OVERDUE FINES ARE 25¢ pER DAY PER ITEM Return to book drop to remove thls checkout from your record. ,. «— P \ I 3 . «I : 6 Copyri ght by Phi1 ‘ip L. Johnson, Jr. 1979 COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT 0F NEGATION AND TRANSCENDENCE IN EMANCIPATORY SOCIAL THEORY By Philip L. Johnson, Jr. A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology 1979 ABSTRACT COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF NEGATION AND TRANSCENDENCE IN EMANCIPATORY SOCIAL THEORY By Philip L. Johnson, Jr. A vision materializes with increasing clarity throughout the course of this work. It is an image of the formidable constraints con- fronted by humankind in the struggle to be free. It is perhaps most awesomely portrayed in the epochal Promethean bondage, both immanently and externally imposed, as the price of our audacious seizure of self-formative prerogatives. In this study we follow the~historical journey of the symbolic bearer of secularized reason through a host of actors. Across the stage of history, Prometheus was played by the exemplary figures of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Bakunin, Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas, now by philosopher, now by political activist, now by social scientist. Yet in each instance the exigencies of the social context demanded that the role of humankind, symbolized by Prometheus, be played within the confines of scholarly disciplines or social move— ments which singularly assumed the burden of a vastly more diverse but preconscious humanity. Each actor in the Promethean tradition depicted humanity as an essentially collective being. Each depicted human existence and freedom cumulatively as dependent on the collective self-determination of humanity as social and collective being. The visionary actors de- picted humankind as originating in streams that distilled from the Philip L. Johnson, Jr. mists of a host of virgin societies. And these in turn had converged in a vast proliferation of new eddies and currents whose total config- uration presented a mosaic--the totality of human culture. But each (as a consequence of the limits of the age) found him/herself advo- cating collective self-realization in the tradition of pre-Promethean egoism, either monologically or within a closed revolutionary structure. This study in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge ex- amines that seeming paradox in terms of the historical context of the aforementioned thinkers. It is intended to shed light on the dilemma of scholarly appeals fbr collective transcendence in the absence of a truly interactional collective structure. It is intended to assess the exigencies of a praxis that seemingly precluded collective self- realization, but more than this, the focus of the study is oriented to those phenomena whose current opaqueness Obscures analysis of our own times in terms of their ripeness for collective emancipation. In effect, we examine the relationship of ideas and the people of ideas (theory) to the context of Western industrial society. Hence we selected several contemporary scholars oriented to the tradition of Hegel and Marx, who had likewise attempted to apply those precepts to the unique problems of industrial society. Had Karl Mannheim, Max Horkheimer, and Jurgen Habermas re- turned to their origins in Hegel and Marx, this study finds that their orientation would surely have been directed not to the elaboration of abstract theoretical formulations, but rather to the juncture of theory and praxis. Marx, embroiled in a class struggle that only anticipated collective self-realization, had left guidelines, but in keeping with the essential core of his work, they could only be realized out of the Philip L. Johnson, Jr. concrete contradictions of the life-world. This study contends that an emancipatory theory consistent with that tradition (that seriously anticipates significant consequences) must realize collective self- realization collectively and with the full participation and support of those to be emancipated. DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Prometheus and all who have breathed warmth into that ancient dream. To Dad's memory and the beginning in a selfless love. To June,who for awhile shared a dream. To Chris,who infused fresh spirit into an all but shattered dream and to "Ma," Greg, Kave, Linda, Martha, Owen, and Steve,whose courage and forbear- ance formed the dedicated and supportive "praxis" without which the theoretical work could never have been conceived and gestated. Perhaps our time is at hand. Perhaps 'tis an age or two away somewhere between here and eternity. But we have shared the Promethean dream in a tra- dition that humbles our small part--and out of our loneliness and fears we have ventured to love. That portent is its own reward. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There is a certain sobering futility in any effort to ack- nowledge one's inspiration and guidance for that amounts in a very real sense to a recounting of the history of one's own experience and of the multitudes who played a significant formative role. I am especially appreciative of the seminars and discussions offered by Dr. Ruth Hamilton of Michigan State University, Dr. William Brazill of Wayne State University, and Dr. Oliver Wendel Holmes of the University of Michigan. I am appreciative of Dr. Jurgen Habermas' willingness to ac- cept visitors in his seminar at Haverford and the University of Penn- sylvania in l976. