COMPULSORY EDUCATION: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS Dissertation for-the Degree of—PILID. I ,. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY . DANIEL VARNUM cowrrs - * 1976 ' NJE'S'I‘?‘ III \I ‘;: UHF“; 31‘ y This is to certify that the thesis entitled ' COMPULSORY EDUCATION: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS presented by Daniel Varnum Collins has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degvein Secondary Education and Curricqum £2592 gm Vajor professor Date October 27, I976 0-7 639 I meme :3 IIIIIIIIII an : The obieC categories with w cohpulsory educat ticient, conditic ”Compulsc at imprecise meaI ‘Iere defined on ‘ “Istory of the at ‘Ir compulsory e ‘ert that certai 7&th left to th 37‘ schools” refe “its schooling a “Giulrehent that it‘itet list or 1:"5- “Comouls< W9“: synonmol ?- Sioh. 69/Qogzasraé/ ABSTRACT COMPULSORY EDUCATION: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS By Daniel Varnum Collins The objective for this study was to develop concepts and categories with which to assess various arguments for and against compulsory education. Such a study is a necessary, though not suf— ficient, condition for resolution of the issues involved. "Compulsory education” was shown to be a general term having an imprecise meaning in general discourse. The term and its cognates were defined on the basis of categories derived from examining the history of the adoption in the United States of various provisions for compulsory education. ”Compulsory learning“ refers to a require- ment that certain specified learning take place, with the choice of means left to the learner or his/her family. “Compulsory provision of schools" refers to a requirement that some unit of government make schooling available. ”Compulsory attendance” refers to a requirement that all children, save those exempted for one of a limited list of reasons, attend school for specified periods of time. ”Compulsory education” and ”compulsory schooling" are used as though synonymoos to refer to any or all of these sorts of com- pulsion. tategori lion provisions helmt and motion. {Argument cation as necess pry includes a informed and abl economic value t is necessary to not be protect without proper to time include tints. Argument Cation as a mm This category in to enhance the and social gain knowledge of 0}: fl“; and to gr 16X and greedy These I °l°oy and pm here used to e Daniel Varnum Collins Categories of argument in favor of various compulsory educa- tion provisions were developed from a review of the history of their development and a review of court cases having to do with compulsory education. g’Arguments based upon a police power theory conceive of edu- cation as necessary to promote the welfare of society. This cate- gory includes arguments that democracy has a particular need for informed and able citizens; that educated workers are of greater economic value to an industrialized society; that a common education is necessary to produce an egalitarian society; and that the culture must be protected against those who would be dangerous deviants without proper schooling. Those considered deviants have from time to time included the poor, immigrants, nonwhites, and nonprotes- tants. Arguments based on a par§n§_patriae theory conceive of edu- cation as a necessary protection for individual members of society. This category includes arguments that society must provide education to enhance the life chances of every citizen as a means for economic and social gain; to guard against lack of foresight or lack of knowledge of opportunities on the part of either learners or par- ;ents; and to guard against exploitation of children by employers or lax and greedy parents. These categories, together with distinctions between ide- ology and practice, intention and outcome, belief and institution, were used to examine two examples of modern intensified criticism «misery lesory education Join Holt Iayof effective stould end. His ad by the inadeq Ivan lIli schools be elimin response. Illic education for so tohave been mad not in their own IrlIiclI he believe: tion. Illich's its called in qu Illich were not lens to which he comlllllsory schoc l”ejection of thl and ethical ins is defensible r 3059 of schooh‘ A major if Robert M, H. e\iInined. Hutn Daniel Varnum Collins of compulsory education, together with examples of defenses of com- pulsory education offered in response. John Holt was shown to have presented very little in the way of effective argument for his claim that compulsory schooling should end. His arguments were demonstrated to be flawed by illogic and by the inadequate evidence he offers in support of his claims. Ivan Illich, in the course of defending his proposal that schools be eliminated totally from society, was shown to have pre- sented a critique of compulsory education which deserves some response. Illich rejects as illegitimate any police power use of education for society's purposes. He considers successful attempts to have been made to socialize persons to attitudes and behaviors not in their own best interests. He calls for an end to schooling, which he believes to be the chief means for this sort of socializa- tion. Illich's proposal that society could and should be deschooled was called in question on several counts, but the issues raised by Illich were not laid to rest by rejecting his solution to the prob- lems to which he points. Illich's critique challenges defenders of compulsory schooling to explicate their rationale. Further, his rejection of the accepted notion that socialization is inevitable and ethical insofar as the intent of those planning the socializing is defensible requires justification of both the nature and the pur- pose of schooling which has socialization as an outcome. A major example of a defense of compulsory education, that of Robert M. Hutchins, and several defenses of lesser scope were examined. Hutchins restated the historical police power argument tit hocracy, i to citizenship: H dot of making ci more citizens benefit that for failin perceived injust social benefit f society, which h Other d restatements of ..tance to demcra DOIice power an: economic gains 1 schooling be us, by responsible a‘Ifi‘luate respon IIIICII. None 5 certain assumpt “It-h the nature Two ma. basis of the a :UISOW Educat ‘Ic‘lent for re Daniel Varnum Collins that democracy, in particular, requires persons to be educated for citizenshipgr Hutchins rejects all purposes for schooling other than that of making citizens. He rejects specifically the police power arguments that schooling can reduce poverty or crime and that school- ing produces economic benefits for society. He also rejects all parens patriae arguments, holding as he does the conviction that citizens benefit most from perfected society. Hutchins was criti- cized for failing to make a convincing case, owing largely to the perceived injustice of his rejection of any valid individual or social benefit from education other than that of a more perfect society, which he describes in terms of a continued class structure. Other defenders were found to have presented more acceptable restatements of the argument that education is of critical impor- _§tance to democracy. Often such arguments were found joined to both police power and parens patriae arguments concerning social and economic gains to be expected from schooling. Arguments that schooling be usedixoregulate deviants seen no longer to be offered by responsible advocates. No defense was found which provided an adequate response in concerted fashion to the questions raised by Illich. None seems quite possible without efforts to reexamine certain assumptions and to deal with certain issues having to do with the nature and purpose of compulsory education. Two major issues requiring resolution were identified on the basis of the analysis. One is that of the appropriate limit to com- pulsory education: what degree of compulsion is necessary and suf- ficient for reaching our personal and societal objectives for caution? The s lasts for adjodic IitIal participat rights of parents related in carpi of control and d If tensions and i options for indi No solut mpulsory educa categories and e in this di sserta ing of decisions rather than thro Daniel Varnum Collins education? The second is that of defining and developing a workable basis for adjudicating issues of control of education and of indi- vidual participation in schooling. The interests of society, the rights of parents, and the rights claimed for children are inter- related in complex fashion. An alternative to prejudging of issues of control and decision—making would make possible both a lessening of tensions and improved chances for widening educational and other options for individuals. No solutions to these, or other issues having to do with compulsory education, were presented. The claim is made that the categories and examples of historical and logical analysis presented in this dissertation, if attended to, should contribute to the mak- ing of decisions regarding compulsory education on a reasoned basis rather than through inertia, economics, or politics as usual. COHPUl in part Departmen COMPULSORY EDUCATION: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS By Daniel Varnum Collins A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum l976 hto ri ht by 5uIIctgwunun coums l976 © Copyright by DANIEL VARNUM COLLINS 1976 I once saw a l pages. Iunderstand t restrict such a list v should be thanked. Al here know who you are ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I once saw a list of acknowledgments which ran to three full pages. I understand that person's thinking. I do not know how to restrict such a list without leaving out somewhere a person who should be thanked. All of you without whom I could not have gotten here know who you are: thank you all most sincerely. hour 1. AN OVERVIEW The Purpose Limitations . A REVIEW OF I IN THE UNITEI Introductic The Develop Compulson CompUISOI Compulsoc I . H A REVIEN or I coucncrou < . some HISTORII < . oomn HOLT'S The Nature The Nature The Nature ~ IVAN ILLICH' - THE ARGUMENT 0F COMPULSQR VVI. SUMMARY AND VBUUGRAPHY . Chapter I. II. III. VI. VII. VIII. TABLE OF CONTENTS AN OVERVIEW The Purpose and Plan of the Study Limitations of the Study . . A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES Introduction . The Development of Compulsory Education Compulsory Learning . . Compulsory Provision of Schools Compulsory Attendance . . . A REVIEW OF LEGAL DOCTRINES RELATING TO COMPULSORY EDUCATION . SOME HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS . JOHN HOLT'S ARGUMENTS The Nature of Human Beings . The Nature of Schools The Nature of Compulsion IVAN ILLICH'S PROPOSALS THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY SOME MODERN DEFENDERS 0F COMPULSORY EDUCATION . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY . 90 I30 T58 163 I84 195 225 25l 265 Compulsory ed lot everyone quite ag tion' is an ambiguous learning on the part ans, Chinese, native excluded, as were fen vision of schools; er of the term recognize follows to clarify tl consistent use of "cc compulsion and of “o vhena limited meaniI others will be allow But whatever existence of public With the need for ta resistance necessary with an acceptable s thing that up. The that every child ext CHAPTER I AN OVERVIEW Compulsory education is as American as apple pie or violence. Not everyone quite agrees on what the term means: "compulsory educa- tion" is an ambiguous term that embraces the concepts of required learning on the part of specified members of society (blacks, Indi- ans, Chinese, native Americans, for instance, were almost always excluded, as were females in some early legislation); required pro— vision of schools; and required attendance at them. Not all users of the term recognize the ambiguity. An effort will be made in what follows to clarify the term and related ones. In the meantime, a consistent use of ”compulsory education" to include any level of compulsion and of ”compulsory learning” or "compulsory attendance" when a limited meaning is intended will be attempted. Uses by others will be allowed to remain ambiguous. But whatever they mean by it, most Americans accept the existence of public schools and compulsory attendance at them, along with the need for taxes to support them, with only the amount of resistance necessary to keep the tax bill as low as is consonant with an acceptable school program. New York City even seems to be glVing that up. There is even less resistance to the requirement that every child except those with certain specific disabilities I attend some school. l assist all children It are in school .2 spent at least one 3" IIIeprlic's acceptaI But while nol apple pie as yet, vie pulsory education it: education the chink in the teach children tl base their educa‘ Communist societ they try to teacl ence, and their I inculcating this Everett Reimer claim that "universal educ ible."6 Carl Bereit out of keeping with calls compulsory sch malfunction . . . ." for "miseducation, s to the national 'nee Idt‘ wasp“) Each ( delivering himself c the claim that com cases, the schools I nearly identical de attend some school, public or private:l Currently, some 99.2 per- cent of all children in the United States between the ages of 6 and 13 are in school.2 In the mid-19605, 94 percent of all students spent at least one year in high school, and 82 percent graduated.3 The public's acceptance of compulsory education seems clear. But while nobody seems to have taken up the cudgels against apple pie as yet, violence has come to have its detractors and com- pulsory education its critics. Thomas Szasz calls compulsory education the chink in the armor of capitalistsocieties: they try to teach children the values of contract and initiative, but base their eduCational system on compulsion and conformity. Communist societies suffer from no such inconsistency: they try to teach children the values of command and obedi- ence, and their educatignal system is consistent with inculcating this ethic. Everett Reimer claims that ”school is dead."5 Ivan Illich argues that ”universal education through compulsory schooling is imposs- ible.”6 Carl Bereiter contends that ”public education is grossly ”7 out of keeping with modern concepts of freedom. Robert McClintock calls compulsory schooling ”an outworn system that is doomed to ”8 malfunction . . . . Paul Goodman argues that schools are places for ”miseducation, socializing to the national norms and regimenting 9 John Holt says ”schools are bad places to the national ‘needs.‘” for kids.”10 Each critic, with the exception of Szasz, who is delivering himself of an aphorism, presents an argument supporting the claim that compulsory attendance should be ended and, in most cases, the schools with it. They are joined by a veritable host of rmarly identical detractors of the schools with a standard taletotell I taught __ veal school in Anywher or 'fabulous" or or IIis incompatit Itried to fight that didn't mess sol ("ill pIe together to s righteous but the and an identical cont and must be done away Much of this darkmutterings about vhichever is one's cl escalation of educati total impressions of Education in has always been a ma‘ schools had been est; there was at a certa the institutional ex Vorld liar II and the been no lack of crit seemed to have as th or practices. It ha tinue to exist as a assigned responsibil lems, and that some he basic American I ”eat of democracy aI 3 I taught ____years (your choice of "l“ or "2") at Conformity School in Anywhereville. The kids were ("great“ or "fabulous" or ”cool") but the System ("sucks" or "is incompatible with learning" or "oppresses everyone"). I tried to fight it by teaching what's important in a way that didn't mess them up, but I couldn't change the System so I (“quit” or "got fired") and got some good peo- ple together to start my own school, which is doing what's righteous but the money hassle is beating us down. and an identical conclusion from it: public schools are no damn good and must be done away with. Much of this could be dismissed, with humorous deprecation or dark mutterings about the enemies of democracy and the public schools, whichever is one's characteristic style, were there not a serious escalation of educational criticism to be found along with the anec- dotal impressions of all the disillusioned sometime teachers. Education in the United States, and in the Colonies before, has always been a matter involving contention. After the common schools had been established, even during those periods in which there was at a certain level general consensus on both ideology and the institutional expressions of it--the period between the end of World War II and the ascension of Sputnik, for instance—-there has been no lack of criticisms of the schools. But such criticisms seemed to have as their objective some reforming of school purposes or practices. It has seemed generally agreed that schools would con- tinue to exist as a chief means of educating, that they would be assigned responsibility for attacking a wide range of social prob- lems, and that some form of compulsory attendance would be necessary. The basic American belief in education as the indispensable instru- ment of democracy and popular sovereignty was in some sense the I. mifing justificax pm knowledge that advantages; if educa1 chief product the dev and duties of citizeI of dexocratic governI its individual recip‘ intended to perfect v asinister attack. debate which eventua part of the American help the schools rea feared; it is rather its claims and the r only those whose par have responded with whether or not any i action. The sort of exemplified in the c familiar bounds to I implicit in the thil their accustomed or of attack would see assumptions in rel a examination of the fir _ Wei 4 underlying justification for reformist criticism. If education pro— duces knowledge that gives its possessors political and social advantages; if education is a moral influence which has as its chief product the democrat whose proper exercise of the privileges and duties of citizenship is the crucial element in the continuation of democratic government; if education is an economic asset to both its individual recipient and society as a whole; then criticism intended to perfect education is more nearly a moral obligation than a sinister attack. Each of these claims was made as part of the debate which eventuated in compulsory education; each has become part of the American ideology about schools. Criticism intended to help the schools reach such urgent and noble goals is not to be feared; it is rather to be accepted and dealt with on the basis of its claims and the reasons offered in support of them. Ordinarily, only those whose particular roles or beliefs were under direct attack have responded with much heat. Such criticism is an accepted thing, whether or not any particular proposed change is deemed worthy of action. The sort of criticism offered by the new wave of critics exemplified in the opening paragraphs seems to go beyond these familiar bounds to challenge many of the assumptions of the ideology implicit in the thinking of both champions of the public school and their accustomed critics. An appropriate response to this new sort of attack would seem, accordingly, to require an explication of those assumptions in relation to the claims being made against them and an examination of the arguments and evidence presented in the challenge ' Mtflidlrd beliefs a fling. has not been ling those prone to hatter, chiefly amo chins. The National tiontypifies the lat reporta reconomendatn thecritics' language institutions,"11 the to compulsory schooli phetic in their crit" the efforts of their my be a useful exera taken seriously."12 ously the challenge ' reasons for such a di tance of an isSue su are disturbed by it sheer quantity of an it"! persons are dis ence from the fact can be argued that claims that compuls A factual c sideration when its i 5 to standard beliefs about schools. Such response, as a general thing, has not been forthcoming. One category of reaction, chiefly among those prone to reject American culture, has been uncritical acceptance of the position that school is dead, or must be executed. Another, chiefly among educators, is uncritical rejection of the claims. The National Commission for the Reform of Secondary Educa- tiontypifies the latter response. Though adopting in their final report a recommendation concerning compulsory attendance that uses ' . the critics' language in referring, for instance, to "custodial institutions,"11 the Commission rejects the very thought of an end to compulsory schooling. Goodman and the others may have been pro- phetic in their criticisms, but "the Commission sees no virtue in the efforts of their disciples to eliminate schools. 'Deschooling' may be a useful exercise in scholarly discourse, but it cannot be taken seriously.“12 In this dissertation, I attempt to take seri- ously the challenge to compulsory education. There are a variety of reasons for such a decision. A psychological canon for the impor— tance of an issue suggests that the fact that a number of persons are disturbed by it warrants consideration of the matter. The sheer quantity of anti-compulsory education writing indicates that many persons are disturbed enough to express their beliefs; by infer- ence from the fact that publishing such books seems profitable, it can be argued that many more are concerned enough to attend to the claims that compulsory education is dysfunctional. A factual canon suggests that an issue is worthy of con- sideration when its resolution is capable of making a radical nfthe potential for Ihy so many consider these challenges to c Alogical can resolution logically rill create new issux original issue. The education seems such accurate that compul take in the first pl attempt to reform an sion that the more no lent purposes to th compulsory public 5 All three c versy over compul so claims by critics a seems significant. examine representat effort to develop a comPulsory educati o _.._—.v __. 6 difference in the way things are. The effects of a decision to do away with either compulsory provision of schools or compulsory attendance would reach to nearly every institution in every corner of the land. The consequences would be so pervasive as to be almost beyond imagination in their effects upon our culture. The enormity of the potential for change may be, in fact, an important reason why so many consider it impractical to spend any effort considering these challenges to compulsory education. A logical canon suggests that an issue is important when its resolution logically will affect the resolution of other issues or will create new issues in consequence of the treatment given the original issue. The question of the value to society of compulsory education seems such a logically—prior issue. Should the claims be accurate that compulsory education is either outmoded or was a mis- take in the first place, it would be a serious error to continue to attempt to reform and renovate the public schools, or else an admis- sion that the more virulent critics are correct in ascribing malevo— lent purposes to the framers and maintainers of the free, universal, compulsory public schools of the United States. All three canons seem to be met in the case of the contro- versy over compulsory education. An analysis of claims and counter- claims by critics and defenders of compulsory education therefore seems significant. The purpose of this study is to identify and examine representative positions on both sides of the issue in the effort to develop an understanding of the current controversy over compulsory education that would forward debate on the issues. _._‘J D In this dis: claims that became c tion during the deba policy. These claim by opponents of com meanings, in terms c the objectives in vi priate? hihat form c stances under which arguments for adopti A brief revi education will press stances which influe decisions made atter attempt to clarify i interchangeable. "( may, to include all earliest requiremen' describe a situatio that is required is attained, with the "Compulsory the second stage 01 Which the authority 4 The Purpose and Plan of the Study In this dissertation, I will attempt to identify those claims that became central arguments in favor of compulsory educa- tion during the debates over adopting its various phases as public policy. These claims, together with some of the counter-claims made by opponents of compulsory education, will be examined as to their meanings, in terms of the assumptions underlying each and in terms of the objectives in view. What beliefs made these claims seem appro- priate? What form did the arguments take? What were the circum- stances under which these claims were accepted as compelling arguments for adopting compulsory education laws? A brief review of the history of the adoption of compulsory education will present some of the arguments, claims, and circum- stances which influenced American beliefs about education and the decisions made attendant upon those beliefs. That review will attempt to clarify the various terms often used as though they were interchangeable. ”Compulsory education” will be used in the broadest ll way, to include all the others. "Compulsory learning, which was the earliest requirement, in Massachusetts Bay Colony, will be used to describe a situation in which regulation of education is minimal: what is required is that certain skills or knowledge is to be attained, with the means up to the learner and his/her family. ”Compulsory provision of schools” will be used to describe the second stage of the development of compulsory education, that in which the authority of the state to require communities to establish A and SWAN)"t “M15 " “mum graceless ‘ avoiding the emotive oppose the notion a1 'oomulsory schoolin implied by "cmrulSC rent of “the common seems as though two The one is a grim Tl1 unfeeling functiona each child into a c of alchemy, where ’5 common experiences . Amrica into citize of democratic self-S prosperous, and equa users of "compulsorj totional experience These latter often n cism, but dispute t former consider the contemptuous of the common school. A m motive content and The steps t eulsory attendance g 8 and support schools at public expense was confirmed. The term is admittedly graceless but it has the virtues of being precise and of avoiding the emotive content of the more usual terms. Those who oppose the notion almost always refer to ”compulsory education" or "compulsory schooling" and understand something pejorative to be implied by "compulsory.” Those who favor it describe the develop- ment of "the common school" or "universal schooling." It sometimes seems as though two different institutions are under discussion. The one is a grim place to which suffering children are herded by unfeeling functionaries in the service of a state determined to mold each child into a cog in the social machinery. The other is a place of alchemy, where the philosopher's stone of knowledge, coupled with common'experiences, will metamorphose the diverse children of America into citizens capable of carrying out the responsibilities of democratic self—governance in such fashion that all will be free, prosperous, and equal. Part of the difference is in the focus; the users of “compulsory schooling" are often talking of the actual insti- tutional experience and the users of ”common school," of the idea. These latter often may concede the correctness of much of the criti- cism, but dispute the significance which is claimed for it. The former consider themselves to be ”realistic” and are impatient or contemptuous of the "idealistic"_impracticality of defenders of the common school. A major objective of this analysis is to expose the emotive content and seek the logic of the contending points of view. The steps between compulsory provision of schools and com- pulsory attendance will be touched on only lightly, though the increasing use of 5 II, W0“ ’ teac life for a climate i ace laws as merely use of schools. 'Compulsory new term referring t (the exceptions have feaales, nonwhites, and some who were ex family need) in some ing“ will be used as education," though it instead to "compulso AI apotential for miso pointed out in an ad ation in 1972”: cc means to an end, som tobe present will b toward the educatior Sometimes, it is trc one's credulity. 0r compulsory education conpulsory attendant c-'0ubtful that he wa ‘Ollowing: "the fac 4 increasing use of state power to regulate such matters as curricu- lum, textbooks, teacher training and certification, and financing made for a climate in which it was easy to accept compulsory attend- ance laws as merely climaxing the effort to set in order society's use of schools. “Compulsory attendance" will be used as a comparatively nar- row term referring to laws requiring the presence of most children (the exceptions have from time to time and place to place included females, nonwhites, those Who were ill or deemed mentally deficient, and some who were excused to work or otherwise serve some compelling family need) in some school, public or private. "Compulsory school- ing" will be used as though it were interchangeable with ”compulsory education? though it is sometimes used as though it were parallel instead to "compulsory attendance" in ordinary discourse. There is a potential for misconstruing what is meant, as Gerald Reagan has pointed out in an address to the American Educational Studies Associ— ation in 197213: compulsory attendance suggests to most people a means to an end, some educational objective. Those who are compelled to be present will benefit because they will be enabled to move toward the educational goals envisioned as meaningful by society. Sometimes, it is true, the benefits claimed for attendance stretch one's credulity. One defender listed among the "reasons to support compulsory education" (he means, on the basis of internal evidence, compulsory attendance, but he uses the terms in a way that makes it doubtful that he was aware that a distinction can be made) the following: "the fact that the subconscious mind stores impressions: arebellious cnna, m (inattentive, may be 1 sdsement stimuli wi 'feediack of knowledg hootechniques and f Reasoning of shot Reagan describe attendance becomes a those of learning. care, raising the ag viding employment f0 education‘s-all c misery attendance 1 objectives are reach are schools on the w Some argumen arguments rather ove further attendance b compulsory attendanc their arguments to c that there are indec learn and that compi Such an outcome. M. Seem to take the fo given number of yea certain essentials W ‘ . _ , )0 i a rebellious child, present under compulsion, although bored and inattentive, may be learning without knowing itJ' (It appears that subsequent stimuli will call forth a response which amounts to a "feedback of knowledge.") And, "even an Unwilling pupil comes to 'know techniques and tools of the learning process."14 Reasoning of this sort comes close to being an argument for whatheagan-described as the other possibility, that compulsory attendance becomes an end in itself, serving purposes other than those of learning. Such purposes, said Reagan, might include day care, raising the age at which persons enter the job market, and pro- viding employment for teachers, administrators, and professors of 15--all commendable, of course, but if the reasons for com- educatibn pulsory attendance laws are only these, the institution by which such objectives are reached could be much more pleasant for its users than are schools on the whole. Some arguments over compulsory attendance turn out to be arguments rather over the age at which the compulsion should end and further attendance be voluntary. A number of persons critical of compulsory attendance at the secondary level are unwilling to extend their arguments to elementary school, implying (sometimes declaring) that there are indeed some things which it is expedient for all to learn and that compulsory attendance is the efficient way to assure such an outcome. Many arguments on behalf of compulsory attendance seem to take the form of a defense of the practice of requiring a given number of years of schooling as justified by a need to teach 16 certain essentials to all. A discussio : will follow. The p so! of the claims, posed rights of chil education, and to c 'police power“ and ' compulsory educatio in general are thos general welfare. E stressed the benefi meet the state's ob citizens, to do for ests. Lately, oppox tion provisions, ha state in the exerci Clarity about the t cise analysis of cl The effort uhen applied to the ers of compulsory e sible reasoning the demonstration will Positions regarding of each. The point schools are nei the ll A discussion of legal doctrines and cases relating to them will follow. The purpose is to provide background for understanding some of the claims, in particular those raising the issue of the sup- posed rights of children, parents, and society as a whole vis-a-vis education, and to contribute to the analysis the broad concepts of "police power" and "paren§_patriae.“ Many claims of a sort favoring 'compulsory education appeal to the police powers of the state, which in general are those necessary to keep the peace and promote the general welfare. Early proponents of compulsory education who stressed the benefits to individuals of learning saw it as helping meet the state's obligations as paren§_patriae, the father of its citizens, to do for them those things conducive to their best inter- ests. Lately, opponents, especially of particular compulsory educa- tion provisions, have been asserting a claim to protection by the state in the exercise of their rights on the basis of paren§_patriae. Clarity about the two concepts enables understanding and a more pre- cise analysis of claims. The effort will be made to demonstrate that this analysis, when applied to the arguments presented by current critics or defend- ers of compulsory education, clarifies the discussion and makes pos— sible reasoning that is more logical concerning the issues. The demonstration will take the form of an examination of representative positions regarding compulsory education and the claims made on behalf of each. The point of view implicit in this study is that the public schools are neither a plot nor an accident. Rather they are the result of attempts titular beliefs and sins that have pro mvlsory educatio isogesis, the readi point of view. The reading of history of both the beliefs the day. An argume must provide free 5 ferent set of impli education was pre-p adequate for the den today, when New Yorl garbage-haulers and parallel to the rear outrage of the Ford at the extremely loi ingly called "free. A useful di (ling a particular or arrangement that things, a set of mo ibout what is or 0 viduals are idios y held in different 12 result of attempts to solve particular problems on the basis of par- ticular beliefs and circumstances. Any synoptic view of the deci— sions that have produced our present system of free, universal, compulsory education in more-or-Tess common schools runs the risk of isogesis, the reading into the events one interprets of one's own point of view. The effort to avoid, insofar as possible, such mis- reading of history requires, among other things, a careful examination of both the beliefs and the practices in relation to the culture of i the day. (An argument, for instance, to the effect that a community must provide free secondary education for all carried quite a dif- ferent set of implications in a day in which nearly all secondary education was pre—professional and a grammar school education was adequate for the demands of citizenship than such an argument would today, when New York City requires a high school diploma for its garbage-haulers and calls them "sanitation men." A more precise parallel to the reactions of some to those proposals would be the outrage of the Ford administration and its supporters across the land at the extremely low tuition which the City University has mislead— ingly called ”free.” A useful distinction may be made between the ideology under- lying a particular educational decision and the institution, practice, or arrangement that resulted. An ideology is a way of looking at things, a set of more-or-less logically related ideas and beliefs about what is or ought to be. Particular ideologies held by indi- viduals are idiosyncratic in character, made up of beliefs that are held in different ways and with different strengths. It is usually , anideology that is L bepodalic schools, canoe, or whatever. of gromds--or non- beliefs--either as with greater or les ally. Beliefs may There may be no sys beliefs held by an other beliefs also Thus person for differing reaso It is therefore so lying the making of particular choice 0 ology about schooli of which have subst the imprecision of suggesting just suc gent, beliefs and ‘ does seem possible relating to educat‘ rhich a great many Particular i deolog general ideology, dies themselves, h 13 an ideology that is on display when someone says llI belieVe in . . ." the public schools, or integrated marriage, or the President's inno- cence, or whatever. A belief may be held evidentially--on the basis of grounds-—or non—evidentially; in a quasi-logical relation to other beliefs—-either as a primary belief or derived from a primary belief; with greater or lesser psychological strength, centrally or peripher- ally. Beliefs may be clustered, or held independently of one another. There may be no systematic relationship among beliefs: some of the beliefs held by an individual may be contrary or contradictory to other beliefs also held by that person.17 Thus persons sharing, in a general way, an ideology may do so for differing reasons and with differing intensities of conviction. It is therefore somewhat misleading to speak of ”the” ideology under- lying the making of a decision. Many ideologies may coincide in a particular choice of action. There likely is no one American ide- ology about schooling; rather there are many such ideologies, several of which have substantial areas of agreement with one another. Once the imprecision of the term is clear, though, it becomes useful for suggesting just such a congeries of partly convergent, partly diver- gent, beliefs and ideas. In such a loose frame of reference, it does seem possible to speak meaningfully of an American ideology relating to education, one that includes certain generalizations to which a great many Americans would give assent as part of their own Particular ideologies. Several of the components of such an extremely general ideology, many of them capable of being described as ideolo— gies themselves, have emerged from the arguments and claims offered llmermy in on right and also trated by the Ameri is a feature of ou considerable elabo acomponent of the tools for upward Ideologies often expressed in This is one distin (although ordinary ment as a "philosoy get the first puncl tends to be abstrar possess only some, which an ideologic in assessing the m cerns, some noble the participants i come down on the s which have been of to be. Some have discipline those w l4 on behalf of the several steps in compulsory education. An idea may come to have an importance for moving people that cannot be eaccounted for merely by describing its origin. The way in which a statement can both be an ideology in its own right and also be part of a more general ideology can be illus- trated by the American belief that opportunity for upward mobility is a feature of our culture. This is itself an ideology capable of considerable elaboration, as in the Horatio Alger mythos. It is also a component of the general ideology about schools: one of the best tools for upward mobility is believed to be education. Ideologies of the imprecise sort being described here are often expressed in terms of situations rather than in abstract terms. This is one distinction between an ideology and a philosophy (although ordinary discourse often identifies an ideological state- ment as a ”philosophy,” as in ”my philosophy is 'if you gotta fight, get the first punch in,'” confided along the bar-top): a philosophy tends to be abstract, logical, and self—consistent. An ideology may possess only some, or none, of these qualities. The situation to which an ideological assertion is addressed is therefore of importance in assessing the meaning of the ideology. But to examine the con- cerns, some noble and some meanly self—serving, which have motivated the participants in the debate over compulsory education is not to come down on the side of one or another of the partial understandings which have been offered as accounts of how compulsory education came to be. Some have explained it as an invention of conservatives to discipline those who might become unruly if given freedom without restraint--the sori expressed in T_hg__Rg tion as the cannon grimly, as a sop th his discontent over appears that Welter ideology of the 0rd tion quite apart f the education of p reasons.18 The term “ the schools themse of our beliefs con ing, administrative various legal and s are defined. More particular ideolog: particular educatii the criticism of t based upon an ideo isms of the overri can ideology. Rat institution, in an institutional arr: cized the ideol 09; as Reagan has 901' 15 restraint--the sort of attitude toward democracy which Plato expressed in The Republic. Others have described compulsory educa- tion as the common man's hope for economic betterment or, more grimly, as a sop thrown to that same common man to distract him from his discontent over basic social issUes. Whatever the outcomes, it appears that Welter is more nearly correct when he insists that the ideology of the ordinary American has seen possibilities in educa- tion quite apart from special interests, that we have insisted upon the education of people for expansive rather than restrictive reasons.18 The term "institution" as it is being used here focuses on the schools themselves, the details of their putting into practice of our beliefs concerning education. This includes curricula, staff- ing, administrative arrangements, physical arrangements, and the various legal and social frameworks by which roles and expectations are defined. More than one institutional arrangement can express a particular ideology, which is one source of frequent criticism of particular educational institutions and practices. Thus, most of the criticism of the schools, until fairly recently, while it was based upon an ideological position, has not challenged the general— isms of the overriding ideology being described here as "the" Ameri— can ideology. Rather, such criticism has tended to focus on the institution, in an effort to reform or restructure some portion of institutional arrangements. The more radical critics have criti- cized the ideology as well as the institution, but in many cases, as Reagan has pointed out, their criticism amounts to little more tiara call for res: reflect some feeling and or attendance I supposed educational One value or institution is that being claimed in a | the institution the sucha function is evidence offered in among the less prec offer evidence to 5 school, and then to ing has sufficient attendance is at be rapid seem to susta represents ineffect The distinc gesting that not er relationship to thl expression, helps between intention any given decisior tially realized. The achievement 0' agiven ideology l 16 than a call for restructuring the institutional arrangements to reflect some feeling that the school-leaving age ought to be low-7 ered or attendance made voluntary or the like while retaining the supposed educational goals of schooling.19 One value of making the distinction between ideology and institution is that it allows a clarification of what is actually being claimed in a particular instance-~is it the functioning of the institution that is challenged or is it the belief that such and such a function is of value? It further allows an assessment of the evidence offered in support of a particular claim. A common move among the less precise of the critics of compulsory attendance is to - offer evidence to show that children in situation n_do not like school, and then to claim that the ideology that holds that school- ing has sufficient value for children to warrant compelling their attendance is at best mistaken or at worst malicious. Such evidence would seem to sustain little more than a claim that situation n represents ineffective or undesirable institutional arrangements.20 The distinction between ideology and institution, by sug- gesting that not everything in theinstitution has a one-for-one relationship to the beliefs of which the institution is partial expression, helps show why another distinction is of value, that between intention and achievement. Some of the intended outcomes of any given decision may never materialize; others may be only par— tially realized. Outcomes that were not intended may be discovered. The achievement of a particular institutional arrangement expressing a given ideology may thus turn out to be quite different from what distinctions betwee and outcome enables tion, intention, or Reagan's di Heshoued that inex schools could lead be ended when some sory attendance be arrangements are po: 1. learninl means 0 outcome 2. attenda that ed attenda 3. both at which i the Uni 4. neither no educ is vali “all critics seem t varied, and then t these alternatives 9 18m to "cannot wo was intended to happen. The source of unintended outcomes may be a defect in either ideology or institution or some aspect of circum- stances not adequately considered or dealt with. The making of distinctions between ideology and institution and between intention and outcome enables a choice of corrective actions more likely to be effective than if it is assumed that all outcomes are intended, or that any other one-to-one relationship between ideology, institu- tion, intention, or achievement exists. Reagan's discussion is particularly cogent in this regard. He showed that inexact expression of what was objected to in the schools could lead to an argument that compulsory schooling should be ended when some other step might be more effective. If compul- sory attendance be distinguished from compulsory learning, then four arrangements are possible: 1. learning might be required but not attendance--any means of learning capable of producing the desired outcomes would be permissible; 2. attendance might be required, but not learning, so that educational justifications of compulsory attendance are not relevant; 3. both attendance and learning might be required, which is assumed to be the case in most states of the United States today; or 4. neither attendance or learning might be required-- no educational justification or any other reason is valid. Many critics seem to make a factual claim that schools have not worked, and then to argue that this makes a case for the fourth of these alternatives, as though “did not work” were logically equiva- lent to ”cannot work.” Others see the actual outcomes as evidence lll'e precise analy and/or changes desi requirements. The possibl l. A clai inappropriate. in continue the compu is often conceded of cornpulsory atte 2. A clai is not appropriate therefore it must E 3. The $0! the schools are sa' considered apprOPY“ if not, either to 1 schooling.23 Only when the criti ance is inappropri; that compulsion mu: my question the p allvropriate to com Justified nor rule 18 that the-framers of the schools had malevolent intentions, which in turn makes the case for the fourth alternative. In either case, a more precise analysis might justify one of the other alternatives and/or changes designed to achieve the logically justified choice of requirements. The possible objections to schools as they are include: 1. A claim that the content of compulsory schooling is inappropriate, in which case the remedy most appropriate might be to continue the compulsion while reworking the content. This objection is often conceded and the solution offered here proposed by defenders of compulsory attendance.22 - 2. A claim that the process itself of compulsory schooling is not appropriate (cf. the claim by Szasz on page 2) and that therefore it must end; or 3. The sort of claim discussed immediately above, in which the schools are said to have failed, in which case if the goals are considered appropriate, the solution is to change the arrangements; if not, either to select new goals or to argue for ending schooling.23 Only when thecritic's reasoning demonstrates that compulsory attend- ance is inappropriate for the goals s/he projects is a conclusion that compulsion must end a logical necessity, and then the defender may question the proposed goals; for others, it may or may not be appropriate to compel attendance but the requirement is neither justified nor ruled out by the argument. Such anal ys one of which makes ing' and justifies described as having Iaking reform claim tobe, on the basis analysis and propos group makes claims damn good" and mus be classed as revi nutter of evidence one considers warr fers because it co The overall cepts and categorie tents for and agaiv tions. Such study resolution of the ‘ undertaking such a rationality, that taken less to move those reasons logi understanding as n There is n ciains and counter attempted from var #4 19 Such analysis enables the sorting of critics into two groups, one of which makes claims which break down into "school is not work- ing" and justifies renewed attention to whatever it is that is describedas having gone wrong. These critics can be classified as making reform claims and assessed much as reformers have continued to be, on the basis of the factual evidence for and against their analysis and proposals and the cogency of their logic. The second group makes claims which amount to an assertion that "schools are no damn good" and must therefore be done away with. These critics can be classed as revisionists, to whom appropriate answer becomes a matter of evidence and logic justifying whatever level of compulsion one considers warranted. Much defense of compulsory education suf— fers because it conflates these two groups. The overall intent in this dissertation is to use these con- cepts and categories as tools with which to assess the various argu- ments for and against compulsory education in its several manifesta- tions. Such study is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for resolution of the issues involved. The defense I would make for undertaking such a project is that appropriate debate rests on rationality, that the issue can best be resolved by argument under- taken less to move or persuade than to test assumptions by reviewing those reasons logically relating to the subject, so as to reach an understanding as near to the truth of the matter as possible. There is no particular conceptual framework into which claims and counter-claims will be fitted. Such frameworks have been attempted from various points of view. Karier, Violas, and Spring, 1‘ for instance. viewe as one of tension bi lelter pictured it .‘ ories, which stress gation to satisfy tl state, and persons ‘ the wants of the pet satisfy them by the seams to fail at so activations mich c part of the ideolog idea to have been obstruct logical a search for an adequ and arguments might to analyze them wit attempted here. The most iv been indicated. 1‘ ments, with rel atev rarily on ideologi ideologies have t0 are, and thus the effort will be mac 4.4 20 for instance, viewed the history of education in the United States as one of tension between capitalists and assorted populists.24 Welter pictured it as a debate between proponents of Republican the- ories, which stressed the needs of the people and the state's obli- gation to satisfy them but in a manner considered prudent by the state, and persons favoring Democratic theories, which focused on 'the wants of the people and assumed their right to demand action to satisfy them by the state.25 Other examples might be given. Each seems to fail at some point to represent adequately the diversity of motivations which coalesced behind the public schools and today form part of the ideology about schooling. The temptation to consider an idea to have been dealt with when it can be categorized tends to obstruct logical assessment of debate, further. In any case, the search for an adequate conceptual scheme to embrace the many claims and arguments might best be forwarded by just the sort of attempt to analyze them without an overriding framework which is being attempted here. Limitations of the Study The most important limitations on the study have already been indicated. It will be confined to analysis of claims and argu- ments, with related explorations of concepts. It will focus pri- marily on ideologies rather than institutional facts, though some ideologies have to do with a stance on what the institutional facts are, and thus the factual must in some instances be considered. No effort will be made to resolve in final fashion the question of “ nearer compulsory misery learning The study. margrnents from historical, perspec ofconsiderable int vith the question 0 lie education in th investigation in an 'herican history 1 education of the pe education free from tory is one of an o overtime of the d imposition of conse classes and the poo tarians,30 or of pl tigation. Whatever ho effort will be n that of the rel ati c lavs, though the cc single coin is call he interpretations erlunents will be ' No attempt the public schools 2] whether compulsory attendance, compulsory provision of schools, or compulsory learning ought to be continued. The study, in being confined largely to analysis of claims and arguments from a philosophical, as distinct from sociological or historical, perspective, necessarily will not deal with some matters of considerable interest. No concerted effort will be made to deal with the question of an appropriate analysis of the history of pub- lic education in the United States. This would be a significant investigation in and of itself. If, as Rush Welter suggests, ”American history is in large measure the history of the expanding education of the people,"26 the usefulness of a general history of education free from unexamined bias is apparent. Whether that his- tory is one of an ongoing search for freedom,27 of the realization over time of the democratic aspirations of the people,28 of a gradual imposition of conservative values by a ruling elite upon the working classes and the poor,29 of a concerted melioristic effort by humani- tarians,3O or of plain muddling through is a worthy topic for inves- tigation. Whatever light may be shed upon it is incidental, however. No effort will be made to resolve even such pertinent questions as that of the relation of child labor laws to compulsory attendance laws, though the common assumption that they are reverse sides of a single coin is called in question as too sweeping a generalization. The interpretations by particular historians of certain claims and arguments will be indicated where appropriate. No attempt will be made to assess the overall claims that the public schools are or are not failing to achieve their ’ objectives. The probably does not evaluation is beyo may contribute to or against a parti schools to achieve anong the purposes Iwill dea offered by only tw John Holt was sele rhose work is on a professional audie in this group such Dennison, Jonathan nett, and George Lr basis of a psycholv widely read than tl Ivan Illi cl scholarly position sented a source of interim, Holt has as I will showin C Illich, though; he points, and in any non-radical educat to lllich. My evi 22 objectives. The evidence required for an adjudication of such claims probably does not exist in any collected form; if it did, such an evaluation is beyond my competency. At best, the deliberations here may contribute to the description of what evidence might count for or against a particular claim of failure on the part of the public schools to achieve one or more of the objectives commonly held to be among the purposes of American education. I will deal with the criticisms of compulsory education offered by only two from among several possible modern opponents. John Holt was selected as representative of a large group of writers whose work is on a popular level, intended toconvincea wide and non- professional audience of the truth of their claims. I would include in this group such persons as James Herndon, Herbert Kohl, George Dennison, Jonathan Kozol, Allan Graubard, Sunny Decker, Harold Ben— nett, and George Leonard. Holt was chosen from among them on the basis of a psychological canon: his works seem to have been more widely read than those of the others. Ivan Illich was selected as the representative of a more scholarly position. At the time I made the decision, he also repre- sented a source of arguments which Holt did not offer, but in the interim, Holt has become an exponent of several of Illich's positions, as I will showiraChapter V. Holt is more than merely a follower of Illich, though; he seems to me to redefine Illich's positions at points, and in any case, Holt appears to reach an audience among non-radical educators and the general public which is not attentive to Illich. My evidence for such a claim is not scientific--merely __ ____ __ Ld that gathered by qu PTA groups and the continuing to inclu Illich is a that he claims and of his claims. He of reference for hi cation. If accepte fications not only his express goal. fied by both a fact adopted, there wou' arrangements of 501 issues arising fror who seems to me hi: superior in thinkiv arrangements for To Professional educa anarchist"3] and d ideas. Illich, to ihpmpriate new a satisfactory to m I will di education by Robe take up particular The choice of Hutc 23 that gathered by questioning my students and occasional audiences in PTA groups and the like. But I am convinced by it to the point of continuing to include-Holt in this analysis. Illich is an important theorist by virtue of the nature of what he claims and the level of argumentation he presents in support of his claims. He offers a dazzling analysis of our culture as frame of reference for his conclusions and proposals having to do with edu- cation. If accepted and adopted, his theories would result in modi- fications not only to education, but to society as a whole. This is his express goal. Consideration of Illich's thinking is thus justi- fied by both a factual and a logical canon: if his ideas were adopted, there would not only be great change in the institutional arrangements of society, but there would clearly be a range of new issues arising from these changes. I chose Illich over Paul Goodman, who seems to me his equal as a cultural analyst and by far his superior in thinking through the necessity for workable institutional arrangements for learning, on the basis of a psychological canon. Professional educators who have pigeon-holed Goodman as a "romantic anarchist“3] and dismissed his proposals are talking about Illich's ideas. Illich, to be sure, says that he leaves the devising of appropriate new arrangements to others, but such a demurrer is not satisfactory to many of his critics. I will discuss the arguments offered in support of compulsory education by Robert Hutchins and James Conant in some detail, and take up particular points raised by some other defenders as well. The choice of Hutchins and Conant was neither difficult nor arbitrary, L-sinte there are re sclnoling put forw actuality is its 0 destructive critic schooling itself. rhich nndern arg ered, will consist A final 5 discourse in the c on the basis of th tation, that certa than do others. T sucha fashion, as than as an attempt out my taking of a assessments are no some of the signif of the various iss 24 since there are relatively few specific defenses for compulsory schooling put forward. Most proponents seem to assume that the actuality is its own chief defense and to spend their energy on destructive criticism of proposals to end compulsory attendance or schooling itself. Some of what is discussed in Chapter VII, in which modern arguments in favor of compulsory education are consid- ered, will consist of this sort of destructive counter-argument. A final summary chapter will assess the present level of discourse in the controversy over compulsory schooling. I propose, on the basis of the claims and arguments considered in this disser- tation, that certain issues more clearly warrant further attention than do others. The entirety of what follows should be viewed in such a fashion, as an effort to clarify and forward discussion rather than as an attempt at resolution of the issues. This does not rule out my taking of an evaluative stance at particular points, but such assessments are not my objective. Rather, my intent is to identify some of the significant elements of meaningful efforts at resolution of the various issues having to do with compulsory education. Only lliss had become general. (1959), Mississippi way to allow paren Virginia have sinc 4nmmas s looks,1974), p. 5Eve books, 1972). 