This is to certify that the

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"SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS AS A TRANSITIONAL ADJUSTMENT PHASE

IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION:

THE CASE OF TABRIZ, IRAN"

By

Housain Banifatemeh Aloochi

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

"SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS AS A TRANSITIONAL PHASE

IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION:

THE CASE OF TABRIZ, IRAN"

by

Housain Banifatemeh Aloochi

This study explores squatter settlements, a widespread phenomenon involving rural-urban migrants in the Third World. The study was conducted in a squatter settlement on the outskirts of Tabriz, one of the large and industrialized cities of Iran, during the summer of 1979.

One hundred and sixty-eight households were randomly selected from a master list compiled from data obtained from the Tabriz Central Statistical Department and Survey conducted by Tabriz University. Information was obtained from structured interviews of the heads of each household by specially trained interviewers.

The results indicate that a majority of these squatter families came from rural areas in Iran. They left their villages because of poverty and economic hardship prevailing in rural Iran. Furthermore, we found that movement into the squatter settlement can be attributed to high rentals, shortage of housing in the city, and the hope of acquiring one's own home. Our findings reveal that the rate of employment is very high among the squatters; at the time of this study, 1979, everybody who could work was employed. Most of the sampled household heads are satisfied with their current living conditions compared with what they left behind in the villages.

The results of this study were compared with three similar studies made elsewhere in the world. Comparisons were made with Gecekondu in Istanbul, Turkey; Baja Vista in Monterrey, Mexico; and Favela in Rio, Brazil. The result of these comparisons indicate that there are striking similarities in many aspects between the squatter settlements in Tabriz and those in different parts of the world. Therefore, we conclude that the squatter settlement is not unique to Tabriz, rather it is part of a world-wide phenomenon.

To:

Adeleh and Darush

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

One of the most difficult tasks confronting most graduate students is that of selecting a major area of interest upon which to devote his or her time, energy and effort, and which ultimately leads to a thesis or dissertation. Such a decision is frequently complicated by alturistic feelings and a genuine desire to conduct research that will in some way benefit humankind.

After a long deliberation period, during which I weighed such issues as my prior research interests, their compatibility with my long range life goals, and the actual feasibility of the project, I decided to conduct my research on the squatter settlements in my native city of Tabriz, Iran. The rationale for this decision is as follows:

First, ever since I was a student at the University of Tabriz, I have had an interest in the study of squatter settlements which have sprung up around the city. The dissertation requirement provided an ideal opportunity to conduct a research concerning a long standing area of interest.

Secondly, having been born and reared in Tabriz city, I am very familiar with the people as well as geographical features of the locale. More importantly, I know and understand the folkways, mores, and norms of the people. Simply stated, my language is their language, my culture is their culture.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM, METHODS AND PROCEDURE

This chapter begins with a brief description of the world-wide situation in which the problem of this dissertation is found. This description is followed by a statement of the research focus, objectives of the study and major questions examined. Some attention is then given to the perspectives on squatter settlement based upon the literature and a general statement of research methodology employed is outlined.

The Problem Setting

Migration is one of the chief means whereby a spatial redistribution of the population occurs. In the Third World, urban populations often are increasing through migration as well as through an excess of births over deaths. The rate of growth often exceeds that of the rural populations. Indeed, the problems of Third World cities have often been attributed to the prevalence within them of large numbers of persons who are only lately acquainted with the demands of urban life. That more than half the residents of Third World cities were born outside those cities should not surprise us, for the cities can only be growing as rapidly as they are by attracting many newcomers. Many Third World cities grow at from 5-10 percent per year.[1/] Since natural increase is at most about three percent a year, migration often accounts for one-half, or even more, of the annual growth.

In the developing countries there has been continuous mass movement from rural areas to the urban centers in recent decades. This is

evident when we compare the increasing numbers of people living in cities in most of the Third World regions with the more developed world. Rapid improvements in health, education, employment opportunities, social affairs and other amenities characterizing the new modernization in the major cities and towns of the Third World have motivated rural people to migrate. Few of these services have yet reached the village level.[2/]

All over Asia, Africa, and Latin America, people are flocking to the cities at an unprecedented rate. In the last ten years, an estimated 200 million people moved from the countryside to the cities of these three continents.[3/] In the Third World many cities are growing at rates so high that they double their populations every 10 to 15 years.[4/] This rural to urban migration constitutes one of the most important migrations in human history. Yet there is little understanding of the social, cultural, economic and political consequences for the migrants, the cities, and the larger society.

The rapid expansion of squatter settlements on the fringes of cities takes on added meaning in light of insufficient expansion in the absorptive capacities of these areas. Few if any major cities in developing nations are growing fast enough in terms of job opportunities, urban services, infrastructure, facilities, and governmental capabilities to absorb current population growth. This disparity in which urbanization outpaces industrialization and the creation of adequate urban institutions is known as "overurbanization" or "hyperurbanization".[5/] Because standard housing is so scarce relative to need, and because even the least expensive dwelling units cost so much more than

the low-income family's ability to pay, vacant lands in and around the central city become natural squatting grounds for thousands of migrant families.

The first major wave of rural-urban migration in Iran after land reform (1963) led to a rapid growth in squatter settlements. An abrupt fall in world prices for Iranian agricultural products depressed the already low standard of living of many rural areas. Here, the decline in agricultural productivity and the attraction of towns were essential factors in propensity to migrate. Simultaneously, the government stressed the development of industries to supply internal markets. A resulting increase in new factories created a concomitant demand for a labor force in a manner reminiscent of the classic "industrialization first" model. These events were paralleled by, and probably contributed to, a rapid rise in construction costs and land values. Housing became scarce and expensive. Urban services, including transport from surrounding suburban areas, were primitive. New migrants searching for homes were joined by many city dwellers no longer able to afford the rents. Squatting on hillsides around the central cities, with the dual advantage of being rent free and centrally-located, became the best solution for many. Consequently, they invaded the land at the outskirts of the city which was without benefit of public services, and built their own crudely constructed houses.

The Research Focus

The primary objectives of this study are: (a) to examine the process and motivations for migration from rural areas to Tabriz; (b) to

analyze the process of squatter settlement formation in that city;
(c) to explore selected dimensions of adaptation to squatter settle-
ment and integration into city life at the fringe of a large city; and
(d) to systematically compare the experience in Tabriz with similar
squatter settlements in other parts of the world. Based upon the liter-
ature as well as personal observation on the movement of rural popu-
lation into Tabriz and the growth of the squatter settlement around the
city, the following are among the major questions posed in this study:

1) What are the origins of those residing in the squatter settle-
ment?

2) What were their motives for migration?

3) Why do migrants now reside in the squatter sections of the
city?

4) What type of jobs do the squatters hold?

5) What is the role of relatives in determining place of destina-
tion?

6) Are residents of the squatter settlement integrated into the
city life in the urban area?

We believe that the establishment and formation of squatter
settlements is not unique to Tabriz, rather it is part of a worldwide
phenomenon of "squattments" which occurs in different parts of the
world. Therefore in order to be able to strengthen the findings of a
single case, namely Tabriz, we will compare the results of our study
with three similar studies elsewhere in the world. Comparison will be
made with Gecekondu in Istanbul, Turkey; Baja Vista in Monterrey,

Mexico; a Favela in Rio, Brazil where definitions and variables are sufficiently comparable.

Perspectives on Squatter Settlement from the Literature

The terms "squatter" can be defined as the illegal occupation of public and private land or buildings. Charles Abrams describes it as a "Trespass of Desperation." The settlements that squatters in the various cities build are known by different names. The United Nations prefers to refer to them as "informal" settlements, a term that automatically carries prejudicial legal connotations. In Bogota they are called "barrios clandestinos," or just "barrios;" in Rio de Janeiro and in Sao Paulo, "favelas;" in other Brazilian cities, such as Recife, they are called "mocambos," while in Port Alegre, they are called, "Canticos." In Mexico City they are known as "barrios de los paracidistas, colonias populares, veciendades, jacales, or tugurios." In Lima, they are known as "barriadas;" in Caracas, "ranchos;" in Santiago, "callampas;" in Panama City, "ranchos;" and in San Salvador, they are known as "champas." In Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Karachi, they are termed "bustees," "jhoupris" and "jhuggis;" in Manila "abrung-barongs;" in Djakarta and Kula Lumpur, "kampungs;" in Amkara and Istanbul, "gece-kondus;" in Lagos and Ibadan, "the slums;" in Tunisian cities they are termed "gourbivilles;" and in Casablanca and other Moroccan cities, "bidonvilles."[6] Finally in Iran they are known as "hashieh nashin" or "zageh nashin."

Squatter areas have traditionally been seen as areas of social breakdown, delinquency, and alienation. Since most squatter areas are

also "slums" (i.e., areas of substandard housing), Marshall Clinard's generalizations about slums reflect the prevailing attitude toward squatters:

Slums vary from one type to another, but certain general patterns of slum life are universal. Although the slum is characterized by inadequate housing, deficient facilities, overcrowding, and congestion, it involves much more than these elements. Sociologically, it is a way of life, a subculture with a set of norms and values, which is reflected in poor sanitation and health practices, deviant behavior, and characteristic attributes of apathy and social isolation. People who live in slum areas isolated from the general power structures and are regarded as inferior, and slum dwellers, in turn, harbor suspicions of the outside world.[7]

An example of the assumed connection between living conditions and social organization is provided in the following description of a squatter settlement in Colombia by Mangin. He states that:

It is the rudest kind of slum, clustering like a dirty beehive around the edges of any principal city in Latin America...living almost like animals, the tugurio's residents are overwhelmed by animality. Religion, social control, education, domestic life are warped and disfigured.[8]

Even sophisticated scholars have taken up the "disease" image of slum and squatter communities, all too readily assuming that these areas are socially disorganized and their people the rejects of progress. Thus, for Daniel Lerner, "the flooding of great urban centres by people who have no work there" is evidence of "the contemporary urbanization and industrialization," as well as "the modernization of most countries of the Third World."[9/] In support of this conclusion, Lerner says:

> Every student of development is aware of the global spread of urban slums -- from the ranchos of Caracas and favela of Rio, to the gecekondu of Ankara, to the bidon-villes and "tin can cities" that infest the metropolitan centers of every developing country from Cairo to Manila.
>
> The point that must be stressed in referring to this suffering mass of humanity, displaced from the rural areas to the filthy peripheries of the great cities, is that few of them experience the "transition" from agricultural to urban-industrial labour called for by the mechanism of development and the model of modernization. They are neither housed, nor trained, nor employed, nor serviced. They languish on the urban periphery without entering into any pro-ductive relationship with its industrial operations. These are the "displaced persons," the DPs, of the developmental process as it now typically occurs in most of the world, a human flotsam and jetsam that

has been displaced from traditional agricultural life

without being incorporated into modern industrial
life.[10]

Since the 1960's, most writers have rejected the view that squatter areas are characterized by disorganization, anti-social activities, and crime, and serve no meaningful social purpose. On the basis of their work in Lima, John Turner and William Mangin argue that squatter settlements in Latin America are "solutions to difficult problems rather than...problems in themselves;" squatter settlements are "a process of social reconstruction through population initiative."[11]

Other sociologists and anthropologists working in Africa have consistently seen purpose, organization, and community in urban slums.[12] A recent lengthy study of a squatter village in Nairobi comes to the following conclusion:

> Nathare Valley village is a relatively well-
> integrated political community in which residents
> share a sense of community and a set of community-
> wide political institutions which help to provide
> orderly management and peaceful resolutions of
> political and social problems.[13]

Similar findings have been reported by T.G. McGee in a study of a Mali squatter settlement,[14] in studies of slum and squatter communities in Manila,[15] and by Janice Perlman in an interview study of Rio de Janeiro in 1968-69 and again in 1973. Perlman's study gives a clear and well-documented account of the social, cultural, political and physical conditions of the squatter population:

The favela provides a community where friends and neighbors can be counted on for mutual favors. There is always someone to leave the children with, an accommodating neighbor with a refrigerator where the baby's milk can be kept fresh in the summer heat; someone whose sewing machine can be borrowed for repair work. Also, food and staples can be purchased on credit from local merchants so that even when there is no income, families can be fed. This level of sharing may be trivial, but it is of absolute importance to those living on the margin of subsistence. Lacking government attention, it provides a minimal, community-sponsored, social security and family welfare system.

Furthermore, because it is the outcome of many incremental decisions based on human needs, the favela is, in fact, well-designed. Friends and families live close together, walkways are distributed where the need requires, public spaces emerge and recede according to use, and tacit agreements not to develop certain areas are obeyed. A certain degree of pride is derived from the fact that most of the families built the homes they live in and that most public amenities are the result of communal efforts.[16/]

The squatter, with the help of relatives and friends, usually builds
tiny shanties out of impermanent and salvaged materials, discarded
pieces of plywood or lumber, rusty galvanized iron sheets, stones and
broken bricks gathered here and there, even tin cans and cardboard
boxes. But somehow they manage. And even though they come to the
cities before the cities have the jobs to employ them and thus produce
the phenomenon of urbanization outrunning industrialization, most
migrants create their own employment, doing little jobs for little
money. Some do find jobs in the city a short time after their arrival
through relatives, friends, or acquaintance and because many employers
are ready to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the in-
flux of large number of cheap and willing workers.[17/] Harry Anthony
indicates that, throughout the cities of Latin America squatters are
found doing jobs as sellers of tortillas, spices, leaves, sweet buns,
papajas or pineapples -- all frivolous and precarious jobs. He states
that the children, aged two or three to ten or eleven, work as boot
polishers in street corners and plazas, selling chewing gum or matches,
or cleaning windshields when cars stop at traffic lights. Even these
small children contribute their meager earnings to the family income.[18/]
Here is how Barbara Ward describes, in almost poetic terms, this world-
wide economic phenomenon:

> There is immense resourcefulness in finding
> employment in the city's so-called "informal sec-
> tor." The squatters are often the men who provide
> low-cost transport on tricycles and jitneys in

Jakarta. They are the office cleaners and mes-
sengers, the street sweepers, bootpolishers, and
garbage sorters; there are 40,000 ragpickers in
Calcutta. They set up streetside food stalls,
even in a city as "formal" as Singapore you can
go from booth to booth around the parking lots
and markets, choosing a different course from
each cook with his own speciality. They mend
and repair. They run tiny laundries and car-
pentry shops. And if economists of the more
rigorous sort see in all this proliferation of
service little net benefit to the economy-which
is, of course, a stupid miscalculation since
the tiny services are needed and paid for-we
can add the thousands upon thousands of mini-
businesses. Tailors, cabinet makers, manufac-
turers of household goods (often fashioned from
cast off materials) grow up in the shanty towns,
find unused corners of warehouses or rooms in
rundown property in the city, and add a usually
uncalculated flow of goods to the output of the
city and goods which the poor can afford to buy.[19]

Practically unknown before the Second World War, squatter settle-
ments have by now become a common feature of all major cities in the
developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Their cheap,
quickly improvised, poorly constructed shacks house anywhere from

twenty-five to fifty percent of the urban populations of the burgeoning

cities of the fast urbanizing, underdeveloped nations of the world.[20/]

According to Kenneth L. Karst, most of the squatters come to the

major cities from the rural areas in developing countries. Some come

from the smaller cities nearby.[21/] They do not come to see the

big city's lights; they do not come because of the services and ameni-

ties the big cities offer; they do not come to find better housing or

better health and recreation facilities; they do not come because they

dislike the countryside. On the contrary, their main concern is employ-

ment. The principal reason they abandon their rural homes and come to

the big cities is to find jobs and produce incomes. They come because

job opportunities are perceived to be greater and because they view the

city as the place where dreams of a good life come true.

Even though, quite often, their dreams are transformed into night-

mares, their hope for a better future for themselves and their children

remains strong as long as they live in the city. They come because

they were unemployed, permanently underemployed, or only seasonally

employed farm workers, never earning sufficient money to eat well, buy

clothes, and to make ends meet, never having hope that their children

would some day have a better life on the farm.

Others come because they were tenant farmers, working for very

little money under difficult conditions with primitive tools, living in

bad dwellings with no electricity, no clean drinking water, no sanitary

facilities, completely non-existent medical care, and very short life

expectancy. Even though all family members were contributing their

hard work to the production of agricultural goods, their total family

income could not provide anything but a miserable living.[22/]   Anthony

says:

> "Squatters come mainly because of a strong desire
>
> and fervent hope to avoid the essential and gravest pro-
>
> blems of the rural poor in the countryside, which are
>
> unemployment, underemployment, or only seasonal employ-
>
> ment."[23/]

Rural underemployment is now present in all of the less developed

countries of the world. It is the result of the rapid population

growth experienced in the twentieth century as a consequence of rela-

tively constant birth rates and declining death rates. While up to

the end of the nineteenth century high infant mortality and mortality

from sickness, disease, and epidemics compensated for high birth rates,

the present century's discovery of drugs, improved medical care, and

public health services have dramatically reduced death rates world-

wide. As a result, underdeveloped countries have extremely high rates

of population increase. Here is how the United Nations in 1976 des-

cribed this situation:

> On the basis of all available evidence, the coming
>
> decade will see the problems of human settlements assume
>
> an overwhelming importance in most of the developing
>
> countries. The total growth of population and human
>
> settlements in the remaining quarter of this century
>
> will be even greater than the massive growth which has
>
> already taken place in the 30 years since the Second
>
> World War. There is no escaping this enormous change,

which is building up, in almost all countries in the
developing world. An unprecedented proportion of
their populations soon will be in their child-bearing
years. The result will be an explosive growth of
human settlements, both from the natural growth of
their own residents and from the inmigration of
youthful rural families who will not be able to find
economic opportunities in traditional rural activi-
ties. The implied needs for administrative capaci-
ties, financial resources, technical and social
infrastructure and national economic development
demand measures of, almost literally, revolutionary
character, and above all a firm commitment, without
which no sustained action is possible.[24/]

It should be pointed out that, as with every migration, not every-
body leaves. For example as Anthony indicates, during the Latin Ameri-
can rural-to-urban migration of the past thirty to thirty-five years,
many stayed where they were, on the farms and the villages, subsisting
when crops were good and suffering in misery when they were not. Those
who migrate to seek economic opportunity and to start a new life in the
city are, generally, the most enterprising, courageous, ambitious, and
adventurous of the rural residents.[25/] A sensitive observer of human
settlement, Otto H. Koenigsberger, describes them as "urban pioneers:"
a self-selected group of men and women at the peak of their working
power who have taken a deliberate decision about their own future. In
Koenigsberger's words:

Like the pioneers who developed the American West,
they have broken with a past that holds no hope. Like
the 19th century pioneers, they are moving to seek a
better future -- if not for themselves then for their
children and grandchildren. They do not expect an
early success and an easy life. On the contrary, they
are prepared "to rough it," to work hard for low wages
and save patiently for a better future.[26/]

The tenacity of the squatters, the determination they have to stay
and work in the big city, their almost unanimous refusal to go back to
the country even though the odds for success in the urban environment
would seem to an outside observer to be so much against them, all prove
that squatters are hard-working people who are full of hope and hold
strongly to the conviction that their only chance for a better life for
themselves and their children is in the city. It is this hope and this
conviction that make them see as still attractive and desirable the
city's services and amenities that to others may appear so badly dete-
riorated. And it is this hope and this conviction that make squatters,
soon after their arrival, organize themselves and prepare to fight and
to make all kinds of sacrifices for what they fervently want and need,
for the secure tenure of a piece of land, for a place to call their
own.[27/]

As long as squatters are subject to harrassment and constant
threats of eviction, their houses are little impermanent shacks and
ugly hovels. Indeed, the walking paths are unpaved, there are no trees
or bushes planted anywhere, and sewage runs in open channels. The one

or two water taps at the bottom of the hillside must serve everyone, and makeshift electrical connections supply only a few of the shanties with electricity. However, once land tenure has been secured through governmental action, fights in courts, time purchase, or, quite often, frightening the absentee landlord into abandoning his property -- the squatter settlements change. They build larger and more permanent houses, sometimes two stories high which are often built of concrete blocks or bricks and are covered with solid roofs. Flowers and trees are planted outside, some streets become paved and lighted, and most homes have electricity, piped water, and sewer connections. The squatter community itself is usually organized, and, in the case of Tabriz through some governmental help and the weekend work of all of its members, it achieves improvements throughout, including the provision of some basic social services, such as schools and play areas for the children.

Thus, squatter settlements gradually become much like the legal residential areas inhabited by people of the other working classes in other sectors of the city. It is security of land tenure, more than anything else, that transforms unsightly, spontaneous settlements into integrated urban neighborhoods and produces for the city high returns in terms of improved housing stock and a more responsible and dependable citizenry.$\underline{^{28/}}$ Therefore, squatter settlements are to be viewed as being markedly different from slums or depressed urban neighborhoods. Squatter settlements are located at the periphery of a city, possess social organization and solidarity and have been formed through the invasion of land on which homes are then built. Squatter

settlements appear as the by-product of rapid economic development and industrialization. They are not the result of communal or psychological disintegration in the village or in the city. Squatter settlements should not be confused with the slums in the industrially developed nations or in Third World cities. A slum is usually regarded as a thickly populated street marked by wretched living conditions. Some scholars regard the slum as characterized by rundown housing, high crime rates, divorce, violence and alienation, strife with the conventional world, detachment from other city dwellers, family disintegration, loss of identity, and child neglect.

Few of the features ascribed to the slum are applicable to the squatter settlements. Indeed, aside from low income, drab-looking houses, and lack of the normal city facilities, few squatter towns show any symptoms of social or psychological disintegration, moral depravity, and crime. As we mentioned earlier (Perspectives on Squatter Settlements, Chapter 1), Mangin views the squatter settlements not as a problem but as a solution to a problem. In the squatter settlements there is poverty but no culture of poverty.

A Comparative View and Expected Findings

The squatter settlements inhabited mostly by country people are part of a basic process of rural migration and urbanization in many developing countries in the Third World. The problems deriving from the dislocation of rural people from their small towns and villages, their settlement in larger towns and cities, and their eventual urbanization -- accompanied by occupational, sociocultural, and political

change -- are reflected in these squatter settlements. Urban forms of association and activity are extended to the people in the countryside, while rural people adopt new occupations and life styles by moving into cities, which in turn are altered structurally and functionally by the new economic and political forces represented in part at least by the migrants themselves. These cities still retain their role as centers of power and decision, and as models of development setting socio-economic standards and goals. At the same time they are subjected to intensive socioeconomic change by the very forces that were awakened in the countryside.

A substantial part of newcomers, mostly of rural origin, lives in dwellings rated as shantytowns or squatter settlements. In India, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 24.1 percent of the population of Ahmedabad was reported to live in houses below standard, while 16.6 percent lived in shantytowns. Half of the population of Bombay, or about three million people, lived in slums and shantytowns.[29/]

In Brazil the population of Belo Horizonte grew by 68 percent in a matter of a few years and it reached 812,000 people in 1966. However, 15 percent of that population lived in favelas. By 1960, more than 10 percent of Rio de Janeiro's population was officially declared as favelados (squatter settlement dwellers).[30/]

In Turkey it has been estimated that the urban population of towns with 10,000 or more increased by 409 percent from 1927 to 1965. The rate of increase in the Turkish cities with populations over 100,000, however, was greater than that in the smaller localities.

