THE GENTLEMAN FROM VERMONT:
THE CAREER 0F JUSTIN S. MORRILL
IN THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MTCHIGAN STATE UNWERSITY
RANDAL LEIGH. HOYER
1974

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Randal Leigh Hoyer

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ABSTRACT

THE GENTLEMAN FROM VERMONT: THE CAREER OF
JUSTIN S. MORRILL IN THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY

Randal Leigh Hoyer

The purpose of this study is to examine the nature,
contribution and influence of the career of Justin Smith
Morrill in the United States House of Representatives.

The comprehensive Justin Smith Morrill Papers in
the Library of Congress provided the core of the research
materials. These papers, reproduced on fifty-two reels of
microfilm, mainly contain political, business, and personal
correspondence; but they also include a diary, a journal,
and personal notes. Smaller, scattered collections of
Morrill Papers were also used. Papers of political con-

temporaries, newspapers, the Congressional Globe, and

 

germane secondary sources furnished other research
materials.

Justin Smith Morrill was born on April 14, 1810,
in Strafford, Vermont. He was apprenticed at fifteen to

learn merchandising and later became the partner of

Randal Leigh Hoyer

Jedediah Harris. The partnership did so well that Morrill
was able to retire from active business at 38 to become a
gentleman farmer. His marriage to Ruth Swan lasted for
half a century.

Morrill always took the active part in local
politics that New England's town-meeting form of govern—
ment encouraged. Although reticent by nature, his clear,
analytical thinking and precise written expression brought
him a respected position in local political circles. His
main interest was working behind the scenes. Though aware
of his reluctance to seek elected office, Morrill's friends
insisted that he run for Congress in 1854. By a fifty-nine
vote margin, he was elected.

Quickly learning the complexities of parliamentary
procedure, Morrill became an effective representative of
his constituents. With a staunch antislavery background,
he entered the slavery controversy immediately. However,
he let others take the lead on the slavery issue while he
devoted himself to the eradication of polygamy. The law
which Morrill guided to passage started the process of
stamping out polygamy.

Keen consciousness of his lack of formal education
inSpired Morrill to champion education for workingmen's
sons. He wanted to see colleges dedicated to the agri-
cultural and mechanical arts which continued to teach the

classics. The Morrill Land Grant College Act provided the

Randal Leigh Hoyer

means to begin the nationwide system of land grant
colleges which became a cornerstone of higher education.

Lengthy business experience in financial matters
led to Morrill's work with tariff legislation. The Morrill
Tariff of 1861 was a keystone of the Republican Party's
financial policy. This law laid the base for the protec-
tive system which continued long after his death. Civil
War expenditures forced Morrill to write several upward
revisions of his initial tariff legislation.

During the Civil War the pressing need for revenue
imposed on Morrill the heavy task of writing internal
revenue laws. To a financial conservative like Morrill,
it was essential that taxation meet as much of the war
costs as possible. Despite his efforts (virtually nothing
remained untaxed), the war was never adequately funded.

After the war Morrill was rewarded with the
Chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee. He used
this position to fulfill promises that internal taxes
would be eliminated after the war. However, he failed in
his attempt to lower the tariff. Before the completion
of his term in the 39th Congress, Morrill waged a skillful
campaign and became Senator-elect from Vermont.

Morrill had always professed indifference to
continued public service, but he actively sought elevation

to the Senate and was reelected five times. After the

Randal Leigh Hoyer

frantic pace of the House in wartime, the more delibera-
tive atmosphere of the Senate encouraged semi-retirement
which more closely suited his sensibilities. Morrill's
political goals had largely been achieved, but he kept
busy, devoting considerable time to a favorite project,
the beautification of Washington. After a fruitful life,

Morrill died in office on December 28, 1898.

 

THE GENTLEMAN FROM VERMONT: THE CAREER OF
JUSTIN S. MORRILL IN THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY

Randal Leigh Hoyer

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1974

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to the staffs of the Library of
Congress, the Michigan State University Historical
Collections, the University of Chicago Library, the
Rutherford B. Hayes Memorial Library, and the Chicago
Historical Society. I am especially grateful to Dean
William Combs of the Michigan State University Historical
Collections.

I would like to thank the members of my committee:
Professors Frederick D. Williams, Warren I. Cohen, and
Donald N. Lammers for their aid and advice. A special
thanks is extended to Professor Frederick D. Williams
for his counsel which made this dissertation possible.
I would like to express my appreciation to Professor

Harry Brown for his encouragement.

ii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page
I. EARLY LIFE AND BUSINESS CAREER . . . . . . 1

II. THE NEOPHYTE CONGRESSMAN AND THE FIGHT

AGAINST POLYGAMY . . . . . . . . . . 21

III. LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT . . . . . . . . 48

IV. THE TARIFF OF 1861 . . . . . . . . . . 80
V. SLAVERY, FINANCE, AND THE REPEAL OF

RECIPROCITY . . . . . . . . . . . 109

VI. THE TARIFF AND THE CIVIL WAR . . . . . . 145

VII. THE INTERNAL REVENUE . . . . . . . . . 172

VIII. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS O O I O O O I O O O O O 2 l 0

EPILOGUE: SENATOR MORRILL . . . . . . . . . 243

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . 254

iii

 

CHAPTER I

EARLY LIFE AND BUSINESS CAREER

For twelve years, 1855-1867, the congressman from
the second district of Vermont was Justin Smith Morrill, a
simple practical man, without guile, whose chief charac-
teristic was common sense. He was not an intellectual and
had little use for those who preferred to reside in ivory
towers. To him, formal education, especially of the philo-
sophical and theoretical variety, was fine as an avocation,
but definitely secondary to practical experience. He asked
advice of men experienced and educated by life. Morrill
had great respect for the practical livelihoods of the
common man. He practiced two of them, farming and store-
keeping. Morrill was also an idealistic and religious man.
He was by choice a Unitarian, a faith embraced by many
prominent New Englanders because it stressed individualism,l
common sense, and humanitarian reforms such as abolition of
slavery and temperance. In keeping with the last-named

policy Morrill neither drank nor smoked.1

 

lShelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service
(Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 19117, p. 209. George F.
Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York: Charles

 

 

l

 

Physically, Morrill must have been an impressive
man. He stood six feet tall. He had deep set, penetrating
blue eyes, a prominent nose and a cleft in his chin. At
the age of 57 he still had thick, wavy, dark brown hair
and full sideburns. His was a rugged masculine face.2

As a politician in an age when it was an honored
profession, he practiced politics, the art of the possible,
deftly. Wise in his dealings with men, Morrill was able to
achieve most of his legislative goals without leaving
vengeful opponents in his wake. His forte was holding his
own in the committee room and the smoke-filled caucus
room.

A quiet unassuming man, Morrill was ill at ease in
any large political gathering. In the House he read his
speeches. When guiding a bill, he presented his facts

forcefully and succinctly, believing that their worth and

 

Scribner's Sons, 1903), II, 55. Elizabeth M. Geffen,
Philadelphia Unitarianism, p. 238. Arthur W. Brown,
Always Young for Liberty: A Biography of William Ellery
Channin TSyracuse: Syracuse UniversityTPress, 1956),
pp. I55-26, 228-29, 234-35. Stow Persons, Free Religion:
An American Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1947). PP. 2, 22.

 

2Passport description, May 7, 1867, Justin Smith
Morrill Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 3 (Microfilm
copy), hereafter cited as Morrill Papers.

3T. D. Seymour Bassett, "Nature's Nobleman:

Justin Morrill, A Victorian Politician," Vermont History,
XXX (January, 1962), 6.

 

 

significance would be obvious to all. When he lost a bill,
which was infrequently, it was often because something
more than a cold factual presentation was needed. Floor
debate was simply beyond his talents, and he knew it.

Thus he seldom spoke; but when he did, members listened.

An anonymous resident of another state, after a visit to

Congress, wrote to the Burlington Free Press that Morrill

 

had the attention of the House when he spoke. The commen-
tator said that although Morrill was quiet, courteous, and
modest, his influence was probably second only to that of
Thaddeus Stevens and that even opponents respected his
manner of supporting his position without being offensive.4
Outside the House, Morrill was an affable, even
witty man. In small groups of family and friends he unbent,
disclosing a warm, affectionate personality. His love and
affection for his wife, Ruth, his son, James, and his
sister-in-law, who lived with them, shows in the letters he
wrote to them during long, lonely winters in Washington.
He frequently told his family how much he missed them and
how he wished he could be with them in Strafford. Both his
loneliness and his wit are exhibited in letters to his wife,
in which he either joked with her or chided her for neg-
lecting him. In one light mood, Morrill announced an

impending visit home through a mock formal letter in which

 

4Hoar, Autobiography, II, 55. Burlington Free

Press reprinted in Vermont Watchman (Montpelier), April 20,

 

 

he posed as a suitor. After describing himself and his
personality in very flattering terms, he asked his wife for
a date.5 The personality that Morrill often showed to

family and friends was quite different from the one so

 

often seen by the public.

As a gentleman of means and influence, he had the
Opportunity to indulge his instincts for the better things
in life. He began by building two homes, one in Strafford
and the other in Washington. Both were fine examples of
the best residential architecture of the day, and were
designed for comfort and gracious entertaining. Many
parties were held in the Washington home, Morrill's birth-
day parties became popular annual affairs. But, in spite
of the many happy hours passed in Washington, the family
was most at home in the fine Strafford house, which still
stands. He had a passing interest in many of the arts and
humanities. His large library contained the best books
available on many topics. Morrill also enjoyed visiting
the art museums in the larger cities and idling away the

hours at home in discussions of poetry and philoSOphy.6

 

5Justin S. Morrill to Ruth Swan Morrill, March 22,
1858, Morrill Papers, Reel 3.

6Bassett, "Nobleman," S. The Morrill Homestead is

owned and maintained by the Justin S. Morrill Foundation,

a group formed especially for that purpose in 1962. Morrill
Papers, Reel 45. This reel contains a catalogue of nearly
1000 titles. Morrill to Mrs. Mary C. Ames, November 7,
1863, Mary Clemmer Ames Papers, Hayes Memorial Library,
Fremont, Ohio. Morrill to Ames, Aug. 12, 1866, Ames Papers.

Basically Morrill was a plain, frank, and practical
product of Vermont, with a veneer of Eastern gentleman
overlaid. Perhaps it was this combinationcflffacets in his
character which made him equally at home among workingmen
or statesmen. Men in all walks of life liked him because
he respected their views. Morrill was a quiet man who
kept his voice low and his temper under control while
others waged bitter, inflammatory verbal battles. Both
colleagues and constituents valued his attempts to offer
reasonable alternatives.

Vermont, Morrill's home state, was an agricultural
state hindered by poor soil, unpredictable weather, and
isolation because of its bad roads. Travel was nearly
impossible in winter or when the roads were muddy. Only
a strong people could live and prosper there. Hardworking,
freedom-loving people struggled to make a living from the
mountain soil. Vermont was no granary. It was better
suited to the raising of livestock, feed grasses and
potatoes. Dairy farming, fine horses and sheep were the
major products.7

Sheep, especially, became the chief agricultural
interest of Vermonters. Spanish Merino sheep and a favor-

able tariff started a wild expansion of wool production

 

7T. D. Seymour Bassett, "Urban Penetration of Rural

Vermont, 1840-1880" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

Harvard University, 1952), pp. 7, 12-14. Holman D. Jordan,
Jr., "Ten Vermont Towns: Social and Economic Characteris-
tics, l850—1870" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Alabama, 1966), pp. 37-38.

 

which lasted from the 1820's to the 1840's. Even when a
lowered tariff and lessened demand brought on a drastic
cut in the sheep population, the raising of sheep still
remained a major concern of the people and their
representatives.8

Vermont was a farm-oriented state. Nearly all the
peOple lived on farms or in small towns which contained
the necessary professionals and service people. Even
doctors, lawyers, blacksmiths, and merchants were dependent
on farming for their livelihood.9

Industry was relatively unimportant in the economy
of Vermont. Mining produced small but profitable quan-
tities of marble, granite and slate. The role of manufac-
turing was seen in the few small factories scattered around
the state. The exception was the one great success story
in Vermont manufacturing written by the Fairbanks brothers
who invented and produced the platform scale used nation-
wide. Not even the construction of the railroads changed
the predominantly agricultural character of Vermont.10

Stability was the chief characteristic of the

Vermont farm towns. They neither grew nor disappeared.

 

8Jordan, "Ten Vermont Towns," pp. 35-36. Bassett,
"Urban Penetration," p. 65.

9Bassett, "Urban Penetration," p. 62.

10Earle Newton, The Vermont Story (Montpelier:

Vermont Historical Society, 1949), pp. 171-72.

 

There was economic Opportunity for a small population but
little possibility of an economic expansion to provide jobs
for the farmers' often numerous progeny.ll

Strafford, the birthplace and lifelong home of
Morrill, was a typical small Vermont town. In it were the
shops and homes of the pliers of trades and professional
men who provided services and supplies for the surrounding
farms. The only nonagricultural industry was c0pperas
mining, which was limited in sc0pe, largely because of the
lack of transportation. It was at least a dozen miles to
the nearest railroad. Strafford remained by necessity a
relatively self—sufficient, isolated, and static agricul-
tural town.12

Morrill loved his sleepy hometown. In his old age
he showed that love by erecting a building to house the
library donated many years earlier by Judge Jedediah H.
Harris. But he knew the thrifty people well and feared
they might turn down the gift rather than assume the

maintenance on a building they had not voted to erect. To

convince them to accept it he explained that the second

 

11Jordan, "Ten Vermont Towns," pp. 154, 268.

12Bassett, "Urban Penetration," pp. 105-6.

COpperas is a c0pper sulfate used in making ink. Jordan,
"Ten Vermont Towns," p. 116.

 

floor could be used as a rental hall. For whatever reason,
the gift was accepted.13
The lack of economic growth forced many young
Vermonters to migrate and discouraged new settlers from
coming into the state. Vermonters went West and helped

build their adopted states. A number of them, including

Stephen A. Douglas, the Senator from Illinois, were later

 

sent to Congress to represent their new neighbors. Most
others, including members of Morrill's family, moved to
other states and lived in relative obscurity. Morrill,
on the other hand, remained and prospered in Vermont all
his life.14
The absence of a booming economy also meant that
the state could not draw immigrants to replace its lost
people. Most Vermonters were native Americans and a
majority were native to the state. As a result there
existed a close-knit, economically and culturally homo-
geneous, middle class people with a strong stake in the

local status quo.15

 

13Speech of Justin S. Morrill at Dedication of

Strafford Library, Sept. 22, 1883, Morrill Papers,
Reel 43.

4Jordan, "Ten Vermont Towns," p. 151. William B.
Parker, The Life and Public Services of Justin Smith
Morrill (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 7. Of
the ten children of Nathaniel and Mary Morrill, half died
in childhood and the other five lived to old age.

lSParker, Morrill, pp. 121-23, 265-66.

Vermonters, tempered by a harsh struggle with
nature, also had to fight against greedy men in the pre-
Revolution era. For many years after the settlers purchased
the "New Hampshire Grants" from the governor of New
Hampshire, New York landlords tried to enforce their vague
old claims on that area. If the New Yorkers had been
successful the Vermonters would have been forced into the
status of tenant farmers. The lengthy battle, fought
occasionally under arms but mostly in the courts, ended in
the validation of Vermonters' title deeds. Shortly after-
wards the Revolutionary War gave the people of Vermont the
opportunity to establish an independent republic.16

In the constitution written for their new republic,
the Constitution of 1777, Vermonters became the heralds of
freedom. Having learned through bitter experience the
meaning of freedom from oppression, Vermonters were the
first to forbid slavery although there were no slaves and
few Negroes there. This initial antislavery feeling
hardened into dedication through the years before the Civil
War. Vermonters were eager readers of the words of such
men as William Lloyd Garrison who began his career in
Bennington. Antislavery feeling in Vermont continued to

increase until in the late 1840's the state legislature

 

16The area called the New Hampshire Grants later

became known as Vermont. Dorothy C. Fisher, Vermont
Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, I953),
p.'77.

 

 

10

and most of the churches had gone on record as being
Opposed to slavery and dedicated to its extinction.
DeSpite the strong antislavery feeling of Vermonters, they
were practical people, not of a fanatical bent. The radical
Liberty Party made almost no headway in the state but the
more moderate Republican Party did very well. In 1860
Abraham Lincoln carried Vermont by a 4 to 1 margin over
Stephen A. Douglas, a native of Vermont but a member of
the Democratic Party which had become tainted with appease-
ment of the Slave Power. As a result of Vermonters'
history of Opposition to slavery the South nurtured a
special hatred of them. The real test came with the start
of the Civil War. The peOple backed up their conviction by
sending half of the state's able-bodied men into battle to
help destroy slavery. They paid heavily in both men and
money to see the goal realized.17
In the nineteenth century, following a frontier
period of free living, Vermonters turned to religion,
humanitarian causes and democracy. Vermont has always been
divided ideologically at the Green Mountains which caused
these movements to be felt with unequal intensity in the

two sections. The eastern portion, where Morrill lived,

 

17Newton, The Vermont Story, pp. 125-26.

 

ll

tended to be more conservative in politics and more orthodox
in religion.18
The general turn to religion led to a temperance
campaign. The campaign began shortly after 1820 and gained
ground until a temporary prohibition was put into effect for
the year 1847. That experiment was followed by passage of
a "Maine Law," permanent prohibition, in 1852.19 Temper-
ance was the biggest issue in local politics until the
Kansas-Nebraska Act.
In addition to the campaign against slavery,
Vermont had other humanitarian movements. One of these was
an attempt to reform the penal code. The most noteworthy
success of that reform was abolishment of the archaic
penalty of imprisonment for debt in 1838. The people also
took part in the campaign, which later spread nationwide,
to provide care for the insane. A home for their care was
built in 1836. This concern may have been fostered because
Vermont led the nation in the number of insane per capita
in this period.20
All decisions, including those to participate in

the several reform movements, came straight from the peOple

 

18David M. Ludlum, Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-
l850 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 62.

 

lgIbid., p. 72.

201bid., pp. 213-15, 219.

12

through their active participation in democracy. The
governmental system rested on the town meeting as the basic
governing unit dealing with local affairs. Such a system
was not unique in the United States but Vermont did make
some original contributions. The first of these was the
"mountain rule" which provided that the eastern and western
sections of the state share as equally as possible in
important offices. One United States Senator came from
each portion. The governor and lieutenant-governor were
always from Opposite sides of the mountains and they alter-
nated every year. The citizens of Vermont also practiced
rotation in Offices on the state and lower levels. The
towns and counties even took turns placing peOple in Offices

at the next higher level.21

Although it appears compli-
cated, it seemed to satisfy most Vermonters.

Justin Smith Morrill was born April 14, 18l0, the
oldest child in a family well established in the community.
Justin's father, Nathaniel Morrill, was a blacksmith who
prOSpered because he had, in addition to the usual equip-
ment, a water-powered triphammer to shape crude machinery.
The water power was supplied from a creek dam jointly built
with a neighbor on the latter's land. The shOp, which
stayed in family ownership and earned rental income for

Justin during his congressional career, caused Morrill

trouble years later when the man who was renting it from

 

21Bassett, "Urban Penetration," p. 169.

l3

him complained that the water was being cut-off. Morrill
wrote and demanded that the neighbor, who controlled the
creek dam, honor his Old agreement to share the water.
Morrill also reminded the man that just a few years before
he had sent over $80 as a share Of the repairs on the dam.22
The blacksmith business was sound enough to provide
a good living for the family of ten children but not enough
for luxuries. Morrill had hOped to attend college but his
father explained that he could afford the tuition of no
more than one of his children. Since he felt it would be
unfair to give this advantage to only one of them he decided
not to send any. Thus, Morrill had to be content with
elementary school and one term each at Thetford and Randolph
Academies.23
Because he was unable to continue his education
Morrill began to prepare for his business career at fifteen.
He worked in Royal Hatch's store for six months, followed
by two years as a clerk for Judge Harris, an influential
local storeowner. At the end of this apprenticeship, he
was invited to work for an uncle in Portland, Maine, where

he was able to learn much Of the technique of merchandising

in a busy shipping center.

 

22Nathan S. Young, "Senator Morrill's Early Life,"
Burlington Free Press, Jan. 30, 1899. Parker, Morrill,
p. 6.

 

23Morrill to Royal A. Hatch quoted in Parker,
Morrill, pp. 6-7. Morrill to James Barrett, Jan., 1886,
MorriiI Papers, Reel 20.

14

While working in Portland, Morrill had use of his
uncle's extensive library. He happily took advantage of
this Opportunity to further his education. During the
next two years young Morrill worked on his vocabulary,
wrote essays, and read many books which included William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England.24

The key first step in Morrill's later business
success occurred in 1831 while on a visit home after two
years in Portland. Morrill took on the task of selling Off
the stock of a deceased merchant. He did so well that
Judge Harris took him into a job where Morrill remained
until his retirement in 1848.

Harris made his efficient, young, former clerk a
full partner. Morrill had the usual selling and stocking
duties of a clerk, but his most important additional duty
was the semiannual buying trips to Boston. Harris had
sufficient capital to enable the partnership of Harris and
Morrill to get better buys through use of cash. They
prospered and over the years acquired a chain of five
stores, four nearby and one some distance away at Derby

Line on the Canadian border.25

 

24Morrill to James Barrett, Jan., 1886, Morrill
Papers, Reel 20. Portland Diary of Justin S. Morrill,
1831, Morrill Papers, Reel 43. ~

25Washington Evening Star, April 27, 1895. Young,
"Morrill's Early Life. James Barrett, "Early Life of
Justin S. Morrill," The Vermonter (St. Albans), Nov., 1896.
A OOpy is included in the Morrill Papers, Reel 45. The
accuracy of this biography is attested to by Morrill.
Morrill to Barrett, Aug. 24, 1891, Morrill Papers, Cornell
University Library, Ithaca, New York.

 

15

A secure position in a well-run country store was
the ideal training ground for Justin S. Morrill, the future
politician. From Judge Harris he received an excellent
training in business finance. This knowledge was repeatedly
put to use during his public life. In addition, he learned
politics at the grassroots level from Harris, a successful
and influential local politician in his own right, and from
daily contacts with the people of the town and surrounding
farms.26

Harris and Morrill was a successful business because
it was an efficient Operation. They exploited their initial
advantage of paying cash for supplies and did everything
else possible to remain ahead of the competition. They made
sure that they had in stock the goods that their customers
wanted, as any good store would, but they also made certain
that payment was received. Their purpose, in terms of
service, was to supply the needs of local farmers, which
required them to extend credit to their clients. Although
Harris and Morrill often sold on credit, they demanded that
all accounts be settled by the first of each year. A bill
unpaid after a reasonable time was put into 6 percent notes

due on a day definite. The credit arrangement proved

satisfactory to all concerned. The schedule of payment

 

26Barrett, "Early Life of Morrill."

16

was flexible enough to give the farmer the chance to bring
in a cash crOp, pay off the notes, and make his profit.27
The success of their stores led Harris and Morrill
into financial sidelines. Soon they had also become a large
moneylending concern, a natural extension of their credit
business. It was not a minor Operation loaning trifling
amounts. Loans of $5,000 were not uncommon and they
charged top rates of interest. There was even one request
from a group organizing a new bank for $20,000. Fairbanks
Scale Company, the largest industrial firm in the state,
borrowed from Harris and Morrill. This loan business was
joined as a profit stretching venture by investment in
stocks. After the partnership acquired a portfolio of
local bank and utility stocks and Boston mill stocks, they
began to offer investment advice to customers. Finally, as
citizens of stature and substantial stockholders, Harris
and Morrill were asked to sit on various boards of direc-

tors. One board on which Morrill served was the Orange

County Bank in Chelsea, a neighboring town.28 Income from

 

27Ibid.

 

28B. F. Tenney to Morrill, July 1, 1853, Morrill
Papers, Reel 1. Nathan S. Young to Morrill, Feb. 18, 1859,
Morrill Papers, Reel 4. Willard Carpenter to Morrill,
Aug. 7, 1853, Morrill Papers, Vermont Historical Society,
Montpelier. Erastus Fairbanks to Morrill, Oct. 22, 1855,
Morrill Papers, Vermont Historical Society. D. B. Cobb to
Morrill, Jan. 22, 1852, Morrill Papers, Reel 31. Young,
"Morrill's Early Life."

17

these sources helped greatly to make it possible for him to
resign from the management Of the stores at the age of 38.

These activities became the lasting portion of
Morrill's business career. The loan and investment
business, which had begun as a sideline, was continued
throughout Morrill's lifetime. His correspondence while in
public office contains a large number of purely business
letters.

But the store was far more important to Morrill's
career than as a mere means to financial security; it was
a classroom for political education. Harris was the single
most important teacher. A party worker rather than an
office seeker, he took his turn at local and county posts,
became a presidential elector, and finally a judge. But
he never showed any ambition for higher office.29 Neverthe-
less, he was in a position to introduce Morrill to many
important party members.

The country store was, in a sense, the larger rural
Vermont society in microcosm. People from all occupations
came and went. In slack times, it was a gathering place,
almost a social center, for the local farmers. They talked
of crOps and the weather, but they talked much about
politics. The country storekeeper became a catalyst of
thought in his area. He did not necessarily originate it,

but he distilled all that flowed in and passed it on to the

 

29Bassett, "Nobleman," p. 7.

18

next group. He was also the newsgathering service on his
trips to the market cities for store supplies. The store-
keeper learned much about the wants and interests of his
customers, including the problems in which he had the
closest personal interest--the problem of debt.30 These
and other problems were the political issues of the day.
Morrill learned the wants, needs, and hopes of a farming
peOple by working in a country store.

A life centering in such a store naturally led
Justin Morrill into politics. For a long time he merely
lingered on the fringes doing the little chores of a Whig
party foot soldier. He was asked to do some stump speaking
but found his place through use of his pen. The party
quickly learned to depend on his facile pen to produce
speeches, platforms, and position papers. Morrill also took
his turn at committee work. In 1844 he was appointed to the
Orange County Whig Committee and in 1848 he was promoted to
the state committee. He was sent by the state committee to
the National Convention of 1852 where he voted for the

31

platform supporting the Compromise of 1850. This type of

loyal service entitled a man to candidacy for an elective

 

30Parker, Morrill, pp. 25-26. Bassett, "Nobleman,"

31J. P. Fairbanks to Morrill, Aug. 7, 1852, Morrill
Papers, Reel 32. Carlos Carpenter to Morrill, Aug. 8, 1853,
Morrill Papers, Reel 30. See also Justin Smith Morrill Mss
Speeches 1844-55, Duke University Library, Durham, N.C.
Parker, Morrill, pp. 50, 53. George W. Julian, The Life of
Joshua R. Giddings (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., I892),
pp. 301-2.

 

19

Office, but Morrill persistently declined with the excep-
tions that he served single terms in the low level posts
of town auditor and justice of the peace. He was content
to do the little jobs and had little inclination for the
roughness of an election campaign.32 He particularly
shied away from any possibility of an intraparty fight.
Morrill was happy in Strafford and reluctant to
leave. In 1848 at the age of 38 he left active business
for life as a gentleman farmer. After building a house on
the farm, he married Ruth Swan, a niece of Judge Harris,
and was looking forward to a long, peaceful life with
her.33
Morrill's reluctance to hold elected Office only

slightly slowed the efforts of his enthusiastic supporters.

His friend E. P. Walton, publisher of the Vermont Watch-

 

man, was particularly indefatigable in his efforts to

34 When in 1854

promote a political career for Morrill.
Andrew Tracey, the congressman from the second district,
announced he would not seek reelection after a single term,

Morrill's backers had the Opportunity they had been

 

32Justin S. Morrill, "Recollections of Congress,"
Morrill Papers, Reel 14. Morrill to E. P. Walton, May 11,
1853, Morrill Papers, Reel 1.

33Washington Evening Star, April 27, 1895.

 

34E. P. Walton to Morrill, May 17, 1852, Morrill
Papers, Reel 1.

20

seeking. Tracey's decision was so unexpected that the
Whigs had no alternate candidate. Immediately, Morrill
was suggested as the only man for the job. Party members
pleaded with him to become a candidate lest the Democrats
get the seat by default, but Morrill was still reluctant.

35

But the pressure was too heavy and his party loyalty too

strong, so Morrill agreed to run on the condition that

there be no fight for the nomination.

 

358. H. Delano to Morrill, June 28, 1854, Morrill

Papers, Reel 31 and J. Kimball to Morrill, July 24 and
Aug. 18, 1854, Morrill Papers, Reel 36.

CHAPTER II

THE NEOPHYTE CONGRESSMAN AND THE

FIGHT AGAINST POLYGAMY

Morrill's nomination for Congress changed his whole
life. He had always thought of himself as a person who
took only the part in politics that his duty as a citizen
demanded.l Now he was about to enter Congress without even
having served in the state legislature, the usual pro-
gression.2 The campaign was not an easy one. Despite
their assurances of a united party, Whig leaders could not
hold the more radical antislavery members, who bolted to
the Liberty party. Their defection and Morrill's aversion
to public Speaking made the election close,3 but Morrill

won. He thus began a long career he never actively sought.

 

1William B. Parker, The Life and Public Services
of Justin Smith Morrill (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1924) I p. 5?.

 

 

2T. D. Seymour Bassett, "Nature's Nobleman: Justin
Smith Morrill, A Victorian Politician," Vermont History,

 

3The majority totaled 59 votes. The tally was
Morrill, Whig, 8380; J. W. D. Parker, Democrat, 5848;
and O. L. Shafter, Free Soil, 2473. Parker, Morrill, p» 60.

21

22

Following the excitement of the hastily organized
campaign and of the election, the wait to claim his seat
was an anticlimax. According to law the Congress elected
in November, 1854, would not meet until December of the
next year, a delay of thirteen months. Morrill had plenty
of time to learn what his friends and neighbors of the
second district expected of him as their representative.

When Congress finally assembled, Morrill became
involved in the contest for Speaker of the House which was
particularly heated because of the slavery controversy.
For the first time the Republicans had the largest single
block of seats, but they lacked a clear majority. From
the beginning their candidate, Nathaniel P. Banks of
Massachusetts, led in the balloting, but he always fell a
few votes short of victory. Along with his fellow Republi-
cans Morrill supported his party's candidate on every
ballot.4 The balloting dragged on and on. The Republicans
-needed to win some of the votes scattered among minor
candidates in order to put their man in the Speaker's
chair. While they worked on the problem, the business of
the government stagnated.

The stalled condition of Congress was accepted by
the Northern people as the lesser of evils. While govern-

ment stagnation was deplorable, it was better than allowing

 

4Fred H. Harrington, Fighting Politician: Major

General N. P. Banks (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1948), p. 30.

 

 

23

the usual proslavery group to organize the House. Morrill's
constituents exemplified those Northerners who strongly
supported the firm stand of their representatives. They
tended to reduce the question to basic elements of slave
versus free control.5 Many weeks passed before anyone was
tired enough to consider yielding.

After a month of no progress, moderates began in
earnest to seek a compromise settlement. The editors of
the New York Times deplored the defect in congressional
procedure which allowed a willful minority to tie up the
nation's business in the face of a poorly united majority.
Yet, they warned that the rights of the minority must be
preserved. The editors suggested that after a set number
of votes, election be by plurality.6 Congressional
moderates were not yet ready to go that far. Instead a
resolution was proposed that the speakership candidates
should all be questioned on their views of the issues.
Morrill tried to amend the resolution to limit the ques-
tioning to the top four candidates in order to hasten
action. This, his first motion, was voted down. The

resolution passed but, unfortunately, it failed to resolve

the deadlock.7

 

5Philip White to Morrill, December 29, 1855,
Morrill Papers, Reel 1.

6New York Times, Jan. 1, 1856.

 

7U.S., Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., lst Sess.,
1856, p. 219. [Hereinafter cited as Cong. Globe.]

 

24

By the end of January, the only alternative to
continued stalemate was election by plurality. Even
Morrill's adamantly antislavery constituents finally

seemed ready to take a chance on it.8

The House agreed to
take three more ballots and then proceed to election by
plurality vote. On the first ballot by plurality Banks
was elected.

Speaker Banks immediately selected the membership
of the several committees. Naturally he gave Republicans
the lion's share of important jobs. Morrill received
appointment to the Committee on Territories which was
chaired by Galusha Grow and included Joshua Giddings. The
Washington Evening Star complained that Banks was packing
this important committee with the Kansas-Nebraska contro-
versy rising on the horizon.9 Of course, the complaints
of the Stag were justified. But there was nothing unusual
in Banks's action. The Democrats in all likelihood would
have done the same thing had they won.

The Sga£_also evaluated the committee members,
landing the Democratic choices and either denouncing
individual Republicans or giving them little praise.

Giddings was described as a "terrible choice," while Grow

had a bent toward abolitionism. The writer predicted that

 

8S. Short to Morrill, Jan. 23, 1856, Morrill Papers,

Reel 1.

9Washington Evening Star, March 5, 1856.

 

25

Morrill, the new member, would probably "take a high spot"
as a businessman since he had done well in business in
Vermont.10

Morrill's success as a businessman may have helped
him get elected, but once he was in office the people
were interested in only one thing, service. They expected
him not only to provide a voice for expressing their views
and needs but also to be a middleman for the distribution
of the favors available from the federal government.

Their requests assumed such a staggering volume and variety
that much of the congressman's time had to be devoted to
constituent service. Nevertheless, such service was not
one-sided. Those who received favors tacitly agreed to
supply votes in subsequent elections.

One of the most frequent requests was for public
documents. Census reports, mapping surveys, reports of
such explorers as Lewis and Clark, the yearly agricultural
reports, and the Congressional Globe were all in demand.11
In isolated Vermont, books were not plentiful and these
seemingly dull publications must have helped to pass the
long winter nights.

Morrill developed an efficient system to enable him

to reap the biggest possible benefit from the publications

 

loIbid.

11Samuel Whitcomb to Morrill, Dec. 8, 1855,
Morrill Papers, Reel 1 exemplifies this type Of request
well.

26

he distributed. His business habits were being carried
over into his political career. He made a record book in
which he wrote down the names, addresses, politics, and
occupations of the recipients. By using a series of symbols
placed after their names, he could tell at a glance which
documents each had received. All of the names were cross
referenced by county and town, and the whole book was
indexed in the front. When a constituent died or moved,
Morrill crossed him Off with a short explanatory notation.
In addition, he kept track of the newspapers and libraries
which received documents.12 Such careful preparation
helped produce relatively effortless reelections.

While public documents comprised the bulk of the
requests, many other favors were sought from him. Morrill
devoted much of his working day to requests for court-
houses, mail routes and the procurement of federal aid for
such items as official weights and measures. In one case
the supplicants promised that Morrill would see their

13

gratitude at the next election. The thinly veiled threat

 

12Morrill Papers, Reels 51 and 52.

13Jason Steele to Morrill, Jan. 8, 1856, Morrill
Papers, Reel 39. B. W. Bartholomew to Morrill, Feb. 18,
1857, Morrill Papers, Reel 28. Norman Williams et al. to
Morrill, July to Oct., 1861, Walter Evans to MorriII,
Nov. 18, 1861, Morrill Papers, Reel 5. Morrill to L. O.
Brastow, Feb. 23, 1868, Morrill Papers, Reel 29. Lewis
Emmons to Morrill, Feb. 1, 1864, Morrill Papers, Reel 5.

Con . Globe, 34th Cong., lst Sess., 1856, p. 2186, 1767,
2572; 3rd Sess., 1857, p. 536.

27

exemplifies the seriousness Of the voters about these
outwardly trivial problems. In addition, he was virtually
inundated with pleas for appointments to the service
academies and for patronage jobs. Since there were always
many more applicants than Openings, Morrill showed a great
deal of tact in not making more enemies than friends.

In view Of the many activities that engaged
Morrill's time in this area Of constituent service, it is
surprising that he had any time left for the questions of
the day. Yet he was quite active in everything of impor-
tance that arose in the House. He seldom made a set
speech, especially in his early years, but he was there to
lend his vote almost without fail.14

The first major issue that Morrill became involved
in was the bitter fight over Kansas, a struggle which had
begun immediately in the 34th Congress under the guise of
the speakership contest. Everyone realized that the new
Speaker would appoint the members Of the Committee on
Territories. Congressmen also knew that Kansas was only
the surface issue, that the real stakes were slavery and
freedom. This knowledge added additional heat to the
battle for the Speaker's chair. As expected, Nathaniel

Banks, the new Speaker of the House, appointed a free-state

 

14A random examination of the Congressional Globe
for these years will show Morrill's name recorded on role
call votes of all major and most minor bills.

28

majority, including Justin Morrill, to the Committee on

Territories. Actually, concern over the composition of

that committee proved premature because the real work on
Kansas was done by a select committee appointed somewhat
later.

The situation in Kansas had gotten out of control.
The territory had been organized under the plan of pOpular
sovereignty which allowed the people to decide the question
Of becoming either a slave state or a free state. Before
the election of the territorial legislature, freestaters
appeared to have a clear majority, but proslavery Missour-
ians crossed the boundary line, voted illegally, intimi-
dated the freestaters, and elected a proslavery majority
to the legislature. Governor Andrew Reeder, convinced
that he had no power to do otherwise, reluctantly and
unwisely certified the legislature as duly elected. The
proslavery members voted to adOpt a slave code and other
acts designed to make life as difficult as possible for
freestaters. Through these tactics they hoped to drive
freestaters out and Obtain a majority Of the permanent
residents.

Chaos threatened when freestaters retaliated by
holding an unauthorized constitutional convention. They
stole a march on proslavery men by writing the Topeka
Constitution and submitting it to Congress with a request

for statehood. The document was carried to Washington by

29

ex-Governor Reeder who had recently been fired at the
insistence Of the proslavery faction.

Congress established a select committee to investi-
gate and recommend a means to untangle the almost hope-
lessly confused situation. Basically the committee had to
decide whether to recognize the proslavery territorial
legislature or to admit Kansas as a free state. The
Democrats favored the former, the Republicans the latter.
Some Northerners were eSpecially concerned over the com-
plication raised by Governor Reeder's certification that
the legislature had been duly elected. Since the Topeka
Constitution had clearly been written under extralegal
circumstances, the Democrats seemed to have the legal
advantage.15

Well aware Of the importance of the Kansas situa-
tion to the nation and to his constituents, Morrill chose
it as the subject of his maiden speech in the House of
Representatives on June 28, 1856. He Opened with a dis-
avowal of animosity toward any part of the nation.

Morrill strongly argued for the admission of Kansas
as a free state under the TOpeka Constitution. He called
upon Congress to

waive all objections [to irregularities], as they
have been often heretofore waived, in favor of junior
States. . . .

By the act establishing the Territories of Kansas
and Nebraska, the peOple were left "perfectly free

 

15C. K. Field to Morrill, March 17, 1856, Morrill
Papers, Reel 2.

30

to form and regulate their domestic institutions in
their own way" . . . It can hardly be presumed,
that any one here will object to the Kansas consti-
tution on the grounds that it lacks anything Of
republicanism . . .

We have Official information in relation to the
election frauds quite sufficient to vitiate the whole
of the territorial election; and no Legislature made
at such an election could make any but illegal and
tyrannical laws . . . there is not a man in this
house who approves, or who would tolerate, such
laws, even in a slave state. . . .16

Morrill had correctly pointed out that the pro-
slavery faction had used fraud but failed to provide
reasons to accept the Topeka Constitution. Simply because
one faction employed fraud, Morrill asked Congress to
accept the work of the other side without question. The
freestaters may well have been unrepresentative too, but
Morrill chose to ignore that possibility.

In the conclusion of his speech Morrill took both
Congress and the South to task for timidity and short
sightedness. He said:

Congress, having the constitutional power to

make "all needful rules and regulations for the
Territories" . . . suddenly abdicates . . . [POpular
sovereignty's] forum is not the Senate or the

Cabinet, but some territorial arena--some gladi-
torial Kansas . . .

It will not be a very violent assumption to
say that if in the preliminary contest among the
squatter sovereigns of Kansas, slavery had come off
the victor, there would be no opposition to her

 

16Cong. Globe, 34th Cong. lst Sess., 1856,

pp. 679-83 appendix.

 

31

admission from the quarter whence it comes . . .
the only way you can make it a pOpular favorite
is to adhere to it when it makes against you as
well as when for you. . . .17

DeSpite his Opening disclaimer, Morrill had
delivered a highly partisan Speech. He chose his side in
the Kansas dispute without waiting for the report of the
select committee. Morrill simply ignored any questions
not conducive to his argument.

The reaction to this speech, which outlined the
free state position so well, was generally favorable in
the North. Morrill wrote his wife that several colleagues
considered it a good effort but that the effect was
lessened because it had been delivered at a late hour when
the House was tired.18

A few days after Morrill's speech the select
committee on Kansas brought in its report. For the most
part the report supported the freestaters' claims that
outrages had been committed in the territory and that
tyranny existed in Kansas. The findings of this official
congressional investigation finally stOpped allegations
that the earlier reports from Kansas had been fabricated

for the personal or party gain of the free state faction.

