arr: v v-..‘.1 S F ”L": R J. b A.“ I ’ .. E; 4.. Sig:“" ‘4’ "V" ‘3‘ 1 I‘w‘ ‘ "cit: I..“ .c.. . .Iul r-c In:_.: "-3 ‘ . r" n-e,‘ i. «5.: 39.4.. ; ‘3‘“b ta Q ‘- J 3-3:: 1‘ l K \ s ‘ u. ‘ 1" pl J K- s \ 5.3!: v o. F ’ lo..e a ‘ fl‘ .5. s H ‘ ‘l. VI A ABSTRACT CHINA'S INTERNAL TRANSPORT PROBLEM: THE CASE OF THE RAILWAYS' FIRST CENTURY, 1866-1966 by Chuen-tyi Chow Transportation improvements, including the reduction in shipping costs, increased speed of delivery, and improvements in the nature and quality of service, strongly influence the economic and social progress of nations. By carrying more goods in less time and at a cheaper rate, railways often prove more important to developing nations than do other methods of transport. In geographically extensive and overpopulated mainland China, railways were selected to stimulate eco- nonic improvement as early as 1866. After a one-hundred- year effort, however, Chinese railways are still in a primary stage of economic development. When the increase in railway mileage in China is compared to population growth, the inadequacy of rail coverage is very apparent. The gaps in rail service magnify transport problems that are already intractable. It is the purpose of this dis- sertation to clarify, through an analysis of fourteen railway periods, the primary factors in the development of the Chinese railway system. ‘ | At 66 ‘ ' ' a. '1. 'o.w ‘ ‘00! 545.5 35. research and ; 1:23:13”: 1-1 *:g, u: :31: some use at 9:. the C325: I932 grin" ‘J ‘M “J p s.‘ ‘n q‘; t 5 werfi ' d‘hs, ‘ C o Chuen-tyi Chow An historical overview and economic-geographic analysis have been combined in this study with archival research and personal interviews. Primary materials in the Chinese language include sources from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China. Materials from the latter source were obtained through agencies in Hong Kong. Data on the Communist railway system originating in Taiwan were primarily from the National Security Bureau which regularly sends agents to mainland China to collect infor- mation for use by the Nationalist government. These materials, not available to the general public, were of considerable value in assessing the questions of why and how the Communists built and administered their railways. The informants interviewed were all individuals knowledge- able of mainland Chinese railways. These retired railway engineers and administrative officials are now living in the United States, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The study demonstrates the following: 1. The entire period of Chinese railway develop- ment is characterized by government participation and an ever-changing and evolving railway pattern. 2. Changes in national purpose and circumstances resulted in fourteen distinct spatial railway patterns in the century since 1866. 3. The correlation of geographic conditions, colonial interests, political considerations, strategic A1 at“. :- -§\‘ { .. ‘§ ‘ C s I Q U .‘ n e.v ' 9 1-3 0 A 3, us i EEK; ‘T Lo 3 A. Jig-lees R‘ p N‘ . ‘dn Q ‘d 9 3.32883 :3 5.32 0 A.— de: “a .3 a I. J efi“. O eJh'V‘ I» V‘ a. s. .a ‘4 3 Q. 3 i... a \P Chuen-tyi Chow concerns, availability of capital, foreign trade ventures, and domestic economic activities relate to each of the fourteen railway periods. a. The spatial pattern provides external expres- sion of economic policies, which at times were mis- directed, leading to an unequal distribution of railways in China. 5. The century-old railway system's primary stage of development was characterized prior to 1949 by contin- uous political and military interruption. Errors of design, location, management, technology, and investment resulted in high-cost railway operations, low volume of traffic, poor service, inadequate network connections, low index of mobility, and contributed to the low market value of commodities carried. These factors prevented the Chinese railway system from becoming a viable national transport system. 6. In a capital-poor country like China, procure- ment of railway capital is always difficult. Most of the railways were built, however, for political and strategic purposes rather than for economic reasons, and therefore profit and loss considerations did not enter into the development planning. Passenger traffic is more signif- icant than freight traffic inasmuch as the lines were constructed primarily to connect political, strategic, and urban centers. 7. F Ma can "9' vac-A h I .,.' ,. "'1... ~.IE:S:L.:-¢.E ‘ Q . ‘ . - Q 2.219;: in ‘7 ~‘ l .m .:3 133;; N‘,:. «WA . Chuen-tyi Chow 7. From a centennial viewpoint, the railways of China can best be evaluated when approached with an understanding of their peculiar politico-economic pattern. Only through appropriate restructuring and economic re- emphasis of the railway function--as a major contributing element in the national economy--can the railway system take its proper place in the total development scheme of China. S i I .u. .3 3 Wm up» 30 ‘ 5.1 .1 I? h CHINA'S INTERNAL TRANSPORT PROBLEM: THE CASE OF THE RAILWAYS' FIRST CENTURY, 1866-1966 By Chuen-tyi Chow A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Geography 1972 hid never emouragezer I“ l a 3:. :‘rtun c 1339: R. P ‘1! :‘i A 6 ' *- M M» as. 3' "a ‘ A l.v:‘:e Pa 'ns 01‘ ‘1' 5‘s: 0’ 9 a F ! 3. 1 . " I» “r 'H . c w “ krtifl I I ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to acknowledge the advice he received from Dr. Lawrence M. Sommers; this dissertation would never have been written without his insight and encouragement. Inexpressible indebtedness is due Dr. Burton 0. Witthuhn, Dr. Donald Brandt, and Professor Alfred R. Pannbacker for their constructive suggestions and most helpful discussions. Their kindness and gener- osity are greatly appreciated. My gratitude is also expressed to the Asian libraries at the University of Michigan, University of Chicago, University of Washington, Yale University, Harvard-Yenking Institute, and the Stanford Research Institute for providing assistance and facilities neces- sary in searching for materials and information used. The author wishes to thank Dr. Kuang-liang Hsu of George Peabody College, one of my best friends, for his gift of Dr. H. C. Tien's book, Gazetteer of China, on which the romanization of Chinese places in this dis- sertation is based. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v List of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Chapter I. TRANSPORTATION AS AN ECONOMIC FUNCTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Economic Function of Transportation Economic Significance of Railway Transportation The Recent Trends of Railway Transportation The Role of Railways in Asian Economic Development II. THE CHANGING CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S RAILNAYPATTERN.............. 34 The Characteristics of the Imperial Era The Characteristics of the Republic Era The Characteristics of the Communist Era III. CORRELATION OF FACTORS IN CHINA'S RAILWAY PATTERN: INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Physical Geography as a Factor in the Development of China’s Railway Pattern Colonialism as a Factor in the Development of China's Railway Pattern Strategy as a Factor in the Development of China's Railway Pattern Political Administration as a Factor in the Development of China's Railway Pattern Capital as a Factor in the Development of China's Railway Pattern Foreign Trade as a,Factor in the Development of China's Railway Pattern Domestic Economy as a Factor in the Development of China's Railway Pattern 111 IV. TI“; 0... ‘9'“ I I O... VI. THE SPATIAL CHANGES IN CHINA'S RAILWAY PATMN O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O The Spatial Pattern of the Imperial Era The Spatial Pattern of the Republic Era The Spatial Pattern of the Communist Era THE ROLE OF RAILWAYS IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPENT O O O O O O O O O O O O O O The Subservience of Economic Goals The Role of Railways in China's Economic Development SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page 202 260 297 303 304 t. A) 0‘ (l, o ‘s 0'. Rails Se; n.,.; 'JViba I 'I -a '5 ‘P d-tol er - '- .11 I q > D n. '1 — Table 1. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. LIST OF TABLES Page Railway Mileage per 100,000 Persons in Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Comparison of Freight Volume Between the First Five-year Plan and the Rehabilitation Period in China (1952 and 1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 New Communist-built Industrial Centers in China Connected by Railways (1949-1966) . 88 Regional Distribution of New Railways in Communist China Since 1949 . . . . . . . . 93 Changes in Railway Trackage and Route Length in Operation from 1949 to 1963 . . . . . . 104 Distribution of 328 Large, Medium, and Small Mining and Industrial Centers by Railway Radial Counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Ranking of Communist-built Economic Cooperation Regions by Industrial Capacity 107 Distribution of 100 Cities by Industrial Ranking in Seven Economic Cooperation Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Foreign Loans of Chinese Railroads, December 31, 1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 State Investment Funds in Transport and Communication Between 1953 and 1960 . . . 163 Exports of China by Economic Classes (in Percentage) 1913-1936 . . . . . . . . . . 167 m181§31§§8t’.°f 91%“? f“: tsetse? . . . 168 Percentage Distribution of China's Trade (1868-1913) e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 169 Regional Distribution of Trade Ports in China (1842-1913) . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 V Table 15. 16. 17. 18. 190 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. Percentage of Chinese Trade by Major Port 1870-1913 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0 Foreign Trade by Region (1911-13) Average (va1ue in H.K.T. 1,000) . . . . . . . . Values and Index Numbers (1913 - 100) of Foreign Trade of China, 1864-1936 . . . Direction of Mainland China's Total Trade, 1950-60 s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e Railways in Imperial Era, 1866-1911 . . China’s Total Length and Density of Railways, Inland Waterways, and Highways in 1949 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Railway Mileage in China December 31, 1935 . Railways in Free China December 31, 1942 . Railroads Completed Between 1935 and 1942 . Railways Completed During Sino-Japanese War, July 7. 1937, to December 31, 1942 . . . Completed New Railways in Communist China 1949-1966 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0 Comparison of 25 Railways Built and Projected in the Communist Period with Nationalist Projected Lines in "First Phase of Postwar Railway Reconstruction" . New Railways Built by the Communist Chinese and Not Projected by the Nationalists . . Ranking of Regions by Railway Density (Km/1,000 Km) 1949 and 1963 . . . . . . . Ranking of Provinces by Railway Density (Km/1,000 Km) 1949 and 1963 . . . . . . . Regional Distribution of New Railway Construction from 1949 to End of 1963 . . vi Page 172 173 175 179 205 217 222 227 228 229 233 234 235 237 238 239 Eat-'9 "t N Jd' “i: Q- J}. «‘0 n“e'.': VVL" ' I " .i Table 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. Page Comparison of Coastal Provinces with Inland Provinces and of Developed Regions with Less Developed Regions in Terms of the Number of Industrial Cities and Industrial Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Ranking of Double-tracks Construction Between 1950 and 1962 in Communist China . 249 Railroad Rollin Stock in Service and Annual Construction %1952-1957) . . . . . . . . . 253 Railway Projects Delayed in Communist China 1966 (Not Including Double-track Lines) . 256 Statistical Summary of Movements on Chinese Railways in 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Comparison of Passenger Traffic and VOlume of Freight Traffic by Railways from 1949 to 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 vii Map l. 3. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. LIST OF MAPS The Growth of Railways in China, 1866-1966 . Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Railway Program, 1921 . Location of Communist National Capitals in Asia and International Railway Connections, 1966 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0 Railway Concessions in China, 1895-1905 . Areal Association of 1945 Rail Network and the Territory Occupied by Japanese in China . . Inter-capital Rail Connections in China, 1966 Areal Association of Rail Network and Treaty Ports and Major Foreign Trade Centers in China, 1966 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0 Relationship of Rail Network and Cultivated Agricultural Land in China, 1966 . . . . Relationship of Rail Network and Fuel and Mineral Resources in China, 1966 . . . . . . Areal Association of Rail Network and Major Industrial Areas in China, 1966 . . . . Railways in China, 1911 . . . . . . . . . Railways in China, 1949 . . . . . . . . . Railways in China, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . Areal Association of Rail Network and Rural Population Density over 500 Person per Square Mile in China, 1966 . . . . . . . . . Interurban Rail Connections in China, 1966 . . Network of Railways and Navigable Waterways in China, 1966 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0 viii Page 31 59 96 123 138 141 166 186 189 190 204 216 231 272 277 282 r. I: RH. 1'." to'A‘l‘UPVI'ieAa a\ sue the var; Ed po‘n"y, US. 0 , - .!L£?OPI i: xzeno bet: CHAPTER I TRANSPORTATION AS AN ECONOMIC FUNCTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES The twentieth-century revolution in transport has made the world aware of the relationship of immobility and poverty. It is sometimes difficult to realize that transport in the more developed parts of the world was once no better, and frequently much worse, than it is in most underdeveloped countries today. Air transport has I‘e<31.1<3ed earth time-distances to less than a tenth their Previous size, and the jet era has reduced such distance fac tors again by half. It was little more than a century ‘30 that the railway introduced cheap and rapid overland transport, and only in the past thirty to forty years that mud roads have given way to all-weather pavements tOI‘ motorized transport. Appropriate transport facilities frequently have proven that they are the key to a country's economic d‘velopment. Indeed, one can observe many instances where .’ critical lack of transport facilities has prevented a country from achieving its economic goals. 0n the other h‘hd, some countries that have impressive facilities ‘139 seem to be going nowhere. Transportation affords u l"eralleled opportunity to make mistakes, including haznotu: e lesser deva‘ massive " [M errors of location, technology, design, administration, and ozzhoice.1 Transportation is, therefore, an essential but not an exclusive condition for economic development.2 Using the above criteria, mainland China is a le saer developed country with a dense population and an extensive national area. China has attempted to develop its system of transportation for slightly more than a century} but the railways, as developed, did not play the role that was expected of them as part of the total Chinese economic scheme. The characteristics of China's railway pattern, therefore, are worthy of analysis. For this purpose, it is necessary to examine the function of tram: sport, the economic significance of railways, the I‘Ehtzent trends of railway transportation, and the role of P‘ilways in the overall economic development of Asia. Economic Function of Transportation Meaning of Transportation From an economic point of view, there are two types of transportation.“ The first is economic 1 Uilfred men, Strategy for Mobility (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 19647, p. 19. 2 D.C.: Ibid. . 18° also see Ga Fromm ed. :[r‘VMeatmgn s p 9 ry s 1 Trans ort t and Economic Develo ment (Washington, D.C.: :He BrooEEgs IfistItutIon, I963} . : PP- 1: 5’ (w 3Edwin T. Haefele, ed., Transport and National Goal pp‘figéngton, D.C.: The Brooking—Is netitufron, 1969), o _ 9. u c John H. Alexander Economic Geography (Englewood litre: Prentice Hall, 19641"'—‘4, p. 6. :rizsportazi the purpcse :rizspar: :1 pom other tegic, etz.) foe nine dim nitiar. of t: In a "15., safe: ' 31:13:: by . 11:91. In 1 Cl?" 6 ' 92', :A transportation, dealing with the movement of goods for the purpose of economic profit. The second is noneconomic transportation, and it deals with the movements for pur- pose. other than economic profit (i.e., political, stra- tegic, etc.). The purpose of transportation is basically to reduce distances. The essential elements in this defi- nition of transportation are: distance, speed and time, cost, safety, and carrying capacity. These are the f‘c tors by which comparative economic values can be deter- mined. In turn, the differences in economic value are bfiued on such variables in transportation as type of carrier, facilities, equipment, management, service, 3°hedu1e arrangement, and the selected goods to be moved. The natural environment which may affect the construction tnd maintenance of the transportation system must also b9 considered. Transportation and Economic Progress Man's economic activity depends mainly upon trans- l‘Dc’l‘taxion. Not only does man develop and operate systems or transportation; man also determines the service fea- tux-e. of transportation, for better or worse. Since man's ecotIonic activities differ from region to region, his p‘tterns of transportation, viewed geographically, will also differ. the interlo: eirlines, 1r eiple mire sully de; transport is an the Lite.“ , 1116 is: gauge-a; ”Elan: can 1.5191, UL also differ. A country's transportation system includes the interlocking network of highways, railways, seaways, air]. ines, inland waterways, and pipelines as well as simple animal and human pathways. Although they are mutually dependent upon each other, usually one form of tran sport is dominant. The world's economy also depends on the interplay of all transportation systems.5 In economic geography, transportation is an impor- tant: geographic element--a spatial variable by which regions can be delineated and their characteristics 'tud 1ed, and in terms of which relationships can be ana- lyzed, such as relationships among route location, traffic flow, and other phenomena. In addition, organized trans- Portation is a geographic factor-~an influence on the location of other economic activities; for without a “0.138 of transport there would be no commercial coal min lag, no production of surplus grains, and no commercial lunbering. Without economic transportation, in fact, the V°rld's economy would remain at a subsistence level and I“I’Sicenal specialization yielding exchangeable surpluses w°uld be impossible.6 \ 5 - n°m1¢3 Marvin L. Fair and Ernest v. Williams, Jr., Eco of Trans ortation (New York: Harper Brothers PuB- [Iafierh 1956!, p. 12. th Edward L. Ullman, "The Role of Transportation and 1.3.: Bases for Interaction," Man's Role in Chan in e the of the Earth ed. w. L.-Thomas (University 0 cago “‘33, 1955). pp.’862-877. The :- eovizg 5031: WISE? It? he loved fr mil: hi: this case the vein of 102.7 Tree .eze util‘. :51: u do °’ '42! t‘. e 91 There is no doubt that the services performed in moving goods, people, and services from one place to another are true forms of production because goods that are moved from places of surplus to places of deficiency normally have their value increased in that movement, and in this case, as in others, transportation which increases tho value of goods may be identified as a form of produc- tion.7 These increases in value, these creations of "Place utility” represent production activities just as truly as do the increases of "form utility” by the farmer 01‘ manufacturer, or ”time utility" by the warehouse man. Transportation, therefore, is recognized universally as ‘- P reductive activity . Determinants of Transport Cost Given the various modes of air, land, and water traJ'laport it is not always apparent which method provides the most economical means of moving goods. To be sure, 8°me shipments even may use more than one mode of travel. U‘9 of a particular form of transportation is determined n°t only by its availability, but also by its cost con- aiderrations. Though transport costs display great \ P01 7John B. Lansing, Trans ortation and Economic 10. (New York: Free Press, I956}, p. 13. KIso see 05.1 . cCarty, A Preface to Economic Geo ra (Englewood rte: Prentice-H511, I966), p. 155. variazion, c' certain cor:- eelie of cs: ‘11:: to be I manta, te sever. deter: :1 fig: 9. g: t ‘ t - .15?! ,3) r“ a ‘ 'e ‘ I!” ‘1‘ "" ‘Ov variation, depending on place, time, and type of transport, certain common factors can be identified. These include: value of commodity to be shipped, size of shipment, dis- tance to be covered, form of transport, regional con- straints, terminal handling, and transshipment.8 These seven determinants have a bearing not only upon the ex- change of goods, but directly influence production. There is, however, a direct relationship between cost and Bl>eed, flexibility, and serviceability of the form of tread sport. As a normal rule, air transport of commodities 18 the highest in cost, as well as the most rapid and flexible. Motor carriers are considerably less costly, but: of necessity slower and otherwise constrained. Sim- ilarly, inland water carriers, ocean carriers, and pipe- lines reflect rates directly related to their service- abil 1ty, speed, and flexibility. Many other points bear on the comparison of costs for different types of transport, the many commodities exhlbit physical limits which prevent competition of trans- p°rt modes. Also, the advantage of a given form of trans- p°rt may be lost when seemingly unrelated circumstances ch‘nge (i.e., interest rates, level of employment, etc.). \ We 8Richard M. Highsmith, Jr. and Ray M. Northam, 0’16 Economic Activities a Geo ra hic Anal sis (New PE: Hircourt, Brace 35 For“, Inc” 1968,, pp. 436-441. Fraction, 2?: cast 3:: 2.11, the s; of small at.‘ T :he :11qu ms of la: :‘a size or nczemt‘m. De ... . t”: “3 er tIGEil'y p3: M3! the 5.353! but: Kinky. °3 ‘59 fol; Para” hve t: Phi-w I.‘.O‘p‘ Furthermore, reduction in size of the shipment increases the cost for certain forms of transport. Thus, in gen- eral , the motor carrier has an advantage in the movement of small shipments for relatively short distances while the railway has lower unit costs for long-distance ship- ments of larger size. the The interrelationship of distance, size of the shipment, and the form of transport is noteworthy. Choice of Transport Technology Developing countries have access to new technology that may enable them to break away from the slow evolu- tionary process of transport improvement and thereby to reduce the time and resources needed to overcome time- 89.4319. barriers. In choosing an appropriate transport technology countries should be guided by consideration °r the following: trends in transport methodology; com- parative transport costs; impact of transport costs on pmduction and other distribution costs; the net effects or the several methods of transport on the development of 8’ transportation infrastructure; and potential transport innovations that may alter the cost and quality of trans- portation systems in the forseeable future.9 All of \ 9Wilfred Owen, op. cit., p. 86. 4.- mm 33.... of 33.15er as: be 321 Otherwise, spirallele errors of ii listake of . these factors need to be weighed in arriving at choices of transport methods in order to promote maximum economic progress. The economic circumstances of a country also must be fully understood before the choice is finalized. Otherwise, one can quickly learn that transport affords unparalleled opportunity to make mistakes, including errors of location, technology, design, timing, or the mistake of investing in transport at all. Function of Transport The function of transportation is to move goods ma people. Goods may be classified into three categories: industrial, agricultural, and consumer. The uneven dis— tribution of natural resources makes it necessary to connect such resources to the needs of production. Since confinercial agricultural lands are almost always distant from the populated areas, transportation is necessary for the supply of foods. In addition, the distance between profinction centers and markets emphasizes the need for tr‘n aportat ion capabil itie s . 10 Appropriate transport facilities are the key to e("3310mm development. Without transport, supply and a 9319.114: factors are restricted by the high cost of moving, \ (c 103. s. Caves, Trade and Economic Structure Q“abridge :P- . : Harvard Un vers y ress, cd by :r. ‘. ‘3 (J 1 (A. 1171:; .. to 3053:2133 :.iies e:;' V (I ‘III '- ”mg hue r ‘. « n‘.. “" dab.‘ the supply 111.4” ‘ e - '50.» Mm; :3" “Reine 11:3". lhe‘. mm 2.93.. Pym: dt‘e t‘” t :15- “52-h i “'33": " l _— _— ‘1 «3y: Ir... a." and by the law of supply and demand. Improvement in living conditions is dependent on the ability of people to communicate and on their capacity to trade. Many stud 1es emphasize factors other than transportation as be 1133 the primary elements necessary for economic develop- ment, including improved agriculture, industrialization, the supply of capital, standards of education, and the availability of a management system. The paucity of development literature on the role of transport can be eitplained in part by the failure to recognize that no 318-13th whether agriculture, industry, power, capital, or human resources are stressed, the development of each is PCrtly dependent for its success on mobility and accessi- 193.13.13.11 Transportation, then, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for economic development. No <-"'->\-lnt:ry where there is a critical lack of transport facil- ities is advancing rapidly. Some countries that have t“finely impressive transport facilities also seem to be ma“fitting time. It is apparent from figures of traffic o‘rried and the levels of national income, that the volume or transport operations is closely related to economic pro81‘s". Where a nation's economy is underdeveloped, \ 11 o M. Beckmann, Studies in the Economics of Trans- Kpp’tation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19567, there will ‘: ecanomic sys severed the I)?! imports ' 4 .. met JCJE :emin; t“: u» these gum owl. ‘I UM «Q‘A‘QA “in“ 0:32? 933:: tartan is 3‘ ~.ee. ‘In t W. 1' int: not I Lune: Eilen econ: 10 there will be a low volume of movement and thus the economic system appears retarded.” The question to be answered then is not whether transport is important or more important than something else; but rather, under what circumstances and upon what basis transportation is an ingredient for economic progress. If there is to be a set of clear guidelines con- cerning the role of transportation in development policy, the se guidelines must begin with an understanding that the function of transportation is quite different from Other economic activities. The importance of transpor- tO-tion is derived from its service function for other ‘ctivities. It is not a separate sector of the econom, but is intricately linked to 9.11 other sectors within a 31"en econolw.13 Economic Significance of Railway Transportation In the history of the world, land transport by “‘e‘hs of human porters, pack animals, and animal-drawn Vehicles has been significant. In some of the less developed areas of the world, such means of transport \ p 1235"!“ J- Tuffe . Richard L. Morrill, and at" 3- 001115. ”Transport Expansion in Underdeveloped countrier a Com " . parative Analysis Geographical Review LIII, u (October, 1963), 503. ’ ' 13Wilfred Owen, op. cit., p. 20. still 32:01: developmnt it: of the 1 not lend the values. '1": quieite f( | Re: 1m tramp 3922127 35: ml"? to ”:1? ton.“ M3111 'c 333“ inc“ «'03:: in P5 M an“: E: gut), p. P. 431 vs. 11 still account for the greatest share of commodity xnoxrement},4 Economic advancement, however, requires the development of systems of land transport beyond the capac- ity of the human or animal carrier, since these forms do not lend themselves to rapid, reliable transport of great V°1unes. Thus, mechanized land transportation is a pre- PQQuisite for all economically developing societies.15 Railways have been an important form of mechanized lend transport since their earliest establishment.16 A century ago railways were established as major carriers. R‘ilways today remain the world's prime mover of com- mod 1ty tonnages.l7 The existence of railways is influenced Primarily by the location of points or regions to be 18 Land- Joined and the nature of the intervening surface. fox-m. in particular influence the direction and layout or railway lines. Economic development can be said to be the growth or the aggregate output of a country, or the growth of \ lnG. