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FINLAND. FOOD. AND AMERICA
By

Fred B. Brown

A Thesis

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History
1982

ABSTRACT
FINLAND. FOOD, AND AMERICA
By

Fred B. Brown

Finland was one of many countries that sought food from
America during the years 1917-1919. Factors like Russian rule
of Finland. the World War. the Russian Revolutions, and the
Finnish Civil War complicated U.S.-Finnish relations. America
had opportunities to use foodstuffs to influence Finnish
developments; to use "grain diplomacy". as it is called today.
After many ups and downs in relations. the final result was
0.8. recognition of Finland's independence. at the insistence
of America's Food Administrator.

The importance of food, both in U.S.-Finnish relations
and in Finland's internal affairs. is the subject of this
essay, emphasizing the effects of American food policy from
1917 to 1919. Publications of the 0.8. State Department
supplied important sources. along with information compiled
largely by Samuel Eliot Morison for the Inquiry. No Finnish-
language sources have been used. though the works of several

Finlanders in English have been consulted.

to my wife

11

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. William O. McCagg, Dr. Donald
Lammers. Mrs. Mary A. Reid. Mrs. Patricia S. Brown. and
the staff of U.S. Congressman Jim Dunn for their aid and
understanding. Thanks also to the staff of the Michigan
State University Library.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IntrOduCtlonOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOO0.0.0.000000000000001

Chapter I...00000000000000000000000000000000000.0000003

Finland and the FinnSooeooococo-o0.000000000000000003
Finland under Swedish Ruleoo0000000000000000000.0000“
Growth of Dissatisfaction with Swedish Rule.........8
FinIBNd under HUSSian Enleocoooooooooooooooooooooooil
Beginnings Of IHdUStrializationoooooooee0000000000013
Changes 1n AgricUItureoooooooooooooooeooooooeooooools

Chapter II.OIO.OOOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00.00.00019
Finnish Emigration to the United States............19
AdJUSting to Life in Americaoooooeoococoon-0000000021
Finnish Immigrants and the Labor Movement..........23

Chapter III......o..o............o.......o...........29
Relations between Finland and the united States
before lglueo0000000000000...cocoa-00000000000000.029
The Russlflcation Of Finland-cooooooooooooooeoooooeBl
Events Of 1905 and 190600oooooocoo-00000000000000.036

Chapter IVs-0.00.0000.cocococo.ooeooooooooeoooooooooouB
Finnish Politics and Renewed Russification.........#3
Contacts with the Great Powers before World War I..h5
German Cultural Influenceoeoooooooeoooooeoooooooooeua
Finland and RUSSiaooooooooooooooooooeoooooooooooooong

Chapter Vooooooooooooococoa-cocooeooeoooeoooooooooooosz

Finnish Attitudes toward the Contending Powers.....52
Finland and World war I - Internal Affairs.........58
The Diet EleCtion Of 19160000000000.0000...0000000062

Chapter Vice-00000000..onoeoooooooooooooooooooooooooo65
Finland and the March Revolution of 1917...........65
Internal Conditions, Spring and Summer of 1917.....68
The Search for Food. and Strained Relations with
BUSSlaooooooooooooeoooooeuoooooooooeooooococo-0000071
The "July Days” 1n Finlandooone...0.0000000000000007“
Further Efforts to Obtain FOOdoooooooooeooooeeoooooal
Results of the October Elections...................82

iv

Table of Contents, cont.

Chapter VIIoooooooooooooeooooonoucooooeoeooooooeoooooag
Effects of the Bolshevik Revolution on Finnish
P011t1CSOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOO0.0.0.00000000000089
Efforts to Obtain Food before the General Strike...92
The November General Strike........................9h
ReSUItS Of the General Strike-0000000000coco-00000098
Beelaration Of Independenceooeeoo00000000000000000100

Chapter VIII-0000000000000ooooeooooooooooooooooooeoollo
The Finnish CiVll waroooooooooeooo00000000000000.0110
Causes Of the C1v11 war...coo-00000000000000000000113
The Great Powers and White Finlandooooooooo0000000120
Red Finland 1n searCh Of FOOdStuffSeooooooo000000012“
Red and White Representatives in America..........126

Chapter IXooooono...00000000000000.0000.000000000000133
From the End of the Civil war to the Armistice....133
Efforts to Obtain U.S. Support for Finland........138
Food and the Recognition of Finnish Nationhood....1U1

COhClUSiOnoooooooeooooooooooococoon.cocoa-0000000000150

Bibliography...oo...oo..........o........o.....o....155

INTRODUCTION

Food is one of the most important resources possessed by
the United States. a very useful resource in the conduct of
U.S. foreign relations. "Grain diplomacy“ - the use of food
to influence other countries - is a familiar concept in
modern American foreign policy. Food has played an important
part in the development of relations between the united
States and Finland, and those relations afford an early exam-
ple of American grain diplomacy at work during the years
1917-1919.

That period was, of course. crucial in the history of
the world at large. and Finland was directly linked to some
of the most important questions of the day. The effects of
food shortage and the Russian revolutions upon a troubled
society are exemplified in Finland. As a part of the Russian
Empire, Finland had difficulties with the Imperial government
and with the succeeding Provisional Government, which contrib-
uted to destabilizing occurrences in both countries. Internal
problems degenerated into civil war early in 1918. with one
Finnish government backed by Russian Bolsheviks, and the other
supported by German troops. Some persons saw a cause of the
civil conflict in America's failure to supply food that
Finland had purchased. Germany had a strong hold on Finland
after the Civil War had ended. and the Allies feared a Finnish-

1

2

German move against the Murmansk Railroad. so important to
Allied plans for Russia. With the end of the World War,
there was reason to suspect both Bolshevik revolutionism and
White Russian imperialism aimed at Finland. The Finnish
government sought both food and recognition of independence
from the Allies in order to secure its position both at home
and abroad. Certainly the United States had ample opportunity
to exercise grain diplomacy toward Finland. or to exercise
charity. or to stand aloof entirely. and to some extent all
of these possibilities came into play. as we will see.

Contacts between Finland and the United States were
infrequent before 1917. but they had some effect on later
relations. and the food supply question also figured in some
of these earlier interactions. Therefore, this essay will
consider Finnish-American relations before 1917. as part of
the general overview of Finnish history necessary to an
appreciation of the period 1917-1919. In addition. Finnish
emigration to the united States will receive consideration,
as a phenomenon that influenced the conception that each
country had of the other. and as a phenomenon that occurred
largely as a result of economic needs related to food supply.
The overall purpose of this essay, then. is to demonstrate
the importance of food in relations between Finland and the
United States. and to examine the effects of American food
policy on a country striving through grave difficulties

toward independence.

CHAPTER I

A synopsis of the history of Finland provides the con-
tent of this chapter. Beginning with a consideration of the
land itself and of the people who became known as “Finns".
the synopsis will continue through the eras of Swedish and
Russian rule to the end of the 19th century. The economic
development of Finland is of primary importance for our con-
cern with the question of food supply. but important social

and political developments will also be considered.

Finland and the Finns

Finland has been described as a country made up of 11%
water and 20% uncultivable marshes. having half of the re-
maining dry land covered with trees!1 Less than 6% of the
entire land surface came under the plow as late as 1901. with
less than 31 in natural meadow.2 The country lies in the
latitudes of Alaska. and its soil is mostly thin and rocky.
“Wheat cannot be cultivated successfully.“ wrote Samuel Eliot
Morison about Finland in 1918. ”and unseasonable frosts often
spoil the other grain."3 Finland has never supported a large
population.

The people we now call ”Finns“ entered their name-sake
land hundreds of years ago. Their language was much like that

of the Esthonians. a little like that of the Hungarians. and
3

1.
nothing like anything else in Europe. Their early interest in
Finland was as a place for hunting and fishing. and trapping
for the fur trade. To them. agriculture meant the slash-and-
burn procedure. rather than farmsteads or village plots.
Besides being wasteful. slash-and-burn agriculture was more
conducive to a sparse. semi-nomadic population than to set-
tled communities. It was a method still in occasional use in
Finland after the turn of the present century. Small wonder
that medieval Finns were neither so numerous nor so well-
organized as to effectively resist invasion.

Among western competitors. Sweden established a pre-
eminent position in Finland through a 13th century crusade.
Swedish colonists then arrived to push out along the largely
uninhabited southern and western coasts. They never pene-
trated very far inland. but their presence constituted a
threat to an eastern competitor for Finland: the Russians of
Novgorod. After years of warfare between Swedes and Russians.
in which Finns suffered much. peace came in 1323. The Finns
living around Lake Ladoga - the Karelians. as they were
called - were divided between East and West. while most of
inhabited Finland became part of the Kingdom of Sweden. The
next 500 years of Finnish history unrolled under Swedish
hegemony. with never-ending problems on the eastern frontier

caused by Russians. Swedes. or the Finns themselves.

Finland under Swedish Rule
Inevitably. Sweden brought new influences to Finland.
but the idea that the Finns then developed a 'passionate

5

conviction' of their mission to 'stand as an outpost of wes-
tern civilization against the barbarian hordes of the east'
is overstated.“ According to Morison. on the other hand.
the Finns who lived away from areas of Swedish settlement
received only a “thin veneer" of Swedish culture. continuing
to live after their own customs and traditions. Perhaps the
'veneer' laid overtop of tradition was Swedish law. which
gradually replaced customary law in Finland. This is rather
an important contribution. which with the Catholic Church
did tend to separate Finland from the Karelians under Russian
rule and the Orthodox Church. Given the fact that the average
Finn had a very limited. provincial outlook. though. too much
can be made of his being a self-proclaimed guardian of wes-
tern civilization. It is an idea born of 19th century roman-
tic nationalism and 20th century politics. Long years of con-
flict were enough to breed hatred and fear of the Russians.
The Finnish people long remained very loyal to Sweden.
They were treated much the same as the Swedish population.
rather than being enslaved. Swedish control of Finland was
originally intended to be a step toward control of Russia's
western trade. No such control was obtained. but Finland
could still be a source of revenue and soldiers. Furs
furnished some income for the Swedish crown and its repre-
sentatives. but the fur trade was already in relative decline
by the inth century. after hundreds of years of exploitation.
A land tax paid mainly in agricultural produce became the
basic assessment. In Sweden this tax was levied on freehold

land. except that owned by nobles. The same system was

6
transplanted to Finland. It was therefore in the interest of
the Swedish crown to encourage the formation of peasant free-
holds in Finland. Nobles did receive grants of land. but ap-
parently these were given most often in the form of several
small tenant farms. Thus it is the proud boast of many Fin-
nish writers that serfdom never existed in their land. That
is perhaps true in the strictest of legal terms. but with
the 17th century - when much land went to the nobility - the
condition of smallholders and tenant farmers deteriorated.

The Finnish provinces had representatives in the Four-
Estate Diet of the Swedish Kingdom when that consultative
body was formed. Those provinces would have electors for the
throne. too. The four estates were those of the nobility.
clergy. burghers. and peasant freeholders. Swedish nobles
held the administrative and military posts in Finland at
first. and they were always prominent. Both Finns and for-
eigners could rise to high positions. however. The clergy.
even the bishopric. was soon filled with Finns who could
communicate with their countrymen. since Finns constituted a
heavy majority of the population. The few towns and their
trade were mostly Swedish. A good deal of Swedish-Finnish
intermixture occurred in the coastal areas. though the
interior remained Finnish.

As long as the people of Finland felt confident in Swe-
den's ability and willingness to protect them from Russia.
their loyalty rested firm despite occasional difficulties.

A primary problem is exemplified in the small population of
medieval Finland. which one estimate put at less than

7

100.000 persons before the Reformation.5 To demand revenue
and foodstuffs of these few people when the land seemed so
unproductive might well put a strain on its inhabitants. Swe-
dish colonists provided an initial answer to the problem.
bringing methods of settled agriculture which increased pro-
ductivity. The southwestern coastal strip is said to have
paid 60% of the taxes levied on Finland in the mid-14th
century.6 This was an area long under Swedish influence. an
area of heavy Swedish settlement. Meanwhile, the crown urged
people to pioneer permanent holdings in the wilderness. and
more Finns began to take up settled agriculture. too.

Despite the increase in productivity. no large stock-
piles of food were accumulated. Increasing taxes. tithes for
the church. and the support and billeting of soldiers all
kept the common farmers in Finland from getting rich. Taxes
and the billeting of soldiers contributed to popular revolts
in the 15th and 16th centuries. (It is important to note
that these revolts aimed at the redress of certain grievances.
not at independence from Sweden. where taxes also caused
unrest.)

Furthermore. the climate was always a problematic fac-
tor for agriculture. A catastrophic famine in 1696-97 demon-
strated how precariously human life in Finland was balanced
upon uncertain conditions of agricultural production. and
how dependent it could be upon outside aid. An early frost
left people eating bread made of flour mixed with the shred-
ded bark of trees. While this was going on. mercantilistic

Sweden was selling grain from other parts of its empire to

8
foreign buyers. After about one-third of Finland's popula-
tion had died. the government realized that it could not
afford to lose more taxpayers and soldiers. Aid finally
arrived. but not as charity; the debt was collected the

following summerl7

Growth of Dissatisfaction with Swedish Rule

Remarkably enough. that episode did not bring an imme-
diate outcry against Swedish rule. Fear of Russia was too
great for that. The famine did show that Sweden would defi-
nitely put its own interests ahead of Finnish welfare. That
fact was made apparent in other ways as well. and would
eventually cause some doubt as to the advantages of being
tied to Sweden.

There had been no serious separatist movements in Fin-
land. but a particularist tendency to 'look out for Finland
first' had often been in evidence. This tendency was rein-
forced so long as the administration of Finland. from the
lowest to the highest levels. was in the hands of persons
who gained a livelihood from their own holdings in that
country. With the advent of King Gustavus Vasa. more admin-
istrative duties went to officers of the crown. supported
from royal revenues. Gustavus Vasa sought more income and
more centralized control over the realm. which is the main
reason for his support of the Reformation in the Swedish
Kingdom. (During the course of the 16th century. Sweden and
therefore Finland established the Lutheran form of Protes-

tantism as the state church.)

9

While Sweden emerged as a Great Power by way of the
Thirty Years' War. officers and other state servants re-
ceived much land in Finland. Some of them were undoubtedly
Finlanders (the term refers to natives of Finland. whether
of Finnish. Swedish. or mixed origin). Finlanders made a
sizable contribution to the Swedish army. But most of the
new owners were Swedes. and Swedish administrative officials
also multiplied. with a concomitant increase in the use of
both written and spoken Swedish. That language was commonly
used in the army. and Swedish bishops took over leadership
of the church in Finland. The Finnish-speaking population
found its language subject to a gradually growing discrim-
ination. This “language disability". as it has been called.
represented a sort of ‘Swedification' of Finland that was
sometimes consciously attempted. sometimes unintentional.
never complete. but nevertheless a source of irritation.
Again. as long as the kingdom's military forces were vic-
torious. so that the Russians were kept at bay. the irrita-
tions were apparently deemed acceptable.

The Great Northern War started in the year 1700. It
marked the end of Sweden as a Great Power. while Peter the
Great's Russia came to the fore. While the war proceeded.
the Russian army occupied Finland from 171a to 1721. a
period known to Finns as ”the Great Wrath”. Already in 1713
there were doubts that the Swedish-born commander of the
forces in Finland had done all he could to defend the country.
The reckoning afterward showed that some five-sixths of the

Finnish soldiery on all fronts of the war were dead or

10
captured: that Finland was devastated while Sweden was rela-
tively untouched: that the population of Finland was down to
around 300.000 while that of Sweden approached 1.5 million.
the largest disproportion in a long time.8 To Finlanders.
it was obvious that their part of the realm had suffered dis-
proportionately. even for a border territory.

The doubts expressed about a general in 1713 only grew
to more general proportions over the course of the century.
Sweden started another Russian war in 17U1. Predictably. it
ended in another occupation of Finland (called this time ”the
Lesser Wrath‘. being shorter and milder than the previous
occupation). During this war. Russia broached the idea of an
independent Finland under Russian protection. Peace terms did
not work out that way. but the idea fueled Swedish suspicions
of separatist aspirations in Finland. Among Finns. rumors
abounded that Sweden would prefer to take Norway and leave
Finland to Russia. Sweden's defense plan of 1785 called for
withdrawing the army from most of Finland if Russia attacked.
in order to cover the approaches to Sweden itself.

Against this backdrop of doubts and fears occurred the
mutiny of 1788. Some officers who had homes and property in
Finland thought it better to negotiate than to fight another
apparently hopeless campaign. In reality. since Russia was
more heavily engaged elsewhere. the mutiny achieved little
militarily. But the attitude of hopelessness. of resignation
to the superior strength of Russia. spread among the educated
people of Finland. The Napoleonic Era brought yet another war

between Sweden and Russia. fought once again in Finland. The

11
Finnish soldiery and peasantry still fought the old foe.
Officers and other estates did not all exhibit the same de-

sire. This time. in 1809. Finland passed under Russian rule.

Finland under Russian Rule

Russian rule had been dreaded for centuries. The reality
proved to be quite bearable, because Russia gave largely
autonomous status to its new Grand Duchy. where internal
affairs were concerned. Externally. Finlanders were not
forced to fight Russian wars. though some did voluntarily.
Since Russians did not receive government jobs in Finland
for almost a hundred years. educated persons found less com-
petition for those jobs than when Swedish civil servants
were present.

There were still those who feared. though. that little
Finland must end in being completely assimilated by the
Russian giant. Some hoped for reunion with Sweden. but they
found little effective response in that quarter. Others
thought the inhabitants of Finland should be awakened to a
sense of self-identity and nationality. In this way. they
could resist cultural absorption by Russia.

These goals spurred a movement to establish Finnish as
the language of culture and government. in place of Swedish.
As mentioned earlier. the Swedish language had come increas-
ingly into use in government and military affairs during the
17th century. yet the vast majority in Finland spoke Finnish
as their mother tongue. Then. too. Swedish had replaced Latin

and Finnish in higher education. so that by the 18th century.

12
Swedish was a prerequisite for state service or any of the
professions. In this manner the language difference opened a
social gap between educated people and the rest of the coun-
try. It was not necessarily a racial gap: John H. Wuorinen
said that the Swedish-speaking middle and upper classes of
the 19th century were ‘in the main” of Finnish origin.9

The language disability grew to serious proportions. The
majority of the population understood little of what went on
in legal proceedings or in all but a few classrooms. Most of
the people received basic reading skills through the Lutheran
church. as confirmation in the church required reading from
prayerbook and Bible. and any marriage required that the
hopeful partners be confirmed! Writing. arithmetic. and prac-
tical application of reading were not necessary to the
church's program. The Finnish-language movement (itself con-
ducted at first in the only useful written language - Swedish)
campaigned to correct these shortcomings.

The movement provoked a reaction from people who trea-
sured the Swedish heritage. They feared that whatever culture
Finland had would be lost if Swedish was ousted. Indeed. the
first approximations of modern political parties in Finland
were the Svecoman - partisans of the Swedish language. and
the Fennoman - partisans of the Finnish language. The language
question soon turned into a bitter controversy involving
political leverage in the administration of Finland. where
Swedish-speakers were in control.

Ultimate power rested. of course. with the Czar. The

administration of internal affairs in Finland. as noted

13
before. was in the hands of native officials. The Economic
Department became the chief central administrative organ.
under the name of the Senate. it also initiated legislation
that went to the Czar. and later to the Diet when that body
was reinstituted for Finland. The Senate governed according
to the constitutions formerly granted by Sweden. under the
eye of the Czar and his Governor-General. The old constitu-
tions did not set exact boundaries to the rights and respon-
sibilities of these various entities. which would become a
cause of much dispute.

The Four-Estate Diet was re-established for Finland in
the latter half of the 19th century. The Diet collaborated
with the higher powers to produce some useful legislation.
and also became the focal point of the language controversy.
Owing to traditional voting methods. the Diet represented
only a narrow group of nobles. property owners. and clergy-
men. so that the Swedish—language partisans controlled it.
The Swedish-speakers were not necessarily blind to the needs
and desires of the majority. but they certainly did not want
to lose their position of influence. Besides. many govern-
ment officials who were not fanatic about the issue simply

did not want to bother with a new language.

Beginnings of Industrialization

In addition to the language question. there were many
other developments during this period which deeply affected
Finland. From 1856 onward. legislation and decrees were

designed to improve transportation. remove impediments to the

1h
lumber industry. open the way for incorporation of endeavor.
and otherwise aid the growth of new industries. Travel
restrictions were eased. bringing an internal migration to
the towns and places where work was to be found. New jobs and
new trade relations opened up. internally and externally.

Industrial endeavor in Finland grew steadily after the
middle of the 19th century. both in terms of the range of
production and the size of output. Growing factories meant a
growing work force. At first. this kind of labor was a wel-
come alternative to bleak prospects in the agricultural sec-
tor. The first organizations for workers were reading clubs
formed by middle class proponents of the Finnish language.
They sought to raise the level of education among workers and
perhaps stimulate patriotism at the same time. What might
later be termed “proletarian' issues were much subordinate
to Finnish-language nationalism.

Workers' associations concerned themselves more with
working conditions when trade unions were formed in the
1880's and 1890's. Even these had middle class language
nationalists for leaders at first. but the leadership changed
as the strike came into use. and as frustration over lack of
a political voice came to the fore. Labor wanted the Diet to
pass suffrage reform laws in 189h. The move was blocked by
Swedish-speakers concerned mainly with limiting the number
of Finnish-speaking voters.10 Thereafter. labor was increas-
ingly radicalized. and less interested in the language ques-
tion as propounded by the propertied classes. Labor leaders

were more likely to observe that most owners and managers of

15
big landholdings or industrial concerns spoke Swedish as a
matter of choice. giving a dual emphasis to class differences.
A separate Labor Party was formed in 1899. which became the
Social Democratic Party of Finland in 1903.

Changes in Agriculture

For much of the 19th century. Finnish agriculture pro-
duced more as more land came under cultivation. It did not
keep up with the population. however. especially after the
great famine of the 1860's. The population of Finland trip-
led through the 19th century. despite the loss of thousands
to the famine and tens of thousands to emigration. More peo-
ple plus changes in agriculture made Finland “largely depen-
dent on other countries for its bread." in Morison's words.11
With Russia next door. and imported grain from America and
Germany available. dependence on foreigners seemed to pose
no problems.

A bigger problem was how to employ more people. At the
turn of the century. about 88% of Finland's 2.5 millions
still lived in rural areas.12 Lumbering. railroad construc-
tion. and new urban industries raised expectations. but still
could not put everyone to work. Division of landholdings was
only a partial answer to population pressure. because this
could proceed to the point of unprofitability if carried too
far. It also presupposed a willingness to divide. There had
always been tenant farmers and landless laborers. but the
ranks of the landless increased rapidly. and were likely to

be further reinforced due to changes in agriculture itself.

16

Such changes came from the desire to make agriculture
more efficiently productive. The government began to push
dairy farming as a way to make better use of the soil. and
because fodder crops and cattle are not so vulnerable to
untimely frosts as are grain crops. Dairying eventually
became the second-largest exporting industry after lumbering.
One result was a shift away from generalized production for
agricultural self-sufficiency. toward specialization and
entry into a wider market economy. Another result was a
decrease in jobs for laborers. as dairying required less
manpower than did traditional methods of food cropping. At
the same time. the government encouraged use of modern
labor-saving devices and scientific methods which. though
slow to be adopted. would further tend to reduce the need
for manpower. So at a time when the numbers of potential
farmers. renters. and laborers were growing. opportunities
for them could not keep pace.

It is true that complaints of local labor shortages
did appear. but mostly in areas where lumbering was not a
big business. where division of land had already gone about
as far as possible. and where emigration took its heaviest
toll. In other words. those areas were not very attractive
to job seekers. Besides. contrary comments about the need
for labor in those areas did also appear.13

The growing pressure on positions in the countryside
made abuses even more likely than when Antti Chydenius. an
18th century clergyman. used the word 'serfdom' while writing

against the old mercantilistic system.1u Renters and laborers

17
could be subject to verbal agreements which put them at the
landlords' mercy. No really effective regulatory or land
reform legislation was forthcoming until after World War I.
although the Socialist Party did try to recruit members among
the rural landless. and was quite successful with renters in
particular.

Along with everything else. saving money toward the
purchase of land grew more difficult. The rise of lumbering
and pulp processing brought a rise in land values. as did
increased productivity from land enclosures and improved
methods. Wages for laborers might keep relative pace. but so
did rents for tenant farmers. The latter were generally the
most likely aspirants to a farm of their own. as they already
had many essential personal possessions. Since travel restric-
tions had been eased. emigration provided hope for those who
wanted to save money for a farm. or who simply wanted to find
steady work. From 1893 to 191k. nearly a quarter of a million
Finlanders left for America.15

The history of Finland shows that although there had
never been an independent Finnish nation before the 20th cen-
tury. Finlanders had exercised varying degrees of self-govern—
ment which gave them a separate identity. Economically. Fin-
land supported only a small population. becoming partially
dependent upon foreign sources of food by the later 19th cen-
tury. Economic and social developments. particularly of the
19th century. brought at the same time growth to Finland and
divisions to Finnish society.