6The quote (New York: Harper nus eschew. ch013pp' 1‘25. 7Carl Berv Prentice-Hall , 197: 8Robert Mr lagazine 6, No. 1 9Paul Goo Scholars (New York . . wJohn Hol‘ hshvng Co., l969) the state must not dyml’ sexual a tharture from the . "The f 'Wrteen. Otherop FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I 1Only Mississippi does not have a compulsory attendance law at present. Mississippi was the last of the 48 continental states to adopt such legislation, in 1918, when compulsory attendance laws had become general. Along with South Carolina (T955) and Virginia (T959), Mississippi (1956) repealed compulsory attendance laws as a way to allow parents to avoid integrated schools. South Carolina and Virginia have since reinstated compulsory attendance laws. 2U.S. Bureau of Census: "School Enrollment: 1970." 3U.S. Bureau of Census: "Educational Attainment: March, 1971." 4Thomas Szasz, The Second Sin (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 22. ' 5Everett Reimer, School Is Dead (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972). 6The quotation is from Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), P. x; the argument is to be found in his Deschooling Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), esp. Ch. 1, PP. 1-25. 7cm Bereiter, W (Englewood carers, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 10. 8Robert McClintock, "Universal Voluntary Study,” The Center Magazine 6, No. 1 (January/February 1973): 30. 9Paul Goodman, Com ulsor Miseducation and the Communit of Scholars (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 23. . 10John Holt, The Under-Achieving School (New York: Dell Pub- lishing Co., 1969), pp. 15—16. 11 “Recommendation #28: Compulsory Attendance ”If the high school is not to be a custodial institution, the state must not force adolescents to attend. Earlier maturity—- Physical, sexual and intellectual-~requires an option of earlier deDarture from the restraints of formal schooling. ”The formal school-leaving age should be dropped to age fourteen. Other programs should accommodate those who wish to leave 25 _I rode University, include "to guaran the certification and the awareness comes to the stude 15Reagan. “Iota. D ”Thomas F moral-11111, 1971 ) 18Rush Wel Mgr (New York: 19Reagan, ) 20Much of tion“ and "ideolog Richard Pratte in in, 1973), pp 23 examples and elabo 2] Reagan, 22 E H ("N York: fierce: 2 3Reagan, 24 his), :laience 25):);er’ 2 61mg, p 26 school, and employment laws should be rewritten to assure on-the- job training in full-time service and work." From The Reform of . Secondary Education (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), p. 21. 121mm,, p. 10. 1‘3Gerald Reagan, "Compulsion, Schooling, and Education,“ Educational Studies 4, No. l (1973): l- 7. 14Ata Razani, "A Historical Perspective and Current Attitudes Concerning Compulsory Attendance (Ed.D. dissertation, Northern Colo- rado University, 1974), pp. 15—16. The other reasons he offers include "to guarantee individual liberty, freedom, and education”; the certification functions of education in screening for employment; and the awareness of the availability of many forms of learning which comes to the student compelled to come near them! 15Reagan, p. 2. 16mm, p. 1. 17Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw—Hill, 1971), pp. 41-53. 18Rush Welter, Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 3. 19 Reagan, p. 1. 20Much of the discussion of the distinction between ”institu— tion" and "ideology" is drawn from the more careful exposition of Richard Pratte in The Public School Movement (New York: David McKay Co., 1973), pp. 23-27. He is not, however, responsible for the examples and elaborations. 21 Reagan, p. l. 22E ,Harry S. Broudy, The Real World ofthePublic Schools (New York. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972). 23Reagan, p. 2. . _ 24Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, Roots of Cr1s1s: American Education in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Rand- McNally, Inc., 1973). 25 Welter, cf. esp. p. 56 ff. 26 Ibid., p. 5. llilliam H. Engler. dissertation. Rutg 27 27R. Freeman Butts, "Search for Freedom: The Story of American Education," NEA Journal 49 (March 1960): 33-48. 28Elwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (Boston: Houghton—Mifflin, 1919)? 29Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Co., 1974); Colin Greer, The Great School Legend (New York: Viking Press, 1972); Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). 30Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Random House, 1961). 3]Such a claim is put forth and defended, for example, by William H. Engler, "Radical School Reformers of the 1960's” (Ed.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1973). The ideolog that they were borl invention of Ameria the Healthy and thl tarians as collect accomplished out o the upwardly striv to be architect an free, creators of understanding and There are account, not least almost all individ Heuractice it.1 the simplistic cha school typical of play pitting the 1 masses, against t‘ Question of the p CHAPTER II A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES Introduction The ideology about our free, compulsory public schools holds that they were born during the 19th century as the quintessential invention of American democracy. The public school was opposed by the wealthy and the privileged, but, with a band of dedicated humani- tarians as collective midwife, the birth of the common school was accomplished out of the energy and ambition of the working poor and the upwardly striving middle class. The resultant schools are said to be architect and symbol of American democracy: open to anyone, free, creators of opportunity for achievement, sources of social understanding and harmony, and producers of political stability. There are a number of things to be questioned in this account, not least the convictions as to satisfactory outcomes for almost all individuals and for society as a whole from schooling as we practice it.1 At this point, however, I wish only to challenge the simplistic character of the account of the history of the common school typical of the myth, which resembles a conventional morality Play pitting the Good, as embodied in us good old boys from the masses, against the Bad, personified by the wealthy elites. The question of the proper assessment of the roles and future of the 28 fpu‘hlic schools of? scope of this effc The proble schools as a spool bad ones through c are self-evident 1 final assumption. evident principles record shows an ur of views and motiv tion. It has been attendance laws or see compulsory ati freedom; The alig public education v simple class-strut by which to identi abandons a simplis defined the public could comfortably Opponents at best sees petty bureauc chief motivation, View, saddled us 1 An approa covers people con 29 public schools of today is, as I have already indicated, beyond the scope of this effort. I The problem with picturing the development of the public schools as a smooth evolution in which the good guys master the bad ones through persistent attention to democratic principles which are self—evident to anyone considering them with an open mind is its final assumption. The schools, in fact, are not founded on self- evident principles, democratic or otherwise. To the contrary, the record shows an unbroken history of controversy reflecting a variety of views and motivations regarding the nature and purposes of educa- tion. It has been argued that certain characteristics of compulsory attendance laws are inconsistent with democratic principles. 40thers see compulsory attendance as a key to the preservation of American freedomd’ The alignment of persons and groups in the quarrels over public education was very different and vastly more complex than a simple class-struggle account would have it. There is no touchstone by which to identify the heroes or villains of the story, once one abandons a simplistic explanation. Only someone like Cubberley, who defined the public schools as a democratic triumph without flaw, could comfortably call all those whose ideas won out good, and their opponents at best misguided.2 Only someone like Murray Rothbard, who sees petty bureaucratic ambition onthepart of the schoolmen as their chief motivation, can identify with certainty the rascals who, in his view, saddled us with today's schools.3 An approach made without the luxury of a fixed viewpoint dis- covers people confronted with problems: what does a man need to earn alivingluhow doe: Ieequip every citi appmpriate for par selecting the mean: child's education's” and to secure educ: questions developev peculiar to the lov spread, partly bec; basis of the logic partly because the answer in the firs attendance laws, f made to the proble among other things control by infonna in the mill towns affected other are support in other c A history appropriately with lose, it is adeque sider some of the the counter-argume toppulsory attendz f— a living?--how does this change with industrial progress?--how can we equip every citizen with an understanding and a willingness appropriate for participatory democracy?--who is responsible for selecting the means of educating children?--who should pay for a child's education?-—how shall we deal with those who fail to value and to secure education for their children? The answers to such questions developed in particular locations, influenced by factors peculiar to the local situation. Gradually, certain solutions spread, partly because they had enjoyed local success, partly on the basis of the logic and enthusiasm behind a particular theory, partly because the social pattern that had created the need for an answer in the first place had continued its spread. Compulsory attendance laws, for instance, were a part of the answer that was made to the problems of urbanization and industrialization, which among other things seemed to cause children to become difficult to control by informal means.t These problems had first come to a head in the mill towns of Massachusetts. Only as similar problems affected other areas did the Massachusetts solution begin to win support in other communities. A history of education in the United States which deals appropriately with such factors remains to be written. For my pur- pose, it is adequate to describe the events and to isolate and con- sider some of the arguments which prevailed, along with certain of the counter-arguments, as compulsory provision of schools and then compulsory attendance became law. This will serve as preparation for examining Dori aducatim. 1n; ulsor Learnir Concern fc lies to settle on culture or merely first families war the family Bible, advanced education These infc closeoknit colony, were those who she children. There in tance from the ori sent their childre 1642 an act was pa Colony requiring 1 read and could uni impovered to remo‘ to be apprenticed weakening of fami vention was to be one's parental do if the state, wer 31 for examining more recent claims regarding the place of compulsory education. The Development of Compulsory Education Compulsory Learning Concern for education arrived with the first complete fami- lies to settle on these shores, whether they came to rebuild European culture or merely to seek wealth. The educational concerns of these first families were met in informal ways: instruction at home from the family Bible, small classes taught by some lettered person, advanced education for the able from the preacher.4 These informal ways, while adequate enough for a small, close-knit colony, soon began to be called into question. There were those who showed little interest in securing learning for their children. There were others who had located themselves at some dis- tance from the original settlement and found it inconvenient to pre- sent their children for instruction. And so it came about that in 1642 an act was passed by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony requiring the selectmen to see to it that every child could read and could understand the principles of religion.5 They were impowered to remove a child who proved untutored from his/her home, to be apprenticed to a more conscientious person. The apparent weakening of family responsibility which led to need for such inter- vention was to be dealt with, if possible, by a stern reminder to do one's parental duty. Should this fail, then the selectmen, as agents 0f the state, were required to intervene.6 problems by means actions on the ba be accomplished b that the absolute need only be perc repelling bases Far from its immediate succ the 1562 Statute c care mandatory.8 ing theologically extended to the ei control over the ( vere not engaged ' more aptly to be c punch to estab' A further little band of to dHuocratic governi governance in the 32 This first compulsory learning law, with its functional reli- gious justification, seems based on a metaphysics in which the uni- verse was perceived as moral, in which individuals could resolve problems by means of hard work, intelligence, and careful choice of actions on the basis of a received ethical standard. The individual, his/her community, the world, were each part of a single orderly pat- tern. The problem of the educator was identical with the preacher's task: (to make moral an immoral man in a moral universe. This might be accomplished by exposing him/her to the “truth"; it was thought that the absolutes of good, evil, the moral design of the universe, need only be perceived to be apprehended and to become thereby the compelling bases for behavior.7 Far from being an American invention, the Act of 1642 and its immediate successors were based on familiar British precedent: the 1562 Statute of Apprentices and the 1601 Poor Law had made child care mandatory.8 The colonists simply defined child care as includ- ing theologically justified literacy and Biblical knowledge and extended to the entire population what had in Britain been a form of control over the children of the poor. The theocrats of New England were not engaged in pioneering a liberal adventure at all; they were more aptly to be described as conservatives seeking effective means by which to establish and preserve their values.9 A further divergence from our familiar picture of a brave little band of true democrats struggling to establish a foothold for democratic government may be found in the actual arrangements for governance in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The leaders were an Stfiaristocracy of bi lie colony was di each. The land w bill held the land prietors, in turn shop for a mercha lhe town common a or for future inh comulsory learni tom's land would still more town 1 The arran and the subsequen through wealth an society was accept tioned by the Bib‘ This New 1 the sovereignty o broadly as Asociety, th to an authori habitual obed distinguishes association 5 ruler claims pendence of t carries with it 1 or persons suprer other person or i 33 aristocracy of birth and wealth, chosen by the literate citizens. The colony was divided into towns of twenty to forty square miles each. The land was titled to the selectmen, the town proprietors, who held the land in trust for a kind of corporate entity. The pro- prietors, in turn, titled persons with appropriate land: a home and shop for a merchant or craftsman; a home and cropland for a farmer. The town common and other land as yet unused were held for joint use or for future inhabitants. Later, when the shift had been made from compulsory learning to compulsory provision of schools, some of the town's land would be used for school sites, and, in many cases, still more town land would be used to support the school. The arrangement was not egalitarian; both the proprietors and the subsequent landowners had first to demonstrate their worth through wealth and talent. Persons were not conceived of as equals; society was accepted as being class-structured along lines sanc- tioned by the Bible.10 This New England pattern depended upon a strong notion of the sovereignty of the state. The term "state," which is defined broadly as A society, the members of which render habitual obedience to an authority within that society which does not render habitual obedience to any other authority . What distinguishes a political community from other forms of association seems to be this, that the obedience which the ruler claims is indefinite in extent, and that he inde- pendence of the ruler is similarly indefinite, carries with it the idea of "sovereignty": or persons supreme in a political community and not subject to any other person or persons.”12 Neither the legal subjection of the ”the power of the person colony to the Kin late justi ficatio power in the Laws definitions: This descript us an abstrac and describin in which it t ciation. in; historica torical devel slow. The ru and the city authority of divided sover times the des so as to hind (notably the discover any In the conduct 0 pendent, and thus God, as they saw of the authority true principles c that they undertc that compulsory 1 of education in 2 cially as author possible in the . to have feared t accept the rule chaos and mob ru 34 colony to the King of England nor the colonists' lodging of ulti- mate justification for the manner of their exercise of sovereign power in the Laws of God (as they interpreted them) voids these definitions: This description of sovereignty is very useful as giving us an abstract conception which may help us in classifying and describing actual sovereigns. But there are few cases in which it tallies with all the facts of political asso- ciation. The historical development of sovereignty, like the his- torical development of the political community, has been slow. The ruling authorities of the family, the village, and the city have merged only by degrees in the ruling authority of the state. Ecclesiastical authorities have divided sovereignty with political authorities. In modern times the desire to divide powers and balance authorities so as to hinder oppression has produced constitutions (notably that of the United States) in which it is hard to discover any sovereign. In the conduct of daily affairs, the colonists were effectively inde- pendent, and thus sovereign. Their responsibility to both King and God, as they saw it, was to account satisfactorily for their exercise of the authority delegated to them as having been consistent with the true principles given them. It was in order to be faithful stewards that they undertook to regulate learning. David Tyack observes that compulsory learning represented a new attitude toward the place of education in society, that of socializing agent for all, espe- cially as authority seemed to be loosening in the face of the freedom possible in the wilderness.15 The leaders among the colonists seemed to have feared that without an education that trained people to accept the rule of religion and law, their freedom would result in chaos and mob rule.16 f The colon syste- with such I omiceptions necesj one, originally '11 schools. Seconda School, and highe professions, in p There wer colonies, the req ing sort. Pennsy pulsory learning children to read with a fine of 5 the middle coloni the efforts of re eties. Such scho Another group of catering to the or education, when i to identify thems century.19 In the Sc the well-to-do. tions made it dii lic schools in t1 35 The colonists attempted to reproduce the British educational system with such modifications as their circumstances and differing conceptions necessitated. There was elementary education for every- one, originally in the dame schools and then in town and district schools. Secondary education, in the form of the Latin Grammar School, and higher education at Harvard, were for those destined for professions, in particular the clergy.17 There were other patterns outside New England. In the middle colonies, the requirements tended to remain of the compulsory learn- ing sort. Pennsylvania's second Assembly, for instance, wrote a com- pulsory learning law in 1683 which required parents to teach their children to read and write, along with some useful trade or skill, with a fine of 5 pounds for a failure to comply. The schools of the middle colonies tended to develop as private concerns, many as the efforts of religious denominations or private charitable soci- eties. Such schools were often free to the children of the poor. Another group of schools could be described as entrepreneurial, catering to the well-to-do for the profit of the proprietor. Public education, when it did develop, was typically only for those willing to identify themselves as paupers, until well into the 19th century.19 In the South, schooling was even more sharply reserved for the well-to-do. The scattering of families on the farms and planta- tions made it difficult to support schools. There were not any pub— lic schools in the colonial period; instruction was private, whether l by a member of th purer, or a board The diffe for by the varian not. The absenc southern colonies under which gover birth, training, doing whatever na lar hindrance by It is a m tern of schooling faire pattern of educational needs out the developme conformi st mental between compulsor so the same justi able served as we only five years a oral Court of the Satan" act, whici tins to read the ill town having ! 22 families. A cc establishing a sv 36 by a member of the family, a hired tutor provided by a wealthy land- owner, or a boarding school of some sort.20 The differences among regions are only partly to be accounted for by the variance in geography and consequent patterns of settle- ment. The absence of New England's rigid theocracy in the middle and southern colonies allowed a readier acceptance of a loose sovereignty under which governance was carried on by those fitted for it by birth, training, and inclination, and others might go their ways doing whatever nature seemed to have fitted them for without particu- lar hindrance by those doing the governing.21 It is a matter worthy of pondering that the New England pat- tern of schooling eventually came to be the norm. Had the laissez- faire pattern of the middle colonies prevailed, for instance, the educational needs of the nation might have been met adequately with- out the development of an educational establishment and resultant conformist mentality. In New England, no sharp distinction was made between compulsory learning and compulsory provision of schools, and so the same justification that had made compulsory learning accept- able served as warrant for compulsory provision of schools when, only five years after the compulsory learning act of 1642, the Gen- eral Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopted the ”01d Deluder Satan” act, which, to foil the devil by teaching his potential vic- tims to read the Bible, required establishment of a dame school in any town having 50 families and a grammar school in any having 100 22 families. A companion act in 1648 put teeth in the requirement by establishing a series of fines for parents and masters who failed to | l g require children i thus nde availabi This seem secure'essential or mahleto prov sideration as mer And indeed there of the New Engl an Island, had adopt all compulsory ed of the united New between compulsor become further bl New England were time, the need to that would permit predominantly a N Along with the pr so that only in h been taken, almos the three states- conpulsory educat lulsory,27 have F Wishes to arrange bloeans of the l schools may well 37 require children under their charge to take advantage of the schools thus made available.23 This seemingly easy step, a logical extension of efforts to secure essential learning even to those whose parents were unwilling or unable to provide it, is frequently passed over without much con- sideration as merely an intensification of the state's compulsion. And indeed there is justification for such an assumption: the rest of the New England colonies, saving only perennial maverick Rhode Island, had adopted similar legislation by 167l.24 The repeal of all compulsory education legislation under Governor Sir Edmund Andros of the united New England colonies in l687 allowed the distinction between compulsory learning and compulsory provision of schools to become further blurred. The efforts to revive compulsory learning in New England were unsuccessful until after the Revolution.25 By that time, the need to socialize children to the sort of cooperativeness that would permit democratic government rather than mob rule, once predominantly a New England concern, had become a national priority.26 Along with the problem, the nation took on the New England solution, so that only in hindsight can it be seen that a conclusive step had been taken, almost without resistance, between l642 and l647. Even the three states--New York, New Jersey, and Ohio-~which today have a compulsory education law which basically makes only learning com- pulsory,27 have public schools provided by law. The parent who wishes to arrange for the education of a child in a manner other than by means of the public schools or recognized and regulated private schools may well face a legal test. Few parents seem willing to make the effort. A ca of schools came t lininary to the q Compulsory Provis To call t Colony the "concl schooling seems a examined. There including those \, who were unwillin resisting the req TM includes, f time, a warrant f the constable of enforce the WM Neverthei Prefigwed in the “the eVentual e available to Sew attention to Dubl 1' The idea W6] 1 -bejn 2- The idea 4:- c.) 5 13 In) *1 m 5 2*- -cu <3 3 ._4 O ;< m D) 3 O C - 3 . (‘9‘ o -h 38 the effort. A careful look at the way in which compulsory provision of schools came to be the rule is thus an extremely important pre- liminary to the question of compulsory attendance itself. Compulsory Provision of Schools To call the acts requiring schools in Massachusetts Bay Colony the "conclusive step” in establishing our system of compulsory schooling seems almost ludicrous when the response to these acts is examined. There was immediate resistance from a variety of sources, including those who thought so much education unnecessary and those who were unwilling to pay the needed taxes. Some towns succeeded in resisting the requirement until the acts were repealed, it appears. Tyack includes, for instance, in his collection of documents from the time, a warrant from the court at Ipswich, Massachusetts, directing the constable of the town of Topsfield to take certain steps to enforce the provisions of the Act of l648.28 Nevertheless, in the clear light of hindsight, we can see prefigured in the Acts of 1642, l647, and 1648 the critical elements in the eventual establishment of compulsory provision of schools, available to serve as precedent when the times called for renewed attention to public education. These elements include 1. The idea that universal education is essential to the well-being of the state; 2. The idea that the obligation to provide education rests primarily on parents; 3 The idea that the state has the right to enforce the meeting of the obligation; 4. The idea that the state may determine the kind and the amount of education which is necessary; 5. The idea that a general tax may be used for the support of schools; and (Lu-J”, c. The idea ‘ supplied The repea? other legislation allowed the towns tion, the educati: the other col onie: schools and acadec lic support, infol ing the children 1 Thus then schools of the ne designed an acadec the classics apprl curriculum includ‘ history, governmec tion.30 Nith thi‘ Academy were reprn toward education power." The then of the values of to support the ex In the So establish a state Slop of knowledge Education in the 39 6. The idea that education beyond elementary level may be supplied by the state. The repeal of all compulsory education acts (along with all other legislation by the independent colonies) under Governor Andros allowed the towns to go their own ways. By the time of the Revolu- tion, the educational provisions of the New England colonies, like the other colonies, were remarkably varied: a mixture of private ‘ schools and academies, town and district schools still receiving pub— lic support, informal dame schools, and other arrangements for tutor- ing the children of concerned individuals. Thus there was available a variety of patterns for the schools of the new nation. In Philadelphia, Benjamin Franklin had designed an academy to meet the needs of a new world. He rejected the classics approach of the Latin Grammar School in favor of a curriculum including practical writing, debates, logic, geography, history, government, religion, mathematics, surveying, and naviga— tion.30 With this practical scientific education, Franklin and the Academy were representative of a utilitarian anti-classical attitude toward education that found expression in the slogan "knowledge is power.” The theory of education thus symbolized became a cornerstone of the values of the emerging middle class, and eventually was used 3l to support the extension of public education. In the South, Thomas Jefferson proposed in 1799 a bill to establish a statewide system of schools for the “more general diffu— sion of knowledge." He enumerated the objectives he saw for primary education in the Report of the Commissioners to Fix the Site of the l ./ . ' University of Vial weds l. for the t 2. to enable and prose writing; . to improv . to unders and to di fided to . to know h those he ciary of duct with . and, in g faithfuln shall be 0" #0) 0‘ Jefferson advocacy of near- ceived of an intro hunanist envision Society could be hunans were capab arrangements to e moral, men. Jeff to identify, and ernnent by those Bl crediting the to be distinguish Jefferson suggest Spurce of the nor Process by which government by the 40 ' University of Virginia as to give every citizen the information he needs l for the transaction of his own business; 2. to enable him to calculate for himself, and to express and preserve his ideas, his contracts and accounts in writing; to improve, by reading, his morals and faculties; to understand his duties to his neighbors and country, and to discharge with competence the functions con— fided to him by either; 5. to know his rights, to exercise with order and justice those he retains, to choose with discretion the fidu- ciary of those he delegates, and to notice their con— duct with diligence, with candor, and judgment; 6. and, in general, to observe with intelligence and faithfulness all the social relations under which he shall be placed.3 43-0) .. \ Jefferson's Enlightenment rationality was the basis for his advocacy of near-universal schooling. Where the Puritans had con- ceived of an immoral man in a moral universe, the Enlightenment humanist envisioned a--potentially--moral man in immoral society. Society could be moved toward the good and natural life of which humans were capable by development of the proper institutional arrangements to express the true wishes of enlightened, and thus moral, men. Jefferson believed that the educated man would be able to identify, and would choose, his own best end, which would be gov- ernment by those best qualified by ability, interest, and training. By crediting the common man with this innate moral sense (which was to be distinguished from the ethical wisdom of the philosopher), Jefferson suggested the way in which education could be viewed as a source of the moral underpinnings of a free America: through this process by which the ordinary citizen learned to choose freely a government by the natural aristocracy of talent. There is more than l ahi‘nt in all thl with the consent! educational systc ordinary man, wov an, the demandiv aristocracy of wt plan in the short of talent, picket selves to be amov prove themsel ves. to break down the birth upon the me religious dominai erment new humani law, and human ec order, the means The inflc man was to be fel South, the educai education was "tc schooling, of the such education, is variety of factor cratic pattern: wealth and thus 1 the same time sca 41 a hint in all this of a Platonic state governed by an aristocracy with the consent and support of all its citizens, propped up by an educational system which gave each citizen what was needed: for the ordinary man, working skills and discernment; for the extraordinary man, the demanding higher education of the University. Though the aristocracy of wealth and birth of Virginia defeated Jefferson's plan in the short run, over time, his slogan about the aristocracy of talent, picked up and circulated by those who considered them- \ selves to be among any such aristocracy if only given the chance to prove themselves, probably went farther even than Franklin's Academy to break down the stranglehold of the aristocracy of wealth and 33 Indeed, the shift away from birth upon the means of schooling. religious domination of educational policy may trace to this Enlight- enment new humanism and naturalistic metaphysics, in which knowledge, law, and human equality were thought to be features of the natural order, the means of equalizing all who grasped them. The influence of any such shift upon education for the common man was to be felt first outside of the South, however. In the South, the educational ideal of the stereotypical Cavalier prevailed; education was "to fit the gentleman to play his social role." Formal schooling, of the classics variety, played only a supporting part in such education, with family and friends the major influence.34 A variety of factors contributed to the maintenance of this aristo- cratic pattern: the plantation economy itself served to concentrate wealth and thus limit those who could purchase schooling while at the same time scattering people thinly and thereby making formal schooling me eod class structure or education to beco stricture in turn have what it take Northern—style pr States.35 It is id] for an alternativ lack of huoanitar lardedwith claim: cessfullyon behal such alternative, entangled with th differences regar opposition to pub universal educati helping each man would Southerners Francis Wayland , unequivocal terms Teacher Associ ati the fact of a and a very li her had been ignorance anc The chara in the South had l l 42 schooling more expensive and informal schooling more difficult. The class structure was strengthened by the way in which this allowed education to become a mark and source of wealth. The strong class structure in turn bolstered a laissez-faire belief system--those who have what it takes rise to the top—-which countered the spread of Northern-style provision of schools until after the War Between the States.35 It is idle to speculate, but one senses a lost opportunity for an alternative educational system in the South. There Was no lack of humanitarians among the aristocracy, to whom appeals well- lardedwith claims that noblesse oblige might have been directed suc— cessfullyon behalf of education for the masses. Unfortunatelyforany suchalternative, the question of public education became thoroughly entangled with that of the education of blacks, so that legitimate 6 Southern differences regarding educational theory were submerged.3 opposition to public schools gave support to Northern belief that universal education would preserve freedom and destroy tyranny by helping each man value and support the cause of freedom. Why else would Southerners so fear the effects of learning upon slaves?37 Francis Wayland, then president of Brown University, expressed it in unequivocal terms after the War was over, addressing the National Teacher Association. He said the root of the War lay in the fact of a diffused and universal education in the North and a very limited education of the South . . . . The Civil War had been a war of edggation and patriotism against ignorance and barbarism. The characteristic way of handling the problem of education in the South had led to stability of its social order, at the cost i ofmobilit)’ of i the productivity solutions in the social unrest, 1" ofnational life was not seen as . ahead. It was t advantage of the tion of the rich over the beckonil The prob‘ the most efficiel cally, to use f“ brought about thl become self-Perl” between order am the North was to schools, in HOW legit, "the bale It seemec schools to teach taining itself. their predeceSSOI llhere those puhpi vocational, the l democratic state. 43 of mobility of its lower classes and eventually of inability to match the productivity of the industrialized North. The characteristic solutions in the North, however effective for winning wars, brought social unrest, instability, and change as seemingly permanent features of national life. In large part this happened because industrialism was not seen as a problem; rather it was considered a means to get ahead. It was thought that education could equip anyone to take advantage of the opportunities available through industrial exploita- tion of the rich resources at hand, with more free for the seizing over the beckoning frontier.3g The problem, to many in the North, had seemed one of finding the most efficient way to equip its citizens, socially and economi- cally, to use freedom wisely. The American characteristics which had brought about the Revolution needed to be preserved and passed on, to become self-perpetuating. The major problem was to find a balance between order and liberty. The South had found one sort of balance; the North was to attempt a more dynamic balancing, to make the schools, in Horace Mann's well-known phrase from his Twelfth Annual Report, ”the balance wheel of the social machinery.“ It seemed perfectly appropriate for the state to structure schools to teach a set of values selected for their utility in main- taining itself. The various proprietors of existing schools, and their predecessors, taught the values that seemed good to them. Where those purposes had been religious, moral, charitable, or vocational, the purpose had now become that of preservation of the democratic state. The M" such an expectat. fltheory 0f tl eoces made them. chual." By conti Public schools, ’ see to it that C‘ racy were PTOdUC‘ The com been realized in proprietary 0" d‘ local and class lic and private ' vague: the 90V? private schools; sometimes the 90‘ proprietor or $0! With the England states, ' of education in ‘ social condition: in immigration, i solutions which ' able means for d servatives saw er the radical demos 44 The dominant educational psychology of the day supported such an expectation for the effects of schooling. Locke's tabgla raga theory of the mind held that men became whatever their experi- ences made them. All men began from the same point, were "created equal." By controlling, through uniform early experiences in the public schools, the influences that shaped people, the nation could see to it that citizens predisposed to the proper exercise of democ- racy were produced. The concept of schooling for the national interest had never been realized in the schools of the l8th century, which were still proprietary or denominational in large percentage, shaped by the local and class interests of their patrons.40 The lines between pub- lic and private education at the beginning of the l9th century were vague: the governments in certain communities subsidized certain private schools; charity students were accepted by most schools and sometimes the government paid for their schooling, sometimes the proprietor or some other private person or group did 50.41 With the growing complexity of life in the industrial New England states, there began a new debate over the nature and value of education in the early years of the l9th century. These new social conditions—~industrialization, urbanization, an acceleration in immigration, a democratization of politics--led to a search for solutions which increasingly focused on education as the best avail— able means for dealing with society's problems with order. The con- servatives saw education as a bridle with which to restrain change; the radical democrats saw it as a tool for the acceleration of change.42 Both a time when the Cor seven white male Andrew Jackson's white male citizi to both groups a of providing wha This pat citizen in elect the ignorant, in educated. Furth institutional su "lilting of the 0f the United St ,Not trus ”With a combin isteristic of th cational reforme tthgh formal e lure, of balanci WA in iegltima be what David Ty poHt"Cally. the conformity; the desired beliefs its 42 Both agreed on the urgency of the need. In 1788 at the change. time when the Constitution was adopted, approximately one of every seven white male citizens had been a voter, but by the time of Andrew Jackson's election in T828, some four of every seven such 43 These new voters must have seemed white male citizens were voting. to both groups an important and obvious illustration of the urgency of providing what each considered appropriate schooling. This pattern of increasing participation of the ordinary citizen in electing officials threatened the new nation with rule by the ignorant, in the eyes of many, unless all men could somehow be educated. Further reason, if any were needed, for urgency in seeking institutional support for democracy was seen in Napoleon's ruthless crushing of the French republic, which added to fears for the future of the United States.44 (Not trusting the informal means of educating and socializing through a combination of school, lyceum, library, and newspaper char- acteristic of the late l8th and early 19th centuries, the early edu- cational reformers attempted to devise ways of protecting democracy through formal education.45 A way of unifying citizenship and cul- ture, of balancing order and liberty so that freedom would be used only in legitimate ways became the objective. The outcome was to be what David Tyack calls a ”paradox"--the free American was to be, politically, the uniform American. The price of liberty was to be conformity; the schools were to be the means of producing the desired beliefs and behaviors.46 realization of ing persons and outcomes in any psychology was innate capaciti actions skillful holder of citiz oping these fac public. Intelli quantitative kn equal access to possible to vary not as naive as chusetts approac belief in its pc argunent was for The effc beliefs of Ameri the benevolence racy for the woo t0 demonstrate a dsociety based 46 The approach was based upon convictions that human beings were capable of being perfected in the understanding and use of their talents for both personal and societal gain, and that the new Ameri- can nation had a culture stable enough to adjust to allow complete realization of democracy. Education was seen as capable of modify- ing persons and cultUres alike, so as to allow alteration of social routcomes in any desired direction.47 As the Lockean tabglg raga psychology was modified by Herbart's concept of developing the mind's innate capacities to be moral, to think, and to perform physical actions skillfully, the schools were confirmed in their role as molder of citizens. Education could produce social virtue by devel— oping these faculties in individuals, and thereby producing a moral public. Intelligence, conceived of as a combination of specific quantitative knowledge with universal common sense which implied equal access to the essential truths of politics and morals, was 48 All this was possible to varying degrees in every normal person. not as naive as it seems now, as Curti pointed out; since the Massa- chusetts approach had not yet been tried in any extensive way, a belief in its powers required only convincing argument.49 Such argument was forthcoming. The effort was made by the early schoolmen to reconcile basic beliefs of Americans in progress, in equal opportunity for all, in the benevolence of God, and in the American mission to model democ— racy for the world with the changing social situation. Education was to demonstrate and to teach the American virtues and to make possible a society based on them by helping reform both the individual and his ties of church they (the Ameri ligence for poli There w nationalistic, economic life, conpulsory provi ers, who object sorts, who felt libertarians, w they saw fit en irresistible co pings of the eff "level ing. "52 These op natural right oi 0bjections, that of someone else ofa poorer one; society for a fr ill egal itarian‘ indoctrinate ch' and that public 47 society. The goal was a culture based on moral and political con- sensus: there was a proper way for an American to act; when you had learned to act that way, you were an American.50 The prior authori- ties of church and state were gone by the boards: “In broad terms, they (the Americans) proposed to substitute their virtue and intel- ligence for political and religious authority . . . ."51 There was much opposition--the rhetoric of the day was nationalistic, but regional and local concerns dominated social and economic life, and thus the debate over education. The opponents of compulsory provision of schools included landlords and wealthy farm- ers, who objected to the necessary taxes; sectarian groups of many sorts, who felt that their particular truth would be restricted; libertarians, who saw the rights of parents to educate children as they saw fit endangered; the proprietors of private schools, who saw irresistible competition; laborers, who saw education as the trap- pings of the effete; and elitists, who feared the effects of "leveling."52 These opponents raised legal arguments, that education is a natural right of parents which the state might not restrict; ethical objections, that it is unfair to tax one person to educate the child of someone else or to tax a wealthy community to support the schools of a poorer one; jingoist claims that there was no place in American society for a foreign philosophy such as all this French Revolution- ary egalitarianism; value questions, that the state schools would indoctrinate children without regard for the beliefs of their home and that public schools would of necessity be irreligious; and strange mixture included crafts tory employees) cal Democrats. coalition had v with changing s sensus where co The mor to see themselv “between an idl often dissolute as the cheapest ernment, and thr theaspiring mir tunity, the gre stances seemed founded. A wav Prove that free Excess. Exampl ”ATS, abol i ti o 48 prophecies of social disaster, that free public education would undermine self-reliance among the common people, and that politicians would be corrupted by the large public school funds coming under their control.53 The proponents of compulsory provision of schools included a strange mixture of merchants, workingmen (a term which at the time included craftsmen and small merchants as well as laborers and fac- tory employees), Calvinists and Unitarians, liberal Whigs and radi- cal Democrats, Easterners and Westerners. The members of this odd coalition had varied motives-—indeed the very membership fluctuated with changing situations—~but the significant thing is their con- sensus where conflict might as reasonably have been expected.54 The more conservative advocates of popular education seemed to see themselves as exercising social and political authority "between an idle and often dissolute aristocracy and an idle and 55 To the rich, education was sold often dissolute working class." as the cheapest alternative to disorder, crime, radicalism, misgov— ernment, and the uselessness of untrained labor. To the poor and the aspiring middle class,educationwas sold as the basis of oppor- tunity, the great equalizer in the race for success.56 Circum— stances seemed to demonstrate that fears for the nation were well- founded. A wave of lawlessness and violence in the T8305 seemed to prove that freed but untamed citizens were capable of almost any excess. Examples such as the Dorr and Aroostook Wars, anti-rent riots, abolitionist demonstrations and resultant fighting, and an one substance Educatio in society, what is Howard Mumfor the successf the hurt pri wealthy, the defensivenes tered masses «not to mention religious bigot It was - prosperity; to both by inculca- duties; and to p thus redistribut distinction.59 The oppc to do more than The problems wer lic education Wv into the ascend. (i) an egalitar Vii. where indi based upon indi 49 ugly series of nativist anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant attacks gave substance to the concern.57 Education was portrayed as the source of the needed changes in society, whatever the changes seen as needed by any given group. As Howard Mumford Jones observed: the successful school leader could at the same time touch the hurt pride of workingmen, the pocketbook nerve of the wealthy, the status aspirations of the poor, and the timid defensiveness of the cultured in the face of the unlet- tered masses58 --not to mention the xenophobia of “native" Americans and the mutual religious bigotry of Protestants and Roman Catholics. It was argued that education was essential to promote general prosperity; to help eliminate crime, vice, poverty, and corruption, both by inculcating morality and by making legitimate employment possible for every man; to safeguard the nation both through reducing sources of social tension and through educating the electorate to its duties; and to promote democracy through equalizing opportunity and thus redistributing wealth, which would eventually break down class distinction.59 The opposition was unsuccessful in gathering adequate support to do more than delay the spread of compulsory provision of schools. The problems were real, and the ideals set forth as reasons for pub- lic education were, on the whole, convincing ones that fit neatly into the ascendant values of Jacksonian democracy. This emphasized (1) an egalitarianism coming from the conditions of frontier survi- val, where individual strength mattered more than anything else, and based upon individual responsibility for liberty and salvation, and ~ : the Presbyterian mm.“ The of the opponents There we provision of pub with charity for sylvania, for in education until huniliating a la consequence some first general pu over furious opp those of the Ge was, in fact, an that was passed r tricts the optior effort to repeal an impassioned a1 Pleading that pr bated class dist Sylvania school Similar-l, with a partial s, and a full compu ed“Cation ended 50 (2) an internalized standard of right and wrong, both supported by the Presbyterian theology which dominated the early l9th century in America.60 The patent self-serving quality of many of the arguments of the opponents must have diminished their impact, also. There were particular pockets of resistance to compulsory provision of public schools. The identification of public education with charity for paupers died hard in the middle states. In Penn- sylvania, for instance, all state aid to education was for pauper education until T834. Many persons refused to claim help with so humiliating a label attached, and it is estimated that there were in 6‘ The consequence some l00,000 illiterates in the state in l834. first general public school law in Pennsylvania was passed in l834 over furious opposition from the sectarian schools, in particular those of the German Lutherans, who feared forced assimilation. This was, in fact, an objective which had been urged by some, but the law that was passed was rather permissive, allowing local school dis- tricts the option as to participation. Nevertheless, a determined ’effort to repeal the law the following year was defeated only after an impassioned and much reprinted speech by Whig Thaddeus Stevens, pleading that private and pauper education strengthened and exacer- bated class distinctions. It was not until T873 that the last Penn— sylvania school district abandoned pauper education.62 Similarly, New Jersey abandoned pauper education grudgingly, with a partial system of tax-supported schools established in 1838 and a full compulsory provision of schools law in T844. When pauper education ended in these two states, it had virtually ended in the North. The Soutl the War Between ' Slowly by public schools by from New England supporters for t ety, and came to school laws, som Ohio, for instant in 1825 and a sy bills, the syste school as a sort similar Story to By appro in the North, fr Nth that it is C0millsorv atten ““0" Provided 1““ ”“er th the wealthy Datr according to Bin 1855‘67 Indsmuc concerned (limos t chusetts had pas this is not part primeSled to ma & 51 ' North. The South gave up the approach only under duress, following the War Between the States.63 I Slowly but surely, the compulsory provision of tax-supported public schools became policy, helped along by the spread of settlers from New England across the midwest. Such persons were generally supporters for the Massachusetts solutions to the problems of soci- ,ety, and came to be instrumental in the adoption there of compulsory school laws, sometimes before the older middle states did 50.64 Ohio, for instance, established school districts and taxing authority in l825 and a system of tax—supported schools in l838, though rate bills, the system of charging parents an extra amount per child in school as a sort of tuition, were not eliminated until T853.65 A similar story could be told for most of the midwestern states. By approximately T850, there existed a remarkable consensus in the North, from east to west, on universal, free, public education such that it is possible to view the later modifications, including compulsory attendance laws, as merely systematizing to make the edu- cation provided as successful as possible.66 There were still prob- lems, notably the persistence of a class system of education, with the wealthy patronizing private secondary schools and academies-- according to Binder, there were more than 6,l85 such schools in l855.67 Inasmuch as public education legislation to that time was concerned almost exclusively with elementary schools (though Massa- chusetts had passed a law requiring public high schools in l827), this is not particularly astonishing. Nevertheless, it allowed the privileged to maintain their advantage for their children, a matter whch was to rev era of expansior were those of 5‘ tion, a problem particularly der immigrants to bv would influence But by r OiAmerican demv lar points on tl andnational QOi o fundamentallg ademocratic edr Seemed 10gical a 9'”)! critics itself Cou]( people at p, had convertr bod ulsor Atter The War H0" at Which tc lh compu] SOry e( society Which We before. Many hi my Caused by 52 which was to receive a certain amount of attention in the next great era of expansion of compulsory public education. Other problems were those of strong continuing resistance to tax support for educa- tion, a problem which never vanished and has recurred of late with particularly devastating impact, and of the increasing numbers of 68 Each of these, also, immigrants to be socialized to America. would influence the spread of compulsory attendance laws. But by midcentury, there was general agreement on the basics of American democracy, save only for certain reservations at particu- lar points on the part of the South. The Constitution, and the state and national governments formed under its authority, were accepted as fundamentally expressive of true democracy. The establishment of a democratic educational system to perpetuate this social order seemed logical and necessary.69 Welter summed it all up neatly: only critics of American society who repudiated democracy itself could consistently repudiate the education of the people at public expense. Others . . . found that hastory had converted them to democracy and public schools. Compulsory Attendance The War Between the States is a convenient point of demarca- tion at which to begin considering the development of the next step in compulsory education, compulsory attendance laws. The changes in society which were to persuade people that compulsory attendance was a part of the solution to the problems they perceived had begun long before. Many historians consider the War itself to have been more nearly caused by these economic and ideological dislocations than by the slavery/s of the land as ' Industr' leather goods, pr towns of New Eng eastern Pennsylr Mechanized agrir in the center 0. invented in T79; the South. The on a large scalr Deere's l837 in and mechanizatir WOW needs v for the traditiv duct was bEing . sible in an agre off the discorm efficiency and 1 In the . in the North am existed Were Exe that EVentUa ted demonstration er and by its 0th “matte”, urbar 53 by the slavery/state's rights issue identified in the fourth grades of the land as ”the reason" for the War. Industrialization, beginning with manufacturing of cloth and leathergoods,paper, and machined wooden products in the grimy mill- towns of New England and small arms and other iron products in eastern Pennsylvania, was extending into every area of commerce. Mechanized agriculture had begun to erode the small farmer's place in the center of production. The cotton gin that Eli Whitney had invented in l793 had helped make large-scale farming profitable in the South. The prairies of the midwest were opened to exploitation on a large scale by the development of gang plows based on John Deere's l837 invention of the steel plow. With industrialization and mechanization came shifts in living patterns and alterations in manpower needs which led to changes in behavior that caused fears for the traditional values. The small-town grip on customs and con- duct was being lost in the growth of cities. The individualism pos— sible in an agrarian culture with the frontier available to siphon off the discontented was being repressed by the demands of industrial efficiency and the ever-more-distant frontier.71 In the initial stages, these changes took place more rapidly in the North and East. The regional differences which already existed were exacerbated, and doubtless contributed to the tensions that eventuated in the Nar.72 In any case, the War must have seemed demonstration enough of the dangers of nonconforming sub-cultures, and by its outcome to have sealed the verdict in favor of industri- alization, urbanization, and mass society. If the South, as the Lvictors viewed; gallantry and ii mterial effici' poster for survi dinnency. Hh service of demo This, i nmt. Where th guardian of rigl the Jacksonian i the agent of de described it. mdemisery and The doctrine of stituted a roma grim Calvinist ‘ restrain. The< tions rather th recreate cultur letit be said. ofthe excesses hmnrtatholics heHcan social heimprovement Educati element in the 54 victors viewed it, with the advantages of its Cavalier individual gallantry and its powerful foreign allies, had succumbed to the material efficiency of the North, there could be little doubt of the power for survival of the changes in culture which had provided the efficiency. What had to be done was to harness these forces in the service of democracy.73 This, it was thought, might be accomplished through govern- ment. Where the early republican government had been seen as a guardian of right, protecting men and government against one another, the Jacksonian conception of the state saw it as a public servant, the agent of desired changes. Human nature was seen as Rousseau had described it. Human potential for excellence, for the good life, made misery and suffering irrational, unnecessary, and remediable. The doctrine of natural rights, asserted in egalitarian terms, sub- stituted a romantic idea of the potential of every person for the grim Calvinist notion of vicious human nature which government must restrain. The evils in society were thought to be evils in institu- tions rather than in human beings; it was the duty of free men to recreate culture and institutions.74 The Calvinism did not vanish, let it be said. It was to provide theological justification for many of the excesses of the nativist attacks on "foreign elements” and Roman Catholics. But the dominant ideology came to be more positive: American social institutions, if properly formed, could bring about the improvement of human nature and conduct. Education, not too surprisingly, was believed to be a major element in the construction of a reformed society. The public school, it was‘ dit'lon merely t andpersonal by themselves thro himnity from a nary example of were believed t their advantage pacification of tion would be t distinctions sh stituted for an tension.76 For he used to crea forms of govern let classes and differing relig the country of and content of The bel in learning and Rather, it was to be derived f development not Comon schools teaching freedm 55 school, it was thought, could break down barriers of class and con— dition merely by being common to all. The poor would learn decorum and personal hygiene from the rich, along with reasons for elevating themselves through hard work; the rich would learn lessons of common 75 humanity from association with the poor. The schools were a pri- mary example of an institution where the interests of all classes were believed to coincide—-the upper and middle classes maintaining their advantages through education, and benefiting as well from the pacification of restlessness among the lower class, for whom educa- tion would be the key to advancement. The conviction that class distinctions should be made to disappear through the schools was sub- stituted for any attempt to understand or alter the source of class 76 tension. For democracy to continue and progress, education was to be used to create a homogenous society. The root of undemocratic forms of government was thought to lie in class society; therefore let classes and other sources of diversity, such as unequal wealth, differing religious beliefs, or too-well-maintained allegiance to the country of one's origin, be submerged by the common experiences and content of schooling.77 The belief in mass education thus was not founded on pride in learning and culture, or on belief in the development of the mind. Rather, it was based on the supposed political and economic benefits to be derived from popular education for popular government--the 78 The development not of high culture, but of a democratic society. common schools must ”elevate and improve and purify American life by teaching freedmen and white illiterates and immigrants their duties ‘ and responsibi hi these ends woulS resmnse to its desires. Thus cationso The desire for a 51’ gave to the qua be held, can th in the move tow the price of st, ahistorian of sory education T up to standards teaching was re gent; compulsor, die out in thei some conmuni ti e: the cheapest to and state super Suvport and dirt attendance was made available, and neglects] Horace ‘ with such other a"t1 instruction 56 79 An education directed at and responsibilities as citizens." these ends would limit the choices of action open to government in response to its citizens by training designed to restrict their desires. Thus it became a conservative posture to favor public edu- cation.80 The War Between the States, by the impetus it gave to desire for a single notion of citizenship and by the definition it gave to the quality of the society in which the citizenship was to be held, can thus defensibly be described as a major turning point in the move toward uniformity. Compulsion was accepted as necessary, the price of stability and predictability in society. George Martin, a historian of the era, summarized the progressive steps in compul- sory education as efforts by the state to hold the entire population up to standards which some were unwilling to reach. Compulsory teaching was required when parents became too negligent and indul- gent; compulsory schools, lest some communities allow learning to die out in their midst; compulsory certification of teachers, when some communities obeyed the laws in perfunctory fashion by selecting the cheapest teacher available; compulsory observance of state rules and state supervision, when communities failed to provide adequate support and direction for their schools; and finally, compulsory attendance was necessary that all might profit from the opportunity made available, and society be spared the consequences of ignorance and neglect.81 Horace Mann had proposed compulsory attendance laws, along with such other features of the Prussian schools as graded curriculum and instruction, in his Seventh Annual Report in T843, following his , trip to study J adopted such a? The 18705 saw i mentvm. But other developme Those w pre-industrial thata community could no longer citizenship in of content and tudes, work hat to citizens of people through curriculum, anc content not onl made it simpler schools to see cities and lars organization, a From having aln had come to be bean integral Pregression of attendance, so '+ 57 trip to study the educational systems of Europe. Massachusetts had adopted such a law in 1852, but it was not copied for some years. | The T8705 saw the move to compulsory attendance begin to pick up momentum. But before that happened, there had been a number of other developments in state control of the public schools. fThose who saw the schools as capable of transforming the pre-industrial culture argued that standardization was necessary-- thatacommunity-dominatedandessentiallyprovincialformof education could no longer equip persons to deal with the complex nature of citizenship in a technological society.82 By careful arrangements of content and conduct, the schools could develop "values and atti- tudes, work habits, time orientation, even recreations" appropriate to citizens of a modernized society.83 This effort to unify the people through unified education called for standardization of texts, curriculum, and teacher training. Graded classrooms teaching graded content not only made it easier to describe standards initially, but made it simpler for centralized authority to supervise and regulate 84 By T860, most schools to see that standards were complied with. cities and large towns in the North had adopted the graded system of organization, and by T870, nearly all schools had fallen into line. From having almost no system when Mann began his efforts, the schools had come to be almost all system.85 Compulsory attendance came to be an integral part of such a standardized system because the regular progression of a graded curriculum increased the need for regular attendance, so that students could keep up with the work.86 ordinary white was justified used to remain setts, who amo training school and degraded" i not understand run. Therefore eradicate Lhei r C. J. Greer of belong to the 5 tea."90 sent. more than the c freedom. The m that Welter cal who opposed pub nants, who deni but evil in hav ,' 5825‘» There was little successful resistance to this process. The ordinary white citizens tended to be enthusiastic about the common school. Most white elementary students attended school with reason- able regularity even without compulsory attendance laws.87 Many white Americans seemed to share, or accept, the ebullient view expressed by Marcus Jernegan, that compulsory education “is the sur- est foundation for the ultimate success of that great experiment in democracy to which we are dedicated.