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 18-21. ‘1 15"- Fabre, A History of Land Transportation (New ork: Hawthorne, 1963), p. 33. 16 G. B. Daggett Princi les of Inland Transpor- % (New York: Harper, 1555), p. 6. 17R. an S. Thoman, The Geograppp of Economic Activitp, %htroductog World Survey ew or : c raw- , , Po . p _ 183. H. Highsmith, Jr. and Ray M. Northan, op. cit., *k31. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIh_______ 'EiIII-..._____......--III tne output . ‘ esteem-n: l (M 3.5.38. ‘31:: I :3! 305313.": lire: also i OI ‘ b"‘e- o, CC 0333210.". 0' . «313, 1133..) 12 the output.19 The relationship of railways to economic development is a close one, for it is not only highly significant in transporting goods and raw materials, but the construction, maintenance, and operation of railway 20 lines also reflect the economic growth of a nation. In general, countries with low standards of living have low standards of transport .21 Science, technology, and edu- cat; ion are essential components for the development and ope ration of effective and efficient transportation sys- tems, including railways. Once a society has achieved the Be ”essentials" for maintaining effective transport syatems, it will have entered into the "industrial age"; occupations will no longer emphasize agricultural pur- Bu ita, but will tend towards manufacturing and service 15filelds. Industry is the key word in the relationship be- t‘een the economic development of a nation and its rail- "an. Countries with little or no industry-nor little or n° Potential for industry--will have few railways. If railways merely serve mining operations in countries rich \ 19w 1: Economic Development Encyclopgdia Britannica (Chicago, 1965), Vol. V, p. 358: 20 G. From, op. cit., p. 31. Also see George w. E1 8on, B. R. Bergmann, . . Hirsch and M. S. Klein, The ‘et of Hi hwa Investment on Develo ment (Washington, ’ - z e roo ngs s u on, , p. 191$. Geg 21hr]: Jefferson, ”The Civilizing Rails," W W, N, 3 (July, 1928), 505-518. a is netural 1 that expartl purposes. of the rail 30 into rel ' light 1 nation Ilse: Baileys, t lea: of I n at: mile; :73 1' Tiny-(3 : 0f :3 “I" “ism; i 10:54:53} ions: 9:2 I 99155135, Q '. !“33‘93, I I lie: 13 : 13 in natural resources, they will be connected only to cities that export the mined products and will serve few other purposes. Also, industry is necessary in the construction or the railway links, for the manufactured products that go, into railway construction are associated with heavy and light industry. Accordingly, costs are high for a nation when railway builders must import these items.22 Ra-ilways, therefore, reflect the rate of economic develop- IIIent of a nation.23 After the industrial revolution got underway, ”‘11way transportation formed one of the most outstanding landmarks of economic-geographic significance on the face or the earth. The primary reasons for supremacy of rail transport were the economic advantages of high capacity, long-distance, reliable (i.e., all-weather, few break- downs, etc.) movement—-all factors necessary for industrial expansion. In examining the distribution and significance of 1‘ a-1‘LZI.seays in an economy, one can use various types of I“Q‘Cures. One such measure-~total mileage of track--is a n(Early meaningless measure since it does not take into \ Tr 22J. R. layer, The Economics of Com etition in the \‘naportation IndustrimW 23:. c . Stover American Railroads (University of lalfiago Press, 1961), 13.5. mm: the intensely t? h: measure says can all :t‘ne test: file of line me since ‘. stance 4 file 25123521113 The total 1 M 6 I St saver tr}; 9.1..) has i ., I ‘4 335: de er a i ~°fis~s . "be to“ "n‘ I‘ .‘.. 14 account the area of the nation under consideration or how intensely the existing trackage is used. A more meaning— ful measure is the density of railway trackage.24 Rail- ways can also be considered in relation to population or on the basis of the volume of traffic or movement per mile of line. This last measure is of particular impor- 13m ce since it provides a statement of the comparative impo rtance of railways . The characteristics of railways in developed and underdeveloped countries are different from each other.25 The total length of railway lines of the world is somewhat greater than it was before World War II. The mileage and rI‘e ight traffic of railways in developed countries gen- era-11y has decreased, but railway expansion has increased in most developing countries who use the train for short- “ad long-distance travel more than do the developed countries.26 The causes of the declining significance of 1‘3-11 traffic in developed countries may be sought by con- sidering the place of railways in the total market as d°r1ned by the characteristics of the service (i.e., need, \ "214 R. M. Highsmith Jr. and R. M. Northan o . cit. p - 431. a .9 _2____ .9 2560 FPO“, OE. cit., pp. 73-800 26 '1' A. Hazlewood Rail and Road in East Africa: 3%8 ort ’ TE g Co-ordination In Undefievelopea Countries 0 n vers ty recs, 1964), pp. 1-8. rice, cezz’.‘ eczeptance) Give nil passes! increasing l half of :‘n ”I s m... 3311:“! M'W’n‘ ‘I g‘oUu.&‘ pr H v“: 23M? ‘ 5‘. tote Laos. Va.‘ contrast, - 30 11,79 “UCw 15 price, comfort, availability, and comparative human acceptance).27 Given the lack of competitive transport systems, rail passenger traffic in underdeveloped countries is increasing as well as is the freight traffic.28 More than hC-lf of the railway lines of the United States today no longer carry passenger trains.29 Broadly speaking, the fire 1ght traffic in developed countries is comprised of manufactured parts and products; whereas mineral and agri- 3111 tural products dominate in underdeveloped countries. Coat considerations frequently cause manufacturing centers to be built near to resources in developed countries. By contrast, the transportation of primary resources continues to reflect long-distance moves in the developing countries ‘~a. movement frequently dependent upon railways. Today, not only is there a relative decrease in 1i'a-I-‘Liheays (i.e., little new railway construction) in devel- Oped countries, but the function of railways is changing 3'3 Well from one of collecting raw materials for factories to One of distributing manufactured products. In the \ 27:. E. Lansing, SIP-.23: pp. 383-384. 281:. J. Taaffe, R. L. Morrill, and P. R. Gould, M. . pp. 505-518. Re 29Robert William Fogel, Railroads and American orJamie Growth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, ’ pp. - e develop 1:3 : I . I‘pnO‘ u OSIrOUJ'. om deve'. :ezzers to . In the use par: of ex; develaping re " L” '53:. ? 16 dove loping nations the collective function dominates the distributive function. In the United States, Japan, and other developed countries there is need to link production centers to ports of entry for the import of raw materials. In the underdeveloped nations the railways focus on the Port of export by contrast. Indeed, many railways in the Cleve loping countries appear to be independent of one mother. In contrast to the developed countries, the rail- Va-ya in developing countries will probably continue to exPQnd in the forseeable future. This is not to suggest th‘t these railways may not need to be subsidized as they My be the only form of transportation and therefore for Be’Iitle purposes not the least-cost type. This is especially true of the planned economy typical of a Communist °°untry.3° The Recent Trends of Railway Transportation Similar trends in transport prevail throughout th‘! world. In nearly all countries truck transport d°m1nates short-haul and bulk shipments. For low-value bulk commodities that move in large volumes, water \ "0 30K. J. Kansky, Structure of Trans ortation Net- Rik“: (University of Chum—WW no see n. s. Thoman, op. cit., p. 115. trszspor‘. a: of getting ‘ general the. menu: .' line ”has; has these 133115 the E333; art. such 1; Ja; 1' Wise; I! 30! I“: in ”1 We; lltion’ l.’ I b .e .. I he:u‘&r a; 93?: “tr: e h a. I “a“.‘c J l7 transport and railways still provide the principal methods of getting things moved.31 Other trends that are becoming general throughout the world include the long-distance movement of passengers by airplane and a reliance on pipe- line transport for the movement of gas and oil. Such new developments alter the interpretation of traditional tPa-n sport methods. Three types of transport patterns have emerged rm!!! these trends. One is characteristic of the econom- ically advanced countries--United States and Western Europe; another is found in lesser developed countries finch as Japan, Soviet Union, India, and China; a third 1" typical of the less populated, underdeveloped countries. 111 some respects, these patterns reflect different stages in Cm evolutionary process. In others, geography, popu- 1‘13 ion , and income levels provide the basis for the par- ticular approach to meeting transport needs.32 Trends in the United States illustrate the trans- Pol-t matrix emerging in an affluent society. Freight tr‘lffic in 1960 was double that in 191:0. Every method of \ be. hicailgnti. 2:25:22 , American Commodity Flow: Geo- Efl) ETP on o a an a er r c sed o r nc es 0 a a terchgggfi’mttle: University V1.13“ ng on ress, 577, pp. . Also see O. W. e on, B. R. Bergmann, L. V. Hirsch, and M. S. Klein, 92. %‘ s P0 191'». 32W. Owen, op. cit., p. 87. transports: enacded in: creased by More dram: tri’fic iii is s resu‘.‘ share or t; 1111910 tc Hater car: the two 35 W316 tsl 18 transportation shared in this growth; but some methods expanded more rapidly than others. Rail transport in- creased by 53 percent and water transport by 89 percent. More dramatic was the 286-percent increase in pipeline traffic and the 383-percent increase in truck transport. A8 a. result of different rates of growth, the railways' there of total freight movements dropped from 61 percent in 19% to 44 percent in 1960. Similarly, while pipelines and trucks accounted for 20 percent of total ton-miles in 1940, by 1960 they were handling 140 percent of the traffic. w‘ter carriers showed a steady growth, but at the end of the two decades accounted for nearly the same share of traffic as at the beginning. Technological changes in Passenger travel resulted in even greater shifts in American transport methods. The automobile greatly ex- Panded total travel volume, and in 1963 accounted for healrly nine, out of every ten passenger-miles. The volume or travel in public carriers also continued to rise, with ‘* doubling of traffic between 19% and 1960. The rail- Weya did not share in the expansion, however. Train travel declined steadily, and the railway share of the passenger bu3-‘Lness dropped from 6’4 percent to 28 percent. Bus travel in 1960 was above the 19110 level but below that of 1950 ‘nd was still declining. Air transport was the major r ‘e tor in the expansion of passenger traffic. The volume of air tr! 1: use if. tropes: c Stezes er: 1122i! ire: :er tri: of energy ferences 1 travel ir. afiendertce interaedie m; u ‘0 MR‘:“‘. ‘8‘ ‘s .34) 1,. ’ ‘u 4. 19 of air travel was thirty-four times higher in 1960 than it was in 1950.33 Trends of Canada3u and the Western European countries were similar to those in the United States and included a general increase in passenger and freight traffic by all methods, the rapid growth of motor truck transport relative to rail, the stable position of water transport in the total picture, and the rapid shift of energy resources to pipelines. The outstanding dif- ferences included a continuing rise in rail passenger travel in places of high population densities, and limited dependence on air travel where good rail service over intermediate distances eliminated the time advantage of air travel between city centers. The Soviet Union35 and Japan placed much greater reliance on railways for both passenger and freight traf- fic, and they began to shift towards road, air, and pipe- line transport much later than did the West. The Soviet 33Data for 19uo and 1950 on freight traffic from Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Transport Eco- nomics and Statistics, ”Intercity Ton-Mile 1939-1959," Statement no. 6103 (1961); 1960 data from Interstate Com- merce Commission, Annual Report, 1960. For passenger traffic: Interstate Commerce Commission, Annual Report, 1940, 1950, 1960. Also see G. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 71:75. 3i‘l‘toy I. Wolfe“ ”Transportation and Politics: tag Egample of Canada, Annals, LII, 2 (June, 1962), 1 - 0. 35George Kish, "Railroad Passenger Transport in the Soviet Union,” The Geographical Review, LIII, 3 (July. 1963). 371-375. orientat: slizatioz ' e vita d :1. oriented. J tic-r. 3:. Remap- VV‘e-b. , 3133.: :9 I part :‘ - r. s A". 20 rail system carried 77 percent of intercity freight, and Japan's system was largely railway-oriented.36 The freight orientation of these countries reflected their industri- alization. In other cases, the less developed countries with dense populations and extensive areas remained rail- oriented. In most developing countries railway construc- tion dominated the picture. China, as a lesser developed country, was of special significance since it had different characteristics of railway construction. In the third category of countries (i.e., Brazil, Burma, Thailand, in tropical lands with low population densities) the low level of economic activity has placed more importance on roads than on railways. These trans- port trends are reflected, in part, in present and pro- posed investment decisions of these countries.37 The Role of Railways in Asian Economic Development Accessibility is a very important factor in ana- lyzing economics. Anything beyond subsistence livelihood urgently requires trade and transportation. Vast areas 361n 1960, railways shared #7 percent of Japan's total freight traffic. According to U.N. Economic Bul- letin for Asia and the Far East, XI, 3 (December, 1955), 37c. Fromm, op. cit., p. 2. in Asia 7838: 'n a‘ CO au- 4 4 pi. w. a. .6 .5 are Fa such me ‘e e R 1 de -. a. v EH. 1‘. 4 AI. 2 a- .U. r“ 3 l e 03 EX «pea; ‘ \e e t \A E 21 in Asia lie more than ten miles from railway track.38 The coherence and strength of a continent are necessarily dependent upon its individual internal accessibility, but most of the Asian countries are inaccessible in terms of rail transportation. In recent years, the growth of transport capacity in the developing countries has been much more rapid than in the rest of the world. In the decade of the fifties, rail freight traffic increased 223 percent in Asia, compared to 27 percent in Western Europe.39 Plainly the above statistics oversimplify the accessibility situation since nation-to-nation differences do exist in Asia. If one compares Indian railways with American or European systems the trains are few and slow. By con- trast, if one compares them with the railways of the rest of the underdeveloped countries in Asia, the trains are many and frequent. Equipment is often old fashioned and schedules are slow, but the Indian railways put a remark- able amount of traffic through, considering the amount of track. The heaviest concentration of lines lies between Calcutta and Delhi. From Delhi, main lines run south to 38There were no points farther than ten miles from railway in Western European countries even as early as 1928. H. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 217. 39W. Owen, o . cit., p. 93: also see United Nations, Statistics Yearbook, 1951, p. 332. tricks st mute: a: mi mete: titties: engines a letter Ir E 0.9723995 tritium 32th mi: 57.1: Iniia this the beam 0 James; I "'I*O; . t.“‘e~ “:5: b“ 22 Bombay on the west or to Madras on the east, and another goes northwest to Pakistan. A line runs down the east coast from Calcutta to Madras, and from Bombay a route crosses the Deccan to Madras, and from Madras there are tracks south to Ceylon or west to Kerala. The major routes are standard gauge, but there are also narrow-gauge and meter-gauge lines. New lines of track are built on standard gauge: diesel engines and in some places electric engines are replacing steam locomotives, although the latter are still dominent."° Economically, both India and China are lesser developed countries in Asia and both of them are indus- trializing, but their railway patterns are quite different. Both railway systems were built during the colonial period, but Indian systems were built entirely under British direc- tion, whereas the Chinese systems were built with British, French, Derman, Russian, Dutch, American, Belgian, and Japanese assistance. The British-built railways formed a unified pattern in India serving British economic inter- ests, but the eight powers responsible for the Chinese railways built their railways to serve their individual colonial purposes, and thus left China with a fragmented howalter C. Neale, India: the Search for Unit , DemocracEg and Progress (New YorE: 5. van fiostrana 60., co: 3 PP. ' 0 q 1', .-' 1'3 11 E: c“ 53 E v e the colo ‘ ‘ b h 49 A.. F‘ l Unfit-ta, 71;: PC--t-:a ' a -Cto a to: ‘ fiaai natio. “.4 ‘ vh.:a, : A.» PW“ ». NV‘ , HIV ‘1' .1 W. J "so u 6.». .awa \J u . a he a U 23 railway pattern. many transshipment points resulted from gauge differences in the pre-Communist period of railway construction and operation before 19u9. Historically, the function of the railways in both India and China were the same--facilitating trade for the colonizing nations and financiers. In India, railways were built by British interests in an effort to extend trade from the coastal areas into the subcontinent!41 In China, the colonial powers built railways in exchange for concessions, for trade and to establish themselves politically. The British also built railways in China to maintain their stronghold in the Far East.”2 In India, nationalization of railways began about 1875, but in China, the Imperial Government, although it began to exer- cise control over its railways at the turn of the cen- tury,“3 did not nationalize its railways as such. The function of contemporary railroads in India facilitates movement of people and freight and especially the movement of grains and other foods throughout the alwalter M. U. Splawn, Government Ownershi .and eration of Railroads (New YorE: The fiEchIIan 50., l , p. ; a so see Nilfred Owen, Distance and Devel- o ment Trans ort and Communication in IndiaITWashington, 5.5.: The Brookings IiBtItution, 1968), pp. 1-5. nan-tn Zen Sun, Chinese Railwa s and British In- terests (New York: King s rown ress, 9 ), p. a. h31b1d., p. 10. veil-be in; 913215 1e, 1 the elm; or View the :se a: “3:5 :f‘e f‘ 1‘ 0e i‘kit. () 0 *fi 1 24 country.uu The function of China's railways has changed from one emphasis to another under different political regimes. In general, the welfare of Chinese people has not seemed to be the direct concern of Chinese govern- ments. Each government primarily has stressed its economic well-being to the exclusion of other considerations. For example, industrialization is being emphasized in Communist China today. Under the present government railways have the expressed function of carrying steel, armaments, iron or minerals.“5 And, of course, the money obtained through the use and sale of these products has not been distributed among the people of China, but rather has been allocated for military and political purposes. China and the Soviet Union are the major Communist countries in Asia, and both of them have emphasized rail- ways in their economic development. Nevertheless, the role of railways in these two Communist countries differs. In a large portion of its national territory in Asia, the entire emphasis of Soviet transport policy has been to extract as much service as possible by importing a minimal capital investment into a single transportation system, uhPeter’T. Bauer, India Economic Policy and Devel- ment (New York: Praeger, I952), p. ‘5;w also see K. P. BEaEnagar,T Transport in Nbdern India (Kanpur, 1955), PP. 51-73. “SChoh-Hing Li, Industrial Develo ment in Communist China (New York: FrederIcE K. Praeger, 63), pp. the rails: long-ran 1 :‘ae loca: relate to I. ‘d 3‘33 Ag § A‘. “Q I..- ‘- 25 the railways.”6 There is a necessary relationship in long-run economic planning between decisions concerning the location of industrial activity and decisions as they relate to transportation. Broadly speaking, it was the objective of the economic planners in the Soviet Union to increase regional self-sufficiency by using railways as the main tool.)47 China's economic policy is concerned with connecting seven newly-formed Economic Cooperation Regions using railways as the major instrument. Six com- modity greups--coa1, petroleum, forest products, mineral building materials, ferrous metals, and ores--account for almost three fourths of rail ton-mileage in the Soviet Union,’48 whereas in China, steel, armaments, and minerals predominate. Among the important lines completed in Soviet Asia, the primary emphasis of present rail construc- tion is the Turkestan-Siberian route between Siberia and Central Asia. The new railways in this area are designed to relieve the traffic pressure on the Trans-Siberian n6Ho11and Hunter, Soviet Trans ort E erience: Its Lessons for Other Countries (washington, 8.5.: The BrooEIfigs Ifistitution, 1958), pp. 5-21. u7Holland Hunter, Soviet Trans ortation Polio (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I957), pp. 123-133. h8Robert C. Kingsburg and Robert N. Taffee,;gg Atlas of Soviet Affairs (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, .9 pp- ‘ o 26 route.u9 The recent construction of Chinese railways has not been primarily for the purpose of relieving present pressures as is the case with the new Soviet railways. The Communist government invented a relatively well- developed rail pattern from the Czarist regime. By com- parison, the present regime in China had to begin their development of railways from a more primitive pattern. From the economic point of view, Communist China in 195250 was comparable to the Meiji Period (1868-1912) in Japan and to contemporary India-~perhaps somewhat ahead of the former and slightly behind the latter, but she lagged considerably behind the Japan of the early 1950's and the Soviet Union on the eve of her first Five- Year Plan.51 Among the Asian countries, Japan, India, and the Soviet Union can be used as yardsticks for comparing transport development in China (Table 1). From the eco- nomic and historical point of view, Japan serves as an #93. Hunter, Soviet Transport E erience: Its Lessons for Other CountrIEs, 0 . cit., pp. 22-36; also Hey I. WoITe, Trans ortation and Poiitics (Princeton: D.‘Van Nostrana 50., 1953), p. 71. 5oAlexander Eckstein, "Conditions and Prospects for Economic Growth in Communist China," werld Politics, VII, 2 (January, 1955), 258. 51H. Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy, 92, 01 e , pp 0 272-2820 lam? 8043:! : 27 TABLE 1 RAILHAY MILEAGE PER 100,000 PERSONS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES Group I Group II Group III Country Miles Country Miles Country Miles Australia 40h Switzerland 78 Japan 12 Canada 378 France 64 India 11 U.S.A. 261 Germany 57 Thailand 9 New Zealand 25h United Kingdom 52 China 2 Spain #8 Italy 31 Soviet Union 28 ‘. Source: International Union of Railways, International Railway Statistics, Year 1961 (ParIs: GeneraI ecre ar a , ernational Union of Railways, 1962). exam“le 12513:: :e we hat-3', s time as q trial: :4! | 1 a: Q—h-. 28 example of a country which started the process of industrialization with the aid of railways in roughly the same way as China did after 1949. India, on the other hand, started from roughly the same base and at the same time as China, but had fallen far behind in its indus- trialization. The Soviet Union, using a more or less similar development model as China, started from a more advanced base and is by now much more advanced than is China.52 Railway transportation played the major role in their economic development, but the function or char- acteristics of the railway systems differ from each other by virtue of differences in their individual economic circumstances. In general, the Asian countries including India, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China have placed major emphasis upon railway transport, but at different stages in their economic development. The Soviet Union and Japan placed much greater initial emphasis and reliance on railways for both passenger and freight traffic, only later shifting to road, air, and pipeline transport. India, with a well-built railway network inherited from the colonial period, continued to accommodate heavy volumes of passenger traffic, including substantial numbers of 520. Fromm, op. cit., p. 78. urban col sixes, '5 called a ‘ l‘ we A543. 'p “I: 4:3??- ‘5 O ‘Ip‘afi Q J A 29 urban commuters. The advanced stage of the Indian rail system, however, is only now approaching what might be called a mature stage of industrial development. Among the Asian nations, China, despite its one hundred years of railway experience, can be considered to be in a.primary stage of economic development. The railway stage is started, but the shifting to highways and airways is far behind (Table 2). The major characteristic of Chinese railways is their continually changing pattern. The changing characteristics of China's railways correlate to the capital formation, colonialism, political, strategic, foreign trade, geographic and domestic economy factors. The unevenly distributed spatial pattern provides external expression of such characteristics (Map 1). Moreover, the spatial pattern does not adequately represent China's economic position. An uneconomical transport system was the most important economic consequence of the influences operative in China. Summary . In summarization, there may be two categories of transportation-~economic and noneconomic. The primary purpose of transportation is to shorten distance (i.e., time, miles, or cost). The essential elements of trans- portation, therefore, are speed, cost, safety, and capac- ity. Because of increasing the value of goods through 30 TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF FREIGHT VOLUME BETWEEN THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE REHABILITATION PERIOD IN CHINA (1952 and 1957) Goods Carried Passengers Carried (10,000 tons) (10,000 persons) Transport Form Incrfase Inorgase 1957 from 1957 from 1952 1952 Railway 24,550.00 85.9 2h,700.00 51.3 Highway 6,7n9.3o 225.8 11,u1u.6o 159.1 {2:2233‘3333 3,685.10 29% 5'6°“-°° 9” Coastal Seaway 1,146.10 195.1 147.00 110.0 Civil Air Line 0.55 175.0 5.u4 145.6 Source: National Security Bureau, Re art on Railwa Con- structions in Mainland China, TaIpeI, I957, p. 23. 31 Has: . . . .. , , mfg.) ....(-\.. .. V1- mc..c.. .J...U . I'll. . . . . 00.00969 _ . e. z (I. u u i e u s e .{.w . * I: .s V \ . .. \ (lites—(l; «\(I «x ... \l! FN ?~\I|.. 4 . .. . N.\...no¢a .9. emu... .... :u . 1. i J . x. a . .... I. . 1. .A- .S. v «Afr. ...... .... . $.02 V 321.3. Vnr a ... rJ 0 fN/s“ r.\l .. 0 A \ . ..L \ a . \.. .v .1.» m1. F...lu¢/.../.w./....l.))..1 .. . I! ~’-. 0’ n. . m / ..N . ..I\ I: . .../if. ~ .L/ J ..\..\ .../. ea ../_... e; 2V. t. x .: s ./ .v ./. ..x 5.. /.. r, a .) I I I \l . ) r/J. \ a . 1 Mi... \:../l/ .4 ml). .../. a .I...‘ ...:I .II. 9 ....s N. . J, l: \I ) |‘ \u ( é.‘ ...) r a. ..l. (a ...k J. a. ....o... .s 021%» a. \. \ /Jlll.. ~ ..l:\ i / ... ~ ./.l.\. -1. ..\r...\ ./ haiku...