This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

FORM VS. CONTENT IN SELECTED CURRENT
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

presented by

Yoon J. Kang

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D.   degree in   Administration
and Curriculum

George Forree
Major professor

Date   November 30, 1981

FORM VS. CONTENT IN SELECTED CURRENT

ACCOUNTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

By

Yoon J. Kang

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Administration and Curriculum

1981

ABSTRACT

FORM VS. CONTENT IN SELECTED CURRENT
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

By

Yoon J. Kang

This dissertation examines the stances of several contempo-
rary ethical theorists who are highly influential in the field of
moral education: John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Sidney Simon
(together with his values clarificationist colleagues). Notwith-
standing vast differences in their positions, it is argued that they
share the view that there is a distinction between _form_ and _content_
in moral judgment and that the basis for moral education lies in the
former to the exclusion of the latter.

The first step in this study is the delineation of the
central views of John Wilson, Lawrence Kolhberg, and Sidney Simon
with respect to three matters: (1) the concept of morality, (2)
the place of rationality in morality, and (3) the nature and purpose
of moral education.

The second step in the argument is a critical evaluation of
the arguments offered in support of the stances taken on these three
matters. The description and criticism of the views that moral
education should be exclusively focused on methodology, moral

reasoning, the valuing process, and so on is followed with an argument that John Dewey's theory of moral education provides a more desirable alternative than do the contemporary theories. Finally, a defense is offered of Dewey's view that moral education cannot reasonably be limited to helping the youngsters to learn "how to think" but should deliberately set out to promote substantive moral values.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Several current theories of moral education distinguish
substantive moral content from forms of moral reasoning and regard
only the latter as relevant to the aims of moral education. This
approach is grounded, in large part, in the belief that it is diffi-
cult, even impossible, to settle substantive moral disputes. Given
this, any program of moral education which teaches such substantive
values is bound to indoctrinate students into a partisan view of
morality. Theories of this sort hold that if schools were to promote
some particular form of moral reasoning, rather than specific moral
injunctions, students could be taught to adopt a rational approach
to moral questions that is neither partisan nor based on outdated
moral codes.

It is important that we clearly understand these contemporary
theories of moral education for they are considerably at variance
with some of the claims of common sense as well as the theories of
philosophers such as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. It is not
<u>obvious</u> that schools should not be allowed to promote some basic
rules or that to do so would be tantamount to indoctrination. While
their views differ in many respects, John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg

and Sidney Simon each incorporate a distinction of this type in their theories of moral education.

John Wilson

John Wilson through his work at the Farmington Trust Research Unit, which was set up in 1965 at Oxford University, has been active in developing and improving theories and programs of moral education. During the last decade Wilson has published several major books and numerous articles on moral education which are noteworthy in that he claims to have developed a rational basis for morality[1] and has proposed programs which detail what schools ought to do in moral education. The central claims in Wilson's approach are that moral education should deal with teaching correct methods of reasoning and that this is not intended to ". . . impart any specific content, but to give other people facility in a method."[2] This recognizes that ". . . the essence of moral education is not the inculcation of right choices,"[3] and that the methodology offers an effective way to avoid reliance on partisan values and the uncritical acceptance of absolute moral injunctions.

The Values Clarificationists

The values clarification movement led by Sidney Simon and his colleagues[4] represents another approach to moral education. It is in part its rapid growth and the wide-spread popularity that make the values clarification approach significant. According to this theory values are determined in the course of the valuing process. Furthermore, whatever one values is right for him and no set of

values can be universally and always objectively right. Given this no one has the right to influence the values held by others and moral education is restricted to the goal of encouraging students to be <u>clear</u> about their values. In short the theory holds that teachers should remain neutral in the discussion of values, simply encouraging each student to clarify his own set of values.

Lawrence Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg, Director of the Center for Moral Education at Harvard University, has been involved for twelve years in the experimental study of ". . . the development of moral judgment and character primarily by following the same group of 75 boys at three-year intervals from early adolescence."[5]

Kohlberg has employed a set of hypothetical moral dilemmas in his studies of moral reasoning. Subjects are told a story which incorporates a moral dilemma--for example, the dilemma of a husband who cannot afford drug costs for a dying wife. The subjects are asked what the husband should do and why. Kohlberg's analysis of responses to these dilemmas has led to his developmental stage theory of moral reasoning in which the subject's definition of values and the type of reasons given in support of his decision provide the basis for classifying responses.[6] In Kohlberg's theory it is the form of reasoning which differentiates one stage from another, not specific responses to specific moral dilemmas.

Kohlberg argues that the stages of moral reasoning:

1. are structured wholes or organized systems of thought, not attitudes towards particular situations;

2. form an invariant sequence. Under all conditions except extreme trauma, movement is always forward, never backward. Individuals never skip a stage; movement is always from a previous stage to a later one; and

3. are "hierarchical integrations." Thinking at a higher stage comprehends lower stage thinking. There is a tendency to function at the highest stage available.

Since stages are defined in terms of forms of reasoning and the goal of moral education is seen as promoting moral development, Kohlberg sees moral education as dealing directly with moral reasoning rather than ". . . imposing a specific morality upon . . ."[7] students.

Overview

The primary aim of this study is to describe and critically evaluate three contemporary theories of moral education of this type, specifically the views of John Wilson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and the values clarification theory popularized by Sidney Simon and his colleagues. The dissertation will consider the cogency of the arguments offered in support of the distinction between content and form in moral education, and will proceed by elucidating in some detail the views of each of these theorists with respect to three issues: (1) their concept of morality, (2) the place of reason in morality and moral education, and (3) the nature and purpose of moral

education. The dissertation will conclude with an argument that theories of moral education which emphasize the development of particular moral dispositions in the young provide a more reasonable approach to moral education than do these second-order theories.

It is necessary to consider conceptions of morality in general and the role of reason in morals since the accounts of the nature and purpose of moral education under discussion are, in large part, determined by those views. Furthermore, these contemporary theorists emphasize moral methodologies and the valuing process rather than substantive value claims or particular dispositions to be fostered in the student. This is rooted in their supposition that any account of rational morality must be articulated in terms of formal conditions or second-order norms rather than substantive moral claims.

I will show that while the theories under consideration employ different conceptions of morality and rationality, they each hold to the view that the goal of moral education is the development of rationality rather than the transmission of a fixed set of moral beliefs. That is, they see moral education not as the inculcating of specific moral beliefs and attitudes but rather the teaching of specific methods of making moral decisions or processes of valuing which are considered to be effective in arriving at sound moral decisions. Since the standards of rational morality are seen not in substantial content but in such formal procedures, schools should not endorse or promote any particular moral injunctions. I will argue on various grounds that the distinction between form and

content does not provide the sort of _value neutrality_ which these theorists seek. But I will also argue that there are defensible moral habits which the schools are justified in promoting and that in doing so teachers are not indoctrinating their students.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I

[1]John Wilson, "First Steps in Education, Morality, and Religion," in Philosophy of Education 1977, Proceedings, 33nd Annual Meeting, Philosophy of Education Society, p. 40.

[2]John Wilson, A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education (London: Geoffery Chapman, 1973), p. 27.

[3]Ibid., p. 64.

[4]Simon's colleagues in this movement are Leland W. Hower, Howard Kirschenbaum, Merril Harmin, Louis E. Raths, and James Raths.

[5]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," in Moral Education, ed., C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (New York: Newman Press, 1971), p. 34.

[6]Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan 56(10) (June 1975): 672.

[7]Ibid., p. 54.

CHAPTER II

MORALITY AND RATIONALITY

IN MORAL EDUCATION

While it is frequently maintained that either implicitly or explicitly moral education is an important part of the curriculum, some current theorists argue that the school should not deliberately promote substantive moral values. Current theorists as diverse as John Wilson, Sidney Simon, and Lawrence Kohlberg support this negative view but argue for quite different views of what the school ought to do in moral education. My purpose in this chapter is to delineate the views of John Wilson, Sidney Simon (together with his values clarificationist colleagues), and Lawrence Kohlberg with respect to three matters: (1) the concept of morality, (2) the place of rationality in morality, and (3) the nature and purpose of moral education.

John Wilson's View

To explain the notion of morality Wilson says that the concept has a broad meaning, including "much more than adherence to particular mores."[1] Rather "it includes the notion of relating to other people as to equals, and knowing what their interests are, as well as acting in accordance with those interests. It also includes

the notion of managing one's own desires and feelings in the right way, even if the interest of others is not obviously involved."[2] Hence the term "morality" can be applied to even "such cases as choosing whom to marry, what job to do, whether to take drugs or whether to engage in 'perverse' sexual behaviour."[3]

Wilson admits that the word "moral" is used in different ways by different people and considers four possible common usages. According to Wilson some people would restrict "moral" to (1) matters where other people's interests are at stake, (2) our personal ideals and virtues even where these do not affect others, (3) questions of the sort "What ought I to do?" "What ought I to feel?" "What ought I to be?" and so on, (4) matters where a person has a free choice or where his will is in some way involved.[4] In regard to these various usages Wilson neither distinguishes essential usage from nonessential, nor does he claim that there are correct or incorrect ways to use the term "morality." Rather he says that "there are no right or wrong answers to these questions." In other words Wilson seems to accept the point that what is central to the meaning of the word "moral" is its various usages and that none of these can be ruled out prior to analysis.

Wilson claims that strategies in using the term can be more or less wise, and that one wise ploy is to use "moral" in a manner that takes into account principles important for a person. As to why this is wise, Wilson gives some reasons. "Since every human being, most of the time, acts for some kind of reason or on some form of principle . . . it will be clear that everyone has a

morality of some kind."[5] The point is that to have a morality of some kind means acting from some reasons or principles, however much these may vary from person to person. Wilson offers no detailed argument for his view, but he clearly wishes to employ "moral" and its cognates in a comprehensive manner. This is evident when Wilson says, "it is better to keep the door open" and "to use 'moral' in a very wide sense." Hence, by "morality" Wilson means broadly ". . . principles of thought and action which are the most important for [the agent], irrespective of their content."[6]

Since Wilson says that "a moral view, to count as rational, must be backed up by certain kinds of reasons,"[7] a crucial question is that of what rational grounds can be given for accepting or rejecting a moral claim. This question was not seen as crucial in earlier eras in which people shared ". . . a set of reasons for their behaviour which were based on traditional acceptance."[8] But ". . . as the old values, faiths, creeds and so on begin to lose their force," Wilson maintains that ". . . we seek a new basis for our morality, a new ground on which to build, perhaps a new authority to accept, admire and obey."[9]

As we seek such a new basis, Wilson claims that "we begin to see that it isn't the new basis itself which is going to be ultimately authoritative," but the criteria "which enable us to assess and perhaps choose between various moral codes or authorities."[10] In Wilson's view the criteria by which we judge "will not themselves be moral principles or codes."[11] This claim suggests that the way we establish the rationality of a particular activity is by formal

rules of procedure. It will become clear later in the chapter what Wilson means by "formal rules of procedure."

Before dealing with these matters let us consider the question of why Wilson should be interested in a rational moral view at all. In dealing with this question, we will come to more clearly understand what underlies Wilson's position regarding the place of rationality in morals.

For Wilson the distinction between facts and values is clear. He stresses that "no amount of facts can prove by strictly logical entailment, that something is valuable, good, right, or to be chosen."[12] Wilson seems to accept this fact-value dichotomy as a "necessary truth of logic,"[13] but he does not believe that this distinction necessitates that moral choices be ungrounded. While he does not maintain that we always know what is right and wrong, "it does not follow from these points that our moral values and beliefs are arbitrary or a matter of taste, or irrational, in the sense that one reason for a moral belief is as good as another."[14] "If we are to act as human beings," Wilson says, "there must be standards, principles and rules of procedure which govern our thought."[15] In short there are rules, principles or standards in virtue of which we can defensibly say that one belief is better, preferable, more reasonable, or more satisfactory than another.[16]

Wilson elucidates the rationality of morals with analogs from science when he identifies in scientific activities the rules and criteria which characterize and govern them.[17] Wilson argues that the principles and procedures governing each particular

activity, for example, science or medicine, are derived from the nature of the subject, not from a "particular set of values."[18] Analogously, Wilson sees the formal criteria of morality as deriving from the nature of morality.[19] "Just as there is a right way of doing science," Wilson says, so there is a right way of doing morals.

It should be noted that these rules or standards which define the rationality of a particular activity are formal rather than substantial.[20] This means that there is a difference between the specific claims and the second-order principles governing them.[21] By second-order principles Wilson means rules of procedure which define correct moves in that particular realm of activity. In morality Wilson identifies the second-order principles as "things like self-awareness, facing facts, developing imagination, being consistent, attending to logic, and so on."[22]

This point is crucial, for on it rests Wilson's claim that "morality has a basis in just the same way that other subjects or forms of thought have bases."[23] The point is that the rationality of morals can be conceived of only in terms of second-order rules of procedure, not in terms of content. We need second-order rules of procedure to deal with the unpredictable and myriad particular, first-order moral questions we face in life. These second-order rules allow us to distinguish rational from irrational, valid from invalid, ways of making moral decisions. In sum, as Wilson says

> Education in morality is like education in other areas of human thought and action (medicine, history, science, etc.), in what there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, and a set of abilities, rules, procedures and to act on them--in brief, a methodology.[24]

One reason Wilson stresses methodology is to emphasize that educating people is not just extracting "right answers" from them, but teaching them what will count as "a good reason" in history, literary criticism, and so on.[25] Thus rational education should encourage students "to derive their beliefs from good grounds, not just teach them in such a way that they repeat truths correctly."[26] Wilson's conclusion applied to moral education is that "if we are educating our children we are setting out to give them some idea about how to do morality."[27] The emphasis upon methodology in moral education helps to avoid "one general danger, the danger of putting forward particular moral values or partisan views of morality as a basis for moral education."[28]

In Wilson's approach it is important to identify which second-order reasons or rules of procedure are basic to moral decisions. He first maintains that the necessary characteristics of rationality in any realm are (1) that one should adhere to the rules of logic, (2) that one should use language correctly, and (3) that one should attend to the facts.[29] He then argues that an analysis of the concept of a "morally educated" person enables us to discover what it is to be good at "morality" and thus to get clear about the specific criteria necessary for doing morals.

