~ I o DC. I o, . n t v" 31:] o '11 . l o O - \¢ 3 t 4 A. u VI i no I‘- vbn Wu». H 1‘. VI: 3%: It} ..Ql|..4.."dl ‘. .- ol hut 1.4.]: n .0 .§¢ Ill antbr o O Ll »' V . OI. l 1\ 1...! wadv I LI 1' A I. l I . I. II V! 00 I; o a. AI. p {‘18 Oblalllh r: v I‘ o 4 v‘. . 510001.: 9&7»; 3»! Cal'- ~I.l .o . l I . Inn-Ill \ u {a} ‘ wvvn.I1 VI .fi.’ |n v. lo I ‘5 "if: “I I I. n O o 1) § no ‘1“!- u ‘ g ‘4 , ell“. - tn .\ . v . nls - I I .I I... I . I . l u"l It :0 ulf ‘IIIO- " utnv".'ln 1‘” - II‘](H..‘¢'DIVH'I(-II.I \I'IIIDD III 1"" la \ ragtuvoo g1}! . I \ I ‘f ' Ils- 0 ‘1 '0 Ill - it}. . ; l ‘11 a .‘l I. O. ’ ("B l lllWWI“WW“WWWllllllljlllll 3 1293 10463 THESl-E‘ This is to certify that the dissertation entitled A TRIUMPH OF BUREAUCRACY: THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKEAND THE IDEOLOGIOAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN POLICE STRUCTURE presented by Jonathan Randall White has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D. degmin Social Science i {MM Mjo rropfes Date MS U is an Affirmatiw Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 RETURNING MATERIALS: MSU Place in book drop to remove this checkout from w your record. FINES will .be chargedfiif book is returned aff'é‘r the liate stamped below. )1 were /; A TRIUMPH OF BUREAUCRACY: THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN POLICE STRUCTURE By Jonathan Randall White A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY College of Social Science 1982 ABSTRACT A TRIUMPH OF BUREAUCRACY: THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN POLICE STRUCTURE By Jonathan Randall White This work is a reinterpretation of the Boston Police strike based on a secondary resource review and the use of primary documents to describe the actual events of the strike. Three areas receive consideration: (1) the relationship of the strike to the bureaucratic reforms of progressivism, (2) the meaning of the strike within the context of 1919 and (3) the long term impact of the strike on police labor militancy. The revisionist view of progressivism is presented, and two cases in New'York City and Pennsylvania are briefly summarized to describe police reform within.the progressive context. Boston's experience is contrasted and compared to the progressive experience in order to capture the pro- gressive influences at work in Boston. The strike is also presented apart from progressivism, as it can be seen as a threat to the socio-political order or 1919. The ideological model or police bureaucracy had been accepted by 1919, but police agencies had not fully institutionalized the concept of centralized authority. An analysis of the long term impact of the strike is used to explain the final triumph of centralized bureau- cratic power and the decline of police unionism. These two events guided American.policing in the twentieth century and serve as the basis for explaining both attempts to reform the police institution and the militancy exhibi- ted by police labor unions after 1960. © Copyright by JONATHAN RANDALL WHITE 1982 Dedicated to my Family, Marcia, Katie Jo and Charlie Thank you for four years of help and sacrifice. 111 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The completion of a Ph.D. is one of the most meaningful and arduous tasks a student undertakes. The preparation of the dissertation requires that the demands the student makes on himself and others become more intense. This process cannot be completed without much assistance and understanding from family, friends, co-workers, faculty and fellow students. I cannot thank everyone by name, but I am most grateful for all the help over the past four years. My sincere appreciation is expressed to my disser- tation and guidance committee members: Dr. Peter Manning, Professor of Sociology and Psychiatry; Dr. David Kalinich, Professor of Criminal Justice; and Dr. Gary Miller, Profes- sor of Political Science. This work could not have been completed without their help and guidance. Special thanks are expressed to Dr. Kenneth Christian, Professor of Crimi- nal Justice, my committee chair, counselor and friend. Dr. Christian went above and beyond the call of duty. For assistance in the research and documentary collection I would like to thank the staffs of the Calvin College Library, the Grand Rapids Junior College Library and the Boston Public Library. I am also grateful to iv Dr. Richard Hill and Ms. Beth Shapiro for their assistance in the initial phases of the documentary and bibliographi- cal search process and Dr. Jack R. Greene for his kind help throughout the entire program. Appreciation is expressed to my colleagues at Grand Rapids Junior College for their friendship and moral sup- port through the years. For this I would like to thank Professor Mark London (especially for flexible teaching schedules), Professor’John Godisak and Dr. Mary DeYoung. In many ways this degree has been a family effort. Understanding, help, shared frustration.and "tuition bail-out" were appreciated. For this I would like to thank my parents, Dencil and.Crystle White, and also Kenneth and Helen Medendorp. Finally to my most severe critic, editor and typist, I am extremely thankful to my wife, Marcia. For all the typing, for all the support, for allowing me to spend so much time away from home, for taking care of Katie Jo and Charlie while "Dad was going to college” . . . thank you, Marcia. Even though you told me not to do it, I could not dedicate my best effort to anyone else. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O . O O O O O I O O 0 Chapter I. II. III. IV. THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLICE BURMUCRACY O O O O O O O O O O The Strike and Progressivism . The Strike and 1919 . . . Interest Groups and Coalitions The New Economic Order . . . . The Temptation of Conspiracy . The Impenderable Question . . . LITERATURE REVIEW . . . . . . . . General American Police History . Selected Sources on Progressive Police Reform: New York and Pennsylvania. . Chronological Narratives of the Primary Sources on the Strike . “mommy O O O O O O O O O 0 0 Addressing Concepts and Forming Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . Research Tools . . . . . . . . Bibliographies . . . . . . . Theses and Dissertations . . Periodical Indexes and Abstra Newspaper Indexes . . . Biographical Sources . . . . Other Sources . . . . . . . . Comments on the Sources . . . . Document Indexes and Library Guides THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY OF AMERICAN POLI 01 NO 0 O O O O O O O O O O cts Strike. The Revisionist Interpretation of Progressive History . . . . . Policing as a Reflection of a New Social Order . . . . . . . . Page 78 86 Chapter VI. VII. VIII. Interest Coalitions in New York: Structural Reform.on the Municipal Level 0 O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O 0 Role Contradiction: The Creation of the Pennsylvania State Police . . . . CONTRADICTION AND CONFRONTATION: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN BOSTON, 191900eeeeeeeeeeeeeee The Boston Social Club . . . . . The Police Commissioner and Centralized Power . . . . . . . . . 1919 and National Hysteria . . . . . . THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE . . . . . . . . winter and Summer 1919: Prelude to strik. O O O O O O The APL Charter . . . The Strike . . . . . THE TRIUMPH OP BUREAUCRACY . . . . . . . The Triumph of Conservatism and the Police Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . Labor and Labor's Regulation . . . . . The Defeat of Police Unionism and Its Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUMMARY 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O BIBLIOGRAPH O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O I O O Page 91 10h 113 115 122 135 11th 1&6: 167 186 189 198 205» 21 1 213 220 INTRODUCTION There are many works on the history of American police reform including the Boston Police strike. These works tend to fall into two broad categories; they are either chronological narratives of events or they are written to support a particular view of police reform. WOrks on the Boston Police strike usually can be cate- gorized as chronological narratives. Descriptions of the police strike generally recount the experience within a limited historical frame. Russell (1975) was able to capture the meaning of the strike in terms of 1919. Lyons (19h7), Robeson (19h?) and Haas (1960) provided chronological narratives of the strike. Reppetto (1978), Fogelson (1977) and Walker (1977) described the long term impact of the strike. These works were excellent in a limited realm, but they failed to relate the strike to its progressive origins and its role in the flow of social change. Further inter- pretation is necessary in order to capture the meanings of the strike in a broadened historical context. The purpose of this work is to consider the Boston Police strike within an expanded historical frame. It is primarily a secondary source study designed to reinterpret the strike in a broadened social context. Three major areas are considered: (1) the bureaucratic relationship of the strike to progressivism, (2) the meaning of the strike in 1919 and (3) the impact of the strike on labor militancy. Such an examination is neces- sary because Boston was more than a saga in the drama of police history. When it is seen as the final act of progressivism within the Red Scare of 1919, it emerges ‘/ as one of the major factors shaping the destiny of the American.police. Each section of the dissertation has a specific purpose. The essential arguments of the paper are intro- duced in Chapter I. Chapters II and III are standard inclusions in any dissertation, containing respectively, a review of the literature and a description of the metho- dology. Chapter IV contains a summary of the revisionist view of progressivism and a brief examination of two cases of progressive police reform. The general situation in 1919 Boston resulting from progressivism and the Red Scare is discussed in Chapter V. Chapter VI contains a chronolo- gical narrative of the strike while Chapter VII is an attempt to reinterpret the strike within a broadened socio-historical context. Chapter VIII is simply a brief summary of the arguments presented throughout the paper. As a brief clarification for the reader unfamiliar with American historiography, it should he noted that the Progressive Era was a reform period falling between.the Gilded Age and the business boom of the 1920s. Generally, it was the period between 1890 and 1920. Traditionalists contend that it was a time when government intervened in the private economy to regulate business in the public interest. Revisionists, on the other hand, argue that government intervention was accomplished at the urging of corporate giants and that reform was actually a guise t/ for the consolidation and self-regulation of industry. A further note of interest to the historian con- cerns the mob which ricted in Boston. The mob did.not represent a proletarian revolt or the rule of Boston by gangs of criminals. It did represent a heterogeneous mixture of individuals and some violence was designed to support the police. Although beyond the scape of this research, the composition of the mob and its motivations merit further examination. CHAPTER I The Ideological Origins of Police Bureaucracy Nineteen hundred nineteen was an eventful year in American history. The doughboys returned home and John J. Pershing was given a hero's welcome by a grateful nation. Vbodrow Wilson spent much of his time taking his plea for American participation in the League of Nations directly to the American people. Labor activists Big Bill Haywood and Samuel Gompers were respectively fighting Jail sentences and organizing workers as the year was interspersed with unionization, strikes and violence. Radical elements of i society chose not to remain silent. During June no less than eight bombs were detonated by radical groups wishing to overthrow the government. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, one of the unsuccessful targets of the June bombers, combined governmental action with the wrath of a frightened America to fervently attack anything he deemed to be "un- American." Nineteen hundred nineteen was a year of tension, fear and change. The events of the year also had a substantial impact on American policing. Progressivism had been a time of change for American police agencies. Popularly denoted as the beginning of professionalism, progressive reform re- modeled police departments into centralized, highly h S structured bureaucracies, ultimately creating a new ideolo- gical police administrative model.1 The popularity of bureaucratic structures was based on the belief that a can- tralized organization would rid policing of corruption and inefficiency. Bureaucracy in law enforcement translated into centralized executive power, rigid paramilitary hier- archy and shifting police accountability from local, often informal, units of urban government to a monolithic rule- bound organization.2 Although it set the pattern for modern American policing, the adoption of the bureaucratic model tended to simplify some of the complex relationships between officers and their organizations. The most prominent example of this situation occurred in postwar Boston. Nineteen nineteen was a year of change for America and it also re- presented the triumph cf the bureaucratic structuring in American law enforcement. 1Robert M. Fogelson, Bi Cit Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 197V;, §3-El. 2For further elaboration on this definition see Donald P. Warwick, A Theor of Public Bureaucrac : Politics, Personalit and Or anization in the State De artment (Cam- ridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1 7 , - . (Warwick stresses the weberian variables of hierarchy, officiality and technical proficiency.) For the origins of bureaus and their institutionalization see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureau- crac (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) S; 2h-31. or the po ice adaptation of bureaucracy see Abraham S. Blumberg, Criminal Justice: Issues nd Ironies (New Yerk: New View- points, 19795, 72-75. (Blumberg contends that police bureaucracy is characterized by six salient features: (1) a functional division of labor and responsibility, (2) downgrading of individual personality, (3) rational decision-making. (h) a fetish of secrecy, (5) submission to bureaucratic control and authority, and (6) economic security and Job tenure.) This work will examine the Boston Police strike of 1919 in terms of its two most significant results, the institutionalization of bureaucratic hierarchy in law enforcement and the inability of organized labor to ( challenge the structure from within. Occurring in the twilight of progressivism, the strike cannot be viewed apart from the reform are because it represented a chal— lenge to the progressive order. The anti-union forces supporting the city of Boston won a victory that sanctioned the final acceptance of the progressive police structure and sounded the death toll for the early police labor move- ment. When police unions reemerged, they were arrogant, militant and powerful. The legacy of the Boston Police strike is found in the inability of institutionalized police bureaus to develop a cOOperative relationship with police labor. In short, the Boston Police strike helped/ to insure a triumph.of bureaucracy and a reemergence of labor militancy in law enforcement. The Strike and Progressivism One of the most striking similarities between the strike and progressivism.was the continued use of the poli- tical processes used by progressive reformers. Both the city and the police union attempted to create temporary interest coalitions as soon as a confrontation appeared imminent. During the reform era temporary alliances among various reform groups were commonplace. Often having very little in common, these groups Joined and demanded police reforms which usually culminated in centralized management and a bureaucratic hierarchy. After defeating a common enemy these coalitions soon disbanded leaving the new hier- archy in their wake. This process was evident in New Yerk and Pennsylvania and it served as a political pattern for the actors associated with the strike. A second relationship between labor disputes and the reform era resulted from the establishment of a new economic order. By the First werld war American business was vir- tually self-regulated.with consolidated industrial giants controlling the market. Labor unsuccessfully challenged corporate domination of American democracy in 1919, partial- ly as a reaction to progressivism. The police strike was a small part of labor's challenge, yet since the industrial revolution the police had traditionally been used in favor of business interests. The actions of the striking police were interpreted as desertion of duty by the business com- munity, and the police, who played a role in labor regulation, would not be allowed to identify with anti-corporate forces. The police lacked the power to question their involvement and role in the corporate state. This situation gave rise to a third aspect of'progres- sivism and the police role, the alliance between government and private enterprise which led to a role contradiction for the police. On one hand the police were expected to regulate labor, while on the other they became increasingly cOgnizant of their own role as laborers. The alliance of government '/ and private enterprise refused to legitimize police labor activity, however, and a role contradiction continued. The police were left with yet another ambivalent function in an increasingly complex situation. Because police work is inundated.with internal con- tradietions, the appearance of a new contradiction may appear to be insignificant.“ However, if progressivism can be viewed as a series of confrontations among interest coalitions, the situation in Boston reflected this process with an interest- ing twist. Whereas police agencies were supposed to ally with progressive business type coalitions, the patrol offi- cers decided to pool their interests with organized labor. This decision was unacceptable to the progressive power structure. With respect to role contradictions, the police have been allowed to vacillate between formal expectations and informal group norms. This was not true in the realm of organized labor. The Boston experience demonstrated that police labor loyalty was to remain consistent with formal expectations. The Strike and 1919 Other aspects of the strike were more reflective of the situation before and after 1919. First, if the strike is viewed only as the outcome of the Progressive Era, it can incorrectly be simplified as merely a challenge to the private industrial order. The strike was much more 9 complicated that that.3 It was perceived to be a challenge to every facet of American democracy. Accordingly, part of this work will focus on the meanings of post war events separate from the influence of progressivism. Second, the strike emphasized the dichotomy between private or public unionism and police unionism. There was never a question concerning the right of public or private employees to unionize. This right had been established earlier. The essential question for the police centered on L/ their affiliation with external labor organizations. No one denied the right of the police to organize, but they violently opposed affiliation with.the general labor move- ment even though other private and public unions had a recognized right to engage in such affiliations. Finally, evidence indicates that the strike had long lasting effects on police unionism. It not only destroyed any real attempts of major urban police forces to make demands from their employers, it also allowed.anti police union forces to be placed in a position of relatively un- checked power for nearly forty years. The Boston Police strike solidified repressive managerial tactics in law v/ enforcement administration and provided the rationale for labor militancy when police unions were reborn. After years 3 Francis Russell, A Cit in Terror: The 1 1 Boston Police Strike (New Yerk: ViEing, 197;), 7-21. 10 of frustration workers demanded a change in administrative behavior. The police strike then is part of the flow of history. It is simultaneously linked to progressivism, the panic of 1919 and the rebirth of police unionism. In terms of pro- gressivism the strike represents the process of interest group coalition formation, the role of the police in the new economic order, the contradiction of that role and the emergence of the contradiction in Boston. The implications of the strike which move beyond progressive reform include its meaning within the context of a period of social change, its impact on unionism in general and its legacy for the police labor movement. Interest Groups and Coalitions The activity of interest groups was evident through- out all progressive police reform. In the traditional view of interest group activity, theorists suggest that groups are endemic to all societies and they tend to congregate around similar interests.h The process of government is explained by analyzing competition among the groups attempt- ing to achieve political power.5 Theorists contend that hDavid B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New 5Arthur F. Bently, The Process of Government (Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1967), 199. 11 interest group competition is the dynamic means by which societies operate. More advanced societies exhibit compli- cated forms of competition while primitive societies engage in less complex behavioral modes. Regardless of the level, competition is the dynamic core of interest group theory.6 Despite the convenience of interest group theory, police reform took place neither in a vacuum nor in a plur- alistic free market model of interest group competition.7 Competition was not the dynamic which moved the reformers, rather it was their subjective interpretations of social reality when combined into alliances strong enough to take some form of political action. The police reform movement, the development of a new ideological administrative struc- ture and the challenge of that structure under the auspices of a police strike were indicative of a process generally ignored by interest group theorists. Coalitions of interest groups wielded more power than individual interests. The dynamic which spawned police reform coalitions was predica- ted on the interpretations of social actors. Interpretations which resulted in action were the backbone of progressive 6Truman, 33-36. 7Peter K. Manning, Police work: The Soci 1 Or aniza- Wfl (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. 1577). 29-31. 12 police reform and the challenge to the bureaucratic model it created. Herein lies the crux of progressive police reform and its relationship to the Boston Police strike. Interest groups competed for influence over the police, but competi- tion gave way to bargaining among the reformers and temporary interest coalitions were formed. The coalitions were guided by nebulous principles, they focused on a common enemy and ’ when the enemy was defeated they ceased to function since they no longer had a unifying factor. The subjective inter- pretation of reform allowed many diverse actors and groups to join under the progressive label. Actors subjectively defined the circumstances surrounding police reform and they often chose to cooperate rather than to compete. Richard Hofstadter suggests that cooperation among interest groups was prevalent throughout reform periods from the 1890's to the 1930's, and an examination of police reform movements through and including the Boston Police strike tends to lend credence to his argument.9 Three unlikely reform groups allied in New IOrk City during the mid-1890's. In 1905 interest coalitions again appeared as 8David Silverman, The Theo of Or anisations (New York: Basic Books, 1970), CHapter 6. See also James 8. Coleman, "Social Structure and a Theory of Action,” in Peter M. Blau (ed.), roaches to the Stud of Social Structure (New York: nge Press, 1973). (TEese works pre- sent a Brief synopsis of phenomenological and action theories.) 9Richard Hofstadter, The figs of Reform: From Bryan t0 FeDeRe (new york: Knopf, , 3 3 -3 e 13 a consolidated state police movement began in Pennsylvania. By 1919 the pattern for coalition.formation was clear for Bostonians. Interest groups made subjective decisions about the police labor situation and placed many of their ideological goals aside to join with strange bedfellows in pursuit of a common goal. The process of coalition formation reveals quite a bit about police reform. First, it indicates the methods by which political groups moved through.the drama of reform. Second, as coalitions grew around.an issue, divergent interpretations were changed to reflect the characters of the coalition. Third, reinterpretation of events often led to a simplification of the situation, providing an easy method for reducing complex social issues into simple con- frontations between "good" and "evil." With the dichotomy drawn, the forces on the side of ”good" were usually vic- torious. This progressive reform.pattern was evident in Boston. As the city and patrol officers gradually defined their positions, they formed alliances to strengthen their ground. Some of the alliances were strange indeed, much as the coalition between the police and organized labor. As the coalitions gained strength, they became more heteroge- neous forcing a simplification of issues. Patrol officers and their allies saw policemen as laborers seeking decent working conditions while the city and its cohorts believed they were observing the initial stages of a revolution. 1h In an age of a Bolshevik scare, the confrontation was soon simplified into a struggle between American 8°9§3939 Bol- shevik evil. The police were doomed to defeat from the minute they walked out. The New Economic Order The new economic order created by progressivism was also an important factor in the strike. In the traditional view the Progressive Era was seen as a time of reform and good government. Inefficiency was replaced by efficiency and corrupt officials by honest citizens. Some historians have even implied that progressivism was the forerunner of the New Deal.10 Police reform, however, must be considered beyond the framework of the traditional paradigm. When the traditional interpretation of progressivism is revised, the nature of police reform and the Boston strike take on some interesting new'meanings. Revision of the traditional paradigm began as early as the 1930's. Charles and Mary Beard postulated that the dominant theme of American history was the protection and 11 consolidation of wealth. This helped pave the way for 1ORichard Hofstadter, ”The Meaning of the Progressive Movement,” in Hofstadter (ed.), The Pro receive Mbvement: 1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-HalI, 1963), 9-11. 11See Charles A. Beard, E onomic In er ret ion of The United States Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1930) and CEErIes and Mary B3ard, The Histogz of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1936). 15 the revised interpretation of progressivism which gained widespread acceptance during the Viet Nam War.12 Two revisionist scholars, Gabriel Kolko and James fir woinstein, offer an alternative interpretation of the Progressive Era. In The Triumph of Conservatism Kolko argues that the Progressive Era represented a victory for conservative economic interests. Regulation favored large corporations. Intervention took place under the auspices of public protection, but in actual practice intervention served the interests of big business. According to Kolko: Progressivism was initially a movement for‘ the political rationalization of business and industrial conditions, a movement that operated on the assumption that the general welfare of the community could be best served by satisfying the concrete needs of business. But the regulation itself was invariably controlled by leaders of the regulated industry, and directed toward 1 ends they deemed acceptable or desirable. 3 After defining political capitalism as the utilization [of political outlets to attain rationalization in the soon- omy, Kolko concludes that progressive politics created poli- tical capitalism in the United States. Businessmen defined governmental intervention in the private economy and no significant group could challenge their power. The 128ee for example William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle, T966). 13oabriel Kolko, The Trium h of Conservatism: A Reinte retation of AmerIcan Histor , 1905-1916 (New York: Free P 1963) , ress, , 2-3- 16 Progressive Era was typified by consensus and unity among business leaders and political leadership.1h In short, it was a period of corporate political consolidation. Weinstein's thesis complements Kolko's argument. According to Weinstein, government intervention in private sector economics was strongly supported by the interest groups representing American industry. While Kolko exam- ines the conservative nature of this process, Weinstein captures the consolidation of corporate power in The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: By 1918 the leaders of the large corpora- tions and banks emerged secure in their loose hegemony over the political struc- ture. They did so by accepting, and unobtrusively leading, a new politics which we will call corporate liberalism, but that was known then by such names as the New Nationalism and the New Free- dom . . . (a climate) that was truly conservative triumphed; it did so in the name of liberalism.15 In Weinstein's view the Progressive Era was a period where business, government and organized labor cooperated and the result was the consolidation of corporate economic power. Within the framework of the Kolko-Weinstein thesis progressive police reform, and subsequently the Boston Police strike, assume a different character. Corporate ”Hbid. , 279-280 . 1SJames Weinstein, The Co crate Ideal in the Liberal S ate: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), 3. 17 interests demanded government intervention which was con- ducive to economic consolidation and growth. Business utilized regulatory agencies to achieve these goals. New bureaus were created and established institutions were reformed. The police, an established institution, were transfigured during the Progressive Era and partially designed to protect the needs of the new economic order. Despite the police role in consolidated capitalism, the elite classes were never able to gain complete control of the police.16 This served to maximize the psychological impact of the strike. Although the police did not become an industrial dominated regulatory agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, they were used liberally as a tool of business. Much of the police violence at the turn of the century was aimed at labor unions. Business leaders were prepared to sacrifice direct control of the 1 police, but they would not tolerate police alliances with organized labor. ‘The police role in political capitalism was limited, yet the business community attached a great deal of importance to it. A breakdown in law enforcement symbolized an ominous threat to consolidated American industry. Eventually, a breakdown occurred in one of the best police departments in the United States. Whereas many 16Samuel Walker, A critical Histo of Police Reform: The Emer ence of Profession lism (szington, MA: Heath, 1977), xii. ‘ 18 urban police departments had been subjected to public scorn and ridicule, the Boston Police Department represented the epitome of bureaucratic organization. Bureaus did not reform New York City and they merely left the Pennsylvania State Police with a military hierarchy. Boston was dif- ferent. Bathed in police controversy prior to 1905, the centralized bureau achieved reform under the benevolent despotic hand of Stephen O'Meara. Boston was Europe in America and Bostonians believed that police bureaucracy was one primary reason for'success in law enforcement.17 It was shocking when the progressive view of police administration was challenged in Boston. Other'police departments were the centers of heated controversy, but Boston had remained aloof. New'York City was the scene of scandal after scandal even after a rational bureaucracy was established.18 Early state police units were critized for their apparent alliance with industrial interests. For example, Colorado mine workers even engaged in an open war with the National Guard after a state police sanctioned attack on striking workers at Ludlow in 191k.19 Under 17Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue Parade (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 88-93. 18Fogelson, 1-12. See also Gerald Astor, The New York Cgpg: Ag Informal History (New York: Scribner, 1971). 19Graham Adams, Jr., The e of Industrial Violence, 1310-1215 (New York: ColumbIa UnIversiti Press, 1966), 19 O'Meara's firm guidance Boston had avoided such confronta- tions. Pew Americans expected trouble with the Boston Police. 'When viewed from the police perspective, however, the strike was not surprising. The new economic order did not work to the advantage of the patrolman. O'Heara's untimely death came as the economic situation worsened, and police officers were increasingly identifying with the labor movement. It was a contradiction, but only one of many in police work. The police were regulators and workers simultaneously, Just as they were officers and citizens in the same manner. The contradiction was important only to the extent that workers were not zealously impressed with police unionization. Unconvinced that the police strike represented the interests of organized labor, Boston union. \ members would.remain on the Job. In a crisis the police found themselves deserted by the left. Police union acti- vity was not surprising, but it failed. At the same time the strike served as a direct chal- lenge to the progressive economic order. The police simply could not walk out. Other strikes could be tolerated, but a police strike represented a threat to business stability. In the words of a New'IOrk Times editorial, the police had no more right to strike than soldiers or sailors.20 The proponents of industrial order could not condone a police zoflew York Times, September 18, 1919. 20 walkout and they Joined to meet it with their full measure of force. The victory for the progressive coalition was so important that a relatively unknown leader rode the tide of national reaction to the strike to the White House. The American police would not be allowed to strike against the public interest, and, in terms of the progressive order, that meant the interests of consolidated industry. The Temptation of Conspiracy With the total acceptance of the progressive model and the anti-union sentiment, it is sometimes tempting to suspect that a conspiracy was fostered among the industri- alists seeking to consolidate capital. Neither the labor nor industrial reactions were the products of conspiracy. They formed dynamic and highly volatile alliances which could not plan actions over a long period of thme. Both sides attempted to Join many diverse groups in the hope of using political ideology to their advantage. Reactions to the Boston Police strike sprang from catharsis, not conspiracy. Unique in 1919, the reactions remained indi- cative of progressive coalitions.21 If the strike is viewed independently of progres- sivism, conspiracy seems even less likely. American society was in chaos in 1919. Major industrial strikes loomed 2‘ Hofstadter, "The Meaning of the Progressive Move- ment," 9-11. See also comments by Kolko, 8-10 and weinstein, 1X-Xe 21 ever present. The fear of the Russian Revolution was real and Americans believed that Bolshevism was being actively exported from the Soviet Union. Their fears were intensi- fied by radical militants who attempted to kill government officials and plant bombs throughout American industry. In foreign affairs woodrow Wilson was seeking support for the League of Nations and essential questions concerning isolationism were foremost in the minds of foreign policy oriented Americans. If industrialists would have engaged in a plot, they would have had far greater concerns than police labor conditions. The Imponderable Question In the final analysis it is dangerous to ask ”what if" questions in history, but the events of progressivism and the police strike still manage to impose an interesting question. What if police administrators and bustness leaders had responded to the police problem by elevating the working status of police officers to a more profes- sional level allowing for social and class mobility? Police labor relations probably would have been less militant and police agencies would have probably developed the characteristics of a regulatory agency. This can be demonstrated by the adoption of bureaucratic models in other progressive regulatory agencies. Boston.could not destroy bureaucracy, but it could have changed the structure of internal power relationships. 22 The Boston Police strike was the final attempt to question the use of the rational ideological model in.police adhinistration. Just as the social and political realities of 1919 doomed officers from the moment they walked out, the popularity and acceptance of centralized rational hierarchy in regulatory agencies insured a triumph of bureaucracy. The only question.addressed in Boston dealt with power allocation inside the bureau. In the end the chiefs won. CHAPTER II Literature Review Prior to the mid 1970s it was very difficult to study social changes in the American police experience due to a lack of secondary police historical literature.\ For the most part, scholars who wished to focus on speci- fic time periods were forced to use primary documents as traditional historians and sociologists had generally ignored the development of the police institution.1 The research conducted for this dissertation revealed that the situation is improving. There are many new works which recount events in police history, not merely for the sake of remembering the past, but to demonstrate the pro- cesses of social change. The methodology used in this work would have been inadequate were it not for this recent development. In keeping with the multi-disciplin- ary approach of criminal Justice, the social aspects of criminal Justice in an historical sense have received growing attention and the body of police historical lit- erature is improving . 