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THE FUNCTIONALIST AND HISTORICAL
MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVES ON
SOCIAL EGALITARIANISM:

A COMPARISON

by

Robert Glenn Parr

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1981

ABSTRACT

THE FUNCTIONALIST AND HISTORICAL
MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVES ON
SOCIAL EGALITARIANISM:

A COMPARISON

by

Robert Glenn Parr

Inequality has been an obvious fact of history,
recognized by both the functionalist and the historical
materialist. But a comparison of these two perspectives indi-
cates a completely different approach to the fact of equality.
However, it does not follow from that recognition that there
is any agreement on the meaning and significance of equality
in human society. Therefore, a comparison of how both func-
tionalists and historical materialists interpret this perva-
sive phenomenon is needed.

A comparison of these social interpretations is likely
to emphasize similarities and differences in the observation of
facts, and in the theoretical approach to explaining those facts.
But a phenomenon such as equality is more than a matter of fact
and theory. It becomes a value for some, often a battle cry

of social movements.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY

CHAPTER II. THE RESPONSE TO INEQUALITY

CHAPTER III. THE RESPONSE OF SOCIOLOGISTS
TO INEQUALITY. . . . .

Lenski

Mosca, Michels, and Pareto
Functionalism

Criticism of Functionalism
Marx

CHAPTER IV. PUNCTIONALISM AND MERITOCRACY
Statement of the Problem
CHAPTER V. A COMPARISON OF THE FUNCTIONALIST

AND HISTORICAL MATERIALIST
PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY

The Pact of Inequality
The Value of Inequality
The Theories of Functionalism and
Historical Materialism
CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1H

20

M0

50

72

77

INTRODUCTION

 

Social historians like Herbert Gans and Gerhard Lenski
conclude that humanity has known only inequality. Those who
have sought solutions traditionally have built upon religious
and philosophical bases, appealing to a world other than the
physical, empirical world of social science.

Punctionalists see inequality as inevitable for the
maintenance of society. Writers such as Gaetano Mosea and Ro-
bert Michels, and Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore defend the
inequalities which accompany a class structure in society.
Critics like Melvin Tumin are able to point out the inconsise
tencies and inequalities of this utilitarian approach.

Meritocracy is a companion of functionalist thinking
which visualizes the post-industrial society as one built upon
the ability and performance of its individual citizens. As the
"cream of the crop" is discovered through testing and then
groomed for the top leadershipgnsitions, a country will be able
to become influential in the world to come. Michael Young and
Daniel Bell deal with this viewpoint in their writings.

The egalitarian cause finds some of its key theoretical
support in Karl Marx. The attempt of Marx is to root equality
in history, and in society's economic relationships which serve
as a basis for values like equality. This then leads to a con-
trast of positivism and historical materialism as it regards
their outlook on human equality.

l

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY

 

Where and when human beings first began to reflect on
the conditions and causes of inequality is anybody's guess.
"The fact of inequality is almost surely as old as the human
species. No known society has ever had a complete egalitarian

"1

social system. Inequality appears to be a fact of life

which has characterized all of known history. This conclusion

has been drawn by many.2

"More equality may be morally desir-
able or politically necessary, but few human societies, and no
modern ones have so far achieved a significant degree of
equality."3 In this Quote, Herbert Gans does not indicate which
ancient societies have achieved a significant degree of equality.
He offers some examples on the individual level, but admits,

"The kinds of relationships I have just described differ from

being hypothetical....All of the relationships I have described

so far are micro-level, and among interpersonal and instrumental

 

lGerhard H. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company, 19667, p. 3.

2See Andrew Peck and Herbert Spiegelberg, The Concept
of Equality, ed. by William T. Blackstone (Minneapolis: Burgess
Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 136, 152. Also Ralf Dahrendorf,
Essays in the Theorygof Society (Stanford University Press, 1968),
p. 178.

 

 

 

 

3Herbert J. Gans, More Equality (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1968), p. 62.

 

3

relationships, equality is probably much rarer."1+ Gans then
recommends that research be carried on to see if an egalitarian
society that may have existed in the past can be rediscovered.
"Finally, although equality at the macro-level, or societal
equality, is hard to find in a modern society, it may be worth-
while studying preindustrial or so-called primitive societies,
either through reviewing the existing literature or through new
field work, to find out if any are egalitarian, and if so, why."
He continues by offering suggestions as to where one might find
desirable results.

Very simple and smaller societies without a division of

labor can perhaps be.egalitarian, particularly if they

have no regligion or one that does not need priestly

authorities; and if they live in an environment where

food and shelter are available in unlimited quantity

so that the need for private property does not need to

be diVided into haves and have-nots.
Finding a society with no division of labor, no religion with
priestly authorities, and unlimited quantities of food and
shelter is a tall order. But in addition to this it may not be
helpful, as Gans indicates. "I do not know whether studies of
such societies would be at all relevant to modern societies,
but it seems to be worth some research effort to find out."6
He realizes that the present condition is serious enough that

it warrants this kind of "needle in the haystack" research. And

he is not looking for perfection, or complete equality, either

 

”Ibid., p. 183.

51bid., p. 18a.

6Ibid., p. 185

u
in the past or for the future. "A completely egalitarian

society strikes me as so utopian as to be beyond policy-oriented
discussion."7 Societies that even remotely approach equality

are rare, if not impossible to find in the history of human-
kind. Gans is unable to come up with an societies that have
"achieved a significant degree of equality."

Gerhard Lenski traces the development of inequality
through different stages of historical development. He deals
with inequality as it applies to the distributive systems of
five stages of society: the hunting and gathering societies,
simple horticultural societies, advanced horticultural societies,
agrarian societies, and industrial societies.

Lenski makes the statement in the first chapter of his

book, Power and Privilege, that,

 

From primitive Stone Age communities to complex industrial
societies, inequality has always been present, though its
forms and degree may vary considerably. In the simplest
societies in the world today, the fact of equality is taken
for granted, as are other familiar features of existence.
Undoubtedly this was true in prehistoric societies. The
belief that conditions need not be as they are is charac-
teristic of socially and technologically more advanced
societies.

The author then begins an examination of these simple and
advanced societies. He deals with the five different societies

named above, noting the degree of equality in each.

 

71bid., p. 66.

8Lenski, op. cit., p. 3.

5
First is the hunting and gathering societies which

are the most primitive of all human societies with respect
to technology in general and mode of production in parti-
cular. Nevertheless, throughout most of human history

this was the only type of society known to man. It is

only in the last then thousand years that men have advanced
to the point where they have been able to control and
enlarge their food supply through the cultivation of plants
and domestication of animals.

At first glance these societies appear egalitarian to some,

but doubts begin to arise when examined more closely. "...Many
untrained observers have reported perfect equality in certain
of these societies...The more careful observations of trained

"10

observers force us to reject these extreme claims... Lenski

makes note of the radical difference between these societies and
industrial ones, and then continues to delineate some signs of
inequality.

In many of these societies, those who are helpless because
of old age, injury, or illness are denied the necessities
of life and in some instances are put to death by their
fellow tribesmen...A much more common practice has Eeen to
abandon such persons at the time of breaking camp.l

In such primitive societies, this can be the fate of any old
person. In that sense it would be an equal condition of life
for all who live long enough. And later,

Sex, like age, is a factor in the distribution process in
these societies, though its importance is variable. Women
invariably occupy a position inferior to men, though in
some societies the difference is not great. Women are
almost always excluded from the role of headman and usually
are ineligible to become shamans or participate in council

 

91bid., p. an.

10

 

Ibid., p. 103.

11Ibid., p. 10a.

6

meetings. Though, as a group, women enjoy less prestige

and influence than men, all women are not equal. Usually

the status of a married woman reflects the status of her

husband.12
In the primitive hunting and gathering societies the disabled
and women have occupied secondary, inferior roles. From this
point things get worse until the industrial age, according to
Lenski's analysis.

The second societies are simple horticultural ones.
Ten thousand years ago primitive men first learned how to

cultivate, or raise for themselves, certain of the plants
on which they depend for food. This important discovery

laid the foundation for the eventual emergence of the first
horticultural societies some centuries or millennia later...
As their name implies, horticultural societies built upon
the foundation of a gardening economy. In this respect
they differ...from the more primitive hunting and gathering

societies, in which the cultivation of plants is either
absent or of secondary importance....

But how do these societies compare with hunting and gathering

ones in terms of equality? "Under comparable conditions,

however, simple horticultural societies are normally larger, more

productive, and less egalitarian. This is reemphasized

later:

"...one of the striking differences which emerges from any
comparison of these two types of societies is that social

inequalities are more pronounced in the horticultural...0n
the average there is a definite difference between the two

 

12Ibid., p. 111.

l31bid., p. 117.

l”Ibid., p. 119.

7
categories, and magy simple horticultural societies
exhibit a degree of inequality unmatched in any hunting
and gathering soc1ety.l
Lenski is clear and certain that there was a definite rise in
inequality as society advanced from the hunting and gathering
to the simple horticultural stage.

Lenski's third stage of historical development is the
advanced horticultural society. Here we read, "Where and when
the first advanced horticultural societies appeared are ques-
tions which still remain unanswered. On the basis of available
evidence it appears that they had their beginnings in the Middle

"15

East more than 6,000 years ago. The difference between the

simple and the advanced agricultural societies is that the latter
are

the more advanced agricultural societies, which employ
more efficient techniques of cultivation and farm on a
larger scale. Perhaps the best single criterion for
differentiating between horticultural and agricultural

is that the latter employs the plow as the basic tool in
cultivation while the former depends on the more primitive
hoe or the still more primitive digging stick.17

Then Lenski proceeds to compare the advanced horticultural

societies of Africa to those of the New World, even though the

two had no cultural contact. He concluded by noting that
these differences are more than offset by the striking
similarities in more basic matters. In the New World, for
example, the rulers of advanced states were regarded as

demigods and treated as such. They enjoyed immense power
and privilege and their subjects were sompelled to display

 

lsIbid., p. 126.

lsIbid., p. 142.

l7Ibid., pp. ll7-ll8.

8
extreme deference. They had at their disposal a complex
and highly developed retinue of ministers, courtiers, and
officials, who saw to it that their slightest order was
executed and who formed a privileged class set apart
from the mass of commoners. Similarities even extended
to the widespread practice of human sacrifice,...the pre-
sence of royal harems, and the practice of electorial
succession...In fact, it appears to be a basic principle
that among societies at an advanced horticultural level of
development, the separation of the political and the kinship
systems and the resulting development of the state are
necessary preconditions for the deveIOpment of marked
social inequality.18

Lenski is pointing out that the instituting of governments dur-
ing this period contributed to stratification of society.
Lenski seems to believe this trend was inevitable.

While it is impossible to prove that African despotism
developed in this manner, as a natural evolutionary out-
Agrowth of the modest tribal governments of simple horti-
cultural societies, both theory and the evidence of
ethnographic studies point this way...The means of effect-
ing the transformation appear to have lain ready at hand
in the older, more primitive system. Thus...an institu-
tion which began primarily as a functional necessity of
group life became, in many advanced horticultural socie—
ties, an instrument em loyed primarily for self—aggrandize-
ment and exploitation. 9

So inequality becomes more deeply entrenched in society through
government institutions.
Agrarian societies are the fourth stage of Lenski's
historical progression. This type of society
had its beginnings five to six thousand years ago in the
fertile river valleys of the Middle East. Subsequently
it spread both east and west, with the result that by the

end of the fifteenth century A.D. agrarian societies were
firmly established throughout most of Europe, North Africa,

 

18Ibid., pp. 159-160.

lgIbid., p. 168.

