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COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF NEGATION AND TRANSCENDENCE IN EMANCIPATORY SOCIAL THEORY

By

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ABSTRACT

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OF NEGATION AND TRANSCENDENCE IN
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A vision materializes with increasing clarity throughout the course of this work. It is an image of the formidable constraints confronted by humankind in the struggle to be free. It is perhaps most awesomely portrayed in the epochal Promethean bondage, both immanently and externally imposed, as the price of our audacious seizure of self-formative prerogatives. In this study we follow the historical journey of the symbolic bearer of secularized reason through a host of actors. Across the stage of history, Prometheus was played by the exemplary figures of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Bakunin, Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas, now by philosopher, now by political activist, now by social scientist. Yet in each instance the exigencies of the social context demanded that the role of humankind, symbolized by Prometheus, be played within the confines of scholarly disciplines or social movements which singularly assumed the burden of a vastly more diverse but preconscious humanity.

Each actor in the Promethean tradition depicted humanity as an essentially collective being. Each depicted human existence and freedom cumulatively as dependent on the collective self-determination of humanity as social and collective being. The visionary actors depicted humankind as originating in streams that distilled from the

mists of a host of virgin societies. And these in turn had converged in a vast proliferation of new eddies and currents whose total configuration presented a mosaic--the totality of human culture. But each (as a consequence of the limits of the age) found him/herself advocating collective self-realization in the tradition of pre-Promethean egoism, either monologically or within a closed revolutionary structure.

This study in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge examines that seeming paradox in terms of the historical context of the aforementioned thinkers. It is intended to shed light on the dilemma of scholarly appeals for collective transcendence in the absence of a truly interactional collective structure. It is intended to assess the exigencies of a praxis that seemingly precluded collective self-realization, but more than this, the focus of the study is oriented to those phenomena whose current opaqueness obscures analysis of our own times in terms of their ripeness for collective emancipation. In effect, we examine the relationship of ideas and the people of ideas (theory) to the context of Western industrial society. Hence we selected several contemporary scholars oriented to the tradition of Hegel and Marx, who had likewise attempted to apply those precepts to the unique problems of industrial society.

Had Karl Mannheim, Max Horkheimer, and Jurgen Habermas returned to their origins in Hegel and Marx, this study finds that their orientation would surely have been directed not to the elaboration of abstract theoretical formulations, but rather to the juncture of theory and praxis. Marx, embroiled in a class struggle that only anticipated collective self-realization, had left guidelines, but in keeping with the essential core of his work, they could only be realized out of the

concrete contradictions of the life-world. This study contends that an emancipatory theory consistent with that tradition (that seriously anticipates significant consequences) must realize collective self-realization collectively and with the full participation and support of those to be emancipated.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Prometheus and all who have breathed warmth into that ancient dream. To Dad's memory and the beginning in a selfless love. To June,who for awhile shared a dream. To Chris,who infused fresh spirit into an all but shattered dream and to "Ma," Greg, Kave, Linda, Martha, Owen, and Steve,whose courage and forbearance formed the dedicated and supportive "praxis" without which the theoretical work could never have been conceived and gestated. Perhaps our time is at hand. Perhaps 'tis an age or two away somewhere between here and eternity. But we have shared the Promethean dream in a tradition that humbles our small part--and out of our loneliness and fears we have ventured to love. That portent is its own reward.

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a unity and feeling of challenge and comraderie to the intellectual endeavor. Dr. Rick Hill's dedication and serious commitment to human emancipation gives academia a humane quality, backed by rigorous scholarship. Finally, to Dr. James B. McKee, I express profound grattitude and respect. His own position is always agressively and courageously taken. Yet his students have been treated to a humility in which his expertise and deep-felt human concerns have been made available not as a harsh authority but as a basis of inspiration and guidance to an active role in the community of scholars. Not only has he given tirelessly in the preparation of this study but he has provided a model of both teacher and friend to which I shall always aspire.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A Frame of Reference

> Wild sociology will encourage radicalism. Yet it will be hard on its own radicalism, suspecting further evils from its own activity should it presume upon its relation to the lay community. It may well be that the daily practice of sociology encourages arrogance on the part of its members, undermining the very resources of humanism with a numb professionalism or the shrill cry of ideology. If this is not to happen wild sociology must make a place for itself, and to accomplish this it must engage hope and utopia. Hope is the time it takes to make the place in which men think and talk and work together. Thus wild sociology is essentially engaged in the education of the oppressed (O'Neill, 1976, p. 9).

> Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses (Marx, 1967, p. 257).

It will be the central assumption of this study that these maxims constitute not merely the guidelines for the "pedagogy of the oppressed," but a sense of community with those of us who are oppressed (spiritually and/or physically) and are striving to include in the dialogue of theory the thinking, talking, and working together of which O'Neill and Marx spoke so eloquently. It is in the light of this ideal of praxis that I will undertake a critique of the social theories of Karl Mannheim, Max Horkheimer, and Jurgen Habermas.

The Problem and Its Assumptions

According to ancient mythology, it was Prometheus whose brazen defiance of the gods simultaneously removed the stigma from secularized reason and enobled humanity. Representing the unity of divinity and mortality, his journey in search of human self-emancipation began before recorded time. It was a lonely passage enshrouded in fear, born of misery, and touched only occasionally by a hint, a glimpse, a distant image, of a being beyond the survival struggles of his prehistoric origins.