1Samuel walker, "Urban Police in American History: A Review of the Literature," Journal of Police Science and Administration, 3 (Summer 197 : 33 - . 23 21; Despite this improvement it cannot be argued that a genuine historiography of American policing exists. werks can be classified into ideological schools, but works focusing on specific historiographical periods are few. For this reason it was necessary to approach the. literature review in a rather unique fashion. Apparently no one has attempted to capture the meanings of the Boston Police strike within the flow of American historiography or the general historical experience. It was therefore necessary to combine a series of different types of literature to capture this flow. At face value many of the sources used in this dissertation are unrelated, but the thesis of the work unites sources from more traditional disciplines. To capture the meaning ”and impact of the strike it was necessary to use this multi-disciplinary approach. The literature used in this study fell into several broad categories. Obviously, since the study was included in a specific time period general historical sources were used. Specific administrative texts from the turn of the century were also valuable. Some sociological and politi- cal science sources were used to uncover the meanings of POlice reform and the strike. General works in police history outlined the strike and other works provided a chronological narrative of the events. In some cases Primary sources, including correspondence, newspapers, autobiographies and official reports, were used to complement 25 other material. In an orthodox historical setting the unification of these broad categories may be questionable, but such unification was necessary to examine the inter- relationships of the strike's social aspects. It was beyond the scope of the literature review to examine all of these categories. For example, since the strike was related to progressivism, the post war era and more modern policing several pages could have been devoted to a review of American historical works, yet this would have done little to explicate the liter- ature which produced the thesis. Therefore, the literature review was limited to the specific sources which served as the basis for reinterpreting the Boston Police strike in a broadened social context. These sources included: (1) general police historical works, (2) lbmited secondary sources on progressive policing: (3) chronological narra- tives of strike activities and (h) primary works dealing with.the Boston.Police strike. Specifically excluded from the literature review were socio-political works dealing with specific time periods and studies in American history. These works provided the concepts necessary to reinterpret the strike, but they did not deal specifically with the events and circumstances surrounding the affair. General American Police History One of the more important secondary works to emerge in recent years is Samuel walker's inquiry on American 26 police reform.2 walker classified three types of histori- cal methodologies for describing police development. The heroic school emerges from the belief that the police separate the decent elements of society from those who would destroy it. The heroic school contends that the police militantly defend society and sacrifice their lives so that the majority of Americans may be free from poten- tial terrorization by the criminal element. Katherine Mayo's work on the Pennsylvania State Police is indicative of the heroic school.3 The second historical tradition was spawned from Marxism. walker sees Marxist histories as an attempt to demonstrate a conspiracy between the police, or the peeple who control the police, and the controllers of capital. Whereas walker dismisses the heroic school for its trite- ness, he vehemently attacks the Marxists, arguing that there is no basis for’their belief in conspiracy and that Marxists are too involved in dogma to allow events to be interpreted Objectively.h 2Samuel walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism (Lexington, MA: Heath, 977 . . 3Katherine Mayo, Jgftigg to All: The Story of'the Pennsylvania State Police New York: Harperrand Row, 922). See also Mayo s wor s, Demobilization and the State Police," North.American Review, 209 (June 1919): 786-79h and Mounted Justice: True Stories of the Penn lvania State Police (New York: Putnam, 1955’. ”For example see B. C. Johnson, ”Taking Care of Labor - The Police in American Politics," Theory and Society, 3 (Spring 1976): 89-117. 27 walker suggests that a third school, a “critical" school, is necessary to adequately describe the history of American policing. The purpose of ”critical history" is to find a mid-point between the dogma of both the heroic school and Marxism. walker wants to critically evaluate the past in order to objectively understand police history. In short, walker seeks to discover the impact the American police had on society and ultimately argues that it was minimal because the police did not control crime and they did not socialize the population. One central thesis cf walker's work is that the maJor change in American.policing came with the emergence of professionalism during the Progressive Era. Profes- sionalism is defined as police adaptation of impersonal, bureaucratic standards as characterized.by changes in police literature, the types of’police services and the progressive reform movement. Professionalism was not a unified movement: it was composed of a series of local and regional reform movements. \In addition, he dichoto- mizes police professionalism separating it from progressive reform. One group of’professionals sought modern managerial efficiency while another group wanted to change police agencies into instruments of social reform. walker uses three time periods to explicate and support the thesis. The first part of the book explores policing in the nineteenth century and sets the background for professionalism. The second portion focusses on 28 1900-1918 and develops the link between administrative efficiency and professionalism. The third part of the book examines some contemporary issues in policing and evaluates them in tense of the social welfare and bureau- cratic definitions of professionalism. Although walker is a maJor contributor to the history of policing in the Progressive Era, a maJor weakness of his work deals with his use of "critical historiography.” It becomes obvious from the first few pages of the introduction that he is not using critical theory in terms of Jurgen Habermas and the Frankfort School, but that he has developed his own ”critical theory." What is his theory? Apparently, walker argues that ”crit- ical" social history is anything that is used.to attack either heroic or Marxist views. On several occasions, especially when dealing with the anti-labor role of the police, he takes pains to criticize heroic and Marxist interpretations of police history, yet his own arguments contain some internal contradictions and he never bothers to criticize them. walker's study should not be associated with critical theory. Another serious weakness of walker's work is his insistence upon separating progressive reformers from police reformers. By his own admission the progressive concepts of managerial efficiency became the bulwark of modern police bureaucracy. In addition, the research in this dissertation reveals that progressive reformers were 29 active in police affairs. Granted, police reform repre- sented a specific type of progressivism, but it was closely linked to the development of administrative hierarchies in law enforcement. Had walker avoided this unwarranted separation, the link between progressivism and the police strike would have been less ambivalent. Walker's treatment of the general chronology of progressive reform and the police strike is strong although he fails to link progressivism to the strike. He provides an excellent narrative of corruption investigations, the failures and successes of municipal and state police reform movements and police unionization. He is keenly aware of Stephen O'Meara's role in establishing the philosOphy of the Boston Police Department and Edwin Curtis' inability to continue that role. With respect to the strike walker also argues that the entire structure of police bureaucracy could have been altered had the strikers achieved success. walker's purpose is to present a broad overview of police reform. He succeeds in this realm, but he has an almost overwhelming topic. Any study which focusses on a specific event will naturally find some weaknesses in his interpretation. Aside from his misuse of critical theory and his failure to link the strike to a broadened historical context, his history is a very strong work. In a very real sense walker is a modern pioneer in police history. Most significantly he captures the evolution of police profes- sionalization in terms of bureaucracy. His work was also 30 used extensively as a secondary source for the experiences in New York City and Pennsylvania. Robert Fogelson's Big City Police was used exten- sively to describe the long term impact of the strike.5 Fogelson neither explores the details of the strike nor its relationship to progressivism, but he develops the strongest interpretation of the ramifications of the anti-police union philosOphy after 1919. Like walker, Fogelson wishes to develop a comprehensive synopsis of the history of police reform. He uses this to explain contemporary issues facing big city police. Arising from public concern with corruption, Fogelson argues that waves of police reform movements swept through urban America from 1890 to 1930. He identifies these reforms with pro- gressivism and.contends that they were a maJor factor in changing both the administrative structure of policing and the social structure of the urban environment. When urban police agencies were reformed by the progressives, individual officers shifted their loyalty from local poli- tical bosses and neighborhoods to the bureaucratic structure of the police agency. Fogelson's analysis of progressivism provided the rationale for arguing that a new brueaucratic ideological structure resulted from the reform movement. 5Robert M. Fogelson, Bi Cit Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977;. 31 Fogelson identifies a second reform period stretch- ing from 19h0-1970. Unlike the reforms of progressivism which were imposed externally, the 19h0-1970 period reflec- ted a move toward internal reform. Fogelson argues that the police sought greater respectability and.professional status during this period. A third period of reform began in the 1960s. It was an external movement designed to redirect the focus of police standards from bureaucratic norms and to make police agencies accountable to neighbor- hoods. This movement, according to Fogelson, appears to have failed. Pegelson establishes the strongest link with pro- gressivism and modern bureaucratic structuring. Although this link has been established by both traditional and revisionist historians, Fogelson demonstrates that the gospel of efficiency was not only linked to regulatory bodies such as the Forestry Service and the Food and Drug Administration: it was directly linked to the creation of a new urban police concept. The ideological administrative model for contemporary policing was established during the Progressive Era. Big City Police also contains an excellent account of the Lexow Investigation. Fogelson approaches the inves- tigation with a unique form, by comparing it both cross culturally with other national police organizations and internally with the progressive movement in urban America. In his description of the events leading to the hearings, 32 Fogelson manages to capture the flavor of progressive reform coalitions. Pogelson only mentions the strike in passing, but he examines the anti-police union sentiment in detail. Linking this sentiment to the strike, he contends that the police were limited to membership in fraternal and benevolence associations after the walkout. He points out that American police were unwilling to become militant because of the paternalistic policies deve10ped by police administrators between the wars. Militancy resulted after world war II when paternalistic mechanisms broke down. The Blue Parade, one of the most comprehensive works in American police history by Thomas Reppetto, is designed to provide an account of police organizational deve10pment.6 Using a colorful description of both actors and events, Reppetto attempts to capture many organizational concepts and combine them into a broad theme of American policing. "Police administration, as the parade metaphor implies, is dramatic, colorful and to a large extent repetitive, and clearly is not simply a technical special- ization."7 To Reppetto, the police institution developed from myriad local, state and national political activities and he writes a social history examining maJor events and the contemporary interpretation of those events. 6Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue ngade (New York: Free Press, 1978). 71bid., 299. 33 Reppetto makes his arguments through the use of several case studies and cross cultural comparisons with European policing. In each case study he examines the maJor actors and.events and he compares the outcomes with trends in other areas. Three broad themes emerge from this methodology. Pirst, policing was geographically and ideologically separated in the United States. Second, similar command structures evolved in most maJor police departments, but local politics and cultural diversity accounted for different social actions in similar struc- tures. Third, Reppetto assumes that ideology and actions within the bureaucratic structure may be evaluated in terms of relative comparison. America did not have a single police policy and.this has resulted in several distinct schools of policing, accord- ing to Reppetto. Boston was one of the most notable attempts to establish a European police system in America, but it failed in 1919. New York set the stage for scandals and progressive reform through the use of outside investigatory committees, while Chicago served as an example of criminal influence in police policy. The state police movement was an attempt to establish a centralized police administra- tion through progressive reform. Reppetto also cites the attempt to augment local police systems with a national police force. California and vollmer represented the pro- fessional legacy of modern American policing. Unlike EurOpe there was no national police institution in America. 3h One of the weaknesses of Reppetto's work is his failure to compare the political systems of Europe and America while comparing police institutions. He adequately demonstrates that the British.model was not applicable to the American situation, but fails to offer an explanation aside from class structure. Traditionally, the parliamen- tary system of Britain and other EurOpean governments has provided a base for continuity in policy. The American political process does not have this base. For example, when a conservative government comes to power in Britain, conservative policies are ensured since the party controls its members and the outcome of legislative referenda. America does not exhibit this characteristic because its legislative members are relatively more independent of party platforms and party control. It is not surprising that American police departments differ from European police agencies when the legislative systems are compared. This is a maJor reason for the lack of a national police policy in the United States, but Reppetto does not fully explore this relationship. Apart from this weakness, Reppetto covers the apparatus of American police control rather well. This is accomplished through the introduction of interpretation by the actors of the maJor events of the day. Reppetto does an outstanding Job of introducing the maJor actors and discussing the motives behind their decisions. He combines the political and police administrative spheres 35 with the feelings of other power groups. For example, he focusses not only on the Parkhurst-Roosevelt liason, but he combines them with power coalitions inside the New Yerk press and police department. Reppetto is one of the few police historical scholars who has managed to reveal the tension inside police reform coalitions and he suggests the logic for the eventual breakdown of reform groups. Progressive reformers could not stay united once corruption was defeated since they destroyed their unifying factor, the common enemy of corruption. Once the common enemy appeared to have weakened, there was too much diversity among the reformers to continue the coalition. Reppetto is a firm believer in the role of police leadership. Although he minimizes the importance of the Lexow Committee, he sees Roosevelt and Parkhurst as the main thrust behind the reform of the New York Police, and even though Roosevelt left the Board of Police Commission- ers in the wake of the Sunday Closing Laws, Reppetto sees his influence in New Yerk after the return of Tammany. On the west coast the primary reason for the development of the professional model was the work of August Vollmer and his contemporaries. The Boston Police strike was partially the result of a leadership failure. Reppetto's history is the study of the influence of police leadership. Reppetto does a good Job of explaining the role of the press. Other historical works cover the use of the 36 press and their ability to influence policy, but Reppetto seeks to explain the logic behind the power. Jacob Riis, Lincoln Steffens and others were in business to sell news- papers. Police corruption scandals were as important to sales as maJor crime investigation stories. Reformers such as Riis certainly had other motives, but Reppetto's interpretation of their roles is related to other critiques of Jingoism. Newspaper competition was fierce during the Progressive Era and sensationalistic police stories sold copies. Selected Sources on Progressive Police Reform: New York and Pennsylvania The examination of Boston within the framework of progressivism necessitated the use of several sources which described police reform in its progressive context. The examination of New York and Pennsylvania was only used to set the tone for Boston, dictating that the review of progressive works be brief and highly selective. It was necessary to examine these works, but they constituted neither the maJor portion of the research nor the main emphasis of the thesis. The following works are mentioned only because they allowed a broadened historical interpre- tation of the strike. None of the works dealt directly with the Boston situation. Several secondary works were used to describe the reform coalitions of the Lexow Investigation in 189k New 37 York. James F. Richardson's, The New York Police, does not focus directly on progressivism, but it provides a solid basis for examining police reform in New York. A narrative history of law enforcement in New York, the work provides a description of the Peelian system adapted in 18hh and its transfiguration.into a bureaucratic hier- archy in the 1890s. Richardson argues that efficiency in administration and rationalization of social and criminal regulation became the police mandate for New York after the 189k reforms. Although he does not appear to realize it, this was the logical outcome of progressive police reform: in essence, a triumph of bureaucracy. Perhaps the most readable secondary work on the New York Police comes from Gerald Astor.9 In The New zprk Cepg, Astor draws heavily on several primary sources and devotes three chapters to the Lexow reform movement. There is, however, a maJor weakness in the work. Astor is a Journalist and his book is designed for popular consumption. While it is obvious that he relied on pri- mary sources, his use of documentation and footnoting is poor. Indeed, the reader must be familiar with primary works, contemporary newspaper articles and documents before the authenticity of Astor's accounts can'be verified. ' / 8James P. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901 (New Yerk: Oxford University-Press, 1975). 9Gerald Astor, The Ne York Co s: An Informal Histogy (New York: Scribner, 1971). 38 Despite the lack of scholarly style, which.Astor states is not intended, the work provides an excellent description of corruption prior to the Lexow Investigation and the resulting reforms. Given the Journalistic nature of the work, Astor is able to describe in very humanistic terms the motives and actions of the reformers. He does this while avoiding both sensationalism and moralism. His methodology captures a view of the reformers that is not presented in more scholarly works. For example, when Rev. Charles Parkhurst was attempting to gather evidence against the Croker-Tammany machine, Astor's writing style allows the reader to accompany Parkhurst and his parish- ioners into New York's red light districts. The account is not only informative, it is very enJoyable and readable. Although designed for popular consumption The New Yerk Caps is an important and valuable secondary source and its only weakness is the lack of scholarly documentation. A master's thesis written by Scot Gibson is avail- able from Michigan State University.1ol Gibson offers an historical account of Theodore Roosevelt's tenure as President of the New Yerk City Board of Police Commissioners. The work is biographical in nature, examining both the impor- tance of the police position in Roosevelt's career and the reforms initiated by Roosevelt. Like Astor, Gibson cites 1oScot Louis Gibson, Theodore Roosevelt as Presi- dent of the New York Cit Board of Police Commissioners (Michigan State University: Master‘s TESsis, 197E). 39 the Sunday Closing Law as the primary reason for Roose- velt's decision to leave New York politics and he concludes that the reforms help to improve the professional character of the department even after the return of Tammany. Unlike Astor, Gibson acceptably documents his work and it contains extremely valuable resources. The work not only provides a biographical sketch, it serves as an excellent synapsis of primary source material. Several other works were used to comment on New Yerk reforms. william McAdoo presented a contemporary description of New Yerk in 1906.11 Using a variety of sources, including first hand accounts and personal exper- iences, McAdoo presented law enforcement from a policeman's point of view. He admitted that the police department had problems with corruption, but argued that the reform move- ment ended serious problems with graft and payoffs. Another contemporary source took an opposing view.12 George Turner, writing for McClure's Magazine in 1909, still found the police-Tammany link quite prevalent. Both of these sources were evaluated within their historical context end were limited by their point of view, but they provided informa- tion about the tension produced by social change. 11William McAdoo, Guarding a Great City (New York: Harper and Row, 1906). 12George Kibbe Turner, ”Tammany Control of New Yerk by Professional Criminals,” McClure's Magazine, n.v. (June 1909): 117-13h. no A few primary sources provided information on New Yerk reform. It should be noted that these sources men- tioned the Lexow Investigation in passing and.that they were not written for the sole purpose of police reform. Theodore Roosevelt and Lincoln Steffens described their roles in police reform in their autobiographies, while Steffen's Shame of the Cities did much to expose police corruption.13 Dissatisfied with the reforms of Lexow, w. T. Stead vehemently attacked the vice problem in New Yerk as he argued that vice flourished not from public demand, but from a strong connection between criminals 11; and police. He called for vigorous enforcement of vice laws from a reformed police department. An additional primary work was Charles Parkhurst's apology for his tenure with the Society for the Prevention of Crime.15 The primary purposes of Parkhurst's work were to describe the events that led to the Lexow Investigation and to recount the testimony given during the committee hearings. The work was somewhat pompous as Parkhurst flaunted his victory in the face of Tammany politicians, 13Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography (New York: Scribner, 192k); Lincoln Steffens, Autobiography (New Yerk: Harcourt Brace, 1931): and Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New'YOrk: Hill and Wang, 1970: orig., . 1hw. T. Stead Satan's Invisible world Dis la ed (New York: Fenno, 1897). 15Charles H. Parkhurst, Our Fight yith Tammany (New York: Scribner, 1895). h1 but it captured the reform movement from Parkhurst's view. Aside from descriptions, Parkhurst's work also provided an insight into his personality. It captured the fervent fundamentalist reform aura better than any other source. Several secondary sources were also used in the brief examination of the Pennsylvania State Police. Deeply entrenched in the heroic tradition described by Samuel walker was Katherine Mayo's, Justice to 511.16 Although designed as an apology, the work offered several secondary and first-hand accounts on the origins of'the state police. It was hardly designed to describe the coalition between business interests and the Roosevelt administration, but_ it indicated that such a coalition existed. Roosevelt took a personal hand in developing the book, writing the preface for the first edition. All of Mayo's work was inundated with flag waving patriotism and Justice to All was no exception. Still, if Mayo's perspective and.purpose are taken into account, the work detailed the origins of the Pennsylvania State Police, and the state police move- ment in general, from the official point of view. Justice to All clearly called for the acceptance of centralized bureaucracy with rigid control from a paramilitary adminis- tration. It was and remains a political ap010gy for prOgressive police reform on the state level. 16Mayo, Justice to All. h2 The Pennsylvania State Police by Phillip M. Conti is the infernally endorsed official history, but by no means is it as rhetorical as Justice to All.17 Conti describes the internal regulations and administrative structure of the original police force, and he Justifies the adoption of the military model. He dismisses the A claims of early critics as the utterances of radical left and never questions the dichotomization and duplication of police services represented by the formation of the Pennsylvania State Police. The deveIOpment of the state police, in Conti's view, was simply the result of honest citizens attempting to professionalize police work. By accepting this view Conti misses several important con- cepts. He fails to realize the impact of bureaucracy, the further institutionalization of the military model and the use of the police to promote a stable business climate. . In 1915 the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor approached the state police from the other side of the political spectrum.18 American Cossack summarized the AFL's position on the state police movement. According to the Federation of Labor, the state police were designed 17Phillip M. Conti, The Penna lvania State Police (New Ybrk: Stackpole, 1977). 8Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, American Co s ck (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, 1915)- 1+3 to suppress organized labor. Trained in military tactics and employed from cavalry formations, state troopers existed to break picket lines and to arrest labor organizers. The Cossack analogy came from the loyalty of the Volga Dons to repressive Russian regimes. The Pennsylvania State Police, using mass cavalry formations in military actions, were the American version of the Russian horsemen, according to the Federation of Labor. Obviously a biased source, American Cossack approached the state police quite differ- ently from endorsed histories or apologies. A more balanced and far more scholarly view comes from Joseph John Holmes' doctoral dissertation on the Pennsylvania National Guard.19 It is not designed as an analysis of the state police, but it provides several provocative insights into their deve10pment. Holmes' thesis is that the National Guard's domestic function was to protect Pennsylvania's steel and coal mining industry from strikes and labor violence. As the demands for a full time centralized police force grew, the National Guard eventually gave way to the new state police in 1905. The administrative hierarchy, methods of Operation.and general character of the state police were directly inherited from the National Guard. In essence, the state police represented the National Guard's domestic function. 19Joseph John Holmes, The Nation 1 Guard of Penns l- vania: Policemen of Industgy (Ph.D. Dissertation: Univer- sity of Connecticut, 97 . 1414. Given the purpose of his dissertation, Holmes also does an adequate Job of describing the national character of the reform movement. Two very helpful administrative works came from Bruce Smith.20 Smith briefly acknowledged the political controversy surrounding the state police, but he focussed more on their operational characteristics and problems. He pointed to the ability of the state police to centralize information and to cross Jurisdictional boundaries. He was also willing to admit, as early as 1925, that the organizational structure of state police systems had a tendency to become too rigid. He devoted quite a bit of attention to the Pennsylvania approach and criticized their biassed response to industrial disturbances. Smith offered pragmatic suggestions fer improving operational efficiency. Chronological Narratives of the Strike It was necessary to examine works dealing with cases in the Progressive Era only because the Boston Police strike has been considered in a limited historical context. Research dealing with the strike has generally focussed only on the events in 1919 and the influence of progressi- vism has been ignored. Descriptions of the strike, however, zoBruce Smith, Rural Crime Control (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1933) and The State M (New York: MacMillan, 1925). #5 tend to be highly detailed and documented. Research covering the chronology of events is fairly complete and extremely competent. Several articles appeared shortly after the strike.21 These works collectively were designed to give an editorial opinion concerning the strike. They usually offered a synapsis of the walkout and then launched an attack on outside union affiliation and striking as a means to redress grievances. They overwhelmingly denied the right of the police to strike and reflected the mood of the country in 1919. One of the first scholarly works to describe the strike without editorial comment was Richard L. Lyons, "The Boston Police Strike of 1919."22 Realizing that the strike had a devasting impact on police unionism, Lyons argued that the results of the strike overshadowed the events. He sought to describe the strike in terms of 1919. The strike created a situation in which the dominant poli- tical power of New England was challenged by an inadequate 21”Boston Police Strike," Survey, h2 (Summer 1920): 881-882; "Boston Police Strike: An Assault upon Our Govern- ment,“ Open Shep Review, 16 (October 1919): hO9-h15: Gregory Mason, "No Bolshevism for Boston,” Outlook, 123 (September 1919): 27: ”Police Strikes," Canadian Municipal Journal, n.v. (September 1919): 300; "Policeman's Right to Strike,” Literary Digest, 62 (September 1919); and "Shall the Police Strike: Public Opinion Gives a Negative Answer," Good Government, 36 (September 1919): 139-1h7: 22Richard L. Lyons, "The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” New England Qpprterly, 20 (July 19h7): 1h8-159. h6 force. This caused the strikers to lose, eventually transforming the police department from a model of excel- lence to a mediocre organization. The police lacked the political power to support the strike and they chose one of the worst possible times to walk out. The newly recruited police officers were never able to obtain community respect and support. The legacy of the strike was poor policing. In the same year that Lyons' work was published Peter Robeson offered a far more comprehensive view of the strike in his master's thesis.23 This appears to be one of the first works that used primary sources to his- torically describe the strike. Robeson introduced the grievances of the policemen while outlining the city's response and the motivations of the principal actors. He saw the strike as a challenge to American ideals and' acknowledged the importance of 1919. His greatest contri- bution was the use of primary sources and the location and review of original documents. In 1960 Frederick Manuel Koss completed his doc- toral research.on the Boston Police strike.2h Although Koss limited his interpretation of the strike to the events of 1919 and its impact on internal police labor 23Peter Robeson, The Boston Police Strike of 1 1 (Master's Thesis: Columbia University, 19E7). 2“Frederick Manuel Koss, The Boston Police Strike (Ph.D. Dissertation: Boston Univers ty, . 1:? relations, his work captured several important aspects of the confrontation. While Robeson uncovered some pri- mary documents, Koss surrounded his work with.them. His political analysis of the strike contains references to original documents and he used these sources to support .his thesis. The Boston Police strike was highly signifi- cant because it catapulted a relatively unknown governor to the White House and because it virtually destroyed police unionism. Koss' work also has some historiographical signi- ficance. Scholars such as Fogelson, walker and Reppetto described the long term impact on unionism after police unions reemerged. Ross was writing at the same time that the unions were becoming militant and reasserting them- selves. It is interesting to note that he hinted at labor militancy as a result of the administrative response that continued in policing after 1919. Granted, the position of patrol officers was relatively good under the period of paternalism following the strike, but when the pater- nalistic mechanisms broke down at the end of the Second werld war, the police had absolutely no method for improv- ing their conditions without identifying with big labor. Koss seemed to suggest that this situation was a result of the resounding defeat of police unionism in 1919. He did not predict the militant labor movement, but he was certainly aware that police officers would not accept the legacy of Boston forever. 14,8 The maJor secondary work used in this research recently appeared. Francis Russell's §_g;tyin Terror is by far the most comprehensive and best documented chronological narrative of the strike.25 Both walker and Reppetto draw on it and it is safe to argue that Russell represents the state-of-the-art of strike research. The work is lacking in some areas, especially when consider- ing the strike within the context of police reform, but more than any other researcher, Russell captures 1919 Boston. Russell offers several opinions concerning the strike. It was due in no small measure to the power obtained by Police Commissioner Stephen O'Meara and the inability of his successor, Edwin Curtis, to control the reigns of power. The strike also resulted from the city's failure to rectify the economic and working conditions of the individual officers. The striking officers were deemed from the moment they walked out because the nation was caught in the midst of the Red Scare. Strikes in recent years have not had the impact of Boston because Americans do not believe that democracy is threatened when the police walk out. The strongest point of Russell's book is his nar- rative of events. Citing Hess and Robeson in his —V—77 25Francis Russell, A Cit in Terror: The 1919 Bos- ton Police Strike (New York: Viking, 1975). #9 bibliography, Russell combines a variety of primary and secondary sources to describe the strike. He paints a . passionate picture of the strike in human terms and he identifies the personal failures and triumphs which led to the eventual outcome. Like most authors he is unwil- ling to criticize O'Meara, yet he does point to Opposing views. He works to dispel the Coolidge myth, attributing the restoration of order to Andrew Peters, but he attacks corrupt Bostonian politics. Even while condemning Curtis, Russell describes the occasions when the commissioner attempted to meet the call of the hour. The blend of his primary and secondary sources leads to this excellent synopsis. There are two shortcomings in A Cipy in Terror that bear mentioning. First, although it is obvious that Russell thoroughly documented his research, there are no footnotes and except where he directly quotes a secondary work, the origins of the sources are extremely confused. In his classic history of the Spanish Armada, Garrett Matingly states that he did not use footnotes for fear of encumbering the reader. Ladislas Farago's biography of George Patton excludes footnotes for-the same reason. Perhaps Russell would offer the same rationale: the book is highly readable. The second weakness is Russell's failure to grasp the influence of progressivism on the police strike. His description of the 1906 reforms is outstanding, but he 50 chose not to relate them to progressivism. When one reads Russell, one obtains the impression that Boston was in a vacuum. Russell's failure to capture the progressive influence is especially lamentable since he devotes quite a bit of attention to the national political situation in 1919 and the effect of the Boston Police strike on police unionism in general. Although intended to provide more than a narrative of the police strike, one of Coolidge's biographies should be mentioned before discussing primary literature. In A Puritan in Babylon, William Allen White offered an apology for Coolidge's actions during the labor confrontation.26 This work was an indication of the Coolidge myth and sum- marized one of the popular interpretations of the strike. Curtis was portrayed as an inept administrator and Peters was deemed a corrupt politician using the strike to embar- rass the governor. For the most part the police were victims of economic circumstances, but they had no right to desert their public posts. Coolidge, White's here, was described as the man who stepped forward to save Boston, and subsequently America, from anarchy. White presented a description of the strike based on Coolidge's perspective. 