9

the Middle East, and South and East Asia. With the
discovery of the New World, this form of social organi-
zation was brought to North and South America....2

Continuing to speak of the development of the agrarian society,

he says it

was made possible by a variety of factors, the most impor—
tant of which was a series of inventions and discoveries
that resulted in major advances in production, transpor-
tation, and communication. Prominent among these were the
invention of the plow and two related developments which
greatly enhanced the value of the plow, namely, the dis-
covery of how to harness animal energy, and the discovery
of the basic principles of metallurgy. The latter made
possible the forging of iron plowshares (a great advance
over their wooden predecessors)...Paralleling these develop-
ments were the inventions of the wheel and the sail,

which greatly facilitated the movement of both men and
Agoods. 1

Many inventions made the agrarian society what it was, as pro-
duction, transportation and communication bring greater masses
of people together for social interaction.

Lenski also analyzes this form of society in light of
the degree of equality.

One fact impresses itself upon most any observer of
agrarian societies, especially on one who views them in a
broadly comparative perspective. This is the fact of
marked social inequality. Without exception, one finds
pronounced differences in power, privilege and honor
associated with mature agrarian economics. These differ-
ences surpass those found in even the most stratified
horticultural societies of Africa and the New World, and
far exceed those found in simple horticultural or hunting
and gathering societies.22

 

20Ibid., p. 189.

211bid., p. 190.

221bid., p. 210.

10
This is a rather conclusive statement—-a fact that almost any
observer can see, marked social inequality, without exception.
Lenski feels there can be little doubt concerning the deteriora-
tion of equality in agrarian societies.
In a concluding statement, he says,

On the whole, agrarian societies give the impression of
gross injustice in the distributive realm. As we have
seen, a small number of individuals enjoyed immense
luxury, consuming in a single day goods and services
sufficient to support large numbers of the common people
for a year. At the same time a considerable portion of
the population was denied the basic necessities of life
and was marked out by the social system for a speedy
demise. It does not take much imagination to conceive
of a more equitable method of distribution.23

Distributive justice appears to strike a new low in agrarian
societies in light of Lenski's analysis.

The fifth and last stage of historical development is
that of the industrial societies. In distinguishing such a
society, Lenski tells us

During the last two centuries, the productive systems of
many societies have undergone a profound change. In this
relatively short space of time, techniques of production
and patterns of economic organization which had endured

for thousands of years haVe been replaced by new and radie
cally different ones. These developments have laid the
foundation for a new and profoundly different kind of
society, the modern industrial...From the technological
standpoint, the more.advanced industrial societies of the
present day differ greatly from agrarian. The raw materials
used are far more Complex and efficient...0ne of the most
important differences sociologically pertains to the sources
of energy used in the performance of 'work'....

Here is the development of "a new and profoundly different kind

of society."

 

23Ibid., p. 295.

2”Ibid., pp. 297—298.

11
But even more important than the profound difference,
Lenski sees a change in the growing effects of inequality.

Given the vastly increased productivity of this type

of society and the greater enlarged powers of industrial
states, nothing would be more logical than to predict
inequalities in power and privilege even greater than those
found in agrarian societies. However, even a limited
survey of the contemporary scene suggests that it is not
the case, and a more intense examination confirms this
impression. If anything, inequalities in power and pri-
vilege seem somewhat less pronounced in mature industrial
than agrarian. In short, the appearance of mature indus—
trial societies marks the first significant reversal in
the age-old evolutionary trend toward ever increasing
inequality.

He would say we have a long way to go, but such a
remarkable reversal in a major historical trend deserves an
explanation. Though the reasons are by no means obvious,
according to Lenski, he suggests a few possibilities, and then
one which is most significant. One contributing factor to the
decline of inequality in the industrial age is the great expan-
sion of human knowledge, accompanied by the spread of literacy
and the extension of education. Another factor is the modern
pattern of warfare which involves the entire population to an
extent unknown in agrarian societies.

But for Lenski there is another factor that stands out
above all others.

More significant than any of these, however, has been the
rise and spread of the new democratic ideology which
asserts that the state belongs to the peOple. This
ideology is not simply a reflection of changing economic

conditions, though as we have seen, it has been affected
by them. Rather, the historical record indicates that it

 

25Ibid., p. 308.

12
had its origin in religious and philosoPhical develoPments
in the seventeenth century and spread rather widely in the
eighteenth century in countries which were still thoroughly
agrarian in character, e.g., the United States and France.
In fact, there appears to be as much justification for the

thesis that this new ideology contributed to the emergence
of industrial societies as for the converse.

Lenski does not feel that this ideology is completely new, but
that modern democratic beliefs were derived from the work of
seventeenth century political theorists such as John Locke,

who put an ancient idea into modern form and made it a signi-
ficant force in the intellectual and political world. Lenski
feels that the ideology was born back in the hunting and gather-
ing societies even though it never materialized in real life

to any extent.

Lenski still believes that inequality is very basic and
an inevitable part of human existence. "Despite substantial
movement toward the democratic ideal, political inequality is
still a basic fact of life in all advanced industrial socie-~

"27

ties... And later he says, "...inequality is apparently

inevitable..."28

although he qualifies this by stating that
the degree of inequality is highly variable in and between
societal types.

Gans and Lenski are just two among many who recognize

that inequality is a characteristic of human society as far back

as recorded history reaches. There is simply no empirical

 

26Ibid., p. 317.

27Ibid., p. 327.

28Ibid.

 

13
evidence indicating a society which is characterized by equality
to any extent in any regard (whether in terms of power, wealth,
education, or division of labor). This is the reason for
Gans' appeal for more research, even against the odds that any—

thing will be discovered.

CHAPTER II

THE RESPONSE TO INEQUALITY

 

Since inequality seems to be a way of life for the
human race, a way which can be historically and scientifically
demonstrated, how have persons chosen to respond to this plight?
Down through history some have been dissatisfied with the
inequalities of their day, while others have adjusted to them
and even attempted to justify them. But few have claimed that
inequalities were non-existent in their society. Traditionally,
inequality has been justified or rejected on religious or philo-
sophical grounds. Inequalities were seen as divinely ordained
or divinely condemned, as rational or irrational.

Examples of ancient writers who believed that conditions
need not be as they were are the early Hebrew prophets who
lived around 800 B.C. Men like Amos, Micah and Isaiah denounced
some of the rich and powerful men of their day. They were not
only concerned with the misuse of wealth and power, but the
means by which they had been acquired. An example is Micah's
indictment of the leading citizens:

Listen, you leaders of Jacob,
you rulers of the house of Israel.
Should you not know justice,
you who hate good and love evil....

Hear this, you leaders of the house of Jacob,

you rulers of the house of Israel,
who despise justice
and distort all that is right;

I”

15

who build Zion with bloodshed,
and Jerusalem with wickedness....
Woe to you who plan iniquity,
to those who plot evil on their beds!
At morning's light they carry it out
because it is in their power to do it.
They covet fields and seize them,
and houses, and take them.
They defraud a man of his home,
a fellowman of his inheritance.29

Micah indicates that these practices are against God's will
and will lead to judgment upon the nation.

But in India, ancient religious thinkers had a differ-
ent view than that expressed by Micah. In the introduction
to "The Laws of Manu" compiled by Hindu priests about 200 B.C.,
there is the following account of the creation of the world.

For the sake of the posterity of the worlds, he (the
Lord) caused the Brahmana, the Kshatriya, the Vaisya,
the Sudra to proceed from his mouth, his arms, his
thighs, and his feet...But in order to protect this
universe, He, the most resplendent one, assigned separate
(duties and) occupations to those who sprang from his
mouth, arms, thighs, and feet.

To Brahmana he assigned teaching and studying, sacri—
ficing for their own benefit and for others, giving and
accepting (of alms). The Kshatriya he commanded to pro-
tect the people...The Vaisya to tend the cattle...0ne
occupation only the Lord prescribed to the Sudra, to
serve meekly even those (other) three classes.30

In contrast to the prophets of Israel, this states that social
inequalities and classes were divinely ordained for the good of

the world.

 

29Micah 3 1-2, 9-10, 2 1-2, The International Version of
the Holy Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Bible Publishers, 1978),
p. 1240, 1242-1293.

30

 

 

Lenski, op.cit., p. N.

16

Greek philOSOphers of the classical period reflected
on the inequalities of their day. Aristotle, for example,
was a supporter of the basic institutions undergirding the
system of social inequality. He defended the institution of
slavery. "It is clear that some men are by nature free, and
others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both
expedient and right."31 Aristotle recognized that some men
who should be free were enslaved by force and violence, but
this had no bearing on the justice and propriety of the insti-
tution. itself.

But Plato attacked the basic institutional structure
of society and advocated the communal ownership of all forms
of prOperty. The ruling class would then be selected on the
basis of moral virtue, intellect and love of knowledge. In

The Republic, Plato recommends, "Until philoSOphers are kings,

 

or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit of
philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one,
and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion
of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never

have rest from their evils..."32

Plato does not object to
social inequality, but to the specific institutional bases
upon which the existing system of inequality rested. In general,

intellectuals and scholars are attracted by this elitist position

 

31Aristotle, Politics, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (New York:
Modern Library, 19935, p. 60.

32Plato, The Republic, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (New York:
Vintage Books, n.d.), p. 203.

 

17
which criticizes the existing system of allocating rewards,
but finds nothing objectionable in social inequality per se.
Centuries later, Jean Jacque Rousseau responded to
inequality in a different manner. He contends.

I have endeavored to trace the origin and progress of
inequality, and the institution and abuse of political
societies, as far as these are capable of being deduced
from the nature of man merely by the light of reason,

and independently of those sacred dogmas which give the
sanction of divine right to sovereign authority. It
follows from this survey that, as there is hardly any
inequality in the state of nature, all the inequality which
now prevails owes its strength and growth to the deVelOp-
ment of our faculties and the advance of the human mind,
and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by the esta-
blishment of property and laws. Secondly, it follows that
moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone,
clashes with natural right, whenever it is not propor-
tionate to physical inequality-—a distinction which suf-
ficiently determines what we ought tO'mink of that
species of inequality which prevails in all civilized
countries; since it is plainly contrary to the law of
nature, however defined, that children should command old
men, fools wise men, and that the privileged few should
gorge themselves with.superfluities, while the starving
multitude are in want of the bare necessities of life. 3

Rousseau feels that inequality has been aggravated by civili-
zation, laws and property. There is barely any inequality in
the state of nature since it is plainly contrary to the law of
nature. The natural state of life is one free of inequality,
according to Rousseau.

John Locke, the political theorist of the English

Revolution of 1688, takes a similar approach.

 

33Jean Jacue Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses,
trans. by G.D.H. Cole (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company 1950),

 

18
To understand political power aright and derive it from
its original, we must consider what state all men are
naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions and dispose of their possessions and
persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law
of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the will
of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein
all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
.more than another; there being nothing more evident than
that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of
the same facilities, should also be equal one amongst
another without subordination or subjection, unless the
Lord and Master of them all should by any manifest declara-
tion of his will set one above another, and confer on him
by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right
to dominion and sovereignty.
All men are in a natural state of perfect freedom, according
to Locke. No man should be dependent upon another or ruling
over another unless God himself does so. The law of nature
allows each individual to function without hindrance from
others. Such is a state of equality where everyone has the same
advantages, none having any more than another.