‘ / m F.) 1 ..N r, ... .. ..I.l\ .l .n d .3 shipment, for: of p: elhodies 1: finally cl :mngly ( portaticn 23:10 natifin. wide Q 20:35: 32 shipment, the form of transportation included is a true form of production. The transport system of a country embodies many modes of transportation. Although they are mmtually dependent upon each other, usually one type is strongly dominant. Choice of a particular form of trans- portation is determined not only by its availability but by its cost as well. The major determinants of transport cost are: commodity value, size of shipment, distance, region, form of transport, terminal handling, and trans- shipment. The function of transportation is to move goods and people, but is quite different from other economic activities. Its importance is derived from goals other than those it is designed to service. It is not a separate sector of the economy, but is intricately linked to sectors of a nation's economy. Railway transportation has both advantages and disadvantages. However, it can promote economic develop- ment by carrying a greater amount of goods in less time at a cheap rate. As a form of mechanized movement rail- roads are closely related to the economic development of a nation. While differences will undoubtedly persist in nation-to-nation economic comparisons, railways will pro- vide a common opportunity for effectively developing countries according to their individual economic and social circumstances. 33 In Asia, India, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China, transport is railway-oriented; but each country demonstrates a different stage of economic development. In the extensive and overpopulated area of China, railways have been chosen as a basic ingredient in achieving eco- nomic improvement. However, after a century of development commencing in 1866, Chinese railways today remain in a primary stage of development. The unusual characteristics of railway development in China, often contrasted with other Asian countries, provides the primary focus for this study. rm cw L *1 DQIISPE Se'v'e ya; CHAPTER II THE CHANGING CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINAFS RAILWAY PATTERN A changing pattern is the major characteristic of China's railways. The spatial expression of the rail network developed to meet the changing needs of the nation.1 From 1865 to 1911 China supplied resources to several colonial powers and became a market for finished European products. Railway construction thus served colonial purposes. After the Republic was established in 1911, China became politically aware of its economic position and attempted to develop railways to serve its national and economic needs. This program was delayed by both the First and Second World Wars. The Communist regime was established in 1949, at which time the railway 2 to policy attempted to develop interregional transport connect the Communist Asian Bloc countries. ‘Viewed his- torically, strongly conflicting attitudes toward railway building developed when foreign control ran counter to Chinese ideas of economic self-improvement. Fourteen periods of rail development are dis- cernible during the one-hundred-year period, 1866-1966. 1 21h. Ministry of Railways had divided administration of the Chinese railway system into six major areas in 1953 based on the six economic regions in China. 34 Generally, the reasons were not economic ones. 35 Each of these periods has an identifiable set of charac- teristics which differentiate it from others. The periods can be grouped into three separate eras as follows: 4‘:me The Imperial Era, 1866-1911 Conservative Period, 1866-189u Scramble for Concessions Period, 1895-1905 Self-strengthening Period, 1906-1910 Nationalization Period, 1910-1911 The Republic Era, 1911-1949 Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Planning Period, 1911-1914 Penetration of Japanese Capital Period, 1915-1920 New Four-power Consortium Period, 1921-1926 The National Government Control Period, 1927-1935 The Sino-Japanese War Period, 1936-1945 The Post-war Period, l9fl5-l949 The Communist Era, 1949-1966 The Rehabilitation Period, 1949-1952 The First Five-year Plan Period, 1953-1957 The Second Five-year Plan Period, 1958-1962 The Economic Recovery Period, 1963-1966 The Characteristics of the Im erial W This era marks the beginning of railway develop- ment in China. Aspirations of foreign mercantile inter- ests and a desire of Chinese literati and officials to use railways as a means of strengthening China in the late nineteenth century, were some of the factors that gave impetus to railway construction. Following the turn of the century certain sections of the Chinese gentry also began to take an initiative in promoting railway construc- tion. possibl R ”Emir l: ." 7y, ‘L ”I v.1 I? ’1 1'le 'd . ‘ s, x 0—. a) (1 pa 36 Most of the railways of this era were owned by foreign interests and their construction was financed by foreign capital. With foreigners monopolizing the highest positions, the Chinese people did not gain the advantages possible if the investment had been a national involve- ment. It has been contended that more unification in China was destroyed than was created during this forty- five-year period of railway construction. The disruption of traditional economic patterns without substitution of adequate new ones was a primary characteristic of this period. Carts, porters, pack animals, and inland waterways carried the greatest volume of goods before the railway was introduced to China.3 In an economy as "enclosed," "A "pro-industrial, and "intensively subsistent" as was China from 1866 to 189#, railway transportation was needed to promote economic expansion. However, in a capital-poor country as was nineteenth-century China, the heavy capital investment necessary for railways was a major obstacle to 3Rhoads Murphey, "China's Transport Problem, and Communist P1anning,‘ Economic Geoggayhy, XXIII, 1 (Janu- GRP: 1955): 19-21. IFei Hsiao-tung, the famous anthropologist in China, described the old Chinese agricultural conditions and practices as a "closed economy or "economy of scar- city.” It might also be called an economy of struggle for physical survival. ‘he devel. is the :1 economic 1 $0111.33 c 1'3; ted :4:- b? 1117611- 37 the development of transportation. Not to be overlooked is the significant political reason for railway construc- tion during this period.5 In addition to the lines con- structed by the foreigners, many Chinese-owned lines were built for political and strategic purposes rather than economic needs. This era can be characterized as one of passive, foreign controlled, poorly designed, and politically inter- rupted railway construction. Four periods are discernible by their distinctive characteristics. These include Con- servative Period (1866-1894), Scramble for Concessions Period (1895-1905), Self-strengthening Period (1906-1910), and the Nationalization Period (1910-1911). The Conservative Period, 1866-1894 The introduction of railways to China tended to emphasize the differing psychological reactions of the colonizer and the resident population. From the Western point of view, the refusal by the Chinese to encourage railway construction was considered to be an unreasonable and unrealistic attitude. From the Chinese point of view, however, rail construction required a new psychological commitment which involved the acceptance of a new and incomprehensible way of life--a way of life entirely 5J. K. Fairbank, China and United States Polic (Cambridge: Harvard UhiversIty Press, I960), pp. 206-515. different Consider: it is not been such was the c '17. men casing 011 River f0. fought 2‘: Shipping Vested 1; the int:- ”Page; Are 3?; a ”with 38 different from and counter to that of the colonizer. Considering the psychology of nineteenth-century China, it is not difficult to understand that there should have been such strong opposition to railway construction. As was the case elsewhere, such concern was explainable. Watermen on the Thames in Shakespeare's London fought the coming of the coaches: portagers on the Sault Ste. Marie River fought the builders of the first canal; canalers fought the railway; railwaymen are fighting the highway; shipping interests are fighting the jet plane. Those with vested interests in older techniques are bound to fight the introduction of new ones.6 Four different reactions to railway construction represented by four different groups of Chinese people are apparent. The railway construction during the Con- servative Period suffered as the result of these widely divergent psychological bases. The first and largest group numerically were the common people. Their tradi- tional position ran counter to acceptance of any new ideas or development. Basically they opposed railway construc- tion in China on the basis of equating mechanical civili- zations with imminent bad fortune.7 The mind of the 6Roy I. Nolfe, Trans ortation and Politics (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand 00., I963),—pp. 82-83. 7One of the messages from memorandums about rail- ways submitted to the Imperial Court is quoted from Ching Shih Kao: ”Foreigners are mostly of Roman Catholic or the for 'Feng-e 8“: ‘4 6‘ q rfiodbh I 11-31 tee 39 common man was fettered by superstition. It was not uncommon to regard interference with ancestral tombs in the form of railway tracks as an offense against the ”Peng-shui,” that is, the good fortune of their ancestral spirits. Like home-loving peasantry everywhere, these nineteenth-century Chinese were unwilling to suffer the expropriation of their farms and homesteads for railway purposes. The unprecedented speed of the locomotive was feared as a source of danger to pedestrians and cattle as well. In retrospect it is clear that the attitude of the common people was the result of their isolation, lack of education and their inability to project the future of railways in terms of overall national economic potential as the most practical means of affecting that potential.8 Protestant faith and are ignorant of the spirits and gods whose abodes are in the mountains and gorges. Where the projected lives are interrupted by rivers and streams the foreigners would sink huge blocks of stone and iron into the bottom of the river and build iron bridges over the top, paying no heed to the abodes of the nymphs, mermaid, and spirits. The blasting of scenic mountains and the interference with beautiful streams disturbs not only the peaceful occupation of the people but also the tranquility of the gods and spirits. It would only be natural that such action should cause misfortune to the people and pro- voke the wrath of the gods in the form of drou hts, floods, plaque, and pestilence." Chane Kin-n68“. 914.2fin. P-Z- 8According to Ching Shih Kao, one of the memoran- dums is quoted here: 1'Since our military strength is inferior to that of the foreigners, it will be only logical for us to make the best use of strategic positions like mountain barriers to strengthen our lines of defense, a principle that has been followed by Chinese strategists . . to bu ... C~ AV 3* D. C. .0.” We a a e: .r;. 99a A» n an. A» non. .ru I. n. D. O I T: n a Go ..4 a» T: 6» -~ I. ...- Qe .. a 3 «J 5 3 I o. a a ..k c we n. u. .1 x . J u. 64 1!... I. an o o 7. «J a. a» I. D. ‘U 6.. as n. .c t t e ..e i p wevh 40 The government was divided into three additional groups of officials who held different opinions about rail- way construction. These groups included the Emperor and his family, the Imperial Court (high-ranking Manchu advisors in the palace whom the Manchu ruler trusted more), and the progressive statesmen. The Emperor and his family's decisions depended somewhat upon the suggestions of the Imperial Court and the progressive statesmen. The Emperors involved in this era of railway construction are Emperor T'ung-chih (1862- 1874), Emperor Knang-hsu (1875-1908), and Emperor Hsuan- t'ung (1909-1911). The influences from Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi on the Emperors were significant since 1862. Thus for a period of thirty years the titular rulers of China were children, and the actual ruler was a woman. The Imperial Court, on the other hand, having ex- perienced years of acute diplomatic friction with foreign powers, were justifiably apprehensive over the ulterior motives of the foreigners who, more or less arrogantly, insisted on the adoption of various railway projects. Con- servative by nature and more cautious than ever in conse- quence of their bitter experiences, Court officials from time immemorial. The introduction of the railway will deprive China of this natural advantage, for the railways will reduce all natural strategic positions to thoroughfares for locomotives and wagons. Such a step may be likened to removing the doors and leveling down the fences of our own home, leaving its interior to the mercy of marauding rob- bers. It would therefore be folly to deprive our nation of its invulnerable position and thus to tempt the enemy to Egrgher attack by providing him with railway facilities.” de'°1"-’11 «Iv-FA dancv - :9 ‘ . - 'sz he ‘ c e- e ‘V-J p l wed/egal‘ a I V d h .‘. n- ..c y e G‘s. . “...: 1. a ho S ‘ -Ve \ U #1 determined to do nothing and allow nothing to be done which might lead to additional foreign complications. They were Manchus and had no educational background in science, technology, and international understanding. Nevertheless, they were representative of the group of high officials who held power during the Manchu regime. The progressive statesmen were Chinese elevated administratively from their provinces. These men were appointed by the Emperors to assume high positions in the central government for two reasons. First, the Manchu rulers wished to use a few high-ranking Chinese officials in the central government in order to control the mass of the Chinese people. Second, the statesmen had a better educational background and were needed by the Manchu rulers to solve the diplomatic problems in the changing world. Some progressivestatesmen such as Li Hung-chang (1823- 1901), Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885), Chang Chih-tung (1837- 1909), and Liu Ming-ch'uan (1844-1908) all recognized the inevitability and desirability of the modernization of China and were strong advocates of railway construction. Li, in his Memorial on Coastal Defense, stressed the im- portance of national defense, ascribing primary importance to the railways in this matter.9 Tso proposed the building of a railway from Peking to the Yangtze valley along the 9L1 Hung-chang's opinion on railways can be found in: Li Hen Chun Kun Chuan Chi V01. 11, p. 27; Vol. 12, pp. 2, 25; V01. I3, p. 8; 701. Ifi, p. 2h; V01. 17, pp. 12, 53; V01. 24, pp. 22, 26. f‘ ' fl-r 4:333 01.. death: 3’ of fore: ' t 5228 O. t. ' 1 5.0!) J, P313; A 3' Yo w Rania: 42 Grand Canal as a matter of military necessity, and on his deathbed memorialized the Emperor on the pressing danger of foreign aggression and the importance of railways as one of the means of national defense to stop that aggres- sion in China.99 Thus, three groups of officials formed an atti- tudinal balance-board during the Manchu Dynasty. The Emperor sat at the pivotal position. The Imperial Court officials served as one plank, striving to influence the Emperor, but they were conservative in attitude. The Chinese progressive statesmen served as the other plank, attempting to influence the Emperor with their radical point of view. The efforts of these statesmen gradually swayed the Court, and public opinion of the common people was diverted from the theoretical issue of the advisability of railway construction to the practical question of actually beginning construction on the first railway. Accordingly, efforts by Westerners to introduce railways to China were abetted by one set of Chinese officials, yet hindered by another. From the beginning, officials of the central government looked to railways to strengthen not only the country, but also their own hold on vested interests in China. Later in this period, they thought of railways merely in military and political rather than in economic terms, going so far as to place the ga'Chang Kia-ngau, China's Stru 1e for Railroad Development (New York: The Jofin Day 00., I913), p. 25. €33 .Jvazir F lino ““41 2.. ‘ ~‘H- 0““ n‘ V a. 9.. a. W. a?» u v 9» “a on M e .u... Cb A: up“ 3 sl‘ 85 n a: a» b I J 9.» AU Fl. 3. 0 .. a . w. .. s y; a» 43 administration of national railways inthe hands of the Bureau of Naval Affairs.9b The balancing movement of the four groups created the basis for the characteristics in railway construction during this twenty-nine-year period. Scramble for Concessions Period, 1895-1905 While the Peking Court continued to resist the oncoming tide of alien influences, the leaders of Japan were eager to accept new foreign ideas and in particular to remodel the Japanese army and navy along Western lines. China assumed itself to be developing along similar lines. waever, in 189M a clash over Korea revealed that she had only been playing at military modernization. China was defeated by her small neighbor, and under the conditions of the Treaty of Shimoneseki, acknowledged the independence of Korea, ceded Taiwan and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, and, in addition, was forced to pay a heavy indemnity. The result was a conviction in foreign diplomatic circles that the Manchu government was incapable of block- ing their independent exploitations in China. France had become entrenched in Southeast Asia in the annexation of Annam in 1885. Russia, utilizing the Trans-Siberian Railway, pushed forward on the Manchurian border.lo 9bZen Sun, E-tu, "Railwa Development in China," Far Eastern Qparterlz, XIV (1955 , 183. 1oRobert N. Taaffe, ”Transportation and Regional Specialization: the Exam 1e of Soviet Central Asia," Annals, LII, 1 (March, 1 2), 80—98. nl‘ II ...F . . E a a. I I]! l1. . c. . . 1 r . t.— . . N. :- 14 . .3 d “J a. M. Ma. me. .I C .3 .C .5 . a it“ .1. E . . o . .. .. _ 4 m ”w ”4 MW .3 L “a Q . a. ‘QJ- .‘nflb \ v b .n V“ l s A!» .na. ‘5 . Q . . 1“ n— 0. b w‘ ...“ Hub». m a a: u‘ ... a. .K e. a: «a T: .....n s" P 0 .Mu. a" 8 LT. « ..a y. 3 “a M. a. 3 a . 3 n. .3 .45. A... u aw . a» 8 Cu . a .9. S m S s .... P n. a g «L ‘ \ ...: #4 England wished to control the Yangtze Valley,11 as France desired Yunnan Province, and Russia the area of Manchuria. Germany, a very latecomer and all the more anxious to make up for lost time, sought to control Shantung Province. To balance the gifts to Germany and Russia, England secured the Lease of Neihaiwei, France obtained Kwangchow, Germany secured Tsingtao, and Russia was given Dairen. These Leased Territories differed from the earlier settlements and were more in the nature of colonies. These were the days when the cry of "the white man's burden" was at its maximum.12 High-minded men were per- suaded that the benefits of their material civilization must be an unmitigated blessing to "the colored races." Southern Asia as well as Africa suffered the benefits of such‘thinking.13 China did not escape from this movement. Agents of railway and mining corporations flocked to Peking. Through the acquisition of railway and mining concessions, spheres of economic influence could be estab- lished and the question of political control could be left to that convenient time when one's competitor was not 11Zen Sun, E-tu, Chinese Railw s and British Interest 1828-1211 (New York: Kings Crown Press, IQBH), PP- ’ . 123. I. wolre, op. cit., pp. 70-91. 131bid. latching cessions L: (I ’J 45 watching so carefully. The uncontrolled race for con- cessions was on. China was in no position to advance herself in this period; she had conceded railway rights to every soliciting power. The foreign concessionaires were allowed to complete construction and begin operating their rail- ways. Host of the main line railways in China were built at this time by foreign engineers with foreign capital and Chinese workmen. The contemplated mining development did not occur because the Manchu dynasty fell out of power before the railways were completed and the country was thrown into administrative confusion. British coal mines at Kailan and Japanese coal and iron mines in Manchuria were the most noteworthy exceptions. The Treaty of Shinonoseki in 1895 conceded to Japan the right to build factories in the Treaty ports. This right was conferred on the British by a treaty in 1902. Cotton and flour mills were opened by both the Japanese and British in Shanghai and Tientsin. In 1902 England allied herself with Japan. Both nations feared Russia's advance into Manchuria, where she controlled the newly built Chinese Eastern Railway. In 190h the inevitable war between Japan and Russia began. Russia was defeated, leaving Japan by the Treaty of Ports- mouth heir to Russian interests in South Manchuria. 3.. ..ss‘ -a' 46 Russia's loss was a momentary gain for China, for the colonial powers insisted that the agreement which America had sponsored in 1898 for an open-door policy in trade should be applied to South Manchuria. To this suggestion Japan submitted unwillingly; yet by so doing, the Con- cessions Period drew to a close. 0n the part of the Chinese, Chang Chih-tung, the Governor of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, played a major role in railway construction during the Concession Period. The new Imperial Railway Administration Bureau was created by his order in 1896 and Sheng Hsuan-huai (1861-1920) was appointed as the director-general. This organization controlled rail construction from 1896 to 1905. Chinese capital for railway construction was most difficult to obtain and foreign loans were needed. Because of the in- put of foreign capital, the construction was dominated by foreign interests and foreign control. China, accordingly, lost her rights even for the railways constructed for her own purposes. This period commenced in 1895, the same year that China was defeated by Japan, and ended in 1905 at the termination of the Imperial Railway Administration. The period marked a high point in Chinese railway history,lu 1uHIung-hsun Lin, Histo of Chinese Railways (Taipei: Ubrld Press, 1953’, pp. 5-9. and was char-act for concessions shape the netwo numerous agreerm eluded with dif; In the 1 ”1'9“!” betwee: Chinese '32"! 1‘01 u minor}. The 3;): Mn test against for “3”“ both r. ”r" Vane Ch. 31 r- . 3.08 the COIOn‘ be ...:5 Partithne ”'9" dealt cm The Self 47 and was characterized by the great international scramble for concessions. Much was done during this period to shape the network of China's future railway system and numerous agreements for railway construction were con- cluded with different powers. In the face of the great disparity in military strength between China and the colonial powers, the Chinese were forced to give in, suffering in silent indig- nation. The sporadic attacks of the Chinese upon indi- vidual foreigners, culminating in the Boxer Movement, must be regarded as spontaneous demonstrations of popular pro- test against foreign intrusion. During this period China suffered both from internal strife and external aggres- sion. while China benefited from the mutual Jealousy among the colonial powers, which spared her the fate of being partitioned and completely subjugated, the colonial powers dealt Chinese national sovereignty a severe blow. The Self-strengthening Period, 1906-1910 During the early twentieth century, the colonial transportation system in China and elsewhere became an expression for local national development. This interest was firmly founded in economic accomplishments, and it expressed itself as a national desire to achieve self- sufficiency in transportation. When no such foundation existed, the nation turned for help to other, richer self-contrc tozally an: in other re proved to ‘r a. 48 nations to acquire transportation facilities. If China, when turning to others for help, had full regard for its economic needs, then it could place itself on the road to self-control. If, however, China's new acquisitions were totally unrelated to its economic needs and not Justified in other real needs, such as strategic ones, they then proved to be merely an empty gesture, made in the interests of an illusory prestige, and in the end led to harm. At the same time, there was strong discontent within many col- onies regarding the system of European political domination. Revolutions had already occurred against European-based colonialism as a political and economic force. The re- action in China was a part of this movement, and the pro- vincial officials formed the nucleus of this discontent. Between 1906 and 1910, China began to move once again towards self-strengthening. This period served as the basis for self-strengthening of her railway develop- ment.15 The economic and political aggressions of the imperialist powers inspired the Chinese people. Their former conservative manner towards rail construction was modified radically. The provincial gentry tried to organize the manpower and collect capital for the purpose 15This is the period of self-strengthening in rail- way construction from 1906, the year after the Imperial Railway Administration Bureau closed until 1910, the year the nationalization of railways was on the move. The opinions during the cultural "self-strengthening" period (1860-1894) did have some influence on this period in railway construction. 49 of railway development which would compete with established colonial lines. The government tried to control the colonial lines whenever it was possible, but such efforts were unsuccessful throughout this period. One of the advocates of railway building for self-strengthening was Hsueh Fu-ch'eng.l6 He suggested to the government that the building of railways would accom- plish three things beneficial to the country: trade would be increased, the transportation of tribute rice would be made easy, and troop movements would be facilitated.17 Ma 18 another railway advocate, included the ex- Chien-chung, ploitation of mineral resources as one of the benefits to be derived from the railways. K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927) declared that the strength of a country was in direct proportion to the ratio of steam power against man and horse power, and he believed that the railway, the steam- ship, and the electric wire were the three things that 16Hsueh Fu-ch'eng (1838- 94) was the Chinese ambas- sador to Great Britain. He published the essay, "On the Introduction of Railways into China," in 1880. 17Feng-tien Chao, "Economic Thought During the Last Fifty Years of Ching Period, "Yenchin Journal of Chinese Studies, Monograph Series No. 18 (fie EIng, 1939), p. 151. . lane Chien-chung (1842-1904) was the Chinese am- bassador to Kbrea. His opinion on railway construction was mainly for mineral exploitation. See Feng-tien Chao, ”Economic Thought During the Last Fifty Years of the Ching Period," Yenchin Journal of Chinese Studies, monograph Series No. 18 (PeEIng, 1939), pp. 155-156. would most ra. defined the r: could ”open t1 eat: of agric; -- 20 Human, " t: such as these the railway a: the Vestem p: ”1131681 sta‘: During the Chinese pe the COIODial p integrity And lith the "id: lesmesa of th ltmgthening the part or t: '38s“ or th- niricamt at t: or: nese Prov Cm StPUctiOn . 50 would most radically change the world.19 Chang Chih-tung defined the railway as the one developmental aspect that could "open the doors to greater development in the inter- ests of agriculture, industry, commerce, and military matters,"20 that is, in the interests of all segments of the national life. During this period, many arguments such as these were aimed at persuading China to accept the railway as a means of strengthening China vis-a-vis the Western powers and as a contribution to China's future political stability. During the period of the scramble for concessions, the Chinese people were watching with increasing concern the colonial powers' rapid encroachment on China's national integrity and sovereignty, and they were concerned both with the avidity of the Concessionaires and at the help- lessness of the 01d Imperial Regime. This self- strengthening effort, born of spontaneous aspirations on the part of the Chinese people to develop the railway systems of the various provinces, was strategically sig- nificant at that time. The lines proposed by the gentry of these provinces served as a valuable guide to railway construction by the government after a few years had passed. 198ee Kang Yu-wei, 0n National Salvation Through material Development (ShangfiaI, 1919), p. 59. 