CHINESE IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN TAIWAN

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The study of overseas Chinese goes back to the latter half of the nineteenth century, but as a series of somewhat unrelated works with little comparative analysis. Social science is necessarily and inherently comparative. Therefore, it is my purpose in this paper to analyze the problem of overseas Chinese comparatively.

According to the China Yearbook 1967-68, the total population of overseas Chinese, including those with dual nationality, is 17,991,483. Nearly 85 per cent of them reside in Southeast Asia. Faced with geographical, economic, and social challenges which are essentially different from those of China, overseas Chinese immigrants respond in a diversity of ways in different areas. This paper attempts to apply the theory of ecology--the study of the interrelationships between organism and environment--to two different areas where Chinese immigrants have settled: Southeast Asia and Taiwan.

There are striking similarities among Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia. A great majority of them are engaged in trade, commerce and industry. They constitute a sizeable proportion of the total urban population and develop a kind of segmentary structure in urban overseas Chinese communities. The real locus of power lies with voluntary associations, especially Chambers of Commerce and dialect associations

formed on non-kin bases. Furthermore, social status and prestige are acquired through wealth.

These similarities, of course, are not coincident and obviously can not be attributed to a common historical background. I seek the explanation in a common human response or adjustment to similar environments.

Chinese immigrants to Taiwan, on the other hand, who migrated in the same years and from the same provinces as those immigrants to Southeast Asia, develop different kinds of settlement and economic patterns, social and political structures. The majority of them go into agriculture and are predominantly rural. As in Southeast China, family and kin groups are significant, while other groups tend to be relatively unimportant. Social control is largely effected within lineages and informally by gentry and elders in the village environment.

It is interesting to note that Chinese immigrants of the same social, cultural and historical background who moved into different ecological environments--Southeast Asia and Taiwan--established different economic patterns, social structures, etc., as adaptive mechanisms. This paper attempts to find out precisely how differences in environment, social structure, and economic pattern are connected and interact with each other.

The problem of Chinese immigrants includes a whole complex of social, cultural, historical, economic, and political aspects. This paper will not be able to embrace all of these problems.

I will focus my attention upon those features which are closely related to economic arrangements and subsistence activities. In order to accomplish this, I will take into consideration population density, settlement patterns, dialect groups, voluntary associations, land ownership, citizenship, [illegible], political situations and historical background.

My propostions in this paper are the following:

(1) An increase in population density leads to an intense struggle for land. Thus, demography and land ownership should be examined if we want to know how the environment affects the economic adaptation of immigrants.

(2) Differences in social structure must be examined in the context of physical and socioeconomic environments. Voluntary associations may be seen as an historical process of adaptation to new conditions. These associations should be examined in order to know how they play an important part in the establishment of economic patterns and the development of the commercial success of Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia.

(3) Chinese communities in Southeast China, as well as in Southeast Asia and Taiwan, are by no means homogeneous. They are divided into different dialect groups. Thus, dialect difference must be examined if we want to understand how they affect the occupational specialization, settlement patterns and social stratification of Chinese immigrants.

(4) The type of society in which the immigrants settled must be examined in order to understand ethnic segmentation and

economic interdependence, to find out whether the environment of any one ethnic group is defined by natural conditions, or by the presence and activities of other ethnic groups.

(5) Political situations must be taken into consideration to understand how they influence the economic patterns, settlement patterns, and the social structure of the immigrants.

(6) Chinese populations in Southeast Asia and Taiwan are the result of long-term migration. Therefore, the time dimension is important in respect to economic opportunity, social structure, and political situation.

(7) Southeast Asia and Taiwan have undergone substantially different historical experiences during the past several centuries. Thus, historical differences should be examined in order to see whether or not they play a part in shaping the present situation of Chinese immigrants.

Freedman, in his article,"What Social Science can Do for Chinese Studies", says "When we examine some aspect of Chinese society we should make explicit comparisons with the corresponding aspects of other societies in order to deepen our understanding at the least and perhaps also to speed the coming of general explanatory principles" (1964:527). In the conclusion of this paper, I will also use immigrants from India and Europe as comparative data in order to show that, given certain common conditions or processes, the same kind of patterns can occur in widely different cultures and areas of the world.

Chapter II

BACKGROUND

A Short History of Chinese Emigration

From T'ang, Sung, Yuan and Ming dynasty records, we know that Chinese intercourse with Southeast Asia began quite early. What has happened in the past must be viewed in the context of the historical background and social and political conditions.

There is evidence that at least three centuries before the Christian era, Chinese merchants had reached the coast of South China and contacted the peoples of the Indo-Chinese peninsula (Wang 1959:2). Yet, it was not until the third century A.D. that Chinese merchants and artisans began to settle in Vietnam (Robequain 1944:32), and later in Cambodia and Siam (Purcell 1965:8).

Chinese merchants and pioneers along the Salween, Irrawaddy, and Chindwin rivers penetrated into Burma in the beginning of the second century B.C., but they began to settle there much later (Chu 1957:198). From the beginning of the second century A.D., the Chinese started commercial intercourse with the countries of the Malay Archipelago (Simoniya 1961:8). In addition, relationships were established with Java in the fifth century (ibid:10).

Because of the flourishing of the Chinese empire and the further development of its productive forces, diplomatic and trade relations were expanded between China and the countries of South-

east Asia during the T'ang dynasty (618-906) (Jimoniya 1961:10).

Written records first mention Chinese-Philippine trade and commercial relations in 977 A.D. (Alip 1959:4). As the years passed, Chinese-Philippine relations, as well as relations with other Southeast Asian countries, became closer and visits more frequent. By the end of the tenth century, Sino-Philippine trade relations were well-established (Dale 1964:151).

It was not until the eleventh century that Chinese merchants went to Southeast Asia in significant numbers (Ying 1959:2). The Sung dynasty (960-1279) was characterized by a considerable development of shipbuilding and the establishment of regular trade relations between China and the Countries of the Malay Peninsula, the Malay Archipelago, and the Philippines. These circumstances created favorable conditions for the increasing Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia.

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, an unprecedented series of official voyages were made by Cheng Ho and his colleagues. These voyages marked the climax of Chinese relations with Southeast Asia (Purcell 1965:16-18). According to Wang, the Chinese were especially active in three regions: "Firstly, the region of Siam, Champa and Pahang on the mainland and the northern coast of Borneo, then Lucknas Brunei; secondly, the more distant coasts of Malacca, Sumatra and Java; and finally, the region of the 'eastern ocean' which consisted largely of the northern islands of the Philippines" (1959:8).

The period from the fifteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century was important because various Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia. In 1511, Malacca, a trading center on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, was taken by the Portuguese who dominated the majority of Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century (Huang 1954:xxii). From 1565 to 1898, the Philippines were under Spanish control (Purcell 1965:507).

In addition, the Dutch established themselves in Java in 1619 (Tan 1963:2). By the mid-seventeenth century, the whole Archipelago was under their control, and Portuguese influence ended in Indonesia, except in Timor (Purcell 1965:391).

The arrival of the Europeans was a turning-point for Southeast Asia and favorable trading opportunities for the Chinese. The desire to benefit economically from the colonies led the European administrators to use special policies with regard to the Chinese. "On the one hand, they encouraged immigration in order that the Chinese might provide coolie labor and entrepreneurial services, relaxed restrictions, and permitted opportunities for profit. On the other hand, they maintained control by limiting occupations open to the Chinese and restricting areas of settlement" (Louis 1967:25).

Hence, Chinese immigration rapidly increased in the seventeenth century. As a result, Spanish and Dutch fears that the Chinese would challenge their authority and compete with their foreign trade, led to a series of massacres of the Chinese people

in the region. The massacres of 1603 and 1639 in the Philippines resulted in the death of about 46,000-47,000 Chinese (Chen 1963: 143-145) & (Felix 1966:70). The same method was used by Dutch authorities in Java as well as in Taiwan. In Batavia alone about 600 Chinese homes were plundered and burned, and thousands of Chinese immigrants were killed in 1740 (Hwa-Chiao-chih 1956: 119). In Taiwan, about 1,000 Chinese were killed by the Dutch in 1652 (Chen 1962:14).

After the downfall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty came to power. Unwillingness to submit to the rule of the foreign conqueror caused a wave of emigration from the southeastern region of China to Southeast Asia and Taiwan.

After 1789, the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula (Purcell 1965:25), and later in Burma (after 1852) (ibid:53). Toward the end of the nineteenth century, France became established in Indochina (ibid:183).

Up to the first Opium War (1839-1842), Chinese emigration was due mainly to political factors. Economic factors played a lesser role. The situation began to change after the failure of the Ch'ing dynasty to defeat the British in 1842. Economic factors then became the ruling causes of Chinese emigration.

Capitalism and imperialism developed in the nineteenth century demanded a large number of coolie laborers. The British welcomed newcomers and provided attractive incentives to settlers.

This stimulated a mass emigration of Chinese in the mid-nineteenth century. Many Chinese quickly settled in Singapore, the Malay Peninsula, and later Sarawak and North Borneo (Lee 1966:209-212).

At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, an increase in the number of women immigrants brought a vital change to the demographic pattern of Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia. Finally, in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party established a People's Republic in the mainland of China and so closed the door to Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.

A. Causes of Chinese Emigration

It is interesting that the majority of the Chinese emigrated from the two southeastern of six coastal Chinese provinces: Fukien and Kwangtung. In addition, they are not drawn from all parts of these two, but are recruited from a few districts or villages near the cities of Amoy in Fukien and Canton in Kwangtung. Why did particular villages in Southeastern China specialize in sending their members abroad? Partial answers to this question may be obtained from historical material, and field study would certainly help us to understand more (Freedman 1963:13).