Many more examples could be cited of religious,
philosophical or political reSponses and reactions to inequa-
lity. Some condone and defend inequalities of their day,
others violently Oppose existing inequalities of one form or
another. But once again the point is that the inequalities are
there and are real as far as these observers are concerned.

In this they all agree, though they differ in their approach to

the problem. Another common denominator these approaches have

is their appeal to beliefs or values that transcend the physical,

 

3LiJohn Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. by
Thomas P. Peardon (New York: The Eiberal Arts Press, 1952), p. u.

 

19
empirical, scientifically testable world. Whether the appeal
be to a deity, a utopia where philosopher-kings rule, to reason
or to the natural state of life, the solutions all "jump
outside" so to speak. Both Gans and Lenski "stayed inside"
and dealt only with the scientific evidence made available to
them. For this reason we have to appreciate Gans' appeal for
more research against the odds that the "needle in the haystack"
can be dsicovered. He is attempting to remain consistent
scientifically and historically even though he would like to

see more equality.

CHAPTER III

THE RESPONSE OF SOCIOLOGISTS TO INEQUALITY

 

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries social
theorists have joined the ranks of philosophers, proPhets,
and political theorists in attempting to deal with the

inequalities of their day.

LENSKI
Gerhard Lenski was quoted earlier in support of

history being of a record of inequality. However, he was
not simply focusing on the fact of inequality. His concern
was how scarce resources come to be distributed as they do.
He concludes that inequality exists once there is a surplus,
and it is power that determines the unequal distribution of that
surplus. He defines a surplus as "...goods and services over
and above the minimum required to keep producers alive and
productive..." He continues,

...if we assume that many of the things men most desire

are in short supply, then,...this surplus will inevitably

give rise to conflicts and struggles aimed at its control.

If, following Weber, we define power as the probability

of persons or groups carrying out their will even when
opposed by others, then it follows that power will determine

 

the distribution of nearly all of the surplus possessed
by a society.3b

 

 

35Lenski, op. cit., p. MN.

20

21
So privileges are primarily the result of power, power being
the determinant in the distribution of goods and services.
This unequal distribution in turn, leads to the stratifi-
cation of social classes.
For Lenski, this use of power is based upon human
nature which is basically selfish. "Thus, when one surveys

the human scene, one is forced to conclude that when men are

 

confronted with important decisions where they are obligated

 

to choose between their own, or their_group's interests and

 

the interests of others, they nearly always choose the former--

 

though often seeking to hide this fact from themselves and

"36 When important decisions are at stake and there

others.
is a conflict of interests, individuals virtually always make
decisions that benefit themselves rather than others. Later
the author states that "...most human action is motivated by
self-interest or by partisan group interests."37 Since humans

are selfishly motivated but also need others in order to satisfy

their principle goal of survival, "...men will share thepproduct

 

 

of their labors to the extent required to insure the survival

and continued_productivity of thoSe members whose actions are
38
N

 

necessary or beneficial to themselves. So the selfish nature

 

of the human being is the key motivating factor for those who

 

361bid., p. 30.

37Ibid., p. 99.

381bid.

 

22
have the power to distribute the surplus of a society. And,
"...societies, like individuals are basically self-seeking
units."39
Lenski also suggests another inborn trait in human
nature which contributes to social inequality. It "...is
that men_are_unequall¥_endowed by nature with the attributes
necessary to carrv on these struggles", that is, the struggles
for rewards that are in short supply. He continues,
These inequalities in natural endowment are not the
primary source of inequality. But they are important
enough to provide some foundation for the...thesis that
nature is the source of social inequality.”0

Humans are unequally endowed by nature with the tools needed

to be successful in the struggle for rewards.

MOSCA, MICHELS, AND PARETO

Three classical writers in social theory deal with
social inequality by postulating an elite theory. These men
are Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels.
These men also refer to power, as did Lenski, but they relate
it to political inequality, which will then be matched by
material inequality.

Vilfredo Pareto is the first proponent of the elite
theory to be considered. Every society contains some indivi-
duals who have greater skill, intelligence, or manipulative

ability than others, and they tend to dominate the group.

 

3QIbid., p. 92.

u01bid., p. 32.

23

So let us make a class of people who have the highest
indices in their branch of activity, and to that class
give the name of elite.

For the particular investigation with which we are
engaged, a study of the social equilibrium, it will help
if we further divide that class into two classes: a
governing elite, comprising individuals who
directly or indirectly play some considerable part in Al
government, and non-governing elite, comprising the rest.

 

 

According to Pareto, the way a society remains stable in
equilibrium is by the circulation of elites. ,Some of these
elites are in the non-governing elite class, but political
systems should remain open and available for the entrance of
new rulers replacing the old ones in a continual circulation
of elites.

Aristocracies do not last. Whatever the causes, it
is an incontestable fact that after a certain length of
time they pass away. History is a graveyard of aristo-
cracies....

They decay not in number only. They decay also in
quality, in the sense that they lose their vigor, that
there is a decline in the proportions of the residues
which enabled them to win their power and hold it. The

‘governing class is restored not only in numbers but...in
quality, by families rising from the lower classes and
bringing with them the vigor and the proportions of
residues necessary for helping themselves in power.”

A flow or circulation of elites from the governed class to the
governing class keeps the latter vigorous and capable of
ruling. But not everyone in the governed class possesses the

necessary "proportions of residues"—-only the elite who are able

to rise to obtain and maintain power.

 

HlVilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. III (New York:
Dover Publishing, Inc., 1935), p. 1923.

H2

 

Ibid., pp. 1930-1931.

24
Gaetano Mosca sees two classes, the ruler and the
ruled, as essential to any society.

In all societies...two classes of people appear--the class
that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class,
always the less numerous, performs all political functions,
monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power
brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is
directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is
now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and
violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least,
with material means of subsistence and with the instru—
mentalities that are essential to the vitality of the
political organism...We know that the same thing goes on
in neighboring countries, and in fact we should be put to
it to conceive of a real world otherwise organized-~a
world in which all men would be directly subject to a
single person without relationships of superiority or
subordination, or in which all men would share equally

in the direction of political affairs.“

Concerned primarily with the political sphere, Mosca sees no
possibility for equality which would eliminate the necessity
of the.ruling class and relationships of subordination.
Later he is speaking in the context of democracy,
assuring the reader,
Absolute equality has never existed in human societies.
Political power never has been, and never will be, founded
upon the explicit consent of majorities. It has always
been, and it will always be, exercised by organized
minorities, which have had, and will have, the means,
varying as the times vary, to impose their supremacy on
the multitudes. Only a wise organization of circumstances
have managed to render the preeminence of a ruling class
less burdensome and less abusive in our time.””
Equality is given no hope whatever of becoming a reality as far

as the government of societies is concerned. The ruling class

is envisioned as always reigning over the multitudes.

 

usGaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1939), p. 50.

L”Ibid., pp. 326—327.

25
Mosca concludes his book with some suggestions for
the future. One of the concerns was the European scene of his
day. "Brief periods d?strong government, where the state
exercises many powers and great authority, may prove of actual
benefit in some European countries, as helping to restore or
provide conditions that will enable the representative system

“5 For normal func-

to function normally in the near future."
tioning it may be necessary for government to exert strong
authority. He continues, "But if the present crisis that is
threatening our political systems and the social structure itself
is to be surmounted, the ruling class must rid itself of many

of its prejudices and change its psychological attitude."”6
Notice that the ruling class should purify itself by the removal
of certain attitudes, but there is no hint that society

should rid itself of the ruling class.

Robert Michels,in his book Political Partiesy_A Socio-

 

logical Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy,
rejects the possibility of a democratic society in the chapter
entitled "Democracy and the Iron Law of Oligarchy." He points
out, "...this tendency is particularly strong in Italy, where

it is led by a man of weight, Gaetano Mosca, who declares that

no highly developed social order is possible without a 'political

class'...that is to say, a politically dominant class, the class

 

”SIbid., p. 993.

”51bid.

26

"97

of a minority. The term "oligarchy" means "rule by the

few", and is utilized by Michels to describe the tendency

for large populations to come under the control of a small
clique of leaders who make decisions on their own irrespective
of the interests of the common citizens. He explains,

There is little difference, as far as practical results
are concerned, between individual dictatorship and the
dictatorship of a group of oligarchs...Theophrastus noted
long ago that the strongest desire of men who have attained
to leadership in a popularly governed state is not so
much the acquirement of personal wealth as the gradual
establishment of their own sovereignty at the expense of
popular sovereignty. The danger is imminent lest the
social revolution should replace the visible and tangeable
dominant classes which now exist and act Openly, by a
clandestine demogogic oligarchy, pursuing its ends under
the cloak of equality.

Society cannot be constructed otherwise.

...the social revolutions would not effect any real modifi-
cation of the internal structure of the mass. The socio-
logists might conquer, but not socialism, which would
persist in the moment of its adherents' triumph. We are
tempted to speak of this process as a tragicomedy in which
the masses are content to devote all their energies to
effecting a change of masters. All that is left for the
workers is the honor "of participating in government
recruiting." The result seems a poor one, especially if
we take into account the psychological fact that even

the purest of idealists who attains to power for a few
years is unable to escape the corruption which the
exercise of power carries in its train.”9

When speaking in an economic context, Michels mentions,

It is nonetheless true that social wealth cannot be satis-
factorily administered in any other manner than by the

 

1+7Robert Michels, Political Parties, A Sociological Study of
the Oligarchal Tendencies of Modern DemoEracy (New York: The
Free Press, 1962), p. 392.

98

 

 

Ibid., p. 399.

uglbid., p. 355.

27

creation of an extensive bureaucracy. In this way we are
led by an inevitable logic to the flat denial of the
possibility of a state without classes.50

Stratification is inevitable. He concludes,

The sociological phenomena whose general characteris-
tics have been discussed in this chapter and in preceding
ones offer numerous vulnerable points to the scientific
opponents of democracy. These phenomena would seem to
prove beyond dispute that society cannot exist without
a "dominant" or "political" class, and that the ruling
class, while its elements are subject to a frequent
partial renewal, nevertheless constitutes the only factor
of sufficiently durable efficacy in the history of human
development. According to this view, the government,
or, if the phrase be preferred, the state, cannot be any-
thing other than the organization of a minority. It is
the aim of this minority to impose upon the rest of society
a "legal order," which is the outcome of the exigencies
of dominion and of the exploitation of the mass of helots
effected by the ruling minority, and can never be truly
representative of the majority. The majority is thus
permanently incapable of self-government....Thus the majority
of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are
predestined by tragic necessity to submit to the dominion
of a small minorit , and must be content to constitute
the pedestal of oligarchy.

The principle that one dominant class inevitably
succeeds to another, and the law deduced from that principle
that oligarchy is, as it were, a preordered form of the
common life of great social aggregates, far from conflict-
ing with_or replacing the materialist conception of history,
completes that conception and reinforces it. There is no
essential contradiction between the doctrine that history
is the record of a continued series of class struggles
and the doctrine that class struggles invariably culminate
in the creation of new ologarchies which undergo fusion
with the.old.51

Michels sees government as essential to the ongoing of human
history, and that government must be composed of a minority

imposing its authority on the majority which is incapable of

 

50lbid., p. 398.

51Ibid., pp. 353—359.

28
self-government. The necessity of this principle of oligarchy
is an iron law which is predestinated and preordained to
be so.

