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ANTITHEIIGAI. RELIGIOUS commons
m KIERKEGAABD AND srmozA

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE 0F PH. D;
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

RUDOLPH 0. MUSKA
I 9 6 0

 

 

b ffffff

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

"Antithetical Religious Conceptions in
Kierkegaard and Spinoza"

presented by

Rudolph C. Muska

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Philosophy

9
‘/’.
25M,
Lewis, . -erby

Major professor

DateNovember 8, 1960

 

0-169

  
      

  

' LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

1S

ABSTRACT

ANTI'IHETICAL RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS
IN KIERKEBAARD AND SPINOZA

by Rudolph C. Muska

The purpose of this dissertation is to select
certain key issues central to modern religious thought,
to illuminate these by comparing the way in which they
are treated by Spinoza and Kierkegaard, and then to sug-
gest which perspective better elucidates the nature of
religious faith.

In the introductory chapter, the prominent char-
acteristics oi? existentialism in its religious expres-
sion are precipitated out of the writings of Kierkegaard.
These, in turn, point up various questions or problems
four of which are selected as crucial to religious faith.
and these are then handled in order, each being the to-
cal point upon which a succeeding chapter is centered.

The first question is whether religion is pri-
marily a matter of knowledge or of faith. In this re-
gard, Spinoza apotheosizes reason, disparages belief as
an inferior kind of knowledge, and proposes that the

human intellect is able to comprehend the very essence

of God. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, holds that
faith is neither inferior knowledge nor probable knowl-
edge, in that it is not even lmowledge at all. Instead.
faith consists in the volitional appr0priation of an ob-
jective uncertainty, and for this reason so-called "re-
ligious knowledge" is an anomalism. .

I The second issue concerns religious truth. Fol-
lowing Aristotelian tradition, Spinoza conceives truth
as objective in that it discloses the nature of things.
In contrast, Kierkegaard maintains that all objective
theories of truth involve an epistemological tautology
which, in religion, generates the ineluctable problem of
obtaining predicates descriptive of faith-objects. Reli-
gious truth, he suggests, does not consist in the agree-
ment of idea to fact, but in the seriousness and genuine-
ness of a commitment. Religious truth is subjective; it
depends on whether or not the manner in which one relates
himself to an object of faith is commensurate with the
nature of that object.

The third chapter pertains to the possibility of
demonstrating the existence of God. Here the discussion
centers upon the relationship of essence and existence
in the ontological argument. Spinoza asserts that es-
sence necessarily involves existence because both are
identical in respect to God. Kierkegaard insists that
these are radically different realms-~one ideal and pos-
sible, the other actual; and any transition from what

might be to what is, is illicit. The effectiveness of
this criticism depends on whether the ontological argu-
ment is meant to demonstrate God's actual existence or
to "prove" that an immediate, intuitive knowledge of God
has an ontological implication.

The fourth question concerns freedom and neces-
sity. Although Spinoza conceives the universe as fully
determined, he maintains that man is nevertheless able
to overcome his bondage to emotions and become "free,"
that is, rationally self-determined. Kierkegaard, onthe
other hand, upholds human freedom by insisting that ne-
cessity pertains only to the realm of thought-~to propo-
sitions and conceptions that do not depend upon actual
events. Freedom (defined as the transition from pos-
sible-being to actual-being) means shaping one's destiny
and character in virtue of uncoerced choices.

The final chapter contains the general thesis of
the dissertation, namely-~the main characteristics of re-
ligious existentialism (such as self-concern, subjective
truth, etc.,) are essential characteristics of true re-
ligion. The comparison between Spinoza and Kierkegaard
is summarized by indicating that Spinoza's view is es-
sentially a phiIOSOphy, whereas Kierkegaard's purpose is
to distinguish ph11030phy from religious faith.

‘Ihe specific thesis is that passion, not reason.
is the fundamental characteristic of religious faith.
PhllOSOph‘Y is an intellectual activity, even though it

may produce emotions in the thinker. But religious
faith, if it is genuine, is a passionate concern in
the reality of Another, a conviction that finds expres-

sion in a way of life rather than a conception of the
universe.

ANTITHETICAL RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS
IN KIERKEGAARD AND SPINOZA

By

\‘ v’.
Rudolph CIiMuska

A THESIS

submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fu fillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Philosophy

1960

G ,/5'/ ’i" ‘i’
(1’1"; 61/?)

PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to select certain
key concepts in Spinoza and Kierkegaard that are of
crucial importance for modern religious thought, to ex-
amine these and reveal their striking contrast, and fi-
nally to suggest that one of these views more adequately
perceives the nature of some of the main problems in-
trinsic to religious faith. The presentation that fol-
lows, however, does not purport to be a comparison, de-
scription or evaluation of Spinoza's and Kierkegaard's
phllOSOphieS as a whole-~to do this with any degree of
thoroughness would be quite beyond the possibilities of
this dissertation.

My original intention was to write about the
irrationalism of Soren Kierkegaard, to either criticize
or defend the paradoxical nature of his major conten-
tions, such as the "absurdity" of religious faith. Then
it occurred to me that such controversial contentions
might best be illuminated by contrasting them with their
polar opposites as stated by an exponent of religious
rationalism. To be sure, Kierkegaard himself does this

very thins most notably in his W
W, where Hegelianism, the dominant philosophy

11

111
in nineteenth century Denmark, is continually set in op-
position to his own brand of dialectic--the "System"
versus the "Individual," as Kierkegaard puts it.1 How-
ever, since various commentators on Kierkegaard have
noticed and indeed elaborated upon this Opposition, I
have decided to select Spinoza for two reasons: (I)
Spinoza in many ways represents the ultimate expression
of rationalism, and hence more sharply defines or points
up the desired differences; and (2) the liberalism of
Spinoza has sufficiently freed him from his particular
theological tradition so that, for the most part, we are
able to analyze and compare his W conceptions
without becoming entangled in the interpretations of
W doctrines.

I have therefore selected the following issues
for discussion, all pertinent to modern religious
thought, devoting a chapter to each of them: "rational
knowledge and faith" (Chapter II), "objective and sub-
jective truth" (Chapter III). "the existence of God"
(Chapter IV), and "freedom and necessity" (Chapter V).
To complete the organization of the paper, an introduc-
tory chapter on the mode of existential thinking is in-
tended to introduce the kind of perspective (and assump-
tions) that furnish the basis of existential thought in

‘_

1The most direct and detailed account of Kierke-
gaard' s anti-Hegelianism is found in the

W-
W. trans. David F. Swanson and m’rWalter
Lowréglo8 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941+).
pp- -1

1v
its religious expression. A concluding chapter contains
the thesis of the paper. which is a pr0posal concerning

certain W in defining religion.

I am not at all sure that a dissertation such
as this is the appropriate place to try to acknowledge
all the teachers. authors, and friends who have con-
tributed to my intellectual growth, whatever it may be.
Nevertheless, I cannot forego this Opportunity to ex-
press my indebtedness to, and respect for, Professor
Lewis Zerby, who, along with Professor Henry Leonard,
has succeeded in making the graduate work at Michigan
State University a pleasant as well as a most stimulat-

ing experience .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
PREACE O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O 11
Chapter
I. THEEXISTENTIAL EWHASIS . . . . . . . 1
The main characteristics of Kierke-
gaard s religious existentialism
The crucial questions that the exis-
tential approach raises for reli-
gious thought
II. OBJEDTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH . . . . . 20

The importance of reason and knowl-
edge, for Spinoza, and his dispar-
agement of mere belief in God

The limitations of-knowledge and the
inappmpriateness of reason in re-
ligion. from Kierkegaard 3 point
of view

The nature of faith, according to
Kierkegaard. and the issue of
passion in religious faith

III. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TRUTH . . . . . 51

Traditional theories of truth: truth
is objective

The problem inherent in objective
theories of truth

Objective and subjective reflection

Kierkegaard's thesis that Truth is
subjectivity -

vi

Chapter

IV. THEEXISTENCEOFGOD 76
Spinoza' 5 version of the ontological
argument

Kierkegaard' s criticism of the argu-
ment, and his analysis of the con-
cepts of essence and existence

The general problem of all attempts
to prove God' 5 existence, and an
alternative interpretation of
Spinoza' s argument

V.FREEIDMANDNECESSITY......... 100

Spinoza' s doctrine of freedom and
bondage

Kierkegaard' 8 analysis of the con-
cepts of free and necessary, and
the value he attributes to choice
itself

The basic difference between Spinoza
and Kierkegaard

VI. TRUE RELIGION: INTELIECTUAL IOVE. OR
EXISTENTIAL PASSION? . . . . . . . . . 133

The intellectual love of God

Spinoza and popular religion

Existentialism and the meaning of
religion: the general thesis

Existentialism and passion: the
specific thesis

BIBLImIIY O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1 58

CHAPTER I
THE EDCISTENTIAL Eli/IPHASIS

Before the advent of existential thinking, most
philos0phers had assumed man to be primarily a thinking
being. Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Des-
cartes and Locke, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment,
for the most part, testify to this predominant concep-
tion of man. It is not until nineteenth century German
philOSOphy that the reaction to this conception finds
expression in such influential philosophers as Neitzsche,
SchOpenhauer, and others.

The point of view of existentialism should not
be too readily identified, however, with these represent-
atives of "irrationalism." True, Neitzsche is hailed by
some as the founder of modern existentialism, but his
anti-rationalism is certainly not typical of the move-
ment. Most, if not all, of the best-known names--Sartre.
Heidegger, Marcel, Tillich, “new more concerned to
indicate some of the limitations of reason and to demar-
cate its proper boundaries.

But it is not our intention, in the pages that
follow, to try to encompass the whole of the existential
movanent, if this is possible, for the diversity of

l

2

thought and individual temperaments of even those ordi-
narily classified as "existentialists" leads some of
them to deny explicitly that they are such. In addition
to this. is the fact that existentialism is not so much
a school as it is an approach. or an attitude, or an em-
phasis on certain problems that face the individual per-
son. And this, of course, is one of its characteristics.

Of no small hindrance to a clearer understanding
of this movement has been the emergence of a vague, ill-
defined kind of "existential" sentiment pervading the
more popular discourse of the day--in literature, art,
music. even television and newspaper. Novels with bad
or shocking characters. artistic freaks, beatniks, philo-
SOphical nihilists, and almost any form of perversion, as
Marjorie Grene complains, have now taken on the connota-
tion of being "existential"; "every play that depresses
without elevating. is labeled 'so existential'.” until
the term is now almost a synonym for "the shocking, the
sordid. or the obscene."1 All this is indeed unfortu-
nate. since existentialism in its modern origin and in-
tent, represents a lofty expression of the ethical and

the religious . 2

 

1Marjorie G. Grene.

W
W (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. 19 , p. l.

2The reference here is to "Kierkegaard whose in-
fluence. according to John Wild. "has been more defini-
tive than that of all the rest (1. e.. Pascal. Neitzsche.
and others). and who may be thought of as the seminal

3
Happily, the intention and limitations of the

present paper do not require us to analyze. synthesize,
or summarize the whole movement, or even to pursue its
diverse ramifications. In this chapter we will attempt
to present the basic features of existentialism as they
are exemplified in Kierkegaard's religious works. so
that the mood of existential thinking will more clearly
emerge. At the same time it is believed that such a de-
scription of his thought will also delineate the main
features of religious existentialism in general and, in
spite of the foregoing comments, should also provide us
with a fair picture of existential thought as a whole.3I

The Main Characteristics of Kierkegaard's

Religious Existentialism

(l) The first and perhaps most general charac-
teristic of Kierkegaard's existentialism is that of self-
ggnggm. This is a concern, simply. about the meaning
of life for the subject himself. It is not a phiIOSOphi-

cal. objective question about the nature and significance

 

mind of the existentialist movement." W
W (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
1955 . P- 27-

3”The present writer is aware that any expository
endeavor reflects to a certain degree the views of the
expositor himself. This is especially so in the case of
Kierkegaard where, due to the depth and diversity, the
prodigiousness and sheer weight of his authorship. there
has been produced a secondary literature which reflects
the interests and convictions of its writers. This
ranges from the less sympathetic and critical expositions
of Crane and Kaufmann to the more sympathetic and devoted
expositions (and commentaries) of Croxall. Lowrie, or
Thomte. See Bibliography, pp. 158-63.

)4

of man, nor is it a question concerning the ultimate
purpose of the universe, nor is it some eschatological
doctrine about a future state. The question is prOperly
put in the first person singular: What is the meaning of
my life? What should I do pm? What is my task here?
This emphasis on self-concern is illustrated in the story
ascribed to SchOpenhauer, in which it is related that one
day. after walking through the streets of Berlin. preoc-
cupied in thought concerning the mystery of man and the
universe. the philoSOpher paused to rest on a bench.
Whereupon a policeman spied him, and seeing that he was
rather shabbily dressed, demanded. "Who are you? What
are you doing here?" And SchOpenhauer. still deep in
thought, is said tohave replied, "I wish to God I knew!"
This reflects the concern about one's own destiny, the .
matter of one's own existence, that is typically exis-
tential.“

 

1‘The emphasis on self-concern is everywhere pre-
sent in the writings of Kierkegaard, and it is implicated
in most of the other characteristics tint are discussed
in this chapter; hence it is one of the most important
factors to be mentioned. It is involved in the stress on
m (" it is impossible to "exist without passion ),
mm, inwardness.’ risk," "subjective reflection,"
the individual. and in the ethical strain that runs
through most all of his works. The personal emphasis in
Kierkegaard' s devotional literature.e e.g., is meant to
stimulate the individual to a concern that will recon-
struct his mode of existence. See Kierkegaard' 3 E21

W. trans. Edna and Howard Hong (Minne-

apo is: Augsburg Publishing House. 1910). as well as the
various 'Fdifying Discourses." several of which are

listed in the Bibliography below, pp. 158-6 3. The serious

and personal nature of concern is indicated in many places
in his Wins. trans- Doug-

5
This is one side of it. But it is also self-

concern in an m sense--Vmat am I to do with my
"self"? Self-concern, in this sense, means being con-
cerned with the quality of one's character; and this im-
plies being concerned about others, or (to use a good ex-
istentialist term) "to care." And while the attitude of
being concerned. or caring. may find expression in var-
ious ways.5 its reference is always toward humankind and
is not a reference to the more narrow concerns (material
things. family troubles. career, and so forth) that so
typically worry the modern man.

The intensity of self-concern. moreover. is
heightened by the consciousness of contingency and death.
the awareness of the immanence of non-being, the realiza-
tion that the fortuity of existence is always attended by
the possibility of not existing. It is this constant
threat of non-existence that is a more emphatic theme in

modern variations of existentialism.

 

las Steers (New York: Harper and Bros., 19%). especially
pp. 1814-97. This infinite personal passionate interest
is reflected in Paul Tillich s distinction between con-
gaggle which dam attention, devotiontandtpassion, and
concern w i demands infinite a en ion mgpndi-
’ New

devotion ultimate passion. W
ork: Charles Scribner 3 Sons, 1955). p. 53. Ultimate
5

concern' is also the main theme in Tillich W
m (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957).

$10 better example of caring. perhaps. can be
given than that of Albert Schweitzer whose life work
issued from his concern about the white man's responsi-
bility to the colored. Unlike some who are engaged in a
similar vocation. his life has been spent in the dispen-
sation of compassion rather than doctrine.

6

(2) Second is the emphasis on the W ex-
isting manuthe "matter of the individual is the most de-
cisive thing," writes Kierkegaard.6 This stress upon the
individual, as opposed to the "crowd. " is fundamental in
Kierkegaard's works.7 It is not. however. an argument
for an unrestrained individualism which seeks to be dif-
ferent. and which places a value on any form of noncon-
formity. And so Kierkegaard should not be miscontrued to
endorse an aristocratic disdain for the masses. nor to
advocate that anything the "crowd" holds is false W
the crowd holds it. What he does object to is the pli-
ancy with which the crowd sways to and fro according to
the variable whims and circumstances of the passing mom-
ent, and to the direction in which the crowd inevitably
swings. to whatever is the easier. the convenient, or
the pleasant. From Kierkegaard's point of view, a sort
of inverse-utilitarianism applies to crowd-determined be-

havior: whatever society demands. or the crowd desires.

6W. trans. W. Lowrie (London:
Oxford Univ. ress. 1950 , p. 12h.

7The value of the individual is assumed every-
where 1n his writings. and explicitly stated in many .
places. The Opposition of the individual to the "crowd'
is especially elaborated in W. pp. 111-
138. In a footnote Kierkegaard explains that the word
crowd is to be understood in a purely formal sense, not
in the sense one commonly attaches to 'the crowd' when it
is meant as an invidious qualification. . . . 'crowd
stands for number, the numerical. a number of nobleman,
. millionaires. high dignitaries. etc.--as soon as the nu-
merical is involved it is 'crowd.' 'the crowd'."

m. r 1). 111+.

 

7
or the multitude thinks is best, is invariably-~in a re-
ligious sense-~the untruth. One does not become either
moral or religious, existentially understood. by follow-
ing the crowd or by joining some form of socio-religious
institution. It is just the Opposite. For in the crowd
one's sense of moral responsibility is weakened if not
entirely diminished. "A crowd." Kierkegaard writes. "in
its very concept is the untruth. by reason of the fact
that it renders the individual completely impenitent and
irresponsible. or at least weakens his sense of responsi-
bility by reducing it to a fraction. Observe that there
was not one single soldier that dared lay hands upon
Caius Marius."8 The modern individual wants "to belong."
Outside the crowd he feels conspicuous and uncomfortable.
but under the levelling influence Of the many he does
things he might never think of doing if he were alone.
Kierkegaard insists, however, that the ethical and the
religious concerns the individual 51m; and as we shall
see in a later chapter. it is only his mm genuine
choices that are significant in making a person's char-
acter and in determining his destiny.

Still, Kierkegaard's statement that the crowd is
"untruth" might be misunderstood. What he means is that
the crowd is untrue whenever it is regarded as the au-
thority, whenever it turns the scale, so to speak. when-
ever any decisive significance is attributed to it. But

 

Sma-

8
all of this does not apply to matters that are earthly

or temporal. where the crowd may have a sort of compe-

tence, but "the untruth Of the crowd. ethico-religiously

 

view is here presented. is the individual; and with it
religion stands or falls. For the religious concerns
the intimate relation between man and God, and has noth-
ing to do directly with any mediating agency--least of
all. what the crowd thinks.

(3) The third characteristic is a protest against
the abstract, the Objective, the neutral, the scientific--
which is a way of saying that existentialism emphasizes
W10 rather than detachment. It reflects the
right to go beyond the positivistic strictures that aim
to undercut the meaningfulness of religion, ethics. art.
and other allegedly non-cognitive human interests. While
it is true that the scientific quest does not ignore the

purposes and welfare of men. yet the scientific temper,

 

9m" p. 112, n.

10The notion of "involvement. of course. is a
typical feature Of existentialism as it is propounded by
both religious and atheistic existential writers. In
Kierkegaard, it is intrinsic to his major emphases on the"
individual. the ethical. and especially subjective truth
(which may be defined in terms Of personal involvement).
This is perhaps the reason why Kierkegaard so Often uses
illustrations of a person in love (e.g.. PP. 81-82 in the
W). or a person as an actor rather than a spec-
tator e.g., p. 181. .). For an illustration quoted
in this paper. see be ow. n. 2’4, p. 1149.

9
in its pursuit of the general, the manipulatable, and the

measurable, requires a studied disregard of the peculiar-
ities which make each individual unique. While it is not
the purpose of the existential emphasis to deny the use-
fulness Of this procedure, it does resist the widely ac-
cepted idea that this is the only respectable way of ap-
proaching any area of human interest. Existentialism
does stand Opposed (for reasons Obvious in this discus-
sion) to the position taken by Dewey, e.g., that the sci-
entific approach is the only road to truth.11 But it is
not the scientific method. as it is generally understood.
that is rejected or questioned at all by the existential-
ist. but the extent Of its applicability; and if the ex-
istential attitude appears to be Opposed to the scientif-
ic, it is because of the subtle tendency Of the latter to
become paradigmatic for the non-scientific as well.)-2

 

" 11"There is but one sure road of access to
truth. John Dewey. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1952 , p. 32.

12One is reminded here Of Luther, Schleiermacher,

and Ritschl, all Of which had reservations in regard to
the powers of reason and the mom of objective know '-
edge. Luther. in particular, referred to reason as the
devil's strumpet which might lead to intellectual pride;
and his emphasis on plain faith and action that is not
dependent upon philosophy or science places him as a
forerunner Of a continuing tradition within Protestantism.
Of interest here. is that thisutradition has stressed the
subjective life Of the spirit --i.e., faith. trust. hOpe,
dispair. aspiration. feeling, etc.--and. has de-emphasized
(in various degrees) the necessity and significance Of
objective knowledge in regard to religion. Luther's mer-
it. according tO Kierkegaard. was that he re-affirmed the
need for the personal appropriation of faith. 'Take away
from the Christian determinations the factor of personal

 

10

Similarly. existentialism has earned somewhat the
reputation of being "anti-intellectual" or "irrational."
largely because Of its de-emphasis upon the significance
Of systematic thought and its use of such terms as "par-
adox." "contradiction." and the "absurd."13 But such a
judgment is not altogether warranted. In the case of
Kierkegaard. at least. there is the recognition of both
the validity and usefulness Of rational thought in every
field of Objective inquiry. He is anxious, however. to
delineate a major area of human concern which falls out-
side the realm Of mm knowledge and truth. Man is
not basically a rational being, Kierkegaard maintains.
but an W1” being--one that thinks. feels. wills.

and desires.

 

appropriation. and what becomes of Luther's merit? But
Open to any page Of his writings. and note in every line
the strong pulse-beat Of personal appropriation. Note it
in the entire trembling prOpulsive movement Of his style,
which is as if it were driven from behind by the terrible
thunderstorm that killed Alexius and created Luther. Did
not the papacy have objectivity enough. objective deter-
minations to the point of superfluity? What then did it
lack§27lgglacked apprOpriation. inwardness."29_s.t§52m1.
PP- - -

13m regard to these terms. see n. 11 on p. 30.

11”Existence." as existentialists use the term.
refers to more than the mere ocpupation Of space-time, as
when we say. 'The table exists. The term points speci-
fically to human existence and it concerns the recogni-
tion that a self-conscious being has of its being alive,
its contingency. its responsibilities. its possible des-
tiny. and so on. While bare existence is simply given
for no apparent reason. man has the ability to 'make him-
self" distinctly human if he embraces the task of living
with seriousness and pathos. See below. pp. 122-28.

11

The existential emphasis on involvement may be
described in different ways. One way is to say that ex-
istential thinking moves from the universal to the singu-
lar. from the class Of "all men" to a definite. identifi-
able individual. Every person knows. for example. that
he is included in the class of mortal beings. and. yet he
is able to calmly acknowledge fatality figures, enjoy the
convenience of high-speed travel, and dream happily Of
far-removed days when he will retire. But let us sup-
pose that a person's doctor informs him that he is going
to die in a short time--the W that he
must die "sometime" suddenly leaps to an W-
m. I-hman mortality now takes on a personal urgency
for this person; it "comes home" to him and he finds him-
self facing the most important (and also the most incon-
venient) issue Of all-~the immanent fact of ceasing to
exist. It is then one sees that existence is not a mere
"predicate." Existential involvement. in contrast to a
detached knowledge that "men in general" die. means that
one relates the decisions Of his daily living to the con-
tingency of his existence.

Another way of speaking about involvement is to
emphasize that human existence consists primarily in be-
coming "engaged" in various situations, as Opposed tO ob-
serving these situations from a safe vantage point. Man
enters into relationships with others not as distant cor-

respondents do but with all of his human equipment. He

12
gives and takes, yields and resists, seeks and avoids--
analogous to a boy who. instead of watching life go on in
the street below, goes down and out into the street and
enters inte the fun or the strife. Every man, except
perhaps when he sleeps or meditates. is involved in the
human drama; Kierkegaard prods the individual to be more
personally aware of it. In addition to this, existential-
ism affirms that certain things are known better by be-
coming involved in them than in remaining detached. Love,
social concern, suffering. etc. are better understood
from the "inside." when one is in love or is socially con-
cerned oractually suffers, then when such situations are
Observed or learned about second-hand. that is. from an
"outside" perspective.
I (1+) The fourth characteristic Of Kierkegaard's
existentialism is the distinction made between existence
and thought.15 These are separate realms. he insists.
Logic deals with abstractions m existence, with con-
cepts that are "lifted out" from the actual. and its
movement depends upon the substitution of these concepts
for reality. This means, however, that the process of
thought has certain advantages. Since it deals only with
ideas and concepts, its possibilities are unlimited. One
can do almOst anything W: construct systems con-

 

15This distinction is perhaps the most recurrent
theme throughout the mm. It is discussed in more
detail below. pp. 89-93, m.

13
taining parts that stand in necessary relations to one
another; "create" and demonstrate the "existence" of be-
ings infinite and eternal; hold contradictions together
in disjunctive combinations; resolve Opposites in terms
of dialectical syntheses, and so on. But all of this is
possible, Of course, in virtue of the ontological differ-
ence between ideas and existent things. And because
thought, by the process of conceptualization. must ig-
nore that which makes each thing individual , when it
"unites" existence it does so by abrogating the unique-
ness and peculiarities of particular things.

Accordingly, one Of the main intentions Of ra-
tional thinking is problem-solving. and this activity
need not be limited only to abstract problems. For men
endeavors also to remove, or mitigate, concrete problems
with which he is faced on every side. and he does this by
converting them into problems of thought. The legitimacy
Of all this is foolish to question, as long as one is not
deceived in the process by over-estimating the power Of
thought. At least. this is what the existentialist seems
to be saying: that the most important issues of actual
existence--such as the meaning Of life. the inevitability
of death, and crucial ethical choices-“may be reflected
upon. but are not thereby resolved in virtue of such re-
flection. As one contemporary writer puts it, "reason
seeks to remove unpleasantness by pretending that the

ultimate question concerning the meaning of life is

11+

within our control, when actually it is beyond our con-

"16

trol. In pressing this pretense. the existentialist

stresses the disparity between thinking and acting. where
the solutions attained in thought are so often betrayed
in the exigencies Of actual existence.