18
Footnotes to Chapter I
1 - Samuel Eliot Morison. Inquiry Document No. #21.
”Memorandum on Finland” (National Archives. Washington. D.C.).
written in 1918. p. 7.
2 - Ibid.. p. 2180
3 - Ibid.. p. 70

h - Agnes Rothery. Finland the New Nation (New York:
The Viking Press. 1936). p. 25.

5 - J. Rampden Jackson. Finland (New York: The MacMillan
Company. 19h0). p. 32.

6 - Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen. A Ristor of
Finland (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Inc.. 1962). p. 43.

7 - Ibid.. p. 1250
8 - Ibid.. p.p. 131-137.

9 - John R. Wuorinen. Nationalism in Modern Finland
(New York: Columbia university Press. 1931). p. #2.

10 - Ibid.. p. 176.

11 - Morison. op. cit.. p. 239.

12 - A. William Hoglund. "No Land for Finns“. in The
Finnish Experience in the Western Great Lakes Region: New

Perspectives (Turku. Finland: Institute for Migration. 1975).
Do 37-

13 - Ibid.. p. no.
in - Jackson. op. cit.. p. #3.

15 - Auvo Kostiainen. The For in of Finnish-American
Communism 1 1 -1 2h (Turku. Finland: The fiigration Institute.
197 o P0 190

CHAPTER II

Emigration was a response to an economic need felt by
many Finlanders. Nearly 10% of the population went to America
during the thirty years prior to World War I. Thus the United
States exercised a strong economic influence upon Finlanders.
though emigration would occur for other reasons. too. But this
chapter will be concerned with emigrants from Finland in Amer-
ica mostly because the immigration side of the process gave
Americans the opportunity to form Opinions about Finlanders.
and vice versa. The impressions formed would have some effect
upon later relations between Finnish and American governments.
(Here we will note that most of the emigrants to America were
Finnish as distinct from Swedish Finns. As the following re-
marks are generally more appropriate to the Finnish emigrants.

they are sometimes referred to as “Finns” or 'Finnish'.)

Finnish Emigration to the united States

Finnish newspapers poked occasional fun at the gun-
slinging. gold-digging Americans. There was a consul repre-
senting the United States at Helsinki from 1856. but Ameri-
ca's rowdy “get rich quick“ image seems to have received
little modification through the consulate. Preachers thun-
dered against the supposed moral weakness of those who suc-

cumbed to the lure of America. They went anyway. to what
19

20
they hoped was a land of opportunity. After all. America fed
its own people and sent its excess produce overseas where it
often undersold what the European peasant could raise. And
there were growing industries. mines and factories. all of
which had to have workers. Steamship lines sent recruiters
with attractive tales of America and good deals for passen-
gers. Emigrants through the years sent good news and money
back home. or returned richer than when they had left. Of
course. some returned with nothing. and the ”America letters“
from emigrants to friends or relatives were not always posi-
tive. Mostly. though. they added to “America fever”.

The great majority of Finnish emigrants left a rural.
agricultural background. Few of them could afford to buy a
farm upon landing in America. and not all of them wanted to
do so. The ideal was perhaps to work and save enough money
so that one could return to Finland and buy some land. The
immediate necessity was to find work. This usually meant low-
paying. unskilled labor in mines and factories. or work at
lumbering or fishing in which many Finlanders had some
experience.

Coming from similar backgrounds. and finding similar
unskilled or semi-skilled work. did not mean consensus in
outlook. For example. some of the emigrants were very reli-
gious. while others were glad to be 'unchurched'. This basic
difference was the wellspring of much discord. In addition.
political circumstances in Finland affected emigrants in
different ways over the years. Some individuals had been

forced to leave: several were Socialists. They added further

21

leaven to the ideas developing in the immigrant community.

Adjusting to Life in America

Like most immigrants. Finns were characterized in many
ways. often conflicting. Hardworking. troublesome. clannish.
individualistic. these are some of the descriptions.1 Like
other immigrants. too. there was a need for relaxation and
association. found too easily in bars. Yet some Finns attrac-
ted a good deal of attention in this regard. Someone once
wrote to a New England newspaper to ask about drinking.
brawling Finns.

“Do those barbarians actually have human souls?"2

Oskari Tokoi worked some years in America before return-
ing to Finland. where he rose to leadership in the Socialist
Party. He tells of American and Finnish workers holding
periodic drunken battles in a Wyoming mining town.3 He then
relates what was truly peculiar about the Finns: how they
organized a temperance society to combat the problem.

The question of alcohol abuse revealed two general char-
acteristics of the Finnish immigrant community. One was a
concern for the quality of life. The other was a penchant for
organization. Churchgoing Finns soon had congregations formed.
some complete with pastors from Finland. The churches gladly
extended their activities into the field of temperance work.
Drunkenness. after all. could mean degeneration of an indi-
vidual. and a reputation that might reduce employment oppor-
tunities for all Finns. Temperance hall activities were sup-

posed to keep the individual occupied and show America that

22
Finns were respectable. responsible people. When religious
influence proved to be too restrictive for many immigrants.
independent societies appeared.

The activities centered on temperance halls were extraor-
dinarily varied. and halls "were built in practically every
Finnish community”.u whether inspired by the temperance
movement or some other impulse. They helped immigrants to
adjust to life in America.

That life was often less than what was expected.
Although wages might be higher and of greater worth in Amer-
ica. the reality was too often unemployment and miserable
conditions for working and living. There is also the idea
that conditions and expectations were relative to previous
experiences. The suggestion was made to this writer that
former serfs from Poland or southeastern Europe might find
life in an American mining town to be not altogether unap-
pealing. Finns. on the other hand. were supposedly accustomed
to healthier surroundings and a somewhat better personal and
social life. Therefore. dark and dangerous mine shafts.
crowded factories. and flimsy shacks were something of a
shock to the Finns.5

Temperance societies and social activities could ease
the pain. but they could not solve the root problems. The
libraries and discussion groups that were part of “hall
activities” may even have helped to deepen dissatisfaction.
It appears that a higher percentage of Finnish immigrants
was literate than in any other immigrant group. This was due

to the foundation given by the church in Finland. added upon

23
in educational programs fostered by the Finnish-language
movement. Hall activities furthered the enlightenment.
Several Finnish-language newspapers were founded. too. Finns
were probably more aware than most recent immigrants - and
maybe more so than most resident Americans. except for the
muckrakers - of injustices that tarnished the golden myth of

the “land of opportunity“.

Finnish Immigrants and the Labor Movement

One way to cope was faith expressed through religion.
through support of the nation and society which allowed
immigrants to enter. through striving for upward mobility.
Many Finns took this path. more in the succeeding genera-
tions born in America.

Another way to cope was to organize workers for mutual
aid. This was not necessarily antithetical to the first-
mentioned Option. but strikes. violence. and politics
opened a fundamental division among the Finnish immigrants.

For a variety of reasons. a very large number of Fin-
nish immigrants joined the Socialist Party in America. In
1912. 10% of the party was Finnish. and theirs was the first
and the largest foreign-language federation in the organiza-
tion.6 Many of them later broke away to the International
Workers of the World when the Socialists became too docile.
Then after the Bolshevik Revolution. Finns gave crucial sup-
ort to the Communist parties in the United States. All of this
gave the Finns a red-tinged reputation in the eyes of other

Americans. though there were at least as many church-going

24
conservatives as there were radicals. and probably more who
were uncommitted in either direction. The radical reputation
was much bigger than the miniscule percentage of Finlanders
among the millions of immigrants.

Finns were involved in some of the most notorious labor
disputes of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They were
leaders in a violent strike of fishermen on the Columbia
River in 1896. Newspapers said that 'a wave of anti-Finnish
sentiment was unleashed in Oregon."7 The Finns were called
“Russian Finns". partly in recognition of the fact that they
entered the U.S. as former Russian subjects. but mostly to
take advantage of the idea that a Russian was likely to be
an anarchist.

The Minnesota iron miners' strike of 1907 brought such
newspaper comments as this:

”...fully ninety per cent of those in line were
Finlanders - fiery followers of the Red Flag ... The
remainder of the motley crowd was made up of Austrians.
Italiags and Montenegros - not one American appearing in
line.“

The obvious inference was that real Americans would not
do such a thing: real Americans were not Reds. Thus anti-
Finnish sentiment partook of rising anti-foreign. as well as
anti-radical. feeling. The same newspaper did. however. dis-
tinguish between older Finns who were “good citizens“ and
”a set of lawless young men who will not work. who are infused
with the lessons of Socialism and Anarchy."9 This is a re-
flection of real differences in political outlook between

more recent Finnish immigrants and those longer in America.

The prevailing opinion about Finns in general was

25
perhaps better expressed by the attempt to block citizenship
papers for one John Svan. allegedly a Socialist. because
”being a Finn he is a Mongolian and not a 'white person".10
The case appeared in the U.S. District Court at Duluth in
1908. where it was dismissed with the opinion that the Finns
“are now among the whitest people in Europe."11 To some. the
case has represented an attempt of the Federal government to
use immigration and citizenship laws to control socialism
among immigrants. But though the case was dismissed. the
epithet of "Mongolian" (read 'inferior') was added to the
anti-Finnish list.

The copper mining country of Michigan's Upper Peninsula
had been the original gathering place for early Finnish immi-
grants. When the strike of 1913 erupted. it was bound to
affect Finns on both sides of the picket line. This strike
may have done more to divide church Finns and leftist Finns
than any other incident. Again. those Finns among the strikers
were called ”Russian aliens. trouble-makers and socialists”.12
Murders and beatings occurred.

What brought nation-wide attention to this affair was a
Christmas Eve celebration for striking miners and their fami-
lies. a celebration that ended in disaster. (Woody Guthrie
later wrote a song about it entitled Italian Hall Massacre.13)
A shouted fire alarm interrupted the proceedings. which were
held on the upstairs level of a cultural hall. There was only
one escape route. and 7h people - men. women. and children -
died in the stampede over those stairs. There was no fire.

Whether the alarm was a mistake or not is unknown. but

26
suspicion of malicious intent was strong. Most of the victims
were Finns. in an area where Finns appeared in support of the
strike on the one hand. and of the conservative Citizens'
Alliance on the other. Area residents did raise $26,000 in
relief funds. regardless of opinion about the strike. but the
union representing the strikers rejected it. That only revived
hostile feelings. It should be noted that those feelings were
directed chiefly against union leaders and organizers. but as
in Minnesota in 1907. it was chiefly Finns who were black-
listed.

Some of the Finnish immigrants were ashamed of the Red-
Russian-Socialist-Anarchist descriptions of their countrymen.
and feared that all Finns would suffer the consequences.
Indeed. job discrimination was practiced against individuals

simply because they were Finns.1u

To combat this. conserva-
tives formed the “True Finns Movement“. Their object was to
shift the odium heaped upon Finns to the Socialist Party. as
if their left-leaning fellow countrymen had simply been mis-
1ed.15 Resolutions (called by Socialist Finns the “Judas
Resolutions“) gave assurance that the majority of the Finnish
immigrants were Christians and hard-working people. They
questioned prevailing economic and social conditions not at
all.

Efforts like the True Finns Movement may have saved some
jobs. but they served mainly to turn the gap into a breach
between leftist Finnish-Americans and the church-going con-

servatives. People who were living at the time of the Copper

Country strike recalled years later that Socialist folk and

27

“white folk“. or church-goers. formed two different social
groups. They allowed that while in Finland there were Social
Democrats who went to church. that did not happen in America.16

The Finnish immigrant community was bitterly divided
when America entered World War I. Not surprisingly. more
headlines went to strikers and draft evaders than to Chris-
tians and soldiers. American military intelligence kept up
surveillance of Finnish radicals that both fed upon and added
to the radical image. The stories culminated during the post-
war “Red Scare“. with this one from the New York Times:

“Says 300.000 Finns In U.S. Are Reds.“

As Carl Ross commented. that report would have had to
include every person of Finnish descent in the whole

country.17 Few Americans bothered to make distinctions.

Finnish emigration to the United States represented a
significant proportion of Finland's population. though small
in comparison to emigration from some other lands. While most
Finns left in order to seek better economic opportunities.
some left for political reasons. Those two streams combined
in many immigrants to produce politically active Finnish-
Americans. both conservative and radical. The radical reac-
tion does not seem to have had a great effect upon the image
of America held in Finland: at least. Finns continued to emi-
grate. But the American image of the radical Finn was magni-
fied and generalized to the point that the Federal government

took active notice of it.

28
Footnotes to Chapter II

1 - Carl E. Waisanen. “The Social Problems of the Finns
in America“. in The Finns in North America. A Social Sympo-
sium (East Lansing. Mi.: Michigan State University Press for
Suomi College. Hancock. Mi.. 1969). p. 201.

Michael G. Karni. “The Founding of the Finnish Socialist
Federation and the Minnesota Strike of 1907“. in For The
Common Good (Superior. Wis.: Tyomies Society. 1977). P. 79.

2 - Carl Ross. The Finn Factor (New York Mills. Minn.:
Parta Printers. 1977). P. 19.

3 - Oskari Tokoi. SISU - “Even Through A Stone Wall“
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957). P. 36.

h - Ross. op. cit.. p. 2“.

5 - Wilbert Salmi. interview. 17 July 1981. Hancock. Mi.

6 - Auvo Kostiainen. The Forging_gf Finnish-American
Communism 191 -1 2b (Turku. Finland: The Migration Insti-
tUEe. 197 g p. 320

7 - Michael M. Passi. “Fishermen on Strike“. in The
Finnish Experience in the Western Great Lakes Re ion: New
Perspectives (Turku. Finland: Institute for Migration. 1975).

P. 100.

 

8 - Karni. op. cit.. p.p. 76-77.

9 - Ross. op. cit.. p. 113.

10 - Karni. op. cit.. p.p. 79-80.

11 - Ibid.. p. 80.

12 - Arthur E. Puotinen. “Copper Country Finns and the
Strike of 1913“. in The Finnish Experience in the Western

Great Lakes Region: New Pers actives (Turku. Finland:
Institute for Migration. 197 . p. 1&7.

13 " Ibid.. pope 152-1530
14 " “1711. CD. Cite. p. 73. p. 780

15 - Reino Nikolai Hannula. Blueberr God (San Luis
Obispo. Cal.: Quality Hill Books. 1979). P. 167.

16 - Oral history project of Suomi College. Hancock. Mi.:
Ida S. Erickson interviewed by Douglas Ollila. 9 August 1973:
Reine Suojanen interviewed by Paul Jalkanen. 19 July 1972.

17 — Ross. op. cit.. p. 160.

CHAPTER III

Finland at the end of the 19th century was a largely
self-governing Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. At the
turn of the century. Czar Nicolas II tried to extend Russian
law to Finland. in place of the old Swedish constitutions.
The attempt provoked resistance in Finland. including the
General Strike of 1905. Finland's counterpart to the Russian
Revolution of that year. These events will be reviewed in the
present chapter. both to add necessary background information
for the later Civil War period. and to continue the story of
relations between Finland and the United States. Those rela-
tions were based upon three needs that Finland was devel-
oping: the need for food from abroad. the need for an outlet
for an expanding population. and the need for political sup-

port against Russia.

Relations between Finland and the United States before 191a

“May the Lord bless and keep all these kind-hearted
Americans..."1

No. it was not an immigrant Finnish Socialist who wrote
those words. but a Russian. Count Alexis Bobrinskoy. Marshal
of the Nobility of St. Petersburg. He wrote in 1893 to thank
the American public for aid sent to famine-stricken regions
of the Russian Empire. including Finland. He wrote to the

29

30
public because it was a private venture. That is. the U.S.
government acted mainly as liaison and shipper. The aid
itself came from private citizens. as noted in this official
communication:

“...a contribution. mainly. if not wholly. made by
charitable citizens of Pennsylvania. amounting very nearly
to “1.000 rubles."2

The money was turned into grain. Finland received the
benefit of about one-quarter of the sum. in addition to
grain that passed from America to Finland in the course of
normal trade.

That was a significant example of the occasional con-
tacts between Finland and America prior to World War I. The
people of Finland did not forget this kind of charitable
action. Newspapers carried articles about it. children wrote
poems about it. people spoke of it years afterward.3 They
grew to believe that America was a country sympathetic to
the needs of Finland.

As for Americans. insofar as they thought of Finland at
all. it was as a part of Russia: a part that occasionally
needed famine relief. that increasingly suffered from a form
of persecution called “Russification“. Primarily. it was the
home of those “Russian Finns“ who came to work and go on
strike in America. These three strands of physical need.
political problems. and emigration. figured prominently in
the thin fabric of Finnish-American relations before World
War I.

31

The Russification of Finland

Americans could read about the beginnings of Russifica-
tion in 1899 in newspapers and articles like “The Constitu-
tional Conflict in Finland“ which appeared in The North
American Review. or “The Downfall of Finland: An Object
Lesson in Russian Aggression“ from Blackwood's Magazine. As
the titles suggest. Finland was portrayed as a country of
outmanned but staunch defenders of western constitutional
government. victimized by a bullying. despotic. oriental
giant. Even so. there was no official or important public
response from Americans to the plight of Finland. though
several well-known Europeans protested to the Czar. One
cannot help but wonder if 'Russian-Finn-Anarchist' immi-
grants tempered American enthusiasm. (Some Americans recog-
nized that Russian oppression might have affected the Finns
on the picket lines. but that recognition did not soften
feelings toward strikers.u) More likely. most Americans
simply did not trouble themselves about Finland's situation.

The situation was that Czar Nicolas II had taken the
traditional pledge of his predecessors to rule his Grand
Duchy according to the fundamental laws of Finland. In other
words. he was to leave Finland to the Finlanders. except for
questions of foreign affairs. But the February Manifesto of
1899 brought new legislative rules which stripped the Finnish
Senate and Diet of any but consultative rights. Finlanders
called the manifesto unconstitutional: Russians called it a
needed clarification.

There were many reasons for the Russian move. including

32
discrimination against Russians in Finland. while Finlanders
received all the benefits of Russian citizenship. They could
do anything a Russian could do. in any place. Russians could
not enter Finland's civil service. and needed special 11-
censes to undertake business affairs in Finland. But Russifi-
cation - the centralization of government institutions and
the integration of subject peoples - was the order of the day
for the whole empire. Finland did not suffer alone. indeed
suffered less than most.

Finland's response was an act glorified in Finnish his-
tory. Some 523.000 people signed a petition to the Czar.
asking him not to break the traditional pledge. but to observe
the law. The figure is said to represent nearly half the adult
population of Finland at the time. and it was attained in a
little over a week.5 Here is Tokoi's comment on the matter.
in relation to his neighbors in a northern agricultural
parish:

“No one was quite sure what that petition really was and
what it implied. but it was explained that every adult must
write his name on it or draw his mark: and that when this
pile of paper was shogn to the Czar everything would return
to its proper order.“

Everything did not return to its proper order.

The next step for Finland came from abroad. Luminaries
from all over Europe to the number of 1.063 signed another
petition to the Czar. entitled “Pro Finlandia“. This likewise
brought no noticeable result.

From a little further abroad. sons and daughters of

Finland in America tried to enlist the U.S. government in

support of their homeland. They drew up an appeal to President

33

McKinley. in which he was asked to “exert influence on behalf
of Finland at the Hague Peace Conference“.7 (The conference
was of course a pet project of Czar Nicolas. whose external
policy in this instance stood in somewhat incongruous con-
trast to his internal policy.) The appeal to McKinley may
have been delivered in person through the voice of Oscar J.
Larson. one of the leaders of the movement. He then held the
elective office of county attorney in Houghton County. Michi-
gan. Soon he was trying to win Finnish-American votes for
McKinley. and he landed in Congress in 1921. There is no
indication that McKinley or the U.S. government ever brought
up the case of Finland at the Hague Conference. despite the
accession of Finnish-American conservatives to the Republican
Party.

Another scheme for Finland. one that may have involved
some of those same Finnish-Americans. seems to have origi-
nated in the home country. According to this plan. an inter-
national jury was to consider the conflict - which was.
arguably. just a difference of legal interpretation - and the
ambassador of the United States was to deliver the verdict to
the Czar. This would be a daring way to line up the United
States officially behind Finland. However. “several influ-
ential Finns“ in the U.S. suggested abandoning the plan when
a Finnish emissary missed seeing McKinley at a resort on

Lake Champlain.8

After the great petition drive. the people of Finland
were generally slow to respond further to the Russian mea-

sures. The agricultural population has been described as

3h

mostly provincial in outlook rather than nationalistic. and
loyal to the Czar while blaming his evil advisors for what-
ever might go wrong.9 The head of the church in Finland.
who was appointed by the Czar. ordered the clergy to obey
Russian dictates.10 The labor movement was cool at first
toward participating in resistance with the bourgeoisie. but
eventually came forward. A reading of Tokoi's autobiography
gives the impression that the constitutional battle aroused
the Swedish-speaking population much more than it did the
Finnish-speakers.11

Among the middle and upper class elements. there was a
split between Constitutionalists and Compliers. The nascent
political parties from the early days of the language con-
troversy had later split into three: the Svecoman or Swedish
Party. the Old Finns. and the Young Finns. (There was also.
briefly. a Liberal Party.) The Swedish Party was Constitution-
alist. meaning that they resisted Russification. Their method
was passive resistance. refusing to carry out what they
regarded as illegal measures. but avoiding violence. The
Young Finns tended to follow the same path. Most Old Finns
believed that it was better to comply with Russian decrees.
They hoped that loyalty would ease Russian pressure. bring
favors to them at the expense of the Swedish-speakers. and
keep Russians out of Finnish government posts. The Old Finns
gained the name of Compliers. or Retreaters. The split between
Constitutionalists and Compliers was taken so seriously that

it extended into social affairs.

Nowhere among these non-labor political parties was

35

there evinced a majority desire for independence. or any
outline for a new departure in the form of government. There
existed. to be sure. a small active resistance group that
encouraged acts of violence and spoke of political changes.
But Hannes Ignatius. who was a prominent member of a similar
group in 1917. said that these early Activists “did not have
popular approbation...“12

While the trial of Finland's position in the Russian
Empire proceeded. the three strands of Finnish-American rela-
tions came together in 1902. Famine again swept the north
countries. and again we hear of a message of thanks to Amer-
icans for needed assistance. It came this time from the gov-
ernor of a Swedish province.13 He voiced what he thought to
be the feelings of his countrymen. as well as those of Nor-
wegians and Finlanders. Apparently the latter. with the Rus-
sians. were too distracted to speak for themselves.

Ample reason for distraction existed in the form of an
imperial edict given in 1901. an edict calling for conscrip-
tion of Finlanders into the Russian army. This brought Russi-
fication home to many more people. The Constitutionalists
were quick to point out that the existing military law of
1878 had been violated. They counselled a boycott of the
draft: eligible young men were not to report. clerks not to
take names. doctors not to give examinations. The boycott
was very effective in 1902. and it was no coincidence that
emigration figures were higher that year than ever before or
since. Tokoi relates.

“No one spoke of evasion or escape. In conversation.

36

it was merely remarked that so-and-so had gone to America
tOOeee'

The boycott weakened over the next couple of years. but
no one from Finland was forced to serve in the Russo-Japanese
War. The Russian Governor-General. previously endowed with
dictatorial powers. was assassinated in 190a. This was the
celebrated deed of Eugen Schaumann. The victim was General
Bobrikov. “the notorious Russifier of the Baltic Provinces“.15
Faced with problems enough elsewhere. the Czar stopped trying
to enforce conscription in Finland. The leader of the Consti-
tutionalists proposed an end to conscription. in exchange

for an annual subsidy. The Czar accepted.

Events of 1905 and 1906

The basic issue of unconstitutional Russian rule was
not resolved. Therefore. with the Czar's army busy fighting
Japan. Finland joined in the disturbances that rocked the
Russian Empire in 1905. Constitutionalists. Activists. the
Labor Party now known as Socialists - all took part in the
November General Strike. The Compliers had already lost much
prestige. They were in no postion to oppose the strike move-
ment. even if they had wanted to. As the Czar granted a
constitution to Russia under similar circumstances. so he
retracted all measures deemed unconstitutional in Finland.
A further concession promised reform of the Diet on a basis
of universal suffrage. Old divisions overcome. a victory so
complete. “there seemed something holy about it.“ said one

participant.16

37

But the unity was achieved more by compromise than by
inspiration. and the “victory“ meant different things to
different people. The parties that mattered at the moment
were the Constitutionalists and the Socialists. They had the
greatest support. They also had differences to work out
before the strike was brought to an end.