Prometheus relieved his divine ancestry of their monopoly on creative action and thought. But his pennance was not the price of defiance alone. Rather it was a trauma of the metamorphosis and transfiguration of our deepest humanity. We could not merely be free. We could not merely declare ourselves free. We had to learn to be free while chained to the bedrock of chaotic existence, while deformed by bestial assaults on our being. Ever so slowly we became aware that we could only martial the wisdom and strength necessary to sever those bonds in a vast Herculean alliance with our brother and sister mortals, now, ever so slowly, as a consequence of their very involvement in the emancipatory act, impregnated by a seed bearing a species-potential and suspended in an ephemeral elixir--critical reason. Sadly, it has taken endless ages to learn that since we were begotten in the highest heritage of the gods, those qualities were likewise linked to our deepest and most passionate mortality. Indeed, the most difficult lesson while we remain in bondage to our own irrationality is that our becoming free is an existentially conditioned characteristic whose teachers are, of necessity, presented in the configuration of life

itself. We are self-taught. We teach each other to be free. We cannot be set free, for the irrational beast is also within ourselves. The Hercules who breaks our chains is ourselves in pedagogic interaction with the companions of our species. Our strength is our unity. Our collective existence is the basis of our reason, and existence, in turn, is forged in the now secularized reason whose only distinction from divine mystification is its parental lineage from concrete existence. We speak here with less poetry than is its due of the dialectic linkage of consciousness and existence.

The secularization of reason, the claim made on the prerogatives of the gods by humankind, has thus involved what in modern jargon is known as the claim on theory by praxis. This study sets out to examine the work (and the contemporary critics) of three thinkers vitally concerned with that claim: Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Their work culminates in the latter's embodiment (objectification) of a concrete organizational vehicle unequivocally committed to an emancipatory secularization of reason which, when carried to its logical end, conveys the prerogatives and the painful obligation of praxis via the totality of our human community.

None of these thinkers, including Marx, realized this objective. But I think that with Marx's work, a final stanza was outlined in an emanicpatory anthem whose melody may be lost to our own inanition before it is heard by all humankind. This is an analysis of certain of its key composers and their critics. The composers heard snatches of the melody, but it remained primarily in their minds, for the din of the struggle to advance freedom drowned the melody long after death claimed its mortal measure. As a result of the failure of those early

efforts to fully ground reason, emancipatory practice reflected a certain ambiguity.

It was this ambiguity, born in the exigencies of nineteenth century class struggle and resulting in an incomplete linkage of theory to praxis, that was seized upon by a body of contemporary critics who set about to correct a deficiency which they believed they found in the theoretical works of Marx. These theorists then, though they paid minimal attention to the context of Marx's era and to his specification of praxis, set about to develop a conceptually sophisticated criticism of Marxian theory.

I contend that what Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas missed was that Marx's "failure" was far less to be explained in his theory of collective emancipation than in the exigencies of a social-cultural context that precluded its realization. I further, perhaps more importantly, contend that any theory that claims lineage in the Hegel-Marx tradition and, as such, purports to contribute materially to the breaking of the Promethean chains, must set out to construct a supportive social context in which the vital force of efficacious theory is realized in the mutually experienced struggles of concrete collective existence.

I propose to undertake a theoretical study in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge. It would trace the issue of consciousness and action from a beginning in Kant, to Hegel and Marx, and then proceed through Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas to the present. The work of Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas followed in the tradition of Hegel and Marx. All three addressed the nexus between theory and social action. Each expressed antipathy to the expediencies of Marx's

praxis,presumably necessitated in the exigencies of struggle. Each responded with a remedial scheme. And each, it will be shown, fell victim to his own form of intellectual elite vanguardism.

Each contemporary scholar was chosen for this study because he represented a unique perspective on the linkage of theory and praxis, congealed sometimes under extreme bureaucratic and political duress. Each had firmly rejected capitalism. Each had recognized the danger of direct confrontation with the formidable structures associated with the political-economic system. On the other hand, each had shared the intellectual disillusionnment with Marxism that had become increasingly widespread since the turn of the century. Each undertook critiques of Marxism (Horkheimer and Habermas having declared themselves as Marxists). Each had identified a telling flaw--an element of positivism--in Marxism which was deemed a significant factor in the decline of the Marxist dream into bureaucratization and totalitarianism. Each, as a result of this disillusionment and of other exigencies to be identified, attempted to seek a middle ground between capitalism and dogmatic Marxism. And each determined to pursue that middle ground by way of withdrawal of theory and/or pedagogy from the arena of struggle.

I believe that the position of particularly the Critical Theorists, when analytically critiqued, promises fruitful insight into the relationship of theory and praxis. This study will set out to identify those insights from three areas of concern.

(1) After having delivered fruitful critiques of Marxian praxis, what were the consequences of having withdrawn their own theoretical endeavors from praxis?

(2) What was the nature of their withdrawal of theory from the

exigencies of praxis? (We will set aside the judgment of whether these actions were necessitated, given the time in which each worked.)

