. Nationalism as a historical process seeks to institutionalize the national group. Nationalism as a philosophy promotes the notion of national group control of the state system. Nationalist political parties draw their support almost exclusively from the national group and generally seek to promote the interests of that group. And finally, nationalism as a condition of mind refers to sentiments common to the members of a national group.

A national group, like other social groups, is given cohesion by certain social forces. While there has been little disagreement among

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<sup>1</sup>Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1970, p. 71 and p. 87. The term national group is mine; Deutsch prefers people. Cf. his Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2d. ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 96-100.

scholars over the notion of the centrality of the national group in the phenomenon of nationalism, there has been wide disagreement concerning the nature of cohesive forces within national groups. What constitutes a national group? What makes it "hang together"? What makes it different from other social groups? Debate over these questions has divided students of nationalism.

A social group whose boundaries are determined by ascriptive criteria is said to be "structural." A labor union is structural since its boundaries are determined by certain objective membership criteria. Negroes are a structural group since they have physical characteristics, such as skin color, which more or less objectively delimit them as a group. North Americans comprise a structural group to the extent that their group is geographically defined. A social group is "non-structural" if its boundaries are determined by attitudinal criteria. "Hawks" and "doves" were two non-structural groups in the late 1960's in the United States. The composition of these groups was based not on any objective criteria like education, occupation, or eye color, but on opinions concerning America's military involvement in Southeast Asia.

Although it is fairly easy to differentiate in theory between structural and non-structural groups, problems often arise when we try to sort out specific social groups. Do Jews form a cohesive social group because of their common ancestry or because of their shared religious beliefs? It is possible to view many groups as both structural and non-structural, possessing both ascriptive and attitudinal forces at the same time.

The idea of the national group as non-structural, based on the existence of a "we-feeling" or a common sentiment among its members, is



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not recent in origin but for the most part it has been only in recent years that this notion has gained wide currency.<sup>1</sup> Traditionally, it was asserted that the national group was held together by certain objective, even physical, criteria. The idea that language was the root cohesive force in national groups derived from German and Slavic thought at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Perhaps as a justification for expansionism, the unity of Germans and later that of Slavs was said to be based on common language. Furthermore, it was felt, as the German philosopher Herder wrote, "a people, and especially a noncivilized one, has nothing dearer than the language of its fathers. Its whole spiritual wealth of tradition, history, and religion, and all the fullness of life, all its heart and soul, lives in it."<sup>2</sup> Jungmann, the Czech philologist and lexicographer, in his article "On the Czech Language" raised language to a paramount position as the basic cohesive force. National groups, he claimed, "live by their languages; as many languages as there are, so many fatherlands exist."<sup>3</sup>

Many more recent commentators have suggested the central position of language, and one cannot deny that it plays a key role in many nationalist movements. It seems a reasonable proposition, as Friedrich suggests, that "nationalism and the building of a nation are greatly aided by linguistic community."<sup>4</sup> As we shall see in the case of Scotland, many

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<sup>1</sup>Infra., pp. 21-2.

<sup>2</sup>Johann Gottfried Herder, "Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität," in Bernard Suphan, et al., (ed.), Sämmtliche Werke, 33 vols., Weidmann, Berlin, 1877-1913, XVII, p. 58. Quoted in Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, Collier Books, New York, 1944, 1967, p. 432

<sup>3</sup>Josef Jungmann, "On the Czech Language," written in 1803 and reported in *ibid.*, p. 559.

<sup>4</sup>Carl Friedrich, Man and His Government, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1963, p. 559.

*[Faint, illegible vertical text]*

of the potent symbols of nationalism are essentially linguistic expressions--slogans, dialects or accents, literature, and poetry.

But there is a persistent tendency to equate the linguistic group with the national group. Hayes, for example, thinks in terms of "a cultural group of people who speak a common language (or closely related dialects) and who possess a community of historical traditions (religious, territorial, political, military, economic, artistic, and intellectual)."<sup>1</sup> Here, admittedly, language must share its role with common traditions; and Hayes' broad definition of historical traditions is inclusive of additional objective cohesive factors.

The listing of several ascriptive determinants of cohesiveness has been common, but it has also been indicative of the confusion which reigns in this area. Znaniecki points out that social scientists tend to think of a national group as "a collectivity of people with certain common and distinctive cultural characteristics (language, customs, historical traditions, etc.) sometimes also 'racial' traits and a definite geographical location."<sup>2</sup> But surely all of these characteristics are not necessary to produce or sustain a national group. The Swiss, for example, speak at least four languages; Americans, Canadians, and South Africans do not each possess common historical traditions nor can they claim common descent. And yet all of these are traditionally described as

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<sup>1</sup>Carleton J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, Macmillan Company, New York, 1960, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Florian Znaniecki, Modern Nationalities, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1952, p. xiv. Another, similar list appears in Hans Kohn, The Idea Of Nationalism, pp. 13-15. Kohn mentions common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion as potential objective criteria. It is interesting to note that the very term nationality derives from the Latin, natio, which implies common race or descent.

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national groups. Furthermore, as MacIver has noted, "scarcely any two nationalities seem to find their positive support in the same objective factors."<sup>1</sup>

It has been this realization that has led to a refined definition of the national group. Traditional ascriptive criteria, e.g., language, race, and historical traditions, may still be crucial to the cohesion of a national group but the key is not the ascriptive criteria themselves but rather the effect they have on group interaction. Deutsch has suggested that national groups are held together by "wide complementarity of social communication." He added that "the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with the members of one large group than with outsiders" produces the conditions necessary for the existence of a national group.<sup>2</sup> Only to the extent that common ascriptive criteria produce such communication patterns do they become relevant to the formation of a national group. Hence, the main characteristic which differentiates between the national group and other social groups is the broad scope of the communication patterns which exists in national groups.

A Marxist interpretation of this definition would take note of the parallel between economic class and national group. The study of nationalism compiled by the Royal Institute of International Affairs contended that "nationalism is clearly related to...other kinds of group feeling in

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<sup>1</sup>Robert MacIver, The Modern State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1926, p. 123.

<sup>2</sup>Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 97. Deutsch calls this a "functional" definition which "differs from the old attempts to specify nationality in terms of some particular ingredient." (p. 97) To this extent it differs from what we have called ascriptive criteria of national groups. But, as we note below, it is not the same as attitudinal criteria.



respect of the emotional impulse underlying it."<sup>1</sup> But, the report went on to state, "it is at the same time differentiated from them in certain important respects....[T]he nation is...a community rather than an association;...it covers a comprehensive range of human activities instead of being restricted to a single end."<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Deutsch has indicated that "ethnic complementarity" is to be distinguished from "vocational" or other complementarity.<sup>3</sup> Economic class is too narrow a focus for delineation of a national group.

Deutsch's notion of complementary communication patterns as the basis for national groups presages the final stage in the evolution of thought in this area. As Deutsch himself would admit, the existence of common communication patterns among a group of people is independent of the content of the communication and of its relevance to group cohesion. Interaction among people must create a sense of community as well as the skeletal framework for community. What must be fostered by common communication patterns is a "we-feeling", a common sentiment, an attitudinal structure encompassing a wide range of subjects.

Although this definitional element is the most recent in an evolutionary chain of development, the idea itself is not new. In 1919, Pillsbury asserted that membership in a national group "is an affair of the mind or spirit, not...of physical relationship. The only way to decide whether an individual belongs to one nation rather than to

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<sup>1</sup>Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1939, p. 329.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 98.



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another is to ask him."<sup>1</sup> More recently Kohn argued that "the most essential element [in the formation of a national group] is a living and active corporate will."<sup>2</sup> If any national group, as a group, is to play a social role, there must be a collective consciousness, a sense that the national group is a socially relevant aggregate.

This discussion should clarify the point that the national group may be viewed either as structural or as non-structural, but that the essential criterion is non-structural, a sense of shared attributes. In brief, a national group is by definition always delimited by non-structural attitudinal criteria; it usually is, but need not be, also delimited by structural, ascriptive, criteria.

Nationality is an extension of the concept of the national group. MacIver has defined nationality as the "sense of community which, under the historical conditions of a particular social epoch, has possessed or still seeks expression through the unity of a state."<sup>3</sup> Hertz echoed this meaning when he said that nationality is "a community formed by the will to be a nation."<sup>4</sup> As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, nationality is the politicization of the national group as it strives to acquire a state.

It is important to note that the definition we use in this study is directly contradictory to Hayes' claim that a "nationality may exist without political unity."<sup>5</sup> This is true of the national group, however;

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<sup>1</sup>W. B. Pillsbury, The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism, Appleton, New York, 1919, p. 267.

<sup>2</sup>Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup>MacIver, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>4</sup>Hertz, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>5</sup>Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 5.

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and the relevance of Hayes' statement is that it fails to distinguish between national group and nationality.

When a national group becomes political, i.e., when attempts are made on its behalf to link it to a state structure, it fulfills the criterion of a nationality. By definition, then, a nationality is always political and is always based on a national group.

Given these definitions, do the Scots constitute a national group? A nationality? Scots are generally regarded as a cohesive national group. One recent survey showed that nearly 80% of all Scots questioned considered themselves Scottish rather than British.<sup>1</sup> In the survey conducted by this writer, more than 77% of those interviewed felt they had a lot in common with other Scots. By contrast, only 23% of the same sample said they had a lot in common with Englishmen. These data suggest that Scots differentiate themselves as a group from other Britons and that they consider themselves a cohesive group.

This "we-feeling" among Scots is the result of centuries of interaction. Relying on the standard ascriptive criteria to explain this interaction would be misleading. In terms of language, geography, and even religion, Scotland has not always been homogeneous. Geographically, Scotland is divided into three distinct regions: the southern uplands, the central lowlands, and the Highlands and Islands. Because of the relative ease in penetrating the two southernmost regions, the Romans, and later the English, were able to extend their military power and cultural influence into these areas, displacing the traditional Gaelic

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<sup>1</sup>A survey conducted by Dr. Jack Brand of Strathclyde University for the Glasgow Herald in April, 1970. These figures are based on the Glasgow sub-sample of 396 respondents.

TABLE 1  
SCOTS AS A COHESIVE NATIONAL GROUP<sup>a</sup>

| Percent<br>who say: | "How much would you<br>say you had in com-<br>mon with Scots?" | "How much do you<br>think you have in<br>common with most<br>Englishmen?" |
|---------------------|--|---|
| A lot               | 77   | 23  |
| Some                | 18   | 45  |
| Not very much       | 2  | 29  |
| Don't know          | <u>3</u>   | <u>3</u>  |
|                     | 100 %  | 100 %   |

<sup>a</sup>N=308

influence. The Highlands and Islands, however, remained substantially Gaelic until well into the eighteenth century.

The divisions between these two groups was reinforced by language differences. At the beginning of the eighteenth century approximately one-third of the Scottish population, most of them in the Highlands, spoke Gaelic.<sup>1</sup> Those in the rest of the country, having been anglicized, spoke a Scots dialect of English. As Gaelic has slowly died out, the population has become increasingly homogeneous from a cultural-linguistic standpoint. By 1891 Gaelic-speakers numbered only 6.2% of the total population, and by 1961, this number had shrunk to 1.5%. But even though Gaelic language and culture has drastically declined in the

<sup>1</sup>J. MacInnes, The Evangelical Movement in the Highlands of Scotland, University Press, Aberdeen, 1951, p. 10.

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Highlands and Islands, the northern mountainous region retains an identity of its own, having special dialects, different traditions, and distinctive economic problems.<sup>1</sup>

Scotland today is predominantly Presbyterian: nearly 55% of the total church membership is affiliated with the Church of Scotland. However, there is a sizeable Roman Catholic minority which, in 1959, consisted of more than 25% of the church membership.<sup>2</sup> Having escaped the effects of the Reformation in the Highlands, a few traditional pockets of Catholicism survive in the north and west of the country. But for the most part, this sub-group traces its origin to the waves of immigration from Ireland during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most of this Catholic population is therefore concentrated in the western areas of the country, especially in Glasgow. This large religious minority augments social heterogeneity in Scotland especially because it is concentrated in a fairly small region.

Despite these internal differences, there are important objective criteria which distinguish Scotland and its people. The Scottish legal system is formally and functionally independent of the English, being based on Roman law rather than common law. This means that the Scots have separate courts, specially trained lawyers, and often require special Acts of Parliament which relate only to Scotland.<sup>3</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. James Kellas, Modern Scotland: The Nation Since 1870, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, pp. 25-35. There have been significant attempts to revive Gaelic as a national language. In 1906, Stuart Erskine, proprietor of the nationalist journal Guth na Bliadhna, popularized the slogan, "No language, no Nation." Cf. H. J. Hanham, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>2</sup>This represents about 15% of the total adult population in Scotland. Kellas, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, chap. 6.

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educational system is also independent: the curricula, exams, and criteria for advancement differ from the English. Traditionally, Scottish education has been more democratic and less dependent on the social class system than its English counterpart, although educational opportunities are approximately the same in both countries now.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, Scotland has its own system of banking, even its own varied versions of the British pound notes.<sup>2</sup> The Scots have their own holidays, their own system of local government, their own polling day for municipal elections, their own distinct (yet not autonomous) branches of the major British political parties, their own minister in the British Cabinet, and for some government services their own administrative structure. Moreover, there are hundreds of specifically Scottish organizations, pressure groups and clubs.

These and other factors have combined over a long period to create a sense of community among Scots, a feeling that they are a distinct and relevant reference group.

The "union of parliaments" in 1707 joined the kingdoms of Scotland and England. A century before, the vagaries of the English law of succession had elevated James VI of Scotland to the English throne, making him James I of England and creating a royal linkage, a "union of crowns," between the two kingdoms. Before 1603, however, Scotland was independent, sovereign and free. The existence of political movements

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, chap. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Each bank in Scotland prints its own currency. The one-pound note alone has at least fourteen different manifestations, each a different design, color, and size. Confused by all this, English merchants often refuse to have anything to do with Scottish currency, to the chagrin of the traveling Scot, although it is legal tender throughout Britain.

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within this body politic today seeking to re-link the Scottish national group to a sovereign state suggests that the Scots are properly termed a nationality.<sup>1</sup>

### What is a Nation?

Like national group and nationality, the term nation has been subject to varying interpretations. When we use the term in this study it will mean a group of people organized in a political state. If a nation is a group of people, a state refers to the formal institutional structure which serves to organize them. Friedrich describes this relationship when he says that

a state does not consist merely in an institutionalized structure of power, that is, a system of rule or government over a definite territory. Nor does it merely possess a predominance of legitimate force within this territory, but it calls for a substructure provided by "a common bond of sentiment" and typically manifest in the body of a nation.<sup>2</sup>

A state is not always associated with a nation; but a nation is, by definition, always associated with a state. This is because the single characteristic which distinguishes the nation as a social aggregate from other similar groupings is its unique relation with the state. State and nation are "the Siamese twins which Western culture has begot. ...Together they constitute the contemporary political community and its order."<sup>3</sup> The term nation-state, because it combines the two halves of this couplet, has come into common use to refer to the prime political actor.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. *infra.*, chap. III.

<sup>2</sup>Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 555.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 547.

<sup>4</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau is generally credited with originating the concept.

As Minogue asserts, a nation should have some kind of pre-political unity.<sup>1</sup> It is usually coterminous with a national group and possesses a sense of community based on shared communication patterns. However, the traditional means of designating the bases for nations are generally misleading. Bryce suggests that common race underlies the nation.<sup>2</sup> Taylor contends that a common territory is the key element,<sup>3</sup> while Herder, as we have seen, opts for language.<sup>4</sup> Others assert that common religion or historical traditions may form the foundation of nationhood.<sup>5</sup>

Any or all of these may be critical factors in individual cases, but as with national groups it is important to avoid confusing the thing itself with its attributes or its correlates. "Nations are neither linguistic nor political nor biological, but spiritual unities."<sup>6</sup> Snyder has simply called a nation "the citizens of a sovereign political state,"<sup>7</sup> but clearly it is more than that. Friedrich comes closest to the meaning we propose:

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<sup>1</sup>K. R. Minogue, Nationalism, B. T. Batsford, Ltd., London, 1967, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>James Bryce, Race Sentiments as a Factor in History, University of London Press, London, 1915.

<sup>3</sup>Griffith Taylor, Environment and Nation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1936, especially pp. 19-32.

<sup>4</sup>Supra, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 22-24; 27-32.

<sup>6</sup>Oswald Spengler, quoted in MacIver, op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>7</sup>Snyder, loc. cit., p. 57.

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a nation is any cohesive group possessing "independence" within the confines of the international political order...which provides a constituency for a government effectively ruling such a group and receiving from that group the acclamation which legitimizes the government as part of the world order.<sup>1</sup>

How does a nation differ from a national group or a nationality?

The linkage to the state is the key element. All three are cohesive social groups, each held together by a common sentiment produced by complementary communication patterns. Both nation and nationality are politicized. But while the nationality only aspires to become structurally institutionalized, the nation already is. A nation is a successful or fulfilled nationality.

Scots, then, while constituting a nationality, do not possess nationhood. It is the drive to become a nation which politicizes the Scottish national group and makes them a genuine nationality.

#### What is Patriotism?

Unlike the terms we examined in the preceding sections, there is a broadly based understanding of the meaning of patriotism. This consensus extends beyond those with a scholarly interest in nationalism and related fields and includes laymen, journalists, novelists, and others. Generally, we mean simply "love of country,"<sup>2</sup> or "love of nation, of its people."<sup>3</sup> Patriotism is not an entity or a social group as are the national group, the nationality, and the nation. It is rather a

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<sup>1</sup>Carl Friedrich, "Nation-Building?" in Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, Nation-Building, Atherton Press, New York, 1966, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup>Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 5. Hayes says that while love for one's primary groups is instinctive, it must be learned for larger groups like nations.

<sup>3</sup>Minogue, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

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psychological orientation. Because patriotism involves feelings of attachment toward an object, it is an affective orientation.<sup>1</sup>

However, patriotism has been more precisely defined so as to involve something more than simple affect. Often, there is an instrumental aspect to patriotism. Doob, for example, calls patriotism "the more or less conscious conviction of a person that his own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his society."<sup>2</sup> Because it involves an evaluation of a political object, this conviction constitutes an evaluative orientation.<sup>3</sup> Patriotism is a psychological concept, a cluster of attitudes, involving both affective and evaluative orientations to the nationality or to the nation.

Doob's definition, stressing the evaluative side of patriotism, presents some problems. He asks whether patriotism is universal and answers in the affirmative, having assumed that one's psychological commitment to a nationality or a nation must be either positive (in which case one is a patriot) or negative (in which case he is a traitor). However, it might be more appropriate to view one's commitment as a mixture of positive and negative elements. If these elements were of equal force, a balancing of the two would produce a net measure of zero patriotism. It may be easier to see how zero patriotism, or apathy toward the

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<sup>1</sup>Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define affective orientation as "feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance." The Civic Culture, Little, Brown and Company, Inc., Boston, 1965, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Doob, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>Defined by Almond and Verba as "the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings." Almond and Verba, loc. cit.



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nation, might result if we consider the analogous case of cross-pressured voters. One possible effect of conflicting attitudes concerning party loyalty and allegiance is non-voting, or apathy toward the parties and their candidates.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, political parochials, those whose cognitive orientations toward the political system are slight or non-existent, might lack patriotism simply because they lack knowledge of the entity toward which patriotism is directed.<sup>2</sup>

A second problem Doob fails to deal with concerns the possibility of dual patriotism. His assumption that patriotism is unidimensional implies that there is only one object toward which a person is patriotic. He says that "people are always socialized in groups, one of which is certain to be recognized as a society with its own distinctive culture."<sup>3</sup> [Emphasis mine] In fact there are often two or even more groups which make claims on a person's allegiance.<sup>4</sup> This is another kind of cross-pressuring and we might expect it to have effects similar to cross-pressuring from other sources. We shall see the extent to which Scots are subjected to role conflicts and subsequent cross-pressuring as a

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1960, pp. 80-88.

<sup>2</sup>Again we are using definitions provided by Almond and Verba. A political parochial is a person whose orientations toward, and expectations about, the political system "approach zero." Cf. op. cit., 16-17. Cognitive orientations are defined as "knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs." Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>Doob, loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup>It is therefore "possible for two nationalities to clash within the boundaries of a single state, and indeed, for two nationalisms to overlap as recently happened in Canada where the all-Canadian nationalism asserting the unity of Canada has been rivaled by the separatist nationalism of the French Canadians." Carl Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 31.

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result of their dual patriotic allegiance to Scotland and to the United Kingdom.

### Nationalism

In order to fully understand and define nationalism we have had to define and elucidate its essential elements: the national group, nationality, the nation and patriotism. Each of these may, in different ways, play an important part in nationalism. But because nationalism has been taken to mean so many different things, we must stipulate our use of the term.

According to Toch, a "social movement represents an effort by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem that they feel they have in common."<sup>1</sup> The aspect of nationalism that interests us in this study can be placed in this category because it involves an effort on the part of a nationality to separate from an existing state and to form a nation-state of its own. In 1936 nationalism was described by Wirth as "the social movements of nationalities striving to acquire, maintain, or enhance their position in a world where they are confronted by oppositions or conflict."<sup>2</sup> These social movements, or nationalist movements as we shall call them, are usually led by associated groups--political parties, interest groups, literary groups, etc. Hence our interest in groups and group activity.

Social movements also have a psychological dimension. Just as patriotism involves a cluster of psychological orientations toward the nationality or the nation, nationalism--as a social movement--deals with

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<sup>1</sup>Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1965, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Max Wirth, "Types of Nationalism," American Journal of Sociology, XLI, 1936, p. 723.

[illegible]

psychological predispositions, goals, and needs. "Nationalism arises psychologically when patriotism leads to certain demands and possibly also to action."<sup>1</sup> In this sense, nationalism can be viewed as a "fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality."<sup>2</sup> All this implies that nationalism consists of more than a social movement. It is the sentiment behind the social movement as well.<sup>3</sup>

When we use the term nationalism in this study, then we are referring to a phenomenon characterized by a social movement involving a set of demands whose purpose is to advance the interests of one's nation or nationality. Nationalism in this broad sense includes both the nationalism of already existing nations--aggressive nationalism<sup>4</sup>--and that of nationalities striving to become nations and to acquire a state. This latter we might term defensive nationalism since it is characterized by strenuous defense of a tenuous nationality. The nationalism of de Gaulle involved the promulgation of programs and policies which were intended

<sup>1</sup>Doob, loc. cit. He goes on to define nationalism as "the set of more or less uniform demands (1) which people in a society share, (2) which arise from their patriotism, (3) for which justifications exist and can be readily expressed, (4) which incline them to make personal sacrifices in behalf of their government's aims, and (5) which may or may not lead to appropriate action." (p. 6.) It is interesting to note that in Doob's view nationalism is strictly not a doctrine or a social movement but a set of demands.

<sup>2</sup>Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Snyder, op. cit., chap. IV, ("The Sentiment of Nationalism"), in which he points out that nationalism "is not an innate instinct, but rather a socially conditioned, synthetic sentiment. It is a socially approved symbol in modern society and acts as a response to the group's need for security and protection. Its realization seems to have become the supreme ethical goal of peoples on earth. It is a persistent but not necessarily a permanent mode of behavior." (p. 110.)

<sup>4</sup>The term "aggressive nationalism" was first used in the Royal Institute of International Affairs report, op. cit., p. 330.

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to advance the interests of the existing French nation. That of George Wallace is characterized by a broad program to promote American interests abroad while maintaining order and propagating symbols at home. Since both of these examples are cases of movements trying to maintain or advance the interests of already existing nations, they are aggressive nationalism.

On the other hand, the Zionist movement (until 1948), because it included a demand for the establishment of a Jewish state, is an example of defensive nationalism on the part of a cohesive yet widely scattered nationality striving to protect its identity and become a nation. Nationalist movements in Bengal, Catalonia, and Quebec, as well as in Scotland, are also of this type since they involve demands for increased autonomy.

This distinction between aggressive and defensive nationalism<sup>1</sup> essentially parallels the dichotomy Kohn describes between nationalism as it originally emerged in the western world and nationalism as it

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<sup>1</sup>The distinction has appeared elsewhere in the literature under different names. Carleton J. H. Hayes, for example, in his article, "Two Varieties of Nationalism: Original and Derived," in *Association of History Teachers of the Middle States and Maryland, Proceedings*, No. 26, 1928, pp. 71-83, describes an offshoot nationalism which is a reaction to the traditional nationalist movements.

Wirth, op. cit., p. 729-30, distinguishes between "hegemonic" and "particularistic" types of nationalism, the former involving a single nation-state structure and the latter a multi-national structure in which individual nationalities struggle to control a state apparatus. "Particularistic" nationalism, which is very close to the type which interests us in this study, is described more fully below. (Infra., p. 39.)

Minogue also makes a distinction between "original" nationalism ("The classic situation was that a nation already existed, fragmented into a variety of states and principalities. Nationalism was an attempt to make the boundaries of the state and those of the nation coincide.") and other types ("Afro-Asian," "macro-nationalism," and "people in search of a home") which we have labelled collectively "defensive nationalism." Op. cit., pp. 12-16.



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appeared in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. In the former the rise of nationalism was preceded by the formation of a nation-state; in the latter, emerging as a protest against the existing state pattern, it involved a state and a rising nationality which rarely coincided.<sup>1</sup>

It has often been asserted that nationalism (and here we mean original or aggressive nationalism) was introduced to the world via the French Revolution. Kohn, for example, suggests that "[n]ationalism as we understand it is no older than the second half of the eighteenth century," and that its "first great manifestation was the French Revolution."<sup>2</sup> There is some reason, however, to think that this date is rather arbitrary. If we look upon nationalism as the sentiment of a nationalist movement, it certainly appeared before the French Revolution. Picking up this theme, Friedrich considers it

more accurate to look upon France as a relative newcomer in the field, though undoubtedly the second half of the eighteenth century presents a culminating point of nationalism in France. Yet similar outbursts preceded that of the French, in England in the middle of the seventeenth century, and in Germany in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

In any case, by the beginning of the nineteenth century nationalism had become a potent force in Europe, having replaced religion and feudalism

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<sup>1</sup>For a good discussion of Kohn's distinction, which is primarily based on historical factors, cf. Snyder, loc. cit., pp. 118-21.

<sup>2</sup>Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 3. Elsewhere Kohn said that "nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state. A deep attachment to one's native soil, to local traditions and to established territorial authority has existed in varying strength throughout history. [His work, The Idea of Nationalism, is a history of this attachment.] But it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that nationalism in the modern sense of the word became a generally recognized sentiment increasingly molding all public and private life." [Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, p. 9.]

<sup>3</sup>Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, p. 35. Cf. also Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1955.

as the most important factor in men's lives.<sup>1</sup>

By the dawning of the twentieth century, the ideology of economic class had come to challenge nationalism as an organizing principle and as a factor determining mass behavior.<sup>2</sup> Dahrendorf's description of Marx's model of the class society contains some statements which are almost paraphrases of those we used above to describe nationalism:

Classes are political groups united by a common interest.<sup>3</sup>

Parallel with the political organization of classes there grows up a theoretical class consciousness, i.e., an awareness on the individual's part of the interests of his class generally.<sup>4</sup>

Every class struggle is a political struggle. It is the deliberate and articulate conflict between two opposed interests, the interests, respectively, of preserving and of revolutionizing the existing institutions and power relations.<sup>5</sup>

This, then, was a new paradigm which revolutionized the way scholars and social theorists conceptualized the organization of modern society. It also revolutionized the manners and methods used by scholars to examine politics and group life and widely influenced even the ways they

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<sup>1</sup>Minogue, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1964, pp. 147-8.

<sup>3</sup>Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1959, p. 16. Class here is analogous to nationality. Note the cohesive effect of "common interest" in both.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-17. This is analogous to the community sentiment we described as patriotism. Cf. supra, pp. 29-31.

<sup>5</sup>Dahrendorf, loc. cit., pp. 17-18. Nationalities too have been described as conflict groups. The political aspect of nationalism led Wirth to develop a typology of nationalism based on the underlying assumption that any "typology of nationalism must correspond to the types of relations of oppositions and of conflicts which characterize the relations between the groups." [Wirth, op. cit., p. 724.] In Wirth's view, nationalities, like classes, are conflict groups which vie with one another for control of state structures and of territories.

viewed social behavior. Lenin's view that nationalism was but a temporary phenomenon (in his eyes an off-shoot of capitalism which might be used to further the class struggle) became widely accepted, not in an ideological sense but simply as a new way of looking at the world.<sup>1</sup>

This growing interest in class rather than nation as the focus of popular loyalties, coupled with an apparent trend toward regional and global international integration, had led to a general discounting of the importance of nationalism. But the rise of secondary or defensive nationalism, in Central and Eastern Europe between 1848 and 1918, in the Third World after World War II, and in some of the more developed countries in the post-war era, has led to a revival of interest in nationalism.

Defensive nationalism has been characterized by responsive patterns to the traditional expressions of aggressive nationalism. Reacting to the existing state system and to the permeating effects of older nationalisms, national groups in Central and Eastern Europe which had been subsumed by the old system became politicized and began to make demands to enhance their political and cultural interests. As Snyder says, "each new nationalism received its original stimulus from cultural contacts with some older nationalism, and then began to extol the heritage of its own past."<sup>2</sup> This occurred fairly early in the Balkans<sup>3</sup> and in

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<sup>1</sup>Lenin considered nationalism to be "a by-product of the historical evolution of capitalism. Owing its origin to it, nationalism was also doomed to die with it." Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality, Bookman Associated, New York, 1958, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup>Snyder, loc. cit., p. 118.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. R. W. Seton-Watson's pioneering work, The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans, Constable, London, 1917.

[illegible]

the old Austro-Hungarian Empire,<sup>1</sup> but the pattern has essentially been repeated in post-war Asia and Africa (where the unifying appeal has been to racial solidarity<sup>2</sup>), and finally in other developed, mainly European, countries.

It is in these latter areas that modern nationalism (i.e., modern defensive nationalism) finds its most powerful expression. There are three types of defensive nationalism, each involving a nationality trying to acquire a state. The first type is called "stateless" nationalism<sup>3</sup> since it involves a geographically scattered nationality, one which strives to become institutionalized in a state but which is prevented from doing so because of geographical non-contiguity. Examples of this stateless nationalism include Zionism before its success in acquiring the state of Israel and Black nationalism in the United States.<sup>4</sup>

The second type of defensive nationalism might be called "annexationist"<sup>5</sup> since it consists of a nationality seeking to join an already

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918, Columbia University Press, New York, 1950

<sup>2</sup>This view has been set forth in Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 233-4. Walker Conner, however, gives a different perspective, claiming that there was "a unique feature to the African and Asian independence movements. Although they had been conducted in the name of self-determination of nations, they were, in fact, demands for political independence not in accord with ethnic distribution, but along the essentially happenstance borders that delimited either the sovereignty or the administrative zones of the former colonial powers. This fact combined with the incredibly complex ethnic map of Africa and Asia to create, in the name of self-determination of nations, a host of multinational states." Op. cit., pp 31-32.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Minogue, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>4</sup>Cf., for example, Essien Udosen Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.

<sup>5</sup>Minogue calls this "macro-nationalism" since the nation-state becomes enlarged. (Loc. cit., p. 13.)

existing state. This is generally because the expectant nationality feels itself to be part of the nation it seeks to join formally.

Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland, feeling cut off from their traditional community in the Republic to the south, agitate for a reunion with Ireland.<sup>1</sup> Ryuku Islanders, under American administration since World War II, have pressed successfully for a reunion with their fellow nationals in Japan.

The last type of defensive nationalism, that which commands our attention in the pages that follow, has been called "secessionist" or "separatist" nationalism.<sup>2</sup> In the extreme, when it is successful, it involves the break-up of the national state although the achievement of more limited goals, such as increased autonomy for a nationality or devolution from a unitary to a federated system, may also be judged to constitute success. Other forms of nationalism may augment the progress of integration, but separatist nationalism represents the opposite trend, a fragmenting of political structure so that it coincides with the lines dividing nationalities.

Perhaps more than other forms of nationalism, separatism may involve violence. Separatist movements in the American South, Ireland, Biafra, and Bangladesh, to name only a few notable examples, involved bloody conflicts during their struggles for autonomy. Other movements have

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Richard Rose, The Maintenance of a Divided Regime: The Case of Northern Ireland. Paper presented to the Meeting of the Committee on Political Sociology, session concerning "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes," VIIth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Varna, Bulgaria, September 18, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Wirth calls this "particularistic nationalism." It "characteristically begins with a striving for cultural autonomy or toleration, which, when the movement makes headway, takes on political significance and finally develops into the demand for political sovereignty." [Op. cit., pp. 729-30.]

experienced limited violence but have remained essentially peaceful, e.g., Quebec, Spanish Basque, and Eritrea. And a final category of separatist movements, including Scotland, Wales, Brittany, and the Ukraine, have been violence-free and have worked almost exclusively through formal legal channels to win their demands. One question which will be considered is why some separatist movements result in violence when others do not. Violence is not simply a prior condition to success. Norway, for example, separated peacefully from Sweden in 1905. Later we shall suggest some reasons why violence does not always accompany separatist movements.<sup>1</sup>

But the main question to which we address ourselves in this study concerns the motivating factors behind such separatist movements. In part, as we have suggested, separatism may be considered a response or reaction to an older, more encompassing nationalism. Scottish nationalism, for example, can be seen as a response to English nationalism which, in the view of many Scots, has always threatened to engulf Scottish traditions and customs.<sup>2</sup> At least this seems a fair starting point for our investigation. Handman has gone a step further in describing this response pattern, calling it "oppression-nationalism," since it is characterized by a nationality suffering deprivations at the hands of an entrenched regime. In his words, "oppression-nationalism" consists in

the system of reactions which is found to prevail in a group the members of which are exposed to a definite and clear-cut regime of disabilities and special subordination. These disabilities usually constitute an interference with the life of the group, and they embrace: efforts to deprive members of the group of the freedom to engage in all legitimate channels of economic enterprise and of making a living, unless they

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<sup>1</sup>Infra, chap. II.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., for example, Coupland, op. cit., p. 137.



desert their group and join the ranks of the dominating and oppressing group; refusal to grant them full participation in the political and administrative life of the community; an attempt to prevent them from employing their own language and developing their own "culture"; a predilection to humiliate them on every possible occasion and a disinclination to receive them on terms of social equality when other merits entitle them to such a reception; and, lastly, constant interference with their freedom of speech and all forms of public expression and movement as well as a policy of ruthless repression of any attempt to state their grievances in public, at home and abroad.<sup>1</sup>

It will be our task in the next chapter to examine these reactions and their hypothesized causes, and to identify the mechanisms by which they function.

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<sup>1</sup>Max Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI, 1921, p. 107-8.

## CHAPTER II

### NATIONALISM: FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLANATION

I ha'e nae doot some foreign philosopher  
Has wrocht a system oot to justify  
A' this: but I'm a Scot wha blin'ly follows  
Auld Scottish instincts, and I winna try.

The expression of Scottish identity has taken on several different aspects. The development of a distinctive, patriotic national literature took shape in the second half of the eighteenth century primarily with the writings of Robert Burns and Walter Scott. These two writers gave lyric expression to the variegated Scottish spirit and became leading literary figures not only in Scotland but throughout the whole of Europe. The "Scottish Renaissance" of the 1920's and 1930's represented a continuation of this tradition of patriotic literature, Edinburgh emerging as one of Europe's leading literary centers. But this patriotic literary nationalism--cultural nationalism as it has been called--is only part of the phenomenon that concerns us in this study.

Cultural nationalism can thrive without its becoming political.<sup>1</sup> Bernard has suggested that in its milder and more frequent form national consciousness produces cultural nationalism. But political nationalism results only when that consciousness becomes so strong that the members of the national group begin to make demands for the unity provided by a

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<sup>1</sup>Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 5.

political state.<sup>1</sup> Hence, although there is a complementary relationship between cultural and political nationalism, they are not the same and they need not occur together.

The phenomenon we seek to explain, then, is political nationalism--or, more specifically, defensive separatism as outlined in Chapter One. Scottish nationalism, as an expression of defensive separatism, has two distinct, yet closely related, manifestations. The first is a long-standing sentiment supportive of advancing Scottish interests by increasing the amount of control Scots have over their own political affairs. This includes not only attitudes and arguments favoring independence for Scotland, but also those reflecting a less extreme devolution of control from the present central government in Westminster, e.g., an increase in the administrative authority of the Scottish Office<sup>2</sup> or the establishment of a locally authoritative Scottish parliament with legislative powers similar to Northern Ireland's Stormont.

The second manifestation of separatism in Scotland is the Scottish National Party, whose policy, according to its campaign literature, "is simple: an independent Scotland."<sup>3</sup> The activities of the SNP include agitating for electoral support at both the parliamentary and municipal levels, publicizing Scotland's case for devolution, and proselytizing on

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<sup>1</sup>Luther Lee Bernard, War and Its Causes, H. Holt and Company, New York, 1944, p. 378.

<sup>2</sup>"Most of the functions for which the Secretary of State [for Scotland] is directly responsible to Parliament are discharged through those principle departments collectively known as the Scottish Office." Great Britain, Scottish Office, A Handbook on Scottish Administration, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Edinburgh, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Scotland v. Whitehall, No. 1: Winifred Ewing's Black Book, The Scottish National Party, Glasgow, n.d. In Chapter IV we suggest that the SNP policy on Scottish government is not quite this simple.

behalf of the separatist cause.

The British two-party system is nearly as strongly entrenched in Scotland as it is in the rest of the United Kingdom, but the SNP has scored some remarkable electoral successes over the past decade. Between 1966 and 1968 the SNP emerged as the largest party in Scotland, claiming the largest membership and having captured a plurality of local councilor seats throughout the country. "Safe" Labour parliamentary seats fell to the SNP in a 1967 by-election (Hamilton) and in the 1970 general election (Western Isles). And in a survey conducted in 1968 by the Gallup Poll throughout Scotland the SNP, apparently at the peak of its popularity, emerged as the most popular choice in a by-election. Table 2 shows that even in a general election the SNP would have received the second highest number of votes.

TABLE 2  
VOTING INTENTION IN SCOTLAND, SEPTEMBER 1968<sup>a</sup>

| Party             | By-election | General election |
|-------------------|-------------|------------------|
| Conservative      | 28%         | 32%              |
| Labour            | 24          | 24               |
| Scottish National | 32          | 27               |
| Liberal           | 5           | 5                |
| DK                | 10          | 10               |
| NA                | <u>1</u>    | <u>2</u>         |
|                   | 100 %       | 100 %            |

<sup>a</sup>N=667

Source: Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. and Daily Telegraph, 1968.

### Problems in Explanation

This chapter will suggest two closely related theoretical frameworks for explaining defensive separatism in Scotland. In attempting such explanations we seek to go beyond the citing of specific sources of separatism in Scotland and to furnish more comprehensive structures which will be able to include manifestations of the phenomenon generally. This presupposes, of course, that cases of defensive separatism can be grouped together and that they have meaning as a class of things over and above their significance individually. This assumption automatically rules out that form of explanation which links outcomes to particular historical events. The secession of the American South from the Union in 1860, for example, has often been explicated in terms of differences over the institution of slavery. However crucial that issue may have been, couching an explanation of the Civil War in those terms does not contribute to the building of broad comparative theory.

There are two common explanations of separatism which avoid this problem of specificity. The first holds that nationalism (both aggressive and defensive) results from, first, a universal tendency for men to unite in groups and, second, a need to assert group identity and to dissociate non-members. Hans Kohn has written:

The mental life of man is as much dominated by an ego-consciousness as it is by group consciousness. Both are complex states of mind at which we arrive through experiences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego and the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside the group.<sup>1</sup>

But while this may be a useful perspective from which to view nationalism, it cannot be said to offer very much in the way of explanation. Why is

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<sup>1</sup> Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 11.

there a drive to acquire a political state on behalf of the national group? If the needs are universal, why did nationalism emerge only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? These questions suggest the inadequacy of this formulation.

A second common explanation of nationalism is not really an explanation at all but rather an analogy. Many writers have noted the similarity between nationalism and religion as foci of human passions and as funnels for group emotions. The rhetoric of nationalists, as Minogue has noted, "is often marked by a positively religious fervour,"<sup>1</sup> and it must be more than coincidence that nationalism arose in Europe just as religion was declining. As interesting as these points are, however, they do not constitute an explanation. They merely beg the question and make one wonder about the basis of religious emotions.

The explanatory principles purveyed in this chapter, while not definitive and often contradictory, can meet some of the broader criticisms made of traditional explanations. We will approach the problem of separatism in this study from the perspective of social psychology. Like other political phenomena, defensive separatism can be viewed in behavioral terms. It is easy, even tempting, to view nationalism as an inanimate process or a nebulous sentiment of some social group. But to explain separatism without reference to the cognitive orientations which motivate its proponents would be like trying to explain the workings of a gyroscope without alluding to certain physical laws. Of course, all behavior is not motivated behavior. Some of it is random; some of it is determined by non-cognitive criteria.<sup>2</sup> We assume however that

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Minogue, op. cit., pp. 144-6.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse, Social Psychology, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1965, p. 21.

separatism can be interpreted in terms of purposive or goal-oriented behavior. In Scotland as elsewhere the proponents of separatism have reasons for their activities and elaborate justifications for their attitudes.

An explanation stressing social psychological motives and predispositions seems particularly appropriate for a phenomenon often described as a "condition of mind." The very description evokes cognitive antecedents. An assumption we make at the outset is that nationalist party activities, or support within the electorate for such activities, implies the prior condition of mind. This assumption will be scrutinized later.

The quest for cognitive antecedents implies a search for causality. But we have been warned by Popper that "[t]he belief in causality is metaphysical."<sup>1</sup> It involves a never-ending search since every cause has itself one or more causes and inasmuch as this is not an ontological treatise, no useful end is served by investigating causality per se.<sup>2</sup> Unlike the physical laws which govern the behavior of the gyroscope, no definitive social laws which control human behavior have yet been discovered. For that reason no specific claim is made concerning the causal relationship between cognitive orientations and separatism. We shall observe the nature of relationships and try to determine how representative our observations are. Our conclusions will be tentative and open.

This does not mean, however, that we shall relinquish all efforts to utilize an implicitly causal theoretical framework. On the contrary,

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<sup>1</sup>Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 248.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1960, pp. 28-9.

we shall follow Popper's admonition "not to abandon the search for universal laws and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever give up our attempts to explain causally any kind of event we can describe."<sup>1</sup> Because both our theoretical frameworks assume a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables, they are properly termed causal models.

#### A Framework for Separatism: Relative Deprivation

What are the psychological predispositions which lead a person to strive for the separation of his national group from the multinational state of which it is a part? Why should a noted Scottish philosopher feel "that under the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom Scotland should have her own Parliament with genuine legislative authority in Scottish affairs?"<sup>2</sup> Why should the Scottish recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize, Lord Boyd Orr, proclaim himself "in favor of a practical, workable plan for a Scottish National government?"<sup>3</sup> Or, more dramatically, why should writers send almost daily letters to the editors of Scotland's major newspapers urging independence and occasionally including passages like this:

I think myself a moderate man, yet if I had to fight I would rather fight the English than the Russians or the Germans. In his heart of hearts there is scarcely a Scotsman who does not feel the same, and if it came to that we would last longer than the Biafrans.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Popper, loc. cit., p. 61.

<sup>2</sup>H. J. Paton, The Claim of Scotland, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1968, p. 252.

<sup>3</sup>From a statement acknowledging his patronage of the separatist 1320 Club, published in Catalyst, December 1967, frontspiece.

<sup>4</sup>Glasgow Herald, January 27, 1970.



The initial hypothesis of this study is that a sense of national group relative deprivation is a necessary pre-condition for separatism. National groups may attempt to separate from a multinational state because of a feeling among members of such groups that they are unjustly deprived of rewards relative to other national groups within their state. The essential theoretical preposition is from Ted Gurr's notion that relative deprivation "is the basic pre-condition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form."<sup>1</sup>

Although Gurr treats relative deprivation as a psychological variable, it is traceable to reference group theories in sociology. Introduced by the authors of The American Soldier, the term referred to interruptions in a person's "patterns of expectation."<sup>2</sup> No formal definition was offered, however, and it was left to later theorists to stipulate exactly what the concept meant. One such scholar, W. G. Runciman, has said that

a person is relatively deprived when (1) he does not have X, (2) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or imagined time, as having X (whether or not they do have X), and (3) he wants X (whether or not it is feasible that he should have X). "To be without Y" can, of course, be substituted where relevant for "to have X."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," The American Political Science Review, LXII, December, 1968, p. 1104.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, vol. I, "Adjustment During Army Life," Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1949, p. 125.

<sup>3</sup>W. G. Runciman, "Problems of Research on Relative Deprivation," in Herbert H. Hyman and Eleanor Singer (eds.), Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 70.

Under this rubric relative deprivation is generated by a person's choice of reference group. A "comparative reference group" is any group whose attributes or situation an individual contrasts with his own. A "membership reference group," on which an individual bases his identity, is the starting point from which such comparisons and contrasts are made. The individual who wishes to share the situation of a comparative reference group, and who considers his wants justifiable, is said to be relatively deprived. The "normative reference group," from which a person takes his values and norms, is generally coincident with the membership group. However, when an individual feels that he does not possess the attributes of his normative group relative deprivation results.<sup>1</sup>

Just as a person may be a male, a Protestant, an auto worker, and a member of a leftist political party all at the same time, he may simultaneously have several distinct membership reference groups. Conscious or subconscious contrasts with comparative reference groups goes on at several different levels. In his role as a member of one group, the individual may feel deprived while in another he may not. Generally speaking, the more salient the membership group, the more intense the sense of deprivation which can result. A female Catholic in Ulster, for example, may feel little relative deprivation as a female while sensing extreme deprivation as a Catholic.

When a person's national group becomes salient as a membership reference group, the potential exists for feelings of national relative deprivation. This situation ensues when the individual contrasts the

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<sup>1</sup> A good introduction to reference group theory is offered in W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, chap. ii.

situation of his own national group with that of another and finds that the discrepancy violates his sense of justice. Under such circumstances, the more salient the national group as a membership group, the more intense the sense of national relative deprivation.