In summary, the arguments of Lenski and these three
elite theorists are similar in that they combine power with
differences in human nature. Lenski is concerned with power
as it relates to the division of labor, while Pareto, Mosca,
and Michels concern themselves primarily with the power of
the state. They View the state as a concentration of political
power and also a necessary function, the political one. So
they anticipate the functional argument by asserting that there
is a political function, that of ruling governing, and this
requires an elite, thus inequality. However, they are not
concerned with inequality as a consequence of the division of
labor, as Lenski is. Lenski recognizes how changes in the
material base of society and its evolving division of labor

permits new forms of power and conquest.

FUNCTIONALISM
In turning to the functional argument, we phase out
the matter of state and deal with inequality only as it relates
to the division of labor. Perhaps the best known representa-
tion of the functionalist position in contemporary sociology
is Kingsley Davis' and Wilbert E. Moore's article entitled,
"Some Principles of Stratification." Stratification is a type

of inequality in which people are.grouped together according

29
to certain characteristics. Then these groups are ranked
higher or lower than one another. Davis and Moore defend
systems of inequality because they insure the fulfullment of
society's essential needs.

The authors explain their direction. "Starting
from the proposition that no society is 'classless', or
unstratified, an effort is made to explain, in functional
terms, the_universal necessity which calls forth stratification
in any social system."52 Notice that inequality is a uni-
versal necessity. The key function of society is the matter
of placing and motivating individuals to perform duties essen-
tial to the ongoing of civilization. And even though the
order of society may be static, people.shift out and die while
new ones are born and need to replace them.

But in this replacement process, Davis and Moore note
that some of these duties or positions are functionally more
important than others. The problem of placement is a major
one since some of the positions most essential to the survival
of society require the greatest ability-and training.
"Inevitably, then, a society must have, first, some kind of
rewards that it can use as inducements, and, second, some way

of distributing these rewards differently according to position."53

 

52Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, "Some Principles of
Stratification," American Sociological Review, Vol. 10, No. 2.
April 1995, p. 292.

53

 

Ibid., p. 293.

30

The distribution of these rewards requires stratification.
Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved
device by which societies insure that the most important
positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified
persons. Hence, every society, no matter how simple or
complex, must differentiate persons in terms of both
prestige and esteem, and must therefore ossess a certain
amount of institutionalized inequality.5

The essential nature of universal inequality is emphasized

again,as the asthors believe every society should have a

degree of inequality.

CRITICISM OF FUNCTIONALISM

The critics of this functionalist view of inequality are
many. One.point of controversy involves the question of who
defines the needs of society. The assumption of a consensus
about the needs of society is highly questionable. Does
everyone hold the same values? Are the needs of society mani-
pulated through propaganda or artificially created scarcity?
Are high rewards necessary to get people to take certain jobs,
or will individuals undergo sacrifices because the qualities
of the job appeal to them? And what about the high rewards
given to seemingly insignificant, nonfunctional roles such as
professional athlete, call girl or musical entertainer?

A critique of Davis' and Moore's position was made by

Melvin Tumin, who questions the assumption and the positive

 

5”Ibid., p. 293.

31
functionality of stratification.

The ubiquity and the antiquity of such inequality has
given rise to the assumption that there must be something
both inevitable and positively functional about such
social arrangements. Clearly, the truth or falsity of
such an assumption is a strategic question for any general
theory of social organization. 5

Later Tumin summarizes,

The possible alternative meanings of the concept
"functional importance" has been shown to be one diffi-
culty. The question of the scarcity or abundance of
available talent has been indicated as a principle source
of possible variation. The extent to which the period

of training for skilled positions may reasonably be viewed
as sacrificial has been called into question. The possi-
bility has been suggested that very different types of
motivational schemes might conceivably be made to function.
The separability of differentials in power and property
considered as resources appropriate to a task from such
differentials considered as rewards for the performance

of a task has also been suggested. It has also been
maintained that differentials in prestige and esteem

do not necessarily follow upon differentials in power and
property when the latter are considered as appropriate
resources rather than rewards.

The article concludes with a listing of sample hypo-
theses which are not generally considered when dealing with
the unequal distribution of rewards in a society. Social
stratification systems discourage the development of consi-
derable talent in,a society, provide unequal access to moti—
vation, recruitment and training, and justify themselves as
natural, right and inevitable in order to rationalize the
status quo, according to Tumin. These "provisional assertions...

should serve to reinforce the doubt that social inequality is a

 

. 55Melvin Tumin, "Some Principles of Stratification: A
Critical Analysis," American Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 9
August 1953, p. 387.

56

’

Ibid., p. 399.

32
device which is uniformly functional for the role of guaran-
teeing that the most important tasks in a society will be
performed conscientiously by the most competent persons."57
Thus he casts doubt on the assertion that social inequality
will guarantee the most important positions to be properly
occupied by the most qualified persons.

Functionalism is the modern, sociological defense of
inequalities that have existed in society throughout human
history, Inequalities of the past may have been based upon
birth or wealth rather than upon personal performance, but the
basic inequalities remain the same. The are simply built upon
a different "status symbol." Functional critics like Tumin
point out the inconsistencies and inequalities of the func-
tional approach as it is applied today in countries like the
United States and Western Europe. Functionalists justify
their position claiming it is at least inevitable to allow
society to maintain its existence, and it is at best good
and rational. Tumin and others have revealed some of its
glaring injustices and falsaunreasonable claims, effectively
questioning its goodness or rationality. But do they show that
functional inequality is not inevitable? Tumin put his finger

on the problem by noting,

 

57Ibid., p. 393.

33

The ubiquity and the antiquity of such inequality has

given rise to the assumption that there must be something

both inevitable and positively functional about such social

arrangements. Clearly, the truth or falsity of such an

assumption is a strategic question for any general theory

of social organization.
There is no doubt that functionalism builds upon the foundation
stones of inevitability and the positive maintenance of
society. The argument is based upon history and utility.
Tumin himself recognizes the ubiquity and antiquity of
inequality. According to previous conclusions drawn from Gans
and Lenski, inequality has been around a long time (throughout
recorded human history) and it does seem to be everywhere and
without beginning or end.

But the all—inclusive appearance of inequality does

not necessarily make.it inevitable, although it does chalk up
one major point in favor of the functionalist argument. The
world of social science does not provide us with evidence of
a society that has even remotely approached a level of equality-—
whether it be removing class distinctions in regards to race,
sex, wealth, power, education, etc. Functionalism can
establish an argument for the inevitability of inequality based
upon human experience throughout history, and egalitarianism
is at a loss to come up with anything comparable on a macro-
sociological level.

Functionalism also builds on a utilitarian basis,

claiming that this arrangement is necessary to hold society

 

58Ibid., p. 387.

39
together and make it work. The inequalities purported by
functionalism have been humanity's way of life for centuries.
The functionalist claims that prestige and rewards should be
arranged to encourage stratification in modern society. Now
the fact of the matter is that inequality has worked to the
extent that humanity still exists on the earth. Other arrange-
ments may have worked, and may have worked much better. But
we have no evidence of that. All we have is wishful thinking.
And in the present world situation it is not difficult to come
up with wishful thinking. But there is little evidence to
indicate the wishful thinking of the egalitarian is much differ-
ent than that of Plato, Rousseau or the Hindu priest. Is it
another escape to a world that isn't really there? Is it

another solution that "jumps outside"?

MARX

Karl Marx introduces an analysis of inequality from a
different direction. He rejects inborn differences as a basis
that requires elitism. While recognizing that inequality had
always been a part of human history, that each class struggle
only brought a new ruling class into existence, he refuses to
accept this as an inevitable characteristic of the human situa—
tion.

Marx builds on history rather than human nature or
universal generalizations, arguing that men create history as

well as social inequalities.

35

History does nothing; it "does pp: possess immense
riches," it "does 393 fight battles." It is mpg, real,
living men, who do all this, who possess things and fight
battles. It is not "history" which uses men as a means
of achieving-~as if it were an individual person-~its

own ends. History is nothing but the activity of men in
pursuit of their ends.

History does not control men, forcing them into molds of
inequality, but history is the product of men. It is men who
achieve goals through their own activity. Humans are not the
pawn of history as it manipulates them for its own purposes.

In producing history, peOple organize themselves in
relationship to their physical environment. According to Marx,
this is a basic starting point as humans produce their own
sustenance.

...we must begin by stating the first presupposition of
all human existence, and thereby of all history, namely,
that men must be in a position to live in order to be able
to "make history." But life involves before anything else,
eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other
things. The first historical act is, therefore, the
production of material life itself. This is indeed a
historical act, a fundamental condition of all history,
which_today, as thousands of years ago, must be accom-
plished every day and every hour merely in order to sustain
human life...In any conception of history, therefore, the
first requirement is to observe this basic fact in all its
significance and in all its implications and to give it

its proper importance.50

The first assumption in the historical approach of Marx is that
humans produce their material life, and in so doing they

"make history." For Marx this "purely empirical" base was the

 

59T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel (eds.), Karl Marx:
Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy INew York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 63.

60

 

Ibid., p. 60.

 

36
only proper starting point.

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary
ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction
can be made only in the imagination. They are the real
individuals, their activity and their material conditions
of life including those which they find already in existence
and those produced by their activity. These premises can
thus be established in a purely empirical way.

The first premise of all human history is, of course,
the existence of living human individuals. The first fact
to be established, therefore, is the physical constitution
of these individuals and their consequent relation to
the rest of nature...All historiography must begin from
these natural bases and their modification in the course
of history by man's activity.

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence
depends in the first place on the nature of the existing
means which they have to reproduce. This mode of produc-
tion should not be regarded simply as the reproduction of
the physical existence of individuals. It is already
a definite form of activity of these individuals, a
definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode
of life. As individuals express their life, so they are.
What they are, therefore, coincides with their production,
and what they produce and with how they produce it.

What individuals are, therefore depends on the material
conditions of their production.6

 

Marx does not begin with "dogmas" which are presupposed
arbitrarily from one's imagination, but he starts with the
"material conditions of life," the product of humans expressing
their life in physical existence.

This relates to society in the following way:

I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal
relations as well as forms of state could neither be
understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called
general progress of the human mind, but that they are
rooted in the material conditions of life...The general
conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached,
continued to serve as the guiding thread in my studies,
may be formulated briefly as follows: In the social
production which men carry on, they enter into definite

 

61Ibid., pp. 53-59.

37

relations that are indisposible and independent of their
will; these relations of production correspond to a definite
stage of development of their material powers of production.
The totality of these relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of society--the real foundation,

on which legal and political superstructures arise and

to which definite forms of social consciousness corres-
pond. The mode of production of material life determines
the general character of the social, political and spiritual
process of life.

Note the foundation upon which the social, political, legal, and
spiritual aspects of life are built is the foundation of the
economic structure. This structure is composed of the rela—
tions of productions which are rooted in the material condi-
tions of life. Such relations of production correspond to the
stage of development of material powers of production in which
a society is located.
Marx continues,
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines
their consciousness. At a certain stage of their develop-
ment, the material forces of production in society come
in conflict with the existing relations of production,
or——what is but a legal expression of the same thing—-
with the prOperty relations within which they had been at
work before. From forms of develOpment of the forces
of production these relations turn into their fetters.
Then occurs a period of social revolution. With the change
of the economic foundation, the entire immense super—
structure is more or less rapidly transformed.
Humans create relations of production which compose the economic
structure upon which is built a superstructure of social, legal,
and political relations. But these relations change from forms

of development into fetters which bind and enslave the indivi-

duals who made such history.