From the work of Freedman (1957), Huang (1954), Lee (1966),

Skinner (1962), Coughlin (1960), Willmott (1967), T'ien (1953), Purcell (1965), Simoniya (1961), Wang (1959), Chen (1964) and Hua-Chiao-Chih etc., the factors which caused or encouraged the Chinese emigration might be summarized as follows:

(1) During the Han dynasty, the Chinese people in the Yangtze valley and further north migrated into the southwestern and southeastern provinces. Because of the mountains and hills of South China, contact with North China was easy by sea and extremely difficult by land. This forced the development of coastal shipping in the southeastern provinces of China. The junk trade with Southeast Asia which followed was an extension southward of this coastal shipping.

Under these conditions, the earliest contacts with the outer world were established mainly through ports in Fukien and in Kwangtung (e.g. Amoy, Swatow, Canton). For instance, Canton had been a port of international trade since the late T'ang dynasty. Thus, the Chinese in this area were the first to do business with foreign traders.

(2) Population pressure upon the land appears to be greatest in southeastern China. In Fukien, overpopulation was mentioned as early as the Sung dynasty. Furthermore, the Chinese contact with Europeans led to the introduction of sweet potatoes and peanuts by the beginning of the seventeenth century. These nutritious crops led to rapid population increase, which continued up to the early nineteenth century.

(5) Because of mountainuous and hilly terrain, there is a large proportion of uncultivable land in Fukien and in Kwangtung. In Fukien, only 12 per cent (Chen 1940:32) and in Kwangtung only 7 per cent (T'ien 1953:3) of the total area is worth cultivating.

(6) There is geographic contiguity and climatic similarity between Southeast Asia and Southern seaboard of China.

(7) Economic development in China during the sixteenth century led many Chinese to invest in industries in the towns and encouraged many poor people to leave their villages in order to find jobs in the urban workshops. This stimulated the growth of export trade.

(8) The opening up of the Five Ports, especially Hong Kong, for foreign trade by the first Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1942 created a new base for Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia.

(9) The change-over of the dynasties (e.g. Sung-Yuan-Ming-Ch'ing-Republic of China) and internal rebellions (e.g. T'ai-P'ing rebellion) set up new waves of Chinese emigration. Many political refugees settled in Taiwan and in Southeast Asia.

(10) The development of the steamship lines in the nineteenth century brought many Chinese emigrants to different areas in Southeast Asia. For instance, in 1870's, direct steamship lines had already established between mainland China ports and the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Java, Sumatra, Burma, etc.

(9) Natural calamities also stimulated emigration. For example, from 1290 to 1626, famine raged 18 times (about once in every 19 years) in Southern China. It was even worse in Fukien. During 1369-1615, there were 29 droughts, and the population suffered from famine 20 times from 1416-1635 (Chen 1940:9-10).

(10) Because of the abolition of slavery within the British Empire in 1833, it became necessary for the various colonial plantations to obtain labour from India and China (Gangulee 1947:21). A large scale labour force was necessary in South-east Asian countries, especially in Malaya, Indonesia, British Borneo and partially in Vietnam and Thailand.

Chapter III

CHINESE EMIGRANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. Population and Distribution

Chinese emigrants and their dependents are found all over the world. According to the China Yearbook 1967-68, the total population of overseas Chinese including those with dual nationality is 17,991,[illegible]. Their geographical distribution is as follows:

Place of Residence	Population	Percentage
Asia	17,322,070	96.29
America	517,[illegible]	2.87
Europe	54,560	0.30
Oceania	49,419	0.28
Africa	47,470	0.26
Total	17,991,[illegible]	100

[illegible], Chinese specialists generally agree that from [illegible] percent of overseas Chinese reside in Southeast Asia. They are widely distributed among the major geographical units of the region, namely, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo, Java, Sumatra, East Indonesia and the Philippines. Among these, the largest Chinese communities are found in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore and Vietnam. Generally speaking, they constitute a sizeable proportion of the total urban population in almost every Southeast Asian country.

I have compiled Table I on the basis of various sources. The figures are not accurate at the present and vary in different

sources. Therefore, this Table is only provided to indicate an approximate picture of the overseas Chinese population and the population of the host countries in the region.

Table I: Population of the Chinese in Southeast Asia & Taiwan

Name of Country	Total Population (in millions)		Chinese Population		Population Density/Sq. Mi.	
Burma	22.6	(1963)	360,000	(1960)	90.0	(1960)
Cambodia	5.7	(1962)	217,000	(1960)	26.1	(1960)
Laos	1.9	(1962)	46,000	(1959)	20.6	(1960)
Thailand	30.8	(1963)	3,799,000	(1963)	145.3	(1963)
Vietnam	31.5	(1963)	1,035,000	(1963)	240.3	(1963)
Indonesia	97.7	(1960)	2,545,000	(1963)	120.0	(1963)
Malaysia	8.7	(1963)	2,461,322	(1963)	64.0	(1963)
Singapore	1.6	(1961)	1,358,100	(1963)	7,100.0	(1961)
Philippines	30.3	(1960)	181,626	(1960)	260.0	(1960)
British Borneo	1.0	(1954)	227,000	(1954)		
Sarawak	0.6	(1954)	115,158	(1954)		
North Borneo	0.36	(1954)	71,371	(1954)		
Brunei	0.06	(1954)	3,300	(1954)	30.0	
Timor	0.52	(1960)	5,000	(1960)		
Taiwan	0.17	(1951)	13,245,667	(1969)	7.6	(1930)
					282.7	(1930)

* aborigine in Taiwan
** All ethnic group in Taiwan

Sources: -UN estimates 62-63, National census
-China Yearbook 1962-63, 1959-60, 1967-68
-Purcell 1965, The Chinese in Southeast Asia
-Ginsburg 1956, North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak; Human Relations Area Files
-Hsiao Yao Hua Chiao Chih, 1962
-Lunstadter 1967, Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, Vol. I
-Barclay 1954, Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan

Chinese immigrants constitute a sizeable proportion of the total urban population in much of Southeast Asia (Crissman 1967:185). Over 40 per cent of the total Chinese immigrants in the Philippines reside in Manila and the surrounding area.

Probably half of the 3.4 million Chinese in Thailand live in Bangkok or nearby in the Chao Phraya River delta of the Central Plains (Coughlin 1960:6). In British Borneo, despite their penetration into remote areas, some 70 per cent of the Chinese are settled in urban areas (Ginsburg 1956:47). Of the total Chinese population in Indonesia, at least half reside in Java. In addition, it was estimated that 58.4 per cent of the Java Chinese live in cities and towns of 8,000 population or larger in 1930 (McVey 1963:101).

In Burma, nearly half of Chinese immigrants are found within a hundred miles of the capital city. About 59 per cent of the Chinese settled in urban area of Cambodia (Willmott 1967: 11). Malayan Chinese are urban, almost 54 per cent of them being classified in 1947 census as town dwellers and over 40 per cent of them living in towns of 40,000 or more inhabitants. Finally, according to Simoniya, 81.1 per cent of the Chinese immigrants reside in the urban part of Singapore (1961:33).

In short, Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia are overwhelmingly urban. This is partly due to the European colonial policy and partly to the mercantile origins of their settlement pattern.

2. Dialect Groups

It was mentioned that the majority of Chinese immigrants

all over the world came from the two southeastern provinces of China, namely, Fukien and Kwangtung. In addition, they are not drawn from all parts of these two, but are recruited from a few districts or villages near the cities of Amoy in Fukien and Canton in Kwangtung.

Giving the whole country a common body of customs, values and beliefs, the Chinese traditional culture is highly unified and pervasive. Yet, the southeastern part of China is an area of great linguistic diversity. In other words, the population of these provinces is heterogeneous. The inhabitants are divided into different dialect groups. These so-called dialects are mutually incomprehensible languages, differing from each other as Italian from Spanish, or Spanish from Portuguese.

The Chinese immigrants preserved their local dialects and continued to form some groupings within the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and also in Taiwan. In fact, the Chinese in Southeast Asia and in Taiwan are by no means homogeneous.

Fukienese (from southern Fukien, in the neighbourhood of Amoy), Cantonese (from central Kwangtung, near Canton), Teochiu (from northeastern Kwangtung near Swatow area), Hainanese (from Hainan Island) and Hakka (from interior parts of northern Kwangtung and southern Fukien) are the five main dialect groups in Southeast Asia. Besides these, a small number of immigrants came to Southeast Asia from Kwangsi, Henghua, Luichow, Hokchia, Foochow, Yunnan, Shanghai and Ningpo areas of China.

and also from Taiwan.

These dialect groups are not equally distributed abroad. Nearly all those outside of Southeast Asia are Cantonese. In Southeast Asia, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Table II will give us a better idea about the distribution of the Chinese dialect groups in the region.

Table II: Distribution of Chinese Dialect Group in Southeast Asia and in Taiwan

Country	Fukienese	Cantonese	Teochiu	Hainanese	Hakka	Kwangsi
			%			
Burma	26	17				
Cambodia	2	10	77	8	3	
Laos	+	+	+	+	+	
Thailand	7	7	56	12	16	
Vietnam	+	+	+	+	+	
Indonesia	+	+	+		+	
Malaysia	31.7	21.7	12.1	5.3	21.8	3.0
Singapore	39.6	21.7	21.7	7.2	5.4	
Philippines	75	23				
B. Borneo	13	12.6	7.4	3.4	41.2	0.1
Sarawak	7.2	26.1	5.0	3.0	56.5	
Taiwan	+	+			+	

+ Indicated the dialect group is existed but the percentage is unknown

Sources: Skinner 1963, Purcell 1950,& 1965, Willmott 1967, Ginsburg 1956, Fried 1959, etc.

This dialect [illegible] is important with respect to occupational specialization, patterns of settlement, and social stratification.

