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The Role of Values in Higher Education:
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
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THE ROLE OF VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

By

Maxie S. Gordon, Jr.

AN ABSTRACT OF

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Administration and Higher Education

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

By

Maxie S. Gordon, Jr.

The purpose of this dissertation is an attempt to explicate the role of values in higher education. It is, to be sure, exploratory in nature but based on well-established philosophical and educational works, with particular emphasis on the writings of Plato, Frederick Nietzsche, and John Dewey--although the writer takes the position that it is impossible to treat seriously problems that are central to the study of values without discussing such thinkers as Epicurus, Epictetus, Locke, Bentham, Mill, Kant, Hobbes, Ayer, Sartre (and a literal host of others) who also offered to the Western world comprehensive views on theories of value.

Moreover, the writer has attempted to bring together the contributions of the three principal scholars named above, along with the contributions of several other scholars, in such a way as to examine in a serious fashion, the different interpretations of the term "value" given via philosophy, education and science

as well. The reader should bear in mind, too, the fact that there are <u>few</u> subjects in all of philosophy, and education (and, indeed, in the society at large) that are more complex and controversial than that of values.

The thesis is argued that each educator ought to develop a philosophical basis, methodology and values approach to teaching, whether or not he/she happens to be in the actual classroom setting, that will enable, especially those students in higher education, to develop higher levels of moral reasoning. In this regard, the writer takes the position posited by Robert B. Bloom, . . . that "compared to college students in other fields, future teachers do not seem to have developed high levels of moral reasoning." A discussion of the implications of the above for undergraduate education in the American colleges and universities constitutes a great deal of the substance, focus, and subject matter of this dissertation.

The author further takes the position that each educator has a moral responsibility to systematically and rationally investigate and develop not only their own value stance, but of at least equal importance, to continually raise and attempt to resolve the crucial moral dilemmas that confront all of us of the 20th century.

The writer further takes the position that the use of the term values throughout this dissertation is

intended to communicate the general overall interest in the broad field of values, with particular emphasis on moral values. It is the opinion of many that moral values are considered as the primary values and serve, in many ways, as exemplars of other types of values. In a word, values constitute the primary and inclusive category; moral values are considered a sub-category of values—and they are considered by this writer to be the most important sub-category. Obviously, there are other categories as well, namely: esthetic values, religious values and political values, etc.

Lastly, some recommendations are made for further theoretical, philosophical and empirical exploration and extension of this one of many attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the role of values in higher education. This extension is accompanied by some concern for the pragmatic or practical aspects of what has been presented in this dissertation.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my two beautiful little children, Maxie S. Gordon, III (age 8) and Alethea Baleria Gordon (age 5)—and to their children after them—in the hope that they too shall continually be of spirit, unity, substance, vision, integrity, love and peace. Always remember that where there is no vision and no unity, a people perish. You are the change if change is to come. It will not be easy; in days to come the road will be rough, but I cannot ask anymore of you than this, to give your very best. And in times like these, I cannot ask any less.

SPECIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In any endeavor of such magnitude as that required via the extensive writing, editing and research activity that goes into the successful completion of a doctoral dissertation, a number of people should be given at least honorable mention. However, space limitations permit me to name only a few.

To my Graduate Committee Chairman, Dr. Paul L. Dressel, I am deeply grateful for the extensive guidance and supervision he has given to my research activities, over the course of the past 2 1/2 years. In addition, he has proven to be more than merely one of the professors with whom I happen to have come in contact during the course of my graduate studies. Needless to say, he has given me a great deal to reflect about, in the broad area of values in education; so much so that it would literally take a life time to digest it all. He has nurtured me from the "embryonic" stage with respect to some crucial issues in the field of Higher Education. And given me the opportunity to broaden my scope of thinking to include a wide range of educational alternatives. I acclaim him as truly an educator, a scholar, a

man of vision, understanding and compassion--and, lastly, as my FRIEND.

To my brother, Dr. Thomas A. Gordon, special thanks is also due. For he has on so many occasions given me sound advice about matters pertaining directly to the writing of this dissertation. Moreover, he has helped me to "better focus in" on some of the practical problems associated with any attempt to develop a consistent and comprehensive theory regarding values development, in the field of higher education. Lastly, I feel that he possesses that special combination of rare qualities that will, to be sure, one day mark him as truly an outstanding educator.

Naturally, to my wife, Gloria Beryl Gordon, who has been my companion, my love, and my life for the past 12 1/2 years, I am also deeply grateful. For she has stood by me on so many occasions in the midst of extremely rough and unsettled times. Still further, I have welcomed her "illuminating" comments about this dissertation from the time that it was merely an idea in my mind, then on to the "drawing board" and, lastly, in the final stages of preparation of the manuscript. Being a teacher and an educator herself and, I might add, well-qualified in her own right, she has brought a combination of humor and comfort by-way-of a positive

attitude about my research efforts, during this most difficult period of my life.

Thus, I feel that the following words most aptly sum up my feelings about this truly remarkable woman, viz.:

Grow strong, my comrade . . . that you may stand unshaken when I fall; that I may know the shattered fragments of my song will come at last to finer melody in you; that I may tell my heart that you begin where passing I leave off, and fathom more.*

^{*}From the opening lines of Will Durant's "The Story of Philosophy," page iv.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply indebted to my parents, the Reverend (Dr.) Maxie S. Gordon, Sr. and Dr. Ethel M. Gordon, for the foundation they laid so many years ago. Above all they planted not only the moral seeds for my spiritual development but of at least equal importance they instilled in me a desire to achieve a higher education.

Against the background of a deep Southern up-bringing--and a way of life that was filled with racial bigotry, hatred and injustice for Black men, especially--they always countered any negative experiences that I had with a positive philosophy. Thus, there are no words that could fully express my gratitude, respect and LOVE for them.

Thank-you very much Mom and Dad for seeing me through (spiritually and at times financially) the successful completion of the doctoral degree.

To Dr. William J. Callaghan I owe a great deal of thanks for nurturing my academic and personal development over the course of the past 16 years. In a very real sense I have grown into "academic manhood" under his tutelage, and as a result of testing my ideas and various theories with him. (Obviously, I have grown

immensely from these transactions.) Additionally, he deserves special credit in far too many ways to mention here as it would literally take a dissertation to point out all of the unique qualities that he possesses.

Suffice it to say that he and his wife, Mary, will always be treasured friends. And I acclaim them both as distinguished from the "herd."

To Dr. Gwendolyn Norrell I am especially grateful for all of the support and encouragement (and, yes, even the "prodding") that she has given to me, since as far back as 1964. To be sure, her interest in and support of my total welfare has been far more than that shown me by most human beings. She is extremely warm, sensitive and cordial and with the power of her convictions. She has been an educator, a counselor, a professional colleague and an inspiration to me and to other students with whom she has come in contact. Always a champion of "social justice" and human rights for all peoples, I feel that my life has truly been enriched as a result of knowing and having worked with her.

To Dr. Louis C. Stamatakos I would also like to express my gratitude and appreciation for the assistance he rendered me, both in terms of the preparation of the dissertation and the advancement of my thinking on values education. In a word, this special recognition is due him because he has worked so closely with me during the

course of my graduate career--and, still further, his consultations, moral support and friendship have been unwaivering sources of support. Lastly, he has displayed a marvelous sense of humor, irrespective of circumstance; and is without equal in matters pertaining to the critique of students' term papers and reports, et. al.

It is doubtful if the present study could have been completed if it were not for the generous and continued support that I received by-way-of a Fellowship from The National Fellowships Fund (The Ford Foundation). This award permitted me continued usage of funds for research purposes; a special dissertation grant; a stipend for "basic" living expenses for my family; as well as a budget for those consumable supplies and items that were required to see the dissertation through to fruition. A special word of gratitude in this regard is due to Dr. Samuel M. Nabrit, Executive Director of the Fund, and to his administrative associate, Miss Lottie B. Goodwin.

The final acknowledgment must, of necessity, go to a number of "key" people who have performed vital typing and editing assistance, especially in regard to the final preparation of the dissertation manuscript.

Thus to Cara Vaughn, Jo Grandstaff, Jan High, and Ann Byrne of Ann Brown Printing and Typing, I say thank-you again for the quality of your work. Whenever I look

in this dissertation, I'll always remember the hard work that you too put into it, and the degree of interest you had in seeing that it was done properly and on time.

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The present crisis in American education is very largely the result of attempting to provide students with a sound education without requiring of them the necessary self-discipline and hard work. Students have been led to believe they can achieve without effort, that all they need do in order to obtain a good education is skip blithely down the royal road to learning. The catch, however, is that what appears to be a royal road to learning is no more than a detour to the dead end of ignorance.

Steven M. Cahn
"The Myth of the Royal Road"
The Andover Review

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For the past two years or so, the writer has become increasingly aware of the vast domain associated with values in education. In addition to the above, the reader should bear in mind, too, the fact that there are few subjects in all of philosophy and education (and, indeed, in the society at large) that are more complex and controversial than that of values.

This controversy and complexity is extremely important for especially the educator as not only must he/she deal with the notion of values within the context of the university community in which educators live and operate but, of even greater significance, they (i.e. the "breed" of teachers and educators) generally determine what specific values will be passed on to future generations; via which media they will be transmitted.

Thus, in this dissertation in general and in Chapter I in particular, the author wishes to stress the point that one cannot separate his/her education from the values climate of their society. In this regard the process of educating is ALWAYS dependent on who "knows"

what about nature to "pass on" to whom, in what form when and where! The focus of this dissertation though chiefly concerned with the role that values should play in modern American universities—which are for the most part located within "mass society"— does, nevertheless, make an attempt to draw upon several of the Platonic dialogues for the purpose of showing that serious social thinkers have been deeply concerned with the problem of values for thousands of years.

The Classical Perspective

Human values are difficult to define, and even more difficult to agree upon. For example, in the fifth century BC in Athens, Greece, the problem of the universal nature of values and whether they could be taught was vigorously debated by Socrates and his opponents, the Sophists. The discouraging conclusion of one of the most brilliant Sophists, Gorgias, was that no absolute values exist; that if they did exist, they would be impossible to understand with the inadequate tools of human reason; and if by some miracle, these values were comprehended, they could not be communicated. Socrates obviously thought otherwise. He believed that a universal system of human values existed, spanning cultural, geographic, and temporal distances; and that it was the duty of each person to come to an understanding of these values.

For Socrates, all evil was the result of ignorance; with knowledge of the True came the desire and ability to do the Good. To be sure, in his commitment to his calling as a teacher Socrates lived out his belief that human values could and must be communicated.

Rhetoric, the "technique or art of persuasion," as defined by Gorgias, was adhered to, primarily by the Sophists, and their influence was felt all over ancient Greece. But, always constantly challenging and quizzing them, to the delight of especially the young men of Athens, was Socrates, who sought to examine and know the truth.

Many historians have attempted to compare

Socrates and the Sophists, as both were interested in man and in human problems, but, there was a vast difference between them. The difference lay within their methods and in their ideals. The Sophists were professional teachers who boasted of their knowledge and their own success. They were given to long discussions on the problems of life, exercising particular care for the rhetoric exercised in such harangues.

Socrates, on the other hand, professed ignorance and a willingness to be taught, for his heart was set on

lected Dialogues of Plato, (New York: Random House, Inc), p. 236.

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seeking the truth. His own discussions were simple in appearance but in context and purpose extremely subtle. His goal was not his own glory but the improvement of the souls of men, for this he considered the command or mission given him by the gods. Thus, in his approach to a problem, he came to develop his own "method of conversation," a dialectic aimed at the true good of his opponent. We may conclude, therefore, that in place of the Sophists sham² display of learning he (Socrates) sought true knowledge, and to their constant chattering he opposed thought provoking discussion. The Sophists, however, made knowledge a public thing, with intellectual frivolity as a result. Socrates in reaction withdrew into the world of thought and reflection to recover his own intellectual stability; and when he then emerged into public life, it was to bring man to his form of wisdom.

In the <u>Protagoras</u>, a young man by the name of Hippocrates, eagerly awakens Socrates before daybreak, in order that he might take leave of him to learn from the leading Sophist of their day. When questioned by Socrates as to his concern with the aged Protagoras, the young man laughingly replied to Socrates that "he

²E. W. F. Tomlin, The Great Philosophers of the Western World, (New York: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1952), p. 77.

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[Socrates] was keeping his wisdom to himself instead of sharing it with him [Hippocrates]." Never weary of investigation, Socrates immediately began to examine and question the young man, attempting to find out if it were his intention to go to Protogoras and pay him a fee; for he supposed Hippocrates to have no knowledge of what he is contemplating doing. And, in fact, Socrates did use the Sophist technique while actually waging a real battle against their teachings. Thus Socrates undertakes to make Hippocrates think about what he is doing, as he shouldn't lightly place himself into the hands of someone whom he does not know to teach him he knows not what!

This incident introduces a most important concept involved in Socrates life of <u>strenuous examination</u>—that of the concept of the soul, and its relationship to man. The soul, for Plato and for Socrates is the intellectual and moral personality, the most important part of man. ⁵

Hamilton and Cairns, p. 308. Furthermore, the dialogue displays "a picture of Greek life or interest the Athenians took in the purely intellectual."

Ignatius Brady, A History of Ancient Philosophy, (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1959), p. 76. The above notion of receiving fees for their teaching was quite germane to the Sophist, though not to Socrates. Concerning this difference, Brady states: "Externally, perhaps Socrates was so like the Sophists, except for the fact that he took no fees, that a superficial observer like Aristophanes was led to number him among them."

⁵A. H. Armstrong, <u>Introduction to Ancient Philosophy</u>, (Boston: Beacon, 1963), p. 40.