38
However,

No social order ever disappears before all the productive
forces for which there is room in it have been developed;
and new, higher relations of production never appear before
the material conditions of their existence have matured

in the womb of the old society...In broad outline we can
designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and

modern bourgeois modes of production as progressive

epochs in the economic formation of society.

The economic structure is most important in shaping the events

of history as well as the superstructure of other institutions

in society. Here Marx earmarks four basic stages of historical

development: the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern

bourgeois (capitalistic). The economic structure of each

holds within itself the seed which will produce the next epoch.

The meaning of Marx's concept of inequality is embedded

in his analysis of historical changes in the economic structure.
In the development of the productive forces a stage is
reached where productive forces and means of intercourse
are called into being which, under the existing relations,
can only work mischief, and which are, therefore, no
longer productive, but destructive forces...Associated
with_this is the emergence of a class which has to bear
all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages,
which is excluded from society and is forced into the most
resolute opposition to all other classes; a class which
comprises the majority of the members of society and in
which there develops a consciousness of the need for a
fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness.

As the forces of production develop, one class is oppressed

with the burden of society and this class composes the majority

of individuals within that society.

But the communist consciousness has its seeds of develop—

ment in the bourgeois epoch, and this will have a different

 

63Ibid., pp. 69—65.

39
impact upon inequality in the future, according to Marx.

In all former revolutions, the form of activity was always
left unaltered and it was only a question of redistributing
this activity among different people, or introducing a

new division of labor. The communist revolution, however,
is directed against the former mode of activity, does

away with labor, and abolishes all class rule along with
the classes themselves, because it is effected by the
class which no longer counts as a class in society, which
is not recognized as a class, and which is the expression
of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc.,
within contemporary society.55

For Marx, inequality is an historical creation of humankind
and communism is a new stage of human history in which
classes are abolished. Since history is the record of human
self-development, past inequalities are understood as the
social consequences of social conditions and economic struc—
tures which are humanly made, not universal generalizations

or characteristic of human nature as an inborn trait.

6”Ibid., p. 65.

 

CHAPTER IV

FUNCTIONALISM AND MERITOCRACY

The functional approach to stratification tends to shift
the justification of classes in society from a hereditary basis
to one of meritocracy. This new class society allocates to
individuals according to specialized abilities rather than by
birth. It will be helpful to distinguish between stratifi-
cation in general and the particular form it takes in a meri-
tocracy.

The tendencies in mass society toward specialization,
professionalization, and the destruction of official
philosophies of inequality can all be summed up in the
master myth of the meritocracy. The meritocracy describes
a mythical future society in which all inequalities are
based on achievement of specialized tasks. At the very
beginning of childhood people begin taking 'intelligence'
tests to determine what they will learn and what kinds of
jobs they will prepare for. As they proceed through life
and enter careers they are continually tested, and are
promoted and demoted according to the test results. Only
functional competence counts, and nobody can determine
what the final goal of all the specializations should be.
The elite is composed of those who have achieved the most
according to the standards of the meritocracy, and its
members can be sure that their superiority is justified and
scientifically validated.

The tendency toward specialization leads to a meritocracy wherein

one's status is determined by standardized test results.

 

65Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, Living Sociology,
A Critical Introduction (New York: David McKay Company, 1969),
p. 299. ' '

 

 

90

91

Michael Young wrote a fable entitled The Rise of the

 

Meritocracy in which England transformed its elite from the

 

children of the nobility based upon the heredity principle to
those who were victorious through the principle of achievement.
The writer is reflecting back from the year 2039 in light of

a revolt among the lower classes, the Populists. Those who
were able to rise to the top through achievement were the
intellectuals.

At the beginning of my special period, 1919, the upper
class had their fair share Of geniuses and morons, so did
the workers; or, I should say, since a few brilliant and
fortunate working men always climb up to the top despite
having been subordinate in society, the inferior classes
contained almost as high a proportion of superior people
as the upper classes themselves. Intelligence was dis—
tributed more or less at random. Each social class was,
in ability, the miniature of society itself; the part the
same as the whole. The fundamental change of the last
century, which was fairly begun before 1963, is that
intelligence has been re—distributed between the classes
and the nature of the classes changed. The talented

have been given the Opportunity to rise to the level which
aecords with their capacities, and the lower classes conser
quently reserved for those who are also lower in ability.
The part is no longer the same as the whole.

The redistribution of the intelligent permitted all the talented
to rise to the level of their ability while the inferior classes
collected the "morons".

This principle of merit slowly became established
through school reform, according to Young. Each person was

directed to his place in society on the basis of his IQ. So by

 

66Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1958), pp. 11-12.

 

92
the late twentieth century all adults with 108 over 130 belonged
to the meritocracy.

The rate of social progress depends upon the degree to which
power is matched with intelligence. The Britain of a
century ago squandered its resources by condemning even
talented people to manual work; and blocked the efforts of
the lower classes to obtain just recognition for their

abilities. But Britain could not be a caste society if
it was to survive as a great nation; great, that is, in
comparison with others. To withstand international compe-

tition the country had to make better use of its human
material, above all, of the talent which was even in England,
one might say always and everywhere, too scarce. Schools
and industries were progressively thrown open to merit so
that clever children of each generation had opportunity for
ascent. The proportion of people with IQs over 130 could
not be raised—~the task was rather to prevent a fall--

but the proportion of such people in work which called upon
their full capacities was steadily raised...Civilization
does not depend upon the stolid mass, the homme moyen
sensuel, but upon the creative minority, the innovator who
With one stroke can save the labor of 10,000, the brilliant
few who cannot look without wonder, the restless elite

who have made mutation a social, as well as a biological,
fact. The ranks of the scientists and the technologists,
the artists and the teachers, have been swelled, their
education shaped to their high genetic destiny, their power
for good increased. Progress is their triumph; the.modern
world their monument.

 

The key to progress in civilization is the nurturing of high
IQ children to the high destiny for which they were equipped.
Then such a creative minority will not waste away in manual
labor as a member of the lower class.

Daniel Bell sees the rise of the meritocracy in Th3

Coming of Post-Industrial Society.

 

 

67Ibid., p. 12.

93

The post-industrial society, in its initial logic, is a
meritocracy. Differential status and differential income
are based on technical skills and higher education.
Without those achievements one cannot fulfill the require-
ments of the new social division of labor which is a
feature of that society. find there are few high places
Open without those skills.

Later Bell adds, "A post-industrial society reshapes the class

69 These

structure of society by creating new technical elites."
new elites are discovered to be the talented ones through IQ
tests. "By the logic of a meritocracy, these high-scoring
individuals, no matter where they are in the society, should

be brought to the top to make the best use of their talents."70
So recruitment into the elite is based upon individual intel-
lectual achievement. And it is in the best interest of the
society to do this in order to protect and develop its most
valuable resource.

As the populist reacts in a demand for greater equality
in this post—industrial society, Bell sees the issue to be
equality versus meritocracy. He notes that equality has been
poorly defined, and that its emphasis and application have
changed in American history. Regarding the redefinition of
equality, Bell points out,

The issues of schooling, of income, of status have all

become matters of social policy because equality has been
one of the central values of the American polity. But

 

68Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 19737, p. 909.

691bid., p. 910.

7OIbid., p. 911.

99

there has never been a clear-cut meaning to equality,

and the earliest form of the idea in the seventeenth
century was quite different than what it assumed in its 71
popular form by the third decade of the nineteenth century.

He continues by referring to the Pilgrim Fathers who founded
the New England colonies. Their equality was one born out of
election by grace, according to Bell, emphasizing the virtue
of labor with the central theme of independence.

This was replaced by sentiment and feeling in which
each man's sentiments were held to be as good as any others.

In nineteenth-century America, however, the notion of
equality was never sharply defined. In its voiced asser-
tions it boiled down to the sentiment that each man was as
Agood as another and no man was better than anyone else.
What it meant, in effect, was that no one should take on
the airs of an aristocrat and lord it over other men.
To this extent, it was a negative reaction to the highly
mannered society of Europe, and travelers to this country
at the time understood it in those terms. On its positive
side, equality meant the chance to get ahead, regardless
of one's origins--that no formal barriers or prescribed
positions stood in one's way. It was this contribution
of attributes--the lack of deference and the emphasis on
personal achievement--which gave nineteenth century America
its revolutionary appeal, so much so that when the German
'98ers came here, including such members of Marx's Social-
ist Workers Club as Kriege and Willich, they abandoned
Eurpoean socialism and became Republicans instead.

What is at stake today is the redefinition of equality.
A principle which was the weapon for changing a vast social
system, the principle of equality of opportunity, is now
seen as leading to a new hierarchy, and the current
demand is that the 'just precedence' of society, in Locke's
phrase, requires the reduction of all inequality, or the
creation of equality of result--in income, status, and
power--for all men in society. The issue is the central
value problem of the post-industrial society.

The principle of equality of opportunity derives
from a fundamental tenet of classic liberalism: that the
individua1--and not the family, community, or the state--
is the singular unit of society, and that the purpose of
societal arrangements is to allow the individual the

 

7lIbid., p. 929.

95

freedom to fulfill his own purposes—-by his labor to gain
property, by exchange to satisfy his wants, by upward
mobility to achieve a place commensurate with his talents.
It was assumed that individuals will differ--in their na-
tural endowments, in their energy, drive, and motivation,
in their conception of what is desirable--and the institu-
tions of society should establish procedures for regu-
lating fairly the competition and exchanges necessary to
fulfill these individually diverse desires and competences.

As a principle, equality of opportunity denies the
precedence of birth, of nepotism, of patronage or any
other criterion which allocates place, other than fair
competition Open equally to talent and ambition. It
asserts, in the terms of Talcott Parsons, universalism
over particularism, achievement over ascription.72

In tracing the development of equality in American history,
Bell demonstrates that "there has never been a clear-cut
meaning to equality" and "the notion of equality was never
sharply defined." It has taken on such emphases as independence,
each one is as good as another and no one better than anyone
else, the chance to get ahead regardless of one's origins, and
the reduction of all inequalities. Bell insists that the cen-
tral problem of post-industrial society is the redefinition
of equality.
SO Bell sees little problem in redefining equality to
include meritocracy.
The post-industrial society, in this dimension of
status and power, is the logical extension of the merito—
cracy; it is the codification of a new social order based,
in principle, on the priority of educated talent.
In social fact, the meritocracy is thus the dis-
placement of one principle of stratification by another,
of achievement for ascription. In the past--and this
was the progressive meaning of liberalism--this new principle
was considered just. Men were to be judged—-and rewarded--

not by attributes of birth or primordial ties but on indivi-
dual merit.

 

721bid., pp. 925-926.

73Ibid., pp. 926-927

96
There is no question about the fact that meritocracy is simply
the exchange of one form of stratification for another.
According to Bell's usage, meritocracy can be equality of
opportunity.
The United States today is not a meritocracy; but this
does not discredit the principle. The idea of equality
of opportunity is a just one, and the problem is to realize
it fairly. The focus, then, has to be on the barriers
to such equality. The redress of discrimination by
representation introduces arbitrary, particularistic
criteria which can only be destructive of universalism,
the historic principle, won under great difficulty? of
treating each person as a person in his own right. "
Bell sees the individual and his achievement as basic and
right in the maintenace of equality of opportunity. Thus,
minority representation and the redress of discrimination
undermine such equality and justice obtained historically at
great price. These are barriers to equality of opportunity.
"But one need not impose a rigid, ideological egalitarianism
in all matters, if it results in conflict with other social

objectives and even becomes self-defeating."75

The problem
here is, what are the other social objectives and who deter—
mines those objectives? And at what point does egalitarianism
become self-defeating?