However, neither Morrill's speech nor the committee's

 

17Ibid., pp. 682-83 appendix.

18Morrill to Ruth Morrill, June 29, 1856 and
Clark Chapman to Morrill, July 16, 1856, Morrill Papers,
Reel 2.

32

report was influential enough to prevent congressional
rejection of the Topeka Constitution.

The New York Times blasted the situation in

 

Kansas as a blot on the nation and predicted that the
people would rise up against such outrage and drive the
reaponsible party from power.19 The editors were poor
prophets. In 1856 the people passed the burden of Kansas
into the feeble hands of "Old Buck."

The new administration might have used the transfer
of power as a chance to begin anew in Kansas. Unfor-
tunately James Buchanan seemed more interested in electing
Democrats than healing wounds. When the proslavery group
submitted the Lecompton Constitution, the President ignored
its doubtful legal status and supported it, since a slave
state would surely elect Democrats. This was too much for
Stephen Douglas. He broke with his party's leadership and
joined the Republicans in a successful fight against the
Lecompton Constitution.

The news for which antislavery men had dared not
hOpe electrified the North. Editorial opinion correctly
predicted the far-reaching results of this vote. The
breakup of the Democratic party and the resulting triumph
of the next Republican nominee were among the predictions.

The thought brought joy to the North, at least to the

 

19New York Times, July 3, 1856.

 

33

Republicans.20 But perhaps their joy would have been
lessened had they not so lightly dismissed the threats
of disunion.

In the few years remaining before the war began,
slavery agitation was never far below the surface in
Congress, but Morrill took little active part in it. He
did not Speak out even when his friend John Sherman was
losing his bid for the Speakership in 1859 over his unwise

endorsement of The Impending Crisis of the South.21 Sherman

 

had signed without having read the book, something Morrill,
always the careful businessman, would never have done. He
couhdbring himself to do no more than vote for his friend.
Although slavery agitation continued, a new act of
the play had begun. The locus of power had shifted. The
free soil men had the votes and were now content to let
matters settle themselves. This contentment probably
explains Morrill's inaction in these years. On the other

hand Southerners began demanding active interference by

 

20Green Mountain Freeman, April 8, 1858. Plyman
Seaner to Morrill, May 2, 1858, Morrill Papers, Reel 39.

 

21Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860, passim.
Hinton R. Helper,TH€ Impending Crisis of the South (New
York: G. P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1960), passim. Helper, a
southerner, condemned slavery as an economic disaster and
called on nonslaveholding whites to boycott slaveholders.
Southerners in the House felt any man who endorsed "in-
surrection" was unfit for Speaker. New York Times, Dec. 9
and 12, 1859.

 

 

 

34

the federal government on behalf of slavery,22 which
throws into doubt their claim that they fought for states
rights.

Morrill's conservative business habits were evident
in his whole political career but were particularly impor-
tant in choosing issues. Just as Morrill, when a
businessman, carefully decided where to invest his funds,
SO too, as a congressman, he carefully chose the issues
before committing his political reputation. He almost
always fought for politically popular issues. He did,
occasionally, run contrary to popular Opinion, as in his
adherence to Unitarianism, but such acts attracted little
public attention. The first of his chosen personal
commitments was the suppression of polygamy.

Toward the end of this first session in Congress,
Morrill reported from the Committee on Territories his
own bill for the suppression of polygamy and spoke in its
behalf. He supported passage of the bill with a concise
speech which focused on the constitutional problem. He
said that Congress clearly had the power to act in this
case because it had purchased the territories and the
ability to acquire includes the power to govern. Morrill
next pointed out that Congress had that power in the
Constitutional clause which gave the Congress the right

"to make all needful rules and regulations reSpecting the

 

22New York Times, Feb. 25, 1859.

 

35

territories." Morrill also insisted that the outlawing of
polygamy would not violate the constitutionally guaranteed
right of freedom of religion because what existed was a
moral outrage hiding beneath the veil of religious prac-
tice. For those convicted of violating the law, he asked
that a fine of five hundred dollars and a sentence of from
two to five years be imposed. Despite his arguments the
House voted to kill the bill by referring it to the
Committee of the Whole where it died quietly.23
The reasons why Morrill's colleagues listened
politely to his arguments against polygamy but did nothing
were complicated, but a few stand out. One main reason
was that, since public interest was low, Congress felt
little pressure. Morrill's bill was premature, coming
before the press exposes and military expedition of the
late 1850's. The New York press passed it by almost
unnoticed.24 There was not even constituent mail to prod
Morrill or anyone else into pressing the bill. Then, too,
he probably used the wrong technique. His argument was far

too legalistic tc>catch the interest of many of his fellow

congressmen. Several of them probably felt as he did on

 

23Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., lst Sess., 1856, p. 149L

 

4Norman F. Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 1850-
1859 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), passim.
New York Times, June 30, 1856. Even in the following
ianuarythe New York Tribune was willing simply to ignore
the Mormon question. New York Tribune, Jan. 10, 1857.

 

 

 

 

36

moral grounds but Utah and polygamy were just too far away
to be of concern. Morrill's timing was faulty.25 His
keen personal sense of moral outrage was in advance of the
national feeling and he brought the remote problem of
polygamy before a House preoccupied with the omnipresent
question Of slavery.

When the House reconvened for the second session
of the 34th Congress, Morrill tried to rectify his mistakes
by working on a new tack. Instead of emphasizing only the
moral aspects of the situation, he exposed the flaunting
of the congressional will by authorities in Utah. The new
approach included the use of a carefully worded resolution
and a painstakingly researched Speech.

The Utah resolution, successfully proposed on
January 19, 1857, called on the president to submit to
Congress all available information on the state of affairs
in that territory. Specifically it sought to determine
whether resistance had been Offered to United States
Territorial Officials, and whether the laws were equally
administered to all residents.26 These official data were
supposed to be combined with the findings of Morrill's own

investigation in order to lay the foundation for an attack

against polygamy on wider and more solid grounds. But that

 

25Thomas F. O'Dea, The Mormons (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 109.

 

26Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1857, p. 376.

 

37

purpose was frustrated because the Executive never
reSponded to this congressional request.27

Morrill had a well researched and carefully
written speech but destroyed its possible impact with
poor tactics in the House. The best he could do was
obtain permission to have it printed in the appendix to
remarks.

In his strongly worded Speech Morrill blasted the
situation in Utah. He based his criticism on several
reports which he considered reliable.

Probably the most serious problem was the "un-
American" form of government. Morrill indicated that:

The Mormons . . . desire a kingly government

in order to make their patriarchal institutions more
homogeneous. . . . and lie in wait for an Oppor-
tunity of defiance and revolt, when they can reach
the "crowning glory" of their schemes. . . .
Publicly and privately, they indulge in the coarsest
and most brutal assaults upon the United States
Government and its Officers. . . . The lack of
patriotism and the ingrained hostility of the
Mormons to our Republic admit of no dispute [but]

I would not punish them for these facts.28

Morrill continued by pointing out that there were
many extraordinary laws and practices in Utah for which
reSponsible parties could be punished. After carefully
studying territorial laws he discovered that:

ferries and bridges seem to be monopolized by the

Governor and the leading elders, who are thereby
enabled to extort considerable tribute from the

 

27Ibid., p. 284 appendix.

28Ibid., p. 285 appendix.

38

emigrant travel passing through to California. . . .
As all the land requires to be irrigated to make it
fruitful, the sole control of the city creek may
be considered the cream of these special grants . . .
The act organizing the Territory of Utah "pro-
vided that the right of suffrage and of holding office
shall be exercised only by citizens of the United
States . . ." yet aliens are allowed to vote and hold
Office. Mormonism is the higher-law qualification.
In point of fact, all the voters are mere machines
to register the edicts of President Young. No one
dares to throw a scattering vote; and hence the
result is nearly always unanimous.
It was also provided in the organic act that
"no law shall be passed [by Utah] interfering with the
primary disposal of the soil." Yet it is notorious
that all Of the valuable portions of the land are
squat upon . . . remain, worthless for all purposes
of revenue to the Government of the United States.29

While Morrill rightly pointed out several clear
violations of the law which called for annulment by Congress
he used faulty logic in his discussion Of republicanism.
First he claimed that the peOple of Utah had preferred
theocracy. Later he failed to mention that the several
practices described flowed naturally from the people's
acceptance of an autocratic government. Indeed, this was
not even a truly autocratic practice, repugnant as it was
to traditional American practice. Having settled in a
semi-arid area the Mormons found it necessary to discard
the usual control of water by riparian rights in favor of

30

the Spanish system of community control. Morrill simply

 

29Ibid., pp. 285-86 appendix.

30Stanley P. Hirshson, The Lion of the Lord (New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 97. O'Dea, Mormons,
p. 88.

 

39

did not understand that to Mormons democracy and freedom
of thought were meaningless words.31
After stating his case for congressional action
against Utah's laws, Morrill got down to his real issue,
the moral abuses Of the Mormons. While polygamy was his
main concern, Morrill also showed that both African and
Indian slavery was common among Mormons. In condemning
polygamy, he indicated first that the Book of Mormon Of
1840 denounced the practice in the phrase "for there Shall
not be any man among you have, save it be one wife; and
concubines you shall have none," and second that Mormon
women had expressed their distaste by a short-lived revolt
in 1856. Morrill felt that despite their claims of new
revelation, Joseph Smith and Brigham Young were simply
rationalizing their taking of multiple wives.32
Morrill concluded his speech by stressing again
that it was the duty of Congress to do anything necessary
to restore a republican form Of government wherever it
was absent in the nation. He insisted that the supremacy
Of Mormon church leaders over the lives of the people of

Utah constituted a rejection of such a governmental form.

Morrill prOposed that Congress disapprove all their laws.

 

31Hirshson, Lion, p. 94.

32Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1857,
pp. 287-89 appendix. Also see New York Times, April 6,
1860. There is evidence that MorrilI is wrong on the
attitudes of Mormon women. See Fawn M. Brodie, NO Man
Knows My History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945),
pp. 304-5.

 

 

 

40

He said that Congress "must not persecute the religion
but yet must annul their extraordinary laws and outlaw
their repugnant practices . . . or be guilty by
association.“33

Morrill stated that Congress could not persecute
a religion, but he was convinced that a practice could be
outlawed. His concern over the absence of republican
government was simply a sham to mask his latest blow at
polygamy. After all it is difficult to define "republican
form of government." Nebraska's unicameral legislature,
for example, is atypical but hardly unrepublican. Surely
Utahans had the right to discard riparian rights and other
traditions. But if they were constantly harassed they
might well discard polygamy to turn off the Spotlight
Morrill was trying to shine on them.

Unfortunately for his purpose, Morrill was unable
to bring much pressure on the Mormons owing to his own
shortcomings on the floor of the House. After failing to
obtain time to deliver his speech, Morrill was forced
into an ineffectual attempt to work through the appropria-
tions process. He moved to withhold all funds from Utah
until there was compliance with federal and territorial
law and Officials. That motion was ruled out of order in

an apprOpriations bill. Next, Morrill moved to delete

 

33Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1857,

p. 290 appendix.

 

41

pay and mileage allowance for the territorial legislature,
which was also ruled out of order because the section had

already been passed.34

At this point in his career Morrill
was still a parliamentary novice, but he learned quickly
and was seldom caught unprepared in future years.

After his easy reelection Morrill returned to

Congress for another try at his seemingly hopeless

35

campaign for the suppression of polygamy. He introduced

a bill early in the first session but it died in committee,
which might have ended the fight.36 However, the situation
in Utah was deteriorating rapidly and Buchanan finally had
to send an army to force compliance with federal authority.
Thus, conditions would probably be more favorable for
Morrill's third try.

The military expedition was only a limited success
in rectifying the state of affairs in Utah. It placed a
Gentile (non-Mormon) governor in office and kept the courts
running at bayonet point. But, Mormons made up the juries

and refused to convict a "saint" Of any crime against a

 

34Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1857,

 

35R. H. Rollins to Morrill, Aug. 5, 1856 and
C. Chapman to Morrill, Aug. 13, 1856, Morrill Papers,
Reel 2. On third nomination see G. C. Robbins to S. A.
Marsh, July 28, 1858, Morrill Papers, Reel 3.

36Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., lst Sess., 1858,
pp. 184, 2114.

 

42

"Gentile.“37 One particularly galling case involved a

Mormon accused of raping and murdering a young Gentile
girl. The Secretary of the Interior had sufficient proof
for a conviction but could not get it. He used the case
as a vehicle to show the need for an indefinite period of
martial law. Martial law had not been imposed when the
army entered Utah and the result had been increased
contempt for the federal government and the judge and jury
system.38 That was the low state to which affairs in Utah
had sunk by the time the thirty-sixth Congress assembled.

Morrill, now in his third term and a member Of the
powerful Ways and Means Committee, quickly began a new
campaign to outlaw polygamy and to bring Utah back under
the control of the central government. On February 15,
1860, he introduced a bill to outlaw polygamy and to
nullify certain acts Of the territorial legislature.39
The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee which
reported it back favorably a month later.

Scattered Opposition came from some legislators
who argued that Congress could not legislate against crime

in a territory since it was an internal matter. That idea

was easily refuted by reference to the congressional right

 

37New York Times, May 13, 1859.

 

381bid., Dec. 30, 1859.

39Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,

 

p. 793.

 

43

to legislate for the territories. Morrill had long ago
taken that position and he stood with it.40
Surprisingly, even with the bill progressing so

well in the House that Morrill felt no compulsion to make

a new major speech, the issue still had not generated
widespread public notice. The common peOple, who seemed

to write their congressman on the slightest whim, were
strangely silent this time. Neither did the newspapers

take much interest. Of course, the Salt Lake City papers
hotly condemned the bill and its author for unconstitutional
intervention in territorial internal affairs and in a

41

matter Of religion. But the major papers said little.

The influential New York Times equivocated. While the

 

bill was pending, the editors said that it seemed unlikely
that anything less than a large Gentile immigration would
solve the problem, but that Congress nonetheless had to
outlaw polygamy. After the bill passed the House, the
Timgg deplored the move because the lack of enforcement
provisions would make the antipolygamy statute a dead
letter. That would serve only to make the federal govern-

42

ment yet more contemptible in Mormon eyes. The fact was

 

401818., pp. 1150-51, 1410, 1492-93.

41The Mountaineer (Salt Lake City), March 31,

 

1860.

42New York Times, March 30, 1860 and April 7, 1869.

 

44

that everyone agreed something had to be done but no one
had a viable alternative to Morrill's solution.

With mainly indifferent support the bill progressed
rapidly through the House. John McClernand of Illinois
interjected an alternative by proposing the division of
Utah as a means of breaking Mormon power. Neither the
idea of division nor any other counter-prOposal gained
significant support. Numerous members made hour-long
Speeches on both sides as the measure moved toward passage.

William H. HOOper, the delegate from Utah, made the
final attempt to defeat the antipolygamy bill. He warned
that the bill would reawaken recently dead animosities
created by military coercion. When pressed on polygamy,
he tried to soften the issue by mentioning that half the
men were monogamous and another quarter had only two wives.
HOOper'S efforts were in vain. Morrill got a large vote

(149-60) and the bill passed.43

But deSpite this large
majority for its passage in the House, the antipolygamy
bill died in the Senate.

A third defeat might have discouraged most men
but Justin Smith Morrill was a persistent individual. Even

while working on a major tariff revision and the land

grant college act, he determined to try again.

 

43Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,
pp. 1515-4 ' - o

45

Following the crush of business brought on by the
secession of the South and the beginning of the Civil War,
Morrill began work on his fourth bill to outlaw polygamy.
Twenty days after its introduction the bill was reported
out of committee with a recommendation that it be passed.
Morrill forestalled debate by explaining that it was the
same bill passed by a large majority in the previous
Congress. He demanded the previous question and the
Republican-dominated House passed the bill. This time
success was complete. The bill reached President Lincoln's
desk and he signed it into law on July 1, 1862.44

Morrill could take pride in achieving a goal which
he had pursued for eight long years, but it was a ques-
tionable success. As with the earlier versions this bill
was unenforceable because it relied on uncooperative
Mormon grand juries for indictments. There were only two
likely possibilities. Either the law would die on the
books or a second civil war would be needed to enforce
it.45 With the life of the Union at stake, Lincoln could
not afford to send part of the army to Utah. That the

law did become a dead letter was shown when, in 1874,

Luke P. Poland, Morrill's successor in the House,

 

44Con . Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 1581, 1843-48. 0.8., Statutes at Large, 37th Cong.,
2nd Sess., p. 501.

45O'Dea, Mormons, pp. 104-5. New York Times,
June 19, 1862.

 

 

46

introduced a bill to give federal judges power to act in
cases covered by the law of 1862.46

Clearly the bill seemed to violate legislative
common sense Since it is seldom wise to pass an unenforce-
able 1aw. The practitioners of the outlawed acts are
allowed to see the limits of power which are better left
vague. It would be far better to wait until the power
necessary to back up the words was at hand.

Because he was no fool, Brigham Young realized
that eventually the power of the United States would be
brought to bear on his people. With this in mind he laid
plans for a strategic retreat. Young told Speaker of the
House Schuyler Colfax in July, 1865, that polygamy was not
essential to Mormonism and could be abolished through a

new revelation.47

How curious that Brigham Young, the
dreamer, should be so pragmatic while Justin Morrill, the
practitioner of the art of the possible, should be so
moralistic.

Why did Morrill work so long and so hard for the
passage of a law which common sense told him could not be

enforced? The answer would seem to be that he was on a

moral crusade. From the first he spoke Of the moral

 

46Nels Anderson, The Desert Saints (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 290. See also
New York Times, Jan. 7, 1867.

 

 

47New York Times, July 18, 1865. On Mormon
reasons for practicing polygamy see Anderson, Saints,
p. 391 and Hirshson, Lion, p. 123.

 

47

outrage which arose from the second of the twin relics Of
barbarism. He must have known that the law's provisions
could not be carried out, eSpecially in the middle of

a civil war. Yet, it seems to have been important to
Morrill to take a moral stand against polygamy and to get
the Congress of the United States to concur. His New
England Puritanism, rather than regard for practical
politics, guided his actions.

Morrill's moral fervor may have been generated by
shame and state pride. He loved his home state and was
ever alert to see that the honor of Vermont was defended.
Because Of this state pride, he could not help but be
shamed by the knowledge that both Joseph Smith and Brigham
Young, the high priests of polygamy, were native
Vermonters.48 Through his bill Morrill could condemn
them and thus remove a smear from the good name of Vermont.
A public damnation, through passage of a bill outlawing
the Mormon's peculiar institution, would serve to satisfy
honor even if it did little toward actually eliminating

what he regarded as a moral outrage, polygamy.

 

48Bernard Devoto, "Brigham Young," Dictionary of

American Biography, 1935, vol. 20, p. 620.

 

 

CHAPTER III

LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT

Many men dream of leaving a monument behind them.
The best monuments, the ones which evoke a favorable memory
of a man, are the hardest to build. Justin Morrill left
his legacy in the more than threescore Land Grant Colleges
around the United States. These colleges were founded as

a result of the Land Grant College Act of 18621

which was
written and sponsored by Morrill. Although he was respon-
sible for several other major pieces of legislation, this
one had the most far-reaching effects. The Land Grant
Colleges continue to educate and train thousands of young
citizens every year.

Several existing plans influenced Morrill during
the years when he was developing the land grant college

concept. Before Morrill introduced his first land grant

bill in 1858, there were a number of institutions for

 

1The bill was often called the Agricultural College
Act, a title affixed by a clerk and disliked by Morrill.
Alfred C. True, A History Of Agricultural Education in the
United States: 1785-1925 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1929), p. 108.

 

48

 

49

training workingmen, including the new Agricultural College
Of Michigan and the Peoples College in New York. There had
also been several attempts to induce Congress to provide
an alternative to the traditional classical education on
a national scale. But, the movement for practical educa-
tion was limited and under financed.2

Alden Partridge founded an academy at Norwich,
Vermont, in 1819, which was incorporated as Norwich
University in 1834. Partridge was an educator who felt
that the existing form of education was defective and
that the greatest defects were rigidity and a lack of
practicality. He planned a curriculum, intended to Open
up the course of studies, that included physical education,
military drill, and a wide variety of electives. The need
for more practical education was met by stressing mathe-
matics and the sciences related to engineering.3

Partridge carried his efforts for educational
reform a step further in a January, 1841, petition to
Congress. He asked Congress to establish a new national
system of education on republican lines. The new system

would supercede the classical system which he felt was

 

2John T. Fey, "Morrill's Concept of Education,"

Vermont History, XXXI (1963), 158. True, Agricultural
Edbcation, passim. N. A. McCune, "Justin Smith Morrill,"
Michigan Agricultural College Record, June 25, 1901,

p. 5.

 

 

 

3True, Agricultural Education, p. 82.

 

50

antirepublican and monastic. He expected these new
institutions to reflect republicanism because they were
to be both nonpartisan and nonsectarian.

The curriculum, Partridge said, should include a
broad Spectrum of courses including the traditional
liberal arts. However, the college would prepare men for
lives in farming, engineering and commerce by teaching
the practical fields of study. These fields would be the
natural and economic sciences with their applications to
agriculture, engineering, manufactures, and commerce;
physical education; and military science and practice.4
In effect, Partridge was asking Congress to finance the
establishment of new Norwich Universities all over the
nation. Nothing came from this action directly, but it
is an important and noteworthy predecessor of the Morrill
bill.

The ideas of Partridge, in many ways the prototype
of the land grant college plan, were well known to Morrill.
Morrill was even Offered, but declined, a trusteeship at
the college.5 In addition, it is almost certain that
Morrill knew Partridge himself very well. Norwich is

only twelve miles from Strafford and Judge Harris,

 

4Ibid., p. 83.

5Morrill to J. Davis, Dec. 8, 1848, Morrill

Papers, Reel 1.

 

51

Morrill's business partner, was an incorporator of Norwich
University and a trustee until his death in 1855.6

A second attempt to establish practical education
was led by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, a member of the faculty
Of Illinois College at Jacksonville. Turner sensed the
educational needs of the common man. He felt that there
were two classes of men; the professional and the indus-
trial. The small, privileged, professional class had the
classical colleges to train their young men while the
industrial class had none.

Turner first advocated founding an industrial
university to care for the professional wants and needs of
workingmen in Illinois, and later expanded his concept to
include such a university in each of the states. All of
these universities would cooperate with the Smithsonian
Institution in improving the life of the industrial
classes. The proposed curriculum emphasized the industrial
arts and sciences which would prepare the students to
perform their chosen job. A classical department might be
added but was not necessary. Experimental farms would
also be an integral part of each institution.7

Enough support had been mustered for the Turner

Plan by 11853 to persuade the Illinois State Legislature

 

6True, Agricultural Education, p. 82.

 

7Ihid., pp. 85-86.

52

to pass a resolution requesting Congress to take favorable
action. The resolution asked the Congress for a law
donating at least one-half million dollars worth of public
lands to each state. The proceeds of the land sales would
be used to endow an industrial university which would pro-
vide the liberal, practical, and varied education appro-
priate to the needs of the industrial classes.8 However,
Congress did not act on the resolution.

Morrill was also well acquainted with the Turner
Plan. He was a delegate from Vermont to the United States
Agricultural Society meeting in February, 1856,9 where the
Turner or Illinois Plan for industrial universities was
thoroughly discussed. In addition, Turner claimed that he
sent Morrill all his information after the introduction of

the Land Grant College Bill.10 However, there is in the

Morrill Papers no evidence to support that contention.11
While Morrill was very likely influenced by the

thinking of many men, probably his greatest motivation was

his own strong interest in education. He never ceased to

 

8rbid., p. 91.

9Ibid., p. 94. He was asked to propagandize in
favor Of Vermont's famous Morgan horses.

10Ibid.

 

11In reminiscences many years later, Morrill
denied having received aid. Morrill to W. T. Hemett,
Oct. 6, 1894, Morrill Papers, Reel 24.

53

feel deprivation at his lack of a college education.
Because of this feeling he spent his lifetime educating
himself well beyond the level he might have achieved in
college.

Morrill was a man taken, almost obsessed, with
learning. He and his friends ranged widely in their
little debating society at Strafford. While reading
(books by and about famous people, Morrill took their
thoughts down and carefully preserved them. Later in_
life he used those notes as the base for a book entitled

Self-Consciousness of Noted Persons.12

 

Throughout his lifetime Morrill took a part in
Spreading education to the working class from which he had
sprung. He took a close personal interest in the Strafford
Library from the time Judge Harris willed it to the town
until he himself had the building erected for it years
later. During his first term in Congress, Morrill was
given the honor Of reporting a bill to increase all the
territorial libraries out of the Committee on the
Territories. He kept up his interest in education through
work on the Agricultural College Act and into later life.

In 1886, for example, he agreed to Sponsor legislation

 

12Carl W. Borgmann, "The Education of Freemen,"
Vermont History, XXV (1957), 32. James Barrett, "Early
Life of Justin S. Morrill," The Vermonter (St. Albans),
Nov., 1896. Morrill Papers, ReeIU43 contains many such
items. Justin S. Morrill, Self-Consciousness of Noted
Persons (Cambridge: John Wilson and Co., 1882).

 

 

 

54

allowing historical society publications distributed
without charge to be mailed free or at a low rate.13 Thus,
Morrill's interest in education was both genuine and of
lifelong duration.

Morrill began the task of improving education
while serving his first session in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Just a few weeks after attending the United
States Agricultural Society meeting in February, 1856,
Morrill introduced a resolution asking the Committee on
Agriculture to explore the possibility of establishing one
or more national agricultural schools on the plan of West
Point and Annapolis. The provision would be made to
instruct one boy from each congressional district and two
from each state at large in scientific and practical
subjects at public expense. However, this attempt failed
abruptly when, on the Objection of Representative Lawrence
Keitt of South Carolina, the House refused even to receive
the resolution.14

Even though this resolution was introduced in the

same month that he had heard the Illinois Plan discussed,

the two measures bore almost no resemblance to one another.

 

13Nathan B. Cobb to Morrill, Dec. 7, 1857, Morrill

Papers, Reel 30. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., lst Sess.,

1856, p. 1440. The honor may have been simply coincidental
but it is probable that the committee was aware of his
interest in the field of learning. Morrill to Albert D.
Hager, Dec. 11, 1886, Justin S. Morrill Collection, Chicago
Historical Society.

14Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., lst Sess., 1856, p. 530.

 

 

55

Nor was Morrill's resolution like the bills he drew up in
1858 and 1862. The resolution was a half-formed idea
prematurely proposed by the inexperienced member from
Vermont.

Yet, there was enough in the resolution to show
that Morrill put a considerable amount of thought into his
Land Grant College Act. He must have been considering
ways to provide higher education for the common man for
quite some time before he entered Congress. Then, it
took him two more years to perfect his educational plan
and to find a way to finance it--through land grants.

A few days after Morrill began his second term in
Congress, he introduced the first Land Grant College Act.
The stated purpose of the bill was "to distribute a por-
tion of the public domain to the states and territories
in order to fund colleges of agriculture and the mechanic
arts." Morrill tried to have the bill referred to the
Committee on Agriculture. He served on that committee and
felt it would favor the bill. John Letcher Of Virginia
demanded that the bill go instead to the Committee on
Public Lands. The latter motion was passed.15

When the Agricultural College Bill was reported

out of committee on April 15, 1858, Morrill demonstrated

 

lsCong. Globe, 35th Cong., lst Sess., 1857,
pp. 32-37. Beginning with the 36th Congress committee
appointments have stood for the life Of the Congress.
Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1860, p. 3. See
aISO Fey, 1rMorrill's Concept Of Education," p. 157.

 

 

 

56

that he had learned parliamentary tactics. Williamson
R. W. Cobb of Alabama, reporting for the majority of the
Committee on Public Lands, recommended that the bill be
rejected. Morrill quickly acted to counter that recommen-
dation, usually a death sentence on a bill. It was
essential that the bill be kept before the House. To help
him accomplish this end Morrill had the aid of two allies,
David Walbridge of Michigan and Israel Washburn of Maine.
The three men made a series of motions designed to keep
the bill on the floor and especially out of the hands of
the unfriendly Committee on Public Lands. Morrill was
granted permission to speak during the next morning hour.l6
Walbridge, who had brought in the favorable minority
report, moved that consideration of the bill be postponed
and that in the meantime the bill and all reports be
printed. Paradoxically, Washburn moved that the bill be
returned to the Public Lands Committee. All these motions
were left pending to guarantee that the Agricultural
College Bill would not be brushed aside.17‘

At the next meeting in the morning hour, April 20,

Morrill and his allies used another series of parliamentary

moves to give him the Opportunity to speak in favor of his

 

16The "Morning Hour" is defined as the time to act
on bills reported from the committees.

17Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., lst Sess., 1857,

pp. 1609-10} The pending motions prevented the automatic
burial of the bill on the Speaker's table by freezing the
committee reports at that point.

 

57

bill. After Morrill rose to claim the floor, Walbridge
and Washburn quickly withdrew their pending motions to
postpone and to recommit. These maneuvers allowed Morrill
to Offer an amendment which would become the pending floor
business. The amendment was in the form of a substitute
bill almost identical to the original bill rejected by the
Public Lands Committee. Since he held the floor, Morrill
now had the chance to deliver his Speech on the Land Grant
College Bill.
Morrill began by pointing out that many areas Of
the economy were aided by government grants, yet the vital
area of agriculture received nothing. He insisted that:
The prOSperity and happiness of a large and
pOpulous nation depends: 1. Upon the division of the
land into small parcels. 2. Upon the education of
the prOprietors of the soil . . . the common mode
Of cultivating the soil in all parts of the country
is so defective as to make the soil poorer year by
year . . . Thus the accumulated store of ages passes
away in a single generation. . . .

We do not ask for constant and persistent outlay
and guidance; but a recognizance for once, and in
the most convenient mode, Of the propriety of
encouraging useful knowledge among farmers and
mechanics in order to enlarge our productive power

Having laid a foundation showing the need for
improvements in agriculture, Morrill explained how agri-
cultural colleges would fill the need. He said:

Such colleges may rightfully claim the authority

Of teachers to announce facts and fixed laws, and
to scatter broadcast that knowledge which will prove

 

18Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., lst Sess., 1857,
pp. 1692-93.

 

58

useful in building up a great nation . . . Farmers
will not be cheated longer by unsustained specula-
tions . . . our mines are much less remunerative
than they would be under the control of Americans,
with some fundamental instruction in their vocation
. . . our mechanics need the means for that arm to
acquire culture, skill, and efficiency . . .

Our present literary colleges need have no more
jealousy of agricultural colleges than a porcelain
manufactory would have of an iron foundary. They move
in different Spheres, without competition, and using
no raw material that will diminish the supply of one
or the other.19

In conclusion, Morrill made an appeal for votes

from the populous Eastern states. For years there had
been a natural resentment in the established areas of the
nation over the distribution of public lands to the new
states. As a rule states were granted federal lands within
their borders. Since most of the public domain lay in the
West, the Older states received almost nothing. In
Morrill's bill lay an opportunity for the East to share in
the public domain through issuance of scrip redeemable in
western lands. Finally, he said, all of the peOple would
have a chance to benefit.20

Following Morrill's speech Cobb forced a test vote

on the bill by moving to table it. Morrill immediately
tried to curtail further actions by moving to recommit and
calling the previous question, but Cobb's motion to table

took precedence. However, once that motion was voted down,

 

19%.! p. 1694' zolbido' pp. 1695-96.

59

Morrill was fairly sure that a majority Of the House would
be favorable if he could arrange a vote on the passage of
the hill.21

The defeat Of the attempt to table gave Morrill
the opportunity to press toward an immediate vote on the
bill through use of the pending call of the previous ques-
tion on his motion to recommit. The opponents of the
Agricultural College Bill demanded a division of the House
on seconding the previous question, but it was approved.
This success cut Off any further motions to amend or refer
and prevented debate by everyone except Cobb who held the
right to speak as the member who reported the bill to the
House.22

DeSpite the continued victories for Morrill, Cobb
and his allies still had a few parliamentary weapons left.
They again moved to table the bill and demanded a roll
call vote. But, that move failed too. The Opponents did
manage to block Morrill's request to withdraw his motion
to recommit. They were only playing a delaying game, but
continued it, hoping to sway votes.

The last great Obstacle preventing passage of the
Land Grant Act was Williamson Cobb himself. He paid a

compliment to Morrill by mentioning the extraordinary

progress Of a bill reported unfavorably. Nevertheless, on

 

21 22

Ibid., p. 1697. Ibid., p. 1739.

60

the verge of an unexpected direct vote on the bill, Cobb
planned to say everything possible to Show that the measure
should not pass.

Congressman Cobb explained that the Public Lands
Committee had two major objectives in mind when it
recommended rejection of the pending bill. The committee
was responding to criticism over land grants made in the
previous session and also trying to return to the tradi-
tional policy of refusing all such requests due to possible
unforeseen dangers.

With these goals in mind he asked for a negative
vote, even though the committee felt the bill to be
meritorious, for several reasons. The committee felt that:

The public domain belongs to all the people of

the United States; their interest in it is common,

and the Government is but the trustee for the common
benefit, limited in its actions over it to those
powers conferred by the Constitution. It is part

of the public funds, and can be devoted to no purpose
forbidden to the money of the Federal Government . . .
[You] may be curious to know how I can reconcile my
vote against this bill, meritorious as it is, with
the votes which I have given in favor Of railroad
grants. It is a very easy matter. . . . I hold that
the grants to States and Territories for railroad
purposes increase the value of the public lands . . .23

In the wake of Cobb's speech Morrill moved quickly
toward victory despite one last delaying tactic by the
Opposition. He asked again for permission to withdraw his

motion to recommit which had only been made to cut off

debate. The opposition forced a vote but recommitment was

 

231bid., pp. 1740-42.

61

denied. Morrill's amendment, the substitute bill, was
then accepted. Finally, after a call of the previous
question, the main question was proposed and the bill
passed on a vote of 105-100.24
Unfortunately for Morrill the rapid progress Of
the Land Grant College Bill was brought to an abrupt halt
by indifference in the Senate. The bill was quickly re-
ported from the Committee on Public Lands with no recom-
mendation. Senator Charles E. Stuart of Michigan, the
Agricultural College Bill's Senate manager, tried to get
a vote without debate. Instead, the Senate sidetracked the
bill by agreeing to hold it over until the next session.25
Soon after the 35th Congress convened for its
second session, it became apparent that Stuart was not
the man to manage the Agricultural College Bill. At the
first Opportunity, he moved that the bill be made a special
order for December 21. But, when the day arrived, the
Senate refused to consider the bill because some members
who wanted to Speak were absent. Stuart argued vainly
that, since the day had been set aside for this bill,

debate Should proceed. Stuart was unable to bring the

bill up again.26

 

24 25

Ibid., p. 1743. Ibid., pp. 1989, 2230.

26Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd sess., 1857,

pp. 108, 186-87.

 

62

Since it had become clear that Stuart could not
persuade the Senate to act, Benjamin Wade of Ohio replaced
him on February 1 to save his friend Morrill's bill. Wade
argued that this worthy bill, which would aid farmers, was
in danger of being lost without a fair hearing in the wake
of the appropriation bills. He made a successful motion
to postpone all other business until the Agricultural
College Bill was acted upon.27

Ironically, the major speech Opposing the bill
was made by Wade's Ohio colleague, Senator George E. Pugh,
who characterized it as a fraud. Pugh claimed that no
agricultural college would ever be built because specula-
tors would get all the land at bargain rates as a result
of the required short selling period Of under five years.
He condemned the distribution arrangement because he felt
it gave little to the poor states and an abundance to the
rich ones. Finally, said Pugh, the bill was an inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the states and beyond
the constitutional power of Congress.28

Jacob Collamer of Vermont retorted with a brief

Speech in which he refuted the main points Of the Opposi-

tion. Collamer countered the claim of unconstitutionality

 

27Hans L. Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin Wade

(New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1963), p. 188. Cong.
Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1859, p. 713.

 

28Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1858,

pp. 714-17.

 

63

by pointing out that Congress had the power to dispose of
the public lands in any way it.<:hose. He also denied
that the western public land states would be ruined or
owned by the older states because the total amount of scrip
was not large and could be chosen only by individuals not
by a state itself.29
On the following day, the opposition stOpped the
Agricultural College Act, but its victory was temporary.
By a single vote, a motion to recommit the bill to'the
Committee on Public Lands was carried. But, on February 3,
Senator William M. Gwin Of California inexplicably changed
his mind and moved to reconsider. With Gwin's vote Wade
was able to bring the bill before the Senate again.30
Following the defection of Gwin, the Agricultural
College Act moved quickly toward passage. The Committee
of the Whole reported the bill to the Senate with only
minor amendments. Even though the vote was postponed over
the weekend and Clement C. Clay of Alabama made a final
plea of unconstitutionality, the Agricultural College Act

passed the Senate by a vote of 25-22 on February 7, 1859.‘31

 

29Ibid., pp. 722-23. Jacob Collamer was so
respected by His constituents that his statue was
included, along with Ethan Allen's, as Vermont's con-
tribution to Statuary Hall in the National Capitol.

3°lbid., pp. 734, 784.

31Ibid., pp. 784-86, 851-57.

64

Morrill hOped to procure the needed presidential
approval for his bill deSpite rumors of a veto. Precedent
was on Morrill's side since the veto had rarely been used.
He also received some support from the Democratic press,

such as, the Burlington (Vermont) Sentinel. The editors

 

stated that Morrill's bill was worthy of enactment and they
hOped it would not get the rumored veto. In addition,
Buchanan's record gave Morrill reason to hope for his
approval. In 1827 Congressman Buchanan had voted in favor
of a bill to supply an endowment for a deaf and dumb
asylum in Kentucky.32
Morrill's hopes were dashed when Buchanan vetoed
the Agricultural College Act on the grounds that it was
both inexpedient and unconstitutional in six ways.
Buchanan insisted that the bill, passed at a time when the
treasury was low, would deprive the government Of revenue
needed in the next year by flooding the land market. The
bill would endanger relations with the states due to the
unwarranted interference by the federal government. The
scrip would cause a monumental injury to new states because
Speculators would grab the best lands and hold up legiti-
mate settlement. Despite good intentions this grant could

not help agriculture since the states probably would not

fulfill the contract and could not be coerced. This grant

 

32Burlington Weekly Sentinel, Feb. 11, 1859. True,
Agricultural Education, p. 183.

 

 

65

could unjustly injure struggling literary colleges. Both
agriculture and education would be better served by estab-
lishing agricultural professorships at existing colleges.
Finally, the President said, it was unconstitutional both
to appropriate money to aid education in a state, this
grant being simply money in a different form, and to
dispose of the public lands by outright gift.33

Morrill immediately denounced Buchanan's veto as
a blunder if not a crime. He said that the president had
flaunted the will of Congress and of the people, many of
whom petitioned for the bill. Morrill claimed that all
of the past presidents, especially Washington, would have
signed his bill.

Next, Morrill refuted each point the president had
made. He said that revenue would not be lost during the
coming year because two years would be needed to settle
details. After that time the land sales would not have any
more effect than the military bounties, which did not
diminish revenues. The bill would not blur the federal-
state division of powers since the states had been made
trustees in the act. Nor would the bill harm the new
states. Equal justice was done to all by the provision
for a reevaluation after the 1860 census. Should the scrip

devalue the land the new states would be better Off because

 

33Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1858,

pp. 1412-13.

 

66

they could hold their lands while the Old states sold the
scrip. Lastly, Morrill insisted, the erroneous logic of
the veto was most clearly exhibited in Buchanan's support
of agricultural professorships for, if the colleges were
unconstitutional, so must be the professorships.

The veto, Morrill concluded, was simply a partisan
move. Had a Democrat proposed a land grant bill for almost
any purpose, Buchanan would have signed. It was only
unconstitutional for an opposition member to suggest giving
away public lands no matter how worthwhile the cause.34

Editorial comment on the veto was divided. The

Republican New York Tribune strongly condemned Buchanan's

 

reasoning. On the other hand the Washington Evening Star

 

and the New York Times praised the president's wisdom and

 

courage.

The Tribune, theorizing at length, claimed that the
real reason for the veto was that Buchanan was a puppet of
the Slave power. Since he was their creature and instru-
ment, he would destroy any measure they opposed, such as a
bill for the education of labor. The slave power felt
threatened by a suggestion to unite mind and muscle so they
ordered Buchanan to veto the Agricultural College Act.
Buchanan would gladly Sign a bill granting lands for a

project that the slave power approved.

 

34Ibid., p. 1414.

67

Buchanan's stated reasons, said the Tribune,
especially regarding financial loss, were foolish on
several counts. First, holders of land warrants had under-
sold the government for ten years with no loss to the
Treasury. Second, many states would hold land until prices
rose as others who had received land grants had done.

