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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

FORM VS. CONTENT IN SELECTED CURRENT
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

presented by
Yoon J. Kang
has been accepted towards fulfillment

of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Administration
and Curriculum

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© 1982

YOON JOONG KANG

All Rights Reserved

FORM VS. CONTENT IN SELECTED CURRENT
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

By

Yoon J. Kang

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Administration and Curriculum

1981

ABSTRACT

FORM VS. CONTENT IN SELECTED CURRENT
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

By
Yoon J. Kang

This dissertation examines the stances of several contempo-
rary ethical theorists who are highly influential in the field of
moral education: John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Sidney Simon
(together with his values clarificationist colleagues). Notwith-
standing vast differences in their positions, it is argued that they
share the view that there is a distinction between f9:m_and content
in moral judgment and that the basis for moral education lies in the
fOrmer to the exclusion of the latter.

The first step in this study is the delineation of the
central views of John Wilson, Lawrence Kolhberg, and Sidney Simon
with respect to three matters: (I) the concept of morality, (2)
the place of rationality in morality, and (3) the nature and purpose
of moral education.

The second step in the argument is a critical evaluation of
the arguments offered in support of the stances taken on these three
matters. The description and criticism of the views that moral

education should be exclusively f0cused on methodology, moral

Yoon J. Kang

reasoning, the valuing process, and so on is followed with an argu-
ment that John Dewey's theory of moral education provides a more
desirable alternative than do the contemporary theories. Finally,
a defense is offered of Dewey's view that moral education cannot
reasonably be limited to helping the youngsters to learn "how to
think" but should deliberately set out to promote substantive moral

values.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to all the fine teachers I
have encountered throughout my study at Michigan State University.
I am especially grateful to Drs. George N. Ferree and Scott R.
Vaughn, guidance and diSsertation committee chairman and co-chairman,
who have given me more than can possibly be acknowledged. I humbly
offer my sincere gratitude for their unfailing encouragement,
assistance and guidance throughout this study.

I sincerely thank all of the dear friends who provided
assistance and encouragement to me in the course of writing this
dissertation. I am particularly thankful to the Francks who shared
their warmth and provided a home away from home. To my parents,
without whose understanding and support this work would not have
been possible, I offer my appreciation; will I be able to do the

same for my own children?

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION .

John Wilson . . .
The Values Clarificationists .
Lawrence Kohlberg

Overview

II. MORALITY AND RATIONALITY IN MORAL EDUCATION

John Wilson' 5 View . .
The Value Clarificationists' View
Lawrence Kohlberg' s View

III. LOGIC AND JUSTIFICATION IN MORAL EDUCATION .
The Components of Morals .
The Justification of Moral Claims
The Values Clarification Method.
IV. A DENEYAN ALTERNATIVE .
Overview .
On Habit Formation .
Dewey According to Kohlberg and the Values
Clarificationists . . . .
V. CONCLUSION

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

iii

Page

—I

00 waN

l02

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Several current theories of moral education distinguish
substantive moral content from forms of moral reasoning and regard
only the latter as relevant to the aims of moral education. This
approach is grounded, in large part, in the belief that it is diffi-
cult, even impossible, to settle substantive moral disputes. Given
this, any program of moral education which teaches such substantive
values is bound to indoctrinate students into a partisan view of
morality. Theories of this sort hold that if schools were to promote
some particular form of moral reasoning, rather than specific moral
injunctions, students could be taught to adopt a rational approach
to moral questions that is neither partisan nor based on outdated
moral codes.

It is important that we clearly understand these contemporary
theories of moral education for they are considerably at variance
with some of the claims of common sense as well as the theories of
philosophers such as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. It is not
obvious that schools should not be allowed to promote some basic
rules or that to do so would be tantamount to indoctrination. While

their views differ in many respects, John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg

and Sidney Simon each incorporate a distinction of this type in

their theories of moral education.

John Wilson

 

John Wilson through his work at the Farmington Trust Research
Unit, which was set up in l965 at Oxford University, has been active
in developing and improving theories and programs of moral education.
During the last decade Wilson has published several major books and
numerous articles on moral education which are noteworthy in that he

1 and has

claims to have developed a rational basis for morality
proposed programs which detail what schools ought to do in moral
education. The central claims in Wilson's approach are that moral
education should deal with teaching correct methods of reasoning and
that this is not intended to ". . . impart any specific content, but
to give other people facility in a method,"2 This recognizes that

". . . the essence of moral education is not the inculcation of right
choices,"3 and that the methodology offers an effective way to avoid

reliance on partisan values and the uncritical acceptance of absolute

moral injunctions.

The Values Clarificationists

 

The values clarification movement led by Sidney Simon and his
colleagues4 represents another approach to moral education. It is
in part its rapid growth and the wide-spread popularity that make
the values clarification approach significant. According to this
theory values are determined in the course of the valuing process.

Furthermore, whatever one values is right for him and no set of

 

values can be universally and always objectively right. Given this
.no one has the right to influence the values held by others and moral
education is restricted to the goal of encouraging students to be
glgar_about their values. In short the theory holds that teachers
should remain neutral in the discussion of values, simply encouraging

each student to clarify his own set of values.

Lawrence Kohlberg

 

Lawrence Kohlberg, Director of the Center for Moral Education
at Harvard University, has been involved for twelve years in the
experimental study of ". . . the development of moral judgment and
character primarily by following the same group of 75 boys at three-
year intervals from early adolescence."5

Kohlberg has employed a set of hypothetical moral dilemmas
in his studies of moral reasoning. Subjects are told a story which
incorporates a moral dilemma--for example, the dilemma of a husband
who cannot afford drug costs for a dying wife. The subjects are
asked what the husband should do and why. Kohlberg's analysis of
responses to these dilemmas has led to his developmental stage theory
of moral reasoning in which the subject's definition of values and
the type of reasons given in support of his decision provide the
basis for classifying responses.6 In Kohlberg's theory it is the
form of reasoning which differentiates one stage from another, not
specific responses to specific moral dilemmas.

Kohlberg argues that the stages of moral reasoning:

l. are structured wholes or organized systems of thought,
not attitudes towards particular situations;

2. form an invariant sequence. Under all conditions except
extreme trauma, movement is always fOrward, never back-
ward. Individuals never skip a stage; movement is
always from a previous stage to a later one; and

3. are "hierarchical integrations." Thinking at a higher
stage comprehends lower stage thinking. There is a
tendency to function at the highest stage available.

Since stages are defined in terms of form§_of reasoning and

the goal of moral education is seen as promoting moral development,
Kohlberg sees moral education as dealing directly with moral reason-
ing rather than ". . . imposing a specific morality upon . . ."7

students.

Overview

The primary aim of this study is to describe and critically
evaluate three contemporary theories of moral education of this type,
specifically the views of John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and the
values clarification theory popularized by Sidney Simon and his
colleagues. The dissertation will consider the cogency of the argu-
ments offered in support of the distinction between content and form
in moral education, and will proceed by elucidating in some detail
the views of each of these theorists with respect to three issues:
(1) their concept of morality, (2) the place of reason in morality

and moral education, and (3) the nature and purpose of moral

education. The dissertation will conclude with an argument that
theories of moral education which emphasize the development of par-
ticular moral dispositions in the young provide a more reasonable
approach to moral education than do these second-order theories.

It is necessary to consider conceptions of morality in
general and the role of reason in morals since the accounts of the
nature and purpose of moral education under discussion are, in large
part, determined by those views. Furthermore, these contemporary
theorists emphasize moral methodologies and the valuing process
rather than substantive value claims or particular dispositions to
be fpstered in the student. This is rooted in their supposition
that any account of rational morality must be articulated in terms
of formal conditions or second-order norms rather than substantive
moral claims.

I will show that while the theories under consideration
employ different conceptions of morality and rationality, they each
hold to the view that the goal of moral education is the development
of rationality rather than the transmission of a fixed set of moral
beliefs. That is, they see moral education not as the inculcating
of specific moral beliefs and attitudes but rather the teaching of
specific methods of making moral decisions or processes of valuing
which are considered to be effective in arriving at sound moral
decisions. Since the standards of rational morality are seen not in
substantial content but in such fOrmal procedures, schools should
not endorse or promote any particular moral injunctions. I will

argue on various grounds that the distinction between form and

content does not provide the sort of value neutrality which these

 

theorists seek. But I will also argue that there are defensible
moral habits which the schools are justified in promoting and that

in doing so teachers are not indoctrinating their students.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I

1John Wilson, "First Steps in Education, Morality, and
Religion," in Philosophy of Education 1977, Proceedings, 33nd Annual
Meeting, Philosophy of Education Society, p. 40.

 

2John Wilson, A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education (London:
Geoffery Chapman, 1973), p. 27.

 

3111111., p. 64.

4Simon's colleagues in this movement are Leland W. Hower,
Howard Kirschenbaum, Merril Harmin, Louis E. Raths, and James Raths.

5Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis
for Moral Education," in Moral Education, ed., C. M. Beck, B. S.
Crittenden, and E. V. SullivanTTNew York: Newman Press, 1971),
p. 34.

 

6Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach
to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan 56(10) (June 1975): 672.

 

71bid., p. 54.

CHAPTER II

MORALITY AND RATIONALITY
IN MORAL EDUCATION

While it is frequently maintained that either implicitly or
explicitly moral education is an important part of the curriculum,
some current theorists argue that the school should not deliberately
promote substantive moral values. Current theorists as diverse as
John Wilson, Sidney Simon, and Lawrence Kohlberg support this nega-
tive view but argue for quite different views of what the school
ought to do in moral education. My purpose in this chapter is to
delineate the views of John Wilson, Sidney Simon (together with his
values clarificationist colleagues), and Lawrence Kohlberg with
respect to three matters: (l) the concept of morality, (2) the
place of rationality in morality, and (3) the nature and purpose

of moral education.

John Wilson's View

 

To explain the notion of morality Wilson says that the
concept has a broad meaning, including "much more than adherence to

1 Rather "it includes the notion of relating to

particular mores.“
other people as to equals, and knowing what their interests are, as

well as acting in accordance with those interests. It also includes

the notion of managing one's own desires and feelings in the right
way, even if the interest of others is not obviously involved."2
Hence the term "morality" can be applied to even "such cases as
choosing whom to marry, what job to do, whether to take drugs or
whether to engage in 'perverse' sexual behaviour."3
Wilson admits that the word "moral" is used in different
ways by different people and considers four possible common usages.
According to Wilson some people would restrict "moral" to (l) matters
where other people's interests are at stake, (2) our personal ideals
and virtues even where these do not affect others, (3) questions of
the sort "What ought I to do?" "What ought I to feel?" "What ought
I to be?" and so on, (4) matters where a person has a free choice

or where his will is in some way involved.4

In regard to these
various usages Wilson neither distinguishes essential usage from
nonessential, nor does he claim that there are correct or incorrect
ways to use the term "morality." Rather he says that “there are no
right or wrong answers to these questions." In other words Wilson
seems to accept the point that what is central to the meaning of the
word "moral" is its various usages and that none of these can be
ruled out prior to analysis.

Wilson claims that strategies in using the term can be more
or less wise, and that one wise ploy is to use "moral" in a manner
that takes into account principles important for a person. As to
why this is wise, Wilson gives some reasons. "Since every human

being, most of the time, acts for some kind of reason or on some

form of principle . . . it will be clear that everyone has a

l0

morality of some kind."5

The point is that to have a morality of
some kind means acting from some reasons or principles, however much
these may vary from person to person. Wilson offers no detailed
argument for his view, but he clearly wishes to employ "moral" and
its cognates in a comprehensive manner. This is evident when Wilson
says, "it is better to keep the door open" and "to use 'moral' in a
very wide sense.“ Hence, by "morality" Wilson means broadly ". . .
principles of thought and action which are the most important for
[the agent], irrespective of their content."6
Since Wilson says that "a moral view, to count as rational,

must be backed up by certain kinds of reasons,"7

a crucial question
is that of what rational grounds can be given for accepting or
rejecting a moral claim. This question was not seen as crucial in
earlier eras in which people shared ". . . a set of reasons for
their behaviour which were based on traditional acceptance."8 But
". . . as the old values, faiths, creeds and so on begin to lose
their force," Wilson maintains that ". . . we seek a new basis for
our morality, a new ground on which to build, perhaps a new authority
to accept, admire and obey."9
As we seek such a new basis, Wilson claims that "we begin to
see that it isn't the new basis itself which is going to be ulti-
mately authoritative," but the criteria "which enable us to assess
and perhaps choose between various moral codes or authorities."10
In Wilson's view the criteria by which we judge "will not themselves

"1]

be moral principles or codes. This claim suggests that the way

we establish the rationality of a particular activity is by formal

ll

rules of procedure. It will become clear later in the chapter what
Wilson means by "formal rules of procedure."

Before dealing with these matters let us consider the
question of why Wilson should be interested in a rational moral view
at all. In dealing with thj§_question, we will come to more clearly
understand what underlies Wilson's position regarding the place of
rationality in morals.