“88 The use of compulsion in educating the "sovereign people“ was justified by fear of the consequences of allowing freedom to be used to remain uneducated.TIWelter cites James G. Carter of Massachu— setts, who among other things was co-founder of the first teacher- training schools in the nation, as reasoning that since the “ignorant and degraded” in society do not voluntarily seek education, they can- not understand democracy and thus threaten revolution in the long run. Therefore the government must assume arbitrarily the power to eradicate their ignorance.89 Few would go so far as Superintendent C. J. Greer of then Washington Territory, who claimed “the children belong to the state and the state should see that they are educa— ted."90 Still, most feared the consequences of lack of schooling more than the contrariness of using compulsion in the interest of freedom. The majority of the critics of compulsory attendance were what Welter called ”disgruntled reactionaries”-—old-guard Federalists who opposed public schooling in any form or degree; proslavery rem- nants, who denied that blacks possessed intelligence and saw nothing but evil in having white children compelled to attend schools with a?" then; and righ ous socialists There the poor and t tually blacks .. to time and pl cussion become cate in non-ch that prevailed misleading, b-. of the "danger lic, poor, and the same time. oriented. Amon came when the g ety of troubles lations in the seemingl y perce struggles to su tion.92 It was education for t were seen to go therefore, less Compulsory atte advantage of ed who come to sch 59 them; and right-wing elitists, who believed the masses to be danger- ous socialists. All of them were ignored and discredited.9] There were several targets for this forced socialization: the poor and the working class, nonprotestants, immigrants, and even- I ‘ . tually blacks. The group which dominated concern varied from time to time and place to place, so that an effort at chronological dis- cussion becomes fearsomely complex. It is sufficient here to indi- cate in non—chronological fashion some of the attitudes and arguments that prevailed relative to particular groups. Even this sorting is misleading, because the same person was often to be found in several of the "dangerous" categories: he might be immigrant, Roman Catho- lic, poor, and a member of one of the struggling labor unions all at the same time. Perhaps the earliest concern, though, was class- oriented. Among the first threats to homogeneity was that which came when the growing labor needs of the mills, coupled with a vari- ety of troubles in Europe, led to an increase in working-class popu- lations in the cities of the northeast. These new arrivals were seemingly perceived less as immigrants than as poor people, whose struggles to survive were thought to make them indifferent to educa— tion.92 It was relatively easy to justify taking steps to secure education for the children of such families: ignorance and poverty were seen to go together, and poverty and crime to go together; therefore, lessening ignorance lessens both poverty and crime.93 Compulsory attendance laws would reach those most reluctant to take advantage of educational opportunity: “the 5% group of individuals who come to school because of the compulsory attendance laws is in "5 new need of children en thesocial or = the part of th tual. The suc learned by obs were infl uenc- cause of crimi good environme representative of more succes crime.95 But thc necessary to al Timed as model laws amounted t minorities.96 ‘ the best chance was then the En respectful of p can social orde education to ac "Americani zed. " There i Americans in pr had reason to b 60 a greater need of a social-educational program than any other group of children enrolled."94 Poverty was believed not to be inherent in the social or economic order. The cause, rather, was ignorance on the part of the poor of natural law, physical, moral, and intellec- tual. The successful knew and used these laws in ways that could be learned by observing their behavior, it was thought. If attitudes were influenced by environment, if a bad environment were a major cause bf criminal tendencies, then compelling children to enter a good environment, one in which they would associate with adults representative of the appropriate cultural pattern and with children of more successful families, was a sound attack on poverty and crime.95 But though compulsory attendance laws seemed reasonable and necessary to allow schools to succeed, to the extent that they con- firmed as models the beliefs and practices of the majority, such laws amounted to class legislation aimed at the poor and at various 96 ”This hang]0_conformism" was meant to give the student minorities. the best chance to move ahead. If one copied the virtues of what was then the English majority-~if one were industrious, persevering, respectful of property, law, and God-—it was believed that the Ameri— can social order would enable one to succeed. The person who used education to accomplish this personal structuring had been "Americanized.”97 There is little reason to suspect the sincerity of many Americans in promoting opportunity through anglo—conformity. They had reason to believe that success was possible, and they saw correctly that began by becon self through i abenevolent c nativist parti democracy agai anglo-conformi POt," which we pluralism, whi co-exist--bega Many 0 Education had were instead i before the War of which the 1 removed.99 pO “Safeguard of lic education y to overcome thv were Seen to e; callitalists to comfoyt denied ..DOWer againsy ofa Continent; against demagog other lineman. 6T correctly that much prejudice existed. To remove the prejudice, one began by becoming less different. The worthy individual freed him— self through his own efforts, using the opportunity presented him by a benevolent community. It was only when the later growth of the nativist parties, with their efforts to protect wages, jobs, and democracy against "foreign intruders,“ exposed the ugly side of this anglo—conformity that other patterns of assimilation--the “melting pot," which would blend the best of many cultures, or cultural pluralism, which would permit a wide variety of sub-cultures to co—exist--began to find defenders.98 Many of those who might have been expected to have resisted education had they perceived it primarily as forced socialization were instead its advocates. The workingmen's parties of the period before the War had seized on education as almost a panacea, by means of which the ignorance which kept the poor in their places might be removed.99 iPopular education was seen by them as anti-elitist, the, "safeguard of liberty” and the chief enemy of privilege. Once pub- lic education was wide-spread, it would enable all who participated to overcome the obstacles to equality and prosperity which presently 100 were seen to exist. It amounted to seizing the tools of the capitalists to be used to raise all the people to the wealth and comfort denied the poor.101 "Knowledge is power” became the slogan --power against arbitrary and unrighteous force; power for mastery of a continent; power against poverty, crime, and vice; power against demagogue or elitist. Knowledge was power to be like every other American: free, prosperous, active, moral, self—reliant. Education woul profit from do The de the radical de sional support Stevens in the of "mobocracy" Education was thought to be well as the po Viewed by the Both were esse SYStem and see ““5 Perceived all the People The wealthy pp, and labor refo Welter modation of it is an indie,“ EducatiOn Was rather Serv ed the idea 0f edt We" in the far Produce Utopia 62 Education Would enable every person to know his duty and how to profit from doing it.102 The demands of the workingmen's parties were picked up by the radical democrats, but did not become practice--inspite of occa- sional support from more liberal Whigs such as that of Thaddeus Stevens in the pauper education controversy--until Whigs frightened of "mobocracy" began to support public education after the War.103 Education was seen by such people as a means of socializing those thought to be dangerous—-agrarian and socialist-labor reformers as l04 well as the poor and immigrants. At the same time, education was viewed by the self-same "dangerous" people as the path to success. Both were essentially conservative, accepting the established social system and seeking to preserve it, and profit from it. Few Ameri- cans perceived the problem involved in making room at the top for all the people it was hoped that education would enable to advance.105 The wealthy Whigs were protecting their own privilege; the agrarian and labor reformers were seeking success for themselves.106 Welter suggests that the history of organized labor's accom- modation of its hopes for education to the expectations of society is an indication that the American dream about the social value of education was not merely a product of a group's perspective, but rather served in critical ways to shape that perspective.107 Thus the idea of education restricted the radicalism of proposed reforms even in the face of evidence that the common schools had failed to produce Utopia.108 It wou wrung from the --indeed, Fore nificant facto his view, beca the children 0 that organized ations provide ing seems to 0 what he called ests of capita attention also All the same, Passage of Com hOthers to the and Voters to that a certain of derhocracy at Only 0 labor Seem Cri 1engi‘ntl societ Sehf‘hnterest. ment The inn h0t to ahter h lhdusma] eduv 63 It would be ”too much to say” that public education was wrung from the privileged classes by the pressure of American labor]09 —-indeed, Forest Ensign argues that organized labor was not a sig- nificant factor in support of compulsory attendance laws, oddly, in his view, because it was legislation “intended primarily to benefit the children of working men."“0 Frank Tracy Carleton's contention that organized labor in the form of workingmen's parties and associ- ations provided the ”vitality" of the movement for compulsory school- ing seems to overstress both the interest and the effective power of 1]] The inter- what he called ”the growing class of wage earners.” ests of capitalists and humanitarians, to which Carleton gives attention also, were engaged before compulsory schooling took form. All the same, organized labor accomplished several things which made passage of compulsory attendance laws easier: their efforts educated workers to the value of free schools; they pressured both legislators and voters to support schools; they convinced the public as a whole that a certain minimum of learning and leisure was an essential fruit of democracy to which every citizen might lay claim.112 Only on the issue of child labor did the support of organized labor seem critical, and even there it seemed less a matter of chal- lenging society's views of the meaning of education than of economic self-interest. Restricting child labor would upgrade adult employ- ment. The important thing was to remove the child as competitor, not to alter his future through education. Significantly, at the Same point in time, labor was opposing use of the public schools for industrial education.H3 % Educat standing for l Educators tend greedy parents thought for th labor laws alm instance, in a Social Science capacity. The cational needs tional require] authorities ra 0f the legisla Sitv if effect Educati than 1'5 Common' tionH6 appear: t1lonsmp betwev argues that thv °f the child ,, zensiilB He v upon the Comm”, "Ovid veep chi” conilate CONpul single Step in 64 Educators' support for child labor laws showed little under- standing for labor's concern for adult employment at a living wage. Educators tended to focus on nonattendance, and to blame "lax and greedy parents" who exploited children in the present without taking thought for their future.”4 Thus educators saw the purpose of child labor laws almost purely as educational. James Kirkland, for instance, in an address to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, argued that the school is the state in its parental \ capacity. Therefore child labor legislation must deal with the edu- cational needs of the child. He proposed that there be an educa- tional requirement in every child labor law, and that school authorities rather than parents be required to meet the provisions of the legislation, pointing out that improved schools were a neces- sity if effective child labor laws were to be passed.”5 Educators and labor leaders were less uniform in their views than is commonly argued. Ensign, whose Teachers College disserta- 116 tion appears to have established the received theory of the rela- tionship between compulsory attendance and child labor laws,”7 argues that the two are aspects of one problem, that of the welfare of the child and the state's vested interest in high-grade citi- 2615.118 He viewed the compulsion in compulsory education as being upon the community, to provide schools and to prohibit anything that would keep children from using them. Thus it was easy for him to conflate compulsory attendance and child labor legislation as but a single step in protecting the child. For example, in criticizing the New York compulsory attendance law of l894 for lack of adequate restriction of which should e; sory exclusion sible for this blind him to ti --which he reji child's earning fight for and a In his synoptii major professoi attendance 1an Thus "the friei 0f comPUlsory ; “35W" (in pass presuppositiom tion of Organi; labor, but he ( thropic agencie t00perat1'Ve,“ E legislation Whi tie on bEhalf c The sor Simphftcatton one pom, she Emmy l“ get 65 restriction of child labor, he argued that “the close relationship which should exist between compulsory school attendance and compul- sory exclusion from labor was not fully appreciated by those respon- ”119 sible for this legislation. His overly simple views tended to blind him to the complexities of the issue. He called it a "theory" --which he rejected out of hand--that parents had an interest in a 120 He remarked of New York State that "here the l2] child's earnings. fight for and against the child has been waged on a large scale." In his synoptic view of things--by no coincidence, Cubberley was his major professor--all who resisted child labor laws or compulsory attendance laws could be lumped together as “enemies of the child." Thus "the friends of children (by which he refers to the proponents of compulsory attendance legislation) had been over—ambitious and hasty" (in passing the New York law of 1886).”2 Ensign's moralistic presuppositions did not quite prevent him from valuing the contribu- tion of organized labor's opposition, on economic grounds, to child labor, but he clearly preferred the moral grounds offered by "philan- thropic agencies.” The combined efforts, though "less than fully cooperative," swayed public opinion in favor of the more restrictive legislation which he favored, though at the time he wrote, the "bat- tle on behalf of the child" was “not yet won.“123 The sort of misunderstanding possible through such over— simplification can be illustrated by Ruth Holland‘s Mill Child. At one point, she claims that when child labor laws did not succeed directly in getting children out of the mills, attention switched to compulsory ati by reducing ti A rigc Holland's fact cessors to the on levels of s than not, prec in the simples laws tended to attendance in Slghificant (E school attenda sachusetts, Ve attendance law MSW attend this that c0mp through a mech attenda”ce law sure to exten d reason remainei Was peggei It seer accurate When 1 HHS and compu, as the age 0f 1 66 compulsory attendance legislation, which achieved the desired effect by reducing the time available in which the child might work.124 A rigorous Study by Landes and Solmon shows convincingly that Holland's facts are incorrect and that, Ensign, Carleton, and suc- cessors to the contrary, child labor laws had no significant effect 125 on levels of schooling. Compulsory attendance laws, more often than not, preceded child labor laws, often by a matter of decades, l26 in the simplest instance. More importantly, compulsory attendance laws tended to follow, rather than precede, a high level of school attendance in any given state.127 A statistical analysis shows a significant (r_= —.47 to -.80) correlation between the level of school attendance in a given state in 1870 (by which year only Mas- sachusetts, Vermont, and the District of Columbia had compulsory attendance laws) and the year in which that state would pass com- pulsory attendance legislation. Landes and Solmon conclude from this that compulsory attendance laws resulted from high attendance, through a mechanism by which educators urged adoption of compulsory attendance laws for a set of reasons including such things as pres- sure to extend schooling to the tiny minority which for whatever reason remained outside the schools, and financial pressure from aid formulas pegged to attendance.128 It seems likely that Proffitt and Segel are more nearly accurate when they assert that the relationship between child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws only gradually became important as the age of retention and the number of years of schooling moved up together, a improved.”9 The la attendance. H setts in 1827, case that seco sory school an attempted to 0 State of Michi Part of compul schooling coul ance was tuned from some high “‘9 l7-year-o] Percent of the 0f the age gro Snowbalied; h l890 and l9l8, Cont. The lnc‘ In these some 1 was Opened, T‘ and l9lo; doub' doubt that it \ C0ncern had he' even When faci‘ v . W est- 67 up together, and means of enforcement of both sorts of laws improved.”9 The late 19th century saw a gradual increase in high school attendance. High schools had first become compulsory in Massachu— setts in 1827, but it was not until Michigan's well-known Kalamazoog case that secondary education began to be included widely in compul- 130 sory school and compulsory attendance laws. After Kalamazoo attempted to open a public high school, the claim was made that the t State of Michigan had never intended to make secondary education part of compulsory provision of schools. The court ruled that such schooling could constitutionally be required. The impact on attend- ance was immediate. In 1870, approximately 16,000 students graduated from some high school, public or private--some 2 percent of the liv- ing l7-year-olds. In 1890, there were 43,731 such graduates, 3.5 percent of the 17-year-olds; in 1900, 94,883, which was 6.4 percent of the age group in question.132 Tyack shows graphically how this snowballed: high school attendance increased 711 percent between 1890 and 1918, though the nation's population increased only 68 per- cent. The increase in enrollment raised costs dramatically, as well. In those same 28 years, an average of one new high school per day was opened. Total costs increased by a factor of 3 between 1890 and 1910; doubled, in fact, between 1900 and 1910.133 Few seemed to doubt that it was all worthwhile, least of all the educators whose concern had helped establish this upsurge in school participation, even when facilities laggedbehind. In 1905, for instance, the New York Times estimated that there were some 60 to 75 thousand children in New York Ci for them and s pel their atte about 90 thous space.134 The education, mm more students Educat tive lot, whos ism and Suppoy farmers and 15 need to avoid 3“ it was nor caPitalism anc shortcomings a were geidom a1 “93 of their Nowher minorities. B ing Educatlona many cities of and 15th AmEnd 1°C“ Politics Americans, eve represented by 68 in New York City who were out of school because there was no room for them and so attendance officers made no serious attempt to com- pel their attendance. At about the same time, it was estimated that about 90 thousand students attended only part-time, for lack of Space.”4 The remedy was to encourage even more support for public education, which could clearly claim to be a success when there were more students than there were seats to hold them. Educators, on the whole, showed themselves to be a conserva- tive lot, whose social ideas were in keeping with industrial capital- ism and supported the status quo against populist challenges from farmers and labor. Partly, of course, this may have been due to a need to avoid hostility on the part of the wealthy and influential.135 But it was more than caution which led them to praise the virtues of capitalism and free enterprise while ignoring or explaining away the shortcomings and consequent social disorders of the system. Students were seldom allowed, much less challenged, to wrestle with the reali- ties of their culture.136 Nowhere was this more evident than in the treatment given minorities. Blacks were unable to benefit from their post-War stand- ing educationally, as a general rule, whether in the South or in many cities of the North, the Emancipation Proclamation and the 14th and 15th Amendments notwithstanding. Schooling was a matter of local politics, in which blacks as yet held little power.137 Black Americans, even when not being cheated systematically by carpetbaggers or segregationists, were rarely part of the grand design for unity represented by the populist ideology, in spite of the fact that 1 During tn! a greater clearer ul education Booker T. Hasl value to the S of increased 1 style that dre money and oppc the point of c nomiclife.139 nature. For e sing the ideal unifying force schools for "d Blacks rights, though had shown that both in their wholem The, this blame-the rewards of edw There I in immigration coming from 501 new arrivals c. had difficulty 69 During the 19th Century, no group in the United States had a greater faith in the equalizing power of schooling or a clearer understanding of the democratic promise of public education than did black Americans.138 Booker T. Washington had demonstrated at Tuskeegee Institute the value to the South of black education, through an impressive display of increased productivity. He had argued persuasively, in a low-key style that drew attacks as Uncle Tomism from militant blacks, that money and opportunity were all that was needed to educate blacks to the point of complete and productive participation in American eco- nomic life.139 Nevertheless, blacks were assumed to be inferior by nature. For example, in a revealing aside, Cubberley, while discus- sing the ideal school code, suggested that the recognition of the unifying force of the common school need not prohibit separate schools for ”defective, delinquent, or . . . negro” children.140 Blacks were slower than any other group to achieve their rights, though enlightened arguments such as those of William Hand had shown that both experience and logic supported their claims, both in their own right and in terms of benefits to society as a whole.141 They were not alone, unfortunately, in being subjected to this blame—the-victim attitude, in which failure to possess the rewards of education was seen as evidence of ineducability. There occurred in the latter half of the 19th Century a shift in immigration patterns that brought a huge increase in the numbers coming from southeastern Europe, until by 1900 more than half of all new arrivals came from this part of the world. Nativists, who had had difficulty enough accepting immigrants from northern Europe and 1. sorted the pe and "Teutonic the British ranean ," and immigrants" in illiterat and not p order, an t eme d u: lifefl‘tg There ' detail that ti on the part 0‘ support can bi . which shows nc ' I of immigrants lated the perc which they rnea the grade they 30.3 percent is Among English- dropped to 27. percent, of no ous national 9 0f their numbe “it; Russian Swedish, only 70 the British Isles, were alarmed. A kind of bogus ”anthropology" sorted the people of Europe into ”races,” among which the "Nordic" and "Teutonic" strains were deemed superior to “Alpine," "Mediter- ranean," and Jewish races.]42 Cubberley complained that these "new immigrants" were illiterate, docile, lacking in self-reliance and initiative, and not possessing the Anglo-Saxon conceptions of law, order, and government. Their coming has served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our national iiie.l43 There was considerable counter-evidence. Smith argues in detail that there was both literacy and a great desire for learning on the part of the majority of these immigrants.144 Statistical support can be found in a report by the U.S. Immigration Commission which shows no great advantage for native-born children over those of immigrants in ability to keep up in school. The Commission calcu- lated the percentage of children who were “retarded" in school, by which they meant two or more years older than the standard age for the grade they were in, using 1909 figures. 0f native-born children, 30.3 percent were retarded; 40.4 percent of all foreign-born were. Among English-speaking foreign-born students, however, the percentage dropped to 27.3, while, as might be expected, a larger share, 43.4 percent, of non-English-speaking students were retarded. Among vari- ous national groups, immigrants from Germany included 32.8 percent of their number in the retarded group, those from Poland, 58.1 per- cent; Russian Jews, 41.8 percent, South Italians, 63.6 percent; and Swedish, only 15.5 percent.145 tion of pupil sented figure illiterates af among childre dren aged 5 1: cent of inmig dren of the s adequately th. children and ' attendance lar unassisted by national consr Those given minorit" schools to pre worst, they we of significant narrow definii duce. The sch called HASP va to glorify the them to the En dominated the these values t those who woul 71 Ayres argued that there was little correlation between reten- tion of pupils and percentage of foreign-born in a city. He pre— sented figures from 1909 showing that there were 44 per thousand illiterates among children of native whites and only 9 per thousand among children of immigrant whites. 0f second—generation white chil- dren aged 5 to 14, 72 percent were in school, compared with 68 per— cent of immigrant white children and 65 percent of native white chil- dren of the same age span. He concluded that the evidence showed adequately that many immigrant parents desired schooling for their children and that there was no need on their account for compulsory 146 Nevertheless, the Cubberleyan view, not attendance laws. unassisted by his considerable prestige, prevailed as a part of the national consensus about the immigrants. Those schoolmen who did offer criticism about the treatment given minorities expressed few reservations about the adequacy of the schools to preserve liberty and democracy almost single-handed. "At worst, they were friendly critics of a naive faith.”147 This lack of significant opposition made possible the gradual adoption of a narrow definition of the true American which the schools were to pro- duce. The schoolmen were largely holders of what would today be called WASP values, based on a common-core protestantism that tended to glorify the virtues of the departed rural tradition and to relate them to the English and northern European ethnic groups which had dominated the population in the early days of the nation. They took these values to be self-evident and resisted debate on them, accusing those who would challenge them of creating political or religious controversy t for such cont efforts of cat only be harmf Incre tion, America middle-class crude ethnic variety of ob books contain "normal" or "‘ ahierarchy 0‘ Some 1 abroad in the expected to N been mob viole in Charl estowr Kentucky, in l grants from we railroad strii to San Francis burgh in 1892; Chicago. Ther tion in the Sc 50"“ problems threat in ethr 72 controversy for selfish political ends. They shared Mann's distaste for such controversy; if the schools were to rest on consensus, the efforts of cultural interest groups to influence the schools could only be harmful.148 Increasingly, though usually unconsciously and by indirec- tion, Americanism was so defined that only white, native-born, middle-class Protestants could qualify. Through stereotyping and \ crude ethnic humor, Roman Catholics, Italians, Jews, blacks, and a variety of other ”foreigners“ were made to seem inferior. School- books contained racist assumptions, such as that depicting whites as "normal” or “typical,” which rigidly classified people by "race" in a hierarchy of virtue.149 Some of this reflected the kinds of concerns that were abroad in the land. The threats to society, which the schools were expected to reduce and eventually to eliminate, were many. There had been mob violence, the burning of a convent and anti—Irish rioting in Charlestown, Massachusetts, in1834; "Bloody Monday" in Louisville, Kentucky, in 1855, when the Know-Nothings attempted to prevent immi— grants from voting; the 1863 draft riots in New York City; the 1877 railroad strike that began in Baltimore and soon reached all the way to San Francisco; the violence in the Homestead Steel strike in Pitts- burgh in 1892; and the 1894 Pullman strike and Haymarket Massacre in Chicago. There was corruption in politics, typified by Reconstruc- tion in the South and the Teapot Dome scandal. There were the per— sonal problems of crime, vice, immorality, and poverty. Some saw a threat in ethnics who by clinging together preserved their national ways and seen of 'radical i 150 movements. ' One 0 the religious in Massachuse‘ protestantism had .to deal or of fundamenta' have it so. I helped solidii government fur groups.152 The cc was exemplary 18305, the Pub by Protestant the city, to w came to be str Society asked most accounts , readings from Nevertheless , children to be iatholic immi g catholi c schoo 73 ways and seemed to defy Americanization. Others feared the spread of "radical ideas," which included support for the various populist movements.150 One of the uglier aspects of the drive for uniformity was the religious bigotry involved all too often. From their beginnings in Massachusetts, public schools had taught a sort of generalized protestantism. For some, even that was too mild: Horace Mann had had to deal with charges of being anti-Christian leveled by a group 15] But most Protestants were willing to of fundamentalist clergy. have it so. Roman Catholic opposition to public schools probably helped solidify Protestant support for public schools rather than government funding for private schools, which would have aided both groups.152 The conflict in New York City over control of the schools was exemplary of what happened in many corners of the land. In the 18305, the Public School Society, a voluntary organization governed by Protestant elites, had established a network of schools across the city, to which all who wished might come. As private benevolence came to be strained by the magnitude of the task, the Public School Society asked for and received city, and later, state, funds. By most accounts, the protestantism of the schools was minimal-~daily readings from the King James Bible being the most apparent aspect. Nevertheless, many devout Roman Catholics refused to allow their children to be exposed to such indoctrination. Aided by heavy Roman Catholic immigration, the diocese was building a network of Roman Catholic schools to attempt to provide education for their own children. porting statil that there H1 who were not. Council suppc School Sociei thrmm into i council major passed resolu schools and t requests from [took place. politics acro instance, is education in school organi: Cubberley dis There example, but lic school sy one of seven 1838 to l859, adefense aga sidered dange 74 children. Governor William H. Seward, himself a Protestant, in sup- porting state aid for Roman Catholic schools had estimated in 1840 that there were 20,000 children of Roman Catholics in New York City who were not in school. The diocese requested from the city's Common Council support that would be equivalent to what was given the Public School Society. When this was refused, Roman Catholic influence was thrown into the political arena in a successful effort to elect a council majority favorable to their cause. When Common Council passed resolutions offering public support for both Roman Catholic schools and those of the Public School Society (but excluding requests from Jewish and Presbyterian schools), a series of riots ‘took place. For a number of years the school question dominated politics across New York state. Seward's ensuing defeat, for instance, is laid to efforts by enraged Protestants. Amid the uproar, education in New York City was handed over to a newly formed public school organization and the Public School Society, "its work done" as Cubberley disingenuously remarked, passed out of existence.153 There were riots elsewhere, in Philadelphia in 1844, for example, but in general, the matter was solved by establishing pub- lic school systems and staffing them by Protestants. In Kentucky, one of seven teachers was a Protestant clergyman during the period 1838 to 1859, for instance.‘54 And so compulsory schooling became a defense against Roman Catholicism, which many Protestants con- sidered dangerous to the nation, believing that obedience to Roman authority precluded loyalty to the United States. The nadir of such efforts was reached in Oregon, where the legislature passed a mlsory a‘ only, relegai to times out! declared this? and other grt schools. The not require ; Event certain distr tralized cont anti-foreign attendance at whose virtues spite of the way were held them into ”111 sentiment for The intoleran it did not be assurance of troubles, and As th were adopted i We redefinit 75 compulsory attendance law requiring attendance at public schools only, relegating sectarian schooling, if it were to exist at all, to times outside the regular school day. When the Supreme Court declared this law unconstitutional, it secured for Roman Catholics, and other groups as well, the right, at least, to conduct private schools. The state might regulate such private schools, but it could not require public schooling.155 Eventually, school reformers used the threat of domination of certain districts by Roman Catholics as an argument in favor of cen- tralized control of schools.156 Anti-religious bias went along with anti-foreign bias in helping build public support for compulsory attendance at schools which were designed to make uniform Americans 157 Curiously, in whose virtues would be those of the majority. spite of the low esteem in which these deviants from the American way were held, the public schools were thought competent to bring them into line. Each particular group or issue created a little more sentiment for compelling all to participate in the public schools. The intolerance of the majority for those who were different, though it did not begin in this period, made the need for some sort of assurance of orderly society in the face of all these changes, troubles, and dislocations seem especially urgent.158 As the list which follows shows, compulsory attendance laws were adopted in state after state as one step in securing participa- tion by all in the reconstruction of society. The emphasis on com— Pelling acceptance of education by those who resisted it was fueled by a redefinition of the nature of society that came along with what Year! 1852-; 18674 1871; 1872- 1873- 1874- 1875- 1876- 1877- 1879- 1883- 76 Year of First Adoption of Compulsory Attendance Laws: l852--Massachusetts 1864--District of Columbia l867--Vermont 187l-—New Hampshire, Michigan, Washington 1872--Connecticut 1873--Nevada 1874-—New York, Kansas, California l875--Maine, New Jersey 1876——Wyoming l877--0hio 1879--Wisconsin l883—-Rhode Island, Illinois, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana 1885-—Minnesota 1887--Nebraska, Idaho 1889-—Colorado, Oregon 1890--Utah 1891--New Mexico 1895-—Pennsylvania 1896--Kentucky l897—-Indiana, West Virginia 1899--Arizona 1902--Iowa, Maryland l905--Missouri, Tennessee l907-—Delaware, North Carolina, Oklahoma 1908--Virginia 1909--Arkansas 1910--Louisiana 1915--A1abama, Florida, South Carolina, Texas 1916--Georgia 1918--Mississippi 1959—-Alaska, Hawaii has come to years of the! that people d polarities oi create an eqi was seen as 1 cultivated by llard found re cation by arc nost lacked e costly in cri trayed the sc individuals r through prepa good life. T individuals t spite of the tion.160 The p society-~impr sion of the a cational refo blacks, iarme scholars, ind hunan beings 77 has come to be called the progressive era, beginning in the final years of the 19th century. The progressive view of humanity was that people are organisms continuous with the natural world, facing polarities of good and evil, chance and causation, and attempting to create an equilibrium--a moral man in an amoral universe. Culture was seen as the product of adaptive intelligence, which could be cultivated by education. Thus the "dynamic sociology" of Lester Ward found ready acceptance when he sought to justify compulsory edu- cation by arguing that society most needed the education of those who most lacked education-—"an uneducated class is an expensive class," ‘59 This por- costly in crime, in poverty, and in lost productivity. trayed the school as a tool for at one and the same time helping individuals rise in the world and constructing the good society through preparing people to build the institutions necessary to the good life. The schools succeeded adequately enough at preparing individuals to compete in the world that they retained public support spite of the way in which social problems stubbornly resisted solu- tion.160 The progressive reformers hoped to reach all aspects of society--improved medicine and nutrition, political reforms, expan- sion of the arts, and a host of other changes were to accompany edu- cational reform, propelled by the intelligence and aspirations of blacks, farmers, workingmen, the poor, businessmen, humanitarians, scholars, industrialists, and all the other categories into which human beings fell.]6] A cla Eliot. for ir State in add! pictured four functions and La Schools, besi priately to h Willi from 1889 til mean in descr perfecti n creating in social concerted Not 01 tives, but thl The schools d' came to them 1 or unable to r sonian view 01 78 A class basis to society had come to be accepted. Charles W. Eliot, for instance, had laid out a progressive version of Plato's State in addressing the Harvard Teachers Association in 1908. He pictured four layers to a democratic society, each with distinctive. 'functions and separate educational needs: 1. a thin upper layer of the ”managing, leading, guid- ing"class—-the intellectual discoverers, the inven- tors, the organizers; 2. the skilled workers, whose numbers grow with tech- nology; 3. the commercial class, whose members buy, sell, and distribute goods; and 4. the ”thick fundamental layer engaged in household work, agriculture, mining, quarrying, and forest work." Schools, besides moving the gifted upward, should educate each appro- priately to his/her needs and status.162 William Torrey Harris, the U.S. Commissioner of Education from 1889 till 1906, had indicated some of what such education might mean in describing the effects of the graded school, which was perfecting the habit of moving in concert with others and creating a strong moral nature through superior training in social habits . . . regularity, punctuality, orderly concerted action, and self-restraint. Not only were class and racial biases built into such objec- tives, but they became a way of explaining the failures of education. The schools did not succeed completely because some of those who came to them were inferior material: children and parents unwilling 164 or unable to make use of educational opportunity. The Jeffer- sonian view of education as an instrument for detecting and refining the aristocri verted into 1 Then the progress. believed in ' made headway lic health. tioned. (20m A pious ' is pecul' with the to regarl He demonstrai represented ( in 1934 shows to come from whom the syst the early 193 cent were Ang beginning. H servative eth questions abo social, racia tive use of p and dramatic intentioned m 79 the aristocracy of talent to lead the nation had subtly been per- verted into a mechanism that assigned places in society.165 There is little value to any effort to malign the intent of the progressives. With few exceptions, they had good motives. They believed in the objectivity of their "scientific” approach, and they made headway against corruption, crime, and various threats to pub- lic health. Their claims of objectivity are somewhat to be ques— tioned. Counts called it A pious fraud. The member of a dominant group, because he is peculiarly tempted to identify the interests of society tltieéflid‘EEEEZiESaEfahlSoiliiia lirpi‘EEléilaElyllflél‘ing He demonstrated statistically that elites were grossly over- represented on school boards of the era. A study by Frederick Bair in 1934 showed that superintendents and school board members tended to come from the successful strata of society. They were people for whom the system had worked. Of 850 superintendents interviewed in the early 19305, he found that 98 percent were native-born; 90 per- cent were Anglo—Saxon; 85 percent came from a rural or small town beginning. He found this adequate to account for much of the con— servative ethnocentrism which he discovered in their answers to his questions about purposes of education and qualities of various social, racial, and ethnic groups.167 The impetus toward conserva- tive use of public schooling for conservative purposes was clear and dramatic and was to have consequences not imagined by the well- intentioned men and women who led this latest reform movement. Thel participate l meaning, who; be of value i that controvl laws, and in- mistaken, is 80 The outcome of compelling students from all backgrounds to participate in an institution guided by persons, however, well- meaning, who held only a limited range of beliefs and behaviors to be of value was, not surprisingly, to be controversy. A portion of that controversy, the assorted claims that compulsory education laws, and in particular, compulsory attendance laws, were at best mistaken, is the subject of what follows. 0 rtunit 19665; Frede Equality of or Christoph: 1972). . 2Cf Mifflin, 191! 3cr The 12-Year .' 4Bel (Chapel Hill. 5Thl Turning Poi n1 Blaisdell Put Ibl' 7[Jar Stumbl ing” (h 7-9. 8Edw (New York: 1' 9Tya 10Pow 11 Jam (Glouster, Ma 1101. II, p. 5 12 Ibi FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II 1Cf., e.g., James Coleman et al., Eguality of Educational 0 ortunit (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966); Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Qfl Equality of Educational Opportunity (New York: Vintage Press, 1972); or Christopher Jencks et al., Inequality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972 . ' x . 2Cf. Public Education in the United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919). 3Cf. "Historical Origins” in William F. Rickenbacker, ed., The 12-Year Sentence (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court Press, 1974). 4Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Formin of American Societ (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 15-16. 5The text of the act may be found in David B. Tyack, ed., Turnin Points in American Educational Histor (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 14-15. 61bid., p. 3. 7Daniel V. Collins, "The Preacher's Task and the Stone of Stumbling” (M.Div. paper, Western Theological Seminary, 1958), pp. -9. 8Edward J. Power, Main Currents in the History of Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 542. 9Tyack, pp. 4-5. 10Power, p. 538. 11James Baldwin, ed. ,Dictionary of Philosophy and aPsychology (Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith Co. ,1957— revised ed. ), Vol. II, p. 593. 12151a, “Sovereign,” p. 558. 13151a. 14Collins, p. 4. 15Tyack, p. 4. 81 16 Ty Educational cational Rev ”Ty.‘ 18Wi USOJ‘Weste 220. 19Mei hJ.: Litth 20Tye 21P01 22The 99.15-16. 23The 19.16-17. 24Pov ZSNev W 26m My . 27 ob 1n RTCkenback 28Tya 1. 29Geo 1 My 3017a 3lCur 32Quo Macmillan, 19 33Cur 34T7dl 35 Cur 82 16Tyack, "Forming the National Character: Paradox in the , Educational Thought of the Revolutionary Generation," Harvard Edu- cational Review 36 (Winter 1966): 29-41. ““‘ 17Tyack, Turning Points, p. 55. 18ni11iam Dixon McCoy, "Public Education in Pittsburgh 1835- ' 1950," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 34 (December 1951): 220. 19Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators (Totawa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1968--reprint), pp. 25-26. ZOTyack, Turning Points, p. 34. 1 21Power, p. 557- ) 22The text of the act may be found in Tyack, Turning Points, pp. 15-16. 23The text of the act may be found in Tyack, Turning Points, pp. 16—17. . V 24 Power, p. 542. 25Newton Edwards and Herman Richey, The School in the Ameri— can Social Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), p. 98. 26Michael Zuckerman, Peaceable Kin dom: New En land in the 18th Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970), pp. 75-77. 27Robert P. Baker, "Statute Law and Judicial Interpretation,“ in Rickenbacker, p. 102 28Tyack, Turning Points, p. 17. . 29George H. Martin, The Evolution of the Massachusetts Pub- l1c School System (New York: 0. Appleton & Co., 1894 , p. 13. 30 Tyack, Turning Points, pp. 51—53. 31Curti, pp. 35—40. 32Quoted in Rena Foy, The World of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 14-17. 33Curti, pp. 41-47. 34Tyack, Turning Points, pp. 28-29. 35Curti, pp. 72-75. 36Fr 1§§§ (New Yo America (New 380w American Fai 1968), p. 12 ll §Efll1New h 43 1- Of American | 67 . p. 46 44Cm Tye 46Tye . 47Var PuM1c Educal 48Wel N11 % 56R. hhw YOrk; 1: 83 36Frederick M. Binder, The A e of the Common School, 1830- 1865 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974). pp. 139-141. 37Rush Welter, Po ular Education and Democratic Thou ht in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 134, note. 38Quoted in Henry J. Perkinson, The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education 1865-1965 (New York: Random House, 1968 , p. 12. 390urti, p. 124. 40Tyack, Turning Points, p. 92. 41Ibid., p. 120. 42Richard Pratte, The Public School Movement: A Critical Study (New York: David McKay Co., 1973), pp. 44—45. 43Clarence Karier, Man,Societ ,and Education: A Histor of American Educational Ideas (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1967), p. 46. 44 Curti, p. 55. 45Tyack, Turning Points, p. 119. 46Tyack, “Forming National Character," p. 31. 47Van Cleve Morris, “The Philosophical Premises Underlying Public Education,” Progressive Education 34 (May 1957): 70. 48 Welter, p. 117. 49 5 Curti, p. 125. 0Tyack, Turning Points, p. 124. 51Welter, p. 118. 52Pratte, p. 46. 53William G. Carleton, "The Battles for Free Schools," Current History 41 (July 1961): 9—14. 54Tyack, Turning Points, p. 121. 55Welter, p. 40. 56Richard Hofstader, Anti—Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Albert A. Knopf, Inc., 1963), pp. 305-306. 57Cu 580u School (New 59cu 60Da Populism: N Seminary, 19 Americ EC“1 in du 7 2Cm 731181 84 57Curti,p.8l. 58Quoted by Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 12. 59 60Daniel V. Collins, "Presbyterian Theology and Jacksonian Populism: New Men for the New Frontier" (M.Div. paper, Western Seminary, 1958), p. 21. 61 Curti, PP. l97-l98. Curti, p. 25. 62James P. Wickersham, A History of Education in Pennsylvania (Lancaster, Pa.: Inquirers Press, 1886), pp. 320-331. 63Carleton. 64 Binder, p. 91. 65Allen 0. Hansen, Early Educational Leadership in the Ohio Valley (Bloomington, 111.: Journal of Educational Research Monograph £5. 1923), p. 6. 66Tyack, Turning Points, p. 125. 67Binder, p. 101. 68Curti, p. 206. 69Welter, p. 116. 7OIbid., p. 103. 71Curti, pp. 50-100,passim; Robert E. Potter, The Stream of American Education (New York: American Book Co., 1967), pp. 189- 211,passim. 72Curti, pp. 95-96. 73 74 Welter, pp. 141—142. Curti, pp. 95-96. 751bid., p. 94. 76Ibid., pp. 232-233. 77Lee 0. Garber, Education As a Function of the State (Minneapolis: Educational Test Bureau, 1934 , p. 7. University P1 83 84 lb Ty; 85Ni‘ H- P. Smith, 86C 1 American Eduv mm 871b‘ 88 Mai Colonies," 5< 89Nel 90F11 bl Charles‘ifi A!!é§9.§§g§§ ta Umver51ty Pr g3H01 hrdUniversi g41bi 95Mic hacon Press, 96Bur 97Pra 98Ibi 78Hofstader, p. 305. 79Welter, p. 156. 8°Ibid., pp. 141-156, passim. 8)Martin, pp. 265-266. 8ZDavid B. Tyack, The One Best System (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 14. 83Ibid., p. 29. Tyack, Turning Points, p. 314. 85William J. Shearer, The Grading of Schools (New York: H. P. Smith, 1898), p. 21. 86Carl H. Gross and Charles C. Chandler, The History of American Education Throu h Readin 5 (Boston: 0. C. Heath & Co., 1964), p. 206. 87Ibid., p. 199. 84 ' 88Marcus Jernegan, ”Compulsory Education in the American Colonies," School Review 26 (December 1918): 731. 89Welter, p. 35. 90Fifth Biennial Report of the Superintendent, p. 59, quoted by Charles Burgess, "The Goddess, the School Book, and Compuls1on,“ Harvard Educational Review 46 (May 1976): 199-216. 91Welter, p. 4. 92Stanley K. Schultz, The Culture Factory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 306-308. 93Hollis P. Allen, Universal Free Education (Stanford: Stan- ford University Press, 1934), p. 50. 94Ibid., p. 21. 95Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 191. 96Burgess, p. 212. 97Pratte, p. 63. 98Ibid., pp. 62-65. 99 100 101c 102w 103B 104 105 106w 107I 108C CLTSLS (Chic 1090 110 Lab&(NewY 111 tional Pro r C0”9913 Pres consin Press “SJ Child Labor, Mm 116E} 117 ‘ Spread 0f C01 described as H8151 119Il 99Binder, pp. 32-35. 100we1ter, pp. 46-49. 10‘Curti, p. 89. 102 Welter, pp. 116-117. 103Binder, pp. 38-39. 104Curti, pp. 219-221. Tyack, One Best System, p. 87. Welter, p. 192. 105 106 107Ibid., p. 178. 108Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis (Chicago: Rand-McNally & Co., 1973), p. 18. 109 noForest C. Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance and Child Labor (New York: Teachers College Press, 1921), p. 87. H1Frank Tracy Carleton, Economic Influences Upon Educa— tional Progress in the United States 1820-1850 (New York: Teachers College Press, 1965; original version, Madison: Univers1ty of Wis- consin Press, 1908), p. 144. 112 113 114 Curti, p. 90. Curti, p. 90. Ibid., p. 236. Ibid., p. 235. 115James Kirkland, ”The School As a Force Arrayed Against_ Child Labor,” Annals of the American Academy of Pol1t1ca1 and Soc1al Science 25 (1905): 552-562. H6Ensign. H70f. e.g., Edwards and Richey, pp. 672-673, where the Spread of compulsory attendance laws between 1852 and 1918 15 described as a means to solve the child labor problem. 118Ensign, p. 236. n916id., p. 130. 120I 121 122 1231‘ 124R 1970). pp. 1 125w Legislation: the Nineteen 54-91. 126II 0f adoption 1 visions. 127II ' 128“ 129 z M Education, 15 130S1 115181118200 et 131 Pt 132U Um“ States Wan-m . 1331) ”11920. 61.6 graduated; in °f ”5 gradua 50313 0f 175 134 - Se City. 1898-19 1967) p. 89. ’ 135cu 136Gr 12 °Ibid., p. 236. 12]Ibid., p. 5. 122Ibid., p. 105. 123Ibid., p. 253. 124Ruth Holland, Mill Child (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1970), pp. 122-128. . 125W. M. Landes and L. C. Solmon, "Compulsory Schooling Leg1slation: An Economic Analysis of the Law and Social Change in ggegNineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History 32 (March 1972): 1261bid., pp. 56-57, in particular the chart showing years of adoption of various compulsory attendance and child labor pro— v1s1ons. 127Ibid., pp. 76-77. ' 128Ibid., pp. 86-87. 129Mavis M. Proffitt and David Segel, School Census, Com— pulsory Education, Child Labor (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1945 , p. 16. 130Stuart et al. v. School District #1 of the Village of Kalamazoo et a1. 30 Mich. 69 (1874). ' 3)Power, pp. 575-576. 132U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1967), p. 207. 133Tyack, One Best System, p. 183. The trend continued: in 1920, 61.6% of the l4-17-year-olds were enrolled, 16.8% of 17s graduated;in 1930, 73.1% of the l4-17-year-olds were enrolled, 29% of 175 graduated; in1940, 79.4% of the 14-17—year—olds were enrolled, 50.8% of 175 graduated. 134Selma Cantor Berrol, "Immigrants at School: New York City, 1898-1914” (Ph.D. dissertation, City Un1vers1ty of New York, 1957), p. 89. 1350urti. pp. 259-260. 136Gross and Chandler, PP. 210-211. 1 37T 138I 139C 140E York: Macmi 141w Sou_th (Vashi in particula 142K W 1430 144T can Educatio 523-543. I Retardation 1 WW 1 eXCerpied on 9 S . W 91895 C011 152U Kiwi” 44 (JL 153 88 137Tyack, One Best System, p. 114. 1381bid., p. 110. 139Curti, pp. 294-295. - 140E11wood R Cubberley, State and County Reorganization (New York: Macmillan, 1918), p. 4. 141wi11iam Hand, The Need of Cpmpulsory Education in the South (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914), cf. in particular pp. 101-110. 142Karier, Violas, and Spring, pp. 66-68; also cf. Tyack, Turning Points, pp. 232-233. 143Quoted by Tyack, Turning Points, p. 233. 144Timothy L. Smith, "Immigrant Social Aspirations and Ameri— can Education, 1880-1930," The American Quarterly 21 (Fall 1969): 523-543. 145U.S. Immigration Commission, The Children of Immigrants in Schools (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1911). PP. 4—5. 146Leonard P. Ayres, Laggards in Our Schools: A Study of Retardation and Elimination in City School Systems (New York: Charities Publications, 1911), Chapter 10, passim. 1 47Welter, p. 123. 148Tyack, One Best System, p. 109. Tyack, Turning Points, p. 183. Tyack, One Best System, pp. 73—74. 149 150 151Cf. Mann‘s Twelfth Annual Report--the relevant portion is excerpted on pp. 101-112 of Lawrence Cremin, ed., The Re ublic and the School: Horace Mann on the Education of Free Men (New York: Teachers College Press, 1957). 