Its significance is readily seen as Socrates points out to Hippocrates the danger to which he was about to expose his soul, as he foolishly is about to put his (and possibly his friend's) money, and his whole welfare into the hands of a man about whom he knows nothing.

And thus from this "brief" encounter we might conclude that Plato intended for us to see two positive or favorable results:

- A young man, in a wild and excited frenzy, who might have been about to harm something of the highest value (namely his soul) was saved (as a result of Socrates' method) from this near disaster; and,
- 2. Socrates succeeded in getting Hippocrates to see, as a result of examination, that the course of action he previously intended to take was, by far not the the best course at all.

For Socrates the unexamined life was not worth living, and thus he confronted his fellow citizens day by day attempting to get them to utilize "his method," and thereby seeking knowledge which for him is based on propositions that have been examined.

The Sophists then were seen as traveling professors, who were concerned with the art of success in public life. They spoke eloquently, and used the art of persuasion for both sides of any case. In the dialogue concerning Protagoras we see that he is more concerned about his appearance, than anything else, for he must maintain fame in the public's eye. And, as he

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is termed a professional and thus paid quite highly, he must not falter in his performance. Genuine knowledge was not the chief concern of the Sophists, as they were concerned rather with performance, and eloquence, and thus they sought to popularize knowledge.

In conclusion, then, before long this brought with it the subordination of purely theoretical learning to its practical usefulness, and the <u>Sophists</u>, far from teaching what is most likely true, instructed the youth in what is most likely to bear political fruit. Thus, eloquent public appeal and the art of rhetoric soon took the place of pure science and philosophy. "In this very desire," states Runes:

However, to persuade and refute, the problem presents itself as to whether among the various conflicting opinions which the Sophists had taught their pupils to defend and to oppose, there was anything of permanent value which could claim the assent of all men everywhere.

This quest of the <u>universal in knowledge</u> and conduct forms the basis of the Socratic Ouest.

We remember the results; unfortunately, Socrates was condemned to death for impiety and for "corrupting the morals of the young men of Athens" with his disquieting teaching. Furthermore, we may feel a bit too

Dagobert D. Runes, <u>Dictionary of Philosophy</u>, (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., New York) p. 295.

⁷ Ibid., p. 295.

complacently that we (that is to say, "History") vindicated Socrates, and so absolve ourselves of the guilt of his death. After all, "everybody" knows his name but only a few "dusty" old philosophers have ever heard of Gorgias, Protogoras, and the Sophists. This is an unfortunate assumption: to equate the name with the thing it represents. Because, quite obviously our educational system today is the natural heir, not of Socrates, but of Gorgias. We do not believe in a universal system of human values, equally binding on all people; nor do we recognize our mandate to communicate these values to our offsprings as the most precious and useful legacy our society has to offer.

Socrates' mind was exceptionally clear, critical and eager. It tolerated no pretense; and since his will was as strong as his convictions, his conduct was as logical as his thinking. For in a skeptical age--one in which Socrates encounters much opposition from the Sophists or wandering teachers--he believed firmly in moral goodness as the one thing that matters; and he identified it with knowledge, because to his straight-forward nature it seemed inconceivable that anyone should see what is right without doing it. In a word, then, his genuis and his contribution lay in his concern for humanity, and a commitment to a way of life that so clearly indicates his attempt to be a good or a wise or

a just man. As stated earlier, the author is primarily concerned in this dissertation with the role that values should play within higher educational settings, in modern (mass) American society. However, as was seen from the foregoing analysis, the <u>raging debate</u> or discourse about values did not begin with American colleges and universities; on the contrary, this controversy dates back to classical antiquity, 8 flourished throughout the middle or dark ages, and still continues today.

Perhaps now it would be appropriate to take a "brief" look at the historical development of some of the early American educational institutions, for the purpose of attempting to answer (in Chapter III) the poignant question: "How then has it happened that values teaching has been neglected in American education?"

American Universities Since the Colonial Period

The first institutions of higher education in America were founded for the purpose of training the clergy. Harvard was founded in 1636 explicitly for this purpose; the same was true of William and Mary, founded in Virginia in 1693; and of Yale, founded in 1701. The

⁸Obviously, the attempt at integrating values, say, into the Academy for the Master was quite different from the attempts to do so in the "wider" social context of the American society.

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case of Yale, however, was somewhat exceptional, as its stated purpose was the training of both clerical and civil servants. In addition, these institutions were both conservative and isolated and compared unfavorably with the universities of the "old world," the latter being chiefly exponents of classical, liberal and humanist teachings.

In the eighteenth century, several philosophical controversies were waged over the nature of higher education in this country. One such problem, for example, was the issue of secularization of the universities. To be sure, in New Jersey, the colonists rejected the New England conservatism that the first universities reflected. The New Jersey colonists felt that a liberal, secular system of higher education was more suited to the colony they were developing. And so in 1746 Princeton was established by the colonial government. Moreover, although New Jersey Presbyterians were behind the project, the institution was secular in spirit.

Following the Revolution, the Americans were divided on the States' Rights vs. Federal government issue in the field of education, as well as in other "Key" policy areas. On the one hand, George Washington and Benjamin Rush (among others) argued for a national

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university to serve the needs of the new Republic.

Other statesmen, however, championed the concept of regional centers of higher education—and it was the ideas of the latter that were eventually adopted.

In any event, the trend toward secularization was firmly established by this time. It continued with the establishment of Union School (1759) and Franklin College (1787), both in Pennsylvania, where both German and English cultures were to be taught.

Some other secular institutions which were initiated roughly about this time were King's College in New York (1754), which would later be called Columbia, and the College and Academy of Philadelphia (1754), later called the University of Pennsylvania. Benjamin Franklin was an active force behind the establishment and guidance of the latter institution. To some extent he imprinted upon it his own interest in the study of science and society more so than in the more traditional disciplines of religion and the classics.

In the pre-revolutionary war years the pattern of state-supported secular universities along with private often denominational institutions became established. The first state universities were those of North Carolina (1795) and Georgia (1801). Moreoever, Other states and territories founded their own state Universities. Every state now has one or more state

supported or state assisted universities. The secularization process too has affected many smaller colleges which were originally founded as denominational institutions. Tufts University (1852) is an example. And although some of these such schools did, in fact, choose to retain schools of theology, basically they are secular, liberal institutions. Even the Catholic universities have acceded to this trend. Lastly, in this regard, the major Catholic universities were founded in the precivil war period—with Notre Dame (1844) being one of fourteen Catholic universities founded during this time.

During the mid-nineteenth century, the universities began to be regarded more and more as meeting the material needs of the emerging industrializing nation.

Medical and law schools were established, and other, more practical arts were incorporated into the curriculums of the existing colleges. The major step in this area, however, came with the passage of the Morrill or Land-Grant Act of 1862 which laid the foundation for the land grant colleges and university system designed to promote agricultural and mechanical studies.

Most of the large Midwestern universities began in this way and contributed to the economic development Of predominantly "western" lands as they were opened up. Eventually, most of these land grand universities developed into complex institutions offering a wide

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range of programs including liberal arts courses and degrees. And although these universities are financially dependent upon their respective state governments, whereas private colleges are not, nonetheless, in the opinion of the writer, it is the large state universities that, in this century, have been the more liberal and radical educational centers in this country. To be sure, perhaps these institutions did (or do) provide the independent decentralism which the early leaders of the "Republic" sought in opposing a national university system such as, for example, that adopted by France. In any event, education in the Western states and territories became more public—if one may say so—than it was in the East.

Another trend, and the one that as we shall see in Chapter III of this dissertation has had a profound effect on my thinking about how values have shaped our present educational institutions, was the belated recognition of the necessity for the education of women and Blacks (and, later, other minority groups as well) on a level comparable to that provided for white males. The first separate-but-equal women's colleges were Vassar (1861), Smith (1875), and Wellesley (1875). Later, "affiliated" colleges such as Radcliffe (Harvard) and Barnard (Columbia) were founded. The first coeducational

college, and the first college to admit Blacks, was Oberlin (1833) in Ohio. In addition to the above the first all Black, or at that time all Negro college, was the Ashman Institute (1854), sanctioned by the state of Pennsylvania and was later called Lincoln University. FiskUniversity was founded in 1866 at Nashville; Howard was founded in Washington in 1867 and named for General Oliver O. Howard, the "Christian general", and lastly, Tuskegee was established in Alabama in 1881. These schools were developed, obviously, as a consequence of Reconstruction politics. And it is questionable, that

For many slaves in the South, freedom came at different times and in different ways. In a word, actual freedom for many and perhaps most, did not come until the war had ended; constitutionally, it became a reality only with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in December, 1865. But the commitment of the nation to the principle of freedom for all had been made in 1863 when President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, declaring the essential inconsistency of slavery with the American democratic creed. Proclamation thus had answered one question, namely, that of the future of human bondage in America; but it too left unanswered another that was no less critical, that of the future place of the former bondsmen in a so-called free society. For a further discussion of this point the reader should see: B. A. Botkin, Lay My Burden Down: Folk History of Slavery (Chicago: 1945), p. 267. Also see, Martin B. Duberman, In White America (New York: The American Library, 1965), p. 56.

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is, open to debate, whether much more than a "little" progress has been made, to date, in this area.

To continue, in 1876 graduate education began in earnest at John Hopkins. Furthermore, a cursory review of our history points out the fact that this seems to have been a response moreso to the mediocrity of American high school and college education than for a desire for superiority in advanced studies. For prior to 1890, most wealthy students were sent to Europe for college. Additionally, American colleges also suffered from a failure to attract European scholars. Thus, America's isolationism in this period was cultural as well as political.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century there emerged a trend away from fixed curriculums in favor of a move toward elective programs. This change also followed from the prevailing political philosophy in basically three ways:

- 1. It was assumed that college students were entitled to decide the course of their own education(s);
- It was thought that political and economic freedom implied the doctrine of freedom in education; and, lastly,
- 3. It was felt that the more traditional schools were out of step with the scientific and social advances of the period.

The Modern Perspective

Turning to the modern perspective, perhaps the most glaring fact of the twentieth century is the destruction of values that has occurred in our time. For the loneliness, emptiness, and anxiety indicate that we can no longer ride on the goals of the past; for obviously these goals have <u>not</u> resolved the particular dilemmas which nearly everyone of us faces today. In a word, then, one can hardly ignore what happens when a society loses its center of values.

Putting the point still further, in the judgment of the author, the most serious general problem facing not only us as a nation today but facing the entire world also seems to be the problem of values. It can be assumed naturally that there are literally hundreds of other related problems that every human being must face-but, in the final analysis, most of us are struggling with the deterioration of morality in the highest sense.

The waves of massacres, devastations, and tyranny in the middle twentieth century point out a crucial lesson to us all, namely: that far, far too many were willing to stand by silently and watch Hitler so audaciously flout the humanistic and Hebrew-Christian values of this period.

In addition, it was the brillant and insightful Philosopher Frederick Nietzche who pointed out to us in

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the 20th century the fact that <u>science</u> in the late nineteenth century was becoming a <u>factory</u> and he feared that man's great advances in science and techniques without a parallel advance in ethics and self-understanding would lead to nihilism.

In other words, Nihilism is the philosophy which points out the story of the tragedy that comes to men and nations when <u>survival</u> conditions are no longer present. Thus, nihilism as a social doctrine warns us that "progress" is possible only through the destruction of all economic, moral, social, political and religious institutions and organizations in the society. According to Nietzche, unless our society does have a <u>radical</u> advance in ethics and morality to match its progress in technology, then we are all doomed to the eventual total destruction of this world.

It must be apparent also to at least the enlightened people in this nation that none of us, from the
oldest to the youngest American, can escape the consequences of the continuing social, political, economic,
moral and religious decay of the major cities in this
nation. Still further, we live increasingly in a
multi-cultural and multi-racial world. And, because of
the rapid mobility and technological conditions of this
nation, coupled with continental or global impact of
the media, people of different value systems are living

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not only next to each other but are to a great extent influenced by each other's values and value systems, even though literally living thousands of miles apart. What happened in Viet Nam is a case in point of this.

Thus, the author is convinced now that one of the problems we need to study in higher education is the role that values should play in educational settings.

In one way or another, values "crop-up" in every phase of education, in decisions as to who gets to teach, and to what is taught: when, where and via which media it is taught. In a very real sense then values are not only inextricably linked to every facet of the educational process, but no such facet is ever value neutral.

In other words, universities do not exist in a vacuum. For example, it is the opinion of the author that values imply "evaluation" processes at work. That is to say, in this society the person or the social unit has placed a greater "weight" on some object or event—and has maintained that, more or less, it ought to be considered "good," or "right," etc. A case in Point of this is the recent controversy over whether or not Black History and Black Studies should be taught in the schools. Thus, values are always positive or negative, depending on where you stand in the culture and, to be sure, what one has to either gain or lose. A value is never neutral.

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In addition to the above, and for quite some time now, the author has argued that the philosophical curriculum slant or point of view, if instituted on a mass scale at such an institution as Michigan State University, will lead to more ethical or value conscious people. At the very least, it is the opinion of the author, that such efforts would sharpen one's powers of critical thinking--although it is evident that MSU encounters a number of forces which stand in the way of the recognition and realization of certain important values. If it were possible to reduce or eliminate some of these negative forces, we could expect much more positive outcomes from those persons who are ultimately responsible for determining what subject matter will or will not be studied; and the form that it will be transmitted to future generations.

In the final analysis, it is the author's belief that values education is, on the one hand, a source of great hope and inspiration for our society at large; On the other hand, cluttered with its own internal inconsistencies. But the question of values (and the ultimate dignity and freedom of man) confronts us as educators today more critically than ever before. Our scientific and technological achievement, our engagement in the pursuit of peace, the serious possibilities inherent in a thermonuclear war, the mass of problems

related to the population explosion, the age-old problem of class versus class, nation versus nation, race versus race will continue to vex and haunt us unless we as educators focus serious attention upon those kinds of problems that involve value dimensions and the future of people in the 20th century.