For Wilson the distinction between facts and values is clear.
He stresses that "no amount of facts can prove by strictly logical
entailment, that something is valuable, good, right, or to be

chosen."12

Wilson seems to accept this fact-value dichotomy as a
"necessary truth of logic,"13 but he does not believe that this
distinction necessitates that moral choices be ungrounded. While
he does not maintain that we alwgy§_know what is right and wrong,
"it does not follow from these points that our moral values and
beliefs are arbitrary or a matter of taste, or irrational, in the
sense that one reason for a moral belief is as good as another."14
"If we are to act as human beings," Wilson says, "there must be
standards, principles and rules of procedure which govern our

.l5

thought.I In short there are rules, principles or standards in

virtue of which we can defensibly say that one belief is better,

preferable, more reasonable, or more satisfactory than another.16
Wilson elucidates the rationality of morals with analogs

from science when he identifies in scientific activities the rules

and criteria which characterize and govern them.17 Wilson argues

that the principles and procedures governing each particular

12

activity, for example, science or medicine, are derived from the

nature of the subject, not from a "particular set of values.“18

Analogously, Wilson sees the formal criteria of morality as deriving

‘9 "Just as there is a right way of

from the nature of morality.

doing science," Wilson says, so there is a right way of doing morals.
It should be noted that these rules or standards which

define the rationality of a particular activity are fOrmal rather

20

than substantial. This means that there is a difference between

the specific claims and the second-order principles governing them.21
By second-order principles Wilson means rules of procedure which
define correct moves in that particular realm of activity. In
morality Wilson identifies the second-order principles as "things
like self-awareness, facing facts, developing imagination, being
consistent, attending to logic, and so on."22
This point is crucial, for on it rests Wilson's claim that
"morality has a basis in just the same way that other subjects or

23 The point is that the rationality

forms of thought have bases."
of morals can be conceived of only in terms of second-order rules of
procedure, not in terms of content. We need second-order rules of
procedure to deal with the unpredictable and myriad particular,
first-order moral questions we face in life. These second-order
rules allow us to distinguish rational from irrational, valid from
invalid, ways of making moral decisions. In sum, as Wilson says

Education in morality is like education in other areas of

human thought and action (medicine, history, science, etc.),

in what there are right and wrong answers to moral questions,

and a set of abilities, rules, procedures and to act on
them--in brief, a methodology.2

13

One reason Wilson stresses methodology is to emphasize that
educating people is not just extracting "right answers" from them,
but teaching them what will count as "a good reason" in history,

25

literary criticism, and so on. Thus rational education should

encourage students "to derive their beliefs from good grounds, not
just teach them in such a way that they repeat truths correctly."26
Wilson's conclusion applied to moral education is that "if we are
educating our children we are setting out to give them some idea

27 The emphasis upon methodology in moral

about how to do morality."
education helps to avoid "one general danger, the danger of putting
forward particular moral values or partisan views of morality as a
basis for moral education."28

In Wilson's approach it is important to identify which second-
order reasons or rules of procedure are basic to moral decisions. He
first maintains that the necessary characteristics of rationality in
any realm are (l) that one should adhere to the rules of logic, (2)
that one should use language correctly, and (3) that one should

attend to the facts.29

He then argues that an analysis of the con-
cept of a "morally educated" person enables us to discover what it
is to be good at "morality" and thus to get clear about the specific
criteria necessary fbr doing morals.

Wilson begins by pointing out that when we describe someone
as rational or irrational, we do not "refer primarily to the truth or

30

falsehood of his beliefs." Rather, we refer to "the way in which

 

or the reasons fOr which he comes to believe, and continues to

 

believe. . . When we call someone a "good scientist" or a

l4

"good literary critic" we mean that he is good at following certain
rules of procedure which are relevant to that field of study without
any special regard to the correctness or incorrectness of any
particular scientific or literary belief.32 This suggests that we
can distinguish between (T) holding a particular belief and (2)
using the methods of reasoning that are specific to a field of
study. It also suggests that the latter is of primary importance
in assessing one's competence in the field of study. What consti-
tutes competence in moral contexts turns out to be what Wilson calls
the moral components, which are treated in his account of a "morally
educated" person.

In order to get clear about what "morally educated" means,
Wilson attempts a general description of moral action. He argues
that the notion of a moral action requires consideration of intent
and acting for a reason.33 Thus "we need to know, not just what
people do, but why they do it." Furthermore, not all reasons will
count as good reasons. The notion of moral action requires that to
count as a good reason it must be based on a rational consideration
of other people's interests. Such a rational consideration involves
such things as regarding other people as equals, knowing what their
feelings are, respecting logic and the facts, not being deceived by
linguistic confusion, and having moral values or principles based on
all these. And finally a morally educated person must have the
ability to act on his moral principles.

Wilson formalized the foregoing analysis of "morally edu-

cated" as a number of components and used the first few letters of

l5

some classical Greek words to label these components. The list of

moral components, briefly characterized, fOllows:

PHIL refers to the attitude of regarding others as
equals, taking their interests as equally
important.

EMP refers to the ability to know what others are

feeling, and what their interests are.

§I§(l) refers to the attainment of the knowledge of hard
facts relevant to moral choices.

§I§(2) refers to the ability of practical "know-how" to
perform effectively in social contexts.

DI§_ refers to the mode of thought to prescribe actions
fOr oneself for the right reasons.
KRAT refers to the motivational and behavioural traits

required (a) to use the other components, (b) to
translate consequent moral judgment into action.34

Wilson's claim is that any moral decision necessarily
involves these components. He stresses that these moral components
do not ". . . impart any specific content, but . . . give other

.35

people facility in a method.‘ In brief, Wilson's recommendation

is that moral education should ". . . develop all these moral com-

ponents in the young,"35.37

The Values Clarificationists' View
Sidney Simon and his colleagues treat a broad range of moral
issues under the name of "values." For them value issues range over
personal taste (e.g., clothes, hair style), politics, religion, work,
leisure time, school, love, sex, family, material possessions,
culture (e.g., art, music, literature), friends, money, aging, death,

38

health, race, war and peace, rules and authority. On their view

16

every issue can be characterized as moral insofar as it is concerned
with a decision or choice about how to live one's life.

In all of these realms, Simon and his colleagues claim that
there is no one set of values right for everyone. Since there is no
general agreement about those matters, it is not only ineffective but
wrong to inculcate any particular set of values in the young.

Even though they believe that everyone has to choose his own
values, Simon and his colleagues seem to reject a laissez-faire
approach to moral education, which they describe as a tendency to
let the young "do and think what they want without intervening in
any way."39 Simon says "Young people, left on their own, experience

"40

a great deal of conflict and confusion. He claims that since they

lack values or are confused by them, people often suffer from such
symptoms as apathy, flightiness, overconformity, and overdissension.4l
Although on this view no one can set correct or valid values
which are applicable fer everyone, Simon and his colleagues maintain
that there should be ways to get the young to come to have their own
proper values. That seems to be the task of moral education as Simon
and his colleagues conceive it. And in their view it is possible to
get rid of a state of confusion, anguish, or suffering provided the
young are taught content-free skills rather than particular values.
As an alternative to the inculcation of values, they propose a
value-neutral teaching method called a values clarifying method.

Their proposed approach is defended on the ground that they are not

"concerned with the content of people's values, but the process of
"42

 

valuing.

17

This valuing process is composed of the following seven
aspects: choosing freely, choosing from among alternatives, choos-
ing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each
alternative, prizing and cherishing, affirming one's position
publicly, acting on one's choice, and repeating with a pattern and
consistency.43

Simon and his colleagues see their approach as defensible
just because "the values clarification approach does not aim to

44 Rather it aims to “help

instill any particular set of values."
students utilize the . . . seven processes of valuing in their own
lives; to apply those valuing processes to already formed beliefs

45 This seems

and behaviour patterns and to those still emerging."
to mean that becoming more self-aware about one's values is the end
of moral education. It further suggests that what is important is
not what particular values one holds but the process whereby one
arrives at these values. In short, if anyone's values are to be
right for him, or if anyone wants to arrive at good or right values,
one must follow the valuing process which they have proposed.

The values-clarification method, then, is a process of

46 Students

helping young people "to build their own value system."
who have been exposed to this approach, they claim, become more
"zestful and energetic, more critical in their thinking" rather than

47 The values-clarification approach,

apathetic, flighty, and so on.
then, is based on activities designed to get people to fbllow the
proper valuing process which, in turn, is claimed to be effective

in arriving at sound values.

l8

Simon and his colleagues maintain that their approach is

not new but is "based on the approach formulated by Louis Raths, who

48

in turn built upon the thinking of John Dewey." Furthermore, they

believe that approaches similar to their own method have always been

used by "parents, teachers, and other educators who have sought ways

to help young people think through values issues for themselves."49

They recommend three steps to teachers: first, ". . .

encourage students to consider alternative modes of thinking and

"50

acting by using the materials and methods provided; next, help

". . . the students to consider whether their actions match their

stated beliefs . . ."351

and finally, ". . . give students options,
in and out of class; for only when students begin to make their own
choices and evaluate the actual consequences, do they develop their

own values."52

Lawrence Kohlberg's View

 

For Kohlberg the term "moral" has its central use in talk
about "moral judgments or decisions based on moral judgments."53
Inasmuch as what makes a judgment a moral one is "not the legislation
of the rule but the individuals' attitude towards it," Kohlberg con-
cludes that "not all judgments of 'good' or 'right' are moral judg-
ments."54 Thus a prohibition of parking fOr one person is a moral
norm whereas for another, a mere administrative regulation. For
Kohlberg ". . . moral judgments tend to be universal, inclusive,

consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal

grounds."55 However, it is not clear whether this claim is based

l9

on his empirical findings or is a stipulated definition of "moral."
His claim is that "like most moral philosophers . . . we define
morality in terms of the fOrmal character of a moral judgment . . .

56 He appears to be maintaining

rather than in terms of its content."
that moral judgments have specific formal characteristics.

To clarify the formal characteristics of moral judgments
Kohlberg analyzes the expression "a moral reason." In Kohlberg's
analysis a moral reason turns out to involve such features as
impersonality, ideality, universalizability, and pre-emptiveness.
Thus "a moral reason does not rest on authority but consists of
reasoning based on a moral attitude . . . independent of appeals to
either authority or self-interest."57 When "a moral reason" is
interpreted in such a way, it seems that not all judgments are
grounded in moral reason. For it is quite possible that some people
"do not answer with a moral judgment that is universal or that has
any impersonal or ideal grounds.‘I If a moral question should arise,
e.g., "Should Joe tell on his younger brother?" Kohlberg thinks some
might answer in terms of "status and property values, his instru-
mental use to others, the actual affection of others for him, etc."58

Having considered such a possibility, Kohlberg claims that
"the formal definition of morality works only when we recognize that
there are developmental levels of moral discourse."59 This is
nothing more than the restatement of his basic assertion that moral
development is a matter of passing through various stages and that
in the final stage a person "not only specifically uses moral words

like 'morally right' and 'duty' but also uses them in a moral way."60

20

If this is so, Kohlberg can "define a moral judgment as 'moral'
without considering its content (the action judged) and without
considering whether it agrees with our own judgments or standards."61
Kohlberg appears to claim here that a moral reason is essential to a
moral judgment, and those reasons which make a judgment distinctively
moral emerge only at a relatively late developmental stage. To
understand Kohlberg's account of moral reasons, therefore, it is
necessary to examine his so-called cognitive developmental theory

of moral development.

Kohlberg maintains that "the moral stages are structures of

moral judgment or moral reasoning." He further claims that "struc-

 

 

tures of moral judgment must be distinguished from the content of

62 An assumption which seems to underlie Kohlberg's

moral judgment."
position on the nature of moral reasons is that an individual's
thinking is restricted by his cognitive structure. Cognitive
structures develop through a series of discernible stages as the
individual moves from early childhood to maturity. These cognitive
structures frame one's understanding of the world in a certain way.
They may be understood as a person's total perspective which
organizes the "active thinking of the person about moral issues
and decisions."63
For Kohlberg particular moral decisions do not clearly
indicate one's moral stage since the content of one's moral judg-
ments or choices is mainly situational. Kohlberg says that "moral
behaviour as such is largely situational and reversible or 'loseable'

54

in new situations." Hence, one can make a moral choice freely,

21

for example, either to steal or not to steal. What is significant
in judging one's moral stage is how one defines the value and the
reasons he gives for valuing it. That is, one's moral stage in
Kohlberg's scheme is determined not by content but by manner of
reasoning. Kohlberg describes the moral stages as follows:

Stage l: The punishment and obedience orientation. The
physical consequences of action determine its goodness
or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of
these consequences.

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right
action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies
one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others.
Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the
marketplace. Elements of fairness, or reciprocity, and
of equal sharing are present, but they are always inter-
preted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a
matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,"
not of loyality, gratitude, or justice.

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy -
nice girl" orientation. Good behaviour is that which
pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There
is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is
majority or "natural" behaviour.

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the main-
tenance of the social order. Right behaviour consists of
doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and
maintaining the given social order fbr its own sake.

Stage 5: The social contract, legalistic orientation,
generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends
to be defined in terms of general individual rights and
standards which have been critically examined and agreed
upon by the whole society.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These
principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the
categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules
like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal

22

principles of justice of the reciprocity and e ualit of
human £1955§3 and of respect for the dignity 0% human

beings as individual persons.65

 

From this theory of moral development Kohlberg concludes

that

The basic educational conclusions we shall draw from this

position are that the only philosophically justifiable

statement of aims of moral education, the only one which

surmounts the problem of relativity, is a statement in

terms of the stimulation of moral development. . . .55
He emphasizes that this educational aim of stimulating moral develop-
ment is neither an attempt to impose a specific morality nor an
attempt to teach fixed rules. Rather, it is an attempt to give the
individual the capacity to engage in moral judgment and discourse.
In sum, for Kohlberg moral education involves helping the child take
the next step of moral reasoning and finally to reach the principled
moral stage.

Kohlberg recognizes that later stages of moral development
are not automatically desirable just because they occur later. He
observes: "Psychology finds an invariant sequence of moral stages;
moral philosophy must be involved to answer whether a later stage is

"67 This is to say that Kohlberg's recommendations

a better stage.
about moral education do not follow from his empirical findings alone.
They also rest on considerations of moral philosophy, considerations
about what moral development ought to be and considerations about
the logic of moral reasoning.68
In support of his claim that stage six ought to be the aim
of moral education, Kohlberg recognizes a distinction between princi-

ples and rules. He says that "principles are freely chosen by the

23

individual because of their intrinsic moral validity";69 hence they
are to be distinguished from "rules which are supported by social
authority."70 In Kohlberg's understanding Kant's "categorical
imperative" states that "principles are universal guides to making

"71

a moral decision, and Kohlberg maintains that a moral decision

"made in terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal

"72 The liberal moral philosophy Kohlberg has in

moral philosophy.
mind turns out to be that of John Rawls who holds, on Kohlberg's
interpretation, that "moral principles are ultimately principles
of justice."73
Kohlberg believes that moral conflicts may be resolved hy

appealing to some principle of justice. Even though he does not
offer a detailed argument in support of the moral view of Kant and
Rawls, he does say the following of their position:

Principles chosen from this point of view are, first, the

maximum liberty compatifile with the like liberty of others

and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which

are not to the benefit of all, including the least advan-

taged.74
Even though there is a concern for justice in some sense at every
moral stage, only stage six reasoners consciously employ the concern
for a conception of justice which coincides with that of Kant and
Rawls. Thus, for Kohlberg, progression through the stages includes
a changing orientation to justice.