Wilson begins by pointing out that when we describe someone as rational or irrational, we do not "refer primarily to the truth or falsehood of his beliefs."[30] Rather, we refer to "the way in which or the reasons for which he comes to believe, and continues to believe. . . ."[31] When we call someone a "good scientist" or a

"good literary critic" we mean that he is good at following certain rules of procedure which are relevant to that field of study without any special regard to the correctness or incorrectness of any particular scientific or literary belief.[32] This suggests that we can distinguish between (1) holding a particular belief and (2) using the methods of reasoning that are specific to a field of study. It also suggests that the latter is of primary importance in assessing one's competence in the field of study. What constitutes competence in moral contexts turns out to be what Wilson calls the moral components, which are treated in his account of a "morally educated" person.

In order to get clear about what "morally educated" means, Wilson attempts a general description of moral action. He argues that the notion of a moral action requires consideration of intent and acting for a reason.[33] Thus "we need to know, not just what people do, but why they do it." Furthermore, not all reasons will count as good reasons. The notion of moral action requires that to count as a good reason it must be based on a rational consideration of other people's interests. Such a rational consideration involves such things as regarding other people as equals, knowing what their feelings are, respecting logic and the facts, not being deceived by linguistic confusion, and having moral values or principles based on all these. And finally a morally educated person must have the ability to act on his moral principles.

Wilson formalized the foregoing analysis of "morally educated" as a number of components and used the first few letters of

some classical Greek words to label these components. The list of

moral components, briefly characterized, follows:

PHIL   refers to the attitude of regarding others as equals, taking their interests as equally important.

EMP   refers to the ability to know what others are feeling, and what their interests are.

GIG(1)   refers to the attainment of the knowledge of hard facts relevant to moral choices.

GIG(2)   refers to the ability of practical "know-how" to perform effectively in social contexts.

DIK   refers to the mode of thought to prescribe actions for oneself for the right reasons.

KRAT   refers to the motivational and behavioural traits required (a) to use the other components, (b) to translate consequent moral judgment into action.[34]

Wilson's claim is that any moral decision necessarily

involves these components. He stresses that these moral components

do not ". . . impart any specific content, but . . . give other

people facility in a method."[35] In brief, Wilson's recommendation

is that moral education should ". . . develop all these moral com-

ponents in the young."[36,37]

The Values Clarificationists' View

Sidney Simon and his colleagues treat a broad range of moral

issues under the name of "values." For them value issues range over

personal taste (e.g., clothes, hair style), politics, religion, work,

leisure time, school, love, sex, family, material possessions,

culture (e.g., art, music, literature), friends, money, aging, death,

health, race, war and peace, rules and authority.[38] On their view

every issue can be characterized as moral insofar as it is concerned with a decision or choice about how to live one's life.

In all of these realms, Simon and his colleagues claim that there is no one set of values right for everyone. Since there is no general agreement about those matters, it is not only ineffective but wrong to inculcate any particular set of values in the young.

Even though they believe that everyone has to choose his own values, Simon and his colleagues seem to reject a laissez-faire approach to moral education, which they describe as a tendency to let the young "do and think what they want without intervening in any way."[39] Simon says "Young people, left on their own, experience a great deal of conflict and confusion."[40] He claims that since they lack values or are confused by them, people often suffer from such symptoms as apathy, flightiness, overconformity, and overdissension.[41]

Although on this view no one can set correct or valid values which are applicable for everyone, Simon and his colleagues maintain that there should be ways to get the young to come to have their own proper values. That seems to be the task of moral education as Simon and his colleagues conceive it. And in their view it is possible to get rid of a state of confusion, anguish, or suffering provided the young are taught content-free skills rather than particular values. As an alternative to the inculcation of values, they propose a value-neutral teaching method called a values clarifying method. Their proposed approach is defended on the ground that they are not "concerned with the content of people's values, but the process of valuing."[42]

This valuing process is composed of the following seven aspects: choosing freely, choosing from among alternatives, choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative, prizing and cherishing, affirming one's position publicly, acting on one's choice, and repeating with a pattern and consistency.[43]

Simon and his colleagues see their approach as defensible just because "the values clarification approach does not aim to instill any particular set of values."[44] Rather it aims to "help students utilize the . . . seven processes of valuing in their own lives; to apply those valuing processes to already formed beliefs and behaviour patterns and to those still emerging."[45] This seems to mean that becoming more self-aware about one's values is the end of moral education. It further suggests that what is important is not what particular values one holds but the process whereby one arrives at these values. In short, if anyone's values are to be right for him, or if anyone wants to arrive at good or right values, one must follow the valuing process which they have proposed.

The values-clarification method, then, is a process of helping young people "to build their own value system."[46] Students who have been exposed to this approach, they claim, become more "zestful and energetic, more critical in their thinking" rather than apathetic, flighty, and so on.[47] The values-clarification approach, then, is based on activities designed to get people to follow the proper valuing process which, in turn, is claimed to be effective in arriving at sound values.

Simon and his colleagues maintain that their approach is not new but is "based on the approach formulated by Louis Raths, who in turn built upon the thinking of John Dewey."[48] Furthermore, they believe that approaches similar to their own method have always been used by "parents, teachers, and other educators who have sought ways to help young people think through values issues for themselves."[49]

They recommend three steps to teachers: first, ". . . encourage students to consider alternative modes of thinking and acting"[50] by using the materials and methods provided; next, help ". . . the students to consider whether their actions match their stated beliefs . . .";[51] and finally, ". . . give students options, in and out of class; for only when students begin to make their own choices and evaluate the actual consequences, do they develop their own values."[52]

Lawrence Kohlberg's View

For Kohlberg the term "moral" has its central use in talk about "moral judgments or decisions based on moral judgments."[53] Inasmuch as what makes a judgment a moral one is "not the legislation of the rule but the individuals' attitude towards it," Kohlberg concludes that "not all judgments of 'good' or 'right' are moral judgments."[54] Thus a prohibition of parking for one person is a moral norm whereas for another, a mere administrative regulation. For Kohlberg ". . . moral judgments tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds."[55] However, it is not clear whether this claim is based

on his empirical findings or is a stipulated definition of "moral."
His claim is that "like most moral philosophers . . . we define
morality in terms of the formal character of a moral judgment . . .
rather than in terms of its content."[56] He appears to be maintaining
that moral judgments have specific formal characteristics.

To clarify the formal characteristics of moral judgments
Kohlberg analyzes the expression "a moral reason." In Kohlberg's
analysis a moral reason turns out to involve such features as
impersonality, ideality, universalizability, and pre-emptiveness.
Thus "a moral reason does not rest on authority but consists of
reasoning based on a moral attitude . . . independent of appeals to
either authority or self-interest."[57] When "a moral reason" is
interpreted in such a way, it seems that not all judgments are
grounded in moral reason. For it is quite possible that some people
"do not answer with a moral judgment that is universal or that has
any impersonal or ideal grounds." If a moral question should arise,
e.g., "Should Joe tell on his younger brother?" Kohlberg thinks some
might answer in terms of "status and property values, his instru-
mental use to others, the actual affection of others for him, etc."[58]

Having considered such a possibility, Kohlberg claims that
"the formal definition of morality works only when we recognize that
there are developmental levels of moral discourse."[59] This is
nothing more than the restatement of his basic assertion that moral
development is a matter of passing through various stages and that
in the final stage a person "not only specifically uses moral words
like 'morally right' and 'duty' but also uses them in a moral way."[60]

If this is so, Kohlberg can "define a moral judgment as 'moral' without considering its content (the action judged) and without considering whether it agrees with our own judgments or standards."[61] Kohlberg appears to claim here that a moral reason is essential to a moral judgment, and those reasons which make a judgment distinctively moral emerge only at a relatively late developmental stage. To understand Kohlberg's account of moral reasons, therefore, it is necessary to examine his so-called cognitive developmental theory of moral development.

Kohlberg maintains that "the moral stages are structures of moral judgment or moral reasoning." He further claims that "structures of moral judgment must be distinguished from the content of moral judgment."[62] An assumption which seems to underlie Kohlberg's position on the nature of moral reasons is that an individual's thinking is restricted by his cognitive structure. Cognitive structures develop through a series of discernible stages as the individual moves from early childhood to maturity. These cognitive structures frame one's understanding of the world in a certain way. They may be understood as a person's total perspective which organizes the "active thinking of the person about moral issues and decisions."[63]

For Kohlberg particular moral decisions do not clearly indicate one's moral stage since the content of one's moral judgments or choices is mainly situational. Kohlberg says that "moral behaviour as such is largely situational and reversible or 'loseable' in new situations."[64] Hence, one can make a moral choice freely,

for example, either to steal or not to steal. What is significant in judging one's moral stage is how one defines the value and the reasons he gives for valuing it. That is, one's moral stage in Kohlberg's scheme is determined not by content but by manner of reasoning. Kohlberg describes the moral stages as follows:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences.

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, or reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behaviour is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behaviour.

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

Stage 5: The social contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal

> principles of _justice_ of the _reciprocity_ and _equality_ of
> human _rights_, and of respect for the dignity of human
> beings as _individual persons_.[65]

From this theory of moral development Kohlberg concludes

that

> The basic educational conclusions we shall draw from this
> position are that the only philosophically justifiable
> statement of aims of moral education, the only one which
> surmounts the problem of relativity, is a statement in
> terms of the stimulation of moral development. . . .[66]

He emphasizes that this educational aim of stimulating moral develop-

ment is neither an attempt to impose a specific morality nor an

attempt to teach fixed rules. Rather, it is an attempt to give the

individual the capacity to engage in moral judgment and discourse.

In sum, for Kohlberg moral education involves helping the child take

the next step of moral reasoning and finally to reach the principled

moral stage.

Kohlberg recognizes that later stages of moral development

are not automatically desirable just because they occur later. He

observes: "Psychology finds an invariant sequence of moral stages;

moral philosophy must be involved to answer whether a later stage is

a better stage."[67] This is to say that Kohlberg's recommendations

about moral education do not follow from his empirical findings alone.

They also rest on considerations of moral philosophy, considerations

about what moral development ought to be and considerations about

the logic of moral reasoning.[68]

In support of his claim that stage six ought to be the aim

of moral education, Kohlberg recognizes a distinction between princi-

ples and rules. He says that "principles are freely chosen by the

individual because of their intrinsic moral validity";[69] hence they are to be distinguished from "rules which are supported by social authority."[70] In Kohlberg's understanding Kant's "categorical imperative" states that "principles are universal guides to making a moral decision,"[71] and Kohlberg maintains that a moral decision "made in terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral philosophy."[72] The liberal moral philosophy Kohlberg has in mind turns out to be that of John Rawls who holds, on Kohlberg's interpretation, that "moral principles are ultimately principles of justice."[73]

Kohlberg believes that moral conflicts may be resolved by appealing to some principle of justice. Even though he does not offer a detailed argument in support of the moral view of Kant and Rawls, he does say the following of their position:

> Principles chosen from this point of view are, first, the
> maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others
> and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which
> are not to the benefit of all, including the least advan-
> taged.[74]

Even though there is a concern for justice in some sense at every moral stage, only stage six reasoners consciously employ the concern for a conception of justice which coincides with that of Kant and Rawls. Thus, for Kohlberg, progression through the stages includes a changing orientation to justice.

Kohlberg compares his approach with that of two alternatives. One is the "indoctrinating" approach to moral education which con- sists of "the preaching and imposition of the rules and values of the teacher and his culture on the child."[75] Another is that of

values clarificationists which aims at "eliciting the child's own
judgment or opinion about issues or situations in which values
conflict, rather than imposing the teacher's opinion on him."[76]

With respect to the first approach Kohlberg maintains that
although it "has aimed at teaching universal values, they are defined
by the opinions of the teacher and the conventional culture and rest
on the authority of the teacher for their justification."[77] Kohlberg
dismisses this approach on the grounds that it fails to rise above
the unreflective valuings of teachers.[78]

The approach of values clarificationists shares certain
features with Kohlberg's in that both stress open discussion of
value dilemmas and both object to any form of indoctrination. The
values clarificationist approach is deficient for Kohlberg because
it has no aim beyond making one more aware of his own values. In
contrast, the developmental approach aims at movement to the next
stage of reasoning. The notion that some judgments are more adequate
than others is communicated and the student is encouraged to articu-
late a position which seems more adequate to him as well as to judge
the adequacy of the reasoning of others.[79]

How can the school or teacher help to advance the student's
moral stages? The answer to this question is closely related to
Kohlberg's recommendation for moral education. Kohlberg maintains
that discussions of moral dilemmas are a useful and effective way
to raise moral stages. Kohlberg cites research in support of this
claim which indicates that among twenty-four teachers in the Boston
and Pittsburgh areas who were given some instruction in conducting

moral discussions "about half of the teachers stimulated significant developmental change in their classrooms--upward stage movement of one quarter to one-half a stage."[80]

Based on that research Kohlberg identifies three important conditions for conducting discussions:

1. Exposure to the next highest stage of reasoning.

2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradictions for the child's current moral structure, leading to dissatisfaction with his current level.

3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue combining the first two conditions, in which conflicting moral views are compared in an open manner.[81]

These three conditions amount to a recommendation to teachers on how to proceed with the discussion of morals. In addition to moral discussions in the class, the moral atmosphere of the home, the school, and the broader society are important conditions for stimulating moral growth. Kohlberg therefore suggests that schools provide a social ethos characterized by justice and role-taking opportunities to "the extent to which it encourages the child to take the point of view of others."[82]

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II

[1]John Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 61.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 20

[5]Ibid., p. 21.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 78.

[8]Ibid., p. 16.

[9]Ibid., p. 23.

[10]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 23.

[11]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 89.

[12]Ibid., p. 72.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 73.

[15]Ibid., p. 137.

[16]John Wilson, Philosophy of Practical Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 104.

[17]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 76.

[18]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 31.

[19]Ibid., p. 4.

[20]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 76.

[21]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 24.

[22]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 102.

[23]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 4.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., p. 24.

[26]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 113.

[27]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 23.

[28]Ibid., p. 27.

[29]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 76.

[30]Ibid., p. 74.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[33]Ibid., p. 191.

[34]John Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum: A Guide for Teachers and Research Workers (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 8.