(3) Do alternative means of theorizing exist for this time and location in history that are more consistent with the Marxian admonition (to which they subscribed) to link theory and praxis?

I will contend in this study that Marx's theory of humanity as communal being was based on a concept that humankind is distinguished both by its ability to do productive work and to creatively interact with others of the species. This implies that despite contemporary critics (Habermas), Marx was profoundly cognizant of the central role not only of work, the material struggle for survival, but also of the interactional or inherently linguistic dialectic aspect of being.

It must, of course, be granted that the revolutionary organization which he most directly influenced did not always reflect this breadth. From this it follows that his later elaborations of those conceptual components that were most pertinent to the immediate performance of the revolutionary act did not radically extend interactional theory beyond the level of experience on which Marx had insisted its formation must be contingent.

Marx, I will insist, was not so naive as to advance the oversimplification of a narrowed instrumental determinism. Rather he was caught up in a period of revolutionary fervor. It was a period of class struggle that hardly lent itself to the realization of the projected ideal. Rational dialogue within a communal context was only a

chimera whose mists, it turns out, require repeated distillation in concrete historical existence before their essential nectar can be imbibed by the great body of humankind. Indeed, the larger development of that great humanistic dream was to extend vastly beyond Marx's time. Since he always insisted that theory must be developed out of the struggles of an era, he found no existential vehicles to the realization of a further grounding of theory beyond the class struggle of the mid-eighteenth century. The time was not ripe.

Marx's life work was clearly an incomplete endeavor which he insisted could only be fully attained upon the fullest possible realization of our communal nature. The latter phases of this endeavor were to occur in an organization that consisted of those to be affected by the emancipatory action and which served as the concrete context of "dialectic transcendence." I will examine and criticize the work of Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas, each of whom initiated his work from a critique of Marx's theory. However, I will contend that in an effort to improve upon Marx it is either incumbent upon them to show how they would ground their theory in a concrete context or to demonstrate how they would either effect a more receptive context or successfully generate an effective theory abstractly. I have already indicated that I find their theories wanting precisely because they fail to meet these criteria. Instead, while insightful in several respects, their theories are individualistically executed and sequestered from the people who would presumably live with the existential consequences. What is more, their theories have not resulted in any notable emancipatory consequences.

I will not presume to argue that the time Marx so long awaited

had arrived in the era of Mannheim and Horkheimer. However, I believe that the same assessment does not necessarily apply to Habermas. In any event, I will question the potential efficacy of theories conceived apart from the participation of those to be affected by them.

I will grant that a question remains whether the time for a dialectic transcendence in the Marxian genre has come. There are those who believe that the time is at hand, that the Western democracies present a context within which an organized effort dedicated to collective self-transcendence might survive. I cannot unequivocally place myself readily in that category. However, I have adopted that projection and acted upon it, not because I am convinced that it must inevitably come to pass but on the assumption that to do otherwise is not only to beckon population, environmental, and spiritual disaster, together with a host of concomitant calamities, but also to ignore an emancipatory impulse that must soon find its time or be cast aside as a utopian illusion.

I believe that the thin line that separates utopian illusion from the realm of realistic possibility can be drawn with reasonable reliability on a perspective yielded up in a critical analysis of history. This, in brief, is the basis of my assumption.

The awakening of commerce and trade provided the wings on which the Renaissance took flight and gave impetus to the Enlightenment and its great industrial and technological revolution. Yet we must assume that the first stages in the secularization of reason are not yet realized. Indeed, we base our hopes for the future on the assumption that we are in an awkward post-industrial stage in which excesses of this immediate post-Enlightenment period may be brought under the

rational jurisdiction of the total human community before they turn back to themselves and augment the competitive impulses of the "bellum contra omnes" from which they sprung.

Perhaps vengence is still to be meted out by a vindictive divinity against the Promethean audacity of our faith in secularized reason and emancipatory praxis. Perhaps we must experience a holocaust which follows as a culminating calamity of our cumulative savagery. If so, then the following pages are squandered in that arrogance. This study defies that prognosis and bases its assumption on the faith that the high-water mark of humanism has not yet been evidenced and that "rationalized" competition and possessive individualism may be transcended in the ultimate realization of our communal essence.

I also base my work on the assumption that <u>if</u> we may speak of a concept whose time is ripe, we must also allow that a time of fruition may equally be lost to overripeness and the infestation which rests in its potential either to rot and decay or to give sustenance. The awesome power provided by the purposive-rationality of post-industrial humanity may be taken, as I believe Marx did, as only the first phase of our Promethean legacy. It may be seen as a first burst which must be brought under rein in the process of our social-cultural maturation. It may also be interpreted as a somber portent of our scientized capacity to self-destruct. It must surely be acknowledged that unless the process of collective interaction is advanced, the apex of secularized reason may be reached prematurely and its purposive-rational precociousness might, if unchecked, facilitate a regression to barbarism. But technology and purposive-rationality may also be conceived as a necessary but insufficient triumph of the larger emancipatory

implications of the secularization of reason. In this event, our only option is to proceed forthwith to undertake the fullest realization of our collective essence. In order to assess the assumption that the time for collective action is at hand, I will attempt to reach into the past via the perspective of the sociology of knowledge. I will attempt to gain critical insights on the historical struggle to humanize reason and free humankind. I will enter upon that venture by tracing the historic development and logical extension of the concept of collective transcendence that was integral to the work of Hegel and Marx. The sequence will be set by historical chronology. I will first give an overview of the problems confronted in each historical sequence beginning with the first Kantian challenge to the purposive-rational criteria of liberalism.