20 Fens-tier] Chao, OEe Cite’ pp. 1-75e T1 comprehens the abilit with the e considerat foreign cc benefited ince had t? part 0f it: by POP‘Jlar undertaken meat '38 31‘ PQiSQ suffi: deVelopment “11“" in the fol-10'3“] “pang thenir 51 The capital required for the construction of a comprehensive railway system was enormous and far beyond the ability of provincial finances during this period.21 With the exception of Kwangtung, which was able to raise considerable capital among its prosperous emigrants in foreign countries, and of Kiangsu and Chekiang, which benefited from their large foreign trade, no other prov- ince had the means of carrying out even a substantial part of its plans. As a result, little was accomplished by popular subscription in comparison with the methods undertaken by the government. The difference in achieve- ment was great, and the failure of private enterprise to raise sufficient capital to meet the expense of railway development presaged the subsequent nationalization of railways in China. The descriptive characteristics of the following period were structured in the Self- strengthening Period. The Nationalization Period, 1910-1911 This period was characterized by Imperial govern- ment control of the railways in China. The nationalization of railways was a direct result of four circumstances. First, since many lines were proposed by the provinces, alchang Kia-ngau, China's Stru 1e for Railroad Development (New York: The 3053 Day 50., 1943), pp. 41-42. the poll: gradually The Impe: control possibil policy 1 the exp. Im‘éeria lithe“ CQ‘AS‘QP “133% r 52 the political status of each individual province was gradually changed into one of semi-independent control. The Imperial government felt that they would soon lose control of China. To prevent this political, centrifugal possibility, the Imperial government decided to create a policy for nationalizing all the railways. Second, from the experiences of provincial railway construction, the Imperial government felt that it could build railways without foreign aid. It was believed that the planning, construction, operation, and administration of railways under one authority would benefit national interests. Third, an anti-Hanchu movement was expanding over the country, and it was very difficult to maintain order because of distance factors and inadequate transportation. A centrally controlled railway system was necessary for military purposes. Finally, given the financial problems of railway construction in all provinces except in Kwang- tung, Kiangsu, and Chekiang, an opportunity for the central government to annex these railways with national capital was created. A quick decision was necessary, and the Imperial government made it. In 1911, Sheng Hsuan-huai, Director- General of the Board of Posts and Communications, was ordered by the Imperial government to memorialize the throne, to nationalize all railway enterprises, and to take over al of speeding by an Imperi railway corp the state co by the provi: ‘11 Previous canceled.22 When '35 made know Popular indig ordinal-y exte vaince : an: mimic!) 1r. EOYEmmen ‘7 Bel 52a take over all private and provincial lines for the purpose of speeding railway development. His petition was granted by an Imperial edict. Henceforth, the trunk lines and railway companies in the country were all placed under the state control. Branch lines might still be constructed by the provinces according to their financial ability but all previous permits for the building of trunk lines were canceled.22 When the new policy of railway nationalization was made known, the people raised a storm of opposition. Popular indignation was once more aroused to an extra- ordinary extent. It was especially intense in Szechwan province, and the coincidence of the outbreak of the revolution in Hupeh province had encouraged the people of Szechwan. T0 suppress the movement, the Imperial government sent its well-eqipped soldiers under the com- mand of General Tun Fang t0 Szechwan, but the general 22The first railway thus taken over by the Imperial government was the Canton-Hankow Railway which the local gentry of Kwangtung, Hunan, and Hupeh had failed to com- plete after five years of controversy. The Imperial government again solicited foreign financial assistance and began in 1909 to negotiate with French, German, American, and British bankers for a loan of 5,000,000. The proceeds of the loan were to cover the completion of the unfinished 560 miles of Canton-Hankow Railway, and the construction of a railway from Kwangshui, a station on the Peking-Hankow Railway, to Ichang, a river port on the northern bank of the Yangtze about 370 miles west of Rankow. The loan was known as the famous Hukuang Loan. According to Chang Kia-ngau, op. cit., p. 44. was ass; met the Szechwa regime Octobel the yo: abdi: Period in Ch' ‘0 r3 53 was assassinated on his way and the Viceroy of Szechwan met the same fate. On September 10, 1911, the people of Szechwan declared themselves independent from the Manchu regime and in sympathy with the revolutionary cause. On October 10, Prince Regent Chun proclaimed on behalf of the young Emperor his abdication from the throne. The abdication of the Manchus marked the close of another period of Chinese railway construction. The Nationalization Period lasted only one year in China's railway history, but it gave great influence to railway policy in the years to follow. The Characteristics of the Republic Era, 1911-19u9 In general, the Republic Era in China demonstrated a changed role for the colonial railways. China, of necessity, assumed increasing control as the Western powers gradually withdrew because of the two world wars. Strategic and economic considerations caused the railways to fall under the direct control of the Chinese military. The era was marked by fluctuating consistency and embryonic change in railway construction. Railway projects were well planned, but the investment of capital in railways presented a serious problem. China was forced to rely on inputs of foreign capital. Regrettably, the Japanese capital investment was infiltrated by political enforcement, and, while tn! bfilci fewer rest..- hard" for Chil moat confusi. , n‘litary and 1 construction 1 81-3.E‘-.fical'lce , Polity throughout 11m 54 and, while the foreign capital from other sources placed fewer restrictions on China, it did not provide a "free hand" for China's railway construction. This created a most confusing situation during this era. Accordingly, military and political interruptions related to railway construction distinguished this thirty-eight-year period. After the new Republic regime was established, it became imperative that China should consolidate once again politically, culturally, and economically. The significance of railway development for achieving this goal was recognized from the start. Politically, the Chinese people have maintained throughout the ages an indivisible identity, internecine wars have been fought and dynasties have changed, but the people have survived all vicissitudes. Not only were they able to withstand periods of alien rule, but also to assimilate and absorb the intruders. An explanation of this power of survival is to be found in their in- tolerance of tyranny and oppression. They rose in arms against foreign aggression and exploitation in the Boxer Movement. The Chinese Revolution in 1911 was again directed against injustice. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen maintained that the final objective of China's revolution was the attainment of liberty and independence, without which neither peace in China nor peace in the world could be :hieved ar st.‘ " eggle a; that China' pendence 2‘ forward in A“, .owning a: 55 achieved and made secure.23 With regard to China's struggle against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek likewise pronounced that China's aims were dependent upon freedom and inde- 24 This aspiration, born of spontaneity, surged pendence. forward in a persistent and unyielding momentum toward a crowning accomplishment, that of rebuilding a free and independent nation. However, political unity can only prosper if an atmosphere of active cultural and economic intercourse is achieved throughout a nation. It was to these purposes that new plans for railway transportation were directed.25 Indeed, an independent and unobstructed development for China served as the primary goal of Chinese railway expansion during the Republican era. Culturally, the Chinese people have been blessed with a common written language and a tradition largely based on Confucian ethics. Local differences of dialect have always existed, but the benefit of a common written language has preserved to a remarkable degree the cul- tural homogeneity of the country. The introduction of Western ideas in the past century, however, has inevitably 23Sun Yat-sen, Three Principles (Shanghai: 1922), pp. 1-5. 2“Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny_(Chungking, 19,42), ppe 1-3e 25Sun Yat-sen, The International Develo ment of China (London: Hutchinson E 00., 1921), pp. 9-13. disturbed an cultural ide Inch faster as a whole h development. tatioo and 2 ideas Spread motives and People into civilization that in orde; to heighten I of cultural ‘ the best Ole.- I“1‘"133 . 27 56 disturbed an otherwise tranquil and harmonious state of cultural identity. The coastal provinces were modernized much faster than the interior, so much so that the country as a whole has suffered from great variations in regional development.26 Only where sufficient means of transpor- tation and communication were available could modern ideas spread at an even pace. The introduction of loco- motives and steam engines into the interior brought the people into closer contact with the machinery of modern civilization. The new administration felt, therefore, that in order to preserve China's indigenous culture and to heighten its values, to smooth out regional differences of cultural development, and at the same time to absorb the best elements of Western civilization, no better means could be found than large-scale development of railwaymz7 Economically, China has enjoyed a unity and age- long stability of her own, particularly in the field of agriculture. But she has suffered from a slow rate of economic progress due to the lack of modern technological equipment. Transportation by railways could solve China's 26John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomac on the China Coast (Cambridge: Harvard UniverSIty Press, I§55), PP. 3'55- 27Chang Kia—ngau, op. cit., p. 8. De 3r Pr Eh 57 problems in the economic field even more readily than those in the political and cultural fields. Only by using railways can heavy equipment necessary for industrial enterprises be carried over long distances. The movement of tools and equipment would be followed by necessary labor relocation from one locality to another, possibly resulting in a more equitable distribution of population and wealth throughout China. The vastness of the country can only be mastered and made useful by the introduction of more railways. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had stated succinctly at the beginning of this era, "Transportation is the key to industries and the railroad is the key to transpor- tation."28 The planners of the new Republican regime attempted to achieve a stronger unification of China's body politic, a greater homogeneity of her culture, and a more thorough economic development. In this way the leadership thought China would at last grow to full political maturity and would be able to preserve the freedom and independence for which she had sacrificed so much in the wars. It ap- peared almost self-evident that the development of a com- prehensive network of railways was the key to making China a competitive partner in the world community given her rich natural endowments, know-how, and population. 28 Sun Yat-sen, The International Development of China, op. cit., p. 98. politics the four positioz '38 the] 0f Kati: railway 1118 app; I53 ope; 0f mats the con: 58 Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Planning Period, 1911-1914 The Republic was born in October of 1911, but the political situation remained unstable. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic, was pushed from his temporary position as president by several political factions. He was then appointed to the position of Director-General of National Railways, with carte blanche authority to plan railway construction on a national scale. At the time of his appointment, in 1912, the National Railway Corporation was created to carry out his programs. With the exception of matters concerning the railways already built or in the course of construction and projected lines for which draft agreements had previously been drawn up by the Hinistry of Communications, the National Railway Corpo- ration had full power to contract loans and execute projects. Railway construction was considered to be the major aspect of the national economic program. Some lines were established in the beginning solely for the purpose of immediate development of the totally undeveloped regions.29 (Map 2) There had been no conflicts of opinions regarding railway construction among the common people, provincial 29Such undeveloped regions as Outer MOngolia, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Tibet. 59 N .....III......III.. a b .x .....r \flx ‘ .... amiss .. ~‘9‘ Z n 33.2 000.00. .9. 8223.: . \VB‘¥‘( V s .2..- 2452... a a... >452: $23-5; zaméo We x. .3.» «49” ..... t» a? >( A‘ M as. £4.16 4,. .9 \nll ‘ K xx... 9 times a” 0‘ ,7 u A44. fl 1“. Q‘ I\..): Y "H. ’..I\.. (n ...x . (rd till. ‘ ..I..I ..ws ,... ...... . (.. ..r. M f. .. ( .J z. z r- . .\ o ficials during th after a 1 three 505 light, a: :zerme: should, 1,, Finally, within t 913-3 the the Fla: that, Ve this pg 100,000 DQQr. by for. CQuraz \. / natiah. 6O officials, and the central government as was the case during the previous era. As soon as China had been unified after a long period of civil war, Dr. Sun Yat-sen set up three goals for the new Republic: first,that the people might, and should, fully contribute their specialties for betterment of the country. Second, that lands might, and should,be fully used to the advantage of the country. Finally, that goods might, and should, be freely moved within the country.30 The railway plan was designed to play the major role for approaching these goals. However, the planning goals were set too high. The result was that very little railway construction occurred during this period. His program called for the construction of 100,000 miles of railways at the cost of CN$6,000,000,000. (See Appendix I.) In his plan he proposed that the railway business in China should be a state enterprise. The development of railways should be carried out by an international organization in harmony with the principle of the Open Door. The old order of rival spheres of influence, strug- gles for concessions, and selfish exploitation of China by foreigners should end, while foreigners should be en- couraged to invest capital in Chinese railways on the 3oFor the details see Sun Yat-sen, The Inter- national Development of China, op. cit., pp. §~I3, 158-161. basis of 1 and integ: capital-s; action am internati: experts I order to 1 D Chinese p. or China! rOYQign b and tho-J 61 basis of full respect for China's national sovereignty and integrity. On the basis of such principles, the capital-supplying powers were expected to agree to joint action and to a unified policy of investment, forming an international organization and charging international experts with the formulation of plans and standards in order to prevent waste and facilitate development work.31 Dr. Sun was eager to secure the confidence of the Chinese people for this plan of international development of China's railway system. He recalled the old days when foreign bankers disregarded the will of the Chinese people and thought that they could do everything with the ap- proval of the Manchu government alone. Unfortunately for theforeign bankers, they found that the contracts con- cluded with the nanchu government by means of bribery and threats were blocked by the people. Had the foreigners through fair dealings first secured the confidence of the Chinese people, many of the difficulties would have been avoided. As soon as the people were won over to this scheme of international railway development, Dr. Sun argued, it would be relatively easy to take the next step 31He suggested inviting foreign investment in China's railway construction through cooperation. He said that "the goal of material civilization is not private profit but public profit, and the shortest route to it is not competition but co-operation." Ibid., p. 161. 62 and open negotiations for construction contracts. As the basis for such contracts he suggested the agreement he himself had concluded with the Pauling Company of London for the construction of the Canton-Chungking Railway. In this agreement the management of the railway was vested in the hands of a Chinese managing director. The proceeds of the loan were to be deposited in the Bank of China. Chinese materials were to be preferred, provided price and quality were suitable. These factors would insure the administrative integrity of China's railways.32 Although Dr. Sun's plan was not carried out during 1912, it had the effect of providing a sound foundation for the program, aiming at unification of all construction work and for control of the railways by the government. But for his leadership and tireless enthusiasm the people would not have realized as soon and as completely as they did the magnitude of China's transportation problems and the urgency of large-scale railway construction, which demands centralized government planning. As a consequence of Dr. Sun's leadership, the private owners of railways in Hunan, Kiangsu, and Henan voluntarily surrendered their lines to the government. In the following years the private railway owners of 320hang Kia-ngau, op. cit., p. #8. The 63 Szechwan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Shansi, and Hupeh followed suit. Thus, one may consider this movement toward nation- alization of Chinese railways as one of the immediate results of Dr. Sun's railway program. Another result of Dr. Sun's program was the revival of foreign investments in Chinese railways after the founding of the Republic. Several important railway agreements were concluded during this period of three years: the Lunghai Railway contract with Belgian inter- ests involving a loan of Lh,OO0,000 (see Appendix I); the Tatung-Chengtu Railway contract with FrenCh and Belgian interests for Bl0,000,000, of which £770,217 was in French francs and 55,789,518 in Belgian securities, had been advanced: and the Pukow-Sinyang Railway Contract with British interests for £3,000,000, of which £2,000,000 had previously been advanced. National control of the railways, and the formation of emphasis upon railway building for domestic economic uses was the primary char- acteristic of this period.33 The Japanese Capital Penetration Period, 1915-1920 World War I forms the backdrop for this period. The basic pattern and composition of world trade was not 33Ibid., p. 53. altered drast| the primary : continuing in War I, with t JaPam in inte Euro; in exPorts, 5 Period betweq Canada, and ‘. E53099“ deci her; and Corn: of North Atll became one or as the “Pkg intern“ in the ”Mod , tration o 6h altered drastically by the war. Western Europe remained the primary trade focus, with other areas more or less continuing in the roles established for them before World War I, with the exception of the rising importance of Japan in international trade.3u Europe declined slightly in relative world position in exports, and rather definitely in imports, during this period between 1915 and l920--with the United States, Canada, and Japan rising in almost direct proportion to Europe's decline. The slight adjustments in trading part- ners and commodities meant a relative rise in the importance of North Atlantic and North Pacific trading routes.35 China became one of Japan's raw material supply regions as well as the market for Japan's finished products. Japan's interests in building railways in China climaxed during the period. This period in the development of China's railway system was, therefore, characterized by the pene- tration oquapanese capital. In the years when the European powers fought a life-and-death struggle, Japan was reaping economic profits on an unprecedented scale. Her foreign trade surplus BuRichard S. Thoman and Edgar C. Conkling, Geo ra h of International Tragg_(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hagl, .pp- -. ~35Ibid., p. 5. mounted surpluse to Yen : Of this countri '1 I) 65 amounted to Yen 1,170,000,000. (See Appendix I.) Other surpluses of her international balance of payments amounted to Yen 862,000,000, making a total of Yen 2,032,000,000. Of this sum she invested directly or indirectly in allied countries, including China, some Yen 1,200,000,000.36 To exploit the concessions she obtained under the "Twenty-one Demands”37 it was necessary for her to invest more heavily in China,38 so that her endeavors at economic penetration and political strangulation could work hand in hand. For this reason the ”Nishihara Loans"39 were extended to China between the years 1917 and 1920. The proceeds of many of these loans, ostensibly made for industrial purposes, were spent by the Chinese government at the time to carry on the military contest being waged with the southern prov- inces. It was indeed the intention of the Japanese to fan the flames of civil war, as well as to gain more specific advantages through her liberal loan support of the new regime for railway construction. 36‘The rest was principally distributed in industrial investment in Japan proper. 37Seven demands on the construction of railways in China. 38During these years Japanese investment in China totaled Yen 120,000,000. 39siso called Szepingkai-Chengkiatun Railway Loan. In addition to the railway items, this loan also covered numerous other credits given to the Chinese government for various purposes. Japan entirely not: primary obje: Upon the out" attention :0 Proximity of in her when extended her Of Chekiang The initially h chin“ "hilt comm-01 of to obta: U failure I “5’s and POuers b 66 Japanese investments in Chinese railways were entirely motivated by political considerations, with the primary objective of annexing Manchuria and Mongolia. Upon the outbreak of the First World War Japan turned her attention to the province of Shantung. Because of the proximity of Fukien to Taiwan, Japan included this province in her sphere of influence as well. From Fukien Japan soon extended her grasping hands to the neighboring provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsu. The slenderness of her own economic resources initially hampered Japan's efforts to develop railways in China while her evident aspiration to gain full political control of Manchuria and M0ngolia made it possible for her to obtain foreign capital with which to attain her own goals in any part of China. This accounts for Japan's failure to make considerable investments in Chinese rail- ways and for her slow pace in comparison with the European powers before the First World War. During the war, when the financial strength of the powers was sapped by the deadly struggle, Japan gathered all the economic resources at her command in a determined effort to gain a predominant position in China. This attempt was made through the ”Nishihara Loans.” The aim of forcing these loans on China was political strangulation and not econ results of t Pol 0f the new serious in became mo“ improving I Cre&8e 10': “Vernment 67 and not economic cooperation, so that positive economic results of these large loans were negligible.“0 The New Four-power Consortium Period, 1921-1926 Political instability appeared in the early stage of the new Republic, and it became progressively more serious in the 1920's. The provincial governors gradually became more powerful by developing local resources and improving local transportation. The opportunity to in- crease local powers was actually given by the central government which was suffering heavily from the diplomatic and military conflicts with Japan. The central government was so occupied with international problems that it lost its internal control. The provincial governors, recog- nizing this weakness, gained more authority by enlarging their military forces and thus established themselves as warlords. The central government sensed the situation and tried to prevent it. The first consideration in solving uoChina's total obligations to Japan with regard to all these railways in manchuria, Mon olia, Shantung, and Suiyuan were Yen 104,970,000 and ON 10,000,000. These included the Szepingkai-Chengkiatun Railway Loan of Yen 5,000,000: the Chengkiatun Taonan Railway Loan of Yen “5,000,000: the HsinmintunMukden Railway Loan of Yen 320,000; the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan of Yen 6,650,000; the Shantung Railway Loan of Yen 20,000,000; the Peking-Suiyuan Railway Loan of Yen 6,000,000: and the Kirin-Hweining Railway Loan of 0N$10,000,000.Accord1ns to8 Chang Kia-ngau, pp, 91;..p. 62. the problem provinces by was short of sortium was acteristic 1 capital for “F constm the “‘3‘ Fou been made p credit by I Exceeded In Great Brit l confePEI hNe' C0n3< obJECtin erfc’l‘ts o 68 the problem was to gain communication access to the provinces by building railways. Unfortunately, the regime was short of development capital and a four-power con- sortium was therefore formed to fill this need. The char- acteristic significance of this period was that foreign capital for the political establishment of China's rail- way construction was obtained. Before the formation of the New Four-power Consortium in 1921, many attempts had been made by foreign governments to control China's foreign credit by means of an international consortium. None had succeeded in doing so.“1 In May, 1919, representatives of banking groups of Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States held a conference in Paris for the purpose of organizing the "New Consortium" and adopted a number of resolutions. The objectives of the "New Consortium" were to concentrate efforts on future undertakings, to place these undertakings on a proper working basis, and to induce the enterprises “lAs early as 1905, British and French banking interests formed the Chinese Central Railway Company to undertake railway construction in the Yangtze basin. The Americans were invited to Join but were not inclined to accede. By 1909 a German syndicate obtained representation, making a Tripartite Group. In the same year an American group demanded participation, and the Hukuang Loan of May 20, 1911, was concluded with a group of British, French, German, and American banks, the so-called Quadruple Group. This group asserted its sole right to provide all loans to the government of China; but this assertion was never recognized by China. already resourc I mean n t have :1 837.1011 69 already in existence to gradually join and pool their resources in an international investment venture. In the meantime, the existence of the "New Consortium" was to have the desired effect of restraining Japan from individual action.