Even if the states did not hold land the amount appro-
priated was not large enough to ruin the market. Finally,
the editors claimed, Buchanan was talking in circles when
he expressed fear Of dumping land and of speculators in
the same message. The speculators would not enter a
flooded market. Buchanan's villains were simply
strawmen.35

The Evening Star came out bluntly in support of
Buchanan. Its editors agreed 100 percent because
Buchanan's message contained an able treatise with in-

36

controvertible arguments against the bill.

The opposition of the New York Times was more

 

unexpected because a few years earlier it had supported a
free agricultural college in New York. At that time,
using many of the same arguments that Morrill used to
support his bill, the Timgg said that education should be
provided for the workingmen. Yet, three years later, the

Times disagreed only with the language of the veto message,

 

35New York Tribune, March 5, 1859.

 

36Washington Evening Star, Feb. 28, 1859.

 

|.0 l‘.lllne[ [.1 .‘l' I.“ 4‘1le [IT I‘D-‘0’ 1‘ [LII

 

‘1' )IIIITl‘ [Ill ’11 ll. ll..[ II.)

68

while making the point that the President showed courage
and rendered a service to the nation. The editors
especially noted that the federal government could not
provide schools for only one group, the farmers, even if
it was the largest in the nation.37 Apparently the 21233
favored agricultural colleges only when established by
individual states.

Morrill was undaunted after one battle, but a
presidential veto prevented any real chance to pass the
Agricultural College Bill until a new president took
office. Nevertheless, Morrill introduced his bill to the
36th Congress. The bill was referred to the Committee on
Public Lands and never reappeared.38

Toward the end Of Abraham Lincoln's first year as
president, Morrill introduced his revised Agricultural
College Act. This bill was nearly identical to the one
vetoed four years earlier. The major differences were an
increase in the land granted to thirty thousand acres per

member of Congress and a provision for the teaching of

military tactics.

 

37New York Times, Jan. 23, 1856 and March 1, 1859.
After the colleges were established the editors became
very favorable. They suggested that young men could
prepare for more useful lives in them than in the Armed
Services' Academies. New York Times, May 5, 1867.

 

 

38Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,

 

p. 793.

69

Despite the Republican majority in the Committee
on Public Lands, the Land Grant College Bill became
stalled because of Western Opposition. It was not reported
back for eighteen weeks, and, when it was returned on
May 29, the committee suggested rejection. The long delay
prompted Morrill to have Benjamin Wade introduce an
identical bill in the Senate.39

In contrast to the bill's lack of progress in the
House, Senate action was remarkably swift, only forty days
elapsing between the introduction of the bill on May 2 and
its passage. Two weeks after his committee received the
bill, Senator James Harlan of Iowa reported it with minor
amendments but without recommendation. Wade then managed
a rapid floor consideration.4o

On May 21, Senator James H. Lane of Kansas made
the main speech in Opposition which was directed at the
land distribution clause, not against passage of the act.
He feared that Kansas, the newest state, would see all its
choice lands claimed by outsiders before it even exercised
its admission option to reserve school lands. To prevent

that catastrOphe, Lane prOposed that all agricultural

college scrip be located in the territories.

 

39Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 99, 2432.

 

4°Ibid., pp. 1935, 2160, 2187.

70

Wade replied that the federal government had been
very generous with Kansas, and it was the state's re-
sponsibility to choose school lands quickly. He denied
Lane's implication that a state had a right to the public
domain within its borders. The land belonged to the United
States to be diSposed of at the pleasure of the
government.41

Senator Harlan of Iowa, another public land state,
made a speech three days later in rebuttal of Lane.

Harlan pointed out that their states should not be selfish
because they had received vast tracts of the public domain
and ought not to begrudge the old states a Share. He

added that Senator Lane's fear was groundless because,

even if all the scrip was located in Kansas, the state
would have immense acreage remaining and also because
choice land was available in other states and territories
of the West.42

The vote on the Land Grant College Act was taken
June 10 after Senator Lane made a final effort to protect
his state. Lane asked for an amendment limiting the
amount of land to be claimed in any one state to one
million acres. Wade accepted the amendment and the bill

passed by a large majority, 32-7.43

 

41 42

Ibid.’ pp. 2238-39. Ibid.' pp. 2328-29.

43Ibid., pp. 2625, 2634.

71

While his Agricultural College Bill was in the
final stages before passage in the Senate, Morrill was
finally able to Speak in the House on the need for its
immediate enactment. He explained that, even though he
himself had often urged postponement Of many worthy bills
until after the war, this bill was twenty-five years over-
due and deserved to pass on its own merits. It would, he
said, provide an educational Opportunity to the discharged
soldiers and the rest Of the agricultural and industrial
classes.

The major change from the bill passed in 1858 was
the provision for military training. Morrill said that:

Something of military instruction has been incor-

porated in the bill in consequence Of the new con-
viction of its necessity forced upon the attention
of the loyal states by the history of the past
year. . . . The national school at West Point may
suffice for the regular Army in ordinary years of
peace, but it is wholly inadequate when a large
army is to be suddenly put into service . . . each
state must have the means within itself to organize
and officer its own forces.44

In his primary appeal for support Morrill stressed
that the nation could easily afford the land but could not
afford the consequences of continued agricultural neglect.
He pointed out that:

There were, September 30, 1861, of surveyed

public lands 134,218,330 acres, the unsurveyed
being many times greater. Of these lands it is

 

44Ibid., p. 256 Appendix. Morrill makes his
position in favor of the military training very clear in
Morrill to Charles Curtis, Apr. 30, 1877, Morrill Papers,
Reel 31.

72

prOposed to donate to the States for these

colleges, if all should accept the conditions,

about 9,000,000 acres. . . . We have now abandoned
the public lands as capital, with the design Of de-
riving a larger revenue from those who may settle
upon them and make them fruitful. And here these
land colleges come in aid of the plan of improving,
not only the new lands, but also the Old, and thereby
extending the basis of taxation and revenue. . . .

I attempted to show, [in 1858] by the facts of the
census of 1850, compared with those of 1840, including
other State returns, that there was a constant and
widely prevailing diminution of crops per acre under
our go-ahead system of farming. . . . I regret to say,
the retrograde march of agriculture, and . . . the
positions heretofore assumed have only too much
support in the census of 1860. . . .

These colleges, founded in every State, will
elevate the character of farmers and mechanics,
increase the prosperity of agriculture, manufactures,
and commerce, and may to some extent guard against
the sheer ignorance of all military art which
Shrouded the country, and especially the North, at
the time when the tocsin of war sounded at Fort
Sumter.45

With the help provided by Senator Wade, Morrill
was able to bypass the roadblock on his bill in the House
and get it enacted into law. On June 17 Morrill called
up the Senate version of the Land Grant College Act and
explained that it was identical to the long delayed House
Bill. The House agreed to consider the Senate bill.
Brushing aside weak opposition, Morrill pushed a final
vote, and the bill passed. President Lincoln signed the

Land Grant College Act July 2, 1862.46

 

45Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,

pp. 257-59 Appendix.

 

46Ibid., pp. 2769-70, 3062.

73

Morrill was proud of his accomplishment, and
during the crucial early years he maintained a close
paternalistic watch to prevent action which would harm
the develOping colleges. The first attack occurred in
1864 when Representative William S. Holman of Indiana
unsuccessfully tried to amend a bill which allowed
additional time for states to accept the provisions of
the Land Grant College Act. Holman proposed that a
state be permitted to divert the fund to educate war
orphans. Morrill angrily retorted that such a move
would eviscerate the original bill without reason since
war orphans were the most likely beneficiaries Of the
Agricultural Colleges.47 A second challenge was raised
in 1869 by George F. Hoar, a congressman from Massachusetts.
He prOposed establishing a national system of common
schools if the laggard states did not act first. Morrill
Opposed this bill because the funds would have come from
land sales. Such competition would lessen the possibility
of such monies going to the Agricultural Colleges.48
Obviously, the Land Grant College Act was a success that

Morrill intended to follow up.

 

47Cong. Globe, 38th Congo: lSt Sess., 1864,
pp. 1284, ' .

48

George F. Hoar, Autobio ra h of Sevent Years
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), I, 265.

74

Managing the passage of the Land Grant College Act
was very difficult, an exhibition of great parliamentary
skill. Few bills have ever passed Congress without a
Single favorable committee report. Of course, Morrill
had the support of a majority in each House, but more than
that was needed. The Houses of Congress usually follow the
advice in committee reports. These committees were com-
posed of men who had become experts in their areas.
Because many unwise bills would gain a majority vote if
placed directly before either House, the committees were
charged with sorting out the many bills which were defec-
tive in some way. Yet, despite the handicap Of negative
or neutral committee reports, Morrill got his bill passed.

The difficulties encountered by Morrill in getting
the Agricultural College Act passed raised the question of
motivation. Constituent pressure, potential advantage,
idealism, pressing need, and many other motives could be
sufficient to cause a man to dedicate himself to pressing
an idea. Usually motivation will rise from a combination
of several causes.

In a representative democracy constituent pressure
has often brought legislative action. Such influence
was felt in this case, but it came in the form of urges
to continue after the bill had been introduced. There is
no evidence that Morrill's constituents ever directly asked

for agricultural colleges. One correspondent did stress

75

the need to improve agricultural methods and suggested the
creation of a Department Of Agriculture to disseminate
information. But, from the time Morrill introduced the
bill, the letters favoring it arrived in substantial
number. Many said it was a grand idea to promote practical
education, while others stressed the more mundane aspects
such as getting a share of public lands for the East.49
Morrill was helped in working for the bill by
many important men, but none of them appears to have been
a motivating factor. Henry Winter Davis, Schuyler Colfax,
and Benjamin Wade all lent their support in Congress.
Presidents J. P. Williams of the Agricultural College of
Michigan and O. P. Hubbard of Dartmouth College and many
other educators lent active support, but none of them
approached Morrill before he introduced the bill.
Actually, prominent people Morrill consulted tended to

be discouraging.50

 

49F. Holbrook to Morrill, Oct. 26, 1857, Morrill
Papers, Reel 35. Holbrook was the war governor Of Vermont.
C. H. Raymond to Morrill, Jan. 14, 1858 and F. G. Cary
to Morrill, Feb. 4, 1858, Morrill Papers, Reel 3.
William C. Kittreayr to Morrill, June 30, 1862, Morrill
Papers, Reel 36. Pliny H. White to Morrill, Jan. 2, 1858
and J. Windsor to Morrill, March 4, 1858, Morrill Papers,
Reel 3. S. Whitcomb to Morrill, Dec. 16, 1857 and John
Kimball to Morrill, Dec. 28, 1857, Morrill Papers, Reel 2.

50Bernard Steiner, Life of Henry Winter Davis
(Baltimore: John Murphy Co.,i1916), p. 161. William
Howard Smith, Schuyler Colfax (Indianapolis: Indiana
Historical Bureau,il952), pp. 99, 114. O. P. Hubbard to
Morrill, Oct. 23, 1858 and Joseph R. Williams to Morrill,
Nov. 15, 1858, Morrill Papers, Reel 4. William E. Sawyer,
"The Evolution of the Morrill Act of 1862" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1948), p. 118.

 

76

Surely, a major encouragement to Morrill were the
existing colleges for practical education. For the most
part those in the United States, such as the Agricultural
College Of Michigan, were small and struggling. But, in
EurOpe there were many flourishing agricultural colleges.
In his speeches on both land grant bills, Morrill referred
to these existing schools as examples Of what could be
done.

Some writers insist that there was only one
important influence on Morrill, Jonathan Baldwin Turner.
Morrill was most certainly influenced by Turner's plan
but there is no evidence in either the Morrill Papers or
the Turner Papers of a Turner-Morrill cooperation as
Turner's adherents claim. If there were any scraps Of
evidence, Turner's advocates, Edmund J. James and Mary
Turner Carriel, would have published them. Both presented
as proof a single letter in which Morrill said "I presume
I recognize Professor Turner, an Old pioneer in the cause
of agricultural education." That letter, dated
December 30, 1861, hardly indicates the existence of an
intimate working relationship of four years standing as
the authors claim. It is on this feeble evidence that

51

both authors rest their case. Actually, Morrill got

 

51Edmund J. James, The Origin of the Land Grant
Act of 1862 and Some Account oijts Author, Jonaihan B.
Turner (Urbana: University OfOIllinoiS Press, 1910),
pp. 28-36. Mary Turner Carriel, The Life of Jonathan
Baldwin Turner (Urbana: University Of’Illinois Press,
1961), p. 144.

 

 

 

 

77

his idea not from Turner alone but from a multitude of
sources.

Professor William D. Sawyer has said that Morrill
claimed that the idea of Land Grant Colleges was ex-
clusively his own. Sawyer read Morrill's statement that
he did not know where the idea came from as a claim by
Morrill of no outside influence.52 That same statement
could be interpreted to say that there was a multitude
of sources for the idea and no single one predominated.

Sawyer strongly denied that the Morrill Act was
any more than a purely political measure. He said that
Morrill's only goals were to gain spoils for the New
England farmers and to benefit the Eastern Republican
party. Sawyer also claimed that Morrill had no concern
for education. He tried to prove these contentions by
pointing out that few of the sentences in Morrill's
Speeches refer directly to education and by claiming
that Morrill had no educational plan prior to 1862.53

The claims of Sawyer are partly correct. Morrill
referred in his speeches to aiding the farmer and gaining
a share of the public lands for the old states. Both of
those goals would very likely benefit the Eastern

Republican party. That there was an effort to secure gain

for the East was indicated by the opposition of the new

 

52Sawyer, "The Morrill Act," p. 116.

531bid., pp. 116, 273-76.

78

Western states, the very states which were to benefit the
most in the future.54
The desire to provide an education for the indus-
trial classes was Morrill's greatest motivation and cannot
be discounted as Sawyer attempted to do. Sawyer ignored
Morrill's lifelong preoccupation with education. When he
claimed that Morrill's floor speeches barely touched on
education, he ignored the fact that very many sentences
deal with education indirectly. Whenever Morrill des-
cribed an agricultural problem and its possible solution,
he was speaking of young men being educated to solve
these problems. Nor was it true that Morrill had no edu-
cational plan before 1862. First of all, that was a
careless error because obviously the plan had to have
been completed by 1858 when the bill was first proposed.
But, the contention was wholly false because Morrill had
a plan as early as 1848. In a letter of that year Morrill
told of his desire to modify the traditional forms of
education. Morrill said he wished to lop off a portion
of the centuries old curriculum and substitute new

55

subjects of more practical value. All he had yet to

plan was the financing through a land grant.

 

54Paul Gates, "Western Opposition to the Agri-
cultural College Act," Indiana Magazine of History,
XXXVII (1941), 109-12.

 

55Morrill to J. Davis, Dec. 8, 1848, Morrill
Papers, Reel 1.

79

Morrill clearly stated his goal to provide
practical education for all who sought it in a speech at
Cornell University in 1883. He said that the active,
energetic, American people needed more than the inherited
systems of Europe, something for daily practical use. He
hoped he had aided large numbers in the professions,
fields, and workshOps to succeed in their vocations and
to become better citizens. Sawyer lightly dismissed this
and other speeches as an old man's rationalizations.56
That fit his thesis, but collapsed in the face of
Morrill's words in 1848.

Morrill worked hard to pass the Land Grant College
Act because he dreamed of educating the industrial classes,
of upgrading American agriculture, and of seeing the Old
states share the public domain. He had the idea for a
new type of college at least by 1848. Some time later he
realized that the new states were getting the entire
benefit of the public lands. It was probably between his
resolution of 1856 and the first bill of 1858 that Morrill
thought Of achieving both goals at once by financing
Agricultural Colleges through a Land Grant. Portions of
the plan probably came from many sources, but the dream
and determination necessary to carry the idea to fruition

were solely Morrill's.

 

56Speech of Justin S. Morrill at Cornell
University, June 20, 1883, Morrill Papers, Reel 18,
Sawyer, "The Morrill Act," p. 116.

CHAPTER IV

THE TARIFF OF 1861

Throughout the history of the United States,
the tariff has been one of the most persistent issues in
American politics. The first Congress enacted a tariff
which nearly all agreed was needed to supply the Operating
funds of the federal government. The first restrictive
trade measures were applied against the British and
French in 1808. Since that time, the level Of the tariff
has been an issue in the political arena.

The tariff controversy centered on the amount of
protection to be granted to domestic industries. While
there were always two extremist groups who advocated
either prohibitive rates or none at all, most men based
their stand on a personal interpretation of the theory of
protection.

According to the theory of protection, if a young
industry's growth was being restricted by such artificial
means as an untrained labor force using complicated new
machinery, a counter artificial barrier, a tariff wall,

was justified. It was assumed that the natural

80

81

advantages of raw materials, cheap power, and a labor
pool were readily available. If any one Of these was
lacking, or if the new industry was so similar to an old
one that a transition could be made, protection was
unwarranted. Of course, supporters of the theory made
allowances for a wide range of opinions on its
application.1

Although protection in the United States had its
birth in the restrictive measures of the Napoleonic Wars,
there were no formal tariff laws enacted until after the
War of 1812. The laws which originated in 1808, by
forbidding Americans to trade with the nations at war,
were in effect, but not in intention, the most severe
form of protection: total prohibition. During the
lifetime of these laws the stoppage of EurOpean manufac-
tured imports encouraged the founding of many new
industries. At the conclusion of the war, however, these
industries were threatened with extinction by British
competition. The same group of leaders who had led the
prowar movement now felt that national pride and security

demanded economic freedom from Britain, and the goal was

 

1F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History Of the United
States (New York: G. P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1931), pp. 2-4.

 

82

to be achieved through a tariff to protect industry. The
Tariff of 1816 set most rates at 20 percent.2

From 1816 to 1824 support for protection increased
slowly but steadily. In the next four years the advocates
of a high protective tariff, then at the height of their
influence, were primarily concerned with nurturing young
industries.3

The Tariff of Abominations, as the South called
the law of 1828, was in many ways a turning point in the
tariff controversy. It marked the high point Of protec-
tion for many years, and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina,
who had supported the early protective movement, now
strongly opposed the legislation. Employing reverse
psychology, Calhoun helped write a bill whose rates,
eSpecially on raw materials needed in New England, were
so high that he expected representatives from that section
of the country to vote with the South to defeat the bill,
and thus deal a mortal blow to the cause Of protection.

But Calhoun miscalculated. The woolen manufacturers had

 

2William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 92-95.
Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 113314. Charles M. Wiltse,
The New Nation, 1800-1845 (New York: Hill and Wang,
1961), pp. 55-58. Taussig, Tariff History, pp. 18-19, 30.

 

 

 

 

 

3Taussig, Tariff History, pp. 23-24. Wiltse, The
New Nation, pp. 103-4. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War,
pp. 106-7, 122-26.

 

 

 

83

united to lobby for high rates and their influence helped
to get the bill passed.4 The defeat of the South on that
vote brought on the Nullification Crisis and marked the
sharp upward turn in sectionalism.

The power of the protectionists was broken for a
decade by the Compromise Tariff of 1833, which provided
for a steady reduction in rates until they reached 20
percent in 1842. Thereafter the rates were supposed to
remain constant, but by 1842 the protectionists had
regained strength and renewed the battle. By that date
the Whigs were clearly identified with a protection policy,
and the Democrats with free trade. The Tariff of 1842,

a protective tariff, was passed under a Whig administra-
tion. The Whig protectionists hOped to consolidate their
position in the election of 1844, but the Democrats won.
Even though the Democrats insisted that the subsequent
Walker tariff of 1846 was a free trade measure, its rates
of 30 percent actually qualify it as a measure of

moderate protection.5

 

4Wiltse, The New Nation, p. 103. Taussig, Tariff
History, pp. 83, 88-89. *Chauncey S. Boucher, The Nullifi-
gatlon Controversy_in South Carolina (Chicago: Uhlver51ty
of Chicago Press,’1916), pp. 5-6. Freehling, Prelude to
Civil War, pp. 132-33, 137-38.

 

 

 

 

5Boucher, Nullification Controvergy, pp. 208ff,
287-90. Coit, Calhoun, pp. 254-561 Freehling, Prelude to
Civil War, pp. 292-97. Taussig, Tariff Histogy, pp. 111-
15. Henry C. Carey, The Harmony of Interests (New York:
August M. Kelley PubliSherS, 1967), p. 6.

 

 

 

 

 

84

By 1840 the credo of protectionism had changed
significantly. The argument that young industries needed
protection was quietly discarded in favor of the argument
that labor in the United States needed protection from the
competition of the pauper labor of EurOpe, an idea pro-
posed by Henry C. Carey, an influential Philadelphia
economist. Carey, an ardent nationalist and strong
advocate of Henry Clay's American System, believed that
the United States would remain an economic colony of Great
Britain until freed by protection.6 During the presi-
dential campaign of 1844, Morrill, a strong nationalist,
became involved in local political affairs, speaking in
favor of both Carey's new protectionist ideas and Clay's
candidacy.7

Economic conditions worked against the protection-
ists in the period following enactment of the tariff of

1846. The economy was so prosperous that, even though

 

6Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The
Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New
York: Oxford UniVersity Press, 1970), pp. 20-21) 36-38.
Taussig, Tariff Histggy, pp. 65-67. Thomas M. Pitkin,
"The Tariff and the Early Republican Party" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1935),
p. 22. For a fuller explanation of Carey's views see
Carey, Harmony of Interests, pp. 227-29.

 

 

 

7Speech of Justin S. Morrill in Orange County,
Vt., June 20, 1844, Morrill Mss., Duke University Library.
Morrill to J. Laurence Laughlin, April, 1883, Morrill
Papers, Reel 36. Morrill's view was strongly supported
by the Vermont Watchman, Jan. 12, 1855.

 

85

they felt the rates were far tOO low, the tariff produced
an embarrassing revenue surplus. The situation seemed to
disprove the usual protectionist claim that low tariffs
brought hard times. By 1857 nearly all factions, including
manufacturers, agreed that a lowering of rates was
necessary.8

On February 5, 1857, during the debate on the
tariff, Morrill made a speech in which he agreed that the
rates had to be reduced and the embarrassing Treasury
surplus ended. He said that an overflowing Treasury was
as bad as an empty one because it allowed wasteful
dissipation.

The basic premise of tariff theory, according to
Morrill, was to provide revenue for the government and
moderate incidental protection favoring native industry
and labor. In addition, the protection granted should be
levied in specific duties since the ad valorem type
encouraged cheating and required too many assessors.9

Having explained his personal view of protection,

Morrill got to the heart of his speech, which was a

 

8Pitkin, "Tariff and Early Republican Party,"
pp. 10, 29. Roy F. Nichols, The Stakes of PoweE, 1845-
1877 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), p. 64. Taussig
denied the basic premise. He felt too many factors were
involved to blame economic conditions on the tariff.
Good and bad times alternated regardless of the type of
tariff in effect. Taussig, Tariff History, pp. 118-21.

 

 

9Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1857,
p. 225 appendix.

 

86

strong statement favoring protection for the wool growers
of Vermont:

My constituents . . . do not come here as
suppliants. DO what is just and prOper for the
whole Union. . . . Those who urge that wool should
be admitted free of duty . . . assert . . . that the
home manufacturer cannot prosper because he cannot
obtain wool as cheap as the foreign manufacturer. . . .
[If wool is free the result] likely to occur, would
be . . . American wool-growers abandoning the
business. . . . 'Their [the manufacturers'] domestic
sources for supplying the raw material would be cut
off and they would speedily be at the mercy of 10
foreign production and foreign legislation. . . .

Morrill concluded his Speech with a bid for
Southern support by insisting that the duty on sugar be
retained:

The question of repealing the duty on sugar I
suppose is to be pressed upon us. . . . We have
held out inducements to the sugar planters in the
South to make heavy investments for the production
of sugar. . . . For the last year or two unpro-
pitious seasons have largely reduced the crop. . . .
They [sugar growers] hope to recover . . . and yet,
while they are crushed to the earth by an inhOSpitable
season . . . it is prOposed to mock them by an
entire withdrawal of what was not begrudged them in
the dawn of their prOSperity.11

Morrill said that Congress had to support a
program of moderate protection to make the United States
as self sufficient as possible. The proposed bill with

the suggested amendments on wool and sugar would achieve

 

10Ibid., pp. 225-27 appendix.

11.Ibid., p. 228 appendix.

87

the goal. He promised to vote for the bill if so
amended.12
While the tariff measure was moving through
Congress, Morrill first won and then lost his bid to
protect the wool growers. He successfully proposed that
only wool worth less than ten cents per pound be imported
duty free and that shoddy and pelts be excluded from the
free list. In keeping with his promise, Morrill voted
for the House version of the tariff. But the Senate
quickly struck out the clause on shoddy and pelts and
raised the upper limit on free wool to a value of twenty
cents per pound. After the committee of conference agreed
on the Senate version, Morrill voted against the Tariff
of 1857.13
Unfortunately, the Tariff of 1857 proved to be
very badly timed since the national economy soon plunged
into a depression which rendered the new tariff woefully
inadequate to meet the Treasury's revenue needs. The

industrialized Northeast was particularly hard hit. In the

South the crisis had much less effect for the cotton

 

12Ibid., Morrill found support for his position
in Vermont. E. P. Walton to Morrill, Feb. 9, 1857,
Morrill Papers, Reel 2.

13Con . Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1857,
pp. 749, 791, 971. Senators Jacob Collamer and Solomon
Foot and the rest of Vermont's delegation also voted no.
Pitkin, "Tariff and Early Republican Party," p. 51.

James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (Norwich, Conn.:
Henry Bill Company, 1884), I, 197.

 

88

market held firm. Attempts were made in the next Congress
to alleviate the situation. In the second session of the
35th Congress, the Committee on Ways and Means reported
two bills. One by John S. Phelps of Missouri simply
prOposed reverting to the higher 1846 rates in order to
realize more revenue from the lower volume of trade until
the economy righted itself. Morrill, who had just taken
his permanent seat on the Ways and Means Committee, drew
up the other bill, which both modified the tariff and
authorized a loan as means to secure needed revenue.
Both proposals were defeated, leaving the act of 1857
unchanged.l4
During the next years many peOple began to see
protectionism as the weapon needed to break the depression.
Supposedly, it would fill the Treasury with revenue while
sparking factory growth and an increase in employment.

Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, and

 

Henry C. Carey appointed themselves spokesmen for those

15 Behind those leaders

demanding a protective tariff.
were many other citizens who supported an upward revision

Of the tariff. Morrill received many letters from

 

l4Allen Nevins, The Emeggence of Lincoln (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), I, 356-57. Cong.
Globe, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1859, p. 1409.

 

15Samuel Rezneck, "Depression and American

Opinion, 1857-59," Journal of Economic History, II
(May, 1942), 17.

 

89

constituents, some asking for revision, others suggesting
their own plans. For a change Morrill was riding a wave
of public feeling, not moving in front of it.16
By the middle of 1858, when it had become
apparent that the economy was not going to right itself,
the influential New York press began a continuous edi-
torial campaign for tariff reform. Both the Independent
Timgg and the Republican Tribune agreed that increases

were necessary for economic recovery.

The New York Times came out in favor of basically

 

the same type of tariff revision that Morrill later
introduced. The editors strongly criticized President
Buchanan for tinkering with the tariff and for trying to
hide the deficits. They said that the nation did not

need tinkering but real revision which would not create
chaos in trade. Only carefully conceived, thorough, and
permanent revisions would be satisfactory. The Timgg also
strongly advocated a switch to specific duties to end

1?

fraud and to save time and money in administration.

The New York Tribune supported a return to pro-

 

tection as the only means to restore confidence. The

editors admitted protection might not be right in theory,

 

160. Crawford to Morrill, Jan. 5, 1859 and John

Kimball to Morrill, Jan. 12, 1859, Morrill Papers, Reel 4.

17New York Times, Nov. 5, 1858. New York Times,
Feb. 1, 1859.

 

 

90

but the people had confidence that it would work; and it
was that popular confidence which was needed if economic
recovery were to be achieved. Following this type Of
reasoning, the editors condemned the Democrats in Congress
for failing to take the necessary measures in the previous
session, during which both the President and Secretary of
the Treasury had requested increases.18

Since the Vermont Republican Party Organizing
Convention of July 13, 1854, was the first state group to
endorse protection as a Republican issue, it was fitting
that Morrill should be assigned the task of writing the
tariff bill. Protection was made second only to Slavery
in importance when the convention voted in favor of a
revenue tariff with incidental protection. Morrill worked
long hours to prepare such a measure which his party
regarded as a revenue rather than protective tariff.19

The bill, quickly dubbed the Morrill Tariff, was
reported for debate in mid-March, 1860. Morrill said that
it had a triple purpose: to revise the tariff, to

aUlthorize a loan needed to pay outstanding debts, and to

 

 

18New York Tribune, July 10, 1858. New York

Tribune, MarcT $61859. Roy F. Nichols, The Disrujtion
no American Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company,
' p. .

19Francis Curtis, The Republican Partyg1854-l904

New York: G. p. Putnam's Son, 1904), pp. 33-33.
aine, Twenty Years, I, 275.

 

91

pay the treasury notes which the administration had used
to cover deficits. Without delay the House referred the
bill to the Committee of the Whole and took the extra-
ordinary action of having one thousand extra copies
printed.20
Even though everyone seemed to agree that the
tariff was a vital question, few members could keep their
speeches directly on the topic. They spanned the political
issues of the day but dwelled particularly on slavery.
Only Morrill kept to the subject as he justified the need
for a new tariff and then carefully explained its
provisions.21
Morrill began by discussing the loan authorized
in the bill, pointing out that it was needed to pay off
the treasury notes "first issued - December 23, 1857 -
. . . for the relief of a temporary emergency."22 Yet, he
said, this temporary deficit had become permanent, through
Treasury Secretary Howell Cobb had stubbornly refused
officially to increase the public debt by funding the

notes. Since such short-term notes were not included in

the national debt totals, Cobb could avoid political

 

 

20Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,
p. 1231.

ZlIbid., p. 1330.

22

Ibid., pp. 1830-31.

92

embarrassment to his party by continually exchanging new
notes for old ones.23 Morrill condemned this practice
because it was fiscal insanity to continue accepting the
higher interest rates on short-term debts: " . . . it is
time we began to husband our resources and change our
form of indebtedness, so as to impose a lighter burden
on the people."24

The second major topic of Morrill's Speech was
the revision of the tariff structure itself. He reminded
the members of the House that general opinion held the
present law to be inadequate. He asserted that such
leading members of the Democratic Party as President
Buchanan and Secretary Cobb

are apparently willing, within the latitude of a
revenue tariff, to make discriminations that will
promote the interests of the country. . . . The
Secretary of the Treasury [also] very earnestly and
prOperly declares "the idea of increasing the public
debt to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government
should not be entertained for a moment." . . . [Yet]
the public debt has been steadily increasing to meet
ordinary expenses, every year during the present
Administration. . . .

There are certain evils resulting from our
present revenue laws. . . . To enable the Government
to go on even in this from-hand-to-mouth manner, the
people are crammed with foreign goods. . . . No
prohibitory duties have been aimed at; but to place

 

23
41, 193.

Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, II,

 

24Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,

pp. 1830-31.

 

93

our peOple on a level of fair competition with the

rest of the world is thought to be no more than

reasonable.25

In Morrill's view the shift from ad valorem to

specific duties was the most important change in the new
tariff, and he spoke of it as follows:

The revenue will obtain ample compensation for any

loss in imports by the specific duties which will

arrest some, at least, of the fugitives that have so

long escaped through systematic undervaluations.

After a most patient examination, I feel confident

the importations under this bill would produce sixty

million of revenue and not more.26

In conclusion Morrill made bids for the support

of several Special interest groups. He explained that the
prOposed duty on sugar would protect the planters in good
years and bad, that the proposed wool duty would bring
mutual benefit to wool growers and manufacturers, and
that numerous loopholes would be closed bringing aid to
several industries. Finally he asked that the measure be
passed because it would cure the economic problems of
the nation.27

Morrill's bill got welcome support from both

sides of the House aisle. John Noell, a Democrat from

 

251bid., pp. l83l-32.

26Ibid., p. 1832. J. Wiley Edwards to Morrill,
May 16, 1835, Morrill Papers, Reel 5.

27Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,

pp. 1833-31. Robert Schenck to John Sherman, March 30,
1860, John Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. [Herein—
after cited as Sherman Papers.]

 

94

Missouri, said that the bill went a long way toward the
goal of protecting everything American from everything
foreign. Garnett B. Adrain, an anti-Lecompton Democrat
from New Jersey, and Henry Longnecker, a Pennsylvania
Republican, both spoke in support of the tariff bill.
John Sherman, the Ohio Republican who chaired the Ways
and Means Committee, denounced the Tariff of 1857 because
it was hastily written to reduce an overflowing revenue
and resulted in a permanent deficit. He admitted further
reforms were possible but insisted that the Morrill Tariff
was needed immediately to avoid a projected seventy
million dollar deficit.28
Constituents and other citizens praised the bill
as a whole, but pleaded that the duty on their particular
product be altered in their favor. A most poignant
comment was that the changes were basically fair, but
that some of the wording was ambiguous and left lOOpholes

for the unscrupulous.29

 

28Con . Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1860,
pp. 1844-48, 1928-31, 1946-50. John Sherman, Recollec-
tions of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and Cabinet
(Chicago: *The Werner Co., 1895), pp. 183-85.

 

29Joseph Fay to Morrill, May 8, 1860, Morrill

Papers, Reel 31. Henry Bowers to Morrill, March 19,

1860 and J. Washburne, Jr. to Morrill, April 26, 1860,
Morrill Papers, Reel 4. Edward Dana to Morrill, May 3,
1860, Morrill Papers, Reel 31. Israel Lombard to Charles
Sumner, Feb. 21, 1861 and Secretary, Jersey City Pottery
Co. to Morrill, May 8, 1860, Morrill Papers, Reel 5.

95

The major opposition in the House came from two
Democrats, Thomas Florence of Pennsylvania and George
Houstan of Alabama. Florence moved a substitute bill
which would have revived the Tariff of 1846 and raised
the rates without dumping the ad valorem system. Houstan,
who Spoke for the South, disputed Morrill's claims and
insisted that the Tariff of 1857 would produce the needed
revenue if given time to work.30

Morrill promptly refuted the Alabaman's claims
that the prOposed measure was unnecessary and weighted in
favor of manufacturers. He hoped that it would produce
sixty-five million dollars which the old tariff could not
do. He also denied that the new bill was a manufacturers'
tariff, pointing out that the free list contained only
items not made in the country. In addition, Morrill noted
that no factory owner would get a windfall if his raw
materials were now on the free list. Since duties on his
foreign competitors' manufactured goods were also lowered,
potential advantages from selling-price reductions were
neutralized.

Morrill then offered a substitute bill, including
many of the changes suggested by friendly colleagues and
corre3pondents, as an amendment to his original by moving

to strike out everything after the enacting clause. The

 

3°Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,

pp. 1859, I973.

 

96

most important change was made on the wool duty. A three-
level rate structure was proposed for wool: a) wool
valued at less than eighteen cents per pound was to be
untaxed, b) wool valued at more than twenty-five cents

per pound was to be taxed at nine cents per pound, c) all
wool valued between these figures was to carry a duty of
three cents per pound.

DeSpite numerous amendments by the Committee of
the Whole, Morrill used clever parliamentary tactics to
get approval of the tariff bill substantially as he wanted
it. When the final House vote was taken, the Morrill
Tariff passed 105-64;31 but the jubilation was Short-
lived.

All hope for final passage of the bill before
the election of 1860 evaporated when Senator Robert Hunter
from Virginia reported the bill and made a successful
motion to postpone it until the second session. While
speaking in favor of this motion, Hunter explained that
he Opposed the bill, first, because in an election year
the discussion would probably get bogged down in political
considerations and, second, because a tariff revision was

not needed. On the second point Hunter agreed with George

 

3lIbid., pp. 1874-83, 2014-22, 2052-56. John
Sherman later rationalized that he had to intervene in
order to save the bill after Morrill allegedly lost
control of it due to unfamiliarity with rules of the House.
Sherman, Recollections, p. lOSff.

 

97

Houstan that the Tariff of 1857 would soon prove itself
adequate.32

Hunter's successful blocking of the Morrill Tariff
was a Pyrrhic victory; with the bill stalled by Democratic
votes the Republicans had a powerful campaign issue. A
Democratic Party supporter, A. G. Holmes of Philadelphia,
suggested to Hunter that the Republicans did not want the
tariff passed. He predicted that the Republican Party
would lose thousands of votes in the election if the bill
was passed to eliminate the issue. Many adhered to that
party only on the tariff issue and disagreed with its
stand on slavery. Holmes asked if it would not be better
for the Democratic Party to compromise on a lesser issue,
protection, to lay the larger issue, slavery, to rest.33
The advice was probably sound since the tariff was indeed
a key issue in a close election.

When Congress reassembled in December, 1860, the
tariff bill made rapid progress in the Senate, mainly

because the resignations of senators from seceded states

removed many obstacles. On January 23, 1861, Senator

 

32Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,
pp. 2910, 3010.

 

33A. G. Holmes to Robert Hunter, April 3, 1860,
Robert M. T. Hunter Papers, Annual Report of the American
Historical Association, 1916, Vol. II YWashington: A.H.A.,
1916), pp. 312:13. [Hereafter cited as Hunter Papers.]

 

98

James F. Simmons, a Rhode Island Republican, who had

assumed management of the tariff bill, initiated adroit
parliamentary maneuvers, including referral to a select
committee, designed to speed enactment.34

On February 13, Senator Simmons, Speaking for the
bill, stressed the need to eliminate yearly federal
deficits. Simmons explained that the government had
been running an annual deficit of twenty million dollars
for four years, with an additional four million outlay in
annual interest on the swelling national debt. He felt
that counting on the old tariff to cover the deficit when
the economy revived was unrealistic; importations in the
three previous years had been the highest in history and
yet revenue had fallen far Short of needs.

The only way to balance the budget, said Simmons,
was through an equitable increase of tariff rates. He
pointed out that the proposed tariff was fair to all; the
average level of duties increased from fourteen and a half
percent to twenty percent and not a single item suffered a
huge increment. Opposition claims of great jumps in rates,
Simmons insisted, either were based on false information

or were Simply misrepresentation.

 

34Con - Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1861,
pp. 521' 6 " .

99

Senator Hunter counterattacked saying that the
tariff was, in fact, unnecessary, and that in the past
it had been justified only by fallacious arguments. In
regard to the latter point, Hunter charged that Simmons
used, as his basis, three years in which trade deficits
were exceptionally large, thus giving no hint of potential
revenue, and continually overstated the needs of the
government. By means of economy in Operations the govern-
ment could use ten million less than the total amount
which would be realized by the pending tariff. Should
more be needed, Hunter added, incidental increases were
preferable to a general revision. Finally, Senator Hunter
predicted that more fraud than ever would be bred because
the rates were too complicated and set exceedingly high.

Since no one else wished to speak on the measure,
Simmons quickly Opened the floor for amendments. All but
two of the fifty amendments suggested by the Select
Committee were accepted. One amendment, which changed the
sugar duty and put a tax on coffee and tea, was particu-
larly controversial. After the amendments were considered,
the tariff bill easily passed, 25-14.35

When the Morrill Tariff was returned to the House
for concurrence on the Senate amendments, Sherman and
Morrill combined to rush it through. Sherman moved that

it be made a Special order for immediate debate. Morrill

 

3sIbid., pp. 885-905, 1064-65.

100

announced his willingness to accept all of the amendments
except the one pertaining to sugar, coffee, and tea. The
sugar duty was unnecessarily complicated, he said, and
the duty on coffee and tea was unfair because those items
were necessities. The House concurred with Morrill and
asked for a conference committee on that amendment.
Agreement was easily reached in the Committee of
Conference, and that opened the door to enactment of the
bill. A compromise was devised in which the Senate
version of the sugar duty was adopted and the coffee and
tea duty drOpped, and the bill passed both Houses. On
March 2, 1861, President Buchanan, an old Pennsylvania
protectionist who had finally freed himself from dominance
by Southerners, signed the Morrill Tariff.36
The Morrill Tariff was a landmark because of its
lasting economic Significance. James G. Blaine considered
the Morrill Tariff a revolutionary change in the

37

government's financial system. It was surely a pro-

found change in that it initiated specific duties and

 

361bid., pp. 1149-50, 1186-1201, 1248, 1416.
New York Times, Nov. 10, 1858. Henry Pierce to Charles
Francis Adams, April 27, 1860, Sherman Papers. Allan
Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (New York: Charles
ScribnerTs Sons, 1947), II, 4.

 

 

37Walter Crockett, Vermont, ThggGreen Mountain
State (New York: The Century History Co., 1921777111,
378-81. Blaine, Twentinears, I, 278.

 

 

101

laid the foundation for a policy of protectionism which
lasted for decades. The bill was also important
politically for the effect, possibly calculated, that it
had on the election of Lincoln in 1860.