As larger and larger proportions of the members of a national group harbor feelings of national group relative deprivation, the more likely it becomes that such feelings will manifest themselves in group action. But it is only by turning to a psychological conceptualization of relative deprivation that we can understand the mechanics by which deprived national groups might become politicized and sustain separatist movements.

When a person wants to share the attributes of a comparative reference group but finds that he is not able to, there is an implicit cognitive contrast between his ideal and his perceived status. It is this cognitive contrast, specifically, which produces relative deprivation.

Gurr has defined relative deprivation

as actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep).<sup>1</sup>

While this explanation makes no mention of reference group theory, it does not contradict the sociological definition of relative deprivation. Perceived deprivation, as an "in the mind" phenomenon, is relative to the individual's ideal value positions. As a sociological or group phenomenon it is relative to the status of a comparative reference group. In


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<sup>1</sup>Gurr, loc. cit. These terms are more formally defined by Gurr in his book, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, p. 27, where he specifies that "value expectations of a collectivity are the average value positions to which its members believe they are justifiably entitled. Value position is the amount or level of a value actually attained....The value capabilities of a collectivity are the average value positions its members perceive themselves capable of attaining."

either case it is a discrepancy between what one has and what one wants.

Prior to examining the theoretical linkage between relative deprivation and separatism, we shall explore the various patterns by which relative deprivation can develop. The expectations people have about receiving rewards change independently of the system by which those rewards are allocated in a society. It is not surprising, therefore, that value expectations and value capabilities often diverge. The degree of relative deprivation is determined by the size of the discrepancy between these two elements. Gurr suggests three common patterns by which the "decremental deprivation" model, illustrated in Figure 1, occurs when a group's value expectations remain fairly constant while its value capabilities are perceived to decline.

FIGURE 1



Examples include the effects of progressive taxation on the wealthy and of regressive taxation on the poor; the loss of political influence by elites and oppositional groups newly barred from political activity; and the decline in status and influence felt by middle-class groups as the status of working-class groups increases.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 46-7.

These examples illustrate the irrelevance of actual social position to a sense of relative deprivation. While one might expect feelings of relative deprivation to arise most frequently among the working class, they can in fact occur at any rung on the social ladder. Runciman discusses the relative deprivation felt by the British middle class as they perceived the erosion of their preeminent position in British society during the 1930's and 40's.<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere he remarks that "there is no stronger initial reason to expect the resentment of inequality to correlate with relative hardship than with relative good fortune."<sup>2</sup> Citing a study of the effects of a tornado on an American community, Runciman shows how those with moderately severe losses, comparing their fate to those with very severe losses, can feel less deprivation than those with minimal losses who compare their fate with people who escaped the tornado's effects altogether. The decremental model, then, is particularly applicable to groups whose position is less ascendant than it once was.

Gurr's second model, "aspirational deprivation," which is depicted in Figure 2, is characterized by rising value expectations against a background of relatively stable value capabilities. "Those who experience significant loss of what they have; they are angered because they feel they have no means for attaining new or intensified expectations."<sup>3</sup> Examples include demands for independence and rapid economic development for colonial peoples; the spread of egalitarian ideas in a non-egalitarian society; and the effects of social mobilization in transitional societies. The aspirational model seems especially applicable to groups whose

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
<sup>1</sup>Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, pp. 130-1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>3</sup>Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 50.


position is static in an otherwise changing society.

FIGURE 2



The third model Gurr discusses, "progressive deprivation," is a variation of the second. As illustrated in Figure 3, value expectations rise at a steady rate while value capabilities rise for a while and then sharply decline.

FIGURE 3



Such a pattern is most common in societies undergoing simultaneous ideological and systemic change. Economic depression in a growing economy can have this effect. So can the articulation of an ideology of modernization in a society that has

structural inflexibilities that prevent expansion of value output beyond a certain point.<sup>1</sup>

De Tocqueville's analysis of the French Revolution was couched in terms of the progressive deprivation model. He observed that

it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary it oftener happens that when a people has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it.<sup>2</sup>

Civil disturbances which follow this general pattern have come to be called revolutions of rising expectations. Davies's "J-curve" theory of revolution is a modern explication of this pattern. Strife is most likely to occur, Davies asserts, "when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable."<sup>3</sup> Like the aspirational model, this pattern is most likely to appear in societies undergoing rapid social change.

There are innumerable additional patterns to which changing expectations and capabilities might conform.<sup>4</sup> One set of patterns, the "minimal change" models, suggests a slowly changing, or even a static, relationship between value expectations and capabilities. Although there

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 53

<sup>2</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1955, p. 177.

<sup>3</sup>James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, (eds.), The History of Violence in America, rev. ed., Bantam Books, Inc., New York, 1970, p. 690.

<sup>4</sup>A good discussion of various theories of revolution is found in Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 59-87.

may be a discrepancy between the two variables, it may be either very small or it may have developed over a relatively long period of time. If the gap is large enough to produce a sense of relative deprivation, it will be felt less intensely than that produced by the three models of explosive deprivation.<sup>1</sup> The result may be a festering sense of being less well off than one should be, or possibly a sense of resignation or despair at not being able to achieve one's aspirations. In any case, these minimal change models differ from the three presented only in the degree, not in the kind of their effects.

According to Max Weber, there are three dimensions of social stratification: class, status, and power.<sup>2</sup> Inequalities, and hence a sense of relative deprivation, can be generated on any or all of these dimensions. A group may feel deprived in terms of its economic status, its social prestige, or its political influence. In his attempts to measure the relation between economic and political deprivation and civil strife, Gurr devised rough aggregate indices of economic and political discrimination. The former referred to the "systematic exclusion of social groups from higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases," while the latter was defined "in terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or practice or social groups' opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite positions on the basis of ascribed characteristics."<sup>3</sup> But since relative deprivation is essentially a cognitive

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, *Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns*, in Graham and Gurr (eds.), op. cit., pp. 639-40.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. his article on "Class, Status, Party," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, pp. 180-95.

<sup>3</sup>Gurr, "A Causal Model...", p. 1109.



phenomenon, such definitions provide only for indirect measures of the deprivation variables. Survey analysis overcomes this difficulty by enabling the researcher to measure directly the pervasiveness and the intensity of feelings of relative deprivation among a population. By simply asking respondents whether they feel deprived in terms of income or occupation, for example, relative to some other group, we can establish the level of relative economic deprivation.

The effects of deprivation which are more or less permanent can be distinguished from those of deprivation perceived to be temporary. Since it is easier for a person to endure, temporary deprivation is less likely to have social effects than permanent deprivation. Gurr distinguishes between "persisting" and "short-term" deprivation. The former includes not only economic and political discrimination but the way a national group was incorporated into the polity<sup>1</sup> and a relative shortage of educational opportunities. The latter, on the other hand, consists of adverse economic conditions, inflation, taxes, new regime restrictions on political participation and representation, and other value depriving policies recently imposed by governments.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Deprivation is least intense, Gurr specifies, if a region was incorporated into the polity by its own request or by mutual agreement. He uses three additional intensity scores, the highest being reserved for groups forcibly assimilated into the polity in the twentieth century. Ibid , p. 1110.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, p. 1109. Utilizing aggregate data on strife events in 114 polities between 1961 and 1965, Gurr finds that the two forms of deprivation differ in their effects on general strife, short-term deprivation accounting for 12% or the explained variance in the magnitude of civil strife, persisting deprivation accounting for 24% when the effects of other variables are controlled. (p. 1121.)

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Linking Concepts: Deprivation, Frustration, Aggression

A national group may experience any of the kinds of relative deprivation outlined above. Whether or not separatism results from such feelings of deprivation and how separatism manifests itself presumably depends on two sets of relationships. The first links deprivation to frustration; the second ties frustration to separatism.

Referring to collective violence in general, Gurr has stated that "[d]iscontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition."<sup>1</sup> In the now classic terms of Dollard, et al., frustration is "an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior sequence."<sup>2</sup> Although this definition allows for a wide variety of frustrating situations, there are essentially only two general categories--conflicts and deprivations.<sup>3</sup> When people have alternative solutions to problems, or when they are cross-pressured to behave in different ways, the resulting cognitive conflict may be productive of frustration since goal directed activity is interrupted. Similarly, when people want or need something which is generally supplied either by the external world or by internal sources and which is not found to be there, the resulting sense of deprivation, involving thwarted expectations, may lead to frustration. Although we are mainly interested in deprivation as a source of frustration, it should be remembered that conflicts, cross-pressuring, or simple

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<sup>1</sup>Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>John Dollard, et al., Frustration and Aggression, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939, p. 7. A goal-response is "an act which terminates in a predicted sequence." (p. 6.)

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Saul Rosenzweig, "A General Outline of Frustration," in Phillippe R. Lawson (ed.), Frustration, Macmillan and Co., New York, 1965, pp. 63-71.

confusion may also generate frustration.

Mowrer has pointed out that deprivation is "a taking away or withholding of something that has been accepted as a desired objective, with full appetitive arousal....that frustration can be experienced in full force."<sup>1</sup> Actual deprivations, whether economic, social, or political, may or may not be perceived by those suffering them. Obviously, deprivations which go unheeded will have no chance to affect people's predispositions or their subsequent behavior. As Chalmers Johnson has pointed out, bad social conditions do not cause revolutions; the demands created by such conditions do.<sup>2</sup> One might expect, however, that the greater the deprivation, the more likely that it will be perceived. A group, for example, suffering unemployment rates double those for other groups in a society are more likely to perceive their relative deprivation than if employment rates were only marginally different. In addition, unemployment affecting a limited number of industries is less likely to be perceived than that affecting the economy generally. The underlying principle at work is that the more people who are themselves affected by a condition, the wider the perception of that condition.

Actual deprivations, of course, need not underlie a sense of deprivation.<sup>3</sup> Group paranoia, a widespread delusion of persecution, is a possible outcome of repeated attempts by members of a group to compensate unconsciously for persistent failures or shortcomings. The distinction is often made between "objective" or actual inequalities and those which

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<sup>1</sup>O. H. Mowrer, "Frustration and Aggression," in V. C. Branham and S. B. Kutash (eds.), Encyclopedia of Criminology, Philosophical Library, New York, 1949, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup>Johnson, op. cit., p. xiii.

<sup>3</sup>Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, pp. 10-11.

are "subjective" or only perceived.<sup>1</sup> Since motivated behavior is based on perceptions of reality, subjective inequalities are the more directly relevant of the two.

While deprivation may be a source of frustration, an individual or group suffering deprivations--even if actual and perceived--need not be frustrated. It should be apparent from the above definition that only the failure to satisfy expectations about rewards or other end-results produces frustration. A deprivation which is expected and accepted does not lead to frustration. Moreover, a group conditioned to accept deprivations will not be frustrated when it experiences them. Members of a slave class, for example, living in a non-egalitarian society may be taught over a period of time to accept their subservient social position, and they may do so without much sense of deprivation and with few attempts to change their situation. The spread of egalitarian ideas, however, may alter the degree to which relative deprivations are considered acceptable.<sup>2</sup> Carlyle said:

It is not what a man outwardly has or wants that constitutes the happiness or misery of him. Nakedness, hunger, distress of all kinds, death itself have been cheerfully suffered, when the heart was right. It is the feeling of injustice that is insupportable to all men....No man can bear it or ought to bear it.<sup>3</sup>

Runciman echoes the point, noting that feelings of relative deprivation

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., for example, Celia S. Heller, Structured Social Inequality, The Macmillan Company, London, 1969.

<sup>2</sup>Ideas, of course, play a central role in revolution. Crane Brinton wrote, "No ideas, no revolution. This does not mean that ideas cause revolutions, or that the best way to prevent revolutions is to censor ideas. It merely means that ideas form a part of the mutually dependent variables we are studying." The Anatomy of Revolution, rev. ed., Vintage Books, New York, 1952, p. 52.

<sup>3</sup>Thomas Carlyle, "Chartism," Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, vol. 29, in Works, 30 vols., P. F. Collier, New York, 1900, pp. 144-5.

are most frustrating when a perceived condition of personal or group inequality violates norms thought proper or "offends the canons of social justice."<sup>1</sup> It is even arguable that frustration occurs only when such norms are violated.

An important assumption we have made throughout this discussion is that both relative deprivation and frustration, concepts usually applied to the analysis of individual behavior, can be utilized to explain aggregate behavior as well. It is not always true, of course, that what is valid at the individual level is equally valid at the group level. The principles of family financial management, for example, are largely inapplicable to national budget-making. And what is deemed "rational" behavior for an individual seeking to maximize the probability of enhancing his own best interests is frequently irrational when he perceives himself as one of a group of actors, each with the ultimate goal of enhancing the best interests of the collectivity.<sup>2</sup>

However, the social psychological concepts with which we are dealing do not appear to present these difficulties. If an individual can possess a sense of relative deprivation, why should a group of such individuals pose any novel problems of interpretation? And why should group frustration, per se, offer any characteristics dissimilar to those encountered with individual frustration? In their comparative study of political violence, the Feierabends devise the concept of "systemic frustration" which makes the notion of frustration "applicable to the analysis of aggregate, violent political behavior within social systems."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Runciman, loc. cit., p. 251.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, Schocken Books, New York, 1964.

<sup>3</sup>Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, in Graham and Gurr, op. cit., p. 635.

They go on to define the concept of systemic frustration in reference to three important criteria:

(1) As frustration interfering with the attainment and maintenance of social goals, aspirations, and values; (2) as frustration simultaneously experienced by members of social aggregates and hence also complex social systems; and (3) as frustration or strain that is produced within the structures and processes of social systems. Systemic frustration is thus frustration that is experienced simultaneously and collectively within societies.<sup>1</sup>

Although persons individually frustrated (or relatively deprived) may behave differently in groups of like-minded persons, the point made here is that the concept is the same at both levels.

The second component of the theoretical linkage between relative deprivation and separatism--that frustration can generate aggressive political activities--has evoked a great deal of scholarly attention. The fundamental conceptual proposition is that frustration finds an outlet in aggression. The first formal suggestion that such a relationship existed between frustration and aggression came in 1917 when Sigmund Freud noted that "being slighted, neglected, or disappointed" produces mental conflict and a need to express hostility.<sup>2</sup> He later found that frustration of satisfactions "may lead to the development of neurosis" and that "a 'collateral' damming-up of this kind must swell

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," vol. XIV, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, James Strachey (ed. and trans.), 23 vols. to date, The Hogarth Press, London, 1953- . Dollard, et al., op. cit., p. 21, interrupts Freud's writings to imply that "[f]rustration occurred whenever pleasure-seeking or pain-avoiding behavior was blocked; aggression was the 'primordial reaction' to this state of affairs and was thought of as being originally and normally directed toward those persons or objects in the external world which were perceived as the source of the frustration.

the force of the perverse impulses."<sup>1</sup>

In the seminal Yale study, Frustration and Aggression, Dollard and his associates presented the first systemic examination of the proposition that "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression."<sup>2</sup> Aggression was defined in the study as a "sequence of behavior, the goal-response to which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed."<sup>3</sup> It was not clear, however, how physically violent the "injury" had to be. The authors made a distinction between "overt" aggression, "fighting, striking, swearing, and other easily observed actions" and "non-overt" aggression, which is "implicit or partially inhibited."<sup>4</sup> But they failed to explore other non-violent manifestations of aggression. We suggest a more broadly applicable concept of aggression. Since the dividing line between what is violence and what is not violence is so indistinct,<sup>5</sup> it seems advisable to use a concept which includes hostile intentions, aggressive attitudes, and certain forms of political deviation. Since the implicit aim of separatism is to aggress against the integrity of an existing state, this may be properly included in a broadened definition of aggression.

Partly because of the narrow definition of aggression utilized,

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<sup>1</sup>Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York, 1920, p. 272. Caroline E. Playne once described nationalism as a "social neurosis caused by the stress and strain of modern life." (Quoted in Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, p. 96.)

<sup>2</sup>Dollard, et al., op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 7-13.



critics have held the Yale hypothesis to be an overstatement of the case. Even one of the original collaborators admitted two years later that the phrasing of the proposition was "unclear and misleading" and that a better statement was simply that "[f]rustration produces instigations to a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression."<sup>1</sup> As Berkowitz asserts, "practically all present-day observers of human hostility contend that frustrations can produce an instigation to aggression."<sup>2</sup> [Emphasis mine] In addition, however, frustration has been shown to generate resignation and apathy, regression to a less mature behavior pattern, and displaced aggression in the form of hostility, self-aggression, or psychosis.<sup>3</sup> The latter, closely related to non-overt aggression and expressed in similar terms, was dealt with by the Yale group.

But what determines the outcome of frustration? Several writers have made a distinction between primary and secondary human needs, the former relating to physiological functions, the latter to social functions.<sup>4</sup> Deprivation on either dimension will produce frustration,

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<sup>1</sup>Neal E. Miller, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," Psychological Review, XLVIII, 1948, p. 338.

<sup>2</sup>Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 28.

<sup>3</sup>The same frustration may not even cause all of the members of the same group to react in the same way. Cf. G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, and E. M. Jandorf, "Personality and Social Catastrophe," in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (eds.), Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1949. For a discussion of frustration as a cause of regression, cf. Roger G. Barker, Tamara Dembo, and Kurt Lewin, "Frustration and Aggression," in Lawson (ed.), op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Cf., for example, D. M. Levy, "The Hostile Act," Psychological Review, XLVIII, 1941, pp. 356-61, and A. H. Maslow, "Deprivation, Threat, and Frustration," *ibid.*, pp. 364-6.

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but as Mowrer put it, "it is doubtful if any primary drive is ordinarily strong enough to lead, when blocked or denied, to anger and aggression."<sup>1</sup> Aggressive responses derive from frustration only where inter-personal social relationships are involved. Yates, in summing up the experimental findings of others, observes that "aggression is primarily produced by the frustration of secondary drives, not primary drives, and particularly by the frustration of social relationships."<sup>2</sup> Weber's dimensions of social stratification--class, status, and power--fall clearly into this category.

Even so, frustrated secondary drives do not always result in violent responses. For example, political powerlessness, "the feeling of an individual that his political action has no influence in determining the course of political events," has been shown to produce political alienation and non-voting.<sup>3</sup> In his theoretical article discussing the psychological components of strife, Gurr speculates little on the possible non-violent outcomes of frustration. His concern is primarily with violent aggression but he avoids the problem of linking frustration only to violent aggression by observing curtly "that frustration is all but universally characteristic of participants in civil strife."<sup>4</sup> It may be inferred from his writings, however, that two general factors determine the form of frustration responses. Since the response variable is

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<sup>1</sup>Mowrer, op. cit., p. 178.

<sup>2</sup>Aubrey J. Yates, Frustration and Conflict, Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, 1962, p. 111.

<sup>3</sup>Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, 1960, p. 62.

<sup>4</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics, XX, January, 1968, p. 250.

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assumed to be continuous and since, other factors being equal, it varies in direct proportion to the strength of the frustration, a weakly felt frustration will produce a non-violent response. A second factor presupposes that aggression is learned behavior. Past aggressions may serve as examples; the absence of such examples may encourage non-violent responses.

The way aggression is manifested depends most directly on the scope and intensity of the frustration. The horizontal scope, i.e., the number of simultaneous frustrations, will affect the goal of aggression. A national group frustrated by only a few deprivations may seek merely to redress these grievances within the existing system. A group suffering a moderately wide range of frustrations may seek a more general redress in the form of increased autonomy. And finally, a national group frustrated on many fronts might be expected to seek independence. The intensity of frustration, on the other hand, will affect the tactics used to achieve these goals. Weakly felt frustration may result in generally non-violent (and probably unorganized) mass protest or in non-violent elite efforts. Frustrations moderately felt may be expressed through support for non-system political parties, while intensely felt frustrations might produce violence. In presenting this generalized continuum of aggression--an extension of Gurr's hierarchies of civil violence<sup>1</sup>--we do not intend to suggest that its levels are pure or mutually exclusive. In fact we would not expect them to be since frustrations are always felt with differing intensities by different people. But the continuum does present a suggested sequence of escalation when frustrations increase in intensity. Doob supports this idea. Beginning with the disclaimer that

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pp. 10-11.

aggressiveness "need not inevitably give rise to nationalism," he asserts that

the amount of aggression to be displaced through nationalism or some other institution depends in part upon the severity of the frustration. If people's basic problems are reasonably well resolved and, moreover, resolved from their standpoint, they are less likely to turn to any scapegoat.<sup>1</sup>

Certain intervening variables may, however, mitigate the effects of frustration. First, the anticipation of punishment or failure will inhibit aggression. As Dollard, et al., state, "the strength of inhibition of any act of aggression varies positively with the amount of punishment anticipated to be a consequence of that act."<sup>2</sup> When such an inhibition is stronger than the instigation to aggression, aggression, as defined by Dollard and his associates, does not occur.<sup>3</sup> However, frustration does not simply disappear when there is a threat of punishment or failure. Rather, there is a readjustment of the goals and tactics of the aggressive response. The expectation that national secession would meet with failure, for example, would presumably tend to force a less extreme goal for a frustrated national group. The expectation that the use of violent tactics would be severely punished might encourage the adoption of a more peaceful approach.

More severe inhibition of aggression might be expected to push the response pattern into the bottom-most categories of aggression, into the region of hostile attitudes, self-aggression, or psychosis. The Yale group claimed that "[t]here should be a strong tendency for inhibited aggression to be displaced" from the object causing the frustration to

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<sup>1</sup>Leonard Doob, op. cit., p. 264.

<sup>2</sup>Dollard, et al., op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-7.

some available substitute.<sup>1</sup> Freud had earlier noticed that "there are very many ways by which it is possible to endure lack of libidinal satisfaction without falling ill." One "powerful counter-effect to the effect of a frustration" is a person's "capacity for displacement" and his "readiness to accept surrogates."<sup>2</sup> With reference to a frustrated national group this means that inhibitions to separate from the current state structure may bring about various forms of non-overt or self-directed aggression, like high crime or alcoholism rates.<sup>3</sup>

The effects of frustration may also be mitigated by a high level of gratification. Frustrations may decline in salience if an individual has significant advantages over those in other groups. This general point was illustrated by Dollard, et al.:

To reason from economic statistics that one country is more or less frustrated than another may be correct, but only in respect to the particular frustration which conceivably may result from the conditions giving rise to those statistics. Since all frustrations occur within individuals, no one frustration can be singled out nor from it can one deduce that aggressive behavior inevitably will increase or decrease. Italians may have less Chianti, but the Italian flag now floats over most of Ethiopia. Germans may have to deprive themselves of meat and fruits, but Vienna and Sudetenland are now part of the Reich. Russians occasionally still have to stand in queues even for basic commodities, but their country now manufactures articles that formerly had to be imported. Let no man say, with our present information, that a pudding is necessarily more or less gratifying than a pageant.<sup>4</sup>

A third factor which might influence the effects of frustration is the high level of institutionalization in society. Huntington has

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>Freud, A General Introduction..., p. 302.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Dollard, et al., loc. cit., chap. vi.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

defined institutionalization as the "process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."<sup>1</sup> Its level is determined by the average degree of organizational adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence in a society. The general effect of a high level of institutionalization is to mitigate frustration and abate overt aggression. Huntington suggests that stability in developing countries is a function of changing levels of institutionalization and modernization. If the pace of institutionalization, or the development of effective systems of social authority, keeps up with the pace of social mobilization and economic development, the likelihood of stability is increased. If a gap develops between the two, however, the chances for stability decline.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Kornhauser has shown how a flourishing structure of independent groups in a society can preclude the development of "mass society." When such an associational structure is absent, non-elites are available for manipulation and mobilization by mass-oriented elites.<sup>3</sup>

But the real effect of institutionalization may be to alter the tactics frustrated groups utilize in expressing their aggression. A structure of groups may facilitate peaceful change by allowing an acceptably low form of aggression to be expressed within the system. Gurr has called this "institutionalized displacement" since "participation in political activity, labor unions, and millenarian religious movements can be a response to relative deprivation which permits more

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 53-9.

<sup>3</sup>William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, The Free Press, New York, 1959, pp. 60-73.



or less non-violent expression of aggression."<sup>1</sup>

It is possible, however, for institutionalization to have the opposite effect of facilitating the expression of overt aggression. Gurr points out that "one can distinguish at least three modes by which groups affect individuals' disposition to violence: (1) by providing normative support, (2) by providing apparent protection from retribution, and (3) by providing cues for violent behavior."<sup>2</sup> Under the first point he emphasized that people are more likely to express hostility in cohesive groups than they are individually. This is because such expressions of hostility tend to be mutually reinforcing. Second, groups can mitigate punishment for aggression by providing a shield of anonymity for participants, by amassing a force capable of repelling retributive actions, or by providing highly visible leaders who can take on responsibility for illicit violence. Finally, groups may provide "a congruent image or model of violent action" which will encourage or permit men to "seize cobblestones or rope or rifles to do violence to fellow citizens."<sup>3</sup> Past involvement of the group in aggressive activities will tend to produce such images.

#### Support for the Proposition

Several writers have described nationalism in terms similar to those we have been using. Snyder has noted, for example, that "[n]ationalism is in part a psychological response to grave threats of insecurity." A national group sensing itself endangered, cut off, or deprived will

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<sup>1</sup>Gurr, "Psychological Factors...", pp. 268-9.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 274.



develop feelings of inferiority and anxiety. One response to such feelings is to exaggerate the superiority of one's own power, unity, "art, language, literature, climate, political virtue, even cooking." Boastful chauvinism, Snyder asserts, is characteristic of all forms of nationalism.<sup>1</sup>

Lasswell has observed that "the demand to be emancipated from an inferior status is one component" of recent nationalist movements. The nationalistic pattern, he says, "began to appear where disunited groups which possessed traditions of culture and political unity came to believe that they were discriminated against in politics, business, language, worship, and education." Like Snyder, Lasswell refers to the "insecurities of the community" around which demands for emancipation developed.<sup>2</sup>

The emphasis on oppression or discrimination as a moving force behind nationalism is a common theme in the literature. Hayes introduced the notion that any nationality which is not politically independent is styled "oppressed" or "subject" or even "enslaved."<sup>3</sup> More recently, Minogue has written that "nationalists feel themselves oppressed." They form a "political movement depending on a feeling of collective grievance against foreigners."<sup>4</sup> Minogue stresses the centrality of collective or national group grievance. Reference group theory provides an appropriate framework within which to view such a collective grievance inasmuch as the national group can be an important normative reference group.

Social psychologists have noted that oppression, or more accurately

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<sup>1</sup>Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, p. 97. Cf. also p. 108. Cf. also Doob, op. cit., chap. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, The Free Press, New York, 1935, 1965, p. 73.

<sup>3</sup>Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Minogue, op. cit., p. 25.



the frustration to which it leads, stimulates people to maintain identities in non-conforming groups such as minority nationalities in multinational states.<sup>1</sup> From a study of overseas Chinese nationalism, Williams finds support for this notion, asserting that "under pressure, real or imagined, a minority may feel threatened and seek security by further isolating itself from those who are outside its system of social communication."<sup>2</sup> The degree of isolation sought will depend on the strength of the group and the seriousness of the threat. Another theorist holds that nationalism can be explained in part as "a reaction to a denial or threat." Such reactions involve feelings of national group inferiority and frustration which encourage various forms of aggression against out-groups.<sup>3</sup> Although this theory is offered to explain offensive nationalism, the terms of its propositions are conceptually close to those we suggested for defensive separatism.

Using an equilibrium model similar to that adopted by Gurr, Deutsch and his associates have suggested that political disintegration results from the failure of the central government to respond to various kinds of demands for change. The success or failure of integration depends on "the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate of claims and burdens upon central governments as against the growing... level of capabilities of the governmental institutions of the amalgamated

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Newcomb, Turner, and Converse, op. cit., p. 415.

<sup>2</sup>Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916, The Free Press, New York, 1960, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus, Bd. I: Psychologie und Geschichte, Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964, p. 27-32.

political community."<sup>1</sup> Political disintegration results either from increasing the burdens on a political system (by increasing social differentiation or the level of political participation, for example) or from declining system capabilities (e.g. economic stagnation or a delay in expected reforms. Frustration is implied as a stage preceding the observed result.

There is also support in the literature for the notion that the activities of separatist political parties--the second manifestation of separatism we noted in Scotland--derives from frustration. Several researchers have found that voting for extremist parties is correlated with discontent. Lipset reports an "inverse relationship between national economic development as reflected by per capita income and the strength of Communists and other extremist groups among Western nations."<sup>2</sup> Kornhauser finds a similar relationship between per capita income in 1949 and the electoral strength of the Communists in sixteen Western democracies. The rank order correlation between the two variables was -.93.<sup>3</sup>

#### Separatism and Social Mobility

A second theoretical framework within which we propose to examine separatism in Scotland relates to the concept of social mobility. Although the conceptualization of social mobility differs significantly from that of relative deprivation, the hypothesized mechanism which presumably links each to separatism is so similar in both cases that one

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<sup>1</sup>Deutsch, et al., op. cit., p. 42. Cf. also pp. 59-65.

<sup>2</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1963, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup>Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 160.

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seems justified in treating these independent variables together. In the sections above we discussed the theoretical linkage between perceived relative deprivation, systemic frustration, and separatism. While the first hypothesis was couched in terms of the psychological prerequisites of participation in strife activities, the social mobility hypothesis bypasses the frustration-aggression linkage, focussing rather on the a priori inter-relation of groups. But in both cases dissatisfaction is assumed to antecede separatism.

The concept of social mobility derives from the sociological literature dealing with social stratification. Social hierarchies involving dimensions such as class, status, and power, structure society and determine the condition and circumstances of men's lives. When people change their location on these hierarchies, they are said to be socially mobile. The term itself is defined by Lipset and Bendix as "the process by which individuals move from one position to another in society--positions which by general consent have been given specific hierarchial values." Moreover, such movement can carry individuals "to positions either higher or lower in the social system."<sup>1</sup> When an individual increases his wealth or status, when he acquires additional political power or a more prestigious occupation, he is "upward mobile." When an individual loses wealth, status, or political power, or when he acquires a less prestigious occupation, he is "downward mobile." A complex and socially dynamic society will include individuals of both types.

Social mobility is frequently measured inter-generationally,

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<sup>1</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959, pp. 1-2.





comparing the social standing of an individual with that of his parents.<sup>1</sup> Alternatively, movement can be measured intra-generationally, comparing the social position of an individual at one point in time with that at a later date. Although there is justification for using either as a measure of social mobility, we use intra-generational mobility in this study. We are interested in the behavioral consequences of mobility and it seems reasonable that movement up or down the social scale within the span of an individual's adulthood may be more intensely perceived (and be more likely to have significant behavioral consequences) than movement compared to one's parents' position.

Mobility may take place in a society when there is an increase in the number of high or low statuses, or when there is sufficient social upheaval to cause an interchange of ranks among individuals.<sup>2</sup> Economic expansion, for example, may create new industries and carry upward a new class of entrepreneurs, while economic depression may wipe out businesses and cripple occupations, creating widespread unemployment and enlarging the group of persons occupying the lowest statuses in a society. Less frequently, a society may be torn by political revolution which thrusts to the top a new elite which subsequently is afforded the power and prestige once enjoyed by the deposed. But an interchange of ranks need not occur only in a revolutionary society. In fact such an interchange on an individual level is a common characteristic of complex societies.

A third way mobility may occur in a society is through the

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. William J. Goode, "Family and Mobility," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, and Power, Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective, 2d ed., The Free Press, New York, 1966, pp. 582-601.

<sup>2</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility," in *ibid.*, p. 565.

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motivation of individuals. The desire to improve one's condition or that of one's group or the desire to avoid a decline in position may motivate one to pursue higher goals. Veblen illustrates this with respect to consumption:

...[I]t is extremely gratifying to possess something more than others. But as fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater satisfaction than the earlier standard did. The tendency in any case is constantly to make the present pecuniary standard the point of departure for a fresh increase of wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new standard of sufficiency....<sup>1</sup>

One notable aspect of motivational mobility is that it does not require an external catalyst such as economic or political change. Even a relatively static society might exhibit this sort of mobility.

The consequences of social mobility are diverse and depend on such variables as the extent of mobility, the number of people affected by mobility (and the extent to which those people form a cohesive group), and the cultural context within which movement occurs. One common effect of social mobility results from the independence of status hierarchies. An individual or group acquiring additional wealth, for example, might not move upward on parallel scales of political power, or prestige. These "status discrepancies" are explained by Lipset and Bendix:

Every society may be thought of as comprising a number of separate hierarchies--e.g., social, economic, educational, ethnic, etc.--each of which has its own status structure, its own conditions for the attainment of a position of prestige within that structure. There are likely to be a number of discrepancies among the positions in the different hierarchies that every person occupies simultaneously, for, as George Simmel pointed out, every person maintains a unique pattern of group affiliations. Mobility merely adds

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<sup>1</sup>Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 565.

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to these discrepancies by creating or accentuating combinations of a high position in one rank and a low one in another; for example, a high position in an occupation combined with a low ethnic status, or a high position in the social-class hierarchy (based on the status of people with whom one associates) combined with a low income.<sup>1</sup>

Although such status discrepancies do not always accompany mobility, the consequences of discrepancies are in many ways analogous to the effects of frustration described earlier in this chapter. Turner has suggested that the personality effects may include stress or tension, a complication of interpersonal relations, and a general disruption in an individual's personal value system.<sup>2</sup> Each of these contributes to personal insecurity and complicates the prediction of a person's behavior patterns. This anomic situation, in which individuals have difficulty in reacting to divergent norms, may produce extreme or unusual behavior patterns. Durkheim, for example, linked both upward and downward mobility to increased suicide rates.<sup>3</sup> Other studies have suggested a relationship between mental illness and upward mobility.<sup>4</sup>

But more interesting and more directly related to our concerns are the political behavior patterns suggested as correlates of mobility and status discrepancies. Some studies have found that ethnic prejudice is related to mobility. Hofstadter has summarized:

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<sup>1</sup>Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>2</sup>Ralph H. Turner, "Modes of Social Ascent Through Education, Sponsored and Contest Mobility," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., p. 457.

<sup>3</sup>Emile Durkheim, Suicide, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1951, p. 246-55. Noted in Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. A. B. Hollingshead, R. Ellis, and E. Kirby, "Social Mobility and Mental Illness," American Sociological Review, XIX, 1954, pp. 577-84 and A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, "Schizophrenia and Social Structure," American Journal of Psychiatry, CX, 1954, pp. 695-701. Noted in Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 65.

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Persons moving downward, and even upward under many circumstances, in the social scale tend to show greater prejudice against such ethnic minorities as the Jews and Negroes than commonly prevails in the social strata they have left or are entering.<sup>1</sup>

Greenblum and Pearlin found that both upward and downward mobility were related to increased prejudice.<sup>2</sup> Bettelheim and Janowitz found downward but not upward mobility related to prejudice.<sup>3</sup> But other studies have failed to uncover such relationships, leaving the issue in some doubt.<sup>4</sup>

Political extremism, a variable closely related to ethnic prejudice, has also been linked frequently to social mobility. Wolfinger and his associates have suggested that many upward mobile Americans need to "affirm their patriotism and new middle class status by supporting the radical right."<sup>5</sup> Lipset and Bendix assert that status discrepancies

predispose individuals and groups to accept extremist political views. Thus, the French bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century developed its revolutionary zeal when it was denied recognition and social prestige by the old French aristocracy: wealth had not proved to be a gateway to high status and power, and the mounting resentment over this fed the fires of political radicalism. Almost the reverse of this process seems to have occurred in Germany during the late nineteenth century: there the Prussian Junkers maintained their monopolistic hold on the army and the bureaucracy while the middle-class leaders of German

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<sup>1</sup>Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right, Anchor Books, New York, 1963, p. 91.

<sup>2</sup>Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., 1st ed., pp. 480-91.

<sup>3</sup>Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, "Ethnic Tolerance: A Function of Personal and Social Control," American Journal of Sociology, IV, 1949, pp. 137-45.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Martin A. Trow, "Right-wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1957, pp. 110 f. Noted in Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 71; and Melvin M. Tumin, "Readiness and Resistance to Desegregation: A Social Portrait of the Hard Core," Social Forces, XXXVI, 1958, p. 261.

<sup>5</sup>Raymond Wolfinger, et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964, p. 278.





industry bought land in order to acquire aristocratic titles and have access to positions at court and in the government. As Max Weber observed at the time, no one was as vociferous in his patriotism and as reactionary in his politics as the man of business who had acquired a title through letters-patent and who wanted to make people forget his bourgeois origin. Political radicalization may also occur among social groups whose social and economic position is in jeopardy. Franz Neumann has suggested that in a number of European countries the middle class turned towards the extreme political right because they felt threatened by downward mobility.... Thus, political radicalism may occur because the status of social groups is imperiled, as well as because the aspirations of ascending social groups exceed their actual status in the society.<sup>1</sup>

And some have suggested that more moderate reform movements might be viewed profitably in terms of discrepancies brought about by social mobility. Hofstadter argues, for example, that early twentieth century American progressivism derives largely from the stress of a "status revolution" which took place in the post-Civil War period. Members of the old middle-class, the Mugwump type, turned to progressivism

not because of economic deprivations but primarily because they were victims of an upheaval in status that took place in the United States during the closing decades of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century. Progressivism, in short, was to a very considerable extent led by men who suffered from the events of their time not through a shrinkage in their means but through the<sub>2</sub> changed pattern in the distribution of deference and power.

#### Support for the Proposition

Although many of these examples suggest that there might be a linkage between social mobility and nationalism, additional evidence is even more convincing. In positing a relationship between rapid economic

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<sup>1</sup>Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., pp. 268-9. Cf. also Lipset and Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., pp. 570-3.

<sup>2</sup>Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, From Bryan to F.D.R., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1961, p. 135.

development and political instability, Olson notes that a swiftly expanding economy means that some people gain a lot and others lose a lot, weakening the bonds of class and caste. It also means that

[s]ome rise above the circumstances of their birth and others fall behind. Both groups are normally *déclassé*. Their economic status keeps them from belonging to the caste or class into which their income bracket would put them.

He stresses that "[b]oth the gainers and the losers from economic growth can be destabilizing forces" since "both will be imperfectly adjusted to the existing order."<sup>2</sup> Although these circumstances are most likely to occur when an economy is changing rapidly, Olson asserts that they can take place even when an economy is nearly stagnant. The important point is that revolutionary or separatist activity may be traced to "those whose place in the social order is changing."<sup>3</sup>

Gellner, in developing his own model for nationalism, ascribes the phenomenon to the uneven distribution of the modernizing effects of industrialism. The uneven impact of this modernizing wave, he says,

generates a sharp social stratification which unlike the stratification of past societies, is (a) unhallowed by custom, and which has little to cause it to be accepted as in the nature of things, which (b) is not well protected by various social mechanisms, but on the contrary exists in a situation providing maximum opportunities and incentives for revolution, and which (c) is remediable, and is seen to be remediable, by "national" secession.<sup>4</sup>

When reinforced by other distinguishing characteristics which differentiate a region and its people from the rest of a country, regional

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<sup>1</sup>Mancur Olson Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," James C. Davies (ed.), When Men Revolt and Why, A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution, The Free Press, New York, 1971, p. 217.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Gellner, op. cit., p. 166.

economic underdevelopment leads naturally, according to Gellner to separatism. New social and political hierarchies are created by the altered economic relationships, giving rise to new grievances on all three of Weber's dimensions of social inequality. Because these new hierarchies are "unhallowed by custom," they offend those suddenly thrust to the bottom, and in so many words, violate their sense of justice.

Rokkan suggests that strife--and separatism in particular--may result from the political mobilization of a state's periphery. "Territorial oppositions set limits to the process of nation-building; pushed to their extreme they lead to war, secession, possibly even population transfers."<sup>1</sup> Defining mobilization as "a process bringing about a steady increase in the proportion of the territorial population standing in direct, unmediated communication with the central authorities,"<sup>2</sup> Rokkan shows that the mobilization of a territorial opposition can have effects varying from wars of secession to "intractable heritages of territorial-cultural conflict."<sup>3</sup> This pattern is analogous to Gurr's model of aspirational deprivation discussed earlier since it is likely to be characterized by rising expectations and stable capabilities.

In an attempt to explain the high incidence of political disorder in developing nations, Huntington has outlined a hypothesis which helps to link Gellner's and Rokkan's ideas to those expressed by Gurr. Huntington suggests that the discrepancy between two forms of change--social mobilization and economic development--

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<sup>1</sup>Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development, David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1970, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 101-2.

furnishes some measure of the impact of modernization on political stability. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants. The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between aspirations and expectations, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations function and the level-of-living function. This generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.<sup>1</sup>

Since societies undergoing rapid change are most likely to experience the discrepancy between social mobilization and economic development, it is no surprise that transitional countries tend to be more unstable than any other.<sup>2</sup> However, this "gap hypothesis" is equally applicable to highly developed societies. If social mobilization preceded economic development, or if an economic decline occurs in an already socially mobilized society, status discrepancies emerge, frustration results, and the probability for instability increase. As Huntington and Gurr have pointed out, modern societies are more likely than traditional societies to possess the means for accommodating discrepancies before they lead to instability--they usually have a higher level of institutionalization, for example--and this is a second reason why transitional societies are more violence-prone.

In later chapters we shall examine the applicability of these two theoretical frameworks to nationalism in Scotland. Chapters Five and Seven focus on the relative deprivation hypothesis, while Chapter Eight

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<sup>1</sup>Huntington, op. cit , pp 53-4.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, in Graham and Gurr (eds.), op. cit., pp. 653-68.

examines the social mobility hypothesis. But first we turn to Scottish nationalism itself. How did it develop, what forms has it taken, who are its leaders? The next two chapters focus on these issues.

### CHAPTER III

#### NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND: THE HISTORICAL MATRIX

I canna feel it has to dae wi' me  
Mair than a composite diagram o'  
Cross-sections o' my forebears' organs.

...like bindweek through my clay it's run  
And a' my folks'--it's queer to see't unroll.  
My ain soul looks me in the face, as 'twere,  
And mair than my ain soul--my nation's soul!

The Scots have always been preoccupied and vexed with the English.<sup>1</sup> Ever since Scotland could justly be called a nation (and perhaps even before), the peoples who populated the northern end of Britain could be found spending much of their time defending themselves from the political and military threat posed by peoples occupying the southern end. England remained a significant threat to Scotland's sovereignty into the eighteenth century when the two nations formally merged. But this merger, effectuated by the Act of Union in 1707, merely transformed what had been a problem of external security into one of defining an internal role for Scotland. It is around this dilemma that most of the nationalist debate in Scotland now revolves.

But this problem, so apparent in the thought and writings of influential Scots, scarcely grazes the consciousness of most Englishmen. The vagaries of intra-Union relationships, the quandry of establishing a

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<sup>1</sup>This theme is examined in Wallace Notestein, The Scot in History: A Study of the Interplay of Character and History, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947, chap. XXIX.





viable national group role within the United Kingdom, is of little or no concern to the majority of the English.<sup>1</sup> To most south of the border, "England" is synonymous with "Britain", and the supreme law of the United Kingdom is referred to as the "English Constitution". It may or may not be all right for the Scots or the Welsh to establish their own parliament to deal with local affairs, but it is unthinkable for many Englishmen to consider a parallel institution for England. To many, the Westminster Parliament is the English parliament.

Like many other nations which have undergone fundamental constitutional change, Scotland has experienced a protracted internal struggle to square old perspectives with new realities. The incomplete integration of Scotland and England has left a residue of the past on the face of Scotland's contemporary consciousness. And since the image of Scotland's present is far less satisfying to many Scots than the image of her past, frequently bitter debates have raged over the question of Scotland's proper national role.

The story of nationalism in Scotland is interesting in its own right. But we trace the outlines of this history in this chapter for two reasons which relate to this study of Scottish nationalism. First, a skeletal chronology serves a useful "stage-setting" function. Because the present derives generally from the past, it is important to have a clear grasp of what has gone before. Although we can provide only the barest essentials of this history here, the works cited in this chapter

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<sup>1</sup>An examination of the memoirs of Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and Harold Wilson, to name three examples of contemporary British politicians who ought to be aware of national group tensions, reveals no awareness of Scottish nationalism beyond the occasional mention of nationalist candidates in by-elections.

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can flesh out the story to the fullest.<sup>1</sup> And second, we relate this story to clarify the depth of Scotland's identity problem. The changing circumstances within which Scotland struggles for national survival have necessitated an on-going redefinition of national identity. We hope to gain some insight into this recurrent crisis.

Nations which undergo fundamental readjustments of sovereignty generally possess variegated histories of nationalism since each shift in the legal status of the nation will alter the character of demands made on its behalf. The process of nation-building--entailing a shift of loyalties from one entity to another--involves such a basic readjustment. Further alterations check and enliven the quality of patriotic and nationalist movements.

Scotland has experienced two such significant modifications in her sovereign status: national unification, culminating in the eleventh century, and the union with England and Wales, occurring at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Attempts to alter the status quo thus established have constituted the nationalist movement in Scotland for the past 250 years. But the two changes in sovereignty (particularly the second) remain the starting point for any analysis of nationalism in Scotland.

Widely separated in time and in surface details, the two events share several characteristics. First, both changes enlarged the size of the formal political community. The first created the nation of Scotland from a relatively heterogeneous cluster of peoples with diverse backgrounds and customs while the second formally joined that nation with England. Second, both changes resulted from outside political pressures

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<sup>1</sup>The two most useful histories of Scottish nationalism are Coupland, op. cit., and, a more recent account, Hanham, op. cit.



as well as internal integrative trends. A unified Scotland could better resist military threats from Scandinavia and England; a unified Great Britain could better deal with the economic and political challenge of France. Third, the changes were each gradual, the first lasting nearly five centuries, the second spanning one century. Finally, while each was punctuated with violence, the two changes were not effectuated in the main by violence. These latter two characteristics are important deviations from the patterns found in twentieth century nationalist movements in Africa and Asia.<sup>1</sup>

These two modifications of sovereignty were both cause and effect of changed attitudes. For example, the uniting of the Picts, the Scots, the Britons, and the Angles, a process whose culmination was reached when King Duncan ascended to an all-Scotland throne in 1034, could not have been possible without an evolving sense of interdependence and like-mindedness among the four peoples. This was partly due to the functional exigencies of external defense, but also to the increased inter-communication brought about by the spread of Christianity and the growing compatibility of customs and habits.<sup>2</sup> According to Wilson, "nation-building is the social process or processes by which national consciousness appears in certain groups and which, through a more or less institutionalized social structure, act to attain political autonomy for their society."<sup>3</sup> This process of institutionalization in early Scotland provided for the first time a common focus for the four peoples. A single

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. David A. Wilson, "Nation-Building and Revolutionary War," in Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup>J. D. Mackie, A History of Scotland, Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1964, pp. 33-41.