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Julian Gervasi for the friendship and profound wealth of Hegelian scholarship which he so willingly Shared. I am also grateful for the humane concern and dedication that has shown through in my many conversations with the late Dr. Arnold Kaufman of the Uni- versity of Michigan. Among the most stimulating experiences of my student years were the lasting friendship and continuing critical dia- logue of two close colleagues, Michael Smith, now of the University of California, and Christopher Bell. It was particularly in dialogue and exchange with Christopher that the enthusiasm for the undertaking of so vast and evasive a goal was sustained. Finally I have been given both a personal and academic inspir- ation by the good members of my committee. Dr. John Useem’s compas- sionate guidance has been a sustaining force throughout my graduate years. Dr. Peter Lyman's sharp and impassioned scholarship brings a unity and feeling of challenge and comraderie to the intellectual endeavor. Dr. Rick Hill's dedication and serious commitment to human emancipation gives academia a humane quality, backed by rigorous scholarship. Finally, to Dr. James B. McKee, I express profound grat- titude and respect. His own position is always agressively and cour- ageously taken. Yet his students have beentreated to a humility in which his expertise and deep-felt human concerns have been made avail- able not as a harsh authority but as a basis of inspiration and gui- dance to an active role in the community of scholars. Not only has he given tirelessly in the preparation of this study but he has pro- vided a model of both teacher and friend to which I shall always aspire. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ...................... l A Frame of Reference ................. l The Problem and Its Assumptions ........... 2 The Problem: Its Cumulative Conceptual Grounding . . l0 Classic Liberalism ................ 10 German Idealism .................. ll Marx's Critics .................... 20 The Social-Intellectual Grounding of Marx's Critical Theorists ............... 20 Karl Mannheim ................... 23 Max Horkheimer .................. 24 Jurgen Habermas .................. 25 The Theoretical Linkage of Theory and Praxis in Critical Theory .................. 28 From Critical Theory: A Return to the Fundamental Basis in Hegel and Marx .............. 35 II KANT .......................... 45 Kant: A Categorical Challenge to Feudalism ..... 45 III HEGEL ......................... 62 Negation and the Dialectic .............. 69 Established Dialectic Context of Freedom ....... 77 Hegel's Paradox: The Abstract "Ground" of Collectivity .................... 80 Civil Society .................... 84 The State ...................... 94 From Unity to an Abstracted Social Being ....... 103 Hegel's Flirtation with the Liberal State ...... 110 The Owl of Minerva .................. 115 The Support of Negation ............... 122 The Role of Negation: Transcendence and Social Existence ..................... 125 Page IV MARX .......................... 131 The Origins of Marx's Materialist Challenge to Hegel . 131 The Hegelian Heritage: The Exigencies of a Secular- ized Reason .................... 139 Transformative Method: Origins of Secularized Reason ...................... 142 The Transformative Method and the Philosophy of the State ....................... 149 Marx and Hegel: The Organization of Emancipation as Embodiment of "Species-Being" ........... 155 The Strategic Origins of Class Conflicts ....... 166 Marx's Political Grounding .............. 171 The Utopians ..................... 176 The Proletariat ................... 181 Toward a Transcendental Support System: Beyond Class Conflict ...................... 189 The Hegelian Critique of Marx: The Pitfalls of Concrete Negation Without Communal Praxis . . . 198 V MARX AND BAKUNIN .................... 219 Marx and the Hegelian Dilemma ............ 219 The Exigencies of Praxis: Solidarity Versus the Dialectic ..................... 233 The Proletariat: A Selected Image of Solidarity . . . 234 The Industrial Proletariat and the Struggle for State Power .................... 241 Power in the International .............. 245 Bakunin: In the Absence of Historical Dialogue . . . 250 The Function of a Leadership Beyond the People . . . . 268 The Collective Dependency of the Secularization of Consciousness: The Control of Alienation, Other and Self-Imposed .................. 281 VI MANNHEIM ........................ 302 The Analysis of Ideology ............... 307 Mannheim's Neutralization of Ideology ........ 307 The Analysis of the Intellegentsia .......... 313 VII HORKHEIMER ....................... 321 Critical Theory ................... 321 Horkheimer ...................... 323 The Critique of Positivism: Horkheimer's Early Flirtation with Materialist Dialectics ....... 325 Critical Theory as Dialectic Synthesis vs Intellec- tualized Synthesis ................ 329 The Early Allegiance to Materialist Dialectics . . . . 