26William Allen White, A Puritan in Bab lon: The Stopy of Calvin Coolidge (New York: Macmillan, 1938). 51 Primary Sources on the Strike There are several primary sources dealing with the Boston Police strike and they are relatively easy to obtain. Many documents and private papers affecting the strike have been reprinted. One notable example is the 1971 reprint of the Boston Police and Storrow Committee reports. These documents have been printed in their original form without editorial comment.27 Boston newspaper reprints can be ordered from the Boston Public Library and the Baker Library, Harvard University. In addition, Calvin Coolidge deals with the strike in his autobiography. Although not cited in this work, the papers of the Massachusetts National Guard have also been printed and they detail the duties of the soldiers patrolling the city during the strike.28 It was not difficult to gather primary material for research. One of the main sources of information was the 1919 Annual Police Report.29 Written by Edwin Curtis with the assistance of his legalistically oriented deputy comman- der, the report covered a vast array of police personnel 27Robert M. Fogelson (ed.), The Boston Police Strike: Two Reports (New York: Arno, 1971). 28Massachusetts State Guard, thes, Data and Ditties: Unofficial Record of the Tour of Duty of A Company, 11th Be iment Infantr Massachusetts State GuardeDuring the Boston Police Strike (Boston: (c) 1919). 29Fourteenth Annual Re ort of the Police Commissioner for the Cit of Bostonr Year Ending November 35, 1212 (New .Ybrk: Arno Press, 19 ; orig. 92 . 52 matters, it addressed the concerns confronting the depart- ment, it provided a breakdown of fiscal expenditures and it gave the official administrative version of the police strike. As its title implies, it was a report on police business. The synopsis of the strike was valuable. The staunch puritanical personality of Curtis was echoed through the lines, as the report Justified the actions taken by the commissioner and Governor Coolidge. There was also a subtle condemnation of Mayor Peters and a section compli- menting the National Guard and Brigadier General Samuel Parker for their efforts in restoring order. Crime rates provided some indirect evidence about the rioting. Although there was no synOpsis of the violence and no report on the number of arrests made during the strike, it can be seen that crime rates rose significantly in 1919. This may not have been due to the rioting, but it leaves room for speculation. Another helpful item was the listing of special police details. It was interesting to note that the Boston Police Department detailed hundreds of officers to strike locations and that the police made arrests at these loca- tions. The alliance of the police union with the Boston Council of Labor Unions was extremely ironic, and the evidence contained in the report was witness to that irony. On the very eve of the strike officers were still being sent to control striking workers. 53 The Storrow Committee report rendered an alterna- tive interpretation of the strike.30 The report contained a wealth of information not only recounting the details of committee action, but providing thirty-one pieces of original correspondence and documents dealing with the strike. Peters' private papers are on file at the Boston Public Library, but it is possible to obtain more direct information concerning the strike from his personal cor- respondence contained in the appendices of the Storrow Committee report. An unsigned section of the report, entitled "Gover- nor Coolidge's monopoly of law and order." (sic), was extremely interesting. It was unclear who attached it to the report and it appeared out of context, but it was a biting indictment of Coolidge's action before, during and after the strike. The anonymous segment was a rhetor- ical and emotional attack against Coolidge . . . something that was extremely uncommon after the strike and even less common in official reports. In essence, Just as Curtis tried to cover his poli- tical bases with the police report, Peters was trying to protect his interests through the Storrow Committee. Both reports were valuable sources for uncovering the events of the police strike and their ready availability made 30Rep9rtgpf the Citizen's Committee A ointed b Mayor Peters to Consider the Police Situation (New York: Arno, 97 ; orig. ctober 3, 9 9 . Sh them all the more attractive. Comparison of the reports provided a documentary debate between primary sources. Several of Boston's newspapers were used. These included the Boston Evening Record, Bppton Globe, Boston Evenipg Transcript, Boston Herald, Boston Post and Boston American. With a few exceptions, Boston newspapers were used primarily to obtain editorial comment and not a description of actions. Some direct quotes from public officials were cited from the newspapers, and it must be admitted that some of the more colorful accounts of the rioting were found in the daily news. One of the main advantages of the newspaper arti- cles, however, came from the various political orientations of the editors. Explicated in the main body of the text, each.newspaper represented a specific political interest group. Two valuable pieces of evidence were generated from this situation. First, newspaper reviews demonstrated the myriad interpretations of police activity within speci- fic social groups. Second, as the strike approached, it was interesting to observe the tendency of editors to drop their individual views and Jointly condemn the strike. Expressing a multitude of opinions at the first signs of labor trouble, the newspapers almost universally attacked the police once violence erupted. The New York Times emphasized the national scope of the strike and its influence on police unionism in gen- eral. The Times was valuable for a number of reasons. 55 From September 9 through September 15 front page stories recounted the violence. These articles included the over- reactions of zealous reporters headlining almost jingoistic entries. In addition, the Tippp_reported on other police union activity as it occurred in conjunction with the strike. Finally, the newspaper also ran a series of editorials on the strike and a special feature on police unionism. The Times reporting on the strike made it a valuable source. Another newspaper, which.would be better classified as a police newsletter, was The Detective. Published in the early twentieth century the purpose of the work was to provide a listing of wanted criminals and a forum for police administrators to express their views. After the Boston Police walked out, many administrators had quite a bit to say. Although only a few specific articles were cited, it was possible to see the growing power of adminis- trators and their belief in paternalism as Opinions were offered in the weekly issues. A final important primary source was Calvin Coolidge's autobiOgraphy.31 In a few pages the laconic Coolidge gave his rendition of the strike. He did not feel that he should have acted sooner to prevent the strike, yet he also felt that he achieved too much public 3‘ Calvin Coolidge, Autobiograpgy (New York: Cosmo- politan, 1931). 56 acclaim for acting when he did. He was neither overly supportive of Curtis nor overly critical of Peters. His account was brief, but typically Coolidge. It was inter- esting to compare his version with the Storrow Committee and police department reports. CHAPTER III Methodology The research.was a product of bibliographical and documentary study. It was based on the prmmise that a specific event and interpretations associated with that event could be described qualitatively through the use of existing sources. The research strategy was to use bibliographical and documentary tools to locate the mater- ial and then to qualitatively classify sources after comparing them. In one sense it produced an historical case study; In another sense it was a sociological exer- cise because the events of the case were related to the social meanings of actions as defined by groups and alli- ances of groups. The late Professor J. H. Plumb Justified this type of sociological-historical research. Descriptions of the past, Plumb argued, are deve10ped to legitimize social power or to promulgate a certain world view. This results in the creation of myths, symbols and a belief in destiny \ and these results are unacceptable in scholarly research.1 1.1. H. Plumb, The Death of the P st (New York: Heughton Mifflin, 1965,, 11-55. 57 58 ”We need," Plumb argued, ”to teach people to think his- torically about social change."2 This concept was endemic to this dissertation and served as the justification for a reinterpretation of existing evidence and producing a qualitative essay based on a case study. The bibliographical and documentary process was amenable to this type of research. It involved the use of historical information gathering tools designed to locate the material necessary to describe an event. Bibliographical and documentary research is a process which employs the use of reference materials, such as indexes, abstracts and archival guides, to locate data. In this case the data and the resulting interpretations were qualitative, although the same process may be employed for quantitative studies.3 The process was used to deter- mine the impact of meanings on specific groups in the evolutionary drama of American law enforcement administra- tion. There were several procedural steps associated with this strategy.h Pirst, general works associated with the 21mm, 1u3. 3See for example Lee Benson, Toward the Scientific Study of History (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 2 . hJac ues Barzun and Henry F. Graff, Th Mbdern Researcher New Yerk: Harcourt, Brace and world, 1970), -3 3 3-95 and 99-119). The procedural steps were taken from this work. m-sa 59 Progressive Era, the post war period, the Boston Police strike and American police history were reviewed. The most prominent works are discussed in the literature review. Second, general concepts were develOped to formulate the specific research questions. Third, biblio- graphical and documentary index guides were used to identify _ and locate primary and secondary sources. Fourth, these sources were reviewed, classified and compared. Fifth, the events were described by summarizing the available primary and secondary sources. Sixth, interpretations of the events were presented and they were related to the progressive revisionist school of American historiography. In a very gross sense this did lead to the test of a hypothesis in a qualitative sense. It was assumed that the revisionist paradigm was essentially correct and that the contentions of the revisionists should have been mani- fested in police reform. The findings of the study reveal that the corporate forces active in progressive social reform were also utilized in police reform, and the police cepied the bureaucratic model endemic to progressive social regulation.5 This was only a side light of the study and there was no formal test of the hypothesis. SFor disagreement see Samuel whlk.r9.é Critical of Police Reform: ence of ro ession . walker draws a sharp distinction between the progressives and the police re- formers. 60 The arguments of the revisionists were not ques- tioned and the research was obviously influenced by revisionism. Had police reform differed from progressive reform it would have been necessary to separate the new police bureaus from other forms of social regulation, but even if this had been the case, the assumptions of the revisionists would have remained unchallenged. The general revisionist view of progressivism was accepted from the outset. Addressing Concepts and Forming Research Questions After conducting a review of the general literature it became increasingly apparent that scholars focussing on the Boston Police strike considered it apart from other developments in American history, or, at best, they saw it as the major factor influencing the downfall of police unionism.6 The evidence indicated that the strike had a strong effect on police labor militancy after 1960, yet the strike, its failure and its effects were part of a general pattern in American history. The main question essentially focussed on how the strike interfaced with the American experience. The question was addressed in terms of progressivism, the Red scare and labor militancy in law enforcement. 6See for example walker; Thomas A. Reppetto, 222 Blue P rade (New Ybrk: Free Press, 1978) and Robert M. ogelson, i Cit Police (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press, . 61 The situations in New Ybrk and Pennsylvania were reflections of progressive police reform, but they were also indicative of the processes at work in Boston. A review of New York and Pennsylvania revealed key factors which linked progressive ideology to the Boston Police strike. Since these events had previously been documented it was assumed that a synopsis of secondary sources would serve as an adequate description of the events. The strike also stood alone in the post war era differing significantly from the progressive process. Nineteen nineteen was a period of turmoil and confusion for America. If the Boston experience was part of the flow of history, it had to be considered within the context of 1919. One outstanding work and several recent histories of the period served this need.7 Reactions to and inter- pretations of the strike were deeply influenced by the pervasive climate of fear in 1919. The impact of the strike could be seen in police labor militancy. Internal police labor relations were shaped by the defeat of police unionism in Boston. It would have been beyond the scOpe of the dissertation to trace police labor history from 1919 to the present, but some general considerations were provided. Once again a review of secondary literature revealed the immediate and long term impact of the strike. 7See for example Francis Russell, A Cit in Terror: The 1919 Boston Police Strike (New'York: Viking. I973). 62 Finally, one of the most important questions dealt with the circumstances of the strike. How did the events in Boston relate the strike to progressivism, the turmoil of 1919 and the future pattern of internal police labor relations? In order to answer this question a case study of the Boston Police strike was presented in the context of its historical presence. Since this composed the major portion of the work several sources were utilized. It should be noted that this was one area where primary sources were used extensively. Although secondary sources covered the strike in detail, original documents were used to criticize or support existing secondary interpretations. These documents did not reveal any "amazing new” discoveries, but they provided the rationale for reinterpreting the mean- ing of the strike. It was necessary to use the primary sources in this manner because previous works on the strike have not attempted to place the strike in a broadened his- torical context. With the exception of the bibliographical and docu- mentary search tools, which are described in detail in the next section of this chapter, the remaining methodological issues are self-explanatory. As previously mentioned, sources which addressed the research questions were located, classified and cross referenced for comparison. Disagree- ments among sources were noted in the main body of the text. The interpretations and conclusions were based on the summary of events described herein. In a methodological 63 sense the dissertation was designed to place the strike within its historical context. Descriptions of progres- sivism and the Red scare were presented to set the stage for the strike. Comments on labor relations were given as a means of demonstrating the long lasting ramifications of the walkout. Boston was not an isolated event; similar to other historical turning points it was simultaneously related to past, present and future. The qualitative methodology used in this research.served as the basis 1 for capturing some of these myriad meanings. ResearchTools The evidence necessary to support the thesis of this paper was provided by various indexes, bibliographies and library guides. The documentary and bibliographical resources were available in various libraries throughout the country and the research tools were used to locate them. The purpose of this section is to identify these tools and briefly summarize and evaluate their contents in terms of the search process. Bibliographies Undoubtedly, the most helpful bibliography was The Library of Congress Catalog.8 This bibliography contains subject, book and author heading arrangements for books 8U.S. Library of Congress, The Library of Congress CatalogI books: subjects (Washington, D.C.: Government rinting fice, current . 61; catalcgued or recatalogued by the Library of Congress. It was the most comprehensive bibliographical arrangement available and the work was excellent for developing a listing of books on the Boston Police strike. The only weakness of the work was its comprehensive nature. The book and subjects listings are naturally extensive (since 1958 materials in the Arabic, Indic, Chinese, Japanese and Korean languages have been included) and it was neces- sary to have a definitive subject heading before the source could be properly utilized. The British National Bibliography was used to iden- tify books copyrighted in Great Britain.9 The work lists all new books published in Britain excluding periodicals, music, maps, selected government publications and some novels. It is arranged by the Dewey Dectmal System and indexed by authors and titles. Although this source was utilized extensively, the same references were available in the Library of Congress Catalog. Much of the research was conducted off campus, however, in a college library which utilized the Dewey Decimal System. For this reason it was a valuable tool. A London Bibliography of the Social Sciences was used for quick reference.10 This was the least 9Council of the British.lational Bibliography, British National Biblio ra h (London: British Museum, current . 10London School of Economics, A London Bibliography of the Social Sciences (London: London School of Economics, 1931-32; 193H-68; 1975-currmnt). 6S valuable bibliography utilized in the search process, but it provided sources in economics, political science and law, including several references to convention presenta- tions and administrative reports. It would have been far more valuable in a cross cultural comparison of British and American police unions since most of the sources were British. Theses and Dissertations The Cogprehensive Dissertation Indeg provides a listing of all Ph.D. dissertations published in the United States.11 The dissertations are listed in subject cate- gories giving the author, title, major professor, institution and abstracts. Dissertations are also listed by author and more recent works can be ordered through University Micro- films, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. It was easy to identify potential sources through the abstracts and the listing of both.major professors and authors led to the discovery of additional journal articles. The general index was very confusing and it was easier to search through individual subject categories, although this was a lengthy process. Dissertation Abstracts InternationalI Series A: Humanities and Socigl Sciences contains abstracts of doctoral dissertations submitted to University Microfilms 11Co rehensive Dissertation Index (Ann Arbor, MI: Xerox, current). 66 by 270 cooperating universities.12 The entries are arranged similarly to entries in the Comprehensive Dissertation In- ggg, but the listings are not as extensive. In addition, the subject sub-categories vary by month and many topics are stretched to their imaginable limitations in order to place them in subject categories. A keyword title index is included for volumes after 1969. This was another good source for quick reference and it was used to search for topics outside the United States. Periodical Indexes and Abstracts Ironically, Criminal Justice Abstracts is not a ready reference to police history.13 Myriad criminal justice topics are included and the works are abstracted, but sev- eral sources in criminal justice history are missing. Many of the works in police history must be located with more traditional historical tools. Presumably this is due to the lack of exclusive historical work in policing and the inclusion of police history in other disciplines. The Reader's Guide is the best source of information‘ for popular literature dealing with the police.1h The work 12Dissertation Abstracts International Series A: Hum ities nd Socia Sciences Ann Arbor, MI: University Hicrofilms, current). 13Criminal Justice Abstracts (New Ybrk: n.p., current). 1hReader's Guide to Periodical Literature 1 00- (New York: Wilson, current). See also Reader‘s Guide to Nigeteenth Century Periodicals (New York: Wilson, annual). 67 is arranged as a subject-author index to general periodi- cals published in the United States. It is extremely comprehensive and is one of the few sources to list "police history” as a topic in the general index. During the Boston Police strike many pepular magazines and professional perio- dicals published short descriptions or opinions about the events. This tool was used to identify such articles. Sociological Abstracts is a classified abstracting service that indexes a broad range of Uhited States and 15 international articles. Abstracts of papers presented at sociological meetings are often included, but it should not be assumed that these listings are complete.‘ The cumulative index is excellent and articles are presented in conglomerated subjects categories. References for this study were generally too broad, but it served as a comple- ment to Criminal Justice Abstracts and the Criminology mix- The Social Sciences Index is a partial continuation of the Social Sciences gnd Humggities Index.16 Author and subject categories are listed in the main portion of each volume including general listings of book reviews. The works are not abstracted. The Social Sciences Index was used in conjunction with the Libragy of Congress Catalog. 15Sociological Abstracts (New Ybrk: n.p., current). 16Social Sciences Index (New York: Wilson, current). 68 It was an excellent means of obtaining information on book reviews. It should.be noted that this work is more compre- hemsive than most of the criminal justice bibliographical tools. Aperica: Histogy ang Lifp is an indexing/abstracting service that covers American and Canadian history and cul- ture from the earliest times to the present.17 Divided into four sections each year, this bibliographical tool provides abstracts and citations, book reviews, books, articles, dissertations and an annual index. Sources are listed in chronological order, making it very easy to identify new works covering a specific period. This source was used during the initial search. It was an excellent tool for gathering the material necessary to conceptualize the research. . The Combined Retrospective Index to Journals in mg, 1818-1919, is an index to 213 English language periodicals accessed by key words and subjects.18 Volumes 1-h deal with world history while volumes 5-9 focus on the United States. Each volume contains a “User's Guide” for ready reference. Although more difficult to use than the Reader's Guide, the Retrospective Index served a similar 17 erica: Histo and Life (Santa Barbara: Clio, current). 18Combined Retros ective Index to Journal in H1 - tory, 1833-191E (fiew York: Carrollton, 1977). 69 purpose. While the Reader's Guide pointed toward popular literature, the Retrospective Index centained scholarly listings. When combined with the Reader's Guide it pro- vided the most comprehensive listing of periodical and scholarly analysis. Newspaper Indexes Most of the newspaper research utilized in this work was conducted by date through the Boston Public Library. The research staff at the library, in conjunc- tion with the microfilming service, provided valuable assistance by mailing articles from Boston's newspapers. This was completed by requesting specific articles on certain dates and no index service was used. The New'York Times, however, is readily available throughout the country and its index was used extensively.19 The Times Index is a ready subject reference to articles written in the newspaper. Index citations refer to date, page and column and many cross references are provided. The Times Index was the most valuable newspaper source used in this study. One of its main benefits was its in- dication of specific dates that articles would appear in other newspapers. Ergo, the Times Index served as a ‘gp,facto index for such.papers as the Boston Globe, the Boston Transcript, the Boston Aperican, the Boston Herald, 19New Yerk Times, New York Times Index (New York: New'YOrk Times, current). 70 and the ngl Street Journal. This method was excellent for gaining newspaper accounts, but made it difficult to gather editorial opinion. It was augmented by use of the giggg Obipuagy Index. With a few exceptions most of the newspaper accounts were used to determine how the strike was being reported. Some editorials were cited and some events, such as the National Guard cavalry charge on Scollay Square, were not adequately covered in secondary sources. The Times Inge; located the articles necessary to give a general descrip- tion of Boston. If this work had been limited to a chron010gical narrative of the strike the use of newspaper indexes would have had to have been expanded. Document Indexes and Library Guides The Monthly Cgtalog is an invaluable resource for locating federal documents.2° As the only official index of United States government publications, the catalog serves as a card catalog for governmental reports. It was not used extensively in this project, however, because local documents are not covered. The Lee Ash Subject Collections helped complement the Monthly Catalog due to its coverage of many local docu- ments and personal papers.21 Ash is a guide to special 21Lee Ash, Subject Collpctiong: A Guide to Special Book Collections gpd Su ject gpphases ew ork: Bowker, 71 libraries and their holdings. Subjects are listed alpha- betically and ordering information is provided. Ash was particularly valuable in locating the papers of Andrew Peters and Edwin Curtis, although they were discovered later in a partial reprint by Arno Press, and it provided the location of Boston's newspapers. Another source for private papers is A Guide to Arcpives gnd Mgnuscriptg in php U.S.22 Information is provided on 1,300 archival and manuscript collections with listings by state, then by city or town. A brief synopsis of the holdings is provided as well as contact information. The main weakness of A Guide to Aachives is that it is somewhat outdated. \It was used to locate newspapers. In addition to the document and archival guides, the unfiled archives of the Michigan State Police were beneficial. The status of the documents and memorabilia is unresolved and they are currently stored in the Michigan State Police Training Academy. The search through the documents was extremely time consuming and random, but it is mentioned because several of the documents help to cap- ture the "flavor" of policing in the Progressive Era. Contained in these archives are copies of a nationally circulated police publication, The Detective. This was a valuable source for obtaining editorial opinion about 22U.S. Historical Publications Commission, A Guide to Archives and Manuscri ts in the U.S. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1931). 72 the strike and comparing Boston's working conditions with conditions on other American police departments in 1919. Admittedly, these archives were used only because of their convenience. Biographical Sources The only biOgraphical source used in this project was the Nationalgyglopedia of American Biogrgphy.23 It is an extremely comprehensive biOgraphical dictionary. The biOgraphies are unappended and individuals alive through 1930 are excluded. Listings are not alphabetical and it is necessary to use the indexes. This source was used in the initial research, but the large amount of biographical data provided by secondary sources and auto- biographies excluded the necessity for its further use once data were gathered. Other Sources The National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) developed a computer generated bibliography for this project early in the research stage. The request was made by telephone and was provided free of charge. The NCJRS representative warned that a general search would be made under ”police history" because NCJRS lacked the capa- bility to generate specific bibliographies for specific' time periods. Although 198 annotated sources were provided 23National clo edia of American Bio ra (New York: mite, 2- e 73 only a few were applicable to the tapic. Still, the ad- ditional abstracts were helpful. Moogy's Goveppgents and Municipalg was helpful.2h It provides investment information, bond ratings, tax based income and fiscal expenditures for federal, state and local governments as well as some foreign governments and municipalities. Designed as an investment manual, the 1919 edition was especially helpful. It dispelled claims of bankruptcy on the part of Boston's city officials. The manual was used to gain a fiscal portrait of the city at the time when police officers were demanding a raise. Comments on the Sources It would be unfair to rank order the bibliographi- cal and documentary tools in terms of their importance to the project. Ideas spawned by some sources were com- pleted by others while some ideas led to ”accidental” discoveries. It can be unequivocally stated that the research in this dissertation was greatly aided by the bibliographical and documentary tools. They transform months of random searching into weeks of organized research. Due to the emphasis on empirical methodology many criminal justice scholars are unaware of their existence and the methods for utilizing the tools. The data compiled for Zhflbod 's Governments and Munici als (New Ybrk: Mb°dya current . 7’4 this dissertation were the product of the bibliographical and documentary search process. When conducting a review of previously gathered data, whether quantitative or qual- itative, these tools should not be overlooked. They provide the basis for meaningful research. CHAPTER IV The Progressive Legacy of American Policing The Boston Police strike was nothing less than a challenge to the new economic order established during the Progressive Era. It was not a conservative confron— tation. That is, the police demands did not represent an attempt to move society back to the days of competitive capitalism. The strike was a reflection of labor strug- gles in the corporate liberal state. Unlike the struggles of production workers, however, the strike had deeper significance. The police were a symbol of social order and in Boston that symbol would seem to crumble. No description of the strike impact can be complete without considering the influence of progressivism, for in many ways Boston was a model of progressive reform. A brief examination of three areas in the progressive movement helps to place the strike in the prOper perspec- tive. First, the revisionist paradigm of progressivism can be examined to capture the function of regulatory agencies, including the labor regulatory role of the police. An explication of the Kolko-Weinstein thesis serves this function. Second, an example of the process of urban reform demonstrates the use of progressive inter- est coalitions in affecting structural changes. An 75 76 examination of the Lexow investigation of the New York City Police Department in 189k reveals several common functions of interest group influence in the creation of urban police bureaus. Finally, an examination of the state police movement demonstrates the willingness of large business to take an active hand in controlling the police. In many ways the strike was a reflection of the consolidation of capital, the political pressures of vari- ous interests and the willingness of industry to direct police affairs. A synthesis of progressive era police reform reveals a general trend in the use of the police. The consolida- tion of corporate capital led to the development of business dominated regulatory agencies. Although the police had a minor role in business regulation, they were expected to help provide a stable economic climate by dis- rupting labor. This business requirement made it necessary to transform the localized orientation of the police to an impersonalized bureaucratic structure. Police officers who identified with local working populations were slow r’ to act against them. Police officers who were alienated from working populations and local political ties were not hampered. The bureau, especially when developed to its military epitome in the Pennsylvania State Police, served these industrial demands. It is too simple to suggest that the bureaus grew solely from industrial needs. Police reform was the 77 product of myriad interests competing and cooperating with one another to achieve some type of reform. Business, although.powerful, was not sufficiently strong to single handedly affect police reform. The creation of the bureau, the ultimate goal of efficiency minded reformers, was the result of negotiation. Coalitions of interests built police bureaucracies. The principle failed in New York, it achieved its ultra structure in Pennsylvania and the Boston Police Department became the model urban police bureau. Business interests had been active in all three instances, but business was only one interest among many. The relationship of Boston to progressivism serves as /» evidence. Once again, an oversimplified interpretation of this argument hints at an industrial conspiracy. This was hardly the case. The dynamic nature of social inter- action through.interest coalitions precluded the possibility of conspiracy. As can be demonstrated from examples of pregressive police reform, changes in the police structure resulted from various alliances of interest groups in par- ticular social situations. The development of the police ideological structure and the institutionalization of the police labor role were the products of evolution, not conspiracy. Corporate and labor interests tried to take advantage of particular situations in the drama of reform. There was no overall plan or conspiracy. 78 The Revisionist Interpretation of Progressive History With the advent of William A. Williams reinterpre- tation of American history, the revisionist school of American historiography became exceedingly popular.1 Gabriel Kolko's Triumph of Coppervatism and James Wein- stein's The Cogporate Ideal in the Liberal State were strongly linked to Williams' paradigm, providing a revi- sionist interpretation of the Progressive Era. Although traditionalists tended to criticize the works for being radical, so-called radicals suggested that both Kolko and Weinstein failed to completely capture the meaning of the capitalist process.2 Despite the criticism of both sides, a thesis emerged from the separate studies indicating that progressivism was not merely a period of reform, it was a time of economic consolidation amenable to the interests of big business.3 Appearing in 1963, Kolko's study was based on the development of political capitalism in a conservative business climate. Businessmen used government intervention 1See for example William A. Williams, The Contours of American Histo§y (Chicago: Quadrangle, 19 . 2Ingrid Lehmann, ”Corporate Capitalism and the Liberal State:_ The Kolko-Weinstein Thesis," ggpitaligtatg, 3 (Spring 1975): 159-166. 