<sup>3</sup>Wilson, in Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit., p. 84.



elite, a single set of symbols, a unified governmental structure, all served to accelerate the rate of attitude change and to further mold the self-identity or "national consciousness" of the nascent Scottish nation.

### Early Nationalism in Scotland

Before discussing the Act of Union as the second--and in the Scottish context the more important--modification of national sovereignty, we need to understand the events surrounding the early development of nationalism in Scotland. For although the circumstances of nationalism have changed since the earliest days, the symbols and the fundamental problem of dealing with a powerful England have not.

As Hanham has noted, "Scottish nationalism is as old as the Scottish nation."<sup>1</sup> But early patriotism, according to Notestein,

was not rooted in reverence for old institutions, nor was it love for Caledonia stern and wild. It was as yet little more than a passionate dislike of intruding enemies and devotion to warriors who had fought against them. It was not yet emotion sublimated into something higher.<sup>2</sup>

The expression of patriotic allegiance to the nation, in song and deed, can be traced back to the beginnings of Scottish national consciousness.<sup>3</sup> The early peak of this expression, however, occurred in the first part of the fourteenth century during the Scottish wars of independence. Edward the First of England, having failed to win control of Scotland first through a royal marriage and then through his intercession in the selection of a new Scottish monarch, turned to military means to extend English hegemony over the whole of the British Isles. He defeated the

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<sup>1</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>2</sup>Notestein, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. M. P. Ramsay, The Freedom of the Scots from Early Times till its Eclipse in 1707: Displayed in Statements of Our Forefathers Who Loved and Served Scotland, United Scotland, Edinburgh, 1945.

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Scots in 1296 and declared himself King of Scotland. But the Scots resisted English rule and support grew for the rebel leader, William Wallace. Wallace enjoyed widespread support among both common people and the nobility. But the ensuing armed struggles ended in Wallace's defeat and death in 1305, whereupon Robert Bruce took up the standard of Scottish nationalism. Bruce was extremely popular and a claimant to the Scottish throne. At the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314 Bruce won a decisive victory over the English. Although conflicts continued after this, Bannockburn assured Scottish independence for the next three centuries and continues to serve as a focal point for the Scottish spirit of independence.

These events inspired the patriotic imagination of Scots. Poets John Barbour and Blind Harry produced works which apotheosized Bruce and Wallace, placing them highest in the pantheon of Scots heroes. But earlier, in 1320, the Declaration of Arbroath became the first and most important document of Scottish nationalism. Urging the Pope to recognize Scottish independence, it read in part,

...so long as an hundred remain alive we are minded never a whit to bow beneath the yoke of English dominion. It is not for glory, riches or honours that we fight: it is for liberty alone, the liberty which no good man relinquishes but with his life.<sup>1</sup>

Over the next three hundred years Scottish independence was intermittently threatened by England. In 1513 at the Battle of Flodden Field the English inflicted a serious blow to the Scots by defeating them on the battlefield and killing their king. But the long-standing alliance between Scotland and France preserved Scottish independence for at least another century.

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 66.

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It is ironic that the Scots lost their national autonomy through a gradual process which began when their king fell heir to the English throne. Shortly after James VI of Scotland assumed the title James I of England in 1603, he asserted his desire to effect the union of the two nations. In his first speech to the English Parliament he expressed his hope that

...no man will be so unreasonable as to think that I am a Christian King under the Gospel should be a polygamist and husband to two wives; that I being the Head should have a divided and monstrous Body.<sup>1</sup>

And James did achieve a modicum of unity between the two countries. A common nationality was proclaimed, a common flag was devised--whose name, the "Union Jack," honored the integrationist king, and there was increased communication and trade between Scotland and England. But the repeal of the Border Laws between the two countries was the only significant legislative achievement during James' reign. The door to increased unification had been cracked, but the formal Union of Parliaments was not to occur until the next century.

#### The Act of Union

After 1690, the Scottish Parliament enjoyed a brief period of substantial freedom from monarchial control. The crown had declined as a symbol of unity and the long-standing differences between England and Scotland, in commerce, religion, and Jacobitism, reasserted their polarizing influence. The Scots were eager to reassert their independence, but in 1700 King William expressed his intention to find "some happy expedient for making England and Scotland one people." In 1703 the Scottish Parliament passed three acts which went against the hopes of

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Mackie, op. cit., p. 191.

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William and his successor, Anne. The "Wine Act" declared Scotland's commercial independence, the "Act anent Peace and War" was meant to preserve an autonomous foreign policy, and the "Act of Security" threatened the total dissolution of the Union unless political, religious, and commercial freedoms were guaranteed by England.

Piqued by the audacity of the Scottish Parliament, the English chamber retaliated with the "Alien Act" which would have deprived Scots of the rights of natural-born Englishmen and penalized their commerce unless they agreed to Union under a Protestant monarch. The Act also empowered the monarch to appoint a commission to negotiate a permanent union. The commission met, drafted Articles of Union, and presented them to the two parliaments. In 1707, resolving their differences in the interests of commercial harmony, the two parliaments ratified the Act of Union.<sup>1</sup>

The main provisions of the Act were (1) "the two kingdoms of England and Scotland shall...be united into one kingdom by the name of Great Britain," with a common flag, a common great seal, and a common coinage; (2) "the united kingdom of Great Britain [shall] be represented by one and the same parliament" in which the Scots are to send 16 peers to join the 190 Englishmen in the House of Lords and 45 commoners to join the 513 English M.P.s in the Commons; (3) the royal succession shall be vested in the House of Hanover, with "all papists...excluded from and forever incapable to inherit, possess, or enjoy the imperial crown"; (4) all subjects of Great Britain shall have full freedom of trade and navigation, and "the same allowances, encouragements, and drawbacks," and the same "customs and duties on import and export"; and (5) all "courts now in being

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. George S. Pryde, Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., London, 1962, pp. 51-2; and P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1909, vol. II, pp. 89-125.

within the kingdom of Scotland do remain," free from any appeal to any English court.<sup>1</sup> A separate act was passed to guarantee the protestant religion and Presbyterian church government in Scotland.

The objectives of those backing the Union were mixed. Whether or not it was "primarily an anti-papalist coalition,"<sup>2</sup> one of its aims was to guarantee that Catholics would never return to the throne of Scotland (and now of England).<sup>3</sup> And since it was assumed that "prosperity could be attained by one country only at the expense of another,"<sup>4</sup> commercial interests wanted to see an Anglo-Scottish common market.<sup>5</sup> The "emulation of English ways and achievements" was thought by many to offer an alternative to Scotland's economic stagnation.<sup>6</sup> These and other objectives were not universally shared, but they do stand out as significant motivations for different groups.

Like all great settlements, the Act of Union was a compromise. Scotland gave up her parliament and sacrificed any notions she might have had about a federal kingdom. In return she received military security

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<sup>1</sup>The bulk of the Act of Union is reprinted in Stephen B. Baxter (ed.), Basic Documents of English History, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1968, pp. 168-72.

<sup>2</sup>Douglas Young, "A Sketch History of Scottish Nationalism," in Neil MacCormick (ed.), The Scottish Debate: Essays on Scottish Nationalism, Oxford University Press, London, 1970, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Robert Rait and George S. Pryde, Scotland, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 1934, pp. 74-5.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>5</sup>Hume Brown suggests that "the nation was ripe for a larger scope than was possible under existing conditions. The initiative, the enterprise, the intelligence were there in large degree; and only the opportunity was needed for her to take her place and hold her own in the rivalry of nations." [Op. cit., p. 72.]

<sup>6</sup>R. H. Campbell, Scotland Since 1707: The Rise of an Industrial Society, Barnes and Noble, Inc., New York, 1965, pp. 3-5.

and broadened economic opportunities. England gave up her exclusiveness and her desires for a completely Anglicized Scotland. In return she received a strengthened position vis-a-vis France and a guarantee for the Hanoverian succession. Despite the unitary form of government created by the Act of Union, each country retained its distinctiveness. The religious and legal systems of both countries were maintained, thus preserving significant institutional symbols of separateness.

And yet, the Act was met with a great deal of trepidation in Scotland.<sup>1</sup> England was still remembered as a frequent enemy and the excesses of Edward I were particularly fresh in the memories of many Scots. Many thought the Act meant not a co-equal partnership with England, but a sell-out to England. And this attitude was fueled from England itself. Even today English historians can write of the Act of Union that

henceforward Scotland was to be represented both in the English House of Lords and House of Commons, and Scottish members were given the right to vote on all questions whether domestic or not.<sup>2</sup> [My emphasis]

If many prominent Englishmen failed to pay even lip-service to the notion of co-equal partnership, it is not surprising that Scots have long been suspicious of the Act of Union and of the relationship it established.

It is interesting to note the differing perspectives from which the Act was viewed in Scotland and England. For the Scots, the Act was clearly of momentous importance. It necessitated a fundamental reconsideration of the role Scotland was to play in the world. It was clear that Scotland could no longer challenge England's economic and strategic

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well <sup>1</sup>There was organized opposition (cf. Brown, op. cit., pp. 118-22) as well as the spontaneous acts of street mobs (cf. infra, chap. V, p. 176).

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in Mackie, op. cit., p. 262.

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hegemony. Scottish commercial leaders became convinced that the revitalization of Scotland's economy required political as well as economic union with England. But this process involved a major shift of focus. Before 1707 the relevant universe of national activity was the international system, but after the Act of Union new limits were imposed on Scotland. It was almost as if a new barrier was built, with London its keystone, further isolating Scotland from the rest of the world.

But for the English, the Act represented merely a kind of house-keeping function. It removed annoying mercantile and political barriers and improved trade relations between Scotland and England. But while it involved a major constitutional change and a reconstituting of Parliament, it hardly altered England's position in the international order or the political elite's perception of England's role in that order. To most Englishmen the real significance of the Act of Union was that it achieved the annexation of useful economic and political territory to the north. Of course, many Scots had a similar opinion about the significance of the Act, and to that extent it was opposed in Scotland.

After 1707 the character of nationalism in Scotland was changed. Although the new union was generally unpopular on both sides of the border (even the English soon wondered whether union with the sullen Scots was worth the trouble),<sup>1</sup> aristocratic and mercantile interests supported it. Opposition to the union was not the same thing as nationalism, but the two were (and still are) closely related. Hence, with the Act of Union, nationalism lost its edge of respectability. Nationalism and political realities in Scotland were no longer mutually reinforcing. After 1707, as Rait and Pryde have noted, nationalists "were forced to

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Brown, op. cit., p. 145.

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become either sentimentalists or conspirators."<sup>1</sup> Frequently they became both.

### Eighteenth Century Nationalism

But there was little organized activity in opposition to the Union. Pamphleteers like Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun were active in denouncing the new relationship just as they had strenuously opposed the Act of Union in 1707. And in 1713 a Scottish attempt to repeal the Act was narrowly defeated in the House of Lords. Even commercial interests were disappointed since the expected economic improvements did not immediately materialize. But large-scale opposition did not develop for almost a century.

The series of Jacobite Risings in 1708, 1715, 1719, and especially 1745, while of little importance to Scotland's overall development, did significantly influence the course of nationalism in Scotland. In attempting to restore the Catholic House of Stewart to a regenerated Scottish throne, the Jacobites polarized Scotland and confused the nationalist cause with the explosive religious issue. Calling the Rebellion of 1745 a "great watershed" in the history of Scottish nationalism, Hanham asserts that

by raising the bogey of Celtic domination over Anglo-Saxon Scotland it drove the Lowlands unequivocally into support for the Union. It made the crushing of the Highland clans inevitable. And it tainted opposition to the Union of 1707 with Jacobitism.<sup>2</sup>

And McLaren writes of the rebellion's after-effects:

With the suppression of the old Highland feudal system of justice, with the forbidding of the Highland dress and the right of highlanders to carry arms and, most of all, with the

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<sup>1</sup>Rait and Pryde, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>2</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 67.

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evictions of the Highland people, the old Gaelic dream of a Gaelic Scotland was finished. It truly was the 'end of an auld sang.'<sup>1</sup>

From this point onward the nationalist cause evoked romantic images of the Bonnie Prince Charles and the glorious struggles of the "Forty-Five" Rebellion. But is also made the separatist argument even less respectable than it had been, and it served as genesis for the long-standing impression among many Scots that the separatist demands were a Catholic stratagem.<sup>2</sup>

By the middle of the eighteenth century the restoration of Scottish independence seemed a hopeless and foolhardy goal. But soon two important literary figures, Robert Burns (1759-1796) and Walter Scott (1771-1832), were to redirect and to reinvigorate Scottish nationalism. Burns, whose birthdate is the closest thing the Scots have to a national holiday, did much to revive the spirit (if not the substance) of Scottish independence. In his poems he glorified the Scottish past and carried on the patriotic traditions established by Barbour and Blind Harry:

Scots, wha hae wi' Wallace bled,  
Scots, wham Bruce has aften led,  
Welcome to your gory bed,  
Or to victorie.  
Now's the day, and now's the hour:  
See the front o' battle lour!  
See approach proud Edward's power--  
Chains and slaverie!<sup>3</sup>

Writing in a Scots dialect he did much to shape, he helped to legitimize the cultural distinctiveness of Scotland.

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<sup>1</sup>Maray McLaren, The Scots, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1951, pp. 19-20; cf. also Brown, op. cit., pp. 325-30.

<sup>2</sup>This impression no doubt was strengthened by the drawing of parallels with the home rule movement in Ireland.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 70.

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But Burns was not much of a political agitator. For the most part he showed little interest in separatist cults or conspiratorial activities. The one significant exception was his association with the Society of the Friends of the People, perhaps the first organized nationalist group after the Act of Union. The Society, led by Thomas Muir, demanded universal manhood suffrage and separate parliaments for both Ireland and Scotland. The Society was soon outlawed and in 1793 Muir was deported to Australia. Muir's trial inspired Burns to write "Scots, Wha Hae."<sup>1</sup> But the main significance of Robert Burns to nationalism at the turn of the nineteenth century was in the new respectability he gave the concept by turning its force from the political arena to the literary realm.

Walter Scott's writings continued this trend. Perhaps more than any other individual, Scott, through his novels and ballads was responsible for Scotland's emerging image as a land of craggy beauty, of kilts and bagpipes, and of highland moors. Hanham writes:

Scott's main achievement was the creation of a new vision of Scotland, the Scotland of the modern tourist industry. Scottish story, Scottish dress, Scottish castles, Scottish scenery, blended together in a romantic vision of a Scotland inhabited by chiefs and clansmen, over which Scott himself, the wizard of the north, in some way presided. This was the vision which Scott himself encouraged Edinburgh to live up to in 1822, when King George IV visited Scotland, the first monarch to do so for more than a century. The gentry dressed themselves up in fancy tartans and glengarry bonnets, the Lord Mayor of London wore a splendid tartan concoction, and even the King appeared in Highland dress. The visit was an immense success, established the kilt as one of the dresses of the gentry, and gave a boost to the woolen manufacturers who from now onwards produced ever more elaborate books of tartans. Indeed, a tartan cult was established which spread across Europe and the world and came to symbolize one aspect of Scottish culture.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Douglas Young in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>2</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 70.

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But unlike Burns, Scott was a convinced unionist. While Burns often took literary swipes at the English and concentrated on glories which derived from past battles with the English, Scott was almost exclusively preoccupied with qualities inherent to the Scots. Becoming a major spokesman for "Tory romantics," he was never accepted as a nationalist leader. The main significance of Walter Scott is that he increased the movement away from political nationalism and into channels which the established elite found more acceptable. At the same time he helped to build a national mythology which was to shape the Scottish consciousness for the next century and a half.<sup>1</sup>

#### Nineteenth Century Nationalism

The era of Burns and Scott represented a kind of literary renaissance in Scotland. It was a period during which the focus of literary attention was shifted from England to Scotland, which claimed not only the major writers of the day but also the major literary journals (Edinburgh Review and Blackwood's Magazine).<sup>2</sup> But the Scottish literary tradition of the early nineteenth century had more flavor of a regional than a national literature. It was during this period the term "North Britain" came to be widely substituted for Scotland. And the almost total separation between literary ideals and political realities assured a non-political phase for nationalism throughout the early part of the century.

This is not to suggest, however, that political nationalism did not

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<sup>1</sup>For a good sketch of the central roles played by Burns and Scott in the shaping of Scottish themes in literature, cf. Kurt Wittig, The Scottish Tradition in Literature, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1958, chap. vii.

<sup>2</sup>This "Athenian Age" is described by Pryde, op. cit., chap. xv; and by Notestein, op. cit., chap. xxii.

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persist. Between 1745 and 1828 a manager for Scotland sat in Westminster. Among other things his job was to see to patronage for Scots and to shape legislation affecting Scots. By tradition this position was given to Scots, but in 1828 the incumbent Tories could reputedly find no qualified Tories in Whig Scotland to take on the job, so the office was unceremoniously abolished. This caused resentment in Scotland and seemed to vindicate those Scots who had been complaining loud and long of Scottish neglect.

By 1850 this resentment found a leader in the Reverend James Begg of the Free Church. According to Hanham, Begg "wanted to promote a regeneration of Scottish life in all its aspects" by reconstituting Scottish government and by starting a "national revival" of the spirit.<sup>1</sup> He proposed the establishment of a special Scottish Office with a cabinet-level Secretary of State for Scotland and he wanted to increase the numbers of Scottish M.P.s in Parliament. If these failed to solve the problem of Scottish neglect, he would support the creation of a special Scottish parliament to deal with Scottish affairs.

Although as Hanham admits Begg did not have much direct impact on the development of Scottish nationalism, his ideas were picked up and developed by others. James Grant was one who extended Begg's ideas and produced articles detailing Scottish neglect and listing her grievances against England. These grievances included an alleged loss of persons in skilled occupations to England, an inequitable revenue/expenditure ratio in Scotland, and supposed heraldic irregularities on flags and coinage.

As a result of this political agitation, as well as the "Tory romanticism" made popular earlier, The National Association for the Vindication

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<sup>1</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 74.

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of Scottish Rights was founded in 1853. Scorned by most prominent Scottish politicians, according to Ferguson, "it was warmly backed by most of the town councils in Scotland, by several of the county commissions of supply, and by many professional bodies."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he suggests, the grievances of the association--paralleling those outlined by Begg and Grant, both of whom were members--seemed justified.

The outcome of numerous well-attended public meetings was over fifty petitions to the government, demanding that Scotland should no longer be left to the ministrations of an overworked lord advocate loosely supervised by the home secretary, that a Scottish secretary should be restored to head a reformed and separate administration, that Scotland should receive a larger share of parliamentary representation (71 M.P.s as against 53), and that she should enjoy a more just proportion of United Kingdom expenditure.<sup>2</sup>

But it was several years before any action was taken on these demands. Although Conservative legislation was introduced in Parliament in 1878 to create an Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, it was not until 1885, after the Liberals committed themselves to the concept of a Scottish Secretary, that a bill authorizing a Secretary of State for Scotland was passed.<sup>3</sup> Also, Scotland's parliamentary representation was increased to 60 in 1868 and to 72 in 1885. Hence, with these developments, Scotland did "obtain some of the substance, without the form, of home rule."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>William Ferguson, "Scotland, 1689 to the Present," vol. IV in Gordon Donaldson, The Edinburgh History of Scotland, 4 vols., Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1968, p. 320.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>"...[I]t was understood that the Scottish secretary was to be a truly responsible minister; his staff became the 'Scottish Office' and he took charge (as nominal vice-president of the Privy Council committee) of the most important department--that of education. At long last, therefore, definite provision had been made for the conduct of Scottish business within the Union." [Pryde, op. cit., p. 208.]

<sup>4</sup>R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1936, p. 130.

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### The Home Rule Movement

After 1885 the nationalist cause in Scotland took on new life. A key factor in this revival was the Scottish Home Rule Association, formed in 1886 by a coalition of Scottish Liberals, Labour leaders, and Radicals. One achievement of the SHRA was the steady production of a lively pamphlet literature. A close examination of this literature reveals that an even more significant achievement of the organization was that it brought together a collection of nationalists with widely divergent backgrounds and ideas.

Hanham suggests that the home rule movement of the late nineteenth century consisted of five major groups, each contributing to the pamphleteering efforts of the SHRA. First, he points to the right wing aristocrats, many of whom blamed Scotland's general malaise on the Union. Lord Bute complained that the Union seemed

to do nothing now but prevent any public Scotch business of a Parliamentary kind being done at all, to place what is done or left undone in the hands of English authorities, whereby inter alia, public money is unfairly spent (look at the fact that there is not in Scotland a single arsenal or harbour of refuge, and that the lives of the Shetlanders were sacrificed only a short time ago to the absence of a telegraph), to subject litigants and others to enormous expense in taking their business to London to be managed by lawyers who do not understand their law, and to drain a lot of the best people and a lot of money out of the country.<sup>1</sup>

Bute, a Catholic, thought a national legislature ought to exist for Scotland even if it were controlled by Radicals.

Second, Hanham notes the continuing influence of the "Tory romantics." Outstanding in this group was Theodore Napier whose dedicated activities on behalf of the nationalist cause (petitioning Queen Victoria

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 84. Hanham's discussion of the diversity of the SHRA appears on pp. 83-90.

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on the misuse of Scottish names, wearing early Highland dress, and publishing a Jacobite journal) apparently embarrassed some of his friends and allies. Nationalists in this group were driven primarily by patriotic--in many cases Jacobite--symbols of Scotland's past. Although the central position of the romantics was challenged by the 1880's, the emotional content of their appeal sustained them as a potent force in the movement.

Third, there was a group of lawyers and businessmen whose views were generally to the left of the aristocrats and "Tory romantics." Although moved in part by nostalgic ideas, the main motivational factors of this group were utilitarian and economic. The external catalyst in creating their nationalist views seems to have been the Irish Home Rule movement.

Fourth, Hanham identifies a left-wing radical strain emerging from the home rule debate of the late 1880's. The best representative of this group is John Morrison Davidson whose Christian socialist temperament and "frantic denunciations of kings, bishops, and lords" helped to make his rather traditional nationalist sentiments acceptable to the left.

Finally, on the left appeared an outright working-class position in the SHRA. Led by such men as Keir Hardie, R. B. Cunningham-Graham, and Robert Smillie, the working-class movement in late nineteenth century Scotland was overlaid with patriotic and emotional themes of nationalism. Unquestionably this was due in part to the uneven impact the Union was alleged to have on various social classes in Scotland, but it was also due to the realization that if home rule were achieved, a recently industrialized Scotland might well be controlled by a working-class party. As early as 1888, Hardie announced publicly: "I am strongly in favor of Home Rule for Scotland, being convinced that until we have a Parliament

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of our own we cannot obtain the many and great reforms on which I believe the people of Scotland have set their hearts."<sup>1</sup>

But it was in the years after the late 1880's that significant support was mounted in favor of home rule. An alliance of labour leaders and "home rule" Liberal M.P.s, led by William Gladstone, gained strength and produced what was nearly the "great watershed" sought by Scottish nationalists.

While the inspiration for home rule in Scotland was clearly home-grown, the major impetus for the movement at the end of the nineteenth century was the "Irish Question." Like Scotland and Wales, Ireland had long lived uneasily in the unitary British system. And like the Scots and Welsh, the Irish had long lists of grievances against the English. But unlike the others, the Irish found themselves polarized against the English on the issue of religion. The official protestantism of the British state clashed with the majority Catholicism of the Irish. The economic, social, and political discrimination felt by Irish Catholics dwarfs by comparison whatever difficulties Scottish Presbyterians endured at the hands of English Episcopalians. While the Constitution recognized the validity of both the Scottish and English churches (the monarch was the head of both), it specifically excluded and discriminated against Catholics.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Hardie's Mid-Lanark election address, quoted in Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>One example of the kind of legal discrimination the Irish had to endure was the Penal Law of 1695 which virtually drove the Catholic Church underground in Ireland. Catholics were forbidden to vote, to hold offices, to bear arms, or to enter into the professions. Catholic clergy was outlawed and Catholic schools were barred. Edmund Burke thought the law "well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself." Cf. Donald S. Connery, The Irish, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968, p. 24.

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Life in nineteenth century Ireland offered few amenities. After 1845 the Potato Blight caused a famine of immense proportions, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and massive emigration. By 1900 Ireland's population had shrunk to only half of what it was at mid-century. The Irish, caught between the Scylla of purposive discrimination and the Charybdis of natural disaster, wanted revolutionary change. The Irish home rulers, led by Charles Stewart Parnell and John Redmond, eventually resorted to widespread violence to achieve their goal of independence. In the end, of course, they did win their goal for most of Ireland, but the resistance to home rule that the Irish had aroused and the bad taste left by the violent tactics of the Irish nationalists probably caused the failure of the home rule movements in Scotland and Wales.

The chances for "home rule all round" had seemed greatly improved in 1885 when William Gladstone, the Scottish leader of the Liberal Party in Parliament, was converted to the notion of self-rule for Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Gladstone apparently hoped that Conservative Party leaders would see the inevitability of the Irish home rule question and follow suit. Instead, the Tories remained firmly opposed to all forms of home rule and anti-home rule Liberals defected from Gladstone's leadership. Parnell, too, who controlled 86 of the 101 Irish votes in Parliament, thought that the Tories would support home rule. He even urged English and Scottish Catholics to vote Conservative in the 1885 general election. But the public disclosure of Gladstone's conversion to home rule only seemed to strengthen the traditional Conservative opposition to home rule.

Remaining firmly against all forms of home rule, the Tories voted against Gladstone's first home rule bill in 1886 (which would have

removed Irish M.P.s from Parliament) and his second bill in 1893 (which would have simply reduced Irish representation to 80 M.P.s while setting up a separate Irish assembly). The first bill was defeated in the Commons by Liberal defections; the second was defeated in the Lords. But if the whole political procedure temporarily dashed the hopes of the Irish home rulers, it permanently disabled the Liberal Party which, rife with divisions and defections, went into a long decline from which it has never recovered. In the 1886 general election the Liberals split into Gladstonian and anti-Gladstonian factions, the latter allying themselves with the Conservatives until 1912. Liberal representation in Parliament fell from 325 in 1885 to just 187 in 1886 (from 57 down to 39 in Scotland). Clearly Gladstone was having little success in achieving home rule for Scotland by concentrating on Ireland first.

In the meantime, the first motion specifically for Scottish home rule was introduced in the House of Commons in 1889 by G. B. Clark, a Liberal M.P. from Caithness who also happened to be vice-president of the Scottish Labour Party. The motion lost by 200 to 79 (even Scots M.P.s voted against it 22 to 19) but the measure did better when re-introduced in 1890, losing by a vote of 181 to 141 (with Scots voting in favor this time, 26 to 15).<sup>1</sup>

In 1881 Clark introduced the first "home rule all round" motion and, while there was little initial support for it, finally a Commons majority of 180 to 170 (38 to 20 in Scotland) vote for it in 1884. Only the Tory-controlled House of Lords prevented the enactment of the measure.

Irish home rule was finally voted by Parliament in 1914, but despite Asquith's promise that his administration would treat the Irish bill as

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<sup>1</sup>Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., pp. 9-10.

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the "first installment of home rule all-round,"<sup>1</sup> there was little serious consideration of self-rule for Scotland and Wales after World War I. A Scottish home rule bill, which was in its second reading when hostilities in Europe began, was never revived. Irish independence resulted in the permanent exodus from Westminster of more than 80 pro-home rule M.P.s, dispelling any hope that a majority favoring home rule for Scotland could be found again.

The Irish question had raised emotions to a high pitch. While it seems unlikely that, as Rait and Pryde contend, "the demand for Scottish Home Rule was largely a synthetic and sympathetic response to the Irish agitation,"<sup>2</sup> it is clear that the two parallel movements did affect one another. For Scottish nationalism the main implication of the achievement of Irish independence was that separatism was totally discredited. The violence in Ireland provided an inhospitable atmosphere for a dispassioned examination of the Scottish situation. Hence, although the diverse characteristics of Irish and Scottish nationalism now seem obvious, the parallels were simply too close. As a result, widespread support for Scottish home rule disappeared for a generation. Being less militant (and perhaps less driven by circumstances) than the Irish, the Scots found their desires for home rule thwarted.

And yet it would be a distortion to belittle the efforts of Scottish home rulers during this period. After all, they had witnessed a Commons majority in favor of Scottish home rule. And they had achieved their objective of establishing a permanent Secretaryship of State for Scotland. Moreover, in 1894 the Commons created the Scottish Grand Committee,

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<sup>1</sup>Ferguson, op. cit., p. 348.

<sup>2</sup>Rait and Pryde, op. cit., p. 129.



which consisted of all Scots M.P.s plus fifteen others added to maintain a partisan balance similar to that in the whole House. The SGC was both an alternative to a Scottish parliament and a means of relieving the legislative load of Parliament. Although the SGC was firmly opposed by the Tories as a revolutionary change, its main significance was procedural and symbolic since it could only deal with the preliminaries of non-controversial Scottish bills, leaving final authority to the English controlled majority in Westminster.<sup>1</sup> The Committee disappeared during the Tory administrations of 1895-1907, but has been (with some extensions of authority and function and changes in formal structure) a permanent fixture of Parliament ever since.

#### Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Scottish Renaissance

While the onset of World War I may have doused any real hope for Scottish home rule, it hardly dampened nationalist enthusiasm. In fact, during the interwar period Scots engaged in some of the liveliest and most colorful nationalist debates in their history. The issues were mostly those which had been aired in earlier debates, but now there was organized dissention in nationalist ranks and the intensity of internecine battles sometimes rivaled that of the anti-English struggle itself.

At the risk of oversimplifying complex internal squabbles, it will be useful to isolate two broad groups of nationalists during the interwar period. The first emerged from the patriotic literary tradition of Burns and Scott but generally espoused explicit and far more extremist political views than either of them. The second was a group with more nearly pragmatic views, concerned more with the instrumentalities of achieving home

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Kellas, op. cit., p. 175.

rule than with the political purity of the movement. But if this group was more firmly rooted in the current realities of Scottish politics, the literary group was responsible for an important revival of the Scottish spirit.

The main figure in the often quixotic literary group (referred to by Hanham as the "fundamentalists"<sup>1</sup>) was Rauraidh Erskine of Marr who had been active in the Scottish Home Rule Association in the 1880's and who was the publisher of the literary review Guth na Bliadhna. Erskine was the main impetus behind the Gaelic political movement which began at the turn of the century. Hanham identifies a strain of eighteenth century rationalism in Erskine's thought "which made him wish to create a new Scottish political system de novo. He had come to the conclusion that the existing system was a bad one, that the culture of the people had been debased, and that it must be re-created on a Celtic rather than an Anglo-Saxon basis."<sup>2</sup> Heavily influenced by the rising tide of nationalism in Europe, especially after the war, Erskine raised the issue of national self-determination for Scotland. If the Hungarians, Bohemians, and Irish could claim sovereignty for their national groups, why not the Scots? He supported even the national aspirations of the Russians in the 1917 Revolution:

Praise to the Bolsheviks! Honour to the Revolutionaries! It is the Russian Revolution that has set the Chancelleries of Europe by the ears, and now bids fair to inscribe in large and indelible letters on the pages of the great Book of Universal National Rights certain priceless principles....Self-determination for all nations....The fabric of the old order is crashing about our ears. Over an angry sea of discord, strewn with the wreckage of foundered kingdoms and systems of rule, there rises, in splendid majesty, the sun of Democracy...Hail to

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<sup>1</sup>Hanham, op. cit., chap. 6.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

Democracy! Let us cast from us our old wet and tattered political rags as we should do sodden garments, and bask in the warmth that the kindly luminary provides us with, rejoicing in the return of the day of Reason and of Right.<sup>1</sup>

Erskine developed an image of Scotland as an oppressed national group which by right based in historical and cultural imperatives and according to the provisions of the League of Nations ought to be liberated.

But Erskine's main organizational contribution was the role he played in forming (with Thomas Gibson) the Scots National League in 1921. The League's monthly publication, the Scots Independent, soon became a major organ of nationalist writings. The basic aim of the SNL was to press for a scheme of Scottish self-government built on the concept that the "relationship between Scotland and England must be mutually agreed upon between those nations acting upon mutual recognition of each other as an independent nation, and with equal powers."<sup>2</sup> Complete independence was Erskine's goal and he condoned any tactics to reach that goal.

A second major figure in the literary group was the essayist and poet Christopher M. Grieve, better known to the world as Hugh MacDiarmid. Among all those who were responsible for the "Scottish literary renaissance," including such notable writers as R. B. Cunningham-Graham, Compton Mackenzie, Eric Linklater, Lewis Grassie Gibbon, and John Maclean, Hanham singles out MacDiarmid as "the one real man of genius" in the lot and a "prophet" of contemporary Scottish nationalism.<sup>3</sup> But he played only a marginal role in organizations like the SNL.

MacDiarmid's main influence was cultural. He once said that

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<sup>1</sup>Guth na Bliadhna, XV, 1918, pp. 97-8, quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 136-7.

<sup>2</sup>Scots Independent, December, 1926, p. 6, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 148.

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"literature is the written expression of revolt against accepted things,"<sup>1</sup> and he wanted to generate a Scottish rebellion through literature. Recently, in an essay bemoaning the decline of quality writing in Scotland, MacDiarmid looked back on the 1920's and 1930's:

The Scottish Renaissance Movement was begun to raise the intellectual and aesthetic levels of Scottish poetry and to establish a place for Scottish poetry alongside the best that was being produced in other countries.<sup>2</sup>

And at the center of this "writing for the glory of Scotland" was the implicit conviction that the best long-run potentiality for Scottish independence rested in an aroused national consciousness. Grassroots organizing and even the contesting of elections might have to be emphasized at some point but both Erskine and MacDiarmid agreed that "[p]urity of principle should come first."<sup>3</sup>

One significant outcome of the literary renaissance was the foundation in 1936 of the Saltire Society "to foster the Scottish way of life," its arts, crafts, and language. Created "by a group of people who cared for the culture of Scotland and who wished to see not a mere revival of the arts of the past but a renewal of the life which made them,"<sup>4</sup> the Society still organizes concerts and lectures, publishes Scottish works of merit, and provides meeting places for those interested in Scottish culture. It is ironic that the Saltire Society, the only remnant of the renaissance era still surviving, was born after the peak of the

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<sup>1</sup>MacDiarmid quoted in Arthur Marwick, The Explosion of British Society, 1914-1970, The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1971, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup>Hugh MacDiarmid, "The Need to Raise Our Sights," Catalyst, vol. 4, no. 3, Summer, 1971.

<sup>3</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 155.

<sup>4</sup>Coupland, op. cit., p. 393.

renaissance had been reached.

The second group of nationalists, who might best be labeled the "instrumentalists," were more geared to action. In 1917 Roland Muirhead and Thomas Johnston re-grouped the Scottish Home Rule Association which had been in limbo since before the war. Although the SHRA was not formally affiliated with the Labour Party, most of its membership was. By 1918 the Labour Party had become a major channel for the expression of nationslist demands and at its annual conference that year a resolution drafted primarily by Sidney Webb advocated a constitutional change toward federalism:

Some early devolution from Westminster of both legislation and administration is imperatively called for...along with the grant of Home Rule to Ireland there should be constituted separate statutory legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales, and even England, with autonomous administration in matters of local concern.<sup>1</sup>

During the Labour Party's first minority government in 1924 an attempt to pass a Scottish home rule bill was made but before action could be taken Labour was swept out of power. In 1926 a Scottish National Convention, sponsored by the SHRA, proposed more far-reaching legislation which in essence would have given Dominion status to Scotland in the emerging Commonwealth of Nations. A bill consistent with this proposal was moved in Parliament in 1927 by James Barr and seconded by Thomas Johnston, both of whom were Labourites. Although the bill was defeated by a Tory majority, the effort did bear important fruit. The frustration of the Parliamentary setback led to the formation in June, 1928, of the National Party of Scotland.

The National Party was a fusion of the four main nationalist organs, the Scottish Home Rule Association, the Scots National League, the

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 12.

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Scottish National Movement (an off-shoot of the SNL which had been formed by Lewis Spence in 1926), and the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association. Primarily the brainchild of J. M. MacCormick, a young Glasgow lawyer, the party was a loose coalition between the fundamentalists and the instrumentalists. Although a "Scottish National Party" that would contest Parliamentary elections was suggested as early as 1903,<sup>1</sup> the National Party of Scotland represented the first attempt by a nationalists group to place nationalists, qua nationalists, in Parliament.

In addition to fighting elections, the aims of the party as described by Lewis Spence (who went to pains to differentiate the party from his own defunct yet anti-parliamentary Scots National League) were "self-government for Scotland with independent national status within the British group of nations, together with the reconstruction of Scottish national life."<sup>2</sup> This was not significantly more radical than the Labour Party resolution of 1918 or the Barr-Johnson bill of 1927 but it was sufficiently alarming to Conservatives that they issued a counter-declaration, backed by leading industrialists, warning of economic disaster for Scotland in the event of separation.<sup>3</sup>

In a by-election in January 1929 the National Party experienced its first electoral test, candidate Lewis Spence winning only four percent of the total vote. The general election of 1929 saw J. M. MacCormick and Roland Muirhead win less than five percent each in the two seats the

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<sup>1</sup>In April, 1903, the nationalist publication Fiery Cross carried the appeal: "Why do not Scottish electors choose Scottish Nationalists as their representatives in Parliament, and thus create a Scottish National Party with a strong leader--a Scottish Parnell?" Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 133.

<sup>2</sup>Lewis Spence, "The National Party of Scotland," Edinburgh Review, vol. 248, 1928, pp. 70-87, quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 152-3.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Ferguson, op. cit., p. 378.



party contested. But in two by-elections the next year J. M. McNicol and Oliver Brown won ten and thirteen percent, respectively, of the total vote in their constituencies. Slowly the party seemed to be making significant headway. Oliver Brown even saved his deposit, a moral victory for any minor party candidate in Britain.

The general election of 1931 showed even more gains but the real boost to morale was the unexpected victory of Compton Mackenzie over confident Tory opposition for the largely honorary post of Lord Rector of Glasgow University. This made the nationalists seem a force to content with, and the established parties responded with a smear campaign linking the nationalists to resurgent Catholicism.<sup>1</sup>

But then internal tensions between fundamentalists and instrumentalists broke out in open fights and the advance of the party was halted. MacCormick wanted the party to moderate its position on separatism to attract more voters; the fundamentalists wanted to abandon the electoral focus and return to ideological purity. Hanham writes:

Erskine of Marr, clear-sighted as ever, recognized that once the literary men joined forces with those whose primary interest was in winning elections, the literary men (who were for him the true nationalists) would be thrust on one side....[H]e argued that, while there was a strong case for greater discipline, it could only be secured by abandoning the policy of sending members to Westminster. Purity of principle should come first, and this meant building up a movement undistracted by the business of fighting elections.<sup>2</sup>

In a bitter battle for control of the party which included a purge of close to one-fifth of the total membership in 1933, MacCormick finally consolidated his position, sacrificing purity for a chance at electoral

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<sup>1</sup>Mackenzie was a Catholic. Cf. J. M. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind: The Story of the National Movement in Scotland, Gollancz, London, 1955.

<sup>2</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 155.

victory.

In 1932 a Scottish Party had been formed by groups of Tories dissatisfied with the Conservative Party policy on home rule for Scotland. Although the Scottish Party did not propose to contest elections, it was clear from the start that they were interested in working with a reformed National Party. A formal merger would suit both parties. MacCormick thought the National Party needed the center-weighted respectability the Scottish Party and its leadership (including the Duke of Montrose and Professor of Law Andrew Gibb) could offer. The Scottish Party, on the other hand, had no hope of becoming a significant force on its own. Hence, on April 20, 1934, the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party merged to become the Scottish National Party.

In contrast to the old National Party the Scottish National Party was moderate and strove for political respectability. While the National goals boiled down to complete independence for Scotland, the SNP objectives seemed more limited, calling for a separate parliament within the existing structure of the United Kingdom. The initial statement of goals read in part:

The object of the Party is Self-Government for Scotland on a basis which will enable Scotland as a partner in the British Empire with the same status as England to develop its National Life to the fullest advantage.

The Policy of the Party for the achievement of that object is that--

- (a) There shall be established in Scotland a Parliament which shall be the final authority on all Scottish affairs including Taxation and Finance.
- (b) Scotland shall share with England the rights and responsibilities they as Mother Nations have jointly created and incurred within the British Empire.
- (c) Scotland and England shall set up machinery to deal jointly with these responsibilities and in particular with such matters as Defense, Foreign Policy, and customs.
- (d) The Scottish National Party shall be independent of all other political Parties.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Scots Independent, May, 1934, quoted in *ibid.*, pp 163-4.

But the new moderate image the nationalities were presenting did not go down much better with the electorate. Only three of the eight SNP candidates in the 1935 general election saved their deposits, SNP proportions of the vote ranging from a strong twenty-eight percent in the Western Isles constituency to a humiliating three percent in Greenock. The East Renfrewshire result (ten percent) was actually worse than the National Party result in 1931 (fourteen percent).

A reaction to MacCormick's moderating influence set in in 1936 and slowly built throughout the late 1930's. World War II brought into focus two issues which further radicalized the nationalists. Although the party had passed a resolution denouncing "undemocratic" Nazism, conscription of Scottish soldiers was opposed by many. In 1937 the party declared itself "strongly opposed to the manpower of Scotland being used to defend an Empire in the government of which she has no voice" and although it was mostly ignored after the outbreak of war, it went on to state that "all male members of the Scottish National Party of military age hereby pledge themselves to refuse to serve with any section of the Crown Forces until the programme of the Scottish National Party has been fulfilled."<sup>1</sup> The issue became one around which the members of the party polarized. Some, like Douglas Young, refused conscription and were martyred in prison.

The second issue dealt with the problem of war-time labor. It became the practice of the Ministry of Labour in London to encourage non-combatants to move to areas where defense production was underway. By 1941 the issue became one of sending Scots girls to do forced labor in England since there was no work available in Scotland. And by 1944

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 166.

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extreme nationalists claimed the government was transporting "many thousands of Scots working folk, including young girls far away from their homeland to forced labour in a foreign land."<sup>1</sup>

But even before the second issue had fully developed, the SNP was split in a factional fight that the moderates, including MacCormick, were to lose. In 1942 MacCormick and his friends left the SNP to form the Scottish Convention, a pressure-group not unlike the old Scottish Home Rule Association.

Now the SNP had come full-circle. Lacking the moderating influence of MacCormick, it was again a party dominated by those taking a purist approach to the question of Scottish independence. Led by Dr. Robert McIntyre, a left-wing populist, the party revived. The party, described as "broadly Socialist in outlook,"<sup>2</sup> did exceedingly well in war-time by-elections. Benefiting from an electoral truce between the major parties, the SNP became a lightning rod for protest against the governing coalition. In a 1944 three-way contest, Douglas Young drew forty-two percent of the vote for the SNP and in a straight fight in April, 1945, Dr. McIntyre was actually elected with fifty-two percent of the total poll, the first Scot ever elected as a nationalist to Parliament. Coming on the heels of these victories, the results of the 1945 general election were highly disappointing. Of eight SNP candidates only two saved their deposits. The SNP seemed to fit perfectly the pattern generally exhibited by minor parties in Britain: heady successes in by-elections when voters can protest the government of the day rather cheaply, followed by

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<sup>1</sup>From Douglas Young's Appeal to Scots Honour, 1944, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>2</sup>R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, The British General Election of 1945, Oxford University Press, London, 1947, p. 252.

disappointingly poor showings in subsequent general elections when the voters' decision may decide not only individual constituency results but the far more serious matter of which party will form the next government.

Most observers were willing to write off the nationalists as unrealistic extremists. Some even claimed that the party "had become almost a joke."<sup>1</sup> But there were others who recognized that, while the SNP could not reasonably expect to achieve significant electoral successes, the intensity of feeling connected with the nationalist cause was indicative of important political undercurrents in British society:

The independent, self-conscious national life and spirit of the nation is a real thing, its maintenance in present conditions is a natural desire and a matter of pressing concern, when in this centralizing age diversity and independence are being sapped away. The ill success of the SNP may tempt people in England to under-estimate the anxiety of so many Scots...over the state of their nation, more especially as the political acumen of Englishmen becomes somewhat obtuse in dealing with this problem of a nationality within the United Kingdom, a nationality that is inferior but not subordinate, an inner loyalty that has no counterpart in English regional patriotism.<sup>2</sup>

#### Twentieth Century Nationalism: The Post-War Revival

The Scottish National Party went into a long decline in the two decades after the election of 1945. It was a period of some financial difficulties and much ideological soul-searching. But the more moderate home rule wing of the nationalist movement was very much in evidence during the late 1940's and early 1950's. In 1947 MacCormick's Scottish Convention called together a Scottish National Assembly which consisted of a broad collection of Scottish political, social, economic, and religious leaders. This was a fairly prestigious group including several

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<sup>1</sup>Ferguson, op. cit., p. 388.

<sup>2</sup>McCallum and Readman, op. cit., p. 120.

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M.P.s and peers and their denunciations of "London government" received a great deal of publicity, winning MacCormick the firm enmity of the Labour government which took such attacks as anti-Labour.

The real achievements of the Assembly were two-fold. In 1948 it produced a "Blueprint for Scotland" which called for the establishment of a Scottish sub-parliament, consisting of all Scots members of the UK Parliament, which would function as a "Scottish Parliament for Scottish Affairs."<sup>1</sup> But more importantly from a public relations viewpoint, the Assembly launched a campaign in 1949 to secure public support for a "Scottish Covenant." This Covenant read:

We, the people of Scotland who subscribe this Engagement, declare our belief that reform in the constitution of our country is necessary to secure good government in accordance with our Scottish traditions and to promote the spiritual and economic welfare of our nation.

We affirm that the desire for such reform is both deep and widespread through the whole community, transcending all political differences and sectional interests, and we undertake to continue united in purpose for its achievement.