For their part. the Constitutionalists agreed to end
the strike when the Russians promised a return to pre-
Russification conditions. The Constitutionalists wanted to
avoid change. To them. the proper political order was a
division of powers between the Senate. Diet. and monarch.

a division not necessarily equal. The Senate should be the
seat of administrative activity. without responsibility to
the Diet. and with powers both to initiate legislation and to
pass upon whatever work the Diet was allowed to do. The Diet
could act as a sounding board of public opinion and have a
limited role in legislation. The monarch should act as a
check on innovations. but not on the system itself.

Constitutionalists were monarchists because a monarch
could perform a useful role if he did not overstep his
bounds. Significantly. the Swedish Constitution of 1772. that
treasure which the Constitutionalists defended and for which
they were named. was designed to strengthen the king against
an unruly Parliament. It had been put into effect through a
coup d'etat backed by military force! (Sweden had since moved
on to something more democratic. but not until after losing
Finland.) The Czar really had nothing to fear from these

bourgeois Constitutionalists. so long as he observed their

38
Constitution. That is why Finland had been his quietest. most
loyal province throughout the 19th century.

The Socialists wanted a national constituent assembly.
For the next dozen years. it was their naive assumption that
any such body would give them majority support. Then they
could change constitutional law to make government respon-
sible to a reformed Diet (for internal affairs. anyway). The
new Diet would have no property qualification for membership
and would be elected through universal suffrage. This body
would take the country through the period of bourgeois repub-
licanism prescribed by history. and up to the revolution that
should someday occur.

The Socialists did not really believe that the old Four-
Estate Diet would reform itself. or give in to universal
suffrage. They remembered the defeat of 189k on a similar
question. The Constitutionalists insisted that any change
must be constitutional. of course. meaning that the old Diet
must approve it. In order to bring the strike to an end. the
Constitutionalists and the Socialists had to make a compro-
mise that would allow them to maintain a united front toward
Russia. from which concessions were sought. Terms of the com-
promise were that Diet reform would be accomplished constitu-
tionnally. and there would be universal suffrage in Diet elec-
tions. The Socialists were convinced when the new Governor-
General also promised a reform along the same lines. The new
Diet was to be a unicameral body of 200 members elected by
all citizens 24 years old and above. Anyone who could vote

could also stand for election. male or female.

39
European liberals hailed the reformed Diet as the most

advanced in the world. The point of importance. however. is
that nothing really changed. The reformed Diet really had no
more power in relation to the Senate and the Czar than did
the old Diet. The Senate was still appointed by the Czar.
was still responsible only to him. and was still in charge
of the administration of Finland. The Diet's legislative
role was very limited. and their petitions for new laws

were subject to the Czar's approval before further action
could be taken. Initiative rested with the higher powers.
which were non-elective. The Constitutionalists thought they
had re-established their check on the Czar. while keeping
him and the power of the Russian state as a check on the
Diet.

Not all of the Socialists were prepared to compromise.
The hard-liners were found mostly in the national guard. a
group organized to keep order when the police forces were
disrupted or disarmed through the strike. The national guard
had a large working-class element. especially after the
university students broke away to form a bourgeois guard.
Later observers have put the names Red and White on these
organizations.

The anti-compromisers in the national guard threatened
to continue the strike into 1906. but outside of encouraging
the old Diet to carry through arrangements for the new. they
did not have the strength to alter the situation. The unions
had come out in support of the Socialist compromise. putting

“unorganized“ radicals in the national guard somewhat outside

#0
the pale.17

In July of 1906. the radicals made another bid to carry
out their program. The Russian garrison at the Sveaborg
Fortress in Helsinki mutinied against its officers. The
so-called Red Guard asked the Socialist Party to proclaim
another general strike in support of the mutineers. and for
a constituent assembly. The party leadership refused. The
Red Guard called their own strike. and went to the aid of
the mutineers anyway. The “White Guard“ was called out with
loyal military units to restore order. The mutiny failed.
but not before Red and White clashed. with the loss of a
few lives. Dedicated radicals were forced to go underground
or abroad. while Finland prepared for elections to the
reformed Diet rather than to a constituent assembly.

Some of those who went abroad went to America. as had
most of the draft evaders and other political exiles of the
period. More would follow when Russian repression set in
again. The most notorious of the political exiles in America
were those who would join the labor movement in their new
country. or who had already done so in Finland. They influ-
enced the Finnish-American labor movement. and no doubt
added to the revolutionary image of the Socialists. espe-
cially the Finnish Socialists. in America.

But there were differences of political opinion among
these exiles. too. A.F. Tanner was a political organizer
whose Myrsky (“Storm“) group is thought to have been the
first Finnish-American Socialist party. He later wrote and

organized for the Socialist Party of America. Matti Kurikka

‘ hi
set up a utopian society in British Columbia. Leo Laukki
turned from educating Finnish-Americans about Socialism to
urging them into the I.W.W. Johan Kock. the Red Guard com-
mander when the Sveaborg Mutiny occurred. founded in America
the “Society for Revolution in Finland and Russia“. This
obviously focused on European rather than American politics.
but the exiles and Finnish affairs in general had a great
impact on Finnish immigrants. Union organizer Eemeli Parras
said that the General Strike of 1905 brought a “new energy

for action“ to radicals in America.18

After the events of 1905 and 1906. Finland seemed to
have found the means to maintain self-government and to
unify the greater part of its people. Looking back upon that
period. however. some would say that the first blood of the
Finnish Civil War was spilled in 1906. The Red Guard at that
time was not a Socialist Party organization. and the Social-
ist Party was not at all revolutionary. but during the Civil
War period these distinctions were blurred. Thus it could be
“proven“ historically that the Socialists had always wished
to subvert law and order and bring bloodshed to Finland.

Meanwhile. America received many political exiles or
escapees from Finland. among those others who still sought
a better livelihood. The U.S. also supplied grain to Finland.
through both trade and charity. These contacts enhanced Amer-
ica's image in Finland. but the U.S. government did not feel
compelled to create any definite Finnish policy as yet.

despite the hopes of some Finnish immigrants.

#2

Footnotes to Chapter III

1 - Foreign Relations of the United States -_1893 (“Pa-
pers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States“.
Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 189#). p. 5#6.

2 - Ibid.. p. 5390

3 - Mortimer A. waldo Papers (Michigan State University
Archives. East Lansing. Mi.. Collection No. #2. Box No. 2).
notes of a tour of Finland in October. 1918.

# - Michael G. Karni. “The Founding of the Finnish So-
cialist Federation and the Minnesota Strike of 1907“. in For
The Common Good (Superior. Wis.: Tyomies Society. 1977). p. 77.

5 - Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen. A History of
Finland (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Inc.. 1962). p. 231.

6 - Oskari Tokoi. SISU - “Eyen Thrgugh A Stone Wall“
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957): p. 9#.

7 - Jaakko Paavolainen. “First Generation Finnish-
Americans Serve the United States“. in Old Friends-Stron
Ties (Turku. Finland: Institute for Migration. 1975). P. 250.

8 - John H. Wuorinen. Nationalism in Modern Finland
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1931 . p. 273.

9 - Tokoi. op. cit.. p. 93.

10 - Samuel Eliot Morison. Inquiry Document No. #21.
“Memorandum on Finland“ (National Archives. Washington. D.C.).
written in 1918. p. 3##.

11 " T0k01. Ops Cite. pop. 101-1030

12 - Hannes Ignatius and Kaarle Soikkeli. La Guerre
d'Independance en Finlande en 1 18 (Helsingfors. Finland:
Imprimerie Otava. 1925 . p. 15.

13 - Foreign Relations - 1903. op. cit.. (190#). p. 731.

1“ - TOkin Op. Cite. p0 1010

15 - ”Orlson. Op. Cite. Do an.

16 - Ibid.. p. 5#.

17 - Osmo Jussila. “Nationalism and Revolution“. Span-
dinavian Journal of History. Vol. 2 (Stockholm. Sweden: The
Almqvist and Wiksell Periodical Company. 1977). p.p. 289-309.

18 - Arthur E. Puotinen. “Early Labor Organizations in
the Copper Country“. in For The Common Good. op. cit.. p. 135.

CHAPTER IV

The period of experimentation with the reformed Diet.
from 1907 to 191#. started with high hopes in Finland. Those
hopes were not justified. as Russification and class dif-
ferences frustrated the work of the Diet. Finland sought
support against Russia from other nations. especially those
with whom there were economic and cultural ties. The demands
of alliance limited the response of Entente nations to the
plight of Finland. while America listened but preferred not
to become involved. As the severity of Russification increased
with the passing years. it seemed to overshadow class dif-
ferences as the chief threat to Finland. At the same time.
Germany appeared to be the most likely friend in Finland's

time of need.

Finnish Politics and Renewed Russification

The first sitting of “the world's most democratic legis-
lative body“ attracted reporters from far and wide. They came
not least to see the world's first female legislators be
seated. This was a most heartening event for American suffra-
gettes. Madame Aino Malmberg - novelist. educator. and deter-
mined proponent of woman suffrage in Finland - drew large
audiences as a lecturer in America. She delighted listeners

with tales of the usefulness of skirts in concealing

‘43

##
inflammatory literature from circumspect male authorities.
She was not allowed to cross the Russian frontier. so
dangerous was Madame Malmberg.

The first Diet election in 1907 gave 80 seats to the
Socialist Party. The Old Finns had an amazing recovery.
gaining 59 seats. a little more than the combined total won
by the Swedish Party and the Young Finns. Minor parties
split 11 seats. The Old Finns have often been accused of
“going radical“ in order to compete for votes with the
Socialists among laborers and small farmers. Actually. the
Old Finns just stuck to their old principle of seeking to
raise Finnish-speakers to self-awareness and to equality
with Swedish-speakers. By 1907. they realized that it was
not only a Finnish literature or dictionary that would help
their peOple. but economic progress. too. In this they and
the Socialists better reflected the people's desires than
did the Young Finns and Swedes with their emphasis on a
supposedly dead issue. that of protecting the constitution.

Unfortunately. the Diet did not live up to popular
expectations. It started with very little real power. It had
even less when a Russian reaction set in. intended again to
erase Finnish particularism. The Russians dissolved the Diet
every year. claimed Tokoi. and twice in 1910!1 Much useful
legislation was frustrated in this manner. or through party
disagreements. Especially galling to the Socialists was the
Czar's refusal to endorse legislation for local government
reform. Communal and municipal assemblies were open only to

tax-paying property holders. and a person had as many votes

#5
as taxable units Of income. Therefore. local affairs were not
just controlled by prOpertied people. but perhaps by just a
few propertied people. depending upon local circumstances.
The result was that neither on the local nor on the national
level did non-propertied persons have a consistently effec-
tive voice or field of political Operation.

It was only too easy to blame the difficulty on class
differences at the local level. and to imagine that the upper
classes secretly supported Russia's obstruction of the nation-
al Diet. Many have said that faith in parliamentary procedure
could not but be undermined in Finland during these interwar
years from 1905 to 191#. This could be true of persons from
any class Of society. but particularly true of the people
without property. The strike had proved to be their most use-
ful tool: small wonder that emigrants Of this class and time

would be found among strikers in America.

Contacts with the Great Powers before World War I

America and other nations heard of renewed Russo-Finnish
difficulties. but most paid little attention. French wine
merchants asked their government to intervene in Russo-
Finnish relations. Finland having a most favorable tariff
situation for them. Wine. though important to the French gov-
ernment. was not important enough to upset the Russian alli-
ance. until Britain also entered the Entente. English pro-
tests for Finland were sometimes heard.

Besides the Asian rivalry with Russia. Britain had

direct economic reasons to pay attention to Finland. Because

#6
of political ties.a preferential tariff. and sheer prox-
imity. Russia was long the chief figure in Finland's foreign
trade during the 19th century. Russian grain was of particu-
lar importance. in exchange for forest and dairy products.
Around 1890. the advent of the icebreaker in Finnish waters
meant that sea lanes were no longer closed for nearly half
the year. A direct sea connection with England gave a sharp
boost to the Finnish dairy industry. Soon three-quarters of
Finland's butter went to England. though milk and cream as
experts still went mostly to St. Petersburg. Finnish forests
also provided timber and wood products for Britain. There
were more British ships calling at the ports of Finland than
from any other nation shortly before the year 1900.

American trade with Finland is harder to measure
because American goods were mostly re-exported to Finland
through intermediary countries.that traded with the U.S. For
years the single U.S. consular representative in Finland was
not even an American.2 A Finlander who had come to the U.S.
to Obtain food in 1918. said that Finland had gotten most of
its wheat from America until the Russians put a prohibitive
tax on it about ten years previously.3 This is hard to
verify. though wheat was undoubtedly the largest single item
of American export to Finland. Other sources would seem to
indicate that Russia was the biggest supplier of grain in
general at least until 1905. and Of wheat thereafter.“
Germany then took an increasingly large share Of the market.
Finland becoming its best customer for rye flour. and second

best for wheat flour.5 Since rye. not wheat. was the staple

#7

grain in Finland. perhaps there is no discrepancy in the
statements made above. America was probably an important
source of wheat. but Finland did not depend upon American
wheat as much as upon grain from other places.

By 1905 Germany had passed everyone as chief supplier to
Finnish markets as a whole. and remained so until the First
World War got started. Russia still topped the list Of markets
for Finnish goods in 1913. but England was a close second and
Germany third. This is of some importance. as the Entente
would search for signs of previous penetration and influence
after German troops were invited into Finland in 1918. Samuel
Eliot Morison. writing a memorandum on Finland for the U.S.
government in 1918. Observed that German dominance of the
Finnish market had nothing sinister about it. as Finnish-
German economic relations dated back to the Hanseatic League.
He could not resist a dig at contemporary Germans. however.
saying that shady business tactics were “no doubt“ used in
gaining the markets.6

In the field of investment. native capital predominated
in Finland's industries. though Norwegian and English inter-
ests were strong in lumbering and textile Operations. respec-
tively. Somewhat surprisingly. Germans were not much involved
with investments of this nature. German bankers were rela-
tively more important than other foreigners in the funding
of Finland's national debt.

Overall. Germany was the most important supplier to
Finland. but England was a very prominent buyer. and Russia

still a large factor in both markets. though in relative

#8
decline. In writing about the effects of the World War on the
Finnish economy. Leo Harmaja said that the loosening of com-
mercial ties between Russia and Finland. coming during years
of mounting political pressure from Russia. made it easier for

Finlanders to consider independence later on.7

German Cultural Influence

Culturally. there is no doubt that educated Finlanders
had strong ties with Germany. As Swedish upper class circles
looked to Germany for inspiration. so did many Swedish-Finns.
And Morison found that outside Of Russia. only German univer-
sities Offered any study of the Finnish language and litera-
ture. a definite attraction for Finnish-speaking students. A
Finnish historian has said that ever since the Reformation.
Finnish theological students in particular and proponents of
culture in general had shifted their sights from Paris to the
German universities.8

Morison thought Germany took advantage of its cultural
contacts to hatch plots concerning the future of Finland. He
tells Of the visit to America of Rudolph Eucken. “the great
German moralist and philosopher.“ Eucken being a Harvard ex-
change professor in 1911. In the course of a conversation
between Eucken and another professor. it developed that “a
large number Of Finns“ studied at Jena with the German philos-

opher. Said Eucken.

“Well. they are not exactly studying philosophy. I am
very interested in Finland. and I am helping these young men
to cast Off the Russian yoke. I have also been at Helsingfors
(Helsinki) and Stockholm to lecture. where I have been in

#9
consultation with those who desire the same end. You see. it
will be very important for us Germans to have a hold on Fin-
land when we are at war with Russia.“
The question was asked. “Does your government know about

this?“

“Of course!“ came the reply. “It is much easier to do
at Jena - a little place. away from Berlin.“9

Morison did not credit the Germans with stirring up
separatist feelings in Finland. But in unusual circumstances.
like a war. Germany would be willing to protect Finland. and
more than happy to have a base next door to St. Petersburg.
At the least. a Finland in which Germany had friends might

prove to be a useful lever against Russia.

Finland and Russia

The charge of separatism “was vehemently denied by Fin-
landers of the bourgeois parties."10 All they wanted were
their just and legal rights. they said. Whether that was
true or not is a question. considering the revelations from
Morison about Professor Eucken. Still. as long as Russifica-
tion consisted more of obstructing the Diet than of intro-
ducing a new administrative rule. the propertied classes
really had little to complain of.

Russification turned more active in 1912 with a law
called the Parity Act. Passed without any kind of consent
from Finland. the new law gave equal rights to Russians in
the Grand Duchy. something that Finnish constitutional rule
had never countenanced. The ultimate consequence was that

administrative posts in Finland were opened to Russians. The

50
new law did not affect most Finlanders enough to stir up a
general resistance. but a few officeholders were imprisoned
or packed Off to Siberia for refusing to carry out the law.

Hoping to interest Americans in the “struggle for
freedom“. Madame Malmberg visited the U.S. in 1912. Woman
suffrage struck a more responsive chord. Lenin pointed out
that Western Europe. too. showed less support for Finland
than usual. Of the Finnish “proletariat“ Lenin wrote.

“It knows that the Western European bourgeoisie. flir-
ting with the autocracy. will not involve itself in the
affair...“11 (meaning the affair of Russification).

The demands of alliance required less criticism Of
Russia from the other members of the Entente. As the world
prepared for war. Finland's biggest problem appeared to be

Russia. and Germany appeared to be the best hope for support

against Russia.

Finland had contacts of varying importance with several
nations before World War I. Admiration for America and the
European democracies was not unusual. But the failure of the
reformed Diet and the inability Of the Entente nations to
protest against Russification. plus the nature Of ties with
Germany. led an important section of Finnish Opinion to see
in Germany the only hope of help for Finland. This outlook
would reinforce pro-monarchist feelings in some Finnish
Constitutionalists. at the expense Of liberal democracy: the
more so since the Socialists advocated more direct democratic
procedures than already existed in Finland. threatening the

established order from the left.

51
Footnotes to Chapter IV

1 - Oskari Tokoi. SISU -_:Even Through A Stone Wall“
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957). p. 115.

2 - Foreign Relations of the_United States -~;218
(“Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States“. Washington. D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office. 1932). Russia. Vol. II. p. 800.

3 - New York Times. 22 February 1918.

# - Leo Harmaja. Effects of the War on Economic and
Social Life in Finland (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University
PreSS. 1933). pop. 32-33-

Samuel Eliot Morison. Inquiry Document No. #21.
“Memorandum on Finland“(National Archives. Washington. D.C.).
written in 1918. p.p. 27#-277.

5 - Samuel Eliot Morison. Ibid.. p. 80.

6 - Ibid.. p. 278.

7 - Harmaja. op. cit.. p. 33.

8 - Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen. A Histor of
Finland (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Inc.. 1962). p. 56.

9 - ”arisen. Ops Gite, pep. 351-3520
10 - Ibid.. p. 63.

11 - D.G. Kirby (ed.). Finland and Russia 1808-1220
(New York: The MacMillan Press. Ltd.. 1975). p. 131.

CHAPTER V

The World War aggravated Finland's problems. externally
and internally. The need to secure the approaches to St.
Petersburg led to a stronger Russian presence in Finland.
with more direct control of Finnish affairs. This further
alienated the Finns from Russia. while at the same time the
war fostered the hope that the Finno-Russian relationship
might somehow be altered. Internally. the war created unusual
economic conditions which deepened class divisions in Finnish

society.

Finnish attitudes toward the Contending Powers

Entente propaganda gave Russia a greatly enhanced image
in the world. an image of which Russia fell short in Finland.
For example. the large Polish-American community was euphoric
and other Americans were impressed when Russia promised
autonomy to Poland. with independence to follow. Finland. so
much more docile than Poland for so many years - but so much
closer tO St. Petersburg - received “police rule“. as one
native described it.

Finland receded far into the background of events as
the war got underway. Professor Julio N. Reuter arrived in
New York seeking sympathy for Finland in 1915. and he received
a hearing: but he received nothing more than that. Reuter.

52

53
Madame Malmberg and others felt that Finland's position was
generally misunderstood. though they did not always agree on
what that position was. A case in point is a rather sharp
exchange of letters that appeared in the New York Times.

The first letter appeared on NOvember 15. 1915. Allan
V. Tornudd wrote it. he being a Master of Philosophy at the
university in Helsinki. He wanted to combat the propaganda
in favor of “liberal. progressive. democratic Russia“. but
the Times went rather overboard by giving his letter the
misleading heading of “FINLAND SIDES WITH GERMANY“. Tornudd
wrote.

“It seems to have become an axiom with too many people
here (in the U.S.) that this is a war about 'principles'.
where all small nations should. in their own interest. stand
by the Allies.“

On the contrary. Tornudd asserted that Finland's exper-
ience left no room for doubt about Russia's true character.

As Russia was being whitewashed to appear as liberal as its
allies. Tornudd felt much corresponding doubt about the Allies'
true motives. Finlanders felt sorry for Belgium and Serbia.

he said. and were no friends Of the German annexationist party.
But just because the Allies found it momentarily expedient to
side with a couple of smaller countries. they were being hypo-
critical in proclaiming that all small nations should look to
them. when they would do nothing for Finland. Tornudd Observed
that the Germans were not alone. either. in breaking inter-
national treaties. or in committing atrocities during wartime.

He ended with.

“To us the downfall of the Russian Empire. the most

5#

notorious stronghold of reactionism in Europe. would be a
greater victory for civilization than the crushing of
Germany...“1

In reply there appeared a letter on November 21 over the
name of Ivan Narodny. said to be managing director Of the
Russian Chamber of Commerce. presumably in New York City.
With this letter went the heading. “WHERE FINLAND'S SYMPA-
THIES LIE“. The writer began by noting that his mother was
Esthonian (“practically the same as a Finn“). and his wife
was a Finn. and he had lived for some time in Finland. He
then developed a racial-historical argument against Tornudd.

“First of all. Allan V. Tornudd is a Finnish Swede. whose
'Kultur' has. naturally. a Prussianized tinge. And. second.
he speaks for the Finnish Swedes. who represent probably
hardly more than 7 per cent of the country's population.“

Narodny continued with some ethnological background.
then explained how Germans and Swedes had enslaved Esthonians
and Finns. Of course no intelligent Finn or Esthonian liked
the current bureaucratic Russian regime. but they loved the
Russian people. he said. Narodny admitted that many Finnish
artists and scholars got their education in Germany. but he
asserted that England was more in sympathy with Finland's
struggle for independence than any other nation. His conclu-
sion stated that the sympathies of Finnish-speaking Finland.
about 90% of the population. were with the Allies. a fact
that one “can hear openly“ in Finland.2

There followed two short letters in refutation of Ivan
Narodny. One remarked that Finland and the Finns had enjoyed
the same rights and privileges as the Swedes when part Of the

Swedish kingdom. and that slavery never existed in that

55
kingdom. The second letter took the Russian to task on the

subject of ethnology. claiming that recent research refu-
ted Narodny's argument at many points.

There came a rejoinder to Ivan Narodny from Tornudd
himself on December 23. He stated.

“The Object of my contribution to the war discussion
was to call attention to the great injustice done to one
small nation in quarters to which we used to look for sym-
pathy and encouragement. through the current misrepresen-
tation of facts intimately connected with our case. If I had
not accurately stated the feelings of a majority of Finlanders.
I should be thankful for corrections - but not from Mr.
Narodny. Russians who have lived 'some time in Finland' and
talk about what they 'can hear openly' are not fit to bear
witness against natives of the country who know things which.
on account of police rule and censorship. are not heard in
the open.

“Mr. Narodny's false ideas about Swedes and Finns have
led him to the insinuation that I speak only to a ruling class
which looks to Germany for help in oppressing the great masses
of the people. ... As it happens that all my sympathies are
with the democratic movement in Finland. (which is not
directed against Swedes as such). his attempt to explain away
my standpoint as that of a privileged minority breaks down
completely.“3

The first lesson the United States might have learned
from that exchange is that Entente “principles“ had their
weak points. that 'making the world safe for democracy' might
be a rather naive reason for getting into this particular war.
As for Finland. the letters contained much that would re-
appear in the propaganda generated during the coming civil
war: the idea that the middle and upper class party of law
and order could get help only from Germany. the claims that
Swedish-speaking Finlanders were Prussianized while the pro-
letariat consisted Of pro-Entente republicans. etc. It is
possible that the letters themselves were calculated instru-

ments of propaganda (“Ivan Narodny“ smacks rather of a Russian

56
“John Q. Public“). but they sound more like the work of men
with personal axes to grind. and perhaps Narodny was a
pseudonym.

Tornudd's axe was the “Russification Program of 191#“.
proclaimed within a few months of Russia's entry into a war
to protect little Serbia. The excuse for a re-ordering of
Finland had finally arrived. A state of emergency was declared
and civil rights and activities severely regulated. while
reinforcements supplemented the Russian garrison. and Helsinki
was made the advanced base of the Baltic Fleet. Tornudd was
not saying that Finland sided with Germany as a result of the
latest Russian move. though there were undoubtedly pro-
Germans in Finland. What he gave was essentially the same
lesson that American consular personnel tried to teach their
government three years later: most Finlanders were pro-
Finland. They were much more concerned about their own land
than about the World War. except for the question of how the
war would affect their land. If they were democrats as
Tornudd claimed to be. the World War made their position very
difficult. As another Of them said.