C. Economic Role

Thompson, in her book, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia, states that "the economic grip of the Chinese upon Southeast Asia's economy is probably the basic cause of the indigenous peoples' resentment and fear of the Chinese minority. Their position is the more remarkable when one realizes that the Chinese form only 6 percent of the region's total population. Chinese are to be found throughout the entire economic gamut. Their importance in the different occupations varies from country to country but everywhere they dominate commercial life, especially the retail trade" (1955:4).

It is well-known that the Chinese have long played a key part in Southeast Asian economy. During the European occupation, Thailand was the only independent country in Southeast Asia. Thus western colonialism and the Industrial Revolution provided a basis which encouraged the role that the Chinese evolved in Southeast Asian economies.

It is necessary to examine the economic role of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The question which I want to deal with in this section is to what extent the Chinese in Southeast Asia are engaged in commerce, industry, agriculture and labour.

(1) The Philippines

Commercial relations between China and the Philippines began centuries before the Spaniards came. Trade made it

necessary for some Chinese to reside on the islands. In 1567, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi found some 40 Chinese who had long since settled in Manila with their wives and children (Chen 1962:11).

Under the Spanish regime, there was a general attempt to push the Chinese into agricultural activities, but these efforts ended in failure. In the year of 1870 (perhaps the high point of Chinese activity in agriculture, according to Wickberg), there were slightly less than 500 Chinese employed in agricultural activities, out of a Chinese population of over 40,000 (1965:58). Although some Chinese did become vegetable gradeners near towns, the majority continued to go into commerce and industry.

On March 20, 1830, the Spanish Governor-General, D. Mariano Ricafort created a committee for the classification of the Chinese. This committee classified the Chinese into four groups (Felix 1969:38-39):

1. all wholesale traders,
2. retail traders,
3. small merchants and artisans,
4. journeymen from all the aforesaid guilds as well as tanners, umbrella-makers, paper-makers, silk spinners and carpenters without shops of their own.

This classification gives us a picture of the economic activities of the Chinese engaged in the Philippines. The

Spaniards relied on them for all kinds of trade and service. They almost monopolized the trade and commerce of the islands, especially in Manila (Purcell 1965:522).

It is estimated that the Chinese, before 1932, conducted between 70 to 80 per cent of the retail trade, a large percentage of the internal commerce, and probably controlled the same proportion of the internal commercial facilities of the islands. Their commercial and credit system covered every kind of business and reached from Manila to the remotest corners of the Philippines. Furthermore, their wholesale business supplied the Chinese provincial merchant and the smallest Chinese retailer all over the archipelago.

(2) Thailand

By the thirteenth century, Chinese traders were already established in the markets and ports of the Gulf of Siam (Skinner 1962:1). When Europeans penetrated the hinterland of Siam in 1830's, Chinese overland trade had already been well-established.

Thailand is an agricultural society. The Chinese here were the middlemen, the money-lenders, the exporters and the financiers. About 70 per cent are engaged in some form of commerce and industry. For instance, the Chinese were closely associated with the rice industry. Before 1942, they owned and operated 80 - 90 per cent of the country's rice-mills.

All over the rice-growing area, we find Chinese brokers and buyers (Purcell 1965:83). In addition, they are buyers and exporters of fish, and handle local sales (ibid:128).

As recently in South Thailand, the Chinese did not grow rice, but were largely in the growing and marketing of fruits and vegetables. Although they also counted among the landowners of Central Thailand, they did not farm themselves, but were merchants (ibid:128).

Finally, it was estimated that the Chinese made up slightly 70 per cent of the non-agricultural labouring population in the country (ibid:129).

Skinner chooses Krungthep, the chief urban concentration of both Chinese and Thai as an example to show us the occupational specializations of the two ethnic groups as follows (1962:303):

Ethnic occupational specialization by major categories (1952)

Occupation category	Ethnic Chinese		Ethnic Thai	
	No.	%	No.	%
Government	30	0.02	43,630	26.97
Professions	3,160	1.59	8,760	5.39
Commerce & Finance	100,720	50.84	41,260	25.41
Industry & Artisan	38,450	19.41	9,880	6,09
Domestic & Service	19,310	9.75	24,540	15.11
Agriculture	2,350	1.19	6,710	4.13
Unskilled labor	34,100	17.21	27,600	17.00
Total	198,120	100.01	162,380	99.99

(3) Singapore

Merchant and artisan are the principal types of the

Chinese in Singapore. Besides these, there are also industrious agriculturists. They own large plantations of gambier and peper plant and monopolize vegetable gardening (Purcell 1965:255-256).

In addition, the Chinese owned "oil mills, biscuit factories, rubber works for the manufacture of shoes, tires, etc., iron foundries, saw-mills, and sauce factories; there were Chinese shipping companies; the Chinese ran motor agencies and repair shops; the bulk of the retail trade everywhere was in their hands" (Purcell 1956:24).

According to Simoniya, the Chinese participation in different economic activities can be summarized as follows (1961:30):

	%
agriculture	8.3
processing industry	21.4
trade & finance	20.3
transportation	11.8
mining industry	0.3
domestic servants (more than)	34

(4) Federation of Malaysia

In the Federation of Malaysia, the picture is a little bit different. A rather high percentage (about 46.4%) of the Chinese are engaged in agricultural production. But more than half of these are occupied in the production of rubber, and the remaining in suburban truck gardens, rice growing and in production of other types of agricultural products (Simoniya 1961:30).

In addition, 14.4% of the Chinese are engaged in trade and finance, 12.9% in processing industries, 4.3% in extractive industries, 3.3% in transportation and the rest, about 14.3%, are domestic servants and employees of state and private institutions (ibid:30-31).

In the year of 1920, the Chinese owned 64 per cent of the tin mining industry, and the European only 36 per cent. Later, because of the increase in the importance of technology in tin-mining, the European owned 67 per cent of the mining industry and the Chinese only 33 per cent in 1938 (Purcell 1965:202).

Furthermore, Malay's important and growing secondary industries, such as pineapple industry, canned pineapples, were in Chinese hands. They also played a significant part in the fishing industry (Purcell 1956:23-24). Finally, they own about 12.5 per cent of the planted rubber estates and many small-holdings in the Federated Malay States and the states settlements (1965:204).

(5) Indonesia

Geographically, Indonesia consists of Java and Madura, Sumatra, Borneo and East Indonesia. With about 80 per cent of the total population concentrated on Java and Madura in 1930 (Hillam 1960:5).

According to Purcell (1950, 1965), Simonya (1961) and

Skinner's (1963) description of Chinese economic activities in Indonesia, merchants form the largest group. From Skinner's statement, the following table is made.

	%
trade (small merchants & buyers)	30.6
processing industry (small entrepreneurs & handicraftsmen)	20
production of raw material	20.0
agriculture, truck farming & gardening	10.7
plant hire work	7.6
fishing industry	0.7
mining industry	0.6
free and public professions	0.4

It was pointed out that Chinese immigrants in Indonesia [illegible] divided into Fukienese, Teochiu, Hakkas and Cantonese. [illegible], the Fukienese are engaged in trade, but in west [illegible] on the west coast of Sumatra, a large number work [illegible] and market-gardening, while in Bagan Si Api [illegible], they were primarily fishermen.

[illegible] Teochiu are mainly engaged in market gardening and [illegible] commercial agriculture, but on the east coast of Sumatra [illegible] majority of them are active on tobacco estates. In North [illegible], they are businessmen and agriculturists, while in [illegible] parts of the Indies, they are merchants, and a few are [illegible] in industrial enterprises.

The Cantonese are skilled artisans, machine workers, [illegible] hardware stores and small industries, restaurant and hotel keepers in Indonesian cities. However, in Sumatra, many of them are also agriculturists, market-gardeners, or mine-

workers like Mabbs (Purcell 1950:41-42, 1965:338-339), Chin [illegible] 1963:102-103).

(6) [illegible]

[illegible] Malaya, the Chinese played a predominant [illegible] in the economy of the Southeast Asian countries, [illegible], Malaya, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. But they were decidedly second to the Indians [illegible] commercial life of the Burma.

In 1921, according to Purcell, the Chinese were classified [illegible] occupations as the following (1950:20-21, 1965:45):

	%
traders & merchants	41
carpenters & workers in metal & leather	28
semi-skilled workers	9
clerical workers	5
miscellaneous	7

[illegible]ly 21,436 are engaged in the exploitation of animals [illegible] cultivation, and except for a few market gardeners, no Chinese are employed on the land itself (Purcell 1950:21, 1965: 45).

[illegible]imaniya, in his article, gives us somewhat different [illegible] of the occupation (1961:32).

	%
processing & mining industry	over 21
agriculture & animal husbandry	over 23
transportation	over 6
gainfully employed segment	49

(7) Cambodia

Occupationally speaking, the Chinese are bankers, money-

[illegible], entrepreneurs par excellence, contractors, speculators with corner harvests, retail merchants, and transporters in Cambodia. They not only control the Cambodia's retail trade and wholesale markets, but also maintain a virtual monopoly over the coastal fishing (Steinberg 1957:40).

With the exception of a small number of Makha peasants in the Battambang Province, very few Chinese are engaged in agriculture. Poultry growing and market gardening are the principal agricultural activities undertaken by the Chinese, especially the Hainanese. Although a high proportion of Chinese is found at all levels of the rice-industry-- trade, processing and transportation; hardly any have turned to the cultivation of rice as the primary means of subsistence (Willmott 1967:48-49), (Steinberg 1957;16).

In addition, Chinese own and operate the majority of the rice mills. The marketing of much of the timber products as well as other forest products (e.g. bamboo, resins, guttapercha, [illegible]) are also controlled by them (Steinberg 1957:213).

Willmott, in his book, The Chinese in Cambodia, gives us a very interesting and useful table of the economic classes among the Chinese in Cambodia (1967:63).