152L1oyd P. Jorgenson, ”The Birth of a Tradition," Phi Delta Kappan 44 (June 1963): 407-408. ““““‘ 153 Ibid., pp. 409-412. 154Ibid.. p. 413. 155Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 156 157. 158. 159 Brenner, ed versity Pre: 160 1 161‘ Vintage Bool 162( Order,” M 163( 164 York: Praeg 165( A I W 166‘ Educaw (( 167F tendent of 5 W FIIIIIIIIIII:__________________________________—_____________—______________ “iifigfiilV 89 l 156 157 1 158 Binder, p. 62. Tyack, One Best System, PP. 150-151. Burgess, pp. 204-205. 159Lester Ward, Dynamic Sociology (1883) quoted in Robert H. I Bremner, ed., Children and Youth in America (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1971), Vol. 3, p. 1106. 160mm, p. 189. 161Cremin, The Genius of American Education (New York: Vintage Books, 1965 a DP. 10-11. 162Char1es w. Eliot, "Educational Reform and the Social Order," School Review 17 (April 1909): 217-218. 163Quoted in Henry J. Perkinson, The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education 1865-1965 (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 75. 164Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucragy, and Schools (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp, 40-41. 165Oscar Handlin, “Education and the American Society," American Education 5 (June 1974): 11. 166George S. Counts, The Social Composition of Boards of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 96. 167Frederick Bair, The Social Understanding of the Superin- tendent of Schools (New York: Teachers College Press, 1934), pp. An I have been me compulsory 1 Alll'te helpfi offered for be shown to doctrines oi as m E 0f state reg for Such reg C1aim Just 11 The tion 18 stra A(ll‘erican his Statement, w S(flitting 0V "(lineman hi Sumy 1“Adiv to ObSCure 5‘ Flint. CHAPTER III A REVIEW OF LEGAL DOCTRINES RELATING TO COMPULSORY EDUCATION An examination of the legal reasoning under which decisions have been made on controversies having to do with various aspects of compulsory education, in particular compulsory attendance laws, is quite helpful for understanding what is at issue. Many arguments offered for and against particular compulsory education measures can be shown to fall under one or the other of two legal categories, the doctrines of the police power of the state and of the state's role as pppgpg patriae, to which appeal commonly is made in justification of state regulation of education or in attempts to determine limits for such regulation. The burden of this chapter is to elucidate the claim just made. The common conception holds that the legal status of educa- tion is straightforward and obvious: "from the very beginning of American history, education was a function of government."1 Such a statement, while not open to challenge more serious than some hair- splitting over nongovernmental education or the precise moment when "American history" began, since the first schooling in America was surely individual families' doing, tends by its simplistic quality to obscure some rather significant developments in theory of govern- ment. 90 ....——_.- The United Stat: social comp; They, throus this case b and limited problems of ity over thi cratic govei defined as 3 to reach de: Of Practical ment, deals Person or SC constraint, gist of many )5 a Claim t taken array, 011911 1611):, Wh Ther relationship 1. the case, th Observes the a1111881 other 91 The fundamental theory upon which the government of the United States was founded holds that all government is a matter of social compact. All power and authority is vested in the people. They, through deliberate actions in the form of constitutions, in this case both federal and state, created a government and defined and limited its powers. For the sake of an orderly solution to the problems of restraint of individual behavior, people granted author- ity over themselves to government.2 This theory holds that demo- cratic government begins as a matter of restraint, which may be defined as self—control, an ordering of intellectual and moral life to reach desired ends in behavior or relationships.3 As a matter of practical necessity, though, democracy, like all forms of govern- ment, deals in constraint, the control of behavior exercised by one person or society (through various agencies) over another.4 That constraint, in one significant form, is systematized in law. The gist of many arguments against particular compulsory education laws is a claim that certain individual rights can neither be given nor taken away, that therefore the state may not constrain people to obey laws which would limit such rights. There are at least three significant opinions about the relationship between law and the state: 1. The state is superior to, and creates, law. If such is the case, then anything enacted by the state in a manner which observes the proper form for doing so is lawful; there can be no appeal other than one intended to persuade the formation of a new majority to torship, t0 2. order, and t is the case, always in or obliges the superior. 3. ferent point When We cons 0f the state aUtomaticall state or the debiting the Law the latter n law Which is distinglllshe ”859 1aw"-.i the) arise“. created in a‘ to be is yet ticular Cage: EXPIESS dTSq 92 . majority to enact differing legislation, or, in some form of dicta- torship, to persuade the ruler to change the ruling. 2. Law precedes the state, as a feature of the natural order, and binds the state when it comes into existence. If such is the case, then an appeal based upon a claim of natural right is always in order against any enactment by the state, and if sustained obliges the state to withdraw the rule in question. Natural law is superior. 3. Law and the state are the same thing looked at from dif- ferent points of view. When we think of the rules, we speak of law; when we consider the institutions which the rules create, we speak of the state. If such is the case, neither the law nor the state is automatically superior and appeals to either the purposes of the state or the rights of individuals may be made and sustained in debating the merits of a particular piece of legislation.5 Law in the United States tends to be interpreted as though the latter were the case, although it is based upon English common law which is an expression of the second position. The common law distinguishes "discovered” law, the natural law which is found in “case law"-—the logic and order appealed to in resolving issues as they arise--from "enacted law,” the constitution and the statutes created in accord with it. The whole of the natural law is assumed to be as yet not fully known, but is there to be discovered as par- ticular cases require resolution. Enacted law is intended to express discovered law; it is a defense, though not always a successful 01 attempt to dl law.6 Ullltl tion that no and the varil of the peopll that a claim to succeed. recognize as gress, or it: SYStem whose mining how tl are to be 58 Die acting 1. Wm for r1 Citation8 Fl‘eel implying the to PTOtect t1 ment. The f] 13 ”eSeSsary A” exPansive (CEEdom Of a] re§U1atjom 3 over compu] Sc 93 successful one, against a particular provision of enacted law to attempt to demonstrate that it is not compatible with the common law.6 United States law allows such appeals, but takes the posi- tion that natural law is well-expressed in the federal constitution and the various state constitutions based upon it in that the will of the people both established them and is able to amend them, so that a claim of rights not based upon the constitution is not likely to succeed. The ”sovereignty" of the state means that the courts recognize as law the rules made in the form of legislation by Con- gress, or its state equivalents. The basis of U.S. law is thus a system whose presuppositions are accepted by the community as deter- mining how the law is to be created and interpreted and how disputes are to be settled.7 The state which was brought into being by peo- ple acting in accord with their understanding of natural law is a system for regulating how law is made; the law regulates its own creation.8 I Freedom under this theory of government is conceived of as implying the minimum of interference—-on1y that which is necessary to proteCt the freedom of all--with the individual by the govern- ment. The freedom of one person may be restrained only insofar as is necessary to prevent his interference with the freedom of another. An expansive definition of what constitutes interference with the freedom of another is necessary to justify many forms of govermment regulation; such arguments tended to dominate one side of the debate over compulsory establishment of schools, the claim that uneducated people cons not be allc side of the another set develop a s bilities an The recognized: 1. mental. Th without aid seize them . include sucl ration of II 2. virtUe of cf Exist under United State pr°t‘~‘ction a Peaceabie as under the la 3. and maintain framed by C0 the r1'9ht t0 goverlllllemku 11 94 people constituted such danger to the body politic that they could not be allowed to use their freedom to avoid learning. The positive side of the minimum of interference notion of freedom, argued by another set of proponents of the common school, is the effort to develop a social order which enables individuals to use their capa- bilities and rights freely.9 There are three categories of individual rights commonly recognized: 1. Natural rights—-those which are inalienable or funda- mental. They belong to the individual by virtue of his/her humanity, without aid of law or government, without needing any action to seize them or assert them, outside constitutional guarantees. These include such matters as the ”inalienable rights" listed in the Decla- ration of Independence, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness!’ 2. Civil rights-~those which belong to an individual by virtue of citizenship or residence in a particular nation. These exist under law, by constitutional guarantee. They include, in the United States, such matters as freedom of speech, religious liberty, protection against unlawful search and seizure, the privilege of peaceable assembly, the claim to trial by jury, and equal protection under the law. 3. Political rights--those having to do with establishing and maintaining government. These are rooted in natural rights and framed by constitutional guarantee. They include the right to vote, the right to hold office, the right to criticize and amend the government.10 A right has been defined as a moral commodity entitling i man has a r doing what Eve the law may cised or ac consider to dren, it is of a right In similar and obligat behavior.12 For order, acco tice of the indePendenc We. healt Ethical Sta and PUrpoge Ships bASed eXists to d be the deve Standards w ordep13 T and hie-mi 1Ed to the 95 entitling its possessor to certain conduct or freedom or good: "A man has a right whenever other men ought not to prevent him from doing what he wants or refuse him some service he asks fororneeds."n Even natural rights are not unlimited. To some extent, the law may circumscribe the manner in which they are to be exer— cised or achieved. On this basis the state may regulate what many consider to be the natural right of parents to control their chil- dren, it is argued. Rights are social in character; the claiming of a right involves establishing the duty or obligations of others. In similar fashion, the rights of other individuals establish duties and obligations for the individual which may limit his/her own behavior.12 For a society to express the qualities found in the natural order, according to John Locke, it must conform to the innate jus- tice of the state of nature, which includes along with equality and independence a conception of obligation not to interfere with the life, health, liberty, or property of others. Conformity to such ethical standards requires a high degree of homogeneity in thought and purposes to ensure friendly, tolerant, and just social relation- ships based on the positive ethical standards themselves. Government exists to develop such a society; among its purposes, therefore, must be the developing of understanding and acceptance of the ethical standards which are necessary to the existence of the desired social order.13 The importance of this presupposed equality, homogeneity, and like-mindedness to a society based on a theory of natural justice led to the American emphasis on using education to produce uniformity. Only the co the product vidual thro endangered social orde of individu The of interest of the sove In this cap citizens in its child.) to keep the was kept se was to prom From this r which is cu With PO1ice military, a The exPresses t kEep Seeiet c0"duct whj deVeToned a F':_ x z" 1 9, Only the conforming American could be a free American. Freedom, as the product of a social order geared to produce good for the indi- 1 vidual through the voluntary compliance of all individuals, was endangered by noncooperative or deviant persons. The demands of the social order took precedence, it came to be thought, over the rights of individuals in certain instances, to be defined by law. The basis for this claim that the state may regulate matters of interest to all through its constitutional powers is the concept of the sovereign as pgp§p§_patriae, "the father of the country." In this capacity, the state is responsible for the welfare of its citizens in a manner analogous to the responsibility of a parent for its chi1d.14 In this older conception, the object of law was merely to keep the peace: the emphasis was on rules by which each person was kept secure in an orderly society. The function of government was to promote the general welfare, good order, and peace of society. From this responsibility was derived the power to regulate matters which is customarily called the police power of the state. Along with police power came the related powers to tax, to maintain the military, and to maintain and affirm in its actions the judiciary.15 The primacy of police power in the authority of government expresses the state's obligation as a matter of first importance to keep society "secure against those forms of action and courses of U16 conduct which threaten its existence. Public education was developed and regulated by exercise of police power, to assure the informed citizens who are thought to be essential to democracy.17 Th1 of the stai time. The conceived 1 individual was the indivi< ful indivic distinctior a large nun awami It cation bega Police POWE them, or an the educati WEpfi System People the use the gov The We the . Up ”11081 e tl 97 ~Though police power is logically an exercise of the authority 1 of the state as pgy§p§_patriae, a distinction came to be made over time. The state, acting in the mode of police power, is very broadly conceived of, by those who make the distinction, as regulating the individual in the interest of society. Acting in the capacity of pgpgpg patriae, the state is thought of, again broadly, as protecting the individual's rights against encroachment, in particular by power- 18 ful individuals or institutions, including government itself. The distinction just made is not always observed nor appropriate, but in a large number of instances serves to clarify the position being taken and to contribute to understanding the issue at hand. It was as a basic function of police power that public edu- cation began. A typical account of the justification for the use of police power to establish public schools and require attendance at them, or an equivalent, is found in the court‘s opinion defending the education sections of the Vermont code: The primary purpose of the maintainance of the common school system is the promotion of the general intelligence of the people constituting the body politic and thereby to increase the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens, upon which the government of society depends. Free schooling furnished by the state is not so much a right granted to pupils as a duty imposed on them for the public good. If they do not voluntarily attend the schools provided for them, they may be compelled to do so. While most people regard the public schools as the means of great personal advantage to the pupils, the fact is too often overlooked that they are gov- ernmental means of protecting the state from the consequences of an ignorant and incompetent citizenship. 9 The General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony intended to secure the colony against the possibility thatits children might grow up unable to carry out the duties of citizenship and religion by requiring 1 Thomas Jeff of persons mmmm regulate th ' e I 1 paterne not to will Sl vide s( cate be better The Ship betwee trol over c recurring c memflyl the issue c 5394822 cas SC110011119 y the 1aW.23 The t918 and, a to St. Thom Child b910n fami1l'8 c1 risht: 0 th me is did no parents ' T 98 requiring learning and then schools for the purpose. Similarly, C ThomasJeffersonsaw systematic public education as the best source of persons capable of making democracy work. The claims of the state were deemed superior to the recognized right of parents to regulate'thelives of their children.20 . the ideal underlying all this legislation was neither paternalistic nor socialistic. The child is to be educated, not to advance his personal interests, but because the state will suffer if he is not educated. The state does not pro— vide schools to relieve the parents, nor because it can edu- Siiieie‘éfiit‘rfifla28813832281188i£838,333;1'51ca" “are” There were those who disagreed. The issue of the relation- ship between the rights of parents and the claim of the state to con- trol over certain aspects of the lives of children has been a recurring one. The rights of the children were not considered in the early legislation or the cases concerning it, and this facet of the issue did not become significant until modern times, with the Brpypzz case, which turned on the question of whether segregated schooling violated the right of the child to equal protection under the law.23 The British common law held that children were family chat- tels and, as such, had no rights. The argument goes back at least to St. Thomas Aquinas and holds, in common sense fashion, that the child belongs to the family prior to any interest of the state. The family's claim is parallel to that described by Locke as a property right: one owns what one creates.24 As interpreted by Blackstone, this did not create any enforceable obligation on the part of parents. The greatest duty of parents to children, he contended, was to givi but this c: be enough ‘ would be p1 uninstructv Th1 tion which courts. Ii raised, the isfactorily over the ct been convnii Petitioned The decisic lng Case 0n - - . m 0f educ atriae remembe Virtue right, r1‘th 0 We 0n out of quently which 1' stitutii abridge| Demon, eSSer ( Tight 1:1 lm‘ahtl1 99 . l was to give them an "education suitable to their station in life" i but this could not be compelled by law. Love for the child should l ‘ be enough to persuade parents to do their duty; failure to do so would be punished by the "griefs and inconveniences" brought by an l l uninstructed child.25 The control restricted only by a parent's sense of obliga— tion which Blackstone espoused was soon modified in United States courts. In one of the earliest cases in which such an issue was raised, the court ruled that the failure of parents to perform sat- isfactorily their duty to the child voided their right to control over the child.26 The young woman in question, Mary Ann Crouse, had been committed to a ”House of Refuge” as uncontrollable. Her father petitioned for her release, arguing interference with his rights. The decision is worth quoting at some length, for it became the lead- ing case on such matters and is still cited occasionally as precedent. . . may not the natural parents, where unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or common guardian of the community? It is to be remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its members, and that of strict right, the business of education belongs to it . . . . The right of parental control is a natural, but not an inalien- able one. It is not excepted by the declaration of rights out of the subjects of ordinary legislation; and it conse- quently remains subject to the ordinary legislative power, which if wantonly or inconveniently used, would soon be con- stitutionally restricted, but the competency of which, as the government is constituted, cannot be doubted. As to abridgement of indefeasible rights by confinement of the person, it is no more than what is borne, to a greater or lesser extent, in every school; and we know of no natural right to exemption from restraints which conduce to an infant's welfare. ___....7 Ti at issue i parent to child was care and c Ohio's com use of pol citing m Power of t stitutiona Th ing indivil child. Th school sys' l” Pmper 1' Po' regards as ' ‘ - ( morals Suc described a schoo] s eha lOO The power of the state to establish public schools was not at issue in this case. Rather, the ability of the state to compel a parent to accept a governmental decision as to the education of a child was at stake. In a later case, the right of parents to the care and custody of their child was urged as reason for declaring Ohio 5 compulsory attendance law unconstitutional as an inappropr1ate use of police power, in that it violated parental rights. The court, citing parens patriae (again in the older sense) as the ba51s of the power of the state to regulate education, held the law to be con- 'stitutional.28 The authority of the state may go even further than compell- ing individual parents to exercise their obligation to educate their child. The state may, in exercise of police power, establish a school system ”without regard to the wishes of the people 'def1c1ent in proper appreciation for its advantages.”29 Police power was defined, in a case often cited in this regard, as including everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals . . The state may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are neces- sary for the protection of such interests. 0 Such interests on the part of the state are not always seen as interference with the rights of parents. Public schools were described as a benefit to parents in another case, in that the schools enable parents to meet their obligation to educate their children the court owed both ance laws meeting tl shown the! have been court may Tl exercise ( substantie welfare ()1 It was hel ents for 1 child home EducatiOns the School cm for "equir tion. In ‘ the SElect elibel a ch curricmum Tights Wen child to a 101 ‘ children in a satisfactory and efficient way.31 In Stat§_v. galley. l the court pointed out that the parental obligation to educate is owed both to the child and to the state, so that compulsory attend- ance laws were appropriate and necessary.32 Parental actions in meeting this obligation may not be interfered with until they have shown themselves to be irresponsible; upon demonstration that parents have been neglectful of a child's education, and only then, the court may take such steps as seem needed.33 Though limiting the exercise of their freedom by some, the exercise of police power may still be valid if it "bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary."34 It was held unreasonable for the state to attempt to prosecute par- ents for violation of compulsory attendance laws when they kept their child home because no transportation was provided by the Board of Education, the family in question living a substantial distance from the school.35 <:TThe compulsory attendance laws may not be made the occasion for requiring parents to give up all control of their child's educa- tion. In Vollmar v. Stanley, it was ruled that parents might oversee the selection of courses by their child, that the school might not expel a child for failure to take all the courses in a prescribed 1.36 curriculum and then prosecute for failure to attend schoo In Dobbins v. Commonwealth, it was held that a black father's civil rights were violated when he was prosecuted for refusing to send his child to a distant black school after being refused admission to a nearby whi requiremen case, pare m to cussed bel relating t Th protect th in a rulin mltted bla rather tha Few states York does, Ohio and N has no com Th Situations has been u the State . Vide a Pro HQ school: to meet tht Sta 1. 1 Kansas Com; of grew 6 the Supreme —:. :I l02 nearby white school, and that this made the compulsory attendance ' requirement, as interpreted by the schools, unreasonable.37 This i case, parenthetically, is an example of the sort of use of parens patriae to protect the individual from the state which will be dis- cussed below as encompassing the second important legal doctrine relating to debate over compulsory education. The most extreme application of this principle as a means to protect the civil rightsof parents which I have encountered is found in a ruling by a New York city domestic relations court which per- mitted black parents to keep their child out of school entirely rather than subject him to “discriminatorily inferior education.“38 Few states have as nonrestrictive compulsory attendance laws as New York does, however. There, only learning is compulsory, as it is in Ohio and New Jersey and in no other state, except Mississippi, which has no compulsory education laws at all.39 The limits of state control have been tested in a variety of situations. The right of parents to elect nonpublic-school education has been upheld consistently. In Statg_v. Counort, it was ruled that the State of Washington might require that a private school must pro— vide a program similar to that defined by state regulations for pub- lic schools in order for student attendance at such private schools 40 to meet the requirements of the compulsory attendance law. In State v. Will, it was ruled that any private school at all met the 41 When the State Kansas compulsory attendance law‘s requirements. of Oregon attempted to require attendance at public schools only, the Supreme Court ruled that the interests of the state were adequatel, either pu require p quality 0' would sat Allin, thl proper in‘ their edur trained tt tion.43 Tl that the ( tion. It tion, unde Powers not States are bully for State's ex some Const tthgh Va Th lts COntro int‘ervene tulle" and since Educ dictlons f F" I . 103 . l adequately served by an educational requirement that could be met in either public or private schools. It was held unreasonable to g ' require public education, but not unreasonable to regulate the quality of the private schools by defining what sort of education would satisfy the requirement.42 Later, in Board of Education v. ‘Allen, the Supreme Court confirmed that, as part of the state's proper interest in the manner in which private schools carried out their educational function, the state might require such matters as trained teachers, prescribed subjects, and minimum hours of instruc- tion.43 The variation in statesI requirements stems from the fact that the Constitution of the United States does not mention educa- tion. It therefore falls, according to the prevailing interpreta— tion, under the provisions of the 10th Amendment in which those powers not delegated to the federal government nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the states or the people. Federal responsi- bility for education is limited to intervening in cases where a state's exercise of its power to regulate education interferes with some constitutional right of individuals,44 and to influence exerted through various federal agencies. There is considerable latitude in how the state may exercise its control. As a general rule, the federal courts have refused to intervene when a state supreme court has interpreted its own consti- tution and legislation passed under it as permitting a practice, since education is a state function. This has led to some contra- dictions from state to state, or from time to time within a given state. F meet stat series of requireme when it c in Indian isfied th has had a may educa as shown . the part 1 revised 5. the Proset tively Wi‘ COlflllunl'ty Garber, e: Amish tea more convE absence 0, amounted t l"‘etlUl'remQr learning} Tw trate the as if it r System fer, FIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIfIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIBIIIIIIIIII” 104 g l state. For instance, the question of what sort of instruction will i meet state compulsory attendance requirements, referred to in the series of cases dealing with nonpublic schools, which g9 meet those requirements, has been answered in opposite ways in various states when it comes to education outside any school at all. An early case in Indiana led to a ruling that tutoring by a certified teacher sat- 45 In Kansas, which 'r isfied the intent of that state's regulations. has had a number of significant cases, it was ruled that a parent may educate at home if the education is of public school quality, as shown by content, hours of instruction, and test performance on the part of the student.46 A later Kansas case, affected by a revised state code and, apparently (on the basis of the brief for the prosecutionL by a series of Pennsylvania cases dealing restric- tively with Amishmen, reversed this ruling in dealing with one Amish community. These people had, under the leadership of one Leroy Garber, established a school of their own, taught by an uncertified Amish teacher and covering farming and homemaking skills as well as more conventional subjects. The court ruled that this, in the absence of certified teachers and state approval of the school, amounted to "programmed home instruction” which did not meet state requirements, interpreted as specifying schooling and not merely 47 learning. Two cases, oddly each involving a family named Turner, illus- trate the difference it makes whether the court interprets the law as if it requires compliance with the state department of education's system for regulating education or as if it merely requires evidence of satisf state dep child at valid Cal taught. uncertifi fied the ency, it ‘ families vate scho. court rul. ful learn ance laws "eQUire ct Board of l ferences . mi9ht be ,' Courts apl With the v interests and Dersoi unlike”, Spry Prov that;1 Shv lllteregtsE [Molly's I l05 of satisfactory learning. In California, the court supported the state department, saying that the Turners might not educate their child at home unless the parent giving the instruction possessed a valid California teacher's certificate covering the grade being taught. The private schools of the state are allowed to employ uncertified teachers. The opinion noted the discrepancy, but justi- fied the stricter requirement on grounds of administrative expedi- ency, it being thought too difficult to supervise scattered individual families unless the number of them could be restricted, whereas pri- vate schools could more readily be supervised.48 In New York, the court ruled that this family of Turners need only demonstrate success- ful learning on the part of their child, that the compulsory attend- ance laws could not be construed to prohibit home instruction, or to require certified teachers, or to require permission of the state's Board of Regents.49 There seems little reason not to call the dif- ferences arbitrary. A possible solution to such arbitrariness might be a more intent examination of the welfare of the child. Some courts appear to have attempted to find a solution to such issues with the child's interests at heart; others appear to neglect such interests almost entirely, under the assumption that the state's rules and personnel adequately guard the child. 0r, though this is unlikely, the various legislatures could clearly specify that compul- sory provision of schools need not mandate attendance at them, but that a showing of equivalent learning would satisfy the state's interests, thus returning to the standard of the Massachusetts Bay Colony's Act of 1642 requiring only learning. States, it should be pointed ou a refusal associatin gain nor 1 only a gro of its ind more anal y those of a nation and right of a state, whi Wishes, ha ‘ often been Standing 5 Zen's righ In ”550% Sil reh'éll'ous l ”ity. had , 1" ViOlativ Specifical' 9t0unds, a: fiburt, howl C0“ducting Statutel 5i l06 pointed out in this context, do not have "rights" to be violated by a refusal to attend school. Rights belong to individuals only. By associating with a group of other individuals, a person can neither gain nor lose rights; a state in this limited frame of reference is only a group of individuals and can have no rights other than those of its individual citizens. To ascribe rights to governments raises more analytical problems than are solved by such a move, not least those of adjudicating conflicts between the supposed "rights" of the nation and those of an individual. If the nation can defeat the right of an individual, then it is not a right at all.50 Thus, the state, while it has the power to compel whatever use of education it wishes, has no "right” to do 50. Its interests in education have often been described mistakenly as though they were rights and had standing sufficient to warrant ready subversion of individual citi- zen's rights. In Illinois, a family educating their child at home for reasons similar to those of the Amish community in Kansas, based upon religious convictions about the nature of the public school commu- nity, had conceded when they were brought into court that they were in violation of the relevant law, which prohibited home instruction specifically. They asked that the law be voided on First Amendment grounds, as restricting their freedom of religious belief. The court, however, evaded the issue by ruling that they were, in fact, conducting a valid private school within the provisions of the 51 statute. In Washington, a similar case resulted in the opposite ruling. There the judge in the original court had reluctantly made the child their int of his fit home inst legislativ no mm P“)! restv quatelyut school. i the Washir stand, in 0f the chi review the A Detential will. In face of it school," h did not pr. look.53 It certified a Upheld the being kept Witch-ye, to be l'lllhor Warsed ti wished to n 107 the child in the case a ward of the court when the parents indicated their intention to continue to educate the child at home in spite of his finding that the state law requiring a certified teacher for home inStruction was valid. Upon studying the provisions of the legislation on the subject, the judge uncovered a loophole, in that no definition or description of a private school was given, and hap- pily restored the child to the family as having been educated ade- quately--which all concerned had stipulated--in a valid private school. When the Shoreline School District appealed this decision, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the original decision must stand, in spite of a vigorous dissent arguing that the best interests of the child were being denied. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the case.52 A series of New Jersey cases demonstrates the frustrating potential in allowing the states to legislate and interpret as they will. In l937, it was ruled that though the New Jersey law on the face of it permitted equivalent instruction “elsewhere than at school," home instruction did not meet the requirement because it did not provide group activity and the common school sort of out- look.53 In 1950, though the mother doing the teaching was state- certified and using state—approved texts and syllabi, the court upheld the notion that the children were being denied their due by being kept from the social life of the school--which was the parents' objective, Since they considered the influence of certain students to be immoral.54 But in T967, another New Jersey court specifically reversed these two decisions on the grounds that had the legislature wishedto require schooling for social purposes, it could have done so unequii showing 01 be met.55 St the police restrictir ning with of parents police pow Amendment, ment of pa Pulsory at school.57 to find a a County c attendance authorizin but reject in M, tive SChoo court Conv 1" yet ano 1” refusin f0? the pu Provided f. the state, partiCUlar 108 so unequivocally and that therefore all that was required was a showing of academic equivalence for the requirements of the law to be met.55 Sometimes the courts in a particular state have interpreted the police power control of education to allow rather rigid standards restricting what is permitted. Pennsylvania is such a state, begin- ning with a ruling in which the court, while recognizing the right of parents to oversee the education of their child, held that the police power of the state was exempt from the provisions of the l4th Amendment, that the state might, forcause, legislate unequal treat- 56 ment of particular individuals. Later it was ruled that the com- pulsory attendance laws required attendance at an English-speaking school.57 The Pennsylvania courts have consistently rejected efforts to find a place for exceptions to state regulations. In 1949, when a county court had acquitted an Amishman of violating the compulsory attendance laws by home instruction, citing Pierce (see p.103) as authorizing his ”school," the appellate court upheld the acquittal but rejected the reasoning on the basis of the principle, also found in Pierce, that the state properly could define acceptable alterna- 58 tive schools. Relying on this appellate court decision, another court convicted an Amishman for the identical offense a year later.59 In yet another case, it was ruled that the state had acted properly in refusing to grant an Amish boy an exemption from attending school for the purpose of helping on the farm, although such exemptions were provided for in the law. The court reasoned that police power allowed the state, in pursuit of its interest in education, to judge that a particular child ought to remain in school while exempting others, n- that the ' exemption. Il firm. A l ance laws The court schooling requiremer larly, anc talented c Dose of re isfactory that the F Child's ph Th of cases 1 Vaccinated the state. for Violat Vaccinated Finally, t and thereu ObSerVed t thus Could father's r cate and t 0V” to th 109 that the language of the statute permitted, but did not require, the exemption.60 In cases not involving the Amish, the courts were equally firm. A Muslim family was convicted of violating compulsory attend- ance laws by keeping their child home on Fridays, a Muslim holy day. The court held that their option to select equivalent private schooling did not justify them in meeting “only a part" of the requirement by irregular attendance at a public school.61 Simi- larly, another family was convicted for allowing an admittedly talented child to skip school on Wednesday afternoons for the pur- pose of receiving ballet instruction, even though the child was sat- isfactory in her school work.62 The court's ruling seems to suggest that the purpose of Pennsylvania's education laws is to assure the child's physical presence, and not that certain learning take place. The extent to which Pennsylvania will go is shown in a series of cases in which a man named Marsh attempted to avoid having his son vaccinated, which was required as a condition for entering school by the state's compulsory attendancelaws. Marsh was convictedandjailed for violating this provision by his refusal to allow his son to be vaccinated, and the boy remained out of school for a period of years. Finally, the state brought an action to declare the boy delinquent and thereupon to remove him from his father's custody. The court observed that the boy had repeatedly attempted to enter school and thus could not properly be called delinquent, but ruled that the father's refusal to allow vaccination constituted a failure to edu- cate and thus neglect of his responsibilities. The boy was given over to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare, promptly served ou earlier, was depri contendin E exercise the neces interests the court for cause attendancv cises of l and excep: police pop stitutione hibited ti Re toiether , Power. It claim of r regmation ConvictiOn teasom'ng Amendment, eXEmpt fro F—"—'—_—" 110 promptly was vaccinated, and was admitted to school. His father served out his term. Had the interest of the child been considered earlier, he might not have lost the years of schooling of which he was deprived during the time in which the state and his father were 63 contending over the power to control his body. Even early cases in many states had placed limits on the exercise of the state's powers. In New Hampshire, while affirming the necessity of compulsory attendance to the meeting of the state's interests in familiar terms parallel to those in Eggg_(see p. 97), the court ruled that a child might be excused from school attendance 64 In New York City, the compulsory for cause, in this case, illness. attendance and child labor laws were upheld as constitutional exer- cises of police power, but, it was pointed out, legitimate limits 65 Arbitrary use of and exceptions to them might be established. police power to restrict the content of education was ruled uncon- stitutional when a challenge was made to a Nebraska law which pro- hibited the teaching of German in the public schools.66 Religion has been the source of a series of cases which have together served to clarify the limits on state exercise of police power. The principle had been established in a polygamy case that a claim of religious belief on a matter did not preclude government regulation of behavior relative to that issue. The court upheld the conviction of a Mormon for polygamy in spite of his religious beliefs, reasoning that while religious belief was protected by the First Amendment, not all acts following on such protected beliefs were exempt from control. The state may regulate, as properly under its control, beliefs 0| another's would be 1 gramnar 0| domestic : may neitht include 51 Pain of di mm. 1 Ti any behavi an imocuc leiuired c this to be guaranteed decision 0 had been 5 attenmtea having ref to the fl a was suffic aPheal to We ortl “is of 0p Which inC11 111 control, "secular” matters even though some person may have religious 67 Often one person's beliefs contradict beliefs on the subject. another's, so that without some such rule, many of society's actions would be stalemated. One family, for instance, opposed the study of 68; another, algebra69; yet another, grammar on religious grounds domestic science.70 The courts have uniformly held that children may neitherbesexcused from attendance because the public schools include subjects of which their parents disapprove nor required, on pain of dismissal, to participate in such study. (See Yollmar v. Stanley, p.101.) The state, on the other hand, may not legislate to require any behavior it wishes. The Board of Regents in New York prescribed an innocuous little prayer, bland and nonsectarian, to be part of required opening exercises in the public schools. The court held this to be an unconstitutional invasion of the right to free speech guaranteed in the First Amendment.71 The precedent for basing this decision on the right to free speech rather than the religious issue had been set in West Virginia v. Barnette, in which the state attempted to expel from school the children ofJehovah's Witnesses for having refused, on religious grounds, to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag as required. The court argued that the free speech issue was sufficient to make the requirement unconstitutional, without aPpeal to the religious basis, saying that the state might not pre- scribe orthodoxy in “politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat- ters of opinion.” The Bill of Rights protects freedom to speak, which includes freedom to keep silent, freedom not to be forced to ._vn. - I 11' !' say somet been used national to refuse sons, in A the power instructi State Uni not theol in-school property, l”eluired 0f‘Sthoo'l was a ill a enroiimen PUblic SC langUage ‘ 0f childr schooling T earner c. was a bent and not t, fur "Secu' transport,- F. "‘3 112 say something not belieVed.72 The precedent set in Barnette has been used to protect the right to avoid joining in singing the national anthem for-personal (non-religious) reasons73 and the right to refuse to participate in patriotic exercises for political rea— 74 sons, in this case the principles of a group of black Muslims. A more difficult issue in the relationship of religion to the power of the state has been that of public support for religious instruction. Some genuine oddities have resulted--in the City and State Universities of New York, it is legal to teach religion but not theology. The first of a series of recent cases ruled that in-school released time for religious instruction was a use of public property, and a subtle compulsion to participate placed on children required by law to be in the school, to establish religion.75 Out- of—school released time, however, was ruled constitutional,76 as was a plan devised by the Chicago Board of Education whereby a dual enrollment arrangement allowed students to take certain subjects in public schools and others in parochial schools. Justice Burke's language made it clear that what was deemed critical was the meeting of children's educational needs and not a particular plan for schooling.77 The state may not support religious education directly. In earlier cases, the United States Supreme Court had ruled that it was a benefit to the individual student, and therefore constitutional, and not to the school to provide parochial school students with texts for ”secular“ subjects such as science or mathematics78 or with bus 79 transportation to and from school. But when Rhode Island and Pennsylva of priVat the court that it t h of the ri late scho noted, a iustifica madam t0 whethe tution an The court the state formation them.83 . at least i later cha| civii rigi attelldanct taught'84 Pe iUthority at them or in partiCL tions baSe if, :U 113 Pennsylvania legislated tax funds for the support of "secular“ parts of priVate and parochial school education in a more extensive way, the court ruled it an unconstitutional establishment of religion in that it tended to make the schools in question more viable.80 None of the cases discussed as yet represents a direct test of the right of the state to use police power to establish and regu- late schools and to compel students to attend them, although, as noted, a number of the cases resulted in rulings which included a justification for the practice as basis for whatever decision was 81 made. Only once has a state supreme court been asked to rule as to whether or not that state might, under the United States Consti- tution and its own, compel parents to educate their children.82 The court ruled, for South Dakota at least, that the police power of the state unquestionably included that authority, both to compel the formation of schools and to compel and regulate attendance at them.83 The question has not been raised in court since, although at least certain critics, some of whose views will be discussed in later chapters, have renewed the claim that it is a violation of one's civil rights, and therefore a misuse of the state's power, to compel attendance at a school in which values, beliefs, and opinions are taught.84 Pending any renewed direct legal challenge to police power authority to establish and regulate schools and to require attendance at them or a showing of equivalent education as that may be defined in particular states, a modification of compulsory education regula- tions based on appeal to the child's rights and a claim that such rights ml PEEQB§.IE set down 1 that only though ti been exte exist, ti rights of wish to b extend ce cumstance consensus being the ment of t interfere will not that othe ties as e the child by their C Wh°m S0ci time~-sla Persons 0. cOmitant x ,—I 1". I 114 rights must be protected by the state under the newer conception of parens_patriae is frequently attempted. Certain decisions already set down provide a basis for such a redefinition. The question as to whether a child has rights at all is one that only recently has become one that is taken seriously. Even though there have been enough instances where a particular right has been extended to children to say that the rights of children do exist, the Supreme Court has not held that all the constitutional rights of adults extend to children. Rather, the court seems to wish to balance state interests against adult rights and only to extend certain adult rights to children under certain specific cir- cumstances.85 Both case law and enacted law recognize the social consensus that the parents are responsible for their children, as being the persons most likely to work for the welfare and develop- ment of the child. This responsibility, it is thought, ought be interfered with only when the child breaks the law or the parents will not or cannot control the child.86 In such cases, it is assumed that other adults, functioning as agents of the state in such capaci— ties as educators, welfare workers, or court personnel, will protect the child's interests without any need to consult the child affected by their decisions.87 Children are legally equivalent to other dependent groups whom society has defined as not having rights at various points in . . . 88 time--slaves, Ind1ans, marr1ed women. The basis for depriving such persons of rights seems to be the dependency; if a right is the con- comitant of a duty, then one who is not independent enough to be able to perfo becomes under co a parall wmas unlike w the chil to estab the powe peculiar may make than tho: Placed tl differ f, ference 5 mdthe! t'°” apps Parent ir d0)“9 So the child tected, w parents, parent“ 115 to perform duties may not logically claim rights, either. This becomes a peculiar—sounding claim in the case of persons clearly under compulsion to remain dependent. The difficulty with using such a parallel as a basis upon which to prescribe rights for children such as have been wOn by the other groups mentioned is that children, unlike wives or slaves or Indians, clearly are dependent; the younger the child, the more apparent the dependency. The slowness of courts to establish children's rights over against the rights of parents or the powers of the state is not simple conservatism. Still, it is a peculiarity worth considering that though the dependency of children may make their needs and interests in appropriate treatment greater than those of adults, many of the limitations of their rights are placed there on the basis of the special needs which cause them to differ from adults.89 The rights of parents can be interfered with, under E§E§fl§ patriae, as in the Qrggse case (see p. 99). Sometimes the inter- ference seems capricious, as in Shoreline (pp.lOS-7),Smoker(pp.lO8-9L and the Marsh cases(pp.109-110),in each of which the court in ques— tion appears to have ruled against a more or less conscientious parent in favor of upholding a rigid view of a point of law, and in doing so to neglect, and in all but Crouse, rather clearly to harm the child. A clearer notion that children have rights to be pro- tected, while in some instances resulting in diminishing control by parents, would in cases such as these protect the child and preserve parental authority as well. on the p claim, m source 0 Horace M his ISEI (The come prov thel Mann The duty merMh gflflflflg a State l Shammer that thei The Burgv Protectei 0f distr‘ discrimii turned a, Prepepty co"ditiOr cation wp llldividua tory for 116 Nevertheless, there is not a federal constitutional claim . on the part-of a child to receive an education, even though such a claim, made on behalf of society rather than the child, is the source of much of the state's use of authority to compel schooling. Horace Mann asserted that authority as a matter of natural law in his Tenth Annual Report: (There exists) the absolute right of every human being that comes into the world to an education; and which, of course, proves the correlative duty of every government to see that figfigngagaoof education are provided for all. [Emphasis, The duty of the state, thus described, has been written into the law; the right to an education has not. The general rule, established in ngmigg v. Richmond County Board of Education,9]-that education is a state rather than a federal function has been confirmed and sharpened in a 1970 Georgia case in which it was ruled explicitly that there is no federally protected right to a public education.92 The Burger court, stating flatly that education is not a federally protected right, rejected therefore an argument that the Texas system of district school financing violated children's rights by allowing discrimination in the funding of education.93 This decision over- turned an earlier one in which it had been ruled that California's property tax system was unconstitutional because it made wealth a condition for proper provision by a particular community of the edu- cation which the court described as a fundamental personal right of individuals.94 At the time, this earlier decision had seemed a vic- tory for the emerging doctrine that parens patriae obliged the state to prop by the ‘ No 2 the Stat libt to i of i The 3955 were not be true, mesmi them as “any of Mt individu court in dUtY" of those no eXtended andstat procedur in Court adults a dEmonstr ddVantag( 117 to protect the child against unequal treatment of the sort prohibited by the 14th Amendment: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any persgg within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. The Roderiguez decision implied further that children as a class were not to be recipients of special protection. There is, if this be true, no need to require general equality of treatment of children; the state, having their interests at heart, can be trusted to protect them as completely as is necessary. Such a notion seems on the face of it contrary to experience. Many of the decisions which have helped shape the emerging concept of parens patriae have dealt withinstancesaf official interference with individual rights. The doctrine was expressed effectively by the court in an Oklahoma case: parens patriae includes the "power and duty“ of the state to protect "minors, those who are insane, and those not competent to protect themselves."96 In 1967, the court extended the rights of children, on the basis of a careful review and statement of this conception of parens patriae, to include full procedural protection equal to that which is the right of an adult in court: “Neither the 14th Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."97 In general, the pattern in Gault, in which an individual is demonstrated to have been treated in a manner that works to his dis- advantage and is not parallel to treatment given others, is required for a s particu the £911 of the the dec court t an armbt Amendmet ruled tl the trac black st deemed i effectiv students reached: the Pers Just mina Should t ful ing j question he reduci SomUch. attend tl tibertyu IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII_________________________________________________:Z§II"I 118 for a successful claim that the court must intervene on behalf of a particular child. Such a showing was the basis for the deciSion in ‘ 'the.§[Qwfl case, in which a violation of the equal protection clause . of the 14th Amendment was found in segregated schools.98 Similarly, I) the decision in linker v. Des Moines rested on a finding by the court that the school's suspension of the Tinker youth for wearing an armband in protest of the Vietnam war was a violation of the First 99 Amendment right to freedom of speech. In Hobsen v. Hansen, it was ruled that individual rights for equal treatment were violated by the tracking system in District of Columbia schools, because poor black students consistently wound up in tracks which gave what was 100 The court accepted an argument that deemed inferior education. effective education would result in reasonably equal outcomes for students, apparently. In a local case in Boston, a more ambitious conclusion was reached: the right to receive a public school education is a basic personal right or liberty. Consequently, the burden of justifying any school rule or regulation limiting 8i ter- minating that right is on the school authorities.1 Should the Supreme Court affirm such a position, contrary to its ruling in Roderiguez, the sort of variability in answers to such questions as that of what constitutes equivalent instruction might be reduced. Such a ruling does not seem likely, not least because so much attention has been paid to means of compelling students to attend the schools. It is a curious sort of ”personal right or liberty" which one must be compelled to claim. restrict §tatg v. court ru by the t of their could de in spite the case Of the 5' religion: Adventis' refused 1 She belit that she Densatioi suCh a 1‘6 ruled, mt Shefbert, Would be T 'ihg into reQUlatio ObieCtWe 119 The limits of the current Supreme Court's willingness to restrict the state's authority appear to have been approached in gtgtg v. Igggr, the celebrated Wisconsin Amish case. Here the court ruled that the police power of the state could be overridden by the traditional interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children, protected by the First Amendment,unless the state could demonstrate a ”compelling interest” in making its rule apply in spite of the infringement on religious belief.102 The doctrine of 9compelling interest" had been enunciated in the case of Sherbert v. Verner, in which the precedent of Reynolds v. United States(seepp.llO—D tothe effect that secular interests of the state, in that case in suppressing polygamy, could override religious convictions was modified. Ms. Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, had been denied unemployment compensation because she refused to accept a job requiring her to work on Saturdays, which she believed to be the Sabbath. The court ruled that the requirement that she accept such a job or forfeit her right to unemployment com- pensation amounted to a restriction of her religious beliefs. Though such a requirement was reasonable for others, the state, it was ruled, must show a compelling reason why the rule must apply to Ms. Sherbert, why making an exception based on her religious beliefs would be against the interests of the state.103 The decision in nggr, in focusing on the question of compel- ling interest, suggested that an adequate defense against state regulations regarding education might be a showing that the state's objectives for education were being met, and that therefore it could be argu was ess unclear case on the rig with pa be emphr educatit tial dis to leave identica as to hi Preceden testimon affairs, a child exPress - ( ageoftr Without c 1970.105 in Which SChools t fer 0ffen that a Ch “WW“ H l 120 be argued that the state had no reason to insist that its regulation was essential. Whether or not this was the intent of the court is unclear, since the religious issue clouds the case. Only a future case on another point will disclose whether the court was protecting the right to religious belief or the right to minimal interference with parental power to control a child's education. nggr, it should be emphasized, did not question the right of parents to determine the '” education of their child. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his par- tial dissent, relating to the one child that had not declared a desire to leave school, it was assumed that the interests of the child were identical to those of the parents. He favored inquiring of the child as to his desires. Such an idea is not unreasonable nor without precedent. Children, frequently of rather young ages, have given testimony accepted as competent on matters having to do with adult affairs, and it should not be impossible to conduct a questioning of a child that Would suffice to indicate ability or lack of it to express interests and desires independently.104 Children's rights and interests seem affected greatly by the age of the child in question. The right to vote was extended, not without opposition, to l8-year—olds and was ruled constitutional in l970.105 A year later, the Supreme Court refused to review a case in which a Texas court had ruled that it was constitutional for the schools to use any degree of corporal punishment thought necessary for offenses against school rules, rejecting specifically a claim that a child's rights include the adult freedom from "cruel and unusual" punishments.106 rights a efforts regulati vidual c sion bas whether it might interest Presumpt heard on in Yoder accepted will be ei‘nmenta 1e9islat States, Particul Ciated 1“ Once the interpre- StUdr, tl Villeug ( mary inc? lZl This tendency to consider age in deciding whether adult rights are possessed by children may point the direction for future efforts to establish workable and realistic compulsory attendance regulations. It would not be a large step to begin focusing on indi- vidual differences among children. Rather than making blanket deci- sion based on chronological age as to what may be permitted or whether the interests of the state or those of parents may prevail, it might be possible for consideration to be given as well to the interests of the child as s/he is able to articulate them, with a presumption that a more articulate child is more competent to be heard on his/her own behalf. This would follow the argument offered in nggr by Justice Douglas. Further, extending the ruling in gaglt, it is becoming an accepted principle that all procedural rights possessed by adults will be recognized for children whenever the schools or other gov- ]07 This needs only specific ernmental authority moves against them. legislative actions at particular points to be confirmed by most states. The establishment of a child's claim to this, or any other particular right, and especially the sort of right to education enun— ciated in Qrgwgy v. Hargraves, requires a decision by the legislature. Once the right is established, the courts then must enforce it and interpret its limits.108 Such questions are not wholly germane to the purpose of this StUdy, though they do cast some light on certain claims made by various critics or defenders of compulsory education laws. A sum- mary includes at least the following points: compel at then dren, w limited selecti state's state 0 0f poli student be read that ch' Vlde for meopm 0f its a to defen VldUa] h interest when. doing so F4444444444444444444444444444444:::Z:iiiiiiiiIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIEEEEEEZEEZSII'fi l22 l. the police power of the state is adequate authority to compel learning, provision and regulation of schools, and attendance at them; i 2. parental rights to control the education of their chil- dren, while circumscribed by the state's police power, include a limited control over choice of curriculum in public schools, the selection of a nonpublic school from among those meeting a given state's regulations, or the choice of non-school learning if the state of their residence permits such an option; 3. other constitutional rights limit the state's exercise of police power: school rules may not be used to deprive either students or parents of rights; 4. non-performance of the obligation to educate a child may be reason enough to terminate or limit a parent's right to control that child's education; 5. conversely, a showing that the state is failing to pro- vide for the education of a child, or doing so in a way not equal to the opportunity it gives other children, may be reason for regulation of its actions by a higher court under the obligation of the state to defend the rights of individuals as paren§_patriae; 6. there is no legal standing to any claim that an indi— vidual has a right to education, though the state for its own interests, among which is the welfare of its citizens, asserts an obligation to compel learning and to provide appropriate means for doing so. arrange schools ing of as will as thos lmgmg trovers 123 The law has limited ability to control the quality of social arrangements-~many of the things most abhorrent about particular schools are perfectly legal--and so a statement of the legal stand- ing of a claim does not necessarily respond to the concern. But, as will be seen, many claims and counter-claims involve suCh issues as those discussed here and might be clarified by careful use of language and definitions and examples from the legal record of con- troversies over education. can Edu America th and 2. pp. (Oxford f0rd: 5 neaDO1 1'5 FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III 1R. Freeman Butts, ”Search for Freedom: The Story of Ameri- can Education,” NEA Journal 49 (March 1960): 34. 2William Lawrence Clark, Elementary Law (New York: The American Book Co. , 1909), p. . , 3James M. Baldwin, ed. ,"Restraint," Dictionar of Philoso— phy and Psychology (Glouster, Mass. Peter Smith Co., 19575, Vol. 2, pp. 469- 470. 4Ibid., "Constraint," Vol. 1, p. 211. 5George N. Paton, A Textbook of Juris rudence, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19645, p. 301. 6E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., and Robert B. Hamilton, The Law of Public Education (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 19705, p. l. 7Paton, pp. 303-304. 81bid., p. 309. 9Baldwin, "Free and Freedom," Vol. l, p. 395. 10Henry C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. , 19275. PP. 511-512. HJohn Plamenatz, "Rights," Aristotelian Society Supple- mentary Volume 24, 1950, p. 75, quoted by Francis Schrag, "The Right to Educate," School Review 79 (May 1971): 36 12Paton, pp. 261-262. 13Baldwin, ”State of Nature," Vol. 2, p. 600. 14 Julius Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (Stan- ford: Stanford University Press, 19665, p. 28 15Lee 0. Garber, Education As a Function of the State (Min- neapolis: Educational Test Bureau, 1934), pp. l7-18. 16 Stone, p. 278. 124 Univen Public (l954). tional was not App. 24. 207 (l94 17 Garber, p. 18. 18Paton, p. 120. 19Fogg v. Board of Education 76 N.H. 296, 82 A. 173 (1912). ' ZOStanley Schultz, The Culture Factory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 302-303. 1G orge H. Martin, The Evolution of the Massachusetts 2 - e Public School System (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1894 , p. 13. 22Brown v. Board of Education 347 u.s. 483, 74 s.cc. 691 (1954). 23Hi11ary Rodham, "Children Under the Law,” Harvard Educa- tional Review 43 (November 1973): 498. 24Schrag, p. 363. 25Quoted in the opinion of Justice Kane in School Board of District 18, Garvin Count v. Thompson 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909) in the course of ruling that the state could not punish parents for a failure to obey the new Oklahoma compulsory attendance law. The legislature subsequently revised the law and the revision apparently was not challenged. 25g; parte Crouse 54 Penna. (4 Whart.) 9, 11 (1839). 27Crouse, p. 11. 28Quigiey v. State 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 638 (1891). 29Antelope Valley High School District v. McClellan 55 Cal. App. 244, 203 P. 147 (1921). 30Lawton v. Steel 152 u.s. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499 (1894). 31Board of Education v. Purse lOl Ga. 422, 28 S.E. 896 (1897). 32$tate v. Bailey 157 Ind. 324 (1901). 33Ifl_r§_Alley 182 N.w. 36o (Wisc.) (1921). 34Grigsby v. Mitchum 191 Kans. 293, 380 P. 2d 363 (1963). 35Alford v. Board of Education 298 Ken. 803, 184 s.w. 2d 207 (1944). 36Ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927). City Do in Will Open Co (1925). (1968). 528 (18 (1953) "compu.| School, (1950), 2d 177, 126 37Dobbins v. Commonwealth 198 Va. 697, 96 S.E. 2d 154 (1957). 38;p_3e_3kipwith 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (N.Y. City Dom. Rel. Ct., Ch. cc. Div., 1958). '''''''''''' ‘ 39Robert P. Baker, "Statute Law and Judicial Interpretations" in William F. Rickenbacker, The Twelve-Year Sentence (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court Press, 1974), p. 102. 4°State v. Counort 69 wash. 361 (1912). 41State v. Will 99 Kans. 167 (1912). 42Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). 43 Board of Education v. Allen 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923 (1968). 44Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 45State v. Peterman 32 Ind. App. 665 (1904). 46Wright v. State 209 P. 179 (1922). 47State v. Garber 197 Kans. 567, 419 P. 2d 896 (1966). 48Peop1e v. Turner 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P. 2d 685 (1953) appeal dismissed 347 U.S. 972 (1954). 49People v. Turner 277 App. Div. 317, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 886 (1950). 50A. Hacker, Political Theory, cited by Robert P. Baker, "Compulsory Education in the United States: Big Brother Goes to School,” Seton Hall Law Review 3, No. 3 (1972): 354—355. 51People v. Levison 404 I11. 574, 577, 90 N.E. 2d 213, 215 (1950). 52Ex rel. Shoreline School District v. Superior Court 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346_PT_20 999, cert. den. 363 U.S. 814 (1960). 53Stevens v. Bongart 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (1937). 54Knox v. O'Brien 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A. 2d 389 (1950). 55State v. Massa 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A. 2d 252 (1967). 56Commonwea1th v. Edsall 13 Penna. D.R. 509 (1903). Co. 191 134 (15 740 (19 (1950). 512 (19 Penna. (1904). 303 (189 624, 63 (1955) of EdUcai 127 57Commonwealth v. Snyder 15 Penna. D.R. 765 (1906). 58Commonwealth v. Petersheim 70 Penna. D.&.C. 432 (Somerset Co. 1949), affirmed 166 Penna. Super. 90, 70 A. 2d 395 (1950). ' 59Commonwea1th v. Beiler 168 Penna. Super. 562, 79 A. 2d 134 (1951). 60Commonwealth v. Smoker 177 Penna Super. 435, 110 A. 2d 740 (1955). ( ) 61Commonwea1th v. Bey 166 Penna. Super. 136, 70 A. 2d 693 1950 . - 62Commonwea1th v. Rapine 88 Penna. D.&.C. 453 (1954). 63Ex rel. Marsh v. Lindsey 130 Penna. Super. 448, 198 A. 512 (1938)E‘M5F§h v. Earle 24 F. Supp. 385 (1938); Marsh's Case 140 Penna. Super. 472, 14 A. 2d 368 (1940). 64 65 (1904). 66Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 626 (1923). State v. Jackson 71 N.H. 552 (1902). City of New York v. Chelsea Jute Mills 88 N.Y.S. 1085 67Reynoids v. U.S. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 68Trustees of School v. People gx_rel, Van Allen 87 Ill. 303 (1897). 69State v. Mizner 50 Iowa 145 (1878). 70§x_§§1, Kelley v. Ferguson 95 Web. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914). 71Enge1 v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 72West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1185 (1943). 73She1don v. Fannin 221 F. Supp. 766 (0. Ariz. 1963). 74Ho1den v. Board of Education 46 N.J. 281, 216 A. 2d 387 (1966). 75People of the State of Illinois §x_re1. McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 464 (1948)?— 76Zorach v. Clawson 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 684 (1952). App. : 370, 1 (1947] Levisc (1950) York: on the pp (1899), SectiOn 128 . 77Morton et al. v. Board of Education of Chicago 69 Ill. App. 2d 38 (1966). ' 78Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education 281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335 (1930). ( 7) 79Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 512 194 . 8OLemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1970). 81E.g.,Everson v. Bd. of Ed. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); People v. Levison 404 Ill. 574 (1950); Knox v. O'Brien 7 N.J. Super. 608 (1950); Fogg v. Bd. of Ed. 76 N.H. 296 (1912). 82Baker, ”Compulsory Education,” p. 353. 83State v. Williams 56 S. Oak. 370, 228 N.W. 470 (1929). 84Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucrac , and Schools (New York: Praeger Publishers, 19715, p. 143. 85Rodham, p. 498. 86 Schrag, pp. 366-367. 87Rodham, p. 490. 88Ibid., p. 493. 891bid., p. 488. 90 . . . Lawrence Crem1n, The Republic and the School. Horace Mann on the Education of Free Men New York: Teachers College Press, 19575, p. 63. 91Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 92Peacock v. Riggsbee 309 F. Supp. 542 (0. Ga. 1970). 93San Antonio Independent School District v. Roderiguez 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4120, March 1973. 94Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1949 (1971). 9514th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Section I. 96McIntosh v. Dill 86 0k1a. 1, 205 P. 917 (1922). 1 (1954) (March ' 409 U.3 to an I III|IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIF_____________________________T:]Il'r’T 129 97Ifl_[g_Gau1t 387 U.S. 1 (1967). ( ) 98Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 691 1954 . 99Tinker v.DesMoines 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 100Hobsen v. Hansen 269 F.Supp. 401 (D.C.D.C. 1967). 1010rdway v. Hargraves Mass. Dist. Ct. Civil Action 71-540—C (March'1971). 1OZState v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (1972). 103Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 104Rodham, p. 508. 1050regon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 1-06Ware v. Estes 328 F.Supp. 657 (N.I. Texas 1971) cert. den. 409 U.S. 1027 (1971) 107Rodham, pp. 506-508. 108Tyll Van Geel, "Does the Constitution Establish a Right to an Education?“ School Review 82 (February 1974). 323. groups offer. partic rather can re ment t Map m to usi zen, h and $111 Person by Wh1l SChOOl! the nu 5a: Sh thi vh mil CHAPTER IV SOME HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS Those who favored compulsory education can be placed in two groups on the basis of the sort of argument which they tended to offer.’ Those who opposed it seem to have criticized proposals for particular compulsory education legislation in a reactionary way rather than by offering alternative propositions, and therefore can readily be considered along with the proponents of whatever argu- ment they were attacking. One group of proponents offered arguments of a police power sort; the other presented arguments of a parens patriae character. Daniel Webster phrased the police power argument well, even to using the word "police" in a “Discourse at Plymouth." Every citi- zen, he said, was taxed on his property for the support of education and Should be pleased to have it so, for schooling for every young person was to be looked on as "a wise and liberal system of police, by which property, and life, and the peace of society are secured."1 Schools, he argued, teach virtue and knowledge and thereby reduce the number in jail and, along with law and religion, help turn peo- ple against immorality and crime. Education helps give a safe and proper direction to the public will. By the diffu- sion of general knowledge and good and virtuous sentiments, the political fabric may be secure, as well against open violence and overthrow as against the Slow but sure under- mining of licentiousness. 130 dealt soned had be racy a in kno teachi one of indivi peacef in the what t do, in 15 exp in a n side 0 (1837) there learne exerci: inmora' ComPUh $055591 E a"911mm 131 The positive side of police power arguments of this sort dealt with education for one's duties as citizen. People who rea— soned this way-seemed to see morals, if no longer religion, as it had been in Colonial times, and the preservation of American democ— racy as essentially one matter. Education would unify all citizens in knowledge and character such as to support the American way by teaching them the wise use of freedom. The character desired was ', one of moralized restraint, of internal sanctions such that the individual would choose to behave in ways which would result in peaceful prosperity for himself and others.3 There was great faith in the power of knowledge: it was believed that people who know what to do will usually Choose to do it, as Jefferson had argued. It was not long before it was realized that some individuals do, in fact, resist restraining themselves even when they know what is expected of them. Thus Mann, for all his grounding of education in a natural right of every human to be taught, came down on the side of the use of force, where necessary, in his First Annual Report (1837). He saw it as not adequate merely to inform people, because there is no compelling quality to knowledge such as to prevent learned persons from choosing evil. There must be controls over the exercise of freedom such that no one may evade learning nor practice immorality. Government by force he thought preferable to anarchy. Compulsory attendance laws were seen as a minimal use of force, by some, at least. Thus it was that the positive aspect of the police power argument was relatively easily submerged by negative forms. Educat harmfu of tho was th prone by for Few ca using other chief tion t most 5 Patter lives, elevat Since keepin It was intend means Power m1Sery 0Ppose 01‘ t0 132 Education would serve to control persons otherwise potentially harmful: "Liberty is the most dangerous of all weapons in the hands of those who know not the use and value of it . . . ."4 The duty of government to protect citizens against disorder was thought by many to be sufficient warrant for restraining those prone to disorder; to do so by means of forced education rather than by force of arms was an enlightened and humane attempt in many ways. Few can be found to defend the right of persons to break the law by using violence, trickery, or corruption to seize the property of other citizens. Especially when it was thought that poverty was the chief factor predisposing persons to crime, it was an obvious solu- tion to project the use of education to reduce, if not quite to end, most social problems. Trained while young in the learning and habit patterns used by proper middle—class citizens to secure comfortable lives, the children of the poor might at one and the same time be elevated to prosperity and educated away from crime and vice.5 And since the poor understandably fear and resent those whom they see as keeping them down, they would naturally resist education even when it was intended to do them good. Therefore, the society which intended to wipe out poverty, crime, and vice through giving the means to self-improvement to the poor was justified in using its power to break the pattern which it was thought created such human misery by making education compulsory.6 The theory was clear enough, and beneficent enough that few opposed it other than those seeking to resist the necessary taxes, or to reduce them by modifying the proposals away from the common 41 — - -""{"_.‘- El’l . schoo paupe seek that, One k in ac becau vate: them i Habm Maine, Islanc earlie and So neighb he sai 1 illi New En pauDer for th 1 of 5 he acc Area. Whites 133 school notion of public education for all toward a less expensive paupereducationat public cost, with those who could afford it to seek their own preferred type of schooling.7 1 Soon, those who disapproved were able to make factual claims that, however noble the theory, the schools were not succeeding. One 19th century educator reasoned that, so poor were public schools in actuality, they accentuated rather than reduced social differences because all who could afford to do so sent their children to a pri— vate school. If knowledge was power, it benefited the rich and kept them ascendant to give the poor an ineffective education.8 Another 19th century opponent, Zach Montgomery, presented an elaborate statistical argument comparing native white citizens in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, the New England states where compulsory education came earliest, to those in Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Georgia, North and South Carolina, the states of the eastern Confederacy and close neighbors, where compulsory education was resisted longest. In 1860, he said, there were among such native white adults in New England 1 illiterate in every 312 and in the Southeast, 1 in 12. But in New England, he claimed, 1 of 1,084 were criminals, 1 of 178 were paupers and 1 of 13,285 committed suicide. The comparable figures for the Southeast were 1 of 6,670 criminals; 1 of 345 paupers; and 1 of 56,584 suicides. He argued that the observed differences could be accounted for by the system of education characteristic of each area. He found that in 1870 New England had 1 of 2,077 native whites who were criminals; 1 of 216 who were paupers; and 1 of 800 who w the n 10,68 the i crime catio crime which causii studei laws 1 force: the re The cc in a 5 Spicuc them 1 to de] 134 who were confined to institutions for the insane. In the Southeast, the numbers were 1 in 1,178 criminals; l in 468 paupers; and 1 in 10,681 insane. He correlated the rise in crime in the Southeast with the increase in public schools, which be blamed for the increase in crime.9 It was not actually the case, he reasoned, that public edu— cation caused crime. Rather, ignorance, which is the true source of crime and poverty in his view, was not removed by ”false education," ’4 which he argued was the appropriate label for the public schools.10 Others were not so sure that schools were not guilty of causing crime. Anna Reed cited evidence Showing that many of the students who were compelled by compulsory attendance and child labor laws to remain in school until a specified age were at that point 11 She argued that forced out of school unprepared for most jobs. the result was to frustrate and anger them into violence and crime. The compulsory attendance laws, by compelling such students to remain in a system whose workings led to retarding them till they were con- spicuously larger and older than their classmates, which embarrassed them into truancy and rebellion, contributed to the factors that led to delinquency and crime.12 The issue was joined in a pair of articles in the Nppph American Review in the winter of 1880-1881. Richard Grant White, a rather well-known Shakespearean Scholar, issued a challenge much like that of Zach Montgomery to the belief that public education had had the effect of reducing crime, corruption, and poverty. White in particular opposed the raising of compulsory attendance require- ments to include secondary schools. He argued that the reasoning whic —T' 135 which held that education was attacking the root of crime, vice, and corruption by enabling men to escape poverty was too simplistic, to begin with: crime and other evil correlate with ignorance and both correlate with poverty, but the frequent examples of educated, intelligent, and wealthy criminals were adequate to refute any claim of a relationship strong enough for education to be the simple remedy.13 The effects of schools, White claimed, after 50 years of com- pulsory education (by which he meant compulsory provision of schools) had been an increase in crime and vice and a decrease in willingness to be farmers and laborers among those whose lack of gifts prevented them from becoming business or professional men.14 It made no sense, he said, to talk now of compelling attendance for even longer periods of time in an institution which had the impact of deterioration in purity of morals, in decency of life, in thrift, and in all that goes to make good citizens, accom- panied by a steadily increasing failure ipsthe acquirement of the very elements of useful knowledge. Since the public school had not made men good and thrifty and happy, nor enabled democratic government to reach its goals, White argued, it was inappropriate to seek to extend it. Rather, public education should end with grammar school and any schooling beyond that should be strictly a matter of free enterprise, save perhaps for scholar- ships for the ambitious and capable among the poor. The protection of the state depended upon something other than education, once minimal levels of learning were reached, in White's view.16 the l publi schoc amour whici taugh visio he ar ”not Point Poten not q educa have New h Schoo‘ theory d15t11 throng Bisho; FranCe the Fr Could hOuld 136 John D. Philbrick, who was at the time the superintendent of the Boston public schools, responded to White. The success of the public schools, he said, was evident in the increase in numbers of I schools, teachers, and normal schools; in the vast increase in amounts of public money spent on education; in the improved system which could be seen in graded texts and schools, in unified methods taught by teacher training institutions, and in centralized super- vision; and in increased demands for higher education.17 Besides, he argued, White was not fair in blaming the public schools for "18 He thus ignored White's "not solving all the ills of society. point that the schoolmen themselves had made just this claim for the potential of the public schools. He further claimed that White was not qualified in the first place to criticize, Since he was not an 19 Had White been an educator,argued Philbrick, he would educator. have known, forinstance, of such official reports as that of the New York state superintendent in 1880, which testified that the schools were, in fact, doing their job.20 Philbrick went on to refute White's claim that the basic theory of public education was not correct by citing a long list of distinguished authorities who said it was, ranging from De Toqueville through Siljestrdm, a Swedish educator who wrote on U.S. schools; Bishop Fraser and Francis Adams of Great Britain; M. Hippeau of France; Emile Laveleye of Belgium; and M. Buisson, the president of the French Educational Commission to the Philadelphia Exposition. Could so many eminent authorities be wrong, he asked rhetorically. Would citizens willingly Spend tax money for a failure?21 not, than exam had ‘ the 1 concr faill argue money grams coulc have who 1 aPPar corru C01111110 atten based throu incl 0 malor tioni assim 591101“; .137 Though this characteristically bureaucratic response does not, on the face of it, reply to the issues raised by White, other than by reaffirming the challenged principles, it serves as a fair example of the manner in which such factual claims that the schools had failed were turned into arguments for continuing and extending the state's control of education. The defenders of public schooling conceded the truth of the showing of failure, but denied that such failure was evidence for rejecting the approach. Rather, it was argued, the public schools could succeed in their efforts if enough money were made available; if increased control over texts, pro- grams, methods and teachers were allowed; if all the recalcitrants could be compelled to take part. The public, knowing themselves to have benefited from learning, readily accepted the theory that those who had not as yet improved themselves must be forced to do so, apparently. In any case, the conspicuous failure of crime, violence, 1 corruption, and poverty to fade away under the attentions of the common school did nothing to inhibit the adoption of compulsory attendance laws. Rather, there was a notable Shift in arguments based upon police power theories to an emphasis on the control through education of persons defined as threats to democracy, which included the poor, immigrants, minorities, and nonprotestants as major groups. New York City principal John T. Buchanan argued that ”educa- tion will solve every problem of our national life, even that of 22 assimilating our foreign element.“ Using the familiar theory that ignorance leads to poverty and crime, both of which are fertile soil for t tance natic zen, parag schoo dicto educa sight ship, whose men 5 916mm Deopl the u: from 1 EXpeyv ter 0' educa; the g Produ< "impel educal 24.9 ( “Unat IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII'IIIIIIIIIIII:::: “"F;.; 138 for the growth of anarchy, as basis for his claim as to the impor- tance of education as sovereign remedy, Buchan asserted that “the nation has a right to demand intelligence and virtue of every citi- 23 He ended his zen, and to obtain them by force if necessary." paragraph with the slogan "a free people must be developed by free schools,“ which does not seem to have sounded to him at all contra- dictory to the use of force to compel participation. Compulsory education would protect foreigners against their own lack of fore- sight by equipping them with the tools for success and for citizen- ship, namely, association with intellectual and honorable people, whose modeling of higher aspirations was a significant value of com- mon school mingling of all classes of citizen; good idiomatic, grammatical English; and knowledge of the country, government, and people of the United States.24 While some could view this in positive termS--Hand called the use of schools to educate ”native-born stock" and "foreigners from all quarters of the globe“ to a Single citizenry a "stupendous experiment in government“25--others emphasized the dangerous charac- ter of those who were the objects of the concern. Allen described education as a “social insurance" which is justified by the duty of the state to protect itself, with any gain to individuals as a by- 6 product.2 Suzallo described as the biggest enemy of education the "imperfectly Americanized American" who sees "no connection between education and democracy."27 Ensign, citing a 1919 report that fpund 24.9 percent of 1.5 million Illinois draftees functionally illiterate —-unable to read military messages or to write letters home--remarked that class tionl quali for t since repre ance immig rapid The 9 fixed ”Glthi enfon hmerir wedge and Cy grants attenc 139 that "some comfort can be derived from the fact that of those classed as illiterates 14.2% are negroes and a considerable propor— 23 The fault lay with the tion of the remainder foreign-born." quality of the illiterates themselves, in his view; had it not been for the influx of foreigners, the battle for literacy would long since have been won. He presented statistics from 1918 for five representative states to back his claim: % of all % of % of citizens native-born foreign-born state illiterate illiterate illiterate Connecticut 6.0 0.5 15.4 Massachusetts 5.2 0.4 17.7 New York 5.5 0.8 13.7 Pennsylvania 5.9 1.4 20.1 Wisconsin 3.2 0.6 8.7 29 Such figures were used as arguments for compulsory attend- ance laws, and for an improved effort at enforcement of them among immigrants in particular. *The intent was to protect society by a rapid and effective socialization of newcomers to American ways. The school was meant to function as the initiator into a relatively fixed and homogeneous belief and behavior pattern, one which was 30 neither fluid nor pluralistic. Where compulsory attendance was enforced and schools effective in inducting the young into the American version of the English culture, public education became a wedge that Split immigrant children from their parents in language and customs.31 The claim that illiteracy was chiefly to be blamed on immi- 32 grants was challenged directly. Alternative plans to compulsory attendance at regular public schools were proposed, such as the part whic comp ingn cani in p for petb atin legi larg none the | 119911 ted : unive blacl Dulsc coulc Contr Count Clal'n hemai all 0 SeDar 140 part-time, after work hours, education at a "continuation school" which was defended by William Dooley.33 Nevertheless, the idea that compulsory attendance was a useful and necessary attack on the will- ingness of the foreign—born to ignore education which would Ameri— canize them became an article of faith. Only one significant group was ignored in this process, and in painful irony, that group, blacks, had great faith in and desire for the power they viewed as coming from learning. Because the car— petbagger governments of the post-War South did not succeed in cre- ating effective schools or in enforcing compulsory attendance legislation, whites were able to ignore the integrated schools in large numbers.34 The Peabody Fund, which poured a great deal of money into efforts to upgrade Southern schooling, probably aided the process whereby black education was made separate, and then neglected, by failing to demand as the price of its support integra- ted schools.35 Some white supremacists put forth the argument that universal education was a sure way to raise poor whites above blacks to a "noble and privileged character“ and so favored com— 36 The racist argument that blacks pulsory provision of schools. could not or would not take advantage of educational opportunity was contradicted by the success of such schools as Tuskeegee Institute. Counter-arguments were proposed such as that of William Hand, who claimed that the results of allowing both whites and blacks to remain untaught rather than integrating schools were negative for all of society.37 Nevertheless, the belief that blacks required separate schools for the goodiyfboth races becameauiarticle of faith. power white resul atter part pggrj resis was v perso was a as pg gover expre democ 18 to Where "loya' force1 consi( and DC Means COndjt the Gr when t EdUcat 141 That the increasingly negative character of these police power arguments for controlling those thought to be dangerous to the white, protestant, anglo—saxon middle and upper classes did not result in strong opposition to compulsory schools and compulsory attendance from the objects of the intended control is surely due in part to a conception of schooling on their part based on a pppgpg patriae argument. Among those who might otherwise have resented and resisted the effort to control them by means of schooling, education was viewed as an instrument of success. Learning would enable any person to reach whatever potential s/he had, they believed, and thus was a weapon against the wealthy and privileged classes. By acting as ppp§g§_patriae in providing this means to self—realization, the government both protected the inalienable rights of individuals and 38 expressed what commitment to democracy and freedom meant. "In a democracy such as ours the primary object in educating the people is to make good, intelligent, loyal, and prosperous citizens."39 Where the uneasy elite focused on such adjectives as "good" and "loyal" in statements like this and saw education as a benign use of force, the ambitious attended to "intelligent" and "prosperous" and considered provision of schooling a protection against the economic and political power of elites. Free education was an effective means of providing children with opportunity to achieve the proper 40 Thus farmers and their organizations, such as conditions of life. the Grange and the Farm Bureau, began to favor compulsory attendance when they ceased being geared to farming as a permanent occupation. Education is not critical to an agrarian way of life, but it becomes esse orga purp mark stab inter as we argun (1831 catic moral nei socie of th He an Paid tivit h(JlJea' 5UPDor PFOdU( for t1 dUCtlc of his 142 essential when mobility in society becomes important.‘ Similarly, organized labor saw formal education as largely irrelevant to its purposes, other than as a means to remove children from the labor market. Education's value was to the individual, in helping improve status within the culture, and not to labor as a class with an interest in changing the culture.41 Clear benefit for the wealthy and privileged could be seen ' as well in such economic gains, so that acceptance of pppgp§_patriae arguments was not necessarily a class matter. Mann's First Report (1837), for instance, had included among the purposes of public edu- cation, both a police power objective, to provide the knowledge and morality essential to the security of the state, and a pgpgpg patriae goal, to supply the tools for individual success, upon which society's prosperity is based.42 Mann aimed certain appeals at wealthy employers because many of them were originally opposed to public education in Massachusetts. He argued, for instance, in the Fifth Report (1842) that education paid off economically in efficient work leading to higher produc— tivity, and thus increased profits.43 Henry Barnard amplified this appeal to stress the benefit to the wealthy of an ”investment" in support for public education which would result in further wealth produced by more effective employees, as well as in greater security for the possessors of wealth.44 But to understand Mann as interested primarily in the pro- duction of docile company men, as both his detractors and certain of his supporters have,45 is to underrate him. Mann did have a basi sing serv tion soci made thei slavi theh doim poor beha' Mann' was 0 C°hDu inspi by in t1'on atthe 143 basic commitment to industrial capitalism--the good habits expres- sing the moral values he commended were effective qualification for service in business and industry, e.g., punctuality, sobriety, ambi- tion, industriousness--but his belief that wealth carried with it social obligations to better the life and opportunities of the poor made him anything but a tool for conservative elites. He criticized the wealthy when they exploited the poor, and he opposed corruption, slavery, and the devices by which the privileged in society used 46 In their superiority to maintain themselves in favored positions. doing so, he provided arguments which were to be persuasive to the poor and upwardly mobile, who hoped to use education on their own behalf, as well as to the successful. The fact that extended education seemed to benefit the mid- dle class more than it did the poor or minorities--helping males into business jobs rather than industrial ones, and females into teaching-—did not keep the argument that education was the source of economic advancement from being a generally compelling one in gain; ing support for compulsory attendance laws from the lower class. Later, a police power economic argument would be built on Mann's logic. If education helped the economy grow, then the state was obliged to provide schools and compel its citizens to use them. Compulsory education, by this reasoning, benefited the economy by inspiring and enabling development of discoveries and inventions; by improving and extending commerce through the greater participa- tion of more successful citizens whom the schools produced; by _ attracting capital and useful immigrants; by helping more citizens tol a cl or) succ of l exte zenr chil and were poli comp redu them: Weall Del 1 less. for p Some vidud and m were tutio lndiv‘ gOVem 144 to be usefully employed and thus self-supporting; and by providing a cheaper and more desirable way to deal-with the poor than welfare or prisons.48 Once it was accepted that education led to economic success for both individuals and the culture, then the investment of taxpayers in the public school came to be a powerful argument for extending and strengthening compulsory attendance laws: the citi- zenry could only be considered repaid when use of the schools by all p children had reduced to the minimum the social costs of ignorance and its attendant evils. Since those most resistant to schooling were also those most costly in social services of all sorts--welfare, police and courts, free hospitals, penal and reform institutions-- compelling them to receive schooling was a common-sense effort to reduce their cost to the taxpayers while enabling them to support themselves. This would amount to a double gain for the economy.49 AcceptanCe of taxes for education was not universal. Many wealthy individuals saw in public schools only another effort to com- pel the "diligent and capable'l to support the "incapable and shift- less.“50 And besides such self-serving sort of opposition to taxes for public schools, there were arguments of an ideological character. Some saw in such collective efforts a quality inimical to the indi— vidualism proper to a democracy. Where such things as construction and maintenance of roads and the operation of the postal service were necessarily done by government or some other collective insti- tution because their use was social in character, education is an individual and private matter, it was argued. To make education a government affair was appropriate for communists, one of the more flan but need as j was at t scho way ' ment: enabl servi 145 flamboyant opponents of compulsory education in the 18805 urged, but not for democrats.5] Such opposition was unsuccessful; the need for public education and the benefits from it were accepted as justifying taxing for support of schools. And if the taxpaying was compulsory, it seemed only fair to the taxpayer that attendance at the schools provided be made compulsory as well. The economic claims on behalf of compulsory provision of schools and compulsory attendance laws are a useful example of the way in which a combination of police power and pppgp§_patriae argu— ments, each convincing to a separate set of individuals and groups, enabled a broad range of persons to see compulsory education as serving their own best interests and to come together in its support. There was little effective resistance. Perhaps the most per- sistent opposition came over the question of parental rights. Zach Montgomery made the case with great thoroughness in his 1886 polemic, Poison Drops in the Federal Senate: The School Question from a Parental and Non-Sectarian Standpoint. He rooted his argument in the natural rights of parents, which he traced to the response made by St. Thomas Aquinas to a proposal to increase the faithful by kid- napping children from nonbelieving families to raise them in the church. Aquinas had rejected the idea on theological grounds with an argument that God had made children, as a property of human nature, to belong completely to their father, the "author of their being," and it followed that they must remain under his control until attaining the "age of reason."52 with lute they tion stat Daren was p Shoul negle for t Phlso (‘eSpol hay m 91V8n but ht 146 ,“MMontgomery argued that since children belong to their parents without restriction or limitation, parents have therefore an abso- lute right to control what happens to them, including the learning they engage in. The state may not legitimately place any restric- tions on parental control of children. He called the view that the state has a responsibility for educating children ”both Communistic and Pagan." Himself a Roman Catholic, Montgomery criticized the hierarchy of the church for having resisted compulsory education on religious grounds rather than those of parental rights, and for their later efforts to obtain public money for parochial schools. The natural law which gave parents control of their children also obliged them to feed, clothe, and educate them, argued Montgomery. Should a family be unable to do so, they might be helped by the 5 charity of any who wished, but to tax everyone for public education "53 was to "take one man's money with which to pay the debt of another. The point of Montgomery's resistance was not a claim that parents might, if they chose, keep a child untaught. This, to him, was precisely the same crime as failing to feed the child, and should be dealt with in Similar fashion, first by punishing the neglectful parents and then by providing their choice of education for the child, just as the state would provide food, but not com- pulsory menus, for an unfed child.54 The state, in his view, has responsibility to prevent abuse of children, as ppp§g§_patriae, but may not extend its police power to regulate the nature of the care given. Such a position would support a compulsory learning law, but not a compulsory attendance law. Though Montgomery rejected com his SCh( tior made was tior --pr be i pare regu inal Pres his 1 Supr of n Vlnc< Doinl ence, relig Chilc apart 147 compulsory provision of schools as well, in fact a case in defense of government-supported schools might be made without departing from his basic position if attendance were at parental option. Such schools could be regarded as an efficient way of providing educa— tional services to those who wish them. Such a claim was in fact made in the l897 case of Board of Education v. Eursg,55 Montgomery's opposition to compulsory provision of schools was based on an argument that had to do with the content of instruc- tion. This must inevitably include matters of morality, he thought -—proper behavior, patriotism, and the like. These he believed to be individual matters which are part of the natural authority of parents to decide and to teach to their children. For the state to regulate such matters is to deny the rights of parents, and children as well. The rights of free speech and of religious belief are inalienable ones, which the government may not interfere with by prescribing teachers, books, companions, or behavior, he argued.56 Montgomery was not successful in his opposition, although his reasoning seems all but identical to that followed by the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. Barnette. Perhaps he was ahead of his time. Perhaps the frequent extravagance of his examples con- vinced people that his reasoning was invalid--he claimed at one point that since public schools remove children from parental influ- ence, which alone can produce virtue, patriotism, morality, and religion, then the public schools could be expected to produce in children vice, treason, immorality, and faithlessness.57 Quite apart from the inaccuracy of insisting that all parental influence van‘ piec the larl the auth the case byt woul of t nota who rEqu SCho with 0f t poor. Date! of m( high bly C ClOUs 181], the 5 IIIIIIIIIIIIIII""""""""""'::: """"""‘“““““““"'———-fr:, l48 - vanished because_certain hours of their children's time were occu- pied in public schools, this sort of claim leaves one uneasy about the logic of anyone presenting it as a serious objection. Simi— larly, Montgomery argued that school discipline problems traced to the children's innate awareness that teachers lacked the natural authority of parents, having only spurious authority derived from the state's false claim to power over education.58 Here this the case, then presumably children who were attending schools selected by their parents, and thus endowed with delegated natural authority, would present no discipline problems, having an innate recognition of the justice of their teachers' control. Such behavior is not notably present in private schools, now or then. Still, there were others less extravagant in their reasoning who pressed the same basic claim, that use of police power to require education in public schools or state-regulated private 59 Often this was linked schools was a violation of parental rights. with a factual claim that the schools were poor, or that the theory of the common school, however beneficial for the children of the poor, was undesirable for other children, compelling as it did parents "to submit to one mingled contagion children of every grade of morality: coarseness and refinement, uncleanness and cleanliness, 60 high social development and low.“ The Presbyterian General Assem- bly of 1799 had sounded such a call, opposing the I'vain and perni- cious philosophy” of public education. Education, they argued in l8ll, was the"legitimate business of the churches rather than of the state.”‘ Charles Hodge, a leader of the conservative "Old School" wing unCl reql thl‘i any thai sty‘ ENC! Man; 149 wing of the Presbyterians, called the common school “positively unChristian" and argued that it was "unjust and tyrannical" to require tax support for such schools.6] Most people did not seem to see it this way. Perhaps, as L. Glenn Smith has suggested, they were more concerned with the threats to peace and prosperity which they saw around them than with any inconsistency with theories of freedom.62; Francis Adams argued that, although compulsion of its citizens was not the characteristic style of the American government, it was evident that indirect influ- ence had failed to persuade some~parents of the value of education and that therefore compulsory attendance laws were necessary as the only possible way to make schooling universal.63 The loss of liberty in question did not seem important, amounting to little more than sacrifice of freedom to harm children, in most cases.64 Furthermore, the actual loss of liberty was slight. There was nearly universal attendance at elementary school among white children by the later years of the 19th century, based upon a general acceptance of the value of schooling, rather than upon the compulsory attendance laws which were just being adopted.65 To assert a right to keep one's children from such accepted means of learning meant to identify oneself as deviant, and thus to be suspected of being some sort of threat to society, exactly the thing which common school education was designed to eliminate. The compulsory attendance laws were not even enforced rigidly at first. There were both practical and social reasons. Many of the children who actually needed the compulsion were dif oft! blac whic Sim; relt away in l pote comp in r l50 . difficult to deal with: especially unwilling learners, they were often disruptive and violent. Others were from despised minorities, blacks or Indians, for example. Especially in crowded city systems which lacked space, it must have seemed a wise use of discretion simply to ignore the absence of those who had shown themselves reluctant and unpleasant students. In l88l, New York City turned away some 9,000 students because there were not classrooms for them; in l896, Chicago still lacked seats for roughly one-third of the potential students.66 Those officials charged with the responsibility of enforcing compulsoryattendancelaws frequently failed to carry out their charge in rigorous fashion. This was not confined to urban schools, accord- ing to evidence gathered from the annual reports of such states as New York, New Jersey, West Virginia, South Dakota, Kentucky, and New Hampshire for the years between l9l8 and l922. These reports showed that each had a problem with unsatisfactory enforcement of compulsory attendance laws.67 Ensign attributed the failure of New York's l903 attendance law to secure universal schooling in part to the refusal of judges to apply it severely enough: "apparently they did not believe the law to be a wise one . . . .“ He conceived of no rea- son which was acceptable for such behavior; he described the judges as "indifferent, short—sighted, or corrupt.“ Gradually, though, spurred in part by financial aid laws based on attendance, effec- tive enforcement procedures were developed and serious efforts made 68 to compel every child to attend some school or other. chi ety fitt over had whic With enjo perfi long, dren in ti come for 1 Zens Claim lSl Those who shared Ensign's concern for the welfare of the child over all other concerns saw this in a positive light: It is now a kindly state that safeguards the child, secur- ing his physical and moral health, insists that he acquire the fundamentals of a literary education, puts him in pos- session of some industrial skill, and seeks to advance him to intelligent, useful citizenship.69 To those who conceived of the function of public schooling in such a way, opposition based on arguments about freedom were bewildering or unAmerican. The importance of preventing the evil consequences to soci- ety of lack of education, which allows children to become ”vagabonds, fitted only for prisons, brothels, and poorhouses,” seemed enough to override any claims about the natural rights of parents. The state had a duty, it was argued, to protect itself against such evils, which “threaten its safety, its peace, and even its existence.”0 Without a strong and secure state, there could be little hope of enjoying the rights of individuals, it was argued. Compulsory attendance laws were seen as helping the state perform its duty to keep itself secure: “Needy parents may no ’ longer jeopardize the future of the state by denying to their chil- dren the elements of education.”71 The benefits to the individual in the form of economic and social success which were thought to come from educational attainment were at one and the same time gains for individuals and security for the state, since prosperous citi- zens were unlikely to be rebels. xx? To such police power arguments were added p§3§fl§_gg££ig§ Claims on behalf of the child. The natural right of parents to .4. con son chi' all« to I cit' was cati angl rec: COFY expr dure It w late into 152 control their children was to be restricted, according to such rea— soning, on the basis of an assertion of the natural right of the child to an education. Henry Barnard argued that it was unwise to allow parents to retain responsibility for controlling the education of their children because some parents might be unable or unwilling to provide schooling. A democracy, he argued, requires that every citizen be educated, unlike other forms of government.72 The claim was made, in fact, that recognition of such a natural right to edu- cation on the part of children was an American invention. The anglo-saxon heritage to which most adult rights are traced does not recognize the right to an education, according to this assertion.73 Whetherthis is so or not, it is apparent that Ensign was correct in his assessment that ”gradually the will of a people has expressed itself in a degree of state control, of compulsory proce- dure, which, suddenly proposed, would have seemed intolerable."74 It was to be little more than a generation until the critics of the late l960$ were to begin arguing that such state control was indeed intolerable. ‘___ Macm Beac (Lan Will apol m Houu 0f C( (Jun! The 5 How: 1972} FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV 1Quoted in Rena Foy, The World of Education (New York: Macmillan Co., l968), pp. 282-283. 21bid. 3Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. l24. 4James P. Wickersham, A Histor of Education in America (Lancaster, Pa.: Inquirer Press, l886l, p. 66, quoting principal William Smith. 5Lee 0. Garber, Education as a Function of the State (Minne— apolis: Educational Test Bureau, 1934), pp. 9-10. 6William H. Hand, The Need of Compulsory Education in the South (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, l9l4l, pp. lO4-l05. 7Garber, p. l0. 8B. 0. Peers, "Report of the Committee on Education in the House of Representatives” (of Kentucky), quoted in “IX Common Schools of Connecticut” by Henry Barnard, American Journal of Education 5 (June l858): l35—l37. 9Zach(ary) Montgomery, Poison Drops in the Federal Senate: The School Question from a Parental and Non-Sectarian Standpoint Houston: St. Thomas Press, l886; reprinted, New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 9-l8. l0 Ibid., p. 28. HAnna Reed, Human Waste in Education (New York: The Century Co., l927), p. l8 l2 13Richard G. White, "The Public School Failure," North Ameri- can Review l3l (December l880): 544-545. \ 14Ibid., pp. 546-548. Ibid., pp. 69-70. m > ary brldg 1% York; Litth 154 l5 16 Ibid., p. 550. Ibid., p. 549. 17John D. Philbrick, "The Success of the Free School System," North American Review l32 (March l88l): 250-25l. 18 19 Ibid., p. 251.- Ibid., p. 253. 201bid., p. 254. 2'Ibid.. pp. 259-26l. 1 22John T. Buchanan, ”Compulsory Education," Forum 32 (Febru- ary l902): 686. 231bid.. p. 687. 241bid., pp. 690-69l. 25Hand, p. l0l. 26Hollis P. Allen, Universal Free Education (Stanford: Stan- ford University Press, l934), p. 52. 27Henry Suzallo, Our Faith in Education (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., l924), pp. l4—l5. . 28Forest C. Ensign, Com ulsor School Attendance and Child Labor (New York: Teachers College Press, l92ll, p. l. 29 Ibid., pp. 252-253. 305. Alexander Rippa, Education in a Free Society (New York: David McKay Co., l967), pp. l62-l63. _ 31David B. Tyack, Turnin Points in American Educational History (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., l967l, p. 230. 32Reed, p. l9. _ 33William Dooley, The Education of the Ne'er-Do-Well (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin Co., l9l6), pp. 27-28. _ 34Henry J. Perkinson, The Im erfect Panacea: American Faith in Education l865-l965 (New York: Random House, l9685, p. 26. 35Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators (New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, l935; reprinted, Totawa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams Co., l968), pp. 26l-265. l854 SEE. on ti T57, U.S. lists 0f Jc sonal Rober Ameri l55 36George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South (Richmond, Va.: 1854), pp. l44-l48, quoted by Rena Vassar, Social Histor of Ameri- can Education (Chicago: Rand McNally, l9655, PP. 266-268. 37Hand. pp. l08-l09. 38Curti, p. 44. 39 Hand, p. l0l. 4OAiien, p. 90. 41 Rush Welter, Po ular Education and Democratic Thou ht in America (New York: Columbia University Press, l9625, pp. l85-187. 42Lawrence Cremin, The Re ublic and the Schools: Horace Mann on the Education of Free Men (New York: Teachers College Press, l957 , p. 33. 43 Ibid., p. 53. 44Henry Barnard, “Benefactors of Education and Science," American Journal of Education l (January l856): 203. 45Such a detractor is Katz, Irony, p. 88; a supporter is then- U.S. Commission of Education John Eaton, who in his l870 Report listed seven company-man characteristics such as reduced likelihood of joining strikes or of creating problems for employers through per- sonal behavior as products of common school education; quoted in Robert E. Potter, The Stream of American Education (New York: The American Book Co., l9675, pp. 294-295. 46Curti, pp. 114—115. 47Richard Pratte, The Public School Movement: A Critical Study (New York: David McKay Co., l973), p. 54. 48Garber, p. 8. 49David B. Tyack, “Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History §g2Compulsory Schooling,” Harvard Educational Review 46 (l976): 38l- 50G. H. Howison, ”Real Ground for State Control of Schools,“ Educational Review 5 (May l893): 425. N“... 51Montgomery, pp. l32—l33. 52Ipid. 53Ibid.. pp. 42-48. (18E 54Ibid., pp. 54-55. 55Board of Education v. Purse 101 Ga. 422, 28 S.E. 896 (1897). 56Montgomery, pp. 70-81. 57Ibid.. pp. 30-31. 581bid., pp. 99-104. 59Cf., e.g., Moses Stambler, ”The Effect of Compulsory Edu- cation and Child Labor Laws on High School Attendance in New York City, 1898-1917," History of Education Quarterly 8 (Summer 1968): 189-214; Edith Abbott and Sophonisba Breckinridge, Truancy and Non- Attendance in the Chica 0 Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917), eSp. pp. 4-6; Oscar Cooper, “Compulsory Laws and Their Enforcement," The Journal and Addresses and Proceedings of the National Education Association of the United States, Session of the Year 1890 (Boston: 1890) quoted by Michael B. Katz, School Reform: Past and Present (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), PP. 72-77; W. S. Definbaugh, Com ulsor Attendance Laws in the U.S. (Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914 , pp. 10-11. 60 Howison, p. 425. 61Daniel V. Collins, ”The Preacher's Task and the Stone of Stumbling," M.Div. paper, Western Theological Seminary, 1958, pp. l3- 14. 62L. Glenn Smith, "A Centennial Perspective on American Edu- cation," hi Delta Kappan 58 (September 1976): 139-143. 63Francis Adams, The Free School S stem of the United States (London: Chapman & Hall, 1875), pp. 239-248. 64“Compulsory Education“ from the Report of the Board of Public Charities of the State of Pennsylvania (1871), pp. 5—30, quoted by Katz, School Reform, p. 70. 65David B. Tyack, The One Best System (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 66. 66 Ibid., PP. 70-71. 67John F. Bender, The Function of Courts in Enforcin School Attendance Laws (New York: Teachers College Press, 1927 , pp, 4-5, 68 69 Ensign, pp- 131-140. Ibid., p. 234. qu0' tic1 157 70Lucius Fairchild, Senate Journal (1870), appendix, p. 12, quoted by Ensign, p. 205. 7(Ensign, p. 234. 72Henry Barnard, "VII. History of Common Schools in Connec- ticut," American Journal of Education 15 (June 1865): 291-292. 