The Turkish Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement estimated, according to a survey carried out in the early 1960s, that about 64 percent of the dwellings in Ankara, 48 percent in Adana, and about 40 percent in Istanbul, qualified as squatter settlement areas.[31/]

In Iran, the urban population which was 31.4 percent of the total, rose to 39.0 percent in 1966 and 46.9 percent in 1976. The percentage of the urban population in cities of 100,000 and more has increased from 51.3 in 1956 to 60.6 percent in 1966. The population of Tehran, which was 1,512,082 in 1956,reached to 4,530,223 in 1976. Tabriz, which had a population of 289,996 in 1956, doubled its population by 1976. According to an unofficial report, 30 percent of the population of Tehran and 10 percent of the population of Tabriz lived in slums and squatter settlement areas.[32/]

The shantytowns, squatter settlements, uncontrolled settlements (as the United Nations labeled them) in the Third World usually, though not exclusively, are inhabited by migrants from villages and rural towns, and therefore represent a strategic group for the study of the transformation of a rural group into an urban one.

John F.C. Turner has viewed squatter settlements in the light of four hypothesis: first, as a manifestation of normal urban growth under historically abnormal conditions; second, as vehicles for social change; third, as the product of the difference between the popular demand for housing and that demanded and supplied by institutional society, and fourth, as a phenomenon that could be controlled by the encouragement of popular initiative through the government servicing of local resources.[33/] Thus, it is clear that rural migration into

cities in the Third World results in squatter settlements that are as
a whole part of a total process of social change, in the form of
urbanization and modernization. They are mostly the product of inter-
nal migration and should not be confused with other forms of population
movements.[34/]

The outstanding features of squatter settlements seem to be,
first, that they are found in nearly all the cities of Third World
countries, and, second, that they are similar to each other in terms
of their evolution and their relations with the city. Consequently,
it is desirable to compare the results of the study of the squatter
settlement in Tabriz with the similar settlements elsewhere in the
world.

Comparison will be made with the following three studies of
squatter settlements:

The Gecekondu: Rural-Urban Migration, edited by Kemal Karpat:[35/]
This study was conducted in 1968 in a squatter settlement at the pe-
riphery of Istanbul, Turkey. Karpat surveyed 949 individuals based on
questionnaires. He interviewed each squatter above the age of 16.
From the total 949 sample size, 430 were married women, 393 were
married men, 89 unmarried boys, and 37 unmarried girls. That is,
roughly 80 percent of the squatters above the age of 16 were subjected
to interviews lasting from one and a half hour to four hours.

Settlers of Baja Vista, edited by James Hopgood:[36/] This study
was conducted in 1971-72 in a settlement bordering Monterrey, Mexico.
Two interview schedules (the "surveys") were given to all consenting

household heads in the settlements. These surveys collected basic
social and demographic data, such as household statistics, place of
birth, migration, reasons for migration, intra-Monterrey residential
movements, and so on. The basic research technique, however, was
participant observation of daily household activities, local associa-
tions, and fiestas. Structured and semi-structured interviews and
directed conversations were conducted with key-informants on major
research themes.

The Myth of the Marginality, edited by Janice Perlman:[37/]   This
study was conducted in 1968-69 as the research for her doctoral dis-
sertation. It was done in three types of squatter settlements in the
Greater Rio de-Janiero Metropolitan Area: (1) a favela on a hillside
in the midst of an upper-class residential and commercial area; (2) a
favela in the industrial periphery of the city; and (3) a suburbio -
a group of neighbhorhoods in an outlying satellite, or ordinary city.
In each of these communities, 250 people were interviewed. Two-hundred
of them were chosen at random from men and women 16 to 65 years of age,
and 50 were community leaders chosen on the basis of positional and
reputational sampling techniques.

We expect that the similarities exhibited by the four cases of
squatter settlements will greatly exceed the dissimilarities exhibited
by them. The similarities with which we are concerned include the act
of land invasion, the manner in which squatters take possession of the
land, plan and build their dwellings, and the development and expan-
sion of settlement. We also are concerned with economic status, occu-
pations and type of jobs held, mutual assistance, sense of belonging,

the basis for common political and civic action to secure the settlement's physical survival, and bonds of solidarity. It should be obvious that each case of squatter settlement is unique in many ways, as for example, the particular set of conditions in rural areas leading to migration, the time the settlement was formed, and the rate of industrial growth characterizing the cities. Nevertheless, we expect to find broad similarities in all cases in regard to characteristics of the squatters, reason for migration, social and economic structure of the household, family structure, education, occupation, satisfaction from living conditions in the squatter settlement and so on.

Methods and Procedures

This section seeks to set forth the methodological foundation of the study of marginal residents or squatters in Tabriz, conducted in 1979. Most of the families interviewed for this study are illegal invaders of the land they live on and they occupy small pieces of land.

The sampling procedures were devised for shanty town, located on top of a hill, without any telephone service, paved streets, public services and for which maps and directions were, for some parts, nonexistent. The only available official information sources for the area and population under study were the enumeration of the squatter settlements undertaken by the Central Statistics Department in 1977, and a survey conducted by the Research Department in Tabriz University in 1974.

The following section describes the site selection, the initial questionnaire construction, the sampling procedures, and the interview techniques.

Site Selection: One of the first steps of the study was to go to the Tabriz Statistical Department to discover how many families live on the marginal section or squatter settlement area of the city. The information received from them revealed that there were 1,700 households living in the squatter area. This information was based on an enumeration conducted in 1977 by that department. A similar survey was also conducted by Tabriz University's Research Department in 1974.

The northwest sector, the location of squatter settlement of Tabriz, is two to four miles from the center of urban social and economic activities. Because of the mountainous topography of the region, flanked by Mount Oan Ebnali, the government did not spend its limited resources to bring public services such as running water and electricity, etc., to the area. The task (for example, pumping running water up hill) is difficult and very costly. Because of this, the area was uninhabited for years.

When the peasantry began its migration to the city, they were faced with the problem of finding a place to live. Since they were unskilled and for the most part unable to afford living within the city proper, they invaded this uninhabited land and began building their domiciles at the foot of the hill, the closest available area to the city. As more and more migrants arrived, they, too, set up their residences at the base of the hill. Once all the land at the base of the hill was occupied, newcomers built their houses in a staircase-like

fashion up the sides of the hill. Such is the nature of the area in which a sample of squatters were interviewed.

Formulating the Questionnaire: After review of related literature on squatter settlement and discussions with long-time residents, leaders, newcomers and others, I was ready to make a list of items which were interesting or important. These items became the pre-test version of the questionnaire.

The pre-test questionnaire was designed to minimize the effect of my own preconceptions and to maximize the consideration of issues as defined by the squatters. The intent was to allow the manner in which those residing in the settlement structure their own world to determine the form and content of the final questionnaire. The pre-test questionnaire was extensive and every question was open-ended. It took from two to four hours to administer and often demanded two or even more sessions to complete. During the second week of July, 1979, some of the pre-test questionnaires were administered in the squatter settlement by the leaders, long-time residents, newcomers, and shop-keepers, as well as by several sociology professors, fellow students in Tabriz University, and finally by officials in the City Hall and Central Statistical Department of Tabriz. For each question, the answers were tabulated on separate sheets and then classified into several categories derived from the entire range of responses. This was a crucial step in order to insure that the terms of reference for the study were an appropriate blend of local reality and scholarly concerns. Those questions which were ambiguous, hard to understand, too politically sensitive, or which did not discriminate among the

population were revised or dropped, as those that seemed most remote in terms of measuring the underlying objectives being sought. The final product of this effort was a revised questionnaire with most items in closed form.

The Sample: A master list containing the names and addresses of the household heads located in the squatter settlement was compiled from the data obtained from the Tabriz Central Statistical Department. According to these official sources, as indicated previously, there were 1,700 households located at the periphery of the city. Because of time and economic constraints, we decided to limit the sample size to 10 percent of the total number of households.

One hundred and sixty-eight households were randomly selected from the master list. The selection criterion for inclusion in the sample consisted of selecting every tenth household on the list. This procedure does not violate randomization because the master list was not compiled in alphabetical order and consequently all members of the population had an equal chance of being selected.

Conducting the Interviews: Due to the time constraints, it was evident from the beginning that I could not administer the 168 questionnaires alone. Therefore, I went to the Sociology Department at the University of Tabriz (the department from which I graduated), to obtain help. This was facilitated by the fact that I already knew some of the students and professors in that department. I proposed my plan of study and requested technical aid. Eight students, five of whom I knew as fellow students, volunteered to help me in administering the qubstionnaire.

I first instructed them on all the items, as well as the type of responses we wished to obtain or elicit from each item. The next step was to go to the squatter settlement in order to have some idea about their location and characteristics. We then started to interview using the questionnaires. There were nine interviewers, eight sociology students and myself. The interviewers were divided into three teams consisting of three members in each. Each of the three teams was responsibile for completing fifty-six questionnaires. That is to say, each team had to interview fifty-six household heads.

There was a fairly high turnover rate among the interviewers when the novelty of the experience wore off and they realized the difficulty of the task. The difficulty of the task is accentuated when one considers the limited accessibility of many of these household heads. As an interviewer, it was easy to become discouraged when the household was located on the top of a high hill. Aside from this, it was almost imperative to conduct most of the interviews during weekends in order to obtain information from those who worked day and night during weekdays. It was very hard to ask interviewers to sacrifice their weekends to work on data collection.

Upon first entering a household, interviewers were instructed to state their purpose briefly. Some of the residents were already aware of the study, so little explanation was necessary. Interviews were conducted at the appropriate scheduled times in order to eliminate (or reduce) the likelihood of absentees especially when households were economically dependent on the work of both husband and wife.

The interviewers were very well received and the interviewing was conducted without any serious problems. In general, this was attributed to our prior conversations with local residents and in particular, the informal association which interviewers had with the squatter settlements. Lastly, it was due to native friendliness. Fortunately, most of the sampled household heads understood the items of the questionnaire, however, a few family heads did not understand and these were categorized as "not ascertainable."

Each interview took from half to one hour, with forty-five minutes being the mean interviewing time. Interviews conducted with those who were literate took considerably more time because persons had more to say on each item and demanded greater explanations. Three-quarters of the families interviewed were found at home, and interviewed on the first attempt. The remainder of the sample was interviewed on the second or third visit. It was interesting that some of the families wanted to be interviewed alone. This was due to the cultural and political orientation of these people. Eastern people do not want to expose their historical and their personal background and feelings to outsiders. The overall refusal rate was remarkably low among the respondents.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IRAN

The purposes of this chapter are threefold: first, to clarify
geographic and socio-economic attributes of Iranian society that give
rise to squatter settlements; second, to describe briefly the city of
Tabriz, a large, industrial city which served as host for the squatter
settlement studied; and third, to outline the process of land reform
and industrialization leading to migration and squatter settlement.

Geographic Characteristics of Iran

Iran is the largest of the southeast Asian states.[38/]   Its area
of about 628,000 miles is slightly smaller than that of Mexico and
about one-fifth the size of the United States. It lies between 25 and
40 degrees north latitude, approximately the latitude of Monterrey,
Mexico, and Denver, Colorado, respectively. It is located between 44
degrees and 64 degrees east longitude, a spread equivalent to that of
Reno, Nevada, and Abilene, Texas.[39/]

Iran, today, is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea and the
Soviet Union, on the south by the Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf, on
the west by Iraq and Turkey, and on the east by Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In a sense, the Iranian Plateau stands as a bridge connect-
ing three continents -- Asia, Europe and Africa. Because of this geo-
graphic location, it has always had a significant position in the
political and sociocultural strategies of East and West.

According to land conditions, climate, water, and population
density, Iran has been divided into seven geographical regions as

follow: (See Figure 2.1).

1. <u>Northern and North Central Region</u>. This region, which includes the Elburz Mountains and Caspian Plains, has moderate temperature, high rainfall and excessive humidity. Its abundance of water, rich soil, and pleasant climate has made this the most developed and productive agricultural region of Iran. The region consists of the provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran-Gorgan, and the northern part of Khorasan and Central Province.

2. <u>Northwestern Region</u>. This part of Iran, with an average of sixteen inches of rainfall, ranks second in agricultural production. It is characterized by "a series of fault-block ranges and valleys, has a considerable area that can be cultivated, and although dry-farming and irrigation normally must be practiced, the supply of water is better than in most of the country."[40/] This region consists of the provinces of East and West Azarbyjan.

3. <u>The Central Plateau</u>. This region, with an average of less than five inches of rainfall, is the largest but agriculturally one of the least developed and productive areas of Iran. The lack of sufficient water for irrigation and the scarcity of cultivatable land are two major factors retarding the agricultural development of this area. Most of the southern part of central province falls into this region.

4. <u>The Eastern Highland and Basin Regions</u>. This area is as underdeveloped as the central plateau. Population and agriculture are scanty and spotty since water is scarce and unevenly distributed. There are a few relatively large areas of cultivation but in most of the region there are only small basins and valleys in which cropping

Figure 2.1. Map of Iran.

can take place. This region contains most of Khorasan Province.

5. <u>The Central and Southern Zagros</u>. This region is described as a series of mountain ranges, generally running in the northeasterly-southwesterly direction, is separated by valleys and basins, some of which have interior drainage.<u>41/</u> It is an important area of crop production and best known for its pastoral activities and the production of livestock. The distribution of cultivated or cultivatable lands in this region is uneven. The northern and southern sections contain rich soil, but not the central section, which has a large proportion of ranges and mountains and quite narrow valleys. The northern part also has a series of valleys and basins, but most of them are agriculturally well developed. This region not only produces sufficient quantities of food for local consumption, but has some surplus food for export.<u>42/</u> The provinces of Kermanshahan, Kordestan, Isfahan-Yazd and Fars-Bandar are located in this region.

6. <u>The Makran Region of Southeastern Iran</u>. This region, which is part of the southern coastal area, is hot. Temperatures rise to 125 degrees in the summer, and winter is frost-free. The total rainful in this area ranges from five to ten inches. Dates are the major food crop, but cereals are also commonly grown beneath the palms. Generally this region is poorly watered and its agriculture amounts to little. This region contains the provinces of Kerman and Baluchestan-Sistan.

7. <u>The Southwestern or Khoozestan Region</u>. The plain of Khoozestan covers all the southwestern section of Iran. The surface of this region is composed of river silts deposited by five Iranian

rivers. Today the lands that are cultivated in this region are those that lie close to the river bank where water is available. It is estimated that all the land of Khoozestan region could be irrigated by the construction of one major system of irrigation.[43/]

Demographic, Social and Economic Characteristics
of the Iranian Population

According to the last national census taken in November, 1976, the population of Iran was 33,662,176 (Table 2.1). About 17,337,175 were males and 16,325,007 were females, or 106.2 males per 100 females (Table 2.2). The population was largely concentrated in the North Central, Northwestern, Southeastern, Central and South Zagros regions, the most agriculturally developed areas in Iran.

The annual growth rate of the Iranian population has been generally increasing since the early part of the century. In 1966, the annual growth was 3.2 percent, while in 1976 it reached 3.4 percent. However, the estimated rate of increase in 1980 was 3.0 percent (Table 2.1).

Three major characteristics of Iran's population are indicative of an underdeveloped country. These include: (1) a very low annual per capita income, estimated at $85 U.S.; (2) a high proportion of illiteracy, estimated to be more than 60 percent of the population aged 10 years or over; and (3) a heavy dependence upon agricultural industries, in which about 60 percent of the population are engaged.[44/]

Slightly more than half (53%) of the Iranian population lives in rural areas (Table 2.3). The majority of rural people are illiterate, have poor sanitation, and live at a very low socio-economic level.

Table 2.1.   Population Growth of Iran, 1956, 1966, 1976 and
             Estimated Population, 1980.

Year	Numbers (Millions)	Growth (Percent)
1956	18,954,704	-
1966	25,078,923	3.2
1976	33,662,176	3.4
1980*	37,694,900	3.0

*Estimated population (July 1, 1980).

Source: National Census of Iran, November, 1956, 1966 and 1976.

Table 2.2. Population of Iran, by Age Groups, 1956, 1966, 1976,
and Sex Ratio, 1976.

AGE GROUPS	TOTAL 1956	TOTAL 1966	TOTAL 1976	SEX RATIO 1976
All Ages	18,954,704	25,078,923	33,662,176	106.1
Less than 5 Years	3,347,714	4,436,921	5,403,718	108.3
5 - 9	2,822,953	4,106,158	5,353,080	107.0
10-14	1,822,499	3,017,250	4,301,231	110.7
15-19	1,420,529	2,129,036	3,609,084	101.9
20-24	1,497,170	1,682,161	2,808,756	93.2
25-34	2,904,189	3,317,718	3,807,421	94.0
35-44	1,947,458	2,739,289	3,291,021	109.2
45-54	1,446,434	1,584,447	2,714,349	120.1
55-64	987,081	1,097,838	1,288,026	119.4
65 years and Over	758,671	968,105	1,185,489	112.1

Source: National Census of Iran, 1956, 1966 and 1976.

Table 2.3. Population Distribution of Iran, by Residence and Sex, 1956, 1966, and 1976.

YEAR AND SEX	TOTAL		URBAN		RURAL	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1956:						
Both Sexes	18,954,704	100.0	5,953,563	31.4	13,001,141	68.6
Males	9,644,944	100.0	3,070,149	31.8	6,574,795	68.2
Females	9,309,760	100.0	2,883,414	31.0	6,426,346	69.0
Sex Ratio	103.6	--	106.4	--	102.3	--
1966:						
Both Sexes	25,078,923	100.0	9,794,246	39.0	15,284,677	61.0
Males	12,981,665	100.0	5,096,654	39.3	7,885,011	60.7
Females	12,097,258	100.0	4,697,592	38.8	7,399,666	61.2
Sex Ratio	107.3	--	108.4	--	106.5	--
1976:						
Both Sexes	33,662,176	100.0	15,797,235	46.9	17,864,951	53.1
Males	17,337,175	100.0	8,272,304	47.7	9,064,875	52.3
Females	16,325,007	100.0	7,524,931	46.1	8,800,076	53.9
Sex Ratio	106.2	--	109.9	--	103.0	--

Source of Data: National Census of Iran, 1956, 1966, and 1976.

Almost all of the rural population is engaged in agricultural and live-
stock production. Most of the rural people live in very small villages.
However, a minority are nomadic tribes who do not have permanent resi-
dence and migrate from one place to another.

An Iranian village is typically small in area and population, and
has very little contact with the outside. It usually consists of a
cluster of mud houses which are occupied by several extended and joint
families. Practically all the villagers are cultivators but a few of
them may occupy traditional artisan positions such as blacksmiths, car-
penters, and barbers. Most products of the village are produced and
consumed locally, and therefore the village is self-sufficient in most
respects.[45/]

Before land reform (1963), all the villagers were characterized
by large land-holdings which involved three types of property owner-
ship: private ownership, mosque ownership, and state ownership. Three
types of private landholders could be distinguished, namely, the large
landholders, the medium landholders, and the petty landholders. Along-
side the landholders, there was a large amount of peasants, village
middlemen, and traditional agricultural laborers. The big landholders,
i.e., those with more than five villages each, owned a total of 19,000
villages in Iran (38% of the total). This category contained thirty-
seven families. The medium landholders, i.e., those with between one
and five villages, owned a total of 7,000 villages (14% of the total).
The petty landlords, i.e., those with less than one village each, owned
about 15,000 villages (30% of the total). Almost all of these three
types of landholders were absentee landholders. Religious institutions

owned a total of 6,000 endowed villages (12%). Finally, the state
itself owned over 3,000 villages (6%).[46/] According to governmental
statistics for 1956, before land reform, the total number of peasant
families were 1.8 million (59% of all rural families). Only seven
percent (130,000 families) of the 1.8 million families (four percent
of all rural families) owned their own land which averaged about three
hectares each. The remainder (93% of 1.8 million families or 55% of
all rural people) did not own land, but had only the right to culti-
vate it. In traditional speech, they were called Nasagh holders.[47/]
The village middlemen were those who indirectly participated in pro-
duction. They did not own the land, the means of production, and they
were shopkeepers and other occupational groups related to farming.
Finally, the traditional agricultural laborers were those who worked
on the land for the Nasagh holders for a return in kind. In the tradi-
tional classification of the rural population, village middlemen and
traditional agricultural laborers formed a stratum called Khoshne-
shin.[48/] This group comprised 1.25 million families (41% of all rural
families). The middlemen families formed a relatively small proportion
of the Khosheshins (their numbers did not exceed a few hundred thou-
sand persons).[49/]

Through the implementation of land reform (1963), half of the
rural population acquired land and the other half did not. Indeed, the
latter lost even the partial access to cultivating and work rights they
had before land reform. Side by side with the creation of a new rural
propertied class came the creation of a new landless class, with
nothing to sell but their labor power.[50/]

Consequently, land reform has created and rearranged rural classes and strata in relation to property in the form of land. Only 570,000 families received enough land, which along with 130,000 previously better-off peasants, became a total of 700,000 well-off peasant families. Over one million peasant families received less than one hectare of land. The majority of these families joined pre-reform rural agricultural laborers because of the insufficiency and undesirability of the distributed land.[51/] The pre-reform agricultural laborer still remained landless because according to land reform regulations, only Nasagh holders were eligible to acquire the land. In sum, then, we can talk about the polarization of the rural population. On the one side, a minority of well-to-do peasants (700,000 families), and, on the other side, a majority of poor peasants with less than one hectare of land, and finally the landless agricultural laborers.

The social control of the village is usually maintained by the authority of a headman who is generally the wealthiest and most influential member of the village. Furthermore, he very often represents the government. The villager is generally suspicious of the values introduced from the outside and prefers to follow established traditions. Consequently, most of the tools and techniques of transportation, cultivation, and home industries have remained primitive.

Iranian cities, in contrast to the villages, are quite similar to those of modern societies since their economic, political and socio-cultural structures have been considerably influenced by western industrialism, urbanism, and modern technology. About 46.9 percent of the

Iranian people lived in urban communities in 1976 (Table 2.3). Literacy in cities is considerably higher than in the villages and the socio-economic status of the population, especially those of the upper and middle class, is highly advanced as compared with the rural population. Most of the urban labor force is engaged in non-agricultural occupations, working in small and large factories, commerce, transportation, construction, government and private services. Three social classes may be identified in the urban populations of Iran:

1. The upper class, or elite, estimated to number from two hundred to one thousand, consists of the most powerful, prestigeful, and wealthy persons in Iran. The members of the upper class are large-scale manufacturers, clergymen, top government and military leaders, and prominent Western-educated professionals and intellectuals.52/

2. The middle class, which has largely emerged in the last few decades and is rapidly growing, is composed of skilled factory workers, educated white-collar workers, small industrialists, bankers, small businessmen, and old-time artisans, shopkeepers, and small traders.

3. The lower class, which is composed mostly of rural migrants who came to the cities to find jobs or to visit relatives and remained. This class consists occupationally of unskilled day laborers, personal servants, porters, peddlers, and other

low-status occupations. Many members of this class

live in squatter areas of the city.

The gap between city life and village life, while extremely great,

is slowly closing as a consequence of the diffusion of urban and indus-

trial ideology through modern education, communication, and contact

between urban and rural populations.

The inhabitants of Iran have neither racial nor linguistic unity,

but over 98 percent profess to be Moslems (Table 2.4). The most impor-

tant ethnic groups are the Persians, accounting for nearly three-quar-

ters of the total population, the Turkish, Baluchi and Arab elements.

There is a considerable number of Armenians, and a small number of

Jews, Assyrians, Brahuis and Hazaras.

Out of the total population of 25.07 million in 1966, 24.8 million

were Moslems of whom 90 percent were Shi'a, which is the official reli-

gion of the state. The Shi'a Moslems became the majority group under

the Safavid kings; prior to this time the Sunni Moslems were the domi-

nant group.[53]

Christians form the largest non-Moslem religious minority group

in Iran (Table 2.4). Armenians number approximately 190,000. Most of

the Armenians live in Tehran, Julfa (Isfahan), Tabriz, Rezaizeh and

Rasht where they have been important in commerce and the development of

industry.[54] The Jews are found in most of the major cities[55] and in

1966 numbered 60,683 (Table 2.4), but their numbers have been greatly

reduced by the migration to Israel of approximately 45,000 members

since 1948, and especially after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Table 2.4. Religious Affiliation of the Iranians, 1956 and 1966.