“We have wanted the impossible thing. We have wanted
Germany to go to Petrograd. and the Allies to win the war.““

Thus there were Finlanders who believed in the Entente
principles that Tornudd complained of. though they were not
very vociferous early in the war. Tornudd was more pragmatic.
or more disillusioned with America and with the Allies. He and
many more like him would take help where they found it.

Narodny was wrought up over his half-Esthonian heritage

57

and his personal Finnish alliance. but he. too. had a message
of importance. The other letter-writers might discount his
arguments. but it was possible that Russia was only part of
the problem in Finland. There could be internal difficulties
as well. difficulties that many Finlanders would like to
solve in accordance with the very principles for which the
Allies supposedly fought.

And notwithstanding Tornudd's accusations of hypocrisy.
the Allies did try some gentle persuasion with Russia. at the
behest of friends in Finland. Morison said that “leading
Finlanders“ (probably from the merchant circles of ship
owners and traders where pro-Allied sympathy was strongest)
made efforts to have England and France influence Russia on
behalf of Finland. In conversation with Morison. Professor
Reuter related.

“Representations were accordingly made at Petrograd by
the British and French governments. which had the desired
effect of restraining the application of this program."5

Russification seems not to have been applied in its full
vigor.6 But unfortunately for the Allies. their efforts
brought them little praise. Morison commented.

“As the success of these representations depended on
their secrecy. England and France received no credit for them
from the Finnish people. Hence the effect of the (Russian)
Program of 191# was to swing public opinion in Finland. which
had been rather bewildered and on the whole neutral during the

early months of the war. into anti-Russian and pro-German
channels.“

Another barometer of public sentiment was that early in
the war there were Finlanders who joined the Russian military
service. but after the Russian occupation. the opposite

occurred. An underground movement commenced. with the purpose

58
of sending young men outside the country to obtain military
skills for use against Russia. Though Germany agreed to be the
host country for this “Jager movement”. the movement was not
originally an expression of pro-Germanism. Sweden was first
asked to train the young Finlanders. but refused. Socialists
like Tokoi supported the program for awhile. and they were
certainly not pro-German. In fact. Tokoi warned Jager organ-
izers that elements of his party might try to turn a war of
liberation into a civil war.8 This shows what end was origi-
nally intended for the Finnish Jagers. who ultimately num-
bered some 2.000. It also shows. again, that Russia was not

the only problem in Finland.

Finland and World War I - Internal Affairs

Despite the oft-painted image of Russia as the “tradi-
tional enemy“. bourgeois Finland had resisted Russification
rather than Russia. It was the peasant population that fought
when Finland passed under Russian rule in the 19th century.
The educated people were. for the most part. more interested
in peace and government offices. Their attitude did not
change until their peace and their offices were threatened.
The events Of 191# were threatening. and the war gave the
possibility that Russia could be defeated or influenced and
the whole problem solved. Closer contact with Russians also
brought racism to the surface. Anti-Russian sentiment rose.

The Socialists. with the industrial workers. rural
laborers. and tenant farmers. faced a more complex problem.

Insofar as Russian autocracy appeared to uphold the “herrat“ -

59
the masters. or gentry. nationalism could be a strong force
among working class Finns. On the other hand. Russians could
be friends. like the Social Democrats who sometimes brought
party conferences to Finland. Friends and enemies were likely
to be chosen on the basis of relationship to the class
struggle.

The doctrine of the class struggle was deeply instilled
in the mainstream Finnish Socialists -

“They have been fed on class hatred for years. and the
danger Of a social revolution like that of 1918 was predicted
long before.“ said Morison.9

The danger was predictable because little was accom-
plished politically for working class Finlanders. But revo-
lution was by no means inevitable. Protest in the form of
strikes had declined by 60% from 1907 to 1913.10 The decline
may have been due in part to discouragement. as Russian
soldiers were sometimes used to break strikes. Yet although
strikes were even fewer in 191#. workers won a third of them

11 This is

and drew a compromise on almost all Of the rest.
not to say that they were winning all that they desired.
Statistics from 1908-09 concerning 350 “typical industrial
workers' families“ showed that one-quarter could not live on
their earnings.12 The point is that no revolution was made
to help them out. nor was one planned for them to look for-
ward to. The Finnish Socialist Party did not believe in
creating revolution. If it came. it must be spontaneous.
because conditions drove the people to it. Conditions.

though poor. had not driven the people that far before
World War I.

60

The war brought dizzying economic highs and lows to
Finland. Unemployment hit heavily at first. owing to the
loss Of export markets and sources of raw materials. By 1915.
Russian war orders put people back to work and even created
new jobs. The Russian military planned extensive fortifica-
tions for Finland. The need for workers then exceeded the
available supply. and laborers were brought in from as far
away as China. Everyone had to eat. and farmers found food
prices rising.

That was no boon to industrial workers. Inflation cut
the value of their pay. while wartime restrictions on labor
organizations left them powerless. As Tokoi wrote.

“The efforts of the unions to secure increased pay for
skilled labor had to cease - at the very time when many
employers were taking advantage of the situation to cut
wages.“1

Housing had already been inadequate: the situation
worsened with the arrival of Russian soldiers. laborers. and
war refugees. Few new buildings went up because wages and ma-
terial costs were deemed too high. Rents went up instead.
until the government put a lid on them. Housing was little
better for rural laborers. Often worse for overcrowding and
uncleanliness.

On the other end Of the scale were factory owners.
operators of businesses. speculators in goods and money
exchanges. and those engaged in contraband trade with Germany.
or in trade between Allied and neutral countries. Again.
Morison had a comment to make on the subject after an inter-

view in 1918:

61

“In Helsingfors there was a riot Of luxury and
profiteering. Dr. Kaarlo Ignatius. one of the present
Finnish envoys to the United States. and a person who evi-
dently himself secured a good slice of this war prosperity.
boasts that 200 Rolls-Royce cars are now owned in Helsingfors.
In the remote country districts. privation increased with
each year Of the war.“1

Those farmers who were largely self-sufficient did not
feel the privation so much. and dairymen had lucrative mar-
kets in Finland and Russia. Lack of needed imports gradually
hurt them. though. along with the loss of livestock to mili-
tary requisition. and difficulties in transportation of farm
produce. In Finland at large. a food shortage 'increased with
each year of the war'.

There had been large stocks of grain in Finland just
before the war. These arrived when wholesale buyers tried
to beat a pending Russian duty on grain imported from other
countries. The stocks helped after the war started. but they
were not managed with the idea that hostilities would con-
tinue for a long time. Russia alone remained of the usual
foreign sources Of foodstuffs. and transportation problems
made deliveries from there increasingly uncertain. Kaarlo
Ignatius told Americans through the newspapers that Finland
normally consumed about 800.000 tons of breadstuffs in a year.
Finland normally produced less than half of that. he said.15
Finnish production generally declined after 1915.16
Government price fixing and projected requisitions did not
create a desire to increase harvests. There was no consis-
tent. all-encompassing plan for production and distribution

of food. It was not long before a healthy black market

appeared. and workers were no happier to know that food was

62

held off the open market for those who could afford it. The
typical middle class Finlander was not so much better Off.
however. as these figures for average consumption of staple
foods per capita would indicate: for 1913. 63.3 kilograms of
wheat flour. 187.7 kgs. of rye flour. and 115.1 kgs. of
potatoes. By 1917 the numbers were 8.6 kgs. of wheat flour.
61 kgs. of rye flour. and 113 kgs. of potatoes.17 From
figures like these. Anthony F. Upton concludes.

“As long as the war continued the prospect was that the
situation would get worse. and the fear Of actual mass star-
vation was ever-present during the events of 1917-18 and

must be reckoned one of the most powerful causes of social
and political instability.“18

The Diet Election of 1916

Because parliamentary activity had become an exercise
in futility during the years before the war. membership in
the Socialist Party had decreased. Hard times for the workers
reversed the trend. especially since the party took care to
compare the workers' lot with that of the bourgeoisie. as it
was imagined. Supposedly. the rich got fed and the farmers
got rich while the workers suffered. The Socialists had no
answers. but their slogans were appealing. and in the sched-
uled Diet election Of 1916 they won an absolute majority
with 103 Of the possible 200 seats.

Their victory meant little to the other parties and
classes of society at the time. for the same reason that the
election itself seemed meaningless: the Russians had suspended

the Diet for the duration of the war. Just over half Of the

63
eligible voters went to the polls. Tokoi's statement. “To the
bourgeoisie it seemed much better not to have a Diet at all.“19
is probably extreme. It does indicate who went to the polls.
and more importantly. it shows grave mistrust growing between

different parts of society.

We have seen that the World War sharpened antagonism
between Finland and Russia. and also sharpened antagonism
between social classes in Finland. The desire to ease Russian
pressure extended through all classes to some degree. however.
and of course there could be no social revolution as long as
Imperial Russia remained strong and bent upon controlling
Finland. Russia was therefore the primary Object of attention
for most Finlanders. which is why the enthusiasm for Russia's
allies was dampened somewhat among Finns. If Russian power
was broken. and the harsh economic conditions of wartime
remained unchanged. then social questions would assume a

more important. and more serious. aspect.

6#
Footnotes to Chapter V

1 - New York Times. 15 November 1915.

2 - New York Times. 21 November 1915.

3 - New York Times. 23 December 1915.

# - Samuel Eliot Morison. Inquiry Document No. #21.
“Memorandum on Finland“ (National Archives. Washington. D.C.).
written in 1918. p. 88.

5 - Ibid.. pep. 86’870

6 - D.G. Kirby (ed.). Finland and Russia 1808-1920 (New
York: The MacMillan Press. Ltd.. 1975). p.p. 135-138 for
details of the Russification Program of 191#.

7 - Morison. op. cit.. p.p. 87-88.

8 - Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen. A History of
Finland (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Inc.. 1962). p. 2#9.

9 - Morison. op. cit.. p. 2998.
10 - Ibid.. p. 2991.

11 - Ibid.. p. 299k.

12 - Ibid.. p.p. 2991-2993.

13 - Oskari Tokoi. SISU - “Even Through A Stone Wall“
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957). p. 129.

1# - Morison. op. cit.. p. 91.

15 - New York Times. 11 November 1917.

16 - Leo Harmaja. Effects of the War on Economic and
Social Life in Finland (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University
r888. 19 g p. 1 O

17 - Kirby, Op. Cite. p0 2150

18 - Anthony F. Upton. The Finnish Revolution 121g-1218
(Mingeapolis. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 19 0 .
p. 1 .

 

19 - TOkOl. Op. Cite. p0 1300

CHAPTER VI

Russia's March Revolution of 1917 came to Finland
through the Russian soldiers and sailors who were stationed
there. The Provisional Government dropped Russification
measures in favor of a return to internal autonomy for Fin-
land. As a working relationship between Russia and Finland
was not agreed upon until autumn. that relationship remained
a primary concern. But the granting of internal autonomy.
plus the lack of discipline in the Russian military. allowed
class and party differences to surface in Finland. Even the
question of relations with Russia was affected by party
maneuvering and internal conditions. Economically. those
conditions continued to deteriorate. The food shortage grew
quite serious. and became a factor in foreign relations as
well as in Finnish politics. The Provisional Government.
abetted by the United States. tried until the end of its
existence to use food as a lever with which to move Finland

in desired directions.

Finland and the March Revolution of 1917

“In Helsinki the 13th of March. 1917. dawned like many
another March day before and since. ... But the day's work
had scarcely begun when strange rumors were circulating.
claiming that something out of the ordinary had happened.“

Thus did Oskari Tokoi recall the beginning of Russia's
65

66

March Revolution. There was no great convulsion in Finland.
only Russian soldiers and sailors hunting down their officers.

Finlanders did nothing to bring the revolution to their
land: the soldiers and sailors did it for them. Similarly.
the new Provisional Government eased the reins on Finland of
its own accord. but the Russian moderates wanted to give Fin-
landers a part in their own affairs. Therefore. a few days
after the Czar had abdicated. the Provisional Government drew
up a manifesto with the help of a delegation representing the
different political parties of Finland. The manifesto
restored the “Finnish Constitution“ and Finnish internal
autonomy. and voided once again all unconstitutional measures
since 1899. Finlanders were encouraged to submit proposals
for a new constitution. in order to ameliorate internal condi-
tions and clarify future relations between Finland and Russia.
Through the manifesto. the Provisional Government released
all political prisoners and convoked the Diet for April.

The Socialists could now do what no one had expected.
not even themselves: form a government. The Diet majority
gained in 1916 entitled them to submit a list of their
members to Russia for approval as the governing Senate of
Finland. The opportunity provoked disagreement over whether
to form an all-Socialist Senate. or whether to participate at
all. A majority of party leaders and Diet members opted for
a coalition Senate with four bourgeois parties. The Socialists
would get half of the seats. the bourgeois parties half. and
Tokoi was named Deputy Chairman. or Premier. That gave him

another vote in Senate decisions. except when the Russian

67

Governor-General participated as Chairman. which happened
infrequently. The Socialists could therefore eXpect to keep
the Senate from blocking legislation approved by their Diet
majority.

Being under no necessity to force concessions from Rus-
sia at this early stage. Finlanders had no real need to
form the kind of united front that had briefly prevailed
during the General Strike of 1905. The desperate solution by
direct action - which was embodied in the Jager movement -
was no longer required. allowing all to lapse back into their
normal political attitudes. For this reason. the March Revo-
lution was at first a disappointment to the Finnish Activists.
(They were less a political party than a cross-section of
parties made up of individuals who advocated armed action.)

Hannes Ignatius. a member of the Military Committee that
worked with the Activists. expressed some thoughts about the
revolution and the different political groups in Finland. He
wrote of the bourgeois parties (Old Finns. Young Finns.
Swedes. and Agrarians) that they saw a chance to develop
autonomy in union with a more co-operative Russia. The
Activists came to view the revolution as an opportunity for
separation because of the breakdown of discipline in the
Russian military. The Socialists saw a chance. said Ignatius.
to realize the “final goals Of Socialism in Finland: all of
these who had supported the Jager movement and aspirations Of
independence now retired completely from the struggle for
liberty.“2 Actually. even the Socialists were not yet ready

for full Socialism. Their first demands were for social

68

reforms and a more truly democratic constitution. “Liberty“
in the sense in which Ignatius used the word. writing after
the Civil War. meant breaking all ties with Russia. To the
Socialists. the desire for liberty in that sense depended
upon who ruled in Russia. They certainly did not withdraw from
a struggle with the Provisional Government.

For the most part. the foregoing remarks may be taken
to show that the basic Objectives of the different parties
had changed little since 1905. except that the Agrarian Party
had been organized to represent small farmers and rural
1aborers who preferred capitalism to socialism. (Regarding
relations with Russia. the Agrarians generally aligned them-
selves with the other bourgeois parties when a decision was
to be made. though their ideas represented something of a
middle ground between bourgeoisie and Socialists.) The lack
of immediate direction or pressure from Russia allowed the

differences between the parties to surface and widen.

Internal Conditions. Spring and Summer of 1917

“The fairest summer of the Finnish proletariat is
dawning.“3 So wrote novelist F.E. Sillanpaa. himself the son
of a tenant farmer. though educated in bourgeois circles.
Russian power left the side of the masters in 1917. The
March Revolution was an important first step. yet there was
more to be done. as Sillanpaa knew:

“But in the Fatherland and its inhabitants were other
aches than Czarist oppression. and these aches were no cured

by the revolution: so the revolution had to continue.“

After the March Revolution. the sentiment of the Russian

69
garrisons leaned toward support of the workers in Finland.
The Provisional Government was preoccupied for the time
being. Finnish workers. with nothing to fear. gave their
attention to the masters.

“Strikes in all branches of industry throughout Finland
are reported in a dispatch from Helsingfors. In some districts
the strikes have been accompanied by acts of violence against
the employers.“

The labor movement was free of the former wartime ban
on its activities. Membership of major trade unions increased
by 89.571 from March 30th to June 30th. A low estimate of the
number of strikes and work stoppages for 1917 comes to #78
or seven times the number recorded for 1913.6 These figures
refer to organized workers only. Loggers and agricultural
workers held many a wildcat strike. and violence was more
common in rural areas.

Not only was the ban lifted. but the soldiers and
sailors occasionally gave active assistance to the Finnish
workers. Industrial workers had gone on strike for the eight-
hour day in April. During settlement talks. Russian sailors
walked in with drawn pistols to back the workers' demands.
Bourgeois Finland was outraged at this interference in
internal affairs. though it was just a reversal of roles
from previous years. The Socialists and the labor unions
were surprised. too. as they apparently did not invite the
visit. Nevertheless. it was quite clear where the sympathies
of the soldiers and sailors lay.

They had served as police during the revolutionary days

Of March. until they gave the task to Finnish workers'

70

militias. Naturally. the militias were also sympathetic to
the proletarian cause. so strike activity could be expected
to increase. Most of this activity was unorganized. and
expressive of immediate grievances: the desire for more
liberal unemployment compensation from the communal govern-
ments (there was no national plan). seats in those govern-
ments. and food.

Unemployment problems arose again because the revolution
dislocated the military supply industries and the fortifica-
tions works. The lack of means with which to buy the neces-
sities of life then aggravated the shortage of those
necessities.

Rationing cards for bread grains came into use in the
summer. The ration dipped down to #.3 ounces per person per
day.7 That was less than half the allowance in Russia.
where the cry for bread had been a cause of demonstrations
in March. Furthermore. food prices skyrocketed. In Helsinki
the price of butter. one of the more plentiful food items.
was up 18#.5% from what it had been in 1913. The price of
potatoes was up #17.5%. of hard rye bread 225.6%. of salt
herring 302.3%. of coffee ##1.9%.8 These items constituted
the usual fare for a working class family.

The outlook for the future was no better. Imports were
still down. and 1917 did not bring a good harvest in Finland.
A late frost followed by a drought is sometimes given as the
reason.9 Leo Harmaja said.

“Summer weather conditions were favorable. and the

harvest prospects would have been good but for the human
coefficient.“10

71
He referred to the widespread rural strikes of the season.

Whatever the cause. food was not plentiful. at least
not at affordable rates for workers (it is not clear whether
the prices quoted above were decontrolled market prices
after rationing was introduced. or black market prices. but
one suspects the former). Workers rioted and went on strike
for lower prices.

Tokoi wrote that working class “order guards“. even
more extra-legal than the workers' militias. sometimes
confiscated grain if farmers did not obey the government's
collection orders.11 The farmers disliked any kind Of
forced levy. so they were further embittered at the workers.
If the latter thought farmers intended to starve proletarians
into submitting to the old order. farmers thought workers
preferred the handouts of unemployment compensation to

productive effort.

The Search for Food. and Strained Relations with Russia

The need for food caused Finland to turn once again to
the United States. When it did so. America was no longer a
neutral onlooker with a benevolent public free to act as it
wished. The U.S. was proud to be the first nation to recog-
nize the Provisional Government as the legal ruling authority
in Russia. as well as in all the territories of the old
Empire. Less than a month later. the two governments were
comrades-in-arms. America had obligations to all of its
associates among the Allies. which included supplying them

with foodstuffs. In any question regarding Finland. Russia

72
and the war effort would receive first consideration.

In the month of May. the Finnish government contracted
with W.R. Grace and Company of New York for 50.000 tons of
wheat flour. The order was paid for immediately and appli-
cation made to the Interallied Supply Committee in Petrograd
for importation licenses. The Supply Committee. headed by the
Russian General Michelson. suggested that Finland buy rye
flour from Russia. Accordingly, no licenses fOr importation
from the U.S. were forthcoming. The credit was left in Amer-
ica for possible future use. Finland then paid the Provi-
sional Government for the rye flour. to be delivered in
August or September.

The promise did not fill empty stomachs. The last thing
the United States or any of the Allies wanted was the disso-
lution of the Russian state. and they believed that Finland
was disaffected. The American consul at Petrograd concluded
a long telegram on Finland with these lines. written on
June 2:

“The present shortage of export from Russia to Finland
has caused hardship in Finland which. since the war. is
dependent to a large extent on Russia for cereals. If the
shortage continues it may increase the growing Finnish
dissatisfaction with the Russian revolutionary government.“12

Despite the warning. the U.S. made no move to supply
Finland's shortage. Perhaps it was not possible. as the
American grain harvest was not as big as desired: or perhaps
it was a way Of supporting the Provisional Government. Minis-
ter of War Guchkov gave Finland to know in March that if it

wanted favors. it must pay for them - that is. support the

war effort.13 Guchkov was probably thinking primarily Of

73
monetary contributions toward support of the enlarged Russian
military establishment in Finland. but he may have had more
in mind. There had been no conscription in Finland since 190#.
when the draft was abolished in exchange for the institution
of a monetary subsidy. The subsidy had increased sharply in
succeeding years. and opposition to it had increased accord-
ingly. Expenses could not have decreased since the war started.
so Guchkov certainly wanted money. He may have wanted men as
well.

But though proposals on a form of government. division
of powers. and other questions passed from Finland to Russia.
there was no suggestion of help in the war. and not much good
will expressed toward the Provisional Government. either.
Such impolitic behavior did not make the Russians any more
willing to deliver food. and convinced the Provisional Gov-
ernment that any final solution for Finland's status should
simply wait for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

Among the general populace of Finland. procrastination
only fed the desire for an immediate solution. and “indepen-
dence“ became an increasingly popular term. The bourgeois
political parties took note of the sentiment. but still
recognized the authority of the Provisional Government. They
decided to negotiate whatever concessions could be Obtained
toward the fullest autonomy possible. The Socialists now
appeared to be the champions of independence. They preferred
to believe that the revolution had given the Czar's preroga-
tives to the Russian people. so likewise the Czar's powers

as Grand Duke of Finland should go to the Finnish people.

7#
The Provisional Government might participate in Finnish legis-
lation. but the actions of an avowedly temporary authority
should not be taken as precedents for the establishment Of
sovereign powers.

The Provisional Government had encouraged the Socialists
from the very beginning to use their Diet majority in pursuit
of internal reforms. like the eight-hour day and local gov-
ernment reform. The implication was that such legislation
would receive quick approval. The Socialists' more indepen-
dent stance in the matter of approval and authority quickly
soured relations between them and the Provisional Government.
Questions of internal reform and external relations were held
up. and then there were the problems of Finnish support for
the Russian war effort. and Russian aid to hungry Finlanders.
The Socialist Party Congress of June labelled the Provisional
Government “bourgeois“. and pronounced it “incapable of ade-

quately guaranteeing the inviolability of Finland's freedom“.1u

The “July Days“ in Finland

The Russian military forces in Finland loomed large in
the plans of Allied strategists. The Russian forces were
regarded as a key to Petrograd. to the stability of the Pro-
visional Government. and therefore to the entire eastern front.

They were a key factor in Finnish affairs. too. Having
brought the revolution to Finland. they gave support to the
workers. and received the blame for all the unrest and riotous
activities that offended the bourgeoisie. Stories abound of

anarchical behavior that set a bad example for 'irresponsible

75

elements' of Finnish society. Unemployed - if not necessarily
irresponsible - elements abounded when the war industries and
fortifications work collapsed following the March Revolution.
Bourgeois commentators would commonly place the blame for the
Finnish Civil War on jobless drifters. and the corrupting
influence upon them of the undisciplined. revolutionary Rus-
sian military. That claim has been disputed. though the unem-
ployed and the Russian military were certainly unsettling
influences who contributed to a rise in crime.

One reason for the military's anti-social activities was
probably financial. Their money was worth much less after
Finland re-established its own currency. in order to break
the connection with the devalued ruble. A prominent Socialist
explained the switch:

“Our connection with Russia has injured the Bank of
Finland to the amount of about twenty-four million dollars.
because we have been compelled to put the exchange value of
the ruble higher than it was in reality.“15

The figure was given in dollars because it came from
YrjO Sirola. who had lived in the united States. where he had
been a well-known figure in the Finnish-American labor move-
ment. His comment was intended for reading in American news-
papers. It was given not only to justify breaking away from
the ruble. but also to justify breaking away from the Provi-
sional Government. and this at the very time when the United
States was trying to prop it up with a loan.

In July Of 1917 the Provisional Government faced a

threatening situation at home. made worse by what amounted to

arrears in payment to the soldiers and sailors in Finland.

76
They did not want rubles because Finland would no longer
accept rubles at par. as forced to do before the revolution.
The Provisional Government did not have sufficient Finnish
currency with which to make the payments. Finland made no
move to ease the problem. The Socialists would not do any-
thing to reconcile the military with the Provisional Govern-
ment. and bourgeois Finland would rather have seen the armed
forces withdrawn altogether than make a loan to keep them
happy. Then there was the food question. As the American
consul at Petrograd had warned a month earlier.