[35]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 27.

[36]Wilson, Teacher's Guide, p. 24.

[37]Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum, p. 8.

[38]Sidney Simon, Leland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum, Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students (New York: Hart Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 15.

[39]Ibid., p. 17.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmin, Leland Howe, and Sidney B. Simon, "In Defense of Values Clarification," Phi Delta Kappan (June 1977): 743.

[42]Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

[43]Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values and Teaching (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 29-30.

[44]Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

[45]Ibid., p. 20.

[46]Ibid., p. 18.

[47]Ibid., p. 20.

[48]Ibid., p. 19.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Ibid., p. 20.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 55.

[54]Ibid., p. 56.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Ibid., p. 55.

[57]Ibid., p. 56.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid., p. 55.

[60]Ibid., p. 56.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 671.

[63]Ibid., p. 670.

[64]Ibid., p. 672.

[65]Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," The Journal of Philosophy (October 1973): 164-165.

[66]Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 41.

[67]Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 672.

[68]Ibid., pp. 672-673.

[69]Ibid., p. 673.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Ibid., p. 672.

[72]Ibid., p. 673.

[73]Ibid., p. 672.

[74]Ibid., p. 673.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid., p. 674.

[80]Ibid., pp. 675-676.

[81]Ibid., p. 675.

[82]Ibid., p. 676.

CHAPTER III

LOGIC AND JUSTIFICATION IN
MORAL EDUCATION

In the previous chapter I presented a general account of the views of some current theorists who commonly make a distinction between _form_ and _content_ in moral education. Based on this distinction they suggest that moral education should be exclusively focused on methodology, moral reasoning, the valuing process, and so on. In this chapter I will elucidate and criticize some of the arguments offered in support of their positions. I shall particularly focus on several important differences among these theorists.

First I shall examine in detail the components Wilson has proposed as a basis for moral education, concentrating on his notion of logical definition. Then I shall discuss these theorists' views regarding the justification of moral decisions. I will argue for the inadequacy of Kohlberg's as well as the values clarificationist's recommendations, showing that they either overemphasize the role of reasoning in morals or they fail to see the full logical consequences of their views. At the end of the chapter I shall argue that Wilson has developed a more adequate theory of moral education--one that differs considerably from the others.

The Components of Morals

In this section I shall further discuss Wilson's notion of moral components and provide a background for showing how his view differs from those of Kohlberg and the values clarificationists.

Wilson builds his argument for moral education on a distinction between the content of particular moral beliefs or judgments and those second-order principles which define and govern morality. One way to understand his methodology is by way of an analysis of Wilson's self-assigned task in the discussion of moral education. He starts with the fact that one cannot give simple answers to a host of questions which arise in actual moral contexts. The answers which can be given to recurrent moral questions depend to a marked degree on the particular characteristics of those contexts. Since answers to particular moral questions usually can be made only after attending to a great variety of empirical considerations, and since it is beyond his professional capacity as a philosopher to search for factual knowledge of this kind, Wilson does not regard it as his task to issue direct moral injunctions. Instead he seeks to find and make explicit the criteria for assessing the rationality of particular moral judgments or beliefs.[1] In his major ethical works, therefore, Wilson deliberately avoids issuing specific moral rules for particular situations. Rather, his primary concern is "to give as clear an outline as possible of a rational methodology"[2] which might be used to determine criteria for the assessment of particular moral judgments or beliefs. Only then, he argues, can we proceed to assess alternative programs of moral education. The central

question for Wilson then becomes how one can possibly identify what counts as a good reason for a moral judgment or belief. His account of what would count as an acceptable aim in moral education is in turn based on this analysis.

The method Wilson employs is a kind of conceptual analysis. He argues that there are certain common components in any moral situation and that these components can be identified by an analysis of the key concepts in moral discourse. The procedure advanced by Wilson assumes that moral terms function in the language and hence that they must involve some shared meaning by those who use them. In Wilson's view, if a term in moral discourse, e.g., "ought" or "person," functions in the language, as, of course, it does, it must have some stock use or uses which can be identified and described. He argues that unless we understand the stock use of moral terms such as "right," "good" and "ought," we cannot answer the question of what is to count as a good reason in the moral sense.[3]

For Wilson, the reason for adopting the method of conceptual analysis to identify the rational criteria for assessing moral judgments is clear enough. This method is a deliberate process intended to elicit conceptually relevant points in deciding what counts as rational criteria or appropriate rules of procedure in morals. Sometimes in attempting to explain the precise task he sets out to do, Wilson refers to it as a second-order inquiry, as opposed to an inquiry into the character of prevailing social practices.

Wilson characterizes his efforts to describe the formal criteria as a logical definition of morality, since, as I will show,

he demonstrates that moral discourse logically presupposes the
concept of a person. Furthermore he shows that an analysis of the
concept of a person yields the other moral components. As he
observes:

> It is clear enough that the other "components" are logically
> required. We must know what other people feel (EMP), know
> the facts (GIG), and be able and willing to bring this
> knowledge and our attitude of concern to bear on actual
> situations, so that we decide and act in right ways (KRAT).[4]

The point is that these moral components, in Wilson's view,
are "necessary for the making of moral decisions in general."[5] Any-
one "who seriously asks the question 'What ought I to do?'" puts
himself in a moral context in which the concept of a <u>person</u> is
central. Furthermore, the acceptance of others as person (PHIL)
entails that he must consider other people's feeling (EMP), facts
(GIG), and so on.

Wilson argues that the formal criteria for morals require no
further grounding since the components are derived from the nature of
moral situation and follow logically from the question "What ought I
to do?"[6] It is just "incumbent on any rational person"[7] to treat
others as equals, and that is the central moral component--PHIL. As
Wilson points out, "one person may be stronger or cleverer, or richer,
or more powerful than another."[8] But they are still equal, Wilson
maintains,

> Because they are the same in certain very important ways.
> They are the same in using language, having thoughts and
> feelings and wants. This is more important than the fact
> that they are of different shapes and sizes, different
> intelligences or ages or anything else. . . .[9]

The conclusion Wilson draws is quite clear: "We have to treat other people as equals because they are equals."[10] The specific force of this claim will be discussed more fully in section two of this chapter.

It would be a misinterpretation of Wilson's view on the rationality of morals to insist on a too narrow interpretation of the term "logical requirement." Wilson's contention is that the rationality of morals requires that one in moral contexts must be committed to these rules of procedure. Thus, for Wilson it is logically inconceivable for any rational person in a moral context to raise a question like "Why should we treat others as equals?" This point of view is revealed in his comparison of morals with science. He argues that to refuse to accept certain rules of procedure considered to be most appropriate in science indicates that one is either incompetent or not doing science. Similarly, to abandon or fail to accept this central moral component--PHIL--means that one is either irrational or incompetent in morals. If the central component is required of any rational person in a moral context, then the other components are also logically required, since "being rational or reasonable, does not mean disregarding one's feelings, but trying to assess, guide or direct them in some coherent way."[11]

Thus, the most possible interpretation of Wilson's intended sense of "logical requirement" is that the criteria of morals are based on the rules of procedure that every rational person must accept in moral contexts. It is also a logical definition of morals

in the sense of being undeniable by a rational person when he seriously asks the question "What ought I to do?" The formal criteria of morals, which consist of a set of moral components, then, render the basis for moral education.

The Justification of Moral Claims

The discussion in the previous section centered on Wilson's views regarding the criteria of morals, which in turn provide the basis for moral education. I examined Wilson's notion of the moral components in order to set out his general views about rationality in morals; I shall now examine in detail the views of Wilson and Kohlberg on the logic of the justification of moral claims. In this regard, Wilson maintains that moral situations involve bringing people into a right relation with other people, who have their own interests and responsibilities, and who must, as moral beings, consider the interests and responsibilities of one another whenever they perform morally relevant acts. The notion of the justification of moral claims is partly defined by the willingness to make this consideration. Kohlberg, on the other hand, holds that the justification of moral claims depends on the use of the principle of justice. Thus what we ought to do in any particular situation can be determined by reference to the principle of justice.

In what follows I shall present and compare the stances of Wilson and Kohlberg regarding the justification of moral claims and its implications for moral education. However, it might be pointed

out in advance that much of what Wilson has to say about these issues cannot be compared with that of Kohlberg.

Before turning to Wilson's view about the justification of moral claims, I shall consider what motivates him to seek the rational criteria of morals. Wilson points out that since values are not facts and value questions cannot be settled in the way in which factual questions are settled, it is necessary to explain the grounds on which value questions are settled in a rational manner. He explains that although different sorts of justification are required for a scientific and a value claim, in both cases a rational approach involves commiting oneself to the kinds of arguments, reasons, and judgments that are most appropriate to the different contexts.

What does the justification of moral claims consist in? One way in which Wilson answers this question is by pointing out the similarity between the assessments of our ordinary claims to knowledge and moral claims. A particularly interesting part of Wilson's view is presented in response to the thesis that if an empirical proposition is to be cognitively meaningful, it must be capable in principle of being verified by an appeal to evidence.[12] Some have held that inasmuch as moral claims fail to satisfy the requirements of empirical verification they lack an adequate rational basis or do not admit of rational defense: they are subjective, a matter of taste, irrational, and so on.

Wilson recognizes that by the very nature of morality, moral claims cannot "follow logically from a consideration merely of empirical fact or of language."[13] This is one respect in which moral

and scientific claims are different. Nevertheless he believes that empirical and moral claims share some important characteristics and that both can be settled rationally. He noted that what is distinctive about knowledge in general is an implicit reference to some set of criteria in terms of which the knowledge is described and can be evaluated. This means that one cannot make a statement true simply by believing it; just because one claims to know something, it does not follow that whatever he believes can be claimed by him to be ipso facto intellectually justified. To make a scientific judgment is to admit that it is answerable or can be supported by certain interpersonal criteria acknowledged and shared by the scientific community. Wilson finds little difference between the claims of factual knowledge and those of moral beliefs; for, as with scientific views, moral claims and beliefs have to be defended by reference to certain public standards. In his words:

> For when somebody holds up a rule of behaviour as something
> to be followed (by the use of words like "good," "ought,"
> and "right" that have a universal application), as opposed
> to merely expressing a selfish or personal desire or inten-
> tion, then he ipso facto submits it to the judgment of all
> of us.[14]

What Wilson takes to be the similarity between them is that reasons are crucial for supporting one's view in morals as well as in science. In both cases, if one's view is to be considered rational, it must be backed up by certain kinds of reasons. For example, if one says that a certain judgment is true or morally right, the person must prepare to give a justification for what is claimed to be true or morally right.

Wilson holds that a scientific view, to count as rational, must be related to "observed empirical facts, experimental results, and so forth."[15] Thus if someone holds a scientific belief such as "The earth is flat" and cites his preference or choice as the reason for the correctness of his judgment, then his answer does not provide a justification for what is claimed. The sort of justification needed for a scientific view requires an individual to take empirical evidence as the proper means of justifying his view. Unless one is able to understand clearly the meaning of justification employed in scientific judgments, one cannot begin to answer scientific questions. Thus Wilson seems to be arguing that rationality in a factual discussion lies in recognizing that certain kinds of "standards and methods" are appropriate and others are not.[16]

Similarly, it is essential for one's behaving rationally in moral contexts to recognize that certain reasons and justifications are appropriate in dealing with moral issues. Hence, if a person says, "One ought to do so and so," the person must be prepared with some reasons for doing so and so. In Wilson's view, what distinguishes a rational moral opinion from an irrational one is the nature of the reasons that are offered as part of the justification. He points out that there may be a number of reasons which can be offered in support of a moral judgment, but not just anything can count as a reason.[17] He insists that reasons that are acceptable for supporting and justifying a moral claim must be relevant to moral contexts, they must be chosen from the consideration that

"people are equals," namely the central moral component PHIL. This helps determine the rationality of moral claims and beliefs.[18]

Central to Wilson's position is the belief that we cannot justify moral claims unless the reason or justification correlates with PHIL. In support of his contention he offers one example in which two people are in a boat with not much food, and they both want it.[19] If one of these people takes all the food, and claims that his being hungry is a good reason for his taking all the food, then this justification is no more valid than saying "I'm stronger than you," or "I'm of royal blood." When someone answers this way he is not justifying his action but rather is refusing to give a justification. In Wilson's words, the reasons that are advanced as a justification may be understood as explaining why he is doing what he does rather than justifying it."[20] Thus a reason, to be a moral reason, must be based on the notion that people are equals. It seems clear to Wilson that whether one's justification for moral action and beliefs is acceptable or not depends on whether the person considers "other people as being on equal footing"[21] with himself. To understand why Wilson is so certain of his claim, we must elaborate the reasons he gives for this contention.

Wilson points out that without the notion of PHIL, which he sometimes calls "the notion of the impartiality of moral judgement,"[22] "the whole business of morality and interpersonal rules could not get started."[23] The point is that morality functions to guide our decisions about what to do in certain situations; that is, to prescribe conduct for others as well as for ourselves. However, any

justification for moral action cannot be advanced as a moral reason unless the person puts himself in a context where it is necessary to treat others as equals. Whenever we make a moral claim like "It is wrong to do X" or "One ought not to do Y," we do not claim that these prohibitions are derived from the rules of procedure which correctly apply to some of us but not to others.[24] In Wilson's words, "This is because words like 'ought' and 'right' only make sense as _between_ people. What is right for one is, other things being equal, right for another."[25]

Wilson's claim that it is necessary for anyone in a moral context to accept others as equals can be understood in the following way: (1) If I ask the question "What ought I to do?" and (2) if I maintain that "I ought to do X," then (3) it is to say that I have a good reason for doing X, and I can justify doing X by reference to the central component--PHIL.

To illustrate further what is meant by treating others as equals, it may be helpful to consider Wilson's above-cited example of the person who tries to grab all the food in the boat. The person may insist that his own view is rational because he can offer reasons for what he is trying to do by reference to the central component. That is, the person may claim that he recognizes that people are equals, and yet he may hold that his primary concern is with his surviving. Therefore what he ought to do is to grab all the food in the boat.

