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E .V c . g. .h Ava . 1 i}: 1;. 3.1. bun—mwmfi.ax‘£33,k .k ".95 that b ' l } Will/UNI!!!NIH/Will?I!!!fill/ll!Ill/WIIJIWW 3 1293 10414 5788 This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE ORIGINS AND EDITORIAL POLICIES OF THE RICHMOND WHIG AND PUBLIC ADVERTISER, 1824-1865 presented by Robert Hume Tomlinson has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degreein History Major professor Date 5 jm Iq7’ 0-7639 \p ABSTRACT THE ORIGINS AND EDITORIAL POLICIES OF THE RICHMOND WHIG AND PUBLIC ADVERTISER, 1824-1865 BY Robert Hume Tomlinson John Hampden Pleasants founded the Richmond Whig on February 27, 1824. Within a decade he made the paper one of the important political organs in Virginia. In its early years the flhig supported state rights principles and opposed protective tariffs and national banks. But by the mid-1830's it shifted position and embraced protection and the Second National Bank. On slavery the paper followed a moderate course favoring gradual emancipation, at least until public opinion in the South, aroused against northern abolitionists, forced the @233 to drop its anti-slavery program. Throughout the period under study, the flhig_sought a coalition of northern and southern conservatives to pre- vent a disruption of the Union. During debates over the annexation of Texas, the whig_warned southern politicians that disputes over territorial expansion and extension of slavery could only weaken bonds holding the nation together. Slavery, it explained, would set one section II again: pchti StatEE in the Q n N_~.:" U»..._“. {a Q T.‘ m.‘ '. ‘ -.‘ u . Robert Hume Tomlinson against the other. The free states, fearing a loss of political power, would oppose the creation of new slave states and therefore insist upon non-extension of slavery in the territories; on the other hand, the South would demand the addition of slave states and thus insist that the territories be open to slavery. After the threat of secession became critical in 1850, the Whig concentrated its editorials on benefits states reaped from the Union. In 1860 the paper supported the creation of the Constitutional Union Party and endorsed John Bell as a presidential candidate. Yet the election of Lincoln did not induce the Whig_to endorse drastic action by the South. Until the firing on Fort Sumter, the paper cham~ pioned compromise in an attempt to settle the crisis peacefully. But when Lincoln issued his call for militia, the Whig_changed editors and joined the ranks of seces- sionists. While the paper professed approval of the Con- federate government, it soon became a severe critic of Jefferson Davis"administration, and few cabinet members escaped the wrath of the Whigfs editorials, As the South's military position deteriorated, the paper tried to maintain southern morale by ignoring or discounting the importance of northern battlefield successes. Even as General William T. Sherman marched through Georgia, the “mig confidently predicted victory! Robert Hume Tomlinson This study is based primarily on the Whigfs edito- tials for the period, but use was also made of the edi- torials of the Raleigh Register, Knoxville Whig, Southern Patriot, and the New Orleans Bee, leading Whig papers whose views helped to place those of the Richmond paper in perspective. Diaries and numerous secondary works pertaining to southern journalism and journalists also proved beneficial. A bibliographical essay is included. This work has eight chapters. The first five trace the development of the Whig as a major political press and explain its position on national issues; the last three pertain to the Civil War years. THE ORIGINS AND EDITORIAL POLICIES OF THE RICHMOND WHIG AND PUBLIC ADVERTISER, 1824-1865 BY Robert Hume Tomlinson A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1971 CDCopyright by ROBERT HUME TOMLINSON 1971 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I offer a sincere thank you to the many peOple who assisted me in preparing this thesis. To some I owe special notice. Dr. Frederick D. Williams, director of my doctoral committee, provided guidance, encouragement, and constructive criticism for which I express my lasting gratitude. But certainly my wife, Diane, deserves more credit than anyone for my completing this task. Her typing, proofreading, and more significantly her unshake- able confidence were invaluable. And finally to Mary Beth, a father's dream, I say thank you for the love and joy she generates in our home. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . iii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter I. THE BEGINNING: SEARCH FOR A CAUSE . . . 5 II. p A CAUSE: ORGANIZE T0 OPPOSE JACKSON. . . 37 III. TROUBLESOME AND DIVISIVE ISSUES: SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. . . 67 IV. ECONOMIC POLICY: SHIFT WITH THE TIMES . . 105 V. A VOICE OF CAUTION IN A TIME OF TURMOIL. . 146 VI. THE WAR YEARS: ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 1861-1865. . . . . . . . . . . 189 VII. STRAINS ON NATIONAL UNITY . . . . . . 211 VIII. TWISTING THE TRUTH. . . . . . . . . 237 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . 263 iv INTRODUCTION From 1824 to 1846 John Hampden Pleasants, a native of Goochland County, edited the Constitutional Whig. After graduating from William and Mary College in 1817 he practiced law and in 1823 assumed the job of acting editor of the Lynchburg Virginian. He soon left for Richmond, the state's largest city, determined to inculcate a greater appreciation for Thomas Jefferson's Republican ideals. To accomplish this task he founded the Constitutional Whig on January 27, 1824,1 and since his father, James, had served in the state legislature and now occupied the Governor's mansion, young Pleasants assumed his post with first-hand knowledge of Virginia politics.2 In a "Proposal" the Whig summed up its political creed by pledging to venerate the Constitution, oppose extension of the tariff system, oppose national improve- ments lacking authority of the people, and oppose all standing armies. While the Whig obviously intended to pursue a particular philosophy, the paper also promised to open its column to men of all political persuasions so that they could challenge or debate the paper's editorials; the Whig accused Ritchie of limiting space in his paper to artiCles that confirmed his Opinions. In a rather sarcastic tone the Whig expressed gratitude to Ritchie for his former advocacy of the Republican Party. Because of the fierce competition between the two Richmond papers, some uncharacteristically harsh personal attacks filtered into the papers' editorials with each blaming the other for the lack of harmonious relations. After the Enguirer tried to ignore the Whig by refusing even to mention the paper or editor, the Whig_belittled Ritchie by saying that his influence had resulted solely from the absence of any competition: clearly the Whig_implied that Ritchie's competition would keep a check on him and report his inconsistencies to the public. When the Whig began in 1824, it published two editions a week, but in 1828 the public support warranted the expansion of service to a daily. Primarily the daily edition served city residents while the semi-weekly and weekly Whig_(also known as the Country Whig) went out to readers in the counties. By 1831 the Country7Whig claimed subscribers in every county of the state and by 1833 the daily Whig ranked second only to the Enquirer in state-wide circulation. It was also in 1833 that the paper changed its name to the Richmond Whig_and Public Advertiser. Finally in 1842 the Whig announced its long sought after goal: possession of the state's largest subscription list.3 Not until just before the Civil War did the Whig lose its number one position to the Richmond Penny Post. Even though the Whig_enjoyed a large circulation, the paper generally represented a minority opinion in the state and nation. Nevertheless, awareness of the Whig's views is important because they revealed a lack of una- nimity in Virginia politics and on many occasions the Whigfs analysis of the nation's problems proved to be more accurate than the editorials of its better known rival, the Enquirer. For more than three decades the paper served as the spokesman for the loyal opposition, and if southerners had pursued more often the Whig's alternatives they might have avoided much hardship. 1 Jose; tan. a year so' . See INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES lJoseph Butler owned half interest but in less than a year sold his interests to Pleasants. 2Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Th3 Dictionaiy of American Biography (20 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930}, XV, 7-8. See also Richmond Whig, February 28, 1846, for Pleasants' obituary. 3See Richmond Whig, November 15, 1828; January 1, 1833; November 5, 1833. ”W w.L ‘. L IE q :1 at etWEEI on an ed to es s not as at 'th. h alprinci L: 51 '9‘ ‘— L a .‘v A .A‘v ;R~~ ‘lu;~ - .1 u G xdrew J“ I. .a a a n \ rginic "ghout the r V; V¥ln 1824 e: .thntrdte stirs a::~ d“: I-‘I‘.A flfi- AA CHAPTER I THE BEGINNING: SEARCH FOR A CAUSE Between 1824 and 1829 the Whig_worked for the election and re-election of John Quincy Adams and attempted to establish itself as a spokesman for Repub- lican principles. The Whig in 1824 and 1828 endorsed Adams not as the ideal candidate but as a lesser evil than Andrew Jackson. Understandably then, the paper concentrated on attacking Jackson and the other candi- dates rather than extolling the virtues of Adams. Throughout the period the Whig desired primarily to offer Virginia a choice in future elections and to chal- lenge Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, who in 1824 espoused the cause of William H. Crawford of Georgia. Both papers said they embraced Jefferson's principles and both decried Andrew Jackson's militarism, but on little else did they agree.1 Unlike the 1820 election, the press had many candidates to choose from in 1824. Crawford, a huge handsome man, enjoyed popular support from Virginia's state rights advocates, who appreciated the Georgian's 2 refusal to oppose Monroe's election in 1816. Although John Randolph c national bank .; moderate tar; the United Sta: Pia-iison's and I- ontencer unti; Ben C born in Hanovezl part for his c visited Ricra'nor. Ritchie, editor Lie voters to a q L‘EY Seemed t0 6 John Randolph and other opponents of the tariff and national bank endorsed Crawford, the Georgian favored a moderate tariff and the rechartering of the Bank of 3 In 1823 he, with service in both the United States. Madison's and Monroe's cabinets, appeared to be a strong contender until a stroke paralyzed and blinded him.4 Henry Clay, another presidential candidate, was born in Hanover County, Virginia, but found little sup- port for his campaign in the Old Dominion. Though he visited Richmond in 1822 and conferred with Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Enguirer, Clay could not persuade 5 the voters to accept his American System. At first Clay seemed to be the West's favorite, but prior to the election Jackson replaced Clay as that section's repre- sentative; and by November 1824 the Kentuckian had lost almost all his popularity in Virginia. Others also vied for Virginia's electoral votes, including John C. Calhoun. Long a national figure favor- ing what the ngg called "latitudinarian" policies to expand the role of the central government, Calhoun never aroused much support in Virginia. Though the South Carolinian possessed great intelligence, his austere and condescending attitude evoked little popular enthusiasm so necessary for him to achieve his lifetime goal, the White House. Calhoun's frustrations in the 1824 election marked the first of many he met in presidential sweepstakes . he most strik eyes, which se his long black became an even head, Calhoun spakesnan. ye reasoned papel side SOUth C a] Anothe Career: ESpec knOWn and ad}? becaUSQ Of hi sweepstakes. In appearance Calhoun was tall and gaunt. The most striking thing about him was his multicolored eyes, which seemed to bore through his opposition. With his long black hair (in a few years it turned gray and became an even more imposing sight) brushed back on his head, Calhoun became the symbol of the Old South's spokesman. Yet his political theories and closely reasoned papers failed in 1824 to stir the voters out- side South Carolina.7 Another candidate, Andrew Jackson, also saw his hopes frustrated in 1824. By virtue of his military career, especially the Battle of New Orleans, he was well known and admired before his entry into national politics. Because of his Florida military activities in 1817, Virginians, especially the WW g editors, feared that Jackson was too much the military chieftain and unwilling to abide by Constitutional restraints.8 Unfortunately for Jackson's hopes in 1824 and for Thomas Ritchie's aspirations for national influence, the Enguirer's editor, with the endorsement of other state rights advocates, called the old soldier a military despot too naive to be trusted with power.9 Consequently in later years when Ritchie switched to support Jackson, the editor encoun- tered a cold reception from his old foe; the editor, therefore, while in his most productive years, remained stranded in Virginia while men like Francis P. Blair went to Washin national admin Throug- rawford was p 'ut editorials | Chance to win With Virginia‘ throw away the reOily aid Am Paper maintaix the nation am went to Washington to edit the Washington Globe for the national administrations.lo Throughout the campaign, the ngg recognized that Crawford was probably the first choice of Virginia voters, but editorials also warned that the Georgian had no chance to win the Presidency, whereas Adams might win with Virginia's electoral vote. Why, asked the ngg, throw away the state's vote on Crawford and thus indi- rectly aid Andrew Jackson's chances of success? The paper maintained that Jackson was gaining strength in the nation and that Adams, while not the perfect candi- date, was the lesser of the evils. Since the Enquirer spoke of Jackson as a military despot, the WWig_h0ped that Thomas Ritchie would drop Crawford in favor of Adams just to defeat Jackson.11 In response to the ngg, the Richmond Enquirer lamely stressed that Crawford was the choice of the Congressional caucus, a body that had in the past desig- nated the best national candidate.12 Crawford's sup- porters tried to secure Pennsylvania's endorsement by selecting Albert Gallatin, but the Pennsylvania legisla- ture upset their plans by nominating Andrew Jackson. Since few attended the national caucus on February 14, most realized that the nomination in Washington gained 13 few votes for Crawford. In October Gallatin withdrew to allow Crawford's party the opportunity to offer Henry Clay the Vice- But realizing seemed the pr Wastin of the caucus two hundred si ing, the paper hardly r6prese rePresented sj States (New yc accounted for realized that Congress, the Crawfordus We Q9. feared t Cahoums "hi the Georgian' 53‘ § ore NOVernb Assembly clot to allow them had the best F9 La“. “‘Oun . l7 Clay the Vice-Presidential spot on the caucus ticket. But realizing the weakness of Crawford's candidacy, Clay scorned the proposal. Wasting no time the WWig ridiculed the importance of the caucus nomination: since only sixty-six of the two hundred sixty members of Congress attended the meet- ing, the paper could justly say that the designation 14 The sixty-six hardly represented a national consensus. represented sixteen of the twenty-four states but four states (New York, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia) 15 When it is accounted for forty-eight of the total. realized that two hundred twenty Republicans were in Congress, the Whig's contention that the caucus revealed Crawford's weakness not his strength seems correct. The Whig feared that Crawford would only divide John C. 16 But sensing that Calhoun's "high-handed federalism." the Georgian's people in Virginia would not back out before November, the ngg suggested that the General Assembly clothe the electors with discretionary powers to allow them to vote for the candidate whom they thought had the best chance of defeating Andrew Jackson and Calhoun.17 Calhoun, who soon became the South's spokesman, still appeared to Virginia Republicans in 1824 to be an advocate of federal power: national bank and internal improvements.18 Five years later the South Carolinian changed his in trines which union: ironic- rights in 183 lflgivlhich cla trines of 179: ‘13) the old . Vin in Virgin PhiIOSOphy ev ideas . 19 BY 5; Cranord's be the“ candid attempts to . mmors Sprea Crawford won 0:: “ice; expe 10 changed his image and formulated the nullification doc- trines which eventually led to disruption of the federal union; ironically the man who became the symbol of state rights in 1832 could not in 1824 meet the test of the ' Whig which claimed to represent the state rights doc- trines of 1798 and 1799. But a group's identification with the old Jefferson ideals was typical, because to win in Virginia most politicians embraced Jefferson's philosophy even though in practice they ignored his ideas.19 By spring Calhoun's cause was fading and Crawford's backers became disheartened when they heard of their candidate's illness.20 Despite his managers' attempts to keep the severity of the stroke secret, rumors spread. The Whig surmised correctly that while Crawford would survive, he would be unable to assume high office; expecting Crawford to withdraw, the Whig invited the caucus candidate's followers to join the Adams move- ment.21 The Whig's editorials in the spring tried to explain away John Quincy Adams' federalist ideas of the past and to define his position on the tariff and inter- nal improvements. While reporting on a tariff bill (it later became known as the Tariff of Abominations) in Congress, the Whig commented that Adams opposed the tariff but that Jackson, if President, would sign it into law.” It was Carolina and S Jackson since excused Adams' been following also belonged nsider Adams Virginia; in t Offered the be tutiOn,24 To reminded reade Ch‘JSetts OPPO: COngrESs wit that).25 11 law.22 It was inconceivable to the Whig that North Carolina and South Carolina would continue supporting Jackson since he favored a tariff.23 The Richmond paper excused Adams' record as that of a federalist who had been following his father's policies. Since Crawford had also belonged to the federalist party, the Whig did not consider Adams' record damaging to his candidacy in Virginia; in the eyes of the Whig, John Quincy Adams now offered the best protection of the United States Consti- tution.24 To support their case, the Whig's editors reminded readers that all but one congressman from Massa- chusetts opposed a new tariff in the last session of Congress (Virginia's representatives did no better than that).25 As the campaign progressed the Whig attempted to woo Crawford's voters to Adams' banner. When Ninian Edwards accused Crawford of wrong-doing while Secretary of Treasury for Monroe, the Whig denied the accuracy of Edwards' charges and reported that a congressional inves- tigating committee had found no evidence against Crawford. The Whig emphasized that Adams did not support Edwards, and in fact had termed the charges ridiculous.26 Regard- ing the tariff, the Whig conceded that Crawford's position was similar to Adams': both favored a tariff 27 for revenue only. The defense of Crawford against Edwards' accusations and the Whig's favorable words about Crawford on t‘n attempts to p1 of Clay, autho Just p on Crawford's caucus candida Efforts failec over eighty-f. 2,861; and C1 SinCe 12 Crawford on the tariff issue revealed the paper's attempts to please Crawford's men. If the election went to the_House of Representatives, the Whig seemed to be banking on them switching to Adams to avoid the election of Clay, author of the American System.28 Just prior to election day the Whig concentrated on Crawford's poor health and stressed that votes for the 29 but the paper's caucus candidate indirectly aided Clay, efforts failed: Crawford easily carried Virginia with over eighty-four hundred votes to Adams' 3,189; Jackson's 2,861; and Clay's 416.30 Since no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes, the selection of the President depended upon the House of Representatives. Even though the House settled the election, the Congress stirred lasting con- troversy by choosing Adams who received fewer popular and electoral votes than Jackson. Under the Constitution each state has one vote for President when the election goes to the House; so in 1825 Adams won with thirteen votes while Jackson and Crawford followed with seven and four respectively. Jackson and his supporters cried that Congress had cheated them and began campaigning immedi- ately for the 1828 contest. Was Jackson cheated? 0n the surface Jackson's vote total appeared to make him the popular choice since he garnered forty-seven thousand more votes than his nearest conpet popular vote i appeared on tl‘. six states , an moreover. stat other states .3 political cap“; as Secretary c m“ Producer While has” Presi disappointing voters had QC the state, hE correctly Su: (la: 5 es via Ca 13 31 But no exact account of the nearest competitor, Adams. popular vote is possible since all four candidates appeared on the ballot in only five states; three men in six states, and only two candidates in seven states; moreover, state legislators chose the electors for six other states.32 Yet Jackson's people stored up a lot of political capital by labeling Adams' appointment of Clay as Secretary of State a "corrupt bargain" although they never produced hard evidence to support the charge.33 While the Whig had expected Congress to name 34 the November election was not too Jackson president, disappointing to the paper. It believed that Virginia voters had gotten a choice and although Crawford carried the state, he had done poorly in the nation. The Whig correctly surmised that the method of selecting candi- dates via caucus had received a death blow. With the election over the Whig claimed that it had never really expected Adams to carry Virginia; the important thing was that Virginia had an alternative.35 Gradually the Whig began to anticipate that Adams just might be able to beat out Jackson in the House. In January the Richmond daily said that Adams might win by picking up strength in Congress from Crawford's sup- porters,36 and by the first of February, after Clay's endorsement of Adams surfaced, the Whig realized that the New Englander's chances were good. The opposition press had already ac hereby Adams Q port by offeri E r) (—f (D an 0’ r' y Q: Jackson, the c 0“ Population “'30 favored la O‘dtcome. 39 W2". defended the n Charges by Say and that his \ Office. 40 If the be “lit anti. 14 had already accused Clay and Adams of a corrupt bargain,37 whereby Adams was supposed to have obtained Clay's sup- port by offering to appoint him Secretary of State.38 0n the day before the balloting, the Ehig'pre- dicted that Adams would win. It was to be a victory over Jackson, the candidate of the most "ignorant portion of our population," and the editorial stressed that those who favored law over force should be delighted with the outcome.39 When Clay accepted his cabinet post the paper defended the new Secretary from the corrupt bargain charges by saying that he was the best man for the job and that his vote for Adams should not exclude Clay from office.40 If the corrupt bargain charge went unchallenged, the flhig anticipated that Jackson could use the accusa- tion to Adams' detriment in 1828; for the sake of future elections the paper published for several months Clay's speeches defending his action. Yet the editors admitted that even though Clay convinced them of his sincerity and ability, they feared (and as events turned out, justifi- ably) that the people did not accept his explanation.41 Clay, in a speech to his congressional district, explained that he had determined by the end of November to support Adams long before a cabinet post was offered. Because Adams was "learned" and "experienced" in domestic and foreign affairs, the Kentuckian concluded that of the three candida zen. To conc‘ offered no nee Jackson's mil‘ Florida) and P and Madison. AlthOL ginians Of Clé delight in ba. about Crawfor Pliblished an RitChie . I 15 three candidates the New Englander was clearly the best man. To conclude his address Clay said that Adams offered no new dangerous precedents (a reference to Jackson's military career and questionable actions in Florida) and promised to follow the ideals of Jefferson and Madison. Although unsuccessful in convincing most Vir- ginians of Clay's innocence, the Ehig still took great delight in baiting the Enquirer's editor, Thomas Ritchie, about Crawford's defeat. After the election the flhig published an editorial entitled the "Death of Thomas Ritchie." The sarcastic and witty political obituary illustrated the fierce competition between the two papers and the anger of the flhig over Ritchie's attempts to ignore his newest competitor. According to the obituary the malady first appeared when Ritchie endorsed the caucus candidate, Crawford. The editor, said the flhig, had the "whimsical notion" that the Republic was in danger and would collapse unless the populace endorsed the Enguirer's choice; thus when Crawford failed to stir the voters, Ritchie became depressed and babbled that without him the nation could not continue. Continuing the joke, the flhig described Ritchie's last moments: For several days Mr. Ritchie was kept alive by the stimulus of anxiety. To hear from New York,North Carolina, and Ohio was his last wish. His friends began to b might rev; again. V2 On Saturd, Carolina Spirit of trons tidi their anm to wait i. For fifte Virginia, from the he requE measure ' Side of . sen’cimen the majo has (3in 0f the F "omnipm 16 began to hope that cheering news from these states might revive him, and even restore him to health again. Vain hope! and [sic] evanescence as vain. On Saturday night Mr. Van Buren wrote that all "except honor" and four electors were lost in New York. On Sunday night it was ascertained that North Carolina had abjured the Caucus. It seems that the spirit of Mr. Ritchie lingered to carry these disas- trous tidings to Heaven. It fled immediately upon their annunciation, refusing like Patrick Coutts, to wait for the news from Ohio. . . . For fifteen years he had ruled public opinion in Virginia, and in all that time he had never dissented from the majority. He was so good a Republican that he refused to express any opinion, to advocate any measure, before he had clearly discovered on whose side of the question public opinion was. His own sentiments were cheerfully sacrificed to those of the majority. Where is the man, living or dead, who has given stronger devotion than this to the "will of the people" or paid greater respect to the "omnipotence of public opinion"!43 The 1828 campaign had already begun. For the next four years Ritchie, far from being "dead," attacked Adams at every opportunity while the Whig defended the administration and tried to launch an offensive of its own against Calhoun and Jackson, two men sure to oppose Adams. Some unprincipled and unpatriotic Virginians, lamented the Whig, were plotting to oppose all adminis- tration actions without regard for their worth, because those in the conspiracy seek only to elevate Jackson to the presidency.44 In Virginia anti-administration forces were form- ing against Adams, and they gradually began to accept Jackson as the logical candidate to oppose him. Working closely with Martin Van Buren of New York, a strong Jackson man , including L. 3 John Floyd, 21: Jackson and s Ritchi Prise to the E reacted to an In 1826 John (Randolph cor: resigned to j wanted dearh critic who n Senate to EX] Opponents . 47 . Quids " in O that he was ugh faCtion ‘9‘», We Panama C v»: ‘n. ‘gi‘ts advo c 17 Jackson man, Ritchie and other Virginia political leaders including L. W. Tazewell, Andrew Stevenson, John Randolph, John Floyd, and William C. Rives, organized to elect Jackson and secure for Virginia the spoils of office.45 Ritchie's full endorsement of Jackson (no sur- prise to the Whig) came in January 1827 when the editor reacted to an apparent defeat of his political faction.46 In 1826 John Randolph's turn in the Senate expired (Randolph completed James Barbour's term when the latter resigned to join Adams' cabinet). The Adams-Clay faction wanted dearly to defeat the administration's most abusive critic who relished the opportunity given him in the . Senate to expound for hours on the short-comings of his opponents.47 During Jefferson's term, Randolph led the "Quids" in opposing the embargo and hence it was logical that he was in the forefront of another anti-administra- tion faction. When Adams proposed to send delegates to the Panama Conference, Randolph led other southern state rights advocates in denouncing and then preventing Adams from sending his mission until the conference was almOst over.48 By a vote of 115 to 110 on January 13, 1827, the Virginia Legislature elected John Tyler to replace John Randolph in the United States Senate.49 Tyler, who had been Governor for little more than a year, was favored by the Adams' men, but the victory proved costly to them 18 when Tyler, after finding out that DeWitt Clinton of New York was not going to be a candidate, came out in support of Jackson for President in September 1827.50 About the only consolation for the Adams men was that Tyler's manner of opposition would be more reasonable.51 Tyler's election was the final shove needed to push Ritchie into Jackson's corner. Although the editor had been moving towards the Old Hero, Ritchie had not openly endorsed Jackson, but in January 1827 the Enquirer did so and in fact became Jackson's strongest advocate in Virginia. Rather than discouraging the opposition's forces, the Adams-Clay faction helped unite them.52 Adams' first annual message, which outlined the President's plan for internal improvements (roads and harbors), also aroused strong objections and weakened the Whigfs chances of maintaining an administrative party in Virginia. Because of the President's support of internal improvements, men like William B. Giles deserted Adams and joined Ritchie and the other anti-administration men. Giles championed resolutions in the Virginia Legislature denouncing the tariff and internal improvements, and while Governor from 1827 through 1830 he endorsed seces- sion as a legitimate means of opposing federal encroach- ment.53 Regretably for Giles, he allowed personal animosity to mar his political judgments, a trait making his career erratic.54 But for the time being he and 19 other conservatives like William C. Rives and Andrew Stevenson swelled the ranks of Jackson.55 As the opposition grew, the Whig_renewed its attack on Jackson's militarism, since, to the paper, he was "the most dangerous man in this confederacy."56 After Jackson resigned from the United States Senate in October of 1825, the Whig_pictured him as a man lacking the talent and ability necessary to function in the Senate; therefore he had remained "dumb" during the debates on the tariff and canals (internal improvements) and then fled the Senate to avoid unfavorable comparison to his able colleagues.57 To combat charges that Adams was not a Republican but a Federalist, the Whig_countered by saying that Adams left the Federalists the day he supported President Thomas Jefferson's embargo.58 Since most people now respected Adams as a Republican, the Whig_questioned the logic and consistency of men like Giles and L. W. Tazewell of Virginia who denounced the President when he espoused moderate tariff policies and plans of internal improvements quite similar to those advocated by Jefferson and Adams.59 When those two Republicans pro- posed a tariff or improvements, said the Whig, Giles and Tazewell "applauded."60 Another issue also stirred opposition in the Old Dominion to Adams' administration: the Panama Conference, designed to a' towards Spain union" among message in De acC9?"