The same question re-occurs: certainly Kierke-
gaard does not deny all significance to speculative
thought; and if he did. how could he express his own
"unsystematic" view? The answer is that Kierkegaard was
acutely aware Of the power of thought, and was himself
pre-eminently equipped to either effect subtle dialecti-
cal analyses Or to project grandiose logical structures.17
and that his authorship in all of its variety constitutes
a predetermined plan of thought. But it is against the
system-building that attempts to circumscribe and synthe-
size everything in thought, as epitomized by Hegel's phi-

16

D- E. Roberts. MW
Belief, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959 , p. 80.

17Any amount Of reading in the main works Of
Kierkegaard will leave little doubt as to his ability to
perceive and express dialectical subtleties. That he was
unusually gifted for the task of thought was recognized
by Kierkegaard in his childhood. so that his wit provided
him with a ready defense against his hardier classmates.
Nevertheless. he later confesses with candor that at
times he could not avert the thought that there was any-
one in his generation who had the upper hand over him.
However. the context in which this conceit is admitted
should be read. See W, pp. 72-83. In
this same place he records how for long periods of time
he would be employed with nothing else but the perform-
ance Of dialectical exercises with an adjunct of imagina-

tion." trying out his mind as one might play upon an in-
strument.

 

15
lOSOphy, that Kierkegaard directs his most stinging
barbs.18 And while he admired Hegel, and spoke with
reverence toward Spinoza.19 his intention was to call
into question the relevance Of such metaphysical thought
to life. Kierkegaard's criticism Of rationalism, in a
word, is not its use of reason, but its tendency to
transform life. which he conceived as an existence-prob-
lem, into a thought-problem.

(5) The fifth characteristic of Kierkegaard's
existentialism is the notion that ethic-religious truth
is "subjective" truth. The term "subjective," here.
should not be confused with the idea of personal distor-
tion or mere Opinion, as the term is Often used, e.g., in
ethical discourse. Nor should this conception of truth
be thought of as replacing other kinds of truth. Kierke-

 

18"So far as metaphysical speculation is con-
cerned. Kierkegaard regarded it as an attempt to solve
the problems of life automatically, ‘ . . . he has in mind.
Of course. the system of Hegel. . . . In the face Of tor-
menting conflicts. surging passions. ethical decisions.
. . . it is intolerable to be told by Hegel that the out-
er and inner worldsufit together into a total scheme which
is wholly rational. Roberts. m3... p. 69.

19To my knowledge Kierkegaard never speaks de-

rogator 1y of Spinoza. But almost everywhere he writes
against he System." that is. Hegel s W. His
admiration for Hegel W. however. is a differ-
ent matter. and is quite explicitly admitted in a lengthy
footnote to the W, p. 558. Nevertheless. he
goncludes the footnote with the following Observation:
If he had written his whole Legje and declared in the
Preface that it was only a thought-experiment (in which.
however. at many points he had shirked some things) , he
would have been the greatest thinker that ever lived.
Now he is comic."

l6

gaard distinguishes between three general kinds of truth:
the "more idealistic" (which is tautological), the "more
empirical" (approximate truth that is applicable to mat-
ters of fact). and "subjective" truth,20 which applies to
the ethical and the religious. or to what might generally
be referred to as the area of personal relationships.

While these various conceptions of truth form the
subject-matter for a subsequent part of this paper (Chap-
ter III), we might summarily define subjective truth as
the manner in which a subject is related to. and the man-
ner in which his life is determined by. another. The
"other." in religion. is an object of faith the reality
Of which cannot be demonstrated or confirmed in terms Of
the usual criteria of verification. In simpler. if less
precise. words. subjective truth refers to the reality or
seriousness or "truth" of a conviction. In one way, this
notion Of truth has recently come into more popular
(though not always unambiguous) usage. The phrase most
commonly heard is, "in his moment of truth," which simp-
ly means that what a person deeply believes in is tested

in some crisis Of life.21 Such is the case when Socrates.

 

201m.’ pp. 169-820

21TO briefly illustrate by means of two examples
from recent events. we read of the candidate. running for
his party's presidential nomipation. going to California '
to face his moment of truth. (In this case. the "truth'
lies in his inward conviction that he can capture the nom-
ination, and this will be confirmed. or refuted by ensuing
events.) But this illustration is not as good because
the conviction will be clearly and objectively confirmed

17
after speaking about preparing to die, is faced with the
moment in which he can escape death as his friends ar-
ranged, or where he can (as he actually does) redupli-
cate his convictions in his actions.

Subjective truth. then, is expressed in terms of
how an individual is involved in relation to another, or
to an ideal, by way Of an earnest conviction. It is pri-
marily meant to be relevant to ethics and religion, and
though it is one Of the most controversial ideas of
Kierkegaard it is also one Of the most fundamental.

@) Involvement, again. is closely related. to
the sixth main characteristic to be considered here--
namely, the significance Of choice.22 which presupposes
that decisions are not coerced and which implies that one
is responsible for what he is and what he does. As we
shall indicate later. the existentialist looks at the
world as something incomplete; he conceives every moment
to be an Opportunity to help fashion it by choosing al-
ternatives that bring about events determined by the di-

 

or refuted. A second illustration is closer to Kierke-
gaard s idea of subjective truth. It concerns a young
ady who swam into shark-infested waters to pull ashore
her pompanion who was already attacked and near death.
Her moment Of truth appeared when her apparent convi c-
tion of the value Of human life required an immediate
action that involved an incalculable risk on her part.
In this case. the 'truth' was determined by a kind of
action that ehe was willing to consummate. and not by
the course Of external events.

22For a more detailed treatment of this topic.
see below, pp. 118-32.

18
rection Of the choice. That one is able to choose--that
is, that the choice itself is not totally determined--is
presumed on the grounds both of actual experience and of
value. In the one case. experience continually presents
itself with genuine choices and "forced Options" such
that one must act in one way or another. When a train is
departing, e.g., one cannot hesitate too long in deciding
whether or not to get aboard; he must act at once. While
in the other case. most everything to which modern man
attaches any value-~correct thinking, scientific re-
search. education. or morality--becomes uninspired and
meaningless if the participants in these activities are
firmly convinced that their thoughts and actions could be
different than they actually are.23 And so while the ex-
istentialist admits the fact that there are all sorts of
external factors that may severely limit the alternatives
presented to choice. this in no way lessens the responsi-
bility of the chooser for what he does and what he final-
ly makes Of himself. It is as if every time a person
chooses he adds a stroke to the portrait of his person-
ality that he continues to create. fashion, improve, or
distort throughout the course of his life.

antistentialists in general. and Kierkegaard in

particular. believe that a person 8 choices shape his
destiny and that the very essence Of ethics and religion
is undercut by a thorough-going. fatalistic determinism.
This is why the emphasis found in existentialist litera-
ture is heavy upon individual responsibility. where these
writers stress the necessity Of choosing. more than the
mere possibility of choice.

 

19
The Crucial Questions that the Ebtistential

Approach Raises for Religious Thought

Now these various ways Of characterizing Kierke-
gaardian existentialism give rise to certain questions.
the foremost Of which is whether or not these existen-
tial conceptions are a fruitful way Of interpreting re-
ligion or permit a better understanding Of religious cat-
egories. And this question, it seems, is best determined
by investigating in more detail the meaning of these var-
ious conceptions, such as "subjective truth." It is
hOped that the exposition and discussion that follows
might be enhanced by the device Of constrasting these
notions with those of Spinoza which are so Opposite in
character.

Therefore. the following questions have been se-
lected as crucial to the religious problem: (1) Is reli-
gion essentially a matter of reason, or Of faith? (2)
How can ”subjectivity" constitute M? (3) Is it poss-
ible to know. in virtue of logical proofs. that God ex-
ists? And (it) does religion imply the necessity Of
freedom? These questions correspond respectively to
Chapters II. III, IV, and V below.

CHAPTER II
OBJECTIVE KNOWLEIBE AND FAITH

On the issue of faith and reason, Spinoza and
Kierkegaard present us with views which are antipodal.
It is in this area that the basic contrasts are made be-
tween faith and objective knowledge, irrationalism and
rationalism. With this in mind. the present chapter can
be divided into three parts: (1) the role of reason and
understanding in religion. for Spinoza, and his rejection
Of the appropriateness Of "belief” in God; (2) the limi-
tations of knowledge and the inappropriateness Of reason
in religion, from the Kierkegaardian point Of view; (3)
the nature of faith. according to Kierkegaard, and the
issue of passion in religious faith.

The Importance of Reason and Knowledge.
for Spinoza. and Hisunisparagement
of Mere Belief in God

Spinoza, as indicated in the Preface, represents
rationalin in one of its most consistent and respected
forms, and so provides a particularly striking example of
rationalism in religion. His confidence in the method Of
reason was so complete that he saw no reason to limit its

aPpllcation to mathematics or science. If reason could

20

21
yield certain and indubitable truth in these areas. why
should such a tool be inapplicable in regard to the high-
est kind Of knowledge-~knowledge of God Himself. Hence.
the reason for using this method was to avoid error and
to produce "real knowledge" and certainty. Spinoza. Of
course. took the structureUOf geometry as the model for
all knowledge. Why should not ethics. for example, ap-
proached in the same rigorous, deductive, and impersonal
way. likewise attain knowledge that is exact and certain?
"I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly
the same manner," Spinoza asserts. "as though I were con-
cerned with lines. and planes. and solids."1 The prej-
udices Of the human mind, in particular, its tendency to
read purposes into every human activity and thought. had
all-too-long operated to conceal the truth from the human
race, according to Spinoza; whereas the method Of mathe-
matics, with its Objective consideration Of the essences
of figures. has "saved the truth" for humankind.

Thus Spinoza courageously apotheosizes reason,
considering the very nature Of reason as divine and the
ability Of the intellect as unlimited. Consequently
there can be no problem concerning the relation Of faith

and reason. or theology and philOSOphy.2 Faith and the-

 

1

WW: trans.
R.H.M. Elwes vo a; London: George Be and Sons, 1908).

II. Eihisa III. 129.

zit should be pointed out that Spinoza deals with
m different conceptions Of religion in his works. Where

22
ology have as their province the fundamental dogmas Of
Scripture, and the purpose Of these is to stir the heart
to Obedience even though many of these dogmas "contain
not a shadow Of truth." Reason "defines the dOgmas of
faith" and determines their precise truth. "for reason is
the light of the mind, and without her all things are
dreams and phantoms."3 Furthermore, reason makes no de-
mands that are contrary to human nature. for man's natu-
ral needs and wants are in accord with reason. This is
part of the total view Of Spinoza which correlates the
natural with the rational--that which is natural 13 ac-
cording tO reason. For Spinoza. reason is the "mistress
ofthe whole realm of truth"; its function is to under-
stand. its perfection is the highest goal that man should
seek, its nature is to perceive the necessity Of things
(to view everything W). for "this
necessity Of things is the very necessity of the eternal
nature of God."Ll

 

he speaks most explicitly Of defining faith (Vol. I.

W. chap- XIV) he means a
simp e Biblical faith as Opposed to philosophical un-

desstanding. This kind Of "faith" means. in his words.
a belief in God. But Spinoza conceiy'es religion in "
its highest expression in terms of an intellectual love
described toward the end Of his Rimes. These two con- -
captions Of religion are discusssd on pp. 136-37; 139-
h2.21§elow.6 His use of the word belief is discussed on
p. 9 no 0 ' ‘

W. to. 191+.

"E11113 II, PrOp. ill-I, Corol. 2, Proof.

23

Now corresponding to the necessity and sublimity
Of reason is the competence Of the human intellect. and
this. is no accidental correspondence; for just as the
very nature of reason is divine so also is the very na-
ture Of the mind itself. This is because We
mm for Spinoza. Thus the structure Of
mind accounts for its amazing power. In virtue of its
native strength the mind is capable of forming the nec-
essary intellectual tools to enable it to reach the "sum-
mit Of wisdom." In short, the ability and strength Of
the intellect is unlimited--by an increasing comprehension
of natural Objects it is capable of attaining perfection,
even the knowledge Of God. Hence Spinoza's well-known
proposition, "The more we understand particular things,
the more do we understand Cod."5 Here is a radically
different kind Of rationalism than is found in more com-
mon forms of religious philosophy. such as Thomism. in
that the human mind, for Spinoza, is able to know the
very W of God.

It is for this reason that man should not have
mere beliefs6 about God when he is endowed with the abil-

 

5m. V, PrOp. 2b..
6While the word "belief" is used here in its
quite ordinary sense. as-in The child believes that
fairies are real.‘ it is by no means an unambiguous
term. It is common. for example. for philOSOphers to
{rams empirical judgments in terms of belief. such as

I believe this paper is white. Unlike Plato. who more
clearly distinguishes between knowledge and belief.
Spinoza considers belief as an inferior "mode of knowl-

21+
ity to understand Him. TO believe without "pi-cots" is
unwise, even vicious, for two reasons: (1) mere belief
permits a person to entertain any kind Of false or "in-
adequate" ideas which might result from his prejudices.
passions, or limited perspective, and (2) Spinoza is con-
vinced of the principle that anything invisible can only
be grasped by the mind, and that Objects intellectually
perceived can be apprehended only by means Of proofs. in
the manner set out in the wee. Where there is no such
apprehension and under standing there is only ignorance
and doubt. Why, then. should any rational person not
seek to understand God? If "any tell us that it is not
necessary to understand the Divine attributes. but that
we must believe them simply without proof , he is plain-
1y trifling."7 The objectivity of knowledge. on this
view. and the certainty that pertains to it. is specifi-
cally mentioned here because Of the fundamental contrast
it provides with Kierkegaard's conception of faith and
the uncertainty that pertains to it.

Just as the function Of reason is to understand.

 

sdge"--mor;e”specifscallyureferring to it as "hearsay."
Opinions guess." and surmise. It is this inferior
kind Of knowledge. that-Spinoza contrasts with under-
standing. It shouls be mentionegl, Of course. that Spinoza
also uses the term true belief. but this is a reference
to a different and higher stage of knowledge. See Vol. I.
W. pp. 8-11. and A
‘10- h ‘z. ‘ u .00 ,2. an thus-n ‘J- ‘:.. ‘ (Chicago:
"en curt, 1909 3 pp. "30

7W. p. 178.

25
so the content of this understanding is objective and ir-
refutable "real knowledge," as Spinoza calls it. Of the
four typesof knowledge. or more prOperly speaking, the
four "modes of perception" that Spinoza describes in the
WW. it is only the latter
two that constitute genuine knowledge. These two, infer-
ence and intuition, both deal with the intellectually
grasped essences Of things. And yet it is only rational
intuition that yields indubitable 1mowledge--knowledge
that involves no risk of error. knowledge that puts one
in possession of perfection. knowledge which consists Of
"true and adequate ideas, " unchanging and eternal. inde-
pendent Of the individualIWho appropriates them. For if a
per son apprehends the very essence of a thing. how can he
be mistaken? Spinoza, in the tradition of Plato and Des-
cartes. just could not conceive of a clear and distinct
idea being false, because such ideas are either simple
(such as a straight line) or compounded out Of simple
ideas (such as a triangle); and for anyone to assert
that a simple self-evidently true idea is false. is to
both misunderstand the nature of understanding and the
nature of truth and falsehood. Thus. possession Of the
true idea of a thing. i.e., apprehending its subjective
essence. is the standard of truth which involves the
greatest certainty available to man and implies the most
Perfect kind of Objective knowledge. As Spinoza argues,

26

NO one. who has a true idea. is ignorant that a true

idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a

true idea is only another expression for knowing a

thing perfectly. or as well as possible. No one, in-

deed. can doubt Of this. . . . Further. what can

there be more clear. and more certain, than a true

idea as a standard of truth? Even as light displays

both itself and darkness. so is truth a standard both

Of itself and of falsity.8

In this discussion of knowledge. truth. and cer-

tainty. a few comments should be made that are relevant
to the topic at hand. First, Spinoza. being a cartesian
rationalist, believed in the doctrine of innate ideas.
ideas common to all men which form a universal basis for
all rational knowledge. but he did not believe that all
notions are common to all men. Second. again like Des-
cartes, Spinoza never questions the rationalist analysis
Of what constitutes genuine knowledge, especially the
presupposition that understanding essences in the mathe-
matical realm is the same as understanding essences in
the realm Of things; and like Descartes. he continually
reverts to geometrical illustrations (especially tri-
angles). And third. particularly significant for our
purposes here. is Spinoza's doctrine that knowledge
changes passion into emotion. This doctrine in itself
is not so striking. as is his explanation Of how this
happens--namely. his identification of volition with the
understanding. or more accurately, his reduction of the

emotional to the rational. Passions, for Spinoza. are

 

8m II. PrOp. 143. note.

27
a sort of misunderstanding. All that is meant by "will"
is various acts of volition, and all acts of volition I
are (confused) ideas; therefore whenever an individual
”desires" something, or when he "strives" toward some
goal, he'simply does not understand the nature of things.
Such a person. in effect, does not really get. One might
say. instead, that he is "pushed"; for in his failure to
perceive the adequate causes of things. he is at the mer-
cy Of causes external to himself. In this case, as
Spinoza puts it, his mind is "passive," his perception
is dim. his desires are "irrational." Thus. the trans-
formation Of a passionate desire into a prOper emotion
amounts to the power Of reason producing the change from
an "irrational desire" into a rational one.

. According to Spinoza's view. then, all the human
faculties and emotions are ”modes of thinking," since man
is basically a rational creature.9 In contrast to this
aspect of rationalism, Kierkegaard may certainly be re-
garded as an "irrationalist," in that he considers voli-

 

9"The essence Of man . . . is constituted by cer-
tain modes Of the sttributes of God. namely . . . by the
modes Of thinking. (we II, Prep. 11. Proos.) And in
the Corollary to the same Proposition we read that she
human mind is part of the infinite intellect Of God.
However in Part III. after speaking of use passive em-
otions. Spinoza defines man ss follows: Deeue is the
actual essence Of'man,' and 'by the term-desire. then. I
here mean all men s endeavors, i ulses. ap etites, and
yOlitions.‘ (Definitions Of the otions. ef. l and.
Dcpl.) In-this latter place it appears as if Spinoza s
conception of man may not be so singularly different
from that of Kierkegaard.

28
tion and passion as non-intellectual functions more bas-
ic than thought and. to a great extent, determinative Of
actual thinking.
The Limitations Of Knowledge and the
Inappropriateness of Reason in
Religion, from Kierkegaard's
Point Of View
In considering the limitations of reason and ob-

jective knowledge one is reminded that the problem and
scope of knowledge was not as great in the seventeenth
century as it is today. It is little wonder that Spinoza
could aim at grasping the Whole in a sense that modern
man is not likely to attempt. Similarly, the confidence
in pure reason, so unquestioned by the rationalists of
that period, is almost non-existent in our day. At least
this is the case in modern science and philOSOphy. And
yet when it comes to religion, faith in the competence of
human reason is as strong as ever, as indicated in the

movements Of Liberalism. Neo-thomism. Humanism. and Fun-
damentalism.10 It is in Opposition to such religious

 

10Fundamentalism. of course. is a broad term
that covers many variations of conservative religion.
and it is often caricaturized as pure fanaticism and ir-
rationalism. In some cases this ascription is quite cor-
rect. although ths movement is more ascuratsly described
by such some as Biblical literalism and philosophical
naivete. 0n the-whole. however. it is more rationalis-
tic than-its Opponents are prepared to admit. Two emi-
nent spokesman for fundamentalism might be mentioned here.
(1) J. Gresham Machen. co-founder of Westminster Theologi-
cal Seminary, a generation ago produced a series of books
in which he argued that the 1mm]. (in religion) is the
irrationalist. (2) Edward J. Carnell. who is perhaps the
leading contemporary fundamentalist theologian and phi los-

29
philosophies. which are basically rationalistic. that
the phenomenon Of Nee-orthodoxy has appeared in recent
times. This religious philos0phy has been variously des-
ignated as ”anti-intellectualism." "anti-rationalism." or
"irrationalism." due mostly to the primacy it gives to
faith over reasOn and its depreciation of the relevance
Of reason in religion. Kierkegaard is an acknowledged
source Of much that is involved in this view, and we shall
turn to see what position he articulates in regard to the
role Of reason and the limitations of knowledge in con.-
nection with religious faith.

The first thing to notice. in regard to reason,
is that Kierkegaard is a rational thinker who accepts
the necessity for rational thought. with certain qualifi-
cations. even in religion. In the W. he empha-
sizes the fact that the religious man must reason in un-
derstanding his faith lest any nonsense should slip in
under the guise of "faith.” Thought is to be used in de-
fining. clarifying. and relating one's faith to the var-
ious areas Of knowledge. and where intellectual problems
arise which demand strenuous thought the individual
should not take refuge in intuition. mystery, or "blind
faith." According to Kierkegaard. the task or thought

 

Opher. has defended Biblical conservatism as the most
rational and coherent view of man and the universe.
Among his many books. W2-
geuee (Grand Rapids. Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publish-

ing 00., 191i8). provides a good example Of his rational-
8m.

30

is to discern what is comprehensible from that which is
incomprehensible, and to recognize its own limits.11 The
religious thinker, therefore, "cannot believe [nonsense]
against the understanding. for'pracisely the understand-
ing will discern that it is nonsense and will prevent him
from believing it; but he makes so much use of the under-
standing that he becomes aware Of the incomprehensible,
and than he holds to this. believing against the under-

 

11The words "incomprehensible." "nonsense," "par—

adox," and 'contradiction" all call for some comment here,
since-Kierkegsard s free use sf these terms suggests that
he is surely against reason. " Perhaps the strongest of
these terms is contradistion. which is discussed below,
p. 37. n. 22. Ths word paradox is Often used in she
general sense of something difficult to usderstand or
having the appearance of a contradiction. but its—si'g-
nifisantly singular rsferent is Christ (the 'Paradox.

the Absolute garadox')"who, as the object Of Christian
faith. is the God-Man, a conception that Kierkegaard
says is repugnant to common-sense. See below,"p. 1:3, s.
28. and also Kierkegaard. s elaboration Of the Offence

in W. trans. Walter Lowrie (Prince-
ton: rinceton University Press, 19%). pp. 79-llili. The
most complete discussion Of the Paradox is found in m-

W. trans. David F. Swanson (Princeton:
rinceton Universsty Press. 1916). pp. 29-143. The Para-
dox, further. is incomprehensible. which means that it
cannot be understood as. let us say. a mathematical the-
orem may be understood or grasped by the intellect. The
Paradox, however. is not incomprehensible in the sense Of
a mathematisal surd. n.r is it directly Opposed to reason
(something irrational ). nor is it something infra- or
supra-rational, belonging to some area of truth not avail-
able tO ordinary reason. It is. "rather, something that
thought cannot think; is is the Ignkno . " Still. Kierke-
gaard holds. it is not nonsense. for by- nonsense' he
seems to mean such things as square-circles or trivial
foolishness. Nevertheless, a serious problem is involved
here: In what way does Kierkegaard distiu ish the Para-
dox (which is 'foolishness to the Greeks from other
foolishness or-nonsense? This dsfficulty is not lessened
by his exslicit use of the word absurdity" in the Beet-
Enfim. See the discussion of Christian faith on pp.
2" 3. below.

 

31

12 In short, Kierkegaard is not at all Opposed

standing."
to using reason in religious thought, as long as a person
knows where it is applicable and where its limitations
lie.
Secondly, Kierkegaard's Objection to the function

Of systematic thought is that it tends to blur the dis-
tinction between thought and being, and this has impor-
tant ethical implications. Even on the less speculative
level Of Objective scientific thinking. Kierkegaard argues
that such thought is "abstract”--i.e., it abstracts from
exixtence.13 Kierkegaard further distinguishes between
"pure" and ”abstract" thought. "Pure" thought pertains
to philosOphical idealism, the manipulation Of meanings
and implications as in the case of Hegelian dialectic.
where the movement of reality corresponds to. and is
identified with. the order of thought. The reliability.
if not the legitimacy. of such thought. Kierkegaard
feels, is highly questionable. Validity of thought is
one thing; to confuse it with reality is another.

The triumphant victory of pure thought, that in it

being and thought are one, is something both to

laugh at and to weep over. since in the realm of

ure thought it is not even possible to distinguish

em. . . . That thought has validity was assumed
by Greek philosophy without question. By reflect-

1W. p. 50h.

13Kierkegaard asserts that the medium of abstract
thought is always possibility, not reality. “Abstract
thought can. get hold of reality only by nullifying it."
he writes. 'and this nullification Os reality consists-
in transforming it into possibility. 1mg... p. 279.

 

 

 

32
ing over the matter one would have to arrive at the
same result; but why confuse the validity Of thought
with reality? A valid thought is a possibility, and
EXEWafiflfihfi‘é Elflézfiaa‘isti’é’fi‘féfiiidiu‘s real °r
On the other hand. Kierkegaard refers to scientif-
ic thought as "abstract," as it also lays emphasis on the
content Of thought rather than on the thinker. But such
knowledge is reliable and useful. precisely because it is
impersonal and objective. and yet, it negates the exist-
ence of actual things. Kierkegaard describes abstract
thought as "thought without a thinker. . . . it ignores
everything except the thought" ; and he asks. "What can
it then mean to ask in the language Of abstraction about
reality in the sense of existence. seeing that abstract
thought abstracts precisely from existence?"15 This is
an important matter to Kierkegaarduthat both systematic
pure thought and abstract scientific thought tend to
"negate" the thinker, in that such thought serves to re-
move the existing subject from the concrete situations
which involve the necessity to make decisions. In so
far as a person is able to think spent conflicting posi-
tions or alternative ways Of action, he is essentially
not in the conflict. And as long as a person can isolate
a position in thought and calmly reflect upon it, he can

probably do the same with alternative positions or pos-

l’hudu p. 292.
15112151.. p. 296.

 

33

sible ways Of action. because in reflection one deals
merely with possibilities. It is only when a person
places himself in the position where he must actualize
one of the alternative possibilities that he begins to
experience the tension involved in serious choices.