RELIGIOUS GROUPS	1956		1966	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Moslems	18,654,127	98.4	24,771,922	98.80
Christians	114,528	0.6	149,429	0.60
Jewish	65,232	0.3	60,683	0.23
Zoroastrians	15,723	0.1	19,816	0.08
Others and not reported	105,094	0.6	77,075	0.29
TOTAL	18,954,704	100.0	25,078,923	100.0

Source: Adapted from first National Census of Iran, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 146 and National Census of Population and Housing, op.cit., Vol. CLXVIII, p. 13. In Population of Iran, edited by Momeni, 1977.

The languages native to Iran are Persian, spoken by a majority of the population and the official language of the country, and various languages closely akin to Persian which are spoken north of Elburz in Gilan and Mazandaran and by Lur and Bakhtiari tribesmen. Kurdish and Baluchi are related languages of the Indo-European group and are spoken in the rural areas and towns where these tribal groups are still an important entity. Arabic dialects are spoken by some two million people, particularly in Khoozestan, along the Persian Gulf and by some of the nomadic tribes in Fars Province. Turkish dialects, unrelated to Persian or Arabic, are spoken by approximately four million people: the Azeri in Azarbyjan, the Qashqai, some of the Khamseh tribes in Fars, and the Turkomen in Khurasan.⁵⁶/

Geographic and Political Characteristics of Tabriz

Tabriz, one of the largest and most industrialized cities in Iran and one of its former capitals, lies in a valley to the north of the long ridge of Mount Sahand. This valley opens out into a plain that slopes down gently to the north and to Lake Rezaieh, forty-two miles to the West. By virtue of its situation and its altitude of 4,600 feet, Tabriz has an agreeable summer climate, but the cold in winter is severe. The nearest points on the Soviet and Turkish frontiers are, respectively, 60 and 100 miles from the city. Owing to its proximity to Russia and Turkey as well as to the fact that it is in an earth-quake zone, Tabriz has had a very eventful history.

The name Tabriz has been popularly derived from Tab-riz, meaning in modern Persian "fever-dispelling," but its origin is more likely to

be found in the much older Pahlavi roots tap-riz (or tav-riz), signi-
fying "causing to flow", a possible allusion to the numerous springs
of mineral water that rise in the slopes of Mount Sahand.[57/]

Tabriz was probably taken by the Arabs about A.D. 642, but it was
then and for long after merely a small town, being completely over-
shadowed by the much larger and more important cities of Ardabil and
Maragheh[58/] (two cities located in Azarbyjan Province).

In A.D. 858 Tabriz was totally destroyed by an earthquake, the
first of a number of disasters caused by the forces of nature that it
was to suffer. It was, however, soon rebuilt, and a little over a
century later it was a walled town and was described as a "small
borough, pleasant and prosperous."[59/]

When the Mongols overran Persia in 1220-21, their armies twice
appeared before the walls of Tabriz, but on each occasion they were
induced to spare the city by the prompt payment of a large ransom.
Not long afterwards, however, it fell into their hands. Later in the
century, Hulagu Khan, the first of the Mongol rulers of Persia, made
Maragheh his capital, so Tabriz was once again relegated to a sub-
ordinate position.

Ghazan Khan, who became II-Khan in 1295, made Tabriz his capital
in place of Maragheh; thus the former city became the chief administra-
tive center of a vast empire that stretched from the Oxus to the bor-
ders of Egypt and from the Caucasus to the Indian Ocean.[60/] With the
fall of the Mongol dynasty, Tabriz entered upon a very confused and
troubled period, as it became a "bone of contention" between the rival
dynasties of the Jala'irs and the Chubanids.

In 1501 Shah Isma'il, the first of the Safavi rulers of Persia, occupied Tabriz, where he was crowned; soon afterwards, he made the city his capital in place of Ardabil. At that time the population of Tabriz was between 200,000 and 300,000, [61/] of whom two-thirds were Sunis. Notwithstanding the preponderance of the later, Shah Isma'il forced them all to adopt the Shi'a form of belief.

In 1721 the city was once more devastated by an earthquake, which, besides destroying the walls, is said to have caused the death of 80,000 people. In the following year, so fatal for Persia, the Russians under Peter the Great invaded the country on the pretext of helping the existing system. [62/] By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russia had become as grave a menace to Persia as Turkey had been, and Tabriz, being situated so near to her frontiers, was made an important military center. [63/]

In 1827, in the course of the second of the two disastrous wars that Persia waged with Russia in the early part of the nineteenth century, the Russian forces captured Tabriz. The city was, however, restored to Persia by the Treaty of Turkomanchai which was concluded in the following year.

During the Second World War, Tabriz once again was occupied by Soviet troops. Although under a treaty obligation to withdraw from Persia within six months of the conclusion of the state of hostilities with Germany and her allies, the Russian troops remained in Tabriz and other occupied parts of Persia for some months after the stipulated period. When they left, Tabriz was under the control of the so-called Democrats until they were driven from the city by regular Persian

troops some months later.$^{64/}$

At the present time, Tabriz is the capital city of Azarbyjan Province with a population of 597, 976, an annual growth rate of 4.8 percent (Table 2.5). It is one of the most important industrial and commercial centers which constitutes one of the major metropolitan areas in Iran (Figure 2.2).

Although it is the fourth largest city in population (Table 2.6). Tabriz has a wide range of primary and fabricating industries, including textiles, a tractor factory, car manufacturers, a cigarette company, chemical products, paper, construction materials, appliances, plastics, and foods. The city is the hub of a transportation and communications network, various local and government services, financial interests, and education (Figure 2.3). These industries have added to the economic well-being of the city and have also served to propel an influx of potential laborers (a characteristic of big cities in developing countries) into the city and surrounding areas.

A number of local, national, and international developments contributed to Tabriz's industrialization. Railroads to Tehran, to Jolfa at the border of Russia, and to Turkey, improved transportation and communications. It is worth noting that the railroad network has been the most fundamental factor in the modern growth of the city. There are other factors which have been essential in the industrialization process in Tabriz. These factors are as follow:

a) favorable state laws granting certain tax exemptions to industries;

b) availability of moderately trained local labor;

Figure 2.2. Map of East Azarbyjan Province.

Figure 2.3. Map of City of Tabriz.

Table 2.5. Population of Tabriz, 1900 - 1976.

YEAR	POPULATION IN THOUSANDS	ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
1900	200	-
1940	213	0.2
1956	290	2.2
1966	403	3.9
1976	598	4.8

Source: National Census of Iran, 1956-1966 and 1976.
         J. Bharier from travel book, gazetteers, maps, etc.

Table 2.6. Population of Iran's Largest Cities, 1956 and 1976.

CITY	POPULATION 1956	PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION	POPULATION 1976	PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION
Teheran	1,512,082	25.4	4,530,223	28.6
Tabriz	289,996	4.9	597,976	3.8
Isfahan	254,708	4.3	661,510	4.2
Mashhad	241,989	4.1	667,770	4.2
Abadan	226,083	3.8	294,068	1.8
Shiraz	170,659	2.9	425,813	2.7
Kermanshah	125,439	2.1	290,600	1.8
Ahwaz	120,098	2.0	334,399	2.1
Rasht	103,491	1.8	188,957	1.2
Hamadan	99,909	1.7	165,785	1.0
Qom	96,499	1.6	247,219	1.5
TOTAL	3,246,953	54.6	8,404,320	53.0

Source: National Census of Iran, 1956 and 1976.

c) availability of more water locally than in other
    cities in East Azarbyjan Province;

d) proximity to Russia and Turkey in terms of com-
    merce;

e) substantial availability of foreign and local
    capital for investment (especially Belgian and
    American); and

f) educational opportunities, e.g., existence of
    Tabriz University, educational institutions,
    professional training centers which have
    attracted students from all over the country.

This rapid industrialization has created a demand for an indus-
tiral labor force and stimulated an exodus of the rural population to
Tabriz in search of work and a higher standard of living than that af-
forded by the villages. Most of the immigrants from the villages are
unskilled and have difficulty finding employment, thus adding to the
already acute problem of unemployment and underemployment in the city.
Many of the immigrants to Tabriz city are semi-skilled workers from
the smaller towns within Azarbayjan Province. In addition to the
peasants and people from small towns, tribesmen gradually giving up
their nomadic life, have migrated to Tabriz in increasing numbers.
(This will be explained in more detail later on in Chapter 4).

The most critical urban problems in the developing countries are
evident among the newcomers to urban areas, the inmigrants. Typically,
such newcomers locate in the cheapest and least desirable places to

live, often in shantytowns as squatters. This is true of the squatter settlements in Tabriz. While the city is growing very fast and lags in the provision of adequate city services, its surrounding suburbs and squatters are growing much faster than the city itself. The fundamental cause of this growth can be found by taking into account the historical process of rural-to-urban migration during the last decades.

Data which would allow a historical reconstruction of squatter settlement in Tabriz are likewise presently unavailable. According to an official of the city planning department, squatter settlements are of recent origin in Tabriz, and have appeared largely since 1963. This is supported by our finding on the time of arrival of migrants to the squatter settlement (Table 2.7). Nevertheless, we find it difficult to believe that there was no squatting in the period 1950 to 1960 when the metropolitan area was experiencing its greatest rates of growth and housing construction was lagging. Rather, we support that squatting was probably less organized, on a smaller scale, and not as widespread as in recent years.

The major area of squatter settlement development in the city of Tabriz has been in the Northwest (Figure 2.4), which is locally called Goshkhaneh Selabi (literally translated as being a bird house). This area has been among the least desirable for development by business, industry and housing projects because of the terrain and/or peripheral locations. When the peasants began migration, they were faced with high rentals and shortages of housing in the city. As a result they invaded this uninhabited land and built their own houses.

Table 2.7. Time of Migration to Squatter Settlement, Tabriz.

YEAR	NUMBER	PERCENT
Before 1963	25	14.9
Between 1963 - 1970	85	50.6
Between 1971 - 1979	58	34.5
TOTAL	168	100.0

Figure 2.4. Partial Map of Tabriz Illustrating the Location of
Squatter Settlements.

The great majority (88%) have constructed their own houses, typically, have done so alone or with family help.

The narrow lanes in the squatter settlements are bordered by high mud walls, in which double doors lead into the courtyard of each house. The houses are built of mud, brick, cement and wood. The type of construction materials vary with each family's economic well-being. Generally, the houses face toward the south so that the warmth of the winter sun can carry directly into the main rooms. The better houses have one reception or living room in which the cherished possessions of the family are on display.

The above discussion provides a general understanding of the physical conditions of squatter settlements in Tabriz. However, a detailed description and analysis of the establishment, development, housing patterns, and available city services, will be explained later on, in Chapter 4 of this work.

CHAPTER THREE

URBANIZATION AND MIGRATION

The purpose of this chapter can be summarized as follows: First,
to examine the process of world urbanization in light of the experience
of Iran; second, to understand the process of rural-to-urban migration
and its many causes; third, to explore the relation between rural to
urban migration and the growth of big cities; and lastly, to examine
the settlement pattern of newcomers to urban areas, and their impact
on the formation of squatter settlements on the outskirts of major
cities.

The Process of Urbanization

Cities and urban areas existed as early as 4000 B.C. but they were
few and generally small and had to be supported by much larger rural
population. Urbanized societies, in which a high proportion of the
population lives in cities developed only in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries[65/] (Table 3.1). In the last two centuries the propor-
tion of urban population and the number of cities have grown dramati-
cally (Table 3.2). In 1800 only 2.4 percent of the people of the world
lived in urban places of 20,000 or more; the proportion increased to
20.9 percent by 1950. In 1800 there were about 50 cities of 100,000 or
more population; this number grew to about 900 in 1950.[66/] In this
period, Iran's experience paralleled that for the entire world. Much
of the increase of the population in cities is attributed to rural-to-
urban migration, "clearly the most massive inmigration in modern
times."[67/]

55

Table 3.1. Estimated Percentages of Urban Population (as nationally defined).

	1920	1940	1960	1980	2000
World Total	19	25	33	41	51
More Developed Region					
Europe	46	53	58	68	77
North America	52	59	70	78	85
USSR	15	32	49	64	76
Oceania	47	53	65	70	72
Less Developed Region					
East Asia	9	13	23	35	51
Southern Asia	9	12	18	25	34
Latin America	22	31	48	63	76
Africa	7	11	18	27	39
More Developed Regions	39	47	60	71	81
Less Developed Regions	8	12	20	30	43

Source: Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920-2000 (United Nations, E, 69, XIII,3) and revised figures calculated by The Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat, Document E/C, 6/115 (1971).

Table 3.2. Urban and Big-City Population (in millions).

	1920	1940	1960	1980	2000
Total	1,860	2,295	2,982	4,467	6,515
More developed regions	673	821	976	1,210	1,454
Less developed regions	1,187	1,474	2,006	3,257	5,061
Urban (as defined nationally)	360	570	985	1,854	3,329
More developed regions	260	385	582	864	1,174
Less developed regions	100	185	403	990	2,155
Big-City Population (500,000 Inhabitants and over)	107	180	352	665	--
More developed regions	93	145	221	343	--
Less developed regions	14	35	131	322	--

Source: United Nations, Document E/C, 6/115 (1971).

Although predicting the future trend of urbanization is rather hazardous, the growth rate of urban population and the increase in the number of cities in the last two centuries suggest that regression toward ruralism and village life is almost impossible. Urbanization is so widespread, so much a part of industrial civilization, and gaining so rapidly, that any return to rurality, even with major catastrophies, appears unlikely (Figure 3.1). On the contrary, since every city is obsolescent to some degree -- more obsolescent the older it is -- the massive destruction of many would probably add eventually to the impetus of urban growth.[68/]

Urbanization, the process of population concentration in cities, has been shown to have a "clear, although not perfect correlation"[69/] with industrialization. Although city life is an old phenomenon and existed in the pre-industrial period,[70/] "the rise of the modern city was concomitant with the industrial revolution and the historical connection between industrialization and urbanism has been generally recognized."[71/]

In terms of a more quantitative, demographic point of view, urbanization has been defined as "a process whereby population tends to agglomerate in clusters of more than a certain designated size."[72/] The size of the population in a settlement has been used as a significant criterion to distinguish the urban category from the rural. While size cannot be the only criterion for the demarcation of urbanization, "it has been the most widely accepted and the single most important criterion among several used."[73/] The number of inhabitants required for an area to be called urban or "city" varies in the different

Figure 3.1. The Growth of World's Urban and Rural Population,
1800-2000 (in millions).*

Sources: Data for 1800, 1850, 1900 adapted from estimates made by
Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz as published in P.M. Hauser,
ed., Urbanization in Asia and the Far East (Calcutta:
UNESCO, 1957), p. 56, data for 1950 from United Nations
Population Division.

*Figure 1 reprinted from Habitat: United Nations Conference on
Human Settlements, Global Review of Human Settlements,
Item 10 of the Provisional Agenda A/Conf. 70/A/7, p. 18.

countries. These numbers range from 5,000 persons in Iran to 3,500 in the United Kingdom, 2,500 in the United States, 2,000 in France, 1,000 in the USSR, and 250 in the Netherlands.[74/] Demographers sometimes use population density, or the ratio of the number of people to the area of a place, as another criterion to distinguish urban from rural areas. Besides the criteria of size and density, administrative, economic, and social criteria, either singly or in combination, are often used to distinguish urban from rural areas. A sociological definition which takes into account the structural and functional characteristics of an urban area or city as a social system was advanced by Wirth. He proposed that:

> For sociological purpose a city is a relatively
> large, dense and permanent settlement of heterogeneous
> individuals. Large numbers account for individual
> variability, the relative absence of intimate personal
> acquaintanceship, the segmentalization of human rela-
> tions which are largely anonymous, superficial, and
> transitory, and associated characteristics. Density
> involves diversifications and specialization, social
> relations, flowing contrasts, a complex pattern of
> segregation, the predominance of formal social control,
> and accentuated friction, among other phenomena.
> Heterogeneity tends to breakdown rigid structures and
> to produce increased mobility, instability, and inse-
> curity, and the affiliation of the individuals with a

variety of intersecting and tangential social groups
with high rate of membership turnover.[75/]

Briefly, a city or an urban community in the pre-industrial or industrial stage is a complex social system which structurally and functionally differs from a village or rural community. Of course, the degree of complexity of an industrial city is considerably more than that of a pre-industrial city but, in general, the processes of urbanization and city settlement produce certain properties that are different from those of rural and village settlement.

A review of some general findings concerning the characteristics of urban and rural communities may illustrate some of the consequences of urbanization.

Demographic Consequences of Urbanization: The composition of the urban population and its growth components -- fertility, mobility, and migration -- have shown considerable variation from the rural population. "Cities contain a larger proportion of persons in the prime of life than rural areas, which contain more old and very young people... The larger the city, the more this specific characteristic of urbanism is apparent."[76/] Another characteristic of the population composition of the city is its heterogeneity. Compared with the rural population, the urban population has a low proportion of native residents. Obviously this is due to migration from rural areas or from other cities.

As a general rule, in cities women predominate numerically over men.[77/] This pattern, of course, has several exceptions. In the large cities which have attracted foreign-born males, the proportion of males

is greater. In pre-industrial societies where migration from rural to urban is primarily male, the proportion of males is higher in the cities.[78/] Low fertility has been generally regarded as "one of the most significant signs of the urbanization of the Western World."[79/] Low fertility has resulted in a decrease in the median size of the urban family, which is typically smaller than the rural family. Available data show that high fertility and large size of the family are generally characteristic of most large Asian countries, for example, India, Ceylon, Burma, and Korea.[80/]

Occupational structure is another variable which is subject to the influence of the urbanization processes. "In Asia as well as in the other parts of the world, urbanization has been marked by a changed pattern of occupational structure, especially a relative preponderance of tertiary activities."[81/]

As was discussed before, the degree of division of labor, role differentiation and specialization in a city, generally are higher than that of a village. This means that a city has much more occupational variety than in a village. Since these occupations require skill, and specialization which can be gained only by training rather than by heritage, most of the city statuses are open to those persons competent to achieve them. Thus, typically, a city has higher occupational mobility than a village or a rural area.

Finally, urbanizing countries have a large net migration flow from rural areas to the cities. This pattern has been observed in Western as well as in non-Western societies.[82/]

<u>Social Organizational Consequences of Urbanization</u>: A city as a complex social system consists of numerous specialized social organizations. These organizations provide various economic, political, religious, educational, and recreational services and activities for the people. The modern urban form "has often been described sociologically as consisting of the substitution of secondary for primary contacts, the weakening of bonds of kinship and the declining social significance of the family, the disappearance of the neighborhood, and the undermining of the traditional basis of social solidarity."<u>83/</u> Thus, the growth and development of urbanism have made several activities and services of the traditional family organization dysfunctional and insignificant. "In cities mothers are more likely to be employed, lodgers are more frequently part of the household, marriage tends to be postponed, and the proportion of single and unattached people is greater."<u>84/</u>

City structure has several economic, political, and sociocultural distinctive features which are remarkably different from those of village structures. These features are not merely characteristics of the cities in industrial societies but are also found, with certain variations, in the cities of the less industrial, pre-industrial societies. Cities generally are the centers of various economic services and extensive commercial activities, including foreign trade. Cities also generally serve as headquarters for national and regional political, administrative, and governmental operations. This concentration of activities makes the city much more powerful and influential than villages. Generally it is in cities where new economic, political, and

social systems emerge and break with the old traditional systems.
Urban areas are where the new ideologies, fashions, and fads start,
where values and attitudes become more secularized, and minds become
more open and sharper. The modern city is "where social change begins,
where the specialization, talent and organization necessary for origi-
nating and extending new ideas are available; city development there-
fore is a good index of past economic progress and safe augury of new
progress to come."[85]

Urbanization In Middle Eastern Countries: History records the
existence of numerous cities in the area between the Nile and Indus
Rivers, indicating an urban pattern of human settlement in past cen-
turies.[86]   From these settlements, concepts of urban life were spread
to other parts of the old world. The grid-pattern town, for example,
was initiated at Mohenjo-Daro in the first half of the third millennium
before Christ, and later was brought to Europe by the Romans.[87]   The
Persian Achaemenid, the Parthian, and the Sasanian empires had forged
and diffused elements of middle Eastern culture, particularly urbanism,
in Asia and other parts of the old world.[88]   Today, ruins of these
great cities are found in every country of the Middle East region.
Many of these cities belonged to pre-Islamic civilizations which had
flourished in that area. Because Islam is an urban religion, it
brought a momentum both to city development and to an urban way of
life.

Thus, urbanization is not a novelty in the Middle East. The rapid
population growth, together with the technological changes of this
century, has made it possible for cities to expand and to function as

never before.[89] Many old cities have gained population, and many new cities have emerged to fulfill a wide variety of functions. A city today is composed of a set of administrative, trading, industrial, and socio-cultural sub-systems in an overall national urban system.[90] The gradual socio-economic development experienced by human societies in general has freed many rural dwellers so that they could migrate to the cities, and this shift in population redistribution has accelerated in recent decades.[91]

Data presented in Table 3.3 shows differential rural-urban population growth rates of some Middle Eastern countries since 1950. In almost all of them the rural population growth rate is substantially lower than the urban population growth rate. However, the growth rate is not constant among the cities. A remarkable differential exists in the growth rates of large cities and small towns. Cities of 100,000 and over have grown at least two times faster than those having less than 100,000 inhabitants, and almost three times faster than the national population growth for the region.

In general, the population of any locality may increase by means of an excess of births over deaths (natural increase) and through an excess of in-migrants over out-migrants. Assuming that there is no great difference in the rate of natural increase between rural and urban areas, it may be concluded that the observed urban population increase is primarily attributable to migration to the cities.[92] The process of population redistribution in the Middle East region has the following common characteristics: 1) rural population is declining;

Table 3.3. Annual Growth Rate of Population, 1950 to 1960, and 1960 to 1970 (percent).

Country	Total	Rural	Urban	Town*	City**
Iran					
1950-60	2.8	1.9	5.0	5.0	5.0
1960-70	3.0	2.0	4.8	3.4	5.9
Turkey					
1950-60	2.8	2.2	4.8	3.2	6.9
1960-70	2.5	1.8	4.2	1.4	6.8
Egypt					
1950-60	2.5	1.5	4.2	3.0	4.9
1960-70	2.5	1.5	4.0	3.3	4.2
Iraq					
1950-60	2.8	2.1	4.0	1.7	6.5
1960-70	2.9	2.2	4.0	-0.5	6.8
Syria					
1950-60	2.9	2.6	3.3	0.9	4.5
1960-70	3.0	2.7	3.4	-0.2	4.6
Lebanon					
1950-60	1.8	0.8	4.0	-1.1	5.8
1960-70	2.1	1.0	4.0	3.3	4.2
Israel					
1950-60	5.3	6.5	5.0	2.5	8.2
1960-70	3.2	1.3	3.7	-0.6	6.8
Jordan					
1950-70	2.8	2.0	4.1	-0.1	-
1960-70	3.6	2.8	4.8	2.9	7.8
Saudi Arabia					
1950-60	1.7	0.9	7.2	2.7	16.9
1960-70	1.7	0.6	6.4	5.1	7.7

Source: Kingsley Davis, World_Urbanization 1950-1970, Institute of California, Berkeley (1969), Table D.
*"Town" means an urban place of fewer than 100,000 population.
**"City" means a place with 100,000 or more.

2) urban population is increasing at a rapid pace; 3) cities in the upper level of the hierarchy are growing much faster than those in the lower level.