73 74 Suzallo, p. 33. Ensign, p. 86. rea< ever nisc thm CHAPTER V JOHN HOLT'S ARGUMENTS John Holt's work was selected for analysis on the basis of a psychological canon for importance: he seems to be more widely read than other critics. Few of my City University students have even heard of their fellow New Yorkers Paul Goodman and George Den- nison, much less read anything either has written. Many of them, though by no means most, have read one or more of Holt's books. A concerted effort to read Holt is curiously depressing. The complaint which Maxine Greene makes of Ivan Illich applies a fortiori to Holt. Greene said that Illich receives awed attention for discussing things which philosophers of education have been debating for fifty years as though they were his own original con- ceptions.1 Holt's early works, How Children Fail, How Children Learn, The Underachieving School, and What Do I Do Monday? are essentially reformist in character. He writes of his observations of children's learning behavior, which are frequently observations made with care and capable of provoking thought. He discusses the conclusions about teaching and learning which he has drawn from these observations. The best of the latter are very similar to the recommendations of the "discovery learning" school of curriculum developers. Had we not his own word for his innocence of any study of educational the- ory,2 we might have classed him as a rather creative adherent to that 158 the est dre occ sch ear whi off tri 8Xpl enti hate what to f cOnt - (Sp theory of instruction. Holt, in these early works, seems inter- ested primarily in devising ways to improve teaching so that chil- dren might benefit. He does prefigure his later works with an occasional unsettling pronouncement about the general evils of schooling, rather than specific shortcomings. The tenor of these early writings, however, is one of interesting and seemingly worth- while attempts at remedies. The chief criticism which one might Vfi offer to this essentially innocuous body of work are relatively trivial ones having to do with style and somewhat more serious ones exposing his peculiar logic. His style is anecdotal and repetitive. How one comes to dread the submarine story (Mr. Holt was an officer in the submarine service during World War II, serving with a crew whose interest in successfully prosecuting the war enabled them to learn complex skills readily), the cello recital (Mr. Holt is a devoted amateur musician, whose dedication seems to him appropriate exemplification of the value of self-chosen learning goals for motivation), the mathematical quests (Mr. Holt enjoys devising proofs and considers such mental exercise morally superior to study of mandated mathematical curricula), and the other experiences whose frequent reappearances weave the entire corpus of his work together. A minor stylistic irritant is the inconsistency of his esti- mate of his readers. He assumes at one point that everyone knows what a tachistoscope is, and how it is used by reading instructors to flash groups of words before a learner's eyes at variable speeds controlled by the teacher.3 At another, he tosses in the definition what to t esch empl assw For This I am year- who, was i devel Help from laws study Wish. Sider sibi] their Unass 160 of a compartment on a train even though the context makes it clear what he is describing.4 These qualities, though unimportant in themselves, contribute to the more serious issue of Holt's reasoning patterns. Though he eschews linear logic as a useful way of thinking,5 he frequently employs a form of it in a type of reasoning which deals heavily in assumed universals. He establishes these with an anecdote or two. For instance, he claims that children who use any substantial part of their intelligence and energy can do in two days or less what schools ask them to do in five. If the law said that children could go to school only as much as they wanted, they would be able in non-school time to undertake a great many serious projects for which they now have no time. This claim (which contains a number of interesting assumptions that I am passing over at theinoment) is supported by the story of an 11- year-old Rumanian figure-skating star of the Grenoble championships, who, it is alleged, did all her studying at home. This presumably was the source of her success by freeing her time for the purpose of developing her athletic skills, though Holt never quite makes the claim in so many words.7 He does, however, draw sweeping conclusions from the supposed universal, in this case that compulsory attendance laws violate the civil liberties of children by forcing them to study the standard curriculum rather than using their time as they wish." One presumes, on the basis of this story, that Holt must con-1 sider Rumania free and enlightened. He does not entertain the pos: sibility that there may be any limit to the right of children to use their time as they wish; he merely asserts it as though it were unassailable. ment sals. to he An e) Thing chilc betwe disci teaci =1mr—s _:. He th one t lems ing i asked 1'11 wh lems a wee the 5. this. riCUli trait examp But h' 161 On other occasions, Holt treats observed behavior or argu- ments put forth by teachers as though they were claimed to be univer- sals, against which he produces a counter-example, which he considers to have demolished the validity of whatever it is he wishes to oppose, An example may be seen in a chapter titled "Art, Math, and Other Things" in How Children Learn. After having told some stories of children doing creative exploration of perspective on the interface between art and mathematics, Holt makes the connection between the disciplines and then remarks, as though it were a truism to which any teacher would give assent: One of the fundamental ideas behind most of what we do in school is that children should and must spend many years memorizing a lot of dull facts before they can begin to do interesting things with them.8 He then tells of a first-grade class in which he was substituting at one time. The regular teacher had the custom of putting simple prob- lems in addition on the blackboard for her students to do upon arriv- ing in the mornings. When Holt failed to do this, the class members asked to put their own problems on the board. Within the short time in which Holt was in charge, they proceeded from simple 2-digit prob- lems to more complex 3-digit problems without asking his help: "in a week-~working only a few minutes a day-—they covered material that the school was prepared to spend years teaching them."9 He considers this example virtually to have demolished the validity of school cur- ricula. His reasoning would be appropriate if this were a universal trait of schools and an authentic counter-example, since a counter- example proves it not to be the case that something is a universal. But his "rule“ is not in fact universal—-schools do not require men som do onl exa1 tim for men CUP] chil situ is h whic With more Who ) 162 memorization for the sake of filling time, but for the reason that some things must be learned that way as basis for other learning. I do not suppose that Holt actually believes that memorization serves only to kill time; he omits alternative explanations in order to high- light the one which serves his rhetorical purpose. But his counter- example suffers from the omission, becoming vulnerable to the objec— tion that the children had to have the learning he deplores as basis for that which he approves. Had his use of the example been confined merely to an observation that children could proceed faster than the curriculum assumed, given opportunity to explore, he would have been saying something warranted by his observation, though less sensa- tional in import. But Holt not only treats his conclusion as estab- lished by the anecdote, but goes on to build new arguments from it: in his latest book, he uses this vignette and accompanying argument as "proof" of a claim that schools are in essence authoritarian, and therefore illegitimate. He claims that any teacher who observed such learning happening would be bound to intervene to use the exploration for instructional purposes selected by the teacher rather than the children.10 Since he did not, in fact, do this himself in the actual situation, this is a rather odd contention. Equally open to objection is his assumption that any teacher intervention is wrong, an argument which will be examined in greater detail below. The importance of examining Holt's brand of logic has to do with his later writings. Where the first books establish him as no more than an oddly popular member of the band of romantic reformers who were so much in evidence during the 19605, the last three, [fly US! sic pri bur Hol cat act wil COV tin cat thr sor 50ml Proi ment SUSc View Lock alte 163 Freedom and Beyond, Escape From Childhood, and Instead of Education, use the anecdotal evidence of the earlier works as basis for revi- sionist conclusions about schools. The conclusions are borrowed 11 The principally from Ivan Illich, as Holt himself makes clear. burden of what follows is an attempt to demonstrate at minimum that Holt does not adequately support his contention that compulsory edu-V cation in all its forms must end. It is my belief that he does not actually understand what Illich is arguing, a conclusion that I hope to document as well. Dealing with Holt's advocacy of Illich's ideas will not necessarily make the following chapter redundant when it covers what Illich himself has to say. Holt makes several sorts of claims, often difficult to dis- tinguish one from another with any precision, so that an orderly categorization is all but impossible. I have classified them under three loose headings, not mutually exclusive, on the basis of the sorts of summary statements he makes to the proffered arguments, sometimes as introduction to the anecdote(s) which he submits as proof, sometimes as conclusion. The Nature of Human Beings Holt much of the time views people as very malleable, funda- mentally capable of accomplishing almost anything they wish, but susceptible to distortion by outside forces.12 It appears that he views human nature, in particular in the formation of values, as a Lockean tabula rasa on which anyone may write but which may be altered only with greatest difficulty once inscribed. Thus many of so sor hai Ita cir $er the apps ever DPOp in f it i aCC01 50m} SUCCE 164 his conclusions seem based on a conception of all persons as capable, in potential at least, individuals in thrall to society because they are continually tricked into thinking themselves incapable by cun- ningly conceived institutional arrangements. Many of his stories are illustrations of his convictions about human capabilities, especially those of particular children. In attacking the “institution of child- hood“ (his term for a way of treating children which he considers a social invention designed to reduce job competition in industrialized society), Holt offers as evidence for the competency of children who have passed the biological state of infancy the story of two young Italians. These boys had been left on their own through some tragic circumstance during the invasion of Italy toward the end of World War II. At the approximate ages of four and five, they managed to feed and shelter themselves adequately to survive on their own and to remain independent even after the capture of their city. “Only after several years" were they compelled to accept control by the state in the form of residence in a home for orphans.13 Since such feats are possible for particular children, Holt 1 appears to reason, then all children are capable of learning what- ever they need to know. Therefore society can have no legitimate or proper purpose in compelling people to learn}4 That society does in fact compel people to learn is a consequence of the way in which it is controlled by certain individuals for their own benefit, according to Holt. He rejects any notion of social compact, of the social order as self-imposed restraint. Rather, he sees it as a successful effort to control by use of legal force the majority of per sel pov pa_i aPF org the the cri 118V WOY‘ the whi equ tut COO SOC alw W66 165 persons, who are defined as bad. This effort is made by a self- selected group of "good" people who have by various means come to power: A few people, at least, can be trusted to plan this social order, and to decide what power it should have, which people should use this power, and in what ways, and how these peo- ple should be found or chosen. It would seem that Holt does not consider the state to have any legitimate police power; though he does occasionally invoke a parens patriae sort of obligation to intervene on behalf of individuals, he~ appears to believe that left on their own, people do the right thing; Holt's failure to speak of any possible problems in a society organized around his conceptions may stem from a failure to perceive them. It may, perhaps, represent a bitter dismay at the prospect that schools, even though subjected to powerful and often valid criticism have not changed, and a fatalistic conviction that they never will.16 (Whatever the explanation, one finds nowhere in Holt's work the recognition of the problems which a cplture must solve and the patient effort to Spell out solutions and means of transition which are characteristic of Paul Goodman, whose criticisms are equally anarchistic.17 Goodman saw a need for some means to insti- tutionalize, albeit in small and fluid institutions responsive to control by their clients, learning of a sort appropriate to the society he hoped for. Holt simplistically rejects schools as being always, in any form, an instrument for doing wrong. To Holt, it is self-evident that education is a chief means of control used as a weapon against the self—determination of most people by those in 0 th 'n e h 501 de: SCI power. It amounts to a means for depriving people of the right to control their own minds and thoughts, in a fashion which keeps them dependent for their entire lives.18 This is a distortion of a classic position, held by such social analysts as Comte and Marx, that culture determines education to the point that content is all but irrelevant. Holt talks as though the control were absolutely effective and irresistible, ignor- '/ ing those who manage to escape being controlled, among whom he him- I self would seem to be numbered. It is not clear whether he regards this as fortuitous, as evidence of carelessness on the part of society's overseers, or as a sign of the basic strength of the human desire for freedom, which he also postulates. He apparently sees no serious conflict between the mind—bending power of schools which he is here describing and the sort of remark he makes about children in other contexts, for instance that the child has an "innate and unquenchable drive to understand the world . . . and to gain freedom (9 An ”innate and unquenchable drive” would, and competence in it.“ by definition, survive control mechanisms. Holt thus seems to have an irresistible force challenging an immovable object, though, to be fair, he only uses his superlatives for one side at a time, depend- ing upon which way he is looking at a given moment. This sort of inconsistency runs through Holt's writings. He seems to be afraid, in his dark moments, that it may be the case that a sort of evil moral determinism prevails, as though Murphy's laws 20 were valid. At other times, he seems to have a confidence that the human capacity for good could change things if given a chance. Thus, 167 he on occasion speaks of the institution of childhood as possibly well intended, a parens patriae effort at protecting children that does not work because the protection tends to restrict children in harmful ways.21 But because the intentions are good, possibly the institution can be changed. We do not quite trust children to learn, so we insist on schooling them. If only we trusted them, if only we could see how bad the repression in schools is for kids and turn them loose, he argues almost wistfully, we would discover that they would i learn everything necessary for their own good.22 This claim is not likely to be answered, since it is so absolute in character that few will be willing to test it. For that matter, it would seem to require at least a substantial sub—culture for an adequate test. The ambiguity of Holt's attitude toward the state is clear- est in his occasional discussions of civil rights. Though he rejects as unwarranted any use of the police power of the state to establish schools, the content of learning, or any other minimal basis for citizenship, he nevertheless calls upon the state to enforce the patterns of relationships which he favors. He proposes that the rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities of adult citizens be made available to any youn person, of whateverzgge, who wants to make use of them emphasis, Holt's]. He enumerates as being among such matters equal treatment in law; voting and political activities; legal responsibility in buying, selling, and other contracts; the right to privacy; financial inde- pendence; control of education; choice of residence; the right to 168 choose associates--in summary, power to do what any adult legally 24 may do. He concedes that there might be problems, but they could be solved by making changes gradually, always, as he previously had 25 The objection suggested, deciding issues in favor of the child. raised by Coons, that dependent people, children among them, will be controlled by somebody, and that Holt's sort of proposal lays chil- dren open to an enlarged possibility of exploitation by truly evil persons, in contrast to whom parental and societal restrictions on the alleged civil liberties of children would be a minor evil, seems not to have occurred to Holt.26 Or perhaps Holt believes that chil- dren, given freedom to choose, will always select companions with an eye to their good qualities and potential for uplifting experiences. The rebuttal to such an argument may be seen most nights lounging in front of the candy store around the corner from my home, selling dope, sex, and liquor to any innocent who will buy. If Holt could make up his mind whether people are morally potter's clay, to be molded by the schools and fired into permanent form by society--his anti-school posture-—or are spiritual gold, able to maintain their integrity against almost all influences and thus able to survive and learn from every experience they may choose to undergo--his pro-child posture--he might make a more coherent and consistent set of proposals for achieving the Utopia he prescribes as being best for people. (”(69.1 The Nature of Schools Holt's view of schools is uncompromising: Schools seem to be to be among the most anti-democratic, most authoritarian, most destructive, and most dangerous institutions of modern society. No other institution does more harm, or more lasting harm to more people or destroys so much of their curiosity, independence, trust, dignity, and sense of identity and worth. 7 And Universal compulsory schools are not and never were meant to be humane institutions, and most of their fundamental purposes tasks, missions are not humane [emphasis, Holt's].28 Holt's reason for such a wholesale denigration of educators past and present appears to be an uncritical acceptance of the conclusions of the revisionist historians with whom he often is to be found sharing the lecture platforms of the land. But whatever the source, his con- clusions are entailed by his assessments: no matter how humane the persons attempting to modify schools for good, their efforts will fail,'for schooling "cannot be reformed, cannot be carried out wisely . . . . ¢~29 or humanely, because its purpose lS neither w1se nor humane.“ Holt assumes that all observed outcomes of education were intended, were implicit in the arrangement and are therefore determined absolutely by the form of the institution, and are identical for all learners. He concludes by virtue of these assumptions, that these outcomes cannot be altered in any way.v It requires but little factual data or exercise of logic, however, to see that none of these assumptions is accurate in the extreme form in which Holt casts them, and that therefore his conclusions based upon them must be in error. Were schools so effective in these malevolent purposes, there would be no 170 revisionists to cry out for their end, save for the odd product of a completely private education, who could be ignored in the relatively humane cultures and shot in the others. Holt's very existence, and that of his associates in the revisionist view, seems adequate refu- tation of Holt's conclusion that schools can accomplish nothing save their intended evil. It seems a simple point—-a1most a debater's trick--but a careful consideration of the actual variety of outcomes of schooling, while destructive of easy certainties, should pay off in more con- structive discussion. 9A5 McCracken has pointed out, people can learn either things that are true, are useful, are good habits and sound values or things that are false, are useless, are bad habits and deplorable values}:0 Holt takes an indefensible position when he defines education as a system for producing the second set of out- comes. Paul Goodman, objecting that compulsory schooling produced such outcomes all too often by virtue of its nature, called it "com- pulsory miseducation" and argued for a system more likely to produce learning of a desirable sort. It should be noted that this objection cannot be raised against Illich's conception of the effects of schooling as inevitable, but only against Holt's inadequate descrip- tion of the determinism which he conceives to be operating. But there are arguments and claims which must be taken seriously to be found among Holt's pronouncements on the nature of schools. He bases them on a familiar list of social purposes for 31 schooling which is also articulated by Illich and Everett Reimer. Schools, in this view, exist: 171 1. To keep the young out of adult society. The custodial function explains why schools don't allow children to escape by demonstrating competency, or incompetency, for that matter: their mere presence in school is culturally valuable. This is an argument for thesecondof Reagan's possibilities: compulsory attendance without any required learning (see page 17). To it may well be added an argument that while being kept, children might as well learn something, of course. 2. To sort and grade people for their places in society. We consider our culture to be an enlightened one because we have replaced the accident of birth with schooling as a determinant of the roles to be filled by individuals, but according to this view, ‘ schools result in making losers of the same groups of people. And, as well, the process supplies an argument that such people must deserve to be losers since they failed to profit from the opportunity given them. The argument concludes that society is, in fact, unchanged by schooling. '3. To prepare people to accept society as it is and to per— form accordingly. Conformity to external definitions of worth is a chief product of the organization and functioning of schools, according to this argument.32 The assumption underlying the identification of this sort of list of functions as the purposes of education is, once again, the theory that the nature of the culture is the important content of education--the medium is the message--in contrast to the ostensible content. It is difficult to challenge a claim that schools do in —. "' m!.:' 172 fact function in these ways. But the implied claim that these are the only functions of schooling may be challenged: people do learn useful skills and knowledge along with enculturation. Further, some forms of enculturation would seem to be desirable; it would take a most unthinking person, or a consistency-above-all-else cul- tural nihilist to argue seriously that enculturation is in and of itself wrong. Holt in fact does just this on occasion.33 In Holt's case, the identification of this (incomplete) list of social functions as the purposes of education traces to his defi- nitions (he has more than one) of education. At one point, he calls education "planned and purposeful learning” which can only take place in schools: Almost all societies and people now define education or learning as schooling, and measure people's intelligence, competence, job-worthiness, and capacity for further learn- ing almost entirely in terms of the length in years and the expense of thg schooling they have already received [empha- sis, Holt's]. 4 Holt then recapitulates Illich's economic argument for deschooling in somewhat altered form. Illich argues that use of schooling for credentialling creates an artificial demand for schooling which, if met, would turn out to be useless. This, besides being undesirable in other ways, represents a misuse of capital, that in any case is probably not available in needed quantities, in particular in unde- veloped nations.35 Holt argues merely that the money would be unavailable even in the wealthy United States, and thus the limited supply of available educational credentials functions to maintain social stratification. He considers this outcome to have been selected purposefully.36 We: 1:01 eq. C61 SIN Car 173 Though so limited a definition of education is subject to successful challenge, Holt proceeds to reason rather effectively from it. Schooling cannot be justified by claims of economic bene- fit, he argues. He constructs a partial version of Greene's zero correlation argument, that there is no economic advantage in school- ing which is matched by others.37 Green said that there is a point of zero correlation between one's educational attainment and his/ her life chances just where nearly everyone has received the identi- cal amount of education. Education which is nearly universally possessed may influence future employment or education, but it does not allow differentiation among individuals. Other matters account 38 for variation in life chances. Holt concludes that to the extent schooling is universal, it is no longer true that education leads to jobs.39 Holt argues that it is false and misleading to claim that education can benefit the poor, since the problem is not one of lack of credentials on their part, but one of the economic condition of society. Schools, he reasons, cannot create or redistribute jobs, nor bring about unending economic growth, which in Holt's view are necessary prior steps before any investment in learning for the poor could succeed.40 If resources are in fact limited and cannot be equalized through schooling, then Holt seems to have offered a suc- cessful refutation of the poverty/crime/vice justification for com- pulsory schooling. It might be the case that ending poverty would succeed in reducing crime and vice to the minimum, but if poverty cannot be ended by means of schooling, it is erroneous or deceptive expe scho scho Cons atte attai crud, and 1 Socie Separ 174 to offer such a claim in support of compulsory schools.41 One need not accept Holt‘s belief that all this is planned to be convinced by the factual elements of his argument. His conclusion is in error, however, in the strong claim that there is no relationship between education and employment simply because educational attainment is not in itself sufficient to secure jobs. Such a claim is an excluded-middle fallacy. A second definition that Holt offers for "education" is "learning cut off from life and done under pressure of bribe or threat, greed, and fear.”42 Schools, by monopolizing learning and the resources available for it, according to Holt, have convinced people “that learning is separate from the rest of life, that we only do it or do it best when we are not doing anything else, and 43 This is a best of all in a place where nothing else is done." familiar Deweyan point about the need to connect learning to life experience, slanted to support an attack on the validity of using schooling as an occasion for learning. Holt sees the separation of school learning from ordinary experience as more than an unfortunate consequence of institutional arrangements, however. Where Dewey gave attention to changing the arrangements, Holt feels constrained to attack them as some sort of deliberate plot against freedom, in a crude echo of Illich's attempt to demonstrate that schools reflect and function to support the institutional and economic structure of society.44 When Holt is looking at the consequences for children of such separation, he reasons through to conclusions not incompatible with 175 those of Dewey, on a certain level. He discusses at one point the necessity to build competence upon competence. Successful experience leads to more willingness to attempt things, and thus to wider experi- ence. If, on the other hand, a child is given no opportunity to do things, in part because his learning is isolated from real-world doing of things, then he cannot develop competence. An opportunity entails risk: the child may succeed and increase in competence, or fail and remain incompetent in that area. Holt feels that we fear risk and so tend to create structures which produce incompetence through lack of opportunity.45 As logic goes, this is sound, and above Holt's usual stan— dard. But is it accurate as a description of either the intent or the fact of schooling? An examination of materials and practices ‘ would suggest that many schools hope to provide sequenced experiences in which students learn by doing very real things and that they often function in ways designed to do just that. Holt feels that school in and of itself makes any such effort unsuccessful. An observer of a class in which children are pitting themselves against the world of nature, say with the one of the Science Curriculum Improvement Study's kits which provides eqUipment for experimenting with objects and water to discover the relationships between mass and weight, might reach a different conclusion. Holt's well—taken argument might then amount to a case for better curriculum rather than for no cur- riculum other than the surrounding world. Yet another of Holt's definitions of education, while similar to those discussed above, focuses on the role of society in selecting 176 the content of schooling. Education is, "as most people“ define it-- a factual assertion open to challenge, for which Holt offers no evidence whatsoever--"something that some people do to others for their own good, molding them and shaping them and trying to make them learn what they think they ought to know."46 The tracking of ante- cedents through this thicket of pronouns is a fair metaphor for the search for rational justification of Holt's conclusions in his mul- tiplication of anecdotes, let it be said parenthetically. However ill-phrased it may be, though, this sentence conveys another of Holt's convictions as to why compulsory schooling is ille- gitimate. He makes it explicit later in the same book. He objects to schools in large part because he deems what they teach to be unworthy in itself, in part through having been selected for students by others. Schools teach their official curriculum and along with it ideas and attitudes,some of which are consciously taught and others implicit in the material, or conveyed unconsciously. Examples of such ideas and attitudes include patriotism, local prejudices, con- servatism (no parallel mention of liberalism), sexism, racism, and the like.47 This is Holt's version of what Ivan Illich calls the "hidden curriculum." Once again, Holt fails to represent adequately the subtlety of Illich's argument, here that the pattern of society implicit in schooling is a determinant of values such as to snare consumers of schooling beyond the power of ordinary persons to 8 extricate themselves.4 Holt's chief objection seems to be that he disapproves of the anglo—conformity of what is taught, which he 1 7.7 conflates with compulsory attendance by virtue of his belief that all observed characteristics of schooling are intended.49 Holt supports his objection at one point by a long descrip— tion of Stanley Milgram's "obedience" experiments, which resulted in a finding that a sizable proportion of adults will give electric shocks which they believe may be doing harm to another volunteer when pressured by the authority of an “experiment" and a “researcher“ in a laboratory jacket. Holt concludes that such obedience is a deliberately selected product of schooling, that persons are taught not only to obey unquestioningly, but to judge morality by obedi- ence.50 This claim illustrates one of my chief objections to Holt. He summarizes Milgrim's findings accurately enough but where Milgram offers as a tenative conclusion, to be investigated by research, the possibility that schools may contribute to the phenomenon he describes, for Holt the matter is proven., Schools teach human beings that it is better to do barbaric things than to risk disapproval, to Holt. Milgram offers other possible explanations, some of which later versions of his experiment tested, which also were found cap- able of accounting for some of the obedience. Holt's way of over- simplifying complex matters ignores such cautious qualifications. It is difficult to convey how frequently he does this without sound- ing completely biased against him. Similarly, for example, Holt sums up a much-less-adequate description of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development with the conclusion that schools are by definition operating at Stage One, the level in which decisions are made on the basis of fear of —__A 178 punishment and desire for reward.5] Kohlberg, in fact, has research evidence to the contrary, but it does not fit the claim Holt wishes to make. $0 Holt uses Kohlberg's conceptual scheme to describe his own conclusions, formed on the basis of other evidence. This is a piece of genuine, if unconscious, mendacity. I do not think I am being generous in assessing Holt's dis- tortions as not chosen consciously. It is clear from many of his peculiar examples that he has little notion of what constitutes a chain of proof. Among a host of possible illustrations for my claim can be found: 1. A chain of reasoning which runs “some 'helpers' (Holt's word for all the people who care for children in various institutions, including schools, homes, places like Willowbrook State Hospital, his example at this point) misuse their position to abuse, or other- wise take advantage of children, by intention or accident.“ ."This implies that all 'helpers' are potentially dangerous." Therefore, "we should do away with 'helping' as an institution."52 This is the fallacy of hasty generalization. And there is more: to this generalization, Holt adds the conclusion that "the only way we can fully protect someone against his own mistakes and the uncertainties of the world is to make him a slave."53 He has then arrived at his by-now-familiar argument that any intervention is illegitimate in and of itself. One needs to be on guard in order to avoid having Holt's conclusion smuggled past in the innocent form of the word ”fully." Upon reflection, there is no warrant for so extreme a claim. A person "fully” protected against danger might well be 179 ' enslaved by being kept confined in a padded room far underground; it is hard, in fact, to conceive of a completely safe environment. But only the hopelessly neurotic among parents and other "helpers" would attempt such protection. Others seek to guard children and other dependents against selected hazards, the nature of which varies with individual abilities and circumstances. Holt's claim is an exaggeration; what parents and schools, in fact, do is more moderate and much more readily defended. Indeed, the burden of proof shifts to the person who wishes to call such protection of children ille- gitimate. 2. A claim that there are no skills to be learned having to do with reading. Rather, there merely are acts of reading: a kid who has seen written language around him one day decides to find out what it means and forthwith engages in acts of reading. If allowed to do so, with only the help he requests, he will read in a matter of months, according to Holt.54 This may, of course, be the case. Many children might learn to read in some such painless fashion. Holt is certainly on target if his claim is that many systems of reading instruction over- complicate the matter. But surely there are children who benefit from instruction that improves their ability to do some of the things involved in reading. Surely there are children who will not learn to read, left to themselves, either because they do not attend to the written language around them, because they cannot frame the use- ful question, because they have no trusted reader of whom to ask it, or for some other reason. A portion of the art of teaching is to 180 recognize and deal with such non-learners. A case in point is one described by George Dennison, a man whom Holt professes to admire and could profit from emulating, in my judgment. A particular stu- _ dent, Jose, owing to his background and experiences, seemed to have no need to learn to read, and many handicaps making it difficult for him to do so. Holt, to be consistent, should have to argue for let- ting Jose go his way unless and until something caused him to wish to read. Dennison, knowing that mastery of reading would help Jose deal with some of his circumstances in positive ways, devised a help— ful approach and compelled Jose to participate in it until he began to learn to read, and had confidence in himself enough to continue;5 3. The claim that what people learn from driving is to think of other people, drivers and pedestrians alike, as nuisances, obstructions, and enemies who prevent us from getting where we are going.56 It may be the case that some people feel this way as a general rule; probably most of us who drive feel this way some of the time, but the conclusion that this is the thing learned from driving is clearly an untenable exaggeration. Many of Holt's careful observations that certain individuals learn certain things in or from schools are generalized in similar inappropriate fashion. Perhaps these are enough examples to serve to make the point. Holt universalizes his claims as to the efficacy of proposed alternatives as well. He speaks of the value of combining the resources and buildings of schools and libraries and encouraging the entire community to make use of them. This would, he believes, 181 increase commerce in ideas and make resources more widely available ' in ways which would contribute to the breaking down of compulsory schools.57 The ideas are good ones and where they have been tried, as in the Mott Foundation's community schools program, have had some very real successes. But the sweeping reorganization of social rela- tionships which Holt, in McLuhanesque fashion, expects does not seem to materialize. Holt offers the prediction that if public printing facilities were to be made available, people would use them to attempt to commu- nicate their ideas. Some, he believes, would write books, and texts for children, and this would "do more to increase people's interest in reading and writing than any number of S-chool [sjgi] courses."58 Apart from nitpicking about which courses he might be referring to or methods of measuring interest, it is difficult to counter such optimistic claims without trying the experiment. But an interesting counter-argument may be based on the historical fact that the age when compulsory school and compulsory attendance laws were being adopted was also an era of widespread and highly competitive inde— pendent newspapers. Few in that time seemed to lack opportunity to express opinions to the public. And that free market in ideas helped produce, or at minimum failed to prevent, the compulsory education which he considers the author and sustainer of uniformity. Would a new era of easy sharing of ideas have different outcomes? It is as easy to argue one way as the other. Holt seldom considers tentative conclusions or alternative possibilities. He points out the insincerity and dishonesty that 182 are encouraged by some aspects of schooling. Some teachers punish honest expressions of opinion. Students learn not to object to requirements and arrangements, but to do whatever is necessary to achieve grades, certificates, or diplomas. There is more than a modicum of truth in all this. But his conclusions thatnothing can be done to promote honesty in compulsory schools and that nothing need be done save make schools voluntary in order to achieve honest teacher-student exchanges59 are equally invalid, and for the identi- cal reason. Sometimes his examples do not support his claims. His objec- tions to the inefficiency of schools have merit and might well sustain arguments in favor of reducing the number of years of compulsory attendance, or for replacing compulsory attendance requirements with compulsory learning. But he argues that the success of the military in teaching particular bodies of needed learning, such as welding skills or foreign languages, in relatively brief periods of time shows that we could eliminate schools entirely. Holt feels we could substitute such intensive courses, elected by students when they felt a need, for schooling.60 His example is flawed in several ways. There is reason to doubt, as McCracken has pointed out, that we know our own minds adequately always to make the decisions useful to us. A general education protects us from our "inability to know at ten, fourteen, or twenty-three, exactly where we are headed intellectu- ally . . . ."61 Further, the military men who learned so efficiently were by no means all volunteers; many were coerced as thoroughly as any school's students. 183 Holt misunderstands, or misapplies, some of his supporting evidence. He claims schools have the effect on most children of reducing their curiosity and intelligence. Before schools get con— trol of them, he argues, children can learn the complex business of language completely from nothing. This, he believes, is a much more difficult piece of learning than any task schools require, but chil- dren often prove unable to learn school things even though they have learned to speak. He concludes from this that if we left them alone, ' children could and would learn to read and to do the other things just as effortlessly as they appear to learn to speak.62 Chomsky's conception of the inherent capacity for language, and other linguis- , tic theories as well, challenge Holt's assumption that the task of learning haspeak is in a simple way parallel to school learning tasks.63 Further, Holt seems to be assuming that all children learn oral language equally well—-that all succeed in this, while some fail at school tasks. Observing students who are having difficulty with school learning might just as well support the opposite claim, that failure to learn spoken language well is contributing to school failure. Many of the conclusions which Holt reaches are subject to the same sort of comment. He points to a very real problem, backing up his identification of—the troublesome matter with observations and arguments capable of contributing to an attempt to change whatever it is. But his underlying pessimism about the possibility of changing the actuality of schooling leads him to conclude that fear and irrelevance cannot be conquered, that boredom and degradation of 184 children's most appealing qualities are inevitable in school. He seems to think that what is, must be, barring revolutionary replace- ment of the institutions that deal with children, and so his analyses of what he sees in schools lead only to nihilism, educationally speaking. Holt claims, but does not demonstrate, that his proposed changes would benefit both individuals and society by changing the nature of learning. His less than adequate support for his claims leaves them highly suspect. The Nature of Compulsion The third broad category of claim made by Holt is character- ized by an emphasis on the destructive qualities and effects of com— pulsion as an aspect of the relationships between schools and the persons involved with them: "Compulsory and competitive schools 64 Though compulsory attendance laws are cruel by their very nature.” may once have served the humane purpose of protecting children against exploitation, Holt believes that now they protect nobody, that schools 65 Their com— themselves have come to be the exploiters of children. pulsion to attend becomes a compulsion to attend on the school's terms--children can succeed only by conforming to the school's defi- nition of what is desirable. Conformity, argues Holt, is antitheti- cal to development of one's individuality and thus ultimately to freedom and democracy as well.66 To base the opportunities and roles open to individuals on credentials earned in school as completely as our culture does is to make compulsion more than a matter of laws about attendance. Rather, 185 argues Holt, it is “saying tosomeone that just to be allowed to live in the world at all he must be able to show that he knows this or that.“67 The "messages of compulsory schools" include contempt for the students, whom society must force to learn because they are too stupid or too lackadaisical to get the knowledge that is valuable to them. Another message is that learning and life are separated, that experience is not adequate as qualification fer jobs or further edu- cation.68 If there were no compulsion, Holt argues at length, students could learn on their own as their goals and interests make learning seem important to them: They could then accept, without feeling pre- judged, the need to demonstrate as credentials the possession of the appropriate knowledge or skills for their chosen occupation or objec- tive. Holt agrees that there are knowledge and skills appropriately demanded at particular points. Just as a driver must have physical abilities, such as proper vision, hand-eye coordination, and reason- able speed of reflexes; knowledge of laws, regulations, and rules of the road; and must demonstrate judgment in controlling his vehicle in order to be licensed, so a would—be doctor might properly be asked to prove capabilities and knowledge. Many, if not most, other oppor- tunities, jobs, and privileges should be understood in the same way/.69 What Holt objects to is in part a narrow definition of the means of credentialling: he would prefer a variety of ways to demon- strate competence. But more importantly, he is making a psychologi- cal claim about human reactions to compulsion. Both students and teachers are affected negatively, in his judgment, by being part of 186 a compulsory system. Students receive the messages of contempt and hostility and react negatively in ways which obstruct learning. Teachers, secure in awareness that students must attend to them, make little effort to explain themselves and none to adapt to student needs and desires.70 Were the compulsion removed, Holt suggests, schools would have to improve so as to attract students.71 Teachers would be able to reject students or be rejected by them, and so would have to become truly professional, accountable for the stances they take and judged by the outcomes.72 The student-teacher relationship Holt envisions is not one of equality. The teacher has superior knowledge, which gives him a genuine authority which the student accepts by 73 This leads to some seeming electing to study with that teacher. contradictions,in my opinion. Though Holt points to the authori— tarian quality of compulsory schooling as a chief reason for opposi- tion to it, in psychological terms and in pursuit of freedom, he says that, once chosen freely,the1nost authoritarian of teachers is not harmful. This claim is supported by a line of reasoning which begins with the truism “no one can act or learn for another." Therefore, Holt, believes, only freely chosen learning is legitimate, but if freely chosen, it is legitimate no matter what its form.74 But to claim as Holt does here that freely chosen learning is justified merely by the manner of its choice is an error, as Pratte argues. All learning is justified in some fashion as being true or useful or valuable?5 Holt has merely made the rather odd evaluation that an individual may justify ‘learning but a society may 187 not. Further, his notion that desire serves as an adequate justifi- cation is vulnerable to the reasoning of Dewey's which Maxine Greene cited in criticizing Illich's reliance upon individual selection of learning goals: The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; it does not settle it. Only a child in the degree of his immaturity thinks to settle the ques- tion of desirability by reiterated proclamations: ”I want it; I want it; I want it" [emphasis, Dewey's].76 Holt has confused a naturalistic description--that humans on a certain level control their own behavior, are not robots or machines operated by another--and a psychological state, that of feeling free, not com- pelled. His category error, if undetected, makes the sensible observation that a teacher can teach most effectively when a question has been asked the warrant for asserting that without such a question, no learning of a legitimate sort may take place. That sort of con- clusion overlooks the role of the teacher in stimulating questions, in assisting persons to learn and to act, in ways that sometimes come to have legitimacy even as the learning is taking place. Further, there is something curious about a contention that a teacher may have legitimacy through possession of knowledge on a course-by-course basis, as it were, but a school may not claim that authority unless nobody, anywhere, for any reason, is compelled to be in school.77 Holt is unable to stay with his claim, even though he makes it freely as a part of the foundation of his opposition to compulsory schooling. In another context, later in the same work, he speaks approvingly of George Dennison's First Street School as a place where proper learning takes place.78 By his own definition it 188 is illegitimate as a school since the students were there by compul- sion, having selected First Street as an alternative to other school- ing. Further, in practice, it violates his notion of free choice as source of legitimacy in teacher-student relationships. As the story of Jose described above illustrates, the staff of First Street School used coercion when an adult decided that it was appropriate. Holt frequently applies differing standards to himself and those of whom he approves than he does to the schools he decries. 0n the one hand, for example, he points out the importance of limiting adult intervention in children's learning. Such intervention tends to work in favor of convergent thinking, he believes, and thus against the potential for discovery and creativity when a child is allowed and encouraged to think divergently.79 It might be objected, of course, that adults might intervene in such fashion as to encour— age divergent thinking, but Holt does not speak of such possibility. He is willing to concede that adults may properly intervene to pro- 80 Though he fails to say so in this con- tect children from danger. text, it appears that schools either fail to protect children or protect them against nonexistent or misjudged dangers. Schooling, as he has said in so many ways, is not legitimate in large part because it represents the imposition of adult choices upon children. By contrast, he describes himself and those like him as attempting ”to put_more freedom, autonomy, choice into children's lives and learning" [emphasis, mine].81 The illogic of “compulsory freedom" imposed upon a child by an adult is not confined to Holt, of course. The only way'hiwhich compulsory schooling can be considered an 189 exercise of freedom is by some such toleration of contradictories, at least long enough for the school at which attendance is compelled to provide experiences enabling its students to understand and claim for themselves freedom. Our culture, further, may well require such edu— cation for freedom as the best expedient possible. My point is merely that it is curiously inconsistent for Holt to use such language along— side his strong condemnation of all compulsion. Most of his reasoning does lack subtlety. He argues that there is a flaw in the counter-argument to deschooling proposals which raises the claim that those most prone to drop out of voluntary schools would be the persons most in need of learning. If schools, under pressure to persuade students to enroll, would only become effective and interesting, Holt argues, students would attend. He might well find support for such an argument in the research of Landes and Solmon, which showed that most students attended school 82 But as Reagan has even before attendance became compulsory. attempted to show, such attendance might well be a product of informal compulsion which is in effect no different from legal com- 83 If credentialling were not ended along with compulsory pulsion. attendance, then informal compulsion would more than likely replace legal compulsion and wise parents would force their child to attend school. Pleasant and effective schools would be in such circumstances just what they are now, a delightful but fortuitous experience for the coerced learner. When Holt does present a subtle and strong argument, it is frequently borrowed and usually aborted. He makes at one point a 190 distinction which he credits to Illich, between "compulsion" and "prohibition." A compulsion requires the performance of some act, often in thoroughly specified ways. A prohibition forbids the per- forming of some act, but necessarily leaves a wide realm of free choice among nonprohibited acts. Holt uses the distinction to charac- terize what he calls a "free" society. He argues that such a society may be known by the fact that it tends to regulate behavior largelyby prohibitions of limited character. A "free" society, says Holt, pro- hibits only truly dangerous behavior.84 But he does not make the obvious and powerful application to schools which this distinction suggests. Rather than compulsory attendance laws, it would seem, a culture valuing freedom would be well served by a "prohibition" law. Such legislation would say in effect ”no child may remain ignorant" and would thereby parallel the intent of the compulsory learningstat- utes of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Holt elsewhere suggests that we ought substitute compulsory learning for compulsory attendance,85 but on less well-reasoned grounds. In summary, Holt, in spite of his popularity, offers no com- pelling reasons for accepting his recommendation that schooling be ended. He does offer cogent criticisms of particular elements and practices in schools which could serve as arguments for reform of the matters in question, but so flawed are his arguments by his underly- ing assumption that education is by definition illegitimate that it is difficult to attend to him long enough to discover his usable analyses. A much more respectable attack on compulsory education is that which Ivan Illich has put forth. FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V -- 1Sumner Rosen, Judson Jerome, Maxine Greene, and Arthur Egarl, "Illich: Pro and Con," Social Policy 2 (March-April 1972): 2John Holt, What Do I Do Monday? (New York. E. P. Dutton & Co. , 1970), p. 77 3; 3John Holt, How Children Fail (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), p. 58. 4John Holt, How Children Learn (New York: Pitman Publish- ing Co. , 1967), p. 151. 5Hoit, Monday. pp. 11-12. 6John Holt, The 7Underachieving School (New York. Dell Pub- lisbing Co. , l969),p . 7Ibid. 8Holt, How Children Learn, p. 142. 9Ibid., p. 148. 10John Holt, Instead of Education (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1976). pp. 100-102. HJohn Holt, speech at Lansing (Michigan) Everett High School, February 18, 1972. '2H01t, Instead, Ch. 10, ”On Human Nature," pp. 112-117. 13John Holt, Escape From Childhood (New York. E. P. Dutton & Co. , 1974), p. 4. 14Ho1t, Instead, p. 111. 15Ibid., pp. 16Richard Flaste, "Embittered Reformer Advises: Avoid School,” New York Times, April 16, 1976, p. 35 17See, for a brief summary, Part II, "Education of the Young," in New Reformation (New York. Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 67-121. 191 i 192 18Holt, Instead, p. 4. Holt, Underachieving, p. 3. 20Murphy's Laws: (1) Whatever can go wrong, will. (2) Left to themselves, things go from bad to worse. (3) Nature sides with hidden flaw. 21 19 Holt, Escape, pp. 26-27. 22Holt, Instead, p. 122. 23Holt, Escape, pp. 18~19. Ibid. Holt, Underachieving, pp. 78-79. 26John E. Coons, ”Law and the Sovereigns of Childhood," Phi Delta Kappan 58 (September 1976): 22. 27 24 25 Holt, Escape, p. 247. 28John Holt, Freedom and Beyond (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1972), p. 242. 29Holt, Instead, p. 4. 30 . Samuel McCracken, ”Quackery 1n the Classroom," Commentary 49 (June 1970): 47. 3(Cf., e.g., their chapter "Proposal for a Planning Seminar Aimed at the Development of Basic Educational Alternatives,” in Daniel U. Levine and Robert Havighurst, Farewell to Schools??? (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Co., 1971 . pp. 1—14. 32Holt, Instead, pp. 157-169. 33See the discussion in part three, below, of his claim that any adult selection of curriculum is morally wrong. 34Holt, Freedom, p. 118. 35Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 5-10. 36Holt, Freedom, pp. 118-122. 37Ibid., pp. 122-123. 193 38Thomas F. Green, "The Ironies of Educational Growth," the Boyd Bode Memorial Lecture, The Ohio State University, July 1971, cited by Gerald M. Rea an, "Compulsion, Schooling, and Education," . Educational Studies 4 1973): 4, n. ____________________ 39Holt, Freedom, pp. 206-207. 4°Ibid., pp. 147-152. 41Ibid., p. 186. 42Holt, Instead, p. 3. 43Ibid., p. 10. . 44See Illich, Ch. 3, "Ritualization of Progress," pp. 34-51. ‘ 45Holt, Escape, pp. 87-101. 46Ho1t, Instead, p. 3. 471bid., pp. 170-171. 48 49 Illich, pp. 73-75. Holt,‘Freedom, pp. 196-197. 50Ho1t, Instead. pp. 178-186. 5'Ibid.. pp. 186-188. 52Holt, Escap . PP. 78-86. 53Ibid., pp. 85—86. 54Holt, Instead, pp. 14-15. 55George Dennison, The Lives of Children (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 75-88. 56Holt, Escape, p. 12. 57Holt, Instead, Ch. V., “More Resources for Doers," pp. 38- 49. 58Ibid.. pp. 44-45. 59Ibid., pp. 24-25. 60Ho1t, Freedom, pp. 202-203. 61McCracken, p. 48. 194 62Holt, Underachieving, p. 17. . 63McCracken, p. 47. 64Ho1t, Instead, p. 145. Holt, Underachieving. Pp. 28-29. Ibid., p. 138. 65 66 67Holt, Instead, p. 5. 68Ibid., pp. 171-172. 691bid.. pp. 4-5. 7°Ibid., p. 72. 71 Holt, Freedom, p. 245. 72 73 Holt, Monday, p. 265. Holt, Instead, p. 109. 74Ibid.. pp. 57-59. 75Richard Pratte, The Public School Movement: A Critical Study (New York: David McKay Co., 1973), p. 171. 76Rosen, Jerome, Greene, and Pearl, p. 48. 77Holt, Instead, p. 20. 781bid., p. 78. 79Holt, Freedom, p. 66. 80 Ibid., p. 52. 8'Ibid., p. 28. 82W. M. Landes and L. C. Solmon, "Compulsory Schooling Legisla- tion: An Economic Analysis of the Law and Social Change in the Nine- teenth Century,” Journal of Economic History 32 (March 1972): 54-91. 83Gerald Reagan, "Compulsion, Schooling, and Education," Educational Studies 4 (Spring, 1973): 3. 84Ho1t, Freedom, pp. 18-20. 85 Holt, Instead, pp. 196-197. CHAPTER VI IVAN ILLICH'S PROPOSALS Ivan Illich's ideas were selected for analysis on the basis of both a logical canon and a factual canon for importance. What he proposes is so far-reaching in its import that it calls for attention before decisions are made dealing with less-sweeping proposals. If his ideas should be made the basis for action, a number of further issues would arise in consequence. Several of his critics, in fact, point to such further issues and argue that the difficulties of resolving them constitute a strong argument why Illich's thinking should be rejected. Many such arguments have to do with the arrange- ments for alternative approaches to learning which an end to school- ing would necessitate. I will present examples in more detail somewhat later in the chapter. Illich, however, argues that such discussion misses the point. The reason he offers is that his atten- tion is directed toward a more serious issue than that of a critique ofschooling.1 Understanding that issue seems to me the key to hearing what it is that Illich has to say without being distracted by his verbal pyrotechnics. Put very simply, the claim Illich is making is "that the ethos, not just the institutions, of society ought to be 'deschooled.'