- an invi delegates. s: grevented Spa; 5‘3P‘Ported the 3355'” by shc 393th America or Henry Clay Gallatin was cne of th e f den-Ce of the But f \ and the Whi \ 20 designed to arrange commercial treaties, a unified policy towards Spain and the Holy Alliance, and "to cultivate 61 In Adams' annual union" among the sister Republics. message in December 1825, he announced his desire to accept an invitation to send to the conference American delegates. Since "language of the United States" had prevented Spanish intervention in Latin America, the Whig_ supported the President's attempt to deter Austria and Russia by showing continued United States interest in South America.62 The Whig suggested that Albert Gallatin or Henry Clay be sent to represent the government. Gallatin was an experienced diplomat while Clay had been one of the first to call for the recognition of indepen- dence of the South American Republics.63 But administration critics disagreed with Adams and the Whig and made the proposed mission to Panama a 64 While not directly attacking major political issue. the goals of the conference, the opposition protested that Adams had accepted the invitation to send ministers without consulting the Senate. The Whig countered by saying that while Adams selected the ministers, he did not intend to send them until the Senate confirmed them.65 As the opposition increased its attacks and appeared to make political capital out of the issue, the Whig tried to back away by implying that while the conference promised few benefits, no harm could result. The S 1:95 on the c; Q Q I Acans, a nu‘r‘b Relations Cowl the chairman; Sign L. White, Since John C . name the conni ‘M stacking the o ll{Drove Calhou: V:A “won, a veter‘ UPPosing 9Very against confin generally know: so“ who seldom [flirt u Y‘seven y‘ .d‘élgn Relath Rina MiSSion TaZewe: 21 The Senate conducted debates and committee meet— ings on the conference, and unfortunately for Clay and Adams, a number of Clay's enemies sat on the Foreign Relations Committee: Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, the chairman; Littleton Waller Tazewell of Virginia; and Hugh L. White, the man who succeeded Andrew Jackson. Since John C. Calhoun, the Vice President, had helped name the committee members, the Whig charged him with stacking the committee to hinder Clay and therefore improve Calhoun's chances for the presidency in 1828.66 Macon, a veteran of the Revolutionary War, took pride in opposing every appropriation bill. In 1825 he had voted against confirming Clay as Secretary of State and was generally known as a "local-minded" and opinionated per- son who seldom acted as a constructive force during his 67 As chairman of the thirty-seven years in Congress. Foreign Relations Committee be strongly opposed the Panama Mission.6 Tazewell led the effort to organize forces in Virginia against Adams. Although Tazewell wrote little 0f lasting value, some of his contemporaries, including thn.Marshall, Spencer Roane, and William Wirt, praised his intellect; but a lack of human sympathy and common Sense deprived the Senator of broad popular support. Hepublicly opposed the celebration of George Washing- tOn's centenary because it savored too much of "man 22 worship"! Such a man could not be dissuaded from oppos- ing the Panama Mission.69 The third foe of Clay on the Foreign Relations Committee was High L. White who had replaced Jackson when he resigned from the Senate. Being a firm supporter of Old Hickory, White never hesitated to make life difficult for Clay and Adams, especially on a matter of foreign policy.70 Both the Senate and the House refused to endorse the mission until Adams revealed more details about the conference. The Senate especially requested the privi- lege of seeing the letters that the Panama Conference and the administration had exchanged. In a message to Congress in March, the President rejected the Senate's request but explained the objectives of the mission to be (1) to abolish private war on the ocean, (2) to obtain South American concurrence in the Monroe Doctrine which prohibited further European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, (3) to coordinate efforts to suppress the African slave trade, (4) to consider the problem of Haiti, (5) to discuss the conditions in Spanish possessions of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and (6) to consider the religious rights of Americans while staying in South America.71 The Whig fully approved of Adams' objectives and said that they conformed to the goals of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling 23 alliances with none."72 Gradually public opinion seemed to support Adams, but by the time the Senate and House acted favorably on the measure the conference was almost over.73 Convinced that Adams' critics opposed him not on principle but for personal reasons, the Whig warned its readers that the Union was threatened.74 The paper maintained that Ritchie, White, and the others strove only to elect Jackson. Therefore the Whig's adversaries were denouncing a government which "conformed to the practice of Government under all administrations," and the Whig argued that "never have the United States in the aggregate been more prosperous or flourishing at home or more respected and deferred to abroad."75 These favor- able conditions resulted, said the Whig, from filling diplomatic stations with good men and protecting the national Treasury.76 Even though the Whig praised Adams' strengths and accomplishments, the editorials also attempted to dis- credit Jackson and to prove Adams innocent of the corrupt bargain charge. Some, said the Whig! preferred Jackson because he was from a slave state, but if Adams was excluded because he was from Massachusetts, then what had happened to the equal rights of the states? To deny Adams support because he was from a free state was to 77 deny the "spirit of the Constitution." Some supporters Cfi'Old Hickory pointed to his military career as proof of 24 his ability to be president, but the Whig contended that military skill did not necessarily establish a person's fitness for political leadership. The paper reminded its readers of Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte, both of whom proved better generals than politicians. Jackson's boldness, said the Whig, would threaten the nation's security, because the General showed no respect for law: rather than carry out law, he preferred "originating" it.78 Recognizing that much of the administration's opposition resulted from Clay's appointment as Secretary of State, the Whig often tried to assure the public that no corrupt bargain took place. Frequently the Whig_ defended Adams by pointing out that Thomas Jefferson acted similarly. In 1801 the presidential contest went to the House where Jefferson was elected President, and some of the congressmen who favored Jefferson later joined the cabinet as Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury. But no one raised the question of a deal, and justly so said the Whig, because there was no wrong- doing just as there was none in 1825.79 As the campaign rhetoric became more heated, the Whig commenced to question the future of the nation. Since it was apparent to the Whig that those opposing Adams did so for patronage not principle, the paper cor- rectly prophesied that if Jackson got into office many of his supporters would desert him. The "cuts" would covet 25 the place of the "ins" but once the opposition achieved power they lacked the unity of principle to rule.80 In fact it was clear to the Whig that Jackson served only as a "cat's paw" for hungry office seekers. According to the Whig only the re-election of Adams or a constitutional amendment restricting the presidential tenure to one term of six or seven years would prevent further development of factions. When a person got to the White House with a limitation of one term he would not have to spend his first four years trying to secure his re-election. The paper believed that if Adams defeated Jackson in 1828 then maybe principle would again return as the basis for criticism.81 In September 1827, the Whig endorsed the call for an anti-Jackson Convention to meet in Richmond and nomi- nate an electoral ticket for 1828. The Whig assumed that a convention would prevent the legislative caucus from dictating to the people; since an "inequality, monstrous and unjust, exists in the representation, the paper mocked as insulting any caucus nomination.82 To insure the convention's success, the Whig urged county leaders to hold local conventions to designate delegates to go to Richmond.83 Because the paper believed that "the people have had no influence in the choice of President" the editorials depicted the convention as "an experiment to ascertain if the people of Virginia are . . . competent 26 . . . to nominate a President of the United States"-- without the unasked for assistance of a legislative cau- cus.84 The editorials claimed that people who valued the Union, now threatened by Jacksonianism, were going to unite in the convention behind Adams.85 On January 8, 1828, the Anti-Jackson Convention convened in Richmond with over two hundred delegates representing eighty of the one hundred five counties. The delegates promptly named an electoral ticket support- ing John Quincy Adams and Benjamin Rush of Pennsylvania, and in an "Address to the People of Virginia" (much to the liking of the Whig) the convention vigorously attacked Jackson.86 Because a man of "military reknown" threatened civilian control of government, Andrew Jackson 87 The Address was "altogether unfit for the Presidency." judged as unsatisfactory Jackson's service as a delegate to the Tennessee Constitutional Convention, as a Repre- sentative and Senator in Congress, and as a judge on Tennessee's Supreme Court. Alluding to Jackson's past reluctance to assume office, the convention reminded its readers that the Old Hero resigned from three of his positions and had acknowledged his unfitness for all offices.88 Since the delegates wanted to use his mili- tary record as proof of his unfitness, they charged Jackson with having kept martial law in New Orleans two months after the enemy left and resurrected his execution of two British citizens during his Florida campaign.89 27 On the issues of the tariff and internal improve- ments, the delegates tried to sidestep by affirming the right of Congress "to regulate the tariff of duties, so as to give protection and encouragement to agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation."90 They asserted that Congress must apply that power to benefit the whole nation, not just one sector of the economy. While the Address acknowledged Virginia's opposition to federally funded internal improvements, the convention alleged that good arguments for and against improvements existed. The delegates contended that Adams' administration had done no more regarding improvements than Jackson would do.91 From the Address it is obvious that the delegates hoped to carry Virginia for Adams by arousing the voters against Jackson rather than for Adams. There was little hope of initiating mass support for the President.92 On January 14, 1828, the Virginia Legislative Caucus (Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Enquirer, acted as Secretary) nominated Andrew Jackson for President and John C. Calhoun for Vice President. Again the Whig declared that the caucus could not represent the people, because of the unequal distribution of representatives in 93 the legislature. But the Whig confessed that Jackson was strong in Virginia and estimated that he then had about a three thousand vote majority of the sixty thou- sand freeholders.94 When the editors calculated Adams' 28 strength nationally, they found things more to their liking. In March, the Whig published figures which gave Adams a five-vote edge in the electoral college.95 During the campaign the Whig stressed Jackson's weaknesses rather than trying to identify Adams' positive qualities.96 To cast doubt on Jackson's loyalty, the paper tried to connect the General with Aaron Burr's con- spiracy by reporting that Jackson urged a judge in 97 No evidence was offered. Tennessee to join Burr. Although the Whig said that Virginia had to put up with the slave trade because of the shortsightedness of states- men, the paper doubted the wisdom of elevating to high office a man who was a slave trader himself.98 Lamenting the rise of fraudulent voting practices, the Whig blamed Jackson and his followers for corrupting the country's democratic institutions.99 But the threat of Jacksonian- ism as described by the Whig failed to turn the tide in Adams' favor. In the nation and in Virginia, Jackson swept the election by carrying fifteen of the twenty-four states; he received 647,276 popular votes and 178 electoral votes to Adams' 508,064 popular votes and 82 in the electoral college. Similarly in the Old Dominion Jackson polled 100 over 26,000 votes to his opponent's 12,000. While Adams did well in the northwest counties, he was over- 101 ‘whelmed in the east and southwest. For the Whig the 29 only bright spot was the good showing Adams made in metro- politan Richmond: Adams carried the city of Richmond and the counties of Chesterfield, Henrico, and Hanover by more than a two to one margin.102 Immediately after the election the Whig openly declared its intention of being an opposition press. Despite the promise of the Enquirer and other Jackson supporters to judge Adams fairly, they had attacked him during his term without reason and in spite of the fact that the country's affairs were "prosperous." Adams was "able" and had tried to do his duty, said the Whig, but his opponents preferred to level partisan attacks at him, even at the cost of national progress.103 If the Whig believed its own editorials criticizing Jackson, the paper explained that it had no alternative except to con- front the new administration at every opportunity. While the Enquirer had been "hypocritical," the Whig said that it was warning Jackson of what he could expect.104 Between 1824 and 1829, the Whig had moved from a paper supporting the state rights principles of the Virginia Resolutions to a paper determined to oppose Andrew Jackson and the Democrats. Initially the Whig_ opposed the tariff, as well as other measures that tended to strengthen the central government. But by the late 1820's and the early 1830's, the paper began to shift ground because the strongest candidate who could oppose 30 the "Old Hero" was Henry Clay, the architect of the American System. To accept Clay entailed endorsement of some form of the tariff and the Bank of the United States, neither policy being very popular in Virginia. CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES lCharles Ambler, Thomas Ritchie, Study in Vir— ginia Politics (Richmond: Bell, Bock and Stationery Com- pany, 1913), 89-91; Constitutional Whig, March 2 and June 11, 1824. All future references to the Constitu- tional Whig or RichmondyWhig and Public Advertiser will be referred to as the Richmond Whig. 2Richmond Whig, February 20, February 24, March 2, April 24, June 11 and October 29, 1824. 3Dictionagy of American Biography, IV, 527-530. When a friend of Monroe went to Crawford to determine if he would oppose Monroe, Crawford said no, that he favored Monroe. It was assumed that Crawford was young enough to be a candidate in 1824. By bowing out in 1816 Crawford won many Virginia supporters. 4 Ibid. SAmbler, 87-88. 6Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 1788 to 1897 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1898), 136. 7Dictionaryof American Biography, III, 411-419. See also Charles Wiltse, John C. Calhoun (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1944), I. And see William M. Meigs, The Life of John Caldwell Calhoun (New York: G. E. Strechert and Company, 1917), I, 226-287. 8 Ambler, 93-94. 91bid. lOIbid., 109-110. _ llRichmond Whig, February 20, February 24, March 2, Aprll 2: April 24, June 11 anui October 29, 1824. 12 Ambler, 92. l3Stanwood, 130-131. 14Ibid., 132. 31 32 15Ibid., 130 16Richmond Whig, February 20, 1824. 17Ibid., February 24 anui March 2, 1824. Since the Virginia Legislature endorsed Crawford on February 24, by an overwhelming vote, it was not likely that the com- mitment could be weakened so soon. 18Meigs, 226-287. 19Richmond Whig, February 20, 1824. See also Henry H. Simms, The Rise of the Whigs in Virginia 1824- 1840 (Virginia: The William Byrd Press, 1929), 22-23. 20Richmond Whig, June 11 anui June 15, 1824. 21mm. 221bid., May 4, 1824. 231bid. 24Ibid. 251bia., July 2, 1824. 26Ibid., July 16, 1824. Ninian Edwards accused Crawford of corruptly favoring certain banks in the Panic of 1819. A Congressional committee investigated and cleared Crawford, ruining Edwards' reputation. See Dictionary of American Biggraphy, IV, 527-530. 27Richmond Whig, July 2, 1824. 281bid., July 2 anui July 16, 1824. ngbid., October 29, 1824. 30Stanwood, 136. 31Ibid., 135. 321bid. 33Dictionaryof American Biography, IV, 173-179; C;ement Eaton, Henry Clay andttheyArt of Politics (Boston: L1ttle, Brown and Company, 1957), 52-57, 60, and 177. 34 Richmond Whig, November 5, 1824. 351bia., November 9, 1824. 33 36Ibid., January 21, 1824. 37Amb1er, 99. 38 Ibid., February 1, 1825. 39Ibid., February 8, 1825. On February 9, when the House voted, Adams received the vote of seven states which had given all or a majority of their electoral votes for either Jackson or Clay. See Stanwood, 140-141. 40Richmond Whig, February 25, 1825. 411bid., April 1, 1825. 42ihig. Clay's entire speech is in this issue. 431bia. 44i§i§., May 13, 1825. Ambler, 98-117. 45Ambler, 110-111. 46Ibia., 106-107. 47Simms, 22-23. 48Simms, 21-24; Dictionary of American Biography, XV, 363-365. 49Oliver Perry Chitwood, John Tyler, Champion of the Old South (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 78-80. Tyler had just been elected to a second term as Governor in December. -508imms, 23-25. Chitwood, 78-85. 51Ibia. 52Ambler, 107. 53Herman V. Ames, ed., State Dgcuments on Federal REIations (New York: DaCapo Press, 1970), 10-11. 54Dictionary of American Biography, VII, 283-284. SSIbid. 56Richmond Whig, March 15, 1825. 57Ibid., November 1, 1825. 34 saihig., December 8, 1825; January 10, 1826. 591bid. 6OIbid. 6lihig,, December 13 auui November 22, 1825. Adams announced his plans in his Annual Message to Congress. 62Ibid. 63Richmond Whig, November 22, 1825. Eaton, Clay, 40-42, 57-58, 181, and 195. 64Richmond Whig, January 14, 1826. Simms, 21. John Randolph led the opposition and accused the adminis- tration of trying to destroy slavery. The Whig ridiculed Randolph's attack and accused him of opposing the confer- ence because of his dislike of Clay. Carl Schuz, Hen Clay (New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Company, 1968), I, 267-277. He offered a good account of the debates and the groups who opposed the mission. 65Richmond Whig, December 13, 1825; February 24, 1826. 66Ibid., January 10, 1826. 67Richmond Whig, January 10, 1826; Dictionary of American Biogrhphy, XII, 157-159. 68 Ibid. 69Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, 355- 357. 70Richmond Whig, January 10, 1826. 7lIbid., March 21, 1826. 72Ibid. 73Ibia., April 28, 1826. 74Ibid., March 21, 1826. 751bia., March 16, 1827. 76Ibid. 77Ibia., June 20, 1826. 78 79 Ibid. Ibid., 35 July 11, July 14, July 18, July 21, July 25, August 1 anui August 15, 1826. 80 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid., 83 Ibid., 84 Ibid., 85 Ibid., 86 Ibid., 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., 89 90 Ibid. Ibid. 91 92 93 Ibid 0 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., March 27, 1827. September 1, 1827. September 15, 1827. October 6, 1827. October 13, 1827. January 12 and January 16, 1828. January 16, 1828. In this editorial the Whig said that the East had secured control of the legislature because it had not been apportioned according to the white population. 94 95 October 11, 97 98 99 100 101 Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., February 20, 1828. March 22, 1828. August 2, August 9, October 8 and August 2 and August 9, 1828. October 11, 1828. October 15, 1828. Stanwood, 148-149. Simms, 32-33. 36 102Richmond Whig, November 12, 1828- 103Ibid,, November 19, 1828; March 6, 1829. 104Ibid., November 19, 1828. CHAPTER II A CAUSE: ORGANIZE TO OPPOSE JACKSON During Jackson's term of office the Whig_continu- ally denounced his positions on the major national issues. As the Whig_had hoped, many people became disenchanted with Jackson and aided the paper in forming an organized opposition: the Whig Party in Virginia. With the very first official act of Jackson, his inaugural, the Whig aimed its editorial guns and blasted away at the new administration. Not only his address but the men around the Presi- dent came under rebuke. Since in the inaugural Jackson stressed what he would not do, the Whig described the address as "a piece of still life," and sarcastically accused Jackson of "spitting upon the carcass of the dead Lion."l Nothing about the speech appealed to the Whig, Accusing Jackson of being a puppet, the Whig contended that men like-Van Buren and Duff Green would decide what Position Jackson's administration would endorse. Initi- ally the Whig identified Van Buren, the Secretary of State, as the power behind the throne, but by mid-April 37 38 of 1829 the paper called Duff Green, editor of the United States Teleggaph, "President de facto": no appointments, claimed the Whig, came without Green's approval. Since Jackson, in the paper's opinion, lacked a President's qualifications, the country had to expect other men in the administration besides the "Old Hero" to run the country.2 When Jackson began replacing men in government, the_Whig strove to make the spoils system a major politi- cal issue. Although Thomas Jefferson removed some office holders after his election in 1800, Jefferson, explained the Whig, neither proscribed as many as Jackson nor ignored an employee's ability to do his job. But even more important Jefferson's victory resulted from a "con- test of principles"; therefore, explained the Whig, some changes in office holders was to be expected. The elec- tion of 1828 involved "persons" not "principles," the Whig asserted, adding that Adams and Jackson generally agreed on Constitutional principles and that only the personality differences separated the men.3 Because the Enquirer had opposed the appointment of Rufus King, a former Federalist, as Envoy to England in Adams' admin- istration, the Whig took special delight in the appoint- ment of Louis McLane as Envoy in 1829 forcing the Enguirer also to endorse a former Federalist. Of course the Whig charged its newspaper neighbor with hypocrisy.4 39 As more and more newspaper editors found their way on to government payrolls, the Whig sounded an alarm. While not denying the right of any man to hold office, the paper questioned whether editors should monopolize the offices.5 Since the Enquirer had attacked Adams for appointing editors, the Whig wondered why the Jackson supporters failed to respond when one quarter of Jackson's appointments came from the press corps. Similarly, the Enquirer had opposed Adams' removal of the public printer 6 but applauded the same action in 1829. By mid-year the aggregate yearly salary of the newspaper men in office surpassed $100,000 and yet they continued running their papers. Because freedom of the press was so necessary in a democratic society, the Whig admonished the administra- tion for endangering the Republic: no matter how well- disguised, Jacksonianism stood for "DESPOTISM" and "Tyranny."7 When Jackson gave his annual message to Congress in December 1829, the Whig took exception to what the President said about the Indians, tariff, internal improvements, and the Bank of the United States. The lflhig_called Jackson's advising the Indians of Georgia and «Alabama to move west of the Mississippi an "unauthorized iJTvasion of human rights" and a "violation of the Consti- tnltion." If they refused to go, Jackson had warned them tflmat.they must obey the laws of Georgia; therefore said 40 the Whig the administration endorsed having the Indians under the authority of the people who were "seeking your [Indians'] destruction." This was like committing the "lamb to the wolf" for safe-keeping.8 The Whig criticized Jackson's statement on tariffs as inconsistent and confusing, because the mes- sage supported only a "modification" of the tariff, leaving in doubt whether Jackson planned to raise or lower the duties. Since no domestic producers competed with foreign imports, the Whig found it reasonable for the government to lower duties on tea and coffee, but how did Jackson hope to protect home industries without a "protective tariff"? While Jackson employed "smooth and conciliating phrases," the Whig doubted he could satisfy the anti-tariff forces in the South, and predicted that the tariff controversy would cost Jackson one base of support--the South.9 Other issues, the Bank of the United States, and internal improvements also troubled the paper. Jackson made it clear in his message that he opposed renewing the bank charter scheduled to expire in 1836. Since the charter had seven years to go, the Whig questioned the wisdom of broaching the subject so early, but what really disturbed the paper was the implication in the President's message that a National Exchequer under the immediate Control of the government might replace the Bank. Fearful 41 of the motives of Jackson's administration, the Whig accused Secretary of State Van Buren of trying to dis- credit Calhoun who supported the Bank. Because the paper believed that the Bank of the United States provided a uniform and sound currency, the Whig cautioned against any drastic changes in the nation's monetary system. It asked its readers to remember that the exchange rates improved after the Bank was established so that remit- tances could be paid to any part of the Union with ease. Regarding internal improvements the Whig expressed dismay over what the paper described as Jackson's opposition to internal improvements financed by surplus revenues dis- persed according to population.10 Actually, Jackson had not rejected distribution of federal funds in his message; he had in fact suggested that a distribution according to a state's representation in Congress seemed the best way to dispose of surplus revenue. If questions arose over the constitutionality of such a scheme, he had urged the states to consider a Constitutional amendment. It is true that he warned against "encroachments upon the legitimate sphere of State Sovereignty," but the overall tone of the message denoted approval of distributing money for improvements according to a state's representation.11 The Whig, for Presumably political reasons, simply ignored the impli- cations of the President's message. 42 After Jackson's Second Annual Message, the Whig again misrepresented his position on the internal improve- ments, but the paper acknowledged that the administration finally had taken a stand on the tariff by endorsing it. Because the President opposed federally financed internal improvements, the Whig predicted that Jackson would lose Pennsylvania in 1832, and that the President's embracing of the tariff was sure to alienate Virginia's voters.12 Looking forward to the approaching presidential canvass, the paper predicted that Jackson's "logic" would cost him the election.13 To rally the anti-Jackson forces, the Whig con- tinued a barrage of editorials on the Bank, tariff, government expenditures, internal improvements, and Jackson himself. While Jackson's men in the South con- tended that the "Old Hero" opposed protective tariffs, the Whig countered by reminding readers that, as a Senator, Jackson voted for tariffs. It labeled the President's attacks on the Bank, long before the expira- tion of its charter, inappropriate and injurious to the economy. Since Jackson had once favored one term for Chief executives, the Whig derided him for doing what he criticized other Presidents for pursuing: a second term.14 During the election of 1828 Jackson had pledged to cut government expenses, but the Whig could prove he had failed to do that. The paper doubted whether he 43 sincerely sought retrenchment, since he had sent ambassa- dors to little strife-torn countries with few ports like Guatemala.l After Van Buren received the Vice-Presidential nomination, the Whig perceived that the New Yorker was Jackson's choice for president in 1836. Consequently, the defeat of Jackson in 1832 was important not only to end his influence over government for the next four years, but to protect the nation from having Van Buren succeed Jackson in 1837, or sooner if the Old Hero died in office. The possibility of Jackson not surviving the next four years appeared likely to the Whig, which described the President as "tottering on the brink of the grave" and losing his mental capacity.16 By the time the nominating conventions met to .select candidates, the Whig's choice, Henry Clay, was the popular choice of the anti-Jackson groups. State elec- tions of 1830 in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri encouraged the Whig which pictured Clay as a man possessing a "powerful mind" and the only man whom it could truthfully call great. Even though the flhig_had not favored Clay for the presidency in 1824, the ‘modification of his tariff policy and apparent willingness to compromise convinced the paper that he was the best candidate to unite the anti-Jackson voters and rid the nation of its "greatest curse."17 44 On December 12, 1831, delegates from seventeen states met in Baltimore to name a ticket for the National Republican Party. In a voice vote the convention selected Clay to head the ticket and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania as the Vice-Presidential candidate. The convention adopted resolutions criticizing (l) the administration's corruption, (2) hostility to internal improvements, (3) treachery on the tariff issue, (4) attack on the Bank, and (5) the humiliating surrender to Georgia in the Cherokee Indian case.18 Despite the danger in Virginia of endorsing a tariff advocate, the Whig greeted Clay's nomination with enthusiasm and launched a campaign offensive.19 In mid-summer of the election year, Jackson vetoed a bill to give Virginia $21,000 for the improve— ment of the James River, an action that provided the Whig with ammunition for campaign literature. Because Jackson had signed bills for internal improvement, including some for the Cumberland River in his home state, the Whig labeled Jackson's veto "flagrantly and atrociously incon- sistent." The President explained his position by saying that the project was not "national in character," but the Richmond paper made good use of the veto to strengthen Clay forces in the counties along the James River.20 By late 1831 a new political faction offered another opponent to Jackson when a Baltimore Convention 45 of Anti-Masons nominated William Wirt, formerly an Attorney General for the United States, as their candi- date for President. Although not all National Republi- cans (Clay's supporters) were Anti-Masons, the paper believed that most Anti-Masons were National Republicans; thus the Whig viewed the new party as an asset. During the campaign some National Republican state organizations like the one in New York endorsed Wirt in an unsuccessful bid to prevent Jackson from cornering that state's elec- toral votes.21 Clay's hopes for Virginia's support received a boost when some Democrats refused to accept Van Buren as Jackson's running mate and began to arrange a Jackson- P. P. Barbour ticket. Men like Thomas W. Gilmer of Albemarle County and William B. Preston of Montgomery County feared that Jackson would not survive a full term; hence they envisioned that Van Buren would succeed Jackson and since the former had an unsatisfactory record on slavery and the tariff, Gilmer and other Barbour men tried to substitute a southerner for Van Buren.22 Unfortunately for the Whig_and its candidate neither the Bank veto nor the selection of Van Buren as Vice President weakened Jackson's hold on many voters. Politicians who favored rechartering the Bank and who voted for the bill in Congress and voted to override the veto still favored Jackson in the election.23 Thomas 46 Ritchie reminded his readers that Jackson's party sup- ported expansion of the suffrage while many of Clay's advocates had opposed a larger electorate. Since Jackson's veto of internal improvements had aroused the western section of the state, the Enquirer deemed it wise to remind West Virginians of the paper's past support for their reform measures. Besides rejuvenating old loyal- ties, the Enguirer successfully connected Clay with Calhoun and the latter's advocacy of nullification: while acknowledging the inequity of the tariff, Ritchie emphasized that there were better ways than nullification to bring about change. When election day came, Jackson retained his old support in the mountains and valley.24 In fact, Jackson smashed his opponents in Virginia. Out of over 45,000 votes cast, Jackson received more than 33,500, and even in the Whigfs strong- hold, Richmond, Jackson won by 40 votes. Of the more than 100 counties, Clay carried only half a dozen. In December William C. Rives, an administration supporter, 25 But the defeat for the was re-elected to the Senate. opposition party in the national elections was washed away by the nullification crisis which began to reach a Climax one month after the election. For some time trouble had lurked just under the surface; the tariff, especially in South Carolina, was a cutting issue that threatened to sever loyalty to the 47 Union. When the 1832 tariff passed Congress with most of the objectionable duties still intact, a state convention met in Charleston on November 19, 1832, and passed resolu- tions of nullification which prevented the collection of tariffs at South Carolina's ports. In the opinion of most Virginians, nullification, the product of Calhoun's fertile mind, appeared to be too drastic a remedy. But more important than Virginia's reaction was President Jackson's response to South Carolina's challenge of national authority. At first the President appeared to assume a moderate attitude towards the ordinances. In his annual message to Congress on December 4 the President briefly referred to South Carolina's convention but indi- cated that he expected the Congress to resolve the diffi- culty. He wrote that he favored the reduction of duties on many articles which did not threaten domestic produc- tion. A few days later the President dispelled all conjectures that he would be lenient, as he had been with Georgia over the Cherokee Indian affair. In a Proclama- tion on December 10 and in a special message on January 16 Jackson explained that he now perceived that South Carolina was not going to try to settle her problems; therefore the President believed he was compelled by the Oath he gave at his inauguration to suppress South Carolina's "extraordinary defiance." Aggression, state 48 authorized resistance to revenue collection, would not go unchallenged in Jackson's administration.26 It was clear to Jackson that the government in South Carolina intended to ignore the Executive, Congress, and public opinion. If not, why, asked the President, had South Carolina organized her militia and created a "State Guard" consisting of 2,000 men from Charleston and 10,000 men from across the state? Rather than strive for a settlement of the tariff question, the state demanded submission to her position. She intended, continued Jackson, to void a law passed by Congress or secede from the Union, but he refused to acknowledge any such power and argued that no state had the right to ignore its responsibilities and obligations.27 After surveying South Carolina's recent actions and messages to him, Jackson explained why he thought the compact theory of government offered no grounds for a state to nullify a federal law. While many supported Jackson's resolve to maintain the Union, his attack on the compact theory frightened and angered not only the Whig_but some politicians who considered themselves friends of the President. He emphasized that the Consti- tution provided for checks against unjust acts: power of Congress to legislate, President's powers of veto, and theejudiciary's authority to declare laws unconstitu- ‘tional. These checks in addition to the force of public 49 opinion and the possibility of constitutional amendments were "the solutary limitation upon the powers of the whole [federal government]." Before a state could break the compact, all methods open to remedy a wrong had to be explored and then only causes justifying revolution war- ranted disruption of the Union. Until a state pursued all channels, Jackson declared, "the measures of the [federal] Government are . . . valid and consequently supreme."28 The obvious prosperity in the United States and the increase of free men testified, said Jackson, to the usefulness of the tariff. People had accepted the tariff for some time since in all revenue matters the "people's representatives" approved