Urbanization in Iran: Urban settlement and an urban way of life are not new to Iran. Landmark ruins of Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatana, and many other historical sites are evidence of Iran's past urbanization. Since the arrival of Islam (641), city life has become more important, and the Islamic religion has required the city to achieve social and religious goals, e.g., group prayers.[93]

Rapid increase in the population of Iran in this century has been simultaneous with the growth of the old cities and the emergence of new cities.[94] The Census of 1956 shows 31.4% of the total population to be urban and the remaining 68.6% to be rural. In ten years (1956-66), these percentages changed to 38.5, urban and 61.3, rural.[95] In Iran, as elsewhere, urban growth does not advance at a constant rate for all levels of the urban hierarchy (Table 3.4). Of particular interest are cities with a population of 100,000 and more and an annual growth rate of more than five percent (Table 3.3). Their number increased from nine to fourteen between the year 1956 and 1966.[96] These fourteen cities also accounted for about 70% of the total urban population, while the 58 remaining Iranian cities housed only 30% of the urban population in 1966. One immediate result of this imbalance of urban growth is reflected in the hierarchical distribution of the city system in Iran. The facts show that the distribution of cities in Iran is "primate", rather than "rank-size."

Table 3.4. Percent Distribution of Urban Population in Iran, 1956 and 1966.

Number of Classes	Size of Classes in Thousands	Number of Cities, 1956	Percent of Total Urban, 1956	Number of Cities, 1966	Percent of Total Urban, 1966
1	500 and over	1	33.4	1	36.6
2	100 - 499	8	34.0	11	33.0
3	50 - 99	9	14.0	16	13.7
4	20 - 49	27	18.6	44	16.7
	TOTALS	45	100.0	72	100.0

Source: National Census of Iran, 1956-1966.

Figure 3.2. Iranian Cities over 20,000 Population in 1966.

Population in
Thousands

20 to 49
50 to 99
100 to 499

500 and over

It has been calculated that in 1900, 21 percent of the population lived in urban areas. 97/ This percentage persisted until the 1940's although the number of urban dwellers increased from 2.07 million to 3.20 million. The latter part of this period coincides with the period of reform and development of motor transport. This increased mobility probably accounts for some of the migration to the towns during the period, but the fact that the urban-rural ratio remained the same during those forty years may partly be explained by the need for the agricultural sector to produce more food for a growing rural and urban population and by an increase not only of cultivable land but also of the labour force. 98/ This pattern changed later. As I mentioned earlier, the urban population increased to 31 percent in 1956 and 39 percent in 1966. In 1956-66 intercensal period the number of settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants increased by 37. 99/ The most striking point is the correlation between urban settlements and areas of high rural population densities. With the main role of many urban centers being the performance of higher order functions for rural areas, it is not surprising that the greatest networks of towns and cities are found in Azerbyjan, north and south of the Elburz, and in basins along the Zagros mountains. Many of these settlements are on the historic trade routes, such as the Silk Road, 100/ and this route network is again being re-emphasized by current road-building programs.

Table 3.5 shows that the percentage of the urban population in cities of 100,000 and more has increased from 51.3 in 1956 to 60.6 in 1966. The lowest annual growth rate has been in towns with a population of 50,000 to 99,999. An analysis of intercensal growth in all

Table 3.5. The Number, Size and Growth of Iranian Towns, 1956 - 1966.

Size of Locality	1956			1966			Annual rate of increase, 1956 - 1966
	Cities		Percentage distribution of urban population	Cities		Percentage distribution of urban population	
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent		
5,000- 9,999	90	48.4	10.6	97	43.5	6.6	4.20
10,000- 24,999	56	30.1	14.7	64	28.7	11.7	4.50
25,000- 49,999	22	11.8	12.8	35	15.7	11.7	3.40
50,000- 99,999	9	4.8	10.6	13	5.8	9.4	3.10
100,000-249,999	6	3.2	16.7	8	3.7	12.4	3.95
250,000-499,999	2	1.1	9.1	5	2.2	19.0	4.20
500,000+	1	0.5	25.5	1	0.4	29.2	7.15
TOTAL	186	100.0	100.0	223	100.0	100.0	6.01

Source of Data: Ministry of Interior. 1956 and Plan Organization, 1966.

urban areas showed that there was virtually no correlation between town size and percentage growth. In the case of towns in the size categories 5,000 - 9,999 and 10,000 - 19,999, a few increased by less than 20 percent but most grew by more than 25 percent. The highest absolute and relative growth was in towns over 10,000.[101/] When growth of small towns is considered in different parts of the county there is again a random pattern although two trends are discernible: high rates of growth occurred in towns remote from a major city (because of a great increase in government services), and in towns close to major provincial cities and part of their embryonic city regions.[102/]

Assuming an equal rate of natural increase in rural and urban populations, the differential growth rate of cities is due to migration from rural and small towns to the cities. Approximately one-fourth of the urban population in 1966 were in-migrants. Considering city size classes, the differential attractiveness of big cities becomes evident. More than 37 percent of the inhabitants of large cities (100,000 or over) are in-migrants, whereas less than 15 percent of the population of smaller cities (20 to 99 thousands) are in-migrants (Table 3.6). Furthermore, the differential population growth is a reflection of socio-economic, administrative, and spatial functions, all of which facilitate the growth process.

A study of urbanization usually involves the migration process. In the early stages of urbanization, almost all of the inhabitants of new towns probably have migrated from rural areas. In the next part of this chapter, the process of rural-urban migration and its effect on

Table 3.6. Percent Population Change and Percent Migrant,
Non-Migrant Composition.

Number of Classes	Size of Class in Thousands	Percent Change 1956-66	Percent Migrant 1966	Percent Non-Migrant 1966
1	500 and over	79.0	48.9	51.1
2	100 - 499	74.6	26.7	73.3
3	50 - 99	76.6	14.4	85.6
4	20 - 49	60.0	13.8	86.2

Source: National Census of Iran, 1956 - 1966.

urban population growth and decline of rural population in Iran will
be explored.

Rural-Urban Migration in Iran: Spatial and occupational
mobility are integral parts of economic development. The process of
change from a rural-agricultural to an urban-industrial economy in-
volves spatial and occupational population redistribution.[103/] In this
process, the proportion of population in rural areas declines in spite
of its high fertility, whereas urban population increases rapidly due
to a low mortality rate and migration.[104/] In Iran, as elsewhere in
the less-developed countries, urban population has tended to increase.
There has also been a shift in the occupational structure of the
society, since the rate of manpower in agricultural activities has
declined, and the rate of manpower in non-agricultural activities has
gained ten percent in one decade (Table 3.7). These changes in the
occupational structure usually take place through a transfer of labor
force from one place to another. The data presented in Table 3.7 tends
to support this alleged association between occupational and spatial
mobility in Iran.

Iran is a nation of great economic, social, and physical contrasts.
The thirteen provinces display variations in population density, agri-
cultural productivity, and industrial development (Table 3.8). The
eastern arid provinces, for example, comprise sixty-five percent of the
area, but hold less than thirty percent of the population whereas the
central (or Tehran) province contains four percent of the area and
twenty percent of the total population. Consequently, population
density ranges from 2.4 persons per square kilometer in Baluchestan

Table 3.7. Population and Occupation Change in Iran, 1956 - 1966.**

Population Year	Population in 1,000	Rural (Percent)	Urban (Percent)	Migrants (Percent)	Active Population in Agriculture (Percent)	Active Population in Non-agriculture (Percent)
1956	18,954	68.6	31.4	11.0	56.7	43.3
1966	25,323	61.7	38.7	18.7*	46.6	53.3
% Change	+33.6	-7.3	+7.3	+7.7	-10.1	+10.1

Source: National Census of 1956 and 1966 (Iran).

*Percent of Migrants as Estimated by the Household Survey of 1964.

**The Migrant Tribes of Iran are included in the 1956 Census, but are Excluded from the 1966 Census.

Table 3.8.   Area, Population, and Occupational Distribution of Iranian Provinces: 1956-1966.

Number	Province	Percent Area in SKm²	Population Density 1956	Percent Population in 1966	Percent of Population in Agriculture, 1966	Percent of Population in Manufacturing, 1966
Total	Iran	1968*	11.5	25,078*	46.2	18.5
1	Central	3.7	44.7	19.9	19.2	26.5
2	Gilan	3.0	33.5	7.0	62.9	11.9
3	Mazandran	9.4	10.9	8.1	64.4	9.9
4	E. Azarbayjan	4.5	29.1	10.3	50.2	19.4
5	W. Azarbayjan	2.1	20.4	4.3	61.0	7.3
6	Kermarshahan	3.6	23.2	7.3	55.2	9.4
7	Kurdestan	2.1	16.4	2.5	69.4	8.2
8	Khoozestan	7.1	17.6	9.7	35.9	16.4
9	Fars-Bandar	9.0	8.9	6.7	44.2	16.7
10	Kerman	13.7	3.5	4.4	47.5	24.9
11	Khorasan	19.1	6.4	10.0	53.8	18.4
12	Isfahan-Yazd	12.0	7.7	8.0	37.3	32.5
13	Baluchestan	10.8	2.4	1.3	66.0	9.0

*In thousands.   Source: National Census of Iran, 1956 - 1966.

Province (in the extreme southeast), to 44.7 persons per square kilo-
meter in the Central Province in 1956.

Data on occupational mobility of Iranian migrants shows possible
jobs opened to the migrants in the cities and villages (Table 3.9),
yet there is evidence that many migrants add to the unemployed urban
population. The survey of manpower in 1964 indicated that about 62%
of the migrants who came to cities in order to find a job failed to do
so and remained unemployed. Furthermore, a majority of those who found
a job or changed jobs were engaged in occupations such as services,
trade, transportation, and communication. Low-skilled jobs such as
shoe polishing, carpet and house cleaning, and particularly petty
trading are frequently taken by the newcomers.[105/] Although manufac-
turing and production doubled their migration absorption share, they
are far behind the services and trade absorption rate. The former
economic sectors are not dynamic enough to absorb the available labor
force. Zachariach's findings in this vein led him to advocate that
this is a symptom of the underdevelopment in the Asian urbanization
process in this century. According to Zachariach:

> ...reason for the alleged lack of balance between
>
> urbanization and urban development in Asian
>
> countries is the inability of the urban indus-
>
> tries in these countries to absorb the ever-
>
> increasing migrant labor force. Compared with
>
> European countries during a corresponding period
>
> of economic development, the urban labor force

in these countries consists of a relatively

small proportion of factory workers and a

large proportion of workers employed in occu-

pations as miscellaneous, usually menial,
106/
unskilled services.

Under such circumstances, migration may not be a response to the actual

demand for labor in the cities. Still, in spite of all its problems,

city life is preferred because of the poor quality of rural life in the

less-developed countries.

In the past, there has been a tendency to think of migration as a
107/
simple rural-to-urban move.   Bharier has shown that in Iran the

movements are far more complex, and that the concept of a rural-urban
108/
continuum is only part of the pattern.   By taking the total urban

population increase, which was 105 percent between 1900 and 1956, he

argues that any individual town or city which had an increase above

that figure had net in-migration.

For the period from 1956 to 1966, Bharier using similar techniques

as in the earlier period, calculates that there has been a sharp rise

in the amount of rural-urban migration as a percentage of total migra-

tion. It now amounts to 90 percent as compared to 39 percent in the
109/
earlier period.   Information on place of birth is given as a sum-

mary, as shown in Table 3.10. Of the total population, 86.9 percent

were born in the shahrestan of enumeration, compared to 89 percent in

1956, although shahrestan boundaries have been altered between the two

censuses. The percentage of the urban population born in the shahres-

tan of enumeration was 37.6, and of the rural population, 95.4.

Table 3.9. Occupation of Rural-Urban Migrants Before and After
Migration, 1964.

OCCUPATION	Percent Urban		Percent Rural	
	Before Migration	After Migration	Before Migration	After Migration
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Out of labor force	68.0	59.5	64.2	59.2
Seeking work	5.6	3.3	1.9	0.7
Technical and professional	1.5	2.3	1.0	1.3
Management and administrative	0.5	1.2	0.2	1.3
Clerical	1.6	3.3	0.4	0.6
Trade	2.2	6.0	1.3	2.4
Farming	10.2	1.3	22.6	24.7
Transportation and communication	0.9	2.8	0.5	1.0
Manufacturing and productivity	5.1	11.8	3.6	5.0
Services	1.9	7.1	1.8	2.9
Military	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.8
Others	1.4	0.2	1.5	0.1

Source: Household Sample Survey, 1964.

Contrasts between different ostans (provinces) and urban and rural
areas are shown^{110/} (Table 3.10). As Table 3.10 shows, over ten per-
cent of the urban population in most provinces were born in a different
ostan or shahrestan.

Reasons for these migration figures are many, and although little
research has been done on causes of movement, many of the classic
features operating in developing countries can be seen.^{111/} Movement
from the land has been caused by a relative decline in agricultural
productivity, some increase in mechanization and land reform with re-
distribution of land, leaving a group which no longer can find employ-
ment in rural areas. Rural unemployment resulted when the farm produc-
tion techniques could not accommodate all workers and when there are no
alternative sources of non-agricultural employment. Mechanization of
agriculture drove peasants off the land and at the same time was unable
to absorb rural wage laborers. Because of failure of both the agricul-
tural and non-agricultural sectors to provide employment, the rural
farm laborers are faced with unemployment.

The establishment of agri-business has created both the problem of
rural unemployment and decline of agricultural production. The "fer-
tile region" for agri-business industries used to be found around the
hydro-electric dams. They denied the growing rural population access
to land and contributed to the spread of the wage-earning rural class
and consequently increase of rural unemployment. Not only casual
labourers, but even many with a claim to specific pieces of land, are
being driven out. In Khoozestan, an estimated 17,000 people had been

Table 3.10. Birthplace of Population of Iran, 1966.

Ostan, Governorate of Farmandarikol	Percentage born in Shahrestan of Enumeration			Percentage born in other Shahestan of Ostan of Enumeration			Percentage born in other Ostan		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Central	65.1	54.5	90.4	11.3	13.9	5.0	22.8	30.5	4.5
Gilan	95.0	86.7	97.4	2.7	7.5	1.4	2.2	5.5	1.2
Mazandaran	83.5	74.5	86.4	4.0	5.9	3.4	12.3	19.3	10.1
East-Azerbayjan	96.2	90.5	98.5	2.5	6.3	0.9	1.2	3.0	0.5
West-Azerbayjan	92.4	82.0	96.0	3.4	6.3	2.3	4.2	11.5	1.6
Kermanshahan	90.3	83.4	94.9	4.0	5.3	3.3	4.S	11.1	1.3
Khoozestan	79.5	69.6	92.1	8.5	11.0	5.3	11.7	19.0	2.5
Fars	93.5	89.3	96.4	3.2	4.8	2.2	3.2	5.3	1.5
Kerman	95.1	88.3	97.5	2.6	6.1	1.4	2.2	5.5	1.1
Khurasan	92.5	81.6	96.9	5.4	11.3	2.4	2.6	6.3	0.6
Isfahan	95.9	94.2	97.6	2.0	2.6	1.4	2.0	3.1	0.9
Sistan and Baluchestan	93.7	69.1	98.3	2.7	12.2	0.9	3.4	18.1	0.7
Kordestan	94.8	85.3	96.7	1.6	4.3	1.1	3.3	10.3	1.9
Hamadan	97.3	93.9	98.4	0.9	1.4	0.7	1.8	4.6	0.9
Charmahal	97.9	96.7	98.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.9	3.1	1.4
Lorestan	94.7	84.6	97.9	1.5	4.6	0.5	3.7	10.7	1.5
Ilam	95.8	89.0	96.9	0.4	0.8	0.3	3.6	9.9	2.5
Kohkiluveh	94.2	58.9	97.9	0.4	1.2	0.3	5.3	39.6	1.7
Ports and Islands Persian Gulf Islands	94.3	81.0	98.0	1.2	3.6	0.6	4.3	15.0	1.3
Ports and Islands Oman Sea	94.9	78.7	97.8	1.3	4.5	0.7	3.7	16.4	1.3
Semnan	93.2	87.0	97.5	1.5	2.9	0.6	5.1	9.9	1.9

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 as persons born in foreign countries are excluded.
Source of Data: Plan Organization, 1966. Momeni, J.A. "Population of Iran," 1977.

driven out by 1974. Their villages have been bulldozed away.$\underline{112/}$ As a

consequence, persons had to leave the rural areas and go to the

cities.

The attraction of the cities, whether it be real or imagined, is

the prospect of a job for those unemployed, better wages for those

already employed, the availability of better health and educational

facilities, and a belief that standard of living can be improved.

Since the city is the center of change, economic development and

cultural diffusion attract potential migrants.$\underline{113/}$ As long as urban

life has its advantages over rural life, this process may be expected

to continue. This is strongly reflected in the Iranian migration data

gathered as a part of a manpower sample survey which is presented in

Table 3.11. In 1964 about half of the total migrants (49.2%) stated

that their main reason for migration was to find a better job. An

additional 11.2% moved because of unemployment. Therefore, more than

60% thought of migration as a means of finding a job or to improve

their job status. Agricultural occupations are usually low paying and

consequently have less prestige. Thus, it is not surprising that about

41% of all the migrants seeking a better job went to the cities. In

the same manner, more than 41% of unemployed males and 36% of unemploy-

ed females chose the cities as a favorite place for seeking employment

(Table 3.11).

A concentration of educational institutions and training opportu-

nities in the urban centers also intensifies the pull force of the

cities. Almost all of the migrants who moved for educational reasons

went to the cities (98.7% as shown in Table 3.11).

Table 3.11. Urban and Rural Migrants: Their Reasons for Migration, 1964.

REASONS FOR MIGRATION	TOTAL	URBAN		RURAL	
		MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)
Seeking a better job	49.2	25.20	16.11	33.40	25.30
Seeking work	11.2	41.60	36.20	11.00	11.20
Transfer	7.7	16.30	27.70	30.60	25.40
Marriage	10.9	.01	34.50	.02	62.90
Joining their family members	8.8	49.20	47.30	.02	.02
Education	1.3	62.80	35.90	.02	.01
Other Reasons	10.9				

Source: Manpower Sample Survey, 1964 (Iran).

Iranian migrants tend to move to the large and dynamic
cities which may provide them with better services and amenities.
These "pull" forces at the destination are usually reinforced by the
"push" forces at the origin such as awareness, aspiration, and modern-
ization to create the existing urban conditions. As a result, the
large cities which are already faced with acute traffic problems,
shortage of housing, poor sanitary conditions, and lack of utilities,
are having their situations intensified. In fact, few of those who
come to the cities to enjoy its services, amenities and technical faci-
lities are actually able to do so.

The new arrivals in the city face an acute shortage of suitable
low-cost housing. Rampant inflation lowered the real income of the
wage earners and government officials, making them unable to meet the
rising cost of rents, which was stimulated by the growing demand for
housing. At the same time, a boom in construction business, which was
entirely in the hands of private entrepreneurs, created land specula-
tion of gigantic proportion. Some lots around major cities like Tehran,
Tabriz, Mashhad and other cities that sold for a minimal price before
1963 went up fifty times after 1963 and permitted a rapidly growing
class of urban entrepreneurs to accumulate capital. This class, in
turn, instead of investing in industry, built luxurious dwellings in
order to assure themselves a steady income and safeguard the value of
their money. The construction boom increased the need for workers,
most of whom came from villages. As the construction boom continued,
and later industrialization got underway, manpower including those

employed in the public sector became scarce. Consequently, the avail-
ability of employment, higher wages, better insurance and fringe bene-
fits attracted additional people from small towns and villages.

Industrialization emerged after 1963 as the chief factor creating
structural changes and giving further stimulus and a new direction to
rural migration. The working people engaged in industry and services
grew from 43.3 percent in 1956 to 53.3 percent in 1966. Those employed
in agriculture decreased markedly, as already noted. The effect of
this development was evident in population growth, migration, and
urbanization. As mentioned earlier, the total population of Iran rose
from 18 million in 1956 to 25 million in 1966 and 33 million in 1976.
The urban population, which was 31.4 percent of the total in 1956, rose
to 39.0 percent in 1966 and 46.9 percent in 1976. In terms of the
total population, the rural population increased yearly by an average
of 1.8 percent from 1956 to 1966 and 1.7 percent from 1966 to 1976; the
urban population growth was 6.0 percent during the same period.

Much of this urban growth was due to migration. Over ten percent
of the Iranian population were migrants of one kind or another in 1966.
Therefore, migration provides a key to understanding not only the
changes in Iranian demography, but also the basic transformation in the
quality of the population. The rise of squatter settlements in these
conditions appears as a forgone conclusion.

The squatter settlements, inhabited mostly by country people, are
part of a basic process of rural migration and urbanization in Iran and
elsewhere in the world. Factors contributing to Iranian urbanization

include the substantial natural rate of population growth, the concentration of economic development and opportunity in the cities, and the pronounced rate of migration to the cities from small towns and rural areas.

Associated with urban growth is an overall increase, ranging from accretion in some cities to proliferation in others, of often illegal occupation of public and private terrain by the migrants, leading to the formation of "squatter settlements", "squattments", or shantytowns.

Thus, the outstanding feature of squatter settlements seems to be, first, that they are found in nearly all the cities of the Third World countries, and second, that they are often similar to each other, in terms of their evolution and their relations with the city. We now turn to the analysis of our data for the squatter settlement located at the outskirts of Tabriz, and where possible compare our data with three comparable studies of squatter settlements.

Chapter 4 is confined to an examination of the pattern of squatter settlements, how the land was occupied, housing characteristics, origin of the migrants, occupation prior to migration, kin contacts, and reasons for migration to Tabriz. An analysis of the social and economic characteristics of the squatters is found in Chapter 5. This chapter considers household composition, family structure, education and occupation of the squatters, and the social organization of the settlement. Chapter 6 is devoted to an examination of the urbanization process in which the squatter settlement is viewed as a mediating stage in the process of adjusting to urban life. Satisfaction with life in the

settlement, adoption of urban patterns, relations with urban dwellers, and aspirations for the future are explored in this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CHARACTER AND GROWTH OF THE SQUATTER SETTLEMENT

Based upon the literature concerning squatter settlements and personal observation of such a settlement in Tabriz, some general observations are in order before reporting relevant findings from the field study.

The Genesis and Nature of the Squatter Settlement

The manner in which squatters in many Third World countries take possession of the land, plan and build their dwellings, and eventually expand them is strikingly similar. The immediate cause prompting such action is the shortage of housing coupled with high rentals in the city. This situation is aggravated by the lack of a proper government housing policy stemming either from lack of social concern and planning experience or, most often, from investment priorities that favor industrialization and defense rather than social welfare.

The specific ways that shantytowns are established, a spectacular affair indeed, follow a precise and planned course in which housing and building skills, community spirit, entrepreneurship, and profit motives play important roles.[114/] In some cases, a few individuals may establish a few dwellings on a large, vacant, and rather inaccessible piece of land, and then parcel and sell to relatives and friends.[115/]

In Tabriz there are specialized squatter dealers who have built and sold dwellings to migrants and have become rich and prominent in the process. In other cases the settlement may be established as a

consequence of an organized mass invasion by dwellers living in over-populated city quarters. The decision to invade a vacant lot is made after it has been surveyed in advance. Then thousands of people move overnight onto it, divide and name it (usually giving it a name that sounds patriotic or associated with a famous national or religious figure), and begin to build shacks on it with the assistance of friends and relatives. Cardboard, tin plates, and other usable materials are used to erect the "houses" in a matter of hours. By morning the previously empty land appears dotted with one-room shacks that, if successfully defended against the police, may be gradually expanded to become permanent houses. Observers agree that if it were not for this form of house building, the housing authorities could not meet the housing demand.<u>116/</u> Moreover, the mere act of invasion is actually a community action that forms a basis for solidarity and cohesion in the shantytown. The investment in this form of housing in terms of labor, material, and land improvement adds consdiderable value to the city properties and subsequently increase the urban tax revenues.