The Democrats left little doubt that they con-
sidered the tariff issue a Republican plot to win the

presidency. Early in 1859 the Democratic Burlington

 

(Vermont) Sentinel called on Democrats to unite and snatch
the tariff issue from the opposition's hands. The editors
predicted that the Republicans would attempt to keep the
issue alive for the campaign.38 Obviously, the best way
to do that would be to launch tariff revision in the House
only to have it founder on the rocks of Democratic recal-
citrance in the Senate. Fearing that ploy, many
Pennsylvania Democrats urged Senator Hunter to let the
tariff pass so that their state's electoral vote would
fall into its natural home, the Democratic Party. Instead,
Hunter decided to hold firm, as Southern and Western

Democrats demanded.39

That was not surprising Since he
knew that Pennsylvania Democrats, including Buchanan,
were staunch protectionists and thus exceptions to the

Party's antitariff mainstream.

 

38Burlington Sentinel, Feb. 11, 1859.

 

39A. G. Holmes to Hunter, April 3, 1860, Hunter
Papers. Nichols, Disruption of Democracy, p. 321.
Sherman, RecollectIOns, p.21867.

 

 

102

Having seen their party narrowly defeated in the
1856 election, Republican party leaders were convinced
that a switch in the electoral vote in several key states,
including Pennsylvania, would carry the coming election
for them. The Republican platform was carefully formu-
lated to appeal to vast areas of the North. Planks were
drafted to draw support from various regions with the
tariff plank aimed mainly at Pennsylvania. The Democracy
had long held the votes of Pennsylvania, but the
depression left those votes Open for bid. The Situation
in Pennsylvania was clearly indicated by the Democratic
reverses in the statewide election of 1858 in which the
new PeOples Party, which was formed around a Single
issue, protection, elected David Wilmot to the governor-
Ship and swept most of the state's Congressional delega-
tion. Pennsylvanians believed that protection was the
only salvation for their industry, and the party which
provided it would get the state's crucial electoral votes.
Conservative Republicans eagerly seized the popular tariff
issue, ideologically more comfortable to them than

antislavery.4o

 

40Reinhard Luthin, "Abraham Lincoln and the
Tariff, " American Historical Review, XLIX (July, 1944),
609- 27. Pitkin, "Tariff andanrly Republican Party, "
pp. 93, 120- 24. Foner, Free Soil, pp. 202- 3. Ten of
the fourteen incumbent Democratic congressmen were
defeated. Nichols, Disruption of Democracy, pp. 236-37.
David Wilmot was the author ofithe "Wilmot Proviso."

 

 

103

The Republican Party found the ideal candidate to
exploit Democratic weakness on the tariff issue, Abraham
Lincoln. Since he was an old Whig protectionist, his
record could be used to swing Pennsylvania into the
Republican column. His tariff record also gained favor
in New Jersey, New England and scattered areas of the
West.41 The final item needed to make the choice ideal
was his residence in another important state, Illinois.
Convinced of Lincoln's ability to win, the Pennsylvania
delegation threw their support behind him at the
Republican convention and helped him gain the presidential
nomination.42

Although protection had been downgraded as a major
Republican economic issue, it was the paramount one in
Pennsylvania and neighboring New Jersey. Protection was
the topic of all the national party figures, including

Morrill, who came to campaign for the national ticket.

The New York Tribune told Pennsylvanians that only the

 

Republicans would establish the protection they needed.

 

41Richard Hofstadter, The American Political
Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 97, 105.
Nichols, Stakes of Power, p. 81. George H. Knoles (ed.),
The Crisis of the union, 1860-61 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1965), p. 6. Nevins, Emer ence
of Lincoln, II, 304. Luthin, A.H.R., XLIX, pp. 60 -l4.

 

 

 

 

 

 

42Reinhard Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 73-74.
Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, pp. 101, 117.
Nichols, Disruptibn of Democracy, pp. 337-38. Pitkin,
"Tariff andEarIy Republican Party," pp. 190-201.

 

 

 

A I I
11‘

104

Pennsylvanians heeded the advice, voted their self
interest, and helped to elect Lincoln president.43

The Morrill Tariff passed after the election, but
the controversy, instead of dying, began anew with the

press taking turns predicting the effects of the new

tariff. The New York Times, in a radical Switch from its

 

position of a year earlier, strongly condemned the bill.
In March, 1860, the Times insisted that the Morrill bill
was a needed revision which raised rates only slightly
and made a welcome shift to Specific duties. A year
later in the midst of the secession crisis, the editors
claimed that the bill was a highly protective measure, a
reckless act at a time when the Confederacy could corner
commerce under a free trade policy.

Other elements of the press, which seemed to have
confidence in the future of the Union, confined themselves
to a calm defense of the new tariff. The New York Tribune
pointed out that the final law was almost exactly what the
Democratic president had requested, a change to specific
duties with only moderate rate increases. The Vermont
‘Watchman was more blunt, pointing out that the tariff was

moderate and obviously good for the United States

 

43Foner, Free Soil, pp. 202-3. Luthin, First
Lincoln Campaign, pp. 195-209. Nevins, Emergence of
Lincoln, II, 298-305. Pitkin, "Tariff and Early
Republican Party," pp. 210-34. New York Tribune, Sept. 29,
1860. John Bell of Tennessee, the Constitutional Union
.Party candidate, also favored protection. Ollinger
Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of
1860 (Baltifiore: file Johns Hopkins Press, 1945), p. 30.

 

«a1
:-
a

v

91Hi\

105

because only the free traders and foreigners were
complaining.44

The controversial nature of the Morrill Tariff
raises the question of why Morrill emerged as author and
manager. In most cases, bills closely tied to a political
strategy are Sponsored by the eloquent party leaders who
seek national exposure. Morrill was not such a man.

Perhaps the main reason that the Tariff of 1861
carries Morrill's name is that it was a natural issue
for a Clay-Whig. Morrill began his active political life
at the high point of the Whig Party, the party of the
American System, which advocated a protective tariff and
internal improvements. Morrill's earliest speeches,
delivered in Clay's presidential campaign of 1844, were
liberally sprinkled with calls for a protective tariff.
While he supported strong industry, Morrill indicated in
his Speeches that he did so out of compassion for the
workingmen. He wanted both farmers and factory workers
to reap the benefits of employment.45 He used the same
language in 1860.

It was strongly implied that Morrill was picked

by the party because he was from a relatively uninvolved

 

44New York Times, March 28, 1860; Feb. 14, 1861;
.March 22, 1861. New York Tribune, April 6, 1861.
‘Vermont Watchman, Aprilil2, 1861.

45Speech of Justin S. Morrill in Orange County,
‘Vt4,, June 20, 1844. Morrill Mss, Duke University Library.

 

 

 

0'

106

state. John Sherman, stating the case a bit too strongly,
said that because Morrill was from a small agricultural
state he was unbiased by sectional feelings or his con-
stituents' interests. Morrill called himself an impartial
juror, rationalizing that he could hold that position Since
Vermonters were so industrious that the revenue system was
a matter of indifference to them.46
While Morrill could be generally impartial, his
campaign for a wool duty proved a solid exception.
Immediately after claiming impartiality, he stated his
Opinion that it would be best if all of the raw material
produced in the United States was used in domestic indus-
try. Vermont had a vocal minority of woolgrowers who
were intent on the manufacturers taking all they could
produce in the future. It became apparent that Morrill
had always planned to protect both present and future wool
production when he bragged in 1866 that he had gotten more
protection for wool at each successive wartime tariff
revision.47

In writing his tariff bill Morrill was also being

loyal to the principles of the Vermont Republican Party.

 

46Sherman, Recollections, p. 183. Cong. Globe,
36th Cong., lst Sess., p. 1974.

 

 

47Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,
p. 1974. Morrill to Edwin Hammond, Feb. 17, 1866,
Morrill Papers, Reel 7.

 

Cx"

F1.

{N

U...

107

From the day of its founding, the state party had
supported a revenue tariff with incidental protection.
Morrill's bill filled the party's prescription.48
The Morrill bill was an important issue in the
1860 campaign, but if there was a conscious Republican
effort to delay its passage, as some party leaders
suggested, Morrill probably had no part in it. Certainly
Republican leaders knew that the tariff was not likely to
pass the Senate, which would give them a good issue in
certain sections of the country. They could have asked
Morrill, one of their best parliamentarians, to push the
bill to the point where delay would benefit the Republican
Party the most: but that would have meant putting undue
stress on an issue which might prove internally devisive
to the party. Besides, Morrill indicated his determination
to do all he could to get the tariff passed in the 1860
session. He wrote Henry C. Carey that he would be willing
to continue the session through the summer (the supreme
sacrifice, considering the heat of Washington), if the

tariff could be pushed through.49 Morrill felt that the

 

48Curtis, Republican Party, pp. 331-33. Blaine,
Twenty Years, I, 275.

 

 

49Henry Winter Davis to Morrill, August 20, 1859,
.Morrill Papers quoted in Luthin, First Lincoln Campaign,
p. 7. Foner, Free Soil, p. 304. Morfill to Henry C.
Carey, June 21, I860, Edward Carey Gardiner Collection,
The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
(Hereafter cited as Gardiner Collection.)

 

.I~ .hl‘ C

4: F \.r.

108

economy deSperately needed aid and that further delay
might prove disastrous.

In addition to having a long standing interest
in protection, Morrill wrote the tariff bill because he
was well suited by experience and temperament to compose
a complicated bill in a turbulent time. Colleagues from
both parties attested to his skill at tariff calcula-

tions.50

Morrill was also qualified because of his
ability to get along with peOple; he could disagree with
others without being personally abusive. Regardless of
how far afield opponents ranged during debate, Morrill
always returned to the issue. Because of his Skill, a

cornerstone of the Republican Party, financial policy

was laid.

 

50John Sherman attributed Morrill's Skill to his
.business experience. Samuel S. Cox, an Ohio Democrat,
‘testified that Morrill had a great ability at tariff
tealculations which helped carry the nation through the
«difficult war years. Samuel S. Cox, Three Decades of
Federal Legislation: 1855-1885 (Providence, R.I.: Reid
Publishers, 1888), p. 75. Sherman, Recollections, p. 183.

 

uh...

CHAPTER V

SLAVERY, FINANCE, AND THE REPEAL

OF RECIPROCITY

Despite the gratifying biennial election results,
returning to the capital was not entirely joyful for
Morrill. Following the example of many members of
Congress, he had chosen to leave his wife behind in the
comfortable surroundings of their spacious Strafford home.
And life in Washington was lonely for a man strongly tied
to home and family. However, in spite of his lengthy
absences and pressing duties Morrill always maintained a
keen interest in affairs at home, frequently inquiring
about the health of his family and about the condition of
the flowers and fruit trees in the garden.1

His decision to go to Washington alone may have
been influenced by his wife's delicate health. Her
condition was probably caused in part by the death of

'their infant first-born son, Justin, shortly after

 

1William B. Parker, The Life and Public Services
of’.Justin Smith Morrill (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1924), pp. 62, 76, 120, 131.

109

110

Morrill's first election. The loss deeply saddened both
parents, and Morrill referred to the boy frequently in
letters to his wife. A few years later, however, they
were able to rejoice in the birth of a second son, James.2

Although Morrill's life in Washington was lonely
he made a number of friends and had congenial surroundings.
He was invited by Senator Solomon Foot of Vermont to join
the "Mess" at Mrs. Curtis's boarding house on Capitol Hill.
In the group were Senators William Pitt Fessenden of Maine
and Jacob Collamer of Vermont. In later years, when the
group moved to Mrs. Shipman's, the "Mess" also included
Senator James Grimes of Iowa, Congressman Elihu Washburne
of Illinois, and Horace White, Washington correspondent

for the Chicago Tribune. The political discussions at

 

meals helped establish lifelong friendships. White
continued to write Morrill on current topics long after
returning to Chicago as an editor of the Tribune. So

close were Morrill and Fessenden that Morrill was pained
years later to find that they were on Opposite sides in
President Johnson's trial. The presence of such companions

eased Morrill's lonesomeness for his family.3

 

2parker, Morrill, pp. 61, 151.

3Charles A. Jellison, Fessenden of Maine (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 140. Parker, Morrill,
pp. 62, 101-2, 114-15. Richard Current, Old Thad Stevens
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1942),
pp. 237-38. Morrill to William Pitt Fessenden, May 10,
1868, Fessenden Family Papers, Bowdoin College Library.

 

 

111

The peak of Morrill's career in terms of service
to his country came during the Civil War. During those
turbulent years Morrill made a personal contribution
toward combating slavery, found time to guide the Land
Grant College and Anti-Polygamy acts to final passage,
and began work for repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty. In
addition, Morrill was playing a vital role in establishing
a financial base necessary to fight a modern war. Without
Morrill's adept handling of his duties on the Ways and
Means Committee during an unprecedented financial crisis,
the war effort and the government could have collapsed.

Morrill's stand against Slavery was entirely con-
sistent with the historical position and contemporary
Opinion of his constituents. Vermonters had a long and
active antislavery history, and their hostility towards
slavery intensified in the years following Morrill's
election. In 1858 the Vermont legislature officially
abolished slavery in the state and provided a jury trial
for alleged runaway slaves. The first law was super-
fluous, but it left no doubt as to the sentiments of

Vermonters. The Vermont Watchman, Speaking for the state's

 

Whig majority, ran a series of editorials Opposed to the
extension of slavery and in favor of a united North to

battle the slave power.4 The Watchman also echoed a

 

4New York Times, Nov. 25, 1858. New York Tribune,
Dec. 9, 1858. See also Wilbur H. Siebert, Vermont's
Anti-Slavery and Underground Railroad Record (Columbus,
Ohio: The Spahr and Glenn Co., 1937).

 

 

 

112

popular northern sentiment when it called John Brown a
saint who sought great good. Vermont, on its record, came
generally to be considered the most radical northern
state.5

The seeds of radical Republicanism germinated
mainly in New England and in rural areas of the West
settled by migrating New Englanders. New England and
eSpecially Vermont, a state almost totally rural, sent
radicals to Congress and returned large majorities for
national Republican candidates. Upstate New York,
Northern Pennsylvania, the Western Reserve of Ohio, and
sections of Michigan and Wisconsin were all settled by
New Englanders and were radical districts. Morrill
pointed out that "almost every free state has its New
England within its border." The name "little Vermont"
given to St. Lawrence County, New York and the presence
of the town of Vermontville in Michigan indicated
Vermont's contribution to this radicalizing migration.
.Although urban areas such as New York City and Cincinnati

were often conservative and Democratic, the New England

 

5Vermont Watchman, Feb. 3, March 10, and Oct. 6,

1854; Aug. 10, 1855; Dec. 2, 1859. Eric Foner, Free Soil,
Free Labor, Free Men, The Ideology of the Republican

Party Before the Civil War (New York: OxfOrd University
Press, 1970), p. 1072 Reinhard H. Luthin, The First
Lincoln Campaign (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964),
pp. 191-92. Ollinger Crenshaw, "Urban and Rural Voting

in the Election of 1860," in Eric Goldman (ed.), Histor-
iography and Urbanization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1941). PP. 54-55.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

113

influence in rural areas and small towns helped create a
firm radical Republican base in the North.6

Justin Morrill, the businessman-farmer from
Vermont, stood firmly with the radicals on the slavery
issue. He fit James Russell Lowell's description of the
radical: one who put the moral issue first in the anti-
slavery movement. Within the radical camp, unity on the
Slavery issue and disagreement on other matters, especially
economic issues, was common. Morrill did indeed differ
with radical colleagues on economic, social, and other
issues. Morrill also held one tenet which was charac-
teristic of party moderates. He strongly believed in
party loyalty--not a radical forte. Thus Morrill would
probably best be called a moderate radical.7

In the Spring of 1860 the moderates in national
politics were rapidly losing ground to the extremists in
the Slavery controversy. Rhetoric became hotter on both
sides. Southern Democrats tried to persuade the party's
national convention to reCOgnize slaves as Simply prOperty,

an action that the moderate New York Times termed

 

 

6Foner, Free Soil, pp. 106-7.

 

7Foner, Free Soil, pp. 104-10, 147, 216. Cong.
Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863, p. 633; 38th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 1864, pp. 2470-75, 2908-9. Parker, Morrill,
53. 57. Hans Trefousse, The Radical Republicans (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 20-26, 1—41.

 

 

114

regrettable.8 In the midst of the controversy over
slavery Morrill outlined to the House of Representatives
the radical antislavery position held by most Vermonters.

Morrill stated his strong aversion to slavery,
his dedication to the Republican principle of non-
expansion of slavery, and his Opposition to any further
territorial expansion of the United States, particularly
regarding Cuba. He declared that he was dismayed by the
course of Slavery in the history of the country since the
Founding Fathers had expected it to wither away, yet
it grew ever stronger.9

Morrill clearly expressed the radical Republican's
fundamental belief that the whole northern way of life
depended on the prevention of slavery expansion. To
explain why Republicans could not agree to the southern-
ers' demand for a cessation of the antislavery campaign,
he declared that "when a people reach that Utopian dream
of the South, where all agitation is banished, and where
all criticism is silenced, they will, indeed, have
reached that perfect equality, that stolid acquiescence,
where property in slaves will everywhere be recognized;

for there all will be slaves." The North, he asserted,

 

8New York Times, April 27, 1860.

 

9Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,
pp . 388-89 appendix.

 

 

115

in company with the entire civilized world, was united
in Opposition to that southern dream.10

Despite his personal hatred of slavery, Morrill
took pains to convince the slaveholders that the only
action contemplated was to be against slavery expansion,
not slavery itself. He said that notwithstanding the
strong antislavery feeling in the North, northerners would
not interfere with Slavery within the states. Indeed,
should a foreign power invade the South to destroy
slavery, the North would honor its constitutional obliga-
tion to defend that section and its slaves. But the
extension of slavery could not be tolerated.

In discussing his opposition to territorial
expansion, Morrill also displayed his intolerance of
social equality. He was convinced that inclusion of
new blocks of foreigners would endanger the American form
of self-government. Southward expansion would be
especially bad because the areas in view were inhabited
by inferiors: "It is not necessary to point out the
fatal defects in the characters of Cubans and Mexicans,

to Show their utter unfitness as associates upon a

 

10Ibid., p. 388 appendix. Foner, Free Soil,
pp. 309-13. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political
Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 119.

.Eiithin, First Lincoln Campaign, p. 221.

 

 

116

footing of equality in the Union." Thus he advised that
Congress abandon annexation schemes.11

In closing Morrill indicated that the North held
no hostile feeling as a result of the South's long domi-
nation of the national government. But he pointed out
that the North's turn had come, and that threats of dis-
union would not prevent the legal transfer of power.
Slavery's time of ascendancy was over; the world clamored
for the end of slavery extension and territorial
expansion.12

Neither Morrill's speech, nor any other, defused
the crisis. After the Democratic Party broke into
northern and southern factions, the road to the presi-
dency lay Open for the Republican nominee. Thus the
slaveholders helped guarantee what they greatly feared,
a victory for Abraham Lincoln, an event which they
claimed would justify secession.

Senator Stephan A. Douglas of Illinois was the
leading candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination

but he had several serious obstacles in his path. His

 

11Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., lst Sess., 1860,
pp. 388-90.

 

12Ibid., p. 390 appendix. Morrill's words help
to prove Roy Nichols's thesis that the lust for power
was the potent force in these years. Roy F. Nichols,
'Fhe Stakes of Power: 1845-1877 (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1961), pp. ix-x.

 

'-

117

strongest support lay with Northwestern delegates who
were convinced that only Douglas could carry their
states. He also had many supporters from the East and
some from the South. However, to most southerners,
Douglas was anathema. They had no candidate of their own
but they did have a proslavery platform to prOpose which

Douglas supporters could never accept. Douglas was also

2.. ‘

opposed by the Buchanan Administration even though he had

stepped aside for Buchanan in 1856. The two men had

 

 

 

subsequently split over Kansas policy and had become
bitter enemies. Finally, Senator Douglas's chances were
reduced Simply by the location of the convention;
Charleston was hostile territory and the galleries cheered
for his Opponents.l3

When the convention Opened, neither side was
seriously concerned about the consequences of a split.
Douglas supporters felt that if a few southern delegations
bolted, Douglas would gain sympathy and an easier nomi-
nation. Southerners expected both a compromise candidate
and compromise platform to be offered as an enticement to
return. Failing that, they hOped that the election would
be thrown into Congress where they might win through

political bargaining. When the split came neither faction

 

13Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American
Demmcracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948),
pp. 156ff, 290-302. Luthin, First Lincoln Campaign,
pp. 120-32.

 

 

118

would compromise and the convention adjourned without
making nominations.

The Democrats reconvened Six weeks later in
Baltimore to make another attempt to hold the party

tOgether. But the divisive forces were too strong. The

 

southerners bolted again when Douglas's managers refused
to withdraw his name. The remainder of the convention
then nominated Douglas. The southern faction nominated

Vice President John C. Breckinridge to carry their
14

 

banner.

In the period between the two Democratic meetings,
the Republicans, manifesting a Spirit of confidence and
unity that was in marked contrast to that of their
opponents, met in Chicago. The supporters of Senator
William H. Seward of New York felt that he was too far in
front to be stopped. But his strength was not broad
enough. The convention turned to the more moderate, and
therefore more acceptable, Abraham Lincoln of Illinois.
Following Lincoln's nomination all party factions quickly
pledged their support.

The campaign of 1860 became a four-party contest
with the entry of the Constitutional Union Party. It soon

became clear that Breckingridge would carry most of the

 

l4Nichols, Disruption Of Democracy, pp. 295-318.

Inlthin, First Lincoln Campaign, pp. 132-35.

 

 

 

119

South and that Lincoln led in the North with its large
electoral vote totals. The election returns showed
Lincoln with less that 40 percent of the popular vote
but with a decisive victory in the electoral college.15
Elements of the northern press strongly criticized

the southerners while still working for a peaceful solu-

tion. The New York Times said that despite the illegality

 

of secession threats, the federal government must wait
for an overt act. In that event, the government would

have to use force. The Burlington (Vermont) Sentinel

 

said that the Southern Democrats had refused to help
nominate a national candidate and must now accept the
consequences.

Talk of compromise was widespread in the weeks
following the election, but the unrealistic conditions
insisted on by the slaveholders required an almost total
abandonment of Republican principles. Constituents of
such free-state congressmen as Sherman and Morrill wrote
to them urging a firm stand. Morrill agreed with a

Vermont Democrat that flexibility was in order, but he

 

15Luthin, First Lincoln Campaign, pp. 136ff.

 

16New York Times, Sept. 19, 1860; Nov. 10, 1860.
Burlington Sentinel, Nov. 9, 1860.

 

 

 

and a N . and
D as -,\.¥ ‘ Q

 

120

17

refused to abandon principle. The New York Tribune

 

urged a policy of no concession to people beaten in a

fair election. Even the moderate New York Times agreed

 

that it was ridiculous to demand that all concessions be
made by the Republicans. Its editors added that if the
southern position remained inflexible, no action Should
be taken.18
The period between Lincoln's election and his
inauguration was marked by uncertainty and confusion.
No one in Washington was quite sure what could or should
be done to meet the challenge of secession. President
Buchanan, who should have provided leadership, vacillated,
being continually buffeted by conflicting cabinet advice
and his own natural reluctance to act decisively. He
finally did little more than send a message to Congress
outlining his helplessness to act. The President's
carefully drawn message explained to Congress that it was
clearly unconstitutional both for a state to secede and
for the federal government to stOp secession by force. In
effect Buchanan left the next move up to the Congress.

Congress made important attempts at compromise

by creating a Committee of Thirteen in the Senate and a

 

l7C. Coolidge to Morrill, March 5, 1861, Morrill
Papers, Reel 30. W. T. Bascom to Sherman, Dec. 23, 1860,
Sherman Papers. Morrill to Stephen Thomas, Dec. 23,
1860, Morrill Papers, Reel 5.

18New York Tribune, Jan. 26, 1861. New York
IfiJnes, Dec. 3, 1860; Jan. 18, 1861.

 

N

121

Committee of Thirty-three, with one member from each
state, in the House of Representatives. On the latter
committee Morrill represented Vermont.

By this time, December, 1860, Morrill was so
convinced of the futility of compromise and the inevit-
ability of war that he tried to avoid serving on the ‘
Committee of Thirty-three. He was also concerned about ‘i
potentially harmful political consequences, so he

suggested that a retiring colleague take his place. He :1

 

agreed with Lincoln and the majority of the party that the ”
only compromise satisfactory to the South would require
complete surrender of Republican principles. That was
unthinkable--to Morrill, to Lincoln, and to the majority
of the party. Morrill believed that the slaveholders

were bent on reestablishing slavery in the North, and thus
were prepared to reject scornfully any proposal that
northerners might offer. Apparently, there was no basis
for compromise. He told his wife that "we must accept the
truth that there is an 'irrepressible conflict' between
our systems of civilization." Morrill appreciated fully
the painful reality of impending civil war, but despite
his feelings he Served on the committee, hoping that some

good might come from it.19

 

19Morrill to Ruth Morrill, Dec. 7, 1860, Morrill
.Papers, Reel 5. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
.1860, pp. 6, 22-23} 61-63. Morrill to Anonymous,
Dean 11, 1860, Morrill Papers, Reel 37. David M. Potter,

 

122

While the select committees of Congress deliber-
ated, the states of the lower South were acting swiftly.
By the end of January it was clear that compromise had

failed in the Senate and was doing little better in the

House. While there was still hope that a compromise plan

might be reported, it was largely an empty hope. Almost
completely ignoring the actions of Congress the South
followed its own path. On February 1, Texas became the
seventh state to pass an ordinance of secession.20

Since Morrill was unable to agree fully with any
member of the Committee, he decided to tell the House
his views on the national situation before the committee
reported. He warned southerners that if they rebelled
the North would fight, but also insisted that there was
no reason to quarrel because the South had no real
grievances. Simple apprehensions and the loss of an
election were not justifications for threats to secede.
Morrill called their attention to the fact that although

the South had long ruled the nation, and had held a

 

Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1962), p. 177. Foner, Free Soil,
pp. 219-24. William E. Baringer, A House Dividing
(Springfield, Ill.: The Abraham Lincoln Association,
1945), p. 194. Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950),
p. 155. Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), II, 361.

 

 

 

0Nevins, Emergence of Lincoln, II, 390ff.

 

 

 

u \l
p, we

123

disprOportionate share of federal jobs, the North had

never issued threats.21
The issue, as Morrill saw it, was to respect the

rights of both sides while upholding the Constitution.

Since to admit the right of secession was to brand the

Constitution worthless, there seemed to be only one way

 

to accomplish both goals peacefully:

If the seceding States desire to quit the Union, and _
to quit it forever, let them prOpose constitutional p,-
amendments for that purpose, and calmly submit them .
to the people. . . . For one, I cannot make what L
appears to me to be concessions, nor consent to

any measure that shall lower the moral and political
standard of the great majority in the North. The
South Shall have its rights; but I am commissioned
to surrender none.2

 

In keeping with what he felt to be a conciliatory
spirit, Morrill announced that, although he had reserva-
tions, he would go along with several of the proposals the
Committee was about to report. The constitutional amend-
ment barring interference with Slavery in the states was
unnecessary, he declared, because no one had claimed the
right to interfere with domestic institutions. To him
even the implication that the Republican Party would
attack slavery in the states where it legally existed was

slanderous. Nevertheless, Morrill said that he would vote

 

21Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1861,

pp. 1005-6. Potter, Lincoln and His Party, p. 97.

 

 

22Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1861,
p. 1006.

 

124

for the amendment in the interest of harmony. He also
had minor mngivings about changes in the Fugitive Slave
Law but felt that the modifications were generally good.
Morrill approved all these suggestions of the Committee
of Thirty-three because they violated no principle of
his.

After frankly stating that he considered the Gulf
states beyond reason, Morrill admitted that he was Speaking
mainly to the border states which he hoped might still be
saved for the Union. Having already offered them the olive
branch, he now tried to expose to them the duplicity of
the deep South. The ideal of reconstructing the Consti-
tution was a sham, Morrill argued. The Gulf states
planned revolution; they intended to mangle the Constitu-
tion until it became unrecognizable. In closing Morrill
asked that all parties try to live under the Union a
little longer.23

When the Committee of Thirty-three reported,
Morrill supported only those recommendations which were
consistent with his personal views. He voted for ten
prOposals that asked the states to put no physical or
legal barriers in the way of slave catchers operating
within the law. As promised, Morrill supported the pro-
posed constitutional amendment. But, he drew the line at

the suggestion to admit New Mexico to the Union under

 

231bid.. pp. 1006-8.

 

 

 

 

film

a.“

ho‘

are

 

 

125

popular sovereignty because it allowed the possibility
of slavery extension. Morrill's votes were in the
majority in each case.24
DeSpite passage of several major recommendations,
the compromise pleased almost no one because it was not
a true compromise. Real compromise occurs when concessions
are made by both sides, and the Southerners refused to
yield a single point. In a Special one-man minority
report, Charles Francis Adams, the delegate from

Massachusetts, said that in view of Southern intransigence

Congress Should do nothing at all. The New York Times

 

agreed with Adams suggesting that the offering of a one-
sided compromise was abject. Southerners thought so little
of the possibility of agreement that many, including the
member who suggested the Committee of Thirty-three,

Alexander R. Boteler of Virginia, refused to serve on it.25

 

24Ibid., pp. 1261-63, 1283-85 and Edward L.

Pierce, MemOlrs and Letters of Charles Sumner (Boston:
Roberts Brothers, 1893), IV, 12. Although Morrill was
more radical on compromise than some party stalwarts, he
was not an extremist. Charles Francis Adams and William H.
Seward were willing to admit New Mexico to statehood with
the possibility of slavery while Charles Sumner would
brook no compromise at all. Martin B. Duberman, Charles
Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1961), pp. 241-41. George H. Knoles (ed.), The Crisis of
the Union, 1860-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1965), pp. 93-94. Nevins, Emergence
QfgLincoln, II, 399-400. David Donald, Charles Sumner
ggd’the Coming of the Civil War (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1960), pp. 368-72.

 

 

25New York Times, Jan. 18, 1861. Cong. Globe,

36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1861, pp. 6, 22-23. Nichdls,
lJisruption of Democracy, pp. 394-95.

 

 

 

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In-

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Q.
4"

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I.‘ 1
l V i
A
':h‘ I
5‘ I
‘ ‘

 

126

Apparently the slave state congressmen were just stalling
while the South organized.

Morrill worked hard to reconcile the Southerners
to the government because he was well aware of the horror
Of war. War was no glorious lark, Morrill felt, and
only a defensive war, fought as the last resort, could be
justified. He even wondered whether the South should have
been left to founder on its own internal discord.

Nevertheless, when the fighting began, Morrill
firmly supported the war effort. He loyally voted for
all necessary troops and funds. He boosted army morale by
making visits around Washington to Vermont troops in their
camps and the wounded in the hospitals. Morrill felt the
pain of grieving soldiers' relatives and aided them when
he could. He continually hoped for an early end to the
war, which he tried to hasten through a resolution calling
upon all of the Northern peOple to unite against the common
foe. This resolution, adopted in the hopeful wake of
Antietam, was swiftly followed by the bloody, bitter dis-
appointment of Fredericksburg.26

Morrill was so involved with financial matters

that he did not take an active part in antislavery work

 

26Speech of Justin S. Morrill before the Windham
County Agricultural Society, Oct. 6, 1865, Morrill Papers,
Reel 50. Morrill to Ruth Morrill, Dec. 15, 1860 and
.Jan. 13, 1861, ibid., Reel 5. Walton's Daily Journal
Uflontpelier), Dec. 13, 1861. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong.,
last Sess., 1861, p. 212. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd
56:88., 1862, pp. 14-15. Morrill to Ruth Morrill, May 7
and 14, 1864 quoted in Parker, Morrill, p. 132.

127

until late in the war when it appeared that the Thirteenth
Amendment would fail in the House. The Emancipation Pro-
clamation was two years old, Sherman was in the Carolinas,
Grant was besieging Petersburg, and yet the interment of
slavery might still be delayed. At that time Morrill felt
compelled to Speak out loudly for freedom. He asked for
passage of the amendment by a large bipartisan vote.
Dismissing the Democrats' objection that control of slavery
was reserved to the states, he pointed out that the people
could cede the power to the federal government. The
Democratic Party, Morrill said, could win a badge of dis-
tinction without abandoning principles since there were
still many issues to divide the parties. He stressed that,
since even the rebels were giving up slavery, a Congress
of freemen could not be left as its sole support. Perhaps
Morrill's plea was heeded because the Thirteenth Amendment
unexpectedly passed. It could not have received the
required two-thirds from the Republicans alone; yet, it
passed with seven extra votes.27

The uncertainty of the passage of the constitutional
amendment indicates that the Congressional Democrats had
been out of touch with national opinion on the slavery

issue. By early 1865 Northern newspapers all across the

 

27Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865,

ppn. 172-74. Allan Nevins, The War for the Union (New
Yorflf: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), IV, 213-14. New
York Tribune, Jan. 7, 1865, Vermont Watchman, Feb. 10'7-
1865.

 

 

 

128

Opinion Spectrum had indicated support for the amendment.
As early as the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation,

the moderate New York Times had urged the end of Slavery.

 

Naturally, the New York Tribune and the Vermont Watchman

 

 

agreed. A surprise was the strong support for the amend-

ment by the staunchly Democratic Washington Evening Star.28

 

It was surely the end of an era.

In Spite of Morrill's long opposition to slavery,
it should be pointed out that he did not believe in
equality of the races. Although he supported the war
effort even to the enlistment of black troops, when the
Negro Soldiers Bill was under debate in January, 1863,
Morrill proposed an amendment which would have placed
black soldiers in a lower caste. He suggested that no
Negro be given high rank or in any other way be allowed to
command white officers or men, and that Negro privates be
paid three dollars per month less than white privates.
Although it was a bitter blow to Stevens, the amendment
passed, and the unequal policy remained in effect for more

than a year.29

 

28New York Times, Jan. 3, 1863. New York Tribune,
Jan. 7, 1865. Vermont Watchman, Feb. 10, 1865: Evening
Star, Feb. 1, 1865.

29Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863, p. 633.
Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York: W. W. Norton
and Co., 1959), pp. 160-61. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong.,
lst Sess., 1864, pp. 2470-75, 2908-9. On Morrill's
devotion to antislavery also see Edward Magdol, Owen
Love'o (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, I967),
Pp. 0-32, 305, 349.

 

 

 

 

 

 

129

In the wake of the mass resignation of slave state
congressmen, Morrill became eligible by seniority for the
chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee but declined
in favor of Thaddeus Stevens. Morrill and Stevens were
both beginning their fourth congressional terms but,
because Stevens's service had been broken, Morrill was
technically senior on the committee by one session. The
offer may have been pro forma because all authorities seem
to accept without comment that the more renowned Stevens
would get the chairmanship since he had been denied the
position of Secretary of the Treasury. However, pro forma
or not, the Offer was made and Morrill was free to take it.
In later years he would assert himself more; but in 1861
Morrill's modest self-appraisal caused him to decline the
powerful and thankless chairmanship, telling his wife
that "the work is very great and I dursn't undertake it."
Four years later when the position was again offered to
him, he accepted.30

As chairman of Ways and Means, Stevens made wise
use of available talent by forming three subcommittees.
Morrill, already reCOgnized as an eXpert on tariffs, was
also given responsibility for the war tax program. Stevens

took appropriations as his own bailiwick and established a

L

30Parker, Morrill, pp. 125, 133. Brodie, Stevens,

pp. 148-50. Allan NeVinS, The War for the Union (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), I, 181-83.

'I'1

C)

r.) .

(I)

130

third subcommittee under Elbridge G. Spaulding of New York
to handle the loan bill.31
During the special session of July and August,
1861, Congress did a commendable job, passing the emer-
gency appropriations as they emerged from the Committee
on Ways and Means. Stevens and Morrill worked in tandem
to secure the necessary bills. Stevens easily managed the
passage of army and navy appropriations to pay the deficits
on all military activity following Fort Sumter and provide
for the next fiscal year. Morrill then guided the milita
pay bill through the House. These bills passed only five
days after Congress convened. However, the influence of
Stevens and Morrill was truly tested on a bill to increase
the army pay four dollars a month. The measure carried a
rider ratifying all the military actions previously taken
by Lincoln and, since the rider was vital, the bill had to
pass. But both Stevens and Morrill thought the four-
dollar raise was too much. Stevens was defeated on a
motion to halve the sum, but the Senate later approved a

bill which included the lesser increase. Morrill and

 

31Brodie, Stevens, p. 172. Wesley C. Mitchell,
AgHistory of the Greenbacks (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1903), p. 45. Robert P. Sharkey, Money,
glass, and Party: An Economic Study of the Civil War
End Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1959), p. 29.

 

 

 

131

Stevens exhibited their power by securing passage of the
Senate version.32
In the regular long session of the Thirty-seventh
Congress (it Opened in December, 1861) Morrill assumed
the duties of floor manager of major apprOpriation bills.
The task required a superior command of parliamentary
skills and constant alertness lest a crippling amendment
be proposed. Morrill performed the task well, securing
passage of a number of apprOpriation bills, including
those for the Post Office, Indians, and Navy, virtually
as the Committee wished. Throughout the war Morrill
managed the appropriation bills with increasing facility.
Only occasionally did a member of the House succeed in
attaching an amendment that Morrill disliked.33
In debate on a number of bills Morrill grasped
the Opportunity to preach economy. During consideration
of a large fortifications bill, several Philadelphia
congressmen proposed additional batteries on the Delaware

River. Since Morrill knew that the bill was already

satisfactory to the War Department, and that one pork

 

32Con . Globe, 37th Cong., lst Sess., 1861,
pp. 77, 448-43, 456-57.
33

Con . Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 931-32, l877. Morrill carried a share of these
duties in the previous Congress. Con . Globe, 36th Cong.,
lst Sess., 1860, pp. 2851-52, 3197-98; 36th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1861, p. 1424; 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1862,
pp. 168-70; 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, pp. 302-7,
321-48, 645, 1072-73, 1417-18.

132

barrel amendment would bring a rash of others, he fought
the proposal and the bill passed without amendment. While
supporting a bill to pay bounties to widows of volunteers,
Morrill failed to get a reduction in the sum which he
felt was overly generous. He also argued for postpone-
ment of the Pacific Railroad and other western public
works until after the war. Morrill pointed out that the
railroad would be unprofitable and that the government
could not afford a subsidy. But a plank on the Pacific
Railroad had been included in the Republican Platform of
1860, and strong support, including that generated by
Stevens, successfully urged redemption of that pledge.
Morrill proved his devotion to economy in the
midst of war when he opposed an increased budget for the
Department of Agriculture in 1864. Morrill asked that
the budget be held at the existing level, explaining that
wartime was inappropriate for vast increases in Spending
within purely civilian Executive Departments. Since the
area of agriculture was known to be close to his heart,
his words should have convinced the most Skeptical critic

of his sincerity.34

 

34Con . Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 380-84, 1833-35, 1708—9 and Statutes gt Large, 37th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862, p. 489. Luthin, First Lincoln

Camgaign, p. 225. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong.,iISt Sess.,
' pp. 1018—19. -

 

 

133

inlthenudst of the crushing workload of war
finance, Morrill made time to work for two more personal
goals. One project was to establish a national statuary
hall in the Capitol, the other to obtain abrogation of
the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty.

In January, 1863, with the North still reeling
from the disaster of Fredericksburg, Morrill affirmed
his faith in the future of the Union by proposing a
resolution that the Old Hall Of the House of Representa-
tives be dedicated as a national statuary hall. He
explained that ever since the House moved into its new
quarters in 1857 the former meeting room had been used
only for storage. Out of his deep respect for those
distinguished molders of the Union who had met in the Old
Hall, Morrill asked that the room be consecrated to the
nation's illustrious dead. Although he correctly assumed
that there would be no real objection, the resolution was
referred to committee where it died.

Morrill, never one to give up easily, reintro-
duced his statuary hall resolution in April of the next
year. He carefully explained that it would cost almost
nothing Since the states would be invited to submit
statues and the necessary remodeling would be paid for

out of funds for the Capitol extension. Assured that

134

they could achieve a dignified end without expense, the
House created Statuary Hall.35
The resulting invitation for each state to send
likenesses of two distinguished citizens met a wall of
indifference. Five years after the invitation was issued,
Morrill was still trying to get some state to take the
lead. Perhaps the state governments Were Simply pre-
occupied with postwar problems, but very likely their
reluctance could be traced to the fact that the states
paid the bill. Eventually, the several states agreed
that the honor was worth the cost.36
The idea of establishing free reciprocal
Canadian-American trade in raw materials first gained
favor in the late 1840's. Several attempts to achieve this
by mutual legislation were lost in the press of business in
Congress. A few years later the British government

empowered Lord Elgin, the Governor-General of Canada, to

negotiate reciprocity by treaty. An accomplished diplomat,

 

35Lonnelle Aikman, We, The People (Washington,
D.C.: The United States Capitol HistoriCal Society,
1969), pp. 87, 94-97. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess.,
1863, p. 194 and 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1864, pp. 1736-37.