Kohlberg compares his approach with that of two alternatives.

One is the "indoctrinating" approach to moral education which con-
sists of "the preaching and imposition of the rules and values of

the teacher and his culture on the child."75 Another is that of

24

values clarificationists which aims at "eliciting the child's own

judgment or opinion about issues or situations in which values

conflict, rather than imposing the teacher's opinion on him."76
With respect to the first approach Kohlberg maintains that

although it "has aimed at teaching universal values, they are defined

 

by the opinions of the teacher and the conventional culture and rest

.177

on the authority of the teacher fOr their justification. Kohlberg

dismisses this approach on the grounds that it fails to rise above
the unreflective valuings of teachers.78
The approach of values clarificationists shares certain
features with Kohlberg's in that both stress open discussion of
value dilemmas and both object to any fOrm of indoctrination. The
values clarificationist approach is deficient for Kohlberg because
it has no aim beyond making one more aware of his own values. In
contrast, the developmental approach aims at movement to the next
stage of reasoning. The notion that some judgments are more adequate
than others is communicated and the student is encouraged to articu-
late a position which seems more adequate to him as well as to judge
the adequacy of the reasoning of others.79
How can the school or teacher help to advance the student's
moral stages? The answer to this question is closely related to
Kohlberg's recommendation for moral education. Kohlberg maintains
that discussions of moral dilemmas are a useful and effective way
to raise moral stages. Kohlberg cites research in support of this

claim which indicates that among twenty-f0ur teachers in the Boston

and Pittsburgh areas who were given some instruction in conducting

25

moral discussions "about half of the teachers stimulated significant
developmental change in their classrooms--upward stage movement of
one quarter to one-half a stage."80
Based on that research Kohlberg identifies three important
conditions fbr conducting discussions:
l. Exposure to the next highest stage of reasoning.
2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradic-
tions for the child's current moral structure, leading
to dissatisfaction with his current level.
3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue combining
the first two conditions, in which conflicting moral
views are compared in an open manner.8 '
These three conditions amount to a recommendation to teachers on how
to proceed with the discussion of morals. In addition to moral dis-
cussions in the class, the moral atmosphere of the home, the school,
and the broader society are important conditions for stimulating
moral growth. Kohlberg therefore suggests that schools provide a
social ethos characterized by justice and role-taking opportunities
to "the extent to which it encourages the child to take the point of

view of others."82

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II

1John Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1967), p. 61.

 

21bid.

3Ibid.

4Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 20

 

51bid., p. 21.

61bid.

7Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 78.

 

81bid., p. 16.

91bid., p. 23.

10Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 23.

 

11Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 89.

121pm.. p. 72.

131pm.

14Ibid., p. 73.

151b1d., p. 137.

16John Wilson, Philosophy of Practical Education (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, T977), p. 104.

17Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 76.

 

26

27

18Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 31.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

191bid., p. 4.
20Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 76.
21 . . -
W1lson, Teacher 5 Gu1de, p. 24.
22Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 102.
23 . , . .
W1lson, Teacher 5 Gu1de, p. 4.
241pm.
251bid., p. 24.
26Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 113.
27 . . .
W1lson, Teacher 5 Gu1de, p. 23.
28113111., p. 27.
29Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 76.
3°1b1d., p. 74.
311bid.
321bid., pp. 74-75.
331bid., p. 191.
34

John Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum: A Guide
for Teachers and Research Workers (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969),
p. 8.

35Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 27.

36Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 24.

37Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum, p. 8.

28

38Sidney Simon, Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum,
Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers

 

and Students (New York: Hart Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 15.

 

391bid., p. 17.

4OIbid.

41Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmin, Leland Howe, and
Sidney B. Simon, "In Defense of Values Clarification," Phi Delta
Kappan (June 1977): 743.

42Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

43Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values
and Teaching(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1966), pp. 29-30.

44

 

Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

451616., p. 20.
461bid., p. 18.
471616., p. 20.
481616., p. 19.
491616.
501bid., p. 20.
511616.

521616.

53

Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 55.

54Ibid., p. 56.

551616.

29
56Ibid., p. 55.

57Ibid., p. 56.

58Ibid.

591bid., p. 65.

601bid., p. 56.

611bid.

62Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 671.

63Ibid., p. 670.

641616., p. 672.

65Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," The Journal of
Philosophy (October 1973): l64-165.

 

 

66Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 41.

67Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 672.

681bid., pp. 672-673.

691bid., p. 673.

7OIbid.

711bid., p. 672.

721bid., p. 673.

731bid., p. 672.

741616., p. 673.

751bid.

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

p. 674.
pp. 675-676.
p. 675.

p. 676.

30

CHAPTER III

LOGIC AND JUSTIFICATION IN
MORAL EDUCATION

In the previous chapter I presented a general account of
the views of some current theorists who commonly make a distinction
between form_and content in moral education. Based on this distinc-
tion they suggest that moral education should be exclusively fOcused
on methodology, moral reasoning, the valuing process, and so on. In
this chapter I will elucidate and criticize some of the arguments
offered in support of their positions. I shall particularly focus
on several important differences among these theorists.

First I shall examine in detail the components Wilson has
proposed as a basis for moral education, concentrating on his notion
of logical definition. Then I shall discuss these theorists' views
regarding the justification of moral decisions. I will argue fOr
the inadequacy of Kohlberg's as well as the values clarificationist's
recommendations, showing that they either overemphasize the role of
reasoning in morals or they fail to see the full logical consequences
of their views. At the end of the chapter I shall argue that Wilson
has developed a more adequate theory of moral education--one that

differs considerably from the others.

3l

32

The Components of Morals

 

In this section I shall further discuss Wilson's notion of
moral components and provide a background for showing how his view
differs from those of Kohlberg and the values clarificationists.

Wilson builds his argument for moral education on a distinc-

tion between the content of particular moral beliefs or judgments

 

and those second-order_principles which define and govern morality.

 

One way to understand his methodology is by way of an analysis of
Wilson's self-assigned task in the discussion of moral education.

He starts with the fact that one cannot give simple answers to a
host of questions which arise in actual moral contexts. The answers
which can be given to recurrent moral questions depend to a marked
degree on the particular characteristics of those contexts. Since
answers to particular moral questions usually can be made only after
attending to a great variety of empirical considerations, and since
it is beyond his professional capacity as a philosopher to search
for factual knowledge of this kind, Wilson does not regard it as his

task to issue direct moral injunctions. Instead he seeks to find

 

and make explicit the criteria for assessing the rationality of

1 In his major ethical works,

particular moral judgments or beliefs.
therefore, Wilson deliberately avoids issuing specific moral rules
fOr particular situations. Rather, his primary concern is "to give

2 which

as clear an outline as possible of a rational methodology"
might be used to determine criteria fbr the assessment of particular
moral judgments or beliefs. Only then, he argues, can we proceed

to assess alternative programs of moral education. The central

33

question for Wilson then becomes how one can possibly identify what
counts as a good reason for a moral judgment or belief. His account
of what would count as an acceptable aim in moral education is in
turn based on this analysis.

The method Wilson employs is a kind of conceptual analysis.
He argues that there are certain common components in any moral
situation and that these components can be identified by an analysis
of the key concepts in moral discourse. The procedure advanced by
Wilson assumes that moral terms function in the language and hence
that they must involve some shared meaning by those who use them.
In Wilson's view, if a term in moral discourse, e.g., "ought" or
"person," functions in the language, as, of course, it does, it must
have some stock use or uses which can be identified and described.
He argues that unless we understand the stock use of moral terms
such as "right," "good" and “ought," we cannot answer the question
of what is to count as a good reason in the moral sense.3

For Wilson, the reason for adopting the method of conceptual
analysis to identify the rational criteria for assessing moral judg-
ments is clear enough. This method is a deliberate process intended
to elicit conceptually relevant points in deciding what counts as
rational criteria or appropriate rules of procedure in morals. Some-
times in attempting to explain the precise task he sets out to do,
Wilson refers to it as a second-order inquiry, as opposed to an
inquiry into the character of prevailing social practices.

Wilson characterizes his efforts to describe the formal

criteria as a logical definition of morality, since, as I will show,

34

he demonstrates that moral discourse logically presupposes the
concept of a person. Furthermore he shows that an analysis of the
concept of a person yields the other moral components. As he
observes:
It is clear enough that the other "components" are logically
required. We must know what other people feel (EMP), know
the facts (GIG), and be able and willing to bring this
knowledge and our attitude of concern to bear on actual
situations, so that we decide and act in right ways (KRAT).4
The point is that these moral components, in Wilson's view,
are "necessary for the making of moral decisions in general."5 Any-
one "who seriously asks the question 'What ought I to do?'" puts
himself in a moral context in which the concept of a pgr§9n_is
central. Furthermore, the acceptance of others as person (PHIL)
entails that he must consider other people's feeling (EMP), facts
(GIG), and so on.
Wilson argues that the formal criteria for morals require no
further grounding since the components are derived from the nature of
moral situation and follow logically from the question "What ought I

"7

to do?"6 It is just "incumbent on any rational person to treat

others as equals, and that is the central moral component--PHIL. As

Wilson points out, "one person may be stronger or cleverer, or richer,

"8

or more powerful than another. But they are still equal, Wilson

maintains,

Because they are the same in certain very important ways.
They are the same in using language, having thoughts and
feelings and wants. This is more important than the fact
that they are of different shapes and sizes, different
intelligences or ages or anything else. . . .

35

The conclusion Wilson draws is quite clear: “We have to
treat other people as equals because they are equals."10 The
specific force of this claim will be discussed more fully in section
two of this chapter.

It would be a misinterpretation of Wilson's view on the
rationality of morals to insist on a too narrow interpretation of
the term "logical requirement." Wilson's contention is that the
rationality of morals requires that one in moral contexts must be
committed to these rules of procedure. Thus, for Wilson it is
logically inconceivable fbr any rational person in a moral context
to raise a question like "Why should we treat others as equals?"
This point of view is revealed in his comparison of morals with
science. He argues that to refuse to accept certain rules of pro-
cedure considered to be most appropriate in science indicates that
one is either incompetent or not doing science. Similarly, to
abandon or fail to accept this central moral component--PHIL--means
that one is either irrational or incompetent in morals. If the
central component is required of any rational person in a moral
context, then the other components are also logically required,
since "being rational or reasonable, does not mean disregarding
one's feelings, but trying to assess, guide or direct them in some
coherent way.“11

Thus, the most possible interpretation of Wilson's intended
sense of "logical requirement" is that the criteria of morals are
based on the rules of procedure that every rational person must

accept in moral contexts. It is also a logical definition of morals

36

in the sense of being undeniable by a rational person when he
seriously asks the question "What ought I to do?" The fbrmal cri-
teria of morals, which consist of a set of moral components, then,

render the basis fbr moral education.

The Justification of Moral Claims

 

The discussion in the previous section centered on Wilson's
views regarding the criteria of morals, which in turn provide the
basis for moral education. I examined Wilson's notion of the moral
components in order to set out his general views about rationality
in morals; I shall now examine in detail the views of Wilson and
Kohlberg on the logic of the justification of moral claims. In this
regard, Wilson maintains that moral situations involve bringing
people into a right relation with other people, who have their own
interests and responsibilities, and who must, as moral beings, con-
sider the interests and responsibilities of one another whenever
they perfbrm morally relevant acts. The notion of the justification
of moral claims is partly defined by the willingness to make this
consideration. Kohlberg, on the other hand, holds that the justifi-
cation of moral claims depends on the use of the principle of justice.
Thus what we ought to do in any particular situation can be deter-
mined by reference to the principle of justice.

In what follows I shall present and compare the stances of
Wilson and Kohlberg regarding the justification of moral claims and

its implications for moral education. However, it might be pointed

37

out in advance that much of what Wilson has to say about these issues
cannot be compared with that of Kohlberg.

Before turning to Wilson's view about the justification of
moral claims, I shall consider what motivates him to seek the rational
criteria of morals. Wilson points out that since values are not facts
and value questions cannot be settled in the way in which factual
questions are settled, it is necessary to explain the grounds on
which value questions are settled in a rational manner. He explains
that although different sorts of justification are required for a
scientific and a value claim, in both cases a rational approach
involves commiting oneself to the kinds of arguments, reasons, and
judgments that are most appr0priate to the different contexts.

What does the justification of moral claims consist in? One
way in which Wilson answers this question is by pointing out the
similarity between the assessments of our ordinary claims to knowl-
edge and moral claims. A particularly interesting part of Wilson's
view is presented in response to the thesis that if an empirical
proposition is to be cognitively meaningful, it must be capable in

12 Some have

principle of being verified by an appeal to evidence.
held that inasmuch as moral claims fail to satisfy the requirements
of empirical verification they lack an adequate rational basis or do
not admit of rational defense: they are subjective, a matter of
taste, irrational, and so on.

Wilson recognizes that by the very nature of morality, moral
claims cannot "follow logically from a consideration merely of

l3

empirical fact or of language." This is one respect in which moral

38

and scientific claims are different. Nevertheless he believes that

empirical and moral claims share some important characteristics and

that both can be settled rationally. He noted that what is distinc-
tive about knowledge in general is an implicit reference to some set
of criteria in terms of which the knowledge is described and can be

evaluated. This means that one cannot make a statement true simply

by believing it; just because one claims to know something, it does

not fbllow that whatever he believes can be claimed by him to be

ipso facto intellectually justified. To make a scientific judgment

 

is to admit that it is answerable or can be supported by certain
interpersonal criteria acknowledged and shared by the scientific
community. Wilson finds little difference between the claims of
factual knowledge and those of moral beliefs; for, as with scienti-
fic views, moral claims and beliefs have to be defended by reference
to certain public standards. In his words:

For when somebody holds up a rule of behaviour as something

to be followed (by the use of words like "good," "ought,"

and "right" that have a universal application), as opposed

to merely expressing a selfish or personal desire or inten-

tion, then he ipso facto submits it to the judgment of all
of us.14

 

What Wilson takes to be the similarity between them is that
reasons are crucial for supporting one's view in morals as well as
in science. In both cases, if one's view is to be considered
rational, it must be backed up by certain kinds of reasons. For
example, if one says that a certain judgment is trug_or morally
right, the person must prepare to give a justification for what is

claimed to be true or morally right.