3For an alternative view see Richard Hofstadter, The e of Reform: From Br an to F.D.R. (New Yerk: Knopf, 79 in their own interests. Kolko writes: Political capitalism, as I have defined it, was a term unheard of in the Progressive Period. Big business did not always have a coherent theory of economic goals and their relationship to immediate actions, although certain individuals did think through explicit ideas in this connection. The advocacy of specific measures was frequently opportunistic, bum many indi- viduals with similar interests tended to prescribe roughly the same solution to each concrete problem, and to operafiion- ally construct an economic program. Kolko goes on to argue that the question of regulation was not the important issue of pregressivism. The fundamental questions of reform dealt with the type of regulation and its control.5 In the economic environment regulation appeared in two crucial ferms. First, there were a series of informal agreements between various businesses and the federal government. The second was outright economic regulation through the creation of bureaus designed to directly super— vise the economy. Conservative business interests did not always achieve their legislative goals, but they eventually triumphed by creating a stable economic environment in which neither their profits nor their right to exist could be challenged.6 hGabriel Kolko, The Trium h of Conservatism: A Rein- te rotation of American Histo 1 55-1 16 (New York: Free Press, 1963), 3-H. 5ibid., h. 6Ibid., 6. — I 80 At the turn of the century American business sought a method for increasing profits through stabilization of the economic environment. Most businessmen assumed that combined capital avoided the waste of small scale produc- tion while producing a stabilizing effect.7 This assumption proved incorrect and its failure forced businessmen to turn 8 The failure of to the arena of political intervention. mergers to control the economic conditions was the result of the inability to control competition from smaller and sometimes more technologically advanced businesses. Vol- untary agreements among corporations also failed. The only viable alternative was government regulation, yet businessmen would not accept this until they were assured control of the regulatory mechanisms.9 Kolko continues his arguments by focussing on business regulation efforts during the Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson administrations. Roosevelt favored reform only to the extent that it prevented radical change. He neither attacked the corporate structure nor the growth of big business. He limited his trustbusting to a few exceptionally evil business Operations. Businesses working under 81 Roosevelt's protection, such as Elbert Gary's United States Steel, enjoyed the luxury of a governmental detente.1O Taft's presidency represented a continuation of Roosevelt's progressivism with one important exception. Whereas Roosevelt informally agreed not to attack his favored industries, Taft was entirely unpredictable and this was unacceptable to the business community. By 1912 Taft's administration was in shambles, but it "vividly illustrated the need for a more formal, predictable, and permanent basis for the relationship of the large corpora- ”11 Business achieved tion to the national government. this goal in the Wilsonian period. According to Kolko, Wilson was not a reformer in a liberal sense. He favored big business with politically conservative and anti-union views. Under his administra- tion, businessmen achieved government regulation of industry with corporate control of regulatory bureaus. Wilson's New Freedom was the triumph of political capi- talism. ”The New Freedom was, more than anything else, government regulation of banking, industry, and railroads."12 The outcome of New Freedom was the logical conclusion of 1°Ibid., 76; 88-89; 127-128. 11Ibid., 16h-172. 121bid., 257. 82 political capital. That is, the business community achieved a stable economic climate through political means and self regulation.13 ,Kolko's interpretation of progressivism has a tre- mendous impact on interpretations of police reform and the linkage of reform to the police strike. Political democracy was not synthesized with industrial reality.1h As will be demonstrated later, the police were caught in the middle of the shift toward corporate democracy. As an institution/} they represented a regulatory agency, but as individuals they represented workers selling their skills on an open market. Such a situation was conducive to eventual con- .frontation with the new economic order. Kolko's views were reinforced and complemented in 1968 with the appearance of Weinstein's work. In gg2_ Cogporate Ideal in the Liberal State Weinstein advances two main theses. First, the dominant political ideology of the United States was created during the Progressive Era. Second, this ideology reflected the needs of American corporations and financial institutions. In short, pro- gressive reform was dominated by businessmen who sought to establish a corporate social order favorable to industry.15 13Ibid., 278. "*Ibid” 286. 15James Veinstein, The Go crate Ide l in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), xi. 83 The liberal state was created to rationalize business practices and to provide a stable business environment. Weinstein makes an apolOgy for his definition of liberalism. ”The confusion over what liberalism means and who liberals are is deep-seated in American society.” The meaning of liberalism has changed over the decades and an intellectual tradition promulgates a belief that pro- gressive liberalism and subsequent reforms have been anti-big business. Weinstein contends that this leads to a false state of consciousness. Corporation leaders, however, support the misinterpretation of liberalism because “false consciousness of the nature of American liberalism has been one of the most powerful ideological weapons” of American capitalism.16 What, then, does Weinstein mean by liberalism? "Both in its nineteenth and twentieth century forms, liber- alism has been the political ideology of the rising, and then dominant, business groups.” American liberalism has been the process of an entrepreneurial struggle to free business enterprise from social restrictions. Corporate leaders did this by adopting to their own ends the ideals of middle class reformers.17 This was the meaning of progressive reform. 16Ibid., xii. 17Ib1de p 1111-XVe 8h Weinstein does not apply his interpretation of liberalism to police reform, yet a lOgical extension of his thesis reveals a connection. Police reform was a mid- dle-class movement and was clearly influenced by the business community. Within weinstein's context police reform would have therefore been influenced directly by corporate interests. Whereas Kolko offers a reinterpretation of progres- sivism based on the actions of governmental officials, Weinstein moves to political interest groups to explain the process of the reform movement. Organizations such as the National Civic Federation (NCF), a group composed of large business interests, provided the opportunity for corporations to actively intervene in the economy. For example, in the area of workman's compensation, the NCF prepared model bills and, with the assistance of other interest groups, lobbied for their passage. Reform during the Progressive Era was reform generated through interest groups and coalitions.18 In a detailed examination of the NCF, Weinstein offers evidence of its activities through the reform period. Time and time again laws were enacted for the benefit of private corporations. In addition, regulatory agencies were created to serve the interests of big busi- ness. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) f 18Ibid., 38-51. 85 has been cited for its bias against big business, but ”the principles underlying the FTC were enunciated by corpora- tion leaders and their lawyers consistently throughout the Progressive Era in response to a series of legislative and judicial actions stretching over some seventeen years."19 The NCF was a major vehicle for such regulation reform. Businessmen and political leaders most committed to regu- latory legislation were concentrated in the National Civic Federation.2° On the local level, Weinstein argues that smaller businessmen backed reform. He cites the actions of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) as an example. Composed of small manufacturers and other small businesses, the interest group effected changes in municipal government structure. Acknowledging that other reformers were also involved in municipal reform, Weinstein concludes, ". . . on a local level the business organizations were able to rapid- ly press forward their political domination of American , municipalities.” Urban reform actually represented a vic- i tory for business.21 During Wilson's administration, business achieved its major objectives. Through an examination of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, Weinstein argues 19;big., 62. 2°Ibid., 71. 86 that government was able to provide the climate necessary for business prosperity. This was one of Wilson's most 22 With the advent of the First important achievements. World War, American business, under the auspices of liber- alism, was able to gain self-regulation within a social order designed for the benefit of corporations.23 In summarizing the Kolko-Weinstein arguments, a common theme emerges. The Progressive Era, far from.being an age of reform and good government, was a period of economic consolidation. Large corporations used government regulation to achieve autonomy and, in turn, gain effective control of government. While not the product of a conspir- acy, businessmen gained a stable economic climate, a means to rationalize the economic order and a means to control the social order. As stated by Kolko and reiterated by Weinstein, the Pragressive Era was a triumph for conserva- tism. Conservative business interests triumphed over liberal democracy. This business triumph would.have a major impact on police reform and the police function. Policing as a Reflection of a New Social Order Traditional historiography cites the Progressive Era as a time of reform and good government. It was an era 22Ibid., 197. 23Ibid., 251-252. 37 when corruption and inefficiency were replaced by officials seeking to introduce modern management practices in the business of government. Police reform, as extended from the traditional view, was a reflection of the movement toward good government. It is not surprising, therefore, that police histories often cite the age as the advent of 2h professionalism. In this context a police strike was mainly a reaction against good government, reform and professionalization. Revisionist interpretations of pro- gressivism offer an alternative response. The evidence presented in the works of Kolko and Weinstein suggests that a reinterpretation of progressive police reform is in order. Such an interpretation reveals three major implications in the relationship between the Progressive Era and the Boston Police strike. First, the strike represented an attack on the progressive order. In the traditional mode, the International Association of Chiefs of Police have claimed through the years that the walkout was an attempt to challenge the social order, but revisionist paradigm expands their stance.2S Viewed from the framework of Kolko and Weinstein, the strike was a 2“For example see William J. Bopps & Short History of American Law Enforcement (Springfield, : omas, 972). See also D. C. Dilworth, Blue and the B ss - American Policipg - 1890-1919 (Gaithersburg, MD: IACP, 1976). 25International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Reference Notebook (Gaithersburg, MD: IACP, 197k), ection 2A . / 88 specific attack against a business-government alliance. V) Obviously, as a symbol of social stability, a strike by any organization representing the homeostasis is a threat to order, but the police strike was an attack against a newly consolidated order. Boston's importance can be demonstrated by the reactions to the strike. There were four police strikes during the Progressive Era. Two were insignificant, but in 1918, almost a year to the day before Boston, the Cin— cinnati Police walked out during the largest parade in the city's history. The populace did not panic and there was no breakdown of social order. The striking police returned to work without incident and they were reemployed.26 Cincinnati posed no threat because the situation remained calm and industrialists remained calm. Boston was a different story. When the Boston Police walked out the city was in chaos and news of the tribula- tions spread rapidly across the nation. Newspapers ran daily features of robberies, rapes, murders and riots.27 (\ National attention quickly focussed on a city that appeared to be in the initial stages of revolution. This appearance \ turned the strike into an attack on the progressive social order. 26F'raneis Russell, A Cit in Terror: The 1 1 Boston Police Strike (New York: Viking, 1975), 233-23h. 27For examples see New York Time , September 11-15, 1919 and Boston Transcript, eptember -15, 1919. 89 A second concept absent in traditional historio- graphy but amenable to revisionist interpretations centers on the role dichotomy for individual police officers. As agents of a regulatory bureau, the police were bound to protect the interests of corporate structures, yet as workers they sold their labor power on the corporate market. As demonstrated in the Kolko-Weinstein thesis, many progres- sive reforms were created to help rationalize the American business system. In the waning years of the movement, the business process had been rationalized, but the contradic- tory position of individual police officers had not. As will be discussed later this represented an additional contradictory function in a confused police role. A third implication of revisionism emerged directly from Weinstein's case studies. Weinstein contends that the NCF and.the NAM played a large role in the drama of reform. The NCF or its members were primarily active on the national level, while NAM participants frequently worked for municipal or local reform. Weinstein explains the difference in the level of operations by examining the orientation of the interest groups. NAM‘was composed primarily of small businessmen and the NCF reflected cor- porate interests.28 The interest coalitions active in progressive police ‘reform gathered on the local and national levels. If 28Weinstein, 17; 80. 9O Weinstein's arguments are accepted, then it may be assumed that small businesses tended to support local police reform while large corporations involved themselves with national law enforcement issues, and that these groups frequently opposed each other as they did in other areas. In fact, a study Of their activities seems tO indicate that this was the case.29 The Boston Police strike presented an interesting change Of events. As interest coalitions formed, there was no distinction between small and large business con- cerns. Rather than Opposing one another they chose to 30 join together to Oppose the strike. Corporate interests and the needs Of small businessmen found temporary unity in the face Of a common enemy. In summary, revisionist historiography leads to the application of three concepts when considering progressive 29For example small business contributions financed the Lexow investigation in New York City, while U.S. Steel joined with President Roosevelt on a national level to lobby for the establishment of the Pennsylvania State Police. See Gerald Astor, The New YOrk Co a: Informal Histo (New YOrk: Scribner, 1971) and Grant C. McConnell, Private POppr gnd American Democracy (New York: Vintage, 1975). 3°This is evidenced by the composition of the Storrow Committee which served as an independent citizen's group appointed by the mayor to investigate the police labor situation. Storrow, a Yankee elitist, headed a committee representing the major industrial and financial powers Of New England as well as local Boston businessmen. The com- mittee did not work well as a whole, but it gave the appear- ance Of an alliance between small businesses and large corporations. It was publically used to symbolize this alliance throughout the strike. 91 police reform. First, since police strikes threaten any existing social order, the Boston Police strike logically represented an attack on corporate liberalism. Second, the strike was directly influenced by a police labor con- tradiction and the failure tO provide the police with class mobility. Finally, while Weinstein indicates that large and small businesses maintained different levels Of oper- ation during the majority Of the Progressive Era, they were able to combine their interests and work jointly against the striking policemen. A brief examination of two police reform movements will further elucidate these processes and set the stage for the Boston Police strike. Interest Coalitions in New YOrk: Structural Reform on the Municipal Level During the 1890's the New YOrk Police Department did not reflect the dignified Yankee posture Of the Boston Police. Since the time Of its inception the department had been sur- rounded in controversy. By the 1890's scandals rocked the department weekly, as reformers and muckrakers charged both the police and Tammany Hall with corruption. Investigative reporters sought evidence to indict the police and publicly charged them with inefficiency and corruption. Other reformers were enraged with the Openness of payoffs and police toleration Of vice activities. In the early 1890's 92 the New YOrk Police Department presented an ideal target for progressive reformers.31 The Tammany Hall machine, under Mayor Richard Croker, dominated New'YOrk City politics at this time. Although a continual target of newspapers, Tammany Hall maintained a firm grip on the city by providing services required by constituents, forming a large power base among immigrant voters and falsifying the results Of precincts voting in municipal elections. One Of the main instruments used by Tammany was the police department.32 Police corruption was a direct result Of political control Of law enforcement rather than a conscious decision to violate abstract legal norms, and police activities were determined by the social and legal mores Of the community.33 Due to the large immigrant population in New‘YOrk, good government reformers had little chance Of effecting change by themselves. Both high ranking Republicans and Democrats disliked the reformers and did not wish to see them come to 31For examples see Lincoln Steffens, The Autobio- r h Of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 593)): Charles Parkhurst, Our Fight with Tpgpgny (New York: Scribner, 1895) and W. T. Stead, Satan s Invisible WOrld Displayed (New YOrk: Reno, 1897). 32James F. Richardson, The New YOrk Police: CO onial Times to 1901 (New YOrk: Oxford University Press, 197%), 225-23h. 33Samuel walker,.A Critic l istor Of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism (Lexington, MA: Heath, , e 93 power.3h The reformers were forced to form a broadly based coalition. They eventually failed to extricate the police from local political influence, but they created a new bureaucratic structure for the department. This process would be repeated in Boston in 1905. The New York City Police Department in the late nineteenth century had political strength due to its close affiliation with the public. Individuals in the city iden- tified with specific Officers and precincts. Police officers themselves were political Operatives, acting as agents fer the factions they represented. Officers usually Obtained their positions through a system Of political patronage, providing additional loyalty for the power in control.35 Given the personal identification of citizens with individual officers and precincts and the political power of’the patrol officer on the beat, the public in general failed to support reform. : New'YOrk serves as an interesting contrast to Boston in this area because Bostonians succeeded.where New YOrkers failed. The process Of individual identification continued in Boston after the 1905 reform. The New YOrk experience contrasts with Boston in another realm. Graft worked in New York. Despite corrup- tion and political control Of the police, the police system helped maintain social equilibrium. Bribes, payoffs and 3“Richardson, 235. 35Walker, 3; 8-9; 11. 9h kickbacks stabilized social order within individual pre- cincts. Graft helped assure police support for local businesses. Police alliances with immigrant gangs preven- ted gang warfare and disruptions on the streets.36 In the final analysis, the police system in New York City, albeit corrupt and less than optimally efficient, was a successful Operation. It was possible, however, to start a reform move- ment. Progressive police reforms were generally the result of a single incident or issue.37 While the immigrant popu- lation was willing to support Tammany Hall, and subsequently police corruption, the protestant native born American stock was not. An investigation initiated by protestant moralists proved to be the catalyst for a reform movement. The same process served as a base for reform in Boston. The protestant attack on the New YOrk police did not derive from concern about illegal police activities. The major focus Of the early reformers was the immoral behavior of lower class citizens. Inspired by fundamental Christian ethics, the reformers Openly attacked gambling, prostitution, abortion and drunkenness. They were con- cerned with "Satan's invisible world” and this eventually led them into a fight with Tammany Hall. 36Astor, 28-29. 37W'alker, 25. 95 While the pious reformers could develop a respect- able force, they were not individually strong enough to affect change. Reform would entail a confrontation with the New YOrk Police, but unlike Boston the white native-born American New YOrk protestants did not have the political power to successfully confront machine politics. They needed allies and found them when other reform groups saw a chance to attack police corruption. A coalition Of diverse interest groups began to form in 1892. The interest coalition that grew around police reform represented four primary interest groups: (1) small businesses, (2) moral reformers, (3) good government poli- ticians and (h) individual newspapers and reporters. Small businesses saw a great advantage in police reform. The New YOrk Police extorted vast amounts of money from local busi- nesses. Fruit vendors paid to stack the merchandise on the sidewalk, soda water sellers had an association to pay ”police rent" for street corners and most merchants were expected to provide gratuities to avoid arrests. When bar owners allowed clandestine gambling on the premises, police payoffs skyrocketed. Police corruption was costly to small business.39 38Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue Parade (New YOrk: Free Press, 1978), 57-62. 39Astor, 70-72. ‘96 Moral reformers banded together in 1878 in the Society for the Prevention of Crime. Organized by a group Of protestant churches, the Society had much to say about criminal activity in New York, but they had little politi- cal clout. They threatened neither criminals nor corrupt police, but in 1890 the situation changed. The Reverend Dr. Charles Parkhurst, Minister Of the Madison Square Presbyterian Church, was elected president. The moral reformers, under the auspices of crime prevention, were to become the catalyst Of police reform.""o Good government progressives seeking an end to Tammany dominated politics found the police corruption issue a convenient vehicle for achieving municipal reform. Accordingly, their goals for police reform centered on administrative efficiency, the gospel of good government. The progressives sought to centralize police authority while depoliticizing administrative offices. Centralized authority would facilitate the introduction of modern managerial techniques in the department, eliminating waste and inefficiency. Tenure for executives in administrative offices would be combined with civil service hiring and retention practices to politically neutralize the depart- ment. PrOgressive reformers were essentially good gover- ment reformers.m l'°Ibid. , 1+5. theppettO, 63. 97 Newspapers were guided by a multiplicity of motives. In the days prior to the jingoism of the Spanish American war, Obviously, many editors were interested in stories that would sell. Others had a long record of backing mun- icipal reform causes, while some would later be linked with the muckrakers.“2 Two newspapermen, Jacob Riis Of the N w YOrk Sun and Lincoln Steffens Of’the Ney‘YOyk POpp, joined with other reformers to play a leading role in the drama. The four interest groups had.some common features, but their long range goals and Opinions were diverse. The situation was such that it created an opportunity for the diverse interests to join in a common coalition. Their long range goals would be displaced and their ideologies simplified in order to join together to work under a com- mon banner. The struggle was simplified into a confrontation between good and evil. Although the events and circumstances would change by 1919, a similar process would be evident in Boston. Under the leadership of Parkhurst, the Society for the Prevention of Crime became the sounding board for ‘ police reform. He became intensely concerned with vice after being elected president of the Society in 1890. Before his climb to power the Society was an ineffective f? “ZSteffens, forward. 98 organization, but Parkhurst piously attacked the Open tolerance of vice thereby making the Society a powerful force by uniting it against a common enemy.“3 By his own admission, Parkhurst took a strong anti-police stand. This was a latent function of his attack, however, because he was primarily concerned with vice.hh His criticism of the police was not directed at the law enforcement institution, it was aimed at the admin— istration that tolerated immoral behavior on the part Of the citizenry. His cry of “down with the police" heralded a fight against Tammany. He recognized the need for an uncorrupt police force only to the extent that it could combat vice.h§ With the fundamentalist denouncing immoral activi- ties from the pulpit, the Society for the Prevention Of Crime was soon a thorn in the side Of the police depart- ment. Not a meek mannered lot, the Society was famous for its "raids" on gambling activities and houses of’prostitu- tion, vigorously pressing charges against the suspects. They pressured individual officers on the beat and “BReppettO, 60. Reppetto is not convinced that Parkhurst was sincere. He points out that Parkhurst held the pulpit for twelve years prior to the reform movement and he championed no reform causes. Parkhurst, in Rep- petto's estimation, was a political opportunist interested in advancing his ego. tharkhurst, 35-50. usReppetto, 61. 99 publically denounced police corruption. Unlike many religious progressives, they did not approve of church involvement for the relief of the poor. They wanted to attack vice.“6 The first attack culminated in 1892 when Parkhurst Openly attacked the police department and the city adminis- tration from the pulpit. After accusing corrupt officials of tolerating vice crimes, he referred to police adminis- trators as "a damnable pack of administrative bloodhounds that are fattening themselves on the ethical flesh and blood of our citizenshipflm7 The police responded by challenging Parkhurst to produce specific evidence and the media supported them. Embarrassed because he lacked the evidence, Parkhurst set out to gather it.he As he did so, a reform coalition began to build and when he obtained the evidence, it solidified. The major actor to ally with Parkhurst was a New \ YOrk Assemblyman, Theodore Roosevelt. Unlike Parkhurst, Roosevelt's primary concern was with corruption and inef- ficiency on the police force. He believed that administra- tive changes were needed to revamp the police into a highly “'6‘, tor ' (4.6-14.8 e h7Ibid. , us. hBWalker, 26. 100 11.9 centralized non-political anti-crime force. In Roose- velt's view, the corruption issue permeated the entire police department. Rather than simply improving vice enforcement, Roosevelt believed that administrative changes would reduce corruption.so Roosevelt's alliance with Parkhurst was ironic, yet .it demonstrates the power that the interpretation of events has on interest groups. In order to deliver effective political punches, an ideologically diverse group of actors joined to work for a common goal. Differences existed, but the parties brushed them aside for the sake of unity. For example, while Parkhurst was rhetorically chanting "down with the police,” Roosevelt symbolically and publically supported the police. TO support the police, however, was to support corruption, given Parkhurst's stand.S1 Parkhurst's rhetoric made it difficult for Roosevelt to publically address corruption but he accepted the anti-police stand for the sake Of unity.52 ugscot Louis Gibson, Theodore Roosevelt as President of the New York Cit Board of Police Commissioners (Master's Thesis: Michigan State University, 197E), 63-91. SOWalker, hS. 51Reppetto, 51. 52See Theodore Roosevelt, "The Lawlessness of the Police," in The WOrks of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. XIV (New YOrk: Scribner, 92 . 101 The Parkhurst-Roosevelt alliance gained strength in1893. Jacob Riis had been interested in reform since his first appearance in America. As a young immigrant he had been a police lodger and he covered the police beat while working as a reporter. He believed that police reform could lead to honest government. As an editor, he committed the Spp,to good government reform and he joined the informal alliance.S3 Lincoln Steffens, already a friend of Roosevelt's, focussed on police brutality. A police reporter, Steffens was appalled by the amount of unnecessary force used by New York patrolman. Steffens approved of the clubbing of criminals, however, the use of force on innocent peOple raised his anger. His campaign was aimed directly at police brutality},4 Both Steffens and Riis supported the Parkhurst- Roosevelt alliance editorally. .When small businesses joined the alliance by partially funding a Parkhurst-Roosevelt investigation of corruption, the coalition was completed. Four diverse groups joined in the pursuit of a common goal. Riis and Steffens worked for rival newspapers, Parkhurst represented the white protestant native-born elite, Roosevelt was concerned with corruption and businessmen found it easier to fund an investigating commission than to pay police protection. 53Reppetto, 50. ShAstor, 80-82. See also Steffens, Autobiography. 102 This unlikely alliance initiated reform on the New York Police Department as Roosevelt quietly placed aside the claim that Parkhurst was a ”dishonest lunatic."SS The immediate result produced by the alliance was a state investigation of corruption on the New York City Police Department. This investigation was headed by state 56 Parkhurst gathered the evidence Senator Clarence Lexow. and with the help of the informal coalition brought pres- sure to bear on the city, the police department and.the state. Roosevelt's rise to the Presidency of the Board of Police Commissioners was a result of the investigation, even though all the officers punished by committee action were eventually acquitted. The importance Of the reform movement and its rela~ tionship to Boston are not tied to the Lexow investigation: rather, the process of coalition formation and the recom- mendations of the reformers would be repeated in Boston I in 1905 and 1919. New YOrk reformers were successful only while they remained united and Tammany Hall eventually S7 regained power mainly due to a breakdown in unity. 55M. R. Werner, It Ha ened in New York (New YOrk: Coward-McCann, 1957), 116. 56A synOpsis Of the findings appears in FOgelson, 1-6. Astor has a more colorful summary of the events and the New York Times provided day-tO-day news accounts and several editorials in December 189k. The Lexow Committee transcripts (h volumes) are on file in the State Library, Albany, New YOrk. 57Reppetto, 66. 103 Once the common enemy had been defeated, the diverse coali- tion no longer had an incentive to remain together. They created a new bureaucratic hierarchy for the police and assumed that it would settle the corruption problem. The coalition dissolved after finding a “solution." Without a conscious effort the ideological structure Of American policing began to evolve. The American police became relatively autonomous bureaucrats defining their own function and role. As a regulatory agency they were linked administratively and ideOlOgically with the progres- sive movement, and it was assumed that rational centralized control would eliminate the corruption problem generated by local politics.58 They were available for business control. 1 The impact Of the New York reforms would be felt in Boston in two ways. First, the relative autonomy given to bureau chiefs by interest coalitions would allow police administrators to launch a devasting Offensive against police unionism. Second, the New York Patrolmen's Bene- volence Association (PBA) was formed in 1891, coinciding with a decline in the economic status of policing. In the years following the Lexow investigation, bureaucratiza- tion alienated patrol Officers from the police department and forced them to turn to the PBA for identity.59 A v” 58Walker, 28; h5. 59Ibid., 119. - 10h similar pattern of events began in Boston with the reform of 1905 and culminated in the labor'conflict of 1919. The New York experience did not demonstrate the extent of the role contradiction in labor and.the linkage to corporate interests. The reform coalition and the structural changes resulting from Lexow did not institu- tionalize the continuance of the police anti-labor role. It will be helpful to briefly examine some events in Pennsylvania before focussing on Boston. Interests allied on a national level in Pennsylvania to insure that the political ideolOgy of American policing would continue to be anti-union and pro-business. Role Contradiction: The Creation of the Pennsylvania State Police Whereas New York represented the coalition process and structural reforms forged by progressives, Pennsylvania is more amenable to a revisionist interpretation of Progres- sive Era history. Interest coalitions were also present in Pennsylvania at the turn of the century and the ideology behind the state police movement certainly promulgated an increased use of centralized bureaucracy, but Pennsylvania introduced another aspect of policing. It prescribed a police labor regulatory role in the progressive order, providing reinstitutionslization of a role contradiction. There were many precedents for the use of police against strikers, but the Pennsylvania State Police became the 105 first police department specifically created to regulate / labor. Crime fighting was a secondary function. It is not surprising that Pennsylvania pioneered the state police movement. A center of the industrial revolution, the state had labor problems dating back to the early days of the coal industry. Shortly after the Civil war the Molly Maguires began sabotaging mines and equipment as well as causing general disruptions of the coal production process. Mining companies combatted the Molly Maguires with private detective agencies and their own industrial police forces.60 As the Molly Maguires fell from the forefront, labor unrest and violence con- tinued to grow, especially with the introduction of the steel industry. Industrialists were forced to rely heavily on the National Guard for assistance with labor troubles.61' Enbert H. Gary of United States Steel was one of the most prominent representatives of industrial interests in Pennsylvania. A member of the NCF, Gary was not Opposed \/ to labor unions, he was against disruptions in the business. climate. An unstable economic environment was detrimental to production. The presence of unions did not necessarily 60See for example Wayne Broel, The M011 Ma ires (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 196E). 61See for example Joseph John Holmes, Guard Of Penns lvani : Policemen Of Indust 106 thwart production, but strikes and violence did. Accord- ingly, Gary was willing to use his economic powers against striking workers.62 Industrialists such as Gary Often called upon the local public police during labor disputes. Industrial police forces were not sufficiently strong and there was some ambivalence concerning their arrest power and.author- ity. There was a problem, however, with the use of local police. Many times they failed to take any action against strikers, even when there were clear violations Of the law. Local police often identified with the workers' causes or they simply would not act because they were neighbors with the laborers. During large violent/strikes, industrialists were forced to wait for the mobilization Of the National Guard.63 The local system Of law enforcement also presented administrative problems outside the realm of industrial regulation. Rural crime was rising and there was no effective means to challenge it. Crossing jurisdictional boundaries afforded problems for the police, but none for the criminals. In addition, there was a general lack of communications among various local police agencies. Law 62McConnell, 56. 63Bruce Smith, Rural Crime Control (New York: Columbia University, 1 , - . 107 enforcement was dominated by local interests and was in- capable Of tackling statewide problems.6h The inability of local police agencies to OOpe with social problems and the industrial requirements for a labor regulatory agency combined with a third factor to create a powerful interest coalition on the national level. In 190k Roosevelt won his first presidential election. Unfettered from the chains Of the McKinley legacy, Roose- velt was free to follow his own course of action. Roosevelt's desire for police reform and bureaucratic centralization coincided with the needs of other interest groups in Pennsylvania. A prOgressive interest coalitiOn was born. TO understand Roosevelt's willingness to ally with a monopoly such as Gary's U.S. Steel, two characteristics of Rooseveltian politics need to be considered. First, Roosevelt made a distinction between good trusts and bad trusts. He had the reputation of ”trust buster,” but he used the Sherman Anti-trust Act sparingly. When he in- voked it, he singled out monopolies that had behaved in particularly devious or evil fashions. Trusts which acted in the public interest, according to Roosevelt's principles, 6thid., 126. See also Phillip M. Conti, The Penn- sylvania We Police (New York: Stackpole, 19771—an"""'"'d August Vollmer and Alfred Parker, Crime and the State Police (Berkeley, CA: University of California ress, 93 . Katherine Mayo cited crime control as the prime reason for the creation Of the state police in Ju tice for All: The Story of the Pennsylvania State Police (New YOrk: Putman, 108 65 were neither subject to scrutiny nor attack. The steel and coal interests in Pennsylvania, especially under Gary's direction, achieved Roosevelt's standard for a good trust. Gary was subject to favorable consideration.66 Second, even as President, Roosevelt had no desire to abandon the concept of police centralization; in reality his dreams grew. He attempted to create a national police force, but was thwarted by Congress. Undaunted, he moved to establish the national detective bureau which would serve as a model for the FBI.67 He continued to be a firm believer in bureaucratic centralization for'the police. The time was ripe for interests to work for a common goal. Roosevelt and Gary worked closely with the state government and industrial interests to create the Pennsyl- vania State Police in 1905. The interest coalition was not as diverse as the interests Of NeerOrk, and its breakdown came as the actors focussed on other national issues, but it did disband once again leaving an autonomous police bureaucracy in its wake. For his part, Roosevelt was delighted. He believed that he had created a constabu- lary worthy Of his beloved Rough Riders. He applauded Katherine Mayo's works which.praised the heroics of the 65Kolko, 127-128. 