334 vi Disillusionment: The Resurrection of the Bourgeois Philosopher .................... Transcendence of Traditional Dialectics: Toward an Intellectual Synthesis .............. Horkheimer's Legacy to the Critical Theory of Habermas ..................... VIII HABERMAS ....................... Habermas, Hegel, and Marx .............. A Critique of Materialism: Toward an Intellecual- ized Material Synthesis .............. Knowledge-Constitutive Interests .......... The Theory of Communicative Competence ....... The Ideal Speech Situation ............. Dialogue Constitutive (Pragmatic) Universals A Critique of Pure Discourse ............ Theory and Praxis .................. Levels of Generalization ............ The Retrospective Posture of Reflection ..... The Separation of Enlightenment from Praxis . . . The Teacher-Analyst as Authority ........ The Separation of Theory and Enlightenment from Struggle: Habermas' Rationale .......... Risks in the Theory-Praxis Nexus ........ The Separation of Theory from Struggle ..... Theory as Emancipatory Struggle ......... On Value Freedom Revisited ............. IX THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPREHENSION: THE EXIGEN- CIES 0F COLLECTIVE NEGATION AND TRANSCENDENCE IN SOCIAL THEORY ........................ Theory and Emancipatory Praxis ........... Expertise and Authority in Struggle ......... Toward a Theory of Emancipatory Praxis ....... Collective Synthesis .............. The Collectivity as Transcendental Unity Synthesis: The "Aufheben" of Alienation BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................... vii Page 340 353 368 376 379 381 384 391 395 397 403 407 411 413 415 417 426 429 438 441 444 450 451 458 462 462 464 469 479 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION A Frame of Reference Wild sociology will encourage radicalism. Yet it will be hard on its own radicalism, suspecting further evils from its own activity should it presume upon its relation to the lay community. It may well be that the daily practice of sociology encourages arrogance on the part of its members, undermining the very resources of humanism with a numb pro- fessionalism or the shrill cry of ideology. If this is not to happen wild sociology must make a place for itself, and to accomplish this it must engage h0pe and utOpia. H0pe is the time it takes to make the place in which men think and talk and work together. Thus wild sociolo y is essentially engaged in the education of the oppressed (O'Neill, 1976, p. 9 . Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses (Marx, 1967, p. 257). It will be the central assumption of this study that these maxims constitute not merely the guidelines for the "pedagogy of the oppressed," but a sense of community with those of us who are Oppressed (Spiritually and/or physically) and are striving to include in the dialogue of theory the thinking, talking, and working to- gether of which O'Neill and Marx Spoke so eloquently. It is in the light of this ideal of praxis that I will undertake a critique of the social theories of Karl Mannheim, Max Horkheimer, and Jurgen Habermas. The Problem and Its Assumptions According to ancient mythology, it was Prometheus whose brazen defiance of the gods simultaneously removed the stigma from secularized reason and enabled humanity. Representing the unity of divinity and mortality, his journey in search of human self-emancipation began be- fore recorded time. It was a lonely passage enshrouded in fear, born of misery, and touched only occasionally by a hint, a glimpse, a dis- tant image, of a being beyond the survival struggles of his prehis- toric origins. Prometheus relieved his divine ancestry of their monopoly on creative action and thought. But his pennance was not the price of defiance alone. Rather it was a trauma of the metamorphosis and transfiguration of our deepest humanity. We could not merely be free. We could not merely declare ourselves free. We had to learn to be free while chained to the bedrock of chaotic existence, while deformed by bestial assaults on our being. Ever so slowly we became aware that we could only martial the wisdom and strength necessary to sever those bonds in a vast Herculean alliance with our brother and sister mortals, now, ever so slowly, as a consequence of their very involvement in the emancipatory act, impregnated by a seed bearing a Species-potential and su5pended in an ephemeral elixir-~critical reason. Sadly, it has taken endless ages to learn that since we were begotten in the highest heritage of the gods, those qualities were likewise linked to our deepest and most passionate mortality. Indeed, the most difficult lesson while we remain in bondage to our own irrationality is that our becoming free is an existentially conditioned characteristic whose teachers are.of necessity,presented in the configuration of life itself. We are self-taught. We teach each other to be free. We cannot be set free,for the irrational beast is also within ourselves. The Hercules who breaks our chains is ourselves in pedagogic interac- tion with the companions of our Species. Our strength is our unity. Our collective existence is the basis of our reason, and existence, in turn, is forged in the now secularized reason whose only distinction from divine mystification is its parental lineage from concrete exis- tence. We speak here with less poetry than is its due of the dialec- tic linkage of consciousness and existence. The secularization of reason, the claim made on the prerogatives of the gods by humankind, has thus involved what in modern jargon is known as the claim on theory by praxis. This study sets out to examine the work (and the contemporary critics) of