Frederick Nietzsche once remarked, prophetically, that men are no longer creative and critical. They cling to dogma, absolutes and mistakes, namely, mistaken standards and thus they fail to realize that "everything absolute belongs to pathology. According to him, men exalt everything but the right thing, from reason and logic to pessimism and pity.

In sum, mankind in the twentieth century is weak, dishonest, and decadent, and hypocritcal, His only hope for regeneration is a new perspective on life. Still further, we need to know, according to Nietzsche, WHY we believe in the values we do, and HOW we came to adopt them. In other words, we need to understand the true genealogy of morals.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

It has been said that philosophical movements often reflect particular places and periods of time. Perhaps this is best seen in contemporary philosophy, for if one were to ask what sort of questions philosophers today are trying to answer, a brief reply might be that they are mainly concerned with the terms in which we express what we experience. This, however, should not be taken to imply that modern philosophy is necessarily subjective. While some maintain that what we experience only exists in the mind, others would deny it, although they might still be content to call what they analyze "experience." Perhaps for these philosophers, then, the problem is merely to state and then argue about what is meant by such terms as "experience," "meaning," "understanding," and "values," etc.

The writer takes the position that the use of the term values throughout this dissertation is intended to communicate the general overall interest in the broad field of values, with particular emphasis on moral values. It is the opinion of many that moral values are considered as the primary values and serve, in many ways, as exemplars of other types of values. In a word, values constitute the primary and inclusive category; moral

But in this dissertation, in general, and for the purposes of this chapter, in particular, the author wishes to take a "fresh" approach to such perennial problems as those treated via the aforementioned concepts, an approach that is strikingly different from the present trend(s) in modern philosophy, namely: to do merely conceptual or linguistic analyses about values. To this end, I shall discuss the views of three of the most influential of the "social philosophers" known to the Western world, i.e. Socrates via the writings of Plato; Frederick Nietzsche; and John Dewey. Each of these thinkers, in turn, showed the need for emphasizing so much more than a mere conceptual, linguistic, or

values are considered a sub-category of values—and they are considered by this writer to be the most important sub-category. Obviously, there are other categories, as well, namely: esthetic values, religious values and political values, etc.

The reader should understand (for the sake of clarity) that I am only assuming that the positions I attribute to Socrates are actually Socrates'. It may well be the case that Plato changed his (Socrates') view(s) in later writings; or, I might have mistakenly attributed Plato's thoughts to Socrates. Nevertheless, what is of philosophical importance is not who was the propounder of such arguments, but the arguments themselves and the historical problems to which they gave rise.

intellectual analysis of values; on the contrary, they argued for a <u>new</u> emphasis (or, perhaps I should say, a <u>revival</u> of an old emphasis) on the notion of commitment or concrete involvement in social situations in the hope that the majority of persons will consciously attend to the implications of their actions for themselves and for others, that is, always with a view towards humanity. To be sure, the author wishes to maintain that linguistic analysis <u>does</u> have its "proper" place in modern philosophy, but, in the final analysis, <u>one also must be</u> <u>committed</u> to a way of life that indicates an attempt to <u>be</u> a good or a wise or a just man.

Plato

It has been said often that the best introduction to philosophy is through Plato, and many serious students of philosophy feel that the best introduction to Plato is through his earlier dialogues of which the Crito (in which Socrates, in prison awaiting execution, considers whether he should escape as his friends and pupils urge) and the Apology (Socrates' speech defending himself at the trial) are excellent examples. Furthermore, for the sake of clarity, many scholars maintain that Socrates wrote nothing himself, but talked at length to the young men of Athens, including Plato, who listened to him in the streets and gathering places of Athens.

The "fine" line between Socrates and Plato is hard or difficult if not impossible to draw. Moreover, for the purposes of this dissertation, the question of what was original with Plato and what belongs to Socrates is of little importance. Suffice it to say that it is the opinion of this author that Socrates via the writings of Plato was perhaps the greatest of all philosophers and indisputably the founder of Western philosophical tradition.

Almost 2500 years ago the noble Socrates was put on trial for his very life because he supposedly "corrupted the morals of the Athenian youths." But it is clear from the account of his trial as it appears in Plato's Apology that Socrates could have avoided the death penalty. That is to say, had Socrates agreed to abandon the practices for which he had been summoned before the court, the jury almost certainly would have voted an acquittal.

Yet this he refused to do, preferring to drink the hemlock rather than to alter his way of life. This invaluable lesson that Socrates taught so long ago cannot be minimized; for he maintained that the examination of life (to which-he-Socrates had devoted most of his own life and for which he was willing to die) is of more value than life itself.

In my mind, this classical genius had set an ethical or normative standard not only for his fellow Greek philosophers, but, to be sure, for us today as well. For his statement before the court that "the unexamined life is not worth living" must come to us as a challenge that somehow has to be met.

Socrates was concerned with the <u>conduct</u> of men, or the type of behavior in which the person involved makes a voluntary choice between alternatives as a result of having decided that he ought to choose one of the alternatives in preference to the other, i.e. behavior resulting from a moral choice. In other words, and in the opinion of the writer, Socrates had laid the basis for a major system of thought in which men today might well afford to heed.

According to the Master, philosophy or the interpretation of philosophy then is not merely an intellectual affair; on the contrary, the philosopher must be imbued with a desire to be involved in/with concrete "social" situations and matters pertaining to human character and conduct.

Who are to be the rulers and who their subjects?

The best rulers will be those who most have the character of Philosopher guardians. To this end they ought to be wise and efficient. There must be a selection.

In the Ideal State (in which Platonism as a political philosophy finds its best known exposition) Plato shows that this selection is to be based on education. Only those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against its interest, will be selected. They will have to be watched at every age, from youth upwards, in order to see whether they preserve their resolution, and never under the influence either of force or enchantment forget, or cast off, their sense of duty. They must be made to perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, since only he who remembers and is not affected by pleasures, pains, or terrors is selected. Such a man, because of his nature and training, shall be honored in life and death, with the greatest memorials of honor that his society can give him. But he who fails must be rejected.

The training of the philosopher rulers requires the selection of the most promising children in their

³Plato compares such a man with a piece of gold that has been tested in the refiner's furnace. Such a man is <u>more</u> thoroughly proved, and he will always bear himself nobly, for he has a rhythmical and harmonious nature.

infancy, and a rigorous disciplining of them in gymnastics (in order to harden their bodies) and music, poetry and art (in the Greek sense of literary studies). The true functions of the two arts of music and gymnastics both improve the soul and each is of value in its work only when employed in the proper proportion and harmony. It is not the case that one is for the training of the soul and the other is for the body; on the contrary, these arts must be incorporated into the soul in several phases, resulting in either the harmonious soul, which is both temperate and courageous, or the inharmonious soul, which is cowardly. According to the Master, excess in the former leads to effeminacy, and excess in the latter to harshness.

In the first stage of this process sweet and soft music pours into a man's soul, and in this way the passion or spirited element is tempered. Such a man is compared to a piece of iron, as they are both useful when tempered, instead of brittle and useless. However, if he carried on this softening and soothing process in the second stage he begins to melt, and may waste away his spirit until he has cut out the sinews of his soul and becomes a feeble warrior.

Dagobert D. Runes, "Dictionary of Philosophy," (New Jersey: Littlefield: Adams & Company, 1962), p. 238.

In gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercises and is a great eater-being the reverse of a proficient student in music and philosophy--at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, as he becomes twice the man he really was. Then, if he does nothing else, that intelligence grows feeble, and he becomes dull and blind through a lack of any sort of inquiry or culture. His mind never wakes up or receives nourishment, and he finally becomes a hater of philosophy, and uncivilized, he never uses the weapon of persuasion. Plato compares him to a wild beast as he lives violently, ferociously, and in ignornance as he knows no other way.

Thus there are two principles of human nature—one philosophical and the other spirited which corresponds to music and gymnastic. He who mingles them in the fairest proportions, best tempering them to his soul, may rightfully be called the true musician and harmonist. Such a genius as this is required if the society is to last.

After the incorporation of these arts into their lives, the young adults begin to study science and mathematics, those failing to prove themselves competent by the age of twenty being weeded-out, while only the best or the most competent remain to continue their education. This they will do until the age of thirty,

and then begin the study of dialectics (the study of ideas) 5 which was to last for approximately five years.

Each man was required to spend fifteen years of practical apprenticeship in the subordinate offices of the state, and he would therefore enter the army or the civil service at approximately the age of thirty-five. Here he remained until the age of fifty (the last stage of separation) and then returned to study philosophy. Those who spend their lives studying philosophy beyond the age of fifty are the guardians, and are to be the actual rulers of the state. They are to rule or give commands because by nature and by training they are the best men for the job; and, they are to rule through the use of reason.

The <u>rulers</u> must of necessity have subjects, and these subjects are divided into two classes. Just below the ruling class are the warriors, their primary function being to aid the ruling class by insuring that all orders passed down to them are properly obeyed.

The <u>warriors</u> are to watch over the general good or welfare of the state, and their education is to be careful, so they they might never lose courage in battle, become traitors, or fail in any of their responsibilities.

⁵Runes, p. 238.

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There must, however, always be people over them, and to whom they are to be responsible, and these are the rulers.

Finally, there are the craftsmen or producers, who are the <u>industrialists</u>, and they are to provide the economic income for the state. <u>Each man has a special function and is educated to fit a particular custom</u>. They must, of necessity, never lie, as they aren't really able to understand the laws or customs, etc. Thus, for them to achieve happiness they must not deviate from their function.

The Ideal State is divided into three classes, and each is based on a strict and absolute division of labor. The efficiency of production hinges on each person's doing that at which he is expert, and nothing else. Plato feels that a man who devotes himself solely to one occupation will do the best job. Therefore, the rulers are to be exclusively rulers, and nothing else. For to deviate in any manner would upset the harmony of the state. The producers and the guardians must always remain temperate, and never become disobedient. Thus they will take the laws and institutions of the state like a dye, and never lose them. And in order to insure that Certain means are adopted to certain ends, there must be an elite class among the guardians, who will be responsible for the overall welfare of the state. are to be the philosopher-kings.

excelling particularly in their rational abilities or their special virtues in philosophical wisdom. The soldiers, or guardians of the state, must be remarkable for the development of the spirited, warlike element, under the control of the virtue of courage. And finally, the lower class will be made up of the workers of every sort, whose characteristic virtue is temperance. Justice or harmony consist in each of these classes not meddling in the affairs of the others, but, in doing their own job and doing it rightly.

Women are to have the same duties as men, thus, they must have the same nurture and education. They will be taught music, gymnastics and the art of war, which they must practice like the men. 6

At this point one might raise several objections to this contention, for Socrates (Plato) says that "at the foundation of the state everyone was to do the work best suited to his own nature." We might then ask "do not the nature of men and women differ, and, if so, should not the task assigned them differ also?" If so, it seems that Socrates has fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that "men and women whose natures are different ought to perform the same actions." Socrates attempts to resolve this inconsistency by considering the notions of sameness or difference. He holds that if this difference consists only in the fact that women bear and men beget children, then, we must maintain that this doesn't amount to a proof that woman differs essentially from man in respect to the sort of education she should receive. Therefore, we shall continue to hold that men and women ought to hold the same pursuits.

In reference to the pursuits or arts of civic life, there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex. For Plato, the gifts of nature are diffused alike in them, so the pursuits of men might be the pursuits of women, except that woman is weaker than man. Therefore, men and women alike possess the qualities which make good guardians of the state.

The state has wisdom, and this is found in the ruler, as he takes counsel for the good of the state.

The state exists solely that its citizens may become good, so its goal is "the happiness and well-being of the citizens." This is achieved through the institutions of education, as through them they are made wise. Therefore, for Plato, the wise should be the absolute rulers of this utopia, and thus it shall be ruled by an aristocracy of the intellect, or the few wise and best men, over the many.

Finally, we might briefly summarize our discussion of the function of education in the utopia by saying that Plato intended for the best education to be taught to the best children, as this phase of education is intended to create an intellectual elite; the military class, on the other hand, was to undergo a shorter period of training suited to its functions, and the masses of

people engaged in production, trading, and like pursuits, were not offered any special educational schedule.

For the two upper classes Plato suggested a form of community life which would entail the abolition of monogamous marriage, family life, and of private property. Thus, children of these classes are born to the state, and those born either out of marriage sanctioned by the state, or physically defective, would be immediately put to death. Presumably, the remainder were okay. Private property too was abolished, and one was allowed to have only the barest of necessities. Also, all things which are considered to be immoral are censored. The lower class families, on the other hand, differ from their counterparts in that they presumably have normal marriages and normal family lives.

In the end, Plato feels that there might be a reform of their state if only one change was made, but this change, though possible, was not to be easy. And so for him, until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy—until political greatness and wisdom meet in one ruler—cities will never have rest from their evils, nor the human race.

One further point about Socrates needs mentioning, as it will throw more light on the subject-matter under

consideration, viz., that this "behavior resulting from a moral choice" reflected <u>Socrates' belief that goodness</u> is a matter of knowledge. Specifically, he wished to reduce all excellence to some kind of knowledge and was profoundly convinced that no man does wrong on purpose, i.e. no man sins on purpose.