66Gary, 67. 67Walker, 75. 109 state police. The force was a prime example of what good government and good business could do.68 On the other hand, Gary had policemen for industry. In a work informally endorsed by the Pennsylvania State Police, there is no attempt to deny that labor prob- lems were prevalent during the creation Of the police, but the work stresses that the main function Of the troopers was to fight crime. The state police had no problem with jurisdictional boundaries, they had an excellent communica- tion system through a centralized command structure and they were excellently suited for rural police patrol. The work emphasizes that the stringent military tradition was the embodiment of Peelian professionalism.69 Interestingly, the book does not examine the advantages of using disci- plined paramilitary forces against striking workers. The Pennsylvania Federation of Labor was concerned with anti-union violence. Unlike Roosevelt and his indus- trial allies, the Labor Federation argued that the police were a military force aimed at destroying organized labor. Citing examples of labor spying, beatings and harassment, 68Mayo, "Forward," Theodore Roosevelt. For another example of Mayo's praise for Roosevelt see Mounted Justice: True Stories of the Penns lvania State Police (New YOrk: Harper and Row, 1922). Roosevelt wrote the forward to Justice for All and Mayo included his picture in full Rough Rider regalia labeling Roosevelt as a state police colonel. 69Conti, 1-29. This is not an official history, but Conti is a former state police commander and he appar- ently maintained close police ties while writing the book. 110 the Pennsylvania Federation Of Labor lobbied for the decommissioning of the state police and urged the AFL to fight the state police movement on the national level. Rural crime did not justify the permanent maintenance of state troops.70 Despite the claims of traditionalists, the objec- tives of the coalition which developed the state police and the subsequent use of trOOpers against organized labor demonstrate that the state police were primarily an anti-labor force. Samuel walker probably sums it best when he writes: Although officially created to deal with the question of crime in rural areas, the Pennsylvania state police in reality dealt . primarily with industrial strife. From the standpoint of industrialists, munici- pal police departments and the state militia were all too often unreliable in times Of strikes. Either because of the social origins of the officers themselves or because of political influence, they were too sympathetic to the interests of workingmen.7 The state police were not created for the sole purpose of regulating labor and they were not spawned by a reformed government merely seeking to control rural crime. The state police grew from a coalition of interests. The centralized state bureaucracy addressed a variety of law enforcement tasks which heretofore were generally 70Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, Agerican . Coss ck (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, 1915). 71Walker, 76. 111 neglected by local police. The labor issue represented only one type of activity for the state police, but it cannot be denied that part of the state police function was to help provide a stable business environment. While it played only a small role, labor regulation continued to be a central part Of the state police movement and the police were used liberally in favor of business interests. This role was a reflection of police activities prior to the Progressive Era, but the state police movement insti- tutionalized anti-labor activity in the Progressive order. The Pennsylvania State Police, born from a coalition Of national interest groups, reflected the needs of the domi- nant industrialists in the reform coalition. Not limited to a role of labor regulation, they still managed to become the policemen Of industry. The institutionalization of labor regulatory acti- vities provided the basis for a role contradiction more potent than other contradictions. It was not readily apparent in 1905, but it became a full-blown issue in the First WOrld war when Officers were declared public employees rather than Officers of the state. As public employees ) police Officers were subject to conscription. Government recognized police work as common labor and not an Official \ «# function of the state. In the turmoil Of 1919 officers returning from the military were very cognizant of this position. They would take advantage of it in Boston. 112 Still, in the early years of Progressivism the labor contradiction was not a valid issue since it was one of many inconstancies. The early State Constabulary became an accepted part of the progressive industrial order. Even if individual troopers had wished to question their status, it is doubtful that they could have broken ranks. The state police were inundated with harsh military discipline, and a trooper's life was more indicative of a soldier's life than a policeman's. With such standards, the development of the Pennsylvania State Police institu- tionalized an anti-labor function in the ideological bureaucracies of progressivism. Paramilitary state trOOpers were not to question the labor contradiction and the same attitude was expected from municipal Officers. Unfortu- nately for the industrialists, Boston police Officers would confront this institutionalized role in 1919. Business had triumphed in the name Of liberalism but the police would challenge it. CHAPTER V Contradiction and Confrontation: The SociO-Political Situation in Boston, 1919 The situations in New YOrk and Pennsylvania did not have a direct affect on the Boston Police, but they were indicative of the progressive influence on policing and the problems that were to appear. Like New York, Boston had undergone an administrative transformation in 1906, leaving the agency under the direct control of a single police commissioner. Raymond Fosdick praised the administrative structure and claimed that it should serve as a model for other departments.1 Like Pennsylvania, the Boston Police were used extensively against strikers and part Of their function was labor regulation. The acceptance of centralized bureaucracy, which subsequently became the ideological legacy of progressivism, and the continued use Of police force against labor link the Boston Police with the reform era. Boston had a police agency which reflected the structure and behavior of progressive reform. The reform movement in Boston helped to create the atmosphere necessary for a police strike, but the situation 1Raymond Fosdick, American Police Systems (New YOrk: Century, 1921), 209-210. 113 11k in Boston was more than a reflection of progressivism. In 1919 Boston was a blending of the Old and new. When the First WOrld War ended, America was forced to chart a course beyond the thundering days of social reform. As in other American cities, Boston was caught in the middle of turmoil. The situatiOn in 1919 was shaped by the events of prior years, but it also stands by itself. Nineteen nineteen was a year that struck at the heart of America. The Boston Police were a product of progressivism, but they faced the events of 1919 in unique fashion. The blending of the old progressive influence with the new challenges posed in the post war turmoil serve as the backdrop for the police strike. Although still part of the reform period, Bostonians faced the demands of inflation with threatened deflation, unemployment and a fear Of revolution. A police strike in other times may not have had the impact of the Boston walkout, but the meanings attached to the strike in 1919 were decisive. Up to this point, the drama has been examined through the general nature of police reform in the Progressive Era. The strike was not a reaction to police reforms, but it was heavily influenced by the legacy Of progressivism. Centralized administration provided an excellent means for thwarting the strike and future police union activity. zFrancis Russell, A Cit in Terror: The 1 1 Boston Police Strike (New York: Viking, 1975), 2E2-2EK. 115 The labor contradiction not only posed a dilemma for indi- vidual police Officers, it alienated them from members of the work force. Even though the prOgressive influence was prominent in the strike, the socio-political situation of 1919 merits further examination. Three key factors came together in 1919 and they helped to produce a situation conducive to a strike. The Boston Social Club, the organization which spawned the police union, attempted to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor. As this was occurring, Boston's former mayor, Edwin Upton Curtis, replaced Stephen O'Meara as Police Commissioner. The actions of the Social Club and the commissioner were interpreted within the context of a red scare. By September 1919 these ingredients com- bined into a volatile mixture. The police department, the city and the nation were set to explode. The Boston Social Club The Boston Social Club was not a police union. Ironically, the Social Club was created by Police Com- missioner Stephen O'Meara in 1906. The purpose of the organization was to provide patrol Officers with an Oppor- tunity to participate in a fraternal group across precinct boundaries. There is no evidence to suggest that the Social Club, or its various committees, had any impact on policy formation in its early years and O'Meara never 116 used it as a tool for running the department.3 By 1919, however, the Social Club would play a leading role in the strike. General police historians devote little attention to the origins and functions of the Social Club. Francis Russell is an exception. He noted that the club was actually a sounding board for administrative policies but never ser- iously challenged centralized power. During the strike, Russell explains, patrol officers were less than enthusias- tic with their support fcr the club. He contends that ”it was overwhelmingly clear that the policemen wanted no more Of an organization that they had come to feel was 'weak- kneed' and dominated by the commissioner.” Officers failed to pay their dues and even the club's president and vice- president forsook the organization for the striking union.h Even in the midst of'the walkout, the organization remained essentially the same. It was a fraternal organization and was important because it could.generate a union, but it was nothing more than its name implied.' The nature of the club demonstrates the contradic- tion in the police labor regulatory role. Police officers were not allowed to identify with laborers, ergo they could form no labor union. Linked to this situation was the identification Of police power with state power. Police 31bid., 38. hIbid., 101. 117 Officers were considered to be officers Of the state and as such they could not lcgically belong to a union. Union membership demanded divided loyalties. Police Officers, it was argued, could not simultaneously be loyal to the state and loyal to another organization.5 Loyalty to a departmental social club was acceptable: loyalty to a union was not. Commissioner O'Meara elaborated further in a general order issued June 28, 1918. As rumors spread about possi- ble Social Club affiliation with the AFL, O'Meara wrote: There is no substantial disagreement as to the wisdom and even the necessity of maintdining unions among persons followb ing the same industrial occupations. Though a union of public employees . . . is in itself a matter Of doubtful propri- ety, such union in any case and at the worst could affect the Operations only Of a particular branch of the city service. The police department, on the other hand, exists for the impartial enforcement of the laws and the protection of persOns and property under all conditions. Should its members incur Obligations to an out- side organization, they would be justly suspected Of abandoning the impartial attitude which heretofore has vindicated their good faith as against the complaints almost invariably made by both sides in many controversies. sNewYOrk Times, September 10, 1919. 6Fourteenth Annual Re art of the Police Commissioner for the Cit of Boston Year Endin November30L_191§ (New York: Arno, 1971 I 1925) 8. 301°81- s 118 It was clearly O'Meara's view that a police union could not be tolerated and the Social Club was not to act as a union agent. ‘ Shortly before the strike, Boston Mayor Andrew J. Peters appointed a special committee to review departmen- tal problems. In the Official report written after the strike the committee stated: The Boston policemen for 15 years were getting low wages and worked long hours under burdensome conditions. They had an organization called the "Social Club” which redressed no grievance; brought about no relief: was controlled by Head- quarters and was absolutely useless as a means of improving the economic condi- tions of the members of the police force.7 It was the committee's Opinion that the Social Club could in no way function as a police union. Raymond Fosdick was sympathetic to the Boston patrol- men who were denied union membership. In 1920 he wrote that the position of a police Officer was similar to the soldier. ”He represents the state in its power to compel obedience." Yet Fosdick went on to argue that the Boston Police had been underpaid for years. ”If the police may not strike to improve their situation, and if they may not affiliate with organized labor, then the community that employes them owes them a responsibility which up to the present time, certainly, it has not fulfilled."8 Fosdick 191 7James J. Storrow to Andrew J. Peters, October 3, 9. 8Fosdick, 319-321. 119 argued that there was no need for unionization, police improvement was an administrative responsibility. He sympathized with fraternal organizations,but called upon centralized administration to enact paternalistic programs to prevent unionization. Newspapers ignored the fraternal aspects Of the Social Club and focussed on unionization. In a series of editorials, The New YOrk Times blasted the police union, but failed to mention the Social Club.9 The Boston Evenipg Record in an Opposing view saw the Social Club as an admin- istrative tool and condemned the view that police Officers' grievances be restricted to an inside organization which had to be ”entitled to his (the commissioner's) favorable opinion."10 The Boston Herald saw AFL affiliation as the main issue and saw no need to mention the function of the Social Club.11 Although it did not elaborate on the pur- poses Of an internal fraternal organization, the Boston ngpg’approved of the Social Club and condemned the pro- posed alliance with the AFL. With the exception of labor directed publications, newspapers appeared to agree that a fraternal organization was acceptable; a police union was not. 9New'York Times, September 9-15, 1919. 10Boston Evening Record, September 8a 1919- 11Bostcn Herald, September 8, 1919. 12Boston Globe, September 8, 1919. 120 Russell's work gains added importance in the wake of Fosdick's and the newspapers' conglomerated interpre- tations. Indeed, the Social Club was not a union and it did not have the power associated with organized labor. Despite this, the Social Club became the vehicle for unionization. Russell points out that when the Boston Police began to take the first timid steps toward labor activism, the Social Club was the organization used to announce their grievances. In 1918 representatives of the club met with Commissioner O'Meara to ask for a $200 across-the-board raise. O'Meara presented the request to Mayor Peters, but Peters contended that the city lacked the funds for such a raise. He promised O'Meara that he would consider the raise in the next budget year.13 It is important to note that these actions took place within the confines of the Social Club. In December 1918 the club was active again, send- ing a delegation to meet with Mayor Peters and the newly appointed commissioner, Edwin Upton Curtis. They again requested the $200 raise. When Peters pled insufficient funds, the president of the club asked the mayor if he would like to see the disorders Of the recent Montreal police strike repeated in Boston. Upset by the militant demand, both Peters and Curtis replied that such a raise ' 3Rus sell , Lia-1+9. 121 was a fiscal irresponsibility. The Social Club convened a special meeting and voted to support the raise care- fully avoiding the word strike.1h The Social Club was not a militant labor force and it could not be under its charter, yet in the months before the strike it served as a catalyst to militant unionization. It clearly over- stepped the intended purposes Of its founder, Stephen O'Meara. Russell further states that the club hired an attorney to represent their interests and when the patrol officers agreed to apply for a union charter, their vehicle was the Social Club.15 After the striking officers formed their own AFL union it was eventually assimilated into the Boston Social Club.16 The club was not a union, but it behaved in a manner which reflected the needs of police workers. In the final analysis the Social Club was not an instrument for the actual strike, yet its organizational structure provided a convenient means for moving toward unionization. Russell's contributions help to explain the role Of the Social Club and elucidate the processes by which it served as a vehicle for allying police labor interests. 1th1de, h9’50e 15Ibid., 55. 161bid., 217-218. 122 Samuel Walker provides a brief but excellent syn- opsis of the club's position. "The question of the Boston Social Club's relationship with a national organization proved to be the central isSue of the strike." He went on to describe the strike as a conflict between the club 17 and the police commissioner. The Boston Social Club did not go on strike, it gave the officers an opportunity to seek greater power. It was a catalyst to a labor coalition. The Police Commissioner and Centralized Power The office of Police Commissioner and its symbol of conglomerated power formed a central issue in the strike. In 1906 progressive police reform hit Boston in the same fashion as New York, yet while corruption and inefficiency. occurred in Boston, they were not as commonplace as in other American cities. The department was controlled by three commissioners, once again similar to the system used in New York City, but there were complaints about their effectiveness. The upper-class reformers Of Beacon Hill claimed that the police failed to enforce liquor laws vigorously. Others found vice, prostitution and a limited amount of police corruption.18 The commissioners held 17Sanuel walker, A Critical Histo of Police Reform (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1977), 11E-115. 18Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue Parade (New YOrk: Free Press, 1978), 96. 123 different views and often found it difficult to agree on administrative matters.19 As in New York, the reformers sought administrative controls to eliminate vice, corrup- tion and inefficiency. Unlike New York, the reformers were successful. Success was primarily due to Stephen James O'Meara who was appointed by Governor Curtis Guild as Police Com- missioner. In 1906 O'Meara assumed the consolidated police commissioner's office and immediately began to make changes in administrative policies. His personality and ability helped to transform the department into a modern bureau- cracy with O'Meara benevolently controlling the reigns of power. Historians and contemporaries have been extremely kind to O'Meara. Reppetto writes that O'Meara was the ideal person for the Job. His ”varied affiliations gave him a unique understanding of both the Irish and the Yankee worlds . . .' This was essential to political survival in Boston. In addition, the consolidated office presented O'Meara with an immense amount of power. Reppetto states that O'Meara was given the standing authority of a European 19Russell, 36. It is interesting to note that the progressives of New YOrk failed to address this issue. They ignored the conflicts on the Board of Police Commis- sioners and assumed that the organizational structure could effectively overcome those problems. See Scot Louis Gibson, Theodore Roosevelt as President of the New YOrk City Board of o ce ommissioners ster s es s: c gan Sta e University, 157E}. Bostonians attempted to settle the problem by further concentrating power. 12h police commissioner, only his power was greater. During O'Meara's reign the police department was ”remarkably free from corruption and restrained in the use of force in an era when payoffs and the third degree were common- place.” O'Meara's power kept the police from being "plaint tools for the likes of a Parkhurst."20 Russell is also sympathetic. ”Tall, of soldierly bearing, he carried himself with an innate air of author- ity that scarcely any subordinate would feel inclined to challenge.“ Of Irish stock and a Canadian immigrant, O'Meara grew up in a ”rugged Celtic enclave where babies were said to be born with their fists clenched.” Gaining his police experience as a reporter for various newspapers in Boston, O'Meara advanced to editor, publisher and part owner of the Boston Journal. He sold his interests and made an unsuccessful bid for Congress in 190k. A member of numerous social, political and religious organizations, his friends included Joseph Pulitzer, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. After appointing him commissioner, Governor Guild said that O'Meara was a man above politics.21 Russell further compliments the commissioner for his uncorruptibility. ”The Boston Police Department under its austerely upright commissioner remained a towering exception to the corruption of City Hall.” He goes on to 2°Reppetto. 97-99. 21Russell, 36-38. 125 state that ”Boston under Commissioner O'Meara remained and would continue to remain singularly free of the scandals so recurrent in the police departments of most maJor American cities."22 Russell's greatest compliment falls into the arena of the strike. O'Meara died suddenly on December 1h, 1918. ”If O'Meara had lived out his third term," Russell writes, "the Boston Police strike of 1919 would probably have never taken place. Under his successor, Edwin Upton Curtis, it became almost inevitable."23 If one avoids the statements of machine politicians, attempting to find a critic of O'Meara is like searching for a critical treatise on Horatio Nelson. Critical biogra- phical statements are difficult to locate.2h For the most part O'Meara has remained a man above criticism. Contemporaries were of the same opinion. When defending his actions during the strike, Commissioner Curtis repeatedly cited his predecessor and argued that O'Meara would have approved of his actions. Curtis stated that his anti-union stance was a direct extension of O'Meara's 221b1de, 38-39e 231mm, 13. 21"A notable exception is Leonard V. Harrison, Police dministration in Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University’ areas, 153K}, 23. Harrison believed that O'Meara's conserva- tive policies prevented the department from moving into the twentieth century. 126 policies. When union affiliation appeared inevitable, Curtis delivered a general order to the officers, using several references to O'Meara. "I am not an opponent of labor unions and neither was Mr. O'Meara.” In his conclu- sion Curtis cited him again, stating that "Mr. O'Meara put it well when he said that 'the policemen are their own best advocates. . .'” Finally, when he offered an explanation for the strike, Curtis said that the officers failed to pay attention "to the disapproval of both the present and former Commissioner.”25 Curtis evidently believed that O'Heara's popularity would reach beyond the grave and.he refused to publicly criticize him. O'Meara enjoyed the praise of Theodore Roosevelt for his work in eliminating brutality and establishing an uncorrupt promotional system.26 While other American.police were known for brutality, O'Meara gave the Boston Police discipline and respectability. Brutality was eliminated. In 1921 Fosdick praised O'Meara for serving credibly for many years and he used O'Meara's Boston extensively as the epitome of a rational police system.’ Like Roosevelt, he was especially taken with O'Meara's promotional system.27 O'Meara's contemporaries joined with mayors, governors and presidents to sing his praises. 25Annual ReportI 1212, 8-10. 26Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography (New York: Scribner, 192a), 291. 27Fbsdick, 293. 127 The respect commanded by O'Meara had important political ramifications. If Pennsylvania represented the new paramilitary version of the state police, Boston became I the epitome of urban bureaucratic power. New York paid lip service to police reform, but in the arena of New York politics the police department remained a hotbed of scandal and corruption. Boston, on the other hand, was ripe for reform and O'Meara became the man of the hour. Unlike Roosevelt's tenure as police commissioner, O'Meara's popularity did not fade once he took office. It grew. Under his guidance administration in the Boston Police Department was rationalized in an autocratic sense. Aside from his charisma and popularity, there was a pragmatic reason for the success of O'Meara's reign. When the department was reorganized in 1906, the commis- sioner was given virtually unlimited power. Another may not have been so successful, but O'Meara had the personal characteristics to use the power for individual and organ- izational success. In New York City the battle for centralization of power continued beyond the Lexow Inves- tigation. Boston was more reminiscent of the Pennsylvania State Police. Power and authority were centralized in one office. If graft worked in New'York, autocracy worked in Boston. The legislative act which created the office of commissioner lends some idea of the power that office bestowed. 128 The Police Commissioner shall have author- ity to appoint, establish, and organize the police of said city, and make all need- ful rules and regulations for its efficiency . . . Except as otherwise provided herein, all the powers and duties now imposed or conferred by law upon the board of police of the city of Boston are hereby conferred and imposed upon said police commissioner. Present rules and regulations . . . for said city shall continue in force until other ordered by said police commissioner.28 The police commissioner's seat was actually a throne of power. O'Meara wasted no time in putting the power to use. He was a strict disciplinarian, almost to a fault, but his decisions were interpreted by the rank and file as being extremely fair.29 State and local politicians Joined with the patrol officers to applaud the disciplinary system. After being appointed for a third five year term, O'Meara wrote that the state had "uniformly assured me that I should maintain the independence of Judgement and.conduct which was the basic condition of my acceptance of office."30 Another factor which contributed to O'Meara's power was his length of service. He held the office for twelve _', 28o.r. Russell, 36. 291bid., 38. It should be noted that this is another area where Leonard Harrison criticized O'Meara. According to Harrison discipline in the Boston Police Department was based on an outmoded puritanical code. Harrison, 23. Russell also makes note of this. Russell, 30Boston Police Department, General Order No. 1,063, June 5, 1916. 129 years under a variety of governors representing both major political parties. Fosdick wrote that "his success was in no small measure attributable to his uninterrupted tenure of service. In the twelve years of his commissionership he had the unique Opportunity of making himself . . . an efficient police executive."31 Reppetto argues that part of O'Meara's success was due to the high ratio of police to population. At 2.3 officers per 1,000 population Boston had the highest police per capita ratio in the country. Unrecognized even by Fosdick was the political strength generated from the large amount of personal contact between the police and the public. O'Meara was able to control the rough poli- tics of Boston by maintaining a tough Yankee puritanical position, while the composition of his department gave him an Irish power base.32 ”The cops were not outsiders, pea- sant lads sent in to police the urban proletariat; instead they were drawn from the local Irish working class and so while administratively they may have been an army of occu- pation, socially they were not."33 With an administrative structure accountable to the Yankee-controlled legislature and a working force that closely identified with the Irish 31Fosdick, 23o. 32Reppetto, 105. BBIbide , 97-98e 130 population, O'Meara avoided political interference from the strongest city administrations. O'Meara also maintained strict control of the civil service and promotional systems. O'Meara wrote, "No writ- ten examination can possibly disclose the qualities and habits which are of vital importance in a police officer of rank and can be known only to his superiors.”3u Accord- ingly, O'Meara submitted to the dictates of the civil service commission, but he was free to make his own hiring and pro- motional choices from their lists. In his own explanation of the promotional system O'Meara stated: The commissioner then decides upon the divi- sions where the promotions should be made. The captains of these divisions are instruc- ted to write with their own hands, neither informing nor consulting any other person, and to forward under seal to the Commissioner the names of the patrolmen under them whom they regard on the whole as not deserving and not likely to succeed as sergeants -- each captain is to send twice as many names as it was intended should go upon the list. The Commissioner then examines his own memoranda of names -- men whose work had attracted attention or much favorable expres- sion. After weeks of inquiry, examination of records, without interference from any source, the Commissioner decides upon the men whom he will nominate to the civil service commission for examination.35 3hStephen O'Meara to the Massachusetts Civil Ser- vice Commission, February 12, 1913. 3SStephen O'Meara, Administrative Memorandum, May 19, 1913. 131 O'Meara ruled the Boston Police Department with despotic power, but his reputation for fairness, his con- cern with efficiency and his pOpularity gave his regime a tremendous amount of power. He delegated the power to subordinates while keeping an active role in adminis- trative affairs. In an era of reform O'Meara epitomized the goal of the progressives. The Boston Police Depart- ment was a progressive ideological structure pg£_excgllence. It was believed to be a nonpolitical, rational bureaucracy. O'Meara's sudden death in December 1918 was a latent issue in the strike. To paraphrase Fosdick, the actors may change, but the system continues. Fosdick qualified his statement about system continuation with a key phrase. The system may continue, but it had to avoid rigidity. Flexibility was the key to success in police administra- tion.36 Unfortunately, the new commissioner, Edwin Upton Curtis, was anything but flexible. whereas O'Meara enjoyed virtually unlimited praise from contemporaries and historians alike, Curtis was not so fortunate. History has been cruel to Curtis, and per- haps unduly so. Curtis did not create the labor problems in the Boston Police Department; in fact, they were inheri- ted from O'Meara's administration. Curtis simply did not possess the personal attributes necessary to control the problems. O'Meara was able to keep the lid on trouble; 36Fosdick, 313-315. 132 Curtis could not. Neither historians nor contemporaries were overly forgiving. Police Commissioner Curtis began his new job with several unsuitable situations. He was a staunch Yankee protestant with no connections to the Irish community. As the former Republican mayor, he returned to a Democra- tic municipal administration in a subordinate position. He not only walked in the shadow of a great man, his quip- pish personality failed to provide the traits necessary to follow an O'Meara. Finally, he had little underetanding of police affairs and at times the situation seemed to be beyond his understanding. Criticism of his tenure may be widespread, but it is probable that Curtis was the wrong man for the job and Governor Calvin Coolidge should be blamed for his appointment. In an apologetic biography of Calvin Coolidge, William Allen White described Curtis as ”a full-faced, full-chested, deep-voiced man . . . whose weak heart was indicated by pink pouches under his eyes and a palled skin. 0f the old stock mad old school, a gentleman unafraid was he . . ." White added that Curtis "naturally would contend for regular military channels.” White ultimately placed blame for the strike on Curtis' shoulders. He had no prac- tical understanding of the police department and as an industrialist he had a habit of firing and hiring when he pleased. He supplied Governor Coolidge with improper information and was at odds with Mayor Peters. Since the 133 1906 reforms the commissioner was solely responsible to the governor and.White did not feel that Curtis could adequately serve his hero, Calvin Coolidge. Curtis "lived on another planet, in another era."37 Coolidge himself was less critical of the new com- missioner. His biography offers support for both Curtis and his actions although Coolidge admitted, "I fully expec- ted it (support for Curtis) would result in my defeat in the coming campaign for reelection as Governor."38 Typi- cal of Coolidge's terse style, his support for Curtis was not overwhelming. "To Mr. Curtis should go the credit for raising the issue and enforcing the principle that police should not affiliate with any outside body, whether of wage earners or of wage payers, but should remain unat- tached, impartial officers of the law, with sole allegiance to the public. In this I support him."39 Coolidge supported him in little else. Russell draws his portrait of Curtis from White and, like White, he is extremely critical. Russell describes Curtis in White's terms as "an uncompromising martinet with no previous experience in police administration and no great 37William Allen white, A Puritan in Bab lon: The Stogy of Calvin Coolidge (New YOrk: fiacfiillan, 1938}, 2" e 38Calvin Coolidge, Autobiography (New York: Cosmo- politan, 1931), 128. 39Ibid., 133. 13h affection for the Boston Irish." As previously mentioned, Russell felt that the appointment of Curtis to commissioner made the police strike almost inevitable.“0 Of one of Boston's oldest and most established families, Curtis was elected mayor in 1895, but he was never elected to an office again. In 1906 as a reward for his service to the Republican party he was appointed Assistant U.S. Treasurer. From 1907 to 1913 he was col- lector of customs in the Port of Boston. Despite his success in appointed positions, Curtis resented Irish domination of Boston politics and felt that the city would not be a decent place until the established Yankees over- threw the Irish. He accepted the office of police commissioner with this in mind.“1 Stephen O'Meara created a powerful autocratic admin- istration in the police department. Upon his succession, Curtis was a man ill-equipped to control the reins of power. Politically frustrated and fearful of the Bostonian Irish, Curtis was not the man for the hour. Whether his appointment made the strike inevitable is a debatable point. The Boston Police were suffering from poor working conditions and low wages inherited from O'Meara's regime. Regardless, it can be unequivocally stated that the appoint- ment of Curtis did not help matters. hoRussell, A3. mIbid., h3-u6. 13S 1919 and National Hysteria Confrontation between the Boston Social Club and the office of police commissioner took on added meaning because of the political situation in 1919. PeOple might have been able to conceptualize the central issues of the strike in another era, but the events of 1919 tempered their views. By September of that year traditional competitive interests would ally with one another. Republicans would join Demo- crats, Yankees with the Irish, banks and large corporations with small businesses, and, perhaps most surprisingly, the police allied with organized labor. The coalitions of Boston followed a building process similar to reform coali- tions, but they were not alliances of progressivism, they were coalitions of fear -- fear spawned by 1919. War cemented the progressive industrial order into the American social structure, yet Americans were disillu- h2 sioned. Returning soldiers found unemployment, sky- rocketing prices and runaway inflation. Unions flexed their muscles testing their new found power and radical political groups threatened the political process. Indus- trial consolidation remained relatively unchallenged in the early years of the progressive movement; a real challenge appeared in 1919. Striking Boston policemen, not aware of the meanings attributed to their actions, would be viewed haJames Weinstein, The Go orate Ideal in the Lib- eral State: 1900-1918 (Boston: Eeaoon, 1968,, 21H-25E. 136 as insurrectionists. Boston was destined to become a battleground between the forces of socio-economic order and revolution. Individual Boston policemen were by no stretch of the rational imagination communists, anarchists or Bolshe- viks. However, imaginations in 1919 avoided rationality. There was fear of a Soviet revolution in America. Between July and December there were major riots in twenty American cities. Burnings, lootings and beatings left more than twenty dead and thousands homeless. Americans feared their country was falling apart.”3 Millions of peOple thought that a Red revolution had begun. Social historian Frederick Lewis Allen wrote, ”They were less concerned with making the world safe for democracy than with making America safe for themselves.”hh Bombings had a significant effect on American atti- tudes. In June a postal inspector discovered sixteen letter bombs addressed to a number of government officials and industrialists, including Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. Later in the month a second attempt was made on the life of Palmer, who escaped injury (4'3Ellis w. Hawley, The Gr t w r d the e rch or Medern Order A Histo of the Americ n Peo lo and their "In'st'itu—t"i‘o'ns. 1917-1933 (N"e'w"Y""or—-—k. St—. Mar' t'i'n 's 19795. 