Economic class	Chinese Number	%	All Cambodia Number	%	Chinese as % of total
Peasants & fishermen	-	-	4,950,000	86	-
Working, of which:	64,000	15½	209,000	4	31
industrial	24,000	5	54,000	1	44
commercial	30,000	7	42,000	1	71
rural	2,000	½	102,000	2	2
service A	8,000	2	11,000	-	73
Commercial, of which:	359,000	84	378,000	6½	95
rural	173,000	41	183,000	3	95
urban	186,000	43	196,000	3½	95
Professional & government	2,000	½	202,000	3½	1.4
Totals	425,000	100	5,740,000	100	7.4

From the above, we see that "the greater part of the Chinese, over 80 per cent, are in the families of merchants. If we include employees, about 90% of the Chinese in Cambodia are involved in commerce. Furthermore, the Chinese probably represent over 90% of the total number of people engaged in commerce in Cambodia, and 95% of the merchants themselves. One may therefore safely say that the Chinese generally, form the economic middle class in Cambodia" (Willmott 1967:63-64).

(8) Laos

A great majority of Chinese are connected with the commercial pursuits, including moneylending, in Laos. In other words, they are millers, traders, moneylenders and shopkeepers (LeBar 1960:33,43,107,215).

In comparison with other Southeast Asian countries, there is only a small percentage of Chinese reside in Laos. That is to say that Laos has the smallest Chinese immigrant community in Southeast Asia. Laos is backward in economic development, lacks seaboard and internal communications, so only small commerce is practicable. Therefore the Chinese are few (Purcell 1950:29).

(9) Vietnam

Vietnam was a part of Indochina. Historically, Indochina consisted of Cochinchina, Tongking, Annam, Cambodia and Laos. The first three have resumed their historical identity as Vietnam.

The basic type of activity of the Chinese immigrants in Vietnam is trade and small industry. They are also artisans. Furthermore, according to Dimoniya, a small group of small proprietors are engaged in agriculture (1961:32).

(b) British Borneo

From Table II on page 17 we see that Cantonese, Fukienese, Hakka, Hokkien and Teochiu are the main dialect groups in British Borneo. It is interesting to see that particular dialect groups tend to be found in particular occupations.

The Hakkas commonly engage in agriculture and also are important in special urban occupations like tinsmithing. The Teochius are found in every occupation, but are especially identified with pepper production. The Cantonese are mine-workers or laborers, as in Malaya. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, they dominate the watch and clock trade. The Fukienese and the Teochiu are engaged predominantly in commerce. The former have the largest share of the import and export trade and naturally control the financial affairs of the towns in which they reside. The latter dominate the grocery or shop-keeping trade (Ginsburg 1956:153-154).

As a whole, the Chinese are predominantly engaged in commercial occupations. Those who are engaged in agriculture are mainly market or vegetable gardeners or work as estate laborers until they have sufficient capital to have a small business or move closer to town.

Occupation

From the data described above, it is very clear that the majority of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are engaged in trade, commerce and industrial productions. For instance, 95 per cent in Federation of Malaya, 63 per cent in Singapore, 90 per cent in Indonesia, 84 per cent in Thailand, over 90 per cent in Burma and 90 per cent in Cambodia are engaged in production and trade (Sirondja 1961:30-32, Willmott 1967:64).

Only a small number go into agriculture, and of these a great majority are market or vegetable gardeners and pepper growers. Hardly any, except a few Hakkas in Cambodia and South Thailand, have turned to the cultivation of rice as the primary means of subsistence.

Chapter IV

CHINESE IMMIGRANTS IN TAIWAN

Taiwan is an island parallel to the southeastern coast of China, lying between Japan and the Philippines. During the Yuan dynasty (1206-1368 A.D.), it was an integral part of the Chinese Empire. In the year of 1291, an administrative office was established at Penghu islands, the so-called Pescadores, which is the stepping stone from mainland China to Taiwan, in order to rule over "the Chinese fishermen, salt smugglers, pirates and merchants who had begun to call at and settle in the islands" (Eto 1964:43).

As early as the Sui dynasty (581-618 A.D.), a few Chinese had already moved to the Pescadores. Some semi-permanent Chinese settlements dating from the 12th century have been found on the islands (Ferrell 1969:12). Yet it was not until the 17th century that large numbers of Chinese migrated from Fukien and Kwangtung to Taiwan.

According to Chen Ta, about 25,000 Chinese settled in and around Anping, in southern Taiwan, during the 15th century. They were engaged in agriculture and industry (1967:40).

After 1602, the Dutch entered the Pescadores, but were driven out by Chinese forces. In 1624, the Dutch invaded the Penghu Islands and built a fortress there (Chen 1964:29). Furthermore, they occupied Anping in south Taiwan and erected

Fort Zeelandia (Chen 1967:40). Two years later, the Spaniards also landed at Kee-lung and occupied the northern part of Taiwan, but the Dutch drove them out in 1641. Therefore, before the coming of the Koxinga in 1661, Taiwan was a Dutch colony for about 40 years.

During the first decade, neutralising aborigine hostility was the chief domestic problem. After their troops defeated several of the more powerful tribes in 1635-36, the Dutch included some seventy thousand subject aborigines under their control (Ito 1964:44-45). Meanwhile, they encouraged the Chinese emigration from the mainland. Thus Chinese immigrants increased to 50,000 in 1660 (Chen 1964:108-111). A great majority of them are farmers who cultivated rice, sugar cane, indigo, grain plants and potatoes (Ito 1964:45; Chen 1962: 14). In addition, the cultivated land near Tainan increased from about 3,000 morgen (1645) to 9,402 morgen (1656). The yield of sugar increased about ten times (Chen 1962:14; 1964:92).

After the downfall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, Koxinga succeeded his father Cheng Chih-lung and continued his loyality to the Ming dynasty. He developed trade with Japan, Taiwan, Cambodia, Siam, Annam and the Philippines; and maintained his sea-power ably the Fukien coast. In 1661, bringing with him 25,000 men (Chen 1967:41), Koxinga forced out the Dutch and liberated the Chinese from slave of Dutch, Taiwan and the Pescadores. He used Taiwan as a base against the Manchus and attempted to restore the Ming dynasty.

Under the reign of Jiajing and his successors, Chinese immigration, including farmers, flocked to the island. Taiwan soon had a Chinese majority in population (about 100,000). In the population increase, an increase in cultivation of newly land was also necessary. According to Chen, the cultivated land increased to 10,454 morgen in 1684 (1961:127). Besides opening up land for cultivation, Jiajing also promulgated land laws, appointed civil officers, and adopted military preparations and established schools in Taiwan (Chen 1967:41).

In 1683, the Manchus conquered Taiwan and made it a prefecture of Fukien province in the following year. During the mid-19th century, the island was a destination for Chinese emigrants from Fukien and Kwangtung. Taiwan became a province of China in 1886. At the conclusion of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the island was ceded to Japan until 1945.

Agriculture is the basic economy of Taiwan, supplemented by the production of export crops and secondary manufacturing industries (Riggs 1952:62). Under Japanese rule, agriculture continued to be the mainstay of the Formosan economy. The table presented in Barclay's book, Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan, will give some idea of this (1954:59).

Occupation	1905	% 1930	1940
Agriculture	71.2	60.2	64.6
Fishing	2.2	1.9	5.4
Mining	0.5	1.4	1.9
Manufacturing	6.2	9.5	7.6
Commerce	6.7	12.9	10.8
Transportation	2.1	3.0	2.7
Gov't & Serv.	2.2	4.0	5.1
Other	0.9	0.2	2.7

Through bringing new lands under cultivation and through the introduction of scientific methods, the productivity was greatly expanded. At the end of 1941, there were million people engaged in farming, "about one third were owner cultivators, another third tenant cultivators, and the final third part tenant part owner cultivators" (Ballantine 1952:40-41). The total cultivated land increased from 864,000 acres in 1899 to 2,111,000 acres in 1941 (ibid: 41). Rice was the most important crop.

Until 1967, 53 per cent of the total population in Taiwan still engaged in agriculture (China Yearbook 1967-68: 109).

Chapter V

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

From the data presented above and elsewhere, characteristics shared by Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia and in Taiwan may be summarized as follows:

(1) The majority came from the two overpopulated southeastern Chinese provinces: Fukien and Kwangtung.

(2) Most of the emigrants went abroad from the seaboard cities of Amoy, Foochow, Chuanchow in Fukien, and from Canton and Swatow in Kwangtung. The earliest contacts of the Chinese with the outer world were established mainly through these ports.

(3) Chinese immigrants in southeast Asia are far from homogeneous. Each area is divided into different dialect groups. [illegible] are far from homogeneous. Each area is divided into different dialect groups. [illegible] (Teochiu, Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Hainanese.)

(4) The countries in which Chinese have settled have similar tropical climates associated with monsoon rain systems. In addition, international trade (e.g. rice, spices, tin, rubber, oil, resins, hardwoods, birdsnest, rattan) is important in these regions.

(5) With the exception of Thailand, the Chinese in Southeast Asia and in Taiwan had been subordinated to the colonial

policies of the Dutch in Indonesia and in Taiwan; the Spanish in the Philippines; the British in Burma, Malaya and Borneo; and the French in Indochina, etc.

(6) The difficulties of the Chinese language and the conspicuous distinctions of Chinese custom made it essential to use a capitan China, also called quatermaster, captain, or headman in English, nai or amphoe in Thai, and chef in French, as an intermediary between European administrations or host governments and the Chinese community. His duties were to act as judge in petty civil actions where both parties were Chinese, collect taxes, keep order, etc. This system of indirect rule proved an easy economic way of maintaining law, peace, and order within the Chinese community before the mid-nineteenth century. During this period, the Chinese were living in a state of semi-independence in [illegible] and also in Taiwan under Dutch occupation.