“2 The agreement establishing the New Four-power Con- sortium was signed on October 15, 1920. Despite the assurances of the Consortium as to its purposes, the Chinese people entertained serious doubts whether China would truly benefit from its operations. They feared international control of their railways and of the monopoly created by the Consortium in lending money to the Chinese government,43 for if China should desire a loan, she would be obliged to resort to, and to accept, the terms of the Consortium. The inclusion in the Consortium of Japan, which had forced on China the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, uzThis indicated the extent of the Western powers' apprehension concerning Japan's further advance in China, an advance which was bound to be at the expense of the interests of the other powers. It was for the purpose of preventing a Japanese monopoly in China and eventually in East Asia as a whole that the British supported such an international organization for the control of foreign rail- way interests in China. The Japanese were aware that the proposals were aiming at their special rights and interests and spared no effort to stir up opposition against the plan. u3Japanese-controlled newspapers in Peking raised a storm of opposition. The Chinese, under the impression that there was no distinction between international control of railway investment and international partition of China, also raised objections against such a plan. aroused ser‘. of the Bank leading Chin Finance Corp Sovernment New Consorti culled its “Y3 and met financial o Ema-meme posed that mereiént ”man {1 national 1 J 301“- “as was in c: Banker! E 70 aroused serious apprehension. Mr. Liang Shih-yi, the head of the Bank of Communications, called a conference of all leading Chinese banks at Peking to organize the China Finance Corporation for the purpose of underwriting all government and industrial loans in competition with the New Consortium. The Banker's Association at Peking also called its members to frequent consultations to discuss ways and means to meet the situation. It was evident that the limited strength of this financial organization would not be able to meet all governmental and industrial needs. It was therefore pro- posed that, as long as administrative integrity and national sovereignty were not Jeopardized, China should make use of foreign financial assistance for the development of her national resources. Japan's predominant position in Hanchuria and Mon- golia was virtually recognized by the Consortium, which was in conflict with the announcement of the Chinese Banker's Association. Thus, there was no hope of persuading the Chinese people to cooperate with the Consortium. In fact, the New Consortium was never recognized by the Chinese government and its place in the history of Chinese government finance is purely theoretical. After the for- mation of the Consortium the member powers ceased to pro- vide further loans to China. A31; Consortium, railway his: recording d_ The 0! the Kim resolution { War 1, in . notes to Tip deemed the In Russ“, pe Eastern Be it Was c3 and smile The 50am ChinQSQ I direCth the Com the Sow:- Jag in i 71 Aside from the formation of the New Four-power Consortium, which characterized this period of Chinese railway history, several significant events are worth recording during this period. The first was the restoration to Chinese control of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway in accordance with the resolution passed at the Washington Conference after World War I. In 1922 the Chinese government issued treasury notes to the amount of Yen M0,000,000 with which it re- deemed the whole of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway from Japan. In 1924 an agreement was reached with Soviet Russia, permitting the purchase by China of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Prior to the Railway purchase by China it was controlled by a Board of Directors on which China and Soviet Russia each were represented by five members. The Board of Directors designated one Russian and one Chinese as deputy directors and a Russian as the managing director. By this agreement Russia virtually took back the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which in 1919 the Soviet government had offered to China unconditionally. However, Russia was soon forced to "sell" the railway to Japan in consequence of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The National Government Control Period, 1927-1935 The political instability of the Republic was ended by Chiang Kai-shek's military victory. China was united under Chiang ment in Nam role as the after the 1‘s establishme: was soon f0 the MI cap in the Ram. constraczig from the B: Th' during the brought 1: altered hf DOSItiOn ‘ industria and inter 8c10u3neE interest how in 1 72 under Chiang's army, and he established a national govern- ment in Nanking. The lower Yangtze region resumed its role as the political center of China, a position it lost after the fall of the Ming Dynasty in 164M. With the establishment of the National government in the south, it was soon found necessary to increase traffic to and from the new capital. A.new Ministry of Railways was created in the National government. The investments for railway construction came primarily from two sources: indemnities from the Boxer Rebellion and taxes on imports and exports. This period concluded Chinese railway development during the seventy-year period from 1866 to 1935. It brought important changes into China's national life and altered her relations with foreign countries. From the position of a self-sufficient, self-contented, and pre- industrial nation, through periods of external enforcement and internal strife, China found her way to national con- sciousness through railway planning and control. The interest aroused by successful railway operation had taken hold in China.uu However, the internal peace, which at qun an interview with opponents of international control of Chinese railways in 1926, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister, pointed out that China had been conclud- ing railway contracts with foreign nationals which gave them considerable political influence over ever-widening areas of China, which affected the economic and political security of China and tended to give rise to international controversies. Sir John further stated that the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War of last brought left the co_. Periods of : treasury, a: even heavie: nation was , the widow. further 20:: 1:5. for railway the CODSQm “‘9 part 0; Billie time of the new inVeszmeE: The NMich P‘dttina 1 dellelopme 73 last brought unification under the National government, left the country in a feverish and exhausted condition. Periods of disorder and internal strife had depleted the treasury, and the pressure of taxation and debts was made even heavier by the general distress of the country. The nation was disturbed by frequent political changes, and the widespread distress of the rural population added further complications to an already difficult situation. Independent foreign capital was not forthcoming for railway development because the agreement establishing the Consortium expressly prohibited independent action on the part of the individual Consortium members. At the same time the Consortium was uncertain of the future policy of the new National government and would not risk further investments before the political situation became clearer. The National government, on the other hand, was too busy putting its house in order to pay any attention to railway development. The provinces which had escaped the ravages of civil war were nevertheless anxious to improve their 1904-1905, and the Japanese-German War of 1914, were all caused by the conflict of interests among the powers in China and by their attempts to enlarge and strengthen their respective spheres of interest. On the other hand, accord- ing to Sir John, if the railways were brought under central- ized control, there would be three advantages to China: she would be able to recover the railways which were in foreign hands, to regain all administrative and political rights in her own territory, and within a certain period, to build and o erate her own railways. Chang.Kia-ngau. M's pp. 7'68. internal co.- stress. Th Ihose coura China ' 8 owr, lay develop! the central Manchur 13, China‘ 3 r31 ’ :- IL. China amé hostiliti. construet an13 of prepare complies con tru first 10:; transpc Period EOal 'h‘ ~\\‘\\ Pg. 14 74 internal communications as a means of relieving economic stress. This desire brought to the front new leaders whose courage in initiating construction projects with China's own resources marked the revival of popular rail- way development. Parallel development of railways by both the central government in Nanking and local governments in Manchuria formed the characteristics of this period in China's railway construction. The Sine-Japanese War Period, l936-19h5 After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1935, China armed for defense. The eight-year Sino-Japanese hostilities erupted in 1937, but this period of railway construction actually began in 1936. This is because the goals of the railway construction in 1936 were altered to prepare the nation for war. Railway construction during this period was more complicated than it had been during previous periods.u5 Construction was divided into four phases including prep- aration for war, adjustment to war conditions, wartime transportation, and wartime construction. Hewever, this period was characterized primarily as one in which the goal was to protect the railways from enemy attacks, and usFor details see Chang Chia-ngau, op. cit., Pp. 193-293. 4, of evacuatl strategic entirely us Pre aration The originally Passenger n emergency, bound to o imprQVemeh distances Crossing : tramc a ficient t laying &: facilita 75 of evacuating the railways in the occupied areas for strategic reasons. The railroads were, therefore, almost entirely used for military purposes. Preparation for war stage, 19§§_ The facilities of Chinese railway systems were originally used to meet the requirements of freight and passenger movements under normal conditions. In times of emergency, congestion and interruption of traffic were bound to occur. To forestall such an eventuality certain improvements in station facilities had to be made. Where distances between two stations were great, additional crossing stations were opened with the hope of increasing traffic density along the whole line. Stations with insuf- ficient trackage or very short loop lines were improved by laying additional tracks or extending the loop lines to facilitate train movements. In some cases special military tracks were added. Where the station platforms were too short or the loading and unloading platforms were insuf- ficient in number, the existing facilities were lengthened or special military platforms were built. Water stations necessary for the steam locomotives were enlarged and new water supply sources created. Emergency water stations were also built at all important points to replace any regular water stations that might be destroyed. Numerous coaling stations were added to enable locomotives to take on coal at main target were built house railw It was qui: would atte: and to Die difficult thePQIOre essential 76 on coal at convenient points. Since the railways provided main targets for enemy aerial attacks, air-raid shelters were built in all stations and concrete dugouts erected to house railway telephone exchanges and control offices. It was quite evident that in the event of war the enemy would attempt to interrupt China's regular transport routes and to blockade China's coast so that it would be very difficult to import railway materials. All railways were therefore ordered to store up sufficient quantities of all 46 essential materials to meet one year's requirements. The adJustment to war condition stage, l9§1_ When fighting broke out, the Ministry of Railroads ordered the work on the Nanchang-Pingsiang Railway to be completed immediately. Through trains were ordered to be operated in the Hangchow-Yushan-Nanchang-Pingsiang sections, using pontoon bridges in place of permanent bridges which had not been completed. 0n the Hangchow-Hushan section of the railway, originally built with light rails, the work of laying heavy rails was accelerated. At the same time the construction work of the Nanking-Kiangsi Railway was ordered to be rushed to completion, and the traffic move- ment of other railways was accelerated. n6Chang Chia-ngau was ordered to manage the pro- curement of materials by the railways. In no previous neet the re a power.47 '1 Military Tr under a Co. officers :- 77 In the history of Chinese railways there had been no previous occasion in which railways were called upon to meet the requirements of a modern war against a foreign power.’47 To co-ordinate transportation, the Railway Military Transport Corps was organized on July 2A, 1937, under a Commander and a Lieutenant-commander, with field officers responsible for each line. All matters relating to military transport were placed in the hands of the Railway Transport Corps. The station staff and dispatching officers were Jointly responsible to the Civil Railway Administration and to the Railway Military Transport Corps. The wartime transportation stage, 1937-12h5 The performance of the railways in the annals of wartime transportation may be reviewed in five periods: the first beginning with the outbreak of war to the time of the fall of Nanking (July 7, 1937, to December 13, 1937); the second covering the time to the great battle of Hsuchow (December 13, 1937, to May 31, 1938); the third period (May 31, 1938, to November 25, 1938) lasted until the evacuation of Hankow; the fourth period to the loss of Nanning (November 26, 1938, to April 30, 1939); and the fifth period beginning in May, 1939, and extending through u7Hung-Hsueh Lin, op. cit., pp. 14-15. fi‘ 94 C4 '—~ D11 78 the third victorious Changsha campaign to the end of the war (August, 1945). From the very beginning of the war Japanese strat- egy involved the utilization of Chinese railway lines.“8 Japanese occupation of railways gave the Japanese facil- ities for military control in China. The first twenty-one months of the war, from the fighting at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937, to the fall of Nanchang on March 30, 1939, were characterized by a violent struggle for railway lines. With the fall of Hankow, over 80 per- cent of the railways built before the war in China had either fallen into enemy hands or had been destroyed. After the fall of Hankow the railways ceased to play an important part in China's defense, and China con- centrated her military effort on counterblockade and guerilla fighting. Accordingly, China's transportation policy was concentrated on the development of highways and waterways. The military role of China's railways was therefore most important only during the first twenty-one months of the confrontation with Japan. I Prior to the fall of Hankow and even after it can be shown that the number of troops and the tonnage of sup- plies moved by the railways were tremendous. In the first l‘8Chiao--min Hsieh, China-~Ageless Land and Count- less People (Princeton: 13.-Van Nostrand, T967), pp.—52—5- 5. 79 period, from the outbreak of war on July 7, 1937, to the fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937, the railways moved 4,460,000 troops and 1,230,000 tons of supplies. In the second period, ending with the battle of Hsuchow in June, 1938, the railways moved 4,330,000 troops and 1,140,000 tons of supplies. In the third period until the evacuation of Hankow in December, 1938, over 2,600,000 troops and 480,000 tons of supplies were moved. In the fourth period, untiithe fall of Nanning in December, 1939, the railways were still able to move 2,830,000 troops and 350,000 tons of supplies. During the fifth period the railways moved over 2,280,000 troops and 470,000 tons of supplies in 1940, 3,182,000 troops and 413,000 tons of supplies in 1942. In other words, during these first five and a half years of war China depended upon her railways for the movement of 21,582,000 troops and 4,433,000 tons of supplies, an achievement unprecedented in her history. The wartime construction stage, 1932-1245 For the purpose of receiving allied military aid and for the protection of the unoccupied areas, the Chinese government was anxious to construct railways in southern, western, central, and northwestern China. Among the rail- ways which had their inception during the war were the ugChang Chia-ngau, op. cit., p. 228. 80 Hunan-Kwangsi, Kweichow-Kwangsi, Yunnan-Burma, Suifu- Kunming, and the railways of the northwest. The shortage of capital and physical handicaps in the mountain regions made construction very difficult. One of the policies in railway construction in northwestern China was to assign engineers permanently to a given region. This assignment of employment solved some of the unemployment problems in China during the wartime period. The Postwar Period, 1945-1949 The characteristic of this period in China's rail- way construction was the restoration and rehabilitation of the existing railways together with the beginning of the first Ten-year railway construction plan. Unfortu- nately, these goals were delayed by a civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists. The new railway con- struction was stopped and some operating railways that had survived in a relatively undamaged state were damaged or destroyed during the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists. War resistance to Japanese aggression dealt a fatal blow to China's national economy. Prior to the war, despite many difficulties China's economy had been able to progress substantially. While the Communist military forces were virtually defunct after the 25,000 1150 "Long 50One ”11" equals one-third English mile. In In 81 March," China itself was progressing toward political unification. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and the subsequent loss of the established industrial areas in the coastal provinces dealt a lethal blow to China's new industries. Heavy destruction in the rice-producing areas of south and east China was responsible for a great decline in food production. Shortages in the commodity market became serious after 1939. To support ever- increasing war expenditures, the central government in- creasingly resorted to issuing bank notes. Japan's surrender in 1945 failed to normalize China's national economy. The civil war between the Nationalist government and the Communist forces erupted immediately and inflation entered a serious phase. 0f China's 12,030 miles of railways, 3,726 miles had been lost as the result of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and 6,566 miles were lost or destroyed during the Sino-Japanese War. Large sections of important trunk lines were removed by the Chinese in the course of war operations and were not rebuilt by the Japanese. Most of the railway Junctions were the scene of heavy fighting. The Junctions suffered great damage as did the rolling stock and other equipment.51 MOreover, the Japanese in 51Norton Ginsburg, "China's Railway Network," Geographical Review, XLI (1951), 470, 472. nan: term rail nort totaj total 82 many cases failed to keep the much-used railways in those territories under their occupation well repaired and nor- mally supplied. The most immediate need at the end of the war was the reconstruction and general rehabilitation of existing railways. Judging from conditions in 1945, the following sections of main lines were torn up on account of war operations and were still unrehabilitated: the Kaifeng- Loyang section of the Lunghai Railway of 206 miles; the northern and southern section of the Canton-Hankow Railway, totaling 393 miles; and the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway, totaling 565 miles-~altogether 1,279 mi1es.52 Several lines which had been partly constructed were scheduled to be completed immediately after the war, to prevent erosion of the unfinished road bed. These lines included the YunnaneBurma Railway of 556 miles, on which earthwork and tunnels had been partly completed; the Suifu- Kunming Railway of 534 miles, of which a 99-mile section had been finished; the 330-mile Chengtu-Chungking Railway on which half of the tunnels and earthwork were ready, and the section between the present terminus of the 52The average requirement per mile was estimated as 160 tons of rails, rail-Joints, spikes, and other steel; China needed 204,640 tons of these materials. To equip these lines and to replenish the rolling stock of other lines would require 500 locomotives and 6,000 cars and wagons. 83 Hunan-Kwangsi Railway and the border of French Indo-China, measuring 250 miles, on which earthwork and bridges had already been largely completed and some of the tracks laid, when the work had to be destroyed because of the enemy's attack. The incomplete parts of all of these lines totalled 1,571 miles. To rebuild the lines that were destroyed and to complete those which had been partially completed during the war totaling 2,850 miles, China needed altogether 456,000 tons of rails, 8,610 cars and wagons, and 761 loco- motives, at an estimated total cost of about U.S. $100,000,000. (See Appendix I.) The reconstruction of the destroyed and damaged lines and the completion of the unfinished lines was to be undertaken immediately, that is to say, during the two years immediately following the end of hostilities. The most logical approach to the postwar indus- trialization of China focused upon railway development. When the war was over, China could hardly expect to obtain from her allies an unlimited supply of steel for the development of her railways. It was therefore necessary to confine China's program of railway construction to the most essential needs. The Nationalist government had given this problem serious consideration and proposed that a ten-year program covering the construction of 14,300 miles of ipa to: of V0; Cor no ‘4 84 of railways be launched. Economically, with the completion of the Ten-year program of rail construction, it was antic- ipated that the purchasing power of "450,000,000 cus- "53 tomers was automatically assured and that a fair part of the surplus manufactures of the industrial nations would find a ready market in China. Concommitantly, it was hoped the growth of China's railways would greatly in- crease the productive power of the Chinese people enabling them to produce more for export and thereby to supply part of the raw material needs of the industrial countries. Thus, the direct economic assistance of the Western nations was not only to their own economic advantage, but it also enabled China to develop her production and to pay back her loan obligations. Rail development was thus to be a reciprocally beneficial arrangement to both creditor and debtor nations-ean arrangement that fostered and strength- ened the economic ties between nations and served to stabilize China. The first Ten-year rail construction program emphasized government intervention together with the rehabilitation of the existing railways. The Characteristics of the Communist _EFE:—T§49-1966 This era was significant in terms of central control of railways. Colonialism had been ended in China 53The total population in China in 1945 was 450 million. It is now over 800 million. 85 and many new lines were built for political, strategic and economic reasons. Eight years of prolonged war against Japan and three years of civil war had exhausted China's existing resources and introduced two striking changes in the economic structure.54 First, the middle class, which was composed of the well-to-do peasants in the rural areas and the petty bour- geoisie in the urban districts,was destroyed. The second effect of the war was to place the central government in control of virtually all Chinese capital. Without the first change, the success of the Communist regime would have been uncertain. Without the second change, the course of the transformation of the private sector into a state enterprise would have had to be prolonged. In transforming its economic institutions, the Communist regime endeavored to closely imitate Soviet patterns in its early stages.55 For this reason, its transformation must be traced from 5“Chang Chu-yuan, Communist China's Economy, 1 4 -1 62 Structure Chan es and CrisisTSouth Orange: e on a n vers y ress, , p. . 55Speaking at a banquet in honor of former Soviet President veroshilov, on April 17, 1957, Communist China's leader, Mao Tse-tung, pointed out: "The Chinese people have always considered their revolution to be a continu- ation of the Great October Socialist Revolution and have looked upon this fact as a great honor." According to Jen-Min-Jih-Pao (People's Daiu), April 18, 1957. acco whic l iti ree PO' 1 ‘s m; l \Je: "/3 I?" err/5 O c) .’1' 86 its origins in Marxist-Leninist principles56 and analyzed according to the development of Mao Tse-tung's thought which integrated classical communism with Chinese con- ditions.57 Although Communist China sought to follow the basic steps taken by the Soviet Union, differences in eco- nomic and cultural backgrounds necessitated certain adap- tations to better suit Chinese conditions. This general- ization may be supported through comparisons of several key factors. Compared with Russia on the eve of the Revolution of 1917, China's industrial base was more back- ward and its skilled labor force much smaller. The most useful comparison is between the level reached by China on the eve of the communist advent to power and that reached by Russia on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution. Population factors indicate a second distinction between the Soviet and Chinese situations. The population of China in 1949 was three or four times that of Russia in 1913.58 56Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of Communist China from 1960-1965, said, ”The road we are taking is the road tra- versed by the Soviet Union. We have always believed that Marxism-Leninism is universal truth.” According to Docu- ments of the First Session of the First National PeopIe's Con ress 0T7the Peo 1e's'Re ublic of China (Peking: Foreign Ian guages ress, , p. . 57Cheng Chu-yuan, op. cit., p. 11. 58Tseng Wen-ching, Socialist Industrialization of China (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1958), p. 24. Until repre In Rt scizt these the C tier The I to IE facij natig 87 Until 1952, China had only 10,120,000 nonfarm workers representing only 1.6 percent of the total population. In Russia, however, by 1937, Soviet nonfarm workers con- stituted 34.7 percent of the total population.59 Under these conditions, even after their assumption of power, the Chinese Communists were forced to rely on the cooper- ation of the bourgeoisie class to a considerable extent. The Party's moderation toward the bourgeoisie was designed to make use of all available economic forces in order to facilitate the work of rehabilitating and building up the national economy.60 The Communist government gave indus- trialization top priority in its planning, and has ap- parently assumed that massive railway building is a first (Table 3), rather than an accompanying, step in economic development.61 Railway building in China in the past has not been able to create de novo the kind of economic conditions conducive to profitable railway operation. Rapid expansion of mileage under such circumstances may outrun general 591bid., p. A2. 6oLiu Shao-chi, Political Report (Peking: People's Publishing House,-1960), p. 51. 61Rhoads Murphey, o . cit., 25: also see George B. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peop e (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963). pp7'1I33119; 88 TABLE 3 NEW COMMUNIST-BUILT INDUSTRIAL CENTERS IN CHINA CONNECTED BY RAILWAYS (19u9-1966) Hopei Province Peking--industria1 complex Chinsi--coal mining Chengteh--chemica1 5 Shouwangfen--copper ' Kalgan--engineering Huanhua--steel Paoting--comp1ex Shihchiachuang--complex Hantan--textile Fengfeng--coal Shansi Province Sishan--coal Huankang--coa1 Yuchih--textile Fensi--coa1 6 Houma--coal ' Shangtung Province Chinan--comp1ex Chihpo--iron, coal 7 Chinlingcheng--iron ° Hsinwen--coal Yentai--food industry Heifong--textile, food Tehchow--textile Chining--food, farm tools Henan Province Chengchow--textile, 8 engineering ‘ Loyang--textile, engineering Shanmensha--hydro- electric Pingtingshan--coal Hsinhsiang--textile Kaifeng--chemica1, engineering Liaoning Province Yingkow--paper, textile Antung--1umber, paper, chemical Chinchow--chemica1, refining Chinsi--chemical, refining HuanJen--hydroelectric Shuifeng--hydroelectric Chinhsien--textile, paper Kirin Province Lioayuan--coal Tunghua--coal, iron Yunfeng--hydroelectric HeilungkianggProvince 0chen--electric equip- ment Hokang--coa1 Shuangyashan--coal Yichun--lumber, chemical Mutankiang--1umber, paper Anta--petroleum oil Inner Mongolia Huhohaote--comp1ex Hailaerh--steel, food Chalainor--coal Yakeshih--lumber, coal . 4 NU 10. ll. 10. 11. 12. 89 TABLE 3 (continued) Chalantun--lumber Ulanhaote--steel, engineering Tungl iao--meat, dairy industry Paiyunpop--iron mining Paotow--stee1, electric, food Shihkuaikow--coal Chotzeshan--coal Shensi Province 14. Hsienyang-—textile Paochi--stee1, textile, engineering Tungchuan--coal Yaohsien--cement Kansu Province 15. Lanchow-doil refinery, atomic Tienshui--engineering, textile Tehwulu--copper, dairy Paiying--coal Yungteng--cement Wuwei--coa1 Shantan--coal Liuchiashai--hydro- electric Yenkoshai--hydroelectric Ningsha Province 16' Yingchuan--textile, chemical Shihtsuishan--coal Chingtungshai--hydro- electric Chinghai Province Sining--textile, dairy Tatung--coal Chilienshan--metal Mahai--petroleum, natural gas Lenhu—-petroleum Yushashan--petroleum 17. 