For Bell, meritocracy emphasizes individual achievement
and earned status as confirmed by one's peers.

The meritocracy, in the best meaning of that word, is

made up of those worthy of praise. They are the men who
are the best in their fields, as judged by their fellows.

 

7"Ibid., p. 950.

751bid., p. 952.

97

And just as some individuals are worthy of praise,
so are certain institutions--e.g., those engaged in the
cultivation of achievement, the institutions of science
and scholarship, culture and learning. The university
is dedicated to...scholarship and learning and to the
transmission of knowledge from those who are competent
to those who are capable. There is no reason why a uni-
versity cannot be a meritocracy, without impairing the
esteem of other institutions. There is every reason
why a university has to be a meritocracy if the resources
of the society--for research, for scholarship, for learning--
are to be spent for 'mutual advantage,‘ and if a degree
of culture is to prevail.

And there is no reason why the principle of meritocracy
should not obtain in business and government as well.
One wants entrepreneurs and innovators who can expand
the amount of productive wealth for society. One wants
men in political office who can govern well. The quality
of life in any society is determined, in considerable
measure, by the quality of leadership. A society that
does not have its best men at the head of its leading
institutions is a sociological and moral absurdity.

Nor is this in contradiction with the principles of
fairness. One can acknowledge, as I would, the priority
of the disadvantaged (with all its difficulty of definition)
as an axiom of social policy, without diminishing the
opportunity for the best to rise to the top through work
and effort. The principles of merit, achievement, and
universalism are, it seems to me, the necessary foundations
for a productive--and cultivated--society.76

Society's leading institutions should have its best men at the
top, according to Bell, and anything less than that is ridi-
culous. It is assumed that these leaders will maintain a quality
leadership that will seek the mutual benefit of everyone, even
the disadvantaged. Productive, cultivated society can only be
attained through the principles of merit and achievement.

Many problems can be pointed out here, just as Tumin

does with the functionalism of Davis and Moore. For instance,

 

76Ibid., p. 959

98

will the meritocracy give priority or any recognition at all
to the disadvantaged? At what point will the maintenance of
a degree of culture prevail over the mutual advantage of the
competent as well as the unqualified? But Bell builds on the
ambiguity of equality. He attempts to demonstrate that meri-

tocracy is in the best interest of equality and all of society.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Inequality has been an obvious fact of history, recog-
nized by both the functionalist and the historical materialist.
But a comparison of these two perspectives indicates a completely
different approach to the fact of equality. However, it does not
follow from that recognition that there is any agreement on the
meaning and significance of equality in human society. Therefore,
a comparison of how both functionalists and historical material-
ists interpret this pervasive phenomenon is needed.

A comparison of these social interpretations is likely
to emphasize similarities and differences in the observation
of facts, and in the theoretical approach to explaining those
facts. But a phenomenon such as equality is more than a
matter of fact and theory. It becomes a value for some, often

a battle cry of social movements.

99
In the next section, therefore, we shall deveIOp a
comparison of the functionalist and historical materialist
perspectives on equality by comparing them in terms of fact,

value and theory.

CHAPTER Vi

A_COMPARISON OF THE FUNCTIONALIST AND HISTORICAL

 

MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY

 

So far we have attempted to establish that inequality
has been the trade mark of human history, and characterizes
society in our day. These inequalities were evident to many
who responded to them in one way or another. They may have
attempted to justify the status quo, or may have reacted
strongly against the inequalities of their day. While there
may be slight variations, it appears that the evidence of
social science is overwhelmingly conclusive that there are
inequalities and classes of people even in so-called advanced
Western society. Both the functionalists (many of whom are
positivists in that they go about their argument in a positi-
vist way) and the historical materialists such as Marx attempt
to deal with the fact of inequality from their different
theoretical perspectives.

In comparing the two approaches to equality, it will
assist our thinking to examine the perspectives in light of
the fact of inequality, the value of equality and the theore-
tical approach to equality. First, how do the functionalists

and historical materialists respond to the fact of inequality?

50

51
Second, what is the position of each perspective on the value
of inequality? And thirdly, how do the positivists and Marx
seek to explain inequality in light of their value commitment?

This would be their theoretical perspective.
THE FACT OF INEQUALITY

It has already been noted to considerable extent that
the fact of inequality is as old as human society itself, and
characterizes all of human history. Both functionalists and
historical materialists concur on this point. Davis and Moore
acknowledge that they are "starting from the proposition that

."77 After Marx

no society is 'classless' or unstratified..
designates the four basic stages of historical development,
the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois, he then
recognizes that classes have characterized all these epochs.
"In all former revolutions, the form of activity was always
left unaltered and it was only a question of redistributing
this activity among different people, of introducing a new

division of labor."78

There is simply no empirical evidence
indicating a society which is characterized by equality to any
extent in any regard (whether in terms of power, wealth,
education or division of labor).

It was noted that throughout history many have been

dissatisfied with inequality (like the historical materialists),

 

77Davis and Moore, 0 . cit., p. 292.

78Marx, op. cit., p. 65.

52

while others have attempted to justify them (like the func-
tionalists). Functionalists tend more to relativize the pro-
blem; that is, they speak of degrees of equality as a trend
of greater or lesser inequality over a period of time. Marx
does not seem to speak of such degrees. The historical mate-
rialist deals with limited forms of equality in connection
with social class, while the functionalist treats them inde—
pendently of the class structure. But no theorist on either

side of the issue claims that inequalities are non—existent.

THE VALUE OF EQUALITY

Despite the persistent history of inequality, there is
also a persistent value placed on equality. The facts of
history have not been able to destroy this value.

The functionalist takes a positivistic, value-free
approach to equality. According to this perspective, beliefs
and values transcend the physical, empirical, scientifically
testable world. Whether the appeal be to a deity, to a utOpia
where philosopher-kings rule, to reason, or to the natural
state of life, the solutions all "jump outside" of the real
world. The positivist emphasizes that each of the solutions
to inequality goes beyond the boundaries of science and
explores an area not open to the sociologist when operating
as a social scientist. The sociologist is tied to empirical
science and what it reveals about the world in which we live.

In social science truth can be determined only through the

53
consistent, honest use of science and its testing procedures.
One can sharpen the tools and methods of research, but one
cannot jump to another world where the tools and methods of
scientific examination do not apply and speak with the same
authority-

So the functionalist insists that egalitarian concerns
are just another escape to another world--the product of
wishful thinking which has no scientific support. If one
represents and contends for some egalitarian interest, how
can he know he is supporting an interest which is consistent
with what he knows and claims to be as a social scientist--
one who is committed to evidence as it is validated through
his profession and discipline?

Since stratification is the way society has always
"worked", the functionalist values this stratification above
other values such as equality. This is not to say that the
functionalist does not recognize the value of equality; he
simply thinks in terms of a hierarchy of values, placing meri—
tocracy or equality of opportunity above other values. Daniel
Bell writes

The post-industrial society, in this dimension of

status and power, is the logical extension of the meri-
tocracy; it is the codification of a new social order
based, in principle, on the priority of educated talent.

In social fact, the meritocracy is thus the displace-

ment of one principle of stratification by another, of
achievement for ascription. In the past...this new
principle was considered just. Men were to be judged-~and

rewarded-—not by attributes of birth or of primordial ties
but on individual merit.

 

7gBell, Op. cit., p. 927.

59
For the functionalist, the status quo remains the same while

the value emphasis shifts from ascription to achievement.

"The United States today is not a meritocracy; but this does
not discredit the principle. The idea of equality of oppor—
tunity is a just one, and the problem is to realize it fairly.
The focus, then, has to be on the barriers to such equality."80
Values such as equality would be barriers to meritocracy, or
equality of opportunity. "...One need not impose a rigid
ideological egalitarianism in all matters, if it results in
conflict with other social Objectives and even becomes self-

defeating."81

For the meritocrat, egalitarianism conflicts
with the more essential social objective or value of achieve-
ment. Functionalism builds upon the foundation stones of the
inevitability and positive maintenance of society. The argu-
ment is built upon history and utility. The all—inclusive
appearance of inequality makes it inevitable as a value. The
functionalist insists that the argument for the inevitability
of inequality is based upon human experience throughout human
history, and the egalitorian is unable to support his value of
a macro—sociological level. Therefore, while some functional—
ists recognize that limited inequalities may not be necessary
for society (dysfuntions of racial inequality or inequality of

educational opportunity), yet these inequalities are necessary

for the functioning of privileged groups in society.

 

80Ibid., p. 950.

81Ibid., p. 952:

55

Another key value for the functionalist is utilita-
rianism. Meritocracy insists that the value of achievement
in modern society is necessary in order to hold society to-
gether and make it work. While it is true that other values
may have worked, the fact of the matter is that only strati—
fication in society has worked. There is no evidence, but
only wishful thinking that any other value could work. For
the functionalist,egalitarianism is simply an escape to another
world that does not exist.

Now what about the position of the historical materi-
alist on equality as a value? Marx would look at the process
of production by which humans sustain life, and then social
relations which give rise to values or principles.

Let us admit...that real history, history as temporal
order, is the historical succession in which ideas,
categories and principles have manifested themselves.

Each principle had its own century in which to reveal
itself: The principle of authority, for instance, had the
eleventh century, just as the principle of individualism
had the eighteenth century. Accordingly, it was the
century which belonged to the principle, and not the prin-
ciple which belonged to the century. In other words, it
was the principle which made history, and not history
which made the principle. When further, in order to
save the principles as well as history, we ask ourselves
why a particular principle appeared in the eleventh or
the eighteenth century rather than in any other, we are
bound to study closely the men of the eleventh century and
those of the eighteenth, to examine their respective needs,
their productive forces, their mode of production, the
raw materials of their production, and finally the relations
of man to man which resulted from all these conditions of
life. In making a thorough study of these questions, are
we not presenting the real, profance history of men in
every century, showing men to be at the same time the
authors and the actors of their own drama? But from the
moment that men are represented as the authors and actors

56

of their own history, we arrive, by a roundabout route,

at the real point of departure, for we have now abandoned

the eternal principles from which at first we began.82
Marx would reject any permanent, unchanging values, thus
placing all ideas into their originating context which is a
real history as temporal order, that "historical succession
in which_ideas, categories, and principles have manifested
themselves."

This is the Marxian starting point, as quoted earlier.

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones,

not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can

be made only in the imagination. They are the real

individuals, their activity and their material conditions

of life, including those.which they found already in

existence and those produced by their activity. These

premises can thus be established in a purely empirical

way.
Such a starting point cannot begin with the egalitarian dogma.
As it begins with real individuals and their material condi—
tions of life, it begins with premises which can "be established
in a purely empirical way." But the positivist begins with the
assumption of universal propositions which then form a case
against equality, according to the functionalist. A merito-
crat such as Bell maintains such a starting point, based upon
the evidence of stratification as the only relations which men
have ever known. For Bell, the shift from the old to the new,

or the former to the present relations is not a shift to a new

type of relations (equality), but simply a shift in the basis

 

82Ibid., p. 61

83Ibid., p. 53.

57

of the old inequality.

The post-industrial society, in this dimension of
status and power, is the logical extension of the meri—
tocracy; it is the codification of a new social order
based, in principle, on the priority of educated talent.