 

 

36Morrill to Lincoln, Jan. 25, 1865 and U. s.
Department of State to Morrill, Feb. 3, 1865, Morrill
Papers, Reel 6. Morrill to Governor Claflin of Massa-
chusetts, Jan. 13, 1870, Claflin Papers, Hayes Library..
The first statue, a marble likeness of Nathanael Greene,
'was presented by Rhode Island in 1870. Aikman, 321
.293 People, pp. 97-98.

135

Lord Elgin quickly surmounted the obstacles barring
negotiation and achieved ratification of the treaty.37
During the war years Morrill worked toward the
abrogation of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, a cause
popular in his home state and around the nation. There
was support for abrOgation because the treaty seemed to
work unfairly toward the United States and especially
toward Vermont because of its proximity to Canada. Many
Vermonters had opposed the idea from its inception. In
1852, two years before reciprocity went into effect, the
Vermont Legislature passed a resolution against it.
Generally, early reaction to the Reciprocity Treaty in
the United States was favorable; however, after the
treaty had been in operation for several years complaints
began to arise.38
Dissatisfaction centered not on the idea of
reciprocity but rather on the way the current document
seemed to favor Canada. As written, the treaty was

largely a matter of convenience allowing for mutual ex-

change of raw materials at various points of the border,

 

37Frederick E. Haynes, The Reciprocity Treaty with
Canada of 1854 (Baltimore: American Economic AssociatiOn,
1892), pp. 12-18.

 

 

38Rodney Field to Morrill, Jan. 13, 1863, Morrill
Papers, Reel 32. Gardiner Brewer to Morrill, Dec. 19,
1864, Morrill Papers, Reel 29. Horace White to Morrill,
March 14, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7. Walter Crockett,
:Zgrmont, The Green Mountain State (New York: The Century
History Co., 1921), III, 409. New York Tribune, Feb. 16,
1856.

 

 

136

i.e., Nova Scotian coal to Boston, Pennsylvania and West
Virginia coal to Toronto and Montreal. Yet in the opinion
of many Americans, Canadians violated the spirit of the
treaty by imposing high tariffs on imported manufactured
goods. Thus, while raw materials from Canada flowed
freely, finished products from the United States were
impeded.39
Morrill was forced to go slowly in working to
kill the Reciprocity Treaty because, according to one
provision, notice to abrogate could not be given until
the treaty had been in effect for ten years. Because no
action could be taken until 1865 Morrill contented himself
with occasionally bringing the issue before Congress as
he did in an 1858 resolution asking an investigation of
treaty operations and by complaining in his 1860 tariff
Speech that reciprocity was disastrous to United States
trade.40

The Canadians, who eagerly sought to continue

reciprocity, hurt their own cause by appearing too friendly

 

39Vermont Watchman, Dec. 18, 1863. New York

Times, June 12, 1863; Dec. 19, 1863. Haynes, ReCiprocity
Treaty, pp. 29, 41-51. Charles C. Tansill, The Canadian

Reciprocity_of 1854 (Baltimore: The Johns HOpkins Press,
1922), p. 81. RObin Winks, Canada and the United States

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), pp. 342-43.

 

 

 

40Vermont Watchman, Dec. 18, 1863. Cong. Globe,

35th Cong., lst Sess., 1858, p. 715 and 36th Cong.,

 

 

137

to the Confederacy. Joshua Giddings, the Consul-General
at Montreal, indicated that Canadian attitudes had changed
his favorable opinion of the treaty. He now believed that,
since reciprocity had not won friendship, it ought to be
abolished. To many in the United States, Canada appeared
to be doing little to prevent Confederates and their
sympathizers from organizing such operations as the raid
on St. Albans, Vermont. When apprehended, the raiders
were treated with leniency by Canadian authorities. Such
acts seemed distinctly unfriendly. Perhaps by design
the resolution of abrogation passed on the same day that
Canada freed the St. Albans raiders.41
At the beginning of the Thirty-eight Congress
Morrill introduced a resolution calling for abrOgation
of the reciprocity treaty. He asked that it be considered
a domestic issue and, as such, be referred to the Ways and
Means Committee, where his influence was strongest.
Instead, the House sent the resolution to the Commerce

Committee.42

 

41Joshua Giddings to Morrill, Oct. 29, 1863 in

Justin S. Morrill, "Notable Letters From My Political
Friencs," Forum, XXIV (Nov., 1897), 143-44. Haynes,
Reciprocity Treaty, p. 27. Winks, Canada and United
States, pp. 244ff, 345-47.’ Vermont Watchman, Dec. 23,

. On Oct. 19, 1864, some 23 Confederate soldiers
in civilian dress crossed from Canada to rob and burn
in St. Albans, Vermont.

 

 

 

42Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1863, p. 19.
Haynes, Reciprocity Treaty, p. 22.

 

 

138

Morrill attacked the reciprocity treaty with the
fervor of a man trying to plug a hole in a dike. Because
imports of Canadian goods exceeded exports to Canada, the
difference had to be paid in gold. That was a truly
serious leak in the financial dike of a nation at war.
However, in his speech on January 27, 1864, Morrill
stressed that the most important point was that reciprocity
was unconstitutional. His constitutional argument was
advanced because he regarded it as the best means for
achieving the end he sought--the retention of the taxing
power by the House. Since reciprocity took the form of a
Special tariff within a treaty, he said

commercial treaties, of the character of the
reciprocity treaty, go far to wrest from the House
its prOper constitutional authority, and the
cooperation of the House puts in peril the rule
which is one of the prominent safeguards of
American liberty. So long as external taxation, or
a duty on imports, or so long as internal taxation
or a tax upon home productions, must be resorted to
for the support of the Government, the House of
Representatives had no right to surrender or even
hold in abeyance any part of its legitimate functions
touching the power of taxation. . . .43

In order to build an airtight case against recip-
rocity, Morrill pointed out that it had failed to fulfill
the hopes of its supporters. He claimed that its worst

failure was as a commercial venture because "the ancient

laws of trade have been reversed. While our exports to

43Gong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,

 

p. 3770

139

Canada used to be double our imports, since the treaty
the reverse is true." He insisted that the Reciprocity
Treaty had no chance to succeed because it was badly
written. "What use," Morrill asked "to allow cotton free
from Canada to the United States and grindstones from the
United States to Canada when the flow of trade is directly
opposite."44

Morrill noted in conclusion that the treaty
neither fostered friendship nor hastened annexation.
Canadians vilified the Union and hoped for its defeat as
much as Great Britain did. Annexation was no closer and
Morrill was glad, because in his view the United States
needed neither the people nor the treaty.45

Further action was stalled until May 18 when the
resolution was reported from the Commerce Committee with
an amendment providing for negotiations on a new treaty.
Congressman Elijah Ward of New York strongly defended the
amendment on the grounds that reciprocity could be made

to work. Since the United States would be badly hurt if

 

44Ibid., pp. 378-81.

45Ibid., pp. 381-82. It seems that the most
fervent annexationists were Canadians. Before the treaty
they felt union with the United States was the only way
to retain prOSperity following repeal of the British Corn
Laws, but once reciprocity was Signed annexation agitation
ceased. Southerners supported reciprocity to prevent
annexation. While they were anxious to acquire potential
Slave territory, they had no desire for more free
territory. Tansill, Canadian Reciprocity, pp. 9-19,
76-77. Haynes, Reciprocity Treaty, pp. 10-11.

 

140

all Canadian trade was forced back to Great Britain, Ward
hoped to avoid that eventuality by negotiating a new
treaty based on true reciprocity. Because the House sub-
sequently voted to postpone the resolution until
December, final action on the abrogation of reciprocity
was not taken until the next session. Soon after the
opening of the second session of the 38th Congress Morrill
called for a vote and got his resolution passed.46
Even though Congress had decided to end the Special
trade privileges with Canada, Morrill had to be vigilant
lest some group exert pressure for reversal of the deci-
sion. Since the treaty did not expire until 1866, there
was ample time for its proponents to work, but Morrill and
others prevented action. Morrill continued to oppose any
revival of the Reciprocity Treaty throughout his later
career. In 1874, for example, he wrote Hamilton Fish, then
Secretary of State, that he continued to feel reciprocity
was unconstitutional and detrimental to United States

trade.47

 

46Con . Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,
pp. 2333-38, 3508-9 and 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1864,
pp. 31-33. Haynes, Reciprocity Treaty, pp. 20-22.

47Morrill to William Pitt Fessenden, June 19,
1865, Morrill Papers, Harvard University Library.
Morrill to Hamilton Fish, June 4, 1875, Morrill Papers,
Reel 13.

141

The Congress voted to repeal the Canadian
reciprocity treaty because it had failed and because of
national anger at Canada's support of the Confederate
cause. Reciprocity had been established through the
combined efforts of groups with diverse motivation: one
wished to expand trade, another hoped to foster inter-
national friendship, while others were for or against
annexation of Canada. Most were disappointed. In addi-
tion, many people in the United States felt that
Canadians were hypocritical in opposing Slavery yet showing
sympathy for the Confederacy during the Civil War.48

Morrill led the effort for repeal because he felt
the treaty was a failure and because he apparently was
an AnglOphobe. Since reciprocity had not produced better
trade relations and had usurped the taxation privileges
of the House, he, as a financial expert, refused to condone
it. In addition, Morrill did not hide his distaste for
the British and their institutions. He even opposed the
Northern Pacific Railroad because it might benefit British
North America more than the United States, just as
reciprocity had. In 1865 he strongly condemned a prOposal

to grant cabinet members a voice on the floor of the House

 

48W. Jett Lauck, "The Political Significance of
Reciprocity," Journal of Political Economy, XII (1904),
495-524. New Yorkiiimes, Jan. 17, 1865. Haynes,
Reciprocity Treapy, pp. 19, 56-58.

 

 

142

because he thought a method used by the monarchist British
government had to be unsuited for a republic.49 His
typical Vermont AnglOphobia aside, Morrill had substantial
motivation for his effort to abrogate the Reciprocity
Treaty since it had become the symbol of all that was bad
in Canadian-United States relations.

By the time the repeal of reciprocity was
achieved, Morrill had become reconciled to the peOple's
determination to keep him in Washington. Although he had
attempted to retire a number of times, especially in 1863,
on each occasion he was overwhelmingly renominated and
reelected.50

In the Spring of 1863 Morrill made plans to retire

from Congress, content that his work was done. Convinced

that every man strives to leave the basis of future

 

49Morrill to Henry C. Carey, Nov. 14, 1863,
Gardiner Collection. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess.,
1864, pp. 2293-99; 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, pp. 421-25.
Haynes, Reciprocity Treaty, p. 22. Morrill's argument that
such a treaty was unconstitutional was first made by
President Zachary Taylor and Secretary of State John M.
Clayton in 1849. Tansill, Canadian Reciprocity, pp. 25—26.

 

 

50T. D. Seymour Bassett, "Nature's Nobleman:

Justin Morrill, A Victorian Politician," Vermont History,
XXX (Jan., 1962), 11-12. R. W. Clarke to Morrill,

April 16, 1860, Morrill Papers, Reel 30. Peter L.
Washburn to Morrill, July 27, 1860, Morrill Papers,

Reel 40. Henry Winter Davis to Morrill, Aug. 1, 1860,
James Hawley to Morrill, Aug. 6, 1860, James Harvey to
Morrill, Aug. 8, 1860, and W. Sweatt to Morrill, June 2,
1864, Morrill Papers, Reel 5. Charles Sumner to Morrill,
Sept. 11, 1864 in Morrill, "Notable Letters," Forum,

XXIV, 278-79.

 

143

reputation behind him, Morrill felt that in the tariff,
internal revenue, and land grant college bills his work
was concluded. Worn out from the rigorous wartime labor
on the Ways and Means Committee, he longed to return to
the quiet life of a gentleman farmer that he loved.51

Many people ignored Morrill's intention to
retire and worked to see that he succeeded himself again.
In general, he had the strong backing of constituents,

congressional colleagues, and the press. However, one

newspaper, the Bellows Falls (Vermont) Argus, accused

 

him of faking retirement to drum up votes as he had done

before. Despite that sour note, Morrill accepted a draft

and served again.52
Morrill's past election strategy gave some

foundation for the suspicions of the Argus. Each of

 

51Justin S. Morrill, Self-Consciousness of

Noted Persons (Cambridge: John Wilson and Co., 1882),

p. 184. Morrill to Portus Baxter, June 4, 1863, Morrill
Papers, Cornell University Library. Morrill to O. P.
Chandler, June 26, 1863, Morrill Papers, Reel 30. Morrill
to Voters of Second District, April 27, 1863, Morrill
Papers, Reel 5. The 1862 election was postponed until
September, 1963, due to the war, Parker, Morrill, p. 153.

 

52C. M. Stone to Morrill, June 24, 1863, Morrill

Papers, Reel 39. Elihu Washburne to Morrill, May 30,
1863, Henry Winter Davis to Morrill, Aug. 11, 1863, and
Schuyler Colfax to Morrill, Oct. 5, 1863, Morrill Papers,
Reel 5. Brattleboro (Vermont) Phoenix reprinted in
Vermont Watchman, May 22, 1863. Bellows Falls Argus,
Jan. 15, 1863, Morrill Papers, Reel 49. Vermont
Watchman, Sept. 4, 1863.

 

 

144

Morrill's election campaigns began with an offer to
retire and ended with his reelection by an ever-increasing

margin.53

With the exception of 1863, the regular letter
of intent to retire was largely a device to wake up his
complacent supporters and get them out securing convention
votes. At the same time Morrill probably would have quit
on any occasion that a serious intraparty fight seemed

imminent. Basically, offering to step down was an

effective electioneering technique.

 

53Bassett, "Nature's Nobleman," 11-12.

CHAPTER VI

THE TARIFF AND THE CIVIL WAR

Although the Morrill Tariff of 1861 was not designed
to be a war tariff, it served as a base for the war re-
visions. Since this law entailed an overhaul of tariff
structure in the switch to specific duties, further major
changes were unnecessary. Basically, Morrill had only to
tighten up the language in order to eliminate a few
inequities and formulate a rational schedule of rate
increases.

When Congress convened on July 4, 1861, for the
special session called by President Lincoln, Morrill was
reluctant to tamper with the tariff law which he had
worked long hours to perfect. Visits to the customs
collectors in Boston and New York had confirmed his feeling
that the tariff was working well and needed only to be
amended to increase rates. But a meeting with Secretary
of the Treasury Salmon Chase convinced him that the
Secretary favored a return to the ad valorem system. Both

to prevent losing the Specific duties, and to meet the

145

146

dire need for money, Morrill agreed to COOPerate with
Chase in drafting a new bill almost identical in form to
the existing law but with substantially increased duties.1
The gathering of Congress, members arriving inter-
mittently, singly or in small groups, was perhaps symbolic
of the disorganization accompanying the rallying of the
North. The national situation had been utter chaos in
the first weeks after Fort Sumter; it was better by early
July but far from organized. Under President Lincoln's
proclamations, volunteers had swelled the army from 16,000
to 186,000, assuring the safety of the capital city. At
army headquarters plans were being made for the defense
of Washington and for the initiation of offensive opera-
tions. The War and Navy Departments were struggling to
organize the letting of hundreds of contracts, the recruit-
ing of thousands of men, and the transporting of everything.
Treasury Secretary Chase's painstakingly drawn estimates
of costs quickly proved inadequate. Despite this situation
of confusion and uncertainty, Congress had to legislate
for future needs.2

While the North was still organizing for war,

pressure for offensive action by the great host encamped

 

lMorrill to Henry C. Carey, July 6, 1861, Gardiner
Collection. Francis Curtis, The Republican Party 1854-
1904 (New York: G. P. Putnamis Sons, 1904)) pp. 526-27.

 

2Allan Nevins, The War for the Union (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), I, l48ff.

 

147

around Washington became unbearable. Early small unit
successes had fed the hope of a swift victory. Critics
demanded that the army move South and destroy the enemy
in a single blow: "Forward to Richmond" became their cry.
Thoughtful observers, aware of the difficulties involved
in military preparations, deplored that heedless attitude.
Morrill lamented "the senseless cry of 'On to Richmond!’
'Only show the Stars and Stripes and they will runl'" He
feared that the public clamor would force General Scott
to move before the army was fully prepared for an assault.
Although Morrill hoped for a Short war, he knew that no
single battle by an ill-prepared army would suffice.3

While the new tariff and other financial proposals

were being drafted, the New York Times published a long

 

editorial on war finance. The editors felt that a plan to
finance military expenses through loans was justified, but
that the ordinary expenses of government and the interest
on the debt had to be raised through taxation. The loans
must then be repaid from peacetime surpluses as rapidly

as possible, but, the editors insisted, the government
would have to be realistic about the repayment period.

For example, there should be no promise to pay in a Short

time, such as three years, because that would be impossible

 

3Morrill to Ruth Morrill, July 20 and 22, 1861
quoted in William B. Parker, The Life and Public Services
9; Justin Smith Morrill (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1924), p. 126. Nevins, War for the Union, I, 211-14.

 

 

148

in the event of a long war, nor should there be a plan to
pay in a single generation because the loans would be too
large. As an alternative the editors of the Timgg suggested
that the debt be distributed over a period as long as fifty
years so that posterity might bear its share of the cost.4
On July 16 Chairman Thaddeus Stevens of the
Committee on Ways and Means reported the new tariff and
moved for immediate consideration. The proposed tariff
was basically the same as the Morrill Tariff but with pro-
visions designed to increase revenue. Coffee and tea,
previously on the free list classed as necessities of life,
were now to carry duties of five and fifteen cents per
pound respectively. Besides the general increase in rates,
the new tariff Sharply raised the duties on luxury items
such as distilled liquors, wines, sugar, and cigars. In
addition, Since revenue was the goal, prohibitive rates on
iron, steel, and a few other items were lowered. The bill
was referred to the Committee of the Whole and made a
special order for the following day.5
The tariff was given priority on July 17, but

Stevens's hope of immediate passage was frustrated.

Although the debate was limited to one hour, several

 

4New York Times, July 15, 1861. See also Walton's
Daily Journal (Montpelier), July 24, 1861.

5Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., lst Sess., 1861, p. 152.

New York Times, July 17, 1861.

149

serious challenges arose. Clement L. Vallandigham, a
Democrat from southern Ohio, offered a substitute bill
which was essentially a return to the Tariff of 1857. He
was especially upset because coffee and tea, admittedly
necessities of life, were to be taxed. Several members
successfully proposed amendments including one which
lowered the rate on coffee to three cents per pound.
Morrill then urged passage of the tariff, even
though he regarded it as imperfect, because the Treasury
was empty. The rates were too high, he believed, but the
tariff was a war measure and Speedy approval was necessary.
Morrill was also convinced that Stevens had set the revenue
estimates too high. He pointed out that imports were
bound to be lower than the previous year because the
Southern market had been lost and people tended to hoard
their money in troubled periods. Believing that the bill
would not suffice, even with its high rates, Morrill
warned the House that internal taxes, including a direct
tax and an income tax, would be needed to finance the war.
He concluded by agreeing with the 23223 that taxation had
to pay the ordinary expenses of government and the interest
on the public debt.6
Only two days after calling up the tariff, Stevens

compelled its passage. He introduced a substitute which

 

6Cong: Globe, 37th Cong., lst Sess., 1861,
pp. 171-76.

 

150

was actually the original bill with minute alterations.
Stevens then demanded approval of the substitute bill as
a vote of confidence in the Committee on Ways and Means.
Under this pressure the House quickly passed the bill and
sent it to the Senate.7

Between the passage of the tariff and the subse-
quent consideration of a war tax bill, the Congress shared
the North's deep psychological shock in the wake of defeat
at the First Battle of Bull Run. With the myth of a short
glorious war rudely shattered, the nation and the Congress
realized that they had to gird themselves for a bloody
struggle of indefinite duration. The defeat probably
Opened the eyes of many congressmen who previously had
hesitated to vote the unprecedented sums needed.

Under the disheartening shadow of prolonged war,
the House resumed consideration of war finances when
Stevens reported an internal revenue bill which included
a direct tax. Urging rapid consideration, Stevens ex-
plained that the direct tax would fall on real estate and
the internal taxes on personal property. Morrill then
explained that even though Vermont Opposed the direct tax

as much as any other state, the Treasury had to have it.

 

7Ibid., pp. 204-5. In the Senate, Fessenden
began a pOIle of strong support for war finance bills
but Sumner opposed the tariff on grounds it would alienate
British support. Charles A. Jellison, Fessenden of Maine
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 133.
David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf,*1970), p. 35.

 

151

Later, other means, especially an income tax, would be
necessary. He pointed out that, although the war was to
be financed by huge loans, the bonds would not sell unless
this bill was passed to guarantee payment of the interest.
Morrill insisted that the session would be wasted if the
tax bill failed; even to postpone the bill would be tanta-
mount to declaring withdrawal of the troops in the field
and abandonment of the capital. His conclusion was a
rhetorical question: "Do we sustain the war effort or
not?"8
Despite the best efforts of Stevens and Morrill,
the House was reluctant to pass the bill in its original
form. To break the impasse, Congressman John McClernand
of Illinois maneuvered to halve the direct tax from thirty
to fifteen million dollars. At this point Stevens lost
his temper and stated that any move against the original
bill was an act of disloyalty. Morrill, acting quickly
to ease the tension, suggested that the figure be set at
twenty million because that would actually bring in twelve
million dollars from the loyal states. McClernand accepted
Morrill's amendment and the bill was returned to the Ways
and Means Committee to be altered.
When the bill was again reported from the committee,

it had been changed to include a twenty million dollar

 

8Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., lst Sess., 1861,

pp. 246-52.

152

direct tax and an income tax of 3 percent on all incomes
above six hundred dollars. As an alternative, Schuyler
Colfax of Indiana suggested that the federal government
demand the return of the treasury surplus distributed to
the states in 1836. After brushing aside that final
challenge by eXplaining that the funds were a pure gift
and long ago Spent, Morrill got nearly unanimous approval
of the substitute tax bill.9
Morrill tried to clarify the general public's
confusion about the direct tax bill in a letter to
Henry C. Carey, the protection advocate, who he knew would
publicize it. He explained that the tax bill was moving
so quickly that no one outside the House, not even the
newspapers, had accurate knowledge of it. Morrill admitted
that the burden of the two taxes would fall unequally
because Vermont and Western farmers would be hard hit by
the direct tax while the tax on nonfarm income would rest
most heavily on people in the industrialized Atlantic
states. However, Morrill seemed confident that patriotic
citizens would bear all war taxes cheerfully.lo
The direct tax bill stirred sectional controversy

because it was soon clear that the West would be pressed

hardest. The Ways and Means Committee quickly realized

 

91bid., pp. 306-7, 323-31.

loMorrill to Henry c. Carey, July 31, 1861,
Gardiner Collection.

153

that they could not constitutionally tax personal property
directly because a direct tax could only be levied on real
estate. And almost all of the wealth in the Western
states was in land and therefore taxable while much
Eastern wealth was in untaxable personal property. Because
of the constitutional restrictions, the average tax on all
property in Illinois was 7 mills while in Massachusetts it
was only 2.6 mills. Morrill feebly tried to ease the
sectional squabbling by pointing out that Vermont shared
the plight of the West, but he knew that fairness, not
rhetoric, was needed. The income tax on nonfarm income
over $600 was the solution because it would tax Eastern
wealth in salaries, securities, and other investments.
Morrill placated the West by claiming that the income
tax would raise two-thirds of the expected revenue. Unfor-
tunately, events falsified his statement. The West bore
the initial burden because the direct tax was collected
while the income tax was suspended pending revision.11
The tax and tariff bills were sent to the same
House—Senate Conference Committee, which returned a hybrid
act labeled as the Tariff Bill. Modifications included

cutting the rate on coffee to four cents per pound, raising

 

11Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracygin
America (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 65-66.
Nevins, War for the Union, I, 195-96.

 

 

154

the lower limit on taxable incomes to eight hundred
dollars per year, and dropping all excise taxes. Both
Houses of Congress agreed to the combined bill and thus
the early, albeit inadequate, financial basis for the war
effort was completed.12
Newspaper reaction to the financial package was
generally favorable. Walton's Daily Journal seemed a bit
confused by all the parliamentary maneuvering but favored
the result. On July 24, as consideration of the tax bill
was beginning, the editor appraised the tariff as an
acceptable last resort in lieu of direct taxation. Ten

days later the Journal claimed the combined bill was a

masterstroke. The Evening Star praised the direct tax but

 

condemned the increased duties. The New York Times agreed

 

that the omnibus bill was necessary but predicted that,
because it was rushed through, revisions would be required
in the regular congressional session. The act's major
fault was that the high tariff rates would probably stop
trade rather than bring in revenue. As an additional note,

the Times pointed out that the direct tax would have the

 

12Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., lst Sess., 1861,

pp. 415-28. This’first income tax in the nation's history
was never collected because before its effective date
another law was enacted. Edwin R. Seligman, The Income
Tax (New York: The Macmillan Company, l9ll), p. 435.
NEVins, War for the Union, I, 195. Ratner, Taxation and
Democracy, pp. 65466. Jellison, Fessenden, p. I31. The
South had to pay its share of the Direct Tax after the
war. F. H. Pierpont to John H. Gilmer, Jan. 5, 1866,
Thaddeus Stevens Papers, Library of Congress. James L.
Sellers, "An Interpretation of Civil War Finance," American
Historical Review, XXX (Jan., 1925), 295.

 

 

 

 

 

 

155

welcome side effect of curbing government corruption
because the people, now paying for government out of their
own pockets, would observe how the money was spent.13
As the Times had predicted, the tariff structure
adopted in the special session of the 37th Congress lasted
only until the next session. Reforms began with emergency
duties placed on tea, coffee, and sugar. By the time the
Tariff Act of 1862 was completed, many additional revisions
were included.14
Shortly after the House convened, Morrill reported
a bill raising the rates on tea, coffee, and sugar. It
increased the duty on sugar one-half a cent, coffee one
cent, and tea five cents per pound. Secretary Chase hoped
the proposed duties would generate an additional seven
million dollars a year. However, Morrill stated that even

if revenue should decrease because of a drop in imports,

the result would be good since the coin needed to pay for

 

13Walton's-paily Journal, July 24, 1861; Aug. 3,
1861. Washington Evening Star, July 20, 1861. The
tariff acts of March and August, 1861, combined nearly
doubled the rates from the Tariff of 1857. Samuel S.
Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation: 1855-1885
(Providence, R.I.: Reid Publishers, 1888?, p. 137 and
Reinhard Luthin, "Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff,"
American Historical Review, XLIX (July, 1944), 627.
Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party (Baltimore:
The Johns HOpkins Press, 1959), pp. 19-26. New York
Times, Aug. 3 and 6, 1861.

 

14Allan Nevins, The War for the Union (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons,’I960), If, III-13.

 

156

foreign goods would remain in the country. Finally, he
explained that the Ways and Means Committee gave the bill
priority because they wanted it applied to the import
session beginning with the cessation of the North Atlantic
winter storms.

Morrill's curious statement that he would happily
see trade curtailed in order to keep coin at home suggested
his concern about the troubled state of national finance.
He was beginning to realize that, regardless of the
increased duties, the tariff could never satisfy the
Treasury's revenue needs. As a result of this realization,
Morrill soon changed his philosophy, viewing the tariff
simply as a means of balancing the internal taxes.

Revenue would still be sought but the main purpose of the
tariff would be to ward off foreign competition so that
domestic industry would flourish and fill the Treasury
with heavy excise tax payments. Morrill was also con-
cerned that the loss of the Southern market, and coin
hoarding by the public, would result in large annual trade
deficits with the difference necessarily being paid in
gold. As a hard-money man, he was increasingly concerned
over the growing shortage of coin to finance war spending.
The depressing annual report of Secretary Chase, along
with the Trent Affair's threat of British intervention,
had so shaken public confidence that bond sales were

dropping, coin reserves in banks were falling, and the .

157

nation was on the brink Of a funding crisis. One week
after Morrill's speech, on December 30, 1861, the major
banks suspended specie payments.15
The only Opposition to the Coffee, Tea, and Sugar
Bill, by Vallandigham of Ohio, was too ineffectual to
prevent its enactment in the minimum possible amount of
time. Vallandigham proposed a tax on exports as an
alternative, but, since that type Of tax was specifically
forbidden by the Constitution, Morrill had no trouble
turning the idea aside and Obtaining a majority for the
bill. On December 24, the day after he reported the
special tariff to the House, it was signed into law.16
Secretary Chase was overzealous in his application

of the new rates and found himself condemned by the New

York Times. Chase announced plans to tax stocks of

 

coffee, tea, and sugar already in bonded warehouses as
well as new imports. The Times rightly condemned this
retroactive taxation on the grounds that the law's framers
did not intend it. The editors supported their views by

pointing to the specific exemption made in the tariff law

 

15Ratner, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 68-69.
Sharkey, Money, Class, and’Party, pp. 25-28.

 

16Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1861,
pp. 169-70. U.S., Statutes_at Large, 37th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 330. Jellison, Fessenden, p. 133. Edward
Stanwood, American_Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth
Century (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903),
II, .

 

 

 

158

for goods afloat. They added that, since bonded goods
had already been assessed and the tax paid in good faith,
it would be oppressive to levy additional duty.17 The
Timg§_was most likely correct because, had Morrill planned
to tax stock on hand, there would have been no point in
rushing passage to beat the import season.

Through the initial phase of the war the mood
of Congress was mixed and constantly fluctuating. At
adjournment in August, 1861, Congress had been chastened
by the Bull Run disaster. Successful amphibious Opera-
tions, and Grant's victories at Forts Henry and Donelson,
and later at bloody Shiloh, cheered the membership.
McClellan's lack of action frustrated all, especially
radicals. When McClellan finally moved, hOpe for a major
Eastern victory was soon dashed by his failure in the
Peninsular Campaign. In financial matters there was a
great sense of urgency. The suspension of specie payments
disrupted public and private credit badly. Congress
immediately passed a resolution pledging to support the
public credit by imposing a minimum of $150 million in
taxes and tariff.

The cost of the war was staggering and growing
so rapidly that all estimates were soon outdated. In

December, Secretary Chase unrealistically asked for only

 

17New York Times, Dec. 30, 1861.

 

159

$50 million in new taxes, but in January Congress resolved
to vote at least three times that amount. Chase estimated
in mid-summer 186l that the expenses for the next year
would total $320 million, but the cost was already
approaching $2 million per day. For example, the initial
cost to clothe the 500 regiments authorized in July was
$10 million, but a soldier could wear out a good uniform
in less than three months. The expansion of the armed
forces, the immense consumption of equipment, and the
suspension of Specie payments exerted inflationary
pressures that sent prices Skyward.18
Because of a heavy workload, the Ways and Means
Committee did not introduce the general tariff revision
in the House until June 25, l862. Although Stevens
brought up the so-called temporary tariff increase, Morrill
took charge of it.19 Morrill skillfully guided the bill
through a hail of amendments virtually unscathed. He
himself prOposed fifty minor changes and got them all
approved. Of the several amendments offered from the

floor, the only one adopted restored rags (for paper) to

the free list, a move which Morrill personally favored

 

18Nevins, War for the Union, I, 195, 303.
Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, pp. 50-52. Nevins,
War for the Union, II, 47lff. Ratner, Taxation and
Democracy, pp. 68-69, 79.

 

 

 

 

 

19Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 2936-40.

 

160

because it aided education. The most serious challenge
arose when Morrill was accused of unfairly supporting
the woolen industry to aid Vermont woolgrowers. Morrill
defended the woolen rate, weathered the storm, and guided
the tariff to passage.20
At this point Stevens took responsibility for
getting the House bill into the statute books. When
the Senate returned the bill with numerous amendments,
Stevens won a motion to disagree and to go into conference
committee where he preserved most of the House version.
By July 14 the tariff was law.21
In a separate action, immediately following
enactment Of the basic tariff bill, Stevens ignored
Morrill's objections and reported a bill to raise the
duty on sugar by one cent per pound. Morrill registered
his strong opposition because it would be a doubling of
the rate as well as the second increase of the session.
The effective rate, one cent per pound, he noted, was

already high since sugar sold at only four cents per

pound in Louisiana and Texas. The proposed increase was

 

20Morrill to Henry C. Carey, July 12, 1862,

Gardiner Collection. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd
sess., 1862' pp. 2936- ’ - ' 3050-550

21Con . Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 3213, 3263. Statutes at Large, 37th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 543. The free list included 99 items, down from
182 in the Morrill Tariff. Stanwood, American Tariff

Controversies, II, 127-28. Ratner, Taxation and
Democracy, p. 78.

 

 

 

 

 

161

particularly unfair because it made the rate 50 percent
of the market value and also failed to tax sorghum or maple
sugar, the two great rivals of cane sugar. Despite
Morrill's arguments, Stevens got his bill passed.22
Regarding the Tariff Bill of 1862 and the Sugar
Bill, Morrill again exhibited his devotion to the virtue
of fairness even while upholding the principle of pro-
tection. Although he wrote in his personal notes that the
nation had many varied industries which had to be brought
under the guardianship of Congress, he was not a strict
protectionist. That was proved by the complaints of
Henry C. Carey and others that iron, coal, and additional

special interests needed much more protection. The main

point Of the 1862 tariff, as the New York Times explained,

 

was no longer revenue but rather to compensate for the new
Internal Tax Bill. To keep native industry alive while
paying large excise taxes, Morrill wanted to protect them

from disastrous foreign competition.23

 

22Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,

pp. 3332-33.

 

23Justin S. Morrill, "Notes on the Tariff of
June, 1862," Morrill Papers, Reel 1. Alfred B. Lindley,
"The Copper Tariff of 1869," Michigan History, XXXV
(March, 1951), 2. Morrill to Henry C. Carey, March 18,
1862, Gardiner Collection. Henry C. Carey to Morrill,
June 22, 1862 in Justin S. Morrill, "Notable Letters From
My Political Friends," Forum, XXIV (October, 1897), 148-49.
Morrill to Carey, July 12, 1862, Gardiner Collection.
New York Times, Aug. 1, 1862. Nevins, War for the Union,
11,484, 490-91. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party,
pp. 77, l4lff.

 

 

 

 

162

Morrill, a lover of books, travel, and art,
welcomed the adjournment of Congress which allowed him
to return to his cherished leisure-time pursuits. He
spent the summer of 1862 in Strafford, reading and resting.
He often combined business and travel, going several
times to Boston and, at least once, as far as Illinois to
check his investments. A pleasant trip to St. Paul
occupied the Morrill family during the summer of 1863.
After the war, Morrill took the trip dreamed of by most
lovers of books and art--the grand tour of Europe.24

The Tariff question entered a period of relative
quiet following the rapid changes of 1861 and 1862.
Despite an abundance of ideas about possible modifica-

25 there was no significant attempt at tariff

tions,
revision in the short session of 1863.

Shortly after Congress adjourned, the fortunes
of the Union sank to their lowest ebb. The depressing
defeat at Fredericksburg was followed in May by disaster
at Chancellorsville. The premium on gold, fluctuating

with the fortunes of war, rose sharply. Perhaps the only

positive note was the absence of foreign intervention.26

 

24Parker, Morrill, pp. 46-47, 131, 154.

25Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1959), p. 171. Gardiner Brewer
to Morrill, Dec. 10, 1862, Morrill Papers, Reel 5. J. H.
Clay Mudd to John Sherman, March 3, 1863, Sherman Papers.

 

26Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, p. 52.

 

163

By the time Congress convened in December, 1863,
the fortunes of the Union had risen, but so had expendi-
tures. July marked a military turning point with victories
at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Union forces suffered a
setback at Chickamauga, but recovered in November with
victories at Chattanooga. But, while the war effort
seemed on the upswing, Congress had to find ways to pay
the bills. New troops needed equipment. Veterans had
to be resupplied. The more frequent battles were con—
suming ever increasing quantities of clothing and equip-
ment. The war was now costing $2,250,000 per day.
Secretary Chase estimated that the total cost of the war
for 1863-64 would be $750 million, but that figure proved
to be on the conservative side. Prices climbed rapidly,
and the dollar dropped to less than half of its 1861
value. The interest on the debt, pledged in gold, was
constantly rising and had to be paid. At the same time,
the customs receipts, needed to pay the interest, fell
short of expectations--part1y because of the successes
of the Confederate navy. Again, it was up to the Congress
to sustain the war effort.27

With rising expenditures making rate increases
inevitable, Morrill saw the need to counter a shippers'

movement to sidestep the anticipated higher duties by

 

27
pp. 81-94.

Ibid., p. 51. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy,

 

 

164

stockpiling goods. To prevent a large revenue loss,
Stevens proposed a joint resolution to increase duties
until June 1 by 50 percent generally, and to place a
10 percent ad valorem duty on the free list. The motion
was soundly defeated. Morrill reintroduced the resolu-
tion with the increases halved and suffered a similar
defeat. Morrill returned a week later with a substitute
which itemized the increases desired and extended the
effective time to July 1. He claimed that the resolution
would prevent a flood of imports while the major revision
was being prepared. Morrill conceded that the temporary
tariff was a crude measure but insisted that it was
necessary. The revised resolution then passed, giving
Morrill the time he needed for extensive tariff
calculations.28
On June 2, 1864, Morrill explained to the House
that rising expenditures had created a need for tariff
revision. Most of the additional revenue, he noted,
would come from internal taxes, so that the purposes Of
the tariff bill would be to produce supplemental revenue
and to protect home industries which could then pay
increased excise taxes. In addition, an effective

measure was needed for the duration of the war, whether

 

the fighting continued for months or years.29

28Con . Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,
pp. 1702-3, - .

29

Ibid., p. 2672.

165

To accomplish its revenue goals the Committee on
Ways and Means worked to balance the many factors involved
in the rate system. In general, as Morrill explained, the
duties were raised sharply on such luxury items as
tobacco and Spirituous liquors, and minimally increased
on necessities like sugar. In a personal comment, Morrill
mentioned that he hoped to see the high taxes discourage
the use of alcohol and tobacco.30 Thus, Morrill concisely
explained the basic premise behind the rate structure and
expressed his own puritanical principles.

Having generally covered the pending tariff bill,
Morrill detailed the item most vital to his constituents--
wool.

The woolen manufacturing establishments have since

[1861] prOSpered . . . The wool-grower has so far
prospered, also, . . . and yet he has not kept pace
with the wants of the manufacturers. . . .

[Nevertheless] there is much of last year's clip

of wool now on hand unsold. . . . This shows there

is some defect in the law that must be remedied,

and that the manufacturer is in a better position
than the wool-grower. . . . I know sound policy
dictates that for proper encouragement of manufac-
turers all raw materials should be free. . . . But
until we reach the point of supply for our own
country, I do not see why encouragement may not be 31
given to the wool-grower as well as the manufacturer.

Morrill, in conclusion, anticipated the most
obvious Objection by stressing that there were no pro-

hibitory duties. Since the object was to gain additional

 

30 31

Ibid., pp. 2672-73. Ibid., pp. 2673-74.

166

revenue, that would be self-defeating. He admitted,
though, that the new rates were far higher than usual in
order to counteract the internal taxes placed on domestic
industry.32
In a long, bitter denunciation, Samuel Cox of Ohio
predicted that the proposed tariff would precipitate the
downfall of the nation by pushing it into financial chaos.
The bill, he said, would efficiently transfer money from
the many to the few--from labor to capital. Cox warned
that the face of society would be changed within five
years: the multitude would rise to cut the throats of the
wealthy and then destroy itself through impatience.33
Cox made a possibly valid point in his argument
that the tariffs were pricing cheap foreign goods out of
the reach of the common man and forcing him to pay inflated
wartime prices for domestic goods. At the same time, he
contended, the government was protecting the profits Of
wealthy factory owners in order to perpetuate tax receipts;
and if these practices continued, there might indeed be
a dangerous transfer of money from labor to capital. But
Cox ignored the general improvement in the economy and the
inescapable argument of war necessity. The face of society

was changed, but not in the drastic way that the Ohioan

predicted.

 

32 33

Ibid., p. 2674. Ibid., pp. 2775-83.

167

Stevens defended the protection given to manu-
facturers as both just and necessary. He said that since
the government collected one-half of its revenue from
internal taxes on industry, manufacturers deserved pro-
tection while carrying such a heavy tax burden. In
addition, Stevens pointed out, if industry was not pro-
tected, many companies would fail and tax receipts would
plummet.34

When all the angry words were spent, Morrill
encountered only minor Opposition as he shepherded the
bill through the amendment procedure to final approval.35

One of the most surprising aspects of the Tariff
of 1864 was the little debate it produced. Aside from
the speech of Cox, there was little discussion of the bill
in the House. The neWSpapers and public seemed to take
even less interest. The only section of the bill which
elicited significant comment from Morrill's constituents
was the wool duty: growers demanded protection and
manufacturers argued that the growers did not need it.

Perhaps peOple seemed indifferent because Morrill had

 

34Ibid., pp. 2692-93. With the passage of this
bill, duties averaged 47 percent of the goods' value.
Roy F. Nichols, The Stakes of Power 1845-1877 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1961), pp. 145-46. Sharkey, Money! Class,
and Party, p. 152.

 

 

 

35Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., pp. 2717-22,
2743-51. Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies, II,
128-30. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy, pp.’88-89.