13.. Sinkiang Province Urumchi--steel, ‘ engineering Shihhotze--textile, food Kalamai--petroleum Ining--food, textile Olatai--metal Hami--steel, chemical, food Kiangsu Province Nanking-~electric, chemical, auto- mobile, cement, textile Hsuchow--coa1 Chinping--mining Chekiang Province Hangchow--steel, textile Ningpo--chemica1, textile Shaohsing--stee1 Shiaoshan--chemica1, textile Hsingankiang--hydro- electric Hsuhsien--chemical, hydroelectric Kiangshan--cement Anhwei Province Hofei--stee1, mechanic, chemical Pangfou--mechanic, tex- tile, food Chaohsien--cement Tungkwanshan--copper, iron Hupeh Province Hwangshih--cement, steel Puchi--coa1 Tankiangkow--hydro- electric Shassu--textile Ichang--coal 18. S? L“? C) 20. 31. I 5.” 90 TABLE 3 (continued) 18 . Hunan Province Changsha-~engineering, textile Chuchow--engineering, chemical Hsiangtan--electric, textile Lienyuan--stee1 Hengyang--chemical, paper Changteh--textile, leather Tuchi--hydroe1ectric 19 . Kiangsi Province Nanchanguaircraft, chemical (3hiukiang--textile IPengcheng--coa1 Iisinyu--steel 1(anchow--paper, sugar EShangyu--hydroe1ectric Tayi--min ing 20 ° Eukien Province IFuchow--stee1, engineering ICutien--hydroe1ectric lianping--steel, lumber Sanming--stee1, engineering 3Fungan--cement, paper Changchow--sugar, engineering Amoyusteel, engineering C31'1ua.nchow---sugar, engineering JENatien-—sugar, paper .Kwangtung Province ICflangmen---engineering, sugar Yingtehncement \Shaokuannengineering 53c: ‘JJ:~ 53].- Hsukiang--coa1 Jenhua--coal Swatow--chemica1, canning Muming--petroleum Chankiang--chemical Haikow--engineering, canning 22. Kwangsi Province Nanning-~stee1, food, sugar Liuchow--steel, cement Kweilin--textile Wuchow--lumber, sugar Sichin--hydroe1ectric Iaiping--mining Ssuting--mining 23. Kweichow Province Kweiyang--stee1, chemical Tsuni--steel, mining, food Kaiyang--mining Tuyun--steel, cement, paper Anshun--stee1, engineer- ing, food Miaotiacho--hydroelectric 2h. Szechuan Province Chengtu--stee1, complex Chungking--steel, complex Nanchung-—petroleum, silk Kiangyu--stee1, cement Chintang--chemical 25. Yunnan Province Kunyang--mining, chemical Yimen--1ron Huanwei--coal, electric Tungchuan--copper, mining Kaiyuan--coa1, electric 26. Tibet Lhasa--e1ectric, steel Heiho--mining Ge: Information on new industrial centers is mainly from The Chinese Industr¥_Under the Communists' Contrdl, unpfibIT*report' rom MainlandfiChInaI—Na- ona Security Bureau, Taipei, Formosa, 1966. ea... an: cew t0 k~ 91 economic development too far and become a heavy charge on an economy inadequately eqipped to use it. As such, Com- munist emphasis on railway construction on a very large scale, in advance of the effective commercialization of the economy, posed problems even for a totalitarian system.62 Capital was and is crucially scarce in China, and it may be questioned whether it was or is wise to con- centrate limited funds so heavily on rail transportation to the exclusion of other economic considerations. Largely a subsistence economy, Communist China is in a. very different position from that of the United King- dom and the United States when they expanded their railway Byatems in the great age of nineteenth-century railway building.63 China cannot, as they did, build railways I‘D idly, and profitably in an expanding and already highly developed commercial-industrial economy, with a mounting capital surplus. Nor can China expect from railway build- ing the same catalytic effect on economic development: since her own economy is in such a different stage to begin with. The Soviet Union, although placing a much greater relignce on railways for both passenger and freight traffic, \' 62Rhoads Hurphey, op. cit., p. 27. 63For further details, see Leland H. Jenks, "Rail- 1‘0 JQEQ B as an Economic Force in American Develo ment," The Not Economic History, IV, 1 (May, 1944 , 4-11,- has Corr: 3:3, or . Com na'. m 92 has begun the shift to air and pipeline transports“ Communist China has Just become familiar with the railway stage and lags far behind in air and pipeline movements Large-scale railway construction became the of goods. Railway Communist regime's most important achievement. construction in the early 1950's was primarily oriented towards defense.65 Nevertheless, railways were expected to play a major economic role in the establishment of a national transport network. A detailed analysis of the function of the Communist-built railways points to pre- dominately political, strategic and economic roles (Table it, Map 3). This produced a heavy investment in Btrategic considerations and one which cannot be expected to Pay for itself for many years. In comparison with prev ious eras, Communist China was motivated to plan and ‘30“ Btruct self-supporting railways. The Rehabilitation Period, 1949-1952 The major characteristic of this period was the rehabilitation of the lines damaged during the Sino- J atPa-IIese and civil wars. The Nationalist government did 1) of; complete the reconstruction in the previous postwar \v 5uw. Owen, op. cit., p. 88. 65Yang MirgShan Chuang, An Analysis of Communist Tr- Deg'rls ortation in Mainland China (Taipei: National a V31) 39 College, I§5'7), p. IJYang Ming Shan Chuang means 1 llege at the Yang Hing Mountain. It was used here as th 9 name of auther which included a group of reporters.) ‘ 030 F ourL—‘hu <>‘.P~ur\ I E'IIL' I‘-‘l"g.<¢ g§.13w< z. ghg 438:.(2 51.1200 to 20:35.. ..H. l‘ .‘ Huff’s-.(FZW'JI‘IJ ...,» -¢;-Q£ «Iz/ ;);I.\.r {I .ll pe U8. 97 period, and more lines were destroyed due to the civil war. The, Communist leaders were most anxious to consoli- date their new regime with an adequate transportation system (particularly the railway network), because the railways were able to carry troops to unstable urban centers where the Komingtang influences still remained. The railways played a significant role in the consolidation The increase in the rate of rehabilitation in- s trategy . The purpose dicated the urgency of such political needs. 01' railway construction during this period was therefore mainly military and political. The building of the new railways in China began 66 in 1950, with three important lines: Laipin-Chennankwan, Tienahui-Lanchow, and Chungking-Chengtu. The first was comp lgted in 1951, the latter two in 1952. line s-u-Lanchow-Sinkiang and Chengtu-Paoki, as well as a When the Communist Two more major few minor ones, were begun in 1952. FIVE-year Plan was started in 1953, work on these lines was continued while surveying began on ten new routes, inclistening major routes from Paotow to Lanchow and from Chengtu to Kunming. \ 9% 66Chennankwan 52‘» $7M] had its name changed to In is") N) Munankwan after this railway opened to traffic. Pgathe Chinese language Chennankwan means Southern Control Hana: Hunankwan means Southern Friendly Pass. Peking- 01 relationships are reflected in the change of name or th is new railway . 4a ea: 19- 01‘ c0 8‘. 98 It is difficult to reconcile conflicting Communist figures on total new railway construction, but official claims indicate that possibly 400 to 480 kilometers (250-300 miles) were built in 1950-51, and about 11.80 kilometers (300 miles) were built in 1952.67 One could easily be misled by these figures to think that until 1952 the Communists were doing nothing but rehabilitating or repairing existing lines. Actually, their efforts were concentrated on a few key lines that were to them most a trategic in function . The First Five-year Plan Period, 1953-1957 The First Five-year Plan for railway construction, announced by the Communist government early in 1953, set 125 .. 000 miles of additional railways as the national goal .68 Briefly stated, several characteristics presented th'i‘lnselves in this period of Chinese‘railway construction. First, available data indicate that by far the 31‘efi-‘ccst portion of the capital needed to finance the \w “13.1 67The mileages of railway opened to traffic in 12 l"Iland China from 19118 to 1953 are the following: (3 ’ 768 kilometers in 1948 (including both Kuomingtang and bg‘émlunist arts); 21,715 kilometers in 1919 including parts} 22,238 kilometers in 19503 23,0 3 kilometers .1 1:: 1951; 2 ,332 kilometers in 1952; and 24,821 kilometers 1953. According to Yung-hsing Chao3 Communist China's ’ R “Constructions (Hong Kong, 19514 p. 23. 918.. 68People's Publishing House, The First Five- ear Xx the People's Republic of Chum. 3. ‘ ll‘1 99 railway projects was to be furnished by the government, and that the latter had given railways a high priority in the overall national budget. These funds were mainly accumulated out of production by state enterprises and budgetary savings. Out of a national budget for 1953 amounting to US $9,864,700,000, the state's investment in basic industries and communications was reported to have been one third of the total amount. That part of the sum covering expenditures for communication and transportation represented an increase of some 65 percent over the 1952 investment, making it the biggest single item of increase over the previous year.69 Under this budget, eleven new rail lines were slated for construction during the year. Aside from government investments, a limited amount of Russian aid became available through the 1950 Sino-Russian agreement amounting to US $300,000,000 credit being advanced to China over a five-year period. The loan included credit for "railway and other transport equip- ment, rails and other material for the restoration and development of the national economy of China."70 It became clear that in railway development, as well as in overall industrialization, more responsibility 69The New York Times, July 27, 1953: Central Daily News, Taipei, FeB. 12, 1953, October 7, 1953. 7oAitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (New York, 1950), p. A20. ’ 100 would have to be assumed by domestic capital than was true in the past. Secondly, in the operation of the railway system there appears to have been extensive overall planning during this period, as well as stepped-up centralized control. An indication of this trend was the nationwide program of planning "transportation schedules" that was launched in 1950.71 Under this policy, the various rail- ways were asked to report to the Ministry of Railways of the central government. Through the regional railway administration offices located at rail centers, estimates were generated of the passenger and freight traffic for the coming year. They were required to present their budget at the same time.72 These ”transportation sched- ules” would seem to have involved not only the sheer business operations of each railway, but to be realistic, the estimates would have to be coordinated with data on the probable volume of the production and distribution of major commodities. This system was called "an important part of the overall economic planning of the nation," and Teng Tai-yuan, in reviewing in October, 1952, the three 71Yuan-11 Wu, The Econo of Communist China,¥an Introduction (New York: FrederIcE I. Praeger, l965), p. :20 72People's Publishing House, Selected Essa s on the Chinese Economy, 1950 Peking, 195I), Vol. VII, PP- ES-EB. 101 years' activities in China's railway affairs, pointed out that one of the major achievements under the new regime had been its high degree of unified administration.73 With the launching of the First Five-year Plan and the organization of a new State Planning Commission and other central agencies to supervise the industrial- ization of the country,7u it is obvious that henceforth railway development would be based on a centrally directed and controlled basis. Thirdly, and closely related with the general emphasis on the development of the country's resources, it can be seen that increasing amounts of domestic build- ing material and rolling stock were being used, insofar as they were available. For example, light rails and train parts were produced by steel mills in Shanghai, and beginning in the autumn of 1953, the Anshan Steel Works in Manchuria was expected to produce rails that would reach an estimated total length of some 2,156 miles per year.75 The partial blockade and embargo then in effect also contributed to the tendency toward a rela- tively greater dependence on and use of domestic products. 73Centra1 Daily News, Taipei, October 27, 1952. 7“The New York Times, December 13, 1952. 195 75Centra1 Dull—N512! August 1: 1953; August 2h, 3. Illa II. FLA P was 102 Fourth, railways continued to occupy the top place in China's communications both in a contemporary sense and in terms of planning for the immediate future. This emphasis resulted from the railways' great capacity for bulk haulage, and the availability in China of its principal fuel--coa1. The relative dependence on the railways for communications and transportation during this period is indicated by the fact that while the of- ficially scheduled volume of rail transportation for 1952 was expected to be 161 percent of the highest level before 19h9, that of the highways was only set at 112 percent.76 The characteristic nature of this period is best seen in the parallel construction of new railways and the establishment of railway industry. This was the first time that China had built so many new lines and produced what might be considered sufficient numbers of rolling stock. The railway administration was reorganized and the Russian aid was evident early in the period.77 Sig- nificantly, the manpower, capital, and planners associated with the railway industry were all Chinese. During the period, the rehabilitations, restoration, and new 76Po I-po, "Three Years of Achievements of the LPeople's Republic of China," New China's Economic Achieve- ment 12'12-1252 (Peking, 1952), p. 159. 77Theodore Shabad, China's Chan in Ma (New York: I?rederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 82-87. 103 construction were carried out concurrently. The rehabil- itation and restoration of old lines requently were empha- sized by the government due to the urgency of political considerations. Some new lines were developed by the Communist regime mainly for foreign trade purposes par- ticularly to Communist bloc countries in East and South- east Asia. The Second Five-year Plan Period, 1958-1962 After eight years of Communist control, the new regime was politically consolidated, but the sharply in- * 78 creasing population caused many problems of economic unbalance. The railway construction during this period was for the first time characterized primarily by economic considerations (Table 5) rather than by political, mili- tary, or other factors. During peacetime the economic priorities of a country frequently receive prime consider- ation, and this was the case in China. Railways con- structed during this period were premised upon the follow- ing economic principles: 1. Establishment of a national transportation system.79 7EChandrasekhar, China's Population, Census and ”Vital Statistics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press, 1960), 177175. 79Foreign Language Press, The Second Five- ear Silan Fulfilled in Two Years (Peking, I960), pp. 15-19. 104 TABLE 5 CHANGES IN RAILWAY TRACKAGE AND ROUTE LENGTH IN OPERATION FROM 1949 TO 1963 Route Length Trackage New Construction Year in Operation 1949 26,700 21,989 1950 22,512 1951 23.352 1952 23,600 24,518 1,233 1953 25.069 25,072 706 1954 26,263 25,873 1,132 1955 27,68 27,171 1,406 1956 29,548 29,237 2,242 195 32,656 29,862 1,166 195 34.391 31,193 2.376 1959 37.955 3.136 1950 42,659 32,570 7.344 1961 1962 1963 51,048 34,235 1,566 Sources: Ling, Hung-hsun, General Surve of Railwa s in China (Taipei, 1950), pp. 27, $3; Wu, Yuan-II, _¥ conomic Surve of Communist China (New York: Bookman Associates, , p. 3 ailwa s in Communist China (Taipei: Communication Research Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, 1961), pp. 25-28; and The Great Ten Years (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1959), p. 127. 105 2. Connection of existing mining centers and manufacturing centers.80 (Table 6) 3. Movement of industry to the interior,81 from east8and north coastal regions. (Tables 7 and 4. Only one policy was directly military in its orientation during this period; namely the construction of a strategic line along thg southeast coast facing the Taiwan Strait. 2 5. Strengthening intraregional transport systems as the found tion for future interregional development. 3 6. Connection of all provincial capitals for centrifugal political purposes. 7. Implementing the double-tracked lines in the economicghly advanced regions to relieve the traffic. The Economic Recovery Period, 1963-1966 The Third Five-year Plan for railway construction was complicated by the political conflicts between the party leader, Mao Tse-tung, and the government chairman, Liu Shae-chi. The internal political conflicts were 80 81Choh-ming Li, Industrial Development in Communist China (New York: Frederick A.‘Praeger, 1964), pp. 5-9. 82Kuei-sheng Chang, "The Changing Railroad Pattern in Mainland China," Geographical Review, LI (1961), 540. Yuan-11 Wu, op. cit., pp. 4-7. 83Ta Kung Pao She, People's Handbook (Shanghai, 1959). p. 192. 8nPeking Review, July, 1966. S: I \hwnilhpalmmk O S 106 TABLE 6 DISTRIBUTION OF 328 LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CENTERS BY RAILWAY RADIAL COUNTS* % Relative Railway Radial Counts No. of Cities Frequency Large Industrial Centers 0 to less than 4 0 4 to less than 8 2 22.2 8 to less than 12 1 11.1 12 to less than 16 4 44.4 16 to less than 20 1 11.1 20 to less than 24 0 24 to less than 28 O 28 to less than 32 1_ 11.1 Total 9 IOU Medium Industrial Centers 0 to less than 4 20 35.1 4 to less than 8 23 40.3 8 to less than 12 14.0 12 to less than 16 2 3.5 16 to less than 20 2 3.5 20 to less than 24 1 1.8 24 to less than 28 1 1.8 Total 57 IUD— Small Industrial Centers 0 to less than 4 214 81.7 4 to less than 8 43 16.4 8 to less than 12 4 1.5 12 to less than 16 1 0.4 Total 262' IOU— *A city with a single-tracked railway passing through it is treated as having two railway radials. The number is halved if the rail line is a branch, spur, or special purpose line. An arbitrary weight of four is employed as a multiplier to give the terminus of a single-trackaged line a weighted index of four radials. The number is halved for branches, spurs, and special purpose lines. The numbers are doubled for double-track lines. The 328 cities are based on the information from Appendix E, Table E-3, of Yuan-11 Wu, The Spatial Econo%% of Communist China (New York, 1967), PP- ' - Source: 107 TABLE 7 RANKING 0F COMMUNIST-BUIDT ECONOMIC COOPERATION REGIONS BY INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY Annual capacity in sameness: s isms“ iifit‘s‘é‘ém 1958-1960 average capacity East 11,563 40.77 1 North 4,951 17.45 2 Northeast 3,362 11.85 3 Central 3,178 11.20 4 Southwest 2,406 8.48 5 South 1,785 6.29 6 Northwest 1,120 3.25 7 Total 28,365 100.00 Sources: The amount of gross value-added data from I-wen Chao, Peo le's Han New China's Indust dfiook (PeEIng, I955 Great Ten Years—(Peking, 1960). -62 (Peking. 1957); )3 and Eggi 108 TABLE 8 DISTRIBUTION OF 100 CITIES BY INDUSTRIAL RANKING IN SEVEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION REGIONS 1961 Economic No. of Cities in Indicated Industrial Rank Cooperation __ Region A B C Total Northeast 3 5 (4)* l4 (1) 22 North 3 4 (3) 10 17 East 5 3 (2) 18 26 Central 1 5 (4) l2 (2) 16 South 1 11 12 Northwest 1 2 (2) 5 8 Southwest 1 l (1) 7 9 Total 15 20(16) 75 (3) 100 *Numbers in parentheses represent the number of new established centers after 1949. Source: Appendix C. Table C-l, Table C-2 of Yuan-11 Wu, The Spatial Econom of Communist China (New York: Praeger, l9 7),'pp. 238-241. In If) fill—v 109 caused by the diplomatic split between China and the Soviet Union, and the ”cultural revolution" was one result of this political instability during this period. New railway construction had stagnated. Many projects were stopped, such as the extension of Lunghai Railway at Chumchi and it seems that it will not reach the Sino-Soviet border. Construction primarily involved con- tinuation of the already begun work which had remained uncompleted from the previous periods. Conflicts within the Communist bloc, the disturbing condition created by the Red Guards, the decrease of international trade, along with the increased military aid to North Vietnam, as well as economic aid to some African countries, had a negative effect upon railway construction. Railway construction was not only reduced, but frequently brought almost to a standstill. The existing railways played an important role in internal political conflicts. Troops and Red Guards were dependent upon the railways. In 1953, Communist China and other Asian Communist countries developed a very active trade with the European Communist bloc,85 but the well-known rift between the two blocs, especially between the Soviet Union and China, was 85Feng-hwa Mah, "The Terms of Sino-Soviet Trade," Industrial Development in Communist China, ed. Choh-Ming .II (New YorE: Frederick A.7Praeger, I954), pp. 174-175. 110 reflected in the sharp drop in traffic in 1963. (Imports from the Soviet Union dropped from 80.6 percent in 1953 to 34.2 percent in 1964; exports to the Soviet Union dropped from 64.1 percent in 1953 to 37.2 percent in 1964.)86 Summary In summation, the characteristics of Chinese railways is one of obviously changing patterns. Compara- tively speaking the distinguishable characteristics of each of the three eras include the following. The Imperial Era emphasized foreign management for external strategic purposes and a relatively local passivity toward the foreigner and his railways. The Republic Era was characterized by an increasing Chinese awareness of the foreign threat, a realization of the unlikely value of railways, and a continued and increasing . penetration of foreign investment. The Communist Era emphasized state control, political unity as well as self- directed economic considerations. This latter era also has proven to be the era of greatest railway expansion. Closer examination of the periods indicates the Conserva- tive Period (1866-1894) was significant in psychological reaction towards the introduction of railways in China. 86R. S. Thoman and E. C. Conkling, op. cit., p. 75. 111 The Scramble for Concessions Period (1895-1905) was the highlight period in railway construction and marked the formation of the basic structure of China's railway system. During the Self-strengthening Period (1906-1910), the railways were used in defense against the Western powers. The Nationalized Period (1910-1911) was characterized by the movement of the Manchu government control over the railways in China. It greatly influenced the railway policy of state ownership from then until the present. National control of railways and the use of rail- ways for domestic economy purposes are the factors associated with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's planning period (1911- 1914), for the plan was mostly unrealistic. The Japanese Capital Penetration Period (1915-1920) was indicative of Japan's political ambition in China through the railway loans, so that attempts at economic penetration and political strangulation could work hand in hand. The New Four-power Consortium Period (1921-1926) was effected by the backing of foreign capital in China's railway con- struction but in a moderate and cooperative manner. The parallel development of railways between the central government in Nanking and the local government in Manchuria under different economic and political circumstances formed the characteristics of the National Government Control Period (1927-1935). The Sino-Japanese War Period 112 (1936-1945) was characterized by the protection of the railways from enemy attack, evacuation of the railways in enemy-occupied areas, and the building of strategic lines in the unoccupied areas. The characteristics of the Postwar Period (1945-1949) were the restoration and rehabilitation of the existing railways for military needs together with the beginning of the Ten-year Railway Con- struction Plan for new economic development. The characteristics of the Rehabilitation Period (1949-1952) were the rehabilitation of the lines damaged during the Sino-Japanese War and the civil war, and com- menced immediately after the Communist regime was estab- lished. The First Five-year Plan was significant in the parallel construction of new railways for consolidation of the new regime, connections within the Communist bloc, and the establishment of a railway industry. However, during the Second Five-year Plan period economic functions were emphasized. Stagnation was the primary character- istic of the Economic Recovery Period (1963-1966) in China's railway history because of the internal and ex- ternal political conflicts. CHAPTER III CORRELATION 0F FACTORS IN CHINA'S RAILWAY PATTERN: INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS The internal structure and spatial characteristics of the railway pattern demonstrate a multifunctional origin. The railway developed as a response to seven factors: geography, colonialism, military strategy, poli- tics, capital availability, foreign trade, and the domestic economy. These factors working in various combinations or alone affected each of the fourteen railway construc- tion periods. In this centennial review of rail develop- ment it is useful to identify the dominant factors whenever more than one is applicable during a given period. Physical Geography as a Factpr in the Development 0 hIna's Rail Pattern Landform and drainage systems formed a serious barrier to the development of Chinese transport systems. Consequently, the goal of railway development since 1866 has been to break the transport barrier and to improve mobility. The land mass in China is generally of high relief in the west and low relief in the east. This west- east inclination is like a three-section staircase. The first and highest section is located in the southwest where the Chinghai-Tibet Plateau rises for the 113 114 most part to over 4,000 meters above seal level, consti- tuting the highest land mass in the world. Here are located the headstreams of most of China's major rivers. These rivers generally flow in an easterly direction serving as a barrier to north-south communication. North- wards, across the Kunlun and Chilien Mountains on the northern fringe of the Chinghai-Tibet Plateau and east- wards, across the Ta'HsuehiShafi ( Great Snow fits) on its eastern fringe, the land slopes away to plateaus and basins at altitudes of 1,000-2,000 meters. This forms the second step of the staircase in an are from the Tarim Basin in the northwest, across the Inner Mongolian Plateau, the Loess Plateau, and the Szechuan Basin to the Yunnan- Kweichow Plateau in the southwest. Among the sub-regions identified on this second step, the Szechwan Basin, at 500 meters above sea level, is relatively low-lying. The lowest step in the generalized relief of China follows a line running from the high slopelands of the Greater Khingan Mountains in the northeast and passes through the Taihang Mountains on to the east--nowhere dropping below 500 meters elevation. This third and low- est section includes the Northeast Plain, the North China Plain, the Middle and Lower Yangtze Plains, and the South- eastern Hills. As the Romans used roads for transportation, the Chinese use rivers. The Amur, Yellow, and the Yangtze 'vf’b\ 'th 115 rivers are among the longest in the world. The Yangtze, more than 3,000 miles long and with several lakes and large navigable rivers, is by far the most important waterway. Its basin embraces more than two fifths of the country--an area which is the most densely settled and most productive in the country. The tributaries of the Yangtze, including a great system of canals (The Grand Canal extends from the coast near Ningpo, east of Hangchow, across the great lowland for 1,000 miles to Tientsin, the port of Peking) serve this vast area. Railways parallel the Grand Canal and a portion of the main river and its tributaries. Ocean vessels navigate the river at all times between Shanghai and Nanking. In the summer high- water season vessels of 10,000 tons use the river to Hankow, but in this stretch during the winter, the low- water season, only vessels that draw 10 feet of water can navigate the stream. Shallow-draft steamers operate throughout the year to Chungking, 1,500 miles from Shang- hai. Farther upstream and on other parts of the system, powered boats, sailboats, junks, and rafts transport a huge tonnage of foodstuffs, minerals, fibers, forest products, and manufactured commodities.l It is to be noted that this river primarily provides an east-west communication and transportation link. 1H. J. Wiens, ”Riverine and Coastal Junks in China's Commerce," Economic Geograpgp, XXXI (1955). 