the duties. To strengthen his argument that the tariff had not precipitated economic disaster in the United States or South Carolina, Jackson quoted the state's Governor, James Hamilton, who in a report to his legislature in 1832 declared that the state had a "happy economic future" and enjoyed social tran- quility. How, asked Jackson, could any state in such good condition justify revolution and dissolution? Answering his own question the President concluded that there was "no sufficient cause for the acts of South Carolina."29 No matter how painful the task, Jackson pledged "to Spare no effort to discharge" his duty of upholding 50 the law of the land. With only a few modifications of the Militia Act of 1795, he believed he could act to resist a state's unwillingness to conform to the law.30 Because the friends of civil liberty all over the world depended on the United States to provide an example for others to follow, Jackson declared that he must uphold the Constitution. "The Constitution and the laws are supreme and the Union indissoluble."31 Not only the Whig but even Thomas Ritchie's Enquirer warned South Carolina that precipitous action promised more harm than benefits, and although many Vir- ginians opposed the tariff, they also wanted to maintain the Union. On December 13 Governor John Floyd presented South Carolina's nullification ordinance to the Virginia legislature which immediately began debating what role the Old Dominion should assume.32 By a vote of 73 to 59 the legislature adopted resolutions requesting that (l) Virginia's senators and representatives in Congress support reduction of the tariff, (2) South Carolina sus- pend her ordinance until the present session of Congress was over.33 In addition, the legislature denied that Virginia's Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 sanctioned nulli- fication. To convey these resolutions, the legislature Selected Benjamin W. Leigh as its commissioner. Leigh, a representative of pro-slavery Tidewater Virginia and soon.to be United.States Senator, was well received in 51 Charleston.34 In order to appear sympathetic to the anti- tariff forces, the legislature also denounced Jackson's Proclamation because he seemed to base his powers on a theory of national government and not a confederate government; hence to Virginia's legislature the Proclama- tion constituted a threat to state sovereignty. While the Whig_opposed nullification, the paper accused Jackson of reviving the Federalists with his Proclamation. Again the Whig_made use of its earlier accusations by maintaining that the General had no con- cern for the Constitution or limits by it on the President. Rather than depend on military might to secure the Union, the Whig urged compromise in Congress on the tariff rates. By February the paper believed that Clay, the natural mediator, would persuade the Congress to accept a reduc- tion of the tariff and allow South Carolina to withdraw her ordinance of nullification.35 Throughout the tariff and nullification crisis which began in 1828, the Whig_made clear the paper's caesire to maintain the Union. In June, 1828, the Whig's editorials expressed a concern that some politicians seriously contemplated separation of the states even though most people in the past viewed dissolution as a "holy terror.” While the number favoring disunion was Small, there were enough to make every man who regarded the Union as the only "bulwark of our peace and liberties" 52 set his face against the abettors of dissolution, against such men as William Giles of Virginia, Dr. Cooper, and James Hamilton of South Carolina who conspired with the secessionists. The Whig surmised that southerners would have to choose one day between the Union and South Caro- lina's schemes of secession, and warned that since an attack on the Federal Union must lead to "blood and desolation" and end in "despotism, there was no prospect of a peaceful separation. After the United States had been divided and weakened the Whig wondered who would provide protection against foreign advancements.36 A month later the Whig became encouraged by pub- lic reaction which disagreed with South Carolina's poli- ticians. The paper confidently expected the "furious advocates of resistance and disunion" to quail before the United States and even from some quarters in South Caro- lina. Confidently, the Whig informed the fire-eaters that a majority of the people preferred Union to dollars and cents.37 When Senator Daniel Webster and Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina debated in January 1830, the Whig endorsed the arguments of Webster by supporting the con- tention that states had a right to secede but only when revolution was justified. To the paper, Webster's words meant "moderation and justice" and called for a "healing" of the country's wounds, but on the other hand Hayne's 53 talk of nullification revealed, said the Whig, the "bully- ing spirit" of the fire-eaters who seem to think they can dictate their wishes to the other twenty-three states.38 These men hoped for a "republic south of the Potomac" but the Whig ridiculed such a calculation as absurd, chimeri- cal, and stupid.39 What would secession entail? First "civil war" in its unrelenting form would follow secession, with the North and the West retaining the United States Treasury and the Navy, except for two ships of the line in Hampton Roads and one frigate in Charleston. Virginia, located on the border, would have to absorb the heat of battle as well as the hardships, including (1) a destruction of the tobacco economy, (2) the secession of western Virginia, and (3) the end of slavery in Virginia. The Whig con- cluded that the whole scheme was "treasonable," "ruinous," and "silly."40 In September 1831 the Whig published and endorsed an article, signed "ONE OF THE PEOPLE," challenging Calhoun's theory of state sovereignty. Calhoun's idea, contended the author, allowed one state to annul a law unless three-fourths of the states were willing to over- turn the decision of the state that nullified the law. With each state legislature acting as a supreme court, only chaos could result. If a law passed by Congress and signed by the President was unconstitutional, it was up 54 to the Supreme Court, not a state, to declare the law unconstitutional; and since the Constitution allowed amendments, grievances could be handled in a legal manner.41 But if the federal government gave in to South Carolina, the Whig declared, agreeing with the writer, the power to destroy the government would be in the hands of each state. Obviously a middle course was needed, and the Whig counted on men like Henry Clay in Congress to arrange a satisfactory compromise.42 Compromise was slow to come. As Congress began debating the tariff bill in the Spring of 1832, South Carolina shifted her demand from ending protective duties to the abolition of all tariffs. The apparent determina- tion of South Carolina to precipitate a clash with the federal government shocked the Whig. At the moment that a modification of tariffs was near, the Governor of South Carolina traveled across his state stirring up emotions and making new demands.43 Realizing that continued South Carolinian intransigence imperiled the chances of compro- mise, the paper cautioned the fire-eaters that the right of levying duties had to be recognized before significant reduction of rates was possible.44 In the late summer and winter of 1832 the crisis deepened. As hope for a reduction of rates faded, South Carolina moved towards convening a state convention to nullify officially a federal tariff law. If such a thing 55 occurred the Whig advised that the government use no force "until nullification is enforced." The paper feared that violence would only complicate the diffi- culty.45 Yet the Whig recognized the disadvantages of the other alternatives: to acquiesce and repeal the tariff would endanger the integrity of the Union and invite other states to follow South Carolina's example, and to allow South Carolina to repeal the tariff and also remain in the Union was impractical. Again the Whig called on the Congress to try to settle the tariff problem peacefully. If Congress failed to respond, the Whig anticipated that Jackson, despising Calhoun and other leaders in the nullification drive, would provoke a bloody war.46 To the Whig's disappointment, Jackson acted first with his Proclamation on December 10. His repudiation of nullification and secession and denial of the sover- eignty of states provoked bitter editorials from the Whig, which maintained that if the President was correct then Virginia belonged to a "Consolidated Empire" ruled by the majorities in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York. Since Jackson's message to Congress on December 4 had been reasonable and friendly toward South Carolina, the President's new tough attitude puzzled the Whig. After the Proclamation the paper began to espouse a line more favorable to the nullifiers. The President's assault on 56 state rights theories compelled the paper to rally anti- administration forces: "the friends of State Rights must make a last stand for their existence."47 Jackson's Proclamation and the Whig's response to him placed the paper in an uncomfortable position. While the Whig renunciated nullification of the tariff, the paper also stressed that when a government became oppres- sive (as Jackson threatened in his Proclamation), nulli- fication became preferable to secession or revolution; consequently the Whig advised Virginians to disclaim South Carolina's mode of resistance but not the principle 48 of state sovereignty. Other papers, such as the Kanawha Banner, understandably confused by the Whig's turnabout, accused the paper of inconsistency. Admitting a change of position, the Whig justified the switch by saying that "the fruit of further inquiry and additional information necessitated a new policy. Conscience, editorialized the Whig, required no less.49 What the paper did not mention was that Jackson's Proclamation angered many conservative Eastern Virginia politicians who might join the emerging Whig Party to defeat Andrew Jackson. In other words, the Whig wanted the Union, but balked at applying the force necessary to preserve it if such action might weaken the prospect of defeating Jackson. The Whig defended its new posture by pointing out the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the North and 57 South. Because of slavery the South's interests were different from other sections and its population inferior in numbers; consequently political power and control of the national government would move North. If the North tried to oppress the South with the new power, explained the Whig, then the states needed an escape, nullification and secession.50 A compromise tariff finally emerged from Congress and the crisis subsided, but in late February and March of 1833 the Whig refused to credit Jackson with having anything to do with South Carolina's retreat. He merely intensified emotions, said the paper, which asserted that Clay, though long a supporter of a protective tariff, was the hero, for he placed the tariff on "the altar of peace' when it imperiled the Union.51 After the storm of political activity receded, the Whig generalized on the exercise of political power in the United States, Great Britain, and France, and came to some disturbing conclusions. Despite the fact that the three countries considered themselves friends of liberal principles, they had recently "oppressed" their people. The French overthrew Charles x expecting Louis Phillipe to secure republican rule, but instead he had adhered to policies similar to Charles'; in England the Whigs came to power after promising reform of Parliament, bUt they embraced despotism more firmly than the Tories; 58 and Andrew Jackson assumed office in 1829 promising to retrieve liberty, but instead he revived the principles of the "reign of terror" and consolidated power in his hands. These sad accounts convinced the Whig that "power . . seeks extension and enlargement." Ambitious men out of power pledge anything to gain it, but forfeit all their pledges and desert their principles to retain and increase their authority; thus "the price of liberty, is eternal and sleepless vigilance and jealousy of those who are entrusted with power."52 The Whig disapproved of abusing those who sup- ported nullification because they loved the Union and attempted to save it by forcing the nation to rectify grievances.S3 The alternative to nullification was revo- lution which would permanently destroy the country's bonds. How anyone such as Thomas Ritchie would support the right of revolution and then claim to be a better Union man than the nullifiers mystified the Whig. At least the nullifiers tried to end oppression in an orderly and peaceful manner, and indeed they succeeded in 1798 and 1833 by bringing about changes without destroying the Union.54 The Whig_saw in 1833 a greater requirement than eVer for political parties. Since parties kept alive the "Vestal flame of liberty," Monroe erred in attempting to merge the Federalist and Republican Parties. In the long 59 run, said the Whig, Jackson's Proclamation might prove a blessing since it betrayed the true beliefs of the Feder— alists and their love of centralized power; consequently, the South must either rally to the principles of 1798 or "submit like recreants and dogs" to northern aggression.55 As the Whig had anticipated, the tariff and the nullification crisis disrupted Jackson's supporters in Virginia. A few such as Thomas Ritchie remained loyal to "Old Hickory," but many former followers broke openly with the President in the winter of 1833, including John Tyler, John Randolph, L. W. Tazewell, and Benjamin Watkins Leigh. Quickly an opposition party grew, count- ing in its ranks advocates and opponents of the tariff, national bank, federally financed internal improvements, and distribution of the public land proceeds.56 This unlikely coalition held together because the different elements all feared the growing power of Jackson and the federal government. Governor John Floyd, always in contact with the emerging Whig party in Vir- ginia, yet an admirer of John C. Calhoun, sent South Carolina's ordinances to the Virginia legislature and told that body that Jackson's Proclamation was the act of a tyrant and intimated that Virginia should stand by her sister state, South Carolina. Recognizing the prospects Of a confrontation between federal and state forces, Floyd confided in his diary that he could not expect to 60 survive a civil war but "a republic and constitutional liberty I will have or I will perish in the struggle."57 Throughout 1833 the Virginia Opposition Party gathered strength so that by the winter of 1833-34, it could, with some hope of success, predict that the oppo- sition would carry the legislature in the approaching state Spring elections. L. W. Tazewell succeeded Floyd as Governor and B. W. Leigh replaced W. C. Rives in the Senate after the latter antagonized the legislature by endorsing Jackson's Force Bill. To make matters worse for Jackson's men, he reacted strongly to the Senate's censure of him for removing federal deposits from the Bank of the United States.58 On March 28, 1834, the United States Senate cen- sured Jackson in the following words: Resolved, that the President, in the late Executive proceeding in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not con- ferred by the Constitution and laws, but in deroga- tion of both.59 - The President defended his actions in a "Protest" sent to Congress on April 15 and accused the Senate of assuming the role prescribed for the House of Representatives. If what the Upper House said was true, then the President reasoned that impeachment was the proper action and the initiation of any such action had to be in the House, not the Senate. The latter, said Jackson, had voted for con- Viction before he was accused.60 61 Jackson's new controversy with Congressional critics merely added credulity to the arguments of his opponents in Virginia who campaigned on the platform that the executive had to be restrained to prevent him from "61 After continuing what the Whig called "consolidation. the "Protest" became known, Ritchie despaired of winning the state elections in May, and when the votes came in, the opposition controlled seventy-nine seats to the admin- istration's fifty-five in Virginia's Lower House. Although the Senate, with its staggered elections remained in the hands of the administration forces, the opposition possessed enough votes to control the joint ballots used to select United States Senators and Governors.62 As opposition forces across the nation gained strength, the question of a name for the new party arose. In New York at an anti-administration meeting on April 1, 1834, it was suggested that perhaps the appellations "Whig" or "Tory" might be appropriate. The Richmond Whig reacted favorably to "Whig" because the word represented groups who prefer "liberty to tyranny" and "privilege against prerogative," but because of the bitterness generally attached to the term "Tory" the paper opposed that name. Beginning in April 1834, most of the anti- administration groups accepted the title Whig.63 The new party quickly flexed its power in Vir- ginia. Within a few months it carried the state 62 legislature, elected a governor, forced the resignation of United States Senator William C. Rives, and replaced him with Benjamin Watkins Leigh, also a Whig. But the successes provided a poor basis for predicting the future, since the main adhesive needed to hold the Whig coalition disappeared when Jackson left office in 1836. With all the differences the Whigs had with each other, they could only combine to oppose Jackson's reach for what they termed unconstitutional power or as the Whig phrased it, "Executive encroachment and Executive pretensions to absolute power."64 Slavery soon became a troublesome issue for the Whigs. Many Whig leaders, including the editors of the Richmond Whig and Samuel McDowell Moore of Rockbridge, looked forward to the end of slavery in Virginia, but others such as B. W. Leigh and John Tyler defended the institution. The State Constitutional Convention of l829-1830 and Nat Turner's Rebellion in 1831 had enliv- ened debate on the peculiar institution and, in retro- spect, had revealed the potential threat to the solidar- ity of Virginia's Whigs. But as of 1834, Virginia had a strong Whig party containing men of different philosophies. For ten years this group had been developing; at first the presidential elections provided the impetus for the opposition and finally the issues of the tariff and the role of the 63 president combined to fashion a formal party organization. Between l824 and 1834, the Richmond Whig had encouraged and supported the anti-administration coalition in the state. Also in 1834 it became the principal newspaper and leading vehicle for articulating the position and views of Virginia Whigs.65 CHAPTER I I FOOTNOTES lRichmond Whig, March 6, 1829. 2Ibid., April 3 enui April 17, 1829; October 1, 1829. 31bid., May 1, 1829. 4Ibid., April 24, 1829. 5Ibid., June 16, 1829. 61bid., May 19, 1829. 7Ibid., June 23, 1829; July 24, 1829. 81bid., December 12, 1829. 91bid., December 14, 1829. loIbid., December 14 anui December 15, 1829. 11Richardson, ed., II, 442-462. 12Richmond Whig, December 14 anui December 21, 1830. l31bid., December 11, 1830. l4Ibid., August 11, 1831. lsIbid., April 17, 1832. 16Ibid., February 24, 1832. 17ihig., April 30, 1830; July 17, 1829; August 26, 1830; November 7, 1831; September ll, 1832. 18Stanwood, 156-157. 19Richmond Whig, December 30, 1831. 20i§i§., July 19, 1832; July 24, 1832. Zlihig., November 14, 1831; February 11, 1832; August 17 and August 21, 1832. 64 65 22Simms, 79-80; Ambler, Ritchie, 146-147. Those backing the Barbour movement in Virginia and North Caro- lina hoped to throw the election into the Senate where they expected Calhoun to beat Van Buren. 23Stanwood, 162. 24Ambler, Ritchie, 119-154. 25Simms, 62; Stanwood, l63. 26Richardson, II, 611—632 and 640-656. 27l§i§3l 611-632. zsléiés 291bid. 30 What Jackson wanted and got was the so-called "Force Bill" which strengthened his hand militarily. See Winfred A. Harbison and Alfred H. Kelly, The American Constitution, Its Origins and Development‘74th edition; New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1970), 314. 31Richardson, II, 611-632 and 640-656. 32Simms, 65. See also Charles H. Ambler (ed.), The Life and Diary of John quyd (Richmond: Richmond Press, 1918), for that date. 33 Ibid., 67 34Ibid., 68-71. 35Richmond Whig, February 15, 1833. 36Ibid., June 21 and June 28, 1828. 37Ibid., July 19, 1828. 38Ibid., February 2 enui February 8, 1830; July 16, 1830. 39Ibid., July 16, 1830. 4OIbid. 41Ibid., September 12, 1831. 42Ibid., November 24, 1831. 43Ibid., April 20, 1832. 66 44Ibid., June 22, 1832. 451bid., August 10, 1832. 46Ibid., November 30, 1832. 471bid., December 14, 1832; December 18, 1832. 48Ibid., January 11, 1833. 49Ibid., January 31, 1833. 5°1bid., March 12, 1833. 511bid., February 28, 1833. 521bid., July 9, 1833. 53ipig., August 2, 1833. The Whig was referring to critical editorials in the Norfolk Herald and the Richmond Enquirer. 54 Ibid., August 2 and August 23, 1833. 55Ibid., August 9, 1833. 56Simms, 76-87. 57Ambler, Diary, 203. 58Ambler, Ritchie, 156-160. 59Richardson, II, 69. 60Ibid., 69-94. 61Richmond Whig, April 19, 1834. 62Ambler, Ritchie, 159-160; Simms, 85-86. 63Richmcnd Whig, April 8, 1834. 64Ibid., May 13, 1834. 65According to the June 30, 1831, Whig, the paper had a weekly edition going to every county in Virginia. As of November 15, 1828 the Whig published a daily for its Richmond city readers. CHAPTER III TROUBLESOME AND DIVISIVE ISSUES: SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM The problem of slavery and the related questions of suffrage and representation confronted the Whig for thirty-five years. Not only the northern and southern states but Eastern Virginia and Western Virginia also eventually split over the question. When the Whig began publishing in 1824, it actively sought an end to the peculiar institution. Since the Whig believed that slavery retarded Virginia's economic growth and contributed to political divisiveness, the paper naturally encouraged emancipation schemes. When Monroe's administration in 1824 requested that the Senate ratify a treaty with Great Britain out- lawing maritime slave trade, the Whig approved and credited the proposed agreement to John Q. Adams. Others, however, objected to the provisions of the treaty allow- ing British sailors to search American vessels while enforcing the prohibition. The Whig responded to the critics by arguing that the United States would yield 67 68 "not a tittle of right or principle to Great Britain, which she had not mutually conceded to us." In vain the Whig contended that no other course could accomplish so "holy a purpose."1 In early 1825, when Rufus King of New York pro- posed a bill in the Senate to finance an emancipation scheme, the Whig quickly endorsed his plan. According to King the net proceeds from the sale of United States public lands would be sufficient to pay for the removal of slaves and "free persons of color"; the federal govern- ment, however, would not interfere with any state laws that prohibited emancipation. The Whig said that King was offering the South an opportunity to rid itself of an "evil" which was "wasting" the section's happiness and strength. Because of the "blighting curse" the North had developed a superior economy and if the South wished to match the North's economic growth, the South had to accept some form of abolition.2 Unfortunately for the Whig, not many southerners agreed with the paper's assessment of King's bill. By August the Whig itself, under pressure, shifted its posi- tion and said that the New York Senator's plan was too tardy and slow. Since not enough funds would be avail- able, the idea was impractical, "ill-advised and vision- ary," Comments about King's "disloyalty" during the war Of 1812 revealed that southern opposition was concentrating 69 less on the Senator's scheme than on his former federal- ist leaning.3 While the Whig pursued an end to slavery, the edi- torials showed a preference for the projects of the American Colonization Society rather than federally directed actions envisioned in King's plan. Since slavery was "intimately blended with our polity," the Whig feared that a sudden disappearance of the "evil . . . might jeo- _pardize the prosperity and perhaps the well-being of society." Beneficial efforts would follow emancipation which the "intelligent portions of the population" real- ized, and they would someday persuade the public to sanction emancipation. Most of the Colonization Society's Opposition, claimed the Whig, came from President J. Q. Adams' adversaries, who tried to tie abolitionism to Adams and unite the South against his administration.4 All the abolitionist schemes endorsed by the Whig provided for removal of the Negroes from the state, but until that was accomplished the Whig wanted them treated decently, whether slave or free. The editors agreed with Governor William B. Giles who requested the repeal of unjust laws which allowed the sale into slavery of a "coloured female," for the most paltry theft. Once she became a slave all of her children were likewise bound to the system.5 As abolition gained momentum in the North, Virginia's legislature passed sedition laws prohibiting 70 the writing, printing, or circulating of any paper, pamph- let, or book counseling slave insurrection or rebellion. The laws also prohibited a white man from teaching a slave to read or write. The Whig denounced the laws as a viola- tion of freedom of speech, declaring that they were so sweeping that the authorities might construe some litera- ture on colonization as subversive, and so send an innocent man to jail. The Whig also pointed out that since a slave increased his value when he acquired reading skills, denying the slave owner the right to teach his slaves how to read and write constituted illegal reduction of the value of a citizen's property.6 In 1831 a slave insurrection brought new urgency to the debate of the peculiar institution's future in Virginia. On August 21 Nat Turner, a slave preacher and self—proclaimed prOphet, led a band of slaves numbering about seventy on a killing spree that resulted in the deaths of about sixty people, mostly women and children. To suppress the rebellion Governor John Floyd ordered four companies of state militia to the area while the federal government dispatched three companies from For- tress Monroe. The Whig's editor, John Hampden Pleasants, accompanied the state militia from Richmond.7 When word of the disturbance first arrived in Ricmmond, the Whig played down the importance by explain- ilng'that a few runaways had probably plundered and killed 71 some people but that the authorities had subdued the slaves quickly; hence the Whig concluded that there was "no cause for the slightest alarm." Gradually, however, the Whig received reports from Pleasants in Southampton that revealed the magnitude of the uprising and the loss of life: his accounts gave grisly descriptions of tor- ture and mutilation of victims.8 The Whig identified Nat Turner (Pleasants described him as a religious fanatic with no purpose) as the ringleader of the murderers. The terror began when Turner and a few followers got drunk and killed a white man. Believing they were dead men for having slain him, the editor reasoned that they went wild with fear. As the band spread out over a twenty mile region, more slaves joined Turner and between the early morning hours of Sunday, August 21, and noon Monday, they killed most of their sixty-two victims.9 It is interesting to note that although the Whig's chief editor was on the scene and saw first-hand the results of the slave rebellion, he still expressed concern about the Negroes in Southampton. He cautioned against blind revenge propelled by unwarranted fear.lo In spite of the presence of the militia, whites went on (a.rampage and seldom made any distinctions between slaves Jinvolved in the plot and those who were not. The white “Ribs and militia killed two-thirds of the rebel slaves 72 while the rest stood trial and died on the gallows.ll For the next two months Nat Turner avoided capture but finally Southampton County officials caught and hanged the man they blamed for initiating the uprising.12 Although no other slave revolts took place in Virginia immediately after the Southampton disturbance, and despite attempts of the Whig and other papers to calm the people, many rumors circulated of impending outbreaks. Governor Floyd complained in his diary of receiving num- erous pleas for weapons from Amelia, Dinwiddie, Accomac, and Nottoway counties as well as some localities near the Blue Ridge line. When people did not talk of slave insurrections they debated various programs of abolition.l3 The Whig continued backing its favorite scheme: colonization. According to the paper, Virginia needed to transport 2,000 slaves a year‘to Liberia to reduce the chance of another Nat Turner revolt. During the follow- ing year the Virginia chapter of the American Colonization Society anticipated exporting two hundred Negroes from Southampton County alone. The Whig urged all citizens to contribute generously and help defray the high transpor- “tation costs.14 The fact that Virginians began talking openly labout abolition did not mean that they were about to join Iforces with William Lloyd Garrison. Quite the contrary, tZlhey placed much of the blame for the Turner uprising on 73 Garrison's editorials in the newly established Liberator. Governor Floyd, convinced of Garrison's guilt, predicted that if no steps were taken to prohibit the publication of seditious materials the Union could not endure. He confided to his diary that "a man in our States may plot treason in one state against another without fear of punishment, whilst the suffering state has no right to resist by the provisions of the Federal Constitution." If the abolitionists went undisturbed, he wrote, "it must lead to a separation of these states."15 Since the Virginia legislature was convening in December, many urged their delegates to bring up slavery and debate the feasibility of various emancipation plans. Although state politicians had avoided the topic like a plague, the Whig reported that even the large slave owners were now agitating for a debate. The Whig_editori- alized that if nothing was done, many frightened people would leave Virginia; and since the state had dropped from first in population to third between 1810 and 1830, the Whig warned that she could ill-afford more depar- tures.l6 Another concern, especially since Nat Turner, was the increasing percentage of Negroes in the popula- tion. In 1790 whites outnumbered blacks by 24,000, but by 1830 the latter exceeded the former by 81,000.17 In October the Whig reported that several states including Georgia and Louisiana had enacted laws prohibiting the 74 introduction of slaves for sale in the state. If other states followed suit, they would then close Virginia's valve for excess population.18 When the Virginia legislature convened in Decem- ber, many young faces appeared including: Thomas Marshall, John Marshall's oldest son; Thomas Jefferson Randolph, grandson of Thomas Jefferson; James McDowell, Jr., later to be a Congressman and Governor; William B. Preston, a future Congressman; and William H. Roane of Hanover, grandson of Patrick Henry. These men, prodded by their constituents, were eager to debate slavery and Governor Floyd's message on December 6 gave them encour- agement by suggesting that the Commonwealth appropriate funds for the removal of free Negroes from the state. Since so much of the annual message dealt with insurrec- tion and removal of slaves, the speaker of the House referred the subject to a select committee of thirteen, ten of whom came from east of the Blue Ridge.19 When Roane of Hanover presented petitions from a local Quaker society recommending a policy of gradual emancipation, one week after the legislature gathered in Richmond, the Whig got its desired debate. Pro-slavery forces led by William O. Goode of Mecklenburg tried to Prevent the petition from going to the select committee Studying slavery, but when the House referred the peti- tion by a vote of 93 to 27, the attempt failed.20 75 On January 10 Goode inquired about the progress of the select committee and learned from the committee chairman that the subjects under review, gradual emanci- pation and removal of free Negroes, were very complex and hence the committee could not yet report back to the House. Goode, hoping to abort the committee report, pro- posed a resolution discharging the committee from con- sidering any petition, memorials, or resolutions pertain- ing to manumission. To counter Goode's move, Thomas Jefferson Randolph offered an amendment to Goode's resolu— tion by suggesting that the committee study the feasi- bility of presenting to Virginia's voters Thomas Jefferson's old plan of making all children born of a slave mother the property of the Commonwealth. After they attained a certain age the state would pay for their transportation to Africa. Goode, with his proposal, pre- cipitated exactly what he had desired to avoid: a lengthy debate on emancipation.21 Before the House could adopt either Goode's or Randolph's resolutions, the select committee reported out a resolution on January 16 declaring it inexpedient to enact at that time any legislation on the abolition of slavery. With this report Goode's and Randolph's resolu- 1ions were out of order. But to continue the debate PrESton moved that "expedient" replace the word "inexpe- diewrt" in the committee's resolution and for the next 76 nine days Virginia's legislature argued over the desira- bility of the peculiar institution.22 For two weeks the Whig reported many speeches that chronicled the disadvantages of Negro slavery. Samuel McDoWell Moore of Rockbridge County, soon to be a leading Whig, challenged proponents of the system to explain how they justified limiting any man's liberty when Americans proclaimed in 1776 that the "enjoyment of liberty, is one of those perfect, inherent and inalien- able rights, which pertain to the whole human race." Believing no satisfactory explanation was possible, Moore identified an "irresistible tendency" of slavery, the destruction of "virtue and morality in the community." Because slave owners feared an informed and educated Negro, "ignorance is the inseparable companion of slavery." And without informed minds slaves could not be