Wilson points out that the person's position really is not an acceptable moral justification because he does not understand

what it is to treat others as equals. Moreover, the reasons advanced
by that person are based on "selfish" desires and interests, neither
of which "can by themselves count as moral reasons."[26] In making a
moral judgment one is inevitably involved in an interpersonal situa-
tion where others are affected, and where it is required to have
rules of procedure which allow one to settle conflicting claims about
what ought to be done in that situation. The boat example illustra-
trates a situation in which "there is some kind of conflict between
two people"[27] and "either one of them must convince the other by
some sort of argument which they both accept."[28] Thus Wilson argues
that to be reasonable in moral contexts one must recognize that other
people are persons who have as much right to their own desires and
opinions as oneself.[29] In moral contexts, therefore, Wilson main-
tains that we must grant that "what one of them desires, or wants,
or feels, or thinks, is no more and no less important than what the
other desires."[39]

From this Wilson concludes that what is necessary for the
making of moral decisions is the attitude of regarding others as
equals, taking their interests as equally important as one's own.
This has several important consequences, for in order for a person
to consider the interests and concerns of others equally he must
have the ability to know what others are feeling and what their
interests are--EMP. Furthermore, the concern for other's interests
as one's overriding reason for acting must be strong enough to
overrule any alternative reasons--GIG. Finally he must bring the

components above "to bear on practical situations, so that he makes decisions to act in a concerned way"[31]--KRAT.

These, then, are some of the salient features of Wilson's analysis of the nature of moral justification. Wilson maintains that "It is these features which differentiate rationality in morals from rationality in other human activities, such as mathematics or science."[32] To judge the rationality of moral claims, therefore, one must see whether the decisions are based on the consideration of others as human beings whose interests, desires and needs are as important as one's own.

Wilson's view of the rational attitude in morals has a bearing on the formulation of programs for moral education. If the moral components define what is acceptable in reasons offered in support of moral decisions, then any adequate program for moral education must be concerned with promoting the disposition to respect others and regard them as conscious persons whose wants, interests and desires count as much as one's own. The components described by Wilson are in fact intended to encompass these essential features of morals.

Wilson seems to be certain about the adequacy of the criteria as an acceptable set of objectives for all moral educators regardless of their particular creed or culture. For the moral components "are not the peculiar property of any particular faith, creed, set of moral values or partisan beliefs, but qualities and rules of procedure which define what it is to be reasonable or serious about morality."[33]

In summary, the strength as well as weakness of Wilson's argument depends on whether the components adequately identify what is to stand as a justification about one's decision to do something. However, one may find that the moral components are not helpful in certain cases, because it is not clear how he can derive particular moral decisions from the components. The moral components require that one take into account the interests and concerns of others whenever he makes a decision to do something. He must consider how his act affects others and where others' interests are. This is so because, as Wilson observes:

> The concept of "giving a reason" or "having a reason" entails granting the validity of that reason to other people in relevantly similar positions. . . . Hence reasoning itself implies a kind of embryonic morality, inasmuch as anything that could count as a reason must be impartial as between one person and another.[34]

The most Wilson attempts to do is to show that anyone who offers a reason for his moral action commits himself to "a universalizable rule."[35] The kind of difficulty Wilson might face is that while a specific maxim such as "Helping others who need help" shows what one's moral obligations are, it is not obvious what moral duties can be derived from the moral components. It seems, therefore, that someone, having considered another's interests to be equally important as his own, may conclude without inconsistency that he has no obligation to help anyone. This sort of objection arises since Wilson's moral components can never prescribe specific moral duties as do substantial moral principles.

To see whether objections of this sort are valid, we must reexamine what Wilson says in describing the components. If his intention is to give a moral injunction, it may be objected that the components are too ambiguous to guide individuals' moral acts. As has been pointed out, however, his intent is to show the features of morality which are necessary to make any moral decision. Thus what Wilson means is that these components embody certain rules of procedure that are essential to any rational moral decision, noteworthily the requirement to treat others' interests as important as one's own. Hence it should not be construed as a substantial moral standard but rather as a way of prescribing an inescapable rule of procedure which one must accept in moral contexts. Just as one cannot provide a good reason for a scientific view without being logical, objective and knowing the facts, so moral claims cannot be justified unless one is willing to take others' interests as equally important to one's own in his moral dealings.

I have examined Wilson's thought about the justification of moral claims by illustrating his account of moral rules of procedure. I shall now examine Kohlberg's stance on the same matter and contrast it with Wilson's.

We have seen that Kohlberg justifies his recommendation for moral education by distinguishing between methods of reasoning and particular moral beliefs. Since he believes that indoctrination is inevitable in the direct teaching of values, and that individuals continually change the content of their moral views, he considers

the teaching of substantial values an inappropriate form of moral education.[36]

Kohlberg does claim that there are universal moral values or principles--most notably the principle of justice. The principle of justice admits of less variation between individuals and cultures than most other moral claims. Since it is distinct from arbitrary conventional rules and beliefs, and since the principle is formal in nature, Kohlberg seems to believe that one can teach a method of reasoning based on the principle of justice without imposing specific moral content. Thus the principle of justice can be understood as a procedural criterion for guiding each individual's moral decisions. Kohlberg's point is that the principle of justice provides the ultimate criterion for moral appraisal and that on the basis of this criterion an individual may choose the course of his own conduct.

On a superficial level Kohlberg and Wilson may seem to have similar positions inasmuch as both suggest that moral education consist in certain methodological procedures. More careful analysis will show, however, that they perceive method quite differently and offer very different grounds in support of their views.

As has already been seen, in Kohlberg's view, the notion of justice requires us to consider each individual's human worth equally. Thus the principle is regarded as an impartial method for resolving conflicting moral claims. Kohlberg stresses the value of employing the principle of justice (moral reasons) in evaluating competing claims and assumes that all moral decisions can be made and justified in accordance with this principle.

Wilson also emphasizes methodology in moral education. But he in no way subscribes to the view that we can determine, strictly on the basis of a set of basic moral principles, what an individual ought to do. While Wilson uses the term "method" since he is talking about decision procedures, he does not conceive of his task as one of developing an overall moral system. In any case, Wilson limits his discussion to the framework or general directive that is often absent or self-evidently presumed in other discussions of moral education. He points out that it is unreasonable to assume that moral conflicts can be settled in a coherent manner, simply by appeal to a set of moral principles. He does not dismiss the notion of justice as worthless but thinks that suggestions such as Kohlberg's do not adequately do justice to how people actually face moral problems.

Wilson thinks it is important to recognize that a moral decision must be based on something more than the moral principles themselves; that is, "on the wants, wills, feelings or interests of other people."[37] Furthermore, each individual's moral decisions are likely to be influenced by the individual's overall views as to how one ought to live. Thus Wilson contends that any adequate program of moral education demands more than a set of moral rules or principles. It must also be conerned with the development of rationally defensible dispositions, attitudes and feelings of the individual.

The profound difference between their recommendations is in part due to the range of issues seen as belonging to the domain of moral education. The difference becomes apparent if we compare

their views about what we are to count as a moral issue. Kohlberg
contends that moral problems basically amount to the conflict of
just claims. Hence Kohlberg's contention is roughly that conflicting
moral claims can be resolved by appealing to the principle of justice
and the goal of moral education is to be found in that principle.
In contrast, Wilson maintains that there is no reason to assume that
moral issues are restricted to considerations of justice; in fact,
he broadens his concept of morals to cover not only a set of moral
rules but all aspects of moral decisions. The aim of moral educa-
tion, according to Wilson, is "to help people formulate their own
way of looking at the world,"[38] to help them find the most reasonable
approach to moral issues. Thus Wilson views moral education as
multifaceted and encompassing several constituent educational objec-
tives.[39] Kohlberg's position fails to take into account such con-
textual requirements.

Another important difference between Wilson and Kohlberg can
be seen by attending to their motives for drawing a distinction
between form and content of moral belief. By distinguishing between
the content of particular moral beliefs and second-order principles
governing morality, Wilson intends to illustrate that a reasonable
conceptual framework for moral education can be found on neutral
ground which makes it possible to avoid taking up a partisan posi-
tion on moral issues. In the case of Kohlberg, on the other hand,
the main reason for drawing a distinction between form and content
is to indicate how the principle of justice can accommodate conflict-
ing moral claims and remain the sole acceptable moral standard. As

we saw in Chapter II Kohlberg specifically suggests that the purpose
of moral education is to ensure that students follow the principle
of justice in their moral reasoning. Since Kohlberg claims that
moral education is exclusively a matter of the improvement of indi-
vidual's moral reasoning, it would seem that there are important
differences in Kohlberg's and Wilson's theories with respect to the
theoretical role of passions, emotions, habits, dispositions, motives,
etc.

Kohlberg provides us with several reasons to support his
cognitive-developmental approach: first, moral reasoning, while
only one factor in moral behavior, is the single-most important or
influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior, secondly,
reasoning is the only distinctively moral factor in moral behavior;
third, the progression of moral judgment is irreversible, that is,
a higher stage is never lost.[40] But Kohlberg's argument may be seen
as circular, for to state these reasons is tantamount to reemphasiz-
ing his definition of the stages of moral development, that is, an
individual's moral stage must be determined exclusively by his
ability to reason.

The Values Clarification Method

In the previous section we have seen that Kohlberg stresses
the importance of moral reasons for accepting or rejecting various
moral alternatives. In Kohlberg's approach to the justification of
moral decisions, the principle of justice is simply assumed, whereas
Wilson appeals to the need to consider the interests and concerns of

others as a means of justifying our thinking in moral contexts. In
fact, Wilson points out that helping one to discover and articulate
the right relationship to others is the central task of moral educa-
tion. While Simon and his colleagues offer somewhat different
supporting reasons, they too maintain that each individual must
choose his own values. The values clarification method constitutes
the sole content of moral education. The values clarificationists
maintain that since moral claims may radically differ, teachers
should avoid imposing their claims on their pupils. Thus the task
of the moral educator is to encourage pupils to clarify their values,
not to foster any particular ones. In this section I shall discuss
certain theoretical as well as practical problems in the views of
the values clarificationists.

In advocating the values clarification method Simon and his
colleagues have maintained that since everyone must decide what is
right for him, what is important is that each person go through the
proper valuing process. According to them, every individual--teacher
or pupil--makes equally competing value claims. In their view, this
is a principal reason why teachers must be neutral regarding value
issues. The values clarification method is said to be designed to
get people to arrive at genuine or authentic values, without imposing
any substantial content.

Their position differs radically from that of other current
theorists in that they regard morality as purely a matter of choice,
with one choice being no better than another. Even if one were to
grant this claim, certain theoretical and practical problems would

remain. First, Simon's account of the values clarification method indicates that the method is not something to be chosen; it dictates what ought to be done when any individual makes a moral decision. But if there is no correct set of values, and if the criteria for defensible values are set by each individual's preference, it is not clear on what basis it can be said that the values clarification method should be universally employed. Thus if Simon and his colleagues' contention that there can be no correct substantial values is not mistaken, it is inconsistent with their recommendation of the values clarification method.

Second, it may be pointed out that to clarify, to make people think, is itself a value, and that moral discourse is not possible without assuming certain criteria by which we can judge goods and bads, rights and wrongs in human affairs. Once we reject this assumption, there seems to be no independent way to settle people's conflicting value claims. This type of difficulty is well illustrated in Simon and his colleagues' claim. They respond to the frequent criticism that their approach is valueless or relativistic by maintaining that it simply is not so. They point out that they encourage individuals "to keep developing their values through the use of the valuing process so long as they do not infringe on the rights of others."[41]

Their point here is much like Mill's about the limits of an individual's freedom in society. In considering to what extent society ought to limit individual freedom, Mill proclaims that in situations in which a person's conduct ". . . merely concerns

himself . . . the individual is sovereign."[42] Unless his conduct

affects prejudicially the interests of others, a person cannot

rightfully be compelled to do what other people think better, wise

or right for him to do. In Mill's view, however, such a doctrine

is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their

faculties. Thus for Mill there is no doubt that people should be

taught in their youth to know and benefit from experience of others

until they have attained the capacity to guide themselves to improve-

ment. Mill holds that

> It would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as
> if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they
> came into it, as if experience had as yet done nothing
> towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct,
> is preferable to another . . . but it is the privilege and
> proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity
> of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his
> own way.[43]

But the values clarificationists' conclusion that one not infringe

on the right of others can only be attributed to the fact that each

individual through his own values clarification process decides that

to infringe on the right of others is something to be rejected. From

the values clarificationists' point of view, the principle of respect

for the right of others can only be <u>clarified</u>. To promote it would

constitute imposing arbitrary rules on others. But whatever Simon

and his colleagues' idea of values clarification, the fact remains

that everyone must have the principle in some sense before he can

<u>clarify</u> it. If the young <u>learn</u> to respect the rights of others by

thinking about what they want, something other than clarification

has occurred.

Having rejected all objective bases for morals, Simon and his colleagues treat the values clarification method as the only alternative to an objective ground for morals. As we have seen, they maintain that the aim of moral education is to clarify, not to foster any particular values. As indicated above, however, it is not even possible to clarify one's own values unless one already has some substantial values about the world. These are the sorts of theoretical questions Simon and his colleagues must solve, though I doubt that they will be able to solve them until they come to realize that their proposal for moral education itself presupposes certain commonly shared criteria.

I shall now discuss some practical problems generated from the values clarificationists' claim, and contrast their view with that of Wilson. At the practical level one may argue that even if an individual's actions may affect no one but himself, they nevertheless may do great harm for the development of his character and ability. One may claim that the human mind should grow, expand and develop, not merely become clarified. Furthermore, a person may cause harm to others by inaction as well as action. After all, an individual's moral life depends in large part upon the degree to which he is familiar with the wider social context and the consequences of his action. If the school lets the students become clear about their values without fostering the full range of features appropriate to a desirable character, then it seems clear that the school is itself to blame for the consequences. Mature teachers may help students to learn to have a fair attitude in relating to

others, a willingness to admit mistakes and modify their views in the face of sound counter arguments.

But if Simon and his colleagues are consistent in their stance, they could not allow teachers to be in such a position because they insist that the role of the teacher is to "treat each student with equal respect" and let him make his own moral choices. This is one of the reasons for the difficulty in accepting their description of the teacher's role in the teaching of valuing process.