With that end in view we solemnly enter into this Covenant whereby we pledge ourselves, in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs.<sup>2</sup>

Within a week 50,000 Scots had signed the Covenant and after six months nearly a million had signed. Eventually the document had the support of around two million persons out of an electorate of 3.6 million, but the return from this effort was slight. Prime Minister Atlee responded by placing a strong home rule Labourite in the Scottish Office and the campaign confirmed that home rule was a popular concept in Scotland. But little else was achieved. The Labour government, having said nothing

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in Hanham, op. cit., p. 171.



about home rule for Scotland in its 1945 election manifesto, was kept busy with more pressing issues of social reform and the whole question was shunted to the "study" stage out of which it failed to advance before Labour fell from power in 1951.

Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, the outlook for the nationalists seemed singularly bleak. Aside from the 1950 theft by university students of the Stone of Scone, an ancient Scottish royal relic, from its resting place in London, there was little activity and scant evidence of continuing support for home rule. The Liberal Party in Scotland, led by Jo Grimond, came to predominate the home rule field, focussing on both the constitutional and economic arguments for devolution within the United Kingdom. But the Conservative government and Labour opposition were almost totally silent. In 1952 the Conservatives had appointed a Royal Commission to study the constitutional problems of Scotland in the UK, recommending in 1954 marginal administrative devolution. But sagging economic conditions in Scotland led to massive swings of votes to Labour and Liberals in the elections of 1959 and 1964.

Meanwhile, the SNP was beginning to stir again. A new generation of leaders, less concerned with ideology and more willing to accommodate a wide spectrum of nationalist viewpoints were coming to prominence. In 1962 William Wolfe, an industrialist and accountant, contested the West Lothian by-election for the SNP and wound up second, capturing twenty-three percent of the total vote. In the same year another young nationalist, Iain MacDonald, a farmer and aviator, took over the SNP national organization and, with Wolfe, began to develop a network of local grassroots organizations, building up membership and increasing the party's visibility. In 1962 the party had 40 branches with around 2000 members;

by 1964 the number of branches was increased somewhat and membership was up to 8000. The general election of 1964 showed increased gains, with the party contesting 15 seats (the largest number in its history), saving three deposits, and winning more than 64,000 votes.

But the general election of 1966 showed even more clearly the extent of the nationalist revival. In that election 23 seats were contested, 13 deposits saved, and over 128,000 votes won throughout Scotland. The proportion of the vote in individual constituencies ranged as high as thirty-five percent in West Lothian, twenty-six percent in West Stirlingshire, and twenty percent each in West Perthshire and East Stirlingshire. While the SNP of the 30's and 40's seemed to be primarily an urban-based party, contesting burgh constituencies for the most part, now it was running its strongest races in county constituencies, where, it seemed fair to surmise, national consciousness was stronger.

Party membership, too, had gone up dramatically; from 20,000 in 1965 to 42,000 in 1966. The party, conducting colorful meetings, was becoming a vibrant social force particularly attractive to the young, for whom SNP activities often provided the only recreation in rural areas. Although the constitutional issue was not ignored in literature and speech-making, the decentralized character of the SNP national organization allowed for local differences in policy. In some areas full independence was the goal, in others a lesser measure of home rule. But whatever stand was taken, it was generally vague and subordinated to the main issues which were taken to be Scottish neglect and economic stagnation. As the strength of the party grew, in membership subscriptions and in votes, it was clear that the protest function of the party was becoming increasingly important. What had begun as a party emphasizing national consciousness was

now being viewed as a potentially viable vehicle of protest.

This dimension of the SNP had been important at an earlier time--in 1945 when the only way to protest the government was to vote for a minor party--but it seemed to acquire added significance after 1966. The Gallup Poll showed that for all of Britain support for the Labour Prime Minister had dropped from sixty-three percent at the beginning of 1966 to just forty-seven percent at the end of the year. And satisfaction with the leader of the opposition also declined; from forty-four percent to thirty-eight percent. Part of Britain's trouble was economic. The international balance of payments was in the red, the stock market in decline, and consumer spending down. The extent of disillusionment with the Labour government was profound. The polls showed that what had been a fifteen percentage point lead for Labour over Conservative in the second quarter of 1966 had been transformed a year later into a five point lead for the Tories.<sup>1</sup>

It was in this context that the SNP contested two by-elections in 1967. In March came Glasgow Pollok, usually a marginal constituency. SNP candidate George Leslie pulled twenty-eight percent of the vote, came close to the Labour total, and swung the seat to the Conservatives. It was a strong showing for the nationalists and seemed to indicate that they were attracting votes primarily from Labour. This became even more obvious a possibility in the second by-election in November. The constituency was Hamilton, an industrial town southeast of Glasgow and one of Labour's Scottish strongholds. If anything has brought the SNP into national and even world prominence, it was the Hamilton by-election since

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<sup>1</sup>Gallup Polls and economic indicators reproduced in David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970, The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1971, p. 24.

the party won a spectacular victory from Labour with forty-six percent of the vote.<sup>1</sup> This result shocked the established parties, catapulted the SNP into media prominence, and transformed their successful candidate, Mrs. Winifred Ewing, a Glasgow Lawyer, into an overnight sensation.

The protest dimension was undoubtedly a key factor. The SNP offered a convenient vehicle for Labour voters who couldn't bring themselves to vote Conservative--its appeal was basically left-wing (Mrs. Ewing proclaimed herself a Socialist), it was stressing popular economic issues (and opposition to the Common Market), and it aroused a feeling of national comradeship in a difficult era. But now that the SNP proved that it could be electorally viable, could it maintain the support of those protesting Labourites by the force of its nationalistic message? When the control of Parliament was at stake in a general election, could the party sustain its appeal? As the disillusionment with Labour increased in 1968,<sup>2</sup> many suggested that the party was headed for widespread general election victories.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, after the municipal elections in May, 1968, when the SNP gained a total of 100 seats and thirty percent of the vote around Scotland, it began to look as if the party had become not only viable but highly popular.

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<sup>1</sup>The Labour candidate received 41.5% of the vote and the Conservative 12.5%.

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<sup>2</sup>In the second quarter of 1968, satisfaction with Prime Minister Wilson had dropped to just 29% and the percentage point spread between Conservative and Labour had widened to more than 25%. (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., p. 24.)

<sup>3</sup>Young asserted in 1969: "It is possible that the revived SNP, with its predominantly young membership, is replacing Labour today as the main radical force in Scottish politics, as Labour replaced the Liberals between 1922 and 1924. On recent form, at a general election in 1970 or 1971, the SNP might win a dozen or so seats, perhaps 40 out of the whole 71." (Young, in MacCormick (ed.), op. cit., p. 19.)

There were now nearly 500 branches of the party with a membership of more than 120,000. While a national poll in November 1967 showed that twenty-four percent of all Scots intended to vote SNP at the next general election, the figure had risen to forty-three percent by mid-1968.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, there was revived talk of an SNP/Liberal Party election pact. In prior elections, the two parties had tacitly agreed not to run candidates against each other, but now there was firm support from the Liberal Party, especially from Grimond, for a formal agreement. Such a pact would have inestimably solidified nationalist support although it would have diluted the already vague principles of the SNP. In any event, the pact was never consummated since the SNP had already set for itself the goal of contesting all 71 Scottish constituencies. And from the perspective of 1969 it was easy for the inexperienced SNP leadership to be blinded by the prospect of success won alone.

But SNP fortunes did not continue onward and upward. By-elections in Glasgow Gorbals in October 1969 and in South Ayrshire in March 1970, although both strong Labour constituencies, did not provide the party with another Hamilton. SNP candidates received twenty-five percent and twenty percent of the vote respectively. Opinion polls showed a national decline in the proportion of electors intending to vote SNP in a general election: from twenty-one percent in January, 1969, to under thirteen percent in March, 1970.

Going into the 1970 general election, the SNP had fielded the largest number of parliamentary candidates (65) in its history. But the results of that election in June 1970 showed that the nationalist electoral

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. James Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism," Appendix V in Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., p. 455. Kellas' article provides an excellent summary of the post-1966 revival of nationalism.

bandwagon had been halted again. Only 22 candidates saved their deposits, and while one seat was won (the traditionally Labour Western Isles constituency with forty-three percent of the vote), the party received more than a quarter of the vote in only five other contests. Even the popular Mrs. Ewing could muster just thirty-five percent to Labour's fifty-three percent. The total number of voters for the SNP went up to more than 300,000, representing over eleven percent of the Scottish total, but in the seats the party contested the vote dropped from fourteen percent in 1966 to twelve percent.<sup>1</sup>

A few commentators proclaimed the death of the SNP and the repudiation of the home rule idea, and indeed in the years after 1970 the party was to disappear almost from sight in the cities. But there was a base of support for the SNP in the rural areas and the party could take solace in their local office-holders and in their sole Member of Parliament, Donald Stewart. They could also claim, with justification, that their efforts had precipitated the Labour government's 1968 decision to appoint a Commission on the Constitution, headed by Lord Crowther, to look into the possibility of changes relating to the constitutional status of Scotland and Wales.

By 1970 the SNP had managed to break through the general election barrier, overcoming the suggestion that the party was nothing more than a protest party viable only in by-elections. And opinion poll data continued to suggest that while there may have been voter disillusionment with SNP performance in office and a lack of clarity concerning

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, p. 460.

the party's programs, support for devolution continued at a high level.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The National Opinion Poll result for January 1969 showed that only 21% of Scottish voters intended to vote for the SNP while 67% in a survey done about the same time wanted to see a separate Scottish Parliament. Cf. James G. Kellas, "Scottish Nationalism," in Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., p. 455; and National Opinion Polls, Scottish Government Survey, A Report on a survey conducted by National Opinion Polls Limited for the Scottish Plebiscite Society, N.O.P. Market Research Limited, London, 1969.

CHAPTER IV  
ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM

And O! to think that there are members o'  
St. Andrew's Societies sleeping soon',  
Wha to the papers wrote afore they bedded  
On regimental buttons or buckled shoon,

Or use o' England whaur the U.K.'s meent,  
Or this or that anent the Blue Saltire,  
Recruitin', pedigrees, and Gude kens what,  
Filled wi' a proper patriotic fire!

Political movements consist of leaders, ideas, and a mass of followers. In a rational world ideas should link leaders to their followers, but frequently, as we shall see in a later chapter, followers may decide to follow for reasons quite unrelated to the ideology of the movement. The "interchangeability of mass movements" suggests that specific demands are less important to masses than the general prospect for some sort of change.<sup>1</sup>

But ideas are crucial to the viability of political movements. They provide a coherent framework within which leaders can appeal to masses and thereby attempt to bring about the solidarity of the whole. And they provide a means for the self-realization of elites, hence attracting and maintaining effective leadership for the movement.<sup>2</sup> If ideas are of peripheral interest to the followers of mass movements, they are of central

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, The New American Library, New York, 1951, chap. iii.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. David E. Apter, op. cit., pp. 18-21.



importance to leaders.

This chapter is a brief examination of the leaders of nationalism in Scotland and of the policies they advocate for changing the government of Scotland. Because such an examination would have little value without some point of reference, we shall compare the SNP elite with their counterparts in the other major political parties in Scotland. Biographical data for all candidates in the 1970 general election is used for this analysis. In the second half of this chapter we shall compare the SNP program for Scotland with those set forth by the other parties. Official and unofficial published statements, particularly from the late 1960's, will be used for this analysis. The aim of this chapter is to clarify the status of the nationalists and the context in which their demands are made in contemporary society.

#### Who Are the Nationalist Leaders?

An examination of standard demographic variables reveals that for the most part SNP candidates for Parliament in 1970 differed only marginally from their colleagues in the other Scottish political parties. Using criteria of age, sex, education, occupation, and political experience, the nationalists stand out strikingly only in terms of the place their education was obtained (overwhelmingly Scotland) and the relative inexperience they have in running for higher political office. Other differences they share with candidates from one or more of the other parties. Each of these criteria is examined below.

Except for miscellaneous "other" candidates, the SNP candidates were on average the youngest in Scotland in 1970. But it is the Labour Party candidates that stand out as being different from the rest on this age dimension. Table 3 shows that while the median age for SNP candidates

was 39 and that for the Conservatives was 41, Labour candidates had a median age of 45. The likely explanation for this circumstance relates to the success of the Labour Party over the past several elections. In 1966 they won 46 of Scotland's 71 Parliamentary contests.<sup>1</sup> And successful candidates have a tendency to stand for re-election, closing the door to younger prospective candidates as bearers of the party's label. But on balance, the SNP leadership ranks appear somewhat more open to younger aspirants than the ranks of other parties.

TABLE 3  
SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY AGE

| Age          | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|--------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|              | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| 21 - 35      | 35.7  | 25.3 | 37.3 | 33.3 | 38.1  | 33.2  |
| 36 - 50      | 45.7  | 43.7 | 47.8 | 48.1 | 47.6  | 46.1  |
| 51 and older | 18.6  | 31.0 | 14.9 | 18.5 | 14.3  | 20.7  |
| Median Age   | 41    | 45   | 39   | 41   | 38    | 41    |
| N            | (70)  | (71) | (67) | (27) | (21)  | (256) |

Sources: The Times, Guide to the House of Commons, 1970, The Times Newspapers Ltd, London, 1970; and a pre-election series of articles on Scottish Parliamentary candidates in the Scottish newspaper, The Scotsman.

The picture of openness is strengthened if we consider the sex of parliamentary candidates. Table 4 shows that while fifteen percent of all SNP contestants were female, only eleven percent of the Liberals, four percent of the Labourites, and just three percent of the Conservatives were female. This circumstance, however, may reflect the recent success of Mrs. Ewing in the 1967 Hamilton by-election as much as it does the openness of the SNP elite ranks to women.

<sup>1</sup>The Conservatives won 20 and Liberals 5.

TABLE 4

## SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY SEX

| Sex    | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|--------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|        | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| Male   | 97.1  | 95.7 | 85.1 | 88.9 | 95.2  | 92.6  |
| Female | 2.9   | 4.3  | 14.9 | 11.1 | 4.8   | 7.4   |
| N      | (70)  | (71) | (67) | (27) | (21)  | (256) |

Sources: The Times, House of Commons; The Scotsman.

In terms of the educational attainment of its candidates, the SNP seems to rank somewhere between the pattern of the Conservative Party and that of the Labour Party. Table 5 suggests that the technical college route to professional advancement is somewhat more frequently chosen by SNP candidates than by the candidates of other parties. These facts reinforce the image of the SNP as a party of the "new class," of the emerging technocratic elites.

TABLE 5

## SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY EDUCATION

| Educational Attainment      | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|-----------------------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|                             | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| Primary                     | 0.0   | 7.6  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 14.3  | 2.7   |
| Secondary                   | 28.6  | 22.7 | 26.7 | 15.4 | 42.8  | 25.2  |
| Tech. college/<br>Adult ed. | 7.9   | 12.1 | 15.0 | 0.0  | 0.0   | 9.9   |
| University                  | 63.5  | 57.6 | 58.3 | 84.6 | 42.8  | 62.2  |
| N                           | (63)  | (66) | (60) | (26) | (7)   | (222) |

Sources: The Times; House of Commons; The Scotsman.

But it is most interesting to note where this education was

obtained. SNP candidates were far less likely to have attended school in England than Conservatives, Labourites, or Liberals. Since there is no residency requirement for parliamentary candidates, several candidates from these latter parties are not Scots (this is particularly true of the Conservatives), and there is no particular reason why under these conditions their education should be Scottish. The nationalists, home-grown to a man, were almost uniformly Scottish trained.

TABLE 6

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES IN 1970: PLACE EDUCATED

| Location of<br>last school | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|----------------------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|                            | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| Scotland                   | 67.2  | 83.8 | 95.2 | 52.0 | 75.0  | 78.3  |
| England                    | 32.8  | 13.2 | 3.2  | 40.0 | 25.0  | 19.5  |
| Other                      | 0.0   | 2.9  | 1.6  | 8.0  | 0.0   | 2.2   |
| N                          | (64)  | (68) | (62) | (25) | (12)  | (231) |

Sources: The Times, House of Commons; The Scotsman.

The occupational data generally reflect the findings of the educational data. Table 7 shows that SNP candidates tend to show up in the "intermediate" occupations more frequently than candidates of other parties. Occupations like "sales director," "school teacher," "accountant," "engineering manager," are intermediate occupations, and they often appear in SNP candidate biographies. In contrast, Conservative biographies frequently mention "company director," "farmer/landowner," "insurance broker," and Labour biographies include a more diverse collection of "journalists," "miners," "union officials," and "research scientists." SNP candidates include fewer manual workers than are among Labour candidates (six percent for SNP versus nineteen percent for Labour)

but fewer professional non-manual workers than are among Conservative candidates (fifty-six percent for SNP versus sixty-six percent for Conservative). This contributes to the "center-weighting" of the SNP candidates in the technocratic or "new class" occupations as noted above.

TABLE 7

## SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970: BY OCCUPATION

| Occupation                 | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|----------------------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|                            | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| Professional/<br>manag.    | 65.7  | 60.9 | 56.1 | 66.7 | 14.3  | 57.6  |
| Intermediate               | 22.4  | 14.5 | 27.3 | 25.9 | 4.8   | 20.4  |
| Skilled non-<br>manual     | 7.5   | 5.8  | 6.1  | 0.0  | 9.5   | 6.0   |
| Skilled manual             | 4.5   | 10.1 | 3.0  | 0.0  | 19.0  | 6.4   |
| Partly skill/<br>unskilled | 0.0   | 8.7  | 3.0  | 0.0  | 47.6  | 7.2   |
| Econ. inactive             | 0.0   | 0.0  | 4.5  | 7.9  | 4.8   | 2.4   |
| N                          | (67)  | (69) | (66) | (27) | (21)  | (250) |

Sources: The Times, House of Commons; The Scotsman.

Finally, the political experience of SNP candidates, while much more limited than the other major candidates in terms of contesting Parliamentary elections, rather closely parallels the histories of the other candidates in terms of prior office-holding. Table 8 shows that only thirty-one percent of SNP contestants had ever stood for Parliament before, contrasted with fifty-three percent of the Conservatives and sixty-one percent of the Labourites. This is not surprising given that the nationalists contested only 23 seats in 1966 and just 15 in 1964. It also reflects the inexperience of the non-incumbent.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This also explains why Conservative candidates had less experience than Labour candidates in Scotland.

TABLE 8

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970:  
BY PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION EXPERIENCE

| Campaign<br>experience                   | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|--|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|  | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| Had stood for Parl<br>before 1970        | 52.8  | 60.6 | 31.3 | 33.3 | 14.3  | 44.1  |
| Had never stood for<br>Parl. before 1970 | 47.2  | 39.4 | 68.7 | 66.7 | 85.7  | 65.9  |
| N  | (70)  | (71) | (67) | (27) | (21)  | (256) |

Source: The Times, House of Commons.

But Table 9 suggests that the SNP candidates were not entirely political neophytes. Although fewer nationalists had held political office than Labourites, the SNP proportion was equal to that for the Conservatives. Schwartz' study of SNP local leaders suggested that the nationalists "had little prior experience in the practice of politics."<sup>1</sup> Clearly, this may have been the case for SNP candidates standing for office prior to 1968. The municipal election victories of 1968 and 1969 produced more than 100 potential candidates for higher office with prior elective experience. A number of these successful nationalists appeared among the list of candidates standing for Parliament in 1970.

This outline of some of the significant ascriptive characteristics of nationalist leaders suggests, then, that while the nationalists tend to be more youthful, their ranks more open to women, and their occupational status more white collar/middle class, they do not differ

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. John E. Schwartz, "The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence," World Politics, XXII, July, 1970, p. 496. Unfortunately, Schwartz does not offer comparative data for the leaders of other parties.

markedly from the leaders of the non-nationalist parties.<sup>1</sup> On some dimensions, like educational attainment and occupation, the SNP candidates seem to hold a middle ground between Labour and Conservatives.

TABLE 9

SCOTTISH CANDIDATES FOR PARLIAMENT IN 1970:  
BY PREVIOUS ELECTIVE OFFICE EXPERIENCE

| Elective office<br>experience | Party |      |      |      |       | Total |
|-------------------------------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
|                               | Cons. | Lab. | SNP  | Lib. | Other |       |
| Some                          | 25.7  | 38.0 | 25.4 | 11.1 | 4.8   | 25.8  |
| None                          | 74.3  | 62.0 | 74.6 | 88.9 | 95.2  | 74.2  |
| N                             | (70)  | (71) | (67) | (27) | (21)  | (256) |

Source: The Times, House of Commons.

This contributes to a picture of the SNP as a "half-way house" for defectors from one major party to another.<sup>2</sup> But there is something

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<sup>1</sup>In part this may be due to the similar methods used for selecting candidates in the various Scottish parties. Referring to the Welsh and Scottish nationalists, Lees and Kimber write: "The nationalist parties experienced a period of growing electoral support in the late 1960's which, it seemed, could assume proportions beyond the significance of by-election victories, even given the failure to improve their parliamentary representation in 1970. In such circumstances the minor parties, aspiring as they do to major party status, and no matter how justified these aspirations may be, tend to select candidates in ways which are markedly similar to those of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. Like their larger rivals, both the Communist Party and the Scottish Nationalists retain the right to veto any candidate chosen by a local party, but this is an essentially negative control and selection is basically in the hands of local parties. The Scottish Nationalists also maintain a list of available candidates, who have previously been vetoed at national level. At the local level the procedures again tend to be similar, with the initial steps being taken by small Selection Committees, subject to later approval by wider bodies representative of the local membership." John D. Lees and Richard Kimber, Political Parties in Modern Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1972, p. 91.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 29, 1965, p. 28

unsatisfactory with this theory as applied to the SNP. Why could the Liberals not be used as this bridge? They would seem to be the more logical choice; they are more respectable, and even a viable political force in some parts of Scotland. Moreover, while there are some major exceptions,<sup>1</sup> there is little evidence that SNP leaders are defectors from other parties. Schwartz found that most local leaders were newcomers to nationalism, sixty-eight percent being SNP members for less than five years. But only ten percent had been members of other political parties.<sup>2</sup>

If the "half-way house" theory has validity in the context of Scottish nationalism, it is probably in its application to mass voting patterns. Further investigation into the motives of leaders in joining and becoming active in nationalist activities would probably reveal that the ideology of nationalism itself played a central role.

Although such composites are always oversimplifications, the broad picture of the nationalist leader that emerges from our biographical data portrays a young, middle-class professional or technician who has been active in politics only a few years and whose life has been shaped predominantly by the contemporary Scottish experience. As one SNP organizer remarked, "We are not a bunch of yahoos or bomb-throwers. We are drawn from all walks of life and we are serious about Scotland's future."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Winifred Ewing, for example, was once a Labour Party member.

<sup>2</sup>Schwartz, op. cit., p. 496.

<sup>3</sup>In remarks to the author, October 1969.



### Party Attitudes Toward Scottish Nationalism

But how do the proposals for changing Scottish government offered by the nationalists differ from the non-nationalist position? What have the major parties proposed regarding the issue of Scottish devolution? We now turn to a consideration of these proposals.

The program of the Scottish National Party has always been vague and inconsistent.<sup>1</sup> The principles on which it was founded in 1934 were relatively moderate, stressing the goal of a separate parliament for Scotland within the basic framework of the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> But by 1946 the party had swung toward the more extreme demand of complete independence. The aim of the party was then proclaimed to be:

Self-Government for Scotland. The restoration of Scottish National sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish Government whose authority will be limited only by such agreements as will be freely entered into with other nations in order to further international co-operation and world peace.<sup>3</sup>

The tactic chosen by the party was to contest the Scottish Parliamentary seats under the existing system until a majority of all 71 Scottish seats were controlled by the SNP. Then

a Scottish Constituent Assembly shall be summoned either (a) in virtue of an Act of Parliament passed by agreement with the English members or (b) failing such agreement, by

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<sup>1</sup>In February, 1970, a former chairman of the SNP, Arthur Donaldson, defended the vagueness of the party's policy and warned the party not to get "too detailed" about what the party planned to do after independence is achieved. He explained that details are "subject to too many possibilities of change." Cf. The Scotsman, February 26, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *supra*, chap. III, p. 114.

<sup>3</sup>This and subsequent statements are part of a comprehensive "statement of Aim and Policy of the Scottish National Party" adopted 7th and 8th December 1946. The section on constitutional policy is brief but the statement goes into detail on proposed economic and social policies. The statement is reprinted in Hanham, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-30.

the Scottish National members acting in terms of the authority conferred upon them by the Scottish electorate.

Although nothing is said about the method to be used for selecting this Constituent Assembly, it is to frame a Scottish Constitution and submit it to the Scottish electorate for approval. The party hoped for a small central government and a method of electing a Parliament which would take into account "area as well as population...in the consequent redistribution of constituencies." There was passing reference to the functions of the Crown (which were to be exercised through a new Scottish Privy Council) but there were no more details of the constitutional changes desired by the party.

Although the above policy has remained the official position of the SNP ever since 1946, significant deviations began to occur in the late 1960's as the party again became a viable electoral force. In 1968 the party's position on constitutional change was presented in somewhat less clear language. Calling itself "the democratic party," the SNP claimed to seek for Scotland the "freedom and power to rule herself, reform herself, respect herself." It then went on to explain:

When a clear majority of the Scottish Parliamentary Seats is held by SNP M.P.s, they will ask the UK Parliament to set up a Scottish Legislature with full control over all the affairs of Scotland. Failing such agreement in London, the SNP M.P.s and any other Scottish M.P.s who care to join them, will form a Scottish government, loyal to the crown.<sup>1</sup>

This differed in two major ways from the 1946 statement. First, it was no longer automatic that a Constituent Assembly (now called a Legislature) would be set up when the SNP controlled a majority of Scottish seats. In the (likely) event that the British government did not go

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<sup>1</sup>"SNP and You: Aims and Policy of the Scottish National Party," 3d ed., The Scottish National Party, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1968, p. 7.

along with SNP demands, the party intended to set up its own Scottish government. Second, there was no mention of the "restoration of Scottish National sovereignty." We have to wait for the end of the statement to clarify the nature of the final goal of the party: "We want what is normal for a nation--political independence with full control of our own affairs...."<sup>1</sup>

The general thrust of this statement was reaffirmed in October, 1969, when Dr. Robert McIntyre, President of the SNP, testified to the Crowther Commission on the Constitution that the party would be compelled to declare a unilateral declaration of independence if the Parliament failed to concede it on the election of a majority of nationalist M.P.s.<sup>2</sup> But by December it was not clear that total independence was to be the final goal. In a policy statement issued by William Wolfe, Chairman of the SNP, it was declared that while political independence was still sought, "separatism and isolation are outdated concepts in general and quite alien to the Scottish character in particular," What the SNP wanted was "an association of states of the British Isles" whose object would be "economic cooperation between the member states in economic, social, cultural, and scientific fields." Even "political decisions" could be taken by this association, provided "that the consent of all the member states" was achieved.<sup>3</sup>

This policy revision was trumpeted in much of the sympathetic Scottish press as a retreat from separatism, a sensible moderation of policy. And with a general election around the corner such a moderation

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>2</sup>The Scotsman, October 1, 1969.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in The Scotsman, December 11, 1969.

of policy could be easily understood. Nevertheless, four months later in evidence to the Crowther Commission the party was again foursquare behind complete independence. The party declared "that the right of Scotland to full self-government is full and unqualified, and that Scottish national sovereignty is equal to that of any other state."<sup>1</sup>

The party's election manifesto, issued a month later in May, 1970, tried to reconcile the extreme and moderate positions. Stressing the goal of "independence" and "self-government," it denied the authority of the British Parliament to take Scotland into the European Economic Community. At the same time, it proposed "to take the initiative in the formation of an association in British states as a means by which all of the nations of the British Isles can co-operate as equals in achieving mutual progress."<sup>2</sup>

These twists and turns of policy may have been partly the result of a conscious attempt to win as many voters as possible to the nationalist cause. As Jo Grimond, the leader of the Scottish Liberals, remarked, the SNP had a policy for just about everybody who was remotely for Scottish home rule. He said that the party "spoke in the past of separation, then of dominion status for Scotland, and now they talk of a separate country and also of an association with England, Wales, and Northern Ireland."<sup>3</sup> But the discrepancies were also due to real differences within the party, cropping up again as in the past, over the degree of devolution that realistically could be achieved. Since there was no consensus on this issue, it is not surprising that a consistent

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in The Times, London, April 8, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in The Scotsman, May 15, 1970.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in The Scotsman, December 13, 1969.

and uniform policy has not emerged.

In contrast, the Scottish Liberal Party policy on Scottish home rule remained almost unchanged for eighty years. Although the issue has been stressed more at one time than another and although individual leaders have dissented, the party has generally supported the Gladstonian proposal for a Scottish parliament within the existing structure of the United Kingdom. Party resolutions in the post-war period have reiterated the theme. In 1947 the party conference urged "that the time has come for the introduction of a Scottish legislature with financial powers which shall be the final legislative authority for Scottish affairs."<sup>1</sup> In the following year a special conference resolved:

We Scots know our own troubles, but we could solve them. We must have our own Parliament in Scotland, dealing with Scottish affairs. At the same time, we must continue to be represented in the British Parliament which would deal with matters affecting the whole of Britain, such as international relations.<sup>2</sup>

This position, "to press for a Scottish Parliament within the framework of the United Kingdom,"<sup>3</sup> was reaffirmed nearly every year through 1970.

In 1961, the British Liberal Party renewed its pledge of support for its Scottish Affiliate:

This Assembly of the Liberal Parties of Great Britain urges the early establishment of a Scottish Parliament for Scottish Affairs, stating its firm belief:

- a. That Scotland is a nation, by historical fact, with separate culture and potential economic viability.

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<sup>1</sup>Resolution passed by the Scottish Liberal Party Conference in 1947. Quoted in Scottish Self-Government: The Views of the Scottish Liberal Party, The Scottish Liberal Party, Edinburgh; 1970, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>Resolution passed in 1948. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

- b. That the establishment of a separate Parliament is the practical way to tackle her special problems.
- c. That this would greatly help the work of the United Kingdom Parliament in World Affairs.
- d. That the maximum amount of fiscal power (consistent with the close co-operation in the United Kingdom and the Common Market in Europe) is essential for a Scottish Parliament. To achieve this:
  - 1. A Scottish Treasury should be responsible to the Scottish Parliament for the levying of direct and indirect taxation in Scotland and should contribute to the United Kingdom Treasury the Scottish share of Defense, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expenditure.
  - 2. Customs duties should be levied throughout the United Kingdom by a joint customs Commission under the authority of the Joint Exchequer Board.
  - 3. Excise duties in Scotland should be levied by the Scottish Treasury.
  - 4. A Joint Exchequer Board should provide the essential liaison and co-ordination between the Treasuries.<sup>1</sup>

But in 1970 the Scottish Liberal Party proposals to the Crowther Commission indicated a possible deviation from this long-standing policy. In what David Steel, Liberal M.P., insisted was not "a change in the policy of the Scottish Liberal Party,"<sup>2</sup> a program for "phased federalism" was outlined. Under this plan, the "first stage" Scottish Parliament would depend on taxes raised by the Westminster Parliament and would in the main simply take over the existing functions of the Scottish Office. A Scottish government, consisting of perhaps fifteen ministers, would take over for the Secretary of State for Scotland but the Parliament

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-2.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in The Scotsman, April 3, 1970.

would not--until the "second stage"--have taxation authority.

This deviation was primarily the result of growing opposition from the English Liberal Party to the idea of separate parliaments within the United Kingdom. It was difficult, they thought, to conceive of an English Parliament, with control over local English Affairs.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the Scottish affiliate was proposing a compromise solution involving an experimental period during which only Scotland would have its own Parliament in hopes that the whole United Kingdom could be federated at a later date.

But before these slight variations in Liberal Party policy, there was an expressed willingness to cooperate with the SNP. In 1967 the Scottish Liberal Party conference went on record welcoming

any indication from the leaders of the Scottish National Party that they are willing, in recognition of the need for both parties to place the national interests of Scotland, before short term Party interests, to co-operate with the Scottish Liberal Party to achieve a Scottish Parliament.<sup>2</sup>

Jo Grimond had long sought an electoral pact between the two parties. His argument was that the two parties were in essential agreement that Scotland should have its own parliament. He considered it counterproductive for the SNP to contest those seats which, on past performance, are better prospects for the Liberals. In addition to the five seats the Liberals already had, Grimond cited five other constituencies in which the Liberals were particularly strong.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. The Glasgow Herald, April 22, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Scottish Self-Government: The Views of the Scottish Liberal Party, p. 42.

<sup>3</sup>After the election of 1966 the Liberals held Orkney and Zetland (Grimond's seat); West Aberdeenshire; Inverness; Roxburgh, Selkirk, and Peebles; and Ross and Cromarty. In addition, the Liberals were within striking distance in East Aberdeenshire; North Angus and Mearns; Banff; Greenock; and Caithness and Sutherland.

Some within the SNP, notably David Simpson, an economist and the party's candidate for Berwick and East Lothian, favored such a "common front." Presumably the Liberals would at minimum agree not to contest those constituencies in which the SNP had shown strength in 1966.<sup>1</sup> In November 1969 the leaders of the two parties formally met and discussed a possible pact. Simpson suggested that mutual support for "the idea of a sovereign Scottish parliament" was sufficient basis for constituency-level alliances.<sup>2</sup> But the outcome of this meeting was inconclusive and by December the SNP National Council rejected the idea of a formal national pact between the two parties, explaining that the Liberal position on Scottish independence was "one of confusion and constant contradiction."<sup>3</sup> Cooperation between the parties at the constituency level was not ruled out--in fact, the Liberals in East Lothian had already decided to back Simpson, and the SNP had no intention of opposing Grimond in Orkney--but the chances for a large-scale pact for the mutual benefit of both home rule parties were now nil. Grimond thought it "madness" for the SNP and the Liberals to oppose each other and divide the home rule vote,<sup>4</sup> but there was little sign of cooperation after this point. In fact, the failure of the electoral pact may have been the final factor which subsequently pushed the Scottish Liberals into their revised proposal for "phased federalism."

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<sup>1</sup>West Lothian; Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire; West Stirlingshire; Perth and East Perthshire; Kinross and West Perthshire; and of course Hamilton.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in The Scotsman, November 29, 1969.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in The Scotsman, December 8, 1969.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. The Scotsman, December 31, 1969.



Aside from the Communists,<sup>1</sup> it was the Conservative Party which in 1970 proposed the next most radical plan for changing Scotland's government. There is not much history to the Tory plan for Scottish devolution. In fact, for most of the past century the Conservatives have not even taken cognizance of the existence of a home rule movement in Scotland. But in 1968 at the national party conference Edward Heath proposed a "Scottish Assembly" with limited rule-making authority in purely Scottish affairs. In March, 1970, a Party commission, which had been appointed to study the Heath recommendations, issued its report. Alec Douglas-Home, the former Prime Minister and Chairman of the Commission, indicated that the Heath proposals had merit and should be enacted. The Commission recommended a parliament to be called the "Scottish Convention" with two main powers: the ability to summon Scottish Ministers in the Westminster Government to appear before it, and the responsibility for dealing with all stages of Scottish legislation except the Third Reading--which would be handled by Westminster as usual. The report was inconclusive on the question of the power of taxation for the Convention, but it indicated that special taxes on things such as liquor and cigarettes might be a feasible way of raising revenue for Scotland.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In its proposals to the Crowther Commission, the Communist Party of Great Britain advocated a plan similar to the Liberal program: separate parliaments for Scotland and Wales, with administrative machinery and financial resources adequate for them to plan national development. These parliaments would be elected by proportional representation independently of the Westminster Parliament and would have the power to tax and to deal with areas such as domestic planning, employment, working conditions, agriculture, transport, fuel and power, housing, education, health, and culture. Cf. The Scotsman, April 24, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Scotland's Government: A Report of the Scottish Constitutional Committee, Scot. Const. Comm., Edinburgh, 1970. Cf. also The Glasgow Herald, March 20, 1970, and a preliminary report in The Sunday Times, February 22, 1970.

The plan immediately ran into stiff opposition from Conservative leaders in both Scotland and England, but in May, 1970, the Scottish Conservative Party officially endorsed it.<sup>1</sup> The main advantage of the proposed Convention would be that it would relieve the work load of the UK Parliament by shunting the time-consuming preliminary stages of Scottish legislation to a special body; the main objection to the plan was that, being an independently elected chamber, there was a good possibility that a majority of its members might be hostile to the executive in London. This would create a situation of parliamentary impasse.

But there seemed little chance of it ever being enacted--even if one of its main proponents, Edward Heath, was elevated to the Prime Ministership. Even the Party's election literature for Scotland published later in the year gave little space to the new recommendations. The main thrust of the literature was: "Reform is needed in central government, which is overloaded," but "we reject separatism and believe federalism to be impractical."<sup>2</sup> All the hullabaloo about home rule which had encouraged the Conservatives to move in the direction of devolution in 1968 was simmering down by 1970. In subsequent years, Heath's Conservative government was not to act on the Home recommendations.

It is ironic that the party least favorable to additional administrative or legislative devolution in Scotland is the Labour Party. After decades of support for home rule, the party ceased serious

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. The Scotsman, May 16, 1970.

<sup>2</sup>Tomorrow Scotland, Better with the Conservatives, Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, Edinburgh, 1970.

discussion of the issue as they sensed electoral victory in 1945. By 1958 the Scottish Council of the Labour Party was declaring its belief "in the principle of the maximum possible self-government for Scotland" provided that Scotland continue its full representation in the British Parliament.<sup>1</sup> From this point, opposition to the idea of Scottish home rule grew steadily. The 1966 election manifesto indicated that the party was against the removal from Westminster of any rule-making authority relating to Scotland. "Labour respects the differences of culture and tradition in Scotland," it declared, but "we see the economic well-being of Great Britain as indivisible."<sup>2</sup>

In its 1969 statement, the party stressed again "indivisibility" of Britain:

We believe in Britain. We believe that the voice of Britain in the councils of the world must not be weakened in any way. Equally we insist that Scotland's share in that voice must not be lessened.

Regional policies of real benefit to Scotland can only be carried through effectively on a United Kingdom basis and this strengthens our rejection of any proposals that Scotland should be economically or politically torn apart from the United Kingdom.

Whilst we reject complete separation,...we nevertheless recognize the desire of our people for a deeper involvement in our own affairs. We wish to obtain the greatest possible devolution consistent with our absolute determination to retain the maximum possible influence on the economic and political policies of the United Kingdom.<sup>3</sup>

It then went on to explain how local government reform was the proper response to this desire "for a deeper involvement in our own affairs."

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Scottish Government: Interim Report, Labour Party Scottish Council, Glasgow, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted in The Government of Scotland: Evidence of the Labour Party in Scotland to the Commission on the Constitution, Labour Party Scottish Council, Glasgow, 1970, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Scottish Government: Interim Report, p. 21.

This theme was reiterated in March, 1970, in the Labour Party's evidence to the Crowther Commission on the Constitution. After dismissing the idea of separatism on economic grounds, the statement admitted the need for some change in the "monolithic framework" of British government. But reform is needed not at the national level, but the local level. "[T]he reform of local government presents the best and most immediate opportunity for further devolution of power to Scotland, and for a parallel strengthening of Scottish local democracy."<sup>1</sup> Incorporating the recommendations of the Wheatley Commission on Local Government in Scotland<sup>2</sup> issued in September, 1969, the statement proposed a two-tier structure for local government: seven regional authorities with control over major planning, industrial development, roads, education, etc., and thirty-seven district authorities with control over local planning, parks, libraries, licensing, etc. But this plan involved little or no devolution of administrative authority from the national government to local authorities. It was a suggestion for purely internal reform.

On the question of a separate parliament for Scotland, even with the limited authority of the Conservative's Scottish Convention, the evidence to the Crowther Commission was unequivocal:

We have considered long and carefully the possibility of a separate Parliament, Assembly, Council or some other elected authority with executive or legislative powers covering the whole of Scotland, and we feel strongly that any such body--whilst superficially attractive as a short-term palliative to our problems--would be divisive and would inevitably create

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<sup>1</sup>The Government of Scotland..., p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Scotland: Local Government Reform, H.M.S.O., Edinburgh, 1969; and, for a brief description, The Scotsman, September 26, 1969.

an unfavourable environment for the methods of government which we require.<sup>1</sup>

At one point in its presentation of evidence to the Commission the party spokesman even said he would prefer to see the Tories rule Britain than see the Scots win complete independence with their own parliament. The Times reported the session as follows:

Mr. John Pollock, vice-chairman of the party, said a Scottish Assembly as proposed by the Conservatives would, if it was to be effective, reduce the effectiveness of Scottish M.P.s at Westminster, where their voice ought to be heard. If the assembly was to be purely a talking shop it would not attract members of any calibre.

. . .

Asked by Lord Crowther if the party would change its view if a Conservative government was elected and remained in power for as long as 13 years, Mr. Pollock said: "It is an unlikely hypothesis but even the possibility of a Conservative government ever ruling Great Britain again would be preferable to complete independence."<sup>2</sup>

One begins to understand part of the motivation behind this attitude if one considers that without Scotland sending M.P.s to Westminster, Labour would have lost the election of 1964. In 1966, Labour sent 26 more M.P.s to Westminster from Scotland than the Conservatives did.

In summary, then, it is clear that the SNP, although presenting proposals varying in detail, advocated the most sweeping changes in the government of Scotland. These changes center on the establishment of an independent Scottish parliament with powers over all affairs of Scotland. Whether or not complete severance of all ties to England would be a part of this, however, is a matter of considerable dispute. The Liberal Party and the Communist Party proposed similar plans for a

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<sup>1</sup>The Government of Scotland..., p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>The Times, London, May 5, 1970.

Scottish Parliament with limited authority to raise taxes and to legislate in areas relevant to Scottish local affairs, matters of international relations and defense being left under the control of the British Parliament. The Conservative Party proposed a parliament for Scotland with even less authority, limited to the consideration of preliminary stages of Scottish legislation and to the right to question government ministers. And finally, the Labour Party advocated the least change in the existing relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom. Rejecting the idea of a separate parliament for Scotland, Labour instead proposed a reform of local government to increase the involvement of Scots in their own affairs.

## CHAPTER V

### SCOTLAND AS A DEPRIVED REGION

Was it for little Belgium's sake  
Sae mony thoosand Scotsmen dee'd?  
And never ane for Scotland, fegs!  
Wi' twenty thoosand times mair need!

The physical nuances of a landscape strongly influence the distribution, livelihoods, and well-being of a people. Arid or mountainous land is frequently unsuitable for agriculture; insufficient basic mineral resources like coal, petroleum, and iron often retard industrial development. As societies industrialize, they become more specialized, and the character of a nation's landscape makes some areas appropriate for shipbuilding, others for paper production, still others for growing cotton, while leaving some regions economically non-productive.

This geographic influence on economic activity and the placement of industries may have profound social implications. First, to the extent that one's occupation or role in the economic system influences one's social outlook, geography may correlate with opinions, attitudes, and even ideologies. If working in the mines or on the docks fosters left-wing political views, mining towns and port cities may be characterized by significant socialist or communist organizations.<sup>1</sup> One need not accept the Marxist notion that all political conditions derive from

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Kornhauser, op. cit., pp. 213-22.

economic relationships<sup>1</sup> to acknowledge that occupation is related to political attitudes and to political behavior.<sup>2</sup>

Second, both long-run economic trends and the short-run vagaries of the market mechanism have uneven effects in a nation's economy and may affect geographic regions differently. The development of nuclear power sources may adversely affect areas where coal mining is a dominant economic activity while lowering costs and increasing productivity in areas which previously had to pay high transport rates for traditional fuels. In addition, the depletion of a region's mineral resources, forcing consumers of raw materials to turn to other regions or external sources, will be felt unevenly in an economy. The typical result of such circumstances is a rise in unemployment in the region directly affected.

In a semi-planned economy, short-run variations in demand can also have a differential regional effect. Industries concentrated in specific areas can have a potentially harmful effect on their region should demand for their products fall off. The aerospace industry in Washington, California, and Florida is a contemporary American example. A rise in regional unemployment is the expected result.

Hence, in a number of complex ways geography can influence a society's economic and political systems. But one assumption of behavioral theory is that environmental conditions must be perceived if they

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<sup>1</sup>Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 141-4.

<sup>2</sup>In Britain, for example, 75% of those in "unskilled manual" occupations had a Labour party self-image in 1963 while only 14% of those in "higher managerial" occupations identified with the Labour party. Cf. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain, Macmillan, London, 1969, p. 77. For evidence from France, Italy, and Britain in the 1950's, cf. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 230-78.



are to affect human behavior. Boulding suggests that men's "behavior depends on the image" they have of the world.<sup>1</sup> If regional variations within a society are subtle or insignificant, they may not become part of the image of their society men carry around in their heads. And behavior cannot reflect conditions which are not perceived.

In later chapters we shall use attitudinal data to construct a model of the Scottish national image. But before turning to that data, which is after all only the combined subjective impressions of a national group, we shall examine aggregate evidence to establish the empirical parameters of regional economic and political variations within Britain. The predominant Scottish image is that within the context of the United Kingdom, Scotland is economically and politically deprived. But as we show in this chapter, the aggregate evidence presents a highly ambiguous picture. Scotland trails the rest of the country in some respects but leads in others. In Chapter Two we noted the distinction between persisting and short-term deprivation. The former involves economic and political discrimination, the way a region was brought into the union, and a relative paucity of educational opportunities; the latter involves recently adverse economic conditions, taxes, inflation, and new government restrictions on political participation and representation.<sup>2</sup> These deprivation variables, in addition to data on population growth and movement, provide the focus for this

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth Boulding, The Image, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1956, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. chap. II, pp. 18-19.

chapter.<sup>1</sup>

### Population and Migration

Embracing one-third of the total area of the United Kingdom, Scotland claims only 9.6% of its total population. Like most of the rest of the world, Scotland's population has multiplied significantly in the past century and a half, increasing from only 1.6 million in 1801 to an estimated 5.2 million in 1966. Scotland industrialized during this period, and a great population shift to urban areas transformed the demographic and social character of the country.