Perhaps the simplest expression of the close relation between knowledge and goodness is found in the Lysis, where the youth of that name has had to admit that though his parents love him, they forbid him many things and is led to the conclusion that they trust him to act alone only where he possesses the necessary knowledge, and this is then shown to be the case with every one. As Socrates says:

Every one - whether man or woman, Greek or foreigner-will entrust us with the things of which we have acquired knowledge. In such matters we shall do what we please and no one will want to hinder us; we shall ourselves be free and rule over others. It is our province, and there we act with benefit. Where we do not possess understanding, no one will allow us to do what we want, every one will hinder us as much as possible, not only strangers but our father and mother, or anything nearer to us still. We must then obey orders. Such things are not our province, we can derive no benefit from them. (210b)

And so, as we prepare to take our leave of Socrates, we cannot help but be impressed with the message that he has left for us, both young and old alike, of the twentieth century. He has told us that

we are <u>free</u> to question the very nature of our existence; and <u>responsible</u> beings only to the extent that we seek to fulfill this task.

childhood and youth, have accepted with very little question the moral precepts and practices learned in the home, school, and church (and perhaps this is as it should be). But what happens when a previously accepted "moral truth" becomes challenged, or comes in serious conflict with other existing values—as is evident in the racial and educational crises in America. Again, Socrates has supplied us with an answer, for he tells us that we can choose to subject these values to rigorous tests and "undergoings"—with a view toward determining whether these values are rational, i.e. provide a rational justification for morality.

This conviction—that the pursuit of truth is worth the risk of one's life—is one of Socrates' major contributions to the Western tradition. He believed that philosophy must be <u>lived</u>, not merely thought about or verbally accepted; for its value lies in its contribution to the goodness of a man's life. His own life is our best exemplification of this view. (<u>Plato's Meno</u>, Sesonske and Fleming, p. 2).

To digress from the central theme for a moment, the reader might note that the history of philosophy

provides us roughly with two main answers to the question of how we obtain knowledge, that is, what we know of the "outside" world. The first is that knowledge is in fact obtained in and through sense experience, and is called the theory of empiricism. The second answer, that it is obtained by our reason alone, has usually been given by philosophers known as rationalists. They have argued that the mind is provided initially with a number of ready-made principles or faculties, and that in order to obtain knowledge it only needs to reason in accordance with these principles and to use these faculties. Specifically, just as a mathematician sitting in his study could, provided he reasoned well enough, deduce the whole

There was also a widely accepted third approach to knowledge, namely intuition. This is the theory that certain ideas are so clear and so simple that when we encounter them we know directly and immediately without needing any proof whatsoever that they are indeed true. Thus the process or method of intuition may be defined as the process of knowing or apprehending self-evident truths, in the direction of the Summum Bonum. In my opinion, however, intuition, called Practical Reason by Kant, simply affirms that which rationality cannot in itself handle. I would further argue that the history of philosophy has shown that this is usually part of the rationalist approach, e.g. Descartes noted that there are two avenues to truth; intuition and deduction.

⁸John Dewey is a chief proponent of empiricism.

⁹ Plato was the <u>initial</u> proponent of this philosophical position.

of mathematics from a set of fundamental axioms by sheer process of reasoning, so, the rationalist taught, the philosopher, provided he was a good enough philosopher, could discover the truth about the universe by the same methods. Hence a rationalist philosopher was one who took the view that reason itself, unaided by observation, can provide us with true knowledge. Such knowledge is generally called a priori.

Moreover, the rationalists, who had been inclined to regard all knowledge as mathematical in character, tended therefore to think of a priori knowledge as analytical. To be sure, it was a making clear or explicit the implications of what one already somehow knew. And, if the following question were asked, namely, "How did one come by this prior knowledge?", the general answer was (as Descartes attempted to prove nearly 2,000 years later) that the mind possesses initially, as it were, certain "innate ideas" in which or by means of which this knowledge was stored up. A man had only to develop these ideas and the knowledge would reveal itself. A priori knowledge, then, was analytical. And, it was also necessary, since, if A is implied by or contained in B, then so long as B is as it is, A cannot be other than it is. 10

¹⁰C. E. M. Joad, "Guide to Philosophy," (New York: Dover Publications, 1936), p. 108. He argues

To return to the central theme once more, we might then ask the question can the human mind, by processes of reasoning and reflection, reveal to us the nature of the universe? Plato certainly thought so. And this is brought out by an illustration in the dialogue called the Meno, where Socrates cross-examines a slave in order to throw light upon the nature of his knowledge of mathematical propositions. The slave is placed before the figure of a square, and Socrates proceeds to question him as to the nature of the square whose area is double that of the original square. Socrates then asks can he (the slave), for example, give any information about the side of this double square? The slave is at first at a loss, and makes a number of false suggestions. Finally, he perceives in the diagonal of the given square the side of the double square which he is seeking.

The point is that Socrates concludes that the slave had in himself as an original possession the know-ledge of which he is suddenly made conscious. Thus,

the thesis that: "if the universe were like a mathematical problem, the claim put forward by the philosophical rationalists on behalf of reason could be sustained.

But, unfortunately, the realm of what exists is different from the realm of mathematics; it contains the sort of facts with which mathematicians concern themselves, and, in so far as it does, may legitimately be explored by pure reason; but it contains other facts as well. The sort of facts with which mathematicians concern themselves are usually known as necessary, the remainder are contingent."

"teaching" is a process of directing the attention of the pupil to what he already knows. Learning then, for him, is the apprehension of inborn knowledge. It is, according to the Master, "to recover of oneself knowledge from within oneself."

Nietzsche

Nietzsche stands as the Darwin of ethics--his moral system takes root in a philosophy of life and selection, survival and struggle. Life for Nietzsche is a universal and invisible force--a dynamic entity essentially irrational, violent, brutal, and at times tragic. Capable of both growth and decline, life compels chaotic man to chaotic action in a chaotic world. He who thinks that life follows from a rational principle need only examine the "facts" of existence to see life's relation to reason: life controls reason--not reason life.

Nature takes pride in power, strength of will, energy, capacity; She is unswayed by logic, sentiment, and/or debate. In Nietzsche's own words:

¹¹ PLATO'S MENO: "Text and Criticism," Alexander Sesonske and Noel Fleming (Editors) (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965) p. 2.

To speak of right and wrong per se makes no sense at all. No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically 'unjust,' since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. 12

To be sure, self-preservation, aggression, and self-assertion, etc. are the rules of Nature's game.

Men want and they take. Will to Power is its own justification; the strong say "I will" and that suffices.

Will to Power keeps pace with Nature; it re-enforces life, and where it roams, logic and reason cannot. For life is too difficult, too complex, too changeable, to be reduced to formula.

Only death can break man's tie to life and Nature. Man's sole reality is his earthly existence. And this existence is at heart irrational—for who will deny the ubiquity of thwarted human striving, meaningless achievement, cruelty, and suffering? Thus, Nietzsche's challenge is this: no matter the irrationality—experience the tragedy of existence and therewith existence itself. To be sure, he asks for self-awareness and self-assertiveness in this life and this world: renunciation, suppression of Will to Power, fear of Hell,

¹² The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Francis Golffing (translator) (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 208.

and false hope in Heaven, according to Nietzsche, all are delusion. The earth is man's and until death returns him to dust, man can sink or rise to no other reality save his earthly one. According to Nietzsche, therefore, he ought to recognize this as a "fact" of existence and to affirm it physically, intellectually, and morally.

One would be seriously mistaken to interpret
Nietzsche (in the above paragraph) as asking, "Is life
worth living?" since this would suggest that the value
of life can be judged by some external standard. On
the contrary, Nietzsche believes that life itself is
the ultimate criterion of judgment. Man must say Yea or
Nay to it and it alone. Only if he says Nay to it is
life really a burden. For life is a struggle, Will to
Power, ups and downs; ergo, fullness of life lies in
fullness of struggle, the value is in the struggling.
Thus, it is the striving itself that counts—even failing
while daring greatly.

To be sure, Nietzsche writes as an act of defiance against a society he sees as radically wrong. Men
are no longer creative and critical. They cling to
dogma, absolutes, and mistaken standards, (i.e. anything
except <u>life</u> as a standard of life is mistaken). They
fail to realize that <u>everything absolute belongs to</u>
pathology. They esteem religious and intellectual ideals

over actualities. They exalt everything but the right thing--from reason and logic to pessimism and pity. They view the laws of Church and State as impeccable--immortal and immutable--when by the "facts" of existence many things esteemed as right and holy are, in reality, loathsome; just as many things in bad repute are really not wrong in themselves. They give lip service to Christianity, but are in no real sense Christian. They are weak, dishonest, hypocritical, decadent; their only hope of regeneration is a new perspective on life. They need to know why they believe in the values they do and how they came to adopt these values; they need to understand the true genealogy of morals.

"God is dead!" says Nietzsche, and it is imperative that man understand the significance of this death.

Man can prevail in this world without God and without the comfort of any orthodox religion's claim to absolute truth. God is dead; forget fear, and embarrassment, etc., says Nietzsche, and admit this "fact"; recognize by it that "meaning" in the traditional (Judeo-Christian) sense no longer exists, that men must learn to stand at the center of their own lives. God is dead, says Nietzsche, and the human situation—as bad as it is—will not be helped by creating gods of absolutes in a vain search for security. Man must bring back his soul

from Heaven and put it in the body. Thus, writes Nietzsche:

Zarathustra speaks of the death of God and proclaims the overman. Faith in God is dead as a matter of cultural fact, and any "meaning" of life in the sense of a supernatural purpose is gone. Now it is up to man to give his life meaning by raising himself above the animals and the all-too-human. What else is human nature but a euphemism for inertia, cultural conditioning, and what we are before we make something of ourselves? Our so-called human nature is precisely what we should do well to overcome; and the man who has overcome it Zarathustra calls the overman. 13

And so, Nietzsche's critique of Judeo-Christian values is quite strikingly clear as he considers not only their rigid continuation but even their birth decadent and life-repudiating. They are born in the weak, malicious reaction to aristocratic values and hence from the outset are unhealthy and pathological or degenerate.

Man for Nietzsche is, most of the time, a sick, degenerate animal, biologically depressed, unsociable, bestial. (Here, one can almost envision Hobbes nodding, Aye!) Men are unhappy even when they try to lose themselves in art, religion, or work. Thus Nietzsche offers a program to regenerate degenerate man and return him to the center of life: master-morality must regain its rightful dominance; there must be a transvaluation of all values.

¹³ The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann (ed.) (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), p. 118.

Equality fosters mediocrity and anarchy. Like transcendental hope, it works against the creation of "superior personalities." In Nietzsche's own words:

I do not wish to be mixed up and confused with these preachers of equality. For to me justice speaks thus: "Men are not equal." Nor shall they become equal! What would my love of the overman be if I spoke otherwise? 14

Some men are just naturally superior to others, i.e. stronger physically, more alert mentally, more driven by the Will to Power. Even so, however, master-morality does not exclude the weak: their place is to serve the strong, and they had better learn to stay in their place. The goal of Nietzsche's dream of regeneration is the creation of "superior personalities"—namely, supermen or overmen—to be forged in a crucible of conflict and competition. For the idea of "live and let live" has thwarted human progress long enough. The overman will delight in combat of all kinds, for he is superior in mind and body, conscious of his power, free from transcendental hope.

In sum, the overman is free from the dominance of morality: he obeys neither gods nor laws. His life is inner-directed, making externally-imposed codes of conduct unnecessary. Negative sanctions, such as, say,

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 213.

"Don't," are irrelevant to him; true inwardness makes him beyond good and evil. Moreover, the overman values heroism, discipline, duty, energy, manhood, creativeness, pride, spontaneity, etc. But he scorns comfort, weakness, pity, equality, and intellectualism. Savoir faire, self-reliance, autonomy, (perhaps I should say "great soulness or soulfulness") all these distinguish the overman. And so, as one views Nietzsche's "fittest" of all men, one notes that the future heralds his arrival.

Nature bids him come. Sheer prowess of body, creativeness of mind, and exuberance of spirit demand that he answer Nature's call.

An Appraisal

The foregoing quite <u>brief</u> exposition enables us now to draw out some of the more striking implications—both positive and negative—of Nietzsche's philosophy. These critical remarks, however, will also be quite brief; they are really only sketches of what would be (or perhaps I should say, "should be") definitive criticisms.

To appraise Nietzsche is to understand the aphorisms of his ethics and the man. My initial reaction to his philosophy in general is that he is quite seriously mistaken in his interpretation of the "facts" of existence; for one thing, what one discerns as the

"facts" of existence are not always facts. But in an effort to be objective in his probing of all value, he (i.e. Nietzsche) decides to rely solely on the "facts" of existence. Nothing is more indisputable he thinks than man's indelible pact with that Nature with which he is essentially involved. After all, consciousness is at bottom natural instinct. Human actions -- from blind impulse to conscious thought--are but expressions of man's primary instinct to preserve life. Life is struggle and this world is just one of struggling instincts and desires. Will to Power, then, is the crux of human reality. Nevertheless, even though Nietzsche may be partially correct in maintaining this view, I cannot accept his interpretation in its entirety. For moral systems do not have to follow strictly and solely from facts of existence.

To be sure, in this same vein, moral systems may be based on other more important criteria, such as, say, social utility, and/or happiness, etc. Then, too, man does <u>not</u> live by instinct alone—Nietzsche tends to overestimate the role of intuition, "creativeness" and "super personalities" in shaping human history. As a result of this overestimation, etc. his transvalued morality hinges in part on a fine distinction which in theory is open to question and in practice quite arbitrary and exceedingly difficult to determine.

But to criticize Nietzsche solely on the logic of his arguments seems somewhat unfair, since he is more of a poet-preacher-philosopher than a logician. Thus, a more apt criticism would be to call in question the style and tone of his writings. And so, my bias is Nietzsche is simply far too emotional--even for a poet-preacher-philosopher. For if anyone hails Nietzsche as vigorous, violent, powerful, then I can only add: and deafeningly so. Nietzsche shouts far too much; his imagination cannot be contained (much the same as his use of the first person on nearly every page). Continually nervous, he showers us with exclamations. And whether exaggerating, asserting, or generalizing, he pounds away unrelentingly at his pulpit of aphorisms. Undoubtedly, Nietzsche is fascinating to read, shocking, brilliant, controversial, interesting. But one so radically unorthodox--so against every virtue and for every vice--can hardly appear as anything else.