virtuous and moral, so they with their vices would also extend an "injudicious influence" upon the morals of the free. Another argument of Moore's, one echoed by many anti- slavery people including the Whig, warned that the pecu- liar institution weakened the country's defense against foreign aggression. While he admitted that many slaves received "mild" and "humane" treatment, he still charac- terized slavery as an "intolerable evil."23 Supporting Moore, George W. Summers of Kanawha County contended that slavery made labor "dishonorable"; 77 consequently habits of idleness and dissipation attacked the virtue of industry. Denying that he was a "fanatic or philanthropic enthusiast," Summers emphasized his main goal of improving the condition of whites. In Summers' opinion the West, with no large slave population, enjoyed greater spirit of free inquiry and freedom of thought than the East. Even the poorest individual possessing only a "trusty rifle, log cabin, and a 'patch of corn,‘ is the most independent of men." To eradicate slavery, Summers, like the Whig, disapproved of immediate aboli- tion and favored the gradual "pgst nati" plan (that of Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Jefferson Randolph). Summers respected the property rights of slave owners but cautioned them that all property "is held subordinate to . . . the general welfare of the community in which it exists."24 From Mecklenburg County two delegates, Alex G. Knox and William O. Goode, championed the property inter- ests of the slave owners. Knox began his argument by denying that Thomas Jefferson's ideas should carry any weight since he waited for "the last solemn act" to manumit his slaves. Rather than castigate slavery as an evil and a source of the Commonwealth's weaknesses, as the Whig_had done, Knox suggested that the peculiar institution facilitated the preservation of "a Republican Government." He asked his adversaries to name one 78 "solitary instance of a Government, since the institution of civil society, in which the principle of slavery was not tolerated in some form or another." Even the slaves, declared Knox, profited from slavery since they enjoyed instruction in moral principle, an enlightenment which the African, "wandering in wretchedness over sun-scorched deserts, never encountered."25 Goode also defended the system by claiming, what the Whig denied, that slavery contributed to an efficient agricultural economy.26 He contended that slavery pro- vided Virginia with the constant and dependable labor force which was required to plant and harvest tobacco. Some critics pointed to the state's declining exports as proof of the evils of slavery, noted Goode, but the reduction resulted from declining prices not the adver- sities of slavery. In the future, however, Goode expected the lower southern states to drain off many of Virginia's excess slave population. Why? Because it was profitable to use slaves in the production of cotton; hence Virginia would gradually end slavery just as the North did earlier. .Already, said Goode, some farmers in Virginia had made slavery less important to them by shifting from tobacco to wheat production and the raising of livestock.27 Besides defending slavery and its benefits, Delegate John T. Brown of Petersburg catalogued the reasons why a slave's life was superior to that of many 79 peasants in Europe and some laborers of the North. The happiness of the slave "does not call for his emancipa— tion." Brown asked how else the slave would be sure of a subsistence, independent of accident, protected while ill, and secure from cruel treatment. While the Negro lacked liberty so, said Brown, did a great part of man- kind; not all could reach the top of the scale because the ignorant had to toil anxiously for their daily bread. To be free a man must be civilized and enlightened, con- ditions, Brown stressed, that the Negro was the least likely to attain.28 Unable to allow Brown's comments to go unanswered, Moore of Rockbridge again took the floor and contested the notion that a slave happily accepted his condition. While not questioning that the slave enjoyed comforts that workers around the world lacked, he argued, as did the Whig, that the very improvement offered the slave insured his eternal determination to improve himself, and that no amount of oppression could smother his desire for liberty. Moore asked, "Was it the fear of Nat Turner and his deluded drunken handful of followers" who produced panic in counties that never heard of Southampton? No. People all over the state requested arms because they held a suspicion "eternally attached to the slave himself, the suspicion that a Nat Turner might be in every family, that the same bloody deed could be acted over at any time 80 in any place. . . ." Moore counseled his fellow dele- gates to prevent future Southamptons by initiating a policy of abolition.29 Since both the emancipators and the slavery party numbered about sixty delegates, the decision on whether positive legislation would result depended on the votes of about a dozen compromisers. After two weeks of debate the legislature closed the discussions with four polls on 30 The first count came on a motion to the main topics. postpone indefinitely the committee report and Preston's proposed amendment. The slavery group lost this round 60 to 71 (only four of 24 Valley delegates voted aye and none of the 31 Trans-Alleghany men voted aye). When the Preston amendment came up, declaring it "expedient" to enact abolition laws, it too failed by a similar vote, 58 to 73. After the first two votes it was clear that neither the extreme pro-slavery or anti-slavery groups possessed the votes necessary to obtain all that they wanted.31 At this point Archibald Bryce of Goochland attempted to open the way to compromise by offering a Preamble to the committee report. This preamble declared that slavery was an evil, but also stated that action Other than removing free Negroes should await further growth of public opinion. This was approved 67 to 60. With Bryce's preamble the original committee report, 81 resolving that it was "inexpedient" to enact abolition plans, passed 65 to 58.32 For once the Richmond Whig and Enquirer agreed on a major issue: an end to slavery had to be found. Ritchie of the Enquirer said that the nation was watching the legislature to see if Virginia could lead the South away from the curse of slavery. Optimistically the Whig_ proclaimed that the unchaining of the presses to allow open debate on slavery and the frank discussions in the state government insured an eventual end to the insti- tution.33 Nothing, said the Whig, was more important than slavery, not even war. The latter affected only a small part of the society, but slavery with its moral conse- quences extended indefinitely its "curse" to every indi- vidual in the state. The debates in the legislature, emphasized the Whig, were the most important since those of 1776. Virginia had set an example that other southern states might follow. But even the Whig did not expect immediate abolition. The larger slave holders would pre— vent any sudden change; nevertheless the paper expected small slave holders, merchants, and mechanics to unite someday and close out the peculiar institution. Even the larger slave holders, predicted the Whig, would see that the system had sheared the state of needed economic flexi- bility and threatened the lives of the white population. 82 Should a conflict with the North come, the Whig_warned that the slaves would be a dagger "in our bosom." Even though gradual abolition might take fifty years, the paper delcared that the job had to be done.34 While the emancipationists failed to win approval of positive laws leading to abolition, they did not view the debates or votes as a failure or the end of hope for the eventual end of slavery. The Whig listed five decla- rations that the House of Delegates had made: (1) that it was not expedient at this session to legislate on abolition, (2) that the "coloured" population was a great evil, (3) that humanity and policy demanded the removal of free Negroes and those who would become free, (4) that the above actions would absorb present resources, and (5) that it would be expedient to commence a system of abolition when public opinion demanded such action. In the opinion of the Whig the House of Delegates went as far as it had a right to go.35 The slavery debate, however, embittered and frightened some people. Governor Floyd supported the emancipationists when the debates began, but by late .Ianuary entries in his diary reveal a growing concern for the state's political stability. Goode confided to Floyd that he and other pro-slave interests, hoping to get :revenge on western Virginians, voted "no" on a bill pro- ‘viding a loan to make internal improvements. The 83 Mecklenburg delegate confessed that the debates convinced him that the peOple west of the Blue Ridge had no common interest, and that a separation of the two sections was preferable to a renewal of the slavery agitation in the House.36 To combat the anti—slavery arguments presented in the press and the legislature, Professor Thomas Roderick Dew of William and Mary College presented his Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832, defending the peculiar institution. He convinced many people and made his work a Virginia conservative's hand- book. Among those persuaded by Dew was John Floyd whose conversion may have resulted partly from the rising ten- sions with the federal government. Floyd appeared ready to let someone else such as Dew decide the slavery issue once and for all.37 Other events besides Dew's publication diverted Virginia's energies from ending slavery. Almost as soon as the debates ended in 1832, national political events captured the press' attention: rejection by the United States Senate of Martin Van Buren as Ambassador to Great Britain, the tariff controversy, and the threat of South Carolina to nullify laws and secede if necessary all tended to push slavery in the background. Since the debates resulted primarily from the turmoil of South- aImpton, as time passed and no more Nat Turners appeared, 84 many people concluded that slavery was there to stay and that another rebellion was unlikely.38 The Whig, however, took a longer time in changing its position on abolition, but the paper realized that Virginians were adopting more defensive attitudes about slavery. In 1835 the paper reported that a "most unfavor- able" impact resulted from actions of northern "immediate abolitionists." Because they preached violence and fanaticism, the Whig explained, southern abolitionists could have no respect for them. Three years later as the Democratic press converted former Whig voters to its party by associating Virginia Whigs with some northern Whigs who favored immediate abolition, the Whig shifted its position to favoring only exportation of free Negroes.39 Because of the "vile" abolitionists the Whig realized in 1845 that little hope for ending slavery remained: they had brought on the "universal suspension, not only of all measures for emancipation, but even of 40 From this point the Whig found it all thought of it!" politically expedient not to question the peculiar insti- tution. ***** Less than a month after the Whig began publishing, Editorials favored the calling of a state conventionto revise the nearly fifty year old constitution. While the Whig stressed that it meant no disrespect for the 85 revolutionary leaders, the paper argued that in 1776 (date of the last Virginia constitution) people were in turmoil and leaders were inexperienced in writing constitutions; the Whig, therefore, recommended that Virginia consider some needed changes to protect the founding fathers' ideals, and since the old document lacked provisions for amendment, a convention was necessary.41 For several years the Whig and other papers and groups (especially in the counties west of the Blue Ridge Mountains) agitated and petitioned for the legislature 42 But the delegates were slow to to call a convention. respond. In February of 1825 the Senate rejected a bill providing an opportunity for the voters to state whether or not they approved of a convention. One year later the House by a 101 to 94 vote rejected another attempt to put the question of a convention before the voters. After a third attempt failed in the House (107 to 103), the Whig warned of dire consequences if the legislature ignored much longer the will of the people. When the representa- tives denied voters the right to express themselves, "the servants" were telling "the master" what he could do. The paper, recalling the American Revolution, cautioned the resistors of change that revolution came in 1776 from less cause than the legislature had now given the people.43 Finally in December 1827 the advocates of consti- tutional reform mustered a majority in the House (114 to 86 86) and a few weeks later the Senate also passed the bill asking the voters whether they wanted a convention. If they voted yes, the Whig assumed, the legislature would call a convention, but legally the popular vote did not bind the legislature. Although the Whig had finally got the question before the people, the paper despaired that only freeholders would be able to vote. It was, com— plained the Whig, simply "unfair" to exclude "free men" from a voice in forming the government under which they would live. Freehold suffrage violated the "essence of Republicanism"--that all free men have the right to vote. To exclude non-freeholders from the election fostered danger because they probably "constituted a majority of freemen of Virginia," and if the convention question failed in the next election they might take matters into their own hands.44 But the voters avoided such a con- frontation, endorsing the convention by a majority of 7,100 votes. After the success at the polls in April, the sup- porters of reform strove to get voters to pressure their representatives to heed the will of the majority. Since the presidential election had pushed the convention issue out of the spotlight, the Whig constantly reminded the readers not to become apathetic about needed constitu- 45 tional changes. But as the legislature decided to abide by the popular demand, the Whig's fear for a 87 convention proved to be unfounded; nevertheless there were problems, one of the most important of which was establishing the basis for representation.46 A conflict arose over whether to apportion dele- gates to the convention according to the total white population or by aWarding each congressional district one representative. Since only seven of the twenty-one districts were west of the Blue Ridge, the westerners objected to the latter. They argued that over forty-five per cent of the white population lived in the West, but that region, by the congressional district plan, would receive only thirty-one per cent of the delegates. After extensive debates the legislature compromised by direct- ing each of the twenty-four senatorial districts to elect four delegates. According to this arrangement (nine districts were west of the Blue Ridge) the West got thirty-six of the ninety-six seats in the convention or about thirty-seven per cent. The Whig, even though it .had favored the reformers, counseled acceptance of the compromise.47 Once the state settled on organizational and pro- cedural items, the last hurdle for the reformers was the selection of delegates. As the April election approached, many former opponents of constitutional change reversed their stances and declared for reform. Amused, the Whig cautioned readers not to be fooled by men like William 88 Daniel of Lynchburg who Opposed changes in the judiciary (election of judges). While the Whig feigned gratifica- tion for the surge of "new converts," the paper suggested that the voters stick with the "old advocates" of reform.48 In the election, voters in Richmond and the city's sena- torial district chose Chief Justice John Marshall and United States Senator John Tyler as members of the dis— trict's four-man delegation. These two men joined such other distinguished leaders at the convention as James .Madison, James Monroe, United States Senator L. W. Tazewell, Governor William B. Giles, eleven members of Congress (among them, John Randolph, C. F. Mercer, P. P. Barbour, and Philip Doddridge), as well as the distin- sguished lawyer and future United States Senator, B. W. Leigh . 49 Before the convention met in Richmond on Octo- laer 5, 1829, a mass meeting in Augusta County sent an (address to the delegates imploring them to consider the 'Rvisdom and safety" of gradual emancipation. The Whig, agreeing that slavery brought "down a curse upon the land “fliere it exists," supported requests that the convention iJTVestigate ways to relieve "our posterity" from the buJt'den of slavery. While the Wh__:L_g initially had not 1Z’J-élrlned to suggest emancipation as a topic, the paper now ccnltended that since Augusta had formally raised the Subject it was incumbent on the delegates to give 89 consideration to the petition. The paper pleaded with the politicians not to be demagogues and inflame passions by saying that the petition constituted an attack on pri- vate property.50 The topic, however, never came up in the convention. As scheduled the convention assembled in the Capitol in Richmond on October 5, and named James Monroe Presiding Officer. The assembly created four committees (each had one representative from each senatorial dis- trict) to study different sections of the constitution and recommend amendments.52 One of the proposals that vitally concerned the Iflhig came from the committee on suffrage. It advised that (all who then enjoyed the right to vote should continue to eexercise the privilege, and that suffrage should include 'those who possessed freehold of a certain value (amount 'to be decided by the convention); owners of vested eastates in fee, in remainder, or in reversion; lease- Iiolders paying a certain amount annually; and taxpaying fuousekeepers. While many expressed disappointment it hHecame clear quickly that the reformers lacked the votes tC> expand suffrage any more than the report proposed.53 While the Whig had clamored strongly for an extension of suffrage, many in the East had also favored erfilarging the electorate. At the start of the convention, John Marshall presented a "memorial from a numerous and 90 respectable body of citizens, then non-freeholders of the City of Richmond," claiming that they should have the privilege of voting. The memorial and others like it from Fairfax and Shenandoah counties cited the Bill of Rights and the work of Thomas Jefferson in championing their claims. They denied that property was a fair cri- terion by which to judge merit, because under the old constitution many intelligent men whose vocations required no property had no opportunity to participate in sgovernment. To charges that they were too ignorant and ‘vicious to vote, they indignantly reminded the delegates that non-freeholders fought in the country's wars and <:omposed a large percentage of the militia. But the non- Ioroperty owners failed to convince a majority of the delegates . 5 4 Benjamin Watkins Leigh led the conservative oppo- sition against any extension of suffrage. If free man— liood suffrage became law in Virginia, Leigh warned, the .liberty of all would be threatened. He explained: It has pleased heaven to ordain that man shall enjoy no good without alloy. Its greatest bounties are not blessings, unless the enjoyment of them be tem- pered with moderation. Liberty is only a means; the end is happiness. It is indeed the wine of life; but like other wines, it must be used with advantage; taken to excess, it first intoxicates, then maddens, and at last, destroys.55 It VVas obvious to Leigh that all men were not created equalsince every day men were born into bondage. He went further and denied that the majority had a natural 91 right to govern and he termed the Bill of Rights a com- pilation of "metaphysical subleties."56 In the debate following the presentation of the committee report some delegates futilely tried to alter the report. Philip Dodderidge championed universal white Inanhood suffrage, and when this proposal appeared dead he supported other plans, including one that would make all taxpayers eligible to vote. But by a four-vote mar- gin the old guard defeated that plan. By the constitu- tion of 1831 the following qualified a man to vote: (1) a 25-acre freehold of improved land acquired before 1830; (2) a 50-acre freehold of unimproved land acquired loefore 1830; (3) a $25.00 freehold; (4) a $25.00 joint tenantship; (5) a $50.00 reversion; (6) a five-year leasehold of annual rental value of $20.00; and (7) being a tax-paying housekeeper and head of a family. The new Iprovisions enlarged the electorate some, but the law also Iproved confusing and resulted in many contested elections (aver the next twenty years.57 Another divisive issue, apportionment, also cap- tnlred the Whigfs interest. Delegates from the West wanted to base representation on the white population While the conservative spokesmen of the East demanded that prc3perty (slaves) be part of any representation distribu- tiCInn Others sought compromise by suggesting an average of 'the federal numbers (counting three-fifth's of slave population) and white basis. 92 One defender of the status quo, A. P. Upshur, contended that it was necessary to consider two majori- ties: a majority of numbers and a majority of interests. MMile admitting in most governments a majority of the legal voters could safely exercise power, he stressed that in Virginia people lacked identical interest. Thus it was necessary for the slave owner to possess power to jprotect his "peculiar" property from unfair taxation. :Property, he believed, had to have a voice in government (or government would destroy property. Other conserva- ‘tives,such as William B. Giles, maintained that Negro sslaves were human beings who deserved representation -through their masters.58 Associating reformers with radicalism became a ifavorite device of the conservatives. They claimed that inf the reformers had their way, Virginia would face chaos earld bloodshed. While the reformers objected to the com- EPEtrison, they used the opportunity to point out_that IFfirance's upheavals followed the rule of a privileged minority, not a period of excessive liberty.59 On October 24 the committee responsible for the liagislative department reported out a bill favoring the White population as the basis for the House of Delegates, laud: asking for no change in the Senate. Immediately the eastern conservatives proposed a plan relying on the Iniined basis (white population combined with taxation). 93 'The mixed basis, they contended, offered the only means <>f giving justice and protection to property owners. )mhile the basis would increase the West's labor represen- tation without additional taxation to them, the East's labor, on the other hand, would lose representation but have no reduction of taxes and probably an increase. But the delegates from the West, supported by the Whig, com- plained that the legislature ignored the economic needs of the mountains. George W. Summers of Kanawha argued that because of inequities in the legislature, the East liad prevented the establishment of branch banks of the Bank of Virginia west of the Blue Ridge. The easterners denied the charge and asserted that, in fact, a “wise and conservative minority" had spared the West the evils of eaxcessive banking.60 The conservatives also asserted that a switch to the white basis had dangerous implications for national IPOlitics. Since the slave population provided the South Vwith one-third of its representatives in Congress, the CRDnservatives contended that repudiation in Virginia of tine principle (to include slaves in representation) would Cully encourage those in the North who oppose counting tilree-fifth's of the slave population in congressional (iistricts. To change the basis of representation in the Stfiite, warned the conservatives, would imperil the South's political power. 61 94 Quoting the Bill of Rights, the advocates of white basis said that "all power is vested in and conse- quently derived from the people" and that the white basis plan adhered to the principle of power to the people. But the mixed basis, they argued, granted power to wealth. While the first plan offered a millionaire no more repre— sentation than any other white man, the conservatives' plan conferred on a rich man representation equal to many Lhundreds of honest citizens.62 As the debate over representation intensified, Inen such as John Marshall, James Madison, and James Iflonroe tried to find a compromise. Although Marshall :Eavored federal numbers (counting three-fifth's of the SSlave population), he proposed conciliating the sections' Clifferences by allowing the average between white basis ennui federal numbers to determine the distribution of Ciealegates. Madison, aged and enfeebled, pleaded for iigyreement and compromise but also expressed his prefer- Eence for the federal numbers. Recognizing a danger of division in Virginia, Monroe addressed the convention and warned that if the convention failed to reach agree- InEint soon, they would have to return to their homes in C'1:i.sgrace. If a constitution passed with only a narrow Inajority, the countryside would erupt with sectional ffeelings leading to "dismemberment of the State." Rather (ban allow such a disaster, the former president pleaded 95 with the delegates to yield something to their opponents. He recognized that westerners had a legitimate claim for more delegates in the legislature, but he reminded the reformers that property owners also had rights. To Monroe a plan recognizing the white basis in the House and federal numbers in the Senate seemed reasonable.63 After weeks of debate the convention endorsed tVilliam F. Gordon's plan which apportioned both Houses to Jaemove inequities. But no principle of representation loeecame part of the constitution. By Gordon's plan Wes- ‘tnern Virginia increased its number of delegates, but a procedure to correct future imbalances remained undefined. IJIdder the new constitution the westerners received 56 Cieelegates in the House to the East's 78, while in the IJIpper house they got 13 senators to 19 in the East. The <2<3nvention apportioned seats according to the 1820 census ;rxather than the 1830 census, which revealed a smaller £>earcentage of the state's population in the East.64 On January 15, 1830, the convention adjourned Eiégi§_gi§_leaving the voters the choice in April of 1830 CXE' accepting or rejecting completely the proposed consti- t341Lion. The Whig lost no time endorsing the new consti- tution even though the document was not all that the paper had hoped for. The Wh_ig noted that it contained no provision for popular election of Governor, abolition of Executive Council, or representation based on the white 96 population.65 Before the convention met the Whig had supported white basis for both Houses. As the debates dragged on the paper feared that no constitution might result and so suggested a compromise with the advocates of federal numbers. The paper had agreed with Monroe that if one section forced all its views on the other, the state might divide permanently between East and West. The Whig, while fighting for the new constitution, .labeled as aristocrats those who opposed extending the ssuffrage and equalizing representation. They, said the gmaper, preferred property "to persons" and sought to give :irufluence to wealth while denying free men equal rights.66 The Whig emphasized that at least the reformers eat:tained greater representation for the West. While the vvkrite basis remained unrecognized in the constitution, ‘tfliea paper reminded those disappointed by the results that tdiee mixed principle also failed to gain acceptance; thus 1DY voting to approve the new constitution the reformers VMould not endorse the despised concept. In addition the 571113 considered it worthwhile that the state would rid itSelf of eighty superfluous legislators (reference to reduced numbers in the constitution) and five Councillors (EXecutive Council reduced from 8 to 3) .67 In the spring the voters approved the new consti- tut110nwith over 26,000 voting yes to 15,363 no's, but the xmote showed a wide split in the state.68 By more 97 than a two to one margin the West cast 13,282 no votes and only 5,985 for ratification while the East polled 20,070 for ratification and only 2,281 against.69 Although distinguished men served in the consti- tutional convention, they failed to arrive at a lasting settlement of the state's controversies. Almost every state election between 1831 and 1851 aroused bitter feel- ings and contested elections because the suffrage .requirements were so muddled and confusing. At the close <>f the convention the Whig had advised the unsuccessful vvesterners to send to the next constitutional convention fiewer lawyers and more "men of everyday sense."‘70 But tflne fact remained that Virginia had failed to settle .isssues that dangerously divided the state. Because the state constitution adopted in 1830 IfEelJ.short of satisfying the reformers and since the suf- frage requirements were so vague that the legislature cxbritinually had to decide contested elections, many Papers in the West and East, including the Wh_ig, soon advocated the calling of a new convention.71 While the eas tern politicians primarily concerned themselves with SUififrage, the westerners, as expected, were most keen on establishing representation on the white basis. After Obtaining public approval in April 1850 and electing delefiaates to the convention in August the Reform Conven- tiorl assembled in Richmond on October 14.72 98 In contrast to the almost undivided attention the Whig gave the constitutional convention of 1830, the paper during the convention of 1850-1851 refrained from vigorous support or opposition to questions before the delegates. The Whig, while most of the debates in Rich- mond went on, focused on the efforts of Clay in Washington to diffuse the major national crisis over slavery in the territories. California had applied for admission in 1850 as a free state, precipitating a conflict between tflne pro-slave and abolition advocates. Even after the cnompromise bills passed Congress in the fall of 1850, tflne Whig used most of its editorials to encourage south- exrn acceptance of the settlement. Other than indicate .a. preference for freehold suffrage to universal manhood £311ffrage and the mixed over the white basis of represen- izartion, the paper refrained from commenting on the pro- Posed constitutional reforms. It also underwent two Cfiiéanges of editors between 1850 and 1851 which probably CKDrltributed to the paper's reluctance to comment on <1i‘tisive subjects. And since the Whig was seeking poli- ‘ticxal unity not turmoil, acceptance of the constitution SeErned reasonable . 73 Most voters in the state followed the paper's exanuple in acquiescing in the convention's proposals. Whilia the reformers got the universal suffrage as well as the ‘vhite basis for the lower house of the legislature, 99 ‘the East maintained the mixed basis in the Senate. As a result the West would elect a majority in the Senate, 30 'to 20, but on the joint ballot the west controlled by :four votes. The direct election of Governor was another :reform that displeased the Whig, but as with the other .issues the Whig, for fear of disrupting the state, chose riot to debate the reformers. So on October 4, 1851, \firginia's voters ratified the constitution 75,748 to £11,063. The total number who voted, 86,811, represented afloout 49 per cent of the adult white male population.74 CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES lRichmond Whig, June 15 and June 22, 1824. 2Ibid., June 22, 1825. 3Ibid., August 2, 1825; Charles S. Sydnor, Whg IDeavelopment of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, Vol. V 2333 A History of the South, ed. by Wendell Holmes £31:ephenson and E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton Rouge: ILCDuisiana State University Press, 1948), 123-124 and 128. 4Ibid., August 2 and August 15, 1825. 5Ibid., December 5, 1827. 6Ibid., February 22, 1830. 7Ibid., August 25, 1831. 8Ibid., August 25 and September 3, 1831. I’leaasants offered one of the best accounts of the insur- re ction . 9 Ibid., August 29, 1831. loIbid., August 29, 1831; Joseph 0. Robert, The EEQEidl from Monticello, A Study of the Virginia Slavery DEflDErte of 1832 (Durham: Duke UniVersity Press, 1941), 3-4. 11Richmond Whig, September 3, 1831. Robert, 4—10. 12Robert, 15-30. D' 13Richmond Whig, October 6, 1831. Ambler (ed.), .JEEEIL, 157-161. 14 Richmond Whig, October 6, 1831. 15Ambler (ed.), Diary, 159-162. 16Richmond Whig, November 17, 1831. 17Robert, 11. 100 101 18Richmond Whig, October 6, 1831. 19Robert, 14-16. Later the legislature expanded tile: special committee by eight; sixteen of the enlarged group came from the East. 20 Ibid., 16-17. 21Richmond Whig, January 13, 1831; Robert, 18-19. 22Richmond Whig, January 17, 1832. 23Ibid., January 16 through January 25, 1832; Rcfloeart, 62-64. Robert offered portions of many of the nuaj<3r speeches given during the debates. 24Richmond Whig, January 16 through January 25, 1832. 25Robert, 84. 26 Richmond Whig, February 22, 1825; August 2, 1827; February 22 , 1830 . 27 Robert, 107. 28Ibid., 90-91. 29ihig., 104. Richmond Whig, January 19, 1832. 3ORichmond Whig, January 28, 1832; Robert, 115-118. 31Robert, 113-118. 32Ibid., 113-118. 33 164‘167. J 34RiChm0nd Whig, January 12, January 19 and anuairy 21, 1832. 35 Richmond Whig, January 19, 1832; Ambler, Ritchie, Ibid., January 28, 1832. 36Ambler (ed.), Diary, 175-177. 37Robert, 46-47. 381bid., 49-54. 39Richmond Whig, July 24, 1825; January 12, 1838. 102 40Ibid., June 20, 1845; Clement Eaton, Freedom of Thought in the Old South (Durham: Duke University Press, 1940), 89-143. Eaton stressed that northern abolitionists chilled southern abolition movements. 41Richmond Whig, March 16 and March 23, 1824. 42Ambler, Ritchie, 118-123: Simms, 36-38. Julian Chandler, "Representation in Virginia," in Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ed. by Herbert Baxter Adams (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1896), XIV, 20-44; Julian Chandler, "Suf— frage in Virginia," in Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ed. by Herbert Baxter Adams (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1901) , XIX, 28—40. 43Richmond Whig, January 30, 1827. 