“So long as Russia refuses or is unable to send flour
to Finland 20 steps will be taken to relieve the rate of
exchange.“1

Elihu Root was then in Russia as an American envoy on
special mission. He believed that the pay problem endangered
the Provisional Government and the entire Russian position
in the war. He recommended a credit of 875.000.000. supposed
to be sufficient until November. He asked the U.S. Secretary
Of State for a reply by July 1#. which was pay day for the
military forces.

The response was affirmative. with the consideration
that David R. Francis. America's Ambassador to Russia.
wanted certain restrictions placed on the money. As it was
to be used to Obtain Finnish marks for the payment of Rus-
sian soldiers and sailors. he wished to make certain that
Finland did not manage to take some advantage of the situa-
tion. He telegrammed the Secretary Of State.

“Thinking Finland might have designs (to) use this

credit for purchases in the United States. I have definitely
informed Russian Government that the extension of this credit

77

carries no obligation on our part to permit any kind of
exports to Finland or elsewhere.“1

Maybe it was a normal precaution. but it looks more
like the continuation of an undeclared embargo. on foodstuffs
in particular. designed to encourage Finnish support for the
Provisional Government.

The first installment on the credits did not go through
on pay day; the necessary financial exchanges were not made
in time. Troops had to be sent to Finland to “subdue Obstrep-
erous sailors in the Baltic Fleet“. The sailors constituted
another threat to the Provisional Government. in which
changes were made due to the “July Days“ disturbances from
the 15th to the 20th. A note from Francis dated July 2#
revealed one Of the complications in delivery Of the
paychecks -

“Finland announced severance of diplomatic relations
with Russia.“18

Francis did not have his facts quite right. but he had
the general idea.

The move toward independence was not exactly a bolt
from the blue. The final Diet vote that passed the “Law on
Authority“ was taken on July 18. A month earlier. the Pro-
visional Government had approved a bill on the separation of
powers between Russia and Finland. The Finnish Senate sub-
mitted the bill. under the name of Tulenheimo. from the Old
Finn Party. His proposal gave most of the former Grand Ducal
prerogatives to the Senate. including the final sanction of
legislation. except in matters that affected Russian interests

according to the opinion Of the Governor-General. The

78
Provisional Government would have a veto in those matters.
and would retain the right to appoint the Governor-General
and the Senate.

That was a fine proposal from the Old Constitutionalist
point of view. The Socialists were having none of it. Their
Diet Committee on Fundamental Laws amended the bill “past
recognition“. in Morison's words. then submitted its own pro-
posal. The Socialist “Law on Authority“ gave supreme power
to the Diet in all questions except defense and foreign
policy. which were to remain in the hands of Russia. Tokoi
referred to those departments as “the last vague bonds with
Russia“. and could not promise that they would remain unbro-
ken in the future.19 Article 2 of the law said. in part.

“The current session of the Seim (the Diet) is called
without special summons and is to last until a new form Of
government is established.“20

The bourgeois parties were torn between popular senti-
ment for independence and fear of putting supreme power in
the hands Of a Diet with a Socialist majority. a Diet that
could not be legally dissolved under the current system if
the “Law on Authority“ was passed through that system. The
Socialist bill went through three readings in the Diet. A
report in the New York Times for July 18 spoke Of “extreme
tension and nervousness“ over the outcome of the Diet vote.
Also contributing to the tension were the payment situation
in the military. knowledge of disturbances in Petrograd. and
“a threat of a general strike if the Diet postpones the pas-
sage of the new communal bill abolishing property qualifica-

tions (for holding the franchise). The latter was the subject

79
Of a demonstration in the Senate Square last night.“21 That

was a clear demonstration to the bourgeois parties that local
as well as national authority was on the line.

The final vote on July 18 passed the Socialist bill into
law by a tally Of 136 to 55. Thus some of the bourgeois mem-
bers saved face with their constituents on the independence
issue. but there was still a move to be made. On the bourgeois
motion to submit the law to the Provisional Government for
approval. the constitutional thing to do if that government
was really heir to the Czar. the vote was 10# to 87 against
submission. a strictly party vote. The Socialists were to be
held responsible for whatever action Russia chose to take in
answer to the law.

Governor-General Stakhovich Observed that the law vio-
lated Finland's own constitution. He predicted that the Finns
might suffer from it. The bourgeois parties took the same line.
They claimed to support the principle Of independence. but as
of old. they could not accept anything that might threaten
their system. Constitutional rule was preferable to an inde-
pendence based on what seemed to be lawless irresponsibility.
Bourgeois Finland was not entirely convinced. and some Of
their newspapers gave favorable comment to the Socialists on
this one issue of independence. The Socialists did not have
support where it counted. however. The Russian Socialist
Tchkeidze. at a Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
declared that only a Russian-Finnish agreement sanctioned by
the Constituent Assembly could bring Finnish independence.
Unfortunately for the Finnish Socialists. most of their

80

Russian proletarian brothers agreed with Tchkeidze. except
for the Bolsheviks. But after the July Days came to an end.
the Bolsheviks were not heard from for a time.

Tokoi had said when the bill was passed.

“The only obstacle in the way of such a solution of the
question was the Russian Temporary Government. According to
the latest information this obstacle does not exist anymore."22

This statement has been taken to prove that a conspiracy
existed between the Bolsheviks and the Finnish Socialists to
bring down the Provisional Government. This is unlikely. Argu-
ments against the conspiracy theory have also been made. inclu-
ding the idea that since the Bolsheviks were taken unawares by
the July Days movement in Petrograd. they could scarcely have
had anything planned simultaneously for Finland.

At any rate. the Provisional Government was not dead yet.
Its manifesto for dissolution Of the Diet (a prerogative of the
Czar) came before the Senate on August 1. the Senate having the
right to promulgate decrees in Finland. Governor-General Stak-
hovich made sure to attend this session of the Senate. and his
vbte broke a tie. The Diet was to be dissolved. and new elec-
tions held in October. if the Provisional Government could
muster the strength to back its order. Otherwise. the Social-
ists would claim that since the Diet had passed a law making
itself the supreme authority in Finland. no other entity had
the right to dissolve it. In fact they did make the claim.
but a meeting that included soldiers' and sailors' representa-
tives at Helsinki gave assurance of noninterference if force
had to be used to keep the Diet from sitting. One of the argu-

ments used against Finnish independence at that meeting was

81
Finland's refusal to help pay the military forces. a refusal
that was connected with the food problem.

Finland had not been very co-operative. it is true. But
the idea that America should have contributed to more amicable
Russo-Finnish relations through a positive response to the
food problem seems not to have occurred to anyone. Unless.
that is. the cupboard was truly so bare that there was no
food to spare. The American opinion of the whole affair may be
summed up in the words of North Winship. the oft-quoted consul
at Petrograd. written before the Diet was dissolved:

“A further evil result of the mutiny (the July Days)
lies in the excuse it gave the Social Democratic majority in
the Finnish Seim to as its law declaring Finland's indepen-
dence of Russia...“25a

Tokoi's recollection of the Socialist defeat in July was

a very gloomy one. He wrote.

“This outcome broke the ties which had held the goalition
cabinet and the Diet together. It led to civil war.“2

Further Efforts to Obtain Food

The Socialist Senators were not forced to vacate their
posts. since somebody had to run the country. The party
debated pulling their people out of the government. anyway.
In the midst of food strikes and a controversy over the price
of butter. the Socialist Senators resigned. glad at this
point to be rid of responsibility.

August came to an end. and the promised flour from
Russia did not appear. In early September. Russia stopped all
grain exports. reneging on the deal of the previous spring.

Finnish harvests were below normal by two-thirds. Finland

82

thought again of the United States and got an import license
from the Inter-Allied Supply Committee for 60.000 tons of
American wheat flour. Payment for most of it had already been
made. Again the order went through Grace and Company. which
chartered three Swedish vessels and applied to Washington for
export licenses in late September. The application was refused.

Meanwhile. some 15.000 tons of flour arrived in east
coast warehouses. with another 30.000 tons on the way. The
United States Food Administration stepped in on October 6.
asking Grace and Company to stop buying flour for Finland.
The Food Administration gave a rather peculiar reason for its
action. declaring that more purchases at that period would
“mean that millers would be putting on their books or in tran-
sit a quantity of flour which. if it was not cleared. would
merely cause confusion and congestion.“25 Why it should not
be cleared when the order was made. the money paid. and the
ships available. was soon explained. The U.S. wanted approval
from the Provisional Government for Finland's efforts to feed
itself.26 All parties waited a month. only to find that when
the approval came through in November. the Provisional Govern-
ment was no more. The U.S. did not consider itself to be under

any further Obligation to ship the purchased flour to Finland.

Results of the October Elections

For the October elections. the Old Finn and Young Finn
parties banded together on a law-and-order program. They
turned to their own advantage the strikes. lawlessness. and

venomous Socialist rhetoric of the time. all of which had

83
strong roots in the food shortage. As there was little chance
of cross-over voting between the Swedish Party and the Social-
ist Party. the bourgeois groups were virtually united against
the Socialists (though the Swedes still made more of the
language question than any other issue). Even the Agrarians.
who considered themselves socially radical. held the Social-
ists partially responsible for the violence of strikes and
riots.

The Senate. now without any Socialist members. scored
propaganda points by getting a promise from the Provisional
Government of wider autonomy and. possibly. some food aid.
This bit of encouragement came less than two weeks after Rus-
sia had cut off all grain exports. Whether or not Russia had
grain to spare. there was no display of scruples over politi-
cal speculation with foodstuffs.

The Socialist Party increased its number Of votes again.
but the turnout at the polls was so much greater than in 1916
that the Socialists lost seats in the Diet. They were still
the largest single party. with 92 seats. but they no longer
held a majority. Upton contends that the Socialists had “room
for political maneuver“ if they desired it. in a number Of
directions. For one thing. the Agrarian Party came out for a
modified form of the Socialist Law on Authority. and the
Agrarian share of the Diet was up to 26 seats. Instead. the
Socialists refused to take part in the Senate or any coali-
tion. and reassumed the role with which they were most com-
fortable. according to Tokoi - that of opposition party.
Actually. the Provisional Government limited the Socialists'

8#
“room for maneuver“. though the Socialists themselves may not
have realized it at the time.

The new government busied itself immediately with plans
for a delimitation of powers between Finland and Russia.
until the Constituent Assembly should meet. The Socialists'
latitude for action was now limited by Kerensky's threat to
prevent any foodstuffs from going to Finland if there was an
attempt to pass again the Socialist Law on Authority. whether
or not the Agrarians or anyone else wanted it. too. The So-
cialists may never have known about the threat. but it was
enough that the Finnish government knew of it. It was an added
weight to existing arguments against the Socialist version of
a delimitation of powers. The foodstuffs to which Kerensky
referred may have been the American grain. the delivery Of
which required the approval of the Provisional Government. or
it may have been the Russian food that was the subject of
enticing promises to the Senate after the Socialists had left
that body the previous summer. Kerensky used foodstuffs from
whatever source as a tool to control the work of the Finnish
government.

The projected new basis for Russo-Finnish relations
turned out to be somewhat like the Law on Authority. with the
notable exception that the Senate. not the Diet. was to exer-
cise the former Czar's prerogatives. It was conceded that the
Diet would appoint the Senators. but that was not enough to
win over the Socialists. They held to supreme authority not
for the present Diet. which the Agrarians would have accepted.

but for the previous. Socialist-dominated Diet. The Socialists

85

viewed everything that had happened since the dissolution of
that Diet as illegal. even though they had taken part in the
October elections. In other words. they wanted everything that
Kerensky had refused by dissolving the Diet after the affair
of July. 1917. The new project went ahead without them.

The day after the Provisional Government had agreed to
this new act. the Bolshevik Revolution began. Russo-Finnish
relations were up in the air again. and the many internal

problems - notably food supply - remained unsolved.

From the March Revolution to the Bolshevik Revolution in
1917. Finland experienced much conflict in both internal and
external affairs. The common threads in those affairs were
(1) differences in philosophy between Finnish political parties.
and (2) the question of food supply. against the continuing
question of relations with Russia. The Finnish Socialist
government proved unacceptable to the Provisional Government.
and the other Finnish parties ultimately supported the Russians.
By the time a more acceptable government was formed in Finland.
the Provisional Government was gone. Meanwhile. the food
shortage grew worse. a grievance felt very acutely among
workers. In combination with the bitterness of Socialists and
their sympathizers over the dissolution of “their“ Diet in
July. and the election defeat of October. much ill-feeling
was produced.

The attempt to use food to influence Finland did finally
succeed. but success came too late either to help the Provi-

sional Government. or to get food to Finland. The unrelieved

86

food shortage contributed over the summer of 1917 to the
growing rift between Finnish political parties and social
classes. In addition. hungry Finns turned away from local
authorities and toward direct action to Obtain what they
wanted. Workers' militias and “order guards“ gave way to a
re-emerging Red Guard as the leading arm of proletarian
activists. The next step was to extend direct action to the
national level. Thus the efficacy of Russian and American
grain diplomacy in Finland up to the Bolshevik Revolution
is questionable: particularly questionable is the negative
approach of withholding foodstuffs in order to gain control

over a people.

87
Footnotes to Chapter VI

1 - Oskari Tokoi. SISU - “Even Through A Stone Wall“
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957). p. 131.

2 - Hannes Ignatius and Kaarle Soikkeli. Lagguerre
QLIndependance en Finlande en 1918 (Helsingfors. Finland:
Imprimerie Otava. 1925). p.p. 22-23.

3 - F.E. Sillanpaa. Meek Heritagg (New York: A.A. Knopf.
1938). p. 223.

# - F.E. Sillanpaa. The Maid Silja (New York: The
MacMillan Company. 1933). p. 172.

5 - New York Times. 27 May 1917.

6 - D.G. Kirby (ed.). Finland and Russia 1808-1220
(New York: The MacMillan Press. Ltd.. 1975). p. 215.

7 - Samuel Eliot Morison. Inquiry Document No. #21.
“Memorandum on Finland“ (National Archives. Washington. D.C.).
written in 1918. p. 10#.

8 - Kirby. op. cit.. p. 215.

9 - Fgreign Relations of thelUnited States - 1918
(“Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States“. Washington. D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office. 1933). Supplement 2. p. 572.

10 - Leo Harmaja. Effects of the War on Economic and
Social Life in Finland (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University
Press. 1933 . p. 9.

11 ‘ T0k01. Op. Cite. P. 1H7.

12 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p.. 726.

13 - Anthony F. Upton. The Finnish Revolution 1 1 -1 18
(Minneapolis. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 1980).
P0 370

1# - New York Times. 23 June 1917.

15 - New York Times. 1# July 1917.

16 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 7250

17 - Foreign Relations - i918. op. cit.. (1932).
P1118813. V01. III. p. 12.

18 - Ibid.. p. 170

88
Footnotes to Chapter VI. cont.
19 - New York Times. 22 July 1917.

20 - Foreign Relations - 1918. OP. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 727.

21 - New York Timgg. 18 July 1917.

22 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
RUSSia. V01. II. p. 7270

23 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1931).
Russia. V01. I. p. 169.

2# - Tokoi. Op. cit.. p. 1#6.

25 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1933).
Supplement 2. P. 573.

26 - Juhani Paasivirta. The Victors in World War I and

-—

Finland. (Helsinki. Finland: The Finnish Historical Society.
1965): P0 570

CHAPTER VII

The Bolshevik Revolution in November of 1917 put Russo-
Finnish relations up in the air again. but by that time.
internal difficulties were taking precedence in Finland. The
food shortage. in particular. was the cause of much hardship.
and a source of much suspicion and recrimination between
classes. Finland tried to redress the food problem by Obtain-
ing foodstuffs from foreign sources. notably the United States.
The U.S.. however. requisitioned the grain that Finland had
previously purchased in America. Real and imagined grievances.
the unsettled situation in Russia. and a corresponding absence
of any threat of armed action by Russian forces all combined
to produce a general strike of Finnish workers in November.
The strike created more problems than it solved. The food sup-
ply question remained unanswered. When a bourgeois government
declared Finnish independence in December. the new nation was
in a very unstable condition. The government hoped that food
and recognition from abroad would contribute to a settlement
of internal problems. but those hopes fell short Of realiza-

tion.

Effects of the Bolshevik Revolution on Finnish Politics
Having ousted the Provisional Government. the Bolsheviks
called for an uprising in Finland. too. “Rise. rise at once

89

90
and take power into the hands of the organized workers.“
Lenin exhorted.1

Taking over the American consular post at Helsinki in
November. Thornwell Haynes reported.

“Owing to temporary overthrow interim government no
authority existing in Finland. ...“2 But Finland did not
experience a Bolshevik-style revolution. although Lenin's
representatives promised aid in whatever form was suitable.

With the benefit of hindsight. one can see that the most
favorable moment for the workers was indeed at hand. The
Finnish Socialists. however. like everyone else at the time.
thought the Bolshevik takeover could well be an ephemeral
occurrence. They did not feel confident about trusting to
Bolshevik support. nor did they feel that Finland had reached
the proper historical-economic stage for a socialist revolu-
tion and a dictatorship of the proletariat. If forced to take
power. the Socialists thought it would be for an interim only.
until a constituent assembly of Finlanders was called to
settle matters. Rather. the Finnish Socialists hoped to win
agreement to their demands in the Diet. backed by the threat
of a general strike.

Their major political demand was that the Law on Author-
ity be recognized. Then after the Socialist-dominated Diet of
the previous summer was seated again. they would appoint a
Socialist Senate. confirm the eight-hour day and the communal
government law (both of which the Provisional Government had
approved. but which had never been enforced). and otherwise

prepare the country for a constituent assembly. This and

91
other demands made up the “We Demand“ program presented in
the Diet.

The Diet first wanted to solve the latest quandary in
Russo-Finnish relations. The political parties did a turn-
about from their positions of the previous summer. Then the
bourgeois parties had called for negotiations with the Pro-
visional Government as heir to the Czar. while the Socialists
wanted separation. Now the bourgeois parties wanted separa-
tion from Bolshevik Russia. while the Socialists called for
negotiations with the supposed representatives of the Russian
people. The bourgeois parties arrived at an interesting - and
of course constitutional - solution: on the basis of the
Swedish-Finnish Constitution of 1772. they declared that since
the ruling house had vacated the throne. the ruling powers
fell to the Diet. (Nobody explained why that solution did not
apply to the Socialist Diet after the March Revolution: some
separatists at the time thought it did.) This was not a vic-
tory for a sovereign Diet. The Old COnstitution gave power to
the Diet only until a new ruler could be found. A good deal
of maneuvering went on before the Diet decided on November 9.
by a strict bourgeois - Socialist vote. against the “We De-
mand“ program and for a directorate of three men to exercise
sovereign authority. The Socialists and the Agrarians com-
bined to block the nominations to this directorate (an Old
Finn. a Young Finn. and a Swede). and the resulting politi-
cal impasse had not been resolved when a general strike was

declared.

92
Efforts to Obtain Food before the General Strike

After Russia reneged on the promised rye flour in Sep-
tember. the United States refused immediate shipment of wheat
flour in October. as seen in the last chapter. The Provisional
Government seems never to have made good on its hints of pos-
sible aid. Finland was forced to try different approaches.

From conversations with Bolsheviks in the soldiers' and
sailors' committees. Finnish Socialists were led to believe
that another revolution was coming to Russia. before it
actually occurred in November. They considered the possi-
bility of a similar undertaking in Finland. Food was a key
factor. The promise of it could win credibility for a Social-
ist government. Late in October. Socialist leaders expressed
to the Bolsheviks their hope of Obtaining food from Russia.
The reply was that if power passed to the workers in Finland.
food might be Obtained.3 Thus the Bolsheviks hoped to spur
the Socialists to lead a revolution in Finland. Even among
comrades there was speculation in food.

Faced with the dilatory response of the Provisional Gov-
ernment on the question of food from America. Finland's bour-
geois government set out to ease what it considered to be a
cause of Allied doubts about shipping food to Finland. A Fin-
nish envoy. Professor von Wendt. took a proposal to Ira Nelson
Morris in Stockholm. Morris being U.S. Ambassador to Sweden.
The Finnish proposal was designed to prevent Germany from
seizing provisions sent by the United States “in the event
that she (Germany) occupied Finland“. Unloading was to occur

at Narvik in Norway. whence foodstuffs would be shipped by

93

rail to Karunki. Sweden. on the Finnish border. The provi-
sions were to remain in warehouses there under American con-
trol. and were to be rationed out weekly to Finland. Sweden.
which was Often at Odds with the Allies over blockade and
trade questions. had agreed to forego any compensation for
its part in the plan. asking only that the U.S. supply coal
and lubricating oil for the trains.’4

The plan was discussed in Stockholm on November 3.
Herbert Hoover. as U.S. Food Administrator. had already
requisitioned part of Finland's flour on October 27. even
though no word of approval or disapproval on shipments to
Finland had yet arrived from the Provisional Government.

Dr. KaarlO Ignatius. who spoke to Morison of the Rolls-
Royces in Helsinki. painted a different picture of Finland
for the American press on November 11.

“...we are within sight of literal starvation. Many
communes have practically no reserves. Their population has
been obliged to resort to an expedient painfully common in
Finnish history - the mixing of ground pine bark with grain
flour...“

Ignatius was in the United States to appeal for export
licenses in order to facilitate the plan presented by von
Wendt. Ignatius appealed further to the declared ideals of
the Allies when he stated.

“The supplying of Finland's needs will materially serve
the Entente cause. as it will prove to my countrymen that
they. too. are included among the small nations which the
Allies are attempting to help.“

Some Finlanders had long been doubtful of Allied ideals.
as Allan V. Tornudd showed us. It did not help matters when

the rest of Finland's flour was requisitioned on November 30.

9#

The fall of the Provisional Government may have compli-
cated Finland's case before the United States. but probably
did not affect the eventual outcome. The requisitioned flour
was destined for France. The Allies had spoken for all of the
exportable wheat America had. and whatever else could be
gained through restriction of consumption in the United States.
Pressure was increasing on oats. rye. barley. and corn. as
well. In January of 1918. the British Food Controller told
Hoover's representative in London.

“Unless you are able to send the Allies at least 75.mil-
lion bushels wheat over and above what you have exported up to
January 1 and in addition to the total exportable surplus from
Canada I cannot take the responsibility of assuring our people
that there will be food enough to win the war.“7

The pressure on American produce was apparently not made
known in Finland. a lack of communication which hurt America's
image and the cause for which it fought. Juhani Paasivirta
writes of a bitter reaction in Finnish newspapers toward

“empty Wilsonian idealism“. “American cynicism“ became a

catchword. he says.8

The November General Strike

Ambassador Morris telegrammed to the Secretary of State.

“...Wednesday Socialists presented Conservatives ultima-
tum either renounce Conservative moderate directorate or
accept consequences general strike...“9

That was the political reason for the strike that started
on November 1#. The unions were mainly responsible for organ-
izing the movement. and the motivations of rank-and-file mem-

bers come forth in the following comments from union meetings:

“There are a lot of workers with large families who have

95

not had butter for months on end. and they have also had to
go without bread for a number of days. not to mention milk
which for many is already a distant memory of the past...“ 0

“The meeting took up the question of what could be done
to prevent our having to eat lichen. which the bourgeoisie are
starting to feed us with. It was resolved to make it clear to
members that there was no other way but to seize power once
and for all and if we have to eat lichen. then the bourgeoisie
will have to eat the same helping as the worker...“

“We know that the shortage of foodstuffs has brought
matters in this country to the point where we have to decide
whether we submit through hunger to bourgeois rule or take up
a struggle which will either take us to victory or defeat. In
any case. grim death lies before us if we do not fight against
it. We will die in any event... The workers of our locality
are behind any decision that is taken here. They feel that we
cannot stand this general starvation any more. Farmers and
others there are so overbearing towards the workers who appeal
to the provisions boards and individual landowners that it is
said of them that they are used to feed corn and meal to
their pigs. ...fi12

Those statements show a willingness in some quarters to
do more than just go on strike. The so-called Revolutionary
Central Council. supposedly the directors of the strike move-
ment. did not go along with radicals. but they did know what
motivated the masses. In the list of strike demands put for-
ward by the Council on November 1#. the very first stated.

“The government must organize effective means to combat
the shortage of foodstuffs and unemployment. bearing in mind

the proposals of the Trade Union Council and the demands of
organized labor.“13

Then followed demands for recognizing the Law on Authori-
ty. and for confirming and passing social legislation. The
food shortage. the black market. and the attitudes Of farmers-
and bourgeoisie on these subjects were emphasized and embroi-
dered upon in Socialist publications. because they aroused
emotions. Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that

the food shortage was indeed the most important cause for

96
unrest among the workers of Finland.

The strike was assured of general success in stopping
work. because the revived Red Guards were able to buy or
obtain the loan of rifles from the Russian military in many
(though not all) places where garrisons or bases were located.
This gave the workers a distinct advantage. Nowhere did the
Russians intervene against the strike movement. The New York
13mg; reported on November 18 that the Socialists. supported
by armed workers and Russian Bolshevik soldiers. controlled
the country. Only provisions trains were operating. And.