39

Wilson holds that a scientific view, to count as rational,
must be related to "observed empirical facts, experimental results,

15 Thus if someone holds a scientific belief such as

and so forth."
"The earth is flat" and cites his preference or choice as the reason
for the correctness of his judgment, then his answer does not provide
a justification for what is claimed. The sort of justification
needed for a scientific view requires an individual to take empirical
evidence as the proper means of justifying his view. Unless one is
able to understand clearly the meaning of justification employed in
scientific judgments, one cannot begin to answer scientific questions.
Thus Wilson seems to be arguing that rationality in a factual discus-
sion lies in recognizing that certain kinds of "standards and
methods" are appropriate and others are not.16
Similarly, it is essential for one's behaving rationally in
moral contexts to recognize that certain reasons and justifications
are appropriate in dealing with moral issues. Hence, if a person
says, "One ought to do so and so," the person must be prepared with
some reasons for doing so and so. In Wilson's view, what distin-
yguishes a rational moral opinion from an irrational one is the
nature of the reasons that are offered as part of the justification.
He points out that there may be a number of reasons which can be
offered in support of a moral judgment, but not just anything can
count as a reason.17 He insists that reasons that are acceptable

fbr supporting and justifying a moral claim must be relevant to

moral contexts, they must be chosen from the consideration that

40

"people are equals," namely the central moral component PHIL.

This helps determine the rationality of moral claims and beliefs.18
Central to Wilson's position is the belief that we cannot

justify moral claims unless the regsgg_or justification correlates

with PHIL. In support of his contention he offers one example in

which two people are in a boat with not much food, and they both

want it.19

If one of these people takes all the food, and claims
that his being hungry is a good reason for his taking all the food,
then this justification is no more valid than saying "I'm stronger
than you," or "I'm of royal blood." When someone answers this way
he is not justifying his action but rather is refusing to give a
justification. In Wilson's words, the reasons that are advanced as
a justification may be understood as explaining why he is doing what

20 Thus a reason, to be a moral

he does rather than justifying it."
reason, must be based on the notion that people are equals. It
seems clear to Wilson that whether one's justification fbr moral
action and beliefs is acceptable or not depends on whether the person

2‘ with himself.

considers "other people as being on equal footing"
To understand why Wilson is so certain of his claim, we must elabor-
ate the reasons he gives for this contention.

Wilson points out that without the notion of PHIL, which he
sometimes calls "the notion of the impartiality of moral judgement,"22
"the whole business of morality and interpersonal rules could not
get started."23 The point is that morality functions to guide our
decisions about what to do in certain situations; that is, to BEE?

scribe conduct for others as well as for ourselves. However, any

4l

justification for moral action cannot be advanced as a moral reason
unless the person puts himself in a context where it is necessary
to treat others as equals. Whenever we make a moral claim like "It
is wrong to do X" or "One ought not to do Y," we do not claim that
these prohibitions are derived from the rules of procedure which

24 In Wilson's

correctly apply to some of us but not to others.
words, "This is because words like 'ought' and 'right' only make
sense as between people. What is right fbr one is, other things
being equal, right fbr another."25

Wilson's claim that it is necessary for anyone in a moral
context to accept others as equals can be understood in the fbllowing
way: (l) If I ask the question "What ought I to do?" and (2) if I
maintain that "I ought to do X," then (3) it is to say that I have
a good reason for doing X, and I can justify doing X by reference to
the central component-~PHIL.

To illustrate further what is meant by treating others as
equals, it may be helpful to consider Wilson's above-cited example
of the person who tries to grab all the food in the boat. The person
may insist that his own view is rational because he can offer reasons
for what he is trying to do by reference to the central component.
That is, the person may claim that he recognizes that people are
equals, and yet he may hold that his primary concern is with his
surviving. Therefore what he ought to do is to grab all the food
in the boat.

Wilson points out that the person's position really is not

an acceptable moral justification because he does not understand

42

what it is to treat others as equals. Moreover, the reasons advanced
by that person are based on "selfish" desires and interests, neither

26 In making a

of which "can by themselves count as moral reasons."
moral judgment one is inevitably involved in an interpersonal situa-
tion where others are affected, and where it is required to have
rules of procedure which allow one to settle conflicting claims about
what ought to be done in that situation. The boat example illustra-
trates a situation in which "there is some kind of conflict between

27 and "either one of them must convince the other by

28

two people"
some sort of argument which they both accept." Thus Wilson argues
that to be reasonable in moral contexts one must recognize that other
people are persons who have as much right to their own desires and

29 In moral contexts, therefore, Wilson main-

opinions as oneself.
tains that we must grant that "what one of them desires, or wants,
or feels, or thinks, is no more and no less important than what the
other desires."39
From this Wilson concludes that what is necessary for the
making of moral decisions is the attitude of regarding others as
equals, taking their interests as equally important as one's own.
This has several important consequences, for in order for a person
to consider the interests and concerns of others equally he must
have the ability to know what others are feeling and what their
interests are--EMP. Furthermore, the concern for other's interests

as one's overriding reason for acting must be strong enough to

overrule any alternative reasons--GIG. Finally he must bring the

43

components above "to bear on practical situations, so that he makes

"3‘ --KRAT.

decisions to act in a concerned way
These, then, are some of the salient features of Wilson's
analysis of the nature of moral justification. Wilson maintains that
"It is these features which differentiate rationality in morals from
rationality in other human activities, such as mathematics or

32 To judge the rationality of moral claims, therefore,

science."
one must see whether the decisions are based on the consideration

of others as human beings whose interests, desires and needs are as
important as one's own.

Wilson's view of the rational attitude in morals has a
bearing on the formulation of programs for moral education. If the
moral components define what is acceptable in reasons offered in
support of moral decisions, then any adequate program for moral edu-
cation must be concerned with promoting the disposition to respect
others and regard them as conscious persons whose wants, interests
and desires count as much as one's own. The components described by
Wilson are in fact intended to encompass these essential features
of morals.

Wilson seems to be certain about the adequacy of the criteria
as an acceptable set of objectives for all moral educators regardless
of their particular creed or culture. For the moral components "are
not the peculiar property of any particular faith, creed, set of moral
values or partisan beliefs, but qualities and rules of procedure

which define what it is to be reasonable or serious about morality."33

44

In summary, the strength as well as weakness of Wilson's
argument depends on whether the components adequately identify what
is to stand as a justification about one's decision to do something.
However, one may find that the moral components are not helpful in
certain cases, because it is not clear how he can derive particular
moral decisions from the components. The moral components require
that one take into account the interests and concerns of others
whenever he makes a decision to do something. He must consider how
his act affects others and where others' interests are. This is so
because, as Wilson observes:

The concept of "giving a reason" or "having a reason"

entails granting the validity of that reason to other people
in relevantly similar positions. . . . Hence reasoning
itself implies a kind of embryonic morality, inasmuch as
anything that could count as a gzason must be impartial as
between one person and another.

The most Wilson attempts to do is to show that anyone who
offers a reason fbr his moral action commits himself to "a univer-
salizable rule."35 The kind of difficulty Wilson might face is that
while a specific maxim such as "Helping others who need help" shows
what one's moral obligations are, it is not obvious what moral duties
can be derived from the moral components. It seems, therefore, that
someone, having considered another's interests to be equally important
as his own, may conclude without inconsistency that he has no obliga-
tion to help anyone. This sort of objection arises since Wilson's

moral components can never prescribe specific moral duties as do

substantial moral principles.

45

To see whether objections of this sort are valid, we must
reexamine what Wilson says in describing the components. If his
intention is to give a moral injunction, it may be objected that the
components are too ambiguous to guide individuals' moral acts. As
has been pointed out, however, his intent is to show the features of
morality which are necessary to make any moral decision. Thus what
Wilson means is that these components embody certain rules of pro-
cedure that are essential to any rational moral decision, note-
worthily the requirement to treat others' interests as important as
one's own. Hence it should not be construed as a substantial moral
standard but rather as a way of prescribing an inescapable rule of
procedure which one must accept in moral contexts. Just as one
cannot provide a good reason for a scientific view without being
logical, objective and knowing the facts, so moral claims cannot be
justified unless one is willing to take others' interests as equally
important to one's own in his moral dealings.

I have examined Wilson's thought about the justification of
moral claims by illustrating his account of moral rules of procedure.
I shall now examine Kohlberg’s stance on the same matter and contrast
it with Wilson's. .

We have seen that Kohlberg justifies his recommendation for
moral education by distinguishing between methods of reasoning and
particular moral beliefs. Since he believes that indoctrination is
inevitable in the direct teaching of values, and that individuals

continually change the content of their moral views, he considers

46

the teaching of substantial values an inappropriate form of moral
education.36

Kohlberg does claim that there are universal moral values or
principles--most notably the principle of justice. The principle of
justice admits of less variation between individuals and cultures
than most other moral claims. Since it is distinct from arbitrary
conventional rules and beliefs, and since the principle is formal in
nature, Kohlberg seems to believe that one can teach a method of
reasoning based on the principle of justice without imposing specific
moral content. Thus the principle of justice can be understood as a
procedural criterion for guiding each individual's moral decisions.
Kohlberg's point is that the principle of justice provides the ulti-
mate criterion for moral appraisal and that on the basis of this
criterion an individual may choose the course of his own conduct.

On a superficial level Kohlberg and Wilson may seem to have
similar positions inasmuch as both suggest that moral education
consist in certain methodological procedures. More careful analysis
will show, however, that they perceive method quite differently and
offer very different grounds in support of their views.

As has already been seen, in Kohlberg's view, the notion of
justice requires us to consider each individual's human worth equally.
Thus the principle is regarded as an impartial method for resolving
conflicting moral claims. Kohlberg stresses the value of employing
the principle of justice (moral reasons) in evaluating competing
claims and assumes that all moral decisions can be made ang_justified

in accordance with this principle.

47

Wilson also emphasizes methodology in moral education. But
he in no way subscribes to the view that we can determine, strictly
on the basis of a set of basic moral principles, what an individual
ought to do. While Wilson uses the term "method" since he is talking
about decision procedures, he does not conceive of his task as one
of developing an overall moral system. In any case, Wilson limits
his discussion to the framework or general directive that is often
absent or self-evidently presumed in other discussions of moral
education. He points out that it is unreasonable to assume that
moral conflicts can be settled in a coherent manner, simply by
appeal to a set of moral principles. He does not dismiss the notion
of justice as worthless but thinks that suggestions such as Kohlberg's
do not adequately do justice to how people actually face moral prob-
lems.

Wilson thinks it is important to recognize that a moral
decision must be based on something more than the moral principles
themselves; that is, "on the wants, wills, feelings or interests of

37 Furthermore, each individual's moral decisions are

other people."
likely to be influenced by the individual's overall views as to how
one ought to live. Thus Wilson contends that any adequate program
of moral education demands more than a set of moral rules or princi-
ples. It must also be conerned with the development of rationally
defensible dispositions, attitudes and feelings of the individual.
The profbund difference between their recommendations is in

part due to the range of issues seen as belonging to the domain of

moral education. The difference becomes apparent if we compare

48

their views about what we are to count as a moral issue. Kohlberg
contends that moral problems basically amount to the conflict of
just claims. Hence Kohlberg's contention is roughly that conflicting
moral claims can be resolved by appealing to the principle of justice
and the goal of moral education is to be found in that principle.

In contrast, Wilson maintains that there is no reason to assume that
moral issues are restricted to considerations of justice; in fact,

he broadens his concept of morals to cover not only a set of moral
rules but all aspects of moral decisions. The aim of moral educa-
tion, according to Wilson, is "to help people formulate their own

d,"38 to help them find the most reasonable

way of looking at the worl
approach to moral issues. Thus Wilson views moral education as
multifaceted and encompassing several constituent educational objec-

39 Kohlberg's position fails to take into account such con-

tives.
textual requirements.

Another important difference between Wilson and Kohlberg can
be seen by attending to their motives for drawing a distinction
between form and content of moral belief. By distinguishing between
the content of particular moral beliefs and second-order principles
governing morality, Wilson intends to illustrate that a reasonable
conceptual framework fbr moral education can be found on neutral
ground which makes it possible to avoid taking up a partisan posi-
tion on moral issues. In the case of Kohlberg, on the other hand,
the main reason for drawing a distinction between form and content

is to indicate how the principle of justice can accommodate conflict-

ing moral claims and remain the sole acceptable moral standard. As

49

we saw in Chapter II Kohlberg specifically suggests that the purpose
of moral education is to ensure that students follow the principle

of justice in their moral reasoning. Since Kohlberg claims that

moral education is exclusively a matter of the improvement of indi-
vidual's moral reasoning, it would seem that there are important
differences in Kohlberg's and Wilson's theories with respect to the
theoretical role of passions, emotions, habits, dispositions, motives,
etc.

Kohlberg provides us with several reasons to support his
cognitive-developmental approach: first, moral reasoning, while
only one factor in moral behavior, is the single-most important or
influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior, secondly,
reasoning is the only distinctively moral factor in moral behavior;
third, the progression of moral judgment is irreversible, that is,

a higher stage is never lost.40

But Kohlberg's argument may be seen
as circular, fbr to state these reasons is tantamount to reemphasiz-
ing his definition of the stages of moral development, that is, an
individual's moral stage must be determined exclusively by his

ability to reason.

The Values Clarification Method

 

In the previous section we have seen that Kohlberg stresses
the importance of moral reasons for accepting or rejecting various
moral alternatives. In Kohlberg's approach to the justification of
moral decisions, the principle of justice is simply assumed, whereas

Wilson appeals to the need to consider the interests and concerns of

50

others as a means of justifying our thinking in moral contexts. In
fact, Wilson points out that helping one to discover and articulate
the right relationship to others is the central task of moral educa-
tion. While Simon and his colleagues offer somewhat different
supporting reasons, they too maintain that each individual must
choose his own values. The values clarification method constitutes
the sole content of moral education. The values clarificationists
maintain that since moral claims may radically differ, teachers
should avoid imposing their claims on their pupils. Thus the task
of the moral educator is to encourage pupils to clarify their values,
not to foster any particular ones. In this section I shall discuss
certain theoretical as well as practical problems in the views of
the values clarificationists.