44Ibid., February 2 and February 6, June 4 and December 19, 1828. The Whig denied that freeholders were superior citizens to non-freeholders. In the June 4 edi- torial the Whig calculated that non-freeholders out— numbered the freeholders by 10,000. Chandler (XIX, 40) contended that before the 1830 constitution two-thirds of the freemen could not vote and that the 1830 constitution Permitted only about one-half of the freemen to vote. He based this conclusion, however, not on the examination of tax records but on the voter turnouts prior to and after the constitutional reforms. But it is significant that no one contested the reformers' argument that thousands 0f freemen could not vote. In fact the opponents of suf- fFage expansion defended the practice of exclusion as wlse and necessary. 45Ibid., November 22, 1828. 4611313., January 9 and January 13, 1829. Ch 47Richmond Whig, January 9 and January 13, 1829; ( arles Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776-1861 ”“3“? York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), 144-145. 48Richmond Whig, April 21, 1829. Ch 49M” May 5, May 26 and October 5, 1829; Seansiler, "Suffrage in Virginia," XIX, 31; Ambler, —-£ngpona1ism, 145. 50Richmond Whig, July 14, 1829. 103 51Ibid., July 21 enui October 5, 1829. As Octo- beaxr 5 approached the Whig announced that a stenographer WTDtle record the speeches and debates for the paper. And t<> lxil 8, 1851. It is interesting to note that between ZLESBO and 1851 the Whig had dropped its advocacy of uni- xresrsal manhood suffrage and representation based on the vvrlite population. 74Ibid., April 8, July 1 and July 7, 1851. (Irlandler, "Representation in Virginia," XIV, 68-70. CHAPTER IV ECONOMIC POLICY: SHIFT WITH THE TIMES For Virginia to regain her lost power and pres- ti ge in the national government, the Wh_ig believed that the state had to abandon her reliance on a one crop agricultural system. To facilitate economic growth the paper recommended that Virginians re-evaluate their positions, as it had done, on the tai'iff, the national bank , land policy, and internal improvements. Other editors in Virginia, however, challenged the Wh__1g on almost all the major controversies. During a time when most championed only one section's interests, the paper tried to convince the people in the South that section- 3118m and provincialism would ultimately end in tragedy for the region. Because political and economic advantages had flOWed away from the once dominant Old Dominion, the W-fll Stressed that many of the state's notions regarding naltional and state government relations were outmoded. Wth asked the Wh_ig, should Virginia allow constitutional qualms to interfere with the building of roads, canals, 105 106 earid harbors or the diversification of the economy, or the founding of a stable currency? The Whig answered that riaitional trends foretold the creation of new industries and new roads, both of which required national protection and financing; therefore, if Virginia desired to recover her former place in federal councils she had to endorse new ideas. The W_hig occupied a good position to encourage southerners, and Virginians in particular, to embrace national policies, since it too had formerly advocated the very policies that the paper in the 1830's was press- ing voters so hard to drop. Until other points or views had a hearing, the WES. reasonably concluded that few Would break out of their mental ruts; thus the Wh_ig assumed the task of persuading its readers of the requi- Siteness of change. First the tariff, then the Bank, and finally the dilemma of how to distribute and improve the land captured the W_hig's attention. * 1: * * * At its beginning, the M's editorials had Str01’1eg condemned a protective tariff system; the tariffs constituted a "degrading tribute" to the North, beCaI-‘lse the system permitted domestic industry to raise prices that mechanics, farmers, and merchants had to pay. With the prospect of benefiting only a few, the "tariff- 1tes" would ruin and oppress "the many." Even though 107 experience had born out Adam Smith's opinion that every man guarded best his own interest and that "all classes" prosper when government restrained itself from favoring one group over another, many politicians still promoted protection. To avoid a "downright robbery" the Whig advised the South to boycott northern goods and thus apply pressure on the tariff advocates to reverse their stance.2 Other evils, warned the Whig, would result from a prohibitive system. Smuggling, a "horrid" and "nefa- ri ous" practice, would surely emerge once tariffs raised the price of imported goods, and no threats of severe punishment would prevent men from trying to avoid the required duties. In 1825 the M doubted that more industry constituted a blessing because any little mechan- iCal-l innovation meant a reduction of jobs and conse- quently higher unemployment. And the Wh_ig also cautioned that once the United States excluded foreign products, Other countries would do likewise in self-defense, so to the Whig the tariff system was self-defeating. In addi tion the Whig said that governments trying to prevent Smuggling generally violated an individual's rights through illegal search and seizure procedures: avoiding these evils and dangers would preserve the stability of the U1'lion . 108 Less than two years later, however, the Whig began reconsidering the tariff since it seemed destined to remain law for a long time. Believing that few Vir- ginians (including its own editors) had ever objectively studied import duties, the paper pledged that articles on both sides of the subject would soon appear in the Whig. With the additional information and debates the Whig expected the tariff to attract new devotees. In October, 1827, the Wh_ig reprinted an article from the Charleston CitL Gazette defending the tariffs, and after endorsing the item the Richmond paper contended that: already voters in the Old Dominion perceived that dire predictions of disaster voiced in 1816 and 1824, When the last two tariffs passed Congress, had not come true If the nation pursued its present tariff policies, the Dlhig predicted, a larger home market would arise for agri cultural products as well as raw materials. As long as the rates allowed for continuance of the United States foreign commerce, the paper foresaw only better days. Furthermore, if the country fully adopted Clay's American System then all sections would share the benefits and burciens more equitably.5 In Virginia and in the nation we would also develop resources, continued the Wh_ig, and foster independence from foreign countries for the produc- t' . . . 101‘ of articles of comfort not to mention enjoying a S . hleld from fluctuations in European markets.6 From the 109 W_h_ig's vantage point, the South had "but . . . two alter- natives, to bring themselves within the benefits of the "American System," by commencing manufactures themselves or to leave the Union.7 But when South Carolina and groups in other southern states in 1828 actually began suggesting dis- union rather than abide by tariff laws, the W_h_ig recoiled in shock at the demagogues who exhorted the populace to overthrow constituted authority.8 Numerous anti-tariff county conventions in Virginia petitioned the legislature to restrict the sale of articles manufactured in the North and West. To quell some of the tensions, the Wh_ig edito- rialized that such drastic action ran counter to the United States Constitution which delegated to Congress the power to regulate trade between states. Besides, it would be foolish for Virginians to pay $7.50 for a hog When they could obtain one from Kentucky for $5.00, but, 9 Warned the Whig, some extremists contemplated just that. Similarly a call by the Southron of Milledgeville, Georgia for a national anti—tariff convention promoted a vigorous m reaction. The Georgia paper assumed that a national meeting would instruct state legislatures on how best to obs truct the sale of goods protected by the tariff. Such actions, feared the Wh_ig, "would prove fatal to the tran- qUility and integrity of the Union."]'0 110 Anti-tariff forces in Virginia and South Carolina became subjects of strong editorials questioning their motivations; John Randolph, a constant critic of Adams and Clay, cared too much for England, said the M, to be trusted.11 More surprising to the Wh_ig was John C. Calhoun's sudden antagonism for the tariff, a measure he formerly endorsed. Perhaps, reasoned the Wh_ig, political expediency determined his vote: with South Carolina becoming more intransigent Calhoun may have had to accomo- date his theories to the changing political winds to insure his place in the Senate and his state's backing in the approaching presidential elections.12 Despite the tempest the "Tariff of Abominations" became law in 1828, but the voices opposing the duties Continued agitating the South. The Whig pleaded unsuc- cessfully for a moratorium at least until 1832 when the tOpic would again come up before Congress. When debates Persisted, the paper labeled the activities "child's play" and "unstatesmanlike"; nevertheless because no quiet resulted, the W_h_ig reluctantly resumed printing pro- tariff articles which only intensified the discussion that the paper wanted stilled.l3 Anti-tariff forces again in 1831 sought a national convention of all tariff foes, which, of course. the Whig Viewed with alarm. Since most tariff advocates would never change their minds, what, wondered the Whig, could 111 a convention accomplish? One result the paper antici- pated was encouragement of South Carolina's nullifiers who had never stopped fomenting dissatisfaction over the 1828 tariff. Because some of the nullifiers had no training in economics or business, the Wh_ig pointedly referred to the tariff as a "business affair" understood only by those trained in the field. When the convention received the endorsement of Thomas R. Drew of William and Mary College, the paper belittled the professor by com— menting that the issue concerned an "everyday affair, much too simple to be understood by those, who in the Eozride of much learning, disdain to pick up the facts . . . . and insist upon digging into 14 strewed along the path . . the bowels of the Earth for truth." The Whig perceived that pro-tariff men, in response to South Carolina, would call a convention of their own. Not only would both con- ventions fall short of winning more converts, but most likely, forewarned the Whig, acrimonious speeches and adcizresses would imperil the peace, harmony, and "union" Of the nation.15 But since the nullifiers revealed no propensity for moderating their demands, the Wh___ig also continued editorials defending the import duties. Again the paper accused southern politicians of willfully mislead- ing the masses for political expediency. After denying that the paper represented manufacturers, the Whig 112 professed that "we honestly . . . believe, that it is for the permanent interests and independence of the country" to maintain a tariff. Virginia, said the paper, would enhance her position in the nation if she applied her surplus capital and labor to manufacturing to aid her "drooping" agriculture. Besides it was "wise" and "patri- otic" to disperse money at "home" rather than in England. A protective tariff would also enlarge the home market for agricultural products: "agriculture and manufactures are in strict alliance - Siamese twins - who if one flourishes, the other must flourish, if one falls sick - . . the other must languish also."l7 To calm the tobacco growers of Virginia, the Whig claimed that they would buy necessities at a lower price with the tariff than without it. And when cotton planters cried for 1Te lief the Whig impatiently reminded them that they, of all the agriculturalists, had less to complain about Since the tariff created an American market to supplement French and English markets.18 The Wh_ig advised those who Objected to federally financed internal improvements to support the tariff which provided revenue to reduce the national debt but not internal improvements. Once the government cleared the national debt the paper promised that lower tariffs would replace the present rates and end the annual surpluses which stimulated internal improvement. Most who favored the tariff wanted only to 113 provide revenue and incidental protection of industry; but as soon as the debt no longer existed then the Whig foresaw a reduction in duties of almost $l0,000,000.19 When South Carolina nullified the tariff of 1832, the W_h_i_g strove to encourage a compromise; fearful for the Union, the Wh_ig pleaded with southerners to act rationally rather than emotionally. Though appreciating Jackson's determination to carry out the law of the land, the paper rejected Jackson's theories on state rights and his appeal for additional power in the so-called Force Act.20 After the crisis in 1833 passed, the tariff did rust stir many comments from the Whig until the 1840's (iuring the administration of Tyler and Polk. With a Whig iiéhninistration in Washington for the first time in 1841, time paper recalled its previous arguments about the need (31? a home market, and the benefits of a diversified economy.2 But the paper also presented some new argu- ments including quotations favoring duties from the presi- dential messages of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe. Clay's speeches which promised no "High Tariff" also appeared in the Whig: he cIOntended that manufacturing had taken "deep root" so a need no longer existed for high tariffs.23 As debate in England on whether or not to repeal the corn laws intensified, American free trade advocates 114 attempted to use the debates as evidence that the United States and Great Britain might soon reach an accord on a trade policy removing all duties. The Whig denied the likelihood of England repealing her corn laws and sug- gested that England only wanted to trick the United States into adopting a free trade policy so that England's manu— facturers could swamp the American market with cheap products to destroy United States manufactures.24 Not only would free trade destroy American products, said the Whig, but it would also drain the United States Treasury of specie. The death of President William H. Harrison in 1841 had put the Whig tariff in danger, but John Tyler, Who succeeded Harrison, signed the bill, greatly relieving the Whig's worries .25 . The 1844 national elections, however, again heightened anxiety that the free trade Democrats led by the new President, James K. Polk, might triumph. After Polk designated Robert J. Walker, an anti-tariff man from Mississippi, as Secretary of the Treasury, the Whig edi- tor wrote that little hope persisted that anything but a low tariff could pass the new Congress. Yet the paper, determined to uphold the tariff, renewed the editorial defense by questioning how the United States could pro- vide military supplies to her soldiers if the country depended on Great Britain. She had nearly gone to war OVer Oregon and had an interest in Mexico, 50: the Wh___lfl 115 queried, what if the United States fought a war with Great Britain? Could Americans expect their enemy to sell weapons to her? No.26 And later as the War with Mexico raged, the editorials again pressed for continu- ation of a revenue tariff to meet defense expenses. When supporters of low duties claimed that greater agricultural exports to England resulted from rumors that the United States contemplated free trade, the W1_1ig retorted that probably the rumors of a short European crop determined the increase in price and demand for American goods.2.7 Not only the rates bothered the W_hig but the recommendation of Senator Dixon Lewis of Alabama (sup- ported by the Secretary of the Treasury), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, that the new tariff follow the a valorem principle also disturbed the paper and Richmond merchants. They preferred specific duties to avoid the deceptions of "unscrupulous foreigners" who had little regard for "our custom-house oaths." But perhaps it was too much to expect a "Southern cotton-planter [Lewis]" to understand "commercial operations."28 If the 51S! valorem tariff became law the opponents forecasted that "DIRECT TAXATION" would result to pick up the slack- ehed flow of revenue.2 Their pleas and arguments came '30 naught because the Congress passed the bill and Polk signed it.30 116 During the 1850's the tariff faded from national attention as slavery and territorial policies dominated the political debates; nevertheless the Whig on occasion reiterated its reasons for a protective system and blamed the South's weakening economic condition on the failure to diversify. Usually the editorials identified the vil- lains--free trade Democrats--many of whom represented Virginia in Congress. "The support of Free Trade," the Whig contended, would "stand out in history as the most . 3l marvelous instance of popular error on record." ***** When the Whig sided with Clay in national politi- cal contests, the paper necessarily embraced the Bank of the United States and also accepted the task of challeng- ing the opposition's financial programs. During the 1830's and 1840's the Whig frequently launched editorial campaigns to convince doubtful Virginians of the National Bank's benefits; usually, however, it fell short of its goal. Since none of its editors could claim expertise in banking, the Whig worked under a handicap because a pri- mary antagonist, the Richmond Enghirer, could call on state bankers such as Dr. John Brockenbrough, President of the Bank of Virginia and Ritchie's cousin, for support in attacks on the Whigfs bank policy. In the midst of electioneering for the presidency in 1832, Henry Clay pushed the National Bank into the 117 Whigfs editorial column. Even though the Bank's charter did not expire until 1836, the Whigs in Congress deter- mined that by pressing a rechartering of the institution and requiring the President to take a stand, they could aid Clay. If Jackson signed the bill he stood to lose voters in the South and West, and should he issue a veto many northern Democrats especially in Pennsylvania would, 32 After the so the Whig reasoned, desert the Old Hero. Congress had sent the Bank Bill up to the President on July 4, the paper commented that the Whigs had played their cards well because Jackson now had to show his "true colors." Just what the President might do the Whig did not know, but it suspected that he would use a veto with the promise that if the next Congress again passed the bill he would accept it as the "will of the People."33 He neglected to follow the script the Whig had outlined, however, when he vetoed the Bank Bill and eXplained in his veto message to Congress that he deemed the Bank unconstitutional and inefficient. The Whig con- ceded that with much skill he had appealed to class hatred, sectional jealousy, and prejudice against fCreig'ner's.34 Stunned not so much by the veto as the harSIi language, the Whig rather lamely supported Clay's 35 Although the dGfense of the Bank's constitutionality. Whig regretted the defeat, the paper delighted in the profipect of Clay now being able to carry Pennsylvania in 118 the approaching presidential elections. After the veto the Pennsylvania Enquirer, formerly a firm Jackson paper, "hauled down the Jackson colors," noted the Whig, which reasoned that since Biddle's home office was in Phila- delphia, many Pennsylvanians would resent the President's outburst against what they recognized as a state and national interest.36 When the Democratic presses launched an offensive against Clay and Webster, charging that their support for the Bank resulted from their financial obligations to that institution and from their former positions as defense attorneys for Biddle's Bank, the Whig rebuked the press for slander and attempted to put the Democrats on the defensive. To the accusation that Biddle's power constituted a danger to the nation, the Whig retorted that the nation's finances were never in better condition, and that if Biddle had in fact purchased newspapers to counter criticism of the Bank, as some claimed, he had only followed the "precedent established by the General himself." The Whig also underscored its distrust of Jackson by labeling his actions a "high-handed usurption" and an exercise of power never designed for use except when public funds were in danger. And since no one even pretended that the Bank endangered public money, the Whig added, he had violated the law. If he suspected Biddle of "wrongdoing" why did he not remove the man rather than destroy the Bank?37 119 After winning re-election Jackson began, illegally ill the Whig's opinion, to remove government deposits from tflie Bank of the United States. Basing removal on what he czalled the voters' mandate, Jackson sought to shackle E3iddle's institution even before the expiration of the czharter in 1836. The Whig, unconvinced by the President's airguments, contended that his victory represented only a g>ersonal victory based on popularity with the voters; even :if some of the voters endorsed his veto, they certainly 11ad.not contemplated the precititous removal of United fitates deposits.38 In order to explain the withdrawal Exalicy, the Whig offered an illogical account of pressures CH1 Jackson: supposedly Vice-President Martin Van Buren lmad initially proposed the scheme with the intention of :rtopping the plan at the last minute to gain the affection of the banking interest, but Amos Kendall, a member of nJackson's Kitchen Cabinet and no friend of Van Buren, helped force the bill through to embarrass the Vice- President in the West. In other words, according to the Whigy the whole idea had backfired on the Magician from New York. If the Whigfs analysis of the policy's origin appeared dubious, the editorial's prediction of economic instability and unsatisfactory exchange rates came closer to the truth.39 Because withdrawal would reduce the Bank's specie and thus its ability to discount notes, the Whig predicted that many merchants distant from the 120 Mother Bank would not be able to remain in business since the exchange duties would fall into the hands of "shavers and brokers" who would demand unreasonably high rates.40 As Jackson began distributing federal deposits to state banks (Pet Banks), the Whig seized the opportunity to question the sincerity of the President's position. In his veto he had criticized the Bank of the United States for concentrating too much power in one man's hands and for selling stock to foreigners, but the Whig per- ceived that many deposits had found their way to the Man- hattan Bank which was also controlled by one man and owned mostly by foreigners. If, in fact, the President had only exchanged one bank for another, what, asked the Whig, had Jackson accomplished except a personal assault of Biddle?4l None of the Pet Banks, in the Whigfs opinion, possessed enough specie to meet economic crises; there- fore "a casual derangement in the commerce of the country, the loss of a southern crop, or the demand of specie from abroad" could create a "violent convulsion in the whole paper system."42 Unlike the Bank of the United States, the Pet Banks lacked the desire to limit issue of state bank paper which, if unrestricted, would wreck the economy and scatter "public monies" to "the four winds." Though the Whig hoped that no panic would develop, the paper in the spring of 1836 foresaw an "evil hour" when Jackson's 121 assurances of a "more equal currency - and a more healthy circulation" would be proved erroneous.4 By mid-l836 the Whigfs prophecy seemed to be coming true. Trying to stem the wild financing of lands in the West, Jackson issued the Specie Circular which required settlers to pay gold and silver, not bank notes, for federal lands. Since the banks had been preparing to receive millions that the federal government had just voted the states (a law distributing any federal surplus over five million dollars), the circular descended like a bolt, severely tightening the money market.44 At that point some Whigs, assisted by Democrats like Senator William C. Rives of Virginia, campaigned to enact legis- lation compelling the government to accept bank notes for federal land and in early 1837 they succeeded. This pleased the Whig, but Jackson, as one of his last acts as President, pocket vetoed Rives's Currency Bill.45 As the most severe economic panic since 1819 seized the country, the Whig placed the blame completely on the Democrats. When the Executive took control of the public money, claimed the right of manipulating the cur- rency, and exercised that right, contended the Whig, the panic became inevitable, for "no credit system" that depended on "the will of one man" could possibly "flour- 46 ish." The paper insisted that the destruction of the Bank of the United States supplied the primary impetus 122 for the evils now facing the nation. When the Bank fell the "Pet Banks" increased banking capital by $100,000,000, thereby flooding the United States with worthless notes. Speculation and overtrading, as a result of inflated cur- rency, ran rampant between 1834 and 1836, but by the spring of 1837 it was clear to the Whig that the condi— tions compelled the Pet Banks to curtail their activi- 47 ties. By May the crisis had deepened so much that the Whig lamented the "folly of the rulers" that had destroyed "our credit as a people . . . abroad."48 But while the Whig leveled the blame at the Democrats, it still advised Whigs to avoid vindictiveness and to assist the administration in finding a solution.49 Cooperation with Van Buren's administration, however, did not include accepting a "Treasury Bank" or "Sub-Treasury System." Such an institution placed the public monies into the hands of office holders, a dangerous precedent.50 Even- tually in July 1840 Van Buren got his Sub-Treasury, but the Whigs, after victory in 1840, repealed the measure in 1841. Pleas from the administration that the banks resume specie payment in 1838 failed to gain support from the Whig, which preferred Biddle's advice of waiting until the panic destroyed all the worthless and non- redeemable notes before state banks attempted to renew 51 specie redemption. Since the government for the last 123 nine years had chased specie from circulation, the Whig thought it unfair for Van Buren's people to blame Biddle for their error.52 Later, although professing "little knowledge of the subject," the Whig urged further delay in resumption of specie payments by banks for fear of acting "premature" and causing irreparable damage to the financial system.53 With William Henry Harrison's victory in the presidential election of 1840, the Whig anticipated a Special session of Congress to meet and repeal Van Buren's Sub-Treasury law, which the paper called a "fraud," and replace it with a national bank.54 But only a month after his inauguration Harrison died, propelling the state rights Virginian, John Tyler, into the White House. In May the Congress convened, as Harrison had instructed prior to his death, with the expectation that the Whigs would now establish a national bank;55 and their expecta- tions were buttressed by Tyler, who in his address to Congress judged Van Buren's "Sub-Treasury" unsatisfactory and suggested the creation of a "fiscal agent" to manage government funds. His references to the topic further convinced congressional Whigs of the new President's support of a national bank.56 As the Whig_had expected, Tyler's Secretary of Treasury, Thomas Ewing, submitted a report to the Con— gress on June 3, recommending repeal of the Independent 124 Treasury Act and the creation of a fiscal agent of the United States. A few days later the Senate requested that the Secretary forward as soon as possible a detailed plan for his proposal. Ewing immediately conveyed on June 12 a scheme providing for (l) a central bank in the District of Columbia, and (2) branches of discount and deposit in several states if they consented. Obviously the crucial element (and one that favorably impressed the Whig) in the administration's plan focused on the require— ment that each state sanction any proposed branch of the bank to be placed in the state.57 Since all, even the most staunch state rights advocates, accepted the federal government's power as the legislative body of the Dis- trict to establish a bank in that area, Tyler's plan had avoided the pitfalls that plagued former bank proposals.58 After hearing the plan, the Congress sent it to a select committee chaired by Clay, where Tyler's scheme evoked little favor. Rather than endorsing the Presi- dent's ideas, the committee, in effect, sent to the floor 59 of the Senate a renewed call for a national bank. The committee assumed the constitutionality of a national bank (a question that troubled Tyler and other state rights men) and denied the necessity of having a state approve a branch bank. To do otherwise, contended the committee, would rob the bank of its national character and probably prevent adequate stock subscription.60 125 Even though Clay enjoyed the support of most Whigs in the Senate, some including William C. Rives, now a Virginia Whig, objected to the deletion of the section requiring state approval and unsuccessfully offered an amendment. But after much debate Clay as well as the Whig perceived that his bill without amendments could not pass;61 consequently he incorporated a proposal suggested by John Minor Botts (a Whig representative who claimed to have the President's approval) which required a state's assent before a branch could be established, but allowed the government to assume that any legislature approved if it did not register a formal dissent at its first session after the passage of the act. The Senators adopted the bill with this amendment and sent it to the House which also acted favorably.62 When the bill passed the Senate, the Whig scoffed at any suggestion that the President might veto the bank and hence prevent a quick settlement of this "vexed "63 While the paper denied that a veto would question. shatter the Whig Party, the W_h_i_g admitted such an action would "shock" most peOple and give new hopes to the late defeated party.64 But when the veto came on August 16, the Whig confidently expected the Whigs in Congress to unite with the President on a compromise. The President had acted constitutionally, reported the Whig, and every- one should obey it. And since his move appeared to be a 126 matter of conscience, the Whig hoped he would continue to enjoy the nation's respect.65 But the Whig also cautioned Tyler not to let praise from old enemies, like the Enguirer, sway him because Ritchie and the "Locos" only wanted to trick the President into thinking he could expect their continued support even in the presidential election of 1844.66 Later events proved the Whig's hOpes false, how- ever, because Tyler had not used his last veto. He had inferred in his first veto message that some form of a bank was acceptable to him, but the Fiscal Corporation which became the Congress's second proposal also went beyond Tyler's constitutional limits. In an attempt to placate Tyler, Whigs such as A. H. H. Stuart of Virginia had conferred with the President and his Secretary of the Treasury to determine what bill would be acceptable.67 But while the Whig leaders had professed a desire to mediate differences, the second bill still created a national bank that varied greatly with Tyler's bank pro- posal which stressed the need to preserve state sover- eignty; consequently on September 9, 1841, he vetoed the second bank bill.68 Stung and surprised, the Whig accused Tyler of wanting to control the whole national Treasury, despite strong party support for a well- regulated Bank of the United States to guard against Executive power and influence which might combine "the Purse and the sword."69 127 After the second failure the Whig gave up any ideas of having Congress pass and have signed a bank bill before 1845. But the editorials continued offering to the readers reasons why, in the future, the nation had to have a new bank; the Whig emphasized the ability of a national bank to control state banks and keep them from issuing more money than necessary to facilitate community development. Nothing, warned the Whig, created a greater danger to an economy than "redundancy of paper money": a condition that Jackson encouraged by destroying the Bank of the United States.70 Reviewing the debates and votes on the bank in 1816 enabled the Whig to remind southerners that their representatives had approved of the measure 34 to 19.71 With the defeat of Henry Clay in 1844 the Demo- crats, led by James K. Polk, put to rest any further hopes of reviving a national bank. The Democratic admin- istration favored a Sub-Treasury or Independent Treasury system, and in July 1846 Polk succeeded in accomplishing one of his four main goals: the passage of his Constitu- tional or Independent Treasury. Though the Whig_pre- dicted that Polk's institution would affect "injuriously all the great interests of the country," his scheme prevailed and virtually put the bank issue out of future political battles.72 ***** 128 As with the tariff the Whig traveled a twisting path in regard to internal improvements. Initially the paper abhorred federally financed canals and roads claim- ing that if Congress ever acquired the power to build them an endless succession of appropriations would result.73 If the founding fathers had wanted Congress to finance improvements, the Whig argued, they would have delegated the power to Congress, adding that a constitu- tional amendment conferring such authority would be dangerous. "'Good roads are good things,‘ but the pre- servation of the sovereignties of the states, the integrity of the Constitution, and the liberty of the people, are better."74 Even though J. Q. Adams favored internal improve- ments, the Whig explained that while it differed with the New Englander on that subject, there seemed to be no alternative to backing Adams for president since all other candidates also endorsed federal internal improve- ments despite the denials of some of their hypocritical supporters in Virginia. Furthermore the Whig indicated a willingness to abide by the "will of the majority" and acquiesce to construction of roads and canals with 75 When Adams, in his annual message to federal funding. Congress (December 1825) called for a National University and Observatory, the Whig again disputed the legality of spending federal money for such purposes; yet the paper 129 also said that those who sanctioned construction of roads and canals should now admit the right of Congress to establish a university and observatory.76 As early as 1830 the Whig had come out for dis- tribution of net annual proceeds of the sale of public lands among the