“2 Illich understands schooling as merely a part of the larger pattern of conceptions, institutions, attitudes, and behavior which constitute culture--the "ethos" of society. It is 195 196 an important part, inasmuch as its primary function is to socialize, to imbue members of society with patterns of thinking and behaving which fit them into society. This is a standard analysis, reminis- cent of Durkheim's description of social systems, which is not par- ticularly original or striking; what is disturbing is the claim Illich makes that this ethos is dysfunctional for a large number, if not all, of the individual members of society, and that socializing persons into such a culture ought therefore to end.3 Illich supports this claim with a variety of arguments and illustrations which are not easily summarized in any satisfactory way. The essence of his contention may perhaps be suggested by his image of the current society as Promethean. We have, says Illich, so indulged our ability to use the world that "reality itself has become dependent on human decision."4 It is not merely the power to destroy, by fission or fusion weapons, by slow depletion of resources, or by pollution, that Illich deplores. It is the restructuring of values which accompanies extreme power to control which he considers the source of the danger. We come to imagine that there is nothing we want which cannot be supplied by some institution.5 Therefore we feel justified in demanding a higher quality of life than the world can supply to every person.6 Illich calls this the "institu- tionalization of values," which is one of his more difficult terms. He means by it in part a linking of values to institutions which both frame them and express them. But the term also means to Illich a confusion between ”process and substance."7 Things come to have operational definitions rather than substantive ones: health, 197 learning, dignity, independence, and creative endeavor are defihed as little more than the perfonmance of the institutions which claim to serve those ends, and their improvement is made to depend on allo- cating more resources to the management of hospitals, schools, and other agencies in question.8 The institutionalization of values makes it difficult to understand restraints, much less accept them. We can do whatever we can conceive; why, then, hold back from doing? Therefore, in institutionalized society, there is a constant pressure fortheprocess to deliver more in hopes of satisfying more. The outcome of a clash between rising expectations and dwindling resources can only be disaster.9 Illich calls for a revolution in thinking which will deemphasize control, reduce demand, and refocus on indi- vidual human worth, completing his image by calling the new values Epimethean.10 Prometheus had been the brother to steal the power of the gods, to attempt to control the world in order to reduce the effects of Pandora's evil gifts. Epimetheus, which in Greek means "hindsight" (and thus supplies an added overtone of meaning to Illich's image), had married Pandora and found that she also brought humanity desirable gifts, of which the chief one was hope. Illich suggests that Epimethean man, hOping, can restructure society to be more expressive of the good gifts, cooperating with the earth and one another rather than controlling, coopting, and coercing. The influence of Illich's Roman Catholic theology is apparent. The definition of hamartia, the most common of the Greek words trans- lated in the New Testament as "sin" is more literally “to have missed the mark.” Illich is saying that we are in trouble, are i 198 receiving the consequences of our sin, because we have missed the mark. We are guilty of Faust's error, the mistake of pfippj§, We are trying to control that which is not to be controlled in the way 1 we wish. We have built a culture based on false principles, says Illich. If we do not change it, we will not survive. Deschooling Society discusses the remedy which Illich pro- poses. The part which he believe school plays in structuring the society we now have is central to his analysis. Schooling is itself an example of an institutionalized value: we confuse education, which should be understood as producing knowledge or skill, with the completion of some sequence of time in school. Learning comes to be defined as a Commodity-—the product of the process of schooling-- which we can purchase for the sake of benefiting ourselves.H But more importantly, schooling is the primary factor, as Illich sees it, in forming the frame of reference that causes us to view the world in terms of institutionalized values. It is this critical role which led him to focus on the school in his critique of society: ". . . social reality itself has become schooled.“12 Schooling functions to produce this way of looking at the world by what Illich calls its “hidden curriculum" rather than by overt instruction. Although,there are parts of the overt content of schooling which may well contribute to the understanding Illich is identifying. The linear logic of science, for instance, supports a cause and effect view of reality which strengthens a reliance on an institutional definition of value. 199 The "hidden curriculum“ is "found in the ceremonial or ritual of schooling itself."13 The assumptions which underlie the institu- tion of schooling are conveyed to students in all that is done. These assumptions, as Illich describes them, are 1) that there is a secret to everything in life; 2) that one's quality of life depends upon knowing the secrets; 3) that only teachers can impart the secrets; and 4) Egagofigg Tfictfizs come ig arderly sgccesiion which may prescr1 e curricu um. The content of the "hidden curriculum" is a way of under- standing that places schooling at the center of things. Learning is a school matter rather than something which can go on whenever an individual is engaged with the environment or the culture. The real world is not the school world, and the school world is more impor— tant; one acquires a meaningful education in school, where one studies gpppt_the world. Merely being jp_the world observing how something is done, perhaps even helping, provides no credential and hence has not been education. It has little or no value in a world in which values have institutional definitions. Consumption, to Illich, is the focal point for understanding--schooling, when con- sumed, is the source of credentials which in turn entitle one to roles in production and to the benefits which come from having a role. The nature and purpose of institutions is to produce; the nature and destiny of man is to consume, according to this part of the hidden curriculum. Each person measures his/her own worth in such terms; the more educational credits consumed, the more worth and the more reward from the institutions of production.15 200 Schooling inculcates what in another place Illich calls the myths of the hidden curriculum: “that bureaucracies guided by sci- entific knowledge are efficient and benevolent; that increased pro- duction will build a better life"; and, to go with them, the habit of self-defeating consumption of services, alienating production, and tolerance for institutional rankings. Schools do such things “no matter what ideology prevails," in spite of any effort made by par- ticular teachers to teach something different.16 These are "systems effects," consequences of the institutional arrangements, not the content taught. All this is difficult to focus on; Illich is attempting the equivalent for human beings of pointing out water to a fish. It is no wonder that so many respond to him by taking up on particular points rather than the whole analysis. Those who dislike schools for other reasons pick up on the slogan “society must be deschooled," and consider Illich an ally in promoting their particular approach. He may or may not be. They see the "hidden curriculum" as composed of the things of which they disapprove. For example, Illich's point that schools teach tolerance for institutional rankings—-external definitions of worth-—is interpreted to mean something about grades and the practice of grading that adds up to "grades are part of the plot" and "ending grading will end that much of the conspiracy against kids.“17 John Holt's reduction of the notion of hidden curriculum to a matter of the covert values of a particular community, as I dis- cussed it above, is another case in point. Illich is not talking 201 about particular values so much as he is about a manner of valuing, an inculcated mind-set that allows only certain sorts of issues to be classed as value-matters. A response to Illich's analysis which pro- poses alternative forms of schooling may accordingly be seen as pro- posing merely another version of the thing Illich opposes. A switch to alternative schools might turn out to be even more dangerous, in Illich's opinion. Whereas people who come to school under duress may hate and fear it enough to resist it insofar as they can, those who are seduced into attendance by pleasant and interesting schools may become all the more vulnerable to the set of institutional values (8 The hidden curriculum works better when which schools inculcate. the pill is sugar—coated. Similarly, many of Illich's opponents focus on only a part of his critique as though, for example, an effective demonstration of the difficulty of accomplishing the creation of learning networks-- one of Illich's proposed alternatives to schooling—-would prove his analysis of society wrong. These are not meaningless questions at all. At one level, the practical issues of an attempt to deschool society are an appropriate part of discussing an end to compulsory attendance or compulsory provision of schools. My point here is merely that such discussion does not come to grips with what Illich views as the important issue. Before returning to these practical issues, I wish to examine Illich's critique at one or two points where it seems to me vulnerable to questions. I do not propose to discuss Illich's fundamental belief that society's workings are dys- functional for most individuals, though such a refusal on my part 202 may well vitiate the criticisms I make of the portion of his analysis which I do examine. An appropriate response to Illich on this level requires a depth of scholarship and breadth of information equal to his own. Indeed, he may be correct. But even if he were proven correct, it would not entail that his analysis of the role of school- ing in culture was accurate. It is this analysis which I wish to consider. Illich seems to be innovative in regarding schools as the dominant institutional force in society. He appears to consider schools an independent variable which produces effects upon the social system rather than a dependent variable which changes as the social system changes.19 He gives the impression that he has come to this conclusion by making a considered judgment after examination of evi- dence drawn from observations of society. This may not be the case. The fact that I am unable to offer an opinion with any degree of certainty illustrates what is for me the most intensely irritating of Illich's characteristics: he makes no effort to leave markers for those who must toil along in his wake. It would be difficult enough to follow an argument that includes, as does that of Illich, elements drawn from sociology, theology, economics, history, and several other fields of knowledge, if references and allusions were given. Few among us read deeply in so broad a range of disciplines as to be able adequately to examine so free-wheeling a presentation as that of Illich, even with the assistance of the customary courtesies of scholarship. Without them, one may only speculate. 203 The question of the role of schooling in society is a case in point. Illich receives credit for a revealing analogy in the comparison he makes between the disestablishment of the church after the industrial revolution and the (proposed) deschooling of society after the technological revolution we seem to be experiencing. A pioneering sociologist by the name of Edward Ross had this to say at the turn of the century: The ebb of religion is only half a fact, the other half is the high tide of education. While the priest is leaving, the civil servant, the schoolmaster is coming in. As the state shakes itself loose from the church, it reaches out for the school. Stepbystep with disestablishment of religion proceeds the establishment of education--so that today the moneys public and private, set apart for schools and universitéss far surpass the medieval endowments of abbeys and sees. Did Illich merely invert Ross's image? He does not say. The only clue available is that one of Illich's associates at CIDOC (The Center for Intercultural Documentation in Cuernavaca, Mexico) on occasion has been a sociologist by the name of Paul Violas who does write about Ross.2] This is more than a technical matter of giving or not giving credit. If Illich is drawing his conclusions from observations of schools and society today, his claims have a certain status. But if, instead, his claims are rooted in an uncritical acceptance of a nine— teenth century sociologist's views, it would seem he is making a different sort of assertion. Some of the other things Ross had to say in Social Control are worth attending to in this regard. Ross's view, which was common among the sociologists of his day, was that industrialization and urbanization were making profound e._- ‘“\sesr 204 alterations in human relationships which offered an opportunity for beneficial change. He had the characteristic meliorative view of social control held by many progressives of his era. Society could and should use every means at its command to influence its members in positive ways, to Ross. He viewed the state as the most desirable source of social control because it is “an organization that puts the wise minority in the saddle."22 Ross in particular focused on schooling as a useful means for control: "The schooling of the young is a long-headed device to pro— n23 mote order. It works, to Ross, because people are malleable. Schooling substitutes a picked model, the teacher, for the random model of biological parents in the process of imitation by which, Ross thought, children internalize the values provided by external 24 authority. By means of education presenting the interests, beliefs, and values of the culture, Ross argued, “society is able to get the individual on its side for almost nothing.“25 And that, to Ross, was the essence of social control: ”the art of introducing into a man's mind unwelcome ideas so neatly as not to arouse the will to expel them."26 This is, I think, what Illich means by the "hidden cur- riculum." Ross, a man of his time, stressed especially the value of such indirect means of control in socializing those of differing ethnic and social background.27 Ross offers other arguments of like nature, but these are perhaps examples enough to support the question I am asking. Is Illich guilty of armchair extension of views like those of Ross or 205 is he a scientist who can give empirical support from current culture for his criticism? From reading Illich, we cannot be entirely sure. One possibility is that Illich's description of the effects of schooling is correct, but that these effects represent an avoid- able unintended outcome. Those who planned to use schooling for social control were mistaken about the results of the decisions they made. If such is the case, deschooling may not be entailed in order to produce a desirable society. It may be sufficient to identify and alter the elements in compulsory schooling which have undesired effects. Illich's assertion that it is the essence of schooling which is at fault more than likely admits of only a technical possi- bility of verification. We could devise a test, but are unlikely to risk it. As Sam Snyder observed, the educational establishment would not be likely to quit, even if it were proven to them conclusively that they were wrong.28 How much less likely would they be to coop- erate in a test of the magnitude required to assess Illich's pro- posals, which was designed to examine the possibility that schooling is totally wrong? We are more likely to explore the possibility that reform of some character will solve the problem, if indeed it is agreed that a problem exists at all. If, however, Illich is making the claim that society in fact consists of a system which works in such fashion that schools are a strong independent institution producing the systems effects he lists, then his argument becomes vulnerable to an objection based on Charles Schindler's analysis of Illich's term “deschooling society." .--.-—_..s'\ 206 Illich, when he speaks of schools, means a process which is age-specific, which is teacher-related, which involves compulsory attendance on a full-time basis, and which has an obligatory cur- riculum.~29 He uses this definition consistently, according to Schindler.30 This amounts to an anti-school programmatic definition: anti-school in that each of these elements is identified by Illich as antithetical to good education; programmatic in that a school is identified by the fact that these things happen there.- It has the effect of building his conclusions into his starting point, which may serve as an objection to them. "Deschooling" would mean removing these four characteristics from the institutions having to do with 1earning.3] Schindler points out that Illich does not offer a single con- sistent meaning for the term "society." Rather, he uses several familiar synonyms: "humanity,” “culture," "the state," "the system," “the individual writ large." His meanings are understandable on a certain level from context; he is concerned with all the varied 32 This has the consequence, however, that meanings of "the social.“ “deschooling society" becomes all but meaningless. If "deschooling“ is programmatic, to remove the four characteristics which constitute schooling, but "society” has no precise referent then the most that can be done is ”deschool schools," the institutions which have the four characteristics.33 Schindler concludes that "deschooling society" cannot be a literal educational doctrine. He classifies it rather as an 207 “educational slogan“ which is an elliptical form of "the deschooling of society ought to be accomplished."34 Thus Illich is on the one hand identifying schooling as an independent variable producing many of the characteristics of soci— ety; on the other hand, he is calling for removal of the qualities which do the producing. He might equally meaningfully call for "desocializing seciety.“ In a certain sense, this is precisely what he has done. He leaves rather too much to be worked out, though. Illich gives us a program as to what to do about the society we have, but what are we to do to replace it? To attempt to institutionalize a program for the new society is to err again, if Illich's objection . to institutions is valid. His critique of society will not serve to establish the parameters of the new socialization he calls for-- unless, indeed, his objection is to socialization itself. The convivial society made up of Epimethean man appears to depend for its definition on a naturalistic account of what ought to be, which raises as many questions as it answers. Illich says at one point: I chose the term "conviviality" to designate the opposite of industrial productivity. I intended it to mean autono- mous and creative intercourse among persons, and the inter- course of persons with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made envi— ronment. I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realized in personal intggdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value. The objections to a theory that individuals will thrive if only their relationships are guided by the ”intrinsic" ethical values which they will express by the manner in which they use their autonomy are many. 208 An argument from history is the only one I will offer, namely, that humans seem to need social structures to restrain the uses which certain of their number wish to make of their autonomy. Some free people seem to live convivially, but others seem willing to employ force against weaker persons for the sake of self-gratification. There is no evidence that humans place "an intrinsic ethical value" on freedom. Illich's Roman Catholic theology should prevent him from urging such a definition, for original sin is as much a part of the human condition in that view as is any innate propensity for good. Illich thus seems to be doing something other than analyzing society with an eye to developing programs for change. His notion of deschooling may mean only a form of demythologizing, suggesting that we can transform ourselves into the good society by reordering our self-perceptions so that we free ourselves in order to fulfill our- selves. This is fine poetry, but impractical. To define social change as a personal, spontaneous, individual, psychological process which has no political dimension but is dependent upon an unchanging human essence which culture is repressing, as Illich does,36 is to identify it as unreachable. Culture will continue to repress the necessary essence unless some political program for changing culture is engaged in. Illich thus has an error at the heart of his analysis. In a certain sense, no more need be said. If Illich is not correct in considering schools to be an independent variable capable of bringing about the systems effects which he objects to, then he may not have a basis for commending the deschooling of society. The objection raised by Judson Jerome that Illich's deschooling does not '7 \g W ‘3 209 address the problem defined by his critique could be correct. Jerome argues that if the possessors of power and privilege are using schooling to socialize to their desires, they will not be defeated by laissez—faire education which offers only access to learning. To remove the things Illich opposes from society implies, to Jerome, total deinstitutionalization,37 not merely deschooling. The question of what a noninstitutional structure for human relationships might be is raised, and cannot be answered satisfactorily with imagery. Illich offers some specific alternatives to schooling, more as illustrations of possibilities than as proposals. He calls this approach to the distribution of educational resources “networks." He intends the term to suggest an open-textured arrangement without specific structure, not partaking of the qualities he considers offensive in the institutional structure of the present culture. There are four such arrangements in Illich's most frequent sug— gestion: 1. Reference Services to Educational Objects: informa- tion about the location of and access to things, places, and processes for relatively formal learning --museums, libraries, laboratories. 2. Skill Exchanges: lists of skills available, condi- tions-~"I will trade three hours of x for someone who will show me y,” addresses; 3. Peer Matching: lists of persons looking for someone to join in learning about something or other; and 4. Reference-Services to Educators-at-Large: lists of those offering to teach tggngs, their subjects, qualifications, and fees. Each would require computerized lists, access to the data in readily available locations, and a classification convention similar to 210 --though doubtless more complex by several orders of magnitude--that of ERIC. It is not easy to see a qualitative difference; such arrange- ments would require an elaborate structure which by virtue of its complexity might well prove more, rather than less, susceptible to being coopted against its clients. The skills required of users, the confidence and aggressiveness required for seeking out desired learning experiences, could favorthepresent elites. Illich seems not to deal with this problem. He has raised three sorts of objections to schooling: that some two—thirds of the people of the world cannot afford the cost of competitive levels of schooling; that schools fail to benefit the lower class by not sat- isfying their needs; and that they fail the "nominally successful" in society by misdirecting and stultifying their desire for learn- ing.39 Whatever the networks may accomplish in removing the first and third of these objections, surely the second remains. Fischer claims that Illich misreads human nature: Fischer believes that people will prove too selfish to do what is necessary for the networks to provide equalaccess.40 Havighurst considers the proposal elitist, favoring "haves” against ”have-hots.” He thinks the skills necessary for successful use of the networks are the same as those making for success in schools. Free public schooling, he argues, was invented as a tool to reduce this advantage. Substi- tuting networks which restore the advantage because the schools fail 41 to help some students seems to him illogical. Jackson reinforces this argument by pointing out that the characteristics of those 211 already suffering cultural impoverishment are precisely those which would limit their ability to use voluntary means of education. He concludes that class distinctions would be strengthened.42 Illich appears to consider all this to be covered by the nature of the new society that is necessary before such an approach to learning can even be attempted. These networks are meant to serve a society that does not now exist. The end to a process of schooling meant to produce the consumer culture would mean an upsetting of society which could be exploited to move toward the desired new social arrangements.43 This new culture would involve a new style of educational relationship between man and his environment, says Illich. It would be based on changes in attitude toward growing up, toward use of the _available tools for learning, toward the quality and structure of daily Hie.44 What these new attitudes would consist of is to be understood chiefly by negation: the opposite of the things Illich criticizes in schooling. There would be no compulsion to selection of learning. Instruction, in the sense that one person's judgment determines what another must learn, is to Illich a chief evil in schooling. It restricts the individual's imagination to the vision had by the institution. Most learning is not, according to Illich, the result 45 This is not to say that there is no legitimacy to of instruction. teaching, once the student is responsible for selecting the learning. The teacher's claim to superior knowledge becomes a matter of sub- stance, and his ordering of the presentation of learning is evidence ,—f—————i , It; —4—-—-‘ 212 of his wisdom (or lack of it).46 This is consistent with Illich's rejection of consumerism: the individual is to dominate the process. What is difficult to accept is Illich's confidence that this would prove beneficial to individuals and to society. Arthur Pearl con- tends that the results would be negative. Freedom to select one's learning amounts to freedom to live on the basis of one's prejudices, he argues. People will do anything possible to avoid encountering painful truths. Since many of the important truths of today are painful ones, people will be miseducating themselves if they avoid them. (Illich could well employ this argument against those who refuse to attend to his analysis, it must be admitted.) Pearl uses the product of free selection of television programming as a case in point: frivolous programs have larger audiences than do serious 47 ones, and thus are, commercially, more successful. Pearl contends that compulsory schooling is a necessary means by which to compel persons to face problems.48 Another feature of Illich's new relationships between men and learning would be a rearranging of credentialling. Persons would demonstrate their capabilities to be employed in some capacity by demonstrating competency through tests appropriate to the job. They will have learned these skills by whatever combination is appropriate of formal teaching by practitioners of the skill they wish and informal on-the-job training. This is part of what Illich implies by the charge that schools remove students from reality, the neces- sity he sees for involving learning with doing if the learning is to be significant: “Access to reality constitutes a fundamental '.“ \-§ 213 alternative in education to a system that only purports to teach ]."49 Illich means more than on-the- gpppt it [emphasis, Illich's job skill training by "access to reality." It also suggests that anyone interested should be able to get information, use of tools and processes, admittance to public places, or anything else not subject 50 to demands of personal (not social or commercial) privacy. Illich feels such personal control of learning is necessary to avoid social control, not because he places no value on qualified teaching.5] Illich thinks we now have the basis for such redefinition of creden- tialling. He claims that demonstration of appropriate competency is the sole legal requirement for employment. His argument is based on the precedent set in the case of Griggg v. Duke Power Company, in which it was ruled that employers may not make educational require- ments which are unrelated to the job. This is perhaps not a uni— versally applicable precedent, though. Griggs, a black man, had been denied a janitorial job for want of a high school diploma. The court may have suspected the educational qualification to have been covert racism.52 Even if such is not the case, it is less difficult to dismiss the need for a diploma for janitorial service than it is to do so for surgery. Illich appears to have a misplaced confidence that complex matters are as readily learned as simple skills: "It does not take much time for the interested learner to acquire almost n53 any skill that he wants to use. One wishes to inquire what excep- tions are covered by the qualification "almost"?—-Operation of nuclear power plants?--Philosophical analysis?—-The conducting of adult learning? Smith's caustic objection covers the concern. If what 214 Illich is proposing is that people will learn specialized skills without formal training, for example, by watching brain surgeons and violinists in action, the outcome will "set back the clock in medi- cine and music."54 Smith considers Illich to have displayed a cavalier attitude toward all professionalism and a child- like faith that once we are liberated from manipulation by professional teachers, we will in our wanderings find other "skill-models" in the community. They will by example show us how to repair telephonegs become linguists, practice m1dw1fery, or deSIgn bu11d1ngs. Smith argues that Illich is correct in placing a high value on student interest, but in error in considering it the only significant factor in learning. Interest is not always spontaneous, but may arise from contact with something unknown until suggested by contact with mate- rial taught to the student because the experience of others suggests it to be of value to the culture.56 Compulsory schooling may be a necessary, and not merely sufficient, condition for broad enough exposure to possibilities. Manfred Stanley remarks in this connec- tion that ". . . compulsory schooling . . . by exposing people to new motivations and possibilities, often functioned as a potent conduit to social mobility."57 This does not completely refute Illich's position, since he would raise the objection that the mobility in question is defined and guided by society and thus of questionable validity. Illich's basic position has less to do with these pro- posals than with his conviction that people must experience the world without the schooling frame of reference. Joel Spring compares this desire in Illich to Tolstoy‘s wish to have learners engage their cul- ture without schooling. Tolstoy, says Spring, defined culture as the 215 sum of the social forces shaping individuals. Schooling he saw as a conscious attempt to shape persons to a particular likeness-— "culture under restraint." The issue for Tolstoy, and, says Spring, for Illich, is one of compulsion. Instruction which provides infor— mation and teaching of skills is a means of culture when engaged in freely, and a means of schooling when the teaching is forced on the student and the instructor chooses the topics.58 Stanley says that Illich's argument in favor of learner sovereignty, that it is not legitimate for one person to choose learning for another, amounts to a denial that anyone may represent society in its dimension as moral community. Stanley considers important the conception of community as a source of continuity in tradition, moral views, and cognitive standards. These things serve as standards which put necessary parameters to individualism. Education is thus, to Stanley, not just any learning; it is learning for community.59 This argument is not a valid objection to Illich‘s funda- mental analysis. Illich puts forth exactly the denial Stanley objects to: he says that the effect of allowing the community to regulate values is a negative one and therefore illegitimate. What Stanley might more validly have objected to is the consequence of a denial of the legitimacy of social values. Illich either must allow for complete individualization of evaluation—~the "law of the jungle"-—or he must somehow reintroduce social vaers. Illich thus is inconsistent, but not in the way Stanley supposes he is. Sidney Hook's point is well taken. He argues that Illich "neglects the 216 principles of intellectual authority and organization necessary to negotiate the conflicts of freedoms.“60 Without some such principles which are assented to by the community, the likely solution to conflicts among individual uses of freedom is force used in random ways. The community control which Illich deplores can be use of force in limited and appropriate ways as well as the inappropriate ways to which‘he objects. Illich may be proposing an illogical response when he recommends that inappro- priate control be replaced by no control. If there is a genuine need for some sort of solution to the problem of unrestrained behavior, then substitution of appropriate control for inappropriate control may be the logical response. Though Illich is critical of schools, he has not been heard accurately by those who speak of him as criticizing schools for being ineffective. To the contrary, his objection is that they have been all too effective. He considers the proponents of compulsory school- ing to have been making valid claims about the potential of school to socialize. He rejects the outcomes as being bad for people, as evidence of inappropriate objectives rather than of failure to reach objectives. He rejects compulsion for what he sees as its success, not its failure. To present arguments that Illich has not offered adequate evidence to support his contention as to the central role of school- ing in enculturation or to demonstrate the inadequacy of his proposed alternative learning systems is not to defeat his central thesis, however. Some of his critics suppose that this is the case, that 217 the weaknesses at certain points of his supporting arguments are . proof that Illich is mistaken in his conviction that the present culture and its institutions are expressions of deplorable values. I regard this as unresolved by discussion on the level to which this dissertation is directed. This opinion is the support I would offer, in part, for continuing to take seriously certain of Illich's ideas, arguments, and evidence as meaningful contributions to the debate over compulsory schooling. It may well be, as Neil Postman argues at one point, that Illich's ideas simply are irrelevant. Illich is proposing a change that society just will not allow to take place-— and for the very reason Illich sees so clearly: the schools function to perpetuate the established order. If Illich thinks that Grigg§_v. Duke Power Company will turn this around, he needs some reality therapy. Schooling may be called dead, says Postman, but the students are alive and present, and what happens to them matters so much that school will necessarily go on. The problem therefore is one of reform.62 Postman proposes that Illich's ideas may have value "as a standard of judgment rather than a serious political proposal." .They might be seen as the source of a series of questions to be used to evaluate particular reform proposals: will x work in such fashion as to make resources more widely available? to reduce authoritarian forms of schooling? to free and empower students in constructive 63 ways? Illich's own proposals, it would seem, pass only the first of these tests, if the final qualifying phrase is taken seriously. 218 Illich offers at least three criticisms of schooling which require some serious response, according to Stanley. These are Illich's claims: 1. That education is not dealing satisfactorily with the inaccessibility of the modern world. There is incomprehensibility in the realm of knowledge. There is the way in which society has become impermeable to attempts at action to change things, in the realm of practice. 2. That consumerism, which is dysfunctional, is thoroughly intertwined with schooling; and 3. That the authoritarian character of education is dys- functional for the individual's understanding and experience of freedom.64 Illich describes the characteristics of an educational system which would not be vulnerable to the third of these criticisms, at least. It would provide access to resources to anyone who wishes to learn,at;any point in his/her life. It would empower those who have something to teach to find those who wish to learn. It would furnish access to the public to anyone who wishes to present an issue, an idea, or a criticism.65 It would seem worthwhile to debate the value of such a system. The nature and worth of approaches to education which respond to his other criticisms would also be of genuine con- cern. It may not be appropriate therefore to condemn Illich for failure to operationalize his slogan. Rejecting the definition of schooling he offers is one thing; proposing alternative learning environments which meet his objections is another. 219. The questions which Peter Wagschal finds Illich raising by his arguments are important ones which admit of no simple answers. The issues arising from the notion of deschooling include at least these questions: Do you trust people or institutions? Do you value diversity or efficiency? Do you feel humans are internally motivated and self- actualizing or lazy and needful of outside stimuli? Do you value evolution into the unknown or stability through planning even of change?66 Illich favors the first of each pair of alternatives; the proponents of compulsory education in the past have rather uniformly defended the second--though not necessarily in precisely these terms. By his analysis, Michael Macklin has argued, Illich success— fully has placed the burden of proof on society to justify its interventions in the lives of individuals, in particular when those interventions prescribe behavior.67 Until very recent times, the burden of proof has clearly rested with those who sought to exempt some child from the provisions of compulsory attendance laws. The possible exception tothisgeneralism which is found in the "compel- linginterest" doctrine in State v. Yoder68 has not as yet clearly become a precedent applying to all compulsory attendance laws and other state regulations of education. Illich has issued a challenge to those who continue to defend compulsory schools and compulsory attendance. He does so by agreeing 220 that the historical argument that schools may be used to socialize persons to society's values is a valid one. Schools, says Illich, do exactly that. But he argues that such socialization is not legitimate; it is to use schooling for purposes that are not ethical. This challenge cannot be met merely by destructive criticism of the alternatives Illich proposes. Rather, it requires the state— ment of a rationale for whatever level of compulsion is deemed important. As I hope to show in the next chapter, though some efforts to justify compulsory schooling have not responded in such a fashion, there have been some substantial efforts to state a rationale for modern continuation of compulsory schooling. FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI 1For instance-~he repeats his arguments often--in Ivan Illich, “The Breakdown of Schools: A Problem or a Symptom," Inter- change 2 (1971): 5—6. szan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. xix. 3 Ibid., pp. 107-116. 4Ibid., p. 109. 5Ibid., pp. 108-109. 6Ibid., p. 112. 7Ibid., p. 1. 81bid. 91bid., pp. 113-114. 10 Ibid., pp. 115-116. HIvan Illich, "After Deschooling, What?" in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer, and Frank Reissman, eds., After Deschooling,What (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. l-2. 12Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 2. 13Ibid., p. 32. 14 Ivan Illich, ”Education Without School: How It Can Be Done," in Daniel U. Levine and Robert J. Havighurst, eds., Farewell $0 Schools??? (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 971), p. 38. 15Ivan Illich, "Education: A Consumer Commodity and a Pseudo- Religion,“ he Christian Century 88 (December 15, 1971): 1465. 16I11ich, Deschooling Society, p. 74. 17See, for instance, "Grades, Bah Humbug!” in Ronald Gross and Paul Osterman, eds., High School (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), pp. 155-157. 221 4____-_____________IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII'P ii 222 18Iiiich,“Aiter Deschooling, What?" pp. 14-15. 19Maxine Greene, "To the Deschoolers," in Levine and Havig— hurst, p. 100. 20 1906) Edward A. Ross, Social Control (New York: Macmillan Co., 2(For example, in "Progressive Social Philosophy: Charles Horton Cooley and Edward Alsworth Ross," in Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1973), pp. 40-65. 22Ross, p. 74. 23Ibid., p. 168. 24Ibid.. pp. 164-165. 251bid., p. 166. 26Ibid., p. 108. 27Ibid.. pp. 232-233. 28Sam R. Snyder, ”What Is Ivan Illich Talking About?" 321 Delta Kappan 53 (April 1972): 56. 29Iiiich, Deschooling Society. pp. 25-25. 30Charies R. Schindler, "A Philosophical Analysis of Ivan Illich's Construct 'Deschooling Society' and Related Terms" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1972), p. 47. 31Ibid.. pp. 48-49. 32Ibid., pp. 51-53. 33Ibid., p. 54. 34Ibid.. pp. 64-65. 35Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviali§y_(New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 11. 36Iiiich, Deschooling Society. pp. 54-55. 37Sumner Rosen, Jerome Judson, Maxine Greene, and Arthur Pearl, "Illich: Pro and Con,“ ocial Policy 2 (March/April 1972): 47-48. 38Illich, ”Education Without School,” pp. 39-40. 223 . 3?Everett Reimer and Ivan Illich, "Proposal for a Planning Seminar Aimed at the Development of Basic Educational Alternatives," in Levine and Havighurst, p. 1. 4O . John Fischer, "Public Education Reconsidered," Today’s Edu- r cation 61 (May 1972): 22-31. _ 'f 4(Robert J. Havighurst, "Prophets and Scientists in Educa- tion," in Levine and Havighurst, p. 85. 42Phillip Jackson, "A View from Within,” in Levine and Havig- hurst, pp. 63-64. 43Iiiich, ”Education without School," pp. 36-37. 44 45 Ibid.. pp. 35-36. Illich, Deschooling Society. pp. 39-40. 46Iiiich, ”Education without School," pp. 54-55. 47Arthur Pearl, "The Case for Schooling America,“ in John Martin Rich, Innovations in Education: Reformers and Their Critics (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1975 , p. 182. 48Ibid., p. 183. 49Ivan Illich, “An Alternative to Schooling," Saturday Review, June 19, 1971, pp. 47-48. 50Iiiich, Deschooling Society. pp. 79-84. Ibid.. pp. 87—91. 52Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 91 U.S. 849 (1971). 51 53Iiiich, ”An Alternative," pp. 47-48. 54Mortimer Smith, “The Romantic Radicals: A Threat to Reform," in Levine and Havighurst, p. 74. 55Ibid. 56Ibid., pp. 74-75. 57Manfred Stanley, ”Illich Defrocked," in Cornelius J. Troost, ed., Radical School Reform: Critique and Alternatives (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973), p. 80. 58Joel Spring, A Primer of Libertarian Education (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975), pp. 57-58. 224 59Stanley, p. 77. 60Sidney Hook, "Illich's Deschooled Utopia," in Troost, p. 74. 6(Neil Postman, "My Ivan Illich Problem," in Gartner, Greer, and Reissman, p. 145. 62Ibid., p. 147. 63Ibid., p. 146. 64Stanley, pp. 74-75. 65Iiiich, Deschooling Society, p. 72. 66Peter H. Wagschal, "An Impractical Proposal,“ in Levine and Havighurst, pp. 80-82. 67Michael Macklin, "Those Misconceptions Are Not Illich's," Educational Theory 25 (Summer 1975): 325. 68State v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (1972). "a CHAPTER VII THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY SOME MODERN. DEFENDERS 0F COMPULSORY EDUCATION A certain amount of the response to deschooling and radical school reform p \als has been of a negative character. C. B. Smith, for/ah/i:::::ce, presented an argument that compulsory school- {Hng was the only effective way to insure workers able to meet the ldemands of high technologyi He compared the needs of the United States to those of the Soviet Union, which he claimed to have an effective educational system which is producing capable workers. Thus, said Smith, anyone proposing changes in public schooling is risking the ability to compete with the Soviet Union. An attack on the common schools, he summed up, is an attack on America.1 Similarly, Cornelius Troost introduced his collection of articles critical of deschooling and radical reform proposals with a strong claim about the effects of ”radical school reform.“ He blamed the open classroom and free schools, which he seems to think are identical, for bringing about deviant behavior. The emphasis on individualized learning characteristic of both sorts of alternative arrangement for schooling, Troost claimed, creates in students high potential for age—segregated peer group loyalties, anarchistic think- 2 ing, and thrill-seeking by means of drugs, sex, violence, and crime. 225 \L.§ 226 Such claims as that of Troost seem to be a sophisticated form of pg hominem argument. If Paueroodman, for instance, favored open education and free schools, it must be because this sort of education will produce persons like himself. And he was an avowed anarchist and admitted bisexual. If exposing the gg_hominem basis for such claims is not adequate reason for dismissing them, they may be evalu- ated further on the basis of factual data. Is there a correlation between attendance at free schools or open classroom public schools and the sorts of behavior to which Troost objects? Are all critics of the public schools pro-communist? "‘ I do not wish to consider these sorts of argument further. Even if the evidence should support them, they do not amount to a positive case for the continuation of compulsory schooling. Such arguments, even if confirmed by factual data, at most could be used to support a claim that present arrangements should continue because the alternatives proposed were not satisfactory. Stronger arguments would attempt to demonstrate that compulsory education is valuable or necessary in itself. It is such stronger arguments which will be considered in the remainder of this chapter. (A One of the most thorough attempts to defend compulsory attend- ance requirements is that of Robert Hutchins in the 1972 yearbook of the Great Books collection.3 I will consider the arguments presented by Hutchins in detail somewhat later. In contrast to Hutchins, though, many defenders are relatively quick to assume that their evaluations need little urging. James Conant, for example, states in a single paragraph two of the classic arguments for compulsory 227 education and asserts that they are still valid. [Compulsory school- ing, he said, came into being because democracy require; an‘educated electorate and as an effective means for upward mobility of citizengfi Conant is willing to concede that there are some difficulties with compulsory schooling: -"The more one studies the problem of how to develop academic talent through education in a free society, the more one concludes that attempts at compulsion are not the answer."5 This statement, however, does not introduce a major discussion of alternatives. It is instead a sort of summary of the need to con- tinue attempts to perfect public schools. Universal education,though not yet perfected, has succeeded for one hundred years or more in the task of socializing "millions of immigrants and native citizens."6 Conant feels that compulsion can be replaced by persuasion, provided only that educational programs of good quality and proper character exist.7 In an earlier work, Conant had given some indication of what sort of educational program he would consider satisfactory. The most important quality for education to have is commonality, accord- ing to Conant. 'It should provide a common experience capable of uniting diverse Americans in an understanding of democracy and in valuing national unitygg For there to be such a common experience, the majority of students must continue to enroll in public schools. Conant agrees that democracy entails the freedom for persons to elect private means of education, but considers it potentially the source of disunity: 228 Unity we can achieve if our public schools remain the pri- mary vehicle for the education of our youth, and if, as far '\ as possible, all the youth of a community attend the same school irrespective of family fortune or cultural background./g ,. / The positive results to be expected of common educational experience Ninclude religious tolerance, mutual respect across class and voca- [tional lines, and confirmed belief in the rights of the individual}0 Just how this is to happen is not made clear. The polarization of many integrated schools into racial groups lends substance to an argument that merely bringing students under a single roof is not adequate to reach such goals. The failure of some defenders of the common school to respond to claims by critics that the noble inten- tions are not, in fact, being realized is a major weakness in their case. Merely reaffirming the objectives does not respond to the criticism. Conant, of course, was writing before the notion of deschool- ing, and before radical school criticism had gained much momentum. It is inappropriate, therefore, to appear to criticize him for fail- ing to respond directly to arguments of the sort presented by Holt and Illich. The specific defense of compulsory schooling offered by Hutchins, however, is based upon reasoning rather similar to that of Conant. The community is the central factor in education, according to Hutchins. Human beings seem unable to get along without communi- ties, so they must find some way to achieve the best possible commu- nities. ,Education is the chief means for doing so, and schools are an ”. . . institution erected by the society for the specific purpose of helping the citizen learn to live in it and . . . helping him The American conception of society, says Hutchins, is that of a "self-governing community of self—governing citizens." Such a society requires persons who can think for themselves, for no other (3 Education is the sort of person is capable of self—government. means whereby the intellectual development which is essential for citizenship is made possible. (The proper purpose for schooling, says Hutchins, is the goal enunciated by Dewey, “to put the child in full pos§ession of allhispowers.“14 Those powers, well developed, are precisely what is needed for intelligent citizenship. This line of reasoning is adequate justification for compul- sory public schooling, according to Hutchins. The public school has been . the foundation of our freedom, the guarantee of our future, the cause of our prosperity and power, the bastion of our security, the bright and shining beacon that was the source of our enlightenment. This rhetoric glosses over the historical fact that the political freedom and the enlightenment in question predated the establishment of the common school and the passage of compulsory attendance laws by several years, but no matter. Hutchins has made his point clear: education is of such critical importance to democracy that no child may be allowed to evade schooling or to be kept from it by any cir- cumstance. No chance may be taken that parental lack of resources or indifference may cause a failure to educate a child.16 In a later version of this article, Hutchins sharpened this point. He objects to the notion that only parents have a right to 230 educate children, because the role of the community is necessarily the dominant one, in his view.17 This does amount to restraint upon parental control, just as some persons object, but the nature of community entails restraint: 1:5 community of any kind must impose some limits on the freedom to choose one's own goals and develop one's l8 own life—stylelfi, One of the important restraints, to Hutchins, must be regulation of education if society is to continue to improve itself: "There is no easy way by which a political community can make itself better. It seems doubtful that it can do so by leaving education, 'the making of citizens,’ to chance."19 Hutchins considers individualism to be a serious threat in a world so interdependent as is ours.20 It is not entirely clear what he means by "individualism," since he values “diversity" as one of the important qualities of democracy. Diversity is somehow to be produced by the common schools—-or at least allowed to flourish if brought to them by their clients-~along with the unity of understanding necessary for self-government.§1 An end to compulsory schooling, to Hutchins, would promote a dangerous individualism no matter what form it took: no schools at all, handing over schooling to private interests, or public schools that allowed students to attend or not as they might choose. Any such change would result in "cultural, social, and economic segregation," as individual families and small segments of the community organized schooling to meet their own interests.22 Hutchins is critical of the idea that the interests of the student Should be given significant weight. He appears to think that such anti-school reasoning invokes the notion that "schooling 231' should be fun“ so it will interest learners. He equates such an idea to a "play theory" of education, which he considers Kant to have criticized decisiveiy.23 Illich's networks are not adequate to insure needed learning, according to Hutchins, precisely because their use would depend upon the learner's interest. Interests are too changeable to be relied upon. It is perfectly true that things should be interesting so that everyone would enjoy learning insofar as that is possible: “But the :9- art of teaching would seem to consist in large part of.making what ought to be learned interesting to learners who bring little interest with them to the task."24 The problem to be solved is that children may not want to learn what they should. Some needed learning is sim- ply outside the experience of most students until they are forced to attend to the subject. One purpose for curriculum is efficiency: it avoids wasted motion by exposing students to material that experi- ence has shown to be valuable.25 Hutchins consistently urges that the social purposes of schooling are more important than any other consideration: "On bal- ance, if we have to choose between an education that expands our individuality and one that draws out our common humanity, we should n26 at this juncture prefer the latter. He feels that there is no need to choose between the two, however. In his view, the only way an individual can be fulfilled is through community, democratic com- munity to be precise: The individual cannot become a human being without the demo- cratic political community; and the democratic political com- munity cannot be maintained without independent citizens who are qualified to govern themselves and others through the democratic political community. 232 Hutchins does not indicate the label he applies to those who are excluded from humanness by the unfortunate circumstance that they live undersomenon-democratic government. His reserving of human status to democrats is inconsistent with his concern for recognition of the interdependence of the entire world, in any case. It does underline his utter seriousness about the value of compulsory school- ing; no less a matter than one's humanity is at stake. The zeal for democracy which Hutchins displays must be admired, but surely this claim is too strong to be taken seriously-( His reasoning is usually more careful. He agrees that many criticisms of the present schools are justified. There is truth to the claims that schools are boring, inefficient, authoritarian, 28 ineffective, bureaucratic. ‘But all this is not adequate reason for ending compulsory education. It does justify calls for reform. H chins points out that evidence that some schools harm some children //d::s not demonstrate that schools must harm children. And even less does it support a claim that all schools harm all children. Compul- sory attendance cannot be considered g_prjpri_grounds for a conclu- sion that schooling is harmful.29 5% The harmful thing about current schooling, in the eyes of Hutchins, is that the original purpose for schooling has been all but abandoned. The only legitimate purpose for education, he argues, is 30 Education was intended to the making of good citizens for society. benefit society principally, though individuals gained also from good government. Individual economic gain was an incidental benefit. Only gradually did advancement up economic and social ladders become 1...: 233 a part of the purpose of schooling, claims Hutchins.31 Once again, Hutchins appears to have been attending to historical evidence selectively. Both societal and individual benefits, including eco- nomic ones, appear to have been urged, usually in combination, as reasons for compulsory learning, compulsory provision of schools,-- and compulsory attendance laws. Hutchins argues that schools cannot possibly deliver on a promise of personal gain from education. There are too many other 4 factors involved in personal success. The rage of those who are disappointed by failure to advance after being told that only school- ing was necessary for them to get ahead is justified. Schools are being criticized appropriately, says Hutchins, when they are attacked for selling themselves for such wrong purposes.32 The definition of education as a commodity benefiting its consumers, besides describ— ing outcomes inaccurately, is necessarily devisive. It gives improper advantage to those who are already privileged, in that they can much more readily obtain schoolingn It discriminates against the poor.33 Further, when such individual gain is accepted as a proper purpose for schooling, it lends substance to the harmful rhetoric of individual, group, neighborhood, race and class. All this, to Hutchins, is destructive of the unity essential to democ- racy.34 His reasoning seems to contain the odd assumption that unequal distribution of resources will not be devisive unless the promise is made that schooling will do something about it. Hutchins considers a return to the true purpose of education the only practical response to just criticism: “Education is the 234 35 deliberate attempt to form men in terms of an ideal.“ The more nearly that ideal is realized, the more readily the problems now afflicting society will be resolved. Many of those problems come from the same misdirection of purpose. Schools are not to blame for this misdirection. It is the fault of parents and employers that we so emphasize credentialling. It is the fault of all of us for allow— ing propagandists for new definitions of community to coopt the schools.36 Hutchins argues that credentialling is by definition incon- gruous with compulsory universal education. He points to the fact that his own bachelor's degree was once much more valuable than such a degree is today. When he received it, in the 1920s, only some two percent of the population possessed similar credentials. But “my advantage has been undermined . . . .” Schooling cannot confer sta- tus when it is universal. "When everybody's somebody, nobody's any- 37 body,” Hutchins declares. The faintly elitist flavor of this argument conveys his attitude accurately. Hutchins is presenting more than merely a logical reason for abandoning credentialling as a purpose of schooling. Schools cannot ”get rid of war, disease, “38 They cannot change parental attitudes 39 poverty, slums, or crime. or their socioeconomic status. "We have learned that socioeconomic status and family attitudes and background impose constraints on the 40 Hutchins would child that the school seems powerless to overcome." disagree with me sharply, no doubt, but I see no significant differ- ence between his views and a conclusion that what is born in a per- son or instilled by his/her family and environment is what will be. 235 /Education can only contribute to changing environments and solving \problems, and that indirectly, by raising individual levels of intel- higence. Schooling is, to Hutchins, a "means of accentuating and per- petuating accepted values, not of raising a nation by its own boot- straps into a different and better world.