In contrast, Wilson has no doubt about what has to be done in the school. He points out that the young should be initiated "by imitation, the force of example, compulsory rules and other methods into a particular moral code or tradition,"[44] even though they may later come to understand fully or reject parts of it for themselves. Thus he made it clear that it is an essential part, though not the whole of moral education, to get the young to "go through the motion of" a particular moral code. He adds:

> It would be dishonest and grotesque, as well as inefficient, for teachers to pretend that they themselves do not have such a code, or to be over-hesitant in telling children what it is; and for this reason alone it is obviously important that teachers and other educators should attempt to make their own beliefs as rational as possible.[45]

According to Wilson moral rules can only be "acquired by practice and instruction."[46] One of the central tasks of the educator is to help the student learn to see the moral rules for himself. And to see the moral rules is to see that there are rules for the conduct of moral deliberation. Although Wilson does not explicate the specific way to initiate them he does observe that

"not only rationality and freedom, but discipline and obedience"[47] are required if we intend to turn the young into rational persons. Thus, Wilson concludes:

> Any theory of moral education which implied that we would treat children of all ages as rational adults, who only need to be reasoned with in order to become morally educated, would of course be grotesque in the light of facts.[48]

In this chapter, we have seen that there is considerable variation with respect to what constitutes the form of moral education. In particular I have tried to indicate that Wilson's view of moral education is more deserving of attention. His scrupulous analysis illuminates the much too frequently forgotten point that if an individual is to assume the responsibility of his own moral decisions, he needs to acquire a whole range of dispositions that can contribute to the development of a principled view of the world. A particularly important feature is his claim that a rational attitude in morals inevitably involves the need to consider the concerns and interests of others. This has been a recurring theme throughout his discussion of morals, and it plays an essential role in his view on the nature of morality.

[1]John Wilson, <u>Reason and Morals</u> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 2-14.

[2]Ibid., p. 163.

[3]Wilson, <u>Introduction to Moral Education</u>, p. 55.

[4]Wilson, <u>Teacher's Guide</u>, p. 31.

[5]Wilson, <u>Introduction to Moral Education</u>, p. 218.

[6]Wilson, <u>Teacher's Guide</u>, p. 31.

[7]Ibid., p. 28.

[8]Ibid., p. 31.

[9]Ibid., p. 28.

[10]Ibid., p. 30.

[11]Ibid., p. 31.

[12]A. J. Ayer, <u>Language, Truth and Logic</u> (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), pp. 5-15.

[13]Wilson, <u>Reason and Morals</u>, p. 136.

[14]Wilson, <u>Introduction to Moral Education</u>, p. 80.

[15]Ibid., p. 78.

[16]Ibid., p. 90.

[17]Ibid., p. 105.

[18]Ibid., p. 86.

[19]Wilson, _Teacher's Guide_, pp. 28-29.

[20]Wilson, _Introduction to Moral Education_, p. 105.

[21]Ibid., p. 77.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 81.

[25]Wilson, _Teacher's Guide_, p. 29.

[26]Wilson, _Introduction to Moral Education_, p. 98.

[27]Wilson, _Teacher's Guide_, p. 28.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., p. 29.

[30]Ibid., p. 28.

[31]Ibid., p. 39.

[32]Wilson, _Introduction to Moral Education_, p. 90.

[33]John Wilson, _Practical Methods of Moral Education_ (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972), p. 5.

[34]Wilson, _Introduction to Moral Education_, p. 104.

[35]Ibid., p. 98.

[36]Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 673.

[37]Wilson, _Introduction to Moral Education_, p. 66.

[38]Ibid., p. 179.

[39]Ibid., pp. 138-140.

[40]Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," p. 672.

[41]Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe, and Simon, p. 744.

[42]J. S. Mill, On Liberty (Garden City: Anchor Press/ Doubleday, 1973), p. 484.

[43]Ibid., p. 533.

[44]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 151.

[45]Ibid., p. 151.

[46]Wilson, Reason and Morals, p. 163.

[47]Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 150.

[48]Ibid., p. 144.

CHAPTER IV

A DEWEYAN ALTERNATIVE

We have seen that both Kohlberg and the values clarifica-
tionists maintain that moral decisions must be made by reason
unencumbered by convention, custom or tradition. They argue that
morality consists in relating rules of procedure to particular
situations and choosing a course of action which will resolve those
situations. In support of their claims both groups appeal to John
Dewey's moral theory and argue that their stances on moral education
are in accordance with Dewey's. Specifically Kohlberg claims that
his "theory of values rests on Dewey's analysis, including an
emphasis on the essential unity of scientific judgment and rational
value judgment."[1] Simon and his colleagues, too, hold that their
values-clarification method is "built upon the thinking of John
Dewey."[2]

In this chapter I will examine Dewey's position on moral
education--a position which I regard as more defensible than the
views of current theorists--particularly concentrating on his view
of the role of experience in the process of habit formation and the
role of the moral educator in fostering desirable moral habits. I
will defend Dewey's view that moral education cannot reasonably be
limited to helping youngsters to learn "how to think" but should

deliberately set out to promote substantive moral values. In part, this is to show an error in the views of Kohlberg and the values clarificationists to the effect that they are continuing in the Deweyan tradition. After discussing Dewey's view on moral education, I will argue first that both Kohlberg and the values clarification-ists misunderstand some of the key concepts in Dewey's moral philosophy and, second, that Dewey's moral theory places him in opposition to their central tenets. Since Dewey's moral theory is closely related to his views on experience and human nature, I will proceed by elucidating briefly his views on the method of inquiry and human nature and their relationship to moral education.

Overview

In his essay "From Absolutism to Experimentalism"[3] Dewey points out that his thinking was influenced by William James' bio-logical psychology. The thinking process, according to James, is the conscious process by which the organism and its environment become integrated. This biological concept of mind was later elaborated in his discussions of "experience," which emphasized the creative individual in interaction with its environment. It was also the influence of this Jamesian psychology which led Dewey to reject traditional accounts of experience. Experience had been understood primarily in terms of knowledge, but Dewey does not limit experience to epistemological contexts. He argues that experience which leads to knowing is just one sort of interaction; "experience" designates all natural phenomena which may be described in terms of

interaction. According to Dewey inquiry is a form of interaction between the organism and the environment.

In his analysis of inquiry Dewey points out that a living organism may find itself in a problematic situation at any time because of a "hitch in its experience." A situation is <u>problematic</u>, according to Dewey, when the organism <u>feels</u> a difficulty due to the obstacles encountered in the environment; he calls the process by which the difficulty becomes resolved "inquiry." When experience is interrupted it is reintegrated by the act of inquiry. For Dewey, then, to inquire is to strive to overcome difficulty, to transform a problematic situation into a situation in which the continuity of experience is restored.

In <u>How We Think</u> Dewey suggests that five distinct steps are involved in the process of inquiry:

> (i) A felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solutions; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestions; (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief.[4]

In his later works Dewey characterized what he previously called an interaction as a transaction[5] and introduced a more elaborate analysis of the notion of inquiry.[6] For our purposes, however, his simpler treatment in <u>How We Think</u> will suffice. Even though it is an earlier version of his theory of inquiry, the steps he introduces there will enable us to see how he conceives of the nature of moral problems. Dewey characterizes the process of inquiry as follows:

(i) <u>A felt difficulty</u>. The difficulty which is felt occurs because of a conflict within our experience. The felt difficulty in the disturbed and perplexing situation exerts influences on the development of an idea or a suggestion. The felt difficulty forms the background of our thinking and guides us in seeking possible solutions. Rational reflection over conduct, for example, emerges when we are confronted with a situation in which the results of various courses of action are in direct conflict--that is, moral reflection begins when an individual asks the question: "Why should I act thus and not otherwise?" Thus it is reflective deliberation and discourse that motivate the process of inquiry.

(ii) <u>An intellectualization of the difficulty</u>. In a simple case of reflection the felt difficulty and our explicit understanding of the problem may be merged, but in more complex situations a great deal of ingenuity and experimentation are essential in order to locate the source of perplexity precisely. A careful formulation of the perplexity is essential if our inquiry is to be productive.

(iii) <u>Suggestion of possible solutions</u>. The situation in which the perplexity occurs requires us to generate a suggestion about how the perplexity can be solved. Accordingly, such a suggested solution is analogous to <u>supposition</u>, <u>conjecture</u>, <u>guess</u>, <u>hypothesis</u>, and (in more elaborate cases) <u>theory</u>. This step of inquiry, in con-trast to the preceding steps, is an anticipation of what will happen when certain hypotheses or ideas are applied to the problematic situation. "Since suspended belief, or the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the presence

of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue or the probable explanation to favor, cultivation of a variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good thinking."[7]

(iv) <u>Development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestions</u>. This step involves reasoning or reflection in which a hypothesis may be rejected immediately upon examination of its logical consequences, while at other times our reasoning about the hypothesis leads up to another idea known by previous test to be related to it. "Reasoning helps extend knowledge, while at the same time it depends upon what is already known and upon the facilities that exist for communicating knowledge and making it a public, open resource."[8]

(v) <u>Further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection</u>. This final step in the process of inquiry is a kind of experimental corroboration, or verification, of the conjectured idea. Sometimes simple observation furnishes corroboration of the relevant hypotheses that have been tentatively developed, while at other times it is necessary to construct elaborate experiments; that is, "<u>conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see if the results theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur</u>. If it is found that the experimental results agree with the theoretical, or rationally deduced, results, and if there is reason to believe that <u>only</u> the conditions in question would yield such results, the confirmation is so strong as to induce a conclusion at least until contrary facts shall indicate the advisability of its revision."[9]

These, then, are the five phases or aspects of inquiry.
Dewey, however, points out that the discrimination of five phases
does not mean that in a given situation they are independent or occur
in a fixed order.[10] In practice, several of them may be fused into a
single phase, which will then require a seemingly disproportionate
development. Nevertheless Dewey believes that the five phases of
reflection that have been described represent "the indispensable
traits of reflective thinking."[11]

Dewey maintains that this description of the pattern of
inquiry provides a theoretical account of all inquiry. In Dewey's
view the pattern of testing and confirming hypotheses is not confined
to scientific inquiry, but it can be applied to almost any type of
inquiry. Accordingly, he regards values inquiry as a case in which
the pattern of inquiry can be applied. It is Dewey's abiding belief
that the purported gulf between science and morals is a product of
bad logical theory and is not characteristic of the world. For value
inquiry, like scientific inquiry, is prompted by the maladjustment of
the organism and its environment and proceeds to solutions by way of
observation, hypothesis, and experiment. Thus the task of a proper
logical theory is to discover the general pattern and principles of
thought, indicating how these patterns of thought hold good for
reality irrespective of differences in context. As Dewey remarked:

> As my study and thinking progressed, I became more and
> more troubled by the intellectual scandal that seemed to
> me involved in the current (and traditional) dualism in
> logical standpoint and method between something called
> "science" on the one hand and something called "morals"
> on the other. I have long felt that the construction of
> a logic, that is, a method of effective inquiry, which

would apply without abrupt breach of continuity to the fields designated by both of these words, is at once our needed theoretical solvent and the supply of our greatest practical want. This belief has had much more to do with the development of what I termed, for lack of a better word, "instrumentalism," than have most of the reasons that have been assigned.[12]

Consequently Dewey came to hold that the pattern of inquiry comprises a theoretical account by which we can explain all inquiry, both scientific and moral. The difference between scientific and moral inquiry, according to Dewey, lies not in the process of inquiry employed, but in the <u>context</u>. The type of situation in which a value inquiry occurs is one that is incomplete and requires some action to complete it--that is, a problematic situation. For Dewey, therefore, value inquiries are analogous to scientific inquiries since in both cases the inquiry will always have the indispensable traits of reflective thinking.

In order to understand Dewey's approach fully, we must again focus on his view of human nature. According to Dewey two factors, impulse and habit, enter into human nature. Impulse provides the "push" for human action but does not determine the direction of the action.[13] There is no direction inherent in impulse. Thus the behavior of the infant is random and aimless. Only as an individual acquires dispositions and tendencies to act in certain ways in particular situations does impulse find a direction and a goal. Dewey describes the essence of habit as follows:

> The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to <u>ways</u> or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain

classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions,
rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means
will.14

A habit, then, is an acquired way of thinking, feeling and/or
doing. But as Dewey observes significant changes may occur in one's
environment such that our characteristic modes of response become
ineffective. The habits acquired by the individual are no longer
appropriate, producing ineffectual responses to hitches in our
experiences.

Dewey conceives of intelligence as involving a set of habits
which comes into play when other habits break down. As human beings
and their environments change, problems and conflicts more or less
commonly occur in human life. Hence, human beings may at any time
be confronted with problematic situations--as long as human beings
are alive, there will be new conflicts and problems which demand
actions and resolutions. According to Dewey, in such cases the
habits of reflective intelligence guide our inquiries into the
changed physical, social, and cultural conditions. With regard to
the nature of this sort of inquiry, Dewey maintains that its purpose
is to resolve conflicts that arise in the environment.

Dewey calls the process of reflectively modifying, extending,
and changing one's values in a problematic situation a process of
valuation. Thus he prefers to call his theory a theory of _valuation_
rather than a theory of value. In delineating his theory of valuation,
Dewey considers two usages of "value."15 The verb "to value" desig-
nates both _prizing_, in the sense of cherishing certain objects, and
"_appraising_ in the sense of _putting_ a value upon, _assigning_ value

to."[16] Anyone who has likes--and we all do--has values in the former sense. But values that have been reflectively criticized and intelligently transformed are the product, the outcome, of the process of valuation.

Dewey's emphasis is upon valuation as appraisal or evaluation. With regard to the nature of valuation, Dewey points out that it is primarily "to describe and define certain things as good, fair, or proper in a definite existential relation."[17] In other words, Dewey holds that valuation involves the projection of consequences for the satisfaction of a given desire for the whole range of desires that one may have and the attendant reorganization of one's entire corpus of desires as intellectually considered in a long-range way.