states according to representation in Congress so that the states would have enough funds to finance their own improvements: roads, canals or educa- tion. Under such a plan Virginia could, calculated the Whig, finally receive a just reward for her service to the Union-~donation of western lands to the federal government. Certainly, contended the Whig, the scheme would violate no state rights principles.77 During the years prior to the Civil War a number of proposed land policies interested the Whig, especially Clay's plan, first introduced in 1832, for it best fitted the Whigfs beliefs. Rather than drastically reduce land prices and cede land to the states in which it lay, as the Democrats wanted, Clay recommended that ten per cent of land revenue go to the state in which the sold land lay, and that the remaining proceeds be distributed among the states according to their Congressional representa- tion. Once they got their share, the states could use the revenue on education, internal improvements, coloni- 78 zation of Blacks, or the reduction of state debts. Unfortunately, reported the Whig, Clay lacked the backing 130 in Congress to get the measure through.79 While Clay pressed for his land bill, Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri presented an alternative much more favorable to the developing western states. His plan simply turned public lands over to the western states in which they lay, an arrangement, said the Whig, which denied Virginia her fair share.80 About the only benefits the paper could see from granting public lands to the western states involved the reduction of money available for federal patronage often used by the Executive "as a political 81 With the Congress divided and the President engine." opposed to Whig proposals, no land bill became law during Jackson's term. But by the middle of Van Buren's Presidency the controversy again aroused tempers and produced conflict- ing bills in Congress. The administration backed a Pre- Emption Bill in 1838 which the Whig believed would make landholders out of "squatters" who had intruded on public land.82 With an eye on approaching elections, the paper accused the President of trying to buy votes; moreover, if Van Buren got his way, the Whig complained, Virginia would lose money equivalent to that needed to expedite internal improvements and educational reforms.83 Not until John Tyler assumed the Presidency in 1841 did the Whig see a satisfactory distribution bill become law.84 Since Virginia Democrats led by Thomas 131 Ritchie bitterly opposed dispersement of net proceeds of public land sales, the Whig commenced a defense of the law by denying the charge that it required an increase in the tariff rates. In a more positive vein the Whig predicted that the government would retrieve public credit so badly hampered by the "Locos's" attack on the currency. And finally because the bill directly cur- tailed corruption and increased power of the states while lessening that of the federal government, the Whig con- sidered it "the greatest, most practical and substantial 85 States Rights measure of the age." But when Virginia's Democrats regained control of the state legislature in 1842, they refused to accept federal money from the land sales, whereupon the Whig lashed out at them and Thomas Ritchie in particular, labeling their efforts "absurd" and blaming their actions on a hatred for Clay who had been instrumental in securing the bill.86 While the Whig_failed to attain what it wanted, the western representatives in Congress also lost their bid for their favorite project: graduated prices for public lands. When Polk took office in 1845, his legis- lative goals included a sliding scale for western lands and in an attempt to put the plan into law the adminis- tration sought a coalition of southerners and westerners. The administration, to secure the South's votes, promised a reduction of tariff rates, a commitment Polk kept. But 132 once the tariff bill passed Congress enough southern representatives reneged and voted against the land bill to kill it in the House.87 Its defeat obviously pleased the Whig, which contended that if the measure had become law it would have alienated the entire "Public Domain" while receiving "into the Treasury from the sales scarcely a sufficient amount to defray the expenses con- nected with their survey and sale."88 Throughout the 1850's the Whig on occasion reiterated its disapproval of graduated prices and all attempts at giving away land to the western states. Those who proposed such plans as Stephen A. Douglas, Thomas Hart Benton, and Andrew Johnson, the Whig accused of appealing to "class legislation" that filled the Northwest but left Virginia and other former land owners with nothing. If the Democrats pursued their present course, the Whig warned, Virginia would lose population and "all elements of greatness."89 When Virginia's representatives declined to contest Iowa's and Illinois's request for public land to finance railroad construction, the Whig belabored the politicians for preferring "ster- ile abstractions to the state's welfare." If someone did not act quickly, lamented the paper, no one could ever halt the "grab system."90 As homestead bills received increased attention in Congress, the Whig railed and called them attempts to 133 turn the "government into a stupendous alms-house, for the benefit of the vagrants and paupers of every nation "91 But the Whig proved ineffectual in its Upon earth. efforts and by 1857 the paper admitted as much. Since southern states like Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri had enjoyed grants of public land, it was fruitless, said the Whig, to expect them to object to other states obtaining similar benefits. On the other hand the northeastern states were satisfied that Congres- sional grants filled up the territories with foreigners and abolitionists so those states, the Whig realized, would not demand their share of public lands.92 After 1857 the Whig seldom mentioned land policies. ***** To facilitate the goal of diversification ener— getically the Whig pressed for internal improvements (financed by local and state government) and later direct steam lines to Europe, but the paper found it almost impossible to persuade Virginians to change their eco- nomic patterns. As a consequence, the Whig occupied the post of an opposition voice warning that if Virginia and the South did not strengthen themselves economically, they would face an unhappy future of shrinking political and economic power. Internal improvements, said the Whig in 1825, benefitted all segments of a society by banding people I34 together, developing industry, and facilitating transpor- tation of agricultural goods to markets; hence the wealth 93 . Five years and prosperity of all the people increased. later the Whig_bemoaned the fact that Virginia was still "behind nearly all the states" and her "old resources" were exhausted; therefore the Whig concluded that "pride, interest, and a generous spirit of emulation, all demand 94 For a start the paper immediate and efficient action." urged Richmonders to develop rail lines connecting the capitol with the Shenandoah Valley allowing Richmond mer- chants the opportunity to market the Valley's products. When Lynchburg citizens and their state representatives petitioned the legislature to improve the navigability of the James River, the paper implored Richmond residents to support Lynchburg's request which would connect East and West Virginia as well as foster a commercial thoroughfare along the James.95 Much to the Whig's delight a group formed the James River and Kanawha Company with the goal of connect- ing the James and Kanawha Rivers via a canal and railroad. When completed, Richmond would have an outlet to the Mississippi Valley; consequently the city of Richmond, in 1834, realizing the potential, subscribed to $400,000 of Stock,96 but a shortage of money constantly hampered the Company and eventually prevented success.97 With projects under way to improve the James River above Richmond, the Whig began agitating in 1838 135 for the clearing of the river "below tide."98 Since Richmond was "as much a port of entry as any port," the Whig campaigned for the federal government to improve navigation in the national interest.99 But because Vir- ginia's state rights advocates abhorred federally financed improvements, the Whig also failed in this endeavor. When delegates assembled at Richmond in 1851 to write a new state constitution, the Whig fruitlessly edi- torialized that they ought to provide future legislatures with more authority to appropriate money for works of internal improvements. But the new constitution severely reduced the likelihood of state aid: according to the new regulations the state legislature had to raise annu- ally seven per cent of the public debt which in 1852 would amount to $770,000 above what was requisite for ordinary expenses of the government. Since debt retirement pay- ments would produce new taxes, the Whig correctly pre- dicted that no hope existed for the levying of additional taxes to invest in "local, low profit adventures."100 With these facts before it, the paper urged the legisla- ture to concentrate less on local interests and more on improving the economy of the entire state by such projects as the James River Canal, the Danville Railroad, and the 101 Because all of the projects men- Central Railroad. tioned directly involved the capitol city, the Whig appeared less than objective in its selection of worthy projects. 136 After 1852, however, little chance remained for Virginia to complete rapidly her programs of improvement. Due to the debt retirement provisions of the state, the preference of northern capital for industrial investments, and reluctance of foreign investors, the Whig_despaired that the state could not acquire the necessary capital. Bitterly it blamed the Democrats who, the paper said, had gladly debated slavery and passed resolutions reaffirming their love for the Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 rather than meet Virginia's economic wants. While it admitted that the Democratic tactics garnered them votes, the paper regretted that they had also let Virginia's economy stagnate.102 With the failure to advance internal improvements apparent, the Whig concentrated on establishing a direct steam line between Norfolk and European markets. Besides creating a commercial interest, the Whig predicted that the direct line would improve the state's currency and increase the flow of European immigrants and capital, both badly needed in Virginia.103 Numerous Southern Com- mercial Conventions in the 1850's encouraged the Whig by endorsing a steam line; conventions in Memphis, Charleston, Bristol, and Richmond resolved in favor of establishing direct connections with Europe from ports along the Vir- ginia coast as well as from points in Georgia and Louisiana.m4 In 1857 the Bristol Convention delegates 137 appointed William B. Preston as their representative and instructed him to go to Europe and determine whether a direct steam line was feasible, and the next year at a convention in Richmond, he reported that such a project could succeed.105 Since Preston stressed the advantages of a line between France and the Chesapeake Bay, the Whig praised Preston's report and urged the state to raise one and a half million dollars to establish the line. Again the Whhg argued that the growth of commercial inter- ests in Virginia and eventually throughout the South would strengthen the South in national politics.106 Besides stressing the need to establish southern commerce, the Whig consistently solicited manufacturers to build factories in Virginia, and in the two decades prior to the Civil War, beseeched other southern states to divert capital from agricultural pursuits such as cotton to the production of essentials--clothing, equip- 107 A common theme of its editorials was ment, and iron. that an agricultural state could provide additional mar- kets for farm goods (and higher prices) if industrial laborers could secure opportunities to sell their skills. Obviously, argued the paper, a worker could not grow his own food; consequently he would depend on the farmers to meet his needs. As the demand for good products increased the Whig expected more Virginians to abandon staple crops for the cultivation of corn and vegetables as well as the raising of hogs.108 138 The Whig's analysis of Virginia's economic woes was clearly expressed in an editorial in 1852 which said that "evil consists in the great mass of the population of Virginia having only one pursuit." Virginia, argued the W_hig, had to forego her "Arcadian taste" against manu- facturing before she could "devise means for multiplying and diversifying industrial pursuits - so as to prevent emigration and furnish profitable occupations to a great number of people."109 But because of the state's "Arcadian taste" Vir— ginia resisted the Whig's suggestions so that a failure of one crop ruined a farmer and abundant crops lowered prices. For forty years the Whig presented alternatives, but unfortunately for the state's economic development, the voters waited until after the Civil War to adopt most of them. Rather than diversify their economy the People divided over slavery and embarked on a sectional conflict. CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES lRichmond Whig, February 10 and February 20, 1824; ZXugust 26, 1825. 2 Ibid., August 26, 1825. 3Ibid., August 30, 1825. 4Ibid., August 8, 1827. Recent elections across 'the nations had convinced the Whig that most Americans sup— ;Dorted the tariff, so the Whig thought it unwise to oppose a: political party solely because of the tariff. 5Ibid., October 6, 1827. Clay's American System cxentered on a protective tariff to establish American iJidustry and furnish a home market for the agriculture of tile American farmer and federally financed internal ianrovements. The distributing of net land sales to the StLates also became part of Clay's system. These new rervenues would allow states to finance improvements of thteir own. See Clement Eaton's Henry Clay and the Art of Agyerican Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19 577, 43-46 . 6 Ibid., October 6, 1827. 71bid., August 8, 1827. While in theory the Whig accepted the logic of free trade, the paper, however, doubted the wisdom of letting the United States adopt the POJJicy while no other nation did so. 8Ibid., September 22, 1827. 9Ibid., August 30, 1828. The Whig was responding to ean anti-tariff resolution passed at a Mecklenburg Courlty meeting. loIbid., June 14, 1828. llIbid., October 1, 1828. 12Ibid., October 15, 1828. Since the Whig had radi— call); shifted its policies, the paper's attack seemed unfair, See Meigs, I, and Wiltse, I. They both contend that: Calhoun's reversal of policy was sincere. 139 140 1333331., February 9 and October 26, 1830. l4Ibid., July 18, 1831. 15Ibid., August 11, 1831. l6Ibid., November 10, 1831. The Whig argued that the constitutional power given Congress to regulate com- merce was sufficient to allow it to regulate duties. 171bid., July 7 enui October 6, 1831. The Whig feared that without the tariff to secure a home market, the United States would be at the mercy of Europe. 18Ibid., July 21, 1831. 191bid., November 24, 1831. 20See above Chapter II, pages 40-42. 21Richmond Whig, March 28, June 7 and July 21, 1842; September 5, 1844. Without the traiff the Whig Predicted 700,000 workers would turn to farming. Since Massachusetts alone bought 40 million dollars a year of AInerican raw materials--cotton, tobacco, rice, wheat, and corn--the Whig believed an anti-tariff policy would be suicide for the South. 223319;, April 6, 1843; March 14, March 19 and March 26, 1844. 231bid., October 27, 1843. 24I_b__i_d,-: July 4, 1843; April 12, 1844. , 251219.” June 7, 1842; July 4, 1843; March 2 and April 12, 1844. p 1840 26Ibid., February 3, February 10 and February 12, 27Ibid., June 1 and July 18, 1846. 28Ibid., July 17, 1846. J BEE-r July 31, 1846. See also Charles Sellers, NNIM. Polk Jacksonian (New Jersey: Princeton University fess . 1957), II, 445-468. del 30When the tariff passed, the Whig predicted a Preuge Of British goods creating unemployment. Since Vice- s:"dent George M. Dallas had cast the deciding vote, the 141 Whig heaped scorn on him. See Richmond Whig, July 31, August 1, August 4 and October 26, 1846. And see Sellers, Polk, II, 445—468. 31Blaming the drain of specie on Democratic cuts in the tariff, the Whig complained that England's superior productive capacity had allowed her to swamp the United States with manufactured goods. See Richmond Whig, March 26, 1853; October 6, October 7 enuT'October 9, 1857. 32Richmond Whig, July 9, 1832. See also Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clgy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 257-260. And Clement Eaton, Clay, 99-100. 33 Richmond Whig, July 9, 1832. 34For good accounts see Ralph C. H. Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), 239-240; Charles S. Sydnor, Whg Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, Vol. V of A History of the South, ed. by E. Merton Coulter and Wendell Holmes Stephenson (10 vols.; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 205; Eaton, Clay, 100; Van Deusen, Clay, 258-259; Richardson, Jackson's Papers, II, 576-591. 35Richmond Whig, July 13, 1832. 36 Ibid. 37Ibid., September 27, 1833. 38Ibid. 39Ibid., September 24 enui October 4, 1833.. 40Ibid. 4l£hig., October 4, 1833; March 6, 1835. 42Ibid., April 1, 1836. The Whig used the Secre- tary of Treasury's report on the holdings of thirty-five pet banks . 43 Ibid. 44Sellers, Polk, 320; Van Deusen, Clay, 288-290. 45Sydnor, Southern Sectionalism, 320; Richmond Whig, March 7, March 21, April 11 and April 14, 1837. Particularly disturbing to the Whig was the practice of 142 transferring specie from commercial cities where it was needed to the "Western wilds" where it could not be found. 46Richmond Whig, March 21 and March 28, 1837. 47ihig,, April 11 and April 14, 1837. 481pig,, May 16, 1837. 4gihig., June 20, 1837. 50Ibid., July 28, 1837; July 3 anui June 29, 1838; August 20, 1839. See also Van Deusen, Clay, 345. Eventu- ally in July 1840 Van Buren got his Sub-Treasury but the Whigs elected in 1840 repealed it in 1841. 51Thomas Payne Govan, Nicholas and Public Banker, 1786-1844 (Chicago: Chicago Press, 1959), 312-406. Biddle chartered by the state of Pennsylvania. 52 Biddle, Nationalist University of now headed a bank Richmond Whig, April 17, 1838. 53 Ibid., January 8, 1841. 54 Ibid., January 25, 1841. 55 Chitwood, John Tyler, 213-215. 56Ibid., 212. 57 Richmond Whig, June 25, 1841. 58 in.1831. Chitwood, John Tyler, 219-221. 59Richmond Whig, 6OChitwood, John July 5, 1841. Tyler, 219-221. 61 July 2, 1841. 62Chitwood, John Rives had returned to the Senate Tyler, 223. 63Richmond Whig, 6 65 66 Ibid., August 21, 1841. July 31, 1841. 4Ibid., August 10, 1841. Ibid., August 18 and August 19, 1841. Chitwood, John Tyler, 1230 through 236 and 240 described fierce Whig reaction to angler. 143 67Chitwood, John Tyler, 240-247. 68Ibid. 69Richmond Whig, September 11, 1842; April 7, 1843. 70Ibid., December 19, 1843. 71Ibid., February 20, 1844. 72Ibid., April 7, 1846. 73£hig., January 27 anui February 6, 1824. 74Ibid., March 15 anui December 13, 1825. The Whig contended that the power to finance internal improve- ments would be for an unlimited time whereas the war authority was of short duration. 75 Ibid., March 15, 1825. 7639ig,, February 6, December 13 and December 20, 1825. 77Ibid., February 11, 1830. 78Van Deusen, Clay, 253-255. 79Richmond Whig, March 8, 1833; December 4, 1835. See also Van Deusen, Clay, 252-255. 80 Richmond Whig, March 8, 1833. 81Ibid., March 3, 1837. 82Ibid., February 2, 1838. 83£hig., January 18, 1839; August 10, 1841. The Whig estimated that distribution would give Virginia three to four million dollars a year. 84Ibid., September 7, 1841. 85Ibid., March 25, 1842; April 6, 1843. Since Congress had the power to "disppse of the territory of the United States," the Whig assumed that the Congress could also distribute the profits from land sales. 86 Ibid., February 10, 1843. 87Sellers, Polk, II, 471-472. 144 88Richmond Whig, July 15, 1846. 89£hig., March 9 and March 11, 1852. 90Ibid., March 4, March 5, March 9, January 12, June 30 and .Iuly 2, 1852. 91 Ibid., March 17, 1854. 92Ibid., April 21, 1857. 93Ibid., August 19, 1825. 94Ibid., September 14, 1830. 95£§£Q-, JUIY 3 ENKi November 26, 1830. 96Ibid., December 27, 1834. 97Ibid., May 23, 1845. 98Ibid., November 9, 1838. 99ihig., October 17, 1843; July 24, 1851. looIbid., February 13, 1852. lOlIbid., February 13, 1852. Ibid., November 11, 1851; January 2, July 12 and July 15, 1857. 103Ibid., February 25 and. March 11, 1351; Decem- ber 14 , 1852 . 104Ibid., June 8, 1853; July 1, 1854; June 19, 1857. See Herbert Wender, "Southern Commercial Conventions, 1837- 1859," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Politjtel Science, ed. by the Departments of History, INDlitical Economy and Political Science (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930). 105Richmond Whig, June 2, May 30 anui July 3, 1857. Etn: full reports on the commercial conventions see Whg Ckflmnercial Review of the South and West, VIII-XXVII. Hereafter referred to as DeBowTs Review. 106 Richmond Whig, February 19, 1858. 145 107Ibid., February 8 anui December 31, 1841; January 19, 1844; March 20, June 10 enui July 25, 1845; August 27 enui September 8, 1846; May 11, 1849; August 13 and September 4, 1852; January 4, 1853; June 15 and October 31, 1854. 108Ibid., December 31: 18413 June 10' 1845; May 11, 1849; August 13, 1852 anui April 27, 1858. 109 Ibid., August 13, 1852. CHAPTER V A VOICE OF CAUTION IN A TIME OF TURMOIL During the political controversies in the 1840's and 1850's the Whig_generally acted as a minority voice .warning the majority that its policies threatened the Union's stability. Whether issues involved territorial expansion or presidential elections, the paper accused the Democrats of leading the nation into turmoil and disaster. Unsuccessfully the Whig sought a national coa- lition of conservatives to prevent a civil war between the sections. As early as 1829 the Whig had opposed annexation of the Texas Territory because it would lead "to the inevitable destruction of the Union.” Why, asked the Whig) saddle the nation with new and heavy debt except perhaps to gratify a few adventurers?1 When rumors of annexation increased during Texas' fight for independence, the WhigLagain cautioned that because of treaties of friendship with Mexico the United States should not even discuss annexation until Mexico recognized the indepen- dence of Texas.2 But despite Whig opposition, likelihood 146 147 of annexation persisted. During John Tyler's administra- tion the Whig, aware of his desire for Texas, accused him of trying to "strengthen himself at home" by diverting the public's attention to foreign affairs.3 If Texas became part of the Union the paper feared that the Union could not endure: "we trust for our country's sake and happiness - for her liberty and Union and Peace - that this most extravagant scheme . . . of annexing Texas . . . will be frowned down by the . . . people."4 Unless the United States dropped the Texas ques- tion, the Whig_warned, slavery would entangle national politics. If slavery spread to Texas, the paper admon- ished, the North would dissolve the Union rather than accept Texas, and if Congress prohibited slavery in Texas then the South would secede rather than allow free states to acquire so much power in the federal government. Either way, in the Whig's View, the United States would lose. Since Texas included enough territory to support 30,000,000 people, it could defend itself militarily; and even if England established controlling influence in Texas (as some said England planned to do) the United States ought not interfere. Under England the territory MKNJld learn to cherish a "love of justice, of law, and liberty, which so pre-eminently distinguish Great Britain"; hence a policy of non-intervention could advance American interests.5 148 Of course voices in Virginia challenged the Whig's analysis. Henry A. Wise, soon to become a Democratic Congressman from Virginia and in 1855 the state's governor, intimated that England wanted to abolish slavery in Texas and thus weaken the institution in the South. Supposedly England's plan included Mexico's recognition of Texas on the condition that Texas end slavery. Responding to Wise, the Whig charged him with trying to further his political career by stirring up a storm of emotion which would cost the country "blood, tears, and treasure" it could nOt afford.6 Because of Great Britain's activities the Whig correctly anticipated appeals to the President to enforce the Monroe Doctrine; therefore, the paper hastily pointed out that a "very different state of affairs" existed when Monroe delivered his message in 1823. Then the country acted to prevent the "Holy Alliance" from crushing free government in Latin America; on the other hand, the United States in 1843 did not know what England planned.7 As the 1844 presidential election approached, the Whig, in an attempt to rally supporters, catalogued reasons why the Whig Party had rejected pressures for annexation. First a war with Mexico was certain to follow annexation, and besides a war debt, the nation would have to shoulder Texas' debt of ten million dollars. .If Texas' superior cotton lands became available, the Whig predicted, South Carolina, Georgia, and the Gulf Coast cotton states 149 would lose population and capital to the richer land. In addition, other nations would consider the United States a "bully" for forcing Mexico to give up just claims and for violating a treaty of "commerce, amnity, 8 Those who encouraged expansion did so, and friendship." said the Whig, for personal advantage. Some, like Sena- tor Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, were "land jobbers" seeking a quick profit while politicians like John Tyler sought votes.9 By mid-1844 the Whig even denied that England was interested in Texas and thus the need for speedy annexation no longer existed.10 When James K. Polk defeated Clay for the Presi- dency in November 1844, the paper knew that the Texas and Oregon questions would not abate. During the campaign the Democrats had promised to secure all of the territory up to the 54°40' line. But England, also possessing a claim to the Oregon Territory, had always insisted on a line following the Columbia River up to the 49th parallel. After Polk's inauguration in which he affirmed his inten- tion of securing all of Oregon, the Whig foresaw the likelihood of England's encouraging Mexico to go to war over Texas. Since Great Britain could anticipate a war over Oregon, why not, reasoned the Whig, expect her to obtain the aid of Mexico by provoking war and thus give 11 indirect aid to England's effort to retain Oregon. But even more important was Congress' passage at the end of 150 Tyler's term of a joint resolution annexing Texas which made a conflict inevitable.12 If there had to be war with Mexico, the Whig emphasized that a war over Oregon at the same time with England amounted to suicide. Rather than fight, the Whig recommended that the administration press for a compro- mise based on the 49th parallel; such a solution, the Whig contended, would satisfy the British government. Should war with England come, the paper forecasted that the Royal Navy would sweep American commerce from the sea and blockade American ports, placing the United States in 13 Members of Polk's administration, a very weak position. although not the President himself, recognized the dire possibilities and sought to mediate differences over Oregon.l4 In the meantime the Whig watched the administra- tion move closer to war with Mexico. By August of Polk's first year in office, the Whigfs editorials averred that the government was "hungry" for California and that Polk contemplated securing it by purchase if possible or force if necessary.15 With renewed fervor the paper pleaded with the public to act with the "respect due" one nation to another, great or small. When the Enguirer questioned the Whigfs patriotism, the paper replied that it had reluctantly concluded that Mexico, not the United States, had the justification to declare war; nevertheless, the 151 Whig assured its readers that if war came it would support the war effort.16 In May 1846, when news dispatches told of Mexican attacks on American troops in disputed territory along the Texas border, the Whig concluded that Polk had precipi— tated war by moving troops under General Zachary Taylor from the Nueces to the Rio Grande. If Mexico had attacked Americans at Corpus Christi, then Mexico, explained the Whig, would have been wrong and Polk free from censure, but that had not happened.17 So the administration was using "Love of Country" to cover its "own errors": anyone who accused Polk of "folly" and responsibility for the war became, in the pro-war press, unpatriotic. After criti- cizing Polk, however, the Whig endorsed the bills autho- rizing the raising and equipping of volunteers because it accepted the fact that American troops were under attack.18 Fortunately for the United States, the Whig could report in June the settlement of the Oregon boundary dis- pute. Before England received news of hostilities in Texas, her government had sent a proposed compromise cen- tering on the 49th parallel, and on June 10 the President submitted the treaty to the Senate which promptly ratified the arrangement.19 The Whig, never having believed the American claim to Oregon to be "undisputed," wholeheart- edly approved of the treaty, but insisted on crediting Polk's ambassador at London and the Senate rather than the President.20 152 With Oregon settled the Whig again concentrated on the Mexican conflict which the paper hoped would come to a speedy end because of its "tendency, if protracted, to strengthen the power . . . of the Executive." If the struggle extended over a long period of time, the paper also recognized that demands for more of Mexico's lands would increase. "No rational mind," argued the Whig, could doubt that the addition of an immense territory, occupied by "an ignorant, heterogeneous and bigoted popu- lation," must terminate in disunion and ultimately in "subversion of our limited constitutional government."21 When some New York Whigs began suggesting Zachary Taylor as a presidential possibility, the Whig reasoned that perhaps Polk would now close out the war quickly to avoid having new heroes appear to challenge his party in 1848.22 As criticism of the Whig's unpatriotic attacks on the President increased, the paper attempted to explain the fine distinctions which allowed it to call the war "unjust" and "unnecessary" and yet at the same time required it to support the prosecution of the war. If Congress had declared war on Mexico to retrieve debts or redress grievances of Americans in Mexico, explained the Whig, no one would have questioned the "justice" or "con- stitutionality" of the war, but because Polk ordered American troops beyond the "legitimate" boundary between Mexico and Texas, the paper contended that most people 153 understood that Polk initiated the war. Even though the war "in its origin" was unconstitutional, all "true patriots" would now defend the country.23 After hearing of Stephen W. Kearney's activities in California, the Whig lamented that now it was certain that Polk had determined from the beginning to acquire 24 Because a New York regiment New Mexico and California. carried agricultural implements, not rifles, the Whig accused Polk of sending them not as soldiers but as "emi- grants" to settle the territory. Obviously, observed the Whig, Polk would employ his authority to raise 50,000 volunteers to colonize Mexican land.25 At the end of a hot summer in 1846 David Wilmot, a Democratic representative from northern Pennsylvania, did just what the Whig wanted to avoid: he entangled slavery in the debates on the Mexican War by urging Con- gress to prohibit slavery from all territory taken from 26 While many northern states, including Massachu— Mexico. setts, Michigan, New York, and Vermont, endorsed the "Wilmot Proviso," almost all southern states denounced it. Senator William O. Butler of South Carolina labeled the proviso treasonable, and Calhoun warned that the South would secede rather than submit. The Washington Union (now edited by Thomas Ritchie) wanted Wilmot read out of the party.27 The Whig joined the debates, reluctantly, because Slavery in the territories was "a question, once 154 settled . . . forever, by the celebrated Missouri Compro- "28 mise. In the Whig's opinion Congress lacked the power to forbid introduction of slavery into any portion of the Union: "each state must determine for itself, . . . ques- 29 To avoid disunion the Whig 30 tions of this character." advised against any new acquisition of land. It argued that if the United States declared its intention not to take Mexican land, that government would have greater incentive to stop fighting. Should the war continue, however, the Whig contended that the South would face “submission" to the Wilmot Proviso or "disunion."31 Rather than following the path of conquest, the Whig restated that it believed the United States' mission was "to transmit to our posterity the free institutions bequeathed to us by our ancestors." And the Whig expressed confidence that "the example of free government, as illustrated in our own experience, would recommend itself to the people of other countries, in Europe as well as upon this continent." But if the United States dis- membered Mexico, "our own Confederacy" might also dis- solve.32 When the war finally ended with Senate ratifica- tion of the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo on March 10, 1848, little debate occurred because the public wanted the war over.33 But the Whig stressed that whatever the treaty provisions, the United States had paid too high a price. 