In social fact, the meritocracy is thus the displace-
ment of one principle of stratification by another, of
achievement for ascription. In the past...this new
principle was considered just. Men were to be judged-—
and rewarded--not by attributes of birth or primordial
ties but on individual merit.8"

As was mentioned earlier, the meritocracy advocates have his-
tory on their side in this regard. However, they argue that
the fact of inequality is an argument against the value of
equality.
Marx responds in a manner that applies to the issue
at hand.
The whole previous conception of history has either
completely neglected this real basis of history or else
has considered it a secondary matter without any connec-
tion with the course of history. Consequently, history
has always to be written in accordance with an eternal
standard; the real production of life appears as
ghistorical, while what is historical appears as separated
from ordinary life, as supraterrestrial.
Here the funtionalist could continue his argument claiming
there is a tendency to write and interpret history from the
vieWpoint of the "eternal standard" of equality as a value,
unsupported by the facts. "Thus the relation of man to nature
is excluded from history and in this way the antithesis between
nature and history is established. The exponents of this con-

ception of history have consequently only been able to see in

history the political actions of princes and States, religions

 

8"8e11, op. cit., pp. 926-927.

58
and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in particular
have been obligated to share in each historical epoch the

illusion of that epoch." The functionalist may argue that

 

egalitarianism is part of the illusion of the present epoch

in American and Western society. Marx then illustrates,

ii .For1instance, if an epoch imagines itself to be actuated
by purely 'political' or 'religious' motives, although
'religion' and 'politics' are only forms of its true
motives, the historian accepts this opinion. The 'idea,'
the 'conception' of these conditioned men about their

real practice, is transformed into the sole determining,
active force, which controls and determines their practice.

85
It is not difficult to motivate people, even those of the
Western world, with religious motives. An egalitarian cause
can take on a religious flavor and conceal true motives. The
equality concept lends itself to this quite easily because of
its pOpular emotive appeal. It can take the form of an
eternal principle of justice for those who are accustomed

to that sort of thought process while at the same time motiva-
ting the existentialist who would reject the existence of any
absolutes. Thus it can be used to control and determine the
practice of two individuals who are diametrically opposed in
their general philosophy of life. It can be so used to great
effectiveness because of its emotive value in Western thought
as an "illusion of the epoch." The word equality can become,

a .cOntentless banner which individuals are called to follow

with highly motivated fervency. There is no content by which

 

85Ibid., pp. 55-56.

59
by which to test it, so the word can be used to mean the very
opposite of that to which an egalitarian may adhere. The
result may be that some will begin to fear the very word
"equality," not because they lack a desire for it, but because
of memories of its use for obtaining some sort of manipulative
political, religious, or social control.
Quoting Marx again,

When the ideologists had thus assumed that ideas and

thoughts dominated past history, that the history of

ideas was the whole of past history, when they had assumed

that real conditions were modelled on man and his ideal

conditions, i.e., upon his determinations, in short they

have made the history of the consciousness men have of

themselves the basis of their real history, nothing was

easier than to call the history of mind, of ideas, of the

sacred, of representations, the history of 'man' and to

substitute this for real history. 5

The application of this Marxian analysis to the con-

temporary egalitarian issue reemphasizes the epistemological
and metaphysical questions posed earlier. Has equality or the
ideal of classlessness taken on the characteristics of an
eternal standard of measurement, and the teleological goal
of human history? Is it viewed as dominating past history in
the sense that life's real conditions are being modelled on
man as history inevitably evolves to its ideal goal of equality?
Marx would not accept such an interpretation, but would explain
this as humans making "the history of the consciousness men

have of themselves the basis of their real history", which is

calling "the history of the mind, of ideas, of the sacred, of

 

861bid., p. 59.

60
representations, the history of 'man' and to substitute this
for real history."

Elsewhere Marx warns that periods of transformation
are especially vulnerable to this method of historical inter-
pretation.

With the change of the economic foundation the entire
immense structure is more or less rapidly transformed.

In considering such.transformations the distinction should
always be made between the material transformation of

the economic conditions of production which can be deter-
mined with the precision of natural science, and the
legal, political, relgious,aesthetic or philosophical--

in short, ideological, forms in which men become conscious
of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion

of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself,
so can we not judge of such a period of transformation

by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this conscious-
ness must rather be explained from the contradictions of

material life, from the existing conflict between the
social forces of production and the relations of production.

87
So the historian should beware not to judge a period of trans—
formation by itw own consciousness. From the standpoint of
"natural science," humans are producers of inequality in

their relations. Any other picture or projection of human
relations is not real from a scientific point of view. Any
projection of meritocratic society must be based upon an

"idealist View of history." It explains practice from the idea
rather than explaining the formation of ideas from material
practice.

Marx criticized Hegel of the same thing--that is jump-

ing outside of human history and appealing to universal or

absolute ideas.

 

87Ibid.

61

Hegel's conception of history presupposes an abstract

or absolute Spirit which develops in such a way that
humanity lS nothing but a mass which more or less bears
it along. Within the framework of empirical exoteric
history, Hegel introduces the operation of a speculative,
esoteric history. The history of humanity becomes the
history of the abstract Spirit of humanity, a Spirit
above and beyond the real man.

 

 

The idealist can be guilty of appealing to the absolute,
abstract Spirit of classlessness, a value which is above and
beyond the real man.

However, it must be emphasized that Marx is taking a
different approach than Hegel. and the idealists. He is
wrestling with the age old problem in Western thought-~that of
the two worlds. The two world concept can be traced back to
Plato and his mind/body dichotomy. Then it flows through
Kant's noumena/phenomena distinction into Hegel's attempt
to unite the absolute ideas with phenomena. This same dicho-
tomy is evident in the separation of facts and values by the
positivist. For Hegel, the absolute Spirit, history, ideas, or
whatever was the manipulator and director of the phenomenal
realm, where humans live. Marx rejects, or reverses, this,
and in so doing "turns Hegel on his head". It is the phenomenal
world, particularly as it relates to the means of production,
which gives rise to ideas, categories, history, and so on.

Marx does not reject ideas, morality or even the ethic of

equality, but he merely insists that such is not an "abstract

 

88Ibid., p. 57.

62

Spirit of humanity, a Spirit above and beyond the real man,"89

 

a separate metaphysical entity which is not rooted in "real
history" in a firsthand fashion. Marx not only objects to
ideas and absolute Spirits imposing their "wills" upon men,
he also objects to the manner in which Hegelian thought carries
on the dichotomy of ideas and real history.
Just as it separates thought from sense experience, mind
from body, and itself from the world, so it separates
history from natural science and industry, and sees the
birthplace of history, not in vulgar material pgoduction
on earth, but in the cloudy regions of heaven.
Marx is attempting to dissolve the barrier betweenthings as
they appear, and things as they are, between ideas and empirical
reality. He is not rejecting values, but combining them with
"real history" by rooting them in the empirical, phenomenal
world.

On the other hand, Marx avoids the trap of positivism
which begins and ends with.empiricism alone, leaving no room
or place for values, such as egalitarian concerns. Positivism
has a rather paradoxical development, for it begins with
randomness and chance in its purely inductive approach to the
empirical universe, and it ends with determinism. For all
egalitarians, and certainly for Marx, such determinism is

utterly intolerable. However, as a social scientist, Marx is

committed to the historical perspective. How can man's liberty

 

891618., p. 57

90Tbid., p. 59

63
and freedom be salvaged from behavioristic, deterministic
positivism? The Marxian answer is to reject any sort of
metaphysical reality while positing all of history as humanly
created. "...We must begin by stating the first presuppo—
sition of all human experience, and therefore of all history,
namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be

"91 In this way equality can be

able to 'make history'.
attained through human struggle, and approximated through
socialist forms of organization until true communism is

attained.

THE THEORIES OF FUNCTIONALISM AND

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

The theoretical approaches of these two perspectives
is an attempt to explain the fact of equality and in turn a
justification for their respective value positions.
Funtionalism supports stratification as the grouping
together of people according to certain characteristics, and
such groups are ranked higher or lower than one another. The
meritocrat insists that such a system will insure the fulfill-
ment of society's essential needs. The problem of placement
is important since some Of the most essential positions require

the greatest ability and training. "Inevitably, then a society

 

91Ibid., p. 60

69
must have, first, some kind of rewards that it can use as
inducements, and, second some way of distributing these
rewards differently according to position."92 The distri-
bution of these rewards requires stratification.

Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved device
by which societies insure that the most important
positions are consciously filled by the most qualified
persons. Hence, every society, no matter how simple or
complex, must differentiate persons in terms of both
prestige and esteem, and must therefore possess a certain
amount of institutionalized inequality.9

The functional approach justifies classes in society on the
basis of meritocracy.

This class society allocates to individuals according
to specialized abilities rather than by birth.

The post-industrial society, in its initial logic, is

a meritocracy. Differential status and differential
income are based on technical skill and higher education.
Without those achievements one cannot fulfill the require-
ments of the new social division of labor which is a
feature of that society. And there are few high places
Open without those skills.

Bell continues, "a post—industrial society reshapes the class
structure of society by creating new technical elites."95
Such new elites are recognized as the talented ones through
testing. "By the logic of meritocracy, these high-scoring
individuals, no matter where they are in the society, should

be brought to the top to make the best use of their talents."96

 

92Davis and Moore, op. cit., p. 293.

93Ibid., p. 293.

9”Ben, Op. cit., p. 909

951bid., p. 910.

96Ibid., p. 911.

65
It is in the best interest of society to recruit the indi-
vidual achiever into the elite in order that society protect
and develop its most valuable resource.

The principle of equality of opportunity derives from a
fundamental tenet of classic liberalism: that the indi-
vidual--and not the family, community, or the state--is
the singular unit of society, and that the purpose of
societal arrangements is to allow the individual the
freedom to fulfill his own purposes-—by his labor to gain
property, by exchange to satisfy his wants, by upward
mobility to achieve a place commensurate with his talents.
It was assumed that individuals will differ-—in their
natural endowments, in their energy, drive, and motiva-
tion, in their conception of what is desirable—eand the
institutions of society should establish procedures for
regulating fairly the competition and exchanges neces—
sary to fulfill these individually diverse desires and
competencies.

As a principle, equality of opportunity denies the
precedence of birth, of nepotism, of patronage or any other
criterion which allocates place, other than fair competi-
tion open equally to talent and ambition.

A hands-off policy is encouraged by Bell whereby an individual

might be able "to achieve a place commensurate with his talents."

Institutions are only to assure fair competition, recognizing

that individuals differ in energy, motivation and desire.
Funtionalism is concerned with providing for the best

men to get to the top.

Thee.meritocracy, in the best meaning of that word,

is made up of those worthy of praise. They are the men
who are the best in their fields, as judged by their
fellows.

And just as some individuals are worthy or praise, so
are certain institutions--e.g., those engaged in the cul-
tivation of achievement, the institutions of science and
scholarship, culture and learning. The university is
dedicated to...scholarship and learning to the transmission
of knowledge from those who are competent to those who are
capable. There is no reason why a university cannot be a

 

971mm, p. 925-926.

66

meritocracy, without impairing the esteem of other
institutions. There is every reason why a university
has to be a meritocracy if the resources of a society--
for research, for scholarship, for learning-~are to be
spent for 'mutual advantage', and if a degree of culture
is to prevail.

And there is no reason why the principle of meritocracy
should not obtain in business and government as well. One
wants entrepreneurs and innovators who can expand the
amount of productive wealth for society. One wants men
in political Office who can govern well. The quality
of life in any society is determined, in considerable
measure, by the quality of leadership. A society that
does not have its best men at the head of its leading
institutions is a sociological and moral
absurdity.