If the [illegible] striking between the Chinese in [illegible], the differences are also significant and need to be explained. The main differences have to do with economic pattern and social structure as stated briefly in the introduction (pp. 1-2). In the remaining section of this paper, I will review in more detail these significant differences and analyze how differences between ecological environments, social structure and economic pattern are connected and interact with each other.

It is generally true that immigrants are affected by colonial or host governmental policies. But the economic [illegible] of Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia is not explainable by a by-product of the European colonial policies.

The desire to benefit from the economy of the Southeast Asian colonies led the European administrators to use special policies with regard to the Chinese immigrants. On the one hand, they encouraged emigration and maintained control by limiting occupations open to Chinese. On the other hand, they put restriction on areas of settlement. I will discuss the details of these separately in the following paragraphs.

During the European occupation of Southeast Asia, efforts were made to admit Chinese only for unskilled labor, the lower urban services, and agriculture. Immigrants were forbidden to engage in trade. These efforts always ended in failure.

Ever since sixteenth century, for instance, the Spanish authorities tried to confine the Chinese as far as possible to agricultural activities in the Philippines. Although attempts were made to restrict occupational pursuits, limit residence, raise taxes, etc., the efforts ended in failure. In the seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries, agricultural colonies had been established in Laguna and in Pampanga. But neither of these succeeded (Wickberg 1965:55), for in 1870, there were fewer than 500 Chinese employed in agricultural activities, out of a Chinese population of over 40,000 (ibid:56).

Another example is the Chinese immigrants in Indochina. During the earliest days of the conquest, the French government had unsuccessfully endeavoured to employ Chinese laborers in the fields. Subsequently, they attempted to induce the Chinese to go into agriculture. But all of these efforts were equally fruitless (Purcell 1965:101). As in the Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the majority of the Chinese continued to go into trade and commerce. In this respect, colonial policy did set limits to immigration, yet never determined it.

On the other hand, the encouragment of immigration and restriction on the areas of settlement led to a rapid increase in the Chinese population and the formation of urban overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.

For instance, under Spanish regime, Parián was first built to confine the Chinese to a localized and readily controlled area near Manila. Later, Binondo and Santa Cruz were established and acted as receiving centers and agents of socialization for newly arrived immigrants. All the Chinese were supposed to stay in these places. Only the Catholic Chinese were permitted to reside outside of Parián (Felix 1966:94-110).

The situation was more or less the same in Indonesia. The Chinese were required by Dutch authority to live in designated urban neighborhoods and could travel out of the places only with permits issued by government bureaucrats (Levy 1963: 33).

In Thailand, during the centuries when Ayutthaya was the capital of the country (1350-1767), the Chinese, like other foreigners (e.g. French, English, Dutch, Portuguese, Jews) resided in a particular quarter of the royal city. But here, the Chinese were more widely scattered there than in any other Southeast Asian country (Thompson 1955:44). This might be explained partly by the absence of a colonial power, and partly by Thai government policy (i.e. unrestricted immigration, complete freedom of movement, low taxation, a monopoly policy that led to Chinese supremacy) of the nineteenth century, which was favorable toward the Chinese (Skinner 1962: 142).

From the above we can see that colonial and host government policy did indeed affect the formation of urban overseas Chinese communities. Yet, the economic pattern which the Chinese immigrants developed in Southeast Asia was not the by-product of European colonial policies.

Why, then, did the Chinese not like agriculture in Southeast Asia, when so many of them had been peasants at home? Historical reasons, in the context of ecological environment and social structure, will be stated in the following:

(1) First, to Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, agriculture has not pay as well as trade. The expansion of the population and the large proportion of the uncultivable land in Fukien and Kwangtung, are the main reasons that force the Chinese

people migrate to Southeast Asia in order to earn their livings. The emigrants have already experienced or seen the difficulties and hardships of being engaged in agriculture. Then, if they are still going to make living, why go agriculture?

[illegible] saying in Burma, "out of sweat can always [illegible]". It is the habit of many emigrants to get back to their fathers' land. Still, agriculture is an alien area, no doubt, the Chinese would like to join as much as possible in order to [illegible] their families back home, to honor their parents, and to plant [illegible] in fruitful soil. Particularly, "fish" is a very common [illegible] by China. People will [illegible] they can [illegible].

Nevertheless, I agree with Purcell when he states that "[illegible] to [illegible] agriculture (though [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] with me) for the simple reason that [illegible] as well as [illegible]" (1965:555).

Many points out that the general effect to push [illegible] agricultural activities failed mainly because [illegible] [illegible] (1965:56). The [illegible] [illegible] although some Chinese did become wealthy [illegible], the majority continued to [illegible] [illegible] of general [illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible] (1965:56).

[illegible] of Chinese who [illegible]

agricultural activity, namely full and market vegetable gardening or pepper planting, with the exception of the Hakka in Indochina, a small number in Malaya, West Borneo, and Southern Thailand (Simoniya 1961:20-21). In other words, very few Chinese immigrants have turned to the cultivation of staple crops as a primary means of subsistence.

Throughout Southeast Asia, the Chinese have specialized in and controlled these highly skilled cultivations-vegetables, peppers, etc., which were concentrated almost entirely around the large cities and densely populated areas. In contrast to rice, both vegetables and peppers are cash crops, which involve "a heavy degree of financial speculation" (Willmott 1967:51). In this respect, I agree with Willmott's statement that "Chinese participation in agriculture can be characterized as commercial, in which a cash profit is expected from investment" (1967:51). That is to say, agriculture was not considered of as a way of life.

(2) Secondly, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are overwhelmingly urban. Urban settlement limits the opportunity for the development of the agriculture other than suburban vegetable gardening and horticulture.

Urban areas or cities are always the trade, commercial, or manufacturing centers, trans-shipping points and sometimes serve as intermediaries in international commerce, e.g. Singapore (Sjoberg 1966:99). These areas stimulate the broad

development of processing industries and trade, and provide more chance for specialized occupations.

(3) Dialect groups and their traditional occupations might be the third reason which influence Chinese economic activities in Southeast Asia.

As stated earlier, the unequal distribution of dialect groups throughout Southeast Asia is one of the most significant features of overseas Chinese population. This is due partly to the ancient trade routes which linked various ports in southeastern China with particular places in Southeast Asia; and due partly to the fact that Chinese immigrants tend to go to the places where others from their home towns or same villages have settled. In other words, they tend to mix with those who speak the same dialect.

Furthermore, arriving in a new land, very naturally, the immigrant will find himself faced with new difficulties. It is hard for the individual to struggle for survival, but "the Chinese immigrants were saved by their extraordinary capacity for mutual help" (T'ien 1953:6). Therefore, new immigrants usually followed the same occupations in which a majority of his own dialect speakers are found. While opening a business, he chooses a person from the same dialect group as a partner and employs assistants likewise. As a result, "in any one place abroad those with the same occupation tend to have come from the same place in China" (Crissman 1967:196).

In other words, various dialect groups identified with particular occupations in Southeast Asia.)

Wiseman points out that "the occupations monopolised by a given speech community in one place belong to others in different places and have nothing to do with regional specializations back in China" (1967:100). I cannot find myself in complete agreement with this statement. My argument is that in some cases, regional specializations back home will influence the immigrants' occupation abroad.

South Fukien and East Kwangtung are largely mountainous. Many inhabitants were driven to seek their living in ways other than farming (Chen 1939:29). South Fukien, for example, is an important area in the annals of China's overseas trade. The strongly mercantilistic content which Fukienese culture consequently acquired in the course of centuries is still apparent in the Philippines, the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore, Indochina, and Indonesia. Not only are the Fukienese, by comparison with other dialect groups, more often occupied in trade, but among the traders, they are also more successful (Chen 1960:102).

Traditionally, the Teochiu have specialized in agriculture. They are well represented in market gardening and other commercial agriculture in Indonesia and Indochina. However, in the past five decades, there has been a steady advance of the Teochiu people in the whole range of commercial specializations.

In many areas, such as Thailand and Cambodia, where Fukienese are poorly represented, Teochiu dominate trade.

Hakkas are the people from interior parts of Northern Kwangtung and Southern Fukien. According to Skinner, "Hakkas more than any other speech group turned to emigration through economic necessity. And throughout the great migration waves from 1840 to 1930, they were the poorest Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia" (1963:102-103).

As I mentioned before, dialect groups were associated with occupational specialization and this affected the distribution and patterns of settlement. In Southeast Asia, Hakkas, for example, were the most rurally inclined dialect group. We often find a small number of Hakka peasants in Takeo province, Cambodia (Willmott 1967:40). Likewise, Purcell described them as, "Dwelling in little villages, bordering China between Monkay and Tienyen, and living on rice growing and fishing, they appeared to be firmly-rooted peasants" (1965:101).

On the other hand, Hakkas are mine-workers in Indonesia and Malaya, artisans, workmen, and even businessmen in Indo-China. Therefore, under certain circumstances, traditional occupations might be changed in order to adapt to the new environment.

I could go on to talk about the Cantonese and other dialect groups in the region, but this is not the main

interest of my paper. What I am trying to do is to cast doubts on Crissman's statement. Although quite a number of Chinese changed their occupations overseas, the traditional specialization and the background did influence the economic pattern of the Chinese in Southeast Asia to some extent.

(*) Fourthly, overseas Chinese associations also played an important part in economic activities. In most Southeast Asian countries, [illegible] secret societies (before the mid-nineteenth century) and so-called voluntary associations (after 1850), such as dialect-group associations, regional associations, surname associations, Chambers of Commerce, occupational guilds, business associations, social clubs, religious groups, sports or recreation associations, etc.

There are several factors which encouraged the formation of Chinese associations in Southeast Asia. A brief description will be given in the following.