This is what Kierkegaard refers to when he says
that when a person minke he does not "exist." In re-
flection one "loses himself" in thought. so to speak. and
by so doing he removes himself from the existential situ-
ation.16 Of course one exists (in the sense that there
has to be a thinking person) whenever he thinks, but
Kierkegaard's point is that when one is thinking he does
not act, deal with others, love. hate, or become involved
in various human situations. This, then, is the danger
Of abstract thought for the "existing individual," that
it "requires him to become disinterested in order to ac-
quire knowledge. On the other hand, "the ethical demand
is that he become infinitely interested in existing. "17
Reason. on Kierkegaard' 5 view. does not necessarily mit-
igate ethical choice--it may even intensify it. as a per-
son rolls over in his mind all the possibilities pre-
sented to thought--it may. indeed. paralyze action it-
self as the individual contemplates the consequences of

16In a way. reflective thought is something like
day-dreaming. in which one forgets. or ignores. his ac-

fual needs and the concrete situation in which he actual-
y is.

 

171m. , p. 280.

3h

one course Of action or another. This, of course, is a
basic existentialist conviction: reason cannot eliminate
the basic risk involved in making personal decisions.18

From this point of view, than, Objective knowl-
edge is limited as tO its apprOpriateness in religion,
and may even be deceptive and harmful to religious sen-
sitivity. This does not mean that such knowledge as a
whole is unreliable or insignificant. nor does Kierke-
gaard deny its practical importance. His complaint is
that objective knowledge, invaluable in areas such as sci-
ence and history, should be thought equally applicable and
necessary in personal religions Whether or not Kierke-
gaard is justified ‘when he refers to objective thinking
as "irreligious," his intention is to emphasize that re-
ligion is a sphere wherein' such knowledge .is inept.

Now "the term ”religious knowledge," like "reli-
gious thought." may refer to more than one'thingn Just
as the latter may be thought about religious matters 91

 

18For example. an expression of this conviction
is found in David F. Swanson. WWW
111W. ed. Lillian M. Swepson Phil-
ade phia: Iestminster ress. 1919), p. 101i. 'Reflection
is no doubt a factor in the solution of such practical
and vital problems as confront the individual. but alone
and unaided it is quite powerless to solve any human
problem, except such as are already solved. in a certain
sense. before reflection upon them begins. When we find
ourselves assuming that cognition or reflection deter-
mines us univocally to a line of action. it is because
we fail to bring our chief underlying presuppositions to
consciousness. Or we are perhaps dominated by a predi-
lection for some special possibility. hOpeful or despair-
ing; and this excludes from our consciousness alterna-
tives equally possible. ’

35
thought that is infused by a religious perspective. so

the former may refer either to objective information de-
scriptive of religious phenomena 9:, convictions earned by
personal experience. And yet, while this distinction has
generally been recognized, it has usually been the case
that both exponents and Opponents Of religion have taken
"religious knowledge" to mean Objective information or
theological facts. Religious knowledge in me sense is
Objective, neutral. and available for anyone to accept

or to reject. or even to acknowledge with personal de-
tachment in the way an inquirer might apprOpriate any
other kind of knowledge. Such disinterested religious
knowledge is propositional in form and implies the usual
criteria for distinguishing other types of objective and
scientific knowledge.

But Christianity.19 according to the analysis Of
Kierkegaard, is not an "objective faith"--he considers
this to be a contradiction in terms--nor does it consist
in a collection of doctrines or Objective truths. For an
objective faith. as he sees it, is "a sum Of doctrinal
prepositions." whereas a serious personal religion is
nothing Of the kind. Neither is Christianity an objec-

 

19Since Christianity is the frame of reference
within which Kierkegaard expounds his religious philos-
OPhY. I have not hesitated to retain this concrete term
Wherever it facilstates the exposition. Oneucould. how-
ever. substitute "being seriously resigious. 9r some
such phrase. for Christianity and Christian without
seriously altering the argument. - -

36

tive thing. such as a philosophical system, a temporal
institution, or (simply) an historical event. True faith
only exists in individual persons; in this context it ex-
ists in the form Of selves striving to "become" Chris-
tians. i.e., striving to embody a way of life.. In the
words of a contemporary religious writer, "even if every-
one gave intellectual assent to a set of dOctrinal prepo-
sitions, Christianity would not exist unless someone em-
bodied in his life what these propositions refer to.""’30
The constant theme of the W is not "Which dOc-
trine must I believe?" but "How do I become a Christian?",
and this is a question which emphasizes the subjective ap-
propriation Of a faith-Object as being more important than
the precise conception of that Object itself. This will
be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Accordingly, the main reason why objective knowl-
edge is inapprOpriate in religion. on this view. is that
religion, similar to love. is known from the "'inside'; it
is something heartfelt and constraining rather than some-
thing informative and intellectually grasped. Religious
faith has more to do with an act of commitment than it
has with gaining certain information about God. man, or
the nature Of the universe. Hence, objective knowledge
is not false but irrelevant to the subjective commitment
of faith, simply because knowledge consists in a cogni-
tive relation between a thinker and the object Of his

 

BOROberts. mu p- 95-

37
knowledge. It is a mental activity in which the objects-

known are considered apart from the knower's relationship
to them; whereas in existential religion the Object of
faith is held to be a personal kind Of reality with

which the believer becomes vitally concerned, not with
his mind but with his whole being.21 According to Kierke-
gaard. this is what makes possible the distinction between
mm what Christianity is and being a Christian. In
connection with a 519.931.1112 such a distinction is unthink-
able. for one either apprehends thedoctrine or he does
not. But the fact that this distinction is meaningful.
Kierkegaard argues, is an indication that Christianity
has commonly been transformed into a doctrine that asks

to be understood,22 and this. of course, is a misconcep-

 

211n religious existentialism. "subjective"
snowledgs is more akin to what is meant-when we speak of
knowing a person--that is. the reference goes beyond
mars y knogrijng certain things about someone. See below,
p. 9 no 0

2 . p. 339. "Christianity is not a
doctrine but an existential1 communication expressing an
existentias contradiction. The term existential com-
munication here is a reference to Kierkegaard s conten-
tion that Christianity is not a philosophical or specula-
tive dsctrine. and so he merely uses the termnto distin-
guish Christianity as something-known from Chsistian-
ity as-ssmething-lived. In regard tO-the term contra-
diction. some clarification is required. Kierkegaard
uses this term quite freely in different contexts. (1)
In general. the uses the word to designate an incongruity
between one s statements and his actions. which results
in either the comic or the tragic. depending upon one 3
point Of view. There are many illustrations of this in

the lengthy footnote in the EQSISQIIRI pp. 159-62. He
also points out many "csntradictions Of this sort in

his biting W"! trans. waiter
Lowrie (Boston: Beacon ress. l9 .- (2) But more im-

 

38
tion Of religious mm.

In the following passage from the 29.31.552.121.
Kierkegaard sums up much of the above discussion and
makes the observation that faith differs from an intel-
lectual doctrine in virtue of its manner Of mediation:

The Object Of faith is the reality of another, and
the relationship is one of infinite interest. The
object of faith is not a doctrine. for than the re-
lationship would be intellectual, and it would be of
importance not to botch it. but to realize the maxi-
mum intellectual relationship. The Object Of faith
is not a teacher with a doctrine; for when a teacher
has a doctrine the doctrine is e9_1;p_ee more important
than the teacher. and the relationship is again in-
tellectual. and it again becomes important not to
botch it. big to realize the maximum intellectual re-
lationship.

 

The point Of interest here is in regard to the importance
of the teacher in the faith-relationship. Knowledge is
independent Of the mediator Of it--it does not require
the teacher. But when it comes to mm. the Object Of
faith is closely linked with the content of faith. that

 

portant for our purposes is the wsy he uses this term in
reference to Christianity. Hera contradiction means
the W. where the object Of faith can-
not be comprehended by reason but belongs tonthe area of
faith. (See below, pp. li2-li3.) His use Of contradic-
tion always refers to existense and to what may app
absurd. as in the case of the Sign Of Contradiction
where Christ signifies that he is the very Opposite to
what he appears to be (Divine Being. yet ordinary car-
penter). Thus Kierkegaard. as I understand him. neither
prescribes nor intends to embrace any 1921.951 contradic-
tions. That which he rsfers to are exietemiel contra-
dictions. The God-man is perhaps the most important
example. Another is the intense conflict generated with-
in the finite and human individual whenever such a one
seeks to base his eternal happiness on a relationship to

something historical- (See the 295.13.911.21. p. BAG).
23mm... p. 290.

 

39
is, the object of faith is the teacher.2" Now a mo-

ment's reflection will lead us to Observe that where
religion is purveyed as an objective doctrine. the pur-
veyor becomes the Object Of faith-«as in the case of
Mohammad, the Church, the Saints. or the Bible; those
who have medjetee the faith tend to become the phlegm
Of faith. for these have given the condition Of faith.
It is not only that Objective knowledge has cer-
tain limitations when applied to religion. but from the
existential-religious position it also produces some
maleficent effects. Three of these might be noted here.
The first is what Kierkegaard regards as the senseless
accumulation of knowledge about everything except what it
means to live ethically. He contends that Objective re-
flection tends to remove the individual from the exis-
tential situation in which he finds himself. where his
needs. interests. personal concerns and responsibility
are of utmost importance. There is a sense in which a
great quantity Of knowledge or an abnormal engagement in
its pursuit might qualitatively "cheat men out Of the
simple. profound and passionate wonder which give impe-
tus to the ethical."25 Second. knowledge often gets
confused with virtue itself, a view which. if held bald-

 

” 2km Kserkegaard's terms, the teacher contributes
the condition of faith.

2b-This quotation from Kierkegaard's We is

cited in the editor's Introduction to the W.
p. xv.

ho
1y, permits no distinction between good or bad knowledge,
that is. knowledge put to base or to noble use. Am
third. the attempt to maintain that religious affirma-
tions are a kind of Objective knowledge produces a prob-
lem concerning the meaning of religious assertions, since
the method by which putative knowledge is considered to
be reliable includes criteria which automatically rule
out the possibility of knowledge that is not verifiable
by sense-Observation. That this has been insisted upon
by modern positivism is a contribution to clearer think-
ing even though it constitutes an obvious dilemma for tra-
ditional theology--the dilemma Of asserting that theolog-
ical propositions are cognitive and sensible. and yet
fail to provide any clear criterion Of meaning by which
the sensible prOpositions can be determined from the non-
sensible. This problem, it might be noted. applies with
more severity to traditional religious views which main-
tain that religious propositions are genuine factual
statements descriptive of actual Objects and events. It
is Of interest to note here that Kierkegaard's position
that religion is not concerned with factual statements
or doctrines. and Spinoza's view that the dogmas Of
faith are not meant to be true assertions about divine

things, both appear to avoid me problem. at least.

MI
The Nature Of Faith, According to
Kierkegaard, and the Issue of
Passion in Religious Faith

Up to this point we have considered: (1) the im-
portance of reason and knowledge. for Spinoza, and his
criticism of mere belief in God as unreasonable and un-
wise; and (2) the inappropriateness Of reason and knowl-
edge in religion, from the Kierkegaardian point of view.
Here we have Observed a two-fold attitude toward reason
and knowledge. On the one hand, both rational thought
and Objective knowledge are accepted as desirable and
necessary; while on the other hand. they are considered.
to be misplaced endeavors when applied to the sphere of
religious faith. Some reasons as to why this is so have
already been indicated. Further reasons will emerge as
we look into the nature of faith, as Kierkegaard sees it.
and the issue Of passion in religious faith.

Faith. or belief, has three different references
in the writing of Kierkegaard. all Of which maintain the
same basic idea contained in the first definition given
herewith:

(l) Belief, OIW. means the appro-
priation Of something for which the evidence is not con-
clusive; that is. the trust one might have in the actual-
ity. efficacy. or existence Of something that is objec-
tively uncertain. (For example. one might believe. or
"feel sure." that there is some form of life on planets

other than our own, or one might believe in the inevita-

1+2
bility of some future event, etc.)

(2) W means the appropriation of an
Object Of faith (God). which is objectively uncertain,
with the utmost passion Of inwardness. This means going
beyond what one can reasonably know or feel sure of, and
positing the reality of a being which transcends the nat-
ural order Of things. This object of faith implies the
creativity and sustenance of value, which in turn, if
taken seriously. involves a re-orientation in the be-
liever's mode Of existence.

(3) W means the laying hold of an
incongruity or paradox, which is not only objectively un-
certain but ostensibly a contradiction, with the infi-
nite“?6 passion Of inwardness. The "Absolute Paradox" is
that the infinite God should enter into a finite man,

 

26Since the word "infinite" is used in different
ways by both Kierkegaard and Spinoza. it deserves some
comment here. Kierkegaard often uses this term to ex-
press the highest degree of intensity in regard to car--
tais states of feelisg orflreflection. as innthe case of
an infinite concern or infinite passion. (Foruan
illustration Of this, see p. 116, n. 22. below.) Infi-
nite is also used to indicate the absolute otherness and
indeterminateness of the"Supreme seing. although it is
not clsar to ms whesher absosute (in this context)
means extreme or complete. Spinoza. on the other .
hand. may be clearer in his use of theuterm infinite.‘
In referring to something as infinite in its own kind."
he means that it has more Of some quality than anything
else of the same kind. The intension here is quantita-
tive or corsrparative, but still descriptive. But Spinoza
also uses infinite in referenceuto God. in a way thas
is similar to Kierkegaard. The absolutely infinite.
for Spinoza. is a reference to the inexhaustible. un-
limited, and unique attributes of God which are beyond
enumeration and description. m I, Def. 1. and Elpl.

”3

that being should unite with becoming, that the eternal
and perfect should become involved with the temporal and
imperfect. However this may be expressed, Kierkegaard
refers to it as "a cruxifixion of the understanding"?7
which intensifies passion to an infinite degree.

There are actually two ways in which faith in-
volves the paradoxical. In regard to Christianity, the
idea Of a "God-man" is an "absurdity." that is, it cannot
be understood by the intellect; and so here the Paradox.
which is a person, is a "stumbling block unto the Jews"

and "foolishness unto the Greeks.“ In this case the Par-
adox, being an Obstacle to the understanding. produces
what Kierkegaard refers to as the offense W.28
Hence his definition or Christian faith is that "Chris-
tianity is the absurd, hold fast in the passion of the
infinite."29 In the second place. the nature of faith
itself is paradoxical because its Object (God) cannot be

an Object Of knowledge. As an "Object Of faith" God is

 

27See below. p. I48. 11. 35.

28W. "of the highest degree." As .

Lowrie and Swanson explain in the introduction to the
. it is tlse paradox that keeps faith from be-

coming knowledge. What renders faith perpetually uneasy
(i.e.. what insures that it shall always remain faith and
not become knowledge) is the paradox and the possibility
Of the Offense. In its extremest expression. the paradox
is the God-Man. the fact that a man's relation to his
eternal blessedness is dependent upon something histori-
cal. something morsover which. by its very nature, cannot
become historical. (p. xviii.)

2911219... p. 192.

an
absurd in the sense that He is not a knowable entity.
To say that God is "spirit” is not to assert that He is
a "thing" which can be described in terms of ordinary
descriptive language; or to assert that God is a "being
everywhere present, and yet One" is not vary illuminat-
ing even though it may be intelligible. But an Objec-
tive faith. on the other hand. involves descriptive prOp-
ositions which presuppose an Object of knowledge, and so
make knowledge at least a possibility. This will not do
for Kierkegaard. His position is that even We
knowledge precludes faith. as illustrated in the follow-

ing quotation from the 215.133.911.121-

Suppose a man who wishes to acquire faith; let the
comedy begin. He wishes to have faith. but he wishes
also to safeguard himself by means of an Objective
inquiry and its approximation-process. What happens?
With the help of the approximation-process the absurd
becomes something different; it becomes probable. it
becomes increasingly probable. it becomes extremely
and emphatically probable. Now he is ready to believe
it. and he ventures to claim for himself that he does
not believe as shoemakers and tailors and simple folk
believe. but only after long deliberation. Now he is
ready to believe it; and lo, now it has become pre-
cisely impossible to believe it. Anything that is
almost probable. or probable. or extremely and em-
phatically probable. is something he can almost know.
or as good as know, or extremely and emphatically al-
most know--but it is impossible to believe. For the
absurd is the Object g8 faith, and the only Object
that can be believed.

That religious faith involves an object that can-
not be known. means that a "leap" is necessary in which
the believer apprOpriates or grasps the object of faith.

 

30mg... n- 189.

#5

But such a leap involves "risk.

struggle.’ and uncer-
tainty, and consequently, "passion." These aspects of
subjective faith, all closely related, should be brief-
ly considered.

The leap perhaps needs least comment, although
it is Of the most crucial importance in Kierkegaard's
conception Of faith. The essence of the leap is choice
and, within the present framework. a decision of the
highest significance; it is a decisive commitment, or as
Kierkegaard puts it. an "all or nothing" affair. It is
not the assimilation of doctrines or an assent to creeds.
but a decision that a certain kind of orientation (given
expression in the life of Christ) is definitive of a most
meaningful sort of life. The leap is not blind, as it is
when one chooses a number in gambling, but is a movement
toward a position that presents itself as worthy of total
commitment. Neither is it a movement guaranteed by evi-
dence. information, or logic. for though the intelligence
may clearly define it in contrast to Opposing choices,
the leap itself is non-rational. Unlike many "leaps Of
faith" made in daily life, this leap is a constantly re-
newed acquisition rather than a once-made decision--it is
more Of a continuous resolution than a logical conclusion.

That choice involves risk is Obvious if the
choice is a genuine one. that is. if the alternatives
are real possibilities. Sometimes faith is used to de-

scribe a situation where the grounds for a particular

#6

choice is so loaded that one cannot help but make that
particular choice. In like manner the prospective ad-
herent to a religion Often demands that he blow in ad-
vance that the sacrifice'demanded by his faith is worth
the price. But this is to lessen the risk and mitigate
the choice. In the case of a genuinely serious religious
faith the risk is absolute. Such a faith, as Kierkegaard
presents it. demands not only that one venture his life
and its prizes but that he risk his thought-~to believe
against the understanding. Thus. "when faith resolves
to believe it runs the risk of committing itself to an
error, but it nevertheless believes. There is no other
road to faith; if one wishes to escape risk, it is as if
one wanted to know with certainty that he can swim before
going into the water."31

And just as the "leap" is a continuous affair,
so the risk involved is also continuous. Faith, risk.
venture. the whole thing is a process of becoming some-
thing else. This is why no one simply is a believer,
but constantly becomes a believer as he lives under the
conviction that a God exists. Faith is a constant strug-
gle.32 and it is therein that its value lies; not in at-

31Trasnania. p. 68-

" 32A misconception Of Luther's doctrine "by faith
alone is the idea that faith is an easy thing. In an
imaginary dialogue between a "Christian' and Luther. the
latter makes it clear that "faith is a turbulent thing."

Kierkegaard. Windham. pp. 10-1”-

 

in

taining or acquiring but in a constantly renewed commit-
ment in the face Of constant doubt; not to acquire but
to preserve. for the soul must be saved, so to speak.
from the understanding.

"Without risk there is no faith" and without risk
there is no passion. It is the passionate side Of man.
Kierkegaard emphasizes. that furnishes the movement from
detached and logical examination of alternative positions
to active involvement in one Of them. And in the strug-
gle of faith, passion is present in its maximum where
doubt is to be overthrown by a passionate effort of the
will. "Belief and doubt are not two forms of knowledge."
he writes. "determinable in continuity with one another,
for neither of them is a cognitive act; they are Opposite
passions."33

The difficulty of Christian faith is holding
fast to what is incomprehensible, and this is why passion
is accentuated to the highest degree. or as Kierkegaard
Often expresses it. with the "infinite passion Of in-

 

33m., p. 69. Kierkegaard does not subscribe
to the position that belief and doubt are varying degrees
of assent and reservation, more or less inversely related
on the same continuum (knowledge). He thinks, rather.
that belief and doubt are acts Of volition--that is. will-
ingness or unwillingness to ive assent. Greek scepti-
cism. he argues. is an illus ration of this. The scep-
tics did not deny the validity Of sensations or immediate
cognitions. but willed to keep the mind in suspense by
refusing to draw conclssions. According to Kierkegaard.
belief excludes doubt and doubt excludes belief. and
neither are held to be kind Of knowledge. W,

pp 0 67-69 0

1+8

wardness." This is a subjective task which does not
avoid the risk "in which passion chooses and continues
to live, reaffirming its choice."3’* Certainty. on the
other hand, displaces faith, since certainty and the
passion Of faith are incommensurate. When faith loses
its passion, therefore. it is being replaced by knowl-
edge or indifference, certainty or unconcern.

Faith. then. according to the religious-existen-
tial point of view. is quite unlike the more common con-
ceptions of faith or belief. It is not a "mock battle"
the outcome Of which is already assured. but a genuine
struggle that implies the real possibility of defeat.
Faith is not, as Aquinas pictured it. the acceptance of
facts upon the authority of another. Nor is it a provi-
sional assent to religious assertions that will gradual-
ly become more probable. and hence better warranted.
Neither is faith something produced by thought. One does
not become a "believer" by means of reflection. although
reflection may be utilized in the process of so becoming.
As noted above. the Paradox prevents faith from turning
into understanding. "The dialectical aspect Of the prob-
lem requires thought-passion--not to want to understand
it. but to understand what it means to break thus with
the understanding and with thinking."35

31W: p° I410

3511219... p. 505 This play on words. most like-

ly intentional on Kierkegaard' a part. calls for some ex-

 

1+9

It is not uncommon for religious writers to speak
about a special kind of "knowing" in regard to religious
matters. but Kierkegaard is not one Of these. Knowledge
ordinarily refers to the factual and the probable. and
Kierkegaard will have nothing to do with either proba-
bility or certainty. If one says "I believe" and means
"it is probable that." he misunderstands the nature Of
religious faith, for one cannot both believe and know
the same thing. Since knowledge usually implies a meas-
ure Of understanding, Kierkegaard uses various illustra-
tions to indicate the essential difference between be-
lieving and understanding. perhaps the best Of which is
his likening faith to launching out into deep water. The
wader, the person who approaches God as a likely hypoth-
esis. "feels his way with his foot. lest he get beyond
his depth; and so the shrewd and prudent man feels his
way with the understanding in the realm Of the probable."
The believer. on the other hand, goes way out "lying up-
on the deep, the seventy thousand fathoms. in order there
to find God. . . . The probable is therefore so little to
the taste of a believer that he fears it most Of all,

 

lication. By the phrase "to underssand what it means

O break shus with tlse understanding he means that a per-
son must somprehend "that the nature Of religious faith
is not to understand something but to 49, something--
just as one might say that the thing to understand
spent a personal relationship (such as that between a
father and son) is that such a relationship is not an
intellectual one. and that its.essence does not consist
in something being rationally 'understood."

50

since he well knows that when he clings to probabilities
it is because he is beginning to lose his faith."36 The
W. on Kierkegaard's view, believes against the un-
derstanding, and cannot escape risk, struggle. and pas-

sion. TO take faith seriously means to abandon the pre-
tense Of knowing or understanding, and to replace the un-
derstanding with faith; for the person who would replace
faith with understanding. or would identify the two, or

would seek to "catch a glimpse of some higher understand-

ing." is by this very endeavor being W1.

 

36mm. pp. 208-09-

CHAPTER III
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TRUTH

Kierkegaard's conception of truth as "subjective"
constitutes a radical departure from the long established
tradition of objective truth in philosophy and science.
One is reminded of the great rationalistic thinkers--
Plato. descartes. and Spinoza. among others, who placed
such emphasis on the objectivity Of truth. asserting that
its status is independent of those who embrace it, and
claiming that its nature compels assent and its ideal
commands allegiance. And then too. there is the impres-
sive line of empirical thinkers. for whom the ascertain-
ment Of truth and elimination of error presupposed the
Objectivity of truth. It seems as if a primary Objective
in ascertaining truth is to permit assertions concerning
ideas and states Of affairs that are not effected by the
way in which an individual appropriates them. But the
term "subjective" suggests mere Opinion and even personal
distortion of reason and fact. How, then, can "subjec-
tivity" constitute "truth"? Before we consider this
question, however, we might briefly review some of the

main ways in which truth has traditionally been conceived.

51

52

Traditional Theories Of Truth:
Truth is Objective

In spite Of the more searching and puzzling ques-
tion sometimes phrased as "What is Truth?", most philos-
Ophers have aimed at more practical analyses Of truth
that might be applicable to the assertions made in sci-
ence, history. and the ordinary course of life. In these
attempts, truth has been conceived as a quality of propo-
sitions rather than an ascription to reality. As an at-
tribute of propositions. truth may be classified in two
ways. following the long established division Of proposi-

tions into the two categories referred to by Hume as mat-

ters of fact" and "relations of ideas." The main charac-
teristic of both of these types of truth is that they are
meant to be Objective; the rational kind being quite in-
dependent Of the subjects that appropriate it, while the
empirical kind is at least "inter-subjective," which in
principle gives it a sort Of independence from personal
distortion. Since tautological truth1 deals with rela-
tions among ideas--the predicate Of an assertion restates
a meaning already contained in the subject--it should not

llt is not necessary in this plase to go into
thenproblem as to whether all so-called truths of rea-
son are tautological or not, nor does it seem necessary
to discuss certain types and tssss Of trsth that fall un-
ger the headings of revesled," innate." self-evident,"
universally agreed upon. or mystical. For a critical
examination of most Of these views. the reader is refer-

red to Brand Blanshard. WW (2 vols..
gndon: George Allen and Unwin. td.. l9 . II, chap.

53

require any elaboration here. The major theories of
truth that pertain to matters Of fact. however, will be
briefly considered at this point.