“...The Socialists. aided by Russian soldiers. are
searching the houses of non-Socialist citizens in various
places for provisions and weapons. ...“1

Later on. the Times carried a report on Finland under

this heading:

“FINLAND A PREY TO WILD ANARCHY - Red Guards. Organized
by Socialists. Rove About. Murdering and Pillaging at Will.“15

Those quotations gave Americans an exaggerated impression
of Socialist leadership in strike activities. and of active
participation by Russian soldiers. On the other hand. they do
tell why the general strike did more to bring on a full-scale
civil war than to resolve existing difficulties.

The strike started quietly enough. with work stoppages
organized by local committees and Red Guards. Government
employees mostly walked off the job to protest the strike.
and the bourgeois Civil Guard units - organized for local
defense - were not well-enough armed to offer any resistance.
The Socialists were able to get confirmation of the eight-

hour day and local government laws in the Diet. They also

97

supported an Agrarian proposal to give sovereign authority
in Finland temporarily to the Diet. in order to break the
impasse over the Directorate. These successes bolstered the
radical desire for a complete takeover of governmental author-
ity. But first the Socialist Party leadership. and then the
union leadership. rejected the idea of a Socialist or prole-
tarian takeover. Their excuse was that such a move must usher
in a socialist society. and they argued that Finland was not
yet ready for socialism. that more preparation was needed.

Instead. they instructed the Red Guard to institute
thorough searches for hoarded food. The leaders knew what was
most in the minds of the rank-and-file. and sought thus to
channel energies away from outright revolution. The institi-
tion of systematic food searches coincided with a rise in
violence. The total of 3# people killed during the strike
period. which lasted about a week. caused extreme indignation
when it became known across the country. The leaders of the
labor movement were themselves very much sobered. if not
terrified. by their evident lack of control over the Red
Guard units. It strengthened their resolve to seek gains
through parliamentary procedure. They called for an end to
the strike with the promise Of forming a Socialist government.
or a favorable coalition. through action in the Diet. This
government was to protect the gains already made. and protect
the Red Guards from reprisals. In sum. the Socialist Party
switched from its former position of allowing revolution to
proceed without preparing for it. to halting revolution due

to a lack of preparation.

98

Results of the General Strike

The strike did end. but the Socialists could neither
form their own government nor join a coalition. None of the
other parties wanted anything to do with them. and there
could be no question of renewing the strike in order to force
an entirely Socialist government upon the country. since
labor “leaders“ might be unable to keep control. When they
refused to join the bourgeois parties in condemning the activ-
ities of the Red Guard. the Socialists were called accomplices
to murder. What was worse. the Socialists and the workers in
general had been in unofficial league with the Russian sol-
diery. The latter was now considered to be the “enemy“ in
bourgeois circles. stirring up revolutionary sentiment. sup-
plying workers with arms. blocking the road to independence.
The Socialists could only answer with charges of bourgeois
provocation. accumulated over the years.

The persistent food shortage also plagued the Socialists.
It was an excuse for the continuing activities of the Red
Guard units around the country (though not the only excuse.
They often tried. for example. to force payment Of wages
missed during the strike. with a little extra in addition.)
As the Red Guards refused to disband. the bourgeois Civic
Guards renewed their efforts to organize and obtain arms.

Labor leaders and Socialists had nothing positive to
offer the workers in regard to food. so they resorted to the
tried-and-true method of blaming someone else for the problem.
while still hoping to restrain a revolution. When the Revo-

lutionary Central Council called an end to the strike. their

99

proclamation trumpeted the bourgeoisie's failure “to win the
Imperial powers for their Senate or their three kings“. and
emphasized the gains in social legislation. Then it was ad-
mitted that the food shortage had in no way been alleviated.
but the proclamation declared that a general strike would not
help the workers to obtain bread. Rather. “...the fight must
be continued in a different guise. in the Diet and outside it.
not simply in the form of a general strike.“16

With their proclamation. labor leaders tried to disso-
ciate strike activity from the food question. which had been
the major reason for calling a strike in the first place.
There existed perhaps the hope of getting food from the Bol-
sheviks. even though no Finnish revolution had occurred. as
the New York Times reported a promise from Russia to Finland
of 16.000 tons of grain per month. This would bring a peaceful
solution to Finland's most pressing problem. which is what
most of the workers and their leaders desired. A Socialist
named Aronen remarked in the Diet that what were called
“hooligan gangs“ in the bourgeois press were really “hungry
workers. who would be wholly peaceful if they could get the
bare necessities of life.“17

But. the Times report noted that only 700 tons of grain
came through in November. and that military exigencies stopped
shipments thereafter.18 Later developments lead one to doubt
that Russia could really spare 16.000 tons of grain per month.
though transportation difficulties rather than poor harvests
were the immediate causes of shortage there. In any case. the

result for Finland was not changed. If the Diet or the

100
government could not provide an answer to the food problem.
and the strike was deemed useless. radicals would contend
that revolution was the only remaining option. playing upon
the added fear that the bourgeois “Butcher Guards“ might act

flrSt 0

Declaration of Independence

The bourgeois parties stood together to nominate a gov-
ernment in opposition to the “Red Senate“ or “Red Government“
proposed by the Socialists after the strike. The bourgeois
list passed in the Diet vote. The new government had as
Premier Judge P.E. Svinhufvud. He was of the old Constitu-
tionalist school. and had been highly critical of Russifica-
tion. His speeches as Speaker of the Diet had led to several
of the dissolutions of that body before World War I. A period
of exile in Siberia had made him a national hero. Naturally.
a high priority for his government would be independence from
Bolshevik Russia. Svinhufvud's Constitutionalist background
indicated that a second priority would be settlement of a form
of government without the Diet as supreme authority. He had
only agreed to accept appointment from the currently-
sovereign Diet when that body agreed to leave the actual pre-
rogatives of government to the Senate. A third priority could
be predicted from Svinhufvud's occupation as a judge: law and
order. These were in fact the major points of his program as
presented before the Diet on November 2#.

The Svinhufvud government did not forget the need for

food. either. Professor von Wendt saw Morris again in

101
Stockholm on December 3. intimating that Germany was inquiring
about the amount of food needed in Finland. Supposedly. the
Germans were soon to make proposals in the matter. and unless
the U.S. quickly released a shipload of food for Finland. von
Wendt feared the consequences. He was anxious to obtain food
from America. though his country must have it and could not
quibble about who supplied it. He added that if Finland “is
obliged to accept German food she will undoubtedly be more in
sympathy with Germany than she is at present.“19

Apparently. Finland still had no idea why its foodstuffs
had been requisitioned. and thought the U.S. was still holding
the goods. Von Wendt's latest approach was made either in sin-
cere fear Of German influence. in ignorance of facts that
Svinhufvud knew about. or in a deliberate attempt to pressure
the United States - to use a little reverse grain diplomacy.
Finnish Activists had asked the Germans for food. and Svin-
hufvud was in touch with the Activists. But General Luden-
dorff's reply to them. made on November 26. was as follows:

“The question of foodstuffs must be taken up with Berlin.
It must not be forgotten that foodstuffs could easily fall
into the wrong hands. as long as Finland is not free of Rus-
sian troops. Support will only be continued after the country
is freed Of those troops.“20 (Ironic that Ludendorff balked
at the very same thing that von Wendt tried to overcome in his
earlier proposal to Morris!)

The support to which Ludendorff referred was mostly in
the form Of arms for the Activists. Even in the months ahead.
German aid in the form of foodstuffs was never very great.

But it is possible that Berlin had made favorable gestures
toward the Finns. and certainly the requisitioning of pur-

chased wheat by the United States gave a wonderful Opportunity

102
for propaganda. at least. Consul Haynes at Helsinki noted as
much when he recommended food for Finland in order to combat
pro-German propaganda there.21 Whatever the reality of the
situation. von Wendt used it as a lever against the United
States. Still there was no reply from America.

The Svinhufvud government declared Finnish independence
on December #. to which the bourgeois majority in the Diet
responded favorably two days later. (The Socialists did not
support the declaration.) Svinhufvud drew up an official
appeal for recognition to be sent to the Scandinavian nations
and to the western Allies. and delegations were sent out to
seek recognition from all the Great Powers. The appeal gave
constitutional grounds for independence and observed that no
foreign recognition had been given to the latest Russian gov-
ernment. Complaints were voiced particularly against the Rus-
sian troops and their baneful effect upon the “hot-headed and
unstable elements of society“.22 It was assumed (without any
thought for strategic considerations) that foreign recognition
of Finnish independence would force Russia to withdraw its
troops from Finland.

The largest paragraph in the document rehashed the food
shortage. in which relations with Russia. its rapacious troops
and the presence of war refugees. and the need for American
food all received mention. To end the shortage and stabilize
the country. it was “vital“ that Finland's “truly isolated
position“ should be opened up.23 It was a well-conceived
statement. considering that the Allies were likely to be sen-

sitive about breaking up the Russian Empire. and recognizing

103
that America was still the best source of foodstuffs. which
would have to pass through the British blockade. Giving aid
to Finland would be a humane thing to do. and in effect would
bring de facto recognition from the Allies. which might lead
to an act de jure.

Several nations did recognize Finnish independence. Rus-
sia was the first to do so. early in January of 1918. in ac-
cordance with the principle of self-determination of nations.
Lenin felt. too. that a demonstrated willingness to grant
Finnish independence would encourage the Finnish labor move-
ment to make a revolution by disposing Of any nationalistic
sentiment that might remain against Russia. throwing the
light squarely on economic issues. The Scandinavian nations
and Germany soon extended recognition. also.

France gave recognition in a precipitate fashion that
upset Russian exiles. in the hope of beating Germany to the
punch and thereby winning Finnish sympathies for the Allied
cause. The plan did not work. because the Svinhufvud govern-
ment had long counted on German action. no matter when it was
taken. And besides. France by itself had nothing to offer
Finland. and the United States and Great Britain were not
disposed to extend recognition to Finland until after the
long-awaited Russian Constituent Assembly had a chance to act
upon the issue. With the demise of that body. the British
“indefinitely postponed“ formal recognition. They proposed
to the U.S. that the two nations should formally recognize
Finland “as soon as the Finns express by some unmistakable

method such as an election their sanction of their own

10#
independence.“2u Until then. the British would treat the
present Finnish government “as the de facto authorities in
Finland“. The United States followed Britain's suggestion in
the matter. though when the British proposal arrived. Fin-
landers were already using bullets rather than ballots to
decide their political preferences.

While the U.S. waited for the Constituent Assembly to
meet. Kaarlo Ignatius spoke with Secretary of State Lansing
in Washington. He reviewed Finnish attempts to get grain
since May of 1917. and the necessitous condition of Finland.
If the U.S. would release part of the requisitioned goods
according to the transportation plan previously outlined.
“...there is not the slightest possibility that any portion
or this flour will reach the enemy.“ he said.25 (Again. it
was assumed that the requisitioned flour was merely being
held. not used elsewhere.) In addition. there was soon a tele-
gram from Svinhufvud explaining again Finland's declaration
of independence. and stating that relations with the united
States were the most urgently desired of all. owing to the
food shortage.26

Lansing relented. in regard to foodstuffs. Haynes. von
Wendt and the rest had made an impression. and the State
Department was ready to use food to counteract suspected Ger-
man influence in Finland. Lansing instructed Hoover to find
the provisions. which did not please the Food Administrator.
He did not feel that America should play at grain diplomacy
with nations like Finland if it hoped to fulfill previous

obligations to the Allies. Nevertheless. he managed to

105
arrange for #5.000 tons of oats and corn to be shipped imme-
diately. If wheat was preferred. it would have to be obtained
in Australia. he said. and Finland would be responsible for
shipping. Ambassador Francis in Russia had advised that food
be sent to Finland without recognition Of independence. and
Lansing informed him that foodstuffs were being gathered.
He also reported to Francis.

“Food Administration has requisitioned for France flour
purchased by Finnish Senate. Conditions so urgent as to offer
no other alternative.“27
If the U.S. Ambassador to Russia did not know why the flour
was requisitioned until December 19. when the note was sent to
him. one may wonder if Finland ever found out.

With American produce being gathered for Finland. the
next requirement was British co-operation. Britain reported
“...to all intents and purposes open trade between Germany and
Finnish ports...“28 Furthermore. rice sent from Sweden to the
Finns had been seized by Russian soldiers. The British remind-
ed America Of Allied food requirements. and expressed concern
over the diversion of neutral shipping to the project for Fin-
land. They were piqued Over the lack of “full consultation“
in the matter. and advised careful organization of distribu-
tion if the shipment went forward. Lansing fell back on the
Narvik-to-Karunki plan proposed by von Wendt. Morris was to
iron out everything with the Swedish government and the
British minister at Stockholm. according to instructions
sent from Lansing on January 16. 1918. On January 29. Morris
wired back that all was arranged. or almost all. “However.“

he said.

106
“I respectfully suggest that no shipments be sent for-
ward until order is once more restored in Finland. as under
present conditions it would be impossible to control their
distribution.“29

The Finnish Civil War had begun.

The general strike of November. 1917. illustrated the
gravity of Finland's food problem. it being the chief grie-
vance of the strikers. As no solution was attained - and no
effective authority was established by the Finnish government.
the Finnish labor leaders. or the Russians - further distur-
bances followed the end of the strike. Bourgeoisie and prole-
tariat were less able to work out problems peacefully than
before. and both sides accelerated efforts to organize armed
guards.

The strike period also illustrated the fact that Finland
was not among the small nations that the Allies were trying
to help. Poor organization of American resources had allowed
a private firm to deal with the Finns when the U.S. govern-
ment had no intention of sending food to Finland for the sake
Of Finland. Food might have been sent to support improved
relations between the Finns and the Provisional Government.
but even before that government fell. part of the wheat pur-
chased by Finland had been requisitioned. The rest was requi-
sitioned after the Bolshevik Revolution. although Finnish
envoys and the strike all showed the importance of getting
food to the country. Not until Lansing was convinced that
German influence was on the rise did the U.S. move to find

foodstuffs for Finland. while the British remained skeptical

107
of the project. Reactions to the Finnish declaration of inde-
pendence showed that the Allies were not hostile to Finland:
rather. they were divided over the importance of Finland as
opposed to the importance of deferring to Russian feelings.
and they were also unsure about the security of any provisions
that might be sent to Finland. By the time the details of
shipment had been worked out. a state of civil war discour-

aged completion of the project.

108

Footnotes to Chapter VII

1 - Anthony F. Upton. The Finnish Revolution 1917-1918
(Minneapolis. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 1980).
p. 1“]. e

2 - Foreign Relations of the United States - 1918
(“Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations Of the United
States“. Washington. D. C.: United States Government Printing
Office. 1932). Russia. Vol. II. p. 732.

3 - D. G. Kirby (ed. ). Finland and Russia 1808- 1920
(New York: The MacMillan Press. Ltd.. 1975). D- P- 190-191.

# - New York Times. # November 1917.
5 - New York Times. 11 November 1917.
6 - Ibid.

7 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1933).
Supplement 1. Vol. I. p. 536.

8 - Juhani Paasivirta. The Victors in World War I and
Finland (Helsinki. Finland: The Finnish Historical Society.
1965’s p0 58-

9 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 731.

10 - Kirby. op. cit.. p. 216.

11 - Ibid.. p. 216.

12 - Ibid.. p. 217.

13 - Ibid.. p.p. 193-19#.

1# - New York Times. 18 November 1917.
15 - New York Times. 29 November 1917.
16 - Kirby. op. cit.. p. 196.

17 - Upton. op. cit.. p. 179.

18 - New York Times. 7 December 1917.

19- Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 733.

20 - Kirby. Op. Cite. pe ZOOe

21 - Paasivirta. op. cit.. p. 58.

109
Footnotes to Chapter VII. cont.
22 - Kirby. op. cit.. p. 202.
23 - Ibid.. p. 203.

2# - Foreign Relations 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. VOl. II. p. 7#5.

25 - Foreign Relations
Supplement 2. p. 57#.

1918. op. cit.. (1933).

26 - Foreign Relations
Russia. Vol. II. p. 73#.

1918. op. cit.. (1932).

27 - Foreign Relations
Supplement 2. p. 57#.

1918. op. cit.. (1933).

28 " Ibide. P0 575'
29 - Ibide. p0 577e

CHAPTER VIII

The Finnish Civil War was short but costly. The bour-
geois (White) government. with the aid Of German intervention.
defeated the proletarian (Red) government. Thousands of lives
were lost on both sides. The militant labor movement was
crushed. Reasons for the outbreak of fighting were varied.
but the food shortage was prominent among them. Some of the
Finnish Whites would blame the United States and Great Brit-
ain for causing the fighting. because of the foodstuffs requi-
sitioned in 1917. Nonetheless. both Reds and Whites sought
recognition as well as foodstuffs from the U.S.. whose

cO-operation could have been crucial for either side.

The Finnish Civil War

“The bourgeoisie can either begin their attack or carry
on concentrating their forces. If the red guards go into
action. this can be used by the bourgeoisie as an excuse for
attacking. An action could start of its own accord just to
relieve the tension.“1 - Yrjo Sirola. 13 January 1918. soon
to be Foreign Minister of the Finnish Socialist Workers'
Republic.

“That ended the Sunday quiet for me. I had known nothing
of these developments. for I was not a member of the Revolu-
tion Committee. but now I hurried to the committee head-
quarters. There I found an indescribable confusion.“2 -

Oskari Tokoi. 28 January 1918. soon to be Minister of Food in
the Workers' Republic.

The first quotation above explains why the shooting
started in the Finnish Civil War. The second quotation ex-

plains the eventual outcome. The facts and figures say that

110

111
on January 9 the Diet supported the government's desire for
law and order by granting the authority to create an official.
and obedient. armed force. As the negotiations for a separate
peace with Russia were dragging. Germany soon agreed to arm a
Finnish government force. (These talks led eventually to
active German intervention.) The workers felt threatened at
these actions by the bourgeois government. Red Guards in
Viipuri commenced a search for weapons on January 19. and
attacked a factory where arms were being produced and stored
for the bourgeois Civic Guard. In the midst of the crisis at
Viipuri. the Civic Guard - or White Guard - was recognized as
the official government peace keeping force. superseding the
ineffective militias. This had the effect of putting the Red
Guard at Viipuri. and anyone else who might resist the White
Guard. in a position of rebellion. Lenin ordered up Russian
arms for the Finnish proletariat on January 27. and the hand-
bills announcing revolution appeared the next morning.

The Socialist Workers' Republic. or Red government. soon
controlled about one-fifth of the country. the southern
region where all the major population centers were located.
White Finland took in all the rest of the country - but only
about half of the total population. Part of the Senate escaped
to Vaasa on the west coast. which became the new seat Of the
White government. Most of the other high government Officials
went into hiding. while clerks and secretaries walked Off the
job.

Vaasa was already headquarters for General Mannerheim.

Commander-in-Chief of whatever armed forces the Whites could

112
raise. Mannerheim was a Swedish-Finn. and a former general
of Russian Imperial forces. distinguished in actions against
the Central Powers during the World War. He left the Russian
service after the Bolshevik Revolution. He was joined by other
Finnish professionals. as well as Swedish and German volun-
teers. and the Jdgers who were released from duty in the Ger-
man army. Though this group did not always see eye to eye
among themselves or with the government they represented.
owing to differences of opinion on the World War. they gave
the White army a leadership and organizational advantage
which offset the initial Red advantage in arms.

The Reds did indeed receive arms from Russia and from
remaining units of the Russian garrison. The Reds did not.
however. receive the benefit of a formal Russian intervention.
The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk between the Germans and
Bolshevik representatives produced pressure to withdraw Rus-
sian forces from Finland. The process was well under way when
the Finnish Civil War began. accompanied by much outright
desertion. The Bolsheviks asked for volunteers to remain and
fight for the proletarian revolution. and there was a modest
response. even including a few officers such as one Colonel
Svetchnikov. who took a hand in strategic planning. But on
the whole. Russian volunteers were more of the type who
arrived at the front by train from Petrograd and returned
after a day or two of fighting.

The Finnish Civil War was not a long one. but only with
the landing of 12.000 German troops in April did the and come

definitely into view. Mannerheim's White army held a victory

113
parade in Helsinki on May 16. The war did produce scenes of
ferocious fighting. and even more ferocious retribution
wreaked upon captives. Some 10,000 persons died in the
Terrors. both Red and White. The last word in retribution
went to the victorious Whites. They put 80.000 prisoners into
concentration camps. where nearly 12.000 died over the next
few months. Such an end could hardly be surprising. consider-

ing that the whole country was still short of food.

Causes of the Civil War

At the American consulate in Helsinki. Thornwell Haynes
shared his duties in February of 1918 with a new Vice-Consul.
The new man was Mortimer A. Waldo. fresh from two years Of
service with the Y.M.C.A. in Russia. Owing to that experience.
Ambassador Francis had asked Waldo to go to Finland where a
vice-consular post would be created for him. rather than
returning home to service in the army. Young Waldo often
remarked in his letters upon the good fortune he had experi-
enced in housing arrangements. and his stay in Helsinki was no
exception. He was taken into the apartment of Mr. Ernst Kro-
gius. general manager of the Finnish Steam Navigation Company.
His shipping line had Opened up the butter trade with England
and later took over the carrying of Finnish emigrants to
English ports. from where they re-embarked for America. Kro-
gius had sent his family to Sweden when the Civil War broke
out. and with his pro-Ally sentiments he did not hesitate to
take in a boarder. in return for placing his apartment under

the protection of the American flag.

11#

This proved to be an interesting and useful arrangement.
It was Ernst Krogius who contacted the White government at
Vaasa. and obtained assurance that the German intervention
“had nothing whatever to do with the war (World War I). and
that consequently the representatives Of the countries in war
with Germany had nothing to fear from the Germans. and stood
in this matter under the protection of the legal Finnish
government.“3

It was to Lars Krogius that Kaarlo Ignatius reported on
the prospects for U.S. recognition of Finland before the Civil
War began. Ernst had a brother by that name. perhaps one and
the same person. who was a former member of the Diet.

It was to the Krogius apartment that a fugitive member
of the White government came after bribing his way out of
jail. This was Sir Henrik Ramsay, holder Of an English title
and dual citizenship. and also involved in shipping concerns.
He stayed for weeks. meeting his wife who would disguise her-
self as a boy. and forming a close friendship with Vice-
Consul Waldo.

They became such good friends all around that Krogius
later wrote a letter to the U.S. government in which he
vouched for the reliability of Waldo's views regarding Fin-
land. which were essentially the same as his own. In a report
to the U.S. ambassador in Sweden. Vice-Consul Waldo agreed
with Krogius and the White government by assigning the imme-
diate cause of the fighting in Finland to Russian influence.
Then. commenting on the German ascendancy in Finland follow-

ing the Civil War. he wrote.

115

“Concerning the actions which have led to the present
critical condition in the relation of the allies with Finland
it is well known of course that Finland (appealed) long ago to
America for food relief. to prevent the hardships among the
poor classes. which in the absence of the relief have undoubt-
edly been the causes of the irritability and uprising of those
classes. Had the government been able to furnish food for this
part of the population the revolution could probably have been
avoided entirely. for as it was in Russia so in Fin and the
slogan of the revolutioners was 'give us bread'...“

Consul Haynes had been asking his government to send
food to Finland ever since his arrival in November of 1917.
In May 1918. he gave his opinion on the Civil War:

“The principal cause for the present revolution was the
hopeless state Of food question and distrust of laboring
class against bourgeoisie not providing food either from
Russia or the United States. Had food arrived according to my
November and December telegrams. the Red Guard. amounting to
10.000. including Reds from Russia. would have been easily

controlled by legal Finnish government and no German help
would have been needed.“5

Haynes therein referred to earlier telegrams in which
he had asked for food in order to combat pro-German propaganda.
(His figures for the Red Guard may have been meant to describe
pre-Civil War hardliners. As the war progressed. the Red and
White forces both grew much larger than that number.) Haynes
later posed a rhetorical question to Secretary of State Robert
Lansing:

“Is it true that Finland is in the hands of Germany
today because the Allies refused her food?“

His admission that “the western front is of vastly more
importance than Finland's paltry three and a half million
inhabitants“ had a touch of sarcasm about it. as Haynes went
on to tell why Finland itself was important. He ended by pru-
dently assuring Lansing of his loyalty to government policy.6

Despite that assurance. one might easily rephrase his

116
question to read.

“Is it true that the Allies were responsible for the
Finnish Civil War?“

Ira Nelson Morris dismissed the idea. but even in doing
so he showed that it had attained some currency. He told of
the mission Of two lieutenants during the Civil War. one Amer-
ican and one Englishman. sent to Vaasa to help some American
citizens to cross the White lines and leave Finland. Morris
related.