Before the 1960's, overseas Chinese were considered outcasts by the imperial Chinese government. As the Chinese government did not provide consular protection for its nationals overseas, feeling that they were unfilial deserters or political dissidents (Wickberg 1965:211), the immigrants were self-reliant for assistance and protection in alien areas.

In comparison with the population of the host countries, the Chinese are small in number, yet their significance in

economy is great. This economic importance has been relevant to the modern nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. And it is within the economic realm that the indigenes perceive the threat. Legislative action has been one set of means to keep the Chinese under control, government sponsored organizations to compete with them has been the other.

As an ethnic minority in the region, the Chinese are not formally integrated into the local or national levels of the host governmental organization. Therefore, it is to their advantage to act in some coordinated form to protect their interests as individuals and as a collectivity with regard to discriminatory legislation against immigration and arbitrary taxation (Coughlin 1960:65).

Furthermore, in China including Taiwan, family and kin groups are predominant, and other groups tend to be relatively unimportant. Social control is largely effected within lineages and informally by gentry and elders in the village environment. The situation is just the reverse in Southeast Asia. There, the real locus of power lies with business and dialect associations, both of which are formed on non-kin basis. For instance, in Bangkok, lineages are nonexistent or relatively ineffective. The Chamber of Commerce together with the Teochiu association are the key power groups in the Chinese community (Skinner 1958:207). As a result, social controls operate much more at the extrafamilial associational level. The associations have arisen in response to the demand

of [illegible] of foreign hostility.

Finally, the plight of the pioneers and particularly newly arrived labourers as well as lack of social welfare organizations in host countries from which the Chinese might get assistance, encourage the establishment of the various associations for their mutual benefit. The associations serve [illegible] and unify [illegible] distinct levels of overseas Chinese communities.

As already stated, secret societies were found in most of the Southeast Asian countries before the mid-nineteenth century. Owing to official suppression and other reasons, they rapidly declined and were eclipsed in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Therefore, the dialect group and regional associations, etc. were established in order to meet new needs.

In Thailand, for example, these associations not only protected the special occupational interests of its members, helped new immigrants from the home district or emigrant areas to find jobs and get established, built and maintained temples with gods peculiar to the home district and cemeteries for the use of those who could not afford shipment of their remains to China for burial, but also provided the locale and occasions for social gatherings of those from the same region or emigrant area (Skinner 1962:167).

It was in the first decade of this century, we find the

[illegible] network of [illegible] which for the first time [illegible] across Hokkien-speaking lines and enhanced the wealth of the Chinese communities in Thailand, and in the Philippines as well as in many other Southeast Asian countries. In my view, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was the most important [illegible] political, diplomatic, welfare, and cultural functions [illegible] chief organization of the entire Chinese community [illegible].

I agree with Coughlin's statement that,

> The phenomenal commercial success of the Chinese in Thailand, and indeed throughout Southeast Asia, has no single or simple explanation. Certainly this success is partly attributable to such personal qualities as perseverance, capacity for hard work, and business acumen, but one of the most important factors has been the tight social and economic organization developed by overseas Chinese communities. Such communities in Southeast Asia appear remarkably self-sufficient and to many observers seem to form alien societies within the host society. They have proved unusually effective, on the one hand, for encouraging mutual aid and co-operation among heterogeneous linguistic and socio-economic groups and, on the other, for providing protection from hostile or competitive individuals and governments. Rather than most people the Chinese have learned the dictum that 'in unity there is strength'. Their organizational cohesion furnishes much of the answer not only to the economic well-being of the Chinese as a group but also to the persistence of their cultural patterns and values in an alien and sometimes unfriendly social environment (1960:32).

[illegible] important factors of political [illegible], land ownership, and citizenship also [illegible] the different economic [illegible] of the Chinese immigrants in Taiwan and in Southeast Asia. I will discuss the situation in Thailand as an [illegible]

separately.

b. Taiwan

During the seventeenth century, it was the mercantilistic Dutch administrator who encouraged the Chinese to migrate to Taiwan. In order to get some profit from the export of rice and sugar, the Chinese immigrants were pushed by the Dutch authority to go into agriculture. Therefore, from 1645 to 1656, the cultivated land increased from about 3,000 morgan to 8,402 morgan. And the yield of sugar increased about ten times (Chen 1968:14, 1964:99).

In 1661 Koxinga invaded Taiwan and created a turning-point for the Chinese immigrants. He brought with him 25,000 men, military conquest and better agricultural techniques, and Taiwan soon had a Chinese majority in its population.

Before the coming of the Chinese immigrant, the Formosan Aborigines were essentially hunters and gathers, but they also engaged in slash-and-burn agriculture. Physically and culturally, they resemble the native peoples in Southeast Asia, especially the Dayaks of Borneo and the mountain tribes of northern Luzon (Ballantine 1952:7). Linguistically, they belong to the family of Austronesian or Malayopolynesian languages (Ferrell 1969:3). They numbered about 150,000 to 200,000 at the end of Dutch occupation (Chen 1964:101). The population density was low (see Table I on page 14).

Little by little, the Chinese immigrants displaced the aborigines from the lowlands, and pushed them back into the mountains (Chen 1964:149). The Malayo-Polynesian aboriginal tribes cultured in nature, became a small minority and eventually controlled and in some cases even assimilated by the mainland Chinese immigrants.

As the Chinese population increased rapidly, the opening up of new land for cultivation was necessary. Hence, cultivated land increased to 12,471 morgen in 1624. The occupied area was enlarged from a few scattered points along the western coast to the entire level portion of the island.

Henceforth, Taiwan was under the Chinese rule until the Japanese occupation in 1895. The basic economy was agriculture.

B. Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, the Chinese immigrants have been under the domination of the colonial powers of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britian, France and the United States. Therefore, the Southeast Asian Chinese, unlike those in Taiwan, have never been in political control. The regulations and laws have been set up by others. The Chinese have merely performed the activities that the European administrations or host governments have allowed them to perform.

Although the status of the Chinese immigrants varies from country to country, all the host governments in Southeast Asia have placed restrictions on their immigration, education, political and economic activities (Thompson 1955:3). I will concentrate on economic activities and discuss them in detail.

The main staple in Southeast Asia is rice. Throughout the whole region, the native people are peasant proprietors and do most of the rice-growing. Since the subsistence comes from farming, land is always associated with citizenship. Thus, "the distinction between land holders and the landless separate true citizens from something less than citizens" (Goldschmidt 1967:205-206). The host governments always keep the best land for the indigenous people, and restrict or forbid alien ownership of land.

For example, in Cambodia, laws forbidding Chinese immigrants from owning property were passed in 1920 (Willmott 1967:50). The Chinese are not allowed to own rice land (Steinberg 1957:206).

Some of these laws date back to colonial days. Simonija points out that "the land laws of the colonial authority prevented a wider participation of the Chinese population in agriculture in Indonesia and later also in Malaya and Indochina" (1961:74). In Indonesia, for instance, as soon as the Dutch established their domination in Java, they forbade the transfer of land to any other nationality (Ibid:74). As a result, "Chinese agricultural communities and small peasant farmsteads

in Indonesia are found only in sparsely populated and mostly virgin islands of the outer provinces where the influence of the Dutch administration was less felt" (ibid).

After establishing their control over Malaysia , the British administrators introduced the "land reservation" policy kept the best land for the Malays (Purcell 1965:205). Any reserved land including the vast land areas of the Malay principalities was forbidden to be transferred to Chinese or any other nationality (Simomiya.1961:75).

In addition, "red lands", suitable for the cultivation of rubber and other profitable raw materials, were barred to all aliens in Indochina (Purcell 1965:191-192).

In some countries, the Chinese could rent land from the government or the indigenes, but that is a kind of "parasitic" way of living. Land is one of the most important prerequisites for the development of agriculture. Since ownership was forbidden to the aliens in Southeast Asia, the Chinese would prefer the hard toil of the field if he could obtain a position with a Chinese firm. Cases indicate that a great number of Chinese immigrants did engage in agricultural or plantation labour only in the beginning. After accumulating sufficient capital, however, they would turn to small business.

Political participation is one way of obtaining land, as the situation in Taiwan. Participation in the local government

or acquired citizenship in the other.

In Thailand, for instance, the first Nationality Act promulgated by the government in 1913/14 claimed that any person born in Thailand is a Thai. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Chinese immigrants bought land in the names of their children, who [illegible] with Thai nationality (Skinner 1957;1[illegible]).

Surely, the larger the population of the Chinese immigrants, the greater the possibility or opportunity for them to participate in the host government.

Table III: Number of Chinese in Southeast Asian Countries

Country	Total Population	Chinese Population	% of total Population
Singapore	1,446,000	1,090,000	75 (1957)
	1,813,500	1,387,861	76.5 (1955)
Malayan Federation	6,279,000	2,333,000	37 (1957)
	6,152,000	2,336,400	37.9 (1955)
Sarawak	612,070	180,051	29.3 (1955)
N. Borneo	377,224	89,007	23.6 (1955)
Brunei	65,240	12,350	18.9 (1955)
Thailand	20,300,000	3,500,000	17.2 (1955)
Indonesia	77,654,500	2,300,000	3.0 (1955)
Vietnam	26,300,000	1,500,000	5.7 (1955)
Cambodia	4,358,600	1,500,000	4.7 (1955)
Laos	1,425,000	1,500,000	4.7 (1955)
Burma	19,434,000	350,000	2.0 (1955)
Philippines	21,840,000	300,000	1.4 (1955)
Total	180,000,000	12,335,600	6.8 (1955)

Sources: Simoniya 1961:10
Dally 1960;126

(Owing to different sources, the figures provided in this Table sometimes vary from Table I on page 14)

Table III indicates that a high percentage of Chinese reside in Singapore, the Federation of Malaysia, Brunei, N. Borneo, Sarawak and Thailand. The question is to what degree the Chinese immigrants participate in the governments of these countries. I will use the Chinese in Singapore, the Federation of Malaysia, Sarawak and Thailand as examples and discuss them separately in the remaining paragraphs.