(1) The correspondence theory is perhaps the most
common way in which truth is understood by the ordinary
person and is most widely acknowledged by those who are
called philOSOphical raalists. It may be formulated with
various degrees Of refinement, but is usually stated in
terms of "agreement" or "corraspondence"--a statement is
"true" if it agrees with some fact; that is. a statement
expresses a judgment that is true if the ideas contained
in it "correspond" to a certain factual state of affairs.
At first sight this theory seems so Obviously true that
one might wonder why it is ever questioned. The state-
ment "A chair is in this room" either corresponds with
the facts or it does not, and it can be readily checked
by Observation. The widespread acceptance of this view
is indicated by the fact that it is equally congenial to
religious writers as well as to those who are not.2 And

yet. critics of the correspondence theory have pointed

 

2Two examples are cited here from contemporary
writers of different persuasions. The first is from D.
Elton Trueblood. W (New York: Harper
and Brothers. 195 . p. 3 . Our ideas, in spite of the
fact that they are and must be subjective. have or can
have W. They have Objective reference
because they refer to objects. and they partake of the
nature of truth when they grasp the character Of these
objects correctly. . . . God. according to what most men
of recent centuries have believed. is spiritual in nature.
To say that God exists really, not merely as a projection
of our own minds. is to say that He is an Object or that

5h

out certain difficulties involved in it, the foremost Of
which is due to the ego-centric predicament. This is the
problem as to how ideas and objects can "correspond" to
each other, that is to say. the precise manner in which
mental thoughts can be compared with actual things. The
"coherence" theory of truth is an attempt to circumvent
this (and other) difficulties in the correspondence theo-
ry.

(2) In the coherence theory, truth is conceived
in terms of the consistency or harmony of propositions
with one another and with the "whole"--which may be un-
derstood either idealistically, as the "Whole Of reali-
ty." or more empirically as the whole Of experience.

This view, which has been advanced by such idealists as
Hegel and Bradley. among others. has in more recent times
received a cogent expression in Blanshard's We;
W03

In its simplest terms. the coherence theory may
be stated somewhat as follows: an assertion or judgment
is true if it "fits in" (or "coheres") with other asser-
tions we have already found to be true. Such a view may

have as its model a logically consistent system, but from

 

He has Objective status. and to say that a stons really
exists is to say that it likewise is an Object. The
second is from Bertrand Russell. W-
5;me (London: Oxford University Press. 1952 , p. l .
A belief is true when it W to a certain asso-

ciated complex (the fact cosresponding to the belief).
and m when it does not.

3Vol. II. chaps. 26, 27.

55
the standpoint Of the individual knower. any ~singular as-

sertion Of truth is only a "partial" truth, subject to a
more complete understanding'of the whole. Accordingly,
truth is a matter Of degree. a notion that is not espe-
cially congenial to those who maintain that a belief at
any one time must either accord with the facts or not.LI
At the same time. it is held that this notion Of a belief
as being "more true" or "less true" provides a means Of
explaining relative . truth, the fact that some truths
change, grow, or evolve over a period of time. Neverthe-
less, certain Objections to the coherence theory seem to
have force. It is argued, for example, that this view
either presupposes some agreement between statements and
facts-«in which case it requires the correspondence theo-
ry. and hence inherits some of its, problems-~or else the
coherence consists only in the relations between state-
ments (their reciprocal consistency). But formal con-
sistency in itself is no guarantee Of factual consistency,
for it is possible to have a consistent system that is
composed of assertions all of which are factually false.

 

LIR. L. Patterson, e.g., rejects the coherence
view as self-refuting because of this notion of partial
truth. Since no finite mind can include in its urview
the entire system. no finite mind can arrive at a solute
truth. and any theory advanced by any finite intelligence
will be at once partially true and partially false. Now
the coherence theory Of truth is such a theory; it will.
therefore. be only partially true and also partially
false. Need more be said?‘

W (Durham: Duke University Press. 195%.
p. .

56
(3) A third conception of truth that is also
prOpositional in form is pragmatism. although in some Of
its expressions the issue of "Objectivity" is not entire-

ly clear. On this view a preposition is true if it

"works," or "satisfies.’ or "guides,’ or leads to veri-
fiable consequences. Truth is not so much a settled fact
as it is a hypothesis to be tested by forthcoming experi-
ences. Since the pragmati st theory contains the elements
of hypothesis. action, and confirmation. it is felt by
its advocates to incorporate the essential features Of
scientific investigation. Pragmatism acknowledges the
problem that we cannot compare our ideas with reality.
Hence its emphasis is upon what an idea "does," or what
experiences it may produce. If an idea servesus suc-
cessfully, produces satisfactory results, etc., it he-
gemee true.

Although this view has been stated with varia-

tions by James, Dewey,5 and others. it is not without

 

l5Perhaps one of the most quotable passages on the
pragmatist s conception of truth is found in John Dewey,
New American Li‘srary Edition
New York: Mentor Books. 195 ), pp. 128-29. That which
guides us truly is true--demonstrated capacity for such
guidanpe is precisely what is meant by truth. The adverb
truly is more fundamental than either the adjective,
true, or the noun. truth. An adverb expresses a way. a
mode Of acting. Now an idea or conception is a claim or
injunction or plan to ent in a certain way as the way to
arrive at the clearing up of a specific situation. When
the claim or pretension or plan is acted upon it guinea
w; it leads us to our end or away from
it. Its active, dynamic function is the all-important
thing about it. and in the quality of activity induced
by it lies all its truth and falsity. The hypothesis

57
its own difficulties. .A particular source of attack has

been the various meanings given by the pragmatists to the
terms "satisfactory" and ""verifiable. Sometimes' 'satis-
factory consequences" refers to human desires or purposes;
other times it refers to that which promotes biological
survival. At times "verification" seams to refer to an
individual need (as in James' essay. "The Will to Be-
lieve"), while at other times verification must be more
public. as Dewey, Peirce, and even James have emphasized.
TO the typical realist, Of course, the notion
that truth "changes" suggests muddle-headedness on the
part of thepragmatist. Certain events either happened
or they did not. "Our gninjene may change. and they are
almost bound to change, because we are fallible and igno-
rant persons. but the event does not change, and conse-
quently the truth does not change."6 To this the pragma-
tist might retort that he agrees with this statement ex-
cept for the final inference. For truth, he would in-
sist. is not the event. but human judgments ("Opinions")

concerning the event . 7

 

that works is the true one; and truth is an abstract noun
applied to the collection Of cases. actual, foreseen and
desired. tsat receive confirmation in their works and con-
sequences.

6Trueblood. mu... p. ’41. (italics mine).

7For a rationalist critique Of pragmatism. see
BlanShBId, Me, I, Chap. 10 o

58

The Problem Inherent in Objective
Theories Of Truth

As we have indicated, the traditional theories
Of truth described above are primarily concerned with
matters of fact. And since it is not likely that tauto-
logical truth is Of vital concern to an individual in
regard to his existence, most religious conceptions of
truth are also of the type which deal with assertions
about matters Of fact; only in this case the alleged
"facts." that are referred to, concern divine beings or
theurgical events. But Kierkegaard prOposes .that this
kind Of truth also is tautological. although in a dif-
ferent way, so that it too does not succeed in producing
legitimate truth in matters of religion.

Kierkegaard begins by defining truth in the most
general terms as the conformity of thought and being.8
By "being," in this context, he means the concrete Object
about which an assertion is made; by "thought" he means
the descriptive terms used in such an assertion; and by

""conformity he refers to the accuracy with which the as-
sertion reflects, or corresponds to, or conveys to others
certain characteristics Of the Object being described.
Now "truth." according to this analysis. can be defined
in two different ways, depending on how "'being' is con-
ceived. If "being" is understood as empirical objects.
then truth may be considered as the conformity of thought

W. p. 169.

 

59

and being. In this case. truth can only be a W,
since the empirical Objects under description are con-
stantly in a process Of becoming, and since the knowing
subject also is continually in flux. And so truth, re-
garded in this "more empirical" way. is only an approxi-
mation. But if this difficulty is not a serious one in
respect to the attainment of truth about the empirical
world. it presents a grave difficulty if applied to the
ascertainment Of religious truth, and for this reason:
the Objects to which alleged "truth-assertions" intend
to refer are notoriously illusive in yielding descriptive
predicates that can be commonly agreed upon, if they can
even be obtained at all.9

On the other hand, Kierkegaard continues. truth
might be defined "more idealistically" as the conformity
of being with thought. In this case "being" must be un-
derstood mere abstractly by transforming ”into an ideal
conceptual reality, commensurate with the timeless and
changeless categories of thought. Then the correspondence
between abstract thought and this "abstract reflection Of
being" would be possible, and truth-assertions could be
made that would be finished and complete. But this is

9A1though Mill's Wen was not
published during Kierkegaard s ifetime, are is little
doubt what his reaction would have been t9 this kind Of
empirical approach to religion. For Mill a conclusion
that God is a likely hypothesis is precisely the kind of
thing that one might entertain with a cautious intellect.

but which could never call forth the passion of faith
with which an individual might stake his eternal destiny.

 

60

only to Obtain a tautology, in which thought and being
mean the same thing, and the "correspondence" is just an
abstract self-identity in which the predicate Of the
truth-assertion only ""reduplicates the subject.10

Kierkegaard then goes on to show in what way Mb
views involve a tautology. He does this by indicating
that abstractions are required in both the truth-asser-
tions and the characterization Of the Objects to which
they refer. so that an assertion is true whenever the ab-
‘stractions it predicates Of some concrete Object are the
same as (" correspond" with) the abstractions used in re-
ferring to such objects. The only difference between the
two conceptions of truth is the degree Of abstraction,
the first being "more empirical" in that the abstraction
is not as complete as in the' 'more idealistic" conception.
"Neither formula says anything more than that. . . the
truth 15.1 .a. the truth is a reduplication. Truth is
the subject of the assertion. but the assertion that it
is. is the same as the subject; for this being that the
truth is said to have is never its own abstract form. In
this manner we give expression to the fact that truth is
not something simple, but is in a whollyabstract sense
a reduplication."11 It is because of the problem that

10mm. p. 170.

11m. Kierkegaard seems to mean something

like this: since ""red. e. g., is an abstract term which
enables us to identify and communicate certain Objects
of experience, when someone says 'This book is red" he

 

61
"empirical" truth is not about "being," that the bolder
"idealistic" abstraction may be'made; for then it becomes
possible to"'unite" thought and being in perfect harmony.
This approach. of course. requires a courageous assump-
tion concerning the metaphysical competence Of the human
intellect.

Kierkegaard maintains. however, that the finite
mind of an existing individual is not capable Of such an
accomplishment. What is finally or ultimately true of
reality or God (the actual conformity of thought and
"being-as-it-is") is not given to man to know, for the
human intellect'is not able to break through the wall Of
abstraction that is erected in "knowledge by description."
Man cannot see things Wm. Instead '
of a supra-human perception of reality, truth for finite
beings is limited, approximate. and imperfect. Neverthe-
less. though truth is a human instrument it is apprOpri-
ate in regard to the empirical world. The point at which
objective truth becomes inappropriate, from Kierkegaard's

 

is saying that this concrete object besongs to the class
Of Objects to which theuabstract term rsd applies.

That is. the assertion This book is red'.is not true be-
cause it is a statement-that 'corresponds' to a non-lin-
guistic form of being. but because its object is another
case sf thsse objects that are generally described by the
term red. Hence truth. according to this analysis. is
more of a correct classification of Objects than it is an
assertion about concrete being as such. Truth is a re-
duplication and is tautological in the sense that the
above sruth-assertion amounts to "This red book is red."
1.6-. This instance Of what is called 'red' is one of -
the kind that is called 'red'."

62
point Of view, is whenever man proposes to make valid
truth-statements about God. Within the present frame Of
reference. then, the important question becomes: What
kind Of religious truth is possible for an existing per-
son? And to answer this question is the problem set in

the W-

Objectiva and Subjective Reflection

Kierkegaard holds four related notions that
should be made explicit and which underlie most of the
discussion that follows. These are: (l) "existence"
means the self-conscious awareness Of ona's finitude;
(2) passion is the expression Of existence; (3) existence
separates thought and reality; and (’4) thought separates
the thinker from reality.12 Thus. to the extent that a
person acts. lives. and feels a particular duty. for ex-
ample. he does not conceptualize it. and thought is irrel-
evant to the action; but when he sits back to think and
reflect about his duty, at that moment, at least. he does
not act. Similarly, as soon as one reflects upon a par-
ticular duty. or conceives reality, or meditates upon
some eternal truth. the process of thought separates it
from himself--that is. the more he thinks about it the
more the content of his thought gets between the thinker

 

12These four notions are discussed in different
parts Of this paper. The first may be found on p. 10.
n. 11-: and pp. 89-91; the second on p. 155; and the third
on p. 89. The fourth notion is elaborated in the text
immediately following it.

63
and.the Object of his thought. Kierkegaard is not sug-
gesting that reflection is misplaced Where the Object of
thought may be mathematical symbols or the world of sense-
experiance, but that one does not relate himself to ethi-
cal conerns or religious reality in virtue of reflective
thought--that is. through the mediation.of abstractions
drawn.from.these. This is Why the traditional arguments
for the existence Of God are someWhat beside the point.
because they are conceptual arguments and.conclude only
to a geneenl Of God.

For the existing individual, than. the fact that
he exists keeps (his) thought and.being apart, and so he
can.conceive truth in two ways. (1) Objectively, truth
becomes an.object and thought must point away from.the
subject (or thinker). (2) Subjectively. truth becomes a
matter of appropriation.and thought must move inwardly
into the subject to examine the manner or quality Of the
relationship. And since the inquirer is an.oxistingihu-
man being he cannot go both ways at the same time. He
must either seek religious truths by means Of Objective
reflection or also focus his attention upon.his relation-
ship Of faith, to see if the seriousness of that relation-
ship is commensurate with its object.

Objective reflection, however, leads away from
the thinking subject and makes him accidental and.unim-
portant. Although it may lead to Objective truth. in.the

process it renders the subject indifferent. The "way of

61+
objective reflection leads to abstract thought. to mathe-
matics, to histOrical knowledge of different kinds; and
always it leads away from the subject, whose existence
or non-existence, and from the objective point of view
quite rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent."13 At its
maxirmm, Kierkegaard suggests. this way becomes a contra-
diction. In as much as a person's thinking becomes ob-
jective he will negate or eliminate himself, the subject.
while all the time it is the subject that makes this ac-
tivity possible. If the area of lmowledge here were that
of physics or history, this would be the idea1--that is.
to become completely ""disinterested in order to compre-
hend the truth in an unbiased and objective way. But
where a religious object is involved, especially one that
implies demands which are decisive for one's life. subjec-
tive concern can hardly be eliminated any more than when
a person attempts to examine his own deepest prejudices
and presuppositions.

When he speaks of "subjective reflection," Kierke-
gaard is referring to the kind of introspective thinking
that is animated by genuine concern, for he believes that
it is only this kind of reflection that can engender re-
ligious truth. Hence it is reflection' 'turned inward"
in which attention is focused upon one' 3 self, his inner

life. the sources of his motivation. Such reflection is

 

13m” p. 173.

65

meant to pierce beneath the facade of compensatory pre-
tenses that are erected to impress others, to excuse
one's behavior, to justify one's failures, etc. It is an
activity in which concern for the self is intensified be-
cause questions are honestly faced for which reason and
learning cannot furnish the answers, questions such as--
Is there any point to the (apparent) "absurdity" of exis-
tence? Subjective reflection, then, is a penetrating ex-
amination of a person's innermost being in which he seeks
for the meaning of existence in something that transcends
his own existence. This is a process that produces pas-
sion. "Inwardness is an existing subject culminates in
passion," is the way Kierkegaard expresses it.1h

Kow while the objective approach to truth is im-
personal in the sense that it usually does not produce
any great concern for the subject who pursues it, the
subjective approach is extremely intimate and productive
of maximal personal interest in that it becomes decisive
(in the religious sense) for one's life and destiny. This
is the place, according to Kierkegaard, where knowledge
is "essential," where there is no objective certainty,
andwhere truth is "paradoxical." This leads to the ar-
ticulation of Kierkegaard's major thesis in more detail.

1km" Do 177'

 

66

Kierkegaard's Thesis that
Truth is Subjectivity

But how can subjectivity constitute "truth"?
Kierkegaard answers, in effect: by distinguishing reli-
gious truth from other kinds of truth and defining the
nature of religious truth in terms of personal commit-
ment. "Subjective truth," as he expounds it, is not the
relationship between a state of affairs and a proposition,
but the relationship of an individual to an object of
faith. Further, subjective truth consists in the m of
relationship existing between an individual and another
(or an "other"), which is fairly indicated by the meaning
of "true" in the expression "He is a true friend." The
truth of such a relationship lies in the subtle aspects
of the subjects' mutual affections of warmth, devotion,
loyalty, etc., that call for the designation of "true
friend" to one or both of the parties involved.15 Of
course, there are some important differences between
"truth" in this illustration and the truth of a religious
relationship, although they both may be considered cases
of "subjective" truth. In the case of a true friendship,

1511; might be argued, of course, that "He is a
true friend is merely a shorthand way of surrmarizing a
number of descriptive prOpositignfi, such as: He can be
counted upon in a time of need, He will never say any-
thing against X, etc., each of-which are provisionally
true statements in the objective sense, awaiting future
confirmation. A reply to this contention might be that
these sub-prOpositions are only two out of a countless
number of possible ways a friendship might find expres-

sion, but that these expressions of friendship do not
W the friendship itself which is prior to them.

 

67
e.g., evidence of this relationship comes from both sides,
so to speak--A smiles at B, thanks B, etc., while B sees
A and knows that he exists. However, when the party re-
lated to is an unseen reality (an object of faith), the
evidence for this relationship is all on one side.

But what is the evidence for the kind of rela-
tionship last mentioned? The only possible evidence lies
in the behavior and the attitude of the person who lays
claim to such a relationship. Its "truth" is revealed in
the earnestness of the observed party, for it is the se-
riousness of his commitment that constitutes the rela-
tionship of faith. If it is "truly" a God-relationship,
that is, if it is one that elicits ultimate concern, it
will reveal itself in that person's actions.16 If one
views the external world as an object of ”animal faith,"
the manner in which he acts upon this conviction reveals
its certitude in a way not entirely dissimilar to the
case in point.

Yet, if the foregoing illustration of true friend-
ship is reasonably typical of subjective truth, why does
Kierkegaard maintain that such truth is "'paradoxical '7

Whether or not his answer is entirely satisfactory, it is

 

16Socrates' conviction in the unseen reality of
immortality is "illustrated by Kierkegaard in the follow-
ing passage. "On this if' he risks his entire life, he
has the courage to meet death, and he has with the passion
of the infinite so determined the pattern of his life that
it must be found acceptable-41 there is an immortality.
Is any better proof capable of being given for the immor-
tality of the soul?" 112151., p. 180.

68

this: subjective truth in religion appear-s paradoxical,
or even more accurately, 1.5. paradoxical W
W. This is because religion requires an in-
finitel7 attachment to an object that is not validated by
reason or evidence. It must be grasped in faith. This
does not mean that the nature of eternal truth is "in it-
self a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of
its relationship to an existing individual."18 Whatever
eternal truth may be in itself, it cannot be objective
truth for man; the only kind. of religious truth for a fi-
nite, existing person is subjective truth. If one could
succeed in lifting himself above his finite situation
this problem of truth would not exist. But as it stands,
according to Kierkegaard, faith, passion, uncertainty,
and subjective truth are intrinsic to the religious sit-
nation.

The main distinction, then, is this: in objective
truth the important thing is whether or not the mind is

related to W. whereas
in subjective truth the important thing is whether or not

the Wanna-19 That is. obJectivelv

 

17That is, "a highest degree of." See below,
second part of n. 15, p. 90, and n. 22, p. 116.

18m" p. 183. Religious truth is paradoxical
in more than one way. In certain contexts it refers spe-
cifically to Christ and even to Christianity itself (see
n. 11, p. 30). But in general, religious truth is para-
doxical because its requirement is so high while its
object is so (objectively) uncertain.

19In regard to objective truth, "the assumption

69
speaking, it is the object-known that is of most impor-
tance. The assertion that "God exists" is true if the
object of knowledge (God) does really exist, so that ob-
jective truth consists in the correct knowledge or in-
formation about an actual state of affairs.

On the contrary, a person is "in the truth" sub-
jectively if the way in which he is related to something
is true. The problem is not whether the object of faith
is the true God, but whether or not the relationship it-
self indicates that it is truly a "God-relationship." It
is the relationship itself that is of crucial importance
and "truth" here refers to being related in a manner ap-
prOpriate to its object. And where the intended meaning
of this object is God (in the sense of a "Supreme Being"
and sustainer of all things), then the nature of this ob-
ject implies an infinite interest and concern on the part
of the individual related to it.20 This contrast between
a true relationship and a "'true' object--that is, whatever
God may actually be--is emphasized with insistence:

When the question of truth is raised in an objective
manner, reflection is directed objectively to the

truth. as an object to which the knower is related.
Reflection is not focussed upon the relationship,

 

is that if only the truth is brought to light, its appro-
priation is a relatively unimportant'matter, something
which follows as a matter of course. 1mg... p. 2H.

20m one place Kierkegaard refers to religious
belief as follows: "the believer differs from the ethi-
cist in being infinitely interested in the reality of an-

other." mg,” p. 288.

70
however, but upon the question of whether it is the
truth to which the knower is related. If only the
object to which he is related is the truth, the sub-
ject is accounted to be in the truth. When the ques-
tion of truth is raised subjectively, reflection is
directed subjectively to the nature of the individ-
ual' 3 relationship; if only the mode of this rela-
tionship is in the truth, the individual is in the
truth even if he ghould happen to be thus related to
what is not true.
Kierkegaard illustrates this point with a story about two
""religious men. One lives in the midst of Christendom
and goes to the house of God with the' 'true conception"
of God in his mind but prays in the wrong spirit; the
other lives in an idolatrous community and prays with in-
finite passion before an idol. The latter prays "in
truth" even though his eyes rest upon the image of an
idol, while the former prays falsely to the true God, and
so worships in fact an idol.

It may appear from the above illustration that
Kierkegaard is intent upon deprecating objectivity in
general, but it is once again his way of pointing up the
meaning of truth that is relevant to ethics and religion.
Kierkegaard is concerned here with what he calls "essen-
tial" truth, truth which is essentially related to exis-
tence. Ethical and religious truth and knowledge are the
only kinds of truth and knowledge that are "essentially
related" to the fact that the knower exists. Here, truth

has to do with the W of the knower, and not the

 

21m-: p- 178. (italicized in the text).

71
fact of his knowing. On the other hand, objective truth,
as in the case of objective knowledge, is indifferent to
the fact of the knower's existence.

According to this view, all other knowledge,
whether scientific and precise or merely common hearsay,
is commensurate with curiosity, with one's intellect
rather than his character. curiosity, however, has pre-
cisely nothing to do with the ethical or the religious;
its very presence, instead, transforms the effort into

something "irreligious."22

God is not an object or
"thing" about which one might discover more and more in-
formation, as one might do about the universe. Rather,
God is a 5mm; he is found, so to speak, ”within the
heart"; he exists I911 the seeking individual .in his in-
wardness; he exists only for subjectivity, and not as a
”divine being" somewhere. It is the phiIOSOphical and
theological ideal to bring God to light, so that a person
can hug what is true and what is not true concerning God;
in sharp contrast to this ideal is Kierkegaard's point of
view, in which the truth of God is not contained in prop-
ositions about him but in the seriousness wherewith one
relates himself to God. For "God only exists for an ex-

isting man, i.e. he can only exist W. . . . When

 

22When the scientific method is primarily in-
formed by curiosity“ Kierkegaard writes in his Journal,
it is pernicious. Let it deal with plants and animals
and stars in that way; but to deal with the human spirit
in that way . . . only weakens ethical and religious pas-
sion. 11211., p. xv.

72
an existing individual has not got faith, God 13, not, nei-
ther does God m, although understood from an eternal
point of view God is eternally."23
In extending the contrast between subjective and
objective truth, Kierkegaard puts it this way: "1mm-

: ‘ a. ‘0 ‘:.. u '0; -. o 0‘ 1-9 ‘ ‘ z..-
WWW-"2” This is another way of indica-
ting that subjective truth is not independent of who as-
serts it or holds it, or more correctly, who is involved
in it. Religious truth (truth that is subjective) is not
”the Truth," some absolute and fixed description of real-
ity, but the totality and intensity of one's commitment
of faith. For if religious truth were objective it would
be equally true in the mouth of anyone--the disinterested
historian, the indifferent passer-by, the militant athe-
ist, or the fervid evangelist. Thus, many people conceive
their religion in terms of an "objective faith,” which
Kierkegaard defines as a sum of doctrinal prOpositions.

If this conception were correct, then Christianity would
consist in a body of information which needs to be dis-
seminated. And this is exactly what it is for many indi-
uals.

Most of what is meant by existential religious

23W: trans. and ed,
Alexander Dru ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1958),

p. 110.

2m, p. 181-

 

73

truth is the "how" of its expression, i.e., the manner in
which it is attained and held fast, the mode of existence
it expresses, and the state of concern it characterizes.
In short, religious truth refers not to a state of af-
fairs but to a state of being (a state of being fully
committed), and the above description is an attempt to
simply state that subjective truth is infinite passion.
"At its maximum this inward 'how' is the passion of the
infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the truth"
(and since) "the passion of the infinite is precisely sub-
jectivity, . . . subjectivity becomes the truth."25 Sub-
jectively, something is true because of the infinite pas-
sion with which an individual embraces it, just because
an intellectual resolution is not possible. It is an in-
ward and total commitment to an "unproved" object of faith
that is the truth for an existing individual.

Thus, in defining subjective truth, its antithe-

sis to objectivity needs to be expressed. Here is Kierke-

gaard' 8 definition: "W

a r, rue o. a 01-. o - o‘ c‘ u.- 0: cc; - 1-
W, the highest truth attainable for
an W individual."26 And, as Kierkegaard indicates,
this same statement is also a definition of faith-~namely,

the infinite passion with which a person holds to an ob-

25112151., p. 181.

26mg. , p. 182.

 

7h
jective uncertainty constitutes his religious faith. It
is precisely because one cannot know God objectively, as
he Imows things, that he must believe. This is why faith
involves risk, passion, and the "leap," because the ob-
ject of faith is not an objective certainty.