In advocating the values clarification method Simon and his
colleagues have maintained that since everyone must decide what is
right for him, what is important is that each person go through the
proper valuing process. According to them, every individual--teacher
or pupil--makes equally competing value claims. In their view, this
is a principal reason why teachers must be neutral regarding value
issues. The values clarification method is said to be designed to
(get people to arrive at genuine or authentic values, without imposing
any substantial content.

Their position differs radically from that of other current
theorists in that they regard morality as purely a matter of choice,
with one choice being no better than another. Even if one were to

grant this claim, certain theoretical and practical problems would

5l

remain. First, Simon's account of the values clarification method
indicates that the method is not something to be chosen; it dictates
what ought to be done when any individual makes a moral decision.
But if there is no correct set of values, and if the criteria for
defensible values are set by each individual's preference, it is not
clear on what basis it can be said that the values clarification
method should be universally employed. Thus if Simon and his
colleagues' contention that there can be no correct substantial
values is not mistaken, it is inconsistent with their recommendation
of the values clarification method.

Second, it may be pointed out that to clarify, to make people
think, is itself a value, and that moral discourse is not possible
without assuming certain criteria by which we can judge goods and
bads, rights and wrongs in human affairs. Once we reject this
assumption, there seems to be no independent way to settle people's
conflicting value Claims. This type of difficulty is well illus-
trated in Simon and his colleagues' claim. They respond to the
frequent criticism that their approach is valueless or relativistic
by maintaining that it simply is not so. They point out that they
encourage individuals "to keep developing their values through the
use of the valuing process so long as they do not infringe on the
rights of others."41

Their point here is much like Mill's about the limits of an
individual's freedom in society. In considering to what extent
society ought to limit individual freedom, Mill proclaims that in

situations in which a person's conduct ". . . merely concerns

52

42 Unless his conduct

himself . . . the individual is sovereign."
affects prejudicially the interests of others, a person cannot
rightfully be compelled to do what other people think better, wise
or right for him to do. In Mill's view, however, such a doctrine
is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties. Thus for Mill there is no doubt that people should be
taught in their youth to know and benefit from experience of others
until they have attained the capacity to guide themselves to improve-
ment. Mill holds that

It would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as

if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they

came into it, as if experience had as yet done nothing

towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct,

is preferable to another . . . but it is the privilege and

proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity

of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his

own way.4
But the values Clarificationists' conclusion that one not infringe
on the right of others can only be attributed to the fact that each
individual through his own values clarification process decides that
to infringe on the right of others is something to be rejected. From
the values Clarificationists' point of view, the principle of respect
fbr the right of others can only be clarified. To promote it would
constitute imposing arbitrary rules on others. But whatever-Simon
and his colleagues' idea of values clarification, the fact remains
that everyone must have the principle in some sense before he can
clarify it. If the young learn to respect the rights of others by

thinking about what they want, something other than clarification

has occurred.

53

Having rejected all objective bases for morals, Simon and
his colleagues treat the values clarification method as the only
alternative to an objective ground for morals. As we have seen,
they maintain that the aim of moral education is to clarify, not to
foster any particular values. As indicated above, however, it is
not even possible to clarify one's own values unless one already has
some substantial values about the world. These are the sorts of
theoretical questions Simon and his colleagues must solve, though I
doubt that they will be able to solve them until they come to
realize that their proposal for moral education itself presupposes
certain commonly shared criteria.

I shall now discuss some practical problems generated from
the values Clarificationists' claim, and contrast their view with
that of Wilson. At the practical level one may argue that even if
an individual's actions may affect no one but himself, they never-
theless may do great harm for the development of his character and
ability. One may claim that the human mind should grow, expand and
develop, not merely become clarified. Furthermore, a person may
cause harm to others by inaction as well as action. After all, an
individual's moral life depends in large part upon the degree to
which he is familiar with the wider social context and the conse-
quences of his action. If the school lets the students become clear
about their values without fbstering the full range of features
appropriate to a desirable character, then it seems clear that the
school is itself to blame for the consequences. Mature teachers

may help students to learn to have a fair attitude in relating to

54

others, a willingness to admit mistakes and modify their views in
the face of sound counter arguments.

But if Simon and his colleagues are consistent in their
stance, they could not allow teachers to be in such a position
because they insist that the role of the teacher is to "treat each
student with equal respect" and let him make his own moral choices.
This is one of the reasons for the difficulty in accepting their
description of the teacher's role in the teaching of valuing process.

In contrast, Wilson has no doubt about what has to be done
in the school. He points out that the young should be initiated
"by imitation, the force of example, compulsory rules and other

"44 even though

methods into a particular moral code or tradition,
they may later come to understand fully or reject parts of it for
themselves. Thus he made it clear that it is an essential part,
though not the whole of moral education, to get the young to "go
through the motion of" a particular moral code. He adds:

It would be dishonest and grotesque, as well as inefficient,

for teachers to pretend that they themselves do not have

such a code, or to be over-hesitant in telling children

what it is; and for this reason alone it is obviously

important that teachers and other educators should attempt

to make their own beliefs as rational as possible.45

According to Wilson moral rules can only be "acquired by

46 One of the central tasks of the edu-

practice and instruction."
cator is to help the student learn to see the moral rules fbr
himself. And to see the moral rules is to see that there are rules
for the conduct of moral deliberation. Although Wilson does not

explicate the specific way to initiate them he does observe that

55

"not only rationality and freedom, but discipline and obedience"47

are required if we intend to turn the young into rational persons.
Thus, Wilson concludes:

Any theory of moral education which implied that we would

treat children of all ages as rational adults, who only

need to be reasoned with in order to become morally edu-

cated, would of course be grotesque in the light of facts.48

In this chapter, we have seen that there is considerable

variation with respect to what constitutes the form of moral educa-
tion. In particular I have tried to indicate that Wilson's view of
moral education is more deserving of attention. His scrupulous
analysis illuminates the much too frequently forgotten point that
if an individual is to assume the responsibility of his own moral
decisions, he needs to acquire a whole range of dispositions that
can contribute to the development of a principled view of the world.
A particularly important feature is his claim that a rational atti-
tude in morals inevitably involves the need to consider the concerns
and interests of others. This has been a recurring theme throughout

his discussion of morals, and it plays an essential role in his view

on the nature of morality.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III

1John Wilson, Reason and Morals (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1961), pp. 2-14.

 

2Ibid., p. 163.

3Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 55.

 

4Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 31.

 

5Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 218.

 

6Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 31.

 

71bid., p. 28.

81bid., p. 31.

91bid., p. 28.

1OIbid., p. 30.

11Ibid., p. 31.

12A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1946), pp. 5-15.

 

13Wilson, Reason and Morals, p. 136.

 

14Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 80.

 

151bid., p. 78.

16Ibid., p. 90.

17Ibid., p. 105.

56

57

 

 

 

 

 

 

181bid., p. 86.
19Wilson, Teacher's Guide, pp. 28-29.
20Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 105.
21161d., p. 77.
zzlbid.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., p. 81.
25 . , .
Wilson, Teacher 5 Gu1de, p. 29.
26Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 98.
27 . . .
W1lson, Teacher 5 Gu1de, p. 28.
28Ibid.
2916id., p. 29.
3OIhid., p. 28.
311bid., p. 39.
32Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 90.
33

John Wilson, Practical Methods of Moral Education (London:
Heinemann Educational Books, 1972), p. 5.

 

 

34Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 104.

35Ibid., p. 98.

36Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 673.
37

Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 66.

 

58

38Ioid., p. 179.

3916id., pp. 138-140.

40Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 672.

41Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe, and Simon, p. 744.

42J. 5. Mill, On Liberty (Garden City: Anchor Press/
Doubleday, 1973), p. 484.

43

 

Ibid., p. 533.

44Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 151.

 

45Ibid., p. 151.

46Wilson, Reason and Morals, p. 163.

 

47Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 150.

 

48Ibid., p. 144.

CHAPTER IV

A DEWEYAN ALTERNATIVE

We have seen that both Kohlberg and the values clarifica-
tionists maintain that moral decisions must be made by reason
unencumbered by convention, custom or tradition. They argue that
morality consists in relating rules of procedure to particular
situations and choosing a course of action which will resolve those
situations. In support of their claims both groups appeal to John
Dewey's moral theory and argue that their stances on moral education
are in accordance with Dewey's. Specifically Kohlberg claims that
his "theory of values rests on Dewey's analysis, including an
emphasis on the essential unity of scientific judgment and rational

1

value judgment." Simon and his colleagues, too, hold that their

values-clarification method is "built upon the thinking of John
Dewey."2
In this chapter I will examine Dewey's position on moral
education--a position which I regard as more defensible than the
views of current theorists-~particularly concentrating on his view
of the role of experience in the process of habit formation and the
role of the moral educator in fostering desirable moral habits. I

will defend Dewey's view that moral education cannot reasonably be

limited to helping youngsters to learn "how to think" but should

59

6O

deliberately set out to promote substantive moral values. In part,
this is to show an error in the views of Kohlberg and the values
clarificationists to the effect that they are continuing in the
Deweyan tradition. After discussing Dewey's view on moral education,
I will argue first that both Kohlberg and the values clarification-
ists misunderstand some of the key concepts in Dewey's moral
philosophy and, second, that Dewey's moral theory places him in
opposition to their central tenets. Since Dewey's moral theory is
closely related to his views on experience and human nature, I will
proceed by elucidating briefly his views on the method of inquiry

and human nature and their relationship to moral education.

Overview

In his essay "From Absolutism to Experimentalism“3

Dewey
points out that his thinking was influenced by William James' bio-
logical psychology. The thinking process, according to James, is
the conscious process by which the organism and its environment
become integrated. This biological concept of mind was later
elaborated in his discussions of "experience," which emphasized the
creative individual in interaction with its environment. It was
also the influence of this Jamesian psychology which led Dewey to
reject traditional accounts of experience. Experience had been
understood primarily in terms of knowledge, but Dewey does not limit
experience to epistemological contexts. He argues that experience

which leads to knowing is just one sort of interaction; "experience"

designates all natural phenomena which may be described in terms of

6l

interaction. According to Dewey inquiry is a form of interaction
between the organism and the environment.

In his analysis of inquiry Dewey points out that a living
organism may find itself in a problematic situation at any time
because of a "hitch in its experience." A situation is problematic,
according to Dewey, when the organism feels a difficulty due to the
obstacles encountered in the environment; he calls the process by
which the difficulty becomes resolved "inquiry." When experience is
interrupted it is reintegrated by the act of inquiry. For Dewey,
then, to inquire is to strive to overcome difficulty, to transform a
problematic situation into a situation in which the continuity of
experience is restored.

In How We Think Dewey suggests that five distinct steps are

 

involved in the process of inquiry:

(i) A felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition;
(iii) suggestion of possible solutions; (iv) development

by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestions; (v) further
observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or 4
rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief.

In his later works Dewey characterized what he previously
called an interaction as a transaction5 and introduced a more

6

elaborate analysis of the notion of inquiry. For our purposes,

however, his simpler treatment in How We Think will suffice. Even

 

though it is an earlier version of his theory of inquiry, the steps
he introduces there will enable us to see how he conceives of the
nature of moral problems. Dewey characterizes the process of inquiry

as follows:

62

(i) A felt difficulty. The difficulty which is felt occurs

 

because of a conflict within our experience. The felt difficulty in
the disturbed and perplexing situation exerts influences on the
development of an idea or a suggestion. The felt difficulty forms
the background of our thinking and guides us in seeking possible
solutions. Rational reflection over conduct, for example, emerges
when we are confronted with a situation in which the results of
various courses of action are in direct conflict--that is, moral
reflection begins when an individual asks the question: "Why should
I act thus and not otherwise?" Thus it is reflective deliberation
and discourse that motivate the process of inquiry.

(ii) An intellectualization of the difficulty. In a simple

 

case of reflection the felt difficulty and our explicit understanding
of the problem may be merged, but in more complex situations a great
deal of ingenuity and experimentation are essential in order to
locate the source of perplexity precisely. A careful formulation of
the perplexity is essential if our inquiry is to be productive.

(iii) Suggestion of possible solutions. The situation in

 

which the perplexity occurs requires us to generate a suggestion

about how the perplexity can be solved. Accordingly, such a suggested
solution is analogous to supposition, conjecture, guess, hypothesis,
and (in more elaborate cases)_thegry. This step of inquiry, in con-
trast to the preceding steps, is an anticipation of what will happen
when certain hypotheses or ideas are applied to the problematic
situation. "Since suspended belief, or the postponement of a final

conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the presence

63

of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue or the probable
explanation to favor, cultivation of a variety of alternative sug-
gestions is an important factor in good thinking."7

(iv) Development by reasoning of the bearings of the suge

 

gestions. This step involves reasoning or reflection in which a
hypothesis may be rejected immediately upon examination of its
logical consequences, while at other times our reasoning about the
hypothesis leads up to another idea known by previous test to be
related to it. "Reasoning helps extend knowledge, while at the same
time it depends upon what is already known and upon the facilities
that exist for communicating knowledge and making it a public, open
8

resource."