The Problem: Its Cumulative Conceptual Grounding

Classic Liberalism

I begin here with a brief reference to classic liberalism because it was against this intellectual rationale of bourgeois individualism that Hegel and Marx directed their fateful humanistic challenge. Within classic liberalism, there had been a sense inherited from revelation that reality was simply what was perceivable. Humankind was less the creator than the recipient of meaningful knowledge. For liberalism, meaning was generated individually on the basis of a presumed inherent quality of human nature--what might be termed immaculate perception--and the historical social context was of minimal significance. It followed that individuals were the formative factors. They, and not some abstract externality, were the rational instruments

of reality. Socio-political factors, like divine mystification, could only interfere with individual autonomy and, where possible, were to be eschewed. Community interest was essentially non sequitur. The political state had only the function of referee who prevented chaos in the struggle between self-sufficient and self-seeking individuals.

To classic liberalism in general, the primary value of the collectivity was to place constraints on individuals otherwise engaged in an inherent war of all against all. It was in this self-interested struggle that humankind was to attain full appreciation of the fruits of enlightened self-interest. Human values inclusive of the concept of truth were clearly in jeopardy.

German Idealism

The German idealists, Kant and Hegel, reversed the priorities and established the collectivity as an intrinsic primary essence. Kant initiated the process by challenging the liberal notion that reality was what was perceivable. Further, Hegel insisted that to establish meaning and consciousness, raw perceptions must pass through frames of reference conditioned by historical-cumulative social structures (by the collectivity).

Kant, undertaking an early critique of the liberal tradition (particularly John Locke) had initiated a demystification of the source of human knowledge. In his effort to preserve values from the pervasive instrumental calculus of classic liberalism (bourgeois individualism), he had raised a seminal issue. How are disparate perceptions united to give meaning? His answer, simply put, was that the unification--a transcendental unity--was a functional quality of the individual mind.

Hence--and the immense importance of his insight should not be lost in our critique of Kant--reality, including even the previously rigidified subordination of human will to the mystification of sacred forces, could from this point be more readily conceived within a secularized realm. A crucial step in the secularization of reason had been taken.

Kant's effort, also intended to preserve scientific truth, dichotomized the individual and the essential components of the fixation of belief (phenomena and noumena). His intention was to protect "eternal" values from the exigencies of the phenomenal world. He had simply assumed the a priori qualities of the noumena as universal and apprehendable via the categories of the mind. In that sense, these qualities were protected from the uncertainties of human existence. He paid a price, the consequences of which this study will examine in its treatment of Critical Theory. However, in the process he succeeded in retaining the conceptual apparatus (essence) within which Hegel was to generate his historical-cumulative "common interest." That is, he left to Hegel a conceptualization of the basis on which we might aspire to or even constitute our own essence.

The Kantian categories themselves were ontologically fixed in the nature of the human mind (e.g., spatiality and temporality). It was to be Hegel's insight that historicized the categorical a priori and that pointed out that the categories were not fixed in nature, but were rather historically-culturally structured frames of reference through which raw perceptions passed to acquire their meaning.

It was Hegel's critique of Kant that brought the omnipotence and omniscience of the universe within the direct awe-stricken grasp of

both sheep and goat-reprobates alike. History had begun with the gradual, cumulative domestication of the beast, whose early ages had required a father protector. The Renaissance witnessed the predominance of a mutant, a half-human/half-beast whose hooves were enmired in the world of non-consciousness and fear, but whose humanized mind was already reaching to the firmament. In its turn, the Enlightenment had brought the twilight of the satyr and the birth of a human being who must now build and maintain a self as a conscious potential to be reckoned with in nature. The chains of Prometheus were being fractured.

Humanity was for the first time in a position to complete a metamorphosis begun with the first social groupings. Hegel's critique of Kant and the liberal tradition allowed that there was a human potential in each individual but that the metamorphosis to consciousness of the full human potential (freedom) could only occur in a social context. What is more, it was a profoundly awesome, indeed terrifying, fate. He had elevated the concept of the common interest from obscurity to a central functional category. Perceptions must pass through categories to acquire meaning, but they were not austere and a priori as Kant had insisted. Rather, they were historical, and hence, both dependent upon and amenable to an existential context created by humanity itself.

The father-protector was being abandoned and the conscious adoption of change meant that we must also consciously submit our very being itself to self-annihilation and rebirth. Through work and the division of labor, we would experience not only a confidence in our ability to change but also alternative ways of life. These experiences implied not only a new way but the horrendous reality of personal

negation. Birth and death dwelled within the realm of an emancipated consciousness.