As in England, the middle of the nineteenth century was a time of great economic change in Scotland. "The prosperity of Scotland," Cairncross notes, "was built on heavy industries--especially those in the metal and engineering group."<sup>2</sup> With coal a convenient source of

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<sup>1</sup>Although the British have a penchant for gathering aggregate statistics perhaps unmatched by any but the Swedes, the problems of comparing regions within Britain using such statistics are formidable. In the first place many data are not centrally gathered. Scotland has traditionally enumerated its own census, managed its own developmental statistics, and has been responsible for its own social service data. This means that information needed to do a comparative study is scattered. Moreover, as a result, there are variations in the nature of the comparative base. In some instances Scotland can only be compared to England and Wales. In others it is necessary to contrast Scotland with the United Kingdom as a whole, i.e., England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Because we want to show the relative well-being of Scotland and England, we will use regional data whenever possible. But due to these irregularities in statistical compilation, we will often be forced to utilize other baseline data. This will always have the effect of reducing differences and this should be kept in mind when we use "United Kingdom" or "Great Britain" baseline data. A third difficulty is that the criteria on which data are gathered often differ from one region to the next. This is particularly noticeable between England and Scotland in such areas as finance, education, and law, since business in these areas is run independently in the two regions. Whenever these data are non-comparable, we will avoid using them. For a good general description of the "multi-national regions" of the United Kingdom, cf. Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, An Irish Perspective, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1971, chap. ii.

<sup>2</sup>A. K. Cairncross (ed.), The Scottish Economy: A Statistical Account of Scottish Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1954, p. 3.

power, Scotland soon established world leadership in shipbuilding and marine engineering, locomotive-building, foundry-work, and the production of heavy industrial equipment. She built a strong export trade in textiles, carpets, and whiskey. "From being a poor and backward agricultural country," Cairncross summarizes, "Scotland leapt forward to the very forefront of modern capitalism...."<sup>1</sup>

Paralleling this process of industrialization was a population migration from rural areas in the Highlands and southern Borders to the cities in the central lowland belt.<sup>2</sup> In 1801 forty-two percent of the population lived in the central belt, which includes both Glasgow (situated near the western coast on the River Clyde) and Edinburgh (on the banks of the Firth of Forth near the eastern coast). The urbanization of Scotland was largely complete by 1931 when seventy-five percent of the population lived in this central belt. Migration trends in Scotland still reveal these centripetal forces, but regional population proportions have changed little in the past forty years.<sup>3</sup>

While in absolute numbers Scotland's population has increased markedly over the past 160 years, two factors contribute to an image of stagnation. First, population growth, especially in the twentieth

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>For census purposes, the Registrar General divides the country into four regions. Northern, West Central, East Central, and Southern. The two central regions separate the Northern and Southern divisions and combine to make the central lowland belt. This belt consists of the counties of Dunbarton, Ayr, Renfrew, and Lanmark in the west, and Fife, Clackmannan, Stirling, West Lothian, Midlothian, East Lothian, and the city of Dundee in the east.

<sup>3</sup>In 1961, 76% of the population (about half of whom resided within 20 miles of Glasgow's city center) lived in the central belt. Population figures are from the decennial census reports which are summarized in Kellas, op. cit , pp 238-43.

TABLE 10

## SCOTLAND'S POPULATION, 1801-1966

| Census      | Total in millions | As percentage of England and Wales |
|-------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1801        | 1.608             | 18.1                               |
| 1851        | 2.889             | 16.1                               |
| 1871        | 3.360             | 14.8                               |
| 1891        | 4.026             | 13.9                               |
| 1901        | 4.472             | 13.7                               |
| 1911        | 4.761             | 13.2                               |
| 1921        | 4.882             | 12.9                               |
| 1931        | 4.843             | 12.1                               |
| 1951        | 5.096             | 11.6                               |
| 1961        | 5.179             | 11.2                               |
| 1966 (est.) | 5.188             | 10.7                               |

Sources: Kellas, Modern Scotland; and Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, London, 1969.

century, has been unsteady. Between 1921 and 1931 Scotland's population actually declined slightly and a similar falling off was observed between 1961 and 1971. Second, as a region Scotland has grown far less quickly than England. As Table 10 shows, the proportion of Scots relative to English and Welsh has fallen steadily since 1801. These factors can be traced neither to lower birth rates nor to significantly higher death rates in Scotland. In fact Scottish birth rates are higher than those in any of the other nine Standard Economic Planning Regions of Britain. Death rates, while slightly higher than the British average, are still lower than in three other regions.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, births have always exceeded deaths in Scotland.

Scotland's relatively low rate of population growth and its occasional absolute decline in numbers is directly related to emigration.

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<sup>1</sup>Edwin Hammond, An Analysis of Regional Economic and Social Statistics, University of Durham Rowntree Research Unit, Durham, 1968.

TABLE 11

MIGRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION,  
SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND AND WALES, 1871-1971,  
BY DECADES

| Decade         | Scotland | England and Wales | Difference: Scotland<br>exceeds England and Wales |
|----------------|----------|-------------------|---|
| 1871-81        | -2.8%    | - .7%             | 2.1   |
| 1881-91        | -5.8     | -2.3              | 3.5   |
| 1891-1901      | -1.3     | - .2              | 1.1   |
| 1901-11        | -5.7     | -1.5              | 4.2   |
| 1911-21        | -5.0     | -1.7              | 3.3   |
| 1921-31        | -8.0     | - .4              | 7.6   |
| 1931-51        | -4.5     | +1.9              | 6.3   |
| 1951-61        | -5.5     | + .9              | 6.4   |
| 1961-71 (est.) | -7.6     | +1.4              | 9.0   |

Source: Central Statistics Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics.

The rate of population outflow has always been greater in Scotland than in England and Wales. Table 11 shows net migration in the two regions as a percentage of their respective populations. It is apparent that the discrepancy between the regions has increased in the past fifty years. A report prepared by the Scottish Economic Planning Board (SEPB) showed that between 1951 and 1968, ninety-two percent of Scotland's natural population increase was lost through emigration.<sup>1</sup> This high rate of population outflow can be seen not only as a cause of Scotland's slow population growth but also as an important result of certain social conditions inside Scotland.

The reasons people emigrate from their countries are varied. Some seek relief from racial or religious discrimination; others attempt to

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<sup>1</sup>The Report, prepared for circulation among Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants, was summarized by the Edinburgh newspaper, The Scotsman, January 29, 1970. During the latter part of the period studied the net outflow in Scotland was matched in western Europe only by Malta.

escape political oppression. Some respond to economic hardships at home; others have a vision of unlimited opportunities abroad. A common thread connecting these motivations is a perception of relative deprivation; most people emigrate because they think they will be better off politically, economically, or socially, than they were in the first place. They expect emigration to remove inequalities or deprivations. And since emigration is such a drastic step, involving separation from family, friends, and home, such deprivations must be strongly felt.<sup>1</sup>

In Scotland, a number of social conditions might underlie the motivation to emigrate. Some of these will be noted below. The SEPB report showed that "for Scotland the closest relationship appears to exist (with a time lag) between the level of net emigration to the rest of the U.K. and relative unemployment--especially relative male unemployment--as measured by the difference between Scottish and Great Britain percentage rates."<sup>2</sup> In addition, the report found negative correlations between emigration rates on the one hand and income levels, economic opportunities, and housing conditions on the other. These factors suggest a strong positive relationship between deprivation and emigration.

A significant implication of the data in Table 11 is that, since emigration has been increasing in Scotland, an underlying sense of deprivation may also be on the rise. This conclusion is unavoidable if we assume a strong positive linkage between deprivation and emigration.

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Oscar Handlin's description of deprivations and hardships felt by American immigrants in The Uprooted, Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1951.

<sup>2</sup>Loc. cit.

It is also notable that the two major surges of nationalism in the twentieth century, the cultural renaissance of the 20's and the political activity of the 60's, occurred during periods of very high emigration. While these are but the aggregate effects of behavioral variables and ought to be treated as indicative rather than conclusive, one reasonable explanation of these relationships is that emigration and nationalism are complementary and not mutually exclusive ways of responding to a single stimulus--deprivation-induced frustration. One means of dealing with an unpleasant or frustrating problem is literally to run away from it. When the emigrant leaves home, he hopes to leave his problems behind.

In connection with this it is important to know where emigrants go in order to determine the perceived source of the problems. If Scots emigrate abroad, we might conclude that England is perceived to be not much better off than Scotland. If the flow to England is high, England is seen as a place of escape from Scotland's problems. Available migration data shows that emigration from Scotland to other parts of the United Kingdom has always been high, but that short-term fluctuations are possible. In 1963, sixty-two percent of those leaving Scotland were bound for other parts of the United Kingdom. By 1967 this proportion had fallen to just thirty-six percent.<sup>1</sup> This suggests that Scots were increasingly regarding their problems to be universal throughout the Kingdom and not specific to Scotland. England, in other words, may have ceased to be a positive comparative reference group for many Scots.

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<sup>1</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 30.

### Income and Unemployment

There is no official estimate of the total worth of goods and services produced in Scotland. Since Scotland lacks economic as well as political autonomy, national income is a hypothetical concept which, while useful in gauging Scotland's overall economic well-being, is imprecise and tentative. Income and production statistics are gathered on a regional basis in Britain, but it is difficult to calculate Scotland's share of United Kingdom property income, national debt payments, and private company profits since these are computed on a national basis.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, independent efforts to estimate the Scottish national income have arrived at similar broad conclusions. Campbell estimated that real income (in 1938 prices) per head of population in Scotland rose from 83 pounds in 1924 to 182 pounds in 1948.<sup>2</sup> But this absolute rise was not matched by an increase in the percentage ratio between real income in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole. With only minor fluctuations, Scotland's real income per capita remained at ninety percent of the United Kingdom figure throughout the period studied.

A more recent study of the Scottish economy presents an even more marked contrast between Scotland and the rest of Britain. McCrone found that Scotland's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1960 was only 8.7% of the U.K. total.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>A discussion of the difficulties of measuring Scotland's national income appears in A. D. Campbell, "Income," in Cairncross (ed.), op. cit., pp. 47-9.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-1.

<sup>3</sup>The Gross Domestic Product "measures the output of the Scottish economy, but unlike national income it takes no account of income received by Scottish residents from elsewhere, nor does it deduct income arising in Scotland which is paid to shareholders and others living outside Scotland...." However, "[s]ince the difference between GDP and national income is very small, this may be taken as a guide to the Scottish standard of living." Gavin McCrone, Scotland's Future: The Economics of Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp. 12-13.



Expressed in terms per capita, measuring the "overall productivity of the economy," Scotland's GDP was 377 pounds compared to the United Kingdom's 431 pounds. At that time Scotland's level of per capita output was only eighty-seven percent of the United Kingdom's level. Moreover, the Gross Domestic Products for Wales and Northern Ireland (each about ninety percent of the United Kingdom average) are included in the total figures and depress the United Kingdom total; were Scotland compared to England alone, the differences would be even more marked.

A comparable discrepancy is discernable in personal income figures. In 1965 the average annual income for Scots was 853 pounds, only ninety-one percent of the average English income of 938 pounds.<sup>1</sup> Figure 4 reveals the extent to which Scotland's income distribution deviates from the national average. Nearly fifty-five percent of all Scottish incomes are under 750 pounds annually contrasted to forty-six percent of all British incomes. Two factors contribute to this discrepancy. First, wages are generally lower in Scotland than for equivalent work in England. Table 12 shows that for every industry group but two, the average annual wage in 1967 was lower in Scotland than in the United Kingdom as a whole. Moreover, the cost of living is approximately as high in Scotland as elsewhere in the Kingdom. Although in 1967 the average weekly household income in Scotland was ninety-six percent of that for the whole United Kingdom, expenditures were more than one hundred percent, indicating that income discrepancies are not mitigated by countervailing costs.<sup>2</sup>


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<sup>1</sup>Hammond, op. cit., Table 7.1.1 (b).

<sup>2</sup>Scottish Statistical Office, Digest of Scottish Statistics, No. 33, April, 1969, HMSO, Edinburgh, 1969.

FIGURE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME BEFORE TAXES,  
BY PERCENT: SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1964/65



Source: Hammond, An Analysis of Regional Economic and Social Statistics, Tables 7.1.1(a) and 7.1.1(b).



Number of species in various taxonomic groups, 1960-2000

TABLE 12

AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS OF MALE MANUAL WORKERS,  
BY INDUSTRY, SCOTLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1967

| Industry                                 | Weekly Earnings |    |                |    |                             |
|--|-----------------|----|----------------|----|-----------------------------|
|  | Scotland        |    | United Kingdom |    | Scotland<br>As % of<br>U.K. |
|  | s.              | d. | s.             | d. |                             |
| 1. Agriculture, forestry, fishing        | * <sup>a</sup>  |    | *              |    |                             |
| 2. Mining and quarrying                  | 412             | 0  | 418            | 9  | 98.4                        |
| 3. Food, drink, tobacco                  | 378             | 1  | 399            | 6  | 94.6                        |
| 4. Chemicals and allied industries       | 429             | 6  | 430            | 2  | 99.9                        |
| 5. Metal manufacture                     | 416             | 8  | 431            | 6  | 96.6                        |
| 6. Engineering and electrical goods      | 427             | 9  | 415            | 3  | 103.0                       |
| 7. Shipbuilding and marine engineering   | 416             | 3  | 433            | 6  | 96.0                        |
| 8. Vehicles                              | 442             | 3  | 467            | 5  | 94.6                        |
| 9. Metal goods not elsewhere specified   | 403             | 5  | 411            | 0  | 98.1                        |
| 10. Textiles                             | 340             | 0  | 373            | 2  | 91.1                        |
| 11. Leather, leather goods, fur          | 339             | 6  | 363            | 11 | 93.3                        |
| 12. Clothing and footwear                | 367             | 10 | 365            | 6  | 100.7                       |
| 13. Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc. | 395             | 4  | 428            | 11 | 92.1                        |
| 14. Timber, furniture, etc.              | 355             | 0  | 389            | 1  | 91.3                        |
| 15. Paper, printing and publishing       | 418             | 10 | 478            | 2  | 87.6                        |
| 16. Other manufacturing industries       | 402             | 9  | 419            | 11 | 95.9                        |
| 17. Construction                         | 400             | 1  | 412            | 0  | 97.1                        |
| 18. Gas, electricity and water           | 372             | 0  | 385            | 9  | 96.4                        |
| 19. Transport and communication          | 385             | 4  | 419            | 0  | 92.0                        |
| 20. Distributive trades                  | *               |    | *              |    |                             |
| 21. Insurance, banking and finance       | *               |    | *              |    |                             |
| 22. Professional and scientific services | *               |    | *              |    |                             |
| 23. Miscellaneous services               | 351             | 2  | 355            | 4  | 98.8                        |
| 24. Public administration and defense    | 294             | 7  | 322            | 10 | 91.2                        |
| All categories except 1, 20, 21, 22      | 394             | 4  | 411            | 7  | 95.8                        |

<sup>a</sup>data missing

Source: Kellas, Modern Scotland, pp. 244-5.

The income gap between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom was not always as apparent as it is today. During the first decades of the century Scotland's wages in many industries were actually higher than UK averages. A Board of Trade Earnings Enquiry in 1906 revealed that of seventeen industries surveyed, Scottish men received

wages higher than UK averages in six. Scottish women received higher than average wages in nine industries out of eleven.<sup>1</sup> But by midcentury Scotland's wage situation had worsened. One example of the extent of the reversal is the boot and shoe industry where average weekly earnings in 1906 were 30/3 in Scotland and only 26/4 in the United Kingdom generally. In 1951 earnings in Scotland were up to 126/2 weekly but those for the UK as a whole passed Scotland at 155/3.<sup>2</sup> Similar patterns are discernable in nearly all industries. Ireland's exit from the union in 1921 inflated the United Kingdom totals somewhat but not enough to account for such large differences. There were indications that during the 1960's wage discrepancies between Scotland and the United Kingdom were declining. In 1962 the percentage ratio was ninety-three percent, in 1965 it was ninety-four percent, and by 1967 it had risen to ninety-six percent.<sup>3</sup> But this fluctuation is minor and may be transitory.

The second factor affecting the gap between average incomes in Scotland and in England is unemployment. Table 13 shows that rates of unemployment have always been higher in Scotland than in Great Britain as a whole. In the post-war period, although unemployment has been generally low, Scotland's rates have been close to double those for the whole country. One problem relates to the nature of Scotland's economy. Leser argues that

The predominance of heavy industry makes Scotland sensitive to economic depression since it is generally the production of heavy engineering products that falls off the most drastically in a slump. In the early 1930's, for example, unemployment in Britain increased from 10.1% in the comparatively

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<sup>1</sup>D. J. Robertson, "Wages," in Cairncross (ed.), op. cit., p. 152.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Kellas, op. cit., p. 245.

prosperous years 1927-29 to 20.3% in the worst years of the slump, 1931-33, while in Scotland the increase was from 11.4% to 26.2%. Scotland was rather harder hit, and one reason, but not the sole reason, was that she had specialized in some of the industries that suffered the biggest increase in unemployment. No doubt if one were to compare Scotland not with Great Britain as a whole but with the Midlands or the South of England, the difference in unemployment rates in the slump of 1932 would be much greater.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE 13

AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT IN SCOTLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN,  
BY PERCENT, IN SELECTED YEARS

| Year | Scotland | Great Britain | Year | Scotland | Great Britain |
|------|----------|---------------|------|----------|---------------|
| 1923 | 14.3%    | 11.6%         | 1955 | 2.4%     | 1.1%          |
| 1926 | 16.4     | 12.3          | 1959 | 4.4      | 2.2           |
| 1927 | 10.6     | 9.6           | 1960 | 3.7      | 1.6           |
| 1930 | 18.5     | 15.8          | 1961 | 3.2      | 1.5           |
| 1932 | 27.7     | 21.9          | 1962 | 3.8      | 2.0           |
| 1935 | 21.3     | 15.3          | 1963 | 4.8      | 2.5           |
| 1939 | 13.5     | 10.3          | 1964 | 3.7      | 1.6           |
| 1943 | 1.0      | .5            | 1965 | 3.0      | 1.4           |
| 1945 | 2.2      | 1.0           | 1966 | 2.9      | 1.5           |
| 1946 | 4.6      | 2.4           | 1967 | 3.9      | 2.4           |
| 1950 | 3.1      | 1.5           | 1968 | 3.8      | 2.4           |

Sources: Kellas, Modern Scotland; Scottish Statistical Office, Digest of Scottish Statistics.

But even more important in the long-run is that two of Scotland's mainstay industries, mining and shipbuilding, have declined in overall importance to the British economy. The Central Statistical Office's Index of Industrial Production shows that during the 1963-68 period only three British industries showed a decline in production. One was the leather industry--not particularly important to Scotland--which in 1968 produced ninety-three percent of its 1963 level of output. The

<sup>1</sup>C. E. V. Leser, "Production," in Cairncross (ed.), op. cit., pp. 69-70.

other two industries were mining and shipbuilding, the former producing only eighty-five percent of its 1963 level, the latter eighty-seven percent.<sup>1</sup> Since these two industries together account for almost seven percent of the total employment in Scotland, this decline in production can only have inflated Scotland's unemployment figures.

The SEPB report noted above supplied evidence to suggest that economic deprivations, including unemployment, may be related to emigration. One way to examine this hypothesis using aggregate data is to see if sub-groups with high unemployment rates are those with high emigration rates. A few examples will show that the results are mixed. First, the geographic regions of Scotland most severely affected by unemployment are the Highlands and the southern Borders. In many parts of the Highlands unemployment runs as high as twenty percent. The shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy caused a corresponding shift in population. The relative population decline in these regions is striking: from fifty-eight percent of the total Scottish population in 1801 to only twenty-four percent in 1961. Since 1891 there has been a decline in absolute numbers as well. As economic opportunities increased in the cities relative to the countryside, working families emigrated to Scottish cities, English cities, and abroad. The Highlands, the region most commonly differentiated from the rest of Britain in cultural and historical terms, is one of the regions most severely differentiated in an economic sense as well.

However, an examination of age groups shows that the relationship between unemployment and emigration is not general. Unemployment is

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<sup>1</sup>Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 106, 1969, HMSO, London, 1969, p. 146.

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higher among workers over forty than among those under forty. The over forty group, making up forty-nine percent of all insured employees, represent fifty-one percent of all those unemployed.<sup>1</sup> But the SEBP report showed that emigration is "concentrated in the key 15-34 age group and amounted to fifty-five percent of the net loss."<sup>2</sup> This discrepancy illustrates the central fact that, while unemployment and emigration are undoubtedly related, there are intervening variables which depress the correlation. Ease of mobility probably makes young people more likely than older people to emigrate. The perception of opportunities, both at home and elsewhere, is also likely to be a key factor, but one not necessarily related to one's employment/unemployment status. The SEBP report itself goes on to contradict the relationship between unemployment and migration when it finds that sixty-four percent of Scotland's net loss occurs among persons economically active while this group makes up only fifty percent of the population as a whole.<sup>3</sup> Hanham is probably right when he asserts that emigration is a kind of safety valve in Scotland since unemployment and its concomitant problems would have been even more serious had it not been for the ease of emigration abroad and to the south.<sup>4</sup> But the relationship is not simple and those who emigrate do not appear to be the unemployed.

Hence, in terms of national and personal income and relative rates of unemployment Scotland trails United Kingdom averages and presents an image of a deprived region. Other specific indicators strengthen this

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<sup>1</sup>Data are from 1966. Hammond, op. cit., Tables 2.1.4 and 2.2.3.

<sup>2</sup>The Scotsman, January 29, 1970.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Hanham, op. cit., p. 30.

image. With 9.6% of the total British population, Scotland claims only 7.5% of its cars,<sup>1</sup> 5.5% of its computers,<sup>2</sup> and the headquarters of just 4.7% of Britain's 300 largest firms.<sup>3</sup>

But to say that Scotland suffers deprivation is not to say that she suffers from discrimination. In fact the central government has set up procedures for reducing the economic discrepancies between England (especially southeast England) and the rest of the United Kingdom. Begun in 1960 and greatly expanded in 1966, government programs now exist to lure private industry into especially designated "development areas" by providing financial incentives in the form of investment and building grants, training schemes, and general purpose loans.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of such programs is to encourage companies to carry on expansion in areas other than the southeast, thereby reducing what are euphemistically called the "reserves of manpower" in the development areas. Being one of these areas, Scotland is a preferred region for industrial development. Although these programs have thus far met with only limited success, their very existence, when emphasized by widespread

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<sup>1</sup>Hammond, op. cit., Table 6.5.2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Table 2.6.2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Table 2.6.4.

<sup>4</sup>Included in the program are: (1) The Industrial Development Act (1966) which provides for long-term investment grants for new plant and machinery in certain industries at a rate (40%) double that for the rest of the country; (2) Local Employment Acts (1960 to 1966) which provide government premises for rent or purchase, grants of 25-30% for new buildings, or general purpose loans for capital assets or working capital; and (3) the Nucleus Labour Force Scheme which provides assistance for unemployed local people transferred temporarily to the new place of work for (additionally assisted) industrial training. The five development areas, in addition to Northern Ireland, are Scotland, Wales, Merseyside, North (Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, Durham, and Yorks, North Riding), and Southwest (Cornwall and North Devon). Cf. Great Britain, Board of Trade, Government Help for Your Business, HMSO, London, 1969.

publicity, may relieve the sense of neglect in Scotland.

A second important way the central government seeks to equalize living standards in Scotland and England is through the system of direct grants to local authorities. These grants are for use by municipalities and counties in sustaining their programs in education, housing, health, law enforcement, roads, and other services. In 1966-67, government grants accounted for twenty-eight percent of the total income of local authorities in England and Wales and thirty percent of the total in Scotland. But the size of the Scottish grants in relation to that for England and Wales indicates even more forcefully the central government's intent. In 1966-67 the Scottish grant was thirteen percent of that awarded to England and Wales, about 33 million pounds more than would be apportioned to Scotland solely on the basis of population.<sup>1</sup> Table 14 shows that "identifiable" central government expenditure per head of population is substantially greater for Scotland than for England and Wales.

Long-run economic indicators reveal the extent to which persisting deprivations are suffered by sub-groups within a society, but short-run fluctuations in certain sectors of an economy may adversely affect some groups more than others. The short-run economic situation for Scotland, however, closely parallels that for the United Kingdom as a whole. The 1956-68 period--both in Scotland and in the whole of Britain--was an era of inflation, rising taxes, an unfavorable trade balance, and generally unencouraging economic indicators. The annual rate of inflation in Britain was more than 3.6% between 1962 and 1968, up from the 2.5%

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<sup>1</sup>Central Statistical Office, op. cit., pp. 313-7.

TABLE 14

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER HEAD OF POPULATION IN  
SCOTLAND AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1966-67

| Service   | Scotland |    |    | England<br>& Wales |     |    |
|---|----------|----|----|--------------------|-----|----|
|   | L        | s  | d  | L                  | s   | d  |
| Roads (including Lighting)  | 6        | 6  | 0  | 4                  | 8   | 2  |
| Airports  |          | 12 | 9  |                    | 4   | 1  |
| Ports   |          |    | 5  |                    | --- |    |
| S.E.T Additional Payments   |          | 13 | 1  |                    | 15  | 9  |
| Promotion of Local Employment   | 3        | 12 | 1  |                    | 9   | 3  |
| Agricultural Support  | 6        | 6  | 0  | 4                  | 0   | 7  |
| Agricultural and Fishery Services   | 1        | 19 | 4  |                    | 12  | 0  |
| Forestry  |          | 11 | 2  |                    | 1   | 7  |
| Housing   | 4        | 12 | 1  | 1                  | 18  | 4  |
| Environmental Services  |          | 15 | 0  |                    | 10  | 7  |
| Libraries and Museums   |          | 2  | 4  |                    | 4   | 10 |
| Police  | 1        | 18 | 11 | 2                  | 2   | 5  |
| Prisons   |          | 13 | 1  |                    | 11  | 9  |
| Other Law and Order<br>(including Fire Services)  |          | 15 | 10 |                    | 17  | 8  |
| Education (excluding Universities, etc.)  | 3        | 10 | 2  | 1                  | 5   | 3  |
| Universities and C.A.T.s  | 7        | 3  | 4  | 3                  | 17  | 5  |
| Health and Welfare  | 27       | 3  | 3  | 23                 | 2   | 0  |
| Children's services   | 6        | 6  | 0  | 5                  | 11  | 5  |
| Benefits and Assistance   | 47       | 13 | 11 | 44                 | 14  | 6  |
| General Rate Deficiency and Equalization<br>and transitional grants, to Local<br>Renues, etc. | 24       | 15 | 1  | 22                 | 3   | 2  |
| TOTAL   | 145      | 9  | 10 | 117                | 10  | 9  |

Source: Scottish National Party, Scotland v. Whitehall: Winifred Ewing's Black Book, Scottish National Party, Glasgow, n.d., p. 9.

rate between 1956 and 1962.<sup>1</sup> This inflation rate more than cancelled the 3.1% rise in the British GNP during the 1962-68 period and helped to offset the 6.3% rise in incomes.<sup>2</sup> Personal taxes increased

<sup>1</sup>Central Statistical Office, op. cit., p. 354.

<sup>2</sup>Organization for European Co-operation and Development (OECD) figures on GNP reported in David McKie and Chris Cook, Election '70, Panther Books Limited, London, 1970; income data in Central Statistical Office, op. cit., p. 271.

during the 1962-68 period at an average rate of 12.0% annually, somewhat more rapidly than incomes, placing a heavier burden on taxpayers.<sup>1</sup> But most attention during this period was focused on Britain's balance of payments, a general measure of the country's standing in the international market. Throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's international receipts generally exceeded international expenditures. But between 1964 and 1968 a deficit of 915 million pounds was accumulated, occasioning a 14.3% devaluation of the pound in November 1967.<sup>2</sup> Additional evidence that Britain's relative economic position was slipping deals with GNP growth rates. In a study of "Real National Income" in nine western countries growth rates between 1955 and 1964 ranked Britain eighth. Germany and Italy grew about twice as fast as Britain.<sup>3</sup>

But there is little evidence to suggest that Scotland suffered these short-term economic reverses more severely than the United Kingdom as a whole. The Scottish Family Expenditure Survey in 1965/67 showed that Scottish households paid income taxes and national insurance contributions at a rate only ninety percent of the United Kingdom average. Given that Scottish household income during this period was ninety-six percent of the United Kingdom average, Scots paid relatively less to these funds.<sup>4</sup> In Britain as a whole income taxes rose twelve percent annually between 1962 and 1968; in Scotland the average annual rise was under nine percent.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 289.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 256 and p. 268.

<sup>3</sup>Edward F. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experience in Nine Western Countries, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1967, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup>Scottish Statistical Office, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

### Housing and Health

Housing conditions represent another dimension on which economic deprivation can be measured. As Baird notes, "Scottish housing has for long had an unenviable reputation and, rightly or wrongly, the Glasgow slums have widely been regarded as without equal in Western Europe."<sup>1</sup> The major problem is overcrowding. More than twenty-two percent of the Scottish population reside in housing which is officially designated "overcrowded." In Glasgow the proportion is more than thirty-four percent.<sup>2</sup> Density in Scottish housing has always been higher than in England. Table 15 shows that although the gap has narrowed considerably since 1911, in 1961 there were still .27 more persons per room in Scotland than in England.

TABLE 15  
HOUSING DENSITY  
IN SCOTLAND AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1871-1961

| Year | <u>Persons per room</u> |                   |
|------|-------------------------|-------------------|
|      | Scotland                | England and Wales |
| 1871 | 1.69                    | * <sup>a</sup>    |
| 1891 | 1.62                    | *                 |
| 1911 | 1.45                    | .95               |
| 1931 | 1.27                    | .83               |
| 1951 | 1.04                    | .73               |
| 1961 | .93                     | .66               |

<sup>a</sup>Data not available

Sources: Robert Baird, "Housing," The Scottish Economy, in Cairncross (ed.), p. 197; Hammond, An Analysis of Regional Economic and Social Statistics, Table 3.2.3.

<sup>1</sup>Robert Baird, "Housing," in Cairncross, (ed.), op. cit., p. 193.

<sup>2</sup>General Register Office, Scotland, Census 1961: Scotland, Vol. Four, Housing and Households, Part I, HMSO, Edinburgh, 1966. Housing is overcrowded by Ministry of Housing definition when housing density is 1.5 or more persons per room.

Of all occupied dwellings in Scotland 57.8% have from one to three rooms. This contrasts with the situation in England and Wales where only 14.5% are so modest.<sup>1</sup>

Compounding the problem of overcrowding is the generally unfit condition of many Scottish dwellings. In 1966 it was estimated that forty-three percent of all Scottish dwellings were of pre-1919 vintage compared to thirty-nine percent in England.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Scottish houses tend to be more dilapidated, over ten percent being demolished or closed as slums in the 1955-66 period as contrasted to just six percent in England and Wales.<sup>3</sup> Scotland's industrial cities, especially Glasgow, often take on the aspect of war-devastation as vacant buildings whose fabric show the abuse of years and of vandals, stand in silent anticipation of the wrecking ball. But house building is proceeding no faster in Scotland than in England and Wales. In 1962 construction on .6 permanent houses and flats per capita was completed in England and Wales, but the rate was just .5 per capita in Scotland.<sup>4</sup>

Another aspect of dwelling fitness concerns the availability of common household amenities like running water and toilets. The data in Table 16 suggests that, while differences exist between the two regions, Scottish dwellings are not appreciably less fit than those in England and Wales. Glaswegians, however, are somewhat less likely than Londoners to have hot water or a fixed bath.

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<sup>1</sup>Kellas, op. cit., p. 248.

<sup>2</sup>Hammond, op. cit., Table 3.3.1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Table 3.3.2.

<sup>4</sup>Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, No. 288, December 1969, HMSO, London, 1969, p. 91.

TABLE 16

HOUSING CONDITIONS  
DWELLINGS LACKING CERTAIN HOUSEHOLD AMENITIES, BY PERCENT

| Amenity      | Percent lacking in: |                               |          |                                     |
|--------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|
|              | England<br>& Wales  | Greater London<br>conurbation | Scotland | Central<br>Clydeside<br>conurbation |
| Cold Tap     | 1.7%                | .2%                           | 1.4%     | .1%                                 |
| Hot Tap      | 21.0                | 19.8                          | 20.7     | 25.4                                |
| Fixed Bath   | 21.7                | 17.2                          | 26.7     | 31.2                                |
| Water Closet | 7.1                 | .6                            | 2.6      | .2                                  |

Sources: General Register Office, Census 1961, England and Wales, Housing Tables, Part II; General Register Office, Edinburgh, Census 1961: Scotland, vol. Four, Housing and Households, Part I.

Perhaps exacerbated by generally poor economic conditions, including unfit housing, the level of overall public health in Scotland is lower than in England. Tuberculosis rates in England and Scotland are, respectively, 31 and 47 per hundred thousand. Dysentery occurs in Scotland at a rate almost double, and pneumonia at a rate almost five times that in England. Life expectancy and infant mortality, two frequently used indicators of the general quality of health care, show Scotland marginally worse off than England. Males can expect to live 68.7 years in England and Wales, but only 67.0 years in Scotland.<sup>2</sup> Twenty-three infants per thousand live births fail to survive the immediate post-natal period in Scotland, while the mortality rate is just

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<sup>1</sup>Rates for 1966 as computed from Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract..., p. 7 and p. 62.

<sup>2</sup>From life tables covering 1966-68, *ibid.*, pp. 38-9. The differences in female life expectancy are even greater: 74.9 in England and Wales and 73.1 in Scotland.





nineteen per thousand in England and Wales.<sup>1</sup> But the National Health Service has responded to these imbalances by providing for more extensive health care services in Scotland. In 1966, for example, Scotland boasted 122 staffed beds per thousand population while England and Wales had only 99 per thousand. Scotland had medical and dental staff at a rate of 5.4 per thousand population contrasted to just 4.3 per thousand in England and Wales.<sup>2</sup> So while housing conditions and health standards are somewhat deficient in Scotland, the quality of health care is at least on a par with that in England.<sup>3</sup>

#### Educational Opportunities and Politics

A century ago Scottish schools were widely considered superior to their English counterparts. In the 1860's the Royal Commission on Schools in Scotland noted this superiority and commended Scottish schools for their democratic character:

Education has been more generally diffused (in Scotland); riches have been less rapidly and largely accumulated; and as a consequence these circumstances have again reacted on education; have caused the middle classes to value it more generally than those in England do; and have prevented the creation of that gulf which exists between men of cultivation and the middle classes in England, the existence of which all thoughtful persons, who have had a superior education, must have deplored.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Mortality rates for 1966 computed from number of deaths of infants under one year of age. In contrast, maternal mortality rates are about equal in the two regions.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 59-60.

<sup>3</sup>This is a somewhat subjective conclusion. Scotland's advantage in terms of beds and medical staff per capita probably stems from the distribution of the Scottish population, much of which is in widely scattered rural areas. This necessitates a rather low doctor/patient ratio throughout much of Scotland, and inflates the region's figures.

<sup>4</sup>From Burgh Schools in Scotland (Fearson's Report) as quoted in Kellas, op. cit., p. 77.

Unlike the English system, Scottish curriculum has been uniform both within and between schools. As Kellas notes,

[t]he content of Scottish secondary school courses has always been regarded as a preparation for university. It has thus been traditional orthodoxy that the same education is given to all, irrespective of whether the pupil desires, or is able, to go to university.<sup>1</sup>

This democratic aspect of Scottish school persists. But in some important respects the Scottish educational system no longer holds an advantageous position with respect to its English equivalent. It is true that total public expenditure on education is greater for Scotland than for England. In 1966 expenditure in Scotland amounted to 34 pounds per head of population, of which just 11 pounds were provided by the central government; the level of expenditure in England was somewhat lower at 27 pounds per head, of which the central government provided just 5 pounds.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the opportunities for higher education seem on the surface more widespread in Scotland, with some 488 full-time students per hundred thousand population enrolled in universities as opposed to the 221 per hundred thousand in England.<sup>3</sup>

But what is often overlooked is that a sizeable proportion of students in Scottish schools are not Scots. In 1961, for example, twenty-three percent of students in Scottish universities were English or Welsh. By contrast only .7 percent of those in English and Welsh universities were Scottish.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, while Scottish schools enroll

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<sup>1</sup>Kellas, op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>Computed from data in Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract..., p. 106.

<sup>3</sup>Hammond, op. cit., Table 4.3.2.

<sup>4</sup>Kellas, op. cit., pp. 83-4.

eighteen percent of all British students, they receive only fourteen percent of all university spending in Britain.<sup>1</sup> These proportions strongly suggest that Scottish universities are matriculating more than their fair share of British university students. Because each is administered separately, other differences, in curriculum, in stepwise procedures up the educational ladder, and in testing, are apparent between the Scottish and English systems. These differences, however, are formal rather than substantive.

Political opportunities seem even more readily available than educational opportunities for Scots. Enjoying the full rights of British citizenship, Scots experience no significant political discrimination. Of the 630 Members of Parliament, each representing individual constituencies through the United Kingdom, 71 (more than eleven percent) represent Scottish constituencies. Were seats apportioned purely on the basis of population, Scotland would have only 60 representatives. This means that Scotland has a bonus of eleven votes in Parliament. And conforming to the national trend of having M.P.s reside in the constituencies they represent, nearly all Scottish M.P.s in the modern era have been native-born Scots. Although a precise count is difficult, only about eight M.P.s sitting for Scotland in the 1966 Parliament were not Scots (eleven percent), while thirteen Scots were sitting for English constituencies (a scant two percent of the English total).<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, Scots seem to have relatively easy access to the higher British political elite. Of the 48 individuals who served between 1900 and 1968 as Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Foreign

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<sup>1</sup>Hammond, loc. cit., Tables 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Dod's Parliamentary Companion, Whittaker and Co., London, 1967.

Secretary, six were Scots.<sup>1</sup> Scottish Prime Ministers in this century have been Bonar Law, Campbell-Bannerman, MacDonald, Macmillan, and Douglas-Home.

Equally as important to a sense of deprivation as contemporary political opportunities is the history of a group's relationship to the wider political system, particularly the way that a group or region was incorporated into the whole. On this count there is a residue of ill feelings and a sense of betrayal on the part of many Scots. The union between England and Scotland came in 1707 as a formal agreement between two sovereign and equal parliaments. Since Scotland was not brought into the union through overt military coercion and since the Act of Union was entered into by mutual consent of the two parliaments, the specific procedure of unification might not on the surface appear to be a source of friction and resentment between the two regions. Concern with what happened two and a half centuries ago is rather limited today, but opposition to the Scottish Parliament's action in approving the Act of Union was intense at the time.

When the draft Treaty was presented to the Scottish Parliament in October, 1706, and its terms became public, it was met with a howl of execration throughout the land which was, no doubt, fomented by Jacobites, but which also represented a feeling that Scotland had been sold to the English.<sup>2</sup>

While Parliament debated the issue, letters and petitions to M.P.s urged non-ratification and there was mob violence in Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Dumfries. But those favoring Union--mostly those with business interests armed with promises to specific Members and with 20,000 pounds of bribe money secretly made available by the English Treasury--

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts: 1900-1967, 2d ed., Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1968, pp. 59-65.

<sup>2</sup>Mackie, op. cit., p. 260.

convinced a majority of 110 to 69 to accept the Treaty and join with England.<sup>1</sup> Those who consummated the victory were charged with betrayal by the dissident elements and a general disillusionment with the Union soon set in when expected economic benefits failed to materialize.

Today political discrimination is a charge frequently heard from Scottish critics of centralized political and administrative decision-making in Britain. Except in specific cases these charges are difficult to substantiate.<sup>2</sup> Two representative examples will illustrate the character of these criticisms. The first deals with the coverage of BBC television transmissions in Scotland and England. Color transmissions were begun in November, 1969, throughout England and in parts of southern Wales, but the bulk of the Celtic fringe, including Scotland, most of Wales, and Northern Ireland, had to wait until early 1971. The BBC offered that technical difficulties prevented simultaneous nationwide service, but many Scots cited the decision as a typical example of central government indifference to Scottish sensibilities.<sup>3</sup>

A second example is afforded by the decision of the Ministry of Technology in February, 1970, to test-fly the supersonic Concorde over land. The decision ostensibly reflected concern that an all-sea test would not allow adequate radar coverage of flights and would be too distant from emergency air fields. But travelling at a ground speed twice that of sound, the Concorde would subject the population below to sonic booms for the full 800 miles of the test route. The area chosen

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<sup>1</sup>Ferguson, op. cit., pp 48-53.

<sup>2</sup>One of the best statements of the case for Scottish independence is Paton, op. cit. Paton details several examples of neglect or outright discrimination against Scotland.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Observer Magazine, September 28, 1969, p. 28.

for this route ran up the western coast of Britain, touching only Celtic fringe areas: Cornwall, Wales, Isle of Man, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. Many in these areas, especially in Wales and Scotland which were to be most severely affected, complained of being used by the Ministry of Technology as "guinea pigs" to test public reaction to regular sonic booms.<sup>1</sup>

### Conclusion

As noted at the outset of this chapter, and as we will see in Chapter Seven, many Scots have the general impression that Scotland is a deprived region and that the quality of life is not as high as in England. The consistently high rate of emigration from Scotland to England appears to confirm this. But by no means do all measures show Scotland worse off than England, and many of the differences which do exist can more easily be attributed to chance factors of geography and economics than to overt discrimination by the majority in England. Certain highly visible social and economic conditions in Scotland, such as low wage levels, high unemployment, and poor housing, comprise the focus of popular concern. Because these conditions are easily perceived and have a very broad influence, they may weigh more heavily in determining the deprived image of Scotland than those more favorable educational and political conditions which represent the other side of the coin.

The deprivations which do exist in Scotland may be sufficient, when perceived, to induce emigration among those who are mobile. They may also be sufficient to account for separatist activities in Scotland.

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. The Times, February 18, 1970.

Schwartz concludes that the absence of systematic discrimination against the Scots and the mixed deprivation picture serve to mitigate those activities and to prevent them from crossing the thin line into violent aggression.<sup>1</sup> But the relation between perceived deprivations on the one hand and separatist activity and emigration on the other hand cannot be established definitively with aggregate data. Because the linkage depends on key psychological concepts, a more detailed examination of motivations is required. The remaining chapters of this study focus on survey data which can facilitate such an examination.

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<sup>1</sup>Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 511-2.



CHAPTER VI  
THE GLASGOW SAMPLE

But there are flegsome deeps  
Whaur the soul o Scotland sleeps  
That I to bottom need  
To wauk Guid kens what deid....

Most of the discussion thus far has involved the examination of evidence which is either historical or aggregate. Much of this evidence has provided considerable sustenance for the hypothesis linking deprivation and support for separatism. But one further step in data-gathering needs to be taken. Since both of our hypotheses focus on the behavioral mysteries of support for separatism, we must inquire into the perceptions, attitudes, and motivations which accompany action.

In the last chapter we sought to describe existing conditions of stratification in the United Kingdom and in Scotland. In this and in subsequent chapters we will examine perceptions of those conditions and the motivational linkage between attitudes about Scotland and separatist political activity.<sup>1</sup> Most of the data examined in these chapters were

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<sup>1</sup>All of this is undertaken in the face of protests by Chalmers Johnson who argues that "attitudes are a notoriously treacherous guide to what people actually do. Even projective tests of orientations more subtle than attitudes are open to challenge on this score. Direct behavioral observation is a sounder indicator of systemic equilibrium than the measurement of attitudes by means of questionnaires." [Revolutionary Change, p. 148.] But of course it is the behavior that one wants to explain. "Systemic disequilibrium," the non-synchronization of social values and environmental factors, is a precondition for that revolutionary or strife behavior, according to Johnson. But it would be a distortion to measure response in terms of the conditions hypothesized to be necessary to that response. More meaningful would be the establishment of the relationship between the hypothesized antecedents and the dependent

generated by a public opinion survey conducted among eligible electors in Glasgow in late March and early April 1970.

### Sample Population

In any survey the population from which the sample is selected determines the universe about which generalized conclusions can justifiably be made. Ostensibly any study which claims broad relevance while utilizing a survey research design ought to employ a sample population which will allow universal generalizability. Although this is a study of Scottish nationalism, we would like to say something about the phenomenon of separatism as it occurs in other places as well. But because no social phenomenon can be adequately described or explained on the basis of a single example, any broad conclusions about the general question of separatism reached in this study will of necessity be tentative.

Our sample was drawn from a population of eligible electors in two Glasgow parliamentary constituencies. This fact makes generalized comments even about Scotland problematical. Recognizing in advance the possibility that urban nationalism in Scotland might differ in some crucial way from rural or Highland nationalism and realizing the shortcomings of a sample population smaller than the relevant universe, financial constraints prevented the selection of a broader, nation-wide population. Because of the sensitive nature of parts of the questionnaire which was to be administered to the sample, it was essential that native Scots perform the chore of actually interviewing respondents. Although

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variable, in Johnson's case between systemic equilibrium and strife behavior. Because we are assuming that a perception of disequilibrium is an essential condition if that disequilibrium is to have behavioral consequences, we will focus on the attitudes and perceptions of Scots.

these professional costs are somewhat lower in Britain than in the United States, consultation with representatives of several survey organizations in Britain revealed that with available funds a sample of around 300 could be interviewed in an urban area, while one of only 150 could be interviewed in a rural area. It was this consideration which led to the decision to frame an urban sample population. A sample size of less than 300 respondents was thought to be too narrow a base from which to estimate population parameters and to test the validity of key hypotheses.

Within the realm of urban Scotland, other considerations were kept in mind in the selection of a sample population. It was hoped that the political and social complexion of the population would approximate that of the rest of Scotland, particularly the urban areas. But even more importantly, it was essential that all significant subgroups be present in the population. This was really just a nuance of the first consideration, but it was emphasized because of the possible importance of the Roman Catholic minority to the nationalist movement in Scotland. Conflicting evidence regarding the role of Catholics in Scottish politics was a compelling reason for the selection of a population which would include Catholics in numbers sufficient to undertake comparisons of subsamples of Catholics with subsamples of Protestants.