The point which Dewey argues for is that since valuation arises in problematic situations in which a person cannot resolve the problem by merely acting on impulse, there must be a process in which he evaluates or appraises the conditions that presently exist and can be brought about by various courses of action. Hence he concludes that forming the situational character of things is a prerequisite to initiating value inquiry, and the process of valuation will have "an aim or end only when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of 'means.'"[18] Dewey gave an example of the necessity of forming aims:

> If a bird builds its nest by what is called pure "instinct," it does not have to appraise materials and processes with respect to their fitness for an end. But if no result--the nest--is contemplated as an object of desire, then either there is the most arbitrary kind of trial-and-error operations or there is consideration of

the fitness and usefulness of materials and process to bring
the desired object into existence.[19]

Accordingly Dewey maintains that unless a person acts directly upon
whatever impulse happens to present itself, there is always a process
of deliberation. His point is that the satisfaction of any desire
occurs within a context. There are consequences for the satisfaction
of one's other desires. There are consequences for the world with
which one interacts, including other people. All of these must be
taken into account in working out one's goals. This means that moral
deliberation is an attempt to predict the future results of actions
and thus subject to the critical methods of inquiry we use in
scientific valuation.

Dewey, however, argues that moral as well as scientific
valuation can be guided by empirical knowledge. Suppose, for example,
that someone is perplexed with the problem whether or not a given
social class should have certain exclusive privileges or advantages.[20]
Dewey points out that if we are concerned with intelligent moral
appraisals, then the issue in question has to be examined reflectively
in terms of its long-range consequences. But historical knowledge
indicates that when one race or class has enslaved or exploited
another it has had "the effect of limiting both the range of the
desires of others and their capacity to actualize them."[21] According
to Dewey, such empirical knowledge does not of itself provide the
conclusions of valid moral deliberation but can predict what will
happen under a proposed course of action and furnish directive as to
what ought to be done. In Dewey's own words, this knowledge is what

enables an individual "to foresee possible consequences of his
prospective activities and to direct his conduct accordingly."[22]
"In the long run the effect is similar to a warier attitude that
develops toward certain bodies of water as the result of knowledge
that these bodies of water contain disease germs."[23]

From the above considerations, it might be reasonably sur-
mised that from Dewey's point of view moral valuation is a kind of
intelligent inquiry in that it arises when there is a conflict within
the course of experience, and that we must attempt to define the
exact character of the conflict, formulate possible actions, and
appraise their consequences. But that does not mean that Dewey
regards moral judgment as identical with scientific judgment.

Dewey stresses the point that there are differences between
judgments of value and scientific judgments. He employs an analysis
of practical judgments in order to illustrate the similarities and
the difference between these two.[24] In introducing the concept of
practical judgment Dewey points out the urgency and uniqueness of
situations in which practical deliberation is evoked. Practical
judgments, according to Dewey, are essentially prompted by a prob-
lematic situation in the course of human experience, having to do
with what ought to be done rather than what is the case or how (in
what manner) something should be done. The practical judgment
requires us to find out the means by which actual results are pro-
duced, because they are inherently connected with an incomplete or
an uncertain situation which is to be completed or organized. Thus
in making practical or theoretical judgments we are concerned with

different situations which require different sorts of decisions.
Despite the different contexts in which they occur, however, Dewey
appears to claim that where the methods of inquiry are concerned,
there is no intrinsic difference in the process of deliberation.
Both theoretical and practical inquiries involve the formulation of
an hypothesis or hypotheses to be assessed and envisioning future
possibilities. As in science, the actual consequences which follow
from initiating a course of action serve to test the correctness of
the valuation.

According to Dewey there are no fixed measures of knowledge.
All principles are tentatively employed as hypotheses for conducting
observations and experiments. Thus knowledge, whether practical or
theoretical, is provisional in the sense that it is subject to further
revision. In his own words:

> All principles are empirical generalizations from the
> ways in which previous judgments of conduct have practically
> worked out. When this fact is apparent, these generalizations
> will be seen to be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful
> cases, but instrumentalities for their investigation,
> methods by which the net value of past experience is rendered
> available for present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then
> it will also follow that they are hypotheses to be tested
> and revised by their further working.[25]

In the case of scientific explanations hypotheses may be
provisional in that they may be superseded by another set which will
more adequately explain natural phenomena. And the same considera-
tions apply to practical knowledge since the nature of practical
deliberation is nothing but "an experiment in finding out what the
various lines of possible action are really like."[26] Hence no

existing norms and moral ideas are final or fixed principles, but they are to be refined and transformed by further experience and inquiry.

It is important to note that the assertion that knowledge is provisional is not the same as the claim that all hypotheses are equal or that none is preferable to another. For Dewey the possibility of revision does not deny the existence of an accepted, relatively stable body of knowledge which has been accumulated in past human experience. Nor does he say that each individual should decide what will count as knowledge on the basis of what he sees as appropriate.

As has been indicated in the previous chapter, many of the arguments that have been presented in support of the claim that moral education must be restricted to the teaching of moral methodologies are based on the claim that there are no accepted means of deciding what ought to be done in any particular situation. A major source of this view is the belief that there are no defensible grounds on which to adjudicate disputes about values. This view is not Dewey's; for while he argues against the view that any knowledge claim is absolutely indisputable, certain and immune to revision, he does not suggest that there is no such thing as a knowledge claim sufficiently well grounded to warrant our assent. To the contrary, Dewey argues that the process of inquiry requires that we work with a commonly accepted body of knowledge. In fact his view that the very possibility of future revision or falsification <u>requires</u> that we have knowledge here and now distinguishes him from many contemporary

thinkers. It is only when what is accepted as common knowledge
proves to be inadequate in certain respects that other alternative
accounts are introduced. Moreover, in order to be considered as a
genuinely alternative hypothesis, a claim must be backed up with
adequate evidence and be logically coherent. Dewey says:

> The experimental character of moral judgments does
> not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles
> exist as hypotheses with which to experiment. Human
> history is long. There is a long record of past experi-
> mentation in conduct, and there are cumulative verifica-
> tions which give many principles a well-earned prestige.
> Lightly to disregard them is the height of foolishness.[27]

Though it is obviously possible to invent new principles and
devise new means for their realization, Dewey makes it plan that an
individual should be taught the established body of knowledge, both
theoretical and practical. On Dewey's view of practical knowledge
moral norms cannot be seen as the fixed _ends_ of human action but must
serve as _means_ for reformulating or reconstructing existing social
conditions. If conduct is to be directed intelligently and knowledge
in general is to advance, Dewey would insist that it is essential for
an individual to acquire those characteristic habits of thinking,
feeling and doing which represent the best of our shared experience.

On Habit Formation

In the previous section we have examined Dewey's view concern-
ing the method of inquiry and human nature. Through an examination
of Dewey's theory of inquiry, we have seen that he was primarily con-
cerned with delineating the patterns of thought by which we intelli-
gently resolve perplexing situations and by which we gain and warrant

our knowledge. In what follows I shall discuss Dewey's theory of habit formation. This will help us to understand the relationship between his theory of inquiry and moral education as well as the implications of his naturalistic interpretation of human experience.

In his discussion of the nature of inquiry and human experience which embodies his view on moral education, Dewey made it clear that moral education is especially a matter of developing the habits of intelligent inquiry in the young; for reconstructing or reformulating the direction of human conduct can be achieved only by those who have acquired the habit of intelligence. Thus moral education, Dewey says, "consists in the formation of wide-awake, careful, thorough habits of thinking."[28]

Given Dewey's view about the nature of inquiry, we would agree with the current theorists that to act morally is to act in an intelligent way and that such a course of action requires rational reflection or deliberation. But Dewey does not share the view that reason leads directly to action. He insists that reflection is the result of dispositions which need to be fostered carefully and deliberately. For Dewey "reason, the rational attitudes, is the resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent which can be invoked at will and set into movement."[29] Furthermore, to form the full range of features appropriate to a desirable character, according to Dewey, the individual must learn the well-warranted body of moral knowledge. Only as he learns a wide range of substantial values can he form the habits of intelligence and be intelligent about his conduct. For example, Dewey maintains that such substantial

values as "prudence," "sensibility," "expediency," "generosity," or
"impartiality" should be taught and learned in schools, because "past
experience has shown that hasty action upon uncritical desires leads
to defeat and possibly catastrophe."[30]   Dewey argues:

> The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge
> the significance of what we are doing and to use that judg-
> ment in directing what we do, not by means of direct
> cultivation of something called conscience, or reason, or
> a faculty of moral knowledge, but by fostering those
> impulses and habits which experience has shown to make
> us sensitive, generous, imaginative, impartial in per-
> ceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.[31]

In a similar vein Bertrand Russell emphasizes the necessity
of fostering certain habits in early childhood. For Russell the aim
of moral education is to foster desirable habits. The habits which
Russell wishes to foster include such characteristics as vitality,
courage, sensitivity, and intelligence as well as those of curiosity,
open-mindedness, the belief that knowledge is possible, patience,
industry, concentration and exactness.[32]

Dewey's insistence that moral education consists in building
intelligent habits is partly due to his conviction that coherent,
ordered action is not inherited but is the product of acquired dispo-
sitions. Dewey points out, for example, "only when a man can already
perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to
have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required
for proper execution."[33] Thus for Dewey it is an essential feature
of reflection about morality that the realization of our purposes and
aims in conduct comes to us through the medium of habits.

With regard to the necessity of fostering certain habits, Bertrand Russell explicates the important effects of habit formation in the early years. He says, for example, that "The fact is that children are not naturally either 'good' or 'bad.' They are born with only reflexes and a few instincts; out of these, by the action of the environment habits are produced, which may be either healthy or morbid."[34] Further, Russell suggests that habits acquired very early have a profound impact, similar in force to instinct, upon later life[35] and hence the formation of character and moral disposition ought to be completed by the age of six.[36]

In his discussion of habits Dewey similarly argues for the desirability of deliberately fostering certain habits since the chance experiences of ordinary circumstances may result in undesirable as well as desirable habits. Thus he says of ordinary experience:

> Positive habits are being formed; if not habits of careful looking into things, then habits of hasty, heedless, impatient glancing over the surface; if not habits of consecutively following up the suggestions that occur, then habits of haphazard, grasshopper-like guessing; if not habits of suspending judgment until inferences have been tested by the examination of evidence, then habits of credulity alternating with flippant incredulity, belief or unbelief being based, in either case, upon whim, emotion, or accidental circumstances. The only way to achieve traits of carefulness, thoroughness, and continuity (traits that are, as we have seen, the elements of the "logical") is by exercising these traits from the beginning,[37] and by seeing to it that conditions call for their exercise.

The dispositions which Dewey sees as desirable are those necessary for rational inquiry: habits of evaluating hypotheses carefully, clearly foreseeing the results of various courses of action, and suspending judgment not supported by sufficient evidence.

It may be helpful at this point to turn to Dewey's conception of the subject of moral education. Dewey points out that there have been many who have advocated a radical distinction between "moral conduct" and "ordinary intelligence."[38] He argues that the outcome of this view leads to setting up the development of character as a supreme end, and treats the acquisition of knowledge, which occupies the chief part of school time, as having nothing to do with the development of character.[39] He maintains that "moral education in school is practically hopeless"[40] when we understand it in this manner.

Dewey's belief that knowledge and conduct are closely related leads to his refusal to accept the claim that an absolute distinction between the subject of moral education and other subjects can be made in the school curriculum. Such a distinction, in Dewey's view, can be made only when "the value of concrete, everyday intelligence is constantly underestimated, and even deliberately depreciated."[41] Thus Dewey rejects the notion that "morals is an affair with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do."[42] For Dewey moral education cannot be construed as radically different from ordinary intelligence. For:

> Intelligence is concerned with foreseeing the future so that action may have order and direction. It is also concerned with principles and criteria of judgment. The diffused or wide applicability of habits is reflected in the general character of principles: a principle is intellectually what a habit is for direct action.[43]

Dewey argues that the purpose of intelligence is "to resolve entanglements in existing activity, restore continuity, recover

harmony, utilize loose impulse and redirect habit,"[44] and hence
without the habits of intelligence there is no way of influencing a
person's conduct or resolving the practical problems he encounters
in everyday life. Furthermore, Dewey does not believe that habit
formation, which is the aim of moral education for Dewey, can be
achieved in isolation from the rest of the curriculum. Thus he says:

> All the aims and values which are desirable in education
> are themselves moral. Discipline, natural development,
> culture, social efficiency, are more traits--marks of a
> person who is a worthy member of that society which it is
> the business of education to further.[45]

How then do individuals come by these habits of intelligence?
It seems that Dewey's concept of knowledge provides us with a guide
to his view on habit formation. If any given set of dispositions and
habits are the outcome of interactions, then the aim of moral educa-
tors is that of devising environments that will be conducive to
interactions which produce desirable dispositions and habits rather
than undesirable ones.

But we have already seen that for Dewey the habit of intel-
ligence is an essential part of inquiry because it defines the nature
of the unsettled, indecisive character of the situation and provides
the means of overcoming hitches in our experience. In habit forma-
tion, then, the chief duty of any educational institution is to pro-
vide "an environment which secures the full use of intelligence in
the process of forming habits."[46] The individual who is placed in
an environment which requires intelligent inquiry will then develop
the habit of intelligence through the interaction with the given
environment.

In <u>Democracy and Education</u> Dewey summarized the general function of moral education as direction.[47] As was implied in his account of human nature in terms of impulse and habit, original impulses <u>do</u> <u>not</u> develop or mature into coherent, structured patterns of behavior but become so only as products of interactions. Dewey stresses the significance of <u>direction</u> because the habits of intelligence in particular are the product of deliberate guidance, that is, learned patterns of behavior which are built up out of the unorganized and incoherent original impulses. Since forming the habits of intelligence is essential to a constant "formation of new purposes and new responses"[48] in human conduct, Dewey concludes that the purpose of moral education is to guide and direct the development of original impulse into these habits.

There are for Dewey two methods of direction. One is to employ original impulses directly to influence action, as in the use of commands, prohibitions, approvals, and disapprovals. This can accomplish an immediate effect, but Dewey points out that it should not be expected by itself to result in more permanent and effective educational effects.[49] He points out that threats may, for example, "prevent a person from doing something to which he is naturally inclined by arousing fear of disagreeable consequences if he persists";[50] however he argues that the use of the threat may actually deter the acquisition of intelligent habits of inquiry by which we can reconstruct and reformulate the direction of human conduct.