(v) Further observation and experiment leading to its

 

acceptance or rejection. This final step in the process of inquiry

 

is a kind of experimental corroboration, or verification, of the con-
jectured idea. Sometimes simple observation furnishes corroboration
of the relevant hypotheses that have been tentatively developed,
while at other times it is necessary to construct elaborate experi-
ments; that is, "conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with
the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see if the results
theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur. If it is found
that the experimental results agree with the theoretical, or
rationally deduced, results, and if there is reason to believe that
.ggly the conditions in question would yield such results, the con-
firmation is so strong as to induce a conclusion at least until con-

trary facts shall indicate the advisability of its revision."9

64

These, then, are the five phases or aspects of inquiry.
Dewey, however, points out that the discrimination of five phases
does not mean that in a given situation they are independent or occur

in a fixed order.10

In practice, several of them may be fused into a
single phase, which will then require a seemingly disproportionate
development. Nevertheless Dewey believes that the five phases of
reflection that have been described represent "the indispensable
traits of reflective thinking."11
Dewey maintains that this description of the pattern of
inquiry provides a theoretical account of all inquiry. In Dewey's
view the pattern of testing and confirming hypotheses is not confined
to scientific inquiry, but it can be applied to almost any type of
inquiry. Accordingly, he regards values inquiry as a case in which
the pattern of inquiry can be applied. It is Dewey's abiding belief
that the purported gulf between science and morals is a product of
bad logical theory and is not characteristic of the world. For value
inquiry, like scientific inquiry, is prompted by the maladjustment of
the organism and its environment and proceeds to solutions by way of
observation, hypothesis, and experiment. Thus the task of a proper
logical theory is to discover the general pattern and principles of
thought, indicating how these patterns of thought hold good for
reality irrespective of differences in context. As Dewey remarked:
As my study and thinking progressed, I became more and

more troubled by the intellectual scandal that seemed to

me involved in the current (and traditional) dualism in

logical standpoint and method between something called

"science" on the one hand and something called "morals"

on the other. I have long felt that the construction of
a logic, that is, a method of effective inquiry, which

65

would apply without abrupt breach of continuity to the fields
designated by both of these words, is at once our needed
theoretical solvent and the supply of our greatest practical
want. This belief has had much more to do with the develop-
ment of what I termed, for lack of a better word, "instru-
mentalism " than have most of the reasons that have been
assigned.12

Consequently Dewey came to hold that the pattern of inquiry
comprises a theoretical account by which we can explain all inquiry,
both scientific and moral. The difference between scientific and
moral inquiry, according to Dewey, lies not in the process of inquiry
employed, but in the context. The type of situation in which a value
inquiry occurs is one that is incomplete and requires some action to
complete it--that is, a problematic situation. For Dewey, therefore,
value inquiries are analogous to scientific inquiries since in both
cases the inquiry will always have the indispensable traits of
reflective thinking.

In order to understand Dewey's approach fully, we must again
focus on his view of human nature. According to Dewey two factors,
impulse and habit, enter into human nature. Impulse provides the
"push" for human action but does not determine the direction of the

action.13

There is no direction inherent in impulse. Thus the
behavior of the infant is random and aimless. Only as an individual
acquires dispositions and tendencies to act in certain ways in par-
ticular situations does impulse find a direction and a goal. Dewey
describes the essence of habit as follows:
The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to
g%yg_or modes of response, not to particular acts except as,

r special conditions, these express a way of behaving.
Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain

66

classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions,
rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means
will.14

A habit, then, is an acquired way of thinking, feeling and/or
doing. But as Dewey observes significant changes nay occur in one's
environment such that our characteristic modes of response become
ineffective. The habits acquired by the individual are no longer
appropriate, producing ineffectual responses to hitches in our
experiences.

Dewey conceives of intelligence as involving a set of habits
which comes into play when other habits break down. As human beings
and their environments change, problems and conflicts more or less
commonly occur in human life. Hence, human beings may at any time
be confronted with problematic situations--as long as human beings
are alive, there will be new conflicts and problems which demand
actions and resolutions. According to Dewey, in such cases the
habits of reflective intelligence guide our inquiries into the
changed physical, social, and cultural conditions. With regard to
the nature of this sort of inquiry, Dewey maintains that its purpose
is to resolve conflicts that arise in the environment.

Dewey calls the process of reflectively modifying, extending,
and changing one's values in a problematic situation a process of
valuation. Thus he prefers to call his theory a theory of valuation
rather than a theory of value. In delineating his theory of valuation,

Dewey considers two usages of "value."15

The verb "to value" desig-
nates both prizing, in the sense of cherishing certain objects, and

"appraising in the sense of putting a value upon, assigning value

 

67

to."16

Anyone who has likes--and we all do--has values in the former
sense. But values that have been reflectively criticized and intel-
ligently transformed are the product, the outcome, of the process of
valuation.

Dewey's emphasis is upon valuation as appraisal or evaluation.
With regard to the nature of valuation, Dewey points out that it is
primarily "to describe and define certain things as good, fair, or

"17 In other words, Dewey

proper in a definite existential relation.
holds that valuation involves the projection of consequences for the
satisfaction of a given desire for the whole range of desires that
one may have and the attendant reorganization of one's entire corpus
of desires as intellectually considered in a long-range way.

The point which Dewey argues for is that since valuation
arises in problematic situations in which a person cannot resolve
the problem by merely acting on impulse, there must be a process in
which he evaluates or appraises the conditions that presently exist
and can be brought about by various courses of action. Hence he
concludes that forming the situational character of things is a pre-
requisite to initiating value inquiry, and the process of valuation
will have "an aim or end only when it is worked out in terms of con-
crete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of

'"18 Dewey gave an example of the necessity of forming aims:

'means.
If a bird builds its nest by what is called pure
"instinct," it does not have to appraise materials and
processes with respect to their fitness for an end. But
if no result--the nest--is contemplated as an object of
desire, then either there is the most arbitrary kind of
trial-and-error operations or there is consideration of

68

the fitness and usefulness of materials and process to bring
the desired object into existence.19

Accordingly Dewey maintains that unless a person acts directly upon
whatever impulse happens to present itself, there is always a process
of deliberation. His point is that the satisfaction of any desire
occurs within a context. There are consequences for the satisfaction
of one's other desires. There are consequences for the world with
which one interacts, including other people. All of these must be
taken into account in working out one's goals. This means that moral
deliberation is an attempt to predict the future results of actions
and thus subject to the critical methods of inquiry we use in
scientific valuation.

Dewey, however, argues that moral as well as scientific
valuation can be guided by empirical knowledge. Suppose, for example,
that someone is perplexed with the problem whether or not a given
social class should have certain exclusive privileges or advantages.20
Dewey points out that if we are concerned with intelligent moral
appraisals, then the issue in question has to be examined reflectively
in terms of its long-range consequences. But historical knowledge
indicates that when one race or class has enslaved or exploited
another it has had "the effect of limiting both the range of the

desires of others and their capacity to actualize them."21

According
to Dewey, such empirical knowledge does not of itself provide the
conclusions of valid moral deliberation but can predict what will
happen under a proposed course of action and furnish directive as to

what ought to be done. In Dewey's own words, this knowledge is what

69

enables an individual "to foresee possible consequences of his
prospective activities and to direct his conduct accordingly."22
"In the long run the effect is similar to a warier attitude that
develops toward certain bodies of water as the result of knowledge
that these bodies of water contain disease germs."23

From the above considerations, it might be reasonably sur-
mised that from Dewey's point of view moral valuation is a kind of
intelligent inquiry in that it arises when there is a conflict within
the course of experience, and that we must attempt to define the
exact character of the conflict, formulate possible actions, and
appraise their consequences. But that does not mean that Dewey
regards moral judgment as identical with scientific judgment.

Dewey stresses the point that there are differences between
judgments of value and scientific judgments. He employs an analysis
of practical judgments in order to illustrate the similarities and
the difference between these two.24 In introducing the concept of
practical judgment Dewey points out the urgency and uniqueness of
situations in which practical deliberation is evoked. Practical
judgments, according to Dewey, are essentially prompted by a prob-
lematic situation in the course of human experience, having to do
with what ought to be done rather than what is the case or how (in
what manner) something should be done. The practical judgment
requires us to find out the means by which actual results are pro-
duced, because they are inherently connected with an incomplete or

an uncertain situation which is to be completed or organized. Thus

in making practical or theoretical judgments we are concerned with

70

different situations which require different sorts of decisions.
Despite the different contexts in which they occur, however, Dewey
appears to claim that where the methods of inquiry are concerned,
there is no intrinsic difference in the process of deliberation.
Both theoretical and practical inquiries involve the formulation of
an hypothesis or hypotheses to be assessed and envisioning future
possibilities. As in science, the actual consequences which follow
from initiating a course of action serve to test the correctness of
the valuation.
According to Dewey there are no fixed measures of knowledge.
All principles are tentatively employed as hypotheses for conducting
observations and experiments. Thus knowledge, whether practical or
theoretical, is provisional in the sense that it is subject to further
revision. In his own words:
All principles are empirical generalizations from the
ways in which previous judgments of conduct have practically
worked out. When this fact is apparent, these generalizations
will be seen to be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful
cases, but instrumentalities for their investigation,
methods by which the net value of past experience is rendered
available for present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then
it will also follow that they are hypotheses to be tested
and revised by their further working.25
In the case of scientific explanations hypotheses may be
provisional in that they may be superseded by another set which will
more adequately explain natural phenomena. And the same considera-
tions apply to practical knowledge since the nature of practical
deliberation is nothing but "an experiment in finding out what the

26

various lines of possible action are really like." Hence no

7l

existing norms and moral ideas are final or fixed principles, but
they are to be refined and transformed by further experience and
inquiry.

It is important to note that the assertion that knowledge is
provisional is not the same as the claim that all hypotheses are
equal or that none is preferable to another. For Dewey the possi-
bility of revision does not deny the existence of an accepted,
relatively stable body of knowledge which has been accumulated in
past human experience. Nor does he say that each individual should
decide what will count as knowledge on the basis of what he sees as
appropriate.

As has been indicated in the previous chapter, many of the
arguments that have been presented in support of the claim that moral
education must be restricted to the teaching of moral methodologies
are based on the claim that there are no accepted means of deciding
what ought to be done in any particular situation. A major source of
this view is the belief that there are no defensible grounds on which
to adjudicate disputes about values. This view is not Dewey's; for
while he argues against the view that any knowledge claim is
absolutely indisputable, certain and immune to revision, he does not
suggest that there is no such thing as a knowledge claim sufficiently
well grounded to warrant our assent. To the contrary, Dewey argues
that the process of inquiry requires that we work with a commonly
accepted body of knowledge. In fact his view that the very possi-
bility of future revision or falsification reguires that we have

knowledge here and now distinguishes him from many contemporary

72

thinkers. It is only when what is accepted as common knowledge
proves to be inadequate in certain respects that other alternative
accounts are introduced. Moreover, in order to be considered as a
genuinely alternative hypothesis, a claim must be backed up with
adequate evidence and be logically coherent. Dewey says:
The experimental character of moral judgments does

not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles

exist as hypotheses with which to experiment. Human

history is long. There is a long record of past experi-

mentation in conduct, and there are cumulative verifica-

tions which give many principles a well-earned prestige.

Lightly to disregard them is the height of foolishness.27

Though it is obviously possible to invent new principles and

devise new means for their realization, Dewey makes it plan that an
individual should be taught the established body of knowledge, both
theoretical and practical. On Dewey's view of practical knowledge
moral norms cannot be seen as the fixed ends of human action but must
serve as means for reformulating or reconstructing existing social
conditions. If conduct is to be directed intelligently and knowledge
in general is to advance, Dewey would insist that it is essential for

an individual to acquire those characteristic habits of thinking,

feeling and doing which represent the best of our shared experience.

On Habit Formation

 

In the previous section we have examined Dewey's view concern-
ing the method of inquiry and human nature. Through an examination
of Dewey's theory of inquiry, we have seen that he was primarily con-
cerned with delineating the patterns of thought by which we intelli-

gently resolve perplexing situations and by which we gain and warrant

73

our knowledge. In what follows I shall discuss Dewey's theory of
habit formation. This will help us to understand the relationship
between his theory of inquiry and moral education as well as the
implications of his naturalistic interpretation of human experience.
In his discussion of the nature of inquiry and human experi-
ence which embodies his view on moral education, Dewey made it clear
that moral education is especially a matter of developing the habits
of intelligent inquiry in the young; for reconstructing or reformu-
lating the direction of human conduct can be achieved only by those
who have acquired the habit of intelligence. Thus moral education,
Dewey says, "consists in the formation of wide-awake, careful,
thorough habits of thinking."28
Given Dewey's view about the nature of inquiry, we would
agree with the current theorists that to act morally is to act in an
intelligent way and that such a course of action requires rational
reflection or deliberation. But Dewey does not share the view that
reason leads directly to action. He insists that reflection is the
result of dispositions which need to be fostered carefully and
deliberately. For Dewey "reason, the rational attitudes, is the
resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent which can be
invoked at will and set into movement."29 Furthermore, to form the
full range of features appropriate to a desirable character, accord-
ing to Dewey, the individual must learn the well-warranted body of
moral knowledge. Only as he learns a wide range of substantial
values can he form the habits of intelligence and be intelligent

about his conduct. For example, Dewey maintains that such substantial

74

values as "prudence," "sensibility," "expediency," "generosity," or
"impartiality" should be taught and learned in schools, because "past
experience has shown that hasty action upon uncritical desires leads

30

to defeat and possibly catastrophe." Dewey argues:

The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge
the significance of what we are doing and to use that judg-
ment in directing what we do, not by means of direct
cultivation of something called conscience, or reason, or

a faculty of moral knowledge, but by fostering those
impulses and habits which experience has shown to make

us sensitive, generous, imaginative, impartial in per- 31
ceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.

In a similar vein Bertrand Russell emphasizes the necessity
of fostering certain habits in early childhood. For Russell the aim
of moral education is to foster desirable habits. The habits which
Russell wishes to foster include such characteristics as vitality,
courage, sensitivity, and intelligence as well as those of curiosity,
open-mindedness, the belief that knowledge is possible, patience,
industry, concentration and exactness.32

Dewey's insistence that moral education consists in building
intelligent habits is partly due to his conviction that coherent,
ordered action is not inherited but is the product of acquired dispo-
sitions. Dewey points out, for example, "only when a man can already
perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to
have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required

"33 Thus for Dewey it is an essential feature

for proper execution.
of reflection about morality that the realization of our purposes and

aims in conduct comes to us through the medium of habits.

75

With regard to the necessity of fostering certain habits,
Bertrand Russell explicates the important effects of habit formation
in the early years. He says, for example, that "The fact is that
children are not naturally either 'good' or 'bad.’ They are born
with only reflexes and a few instincts; out of these, by the action
of the environment habits are produced, which may be either healthy
or morbid."34 Further, Russell suggests that habits acquired very
early have a profound impact, similar in force to instinct, upon

35

later life and hence the formation of character and moral disposi—

tion ought to be completed by the age of six.36
In his discussion of habits Dewey similarly argues for the

desirability of deliberately fostering certain habits since the chance

 

experiences of ordinary circumstances may result in undesirable as
well as desirable habits. Thus he says of ordinary experience:

Positive habits are being formed; if not habits of careful
looking into things, then habits of hasty, heedless,
impatient glancing over the surface; if not habits of
consecutively following up the suggestions that occur, then
habits of haphazard, grasshopper-like guessing; if not
habits of suspending judgment until inferences have been
tested by the examination of evidence, then habits of
credulity alternating with flippant incredulity, belief

or unbelief being based, in either case, upon whim,

emotion, or accidental circumstances. The only way to
achieve traits of carefulness, thoroughness, and continuity
(traits that are, as we have seen, the elements of the
"logical") is by exercising these traits from the beginning,37
and by seeing to it that conditions call for their exercise.