(.) Sarawak

According to Leigh (1964:?), the total population of Sarawak was just over 770,000 at the end of June, 1962, including the following ethnic groups:

	%
Chinese	31.3
Iban (Sea Dayak)	31
Malay	17.5
Land Dayak	8
Melanau	6
Other	6

Leigh in his book states that "the Chinese have only recently (just 70+) entered political life and recognized Sarawak as their political home" (1964:50). They played a significant role in the Sarawak Chinese Association and the Sarawak United People's Party (ibid:46). The latter is a socialist party, but "its very formation and subsequent actions were seen by many natives as a Chinese bid for power" (ibid:47). Among 31,000 members in 1962, 54 per cent were Chinese, and the majority of the remaining 46 per cent were Dayaks.

The Sarawak government consists of the Malaysian House of Representatives, Council Negri, Divisional Advisory Councils and district council electorates. According to Leigh, "The Chinese are represented by nine elected members of the Council Negri compared with three Malays, fourteen Ilan and two of the other indigenous races. Two extra Chinese and one Malay are now included as nominated Alliance supporters. Within the Alliance they are certainly over-represented (two of twenty three elected) though in theory they have equal representation with the Ilan and Malays -- two of six" (1964:56).

b) Thailand

Up to the first decade of this century, Thai policy towards the Chinese was generally favorable. The most powerful Chinese leaders were given official position and ennobled. There was a dependent relation between the Chinese elite and the Thai ruling class in pre-modern Siamese history. Not only were the Chinese an object of the Thai government policy, but they also participated to an amazing degree at the court and in government administration during the nineteenth century (Skinner 1962:148).

Through influence of these Thai policies, namely, the employment of successful and influential Chinese as governors and the ennoblement of Chinese leaders, the Chinese elite became loyal to the Thai government and eventually became

assimilated to Thai society. Purcell states, "Before the rise of nationalism in China and Siam there seems to have been no problem of assimilation. In three generations, as we have seen, the newcomers were completely absorbed into the Thai people" (1965:115).

After the rise of nationalism in Thailand, the government attempted to restrict Chinese influence in domestic trade, land ownership, etc. In order to protect its rights and business, the Chinese either enter politics directly or "support leaders or groups already in politics who are amenable to direction by Chinese capitalists" (Coughlin 1960:203). As a result, "In the southern provinces, Thai who are ethnically Chinese have entered local politics directly, with considerable popular support; in the Bangkok area wealthy merchants have formed business alliances with leading Thai politicians and military men and gained thereby the protection of these strong men in the national government" (ibid:203).

(4) Federation of Malaysia and Singapore

It is an extraordinary phenomenon that the Chinese immigrants slightly outnumber the indigenous Malays. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the Chinese play a significant role in the country's economy and have a growing political importance in the government. This accounts for their primacy among the Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia.

A fundamental principle of British colonialism is

unfounded rivalry, but in the law. The colonial power promoted and encouraged minority interests. Therefore, under colonialism, the Chinese immigrants flourished. Originally, the Chinese played no part in the administration. Granting Malayan citizenship, inducing the Chinese to enter the Malayan Home Guard, police, and armed forces, and opening the Malayan Civil Service for qualified non-Malay Asians, were some of the steps of the British pro-Malay policy (Thompson 1955:35-36).

Thus, around 1955, about 73 per cent of the Chinese in the Federation of Malaya were entitled to citizenship (ibid:10). As with the Chinese in Singapore, they now had the vast majority of the potential electorate. No doubt, the power is in the hands of the Chinese if they choose to take it. After independence in 1957, the new government of the Federation was a coalition of Chinese, Indians and Malay parties under the Malay Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Malayan Chinese Association, the Chinese party, had even more influence than just the number of Chinese voters in the Federation (Mitchison 1961:76-77).

In Singapore, on the other hand, Chinese political parties have had a remarkable growth, and the Chinese have an increasing interest in politics. Sycotan, in his article "The Chinese in Singapore", listed five of the major political parties in the 1955 election as the following (1957:27).

1. Progressive: right-wing; English-speaking Chinese, English, Eurasians,

2. Democratic: right-wing; Chinese speaking Chinese (Chamber of Commerce)

3. Labour Front: left-wing; Chinese, coalition with English, others,

4. People Action: left-wing; Chinese, coalition with Indian (Chinese student)

5. Malayan Chinese Association: Chinese, ill-defined splinter of Federation Party.

From this we can see that all of the major political parties are dominated by the Chinese in Singapore.

According to the work of the Southeast Asian experts, there is a marked generalization that the Chinese have entrepreneurial but not political power in Southeast Asia. The cases of Thailand are worthy of careful attention. During the nineteenth century in Thailand, and the past two decades in Singapore, the Federation of Malaysia, Sarawak and also in Thailand, the Chinese did participate in the host governments. The larger the percentage of the Chinese in relation to the host population, the greater their political power. This, in turn, influences the economic activities of the Chinese. In other words, the Chinese-owned large plantations of gambier and pepper plants in Singapore, the rubber estates and many small-holdings in the Federation of Malaysia, and the cultivated land in Thailand might be explained by their dual nationality and their participation in the host government.

(c) The pattern of the society in which Chinese immigrants have settled is important with respect to their economic activities. Both Southeast Asia ; which is so called Southeast Asia and Taiwan are so-called "folk", underdeveloped, pre-industrial societies. In this kind of society, the boundaries are always set. People live on a fixed amount of land and depend upon the resources available to them. Since the subsistence comes from farming, land is central to the value system. The ownership of or a right to land is always associated with citizenship.

[illegible], the population [illegible] is extremely high in South and Chia Nan Plain in Taiwan, As we can observe an increase in population density will lead to an intense struggle for land. Thus there is not much land available for aliens in the region. Under these circumstances, the immigrant might work as agricultural labor or tenant-farmer. Yet, this is a kind of [illegible] occupation. Unless the person is bound by [illegible] or [illegible] through citizenship or some other means, the majority of the immigrants go into commercial activities if they can accumulate enough capital or get a position in a firm.

[illegible] contrast, after the coming of the aliens, the society became a heterogeneous plural society, with different [illegible] of a community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. [illegible], there is a [illegible] division of labor along ethnic lines.

[illegible] the [illegible] colonial [illegible] in Southeast Asia [illegible]

In Fiji, for example, the indigenous are mostly farmers, fishermen and employees of the government. The Chinese and the Indians are traders, middlemen, shopkeepers, etc. The Europeans are in [illegible] production of [illegible] and industry. Therefore, there is an economic interdependence among different ethnic groups. The environment of any one ethnic group is affected by natural conditions and also by the presence and activities of other ethnic groups.

Generally speaking, Southeast Asian countries are agricultural with little industry. In other words, they are pre-industrial societies. Owing to relatively high population density, before the coming of the aliens, the land of primary production has already been taken up by the indigenous. They are the so-called primary producers [illegible]. The newcomers will find more difficulty in getting into that kind of production. On the other hand, the indigenous are engaged in [illegible]. Therefore, more chances are available for the immigrants to enter into trade or commercial activities. In this process, the immigrants might achieve an important role in the economy. The Chinese immigrant in Southeast Asia is a good example of this.

Taiwan was an agricultural and pre-industrial society. Yet, due to low population density, plenty of land was available for the newcomers. With political domination and better agricultural techniques, Chinese immigrants [illegible]

Chapter V

Segmentary Organization

[illegible] Chinese communities and notably, the [illegible] provide a basis for generalization [illegible] .

[illegible] communities in Southeast Asia and in Taiwan [illegible] result of long-term migration. [illegible] Chinese [illegible] in this paper, we use this term to refer to [illegible] have undergone substantially different historical [illegible] the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia are by no means [illegible] . They are divided into different dialect groups. [illegible] differences is important with respect to occupational [illegible] specializations, to the distribution and patterns of settlement, and to social structure [illegible] .

Freedman realizes that the same kind of segmentary [illegible] was also characteristic of traditional Chinese cities. It is mentioned in his article, "The Segmentary [illegible] of Urban Overseas Chinese Communities", that "the Chinese who migrated to the cities of China were likely to [illegible] just like those who went overseas, and [illegible] from the same area tended to congregate [illegible] of business or particular crafts in Chinese cities as well" (1967:209).

because of dialect or language differences, there are [illegible] of communication. Moving to a city like [illegible] pretty much the same as moving out of the country. [illegible] often face new environments and new difficulties. [illegible], from a psychological point of view, there will be a great tendency for people who speak rare dialect or language [illegible] like [illegible] and work in the same kind of business in order to "protect" themselves and help one another out.

This kind of situation, I am sure, will also hold for [illegible] immigrants. The overseas Chinese have frequently been compared to the Jews of the Far East. The Jews are also [illegible] people, disliked in part because of their economic [illegible] and because of the language barrier in Western countries. Likewise, the Indians in Africa, Fiji and other places provide [illegible] examples.

Breckenridge states that "When immigrants are thrown down [illegible] among whom they must make their social life [illegible] themselves, they are likely to divide into units which [illegible] the solidarity of homeland ties. The village, the [illegible], the prefecture, and the dialect are provided overseas [illegible] with lines along which to organize themselves" (1967: [illegible]).

(2) Overseas Chinese associations are a historical process [illegible] adaptation to new environments. They are associated with specific events and the growth of the Chinese communities.