50. huFrederick Lewis Allen, Onl Yesterda : An Infor- Hi to of the Nineteen-Twenties (New York: Harper, I193'”. 133- 137 by leaving a library shortly before a bomb exploded. Mayor Ole Hanson of Seattle, a fervent campaigner against the Red Menace, found a bomb in his mail "big enough,” in his words, "to blow out the entire side of the County-City Building." An explosion in the home of Senator Thomas R. Hardwick of Georgia blew off the hands of a maid. Revolu- tion was in the air.”5 The June bombing offensive began in.a coordinated fashion. On June 2 bombs exploded in eight major cities within the same hour. Anarchist notes were found with some of the bombs. June also witnessed yet another attack on the attorney general. As the Palmers retired one evening they were startled by a shattering explosion. Outside of their'home lay a dead Italian immigrant, his body blown into two pieces. Fortunately for the Palmers, the man stumbled while trying to throw a bomb into their house.“6 The nation, and certainly Palmer, had had their fill of radical bombers. Anti-Red feelings spilled over into anti-union sentiment. This partially resulted from the stands of Bill Haywood.and the International Workers of the World. Several thousand conscientious objectors refused to parti- cipate in the war and the IWW fully supported them. To “51bit! e , 14.9-50 e h6Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties: The United States from Armistice to Normand (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 197E}, 10E. 138 many Americans this smacked of treason.)47 Haywood was convicted of obstructing the war effort under the Espionage Act and the courts also levied substantial fines against the IWW.ha By 1919 Postmaster General Albert Burleson proclaimed that the IWW was nothing less than a Bolshevik front.""9 The attack on the IWW was only one manifestation of anti-union sentiment. In the post war period the entire prOgressive view of unionism was transformed. In the early portion of the movement major unions enjoyed protection from both the government and private corpora- tions. In the wanning years protection changed to official condemnation and animosity, and most Americans began to feel that unions had no rightful place in a peacetime system. As anti-Red hysteria grew, the distinction between unionism and Bolshevism became increasingly dim.SO Yet the feeling against unions cannot be blamed solely on the Red scare. Union activity did not help mat- ters. In 1919 there were hundreds of strikes resulting from rising prices and labor's awareness of its new power. Two months after the Boston Police strike workers either “7M” 85-86. “Bing” 9u-9s. h9g3” 102. soHawley, hB-h9. 139 striking or abstaining from work as strike sympathizers numbered nearly two million. Americans were afraid because many strikes did not deal directly with wages. According to Frederick Lewis Allen, "Some of them (unions) were demanding a new industrial order, the displacement of // capitalistic control over industry . . . in short, some- thing approaching a socialist regime."51 If the distinction between unionism and Bolshevism was dim, there was no attempt to distinguish between the Socialist Party in America and organized labor, and the failure to avoid identification with the SPA was a hard blow to many labor unions. The SPA had been one of the few major organizations and the only large national poli- tical party to Oppose the war. After the war Americans wholeheartedly attacked the socialists.52 Eugene Debs, the perennial leader of the SPA, was sentenced to prispn under the Espionage Act after November 1918, despite the fact that the war was over. The conceptual link between unionism and socialism was particularly harmful to labor.53 In Weirton, West Virginia, private policemen forced striking socialists to kneel and kiss an American flag. Properly elected members of the New YOrk State Assembly 5‘ Allen, ’46-’47 . 52James Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925 (New‘YorE: Monthly Review, 19675, 1hO. S3Noggle, 9S. 1uo were censored from the legislative body simply because they belonged to the SPA. On May Day in Cleveland the SPA paraded under a red flag. A passing Army lieutenant ordered the socialists to lower the flag and, when they refused, he attacked the socialists with his platoon. The Cleveland Police responded to the disturbance and immediately rendered aid to the soldiers. The melee ended with one socialist killed, scores injured and arrested and Socialist Party headquarters destroyed.5’4 Americans were in no mood to tolerate socialism, and if labor was another manifestation of it, it would similarly come under the gun. Of course, the creation of the American Communist Party added fuel to the fire. No relationship needed to be established between the communists and Bolshevism. By their own admission they took orders from Moscow. Most of the Communist party members were foreign and they had been among the more radical members of the SPA.55 Ameri- cans not only perceived the communists as dangerous, they believed that Moscow had many well disguised or unknowing allies in respectable circles.s6 This belief was to prove unfortunate for the striking officers of the Boston Police Department. Shanon, 15-51 . SSIbid.. A7. 56Ibid., 59. 1&1 American reaction to the scare of 1919 was swift and monumental. The Fighting Quaker, as the thrice tar- geted Palmer enjoyed being called, emerged to rescue the Consitution. Palmer assumed powers from the wartime Espionage and Sedition Acts to round up radicals and deport them. His enemy list was not limited to communists, anarchists or even socialists; he went beyond. With the support of major corporations, including Ralph Easley, Chairman of the National Civic Federation, Palmer targeted attacks against the National League of WOmen Voters, the ‘// Federal Council of Churches and the liberal publication lghe New Republic.57 Of course, Palmer also used his power extensively against more radical groups, including the IWW and.the SPA.58 In August 1919 Palmer created an anti-radical intel- ligence division in the Justice Department. The purpose of the division was to assemble a file of radical organiza- tions, publications and leaders. He chose an excellent person for the position, a young anti-communist attorney named J. Edgar Hoover.59 Palmer would not have been successful had it not been for support from the government and major corporations. 57Ibid., 59-60. 58Noggle, 89. 59Ibid., 106. 1&2 The Supreme Court aided by ruling that any action consti- tuting a clear and present danger to the American social order was not deserving of the protection of the First Amendment. Behind the hysteria the corporations were also active. They formed holding companies, financial consortia and information exchanges all justified in the public interest.60 Corporations had much to gain and everything to lose should the worst fear of Palmer become a reality. Support for the hysteria was condoned by American voters. Aside from the Theodore Roosevelts, Ole Hansons and Woodrow Wilsons, political candidates engaged in an immense amount of anti-Red rhetoric. Among the foremost orators was General Leonard Wood, a leading contender for the 1920 Democratic presidential nomination. Wood devel- oped an S-O-S policy for the Reds. ”S-O-S. Ship or shoot," he said. "I believe we should place them (Reds) all on ships of stone, with sails of lead and their first stopping place should be Hell."61 Perhaps the Red scare was a logical American reac- tion to the threat of world revolution. Bombing and riot- ing were certainly a catalyst to reaction and in times of danger a view of the enemy often becomes clouded by the fog 6C’Hawley, 51-51i. 61Noggle, 105. Wood actually made the statement in 1920, but he formed the rhetoric for his view in 1919. See also Jack C. Lane, Armed Pro ressive: General Leo- nard C. Woog,(San Rafael, CA: Presido, 1978}. “43 of war, whether the war is real or perceived to be real. Regardless, 1919 was a time of disorientation, of things either American or unAmerican. Individuals and organiza- tions who challenged the social order in such times could expect their actions to be misinterpreted.62 As a heated summer led to a confrontation in Boston, the Boston Social Club had no intention of spearheading a “/l social and economic revolution. They were concerned with wages and working conditions, the right to identify them- selves as workers and affiliate with a labor organization. They were surprised when their walkout was labeled as a Bolshevik action. After all, the Cincinnati Police had walked off the job a year earlier and the strike had been successful. The Boston Police did not perceive themselves to be revolutionaries striking out at the progressive industrial order. Unfortunately for them, the country did.63 The social environment strongly affects the mean- ings people attach to actions. In the aura of 1919 policemen were officers of the state and would not be allowed to iden- tify with the working classes. Such identification was nothing less than a prelude to revolution. 62Noggle, 101. See also Noggle's fn, 56. 63Jonathan Daniels, The Time Between the Wars: é5%istice to Pearl Harbor (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 9 . ~ CHAPTER VI The Boston Police Strike The Boston Police strike was far more than a labor confrontation. As a.microcosm.of Boston Police history it was a challenge to the ideological police structure created in the 1906 progressive reform and institution- alized by O'Meara's centralized command structure. On a more strategic level it represented a challenge to the national industrial order. In 1919 many Americans believed it to be a first step toward revolution. The individual officers may have merely been attempting to improve their lot, but their actions conveyed far greater'meanings to a frightened America. As in New York, coalitions were active in the strike, but the nature and spirit of interest alliances were drama- tically changed by the events of 1919. Progressive coalitions were slow to form and they needed to be driven by zealous leaders such as Parkhurst or Roosevelt. The Red scare took precedence over the slow formation of progressive coalitions as the alliances of 1919 were formed almost literally over- night. Neither those supporting nor those challenging the strike responded to the cries of a zealot. In fact, Boston needed no zealous leadership. The coalitions of 1919 were 1M4 "+5 coalitions of fear, not reform, and fear was a catalyst for coalition formation.1 The purposes of Boston's interest alliances also varied from progressive coalitions. Prior to the post war era coalitions were formed to create new administra- tive structures. Their purpose was to tear down the old corrupt machinery and to replace it with a bureaucratically ,, efficient organization. New Yerk City, Pennsylvania and 1906 Boston serve as excellent examples. The purpose of progressive interest coalitions was to create a new ideo- logical structure for the police. Bureaucracy triumphed. ” The coalitions of 1919 Boston were developed to influence the progressive structure; they did not seek to replace it.2 The principles of bureaucratic hierarchy would be 1'Zealous" is intentionally used as an extension of Anthony Downs' concept of a zealot in bureaucracy. Downs argues that zealots are able to move an organization although they do not operate in terms of conventional rationality. That is, they do not receive benefits equal to their efforts. Downs applies the concept to contempor- ary bureaus, but it can also be used to describe the early police reformers. Downs writes, ”When a group of such zealots somehow conceives a new function they believe their bureau should undertake, they form a nucleus agitating for change. Enthused by their idea, they persuade their super- iors to give them some resources and manpower to develop it.” Although progressive zealots were forming bureaus, this concept is applicable to their actions. Progressive police reformers were zealots. Anthony Downs, Inside Burea - cracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 5-7; 109-1 ; 2 . 2Richard L. Lyons, ”The Boston Police Strike of 1919,” New England anrterlz, 20 (July 19h7): 1h8-159. See also comments y Frederick Manuel Hoes, The Boston Police Strike (Ph.D. Dissertation: Boston University, , c pter h. 1&6 challenged by the strikers, but they only wanted economic justice on their terms inside the bureaucratic model. Even though the strike represented a threat to industrial order, the strikers and their allies had no intention of developing new administrative structures. The coalition against the strike worked for preservation of the progres- sive order. Bureaucracy had solidified by 1919. The only question which remained dealt with the dispersion of cen- tralized power. In the Progressive Era that power was concentrated in administration. In Boston a victory by the anti-union coalition insured that power would.remain at the top. Winter and Summer 1919: Prelude to Strike The Boston POlice had two major'concerns in early 1919 and they made their desires known to the new commis- sioner, Edwin U. Curtis.' The officers felt that police wages and working conditions were substandard. Before the war the police had been in a comparatively advanta- geous position. They made as much as skilled blue collar workers and were among the highest paid city employees. The stations were run.down and the hours were long, but, considering other workers and police agencies, these 1h? conditions were relatively equal, if not better. The situation changed with the advent of war.3 Wages of laborers rose with war inflation, but the wages of the police remained constant. At war's end, even with the industrial slow down, Boston workers continued to make gains. Telephone and telegraph operators received pay increases after a short strike, and municipal employees received wage hikes, including a significant gain by union- Y? ized firemen who threatened to walk out. By 1919 the city transit workers, traditionally the lowest paid municipal workers, were making more than police officers.’4 Police pay was still not overly poor, but increases in other sectors irritated the officers. Inflation did not help matters. In 1898, the year that wages were set for the department, a six year veteran received the maximum allotment of $1,h00 per annum. A reserve man started at $730 and was usually promoted to patrolman after a year's probation at $1,000 per year. The officers were also forced to buy their own equipment and uniforms, about $200 in 1919. While these wages were extremely high in 1898, inflation and rising prices had 3Peter Robeson, The Boston Police Strike of 1 1 (Master's Thesis: Columbia fiiiversity, 1§E55, chapters 1 and h. hWilliam Allen White, Pu ita n b lon: The Sto o C l 1 00011 e (New Tori: fizcmi§lan, 1958’, ate. 1&8 forced the cost of living up seventy-nine percent by 1919.?’ Officers frequently arrested workers making seventy-five to a hundred dollars a week. Police wages had not kept pace with wartime inflation.5 ’ Police working conditions were not enviable. The modern reader must bear in mind that this was not the era of the forty hour work week with holidays and other benefits, yet the Boston Police were worse off than other workers. Patrol officers worked a seven day week with , one day in fifteen off. They were forced to spend much of their off-duty time on reserve, which.meant that they were not allowed to change from their uniforms or leave the station house.6 Unfortunately for officers assigned to reserve duty, a station house was not a pleasant home away from home. Gary Cordner notes that the importance of a properly maintained police facility cannot be cveremphasized due to its effect on officer's attitudes.7 With the exception of Pemberton Square, Boston Police headquarters, the conditions of the station houses were atrocious. They were in bad SPrencie Russell, A Cit in Terror: e 1 1 Bo ton Police Strike (New York: Viking, 1975}, Ev-Efi. 6Ibid., 50. See also comments by Thomas A. Re petto, The Blue Pgrgde (New York: Free Press, 1978), 107-10 . 1&9 repair, unsanitary and infested with insects and rodents. Police officers and prisoners were often forced to use the same sanitary facilities, and officers assigned to reserve duty often slept two to a bed.8 Cordner's com- ments concern modern police officers who usually work an eight hour shift. The Boston Police literally lived in their station houses. Patrolmen were also incensed by the numerous extra duties assigned by the station house captains. There were &2,057 such activities logged by the department in 1919.9 Many of these duties were demeaning and punitive as offi- cers were often expected to be squires for their commanders.1o The patrolmen resented these intrusions on their official duties. Curtis did not turn a deaf ear to the situation, but the police were not overly enthused with his response. After assuming his office in December 1918 he informed complaining patrolmen that any officer who was dissatisfied was free to resign. Still, Curtis did seek improvements. In February he offered the men a ten percent increase, $1&0 compared to the $200 Social Club request, but the men rejected the offer saying that pay was only one of their 8Russell, 50. See also Leonard V. Harrison, Police édministration in Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University see, 93 . 9Angual Report. 1212, 37. 1°Russell, 50-51. 150 grievances.11 In response Curtis appointed a committee, consisting of a captain, a lieutenant and a sergeant, to investigate working conditions in each station house, the; city prison and the house of detention. He forwarded ar' report to Mayor Peters recommending a general overhaul as soon as fiscally possible and he informed the Social Club of his actions.12 The Social Club expressed appreciation, but individuals were not convinced of Curtis' sincerity. Working conditions remained the same. ‘ By May both Peters and Curtis began to appreciate the gravity of the situation, although neither they nor the Social Club were seriously considering an eventual strike. Curtis approved the $200 raise and requested more.13 The state increased Boston's tax limit from $6.52 to $9.52 and Peters hastily agreed with Curtis' request for the raise. Again, stressing that they were concerned with both wages and working conditions, the patrolmen rejected the offer.1h During the same month others voiced awareness of Boston's labor problems. While attending a state constitu- tional convention, Curtis was publically challenged by a 11l2$2¢e SM-SS. See also Hose and Robeson. 12m ual ReportI 1212, 6. 132.14., 6. 'hRuseeli, 55-56. #2/15, group of labor delegates. They accused him of purposely attempting to keep the police in a low economic station. Curtis refused to discuss the matter, claiming that depart- mental policies were an internal matter and not an affair for public debate. Despite jeers from the labor delegates, Curtis received a standing ovation from the Yankee domina- ted convention.1s This was a typical Curtis response. He wished to rule the department in an autocratic fashion. Although Curtis believed that he had inherited O'Meara's absolute internal power, his assessment of the situation was not realistic. By summer it was obvious that Curtis was having problems with the administration structure. He looked outside the department for political help. Under the 1906 reform the commissioner was directly appointed and subservient to the governor. Unfortunately for Curtis, Governor Calvin Coolidge was leery of the labomg7 situation and delegated all authority and responsibility ,/\\ for the problems to Curtis. Beyond that Coolidge provide no help. On the other side Mayor Peters, a Democrat, was concerned about the police situation, but he had no direct power over internal matters. O'Meara had balanced similar situations for the duration of his tenure. His attachment to the Yankees and the backing of the Boston Irish gave him the opportunities to succeed. Curtis had neither the 15Ibid.. 77. 152 support of the Irish nor the police. In a time of crisis Coolidge, the established Yankee politician, all but deserted him. Curtis was left with.the implied bureau- cratic power of his office, yet he lacked the political backing to exercise actual power. Despite the post war economy and claims of poverty, the police were also aware that the city was not in finan- 1 cial trouble. By summer the firemen, city clerks and office :.' workers of city hall had affiliated with.the American Feder-/ ation of Labor.“ They all won wage increases and the firemen's hours were reduced.16 Municipal unionization did not have an adverse effect and Boston had maintained an excellent financial position. It had an AAA bond invest- ment rating and taxes kept the city well in the black. It appeared that the coming fiscal year would produce a budget excess.17 The police wanted to avoid a confrontation with the city, but they were puzzled by the excellent fiscal situation in light of gains by unionized city employees. It was rumored that the police would seek full union status. Curtis responded to the rumors by reissuing an order of Stephen O'Meara. Reaffirming O'Meara's anti-union posi- tion, Curtis reprinted: I (O'Meara) cannot believe that a preposi- tion to turn the police force into a 16Ibid., 58. 17Moody's Manual, Governments d Munici als 1 1 (New York: Moody's, 19195, "Boston.' 153 union . . . will ever be presented formally to its members, but if, unfor- tunately, such a question should ever arise, I trust that it will be answered with an emphatic refusal by the members of the force who have an intelligent regard for their own self-respect, the credit of the department, and the obli- gations to the whole public which theg undertook with their oath of office.1 Curtis was trying to rely on O'Meara's magic and it was not working. In July, through the auspices of the Social Club, the men circulated a petition for AFL affiliation. As July gave way to August a chaotic situation had evolved in Boston. Curtis demanded, and did not receive, bureaucratic respect. Peters desperately tried to avoid confrontation between the police and the city, but he lacked both the competency and power to do so. Coolidge remained aloof trying not to burn his hands in the growing fire. On August 1, the Social Club held a special meeting in response to Curtis' reissuance of O'Meara's anti-union order. The next move was theirs.- On August 9 the men sent a telegram requesting an AFL charter for a police union separate from the Social Club.19 The die had been cast and out of chaos alliances began to form. 13ml ReportI 1212, 8-9. 19Russell, 7&. 15h The AFL Charter The request for a union charter was a natural out- growth of the police position. The police were responsible for regulating workers, but they had been denied access to upper socio-economic strata. In short, they received little social benefit for regulating workers. They were forced to turn to organized labor and to identify withgxf the labor movement in order to achieve economic success. The policemen of Boston admitted that they were part of the working class and they formed an alliance with an old adversary. It was an ironic alliance, but the police had no other alternative. The Boston Police had been used liberally against organized labor. In 1919 alone they had used an extensive show of force during three separate strikes by the Market’ Teamsters, the Boston Elevated Railway Employees and the telephone employees.20 Ironically, the Boston Central Labor Union (BCLU) placed its hatred of the police in. abeyance and embraced its new ally. Perhaps unionized policemen would be hesitant to take actions against brother workers. The BCLU, the coordinating committee for all AFL unions in the city, officially recognized the police union. on August 15 when the patrolmen of the Boston Police Depart- \ ment became the Boston Police Union, Number 16,807, American 20Annual ReportI 1212, 35. 155 Federation of Labor.21 It would not prove to be a lasting alliance, but one side of the coalition had formed. Curtis was not inactive. As soon as he was aware of the serious attempt to unionize, he issued a second order. This time he composed it himself. No member of the force shall join or belong to any organization, club or body composed of present or present and past members of the force which is affiliated with or a part of any organization, club or body outside the department, except that a post of the Grand Army of the Republic, the United Spanish War Veterans and the American Legion of World's war Veterans me be formed within the department. 2 The order had been issued to no avail on August 11. In a last ditch stand the night before the AFL elec- tion, Curtis ordered that one thousand blank dismissal notices be printed and distributed to captains at the sta- tion houses. The notices were complete except for two spaces, one for an officer's name and one for a reason for severance.23 When this measure failed, Curtis resorted to stronger measures. On August 19 the Police Union held its first meeting for the purpose of electing officers. Curtis learned of 21Boston Globe, August 16, 1919. 22Annugl ReportI 121g, 11. 23Russell, 77-78. 156' the meeting shortly after it adjourned and summoned eight patrolmen who were instrumental in establishing the union to his office. His second in command, Superintendent Michael H. Crowley, interrogated the men and advised them of the implications of Curtis' August 11 order. Meanuhile Curtis met with.three city commissioners and they produced an official response to unionization. Although Curtis was reluctant to back away from his anti-union order, he agreed that officially the city would seek a compromise. The police were to be allowed to organize, but they could not affiliate with an outside union. Curtis would agree to unionization if the police would rescind the AFL char- ter. Peters and the city government thought this to be a rational compromise, but they lacked an understanding of the situation. Curtis actually wanted no compromise and the patrolmen were deeply committed to AFL affiliation.2h ( After the "compromise" Peters took a long vacation in Maine where he could not be bothered by urban problems. In his absence the city commissioners could do little to enforce the spirit of compromise and when he returned the situation was out of control. Despite the spirit of compromise emanating from the city government, Curtis attempted to thwart the young union. He emphatically stated that any police union could not ”in any manner interfere with the executive direction of the department." 2hLyons, 1&8-159. 157 He cancelled all police leaves and summoned command offi- cers to Pemberton Square.25 He began plans to assemble a volunteer special police force and called on the business community to help.26 An anti-union coalition quickly emerged even though Peters and his cohorts believed in compromise. Fear was probably the mitigating factor behind the anti-union alliance. In mid-August the Bogton Heggld, a staunch.Republican newspaper, reported that an anti-union war was on. In a front page story the Herglg repeated many of the arguments promulgated by Curtis. A union meant divided allegiance; the police could not serve two masters. The paper contended that the city would take a step toward Bolshevism if Curtis_submitted to the union. The Hergld gave Curtis full support.27 Motivated by the fear of Bolshevism in a year of fear, the banking community, small business associations and the Chamber of Commerce pledged support to Curtis. Peters was caught in the midst of events and reluctantly added Irish muscle to the coali- . tion, and eventually Coolidge would throw in the remaining; Yankees.28 Fear made allies of old adversaries in very ,/ 25Russell, 87-88. 26Agual ReportL 1919s 17- 27Boston Herald. August 17 and August 20. 1919- 28White, 156. 158 quick order, even before they could consider the ramifi-I cations of their actions. While Curtis was reluctant to accept unionism in any form, it should be stressed that the majority of his allies were only opposed to AFL affiliation. A number of Curtis' allies, including Peters and the banking community, felt that the police needed some type of representation. >< They felt that the police were forced to turn to the AFL I because the Social Club had been so ineffective. A union composed of police officers with no outside affiliation was more to their liking. One prominent Boston banker believed that Curtis' policies were forcing the police into some type of collective action.29 As the police took their action, however, the anti-union alliance became stronger. After all, it was a time of fear. Well noted police historians argue that the time was ripe for compromise and they point to Curtis' unbending attitude as a principal cause for the impending confronta- tion.30 Certainly his defiant attitude and failure to understand the mentality of his Irish police force contri- buted no small part.r Russell goes beyond some of Curtis' 29Unknown origin: approved by James Storrow in Re ort of the Citizen's Committee ointed b Ma or Peter to Consider the Police Situation ectober 3. £919 (New York: Arno, 1971; orig. 19195. 30For examples see Reppetto, 108 and Samuel Walker, Critical Hi to of Pol ce Reform: The Emer ence of erofesgioggligg (szington, MI: Heath, 1977’, 115-116. 159 more blatant moves, however, to examine the actions of the police and members of the BCLU. Russell points out that the BCLU was "tumultuously enthusiastic" about police-AFL affiliation. Its members attacked Curtis and promised support for the police. The plumbers, mechanics, teamsters, typographers and sheet metal workers ”all agreed to support the Boston police by taking any action requested.“ Councilman James Moriarty, a union supporter who earlier referred to the police as "strike breakers," called upon the BCLU to "bring victory to the police or quit." The police felt that union power would bend the unbendable curtis.31 Clearly Curtis was not the man of the hour, but blame cannot be placed solely on his shoulders. The police and the BCLU were committed to the AFL and they probably would have maintained this position in the face of compromise, although they most likely would have avoided a strike. In an era of fear this was interpreted as an un-American position and it strengthened the anti-union coalition. Curtis must still bear major responsibility for the strike. His actions at the close of August did not even vaguely hint at conciliation or recapitulation. On August 26 he tried the original eight union leaders in his office and on August 29 he summoned eleven more. In his own words, "There was no denial of the facts. Counsel 3‘Russell, 89-91. for the defendants argued that the rule (the order for- bidding outside affiliation) was invalid, unreasonable and contrary to the express law of Massachusetts.'32 To Curtis this was no defense and tantamount to an admis- sion of guilt. He was ready to pronounce sentence. The officers would have been suspended immediately had it not been for the indirect intervention of Mayor Peters. Frustrated by his inability to influence police\\ affairs, Peters turned to a political ploy in an attempt to avoid a show down. On August 27 he appointed a Citi- : zen's Committee to investigate the police situation and appointed a prominent Bostonian politician and financier, James J. Storrow, to head it. The thirty-four member committee represented a cross section of Boston's monetary and political powers. On August 29 Storrow broke the committee into an eight member task force which he also headed.33 Storrow called in a number of police officers to gain their views. He was shocked at some of the working conditions and was convinced that if conditions could be improved a confrontation could be avoided. Storrow's { actions were well-intentioned, but they were too little, 3agggual ReportI 1212, 11. 33Citizen's Committee R ort, 1-3. Storrow was the most prominent figure on the committee and the committee's impact was largely due to Storrow's efforts. Russell com- ments that Storrow was the committee. Russell, 97. 161 too late. In late August there was the first serious talk of a police strike as the police union announced that strict disciplinary action against the officers under trial would result in a strike. Curtis did not believe that the police would actually walk out, but Storrow was of a different opinion. 0n Labor Day Storrow met with the commissioner to express his concerns.3h Curtis was ready to sentence the officers on Thurs- day, September &. Storrow and his companions argued that the decision should be delayed to allow the committee a chance to affect a compromise. Curtis agreed to delay announcement of his decision until Monday, September 8, and he added that he was not concerned with pay hikes or reduction of hours provided that command officers got the same benefits. Curtis was firm on only one point. The police must surrender their AFL charter.35 Storrow was quick to act, but he lacked time. The next day he requested an audience with Coolidge. He // argued that if the governor would intervene a strike :>\ could be averted. All that was needed was the time to improve wage and working conditions. WMth.such.improve- ments Storrow was convinced that the police union would surrender its charter.36 Coolidge was of a different 3":tid. , 1,. 35Ibid. , 1,. 36Ibid., u-s. 162 opinion and refused to intervene. "The Governor . . . stated to the representatives of the committee that he felt it was not his duty to communicate with the Comic- sioner on the subject."37 Coolidge would emerge as the ( . y hero of the affair, yet he could have avoided the strike I: before it jelled. He had an uncanny political sense, however. Action at this time had no great political benefit. Coolidge described the meeting in his autobiOgra- phy. When the policemen's union persisted in its course I was urged by a committee appointed by the Mayor to interfere and attempt to make Commissioner Curtis settle the dispute by arbitration. The Governor appoints the Commissioner and probably could remove him, but he has no more jurisdiction over his acts than he has over the Judges of the Courts; besides, I did not see how it was possible to arbitrate the question of the authority of the law, or of the necessity of obedience to the rules of the Depart- ment and the orders of the Commissioner. These principles were the heart of the whole controversy and the only important questions at issue. It can readily be seen how important they were and what the effect might have been if they had not been main- tained. I decided to support them whatever the consequences might be . . . so I remained‘ in Boston ang kept carefully informed of conditions.3 Gaining an appreciation of Mayor Peter's frustrations, Storrow returned to Curtis asking for a compromise. Curtis 37Ibid., 8. 380alvin Coolidge, Autobiography (New York: Cosmo- 163 was not in the mood. He was incensed at the demands of the union's attorneys and the arrogant attitude of the officers on trial. His mind was made up. Further, he resented the actions of Storrow and his committee. He stated that the opinions of Storrow did not come from the men and that Storrow had no competence in police administra- tion.39 Curtis believed that he was the sole administrator of the Boston Police Department. Storrow returned to the committee in the midnight hour to forge a compromise plan and it was completed by Saturday, September 6. The plan had five major points. (First, the union was to surrender its AFL charter. Second/i wages and working conditions were to be improved, but it 'was a matter to be settled among the commissioner, the mayor and the union. +Third, nothing should be done to discourage an internal police union. flourth, union member- ship should not be made compulsory. Fimglly, the officers on trial should have all charges against themdismissed.ho The committee sent the compromise plan to Peters. Peters immediately forwarded the plan to Curtis. ”The report commends itself to me as a wise method of dealing with the subject, and I recommend it to your favor- able consideration," Peters wrote. ”If acceptable to you 39532231 Report. 1213, 1241,. hoStorrow to Peters, September 6, 1919. in; . -.- and the men, it affords a speedy, and, it seems to me, satisfactory settlement of the whole question.”h1 Curtis still refused to budge. ' On Sunday Storrow once again attempted to get the governor to intervene. While Coolidge claimed that he ;%( remained in Boston to keep abreast of the situation, he \ was nowhere to be found. One of the fringe benefits of his office was a chauffeur driven limosene and Coolidgey- had a passion for it. He had motored to the western side of the state spending the day'with loyal friends. There was no talk of the impending police strike. Storrow waited all day for word from Coolidge or Curtis. Noner/ came. On Sunday evening, following the advice of Peters, Storrow released cOpies of the compromise plan to the Boston press.h2 The press enthusiastically embraced the plan. The gprald printed the entire text on page one and called for the police to accept. A police strike, the Herald cautioned, ”will have no public sentiment." The paper also suggested that Curtis accept nothing more than the plan conveyed.“3 The Herald was a.thublican paper’and its response was not surprising. mPeters to Curtis, September 6, 1919. thussell, 109-110. See also Citizen's Committee Report, 10. h3Boston Herald, September 8, 1919. 165 Other papers endorsed the plan although they vas- cillated in their support for Curtis. The @3333 pointed out that the plan did not infringe on the power of the commissioner.