The dispositions which Dewey sees as desirable are those necessary
for rational inquiry: habits of evaluating hypotheses carefully,
clearly foreseeing the results of various courses of action, and

suspending judgment not supported by sufficient evidence.

76

It may be helpful at this point to turn to Dewey's conception
of the subject of moral education. Dewey points out that there have

been many who have advocated a radical distinction between "moral

"38

conduct" and "ordinary intelligence. He argues that the outcome

of this view leads to setting up the development of character as a
supreme end, and treats the acquisition of knowledge, which occupies
the chief part of school time, as having nothing to do with the

39 He maintains that "moral education in

40

development of character.
school is practically hopeless" when we understand it in this
manner.

Dewey's belief that knowledge and conduct are closely
related leads to his refusal to accept the claim that an absolute
distinction between the subject of moral education and other subjects
can be made in the school curriculum. Such a distinction, in Dewey's
view, can be made only when "the value of concrete, everyday intelli-
gence is constantly underestimated, and even deliberately depre-

41

ciated." Thus Dewey rejects the notion that "morals is an affair

42

with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do." For Dewey moral

education cannot be construed as radically different from ordinary
intelligence. For:

Intelligence is concerned with foreseeing the future so that

action may have order and direction. It is also concerned

with principles and criteria of judgment. The diffused or

wide applicability of habits is reflected in the eneral

character of principles: a principle is intellectually

what a habit is for direct action.43

Dewey argues that the purpose of intelligence is ”to resolve

entanglements in existing activity, restore continuity, recover

77

44 and hence

harmony, utilize loose impulse and redirect habit,"
without the habits of intelligence there is no way of influencing a
person's conduct or resolving the practical problems he encounters
in everyday life. Furthermore, Dewey does not believe that habit
formation, which is the aim of moral education for Dewey, can be
achieved in isolation from the rest of the curriculum. Thus he says:

All the aims and values which are desirable in education

are themselves moral. Discipline, natural development,

culture, social efficiency, are more traits--marks of a

person who is a worthy member of that society which it is

the business of education to further.4

How then do individuals come by these habits of intelligence?
It seems that Dewey's concept of knowledge provides us with a guide
to his view on habit formation. If any given set of dispositions and
habits are the outcome of interactions, then the aim of moral educa-
tors is that of devising environments that will be conducive to
interactions which produce desirable dispositions and habits rather
than undesirable ones.

But we have already seen that for Dewey the habit of intel-
ligence is an essential part of inquiry because it defines the nature
of the unsettled, indecisive character of the situation and provides
the means of overcoming hitches in our experience. In habit forma-
tion, then, the chief duty of any educational institution is to pro-
vide "an environment which secures the full use of intelligence in

the process of forming habits."46

The individual who is placed in
an environment which requires intelligent inquiry will then develop
the habit of intelligence through the interaction with the given

environment.

78

In Democracy and Education Dewey summarized the general func-

 

tion of moral education as direction.47 As was implied in his
account of human nature in terms of impulse and habit, original
impulses gghggt_develop or mature into coherent, structured patterns
of behavior but become so only as products of interactions. Dewey
stresses the significance of direction because the habits of intelli-
gence in particular are the product of deliberate guidance, that is,
learned patterns of behavior which are built up out of the unorganized
and incoherent original impulses. Since forming the habits of intel-
ligence is essential to a constant "formation of new purposes and new
responses"48 in human conduct, Dewey concludes that the purpose of
moral eduCation is to guide and direct the development of original
impulse into these habits.

There are for Dewey two methods of direction. One is to
employ original impulses directly to influence action, as in the use
of commands, prohibitions, approvals, and disapprovals. This can
accomplish an immediate effect, but Dewey points out that it should
not be expected by itself to result in more permanent and effective
educational effects.49 He points out that threats may, for example,
"prevent a person from doing something to which he is naturally
inclined by arousing fear of disagreeable consequences if he per-
sists";50 however he argues that the use of the threat may actually
deter the acquisition of intelligent habits of inquiry by which we
can reconstruct and reformulate the direction of human conduct.

The second sort of direction can be characterized as an

indirect method. This consists in furnishing an environment in which

79

the young participate in such a way that habits of intelligence are
encouraged in concrete processes of inquiry. Dewey believes that
this indirect approach is the most basically educative type of
direction, since it directs original impulses into coherent, con-
trolled patterns of dispositions and leads to the formation of the
habits of intelligence.

Dewey's view that the habits of intelligence are accomplished
indirectly through the environment is reflected in his concept of
school. Schools, according to Dewey, are a typical instance of
environments framed with the purpose of promoting moral dispositions.
It is worth noting, however, that by the environment Dewey does not
mean merely physical surroundings. In fact, Dewey identified the
environment with "those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate

or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being."51 The

 

expansive sense of Dewey's use of the term "environment" is well
illustrated when he says that the environment or the world of experi-
ence "consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic

or event, the subject talked about being also a part of the situation;
or the toys with which he is playing; the book he is reading (in
which his environing conditions at the time may be England or ancient
Greece or an imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment he

52 Dewey adds that:

is performing."
The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions
interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and
capacities to create the experience which it had. Even
when a person builds a castle in the air he is interacting
with the objects which he constructs in fancy.53

80

Given the view of the school as a special environment, the
following questions arise: what characteristics do schools have as
a special environment; and what functions should they perform? Dewey
argues that, in the first instance, the school should provide a

simplified environment. He argues:

 

A complex civilization is too complex to be assimilated lg
toto. It has to be broken up into portions, as it were,
and assimilated piecemeal in a gradual and graded way.
The relationships of our present social life are so
numerous and so interwoven that a child placed in the
most favorable position could not readily share in many
of the most important of them. Not sharing in them,
their meaning would not be communicated to him, would not
become a part of his own mental disposition. There would
be no seeing the trees because of the forest . . . . It
selects the features which are fairly fundamental and
capable of being responded to by the young. Then it
establishes a progressive order . . . .54

Secondly, the school should ggrify the existing environment
by eliminating undesirable features. Since "every society gets
encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from the past, and
with what is positively perverse,"55 Dewey holds that the school has
the duty of omitting such things from its environment. Furthermore
the school should avoid those things which thwart human inquiry and
problem solutions, since the formation of purposes in human conduct
is a rather complex intellectual operation. For instance, intelli-
gent conduct differs from acting upon desire or impulse "through its
translation into a plan and method of action based upon foresight of
the consequences of acting under given observed conditions in a

"56

certain way. Thus the school should "select those things that

have the promise and potentiality of presenting new problems which

8l

by stimulating new ways of observation and judgment will expand the
area of further experience."57
Finally, the school should balance the various elements in

the social environment, so that every individual has an opportunity
to escape the limitations of his social class. Dewey argues for a
broader, balanced school environment, since members of a society
composed of diverse racial, religious, and economic groups often have
little or no direct contact with other social classes.

In the olden times, the diversity of groups was largely a

geographical matter. There were many societies, but each,

within its own territory, was comparatively homogeneous.

But with the development of commerce, transportation,

intercommunication, and emigration, countries like the

United States are composed of a combination of different

groups with different customs. It is this situation which

has, perhaps more than any other one cause, forced the

demand for an educational institution which shall provide

something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for

the young.58

Dewey's argument for the legitimacy of these three functions

of the school is closely connected with his faith in the school as
the most effective means for social progress and for developing the
habits of intelligence required for a creative, effective community.
It is through achieving the objective of providing a simplified,
purified and balanced environment that the school can become an
effective means of developing the intellectual and moral dispositions
of individuals. Thus, good schooling, on Dewey's view, consists in
planning environments which are conducive to the develOpment of
desirable ways of thinking, feeling and doing. Those environments

must be simplified in order to be comprehensible to the young,

 

82

purified in order to perpetuate the most worthy aspects of a culture

and balanced in order to increase opportunities for growth.

Dewey According to Kohlberg and the
Values Clarificationists

 

 

In the above I have analyzed and elaborated some of Dewey's
key views on moral education. My purpose in this section is to
examine Kohlberg's and Simon's assertion that their views are
harmonious with Dewey's and in his tradition. My point here is to
show that, to the contrary, both Kohlberg and Simon have profoundly
misunderstood Dewey. I shall argue that one finds little positive
evidence that Dewey's posture squares with these current theorists;
instead, there are positive indications, both in his method of
inquiry and his emphasis on habit formation, that Dewey's stance on
moral education is radically different from theirs.

To begin with, I will contrast briefly Dewey's view of moral
education with that offered by Kohlberg. Kohlberg proposed that
"following Dewey and Piaget" he would argue that "the goal of moral
education is the stimulation of the natural development of the indi-
vidual child's own moral judgment and capacities, thus allowing him

59 The reason

to use his own moral judgment to control his behavior."
Kohlberg cites Dewey's view of morals is mainly that he feels his own
stance on morals is based on stages of development similar to those
Dewey expounded in his works.

Dewey did occasionally employ the term "growth" or "stage of

development" but only to emphasize the necessity of deliberate

guidance in the learning process. The habits of intelligence do not

83

emerge suddenly in adolescence; they are, on Dewey's view, the product
of deliberate efforts to foster certain desirable dispositions. How-
ever, one cannot simply lead a child through an educational program--
moral or intellectual--if the program is beyond the child's level of
understanding. No matter what the substance of the curriculum may
be, to introduce it without due regard for the individual's capacities
is to ignore a fundamental educational consideration. One may there-
fore conclude that it is of paramount importance to know the
capacities of the young and that, in particular, psychology has a
special role in providing such knowledge. As Dewey observed:

The aim of education is growth or development, both

intellectual and moral. Ethical and psychological

principles can aid the school in the greatest of all con-

structions the building of a free and powerful character.

Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages

in psychological development can insure this. Education

is the work of supplying the conditions which will enable

the psychological functions to mature in the freest and

fullest manner.

Kohlberg's point of using stages of moral development is

partly to show that his own cognitive-developmental theories are

61 He

interactional, and, in that sense, in the Deweyan tradition.
believes that the basic characteristics of the cognitive-developmental
approach are consistent with Dewey's position in that both assume that
the stages of moral development are "the product of patterning of the

62

interaction between the organism and the environment." It seems

clear to Kohlberg that "an interaction between certain organismic
structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world"63 leads
to the development of moral stages. Since the stages "respresent the

transformation of simple early cognitive structure as they are

84

applied to the external world,"64 Kohlberg concludes that the

cognitive-developmental approach, as opposed to maturationist theory,
embodies some parallel aspect of Dewey's interactional view.

Despite Kohlberg's assertion that the stages of moral develop-
ment depend on the interaction between organism and environment rather
than the maturation of the organism, it is arguable whether Kohlberg's
theory is compatible with Dewey's view on moral education. Elsewhere65
and repeatedly Kohlberg tries to indicate that the stages of moral

development are natural emergents from the interaction between the

 

child and the environment. Furthermore, he indicates that the aim of

moral education is to stimulate the natural development of the child's
66

 

own capacities. Thus his is essentially a maturationist view after
all and not in the Deweyan tradition. For his position claims that
the individual's natural tendencies are the most important factor in
the development of moral stages, and that the environment's role

should be one which allows these natural tendencies to develop to a
later stage of moral reasoning. To assert glibly that Dewey is com-
mitted to the same stance as Kohlberg on the matter of moral education
is patently erroneous.

A principal contrast between Kohlberg and Dewey concerns
Kohlberg's contention that the principle of justice, which in
Kohlberg's view emerges only at a relatively late stage in development,
constitutes the end of moral education. Dewey would not object to
Kohlberg's emphasis on either the principle of justice or moral

reasoning because Dewey never underestimates the role of rational

reasoning or moral principles in human conduct. But it should be

85

noted that for Dewey the scope of morals extends to all cases in which
our ready-formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions,
to every act that requires intelligent transformation of impulses

into a purpose and the capacity to act intelligently in uncertain
situations. According to Dewey, therefore, the question of what one
ought to do can be raised even when there are no conflicting claims

to be resolved by appealing to the principle of justice. Conse-
quently, a whole range of values which are peculiarly relevant to
uncertain situations depends on the particular conditions under which
ought-questions are raised. In this respect Dewey's stance contrasts
sharply with Kohlberg's, who restricts morality to the range of issues
associated with justice. Thus, Dewey would object to Kohlberg's con-
tention that a single moral principle--the principle of justice--can
be applied to every moral situation.

Dewey furthermore would object to Kohlberg's contention that
the school should promote only the skills of moral reasoning. As has
been indicated, Dewey is justly critical of the identification of
morals with reasoning or principle; he believes that they are
acquired proper habits of conduct including habits of reasoning
which provide us with a solid ground for guiding our moral conduct.
This belief is evident when he says:

Neither the utilitarians nor any one else can exaggerate
the proper office of reflection, of intelligence, in con-
duct. The mistake lay not here but in a false conception
of what constitutes reflection, deliberation . . . We may
indeed safely start from the assumption that impulse and

habit, not thought, are the primary determinants of
conduct.57

86

From the above considerations, it becomes clear that Kohlberg's
stance does not indeed embrace the line of reasoning espoused by Dewey,
in particular when it is recognized that Kohlberg's view of moral
education is characterized by his assertion that moral education is
a matter of teaching students to reason morally, that is, choosing a
course of action in accordance with the principle of justice.

Simon and his colleagues also often maintain that Dewey
advocated a method that is similar to their own values clarification
method--the disposition to project consequences for action, to con-
sider alternatives, to examine the consistency of a value with other
values, and so on.