The second sort of direction can be characterized as an indirect method. This consists in furnishing an environment in which

the young participate in such a way that habits of intelligence are encouraged in concrete processes of inquiry. Dewey believes that this indirect approach is the most basically educative type of direction, since it directs original impulses into coherent, controlled patterns of dispositions and leads to the formation of the habits of intelligence.

Dewey's view that the habits of intelligence are accomplished indirectly through the environment is reflected in his concept of school. Schools, according to Dewey, are a typical instance of environments framed with the purpose of promoting moral dispositions. It is worth noting, however, that by the environment Dewey does not mean merely physical surroundings. In fact, Dewey identified the environment with "those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being."[51] The expansive sense of Dewey's use of the term "environment" is well illustrated when he says that the environment or the world of experience "consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or event, the subject talked about being also a part of the situation; or the toys with which he is playing; the book he is reading (in which his environing conditions at the time may be England or ancient Greece or an imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment he is performing."[52] Dewey adds that:

> The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions
> interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and
> capacities to create the experience which it had. Even
> when a person builds a castle in the air he is interacting
> with the objects which he constructs in fancy.[53]

Given the view of the school as a special environment, the following questions arise: what characteristics do schools have as a special environment; and what functions should they perform? Dewey argues that, in the first instance, the school should provide a simplified environment. He argues:

> A complex civilization is too complex to be assimilated in toto. It has to be broken up into portions, as it were, and assimilated piecemeal in a gradual and graded way. The relationships of our present social life are so numerous and so interwoven that a child placed in the most favorable position could not readily share in many of the most important of them. Not sharing in them, their meaning would not be communicated to him, would not become a part of his own mental disposition. There would be no seeing the trees because of the forest . . . . It selects the features which are fairly fundamental and capable of being responded to by the young. Then it establishes a progressive order . . . .[54]

Secondly, the school should purify the existing environment by eliminating undesirable features. Since "every society gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from the past, and with what is positively perverse,"[55] Dewey holds that the school has the duty of omitting such things from its environment. Furthermore the school should avoid those things which thwart human inquiry and problem solutions, since the formation of purposes in human conduct is a rather complex intellectual operation. For instance, intelligent conduct differs from acting upon desire or impulse "through its translation into a plan and method of action based upon foresight of the consequences of acting under given observed conditions in a certain way."[56] Thus the school should "select those things that have the promise and potentiality of presenting new problems which

by stimulating new ways of observation and judgment will expand the area of further experience."[57]

Finally, the school should <u>balance</u> the various elements in the social environment, so that every individual has an opportunity to escape the limitations of his social class. Dewey argues for a broader, balanced school environment, since members of a society composed of diverse racial, religious, and economic groups often have little or no direct contact with other social classes.

> In the olden times, the diversity of groups was largely a geographical matter. There were many societies, but each, within its own territory, was comparatively homogeneous. But with the development of commerce, transportation, intercommunication, and emigration, countries like the United States are composed of a combination of different groups with different customs. It is this situation which has, perhaps more than any other one cause, forced the demand for an educational institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young.[58]

Dewey's argument for the legitimacy of these three functions of the school is closely connected with his faith in the school as the most effective means for social progress and for developing the habits of intelligence required for a creative, effective community. It is through achieving the objective of providing a simplified, purified and balanced environment that the school can become an effective means of developing the intellectual and moral dispositions of individuals. Thus, good schooling, on Dewey's view, consists in planning environments which are conducive to the development of <u>desirable</u> ways of thinking, feeling and doing. Those environments must be <u>simplified</u> in order to be comprehensible to the young,

<u>purified</u> in order to perpetuate the most worthy aspects of a culture and <u>balanced</u> in order to increase opportunities for growth.

Dewey According to Kohlberg and the Values Clarificationists

In the above I have analyzed and elaborated some of Dewey's key views on moral education. My purpose in this section is to examine Kohlberg's and Simon's assertion that their views are harmonious with Dewey's and in his tradition. My point here is to show that, to the contrary, both Kohlberg and Simon have profoundly misunderstood Dewey. I shall argue that one finds little positive evidence that Dewey's posture squares with these current theorists; instead, there are positive indications, both in his method of inquiry and his emphasis on habit formation, that Dewey's stance on moral education is radically different from theirs.

To begin with, I will contrast briefly Dewey's view of moral education with that offered by Kohlberg. Kohlberg proposed that "following Dewey and Piaget" he would argue that "the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the natural development of the individual child's own moral judgment and capacities, thus allowing him to use his own moral judgment to control his behavior."[59] The reason Kohlberg cites Dewey's view of morals is mainly that he feels his own stance on morals is based on stages of development similar to those Dewey expounded in his works.

Dewey did occasionally employ the term "growth" or "stage of development" but only to emphasize the necessity of deliberate guidance in the learning process. The habits of intelligence do not

emerge suddenly in adolescence; they are, on Dewey's view, the product of deliberate efforts to foster certain desirable dispositions. However, one cannot simply lead a child through an educational program-- moral or intellectual--if the program is beyond the child's level of understanding. No matter what the substance of the curriculum may be, to introduce it without due regard for the individual's capacities is to ignore a fundamental educational consideration. One may therefore conclude that it is of paramount importance to know the capacities of the young and that, in particular, psychology has a special role in providing such knowledge. As Dewey observed:

> The aim of education is growth or development, both intellectual and moral. Ethical and psychological principles can aid the school in the greatest of all constructions the building of a free and powerful character. Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in psychological development can insure this. Education is the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychological functions to mature in the freest and fullest manner.[60]

Kohlberg's point of using stages of moral development is partly to show that his own cognitive-developmental theories are interactional, and, in that sense, in the Deweyan tradition.[61] He believes that the basic characteristics of the cognitive-developmental approach are consistent with Dewey's position in that both assume that the stages of moral development are "the product of patterning of the interaction between the organism and the environment."[62] It seems clear to Kohlberg that "an interaction between certain organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world"[63] leads to the development of moral stages. Since the stages "respresent the transformation of simple early cognitive structure as they are

applied to the external world,"[64] Kohlberg concludes that the cognitive-developmental approach, as opposed to maturationist theory, embodies some parallel aspect of Dewey's interactional view.

Despite Kohlberg's assertion that the stages of moral development depend on the interaction between organism and environment rather than the maturation of the organism, it is arguable whether Kohlberg's theory is compatible with Dewey's view on moral education. Elsewhere[65] and repeatedly Kohlberg tries to indicate that the stages of moral development are natural emergents from the interaction between the child and the environment. Furthermore, he indicates that the aim of moral education is to stimulate the natural development of the child's own capacities.[66] Thus his is essentially a maturationist view after all and not in the Deweyan tradition. For his position claims that the individual's natural tendencies are the most important factor in the development of moral stages, and that the environment's role should be one which allows these natural tendencies to develop to a later stage of moral reasoning. To assert glibly that Dewey is committed to the same stance as Kohlberg on the matter of moral education is patently erroneous.

A principal contrast between Kohlberg and Dewey concerns Kohlberg's contention that the principle of justice, which in Kohlberg's view emerges only at a relatively late stage in development, constitutes the end of moral education. Dewey would not object to Kohlberg's emphasis on either the principle of justice or moral reasoning because Dewey never underestimates the role of rational reasoning or moral principles in human conduct. But it should be

noted that for Dewey the scope of morals extends to all cases in which our ready-formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions, to every act that requires intelligent transformation of impulses into a purpose and the capacity to act intelligently in uncertain situations. According to Dewey, therefore, the question of what one ought to do can be raised even when there are no conflicting claims to be resolved by appealing to the principle of justice. Consequently, a whole range of values which are peculiarly relevant to uncertain situations depends on the particular conditions under which ought-questions are raised. In this respect Dewey's stance contrasts sharply with Kohlberg's, who restricts morality to the range of issues associated with justice. Thus, Dewey would object to Kohlberg's contention that a single moral principle--the principle of justice--can be applied to every moral situation.

Dewey furthermore would object to Kohlberg's contention that the school should promote only the skills of moral reasoning. As has been indicated, Dewey is justly critical of the identification of morals with reasoning or principle; he believes that they are acquired proper habits of conduct including habits of reasoning which provide us with a solid ground for guiding our moral conduct. This belief is evident when he says:

> Neither the utilitarians nor any one else can exaggerate
> the proper office of reflection, of intelligence, in con-
> duct. The mistake lay not here but in a false conception
> of what constitutes reflection, deliberation . . . We may
> indeed safely start from the assumption that impulse and
> habit, not thought, are the primary determinants of
> conduct.[67]

From the above considerations, it becomes clear that Kohlberg's stance does not indeed embrace the line of reasoning espoused by Dewey, in particular when it is recognized that Kohlberg's view of moral education is characterized by his assertion that moral education is a matter of teaching students to reason morally, that is, choosing a course of action in accordance with the principle of justice.

Simon and his colleagues also often maintain that Dewey advocated a method that is similar to their own values clarification method--the disposition to project consequences for action, to consider alternatives, to examine the consistency of a value with other values, and so on.

As I have already noted, Dewey rejects the notion that moral knowledge is absolute, having been established from the beginning of time, and equally applicable in all situations and at all times. He certainly recognizes that knowledge, both practical and theoretical, is not indisputable; one can never rule out the possibility of falsification at a later time. Nonetheless Dewey argues that specific ethical situations determine which kinds of conduct are morally right and wrong. By use of the method of inquiry, Dewey believes that one can evaluate and determine what ethical standards should govern his conduct in a given situation. It is the method of inquiry that enables us to become more intelligent in moral conduct and helps us understand more fully the consequences of our actions. In spite of the possibility of revision by further experience, Dewey does not believe that the validity of knowledge is dependent upon any particular individual. Simon and his colleagues, by contrast,

recommend the adoption of their values clarification method based on the premise of radical relativism; that is, no one can say what another's values should be and therefore each person should decide his own values based on the method they suggest. To interpret Dewey's method of inquiry as the sole criterion by which each individual must decide his own values is, therefore, to distort the point of everything he said.

Dewey, as we have noted, holds that educators must consciously promote the development of desirable habits--characteristic ways of thinking, feeling, and doing. It is evident that this view is incompatible with a theory which limits the role of moral education to the clarification of values. Clarity for Dewey is exceedingly important but he would point out that it is not enough to insist upon the dispositions needed to clarify values. To dispose the young to clarify their values is not likely to generate the full range of features appropriate to a desirable character that Dewey, like Russell, would engender. Thus, the trouble with the values clarificationists is that they do not consider the wide range of dispositions involved in active formation of desirable habits in the young. They assume that promoting the values clarification method is sufficient to foster desirable character, apart from the active promotion of any other disposition.

Furthermore, Dewey reminds us of the important feature of deliberate education: its manifestation of preferences for some special kind of social environment. According to Dewey, deliberate education inevitably selects a social environment so that the young

may not be left to <u>unguided</u> interactions with their environment. A school--as a simplified, purified and balanced environment--provides a set of special environments selected in order to foster certain desirable habits rather than undesirable ones. In this context, Dewey maintains that all deliberate education is a moral undertaking. And to select school environments is to accept that there are right and wrong ways of shaping the intellectual and moral dispositions of the young. This is far from saying that the aim of moral education is merely to help the young become clear on what their values are rather than to foster any particular values. Thus, to claim that Dewey promotes the values clarification method as the aim of moral education is to neglect some of Dewey's key views on moral education.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER IV

[1]Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 69.

[2]Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, p. 19.

[3]John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements, ed. G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1962), Vol. II, pp. 23-26.

[4]John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., Publishers, 1910), p. 72.

[5]John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949).

[6]John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Inc., 1938), pp. 101-119.

[7]Dewey, How We Think (1910), p. 75.

[8]John Dewey, How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933), pp. 111-112.

[9]Dewey, How We Think (1910), p. 73.

[10]Dewey, How We Think (1933), pp. 115-116.

[11]Ibid., p. 116.

[12]Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," p. 23.

[13]John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1930), pp. 88-90.

[14]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[15] John Dewey, _Theory of Valuation_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 5.

[16] Ibid., p. 5.

[17] Ibid., p. 24.

[18] Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_, p. 179.

[19] Dewey, _Theory of Valuation_, p. 23.

[20] Ibid., p. 59.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[23] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

[24] John Dewey, "The Logic of Judgment of Practice," _The Journal of Philosophy_ 12(19) (September 1916): 505.

[25] Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_, p. 222.

[26] Ibid., p. 179.

[27] Ibid., p. 221.

[28] Dewey, _How We Think_ (1933), p. 78.

[29] Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_, p. 184.

[30] Dewey, _The Theory of Valuation_, p. 32.

[31] Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_, p. 194.

[32] Bertrand Russell, _Education and the Good Life_ (New York: Liveright, 1926), p. 60.

[33] Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_, pp. 30-31.

[34]Russell, <u>Education and the Good Life</u>, p. 41.

[35]Ibid., pp. 41, 89.

[36]Ibid., pp. 101, 239.

[37]Dewey, <u>How We Think</u> (1933), p. 89.

[38]John Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u> (New York: The Free Press, 1916), p. 353.

[39]Ibid., p. 354.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Dewey, <u>Human Nature and Conduct</u>, p. 220.

[44]Ibid., p. 187.

[45]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 359.

[46]Ibid., p. 49.

[47]Ibid., p. 24.

[48]Ibid., p. 175.

[49]Ibid., p. 39.

[50]Ibid., p. 26.

[51]Ibid., p. 11.

[52]John Dewey, <u>Experience and Education</u> (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 43-44.

[53] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[54] Dewey, _Democracy and Education_, p. 20.

[55] Ibid., p. 20.

[56] Dewey, _Experience and Education_, p. 69.

[57] Ibid., p. 75.

[58] Dewey, _Democracy and Education_, p. 21.

[59] Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 71.

[60] John Dewey, "What Psychology Can Do for the Teacher," in _John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings_, ed. by R. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1964), quoted from "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," _Phi Delta Kappan_ (June 1975): 670.

[61] Lawrence Kohlberg, "Early Education: A Cognitive-Developmental View," _Child Development_, 39 (December 1968): 1010-1016.

[62] Ibid., p. 1015.

[63] Ibid., p. 1016.

[64] Ibid., p. 1020.

[65] Ibid., p. 1015.

[66] Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 71.