Equally important is the fact that if the new squatters eventually become the owners of the shacks, they turn into champions of private property, and free enterprise. The rate of home ownership in squatter settlements is high. In Tabriz, 88.1 percent owned their own house or shack. Comparable ownership figures are 84.0 percent in Istanbul and 81.0 percent in Monterrey.<u>117/</u> In Caracas, the percentage of home owners ranged between 93 and 96 percent. In India, between 81 and 93 percent of the total number of inhabitants interviewed in one

study owned their houses. In Rabat's shantytowns, 75 to 90 percent of the dwellers owned their baraques. In some cases, as in Rabat, the shack owners pay a rent to the land owner.[118/]

It would seem, based on the literature, that squatter dwellings almost everywhere expand in a more or less similar manner. Usually new units are added to the original room, especially after the deed to the land has been legally acquired, and thus shacks often become true houses. The physical shape of squatter dwellings and the materials used show great variation from country to country. However, a thorough study of this technical matter is beyond the scope of this comparative survey.

The shack is an anchor point in the squatter's existence. One is struck by the tenderness and devotion (especially after the legal title to the land is safely secured) with which the squatter, at least in Tabriz, tends to his shack, and gradually turns it into a real house. Many have small gardens and a variety of flowers seldom seen in city slums. Most squatters regard their shack both as a shelter in which to recuperate their energy for the next day's work and as a means to be with their own families and to integrate themselves into the community at large. Consequently, it is easy to understand why the crime rate is very low. Even those students who had misconceptions about the squatters agree that crime, prostitution, gambling, and drugs present little problem in most shantytowns.[119/]

Housing Construction, Ownership and Size

The house, usually of one room, is erected and furnished however,
meagerly, overnight. Thus, the inhabitants can benefit from the legal
provisions that prohibit the destruction of "inhabited homes without
due process." Actually, many of the dwellings appear so well built
that one can hardly believe it was achieved in a few hours. If the
house looks well settled, the squatter can claim that he has resided
there for a year thus benefitting from the permissive clauses of the
law.

The finishing and the expansion of the house in the Tabriz
squatter settlement, sometimes 2 to 4 rooms, is done gradually by the
owners themselves. The time spent on improving the houses, usually
after returning home from a full day's toil, represents a significant
labor investment and results in a marked improvement of the land, much
of which was unfit for regular construction anyway.

The building of the house and the use of construction materials
show a high degree of adaptability to soil conditions and climate,
which the housing developed by the government are often not able to
achieve. The initial squatter room is often constructed of makeshift
materials. However, soon afterward the shack is consolidated and ex-
panded, often by completely replacing the original material with brick,
cement and other construction materials. As shown in Table 4.1, in
Tabriz, 56.6 percent of the squatters built their house out of unbaked
brick, wood and mud. Others used the following: 20.8 percent, brick,
wood, stone, and mud; 10.7 percent, brick, cement and stucco; and

Table 4.1. Construction Materials Used in Building Houses,
           Squatter Settlement, Tabriz.

MATERIALS	NUMBER	PERCENT
Unbaked brick, wood, and mud	95	56.6
Brick, wood, stone, and mud	35	20.8
Brick, cement, wood, and stucco	18	10.7
Iron, cement, brick, and stucco	20	11.9
TOTAL	168	100.0

finally, 11.9 percent, iron, cement, brick, and stucco. The unbaked bricks used in the area studied were locally manufactured, and were used judiciously according to the soil and slope of the land. Other construction materials were mostly purchased from local dealers in the neighborhood. To some extent, the squatter's building has forced the local entrepreneurs to seek and make the best use of low-cost, locally available materials.

In some cases the purchase of the land and the construction of the dwelling was financed partly by a transfer of capital from the village. Most squatters, owned or had shares in the houses or the land in the village, however, poor they might have been. Most of these properties left in the village were used by relatives. However, a small number of squatters, had sold their rural properties and spent the proceeds to buy or build the squatter dwelling or to meet living expenses, to pay debts, or to open a small business in the city.

As shown in Table 4.2, a very large percentage of squatters owned their own house in Tabriz and Istanbul -- 88 and 84 percent, respectively. Slightly more than five percent rented the house in Tabriz while nine percent rented the house in Istanbul. See Table 4.2 for additional details.

The ultimate size of the house to be achieved after acquiring the land title is determined in large measure by the number of people in the family, including relatives, by the financial situations, and by the squatter's image of urban life and comfort. It seems that the Iranian squatter's standard of housing and urban living followed those

Table 4.2. Home Ownership Among Squatters in Tabriz and Istanbul.

CATEGORIES	TABRIZ HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent)	ISTANBUL MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent)
Owns the house	88.1	84.0
Rents the house	5.4	9.0
Other*	6.5	7.0
Total	100.0	100.0
N	168	370

Source: Karpat, op.cit.

Note: Other includes: Tabriz-inherited (4.7), mortaged (0.6), unspecified (1.2); and Istanbul-Lives with relatives but pays no rent (7.0).

of the urban middle class rather than their own standards. Until 1976, the average floor space, varied between 100 and 150 square meters, which is more than the European and American average. Table 4.3 shows that only 14.9 percent of the dwellings in the Tabriz squatter settlements had a single room; 45.2 percent had two rooms; and 39.9 percent had three or more rooms. Comparable percentages for Istanbul were 17 percent, 53 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Table 4.3). Usually the outside of the house was enclosed with a fence.

Only 11.3 percent in the squatter area of Tabriz had electricity and running water, 7.7 percent use their own water-well for drinking purposes, and 80 percent of the households used the water tap constructured by the city for public use. Those who do not have showers in their homes generally go, once or twice a week, to the public baths in the city. However, public does not mean free, since residents have to pay to utilize the baths. This lack of bathing facilities within close proximity of their homes in the squatter settlements of Tabriz creates severe problems. Not only must they spend money on the bath itself, but they also must pay for their transportation.

Those families that do not have electricity use oil burning lanterns. Fortunately, since Iran is an oil producing country, oil is not expensive. According to Karpat, in Istanbul,squatter residents used the following for heating: 72 percent used wood and 25 percent used a combination of coal and wood.[120/] The difference between Turkey and Iran with respect to heating could be the high price of oil in Turkey since Turkey is not an oil producing country.

Table 4.3. Number of Rooms in Each Household, Squatter
Settlements of Tabriz and Istanbul.

ROOMS	TABRIZ	ISTANBUL
	(Percent)	(Percent)
One Room	14.9	17.0
Two Rooms	45.2	53.0
More than Two Rooms	39.9	30.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Karpat, op.cit.

The most common household appliances among the squatters in Tabriz are blankets, throw rugs, and carpets which are utilized to cover the earthen floor, so that people could sit. These floor coverings vary in cost from blankets which are the cheapest to the most expensive and precious Persian rugs. Only 40 percent of the sampled households indicated possessing heating appliances. These consisted mainly of oil burning heaters that give off very little heat and the traditional coal burning Korsi. The Korsi is open on four sides where people can hover closely and warm their legs. Unfortunately, it does not give off sufficient heat to warm a room.

Migrant Origin and Expectations

Who is the migrant?; Where does he come from?; and What does he expect to achieve? -- are questions that will be explored in this section. In Iran, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, squatters are commonly thought to have a rural origin. This is well-supported by the data presented in Table 4.4. Obviously, all squatters do not have a rural origin for some of them came from small towns and some come from large cities (Table 4.4).

In terms of geographical regions, the survey data indicated that the great majority of squatters in Tabriz came from the rural areas within the same province as Tabriz. The same pattern prevails for squatters' origins in Istanbul, Rio, and Monterrey. Most of the squatters indicated that they did come directly to Tabriz from their place of origin. To a large extent, this is due to the prominence of Tabriz in the Northwest, to the relatively short distances and to the

Table 4.4. Origin of Migrants in Squatter Settlements, Tabriz,
Istanbul, Monterrey, and Rio.

Origin	Tabriz	Istanbul	Monterrey	Rio
	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)
Rural Areas	70.6	79.9	62.0	48.0
Small tows and Cities	8.3	8.2	20.0	33.0
Other provinces, unspecified	4.2	7.7	3.0	4.0
Other*	14.9	4.2	16.0	15.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	168	950	544	494

Source: Karpat, op.cit.; Hopgood, op.cit.; Perlman, op.cit.

*Note: Other includes: Tabriz-Large city (14.9); Istanbul-Large city, (4.2); Monterrey-Medium city (11.0), Large city (3.0), Foreign (2.0); and Rio-Large city (15.0).

availability of transportation.

Prior Work Experience: Given the usual rural origins of migrants among squatters, it is likely that most will arrive in the city with previous work experience in agriculture only. Mangin, among others, found this to be the case in Lima's barriadas.[121/] However, that this is not always the case has been shown by Roberts in his study of two barrios in Guatemala City.[122/] Roberts, for example, reports that about one-third of the occupations in Guatemala City were in agriculture. This is explained by Roberts, in terms of the low industrialization of the city, its dense hinterland and their interrelations.

Tabriz, unlike Guatemala City, is an urban-industrial center in large part surrounded by a sparsely settled countryside. And as noted earlier, most rural migrants to Tabriz come from the rural areas within Azarbyjan province, an essentially agricultural area. The breakdown of previous occupations of squatters reflects the preponderance of agricultural backgrounds. Prior to migration to Tabriz, nearly 71.4 percent of household heads were engaged in agriculture or related pursuits. Other household heads were categorized as: craftsmen (7.7 percent), bedouins or herders (5.4 percent), servants (1.8 percent), and watchmen (0.6 percent). The occupational background of the sample of squatters in Monterrey is remarkably similar to that of squatters in Tabriz. The proportion having agricultural background in the two locales is virtually identical. However, squatters in Monterrey reported a greater diversity of occupations and less unemployment than squatters in Tabriz (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5. Occupation of Household Head at Time of Migration,
Tabriz and Monterrey.

Occupation	Tabriz		Monterrey	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Farmers	80	47.6	65	49.2
Farm Laborers	40	23.8	28	21.2
Craftsmen	13	7.7	4	3.0
Bedouins (Herders)	9	5.4	3	2.3
Miner	-	-	8	6.0
Street vendor	-	-	6	4.6
*Other occupations	4	2.4	15	11.4
Unemployed	22	13.0	3	2.3
Total	168	100.0	132	100.0

Source: Hopgood, op.cit.

*Note: Other occupations: Tabriz-servant (3), watchman (1);
Monterrey-gatherer (4), driver (3), bricklayer (2),
policemen (1), barber (1), radio repairman (1), auto
mechanic (1), porter (1), butcher (1).

Overall, squatters came to Tabriz without any special skills which would have given them an edge in competing for the better paying and more prestigious jobs. How well they are actually doing will be taken up in the "Occupation and Employment" Section in Chapter 5.

Kin Contacts: Many migrants made brief visits to Tabriz before making the final move. Some came only to sample life in the city and liked what they found. Others came to visit relatives and friends and in the process heard much about living and working in the city. The role of the family is crucial in understanding the process of urban adaptation and integration into urban life. A beginning can be made in that direction by briefly noting the role of relatives and friends who preceeded the squatters to Tabriz.

Migrants are typically preceeded in their move by relatives and/or friends.[123/] The image of the lone, unattached, friendless migrant to the city applies to the exception rather than the norm.

Most migrants to Istanbul,[124/] Rio,[125/] and Monterrey,[126/] exhibit this pattern and were preceeded by relatives or friends. This is likewise the case for migrants in Tabriz and especially among those who were married at the time of arrival. Almost 83 percent reported being preceeded by relatives or friends. Perlman mentions that "most migrants to Rio have friends and relatives in the city who can help in the initial adaptation period."[127/]

Although some squatters in Tabriz were uncertain which relative(s) preceeded them, most reported being preceeded by siblings, uncles/aunts, cousins, brothers-/sisters-in-law, children, parents, and grandparents,

in that order of frequency. Only a few reported being preceeded by friends, or nephews/nieces.

Having relatives in the city has clear advantages for the newly arrived and for their future well-being in the city. Most informants reported receiving some type of help from resident relatives. The type of help received included being taken in by relatives until other accommodations could be found, help in finding work, loans, and bus or train fare for the trip. Some received no other type of help than moral encouragement and others indicated they received no help because their relatives were poor, like themselves. Nevertheless, help (moral or material) which is extended to new arrivals does not stop once the migrant is settled. Rather, it lays the basis for a system of continuing reciprocity among relatives and friends.

Reasons for Migration. Respondents differ little among themselves in regard to their reasons for migrating to Tabriz. The overwhelming majority made reference to economic considerations in one form or another. Related to this reason,78.5 percent of squatters in Tabriz, 77 percent in Istanbul, and 62 percent in Rio mentioned low income, poverty, unemployment, and underemployment as a major factor for their migration (Table 4.6). Some mentioned "push" factors by making reference to the lack of work in their communities of origin. Some Tabriz squatters mentioned dissatisfaction with previous job and conflict with neighbors as a reason for their migration (6.4 percent). Others indicated the "pull" of the city with reference to there being more work, or better educational and recreational opportunities. Some gave lack

Table 4.6. Reasons for Migration among Squatters, Tabriz,
Istanbul, and Rio.

Reasons	Tabriz	Istanbul	Rio
	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)
Low income, unem-ployment, and underemployment	78.5	77.0	62.0
Dissatisfaction with previous occupa-tion, and conflict with neighbors	6.4	-	-
Availability of urban services, and attraction of the city	7.1	8.0	9.0
Family reasons	-	-	20.0
*Others	8.0	15.0	9.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	168	370	494

Source: Karpat, op.cit.; Perlman, op.cit.

*Note: Other reasons for migration: Tabriz-lack of educational
opportunity (4.5), unemployment and conflict with neighbors
(3.5); Istanbul-others (15.0); Rio-health (1.0), military
service (8.0).

of schooling in the villages as their reasons for migration (4.5 per-
cent). Others mentioned unemployment, conflict with neighbors, health,
military service, and family reasons as the main factors for their
migration (Table 4.6).

The predominance of economic considerations for migration is
apparently characteristic of squatters in Tabriz as well as in other
squatter areas studied. Hopgood reports the same predominance of eco-
nomic reasons for migrants to Monterrey as does Germani for Buenos
Aires.[128/] Likewise, Karpat and Perlman found much the same set of
factors to be the prime motives for migration among squatters in
Istanbul and Rio.[129/]

Reasons for Squatting: An important part of the process of adapt-
ing and integration to urban life in Tabriz and other cities of devel-
oping countries is related to where one lives. It is not possible to
discuss those among the poor who do not move to a settlement, but among
those who have moved to squatter settlements, the overriding consider-
ation we have seen is economic. Nearly all sampled squatters in Tabriz
expressed the advantage of paying no rent, or paying very little rent,
by moving into the squatter settlement. For the most part, the move
can be conceived of in the adaptive terms of economic rationality or
economic maximization of available resources. Certainly, for some,
there was also an element of compulsion attendant upon the decision to
move. The loss of a better paying job or the loss of a housesite else-
where, for example, influenced some to move to the squatter settlements
rather than to seek cheaper or equivalent rentals elsewhere.

Table 4.7 summarizes the major reasons given by the sampled families for living in the squatter settlements. The majority of these people, almost 80 percent, attributed their living in the outskirts of the city directly or indirectly to economic factors. Almost 38 percent gave the high cost of rent in the city as a reason for their move to squatter settlements. Akin to this, 17.8 percent claimed that they live there because of low income, and they no longer wished or could afford to pay 5,000 rials (U.S., $70). Some 23.8 percent mentioned "having one's own house" as the main reason for moving to the squatter area. Some felt that money invested in a house is not money lost: "Even if we have to move," one informant said, "I can take my house with me or sell it." Karpat's comment on property ownership supports this point. "For the squatters, beyond housing shortage and high rents, there is another compelling personal reason to move to the Gecekondu, a reason that emerges only after long talks with squatters, that is the desire to own property. True, the memory of the material hardship in the village and the economic insecurity in the city exacerbated the squatter's desire to own property."[130/]

Among other reasons for moving to the squatter settlements in Tabriz, 7.9 percent cited proximity to friends and relatives, and 5.3 percent gave proximity to work place as the motivating factor.

The findings summarized in Table 4.7 once again can be explained in terms of the series of political and socio-economic events occurring in Iranian society. As previously mentioned, the rural people migrated to the cities because of many factors, the main one being low income

Table 4.7. Reason Given by Household Head for Moving to Squatter
Settlement, Tabriz.

REASONS	NUMBER	PERCENT
High cost of housing rent in the city	64	38.0
Having own house	40	23.8
Low income	30	17.8
Proximity to friends and relatives	13	7.9
Proximity to workplace	9	5.3
Other	12	7.2
Total	168	100.0

unemployment and underemployment in their original settlements. They came to the cities to find jobs and to find a way of making a livelihood. Since most of these people were poor and unskilled, they were forced to take on the lower-paying jobs available in the tertiary sector. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of the squatters in all settlements examined cited economic factors as the reason for living in the squatter settlements. In the following chapter, the social and economic attributes of the squatters are explored.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SQUATTERS

This chapter focusses on the attributes of residents living in the squatter settlement. It treats household composition and family structure, educational and occupational achievement, employment and earnings. In addition, the chapter includes a discussion of social organization and class in the squatter settlement.

Household Composition

"Household", as used in demography, is a socio-economic unit consisting of a "group of individuals who share living quarters and their principal meals."[131] Thus, blood and marriage relationship or kinship are not necessarily the criteria of a household. In international demographic statistics two types of households are recognized: family households and institutional or non-family households. In this analysis, household refers to the family household. Sometimes the terms "family" and "household" are used with the same conotation, but family "is a different unit which must be carefully distinguished from the household."[132] A family is defined "primarily by reference to relationships which pertain to or arise from reproductive processes and which are regulated by law or by custom. The fundamental relationships are those established between a couple by marriage and that existing between a couple or parents."[133] Thus, a family includes only the members of a household who have relationship with each other

by blood or marriage. Servants, friends and others who live in the household are not a part of the family unit.

Census data of most nations are classified on the basis of household size. The employment of the mean or median size of household to measure the size and structure of the family unit in a society is rather artificial and probably not altogether accurate. Nevertheless, data from various nations indicate that in the highly urbanized and industrialized societies, in which traditional familism has been broken and the nuclear family is more usual than the joint and extended family, the size of the household is smaller than in the case of agrarian and traditional nations, in which the joint and extended families are the dominant type.

In the Iranian census, in keeping with the international standard, a household includes all persons regardless of their relationship to the household head who are living together in one dwelling unit. Bohannan defines the household as "...a group of people who live together and form a functioning domestic unit."[134/] This provides a good starting point and is adequate generally, but a more specific definition is needed that approaches the problems of living together and what forms "a functioning domestic unit."

Consequently, the term household will be used here to refer to all persons living together "under one roof" or in two or more adjacent houses, who regularly cooperate in certain domestically related ways and who share certain social and/or economic rights and obligations. This definition is meant to indicate that there is (or can be)

a distinction between the basic economic unit of production (i.e., wage earning) and consumption, and the unit of residence and socialization, without destroying the unit called a "household."[135/] The basic economic unit is usually, but not always, the nuclear family which may or may not be an independent residential unit. The household, whatever its composition, is the basic social unit. So, while the extended families are only variably characterized by joint economic activity, they are characterized by common residence, mutual aid, and moral support.

In modern urban fashion, the nuclear family rather than the extended kinship group predominates among squatter settlements. In this study nuclear families are the most frequent units among the squatter residents. They account for 79.2 percent of squatter families in Tabriz; and for 76.1 percent in Monterrey (Table 5.1). In her study of Favelados, Perlman found that 90 percent of the residents belonged to nuclear family households, leaving just 10 percent as assorted relatives or friends.[136/]

The number of resident children in nuclear households ranges from one to four, with an average of just over three per household.

Extended Households: Extended households make up 17.2 percent of all sampled households (Table 5.1). The majority of the extended units consists of two to three generations: typically a father and mother (of head or spouse) and one to three married children. Unmarried children of one or more of the affinal pairs are also present. The majority live in the same house, though sometimes partitioned, and

Table 5.1. Household Types in Squatter Settlements, Tabriz
and Monterrey.

Household Type	Tabriz		Monterrey	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Nuclear	133	79.2	239	76.1
Extended	29	17.2	30	9.5
Segmental	-	-	23	7.4
Affinal	-	-	12	3.8
Others*	6	3.6	10	3.2
Total	168	100.0	314	100.0

Source: Hopgood, op.cit.

*Note: Other type of family: Tabriz-Two wife family (1), and one
member families (5); Monterrey-Lone adult (6), Brother and
sister (1), insufficient data (3).

others live in adjoining houses. In either case, the component families share a common lot or yard.

The rest of the extended households should perhaps be dubbed "complex extended." They are joint and extended due to the addition of a collateral relative with spouse and children in one of the generations. For example, the most elaborate of these consists of a man and his wife, married sons, their wives and children; one married daughter, her husband and children; and, the man's brother, his wife and children. With the exception of the married daughter, all live in connecting "houses", each sharing at least one wall in common. The married daughter's house is just a few meters across from her parents' residence.

As noted, the separate "houses" of an extended family household may be arranged in a sort of lineal "compound." In other cases, the houses are usually arranged roughly around a common yard. In still other cases, the distinct nuclear units may occupy separate rooms of a common house. There is often very little difference here between rooms and houses. Houses do not have connecting doorways as do rooms, but have an entrance from the common yard.

Single person households in Tabriz consist of three men and two women (Table 5.1). None of these have relatives in squatter settlements, but do have relatives elsewhere in the city or outside of the city.

In extended households, each nuclear unit may operate essentially as a separate economic unit (separate incomes and separate kitchens).

This is not to say, however, that there is no reciprocity between them. In fact, there is considerable movement of various goods and services between the units in the form of labor, favors, money, child care and clothes. The amount of reciprocity and its balance varies and fluctuates depending upon current economic fortunes of the units and upon the current state of personal relations among the members.

In sum, the composition and form of any particular household is likely to change along with changing economic and social requirements, and obligations. While operating within a traditional framework, household form is indicative of varying adaptive strategies. The realities and necessities of current situations have more to do with household form than migratory status or origin.

Data on household composition and observation suggest that change in the traditional culture among migrants seems to occur, not as a sudden break with the past, but as a show of assimilation of urban influence, and adjustment of the folk culture to it. It seems that the city in the Third World, with its incipient technological, industrial, and scientific orientations, stimulates innovation and creativity and gradually increases the migrant's capacity for emotional detachment, abstract thought, and empathy and his ability to create broader ties with individual and corporate entities.[137/] The extended family and kinship relations, although surviving in squatter settlements, nevertheless have been gradually replaced by the nuclear family, which decreased in size. Karpat in his study of squatter settlements in Istanbul makes the revealing observation that "some women in Turkish

settlements stated that they wanted to settle in the city in order to
escape the traditional authority and the restricted life with the in-
laws in the village."$\underline{138/}$

Family Structure

The family is the center of social life in the squatter settle-
ments. The size of squatter families in various countries appears to
be smaller when compared with those in rural areas, though it is
larger than the average urban family (See Appendix A., Table 1). The
average number of family members in Tabriz is 5.0 compared with 5.9
in the Iranian villages. At the same time, it is larger than the urban
family, 5.0 compared with 4.4 among urban families (Table 5.2). The
average family size among squatters in Istanbul was reported to be
4.7, and in Ankara 5.5.$\underline{139/}$

Migration and life in the squatter settlements provide, through
economic hardships and self-awareness a check on population growth
which could become even more effective if the information and the means
of birth control were made more readily available to the squatter resi-
dents. As Karpat indicates among squatters in Istanbul, many of the
women blamed their parents for raising too many children to be able to
educate them properly.$\underline{140/}$ Consequently, the family size among
squatters, because of the various limiting factors mentioned earlier,
will probably remain below that in rural areas and may continue to
diminish further in the next generation. Already most families sur-
veyed in this study desired to have two to three or fewer children,
thus more nearly conforming to urban norms, rather than three to six

Table 5.2.   Number and Percent of Families by Size, Squatter
             Settlement, Tabriz.