We cannot neglect the fact that they played an important part in the establishment of the economic pattern and the development of commercial centers of the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

[illegible] Freedman's argument that "the social organization of [illegible] overseas Chinese did not originate abroad, but [illegible] that it is derived from patterns indigenous to China [illegible]" (1957:105). Willmott, on the other hand, held that "[illegible] organization was evident in Chinese cities with [illegible] populations, and no doubt these had given [illegible] for [illegible] associations" (1960:209).

It is true that secret societies existed throughout [illegible] as well as Southeast Asia and North America before the [illegible] 19th century. But it is also true that various religious and craft guilds and associations, [illegible] social club etc., were common community organizations in traditional Chinese cities and Chinese communities abroad. But my argument is that the functions of these associations are differentiated to a degree, both inside and outside of China. For instance, a [illegible] in China only have a set of political functions. But they have social, benevolent, and other functions overseas. Chinese Chambers of Commerce and dialect-group associations provide schools, clinics or hospitals, social clubs, cemeteries, etc., for Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia. I think that the [illegible] guilds and provincial associations operated schools, hospitals, and so on in traditional Chinese cities.

In the Chinese communities abroad, all social activities, social status and recognition, education, protection, and social security -- can be satisfied through the various associations. And it is the Chinese community which has originally provided economic opportunities for the immigrants and their descendants.

On the other hand, the Chinese in Taiwan are also divided into three distinct groups: Fukienese, Cantonese and Hakka. As very few studies concerning the Chinese associations in Taiwan are available, it is hard to tell whether they are different from those found in Southeast Asia. Since the late nineteenth century, Taiwan has been a part of Chinese territory. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the associations in Taiwan might have the same kinds of functions as those found in traditional Chinese cities, but not those found in Southeast Asia.

In response to the changing nature of the host countries, the growth of urban societies, needs for mutual help and protection, etc., the establishment of the various associations by the immigrants in alien areas or in urban societies is indeed necessary. In Southeast Asia and in West Africa, this kind of association has been proven an adaptive mechanism, or in Morrill's words, an adaptational device (1967.104).

(1) [illegible] of settlement, rural or urban, will provide or limit

the opportunity for the development of agricultural activity. Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia are overwhelmingly urban. Therefore, it is not surprising that [illegible] them engaged in trade, commerce and industry. [illegible], [illegible] immigrants [illegible]. [illegible], agriculture is [illegible].

(3) [illegible] policy ([illegible] mercantilistic-agriculturalistic), [illegible], [illegible] (tribal-[illegible], [illegible], [illegible]-industrial) in which the immigrants settled, do affect the size of the immigrant population and their economic activities.

Tribal or early folk society [illegible] immigrants. Because under [illegible] techniques, the productivity [illegible], [illegible] says in his article, "The Concept and Method of Cultural Ecology", "Land use by means of a given technology permits a certain population density" (1955:[illegible]). Therefore, in this kind of society, we find that only a few immigrants reside with the indigenes. The early immigrants, before nineteenth century, in [illegible] belonged to this type.

After the coming of the Europeans, a transition from tribal society to folk society took place in Southeast Asia and also in Taiwan. The desire to benefit economically

from the colonies by the European administrations to encourage Chinese emigration, and to push them as far as possible into agricultural activities. In a nutshell, Chinese immigration is fully determined during the second half of the 19th century by the needs of the sugar economy in Cuba and in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Chinese would challenge European authority and compete with them in foreign trade in both regions of emigration of the Chinese in Manila, Cuba, Taiwan and Cuba, Japan. Therefore, under-estimation, the problem of the emigrants could only expand the number [illegible]. Indeed, about 45,000 Chinese emigrated to Cuba and from Hong Kong between 1860. And about 25,000 [illegible] Taiwan, before 1860, with Dutch encouragement.

The case of Manila is very different. A majority [illegible] Chinese emigrants. Indeed the development of agriculture in the Philippines, and especially in the sugar industry, was [illegible] Chinese emigrants. Other activities [illegible] Spanish and Filipino, because of the [illegible] Chinese emigrants.

For example, the Chinese population in Taiwan increased from 2 million in 1810 and over five million in 1940. During [illegible] only 25,000 to 30,000 Chinese emigrated to the Philippines in 1820 and 117,000 in 1841 (Chen 1964:57,58).

[illegible] emigrants by [illegible]

[illegible] 1,000 in 1820 (Khan 1964:20), 50,000 in 1870 (Tinker 1954:20), and 7,270,000 in 1921 (Tinker 1960:15); [illegible] 450 million in 1950 (Khan 1964:20).

[illegible]

Through the influence of the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833, the demand for plantation labour became one of the most important economic factors causing Indian emigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Tinker 1951:2). Most of the Indians went to newly created sugar colonies, Guiana and Fiji. However, a large number went to Mauritius, Fiji, British Guiana, West Indies (Tinker 1960:20), and Africa. Originally, Indian labour was mainly full and they were employed in many [illegible] work.

Although the distribution varies from country to country, having Central and South Africa as examples, the majority of Indians are engaged in commercial activities. From the work of the Patnams (1972) and Smith (1948), we see that the Indians play an important economic middleman role in the region. As with the Chinese in Southeast Asia, for

of the [illegible] Indian traders in Africa were actually [illegible] in India. Most of them came from farm families ([illegible] 1960:66).

[illegible] on the other hand, by its ethnic segregation and economic [illegible] specialization, the [illegible] development of any one ethnic group is [illegible] by natural conditions and also by the [illegible] and activities of other ethnic groups.

(3) The time dimension is also important to the economic [illegible] of the immigrant. The immigrants who migrate first or earlier to an alien area, have more choice and better opportunities to develop economic activities. When some economic [illegible] have already been controlled or occupied by earlier immigrants, the new-comers can only have second, third or even fourth choice in economic activities and sometimes even in place of residence.

Fukienese are the oldest and the largest dialect group [illegible] migrated to Southeast Asia and Taiwan. [illegible], in [illegible] with other dialect groups, they are more often engaged in trade or commercial activity in most of the Southeast Asian countries, e.g. the Philippines, the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. They also play a more important role in industry. In cities and towns, mainly the metropolis or [illegible] cities, the Fukienese are more successful. In addition, the majority of them reside in [illegible] or suburban areas or towns.

On the other hand, among the five main dialect groups in Indian India, the Madras are the poorest people. Living in the infamous areas of northern Kowloon and Jordan Valley, they earned not later than other dialect groups. However, the Madras have less chance of emigration. They are also active in the Federation of Malaysia and Singapore; especially prominent in British Borneo, Indochina etc. In addition, they are the most rural dialect group.

Burma is the only Southeast Asian country where the Chinese are decidedly signed to the Indians in the commercial activity. Until 1935, Burma was part of India. The Indians were the moneylenders, landowners, clerks, professionals and artisans (Purcell 1951:91). Because of the relative foreign stability of colonial control measures, the stream of Chinese immigration has never been so intense into Burma, as into Malaya and Thailand before 1935 (Purcell 1955:54).

In this respect, while the Chinese came in the greatest number, it was not surprising to see that the Indians had the most established channels in Burma in import and export trade and industry. To start, the Indians have less chance of emigration.

(7) Since the majority of the Chinese in Southeast Asia are engaged in trade, commerce or industry, wealth becomes the most important qualification which determines the leadership or social status in overseas Chinese communities. Traditionally,

[illegible] considered the lowest social class in China. But in the new environment, this situation has changed. The wealthiest people in the most powerful [illegible] are the highest social class.

[illegible] immigrants and the overseas have had a high [illegible] environment, and economic strength is [illegible] social power. Therefore, through wealth, they [illegible] high social position and become the most influential [illegible], not only recognized as such by the Chinese, but also by the Japanese and the European colonizers.

On the other hand, life of Chinese immigrants in [illegible] still regulated by traditional Chinese social [illegible] patterns. Thus, family and kin groups are important. Social control is largely effected within [illegible] and informally by gossip and elders in the village [illegible].

(c) Land is the basis of subsistence and is central to the [illegible] cycle. The ownership of land or other resources will affect subsistence activities and the composition of the group (Du and Lee 1955:40). Therefore, under the restrictions of the host government or of a colonial power, the immigrants have a lesser or no right to own land. Nevertheless, there are some ways in which the immigrants can get land in other countries. The most effective way is through the political domination by the immigrants. With military conquest, by

holding a political power in their hands, the immigrants (e.g. Chinese immigrants in Trinidad and the European immigrants in Fiji or Kenya) are free to build on the land.

Finally, participation in the land government or political activity is the authentic way of getting land. The part of the immigrant's participation in the host country is always closely related to the size of the immigrant population. According to the estimation of 1946, for instance, the Indians formed 68.4 per cent of the total population in Mauritius (Meynier 1951:Appendix I). The legislative council of Mauritius consists of 19 elected and 10 nominated members. Eleven Indians were elected in the elections held in 1948 (ibid:21). Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the Indians own about one-third of the cultivated land.(ibid:20).

In Guiana numbered about 47 per cent of the total population in British Guiana in 1946 (ibid:Appendix I). They have attained the highest position in the administrative and judicial structures of the Colony (ibid: 20). The Fijians, according to Mayer, Indian immigrants have formed an absolute majority in Fiji (1961:7). They are also allowed to some extent in government services and in the Legislative Councils (Kamil 1951:429-430).

Land, nevertheless, is used as free gift to the Asians. In 1874, for instance, the law of South Africa provided for free

[illegible] (Freedman 1958:10).

In summary, this paper has attempted to apply the theory of ecology's study of the interrelationships between organism and environment, to two different areas within China as it might have existed: Southeast Asia and Taiwan. An effort has been made to discover how Chinese immigrants of the same social, cultural and historical background moved into different ecological environments and developed different economic patterns and social structures as different adaptive mechanisms. Population density, [illegible] plateau, distant group, voluntary association, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], political [illegible] and historical [illegible] have been introduced in [illegible] environment, social [illegible] approach [illegible] with [illegible].

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