Nor is this in contradiction with the principles of
fairness. One can acknowledge...the priority of the
disadvantaged...as an axiom of social policy, without
diminishing the opportunity for the best to rise to the
top through work and effort. The principles of merit,
achievement, and universalism are...the necessary founda-
tions for a productive—~and cultivated—-society. 8

Men of achievement would be judged by their peers as to whether
or not they were worthy of elevation. The university can

serve as a key institution of achievement, cultivating the
talents of themeritocracy. Those talents would, in turn,

be invested for the mutual benefit of all. Even the disad-
vantaged would come out ahead, for they would receive priority.
But productive, cultivated society can only be realized through
the principles of merit and achievement.

Karl Marx, the historical materialist, explains
inequality in a completely different manner. He places it in
the context of a communist society which develops out of history.
"What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not

as it has developed on its own foundation, but, on the contrary

 

 

g816id., p. 959.

67

just as it emerges from capitalist society; and which is thus
in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually,
still stamped with birthmarks of the old society from whose
womb it emerges." For Marx, the Communistic Society or equality
does not "develop on its own foundation" as a universal
absolute, but "it emerges from capitalist society." Since
he views history and life as a flow, there is no place for
static, isolated values. All values, experiences, and
classes come out of or emerge from the history which humans
created before that time. Truth and knowledge flow out of
this river of life or this womb, and that is an important
clue for evaluating a Marxian epistemology.

Now the value of equality emerges out of human history,
specifically out of capitalistic society as Marx goes on to
explain.

Accordingly, the.individual producer receives back from
society—~after the deductions have been made--exactly
what he contributes to it. What he has contributed to
it is his individual quantum of labour. For example,
the social working day consists of the sum of the indivi-
dual hours of work; the individual labour-time of the
individual producer is the part of the social working day
contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a
certificate from society that he has furnished such and
such an amount of labour (after deducting his labour
for the common funds), and with this certificate he
draws from the social stock of means of consumption as
much as costs the same amount of labour. The same amount
of labour which he has given to society in one form he
receives back in another.

...a given amount of labour in one form is exchanged
for an equal amount of labour in another form.

Hence, equal right here is still in principle-—
bourgepis right....

In spite of this advance, equal right is still burdened
with bourgeois limitations. The right of the producers
is proportional to the labour they supply; the equality

 

 

68

consists in the fact that measurement is made an equal
standard, labour.

But one man is superior to another physically or
mentally and so supplies more labour in the same time,
or can labour for a longer time; and labour, to serve as
a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity,
otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement.

The e ual right is an unequal labour. It recognizes no
class differences, because everyone is only a worker like
everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal indivi-
dual endowment, and thus natural privileges in respect

of productive capacity. It is, therefore, in its content,
a right of inequality, like every right. Right by its

very nature can consist only in the application of an

equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would

not be different individuals if they were not unequal)

can only be assessed by an equal standard in so far as

they are regarded from a single aspect, from one particular
side only, as for instance, in the present case, they are
regarded only as workers, and nothing more is seen in
them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker
is married, another not; one has more children than another,
and so on. Thus, with an equal performance of labour,

and hence an equal share in the social consumption fund,
one.individual will in fact be richer than another, and

so on. To avoid all these defects, right instead of

being equal would have to be unequal.

But these defects are inevitable in the first place
of communist society as it is when it has just emerged
after Prolonged birth—pangs from capitalist society.
Right can never be higher than the economic structure of
society and the cultural development conditioned by it.

 

In passing, it should be noted that here is another indication
of the evolving, developing, flowing interpretation of human
history, and "right" emerges out of such a flow, rather than
being imposed upon it or poured into it as a universal proposi—
tion. Right can never be higher than the economic structure
of society because it is born out of such structure.
Marx continues,
In a higher phase of communistic society, when the enslav—
ing subordination of the individual to the division of

labour, and with it the antithesis between mental and
physical labour, has banished; when labour is no longer

69

merely a means of life but has become life's principle

need; when the productive forces have also increased

with the all-round development of the individual, and

all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly--

only then will it be possible completely to transcend

the narrow outlook of bourgeois right and only then will

society be able to inscribe on its banners: From each

according to his ability, to each according to his needs!

For Marx, history is teleological; it is moving toward

the goal of an equal distribution of goods according to one's
needs. However, this egalitarian goal is not superimposed
upon human history as an absolute ideal, but emerges out of
it. And this history is made up of many inequalities. Marx
notes just a few of them:

...one man is superior to another physically or mentally

and so supplies more labour in the same time, or can

labour for a longer time...It recognizes no class differ-

ences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else;

but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowments,

and thus natural privileges in respect of productive

capacity...Further, one worker is married, another not;

one has more children than another, and so on.
These are the facts of life for the positivist who divorces
Values from facts in his strictly empirical science. But
Marx is committed to relating and unifying these ingredients
of history which seem so chaotic and disjointed by "the divi-
sion of labour, and...the antithesis between mental and physi-
cal labour". Since history is a flow and a continual develop-
ment for Marx, these loose ends are tied together and related

in the process of development. But he also is committed to

remain with the phenomenal world rather than jumping to the

 

ggIbid., pp. 256-258.

70
noumenal realm, or to project an absolute standard from
"the history of the abstract spirit of humanity, a Spirit

above and beyond the real man."100

 

Marx applies a value of measurement, and he refers to
it in the extended quote above. "Right by its very nature
can consist only in the application of an equal standard."
Ultimately that standard will not be reached overnight. It
was born out of the womb of bourgeois right, which emerges
with capitalist society. SO "in spite of this advance,
equal right is still burdened with bourgeois limitations."

In capitalism, "...the equality consists in the fact that
measurement is made with an equal standard, labour." But
Marx warns,

...and labour, to serve.as a measure, must be defined

by its duration and intensity, otherwise it senses to be

a standard of measurement. The equal right is an unequal
right for unequal labour...It is, therefore, in its content,
a right of inequality like every right..., but unequal indi-
viduals...can only be assessed by an equal standard in so
far as they are regarded from a single aspect...Thus,

with an equal performance of labour, and hence an equal
share in the social consumption fund, one individual

will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer
than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects,

right instead of being equal would have to be unequal.

However, this will be outgrown as equal right moves on to
maturity, having been born in the womb of bourgeois right.

...when labour is no longer a means of life but has become
life's principle need; when the productive forces have
also increased with the all-round develOpment of the indi-
vidual, and all the springs of cooperative wealn1flow more
abundantly—-only then will it be possible to transcend

the narrow outlook of bourgeois right...

 

100Ibid., p. 57.

71

Equal right or communist society is the unifying
factor for Marx. There are defects or inequalities in the
real world of human history, in bourgeois capitalism and its
standard of equal measurement, labor. But Marx wishes
"to avoid all these defects," and although "these defects
are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it
is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth-pangs from
capitalist society," yet such defects are signs of immaturity
and will be outgrown through human struggle. Thus the
inequalities, inconsistencies and apparent unrelatedness of
human history are fused together in a flow. Communist society
leaves humans in control, but has a goal which is firmly
rooted in the apparent inequalities of human experience.

So while the functionalist attempts to justify classes
on the basis of meritocracy, Marx sees the inequalities as
human-made products which will be eliminated as a communist

society develops out of the womb.of capitalism.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has noted, first of all, the universal
fact of inequality. Stratification has been a way of life
for humans on earth throughout history. The primary theore-
tical perspectives from a sociological point of view have
been those of the functionalist and that of Karl Marx. These
two theories have been contrasted in terms of the positivist
(functionalism) and the historical materialist (Marx). Each
takes a different position on the value of equality. Equality
as a value is perceived in a positive manner by the historical
materialist, and negatively by the meritocratic functionalist
who builds upon positivistic assumptions.

Functionalists attempt to argue from history, claiming
that people have known nothing else and emphasizing that it
has always "worked". The functional position is a utilitarian
stance which determines whether certain societal relationships
"work" better than others. Such a meritocracy is supposed to
let super-achievers rise to the top, and their expertise
will engineer society toward the most profitable course.

This implies a "knower" of no small stature who is quite certain
as to which course.society should take in order to work, thus
achieving the greatest amount of benefit for the greatest amount
of peOple. Such insight knows what is best for society,

72

73
even if the persons in that society disagree. Those indivi-
duals simply do not "know" what is best for them.

The positivist social scientist examines the empirical
data and inductively concludes that because inequality has
been a fact of history, it should be adopted as a value in
decisions regarding current and future social policy. But
values are beyond knowing if this value-free, purely objective,
empirical approach is to remain consistent.

The Marxian approach limits values to the historical
development of material life. Values then grow out of such
relationships. Marx does not try to conceal values, recog-
nizing that valueless science produces meaningless life where
humans become machines responding to stimuli in a behavioristic
fashion. He clearly rejects this impersonal mechanistic
approach to the human situation. 80 the goal for Marx is
to establish a material, historical base for the value of
equality of classlessness. The positivist would protest
that the historical materialist imposes classlessness as a
value upon the historical, empirical data as an assumption
before the fact.

At this point it is recognized that the positivist
and the historical materialist think differently. The positi-
vist reasons inductively, from particulars (facts) to genera—
lizations as a naturalist. But the historical materialist

thinks critically. He is committed to a dialectical approach

79
where facts and values are blended together in the constant
flux and flow of human history. History for the positivist
would be like a sequence of events which can be isolated
as distinct stages. But time is not like separate frames on
a video tape for the historical materialist. So if one
approaches Marx from a positivistic position, he would insist
that Marx is presupposing his dialectical methodology upon
history. However, a Marxian system of thought does not permit
such assumptions, but rather insists that such a dialectical
flow is inherent in human history and can be gleaned from
an examination of the mode of production.

Along this same line of thinking, it would be well to
emphasize that the view of history as a flow or process does
not lend itself to any sort of absolutes. The Marxian view
of history as a flow will not allow for any universal, absolute
standard that would stand over and above history and by which
history would be judged. So values like that of equality
are part of the process and flow of history.

For the functionalist the value of equality is relegated
to the area of the post-cognitive sphere, and is beyond knowing.
The positivist considers that which is post—empirical as being
post-rational. His world is divided into two realms: the
phenomenal world which he can know through his senses, and
the noumenal world which is not testable and cannot be validated.
But for Marx, equality is not post-rational, for everything

grows out of human history.

75

So it can be concluded that the positivist and the
historical materialist are thinking in different and opposite
directions. The positivist begins with the assumption of a
value—free social science perspective, and with universalism.
In his universalism as a functionalist he assumes that pro-
positions have universal application, and that the study of
society can be treated ahistorically. So it is assumed that
inequality always has been and always will be. It builds social
science on the physical science model where there are
universal laws that do not allow for cultural differences or
historical change.

On the other hand, the historical materialist sees
history as definitive. He assumes historical differences
and changes that are not the same for all of time. He rejects
the simple cause and effect method as inapprOpriate for social

science.

While both approaches are distinctly different in
their approach to equality, neither approach can be used to
prove or disprove the value of equality as an appropriate value
for the social scientist. Ethics simply cannot be empirically
based or validated by what is. Facts do not explain values,
but facts are historical and culturally explained and given
meaning by systems of thought. These systems of thought or
theories such as positivism and historical materialism are
historically and culturally limited and each starts with expli-
cit and implicit assumptions, many of which are taken for

granted.

76
So while inequality is an undeniable fact of history,
the value of equality may be worked into any number of
theories which attempt to explain that fact. And those theories
may Offer guidance for praxis in a meritocratic or an egali-
tarian direction, depending on how they value equality as

that which is either desirable or undesirable.

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