Family Member	Number of Families	Percent	Total Number of Persons	Percent
1 member	5	3.0	5	0.6
2 members	9	5.3	18	2.0
3 members	19	11.3	57	6.6
4 members	26	15.5	104	11.8
5 members	40	23.8	200	22.7
6 members	28	16.6	168	19.0
7 members	21	12.5	147	16.7
8 members	6	3.6	48	5.4
9 members	6	3.6	54	6.2
10+	8	4.8	80	9.0
Total	168	100.0	881	100.0

children per family as was the case in rural areas. This point is supported by Perlman in her study of squatters in Rio. She mentions that Faveladas almost unanimously described a two-child family (one boy and one girl) as their ideal.$^{141/}$

Marriage and family life among most squatters, though showing definite signs of change, was still in large measure regulated by village customs. This is a reflection of the fact that 70.6 percent of squatters in the case of Tabriz; 79.9 percent in the case of Istanbul; 62 percent in the case of Monterrey and 46 percent in the case of Rio were born in and came from rural areas (Table 4.4).

The timing of marriage among the rural residents in Iran differs from that of city residents. According to Iranian constitutional law, the acceptable marital age for both sexes is above eighteen years. Since most of the squatters have rural backgrounds, they marry whenever they want, regardless of age limitations and legal constraints. It is required by law that the marriages be registered. Most of the squatters, however, do not register their marriages at the marriage bureau. Often they are not aware that it is required and rarely is that information requested from them. Government employees, on the other hand, must reveal their marital status, year of marriage, and the number of children they have at the time of employment. As most of the squatters are unskilled and work in the construction and tertiary sector, or some are self-employed like shopkeepers and street vendors, therefore, they are not required to register their marriages in official bureau centers.

Marriage is regarded as a highly desired state among squatters in Tabriz. Divorce conflicts with a basic tenet of Islam that marriage is

Table 5.3. Marital Status and Sex of Household Heads, Squatter
           Settlement, Tabriz.

Marital Status of Head / Sex of Head	Total		Married		Single	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Male	155	100.0	152	98.0	3	2.0
Female	13	100.0	11	84.6	2	15.6
Total	168	100.0	163	97.0	5	3.0

a life-long commitment. As Table 5.3 shows, from a sample of 168 household heads only five were single. The remainder, 97 percent, were married. Only one out of five single persons was divorced. The reason for the low divorce rate among squatters beyond Islamic tradition is the economic dependency and restricted role expectation of women in Iranian society. The husband is the main provider, and for this reason a woman submits to his authority. If she becomes a problem, or in any way creates tension and friction in the family, the man has the option to divorce her and thereby withdraw financial support.

The norms and customs relating to family structure prevalent among rural people are transferred by the migrants to the squatter settlements and provide yet another explanation for the low rate of divorce. Customs and traditions surrounding the family exert great pressure upon couples to remain married, since the family's reputation and its religious standing in the society are at stake. Few of the respondents in the sample who claimed to have married more than once, for example, often ended up remarrying their initial spouse in response to family and relative pressures.

Education

Some researchers of cityward migration have noted that migrants are better educated than those who stay at home and have concluded that migrants are positively selective.[142/] Balan and others have noted the same for migrants to big cities in Mexico.[143/] As Avendano reports, the potential migrants to the cities in Latin America, are better

educated than those not wishing to migrate.[144/] Karpat, in his study

of squatters in Istanbul, found that the educational level of Gece-

kondu population was definitely superior to that in the villages.[145/]

Perlman and Hopgood reached the same conclusion in their study of

squatters in Rio and Monterrey.[146/] This is also the case for squat-

ters in Tabriz. Of a total of 168 household heads, 72.6 percent were

able to read and write. Just about half of the literates claimed that

they had learned how to read and write in the village schools. Accord-

ing to Karpat, of 393 male squatters in Istanbul, 84 percent were lite-

rate. In Rio this figure was 69 percent for both males and females

(Table 5.4).

Squatters born in Tabriz (14.9 percent) are overrepresented among

those who reported being literate. They are also more prominent among

those who attained a higher grade in elementary and high school.

Nevertheless, regardless of being somewhat better educated than the

rural migrant, the natives among squatters in Tabriz are in the same

basic situation. Nearly all lack sufficient education or training to

compete in a credential-conscious society -- one in which an elementary

certificate is becoming the minimum requirement for more and more semi-

skilled and unskilled jobs. Some of Tabriz's industries, companies

and institutions do, in fact, require the certificate for janitorial,

gardening, and other unskilled positions. As Table 5.5 shows, 90.2

percent of literate heads of households were employed, while only 9.8

percent were unemployed; among illiterates, 62.2 percent held jobs

and 34.8 percent were unemployed. Since factory employment is steady

Table 5.4. Literacy Among Squatters in Tabriz, Istanbul, and Rio.

Literacy	Tabriz		Istanbul		Rio
	Head	Spouse	Male	Female	Both Sexes
	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)
Literate*	72.6	26.2	84.0	31.0	69.0
Illiterate	27.4	73.8	16.0	69.0	31.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	168		833		600

Source: Karpat, op.cit.; Perlman, op.cit.

*Note: Level of literacy including males and females: Tabriz-Maktab (21.3), Elementary (72.1), High School (6.6); Istanbul-Elementary (68.0), High School (5.0), Professional (3.0), University (1.0), Self-learning (13.0), Military (8.0), Other (2.0); Rio-No school but literate (9.0), Elementary (58.0), High School (18.0), and Other (15.0).

and offers a variety of insurance benefits, it is considered better than construction or other seasonal work, despite the occasional higher wages paid by the latter.

In the figure cited in Table 5.5 for squatters, I have not attempted to control educational attainment for age. A preliminary examination of survey data indicated that the younger the family head, usually the more educated he will be. This was expected as it is the case for Iran as a whole. Karpat's findings in study of Gecekondu also support this claim. He indicates that 17 men in the ages 16 to 35 age group were illiterates; while the number was higher -- about 45 among those 36 years of age and over.[147/] The relationship between age and education has been clearly demonstrated as well, among an all-migrant sample in Monterrey, and Cedral in Mexico.[148/]

As shown in Table 5.4, the literacy rate among the women is low-- (Tabriz, 26.2 percent; Istanbul, 31 percent). The low rate of literacy among women is the consequence of traditional discrimination and limited exposure to the outside world. The reasons for women's high rate of illiteracy would include: the tradition that girls should be kept home to remain wholesome; parents' ignorance and conservatism in accepting a low status for daughters in the family; the need for someone to take care of brothers and sisters; poverty of the family and the need to earn a living; and migration to the city.

The illiterate men and those who did not pursue studies beyond the first few years in elementary school cited the following as preventing their study: poverty of the family and the need to help

Table 5.5. Employment of Household Head, By Literacy,
Squatter Settlement, Tabriz.

Literacy	Total		Employed		Unemployed	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Literate	122	100.0	110	90.2	12	9.8
Illiterate	46	100.0	30	62.2	16	34.8
Total	168	100.0	140	83.3	28	16.7

either by working on the land or as a worker outside the village;
continuous migration; death of parents; failure of parents or them-
selves to appreciate the value of education; and discrimination in
favor of town boys in the case of those who sought admittance to
higher schools.

In general, it seems that the failure to pursue further education
was due, in addition to the economic causes, to the impractical nature
of education offered in the village. Hence the squatters lacked
interest in education while in the village. But contact with the out-
side world, and with the city in particular, made them appreciate
better the value of education, yet, poverty prevented them from study-
ing beyond grade school.

Occupational Change and Employment

Urbanization for the migrant means a spatial move from the village
to the city as well as an occupational change. Through the move to the
city, a villager's "determination of his social status shifts from its
basis in a kin group, to an occupational change."$\underline{149/}$ Indeed, the
migrants' most profound break with the village and the first major step
toward urbanization is caused by occupational change. There's no other
single field of activity that seems to affect the migrants' personal
and social life as much as occupational change. As Table 4.5 indica-
ted, the majority of migrants (71.4 in the case of Tabriz and 70.4 per-
cent in the case of Monterrey) had agricultural occupations at the time
of migration. These percentages, as will be discussed later, changed
to zero in both cases after migration (Table 5.6). Whether a watchman

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Table 5.6. Occupation Among Squatters (Household Heads, Tabriz; Males Household Heads, Monterrey; Males, Istanbul and Rio).

Categories	Tabriz Head (Percent)	Monterrey Male Family Head (Percent)	Istanbul Male (Percent)	Rio Male (Percent)
Carpet Weaving and crafts	14.9	-	6.0	-
Unskilled or semi-skilled workers	35.1	37.3	41.0	46.0
Skilled	10.1	14.5	17.0	14.0
Shopkeeper	5.9	8.2	11.0	6.0
Guilds (street vendors)	13.7	16.9	17.0	3.0
Government employee	3.6	-	-	-
Unemployed	16.7	13.9	-	17.0
Others*	-	9.2	8	14.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	168	207	370	244

Source: Hopgood, op.cit.; Karpat, op.cit.; Perlman, op.cit..   *Note: Other occupations: Monterrey-watchmen (5.3); Janitors (2.9); Trash collectors (1.0); Istanbul-Agricul-ture (3.0), Unspecified (5.0); Rio-Never worked (3.0), Domestic (4.0), White Collar (7.0).

or a factory worker, the migrant no longer performs agricultural work but a more or less specialized function requiring some skills acquired on the job, or in a special place. He keeps regular work hours, receives his pay in cash, and spends it in the market. The relatively low skills required for services as well as their willingness to take any kind of job, works to their advantage. Moreover, rural migrants in Iran and in Latin America tend to be upwardly mobile, usually through occupational mobility, rurality being no impediment to advance. The most important reason for the mobility is the amount of time spent in the city, which usually is used for the purpose of specialization and socialization.[150]

The rate of employment is very high in nearly all the squatter settlements studied as well as in some other cities in India, North Africa, and Latin America. In Tabriz, 83.3 percent and in Istanbul, 93 percent of the male squatters, were employed (Table 5.7). In Lima, Peru, a bariada had 99 percent employment among the men and in Caracas, Venezuela, 72.5 percent of the men were employed. In Delhi, India, which is known for its high rate of unemployment, 81.2 percent of the busti dwellers had jobs. Algerian bidonville dwellers had 92 to 94 percent employment. In Buenos Aires, Germani found almost no unemployment among squatters. The same high rate of employment prevailed among the squatters in Rio.[151] In almost all of the cases mentioned earlier, unemployment was generally high among women, but this must be attributed to the same social and cultural norms affecting higher class women as well. Nearly all squatters seem to harbor a fairly large

Table 5.7. Employment Status of Household Head in Tabriz, and
of Males in Istanbul, Among Squatters.

Categories	Tabriz		Istanbul	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
I. Employment Status				
Employed	140	83.3	355	93
Unemployed	28	16.7	27	7
Total	168	100.0	393	100.0
II. Status of Employed				
Permanent	87	62.2	290	79
Temporary	32	22.8	76	21
Seasonal	18	12.8	-	-
Unspecified	3	2.2	-	-
Total	140	100.0	366	100.0

Source: Karpat, op.cit.

number of small entrepreneurs, watchmen, self-employed cab drivers,
and peddlers, and so on, whose economic ambitions and innovative
spirit is enhanced by a powerful drive to achieve higher social status
through the only channel of mobility open to them, namely, economic
achievement. Consequently, the squatters' occupations show such a
great variation as to defy a meaningful classification: in Rabat, for
instance, Chene found 22 categories. Squatters may be found in any
sector of the economy that offers employment usually in lower-paying
jobs. In Tabriz, 61 percent of the employed males interviewd in this
study held jobs in construction, technical occupations, and crafts
(carpet weaving), while the rest were employed in a score of privately-
or publically-owned enterprises. Similar findings in Istanbul indi-
cates that 64 percent of the employed males held jobs in construction,
technical occupations, agriculture and trade (Table 5.6).

In Algeria and Morocco (about 74 percent employed) the squatters
work in sugar, cement, and tobacco factories, but also clean and main-
tain parks. In Delhi, India, they appear as textile workers, masons,
clerks, machanics, hawkers, petty shopkeepers, tailors and carpen-
ters.[152/] On the other hand, many squatters, even those who have
relatively high-paying jobs, seem eager to open their own businesses
and work for themselves. In fact, when the opportunity arises, many
squatters open, wherever possible, small repair and grocery shops --
in Tabriz, 5.9 percent; in Monterrey, 8.2 percent; and in Rio, 6.0
percent. (Table 5.6). In Tabriz, they often raise chickens in the
backyard and sell eggs, or engage in some other small-scale trade.

In some exceptional cases, they have devised their own sewing machines, or brought important innovations to the existing ones and become large-scale manufacturers. In Delhi, some huts were used for industrial purposes. An area holding 13,158 families had 92 such industrial establishments.

Economic and Occupational Structure

The dominant role played by economic factors in the formation, development, and eventual urban integration of the squatters has been stressed throughout this study. Occupation and occupational mobility therefore have a central place in the life and transformation of the squatters. It has been mentioned that most squatters in Tabriz and elsewhere appear to be unskilled, poverty-stricken, and unorganized laborers and hence willing to work long hours and to take jobs that the skilled and organized labor would not ordinarily accept. Consequently, as expected, employment among male squatters surveyed in Tabriz was high. As we have seen, 83.3 percent of the heads of households were employed (Table 5.7). Moreover, of the employed, 87 persons, or 62.2 percent, had permanent jobs, 22.8 percent had temporary jobs, and 12.8 held seasonal jobs (Table 5.7). Similar findings are presented by Karpat among Gecekondus in Istanbul. He indicates that of a total of 393 male respondents, 93 percent were employed. Seventy-nine percent of those employed had permanent jobs, and 21 percent had temporary jobs (Table 5.7).

At the time of the survey of the squatters in Tabriz, 16.7 percent of the family heads reported being unemployed. Reasons given for

unemployment were: lack of work or cannot find work, 57.1 percent; illness, 28.6 percent; and suspended from work, 14.3 percent. The average time of unemployment of this group was three months to an unspecified period of time. At best this is only an indication of the nature and degree of unemployment. Quitting or switching jobs because of low pay or other difficulties is common. Some jobs are of short duration and many men go for weeks between jobs.

Many of the male squatters, as mentioned earlier, are doing a different type of work in Tabriz and elsewhere, than they did before the move (Tables 4.5 and 5.6). A look at the list of occupations of squatters reveals that most are working in unskilled and semi-skilled type jobs. Among squatters unskilled or semi-skilled jobs were held by 35.1 percent in Tabriz; 37.3 percent in Monterrey; 41 percent in Istanbul, and 47 percent in Rio (Table 5.6). The jobs held include construction work, builders, drivers, waiters, servants, cooks, masons, gas station workers, gardeners, blacksmiths, watchmen, garbagemen, bus fare collectors, doormen, street cleaners, car washers, repairmen and janitors. Such jobs, although their product is invisible, are in no sense a drain on the urban economy, nor are they for the most part -- artificially created. They are jobs which needed to be done, and which generate income that recirculates throughout the economy.

In Iran carpet weaving is one of the important traditional occupation among the villagers in general and lower class people in the cities in particular. As Table 5.6 shows, 14.9 percent of household heads mentioned their job as carpet weaving type. They work for

industrial carpet buyers, who pay them either on an hourly basis for making carpets in their own home, or for making carpet within a specified time span at a set price.

Some of the occupations among squatters in Tabriz might be considered skilled, such as auto mechanics, butchers, some factory workers, welders, and electrical repairmen. Other skilled occupations include a photographer in the case of Istanbul, and musicians in the case of Monterrey. Some of the skilled persons are assistants or helpers and most have learned the trade through informal means. The percentages of skilled workers among four squatter settlements are: Tabriz, 10.1 percent; Monterrey, 14.5 percent; Istanbul, 17.0 percent; and Rio, 14 percent (Table 5.6). There are also some self-employed persons among the squatters. These are shopkeepers or store owners, and street vendors. The shops were: grocery stores, coffeehouses in the case of Monterrey, Rio, and Istanbul; teahouses in the case of Tabriz. There were also eating places, barber and vegetable shops, all of which were privately owned and operated. According to Karpat, some of the shopkeepers among squatters in Istanbul held jobs elsewhere in the city, either because the income from the store was insufficient or in order to increase their capital. All served the settlements almost exclusively.

The street vendors could also be considered as self-employed and similar to those that go in daily search of work, except that they are selling products. Some of the squatters who are street vendors have push-carts from which they sell fruit and vegetables. According to

Karpat, in Gecekondu, some street vendors have carts mounted on the fronts of bicycles and sell fruit, vegetables and other groceries.

The contention that squatters contribute little to the economy in terms of labor or consumption is not supported by the present study. We found that almost everyone is able to work (Table 5.7). They work in the service sector, as unskilled or skilled workers, as shopkeepers, government employees, and street vendors. Only very few of these squatters work within the local community, while all the others contribute their labor directly to the "external city economy." Squatters not only build the high-rise buildings in Tabriz, Monterrey, Istanbul, Rio and in some other developing countries in which so much pride resides, but they also are the ones who maintain and clean these buildings.

Squatter Earnings

It was difficult to obtain accurate information concerning the squatters' wages and annual income. There was an obstinate effort on the part of men to appear much poorer and more destitute than they actually were. The squatters felt that appearing relatively well-to-do would be held against them and possibly used as a reason for not granting them the title to the land or for forcing them to settle elsewhere. In part this reflected the traditional Islamic understanding of charity and mutual help, whereby the rich have a moral duty to assist the underprivileged in whatever way possible. The poorer one is, the heavier is the responsibility of those capable of aiding him.

Before considering the earnings of squatter family heads, it
should be noted that the income figures need to be taken in light of
the kinds of employment situations discussed above. That is, there is
considerable variability from day to day, month to month, and season
to season for some of the men. Table 5.8 summarizes the monthly
income of household heads in Tabriz. For purposes of comparison we
will divide the income of household heads into three categories: Top
third; middle third; and bottom third. The top third includes
from 18,000 to 21,000 or more rials; the middle third ranges between
9,001 to 18,000 rials; and the bottom third includes the incomes under
9,000 rials.<u>153/</u>   About 42 percent of all monthly income of household
heads falls within the bottom third; 34 percent of incomes is located
in the middle third categories; and finally seven percent is in the
top third level of income (Table 5.8). In the case of Monterrey, the
incomes are also divided into approximate thirds: from 2,001 to 2,900
pesos (top third), from 1,051 to 2,000 pesos (middle third); and
incomes between 151 to 1,050 pesos (bottom third). The greatest per-
centages of incomes in the case of Monterrey, center in the bottom
third of the income distribution (Table 5.9). In the case of Rio, as
Table 5.10 shows, 17 percent of individuals in the random sample were
unemployed, 26 percent were earning half the minimum wage or less,
and another 30 percent earned less than one minimum wage (the U.S.
equivalent of the minimum wage at the time of survey was $40 per
month). In sum, three-quarters of those gainfully employed were
receiving $40 a month or less -- a maximum of $10 per week.<u>154/</u>   This

Table 5.8. Monthly Income in Rials[*] of Household Heads,
            Squatter Settlement, Tabriz.

Amount of Income	Number of House-hold Heads	Percent of Total	Cumulative Percentage
21,000+	7	4.2	4.2
18,001 - 21,000	5	3.0	7.2
15,001 - 18,000	14	8.2	15.4
12,001 - 15,000	22	13.1	28.5
9,001 - 12,000	22	13.0	41.6
6,001 - 9,000	36	21.4	63.0
3,001 - 6,000	24	14.3	77.3
Less than 3,000	10	6.0	83.3
Nothing (unemployed)	28	16.7	100.0
Total	168	100.0	

[*]Note: Currency and exchange rates (November, 1980). The minimum
         wage in Iran is 7,000 rials.

         £1 sterling = 170.73 rials

         U.S. $1 = 72.10 rials

Table 5.9. Monthly Income in Pesos of Household Heads,
            Squatter Settlement, Monterrey.

Income (in pesos)	Number of House-hold Heads	Percent of Total	Cumulative Percentage
2,500 - 2,900	4	1.9	1.9
2,001 - 2,499	-	-	1.9
1,551 - 2,000	8	3.9	5.8
1,351 - 1,550	11	5.3	11.1
1,151 - 1,350	29	14.0	25.1
1,051 - 1,150	17	8.2	33.3
951 - 1,050*	36	17.4	50.7
841 - 950	36	17.4	68.1
751 - 850	20	9.6	77.7
651 - 750	8	3.9	81.6
551 - 650	6	2.9	84.5
451 - 550	7	3.4	87.9
351 - 450	7	3.4	91.3
251 - 350	13	6.3	97.6
151 - 250	5	2.4	100.0
Total	207	100.0	100.0

Source: Hopgood, op.cit.

*Note: The legal minimum daily wage for Monterrey of 37.20 pesos
        falls within this category. (This equalled U.S. $2.97 prior
        to the 1976 devaluation of the peso.)

Table 5.10. Individual and Household Income in Cruzeiros,[*] Squatter Settlement, Rio (N = 600).

Income Level	Percent of Individual Income	Percent of Total Household Income
Nothing	17	-
½ minimum salary or less	26	3
½-1 minimum salary	30	19
1-1½ minimum salaries	16	26
1½ - 2 minimum salaries	8	19
2 - 2½ minimum salaries	3	15
2½ - 3 minimum salaries	-	7
3 - 4 minimum salaries	1	6
4 - 5 minimum salaries	9	2
5 minimum salaries or more	-	3

Source: Perlman, op.cit.

[*]Note: One minimum salary equals 160 cruzeiros or U.S. $40.00.

group falls within the bottom third of the income distribution.
According to Karpat, the median monthly earnings of a working male
squatter in Istanbul was 612 liars and of a woman 459 liars. The
annual earnings per family was about 8,200 liars, which compares quite
favorably with the national gross per-capita income of 3,143 liars.[155/]

As expected, those who generally earn the higher incomes are
those employed in factories and/or those having contracts. Among those
with contracts, the average monthly income is 1,550 rials which falls
in the middle third of income range. Of the seven men in the highest
income category (21,000+), six were government employees, and one was
working as an operative in a factory. These persons fall within the
top third of the income distribution (Table 5.8).

It was also expected that those with more education would general-
ly earn more. Among the men with a high school degree, the monthly
income ranges from 1,450 to 1,760 rials. The men reporting the lowest
incomes, less than 3,000 rials, are some construction workers and
street vendors. Many of these people are advanced in years and are
partially supported by their children or wives. Most of the construc-
tion workers, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, factory and shop
employees fall into the middle range of income (9,001 to 18,000).
Store owners also fall into the middle range, although they were
generally more uncertain or vague about their earnings. Those who
reported have monthly earnings in the 9,000 - 13,000 rials range.

By looking at the monthly income of squatters in four countries
(Iran, Mexico, Brazil and Turkey), one may conclude that the squatters'
earnings, although below the average for established city dwellers,

were substantially above that of many of their friends and relatives left in the native villages. An important development, the increase in living standards, was technically the immediate consequence of occupational change and had profound effects on the squatters' positive attitude toward the city.