The view of Kierkegaard, then, should be clearly
understood, even if we may not concur in it. (1) It is
a genuine subjective view, and Kierkegaard thinks it is
correct to assert that God "exists" IQLA: while at the
same time He does not "exist" £92.3- For in reference to
God, "exists" means that He "is real to" some finite in-
dividual. But to assert that God is "objectively real,"

or "enjoys reality, or "abides eternally" may or may not
be so, for on what grounds can a person say that he real-
ly Mfg (2) Subjective truth is not meant to be ap-
plied--and is, indeed, wrongly used--in reference to em-
pirical objects or mathematical relations. Kierkegaard
does not reject objective truth nor its apprOpriateness
in the various sciences. He believes, however, that eth-
ics and religion are not "sciences" but "existential con-
u

cerns, areas where value-commitments are expressed in

personal modes of appropriation, to which factual informa-

 

27Kierkegaard does not appear to be much impressed
by the variety and vagueness of the testimony given by the
mystics. His explicit criticism of mysticism, however, is
made in regard to the ethical life of the "mystic and not
in regard to the possibility of mystical "knowledge'
notion Kierkegaard would surely reject). See
Vol. II trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, New York: Dou-
bleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 2115-55.

75
tion is secondary. (3) Hence, he does not intend sub-

jective truth as a view to justify any fancy, whim, or
inclination that may be frivolously entertained. There
is a sense in which the religiously serious or morally
sensitive person's convictions may be observed in his
mode of behavior, even though such observation does not
constitute verification in a strict sense.

In sum, subjective truth cannot exist apart from
the subject because the subject is involved in it, where-
as objective truth refers to objects or situations that
are not effected by the subject's cognizance of them. If
another analogy may be used, the objective approach may
be likened to a neutral observer who describes two per-
sons in love in terms of their overt behavior. Here it
is the statements describing this behavior that are true
or false, and subject to confirmation by others. The sub-
jective approach, on the other hand, is more akin to a
person who himself becomes involved in love. This rela-
tionship is one of faith, and it consists in the passion
of the attachment. In this case the question of truth re-
fers to the W itself which, of course, in vari-
ous ways (some unpredictable) finds expression in overt
behavior.

CHAPTER IV
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

While Spinoza and Kierkegaard stand in sharp con-
trast in regard to the possibility of proving the exis-
tence of God, it would not be correct to assume that the
former merely reasserts Anselm's ontological argument nor
that the latter simply reminds us of the Kantian dictum
that existence is not a predicate.

In order to appreciate Spinoza's version of the .
ontological argument1 it is first necessary to examine
his somewhat puzzling but crucial doctrine of essence and
existence, and the role it plays in the general formula-
tion of the argument. An interpretation of this argument
will then be given along with Kierkegaard's criticism of
it and his analysis of the concepts of existence and es-

sence. And finally, the general problem of all attempts

 

1The purpose of this chapter is not to enumerate
or summarize all the various arguments advanced to prove
the existence of God, nor is it our intention to examine
in detail all the various arguments proposed by Spinoza
alone, which might be required if we were defending
Spinoza 5 philosophy. Harry Austryn Wolfson, in his The

(2 vols. in one; New York: Meridian

Books, Inc., 1 5 , chap. vi, classifies these arguments
into four different kinds. But the object here is to
select the first and best-known argument of the Emma
because it relates the categories of existence and es-
sence in a way that Kierkegaard repudiates.

76

77
to prove God's existence will be considered along with

an alternative interpretation of Spinoza's alleged dem-
onstration. These three related objectives will consti-
tute the three sections of this chapter.
Spinoza's Version of the
Ontological Argument

In one sense, Spinoza's argument is not radically
different from that given by Anselm and Descartes, which
in its simplest form, goes something like this: God, who
by definition is the most perfect being conceivable, con-
tains every possible attribute one of which must be exis-
tence; therefore, God exists.2 The key idea supporting
these arguments is that the essence of a greatest or
most perfect or ultimate being involves the existence of
that being. Similarly, Spinoza, both in the m and
elsewhere,3 sets out to show that God is a reality the
essence of which implies his (or "its") existence.
Spinoza approaches the problem ina geometric fashion by
setting down definitions, axioms (many of which have the

 

2Tbis general expression of the ontological argu-

ment is not meant to imply that Anselm sand Descartes
arguments are exactly alike. See below, PP. 80-81. The
precise statement of the argument given by Anselm may be
found in W, trans. Sidney N. Deane (La Salle,
111.: Open Court Publishing 00., 191W), chap. ii. pars.
3 and ’4. The ontological argument of Descartes is to be
found in he we, a M an. .‘ ‘ 09, ‘ on 9‘ ’ 1%"
W5, trans. John Veitch Chicago: e

an Court ublishing Co., 1905), pp. 78-80, and of course
should not be confused with his argument in the third
Meditation on p. 51+.

3mm 1. Props. 11 and 20; W, p. 2.

78
appearance of being self-evident), and propositions-~the
last being statements which are deduced from definitions,
axioms, and previously demonstrated prOpositions.

Spinoza's method is to start with definitions of
"God," "substance," and "self-caused," and then to show
that these three ideas are identical. He does not con-
ceive this to be merely an exercise in thought, however,
in the sense of being no more than the play of an imag-
inative or speculative mind. Underlying the demonstra-
tions is the conviction that a "true idea" of God corre-
sponds to a reality that is outside the mind. Therefore,
he first attempts to demonstrate that "self-caused" and
"substance" are equivalent in meaning, and secondly, that
"substance" means the same thing as "God."

Spinoza begins with the following definition of
"self-caused": by "W, I mean that of which the
essence involves existence, or that of which the nature
is only conceivable as existent."" This definition it-
self is an argument incorporating the Aristotelian-scho-
lastic conceptions of cause and substance; in particular,
the idea that the explanation of anything consists in de-
termining its causes. On the assumption that everything
has a rational explanation, any actual object, such as a
stone or a tree, can be adequately explained in terms of

the various causes (Aristotle's "determining principles,"

"m I, Def. 1.

 

79
for instance). Spinoza, following this line of thought,

and rejecting the notions both of a "conditioned sub-
stance" and a Creator, posits the ultimate cause of

things in an Wages: "substance"--"that of which a
conception can be formed independently of any other con-
ception."5 This means that "substance" can be explained
without making reference to any other thing; it explains
itself, so to speak. But the case is different in regard
to every thing other than "substance," as indicated above,
for every such thing requires for its explanation a ref-
erence to something else, with the exception of that which
is "W." Therefore, "that which is the cause of
itself" is the same thing as "substance." And so Spinoza's
key preposition is "W-
m”;6 that is, to understand the nature of substance

is to realize that it must exist, that "its essence nec-

essarily involves existence. "7

 

5mg... Def. 3. Compare Aristotle's definition
of substance (e.g.'in Book vi of the W) where
substance is that 'to which certain predicates may be
ascribed, while there is no further subject of which it
in turn can be predicated. ' We, trans.
Philép Wheelwright (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1951),
p. 7 . For Aristotle, of course, substance refers pri-
marily to individual things. Wolfson (m. I, pp.
158-59) points out that Spinoza rejects theflscholastic
distinctign between created substances and” absolute"
substance (i.e., God), and describes his substance in
the same terms that the medievalists described God.

6m. I, Prop. 70
7mg., Proof.

80
Having shown that "self-caused" and "substance"

are identical, Spinoza proceeds to demonstrate the iden-
tity of "substance" and "God." Substance is the highest
kind of being--it is "necessarily infinite" (Prop. VIII);
being an infinite being it must have an infinite number
of attributes (implied by PrOp. IX); and each of these
attributes "expresses a certain eternal and infinite
essence" (Prop. X, Note). Thus, substance is the highest
kind of being; and since it also necessarily exists and
has infinite attributes, it corresponds to the scholastic
definition of God. And so in Preposition XI we find God
and substance explicitly identified: "W,
n; - .. .‘ . , - .-. .y c- o‘ y, .o a-zn ‘30 :-;::
: :. a; seq 9‘ 1 ; “ ‘1 :_ 1‘ 3 X; ' 3. ‘ o
In this way Spinoza has moved from the concept of "self-

" and from thence to the

caused" to that of "substance,
concept of "God." If one assents to his definitions and
axioms, it appears that Spinoza has demonstrated that a
true idea of God, unlike our conceptions of ordinary con-
tingent things, necessarily involves His existence.

Kierkegaard's Criticism of the Argument,

and His Analysis of the Concepts of
Essence and Existence

In its simplest expression Spinoza's version of
the ontological argument appears to be more like that
given by Descartes than like the classical statement

found in Anselm's W. In the argument put for-

81
ward in the first part of the m and discussed above,
it is readily seen that Spinoza does not base his argu-
ment on the concept of a "most perfect being" (Anselm)
but on the idea of a "self-caused" being (Descartes), a
being whose essence involves its existence. As far as
his demonstration is concerned, Spinoza seems to have cor-
rectly moved from the meaning of "self-caused" to the
meaning of the concept of God. But is this all just a
movement of m: From whence does it follow that God
actually exists?

Two possibilities of interpretation present them-
selves at this point.8 One is the possibility that Spin-
oza did believe that his rigorous argument demonstrates
the actual existence of God with the force of logical ne-
cessity, for he continually uses the phrase "W-
W." A second possibility is that Spinoza's
probing analysis of the concept of God is an attempt to
determine W God is; to prove only that
He is a being the correct conception of which involves
the m of existence.

Let us assume, for the present, that the first
interpretation is correct, and state the argument in a
simplified and considerably abridged syllogistic form:

 

8There may actually be more than the two possi-
bilities here given. For example, a third possible in-
terpretation might be that Spinoza did not really think
that the argument stated is logically valid; but the
closely reasoned and painstaking structure of the m
nukes this interpretation quite unlikely.

82

A self-caused being is one whose essence
necessarily involves existence. (Definition 1)

God is such a being. (On the basis of definitions,
axioms, and Propositions I-X)

WW. (Proposition XI)

Now, among other things, it should be pointed out that
the argument as here stated has no reference to perfec-
tion, and hence the usual criticism that any perfect
thing we might imagine must also exist (as Guanilo ar-
gued) is not relevant to this argument. And second, from
all appearances Spinoza does intend to establish the re-
ality of an actual being and not merely a concept, a be-
ing that is extra-mental and independent of mind9--a be-
ing, however, W mind can have perfect knowledge.
Spinoza's conviction that the nature of God or
substance cannot even be understood unless that under-
standing includes existence, is clearly evident in the
second Proof to PrOposition XI. Here Spinoza distin-
guishes between an absurd idea such as a square-circle
(which cannot, exist) and an intellectual idea such as a
triangle (which may indeed exist, but does not necessar-
ily exist). In the case of the square-circle, its nature

prevents it from existing; in the case of a triangle,

 

9"What Spinoza . . . is trying to establish by
his proofs of the existence of God is that God is not a
fictitious being, nor a verbal being, nor a being of
reason, but a real being, who has existence outside our
mind and who is the source and counterpart of the idea
we have of Him. Substance, says Spinoza, is outside the
intellect, that is to say, it is not fabricated by the
intellect." Wolfson, mu. 1, p. 162.

83
something external to its nature might prevent it from
existing; whereas in the case of God, no reason or cause
(either internal or external to its nature) can be given
that would prevent its existence. The only way that one
could assert that "God does not exist" would be to fail
to understand his unconditioned, divine nature.

If we interpret Spinoza's contentions-«namely,

 

MW" (Propo XLVII, Part
II), and that His "essence necessarily involves existence"
--as an attempt to show God's m existence, then we
are in a position to consider Kierkegaard's criticism of
this kind of argument. While the line of reasoning pur-
sued in the W is directed against the ontologi-
cal argument in general, and the Anselm version in partic-
ular, it applies, nevertheless, with equal force to the
Descartes-Spinoza version. 10
Ostensibly the ontological argument moves from

something non-existential 19 existence, that is to say,

 

10The most direct criticism is to be found on p.
298 of the W, although Spinoza is not specifi-
cally referred to in this context. However, there is a
lengthy footnote in the W (pp. 32733) where
Kierkegaard explicitly criticizes Spinoza s principle that
the more being' somethi has the more existence it also
has. This is in fact ano her form of the ontological ar-
gument and can be found in both Descartes and Spinoza.

But the form this argument takes in Spinoza's
Wm, trans. Halbert Britan (Chicago:
a Open Court Publishing Co., 1905), I, Prop. 7, Lemma

, is an explicit tautology which states that the more
being ( perfection, reality ) a thing has the more it
exists, and, the more it exists the more "being" it has.

81:
from a conception of a most perfect or self-caused being
to a God that actually exists. Upon closer examination,
however, it becomes evident that the argument presupposes
existence all along. Not entirely dissimilar to the clas-
sic syllogism in which the mortal Socrates falls under the
universal class of "all mortal men," so the attribute of
existence is that which falls under the universal class
of "all attributes." As soon as this is pointed out, the
tautological nature of the argument is quite obvious; the
existence of God is something already contained in the
premises, and thus the argument does not carry us to ex-
istence in the conclusion.

However, Spinoza's argument (in the first part of
the m) is not one of "class inclusion," so to speak,
and its structure is not quite the same. His intention,
rather is to prove the necessary existence of a singular
being, and the argument relies upon identification rather
than class inclusion--name1y, the identification of "self-
caused being" with God." This is indicated in Proposi-
tions II-VI, where the undetermined quantification of the

 

Kierkegaard's criticism is that no distinction is made
here between factual being and idea], being, and that "in
the case of factual existence it is meaningless to speak
of more or less of being. A fly, when it exists, says
Kierkegaard” has as much being as God. (11:13., p. 32,
n.) Spinoza s principle evades the difficulty of deter-
mining God 3 factual existence, as opposed to his ideal
essence. The argument under consideration in the main
body of the present dissertation, however, does not rely
on the principle discussed here, and so is not subject to
this criticism.

55
"that" in Definition I is shown to apply to only one
possible object. Hence, the major premise of the syllo-
gism on page 82 (above) might read instead:

There is one and only one self-caused being whose
essence necessarily involves existence.

This way of formulating the ontological argument, however,
still fails to escape the tautology, for here again the
conclusion desired is contained in the premises. For if
God is not already identified with "self-caused being" in
the major premise, the argument could read something like
the following:

A self-caused being (who might not be God) is one
whose essence necessarily implies existence.

God is such a being.

Therefore, God (who might not be God) necessarily
exists.

For Spinoza, this concluding proposition is as intoler-
able as the statement "a triangle, which might not be a
triangle, necessarily has three angles." In this way,
the identification of "self-caused" and God is made
explicit.

The essential aspect of the criticism given
above, however, might be the formulation'of the onto-
logical argument, is the fact that necessary existence
is never determined but simply gimp, in the premises;

otherwise one could say that a most perfect or greatest

or self-caused being which MW exist is
one that W exists, and this would be a contra-

86
diction. Kierkegaard refers to such an argument as a
deceptive form for what is only a logical development of
a conceptndeceptive in the sense that it appears as if
God's existence is reached in the conclusion, whereas it
is actually presupposed in the premises, as we have indi-
cated. Another way in which Kierkegaard underlines this
point is by referring to the ontological argument as hy-
pothetical in form, requiring an important "if": 11 the
essence of a supreme being is such that it involves exis-
tence, then such a being must exist-11 there La such a
being. As Kierkegaard indicates in the following quota-
tion, the consequent of a hypothesis cannot be separated
and stand as a conclusion independent of that hypothesis.
"If this or that man is a hypocrite he will behave
like a hypocrite; a hypocrite would do this or that;
, this man had done this or that. Likewise in
t e argument about God. When the argument is fin-
ished, the existence of God is as hypothetical as it
was before, but within the hypothesis we have made
the advance of establishing a logical connection be-
tween the notion of a supreme being and being as it-
self a perfection; just as in the argument about the

hypocrite, we established a connection between being
a hypocrite and a particular expression of hypocrisyl1

 

The upshot of the preceding discussion, then, is to make
explicit the fact that the crucial issue of W is
Purely asserted, and the conclusion to the ontological
argument (the existence of God) is no more secured, log-
ically speaking, by a process of reasoning than it is by
the affirmation of a simple believer.

‘

11W, p, 298-

87

Nevertheless, to appreciate the basic difference
between Kierkegaard and Spinoza we need to go beyond the
structure of the argument, as such, and consider the no-
tions of "essence" and "existence." Here the fundamental
contrast is no less than one of direct opposition; in a
sentence, Spinoza unites and even identifies the concepts
of essence and existence, while Kierkegaard not only sep-
arates them but insists upon their radical dissimilarity.

The basis of Spinoza's position, of course, lies
in his doctrine of "substance" and "attribute." Since
the same substance manifests itself in two knowable as-
pects or dimensions (namely, thought, and W), both
attributes of the same thing are essentially identical.
That is, the idea of a particular triangle and the sen-
sible expression of that triangle in the world of actual
things, are identical in essence. In this way Spinoza
brings essence and existence together in an isomorphic
relation to each other. Does this mean that essence al-
ways implies existence, in the sense that for any object
of thought there must exist a corresponding object that
enjoys factual existence? The question is answered by
making the distinction between the nature of things and
the nature of W. "The essence of things produced
by God does not involve existence" (Prop. XXIV), which
means that existence of mugs is accidental; whereas in
the case of substance, or God, it belongs to its very

nature to exist-~"its essence W involves

88
exi stance . "12
Spinoza's insistence on this point is repeated
in different places in his various works; but the most
significant statements, for our purposes here, are those
in which Spinoza W essence and existence in re-
gard to the being of God. One or two good illustrations
should suffice. In the W, for example, is
the following:

The essence of things are from all eternity, and
unto all eternity shall remain immutable.

The existence of God is essence.

For we can know clearly and distinctly that
existence belongs to the nature of God.13

In other words, "that which constitutes God's essence
constitutes at the same time his existence."1"' Existence
forms the very essence of God just as "the three angles
of a triangle equal the sum of two right angles" con-

stitutes the very essence of a triangle. And essences,

 

123mm 1, Prop. 7, Proof (italics mine). The
emphasis above on the contrast betwe n God and "things
ehould eot lead us to forget Spinoza s identification of
nature and God. The universe La God ( .e., the extended
worldnis an attribute of God), and thus things as a
whole do necessarily exist. It is only individual things
(this or that actual object) whose essence does not nec-
essarily involve existence.

13The Wisdom Library edition entitled
gum, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical
ibrary 1958), p. 7 (The order here eas been slightly
altered . Also, Ethics 1, PrOp. 20, The existence of
Efid endtleis essence are one and the same (italicized in
6 ex .

1m. , Proof .

89
as Spinoza tells us, can never cease to be.

For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, the concepts
of essence and existence pertain to two different realms
the nature of which constitute two separate categories.

If our understanding of Kierkegaard is correct, the most
general term he uses is "being," a term which stands for
anything that "is"--stones, fictions, universals, living
things, etc.; and the two most important kinds of being
are "ideal being" and "factual being," objects of thought
and existent things. Whence it follows that "to exist"
does not mean simply "to be." Existence is defined as

the separation of thought and being, whereas thought and
being are united in the realm of ideas. Kierkegaard seems
to mean that when a person thinks and grasps ideas--envi-
sions ideals, exercises his imagination, and so on--the
process of thought engages ideal-being and the content of
thought has ideal-reality. And while this thought-reality
may reflect concrete existence, the extended realm stands
in an indeterminate relationship in respect to it. "Excis-

tence , "

on the other hand, means the opposite of being en-
gaged in thought-activity.

In a general sense, all concrete objects "exist";
trees and stones, for example, are historico-temporal en-
tities in the process of becoming, and these lack the typ-
ical characteristics of ideal-being, such as eternalness
and unchangeableness. But "existence" has a more speci-

fic meaning for Kierkegaard. It refers to self-conscious

90

man, a being who not only exists but is aware of his ex-
istence; a being, moreover, that is unavoidably aware of
the contingency of his existence. Unlike the stone or
the frog, man anticipates the future and enters into the
making of his self and is concerned about what he becomes.
Because he not only thinks but evaluates and cares, he
brings (in varying degrees) ideals into his life, into
his everyday encounter with the world. Consequently,
Kierkegaard defines human "existence" as the synthesis
of the finite and the infinite.15

The main difference between a man and a stone,
as far as existence is concerned, is that the former is
aware of the eternal dimension within himself; and what
it means "to exist" in the human situation is "to realize
the task which the synthesis presents, namely to bring
the eternal into the temporal."16 If the relation be-
tween eternal and temporal is only a W-relationship,
it is completed when understood, for example when a per-
son W5 ideals or values that in no way enter in-

 

15Reminiscent of Pascal, "Ebcistence is the child
that is born of the infinite and the finite, the eternal
and temporal, and is therefore a constant striving. '

, p. 85. Kierkegaard constantly uses the term

inginite to exprese the greatest possible degree; hence,
an infinite coecern with one s existence, or being in-
finitely seized by a thought, etc. In the above quota-
tion, however, this term is used in the context of the
ideal and the eternal.

16Renter momte, ww-
1121.911 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 ,

p. 112.

91
to his actual living. But an seam-relationship is
characterized by an attempt to reduplicate one's convic-
tions in his existence, wherein the eternal enters the
struggle of daily living and becomes determinative of the
self in its concrete situations. In simple terms, instead
of having a clear idea or understanding of ideals or val-
ues, to "exist" means the living or doing of these, a
process which hardly proceeds without effort.

Some important consequences follow from the above
discussion. The first is that God cannot "exist" because
existence only refers to finite things that are changing
and in a process of becoming. God eternally "is," Kierke-
gaard avers, but he is not an entity located "some place."
And since "to become" refers to a transition from poss-
ible to actual, it is impossible for God to "exist." The
striking contrast between this statement and the conclu-
sion of Spinoza--that it is impossible for God m to
exist17--is not merely a difference in terminology. For
in Spinoza the concept of existence embraces both actu-
ality and possibility. Whatever is not impossible, such
as a perfect triangle, "exists"; and the unity of all
possible and actual existence is what is called "sub-

stance" or God.

 

17 I, PrOp. XI, (conclusion to the second
Proof). "Therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor
externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be as-
signed which would annul his existence. Therefore, God
necessarily exists."

92

Secondly, Kierkegaard not only emphasizes the
"non-existence" of God, but the radical difference be-
tween the possible and the actual--together with the fact
that one can never move by a process of reasoning from
the possible to the actual, that is, from thought to ex-
istence. Kierkegaard agrees with Spinoza that the pos-
sible and the actual do not differ in m, but he in-
sists that they do differ in being-namely, the possible
refers only to ideal being. "If ideal and real were not
homogeneous in essence, knowledge could not be of what a
thing is; if they were not heterogeneous in existence,
knowing a thing and being that thing would be the same."15
It is this kind of distinction that makes it difficult for
Kierkegaard to see how one could deduce something concrete,
resistant, and mm]. from the conceptual nature of some-
thing that might be, for the sphere of thought is the
sphere of pure possibility. To move from thought or ideal
being to existent reality is similar to the person who be-
gan to write a treatise entitled "Reality," became en-
grossed in a detailed explanation-of it, soon forgot that
his explanation belonged to the realm of the possible,
and concluded by thinking he was describing actual re-
ality.19

 

1§Swenson, Mo, p. 1114. This fundamental
contrast is exemplified in the relation between promise
and performance, a plan and its realization, a possibil-
ity and its corresponding actuality. Ideality is intent;
reality is fulfillment of intent." mm” p. 113.

1W, p. 298.

93
It is evident, Kierkegaard insists, that we can

only reason 1m existence, but never to it; for if
thought could produce existent reality it would also
have the power to take it away, and an individual thinker
would be able to think himself out of existence. But we
can neither produce nor prove the W of anything.
"I do not for example prove that a stone exists, but that
some existing thing is a stone," just as the "procedure
in a court of justice does not prove that a criminal
exists, but that the accused, whose existence is given,
is a criminal."20 In a word, existence can be M
m: but not .W by thought; the movement from
essence to existence is not logically necessary nor are

the two categories identical--the "inference from essence
"21 ' I

o

to existence is a leap.

The General Problem of all Attempts to
Prove God 3 Existence, and an
Alternative Interpretation
of Spinoza s Argument

The reason, finally, why Kierkegaard rejects all
attempts, rational or empirical, to demonstrate the exis-
tence of God, is that all such demonstrations bring about
a conclusion to a thought-object, an idea, of God, rather

than an actual being. For this reason Kierkegaard asserts
in both the W and the W that one never

2W: P0 310
2W, Po 38.

 

91+
proves God's existence unless he is already convinced of
His existence. Existence must be given, in which case it
is futile to "prove" it, and where it is not given it is
equally futile to attempt to elicit it from premises
which do not contain it already.

For if God does not exist it would of course be im-
possible to prove it; and if he does exist it would
be folly to attempt it. For at the very outset, in
beginning my proof, I will have presupposed it, not
as doubtful but as certain (a presupposition is nev-
er doubtful, for the very reason that it is a presup-
position), since otherwise I would not begin, readily
understanding that the whole would be impossible if
he did not exist. But if when I speak of proving
God a existence I mean that I propose to prove that
the Unknown, which exists, is God, then I express
myself unfortunately. For in that case I do not
prove anything, least of all an existenge, but mere-
ly develop the content of a conception.

 

Now the quotation above involves both of the in-
terpretations suggested concerning Spinoza's intention in
regard to the significance of the ontological argument.23
T'he first and more apparent interpretation is that Spin-
oza did believe that his argument demonstrates the actual
existence of God. From Kierkegaard's point of view this
first interpretation is rejected because existence is al-
ways given and never gained in the course of the argument.
But there are many who refuse to reject the ontological
argument as entirely worthless or insignificant, and by
these an alternative interpretation has been offered?"

22W: p. 31-
23Above, p. 81.
2"More exactly, "interpretations" in the plural--

95
This second interpretation in one way or another concedes
that the argument is not intended to produce a logical
proof for the existence of God, but is only a method of
drawing out the meaning contained in the concept of God.
Of the various advocates of this point of view mentioned
in the preceding footnote, Wolfson's treatment is the most
thorough. By pointing to various passages in the Eihiga
and W25 he argues that Spinoza considered
God as an object of direct knowledge known M,
an idea clear and distinct, adequate and true. This
means that the existence of God, for Spinoza, is self-
evident, an immediate fact of knowledge, and not a fact
that is proven by a process of reasoning. It means, con-
sequently, that the ontological argument is really not a
logical argument at all, but a psychological one--"to

 

interpretations, however, that hold this important point

in conmon--namely, the rejection of the idea that the on-
tological argument logically demonstrates the existence

of God. The 'office of the so-called theistic proofs is
never to induce belief but only and always to provide us
with e, better underetanding of a belief already firmly
held. And again, 'the ontological argument . . . attempts
only to show that to form the conception of God. in our
minds is already to believe in His reality." These quota-

tions are from Baillie, MW (London: Ox-
fird University Press, 1952 , pp. 13 ,l 3. Compare Erich
ank

(London: Oxford University Press, 19 5 , p. 3 ; Nels F.