A final consideration was the extent of nationalist activity present in various locales. In order to guarantee a substantial subsample of respondents who were sympathetic to the separatist cause or were participants in nationalist activities, it was essential that the sample population have some history of nationalist activity--operationalized in terms of Scottish National Party activity. The current revival of

political nationalism in Scotland seems strongest in small cities, in suburban areas, and to a lesser extent in rural areas. But these lack the ingredient above deemed essential to keep survey costs down, namely high population density.

Two Glasgow parliamentary constituencies--Woodside and Maryhill--were chosen for the sample populations with the above considerations in mind. Located in the northwest quadrant of the city of Glasgow, both are burgh constituencies with very high concentrations of population. (See Table 17) Woodside was once the most densely populated area in Britain. Today it is a fairly transient residential area, with three important institutions helping to determine the character of its neighborhoods. Glasgow University, with an enrollment of 7,814 students in 1969-70, is ensconced within Woodside constituency. Although largely a commuter university, a significant number of students reside in the immediate vicinity. A modest proportion of these students are registered to vote in Woodside.<sup>1</sup> Matched by a small number of faculty and staff living and voting in the constituency, this elite contingent lends a middle-class flavor to some areas of Woodside.

Although having less direct effect on the character of the electorate, two other institutions, the Western Infirmary and the University Medical School, are located within constituency boundaries. Immediately adjacent to the University, these two institutions attract a diverse clientele into the area on daily business. The infirmary serves the entire western half of the Glasgow conurbation; the renowned medical school attracts students from throughout the world.

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<sup>1</sup>The general election of 1970 was the first in which those between 18 and 21 could participate. Most university students, however, were registered to vote in the constituency where their parents lived.

The Byres Road shopping district bisects the constituency and serves as a commercial magnet for the northwest quadrant of Glasgow. To the west of Byres Road lies a mixed working- and middle-class residential area of private three-story attached houses which includes some private nursing homes for the aged. To the east lies the University, the Medical School, and the Infirmary and to the north of these, a largely middle-class area of two- and three-story private attached houses, many of which are subdivided into student flats. The constituency then dog-legs to the north where, across the Great Western Road, there is a large, highly concentrated area of three- and four-story private attached houses occupied mainly by working-class families.

TABLE 17

## SCOTTISH SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS BY VARIOUS SUBDIVISIONS

|  | Woodside | Maryhill | Glasgow   | Scotland  |
|--|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Population (1961)  | 62,293   | 69,237   | 1,054,913 | 5,179,300 |
| Area (sq. miles)   | 1.2      | 6.3      | 62.1      | 29,796.0  |
| Density<br>(pop./sq. mile)                                     | 51,312   | 10,979   | 16,995    | 174       |
| Overcrowded Housing<br>(% pop. at 1.5 or<br>more persons/room) | 34.1     | 39.2     | 34.3      | 22.4      |

Source: General Register Office, Edinburgh, Census 1961: Scotland.

Although most of the housing in the area dates from the late nineteenth century, the condition of the housing varies greatly in the constituency. A large-scale slum clearance program in the northern region of the constituency has left ragged holes. Of the total number of houses standing on Whitsunday in 1968 (21,184) some 6.6% were

unoccupied in Woodside while the average for all of Glasgow was just 3.8% unoccupied.<sup>1</sup> Most of these empty houses were slated for future demolition.

The recent political history of Woodside was an important factor in its selection. (See Table 18) Formed in 1950, the constituency has generally been considered marginal, returning Conservative members to Parliament up to the 1962 by-election and from then on being held by Labour. Liberals have stood twice in the constituency, in 1959 and again in 1964, receiving eight percent of the total vote on each occasion. The Scottish National Party offered candidates in 1964, 1966, and in 1970, garnering five, seven, and eleven percent of the vote respectively. Despite the persistence of the Liberal and Scottish National Parties, they have consistently lost their deposits.<sup>2</sup> But the electioneering activities of the SNP throughout the 1960's would ensure a high level of public awareness of the nationalists and their policies.

In addition, SNP activity in annual municipal elections has been apparent in the constituency. Woodside is divided into three municipal wards: North Kelvin, Partick East, and Woodside. Reporting electoral results for 1966-1969, Table 19 shows the extent of SNP support in Woodside wards compared to Glasgow as a whole. Woodside has generally been a stronger than average SNP area. This is further evidence that the SNP candidates are visible in Woodside constituency.

Lying just to the north of Woodside, Maryhill constituency shares

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Corporation of the City of Glasgow, Facts and Figures, City Chambers, Glasgow, 1969.

<sup>2</sup>A deposit of 150 pounds is required of all parliamentary candidates. Any who fail to receive at least 1/8 of the total vote cannot reclaim the deposit. This helps to discourage both "crackpots" and minor parties.

TABLE 18

SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1955-1970,  
BY PERCENT OF VOTE CAST FOR PARTY IN VARIOUS SUBDIVISIONS

| Election/Party | Percent of vote in: |          |                      |          |
|----------------|---------------------|----------|----------------------|----------|
|                | Woodside            | Maryhill | Glasgow <sup>a</sup> | Scotland |
| 1955           |                     |          |                      |          |
| Labour         | 43.9%               | 62.8%    | 50.6%                | 46.7%    |
| Conservative   | 56.1                | 37.2     | 48.1                 | 50.1     |
| Liberal        | ---                 | ---      | ---                  | 1.9      |
| SNP            | ---                 | ---      | ---                  | 0.5      |
| Other          | ---                 | ---      | ---                  | 0.8      |
| 1959           |                     |          |                      |          |
| Labour         | 43.0                | 64.0     | 52.8                 | 46.7     |
| Conservative   | 49.3                | 36.0     | 45.6                 | 47.2     |
| Liberal        | 7.7                 | ---      | 0.5                  | 4.1      |
| SNP            | ---                 | ---      | ---                  | 0.8      |
| Other          | ---                 | ---      | 1.1                  | 1.2      |
| 1964           |                     |          |                      |          |
| Labour         | 45.6                | 68.4     | 58.7                 | 48.7     |
| Conservative   | 40.4                | 27.6     | 38.0                 | 40.6     |
| Liberal        | 8.3                 | ---      | 1.0                  | 7.6      |
| SNP            | 5.4                 | ---      | 0.8                  | 2.4      |
| Other          | 0.3                 | 4.0      | 1.5                  | 0.7      |
| 1966           |                     |          |                      |          |
| Labour         | 50.6                | 67.8     | 60.2                 | 49.9     |
| Conservative   | 41.8                | 20.7     | 35.0                 | 37.6     |
| Liberal        | ---                 | ---      | ---                  | 6.8      |
| SNP            | 7.1                 | 11.5     | 3.2                  | 5.0      |
| Other          | 0.5                 | ---      | 1.6                  | 0.7      |
| 1970           |                     |          |                      |          |
| Labour         | 47.4                | 65.7     | 54.9                 | 44.5     |
| Conservative   | 41.5                | 23.0     | 35.5                 | 38.0     |
| Liberal        | ---                 | ---      | ---                  | 5.5      |
| SNP            | 8.4                 | 11.4     | 8.9                  | 11.4     |
| Other          | 2.7                 | ---      | 1.1                  | 0.6      |

<sup>a</sup>Including the following constituencies: Bridgeton, Cathcart, Central, Craigton, Gorbals, Govan, Hillhead, Kelvingrove, Maryhill, Pollok, Provan, Scotstoun, Shettleston, Springburn, and Woodside.

Sources: F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British Parliamentary Election Results, 1950-1970, Political Reference Publications, Chichester, 1971; and F. W. S. Craig (ed.), British Parliamentary Election Statistics, 1918-1970, 2d ed., Political Reference Publications, Chichester, 1971.

TABLE 19

GLASGOW MUNICIPAL ELECTORAL RESULTS, 1966-1969  
WOODSIDE AND MARYHILL CONSTITUENCIES, BY ELECTORAL WARD

| Election<br>/Party | Woodside        |                 |          | Maryhill |         | Glasgow<br>totals |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|----------|---------|-------------------|
|                    | North<br>Kelvin | Partick<br>East | Woodside | Maryhill | Ruchill |                   |
| 1966               |                 |                 |          |          |         |                   |
| Labour             | 30.3%           | 17.1%           | 36.6%    | 49.7%    | 56.4%   | 39.2%             |
| Conservative       | 52.8            | 67.1            | 57.1     | 38.4     | 15.2    | 46.8              |
| SNP                | 14.8            | 13.5            | 6.3      | 8.3      | 23.7    | 8.1               |
| Others             | 2.0             | 2.3             | ---      | 3.6      | 4.8     | 5.9               |
| 1967               |                 |                 |          |          |         |                   |
| Labour             | ---             | 7.8             | 22.9     | 41.7     | 45.5    | 31.1              |
| Conservative       | 53.1            | 59.2            | 47.6     | 35.1     | 16.2    | 41.8              |
| SNP                | 41.4            | 29.1            | 25.3     | 21.1     | 34.8    | 23.1              |
| Others             | 5.4             | 3.9             | 4.1      | 2.1      | 3.4     | 4.0               |
| 1968               |                 |                 |          |          |         |                   |
| Labour             | 9.0             | 9.1             | 20.1     | 35.8     | 39.8    | 25.5              |
| Conservative       | 48.6            | 50.4            | 41.5     | 23.0     | 11.4    | 34.8              |
| SNP                | 39.8            | 38.1            | 36.2     | 39.3     | 44.8    | 35.9              |
| Others             | 2.5             | 2.3             | 2.2      | 1.9      | 4.0     | 3.7               |
| 1969               |                 |                 |          |          |         |                   |
| Labour             | 11.0            | 6.8             | 21.3     | 42.3     | 50.8    | 29.1              |
| Conservative       | 50.8            | 55.8            | 59.2     | 31.2     | 14.6    | 40.9              |
| SNP                | 34.6            | 32.1            | 19.6     | 26.6     | 29.8    | 26.2              |
| Others             | 3.7             | 5.3             | ---      | ---      | 4.1     | 3.8               |

Source: From annual election reports published in the Glasgow Herald, 1966-1969.

many of Woodside's characteristics. Its population is highly concentrated and the condition of housing is roughly equivalent. But Maryhill is on the periphery of the Clydeside conurbation and a large part of its six square miles is rural. The division includes three farms and a number of small holdings, but nearly all of its 70,000 population is concentrated in the southernmost one-third of its area. The extreme southeastern sector is a continuation of the private three-and four-story attached housing working-class neighborhood found in the northern



part of Woodside. This housing is generally in very ill repair; the neighborhood is treeless and littered with rubble and trash.

But moving north, past rail lines, an old barge canal, and some factory sites, one encounters a small number of detached owner-occupied houses, beyond which one can see the first of ten public housing estates. Built since the 1920's and 1930's by Glasgow Corporation and by the Scottish Special Housing Association, these estates provide somewhat pleasanter surroundings for their occupants than the older buildings to the south. Rents in these estates are generally higher than in the old quarters and many occupants are upward mobile skilled working-class. The largest and newest of these public housing projects is Wyndford highrise estates in the west-central part of the constituency, providing very comfortable conditions for upward mobile working people and middle-class pensioners.

Unlike Woodside, there is some manufacturing in Maryhill. Among the industrial establishments are chemical works, a rubber processing plant, and a fibreglass manufacturer. In addition, there is paper- and match-making and several light engineering works. But these are insufficient to meet the employment needs of the resident population, and just as in Woodside, many people travel to other parts of the city to get to their jobs. Because public transportation is less readily available in Maryhill than in Woodside, there is a comparatively higher rate of car ownership among those who reside in the Maryhill estates.

Politically, Maryhill is staunch Labour. Labour has held the constituency in all eight elections since World War II, usually by at least a two-to-one margin over the Conservatives. The SNP ran candidates in 1966 and 1970, getting twelve percent in 1966 and eleven

percent in 1970. The SNP vote in municipal elections between 1966 and 1969 shows that, like Woodside, Maryhill is a fairly strong area for the SNP within Glasgow. (See Table 19.) This visibility factor was essential in the sample population.

Maryhill is noted for its large Roman Catholic population. A large portion of the nineteenth century population from Ireland to Scotland settled in the northwest part of Glasgow where housing was available and where there was already a small Irish minority. The large Catholic minority was essential to the sample population if an analysis of the influence of religion on nationalism was to be successful.

In conclusion, then, Woodside and Maryhill were selected because they were easily accessible, reasonably representative of urban Scotland, possessed of social and religious sub-groups thought to relate to the dependent variable, and because there had been a modicum of nationalist activity within their boundaries.

#### Selecting the Sample

To select the sample from the population defined above, the official Glasgow Register of Electors was employed as a sampling frame. Inclusion on the electoral rolls is almost automatic in Britain. All persons over 18 who reside in a constituency in England, Wales, or Scotland on the annual qualifying date, October 10, are eligible to be included on the register. On forms supplied in a house-to-house canvass by the Registration Officer, each householder is required to indicate which persons at the residence are eligible. Persons who will turn 18 before June 15 are also included but are ineligible to vote in elections before the following October 2.

On November 28 a preliminary register is placed open for inspection.

Those who are eligible but not included on the list have until December 16 to bring the oversight to the attention of registration officials. Finally, the up-dated and revised Register of Electors, published by parliamentary constituency, by municipal wards within those constituencies, and by individual polling districts within wards, comes into force on February 15. The process is repeated annually.<sup>1</sup> An almost complete list of technically eligible electors is produced by this procedure. For the most part only voters newly qualified to vote in the constituency--those just turned 18 or those just moved into the area--are excluded from the register in more than random frequencies.

The Register of Electors which served as a sampling frame for this study was published on February 15, 1970. The sample itself was selected from valid names appearing on the Register, a pre-test was conducted, and the interviewing began on March 15. This means that there was a three month time lag between the final enumeration of the sample population on December 16 and the initiation of the interviewing. This left some time for movement in and out of constituencies, and hence for additional discrepancies to arise between the sample population and the sampling frame. But because the time lag was short and because most householders move in the late spring or summer, it was assumed that any such discrepancies would be minor.

A systematic two-stage cluster sampling technique was used for the actual selection of individuals to be interviewed. This procedure was particularly appropriate given the organization of the Register of Electors and given the time and budgetary constraints. The "print," or

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<sup>1</sup>A more detailed description is found in R. L. Leonard, Elections in Britain, D. Van Nostrand Company, Ltd., London and Princeton, N. J. , 1968, pp. 9-17.

list of names, for each polling district is arranged alphabetically by street name, and on streets by address, making both randomization and clustering easy. A sample of 430 names was to be selected, from which we expected more than 300 completed interviews. It was decided that 43 clusters, each with 120 names, would be selected using a step-interval cycle which began with a randomly selected number. In the second stage of the sampling, every twelfth name within each cluster was chosen, yielding a final sample of 430. Twenty-five additional names were selected in a similar manner for a pre-test sample.

Cluster sampling yields a large sample size for a given cost, but since it is not built on the assumption that each unit in the population has an equal chance of being selected, it is not random sampling. In cluster sampling the range of variation of statistics is slightly greater than in simple random sampling. Hence, statistical tests which assume randomization will inflate the estimation of significant differences between sample subgroups. This weakens the power of our tests somewhat and urges caution when we interpret results of tests like chi-square. But because we will set no arbitrary "level of significance" at which hypotheses are accepted or rejected, there is no need to follow the procedure of applying further tests which assume a larger sampling variance.<sup>1</sup>

### Interviewing

A questionnaire which had been developed in the preceding months was administered by the author to the pre-test sample in the final week of February. The final questionnaire was prepared and sent to the

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<sup>1</sup>In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba follow this procedure since their five-nation study utilized cluster sampling techniques.

Opinion Research Centre in London, the organization which had been contracted to perform the actual task of interviewing. The ORC interviewers were experienced middle-aged women--all native Scots. Interviewing commenced on March 15 and was substantially completed within three weeks. Call-backs were made until April 16. Of the total 430 names issued, 308 (71.6%) were interviewed. A surprisingly large proportion of the original number had moved to new addresses despite the brief period which had elapsed since the Register was brought up to date. This is probably attributable to the rapid pace of urban renewal in the constituencies under study.

The fourteen-page questionnaire was administered without difficulty. Interviewing time ranged from 25 minutes to 70 minutes, the median time being about 36 minutes. A shortened form of the questionnaire was mailed to those prospective respondents who had not been contacted successfully for a personal interview, i.e., those who had moved, were temporarily away, too old or ill, or had refused. An analysis of the mailed questionnaire showed a slight systematic bias on political attentiveness and a somewhat larger one on the nationalism variable. Those in the mailed sample tended to be somewhat more supportive of nationalism than those in the main study.<sup>1</sup>

### Sample Characteristics

The basic social, economic, and political characteristics of the sample are presented in summary form in Table 20. These findings are presented here for two reasons. First, they provide a concise overview of the survey results, permitting the reader a first glance before the

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Appendix A.

TABLE 20

THE GLASGOW SAMPLE: BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS<sup>a</sup>

|                            |                           | Number | Percent |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|---------|
| Sex                        |                           |        |         |
|                            | Male                      | 140    | 45.5    |
|                            | Female                    | 168    | 54.5    |
| Age                        |                           |        |         |
|                            | 18-24                     | 36     | 11.7    |
|                            | 25-34                     | 50     | 16.2    |
|                            | 35-44                     | 51     | 16.6    |
|                            | 45-54                     | 57     | 18.5    |
|                            | 55-64                     | 52     | 16.9    |
|                            | 65-74                     | 44     | 14.3    |
|                            | 75 +                      | 13     | 4.2     |
|                            | N.A.                      | 5      | 1.6     |
| Birthplace                 |                           |        |         |
|                            | Scotland                  | 287    | 93.2    |
|                            | (Glasgow)                 | (246)  | (79.9)  |
|                            | England, Wales            | 8      | 2.6     |
|                            | Ireland, Northern Ireland | 8      | 2.6     |
|                            | Other                     | 3      | 1.0     |
|                            | N.A.                      | 2      | .6      |
| Religion                   |                           |        |         |
|                            | Church of Scotland        | 163    | 52.9    |
|                            | Church of England         | 6      | 1.9     |
|                            | Other Protestant          | 54     | 17.5    |
|                            | Roman Catholic            | 71     | 23.1    |
|                            | Other or none             | 9      | 2.9     |
|                            | N.A.                      | 5      | 1.6     |
| Age Education Ended        |                           |        |         |
|                            | 13 or under               | 11     | 3.6     |
|                            | 14                        | 183    | 59.4    |
|                            | 15                        | 77     | 25.0    |
|                            | 16                        | 15     | 4.9     |
|                            | 17 +                      | 22     | 7.1     |
| Voluntary group membership |                           |        |         |
|                            | No groups                 | 276    | 89.6    |
|                            | Some groups               | 29     | 9.4     |
|                            | N.A.                      | 3      | 1.0     |

TABLE 20 (cont'd.)

|  | Number | Percent |
|--|--------|---------|
| <b>Occupation</b>                          |        |         |
| Professional/Managerial                    | 7      | 2.3     |
| Intermediate                               | 21     | 6.8     |
| Skilled Non-manual                         | 53     | 17.2    |
| Skilled Manual                             | 70     | 22.7    |
| Partly Skilled                             | 41     | 13.3    |
| Unskilled                                  | 37     | 12.0    |
| Economically Inactive                      | 74     | 24.0    |
| N.A.                                       | 5      | 1.6     |
| <b>Household Income (after taxes)/week</b> |        |         |
| Less than 5 pounds                         | 10     | 3.2     |
| 5-9 pounds                                 | 37     | 12.0    |
| 10-14 pounds                               | 44     | 14.3    |
| 15-19 pounds                               | 56     | 18.2    |
| 20-24 pounds                               | 69     | 22.4    |
| 25-29 pounds                               | 28     | 19.1    |
| 30 + pounds                                | 27     | 8.8     |
| D.K., N.A.                                 | 37     | 12.0    |
| <b>Trade Union Membership</b>              |        |         |
| Yes  | 128    | 41.6    |
| No   | 175    | 56.8    |
| N.A.                                       | 5      | 1.6     |
| <b>Vote Intent (General Election)</b>      |        |         |
| Conservative                               | 82     | 26.6    |
| Labour                                     | 157    | 51.0    |
| Scottish National                          | 44     | 14.3    |
| Liberal <sup>a</sup>                       | 5      | 1.6     |
| None                                       | 5      | 1.6     |
| D.K., N.A.                                 | 15     | 4.9     |
| <b>Changes in Scottish Government</b>      |        |         |
| Complete Independence                      | 37     | 12.0    |
| Separate Parliament                        | 49     | 15.9    |
| Minor Changes                              | 130    | 42.2    |
| No Change                                  | 64     | 20.8    |
| D.K., N.A.                                 | 28     | 9.2     |
| <b>Assessment of London Government</b>     |        |         |
| Improves Conditions in Scotland            | 62     | 20.1    |
| Mixed Views                                | 151    | 49.0    |
| Better Off Without It                      | 69     | 22.4    |
| D.K., N.A.                                 | 26     | 8.4     |

<sup>a</sup>N for all tables = 308

detailed analysis which follows. Second, they provide an opportunity to check the representativeness of the sample. The sample percentages which appear in the right-hand column of Table 20 are estimates of population proportions. But, as in any survey there is a small probability that the sample does not accurately estimate population proportions. With simple random sampling there is a known level of risk and accuracy for a given sample size. The cluster sampling technique complicates this somewhat because of the potentially distorting effect of clustering. By clustering the researcher increases his chances of over- or under-representing certain groups. Since our clusters are geographically determined, any variable which may be related to geography or to different neighborhoods has a higher risk of being mis-estimated than those which are unrelated to geography. Sampling error is different for each variable under the cluster technique, causing risk and accuracy to vary. The following paragraphs will discuss the main sample characteristics in terms of apparent deviations from population parameters.

SEX: The sample obtains an estimate of 45.5% males and 54.5% females in the population. This is very close to the census estimate of 47.1% males and 52.9% females in Glasgow in 1966. Undoubtedly the sample over-estimates the proportion of females since they are more likely to be at home when the interviewer calls. Even with several call-backs and evening visits, working males are traditionally under-represented in surveys which do not allow substitutions. Of those answering the follow-up mailed questionnaire, 54.5% were males, strengthening the hypothesis that they are somewhat under-represented in the main study.

AGE: A preliminary analysis of the sample respondents suggests a



systematic over-representation of electors in the 65-74 year old category at the expense of those in the 18-24 and 25-34 year groupings. Table 21 shows the discrepancy between our sample results and the findings of the 1961 official census in Maryhill and Woodside constituencies. Population estimates for Scotland in 1968 are added for comparative purposes.

TABLE 21

AGE DISTRIBUTION  
BY PERCENT

| Age Group | Sample (1970) | Maryhill and Woodside<br>Census results (1961) | Scotland Census<br>estimate (1968) |
|-----------|---------------|--|------------------------------------|
| 18-24     | 11.9%         | 15.4%  | 15.1%                              |
| 25-34     | 16.5          | 19.2   | 16.8                               |
| 35-44     | 16.8          | 16.9   | 17.1                               |
| 45-54     | 18.8          | 18.4   | 17.3                               |
| 55-64     | 17.2          | 16.1   | 16.7                               |
| 65-74     | 14.5          | 9.6  | 11.2                               |
| 75 +      | 4.3           | 4.3  | 5.7                                |

Sources: General Registry Office, Edinburgh, Census 1961; Scotland County Report, Vol. One, Part 2, City of Glasgow; Central Statistics Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1969.

There are several possible explanations for this apparent discrepancy. A first consideration is that the census list and the electoral register are never identical. This is the case for two reasons. First, the census is taken only every ten years while the electoral register is updated every year. Hence, nine years separates the age distribution from the census and that from our sample. Population changes can occur over such a time span and it should be noted that in terms of the age distribution, our sample seems somewhat more representative of Scotland in 1968 than of Maryhill and Woodside in 1961. It is possible that

Scotland's population profile was slightly older in 1970 than in 1961. Second, the large number of university students present in Woodside constituency further decreases the correlation between the census list and the electoral register. While transient students often retain their official residence at the homes of their parents (thus making them ineligible to vote at their student residences), they are usually counted for census purposes at the place of their de facto residence. Hence the electoral register itself may inaccurately reflect the true resident population.

Second, young people are more active and less restricted in their movements than are older persons. They are far more likely to be absent from their residence either at work, school, or recreation, when the interviewer calls. Although interviewers were instructed to make call-backs, persons who were absent on those occasions (or who could not even be reached to arrange a meeting time) were not interviewed and are left out of the sample. Most of those in the upper age group are retired and lack mobility. They are more likely to be at home when the interviewer calls. In addition, it seems plausible that young people would have less time for the interview than older people and would be more likely to refuse the interview in the first place.

Another closely related possible explanation rests on the hypothesis that young people are more mobile than older people. Although the sampling frame, i.e., the electoral register, was brought up to date only three months before the interviewers went out, considerable movement can occur in such a short period, leaving the sampling frame a less than perfect list of all technically eligible voters in a constituency. The results of the follow-up mailed questionnaire confirm the hypothesis

that young people are under-represented in the sample because they are mobile. Of all those under 35 responding to the mailed questionnaire, forty-five percent were not interviewed because they had moved to a new address. Of those thirty-five or over, only five percent were not interviewed because they had moved.

**BIRTHPLACE:** The sample estimates that 93.2% of the sample population were born in Scotland; 79.9% of the total were born in Glasgow. The 1961 census shows that for Glasgow as a whole, 92.0% were born in Scotland, while 76.2% were born in Glasgow.

**RELIGION:** There is no accurate record of religious preferences in Scotland against which to compare our sample findings. Actual membership in Scottish churches can only be a rough guide. In 1966 the Church of Scotland claimed 63.5% of all church memberships.<sup>1</sup> This is somewhat larger than our sample proportion of 52.9% (or 55.4% when adjusted to account for those with no religion or whose preference was not ascertained). While just 5.8% of church memberships were with other protestant religions in 1966, the sample produced an estimate of 17.5% (18.4% adjusted) in the Woodside/Maryhill population. But this discrepancy is expected since the area under study has long been a stronghold of non-conformism. Finally, Roman Catholics made up 27.9% of church memberships in Scotland in 1966 but just 23.1% (24.1% adjusted) of the sample respondents. Since Catholicism is thought to be stronger than average in the sample population this difference is not easy to explain. But Catholics, due to the strictures of their orthodoxy, may make up a larger proportion of church memberships than their actual numbers in the population would

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<sup>1</sup>In doing these calculations, one-third of the Roman Catholic membership total was deducted since it included persons of all ages.

lead one to predict.

OCCUPATION: Aside from the large number of economically inactive individuals in the sample, most of whom are housewives, retirees, or students, the largest single occupational category is that of skilled manual worker with 22.7% of the sample. Manual jobs as a whole are held by 64.6% of those currently employed, while non-manual jobs are held by just 35.4% of the total. This reflects the working-class character of the sample population and exemplifies the class cleavage in industrial Scotland generally. The 1961 Census in Glasgow showed that about thirteen percent (compared to our twelve percent) were in the top two occupational categories. In the skilled group, both manual and non-manual, there were fifty-five percent (compared to our fifty-four). And in the bottom two groups there were thirty-two percent (compared to our thirty-four percent).

VOTE INTEREST: The interviewing in Woodside and Maryhill was completed two months before the 1970 General Election. The unusual last-week swings in that election upset election predictions based on surveys conducted even in the last few days preceding the June 18 polling day. Our survey could hardly serve to predict voting results in Woodside and Maryhill two months in advance, but it is interesting to compare our findings with the actual vote tallies. In Maryhill, considering only those who said they would vote for a party, sixty-seven percent said they preferred Labour, eighteen percent Conservative, and fifteen percent SNP. The General Election results showed Labour had a final tally of sixty-six percent, Conservative twenty-three percent, and SNP eleven percent. Most significant changes appear to have occurred in Woodside where in our sample thirty-eight percent preferred Labour,

forty-two Conservative, fifteen percent SNP, and four percent Liberal. As it turned out in the General Election, no Liberal candidate stood, but an Independent Conservative did, and the seat went for Labour forty-seven percent, Conservative forty-one percent, SNP eight percent, and Independent Conservative three percent. One interesting consistency in these results seems to be that the SNP did rather worse than we might have predicted from the survey estimates, but particularly so in Woodside where the contest between the two major parties was close. This is fuel for the argument that the SNP vote is largely a protest. Deviant voting is high in by-elections because the stakes are not high. One can register a protest without jeopardizing basic power relationships. In the same way, a one-sided constituency race in a general election offers a more propitious opportunity for meaningful yet harmless protest than does a closely-run affair. This is explored more fully below.

### Operationalizing Scottish Nationalism

We have defined nationalism as a social movement whose participants are engaged in advancing the interests of their common nationality. This is an inclusive definition, able to accommodate such diversities as cultural groups, political parties and organizations with separatist or devolutionary goals, and the groups of individuals who are sympathetic to or supportive of the objectives of these groups. The Scottish nationalist movement has been diverse and fluid, marked by the ebb and flow of national separatist sentiment and by the rise and fall of both political and cultural nationalist groups. In the 1960's, as we have seen, the main organizational manifestation of Scottish nationalism was the Scottish National Party, created in 1934 through a merger of the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland. Although several

additional cultural-political organizations exist, most notably the fundamentalist 1320 Club, the SNP enjoyed by far the largest and politically most significant following.

As indicated in Chapter Four, the specific objectives of the Scottish National Party have never been particularly clear or consistent. Seeming to aim for complete independence at one time and for a regional parliament at another, the SNP position has always been somewhat elusive. But among Scottish political parties, the SNP has been joined only by the Liberals in taking a consistent stand in favor of increased autonomy. Moreover, unlike the Liberals, all of the party's central issues--like inflation, unemployment, and opposition to British entry into the European Economic Community have been related to the overriding imperative of Scottish autonomy.

Since the self-proclaimed aims and objectives of the SNP coincide with those assumed to be characteristic of a nationalist movement, the first way of operationalizing the concept of Scottish nationalism in this study will be in terms of support for the Scottish National Party. Specifically, a nationalist is a person who intends to vote for the SNP in the next general election.

Obviously this entails some problems. As numerous voting studies have shown, there are an endless variety of reasons that people support a given political party. An analogous problem is trying to infer public policy preferences from election results. The easy argument is that there are too many dimensions to the final choice to allow anything more than vague generalizations about mass motivations.

The literature on minor parties in two-party systems stresses

their protest or educational function.<sup>1</sup> Voters dissatisfied with major parties often use minor parties as vehicles of protest or as means of emphasizing the importance of particular issues such as prohibition (U.S. Prohibition Party), taxes (French Poujadiste Party), or foreign policy (Norwegian Socialist People's Party). Hence it might be possible to view the Scottish National Party as merely the vehicle chosen by dissatisfied people who happen to live in Scotland to protest the two major parties, the state of the economy, or British EEC membership. The objectives sought by the SNP might be peripheral in the minds of SNP voters, or they might be unaware of them at all. Alternatively, one might view the SNP as an attempt to educate the major party politicians regarding perceived Scottish deprivations. In this instance, SNP voters would be aware of SNP policy goals and they would agree with them.

Unquestionably, the SNP is a protest party. It is "anti-system" and it attracts adherents on the basis of its challenge to the status quo. But it represents more than a diffuse protest against the current state of affairs. There is a widespread perception of the SNP as a single-issue party whose concerns seldom reach beyond the overriding objective of securing independence for Scotland. A pilot study done at the University of Strathclyde in February, 1969, revealed that by far the most common characterization of what the "Scottish National Party stands for" is "independence" or "home rule". A few respondents simply replied "change." The Glasgow sample on which this study is based shows

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government, Rinehart & Company, New York, 1942, p. 68;; William B. Dickinson, "The American Two-Party System," Editorial Research Reports, July 29, 1964, p. 555; and V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1964, pp. 278-81.

a similar pattern of responses. Nearly ninety percent of all respondents think the SNP policy regarding Scotland is "complete independence" or a "separate parliament" for Scotland. This contrasts with only twenty-three percent thinking the Conservative Party policy is nationalist, and just seven percent thinking the Labour Party supports these policies. (See Table 21). Among SNP voters, fully ninety-five percent think the SNP policy is either complete independence or a separate parliament. These characterizations are not far wide of the mark. They generally parallel the SNP's own statements of aims quoted in Chapter Four.

Secondly, SNP voters do generally agree with the perceived aims of the party. Seventy-four percent of SNP voters in the Glasgow sample said they would like to see Scotland achieve complete independence. Another twenty-one percent desired a separate parliament for Scotland, while five percent wanted only minor changes. Not one SNP respondent out of 44 wanted to leave things as they are. Hence, the overwhelming bulk of SNP voters are aware of SNP policy and are in agreement with it. While this is not conclusive evidence that these voters would vote for the SNP because of the party's separatist policies, it is highly suggestive. Of the eighteen respondents who said they voted for the SNP in the 1966 general election, eleven said they did so "to help Scotland," or because "they favor independence." Only four said they voted SNP as a protest or because they disagreed with the other parties.

Finally, protest voting per se occurs much more frequently during by-elections when control of Parliament is not generally at stake than at general elections. Hence, if SNP votes are largely protest votes, one would expect far more SNP voters in by-elections. In fact, the SNP has achieved some of its most outstanding successes in by-elections.



TABLE 21

PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIES' SCOTTISH POLICIES<sup>a</sup>

| Policy                   | Party  |              |       |         |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------|-------|---------|
|                          | Labour | Conservative | SNP   | Liberal |
| Complete independence    | 2.9%   | 1.6%         | 70.5% | 6.5%    |
| Separate Parliament      | 4.2    | 21.1         | 18.5  | 30.2    |
| Minor changes            | 27.6   | 45.8         | 1.0   | 16.9    |
| Leave things as they are | 51.0   | 14.6         | 1.0   | 5.5     |
| DK                       | 14.3   | 16.9         | 9.1   | 40.9    |

<sup>a</sup>N=308

Of the three M.P.s the party has sent to Westminster, two (Dr. Robert McIntyre in 1945 and Winifred Ewing in 1967) were elected in by-elections. Moreover, in ten Scottish by-elections contested between 1959 and 1970, the SNP received an average vote of 19.7%. In four general elections in this period, the SNP received an average vote of just 4.9%.

But an analysis of the Glasgow survey fails to reveal a sizeable bloc of by-election protest voters. While 14.3% of the Glasgow sample said they would vote for the SNP in a general election, only a few more, amounting to 15.3% would vote for the party in a by-election. At least two explanations can be suggested. First voting behavior cannot be precisely predicted or explained before it happens, particularly when that behavior is deviant or unusual. Protest voting is often compulsive and cannot be detected when a survey researcher asks hypothetical questions. At any rate, the stimuli present at the polling place are surely different than those at home long before an election campaign is mounted.

A second plausible explanation begins from the perspective of a basic motivational factor modified on election day by external institutional or mechanical factors. If there is a protest force which works to increase minor party shares of the vote, there is also an external set of forces, like electoral laws and the perceived probability of the minor party being successful, which serves to decrease minor party vote totals. Beginning with a basic level of intended support (in our case 14.3% for the SNP), the final level of support depends on a balance between (1) the propensity of non-supporters to use the party as a vehicle of protest, and (2) external factors which make a minor party vote difficult or impractical. One of these latter factors might be the perception of a close contest between the major parties. In this case, one might expect a large number of minor party adherents to choose to vote for one of the other parties where their vote would be more meaningful in terms of the final outcome. An analysis of the 1970 general election results bears out this expectation. In thirty-three safe Labour constituencies, the SNP received an average vote of 13.3%.<sup>1</sup> In seventeen safe Conservative constituencies, the SNP got an average vote of 15.8%. In contrast, in the fifteen marginal seats, the SNP garnered an average of only 8.3%.

A final justification for operationalizing nationalism in terms of support for the SNP relates to the fact that inheritance can be excluded as a significant source of identification with the party. Although the SNP in its present form was established nearly forty years ago, it had few adherents until recently. In 1962, after twenty-eight years of

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<sup>1</sup>A "safe" constituency is one consistently captured by one party in every general election from 1955 through 1966. All others are "marginal."

electoral fluctuations, party members numbered only 2,000. Over the next six years nearly 100,000 members were added to SNP lists. This recent rise distinguishes the SNP from the long-established parties in Britain, the bulk of whose supporters, as Butler and Stokes have shown, have inherited their partisan affiliation. This increases the probability that SNP supporters were attracted to the party because of its separatist ideology.

Table 22 shows the voting intentions of respondents interviewed in the Glasgow sample. The forty-four respondents indicating a preference for the SNP are, under the rubric of this first operationalization, classed "nationalists." Those selecting other parties are classed "anti-nationalists," while those choosing no party, those indicating indecision concerning party choice, or those for whom this information is not ascertained are to be excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 22  
SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:  
VOTING INTENTION AT THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION<sup>a</sup>

| Party             | Number | Percent |
|-------------------|--------|---------|
| Conservative      | 82     | 26.6%   |
| Labour            | 157    | 51.0    |
| Scottish National | 44     | 14.3    |
| Liberal           | 5      | 1.6     |
| None              | 5      | 1.6     |
| DK, NA            | 15     | 4.9     |

<sup>a</sup>N=308

The second way we shall operationalize the concept of nationalism deals not with expected voting behavior but with the state of mind which is consistent with separatist ideology. Separatism is the creed whose central tenet is the devolution of political control to one or more subunits of a nation-state. The degree of separatism varies according to the extent to which the sub-unit(s) in question increase their autonomy as a result of such devolutionary processes. It is assumed that paralleling this separatist continuum is a conceptual continuum onto which can be mapped sentiments ranging from those favoring decreased autonomy for sub-units to those favoring independence for sub-units. The effective range of this continuum in Scotland is assumed to be somewhat narrower since the British political system is essential unitary in nature and a lowered level of autonomy for Scotland would be difficult to achieve, and no one desires it anyway. In Scotland the important range of sentiments ranges from those favoring the status quo, to those desiring slightly increased autonomy (generally administrative autonomy), to those favoring the establishment of a Scottish parliament with control over all Scottish affairs except international relations, defense, and foreign trade, and finally to those favoring complete independence for Scotland either within or without the Commonwealth. Although this conceptual continuum is theoretically continuous, these four points seem to represent views which are both popular and distinct from one another.

Because of the vagaries of the survey instrument as a tool for measuring attitudes, two independent questions are combined to create an index of separatist sentiment which will be used as the second means of operationalizing nationalism in this study. Both questions relate

directly to the question of autonomy for Scotland, but one deals in specifics while the other deals in broad generalities.

Question 3(a) taps the extent of general satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the existing structural ties between Scotland and the United Kingdom:

On the whole, do you think the activities of the government in London tend to improve conditions in Scotland or would we be better off without them?

Table 23 shows the distributions of responses over closed-ended categories. This shows Scots to be about evenly divided on the general question of autonomy; about one-fifth express the opinion that Scotland's fate would be improved without the current ties represented by the central London government, while an equal proportion believe the status quo to be beneficial to Scotland's interests. The bulk of the remainder take an in-between position.

TABLE 23

## SCOTTISH VIEWS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL UK GOVERNMENT

|   | Number    | Percent    |
|---|-----------|------------|
| The government improves conditions in Scotland              | 62        | 20.1%      |
| Mixed views   | 151       | 49.0       |
| Scotland would be better off without the central government | 69        | 22.4       |
| DK  | <u>26</u> | <u>8.4</u> |
|   | 308       | 99.9       |

Question 16(e) taps the specific level of autonomy desired by the respondent:

Four different ways of governing Scotland are talked about a lot nowadays: complete independence, a separate parliament for Scotland with control over Scottish affairs, minor changes like giving more power to the present Scottish Office, and leaving things the way they are. Which of these policies is closest to what you think?

Table 24 shows the distribution of responses over closed-ended categories. The table shows Scots to be as deeply divided on the question of specific policies for Scotland as on the general question of autonomy. While about one-fifth are satisfied with the status quo, about one-fourth favor additional autonomy for Scotland, either through complete independence or through the establishment of a separate Scottish parliament with control over Scottish affairs.

TABLE 24  
SCOTTISH VIEWS ON HOW SCOTLAND SHOULD BE GOVERNED

|                          | Number    | Percent    |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Complete independence    | 37        | 12.0%      |
| Separate Parliament      | 49        | 15.9       |
| Minor changes            | 130       | 42.2       |
| Leave things as they are | 64        | 20.8       |
| DK, NA                   | <u>28</u> | <u>9.1</u> |
|                          | 308       | 100.0      |

The results of these two questions are cross-tabulated to create the Index of Separatist Sentiment. The main effect of the creation of the Index is to purify the two extreme positions, pro-status quo and pro-separatism. Inconsistent respondents--e.g., those favoring independence or a separate parliament and thinking that the central

government in London improves conditions in Scotland--are relegated to a central position on the Index, reserving the top and bottom ends on the Index only for consistent respondents. Table 25 shows the cross-tabulation of the 259 respondents in the Glasgow sample for whom responses were obtained on both Question 3(a) and Question 16(e).

TABLE 25  
CONSTRUCTING THE INDEX OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT

| View on how Scotland<br>should be governed | View on activity of<br>central UK government |                |                        | n     |
|--|--|----------------|------------------------|-------|
|  | Better off<br>without it                     | Mixed<br>views | Improves<br>conditions |       |
| Complete independence                      | 21   | 14             | 2                      | 37    |
| Separate Parliament                        | 13   | 29             | 5                      | 47    |
| Minor changes                              | 25   | 69             | 26                     | 120   |
| Leave things as they are                   | 5  | 27             | 23                     | 55    |
| n  | 64   | 139            | 56                     | N=259 |

The resulting distribution on the Index (after combining the two separatist positions from Question 16(e) is summarized in Table 26. The result is a uni-modal distribution slightly skewed in the direction of separatism.

Throughout this study, unless otherwise indicated the Index of Separatist Sentiment will be collapsed to three discrete categories. On the pro-separatist end of the Index the 102 1's and 2's (representing 39.3% of the total) will be dealt with together under the shorthand term "Scotnats." The 81 3's (31.3%) will be termed 'Neutrals,' while

TABLE 26

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM:  
THE INDEX OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT

|                 |   | Number           | Percent              |
|-----------------|---|------------------|----------------------|
| Pro-separatism  | 1 | 34               | 13.1%                |
|                 | 2 | 68               | 26.2                 |
|                 | 3 | 81               | 31.3                 |
|                 | 4 | 53               | 20.5                 |
| Anti-separatism | 5 | <u>23</u><br>259 | <u>8.9</u><br>100.0% |

the 79 4's and 5's on the anti-separatist end of the index (29.4% of the total will be called "Antinats." This step is undertaken to simplify the analysis and to ensure reasonably large cell totals when cross-tabulations are attempted.

TABLE 27

VOTE INTENTION AND THE INDEX OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT

| Separatist<br>Sentiment | Vote Intention       |                       |                       |                      |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
|                         | SNP                  | Other parties         | (Labour)              | (Conservative)       |
| Scotnats                | 92.7%                | 27.9%                 | 20.6%                 | 41.4%                |
| Neutrals                | 4.9                  | 36.3                  | 33.6                  | 41.4                 |
| Antinats                | <u>2.4</u><br>100.0% | <u>35.8</u><br>100.0% | <u>45.8</u><br>100.0% | <u>17.1</u><br>99.9% |
| N                       | 41                   | 106                   | (131)                 | (70)                 |

$\chi^2 = .00$



Table 27 shows the extent to which the two measures of nationalism, one indicated by the respondent's voting intention and the other by his responses on the separatist index, are convergent. Nearly ninety-three percent of all SNP voters are Scotnats, while just twenty-eight percent of other voters fall into this category. This lends support to the assumption that the operationalization procedures described above are valid. It also suggests that to a satisfactory extent using either measure we are tapping the same underlying trait.

### Social Correlates of Nationalism

Before turning to an examination of the main hypotheses of this study we need to clarify some of the basic social correlates of nationalism in Scotland. This will aid in better understanding the separatist movement in Scotland and may have heuristic value with respect to other nationalist movements. In this section we show the inter-relationship between nationalism and the sex, age, birthplace, religion, and education of the respondent.

There is some reason to think that the sex of the respondent might relate to support for separatism. Lipset reports a tendency for males to support left-wing or anti-establishment parties.<sup>1</sup> And a study of urban Scottish voting patterns suggests that males are somewhat more likely than females to be SNP supporters.<sup>2</sup> But in our Scottish sample we find no evidence linking sex and separatism. Table 28 shows that males support the SNP only slightly more frequently than females. And

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<sup>1</sup>Lipset, op. cit., pp. 276-8.

<sup>2</sup>Anthony Piepe and Robin Prior, "Scottish Nationalism--A New Kind of Politics?" Unpublished report, Portsmouth College of Technology, Portsmouth, England, July 31, 1969.

TABLE 28

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND SEX

| Sex            | Vote Intention |               |                     | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |                     |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|---------------------|
|                | SNP            | Other parties | n                   | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n                   |
| Female         | 14.3%          | 85.7%         | 154                 | 38.3%                         | 35.3%    | 26.3%    | 133                 |
| Male           | 16.4           | 83.6          | <u>134</u><br>N=288 | 40.5                          | 27.0     | 32.5     | <u>126</u><br>N=259 |
| $\chi^2 = .51$ |                |               |                     | $\chi^2 = .31$                |          |          |                     |

the evidence on the Index of Separatist Sentiment is inconclusive.

Age is a second characteristic we might expect to find related to support for separatism. In summarizing election studies, Lipset urges a reconsideration of the popular notion that support for the status quo increases with age,<sup>1</sup> but there is some Scottish evidence, including our own report in Chapter Four on age differences between candidates for Parliament in 1970, suggesting that support for separatism is stronger among the young.<sup>2</sup> This was strongly supported by the evidence of the Glasgow sample. The median age among SNP supporters was 40, while that among the supporters of other parties was 48. The median age among Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment was 46 as contrasted with 49 among Neutrals and 48 among Antinats. Presumably, youth are less firmly attached to the established system and more prone to experiment with novel political issues.

The birthplace of the respondent seems to have little to do with his attitude toward separatism. Table 29 shows that while Glaswegians

<sup>1</sup>Lipset, op. cit., pp. 282-6.

<sup>2</sup>Piepe and Prior, loc. cit.