Social Organization and Class

The attachments to the village culture among squatters is strong, as is true among nearly all rural migrants everywhere. However, the village culture was not preserved intact in the squatter settlements but was constantly changing in interaction with new conditions and forces in the urban environment. The residents of the squatter settlements surveyed appear in general to be mobile and fluid, and oriented toward eventual integration in the city. They did not have rigid, permanent institutions, but rather transitional patterns of organization and leadership established to deal with problems confronting the settlement. The squatters did not have any formal, integrated and cohesive form of organization but rather several informal leadership sets that reflected both the migrants' village culture, and the problems confronting them in the city.

Three sets of conditions affect the organization and leadership of the squatters. First, there is the village background, which expresses itself in adherence to prescribed values and behavior toward friends, relatives, and elders, based on a strong sense of community and a high regard for family. Indeed, family customs, formal respect for religion, the maintenance of a concrete identification with the

village, and the priority given to the community over the individual stems from the village culture. Leaders in the community are expected to see to it that attachment to the village culture and values are respected and maintained. Indeed, among the squatters some leaders, usually religious men (Molahs) or older household heads, are ranked in the community largely according to their roles and functions as perpetuators of the village culture. Second, there is the maintenance of order and security within the settlement and its development and well-being. The men who build the best house or open a shop -- that is, those who achieve a degree of success and establish some prestige in the settlement, regardless of their village background, belong to this group of leaders. Third, there is the practical consideration connected with the relations of the settlement with the outside world, the city and the government. Thus, the first group of factors seems to be psychologically and socially useful, whereas the second and third groups of factors aim at securing the physical well-being of the squatters and at integrating it into the city and national life.

In practice, the three basic functions often overlapped as did the roles assigned to the three groups of leaders. On balance, or in case of conflict, the achievement-oriented leaders -- those who had established their authority over the squatters and could best conduct its relations with the outside world -- had the upper hand. In other words, the most successful leader was the one who could harmonize the old with the new.

The squatters' cultural and group activities revolved around the community, which in turn represented religious and social identities

and attachments stemming from a variety of kinship associations, values, and traditional socio-political institutions. The identity of the Iranian villages is assumed to be formed by his family, ethnic group, and religion. The communal identity in turn is a collective expression of the same.

Religion among the squatters must be seen as only part of a broader village communal culture. While an overwhelming majority of squatters claim to be good Muslims, many confessed that they do not perform the rituals of Islam, except perhaps fasting. Only one or two men among those interviewed claimed that their greatest ambition in life is to become a Molah (religious chief). Some religious men offer free religious education in the Koran to squatters' children but defend workers' rights and advocate the full adoption of technology, modern education, and science. Even in the squatters' villages, some religious Molahs or Imams, as they are called locally, turned into fierce advocates of democracy and urged their village mates to participate in elections and other community affairs. They also urge village children to attend Talabeh (clergy) schools. Other Molahs believed that democracy began with Ali, since he instituted welfare measures that are considered an inherent part of a democratic order. The reconciliation of these diverse attitudes may be explained partly by the fact that to be a Muslim for the villages and the squatters means first of all to be part of a community. In other words, religious affiliation is part of a broader social identification with a community, with the acceptance of communal ethics and behavioral

norms. Religion for the squatters is a concrete set of rules and regulations connected with the realities of life rather than an abstract system of ethics. The concrete expression of all these is the community.

In the eyes of squatters, any individual who accepts the supremacy of the community, as they understand it, is a member of the group. The fact that the community explains and justifies its existence by religious, scientific, or political principles has little importance as long as that justification and explanation does not tend to cause a disintegration of communal life. Scholars have defined Muslims' sense of communal attachment as deriving from the Ummat, the ideal Islamic community that includes all believers. The communal life provides the squatters with a sense of psychological security and belongingness, as well as group identity, which is his rationale for accepting the supremacy of the community. It must be stressed, however, that the concept of community among the squatters has been undergoing subtle changes under the impact of industrial and urban conditions. I believe that the idea of community, which is so much a part of modern Iranian society, and responsible for its cohesion, will continue in some form despite these changes.

The Gahvehkhaneh, or teahouse, may be regarded as a social club where problems are discussed and debated and informal decisions are reached. Actually, the teahouse should be regarded more as a communication center rather than a social institution. Though known for centuries in Iranian towns, it spread into Iranian villages rather

recently as an answer to the increased need for a place for communication, gathering, and business transactions. Every major mahaleh (district) in the squatter settlements has its own teahouse frequented usually by men from one region. There is also a major teahouse that functions as a central gathering place. Leaders and squatters meet in the teahouse usually in the evening to exchange views, settle problems, and make decisions. An outsider coming into the squatter area visits the teahouse to get information or to make political propaganda.

In the preceeding section we discussed the elements of the traditional village culture that conditioned the social organization and leadership among the squatters in Tabriz, whose main function was to maintain a village type of community in the settlement. It is worthwhile to mention that the occupation of the squatters plays an important role in determining their ranking in the settlement. The most prestigious group consists of private successful entrepreneurs. The second group is made up of industrial workers because their steady jobs, insurance benefits, and mechanical and technical skills are considered a special mark of achievement and ability. The third group consists of craftsmen and shopkeepers. The fourth group is made up of service workers, although those working for the municipality or other respectable establishment rank somewhere between industrial workers and the craftsmen.

The leaders enjoy considerable prestige among squatters and relatives coming from the same village since their achievements symbolize the potential achievements of all people from the same village. Often

a newcomer is likely to give as reference the name of a squatter leader from his own village or men with well-established occupations, although he does not know them personally. He is sure, however, that they know each other's families. In many cases the successful and professional squatter becomes a model and advisor as well as the yardstick for measuring the success of the newcomers from the same village.

In the preceeding chapter we examined the social and economic characteristics of squatters. We found that migrant squatters are better educated than those who stay at home. A majority of the squatters are doing a different type of job than they did before the move. They take jobs that skilled and organized laborers would not ordinarily accept. The rate of employment was very high among the squatters studied. We believe that the important development in employment, level of income, and increase in living standards was attributed to occupational change which had profound effects on the squatters' integration into the city life. How the squatters integrate and adjust to urban life will be discussed and explored in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS: VILLAGER TO URBANITE

This chapter focusses on the mediating role of the squatter settle-
ments in bringing the gap between village life and that of the urban
area. It considers such questions as the satisfaction of squatters
with life in the settlement, the extent to which migrants adopt urban
patterns, interactions with others outside the settlement, and aspira-
tions for the future on the part of squatter residents.

The Urbanization Process

The current urbanization in Iran, as elsewhere in the Third World,
is regarded in this study as a consequence of rural to urban migration.
In turn, migration and urbanization are considered to reflect both
general historical experiences common to all or most Third World
nations and specific developments involving only a region or a culture.

In common with other Third World countries, Iran was affected in
the nineteenth century by the development of a global market economy
and demand for agricultural commodities. These forces created a cor-
responding urban growth and profoundly altered the traditional social
structure. The specific factors affecting current urbanization in
Iran involved, first, a historical and cultural view of the city as the
highest and potentially the most "virtuous" and comfortable form of
life, and, second, the tendency to equate modernization with urbaniza-
tion. The reforms after 1963, which emphasized the development of
cities and which turned them into symbols of modernity and aspirations,
strengthened further in the public mind the correlation between

modernization and urbanization.<u>156/</u>   The fact that Iranian villagers
already had positive views toward the city certainly was a factor in
their migration and willingness to integrate themselves into city life.
If conditions permitted, probably most Iranian villagers would willing-
ly settle in the city.

In this study, the model for analyzing the urbanization of
squatters in Tabriz was not based on preconceived patterns but was
developed through empirical observation and familiarity with the way
the migrant regarded his own urbanization and how he carried it out.
Consequently, while this study accepts the survival of the village cul-
ture and modes of organization in the city, it also takes the view that
the migrant adapts himself to urban conditions and gradually changes
his physical living and cultural outlook. He does so, as Ned Levine
put it, by striking a "positive relationship between old culture con-
tacts" and "new culture contacts" and seeking familiar people whose
contacts "will help him to acculturate. At the same time, maintenance
of contacts with the village should give a reference point from which
he can compare himself."<u>157/</u>   Thus, the squatter settlement is viewed
as a bridge between village and urban life in the migrant's desire to
adapt to a new environment.

Satisfaction with Life in the Squatter Settlement

As an index of the extent of adaptation to urban life, squatter
settlement residents were asked to compare living conditions now with
those in the village prior to migration. A high proportion, 83.3 per-
cent of the respondents surveyed said that their living conditions were

very good or good as compared to the villages; 8.9 percent considered
their conditions as being fair; and 7.8 percent reported them to
be unsatisfactory. Remarkably similar responses were found by Karpat
among squatters in Istanbul (Table 6.1).

The essential factors in determining the degree of satisfaction
were the length of time in the squatter settlement (the longer the
length of time, the more satisfied, Table 6.2), and the difference
between the low standard of life in the village and the relatively
satisfactory life in the settlement. The city is a better place to
live because all living facilities devised by modern technology are
concentrated there. The expectation of a better life in the future
adds to this satisfaction. Many squatters were aware that they were
handicapped by lack of education and social status. They realize that
they started at a very low level, but they believe that they have come
a long way. A similar situation is presented by Perlman with respect
to Favelados optimism in Rio. She says: "Favelados, despite the diffi-
culties of their circumstances, show a strong sense of optimism, partly
perhaps because it is a Brazilian characteristic in general, partly per-
haps because they need it to keep going. $\underline{158/}$ (See Appendix B., Table 2).

In Tabriz, families derive their satisfaction from having steady
employment and better earnings, a house, however modest, or business of
their own. In addition, they appreciate better food and clothing,
regular work hours, schools for their children, possibilities for
amusement, medical facilities, and personal security.

A minority of the heads who were dissatisfied (7.8 percent) with
their life in the city came from richer village families. They had

Table 6.1. Living Conditions of Household Heads, Compared with
Those in Villages, Squatter Settlements, Tabriz
and Istanbul.

LABEL	Tabriz	Istanbul
	Head of Household (Percent)	Male Head of Household (Percent)
Very good	25.8	28.0
Good	57.5	61.0
Fair	8.9	6.0
Unsatisfactory	7.8	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0
N	168	370

Source: Karpat, op.cit.

Table 6.2. Time of Arrival of Household Heads in Squatter
Settlement, by Satisfaction of Tabriz.

Satisfaction of Head / Year of Migration	Total		Satisfied		Unsatisfied	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Before 1963	25	100	23	92.0	2	8.0
Between 1963-1970	85	100	75	88.2	10	11.8
Between 1971-1979	58	100	42	72.4	16	27.6
Total	168	100	140	83.3	28	16.7

moved into the city in order to achieve a better life but found them-
selves stranded in the squatter settlements. Others were dissatisfied
because they came to the city with a hope of obtaining education but
could not. A few were dissatisfied with the city because of unful-
filled romantic visions of luxury and amusement.

Adaptation to Urban Life

The squatters' adaptation to urban life can be gauged by the ex-
tent to which they adopt patterns associated with city life, such as
reading newspapers and magazines, listening to the radio, seeing
movies, and participating in some form of organized recreation. Radio
and newspaper have penetrated even the most remote villages in Iran
because of the availability of inexpensive radio sets and an efficient
national distribution of newspapers. The lack of electricity in the
squatter area, however, might be expected to render usage less fre-
quent among the squatters. In spite of the lack of electricity, the
high rate of literacy among squatters eventually leads to the high
percentage who report reading newspapers and books (Table 6.3).

More than two-thirds of all household heads interviewed possessed
radios and tuned in daily to various programs. In the case of Istan-
bul, 71 percent,and in the case of Rio, 83 percent of the squatters had
their own radios (Table 6.3). The most popular programs consist of
Mosic Azari (Azari music) which is folkloric and is understood by about
98 percent of the people living in Azarbyjan province. Only a few per-
sons said that they listened to the reading of the Koran on the radio.

Table 6.3. Use of Media and Recreational Facilities by Squatter
            Settlement Residents in Tabriz, Istanbul, and Rio.

Media and Recreational Facilities	Tabriz (Percent)	Istanbul (Percent)	Rio (Percent)
Owns a radio	63.0	71.0	83.0
Owns a television	-	-	25.0
Reads a newspaper and/ or magazine	53.0	80.0	68.0
Reads books	16.0	38.0	-
Goes to the teahouse	72.0	-	-
Goes to the cinema	47.0	64.0	58.0

Sources: Karpat, op.cit.; Perlman, op.cit.

The younger people tend to go to the movies more frequently than their elders. Women in general do not go to see movies due to the traditional belief that women should not frequent public places attended by men other than their husbands. This tradition is even safeguarded in the mosques, where the men and women must sit in separate sections. However, it is acceptable for women to accompany their husbands on the pilgrimage. A similar circumstance is presented by Karpat among squatters in Istanbul. He indicates that "women in general claimed that movie-going was not included in their upbringing."[159/]

About fifty percent of all the Tabriz squatters interviewed stated that their major form of recreation consisted of gathering in the tea house, visit to the relatives and friends, going to the parks and picnics. The rest pointed to reading, soccer, theater and card playing as the main form of recreation. Only 18 percent said that they did not engage in any form of recreational activity.

In general, recreation among squatters was not well organized, but depended on availability and each individual's initiative and imagination. The legal weekend holiday in Iran begins Thursday afternoon and lasts until Saturday morning. This free time provides the squatters with a welcome respite from work that had been conspicuously absent in village life. Many devoted their free time to improving their dwellings, others used it to visit the city, see relatives, and watch soccer games. The latter is a passionate partisan affair. The plan made for the weekend, the special clothes worn at this time, and the clusters of relaxed men in the tea houses on Friday evening shows

regular recreation had begun to become part of squatters life. In contrast, in the village, they either toiled continuously in the summer and sat idly through the winter or wandered around the country in search for work. Making a distinction between work and rest, with special time allotted for each, was an easy urban pattern to adopt.

Relations with City Dwellers

A measure of the squatters' integration into the city is suggested by contact with the people and business in the older, established sections of Tabriz. This contact and the resulting exposure to different ways of thought, manners, and speech had a profound educational impact on the newcomers. The villagers' impressions of the city during their sporadic visits before migration are formed, if they do not have urban friends and relatives, by the cold, impersonal, and often contemptuous treatment on the part of city folks. These impressions are reinforced further by the villagers' belief that some townsmen may deceive and exploit them.160/ The migrants therefore have to cope occasionally with these preconceived ideas while gradually discovering the "inner core" -- that is, the true personality, motivations, and goals of the city people and thus develop an empathy toward them.

The squatters' contact with the city and desire to know its inhabitants therefore plays a significant part in their urbanization. If the rural migrants were exclusively an extension of the village into the city or "urban villages", as many have described them, then the squatters would keep their relations with the city at a minimum and

remain relatively "closed". The attitudes of squatters in Tabriz concerning contact with the city do not support the view that the settlement is a closed community. An overwhelming majority of heads of households, namely, 85 percent, claim that they visit the central city two to five times a week. The remainder paid rare visits to the city. The frequency of the visits becomes even more striking if one considers the fact that most of the men were employed in the vicinity of the squatter settlement and not in the city proper. The central areas of Tabriz are located two to four miles from the settlement. The reasons for visits were -- in order of priority -- shopping, work, entertainment and recreation, and fulfillment of various official formalities.

The nature and scope of the squatters' relations with the city people may be a good indicator of their desire to integrate and identify themselves with the city. A relatively high percentage of squatters (45 percent) reported they had personal relations with new city acquaintances. The percentage having personal relations with relatives or old friends from the villages was 35 and 17, respectively. Only three percent indicated they had no friends and relatives. More than two-thirds of the people with whom the squatters had some relations lived either in the neighboring districts or in other areas of Tabriz. It must be stressed, however, that the urbanizing contact with city people is effective only to the extent the squatters' economic and educational situation improves.

The older squatters who have lived a long time in the city seem less attached to their relatives and show an increasing interest in new

friends. When interviewed in depth, it became evident that older squatters were becoming dissatisfied because of a series of obligations and responsibilities stemming from blood relations. It would seem that kinship relations play a dominant and useful part during the initial phase of migration and settlement, but later, the value of rational, interest-oriented relations with outsiders prevail over the need for relatives. This interest goes hand in hand with the broadening scope of squatters professional, civic activities and with their tendency to judge other men on the basis of achievement rather than kinship ties. In fact, kinship obligations and attachments diminish somewhat as health and welfare services in the city became available. For instance, most work places employing more than five people must provide insurance for employees. In summary, the squatters in Tabriz show a clear tendency toward attaching less importance to distant relatives, instead of treating all more or less as equal as was often the case in the extended household in the village.

Aspirations

Along with the contention that pessimism perpetuates poverty is the corallary that low aspirations prevent squatters from striving to improve their own lot or that of their children. The aspirations of squatters are supposedly typical of the culture of poverty in that people strive for intangible, traditional rewards rather than concrete goals that would help break the poverty syndrome. We found this to be entirely unsupported by the present study. When asked the open-ended question, "What do you want most in your life?", 60 percent of the

squatters gave mobility-related answers such as money or material pos-
sessions. The remainder of the respondents mentioned education for
themselves or their children, professional fulfillment and family well-
being. Of course, it is debatable whether the criteria are meaningful,
since even if the entire sample had given more philosophical responses,
it would not necessarily be true that squatters don't care about their
job stability or their children's education, or that they were unmoti-
vated regarding social mobility. This is well-documented by Karpat in
his study of Gecekondu in Istanbul. He indicates that the potential
for occupational mobility was high among squatters. An overwhelming
majority of squatters wanted to have, if they could, better paying jobs
or at least higher wages in order to further raise their living stand-
ards. Indeed, of a total of 382 male respondents, 86 percent said that
they wanted to have a better job than the one held at the present.[161/]
Another indicator of aspirations among squatters is given by Perlman in
Rio. She asked the following question: "What would you do if you won
in the lottery?" To this, there were unanimously future-oriented
answers, the most frequent (68 percent) concerning either buying a house
or plot of land, or improving their present dwelling.[162/]

Such are the responses of people who value modern forms of accom-
plishment, anxious to secure well-being for themselves and their
children, striving to be integrated into the society at large. As
Portes concluded in his study of squatter settlements in Santiago,
"in their totality, the aspirations of the 'squatters' do not differ
from those of the middle class."[163/]

Paradoxical as it may sound and miserably poor as they may be, the squatters are very frequently vital communities. Conditions may seem bad to outsiders but, for the migrant squatters themselves, they are usually superior to the rural squalor they left behind. The results of our study indicate that 83.3 percent in the case of Tabriz, and 89 percent in the case of Istanbul report their condition very good or good as compared to the villages. The squatters integrate into urban life by contact with the peoples and businesses in the old, established sections of the city. In the case of Tabriz, an overwhelming majority (85 percent) of household heads claimed that they visit the central city two to five times a week. This contact and the resulting exposure to different ways of thought, manners, and speech has a profound educational impact on the newcomers. We also found these people (squatters) very determined, decisive and concerned with their children's education and their family's well being. They want to have better paying jobs, occupational mobility and higher wages. That is why the squatters gradually establish a foothold in the urban economy and begin to invest in their shelters and in their communities enormous amounts of manual labour as well as small savings they may accumulate. There is an extraordinary and admirable resourcefulness in creating employment for themselves and improving the living conditions for themselves and their children.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Summary

The squatter settlements in Tabriz, as well as the three squatter areas that served as points of comparison, represent the by-product of rural to urban migration, on one hand, and a self-devised solution by the migrants to the shortage of housing in the city, on the other. They are, of course, an essential feature in the process of urbanization in the Third World. Consequently, two sets of interrelated conclusions and implications can be drawn from this study: one regarding the characteristics of the squatter settlements and their integration into the city, and the other regarding practical policies connected with low-cost housing, and other problems necessary to ameliorate the squatter problem.

The squatter settlements appear as transitional communities between the village, town, and the city. The majority of the squatters are migrants who are drawn from a relatively homogeneous cultural field, the rural areas. This fact reduces potential problems of adaptation due to ethnic or cultural differences. In the rural areas, poverty, low income, unemployment, and underemployment were the dominant factors which forced the squatters to leave their villages and come to the cities for what appeared to be opportunities for employment, higher pay, and better living conditions. In Tabriz, as well as in the other squatter settlements examined, migrants are typically preceeded in their move by relatives and/or friends. The majority of the

newcomers to Tabriz reported being preceeded by relatives and/or friends.

Household forms were also examined for processes underlying their formation and modification. It seems that in the Third World, the city with its incipient technological, industrial, and scientific orientation, stimulates innovation and creativity. As a consequence, the migrant's capacity for emotional detachment, abstract thought, empathy and his ability to create broader ties with individual and corporate entities gradually increases. Our study shows that the extended family and kinship relations, although surviving in the squatter settlements, nevertheless have been gradually replaced by the nuclear family which is decreasing in size.

Some researchers of cityward migration have noted that migrants are better educated than those who stay at home and have concluded that migrants are positively selected. Our findings support this claim. The educational level among squatters in Tabriz, Istanbul, Monterrey and Rio was markedly superior to that in the villages.

The newcomers are usually unskilled workers, who take low-paying jobs and engage in many kinds of occupations and individual enterprises. They take jobs that the skilled and organized laborers would not ordinarily accept. Consequently, as expected and as the findings show, the rate of employment among male squatters in Tabriz as well as the other three settlements examined is high. The squatters' occupations show such a great variation that they are found in any sector of the economy that offers employment. However, usually they are low-paying jobs. The type of jobs range from construction workers to

technical occupations and street vendors. The contention that squatters contribute little to the economy in terms of labor or consumption is not supported by the present study. We found that almost everyone who is able to work does work. We also examined the monthly earning of the squatters. The greatest percentages of incomes fall within the bottom third of income distribution. Those men generally earning the high incomes were those who were more educated and employed by the government and factories.

The squatters studied appear in general to be community-oriented, upwardly mobile, and oriented toward eventual integration in the city. They do not have any cohesive and integrated formal form of organization but rather several informal leaders. Among the squatters in Tabriz, some leaders, usually religious men (Molahs) or older household heads, were ranked in the community largely according to their roles and functions as perpetuators of the village culture. Those who build the best house or open a shop, regardless of their rural background, are highly respected among the squatters. In case of conflict, the achievement-oriented leaders -- those who had established their authority over the squatters and could best conduct its relations with the outside world -- have the upper hand. The teahouse is the most popular and important locus for the discussion of problems, where issues are debated and informal decisions are reached. Every major mahaleh or district in the squatter settlement has its own teahouse frequented usually by male household heads from one region. There is also a major teahouse that functions as a central gathering place.

While this study was not designed to measure changes in norms, values, and attitudes over time, the evidence suggests an erosion of village culture and modes of organization. The migrant appeared to be adapting rapidly to urban conditions and to be generally changing his cultural outlook. It has been noted that the availability of employment in the city, job mobility, and high income are instrumental in raising the squatters' living standards in the city and inducing them to adopt urban patterns of consumption. All this tends to give squatters an optimistic outlook on life and a willingness to accept the existing sociopolitical condition as well as to develop confidence that living conditions will improve even more in the future. The sense of material well-being and the psychological satisfaction derived from the existence of a relatively integrated family and community appear to have enhanced among squatters a dynamic, creative, and innovative attitude that can be maximized and perpetuated as a permanent feature of the new urban growth.

Our findings for Tabriz, which were supported by the studies compared, indicate that the majority of squatters are satisfied with their living conditions and regarded them as superior to those in the villages. The essential factor in determining the degree of satisfaction would seem to be the difference between the low standard of life in the village and the relatively satisfactory one in the settlement.