155 To determine the total cost the Wh_ig included expenditures for the war effort, payments to the Mexican Government, assumption of American claims on Mexico, surveying of new land, and interest on the debt: the @ig's final figure surpassed $428,000,000. Yet the "bitter hostility" which the war "created between the North and South" worried it even more than the millions of dollars spent.34 Not long after the war's close, disturbing ques- tions about California and New Mexico arose in Congress. By mid-1849 word spread that California would soon apply for statehood and already a battle between pro-slavery states and free states appeared certain. If the North insisted on including the Wilmot Proviso in California's Constitution, the South, editorialized the WM, would threaten secession. Since nature had decreed no slavery in California, the paper regretted that the extremes, North and South, seemed so set on raising "an irritating question for the sake of mere abstraction."35 As a storm over slavery in the territories gathered, President Zachary Taylor formulated a plan of settlement which in December 1849 he presented in his annual message to Congress. Despite the complexity of the Problems involved, the President's plan required very little action. He simply stated that California would 50°11 apply for statehood, and he hoped Congress would accept her request and avoid "exciting topics of sectional 156 36 But in no way did he deal with the other character." assorted problems facing the nation such as fugitive slaves, slave trade in Washington, D.C., boundary disputes between New Mexico and Texas, and the territorial organi- zation of Utah and New Mexico. Despite these shortcomings the Whig accepted and defended Taylor's proposal.37 Attacks on Taylor came from several directions. James A. Seddon, Democratic Congressman from Virginia, disapproved of Taylor's "coercion" of California into statehood before congress had organized an official ter— ritorial government there. In defense the Whig reminded Seddon that Texas had also achieved statehood without a territorial government; moreover the paper denied that the President coerced California.38 Other critics includ- ing Henry Clay complained that Taylor had dealt with only one of five "wounds" afflicting the nation. To these com- plaints the paper just reiterated that Taylor's "non- intervention" policy best protected the nation's interest. According to Taylor the courts could adjudicate the other four grievances.4O But by the spring of 1850 the Whig was wondering whether the southern "fire-eaters" would permit peaceful settlement of the crisis. John C. Calhoun had on March 4 addressed his last remarks to the Senate; he warned his colleagues that the southern people abhorred the consoli- dated government that had developed and that because of 157 their discontent they would, if abolition activity did not cease, demand disunion.41 His speech convinced the Whig that he had "thrown off the mask" and assumed the mantle of an "avowed DISUNIONIST."42 A few days later the paper, using even stronger words, characterized Calhoun's ideas as "treason to the liberties and to the happiness of the people of this great country."43 Just three days after Calhoun's address, Daniel Webster delivered his greatest speech. He began by reviewing the events that had separated the sections over slavery and expansion and then he blamed both the North and South for the friction between sections. Finally he detailed the futility of disunion and the impossibility of peaceful separation.44 From the speech it was clear that Webster, despite his abolition affiliations and support in Massachusetts, had decided to compromise for the Union. Because he was a Whig, the paper took delight in praising the speech as a great contribution towards "national unity."45 But some southerners cared little for national unity. South Carolina's fire-eaters had called for a Southern convention to meet in Nashville in June to dis- CUSS relations between the states and the federal govern- ment. Behind the call lay the belief that after southern- ers agreed on a list of demands, the North would have to acQUiesce or watch the dissolution of the Union. When 158' theideacfi’a southern convention first surfaced, the Whig contended that the convention advocates wanted seces- shmlbutthat they were deceiving southern unionists by describing the convention as an avenue to compromise. Other criticisms by the Whig included: (1) lack of a pmpularxmte to determine if people wanted a convention, (2) lack of power of state legislatures to appoint or defray expense of delegates to the convention, and (3) disapproval of making demands on the North.46 In April the paper advised patriots to let the "disunionists" The Whig accurately perceived that play out their hands. most southerners sought moderation not secession and that the June convention had little chance of influencing the states.47 Events substantiated the paper. When the con- vention opened on June 3 only nine states had sent dele- gates and some of them had dubious credentials. After feebly resolving in favor of extending the Missouri line 48 (36°30') to the Pacific, the convention adjourned. In the Congress some southerners, including Sena- Foote of Mississippi, and Henry Clay, tor Henry S. At Foote's request on organized to draw up a compromise. April 18 the Senate established a special committee chaired by Clay to consider all the known alternatives on the territorial and slavery questions. During the first Clay presented the committee report. It reek in May, anctioned formation of additional states form the Texas 159 territory, admitted California immediately, established territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah without favoring or opposing slavery, recommended payment of money to Texas for ceding contested land to New Mexico, proposed a tough fugitive slave law, and abolished the slave trade in Washington, D.C.49 For the first time in many years the Whig disagreed with Clay on a major issue. He, the Whig complained, would empower the Congress to implement the Wilmot Proviso. In addition he assumed that Congress could, without Texas' permission, award New Mexico 125 million acres to settle a boundary dispute with Texas; moreover the m stressed that the land handed to New Mexico would become free soil. Consequently the Whig "we infinitely prefer the plan suggested by 50 concluded: General Taylor." Through June debates over the alternatives con- tinued in Congress with hope dimming that the Congress could settle the crisis. But in July fate intervened with the death of President Taylor; he had vigorously opposed and had threatened to veto any measure on the :erritories except his own, but his Vice-President and he man who succeeded him, Millard Fillmore, had before aylor died confided to friends that he favored Clay's unpromise bills.51 After Taylor died and Fillmore affirmed his desire for the compromise, the Whig itched its policy to support the new President.52 160 But the battle was far from over, for at the end Of July the Omnibus Bill (containing all of Clay's pro- posals) failed a test vote and briefly precipitated jubi- lation in the ranks of its ultra southern opponents. Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinios, however, picked up the pieces and proceeded to direct the compromise through Congress one bill at a time.53 The Whig empha- sized that the North had dropped the Wilmot Proviso. Even though Utah and New Mexico would be free states, nature, not Congress, decreed it. And since the South had always maintained that a state should determine its own institutions, the Whig contended that California's admittance as a free state, at the request of the state's voters, violated no southern principles. What had won, declared the Whig, was the policy of "non-intervention". Congress had decided to let each state determine its own 55 slavery policy. For the rest of 1850 and much of 1851, the Whig concentrated its editorials on the necessity of union While no power or constitution and futility of secession. :ould take away the right of revolution, the Whig rxplained that "no evidence in the proceedings of the Con- ention which formed the federal Constitution, or in the >nstitution itself" justified the contention "that the ederal government is a league or confederacy of States." viously, said the Whig, the framers created a "National ” 161 Government" with a constitution whose preamble began "we the people," not we the states. If the generation of 1787 meant to form a confederacy, why, asked the Whlg, did they declare the Constitution the "Supreme Law of the 56 I O O 0 Since "no government 18 ever so suic1dal as to Land"? provide for its own demolition," the Whig concluded that the authors founded the Constitution on the "principle of perpetuity" and when it received the signature of George 57 Washington, "men thought it was the seal of immortality." Besides contesting the legality of secession, the Whlg Spent much time explaining the stupidity of secession. While the fire-eaters sought disunion to insure slavery, what they proposed would actually destroy it. If the South seceded, a hostile and abolitionist country would border the new confederacy: the Whig argued that the United States would be even less inclined to return fugi- 58 When tive slaves and less willing to prevent abolitionists from raiding the border states to help slaves escape. secessionists talked about a commercial treaty with England, supposedly dependent on the South's cotton, the Whig questioned the logic of a slave nation trusting the After she made the South vorld's leading abolitionists. me of her colonies, England "would, we doubt not, bring bout abolition here" just as she has done in her other While Negroes would still work the fields, assessions. Ley would be emancipated, for "southern slavery against 162 the combined forces of abolitionism in England and . thebbrfl1cpuld not stand a day."59 By July 1851 the pamarenflumiastically reported that most people, North and South, accepted the Compromise. * 'k * * * ENen while debates over California raged, some southerners contemplated acquiring Cuba and more of In 1849 rumors of an impending filibuster to Mexico. cuba flooded the country; accordingly President Taylor issued a proclamation warning filibusters headed for Cuba that they could expect no aid from the United States. The Whig endorsed the President and admonished those involved that it was illegal for armed groups to invade a country at peace with the United States; moreover, the Whig contended that the filibusters sought to plunder, But whatever their pur— not to free the people in Cuba. the paper estimated that ninety-nine per cent of 62 pose, the American.people agreed with Fillmore's proclamation. When Senator John Slidell of Louisiana proposed in 1852 that Congress give the President the power to suspend neutrality laws if Congress were not in session, the Whlg "ill-advised, reckless and danger- retorted that Slidell's suggestion had but one goal--to open the door for »us ilibusters.63 Later, when the Ostend Manifesto broke into the MS, the Wh'g's suspicions of the Pierce administration 163 proved well founded. After Pierce named Pierre Soule ambassador to Madrid, the Whig had commented that it was "French Jacobin" and a man known to strange to see a thirst for Cuba sent to Spain.64 In 1854 the administra- tion instructed Soule to offer Spain $130,000,000 for Cuba and not unexpectedly the Spaniards refused to sell. Determined to possess Cuba, Soule left Spain and in Ocob- ber met the American ambassadors to London and Paris, John Buchanan and John Y. Mason, in Belgium where they wrote and sent a message, the Ostend Manifesto, to Secre- tary of State William L. Marcy. When it became public in March 1855, Pierce had to repudiate the report which sanctioned in the national interest American seizure of 65 Cuba. But land other than Cuba interested expansionists. Some like Governor William Carr Lane of New Mexico contem— plated using a boundary dispute with Mexico as a pretext Distressed at the possibility of for grabbing more land. lew annexation, the Whig rebuked those "Progressive Demo- :rats" who threaten the nation's stability by seeking to nnex land even though the nation just survived a near Since the United States barely got ital crisis in 1850. "manifest destiny delusion of a Polk Adminis— rough the the Whig questioned the propriety of planting ation" . .,66 . . . 2w seeds of discord. The Mex1cans, said the Whlg, proved themselves undeserving to join the United 164 States Republic. Whenever they had revolted to achieve change they had fostered a military despotism: they did not "know how to appreciate the blessings of liberty."67 Though the nation avoided further conflict over Mexico, another explosive question, that of the Kansas- Nebraska Territory, precipitated a crisis. On January 4, 1854, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, presented a plan for organizing the Nebraska Territory. In its original form the bill avoided slavery except to provide that the state's con- stitution and not Congress would determine that question. The wording corresponded exactly with that used in the Utah-New Mexico Acts. Confused over what the bill actu- ally meant, the W_hig's first editorial on the subject questioned President Franklin Pierce's pledge to observe the "non-intervention policy" in the territories.68 Others, including Senator Archibald Dixon of Kentucky, also found the vague language of Douglas' bill perplexing; consequently southerners secured major amend- ments drastically altering the original proposal. Since Douglas at first left the impression that the Missouri Compromise Line would remain valid until a court over- :urned it, southern senators, eager to destroy the 36°30' 'es triction on slavery, pressured Douglas into adding a ection explicitly repealing the 1820 agreement as it per— :ined to slavery in the Louisiana Purchase Territory. 165 And Douglas also agreed to divide the land into two terri- 69 tories: Nebraska and Kansas. While the South rejoiced over the prospect of extending slavery into new territory, many in the North, long having viewed the 36°30' line a permanent settlement, fiercely objected.70 Their protests produced ridicule in the Whig's columns because those complaining the most were the ones who refused to obey the Fugitive Slave Law of the Compromise in 1850; the Whig, however, professed no interest in reopening "the discussion of the slavery question. We are sick and disgusted with it." If the North would only observe the principles of 1850, the paper predicted that the Congress could avoid debate on slavery in the territories.71 As opposition to Douglas' plan increased in the North, the Wh'g identified what it called the central problem: That issue is not whether slavery shall be extended or restricted, but whether all the states of this Union are equal before the Constitution - whether the people of one section have the same rights as those of the others, that is the true question; the extension or restriction of slavery is the conse- quence, and is a very different matter. Rather than view the extension of slavery as a way to strengthen the institution, the Whig maintained that just :he Opposite was true. Indeed the paper contended that "diffusion" of the peculiar institution "would weaken he And since "quasi-abilitionists" represented Missouri to" 166 and Texas about half the time, the Whig suggested that southerners re-examine their demands for new slave states. If abolitionists had not barred slaves from California, the Whig argued that in fifty years the drain of slaves from Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina would have been so great they would have abolished slavery on their own.72 When the political turmoil did not subside in Because February and March, the Whig admitted despair. so many in the North of all classes--professors, ministers, and tradesmen--joined the "dregs" and "fanatics" in stir- ring up opposition to rights of slave states, the Whlg, for the first time since 1850, expressed concern for the Union. With unmatched "unanimity of sentiment" the North appeared to be driving southerners to "submission or The Whig wrote that most in the South stern resistance." . 7 "concess1ons." 3 would refuse to suffer more As the debate in Congress unfolded, the Whlg watched with disapprobation as angry Senators accused the South of conniving with Douglas to overthrow the Missouri critics charged that in exchange for Douglas' fompromise: ill the South had pledged its support to him in the next 7 Denying all charges the Whig residential election. fended Douglas' actions as sincere and while he was not rfect the paper estimated that he was well above those » attacked him. 75 167 Four months after the debates began, Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Even though the M hoped debates on slavery would terminate, the paper reluc— tantly concluded that since so many politicians, North and South, depended on the slavery issue to stay in office, they would persist in their demagoguery. While the South won recognition of the "principle of free access," the 76 Whig doubted that the victory justified the price. For almost three years the paper avoided discuss- ing developments in Kansas, but just prior to Buchanan's inauguration it returned to the subject by accusing the Democrats of trying to make Kansas a free state. Pierce appointed John W. Geary Governor of the territory who promptly harassed pro-slavery officials in Kansas and as a result Kansas was "lost to the South forever."77 Although, continued the W_h_ig, Democratic papers pledged that if Buchanan won in 1856 he would admit Kansas only as a slave state, they since have reflected and confessed that the country will soon have another free state.78 Embittered by Whig losses at the polls, the paper, rather than quieting emotions, was stirring confusion and trying to disrupt the Democratic Party. And when northern Demo- rrats under Douglas began challenging the Buchanan admin- stration on its Kansas policy, the Wh___ig accurately and leer-fully characterized the event as the Democratic lrty 's "denationalization. "79 168 After the new administration assumed office in March 1857, it named Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, former Secretary of Treasury for Polk, Governor of the troubled Kansas Territory.80 But before he arrived in Kansas the pro-slavery legislature set up elections in June 1857 to select delegates to a state constitutional convention in Lecompton. Since the free—soilers refused to participate in the elections, the slavery advocates expected to control the convention, attach a slave code to the Constitution, and apply to Congress as a slave In the midst of turmoil, Walker arrived and in state. his inaugural declared that the people should be allowed to vote on any portion of the new constitution that per- tained to slavery and in such an election all residents Pro-Slavery groups, not wanting to return could vote. the Constitution to the voters for approval, objected to Since Walker planned to allow all Walker's promise. residents to vote and not just those recognized by the legislature, the Whig labeled the policy "squatter sover- And because Buchanan possessed the power of eignty." recall but did not use it, the Whig concluded that the Although President approved of Walker's performance. Buchanan had promised to protect southern interests in his campaign, the Whig insisted that his Kansas policy 82 revealed his true sympathies. In September the state convention met and as expected drew up a constitution (the Lecompton 169 Constitution) favorable to slave owners. As Walker had promised the slavery portion was put before the voters but no matter how they voted the Constitution would protect slaves already in Kansas. One additional safeguard, included for slave owners, prohibited any alteration of the Constitution prior to 1864. These maneuvers to insure the peculiar institution infuriated Douglas and other northern Democrats. When the Whig heard of the fraudulent voting and denial of representation of fifteen counties in the convention, it also expressed doubt as to the authen- ticity of the convention. Even though the Whig wanted Kansas as a slave state, the paper perceived a "defect" of real substance which if verified might overturn the Lecompton Constitution.83 But soon the Whig satisfied itself that the Lecompton Constitution represented the wishes of enough voters in Kansas for Congress to accept that territory's bid for statehood. If southerners failed to demand admis— sion of Kansas with the Lecompton Constitution, the Whig said that they would be the "laughing stock" of the North. When Congressmen suggested amendments requiring a yes or no vote on the whole Constitution by Kansas voters before Congress granted statehood, the Whig retorted that Con- gress should determine only whether a proposed state con- 84 To the stitution was republican and if so accept it. suggestion by Senator George E. Pugh that Congress affirm 170 the right of people to amend their state constitution, at any thm3(annulling the prohibition on change until 1864) theiwug answered that such a proposal violated the prin— ciple of "non-intervention."85 By mid-April, however, it was apparent to all factions that a compromise offered the only way out of the Kansas debacle. So when the bill for admission went to a joint conference committee, William H. English, an anti-Lecompton Democrat, helped work out an agreement with southern and administration Democrats. The committee reported out the "English Bill" which required that the entire Lecompton Constitution go before the voters again, and if they accepted it Kansas would receive a federal land grant: this last feature appeared to many critics to be a bribe but actually Congress generally granted similar amounts of land to new states.86 Unhappy with the final solution, the Whig called Buchanan's endorse- ment of the English Bill a betrayal and correctly fore- told voter rejection of the Constitution.87 ***** With the revival of the slavery debates over the admission of California in 1850, the presidential elec- tions of 1852, 1856, and 1860 challenged the energies of the Union supporters in Virginia. In all three elections the Whig stressed the importance of electing a man who could best perserve the nation. But the Whig Party in 171 Virginia, like its counterpart in other southern states, disintegrated over slavery; because many Whigs in the North adopted abolition platforms many of Virginia's Whigs turned to third parties in a search for a national unionist party.88 As the election of 1852 approached the Whig clearly indicated that it was satisfied with Millard Fillmore's performance and wanted him to be the Whig can- didate. His adherence to the Compromise of 1850 and will- ingness to use troops to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law convinced the Whig that he possessed the sense of fair 89 play needed to maintain order. If the conservatives, North and South, failed to unite, the Whig prophesied that southern ultras and northern abolitionists would form a sinister coalition bent on permanently dividing the nation.90 When opponents criticized Fillmore's lack of bold policies, the paper explained that the absence of excitement benefited the people; wars and rebellions pleased historians, argued the Whig, but threatened the well-being of the United States.91 Both national nominating conventions, however, neglected to follow the course the Whig expected. In Baltimore during the first week in June, the Democrats jolted the country when they picked a relatively unknown New Englander, Franklin Pierce. He had served in the Senate and fought in the Mexican War, but his positions on 172 major issues were an enigma to most of the nation. And since the convention deadlocked over the candidacies of Stephen A. Douglas, Lewis Cass, James Buchanan, and William L. Marcy, Pierce's neutrality presented the dele- gates an Opportunity finally to nominate a candidate after forty-nine ballots.92 Delighted by this unexpected development, the Whig_ reported that most people, including Democrats, were busy trying to find out "who and what" Pierce represented. Since Pierce while in Congress had voted against every measure designed to develop the West's resources, the Whig predicted defeat for him in that section. Not only had the Democrats named a man of "mediocre intellect," con- tinued the Whig, but they had also neglected to endorse the principle of non-intervention so important to southern voters.93 The Whigfs high spriits suffered a setback, how- ever, when the Whig convention met in Baltimore after the Democrats and chose Wingfield Scott over Fillmore. To placate the southerners, William A. Graham of North Caro- lina received the Vice-Presidential nomination.94 Although Scott lacked Fillmore's popularity in Virginia, the Whig gamely raised the general's banner and advised all of Fillmore's followers to aid Scott's campaign. Rather than emphasize the candidate, the Whig concentrated its editorials on the Whig's platform which promised 173 support for the Compromise of 1850 and swore allegiance to the "integrity of the Union."95 As Democratic presses tried to connect Scott with William H. Seward and other abolitionists of the Whig Party, the paper countered by reprinting Scott's letter of acceptance to the convention in which he embraced the "whole" Whig platform including the strong statement favoring strict enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law.96 But despite the Whigfs efforts, Pierce carried Virginia 73,858 to 58,572. And while Scott's showing was respect- able, the Whig began to have serious doubts as to the future of the Whig Party.97 By the spring of 1855 the Whig had decided to advocate the cause of the Know-Nothing or American Party. While the paper never approved of the secrecy of the organization, the Whig saw nothing wrong with protecting American institutions by prohibiting Catholics from public office. Such a practice, contended the Whig, encouraged patriotism. The Whig stressed, however, that the American Party did not deny a naturalized citizen the right to vote. Yet, since the Whig approved of changing the naturaliza- tion laws to require an immigrant to wait over twenty years before he could vote, the paper obviously contem- 98 So to avoid the divi- plated reducing the foreign vote. sive issue of slavery the Whig appeared ready to unite the nation by stirring nativists prejudices. 174 On February 22, 1856, the American Party convened its national convention in Philadelphia, and nominated the Whigfs favorite candidate, Millard Fillmore. Besides stating the nativists principles, the platform identified the "Federal Union and Constitution" as the only sure bul- wark of American independence.99 In 1856 the Whig had many candidates to contend with. At the Cincinnati convention in June the Democrats named James Buchanan and four weeks later the first national Republican convention nominated John C. Fremont; not until September 17 did the Whig convention meet and 100 After then only to endorse the American ticket. Fremont entered the race the Whig hinted that the elec- tion might have to go to the House of Representatives. That prospect did not worry the Whig, because it assumed that Congress' conservatives would vote for Fillmore, not the radical Republican.101 But the election results showed that the Whig had grossly over-estimated Fillmore's strength in the nation and Virginia. In the state Buchanan led with 89,706 votes to 60,310 and 291 for Fillmore and Fremont respectively. While Buchanan won 174 electoral votes and Fremont 114, the American candidate gained only 8.102 Buchanan's victory displeased the Whig, but Fremont's strong appeal in many of the northern states alarmed the paper more. His performance proved to the Whig that the Republican Party would be a powerful force to contend with in 1860.103 175 More than a year before the 1860 elections, the Whig renewed its call for all national conServatives to unite in an Opposition Party to oppose the "BlackiRepub- licans" and Democrats. Because the only national party, the Democratic Party, appeared likely tobreak up into sectional factions, the Whig contended that the time was right for conservatives in all regions to form a new national organization.104 Since the Whig perceived that no party contemplated interfering with slavery in a state, the paper declared that the new organization ought to ignore slavery. Rather than bicker over a dead issue, the Whig demanded that conservatives nominate candidates who were "well-known, able, conservative, rational men." A man's ability and character, not past differences, argued the Whig, should determine the party's selection.105 Later, in the fall of 1859, events made the paper's appeal more urgent. John Brown, planning to arouse Virginia's slave population into a liberating army, seized the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry, but federal troops promptly responded and captured Brown and his raiders. At first the Whig downgraded the episode as 106 Because of the North's sym- an exaggerated "humbug." pathy, however, the Whig reassessed the raid and concluded that it might turn out to be a godsend since it jarred northern conservatives into realizing that the Union was threatened.107 176 When South Carolina recommended a conference of southern states to discuss federal-state relations, the Whig responded negatively. What the secessionists desired, warned the Whig, was to make impossible demands on the North and then secede; therefore a convention would not benefit Virginia and would only increase popu- lar excitement and widen the national breach. Rather than seek new amendments to protect slavery, as the secessionists proposed, the paper contended that Virginia could better secure her rights by observing and having others observe the United States Constitution. If that was not enough, then no amendment, concluded the Whig, could possibly save the Union. By a vote of 31 to 11 the Virginia Senate acted as the Whig had hoped and rejected the invitation.108 Political explosions at the Democratic Convention at Charleston in April 1860 tended to confirm the Whig's view that the Democrats could no longer remain a national organization. Angered over the convention's refusal to adopt a slave code, southern delegates led by William L. Yancey of Alabama marched out of the convention and the Democratic Party. In June what was left of the National Democratic Party nominated the energetic Stephen A. Douglas. Determined to have a candidate, the southern Democrats nominated John C. Breckinridge.109 On May 9, shortly after the Charleston convention adjourned, the Constitutional Union Party met at Baltimore 177 and nominated a slate headed by John Bell, former Whig and Senator from Tennessee. Pleased with this develop- ment, the Whig praised Bell's unionism and willingness to treat all sections fairly. As the Whig had hoped, the party avoided the divisive issues and in its platform merely pledged to uphold the Constitution.110 Although the Whig stated that the contest pri- marily centered on Bell and the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, the paper also expressed some kind words for Douglas. While the Whig emphasized that it found Douglas' squatter sovereignty views objec- tionable, the paper still preferred the "Little Giant" to the Black Republican or Breckinridge, the tool of "Dis- unionists." So if Fillmore's backers believed that he could not carry a state, the Whig firmly suggested that they switch to Douglas who at least was a "unionist."111 Of course, the Whig also encouraged Douglas' backers to do the same for Fillmore.112 Towards the end of the campaign the Whig, worried about an increased secessionist feeling, stressed that the economic success of the North and South depended on continued unity because "harmony at home" was "essential 113 If the election precipi- to successful trade abroad." tated a civil war, Virginia and the other border states, cautioned the Whig, would face most of the bloody battles alone while the Gulf states remained secure a long way from the action.114 178 Republican victories in the early fall state elections of Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio foretold the November balloting. Even though Lincoln polled only forty per cent of the popular votes, he gathered a total of 180 electoral votes to his opponents combined total of 123. While the Whig lamented the outcome, it did not fail to note that Bell carried not only Virginia but also Kentucky and Tennessee: if the nation was to avoid war, the Whig knew that the border states had to provide leadership in conciliating the sections.115 Immediately the Whig denied that the constitution- ally proper election of Lincoln warranted secession, and in fact the paper disclaimed secession as a legal proce- dure; while the Whig as yet saw no justification for armed conflict it recOgnized, however, that people if oppressed could revolt. After blaming the Democratic Party's rup- ture for Lincoln's win, the Whig advised Virginians that the state "should at all times - and especially in criti- cal times like these - be calm, deliberate and enlight- 116 Before the "Cotton States" seceded they should ened." ponder their course and remember that though they had suffered the border states had endured more; furthermore to secede prior to consulting other southern states amounted to coercion. The Whig also insisted that many of Lincoln's backers were not avid abolitionists and Con- gress, under Democratic control, could limit the new President.117 179 To illustrate further the need for moderation the Whig described just what secession and civil war would 118 Inorder to maintain a standing army the W_h_ii entail. estimated that Virginia would have to pay an additional seven to eight million dollars in taxes and since the new Confederacy abhorred tariffs it would levy direct taxes on Virginia's Slave property to raise revenue. After a long bloody period of anarchy and struggle the Whig pre- dicted that as in France a "strong government"--a dicta- torship-- would assume power and destroy free government. Surely, pleaded the Whig, Virginia deserved a better Between Lincoln's election and inauguration, many peace plans surfaced and the Whig received almost all pro- posals favorably. But whatever occurred, the Whig warned, the federal government should not coerce the seceded states. If troops moved against any southern state, the Whig understood that all slave states would rush to the defense of their sister state. When Lincoln in his inau- gural stated his intention to hold and occupy federal property, the W_h_i_g alerted the President that such action if carried out in South Carolina would mean civil war.120 In an unsuccessful attempt to quiet the crisis, 'ohn J. Crittenden of Kentucky, Henry Clay's successor in he Senate, proposed that the Congress initiate a consti- utional amendment extending the Old Missouri Compromise 180 lbw ulthe Pacific. Territories and states below the linevnmld receive Congressional protection for slavery. 