three thinkers vitally con- cerned with that claim: Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Their work culminates in the latter's embodiment (objectification) of a concrete organiza- tional vehicle unequivocally committed to an emancipatory seculariza- tion of reason which, when carried to its logical end, conveys the prerogatives and the painful obligation of praxis via the totality of our human community. None of these thinkers, including Marx, realized this objective. But I think that with Marx's work, a final stanza was outlined in an emanicpatory anthem whose melody may be lost to our own inanition be- fore it is heard by all humankind. This is an analysis of certain of its key composers and their critics. The composers heard snatches of the melody, but it remained primarily in their minds, for the din of the struggle to advance freedom drowned the melody long after death claimed its mortal measure. As a result of the failure of those early 4 efforts to fully ground reason, emancipatory practice reflected a cer- tain ambiguity. It was this ambiguity, born in the exigencies of nineteenth century class struggle and resulting in an incomplete linkage of theory to prax- is, that was seized upon by a body of contemporary critics who set about to correct a deficiency which they believed they found in the theoretical works of Marx. These theorists then, though they paid minimal attention to the context of Marx's era and to his specifica- tion of praxis, set about to develop a conceptually saphisticated crit- icism of Marxian theory. I contend that what Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas missed was that Marx's "failure" was far less to be explained in his theory of collective emancipation than in the exigencies of a social-cultural context that precluded its realization. I further, perhaps more im- portantly, contend that any theory that claims lineage in the Hegel-Marx tradition and, as such.purports to contribute materially to the break- ing of the Promethean chains,must set out to construct a supportive social context in which the vital force of efficacious theory is re- alized in the mutually experienced struggles of concrete collective existence. I prOpose to undertake a theoretical study in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge. It would trace the issue of consciousness and action from a beginning in Kant, to Hegel and Marx, and then pro- ceed through Mannhehn,Horkheimer,and Habermas to the present. The work of Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas followed in the tradition of Hegel and Marx. All three addressed the nexus between theory and social action. Each expressed antipathy to the expediencies of Marx's praxis,presumably necessitated in the exigencies of struggle. Each responded with a remedial scheme. And each, it will be shown, fell victim to his own form of intellectual elite vanguardism. Each contemporary scholar was chosen for this study because he represented a unique perSpective on the linkage of theory and praxis, congealed sometimes under extreme bureaucratic and political duress. Each had firmly rejected capitalism. Each had recognized the danger of direct confrontation with the formidable structures associated with the political-economic system. On the other hand, each had shared the intellectual disillusionnment with Marxism that had become increasingly widespread since the turn of the century. Each undertook critiques of Marxism (Horkheimer and Habermas having declared themselves as Marx- ists). Each had identified a telling flaw--an element of positivism-- in Marxism which was deemed a significant factor in the decline of the Marxist dream into bureaucratization and totalitarianism. Each, as a result of this disillusionment and of other exigencies to be identified, attempted to seek a middle ground between capitalism and dogmatic Marxism. And each determined to pursue that middle ground by way of withdrawal of theory and/or pedagogy from the arena of struggle. I believe that the position of particularly the Critical Theor- ists, when analytically critiqued, promises fruitful insight into the relationship of theory and praxis. This study will set out to identify those insights from three areas of concern. (1) After having delivered fruitful critiques of Marxian praxis, what were the consequences of having withdrawn their own theoretical endeavors from praxis? (2) What was the nature of their withdrawal of theory from the exigencies of praxis? (We will set aside the judgment of whether these actions were necessitated, given the time in which each worked.) (3) Do alternative means of theorizing exist for this time and location in history that are more consistent with the Marx— ian admonition (to which they subscribed) to link theory and praxis? I will contend in this study that Marx's thg93y_of humanity as communal being was based on a concept that humankind is distin- guished both by its ability to do productive work and to creatively interact with others of the species. This implies that despite con- temporary critics (Habermas), Marx was profoundly cognizant of the central role not only of work, the material struggle for survival, but also of the interactional or inherently linguistic dialectic aspect of being. It must, of course, be granted that the revolutionary organiza- tion which he most directly influenced did not always reflect this breadth. From this it