“Their reception was more than cold: it was discourteous
and unpleasant. They found not merely a strong pro-German
sentiment. which was natural and understandable in the circum-
stances. but also an equally strong anti-American and anti-
British sentiment. Police and military authorities both
reproached them with their governments' alleged responsibility
for the Civil War. declaring that it would not have broken
out if America and England had sent the food which Finland
had bought and paid for. This was of course. nonsense. but it
was true that Finland had some time earlier bought and paid
for #0.000 tons of food in America. and that it had been
requisitioned by the American Food Administrator.“7

Morris was one of the many who traced the cause of the
Civil War to unruly Russian soldiers and scheming Bolsheviks.
This was a favorite theme Of White Finland. which through its
victory was long able to propagate the notion of the “War Of
Liberation“ that was fought in 1918. rather than a civil war.
The Finnish Reds could thereby be painted in the garish hues
of the traitor in collusion with a foreign enemy. rather than
in the respectable colors of the defender of a legitimate
government.

Samuel Eliot Morison subscribed to the same belief. His
contacts with Finlanders in America revealed that radicals

had planned for a proletarian dictatorship since March of

1917. The masses were thought to be growing impatient while

117
the favorable moments passed. Lenin called for a revolution
before the general strike of Nevember. Stalin called for one
afterward. By January it was “now or never“ as the Russian
troops were leaving. The BOlsheviks exhorted once more. via
telegram on January 26 or 27.

“Arrest the government. We promise help.“

Morison further commented.

“A representative of the Bolsheviks in this country
(Jack Reed) admits that the Helsingfors coup d'etat was timed
to suit Trotsky. and that he delayed his return to Brest-
Litovsk in order that he could tell the Germans that the
Finnish bourgeoisie were down and out.“8

Morison found that the Finnish Reds. like the Russian
revolutionaries. believed that uprisings were imminent all
over Europe. Particularly did they count upon German Social-
ists to block aid to the Finnish Whites. and start their own
revolution. Therefore. Morison concluded that the Reds acted
in Finland because they thought they could get away with it.
Yet he also noted.

“Several Finlanders in this country. who were recently
in Finland (Morison finished his memorandum in July Of 1918).
assure me that the real cause of the Red Revolution was
hunger. The lower classes. unsatisfied with their rations.
suspected that the peasants and bourgeoisie were hoarding food.
and revolted in order to obtain it. There is probably some-
thing in this. Domiciliary searches for foodstuffs were one of
the first acts of the Red government.“9

Different persons have posed different contributory
causes for the Civil war ever since it occurred. The two that
most Often recur are the Russians and the food shortage. BOur-
geois Finland simply did not believe that sufficient griev-

ances existed to drive the workers to revolt on their own.

What was Obvious was that no unruly activities occurred until

118
revolution in Russia removed discipline among the Russian
forces in Finland. That is why the bourgeois Civic Guard.
both unofficially and later in its role as a recognized arm
of the government. was aimed primarily against the Russians -
despite the fact that Russian troops were being withdrawn
from Finland before the Civil War started. If bourgeois
insistence upon blaming the Russians thus appears short-
sighted. it is nonetheless true that the region surrounding
Vaasa. where the White government established itself in exile.
was home mainly to Swedish-speaking small farmers. Russian
garrisons were more of a potential threat there than was
organized Red Finnish activity. even though the garrisons
were reduced in strength. The reality in that region was not
so different from the rest of White Finland. having so few of
the major population and industrial centers in it. With
leaders like Svinhufvud in the government. and Hannes Ignatius
in the military (he was quartermaster general of the White
army). the White cause became suffused with the idea of
liberation from Russia. although the great majority of their
armed foes were Finns.

The Finnish Socialists did not themselves get along well
with the Russian military. Their arms were welcome. but Tokoi
remarked that the appearance Of active intervention would
strengthen Opposition to the revolutionary movement. as it had
stirred opposition to the Socialists over the past months.

The Socialists urged Russia to withdraw its troops as fast as
possible. said Tokoi. Indeed. the old question of paying the

military forces came up again. and they ended by virtually

119
extorting a large sum from the Finnish Socialist Workers'
Republic!10

But along with the breakdown of law and order. among
the troops and then in Finland generally. there was always
the food question. They went together. as a letter from a
Socialist student testifies. dated 25 January 1918:

“Anarchy has again burst forth. The bread is coming to
an end soon. They are using the seed now. Robberies and mur-
ders are the order of the day. Trains are stopped and fired
at. ... We have hopes that we can get peaceful conditions in
a few months if we can only get rid of the Russian soldiers.“11

Undisciplined soldiers meant no restraints on the
workers. The question is whether or not restraints would have
been necessary. on more than the level of police action. if
there had been sufficient food. If we rely upon the statements
above and those quoted from the time of the general strike in
November 1917. the answer must be “no“. But the Allies were
not entirely to blame for the situation.

In all fairness to the United States and Great Britain
it must be repeated that they did decide to send food to Fin-
land. but they did not work out the details in time tO head
off the Civil War. Even after the fighting had begun. they did
not immediately give up the project. They did modify it.
however. with a pronounced American bias against any dealings
with the “usurping Socialist government“. as Consul Haynes
called it. On the other hand. Secretary of State Lansing
could say on February 13 that since “the party of law and
order is now in control of north Finland“. foodstuffs should

go forward to them. Ambassador Morris had given assurance of

arranging matters so that he could stop delivery of food “if

120
the Whites should not make proper use of it“. a reference to
the fear of smuggling to Germany.12

Within two weeks there were 8.000 tons of cats ready for
shipment to northern Finland. where it was least needed.

Citing an American traveller. the New York Times reported on
February 18.

“The American saw no indication of a food shortage in
Northern Finland. Peasants who had flocked to the banner Of
General Mannerheim. the White Guard leader. were furnishing
him with considerable stores of provisions.“1

Upton explains the situation in this manner:

“...the suspicions voiced by the Socialists were correct.
the farmers had had large stocks that they had been concealing.
and since the cities did not have to be supplied. White Fin-
land in general experienced no food shortage and the army was
always fed adequately.“1h

He goes on to say that some remote areas did suffer. and
that there were no food reserves adequate to feed the southern
cities on a normal. or even on the previous rationed. scale.
The bread ration was cut in half after Helsinki was taken in
April. “and a period of real crisis began“.15

Finland had a real food shortage. but it is Obvious that
everyone did not share in it to the same extent. Food from the
Allies in November or December might well have defused an ex-

plosive situation. but it was not they alone who could have

done something. at least for immediate needs.

The Great Powers and White Finland
As usual. the same day that the cats were ready for ship-
ment to White Finland. a complication arose. Finland was to

receive the goods if there was agreement to Allied control of

121
distribution. and if there was agreement to end the export of
wood products to whomever Finland pleased. namely Germany.
White Finland did not feel that it could so limit its freedom
of trade. especially since Germany was the source of much-
needed munitions. Ambassador Morris observed that the Finnish
government was undoubtedly pro-German. and the foodstuffs
were held up while the Allies contemplated their position.
As they did so. White Finland made a treaty with Germany on
March 7 by which the Germans promised to uphold Finnish inde-
pendendence and give whatever aid possible. Secret clauses
that made Finland a virtual German protectorate were not known
(in the U.S. anyway) for several months. but the Allies imme-
diately suspected that White Finland would serve German
interests.

By way of explaining their choice of friends. Finnish
Whites claimed that they could have won the war on their own.
but Red brutalities. lack of food. and “the daily arrival of
large hosts of Bolsheviks“ necessitated acceptance of aid
from a powerful friend.16 (They neglected to mention that if
some Bolsheviks arrived every day. others were leaving every
day.) The argument has often been made that Sweden was first
approached. but refused even to ship arms. The Allies could
not be expected to intervene against Russia and thus drive the
latter into Germany's arms. so that left just one choice. It
is the Tornudd argument all over again. and many Finlanders
were quite sincere in it. some even while maintaining a pro-
Entente stance as far as the World War was concerned. Ernst

Krogius took pains to declare that there had never been any

122
thought of a German occupation of Finland. that indeed there
was no such thing. but only the friendly assistance of one
country to another.17 (Finlanders would perform a similar
service later on when they went off to Esthonia to fight Bol-
sheviks.) Those who worked explicitly for German intervention
in the Finnish Civil War appear to have been relatively few
in number. but they were very influential: like Svinhufvud
and his closest associates in the White government.

The Swedish question is a complicated one. Morison spoke
for several who have held that the Swedish government feared
being drawn into the war on Germany's side if it intervened
where the Germans wanted to make a friend. the Swedish upper
classes being largely pro-German and in favor of actively
supporting the Central Powers. Lieutenant Commander John Gade.
of U.S. Naval Intelligence. said that the Swedes stayed out
Of Finland because the Allies refused to support them in such
a venture.18 In fact. the British Ambassador at Stockholm
recommended Allied support for Swedish intervention. but noth-
ing was done.19 But apart from the desire to adhere to neu-
trality. Sweden had an important Socialist movement of its
own. and there was probably fear of a native reaction to an
intervention against Finnish Socialists. A further excuse was
possible anti-Swedish feeling in Finland. Sweden's Prime Min-
ister recognized that “certain circles“ in Finland desired
Swedish intervention. but stated that “a considerable part of
the Finnish people strongly oppose the idea.“20 Hjalmar
Branting. a leading moderate Socialist and cabinet minister

in Sweden. went further. He declared that certain Finlanders

123
(he did not name anyone) had agreed to deliver their country
to Germany even before World War I.21 Certainly there was
much German influence in pre-war Finland. as we have seen pre-
viously. Morison cited this quotation from Svinhufvud. which
appeared in a German newspaper in early 1918:

“All of us had a feeling that our liberation could come
only through Germany.“22

To Morison. that was a damning indictment against Fin-
land. though it says nothing about delivering the country to
Germany.

Lansing still hoped that food could win sympathy for the
Allies. and went ahead with plans for shipments even after
the treaty of March 7th. He steered this course against the
counsel of Ambassador Morris and the other Allied ministers
in Stockholm. and against Hoover's advice as well. according
to Juhani Paasivirta.23 The British attitude fluctuated.
Early in March. the British were for stopping shipments of
grain from America to White Finland. Waldo wrote that the
English consul in Helsinki advised his government against any
kind of assistance to Finland long before the Germans came.

He added.

“It may throw light upon the situation if I say. that af-
ter our government had practically agreed to the shipment of
food for Finland. we received a telegram from the State Depart-
ment. saying that our information concerning the need in Fin-
land did not agree with the English consul's. Sometime after
this the English consul stated that he had gotten hhs informa-
tion from Russian newspapers among other sources.“2

In other words. the opinion Of the English consul was not

trustworthy. in the Opinion of the American vice-consul. and

the former does seem to have been personally unpopular in

12#
Finland.

Despite their consul. Britain did agree to an “initial
shipment“ of 2.000 tons of foodstuffs for White Finland at the
end of March. Almost immediately there occurred the incident
with the American and English lieutenants. reported by Ambas-
sador Morris. and termed an “insult“.25 Morris again advised
strongly against any aid for White Finland. and the operation

came to an end.

Red Finland in Search of Foodstuffs

Red Finland had to eat. too. Captain Walter S. Crosley.
former American Naval Attache in Russia. reported on April 1
that southern Finland would soon face starvation. He felt it
might be avoided through the introduction Of foodstuffs as the
Whites advanced. northern Finland having an estimated two
months' supply of food. The Whites also expected food from
Germany. he added.26

Rather than wait for defeat in order to eat. the Reds
and Tokoi as Food Minister turned to Russia. Tokoi discovered
that the Provisional Government had actually earmarked some
grain for Finland. to be given out when relations between the
two countries became satisfactory. no doubt. It was perhaps
to this grain. in part. that the New York Timeg had referred
in connection with Bolshevik promises at the end of 1917 (see
Chapter VII). This grain was still in Petrograd. Bolshevik
leaders were willing enough to send it to Finland. but as
Petrograd itself was short of food. there was difficulty with

local authorities. Only in late March was the grain available

125

in Finland.

The food stocks left behind by evacuated Russian garri-
sons were helpful. but could not suffice. Tokoi tells of a
visit to U.S. Ambassador David R. Francis in Petrograd. assur-
ing him of a fair distribution Of any food received regardless
of party or class. Then Tokoi “casually“ remarked upon a White
shipment of scrap metal intended for Germany. which was
stopped by the Red Guard. He says.

“The Ambassador promised to cable Washington immediately.
recommending grain be sent to Finland.“27

The Whites got wind Of this proposal. and it caused a
commotion when their government demanded to know if the U.S.
was supporting the Reds. The U.S. was not: the proposal died.

Finally. the Finnish Reds sent their own trains and crews
to Siberia. to procure grain at the source. The first train
got through with a large accretion of foodstuffs at the end
of March. A second and third train were stopped in Russia.
where lack of transportation also produced food shortages.

The American military attache. who had moved to Vologda in
April. reported a strike among Russian railroad workers over
the shipments Of food for Finland. At that time. there was an
American railroad mission in eastern Russia. and the attaché's
final remark showed America's general attitude toward Red Fin-
land. After noting that the trains were allowed to pass
through Vologda despite the strike. he wrote.

“Had American railroad men been on duty this would have
been prevented.“2

126
Red and White Representatives in America

Both Red and White Finland named persons to represent
them in the united States. with the intention of gaining
foodstuffs if possible. and also diplomatic recognition. The
State Department never seriously entertained the notion of
dealing with Red Finland. By the same token. the U.S. govern-
ment dealt with domestic Socialists and radicals only on a
basis Of suspicion and surveillance. ending in the post-war
Palmer Raids. This outlook was certainly carried into inter-
national affairs. and Red Finland was a prime target. The red-
dyed reputation of Finnish-Americans. whether deserved or not
in individual cases. has earlier been detailed. It happened
that Red Finland chose for their representative in America a
man already resident there. a man who had a redder reputation
than perhaps any of his countrymen. His name was Santeri
Nuorteva.

Santeri Nuorteva was working as an editor of the Social-
ist newspaper Raivaaja when called upon to act as envoy for
the People's Republic of Finland. as he called it. He was a
former member of the Finnish Diet. forced to flee the country
in 1911 because he criticized the imperial government. or
because he absconded with party funds. depending upon who
tells his story.29 Nuorteva edited several Finnish-American
Socialist newspapers. was a prominent speaker for the party.
and also found time to practice law. He attracted the atten-
tion Of American Military Intelligence officers after the U.S.
entered the World war. His fellow Finnish-Americans of the

Lincoln Loyalty League. who tried to combat the Red Finnish

127
reputation in America. also informed the government about
certain ”dangerous Finns". like Nuorteva.30 When he wrote to
request an interview with Secretary of State Lansing. an aide
replied in the most general of terms. and of course no inter-
view was granted. Nuorteva had already applied to the Food
Administration and met with no objection to the purchase and
shipment of food supplies. ”but that such an arrangement
required the sanction of the State Department.” No sanction
was given.

The representatives of White Finland got a better recep-
tion at the State Department. The men chosen were Julio N.
Reuter. previously in America as a publicist for Finland in
1915. and Kaarlo Ignatius. who was already in America trying
to obtain food. Lansing received them in late February of 1918.
though careful to explain that he spoke unofficially and per-
sonally. He led Reuter to believe that the U.S. gave de facto
recognition to the White government. though official action
was not to be expected until the ”disorder and confusion” in
Finland was brought to an end.31 Lansing then tried very
hard to get food for White Finland. even after the Finno-
German treaty of March 7.

The treaty and subsequent German intervention in April
made Reuter in particular look like a liar or a fool. He had
gone to the New York Times before meeting with Lansing. in
order to publicize the cause of White Finland. Among other
things he said.

”There is no pro-German party and no pro-Swedish party
in Finland...” ”Finland would not welcome the intrusion of

128

any foreign army to help her...” ”We cannot help the coming
of volunteers. but certainly a German army landed in Finland
would not be welcomed.'32

All of those assertions. except possibly the one about a
pro-Swedish party. were contrary to what Svinhufvud and his
closest associates had in mind for Finland. On March 9. the
Times carried this headline:

”GERMAN PRINCE A8 FINLAND'S KING'33

That was indeed what Svinhufvud had in mind. though the
headline was not yet an accomplished fact. But everyone was
not made privy to Svinhufvud's thoughts. Reuter was pro-Ally.
He probably had voiced his own sentiments quite sincerely. and
furthermore. he had voiced Mannerheim's sentiments. too. Man-
nerheim asked only arms and munitions from outsiders. German
aid being presented to him as a fait accompli on the part of
the Svinhufvud government.3u Again. Mannerheim was a pro-
Ally. and so also was Rudolph Holsti. White Finland's repre-
sentative in England. When a crisis developed between Finland
and Britain during the summer of 1918. Rolsti received word
of the affair through the British Foreign Office! The Svin-
hufvud government kept him deliberately uninformed whenever
his pro-Ally or Republican sentiments might get in the way.35
One may conclude that the Reuters and the Holstis were used
in a charade designed to keep up the illusion of Finnish
neutrality. especially useful in the pursuit of foodstuffs
and recognition. while Svinhufvud and his government pursued
what was really a pro-German policy. (One must add that Holsti
and Reuter were very capable individuals.)

Red Finland did not derive any real benefit in America

129
from the White connection with the Germans. other than more
favorable press notices. The New York Times was full of
atrocity stories about the Reds early in the Civil War. When
the Germans arrived. there was a change in the Times' reports.
Now the atrocities were committed by German-led White Guards.
The Reds took on a more human aspect. Tokoi was asked. ”Would
Finland Join the Russian Federation of Soviets?"

"Certainly not." he replied. ”We belong to a diffe ent
civilization. They are Communists. we are Socialists."3

His questioner concluded that Tokoi and his companions
were definitely pro-Ally. Furthermore. their plan was to form
a republic something like Switzerland. he said. In this
assumption. the questioner came close to the truth.

But the truth that a victorious Red Finland would not go
Bolshevik (at least not immediately) did not stir the U.S.
government. Nuorteva's writing in the newspapers against the
”pro-German” Whites was very effective. Another food commis-
sioner from the White government. a Mr. Valkeapaa. attributed
his failure to get the money Finland had sent to the U.S. in
1917 to Nuorteva's influence. But Nuorteva could not get the
use of the money himself. for Red Finland. The United States
washed its hands of both parties to the Civil War.

As the food shortage was at the root of the November
general strike. so it continued to be a problem that con-
tributed to the outbreak of the Civil War. America and its
Allies could probably have prevented both of these eruptions

with the timely delivery of foodstuffs. but they were not

130
responsible for causing the disturbances. since Finland did
have some food reserves that were not known to the public and
therefore were not tapped before the Civil War. The Allies.
following America's lead. did try to use food to combat Ger-
man influence in Finland. Their plans matured too late to
prevent the fighting. however. which allowed the ties between
Germany and the Svinhufvud government to become too strong to
be broken by a promise of food. This because White Finland had
greater need for munitions and men than for food. and those
were needs that Germany was willing and able to supply. The
U.S. government was not at all willing to support Red Finland.
and neither were any of the other Allies willing to do so
during the Civil War. Therefore. with the defeat of the Reds.
America and the Allies had very little influence in Finland.
and Finland still had very little food.

131
Footnotes to Chapter VIII

1 - D.G. Kirby (ed.). Finland and Russia 1808-1920
(New York: The MacMillan Press. Ltd.. 19757. p. 221.

2 — Oskari Tokoi. SISU - “Even Through A Stone Wall".
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957). p. 155.

3 - Mortimer A. Waldo Papers (Michigan State University
Archives. East Lansing. Mi.. Collection No. #2. Box No. 2).
letter written by Ernst Krogius on 23 October 1918. p. h.

h - Ibid.. consular report written to Ira Nelson Morris
by Mortimer A. Waldo. p. b.

5 - Egreign Relations of the United States - 1918
(“Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States". Washington. D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office. 1932). Russia. Vol. II. p.p. 786-787.

6 " Ibid., p. 8010

7 - Ira Nelson Morris. From An American Legation
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1923). p. 180.

8 - Samuel Eliot Morison. Inquiry Document No. #21.
”Memorandum on Finland” (National Archives. Washington. D.C.).
written in 1918. p. 1230

9 - Ibid.. p. 122.

10 " TOkOi. Op. Cite. pope 161-1630

11 - Morison. op. cit.. p. 116.

12 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 750.

13 - New York Times. 18 February 1918.

in - Anthony F. Upton. The Finnish Revolution 1 1 -1 18
(Minneapolis. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 1980’.

p. 3070
15 - Ibid., p. 3070

16 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 778.

17 - Mortimer A. Waldo. op. cit.. letter written by
Ernst Krogius on 23 October 1918. p.14.

18 - Lt. Com. John Gade. Inquiry Document No. 169
”Corrections in Memoranda on Finland' (National Archives.
Washington. D.C.). written in 1919: p. 1.

132
Footnotes to Chapter VIII. cont.

19 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 796.

20 - New York Times. 22 February 1918.

21 - Gaston Gaillard. L'Allemagne et Le Baltikum.
(Paris: Librairie Chapelot. 1919). p. 183.

22 - Morison. op. cit.. p. 107a.

23 - Juhani Paasivirta. The Victors in World War I and
Finland (Helsinki. Finland: The Finnish Historical Society.
1965). p. 62.

2h - Mortimer A. Waldo. op. cit.. consular report
written to Ira Nelson Morris. p. 2.

25 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1933).
Supplement 2. p. 581.

26 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. VOIQ II. p. 7790

27 - TOkOi. Op. Cite. p0 1580

28 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. V01. III. pope 231-2320

29 - Auvo Kostiainen. "Turbulent Times: The Last Years
of Santeri Nuorteva in America. 1918-1920”. Finnish Americana.
Vol. III (New Brighton. Minn.. 1980). p. 42.

3O - Kostiainen. op. cit.. p. #6.

3i - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p.p. 755-756.

32 - New York Times. 22 February 1918.
33 - New York Times. 9 March 1918.

3h - C.G. Mannerheim. Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. Inc.. 195 . p. 1

35 - Paasivirta. op. cit.. p, #7.
36 - W. 20 April 1918.

CHAPTER IX

The end of the Civil war found Finland in the German
sphere of influence. though officially neutral in regard to
the World War. What appeared to be German-Finnish threats
against the Murmansk Railroad. together with the search for a
German prince to take a new Finnish crown. gave America and
the Allies cause to believe that Finland did not wish to
maintain real neutrality. The uncertain state of Russian
affairs gave yet another reason for Allied reluctance to deal
with Finland as an independent state. or to address Finnish
needs for foodstuffs. Nevertheless. the idea of using American
food to sway Finnish policy remained current. The U.S. govern-
ment did not actually send food until after the Armistice was
declared. and the German troops had left Finland. Then it was
Hoover. in charge of the Allied food relief program. who moved

America and the Allies to recognize Finnish nationhood. too.

From the End of the Civil War to the Armistice

Two days before the White army's victory parade on May
16. Consul Haynes advised the Secretary of State to offer
food and conditional recognition to Finland. President Wilson
was then considering an address from the White Finnish envoys
to the united States. delivered in February when they visited

Lansing. but only handed to the President a few days earlier.
133

13b
The President's reply was short:

”My dear Mr. Secretary: Do you not think that the proper
reply to this is that we shall be willing to recognize the
republic of Finland only when she shows that she is not con-
trolled by Germany. as she now seems to be?'1

An Assistant Secretary noted further.

”I gave the President's reply orally to Dr. Ignatius
when he called upon me recently. The Secretary did not seem
to think that it was necessary to make a formal reply to the
memorial signed by the representatives of Finland.“

There. in a nutshell. is the history of American rela-
tions with Finland from the end of the Civil War to the procla-
mation of the Armistice. The Americans on the spot. Consul
Haynes and Vice-Consul Waldo. tried hard to convince their
government that Finland could be influenced through recogni-
tion and food. being desperately in need of the latter. Ger-
many was giving some foodstuffs. they said. but was getting
more in return in the form of butter. metals. and horses.
Lansing was no longer to be convinced.

And notwithstanding the talk of German control. the most
important reason for nonrecognition of Finland was the desire
to avoid. as yet. countenancing the disintegration of Russia.
That was the word to Morison from Basil Miles. the State De-
partment's Russian affairs expert. His words confirmed the
President's concern for Russia. as expressed in a war aims
speech given by Wilson on January 8.

Finland discounted the idea of German control anyway.
still professing neutral status. In reality. Mannerheim

resigned as Commander-1n-Chief and went abroad when he learned

that the German forces were to stay in Finland and take over

135
the organization and training of the Finnish army. The Svin-

hufvud government was glad to have the Germans. as further
proof against any resurgence of revolutionary activity.