Thus, for Hegel, although the potential for both self-and communal interest existed in the individual, their realization could only be objectified in the collectivity--in the division of labor. The opportunity of death and rebirth was the meaning of freedom and for him the collective form of freedom was symbolized by the state. Clearly freedom could not be conceived as an arbitrary grasp at alternatives that were intuitively apprehendable in an endless and relativistic flux. Rather, freedom was self-realization grounded within the collective on the basis of existentially conditioned criteria. Only in historical social existence could we constitute the highest potential for self-realization. Self-realization was collectively embedded. The rub was that what had begun as a symbol became reified. That is, he modeled his system on the classic liberal structure of the Prussian State and, for lack of sufficient qualification, effectively adorned it with an ontological mask that partially removed the collectivity from history and the full creative imagination of the citizenry. This stopped him short of an unconstrained dialectic transcendence.

Hegel's historical structures consequently remained abstract and static. While the collective "spirit" had been located in society, he separated the holder of the spirit (the state) from the actual collectivity (civil society). Individual development--the empirically grounded processes of dialectic transcendence (the development from sense certainty to self-consciousness embedded in the concepts of objectification, negation, and transcendence)--occurred within civil society. It was here that individual interests were exercised,

mediated by legislative bodies and "disinterested" bureaucrats appointed by the constitutional monarch. Within this sphere our human potential became "objectified" or concretized in the course of history. It was here that our individual interest was grounded materially.

On the other hand, Hegel's critics, particularly Marx, have observed that the collective aspect of the individual was located apart from and, in a sense, antagonistic to material existence (civil society). Within Hegel's model the universal essence, our humanistic spirit, was seated in the state and embodied in the monarch. As qualities of the state and monarch, the humane essence was abstracted from the individual and grounded with the power to enforce its will as a single entity separated from the people to be affected. Likewise, Marx believed that Hegel restricted the philosopher to an abstract analysis of the relationship of the collective essence to change in the realm of material existence. That is, his analysis was retrospective. This left a paradox. The paradox was that Hegel "grounded" the collective essence only abstractly and never realized a concrete historical basis on which the essence might have been realized in praxis.

But he had moved a crucial league beyond liberalism. In a sense, even the Prussian State functioned to humanize the bourgeoisie and represent the communal value that was our essence. Indeed, one might venture the somewhat extravagant claim that what Hegel anticipated was not liberalism but state socialism. Within this model, the individual was no longer directly in opposition to the collectivity (state). On the contrary, the state symbolized the highest essence

and served as the framework (a priori in Hegel) within which that transcendence was to be realized.

Hegel had by no means regressed to the liberal Kantian dichotomy. But what was retained of the liberal tradition, the remnant inherent in the Prussian State, resulted in a contradiction. It was the latent consequence of his deference to the Prussian State as a model. For within that model, the state must function according to abstract principles resulting from self-seeking interests of citizens in civil society. Hence, the function of the state was to mediate the conflicting interests and eliminate the coercive constraints on freedom. As such, the collectivity lost its symbolic transcendental function and became reified. Values embodied in social forms still had not been conceived as predicates but remained mystified as the subject of human existence.

Thus, for Hegel, the individual never directly partook of the universal essence. The individual (particular) in this model might attain the role of midwife or craftsman in realization of the universal (human potential), but never gain full access to initiatory prerogatives necessary to an objectification of universal values. These prerogatives, in effect, were arbitrarily handed over by Hegel to the state and the constitutional monarch. Hegel's model of the state, based as it was largely on the model of the Prussian State, was locked into the liberal assumption of a relatively fixed proportion of inherent self-interest. I hold, and Marx's critique was incomplete and ambiguous at this point, that Hegel's error was not that he consciously opposed the individual to the collective interest as a creative tension, but that the context offered only a limited model that

imbued the collectivity with a mystified social organization which narrowly defined tension as self-seeking, competitive, aggressive, and uniquely barren of any linkage to a conceptual or concrete basis of self-initiated transcendence. He grounded values in history and social structure but regressed to reify the functional manifestation of his time. Unlike Marx, Hegel correctly emphasized the functional tension necessary to a creative transcendence in interaction with others (as collectivity), but proceeded to reify and adulterate the concept of tension by taking a historical manifestation of its occurrence (the historically specific war of all against all) as its root formation. As a model, the Prussian State (presumably the highest form of human collectivity) was opposed or distanced from civil society which was the real material world. Hence, Hegel effectively reified the liberal social structure as the subject and not the object of human social action.

Marx's critique was precisely that Hegel, as a consequence of his insistence on external negation and his fixation of that insight within the political-economic status quo of nineteenth century Prussia, had reified a now seemingly ontological antagonism not only between individuals (within civil society), but also between individual and the state (the universal interest). Hegel could never determine whether aggression could be overcome, be it historical or existential (inherent). Indeed, his model advantaged any tendency to perpetuate aggression. This heritage of the classic liberal mentality persisted in Hegel's thought. The eternal juxtaposition repeatedly presented itself in the form of an inherent antagonism, not merely a tension--I as humanity (Gemeinwesen) vs. I as self-interest. Negation had

come upon an a priori barrier seemingly imposed by the limits of our nature in which the inherent qualities of homo sapiens transformed the process of negation and transcendence of barriers common to all humanity into the relentless negation of conflicting individual interests against common interests. Humanity had not fully realized its moment of positive transcendence. Interpersonal and intergroup antagonism had been consecrated in perpetuity within the self-fulfilling prophecy of a differentiated and fragmented absolute state. For to build on a position that protected against the excesses of "natural" aggression was to encourage aggression. Hegel then left to abstract freedom the duty to effect a reconciliation between self-and common interest. The production of a concrete existential vehicle of transcendence was abandoned to a fate enshrounded in the grim cloak of a mysterious interpersonal aggression and leashed only by the insight of state officialdom.