“ The M, with a high readership among the Irish working class, supported the compromise since it allowed the police to organize.hs The mrican criti- cized Curtis for not accepting the rights of working men. They urged him “not to rock the boat" and to accept the plan.u'6 After Curtis refused to compromise an afternoon paper levied criticism. The editors of the Evening Record claimed that Curtis threw 'the public in the waste basket” and, that he could avoid a strike, but he was refusing to do am!” Generally, both Republican and Democratic papers supported the Storrow compromise. Curtis officially responded to Peters on Monday morning, September 8. . “The Commissioner can discover nothing in the communication transmitted by Your Honor and relating to action by him which appears to him to be either consistent with his prescribed legal duties or calculated to aid him in their performance.” Curtis went on to say that he would reveal his verdict against the union organizers “Boston Globe, September 8, 1919. hsBoston Post, September 8, 1919. M’Boston Aperican, September 8, 1919. ’47Bogton Evenipg Record, September 8, 1919. 166 forthwith.u8' Peters and Storrow were helpless and frus- trated, yet in the face of a strike they would begrudgingly end up in Curtis' camp. Curtis summoned the union leaders to Pemberton Square that afternoon and suspended them indefinitely. He chose suspension rather than discharge to allow the offi- cers to return to work after the AFL charter was surrendered. He thought that disciplinary action would destroy the union. The suspended officers immediately left Pemberton.Square and summoned the union.”9 Curtis ultimately did not believe that the police would walk out. Aside from his belief in his authority, he finally had powerful interests supporting him due to the threat of a strike. In a laconic statement Coolidge offered support for the commissioner. Small businesses joined with large banking interests to condemn talk of a police strike. Many citizens, including the Irish, began to support Curtis simply because they feared a breakdown of law and order. ENen the Citizen's Committee wrote: At these (compromise) conferences the position of the committee was one of scrupulous, rigid and unyielding adher- ence to the Commissioner's and Mayor's position that the men must give up their A.F. of L. charter: that on no basis could their retention as policemen be countenanced; that if the men should heCurtis to Peters, September 8, 1919. h9Annual Repprt, 1212, 1&-15. 167 strike the committee would do the utmost :gr::::§.p8wer to see that they were Curtis knew that he lost some support by rejecting compromise and suspending the officers, but he was aware of solid sentiment against a strike. He felt that the power of his coalition would nip any threat of walkout in the bud, and he deeply believed that the police would be too loyal to strike when the situation actually pre- sented itself. He was wrong. The Strike The suspensions were announced at Monday afternoon roll call at 5:&5 p.m. Many officers were surprised because they thought that the union officials would be fired. Regardless, the police union held a meeting that evening and almost every available patrolman attended. When the suspended officers appeared at the meeting they were greeted with a thunderous ovation which seemed to raise the courage of all the men. A statement was read thanking Storrow for all his work and listing the familiar police grievances. The speaker concluded that without the shelter of the AFL the police union would be powerless. The union, he stated, "has once and for all come to stay."51 The police were confident. SOCitizen's Committee Report, 3- 51Russell, 112. Other accounts of the strike bal- loting and walkout appear in Lyons, Robeson and Ross. 168 Strike balloting began at 9:&5 p.m. and the over- whelming majority of votes favored a walkout. Voting continued throughout the night from members who arrived at the end of their tours of duty. By morning the final vote was counted. One thousand one hundred and thirty-four policemen voted to strike with two Opposed. The walkout began Tuesday afternoon, September 9, 1919.52 At 1:00 p.m. Peters showed up at Pemberton Square. He found the commissioner calm.’ Curtis assured Peters, who was extremely nervous and would remain so throughout the strike, that the situation was under control. Curtis still expected many policemen to be loyal and did not believe that any violent activities would occur in the early going. Peters asked aboutmobilizing the State Guard, and Curtis informed him that it was both unnecessary and illegal. The mayor, Curtis informeleeters, had the power to mObilize the Guard only during the time of riot- ing or serious disaster. Neither situation existed in Boston.53 Uncalmed, Peters left the office only after Curtis agreed to meet the governor later in the afternoon. Curtis had some justification for his confidence. Over four hundred patrolmen remained on duty and he assigned 52Ibid., 113. Apparently the‘gpggpgg_§ppgpg,and the late edition of the gpgpscript gave the irst newspaper accounts of the walkout. 53Cipizen'g Committee Report, 11. 169 225 command officers to patrol.5h In addition, he planned to ask Coolidge for help from the State Police and he assigned one hundred park policemen to street duty. Although he lacked support during early 1919, once the officers began to leave their posts supporters flocked to Curtis' banner. Business interests, both small and.large, were in the fore- front. Of the 3,1&2 volunteers for special police duty, 1,95& came from corporations and business associations. The railroad directly assigned 220 men.to the special police paying them their regular wages.SS Logistically, Curtis had more manpower than under normal circumstances. His confi- dence began to fade, however, as mobs began gathering around the police stations and in Scollay Square late in the afternoon. National eyes had yet to focus on Boston. The Egg; Yopk Tings devoted one column to the strike on page 19 on September 9. The Times gave a brief description of the suspension of the patrol officers and.a detailed account < of Storrow's attempts to thwart the strike. The article implied that the volunteer police would easily fill the vacancies left by the strikers.56 After a night of vio- lence the national cOmplacency gave way to terror. The next morning the Times headlined the mob violence and 5“Annual ReportI 1212, 19. 55Ibid. , us. 56New York Times, September 9, 1919. 170 linked it to other strikes, including an impending national strike of steel workers.57 0n the same morning the Eg;;_ Street Journal headlined "Lenin and Trotsky on the Way."58 In 1919 it appeared that a Bolshevist revolution was begin- ning, yet Boston remained calm on Tuesday afternoon. In a late afternoon meeting with Peters and Coolidge, Curtis still maintained an aura of confidence. He did not think it was necessary to mObilize the Guard even though Peters begged the governor to do it., Curtis pointed out that he had not activated the volunteer police and.they should surely be mobilized before activating the Guard. Coolidge later stated that he felt the Guard should have been.mobilized as soon as the police left their posts.' Hewas reluctant to do so because the mayor had the power to activate the trOOps in the city and Curtis strongly affirmed that the situation was under control.59 It must be remembered that Coolidge was writing an apology after the fact. He had taken.no independent action prior to the strike and there is no reason to believe that he would have done so at this time. COolidge and the Guard remained inactive. 57Ibid., September 10, 1919. 58wall street Jouppgl, September 10, 1919. cf. Russell, 9. S9Coolidge, 130-131. Curtis was quoted in the Boston Post after the meeting stating, ”I am prepared for all eventualities. I am prepared for anything.” Boston Pogt, September 9, 1919. 171 Peters, who had attempted to keep an infantry company on call, was correct. The Guard should have ar- rived as soon as possible. As the strikers left their stations during the afternoon, many with tears in their eyes, mobs gathered at the stations and officers were assaulted in the tough sections of South Boston.60 At one station a fruit peddler walked past and his cart was stripped bare. The mob began to pelt the station with oranges and, a few minutes later, with.nud and stones. As one of the strikers edged away he muttered, "Do your worst. No one will step you now.”61 The night of violence was generally exaggerated // in newspaper reports. Sensationalistic reporting sells papers. Still, there was no doubt who controlled the streets on the night Of September 9. Mobs and Irish gangs roamed almost at will. Upper class gentlemen were attacked and beaten, several women were raped and numerous indivi- duals were robbed. Businesses suffered incredibly. Windows were smashed and stores were looted. Firemen responding to false alarms were pelted with any material available. Boston's mood was ugly.62 6oNeg YOrk gimep, September 10, 1919. 61Russell, 122-123. 62Russell provides an excellent synopsis of the rioting, 122-170. See also Hess, Lyons and Robeson. 172 Officers attempting to quell the disturbance were generally ineffective. Mobs continually advanced on small groups of loyal policemen and they retreated only at gun point. One station in South Boston was literally under ’ siege; the remaining officers and commanders would not \‘ leave the station fOr fear for their lives. Some arrests were made, but they were the exception, not the rule. Mbst of the people who were arrested were simply unlucky. They were usually either injured or they ventured from the sanctity of the mobs. The violence gradually subsi- ded by itself in the early morning hours.63 The nonstrik- ing police officers waited to see what daylight would bring. The rioting placed Curtis in political trouble. His refusal to call out the Guard or mobilize his volun- teer police irritated Peters. In addition, the Park Police refused to perform street duty. In his staunch fashion, Curtis had fired them. All of this was too much' fbr Peters. After spending a restless and fearful night he decided to take matters into his own hands. Under the provisions of a state law any mayor had the authority to mobilize military forces "in case of a tumult, riot, mob or’a body of persons acting together by force to violate or resist the laws of the 63NewYork Times, September 10, 1919. See also Russell , ”IE1 41:7 . ,g 173 ”m“...- commonwealth.”6u Peters now took that action, although he formally stated that he requested trOOps from Gover- nor Coolidge. His next step was to send a message to Pemberton Square. An 1885 law gave the mayor the author- ity to take direct control of the department during times of civil disorders. Peters ordered the commissioner to take directions from city hall.65 Officially, Curtis responded, "I officially await your action.'66 Unofficially, he sought to remedy the situation. He did not want to work for Peters and.he resented Peters' attempt to control the department. Coolidge agreed with Curtis, but he still refused to take action other than attempting to blame the strike on the mayor.67 Peters' maneuvers constituted one of the more ironic episodes of the strike. Historians have not remem- bered him kindly and it is generally assumed that he was an ineffective mayor. His actions were generally unnoticed and his inability to react in a calm manner pervades inter- pretations of his assumption.of police command. At one point he even approached Coolidge in a panic-stricken 6“Citizen's Committee Report, 19-20. 6SIbide , 20-21 e 66Curtis to Peters, September 10, 1919. 67White, 160 and Coolidge, 131-132. 171. state and struck him in the face. He had to be subdued by National Guard trOOpers.68 Yet in the time of crisis Peters moved to save the city. Coolidge, who would emerge '/ as a national hero, did nothing except follow the mayor‘s %\ lead and mobilize Guard units across the state.69 Troops arrived all day on September 10. Brigadier General Samuel D. Parker became the gg_§gg£g_polioe com- missioner through Peters' orders. Combat troops moved into position throughout the city and their intentions were clear. Pedestrians were to keep moving and groups of people were dispersed at bayonet point. When the mobs began to form again that evening they'met military force. The most colorful example of military action )< occurred on Scollay Square. A group of volunteer policemen led by a Harvard football hero had been stationed in the square as a large angry mob formed. In the pattern typi- cal of the previous night the violence began with name calling and cries of “scab” and "strike breaker.’I The mob then advanced on the volunteers, but retreated when the men drew their weapons. Unlike the previous night, the mob became more confident. They advanced again and this time the volunteers retreated. The mob took this as an indication of victory and charged. They grabbed 68Russell, 130. 69Reppetto, 110-11h. Reppetto is one of the few historians to make note of this point. 175 the volunteers, disarmed them and began beating them. It appeared as though some men would be killed.70 The resulting action appeared to be like a final scene of a B-grade western. General Parker wanted to clear the square and then seal off the city in a manner used by military forces when seizing control of an enemy town. He had dispatched a cavalry troOp to the square to begin the operation. They arrived in the nick of time.71 Their commander witnessed the plight of the volun- teers Just as his unit was arriving. He hastily formed his troop into a line formation and ordered the men to draw their sabers. He was not merely trying to make a psychological show of force: he lowered his saber and the troOp charged. The effect was reminiscent of Seydlitz at Rossbach and other cavalry actions in the age of linear warfare. The sight of a saber swinging adversary bearing down on enemy troops at a gallup was horrifying. Upon seeing the advancing troopers, the mob panicked and scat- tered in all directions. The cavalry had saved the day.72 Throughout the evening the sight of men on horse- back brought fear and respect in the ranks of the mobs. The same thing, tragically, did not hold true for the 7oRussell, 156. 71Ibid., 157. 72Boston Herald, September 11, 1919. ,// 176 infantry. Companies moved into position in line forma- tion with bayonets fixed. Gradually, the mobs regained their confidence and began to advance on the infantrymen. They should not have done so. One unit fired a volley into a mob killing two men and wounding nine other people. The nonstriking and volunteer police had been firing into the air. Nerd spread among the mobs that the Guard was firing at people. At one time in history a similar action ‘y’ caused a revolution. In 1919 it caused the mobs to dis- perse.73 After two nights of violence, the city finally calmed. Reports of National Guard violence were grossly exaggerated. The New Yerk Times, for example, reported that the Guard was machine-gunning mobs.7h The Guard was firing, but they were untrained, ill-equipped and.the incidents of shooting were scattered. There was no general attempt to subdue the city by volleys of musketry. Even in the previously cited incident, no one seemed to have given the orders to fire. It was the presence of military force rather than the unrestrained use of force which subdued the city.75 73Ibid., September 11, 1919. 7uNew‘York Times, September 10, 1919. 75Russell, 169. f 177 By Thursday the city was under control. Busines- ses reopened, the streets were cleaned and violence was sporadic, not general. Such was the atmosphere when Calvin Coolidge took his "boldest” step. with the situation well »< in hand Coolidge stepped forward and assumed control of Boston.76 The public blamed Curtis for the strike and Peters had taken all the political risks, but the laconic Coolidge became the American hero who defiantly stood in the face of Bolshevism and anarchy. The coalition against the strike was wavering as old animosities reemerged. All that remained was intense public resentment against the Boston Police. Coolidge sensed the public mood and toekf full advantage of it. He was a shrewd politician. It was growing increasingly clear by Friday that the police unionism was in trouble. The rioting destroyed any chance for victory for the Boston Police and fears of police unionization spread across the country. Unionization for the police was synonomous with Bolshevism. Americans would not stand for it. ' The rioting did much to draw national attention to the strike. A year earlier the Cincinnati Police had suc- cessfully struck, but there had been no outburst of violence and it was not 1919. President Wilson gave an indication of the national reaction to the violence during an address in Helena, Montana on September ll. He denounced the 7601tizon'sCommittee Report, 35. 178 actions of the Boston Police as a "crime against civili- zation." In my Judgement the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and direct as the obligation of a soldier. He is a public servant, not a private employef; and the whole honor of the community is in his hands. He has no right to prefer any private advantage to the public safety. I hope that the lesson will be burned in so that it will never again be forgotten . . . 7 Wilson also used the occasion to link the strike with the radicalism sweeping the country.78 Wilson's speech was hardly the only negative reac- tien to the strike. An anonymous article appeared in the October 1919 issue of Open Shop Review criticizing the strikers and linking them to the “radical” actions of labor unions. According to the article police unionization was a natural manifestation of the labor movement and it called for a halt to all public employee unions.79 Another arti- cle in Survey magazine appeared a few months later arriving 80 at similar conclusions. 77weodrow Wilson, September 11, 1919 cf. New'York Times, September 12, 1919. 781bid., September 12. 1919- 79"Boston Police Strike: Police Strike an Assault RponhOEr Government,” Qpen Shep Review, 16 (October 1919): 09- 1 e 881 88 80"Boston Police Strike," Sppppy, h2 (Summer 1920): - 2e 179 Other magazines Joined in the growing anti-police union sentiment. The Literapz Digest argued that the police had no right to strike because such actions con- noted an attack against democracy. The article was also reflective of the new found popularity of Coolidge, prais- ing him as the hero who kept Boston from anarchy.81 992g, Governmepp conducted an informal survey of Americans and found the vast majority were opposed to police strikes and a smaller’maJority opposed police unionization.82 A Cana- dian publication Joined the crescendo arguing that Boston was a repetition of the Montreal experience. The police, an anonymous Canadian argued, should not be allowed to strike: they were officials of the state.83 One of the most biting accounts came from Gregory Mason in Outlook. Mason saw ailink between police strikgs andfirgvolution. The Boston strike was not an attempt to improve the police situation through collective labor \// action, it was a prelude to revolution. The police became the unwitting tools of the Bolshevists when they abandoned 81"Policeman's Right to Strike,” Literapz Digest, 62 (September 1919): n.p. 82"Shall the Police Strike: Public Opinion Gives a Negative Answer,” Good Government, 36 (September 1919): 39-1 70 83"Police Strikes,” Canadian Municipal Journal, n.v. (September 1919): 300. 180 the offices. Coolidge was once again heralded as the hero who kept the Bolsheviks at bey.8h Newspapers were also quick to condemn the strikers. Of course, locally the Boston papers criticized the police in unanimous fashion after the violence occurred.85 News- paper-criticism was not limited to local papers, however. Russell notes that the San Frpngispo Examiner, the Les épgeles Times and the New York world all ran articles criticizing the police.86 The New Yerk Timgp ran two editorials condemning the police and.a Sunday feature article on the dangers of police unionism.87 The national press corps was united in the attack against Boston's policemen. \\ Police administrators needed no incentive to Jump \\ ) on the band wagon. Their condemnation of.police unionism // only increased with the strike. Richard Sylvester, one of I the most prominent members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police arrogantly cancelled the proposed AFL ‘ charter of the Hashingten,.D.C. Police.88 In Macon, Georgia:\\::> 8ll-GregoryMason, "Mo Bolshevism for Boston,” Outlook, 123 (September 1919): 27. 85For examples see Boston Herald, September 11, 1919; Boston Globe, September 10 and September 11, 1919; and Fasten Americgp, September 12, 1919. 86auuen, 169. 87!!ew York Times September 10, September 11 and September 1K, 1515. 88Ibid., September 1h, 1919. 181 In Macon, Georgia the chief was fired by the city commis- sion because he allowed police officers to remain in a union and he was replaced by an anti-union chief.89 Chief ( A. L. Dunlap, representing the IACP, criticized outside union affiliation and called upon administrators to exer% \. cise benevolent paternalism so that policemen would not \\ be forced to Join unions.90 The message was clear after . (.1 Boston. There would be no police unions as far as police“" administrators were concerned.91 afl,~ If the violence was the cause of failure, the aban- donment of the police by organized labor sealed the police union's fate. The week after the strike began the BCLU met for a sympathy strike vote. Led by the firefighters, the union association voted for a general labor walkout. ‘ Unbeknown to the rank-and-file, however, union leadership had taken control. Faced with an impending steel strike Samuel Gompers did not want the anti-police feelings to ‘/ grow into a general reaction against the AFL.! The strike 89Ibid., September 15, 1919. 90A. L. Dmnlap, ”The Lesson of the Boston Police Strike," The Detective, n.v. (October 1919): 3. 9“See comments by Reppetto, 116 and Robert M. Fogel- son, Bi Cit Police (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 5977), 31. Reppetto claims that the strike ”left a permanent legacy for the American police. It confirmed both their low status and their powerlessness. In the crunch both left and right had assailed or abandoned them.” Fogelson writes that the strike emasculated police unions and after 1919 ”the rank and file were represented only by their fraternal and benevolent groups." ‘\ H 182 vote had been secret. The union leadership told the rank-and-file that they had voted to stay on the Job.92 Curtis' power was restored by Coolidge and for the first time in the office Curtis had the absolute control which had been exercised by O'Meara. With the National Guard firmly in control of the city Curtis had the oppor- tunity to build a new police force. He announced, with Coolidge's full approval, that the policemen had deserted their offices and were not entitled to return.93 The worst fears of the striking policemen transformed into reality. While some community leaders debated the type of punishment which was to be meted out against the strik- ers, Curtis went to the state civil service commission and began a massive recruiting drive. By November he had 1,3h3 new patrolmen on the street.9uK; Gompers may have prevented a sympathy strike, but he was not willing to totally abandon the police. He sent an urgent telegram to Coolidge asking for the removal of Curtis, the continuation of the police union without AFL affiliation and reinstatement of the discharged officers. Coolidge described the event: Soon, Samuel Gompers began to telegraph me asking the removal of Mr. Curtis and 92Russell, 176-180. 93Apppa1 Report, 1212, 16. 9h1b1d., 19-20; 27. 183 the reinstatement of the union policemen. This required me to make a reply in which I state among other things that ”There is no right to strike against the public safety by any body, any time, any where." This phrase caught the attention of the nation. It was beginning to be clear that if voluntary associations were to be permitted to substitute their will for the authority of public officials the end of our government was at hand. The issue was nothing less than whether the law which the people had made through their duly authorized agencies should be supreme. This issue I took to the people in my campaign for reelection as Governor.95 Coolidge would eventually take this message all the way to the presidency. The Boston Police strike made Silent Cal a national hero. ' The Boston Police strike was a failure for labor.v; Officers who had devoted their entire working lives to law enforcement were never allowed to practice policing again. Meaningful police unionism was buried for almost fifty years. In the face of the Red scare and threatened anarchy a coalition of diverse interests formed and dealt the fatal blow. The Storrow Committee sent a fitting eulogy to Peters in early October. It was resolved: That the policemen of Boston were unJus- tified in leaving their posts: that it is vital for the preservation of law that officers of the law should not be permitted, by organization or otherwise, to become affiliated with any outside bodies, the rules or interest of which might conflict with such duty: and that the Committee fully supports the acts 9SCoolidge, 13h. 18b, of the authorities in preserving law and order and towards defeating finally and conclusively the effort to enforce by strike the right of policemen to agin the American Federation of Labor. The fate of police unionism was clear. Administra- tors were virtually given a free hand. In his work, Police Szppemp in the Uniped States, Bruce Smith outlined almost all of the administrative problems facing the American police. He called for an improvement of salaries and working conditions, but he did not mention unionism.97 After 1919 unions were not sufficiently powerful to merit attention. In a nationally published work, which addi- tionally was required reading for rookie New Yerk City policemen, Cornelius Cahalane stressed the relationship of the individual officer with the command structure of a police department. Superior officers are assigned in charge of the various ranks in a department for the purpose of supervising, directing, and instructing their subordinates in the proper performance of their duty. It is the superior's part to promulgate orders and procedure and to see that subordinates perform their duty in the manner which the superior thinks will accomplish the best results. They are selected by some person in authority, either directly or indirectly, for the proper performance of police duty. It is not for you to uestion the Judge- ment . . . your duty (is) to respect the 96Storrow to Peters, October 3, 1919. 97Sruee Smith, Police S stems in the United States (New'York: Harper, 19E55, 137-1E1 and 166-176. Smith also ignored unionism in his previous work Rural Crime Control (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 3 e 185 superior by giving him unqualified obedi- ence in the lawful performance of his duty, promptly to obey his orders or directions, cheerfully to extend to him the respect and courtesy due his rank . . A disciplined patrolman possesses that indefinable something which makes 98 him responsive to orders and authority. This was written four years after the Boston experience. Calahane failed to note that such exploitive discipline was possible because the police had no union protection. If progressivism represented a triumph of conser- vatism and police reform served as a triumph of bureaucracy, the Boston Police strike stands as a bridge between the progressive order and the so-called "professional" era. , ”Professionalism" was essentially "bureauism" and the ~// bureaus were ruled by autocrats. The situation remained constant until police unions reemerged in the 19503 and 1960s. Spawned from a legacy of defeat the unions vowed never to turn back the clock. The militancy of the unions can be directly attributed to the defeat of police union- ism in Boston by an anti-labor coalition that institution- alized a bureaucratic ideological model forged during the Progressive Era. In every sense, the outcome of the Boston Police strike was a triumph of bureaucratic rigidity. 98Cornelius P. Calahane, The Policeman (New York: Dutton, 1923), 11-12. CHAPTER VII The Triumph of Bureaucracy The Boston Police strike was the last step in the drama of progressive police reform. At its conclusion the ideological structure of American policing was firmly established and police agencies would remain centralized with bureaucratic power concentrated in administration. The organizations would evolve into rigid structures and individual officers would find it difficult to identify with fellow laborers. Ironically, anti-police union sentiment would not spill into other public sectors. Firemen, postal employees, sanitation workers and other public employees would be allowed to unionize and seek outside affiliation. Officials in other regulatory agencies, such as the Forestry Service end the Food and Drug Administration, would be given relatively easier access to the upper'middle class and they felt no need to unionize. The growing number of state police agencies would screen union activity through rigid training and military discipline. Progressive police reform and the meanings attached to labor movements in general in 1919 v” Joined to thwart police unionism in America. Several conclusions can be made concerning the general influence of progressivism.on the American police 186 187 structure and specific influences of the Boston Police strike. First, the strike represented the climax of bureaucratic triumph in police agencies. After the strike, even.with.more recent police labor militancy, the concept of bureaucracy was never seriously challenged. Bureaucracy‘Z K with centralized administrative power was institutionalized. Second, the role of individual police officers ~ remained contradictory with respect to labor. This contra- diction is related to monopoly capitalism, but it is not the result of it. The police perform a contradictory func- tion because they help to regulate workers in an industrial society. The role originates from the order maintenance function of the police, and while it must necessarily be related to the economic structure, it is not a result of corporate consolidation. The police are one form of a‘ social homeostasis and it is difficult to use them as an agent for social change. The experience in Boston.demon- '/ strates this concept. Third, Just as the progressives failed to define a formal function for the police bureaus, the strike failed to establish a role for individual policemen. This is one explanation for the maintenance of a variety of role con- tradictions. A central question remained after'the strike. Were patrolmen officers of the state? If so, they were not endowed with the benefit of social mobility beyond the 188 working class.1 Any attempt at professionalism in a tradi- tional sense, such as associated with theology, legalism and scholarship, was lost on the streets of Boston. The police were first and foremost office holders in a bureaucracy. Professionalism became synonymous with bureaucratization. Fourth, police unionism was soundly defeated in Boston. It would be reborn only as a reaction to the gains made by organized labor and it would not have the opportun- ity to peacefully grow and change the bureaucratic structure of policing. Due to the period of relatively unchecked administrative power the new police labor movement would be militant. This is perhaps the greatest legacy of the Boston Police strike. Finally, the strike was unique in American history. It was the only strike that generated long lasting support for anti-unionism in law enforcement. After numerous years other police strikes would follow, but they lacked the overall impact of Boston. Police strikes were accepted as 1It should be noted that Fogelson disagrees. He states that police employment has traditionally been a vehicle of social mobility. Immigrants found the job to be a means of moving into mainstream society while lower and lower-middle class actore use police employment to improve their status. This point is well taken, yet the vast majority of police officers can at best only advance to the working ranks of the middle class. Police employ- ment is a vehicle of limited social mobility and provides class mobility for only a select few. For criticism.see Robert M. Fogelson, Bi Cit Police 9(Cambridge, MA: Har- vard University Press, For support of the position offered in the text see Abraham 8. Blumben§.Crim- l d Ironies (New Yerk: New Viewpoints, 189 a matter of course: they were taken in stride. Boston was another matter. More than any other police labor action in American history, the Boston Police strike shaped the entire course of internal police labor relations. The Triumph of Conservatism and the Police Bureau Gabriel Kolko effectively argues that conservatism triumphed during the Progressive Era and that an actual opportunity to achieve working class participation in an industrial democracy-was placed in abeyance.2 Helko_argues on a strategic level, a level of national policy. There were many battles leading to the eventual triumph of Amer- ican corporations and.many challenges to the progressive order after it was established. In the twilight of progres- sivism there were minor conflicts that had.no bearing on the actual outcome, but they were important in their own sphere. Like the Battle of New Orleans, they were pppp £5232 actions occurring after the outcome of the war had been decided. The Boston Police strike was one such inci- dent. Conservatism triumphed in Boston. Symbolically it signaled the end of challenges to progressive police reform. The bureaucracies created by reformers in jurisdictions such as New'York City, Pennsylvania and Boston were ZGabriel Kolko, The Tri h of Conservatism: A Reinteppretation of American Histopy, 1§55-1§15 (New York: ee ress, 3 , 2-3 190 institutionally established. The professional status of police officers had changed little, but the departmental structures had been altered and accepted. The meaningful outcome was that bureaucracy was equated with professional-) ism, and despite the advent of so-called."prefessionalism,”/// individual officers remained in a relatively constant position. Robert Fogelson describes the outcomes of the reform movement. The reform campaign ”did not deeply erode the historic pattern of local control." While out- side authorities continued to order "shake ups and (they) forced the rank-and-file to restrain their cupidity, they rarely brought about fundamental changes in departmental policies and practices." The structure of the police changed'] and local political influence was transferred from the patrol( ranks to the command.ranks, bum police activity changed very 9 little.3 The Job of the police officer did not change with progressivism. The major alteration occurred in the area of centralizing the power of administrative authority and concentrating power in the chief’s office. "From 1890 on the reformers brought pressure on the authorities to increase the power of the police chiefs, weaken the position of the precinct captains and ward leaders, and thereby centralize 3Fogelson, 95-96. 191 the police departments.'h If Boston represented anything, it was certainly the epitome of this progressive ideological structure in an urban setting. From O'Meara through Curtis the meaning of "commissioner" was centralized power. The strike was a challenge to centralized power. Patrolman and the BCLU thought that Curtis would bend under pressure. Gompers expected that Curtis would be relieved. Yet Coolidge's famous response to the strike had another meaning for police officers across the country. If the police could not strike against the public interest any- thme or anywhere, presumably this meant they could not challenge authority. In fact, after Boston they made no serious attempt until the 1960's and even then they did / not seek to change the structure. Prior to progressivism the power of the chiefs had not been absolute as precinct captains or area commanders maintained control. Although progressive reforms central- ized the power in the chiefs' heads, it also provided the opportunity for rank-and-file organizations to challenge centralized hierarchies.5 The Boston Police strike was a national victory for the chiefs and.it enabled them to solidify strength. Their power was only eroded through a gradual process_of evolution, and in the immediate years lmud. , 97. 51pm. , 99-101 . 192 years following the strike the police could not collec- tively challenge executive authority. Reppetto notes the failure of progressivism to change the status of individual patrol officers and he attributes it directly to the strike. The Boston Police strike com- pletely thwarted police unionization.and for a half century no department could consider collective labor activity. While blue-collar workers made dramatic gains, police wages and working conditions remained constant. The police were emasculated having no real weapon for making demands, and denied the right to strike under the auspices of their special status, they were also denied wage increases because their Job status was so low. Reppetto argues that this forced then to seek job benefits "under the table."6 Police work remained a semi-skilled trade after the strike and it was clear that individual officers did not possess the social mobility that came with more tradi-. tional professions. For the police officer success in the job environment came through rigid adherence to bureaucra- tic policies. Efficiency, obedience and fulfillment of official obligations defined professionalism for American police. Unlike attorneys, theologians and professors, they 1 were not encouraged to innovate or question, and their only hope of mobility was movement to the working class if they 6Thomas A. Reppetto, The Blue Parade (New York: Free Press, 1978), 116-117. 