And this stylistic comment leads naturally to an aside--but an important aside in that it points to the responsibility of a <u>thinker</u> to avoid sensationalism in his writings, lest he be misconstrued and misused by subsequent generations. For some historians have noted a certain relevance of Nietzsche to the rise of National Socialism in pre-World War II Germany. And

although it is problematic to assert that Nietzsche would have supported Hitler (I intend to discuss this very situation, in a later paper), the fact remains that much in Nietzsche's writings can be used and was used to support Nazi doctrine. He (i.e. Nietzsche) argues at times that he is against anti-semitism and nationalism, that he is at heart a "good European." Still, in his disparagement of democracy, passivism, and humanitarian virtue; in his glorification of Superman ethics and the warrior spirit; in his exaltation of uninhibited drives, natural "creativeness," genuine "superiority," and the rugged Bohemian type "genius," Nietzsche paves the way for Nazi misuse and contributes considerably to the creation of that atomsphere of anti-intellectualism-that philosophic climate of opinion -- which set the mood and tempo of a nation and allowed such an antiintellectual movement as Nazism to take hold.

In addition to the above, and in this same connection, it may be noted that both Nietzsche and Freud comment insightfully on the nature of repression, aggression, sublimation, natural drives and other such terms that are related to the discipline of psychology. Yet, the objectivity and scholarly detachment, the discipline and equilibrim of tone, that appears in Freud and is so absent in Nietzsche precludes any appropriation of Freud's writings in the same sense as

Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche's. Thus, emotionalism in excess is Nietzsche's vice--what supports Nietzsche qua preacher undermines Nietzsche qua thinker. For obviously he lacks that calm and subtle restraint that distinguishes the true artist and sober thinker. One certainly is inclined to think that he must have been psychotic and yet (somehow) growing more and more insane.

Nietzsche is forever on the offensive, to return to the central thesis once more, and not a great many things escape his wrath. Socrates and Plato, Christ and Wagner, women and professors, democracy and equality, intellectualism and beer--all have shared in creating the wretched state of modern humanity. One somehow wonders how Nietzsche arrived at his historical and political wisdom.

Another criticism with a view towards Nietzsche's conception of morality might be that like other thinkers before him, he is rather impractical in formulating his Utopia. In one breath, he asks men to be egotistic, selfish, self-reliant; in another, he appeals for self-sacrifices in the preparation and service of the Superman. One wonders, then, who--reading this philosophy-will classify himself as servant, and not Superman. Nietzsche says that the fittest will survive; but one wonders in these increasingly skill-oriented times if Nietzsche's fittest are really best suited to survive--

even in Nietzsche's day (not to mention modern corroboration of the theory of brains being superior to brawn), a well-aimed pistol in the weakest hands was quite an equalizer against the "intuitively-driven" and physically strong.

For all his shortcomings, though, Nietzsche has many points to his credit, i.e. his philosophy has several favorable aspects. Certainly, he is a powerful and insightful thinker, who offers a "kernel of truth" in maintaining that we need not go out of the realm of human relations to found ethical conceptions. Many, too, attest to the value of freedom in Nietzsche's sense of inner guidance and true inwardness. For who among us does not too value manhood, courage, capacity, energy, creativeness, spontaneity, vivacity? Thus, in suggesting that too much sentiment, hope, and sacrifice stifle human progress and hinder the enjoyment of life, the ennobling of life, and the thankfulness to life. Nietzsche teaches a valuable lesson.

However, a view of the man (i.e. Nietzsche the man), uncovers the philosopher's perennial bout with loneliness and disease. For ever since the early death of his father (specifically, he was only <u>five</u> years old, when his father died), Nietzsche was reared by the women of the household. He was continually in poor health. Failing eyesight disqualified him for

soldiering; so, if he glorifies the soldier, war, prowess and struggle, perhaps it is because his health would not permit him to be (in the eyes of some) more than a philologist and a Ph.D. Over-compensation is a dominant trait in Nietzsche. He was never appreciated by his colleagues, and never was a thinker so much alone in his views. In a letter to a friend, Nietzsche writes:

I could sing a song and will sing it, although I am alone in an empty house and must sing it into mine own ears . . . Lo: I am weary of my wisdom, like the bee that hath collected too much honey; I need hands reaching out for it. 14

The "hands reaching out" never came. Nietzsche compensated for the loneliness by hardening himself into an idealized masculinity he could see in Superman. After all, he had written: "What matter thyself, Zarathustra? Say thy word and break into pieces." Nietzsche took the words to heart; he preached the Superman ethic alone for most of his life, and it was only in a fit of apoplexy that he finally broke into pieces.

By late 1888 he was signing his letters the Crucified One. Beneath this pathos, however, there lurks still in the philosopher that undying spirit of noble discontent. One imagines the old warrior bearing up

¹⁴ Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, (New York: Time Incorporated, 1962), p. 386.

valiantly under his tribulation, affirming life and rejoicing to the end for having been able to live and struggle. Nietzsche suffered much in his life; he struggled under hardship--and loved it. One must inevitably conclude, therefore, that he found life's sweetness, even in bitterness and pain.

Dewey

I take John Dewey to be the philosopher who made the greatest contribution to American educational thought and practice. To be sure, Dewey is the one philosopher in whom philosophy and educational theory are virtually indistinguishable. Furthermore, no philosopher has written so extensively on education; in my judgment, Plato alone competes with Dewey for having shaped contemporary civilization educationally.

Dewey's general philosophy, his pragmatism, was in broad opposition to the Hegelian idealistic philosophy which dominated American universities at the beginning of his career. He was much influenced by Charles Sanders Peirce and—as was Peirce himself—by the methods of the sciences and by the particular scientific developments touched off by Darwin's work.

Additionally, Dewey regarded the idealists as badly mistaken on several counts. For example, they gave an essentially supernaturalistic account of learning,

thinking and reasoning where he, as a "good" evolutionist thought these processes could and had to be accounted
for on a naturalistic basis. Still further, they heavily
under rated the connection of thought with practice,
with action, and did not recognize it as a factor in
human evolution and society.

Lastly, they did not see how both meaning and truth depended upon experience, i.e. upon actual observation. For Dewey, the meaning of a factual statement consisted in what it implied about the results of observation and actions. Its truth, or as he preferred to say, its "warranted assertibility," depended upon its accuracy as a predictive device. In a word, these views underlay his emphasis upon linking teaching and learning with the world of the learner's living experience.

Dewey lived and taught through the years of the American Progressive Movement (roughly 1901-1927) which tried to correct the abuses attending the growth of big business in the early decades of the 20th century. Curbing monopolistic development and restoring competition were aims of that movement which sought simultaneously to protect consumers from abuses by the large manufacturers. The Progressive Movement's concern for the people at large led to recommendations for reforms in education as well as in the relations between big

business and the public. His support of both roots of reforms, along with the faith in and strong advocacy of American democracy which appears in his philosophy made Dewey a symbol for the whole progressive movement.

Dewey's deep faith in democratic idealogy, a faith which grows out of his notion of the intrinsic worth of the individual, is a case in point.

Dewey's pragmatism led him to give human experience a more dynamic interpretation than many other philosophers had heretofore given it. The "experiencer" was, for him, less of a "spectator" of his thoughts and actions and more of an "intelligent participant" actively engaged in solving "problem situations" deemed to be significant aspects of the total experiential situation. Thinking, to his mind, was continuous active engagement by the experiencer in attempts to achieve adjustment with the environment.

Believing with Darwin that man as evolved within nature was a part of it, Dewey argued that man ought to be studied by the methods natural scientists use in their inquiries. He affirmed, for example, that the spirit of education should be experimental since, for him, human intelligence or mind is basically a problem solving instrument. Securing knowledge of one's environment through the problem solving method was for Dewey

an affirmation of the intimate connection between thought and action, reflection and experiment.

From what has been stated above, it is apparent then that Dewey considered education to be a continuous endeavor in which accumulated experience is constantly undergoing reconstruction to serve more efficiently personal and social ends. Education was life, for Dewey, rather than mere preparation for it; and it became factual as the mind or intelligence attacked the problem situations in its environment. Thus, as the problems are dealt with scientifically until a satisfactory solution is achieved, the mind and the knowledge it elicits are identified as the chief instruments for dealing with life manifested in each situation.

School, Dewey felt, should provide a closer relationship between the child's (student's) home and its larger environment, the community. Its subject-matter, thus, should be vitally significant to the individual as learner or "experiencer." Recognizing individual differences, it should give ample attention to each pupil according to his/her need in the learning situation. Further, it should take into consideration the meaningful data he/she has acquired, as helpful in the continuous learning experience of the classroom.

This approach rejected the traditional classroom structure and procedures in favor of the so-called

freer climate, e.g. activity programs, projects, trips, movable chairs and desk, space for informal activities and dramatics became part of the progressive classroom experience. Moreover, traditional grading considerations gave way to other modes of evaluation. For example, children under the progressive system were given a greater degree of responsibility, for the features of their social life as students. This was for the sake of making that life more like life in the larger social environment and thereby preparing students for the responsibilities they would encounter there.

In order to grasp this <u>organic</u> relationship that Dewey sees between philosophy and education it is necessary to view all education as a much broader phenomenon than mere schooling. Education involves <u>all</u> of the institutions and individuals that influence attitudes and dispositions. Therefore, the school is such an agency—and so are the home and the church, let alone such obvious molders of human predisposition as television, motion pictures, radio, newspapers and magazines, etc. Any organization from the Boy Scouts to the local youth gangs on the corner is educative (or, miseducative, as the case may be) to the degree it forms or modifies attitudes. In Dewey's own words:

Every place in which men habitually meet, shop, club, factory, saloon, church, political caucus, is perforce a schoolhouse.

Some "brief" mention has been made about a <u>few</u> ideas that play major roles in Dewey's pragmatism, i.e. the accounts he gives of meaning, truth, and the relation of thought. They are enough, in the opinion of the writer, to make it plain that the definition he gives of education grows out of his whole system of philosophy. Again, Dewey speaks for himself; he defined education in the following manner:

That reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to dissect the course of subsequent experience. (Democracy and Education, p. 1) 15

In addition to the above, when the school is set apart from its social context, when schooling is unconcerned with issues in the larger environment, then it, according to Dewey:

. . . tends to become a routine empirical affair unless its aims and methods are animated by a . . . survey of its place in contemporary life as is the business of philosophy to provide. 16

Philosophy, which is the process of ordering ends and means so as to develop a theory concerning the achievement of a desired future, is thus related to

¹⁵ This monumental work or essay by John Dewey contains statements concerning the interaction between philosophy and education. Originally written in 1911 and published for the first time in 1913, the theme of the essay—that philosophy is the general theory of education—was later expanded by Dewey to become one of the central ideas in this famous text.

¹⁶ Ibid.

education in a practical sense--for education, consciously geared to this ideal, becomes the vehicle by which to realize this future.

In summary, then, Dewey's philosophy covers a vast and significant period in American life and, needless to say, his influence is still being felt. It is a well known fact, moreover, that his influence spread beyond the United States and his interests covered many fields in addition to that of education.

Lastly, Dewey managed to functionally link a broadly conceived education with a philosophy grounded in experience. In his words:

. . . education is the process through which the needed (social) transformation may be accomplished. 17

Education thus becomes the translation of philosophy into a deliberately conducted practice.

Thus, it was the brilliant and insightful philosopher, John Dewey--in whom philosophy and educational theory are virtually indistinguishable--who advanced even more radical ideas about education. He favored learning through experience; he portrayed learning as an active, searching process rather than a passive absorption of other's ideas. This philosophy is considerably

^{17&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

at variance with the basic style of European education and, in the opinion of the writer, if truly adopted by American universities could constitute a unique contribution to the field of higher education today.

Another interesting point that needs to be brought out is that according to Ivan Illich, who is perhaps today's most controversial educational revolutionary thinker, and author of Deschooling Society:

. . . for most men the right to learn is curtailed by the obligation to attend school. (Introduction, page IV).

Illich maintains that the social organization or formal organization of the classroom is a focal point of inquiry and innovation in respect to contemporary education and educational processes in modern times, although he argues that the needs of "people-processing" have permeated the educational system to the extent that the situation is clearly defined—both for teachers as well as students, as one of constraint and subordination, i.e. the hidden curriculum, as such, being the education for docility. Illich's philosophy of education then questions the value of extending obligatory schooling to all people, and further advocates the disestablishment of the school. According to him, the school only serves as an effective creator and sustainer of social myth because of its structure as a ritual game of graded promotions.

In a word, he argues for complete freedom from structural constraints, such as the classroom itself, structured learning programs, the entire school building, etc. Illich further argues for the "open-school-approach" which, for him, involves the relaxing of rigidity and calls for the encouragement of cooperation and participation of teachers and teaching that is primarily focused on the student's learning needs rather than being predetermined and prearranged by a handful of adults who feel that they know what is best for students. Putting the point thus: Illich puts forth a comprehensive exposition dealing with the notion that universal education through schooling is not feasible; and that the ethos, not just the institutions, of society ought to be "deschooled." Let Illich speak for himself.