S. Ferre, W (New York: Harper and Brothers,

19%), pp. 193-9 ; and Wolfson, Mi. I, pp. 165-75.
25The exposition here represents the main fea-

tures of Wolfson s presentation. The various passages he

refers to in Spinoza's works are: , p- 3,
and p. 122; Eihigs, II, Prop. 146, and Def.

96

prove the existence of God" really means "to perceive it
directly as a given fact."26 But if this is the case,
what is the need for demonstration, for what could a dem-
onstration add to such a certain knowledge? The answer,
according to Wolfson, is that while the syllogism adds
nothing to the major premise, it is not completely redun-
dant. It is justified in the way an analytical statement
is, namely by helping to unfold the content of the major
premise. Just as the definition of a triangle, for ex-
ample, makes explicit that which is contained in the term

"triangle,' so the "existence of God" is part of the mean-
ing contained in the term "God." The purpose of the so-
called "proof" is that it "translates a conviction into
an argument. (It elicits atruth which is only implicitly
contained in the major premise. It puts an immediate fact
of consciousness in the form of syllogistic reasoning.

It resolves an idea into its component parts."27 The
"proof" of the existence of God in the ontological argu-
ment is that the immediate knowledge of God's existence,
which is implied in the idea one has of God, is valid
knowledge. And Wolfson concludes that all the best-known
versions of this argument--those given by Anselm, Des-

cartes, and Spinoza--prove essentially the same thing,

 

,. 26Wolfson, . I, p. 173. We might recall that
intuition' is the i est and most certain kind of knowl-

edge for Spinozs- WW pp-
8-11; Ethics 11, Prop. , Note 2.

27Wolfson, ihifi. I, p. 175.

97
and therefore the correct form of the argument that
Spinoza advances in the first part of the Eihigs should
be stated as follows:
If we have a clear and distinct idea of God as a
being whose essence involves existence, then
God is immediately perceived by us to exist.

But we have a clear and distinct idea of God as a
being whose essence involves existence.

Therefore, god is immediately perceived.by us to
exist.2

If this interpretation of Spinoza's argument is
correct, then the main force of Kierkegaard's criticism
does not apply to it. This fact, however, does not take
away from the fundamental difference in the views of the
two philosophers. The basic assertion of Spinoza--that
we can know the very essence of God--is indeed a strong
expression of rationalism. Equally so is his conviction
that reason is able to perceive things from an eternal
point of view, as well as his contention that we can have
m knowledge of God, superior to any knowledge ob-
tained either by experience or by discursive reasoning.
Directly opposite to this is Kierkegaard's insistence
that rational knowledge of God is impossible, that
"existence" implies contingencies and uncertainties
(which knowledge may mitigate but never abolish), and
that faith is required but in no way disposed by an at-
tempt to define the essence of a faith-object.

28mg. I, p. 181+.

98

But is it not possible to bring Spinoza and
Kierkegaard together on the issue of direct acquaintance
with God? Does not Kierkegaard. speak of the "certainty
of faith" that results in virtue of being existentially
related to God, and is this not similar to Spinoza's di-
rect knowledge of God's essence? The question itself
suggests the answer. Spinoza's approach is avowedly in-
tellectual (for reason is "divine") and the perception of
God is essentially a rational intuition. To be sure, there
is a unique, pleasurable feeling that accompanies the idea
of God, but this is a "proper emotion" not at all like
the intense, fervent passion that Kierkegaard describes.29
And to be existentially related to God, means to hold fast
with passion to an objective W, which is quite
unlike having adequate mmiedge of the eternal and infi-
nite essence of God. The "certainty of faith," according
to Kierkegaard, has present with it "every moment the in-
finite dialectic of uncertainty," and the "assurance" he
speaks of does not refer to "peace of mind" but to the
acquisition of faith throughan "infinite personal pas-
sionate interest." The assurance only comes "in faith";
it is "earned" asone actively believes, continually over-

coming the persistent presence of doubt-50 For Kierke-

ggcompare the eerfeo’e and unchanging feeling that
arises from Spinoza s third kind of knowledge (pp. 138-
39, below) with the strenuousness involved in existential

faith (pp. 155-56, below).

302251331121, p. 53.

99
gaard, God is apprehended by faith, and not through a

process of thought; for Spinoza, God is known by virtue
of the highest kind of mental perception, and not by

means of mere "belief."

CHAPTER V
FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

That the perennial problem of "freedom and neces-
sity," "freedom of the will," or "free-will versus deter-
minism".may appear insolubleis no reason, of course, to
dismiss it as insignificant or to label it as a fruitless
controversy over words. It is, rather, W of its
significance for human goals and aspirations that it is
of perpetual interest and importance. It is indeed the
responsibility of phiIOSOphy to keep before men the phi-
losophical nature of the problem, lest modern enthusiasts,
in the name of science or philoSOphy, dismiss it as in-
significant or catalogue it under the heading of "Prob-
lems of merely historic interest." .

The problem of freedom really involves several
related problems, such as the nature of the self and the
problem of causality; but for our purposes here we will
limit ourselves primarily to the autonomy of thought and
action, the meaning of freedom and necessity, and the im-
portance of choice in regard to the ethical life, as these
issues are handled by Spinoza and Kierkegaard. The nat-
ural temptation is to pigeon-hole these thinkers as deter-
minist and indeterminist respectively, or to over-simply

lOO

lOl

their views by asserting that Spinoza advocates freedom
of thought while Kierkegaard advocates freedom of action.
However, such summary statements are not very illuminat-
ing; in fact they are misleading, as the discussion that
follows will indicate. Our intention, rather, is to dis-
cuss more fully what is involved in Spinoza's determinis-
tic doctrine, and to observe in what ways it is both akin
to and Opposite from the kind of determinism that is ac-
knowledged by Kierkegaard.1

In order to appreciate the manner in which the
two philosophers handle the problem of freedom, the prob-
lem might be rather simply stated as it generally pre-
sents itself to the ordinary thinking person-«namely, an
individual either can act as he chooses 9; he cannot. Or
in more stringent terms: at the moment of choice eiihei;
there are possibilities in excess of actualities, (to
borrow a phrase from William James), and at least in m
cases a possible course of action may become actual be-
cause of a whim, conviction, or decision autonomously
made by the agent; 9; all choices, and the actions that
follow from such choices, are brought about by the con-
catenation of relevant causes in such a way that the agent

could not have chosen or acted differently than he did.

 

1The term "self-determinism" could be correctly
applied to both views, but they are-self-deterministic
in quite different ways, as we shall see.

102
Now both men are very concerned with this issue,
although in different ways. It is our intention here to
first consider how Spinoza treats the problem and then,
by way of comparison, to examine how Kierkegaard deals
with it.
Spinoza's Doctrine of
Freedom and Bondage
Whether or not the ordinary man is aware of this
problem or certain of its subtleties, it is a fact that
he is often confused in his beliefs pertaining to it.
For example, he commonly adheres to certain telic-fatal-
istic ideas such as, "When my time comes" or "There is a

" while at the same time he sel-

place 'reserved' for me,
dom doubts that he can act as he pleases in his everyday
affairs. But the common belief that one can do as he
pleases does not constitute a philosophical argument for
freedom of the will, although it is relevant to it. All
the same, Spinoza considers this common belief a "super-
stition," and thereupon sets out to provide a true under-
standingof the whole matter. To apprize his position in
this regard, it might be helpful to isolate certain key
elements in his doctrine before drawing any conclusions,
making any criticisms, or suggesting any comparisons with
the quite Opposite standpoint of Kierkegaard on the sub-
ject. The following points, selected by the writer of
this paper, may be considered as constituting the heart

of Spinoza's doctrine as it is found in the m.

103

(1) First is the definitions of "free" and "nec-
essary" given in Part I, in which Spinoza. defines freedom
in terms of necessity. A thing is ""free when it exists
or acts from the necessity of its own nature, while some-
thing is ""necessary when it is compelled to exist or act
by something external to it.2 Hence any thing that act-
ually exists is caused or necessitated either by its own
nature or by some other thing. That which stands out in
this definition is: (a) the reasonable, common-sense as-
sumption that whatever exists must have some cause (ei-
ther itself or some other cause) for its existence--an
W that is hard not to accept; and (b) the uncom-
mon-sense idea that "free" refers to the W of
something, as well as to its action. This is because the
history of the "free-will and determinism" controversy
has centered upOn the question as to whether or not an
individual can effect uncoerced decisions and ah; in cer-
tain ways free from the necessity of universal causation.
And this, in turn, is basic to Kierkegaard and existen-
tialism as a whole--indeed, to affirm such freedom is
probably the one common and most fundamental doctrine of

the entire movement .

 

2The exact wording of Definition 7 is: "That
thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity
of its own nature, and of which the action is determined
by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is neces-
sary, or rather constrained, which is determined by some-
thing external to itself to a fixed and definite method
of existence or action." m I.

101+

(2) The second main point consists of several
prOpositions in Part I (of the Ethics) which follow from
the above definition, taken together with various other
definitions, axioms, and prOpositions--namely: that only
God is "free" (Corollaries to Prop. XVI, and Prop. XVII),
that God is the ultimate cause of everything that exists
(PrOps. XXIII and XXIX), that W exists nec-
essarily (Prop. XXII), and that everything both exists
and Operates in a particular way (PrOps. XXVI and HIX).
Accordingly, every thing in nature is fully determined
not only in its Operation but also in its existence and
in its essence.3 N3 thing is contingent (that is, "acci-
dental"). Spinoza firmly denies the very notion of . "pos-
sibility"; it is a meaningless term, as far as he iscon-
cerned. .Since no thing (apart from God) acts in virtue
of its own nature, there is absolutely no freedom in the
universe. The multifarious essences of things, their
order of existence, and their mode of behavior all fol-
low from a world of nature consisting of determinate caus-
al chains linking every thing and event to whatever pre-
cedes and follows their order of occurrence.

Further, the complex causal universe follows an
order that is iggimiiy necessary, in which all events

are not only governed by uniform laws of nature but in

 

3"cod is the efficient cause not onlynof the ex-
:EistenOSBOf things, but also of their essence. ihid. I,
rop. . .

105
which each thing must occur in the place and manner in
which it does. As Spinoza puts it, "all things follow
from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as
it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three
angles are equal to two right angles.""’ Causal laws are
thus expressions of logical relationships, and the nature
and activity of finite things follow from the infinite
nature of God in the same sense that conclusions follow
from premises in valid logical arguments.5 This emphasis
on necessity and universality will be an important con-
sideration when we turn to Spinoza's doctrine of the
"free man."
. (3) Now this complete and inescapable causal de-
terminism, which embraces every aspect of, and item in,
the universe, includes also the attribute of thought--all
mental activity, every thought and volition and feeling--
for all the variations within the limits of this attri-
bute are likewise contained within the all-embracing real-
ity of infinite Substance. Man, and his feelings, atti-
tudes, and choices, is equally a part of nature, and con-
sequently his mental life is also rigidly determined by

the infinite complex of necessary causes. "Will cannot

 

“1m. II, Prop. 19, Note, par. 15.

5In this regard, one might liken God to a sort of
logical fremework as Wolfson does, although his likening
of God to an infinite logical crust which holds together
the crumbs-of an infinite number of finite modes" may not
be the most propitious analogy. W” I, p. .398.
$116 cetes Ethiha 1, Note to PrOp. , to substantiate
is.

106

be called a free cause,"

writes Spinoza, "but only a nec-
essary cause" and' 'no volition can exist, nor be condi-
tioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
other than itself."6

Therefore, since things could not possibly be any
different than they are (PrOp. XXXIII), freedom of the
will is a delusion, a badly mistaken conception about the
nature of reality; it is, in Spinoza's terminology, a
"confused idea," a mung that one may have of being
able to choose something without being constrained. It
is a feeling that arises because men are not conscious of
the true causes that determine their actions, but think,
rather, that things can be brought about to conform to
their own purposes. But such failure to understand the
causes that determine human actions is just an indication
of man's ignorance. Every seemingly free and spontaneous
act of will has its ultimate source in God, and does not
originate from the mind of an individual person any more
than a falling stone itself determines when and where it
shall fall.

In order that this may be clearly understood, let us
conceive a very simple thing. For instance, a stone
receives from the impulsion of an external cause, a
certain quantity of motion, by virtue of which it
continues to move after the impulsion given by the

6m. 1, PrOp. 32 , and Proof. And in Corollary
2, "will and intellect stand in the same relation to the
nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all
natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God . . .
to exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like
the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is con-
ditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.‘

 

107
external cause has ceased. The permanence of the
stone s motion is constrained, not necessary, be-
cause it must be defined by the impulsion of an ex-
ternal cause. What is true of the stone is true of
any individual, however, complicated its nature, or
varied its functions, inasmuch as every individual
thing is necessarily determined by some external
cause t exist and operate in a fixed and determinate
manner. -

(’4) The fourth point is Spinoza's doctrine con-
cerning the will and the intellect. In regard to the en-
tire comparison between Kierkegaard and Spinoza, there are
hardly any conceptions more crucial and sharply antithet-
ical than those held by these two philoSOphers concerning
the relationship between will and intellect. Spinoza's
statement of this relationship is that "will and under-
standing are one and the same,"8 whereas Kierkegaard's
position is that willing and thinking are two entirely
different functions of the self.

The identity of will and intellect may not seem
so startling to a person acquainted with medieval theol-
ogy, where it was common to assert that these two facul-
ties are identical in the nature of God. But Spinoza
proffers the view which, to be sure, seems required by
his metaphysics, that volition and thought are identical
in man. This no doubt seemed both natural and necessary

for Spinoza, since love, hate, desire, understanding, and

 

7Spinoza, Works, II, MW, Letter 62,

(p. 390). Compare Appendix to Eihihs I, p. 75, on the
common misconceptions of human freedom and purpose.

8mm II, PrOp. 1+9, Corol.

 

108
all other non-extended phenomena also belong to the same
dimension or attribute of reality. And so individual
acts of will are not irrational impulses but sort of
"rational desires"; they are more like logical affirma-
tions than psychological inclinations. Contrary to ordi-
nary usage, therefore, will is a rational faculty, a kind
of thinking, a "mode of thought,"9 while particular voli-
tions are simply im of thingss-"conceptions of
thought."10 '

Recalling Spinoza's intention to show that man is
not free (in the sense of being able to instigate choices
that change the course of his behavior), we see that he
is able to do this by denying will as some actual, moving
power within human nature, and redefining it in abstract
terms. And with this transformation of meaning, all par-
ticular volitions become "ideas"; and ideas cannot effect
any bodily changes because all ideas fall under the "at-

tribute" of thought and are, in their place, as necessar-

 

9ihigi. II, Axiom 3. In the note to Prop. 148,
Spinoza indicates the ipgigai nature of will and intel-
lect where he describes both as "merely abstract" univer-
sals (as opposed to actual faculties), and will as "the
faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is-true
or false. '

10The intellectual nature 03 volition is expressed
in the Note.to PrOp. 9 (Part III): This endeavor to per-
sist in one e being, when referred solely to the mind, is
called xiii. And again in Def. 2: "I say that we as},
when anything takes place, either within us or externally
to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is . . .
which can through our nature alone be clearly and dis-
tinctly understood."

 

109
ily determined as everything else in the universe.

(5) The fifth main point involved in Spinoza's
doctrine of freedom is perhaps the most difficult to
fully understand and to state with clarity and succinct-
ness, due largely to the fact that it covers so much of
Parts IV and V of the Eihihs. It concerns the more prac-
tical point as to how reason can, to some extent at least,
restrain and govern the emotions-«how man, entangled in
a completely deterministic universe, can in some sense
make himself "free."

Roughly, the picture--and the problem--is some-
thing like this: man is born into a world of infinite
causes of which he is at first completely ignorant. Like
all other things in the world, he too is "driven about by
external causes, and . . . like waves of the sea driven
by contrary winds he tosses to and fro unwitting of the
issue and of his fate."11 But man, with his capacity to
think, to imagine, to feel, and to love, sets about to
secure his preservation; he seeks ends that appear desir-
able, and he projects purposes into nature based upon his
desires. And as he does appear to alter the course of
nature in certain ways, he comes to believe that he has
both the power to direct his own actions and the ability
to modify things in nature. But he is deceived. He is
actually in "bondage" to his lower nature--he "feels" one

~—

11%. III, PrOp. 59, Note. (The first person
plural has been changed to the second person singular.)

110

thing, he ""believes another, for his ways are determined
by a welter of blind emotions. Fortunately, however, man
need not remain in this condition of servitude. Like a
slave who gains freedom from his master by ennobling his
task through an inner perception, a person can become
"free" by gaining a higher perspective on things, by ob-
taining a correct understanding of the divine necessity
of the whole, by seeing that "God' 3 nature" could in no
way be different than it is, since it is eternal. 12

This transition from bond to free is brought
about, of course, by the power of reason, although "rea-
son" should not be construed to mean "exercizing freedom
of thought," as we ordinarily assume. The function of
reason, as Spinoza sees it, is a quite natural function.
As correct knowledge is acquired concerning the true or-
der of nature, reason Operates to overcome passive emo-
tions by understanding them.13 Thus reason is a most im-
portant function, and Spinoza refers to it in various
ways: it is the activity of mind when it engages in deduc-
tive reasoning; it is the correct sort of thinking that
1" it is a power that is able

to overcome, transform, and dispel passions;15 it is an

produces rational knowledge;

 

12m. 1, Prop. 33, Proof.
13m. V, Prop. 3; and PrOp. ’4, Note.

1 . II, PrOp. 1+0, Note 2. Spinoza here
equates reason with his knowledge of the second kind."

15m. V, Prop. 2, and Proof; PrOp. 3, and Proof,
and Corol.

111
instrument of the striving for self-preservation;l6 it
is the source of virtue;17 and, finally, it is the activ-
ity which enables man to perceive things under the "form

of eternity, "18

and therefore to gain freedom--to become
a "free man" and live according to his true nature. To
gain such freedom, to be sure, is not the easiest thing,
nor is it attained all at once. Rather, one becomes free
to a certain extent, that is, W he gains an un-
derstanding of the universe in which he exists, in so far
as he understands the factors that cause his actions, in
so far as he can replace inadequate ideas with adequate
ones, in so far as his mind can become active and can sup-
plant actions determined by passive emotions with those
determined by reason; in a word, in so far as he can be
"led by reason."19 For, reverting back to Spinoza's def-
inition of "free,"
determined from a power niihin himself, rather than being

compelled from without. But this takes time and effort.20

a man determined by reason is being

 

16See Note to PrOp. 18, and Props. 20 and 23.
Ihid- V-

17ihid. V, PrOp. 21+; and PrOp. 35, Corol. 2.
18mg. II, Prop. 141+, and Carol. 2, and Proof.

19In numerous places thro. hout Part IV of the
Ethics,"Spinoza uses the phrases" under; the guidanceflof
reason, in obedience to reeson, and led by reason in
reference to the "free man.

23%.11 things excellent are as difficult as they
are rare. m. V, PrOp. 142, Note.

112

If in its essential respects the foregoing pre-
sentation is correct, then, five basic ideas concerning
the possible freedom of volitions and actions, found in
Spinoza's Eihihs, are: (1) his definition of freedom in
terms of necessity-~"being determined by itself alone";
(2) the corollary that m God can be free, and that He
is the ultimate cause of everything else, all of which is
necessary; (3) the consequence that human freedom, in the
sense of freely exercizing one's will, is a misunderstand-
ing; (’4) that "will" is defined in terms of a sort of ra-
tional desire and is really a form of thought; (5) and
lastly, that man can (to some extent) free himself from
"human bondage" and in virtue of reason gain a higher un-
derstanding of the nature of things.

In the light of all this, one may be perplexed
by certain phrases in the latter part of the Eihihs, espe-
cially in Part V, in which Spinoza seems to indicate that
a person is able to effect modifications of certain kinds.
For example, we read that "everyone has the ppm; of clear-
ly and distinctly understanding . . . his emotions" and "of
W that he should become W to
them."21 Yet in what sense can one "bring something
about" if he, does not thereby effect some change, at

 

21 . V, PrOp. ’4, Note (italics mine). Nume;
ous additions references could be cited here. E.g., if
we remove a disturbance of the spirit, . . .' (Ind-"Vi"
Prop. 2) is used in a context that implies that the if
refers to more than a mere logical possibility. Again,
what does the "power of arranging" mean in Prop. 10,

113
least in his thinking? But if this is so, would the
order of thought then be less fully determined than the
order of things?22 What would be the causes, or reasons,
why one person understands the nature of things better
than another? And if these causes are specified, in what
sense could a person "endeavor" to become "more free"23
if all the causes (internal or external) are in no way
manipulatable? And further, what good does it do to ex-
hort a person to do good or to replace inadequate ideas
with adequate ones, if that person can do no other than
what he in fact must do? In addition, since Spinoza de-
fines freedom in terms that imply independence and "un-
conditioned," is not the word "free" being used in a ho-
monymous way--which is the very practice of which Spinoza

criticizes his medieval predecessors?2"

 

(ihid. V), or the mind's ability to refer "bodily modifi-
cations or images of things . . . to the idea of God'
(mid. V, PrOp. 1’4)? Or we might note the expressien in
the last Proposition of the Ethiss (Prop. M2) that we
are able to control our lusts.

22

Above pp. 1014-07. Efigiss I Prop. 33; II
PrOp. 7, and Corol., and Pr0p. . ’ ’

23mg. IV, PrOp. 73.
2"The present writer has in mind the recourse
taken by theologians past and present to make assertions
about God 5 character that carry a different meaning when
applied to the character of man. This important theologi-
cal issue--which finds its classic expression in the
Hebrew-Christian scriptures (see Isa. 55:9 and I Cor. l:
25) and its classic rejection in the fervent declamation
by Mill in his Three Essays on Religighuwould not be
mentioned here if it were not the fact that Spinoza in-
tended to make an advance over what he considered was the

11’4

It is difficult, if not impossible, to escape the
conclusion that all things are not determined in the
strictest sense of the word. For on Spinoza's view, one
ssh realize (that is, make active) ideas, "connect" or re-
place thoughts,25 see things in a different light, and so
on, presumably all on the basis of individual effort. It
appears that man is able to gain a clearer vision that
W is uncontrollably determined by the "divine"
and immutable order of nature. Unless Spinoza has been
quite misunderstood in this regard, "ail things" apparent-
ly does not include spms things--in particular, a person's
ability to gain some freedom by autonomously exercizing
his thought.

Although Spinoza anticipates four objections that
might be brought against his doctrine of determinism, and
also admits that there may be many other criticisms that
he does not consider, he does not appear to speak to the
alleged inconsistency indicated above. If the Eihigs does
contain an inconsistency--roughly speaking, between Parts
I and V--it might be due to Spinoza's intention to depict
conditions that apply to different periods in the moral
deveIOpment of the individual. If so, a person at first

 

specious reasoning of medieval philOSOphers in regard to
the power and knowledge of God. (See Wolfson, pp, sii.

I: P0 3870)

25"If we mm a disturbance of the spirit, or
emotion, from the thought oi; an external cause, and
it te other thoughts, . . . Ethics v, PrOp. 2 (italics
mine .

115

would find himself in a condition of bondage to ignorance
and emotions; and then as he would gain knowledge and use
reason he would advance to a higher plane of moral living,
where he would become "free" in proportion to how serious-
ly he permitted reason to master his passions. The note
to PrOposition XVII might be taken to confirm this view,
where we read that "it is necessary to know the . . . in-
firmity of our nature, hem we can determine what reason
can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her
power."26

But if this is Spinoza's intention, is it pos-
sible, within the system that he has laid down, to effect
the transition from bound to free? John Caird answers in
the negative, arguing that Spinoza's conception of human
bondage is self-contradictory, and that man could never
escape from such bondage even if it were not self-contra-
dictory. For on Spinoza's own view, if "the agencies that
constitute nature or the system of being lie outside of
the individual mind, and dominate it from without, they
can never cease to do so."27 Furthermore, Caird argues,
Spinoza's "free man" must not be the mode of nature he
starts with, for freedom could not be initiated by a mind
completely bound by nature unless from the beginning some-
thing is present in that mind that is not bound. In his

26m IV (italics mine).

27
John Caird (Philadelphia: J .B. Lippin-
cott Co., 1896), p. PM.

 

116
words,

A being who is subject to a law of purely external
causation is incapable of freedom, and therefore
incapable of bondage. To be a part of nature would
be no bondage 30 man 11; he sphis be a part of it.

The very term bondage implies that essentially and
from the first he is something more. One mode of mat-
ter is not in bondage to another, to be so related is
simply the expression of its very nature. Subjection
to the passions would be no slavery; the vicious man
would be as innocent as an animal, if like the animal
he were blindly determined by his appetites.