TABLE 29

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND RESPONDENT'S BIRTHPLACE

| Birthplace                 | Vote Intention |               |         | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |         |
|----------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|---------|
|                            | SNP            | Other parties | n       | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n       |
| Glasgow                    | 12.7%          | 87.3%         | 228     | 40.0%                         | 30.2%    | 29.8%    | 205     |
| Other parts<br>of Scotland | 21.4           | 78.6          | 42      | 35.1                          | 40.5     | 24.3     | 37      |
|                            |                |               | N = 270 |                               |          |          | N = 242 |
| $\chi^2 = .15$             |                |               |         | $\chi^2 = .50$                |          |          |         |

are less likely to support the SNP than those who were born elsewhere in Scotland, the Chi Square level of significance does not encourage a great deal of confidence in the finding. The results on the Index of Separatist Sentiment are mixed and inconclusive.

The relationship between religion and nationalism is a particularly interesting problem because of the divergent popular views on the issue in Scotland. Non-separatist protestants frequently express the opinion that the nationalist movement is a Catholic front. In Chapter Three we suggested that this trend of thought can be traced back to the early efforts of the Jacobites to restore the Catholic Stewart line to the Scottish monarchy. It is no doubt strengthened by contemporary separatist activities by Catholics in Northern Ireland. But surprisingly, non-separatist Catholics frequently express the opinion that the nationalist movement is an ethnocentric protestant movement one of whose goals is to purge Scotland of the Catholic minority (most of whose ancestors emigrated from Ireland in the mid-nineteenth century). At least one study found that Catholics tend to shy away from SNP candidates at the polls.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

But our survey reveals that there is little difference between protestants and Catholics in terms of their support for separatism in Scotland. Table 30 shows that protestants are slightly more amenable than Catholics to the nationalist cause, but not decisively so. A more important finding relates to the non-conformist protestants. Among those preferring the established state church (Presbyterian Church of Scotland) less than thirteen percent were SNP supporters and less than forty percent were Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment. In contrast, nearly twenty-five percent of the other protestant group were SNP supporters and close to fifty percent were Scotnats. This seems a not unreasonable finding since many of the non-conformist protestant groups in Scotland (particularly the non-conformist Presbyterian sects) have long traditions of radicalism and opposition to centrally established authority. The Church of Scotland is the official established religion and, significantly, the British monarch is the formal head of the Church and official "defender of the faith."

TABLE 30

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

| Religious preference | <u>Vote Intention</u> |               |           | <u>Index of Separatist Sentiment</u> |          |          |           |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
|                      | SNP                   | Other parties | n         | Scotnats                             | Neutrals | Antinats | n         |
| Church of Scotland   | 12.6%                 | 87.4%         | 158       | 39.7%                                | 27.0%    | 33.3%    | 141       |
| Other protestant     | 24.6                  | 75.4          | 61        | 49.2                                 | 30.5     | 20.3     | 59        |
| Roman Catholic       | 13.4                  | 86.6          | <u>67</u> | 29.3                                 | 41.4     | 29.2     | <u>58</u> |
|                      |                       |               | N=286     |                                      |          |          | N=258     |
| $\chi^2 = .15$       |                       |               |           | $\chi^2 = .09$                       |          |          |           |

And finally, education does not appear to relate strongly to support for separatism in Scotland. Table 31 shows that support for the SNP is strong among the middle group, but that may well be because fifteen is the recently established school-leaving age and most of those who claim this level of education are under thirty. As we have already discerned, this young cohort is prone to support the nationalists. The relationship does not emerge among this group on the Index of Separatist Sentiment.

TABLE 31

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION, BY AGE OF  
LEAVING SCHOOL

| School-<br>leaving age | Vote Intention |               |           | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |           |
|------------------------|----------------|---------------|-----------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
|                        | SNP            | Other parties | n         | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n         |
| 14 or less             | 15.4%          | 84.6%         | 156       | 38.3%                         | 34.6%    | 27.2%    | 162       |
| 15                     | 30.2           | 69.2          | 53        | 40.0                          | 31.7     | 28.3     | 60        |
| 16 or more             | 10.8           | 89.2          | <u>37</u> | 41.7                          | 16.7     | 41.7     | <u>76</u> |
|                        |                |               | N=246     |                               |          |          | N=258     |
| $\chi^2 = .02$         |                |               |           | $\chi^2 = .30$                |          |          |           |

In summary, then, support for separation in Scotland seems to relate to age and religion, but not to sex, place of birth, or level of education. In the next two chapters we will examine the relationship between separatism and relative deprivation and social mobility.

## CHAPTER VII

### DEPRIVATION AND SCOTTISH NATIONALISM

God gied man speech and speech created thocht,  
He gied man speech but to the Scots gied nocht....

One of the aims of the sample survey conducted in Glasgow was to test the theory that a sense of relative deprivation is an explanatory precondition for the upsurge of national separatism in Scotland. Using aggregate measures of deprivation, we concluded in Chapter Five that Scotland might be termed inferior to the rest of the UK on several dimensions. But whether these discrepant conditions are perceived by Scots and play a central motivating role in the nationalist movement, can only be discerned through the surveying of attitudes and opinions. Survey research presents its own set of problems and shortcomings. Some, like the operationalization of concepts and the reliability and validity of measures, are common to all forms of systematic social inquiry; others, like sensitization, the demonstration effect, and interviewer bias, are unique to the survey technique. Nevertheless, through the survey we can address ourselves more or less directly to the question of attitudes and perceptions.

#### The Perception of Deprivation in Scotland

Ten independent items in the questionnaire administered to the Glasgow sample dealt with perceptions of Scottish deprivations. The unmistakable trend among these items supports the hypothesis that an

awareness of Scotland's inferior status is widespread. In the context of questions about economic conditions, more than forty-five percent of the sample felt that English people were doing much better than Scots, while only fourteen percent disagreed. (See Table 32) An almost identical ratio appeared when the question was worded in terms of "style of living." Almost forty-two percent considered the English style of living superior to the Scottish. Less than fifteen percent disagreed. Hence, the group expressing a generalized sense of deprivation relative to the English is about three times as large as that explicitly disclaiming any such deprivation.

On more specific terms, although ratios vary, the same general relationship emerges between the deprived and the satisfied. Ever since the union of 1707 the sense of being the minor partner in the United Kingdom has pervaded the Scottish consciousness. Feeling that the authority to make decisions about their own destiny rested outside Scotland, the Scots have long nourished a resentment against the English. At best the English have been viewed as paternalistic; at worst, imperialistic. And, in the Glasgow survey, nearly seventy-nine percent of all respondents agreed or agreed strongly that "It seems unfair that English people have so much say in running Scotland." Only eleven percent disagreed or disagreed strongly.

Undoubtedly a great deal of the resentment is simply hostility directed toward the dominant cultural group in Britain. Since Scots have maintained a sense of community, they find it easier to relate to and identify with fellow Scots than with the English. While seventy-seven percent of Glasgow respondents thought they had "a lot" in common with other Scots, only twenty-three percent thought they had "a lot" in

TABLE 32

PERCEPTIONS OF DEPRIVATION<sup>a</sup>


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|   |                   |       |
|---|-------------------|-------|
| "Some people say that English people are doing much better than Scottish people. Do you think this is so or not?"   | Yes               | 45.5% |
|   | Mixed views       | 30.5  |
|   | No                | 14.3  |
|   | DK                | 9.7   |
| "Some people say that English people have a better style of living than Scottish people. Do you think so or not?"   | Yes               | 41.9% |
|   | Mixed views       | 38.3  |
|   | No                | 14.6  |
|   | DK                | 5.2   |
| "It seems unfair that English people have so much say in running Scotland."   | Agree strongly    | 35.7% |
|   | Agree             | 42.9  |
|   | It depends        | 8.1   |
|   | Disagree          | 10.1  |
|   | Disagree strongly | 1.3   |
|   | DK                | 1.9   |
| "In ganeral, how much do you think you have in common with most Englishmen?"  | A lot             | 23.1% |
|   | Some              | 45.1  |
|   | Not very much     | 28.6  |
|   | DK                | 3.2   |
|   |                   |       |
| "How about Scots? How much would you say you had in common with Scots?"   | A lot             | 77.3% |
|   | Some              | 17.9  |
|   | Not very much     | 2.3   |
|   | DK                | 2.6   |
|   |                   |       |
| "Suppose there were some question you had to take to a national government office--for example, a tax or social security question. Do you think you would be given equal treatment? Would you be treated as well as anyone else?" | Yes               | 71.4% |
|   | It depends        | 10.1  |
|   | No                | 6.8   |
|   | DK                | 11.7  |
|   |                   |       |
| "Roads and highways in Scotland are better than those in England."  | Agree strongly    | 1.3%  |
|   | Agree             | 9.7   |
|   | It depends        | 7.5   |
|   | Disagree          | 42.5  |
|   | Disagree strongly | 19.5  |
|   | DK                | 19.5  |
| "Scottish housing is better than English housing."  | Agree strongly    | 3.2%  |
|   | Agree             | 17.2  |
|   | It depends        | 10.1  |
|   | Disagree          | 41.6  |
|   | Disagree strongly | 13.1  |
|   | DK                | 14.9  |

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TABLE 32 (Cont'd.)

|  |                   |       |
|--|-------------------|-------|
| "On the whole, it is easier to make a living in Scotland than in England."   | Agree strongly    | 2.3%  |
|  | Agree             | 14.9  |
|  | It depends        | 22.1  |
|  | Disagree          | 33.4  |
|  | Disagree strongly | 11.7  |
|  | DK                | 15.6  |
| "Do you think people like yourself can get a better paying job in England or Scotland?"  | England           | 34.4% |
|  | No difference     | 49.0  |
|  | Scotland          | 2.3   |
|  | DK, NA            | 14.3  |
| "Do you think that Scotland should have more or fewer M.P.s in Parliament, or do you think that Scotland's representation is about right?" | More              | 60.1% |
|  | About right       | 33.8  |
|  | Fewer             | 1.0   |
|  | DK                | 5.2   |
| "People in Scotland pay more in taxes than they receive back in benefits."   | Agree strongly    | 14.3% |
|  | Agree             | 29.5  |
|  | It depends        | 22.7  |
|  | Disagree          | 10.1  |
|  | Disagree strongly | 1.6   |
|  | DK                | 21.8  |
| "In general, do you think that the government in London cares about people like yourself?"   | Yes               | 12.0% |
|  | Qualified yes     | 16.9  |
|  | Mixed views       | 35.1  |
|  | Qualified no      | 15.9  |
|  | No                | 14.6  |
|  | DK                | 5.5   |
| "My children would be better off if they left Scotland to live in England or another country."   | Agree strongly    | 3.9%  |
|  | Agree             | 20.5  |
|  | It depends        | 24.0  |
|  | Disagree          | 23.1  |
|  | Disagree strongly | 12.7  |
|  | DK                | 15.9  |
| "I would be better off if I left Scotland to live in England or another country."  | Agree strongly    | 1.9%  |
|  | Agree             | 17.5  |
|  | It depends        | 28.2  |
|  | Disagree          | 22.1  |
|  | Disagree strongly | 18.8  |
|  | DK                | 11.4  |

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<sup>a</sup>N for all tables = 308

common with Englishmen. Moreover, fully fifty-seven percent thought they could identify differences of one sort or another between the Scots and the English. These figures suggest that somewhere between one half and three-fourths of all Scots possess a strong sense of national group identity.

However, there are indications that this hostility runs deeper than a simple disassociation from the out-group. Although there is a strong feeling that personal discrimination against Scots by government offices does not occur (seventy-one percent expressed confidence that they would receive "equal treatment" when taking a problem to a national government office), ironically, there is a sense that Scots as a group do suffer inequities in the British system. For example, sixty-two percent disagree or disagree strongly that "roads and highways in Scotland are better than those in England." Just eleven percent express a positive reaction to that statement. Moreover, nearly fifty-five percent disagree or disagree strongly that "Scottish housing is better than English housing." Only twenty percent agree or agree strongly.

Whether because of discrimination or differential economic conditions there is a widespread perception that economic conditions are better in England than in Scotland. Only seventeen percent of the Glasgow sample agree that "it is easier to make a living in Scotland than in England." Forty-five percent react negatively. And when asked whether "people like yourself can get a better paying job in England or in Scotland," more than thirty-four percent choose England while only two percent select Scotland.

Table 33 shows the proportion of all respondents possessing certain luxury consumer items. While nearly all respondents own radios and more

TABLE 33

POSSESSION, DESIRABILITY, AND PERCEPTION  
OF OTHERS' POSSESSION OF CERTAIN LUXURY CONSUMER ITEMS AMONG SCOTS

| Item                           | % Owning |     | % Wanting |     | % saying most Scots own |     | % saying most English own |     |
|--------------------------------|----------|-----|-----------|-----|-------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|
|                                |          | N   |           | N   |                         | N   |                           | N   |
| Radio                          | 98.4     | 308 | 1.6       | 308 | 97.1                    | 308 | 97.4                      | 308 |
| Television                     | 92.2     | 308 | 3.2       | 308 | 96.8                    | 308 | 97.4                      | 308 |
| House                          | 24.7     | 308 | 60.3      | 305 | 28.9                    | 305 | 60.7                      | 306 |
| Car                            | 16.9     | 308 | 59.5      | 306 | 55.3                    | 304 | 71.8                      | 305 |
| Foreign holiday travel         | 21.8     | 308 | 54.5      | 308 | 42.5                    | 307 | 52.6                      | 308 |
| Spare bedroom for visitors     | 20.1     | 308 | 57.0      | 307 | 18.5                    | 307 | 28.2                      | 308 |
| First-class travel on trains   | 4.5      | 308 | 36.0      | 308 | 7.8                     | 307 | 11.0                      | 308 |
| Private education for children | 6.2      | 308 | 31.5      | 308 | 7.1                     | 307 | 12.7                      | 308 |

than ninety-two percent own televisions, much smaller fractions own houses (twenty-five percent), cars (seventeen percent), or have foreign holiday travel (twenty-two percent), and spare bedrooms for visitors (twenty percent). Only a tiny minority boast private educations for their children (six percent) or first-class travel on trains (four percent). But for each item mentioned, a larger proportion of respondents saw wide ownership in England than saw wide ownership in Scotland. This was particularly true with houses, cars, travel, and spare bedrooms. More than twice as many respondents thought Englishmen could afford houses, for example, as thought Scots could afford them. And while seventy-two percent thought Englishmen could afford cars, just fifty-five thought Scots could.

Treating the consumer items as equal and additive, fifty-five saw no discrepancies between the Scots and the English on any of these items. Thirty-five percent saw discrepancies on one or two items, and a further nine percent perceived discrepancies on three or more luxury consumer items. In other words, forty-four of the respondents felt that the Scots as a group are deprived relative to the English on at least one of the eight consumer item dimensions. Not one respondent felt that the Scots were better off on any of the eight dimensions.

As stressed in Chapter Five, the Scots do not suffer superficial political discrimination. With ten percent of the population, they have eleven percent of the members of the Parliament at Westminster. And a large number of Scots have reached the highest circles of the British ruling elite. Nevertheless, there is a distinct perception that the Scots are not given a fair shake in London. More than forty-five percent think that "Scotland should have more M.P.s in Parliament" while an equal proportion think that people in Scotland "pay more taxes than they receive back in benefits." These responses illustrate the lack of confidence felt by Scots in the central government decision-making apparatus as it relates to Scotland. Almost thirty-one percent of the sample indicated that they did not think that the "government in London cares about people like yourself." (See Table 32.)

As expected with such prominent and widespread perceptions of relative deprivation in Scotland, there is considerable thought given to emigration. Altogether, nearly twenty percent of the Glasgow respondents would seriously consider emigration. The most popular countries to which emigration was contemplated were England, Australia, and New Zealand. Only forty-one percent explicitly disagreed with the statement

that they would be better off if they left Scotland to live in England or another country. An even smaller proportion (thirty-six percent) disagreed with the statement that their children would be better off elsewhere. (See Table 32.)

### Nationalism and Objective Deprivation

It has already been suggested that the objective conditions of a person's life are relevant to his behavior only to the extent that those conditions are perceived by him. Where a relationship between nationalism and objective deprivations does occur, there is a high probability that it is due to the awareness of those deprivations. At any rate it is important to establish the relationship between objective personal deprivation and support for nationalism. In this section we will examine the relation between nationalism and income, standard of living, and class.

Many writers have noted that there is no easily identifiable relationship between deprivation and discontent. Hoffer refutes the notion that those who are worst off in society will be the most discontented: "Misery does not automatically generate discontent, nor is the intensity of discontent directly proportionate to the degree of misery."<sup>1</sup> Table 34 seems generally to confirm this. Although in the lowest income bracket nationalism is high and in the highest bracket nationalism is low, the overall distribution suggests no relation between nationalism and income. SNP voters have an average income of 15.75 pounds while those supporting other parties have an average income of 16.20 pounds. But Scotnats have an average income of 16.40 pounds,

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<sup>1</sup>Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New American Library, New York, 1951, p. 33.

TABLE 34

## NATIONALISM AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME

| Income, in<br>pounds/week | Vote Intention |               | n                  | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          | n                  |
|---------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|
|                           | SNP            | Other parties |                    | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats |                    |
| Less than<br>£ 5          | 50.0%          | 50.0%         | 8                  | 77.8%                         | 11.1%    | 11.1%    | 9                  |
| £ 5 - 9                   | 11.1           | 88.9          | 36                 | 27.6                          | 31.0     | 41.4     | 29                 |
| £10 - 14                  | 11.9           | 88.1          | 42                 | 31.6                          | 34.2     | 34.2     | 38                 |
| £15 - 19                  | 17.0           | 83.0          | 53                 | 37.8                          | 42.2     | 20.0     | 45                 |
| £20 - 24                  | 10.9           | 89.1          | 64                 | 36.2                          | 31.0     | 32.8     | 58                 |
| £25 - 29                  | 33.3           | 66.7          | 27                 | 64.0                          | 16.0     | 20.0     | 25                 |
| £30 and<br>over           | 7.8            | 92.2          | <u>26</u><br>N=256 | 26.9                          | 38.5     | 34.6     | <u>26</u><br>N=230 |
| $\chi^2 = .01$            |                |               |                    | $\chi^2 = .06$ Gamma = -.03   |          |          |                    |

TABLE 35

## NATIONALISM AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME

| Income, in<br>pounds/week | Vote Intention |               | n                  | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          | n                 |
|---------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-------------------|
|                           | SNP            | Other parties |                    | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats |                   |
| £ 1 - 2                   | 31.6%          | 68.4%         | 19                 | 52.9%                         | 29.4%    | 17.6%    | 17                |
| £ 3 - 4                   | 21.4           | 78.6          | 70                 | 40.3                          | 32.2     | 27.4     | 62                |
| £ 5 - 7                   | 13.1           | 86.9          | 99                 | 35.3                          | 31.8     | 32.9     | 85                |
| £ 8 - 13                  | 8.9            | 91.1          | 56                 | 38.2                          | 27.3     | 34.5     | 55                |
| £14 - 32                  | 10.0           | 90.0          | <u>10</u><br>N=254 | 22.2                          | 66.7     | 11.1     | <u>9</u><br>N=228 |
| $\chi^2 = .16$            |                |               |                    | $\chi^2 = .60$ Gamma = .09    |          |          |                   |

contrasted to the Neutrals' 16.50 pounds, and the Antinats' 16.20 pounds per week. The cross-tabulation between the Index and household income results in a gamma (G) of only  $-.03$ , indicating a very weak relationship.

However, when income is adjusted to account for household size, a clearer relationship emerges. Table 35 shows that the lowest income groups give the strongest support for nationalism. Among those in the one to two pound category, one-third are SNP voters and more than half are Scotnats. Figure 5 graphically illustrates the trend: as household income per capita increases, support for nationalism decreases. On the relationship between income per capita and the Index, there is a Kendall Tau C of only  $.08$  but this is significant at the  $.04$  level. Per capita household income is thought to be a better indicator of objective deprivation than unadjusted income because it relates better to the standard of living the household is able to attain. Only the Chi Square levels of significance urge some caution with this data.

The second measure of objective deprivation deals with the possession of certain key luxury consumer items (see Table 33). Here the relationship with nationalism is the reverse of that described for per capita household income. As Table 36 shows, except in the category of five or more items, SNP support increases as the possession of items increases. The same general trend is found on the Index side, where just 35% of those in the deprived group are Scotnats while 46% of those possessing four luxury items are Scotnats. This relationship produces a Kendall Tau C of  $-.08$  (significant at  $.03$ ) and a gamma of  $G = -.11$ , indicating that as one moves toward the nationalism end of the scale, respondents are likely to possess more luxury items. Stated another way,

FIGURE 5

## NATIONALISM AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME








TABLE 36

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND POSSESSION OF LUXURY CONSUMER ITEMS

| Number of items possessed |       |               |       | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |       |
|---------------------------|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-------|
| Vote Intention            |       |               |       |                               |          |          |       |
|                           | SNP   | Other parties | n     | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n     |
| 2 or less                 | 13.5% | 86.5%         | 141   | 35.2%                         | 32.0%    | 32.8%    | 122   |
| 3                         | 17.9  | 82.1          | 78    | 41.6                          | 28.6     | 29.9     | 77    |
| 4                         | 19.5  | 81.5          | 41    | 45.9                          | 35.1     | 18.9     | 37    |
| 5 or more                 | 10.7  | 89.3          | 28    | 43.5                          | 30.4     | 26.1     | 23    |
|                           |       |               | N=288 |                               |          |          | N=259 |
| $\chi^2 = .60$            |       |               |       | $\chi^2 = .85$ Gamma = -.11   |          |          |       |

TABLE 37

### SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CLASS, BY OCCUPATION

| Class  | Vote Intention |                |             | Index of Separatist Sentiment |                |                |             |
|--|----------------|----------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|
|  | SNP            | Other parties  | n           | Scotnats                      | Neutrals       | Antinats       | n           |
| <b>NONMANUAL:</b>                            |                |                |             |                               |                |                |             |
| Professional,<br>Managerial,<br>Intermediate | 11.4%          | 88.6%          | 35          | 36.1%                         | 33.3%          | 30.5%          | 36          |
| Skilled non-<br>manual                       | 14.0<br>(12.9) | 86.0<br>(87.1) | 50<br>(85)  | 39.1<br>(37.8)                | 34.8<br>(34.1) | 26.1<br>(28.0) | 46<br>(82)  |
| <b>MANUAL:</b>                               |                |                |             |                               |                |                |             |
| Skilled<br>manual                            | 20.0           | 80.0           | 90          | 42.2                          | 28.9           | 28.9           | 83          |
| Partly<br>skilled,<br>Unskilled              | 14.1<br>(17.0) | 85.9<br>(83.0) | 92<br>(180) | 37.5<br>(39.9)                | 31.2<br>(30.1) | 31.2<br>(30.1) | 80<br>(163) |
|  |                |                | N=272       | N=245                         |                |                |             |
| $\chi^2 = .27$                               |                |                |             | $\chi^2 = .98$ Gamma = .04    |                |                |             |

Scotnats possess an average of 2.93 items, Neutrals 2.86, and Antinats 2.76. The averages are identical for SNP voters (2.86) and others (2.85).

The third measure of objective deprivation deals with social class as determined by occupation. Table 37 shows the relationship to nationalism. Nationalism is slightly stronger among manual workers than among non-manual, but the differences are not particularly convincing. The strongest nationalist group seems to be skilled manual workers among whom twenty percent are SNP voters and forty-two percent are Scotnats. The weakest nationalist group is the professional, managerial, intermediate class among whom just eleven percent are SNP supporters and thirty-six percent Scotnats. The strength of nationalism among the skilled manual group seems to confirm Hoffer's assertion that "[d]iscontent is likely to be highest when misery is bearable; when conditions have so improved that an ideal state seems almost within reach."<sup>1</sup> It also coincides generally with the findings of Piepe and Prior that SNP voting is strongest among skilled and semi-skilled workers.<sup>2</sup>

#### Nationalism and Subjective Deprivation

Five measures of subjective deprivation are used in this study. Only two seem to relate in any significant way to support for nationalism in Scotland. The first, dealing with the respondent's view of Scotland's Parliamentary representation, is a measure of perception of political deprivation. Table 38 shows that of those thinking Scotland under-represented in Parliament, nineteen percent are SNP voters and forty-seven percent are Scotnats. This contrasts with just nine percent

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Piepe and Prior, loc. cit.

TABLE 38

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL DEPRIVATION

| View of Scotland's<br>Parliamentary<br>Representation            | Vote Intention |               |                     | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |                    |
|--|----------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|
|  | SNP            | Other parties | n                   | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n                  |
| Should have<br>more MPs  | 19.3%          | 80.7%         | 171                 | 47.3%                         | 29.7%    | 23.0%    | 165                |
| Representation<br>all right as<br>is/should<br>have fewer<br>MPs | 8.8            | 91.2          | <u>102</u><br>N=273 | 23.2                          | 34.9     | 41.9     | <u>86</u><br>N=251 |
| $\chi^2 = .02$   |                |               |                     | $\chi^2 = .002$               |          |          |                    |

SNP voters and twenty-three percent Scotnats among those not considering Scotland under-represented. Hence, a sense of political deprivation seems to be related to Scottish nationalism.

TABLE 39

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DEPRIVATION

| Where jobs are<br>easier to get | Vote Intention |               |                   | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |                   |
|---------------------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-------------------|
|                                 | SNP            | Other parties | n                 | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n                 |
| England                         | 19.4%          | 80.6%         | 98                | 46.2%                         | 31.2%    | 22.6%    | 93                |
| No difference                   | 11.7           | 88.3          | 145               | 35.7                          | 32.7     | 42.9     | 129               |
| Scotland                        | 14.3           | 85.7          | <u>7</u><br>N=250 | 28.6                          | 31.8     | 28.6     | <u>7</u><br>N=229 |
| $\chi^2 = .28$                  |                |               |                   | $\chi^2 = .46$ Gamma = .19    |          |          |                   |

Second, there is some indication that perception of occupational deprivation relates to nationalism. Table 39 shows that among those

thinking jobs are easier to get in England, nineteen percent are SNP voters and forty-six are Scotnats, while among those thinking jobs are easier to get in Scotland, fourteen percent are SNP supporters and just twenty-nine percent are Scotnats.

TABLE 40

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF DISCREPANCIES  
BETWEEN ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH STANDARDS OF LIVING

| # of luxury items<br>English have but<br>Scots lack |               |       |     | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |     |
|---|---------------|-------|-----|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-----|
| Vote Intention                                      |               | n     |     | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n   |
| SNP   | Other parties |       |     |                               |          |          |     |
| 0   | 16.4%         | 83.6% | 158 | 43.3%                         | 31.9%    | 24.8%    | 141 |
| 1 - 2   | 12.7          | 87.3  | 102 | 34.4                          | 28.9     | 36.7     | 90  |
| 3 - 5   | 17.9          | 82.1  | 28  | 35.7                          | 35.7     | 28.6     | 28  |
| N=288   |               |       |     | N=259                         |          |          |     |
| $\chi^2 = .58$                                      |               |       |     | $\chi^2 = .38$ Gamma = .11    |          |          |     |

But other measures of perceived socio-economic deprivation yield discrepant results. Tables 40-42 show that perceptions of deprivation need not be associated with support for nationalism using either of our measures of that variable. Table 40 deals with the respondent's perceptions of the standards of living of Scots and English. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they thought most Scots were able to afford certain key luxury consumer items (see Table 33) and whether most Englishmen were able to afford them. Of the total sample, no respondents thought Scots possessed more items than the English, 55.2% thought there were no differences, and 44.8% thought that the English had at least one item which most Scots lacked. Table 40 shows, however, that of those who saw no differences between the possessions of Scots

and those of the English, sixteen percent were SNP supporters while of those who thought the English were much better off (possessing three to five more luxury items on the average), eighteen percent were SNP supporters. This relationship is in the right direction but not significantly. But when we turn to the Index as our measure of nationalism, the results are even more surprising. While forty-three percent of the group perceiving no differences are Scotnats, far fewer, thirty-six percent, of the group viewing the Scots as deprived are Scotnats. This is not in the predicted direction.

TABLE 41

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

| View of Scots' economic/<br>position relative to /Vote Intention |   |       |               |                    | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |                    |
|--|---|-------|---------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|
| English  |   | SNP   | Other parties | n                  | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n                  |
| Deprived   | 1 | 15.2% | 84.8%         | 112                | 43.3%                         | 27.3%    | 29.3%    | 99                 |
|  | 2 | 8.7   | 91.3          | 46                 | 44.2                          | 25.6     | 30.2     | 43                 |
|  | 3 | 15.7  | 84.3          | 89                 | 30.9                          | 40.7     | 28.4     | 81                 |
| Not<br>deprived  | 4 | 16.7  | 83.3          | <u>12</u><br>N=259 | 50.0                          | 25.0     | 25.0     | <u>12</u><br>N=235 |
| $\chi^2 = .60$   |   |       |               |                    | $\chi^2 = .34$ Gamma = .05    |          |          |                    |

Moreover, Tables 41 and 42 show the same anomalous relationship between nationalism and perceived economic and life-style deprivation. Respondents were asked whether they thought the English were doing better than Scots (or had a better style of living) and whether they thought the English ought to be doing as well as they are compared with Scots (or ought to have a better style of living). Those thinking the

English were doing better and deserved to be doing better were classed as not deprived("4"on the scale), while those thinking the English were doing better and did not deserve to be doing better were classed as deprived and placed in the "1" position on the scale. Others fell in middle positions on the scale. An examination of Tables 41 and 42 show that there is no systematic pattern to the distribution between nationalism and perceived deprivation.

TABLE 42

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND PERCEPTION OF LIFE-STYLE DEPRIVATION

| View of Scots' life-style relative to / Vote Intention |   |       |               |       | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |       |
|--|---|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-------|
| English  |   | SNP   | Other parties | n     | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n     |
| Deprived   | 1 | 12.9% | 87.1%         | 101   | 39.6%                         | 29.7%    | 30.8%    | 91    |
|  | 2 | 10.8  | 89.2          | 74    | 39.1                          | 23.2     | 37.7     | 69    |
|  | 3 | 20.6  | 79.4          | 92    | 38.8                          | 37.6     | 23.5     | 85    |
| Not deprived   | 4 | 28.6  | 71.4          | 7     | 57.2                          | 28.6     | 14.3     | 7     |
|  |   |       |               | N=274 |                               |          |          | N=252 |
| $\chi^2 = .22$   |   |       |               |       | $\chi^2 = .46$ Gamma = -.06   |          |          |       |

The mixed findings of this section suggest that the simple perception of deprivations among a national group, even when coupled with a notion of justice, cannot adequately explain the existence of a nationalist movement. Perceived political deprivations do seem to correlate with support for nationalism but perceived economic and social deprivations for the most part do not.

These results suggest that alternative explanations should be sought to account for national separatism in Scotland. The next chapter

will show the extent to which nationalism correlates with social mobility, another potentially explanatory condition for unrest and separatism.



## CHAPTER VIII

### SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SCOTTISH NATIONALISM

Is Scotland big enough to be  
A symbol o' that force in me,  
In wha's devine inebriety  
A sicht abune contempt I'll see?

For a' that's Scottish is in me,  
As a' things Russian were in thee,  
And I in turn 'ud be an action  
To pit in a concrete abstraction  
My country's contrair qualities,  
And mak' a unity o' these  
Till my love owre its history dwells,  
As owretone to a peal o' bells.

A second potential source of explanation for nationalism in Scotland derives from the theory of social mobility. In Chapter Two we outlined the rationale for linking social mobility with support for national separatism. When an individual in a complex, stratified society changes his position on one of the important social strata, such as education, wealth, or political power, discrepancies frequently develop among his various status positions. These "status discrepancies" may or may not involve status hierarchies which are salient to the individual. But they generally contribute to role confusion, increase anomie in the individual, and may impel the individual to sever his ties with the established order. Although the behavioral consequences of such discrepancies may vary significantly, the expression of unorthodox political views and participation in divergent political activities has been frequently observed. The presence of a vehicle for the expression of unorthodox political

sentiments--such as that afforded by a separatist movement--may facilitate the political manifestation of such consequences.

### Social Mobility in Scotland

Social mobility is frequently measured in terms of the movement an individual makes away from the social position of his parents. But since we are more interested in the short-term perception of mobility among Scots, we have devised a means of measuring intra-generational mobility. Three independent items in the questionnaire administered to the Glasgow sample dealt with perceived or expected mobility. In each case a large majority of survey respondents indicated that they felt their position, and that of Scotland as a whole, to be improving substantially over time. The first item measured the respondent's perception of short-term change in the family income. After asking the respondent to estimate his household's income, the interviewer posed Question 37(b):

How does this compare with your income over the last five years? Is it higher, lower, or about the same as it was five years ago?

Table 43 shows that nearly half of all respondents thought that their economic position was improved during this period. Just seventeen percent thought that their income had actually gone down in this period.

A second item measured the respondent's expectation of future change in his economic position. Question 15(a) asked:

Do you expect your own earnings to improve, get worse, or stay about the same over the next five years?

Table 44 shows that a little over half of the sample expected their income to improve, while only four percent expected their income to drop. Thirty-eight percent saw no change in the future as compared with

twenty-eight percent who said they had seen no change in their income in the past five years.

TABLE 43  
PERCEPTION OF PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

| Those saying income had: | Percent              | Number               |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Improved                 | 49.4%                | 152                  |
| Stayed the same          | 27.9                 | 86                   |
| Declined                 | 16.9                 | 52                   |
| DK, NA                   | <u>5.8</u><br>100.0% | <u>18</u><br>308 = N |

TABLE 44  
EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

| Those saying earnings will: | Percent             | Number               |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Improve                     | 52.6%               | 162                  |
| Stay the same               | 38.3                | 118                  |
| Decline                     | 4.2                 | 13                   |
| DK, NA                      | <u>4.8</u><br>99.9% | <u>15</u><br>308 = N |

The final measure of mobility relates to the respondent's expectation of future change in Scotland's economic position. Question

15(b) asked:

How about Scotland's economic situation? Do you expect that to improve, get worse, or stay about the same over the next five years?

Table 45 shows the pattern of response for those identifying themselves as Scots as compared with the entire Glasgow sample. In both cases, about forty-six percent expected improvement in Scotland's economic position, while just six percent saw a future decline. Nearly forty-two percent of both groups expected to see no change at all in the economic fortunes of Scotland. This proportion is slightly larger than that perceiving no recent change or projecting no future change in their own personal economic situation.

TABLE 45

## EXPECTATION OF SCOTLAND'S FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY

| Those saying Scotland's<br>economy will: | "Scots" |        | Total   |         |
|--|---------|--------|---------|---------|
|  | Percent | Number | Percent | Number  |
| Improve                                  | 46.0%   | 131    | 45.8%   | 141     |
| Stay the same                            | 41.7    | 119    | 41.6    | 128     |
| Decline                                  | 6.0     | 17     | 6.5     | 20      |
| DK, NA                                   | 6.3     | 18     | 6.2     | 19      |
|  | 100.0%  | 285    | 100.1%  | 308 = N |

We have singled out for special analysis those identifying themselves as "Scots" since the concept of group mobility to which we refer below requires the assumption that all individuals analyzed actually do identify with the group to which we presume they belong. Hence, the sub-sample we use to examine hypotheses involving group mobility excludes those Glasgow respondents who thought of themselves as "English" or "Irish."

One additional observation needs to be made before proceeding.

Each of our measures of social mobility deals with perceived economic or income change. One focuses on the individual's awareness of past income change, another deals with his expectation of future income change. The last deals with expectations about the future economic fortunes of the individual's national group. While this does not allow us a particularly broad operationalization of the concept of social mobility, to attempt more would risk stretching the respondent's ability to detect short-term changes in his status. An individual has solid opinions about pocket-book issues, but he may have imperfectly formed images of his changing social prestige, or political power.

How do our three mobility measures relate to one another? Although it does not seem foreordained that these measures will coincide with one another, we would expect to find a fairly high correlation among them. Table 47 shows the interaction between "Perception of Past Personal Economic Mobility" and "Expectation of Future Personal Economic Mobility." We would expect to find that those perceiving past movement would project an identical trend into the future. The table shows that about seventy-three percent of those perceiving past upward movement in their incomes expect to see a continuance of that trend in the future. And nearly seventy percent of those perceiving no change in the recent past expect to see no change in the near future. But among those who thought their income had declined over the past five years only six percent expected to see a continued decline. This is about the same proportion as among those whose incomes had been on the rise and suggests a fundamental optimism among respondents about their own future.

But Table 47 suggests that confidence about personal future income does not carry over quite as strongly to the national group. Among all

TABLE 46

PERCEPTION OF PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND  
EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

| Expect future earnings to be: | Present income as compared with five years ago: |      |       |         |
|-------------------------------|---|------|-------|---------|
|                               | Higher  | Same | Lower | n       |
| Higher                        | 107   | 22   | 19    | 148     |
| Same                          | 32  | 55   | 28    | 115     |
| Lower                         | 8   | 2    | 3     | 13      |
| n                             | 147   | 79   | 50    | 276 = N |

$\chi^2 = .00$       Gamma = .50

TABLE 47

PERCEPTION OF PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND  
EXPECTATIONS OF SCOTLAND'S FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY,  
AMONG "SCOTS IDENTIFIERS"

| Expect Scotland's economy to: | Present income as compared with five years ago: |      |       |         |
|-------------------------------|---|------|-------|---------|
|                               | Higher  | Same | Lower | n       |
| Improve                       | 79  | 27   | 18    | 124     |
| Stay the same                 | 47  | 44   | 23    | 114     |
| Decline                       | 10  | 4    | 1     | 15      |
| n                             | 136   | 75   | 42    | 253 = N |

$\chi^2 = .00$       Gamma = .22

those who thought their income had gone up recently and who were "Scots," just fifty-eight percent expected Scotland's economic situation to improve in the near future. A similar proportion of those whose incomes were perceived to be static, thought Scotland's economic situation would

remain unchanged. And the unwillingness to project downward trend into the future shows up again as less than three percent of those who thought they had declining incomes saw a decline for Scotland in the future.

And finally, Table 48 shows the extent to which expected personal mobility coincides with expected group mobility. In general, the linkage appears to be very strong, the over-all gamma score being .59. Nearly sixty-eight percent of those who expect their own income to increase also expect Scotland's economy to improve, while more than seventy-two percent of those who foresee no change in personal income expect Scotland's economy to stay the same. But following the pattern seen in the two previous tables, only ten percent of those who project a decline in their own income also project a decline in the national group economy.

TABLE 48

EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND  
EXPECTATION OF SCOTLAND'S FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY,  
AMONG "SCOTS"

| Expect Scotland's economy to: | Expect own future earnings to be: |      |       | n     |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|-------|-------|
|                               | Higher                            | Same | Lower |       |
| Improve                       | 95                                | 24   | 3     | 122   |
| Stay the same                 | 35                                | 78   | 6     | 119   |
| Decline                       | 10                                | 6    | 1     | 17    |
| n                             | 140                               | 108  | 10    | N=258 |

$\chi^2 = .00$       Gamma = .59

In general, these tables confirm our expectations about the inter-relationship of the mobility variables. Past mobility is highly

correlated with future expected mobility and the perception of one's own fortunes is closely tied to that of the national group with which one identifies. There is a slight tendency for respondents to be somewhat more optimistic about the future than past experience would seem to warrant, and the chances of personal income improvement are rated slightly higher than the chances of national economic improvement.

### Nationalism and Social Mobility

According to our measures of social mobility, there is a considerable sense of movement in Scottish society. Perhaps surprisingly, most of this sense of movement is in the upward direction. Only between six and seventeen percent of those interviewed in the Glasgow sample had any feeling of a downward movement. One possible effect of such widespread social mobility is a general loosening of ties to the established order. In perceptual terms this might mean a tendency of the socially mobile to dissociate themselves from class and caste identity. Moreover, Kornhauser's "mass theory" suggests that "the unattached and alienated of all classes are more attracted to extremist symbols and leaders than are their class rooted counterparts."<sup>1</sup> But there is scant evidence in our study to support this contention. Table 49 shows no significant relationship between union non-membership and support for nationalism in Scotland. Although non-union members are more likely to be Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment, they are somewhat less likely to vote for the SNP.

These mixed results emerge again in Table 50 which shows no statistically significant relationship between alienation from secondary groups

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<sup>1</sup>Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 180.



TABLE 49

## NATIONALISM AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

| Union Member   | Vote Intention |               |            | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |            |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|------------|
|                | SNP            | Other parties | n          | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n          |
| Yes            | 17.1%          | 82.9%         | 123        | 36.5%                         | 31.3%    | 32.2%    | 115        |
| No             | 13.9           | 86.1          | <u>165</u> | 41.7                          | 31.2     | 27.1     | <u>144</u> |
|                |                |               | N=288      |                               |          |          | N=259      |
| $\chi^2 = .50$ |                |               |            | $\chi^2 = .67$                |          |          |            |

TABLE 50

## NATIONALISM AND SECONDARY GROUP MEMBERSHIP

| Group Member   | Vote Intention |               |            | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |            |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|------------|
|                | SNP            | Other parties | n          | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n          |
| Yes            | 22.2%          | 87.8%         | 27         | 29.6%                         | 40.7%    | 29.6%    | 27         |
| No             | 14.6           | 85.4          | <u>260</u> | 40.5                          | 30.2     | 29.3     | <u>232</u> |
|                |                |               | N=287      |                               |          |          | N=259      |
| $\chi^2 = .27$ |                |               |            | $\chi^2 = .37$                |          |          |            |

and support for nationalism. Non-group members are slightly less likely to support the SNP and slightly more likely to be Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment.

These results are inconclusive and do not lend support to the hypothesis linking social mobility and support for separatism. However, striking results emerge when we examine directly the relationship between our three measures of social mobility and our two measures of separatism. In five out of the six combinations of variables, we may interpret our hypothesis as significantly upheld. In the sixth case, it is only

partly upheld.

Table 51 shows the relationship between the two nationalism measures and the past economic mobility of the respondent. The clear pattern is that both those who perceived themselves to have moved upward and those who perceived themselves to have moved downward are more likely to be nationalists than those who thought their economic position was unchanged. More than twenty percent of the upward mobiles and thirteen percent of the downward mobiles said they intended to vote for the SNP, while almost forty-eight percent of the upward mobiles and nearly forty-one percent of the downward mobiles ranked as Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment. In contrast, the group perceiving no change in income strongly supported parties other than the SNP and were nearly half Antinats.

TABLE 51

## NATIONALISM AND PAST PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

| Those saying<br>income had: | Vote Intention |               |       | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |       |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------|-------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|-------|
|                             | SNP            | Other parties | n     | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n     |
| Improved                    | 20.7%          | 79.3%         | 145   | 47.7%                         | 33.6%    | 18.7%    | 128   |
| Stayed same                 | 6.7            | 93.3          | 75    | 25.4                          | 28.2     | 46.5     | 71    |
| Declined                    | 13.5           | 86.5          | 52    | 40.9                          | 29.5     | 29.5     | 44    |
|                             |                |               | N=272 |                               |          |          | N=243 |
| $\chi^2 = .03$              |                |               |       | $\chi^2 = .00$ Gamma = .24    |          |          |       |

Somewhat similar results are obtained when we relate the nationalism measures to expected future personal economic mobility. Table 52 shows again that on both measures of separatism the upward mobiles tend to be far more likely to be nationalists than those who expect no change.

TABLE 52

## NATIONALISM AND EXPECTED FUTURE PERSONAL ECONOMIC MOBILITY

| Those saying<br>income will: | Vote Intention |               |                    | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |                    |
|------------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|
|                              | SNP            | Other parties | n                  | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n                  |
| Improve                      | 20.1%          | 79.9%         | 154                | 50.7%                         | 25.4%    | 23.9%    | 138                |
| Stay same                    | 9.9            | 90.1          | 111                | 26.6                          | 37.2     | 36.2     | 94                 |
| Decline                      | 0.0            | 100.0         | <u>12</u><br>N=277 | 30.8                          | 30.8     | 38.5     | <u>13</u><br>N=245 |
| $\chi^2 = .04$               |                |               |                    | $\chi^2 = .01$ Gamma = .33    |          |          |                    |

Inconsistent results indicate that all of the downward mobiles intend to vote for parties other than the SNP, although a slightly higher proportion of the downward mobiles are Scotnats than among the static group. The very small n for this group of downward mobiles may account for the discrepancy.

And finally, Table 53 shows that support for separatism strongly relates to Scotland's expected future economic mobility among "Scots." Twenty percent of the upward mobiles and forty-one percent of the downward mobiles were SNP supporters, while just six percent of those who saw Scotland's economy in static terms were SNP supporters. Similarly, forty-one percent of the upward mobiles and fully eighty-one percent of the downward mobiles were Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment, while less than twenty-six percent of the static group were Scotnats. The relatively low n for the downward mobile group suggests the possibility of some error in the large proportion found to support separatism in this group. In any case, the findings in this table, as in the previous two, strongly support the notion that mobility relates

to support for separatism.

TABLE 53

NATIONALISM AND SCOTLAND'S EXPECTED FUTURE ECONOMIC MOBILITY,  
AMONG "SCOTS"


| Those saying<br>Scotland's<br>economy will: | Vote Intention |               |                    | Index of Separatist Sentiment |          |          |                    |
|---|----------------|---------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|
|   | SNP            | Other parties | n                  | Scotnats                      | Neutrals | Antinats | n                  |
| Improve                                     | 20.5%          | 79.5%         | 122                | 45.2%                         | 32.2%    | 22.6%    | 115                |
| Stay same                                   | 6.1            | 93.9          | 115                | 25.8                          | 35.0     | 39.2     | 97                 |
| Decline                                     | 41.2           | 58.8          | <u>17</u><br>N=254 | 81.2                          | 12.5     | 6.3      | <u>16</u><br>N=228 |
| $\chi^2 = .00$                              |                |               |                    | $\chi^2 = .00$ Gamma = .11    |          |          |                    |

Figure 6 graphically illustrates some of the data in Tables 51 - 53. It shows the percentage of Scotnats in each mobility group on each measure of social mobility utilized in this study. For upward mobile groups and for static groups (where sample n's are large) the results are consistent across all mobility measures. It is only in the downward mobile group (where n's have been shown to be very low, admitting to the possibility of error) that inconsistencies of degree but not direction occur.