193 remained on the Job. The Boston POlice strike sealed their fate: police officers were proletarians.7 If any police officers professionalized after the strike it was the police chiefs and they did so at the expense of the rank-and-file. The problems of bureaucracy were unnoticed as the Vollmers and Wilsons further refined the progressive ideological model.' The chiefs were too absorbed with.adding new technology to notice the rigidity V/f that was forming in their bureaus. Accordingly they pro- fessionalized themselves by becoming rational administrators.8 Individual officers could riot question the paths the chiefs“) charted. Professionalism was synonymous with bureaucraticfi// rationality in the chiefs' view. Bureaucracy triumphed in the Boston Police strike because the resulting national mood left the police power- less to challenge it. Boston placed.police administrators in a position of relatively unchecked power. Administrators made gains in professional status but the same did not hold true for the rank-and-file. In the early 1970's Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham Blumberg were calling for the / “embeurgeoisment” of police officers. They state that this appeal was not being made on a class basis. Rather, Niederhoffer and Blumberg contend that the American police 7Fogelson, 235-236. 8 Samuel Walker, The Emer ence of Profes ona am 1577). 133- 19h should reflect the mores of the American.middle class.9 Police administrators began the "embourgeoisment" process after the strike by working toward a bureaucratic profes- sional ideal. Relegated to a lower status individual officers could not seek this goal. Notwithstanding the merits of the Niederhoffer- Blumberg argument, patrol officers could not and.would not become members of the bourgeois after Boston. They were relegated to the working class. Policing became professional in a bureaucratic sense, but it was not deemed ‘// a suitable vocation for members of the more affluent clas- sea. A Curtis, an O'Meara or a Roosevelt were socially free to become administrators: they could not become patrolmen, however, and maintain the acceptance of their class. Police administration was an acceptable profession: police work was not. With the final acceptance of bureaucracy, the nature of influence groups also changed. In the Progressive Era interest groups and coalitions sought to revamp the entire structure of American policing. Had the Boston Police successfully challenged Curtis the prOgressive structure would have certainly undergone some type of change even though the striking officers were merely trying to influence 9Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg, "The Police in Social and Historical Perspective,” in Nieder- hoffer and Blumberg (eds.), The bivalent Force: Per ec- tives on the Police (San Francisco: Rinehart, 1973), 1-13. 19h should reflect the mores of the American middle class.9 Police administrators began the "embourgeoisment" process after the strike by working toward a bureaucratic profes- sional ideal. Relegated to a lower status individual officers could not seek this goal. Notwithstanding the merits of the Niederhoffer- Blumberg argument, patrol officers could not and would not become members of the bourgeois after Boston. They were relegated to the working class. Policing became professional in a bureaucratic sense, but it was not deemed a suitable vocation for members of the more affluent clas- ses. A Curtis, an O'Meara or a Roosevelt were socially free to become administrators: they could not become patrolmen, however, and maintain the acceptance of their class. Police administration was an acceptable profession: police work was not. With the final acceptance of bureaucracy, the nature of influence groups also changed. In the Progressive Era interest groups and coalitions sought to revamp the entire structure of American policing. Had the Boston Police successfully challenged Curtis the progressive structure would have certainly undergone some type of change even though the striking officers were merely trying to influence 9Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg, "The Police in Social and Historical Perspective," in Nieder- hoffer and Blumberg (eds.), The Ambivalent Force: Pers ec- tives on the Police (San Francisco: Rinehart, 1973), 1-1§. 195 the structure. After Boston the role of interest group and coalition reform was limited to influence. The bureaucratic models were accepted and remained intact. Two excellent examples of this influence process have deve10ped in recent years with the first appearing after widespread urban rioting in the late 1960's. Both the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis- tration of Justice and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals called for sweeping. changes in police policies during and after the period of civil disorders.1o Additionally, Charles Saunders cited the necessity for improving police personnel and more recently Lawrence Sherman has demanded an improvement in the quality of police education.11 A growing body of literature has appeared suggesting that police standards can be improved through job analyses.12 Others have called 1oSee President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Re rt: The Police (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967) and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 197 . 11See Charles B. Saunders, U r di the American Polio (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1975) and wrence W. Sherman, The ual t of Police Educ tion (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, . 12$ee for example Stephen Wollack, The V lidatio of Entr -Level Police Officer Selection Procedures (Fair aka, CA: Wollack, Waibel and Guenther, 1976) and Doug Goodgame, “Training Priorities for First-Line Supervisors in Municipal Law Enforcement: A Contrast of Opiniongs' Jo 1 of Police Science and Administration, 6 (197 18E-195. In November.1978 LEI: devoted an entire confer- ence to Job analysis in law enforcement. 196 for more humanistic awareness of activities through other types of research.13 While all of these studies and their supporting interest groups have called for policy changes, none of them attacked the structure of police bureaucracy inherited from progressivism. In an excellent analysis of the actions of American police during the urban rioting and anti-war protests, James Ahern argued that the police were actually respondents to national policies. In his view the president speaks in and from the patrol car. He argued that policy planners and officers need to be cognizant of their national policy role. Once again, however, he concluded that the crisis in law enforcement should be handled by the bureau.1h The studies which emerged from the period of national atten- tion did not focus on the structure of police bureaucracy. Perhaps a rigid bureaucracy helped to cause the problem or maybe it did not, yet the studies spawned by the period of disorder addressed policies, not the structure of bureau- cracy. It remained unchallenged. 13See for example Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Dis re- 2139. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1975): John Gardner and Michael A. Mulkey, Crime and Criminal Justice: Issues in Public Police Anal sis exington, MA: Heat , 97 and Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon J. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal re t in Crime Control (Chicago: niversity of Chicago ress, 9 3 . 1("See James Ahern, Police in Trouble: Our Fri hten- ipg Cripis in Law Enforcement (New York: Simone, 197 ). 197 A second and more recent example comes from the movement for community based policing. Fogelson aptly notes that it is opposed by the political power structure, yet there remains serious interest in the subject.15 Herman Goldstein devotes a major portion of one of his most a) noted works to increasing the role of the community with respect to police policy.16 Egon Bittner argues that the police should engage in extensive post graduate study in order to gain an understanding of community needs and social mores.17 Once again these examples which point to the benefits of community based policing are not questionr ing the bureaucratic structure of policing. They simply want control of the structure shifted to local communities with vacancies filled by members of the community. Bureau- cracy appears to be sacred. During the Progressive Era the nature of reform was different. The structure of the New York City and Boston police agencies was changed. The Pennsylvania State Police were created along paramilitary lines incorporating a rigid bureaucratic hierarchy. The applicability of bureaucracy to policing was challenged during the Boston Police strike, 15Fegelson, 229. 16See Herman Goldstein, Policin a Free Societ (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 197 . 17See Egon Bittner, The gppction of'the Police in Modern Societ (Chevy Chase, D: ational Institute of Mental Health, 1970). 198 and the failure of the striking officers to affect a change left American law enforcement with one of the maJOr lega- eies of progressivism. The social institutionalization of police bureaucracy was one reflection of the triumph of conservatism. Labor and Labor's Regulation A role contradiction in labor policies continued through progressivism. The situation was not created by the reform period, but the Boston Police strike brought it sharply into focus. In times of disorder America has traditionally expected the police to protect property and as the industrial revolution ushered in a new era this expectation translated into police protection of capital investments. The trend continued throughout progressivism and even on the eve of the strike the Boston Police were arresting striking workers under a variety of charges. The labor role contradiction was not the result of capitalism or the consolidation of capital even though Marxists often contend that this is the major explanation for industrial violence.18 Granted, both the police and other workers were forced to sell their skills on a fluc- tuating market and since they1ere at a strong disadvantage they often reacted in a militant manners. Further, the police were used to regulate labor, yet they became cognizant of 18Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theo , Vol. 1 (New York: Monthly Review, 1968), 23. 199 their own role as laborers. From a Marxian paradigm the police labor contradiction assumes supreme importance; it provides the logic for the police revolt in Boston. It is necessary to move beyond this analysis, however, to capture the social meanings attributed to the police strike. Police work is based on contradictory social functions and the labor contradiction, albeit an important factor-in progressivism and the police labor movement, represented only one inconsistancy. The structure of police work necessitates some contradictory functions. It not only applies to labor, it is a part of daily police functions. The police enforce traffic laws, yet they violate laws as they drive: they regulate liquor establishments, yet they partake: they intervene in violent situations, yet they do so with the authority to use deadly force: and they help to form a social homeostasis, yet they are internally and externally part of society. The social structure of policing forces contradictions in many areas.19 19Peter K. Manning, Pol ce Work: The Social Or ani a- tion of Policing (Cambridge, Mi: MIT Press, 1977), 115-118. Manning argues that contradictions result from the structural character of policing in the following manners: (1) discre- tionary power is used against peeple who support the police, (2) police are expected to follow the moral norm with abso- lute compliance, (3) police are required to apply laws in areas where the law does not exist, (h) police have few discretionary guidelines for'the performance of order main- tenance tasks, (5) police feel the need to determine guilt or innocence, (6) police selectively gather, organize and conceal information, (7) police are expected to be apolitical, but they are a political force and (8) police dependence on information eliminates their ability to control crime. 200 The labor contradiction was important in Boston because the officers demonstrated awareness of their status as workers. It was a matter of cognizance and it was mag- nified by the failure of the police to achieve recognition. Other contradictions co-existed with the labor role and the police did not address them. The labor contradiction is important because it was questioned. The labor issue had to be addressed after the strike, but other contradictions remained intact. As a result of the strike police bureaus forced individual police officers to alienate themselves from the working class. They were officially classified as officers of the state, but such classification did not entitle them to the benefits. The workers themselves also rejected the police. The BCLU accepted the police with open arms only to abandon them when they believed the cause of the entire labor movement was in Jeopardy. Forced to disassociate themselves from labor and to join the ungracious ranks of higher officials, police workers were balanced in a state of limbo. Two developments resulted from the situation and they paved the way to militancy. First, the police were limited to membership in benevolent and fraternal organiza- tions.20 They became militant in an effort to achieve the gains of other blue collar workers. The history of labor impotence resulting from the police strike is the prime 2°Fogelson, 81. 201 reason for militancy in more recent years. In their early years these organizations were powerless and frustrated. When police unionism gained acceptance these organizations were the springboards for labor activities. Second, police administrators reacted to the strike in a paternalistic manner that continued for'numerous years. Fesdick was one of many who called for this action. If this point of view is accepted, if in the public interest the right to strike and affiliate with organized labor is denied the police, the legal representa- tives of the community are under peculiar * obligations not only to deal sympathetically and generously with the genuine grievances of the police, but by continual study and observation to forestall such grievances before they can gain a foothold. This is a point which seems to have escaped the attention of’many commentators . . . in many American cities -- and among them is Boston —- it has been apparent for years that the police were underpaid. They have appealed to their superiors, they have appeared before finance committees and councils, they have taken.their claims to the public through the press -- too often with no result, sometimes, indeed, meeting with nothing but brusqueness and abuse . . . (Administration) cannot strip them of the weapons of defense which other workers have, and at the same time ignore their Just claims because they are pressed merely by argument.21 Chief A. L. Dunlap also called for paternalistic administration shortly after the strike. Policemen.are only human like the rest of us poor mortals. They have families to support who are near and dear to them and 21Raymond Fosdick, Americgn Policg Systems (New York: Century, 1921), 319-321. 202 they feel the pinch of old Highcost as keenly as any other class of citizens. Next to newspaper reporters, college professors and school teachers, they are unquestionably the most underpaid wage earners in the community. And one com- pensatory feature of the Boston strike was probably an increased appreciation of a policeman's real importance to society.22 Curtis was one of the pioneers in paternalism. Within a month of the strike Curtis took two actions for the benefit of the new patrolmen. He requested a salary increase over the two hundred dollars previously granted and he increased retirement pensions. He also requested passage of a law against insulting a policeman. The National Guard made several arrests under a similar statute and felt that police officers were entitled to the ”same safeguard."23 Coolidge joined Curtis by claiming that he helped the striking policemen ”in securing other employment, but refused to allow them again to be policemen."2h Admin- istrators would continue to react to police labor in a paternalistic fashion, including the full employment of despotic authority provided under such a system. The actions of police officers and administrators demonstrate that the labor contradiction was not as important 22A. L. Dunlap, "The Lesson'of the Boston Police Strike,” The Detective, n.v. (October 1919): 3. 231212 Appual Repor , 22. 2hCalvin Coolidge, Autobiography (New York: Cosmo- politan, 1931), 133‘13h- 203 as the awareness of its existence. Other contradictions remained and they were ignored, but the labor contradic- tion was directly addressed by the triumphant bureaus. In terms of external labor regulation the strike did not change the role of the American police. The police still intervened in industrial disturbances, usually on the side of investors. Internally, the police were placed in paternalistic limbo. The ideology of progressivism did have an effect on the methods by which the police should be used. Police attacks on workers continued throughout the twenties and would increase during the depression, but some observers felt that the police should assume the role of a progres- sive regulatory agency. Fosdick argued that the police were to be used as impartial keepers of the peace during industrial strife protecting owners, managers and workers. Although this was the ideal form of behavior, Fosdick noted that it was seldom the case.25 Bruce Smith called upon state police forces to exercise a similar role.26 The police failed in this area due to the local orientation of their bureaucracies. They were strongly affected by the growth of regulatory agencies, but given the rigid influence of paternalism the police never developed the regulatory standards of such agencies as the Forestry 25Fesdick, 322-325. 26Bruce Smith, Rural Crime Control (New Yerk: Insti- tute of Public Administration, 1933), 1H3-1h8. 20h Service or the Interstate Commerce Commission. Other than assisting with the institutionalization of paternal- istic bureaucracy, the Boston Police strike had little to do with this. Progressivism left the police under local control. American police could not become a full blown regulatory agency because they were decentralized pphpgpp_. Individual departments were highly centralized and power was concentrated with the executives, but police power was seldom aggregated. The state police approached regu- latory status more closely than any other agency due to the broad area of their Jurisdictions. In this sense Boston must take its place beside New York and Pennsylvania. Police bureaucracy was generally a localized affair. This had a latent effect on police militancy. The police did not follow the design of many federal and state bureaus, yet they were expected to behave as a regulatory agency. Members of other regulatory boards and agencies enjoyed and continue to enjoy a great deal of social and some class mobility. They frequently made changes from high paying jobs in industry to lucrative government posts only to return to industry‘again.27 The Boston Police strike had some bearing on this situation. After the strike it was clear that the police would never have the luxuries of other reguaatory employees. They could not Jump from public to private employment in 27James Weinstein, The Co orate Ideal in the Liberal S ate: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), 253-25E. 205 a professional sense: indeed, with the exceptions of the chiefs, it was difficult1to move to another department. To achieve any rise in social status the police were forced into collective militancy. They were expected to regulate society, including labor activities, yet they were never given the benefits of other laborers. Role contradictions cannot be used to account for militancy since other regu- lators were in the same position. The decentralized structure emphasizing local bureaucratic control was the prime reason American police lacked social mobility. When it was combined with paternalism and lack of real union power, the evolution of militancy was a logical outcome. The Defeat of Police Unionism and Its Meaning It can be unequivocally stated that the major out- come of the strike was the defeat of police unionism. The police could neither organize nor strike against the public interest. Loyalty to a union meant disloyalty to the state and the oath of office. Police officers could not serve two masters. Politicians, police administrators, news- papers and citizens Jointly rendered the death tell. The primary reason for the death of unionism was the continued belief in crime control. The Boston Police strike seemed to indicate that there was a positive correlation between union activity and rising crime. Coolidge, the Storrow Committee and Curtis, among others, all claimed that union affiliation was the central 206 I issue. Its importance has subsequently been overempha- x” sized. This examination of the strike reveals that Americans were concerned with a breakdown in the social order. A striking police force left its jurisdiction defenseless against crime and its variants, anarchy and Bolshevism. This is what Americans believed. They were more concerned with crime control than police working l conditions. Today many police scholars either acknowledge that the police cannot control crime or they admit they do not understand the effects of police combatting crime. Peter Manning cites portions of the police myth to explain the phenomenon. According to the myth the police are supposed to be able to control crime. After all, that is one of their principal reasons for existence. Deeply rooted in the history of policing and in the police mandate, the myth of crime control permeates law enforcement both inter- nally and externally. That is, the police believe that they are controlling crime and they encourage the public to believe it. They attach themselves to numerous symbols and rituals to perpetuate the myth.28 The Boston Police strike reinfbrced the myth of crime control. Even before the last policeman walked off violence began. The rioting resulted in the view that the police were the thin blue line standing between fi— 28Manning, 35. 207 civilization and chaos.29 Americans hardly needed further evidence. Boston was a city in terror, they believed, because the police walked out. The International Association of Chiefs of Police agreed with this interpretation. Echoing the words of Stephen O'Meara they claimed that loyalty to a union involved disloyalty to the crime fighting function.30 When the Boston Police walked out they deserted the city leaving it to be overrun by criminals. This interpretation takes into account neither the fact that Curtis literally had more people to patrol the city after the strike nor the idea that other factors may have caused the rioting and vandalism. Over thirty percent more arrests were made for crimes against property during the disorder, yet they did not effectively thwart crime.31 Nevertheless, Americans believed that the police could control crime and when they deserted their posts in 1919 they provided an open invita- tion to Bolshevism and anarchy. Unionism represented a challenge to the myth of crime control. Since the myth.was so deeply engrained in American policing there was not the slightest chance of 29See for example Cornelius F. Cahalane, The Police- man (New'Ybrk: Dutton, 1923), 20-21. 30International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Unions (Washington, D.C.: IACP, 1958), 29. 311212 mun Repprt, 29. 208 challenging it. Fraternal and benevolence associations, also true believers in the myth, had no desire to do so. Police unionism was buried in 1919 and the eulogy of the crime control myth was echoed at graveside. Corporate power and small businesses also contribu- ted to the defeat of police unionism. It is important to note that the majority of special volunteer policemen came from the business ranks and that their Opposition went further. American business sensed that it had a lot to lose should the police unionize. Aside from the police role in industrial strife, the police helped to provide a stable business climate and corporate leaders desired police loyalty for the progressive industrial order.32 The police were uniformed representatives of corporate power. If the corporations were the major factor influen- / / sing class stratification, the police helped to perform the role of lower class regulation. Business did not want police unionism. While corporate wishes had an impact it would be .dangerous to overemphasize their role. The police did represent business power, but it was only because businesses were in power. The fact is that the police represent any group in power and their actions help to operationalize the goals of that group. The police were one form of the social homeostasis and the Boston walkout threatened the 32Citizen's Committee Report, ho. 209 equilibrium. Any power group would have questioned this action. For example, had the Socialists been in control in the turbulent times of 1919 and had they been faced with a police walkout, police unionism would probably have been attacked. Power elites require the loyalty of institutions involved in maintaining the homeostasis. The timing of the strike was crucial to both the defeat of the striking officers and police unionism. In February 1919, 600,000 workers staged a general strike in Seattle sending Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson on his nation wide anti-Bolshevist campaign. Hundreds of strikes fol- lowed through the summer culminating in strikes and.violence along the west coast and eastern seaboard. Shortly after the police strike the steel workers walked out with active support from the Communists. This was followed by chaotic violence in the Rocky Mountains and in the South. In November the United Mine Workers struck threatening a coal shortage for the coming winter.33 When these events were combined with the bombings and Red scare, Americans were logically concerned about the police strike and they turned against unionism. The impact of 1919 cannot be overemphasized. In a period of perceived crisis police loyalty to a union was synonymous to desertion in the face of fire. The New 33Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties: The United St tee from Armistice to Normand (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1975) 15% , ’103e 210 York Times summed the feeling best when it claimed that policemen were democratic soldiers in the face of tyranny.3u Americans felt as though their first line of defense had } faltered in Boston and they blamed the unions. Paternalism on the part of administrators and.the growth of fraternal organizations did not meet with hos- tility in the years following the strike and they too had an adverse impact on unionization. Administrators heeded the call of men such as Dunlap and Fosdick. Wages and benefits improved. Fraternal organizations provided group insurance, sick pay, health care and pension benefits. Many improvements being sought by unions were slowly granted to the police through paternalism.35 Unfortunately for the patrolmen such improvements would.not continue, but their immediate effect was to draw attention.away from the desire for unionization. Paternalism was not successful in the long run. Circumstances would revert to the post werld war I era after the Second werld war. Rank-and-file police employees of the 1950s soon allied with.hig labor, which had become a potent political ferce, and they were soon a power with which to be reckoned.36 Police unionism was not to die a second death. 3"‘NewY’ork Times, September 11, 1919. 35Fogel son, 1 96 . 36Ibid., 198-218. 211 The Boston Police strike killed the first attempt the police made to unionize. Once again it was a triumph for conservatism; bureaus supporting the industrial order achieved victory. Yet by 1950 the old machinery and tech- niques employed in 1919 no longer worked. As the police unions gained strength in the 1960's they did not face consistently powerful apposition. The legacy of the past was clear and the police had learned their lesson. Never again would police unions be trounced upon. The Legacy Progressive police reform, culminating in the Boston Police strike, set the stage for’American policing in the twentieth century. It illustrated three processes which would continue throughout the century. First, the progres- sivism was inundated with coalitions of reformers which successfully altered the structure of police organization. Second, the progressive structure evolved into highly centralized rigid systems of bureaucracy that generally remained under local control. Third, the Boston Police union unsuccessfully challenged this ideological model resulting in their own defeat and the demise of police unionism. In all three areas the forces of political capital triumphed. The legacy of the strike was police labor militancy. While no department ventured to mention the word "strike" in the years following Boston, police unions have moved 212 to the forefront through a gradual process of alliance and evolution. New unions would win.their victories by picketing, work stoppages and slow downs, grievances, binding arbitration and, not least of all, by striking. Bold, arrogant and powerful police organizations were to routinely challenge the powers of centralized administra- tion. One cannot help but wonder with Samuel Walker . . . "The defeat of police unionism in 1919 presents one of the great imponderables of American police history: how dif- ferent the development of the police might have been had they gained rather than lost a formal voice in police administration."j37 The question is hypothetical. The triumph of bureaucracy in 1919 guided American.policing for the greater’portion of the twentieth century. 37Samuel walker, A Critical Higtogy of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism xington, MA: Heath, 7 e " 0 CHAPTER VIII Summary The purpose of this chapter is to briefly restate the arguments and conclusions presented in this work. Obviously, this work is a case study taken within.the context of progressivism and the post war era, and the findings were related to modern police structure. The use of this methodology necessitated the presentation of interpretations, arguments and conclusions when their application was appropriate in the main body of the text. This chapter, therefore, is brief, offering only a synop- sis of the findings in aggregate fashion. There can be little doubt that American business had a pervasive influence on the structure and practice of police work in the United States. In this sense, a triumph of bureaucracy was a triumph for conservatism. The business impact on the police was a logical extension of the gains made by political capitalism in the Progres- sive Era. As major corporations achieved virtual self Iregulation through the creation of regulatory bureaucracies it is natural to assume that they influenced the police structure in the same fashion in which they affected regulatory agencies. When case studies of the Progressive Era were examined, the influence of corporatism was clear. 213 21h In New YOrk business financed the reform movement and in Pennsylvania the state police were spawned by corporate interests. Both small and large businesses played a major role in the defeat of police unionism in Boston. Despite the influence of buminess, progressivism influenced the structure of policing in a more profound way. Interest coalitions attempting to reform the police created a new ideological structure, the centralized bureau. Bureaucracy replaced the old ward based system of power control. Again New‘York and Pennsylvania demon- strated the shift toward centralized authority, but Boston represented something more. The Boston Police challenged bureaucracy and,'while they did not question the principles of rational hierarchy, they demanded that power be decen- tralized. The failure of the strike signaled the final institutionalization of bureaucracy with centralized power in American police systems. Interestingly, in the face of a triumphant bureau- cracy the American police would not follow the pattern of other regulatory agencies. They would grow rigid, but they could never evolve into a large scale agency because they lacked the capacity to act as a single unit. A system of local control was responsible for this situation. American.police bureaus were local affairs. State police forces were the only agencies that approached the large centralized structures of organizations such as the Food and Drug Administration and the Interstate Commerce 215 Commission. Police agencies routinely engaged in social regulation, but their efforts were localized and not united. One of the regulatory roles of the police was in the realm of labor. This did not develop in the Progres- sive Era; it was merely a continuation of past practices. The police store one of the representatives of the new industrial order. When considered within the context of the Kolko-Weinstein thesis, part of the police function was to protect corporate interests. The police accomplished this by helping to provide a stable business environment and, more importantly.by taking direct actions against striking workers. This was ironic since the police even- tually sought an alliance with labor. Brief examples of reforms in New‘YOrk City and Pennsylvania were used in this work to illustrate the general effects of progressivism. New‘Ybrk symbolized the transference of power from precinct captains and ward bosses to more centrally based authority, and it demon- strated the reformers' faith in bureaucracy as the cure for corruption. Pennsylvania represented the epitome of the police bureau designed to serve the industrial order. Both cases involved the use of interest coalitions, the groups which would appear almost overnight in Boston. The progressive processes and concepts were impor- tant for an understanding of the Boston Police strike. The strike was partially a reaction to the reforms and 216 it was a challenge to the bureaucratic ideological model. The same processes at work in New York and Pennsylvania worked in Boston. Reform was achieved through the alliance of interest groups and it resulted in a highly structured police bureaucracy. Coming in the twilight years of reform, Boston's walkout was one of the ending dramas of the Progressive Era. Nowhere was the presence of prOgressive bureaucracy stronger than in the office of the Boston police commis- sioner. The progressive reformers concentrated police power in a single office. O'Meara, with strong political support and the respect of his men, was able to maintain a rigid bureaucracy and successfully manage the reigns of power. \Curtis had neither the personality nor the understanding of police affairs to control the situation. Although historians have been cruel to Curtis, his actions admittedly helped to cause the strike. Yet it must be recOgnized that the officers did not focus all of their wrath on Curtis; they questioned centralized power. In this sense they challenged the progressive order. While related to progressivism, the strike also stood as an independent reflection of the times. It occurred in a year of perceived revolution. The consensus of public opinion linked the striking police to Bolshevism and this spelled doom for the union cause when violence erupted. Fear played a large part in the drama by affecting the definitions peOple attached to social actions. Nineteen 217 nineteen was not a year of reason and.rational thought. When the rioting started Americans believed that police unionism was responsible for a crime wave. They would not accept this. The labor contradiction was important in 1919 only in the sense that the police became aware of the issue and formally addressed it. The situation was settled administratively after the strike by denying the officers the right to identify with the working class. The labor contradiction should not be overemphasized. It was only one of many contradictions that have arisen from the social structure of policing and it was addressed only because the patrol officers attempted to affiliate with an outside union. The failure to successfully challenge bureaucracy was only over-shadowed by the failure of the police venture into organized labor. The defeat of the Boston policemen led to the defeat of police unionism. In the following four decades police labor activity was limited to member- ship in fraternal organizations. Police administrators sought to alleviate police grievances through a policy of benevolent peternalism and the chiefs managed to main- tain relatively unchecked positions of power with respect to the power distributed through police organizations. As the chiefs rallied behind the banners of discipline and paramilitary orientation police bureaus were caught 218 in a pattern of organizational rigidity. Unions could not challenge the chiefs. The major legacy of the strike was police labor- militancy, emerging in the 1960s. After the strike the police remained a defenseless proletariat in an industrial society. They were deemed to be officers of the state, yet they were denied the social mobility associated with i regulatory offices. Eventually they turned to the only E tool that would improve their status, militant labor tactics. Had the strike been successful and had it been followed by other successful police labor actions, it is doubtful this situation would have arisen. In terms of militancy the evidence indicated that the strike was important because of its failure. It was the stumbling block for police unionism; it was the tri- umph of conservative forces in the police realm. When the rioting began the police strike and subsequent unionism were doomed by a nation in terror. Had the strike been successful it would have gone virtually unnoticed, similar to Cincinnati a year before. Its failure was the reason for its prominence and its subsequent effects on labor militancy. In the twentieth century the Boston Police strike remains a unique experience in American history. Its effects were far reaching linking the reforms of pregres- sivism to the future of police work. It failed because it took place in 1919, at a time when Americans believed 219 that they could ill—afford a police strike. The economic forces of political capital supported the recruitment of a new more reliable police force and it stood as a sober- ing lesson for every police officer in the United States. 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