Many students, especially those who are poor, intuitively know what the schools do for them. They school them to confuse process and substance. Once these become blurred, a new logic is assumed; . . . the pupil is thereby "schooled" to confuse teaching with learning, grade advancement with education, a diploma with competence, and fluency with the ability to say something new. His imagination is "schooled" to accept service in place of value. (Page 1)

This chapter, in conclusion, has provided information about basically three historical approaches presented by philosophers who have significantly influenced the broad field of values development. Furthermore, building on the works of Plato, Nietzsche and Dewey

will now enable the writer to put forth a personal approach to values development in the field of higher education. In other words, the examination of the philosophic views of the aforementioned thinkers must be regarded as highly significant in enabling the author to develop the major focus of the disseration; their perspectives have contributed to the author's thinking about the role of values, in general, and how values, in turn, relate to higher educational settings in particular.

CHAPTER III

A PERSONAL APPROACH TO VALUES DEVELOPMENT

It has been said that axiology or the branch of philosophy dealing with values and ethics, etc. is a relatively new area in philosophy, although the author has attempted to argue in this dissertation the fact that philosophers even before the time of Plato speculated about the problem of values. In retrospect, it was the noble Socrates that first sought to delineate some of these major concerns about values that philosophers and other serious social thinkers yet today are attempting to resolve. In a word, he (Socrates) was concerned not only with the meaning of the term "value" or the nature of that which one terms of value but, of at least equal importance, he raised the issue as to whether or not values are found only in the object, i.e. and thus exist independently of our ability to perceive them--or, in the mind.

However, most "modern" philosophers would argue that it was not until the middle of the 1890's with the debate between Alexius Meinong and Christian Von Ehrenfels concerning the source of values that the general study of values emerged as a specialized area of philosophy.

Still further, Socrates was concerned with the criteria by which one selects and ranks values; and, lastly, he even offered for our consideration an elaborate notion of a hierarchy of values.

To be sure, philsophers today are still trying to resolve this perennial problem that has literally plagued the history of philosophy for nearly 3,000 years. That is not to say, however, that many philosophers do not agree on the assumption that the problem of defining values is central to any ethical theory; on the contrary, the point is that the problem is based on the fact that there are many contradictory definitions of what is meant by "value"—and the fact that these many points of view are reflected by a literal host of philosophers and schools of philosophy.

In this regard, it is necessary to point out, here, the fact that many philosophers view ethics as a sub-division of the general theory of value. In addition, it has been said that the study of ethics is of great practical value to man. For ethics refers to the process of estimating the moral worth of an action, as this system of moral values provides a means for the individual to evaluate all of the activities and events that surround his/her daily life. In a very real sense then it cannot be disputed that the major decisions one makes in life (and this is especially true of "educated"

persons) often result from one's standards of what they believe to be "right," and "good," etc.

To a certain extent, for example, John Dewey was a humanist, in the sense that what happened to human beings was for him the highest or ultimate value. Thus, knowledge in the sense of facts vis-a-vis discoveries made by scientists is of secondary importance, as facts that cannot be used to further the affairs of mankind are of no meaning or value to society.

Most philosophers of education and practically anyone who dares to even debate the current state of education generally agree that there is something wrong with it. Few people, however, agree as to how it should be changed. For more than 2,000 years a liberal education has been the ideal of the West--as this tradition dates back to Plato, who argued in "The Republic" that leadership should be entrusted to the philosopher who was a lover not of a part but of the whole of wisdom. In modern times, however, there is continual controversy over a so-called liberal education versus one that will enhance job skills.

Still further, it is reasonable to expect that so many differing opinions regarding the value of or the broad, general overall aims of higher education would, of necessity, result in widely divergent

perspectives about the content and methods to be utilized in educating students to assume full responsibility for our total environment, in the years to come. Nevertheless, the point is that many writers and philosophers maintain that the debate is and ought to be about the meaning and purpose of education.

In a similar vein, the author has found it somewhat difficult to develop the "core" concerns of this chapter--especially in the requisite amount of space allotted--as there are a literal host of factors that must be taken into consideration when dealing with the type of society in which we ought to live. Nevertheless an attempt has been made to do precisely this and thus the essence of this chapter has been divided into four parts, namely:

- 1. A cursory discussion of a number of crucial issues in the broad field of higher education which led to the treatment of values education in this dissertation; (and which will be further "highlighted" in Chapter IV)
- Second, a discussion about some specific values that higher education has, in the opinion of the author, an obligation to do something about;
- 3. Third, based on the aforementioned, and still further, based on the assumption that, hopefully, in the not too distant future the author will serve as a

Vice-President of an institution of higher education--and faced with the question of what does this mean in terms of providing salient experiences by-way-of a degree program for the respective college--what kinds of experiences would be deemed essential then for:

- a. the faculty;
- the administration; and,
- c. the student body, as a whole?
- 4. Lastly, what are the criteria for determining the effectiveness of the above?

Perhaps the most significant distinction regarding the broad area of human values, and one of paramount significance for the philosophy of education, is centered around the fact that man is different from all other forms of life. To be sure, he is a product of choice, his own and the choices of his society. In this regard, Aristotle once noted that "man is a creature of the polis." And far too often throughout the course of the history of Western philosophy this gets mistranslated as: "man is merely a political animal." This is true, indeed, but the author does not feel that this is the main point Aristotle wished to convey; on the contrary, he meant to indicate that a human being is rooted in and a result of his membership in a community, a polis. Thus, this is more than a political setting--it is also a social, educational and cultural

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womb. For man does not emerge automatically, or as a result of, so to speak, pulling himself up by his own bootstraps. He must be trained and directed by a network of people, as he/she grows in a cultural matrix of incalculable complexity.

In addition to the above, it is a difficult task, this work of growing to be fully human. The Greeks certainly realized that only a small percentage achieve this status. For example, Archie Bunker would not be a comic figure to the ancient Greeks. represent a tragic parody of what a man might have been, were he properly trained and educated by his community. Archie is what he is, and what he is not, because of his values, because of what he loves and hates, not because of certain skills he has acquired or data he has mastered--or failed to master, as the case may be. As long as education, therefore, limits itself to skill training and the transmission of information, etc. it fails in respect to one of its basic goals which is-or perhaps I should say, which ought to be--nothing less than the encouragement of higher primates to become truly human beings.

The Greeks thought they understood at least the rudiments of this important educational process. Still further, Aristotle, in a book of ethics dedicated to his son, described the aim of . . . education as

basically to make the young student like what is good and dislike what is bad. This too he saw as the foundation for all future ethical action; i.e. the creation of healthy habits, so that the choice of generosity over selfishness (or profligacy), of courage over cowardice (or foolhardiness) comes "naturally," as the result of steady modification of behavior and exposure to superior moral examples.

Aristotle's own teacher, Plato, (who had learned so well from his teacher, Socrates) said much the same thing. C. S. Lewis, in his splendid book,

The Abolition of Man, paraphrases Plato's views on elementary education:

The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting, and hateful. He would hate the ugly even from his earliest years and would give delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul and being nourished by it, so that he becomes a man of gentle heart; all this before he is of an age to reason, so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, he will hold out his hands in welcome and recognize her because of the affinity he bears to her. ("Republic," 402 A, quoted in C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, pp. 26-27.)

There is no dilemma here. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are quite clear about the purpose of education, the role of the student and the teacher, and the source of authority, the mandate, under which both pupil and teacher operate. School is not

separated from the rest of community life. Young people are not alienated from adult authority-figures. All are engaged in the lifetime learning experience of becoming fully human. The "little human animals" are merely at an earlier stage of their development, and so in need of more constant direction from their larger, and, hopefully, rather more human adult animals. There is no evidence of neurotic concern about warping the little creatures, destroying their spontaneity, their individuality, imposing alien values on them. That was precisely the job of education, and of educators—a class which included all adult members of the community. The Greeks sensibly realized that it takes a whole citizenry to nurture a future citizen.

The results are interesting. This philosophy of education did not produce a debased mob of repressed robots. It produced the most highly creative, individualistic society our world has recorded. Despite political turmoil, economic crises, plagues, wars (civil and uncivil), it gave us a splendid roster of names to conjure by: historians like Thucydides, poets like Aesclaylus, dramatists like Sophocles, artists like Phidias, solidiers like Themistocles, statements like Pericles. All, the author believes, because a certain set of human values, with a certain definition of humanity, pervaded an entire culture and became the

foundation of its highly integrated system of lifelong education. This was the source for all authority: the belief that human animals were born to transcend themselves, and by education to become rational creatures, capable of living in harmony, love, and justice. What could be more "relevant" than this curriculum?

Until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was little interest in educational philosophy. Since that time and up until roughly 1950, the predominant philosopher of education was John Dewey. In fact, from 1920 to 1950 most educators were followers of the beliefs and theories of John Dewey.

Additionally, Dewey views the role of the school as the "embryo of society," a place where ideas have a chance to grow and change institutions. This view is similar to the age old one that Plato discussed, viz., of how we want to live, and how we educate our young. For both philosophers viewed the education of the young as the foundation of society.

There are two questions that arise, here, and they are of such magnitude that those of us who are committed to higher education as an endeavor ought be continually pondering, namely: (1) What will be the role and obligation of higher educational personnel with respect to (moral) values, in the not too distant future (and how they in turn can provide models for

society and consequently impact on those who are soon to graduate from institutions like Michigan State)?, and (2) what methods are best suited to accomplish this task?

It is the basic position of the writer, in this dissertation, in general, and in Chapter III in particular—as it is with Aurelio Peccei—that you cannot have a better world until there are better people.

Technology helps and, consequently, people must appreciate the real and potential benefits of the so-called industrial, scientific, and technological revolutions. Yet man moves and operates within some specific set of values. Accordingly, all training and all education is value—based. Hence, mankind must educate itself from now on quite differently if all life on this planet is to survive.

In a recent article, entitled: "Teacher

Training, Moral Dilemmas, and Nonsense Responses,"

the point was made that "compared to college students

in other fields, future teachers do not seem to have

developed high levels of moral reasoning." Specifically,

Robert B. Bloom, coordinator of the Division of Special

Education at the College of William and Mary,

Robert B. Bloom, "Teacher Training, Moral Dilemmas, and Nonsense Responses," Phi Delta Kappan, (May, 1976), p. 2.

reported--in the <u>Phi Delta Kappan</u>, May, 1976--that he gave eighty-two education M.A. candidates a series of six moral dilemmas followed by twelve questions.

Professor Bloom went on to note that the subjects were then asked to rate the importance of the issues raised by each of the questions in resolving the moral dilemma. According to Bloom: "Compared to responses from 815 college students in other fields, education students performed at a significantly lower level of moral reasoning." 3

In some respect, then, it shall be the intent of the author--in the initial portion of Chapter III-to expand on the thrust of the article that Professor Bloom recently brought to the attention of the educational community.

For if Bloom is correct, to be sure, teachers and educators are by-and-large doing exactly the opposite of the sort of things they in fact ought to be doing. To see that this point is, indeed, true one need only reflect about the following comment that Professor Bloom made of his findings, namely:

³ Ibid.

. . . We must begin to consider the <u>moral</u> as well as the purely cognitive qualities of the people we select and prepare for teaching. In a time when creative thinking is tantamount to survival, our children need open, flexible, principled teachers. My research suggests that this is exactly what they are unlikely to get.

Still further, if the position Professor Bloom is arguing is correct, then obviously teachers (especially those of the "near" future) are much worse off than any of the other segments of college students. For one need only consider via the multiplier effect the tremendous number of our nation's youth that these aforementioned education teachers will be "training" in the not too distant future.

Bloom concludes his article by pointing out the fact that "graduates from teacher preparatory colleges were particularly likely to be impressed by pretentious nonsense statements." One example of this, according to him, is as follows, viz:

A significant number of these students thought that a critical aspect of making a decision on whether it is moral to steal an expensive drug to save a person's life was whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.

Of extreme importance for us to note, here, is the fact that Bloom wants us to see that the contents of the

⁴Ibid.

⁵Kappan, <u>loc. cit</u>.

^{6&}lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

X

above quotation raise the issue of <u>conflict among values</u>; and, the point too that, for the most part, education students tended to "gloss over" this highly significant matter.

The late 1960's found our higher educational institutions being dramatically confronted, for the first time, with a whole host of broad moral issues. To name only a few, the various issues surrounding the Vietnam war (or, as many people prefer to call it, the "Vietnam conflict"); the Civil Rights Movement; graft and criminal activity in top echelons of government; the lack of respect for persons in positions of authority; skyrocketing campus crime rates; increasing incidents of students' cheating on term papers and examinations; and, lastly, epidemic proportions of venereal disease and substance abuse--and, in more recent times, changing attitudes and social values about ethnic, gay, and women's rights and awareness programs--all challenged individual beliefs as well as the basic beliefs, values and attitudes of various key university personnel across the face of this nation. Far too often the faculties and administrations were reluctant to face these and other critical moral issues, and thus the effects of this lack of positive action has too been substantiated and documented for all posterity to observe.

In addition to the above, many scientists and scholars believe that the next quarter-of-a century will be the turning point for humanity. Moreover, considerable dispute and disagreement exist at the present time about the role of education in shaping our future society. Alvin Toffler, for example, in his new work: "Learning for Tomorrow, The Role of The Future In Education," deals extensively with the educational ramifications of the major cultural innovations that might occur before the end of this century--and especially as they relate to higher education. Of special relevance to the discussion at hand, are the Chapters on "Why Women See the Future Differently From Men" and "The Black Child's Image of the Future."

In sum, Toffler's thesis is about the <u>many</u> severe stresses and dislocations to which, he maintains, the American culture will be subjected to in the near future.

And there are other futurist thinkers too who have argued that our present style of education is contributing to the world's "macro-problem" rather than aiding in its solution. In a word, each one of us who is involved in the "business" of education has a responsibility to do the very best that we can in order to insure the proper, TOTAL, overall educational development of our students in the future.