121 Other attempts at compromise including the calling of a national convention in Washington also failed, but the Whig still retained its confidence that war was not inevitable.122 When Virginia's voters elected delegates to a state convention on February 4, unionists won a clear victory.123 With most of the Gulf states already out of the Union, the Whig wrote that the burden of mediating the differences between the deep South and the North rested on Virginia. The convention opened in Richmond on February 13, but the delegates took no action until April when they defeated a motion 45 to 95 to submit an ordinance of secession to the voters in May.124 Naively ignoring the growing tensions and approaching crisis in Charleston's harbor, the Whig in April 1861 still envisioned a peaceful reuniting of the nation. CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES lRichmond Whig, October 6, 1829. 2Ibid., July 22 and December 9, 1836; January 17, 1837. 3Ibid., November 22, 1842. 4Ibid., February 28, 1843. 5 Ibid., May 13, 1843. 6Ibid., October 19, 1843. 7Ibid., September 6, 1843; May 21, 1844. 8Ibid., March 28, 1844. 9Ibid. loIbid., May 21, 1844. 11%” April 30, 1845; Ferrell, Diplomacy, 235-240. 12Sellers, Polk, II, 207-208, 215-216. 13Richmond Whig, June 17, 1845. l4Sellers, Polk, II, 357-397; Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, A History (Revised and Expanded Edition; New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), 230-248. Polk's minister to Great Britain, Louis McLane, diligently worked to convince the American State Department of the need to compromise. 15Sellers, Polk, II, 213. Sellers argues that California had long been a goal of Polk. Another historian stressixm; the importance of trade in Polk's decision was Norman Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in Ameri- can Continental Expansion (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1955). 16Richmond Whig, August 18, 1845. 181 182 ljflflfig, May 14, 1846; Sellers, Polk, II, 416-421. 18Richmond Whig, May 15, 1846. l9Ferrell, Diplomacy, 235-242. 20Richmond Whig, June 24, 1846. 21Ibid., June 10, 1846. zahhg,, June 17, 1846. The Whig also cautioned its readers not to engage in "hero worship." 23Ibid., June 30, September 14, October 8 and December 2, 1846. Concerned about the performance of volunteers in combat, the Whig questioned whether a month's training‘was enough to take a man from the "plough" and make a soldier of him. 24ihig,, October 5, 1846; Dwight L. Clark, Stephen University of Watts Kearney, Soldier of the West (Norman: On March 1, 1847, Brigadier Oklahoma Press, 1961), 288. General Stephen W. Kearney proclaimed, as Governor and Commander of the Tenth Military District, that the United States possessed California and that all allegiance to the Mexican government was dissolved. 25Richmond Whig, October 8 and October 12, 1846. For other accounts of the war's origins see Justin H. Smith, The War with Mexico (2 vols.; New York: The Mac- millan Company, 1919); Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New York: .Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); Normal A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Expansion (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1955). 26AllanNevins, Ordeal of the Union (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), I, 9-12. 27Ibid. 28Richmond Whig, February 24, 1847. 29Ibid., April 16, 1847. 30Ibid., February 24, 1847. 31Ibid., May 29 and September 1, 1847. Delieved that no candidate who opposed the Wilmot Proviso :ould win the presidency. 32_I_i3_i_ci., October 23 and October 28, 1847. The Whig 183 33Nevins, Ordeal, I, 18-21. 3huchmond Whig, June 9, 1848. 35Ibid., May 18, 1849. 3lst Cong., lst Sess., 1849, 36Congressional Globe , I, 256. XIX, Part I, 70-72; Nevins, Ordeal, 37Richmond Whig, January 29 and March 22, 1850. ”gig” January 26, 1850. Critics of the adminis- tration accused Taylor of sending Thomas Butler King (a (kmugia Whig) to California to force the people to apply fOr statehood. He did go and encourage state organization but there was little evidence of coercion. 39ihig., January 29, 1850; Nevins, Ordeal, I, 307-320, 265-266. In a Senate speech in January Clay recommended (1) admittance of California with her free (2) establishment of territorial governments constitution, in land taken from Mexico without any condition or restric- tion on slavery, (3) that Texas' western boundary exclude all of New Mexico, (4) that the national government assume the debts of Texas contracted prior to annexation, (5) prohibition of the slave trade in Washington, D.C., (6) protection of slavery in Washington as long as Vir- ginia and Maryland desired it, (7) a more effective fugi- tive slave act, and (8) that Congress formally declare that it has no power to interfere with interstate slave trade. Congressional Globe, Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1850, XIX, Part I, 244-246. 4ONevins, Ordeal, I, 239-256. 41Ibid., 280-282. 42Richmond Whig, March 7, 1850. 43Ibid.,‘March 12, 1850. 288-289. 44Nevins, Ordeal, I, 45Richmond Whig, March 7, 1850. 46Ibid., January 15 and January 22, 1850. 47Ibid., April 9, 1850. 48Nevins, Ordeal, I, 316-317. 184 491bid., 311-312; Congressionalglobe, Blst Cong., lst Sess., 1850, XIX, Part I, 418 and 780. 5ORichmond Whig, May 28 and May 31, 1850. SlNevins, Ordeal, I, 324-344. 52Richmond Whig, August 2, 1850. 53Mfldns, Ordeal, I, 340-342; Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington: American Histori- cal Society, 1913) , 174-211. Cole stressed the importance of the Whigs while Holmon Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1964) emphasized the role of Douglas and the Democrats in securing the compromise. 54Richmond Whig, September 10, 1850. ssihig” September 11, September 23 and Septem- ber 27, 1850. 56Ibid., March 17 and March 18, 1851. 571bid., November 22, 1850. 58Ibid., July 16, 1851. 591bid., October 4, 1850. 6OIbid., July 26, 1851. 6 lFerrell , Diplomagy, 252-256 . 62Richmond Whig, April 29 and May 30, 1851; August 21, 1849. While the Whig accepted the idea that Cuba would one day belong to the United States, the paper wanted the process to be an "honorable and pacific means." 63Ibid., May 5, 1853. 64M. , August 11 and August 12, 1853. 65Ferrell, Diplomacy, 253-256. 66Richmond Whig, March 1 and May 3, 1853. 67Ibid. , March 1, 1853. 68Ibid. , January 7 and January 10, 1854; Nevins, >rdea1, II , 94-100. Senator Stephen Douglas had purposely tade the original language vague. 185 69Nevins, Ordeal, II, 95-98. 79nud., 301-346; Richmond Whig, February 21, 1854. The Whig denied that the Missouri Compromise was a southern measure, rather the paper contended the passage depended on northern votes and only a minority of southern congressmen. 7lRichmond Whig, February 10, 1854. 72M” February 11 and February 14, 1854. 73Ibid., March 15, March 20 and March 21, 1854. When some southerners questioned Douglas' sincerity, the Whig defended him. “Nevins, Ordeal, II, 109-119. 75Richm0nd Whig. March 21, 1854. 763251” May 25 and June 9, 1854. 77Ibid., January 1, 1857. 78Ibid., January 23, 1857. 791bid., March 16, 1857. See Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (First Collier Books Edition; New York: Collier Books, 1962), 104-138. His thesis stressed the importance of the break up of the last remaining national party in 1860, the Democratic Party. 80Nichols, Disruption, 107. Frederick P. Stanton of Maryland was named Secretary of the territory and pre- ceded Walker to the territory in an unsuccessful attempt to settle problems before Walker came. 8lNichols, Disruption, 119-120. 82Richmond Whig, March 16, May 5, June 12, July 13, July 14, July 27, July 28 and August 4, 1857. 83%” January 1, 1858; December 25, 1857. 84Ibid., January 29, 1858. 85Ibid., March 9, 1858. 86Nichols, Disruption, 171-180. 186 87Richmond Whig, April 30, May 1, May 4 and August 13, 1858. When Kansas voters rejected the consti- tution the Whig lamented that now the territory had to waitlnuil 93,000 people populated the area before they could Obtain S tatehood . 8%Hulip Morrison Rice, "The Know-Nothing Party in Virginia, 1854-1856," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LV (1947) , 61-75; Stanwood, Presidential Elections, 56. 89Richmond Whig, February 21 and February 28, 1851; June 8, 1852. goléié-r March 4. April 25 enul July 1, 1851; Sep- tember 18 and September 20, 1852. 911bid., February 27, 1852. 928tanwood, Presidential Elections; Nevins, Ordeal, I, 187; James G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Second edition; Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), 90-91. 93Richmond Whig, June 9, June 11 and June 17, 1852. 94Stanwood, Presidential Elections, 250-251. 95Richmond Whig, June 22 and June 25, 1852. 96Ibid., July 3, July 5, July 23, September 25 and September 28, 1852. To picture Pierce as unsafe on slavery the Whig printed an old speech of Pierce's in which he bitterly attacked slavery. 97Ibid., December 5, 1852; Stanwood, Presidential —— Elections, 257. 98Ibid., March 9 and June 19, 1855. 99Stanwood, Presidential Elections, 261-263. 100Ibid. 101 . . Richmond Whig, June 23 and July 15, 1856. 102Stanwood, Presidential Elections, 276. 103Richmond Whig, January 23, 1857. 104Ibid., June 28, 1859. 187 lOSIbid., June 28, September 20 and October 18, 1859. 106mm,, October 18, 1859. 1°7_I_p_ig., January 13, 1860. 1860 108ih1_d_., January 31, February 3 and March 9, 109Nichols, Disruption, 109. lloStanwood, Presidential Elections, 288-290; Richmond Whig,.January 22, 1860. 111Richmond Whig, July 13, 1860. 112mm,, July 24, 1860. In particular the Whig wanted Douglas' voters to support Fillmore in Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida and Louisiana. 113 . ibld., September 13, 1860. 114Ibid., September 27 and October 5, 1860. When William Yancey traveled north to campaign, the Whig accused him of wanting only to further divide the Demo- crats to insure Lincoln's victory. After a Republican victory, Yancey, contended the Whig, expected the South to secede. 115Ibid., November 9, 1860; Stanwood, Presidential Elections, 297. In Virginia the election gave John Bell 74,681; John Breckinridge 74,323; Stephen Douglas 16,290; and Lincoln 1,929 votes. Thus about 92,900 of the 167,123 votes cast supported unionist candidates. 116Ibid., November 9 and November 13, 1860. ll7Ibid., December 13, 1860. 118Ibid., January 9, 1861. The Whig saw no hope of a peaceful secession. 119 Ibid., January 4, February 9 and February 19, 1861. 120Ibid., January 9, March 6 and March 14, 1851- 121Randall and Donald, Civil War, 150. 188 122Richmond Wth, January 19, January 29: February 15 and March 4, 1861. 123 Ibid., February 8, 1861. 124Ibid., May 5, 1861. CHAPTER VI THE WAR YEARS: ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 1861-1865 When Edmund Rufflin ignited the first shot fired at Fort Sumter in the early morning of April 12, he sig- naled an end to debate over secession. Southerners opposed to disruption of the Union had to choose immedi- ately between shifting position or leaving the Confederacy. Most newspaper editors chose enthusiastically to embrace A few, including Robert Ridgway of the Whig secession. and Parson William G. Brownlow of Knoxville, Tennessee still refused to accommodate disunionists, but neither man retained his post for long. Ridgway lost his job to Alexander Moseley, the old stand-by editor of the Whlg, while Brownlow literally took to the hills--the Smoky Mountains of East Tennessee. The Parson, from the sanc- tuary of Union-held territory, directed editorials at his fire-eating adversaries, but Ridgway remained out of work until the war ended.2 Although the Whig enjoyed wide circulation in the state and in the Richmond area, it faced stiff competition from four other dailies. The Richmond Examiner, edited 189 190 bygkmnDMnmue Daniel, a Skilled but erratic man, pro- vided support for the Whig's criticisms of the Confederate Edward Pollard, Daniel's assistant, took par- government. ticular delight in blaming Jefferson Davis for all of the South's woes. Thecnher local papers, the Enquirer and the Sentinel, supported and defended the Davis administration. The former paper, established by Thomas Ritchie in 1804, initially allowed government officials such as J. B. JOneS, a war clerk, to write editorials explaining govern- The Sentinel, formed in 1863 by Richard M. ment policy. Smith of Alexandria, took up the administration's cause Smith had worked when the Enguirer became disenchanted. earlier on the Enquirer's editorial staff.5 A fifth paper, the Dispatch, provided the city with an independent view. Before the war the editorials directed by a triumvirate of James Cowardin, William H. and Hugh P. Pleasants (brother of John Hampden Davis, tried to steer clear of any party attachment. Pleasants), All three editors had formerly supported the Whig Party, but when that organization faded from the scene they decided to establish a paper modeled after the Baltimore 6 Sun. Several of the area papers found their editors actively involved in the military action--Nathanial Tyler .nd 0. Jennings Wise, the son of former Governor Henry 191 Wise, both took commands at the start of the war. Young Wise died in 1862 on Roanoke Island, but Tyler returned to his post in December, 1862. Both Tyler and Wise pro- vided dispatches to the Enquirer on military activities. For a short time Daniel of the Examiner served on A. P. Hill's staff and tried to build up his commander at the expense Of General James Longstreet. In the summer of 1862 Daniel's efforts irritated Longstreet and started an enduring feud. Considering the egos of the Richmond editors, it is no wonder that serious difficulties arose between the military and the press. But in the early stages of the war the editors and most people tried to maintain a united front.8 Richmond responded emotionally to the news of Sumter with crowds rushing into the city's street shout- ing support for the Confederacy while speakers extolled the virtues of a southern nation. The former editor of the Southern Monitor warned that the North had great but he concluded that the South had no choice but power, Hundreds of citizens paraded to Capitol Square to secede. and appropriated state cannons to boom approval of fire- With little result Governor John eating speeches. Letcher attempted to cool Richmond's enthusiasm by remind— ing the people that Virginia remained in the Union and had refused to recognize the Confederacy. On April 17 after Lincoln had issued his call for seventy—five thousand militia to put down the insurrection 192 in the South, Virginia's State Convention, in accord with popular pressure, voted for secession. Several times prior to Sumter the delegates had voted down secession Under resolutions, but events foreclosed further delay. new direction the Whig openly endorsed separation arguing erroneously that Lincoln had exceeded his constitutional powers when he called out the militia. That action, 11 argued the Whig, was reserved for Congress. The Richmond paper saw one "imperative policy" available to the state--"instant, thorough and cordial union, with the whole South." Under no illusion of a peaceful separation, the Whig_warned its readers that they must prepare to meet the onslaught of a huge federal army. Already sensing the magnitude of the conflict facing the South, the paper entreated all able-bodied men to arm for a conflict against an army of two hundred thou— sand soldiers motivated by a "diabolical hatred."12 To emphasize a radical shift in policies, the Whlg expressed full support and confidence in its former In April some political opponent, Governor John Letcher. voices suggested that Virginia's executive resign to make The room for a man with experience in military affairs. Whlg editorialized that the crisis required all citizens Since no one on the horizon to unite behind the Governor; had outstanding abilities for the job, the paper concluded :hat a change in the State House would entail additional 193 problems for an already complex situation.13 The W_hig sought some continuity in the shifting sands of Virginia's politics. Fortunately for Jefferson Davis, Letcher remained in Office. Generally the two politicians worked well together and, unlike many other southern leaders, avoided disruptive clashes. Since Richmond was the Confederate capitol and seemed destined to be the center of military as well as civil activity, a good working relationship appeared essential for the welfare of the Old Dominion and the Confederacy. Throughout the conflict, the Whig blamed the North for the war and warned that the stakes were high. When Lincoln revealed his plan of supplying Sumter, the Presi- dent made "a substantial declaration of war" which, the paper believed, left the South with the choice of resist- ing or submitting. The sole blame rested on Lincoln and the Republicans who tried to impose their "notions upon 14 Agreeing with southern nationalists like others . " William Yancey and J. D. B. DeBow, the W_h_ig contended that the North-South confrontation was not between mem- bers of the same political community, but one of distinct :ections possessing inimical habits, manners, and morals. To justify the future hardships of the South, the zig identified what was at stake: the extermination of nglo-Saxon freedom," and "intolerable military 194 despotism." During the first winter of the War, the paper declared that "either slavery or the Union must be destroyed. Truly this is the logic of the controversy." Seward deluded some by talking of peace, but he prepared for a "war of gigantic proportions " which belied his pub- lic statements; the Whig advised the border states that they had to choose between slavery or union and surmised 15 incorrectly that all but Delaware preferred slavery. Denying that slavery was the cause of disunion, the paper contended that if slavery had not existed, "fanaticism would have seized upon something else": the . notions upon North was determined to "impose its others."l6 After the fall of Atlanta and just prior to Savannah's surrender, the Wh_ig reminded its readers that the North sought to rule the South and to impose "notions and theories" which only benefitted the Republicans. Although disillusioned and disappointed over military and diplomatic failures, the editor defended throughout the war the South's decision to seek indepen- dence. The Whig considered it an "injustice" to apply to secession because the North the word "rebellion" maneuvered to provoke the South to fire the initial blast; ence the blame rested on Lincoln and Major Anderson at The Republicans desired to rule the South to Jmter. 'rve their own interest, leaving no alternative except . 19 Sistance. 195 Resistance required the creation and organization Of a new national government and, by the time Virginia joined the Confederacy, the Montgomery delegates had formed the essential structure of a provisional executive, congress, and constitution. But with the secession of the Upper South, the location of the capitol became an unsettled issue. Davis favored a move to Richmond, believing that that city would provide the administration with a good location from which to direct military affairs, and that such a move would boost the morale of the border states.20 The Whig agreed, noting that shifting the capitol to an exposed border region would impress Euro- peans with the Confederacy's determination to retain all of the seceded states permanently.21 ***** After Virginia joined the Confederacy, the Whig never hesitated to express its opinions whether they were critical or encouraging. State and national policies as well as most public officials came under the critical eye of the paper's editorials which generally revealed a sus- picion of politicians. Without success the Richmond paper sought major revisions in Virginia's constitution. Disliking Virginia's recent adoption of "universal suffrage" and direct elec- tion of most state officials, the Whig labeled them "ema- nations from the free labor, free schools, free love . 196 of the Yankees of New England." He called the innovations "repugnant to our institutions" and urged the Virginia State Convention to change the state's constitution. Besides limiting suffrage, the Whig recommended appoint- ment of the Judiciary by the Governor with consent of the Senate, annual instead of biennial sessions of the General Assembly, and an end to the direct election of the Governor. Although a state convention convened in November of 1861 to consider constitutional revisions, few innova— tions resulted. Retention of the popular election of Governor disgusted the Whig which commented that the dele- gates had lacked "backbone"; consequently the Whig fore- saw "traitors of the North-West" controlling the state telections. Some changes, however, resulted including a limit.on suffrage to those who paid taxes and the election «of magistrates for twelve year terms, one-quarter to be eelected.every three years. While the Whig found solace lilasome of the actions, it disapproved of the overall gflxilosophy of popular government.23 Despite the Whig's disappointment with the state cxnnstitution, the paper still retained bright expectations for-\Lirginia and the new confederacy. The possession of the 'erst social system," a good climate and fertile soil, production of goods needed by the world, and two thousand miles of coast promised the South independence and 197 prosperity. If war came, the Whig assured its readers that the Confederacy enjoyed a superior military position by virtue of interior lines, high morale, and the cer- tainty of aid from foreign countries.24 For the first time editors of the Richmond Whig gave support to the "King Cotton" theory. The South, explained the paper, produced eighty per cent of the cotton used in European textiles; if the South cut off Europe's supply of cotton, England and France faced eco- nomic ruin and social revolution. "Hundreds of thousands" of unemployed textile workers consumed by "Irrepressible fury" assured the South of aid and commercial agreements with foreign nations to complete secession successfully.25 Unlike the provisional congress and most southern- ers, the Whig opposed the November elections to replace the temporary government. The Whig_preferred "to let well enough alone." Why distract the nation from the war (effort and create divisions in political ranks? A delay until.NOvember 1862 seemed reasonable. The Whig actually desirmmithe postponement of all "agitating questions . . unti1.this war was ended."26 Subsequent political elections and debates made tflue Whigfs warning prophetic. The Richmond Examiner criti- ¢effect on an individual's liberty or a newspaper's right to criticize governmental decisions. Although some southern papers, including the Ricfiumond Examiner, protested bills forbidding editors to describe the movements or numbers of southern troops, the Wh_ig acknowledged the wisdom of such legislation but cautioned the Congress not to go too far.19 The Wh_ig clearly intended not to give the executive or Congress 216 "indiscriminate support" or opposition:20 "the true policy of the press . . . is to assail error and sustain 21 Certainly neither the Whig nor right, wherever seen." the Examiner ever gave "indiscriminate support" to Davis. AS Davis gradually increased pressure on the editors and military commanders barred reporters, the Whigfs anxiety for freedom of the press increased. While Davis provided the press with much of its trouble, most field commanders failed to cooperate with newspapers. Joseph E. Johnston, R. E. Lee, and Stonewall Jackson complained about news helpful to the enemy appear- ing in southern papers;22 consequently few reporters got the privilege of accompanying troops. The War Department irritated the press further by withholding military news until long after it appeared in northern accounts. When no hard news came to the southern editors, they filled the vacuum with guesses which often led first to false optimism and later to bitter disappointment and frustra- tion. ***** In the spring of 1862 the draft became the center of conversation. Jefferson Davis, a state rights advo- cate, startled the Congress in March by requesting legis- lation.to establish conscription. Most of the President's generals, including R. E. Lee, endorsed the action. Recruitment officers, impeded by the realities of war, 217 found it impossible to fill the South's ranks. With mili- tary defeats in the West and McClellan threatening Richmond, the Congress and Davis realized that conscrip- tion offered the South its only hope of meeting the . . 23 crISIS. On April 16, 1862, the first conscription act passed Congress with little opposition. Except for many enumerated exemptions, the law called all white males between eighteen and thirty-five years of age into mili- tary service.24 Even Davis' opponents, including Yancey, Rhett, Pollard, and Benjamin Hill supported the measure. In deference to state rights advocates, one provision placed conscripts in organizations from their respective states. Where possible state officers enrolled the draftees, but when needed the Confederate government pro- vided conscript officers. Newspapers perceived a manpower crisis late in 1861. Initially they favored bounties and furloughs to extend the tours of the twelve-month volunteers whose enlistment periods ended in April 1862.25 But later the Ehig_said that "those entrusted with the conduct of the war" believed that conscription was a necessity, and "we "25 Although the Whig disliked con- therefore go for it. SCription in principle, the approach of enemy armies made quarreling unacceptable. By the summer of 1862 the Whig fully supported the draft and encouraged the Conscription Bureau to 218 impress more men. Prodded by Lincoln's calls totaling six hundred thousand men, the Whig voiced no constitu- tional qualms about the draft. The paper advised Davis to disencumber the War Department of the "Yankees and Jews" who had prevented the South from properly using her resources. Men entrusted with positions in the Con- scription Bureau had to use discretion and wisdom which most of the present personnel lacked. To avoid the "loss " the Whig suggested . credit among the people, 28 of . . that only the best surgeons examine recruits. While the Whig had at first tried to ignore desertion, by August 1862 it was impossible; so to fill Lee's depleted ranks after Gettysburg, the Whig proposed that the women in the area organize "Recruiting Societies" whose job would entail calling on all the able-bodied men in the counties to return to Lee's army.29 "The evil in question," said the Whig, "is a gigantic one. 30 remedy must be speedily found." As the pressures for more men increased, many Some exemptions under the draft system came under close scru- tiny, but when the government proposed dropping exemp- tions for newspaper employees, the press perceived a threat to freedom of the press. If Davis could draft editors or the employees of a paper, he could, contended the Whig, manipulate that medium of communication between the people and government.31 The Whig's editor joined 219 his colleagues in August 1863 by cautioning the citizens against allowing Davis to control the press and thus destroy a safeguard essential for freedom.32 In the winter of 1863 and 1864 the Whig shifted posituxm and editorialized against general conscription. It now maintained that (1) men were needed for farming to provide food for the troops, (2) the draft, by itself, Offered no sure way to victory, and (3) when a government possessed the power of general conscription there was too great a risk of dictatorial government.33 Convinced that the South could not match the North's mass army, man for man, the Whig stressed the desirability of a small, well-trained, well-fed, and fully equipped army. Better the latter, thought the paper, than depending on a mass characterized by confu- sion. Rather than general conscription the editor pre- ferred reducing exemptions to eliminate the soft jobs for the able-bodied in the service of the Provost Marshal and hospitals.35 In the last hours of the Confederacy the Whig opposed Davis' plan for ending all exemptions by substi- The latter, said McDonald, tuting a system of details. promised only "corruption," "discontent" and more "deser- tion." The "fifteen Negro clause" also received the The editor wrote that it provided Whig's endorsement. for the army's manpower needs without crippling farm pro- duction.36 220 Omxments of change in the draft said that only Congress had the power to raise armies. They doubted Congress' power to delegate to the President the drafting and selection power. The Whig concurred that drafting men and putting them under military authority to do non- nulitaqrjobs violated the Constitution. Although the military crisis demanded centralization, the Whig feared that such a development would lead straight to despotism and monarchy.37 Other papers such as the Richmond Examiner, Montgomery Advertiser, and the Charleston Mercury joined the Whig's Opposition to the reduction of exemptions. The Alabama editor accused Davis of seeking "omnipotent "38 The Examiner and the Mercuiy military authority. Rather than junking openly talked of overthrowing Davis. the Conscription Bureau they wanted to shoot anyone who failed to comply with the draft.39 Unlike the Whig the Examiner had no fear of a But the old Democratic paper wanted to make dictator. Lee opposed any sure the dictator was Lee not Davis. such developments and prevented the Richmond paper from attaining its goals.40 Voices like Daniel's calling for "a man on horseback" represented just what the Whlg wanted to avoid. ***** 221 Another disquieting discussion revolved around the Confederacy's varied attempts to finance the war effort. The new Secretary of the Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger of South Carolina, faced the elusive task of formulating an effective economic policy. He, a hard money man, began with virtually no money in the Treasury and only limited experience in finances. In Carolina's legislature he had chaired the state's Committee on Finance, but that experience proved to be of little use; consequently he found it necessary to lean heavily on advice from southern bankers. As one historian has pointed out, Memminger's devotion to hard money seemed ironic since the circum- stances forced the Carolinian to scrap his old ideas.43 Before the war ended the Treasury printed more than $1,554,000,000 in paper currency, three times the amount of greenbacks printed by the North.44 When the Confederacy implemented a produce loan in May 1861.the Whig offered no objection. Common sense seemed to dictate that the government adopt a "supply in kind" policy whereby cotton farmers would place their crops at the disposal of the state and would receive in return state bonds or certificates of debt bearing inter- est.45 Although the South had wealth, reasoned the Whig, the Confederacy lacked money, a medium of exchange to represent that wealth.46 What the paper preferred was a 222 system that would enable Virginia's farmers to pay taxes or make loans in kind. Since the state's agricultural products were less durable than cotton, the Whig sug- gested that farmers supply armies in the vicinity in exchange for a certificate valid for credit on taxes.“ The plan also offered the added advantage of cutting the transportation problems involved in supplying the troops During the summer of 1861, the Whig commenced to have doubts about the produce loan scheme and in October it recommended a new approach. The editor suggested that the South buy cotton and tobacco crops with treasury notes, a superior medium of exchange that would give the farmer more hope of defraying living expenses and paying taxes than the produce loan.48 The Whig contended that notes based on cotton and tobacco offered as much intrin- sic value as any paper money in the world. Unfortunately for the South, Memminger disagreed 49 with the Whig, calling the plan a "socialistic project." Responding to the administration's refusal, the frustrated editor of the paper wrote that the nation's continued existence hung in the balance and that the "supremest law"--survival--required that Memminger suppress his con- stitutional scruples . 50 In the fall of 1862 the Whig urged Congress to raise revenue through either increased taxes or "forced loans. " The latter policy involved collecting an income 223 tax Of twenty per cent and giving the taxpayer a Confed- erate bond bearing eight per cent interest. The Whig stressed that all southerners ought gladly to pay the taxesxxxmssary to carry on the struggle. Since the Constihfifion forbade direct taxation not apportioned according to the population, the Whig naively proposed thatdraft NJ to correct the error of short-term enlist- ments, UN to have uniformity and regularity in the mili- tia system, and (3) to have a well balanced and coordinated military machine which independent state actions could not create. 24Exemptions under the April 16, 1862, draft law included Confederate and state officers and clerks allowed by law; mail carriers and ferrymen on post roads; piltos and persons engaged in the marine service; employees on railroads and telegraph operators; ministers; employees in mines and foundries; printers; presidents and professors in colleges; teachers of the deaf, dumb, and blind; super- intendents, nurses and attendants in public hospitals and lunatic asylums; one druggist in each drug store; and superintendents and operatives in wool and cotton factories could be exempted at the discretion of the Secretary of War. These people were declared producers who were needed to keep in operation the agriculture, trade, mechanical arts, and educational process essential to wartime and a "healthy national life." Not until October 1862 were over- seers of slaves exempted by Congress. See A. B. Moore, Conscription, 52-82. 25Richmond Whig, January 27, 1862. 26;p;g,, April 1, 1862. 27_I__l:_>i_d_., August 23 and September 4, 1862. 281bid., November 1, 1862. 291bid., August 10, 1863. 30Ibid. 31Moore, Conscription, 66-67. 32Richmond Whig, August 29, 1863. 33;;gg;., December 28, 1863; January 4, 1864. 34Ibid., January 4, 1864. 234 35%. The Whig vigorously opposed the posi- tions taken by Senator A. G. Brown of Mississippi. 36%., January 16 and January 19, 1865. 37Ibid. 38Quoted in A. B. Moore, Conscription, 340. 39Moore , Conscription , 336-337 . 401bid. 41James G. Randall and David Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), 256-257. See also Vandiver, Tattered Flags, 26; Coulter, Confederate States , 120 . 42Randall, Civil War, 256-257. 431.1929.- 44_I_b_i_d. 45Richmond Whig, June 5 and June 8, 1861. 46Ibid. 47I_b_i;§_., June 5, 1861. 48£§i_d., October 10, 1861. 49%” October 24, 1861. 509323., October 10, 1861. 51£b__i_