Marx insisted that essence must be grounded--that it function more than abstractly--in the processes of objectification and self-transcendence. It should occur immanently and within a collective structure. Marx's genius was his vision of an organization of emancipation developed out of oppression. He believed that the organized emancipatory structure would ultimately unify the two moments (civil society and the state) in a manner that assumed a continued potential for the historical ascendency of our "communal being" (Gemeinwesen) over narrowed, aggressive self-interest. Marx insisted that the destructive interpersonal negations (alienation) of capitalism could be overcome by an "objectification" of Hegel's concept of collective essence (state), but it must take the form of a revolutionary

organization of emancipation. He systematically critiqued Hegel's abstract separation of the people (civil society) from the state (essence).

Marx did not fully complete his initial determination to "objectify" Hegel's model of the collective realization of consciousness in an organization of emancipation. Throughout his life, the immediate realities of starvation and dehumanizing oppression in the work place seemingly demanded that emphasis be placed on the class struggle and the direct overthrow of "Capitalism." His followers, confronted by the urgency of revolutionary struggle and in the absence of an alternative model, often postponed the individual self-realization of emancipated consciousness in the interest of an immediate destruction of bourgeois power. The resultant climate, in turn, was antithetical to the full realization of emancipation. A highly disciplined revolutionary structure was generally not conducive to the simultaneous development of emancipated consciousness. It had as its primary goal, even prior to Marx's involvement, the attainment of political power. Given an intense emphasis on negation of the coercive power of capitalism, minimal attention was accorded the immanent ramifications of social change. These elements, linked to personal negation, extended to a field vastly beyond political-economic parameters to the realm of our communal essence. But they were accorded a lesser priority in the separated struggle to establish a "substructural" base. Revolutionary force took precedence over the realization of emancipated consciousness by all citizens. It was this failure to realize his ideal that beckoned the critics to be analyzed in this study.

Marx's Critics

The Social-Intellectual Grounding of Marx's Critical Theorists

Marx's critics, Karl Mannheim and Max Horkheimer, lived and wrote in an age of social and intellectual crisis. The age had two major currents. The first was the chaotic disintegration of bourgeois culture in Germany. The splintering of Germany--politically, economically, and culturally--was attributed by these scholars, at least in part, to the bankruptcy of Western science, particularly historical and social science. They found science at a loss either to explain or find a way out of the crisis.

> The prevailing mood of German bourgeois historical and social science during this period is . . . one of "tragic consciousness" marked by "stunned disillusionment," and the writings of Troeltsch, Simmel, Weber, Scheler, and Mannheim, among others, may be seen, in Mannheim's words, "as the product of the greatest social dissolutions and reorganizations, accompanied by the highest form of self-consciousness and self-criticism" (Meja, 1975, p. 57).

In response to this disillusionment Mannheim, Horkheimer, and later, in a less urgent fashion, Habermas sought to establish intellectual order and legitimacy out of chaos. They wanted to create a synthesis of critical reason within a framework of intellectual freedom and stability.

The second major current involved the then prevalent political-economic response to the perceived "social dissolutions." That is, bureaucratization, scientization, and concomitant political oppression occurred under both socialist and capitalist cloaks. So the entire age, not to mention the three theorists in question, was stunned not only by fascism, which had never attempted to disguise its elitist philosophy, but by Bolshevism and the corruption of socialist party

organizations which had righteously declared their intentions to be solely emancipatory. The theorists reacted in horror to the grimly documented usurpation of power by tyrannical elites. Whether in the guise of capitalism, fascism, or ill-conceived socialism, these abuses of power--always linked to an organizational base--struck them deeply. Their theoretical writings expressed their revulsion and, while they rendered some cogent suggestions on the direction of a more egalitarian social theory, their writing also manifested a wariness, especially about threats to their own scholarly autonomy. Indeed, in the process of reviewing their work, one is struck by a concerted effort to preserve the realm of theory and enlightenment from the risks of organizationally coordinated struggles--to such an extent that they insulated theory and pedagogy from the participation of those to be affected by it and unwittingly preserved and advanced the separation of theory from praxis. I will contend that due particularly to the oppressive circumstances surrounding the rise of Marxism and Stalinism, these intellectuals manifested a characteristic tendency to protect the role of theoreticians and teachers so diligently that they obfuscated the issue of participation and regressed from Marx. I will suggest that their position was not merely limited by the context as was Marx's, but that especially Habermas returned to Kant in a manner that inhibited the humanistic secularization of reason by a sequestering of the theoretical function from the realm of emancipatory praxis.

While Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas acknowledged their Kantian and Hegelian roots, each had initiated his theory in a primal dialogue with the Marxian critique of consciousness. Marx had made the first significant step toward the concrete unification of theory

and praxis. He had attempted through this "material synthesis" to link the necessity of rigorous social scientific thought with the goal of free emancipatory activity. He undertook not merely a theoretical critique of the Kantian separation of scientific reason from the reason of normatively (ethically) conditioned everyday life. Rather, his material synthesis attacked the actual everyday existence of bourgeois society. For it was that existence that spawned the theoretical dualism by which necessity and "iron laws" legitimized rule within the fundamental organizing structures of society (primarily economic). Within this world view, freedom was an abstract formal freedom limited strictly to the personal-emotional realm (absence of coercion). For Marx, however, necessity or reality was not opposed to consciousness or freedom. Rather, it was integral to what it meant to be free--the material core of a freely structured and communally oriented society. That core was the embodiment of our communal nature and being (Gemeinwesen).

Marx, of course, believed that the class struggle and the projected concomitant economic changes of his time would set the stage for the ultimate realization of an emancipated consciousness. Neither moment could be strictly causal. For Marx, being dialectically related meant that changes in ownership were possible only through an emanicpated consciousness. To Marx, conscious action was the mover, not the result--but only in the process of concrete social action. Finally, it was to be an action that involved struggle against oppression--an organized struggle for emancipation.

Yet, within the class struggle of his time, not to mention the rise of modern technology, came variables perhaps not forseeable prior

to their occurrence. They raised the spectre not only within bourgeois society but within socialism itself of a highly coercive and manipulative potential that precluded or severely impaired the dialectic mode. Thus, the exigencies of political struggle in Marx's time and the power amassed in those struggles laid the groundwork for abuses. Unprecedented surpluses, technically advanced modes of communication, and highly sophisticated means of surveillance and intimidation became increasingly available to those whose technical prowess exceeded the pace of their humanization. Such means offered potential for both emancipation and scientifically manipulated consciousness. It was to this common problem that Mannheim and the Critical Theorists addressed their work.

Karl Mannheim

Mannhiem set out to correct the Marxian critique of ideology by "neutralizing" what he saw as a class-based bias in Marx's view of emancipated consciousness. He eschewed the struggle and conflict of Marx's material synthesis of theory and praxis* and substituted a kind of intellectual synthesis. It was a form of synthesis compatible with his conception of the objectivity of social science. The institution of social science was to be an arena in which a rationally constituted synthesis could be accomplished. The synthesis was to occur under the expert guidance of relatively unattached intellectuals--sociologists of knowledge. Within the "arena" sociologists of knowledge

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*By material synthesis we mean the materialist perspective based on the premise that we objectify ourselves in the process of concrete material existence, e.g., that consciousness and existence are integral dialectic moments.

were expected to produce "relational" truths derived of synthesis. Their findings were then to be made available to democratically oriented ruling elites. It is important to note at this point that theorists were not mandated within this model to interact directly with lay people in the formulation of their work.

Max Horkheimer

Horkheimer, also, set out to correct a perceived economic-scientistic ontology in Marx and to extend the incompleted cultural-affective component implicit in Marx's concept of Gemeinwesen. His route and that of the Critical Theorists in general abhorred a Mannheimian intellectual synthesis. But he remained faithful to that aspect of material synthesis that demanded a value criterion. That is, he found Mannheim's compromised synthesis unacceptable where that position derived out of a positivistic adherence to a pseudo-objectivity in social science. Yet he sought a true objectivity against the excesses of vulgar Marxist positivism and the "blind" advocacy of revolutionary violence. Hence, having been influenced by the polemic with Mannheim, not to mention the too often aborted dreams of Marxism, his effort was to restore the emancipatory philosophical moment of what he viewed as a scientized material synthesis. Scientization, therefore, meant not merely the relative objectivism of Mannheim but the ontological component of the "vulgar Marxist" critique of ideology as well. It was a perspective that virtually abandoned value-affective qualities for technically abstracted issues of political economics. While Mannheim had sought a "relativized" truth via sociology of knowledge, the focus of Horkheimer was to restore a value component

to relativized, scientized Marxism and sociology. Cognizant of the risks in the separation of freedom (ethics) from necessity (science), he sought a model of inseparability. This model was based upon the establishment of a critical epistemology that would link concepts of the true with what was just and necessary for humanity. However, due to fear of oppression, his effort fell short of its objective. It was, after all, a period of widespread intellectual disillusionment with the lagging pace of emancipatory change and the unforseen bureaucratization and tyranny with which the fledgling cause had been beset. Short of any readily apparent or seemingly feasible means of collective transcendence, his options were limited. Hence, his plan, reduced to its fundamental assumptions, was to advise and enlighten those whom he termed "the masses" in the art of emancipatory thought. There was, I contend, an inescapable elitist implication and that severely limited the efficacy of his theory.

Jurgen Habermas

Habermas, in the tradition of Horkheimer, came to believe that both science and philosophy were in jeopardy. Again, this jeopardy existed not only external to, but also within a pragmatic scientized Marxism. The threat was not now from skepticism but rather from relativized objectivism on the one hand, and the manipulative potential of technology wielded by the powerful, whether capitalist or socialist, on the other. From the beginning of his work, he recognized the dangers of the separation of theory from praxis (social existence and emancipation) but there was the ubiquitous presence of political intimidation.