The interpretation we place on these results needs to account for the lack of a relationship between group membership and separatism as well as for the significant relationship noted immediately above between mobility and separatism. At first this seems a somewhat troubling discrepancy since social mobility is thought to alienate the individual from group life as part of the process of realigning him to new

FIGURE 6

## SCOTTISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL MOBILITY



structures and roles. But this does not seem to be the case in Scotland. While there may be a tendency for the socially mobile to become *déclassé*, there is no tendency to reject group life. There are apparently mechanisms in this process which help to maintain group ties, despite the potentially disrupting influence of mobility up or down the economic hierarchy.

The conditions which help to preserve group ties among the socially mobile in Scotland may be the same conditions which impel the mobile in the direction of separatism. In a sense there are two traditions in Scotland, two alternative establishments. The in-establishment, represented by the present UK system of political unity and moderation, and the out-establishment, consisting of the separate Scottish national tradition of autonomy tinged with a streak of radicalism. This out-establishment provides a convenient point of stability in the lives of the mobile. But to reject the in-establishment and opt for separatism does not necessarily mean that the individual also needs to alienate himself from group life. As we have pointed out, many groups in Scotland are Scottish groups. Even the national unions have semi-autonomous Scottish branches. Gurr has suggested that while social stresses may cause people to alienate themselves from some kinds of groups, they may also cause people to attach themselves to groups under certain conditions. This "institutionalized displacement" most frequently occurs when other channels of social expression are closed or inappropriate.<sup>1</sup> In Scotland, the out-establishment group structure apparently provides both an acceptable vehicle for peaceful protest

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<sup>1</sup>Gurr, "Psychological Factors...", pp. 268-9. Cf. also *supra*, chap. II, pp. 69-70.

and a point of psychological stability. This dual role played by groups and unions may account for the relatively high proportion of nationalists who participate in group life.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The snaw is seekan everywhere: our herts  
At last like roofless ingles it has fund,

And gethers there in drift on endless drift,  
Our broken herts that it can never fill;  
And still--its leafs like snaw, its growth like wund.--  
The thistle rises and forever will!

Scotland lies on the fringe of Europe. She is geographically isolated and aloof from the hectic exchange of economic goods and political ideas which takes place on the continent. Significantly, it is the physical bulk of England which, like a wedge, separates Scotland from the rest of Europe. But like many other fringe areas of the world, Scotland has sought to defend her identity and importance through political action. In an era when the nation-state is declining as a center of political sovereignty and as a point of psychological reference for its citizens, Scottish nationalism has experienced a major resurgence. In a decade when a European economic and political community has taken a step toward realization, an overwhelming majority of Scots resisted pressures to join and reaffirmed their preference for home rule.

This study has been an attempt to illuminate the character and causes of Scottish nationalism. We have traced its history, identified its leaders, studied its ideology, and sought out its fundamental motivations. We have also inquired into the applicability of two complementary frameworks to the study of Scottish nationalism. In this final



chapter we will discuss some of the major findings of our inquiry and consider some of the problems we have encountered.

### Nationalism and the SNP

First, although in Chapter One we concluded that the various behavioral and attitudinal indicators observed in Scotland were consistent with the commonly used term "nationalism," we found it difficult to operationalize support for that movement in Scotland. In Chapter Five we explained why we felt compelled to measure nationalism in Scotland both in terms of attitudes supporting increased devolution from the central government in London and in terms of support for the Scottish National Party. We also indicated that while support for the SNP has fluctuated widely over the years, popular attitudes about Scottish government have been consistent in their support for a significant measure of political devolution for Scotland.

But why in the face of popular support for home rule have the nationalists been unable for sustained periods to mobilize this support at the polls? Why, to put the question in a slightly different form, has the SNP failed to capture decisively the nationalist movement in Scotland? It may relate to the imperfect qualities of the political party as a vehicle for protest. As Toch has said, political parties often "evidence more concern for powerful pressure groups than for needy minorities."<sup>1</sup> But three more convincing reasons stand out: (1) the obstacles presented by the British electoral system, (2) the inability of the nationalists to cooperate among themselves, and (3) a dearth of strong, charismatic leadership.

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<sup>1</sup>Toch, op. cit., p. 220.

The general rule has been proposed that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system."<sup>1</sup> Although it is apparent that others factors must also be present,<sup>2</sup> one could make a very strong case for the primacy of the plurality system in the hierarchy of causal factors leading to a two-party system. Minor parties generally find survival difficult in such systems since victory at the polls depends so centrally on political credibility, which in turn depends on victory. In the British system additional obstacles are placed before minor parties. Media time is rigidly controlled and equal time provisions explicitly rejected in favor of a scheme which allots radio and television time on the basis of the level of electoral support a party has. In 1970 the SNP was given just five minutes of radio and television time (the same it had in 1966) contrasted to the Labour and Conservative Parties' fifty minutes and the Liberal Party's thirty minutes.<sup>3</sup> These restrictions did not help the SNP but it is unlikely that they were much of a detriment. The swift rise of the party in the 1967 by-elections and in the 1968 municipal elections had been closely followed in the Scottish press and widely covered as "news" on radio and television.

Another obstacle is the deposit requirement. Each candidate must pay to election authorities 150 pounds, which is forfeited unless he can secure at least one-eighth of the vote in his constituency. Having limited financial resources, smaller parties often cannot afford to risk the possibility of losing deposits, so they put up fewer candidates

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<sup>1</sup>Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1963, p. 217.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New York, 1967, pp. 37-41.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, op. cit., pp. 204-5.

and foreclose the possibility of winning decisive victories.

But the vagaries of the British electoral system are not alone responsible for the relatively poor long-term showing of the nationalist party in Scotland. Indeed, Lipset suggests that the one major exception to the two-party system rule is in cases where groups can draw on regional support.<sup>1</sup> The Irish nationalists provide a good example of a regional group which won major representation in the UK Parliament in spite of the plurality system.

A second major reason the Scottish nationalists have been unable to win sustained support at the polls concerns the internal organization of the party. Unlike other British parties, the SNP is fairly decentralized. Central party policy is purposively vague and sketchy. Constituency organizations have final authority over policy questions. Moreover, constituency organizations are under no obligation to the national office regarding the selection of candidates. This decentralized feature of the party has contributed to ideological diversity in party ranks. This is often viewed as an advantage in a moderate, eclectic party since it may contribute to the long-term down-playing of ideology and winning of new converts. But ideological diversity in a party based on a single emotional issue can have nothing but disintegrative effects. The internecine battles within the nationalist movement over ideology and tactics (particularly between the Liberals and the SNP) have generally weakened the movement by reducing public confidence both in nationalist organizations and in nationalist leaders.

A final explanation for the failure of the Scottish nationalists

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<sup>1</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1963, pp. 293-4.

to win sustained support relates to the quality of leadership. There is no question that many qualified Scots have been drawn into the campaign for separatism. The Scottish intelligensia, for example, has been generally sympathetic if not actively supportive of the SNP and other nationalist organizations. But the movement has produced no truly outstanding charismatic leader who can command the loyalty of activists, attract new support from the masses, and generally personify the cause. As Lipset has argued, charismatic leadership is indispensable in establishing the legitimacy of an independence movement.<sup>1</sup> But Scottish nationalism and the SNP have not produced a George Washington, nor even a Charles Parnell. All too often its leaders have been narrow, vindictive, and self-righteous. And more importantly they have not been particularly popular figures.

In any case, the language of nationalism has been spoken with many tongues in Scotland while the political predispositions of a majority of Scots have not been transformed into concrete political action. Perhaps more than any other, these two factors have characterized Scottish nationalism over the past century.

#### The Causes of Nationalism in Scotland

But the central issue of this study has related to the sources of nationalism in Scotland and the motivations of its supporters. Having considered aggregate economic, social, and political data, survey data, and evidence from the historical record, we are now prepared to offer some conclusions. As we emphasize at the end of this chapter, our findings are tentative and open, partly because of the limited nature

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., chap. I.

of our study and partly because of the often contradictory evidence we have accumulated. But what we have found has some interesting implications.

The most fundamental requirements of nationalism are present in Scotland. At a minimum nationalism requires the existence of criteria which delineate a group of people as a national group. We have found the Scots set apart from other people primarily by geography, language, customs, and common experience. But just as a mineral resource may or may not be exploited for an industrial purpose, a national group does not automatically become politicized in a nationalist movement.

A conclusion which is as unavoidable as it is trivial relates to the complexity of the phenomenon of nationalism and the futility of the search for a single "cause." Once a national group has been delineated, a number of diverse factors may determine whether (and to what degree) it will become politicized. We set out in this study to determine the relevance of two such factors, a sense of national group relative deprivation and group social mobility. But in the context of the Scottish case, we can easily suggest that other factors bear centrally on the issue.

At least five factors relate in different ways and to different degrees to the phenomenon of national separatism in Scotland. The historical context within which the revival of nationalism has taken place seems to affect at least three of these factors. First, the twentieth century has been for Britain a period of retreat from empire, a moving back from world-wide commitments, and a stepping-down from the pinnacle of world power. This has both removed a major avenue of self-fulfillment for Britons of all nationalities in the military, in

commerce, and in the foreign civil service, and it has instigated a re-appraisal of the conditions of life at home. For those with ambition and drive, the Empire may be thought to have served a "safety valve" function not unlike the role of the frontier in the American experience. But just as the end of the frontier may in some way have contributed to American jingoism and imperialism, the "end of empire" may have ushered in an era of suppressed ambition and pent-up energies throughout Britain. The loss of the Empire, along with these "advantages," may have removed one strong tie among the various elements making up the United Kingdom.

Moreover, the social reforms of the post-war Labour government, the increasing willingness of Britain to cooperate and join with Europe, and the revival of Celtic nationalisms in Britain may all share a common impetus. Each may derive in part from the return to an inward perspective occasioned by the end of colonialism. The era had produced a marked affluence at home but after World War I growth rates slowed down and concern for distributive justice was heightened. World War II further weakened Britain's economic and political power and focussed interest even more directly on internal problems and priorities. Labour's social and economic reforms of 1945-51 undoubtedly helped to allay some of the pressure, but efforts in the 1960's to join the EEC may have helped (at least from Scotland's perspective) to exacerbate the problem.

In the Introduction we noted the coincidence between the modern revival of Scottish nationalism and Britain's movement toward the European Community. Although it is ironic that integrative and disintegrative forces can be taking place at the same time in Europe, the evidence suggests that the former may play a major role in encouraging the latter.

Our survey suggested that Scots were almost unanimously opposed to EEC membership for Britain. Moreover, we have seen that one of the hallmarks of SNP policy was opposition to EEC membership. But it would probably be erroneous to conclude that the nationalists in Scotland are simply ethnocentric parochials. Our survey showed that few Scots would favor EEC membership for Scotland even if Scotland was independent. But the SNP has never ruled out EEC membership for an independent Scotland. In fact, SNP leadership stresses the role Scotland should be, but is prevented by England from, playing in the international system.

Among those surveyed in this study, the conviction was strong that EEC membership would further isolate Scotland from the centers of power by adding another bureaucratic tier. Throughout the 1960's the efforts of the British government to join the EEC seem to have contributed both to disillusionment with the two main parties (especially Labour, the party in power from 1964-70) and to the general attractiveness of the SNP (the only party in Scotland opposed to EEC membership).

A third historical factor which seems relevant to the revival of Scottish nationalism in the 1960's is Britain's short-run economic situation. Although our sample was too small to produce definitive results, it does appear that a large number of voters who opted for the SNP during by-elections between 1966 and 1970 did so simply to protest the Labour government's handling of the economy. Inflation, balance of payments problems, and rising taxes were felt throughout Britain, but the presence of the SNP in Scotland as a party Scots could, in a diffuse sense, identify with, even though they knew little of its issue positions, made it a potential vehicle for protest. In England during the early part of this period it was the Liberal Party which served this

protest function. Once the viability of the SNP had been established (perhaps by the strong showing in the Pollok by-election in March, 1967), the party could attract additional voters (mostly, it seems, Labour voters) who wanted to withhold a vote from their own party without giving one to the main opposition.

These are all powerful arguments and they could be developed further. But in a larger sense they beg the question since they are all explanations purporting to explain the revival of nationalism in Scotland. The final two explanations, those which received most attention in this study, have more relevance to the residual force of Scottish nationalism although the variables with which they deal (relative deprivation and social mobility) are dynamic and can vary considerably over time.

The evidence presented in Chapter Five yields a general picture of Scotland as a deprived region. Wages are lower and the cost of living higher than England. Health and living conditions are less satisfactory than in England. And, most significantly, emigration rates are high. Political representation and education are among the few criteria on which the Scots do not seem to be objectively deprived within the United Kingdom.

For the most part, these deprivations are accurately perceived by a majority of Scots. The sense of national group deprivation relative to England is high. But, surprisingly, the analysis of Chapter Seven reveals that for at least three out of five measures of relative deprivation, no relationship with support for nationalism exists. Only on the political dimension, where ironically no objective deprivation exists, does a sense of relative deprivation relate unequivocally to



separatism.

The answers to two key questions need to be provided at this point. Since the hypothesis linking a sense of relative deprivation to support for separatism was not strongly supported by the evidence from the Glasgow survey, we need to account for the result. And secondly, since the results are generally at variance with the findings of other researchers who have inquired into the sources of civil violence and similar phenomena, we need to account for the discrepancy.

At least five factors appear to account for the weak relation found between relative deprivation and separatism in Scotland. First, the public image of the SNP is not positive. A free-response question on our survey revealed that, among the sample as a whole, positive reactions to the SNP only slightly outweighed negative responses. Even among those we classed as Scotnats on the Index of Separatist Sentiment, positive reactions were only a little more than twice as frequently given as negative comments. While support for the SNP was only one of our measures of nationalism, the general lack of confidence in the party and its leadership undoubtedly affects the attitudes Scots have about the goals the party seeks. If an independent Scotland would mean government by the SNP, many Scots who might otherwise be expected to support devolution would rather continue to take their chances under the present governmental arrangement. It may be, in other words, that the lackluster image of the SNP does more to retard the growth of nationalism in Scotland than its organizing efforts do to nurture that growth.

A second factor affecting the relationship is the expectation of failure. A Gallup Poll conducted in 1968 showed that just 11.5% of those

surveyed thought that the SNP would win "all" or "most" of the Scottish seats at the next parliamentary election. Another 23.2% foresaw the SNP winning "about half."<sup>1</sup> Our survey showed that nearly sixty percent of the Glasgow sample thought that life in an independent Scotland would be "no better" or even "worse" than now. Even among the supporters of separatism the sense of futility was more than thirty-six percent. This evidence of widespread lack of confidence in the nationalist movement may account for the weakness with which those with a sense of relative deprivation support the separatist cause. If the SNP candidates stand little chance of being elected, why support them? Why not cast a vote for the Conservative or Labour Parties where votes will make a difference? Moreover, why turn to separatism as a means to redress grievances if the execution of that policy would mean no change or even a worsening of the situation? Dollard suggests that when the means to relieve deprivations are expected to be ineffective, aggressive impulses will seek surrogate objects of disdain.<sup>2</sup> In Scotland we would expect to find high rates of alcoholism, suicide, and crime, and we do. It may be that deprivation-induced frustration finds its outlet not in terms of aggression against the system which is perceived to produce (or allow) those deprivations, but against substitutes closer at hand.<sup>3</sup>

A third factor which may produce a weaker relationship between deprivation and separatism than expected relates to the intensity with which deprivations are perceived. Dollard, et al., stressed that the strength of the instigation to aggression will influence the form and

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<sup>1</sup>Social Surveys, (Gallup Poll) Ltd. and The Daily Telegraph, 1968.

<sup>2</sup>Dollard, et al., op. cit., chap. iv.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *supra*, chap. II, pp. 67-8.

degree of aggression. Weakly felt deprivations will presumably be less frustrating and, hence, less likely to lead to aggression (or support for separatism) than more strongly felt deprivations. Schwartz concluded that deprivations in Scotland were of insufficient intensity to produce violence but were strong enough to account for separatism.<sup>1</sup> But his study focussed on nationalist leaders who, it may be surmised, have a stronger incentive to rationalize their activity by pointing to Scottish deprivations than those among the general public whose support for nationalism is more diffuse. The motivations of activists, because their activity is more intense and involving, may require a more carefully thought-out system of justifications to support and reinforce that activity. Although we have no convenient way of showing whether and how this discrepancy between elites and masses takes place, weakly felt frustrations among our Glasgow sample may well depress the correlation between sense of deprivation and separatism in Scotland.

A fourth factor which may contribute to our result relates to the possibility that other compensatory factors may mitigate the effects of a sense of deprivation. Specifically, life in Scotland, while it may involve suffering deprivations, can also be highly gratifying. And many of the advantages may be perceived to derive from Scotland's link with England. More than forty percent of the respondents in the Glasgow sample saw the bad effects of separating from England in terms of losing some advantage (usually financial) which derived directly from the union. Although we suggest above that the declining importance of Britain's world role may have removed one gratifying aspect of the union, other political, economic, and psychological advantages may help

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<sup>1</sup>Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 511-2.

outweigh the sense of deprivation so many Scots express.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, odious parallels between separatism in Scotland and in other parts of the world may weaken the expected relationship. The specter of large-scale civil violence, vividly highlighted by the strife so close at hand in Northern Ireland, may considerably dampen enthusiasm for separatism in Scotland. This seems a particularly likely possibility if, as we suspect, the deprivations perceived by Scots are felt less intensely than deprivations are felt by, say, Biafrans or Ulster Catholics. Any bandwagon effect resulting from the observation of separatist movements elsewhere (e.g., Quebec, the Basque area, or Brittany) may be mitigated or outweighed by the violent and undesirable outcomes of a few. Most Scots, even many who perceive unjust deprivations, apparently feel that it is better to endure the indignities deriving from the present governmental arrangement than to risk the great suffering that could accompany a vigorous independence movement. Survey evidence is limited, but recent events in Northern Ireland may have checked the revival of Scottish nationalism in much the same way as the Irish independence movement ended Scotland's hope for "home rule all round" at the beginning of the century.<sup>2</sup>

Although some of these factors are merely speculative, there seems sufficient evidence from the survey to account for the unexpectedly weak relationship found between perceptions of unjust deprivations and support for separatism in Scotland. Moreover, owing to the complexity of the dependent variable, the apparent multiplicity of relevant independent variables, and the inability based on our small sample survey to

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Dollard, et al., p. 170.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *supra*, chap. III, p. 106.

determine the relative importance of various independent variables to different sub-groups, we are forced to conclude that although our hypothesis is not strongly supported, we have no reason to reject it. In fact, we suspect that a sense of relative deprivation is an important aspect of separatism in Scotland and elsewhere. If the mass public is not strongly or directly motivated by this factor, leaders apparently are.<sup>1</sup> A widespread sense of relative deprivation may form the core justification for a separatist movement even though it acts as a specific motivation for only a minority of participants.

The second key question which requires explanation relates to the discrepancy between our findings and those of the researchers whose work inspired this study. One shortcoming in the research procedures used by most theorists of civil strife is that the essential dichotomy between micro- and macro-analysis is not maintained. For example, Gurr's hypothesis linking relative deprivation to civil strife rests explicitly on frustration-aggression theory and, hence, on the perspective of the micro-analyst. He explains that

[t]he basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form.... The underlying causal mechanism is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response.<sup>2</sup>

The Feierabends, too, adopt this micro-level perspective, modifying it slightly by referring to "systemic frustration" as the system-level

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Schwartz, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup>Gurr, "A Causal Model....," p. 1104.

expression of the psychological variable.<sup>1</sup> Eulau describes the viewpoint of the micro-analyst:

The root is man. I don't think it is possible to say anything meaningful about the governance of man without talking about the political behavior of man--his acts, goals, drives, feelings, beliefs, commitments, and values. Man has built nations and empires, created customs and institutions, invented symbols and constitutions, made wars, revolutions and peace. Politics is the study of why man finds it necessary or desirable to build government, of how he adapts government to his changing needs or demands, of how and why he decides on public policies. Politics is concerned with the conditions and consequences of human action.<sup>2</sup>

But the measures Gurr and the Feierabends develop to examine their respective hypotheses are not on this plane of analysis. To measure relative deprivation--a psychological variable as Gurr admits--Gurr looks for patterns of long- and short-term economic and political discrimination. To measure deviant political behavior he looks at the systemic occurrence of dysfunctional activity. After an initial conceptualization of the variables at the micro-level of analysis, they become magically operationalized at the macro-level. This seems an inappropriate strategy. Etzioni, in discussing the fruitfulness of macro- versus micro-level analysis, remarks that:

Theory construction is a process in which concrete data are "broken down" into abstract components and reintegrated on still more abstract levels. While analysis and synthesis are universal features of theory-building, the number of tiers among which analysis and synthesis are spread differs significantly. Much arbitrariness seems justified both in selecting tiers and in fixing the divisions between them; they need only be consistent with each other--i.e., what is defined as being on one level must not be defined in the same theory as being

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<sup>1</sup>Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962, A Cross-national Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X, September, 1966, pp. 249-50.

<sup>2</sup>Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, Random House, New York, 1963, p. 3.

on another. [Emphasis mine.] <sup>1</sup>

Gurr and the Feierabends violate this edict. Their findings-- which rest on the assumption that there is a linkage between the two levels--are not invalidated thereby, but one is cautioned as to the difficulties. Where one seeks to explain political phenomena in terms of motivational antecedents it becomes essential to confine one's methodological manipulations to the personal psychological level of analysis. In our study, we used same-level operationalizations for the major dependent and independent variables. Moreover, where the micro-level analysis is used for operationalization, it is also used for initial conceptualization. As we have stressed, we assume that human behavior does depend in some crucial way on perceptions, attitudes, and motivations. Hence, the discrepancies between our findings and those of other researchers in this field may well derive from these diverse procedures.

The final explanation of Scottish nationalism we examined in this study related to social mobility. We defined social mobility in terms of the changes people perceived and expected in their own economic situation and that of their national group. And we expected to find that those who were mobile in this sense would be more likely than those whose position was static to experience "status discrepancies" and to opt for dysfunctional political modes such as support for separatism.

Our findings, reported in Chapter Eight, were uniform, significant, and supportive of the hypothesis. We found that for each measure of mobility those respondents in the Glasgow survey who perceived upward

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<sup>1</sup>Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society, The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 42.

or downward movement were far more likely to (1) support the SNP and (2) favor increased devolution for Scotland than respondents who felt that time did not affect their economic position nor that of Scotland. There was considerable variation in the proportion of downward mobiles who supported separatism, but the small number who perceived downward mobility gave us a large error factor in estimating proportions among this group. Nevertheless, all of the relationships were in the direction predicted.

Olson's prediction that both upward and downward mobiles will be "destabilizing forces" is generally borne out by this evidence. But we may be able to go further than he in explaining why this is so.<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly, we can attribute support for nationalism among the two dynamic groups to different factors for upward and for downward mobiles. The easier case to explain is the downward mobile group. Since the status quo has not been or will not be kind to this group, we may surmise that the stake this group has in the present order is limited. Scottish nationalism, with its promise for change and improvement, offers this group a vehicle for self-advancement.

But the upward mobile group may also view the movement as an instrument of change, not change to improve one's economic or political well-being as much as to offer a means of self-realization. The upward mobile group may feel the confidence and need to use their new-found status to affect change in the system which is to their benefit. But in addition, the upward group may feel a tinge of resentment against the Anglicized "in-establishment" Scots who "collaborate" with the English in maintaining a status quo detrimental to their own best interests.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. supra, chap. II, p. 80.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Wolfinger, et al., in Apter, op. cit., p. 279.



In an independent Scotland the old Anglicized elite might well be replaced by a "new technocratic elite," perhaps joined by some members of the upward mobile group we are discussing.

Finally, it is important to note the linkage between relative deprivation and social mobility. In Scotland, it is social mobility in the context of a widespread sense of deprivation that yields support for separatism. As noted above, a sense of relative deprivation plays a role at least in maintaining a residual group of supporters of separatism in Scotland. This makes support for separatism a viable alternative and a magnet for the alienated and rootless. Hence, the interaction between these explanatory factors is an important explanation in itself.

Although we set out in this study to "explain" nationalism in Scotland and to search out its "causes," we have been able to do this only to a limited degree. Definitive answers are, of course, elusive. As Kaplan has noted,

[e]xplanations are often thought to add to our knowledge by contributing only to its growth by expansion. The idea is that when something has been explained it is as though we have conquered a certain amount of territory; a new frontier has been established, and, except for mopping-up operations, nothing remains but to continue our steady advance. In an even more popular metaphor, another trick has been laid in the edifice of science, which rises ever higher. Such images imply a finality that explanations do not in fact have; the openness of laws and theories confers a corresponding attribute on the explanations that they make possible.<sup>1</sup>

Our explanations are tentative for several reasons. First, they are only partial explanations. We have been able to explore only a limited set of independent variables out of the multiplicity of causally-related

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<sup>1</sup>Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, Methodology for Behavioral Research, Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1964, p. 351.

factors. From different perspectives, any of the intervening variables we have discussed along the way might be considered a contributing factor. Second, our explanations are conditional. They apply only to certain phenomena and not to others. We have been careful to delimit our study and to focus only on defensive separatism in Scotland.

Third, our explanations are inexact. Given that we have offered valid devices for the prediction of support for separatism, we can only predict the general parameters of the group exhibiting the trait we seek. Fourth, the models we have suggested, while they may be applicable in the general case, are not universally applicable. Deprivation and mobility may be central motivating factors for participants in separatist movements, but the theory based on that observation cannot account for the diverse reactions to deprivation and mobility among a population. Since, given common stimuli, behavior is not uniform, our explanation of that behavior is indeterminate.

Fifth, our explanation suffers from inconclusiveness. It cannot show why deprivation or mobility must lead a national group to separation, but rather why it is a likely outcome. Like all motivated behavior, separatism is a matter of probabilities. Sixth, we are able to confirm our theory only to a limited degree. The existence of contrary evidence lends to our explanation the character of uncertainty. Seventh, as Popper noted, every explanation is itself subject to explanation, making our framework of necessity only intermediate. But to attempt a "full" explanation would clearly be a never-ending task. Finally, our explanation is applicable to only one level of separatism, that of motivations; it sheds scant light on other dimensions of the phenomenon, such as the historical or the ideological.

The animal of nationalism is so large that a political scientist can focus upon the organization and structure of a nation-state or upon its political parties, an economist upon a country's natural resources or its international trade, a sociologist upon the origins and ideologies of the ruling elite, an anthropologist upon the changes in social organization demanded and produced by nationhood--and all of them may be discussing some section of the same elephant.<sup>1</sup>

Our explanations are limited since, as Kaplan says, "[t]here are contexts of inquiry in which questions arise which it does not even begin to answer."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the explanations we have offered in these pages cannot be definitive. They do provide a yardstick against which we can measure our observations, but they are useful in themselves only to the extent that they lend coherence to our observations. If we have done that, we have accomplished our purpose.

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<sup>1</sup>Doob, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 355. The points stressed above are derived from Kaplan's discussion of openness in explanation, pp. 351-5.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A  
THE GLASGOW SAMPLE

A total of 430 names were selected from the electoral registers for Woodside and Maryhill constituencies using cluster sampling techniques. The Opinion Research Centre (London) conducted the interviewing and, making a minimum of three and maximum of five call-backs, produced a total of 308 completed interviews. The reasons for non-completion are enumerated below:

|                |           |
|----------------|-----------|
| Names issued:  | 430       |
| Dead           | 1         |
| Moved          | 39        |
| Not at home    | 47        |
| Too old or ill | 8         |
| Refused        | <u>27</u> |

Interviews not obtained 122

430 - 122 = 308 interviews completed (71.6%)

A shortened form of the questionnaire was mailed to those prospective respondents who had not been contacted successfully for a personal interview. It was hoped that any sample bias might be uncovered by comparing the characteristics of the two sets of respondents. Thirty-five (28.9%) of the mailed questionnaires were returned. Of those who had moved from their original address, fifteen percent responded to the mailed questionnaire, while thirty-six percent of those who were not at home when the interviewer called responded. Thirteen percent of those who were too old or ill, and fully forty-one percent of those who had

refused to respond to a personal interview sent back the forms.

Table A1 shows how the respondents personally interviewed compared on several key variables with those answering the mailed questionnaire. The chi square level of significance is also shown.

TABLE A1  
RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES COMPARED

| Variable      |               | Interviews |       | Questionnaires |       | X <sup>2</sup> level of significance |
|---------------|---------------|------------|-------|----------------|-------|--------------------------------------|
|               |               | #          | %     | #              | %     |                                      |
| Electoral     |               |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Ward          | 1             | 25         | 8.1%  | 2              | 5.7%  | .40                                  |
|               | 2             | 95         | 30.8  | 13             | 37.1  |                                      |
|               | 3             | 50         | 16.2  | 6              | 17.1  |                                      |
|               | 4             | 83         | 26.9  | 5              | 14.3  |                                      |
|               | 5             | 55         | 17.8  | 9              | 25.7  |                                      |
| National      |               |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Group         | Scots         | 285        | 92.5% | 28             | 80.0% | .34                                  |
|               | English,      |            |       |                |       |                                      |
|               | Welsh,        |            |       |                |       |                                      |
|               | Irish         | 11         | 3.6   | 3              | 8.6   |                                      |
|               | British       | 7          | 2.3   | 2              | 5.7   |                                      |
|               | Other         | 5          | 1.6   | 2              | 5.7   |                                      |
| Better paying |               |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| job           | England       | 106        | 40.1% | 13             | 44.8% | .93                                  |
|               | Scotland      | 7          | 2.7   | 1              | 3.4   |                                      |
|               | No difference | 151        | 57.2  | 15             | 51.7  |                                      |
|               |               |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Gov't for     |               |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Scotland      | Independence  | 37         | 13.2% | 1              | 3.0%  | .00                                  |
|               | Sep. Parl.    | 49         | 17.5  | 21             | 63.6  |                                      |
|               | Minor change  | 130        | 46.4  | 8              | 24.2  |                                      |
|               | No changes    | 64         | 22.8  | 3              | 9.1   |                                      |
| Sex           |               |            |       |                |       |                                      |
|               | Male          | 140        | 45.5% | 18             | 54.5% | .27                                  |
|               | Female        | 168        | 55.5  | 15             | 45.5  |                                      |

TABLE A1 (Cont'd.)

| Variable              | Interviews |       | Questionnaires |       | X <sup>2</sup> level of significance |
|-----------------------|------------|-------|----------------|-------|--------------------------------------|
|                       | #          | %     | #              | %     |                                      |
| Attention to politics |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Close                 | 12         | 3.9%  | 3              | 9.1%  | .04                                  |
| Fairly close          | 101        | 32.8  | 17             | 51.5  |                                      |
| Not much              | 195        | 63.3  | 13             | 39.4  |                                      |
| Vote Intent           |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Conservative          | 82         | 29.0% | 8              | 25.8% | .40                                  |
| Labour                | 157        | 55.5  | 15             | 48.4  |                                      |
| SNP                   | 44         | 15.5  | 8              | 25.8  |                                      |
| Occupation            |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| Non-manual            | 81         | 26.7% | 7              | 22.6% | .87                                  |
| Manual                | 148        | 48.8  | 15             | 48.4  |                                      |
| Inactive              | 74         | 24.4  | 9              | 29.0  |                                      |
| Age                   |            |       |                |       |                                      |
| 18-34                 | 86         | 28.4% | 11             | 33.3% | .41                                  |
| 35-64                 | 160        | 52.8  | 15             | 45.4  |                                      |
| 65 and over           | 57         | 18.8  | 7              | 21.2  |                                      |

These data suggest that the group of respondents who were personally interviewed were somewhat less likely to call themselves Scots, less likely to favor significant devolution for Scotland, more likely to be female, less attentive to politics, less likely to vote SNP, and slightly older than the group who sent in postal questionnaires. As we might expect, it is the group we were unable to interview who took a generally more extreme political position, were more likely to be male, and were younger.

The data from the postal questionnaires are probably not a very reliable guide to the true characteristics of the group from which personal interviews were not obtained. Since they do not derive from a random sample of this group, these data can only be taken as suggestive of certain trends. Even so, since the level of significance is so

convincing, it seems safe to assert that our main sample underestimates the level of support for Scottish separatism. It also may underestimate the influence of young males and those who are relatively attentive to politics. But these difficulties are not judged to affect the validity of our conclusions.



APPENDIX B

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

Interviewer's Name . . . . . Interviewer's No. . . . .  
Respondent's Name . . . . .  
Address . . . . .  
Time begun . . . . . Time completed . . . . .  
Length of interview . . . . .  
Date . . . . .

Good morning/afternoon. I am doing a public opinion survey at the University of Strathclyde. For this study we need the answers to a few questions we are asking people all over the Glasgow area.

Q.1(a) First of all, how long have lived here in Glasgow?

- (b) And how do you feel about the Glasgow area as a place to live?  
Do you like living here or not?
- (c) Economically, do you think that the Glasgow area is worse off  
or better off than other parts of Scotland?
- (d) Have you ever lived outside Scotland?

IF "NO" GO TO Q.1(f)  
IF "YES" ASK:

- (e) Where did you live?
- (f) Have you ever been to England?

IF "NO" GO TO Q.1(h)  
IF "YES" ASK:

- (g) How many times have you been to England in the past 10 (ten) years?
- (h) Have you ever visited any other countries?

IF "NO" GO TO Q.2(a)  
IF "YES" ASK:

- (i) Which countries have you visited in the past ten (10) years?

- Q.2(a) Most people in Britain say they are English, Scottish, Welsh, or Irish. Which of these groups would you say you belonged to?
- (b) Would you say that you are proud or not so proud about being \_\_\_\_\_, or doesn't it make any difference?
- (c) In general, how much do you think you have in common with most Englishmen? Would you say a lot, some, or not very much?
- (d) How about Scots? How much would you say you had in common with Scots?
- (e) Are any of your friends or relatives English?
- (f) How about the people you work with? Are there many who are English?
- (g) Generally speaking, what differences, if any, do you see between English and Scottish people?
- (h) What are the things you like most about English people?
- (i) And what are the things you dislike most about English people?
- (j) What about Scots? What are the things you like most about Scots?
- (k) And what are the things you dislike most about Scots?
- Q.3(a) On the whole, do the activities of the government in London tend to improve conditions in Scotland or would we be better off without them?
- (b) In general, do you think that the government in London cares about people like yourself?
- (c) And who do you think of when we talk about people like yourself?
- (d) Suppose there were some question you had to take to a national government office--for example, a tax or social security question. Do you think you would be given equal treatment? Would you be treated as well as anyone else?

IF "YES" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.4(a).

IF "NO" OR "DEPENDS" ASK:

- (e) Why do you think so?
- Q.4(a) There is a lot of talk about "home rule" for Scotland these days. What do you think people mean by "home rule" for Scotland?
- (b) What are your general feelings about "home rule"? Do you favor it, oppose it, or what?

- (c) Could you explain why you feel that way?
- (d) And would you say you held these views about "home rule" strongly or not so strongly?

Q.5 A lot of people are talking about Scotland's role in the world today. When I read the following statements, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with them? (SHOW CARD 1). Just mention one of the numbers on this card.

|   |         |                      |
|---|---------|----------------------|
| [ | CARD 1: | 1. Agree strongly    |
|   |         | 2. Agree             |
|   |         | 3. It depends        |
|   |         | 4. Disagree          |
|   |         | 5. Disagree strongly |

- (a) Nowadays it's better to forget traditional Scottish things like the kilt and the bagpipes.
- (b) Scots law should be made the same as English law.
- (c) I generally try to buy things made in Scotland.
- (d) The Scottish way of life is just about the best in the world.
- (e) It seems unfair that English people have so much say in running Scotland.
- (f) Roads and highways in Scotland are better than those in England.
- (g) People in Scotland pay more in taxes than they receive back in benefits.
- (h) On the whole, it is easier to make a living in Scotland than in England.
- (i) Scottish housing is better than English housing.
- (j) Scottish education should be kept separate from English education.
- (k) In general, it is probably easier for a Scotsman to become a peer than for an Englishman.
- (l) My children would be better off if they left Scotland to live in England or another country.
- (m) I would be better off if I left Scotland to live in England or another country

IF "DEPENDS," "DISAGREE," "DISAGREE STRONGLY" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.6.  
IF "AGREE STRONGLY" OR "AGREE" ASK?

- (n) Where would you go? What country?

- Q.6 Do you think Scotland should have more or fewer M.P.s in Parliament, or do you think that Scotland's representation is about right?
- Q.7(a) Now I'd like to ask how you feel about a few issues in the news these days. First of all, what would you say are the biggest problems facing Britain at the present time?
- (b) Which political party do you think can best handle that problem? (those problems?)
- (c) How about Scotland? What are the big problems facing Scotland today?
- (d) And which political party do you think can best handle that problem? (those problems?)
- Q.8(a) How much say do you think Britain has in world affairs these days?
- (b) Do you think that Britain's say in world affairs is smaller or larger today than it was five years ago?
- (c) Do you think Britain should have a bigger say in world affairs or not?
- Q.9(a) Do you think that it would be a good idea or a bad idea for Britain to join the Common Market?
- (b) If Scotland were made an independent nation, would you favour or oppose its joining the Common Market?
- Q.10 Do you think that state welfare benefits are too high, too low, or about right?
- Q.11(a) Do you think that big business has too much power in Britain or not?
- (b) And how about trade unions? Do you think trade unions have too much power in Britain or not?
- Q.12 How do you feel about the death penalty? Would you favour or oppose a return to hanging?
- Q.13 What do you think about most young people today? Do you think they have too much freedom or not?

IF RESPONDENT IS NOT COLORED ASK:

- Q.14 Do you think that too many immigrants have been let into this country or not?
- Q.15(a) Do you expect your own earnings to improve, get worse, or stay about the same over the next five years?

- (b) How about Scotland's economic situation? Do you expect that to improve, get worse, or stay about the same over the next five years?
- (c) Some people say that English people are doing much better nowadays than Scottish people. Do you think this is so or not?
- (d) Do you think English people ought to be doing ~~as~~ well as they are doing compared with Scottish people?
- (e) Do you think that people like yourself can get a better paying job in England or Scotland?

Q.16 Four different ways of governing Scotland are talked about a lot nowadays: (SHOW CARD 2) complete independence, a separate parliament for Scotland with control over Scottish affairs, minor changes like giving more power to the present Scottish Office, and leaving things the way they are.

|   |
|---|
| <p>CARD 2: 1.Complete independence<br/>2.Separate parliament<br/>3.Minor changes<br/>4.Leave things as they are</p> |
|---|

- (a) Can you tell me which of these is closest to the policy of the Conservative Party?
- (b) How about the Labour Party?
- (c) And the Scottish National Party?
- (d) And which is closest to the Liberal Party?
- (e) And which of these policies is closest to what you think?  
(Which policy would you favour?)
- (f) Have your ideas about this changed in the past five years?

IF "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.17(a)

IF "YES" ASK:

- (g) What did you used to think?
- (h) What caused you to change your mind?
- (i) And when was that? How many years ago?

Q.17(a) And now let me ask you what you think might happen if Scotland became an independent nation. What would be the good effects if Scotland became independent?

- (b) What would be the bad effects if Scotland became independent?
- (c) Do you think there would be more jobs or fewer jobs if Scotland were independent?

- (d) Do you think that housing would improve or get worse?
- (e) If Scotland were independent, do you think on the whole you would be better off, or worse off than you are now, or wouldn't it change things for you?

Q.18(a) Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. In general, do you agree or disagree with this?

- (b) Thinking of the important national and international issues facing Britain, how well do you think you can understand these issues? Very well fairly well, or not so well?
- (c) How about Scottish issues? Do you think you understand these very well, fairly well, or not so well?
- (d) And local issues? How well do you think you can understand them?
- (e) Many people we've interviewed have said that they have trouble understanding political affairs. Which of the reasons on this list best explains why this happens? (Which is the major reason?)  
SHOW CARD 3.

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| [ | CARD 3: 1. Problems are too complex<br>2. People don't care or try<br>3. Those in power don't help people to understand | ] |
|---|---|---|

Q.19(a) How much attention do you generally pay to what's going on in politics when there isn't an election? Would you say that you usually follow politics very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all?

- (b) Do you read a daily newspaper?
- (c) Do you read any Sunday papers?
- (d) Any other weeklies or monthlies? Do you read any of them?
- (e) Do you ever see a newspaper called the Scots Independent?

Q.20(a) Many people don't vote in local or general elections. How often do you vote in local elections?

- (b) How about general elections? How often do you vote in them?

Q.21(a) Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Conservative, Labour, Scottish Nationalist supporter or what?

IF "DON'T KNOW" OR "NONE" ASK:

- (b) Do you sometimes think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others?

IF "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.22(a)

IF "YES" ASK Q.21(c)

(c) Which party is that?

(d) Are you a strong \_\_\_\_\_ or a not so strong \_\_\_\_\_?

(e) As far as you remember, have you always thought of yourself as a \_\_\_\_\_?

IF "YES" OR "DON'T KNOW" GO TO Q.22(a)

IF "NO" ASK:

(f) Which other party have you supported?

(g) What was the main thing that made you change from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_?

(h) Do you remember when you changed to \_\_\_\_\_? (respondent's present party?)

Q.22(a) Did you vote in the last general election (1966), or weren't you able to get to the polls?

IF "YES" ASK:

(b) Which party did you vote for?

(c) What would you say is the main reason you voted for that party?

ASK ALL:

Q.23(a) If there were a by-election in the constituency tomorrow and there were four candidates--Conservative, Labour, Scottish Nationalist, and Liberal--which party would you vote for?

(b) If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

IF NAMES A PARTY, ASK:

(c) If that party did not have a candidate to vote for, which party would be your second choice?

ASK ALL:

(d) Is there any party you would never vote for?

Q.24(a) Do you take an active part in party work?

IF "NO" GO TO Q.25(a)

IF "YES" ASK:

(b) What do you do?

ASK ALL:

Q.25(a) When you were growing up, which party did your father support?

(b) And which party did your mother support?

Q.26(a) Do you happen to know the names of any Labour Party leaders?

(b) How about Conservative Party leaders? Do you know their names?

(c) And the Scottish National Party? Who are some of their leaders?

(d) Finally, do you happen to know the names of any Liberal Party leaders?

Q.27(a) Now I'd like to ask if you know what St. Andrew's House is?

(b) What would you say is the job of the Scottish Office?

(c) And do you happen to know the name of the present Secretary of State for Scotland?

Q.28(a) In the next general election would you say that the Scottish Nationalist candidate has a good chance, a fair chance, or a poor chance in the constituency?

(b) What kind of people would you say support the Scottish National Party? How would you describe them?

Q.29(a) There's a lot of talk nowadays about different social classes. Would you say you belonged to the middle class or the working class.

IF WORKING CLASS, ASK:

(b) As a member of the Scottish working class, do you think you have more in common with English working class people or Scots who are in the middle class?

IF MIDDLE CLASS, ASK:

(c) As a member of the Scottish middle class, do you think you have more in common with English middle class people or with Scots who are working class?

ASK ALL:

Q.30(a) When you make a new friend, how important is it that he is highly respected by others?

(b) How important is it that he is Scottish?

(c) In making a new friend, which would you say is more important, that he is highly respected or that he is Scottish?

Q.31(a) Could you tell me which of the things on this card you already have? (SHOW CARD 4)



- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| [ | CARD 4: 1. A radio<br>2. A television<br>3. A house you own<br>4. A car you own<br>5. Foreign holiday travel<br>6. A spare bedroom for visitors<br>7. First-class travel on trains<br>8. Private education for your children | ] |
|---|--|---|

FOR ITEMS NOT OWNED, ASK:

- (b) Would you like to have a \_\_\_\_\_?
- ASK ALL:
- (c) Do you think most other Scots are managing to afford a \_\_\_\_\_?
- (d) And do you think most English people are able to have a \_\_\_\_\_?
- Q.32(a) Some people say that English people have a better style of living than Scottish people. Do you think this is so or not?
- (b) Do you think that English people ought to have a better style of living as compared with Scottish people?
- Q.33(a) People who do physical labour to make a living--like factory workers or mechanics--are often called manual workers. Other people who make a living--like bank clerks or teachers--are white collar workers. Here is a list of four different groups of people. (SHOW CARD 5) Which of these do you feel you have most in common with?

- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| [ | CARD 5: 1. Scots manual<br>2. Scots white collar<br>3. English manual<br>4. English white collar | ] |
|---|--|---|

- (b) And which would be second?
- (c) And third?
- Q.34(a) Are you married?
- (b) How many persons are in your household?
- Q.35(a) Which member of your family living here is actually the owner/ is responsible for the rent?

IF "SELF" GO TO Q.36 (a)  
IF NOT "SELF" ASK:

- (b) Does he (she) have a paid job now? What does he (she) do?

IF UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED, ASK:

- (c) What kind of work did he (she) do?

(d) Did he (she) ever belong to a trade union?

ASK ALL:

Q.36(a) Do you have a paid job now? What sort of work do you actually do?

IF UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED, ASK:

(b) What kind of work did you do?

(c) Have you ever belonged to a trade union?

(d) How about other organizations like social groups, clubs, or political groups? Have you belonged to any organizations like that?

IF "YES" ASK:

(e) Which ones?

ASK ALL:

Q.37(4) Which letter on this card best corresponds to your household's usual weekly income after deductions? (SHOW CARD 6)

|         |                       |
|---------|-----------------------|
| CARD 6: | 1. Less than 5 pounds |
|         | 2. 5 - 9 pounds       |
|         | 3. 10 - 14 pounds     |
|         | 4. 15 - 19 pounds     |
|         | 5. 20 - 24 pounds     |
|         | 6. 25 - 29 pounds     |
|         | 7. 30 or more pounds  |

(b) How does this compare with your income over the last five years? Is it higher, lower, or about the same as it was five years ago?

(c) Would you say that you are satisfied or not satisfied with your family's present position as far as income is concerned?

Q.38(a) Can you tell me your date of birth?

(b) Where were you born? (TOWN AND COUNTRY)

Q.39 How old were you when you finished your full-time education?

Q.40(a) What is your religion?

IF GIVES A RELIGION, ASK:

(b) How often do you usually attend church?

Q.41 Sex: male or female.

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
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


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
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