 

 

168

justified the bill well enough to satisfy all Objections.
But, even though many recognized Morrill as the leading
tariff expert in the House,36 no man could satisfy all
opponents in a single speech. Probably the opposition
was minimal because it was common knowledge that more
revenue was needed and no one had an alternative to
suggest.

To the surprise of nearly everyone, including
Morrill, the supposedly temporary Tariff of 1864, although
Often revised, remained in effect for nearly twenty years.
Once the high tariff wall was firmly established it proved
difficult to dismantle.37

The long campaigns of Grant and Sherman had been
costly. Victory was clearly near but new troops and new
funding were needed. The troop increase authorized in
July, 1864, had helped push the daily cost of the war to
$3,000,000. Constant fighting along the Petersburg front
and along Sherman's line of march consumed supplies at an

unprecedented rate. With the war nearly over, Congress

 

363. B. Bigelow to Morrill, March 3, 1864 and

H. C. Meriam to Morrill, April 9, 1864, Morrill Papers,
Reel 5. E. B. Bigelow to Morrill, July 23, 1864, Morrill
Papers, Reel 6. Boston Traveller reprinted in Vermont
Watchman, April 29, 1864: Bernard Steiner, Life of Henry
Winter Davig (Baltimore: John Murphy Co., 1916), p. 347.
Cox, Three Decades, p. 75.

 

37 . . .
F. W. TauSSlg, The Tariff History of the United

States (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931),
pp. 163-67, 170.

169

passed funding bills which finally brought the ratio of
loans to taxes down from 8-1/2 to l in 1861-62 to a more
respectable 3 to l in 1864-65.38
As the short congressional session of 1865 waned,
Morrill called up a bill to make a general increase in
the tariff. After he explained that only immediate
approval would give the Senate time to act in the three
days before adjournment, the House limited general debate
to one minute. Morrill turned aside the few proposed
amendments with the explanation that the duties were
necessary for the usual purposes of obtaining funds and
balancing the planned increases in the internal taxes.
Following the reading for amendments, Morrill easily
secured a majority vote for the tariff. The Senate quickly
passed the bill, and it became law on March 3, the last
day of the session.39
This final tariff increase of the war years did

not pass so completely unnoticed by the press as had the

previous act. The New York Times, strongly Opposed to

 

another rise in the duties, predicted that only a reduction

in rates could bring in the revenue that the Treasury

 

38Ratner, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 93-94.

 

39Con . Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865,
PPo 1205'3: 1355-56. Jellison, Fessenden, p. 133.

 

170

sought.40 But with the Union forces on the verge of
victory, there was little other complaint about increased
taxation.

Throughout the war years Morrill sought to provide
ever higher tariffs because he firmly supported the
administration's goals--revenue and protection. In all
his speeches he expressed the need for constantly increas-
ing funds to prosecute the war. As a protectionist who
called free trade un-American, he believed that national
strength and independence required economic self-
sufficiency, a status to be realized only under a system
of protective tariffs. With the important exception of
the wool duty,41 Morrill worked for the national interest
rather than state or local interests. Morrill sincerely
believed that protection was the salvation of the nation
because it brought diversity of employment and increased
the knowledge and wealth of the people. He claimed that
the luster and intellectual caliber of a modern nation
might be measured by the variety and extent of its indus-

trial pursuits. All of these things, Morrill said, would

 

4°New York Times, Dec. 13, 1864.

 

41Morrill to Horace Greeley, Jan. 15, 1870 in
Morrill, Forum, XXIV, 404. Morrill to J. Lawrence
Laughlin, April, 1883, Morrill Papers, Reel 36. Morrill
to Edwin Hammond, Feb. 17, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7.

171

happen behind a protective tariff.42 Although Morrill

may not have been right in his devotion to protection,

he was remarkably successful in putting his beliefs

into law.

 

42Morrill to J. Lawrence Laughlin, April, 1883,

Morrill Papers, Reel 36.

CHAPTER VII

THE INTERNAL REVENUE

By the beginning of the first regular session of
the 37th Congress in December, 1861, the government's
need for funds had become acute and could only be satis-
fied by the extraordinary means of huge loans and a
comprehensive tax program. During the special summer
session, Congress had decided that taxes should pay the
ordinary expenses of government and that loans should
finance the war. To realize those aims, Congress resolved
to raise $150 million in taxes and a like amount in loans}'
The taxes collected fell short of expectations, causing a
decrease in the originally heavy bond sales as people lost
confidence in the government's ability to pay the interest
from tax receipts. Confidence also ebbed because the
Battle of Bull Run had destroyed the hope for a short war

and raised doubts about the ultimate victory of the Union.

 

lWesley C. Mitchell, "The Suspension of Specie
Payments," Journal of Political Economics, VII (June,
1899), 308-9. Expenditures rose so prodigiously that
the antebellum federal budget of $70 million per year
became barely enough for one month. Roy F. Nichols,
The Stakes of Power 1845-1877 (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1961), p. 114.

172

173

Although the bond sale program began with excellent
cooperation between bankers and the Treasury, and with the
full support of the press, this effort was largely depen-
dent on the willingness of the public to buy the bonds from
the banks. On August 17, the major bankers pledged to
take the first loan, amounting to $150 million, over a
five-month period, using their specie reserves as payment.
The government would use the funds to buy supplies on the
Open market. The suppliers and others would then complete
a financial circle by buying the bonds from the banks out
of their profits. The system worked well; the banks ful-
filled their pledge thirty days early, but then suddenly
the public lost confidence. Two shocks in early December
combined with military failure to break the money cycle:
drastically revised estimates showing revenue down and
expenditures up were published in Secretary Chase's first
annual report; and the Trent Affair, with its threat of a
foreign war, compounded the ill news. The public responded
by hoarding specie rather than buying bonds. That trend
forced banks and the Treasury to suspend specie payments.

As the year 1862 opened, the nation's credit had collapsed.‘2

 

2Robert P. Sharkey, Mone , Class, and Party: An
Economic Study of Civil War an Reconstruction (Baltimore:
The Johns HOpkins Press, 1959), pp. 21-27. David Donald
(ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of
Salmon P. Chase (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954),
p. 39. New York Times, Aug. 17, 1861. New York Tribune,
Sept. 7, 1861. Walton's Daily Journal, Sept. 14, 1861.
Mitchell, "SuSpension of SpeciePayments," pp. 308-9,
314-16, 321-25.

 

 

174

Since the war effort depended on restoration of
public confidence in the Treasury's financial stability,
Thaddeus Stevens gave responsibility for the tax program
to Morrill, who had already demonstrated his financial
ability in tariff work. Morrill justified Stevens's trust
by devoting long hours to drafting a workable law in a
field of domestic taxation wholly without guiding
precedents.

The financial crisis, climaxed by the suspension
of Specie payments, brought a sharply critical reaction

from the press. The New York Times supported the suspen-

 

sion and suggested an issue of Treasury notes, the value
of which would be guaranteed by making them payable for

taxes. The Washington Evening Star strongly criticized

 

Congress for allowing the crisis to develOp and stated
that taxes had to be raised Sharply to provide needed

income. The New York Tribune chided Congress for failing

 

to establish a realistic tax structure and insisted that
a minimum of $100 million was needed from internal revenue.
The editors also demanded retrenchment in the government.
The Rutland (Vermont) Herald simply asked the legislators
to realize that the financial crisis was the priority

item.3

 

3Washington Evening Star, Dec. 31, 1861. New
York Times, Dec. 28, 1861. New York Tribune, Jan. 11,
1862. Rutland Herald, Jan. 16, 1862.

 

 

 

 

175

The Committee on Ways and Means acted to still
the mounting criticism and thus give Morrill time to draft
an adequate bill. It initiated a resolution which pledged
Congress to maintain the public credit and acknowledged
the principle, duty, and necessity of levying sufficient

taxation. The New York Times predicted that the people

 

would now regain their confidence in the government and
buy government bonds.4
Only Imilitary victory would fully restore public
confidence, but decisive battlefield success proved
elusive. Victories were achieved: Grant and John Pope
won a series of battles which Opened the upper Mississippi
River; the Monitor ended the threat of the Merrimac; and
New Orleans fell to naval assault. All of these encounters
encouraged the North; but the great expectations attached
to George McClellan's appointment were never justified.
He ultimately failed--and northern hOpes for a resounding
victory dimmed.
The first important financial measure to emerge
from the Ways and Means Committee was a Treasury Note Bill

which Morrill strongly opposed. The bill placed a total

of $150 million in United States Notes in circulation and

 

4Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in
America (New York: John Wiley and Sons,’l967), p. 69.
New York Times, Jan. 16, 1862.

 

 

176

declared them Legal Tender, nonredeemable paper money.5
Unlike Morrill, most citizens, and a large segment of the
press, approved the use of legal tenders in wartime. Six

weeks earlier, on December 28, the New York Times had

 

asked for such a measure. But Morrill distrusted paper
money and never became fully reconciled to it.6 He
denounced legal tenders as a dangerous expedient and in-
sisted that taxation was the only solution. Morrill
warned that the notes would not circulate at par with
specie: contractors forced to take such notes would stop
selling to the government, the poor would be crushed by
racing inflation, and Specie would be driven into hiding.
Believing that government bonds would not sell if the
interest was promised only in paper, he held that gold

and Silver must be the only legal tender. He predicted

that without such a policy the government would soon have

 

5New York Times, Jan. 23, 1862. Sharkey, Money,
Class, and’Party, p. 31. The bill also provided for a
loan of $500 million in 6 percent bonds which would
mature in twenty years.

 

 

6Allan Nevins, The War for the Union (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), II, 212. Seth Hunt to
Morrill, Jan. 31, 1862, Morrill Papers, Reel 35. A. A.
Guthrie to John Sherman, Feb. 11, 1862, Sherman Papers.
Rutland Herald, Feb. 11, 1862. New York Times, Dec. 28,

. Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1959), pp. 173ff. John Sherman,
Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and
Cabinet (Chicago: The Werner Co., 1895), pp. 274-78.
WeSIey C. Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 46, 96, 111, 122.
Personal Notes 1873, Morrill Papers, Reel 43. The New
York Tribune reluctantly supported the bill, Feb. 157—1863.

 

 

 

 

 

 

177

only the paper and would be forced to issue increasing
amounts as inflation fed on itself.7
Because of his stand on the legal tenders, Morrill
found himself in very unusual company. He, along with a
handful of Republicans, including Senators Collamer, Foot,
and Fessenden, joined the Democratic Opponents of the
administration on this issue. Morrill allied himself

with such men as Clement Vallandigham, an Ohioan whose

loyalty was widely questioned. The New York Times scolded

 

Morrill for placing himself in company with such a man
and for deserting the Treasury in a time of emergency.8
The debate over the Treasury Note Bill marked
one of the few times Morrill's Opinion did not prevail,
probably because his arguments were weak. He short-
sightedly continued to assume that the war would end
soon; those who wished to be prepared for any eventuality
were right. Although Morrill's point regarding payment
of bond interest in specie was well taken, he continued

to Oppose the bill after it was amended to satisfy him on

 

7Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 629-32.

 

8Charles A. Jellison, Fessenden of Maine
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962), pp. 147-48,
163. Donald (ed.), Diaries of Chase, p. 43. Nevins,
War for the Union, II, 212. Sherman, Recollections,
pp. 274-78. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress
(Norwich, Conn.: Henry Bill Co., 1884), I, 425. James A.
Bayard to Thomas F. Bayard, Jan. 28, 1862, Thomas Bayard
Papers, Library of Congress. New York Times, Feb. 5,
1862.

 

 

 

 

 

 

178

that point.9 Morrill also insisted that the nation had
enough wealth to pay for the war. This was a valid
position, as subsequent events proved. But, most of the
nation's wealth was not liquid, being tied up in land
and other assets, and the gigantic war effort required a
vast amount of liquid assets. That Morrill was less
vehement in his opposition to the second and third legal
tender billsindicated that he came to recognize the
necessity of a large money supply even though he con-
tinued to Oppose legal tenders in principle.10
Not always so serious and intense as he was during
the Treasury Note Debate, Morrill Often exhibited evi-
dence of a dry wit. One example can be found in a reply
to Henry C. Carey of Philadelphia. Carey had written
complaining that one of Morrill's nephews had borrowed
money from him and had then left Philadelphia without
repaying it. Morrill expressed mock rage that one of the
rascals should so disgrace the family name and Offered to
make restitution personally. Then Morrill gently showed
that Carey had been duped by marveling that one of his

nephews could have done that since they were all less

 

9New York Times, Feb. 14, 1862. Nevins, War for
the Union, II, 212. Stevens urged payment in currency
because Specie would be too costly. Brodie, Stevens,

pp. 174-75.

 

loNevinS, War for the Union, II, 213. Mitchell,
History of Greenbacks, pp. 96, 111. Sharkey, Money,
Class, and Party, pp. 29ff.

 

 

 

179

than ten years old and living great distances from
philadelphia.ll
Early in March, 1862, Morrill reported the long
awaited internal tax bill. He had the right as principal
author to make the first speech on this naturally contro-
versial act. Morrill's points were that the bill was
generally fair and absolutely essential to the national
welfare.12
Morrill declared that in wartime the government
must demand the necessary funds and establish an agency
of collection. He showed that the Treasury would need
$145 million per year and that in order to guarantee
receipt of the funds "it is indiSpensable that the Govern-
ment shall have within its own control--responsive to it
at regular and stated periods--the means of meeting all its
vast engagements. This can only be secured by its own
agents under its own laws." The power of collection,
Morrill said, would be vested in a department of internal
revenue to be headed by a commissioner reporting to the
Secretary of the Treasury. The commissioner would be
assisted by a collector and an assessor in every state or

district and as many deputies as became necessary.13

 

 

11Morrill to Henry C. Carey, July 6, 1861,
Gardiner Collection.

12Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 1194-97.

13

Ibid., pp. 1194-95. Ratner, Taxation and

 

 

180

Major blocks of taxes would come from just a few
sources, Morrill explained. The largest amount, $50
million, would be realized from a 3 percent ad valorem tax
on all manufactured goods; however, the manufacturers would
surely pass the increased cost on to the consumers.

Another large share of the tax load was purposely placed

on liquor and tobacco because, Morrill claimed, "a tax
dependent on the habits and vices of men is the most
reliable of all taxes." Since they could show a profit
under heavy taxes, he predicted that spirits, malt liquors,
and tobaccos would contribute $24 million to the Treasury.14
In the case of vice, Morrill was accommodating himself to
reality. He would rather have seen the vices die, but so
long as they existed, they would help the war effort.

A month later, April 22, 1862, Morrill indicated
his continued distaste for drinking when he introduced a
resolution asking for the cashiering of any officer found
drunk. His resolution was generated by a drunken general's
failure to aid beleaguered Vermont troops at Yorktown
during the Peninsular Campaign. The general ordered the
Vermonters to attack superior forces and then became too
drunk to send the necessary reinforcements. Although many,

including his own wife, questioned the wisdom of the

 

l4Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,

pp. 1194-96. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 69-75.
Nevins, War for the Union, II, 213.

 

181

resolution, Morrill defended it saying that "I don't
expect them to be saints. All I ask is that they be sober
when they are spending Vermonters at the rate of 160 an
hour." The resolution passed after being modified to
read "habitually intoxicated."15
In concluding his Speech on the internal revenue
bill, Morrill mentioned that the income tax had been
retained in the interest of fairness. He said the
committee considered abolishing it but decided that it
would tap any people missed by other taxes, assuring that
all would pay their share.16
The most serious challenges to the tax bill related
to the composition of the Internal Revenue Bureau.
Congressman Timothy G. Phelps of California disputed the
need for both a collector and an assessor in each district
and moved to eliminate the latter. Phelps argued that the
assessor was unnecessary since all taxes were paid to the

collector and since the required monthly tax payments would

make fraud difficult. After Morrill retorted that both the

 

15The incident took place at Yorktown on April 16,
1862. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862, p. 1766.
William B. Parker, The Life and Public Services of Justin
Smith Morrill (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924),
p. 136. ‘Tfie heavy taxation on whiskey did cause consump-
tion to fall somewhat. Allan Nevins, The War for the
Union (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), III,

 

 

 

l6Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 1196-97. Nevins, War for the Union, II, 214.

 

 

182

volume of work and the need for a system of checks required
the two positions, Phelps withdrew his amendment. Thomas
Eliot of Massachusetts moved that the states collect the
taxes,.thus saving the Federal Government a huge sum in
salaries. Morrill denied that it would save money because
the central government would have to pay the state collec-
tors to assume the additional duties. Morrill also doubted
the proposal's efficiency because if a state failed to
collect the revenue, the government would have to inter-
vene with much lost time and ill feeling. Despite Morrillfs
arguments, Eliot insisted on a vote which saw his amend—
ment defeated.l7
Once the amendment process was completed, Stevens
took charge of the bill to give Morrill time to work on
tariff legislation. Stevens closed the debate with a
short Speech in which he defended the tax bill, and
expressed his hope that the war would soon end, allowing
rescission of the law in two years. The bill then passed
the House on April 8. After the Senate returned the bill

two months later, encumbered by 315 amendments, Stevens,

supported by Morrill, got the amendments rejected en masse

 

17Gon . Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 1219-22, ¥22§. Charles Sumner was one politician who
recognized the potential political influence of this new
army of federal agents and made certain that those
appointed in Massachusetts supported him. David Donald,
Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1970), pp. 74-75. Con . GlOBe, 37th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1862, pp. 1219-24, IZZg-ZS.

183

and sent to a conference committee. When he reported
back from the joint committee, Stevens announced that
nearly all of the Senate's amendments had been accepted.
He explained that his original motion to nonconcur had
been intended only to Spare the House tedious hours dis-
cussing individual amendments: embodied in a conference
report the amendments could be considered and adopted all
at once.18

The internal tax bill was generally well received
because both public and press realized the absolute neces-
sity of taxation. If the Treasury had not received the
funds, the Union would have plunged into the same disas-
trous inflation that the Confederacy suffered as a result
of securing about 60 percent of its revenue from the
printing press.19 While some people naturally grumbled
about the added burden, the public had c00perated by
submitting suggestions on the taxes both spontaneously

and in response to Morrill's queries. Among those who

helped Morrill were Henry C. Carey, who sent

 

18Ibid., pp. 1576-77, 2680-81, 2890-91. Edwin R.
Seligman, The Income Tax (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1911), pp. 437-40. Jellison, Fessenden, p. 149.

 

 

19Eugene M. Lerner, "The Monetary and Fiscal

Programs of the Confederate Government, 1861-1865,"
J.P.E., LXII (Dec., 1954), 507. James L. Sellers, "An
Interpretation of Civil War Finance," A.H.R., XXX
(Jan., 1925), 282-95. Nevins, War for the Union, III,
43-44. Richard C. Todd, Confederate Finance (Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 1954), pp. 84-156.

 

 

184

information on railroads and on gas consumption, and
Horace Greeley, who wrote about taxes on newspapers. Of
course, letters were received from those who claimed
their Special interest was too heavily taxed, but there
seemed to be less of this than usual.20
Press Opinion from all sections of the political

spectrum agreed that the bill had to be passed. The

Evening Star, favorable because the internal revenue act

 

conformed to the editors' views on the need for higher
taxes, foresaw that the peOple would pay their taxes

cheerfully. The New York Tribune felt that although the

 

bill had defects, they were due to the committee's extra—
ordinary attempt to be fair. The editors suggested that
it would have been better to tax just a few items heavily,
especially liquor and tobacco, and they also advocated a
mild confiscation act so that the rebels could pay an
amount equivalent to their share of the internal taxes.

A serious complaint was lodged against the tax bill by

the New York Times when the editors, even though strongly

 

supporting internal taxation, branded the prOposed bill a
"monstrosity." The Times joined Congressman Phelps in

opposing the suggested Bureau of Internal Revenue on the

 

20Morrill to Henry C. Carey, Jan. 11, 1862,
Gardiner Collection. Horace Greeley to Morrill, March 18,
1862 in Justin S. Morrill, "Notable Letters From My
Political Friends," Forum, XXIV (Nov., 1897), 271.

Erasmus Plimpton to Morrill, March 20, 1862, Morrill
Papers, Reel 5. William Warner to John Sherman, April 11,
1862, Sherman Papers.

185

grounds that the necessary funds could easily be realized
without creating hundreds of new patronage positions.21
On the same day that the Internal Tax Bill
passed, Morrill suffered a defeat with the enactment of
the second Legal Tender Bill. On June 23, 1862, Morrill
Spoke against this issue of $150 million in legal tenders,
calling the increase a breach of faith with the banks
which had taken United States bonds even when individuals
refused. He said that, according to the bill, the banks
were to be paid in promises and the promises paid in
promises, a complete circle of worthless paper. Despite
Morrill's plea, Stevens urged and obtained passage.2

The issue of legal tenders was another area in

which Morrill and the New York Times disagreed in the

 

Spring of 1862. Morrill felt legal tenders were inherently
worthless and thus dangerous tcathe war finance program on
which he had worked so hard. The Times agreed with

Stevens that legal tenders were a necessary part of
national finance because the banks needed a sufficient
supply of currency to make transactions while Specie pay-
ments were suSpended. They had faith that legal tenders

would hold their value and be a boon to business and the

 

21Washington Evenin Star, March 4, 1862. New
Yorkkgribune, March 22, 1863 and March 8, 1862. New
York Times, May 27, 1862.

 

 

22Con - Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1862,
pp. 2884-8 , - .

186

Treasury because of their constant value throughout the
country. Perhaps the disagreement was caused because
Morrill and the Times Spoke for different constituencies.
The real issue was confidence. Morrill, and the common
people he spoke for, had no confidence in paper money
and failed to realize that the real focus of confidence

23 Because either

was now the government not the paper.
the Times editors spoke for SOphisticated city people, or
Simply possessed foresight, they saw no reason why money
backed by the government could not have value as a medium
of exchange. Eventually, the latter opinion prevailed, as
all paper money was made nonredeemable in Specie a century
later.

Gloomy military and financial Situations greeted
Congress when it met in December, 1862. A year of dis-
appointing military campaigns was soon to be capped by a
bitter defeat at Fredericksburg and a stalemate in the
West. By the end of 1862, a new financial crisis had to
be resolved. War costs increased greatly with the recruit-
ment of hundreds of thousands of additional men, and the
attendant expenses of supply and resupply necessary to

sustain an army one million strong. Inflation, too,

eroded large amounts of available revenue. The tax bill

 

23New York Times, March 31, 1862. Wesley C.
Mitchell, “Value of the Greenbacks During the Civil
War," J.P.E., VI (March, 1898), 143. Brodie, Stevens,
p. 173.

 

187

needed only minor adjustment to increase rates, but vast
new loans had to be authorized in order to maintain the
war effort. Also, the nation faced a currency Shortage
and this time money of denominations less than a dollar
was needed. Because inflation had made the metal in coins
more valuable as bullion than as currency, small change
disappeared. Substitutes appeared to solve the public's
need for ways to make change. Since these tokens, called
Shinplasters, were illegal, the federal government had to
issue official fractional currency.24
The legislation designed to meet these many ends
for the subsequent eighteen months, called simply the
Ways and Means Bill, was reported by Stevens on January 12,
1863. He announced that the bill authorized borrowing
$900 million in bonds, $300 million in interest bearing
Treasury Notes, and $300 million in noninterest bearing
demand notes. Stevens immediately stated his personal
Opposition to the bill and moved a substitute which
omitted the second provision. Speaking for the committee's
majority, E. G. Spaulding of New York immediately retorted

that the entire bill was needed; the nation must realize

 

24Wesley C. Mitchell, "The Circulating Medium
During the Civil War," J.P.E., X (Sept., 1902), 551-56.
Nevins, War for the Union, II, 163-64, 168-69. Ratner,
TaXation and—Democracy, pp. 79-80. Sharkey, Money,

Class, and Party, pp. 51-52.

 

 

 

188

that the war would cost immense sums resulting in a huge
debt.25
On the following day, Morrill delivered the major
speech for the bill in which he pointed out that the
overburdening and constantly increasing demands of the
nation's resources could be met only by total COOperation.
He said that the $900 million request was planned to carry
the war effort for a year and a half; if the war Should
last longer, more would be needed, but no amount was too
much to pay for Liberty and Union. Morrill's personal
sacrifice was a promise to support the bill, even though
it contained a provision for an additional $300 million
in legal tenders, because he felt that discontinuing the
established policy could be disastrous.26
Morrill began his explanation of the three main
and several lesser features of the bill by emphasizing
that the Committee of Ways and Means had been nearly

unanimous in support of the bill as reported. He predicted

that the $900 million in long-term 6 percent bonds and

 

25Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863,

pp. 283-85. AS ofiMarch 31, 1865, the federal debt was
$2,367 million. Hugh McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half
a Century (New York: Charles ScribnerTs Sons, 1888),

p. 243. Government securities were excellent investments
throughout the war. Nevins, War for the Union, III,

258.

 

 

 

 

26Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863,
pp. 294-98. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy, p. 80.

 

 

189

$300 million in 5.475 percent Treasury Notes would be
snapped up. The Secretary of the Treasury promised to use
the additional $300 million in legal tenders only in the
most extreme necessity. Morrill mentioned that among
the lesser provisions was one to authorize $50 million
in fractional currency and another to tax state banks out
of existence. In regard to the latter, he felt simple
regulation of their circulation would be sufficient.
Morrill then made this Speech do double duty by
discussing the National Banking System which was proposed
in a separate but allied bill. The bills were connected
because the Ways and Means Bill would impose the heavy
tax needed to repress state bank circulation and free the
market for national bank notes. Morrill, who rejected
the new system in Spite of the strong support it received
from the Secretary of the Treasury, explained that he
considered the prOposal to be faulty because:
The purpose of this new national banking scheme

is, not to regulate the currency . . . but to

uproot all the State banks issuing currency which

now exist, under whatever system established, in

order to make room for funding United States

bonds. . . . An examination . . . would Show the

banks have been more liberal in their contributions

to support the credit of the Government than any

other class in the country. It is neither just nor

sound policy for the Government at this time to
crucify its benefactors.27

 

27Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863,

pp. 296-97.

 

190

Turning his attention once more to the Ways and
Means Bill, Morrill admitted that the health of the
national finances depended on military success but
emphasized that public indications of faith were a big
help. Congress had shown its faith in the nation's
future by passing nonwar legislation ranging from the
Pacific Railroad to Homestead to the Agricultural Colleges.
That the war could be supported while other projects con-
tinued was, Morrill implied, a sure indication of a
strong government.28

Elijah Ward of New York attacked the legal tenders
because they were wrecking the nation by causing infla-
tion, a condition imposed most cruelly on the soldier.
The troops risked their lives for pay worth only half
its face value. He felt the new issue Of legal tenders
would accelerate this inequity. Fortunately, Ward
offered no amendment, for if he had, Morrill would have
been placed in an uncomfortable position.

On the other hand, Amasa Walker of Massachusetts
supported the entire bill, especially the bank tax
provision. First, he stated that the government had an
obligation to control paper money in order to eliminate
fluctuations and instability, and then he added the

deceptively Simple clinching argument that bank

 

ZBIbido' pp. 297-98.

191

circulation should be taxed because the Treasury needed
the money.29

Morrill and Stevens crossed swords over the tax
on state bank circulation. Stevens wanted a higher tax
while Morrill tried to justify the original proposal
saying that regulation, not repression, was the object.
Stevens won the first round when he moved that the pro-
vision be expanded tO cover city banks, but Morrill tried
to reverse the decision.30 Dismayed by the antibank
statements of Stevens and several other members, Morrill
protested their implications that banks were evil and
deserved to be destroyed; he pointed out again that banks
had done much for the nation both before and during the
war. For example, if state bank circulation Should be
totally curtailed, the nation's produce could not be
moved since buyers and sellers traditionally depended on
bankers to increase their circulation at harvest time
to facilitate sales. If state bank circulation was ended,
he predicted, everyone would be driven into the arms of
the big capitalist. To avoid that, Morrill asked the
House to return to the original bill which supported the
principle of regulation.

Since his amendment had already passed, Stevens

ignored Morrill's arguments and opened a new subject by

 

29 30

Ibid., pp. 334-41. Ibid., pp. 462-63, 480-82.

192

offering another substitute bill on the Treasury Note
question. While his first substitute eliminated that type
of securities entirely, Stevens's second substitute
allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to issue unlimited
3.65 percent Treasury Notes which would be legal tender.
Besides adding the legal tender clause, Stevens was offer-
ing an interest rate nearly 2 percent lower than

in the original bill.

Morrill, almost completely eanperated at this
point, struck back harshly at Stevens's proposal. He
objected to the substitute as it would both devalue the
old no-interest legal tenders and stop bond sales because
people would buy the dual purpose notes to earn interest
and pay their debts. Finally, Morrill pointedly mentioned
that the plan would bring chaos to Stevens's long-standing
effort to realize a uniform currency.

Since Stevens's motion was the last amendment
proposed in the House, Morrill took the steps necessary
to reach a final vote. Following the defeat of Stevens's
two substitute bills, the Ways and Means Bill was read the
third time and it finally passed the House. After the
amended bill was returned from the Senate, Morrill per-
suaded the House to accept those changes he approved and

then to insist on a series Of conference committees until

 

31L§id., p. 490. Brodie, Stevens, pp. 179, 393.

193

all differences were reconciled. He had to agree to a
provision authorizing the Treasury to issue $400 million
in notes which could be legal tender at the discretion
of the Secretary, but his version of the circulation tax
was adopted. Both Houses accepted the compromise, and the
bill passed essentially as Morrill wanted it.32
Apparently the only section of the Ways and Means
Bill controversial enough to evoke public comment was the
bank tax provision. One of Morrill's constituents, ex-
pressing views almost identical to the congressman's
position, predicted that such a tax would cripple the
patriotic country banks which, if left alone, would be
able to contribute far more to the war effort through
purchase of government securities. A dissenting voice on

bank taxes was raised by Joseph Medill, publisher of the

Chicago Tribune, who felt banks should be taxed on cir-

 

culation. Morrill replied that banks were already heavily
taxed: they paid a tax on their charter; stamp taxes on
checks, drafts, and notes; and a 3 percent tax on all
profits from dividends. Besides, he said, taxation must
bear a relation to profits, and profits ran 6 to 10 percent

33

for manufacturers and only 3 percent for banks. Thus,

 

32Con . Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1863,
pp. 520-22, 1837-41, 1313-14, 1352-54, 1398-99.

33John A. Conant to Morrill, Jan. 27, 1863,
Morrill Papers, Reel 30. Morrill to Joseph Medill,
Jan. 3, 1863, Morrill Papers, Reel 36.

194

Morrill had three reasons for opposing circulation taxes;
a) the banks had patriotically bought United States bonds,
b) they were already bearing their share of taxation, and
c) he owned considerable stock in state banks.

Morrill's defeat of the repressive bank circula-
tion tax was short-lived because the National Banking Act,
which carried the same clause, soon became law. ?This bill
brought order totfluanation's bank notes by placing their
issuance under federal control. After state bank notes
were taxed out of existence, a system of national banks
was established with the right to issue notes, a monopoly
upheld by the Supreme Court. Capitalized at a minimum of
fifty thousand dollars in small towns and twice that amount
where the population exceeded ten thousand people, the new
banks transferred at least one-third of their capital to
the Treasurer Of the United States in interest bearing
United States Bonds to be exchanged for 90 percent of
their value in circulating notes. Total national circula-
tion was restricted to $300 million, with half distributed
to the states in prOportion to representation in Congress,
and half given to the cities in proportion to the volume
of business transacted. All national bank notes were
redeemable in United States Notes, the legal tenders.

Finally, the government had created a uniform bank note

195

currency, as secure as the government itself because it
was a national paper currency based on national stocks.34
In opposing the National Banking System, Morrill
found himself intfluaminority as men from both parties
acclaimed it an excellent innovation. John Sherman, who
guided the measure through the Senate, gave it his full
support because he believed it would stabilize the
currency by removing the existing variety of bank notes
and by stOpping most counterfeiting. Samuel Cox of Ohio,
always a partisan Democrat, praised the new system without
qualification. Although Thaddeus Stevens favored the
Bank Act, he felt there was not enough federal control.
Hugh McCulloch, president of the State Bank of Indiana,
came to Washington in 1862 to aid Morrill in working
against the proposal, but a year later McCulloch accepted
the post of Controller of the Currency to organize the new
system. Morrill's Opposition was generated by fear that
state banks would be forced out of business; but, con-

trarily, their conversion to national banks went smoothly.35

 

34Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, pp. 224-31.
Samuel S. Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation:
1855-1885 (Providence, R.I.: Reid Publishers, 1888),
pp. 141-44. Nevins, War for the Union, III, 256. Nichols,
Stakes of Power, pp. 146, 206. Donald (ed.), Diaries of
Chase, p. 42.

 

 

 

 

 

 

35Edward Redington to Morrill, Feb. 3, 1863,
Morrill Papers, Reel 39. McCulloch, Men and Measures,
pp. 163-65. Sherman, Recollections, p.'298. Sharkey,
Money, Class, and Party, p. 225. Cox, Three Decades,
pp. 141-44. Donald, Sumner and Rights of Man, pp. 144-45.
Jellison, Fessenden, p. 165.

 

 

 

 

 

 

196

Comment in the influential New York press was
almost as wholeheartedly favorable as the congressional
reaction. At the time of passage, the Tribune said the
banking proposal was necessary to reestablish the national
credit on a sound, permanent basis. After the system had

proved its usefulness in daily commerce, the New York Times

 

editorialized that at least one good thing had come out
of the war, the reassumption of the federal government's
sovereignty over the currency: all other world govern-
ments had guaranteed the sound, uniform currency necessary
for business and Similar action by the federal government
was long overdue. The editors pointed out that contrary
to the intent of the Constitution, the states had assumed
the power to print money; Since the power to coin money
was vested in the national government, obviously it should
also control any substitute for coin. The Times par-
ticularly approved the forced change to national banks
because it was accomplished with little distress to state
banks.36

Among the strongest proponents of the National
Bank Act was Jay Cooke, the Philadelphia financier, who
was already renowned for organizing the sale of government

bonds. (As sole Treasury Agent for sale of several major

war bond issues, Cooke advertised and sold over one and

 

36New York Tribune, Feb. 3, 1863. New York Times,
Dec. 14, 1864.

 

 

197

a quarter billion dollars in federal securities almost
entirely within the country.) After the National Bank Act
was passed, Cooke and his associates quickly established
a leading position in the National Banking System by
organizing the First National Banks of Philadelphia and
Washington and the Fourth National Bank of New York.37
On the above issue Morrill was behind the times,
instead of out in front as he had been on many previous
issues. Since Morrill was a state bank director and held
considerable stock in banks in the towns around Strafford,
his reluctance to accept national banks could have been
due to financial self-interest. However, if this was
true, it was out of character for Morrill because there
is no evidence of any other instance where he let personal
gain influence his legislative actions. Probably the
National Banking Act was one time when Morrill simply did
not do his homework. Because the bill emerged from
another subcommittee of Ways and Means, Morrill had no
direct part in drafting it, and with the pressures of his
own work, it would have been difficult for him to reflect
on the banking bill sufficiently. Morrill was presumably
sincere in fearing that the common people who owned state

bank stocks would suffer serious financial loss. Having

 

37Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Jay Cooke: Financier of
the Civil War (Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs and*Co.,
1957), I, 155-51, 219ff. Nichols, Stakes of Power,
p. 136. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, pp. 245-46.
Donald (ed.), Diariés of Chase, p. 1751

 

 

 

 

198

made up his mind on faulty assumptions, Morrill stubbornly
maintained his opposition but later admitted the worth of
the system and willingly worked to improve it.38

The months of the congressional adjournment,
March to December, 1863, brought a welcome upturn in the
fortunes of the Union. The repulse of Lee's second in-
vasion of the North at Gettysburg thrilled the Union,
but was tempered by Meade's failure to pursue and destroy
the rebel army. In the same week, Grant Opened the
Mississippi River when he captured Vicksburg following
a long siege. Appointed to overall command in the West,
Grant demonstrated his fitness for even higher responsi-
bilities with his victories around Chattanooga. Early
in 1864 Grant was promoted to Lieutenant-General and
made General-in-Chief of the northern armies.

An incident in the North sadly marred this period
of Union successes. Violent draft riots raged in New
York City from July l3-l6. Originating as a protest to
the Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, the riot soon became
racial with crowds attacking Negroes. Local authorities

failed to quell the disturbances and veteran troops from

 

38List of Vermont Bank Stocks Owned by Morrill,
1855-1888, Justin S. Morrill Collection, Vermont
Historical Society. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess.,
1864, p. 1379.

 

199

the Army of the Potomac were summoned. The federal trOOps
restored order after hundreds had been killed.39
The returning Congress, happy about the improved
news from the battlefields, had also to confront the
usual and unwelcome increase in expenditures. The steadily
growing army consumed supplies and equipment at a stagger-
ing rate. By the end of 1863 the public debt was well
over $1 billion with ever greater sums demanded for inter-
est payments. The daily cost of the war was climbing
beyond $2 million. Raging inflation and an unexpected low
yield from the internal taxes compounded the need for
increased revenue.40
On January 14, 1864, when Stevens called up a
Special internal revenue bill designed to pump a quick
injection of funds into the Treasury, he surprisingly
found himself and Morrill facing their only major setback
of the war years. The bill, which they thought would pass
with little discussion, tripled the whiskey tax to Sixty
cents per gallon and imposed a two cents per pound tax on
any cotton not otherwise taxed. Owen Lovejoy of Illinois

startled Morrill and Stevens by moving that whiskey in

warehouses pay forty cents and new whiskey pay sixty cents

 

39Nevins, War for the Union, III, 119-24.

 

40Vermont Watchman, Dec. 25, 1863. Ratner,

Taxation and Democracy, pp. 81-94. Sharkey, Money, Class,
and Party, pp. 51952: Nevins, War for the Union, III,

' O

 

 

 

 

200

until July 1, when the tax on both would rise to one dollar
per gallon. The first provision was a retroactive tax

in violation of the warehousing section of the tax law of
1862 which allowed whiskey in bonded warehouses to pay the
tax applicable when sealed. Morrill immediately responded
that Sixty cents was the highest possible effective tax

and that the retroactive tax was unfair, illegitimate,

and impractical.

Ordinarily a counterattack by Morrill brought
success, but this time he and Stevens had been caught
unawares, and the financial rebels pressed their advantage.
The rebels' idea, to tax whiskey speculators, had enough
merit to win votes but would severely hurt legitimate
wholesalers who used the bonding system. Fernando Wood,

a New York City Democrat, moved to make the retroactive

tax sixty cents on all untaxed whiskey on hand, and forty
cents on that which had been prepaid at the old rate.

James G. Blaine then moved to make the cotton tax retro-
active. DeSpite the best efforts of Stevens and Morrill,
including their negative votes, the bill passed as
amended.41

With strong encouragement from Morrill and Stevens,
the Senate deleted the retroactive clauses, Sparking a

disagreement which required four conference committees to

 

41Con . Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,
pp. 215-18, 230-72, 282—88, 312-13.

201

resolve. The House accepted the deletion of the retro-
active clause on cotton but doggedly insisted in retaining
it on whiskey. After three weeks of argument the Senate
capitulated, and the bill passed with the retroactive
whiskey tax included.42
Since the Whiskey and Cotton Bill was the only
instance in which Morrill and Stevens wholly lost control
of one of their own bills, it must have left them almost
dumbfounded. The rebellion by the House was swift and
complete. Certainly a few of the rebellious members
sincerely believed that they were striking a blow at the
evil speculators, but that does not explain the dogged
determination of the House majority to pass the retro-
active amendment. What took place was not less than an
outright, albeit temporary, rejection of the House's
financial leadership. The retroactive tax on whiskey
presented the rare chance for the rank and file to brush
the leadership aside while helping the war effort.
Assuredly the retroactive clause was unfair to the honest
dealers, but by their own admission they could safely

43

absorb considerably higher rates. In short, it was a

 

42Ibid., pp. 660-64, 776-79, 892-93, 920,

933-35, 941.

43E. P. Smith to Thaddeus Stevens, c. Jan., 1864,
Stevens Papers. Isaac M. Barrett to John Sherman,
Jan. 26, 1864, Sherman Papers.

202

heady but safe rebellion. There was little Morrill or
Stevens could do to prevent it.

The frequent presence of little James Morrill on
the floor of the House lightened the Spirits of Morrill
and his friends during the hard weeks of 1864. The boy
who, along with his mother, cured Morrill's loneliness,
was also a Special delight to Stevens. James, six years
Old in 1864, was a charming diversion for all whenever he
came to the House with his father or his "Uncle" Thaddeus.
Stevens fondly called him "Little Ways and Means" and
playfully raised his hand during votes.44

Following in the contorted wake of the Whiskey and
Cotton Bill, the Internal Revenue Bill of 1864 was anti-
climactic but nonetheless badly needed. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue indicated that only substantial rate
increases would fill the coffers. Because the Whiskey
and Cotton Bill, even with the dramatic inclusion of the
retroactive tax on whiskey, was only a stopgap, the entire
internal revenue structure needed revision to close loop-
holes, to eliminate inequities, and to incorporate large
rate increases.45 Morrill worked months to write the

necessary law.