248-264. 116 In southern China, the Si, Han, and Min River systems perform services for their smaller basins similar to that of the Yangtze system. In contrast, northern China has no great waterways. The Hwang Ho, a long, large river, is navigable only by small craft in several short stretches because of the large amounts of deposited sedi- ment, the shifting channels, and the generally shallow depths encountered. The Pei River can be navigated by ocean vessels to Tientsin. In northern Manchuria, the Sungari is navigable for small craft from the border to Harbin, and unlike other main Chinese rivers, it flows north. The Liao, which flows towards the south, can carry considerable freight as far north as Mukden. Since the major rivers primarily run from west to east, the Chinese have less trouble carrying goods down- stream from the interior than westward from the coast. Unfortunately, the great bulk of China's population, markets, and production lies in the east and south, but the great bulk of China's industry and mineral resources lie in the north and west. Thus, the logical direction of transport flow in China is, in broad outline, to and from the coast, and secondarily between north and south. This is the ideological spatial pattern which best reflects regional and international complementarity.2 2Rhoads Murphey, "China's Transport Problem, and Comgunist Planning," Economic Geogrgphy, XXXII, 1 (January, 195 s 19- 117 Since the direction of rivers and mointain ranges is predetermined by nature, the Chinese need to use arti- ficial means to impose directional changes in transport. In ancient days, the lack of waterways created a problem for communications between the north and south. Indeed, the Grand Canal was dug to solve this problem.3 Inland waterways, nearly everywhere in the world, handle chiefly bulk, low-priced commodities such as coal, petroleum, iron ore, bauxite, stone, sand, gravel, logs, wheat, and corn, but in some places they handle a variety of manufactured goods, such as iron and steel, lumber, wood pulp, ma- chinery, sulphur, industrial bulk chemicals, raw cotton, and the like. The main advantage of inland water transportation is its cheapness. The main disadvantages associated with inland waterways include the fact that they thwart the main direction of traffic movement. In regions like China the inland waterways are closed by ice for part of the year. A third disadvantage of using inland waterways is the relative slowness of this form of transportation. 3By Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty during the sixth centur . It played an important role until the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911) when a section of the canal in Shantung became choked with sediment. In later years, it fell more and more into disuse as further sections became unnavigable, owing to the consistent neglect of maintenance. Y. T. Jen, A Concise Geography of China (Peking: F.L.P., 1964), p. 6. “Wilfred Owen, Strategy for MCbili§y_(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Inst u on, 964), pp. 90-93; also see Lawrence A. Hoffman, Economic Geo ra h (New York: The Ronald Press, 1965), pp. 45, 78, 153 ana 394. 118 Railways can give faster, but not cheaper, service than can inland waterways and can meet the transport needs of areas lacking waterway services. Some railways were built for the purpose of breaking the north-south physical barriers, and thus form an easily identifiable character- istic of the spatial development of the Chinese railway system. The principal railways running north-south are the Peking-Canton line, the Tientsin-Pukow and Shanghai-Nanking lines, and the Changchun-Harbin and Changchun-Dairen lines. Starting from the capital, the Peking-Canton line extends southward through the North China and Middle Yangtze Plains. After crossing the Yellow River by the bridge at Chengchow and the Yangtze Bridge at Wuhan, it passes through the Tungting Basin and the Nanling mountain area, finally reaching Canton at the Si Delta. The Peking- Canton railroad cuts across the five basins drained by the Hai, Yellow, Hwai, Yangtze, and Pearl Rivers. The Tientsin-Pukow and Shanghai-Nanking lines link the two principal industrial cities of Tientsin and Shanghai. These two railways connect Hopei, Kiangsu, and Anhwei Provinces. Together with the Peking-Shanhaikuan and Shenyang-Shanhaikuan lines, these railroads connect regions north and south of the Great Wall. The Changchun-Harbin and Changchun-Dairen lines join the Harbin-Manchouli and Harbin-Siufenho Railways 119 to form a T-shaped rail framework in the northeast (Manchuria). The main east-west railways are the Lunghai, Lanchow-Sinkiang, Peking-Paotow, Paotow-Lanchow, Chekiang- Kiangsi, and Hunan-Kwangsi lines. It must be quite ob- vious to the reader that the lack of navigable rivers prompted the development of these east-west links. The Lunghai and Lanchow-Sinkiang trunk lines link the eastern and western parts of the country. The Lunghai runs between Lienyunkang on the sea coast and Lanchow in central China. The Lanchow-Sinkiang line extends west from Lan- chow to Sinkiang. Southward from Paoki, the Lunghai is connected with the southwest by the Paoki-Chengtu-Chungking lines. Both the Lunghai and the Lanchow-Sinkiang lines are of prime importance for long-haul connections to sea: China. The Peking-Paotow and Paotow-Lanchow lines provide vital east-west links between the North China plain and the Inner MOngolia Upland. The Chekiang-Klangsi line starts from Hangchow in Chekiang and terminates at Chuchow in Hunan Province on the Peking-Canton Railway: the Hunan-Kwangsi Province line starts from Hengyang in Hunan, which is also on the Peking-Canton line, and ends at Munankuan in Kwangsi. These two lines cut across the southeast, linking many 120 areas in the southeastern hills to the primary north- south transportation route.5 Before the establishment of the Communist regime, several railway bridges already crossed the Liao, Yellow, and Huai Rivers, making possible north-south communication. Before the Communists' first Five-year Plan began there was no railway bridge across the Yangtze River. The Yangtze River, which formerly had been an obstacle to smooth railway traffic between the north and south, was bridged in three locations during the Communist Era. Prior to that time all north and south moving trains were forced to cross the river by ferryboats.6 The first of these bridges was completed at Wuhan in 1957 with Soviet technical assistance and provided the first uninterrupted railway connection between Peking and Canton. The Wuhan Bridge is considered to be the largest rail bridge in Asia. Another railway bridge across the Yangtze River was completed in 1959 at Chungking. It is 500 feet long and connects the existing Chengtu-Chungking Railway with the Szechwan-Kweichow line. The third Yangtze River bridge is at Nanking, where it provides uninterrupted rail connection between Peking and Shanghai. 5Jen Yu-ti, A Concise Geo ra h of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, I964), pp. 85-57. 6Victor P. Petrov, ChinaI Emerging World Pow§£_ (Princeton: D. Van Nostran Co., 19 ), p. 76. 121 In order to improve the efficiency of railways crossing rugged terrain as well as to increase the cargo- carrying capacity of the trains, the most difficult sec- tions have been electrified in China after 1949,7 especially in the mointainous regions, where it is espe- cially difficult for coal-burning locomotives to operate. Of the completed electrified lines, several should be mentioned, including the difficult section on the Chengtu- Paochi line between Paochi and Fenghsien, as well as the section between Paochi and Tienshui. In addition, work is underway between Fengtai and Shacheng, north of Peking, between Taiyuan and Shohsien in Shansi Province, and in several other areas. Electrification by 1966 was planned for the sectors of Fenghsien-Luehyang on the Paochi-Chengtu line and Paochi-Sian, east of Paochi on the Lunghai line. The logical direction of transport flows in China, as determined by geographic factors like landforms, drain- age systems, markets, population, and natural resources, is southward from northeast and eastward from northwest. The major trunk lines were built in China for the purpose of breaking the physical barriers between isolated regions, thereby improving mobility. Geography, therefore, influ- enced the railway pattern of China significantly. 7Ibid. 122 Colonialism as a Factor in the Development of China's RailwayPattern Colonialism is another spatially discernible factor in the development of railways in China. Colonial- ism particularly affected the period of initial railway construction when the backbone of the contemporary rail- way pattern was established (Map 4). Since colonial lines were built by half a dozen foreign powers, the resulting pattern was a fragmented one. Both the Nationalists and Communists have made it a point to connect these dis- jointed sections wherever possible. The modern era of greatest colonial expansion coincided in time with the era of the greatest railway construction.8 The coincidence is by no means accidental, for modern colonialism on a continental scale required the services of railways. The end result of the construc- tion of railways and other improvements to transportation and communication in colonial countries was, however, unexpected. The improvements, which in the beginning advanced colonialism, in the long run produced conditions that led to the rejection of colonial influences. The largest areas of colonial rail development activity in the nineteenth century were India, China, and tropical Africa. Of these, only the last is an example 8Roy I. Welfe, Trans ortation and Politics (Princeton: D. Van Nostran Co., 3), p._77i 123 AMERICAN SPHERE BELGIAN SPHERE samsrc SPHERE i FRENCH SPHERE GERMAN SPHERE ' JAPANESE SPHERE C7 RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN CHINA . I895-I9OS W COMPLETED RAIIWAYS .......... PROJECTED RAIlWAYS N O n I000 RUSSIAN SPHERE Map 4 124 of colonialism in its purest form. The imperial pene- tration of India, China, and tropical Africa during the nineteenth century was in each case different. However, in each case there were these similarities: 1. The foci of invasion originated at coastal points where administrative centers were established. Railways were later built from these centers into the interior. The attempt was to link as large an area as possible under the economic, political, and military con- trol of the coastal centers. 2. In no case did the foreign builders intend the railways to serve the interests of the people through whose territory they passed, but rather, they were built -to serve the colonial interests. For example, India had an advanced civilization, too many people, and too much diversity to be properly called a colony. With insig- nificant exceptions all parts of India were under the control of a single imperial power which meant that the railways had the function, not of carving out an empire, but of consolidating it. By contrast, in China the initial colonial rail developments attempted to fragment the territory. The land frontiers with the Russian Empire in the north and the French colonies to the south were pulled in opposite directions. The nominally independent Chinese government attempted to carve out its own territory 125 with the assistance of railway construction. Although no large part of China was formally detached from the central government during the nineteenth century, as was Manchuria during the twentieth century, to become a Japanese colony of Manchukuo, the aims of the colonizers were unmistakable. Fortunately, only the ports fell under extraterritorial rights and were thus ostensibly under the total control of the imperial powers, of which there were half a dozen. The attempt by each power to appropriate for its ports the largest and most profitable hinterlands led to the "Scramble for Concessions" of the 1890's during the course of which many rail networks were built. The-deficiencies in the several colonial networks plagued China until the present period. In the more com- plex situation of China, economic and political consider- ations reinforced each other. In Africa, where rivalries between the colonizing powers were intense, and there was no centralized local government to play the rivals off against each other, political considerations dominated all others. The experience of tropical Africa was an amalgam of those experienced in India and China: almost all of the African territory was in the hands of aliens as was the case in India, but there were half a dozen contending powers, as was the case in China. 126 In China, railways were related to colonialism in two ways. First, technological advances in transpor- tation made possible the acquisition of colonies for political aggrandizement or for economic purposes and for the later exploitation and retention of these areas within the empire. For example, a rail spur was built from French Indo-China into Kwangsi Province in the south while another extended Russian influences into Manchuria. Second, the needs of railways led to the acquisition of other colonies. The role of these additional colonies was that of staging points or defensive posts along ex- tended routes which served as lifelines to the colonial empires.9 Though colonies may be acquired either with the aid of a railway or for the purpose of making an existing link more economical, the categories are not pure. Colonies that are established for some other pur- pose may also serve as jumping-off bases for further colonization or as defensive bases. Whereas defensive bases are a means to an end, economically valuable colonies are an end in themselves. As such, they do not serve transportation but are served by it. They are needed in the first place through the exploitation of new technological refinements in trans- portation, and thereafter the position of the colonizing 91bid., p. 70. 127 country is consolidated by means of transportation improvements in the colonized country. The progression is logical. One of the distinc- tions between colonizer and colonized is that the former has much more sophisticated means of moving about than the latter. The colonizing country is stronger, but strength by itself is not enough. At all times the abil- ity to exert military power at a distance has been the touchstone for colonial success. It is important to emphasize that poverty in transportation facilities is symptomatic of other weak- nesses. It may denote a sparsity of population and a low level of civilization, as in primitive North America and Australia. It may denote a period of decay and dis- integration, as in China under the later Manchus. It may denote an extreme environmental adversity as in parts of Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa. It may denote a fundamental disunity, regional and social, as in India. In every case there has been weakness to be exploited: this weakness has found expression and has been exaggerated by inadequacy in transportation. Once a country has been colonized, the inadequacy of its transportation facilities becomes a weakness to the colonizer. The problem is exactly the same as that confronting an independent state, which in order to remain 128 viable, must have an administrative center from which the farthest reaches of the domain may be controlled. In order to be able to reap economic benefit from the colony and to keep all parts of it under control, the colonizer must improve the facilities whose very inadequacy helped make his incursion possible. When the decadence of the Manchus made China vul- nerable to encroachment from outside, Europeans took advantage of her weakness from two directions--the Russians and French from the landward side, the other imperial powers from the sea. ' Russia's desire was to gain imperial advantages in Manchuria. She used the pretext that the Trans-Siberian route was circuitous in order to persuade China to enter into partnership with her in the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. On her western borders Russia was careful to gain the defensive advantages offered byes difference in railway gauge, but the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was intended to be an integral part of the Russian railway system, was built to the wide Russian gauge. When Russia persuaded China to enter into a further agreement, to build a branch line, the South Manchurian Railway, China took the precaution of insisting (success- fully) that the new line have the standard gauge, to 129 conform with the Chinese rail network then being con- structed by other European countries. In any case, though Russia's effort at colonial encroachment had placed Man- churia firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, it had the paradoxical result of bringing Manchuria into much closer relation with the rest of China than in the past. To counteract Russian influence, the Chinese used the railway to swarm into Manchuria in far greater numbers than the Russians themselves. The encroachment from the sea was different. Here the pretext of obtaining a convenient corridor across Chinese territory could not be used. Instead there was the naked attempt at economic aggrandizement. The very absence of adequate means of inland transport at first pinned the Western powers and Japan to their original ocean ports. China could be likened to an organism lacking a circulatory system. For this reason, China was able to keep the foci of infection on its exposed surface from spreading inwards. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the invaders were able to make their way into the interior by establishing "spheres of influence" and extracting concessions from China to construct railways and to exploit the economic resources thus tapped. The sphere for Germany was Shantung Province; Britain focused on the centrally located Yangtze Valley: 130 Japan dominated the coastal area adjacent to Formosa; and France moved into the south. Britain tried, without success, to emulate the procedure that Russia followed in Manchuria, by opening a land corridor to Shanghai from her possessions in Burma. France was the only Western power able to advance into China from a broad land base provided by her possessions in Indo-China. The United States' interest in China's railway building was represented by the American railroad magnate T. H. Harriman. He planned to extend his operations from southern Manchuria to northern Manchuria and to make con- nection at some American Pacific ports with American rail- ways under his control. In this way he proposed to establish a transportation system that would encircle the globe.10 Belgium had little if any political ambition in China. Belgium was a small country, her iron and steel 11 industries at this date were well established. Her 10T. H. Harriman went to Japan and drew up an agreement with Count Ito Hirobumi for the lease and opera- tion with American capital of the South Manchuria Railway, which Japan had obtained from Russia. When Count Komura Yutaro returned from Portsmouth, where he signed the peace treaty after the Russo-Japanese War, he violently opposed the Ito-Harriman agreement on the grounds that it would rob Japan of the only tangible fruit of the Russo-Japanese War, which she had obtained at great cost. According to Chang Kia-ngau, China's Stru 1e for Railroad Develgpment (New York: The Jofin Day Co., 1943), pp. 31934. 1180 that the contracts with Belgium would have no political implications. On the other hand, Belgian prices and terms of payments might be more unfavorable than those of other countries. Ibid., p. 38. 131 interest in the building of the north-south Peking-Hankow Railway and the east-west Lunghai Railway was strictly economic.12 Besides the battle of economic spheres in China, the powers also shared political inconsistency among themselves. The directions of railway construction in China's territory were affected by these inconsistencies. The contradictions were most distinguishable between Japan and Russia, Japan and the United States, Britain and France, Germany and Russia, and Japan and Germany.13 Colonialism therefore influenced the railway pat- tern of China. The existing spatial pattern was estab- lished by foreign nations, although it was modified later. Strate as a Factor in the Development of China's Rail Pattern Wars have been a continuously occurring feature of China's modern history. As a consequence, several locations acquired significant strategic and military importance. These locations could easily affect or deter- ming the winning or losing of a military engagement. The 12Chang Chia-ngau, China's Stru 1e for Railroad Development (New York: The Jofin Day Co., I943), p. 38. 13The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo- Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Japanese-German War of 1914, were all caused by the conflict of interests among the powers in China and by their attempts to enlarge and strengthen their respective spheres of interest. 132 efforts of connecting such points for strategic reasons highly influenced the development of China's railway pat- tern. The mountain ranges in China divide the country into separate regions. The Yin Shan separates Mongolia from North China; the Tsingling range separates North China from Central China; the Nanling range separates Central China from South China; the Wu Shan separates eastern China from western China; the Taihang range marks the boundary between the North China plain and the loess plateau; the hilly land in Inner Mongolia separates the North China plain from the Manchurian Plain. Within this complex structure of the physical landscape, transportation nodes are mainly located at gaps where rivers have crossed the mountain ranges. The water gaps become the logical 14 Many paths for communication between different regions. a battlefield in Chinese history was located outside a city near such a water gap. For example, the city of Hsianyang in Hupeh Province is on the Han River, where it emerges from the Tsingling range. Hsuchow, a city in Kiangsu Province, is on the Hwai River, near the dividing line between north China and south China. Tungkuan , a city in Honan Province, is on the Yellow River bend. 1uChiao-min Hsieh, China: Ageless Land and Count- less People (Princeton: D. Van NostrandICo.7)l967), p. 49. 133 Shanhaikwan, a city in Hopeh Province, is on the Bay of Pohai which separates Manchuria from north China. Because of their location in water gaps these cities all became strategic military points. Under wartime conditions, a military leader in control of water gaps could conquer the country and unite it. This was true at the beginning of each dynasty. Then, when a dynasty lost power, the water gaps were occupied by rebels and were no longer paths for communication, becoming instead formidable barriers. As a result the country would be divided and various regions isolated. Water gaps are not only strategic gateways for military action, but are also strategic locations on trade routes and serve as political boundaries as well. The seven geographic gateways that have sometimes led to separation of the country and at other times have tended to unify it include five important water gaps along with two well-known land corridors. To control them by railway and to destroy the lines was a feature of military operations during the civil war and during the Sino- Japanese wars. These gateways include: 1. Tungkuan . Located on the north bank of the Yellow River, Tungkuan is the west gate of the North China Plain leading to the interior of the country. Throughout Chinese history, whenever this gate has been I: Dr... 134 blocked, various kingdoms have risen and the country has been divided. When the gap has been open the country has been united. The Lunghai railway passes through here and forms the southern terminal of the Tung-pu railway in Shansi Province. 2. Yangtze Gorge. This water gap is in the Wu Shan and separates the Szechuan basin in the west from the East Yangtze plains. During periods of blockade of the Yangtze Gorge, the Szechwan Basin usually has become an independent state. The Chengtu-Chungking railway and Szechuan-Kweichow railway focus on this water gap. 3. Nanling Gap. The Nanling Range separates central China from south China. The Nanling water gap provides access from Kiangsi Province to Kwangtung Prov- ince. The railway from Canton to Hankow passes through the gap. It is of strategic importance in military action and is a trade route in peacetime. 4. Tsingling Passes. The Tsingling range is sometimes referred to as the "backbone" of China. It divides the country into two distinct parts. The eight passes through the Tsingling are called "chan taos." Opening the Chan taos provided a great impetus for Chinese unification. During periods of access through the Tsing- ling passes communication between the Szechuan basin and the Hanchung basin is possible: south and north China are 135 connected. During World War II, China utilized the passes to connect Szechuan Province with the northwest part of China. The Paochi-Chengtu railway traverses this area. 5. Kalgan Pass. The Kalgan pass connects the Mbngolian plateau with the North China plain. In peace- time this is an important route for the fur trade. During WOrld War II it was a strategic military point. The Peking-Suiyuan, Chiling-Erhlien, and Tungpu railways cross this pass. 6. Kansu Pass. Between Chilan Mountain in the south and H011 MOuntain in the north--between Tibet and' Mongolia--1ies the Kansu corridor, an elongated valley roughly one thousand miles in length. During the Han Dynasty, a series of fortifications were built there and fire signals from the forts warned of invasion by the nomads. The area was occupied first by military camps. Today, the corridor is irrigated by water from the melted snow of Chilan Mountain. In ancient times the southeast coast of China was not opened to ships, and the Kansu corridor was China's front door connecting China proper with Sinkiang and central Asia. The famous "Silk Road" followed this corridor, and Marco Polo entered China through it. The corridor occupied an important position in ancient overland communication between the East and the West. The Paotow-Lanchow and Lanchow-Sinkiang railways 136 pass through here. This route is of continuing military significance in the maintenance of the western boundary with the Soviet Union. 7. Liaosi Corridor. A narrow, elongated coastal 'plain, located on the shore of the Bay of Pohai, the Liaosi corridor is a thoroughfare connecting the North China plain with the Manchurian plain. The corridor is so important in its strategic location that it became an important battlefield during the Sino-Japanese War. The Peking-Mukden and Tientsin-Mukden railways occupy this gap. Before the Sino-Japanese War, China was viewed by the Japanese as a site for supplying such crucial raw materials as coal and cotton. In addition, China was considered as a market for the manufactured products of Japan. The Japanese dream of economic self-sufficiency required an agricultural China and an industrial Japan. Obviously, fulfillment of that dream would have placed China in a very unfavorable position. It is not surprising that the inappropriateness of the Japanese strategy re- sulted in an eight-year conflict. The first two years of war were actually a rail- way war.15 Japan planned to control China by controlling 15Norton Ginsburg, "China's Railroad Network," Geographical Review, XLI (1951), 471. Also Chan Chia- ngau, ina s tru 1e for Railroad Development New York: The Jofin Day Co., I943), pp._l97-226} 137 her existing railways. China's coastline was totally blockaded. Her industrial cities, most of them located on the coast, were overrun and her railways and navigable rivers fell into Japanese hands (Map 5). Under these circumstances the Chinese could only fight and withdraw. Fortunately the Chinese had a large hinterland into which they could retreat. They developed a policy of "trading space for time" and of "accumulating minor successes as the basis for a major victory." In 1937, when the Japanese military operation was carried on mainly on the coastal plains, the invaders advanced an average of twelve miles daily on the Chinese territory. In 1938, when fighting had shifted to the rugged western land, the advance decreased to only six- and-one-half miles daily. In 1939, when the Chinese were defending the mountainous interior, the Japanese advance was limited to one mile a day. In 1940, the advance was reduced to half a mile a day. Here the terrain became a real asset to China's political survival. The interior of China is very rugged. This con- figuration constituted a great obstacle to the mechanized Japanese army. The Japanese were checked at Tungkuan at the bend of the Yellow River in north China, at the Yangtze Gorge at Ichang, and by the north-south range of mountains on the border between Indochina and southwest China. The 138 mg; CL; 0 . . Agog—«cw... MI... 021 gm: 1:111 . . fi 42.10 2. $3. 