We are now in a position to take a close look at some <u>specific values</u> for which in the opinion of the author, higher education has an obligation or a responsibility. 7

Theme 1: Outer Limits or Environment

Our planet, for example, has a certain "carrying capacity," beyond which we strain its ability to support and sustain life. Every living thing in the universe exists within a web of interconnecting supports and influences. To be sure, ecologists are warning us of the fact that we are running out of drinkable water and oxygen because of mass production, waste, abuse, and improper distribution of our goods and services. Hence, one value that Higher Education ought explicitly take on is: Deep respect for natural balances, ecological integrity, and the protection of our land, water, air and all matters surrounding the biophysical realm.

It is imperative for the reader to bear in mind also the fact that this will vary from one society to another, i.e. it would obviously make sense to transmit nationalist values to students in underdeveloped or developing countries, whereas it might be totally superfluous to do so in countries or nations with high levels of technology. In a similar vein, another example to note is that what is "growth, progress and betterment" for an American might be viewed in an opposite fashion by someone from another culture.

Thus, a dean or a vice-president of an institution of higher education (or, for that matter, any one in a position of authority) would, of necessity, have to-based on the aforementioned value--encourage the faculty to build a general core curriculum as well as specialty areas around the study of:

- Ecology;
- Biology;
- 3. Water, with particular emphasis on the use and abuse of our oceans;
- 4. Climate Control/Weather;
- 5. Energy options;
- 6. Population studies; and, lastly,
- 7. Food Production, with particular emphasis on agri-business.

The important thing here is that the student is forced to grapple or come to grips with the interconnecting problems associated with the environment. Furthermore, evaluating effectiveness, whether via written and/or oral examinations, term papers, field projects and explorations, etc. then becomes a matter of assessing the student's appreciation of not merely isolated environmental factors but, of at least equal importance, the interconnections and interdependencies governing life itself.

In recent times, the poet, T. S. Eliot, has commented extensively about the role education plays in

the development of a culturally healthy society. Specifically, he warns us that the type of schooling we impose is an abstraction. Thus, Eliot sees a need for social commitment in education. He feels that being a well-informed citizen, e.g. one who has directly studied matters relating to public affairs. Furthermore, a sense of public obligation arises out of the student's social environment in the form of both unconscious assimilation and example. In a word, according to Eliot, unless a person is directly concerned with these matters it is, to be sure, useless to expect that they will have farreaching effects on the individual or on society at large.

The author submits that universities must begin to revamp the current incentives for, especially, faculty and "other" key decision makers in ways that support ethical development; as values education ought to be of immediate and continuing concern to everyone involved in the business of education. Additionally, universities must begin to initiate and uphold formal ethical training for college-level faculty, administrators and students alike with respect to the "crucial" ethical problems

⁸B. H. Bantock, <u>T. S. Eliot and Education</u> (New Yokr: Random House, 1969), p. 90.

confronting us, today--i.e. abortion; euthanasia; mental and public health; racism; poverty; war and political oppression, etc.--if we are to survive and contribute to the sanity of the 21st century.

Hence, there are several ways in which increased emphasis on moral development via values education might be accomplished, viz.:

- 1. By a <u>series of rules</u> or regulations that spell out in great detail which particular values are acceptable to said institution's goals and objectives (especially in view of the fact that we basically no longer have religious values to guide us as we did in the not too distant past);
- By focusing particular emphasis on developing or advancing the philosophical thinking of the children and youth of this nation; and, lastly,
- B. By various course offerings which deal explicitly with values education.

Theme 2: Inner Limits

In a similar vein, higher education must also deal with man's soul and psyche as well as the physical quality of his "inner space." In other words, the "new" scholar then becomes one who is mentally and physically attuned to treat and aptly deal with new directions in education. Additionally, if we as future educators cannot do an adequate job of helping people to live and "cope" in this society, how then do we realistically

expect to prepare them to live, at some future date, either in outer space or on the floors of the oceans?

Again, as a vice-president or chief administrator of an institution of higher education, the author would encourage the faculty to propose, design and implement a core curriculum--with options to specialize--in the following, viz.:

- 1. Exposure to Psycho-therapy Techniques and approaches;
- 2. Holistic medicine;
- Stress management;
- 4. Nutrition:
- 5. Various religions of the world;
- 6. Philosophy; and, lastly,
- 7. Martial arts, which would stress the importance of mental discipline and physical fitness.

The author is well-qualified to speak on the point of Martial Arts, etc. as he holds the rank of IL Dan, First Degree Black Belt, in Taekwon Do (The Leading Korean Martial Art); and, a Blue Belt (1st Gup) in Kang Duk Kwon, another style of Korean Karate. In academic circles, as an aside, this would be viewed similarly as (nearly) the equivalent of having two Ph.D.'s.

In addition to the above, and on a more serious note, the author views the student of the martial arts as one who is involved in a discipline that stresses both mind and character development as well as physical fitness conditioning for men, women and children of all ages. Through the scientific use of the body in methods of self-defense which is one of mankind's most priceless pieces of wisdom, the martial arts do in fact aim at the development of the character of its participants. Thus, those who practice their art will obtain through vigorous and tireless training the deeper

Still further, in this regard, the consideration of the meaning and significance of education leads us to the point where the philosophical, ethical and theological presuppositions must of necessity be brought out into the open within our educational systems. if in the not too distant future, we are to educate our students to assume full responsibility for the entire planet, they must be made to examine in a serious fashion various doctrines of or about man, and his relation to education, philosophy and religion as well. To be sure, the author is profoundly convinced that the student who has had a great deal of exposure to the aforementioned subject areas (that is, ethics or moral philosophy and religion, et al.) will be in a better position to deal effectively with not only cogent theories about the material world, as we know it, but he/she will undoubtedly be in a much better position to deal also with such crucial and extremely pressing issues as: war or militarism; hunger; disease;

more reflective aspects of his/her art--as well as qualities of leadership, humility and respect for themselves and <u>all</u> others around them.

For without this mental conditioning, the student will become only a "street fighter," and in his ignorance may believe that he possesses superior techniques. In a word, then, the martial arts via their mental and physical education ultimately serve to develop a sound mind and a sound body!

poverty; racial injustice and a host of other vital concerns that are shaping the direction in which we as a society are moving, as each day brings us closer to the 21st century. As a famous Black educator once remarked: "The problem of human relations may be boiled down to the problem of religion and moral values." 10

Evaluation would hinge on the students <u>demon-strated competence</u> in some selected or requisite number of one or more of the aforementioned seven core curriculum areas of specialization.

Theme III: Culture

Higher Education must also foster an appreciation for cultural diversity. Thus, one who is in a position of authority hires, promotes, provides institutional backing to faculty and offers courses that promote or embellish "cherished" values. In other words, salaries, endowed chairs, tenure and promotions, etc. all reflect institutional priorities. This becomes increasingly important especially in attempting to understand values within the context of the educational society in which we must live and operate. To be sure, the breed of teachers and administrators, for

¹⁰ Inez Bacoats, Echoes From A Life Well-Spent: The Biography of Dr. John Alvin Bacoats, (South Carolina: The State Printing Company, 1970), p. 52.

this society, inculcate by training, particularly in relation to the college level, and reflect values about who ought to pass on wisdom to whom--and in what form this must be transmitted. In addition, this society, as well as any society, must have lines of authority and, typically, the same ordering principles define the educator. And so, who gets to educate, the duration and hardships, et al. of the educator's credentialing process varies with different societies but certainly this "preparation" too reflects the weight that people place on education.

Again, as a vice-president or chief administrator of an institution of higher education, the author would stress the urgency for the faculty to build a core study around the following:

- Anthropology;
- Archaelogy;
- 3. Languages, with particular emphasis on both oral forms and creative writing;
- 4. Literature/stories;
- 5. Music:
- 6. Art;
- 7. Dance;
- 8. Creative drama; and, lastly,
- 9. The <u>mass media</u> as a cultural or ethical bearer via radio, television and the film industry.

Evaluation, in this circumstance, probes not only appreciation but demonstrated proficiency in some creative medium of one or more of the above.

Theme IV: Community

As stated earlier, we live increasingly in a multi-cultural and multi-racial world. And, because of the rapid mobility and technological conditions of this nation, coupled with continental or global impact of the media (as mentioned in Theme III above) people of very different value systems are living not only next to each other but are to a great extent influenced by each other's values and value systems, even though literally living thousands of miles apart. Again, what happened in Vietnam is a case in point of this.

Moreover, the author maintains the point that since transportation and communications innovations have effectively reduced the distances worldwide--and the "global village" concept is already (here) with us to some extent--and since local, national and international and worldwide interaction is imminent, there must be points of reference that will build the sort of philosophical and educational bases for a "new" understanding of man; that might make us respect one another not only in this nation but in distant lands as well.

In this regard, as a chief administrator of a college or an institution of higher education, the author would encourage the faculty to propose the following must areas of study:

- 1. Political Science;
- Geography;
- Global Conflict versus Cooperative efforts;
- 4. International law; and, lastly,
- 5. Transportation and Communication systems.

To be sure, the potential for a dean or a vice-president in this area is virtually unlimited. Specifically, he can organize or institute relevant field trips, invite guest lecturers, and have video presentations, etc. all with the specific objective or value of raising the consciousness of each student so that he/she will become increasingly concerned for all other human beings.

The reader should bear in mind too the fact that a few universities already have stopped teaching in buildings, classrooms, and stationary facilities and are instead renting space in ocean liners--teaching and "pausing" all over the world.

Insofar as evaluation techniques are concerned, a truly worthy student would demonstrate his ability to frame questions and focus upon problems, issues and

concerns that have bearing on the <u>cohesion</u> of people, both at home and on a worldwide basis.

Theme V: Healthy Habitat

Stated simply this theme involves where and how we live. When World War II ended, America heaved a great sigh of relief. The end of the war meant the end of rationing, rent control, paper drives, irritating shortages and a whole host of sacrifices Americans willingly made to defeat our enemies. More importantly, it returned to our homeland the many veterans who had fought so hard for so long. Now they were free to seek their dreams of the "good life" and to secure the scarce resources that were again available to the American consumer. And, they did so with a zest that changed the face of America.

The returning veterans attended college, entered the job market, married, raised families--and moved to suburbia. It was natural. Few questioned the results and even fewer accurately measured the effects of suburban development upon the urban centers.

while our energies were spent on the development of suburban paradises that were available to those who could afford it, and who were, in particular, not minority Americans. Thus, what 30 years ago, started

as the search for the "good life" became the desperate flight to suburban safety. What began as a choice became the imperative. As an administrator of an institution of higher education, the author would be especially concerned about the housing patterns of the future. In addition, he would be concerned too with the proper use of energy, weight, design strengths, and access to both housing and transportation, etc. and would therefore influence the faculty to insure that a core curriculum be made or initiated to treat at least the following:

- 1. Architecture and design;
- 2. Road Construction and transportation;
- 3. Space explorations;
- 4. Ocean living;
- 5. Urban living;
- 6. Rural living; and, lastly,
- 7. Use of leisure time.

And, as applicable to the aforementioned situations or themes, evaluation would hinge on know-ledge and demonstrated competency via written or oral examinations, creative expression, field experience(s) and/or some "approved" equivalent means of assessing precisely what the student knows about one or more of the above areas of study.

Theme VI: Productivity

For our <u>sixth</u> and final category, as a vicepresident or chief administrator of an institution of
higher education, the author would encourage the faculty
to create hypothetical situations where the student will
have to demonstrate the ability to frame questions
in meaningful/useful ways as well as adopt strategies leading to "problem-foci" or answers about the
following, namely:

- 1. When have we as a nation or society had too much growth?
- 2. What is the right trade balance? This question obviously has implications for at least two major points of view, i.e. to what extent are we as a nation supporting something that is neither economically or morally legitimate? Furthermore, one does not need an academic degree to see that in either case we yet attempt to help other nations (like Germany, Japan and South Africa) to our economic and moral detriment. In all three, to be sure, said countries have systematically displayed a history of cruelty, barbarism and aggression in dimensions surpassing previous human experience.
- 3. To what extent should the future job market consider automation, and consumer trends, et al.? Thus, it is imperative for the well-developed student to know something about:

- a. economics;
- b. law:
- c. marketing and/or advertising;
- d. international trade; and, lastly,
- e. job trends.

in terms of the value or the emphasis placed on specialization. But it is the author's belief that higher education in the future ought to provide some options for people who wish to generalize. To be sure, the author's point of view is biased to the extent that he believes that we can no longer afford to have everyone thinking about his/her tiny or narrow areas of specialization; on the contrary, we need people who concentrate even as they learn a great deal more about many, many things. Putting the point in another fashion: due to a myriad of problems confronting us as a society, today, specialization should no longer be the rule of thumb.

Still further, as the author sees it, a dean or a vice-president or basically any authority figure today must respond to at least basically three notions or considerations, viz.:

- Upholding the missions or standards of their respective institution;
- 2. Implementing values education; and, lastly,

3. Continually being aware of and availing the institution of all possible funding sources.

To be sure, no college or university is isolated in this day and age, as with tri-speed satellite-beamed video, the college or university brings a reasonable facimile of the world to each student.

We are now in a position to answer another "key" question and that is precisely what do these values imply when considering the structure of a degree program within a higher institute of learning? 11 more specifically, what kinds of experiences would a college provide which would serve to enhance the appreciation of the aforementioned values? To begin with, all of the values mentioned earlier cover a wide range of concerns as they fall both into the social and natural science fields. Thus, the author proposes that specific courses would be designed and implemented to promote and deal effectively with the aforementioned requisite values--and said courses should be required of all students at the entry level of their respective degree programs. As an alternative to this, however, should those in positions of authority not see this as a "proper" course to chart then said courses in moral

ll Naturally, the author is assuming that an authority or one who is in a position of authority with high resources and low constraints would be in the "ideal" situation. Unfortunately, however, this is oftentimes not the case at all.

or values education could be offered to students in the form of electives, which provide more individual freedom of selection and consequently increased curiousity and interest.