follows that his later elaborations of those conceptual components that were most pertinent to the immediate per- fbrmance of the revolutionary act did not radically extend interactional theory beyond the level of experience on which Marx had insisted its fbrmation must be contingent. Marx, I will insist, was not so naive as to advance the over- simplification of a narrowed instrumental determinism. Rather he was caught up in a period of revolutionary fervor. It was a period of class struggle that hardly lent itself to the realization of the pro- jected ideal. Rational dialogue within a communal context was only a 7 chimera whose mists, it turns out, require repeated distillation in concrete historical existence before their essential nectar can be im- bibed by the great body of humankind. Indeed, the larger development of that great humanistic dream was to extend vastly beyond Marx's time. Since he always insisted that theory must be developed out of the struggles of an era, he found no existential vehicles to the real- ization of a further grounding of theory beyond the class struggle of the mid—eighteenth century. The time was not ripe. Marx's life work was clearly an incomplete endeavor which he insisted could only be fully attained upon the fullest possible real- ization of our communal nature. The latter phases of this endeavor were to occur in an organization that consisted of those to be affected by the emancipatory action and which served as the concrete context of "dialectic transcendence." I will examine and criticize the work of Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas, each of whom initiated his work from a critique of Marx's theory. However, I will contend that in an effort to improve upon Marx it is either incumbent upon them to show how they would ground their theory in a concrete context or to demonstrate how they would either effect a more receptive con- text or successfully generate an effective theory abstractly. I have already indicated that I find their theories wanting precisely be- cause they fail to meet these criteria. Instead, while insightful in several respects, their theories are individualistically executed and sequestered from the people who would presumably live with the exis- tential consequences. What is more, their theories have not resulted in any notable emancipatory consequences. I will not presume to argue that the time Marx so long awaited 8 had arrived in the era of Mannheim and Horkheimer. However, I be— lieve that the same assessment does not necessarily apply to Habermas. In any event, I will question the potential efficacy of theories con- ceived apart from the participation of those to be affected by them. I will grant that a question remains whether the time for a dialectic transcendence in the Marxian genre has come. There are those who believe that the time is at hand, that the Western democracies present a context within which an organized effort dedicated to col- lective self-transcendence might survive. I cannot unequivocally place myself readily in that category. However, I have adopted that projection and acted upon it, not because I am convinced that it must inevitably come to pass but on the assumption that to do otherwise is not only to beckon p0pulation, environmental, and spiritual disaster, together with a host of concomitant calamities, but also to ignore an emancipatory impulse that must soon find its time or be cast aside as a utopian illusion. I believe that the thin line that separates utopian illusion from the realm of realistic possibility can be drawn with reasonable reliability on a perspective yielded up in a critical analysis of history. This, in brief, is the basis of my assumption. The awakening of commerce and trade provided the wings on which the Renaissance took flight and gave impetus to the Enlightenment and its great industrial and technological revolution. Yet we must assume that the first stages in the secularization of reason are not yet realized. Indeed, we base our hopes for the future on the assumption that we are in an awkward post-industrial stage in which excesses of this immediate post-Enlightenment period may be brought under the rational jurisdiction of the total human community before they turn back to themselves and augment the competitive impulses of the "bellum contra omnes" from which they Sprung. Perhaps vengence is still to be meted out by a vindictive div- inity against the Promethean audacity of our faith in secularized rea- son and emancipatory praxis. Perhaps we must experience a holocaust which follows as a culminating calamity of our cumulative savagery. If so, then the following pages are squandered in that arrogance. This study defies that prognosis and bases its assumption on the faith that the high-water mark of humanism has not yet been evidenced and that 'Wationalized"competition and possessive individualism may be tran- scended in the ultimate realization of our communal essence. I also base my work on the assumption that if_we may speak of a concept whose time is ripe, we must also allow that a time of fruition may equally be lost to overripeness and the infestation which rests in its potential either to rot and decay or to give sustenance. The awesome power provided by the purposive-rationality of post-industrial humanity may be taken, as I believe Marx did, as only the first phase of our Promethean legacy. It may be seen as a