That government convened a rump Diet minus 82 Socialists
and tried to push through a new. monarchical constitution.
This was not a fresh idea. as the government still operated
on the basis of the Constitution of 1772 which supported a
monarchy. but there had been a republican constitution on the
table ever since the declaration of independence. A dispute
arose as to whether or not independent Finland had been recog-
nized as a republic by those nations which had opened rela-
tions. The monarchists declared that "adherence to last Decem-
ber's decision is especially unwise. since the obstacles
which then prevented a free choice no longer exist."3 That is.
there was no longer a large Socialist opposition. and no
difficulty was expected from Russia. As the Socialists had
naively expected to control a Finnish constituent assembly.
so now the Svinhufvud government expected that non-Socialist
Finlanders would welcome a monarchy.

There was talk of German promises and pressures con-
cerning a monarchy in Finland. Supposedly. if Finland accepted
a German prince. Germany would aid and support the conquest
of Russian Karelia. a fond dream of Finnish nationalists.

This ”promise” was more wishful thinking than reality. On the
other hand. there was the rumored threat that Germany would
leave Finland to a possible new revolution if a monarchy was
not established. Fear of another outbreak was very real. and

though German troops would become burdensome as any foreigners

136

might become. a German withdrawal would be cause for appre-
hension (especially among the pro-Germans in the governmentl).

True or not. the talk did not convince everyone. The Swe-
dish Party and the Old Finns mostly favored a monarchy. but
the Agrarians were against it. the Young Finns split. the
Socialists not heard from. Pending resolution of the form of
government. Svinhufvud was named regent and given all of the
Czar's former prerogatives. Even so. it proved impossible to
bring the new constitution through the Diet. so the bill was
withdrawn and the session of the Diet suspended. The mon-
archists fell back upon the old reliable version of 1772. one
article of which declared that the Diet could elect a king by
simple majority. By a margin of 1b. with 82 Socialist seats
vacant (although bourgeois vacancies had been filled). the
Diet accepted a monarchy. That was too close for Kaiser Wil-
helm. who removed his son Oscar from consideration for the
position. though of course a German was preferred. A German
newspaper also made the comment that a German prince enthroned
by a Finnish minority would only become a new source of diffi-
culty for German policy. The vote was taken in August. so one
would assume that difficulties were indeed mounting everywhere
for Germany. The Finnish monarchists seemed oblivious to what
was going on in the outside world. as they went on about
their search for a suitable German candidate.

Meanwhile. the Allies feared a German-Finnish thrust
toward the Murmansk Railroad and the Arctic Ocean. The Fin-
ish White Guards obliged with occasional sorties into Karelia

to 'protect the citizens from Bolshevik brigands'. The White

137
Finns also engaged British marines at Petsamo on the Arctic.
a possible site for a submarine base. This was the incident
revealed to Holsti by the British Foreign Office. The ensuing
crisis almost brought Finland openly into the war. Finno-
British relations were further strained by the organization
of the Finnish Legion. a band of Red Finn refugees under
British officers. used to protect the Murmansk Railroad.
Tokoi was with them. and rumors flew of a British offer to
support a Red Finnish government-in-exile.

That did not prevent the British from testing the waters
with an offer of food and recognition of the Svinhufvud gov-
ernment. if Finland would enforce real neutrality. Mention
was made in June of 11.000 tons of American grain to be deliv-
ered after the Germans withdrew. Lansing appeared to know
nothing whatever about the deal. and advised the charge in
London to inform the British ”that this Government has not
changed its views that no shipments of foodstuffs should be
made available for distribution in Finland for the present.*“

Lansing then delivered what was essentially his last word
on the subject until the Armistice arrived. Because Finland
seemed committed to co-operation with Germany and intent upon
expansion into Russian territory. there would be no foodstuffs
for Finland. Lansing took the moral high ground - compared to
the British - and declared that sending food on conditions
“would seem to imply that this Government is interested in
Finland only insofar as it will serve as a pawn in the game
of war against the Central Powers."5 Behind the moral stance

was the desire to keep Finland from getting an exaggerated

138

sense of its own importance as a factor in world affairs.

Nothing was said about sending food without conditions
in order to combat hunger. as the Scandinavian nations asked.
upon a Finnish suggestion. Neither was anything said about a
German allegation that Finland was as neutral as Norway.
which was sometimes referred to as an ”anti-German neutral”.6
Norway received whatever food ”can be spared" from America in
exchange for an agreement on trade and shipping that turned

it into a virtual non-neutral.7

Efforts to Obtain U.S. Support for Finland

Vice-Consul Waldo reported talking with a Finnish-
American in the White army who said that the soldiers favored
a republic for Finland. Waldo observed that many of the more
educated people thought a monarchy was the best way to avoid
renewed revolutionary activity. though a young politician told
him that 'there was still a possibility for the republican
form and that it needed only some little impetus from outside
to strengthen this movement.'8 Hence thewcontinuing efforts
of Haynes and Waldo to get some sign of support for Finland
from America and the Allies.

Consul Haynes sent a lengthy report to the State Depart-
ment in which he claimed that Finland could not be other than
neutral in its weak and hungry condition. that 60% to 65% of
the people were pro-Entente but unable to speak out because
of the government's pro-German orientation. Haynes believed.
too. that America misunderstood Finland. He noted that Ambas-

sadors Morris and Francis were major sources of information

139
for America. and theorized that they were overtaxed with
other responsibilities. making their knowledge of Finland
suspect. But at the top of his list of six reasons for Amer-
ica's misunderstanding of Finland were the Finnish immigrants.
Haynes may have had a point.

Santeri Nuorteva and other Finnish-American radicals
continued to attract Military Intelligence spies and citizen
informers. Nuorteva's Finnish Information Bureau was backed by
the Finnish Socialist Federation (of the American Socialist
Party) during the Civil War. and Russian funds gradually
gained more importance after the Finnish war. The obvious
inference was that a connection existed between Finnish-
American leftists and the Bolsheviks. which would not endear
those Finnish immigrants to the U.S. government. At one point.
Ambassador Francis had been talking with exiled Finnish Reds
in Russia. and became enthused about the idea of a Finnish-
American Legion to be sent over against the Germans. He
wished to make an appeal to the immigrants in American news-
papers. The plan was improbable anyway. but Lansing's answer
showed what he thought of Nuorteva and the Bolsheviks:

"Department questions advisability of co-operating with
or encouraging in any way members or advocates of former Fin-
nish Red labor government. Santeri Nuorteva. who has informed
the Department that he represents the Finnish Red labor party
officially in this country. has announced that aims of hi
party are the same as the Soviet government of Russia...‘

Nuorteva's announcement did not speak for all Finnish or
Finnish-American leftists. because they were badly fragmented.
He was the most visible of them in America. though. so the

State Department chose to take him as a representative figure.

1&0

This did not help Haynes. who hoped to avoid a conclusion on
the part of the U.S. government that aid to Finland would be
wasted because the anti-German faction must be thoroughly
Bolshevik. as leftist Finnish-Americans appeared to be.

Finnish-American conservatives did not give the consul
much help in his campaign for Finland. either. though not for
lack of trying on their part. They organized the Finland Con-
stitutional League as a sort of lobby for the homeland with
the American government. The League's goals for U.S. action
were (1) send food to Finland: (2) recognize “the Finnish
Republic”: (3) request permission of Finland to send Allied
troops to Murmansk and environs: (h) assist Finland econom-
ically: (5) express sympathy for Russia with the intent to aid
all factions opposed to Germany. and declare “the availability
of a friendly and independent Finland to this end."10

Obviously. the League was ill-informed about Finland.
not to mention Russia and the State Department. Leaguers
wanted not only to get aid and support for Finland. but also
to prove that Finnish-American patriots did exist. despite the
pervasive radical reputation and the German presence in Fin-
land. The League thus tried to present both Finland and Fin-
nish-Americans in the best possible light. The result was
utter disbelief that anyone in Finland could be pro-German.
unless due to ”mistakes made by the Allies. and particularly
by the United States“.11 They brought up once again the
requisitioned food. and they criticized subordination of Fin—
land's needs to a hesitating and unclear Russian policy. They

did help to win recognition of Finnish-American loyalists.

1&1
but they were not likely to make themselves popular. There
was some truth to what the League said. but it was said with
the same ignorance of the current situation that brought
forth the following declaration:

"As for a German princeling. we here shall believe in
such a monstrosity when we see it. not before. What we know
is that there have been all sorts of ridiculous stories of
the kind published at intervals for months past. emanating
nearly all of them from Swedish Socialist misinformation

sources and as often contradicted by subsequent statements
or the cold facts.'12

Food and the Recognition of Finnish Nationhood

The cold fact was that on 9 October 1918. Prince
Frederick Carl of Hesse was elected by the rump Diet to the
throne of Finland. The Prince felt it prudent to hold off a
response to the invitation. however. considering that in some
Finnish quarters expressions of opinion were not very encour-
aging. and that the war was not going well for Germany.

During the month of October. Vice-Consul Waldo was jour-
neying through Finland in order to publicize the Allied cause.
after which he wrote up a report. He seems to have spoken
mostly with people who would have supported the White govern-
ment. Generally. they were friendly to him. and remembered
past instances of American generosity while wondering why it
did not still obtain. He found that popular opinion blamed
British interference for America's failure to send food. This
was due to British actions of the previous summer. supporting
the Reds and yet dangling American food in front of the Whites.
The Finns could understand that people might have political

differences. but did not see why such differences should

1&2
prevent them from getting food. Waldo added.

"This blame having been placed on Great Britain. the
standing of America in the mind of the Finn remains unsettled.
The strong feeling of friendliness that has existed so long
has been shaken a little. The general tone places nothing to
our credit and nothing to our discredit.'13

Waldo did not receive uniformly favorable comments
throughout his trip. but the general idea was that food would
revive the former sympathy for America. The relationship with
Germany was treated as one of expedience in a time of extremi-
ty. and Waldo felt that most Finns were pro-Finland rather
than pro or anti anyone else (except maybe Russia).

The U.S. government was not yet ready to extend its
sympathy in October. what with the election of a German prince
to a Finnish throne. A little earlier. in response to another
of Haynes' designs to get food for Finland. the Allies reas-
sured themselves that revictualling could only be undertaken
if Finland broke with Germany. They thought Finland needed to
”change its state of mind“. and develop a conviction of Ger-
many's inevitable defeat. 'Firmness on the part of the Allies
may go far toward establishing that needed conviction.‘1u
Lansing did not contradict those words. which belied his
stance on the ”high ground”. above the use of food in diplo-
macy.

Finnish public opinion did more openly question the
direction of their government's foreign policy in the fall of
1918. but that government remained blindly pro-German until
the Armistice and the probable refusal of Prince Frederick
Carl necessitated a change in Finnish politics. Svinhufvud

prepared to leave the regency. and the Senate and the Diet

1&3
decided on November 15 to name Mannerheim in his stead.
though the actual change would not occur for a little while
yet. Mannerheim was even then travelling in Britain and France.
seeking to open up better relations with the Allies. Haynes
reported.

”They say the new government will demand immediately
withdrawal of German forces from Finland. order general elec-
tions. and request American food and recognition upon the
basis of self--determination..."1

In this manner. Finland would fulfill the basic condi-
tions for recognition which Britain had set down some months
previously. and which the United States had supported.

Haynes went on to express fear of a Bolshevik movement
into Finland. and advised that Allied military forces be held
at the ready in case of need. But he added.

”It will be impossible for the new or any other govern-
ment to succeed without food."16

For that very reason. the Allies were then engaged in
creating a relief organization: or rather. in turning the
job over to Herbert Hoover. He said later.

”Cu; major purpose was to save hundreds of millions of
lives."1

He said at the time.

"It is not necessary for me to mention how fundamental
it appears to me that this (relief) is. if we are tg preserve
these countries from Bolshevism and rank anarchy."1

Hoover said that “dreadful reports" of Finland's diffi-
culties had come to him even before he left for Europe in
November. though on November 22 he had written in his Memoran-

dum on Reconstruction only that “Finland requires some assis-

tance".19 Once in Europe. Hoover received Rudolph Holsti and

inn

a Finnish delegation. who gave out the too-familiar descrip-
tion of a people reduced to mixing the bark of trees with
what little flour they had. The U.S. had already begun prepa-
rations to send 5.000 tons of foodstuffs if shipping could be
found. Hoover agreed to replace for the Scandinavian countries
10.000 tons of provisions which they had offered to Finland on
the condition of later reprovisioning from America. He could
have related also what his government had proclaimed on Novem-
ber 16:

”...however small any initial shipment of food supplies
to Finland may be. we should be prepared to follow it with a
steady flow of materials. which will demonstrate that what we
do to feed the Finnish Bopulation is not a mere matter of
temporary expediency."2
And.

"Our view is that the withdrawal of the German troops
removes the last obstacle to organizing definite measures to
feed the Finnish population regardless of party..."21

All the obstacles were not yet removed. The Finlanders
surprised Hoover by telling him that they would pay for the
food they received. But they could not use the money long
held in the United States. because the banks could not re-
lease it to a country whose government had not received Amer-
ican recognition. Hoover cited other difficulties. as well.
that could be overcome through recognition. Food did get to
Finland. as to other countries: the “Hoover men” arrived to
help establish relief organizations. and people began to be
'Hooverized' - to benefit from food aid.22 But the unre-

solved credit problem briefly endangered the flow of food in

March of 1919. only a month after the relief program started

1&5
to yield regular results. The problem was not insurmountable.
considering the credit status of some other countries then
receiving relief. but it was a problem that was curable
through recognition. Besides. there were other factors that
made recognition from the Allies imperative for Finland.

Britain. France. Italy. and the United States were the
arbiters of European affairs at the Paris Peace Conference in
1919. Three of those nations had never recognized Finland.
and France had broken relations after the election of Prince
Frederick Carl. The Allied representatives often received the
notes or visits of White Russians who wished to make certain
that their interests were not forgotten. including their inter-
est in Finland. This consideration slowed action on the recog-
nition of Finland. which is precisely what the Finlanders
feared. They did not want the question left for the end of
the Peace Conference. when Russian influence might be strong
enough to thwart their bid for independence. After all. no one
could tell yet how the Russian situation might resolve itself.
or what the Allies might do about it.

Finland had a Diet election in March of 1919. with the
Socialists again eligible. and the new government took a turn
toward republicanism. A presidential election would follow in
the summer. when the office of the regency would be dropped.
Thus Finland “self-determined“ in a direction that could
hardly be objectionable to the Allies. But Finland was a
small country on the periphery of Europe. and the Allies had
many important questions to deal with. It was Holsti who

visited Hoover once again to ask for help in this new

1H6
extremity.

Hoover was as frustrated as anyone over the difficul-
ties caused for Finnish relief by the lack of recognition.
He wrote.

“My urgent representations as to the necessity of the
recognition of their independence to the Council of Foreign
Ministers over months got nowhere."23

To Hoover. the status of the Finnish question before the
Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris was “such nonsense“ that
he urged President Wilson to raise it before the “Big Four“.
“and let me do the talking.“ he added. Wilson asked for “the
usual memorandum“.

In his memorandum. Hoover observed that Finland had ful-
filled the requirement of a general election and had created
a liberal ministry. He appealed to sentiment for Finland's
“struggle over a century to gain independence“. as he put it.
and cited the problems arising through lack of recognition.
Hoover's final remarks came from the heart:

“If ever there was a case for helping a people who are
making a sturdy fight to get on a basis of liberal democracy.
and are asking no charity of the world whatever. this is the
case. I am convinced from our reports (from the food relief
organization) that unless Finland is recognized within a very
short time that the present government cannot survive the
difficulties with which it is faced...*24

Hoover loved a country that tried to be self-supporting.
and he hated the threat of Bolshevism. which he inferred in
his note.

He sent his memorandum to the President on April 26.
Hoover did not need to appear before the Big Four. as Wilson

proposed recognition. The proposal caused some discussion.

but the memorandum was soon sent to the Council of Foreign

1&7
Ministers “with directions to act at once“. The Council met
on May 3. and agreed to act favorably. Formal recognitions
were soon extended. that of the United States on May 9.

By this time. the most important result for Finland was
less in the sphere of material aid than in the political
sphere. Moderate republicans had their position strengthened
against both conservative monarchists and radical Socialists
or Communists. The nation was encouraged to take more of a
middle road in dealing with the problems of reconstruction.
The government of the new republic had sought for respect both
internally and externally. With that respect. they hoped for
greater stability inside Finland. and for leverage against

any Russians who might try to extend their rule over Finland.

In a letter of May 19 from Holsti. then Minister of
Foreign Affairs for Finland. Herbert Hoover was assured “of
the great gratitude of the Finnish people for your invaluable
assistance“ both in terms of food relief and in terms of guar-
anteeing to Finland “her place among the sovereign states of
the world..."25

In another letter to Hoover. gratitude was expressed and
extended more generally. The last line said.

“Benedictions were asked for t e great and noble Ameri-
can people living beyond the sea.“2

This time it was not a Russian Count who spoke for the
people of his Empire. but a committee of Finnish citizens who

were speaking for themselves.

1&8

Footnotes to Chapter IX

1 - Foreign Relations of the‘United States - 1918
(“Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States“. Washington. D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office. 1932). Russia. Vol. II. p. 788.

2 - Ibid.. P. 7880

3 ' Ibid., p. 7970

h - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1933).
supplement 2' pop. 581-5820

5 - Ibid.. p. 582.

6 - The American-Scandinavian Review. May-June (New York:
American-Scandinavian Foundation. 1918). p. 161.

7 ’ Ibid.. p. 2910

8 - Mortimer A. Waldo Papers (Michigan State University
Archives. East Lansing. Mi.. Collection No. #2. Box No. 2).
consular report written to Ira Nelson Morris by Mortimer A.
Waldo. p. 80

9 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 810.

10 - Herman Montagu Donner. “A Defense of the League“.
The Finland Sentinel. Volume I. number 3. September (New York:
ghe Finland Constitutional League of America. 1918). P.p. 79-
O.
11 - Ibid.. p. 800
12 - Ibid.. p. 81.

13 - Mortimer A. Waldo. op. cit.. report of Waldo's trip
through Finland in October. 1918. p. 20.

14 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1933).
Supplement 2. p. 586.

15 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1932).
Russia. Vol. II. p. 812.

16 - Ibid.. p. 812.

17 - Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz. Organiza-
tion of American Relief in Europe 1918:1919 (Stanford Univer-
sity. California: Stanford University Press. 19h3). p. 1#.

18 - Ibid.. p. 360

1&9
Footnotes to Chapter IX. cont.
19 - Ibid.. p. 52.

20 - Foreign Relations - 1918. op. cit.. (1933).
Supplement 2. p. 588.

21 - Ibid.. p. 588.

22 - Akseli Rauenheimo. Finland Review. Volume I.
number &. December (New York: Consulate General of Finland.
1919). p. 33.

23 - Herbert Hoover. Memoirs of Herbert Hoover - Years
of Adventure 187&-1920 (New York: The MacMillan Company. 1951).
p0 3650

2a - Ibid.. p. 365.

 

25 - Bane and Lutz. op. cit.. p. 717.

26 " Hoover, Op. Cite. p0 3670

CONCLUSION

The story of relations between Finland and the United
States shows food to be a basis or foundation upon which
other relationships were built. A historically precarious
food supply. which became a definite food deficit in the 19th
century. forced Finland to seek outside sources for provi-
sions. The United States proved able to supply Finland and
many other countries through occasional food relief as well
as in normal trade. These activities strengthened the general
image of America as a land of plenty. and in Finland. Ameri-
cans were thought to be sympathetic and generous. These
images encouraged Finnish immigration. though the experiences
of the immigrants did not always confirm the images. Even so.
natives of Finland would continue to seek support in the
United States for various causes. because they expected to
gain a hearing. The U.S. continued to be a haven for exiles.
too. even if their beliefs were not always held in esteem by
Americans. The U.S. was still viewed in Finland as 'the
friend in time of need' which had always been 'the friend
indeed'.

The circumstances of the World War. and of internal and
external affairs in both Finland and the United States at
that time. brought difficulties in Finnish-American relations.
The U.S. employed or was party to the employ of 'grain

150

151
diplomacy' in its dealings with Finland on more than one occa-
sion during the years 1917-1919. It seems not to have been a
consistent policy. but rather an expedient.

America with its Russian ally may have been withholding
grain from Finland in the summer of 1917. though it is not
certain if it was a case of withholding or of simply not
having grain to give at that time. Finland only knew that it
was not receiving foodstuffs when they were desperately
needed. and felt that Russia in particular was using food as
a weapon. while the U.S. did nothing to help Russo-Finnish
relations. In response. Finland failed to support Russian
military forces financially. leading to disaffection which
further endangered the Provisional Government during the 'July
Days'. Finland's Socialist-dominated government sought separa-
tion from Russia. bringing disruption of the coalition with
the other Finnish political parties. Tokoi. Nuorteva. and the
Socialists have seen this as a definite step toward civil war.
and at the least it did nothing to bring Socialists and bour-
geoisie together. Therefore. the consequences of a lack of
imported grain were crucial for Finland. at a time when the
food shortage sparked strikes and rioting. Since Finland had
been able to contract for American grain in May. one is

tempted to blame Russia and the U.S. both for a short-sighted
policy that could have been reversed. but again. we do not
know what was behind the non-issuance of American export
licenses. The U.S. apparently felt that Russia should be able
to meet Finnish demands at least by Augustor September. in

accordance with the Inter-Allied Supply Committee's decision.

152

The Russian grain was not. however. forthcoming. Tokoi
spoke of finding grain that had been earmarked for Finland by
the Provisional Government. Though he seems to have found it
only after the Civil War had begun. the grain must have been
collected before the Provisional Government fell. In addition.
Finland did contract again for American wheat in September.
1917. which was quickly gathered - but not released. This is
the first clear evidence of withholding American grain. in
conjunction with the Provisional Government. in an attempt to
influence Finland. The attempt succeeded. but the Provisional
Government fell. so it derived no benefit.

Finland was assured of not receiving the Socialist Law
on Authority while the Provisional Government lasted. because
of Kerensky's threat to prevent food deliveries if it passed.
Therefore. the Socialists had no political maneuverability in
the Diet elected in October with regard to their most cher-
ished object. the Law on Authority. until after the Bolshevik
Revolution. By then. it was fast becoming impossible to con-
sider Socialist projects in the normal political process. Rus-
sian grain diplomacy. supported by the U.S.. thus helped to
limit the operation of the political process in Finland. con-
tributing to the general strike of November. 1917.

The requisitioning of the American grain in two stages -
at the end of October and at the end of November - cannot be
seen as an attempt to pressure Finland. America's allies had
developed a serious shortage of their own. and it was this
that Hoover tried to meet. When there was no longer a Provi-

sional Government to support. Finland took a definite back

153

seat to the many other pressing demands that contributed to a
late-season grain crisis among the Allies. The requisitioning
caused hard feelings in Finland. and opened an effectual door
to German propaganda. Insofar as the food shortage was not
alleviated. there is some reason for seeing a contributory
cause of the Civil War in America's act. but it was not the
result of a conscious policy aimed at Finland. and Finnish
farmers were hoarding grain. anyway.

The State Department did decide in December of 1917 to
initiate grain diplomacy with Finland. This was a response to
allegations of rising German influence. Secretary of State
Lansing overcame Hoover's reluctance and Britain's qualms and
and would have delivered food to Finland had not the Civil
War upset his plans. He did not cease his efforts even then.
or after the Finno-German Treaty of March 1918. though he did
limit his scope to White Finland. In this Lansing demonstrated
the U.S. government's extreme aversion to left-wing political
movements. influenced in the case of Finland by leftist Fin-
nish immigrants in America. Not until Allied citizens were
insulted. and German troops about to land. did Lansing stop
trying to supply White Finland. If he seems blind to the
intentions of men like Svinhufvud. one must remember that
Lansing dealt with pro-Ally Finnish envoys who were not kept
informed on Finnish affairs. and with a Consul and a Vice-
Consul at Helsinki who consistently maintained that American
food would affect Finnish opinion. And perhaps it would have

done so. as it had in the past. but we cannot know for certain.

15&

In June of 1918. Lansing claimed that the U.S. would not
indulge in grain diplomacy with Finland. out of regard for
the Finns. Statements of August and September show that the
Allies thought food was being withheld until Finland had a
“change of mind“. however. and Lansing did not then discour-
age the idea. Aid was not promised immediately after the
Armistice. either. but only when Svinhufvud made ready to
leave the regency and the government became less objectionable
to the Allies. That this change was accomplished quietly and
easily was due in part to a growing conviction in Finnish
public opinion that a change was necessary in order to avoid
starvation. This was a success for an undeclared policy of
grain diplomacy. though certainly the defeat of Germany had
the biggest effect.

Thereafter. American food was used not to influence Fin-
nish foreign policy. but to help Finland regulate its inter-
nal affairs. If anything. Holsti managed to use the Allied
food relief program to influence the policy of the Allies
toward Finland. a bit of grain diplomacy in reverse! Owing to
Holsti's contacts with Hoover through the relief program. Fin-
land received food and also recognition as an independent
state. Food. therefore. besides being the basis of Finnish-
American relations and an important factor in Finnish affairs
internally and externally. was directly involved in the emer-

gence of the independent state of Finland.

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