In addition to the above, and for quite some time now, the author has argued that the philosophical (values) curriculum slant or point of view, if instituted on a mass scale at such institutions as MSU will probably lead to more ethical or value conscious people. At the very least, in this regard, such efforts and exposure would, undoubtedly, sharpen one's powers of critical thinking.

Additionally, not only should students be given the opportunity to look quite closely at such moral values, but faculty and administrators also have a responsibility to stay informed about and offer some individual contribution(s) to understanding the world problems facing them. Staff development and training could very easily provide a seminar or seminars which would deal specifically with world issues, utilizing group discussion techniques for the formulation of individual, departmental and university goals and programs which would respond to these and "other" world issues. To be sure, various members of each department's faculty could be required to conduct said seminars on a rotation basis,

perhaps each month or so, depending on the size of the faculty, etc.

each educator ought to develop a philosophical basis, methodology and values approach to teaching, whether or not he/she happens to be in the actual classroom setting, that will enable, especially those students in higher education, to develop higher levels of moral reasoning. The author supports this premise and, furthermore, takes the position that each educator has a moral responsibility to systematically and rationally investigate and develop not only their own value stance, but, of at least equal importance, to continually raise and attempt to resolve the crucial dilemmas that confront all of us in the 20th century.

within the past decade students have become more individualistic in their attitudes toward moral values in regard to higher education. In developing an effective degree program which keeps the importance of values strongly in mind, it is of prime importance that a systematic evaluation method be developed which would measure the change in attitudes following a relevant class. Measurements used for the evaluation would include whether or not the person has moved from an individualistic to a world perspective and if the class

has been successful in changing the student's overall attitudes and values concerning world issues.

If it is true that it doesn't really matter what we teach but the attitudes we utilize in our teaching, our attitudes toward the moral issues confronting the world today are certain to affect the individuals with whom we communicate in the classroom or in a given faculty meeting. It is, therefore, up to each educator to make sure he/she takes responsibility for affecting moral values affecting all of humanity as well as to consistently remind others of theirs. To quote Peccei:

I am fully determined to continue my reflections on man and his future, although I do not know what the next phase will be nor how long it might last. My great hope is to have contributed—in the small measure accorded to one person—to the rebirth of man's spirit, without which the entire human system will revert to conceptions or extreme conditions which will lead it to ruination. But I have faith in man—and I believe in the human revolution which, even at the price of great sacrifices and suffering, will in the long run enable him to triumph. 12

In conclusion of this chapter, then, the author wishes to stress the point that the significance of all life processes and their relationship to our ecological condition is certainly a realistic and crucial value to transmit to students, at this particular point in time. This is especially true vis-a-vis higher education where

¹² Aurelio Peccei, The Human Quality (New York: The Pergamon Press, 1977), p. 205.

students will soon be taking on the responsibility for relieving the earth from technological destruction and wanton waste and abuse.

Another value that is relevant to contemporary society and thus, higher education, is the importance of a united humanity. To be sure, conflict between races and cultures coupled with the world's starvation problem have created a need for a higher level of consciousness concerning each human being's relationship to all other human beings. Thus, the prospect of "world-survival" may soon be dependent upon how willing those who are in possession of vast sums of material wealth are willing to share with those who have little or no resources at all!

Lastly, the world population problem poses yet another challenge insofar as moral values and higher educational institutions are concerned. Should, for instance, family planning ideas and methods be taught to students? And, to what extent should they be taught? In a very real sense, students cannot be expected to take responsibility for their sexuality and the children they bring into the world unless they have first been adequately informed as to the need for such responsibility on both an individual and on a world-wide scale.

In the final analysis, such a focus regarding moral values within a higher educational system does not in any way take away from the general educational role or mission of the institution; on the contrary, it simply adds to the personal development of its individual students. It is the author's belief then that personal development or a broadening of both the mental (cognitive) and moral perspectives are necessary for the attainment of learning in its <u>fullest</u> sense. To quote T. S. Eliot for one final time:

The ideal is a life in which one's livelihood, one's function as a citizen, and one's self-development all fit into and enhance each other. 13

¹³T. S. Eliot, op. cit., p. 104.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The author has attempted to argue in this dissertation the point that it is <u>now</u> time for a "new" renaissance in morality. That is, given the fact that we live in a world characterized by international terrorism and highjacking; sex scandals and dishonesty in government; marked fear on many of our nation's college campuses; increasing incidents of student's cheating and reliance on "dangerous" chemical substances (as the typical state-of-affairs, today, rather than the exception) it is no wonder then that the appeal to norms and values, in this society may, for the most part, not seem rewarding for so many.

In this regard, the author further argues that since colleges and universities exist in a wider social context, and thus sometimes its members do reflect the prominent negative values of the larger society—from the skyrocketing campus crime rates to student and faculty indifference with respect to the denigrating of our educational institutions—this then must be viewed as one of the major challenges facing both our educational institutions and society today.

problems, but they have grown to historic and frightening dimensions. Putting the point thus, and in keeping with the major focus of the dissertation, perhaps the increasing reliance on chemicals and other dangerous substances to avoid the stresses, anxieties, and discomforts of modern civilization constitutes a harsh warning that many aspects of modern civilization are for many people, intolerable.

Additionally, the author further argued the point that if there is to be any hope for the future, via a "revolution" in values, then we must look to educators, (and professional philosophers) and ask what can they do by virtue of their training and disciplines to help stabilize this nation's existence? In other words, putting the question in a little different form, the author asked: What can educators do in order to find new directions by which we as a society can begin to move forward, rather than continue our backward decline?

All of these blatant negative dimensions do suggest, however, the fact that we are in the midst of an extremely unsettled season and troubled age and, still further, in desperate need of new educational and moral leadership. It is possible that the roots of these serious negative maladies may well lie in the way

we treat each other in our families, our schools, our churches, and on our jobs. Furthermore, if we as a society attempted to reduce the harshness we display toward one another—thus, by implication, reducing the level of violence in this nation and, still further, make a concerted effort to increase our respect for one another—many of our present moral/values problems would be well on the way to becoming serious problems of the past.

This becomes increasingly important especially in trying to deal with the role of values within the context of the educational society in which we live. For example, it is precisely the breed of teachers and administrators who determine which values will be passed on to posterity. In addition to the above, the author further argued that one does not need an academic degree to realize that one cannot separate his/her education from the value(s) climate of their society. Thus, the very process of educating is ALWAYS dependent on who "knows" what about nature to pass on to whom; in what form, when and where! It is important for the reader to bear in mind too the fact that students, faculty members and, in some instances, administrators are today moreso than ever before questioning the traditional roles that American universities have assumed (or failed to assume, as the case may be) in

education, research, and service to the larger society. Furthermore, the value assumptions related to the universities' posture on foreign and, especially, domestic policies are also being challenged. Lastly. in this regard, the author has argued the point that this questioning and challenging have taken many forms, and that we cannot help but remember them today as the "whirlwind of events" that came to us in the early sixties. To be sure, we were all astonished at the disrespectful, not to mention hostile, behavior of the rioting students of the sixties. They burned school records, marched on deans, took over university buildings, challenged professors in mid-lecture, boycotted courses, demanded the right to hire and fire faculty, to design curricula, to set degree requirements, and to censor course content for "relevance." We should have seen the whirlwind coming, but we didn't.

For a detailed discussion of this point, please refer to THE UNIVERSITY AND SOCIETY, a speech presented to the new university faculty on September 15, 1970 by Dr. Robert L. Green . . . at that time, Assistant Provost and Director of the Center for Urban Affairs, Michigan State University. He noted that " . . . They have ranged from picketing, singing and marching in front of the administration buildings in the mid 1960s, to the teach-ins during the 1966-67 period, to the ill-fated events of Orangeburg in the latter part of 1968, to Kent State University and Jackson State College of the past spring, to the unfortunate bombing of a research center at the University of Wisconsin . . "

The 21st century will soon be upon us, bringing with it past and present unresolved moral and educational dilemmas (i.e. "old" values crises) as well as new ones that are yet unforeseen; if we fail to focus the requisite amount of attention and a great deal of our resources and energy on this aspect of American society then, in the opinion of the author, we cannot possibly hope to survive. In a word, in reflecting about the campus crisis, in the midst of a highly advanced (mass) technological society, it is the opinion of the author that Nietzsche's prophetic warnings may be all too true--unless we as a society manifest a radical advance in ethics and morality, to match our progress in science and technology, then the end result may very likely be the eventual total destruction of this world.

Perhaps the essential mission of higher education then is to enable the individual to live a life which is at once <u>reasonably</u> satisfactory to himself and those around him. Thus in a very real sense, this dissertation is all about values—past, present and future; and how we can begin to educate our students in the not too distant future, to assume full responsibility for the <u>entire</u> Planet.

The author concludes this dissertation then by emphasizing the point that the study of the role that

values should play in higher educational settings is appropriate, essential, timely, and plausible to the overall mission of higher education. Education today has become a "giant" field in its own right, as it organizes, instructs, criticizes, researches, transmits context, analyzes and actually prepares every single person on this earth, either directly or indirectly, for whatever he/she wishes to do in life. For without educators and teachers, all other professions would literally grind to a halt.

But education can become an even greater force in the future if educators were willing to institute values education both in an academic and in a practical sense, in their respective universities. That way, students might begin to see as a result of personal examples and personal commitment faculty members and administrators giving more than merely "lip service" to values.

Obviously, there is a difference between commitment and action. As a famous educator once noted: "Education is as much the development of insights, directions, and motivations as it is amassing facts and skills."

²Dr. Paul L. Dressel, in a final lecture presented for the Education 965c course, i.e. Seminar In Evaluation.

As the author looks forward to the future, he maintains that as we try to plan for our own future—especially insofar as both our educational and moral perspectives are concerned—the business of educators will and must be to try and better equip us to live in a world that will have mutual respect for all others on the face of this planet, and possibly beyond, as we are on the edge of the unknown in space ventures too.

We of the 20th century cannot afford to make the same mistakes that educators in antiquity often made, as they were mainly concerned with systems of knowledge which were altogether oriented to the past. In other words, the chief responsibility of educators today can only be to orient our knowledge toward future perspectives. 3

It is no wonder then that students all over the nation are uttering the all too familiar words of Edward D. Eddy, Jr.: "Faculty members are accused of being devoid of any genuine sense of concern for the

In a word, the author maintains that if historians of the past have taught us anything, they have taught us that we cannot afford to wait until the stresses and ills that are upon us are of crisis or epidemic proportions, before we seek to do anything about them. Nazism, the glaring fact of the twentieth century, is a case in point of this.

entire fabric of education including student responsibility and morality."4

In the final analysis, the author submits that the following thoughts, written by Maria Montessori, most aptly sum up the point of this dissertation:



I, too, believe that humanity is still far from that stage of maturity needed for the realization of its aspirations, for the construction, that is, of a harmonious and peaceful society and the elimination of wars. Men are not yet ready to shape their own destinies; to control and direct world events, of which—instead—they become the victims . . . If help and salvation are to come, they can only come from the children, for the children are the makers of men."

Lastly, world peace flows inevitably when there is harmony in the nation, security in the community, order in the home, and calm and self-assurance within the self. Still further, the author believes that a much greater emphasis <u>must</u> be placed on the personal, mental (cognitive), psycho-motor, and moral perspectives if we are to enable our students to attain a "proper" TOTAL education. This becomes apparent when we reflect about the significance of the preservation of all life

Edward D. Eddy, "What Happened to Student Values?" Educational Record (56), 1977.

⁵This information was obtained from a Holy Cross Montessori School Newsletter, Summer/1978, page 4.

processes and this vis-a-vis both our ecological conditions and our <u>personal welfare</u> as certainly a viable and desirable value to transmit to students; if we hope to do an apt job of preparing them for the responsibility which they will inherit, prior to the start of the 21st century.

It is a truism that you cannot have a better world until you have better people. And on, and on, and on, until we have the sort of world in which people will have profound respect for <u>all</u> life, including life in outer space and/or on the floors of the oceans.

Accordingly, all education is and ought to be value-based. Hence, mankind must begin to educate itself from now on quite differently, especially in respect to dealing with concepts about moral values. In this regard, students, faculty and staff members then must be persuaded to keep values education in the forefront of their thinking and instruction—while at the same time developing the cognitive and affective qualities of the people who they are teaching.

Some final remarks as to the major assumptions implicit in this study and kind of result aimed at are in order. First, as to value judgments (and especially those of a moral and ethical nature): it has been assumed that these mainly arise in attempting to solve

social problems, or associated groups of such problems. A second assumption is that civilized societies aim at making such judgments <u>reasoned</u> ones, growing out of critical reflection upon all the relevant data. These are points upon which philosophers as different (and as remote from each other in time) as Plato and Dewey would endorse. Alternatives to this approach to the development of value standards are all, at bottom, varieties of authoritarianism.

It would appear that the general principles of a democratic society indirectly involve the assumption that value standards must be rationally defensible; shown as the reasoned-out solutions to social problems; viewed in the light of the relevant data; and in their connection with other value-standards which are similarly based.

As for the results aimed at: obviously these could not consist of solutions, of a finished code of value-judgments and value standards. The aim instead was to map out areas of study containing the facts bearing upon problem-areas about values in contemporary American society. Study of these social problems showed that the standard organization of university studies isolates inquiries which jointly bear on the social issues discussed. It is argued that these dividing walls need to have openings made in them. And especially it has been

argued that many subjects have ignored evaluative aspects—ignored sometimes out of tradition, sometimes for practical reasons, sometimes on the basis of theory (the theory, for instance, that the "cognitive" and "affective" aspects of experience can and ought to be sharply separated). In a word, one of the major points argued in this dissertation is the need for the inter-relatedness of the two aforementioned domains.

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