[67] Dewey, _Human Nature and Conduct_, p. 206.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The theories we have been discussing make diverse points about the nature of moral education. The issues become more comprehensible if we focus on two questions that each takes to be <u>central</u> to its account of moral education: (1) whether there are any universally applicable moral rules and (2) if there are, whether these can defensibly be taught. The stances of our theorists in large part grow out of their preoccupation with these two questions.

Even though they may not explicitly recognize it, Simon and his colleagues take these questions to be central to their discussion of moral education. Simon argues that "values-clarification is based on the premise that none of us has the 'right' set of values to pass to others."[1] When he and his colleagues claim that it is irresponsible to influence another's moral values, their stance is based on the view that there are no publicly defensible moral values. Having concluded that there are no right answers to such questions, they feel compelled to limit moral education to training in the <u>process</u> of valuing.

Kohlberg, on the other hand, argues that "there are universal moral concepts, values, or principles."[2] Furthermore, he argues that ethical <u>principles</u> are subject to "less variation between

individuals and cultures"[3] than are arbitrary rules and conventional beliefs. In this way Kohlberg comes to the conclusion that moral education is a matter of teaching those general ethical principles which underlie and support particular moral decisions.

Wilson is also concerned with the two questions with which we introduced this chapter. He makes a distinction between first- and second-order principles so that (1) we will be able to identify and teach non-partisan values and (2) we may identify defensible criteria for a rational morality. He argues, for example, that teaching first-order principles such as the Ten Commandments is bound to transmit partisan values. This is so, he argues, since in our rapidly changing world one finds a great diversity of moral opinion on virtually every issue of moral importance. Thus Wilson argues that moral education should be based on those rules of procedure which are essential to all morality.

In sum, the three theorists we have discussed share a methodological approach to moral education rather than a substantive or content approach. However much their specific programs may differ, they all agree that the basis of moral education is to be found in teaching certain rules of procedure rather than content. In Chapter II I delineated the central features of these methodologically oriented views.

In Chapter III I have shown that even though each makes a distinction between form and content in morality, there are striking differences in their views about the nature of the distinction. I have argued that Wilson's position differs from that of Kohlberg

and the values clarificationists in that Wilson never claims that moral education is _exclusively_ a matter of teaching a moral methodology. One of Wilson's key points is that moral decisions qua _moral_ decisions must be made on some basis other than one's own interest. The function of rational deliberation--and the role of moral components and second-order rules of procedure in such deliberation--is to ensure that we consider moral issues impartially. From this, Wilson concludes that moral education must be centrally concerned with inculcating rational attitudes and approaches to moral matters. I take Wilson to mean by this that moral education fosters the essential dispositions, outlined in terms of the moral components he describes, and this, in turn, disposes the young to be concerned about moral questions _and_ moral action.

Simon and his colleagues also distinguish between methods and content, referring to particular judgments as opposed to the method by which judgments are made. They argue that the student should not be taught substantive moral values but rather should be taught clarification techniques. Similarly, Kohlberg makes a distinction between form and content, espousing an abstract, general moral principle rather than any particular judgments. In Chapter III I offered a number of criticisms of Kohlberg and the values clarificationists. I argued that the views under consideration, i.e., that the essence of moral education lies in the teaching of moral reasoning or in the teaching of methods of clarifying values, suffer from major deficiencies and lead to probelmatic consequences. The most important question is whether the methods used to make

moral decisions are, in fact, neutral with respect to substantive moral conclusions, i.e., whether our forms of moral reasoning can be taught independently of particular moral beliefs.

Kohlberg and the values clarificationists assume that one can teach moral reasoning or the values clarification process without being thereby committed to specific moral claims. But I have shown in Chapters III and IV that moral education cannot be properly understood exclusively in terms of teaching moral reasoning or valuing processes. Contrary to the views considered, I have argued that the formation of a wide range of desirable habits, which I have argued is the aim of moral education, can be accomplished only by taking into account those beliefs, attitudes, feelings and abilities that are involved in _acting_ morally. While this does not mean that moral reasoning is irrelevant to moral action, it does mean that programs of moral education which emphasize some form of reasoning or other to the exclusion of all other considerations are, and must be, incomplete accounts.

Kohlberg and the values clarificationists also argue that just as our learning of an academic subject is crucially dependent on our understanding the associated body of ideas and principles which constitute the subject, so our learning in the realm of morals depends on our understanding the rules of procedure or the established principles that govern morality. My argument is that moral education, like any other subject taught in the schools, _must_ incorporate substantive claims as well as procedural strategies. The claim that a principled, stage-six form of moral reasoning

or a method for clarifying values can be taught in isolation is equivalent to the claim that the rules of grammar can be taught in isolation from teaching children how to speak. The grammar of a language _does_ represent a general structure which, in some sense, governs that language. But it does not follow from this fact that one could teach (or learn) the grammar of a language apart from learning that language. What is involved in learning a language is not just learning a grammar but must include the acquisition of _linguistic habits_. Likewise learning a morality (or acquiring a moral point of view) is not just learning a form of reasoning but must include the acquisition of _moral habits_.

Besides, those who associate moral competence with mastery of certain rules of procedure overlook the way in which individuals come to a recognition of the principles which define the various subjects. For instance, games can be seen as exemplary of rule-governed activities, and clearly any player must know the rules in order to play the game. But it is equally clear that a knowledge of the rules alone is not sufficient to ensure competence in playing the game. For example, one may have a complete understanding of the rules relevant to base stealing and yet be an incompetent base stealer (by, say, knowing that one should carefully watch the third base coach's signals, yet not have the habit of watching them). Likewise, in moral matters it is not sufficient for one to be con-versant with the rules of procedure, one must have the disposition to behave in accordance with them. This requires something more than instruction in moral reasoning or the valuing process can

provide. The disposition to behave in accordance with the rules is not something which one can come by apart from the context in which these rules are applied.

Russell, like Dewey, recognizes the need for instilling certain moral habits in the young. His specific methods for fostering moral dispositions suggest the importance of concrete experience over abstract principles of moral reasoning. Russell points out that

> The object of education, in this respect, is to let the external pressure take the form of habits, ideas and sympathies in the child's own mind. . . . The idea which is needed is that of justice. . . . Justice is the conception that we ought to try to instill into the child's thoughts and habits.[4]

In fact, for Russell, one's comprehension of general moral principles is a function of one's fundamental dispositions. "It is a folly and a waste of time to give abstract moral instruction to a child,"[5] Russell says, "everything must be concrete, and actually demanded by the existing situation."[6] He explicitly says that

> A child who has seen his parents behaving always with kindness and consideration tries to copy them in this respect. . . . And if you urge him to be kind to his little sister, but are not kind to her yourself, all your instruction will be wasted.[7]

Russell therefore may be construed to maintain that children begin to learn the basic elements of morality, such as sympathy and respect for others through concrete experience and imitation. Further, he claims that the process of habit formation which will make a profound mark on their attitude toward others begins at an early age. Russell also argues that children with a moral upbringing

of the sort he prescribes will, in later life, be likely to develop

the general moral principles (e.g., justice) which are advocated by

many, Kohlberg included. He observes that

> All moral instruction must be immediate and concrete: it
> must arise out of a situation which has grown up naturally,
> and must not go beyond what ought to be done in this par-
> ticular instance. The child himself will apply the moral
> in other similar cases. It is much easier to grasp a
> concrete instance, and apply analogous considerations to
> an analogous instance, than to apprehend a general rule
> and proceed deductively.[8]

Russell's position seems to me to counter the views expressed

by the current theorists we have been considering. If he is right,

moral education should be a deliberate effort to bring about those

circumstances which promote the development of good moral habits

rather than an effort to inculcate some method of moral reasoning.

Dewey would concur with Russell on this matter: the understanding

of general rules, as well as the sort of habit formation which moral

principles describe comes gradually and can be developed only through

concrete experiences. A theory of moral education which emphasizes

habit formation--including habits of rational deliberation--is a far

cry from one which exclusively emphasizes a method of moral reasoning.

Of the views I have examined, Wilson's, with its emphasis on

the moral components of, e.g., attending to the facts, following the

laws of logic, having the concern of others' needs and interests,

giving equal weight to others' needs and interests and so on,

provides a more adequate basis for moral education than either

Kohlberg's or the values clarificationists'. I have, however, only

touched on Wilson's conception of moral education as it compares

with Dewey's--a position which I regard as more defensible than any of the three critiqued here. Further inquiry into the essential characteristics of moral education should explore in detail the possibility of combining Dewey's stance with that of Wilson. A conception of moral education which combines emphasis on the moral components with Dewey's emphasis on the central role of moral dispositions might well display the full range of conditions that must be fulfilled in moral conduct.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V

[1] Sidney B. Simon, "Values-Clarification vs. Indoctrination," Social Education 35(8) (Decmeber 1971): 901-915

[2] Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 41.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Russell, Education and the Good Life, pp. 147-148.

[5] Ibid., p. 182.

[6] Ibid., p. 174.

[7] Ibid., p. 182.

[8] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayer, Alfred J. Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946.

Dewey, John. Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press, 1916.

_____. Experience and Education. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1938.

_____. "From Absolutism to Experimentalism." In Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements, Vol. II, pp. 13-27. Edited by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague. New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1962.

_____. How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1933.

_____. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: The Modern Library, 1922.

_____. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Holt, Inc., 1938.

_____. Moral Principles in Education. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1909; reprint 1975.

_____. "The Logic of Judgments of Practice." The Journal of Philosophy 12(19) (September 1916): 505-523.

_____. Theory of Valuation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939; reprint 1966.

Dewey, John, and Bentley, Arthur F. Knowing and the Known. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949.

Ferree, George. "Education and the Good Life: An Aesthetic View." East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1974 (unpublished).

Ferree, George, and Vaughn, Scott R. "Bertrand Russell's Approach to Moral Education in Early Childhood." In Philosophy, Children and The Family. Edited by Albert Cafagna, Richard Peterson, and Craig Staudenbaur. (New York: The Pleneum Publishing Company, in press).

103

Hare, R. M. _Freedom and Reason_. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

_____. _The Language of Morals_. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.

Hume, D. _A Treatise of Human Nature_. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888; reprint 1975.

_____. _An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957.

Kant, I. _Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals_. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1949.

_____. _The Metaphysical Elements of Justice_. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1965.

Kirschenbaum, Howard, Harmin, Merrill, Howe, Leland, and Simon, Sidney B. "In Defense of Values Clarification." _Phi Delta Kappan_ (June 1977): 743.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View." In _Moral Education_, pp. 57-83. Edited by Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

_____. "Early Education: A Cognitive Developmental View." _Child Development_ 39 (December 1968): 1013-1062.

_____. "From Is to Ought." _The Journal of Philosophy_ (October 1973): 164-165.

_____. "Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View." _The School Review_ 47 (Spring 1966): 1-30.

_____. "Reply to Bereiter's Statement on Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental View." _Interchange_ 1(2): 40-48.

_____. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-developmental Approach to Socialization." In _Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research_. Edited by D. Goslin. New York: Rand McNally, 1969.

_____. "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education." In _Moral Education_, pp. 23-92. Edited by C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan. New York: Newman Press, 1971.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World." Daedalus (Fall 1971): 1051-1086.

_____. "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education." Phi Delta Kappan LVI(10) (1975): 672-673.

_____. "The Moral Atmosphere of the School." In The Unstudied Curriculum: Its Impact on Children, pp. 104-127. Edited by Norman V. Overly. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, NEA, 1970.

Kohlberg, Lawrence, and Mayer, Rochelle. "Development as the Aim of Education." Harvard Educational Review (November 1972): 449-496.

Kohlberg, Lawrence, and Turiel, E. "Moral Development and Moral Education." In Psychology and Educational Practice. Edited by G. Lesser. Chicago: Scott Foresman, 1971.

Kohlberg, Lawrence, and Turiel, E. eds. Recent Research in Moral Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

Mill, J. S. On Liberty. Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973.

_____. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957.

Peters, R. S. Ethics and Education. Chicago: Scott Foresmann and Company, 1967.

Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, Inc., 1948.

Russell, Bertrand. Education and the Good Life. New York: Liveright, 1926.

_____. Education and the Social Order. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1932.

_____. Human Society in Ethics and Politics. New York: Mentor Books, 1952.

Simon, Sidney B. "Values-Clarification vs. Indoctrination." Social Education 35 (8) (December 1971): 902-915.

Simon, Sidney B., Howe, Leland W., and Kirschenbaum, Howard. Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students. New York: Hart Publishing Company, Inc., 1972.

Raths, Louis E., Harmin, Merrill, and Simon, Sidney B. Values and
     Teaching. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing
     Co., 1966.

Wilson, John. A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education. London:
     Geoffery Chapman, 1973.

_____. Education and the Concept of Mental Health. London:
     Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1968.

_____. Education in Religion and Emotions. London: Heinemann,
     1971.

_____. Educational Theory and the Preparation of Teachers.
     Windsor: NFER, 1975; distributed in the United States by
     Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey.

_____. Equality. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966.

_____. Ideals: A Guide to Moral and Metaphysical Outlooks.
     New York: Morehouse-Barlow Company, 1974.

_____. Language and the Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge
     University Press, 1956.

_____. Logic and Sexual Morality. Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
     Penguin Books, 1965.

_____. Introduction to Moral Education. Baltimore: Penguin
     Books, 1967.

_____. Moral Education and the Curriculum: A Guide for Teachers
     and Research Workers. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969.

_____. Moral Thinking: A Guide for Students. London: Heinemann
     Educational for the Farmington Trust, 1970.

_____. Philosophy: Thinking about Meaning. London: Heinemann
     Educational for the Farmington Trust, 1968.

_____. Philosophy and Educational Research. Buckinghamshire:
     National Foundation for Educational Research in England and
     Wales, 1972.

_____. Philosophy and Practical Education. London: Routledge
     and Kegan Paul, 1977.

_____. Practical Methods of Moral Education. London: Heinemann
     Educational Books, 1972.

Wilson, John. Reason and Morals (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

_____. The Assessment of Morality. Slough, Bucks: National Foundation of Educational Research, 1973.

_____. "First Steps in Education, Morality and Religion." In Philosophy of Education 1977. Proceedings, 33rd Annual Meeting, Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 29-48.

Wilson, John, Collier, Gerald, and Tomlinson, Peter. Values and Moral Development in Higher Education. London: Croom Helm, 1974.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigation. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1958.