first burst which must be brought under rein in the process of our social-cultural maturation. It may also be interpreted as a somber portent of our scientized cap- acity to self-destruct. It must surely be acknowledged that unless the process of collective interaction is advanced, the apex of secular- ized reason may be reached prematurely and its purposive-rational precociousness might, if unchecked, facilitate a regression to barbar- ism. But technology and purposive-rationality may also be conceived as a necessary but insufficient triumph of the larger emancipatory 10 implications of the secularization of reason. In this event, our only option is to proceed forthwith to undertake the fullest realization of our collective essence. In order to assess the assumption that the time for collective action is at hand, I will attempt to reach into the past via the perspective of the sociology of knowledge. I will attempt to gain critical insightscuitherfistoricalstruggle to humanize reason and free humankind. I will enter upon that venture by tracing the historic develOpment and logical extension of the concept of collective transcendence that was integral to the work of Hegel and Marx. The sequence will be set by historical chronology. I will first give an overview of the problems confronted hieachtfistoricalsequence beginning with the first Kantian challenge to the purposive-rational criteria of liberalism. The Problem: Its Cumulative Conceptual Grounding Classic Liberalism I begin here with a brief reference to classic liberalism be- cause it was against this intellectual rationale of bourgeois individ- ualism that Hegel and Marx directed their fateful humanistic challenge. Within classic liberalism, there had been a sense inherited from revel- ation that reality was simply what was perceivable. Humankind was less the creator than the recipient of meaningful knowledge. For liberalism, meaning was generated individually on the basis of a pre- sumed inherent quality of human nature--what might be termed immacu- late perception--and the historical social context was of minimal significance. It followed that individuals were the formative factors. They, and not some abstract externality, were the rational instruments 11 of reality. Socio-political factors, like divine mystification, could only interfere with individual autonomy and, where possible, were to be eschewed. Community interest was essentially non sequitur. The pol- itical state had only the function of referee who prevented chaos in the struggle between self-sufficient and self-seeking individuals. To classic liberalism in general, the primary value of the col- lectivity was to place constraints on individuals otherwise engaged in an inherent war of all against all. It was in this self-interested struggle that humankind mes to attain full appreciation of the fruits of enlightened self-interest. Human values inclusive of the concept of truth were clearly in jeOpardy. German Idealism The German idealists, Kant and Hegel, reversed the priorities and established the collectivity as an intrinsic primary essence. Kant initiated the process by challenging the liberal notion that reality was what was perceivable. Further, Hegel insisted that to establish meaning and consciousness, raw perceptions must pass through frames of reference conditioned by historical-cumulative social structures (by the collectivity). Kant, undertaking an early critique of the liberal tradition (particularly John Locke) had initiated a demystification of the source of human knowledge. In his effort to preserve values from the pervasive instrumental calculus of classic liberalism (bourgeois individualism), he had raised a seminal issue. How are disparate perceptions united to give meaning? His answer, simply put, was that the unification-~a transcendental unity--was a functional quality of the individual mind. 12 Hence-~and the immense importance of his insight should not be lost in our critique of Kant--reality, including even the previously rigid- ified subordination of human will to the mystification of sacred forces, could from this point be more readily conceived within a secu- larized realm. A crucial step in the secularization of reason had been taken. Kant's effort, also intended to preserve scientific truth, dichotomized the individual and the essential components of the fixa- tion of belief (phenomena and noumena). His intention was to protect "eternal" values from the exigencies of the phenomenal world. He had simply assumed the a priori qualities of the noumena as universal and apprehendable via the categories of the mind. In that sense, these qualities were protected from the uncertainties of human existence. He paid a price, the consequences of which this study will examine in its treatment of Critical Theory. However, in the process he suc- ceeded in retaining the conceptual apparatus (essence) within which Hegel was to generate his historical-cumulative "common interest." That is, he left to Hegel a conceptualization of the basis on which we might aspire to or even constitute our own essence. The Kantian categories themselves were ontologically fixed in the nature of the human mind (e.g., Spatiality and temporality). It was to be Hegel's insight that historicized the categorical a priori and that pointed out that the categories were not fixed in nature, but were rather historically-culturally structured frames