“41 The advantage of compulsory education is "less superstition, less disorder, less dis— respect for superiors, less factious and wanton opposition to govern- ment, and less rash and capricious judgment of publicyaff‘airs."42 The context in which Hutchins offers this last remark is one that makes it uncertain whether he is uttering his own judgment or is reporting one from the early days of compulsory schooling. The fact that one cannot be certain is an illustration of the pervasive flaw in the basic position which Hutchins holds. He simply contra- dicts himself in attempting to make it appear that democratic SOCiety can gain by things that leave the problems and aspirations of indi- viduals untouched. He attempts to finesse the point by saying that there will be resolutions for the difficulties of some individuals as an incidental benefit of schooling that serves society. This does not come to grips with the fact that a significant portion of the criticism of schooling to which he believes he is offering a valid response comes from those who have not been helped by it. The “self- governing citizens" are demanding that the "self-governing political community" attend to their needs and aspirations. Are they to sub- side upon being told that they are victims of wrong definitions of purpose? Are they to mumble ”yes, massuh" and shuffle off to their places, confident that they contribute pleasing diversity to the rich 236 fabric of democracy? The promise of social and economic success was one major reason why many Americans of the past accepted compulsory schooling. To say now that it was all a mistake, that schooling is not to be held responsible for reaching such objectives, is not to defend a continuing of compulsory education, but, in the view of many, to support calls for its demise. The hollowness at the core of Hutchins' reasoning is all the more disappointing because he is capable of such shrewdness on par- ticular matters. He denies, for instance, that Illich's proposal to deschool society would end the consumer culture. Hutchins does not think schooling created consumer values, for that matter. But he points out that Illich's networks would themselves reflect society's values: It is self-evident that any educational system must do so. A society that wants to change its ways can use its educa- tional system to do it, but an educational system cannot openly set out to achieve goals the society does not accept.43 Hutchins does not quite come to grips with Illich's notion of the hidden curriculum of schools. He points out as though it were an objection to Illich's position that it is no accident that schools are uniform across the land: ”The values of the society are ours. The only way Illich could hope to separate education from us would 44 be to have no system at all.” So far, Illich would doubtless agree, rather than feel himself attacked. But Hutchins goes on to ask the telling question for which Illich seems to have provided no answer: how can life be educational if it is as bad as Illich says it is?45 237 Where, in other words, is the hidden curriculum for Illich's new learning to come from?, For Hutchins, the question of labels and hidden curriculum is unimportant. The overt intent of schooling is what matters: The purpose of the public school is not accomplished by hav— ing them free, universal and compulsory. . . . they are not public schools unless they start their pupils toward an ' understanding of what it means to be a self-ggverning citi- zen of a self-governing political community. Hutchins makes the excellent point that since education to a certain level is necessary for all citizens, it should be removed from all evaluative and credentialling functions.47 This could well become the point of zero correlation of which Green spoke—-the amount of education that makes no difference in life chances, employment, or further education because almost everyone has achieved that much education. There is zero correlation between one's educational attainment and his/her future prospects at the point when the majority of persons has equal educational attainment.48 Hutchins argues for a nongraded basic curriculum which would be designed to prevent any failure: "It is self—evident that if a course of study is designed to provide the minimum requisites for democratic citizenship, nobody can be permitted to fail.“49 This proposal for nongraded and non- grading basic education could become the basis for schooling that answers many of the criticisms that certain aspects of present schooling are miseducative and maladaptive. . Hutchins summarizes his defense of compulsory education by saying that before the principle of compulsory universal schooling can be given up, there must be evidence to Show that public schools 238 cannot be made what they should be and that there is a valid alterna- tive to them. Hutchins believes that neither condition can be met.50 The objectives of schools must be, in his view: 1. to provide the tools of learning, which are reading, writing, computational skills, speaking, listening; the abilities which are fundamental for citizens of a democracy; 2. to open new worlds to the young; to give them broad experiences appropriate to the world community necessitated by the current global culture; and 3. to get the young to understand their own cultural heritage. To Hutchins, "the public school is the only agency that can be trusted with this obligation."52 All other educative agencies suffer from failure to have their primary allegiance to the public, and thus are open to being deflected from their purpose to make public citi- ‘ 53 zens to serve some lesser concern. Hutchins concedes that "the critics of the schools have per- formed a public service in calling attention to shortcomings that 1154 can be repaired . . Curriculum can be improved, arrangements can be altered, and ”interest can be restored to schooling without coming to the indefensible conclusion that whatever is not immedi- ately interesting to children should be omitted from their educa- n55 tion. All that is necessary, to Hutchins, is that these reforms be arranged with it firmly in mind that the sole legitimate purpose for schooling is the making of citizens.56 Hutchins thus has based his entire defense of compulsory education on a reaffirmation of the historical police power argument that democracy has particular need for socialization of all citizens. —: . *i' 239 .3, 51 1 Unlike Conant, he has rejected any pgpgpg patriae sort of argument based on personal economic or social gain. Hutchins rejects the argument that compulsory education is a useful exercise of police power against poverty, crime, and vice. Hutchins, by implication at least, accepts many of the anti-school arguments of Holt and Illich -—and other radical critics--as being valid. He even has accepted as valid Illich's description of schooling as socialization. But Hutchins rejects Illich's claim that socialization is wrong. The central effort which Hutchins makes is an attempt to demonstrate that such socialization is necessary for democracy. It appears that Hutchins would argue that it is also sufficient, if schooling is done properly. Since schooling is not, in the opinion of Hutchins, being done properly as yet, the issue is moot. The reforms which Hutchins advocates should, if they were to be adopted, enable the question of the sufficiency of compulsory schooling to produce a democratic society to be tested. There seems little likelihood, however, that reforms based on so narrow a conception of the purpose of schooling will be undertaken. Other defenders of compulsory schooling have raised points not touched on by Hutchins which are worthy of attention. R. Free- man Butts, for one, bases his arguments on an analysis similar to that of Hutchins. The crucial purpose of schooling is education for citizenship, to Butts also. Education is the foundation of freedom, the source of an individual's ability to choose wisely so as to be free from tyranny, compulsion, and arbitrary restraint.57 Butts calls this objective for schooling "civism." It is the basis for 240 efforts to maintain and improve society, which to be democratic muSt express in its institutions liberty, equality, and fraternitye§8 Butts, however, offers a different account of the reason why compulsory education is essential to produce the democratic community. Rather than existing to socialize persons to democracy, schooling exists to express justice: "Our conception of a just society based upon principles of liberty and equality requires a public education available to all."59 This does not alter the basic purpose of pre- paring persons for citizenship, according to Butts. But it does allow for other purposes as well. Economic benefit for individuals and for the community is a dividend from education that is well worth having, Other individual purposes may coexist with the basic civic purpose for education.60 and may legitimately be worked toward. Butts responds effectively to certain proposals of the cri- tics of schools. He argues that it is inconsistent to base opposition to compulsory education upon appeals to civil rights or civil liber- ties.- The chief function of schooling is to teach and defend just these liberties and rights; to object to such instruction seems to him obtuse.“ There may well be reason to call for reform of particular practices because they violate civil rights, but to object to compul- sory education on constitutional grounds seems to Butts misguided.61 The civic goal of education in American schools is to deal with gll_students in ways calculated to motivate them and enable them to play their parts as informed, responsible, and effective memberg of the democratic political system [emphasis, Butts'].6 It is not difficult to accept such goals. There seems little possi- bility of achieving the good society unless some such objectives are 241 reached by schooling. But the goals themselves do not seem to entail any particular level of compulsion as necessary for their achievement. ‘ Reforms in curriculum and institutional arrangements might make reach- ing such objectives possible without compulsory attendance laws, for instance. Butts would disagree. He argues that it is foolish to call for education based on control by families and voluntary associations at a moment in time when families are weakening. A decreasing per- centage of persons are marrying; an increasing percentage of marriages end in divorce. To Butts, all this adds support to his basic argument that compulsory attendance is a necessary condition for a stable and progressive democratic culture.63 Not all defenders of public schooling would agree. James Piatt argues that compulsory attendance laws require merely attend- ance, which may actually get in the way of the learning which is its objective: ”Learning is not related to attendance; learning is related to a deep desire for self-realization and personal growth.“64 The outcome of compelling unwilling persons to attend schools is an increase in vandalism, classroom aggression, truancy and walk-outs, in his judgment.65 B. Frank Brown claims that compulsory attendance laws are not enforced and so might as well be ended. It is all but impossible, he claims, to obtain a conviction on a truancy charge. Attendance levels, for this and other reasons, says Brown, drop every year.66 James Cass supplies a statistic which supports Brown's argument. According to Cass, the 1970 census showed approximately two million 242 children between the ages of seven and seventeen who were not attending school.67 Dennis Chase, citing evidence tending to show that compulsory attendance laws are not resulting in high attendance, suggests that they may be functioning to inhibit the development of alternative forms of education. If there were not compulsion to attend public schools, they would come under pressure to become more effective to avoid losing students. Further, those concerned for the welfare of students who refused to participate in schools as they are would have more reason to seek solutions to the drop-out issue energetically, in his opinion.68 The chief value to compulsory attendance laws, according to Chase, is in whatever effect they have in protecting society's ”losers” against the cycle of poverty, crime, and unemploy- ment. He argues that the effect of Mississippi's repeal of compulsory attendance laws as an anti-integration measure has been to victimize the poor. 'The wealthy have always been able to educate their chil- dren as they saw fit. The middle classes have found ways to secure satisfactory schooling. But the poor in Mississippi have either suf- fered along with whatever schooling was made available or have dropped out and been neglected.69 He thus perhaps contradicts his own opti- mism concerning the likelihood of intervention on behalf of drop-outs and push-outs from no-longer-compulsory schools. Stephen Arons argues that compulsory attendance is irrelevant in itself. Ending compulsory attendance regulations will not solve the problems of the schools: 243 . . . Mississippi demonstrates that freeing children from compulsory schooling when they have no resources of their own, and when the society offers them no real role or sup- port, is not in the interest of freedom, equality, or humanism]0 Maintaining compulsory education laws, on the other hand, says Arons, will on the face of it fail to eliminate injustice or provide a way out of poverty.71 The urgent need, if Arons is correct, is to find relevant ways to reform schooling so that legitimate educational objectives may be reached for the maximum number of students, without attempt- ing to settle the question of compulsory attendance first. Rela- tively few persons would seem to agree with Illich's claim that there can be no legitimate societal definitions of educational objectives. Rather, it appears more likely that Butts accurately represents the situation when he says that there is still a general consensus in favor of public schooling. Though there is general dissatisfaction with some aspects of schooling, argues Butts, the participation of approximately 90 percent of eligible students in public education indicates that reforming schooling would be all that was necessary to insure continuing support.72 Mortimer Smith contends that much in the educational system is viable, or capable of being strengthened. He considers the his- torical arguments that education is necessary to meet both personal and societal needs still valid. The public school, he argues, is thus a necessary social convenience, well worth whatever efforts are . . . 73 necessary to eliminate its weaknesses. , f 244 Arthur Pearl suggests that Ivan Illich and the deschoolers have misdirected their attack. Rather than blaming schools for the state of things, he says, these critics should oppose the military, industrial, and political institutions which oppose the use of school- ing for progressive purposes. There is ample evidence, according to Pearl, to show that the schools have not been monolithic producers and defenders of the status quo. Rather, there has been in the schools a small army of opponents of war, racism, poverty, and con- sumerism, whose efforts have shown some successes.74 Pearl argues that the urgent need is reform directed toward realizing the intent of those who proposed public education as basis for democratic citi- zenship. There is, in his opinion, a body of knowledge to be learned and a position to be taken regarding the issues and practices of democracy.75 He sees a need to examine government as a part of schooling, and to incorporate democratic ways of dealing with school matters. Holt would have us do the worst possible thing for the future of democracy when he urges that we abandon the effort to pro- 76 vide democratic shcooling, claims Pearl. 'Democracy fails when "little effort has been made to educate 'the masses' to democracy."77 The remedy, though, is to improve the teaching and experience of democracy, not to abandon the attempt to become democratic. Pearl believes such education to be possible and necessary. It would entail abandoning certain sorts of practices which are authoritarian and undemocratic, but not the abandonment of compulsory schooling.78 The modern defenders of compulsory education, in sum, tend to repeat the historical arguments which apparently were decisive . 245 - in the adoption of compulsory public schoolsandcompulsory attend- ance laws. But they avoid what seems, in hindsight at least, the optimism with which the earlier proponents of compulsory schooling viewed the effects to be expected. Many would agree with Decker Walker's caution: “Compulsion has its legitimate place in educa- tion . . . .EWithout compulsion, ignorance, short-sightedness, or prejudice could forecloseall options but the familiar and the congenial.“79 But, says, Walker, this cannot be understood as war- rant for arbitrary and authoritarian educational practices. He urges that extremes be avoided. If we rule out both arbitrary pre- scription and unrestricted freedom as basic qualities of schooling, argues Walker, we are left with advice, guidance, dialogue, persua- sion, negotiation, and interaction as means whereby learners may come to accept and work toward the educational goals which society has for them.80 Such an approach leaves open the possibility, fur- thermore, that the learners can modify and adapt such goals to include their own needs and interests as definitions of objectives to be pursued. The defense offered by Hutchins, in contrast to the sort of moderate approach proposed by Walker and others, seems almost so undemocratic as to strengthen the case for deschooling, if schools were what Hutchins believes they should be. The outcome of the debate over compulsory schooling is still in doubt in many respects, but there appears to be some prospect that it can be resolved on the basis of reasoned consideration of alternatives and issues 246 rather than either inertia or hysteria. This would require both an exposition of the basis for public education in terms that respond to the concerns of its clients and a detailed relating of that basis to institutional arrangements and educational practices. FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VII 1C. B. Smith, I'America Must Keep the Common School," Peabody Journal of Education 52 (April 1975): 226-227. 2Cornelius J. Troost, Radical School Reform: Critigue and Alternatives (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973), p. 3. 3Robert M. Hutchins, "The Great Anti-School Campaign," The Great Ideas Today: 1972 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1972): pp. 154-227. 4James B. Conant, The Child, the Parent, and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 14-15. 51bid., p. 74. 6Ibid., p. 64. 7Ibid.. pp. 74-75. 8James B. Conant, Education and Liberty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 59—62. 9Ibid., p. 85. 10 11 Ibid. Hutchins, pp. 208-209. 12Ibid., p. 209. 13Ibid., p. 204. 14Ibid., p. 200. 15Ibid., p. 155. '6Ibid., p. 204. 17Robert M. Hutchins, "The Role of Public Education," Today's Education 63 (November-December 1973): 82. '8Ibid.. p. 83. 19Ibid. 247 20 Hutchins, ZlIbid., p. 22Ibid. 23Ibid., p 24Ibid., pp 25Ibid., p 26Ibid., p 27Ibid., pp 28Ibid., p 291bid., p 30Ibid., p 3'Ibid., pp 32Ibid., p 33Ibid., p 34Ibid., p 35Ibid. 36Ibid. 37Ibid., p 38Ibid., p 39Ibid., p 40Ibid., pp 4(Ibid., p 42Ibid., p 43Ibid., p 44Ibid. 45 Ibid. 248 "Anti-School Campaign," p. 209. 207. ‘ . 177. . 179-180. . 183. . 208. . 208-209. . 167. . 179. . 174. . 165-166. . 173. . 196. . 175. . 171. . 200. . 227. .1169-170. . 200. . 162. . 187. 11- 249 46 47 Hutchins, "Role of Education," p. 80. Hutchins, "Anti-School Campaign," p. 221. : 48Thomas F. Green, ”The Ironies of Educational Growth," the Boyd Bode Memorial Lecture, The Ohio State University, July 1971, cited by Gerald M. Reagan, I'Compulsion, Schooling, and Education," Educational Studies 4 (1973), p. 4 n. 49Hutchins, "Role of Education," p. 81. 50Hutchins, "Anti-School Campaign," p. 204. 5'Ibid., p. 211. 52Hutchins, "Role of Education,” p. 81. 53Hutchins, "Anti-School Campaign," p. 175. 54Hutchins, ”Role of Education," p. 81. 55Ibid. 56Hutchins, "Anti—School Campaign," p. 223. 57 R. Freeman Butts, “Search for Freedom: The Story of Ameri- 33 can Education,” NEA Journal 49 (March 1960): 58R. Freeman Butts, "Assault on a Great Idea,“ The Nation 216 (April 30, 1973): 558. 591bid., p. 554. 60Ibid. 61R. Freeman Butts, "Once Again the Question for Liberal Edu- cators: Whose Twilight?" Phi Delta Kappan 58 (September 1976): 8. 62Ibid., p. 12. 63Ibid.. pp. 10-11. 54 Ja ame es G. Piatt, "Compulsory Attendance Can Be Fatal, " NASSP Bulletin 58 (February 1974): 5. 65Ibid., p. 2. 668. Frank Brown, in Institute for Educational Leadership, George Washington University, "Compulsory Education," transcript of October 25, 1974, National Public Radio Broadcast. 250 67James Cass, "All the Children?" Saturday Review, March 8, 1974, p. 41. 68Dennis J. Chase, "Com ulsory Attendance: Sense or Nonsense?" Nation's Schools 93 (April 1974): 41-43. 69Ibid. 7oStephen Arons, "Compulsory Education: America in Missis- sippi," Saturday Review World, November 6, 1973, p. 58 (lipid. 72Butts, ”Assault on a Great Idea,” p. 553. 73Mortimer Smith, "The Romantic Radicals: A Threat to Reform," in Daniel U. Levine and Robert J. Havighurst, Farewell to Schools??? (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co. , 1971). pp 72- 73. 74Arthur Pearl, "The Case for Schooling America," in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer, and Frank Reissman, After Deschooling, What? (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 116. 75Arthur Pearl, “What's Wrong With the New Informalism in Education?” in John Martin Rich, Innovations in Education: Reformers and Their Critics (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1975), p. 73. 76Ibid., p. 71. 77Ibid.. p. 83. 781bid., pp. 74-79. 79Decker F. Walker, "Educational Policy Is Flapping in the Wind, " Center Reports 7 (February 1974): 22 80Ibid. CHAPTER VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The starting point for my discussion of the controversy over compulsory education was analysis of the term and its cognates. "Compulsory education” and "compulsory schooling" were iden- tified as general terms describing any or all forms of compulsion. I have considered them to be synonymous and used them more or less interchangeably. "Compulsory learning” is not often found in general discourse. I have considered it to be a relatively precise term referring to the least restrictive form of compulsory education. Compulsory learning requires that certain specified learning take place, but leaves to the learner or his/her family the choice of means. I have coined the clumsy, but relatively precise, term “compulsory provision of schools” to refer to a type of requirement in which some unit of government is made responsible for making schooling available. Attendance is not required, but often certain specified learning is. This sort of requirement was that which was in force in most states in the period when the term "the common school" came into wide use. The latter has become a term with posi- tive affective quality, used often by proponents of compulsory schooling. Those who are critical of compulsory education consider the word “compulsory" to have negative affective quality and speak 251 —: VI. 252 most often of "compulsory schooling" or "compulsory education" or whichever cognate fits their comment. "Compulsory attendance" was found to be a relatively precise term with a limited meaning: the requirement that all children, save those exempted for One of a limited list of reasons, attend some school for specified periods of time. Compulsory attendance usually implies both compulsory learning and compulsory provision of schools. Compulsory attendance laws, in most states, followed legislation (establishing the other forms of compulsory schooling, often by many years. The age limits for required attendance vary, the definitions of acceptable schools and alternatives vary, and the reasons why a child may be exempted from attending vary. But within these parameters, all states except New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Mississippi have similar laws requiring compulsory attendance. Mis- sissippi has no requirements at all. The Other three states essen- tially require only learning, though each has regulations which make it incumbent upon a parent who wishes to educate a child outside schools entirely to be prepared to demonstrate that the child is being taught. In practice, apparently, few parents exercise the option. Most parents who wish an alternative to public schools find it in a private school of some sort. No state may forbid the operation of private schools, though they may, and do, regulate the manner of their operation in certain respects having to do with basic learning content and health and safety rules, principally. The terms "compulsory education" and ”compulsory schooling" are often used in general discourse in contexts which indicate that their users may have "compulsory attendance" in mind. I have 253 attempted to use the relatively precise terms “compulsory learning," "compulsory provision of schools," and "compulsory attendance" con- sistently throughout whenever I referred to the particular form of compulsion of each. I have used "compulsory education" or ”compul- SOry schooling" in contexts when no precision was necessary or when compulsion of more than one sort was indicated. These distinctions, if made consistentlygwould clarify dis- course and contribute to careful delineation of problems and solutions. I have based my discussion of compulsory education on an examination and explication of historical arguments in favor of the adoption of compulsory schooling legislation. I have used categories identified from the reasoning in some of the many court cases whose resolutions have aided in clarifying the legal status of compulsory education to sort these historical arguments. One group can be described as showing a police power conception of the need for com- pulsory schooling. The other can be said to exhibit a pgrgp§_patriae type of reasoning. Police power arguments stress primarily the welfare of society, though individual members of it also benefit when society as a whole gains from schooling and its effects. I would include under this heading, firstly, the arguments which stress the need of a democracy for informed and able citizens. Schooling to prepare persons for the demands of adult life has been considered desirable from the beginning; this sub-category of argument focuses on the particular demands of citizenship in a democracy. These arguments 254 often identify such matters as knowledge of the nature, history, functioning, and purposes of democratic government; positive atti- tudes toward democracy and the activities of citizenship; and assorted skills such as reading, writing, and computation as essen- tial for all Americans. First, provision of schools was made com— . pulsory in the attempt to provide the means for learning of this sort to every child. Later, attendance was made compulsory, in part in the effort to see that no child was without a basic education. A second argument in this sub-category held that the police power of the state was well used to establish a certain manner of schooling. The provision of free public schools was urged as a way to bring together in one common experience all the varied social, religious, and ethnic groups. There were exceptions—-blacks, women, orientals, and native Americans among them at various times and places--but it was considered beneficial for most Americans to be schooled together. ‘The common school, it was argued, would produce 1 both tolerant awareness of diversity and unity of commitment to democracy among its students. Police power arguments, secondly, include those which stressed the need to protect society against deviants. There were two sorts of argument in this sub—category. One focused on persons who seemed to be among society's failures. The other was an inten- sification of arguments based upon the need of democracy for informed and able citizens. The earlier of these two kinds of argument was that which stressed the value of schooling for breaking what was seenaSiicycleof 255 poverty, crime, and vice. The very earliest forms of this claim may very well simply have urged the social and economic benefit to the individual of receiving an education. Later, it came to be argued that society as well benefited when efforts were made to educate the children of the poor. Not only were educated persons more likely to be desirable and useful socially, but there was thought to be so strong a correlation between poverty and crime that schooling was considered an obvious and effective way to reduce crime. Many favored schooling for the unsuccessful members of society from motives of justice and compassion as well as those of self-interest, let it be said. The concise explanations given in reviewing these arguments should not be taken as evidence for a simplistic under- standing of the motives of proponents of compulsory education in its various phases. y The second sort of police power argument having to do with the use of schooling to reduce deviancy proposed socializing persons perceived as different. This argument was based on the belief that democracy must have educated citizens with common understandings and loyalties, and ways of behaving within an accepted range. It iden— tified as special targets for schooling those whose backgrounds, customs, or beliefs were different: immigrants of all sorts, members of the lower classes, nonprotestants, nonwhites. While the schools had excluded some of these persons in an earlier age, the combination of a rising number of immigrants and various instances of social unrest led to widespread urging, by nativists in particular, that 256 schooling be used to ”Americanize" those who might otherwise threa- ten democracy. A final sub-category of police power arguments urged the adoption of compulsory education for its economic benefits to soci- ety. Trained workers were perceived as of critical importance to an industrialized economy. Persons who received an appropriate school- ing, according to such an argument, not only developed literacy and other useful skills, but they also formed valuable habits, such as punctuality and cooperativeness. This argument might also cover education for the more well-regarded sorts of jobs, but the benefits of such employment to the holders of the positions were usually con- sidered motivation enough for the ambitious to seek further education as a way to get ahead. The second broad category of arguments includes those dis- playing a pgpgpg patriae sort of reasoning. The benefit of schooling is thought to accrue to individual recipients, primarily, with society gaining indirectly. This sort of argument stresses social or economic benefits for individuals from providing them with schooling. Society provides the means of education because one of the functions of democratic government, by this reasoning, is to satisfy the needs of individual citizens insofar as that is practicable. Compulsory schooling to enhance the life chances of every individual was a means of protecting children against the consequences of their own lack of foresight or lack of knowledge of possibilities. A second sort of argument in this category linked compulsory school attendance with l l 257 protection of children against exploitation by employers or lax and greedy parents. (Eppppg patriae sorts of claims came to be made by opponents of particular compulsory schooling laws, though. Such claims urged the duty of government to intervene on behalf of particular children to protect them from what were deemed harmful effects of some provi— sion or some supposed violation of civil rights or civil liberties. By the early years of the twentieth century, some combination of these arguments had convinced most Americans of the value of com- pulsory provision of schools and compulsory attendance laws. This broad-based support continues to the present day. Of late, however. persistent efforts have been made to convince the pUblic that com- pulsory education has proven to be a mistake and should therefore be ended. Two examples of such opposition to compulsory education were examined. John Holt was selected as having offered the sort of broad argument aimed at the general public which has become a fre- quent component of discourse on education at a certain level. Ivan Illich was selected as having made himself known to be a proponent of total elimination of schools, not merely compulsory education. Holt was shown to have presented very little in the way of effective criticism of compulsory schooling. He has argued that schooling as a means of socialization is improper; that schooling is ineffective either as a weapon against poverty or as a benefit to individuals in either social or economic terms. His arguments are flawed by the sort of evidence he proposes, and do not support the 258 conclusion he reached, that compulsory schooling be ended. Holt's usefulness, if any, is in the evidence he provides to support l claims that schools ought to be reformed in order to achieve more effectively their objectives. Only one argument seems worthy of further consideration. That argument has to do with ending compul- sory attendance laws as a means for securing schooling and replacing them with compulsory learning laws. Illich was shown to have presented a critique of compulsory education, in his rejection of schools, which deserves some response. Illich rejects as illegitimate any police power use of education for society's purposes. He considers successful attempts to have been made to socialize persons to attitudes and behaviors not in their own best interests. He calls for an end to the use of schools, which he believes to be the chief means of this sort of socialization. Illich's proposal that society could and should be deschooled was called in question on several counts, but the issues raised by Illich were not laid to rest by rejecting his solution totheproblems to which he points. ‘ Illich's critique challenges defenders of some level of com- pulsory schooling to explicate their rationale for it. Further, his rejection of the accepted notion that socialization is inevitable and ethical insofar as the intent of those planning the socializing is defensible requires justification of both the nature and the pur- pose of schooling which has socialization as an outcome. A major example of a defense of compulsory schooling, that of Robert M. Hutchins, and several defenses of lesser scope were examined. 259 Hutchins restated the historical police power argument that democracy, in particular, requires persons to be educated for citizenship. So important is this in his estimate that compulsory attendance at public schools is necessary for most students if democratic community is to be maintained. Hutchins considers the welfare of individuals to be intertwined with that of society in such fashion that all social gains benefit individuals as well. A well-formed citizenry, to Hutchins, will benefit the entire community. Hutchins rejects all purposes for schooling other than that of making citizens. He includes specifically among the purposes he rejects the police power argument that schooling can reduce poverty and crime; the police power argument regarding economic benefits from schooling for society; and pgrgp§_patriae arguments as to social and economic benefits to individuals from schooling. Hutchins was criticized for failure to make a convincing case, owing to the seem- ing injustice of his rejection of any valid individual or social benefit from schooling other than whatever might accrue from the improved community he anticipates from valid schooling. Other defenders were found to have presented more acceptable restatements of the argument that education is of critical importance to democracy. Often such arguments were joined to both police power and pgr§p§_patriae arguments concerning the social and economic gains to be expected from schooling. Arguments to use schooling to regulate deviants seem no longer to be offered by responsible advocates. 260 No defense was found which provided an adequate response in concerted fashion to Illich. In fact, none is quite possible without i efforts at resolving certain questions which emerge from the issues touched on in this discussion of the controversy over compulsory schooling. One response to modern criticism of compulsory schooling has been a determined effort on the part of some to cling to the familiar. Some defenses of compulsory education amount to a claim that schooling as we know it must continue because it has been a part of what we are for so long. The critique by Illich and his followers of the role of schooling in the modern world, if responded to in thoughtful manner, may focus attention on more meaningful aspects of the issue. How can we affirm the educability of most human beings and institution- alize an educational process with minimal coercion in the face of resolute inattention to learning on the part of certain persons (who are, to many, the most threatening members) in society? How can we stress the individual without ending in anarchy? How can we properly express the role of culture and tradition without ending in authori- tarianism? Schooling will play a part in our answer to these sorts of questions. The schools involved will likely be characterized by public funding; by compulsory participation on some level, either through attendance to a specified age or through required learning directed toward certain objectives common to all learners; and by 261 objectives formed on the basis of the demands of citizenship in a democracy combined with the needs and aspirations of individuals. Public cOnfidence in schools, while it seems to have declined to an extent, is such that public education with some form of these characteristics will be found in the forseeable future. Schools will continue, not because malevolent elites are using them to control the rest of us, but because most people desire them. This is not, as Illich seems to suppose, because people have been processed to the point that they can no longer tell what is good for them. It is because schools, whatever their failures and problems, do hold out the promise of a better life. And there is historical evidence to show that for many persons, that hope has been realized. Whether or not that hope will continue to be well placed seems to be to depend in large part on whether or not certain issues are resolved. A prior question, which assuredly is pertinent, is that of the nature of the good life toward which education is directed. Illich is not alone in criticizing this aspect of modern society. There is evidence from ecologists, agricultural experts, economists, and a variety of other sources to suggest that we must adjust our expectations. Any change in cultural objectives, and consequently in individual goals, would likely cause a reordering of educational priorities and arrangements. Even if no such sweeping reorganization takes place, it seems to me that there will be no meaningful resolution to the compulsory schooling controversy until certain issues are attended to. The first of these is the logically-prior matter of developing . _______________________________________________________________________e 262 appropriate means for what Paul Hurrell of Michigan State University has aptly called “the cultivation of freedom-centered values.“ A certain portion of the dispute over compulsory education raises this issue, but without any real discussion of it. Opponents describe the schools as being what they perceive to be a system designed to produce regimented and obedient company men. Proponents indulge in flag-waving rhetoric which assumes the product of the schools to be the able citizen needed by democracy. The possibility that each may be wrong—-that schools were designed to produce able citizens but that the intention is not fully realized-~seems to me worthy of investigation. If this latter should be the case, it would justify renewed attention to efforts such as that of John Dewey to develop learning experiences appropriate for inculcating democratic values 1 and preparing persons for the duties of citizenship. Rather than bickering over the motives of 19th century schoolmen or tinkering with the school-leaving age, it seems to me that we should direct the discussion toward an attempt to discover what level of compulsion will best combine our need to educate for democracy and our concern that no child be allowed to remain unlet- tered or personally unfulfilled. There are two intertwined issues here, in my opinion. One is clearly addressed by the analysis in this dissertation. Do we need compulsory attendance laws to assure schooling for most Ameri- cans? Without breaking down the notion of compulsory education into compulsory learning, compulsory provision of schools, and compulsory attendance, it would seem that such a question must be answered in - I. . ‘ 263 the affirmative. There are clearly more possibilities when the dis- tinction is perceived. A resolution of the question about compulsory attendance depends upon both factual data as to the success of compulsory attendance laws in securing appropriate education for the majority of children and a reconsideration of alternative arrangements. Would some combination of a compulsory learning law with compulsory provision of schools be equally, or more, effective in securing schooling while providing experiences more conducive to democratic values? The belief of certain opponents of compulsory schooling that all students would readily care for their own educational needs seems to be an unrealistic hope. But pointing to the likely victims of a completely non-compulsory approach to education does not jus- tify compulsory attendance, or any other particular level of com- pulsion. Persons concerned for the welfare of children and of society could profitably discuss how best to serve that welfare rather than defending the status quo. The related issue which must be addressed in the effort to resolve the matter of compulsory education, in my opinion, is that of “children's rights." The courts have begun to deal with the question of which adult rights extend to children, but there is important ground to be covered in relation to education. The oppo- nents of compulsory education assert almost without qualification that compulsory schooling violates civil rights of children. The proponents, equally without qualification,assert that the interests of society justify overriding any supposed rights of either parents 264 or children. The partially convergent, partially divergent, inter- ests of society, rights of parents, and rights of children must be brought into a more successful balance for any resolution of the compulsory schooling question. Some extremely complex and perplexing questions must be addressed. How, for example, may we plan education so as to secure for learners exposure to the broadest possible range of opportunities and options in life style? At what points, if any, may parents or children take responsibility for making educational choices? 00 individual rights include freedom to decline to attend to matters which society considers important? May options be closed off only by individuals for themselves, or may parents legitimately restrict possibilities for their children? These, and related questions, though not frequently addressed in direct fashion in discussions of education, seem to me to demand attention in any effort to discuss meaningfully the issue of com— pulsory education. I do not intend to discuss these issues here, nor to propose that resolving them would settle in final fashion the question of compulsory education. At most, they represent matters whose resolu- tion may be a necessary condition for a solution to the problems of compulsory schooling. Attention to the categories, and examples of historical and philosophical analysis, presented in this thesis are similarly to be viewed as a necessary, but not sufficient, c0ndition for resolution of the question of compulsory education. If attended to, they should contribute to the making on a more reasoned basis than inertia or the usual exigencies of politics and economics of decisions regarding compulsory education. BIBLIOGRAPHY 265 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Books Abbott, Edith, and Breckinridge, Sophonisba P. Truancy and Non- Attendance in the Chicago Schools. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19l7. Adams, Don, and Reagan, Gerald M. Schooling and Social Change in Modern America. New York: David McKay Co. , 1972. Adams, Francis. The Free School System of the United States. London: Chapman & Hall, 1875. Allen, Hollis Partridge. Universal Free Education. Stanford: Stan- ford University Press, 1934. Aries, Philippe. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. 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McCoy, William D. ”Public Education in Pittsburgh: 1835-1950.” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 34 (December 1951): 219-38. McCracken, Samuel. ”Quackery in the Classroom.” Commentary 49 (June 1970): 45-58. McSordad, Jacob 0. “Letter from an Indignant Taxpayer.” The School Journal 25 (January 27, 1883): 53. Macklin, Michael. "Those Misconceptions Are Not Illich's." Educa— tional Theory 25 (Summer 1975): 323-29. Mandel, Richard L. "Student Rights, Legal Principles, and Educa- tional Policy.” Intellect 103 (January 1975): 236-42. Messerli Messmer,1 Miller,‘ Morison, Morris, National Nawaz, l Newman, Nolte, ( 02mon,| Parnell Paschal Pearl 3 1 Perrin, 289 , Messerli, Jonathan. "Controversy and Consensus in Common School Reform." Teachers College Record, May 1965, pp. 749-58. Messmer, S. G. "Compulsory Education." American Ecclesiastical Review 6 (1892): 279-95. Miller, Edward A.- "The History of Educational Legislation in Ohio." Ohio Historical Qpprterly 27 (January 1918): 1-271. Morison, Samuel Eliot, ed. ”William Manning's The Ke of Libberd ." William and Mary Quarterly 13 (April 1956): 202-54. Morris, Van Cleve. "The Philosophical Premises Underlying Public Education." Progressive Education 34 (May 1957): 69-74. National Report. "States as 'Super-Parents' of School Children." Intellect 102 (April 1974): 414—15. . ”Blueprint for a Learning Society: End of Schools' Age- 01d Monopoly?” Intellect 101 (February 1973): 278-81. Nawaz, M., and Tanveer, S. A. ”Compulsory Education: National and International Perspective." Educational Leadership 32 (January 1975): 278-82. Newman, Otto Lionel. "Development of the Common Schools of Indiana." Indiana Mggazineofliistory 22 (September 1926): 229-76. Nolte, Chester M. "Brush Up in One Short Sitting: Ten Years of Tumult in School Law, and Their Lessons.” American School Board Journal 161 (January 1974): 48-51. Ozmon, Howard. “The School of Deschooling.“ Phi Delta Kappan 55 (November 1973): 178-80. Parnell, Dale. ”'Survival Competencies': New Oregon Graduation Requirements.” Educational Leadership 31 (February 1974): 3 Paschal, George W. ”The Educational Convention of February 1873 and the Common Schools.” North Carolina Historical Review 26 (April 1949): 208—15. Pearl, Arthur. ”What's Wrong with the New Informalism in Education." Social Policy 1 (March/April 1971): 15—23. . ”The Case for Schooling America.” Social Policy 2 (March/April 1972): 51-52. Perrin, John. ”Beginnings in Compulsory Education.” Educational Review 25 (March 1903): 240-48. Perrin, Perry,‘ Peterso Philbri Piatt, Postman Pyburn, Raywid, Reagan, Reutter, Reynolds Rockwell Rodham, Rosen, s ksmbw Schaeffe 290 Perrin, John. ”Compulsory Education in New England." Journal of Pedagogy 17 (June 1905): 261-76. Perry, Dan W. "The First Two Years." Chronicles of Oklahoma 8 (March 1930): 120-27. Peterson, William J. "Iowa in 1858: Education for All." ng Palimsest 39 (December 1958): 545-55. Philbrick, John D. "The Success of the Free-School System." North American Review 132 (March 1881): 249-62. Piatt, James G. ”Compulsory Attendance Can Be Fatal." NASSP Bulle- tjp_58 (February 1974): 1-5. Postman, Neil; Gross, Ronald; and Fairfield, Roy. "Illich, Pro and Con." Social Policy 2 (January/February 1972): 32-42. Pyburn, Nita Katherine. ”John Westcott's Plan for Public Education in Florida, 1844." Florida Historical Quarterly 27 (January 1949): 300—06. Raywid, Mary Anne. "The Politicalization of Education." Educational Theory 23 (Spring 1973): 119-32. Reagan, Gerald M. "Compulsion, Schooling, and Education." Educa- ' tional Studies 4 (Spring 1973): 1-7. Reutter, E. Edmund, Jr. "Compulsory Education and the Constitution." Institute of Administrative Research Bulletin 14 (April 1974):1-3. Reynolds, J. ”Children's Privacy and Compulsory Schooling.” Teachers College Record 68 (1966): 33-41. Rockwell, J. H. “Our Public Schools Yesterday and Today." Michigan History 14 (Autumn 1930): 655-64. Rodham, Hillary. “Children Under the Law." Harvard Educational Review 43 (November 1973): 487-514. Rosen, Sumner; Jerome, Judson; Greene, Maxine; and Pearl, Arthur. ”Illich: Pro and Con." Social Policy 2 (March/April 1972): 41-58. Rosenberg, Max. ”Proposed: An Equal Opportunity Amendment to the United States Constitution." Phi Delta Kappan 55 (March 1974): 442-43. Schaeffer, Nathan C. “Child Labor and the Public Schools." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci— ence 29 (1907): 84-86. Schrag, Schrag, Sizer,l Slappey 4 Smith, Smith,l Smith,‘ Snyder, SPachmai Stamb1e1 StePhen: Stocker Storr,l SUQBFmar sWlsher L 291 Schrag, Francis. “The Right to Educate." School Review 79 (May 1971): 359-78. "End of the Impossible Dream." Saturday Review, Schrag, Peter. 1970, DP. 68-70, 92-96. September 19, ' A Fresh Plea for “Education and Assimilation. : 31-35. Sizer, Theodore R. Pluralism." Phi Delta Kappan 58 (September 1976) Slappey, George H. "Early Foundations of Georgia's System of Common School Education.“ Georgia Historical Qggrterly 14 (June 1930): 139-49. “America Must Keep the Common School. ” Peabody Journal Smith, C. B. of Education 52 (April 1975): 226- 27 ”A Centennial Perspective on American Education " Smith, L. Glenn. : 139-43. Phi Delta Kappan 58 (September 1976) ”Immigrant Social Aspirations and American Educa- Smith, Timothy L. 1880— 1930. " The American Quarterly 21 (Fall 1969) tion: 523- 43. Snyder, Sam R. ”What Is Ivan Illich Talking About?" Phi Delta Kappa n53 (April 1972): ” The New York Times Spachman, Peter. "Review of Deschooling Society. 23. Book Review, July 11, 1971, p. Stambler, Moses. “The Effect of Compulsory Education and Ch1ld Labor Laws on High School Attendance in New York City: 1898—1917." History of Education Quarterly 8 (Summer 1968): 189-214. "Education in Kentucky." Register of Kentucky Stephenson, Martha. State Historical Society 15 (May 1917): 67-79. Brainwashing the Stocker, Joseph. ”Compulsory Free Enterprise: Classrooms.” Nation 217 (December 17, 1973): 653-55. Storr, Richard. ”The Education of History: Some Impressions." Harvard Educational Review 31 (Spring 1961): 124-35. Saturday ”A Parent's 'Right to Decide.'” 55. Sugarman, Stephen D. 1973, p. Review World, November 6, Swisher, Jacob A. ”Public School Beginnings.l September 1939): 281-94. The Palimsist 20 "A Century of School Legislation 1n Iowa : 174-205. 6f History 44 (April 1946) Iowa Journal Tanner. "Toward Tyack,1 van Geel Walker, Ward, Fl White,l Whitenel Wiebe,| Wittmer C0111115 Committ 292 Tanner, Daniel. "The Retreat from Education—~For Other People‘s Children." Intellect 102 (January 1974): 222-25. "Toward a Society Without Schools.” Center Reports, February 1971, pp. 3—6. - Tyack, David B. "Forming the National Character: Paradox in the Educational Thought of the Revolutionar Generation.“ flgp:.;. vard Educational Review 36 (Winter 1966 : 29-41. "Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling." Harvard Educational Review 46 (1976): 355-89. van Geel, Ty11. ”Does the Constitution Establish a Right to an Edu- cation?” School Review 82 (February 1974): 293—332. Walker, Decker F. “Educational Policy Is Flapping in the Wind." Center Reports 7 (February 1974): 21-25. Ward, Florence E. ”Education in Western Pennsylvania: 1850-1860." Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 5 (October 1922): 268—76. White, Richard Grant. ”The Public School Failure.” North American Review 131 (December 1880): 537-50. Whitener, D. J. "Education for the People." North Carolina His- torical Review 36 (April 1959): 189-96. . ”The Republican Party and Public Education in North Caro- lina: 1867—1900." North Carolina Historical Review 37 (July 1960): 382-96. Wiebe, Robert. ”The Social Functions of Public Education." American Quarterly 21 (Summer 1969): 147-64. Wittmer, Joe. ”The Amish and the Supreme Court Ruling.“ Phi Delta Kappan 54 (September 1972): 50-52. IV. Papers and Monographs Collins, Daniel V. ”The Preacher's Task and the Stone of Stumbling." Unpublished M.Div. paper, Western Theological Seminary, 1958. "Presbyterian Theology and Jacksonian Populism: New Men for the New Frontier.” Unpublished M.Div. paper, Western Theological Seminary, 1958. Committee on Compulsory Education, West Hoboken, New Jersey. "Address to the Friends of Education." [Undated, found in the vertical file at theRutgersUniversity Library, under "Education: Miscellaneous."] Counts, Fantini Flaste: Goldste Hansen, Institu Kern, A Nationa Northro 0h11nge PaSSOW, Profflt Steinhj Strahan 293 Counts, George S. "The Selective Character of American Secondary Education." University of Chicago: Supplementary Educa- tional Monograph No. 19, May 1922. Fantini, Mario. "Alternatives for Urban School Reform." Ford Foundation Monograph, 1970. Flaste, Richard. "Embittered Reformer Advises: .Avoid School." pr York Times, April 16, 1976, p. 35. Goldstein, Stephen R. "Law and Public Education: Cases and Materi- als." Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974. Hansen, Allen 0. "Early Educational Leadership in the Ohio Valley." Bloomington, 111.: Journal of Educational Research Mono- graph No. 5, 1923. Institute for Educational Leadership, George Washington University. “Compulsory Education.” Transcript of October 25, 1974, National Public Radio Broadcast. Kern, Alexander, and Jordan, E. Forbis. "Legal Aspects of Educa- tional Choice: Compulsory Attendance and Student Assignment." Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1973. National Education Association. “Report of the Task Force on Com- pulsory Education.” Washington, D.C.: NEA, 1972. Northrop, B. G., Secretary. ”Annual Report of the Connecticut Board of Education.” 1872. Ohlinger, John, and McCarthy, Colleen. "Lifelong Learning or Life- long Schooling.” Syracuse University: Publications in Continuing Education, Occasional Paper No. 24, 1971. Passow, A. Harry. ”Secondary Education Reform: Retrospect and Prospect.” New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1976. Proffitt, Mavis M., and Segel, David. ”School Census, Compulsory Education, Child Labor." Washington, D.C.: United States Office of Education, 1945. Steinhilber, August W. ”State Law on Compulsory Attendance.“ Wash— ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. Strahan, Richard D. ”The Courts and the Schools." Lincoln, Neb.: Professional Educators Publications, 1973. Chamber 11011:, 1.11 Reagan, Antelom Board 0 Board 0 Brown v City of Cochran Comenw C0mmonw Commonw 294 U.S. Bureau of the Census. ”Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957." Washington, D.C.: Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1967. U.S. Immigration Commission. "The Children of Immigrants in Schools." Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911. V. Speeches and Addresses Chamberlin, J. Gordon. "An Illich Wind That Blows Some Good.“ ddress: The Philosophy of Education Society, Kansas City, Missouri, March 24, 1975. Holt, John. Address: Lansing (Michigan) Everett High School, February 18, 1972. > Reagan, Gerald M. “Compulsion, Schooling and Education." Address: American Educational Studies Association, Washington, D.C., November 3, 1972. VI. Legal Cases Alford v. Board of Education 298 Ky. 803, 184 S.W. 2d 207 (1944). jp_pg_A11ey 182 N.W. 360 (Wisc.) (1921). Antelope Valley High School District v. McClellan 55 Cal. App. 244, 203 P. 147 (1921). Board of Education v. Allen 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923 (1968). Board of Education v. Purse 101 Ga. 422, 28 S.E. 896 (1897). Brown v. Board of'Education 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 691 (1954). City of New York v. Chelsea Jute Mills 88 N.Y.S. 1085 (1904). Cochrane v. Louisiana State Board of Education 281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335 (1930). Commonwealth v. Beiler 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951). Commonwealth v. Bey 166 Pa. Super. 136, 70 A.2d 693 (1950). Commonwealth v. Edsall 13 Pa. D.R. 509 (1903). Commonwealth v. Petersheim 70 Pa. 0. & C. 432 (1949) affirmed 166 Pa. Super. 90,70 A. 2d, 395 (1950). Conmonwe Commonwe Commonwe Commonwe Commonwe em Cumming Dobbins Engel v. Everson Fogg v. LHLeGe Griggs \ Grigsby Hobsen 1 Holden 1 §5_£§l. Knox v. Lawt0n1 Lemon v McIntos ex 3&1? Marsh V Marsh'S MeYer v Merton 295 Commonwealth v. Rapine 88 Pa. O. & C. 453 (1954). Commonwealth v. Renfrew 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.Zd 109 (1955). Commonwealth v. Roberts 159 Mass. 372 (1893). Commonwealth v. Smoker 177 Pa. Super. 435, 110 A.2d 740 (1955). Commonwealth v. Snyder 15 Pa. D.R. 765 (1906). §§_pg[§g_Crouse 54 Pa. (4 Whart.) 9, 11 (1839). Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 175 U.S. 528 (1899). Dobbins v. Commonwealth 198 Va. 697, 96 S.E.2d 154 (1957). Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 512 (1947). Fogg v. Board of Education 76 N.H. 296, 82 A. 173 (1912). Lnre Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Griggs v. Duke Power Company 91 U.S. 849 (1971). Grigsby v. Mitchum 191 Kans. 293, 380 P.2d, 363 (1963) Hobsen v. Hansen 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C.D.C. 1967). Ho1den v. Board of Education 46 N.J. 281, 216 A.2d 387 (1966). §§_pel. Kelley v. Ferguson 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914). Knox v. O'Brien 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (1950). Lawton v. Steel 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499 (1894). Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1972). McIntosh v. D111 86 Ok1a. 1, 205 P. 917 (1922). §x_p§1, Marsh v. Lindsey 130 Pa. Super 448, 198 A. 512 (1938). Marsh v. Earle 24 F. Supp. 385 (1938). Marsh's Case 140 Pa. Super. 472, 14 A.2d 368 (1940). Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 626 (1923). Morton 23.91: V. Board of Education of Chicago 69 Ill. App.2d 38 (1966). IuJJ 0rdway v. Oregon v. Peacock v People v. People v. People v. d People of 3 Pierce v. Prince v. Quigley 1 Reynolds San Antor 1 SCROOI & School D Serrano ShEIOQn Sherber1 E5 rel. LnLem State V State V State v 296 0rdway v. Hargraves Mass. Dist. Ct. Civil Action 71-540-C (1971). Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Peacock v. Riggsbee 309 F. Supp. 542 (D. Ga. 1970). People v. Levison 404 111. 574, 577, 90 N.E.2d 213, 215 (1950). People v. Turner 277 App. Div. 317, 98 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1950). Peop1e V. Turner 121 Ca1. App.2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), appea1 dismissed 347 U.S. 972 (1954). People of the State of Illinois gx rel. McCollum v. Board of Education 3 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 464 (1948). Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944). Quigley v. State 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 638 (1891). Reyno1ds v. U.S. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4420 (1973). School Board District #18, Garvin County gt_gl, v. Thompson gt_gl. 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909). School District of the City of Lansing v. State Board of Education 367 Mich. 591, 116 N.W.2d 866 (1962). Serrano v. Priest 5 Ca1.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1949 (1971). Sheldon v. Fannin 221 F.Supp. 766 (D.Ariz. 1963). Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963). §x_pgl. Shoreline School District v. Superior Court 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999, cert. gpp, 363 U.S. 814 (1960). jp_r§_Skipwith 14 Misc.2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. City Dom. Re1. Ct., Ch. Ct. Div. 1958). State v. Bailey 157 Ind. 324 (1901). State v. Counort 69 Wash. 361 (1912). State v. Garber 197 Kans. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966). State v. State v. State v. State vi State v. State v. State v. Stephens Stuart g Trustees linker 1 West Vi1 Wright Zorach 297 1 State v. Jackson 71 N.H. 552 (1902). ‘ State v. Massa 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (1967). State v. Mizner 50 Iowa 145 (1876). State v. Peterman 32 Ind. App. 665 (1904). State V. W111 99 Kans. 167 (1916). State v. Wi11iams 56 5.0. 370, 228 N.W. 470 (1929). State v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (1972). Stephens v. Bongart 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (1937). Stuartlgp_gl. v. School District #1 of the Village of Kalamazoo 1 pp_ a1. 30 Mich. 69 (1874 ). Trustees of School v. Peop1e gy_pgl. Van Allen 87 I11. 303 (1897). Tinker v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503 (1969). §§_:§l. V011mar v. Stan1ey 81 CO1. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927). Ware v. Estes 328 F. Supp. 657 (N. I. Tex. 1971), ggpt, ggp, 409 U.S. 102711971 ). 63 S.Ct. 1185 (1943). Wright v. State of Kansas 209 P. 179 (1922). 1 1 1 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, Zorach v. Clawson 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 684 (1952). "I11111111111111Es