As I have already noted, Dewey rejects the notion that moral
knowledge is absolute, having been established from the beginning of
time, and equally applicable in all situations and at all times. He
certainly recognizes that knowledge, both practical and theoretical,
is not indisputable; one can never rule out the possibility of
falsification at a later time. Nonetheless Dewey argues that
specific ethical situations determine which kinds of conduct are
morally right and wrong. By use of the method of inquiry, Dewey
believes that one can evaluate and determine what ethical standards
should govern his conduct in a given situation. It is the method of
inquiry that enables us to become more intelligent in moral conduct
and helps us understand more fully the consequences of our actions.
In spite of the possibility of revision by further experience, Dewey
does not believe that the validity of knowledge is dependent upon

any particular individual. Simon and his colleagues, by contrast,

87

recommend the adoption of their values clarification method based on
the premise of radical relativism; that is, no one can say what
another's values should be and therefore each person should decide
his own values based on the method they suggest. To interpret
Dewey's method of inquiry as the sole criterion by which each indi-
vidual must decide his own values is, therefore, to distort the point
of everything he said.

Dewey, as we have noted, holds that educators must consciously
promote the development of desirable habits--characteristic ways of
thinking, feeling, and doing. It is evident that this view is incom-
patible with a theory which limits the role of moral education to the
clarification of values. Clarity for Dewey is exceedingly important
but he would point out that it is not enough to insist upon the dis-
positions needed to clarify values. To dispose the young to clarify
their values is not likely to generate the full range of features
appropriate to a desirable character that Dewey, like Russell, would
engender. Thus, the trouble with the values clarificationists is
that they do not consider the wide range of dispositions involved in
active formation of desirable habits in the young. They assume that
promoting the values clarification method is sufficient to foster
desirable character, apart from the active promotion of any other
disposition.

Furthermore, Dewey reminds us of the important feature of
deliberate education: its manifestation of preferences for some
special kind of social environment. According to Dewey, deliberate

education inevitably selects a social environment so that the young

88

may not be left to unguided interactions with their environment. A
school--as a simplified, purified and balanced environment--provides
a set of special environments selected in order to foster certain
desirable habits rather than undesirable ones. In this context,
Dewey maintains that all deliberate education is a moral undertaking.
And to select school environments is to accept that there are right
and wrong ways of shaping the intellectual and moral dispositions of
the young. This is far from saying that the aim of moral education
is merely to help the young become clear on what their values are
rather than to foster any particular values. Thus, to claim that
Dewey promotes the values clarification method as the aim of moral

education is to neglect some of Dewey's key views on moral education.

FOOTNOTES-~CHAPTER IV

1Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 69.

2Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

3John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in
Contemporary American Philospphy; Personal Statements, ed. G. P.
Adams and W. P. Montague (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1962),
Vol. 11, PP. 23-26.

4John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: 0. C. Heath and Co.,
Publishers, 1910), p. 72.

 

 

5John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949).

 

6John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt,
Inc., 1938), pp. 101-119.

 

7Dewey, How We Think (1910), p. 75.

 

8John Dewey, How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation
of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process (Lexington: D. C.
Heath and Company, 1933), pp. 111-112.

 

 

gDewey, How We Think (1910), p. 73.

 

loDewey, How We Think (1933), pp. 115-116.

 

11Ibid., p. 116.

12Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," p. 23.

13John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern
Library, 1930), pp. 88-90.

 

141616.. pp. 40-41.

89

Chicago

Journal

90

15John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of
Press, 1939), p. 5.

 

16Ibid., p. 5.

17Ibid., p. 24.

18Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 179.

 

19Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 23.

 

2016id., p. 59.

21Ibid.

22Ibid., pp. 58-59.

23Ibid.. pp. 59-60.

24John Dewey, "The Logic of Judgment of Practice," Ihg
of Philosophy 12(19) (September 1916): 505.

 

Liveright, 1926), p. 60.

25Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 222.

 

261bid., p. 179.

27Ibid., p. 221.

280eney, How We Think (1933), p. 78.

 

29Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 184.

 

30Dewey, The Theory of Valuation, p. 32.

 

31Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 194.

 

32Bertrand Russell, Education and the Good Life (New York:

 

33Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 30-31.

 

91

34Russell, Education and the Good Life, p. 41.

 

3516id.. pp. 41, 89.

35Ibid.. pp. 101, 239.

37Dewey, How We Think (1933), p. 89.

 

38John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free
Press, l9l6), p. 353.

39

 

Ibid., p. 354.

401bid.

411bid.

42Ibid.

43Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 220.

 

4416id., p. 187.

45Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 359.

 

461bid., p. 49.

47Ibid., p. 24.

48Ibid., p. 175.

491bid., p. 39.

5016id., p. 26.

511bid., p. 11.

52John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 43-44.

 

92

 

 

 

53Ibid., pp. 43-44.
54 . .

Dewey, Democracy and Educat1on, p. 20.
55Ibid., p. 20.
56Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 69.
57Ibid., p. 75.
58 .

Dewey, Democracy and Educat10n, p. 21.
59Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 71.
60

John Dewey, "What Psychology Can Do for the Teacher," in
John Dewpy on Education: Selected Writings, ed. by R. Archambault
(New York: Random House, 1964), quoted from "The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan
(June 1975): 670.

 

 

61Lawrence Kohlberg, "Early Education: A Cognitive-
Developmental View," Child Development, 39 (December 1968): 1010-
1016.

 

621bid., p. 1015.

63Ibid., p. 1016.

64Ibid., p. 1020.

6516id., p. 1015.

66Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 71.

67Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 206.

 

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The theories we have been discussing make diverse points
about the nature of moral education. The issues become more compre-
hensible if we f0cus on two questions that each takes to be central
to its account of moral education: (l) whether there are any uni-
versally applicable moral rules and (2) if there are, whether these
can defensibly be taught. The stances of our theorists in large part
grow out of their preoccupation with these two questions.

Even though they may not explicitly recognize it, Simon and
his colleagues take these questions to be central to their discussion
of moral education. Simon argues that "values-clarification is based
on the premise that none of us has the 'right' set of values to pass

1 When he and his colleagues claim that it is irrespon-

to others."
sible to influence another's moral values, their stance is based on
the view that there are no publicly defensible moral values. Having
concluded that there are no right answers to such questions, they
feel compelled to limit moral education to training in the process
of valuing.

Kohlberg, on the other hand, argues that "there are universal

moral concepts, values, or principles."2 Furthermore, he argues

that ethical principles are subject to "less variation between

 

93

94

individuals and cultures"3 than are arbitrary rules and conventional
beliefs. In this way Kohlberg comes to the conclusion that moral
education is a matter of teaching those general ethical principles
which underlie and support particular moral decisions.

Wilson is also concerned with the two questions with which
we introduced this chapter. He makes a distinction between first-
and second-order principles so that (l) we will be able to identify

and teach non-partisan values and (2) we may identify defensible

 

criteria fer a rational morality. He argues, for example, that
teaching first-order principles such as the Ten Commandments is
bound to transmit partisan values. This is so, he argues, since in
our rapidly changing world one finds a great diversity of moral
opinion on virtually every issue of moral importance. Thus Wilson
argues that moral education should be based on those rules of pro-
cedure which are essential to all morality.

In sum, the three theorists we have discussed share a
methodological approach to moral education rather than a substantive
or content approach. However much their specific programs may differ,
they all agree that the basis of moral education is to be found in
teaching certain rules of procedure rather than content. In Chapter
II I delineated the central features of these methodologically
oriented views.

In Chapter III I have shown that even though each makes a
distinction between fbrm and content in morality, there are striking
differences in their views about the nature of the distinction. I

have argued that Wilson's position differs from that of Kohlberg

95

and the values clarificationists in that Wilson never claims that

moral education is exclusively a matter of teaching a moral method-

 

ology. One of Wilson's key points is that moral decisions qua
mpggl_decisions must be made on some basis other than one's own
interest. The function of rational deliberation--and the role of
moral components and second-order rules of procedure in such
deliberation--is to ensure that we consider moral issues impartially.
From this, Wilson concludes that moral education must be centrally
concerned with inculcating rational attitudes and approaches to moral
matters. I take Wilson to mean by this that moral education fosters
the essential dispositions, outlined in terms of the moral components
he describes, and this, in turn, disposes the young to be concerned
about moral questions ppg_moral action.

Simon and his colleagues also distinguish between methods
and content, referring to particular judgments as opposed to the
method by which judgments are made. They argue that the student
should not be taught substantive moral values but rather should be
taught clarification techniques. Similarly, Kohlberg makes a dis-
tinction between f0rm and content, espousing an abstract, general
moral principle rather than any particular judgments. In Chapter
III I offered a number of criticisms of Kohlberg and the values
clarificationists. I argued that the views under consideration,
i.e., that the essence of moral education lies in the teaching of
moral reasoning or in the teaching of methods of clarifying values,
suffer from major deficiencies and lead to probelmatic consequences.

The most important question is whether the methods used to make

96

moral decisions are, in fact, neutral with respect to substantive
moral conclusions, i.e., whether our forms of moral reasoning can be
taught independently of particular moral beliefs.

Kohlberg and the values clarificationists assume that one
can teach moral reasoning or the values clarification process without
being thereby committed to specific moral claims. But I have shown
in Chapters III and IV that moral education cannot be properly under-
stood exclusively in terms of teaching moral reasoning or valuing
processes. Contrary to the views considered, I have argued that the
formation of a wide range of desirable habits, which I have argued
is the aim of moral education, can be accomplished only by taking
into account those beliefs, attitudes, feelings and abilities that
are involved in pptjpg_morally. While this does not mean that moral
reasoning is irrelevant to moral action, it does mean that programs
of moral education which emphasize some form of reasoning or other
to the exclusion of all other considerations are, and must be,
incomplete accounts.

Kohlberg and the values clarificationists also argue that
just as our learning of an academic subject is crucially dependent
on our understanding the associated body of ideas and principles
which constitute the subject, so our learning in the-realm of morals
depends on our understanding the rules of procedure or the estab-
lished principles that govern morality. My argument is that moral
education, like any other subject taught in the schools, mp§t_
incorporate substantive claims as well as procedural strategies.

The claim that a principled, stage-six form of moral reasoning

97

or a method for clarifying values can be taught in isolation is
equivalent to the claim that the rules of grammar can be taught in
isolation from teaching children how to speak. The grammar of a
language dpe§_represent a general structure which, in some sense,
governs that language. But it does not follow from this fact that
one could teach (or learn) the grammar of a language apart from
learning that language. What is involved in learning a language is
not just learning a grammar but must include the acquisition of

linguistic habits. Likewise learning a morality (or acquiring a

 

moral point of view) is not just learning a form of reasoning but

must include the acquisition of moral habits.

 

Besides, those who associate moral competence with mastery
of certain rules of procedure overlook the way in which individuals
come to a recognition of the principles which define the various
subjects. For instance, games can be seen as exemplary of rule-
governed activities, and clearly any player must know the rules in
order to play the game. But it is equally clear that a knowledge
of the rules alone is not sufficient to ensure competence in playing
the game. For example, one may have a complete understanding of the
rules relevant to base stealing and yet be an incompetent base
stealer (by, say, knowing that one should carefully watch the third
base coach's signals, yet not have the habit of watching them).
Likewise, in moral matters it is not sufficient for one to be con-
versant with the rules of procedure, one must have the disposition
to behave in accordance with them. This requires something more

than instruction in moral reasoning or the valuing process can

98

provide. The disposition to behave in accordance with the rules is
not something which one can come by apart from the context in which
these rules are applied.

Russell, like Dewey, recognizes the need f0r instilling
certain moral habits in the young. His specific methods for foster-
ing moral dispositions suggest the importance of concrete experience
over abstract principles of moral reasoning. Russell points out
that

The object of education, in this respect, is to let the

external pressure take the form of habits, ideas and

sympathies in the child's own mind. . . . The idea which

is needed is that of justice. . . . Justice is the con-

ception that we ought to try to instill into the child's

thoughts and habits.4
In fact, for Russell, one's comprehension of general moral principles
is a function of one's fundamental dispositions. "It is a folly and
a waste of time to give abstract moral instruction to a child,"5
Russell says, "everything must be concrete, and actually demanded by

"6

the existing situation. He explicitly says that

A child who has seen his parents behaving always with kind-

ness and consideration tries to copy them in this respect.

. . . And if you urge him to be kind to his little sister,

but are not kind to her yourself, all your instruction

will be wasted.7

Russell therefore may be construed to maintain that children

begin to learn the basic elements of morality, such as sympathy and
respect f0r others through concrete experience and imitation.
Further, he claims that the process of habit formation which will
make a profound mark on their attitude toward others begins at an

early age. Russell also argues that children with a moral upbringing

99

of the sort he prescribes will, in later life, be likely to develop
the general moral principles (e.g., justice) which are advocated by
many, Kohlberg included. He observes that

All moral instruction must be immediate and concrete: it

must arise out of a situation which has grown up naturally,

and must not go beyond what ought to be done in this par-

ticular instance. The child himself will apply the moral

in other similar cases. It is much easier to grasp a

concrete instance, and apply analogous considerations to

an analogous instance, than to apprehend a general rule

and proceed deductively.

Russell's position seems to me to counter the views expressed
by the current theorists we have been considering. If he is right,
moral education should be a deliberate effort to bring about those
circumstances which promote the development of good moral habits
rather than an effort to inculcate some method of moral reasoning.
Dewey would concur with Russell on this matter: the understanding
of general rules, as well as the sort of habit formation which moral
principles describe comes gradually and can be developed only through
concrete experiences. A theory of moral education which emphasizes
habit formation--including habits of rational deliberation--is a far
cry from one which exclusively emphasizes a method of moral reasoning.

Of the views I have examined, Wilson's, with its emphasis on
the moral components of, e.g., attending to the facts, following the
laws of logic, having the concern of others' needs and interests,
giving equal weight to others' needs and interests and so on,
provides a more adequate basis for moral education than either

Kohlberg's or the values Clarificationists'. I have, however, only

touched on Wilson's conception of moral education as it compares

100

with Dewey's--a position which I regard as more defensible than any
of the three critiqued here. Further inquiry into the essential
characteristics of moral education should explore in detail the
possibility of combining Dewey's stance with that of Wilson. A
conception of moral education which combines emphasis on the moral
components with Dewey's emphasis on the central role of moral dis-
positions might well display the full range of conditions that must

be fulfilled in moral conduct.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V

1Sidney 8. Simon, "Values-Clarification vs. Indoctrination,"
Social Education 35(8) (Decmeber 1971): 901-915

 

2Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 41.

31bid.

4Russe11, Education and the Good Life, pp. 147-148.

51bid., p. 182.

6Ibid., p. 174.

71bid., p. 182.

81bid., pp. 174-175.

101

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