 

44Richard N. Current, Old Thad Stevens (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1942), pp. 203-4. Parker,
Morrill, pp. 131, 151.

 

45Vermont Watchman, Dec. 25, 1863. New York
Tribune, Jan. 20, 1864.

 

203

Morrill reported the Internal Revenue Bill on
April 19 and outlined the need for the additional funds
to be collected under it. He admitted that the war had
already lasted far longer than he or any member Of the
Ways and Means Committee had anticipated; obviously expen-
ditures far exceeded estimates. "The demands upon the
Treasury are unprecedented, but we have only to marshal
our resources and they are equal to all emergencies, and
to any campaign, good or bad."46

To forestall potential criticisms Morrill pointed
out the improvements made to close lOOpholeS and to tighten
allocation of the prOposed new monies. He stressed that
the Treasury was "receiving from forty to fifty percent
more internal revenue this year than last, and when all of
the officers Shall have been properly taught how to enforce
the provisions of the law, it may be eXpected to do better
still." Next, Morrill mentioned that the new funds for
the armed forces would go further because the army and
navy were recruited and equipped, so that only resupply
would be necessary. Finally, Morrill stressed that the
internal revenue apparatus was SO efficient that its cost

0 0 47
was minimal.

 

46Cong;Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,
pp. 1715-16. The Act of 1864 was intended to double the

revenues. Ratner, Taxation and Democrac , p. 82. Internal
Revenues reached $109,000,000 in 1863-64 and $209,000,000
in 1864-65. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, p. 54.

47
p. 1716.

 

 

Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,

204

Morrill said that the most important rate in-
creases fell on manufactures, incomes, distilled Spirits,
and tobacco. The taxes on manufactures and incomes were
increased from 3 to 5 percent. Whiskey and tobacco rates
were greatly raised, with that on whiskey rising to 500
percent of its average value. With all of these changes,
Morrill predicted the bill would produce a minimum of
$250 million, and with $80 million from the tariff, the
Treasury could collect as much as $400 million per year.48

Morrill's Speech, a general recognition of the
necessity for funds, and the aftereffect of the Whiskey
and Cotton Bill, combined to make the passage of the
Internal Revenue Bill remarkably smooth--ruffled only by
an attack from Fernando Wood. Morrill spoke against two
amendments which would, respectively, continue the retro-
active tax on whiskey, and insert a graduated clause in
the income tax. Morrill considered the latter discrimina-
tion against the rich. When the Senate again struck the
retroactive whiskey tax, Morrill persuaded the House to
concur. Thus, he got the revenue act through with only

one Significant alteration.49

 

48£bid., pp. 1716-18. Ratner, Taxation and

Democracy, p. 82. Nevins, War for the Union, III, 228.

 

 

49Seligman, Income Tax, pp. 440-44. Cong. Globe,
38th cong.' 18t $688., 1864' pp. 1722-29, 175 - p -42,

2995-3021.

205

The few comments from the press on the tax bill

were nearly all favorable. The Vermont Watchman congratu-

 

lated Congress for strongly supporting the national credit
and urged the people to do their part by buying bonds.

The New York Tribune commented in almost the same words.

 

The New York Times agreed with Morrill that the people

 

demanded taxation sufficient to protect the government's
credit.50
A relatively minor tax bill, introduced soon

after passage of the Internal Revenue Act, exemplified

the fine degree to which Morrill's parliamentary skill had
been honed by the middle of 1864. On July 2, he called up
a temporary income tax bill to pay the bounties of new
recruits. Since the bill was limited in object and dura-
tion, Morrill asked that it be passed unamended; but, a
few items, including the retroactive whiskey tax, were
added. After Morrill failed in an attempt to offer the
original bill as a substitute, the amended bill was read
the third time and passed. Faced with defeat, Morrill

used his last card. He got reconsideration, consecutively,

of the passage, the third reading, and the substitute.

 

50Vermont Watchman, May 6, 1864. New York
Tribune, May 7, 18641 New York Times, July 1, 1864
ana Ju1y 27, 1864.

 

 

206

After working back to the substitute, his original bill,
Morrill received a vote for passage.51
The year 1864 was momentous in both the political
and military arenas. The reelection of Lincoln was in
doubt for several months because of war-weariness in the
North and a threatened radical revolt over his policies.
However, the party majority, including Morrill, supported
the president's candidacy. After military victories at
Atlanta, Mobile, and the Shenandoah Valley encouraged the
North, Lincoln was triumphantly reelected. But those
victories, part of the continuous, coordinated campaigns
directed by Grant, had been terribly costly in men and
material. The continuing recruitment and resupply of the
armies, along with the omnipresent inflation, pushed the
cost of the war to $3 million a day.52
By the time Congress reconvened in December, 1864,
the press was filled with suggestions on how the Treasury
should Obtain the needed additional funds. The New York

Times praised the decision of the new Treasury Secretary,

William Pitt Fessenden, to rely on loans instead of

 

51Con . Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., 1864,
pp. 3527-32. Se1lgman, Income Tax, p. 446. Ratner,
Taxation and Democragy, pp. 89-93.

 

 

52Nichols, Stakes of Power, pp. 147-51. Current,
Thad Stevens, pp. 1984203. Parker, Morrill, p. 161.
Ratner,:Taxation and Democracy, pp. 93-93. Allan Nevins,
The War for the Union (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1971), IV, 45. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party,
pp. 51-52.

 

 

 

 

 

207

issuing more legal tenders but it asked that Congress
collect additional taxes so the volume of loans could be
reduced. The Times also praised the public's patriotic
response to taxes and suggested that the government match
their sacrifice by committing itself to military retrench-
ment through elimination of redundant garrisons and unused

Ships. The New York Tribune published its own principles

 

of taxation in which the editors suggested that: taxes
should not discourage industry, diffusion of knowledge
should not be hindered by taxation, luxury items should
be heavily taxed, and taxes Should be used to diminish the
number of jobs which contribute nothing to the wealth or
well-being of the nation or the human family.53

Well aware that the press often expressed the
thoughts of the public, Morrill began his nearly annual
search for the fairest means to raise additional funds.
Since alternatives were limited, the result was
predictable--higher tariffs and taxes, and another
bonding program.

Early in February, 1865, Morrill reported his
last wartime tax bill and explained that it contained

essentially a general increase, with adjustments being

made for items which had reached the taxation limit.

 

53Nevins, War for the Union, IV, 207. Ratner,
Taxation and Democrac , pp. 93-96. New York Times,
fiec. 8, 1864, Jan. 7, 1865. New York Tribune, Jan. 14,
1865.

 

 

 

 

208

Most taxes were boosted from 5 to 6 percent, but the
whiskey tax,always increased previously, was left constant.
Besides the raised rates, Morrill said, inequities would
be ended and means legislated to collect from shirkers.
Morrill then saw the bill through the House with only a
single provision added, which he disliked, a sales tax.
The bill was debated and passed in only nine days.54

The final stroke in the financial picture was
another loan bill which Morrill's colleague, Samuel Hooper
of Massachusetts, reported. The bill authorized the sale
of bonds and Treasury Notes to a value of $600 million.
When a member suggested restricting the issue to bonds,
Morrill stepped in to defend the Treasury Notes because
they allowed the Treasury needed flexibility and gave the
small investor the chance to do his share. With little
additional debate, the unamended bill passed the same day
it was reported.55

Congress adjourned with the end of the war and the

death of Lincoln only weeks away. The North soon rejoiced

at the news of the fall Of Richmond and the subsequent

 

S4Con . Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865,
PP- 695-96, - , 879. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy,
pp. 97-98.

 

55Con . Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865,
pp. 1162-66, 1204-5. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy,
p. 98. Government securities sold very well in the

final year of the war. Nevins, War for the Union,
IV, 379.

 

 

209

surrender of Lee. Morrill and his constituents were proud
that a Vermonter, General Edward Ripley, led the first

unit into the rebel capital. But the death of Lincoln by
an assassin's bullet cruelly ended the jubilation.56

In seeking the motivation for Morrill's activities
in Congress, the easiest to discern is his reason for
drafting the wartime tax legislation. It was simply duty.
Morrill made his greatest contribution of services in this
work because he loved his country; he wanted to see slavery
ended, but more importantly he wanted to help save the
Union. He realized that the courage of the troops would
be of little avail without financial backing.

In playing his role in creating the system of
taxation, Morrill applied, on an unprecedented scale, the
principles of business to national finance. To be success-
ful a businessman must generally pay as he goes and only
borrow against future profits during a temporary Slump.
That was Morrill's touchstone for government action. Since
it was in a crisis, the government had to tax to the prac-
tical limit, and then borrow on the profits of future
generations who would reap the benefits of a successful
war effort. Morrill boldly stepped into a crisis situation

and did more than his Share to resolve it.-

 

56Nevins, War for the Union, IV, 298.

 

CHAPTER VIII

CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

In the first postwar Congress, the Thirty-ninth,
Morrill chaired the Committee on Ways and Means. However,
due to a reorganization, the chairmanship of Ways and
Means was not the same job that Morrill had declined four
years earlier. Samuel Cox of Ohio had instigated a rule
change in 1865 which split the old committee into three
parts: Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Banking and
Currency. Although Morrill had not favored the change,
he admitted that during the war the committee had been
badly overburdened. Despite the division of responsibil-
ities, the position of Chairman of Ways and Means suffered

no apparent loss of prestige.1

 

1Stevens became chairman of both the House section

of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and of the Appro-
priations Committee. Richard N. Current, Old Thad Stevens
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1942), p. 221.
Vermont Watchman, Dec. 8, 1865. Samuel S. Cox, Ei ht
Years in1Congress (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 865),
p. 622 David Lindey, "Sunset" Cox (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1959)) pp. 89-90, 95. Cong. Globe,

38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865, pp. 1316-17. William H.
Barnes, History of the Thirty-Ninth Congress (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1868), p. 29.

 

 

 

210

211

Since the war ended during the congressional

adjournment, President Andrew Johnson was able to begin

 

Reconstruction unhindered. He considered the work an
executive prerogative and was determined to present
Congress with a fait accompli when it convened in December.
Under Johnson's plan, once a majority of the voters in a

state had taken an oath of allegiance they would begin I
Reconstruction by electing delegates to a constitutional

convention. The conventions would be obliged to nullify ~-

 

 

 

secession, repudiate rebel debts, and abolish Slavery.
Southern citizens could then immediately elect state
officials and congressmen. Unfortunately, the South abused
Johnson's leniency by electing former Confederate officials
to high Offices and quickly adOpting Black Codes to re-
strict freedmen. The President did little to chastise
such arrogant actions. The Negro question he carried
little farther than the renunciation of Slavery. However,
the Congress had a more militant attitude, and when it
convened, southern congressmen-elect and senators-elect
faced a body determined to reject them.2

Congress sidestepped a lengthy confrontation on
southerners' credentials by immediately appointing a Joint

Committee on Reconstruction, composed of nine congressmen

 

2Rembert W. Patrick, The Reconstruction of the
Nation (New York: Oxford University15ress, 1967),
pp. 29-33, 47. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruc-
tion 1865-1877 (New York: Random House, 1865), pp. 62-81.

 

 

 

212

and six senators. Congress empowered them to investigate
all questions concerning Reconstruction. Although the
radicals conceived the committee and held a one vote
majority, they did not dominate it. Senator Fessenden,
a moderate, became chairman and kept control. The Joint
Committee on Reconstruction bided its time, hearing wit-
nesses and discussing legislation, while President
Johnson's plans slowly collapsed. The first confronta-
tions involved the Freedman's Bureau and the Civil Rights
Bills, measures which were proposed by and had the support
of the moderates. Johnson wrote an excellent veto message
on the former, which might have gained him public support,
but he quickly lost favor due to a speech on February 22,
1866, which denounced the Committee. Public and con-
gressional Opinion began to abandon Johnson so that, when
he also vetoed the Civil Rights Bill, Congress overrode
the veto. Congress took the initiative in the confronta-
tion when Stevens proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.3
Although evidence continued to accumulate revealing
ill-treatment of freedmen and unrepentance in the South,
President Johnson refused to compromise with congressional
leaders. Having rejected the pleas by the moderates to

Sign the Freedman's Bureau and Civil Rights Bills, Johnson

 

3John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the
Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961),
pp. 59-61. Patrick, Reconstruction, pp. 65-75.

 

 

 

213

continued to alienate that group. Vicious anti-Negro
riots in Memphis and New Orleans, unchecked by the new
Johnson state governments, revolted Northerners. As the
election of 1866 approached, Johnson stood virtually

alone.4

 

The election of 1866 was a triumph for the radicals.
Campaigning was unusually intense for a mid-term election
year. The President threw himself into the fray with a

stump-Speaking tour called the "Swing Around the Circle."

 

But Johnson soon learned that a technique fitted to the
Tennessee hills failed in Northern cities. His single
Speech preceded him and after a time hecklers rather than
listeners met him. The radicals ran an efficient campaign.
Effective speakers dogged Johnson's route. Mass meetings
were held to counter those of the pro-Johnson forces. On
election day the Republicans swept Northern governorships
and elected two-thirds majorities in both houses of
Congress.5

With a mandate from the people and the radicals
in the vanguard, Congress moved swiftly to begin Recon-

struction anew. In the second session of the 39th

 

4Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1959), pp. 243-46. Franklin,
Reconstruction, pp. 57-65.

 

 

5Current, Old Thad Stevens, pp. 256-60. Patrick,
Reconstruction, pp. 85-89. Franklin, Reconstruction,
pp. 66-70.

 

 

 

214

Congress a host of bills were passed over presidential
vetoes. Republican congressmen enfranchised Negroes in
the District of Columbia, curbed presidential power in
the Tenure of Office Act, and established the basis for

Congressional Reconstruction in the First Reconstruction

 

Act. By the last named act, state governments in the ’
South, excepting Tennessee, were declared invalid and

replaced by the military. The Reconstruction procedure

 

involved electing constitutional convention delegates by }
universal male suffrage, excluding those who took part in ‘L
the rebellion. After the peOple approved a constitution
enfranchising all male citizens, elections could be held
for state Officials and congressmen. With ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the state's congressional dele-
gation would be seated. In time the Southern states
complied with the requirements and were readmitted to
the Union.6
AS a leading member of the House, Morrill sat on
the Joint Committee, and, although his reSponsibility for
financial bills restricted his participation, he indicated
his approval of the committee's work by signing its final
report. Morrill was a radical Republican, but his

temperament and his duties on Ways and Means kept him from

a strong leadership role. He left that to Stevens and

 

6Patrick, Reconstruction, pp. 91-99. Stampp, Era
of Reconstruction, pp. 144-47. Brodie, Stevens,
pp. 249-54.

 

 

215

others. But Morrill was no less harsh toward the South;
he said readmission would "not be by my vote until they
[Southerners] have repented and done works meet for
repentance [Sic]."7 He supported the radical bills,
including the Fourteenth Amendment, and the changing of
the date of congressional openings to March 4. The latter
act kept Congress in continuous session and checked
President Johnson. Morrill also favored suffrage for the
freedmen which he supported by votes both in the Recon-
struction Committee and on the floor of the House.8

Peace brought a dramatic drop in expenditures, but
they remained much higher than in prewar years. Rapid
demobilization cut military costs to a fraction of their
wartime Size. Yet, soldiers' pensions would keep the
military budget a major item. The most important new

peacetime cost was the enormous public debt, estimated by

 

7Brodie, Stevens, pp. 242-46. Patrick, Recon-
struction, p. 65. LaWanda and John H. Cox, Politics,
Principle and Prejudice 1865-1866 (New York: Free Press,
1963), pp. 142-43. David Donald, Charles Sumner and the
Rights of Man (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 238)
U.S., Congress, Reportlof the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, House Reports, 39th Cong.,‘lst Sess., II,
No. 30, 1866. Ryland Giletcher to Morrill, Jan. 16,
1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 33.

 

 

 

 

 

8New York Times, Sept. 24, 1866. Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1866, pp. 31-32. George S. Boutwell,
Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs (New York:
McC1ure, Phillips and—Co., 1902), II, 37. .CongLGlobe,
39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867, pp. 453-54. Roy F. Nichols,
The Stakes of Power 1845-1877 (New York: Hill and Wang,
1961). p. 168. Stampp, Era of Reconstruction, p. 147.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

216

Treasury Secretary Hugh McCullock to crest at $3 billion.
Interest had to be paid and a Sinking fund established to
cover the principal as it fell due. Nevertheless,
estimates of surplus revenues indicated that tax reduc-
tions were in order.9

The challenge facing Morrill was the rapid,
orderly dismantling of the war revenue programs. Internal
revenue and tariff laws required radical surgery to ease
the crushing burden carried so uncomplainingly by the
public; however, the reductions had to be accomplished
without losing revenues needed for government expenditures
and payments on the public debt. Morrill decided first
to turn his attention to the internal revenue and later
to the tariff.10

On May 7, after months of careful work, Morrill
reported the Internal Revenue Bill of 1866. He immed-
iately explained that estimated receipts for 1865 would
be $500 million while postwar expenses Should stabilize
at $350 million. However, an anticipated sharp reduction
in revenues from the manufacturing tax, partially balanced

by a large increase from cotton, would eradicate half of

 

9Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 112.

 

loAllan Nevins, The War for the Union (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), IV, 372-73, 382.

217

the surplus, leaving income for 1866 at $425 million.
Thus, Morrill said, he designed the prOposed bill to
eliminate the excess of $75 million by tax reductions.11
Morrill indicated that in the interest of fairness
the Committee revised the tax structure in several ways:
the general trend was downward, but a few items remained
at the high level of 1865, and one important rate in-
creased. Because the Committee felt a Special Obligation
to repay the common peOple's loyal, cheerful bearing of
a heavy tax burden, it removed or greatly reduced taxes
on necessities of life, such as salt, sugar, and coal.
Also, of Significance, the rate on manufacturing fell
from 6 to 5 percent. Morrill claimed that partial com-
pensation for these losses lay in increasing the tax on
raw cotton from two to five cents per pound. On the
other hand, Morrill noted, the high levies on luxury
items, whiskey, and malt liquors remained because their
buyers "were among those persons best able to contribute
something to the support of the government." Finally,
Morrill stated, the Committee on Ways and Means reluctantly
retained the income tax but eased its weight by raising
the personal exemption from $600 to $1,000 and by setting

a uniform rate of 5 percent.12

 

llCong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 2434-35T

12Ibid., pp. 2435-37. Edwin R. Seligman, The
Income Tax (New York: Macmillan Co., 1911), pp. 449-50.
Franklin, Reconstruction, pp. 40, 180.

 

 

 

218

Morrill Opposed the graduated income tax at every
opportunity because he considered it intrinsically
unjust. He never wavered from the position that it was
based on the principal that a man Should be penalized
because he was richer than another. Besides violating
the principal of equality before the law, the graduated
clause would, Morrill said, sap the initiative of
ambitious men. Despite assertions by other members that
the higher rates really tapped the luxuries available
only to the rich, Morrill never reconciled himself to this
type of taxation.13

In concluding his Tax Bill Speech, Morrill noted
that the government was in surprisingly good condition
after four years of bitter war. He stressed that the
confidence of the people in the government was unshakable,
the vigor and elasticity of the nation's industry was
without rival, national resources were growing, and untold
wealth was still locked in the mountains. All that was
asked of Congress, he said, was to save the national
credit.14

Henry Raymond, a member of the House and editor

of the New York Times, mildly criticized Morrill because

 

 

13Ratner, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 83-84, 113.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866, pp. 2783-86.
Seligman, Income Tax, pp. 449-54.

 

 

 

14
p. 2438.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,

 

219

he felt that the revenue estimates were too conservative
and that more reductions and a reordering of reduction
priorities were needed. He chastised Morrill for
apologizing about the income tax because the increased
exemption eliminated inequities, but he insisted that
abolishing the graduated principle would be a mistake.
Finally, Raymond suggested that food and clothing be
untaxed and that the United States derive most of its
revenue from whiskey and tobacco.15
Since nearly every member had some pet item he
hOped to see exempted, the amendment process was involved,
but Morrill's opinion generally prevailed. A member
offered a potentially crippling amendment to the cotton
tax by asking that the first six hundred pounds from each
producer be exempt. Because the cotton tax was a key
part of his revenue bill, Morrill stoutly defended it.
He explained that the idea was faulty because soon every
field hand would be listed as a producer with none growing
over the minimum. Raymond sought support for two of his
suggestions, the increased whiskey tax and the graduated
income tax, but the whiskey tax remained as Morrill set
it, while Raymond succeeded in adding the higher tax on

large incomes. Declaring himself satisfied with the

 

15Ibid., pp. 2438-42. Seligman, Income Tax,
pp. 450-51.

 

 

 

220

amended version Of the bill. Morrill got a final vote in
the House on May 28.16

The Senate returned the bill a month later with
over six hundred amendments but only one major alteration,
a cut in the cotton tax to two cents per pound. Morrill
resolved the difference by reluctantly compromising at
three cents per pound, and the bill passed.17

Public comment on the tax reduction bill was
heavy and wide-ranging, perhaps because it was no longer
unpatriotic to Speak out about one's tax load. Among the
protestors were whiskey and tobacco manufacturers who ob-
jected bitterly about their lot. Many individuals wrote

to protest inequities in the law or arbitrary decisions

by assessors, complaints echoed by the New York Times. A

 

few people protested a prOposal to tax banks. On the
other hand, occasionally Morrill was thanked, as for
keeping the rate low on the new domestic wine industry.
However, when he was shipped a free case in appreciation,
Morrill replied that he could not accept the gift due to
his position and asked to be billed. Morrill did no

special favors but simply followed a policy of taxing an

 

l6Con . Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 2473-80, 3630-36, 2783-86. Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew
Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago: University of

(flhicago Press, 1960), p. 370. Brodie, Stevens, pp. 304,
409. “”

17Con . Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 2862-65, 3444-39. Ratner, Taxation and Democracy,
pp. 113-14.

221

industry only as much as he believed to be fair and
equitable.18
Among the national newspapers, the New York

Tribune and the Washington Evening Star, so often in

 

disagreement, both backed Morrill's tax cut bill. The
Tribune, particularly, defended the increased cotton tax
on the grounds that the South paid few other taxes. The

Evening Star requested even larger cuts, a request that
19

 

Morrill fulfilled in the second session.

The New York Times commented even more prolifically

 

than its rivals in making suggestions on taxation. As
early as July, 1865, the editors predicted internal
revenue receipts of one million per day and high tariff
revenues too. In March, 1866, the Times estimated an
annual Treasury income of $650 million which, as its
editor said on the floor of the House, was far above

Morrill's conservative estimate. Basically, the Times

 

18Nichols, Stakes of Power, p. 200. James G.
Blaine to Morrill, Nov. 15, 1865 in Justin S. Morrill,
"Notable Letters From My Political Friends," Forum, XXIV
(Nov., 1897), 275. I. Stanffer to Stevens, Dec. 26, 1865,
and "Nemo" of Baltimore to Stevens, Feb. 16, 1866,
Stevens Papers. Albert G. Porter to Morrill, May 26,
1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7. New York Times, Aug. 14,
1865. Henry Closson to Morrill, May 5, 1866, and C. A.
Hamilton to Morrill, May 7, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7.
Perkins, Stern, and Co. to Morrill, Dec. 16, 1865 and
Morrill to Perkins, Stern, and Co., Dec. 18, 1865,
Morrill Papers, Reel 6.

 

 

lgflgwfiYork Daily Tribune, Nov. 19, 1866.
Washington Evening Star, Dec. 20, 1866.

 

 

222

favored revising the revenue system, but sought much
larger reductions than Morrill was willing to chance.
Besides its direct comments on tax reductions, the Times
published its principles of taxation. The points were:
first, taxes should be levied on a limited number of
items, eSpecially luxury goods and whiskey; second, once
established the system Should not be disturbed by legis-
lative tinkering; third, an item should be taxed at only
one stage of processing; and finally, enforcement must
be uniform and universal.20 The Times's principles of
taxation coincided almost perfectly with those of Morrill.
Tax receipts during 1866 proved that Morrill had
underestimated revenues and could reduce taxes still
further; indeed revenues had been closer to the $650
million predicted by Henry Raymond and the Times than to
Morrill's cautious appraisal. Expenditures were lower;
the debt crested about a quarter billion dollars below
estimates. But it was typical of Morrill to err on the
safe Side. The surplus could be removed by painless
additional reductions, but if the earlier abatements had
been too radical, he might have been forced into the

nearly impossible position of restoring taxes.21

 

2°New York Times, July 29, 1865; March 1, 1866;
.Aug. 14, 1865; May 11, 1866; and Aug. 4, 1865.

 

21New York Times, March 1, 1866. Cong. Globe,
39t11 Cong., lst Sess., 1866, pp. 971-77. JOhn Sherman,
Recc>1lections of Fort Years in the House, Senate, and
CaBJgnet (Chicago: The Werner Co., 1895), p. 377. Ratner,
ngaction and Democracy, p. 119. Seligman, Income Tax,
Po 4'71.

 

223

On February 13, 1867, Morrill Opened his speech
on the second tax reduction bill by lamenting that shirking
on the whiskey, tobacco, and cigar taxes, prevented the
elimination of most other taxes. But the confusion caused
by changes in the revenue laws and frequent turnover in
revenue officers helped unscrupulous individuals evade such
taxes as the two dollars per gallon on liquor. In order
to obtain revenue, Morrill pointed out, the Committee
tightened the law in those areas but was also forced to
lean temporarily on other articles.22
Morrill explained that reductions can come either

by reducing the overall percentage of tax or by exempting
articles. He said that the Committee chose the later
because by

exempting entirely from taxes such articles as salt,

clothing, leather, pottery-ware, tinware, and

cooperage of all sorts, . . . the committee feel that

they . . . distribute equal favor over the whole

country, and by removing the tax from some of the

common necessaries of life we Shall perhaps indirectly

actually aid all branches of industry.
Morrill expected that the proposed act would bring tax

relief equal to the $75 million cut off the first session.23

 

22Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867,
p. 1216.

 

23Ibid. Morrill's income tax reforms passed in
this bill mainly because it was agreed that the funds
were no longer needed. Seligman, Income Tax, p. 454. The
‘income tax accounted for one-fourth Of the internal
revenue. Rather, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 141-42.

 

 

 

 

224

AS a result of the second round of reductions,
the wartime tax structure would be essentially dismantled.
Expenses, while much higher than antebellum, would be
balanced by income. Morrill said that the Committee of
Ways and Means planned "to so reduce the revenue that no
large balance would remain in the treasury to tempt any
one to disregard the wisdom of economy." Morrill assured
the House that as a result of this bill the weariness of
heavy taxation would pass and the nation's facilities for
development of wealth and power would receive only
temporary setbacks.24

Opposition to the bill was almost nil, but
William A. Darling of New York submitted an amendment
intended to strengthen the whiskey section. Darling
suggested that the proposed five hundred dollar distiller's
license be doubled and be subject to review every three
months. He also prOposed placing inspectors on federal
rather than local payrolls and requiring them to move
frequently from one distillery to another.25

Morrill delegated responsibility for guiding the
bill past the reading for amendment to his colleague,

Samuel Hooper of Massachusetts, who saw the bill through

with only minor changes. The biggest battle arose over

 

24Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867,

pp. 1218-20.

 

251bid., p. 1219.

225

the whiskey license. Both Darling's amendment and the
committee's prOposal were defeated, so the license was
left at one hundred dollars.26
The Senate, preoccupied with reconstruction
legislation, rushed the tax bill through in only three
days. A few of the Senate's amendments were important
changes, but Morrill was able to reach satisfactory
compromises in conference. For example, the Senate wanted
to cut the cotton tax from 3 percent to 2; the conferees
settled at two and a half. Content with the modifications,
Morrill asked the House to approve the conference report.
The bill passed on March 2, 1867, the same day as the
Tenure of Office Act and the First Reconstruction Act.27

Reaction to this important bill was limited, but

the New York Times made significant comments. On

 

February 13, the Times hesitantly indicated that the bill
should pass because nothing better was possible so late
in the session. The editors felt that although most pro-
visions were good, the general manufacturing and whiskey
taxes Should have been lowered. Two days later, after

Morrill's Speech, the Times accepted his explanation that

 

26£2£9.p pp. 1220-23, 1256-62, 1543-50.

271212., p. 1744. Ratner, Taxation and
Democracy, pp. 115-16, 120.

 

 

v" -.p.

i n.
O

Elf
". 7. ‘

 

226

the small surplus expected prevented those reductions and
urged passage of the bill without reservation.28

In the two tax reduction bills of the 39th
Congress, Morrill kept his pledge to the public that the
internal revenue structure would be abolished as soon
after the war as practical.. Though criticized for moving
too Slowly, his policy worked well. While avoiding

serious dislocations of the economy, he dismantled most

of a complex tax system in the short span of fifteen

 

months.

Despite the importance of tax reduction, it was
overshadowed by another issue before Congress--the tariff.
The tax bills Sparked no major controversy because there
was general agreement on the temporary nature of internal
taxation. In the tariff bill, there was a return to an
area of traditional political contention. Morrill had
promised that the tariff rates would fall with the taxes,
but he reneged.

The outcome of Morrill's tariff revision was
foreshadowed by the fate of a Special Canadian tariff in
which he prOposed to keep the best aSpects of the defunct
reciprocity treaty by charging Canadians just enough to
counterbalance the internal taxes. The provision which
proved decisive in the defeat of the bill was a 50 cents

per ton rate on coal. Representatives Of coal producing

 

28New York Times, Feb. 13 and 15, 1867.

 

227

areas, including Thad Stevens, condemned Morrill for his
apparent favoritism to New England which used Canadian
coal, accused him of perpetuating reciprocity, and
demanded the regular rate of $1.25 per ton. Morrill
defended himself against these charges by pointing out
that he had killed reciprocity but saw no contradiction F1
in trying to reinstate an equitable provision. He claimed 7‘
that the coal rate was close to true reciprocity Since

exports and imports over various parts of the border 3
' I.

 

nearly balanced. Because Morrill's arguments did not L“;
sway the ardent protectionists, the bill failed on a
test vote.29
Protectionists, having struggled to win their
ascendancy, were not willing to relinquish the position
which the war had allowed them to assume. Many special
interests would lose if the tariff was reduced, but iron,
coal, and wool men led the defense of protection. TO
them cuts were unthinkable. That the tariffs were only

intended to counterbalance the pressure of internal taxes

on industry was no longer important. Prices and wages

 

rose during the war and that justified high duties.30
29Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
30

F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United
States (New York: B. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931), pp. 174-76.
Howard Beale, "The Tariff and Reconstruction," American
Historical Review, XXXV (Jan., 1930), 276-94. Rohert P.
Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of

 

 

 

228

In the months preceding introduction of his
planned, moderately protective tariff, Morrill repeatedly
exposed his own prejudice in favor of wool. During April,
1866, he introduced petitions from his constituents bearing
thousands of names asking for increased wool duties. In
a letter to the National Wool Growers Association, Morrill
emphasized that he had always worked for protection on
wool even though it was an exception to his basic policy
of free raw materials. In a letter to a friend, he blamed
the manufacturers for continuing the impoverishment of the
growers by buying vast quantities of poor grade foreign
wools which were duty free. His conclusion was that all
imported wool must carry a specific duty.31

His constituents' outcry favoring a rise in wool
rates was so overwhelming that Morrill could not have
resisted had he wanted to. On most questions Morrill would
get a scattering of letters, but this issue loosed a virtual

deluge of mail which was mostly very favorable to higher

wool duties. One writer expressed the position well in

 

Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: Johns HOpkins
fiféss, 1959), pp.4151-52, 163. Ratner, Taxation and
Democracy, pp. 116-17. Among the leaders of the tariff
reductionists was Samuel S. Cox Of Ohio. Lindsey,
"Sunset" Cox, pp. 112-17.

 

 

 

 

31Con . Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 1820, 1870, 2032. Morrill to Henry Randall of
National Wool Growers Association, Feb. 3, 1866, Morrill

to Nathan Cushing, Feb. 1866, Morrill to Edwin Hammond,
Feb. 17, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7.

229

complaining that the manufacturers hid behind prohibitive
rates while the growers did not even have the protection
level of a revenue tariff. Since Morrill was running for
the Senate in 1866, he had to support vigorously the
interests of that influential block of Vermont citizens.32
When Morrill introduced the new tariff bill on
June 28, 1866, he felt the need to explain the failure to
honor his wartime promises of reductions. Morrill stated
that industry needed protection because the ravages of
war had deprived it of a large portion of the labor pool.
In the North half a million men were dead or too badly
wounded for heavy labor; the United States could not
compete with industrial EurOpe in any major area because
of the labor deficiency. Yet, he said, since every man
should be employed, industry must be helped to compete.
Morrill also warned his colleagues that the national
economy was vulnerable to cheap imports because of "the
disturbing flood of an exclusively paper currency." He
was frustrated that little progress was being made toward
retirement of the legal tenders; Congress refused to

retire more than four million dollars in greenbacks a

 

32a. Medill to Morrill, Dec. 19, 1866, Morrill
Papers, Reel 8. J. W. Colburn to Morrill, July 19, 1866,
Morrill Papers, Reel 30. Isaiah Mock to Morrill, Dec. 15,
1865, Morrill Papers, Reel 6. E. Seymour to Morrill,
April 3, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7.

230

month. In essence, Morrill blamed high duties on both a
depleted labor pool and continued paper money inflation.33
Morrill saw a clear connection between currency
contraction and tariff reduction. He knew that the
workingman had’suffered from depreciation of the currency
and the rise in prices. Wages rose too, but had not kept
pace with prices. If Congress did not contract the
currency to force prices down before reducing the tariff,
foreign competition might well cost the workingman his
job. By eliminating competition, the high tariff both
helped and hindered; employment might remain high but so
would prices.34
In the most strongly worded section of his Speech,
Morrill cited the plight of the woolgrowers as the final,
compelling reason for tariff revision. He pointed out
that
flocks of sheep in South America, in Australia, at
the Cape, and elsewhere, have become SO large, so
much improved by mixed breeds, that they threaten
to force the American wool grower to abandon a chosen
and most attractive pursuit. . . . wool equal in
grade to the average American growth can be brought
in from South America for fifteen cents per pound.

. . . but no American husbandman. . . . can compete
with such prices. . . . Unless Congress shall do

 

33Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,

 

34Ratner, Taxation and Democragy, pp. 137-41.
Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, pp. 63-64. Current,
Old Thad Stevens, p. 238.

 

 

 

231

something to revive the courage of these men the

stock of sheep that will be offered for slaughter

the coming fall will exceed anything the country

has heretofore witnessed. . . .35

Morrill also discussed the void left by the

expiration of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty. He in-
sisted that Congress had to act because "termination of
the reciprocity treaty leaves the duties upon agricultural
production, and upon lumber, fish, and coal at such rates
as were imposed at times when it made no difference what
those rates were." But the trade had become so mutually
important economically that it should be fostered. Trade
with the Maritime Provinces was to be particularly
cultivated, Morrill felt, because "the people are very
friendly and they have articles such as we require in
large quantities, such as coal and plaster, for which
they take of us flour and other articles in nearly equal
quantities." The Committee, he said, suggested special
rates, profitable to the nation and yet rewarding to its
friends. Morrill's practical desire to salvage good
aspects of the treaty he so recently denounced must have
mystified many of his colleagues.36

In closing his Speech, Morrill emphasized that he

had always favored protecting native industry from foreign

 

35Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,

 

p. 3466.

36Ibid., pp. 3467-68.

 

232

competition and that the pending bill was the means to
that end. He claimed that the rates were just high
enough to protect laborers, producers, and manufacturers,
while also safeguarding the internal revenue by keeping
the economy Operating at capacity. Morrill predicted
that the tariff would fulfill both goals without diminish-
ing the revenue from imports.37
Ardent protectionists and other dissidents were
ready with immediate rebuttals. Thaddeus Stevens, the
first member on his feet, assailed the entire bill, calling
it a free trade measure from beginning to end. Naturally,
as a representative of coal and iron interests, he cited
those rates as the worst. William D. "Pig Iron" Kelley,
one of Stevens's Pennsylvania colleagues, branded the
special Canadian coal rate unnecessary because, since the
reciprocity treaty expired, mine owners had paid $1.25
per ton without having to raise prices in New England.
Members suggested prohibitory rates on woolen rags and
shoddy, as well as other changes in the wool duty, but

Morrill got them defeated.38

 

37Ibid., p. 3468.

38Ibid., pp. 3468-73, 3494-98, 3513-20. Brodie,
Stevens, pp. 170-71, 304. Kelley was called "Pig Iron"
Because of his devotion to the industry. Sharkey, Money,
Class, and Party, p. 69. Although the tariff bill was
Iater defeated, the wool lobby had enough influence to
see a Special bill, the Wool and Woolens Act of March 2,
1867, passed for their benefit. Paul W. Gates, A ricul-
ture and the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knop%, 1965),
pp. 173-76. Patrick, Reconstruction, p. 177.

 

 

 

233

In a number of areas, Morrill failed, but he
expressed hOpe that the Senate would reverse the changes.
The biggest disappointment was the loss of the Special
Canadian coal duty. He insisted that the provision was
intended to benefit the West and Middle West, not New
England, but his words were to no avail. Unfortunately,

his faith in the Senate also proved disillusioning because

the other house voted to postpone the bill until December.39

Late in the second session of the 39th Congress,
the Senate returned the tariff so drastically changed that
Morrill faced failure in virtually his last effort in the
House. Morrill asked that the amended bill be sent intact
to a committee of conference to save time, but the House
refused 85-86. On the following day, February 26, 1867,
Morrill called up the Senate bill and made a strong but
futile effort to save his tariff. Before proposing amend-
ments, he offered a substitute which was his original bill
with about fifteen additional rate reductions. Morrill

then offered forty-six amendments to the Senate version

and had all but seven accepted. Obviously he had a majority

with him, but a two-thirds vote was necessary to stop
debate and get the bill reported from Committee of the

Whole to the House. Since the ultraprotectionists opposed

 

39Con . Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 3714-16, 3722-25, 3758. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson,
pp. 373-75.

 

 

234

any bill which would set a precedent of rate reductions,
they mustered their strength to defeat the discharge motion
and with it the bill.40 Losing this bill, Morrill's only
defeat on a tariff, was a disheartening way to end his
illustrious service on the Committee of Ways and Means.
Three days later Morrill left the House; he returned to

the Capitol the next day a Senator.

Press reaction to the tariff bill was as constant

and vigorous as in prewar years. The New York Times,

 

Washington Evening Star, and New York Tribune all praised

 

 

the bill when first presented, but the first two papers

had a change of mind as amendments were made. The Tiges_
moved from a position of total acceptance of Morrill's

bill to one Of total opposition. When Morrill reported his
bill, the Tiges supported it on the grounds that he had
written a good act including incidental protection com-
patible with revenue needs. But the next week, while still
basically supporting Morrill, they criticized him for
bowing to Special interests on the wool duty and for favor-
ing his constituents by the Canadian coal provision. The
Times later commended the Senate for saving the nation

from the ultras by postponing the bill. When it came up
the next winter, the editors called for the bill's defeat

because it was a capitulation to the coal, wool, and iron

 

4oCon . Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867,
pp. 1541-43, 1590-95, 1601-9, 1656-58. Ratner, Taxation
and Democracy, pp. 116-17.

 

Y
A

235

interests. Even though, by their own estimate, Morrill's
bill raised rates 50 percent on the average, the editors

of the Evening Star initially supported the tariff because

 

they felt that industry still was unable to compete with
foreign producers. However, ten days hence, the editors
asked for defeat of the bill because the protectionists
had seized control of it. The Tribune claimed that the
tariff status quo contained the lowest rates which would
prevent a disaster to native industry. But the several
wartime revisions were so confusing that the editors asked
for an entirely new tariff with clearly stated Specific
duties. They expressed general satisfaction with Morrill's
bill but said higher iron and steel duties would have
been better. Thus, when amendments raised various rates,
the Tribune's support grew stronger.41
Morrill never made public his personal reasons
for supporting a protective tariff which evolved into a
prohibitory one, but probably they were partly altruistic
and partly selfish. His concern for the workingman was
Sincere and led him to defend their interests. Since he
saw the greenbacks as the key to the inflation which
seriously injured workers, Morrill fought for contraction
of the currency. When Congress did not agree, Morrill was

convinced that the only other alternative was a higher

 

41New York Times, June 5, 1865; June 26; July 1;
and July 13, 1866; Jan. 29 and Feb. 15, 1867. Washington

Evenin Star, June 26 and July 5, 1866. New York Daily
Trlhune, Feh. 24, June 8, June 27, and Dec. 16, 1866.

 

‘4
‘t-d-i‘.‘.

236

tariff to equalize foreign and domestic prices. He wanted
nonprohibitory rates, but since he valued the workingman's
interests more, he accepted prohibitory duties rather than
no increases at all. He was particularly handicapped in
seeking general restraint in the election year of 1866
because he heeded his constituents who demanded substantial
rate hikes on wool. Morrill supported this tariff both
because he felt duty bound to check inflation and (possibly
for the only time in his life) to further his political
career.