5 our. .:<¢ n:— mo ska—game. 4g .l’. Xi, J../ .I.i\ r..\:/.\II .I-Q/ . z; 1,». ..z Sf. .v /..>....\ ./. I J. a .. \.(. A. /..l f//. WI. J. .\..(..\.. (”12.1 “KI x A a 8):“... .\ 139 Japanese army also had great difficulty attacking the Szechuan basin, which is surrounded by mountains. With their advancement checked in the west, the Japanese blockaded the coast and tried to cut off China's supplies from the outside world. Fortunately, there were two railways under construction, which kept China from being totally isolated from the rest of the world and allowed her to receive necessary war supplies. In the northwest there was the Lunghai railway extension con- necting China with the Soviet Union. In the southwest, the Yunnan-Burma Railway connected China with the Indian Ocean. Through these contacts, China received aid from the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and other allied countries. I Many railways were built in China for strategic purposes during the one-hundred-year period following 1866. The strategic factor satisfactorily explains the direction of many miles of railway construction in China. Political Administration as a Factor in the --Development Ef—Cfiina's‘Railgay_Pattern In China there is a saying: "After a long period of unification, the country will be divided." How are different regions politically united and divided? It is natural that when two regions are similar in physical environment, it is easier for the inhabitants to unite 140 politically than if the regions are diverse. On the North China plain, which has a homogeneous physical set- ting, few political divisions exist. But in southwestern China, which has a variety of landforms and climate, the provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Kwangsi have been customarily ruled by several different warlords. The political element is therefore one of the important factors in characterizing the spatial pattern of Chinese railways (Map 6). The spatial pattern evidences two political movements: one centripetal and the other centrifugal. The centripetal movement originated with the central government. This movement was significant in all three eras of railway construction. The new regimes always faced the same problem and tried to use railways as an immediate solution. The difficulty of communicating with the capital made the provinces almost independent of the central authority in local administration. More rapid means of locomotion had the immediate effect of bringing them under central control and of checking the misgovern- ment of the provinces. Two spatial patterns were formed during the one-hundred years both of which radiated from established capitals. One radiated from Peking, during the periods of the late Ching Dynasty, the early Republic, and the Communist regime. Another radiated from Nanking 141 m as: ..(.\..J.. .w a .. c : a a .....V WP :2... 53...: . A . y . a .. s n . -/ .. .. .... axon - a... S. x 230 z. A. \. «3:9 as E. . ..L. .\. .x _. . . .\.. ...... - 5...... ...>. v) P .../...”... ... (...1 fear...» .\..H )-)f-\.mu.).i. of...) ; .. o .. § .. N..\.r\ . I/s/aQVQ/c/ c.... /...2..\ /-u r. a. \ E .c. . 8.381. .13 \1!» . b . z _ If, ./ \ r / ./ I . l .\ ...]..J .\./.\.... .\ /. 1.1. .T.. ...... I (:1 .813: ~ .J. i e . a o a .. o s s 0..) U .‘h .a .0 .u .... 142 during the National government of Kuomingtang rule. Today, Communist railway construction is more concentric for political purposes with most new mileage being built in the sparsely populated western provinces. Undoubtedly, these new lines will help to integrate the farthest reaches of the country with the rest of China. The centrifugal movement in railway construction came from local or provincial governments. This movement was significant during the late Ching Dynasty and the early Republic Era. The local gentry built railways in their own provinces for the purpose of defying the Manchu rule. This was true in south China; Hupeh and Szechwan of central China; and Hunan in the Lake Region. The political instability of the early Republic Era also caused the development of local railways. The warlords built their own railway systems to isolate themselves from the new regime. Examples of this type of railway development include the Shansi system on the Loess High- lands, the Liaoning system, and the Kirin system in Manchuria. The Role of the Government From its earliest days the railway in China was regarded as at least partly a proper sphere of government enterprise. This was brought about by several factors. The agrarian focus of the economy resulted in a dearth of 143 accumulated capital. Moreover, the unwillingness of those who did have some capital to invest in long-term undertakings such as railway construction was clearly evident. These difficulties in raising funds for railway construction forced government action in an attempt to solve the problem. Between 1896 and 1911, an ever- increasing foreign financial and diplomatic pressure was directed at Chinese authorities to gain railway conces- sions. This pressure decidedly placed the government in a pivotal position with regard to railway development. Moreover, since the role of government had always been great in developing irrigation and in building canals and roads, it was easy for the people to accept the direct participation of the authorities in railway affairs. The fact that many of the early promoters of railway construc- tion in China--statesmen such as Li Hung-Chang, Chang Chih-tung, and Sheng Huan-huai--were members of the official bureaucracy only highlighted the role of the government. As soon as railways were built they were placed under the jurisdiction of government agencies. At first railway jurisdiction was handled by the Bureau of Naval l6 Affairs. In 1895 railway matters were transferred to 16 This was because the railways were used for defense purposes at that time. 144 the Tsungli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as a supplementary item having to do with foreign relations.17 Thus, for many years railway business was considered principally in the light of its strategic and diplomatic rather than its economic significance. Then in 1903, the Ministry of Commerce was given jurisdiction over the- railways. Immediately a new set of regulations was drawn up by the Ministry. While the regulations tried to en- courage local investments in new railways, local funding was minimal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, successor to the Tsungli Yamen, was also important in railway development in these years, since it was in charge of the negotiations with foreign representatives regarding loans for government-owned railways.18 With the setting up of the Board of Post and Com- munications in 1906, the railways became the responsibility of a specialized government agency, a practice that has continued to the present day. The Republican government after 1912 placed great emphasis on railway administration and entertained vast hopes for state construction of railways. After 1928 the basic policy of the National 17This is because railways were now deeply in- volved in matters of foreign affairs. 18Chan Hsin-cheng, Histo of Modern Chinese Communication Shanghai, 1937), pp. 72-73. 145 government as stated in the official Outline of Recon- struction was that "all communications enterprises that are nationwide in their effects, such as railways, high- ways, telegraph . . . are to be constructed and operated by the state."19 As a consequence, during the period of the most rapid railway construction under the National government, the state railways remained the most important lines. In fact, between 1912 and 1915 the Republican government nationalized the more important railways20 or railway branches that were still in the hands of private companies at a total cost to the government of $65,684,716.21 Consequently, the remaining private rail- ways made up only a small fraction of the total mileage. Before the Sino-Japanese War, a Ministry of Rail- ways was established in the central government. During the war and up to 1949, the railways were put under the administration of the Ministry of Transportation. The 19 Ministry of Railways, Railway Gazette (Nanking, 1928), p. 126. 20These transactions involved railways in eight provinces; the lines nationalized included the Shanghai- Hangchow-Ningpo Railway, built by private capital in Kiangsu and Chekiang and the rights over the projected Hankow-Szechuan line that rested with the railway com- panies of Hupeh and Szechwan. Hung-huan Lin Histo of Chinese Railways (Taipei: World Press, 1963), pp. I2-I3. 21 Tseng Kun-hua, Histo of Chinese Railwa s (Peking. 1921+). pp. must—”L ‘ -1 L 146 policy of state ownership and control was continued by the Communist government after 1949, and a new Ministry of Railways was established by the Communist government.22 Lack of Administrative Unity In view of the important role the government has played in China's railway development, it may seem a para- dox that one of the problems that persistently plagued railway development and operation was the lack of an efficient, unified administration. One has to take into account the centrifugal forces that were operating in Chinese society to understand this paradox. It is true that designs for a national railway network had emerged as early as the policy-making sessions held in Peking in 1907 by the Board of Posts and Communications. Their plans called for the establishment of four main state rail systems with trunk lines radiating from Peking, each having its satellite lines and its own hinterland.23 Despite this show of potential central authority, the actual management of the existing lines remained in 22The Ministry of Railways was changed to Ministry of Communications in 1971, according to Ming_Dai1y (Hong Kong), Feb. 13, 1971. 23The termini of the four trunk lines were to be as follows: in the north, Kiakhta; northeast, Aigun; south, Canton: northwest, Ili, according to Tung-hua hsu- .lu, Kuang-hsu, Vol. CCVIII, p. 7. 1117 regional control. As one British observer commented, "this was due to the powers of the provincial officials."214 The lack of unified supervision or administration of even individual lines was the result not so much of the power of the provincial officials as such but of the nature of the Chinese administration structure. Given the ter- ritorial, unspecialized basis of traditional Chinese administration, it was not to be expected that officials would regard the railway as a business enterprise that required central financial control and direction. It was apparently quite natural for Chang Chih-tung and his col- leagues to speak of the "Hupeh-section," "Hunan-section," and "Kwangtung-section" of the Hankow-Canton Railway as geographic and administrative units and to leave manage- ment to be handled on a provincial basis. The Szechuan- Hankow line was often referred to in a similar fashion. Fund-raising and bookkeeping, among other things, were carried out in divergent ways in different provinces. Strict provincial demarcations proved to be a retarding influence not only on government railways but on private efforts as well. It was estimated that, partly because of the lack of cooperation among people of neighboring provinces, the lines built by private capital in 1911 24F. H. Kent, Railwa Enterprise in China (London: Edward Arnold, 1907), p. 199. 148 --despite more than a decade of enthusiastic activity-- totalled less than 300 miles.25 At the same time it seemed debatable, even to some of the advocates of govern- ment action in railway development, whether the provincial or central authorities should have ultimate control over the lines. Chang Chih-tung, for example, objected strongly to a proposal originating in Peking for the central government to take control over the railways of Hupeh.26 The fact the major railways were built with loans from a number of foreign countries also contributed to the lack of single administrative control over a particular railway. For the duration of the loan period, each system remained tied to the control of the lending agency. For each system the relative powers of Chinese and foreign personnel, the function of foreigners employed by the railway administration, and the ultimate seat of authority were defined differently.27 The Chinese government was the legal owner of the major lines, and at least on the formal level, the government's right to control was not 26Chang Chih-tung, "Memorials," Collected Works of Chang Chih-tung, Vol. LXVI, p. 24. 27Compare, for instance, the working agreement for the Shanghai-Nanking Railways, and the provisions in the Canton-Kowloon and Tientsin-Pukow railway loan agree- ments: J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and reements with and Concernin China, vol. I (Washington, D.C., I912), PP- E95-498- 149 disputed. However, it was not until the Republican Period that each railway relinquished control over its own policies. For example, the accounts of different rail- ways were kept in different ways and in different cur- rencies. It was not until 1905 that the financial admin- istration and accounting of the various state railways were unified under regulations set up by the Ministry of Communications.28 The overall administrative pattern remained unchanged during the difficult and unstable latter years of the Republic. Upon gaining power the Communists set up a five-year plan for the railways (1953- 1957), immediately after the end of the "Rehabilitation Period." During this time, the Peking Ministry of Rail- ways divided the administration of the railway system into five major areas:29 1. Manchuria: Harbin, Chichihaerh, Chilin, Chinchow. 2. North China: Peking, Tientsin, Taiyuan, Chinan, Chengchow. 3. South China: Shanghai, Canton, Liuchow. 28Chang Hsin-cheng, op. cit., p. 82. 29There were 12 administrative bureau branches in 1953, according to Chi Yu Np! China's Railwa Construc- tion (Peking, 1953), p. 34. There were 17 Branches in , according to National Security Bureau, Re orts on Railwa Construction in Mainland China (Taipei, 1957), PP- 9'49 150 4. Chengtu-Chungking Railway Bureau. 5. Northwest Trunk Line Engineering Bureau. The administration in Manchuria was directed fran a central and semi-autonomous bureau in Mukden while regional bureaus were located at Chichihaerh, Kirin, and Chinchow. In the north, bureaus were located at Tientsin, Chinan, Taiyuan, and Chengchow. In the south, the main bureaus were Shanghai and Hengyang. Secondary centers 30 were at Hangchow, Liuchow, and Kunming. Ca ital as a Factor in the Development of ChinETs RaiIWay Pattern Capital for the construction of Chinese railways during the one-hundred years since 1866 can be divided 31 into four categories: government funds, foreign loans (Table 9), domestic loans, and private capital. Of the varied combinations of funds possible, three broad types of economic support for railway development emerged. These were: state railways (in which foreign loans 30 The Manchuria Administrative Bureau managed 10,819 kilometers of railway, including 30 major and 60 branch lines. The North China Administrative Bureau mana ed 7,468 kilometers of railway, including 12 major and 0 branch lines. The South China Administrative Bureau managed 4,394 kilometers of railway, including 22 major and 26 branch lines. The Northwest China and South- west China Bureaus were formed in 1954. According to Y. H. 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M. ' r, a a \ \lf\ )\ . .. \u \\l \....| ... ./.. \u If as (1’ 5.2..» k \ .\I )/ , A. \u I / A FA\)\ N‘\\ ./..I\ :# \ Pc/z’.l\ V ./.. xx .- a a ... z. .w ./.). \..\ 232 effort to try to increase the overall mileage of the existing railways (Table 25). The results have been quite encouraging. Many thousands of miles of railway track were added to the system inherited from the Nation- alists (Table 26). The railway pattern remained unevenly distributed. Functionally, the rail lines were not pri- marily based on an economic rationale because of the political and military factors which continued to hamper railway construction. Efforts to construct new lines have been concen- trated in two directions (Table 27). First, an effort has been made to decrease China's dependence on the coastal regions. Thus the new railways have been extended into remote areas of the interior. Secondly, it was recognized that railways would continue to be of strategic importance.13 Accordingly, among the first railways to be built were those lines connecting every province of China to the main trunk lines. Thus, the provinces that were practically separated from China proper in the past, such as Sinkiang, Kansu, Tsinghai, Szechwan, and Yunnan, now were able to be reached without much effort via the newly constructed railways. Prior to this construction, 13Yang Ming Shah Chwang, An Anal sis of Transpor- tation Develo ment in Mainland ChIna (TaIpeI: Cavernment Dress, I957), p. 36 233 TABLE 25 COMPLETED NEW RAILWAYS IN COMMUNIST CHINA, 1949-1966 Railway Completed Date Egniih 1. Chengtu-Chungking July, 1952 504 2. Chining-Erhlien August, 1955 338.7 3. Lantaun-Yentai January, 1956 183 4. Paochi-Chengtu January, 1958 669 5. Paotow-Paiyungpop December, 1956 113 6. Litang-Chankiang July, 1955 315 ‘ 7. Yingtan-Amoy January, 1958 787 8. Nanping-Fuchow November, 1958 168 9. Paotow-Lanchow June, 1958 999 10. Lanchow-Singkiang(to Urumchi) January, 1961 1,942 11. Kutuerh-Kanho April, 1956 381 12. Ichun-Hsinching March, 1956 273 13. Shangpancheng-Hwaijou April, 1960 181 14. Kantang-Wuwei April, 1963 150 15. Tienshui-Lanchow October, 1952 371 16. Laiping-Munankuan November, 1951 355 17. Yunnan-Burma (Anning-Yipingland section) April, 1959 102 18. KMeichow-Yunnan (Kweiyang-Anshun section) April, 1963 102 19. Neikiang-Kunming Neikiang-Anpian section) February, 1960 147 Chanyi-Huanwei section) May, 1960 105 20. Fengtai-Shacheng July, 1955 105 21. Lanchow-Chinghai (Howkow-Haiyen section) 22. Kweichow-Kwangsi (Kweiyang-Tuyun section) 23. Szechuan-Kweichow (Shanchikow-Kanshuichang October, 1959 207 December, 1951 132 section) July, 1956 84 24. Canton-Lienkiang (Mouming-Lienkiang section) March, 1959 62 25. HuPeh-Kiangsi (Wuchang-Tayeh section) July, 1958 98 26. Ningpo-Chuanshan January, 1957 42 27. Lanchi-Hsingankiang October, 1957 48 28. Hsuchiachan-Miaotaitze November, 1958 ll 29. Hanyang-WUchang October, 1957 9 30. Hankow-Hanyang November, 1954 6 31. Chiamussa-Lienkiangkow no date given 6 Total : 87963 Information mainly from Communist China's Rail- wa Trans ortation, unpubl rept. from Méinland DEIna, NaEIonaI Security Bureau, Taipei, 1966. Source: 234 TABLE 26 COMPARISON OF 25 RAILWAYS BUILT AND PROJECTED IN COMMUNIST PERIOD WITH NATIONALIST PROJECTED LINES IN "FIRST PHASE 0F POSTWAR RAILWAY RECONSTRUCTION" Communist lines Nationalist lines Route Lifiggh Route L?Eg§h Chining-Erhlien 330 Chining-Kulun 1080* Paotow-Lanchow 278 Paotow-Ningsia 557** Hsihsien-Yingtan 32 Hsihsien-Kueichi 315* Sian-Wuhan 00 Huayuen—Hsiangyang 260* Yingtan-Tzuchi 73 Kueichi-Nanping 280* Chuchow-Lonti 132 Hsiangtan-Chihkiang 498* Tzuchi-Amoy 621 Kueichi-Nanping 280* Tzuchi-Amoy Nanping-Changting 220* Nanping-Foochow 168 Foochow-Nanping 150** Laiping-Munankwan 355 Hsiying-Laiping 455* Lungyen-Meihsien 350 Changping—Meihsien 230* Shihlung-Hsingning 220 Shihlung-Meihsien 330* Tienshui-Lanchow 348 Tienshui-Lanchow 378** Lanchow-Urumuchi 1892 Lanchow-Hami 1636** Hsining-Mangai 1125 Hsining-Yushu 800* Paochi-Tatan 302 Tienshui-Kuangyuan 410** Tatan-Chengtu 367 Chengtu-Kuangyuan 345** Anning-Ipinglang 102 Anning-Suta 844* Lienyuan-Tuyun 825 Tuyun-Chihkiang 357* Chengtu-Chungking 504 Chengtu-Chungking 530** Neichiang-Anpien 142 Neichiang-Loshan 180* Chengtu-Ipinglang 958 Chengtu-Loshan 165* Chungking-Kanshui 86 Chungking-Kueiyang 530** Hsuanwei-Kneiyang 668 Kueiyang-Weining 416** Hsuanwei-Kueiyang Chani-weining 260** * - partially identical ** - identical Sources: Railwa s in Communist China (Taipei: Bureau of DommunicationIResearch, 1961), pp. 29-33; Communist China Railwa Passenger Time Table TPeking: I960 and I96g): Tseng-chiao Dfiao, Postwar Communications Construction in China TShangfiai: 56mmerceIPress, 1947), pp. 63L65I 235 TABLE 27 NEW RAILWAYS BUILT BY THE COMMUNIST CHINESE AND NOT PROJECTED BY THE NATIONALISTS Re ion Borderland Connecting Trunk Lines Total g Lines Lines and Others Lines # Length # Length # Length # Length (km) (1m) (km) (km) Developed Regions Northeast 0 0 0 0 3 115 3 115 North 0 0 3 223 fi 353 9 58? East 9_ O 22 1 0 Total 0 O 986‘ 13 6%; 18 1365 Under- aeveIoped Regions Central 0 0 O 0 9 553 10 553 South 1 315 0 0 4 155 5 470 gorthwest O O 1 185 5 221 5 406 outhwest 0 0 0 0 2 2 Total 1' 3'1"; I 185' 2% 1233’ 2% T729 Grand Total 1 315 '6- 774 34 1849 41 2929 Sources: Railwa Passen er Train Time Table (Peking: PeopIe‘s RaIIway PuEIIsEIng Bureau, 1960 and 1963); Railways in Communist China (Taipei: Bureau of Communication Research, 1961). 236 inland travel by camel, mule, or even wheelbarrow had to be used, all of which required months of time for reaching given destinations. It is true that the introduction of trucks and automobiles somewhat eased the situation but not enough to initiate new industrial requirements. Among the important lines built during the Com- munist Era, at least two railways in the province of Fukien are definitely more military than economic in value. Rapid access to the Strait of Taiwan is of pri- mary importance for both lines.1u Another line of similar military importance was constructed in Shantung, where the existing Tsingtao-Tsinan line was connected by a branch line with the City ofChefoo.15 During the First Five-year Plan practically all railway construction 16 It was not until after 1958 that the was in the west. program changed and building was stepped up in the east during the Second Five-year Plan.17 (Tables 28, 29, 30, and 31) 1”’Kuei-sheng Chang, "The Changing Railroad Pattern in Mainland China,” Geographic Review, LI (1961), 534-548. 15Ibid. 16 Chin-kuo Cheng, An Anal sis of China's First Five-Year Plan (Peking, 1955), pp. 44-49. 17En-lai Chou, A Great Decade (Peking: Foreign 237 TABLE 28 RANKING 0F REGIONS BY RAILWAY DENSITY (Km/1,000 Km) 1949 AND 1963 Region Densitggugank Densit§96gank Inggzase Igggegge Northeast 12 1 13 1 1 4 East 6 2 7 2 l A Central 4 3 6 3 2 2 South 2 4 5 4 3 1 North 2 4 4 5 2 2 Northwest 0.1 5 1.5 6 1.4 3 Sou thwe st 0 6 l_ 7 1 4 Grand Total 3 i a Source: Railway lengths and area data for the measurement of density are from Appendix D, Table D-1, and Appendix E, Table E-l, Yuan-li Wu, The Spatial Economy of Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1 pp. - 9 - 10 238 TABLE 29 RANKING 0F PROVINCES BY RAILWAY DENSITY (Km/1,000 Km) 1949 AND 1963 Rank 194 196 Net Province Density RanE Densify an Incr. Iggr Liaoning 25 1 21 l 4 3 Heilungkiang & Kirin 9 2 11 3 2 5 Hopeh 8 3 12 2 4 3 Kiangsu 8 3 12 2 4 3 Honan 7 4 8 5 1 7 Shantung 6 5 7 6 l 7 Shansi 5 6 9 4 4 3 Anhwei 5 6 3 10 2 5 Chekiang 4 7 7 6 3 4 Hunan 4 7 6 g 2 5 Kiangsi 4 7 5 2 5 Hupeh 2 8 4 9 2 5 Kwangsi 2 8 6 7 4 3 Kwangtung 2 8 3 10 1 4 Shensi 2 8 4 9 2 5 Inner Mongolia 0.5 9 2 11 1.5 6 Fukien O 10 7 6 7 1 Ningsia & Kansu O 10 6 7 6 2 Tsinghai O 10 0.3 13 0.3 9 Singkiang 0 10 0.4 12 0.4 8 Szechwau O 10 2 11 2 5 Yunnan 0 10 2 11 2 5 Kweichow 0 10 2 ll 2 5 Tibet O 10 O 12 O 10 Source: Railway lengths and area data for the measure- ment of density are from Appendix D, Table D-1, and Appendix E, Table E-l, of Yuan-11 Wu, The Spatial Economy of Communist China (New YorE: Praeger, , pp. - D, " 610 . s a s s o s L . .a. . - . . . - , - ‘- —-o - 1 -~<.—- -< s - s . . . o s s . I 6 O -..—a. ' - ,— 239 TABLE 30 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEW RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION FROM 1949 TO END OF 1963* Number of Length of % of Region New Lines Ne? Lines New Lines km Develpped Regions Northeast 3 115 1.2 North 11 1,194 12.2 East Subtotal 21' 3644' 19.4 Underdeveloped Regions Central 10 811 8.5 South 8 1,613 17.0 Northwest 11 3,839 43.4 Southwest 1 1 . Subtotal 3'6 7% 86% Total 57 9,501 100.0 *These data included all trunk lines and major branches identified, but excluded forest railways, spurs, railways under construction and planned lines. Sources: Railwa Passen er Train Time Table (Peking: PeopIezs RaIiway PEBIIsfiIng Bureau, 1963), and Railwa s in Communist China (Tai ei: Bureau 0? TransporfatIOn—Research, 1961 , pp. 29—33. 240 .smmnmmmn.mm-mm .aa .Aamma .aowossm «xnow zezv scano unacsseoo mo meocoom Heapsmm one .33 Hansen» .Hum vanes am xficseaa< one .mnm sands .mnm canes .sum canoe scam and span «eonsom o.ooH m.mm o.Hm N.m mmm m mm «mm Heuoa 9mm mg: Ema Maw slam. w. 1mm mm. nsoawsm oeaoae>en n-eq H.o> o.m: m.>H w.m ::H m Hm boa ucoawom comoao>on o.ooa h.mm o.Hm m.m mum m hm 30m Hence m.mm mod w.mH .mlw .mwlm. fl mm a nooca>onm ocsHCH m.mm m.m: m.HH m.m mHH m ma mm neoca>onm Hepnsoo Hence owned assoc: Hassm Hence owned asses: Hausa acne nonpao mofiosaso HudsonsooH m moapdo HdahumanH no hmnszz NBHoMQ mmmq mBH3 mZOHumm ammoqm>ma ho 02¢ MMOZH>Cmm QZomm A .Ho> “Homada AAHeaHsBV anacoz scano unansesoo scam one open Hecaenep one nowceq ”neonsom unsenpnoz NH m wcdxom zoxmcdanoceaq canceaq pmsenpnoz ma mm . wadhOdHA “momma osHHacom npnoz ma 30H wconosam Hepmneh ennnmcem pudespnoz :H me canasm canes: Hanna: pesospaoz ma Hwa onceHEH canndm “dances sosoz NH row suns» sszsosasosasm Hso-wdono pheasanoz am New mesons seems: scusosm poem ofl Ham asswsssm mafiassz moss-sm unsenpnoz m me Snusssaso ssnasm. canouasm ansoz m AH: essaassossm wsaxoa sssn-msaso pnsenunoz b mm: cszxasscszm seems: censusesm npnoz m mmm masons newcaawcem saumcse endogenoz m mmm salsa Canada spud: possessoz : :Ho.H xoxsm sanpsoae saumsaso BDDOnnasnpceo m maaaa scuceo cans: caninesw Hssosooucosoz m HHN.H sass: msdxom sssumsano Heapceonpnsm H mm>.H zosocdq ceaaasscdum Hesuwasu coawom xasm ammqu oB madcasneflouh ocaq hazaasm ¢2Hmo BmHZDEEoo 2H Nmma 924 omma zmHIBmm ZOHBODMBmzoo Modmelmqmbon mo 02sz . 39%:le VME fifiaéfizfiwcfifr 5% ‘ 5} 308 Lunghai Railway Administration Rureau. ‘Lungnai Railway, Shanghai, 1935fitmflavefiég,vfiwafimemm Ma, Chang-tsung. Communist China's Industry in 196M. on Kon : nion esea ch nstitute 1965. «522%, irefing—sfirsai were. Manual for Newgaper Readers. Hankow, 1950.P£]$§§%p§a Mileages of Railwa in Services. Peking, l9h9. Ministry of Communications. Communist China's Railwa Constructions. ’g‘aipei, 558.7935 §F,¥EE\59=&7=§&§: QEEECBJEEET?§3tHa:J?k?. Ministry of Communications. Statistics of Chinese National Railways, Nanking, l§E§.j[i§§¥, swam-e39 Ev@}3*;\§t,a7'§~~ “PM Ministry of Railways. Annual Re orts on Railwa s. Nan ing: 5 T R EIwa I935 19%? . M nis ry o ys - . ’ik as. /i% ties-er»?! as. %as, Sofia—PM ems. Ministry of Railways. Collections of China's Railwa Loans. Nanking: Ministry of Railways; I937. lsék 1153?, awaken as, 132/g]+f«‘,3},?37 3.. Ministry of Railways. National Railwa Loans. Nanking: M n stry of Ra 1w ys, 1936.54“ , ‘ sewage 1%: ‘v Qwégfi Ministry of Railways. Railw Year Book. Nanking: gniygggfifiaflways: E35 - Edit}: @L‘Eflfifli Ministry of Railways. 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New PorkziPraeger, I967. i Name: Date of Birth: Place of Birth: Degrees Held: Teaching Experience: VITA Chuen-tyi Chow July 1. 1933 Nanking, China B.A., National Taiwan University, 1956 M.A., University of Minnesota, 1959 Instructor, Yale University, Chinese Language, 1960-1962: Assistant Instructor, Michigan State University, Chinese Language, 1963-1964; Instructor, Western Michi an University, Geography of Far East, 19 4-1965; Assistant Professor, Wisconsin State University, Economic Geography, Geography of Far East, 1965-1967: Assistant Professor, DePaul University (Chicago), Economic Geography, Geography of Far East, 1967-1969; Associate Professor, Edinboro State College (Pennsylvania), Trade and Trans- portation, Economic Geography, Geography of Far East, 1969-present. "iiiiiiiiiii“