 

 

28m” p. 269. There are two ways in which the

first sentence of this quotation may be understood. (1)
Caird may meen that iina man is ever in a complete state
of bondage ( 'impotent, being ruled by passions“ his wind
passive and confused, etc. , he has no Opening wedge by
which he cae break out of this passive state, for his mind
is equally bound with the same necessity that interpene-
trates the whole system of nature which, in turn, produces
specific effects within the individual. (2) On the other
hand, Caird may have been either careless or mistaken in
his understanding of Spinoza s doctrine. Nevertheless,
it seems to me that the problem of internal and external
causation, that is involved in a fully deterministic view,
is not avoided by likeneng ratiopal causes (internal to
an active mind) to the internal' causes that account. for
a cartridge 5 exploding when it is struck by a hammer.
The real question seems to be: are any human causes gen-
uinely voluntary--i.e., does the complex of external and
internal factors produce a state that permits the unin-
fluenced emergence of an activity having novelty, direc-
Eion, and ietention? This is, of course, the problem of
free-will. The point is that shy individual action, on
Spinoza 5 account, is thoroughly determined by whichever
internal m happens to be stronger at the time.
Where a person undsmshds all the effects of external
natural causes acting upon him, that person will be ef-
fected W by them; this will then make anreal
difference between the actions ef a man 'sctively de-
termined by reason and the man passively’ determined by
emotions. In hQih cases, the determination is internal
(because it is his reason or his emotions), and in both
cases produced by external causes, althoegh Spinoea pre-
fers to say external when the mind is passive, i.e.,
when 'something takes place within us, or follows from.
our nature externally, we being only the partial cause'
(Eihiss III, Def. 2). But this is just where the problem
appears to be unresolved, namely: in what sense, or for
what reason (cause), can one individual initiate, want,

 

117
To accommodate the doctrine of bondage, Caird
maintains, Spinoza needs (perhaps unconsciously) to shift
his definition of mind from the more limited "self-main-

" in which mind stands as merely one part

taining impulse,
of nature related to the whole, to a broader conception
involving a rational, self-conscious being shis to "shift"
to a life guided by reason. As Spinoza himself writes,
we "see the difference between a man, who is led solely
by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason.
The former, whether he will or no, performs actions where-
of he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master
and only performs such actions, as he knows are of pri-

mary importance in life, and therefore chiefly desires;

 

or try to understand the effect of causes upon himself,
while another individual does (or can) not, since
thought and action is determined by prior causes? ¥t
seems to come to this: either the total concatenation of
causes is such that they produce understanding in some
persons, or else such causes peoduce e, state out of which
understanding might (or will) emerge in just these per-
sons, in'which case this state ie likewise beyond the in-
dividual 9 control (i.e., it is externally" produced).
In either case, it means that a man s destiny is

his control. Or, if it is maintained that the totality
of causes produces in sii men a state that makes under-
standing possible, from whence comes the special causes
that generate understanding in only sgms men? It seems
as if Spinoza cannot have it both ways--either a person's
thought is within his control or it is m of his eon-
trol, and to say that the former is 'internally caused'
does not selve the roblem. If this reasoning is correct,
then Caird s gener criticism is sound, even though his
reference to purely external causatien' is not quite ac-
curate. At any rate, whether Spinoza s doctrine is con-
sistent or not, it seems that it requires (in some man-
ner or other) something unique 'within" man which pre-
vents him from being absolutely "impotent" and that per-
mits him to attain blessedness."

118
wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a
free man."29 ’
Kierkegaard's Analysis of the Concepts of
Free and Necessary, and the Value He
Attributes to Choice Itself

There is a sense in which the transition from
bond to free accords with the view of Kierkegaard, in
that freedom is something that is acquired and that re-
quires an effort. But there is a clear difference as
well. For Kierkegaard holds that freedom (in another
sense) is given at the beginning, and that man may become
bound if he persistently fails to use that freedom. The
root of this difference lies (1) in the fact that Spinoza
rejects any notion of a free will, while Kierkegaard pre-
supposes it all along, and (2) in the different meanings
they assign to the terms "free" or "freedom." In the

pages that follow, we shall deal with Kierkegaard's mean-

ing of both "freedom' and "necessity,’ and then indicate
the pre-emlnent significance he attributes to choice.
First, a general statement about freedom. For
Kierkegaard, "freedom" does not refer to the view of
W with its connotation that "I can do
this or that" without being seriously limited by external
factors, but that certain important choices--ethical, re-

ligious choices--are within the power of human individuals.

 

291m. Iv, PrOp. 66, Note. The same passage is
also cited by Caird, 11211., p. 2711.

119

Plainly, man is not only able to choose, but he can not
exist (as a distinctly human being) without choosing.

0n the other hand, "necessity" refers to am:
looking at things, to a way of organizing one's experi-
ences. That is, necessity pertains to the realm of
thought--to "thought-being"--where the activity of mind
sees things in terms of relations, and where some types
of thought-objects are defined and arranged in logical
ways such that certain ideas are entailed by others. Ne-
cessity belongs to the abstract and the ideal, where the
ordering tendency of the intellect determines the form of
thought. Moreover, this activity is operative both in
science and in history. In history, where the immutabil-
ity of the past is confused with the immutability of the
necessary, the "individual indeed acts, but his action
passes into the order of things which sustains the whole
of existence"; and this "order of things which digests,
so to speak, the free actions and. weaves them into its

eternal law is necessity."30

And in science, the regu-
larity of natural phenomena lends itself to formulation
in terms of unfailingly uniform laws of nature, which in
turn take on the character of necessity. Hence the his-
torian, who as an individual is sure that he can affect
his own future, and the scientist, who as a person feels

certain that his every action is not totally determined,

30Kierkegaard, W, 11, 178.

120
tend to look at history and nature under the form of in-
evltablllty.

The foregoing thus suggests the manner in which
Kierkegaard refutes an absolute determinism-essentially,
by insisting upon the radical (though not total) dissim-
larity between existence and thought. For it is when
these categories are confused that the reality of choice
becomes blurred.

He proceeds by analyzing "change" in the follow-
ing way: to say that something "changes" is to mean that
it is in a process of "becoming." The nature of this
change is an alteration in hsihg but not in essence; that
is, it is movement from not-being--where "not-being" does
not mean "nothingness," but ideal or possible being-"to
being, from possibility to actuality. More precisely,
the change is from possible-being to W. It is
a transition in which the actual "annihilates" the pos-
sible, for Kierkegaard holds that the same thing cannot
be both possible and actual simultaneously. When an ac-
tual event occurs it is in that same moment no longer a
possible event. Therefore it is important to notice that
the realm of "becoming" has to do with possibility and mi
necessity. "Everything that comes into being proves pre-
cisely by coming into being that it is not necessary; for
the necessary is the only thing that cannot come into be-
ing, because the necessary is."31 This is because that

 

31W, pp- 60-61-

121
which is necessary pertains only to ideal being, and the
ideal never changes in its own state of being; whereas to

I!

change means to "become, and when something "becomes" it

is not necessary. Necessity applies, in short, to m-
siiisns and W the truth of which does not de-
pend upon events that occur in the actual world. Neces-
sity only refers to that which can never change, where-
fore the possible and the actual are never necessary.

Now the transition from possible to actual is one
way of defining freedom, and as such it is an apprOpriate
way of describing natural events. "All becoming takes
place with freedom," as Kierkegaard puts it, even though
everything in nature comes into being "through the opera-
tion of a cause."32 Nevertheless, the fact that events
in nature do have determining causes does not mean that
the whole complex of causes and events could not possibly
be any different, any more than the fact that one can de-
duce consequences from a law of nature means that certain
events msi actually occur in the world of nature.

From a historical standpoint, when one looks back
and observes what has actually happened, he may succeed
not only in finding reasons why things happened as they
did but reasons underlying the decisions made by men.

And of course what gives the illusion of necessity here
is that what has happened cannot be undone, and so in

 

32m. 1 p. 61.

122
this sense is unchangeable. But this immutability, in
the light of the preceding discussion, is nothing like
logical immutability. For historical events, m they
happen, are not necessary at all33 but are conditioned by
circumstances and human decisions. Hence,
The immutability of the past has been brought
about by a change, namely the change by which it
came into being; such an immutability does not ex-
clude all change, since it did not exclude this
change. All change is excluded . . . only by being
excluded in every moment. If the past is conceived
as necessary, this can happen only virtue of for-
getting that it has come into being.
The immutability of necessity, however, consists in its
constant internal relationship, in virtue of which it ex-
cludes the possibility of change.
These distinctions are of great importance for
Kierkegaard, for if he can make a case that the past, by

"coming into being, is not necessary, then the future is
also not necessary. Whereas if the historical process is
viewed under the category of necessity, it thereby excludes
the possibility of an "either/or"--the possibility of an
individual to modify his existence by making significant
ethical choices.

This leads to the more concrete import conveyed

by the term "freedom" as Kierkegaard uses it. Freedom

 

3"Someone, of course, might argue that W
had to necessarily happen. Nevertheless, according to
Kierkegaard s presentation, nothing absolutely has to hap-
pen. Besides, the position of the necessitarian is that
.the occurrence of spssiiis events is inevitable.

3"]3213- a 13' 63°

123

(which is given to all men) means that a person has a real
part in shaping not only his destiny but his personality
and his character. The process of becoming is a process
of making one's "self" in a quite literal way--name1y, by
making choices the result of which constitute what a per-
son becomes. A choice actualizes a possibility in two
ways: (1) in the physical sense that a projected course
of behavior becomes (in part) an actual course of behav-
ior; and (2) in the moral sense that the decision itself
makes actual (in part) the moral worth and character of
the agent.35 In this moral sense, freedom means to become
"free min" entanglements of "inauthenticity"36--that is,
to become free from illusions of the crowd, from cultural
pretenses and current prejudices, from false and trivial
values, from the social pressures and the personal whims
and impulses that enslave an individual. In this sense
freedom means to make choices that require effort, as James
once said, over impulses that are more instinctive and ha-
bitual.

The most emphatic, although not necessarily the

 

35Whatever the ontological status of the "self"
may be, Kierkegaare thinke of it as close to sheer pos-
sibility. It may become one thing or another, but at
any rate its existence and its nature are not guaranteee
by the existence of the physical body. Some men ’build
their selves, others impoverish their selves, and in some
cases, there are persons whose selves are incapacitated,
divided, or even annihilated.

151) 36This term is from Heidegger (Roberts, m”
p. .

121

most transparent, expression that Kierkegaard uses for
"freedom" is "to choose oneself."37 To make sense of
this expression it is important to keep in mind that
Kierkegaard is essentially concerned with decisions of
ethical import, and that he is not referring to the less
significant decisions that are common to the economy of
daily life. To "choose," says Kierkegaard, "is essen-
tially a proper and stringent expression of the ethical.
Whenever in a stricter sense there is a question of an
either/or, one can always be sure that the ethical is in-
volved."38 The only situation in which there is a genuine
"either/or," that is, where choice has any significance
for the development of the self, is wherever truth, right-
eousness, and integrity are ranged in opposition to base
desires, insensibility, indolence, or perdition39--only
where the outcome of the choice produces substantial ef-
fects upon the personality.

In one sense, this kind of a choice is absolute;
and yet, it is also subjective. For the importance of the
choice is not the objective reality or value of what is

 

37This conception is one of the two ways of life
offered to the reader in the large two volume work already
eited ebove, p. 7%, n. 27. I}; is developed in the lengthy
essay entitled Equilibrium which constitutes a good
half of volume II (pp. 161-338) in the Doubleday Anchor
edition, 1959.

38mg” II, p. 170.
39Ibid., II, p. 161.

125

chosen--anyway, the person who "defines his life task
ethically" is not confronted with such a considerable
number of alternatives--rather, it is the act of choice
itself that is important. In "making a choice it is not
so much a question of choosing the right as of the energy,
the earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses.""’0
This subjective emphasis, regarding such a choice, makes
it at once more simple and more difficult; more simple,
as indicated above, and more difficult because it is in
the act of choosing that the personality becomes consol-
idated.

But does this mean that any choice that is made
is right? Is Kierkegaard proposing an ordinary ethical
subjectivism? This is where the "absolute" aspect of the
choice comes in. If it is remembered that this is an eth-
ical choice in an existential sense-~that is to say, if a
person chooses in the awareness of its seriousness and
with the concern that it is constitutive of his future
self, and if he chooses with all the inwardness of his
personality-~even if he "were to choose the wrong, he
will nevertheless discover, precisely by reason of the
energy with which he chose, that he had chosen the ‘
wrong.""1

This appears to be the basis of an existential

type of ethical view that does not purport to "transval-

"01m” II, p. 171.

141m.

 

126

uate all values," but one that encompasses, transforms,
and subordinates particular values to a higher principle
of self-concern. In so doing, Kierkegaard does not re-
ject the ordinary values that are common to the bulk of
mankind, but his main point is that the ethical manifests
itself in the act of W of good
and evil for one's life-~in other words, in getting con-
cerned about moral living. "What is it that I distin-
guish in my either/or?" asks Kierkegaard, "Is it good and
evil? No, I would only bring you up to the point where
the choice between the evil and the good acquires signifi-
""2 "It is,

therefore, not so much a question of choosing between

canoe for you. Everything hinges upon this.

willing the good 9; the evil, as of choosing to will, but
by this in turn the good and the evil are posited.""3
This means that when a person chooses to will (or is
willing to choose) in this absolute sense, then the
choice between good and evil presents itself to him and
the relevance of existing under ethical categories is
thrust before him.

Having stated that the value appears in the
choice itself, and that this fundamental choice is one of
becoming ethically concerned, then we see the sense in

which this means "to choose oneself." For it means that

 

"21m” II, p. 172.

"3m” II, p. 173.

127

one W for his present self, even
though he has not chosen the forces and influences that
have made him what he is; it means that one accepts him-
self as a product of his environment!” This is an ac-
tive, self-constituting choice, however, and not simply
a passive resignation. It involves not only a realistic
acceptance and appraisal of what a person is, but also
the possibility of "making oneself" a definite and con-
crete individual. Here, to be "free" does not mean to
escape from what one is, nor to change and be like some-
one else, nor to become immersed in the crowd. Rather,
ona's freedom consists in transforming his self, in ac-
tualizing his ideal self--that is, what hs can become.
For a person to "realize" his self means to choose his
task, which is to accept his real self (what he has to
build with) and to impregnate this with his ideal self
(what he has to build). This is why Kierkegaard says
that the ethical does "not change the individual into
another man, but makes him himself";"'5 for ("the great
thing is not to be this or that but to be oneself, and
this everyone can be if he wills it.'"+6

In all of this, man's ability to make such

1"‘"And this choice is the choice of freedom, so

that when he chooses himself as product he can just as
well be said to produce himself. 1.11151” II, p. 255.

"51mg... 11, p. 257.

h61m., II, p. 1810

 

128
choices is not questioned, for man is a self-conscious,
valuating being that does in fact make all sorts of
choices-~unless, of course, he chooses not to choose.
But even so, Kierkegaard believes that a person (qua hu-
man) is unable to preserve himself in a state of complete
indifference to alternative courses of action without
ceasing to exist as a man. And though one might succeed
in remaining undecided for a length of time in regard to
some problems, he cannot very well persist in indecision
regarding a life-problem, since he must be living in the
meantime. But as a person attempts to hold off choosing,
the inner drift of his persOnality "constantly hastens
onward and in one way or another posits this alternative
or that, making the choice more difficult the next in-
stant because what has thus been posited must be revoked?"7
The Basic Difference between
Spinoza and Kierkegaard
While the comparison of Kierkegaard and Spinoza,

in respect to the problem of freedom, may be considered

 

"7mm... 11, p. 168. The quotation continues
with the following illustration: "Think of the captain on
his ship at the instant when it has to come about. He
will perhaps be able to say, I can either do this or
that, but in case he is not a pretty poor navigator, he
will be aware at the same time that the ship is all the
while making its usual headway, and that therefore it is
only an instant when it is indifferent whether he does
this or that. So it is with a man. If he forgets to
take account of the headway, there comes at last an in-
stant when there no longer is any question of an either/
or, not because he has chosen but because he has neg-
lected to choose, which is equivalent to saying, because
others have chosen for him, because he has lost his self."

(This. )

129

from either a theoretical or a more practical point of
view, it is in regard to the former that the more funda-
mental difference presents itself. Essentially it comes
to this: in virtue of his doctrine of "Substance and at-
tribute" Spinoza is able to introduce logical necessity
into the world of fact by metaphysically synchronizing
the order of things and the order of thought. And by
then referring to a world rationalistically defined, he
is able to show that all finite items in the world are
determined by the nature of the whole. In addition, this
naturalistic kind of religious rationalism enables Spin-
oza to explain some puzzling theoretical problems of the-
ology, such as the "problem of evil," and even to suggest
reasons for the existence of such phenomena as religious
intolerance.

On the other hand, Kierkegaard insists upon the
clear difference and separation of thought and existence.
Although not entirely unrelated, nor incommensurate with
one another, these are nevertheless radically different
realms of being, the courses of which are only partially
related. That is, both the nature and the course of
thought is quite unlike that of factual being. The im-
portance of this distinction and separation, as we in-
dicated earlier, lies in the fact that the meaning of
"necessity" pertains to relations between items of
thought, whereas "freedom" is an existential term ex-

pressing processes in the world of empirical existents.

130

It is here that a basic Opposition of thought exists be-
tween Spinoza and Kierkegaard-~namely, whether the order
of things is the same as the order of thought, or whether
thought is essentially dissimilar, but pertinent to, the
process of existing. For the disagreement is n91 over
the fact that "necessity" is a concept apprOpriate to
thought, but whether or not the structure of thought re-
flects the actual process of existence.

From a more practical point of view, however,
Spinoza and Kierkegaard are not so completely Opposed.
That is, Spinoza seems to be willing to allow that a per-
son can mold his own character,"8 that each individual is
faced with the task of putting his life in order, that a
person can get an adequate conception of himself, that
one can get a new perspective on things and gain an un-
derstanding of his place in the world, that each person
should contemplate his existence in terms of the ethical
because man's real happiness comes from what is within
himself, and so on. All of these phrases could as well
be said for Kierkegaard as for Spinoza.

However, for Kierkegaard, the most important
thing that is pre supposed throughout his works in the
reality of shsiss. It is choice itself that has the

"8"The chief good is that he should arrive, to-

gether with other individuals if possible, at the posses-
sion of the aforesaid character. What that character is

we shall show in due t1me-" Wham:-
stsndlna, p, 6.

131

highest value in that it is the main determinant of hu-
man dignity and significance. He refers to the faculty
of choice as the "greatest treasure" that makes man
greater than the angels."9 And while in the final anal-
ysis Kierkegaard may not succeed in demonstrating the
m of choice, it might be conceded that he demon-
strates the W of choice for a distinctly

human exi stence.5O

 

"9W, II, p. 180-

5C"The majestic accolade to choice, that is re-
produced in this footnote, is not intended as such a
demonstration, but rather to indicate the religious sig-
nificance that Kierkegaard places upon choice. This se-
lection is from his Discourse Miss, and
may be found both in T. H. Croxall 5 WW
Kierhggsggd (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955),

. and his W (London: Lutter-
worth Press, 19148), pp, 37- 39. It is given here at eome
length in order to preserve its poetic continuity.
choice! Do you, my hearer, know how in a single wordA to
express anything which is more glorious? Do you know,
even if you were to talk year in and year out, how you
could mention anything more glorious than a choice, to
possess the power of choice? For though no doubt it is
true that the only blessed thing is to choose aright, yet
the faculty of choice itself is truly the glorious pre-
requisite. What does it matter to the maiden to take note
of all the outstanding qualities of her future lord, if
she herself cannot choose? And, on the other hand, what
more glorious thing does she know how to say than when,
whether others praise the beloved' 3 many perfections, or
mention his many faults, she says: 'He is my heart' s
choice!‘ ? A choice! yes, this is the jewel of great price,
yet not intended to be buried and hidden away; for a choice
which were not used is worse than nothing; it is a snare
in which a man entangled himself as a slave, who did not
become free--by choosing. It is a good thing which you
never can be rid of. It remains with you, and, if you do
not use it, it becomes a curse. A choice! not between
red and green, not between silver and gold; no, a choice
between God and the world. Do you know anything greater
to set beside choice? Do you know any more overwhelming
and humbling expression for God' s condescension and indul-

132

gence towards man than that He places Himself, so to say,
on the same level of choice with the world, yet only in
order that man may be able to choose; that God, if lan-
guage dare speak thus, woos mankind, that He, the eternal
Might, woos feeble mankind because in fact the strong al-
ways dees woo the weaker? Yet, how insignificant is the
maiden 3 choice between her lovers, by comparison with
this choice between God and the world. A choice! Or is
it perhaps an imperfection in the choice that is here dis-
cussed, that man not only can choose, but that he must
choose? Would it not, then, be very profitable for a
young maiden if she had a serious-minded father who said
to her: My dear girl, you have your freedom; you may
choose for yourself, but you ms; choose. ' Or would it
be more useful to her that she had the choice, but coquet-
"111 shlyfchose and chose again, and never reached making a
c Oice

No, man his; choose; for so does God retain His
honour , while at the same time having a fatherly concern
for man. Though God has condescended to be that which

Wu, yet man must, on his part, choose--God
does not al ow Himself to be mocked. Therefore the matter
stands thus: if a man neglects to choose, then that is
the same as the presumption of choosing the world.

Man must choose between God and mammon. This is
the eternal, unchangeable condition of choice, which can
never be evaded, no, not to all eternity. None shall be
able to say: God and mammon, they are not, after all, so
absolutely different. One can combine them both in the
choice, for this is to refrain from choosing. . . . God
is present in the moment of choice, not'as a witness of
it, but that He may be chosen. And God 8 being present
in order that He may be chosen is that which gives eter-
nal significance to the decision of the choice. But that
way of speaking which would forbid God, because He is so
em, from allowing Himself to be chosen, is mockery
O O O O 0

And so man has 'to choose. Terrible is the bat-
tle, the battle in man s inmost being, between God and
the world. The crowning risk involved lies in the pos-
session Of choice. But what, then, is the blessedness
which is promised when the choice is made aright; or,
which is the same thing, what must man choose? He must
choose God 3 kingdom and His righteousness. For this,
he is to give up all, quite indifferently of whether this
all be mi lions or a single penny.

 

 

CHAPTERVI

TRUE RELIGION: INTEIlECTUAL LOVE
OR EXISTENTIAL PASSION

As it was indicated in the last chapter, Spin-
oza's primary concern was a moral one. Mistreated and
outcast from his own people, it was certainly one of his
main intentions to account for the strange behavior of
human beings, and it is to his credit that rather than
become pessimistic or bitter he took an attitude of fore-
bearance and understanding toward the kind of dogmatic
religion that forced a separation between himself and his
ancestral community. His is a case of suffering the re-
proach of men for a higher principle that most men fail
to grasp. And as everyone knows, Spinoza's life so bore
out his moral convictions that today there is hardly a
word written about him that does not make some reference
to the high moral quality of his personal life.

In laying out the Ethics, Spinoza's main purpose
was to show how man may find the way that leads from
bondage unto freedom; and to do this in a manner that
would command respect, he endeavored to lay down a met-
aphysical foundation for the moral life in such a way
that the latter would follow directly from the former.

133

1311
In the course of doing this he assumed without qualifi-
cation the metaphysical competence of reason--an assump-
tion so sweeping that it included the pOSsibility Of a
noetic perception of the very essence of God. Reason,
itself being eternal, is able to conceive things under

the form of eternity.1

The Intellectual Love of‘God
No phrase of Spinoza, perhaps, has been more

quoted or remembered than his "intellectual love of God,"
and it represents about the most concise way of describe
ing Spinoza's conception of true religion. Yet it has
been pointed out that this phrase did not originate with
Spinoza, nor was it even a novel expression to medieval
Jewish or Christian philosophers.2 Inasmuch as this fig-
ure of speech permits a variety of homiletical interpre-
tations, our intention, apart from a brief description,
is to make a single pointed reference to it--but an im-
portant one for our purposes here. It is this: in spite
of the ordinary man's assertion that he "loves God" in a
manner similar to the way in which he loves his father,
by "loving God " he has more often been engaged in some-
thing that is closer to a rational apprehension of a re-

ligious concept-where, of course, it has not been a

 

1m 11, Prop. 1414, Corol. 2.
2Wolfson, m. I, pp. 302-05.

135
hypocritical mouthing or a superstitious fear--than to
a natural kind of paternal affection. That is to say,
that while the average man's "love of God" undoubtedly
falls short of Spinoza's WW, both of
these kinds of "love" are skin in that they are primarily
intellectual.

Briefly, the above phrase simply stands for the
sort of feeling that comes with the correct understand-
ing of things. The more one understands himself and his
emotions, the more he "loves" God, because "he who clear-
ly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions
feels pleasure . . . and this pleasure is . . . accom-
panied by the idea of Cod."3 And, of course, the highest
good man can attain is the knowledge of God." But we
should not be too hasty here, and confuse the notions of
virtue, piety, and love of God without making any distinc-
tions.

To the present writer it seems that Spinoza's

view reveals a definite intellectual aristocracy. This

 

V, Prop. 15, Proof. In Part III of the
, Definifiions of the Emotions, Spinoza defines

p easure as the transition . . . to a greater eerfec-
tion," or-moreifully in the Note to Prop. 11, as a pas-
sive etate wherein the mind pesses to a greater perfec;
tion. But in regard to the 'third kind of knowledge,
pleasure as described differently. Here it is unieue and
eternal, the highest possiele mental acquiescence (ihid.
inf, PrOp. 32, Proof). 'Love is formally defined as "

leasure, accompanied by the idea of annexternal cause
( .' III, Def. 6) and, in the case of intellectual
love,' the accompanying cause is God. .

"I212- IV, PrOp. 28.

136

is not a criticism, of course. Any realistic view of man
cannot fail to acknowledge the differences of intellectual
ability found among men. But the aristocracy is worth
pointing out, nevertheless, whenever the ethico-religious
is correlated with the cognitive. With this in mind we
might notice the different meanings referred to by the ex-
pression "to love God" in Spinoza's main works.

(1) First, specifically referring to the Old
Testament Jews, he acknowledges the existence of tradi-
tional religion which is given to peoples and nations,
and in which the many are exhorted to love God. Here, to
"love God" means W. Being promised rewards,
threatened by punishments, and bound by oaths, the many,
in simple faith, are inspired to obedience by the' 'sacred
scriptures." "All are able to obey," as he puts it, even
though theycannot be wise or led byreason.‘5 Thus, by
implication, Spinoza condones any simple piety or unso-
phisticated "religion of the heart" where "to believe in
God and to hOnour Him . . . is thesame thing as to obey
Him."6

. (2) However, in Part IV and the first half of
Part V of the miss, Spinoza speaks of "loving God"

 

5W, p. 199.