The currency situation, which was partially re-
sponsible for Morrill's tariff stand, deeply concerned
him because he felt that only a rapid contraction of the
greenbacks, and subsequent resumption of specie payments,
would stave Off financial chaos. He urged that policy in
two major Speeches while Chairman of the Ways and Means

Committee.42

Morrill's vieWpoint was Shared by a large
minority in Congress and by Treasury Secretary Hugh

McCulloch. The New York Tribune and the Washington

 

Evening Star both agreed with Morrill on contraction.

 

However, the New York Times suggested that the return to

 

 

42Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 971-73. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1867, pp. 722-27. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Pargy,
pp. 66-68.

 

 

237

specie payments proceed slowly, allowing the economy to
expand to meet the volume of currency.43
Morrill reported a Loan Bill in February, 1866,
which granted the Secretary of the Treasury unlimited
power to contract the currency. Secretary McCulloch had
already withdrawn $25 million without authorization and
Morrill's bill was intended partially to legitimize that
action. Morrill pleaded with the House to trust the
Secretary's discretion on the timing and amounts of con-
tractions. Inflationists like Stevens Opposed the basic
idea. Morrill invited Stevens and McCulloch to dinner in
an attempt to win Stevens's support, but the effort failed.
Other members objected to placing so much power in
McCulloch's hands. Eventually, a compromise authorized
retirement of greenbacks at the rate of $4 million per
month, at which pace contraction could easily take ten
years. Morrill and the other disciples of sound finance

were disappointed; but, at least, contraction was started.‘14

 

43Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, pp. 63-64,
72-77. Lindsey, "Sunset“ Cox, pp. 110, 117-18. Irwin
Unger, The Greenback Era TPrinceton: Princeton University
Press, 1964), pp. 42-44, 121-24. Nevins, War for the
Union, IV, 381. Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Jay Cooke: kEinan-
cier of the Civil War (Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs
and Co., 1907), II, 4. Henrietta M. Larson, Jay Cooke
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 203-6.
Washington Evening Star, March 17, 1866. New York Tribune
quoted in Evening Star, March 17, 1866. New York’Times,
May 2, 1865.

44Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
pp. 1608-14. James G. Blaine, Twent Years of Con ress
(Norwich, Conn.: Henry Bill Co., 1003), II, 321-23.
Sharkey, Messy, Class, and Party, pp. 66-74. Current,
Old Thad Stevens, pp. 238-39.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1 .~
‘11.“. «can»

238

Those who disagreed with Morrill believed that
contraction would bring deflation and economic stagnation
that would be far worse than reasonable inflation during
the generally anticipated growth of the economy. John
Sherman, a leading advocate of this position, was con-
vinced that the future of the national economy would be
better served if Congress took steps to hasten its growth
to par with the currency supply. A surprising ally of

Sherman was Joseph Medill of the Chicago Tribune who

 

usually criticized Morrill for being too liberal in
financial policy. In the opinion of economist James K.
Kindahl, Specie resumption came as early as it safely
could because it was not until 1879 that price levels in
the United States fell to parity with European price
levels. Kindahl felt that the only way to have resumed
earlier would have been to face rapid deflation, a very
unsatisfactory means.45

It is impossible to assess the potential results
of Morrill's currency prOposal, but the reason it was

offered is clear--elimination of the greenbacks. He

opposed the legal tenders from the beginning and, while

 

45Sherman, Recollections, pp. 374-76. J. Medill

to Morrill, Jan. 22, 1867, Morrill Papers, Reel 36.
James K. Kindahl, "Economic Factors in Specie Resumption,"
Journal of Political Economics, LXIX (1961), 38. Unger,
Greenback'Era, p. 44. DiSagreements among Radical
Republicans were common on financial matters. Sharkey,
Money, Class, and Party, pp. 77-80, 280-82, 303-4.
§hémpp, Era ofhheconstruction, pp. 105-7. Franklin,
Reconstruction, pp. 10-13.

 

 

 

 

 

 

239

he tolerated them in wartime, he was dedicated to their
elimination once the conflict ended. Morrill's distaste
for greenbacks was extreme. He almost certainly felt that
deflation was a small price to pay for an end to such an
unorthodox financial device.
Even as Morrill reached the pinnacle of his career
in the House of Representatives, the Chairmanship of Ways '“
and Means, he began working to leave that body for a seat

in the Senate. His campaign was coterminous with his work

‘:"-.¥" _‘

on the tax reduction bills and the tariff. He had expected
an easy campaign with little interruption to his work

since he had generally been considered the logical
successor to Jacob Collamer and had been annointed by the

Senator personally.46

But Collamer's untimely death in
November, 1865, greatly complicated the anticipated smooth
transition. Morrill kept alive his traditional public
indifference to office by running a skillful noncampaign.
From his Washington office he directed the efforts of
friends and political debtors accumulated during the pre-
ceding twelve years. Redemption of favors due and his

excellent record in Congress combined to usher Morrill

into the Senate.

 

46Burlin ton Free Press, May 5, 1866. fMorrill
to C- W. W1 ar , 0V- I , Morrill Papers, Reel 41.

Vermont Watchman, June 22, 1866.

 

240

The campaign mainly consisted of exchanges of
correspondence; Morrill received pledges of support and
status reports from members of his informal staff and he
responded with directives to guide their further efforts.
Morrill also kept his friends well supplied with COpieS of
his speeches (judiciously distributed toiindicate his
position on the issues) and with personal disclaimers of
charges made by the opposition. The work began in the
fall of 1865 before Collamer's death and was steadily
intensified until September of the following year when
the election was held.47

The death of Senator Collamer worried Morrill
because it gave Governor Paul Dillingham the Opportunity
to appoint a successor who, as an incumbent, might have

an advantage in the election. Morrill did not want the

unexpired term himself because he wished to serve out his

 

47E. J. Redington to Morrill, Oct. 25, 1865;

S. M. Gleason to Morrill, Oct. 27, 1865; Stephan Thomas
to Morrill, Nov. 17, 1865, Morrill Papers, Reel 6. Henry
Randall to Morrill, Feb. 12, 1866,Morrill Papers, Reel 38.
Morrill to C. W. Willard, Nov. 10, 1865, Morrill Papers,
Reel 41. Hugh Henry to Morrill, April 4, 1866; Milo
Bennett to Morrill, April 5, 1866; J. T. Drew to Morrill,
April 29, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7. S. M. Gleason to
Morrill, May 28, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 41. W. C.
Lewis to Morrill, June 7, 1866; D. L. Milliken to Morrill,
June 20, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7. David Chadwick to
Morrill, Aug. 13, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 8. Morrill
to E. P. Walton, March 31, 1866; Morrill to Milo Bennett,
May 9, 1866; Morrill to C. W. Willard, March 30, 1866,
Morrill Papers, Reel 7. Morrill to Crosby Miller,

Feb. 28, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 37.

‘W- ..

241

term in the House, but neither did he want an opponent
appointed. Attempts were made to convince the governor
to appoint an interim senator who would pledge not to
run; but, unfortunately, Morrill's only announced
Republican Opponent, Luke P. Poland, got the seat.
Poland, the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, FE
was well respected but lacked both Morrill's immense k
reservoir of public good will, and experience in the lower

house, Often a credential of Vermont's senators.48

 

The Situation was further complicated when é“
Senator Solomon Foot died in March, 1866, allowing a
second appointment and election. The governor chose
George Edmunds, a leading lawyer, which worked to Morrill's
advantage because Edmunds, a Poland supporter, was now
forced to split the Poland forces to secure his own
election. It was the deathblow to Poland's always poor

chances.49

 

48F. Tyler to Morrill, Nov. 13, 1865, Morrill
Papers, Reel 40. Charles Barratt to Morrill, Nov. 17,
1865; Jason Strite to Morrill, Nov. 24, 1865, Morrill
Papers, Reel 6. M. W. C. Wright to Morrill, April 9,
1866; Morrill to G. G. Benedict, March 19, 1865; E. J.
Redington to Morrill, April 3, 1866, Morrill Papers,
Reel 7. Windsor Journal reprinted in Vermont Watchman,
Dec. 15, 18657 Morrill indicated his lack of personal
animosity by including Poland among fourteen he invited
to dinner on January 31, 1866. Morrill to Poland,
Jan. 29, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 6.

 

 

49J. T. Drew to Morrill, April 4, 1866; E. P.
Walton to Morrill, April 4, 1866; C. W. Willard to
Morrill, April 5, 1866, Morrill Papers, Reel 7.

242

Morrill's election was assured when all parties
agreed on a satisfactory compromise. Poland was nominated
for Morrill's seat in the House and was elected to finish
the last months of Collamer's term. Morrill easily beat
his Democratic opponent for the full Senate term beginning
March 4, 1867. George Edmunds was elected to complete
Foot's term and became Morrill's colleague and friend.50

Probably Morrill was never in serious danger of
defeat because it was widely agreed that he had earned
the Senate seat. In addition to the personal support he

had built up over the years, most of the press in Vermont

favored his elevation. The Vermont Watchman and the

 

Burlington Free Press led a solid line Of endorsement for
51

 

Morrill. His colleagues in Congress also favored him.
Despite all those votes of confidence, Morrill waged a
hard and skillful campaign. His election by the legis-

lature allowed him to leave the House of Representatives
at the height of his power and prestige and move to a

distinguished place as a United States Senator.

 

508. w. Bartholonew to Morrill, July 24, 1866;
David Chadwick to Morrill, Aug. 13, 1866, Morrill Papers,
Reel 8. James G. Blaine to Morrill, Aug. 19, 1866,
Morrill Papers, Reel 44. The governor's senatorial
appointments were only effective until the next meeting
of the state legislature. Thus Poland and Edmunds had
to be elected to finish their terms.

51WindsoE_Journal reprinted in Vermont Watchman,
Dec. 15, 1865. Burlington Free Press, May 25,’1866.
Vermont Watchman, June 22 ankouly'20, 1866.

 

 

 

 

EPILOGUE

SENATOR MORRILL

On March 4, 1867, Justin S. Morrill began one of
the longest careers in the history of the United States

Senate. Reelected five consecutive times, he served

 

almost thirty-two years. Many sought the counsel of

Morrill who was often referred to as the "Nestor" of the

Senate in later years. Morrill died in office on

December 28, 1898 at the age of 88.1
Despite the distinction and honor inherent in

such a lengthy term, Morrill's Senate service might be

described as a period of relative leisure after his arduous

work on the Ways and Means Committee. He took a full part

in legislative work, often holding the chairmanships of

the Finance Committee and the Public Buildings and Grounds

Committee simultaneously, but he led no new legislative

campaigns of major political significance. Morrill's

 

1George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy_Years
(New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1903), II, 55.
William B. Parker, The Life and Public Services of Justin
Smith Morrill (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924),
p.7332.

 

 

 

243

244

personal legislative goals and those in the Republican
Party's platform of 1860 had been enacted into law; so,
once reconstruction ended, Morrill and the party were
primarily concerned with preserving the status quo.

Morrill scheduled his long-awaited European tour
for the summer of 1867. The comparatively light duties
of a freshman Senator and the easing of personal responsi-
bility with the death of his mother allowed him to embark
with James G. Blaine for the three-month journey. Al-
though Blaine was twenty years younger than Morrill, each
agreed after the tour that he could not have found a
better companion.

The extensive wanderings of the two legislators
took them to the well known and the remote areas of
EurOpe. But no place did they find more interesting than
Great Britain. Morrill and Blaine were received cordially
at Parliament and in both Houses the leadership requested
that they take seats of honor and attend as often as they
wished. They did so at the beginning and end of their
tours. Aside from the fascinations of official and of
financial London, the travelers took the less traveled
roads to meet the people of England and Ireland, and of
much of the continent. Of course they saw the major
Sights, but they prided themselves on seeing more than
the ordinary tourist usually saw. Morrill so enjoyed the

trip that in 1880, when his wife's health was better, he

 

245

retraced his steps in company with her, James, and Louise,
his Sister-in-law.2
Efforts to impeach President Andrew Johnson, begun
while Morrill was in the House, continued after he entered
the Senate and culminated in a trial. Several attempts
at impeachment failed between January, 1867, and February,
1868, when the House voted to begin proceedings. Although
there were eleven articles, basically, Johnson was charged
with violation Of the Tenure of Office Act stemming from
his removal of Edwin Stanton, the Secretary of War,
without Senate approval. There were serious doubts about
the charge Since the act seemed to protect an appointee
only during the term Of the president who appointed him,
and Stanton was a holdover from the Lincoln administration.
Also in doubt was the nature of the proceeding; must
Senators weigh evidence as in a court or could they vote
on political grounds? Viewing themselves as jurors con-
cerned with evidence, enough Senators voted not guilty to

acquit Andrew Johnson. The remaining months of Johnson's

term passed in relative quiet.3

 

2Parker, Morrill, pp. 185ff, 297-98.

3Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson egg Recon-
struction (Chicago: University of7Chicago Press, 1960),
pp. 491-506. Richard N. Current, Old Thad Stevens
(Madison: University of Wisconsin-Press,‘1942), pp. 300-8.
Rembert W. Patrick, The Reconstruction of the Nation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 126-30.

 

 

 

 

246

With unswerving consistency Morrill supported
the party's political positions and often acted as a
conciliator. Although he harbored serious doubts about
the political wisdom of impeaching Andrew Johnson, he
voted yes both on impeachment in the House and on convic-
tion in the Senate. Morrill believed Johnson to be guilty
but worried that enough voters might be angered to throw
control of Congress to the Democrats. However, the strong
constituent support that he received must have greatly
allayed his concern.4 Fearing above all that a party
split would give the country to the Democrats, Morrill
worked diligently as a conciliator to avoid disunity. At
the time of Johnson's trial, he wrote a fervent note to
William Pitt Fessenden urging his old friend to rejoin
the party ranks and do his duty by voting guilty. Morrill
worked most frantically at his self-appointed task during
the Liberal Republican revolt of 1872 when he wrote both
to Charles Sumner and Horace Greeley in an attempt to

prevent a rupture of the party. He considered internal

 

4Morrill to Mrs. Ruth Morrill, June 28, 1867,
Morrill Papers, Reel 9. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years
of Con ress (Norwich, Conn.: Henry Bill Co.,71884),
II, 370-75. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867,
p. 321; 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1868, p. 411 Supplement.
The only other member able to vote in both Houses was
James W. Patterson of New Hampshire. John Gregory to
Morrill, April 16, 1868; J. K. Parish to Morrill,
April 25, 1868, Morrill Papers, Reel 9.

 

 

_J"-"—

 

247

reform the only solution.5 Surely, Morrill had to be a
loyal Republican to prefer, almost without hesitation,
four more years under Grant to a split in the ranks.

AS a defender of Republican policies, one of
Morrill's tasks was to act as a guardian of the protective
tariff. Since he was an avowed moderate protectionist,
preserving what was basically his own tariff was no real
burden. Protectionists sidetracked several attempts to
lower the tariff, eSpecially those made by the Tariff
Commission of 1882 and by President Grover Cleveland.
Thus, no real change was made and the average rate during
the three postwar decades remained about 46 percent.
Morrill occasionally supported spot reductions but strongly
defended the high rates in general. The protectionists
remained firmly in control of tariff legislation, almost

without interruption, until after Morrill's death.6

 

5Morrill to William Pitt Fessenden, May 10, 1868,
Fessenden Family Papers, Bowdoin College Library. See
also Francis Fessenden, William Pitt Fessenden (New York:
Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1907)] II, 205 and Fawn M.
Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York: W. W. Norton and
Co., 1959), pI1344. Justin S. Morrill, "Notable Letters
From My Political Friends," Forum, XXIV (Dec., 1897),
406, 411.

 

 

6Morrill to American Protective Tariff League,
March 21,1891, quoted in Parker, Morrill, p. 340. This
was an Open letter. Henry S. Randa 11 to Morrill,
Jan. 13, 1868, Morrill Papers, Reel 9. Samuel P. Hays,
The ReSponse to Industrialism 1885-1914 (Chicago:
Uhiversity of Chicago Press, 1957)] pp. 132-33. Edward C.
Kirkland, Industr Comes of A e (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1961;, pp. 27, 184-85. F. W. Taussig, The
Tariff History of the United States (New York: G. P.
Putnam' 8 Sons, 1931), pp. 230, 250. Sidney Ratner,

 

 

248

Morrill turned closer attention to guarding and
nurturing his labor of love, the agricultural colleges,
with emphasis on the college for his home state. A
commission headed by the governor marketed the scrip
allocated to Vermont during the war; so that, when the
fighting ended, they were ready to begin the work of
establishing the school. At all stages of planning for
the college, Morrill kept himself informed on developments
and offered encouragement. When a serious obstruction
arose because no town would donate land for the new
college, a merger with the University of Vermont was
prOposed as an alternative. Morrill favored the idea and
drafted the necessary bill for action by the state
legislature. Success of the bill assured the future of
the college, particularly since Morrill continued to
guide it as a trustee.7

While in the Senate, Morrill continued to champion

the agricultural colleges. As part of this policy, he

 

Taxation and Democracy in America (New York: John
Wiley andShns,—l967), pp. 131,‘151, 159ff. Parker,
Morrill, pp. 300-2, 319-20. Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E.
Reese, An Economic History of the United States (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin 08., 1965), pp. 467-69.

7Burlington Free Press reprinted in Vermont
Watchman, May 6, 1864. Morrill to Charles T. Dewey,
June 3, 1865, Morrill Papers, Reel 48. George Benedict
to Morrill, July 18, 1865; Morrill's Personal Notes,
Oct. 10, 1865; James Hutchinson Jr. to Morrill, Sept. 23,
1865; Crosby Miller to Morrill, Nov. 6, 1865; Clark
Chapman to Morrill, Nov. 7 and 9, 1865, Morrill Papers,
Reel 6. Vermont Watchman, Oct. 27, 1865.

 

 

249

opposed a worthy bill submitted by George F. Hoar in 1869
to establish a national system of common schools in de-
fault of action by the states. Morrill disliked the

idea because Hoar wanted the funding to come from land
sales and various Special funds which Morrill had claimed
for the land grant colleges. On the positive side,
Morrill worked for a supplemental appropriation for
agricultural colleges because the original grant was
often inadequate, as he probably knew it would be. Since
he was a practical politician, Morrill had first asked
for a moderate amount; then, after Congress had committed
itself, worked to get the funding increased. Finally, in
1890, the second Land Grant College Act was passed. It
provided an initial cash grant of $15,000 with stipula-
tions that the sum be increased by $1,000 each year for
ten years and then be continued at $25,000 annually as
long as that sum was adequate. Morrill also arranged

for the colleges to be given preference as depositories
of public documents.8 At his death, the land grant

college system was thriving.

 

8Hoar, Seventy Years, I, 265. W. H. Scott to
Rutherford B. Hayes, June 4, 1890, Hayes Papers, Hayes
Library. Frederick B. Mumford, The Land Grant Colle e
Movement, Agricultural Experiment Station Bu11etin 419
(Cqufihla: University of Missouri, 1940), pp. 18-22.
Hayes to Morrill, Dec. 31, 1890, Morrill Papers, Cornell

 

University Library. Morrill to Hayes, Jan. 2, 1890 [1891],

Hayes Papers.

250

Even after the Republican party began to adopt
imperialism, Morrill remained true to another lifelong
principle, antiexpansionism. He and Fessenden were the
only Senators who unalterably opposed the purchase of
Alaska. In 1881, Morrill pleaded with President James A.

Garfield to settle differences with Spain short of

I mm,

acquiring Cuba. He told his old friend that the presi- -m
dency was honor enough; there was no need of becoming
emperor of Cuba too. Seventeen years later Morrill -~
strongly opposed the accession of Hawaii and was the only ‘fi
Republican to vote no. President William McKinley worried
about Opposition from such a distinguished senator but
avoided a confrontation by utilizing a joint resolution
instead of a treaty to achieve annexation.9
Morrill's Senate career was not devoted solely
to defending Old accomplishments and virtues, for he was
influential in determining the future of the nation, even
if he created no new legislative landmarks. He found a
new outlet for his energies, the Committee on Public
Building and Grounds. From this base he helped create

architectural landmarks.

 

9Glydon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 543. Morrill to
James A. Garfield, May 30, 1881, James A. Garfield Papers,
Library of Congress. Hoar, SeventyYears, II, 307.
Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, The Anti-
Im erialists 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,

8), pp. 147-48. Paradoxically Morrill believed in the
inevitable absorption of Canada. Parker, Morrill,
pp. 320-21.

 

 

 

 

251

Morrill's work on the beautification of the Capitol
and the city of Washington, begun while he was still in the
House, reached fruition in the slower-paced Senate years.
His first effort was the dedication of the Old Hall of the
House of Representatives as National Statuary Hall. In
1866, he worked to restore the grandeur of the Capitol by
urging the removal of various ugly exhibits and peddlers'
stalls from the corridors. Later, among his acts as a
Senator, Morrill Opposed letting the Pennsylvania Railroad
lay tracks across what is now the Mall. He lost but his
judgment was vindicated 35 years later in 1907 when
Congress paid $1.5 million to have the tracks removed.lo

Morrill also left his mark on many of the most
stately buildings and grounds in Washington; Simon Cameron,
Lincoln's first Secretary of War, called Morrill the man
most responsible for the beauty of the capital city.
Morrill helped get authorization to complete the Washington
Monument and later sponsored a bill to protect it from
vandals and souvenir hunters who defaced or chipped the
stone. Morrill next worked to have pleasing and dignified
landscaping installed around the Capitol Building and
helped arrange for Frederick Law Olmsted, the designer of

New York's Central Park, to do it. However, his greatest

 

loCong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess., 1866,
p. 860. JOhn W. Reps, Monumental Washington (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 114-15. Parker,
Morrill, p. 249.

 

 

.1.“
.1, V,
w .

252

triumph was the bill sanctioning construction of the
Library of Congress. Morrill envisioned a magnificent
structure worthy of a great republic and would not settle
for less. Finally in 1886, after several tries over
fourteen years, he got the first appropriation allowing
site acquisition and planning, and two years later four
to Six million dollars was voted to begin construction.
Morrill's final effort was to create a home for the Supreme
Court so that the Court could be moved from the Capitol.
In 1888 he began urging the purchase of a Site. He felt
that the Court deserved its own building, one commensurate
with its great dignity and prestige. On December 13, 1898,
only fifteen days before his death, Morrill saw passage of
the bill approving purchase of the site where the Supreme
Court Building now stands.11
On December 28, 1898, forty-four years after his
first election to Congress, Justin Smith Morrill died.
His life had spanned nearly the entire nineteenth century;
his political career the whole latter half. He was a

legislator who learned the rules and used them well in

 

llSimon Cameron to Morrill, Oct. 24, 1874, Morrill
Papers, Reel 13. Parker, Morrill, pp. 249-50, 321.
Lonnelle Aikman, We, The PeoEIe (Washington: The United
States Capitol Historical Society, 1969), p. 61. Cong.
Globe, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1887, pp. 1284-86. Cong.
GIohe, 49th Cong., lst Sess., 1885, p. 123. Statutes
at Large, 49th Cong., lst Sess., p. 12. Reps,
Monumental Washiggton, pp. 44-45, 80-81. Cong. Globe,
55th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1898, pp. 138-40.

 

 

 

 

253

order to achieve his ends. Successful on the great
majority of issues, he managed to win in a dignified way,
never impugning the motives of an opponent. Although
Morrill was ready to trade favor for favor if no prin-
ciple was violated, he always defended principles first.
Morrill was not a statesman; he was a great American

legislator. .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The only published biography of Justin S. Morrill
is William B. Parker, The Life and Public Services of
Justin Smith Morrill (New York, 1924), a family-authorized
work which contains a wealth of information but often
lacks criticism. An early and still useful biographical
Sketch of Morrill is James Barrett, "Early Life of

Justin S. Morrill," The Vermonter, II (Nov., 1896), while

 

an excellent recent one is T. D. Seymour Bassett, "Nature's
Nobleman: Justin Morrill, A Victorial Politician,"
Vermont History, XXX (1962). A brief profile is found

in Jacob Ullery, Men of Vermont (Brattleboro, 1894).

 

Insights into Morrill's thinking can be gained from his
writings: Self-Consciousness of Noted Persons (Cambridge,
1882) and a series of articles entitled "Notable Letters

From My Political Friends," Forum, XXIV (Oct.-Dec., 1897).

Primary Sources

 

Manuscripts

 

The most significant manuscript collection for
this work is the Justin Smith Morrill Papers deposited

in the Library Of Congress. A microfilm copy of the

254

255

papers, located in the Michigan State University Library,
was used for this study. It consists Of fifty-two reels
containing mostly political, business, and personal cor-
respondence, but also includes a diary, a journal, and
personal notes. Another small but useful collection of
Morrill materials is the Justin Smith Morrill Papers at r
the Vermont Historical Society, a microfilm copy of which
is in the Michigan State University Library. Additional

minor collections of Morrill Mss are at the Chicago

 

Historical Society, Cornell University Library, Duke
University Library, and Harvard University Library.

The Henry C. Carey Papers in the Edward Carey
Gardiner Collection at the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania were very helpful on the tariffs. The papers
of John Sherman and of Benjamin Wade in the Library of
Congress were informative on the Morrill Tariff and the
Agricultural Colleges respectively.

Several collections of papers were of minor aid.
Useful sources in the Library of Congress include the
papers of Thomas F. Bayard, William Pitt Fessenden,

James A. Garfield, Joshua Giddings-George Julian, Abraham
Lincoln, and Thaddeus Stevens. In the Rutherford B.

Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio, are the Mary

Clemmer Ames Papers which throw light on Morrill's devotion
to the arts, while those of William Claflin and Rutherford

B. Hayes touch on aspects of Morrill's late career.

256

A published collection, helpful on the Morrill

Tariff, is the Robert M. T. Hunter Papers, Annual Report

 

Of A.H.A., 1916, 11.

Printed Government Documents

 

The Congressional Globe for the 34th through 39th

Congresses, House Reperts, 39th Cong., lst Sess., II

 

No. 30, and the United States Statutes at Large provide

 

indispensable material on Morrill's congressional career.
Also helpful are the debates of the 40th and subsequent

congresses.

Memoirs
Although memoirs, recollections and reminiscences
must be handled with care, they frequently contain

invaluable insights. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of

 

Congress (Norwich, Conn., 1884) holds the views of a

close friend of Morrill. Samuel S. Cox, Eight Years of

 

Congress (New York, 1865) and Three Decades of Federal

 

Legislation: 1855-1885 (Providence, 1888) give the

 

Opinions of a member of the Democratic Party. John

Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House,

 

Senate, and Cabinet (Chicago, 1895) contains helpful

 

references made throughout Morrill's career. Other works

useful for this study were George Boutwell, Reminiscences

 

of Sixty Years in Public Office (New York, 1902); David

 

Donald, ed., Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War

 

257

Diaries of Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1954); Shelby M.

 

Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service (Chicago, 1911);

 

George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York,

 

1903); Hugh McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century

 

(New York, 1888); and Edward L. Pierce, ed., Memoir and

 

Letters of Charles Sumner (Boston, 1893).

 

Newspepers “1

 

Invaluable sources, because of their interest in

political affairs across the country, were several

Watts- .

metropolitan newspapers. Among these was the New York
Times, which was also indispensable because of its index.

The leading Republican paper was the New York Tribune,

 

while a strong counter for the Democrats was the

Washington Evening Star.

 

The most important Vermont newspapers for this

study were the Vermont Watchman and Walton's Daily Journal,

 

 

both published at Montpelier by E. P. Walton Jr. Walton,
a keen observer of the local political scene, was a close
friend, sometime Congressional colleague, and constant

political backer of Morrill. Other useful Vermont papers

were the Burlington Free Press, Burlisgton Sentinel,

 

Green Mountain Freeman (Montpelier), Rutland Herald, and

 

 

Vermont Record (Brattleboro).

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

 

Secondary Sources

 

General Studies

 

The best history of the period is found in the

several Civil War volumes of Allan Nevins: Ordeal of the

 

Union (2 vols.: New York, 1947), The Emergence of

 

Lincoln (2 vols.: New York, 1950), The War for the Union

 

(2 vols.: New York, 1959-60), and The War for the Union

 

(2 vols.: New York, 1971 pub. posthumously). These
were indispensable for this study.

Several other works were very helpful as back-
ground sources. Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, 5s

Economic History of the United States (Boston, 1965),

 

was eSpecially useful for its informative graphs and

charts. Roy F. Nichols, The Stakes of Power, 1845-1877

 

(New York, 1961), provides an excellent analysis of
issues in that era. His thesis that the lust for power
was the potent force in these years is most convincing.

Charles M. Wiltse, The New Nation, 1800-1845 (New York,

 

1961), in the same series as Nichol's work, is a valuable

study of the early 19th century.

Biogrgphy

There are many biographies of Morrill's political
contemporaries. The most important are studies of
Republican leaders. Charles A. Jellison, Fessenden of

Maine (Syracuse, 1962), is a good modern work on a friend

258

575'

259

and colleague. Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens (New York,

 

1959), effectively analyzes a complex personality while

Richard N. Current, Old Thad Stevens (Madison, 1942), is

 

still a most useful work on political affairs. David

Donald's two masterful volumes, Charles Sumner and the

 

Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1960), and Charles

 

Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York, 1970), proved to

 

be fruitful sources. Hans L. Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin

 

flees (New York, 1963), showed that Wade supported the Land
Grant College Act and the Morrill Tariff out of long-
standing personal commitments.

Several biographies were very useful. Ellis P.

Oberholtzer, Jay Cooke: Financier of the Civil War (2 vols.:

 

Philadelphia, 1907), is old but undoubtedly still the most
valuable study of this key figure. See also Henrietta M.

Laison, Jay Cooke (Cambridge, 1936). David Lindsey,

 

"Sunset" Cox (Detroit, 1959), is a good and helpful study

 

of that fascinating Democrat. Francis Fessenden, William

Pitt Fessenden (2 vols.: New York, 1907), though super-

 

seded by Jellison's study, continues to have value. Mary

Turner Carriel, The Life of Jonathan Baldwin Turner

 

(Urbana, 1961), is a weak, superficial attempt to discredit
Morrill and gain acceptance of the writer's father as
author of the Land Grant College Act.

Other helpful works include Martin B. Duberman,

Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Boston, 1961); Fred H.

 

260

Harrington, Fighting Politician: Major General N. P.
Banks (Philadelphia, 1948); Margaret L. Coit, John C.

Calhoun (Boston, 1950); Arthur W. Brown, Always Young for

 

Liberty: A Biegraphy of William Ellery Channisg (Syracuse,

1956); Willard H. Smith, Schuyler Colfax (Indianapolis,

 

1952), which proved disappointing because the author failed
to explain Colfax's switch on Agricultural Colleges from
pro in 1858 to con in 1862; Glydon G. Van Deusen, William

Henry Seward (New York, 1967); Fawn M. Brodie, NO Man

 

Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith (New York,
1945); and the fine Study of Brigham Young by Stanley P.

Hirshson, The Lion of the Lord (New York, 1969).

 

Special Studies

 

Among the books on Vermont, four proved the most

fruitful. Walter H. Crockett, Vermont, The Green Mountain

 

State (3 vols.: New York, 1921), was particularly bene-
ficial for reviewing the place of the wool industry and of
antislavery in the society. Dorothy C. Fisher, Vermont

Tradition (Boston, 1953), describes the "flavOr" of the

 

state. David M. Ludlum, Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-

1850 (New York, 1939), and Earle Newton, The Vermont Story

 

(Montpelier, 1949), are invaluable socio-political and
socio-economic studies respectively. See also Wilbur H.
Siebert, Vermont's Anti-Slavery and Underground Railroad

Record (Columbus, 0., 1937).

'1“. .fl" ".

I " V7 ' "AIS:

261

On Republican ideology, undoubtedly the finest

study is the recent work by Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free

 

Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party
before the Civil War (New York: 1970), which has fresh
ideas. Very good on the radical wing is Hans L. Trefousse,
The Radical Republicans (New York, 1969). For a more gy

general study see Richard Hofstader, The American Political

 

Tradition (New York, 1948).

 

The nullification crisis is superbly handled in

two works. Chauncey S. Boucher, The Nullification Contro-

 

 

versy in South Carolina (Chicago, 1916), is older but

 

still very useful, while the best study is William W.

Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Contro-

 

versy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York, 1966).

There are several excellent works on the sectional
controversy and secession. The outstanding study of the
pre-Civil War years, especially because of its excellent
analysis of the political process, is Roy F. Nichols, Tse

Disruption of American Democragy (New York, 1948).

 

Another good work is Henry H. Simms, A Decade of Sectional

 

Controversy, 1851-1861 (Chapel Hill, 1942). A recently

 

reprinted classic contemporary viewpoint, that of the non-
slaveholding southern white, is in Hinton R. Helper, The
Impending Crisis of the South (New York, 1960). Two works

on Lincoln's election by Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave

 

States in the Presidential Election of 1860 (Baltimore,

262

1945), and "Urban and Rural Voting in the Election of

1860,” in Eric Goldman, ed., Historiography and Urbaniza-

 

tion (Baltimore, 1941), were very informative. A most
useful and penetrating study was Reinhard Luthin, The

First Lincoln Campaign (Gloucester, Mass., 1964). Several

 

works cover the secession crisis. George Knoles, ed., The

Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1965),

 

contains essays comprising a fascinating debate among
scholars. Two excellent full-length treatments of

secession are David Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the

 

Secession Crisis, 1860-61 (New Haven, 1962), and Kenneth M.

 

Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession

 

Crisis, 1860-61 (Baton Rouge, 1950). Also see William E.

 

Baringer, A House Dividing (Springfield, 111., 1945).

 

Studies of the agricultural college movement are
few but generally well done. An excellent background

work is Paul W. Gates, Agriculture and the Civil War

 

(New York, 1965). Frederick B. Mumford, The Land Grant

 

College Movement (Columbia, Mo., 1940), is very useful.

 

Alfred C. True, A History of Agricultural Education in

the United States: 1785-1925 (Washington, 1929) is the

 

standard work. Edmund J. James, The Origins of the Land
Grant College Act of 1862 and Some Account of Its Author,

Jonathan Baldwin Turner (Urbana, 1910), is a weak attempt

 

to advance Turner's case.

 

263

A complex problem of the 1850's was that of the
relationship between the Mormons in Utah and the federal
government. Two valuable works on the Mormons are Nels
Anderson, Desert Saints (Chicago, 1942), and Thomas O'Dea,
The Mormons (Chicago, 1957). An excellent account of the

abortive Mormon war is Norman F. Furniss, The Mormon

 

Conflict, 1850-1859 (New Haven, 1960).

 

The tariff was one of the most controversial
issues in the nineteenth century. Since there is no good

recent analysis, older works are still the standard.

 

Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the
Nineteenth Century (2 vols.: Boston, 1903), leans toward
the protectionist view but is still useful. More balanced
is F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States
(8th ed.: New York, 1931). Another work helpful in

part, was Henry C. Carey, The Harmony of Interests (New

 

York, 1967), a reprint of the classic. Of valuable service
on the reciprocity issue were Frederick E. Haynes, The
Reciprocity Treaty with Canada of 1854 (Baltimore, 1892),

and Charles C. Tansill, The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty

 

of 1854 (Baltimore, 1922).
Financial history is well treated in several

excellent works. Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy

 

in America (New York, 1967), is a good modern survey. A

 

balanced treatment of monetary policy is found in Robert P.

Sharkey, Money, Class, and Pargy: An Economic Study of

 

264

Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore, 1959). For a

useful contrast see Richard C. Todd, Confederate Finance

 

(Athens, Ga., 1954). Edwin R. Seligman, The Income Tax

 

(New York, 1911), sheds lights on a controversial topic.
The most scholarly modern study of the post-Civil War

currency issue is Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era

_ 1",!
. I 3"" r

(Princeton, 1964), but the Older work by Wesley C.
Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks (Chicago, 1903), is

also valuable.

 

Three modern and indispensable studies on Recon-

struction are John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction after the

 

Civil War (Chicago, 1961), Rembert W. Patrick, The Recon-

 

 

struction of the Nation (New York, 1967), and Kenneth M.

 

Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (New York,

 

1965). La Wanda and John H. Cox, Politics, Principle,

 

and Prejudice, 1865-1866 (New York, 1963), emphasizes the

 

civil rights issue in those years. Eric L. McKitrick,

Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 1960), strongly

 

criticizes Johnson as the obstacle preventing reconcilia-
tion of the North and South.

There are two valuable surveys of economic affairs.
Without question, of superior scholarly quality is Edward
C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and

Public Policy, 1860-1897 (New York, 1961). Also of use,

 

eSpecially for its measurement of the effect of

265

industrialization on American society, is the brief work
by Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism 1885-1914
(Chicago, 1957).

Several other secondary works proved helpful in
understanding particular aspects of the period. On

Unitarianism, Elizabeth M. Geffen, Philadelphia Unitarian-

 

ism, 1796-1861 (Philadelphia, 1961), and Stow Persons,
Free Religion: An American Faith (New Haven, 1947), shed

necessary light. Lonnelle Aikman, We, The People

 

(Washington, 1967), and John W. Reps, Monumental

 

Washington (Princeton, 1967), were beneficial in the

 

treatment of buildings and grounds beautification.

Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, The Anti-

 

Imperialists (New York, 1968), was useful in seeing the

 

changing Republican attitude on expansion.

Articles

 

The following articles were helpful on several
areas of this work. Wilson 0. Clough, ed., "A Journal

of Village Life in Vermont in 1848," New England Quarteriy,

 

I (1928), and Bernard De Voto, "Brigham Young," Dictionary

 

of American Biography, XX (1935), yielded useful back-

 

ground information. The former depicted daily life in
rural Vermont and the latter the Vermont origins of Young.
Three articles shed light on aspects of the Agricultural

College Act. Carl W. Borgmann, "The Education of Free

 

266

Men," Vermont History, XXV (1957), and John T. Fey,

 

"Morrill's Concept of Education," Vermont History, XXXI

 

(1963), accurately analyze Morrill's motivation for and
concept of the colleges. That westerners Opposed the land
grants, not the educational benefits, was well shown in
Paul W. Gates, "Western Opposition to the Agricultural
College Act," Indiana Magazine of History, XXXVII (1941).
Valuable articles on the tariff included Howard Beale,

"The Tariff and Reconstruction," American Historical

 

Review, XXXV (Jan., 1930), Richard Hofstader, "The Tariff

Issue on the Eve of the Civil War," American Historical

 

Review, XLIV (Oct., 1938), Alfred B. Lindley, "The Copper

Tariff of 1869," Michigan History, XXXV (March, 1951), and

Reinhard Luthin, "Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff," American

Historical Review, XLIX (July, 1944). A useful article on
reciprocity was W. Jett Lauck, "Political Significance Of

Reciprocity," Journal of Political Economics, XII (1904),

 

in which he argued that many proponents saw it as a prelude
to annexation. Several articles were of service on the
monetary question. James K. Kindahl, "Economic Factors in

Specie Resumption," Journal of Political Economics, LXIX

 

(1961), convincingly argued that resumption could not occur
before domestic price levels fell to parity with those in

EurOpe. Interesting for purposes of contrast was Eugene M.
Lerner, "The Monetary and Fiscal Programs of the Confeder-

ate Government, 1861-1865," Journal of Political Economics,

fl

 

267

LXII (Dec., 1954). The excellent articles by Wesley C.
Mitchell, "The Circulating Medium during the Civil War,"
Journal of Political Economics, X (Sept., 1902), "The

SuSpenSion of Specie Payments," Journal of Political

 

Economics, VII (June, 1899), and "Value of the Greenbacks

 

during the Civil War," Journal of Political Economics, VI
(March, 1898), were most helpful. Also good was Samuel
Rezneck, "Depression and American Opinion, 1857-1859,"
Journal of Economic History, II,(May, 1942). For an
overview of finance see James L. Sellers, "An Interpretation
of Civil War Finance," American Historical Review, XXX

(Jan., 1925).

Unpublished Dissertations

Several unpublished dissertations were beneficial
for this study. T. D. Seymour Bassett, "Urban Penetration
of Rural Vermont, 1840-1880" (Harvard University, 1952),
holds valuable information on the workings of politics and
economic affairs in Vermont. Holman D. Jordan, Jr., "Ten
Vermont Towns: Social and Economic Characteristics,
1850-1870" (University of Alabama, 1966) is a good in-
depth study of social conditions in several towns, one of
which appears very similar to Morrill's home town of
Strafford. The place of the tariff in Republican prin-
ciples is discussed in Thomas M. Pitkin, "The Tariff and

the Early Republican Party" (Western Reserve University,

268

1935). William Edwin Sawyer, "The Evolution of the
Morrill Act of 1862" (Boston University, 1948), contains
the most complete study of the Land Grant College Act.
For this important legislation Sawyer's work is indis-
pensable, but unfortunately it is also marred by errors

of fact and judgment.

"I01111111“111111S