of reference through which raw perceptions passed to acquire their meaning. It was Hegel's critique of Kant that brought the omnipotence and omniscience of the universe within the direct awe-stricken grasp of 13 both sheep and goat-reprobates alike. History had begun with the gradual, cumulative domestication of the beast, whose early ages had required a father protector. The Renaissance witnessed the predomin- ance of a mutant, a half-human/half-beast whose hooves were enmired in the world of non-consciousness and fear, but whose humanized mind was already reaching to the firmament. In its turn, the Enlightenment had brought the twilight of the satyr and the birth of a human being who must now build and maintain a self as a conscious potential to be reckoned with in nature. The chains of Prometheus were being frac- tured. Humanity was for the first time in a position to complete a meta- morphosis begun with the first social groupings. Hegel's critique of Kant and the liberal tradition allowed that there was a human potential in each individual but that the metamorphosis to consciousness of the full human potential (freedom) could only occur in a social context. What is more, it was a profoundly awesome, indeed terrifying, fate. He had elevated the concept of the common interest from obscurity to a central functional category. Perceptions must pass through categories to acquire meaning, but they were not austere and a priori as Kant had insisted. Rather, they were historical, and hence, both dependent upon and amenable to an existential context created by humanity itself. The father-protector was being abandoned and the conscious adoption of change meant that we must also consciously_submit our very being itself to self-annihilation and rebirth. Through work and the division of labor, we would experience not only a confidence in our ability to change but also alternative ways of life. These exper- iences implied not only a new way but the horrendous reality of personal 14 negation. Birth and death dwelled within the realm of an emancipated consciousness. Thus, for Hegel, although the potential for both self¥and com- munal interest existed in the individual, their realization could only be objectified in the collectivity--in the division of labor. The opportunity of death and rebirth was the meaning of freedom and for him the collective form of freedom was symbolized by the state. Clearly freedom could not be conceived as an arbitrary grasp at alter- natives that were intuitively apprehendable in an endless and relativ- istic flux. Rather,freedom was self-realization grounded within the collective on the basis of existentially conditioned criteria. Only in historical social existence could we constitute the highest potential for self-realization. Self-realization was collectively embedded. The rub was that what had begun as a symbol became reified. That is, he modeled his system on the classic liberal structure of the Prussian State and, for lack of sufficient qualification, effectively adorned it with an ontological mask that partially removed the collectivity from history and the full creative imagination of the citizenry. This stopped him Short of an unconstrained dialectic transcendence. Hegel's historical structures consequently remained abstract and static. While the collective "spirit" had been located in society, he separated the holder of the spirit (the state) from the actual collectivity (civil society). Individual development-~the empirically grounded processes of dialectic transcendence (the develOpment from sense certainty to self-consciousness embedded in the concepts of. objectification, negation, and transcendence)--occurred within civil society. It was here that individual interests were exercised, 15 mediated by legislative bodies and "disinterested" bureaucrats ap- pointed by the constitutional monarch. Within this Sphere our human potential became "objectified" or concretized in the course of his- tory. It was here that our individual interest was grounded mater- ially. On the other hand, Hegel's critics, particularly Marx, have observed that the collective aspect of the individual was located apart from and, in a sense, antagonistic to material existence (civil society). Within Hegel's model the universal essence, our humanistic spirit, was seated in the state and embodied in the monarch. As qual- ities of the state and monarch, the humane essence was abstracted from the individual and grounded with the power to enforce its will as a Single entity separated from the pe0ple to be affected. Likewise, Marx believed that Hegel restricted the philoSOpher to an abstract analysis of the relationship of the collective essence to change in the realm of material existence. That is, his analysis was retrospec- tive. This left a paradox. The paradox was that Hegel "grounded" the collective essence only abstractly and never realized a concrete historical basis on which the essence might have been realized in praxis. But he had moved a crucial league beyond liberalism. In a sense, even the Prussian State functioned to humanize the bourgeoisie and represent the communal value that was our essence. Indeed, one might venture the somewhat extravagant claim that what Hegel antici- pated was not liberalism but state socialism. Within this model, the individual was no longer directly in opposition to the collectivity (state). On the contrary, the state