The squatters' contact with the city and the desire to know its inhabitants plays a significant part in the process of becoming urbanite. If the rural migrants were exclusively an extension of the village into the city, or urban villages, as many have described them,

then the squatters would keep their relations with the city at a minimum and remain a closed community. Our study of Tabriz does not support the view that the settlement is a closed community. An overwhelming majority of household heads claim that they visit the central city very often during the week. We found that a relatively high percentage of squatters had personal relation with new city acquaintances. It must be stressed, however, that the contact with city people is effective only if the squatters' economic and educational situation improve further.

Policy Implications

The full integration of squatters into the city appears to be the first major objective for any realistic policy maker. The success of such a policy depends on fully understanding the nature of the squatter settlements. It is obvious that the positive aspects of rural migration and the squatter settlements greatly outweigh their negative aspects. In fact, the negative view of squatter settlements seems to derive from an impressionistic, subjective attitude on the part of a small urban minority who, acting as self appointed defenders of the urban culture, have given the squatter settlements a bad name. Nevertheless, the squatters in Tabriz, and elsewhere in the world, remain an important urban problem. The policy toward the squatters in Tabriz and similar settlements throughout the world must begin by regarding them as key elements in the development process and by enhancing their role in urbanization as well as village development. Priority should be given to rural development which would be expected to retard the

migration from the countryside and prevent labor shortages in agricul-
ture.

Some basic changes in the structure of the Iranian economy seem
warranted if the economy is to develop as desired. The most helpful
course of action would be to raise the level of agricultural production
and the productivity per unit land and per unit of labor. It is
claimed that land reform in Iran has raised the income of the farmers
and consequently has slowed down the rural-urban migration.[164/] How-
ever, an observer has cast some doubt on the general effectiveness of
the agrarian reforms in the Middle East region, and particularly their
effectiveness in regard to migration in Iran.[165/]

The gap between rural and urban areas in their levels of income,
education, sanitation, and their social conditions needs to be narrowed
in order to prevent village depopulation, overurbanization and their by-
product, the squatter settlement. As far as the economic bases of
urban centers are concerned, the emphasis should be shifted from
service and commercial activities to modern industrial activities.
Diversified manufacturing and production jobs must be provided for the
migrants who are already in the city, as well as for the ever-increas-
ing number who are coming to the city. A comprehensive and coordinated
national and regional plan is required, not only to promote a high rate
of investment in urban industrial growth, but also to improve rural
life and to encourage village development programs. The Italian
regional planning experience (in Mezzogiorno), the Turkish regional
planning experiences,[166/] and the Khoozestan regional development plans

may be relevant to further individual location and regional planning decisions in Iran.

The educational system of the country must shift its emphasis from college preparatory to vocational and job training curricula. Close cooperation between the industrial sector and educational institutions will better enable the former to utilize the technical and professional skills offered by the latter.[167/]

Family planning and population control policies must be expanded in both the rural and urban areas.[168/] Iran, with a population growth rate of about 3.0, will double the number of inhabitants in less than 25 years. This rate will probably affect the rate of the general economic development and retard the per-capita income, which is already quite low.[169/]

Rural-urban migration and overurbanization are viewed as the main causes of squatter settlement. We have outlined some recommendations considered to be effective in reducing the rate of rural migration to the urban areas with the special emphasis on the big cities. The next step in our recommendations is to consider issues that relate to the squatter problem once settlements in the urban peripheries of Iran and other nations have occurred. Some of the practical steps necessary to deal with the squatter problem, are the following:

1. The establishment of a national agency to deal with squatter settlements in the framework of rural migration, urbanization, and housing.

2. The preparation of inventories concerning the type of material and construction plans,

utilized by squatters in building their dwellings.
It should be noted that the squatters have first
hand practical knowledge and experience about
the least expensive local construction materials
and about their suitability to the geographic and
climatic conditions of the area. These are, in
fact, "self-help," "low-cost housing projects"
adapted to local conditions and could provide
useful information for devising inexpensive
national housing programs.

3. The adoption of precise, simple, and
easy-to-carry-out regulations concerning property
rights, including rapid acquisition of legal
titles to the land and dwelling. Similarly,
standard legal provisions should be drawn for the
swift expropriation of lands suitable for con-
struction designated for this purpose around
urban areas. It must be stressed that the urban
expansion in Iran has caused a dramatic rise in
land values and has created a class of rich but
unproductive renters who have engaged in land
speculation and have opposed the adoption of low-
cost housing and settlement projects.

4. Once security of land tenure has been
achieved, a process of combined public and com-
munity action brings about improved housing and

urban infrastructure (i.e., water supply, sewers,
electricity, streets, pedestrian walks, and so on)
in an almost miraculous way. While infrastructure
is really the life-support system, the goods and
services distribution network of a city, most
infrastructure systems in the cities of developing
countries are characterized by extreme inequities.
Those who suffer most severely from deficiencies
in public utilities and services are generally the
families with the lowest income. As a first step
in rectifying this situation, cities in developing
countries should relax substantially the high
quality standards they have adopted (again, as a
result of the influence of the affluent few) for
water supply, drainage and sanitary sewers, con-
struction of streets, and so on. The squatters in
shantytowns and the poor of the slums have an urgent
problem of survival and cannot be expected to meet
the high standards required of engineering approach-
es. In light of the competing priorities for food,
housing, clothing, and education of children, it
would be more reasonable to consider providing a
more modest standard for the water supply and sani-
tation services to a much larger proportion of the
population. All of the elements of the urban infra-
structure could be provided much more economically

if there is some planning preceeding the invasion
by squatters. Since public lands and those of
absentee owners are most prized by the poor
migrants, and these lands will eventually be
settled on regardless of the illegality of the
action, municipal governments should attemt to
keep one step ahead of the squatters. It would
require only common sense for officials to as-
certain ahead of time the probable locations of
future spontaneous settlements. They could then
take the initiative to do some planning and pre-
pare each site for use as a new residential com-
munity. This might involve land acquisition,
some grading, subdivision into lots and, at least,
design (if not construction) of the infrastructure
that will be needed. Such practice would certainly
provide the new residents with a head start in
making a better life for themselves in the city.
In addition, it would give them a psychological
lift and the confortable feeling that they are wel-
come.

 5. Public participation and involvement of
squatters must be encouraged. The evidence indi-
cates that the phenomenon of urban squatting is a
progressive step, considering the squatters' pre-
vious condition. A high degree of planning and

cooperation goes into preparing an "invasion"
and building a new settlement overnight out of
nothing. Political action and a considerable
amount of advocacy and bargaining go into secur-
ing land tenure, public services, and employment.
It is well known by now that squatters really
care for their communities and participate
actively in their affairs. There are many
examples of peasant newcomers who learned quickly
how to join with others to promote their own and
their families' interests collectively and how
to participate in managing their community demo-
cratically with their own shelter and livelihood
as incentives. The possibilities are there for
a new squatter settlement gradually to become a
stable community, provided there is constructive
support by the public authorities. If such sup-
port is not present, if participation and involve-
ment of the poor people in the affairs of their
provisional settlements are thwarted rather than
encouraged, the squatters change rapidly from
budding communities to slums. Public authorities,
at the national and the local level, should take
advantage of this new condition in urban affairs.
The squatter settlement's social structure,

cooperative in nature, with its reliance on self-
help, mutual aid, strong family ties, self-
management, and direct action, has all the ingre-
dients of an incubator of democracy. It has the
characteristics of what can develop into a good
place for people to live: a community from where
they will later progress and participate in the
public affairs of the city at large and even in
its overall decision-making process. With public
encouragement and support for their participatory
activities, the squatters who are at the heart of
some urban problems in Iran, Latin America, Turkey,
and other developing countries are also the core of
its solution. Only their own involvement in the
task of community building offers hope of definite
and lasting improvement.

Limitations and Needed Future Research

Conclusions drawn from any study of this nature can only be as
reliable as the data input, which depends in part upon the techniques
used to guarantee that errors are not added to the basic materials.
The data sets used here are the aggregate results of a government cen-
sus, the survey conducted in summer 1979 in Tabriz, Iran, and research
done by others in different developing countries. Among the limita-
tions of this study are the following: First, as mentioned earlier,
the data obtained in the study of the squatter settlement in Tabriz

were gathered in 1979. It would have been useful to conduct follow-up
interviews in order to obtain more information about the squatter
settlement in Tabriz, especially changes that have taken place since
1979. It would have been interesting, too, to observe and study the
impact of recent revolution in Iran on the squatter settlement, and the
effect of new government policies and programs to solve the problems
facing squatters. But unfortunately, a follow-up study was not pos-
sible due to the political crisis in Iran and the risk of being unable
to return if a follow-up study was attempted. Second, current census
and survey data gathered by the government were unavailable and this
fact created problems especially in dealing with economic development
and urban growth in Iran. This problem was magnified also by unrest
and distrust on the part of the Iranian government of Iranian students
who are/were studying here in the United States. Finally, the lack of
comparability in a number of respects between the data from the study
of squatters in Tabriz with surveys conducted in different parts of
the world, constitutes a major limitation. Since the studies used
were not a part of a grand plan to survey squatter settlements, it
could not be expected that the interview questionnaires and therefore
the data, would be identical.

Many facets of internal migration, urbanization, as well as their
by-product, squatter settlements in the developing countries in gene-
ral, and Iran in particular, should be investigated. One issue of
importance, for example, is whether or not the conclusions found
on a provincial level would hold on a national level. Comparative
research on the squatter settlement pattern in different provinces of

Iran with special emphasis on large cities is needed. In fact, the recent administrative and economic decentralization efforts in Iran are shifting the migration streams toward regional growth poles, such as Khoozestan,Shiraz and especially Isfahan where a steel mill was built. Little is known about the problems and prospects of these types of planned population redistribution and their effect on the economic development of the nation.

Furthermore, the eradication and/or relocation of squatter settlement residents by the government housing project deserves substantial attention. The possibility of being expelled from their houses and communities fills most squatter settlement residents with dread. The location of the squatters puts its residents within close range of the best job markets and affords multiple opportunities for mutual support in times of unemployment or financial stress. It gives them a sense of being where the action is, which figures highly both in their motivation and in their satisfaction with urban life. With all of these benefits and advantages it would be useful to study the desire and motives of squatters themselves toward governmental housing projects/or forced relocation programs. Related to this issue are the following questions which need to be studied in future research:

    a) To what extent do squatters resist or welcome governmental efforts to relocate them in housing projects?

    b) What is the impact of eradication of dwellings and/or forced relocation upon squatter settlement residents?

c) Does relocation speed the process of urban-
ization and integration into urban life on the part
of squatters?

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 Ibid.

75/
L. Wirth. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." American Journal of Sociology, XLIV, No. 6. July, 1939, pp. 1-24.

76/
Ibid., p. 19.

77/
Ibid., p. 20.

78/
Hauser, op.cit., p. 107.

79/
Wirth, op.cit., p. 20.

80/
Hauser, op.cit., pp. 117-120.

81/
Ibid., p. 161.

82/
Ibid., p. 214.

83/
Wirth, op.cit., p. 20.

84/
Ibid., p. 21.

85/
K. Davis. Population of India and Pakistan. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1951, p. 127.

86/
Ira M. Lapindus. Middle Eastern Cities: A Symposium on Ancient, Islamic and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1969.

87/
Dan Stanislawski. "The Origin and Spread of Grid-Pattern Towns," Geographical Review, Vol. 36. 1964, pp. 105-120.

88/
Gideon Sjoberg. "The Rise and Fall of Cities: A Theoretical Perspective," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 4, September, 1963, pp. 107-120.

89/

This is well documented by scholars interested in urban development in historical perspective. See, for example, Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific American, Vol. 213, September, 1965, pp. 40-53.

90/

Brian J.L. Berry. "Cities as Systems Within Systems," Papers of the Regional Science Association, Vol. 13, 1964, pp. 147-165.

91/

Population Division, United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs, "World Urbanization Trends, 1920-1960," in Gerald Breese, ed. The City in Newly Developing Countries. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 1969, pp. 21-53.

92/

So far as it is possible to judge from the available data, there is no difference in the rate of natural increase between urban and rural areas in many less-developed countries. A possible decline in the birth rate in the cities seems to be concomitant with a decline in the death rate. In rural areas, a high birth rate is usually modified by a high death rate, because of inferior sanitation and medical facilities.

93/

For functional importance of a city in Islam, see: Xavier De Planhol, The World of Islam. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1959.

94/

Julian Bharier. "A Note on The Population of Iran, 1900-1966," Population Studies, Vol. 22. 1968, pp. 273-288.

95/

In the 1966 Census, all Shahrestan centers, regardless of size and all places of 5,000 or more inhabitants were considered as urban places. These percentages are based on this definition of "urban places."

96/

For instance, Qazi Ahmad reported similar results for India. See, Qazi Ahmad, Indian Cities: Characteristics and Correlates. University of Chicago Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 102. 1965.

97/

Julian Bharier. "The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1900-1966," Middle Eastern Studies, in press, 1970.

98/
B.D. Clark. Problems of Urban Research in Iran. I.B.G. Study Group in Urban Geography. 1967.

99/
Ibid.

100/
Malcolm, op.cit.

101/
Bharier. A Note on The Population of Iran, 1900-1966, op.cit., pp. 22, 273-9.

102/
Clark, op.cit.

103/
Albert O. Hirschman. "International and Interregional Transmission of Economic Growth, Regional Development and Planning," in John Friedman and William Alonso (eds.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. 1965, p. 624.

104/
During the 1950's the birth rate in Iran was high in both rural and urban areas. It was not until the early 1960's that the planned parenthood program came to the government's attention, and oral and I.U.D. contraceptives were introduced. On the other hand, mortality rate, particularly infant mortality, is lower in the cities where free medical assistance and better sanitation facilities are available than in the villages. As a result, natural population increase has been a significant part of urban population growth in the 1950's.

105/
This is supported by Barbara Ward who describes in almost poetic terms this worldwide economic phenomenon. See Perspectives on Squatter Settlements in Chapter 1.

106/
K.C. Zachariah. "Bombay Migration Study: A Pilot Analysis of Migration to an Asian Metropolis," Demography, Vol. 3. 1966, p. 382.

107/
Clark, op.cit.

108/
Bharier. The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1900-1966, op.cit.

109/
    Clark, op.cit.

110/
    Ibid.

111/
    Ibid.

112/
    Holiday, op.cit.

113/
    Murphey Rhoads. "The City as a Center of Change: Western Europe
    and China," A.A.G., Vol. 44. 1954, pp. 349-362.

114/
    For example, see Mangin, op.cit., pp. 68-69; also The New York
    Times, September 24, 1968, for a case in Lima, Peru.

115/
    This explains why squatter settlements are formed by people from
    one region, often related to each other, as was the case in the
    Isla Manciel settlement in Buenos Aires. See Germani, "Inquiry
    into the social effects of urbanization in working class sector of
    greater Buenos Aires," in Urbanization in Latin America, Philip
    Hauser, ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.

116/
    In Lima, Peru, squatters built 100,000 housing units, whereas the
    low-cost housing authorities were able to build only 31,000 units
    from 1958 to 1968, New York Times, September 24, 1968. In Ankara
    it had been estimated that a Gecekondu replacement project built
    only 700 units in three years, whereas the squatters built at least
    15,000 units during one year. For an example see Robert North
    Merrill, Toward a Structural Housing Policy. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
    versity Press. 1971.

117/
    Karpat, op.cit., p. 29. Also see Hopgood, op.cit., p. 37.

118/
    M.R. Chene. Divided the bidonvilles of Rabat into hygienic, anar-
    chistic, and briquette villages. The last is the best dwelling and
    costs $10 or 50 dirhams, the square meter. The briquetteville is
    regarded as a transitional settlement between the shantytowns and
    the urban districts. Chene, Marges Citadines. Thesis presented to
    E Cole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris, February, 1971, pp. 56-58,
    80.

119/
   In the case of Tabriz, no crime was reported or observed during the survey. Montagne notes that in the Algerian bidonville there was a low crime rate. R. Montagne, "La Naissance," pp. 241-44 in the Gecekondu, by Karpat. See also the works dealing with Latin America cited earlier.

120/
   Karpat, op.cit., p. 94.

121/
   Mangin, op.cit., pp. 342-343.

122/
   Brian Roberts, Organizing Strangers. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, pp. 58-63.

123/
   Douglas B. Butterworth. "A Study of Urbanization Process Among Mixtec Migrants from Tilantongo in Mexico City," in Peasants in Cities, edited by W. Mangin. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 1970. Also see Mangin, 1961, p. 213; and Roberts, 1973, pp. 77-78.

124/
   Karpat, op.cit.

125/
   Perlman, op.cit.

126/
   Hopgood, op.cit.

127/
   Perlman, op.cit.

128/
   Hopgood, op.cit. Also see Germani, 1961, p. 212.

129/
   Karpat, op.cit. and Perlman, op.cit.

130/
   Karpat, op.cit., p. 89.

131/
   United Nations, Multilingual Demography Dictionary. New York: United Nations, 1958, p. 4.

132/
Ibid., p. 5.

133/
Ibid., p. 5.

134/
Paul Bohannan. Social Anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1963, p. 86.

135/
May N. Diaz. Conservatism, Responsibility and Authority in a Mexican Town. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1966, pp. 70-75.

136/
Perlman, op.cit.

137/
On these points, see Joseph A. Kahl, "Some Social Concomitants of Industrialization and Urbanization," pp. 53-74; also Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa, South of Sahara; B.F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, eds.

138/
Karpat, op.cit., p. 40.

139/
Ibid., p. 97.

140/
Ibid.

141/
Perlman, op.cit.

142/
Stillman, Bradfield. "Selectivity in Rural-Urban Migration: Cross-Cultural Studies of Urbanization," in A. Southhall, ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1973, p. 362. Also see Roberts, op.cit., pp. 63-65.

143/
Balan, op.cit., p. 144.

144/
Sanchez Avendano. "La Migracion Interna..." in Hopgood, op.cit., pp. 104-106.

145/
    Karpat, op.cit.

146/
    Perlman, op.cit. and Hopgood, op.cit.

147/
    Karpat, op.cit.

148/
    Balan, op.cit., pp. 107-112.

149/
    H.A. Gould. "Some Preliminary Observations Concerning the Anthropology of Industrialization," p. 139. Cotler notes, for instance, that in a group of Peruvian migrants, employment in agriculture dropped from 39.5 to 1.2 percent after migration," in Mangin, op. cit., p. 120. In the case of Tabriz, and Monterrey, the migrants employment in agriculture dropped to zero point in both cases.

150/
    On occupational change see E. Wilbur Beck and S. Iutaka, "Rural-Urban Migration and Social Mobility: The Controversy in Latin America," Rural Sociology, 34, No. 3, pp. 343-355.

151/
    On employment see for example Germani, op.cit., p. 120; Medina, op. cit., pp. 57-66; and Mangin, op.cit., p. 75.

152/
    In Calcutta, the wards of Cossipore and Sinthi had 13,588 people of all ages. Of this 6,631 were classified as earners. Their occupational distribution was the following: ordinary labor, 1,471; sales, 1,397; handicrafts, 1,282; small owners-managers, 664; professionals, 216; clerks, 311; and the rest distributed among other occupations. Report on the Bustee survey in Calcutta, 1958-59, p. 11 in Karpat, op.cit.; for Rabat see Chene, Marges Citadiness, in Karpat, op.cit., pp. 118-38.

153/
    The legal minimum wage at the time of the survey was 7,000 rials which falls within the 6,001-9,000 rials category.

154/
    Perlman, op.cit.

155/
    Karpat, op.cit., p. 106.

156/
According to Allan Schnaiberg, the determining factor in moderniza-
tion is the nature of the community of early residence, that is,
acceptability of what he called modernism, rather than the time of
migration. Though this study follows Sorokin, Zimmerman, and
Sjoberg and postulates differences between urban and rural organi-
zation, it nevertheless indirectly stresses the impact of modernism
on urbanism. The criteria of modernism according to this study was
involvement in a broad information network, freedom from extended
family ties, involvement in an egalitarian conjual union, freedom
from intensive religious involvement, adaptive relation to an envi-
ronment beyond the local community, and involvement in a suprafami-
lial economic system. Schnaiberg, "Rural-Urban Residence and
Modernism," pp. 71-85.

157/
Ned Levine. "Old Culture - New Culture," in Karpat, op.cit., p.
357.

158/
Perlman, op.cit., p. 146. Also see Appendix, Personal and General
Optimism Among Favelados, Table 2.

159/
Karpat, op.cit., p. 148.

160/
Some townsmen tend to think of the villagers as being naive, igno-
rant, but also full of guile. There are stories of bridges, street-
cars, and squares in the city sold to villagers by smart townsmen.

161/
Karpat, op.cit., p. 111.

162/
Perlman, op.cit., p. 149.

163/
Alejandro Portes. "Los Grupos Urbanos Marginados," mimeographed
(June, 1969), p. 11. Quoted in The Myth of the Marginality by
Perlman, op.cit., p. 149.

164/
"Implementation of Land Reform in Iran," Iran Country Paper, World
Land Reform Conference, RU:WLR/66/44, Rome, June, 1966, p. 5.

165/
Elias H. Tuma. "Agrarian Reform and Urbanization in the Middle
East," Middle East Journal, Vol. 24, Spring, 1970, pp. 163-177.

166/

For the Turkish experiences see: Lloyd Rodwin, Nations and Cities: A Comparison of Strategies for Urban Growth. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 1970, pp. 70-106.

167/

The distribution of academic interests on the part of Iranian University students shows the imbalance between the demands and supply pattern. During the academic year of 1974-1975, 50 percent of the university students were in humanities and social sciences and only eight percent were in industrial engineering and three percent were in agricultural engineering. More than 50 percent of Iranians are engaged in agriculture, while only three percent of the educated people are preparing to give the technical help which is needed.

168/

For background of family planning program in Iran see: John K. Friesen, Country Profiles: Iran, Family Planning. New York: The Population Council and the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction, Columbia University, December, 1969.

169/

Changes in the per capita income of a nation is related to two factors: 1) the rate of national economic development, and 2) the population growth rate. Assuming that the present ten percent economic growth rate and the population growth rate of Iran continues, it will take about 12 years to double the existing per capita income, i.e., from 210 to 420.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A., Table 1.   Age Structure of the Sampled Squatter Settlement in Tabriz, 1979,
and that of Iran, 1976.

Age Groups	Population of Squatter Families,Tabriz,1979			Population of Iran*, 1976		
	Percent of Male	Percent of Female	Percent of Both Sexes	Percent of Male	Percent of Female	Percent of Both Sexes
0 - 9	38.3	39.1	38.7	31.9	31.4	31.6
10 - 19	20.6	18.0	19.4	23.5	23.4	23.5
20 - 29	11.3	18.3	14.5	13.6	15.6	14.6
30 - 39	10.6	11.1	10.9	9.6	10.3	9.9
40 - 49	11.0	6.9	9.1	9.5	8.6	9.0
50 - 59	4.9	3.1	4.0	6.5	5.6	6.1
60 and over	3.3	3.5	3.4	5.4	5.1	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Source: National Census of Iran, November, 1976.

Appendix B., Table 2. Personal and General Optimism of Squatter Settlement, Rio (N = 600).

TIME-FRAME	MUCH WORSE (Percent)	LITTLE WORSE (Percent)	ABOUT THE SAME (Percent)	LITTLE BETTER (Percent)	MUCH BETTER (Percent)
I. Past					
Q. Compared to 5 years ago, do you think life in Brazil now is:	23	18	9	31	18
Q. Compared to 5 years ago, do you think your own life is:	10	14	7	39	30
II. Future					
Q. Do you think that 5 years from now life in Brazil will be:	19	16	15	34	21
Q. Do you think that 5 years from now your own life will be:	8	8	16	33	35

Source: Perlman, op.cit.