., p. 183. It isof particular interest that
Spinoza, in this same work, extends beyond Jewish tradi-
tion and quotes from both MOses and Paul with equal facil-
ity. Here teo he refers to the Bible (both Old Testament
and New)as "Holy Scripture" and "'Revelation,’ which "by
the special grace of God" has been provided for the plain

137
in the general sense of understanding the nature of
things. This applies to the person who "has ever first
in his thoughts that all things follow from the necessity
of the divine nature; so that whatsoever . . . m to
him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that ap-
pearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and
confused view of the universe."7 Such is the person who
is led by reason, who sees through appearances, who de-
taches himself from his transitory interests, and who en-
,joys the peace of mind that comes with understanding his
emotions. This too is the person who rises above the in-
sults and injuries inflicted by others, perceives the
pointlessness of envy and meanness, and is freed from pet-
tiness, hate, impulses, and passions. All of this belongs
to the intellectual kind of love revealed in the conquest
of reason over passions. This "love towards God," as
Spinoza says, "is the highest good which we can seek for

under the guidance of reason, and is common to all men,"8

 

man (p. 1??” that he might be moved to devotion towards
God (p. 9 . And yet, 'we cannot perceive by the natural
light of reason that simple obedience is the path of sal-
vation (p. 198). Spinoza s sympathetic attitude toward
a humble and simple piety is indicated in this quotation
from the biographer Colerus as given in Elwes Introduc-
tion (Ms, 1, p. xix): 'It happened one day that his
landlady asked him whether -he believed she could be saved
in the religion she professed. He answered: Your reli-
gion is a very good one; you need not look for another,
nor doubt that you may be saved in it, provided, whilst
you apply yourself to piety, you live at the same time

a peaceable and quiet life. '

 

7% IV, Prop. 73, Note (italics mine).
8m. V, Prop. 20, Proof.

138
but which, it must be added, is not attained by all men
in like degree.

(3) However, all this occurs before Spinoza spe-
cifically refers (in this regard) to his "third" kind of
knowledge, which he does not introduce until Proposition
XXV. It is in this context that he refers to the intui-
tive vision in which a person may attain "blessedness."9
Here reason, conceiving things "under theform of eter-L-
nity," sees things in their true perspective, an activity
in which "arises the highest possible mental acquies-
cence," which is accompanied in turn "by the idea of God
as Cause," and which is defined in the Corollary to Prop-
osition 102x11 as "the intellectual love of God."10 And
Spinoza indicates'that this kind of emotion is "eternal"
--it does not, like other pleasant feelings, change from
less to more perfect, but is perfect and W. "The
intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind
of knowledge is WWII

Now it is noteworthy that this third sense of
"loving God" is not simply given to anyone; it is a Joy
that in fact is attained only by a few men.12 It is a
Joy unique, the noblest attainment of human life; it is

 

9m. V, Prop. 27; and Prop. 36, Note.
lolhid- V;. also Prop. 33.
111mg. v, Prop. 33 (italics mine).

12This is explicit inlgisiapter 13 of the W-
W. p- -

139
gained in philosophical contemplation in which the mind,

completely detached and unconcerned with the self, fully
understands the unchanging and necessary order of the
universe.
Spinoza and Popular Religion

If Spinoza is an example W of ra-
tionalism in phiIOSOphy and liberalism in religion, yet
his writing reveals influences from his Biblical-Jewish
heritage from which he never entirely escapes. And this
raises the question as to whether or not his concessions
to traditional religion and the rigorous philosOphy pre-
sented in the m are satisfactorily resolved; or, to
put it in a different way, the question arises concerning
a "two-fold" doctrine of truth. In Chapters XII-XIV of
the W he asserts that re-
ligion consists in simple piety, that is, in accepting
and following the plain teachings of Scripture. In this
regard he clearly sees the difference between philoSOphy
and religion, which is, incidentally, a distinction almost
lost in the medieval synthesis. At the same time, how-
ever, his sanction of a simple religion of faith and obe-
dience is not that in which (he asserts) man will find
his greatest happiness; and so we find that there exists
m different ways by which one may approach God or be re-
ligious: the common way exhorted by the writers of Scrip-
ture "which is . . . very simple and easily to be grasped
by all, . . . which would most deeply move the mind of

1140

the masses to devotion towards God";13 and then the
"royal" way (described on pages 137-38, above) which only
the few may attain. And since there is nothing contrary
to reason taught in the Scriptures, Spinoza asserts, there
is no conflict between Revelation (the Bible) and reason.
Reason and faith, phiIOSOphy and revelation, as he sees
it, are entirely different footings "as wide apart as the
poles." I

PhilOSOphy has no end in view save truth: faith,

. . . looks for nothing but obedience and piety.

Again, philOSOphy is based on axioms which must be

sought from nature alone: faith is based on history

agelgfiguage’élzncilogrufi be sought for only in Scrip-
This quotation reveals that while Spinoza was tolerant of
popular religion,15 he took its conception of faith to be
the nature of religious faith in general, a natural mis-
understanding due to his acquaintance with this kind of
religion.

But popular religion in the seventeenth century,

Just as it is- in the twentieth century, was not so much

a. religion of faith as Spinoza was wont to think. In

 

13m” P0 9-
11m" P. 189-

15Although the term "popular religion" is an
arbitrary one, it is in common use. It refers to the
cormnon, usually unreflective adherence of the ordinary
man to his particular church or sect. While such reli-
gion is often dogmatic and sometimes spirited, it is
usually a more or less matter-of-fact acceptance of the
certain doctrines and outward practices that character-
ize the socially-approved religions of the day.

ll+l
spite of its emphasis upon the terms "faith" and "simple
belief," such religion is basically oriented toward the
W1, albeit revealed, truths concerning God, man, and
the universe. And even though Spinoza may have thought
himself to be as far removed from Alpalcl’iar16 as, let us
say, Santayana would have thought he was unlike any mod-
ern fundamentalist, and as dissimilar as is Spinoza's
"God" from the Jewish "Jehovah," still there is one thing
thatOhe has in common with the ordinary man's religion.
It is this: both purport to describe what is actually the
case about God and reality, whether natural or supernatu-
ral, immanent or transcendent. For the so-called "arti--.
cles of faith" of papular religion are really W-
W that have as their object supernatural enti-
ties (God, angels, etc.), unique events (such as miracles),
and divine truths (e.g., "the greatest of these is love").
"Simple belief" and "faith" are terms that refer to the
process of accepting certain true doctrines for which the
evidence is lacking due to the nature of the evidence re-
quired; and there is nowhere a better example of this view
than that of Aquinas who "regards Scripture primarily as
a body of comrmmicated information, and faith as the ac-

 

16A medieval Jewish theologian whose views are
discussed and refuted by Spino a (112151., pp. 190-910. In
particular is Alpakhar 3 "rule' that whenever Scripture
and reason should conflict the-m should give way to
the former. That the Scriptures should. be accepted as a
body of absolute truths and never be interpreted meta-
phorically was, of course, repugnant to Spinoza.

1’42

ceptance of such information upon authority. He repeated-
ly compares faith to a schoolboy's acceptance, upon the
word of his master whom he trusts, of facts (such as the
sphericity of the earth) for which he himself does not
yet know the evidence." 17 For popular religion, general-
ly speaking, to "believe" religious propositions is not
disreputable, it.is the way you find out about religious
realities-~it is the way to become religious. On this

View. "faith" means to be W-
thins-

/,,

Existentialism and the Meaning of Religion:
the General Thesis

At the end of Chapter I, four questions were se-
lected that are raised by the existential approach and
which are crucial to religious thought. That rationalism
and existentialism represent two quite opposite approaches
to the problems these involve has been repeatedly shown
throughout the preceding chapters of this paper, in which
the positions of Kierkegaard and Spinoza have been pre-
sented and contrasted. Now it is time to summarize the
answers given from the side of existentialism, and to in-
dicate their significance.

In the first place, the question was asked: Is
religion essentially a matter of reason or of faith--that

is, does it deal with knowledge or belief? The existen-

 

17Baillie, M” p. 112.

11:3

tialist answer is that unless we blur the essential dif-
ference between believing and knowing, it is evident that
the alleged realities of religion are simply not "known."
For whether it is rational knowledge, demonstrable and .
certain, or empirical knowledge, confirmable and prac-
tically certain, both these produce a mental surety that
is quite unlike the precariousness of believing, with its
elements of hoping and doubting, which pertains to reli-
gion. Without deprecating the necessity and value of
knowledge, it is faith (belief) that is intrinsic to the
meaning of religion, for to "believe" means to claim the
reality of something that is.uncertain and which cannot
be known at all. Faith is an exercise of the will rather
than an activity of the mind.

Secondly: how can subjectivity constitute truth?
And the answer is: by distinguishing the kind of truth
appropriate in religion from other kinds of truth, and by
defining the nature of such truth in terms of "involve-
ment." Here the main characteristic of truth is not the
"what," that is, the W of the assertion that is
made in regard to something, but the "how"--the W-
ages with which an individual posits the reality of some-
thing. In the first case the important thing is m one
is related to (Is the object described really so?); in
the second case the important thing is how one is related,
that is, whether or not the W is sincere or

II

true" (Is the intensity of the appropriation-process

1mm
commensurate with the implications of the object of
faith?).

And third: is it possible to know, as the result
of a logical argument, that God actually exists? The en-
swer to this from the existential point of view, is une-
quivocal. On the one hand, all arguments that move to ex-
istence in the conclusion must already have the existence
given in the premises, since the nature of existence is
actuality and it cannot be deduced from thought, the nat-
ture of which is W. On the other hand, if ex-
istence is I191 given in the premises, it is futile to at-
tempt to produce it as a conclusion to the argument. It
was noted, of course, that theologically-structured argu-
ments might have other purposes, although ordinarily they
are not propounded with this in mind. Moreover, Kierke-
gaard's objection to such argumentation is not a logical
one alone; for according to him, if the existence of God
could be demonstrated in such a way that it became a mat-
ter of fact, then fan}; would no longer be necessary and

the religious life would lose its stimulus.18

 

lsThere is much that could be said on both sides
of this issue. In reference to Christianity, Kierkegaard
notes everywhere the New Testament emphasis upon faith,
and he quotes the warning of Jesus that faith may someday
no longer exist. In general, Kierkegaard s position is
that factual certainty of divine realities fails to in-
spire or move a person to the noblest form of religious
living; it tends to guarantee the outcome of history, it
presents no real evil to overcome, it leaves no self to
remake. 90mpare William James' essay, "Pragmatism and
Religion. in his Wan: (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1919). especially pp. 91-92.

11:5

Finally: does religion imply the necessity and
reality of choice? And the answer is that choice is
everywhere presupposed in the existential way of think-
ing--it is perhaps the one main point common to different
types of existentialism. According to Kierkegaard, the
power of choice is "the Jewel of great price" that has
maximal religious significance, for the nature of the re-
ligious situation is such that God is not merely a witness
of man's choice but one of the W to be cho-
sen.19 In plain terms, the basic religious choice is be-
tween God and the "world"--and this is m, as it is some-
times pictured, a choicebetween the cloister and an im-
moral life. It is in the choice itself that a man re-
veals his "heart," that is to say, what is finally of
greatest importance to himself.

In the light of the above discussion, it is now
possible to assert the general argument of this disserta-
tion. It comes to this: the essential characteristics
of existentialism are the defining characteristics of
true religion--these constitute what is m by reli-
gion, prOperly conceived.2O We might recall the char-

19See above, p. 131, n. 50.
20This of course raises the problem as to what
constitutes a correct conception or definition of reli-
gion, since this is a nominal term and surely one-of the
more ambiguous and inclusive ones. The point of view
here presented has been implicitly reached by considering
what religion is generally considered or reported to be
(in the Judeo-Christian tradition), and then selecting
from such descriptions certain (though not the most com-

 

1146
acteristics outlined in the first chapter.21 Self-
concern, for example, is perhaps the basic religious
attitude; at least, it is contended here that there is
no better way of expressing the religious posture than
to say that it means a person has an infinite interest
in his self and his destiny.22 And although such a con-

 

mon) characteristics as representing the essential fea-
tures of this tradition. While this process was stipu-
lative, certain guiding principles were utilized to pre-
serve it from pure arbitrariness, such as: (g) avoiding
specific theological concepts, (such as the Trinity‘);
(b) making explicit and clear certain aspects of religious
faith often vaguely stated or implied in enerally ac-
knowledged beliefs, (such as self-concern ; and (c) most
important, selecting characteristics that represent what
is generally conceded to be, or that I maintain is, the
higher expression of the religious life, 6. ., infusing
existence with values (Socrates; , placing u timate concern
at the center of faith (Tillich , affirming that religion
penetrates daily existence (St. James), insisting upon the
necessity of choice (Pascal), emphasizing individual soli-
tude (Whitehead), and so on. In so doing I have followed
the common insight of many of the great religious think-
ers, past and present, who remind us that what the bulk

of mankind approves of in morality and religion does not
always indicate what is truest and best.

21Above, pp. 3-18.

22The word "infinite," here, refers to the
greatest possible concern about one 3 life, and it is
partially illl'lstrated in the following passage from
Kierkegaard: What I really lack is to be clear in my
mind W, not what I am to know, except in
so far as a certain understanding must precede every
action. The thing is to understand myself, to see what
God really wishes mg to do; the thing is to find a truth
"111011 is true mi ‘70 find W
W. What would be the use of discovering so-
called objective truth, of working through all the sys-
tems of ph11030phy and of being able, if required, to
review them all and show up the inconsistencies within
each system;--what good would it do me to be able to de-
velop a theory of the state and combine all the details
into a single whole, and so construct a world in which

1147
cern certainly includes the ethical, the impetus to self-
transformation need not be stalled by a technical consid-
eration such as the failure to arrive at a theoretical
definition of the "good." Self-concern means that the
individual is concerned about the quality and the purpose
of his existence, and in its religious expression it im-
plies a life inspired by the vision and hope that value
lies behind, if not permeates, the order of things. It
is the conviction that ultimately W matters and
that a picture of man as a "parasite on a dying speck of
matter" or as a mere "congerie of atoms" is inadequate.
It is the conviction that produces an "inner teleology"
that remakes the self in virtue of the faith-object
posited as the ground of such purpose.

Or, again, take the notion of the emphasis on the
individual. This is both a distinctive feature of exis-
tentialism and. an essential element in religion as it is
set forth here. Religion exists 1%, not in doctrinal
prOpositions nor in ecclesiastical institutions nor in

the traditions of a particular people. "True religion"
is a matter of WW- It

 

I did not live, but only held up to the view of others;
--what good would it do me to be able to explain the
meaning of Christianity if it had up deeper signifi-
cance WW; what good would it do me
if truth stood before me, cold and naked, not caring
whether I recognized her or not, and producing in me a
shudder of fear rather than a trusting devotion?"
W: p. 141+. This quotation also reveals one rea-
son why Kierkegaard took subjective truth so seriously.

1148
does not consist in what one's family, group, or nation
avows or practices, but in the inward movement of the
soul, or better, in what the individual self decides to
do with his life. In short, existentialism underscores
once again the insight proclaimed by such spirits as
St. Paul and Pascal that there is no mediator between
God and man, an insight that is denied in practice by
man's interposition of reason, scripture, or church. The
uniquely "religious" is, as Whitehead affirms, what a man
does with his solitude;23 and it is contended here that
the complete transparency and candor of the religious
mood which is attainable in isolation, is destroyed when-
ever the "crowd" appears and its attitude dominates or
its influence begins to be felt.

Just as the peculiarities of self-concern and
emphasis upon the individual are characteristic of both
existentialism and religion, so is the notion of "involve-
ment" characteristic of both. For once again, to be "re-
ligious" means to enter mg a particular mode of exis-

23

Alfred North Whitehead, ’
(New York: l't'ieridian Books, Inc., 19%), p. 1%. The exact
wording is religion is what the individual does with his
own solitariness. The emphasis on faith pertaining to
the individual is-indicated in the following passage by
Collins: Faith is not susceptible to mass techniques:
each man believes in his own heart and on his own respon-
sibility. . . . Each individual can make the act of faith,
provided he does so on the basis of his own freedom.

This is the crucial Opportunity for becoming an individ-
ual in the highest existential sense." James Collins,

was (Chicago: Henry Regnery 00., 1952),
p. .

 

1’49
tence, a manner of operating, a certain attitude toward
life that is marked by its concrete expression instead
of its abstract conception. All the existential analo-
gies used in this connection-~being "engaged" ii; a battle,
instead of reading about warfare or some historical con-
flict; being a player 9;; the stage, rather than a specta-
tor observing from the balcony; being in love, as opposed
to someone's description of it; w the meal itself,
instead of reading about it in a cookbook--these are all
attempts to indicate that religion is something entered
into rather than something intellectually comprehended?"
And in Kierkegaard, of course, one finds the repeated in-
sistence that religion is not a doctrine nor a teaching
nor a revelation, but a manner of existing.

What is perhaps the most widespread misunderstand-
ing, from the existentialist point of view, concerning
the meaning of religion, is the notion that it is another
area of "fact" the nature of which differs from other fac-
tual information only in terms of its content--that is,
instead of such objects as animals, trees, or stars, in

religion the objects presented to knowledge are God,

 

2"One short but piquant illustration from the

W might be given here to direct attention to the
difference between W and W. "It
is as if one were to recommend being put to death by the
guillotine, saying: 'It is a very easy matter, forsooth;
you simply lay your head down on a block, somebody pulls
a string, the ex falls-~and the thing is done' . But sup-
p28; that b81318 executed was precisely what one did not
W S O p. O

150
angels, pre-historic events, and the like. If this mm
true, a W approach would be required--and 15,
required, for those who conceive religion in this way--
in order to obtain the least distorted and most accept-

able hypotheses about religious "facts.' This is because
knowledge demands detachment, whereas the venture of reli-
gion, it is maintained, implies being involved.

This is one reason for the emphasis on the sep-
aration of existence and thought, logic and living, think-
ing and doing. Indeed, it is a most essential character-
istic of the existential view that religion is not some-
thing thought about, but something the individual is and
ms. ll'iis seems so obvious that it hardly needs to be
pursued. That a person may well understand, e.g., or
even teach others about the virtues of kindness, patience,
or mercy, in no way guarantees the extent to which these
virtues may be incorporated into his own manner of living.
Religion 1m reflection and thought, to be sure; but
religion is primarily not something thought but something
lived, and knowing or thinking does not imply doing. In-
tellectual comprehension is co-extensive neither with a
genuine religious interest nor with religious action.

At an initial'glance, the characteristic of ex-
istentialism that might seem least likely to pertain to
the meaning of religion is the notion of subjective truth;

and if we were concerned here with a "reportive" or lex-

151
ical definition in terms of the way religion is most com-
monly dispensed, it would be hard to deny that it has
usually been thought to consist of objectively true as-
sertions about supernatural realities. And yet, can it
be affirmed with honesty that the person who merely "gets

' assents to, or accepts uncritically the so-called

in on,’
objective facts or truths proffered by a particular re-
ligion, is in any sense (except the most outward) a per-
son of profound religious faith? A moment's reflection
points to the common feature of religion and existential-
ism in this regard: which of the following was more truly
"religious"--the respected Athenian countrymen of Socrates
who fearedthat the established "truths" about the dei-
ties were being jeOpardized by his teachings, or the
ethically-determined Socrates whose actions dramatically
expressed a quality of life marked by the conviction that
the invisible and eternal provides the clarification for
human existence? That which has always exalted the no-
bler forms of the religious life above popular religion
(with its elements of the simple and the superstitious)
has been its emphasis upon the extent to which a person's
convictions determine his actions, rather than in one's
capitulation to specific theological doctrines.

And lastly, just as existentialism cannot be
properly delineated without including its central ethi-

cal insight--the important distinction between what is

152
and what might be, and can be, brought into existence--
so W must be included as an essentium of our
conception of true religion. It could well be argued
that the ability to make genuine choices is the most
basic presupposition of Kierkegaard's view. It is in-
trinsic, surely, to his conceptions of truth, faith, and
ethics. For subjective truth involves W an ob-
jective uncertainty with an infinite passion; and faith
means a leap, a m, a commitment in which the alter-
natives are real and the object chosen is not guaranteed
in advance; and significant ethical behavior, as he sees
it, is not even possible apart from choice, since ethics
is defined in terms of freedom.

In sum, the general thesis presented here is
that the essential characteristics of existentialism dis-
cussed above--concern for the self, emphasis on the indi-
vidual, involvement, the distinction between thought and
existence, subjective truth, and the reality of choice--
provide the most adequate way of portraying the essen-
tial characteristics of true religion.

Existentialism and Passion:
the Specific Thesis

Gathering together some of the main threads of
thought that have been presented in other parts of this
treatise, let us recall how Spinoza has pictured religion.

In a sentence, he has conceived the essence of religion

153
to lie in the acquisition of knowledge and understanding,
in passing from emotionally confused ideas and common
Opinions to a clear intellectual comprehension of the na-
ture of things. This means that in regard to most of the
key religious conceptions considered in this paper, his
views are the very opposite of those advanced by Kierke-
gaard. Where Kierkegaard affirms that the heart of re-
ligion requires the genuineness of a person's choice-
determined behavior, Spinoza denies any such possibil-
ity; where the former urges the need for non-rational
acts of faith, the latter regards belief as inferior
"knowledge"; where the one sustains the distinction be-
tween the activity of thought and the order of existence,
the other unites the two; where the one prOposes that
truth has a subjective reference, the other maintains
that the adequacy of truth is unaffected by the way it
is apprOpriated; and where Kierkegaard stresses the in-
dividual in his solitude and estrangement from God,
Spinoza lends comforting assurance that every person is
a part of Him.

In spite of some interesting similarities be-
tween these two intellectual aristocrats, why is it,
then, that two such profound ethical thinkers differ so
greatly in regard to the nature of religion? The main
reason, it appears, is that Spinoza's view is a 2111.12.5-
m in spite of his religious terminology. His concep-

15h

tion of God is purely philosophical, for it refers to a
being without personality or purpose, and one that in no
way transcends the world of nature.25 This is why the
most important thing for Spinoza is rational understand-
ing, while running throughout the W is Kierke-
gaard's contention that religion is not an intellectual
adventure nor is its purpose to understand at all. And
this is precisely what is being argued here--that reli-
gion should not be identified with philoSOphy. Philos-
ophy is a m activity. This is, finally, the pur-
pose of Kierkegaard's principal religious works--to in-
sist upon the profound difference between philosophical
knowledge and religious faith. Now this contrast is not
made for the purpose of criticizing Spinoza's point of
view, but to point out that it is more accurately a
philos0phical world-view than a religious perspective.

This brings us to the 592211.12 thesis of the

dissertationnnamelw that W

so. a 0‘ 3.: .1, r o z . q- .1. Q .113

W, as we have endeavored to pre-
sent it here. It is this, finally, that distinguishes

the religious from the philosophical or the scientific.

 

25And similarly" with the other terms used by
Spinoza: e.g., eternity" refers to permanence and ne-
cessity, rather than time without end; "'sin' is more
like error than wickedness; and "created" means "'caused
rather than "made out of nothing." Also,- in consistency
with his doctrine of attributes, ""love is a "mode of
thinking" and God is a "thinking thing."

155

It must be noted, of course, that not my passion or
violent emotion is necessarily religious in character

or characteristic of religious faith. Nor are the many
pOpular expressions of religion, in virtue of their em-
phasis on emotionalism, more truly religious for that
reason. But passion (in the context of existential con-
cern) is a reference to the inwardness, intimacy, and

strenuousness of the act of belief. Its intension in-

cludes a "holding fast, a "being committed to,‘ a demand

for the reality of something which cannot be demonstrated.
Unlike the passive nature of emotions or feelings, which
are due more to external factors, existential passion is
active and voluntary; it contains aspects of striving,
wanting, determination, even desperateness and struggle.
Passion in this sense is the basic element in subjective
truth, in choice, in the leap of faith, and in self-con-
cern; accordingly, it is the basic constituent of this
conception of religion. The passion inherent to Kierke-
gaard's conception of faith is revealed in the following
sentences:
This struggle . . . is more persistent than a thirty
years war, because the task is not merely to acquire
but still more hotly to preserve, where every day
the heat is as burning as the one day of the battle
of Zama! While the understanding despairs, faith
presses on to victory in the passion of its inward-
ness. . . . Sitting quietly in a ship while the
weather is calm is not a picture of faith; but when
the ship has sprung a leak, enthusiastically to keep
the ship afloat by pumping while yet not seeking the

harbor: this is the picture. . . . While the under-
standing, like a despairing passenger, stretches out

156

its arms toward the shore, but in vain, faith lggrks
with all its energy in the depths of the soul.

If one were to question whether or not anyone actually
holds his faith in such a fervent manner. the answer is
that most individuals do not-~but, to the extent that
any person holds his religious faith with seriousness
and remains intellectually honest, W he is
involved in a passionate commitment.

Another way of indicating the difference between
philOSOphy and religion is to point out the presupposi-
tional character of faith. After the manner of William
James, the existentialist is asserting the antecedence
of the volitional by saying that it is not the intellect
that decides among or against the passions, but the pas-
sions that predispose the intellect. Religion is prior
to (or "deeper" than) philosophy in the sense that one's
basic convictions--religious or otherwise--set or give
direction to his thought. For religious convictions are
not arrived at as conclusions to logical arguments or
generalizations from experience; because it is convic-
tions already held that determine in the one case how a
person "loads" the premises, and in the other case the
experiences he W in the first place. Religious
convictions are like other fundamental convictions that
men hold--beliefs about the external world, the self, the

order of nature, etc.--in that these are not so mruch

 

26Postscrip , Pp. 201-02, 11.

157
W of thought as they are faiths that we seek to
justify by thought.

In the final analysis, for the person who takes
religion seriously, the "truth" of his religion is not
validated by historical, scientific, or philosophical
thinking, but by the manner in which his convictions
organize and re-make his life. In short, "religion,"
in its highest expression, should be defined in terms of
W rather than by a certain view of the
universe, a particular institution, a creed or doctrine,
or a certain kind of language used. Which is to say that
religion is more of a W reality than a philo-
sophical W it--it is not a "view of" but an
"attitude toward," not the content of what, one believes
but the m in which he believes. This is why the pas-
sionately serious idolater is more W than the
respectable churchmen who merely professes a "correct"
creed, or the speculative thinker who constructs an
inclusive world-view, or the plain man who is faithful
to his mm. For it is not that all of these are with-
out any value at all, but that true religion is a

19.1mm instead of a W-

\5
.\

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