symbolized the highest essence 16 and served as the framework (a priori in Hegel) within which that transcendence was to be realized. Hegel had by no means regressed to the liberal Kantian dichot- omy. But what was retained of the liberal tradition, the remnant in- herent in the Prussian State, resulted in a contradiction. It was the latent consequence of his deference to the Prussian State as a model. For within that model, the state must function according to abstract principles resulting from self-seeking interests of citizens in civil society. Hence, the function of the state was to mediate the conflicting interests and eliminate the coercive constraints on free- dom. As such, the collectivity lost its symbolic transcendental func- tion and became reified. Values embodied in social forms still had not been conceived as predicates but remained mystified aS the subject of human existence. Thus, for Hegel, the individual never directly partook of the universal essence. The individual (particular) in this model might attain the role of midwife or craftsman in realization of the univer- sal (human potential), but never gain full access to initiatory pre- rogatives necessary to an objectification of universal values. These prerogatives, in effect, were arbitrarily handed over by Hegel to the state and the constitutional monarch. Hegel's model of the state, based as it was largely on the model of the Prussian State, was locked into the liberal assumption of a relatively fixed prOportion of inherent self-interest. I hold, and Marx's critique was incomplete and ambiguous at this point, that Hegel's error was not that he con- sciously opposed the individual to the collective interest as a crea- tive tension, but that the context offered only a limited model that 17 imbued the collectivity with a mystified social organization which narrowly defined tension as self-seeking, competitive, aggressive, and uniquely barren of any linkage to a conceptual or concrete basis of self-initiated transcendence. He grounded values in history and social structure but regressed to reify the functional manifestation of his time. Unlike Marx, Hegel correctly emphasized the functional tension necessary to a creative transcendence in interaction with others (as collectivity), but proceeded to reify and adulterate the concept of tension by taking a historical manifestation of its occur- rence (the historically specific war of all against all) as its root formation. As a model, the Prussian State (presumably the highest form of human collectivity) was opposed or distanced from civil so- ciety which was the real material world. Hence, Hegel effectively reified the liberal social structure as the subject and not the object of human social action. Marx's critique was precisely that Hegel, as a consequence of his insistence on external negation and his fixation of that insight within the political-economic status quo of nineteenth century Prussia, had reified a now seemingly ontological antagonism not only between individuals (within civil society), but also between individual and the state (the universal interest). Hegel could never determine whether aggression could be overcome, be it historical or existential (inherent). Indeed, his model advantaged any tendency to perpetuate aggression. This heritage of the classic liberal mentality persisted in Hegel's thought. The eternal juxtaposition repeatedly presented itself in the form of an inherent antagonism, not merely a tension-- I as humanity (Gemeinwesen) vs. I as self-interest. Negation had 18 come upon an a priori barrier seemingly imposed by the limits of our nature in which the inherent qualities of homo sapiens transformed the process of negation and transcendence of barriers common to all human- ity into the relentless negation of conflicting individual interests against common interests. Humanity had n9t_fully realized its moment of positive transcendence. Interpersonal and intergroup antagonism had been consecrated in perpetuity within the self-fulfilling pr0phecy of a differentiated and fragmented absolute state. For to build on a position that protected against the excesses of "natural" aggres- Sion was to encourage aggression. Hegel then left to abstract freedom the duty to effect a reconciliation between self‘and common interest. The production of a concrete existential vehicle of transcendence was abandoned to a fate enshrounded in the grim cloak of a mysterious interpersonal aggression and leashed only by the insight of state officialdom. Marx insisted that essence must be grounded--that it function more than abstractly--in the processes of objectification and self- transcendence. It should occur immanently and within a collective structure. Marx's genius was his vision of an organization of emanci- pation developed out of Oppression. He believed that the organized emancipatory structure would ultimately unify the two moments (civil society and the state) in a manner that assumed a continued potential forthe historical ascendancy of our "communal being" (Gemeinwesen) over narrowed, aggressive self-interest. Marx insisted that the de— structive interpersonal negations (alienation) of capitalism could be overcome by an "objectification" of Hegel's concept of collective essence (state), but it must take the form of a revolutionary 19 organization of emancipation. He systematically critiqued Hegel's abstract separation