Thus, he set out to restore:

(1) science, discredited on the one hand by the positivism of vulgar Marxism and on the other by Mannheimian relativism

(2) the freeing element of epistemological discourse, the validity of which, in his view, could be tested only if securely insulated from political harassment

(3) the scientific-epistemological legitimacy of Marxism.

In essence, Habermas attempted to redefine Marxian material synthesis by way of a revival of a philosophical-epistemological moment integrated with a pure emancipatory science. Habermas combined the foci of both Mannheim and Horkheimer. He preserved the institutional structure of both bourgeois science and epistemology through the formulation of what he termed emancipatory science.

It will be the contention of this critique that Habermas (in the tradition of Critical Theory) has not yet overcome the limitations of a resultant scientized philosophy and a purified science, in both cases abstracted from the dialectic process indigenous to Hegelian-Marxist praxis. He has not yet shown how social scientific and philosophical theory may be fruitfully linked to praxis. The dialectic method has been essentially defaulted.

Habermas, not unlike Horkheimer, was truly dedicated to the provision of praxis-oriented insights to thwart what would otherwise result in an intensified mechanized trend toward manipulation of consciousness. However, I will attempt to demonstrate that several factors restricted him to means within which the theoretic-pedagogic function could be protected from certain exigencies of praxis including primarily the coercive potential of political organization. These

factors were:

(1) the rigid character of traditional social science and epistemology

(2) the burgeoning technology and bureucratization together with their manipulation of consensus (which demanded, in his view, a powerful revolutionary avant-garde capable of devising foolproof means of identifying manipulation in the realm of ideas)

(3) the Mannheim-Horkheimer tradition of disillusionment about aborted socialism, Stalinism, and Nazi suppression

(4) a preoccupation, more typical of liberalism than of the Marxism he professed, with coercive restraints on freedom at the expense of a concomitant consideration of the positive existential bases on which abstract concepts of freedom must be concretized

(5) a failure to fully analyze the period in which Marx lived in terms of the social-historical variables on which critical understanding of Marx's work is contingent.

The solution on which Habermas has settled to date has its embryonic origins and limitations in both Horkheimer and Kant. It involves a significant degree of separation of social science and epistemology from social existence (1) at the level of formation of theoretical concepts; (2) at the level of theoretical validation; and (3) at the stage of subsequent enlightenment (of those to whom he refers as "the masses"). The model employed is akin to that of the Kantian dualism in which science (necessity) was separated from social existence (freedom) in an effort to preserve both science and philosophy.

The result is the unwitting deification of inviolate modes of both theory construction and enlightenment which are insulated from "the masses."

Once formulated, this theory is to be applied to enlighten "people" by (1) an avant-garde within the Party, much like Mannheim's, which is in turn to be educated by the theorist-therapist; and (2) a program, based on communicative competence, directed to the recognition of systematically distorted communication. This program is to be taught by emancipatory theorists via a compatible psychoanalytic model with its own elitist components.

Habermas has succeeded in the delineation of a cogent critique of the positivist component in vulgar Marxism. However, I will contend that, like Horkheimer, he has to date compromised his effectiveness in the realm of emancipatory theory at two vital junctures. First, neither he nor Horkheimer achieved a rigorous and consistent critical analysis of their own Hegelian-Marxian rootedness in the dialectic process. Second, despite vigorous protestations to the contrary, they have allowed the dualistic nature of bourgeois society to be reflected in the non-dialectic formulation both of their theory and of their model of enlightenment.

The Theoretical Linkage of Theory and Praxis in Critical Theory

I will contend that certain lingering elements of adherence to the Weltanschauung of traditional liberal epistemology, liberal social science, and liberal pedagogy brought the Critical Theorists into a functional unity with Mannheim and initiated a regression to the pre-Hegelian perspectives of Kant. As a result of the theoretician's

isolation from the organization of emancipation and struggle, as a result of a consequent self-imposed restriction of the theoretician's activity to enlightenment of "the masses," I believe that the Critical Theorists found themselves on common grounds with Mannheim. Habermas then furthered this latent alliance by assuming the prerogative to effect a non-dialectic synthesis of emancipatory ideas for the avant-garde of the oppressed. In short, the efforts of Mannheim and the Critical Theorists to achieve objectivity, and particulary of Horkheimer and Habermas to correct a scientized positivistic objectivity in isolation from the exigencies of praxis, embodied a separation of freedom from necessity in the very Kantian mode that they had presumably renounced.

Although they vehemently rejected Kantian dualism, they ultimately adopted a comparable model. A unification of theory and praxis would necessarily occur within, or in intimidatingly close proximity to, organizational structures with extant constellations of power that these theorists feared and for which, given their perspective, they could forsee no basis for joining. Given a seeming lack of alternatives, they chose to elaborate their theory in the absence of praxis.

Thus, a significant segment of the critique of Habermas will focus on his insistence on the sequestering of theory and enlightenment from the organization and struggle for emancipation. This method, consistent with the precedent of Mannheim and Horkheimer, was defended by Habermas on the basis of a critique of Marx's* advocacy of an inseparability of theory and enlightenment from both struggle and

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*Lukacs, reflecting Marx's position, was the contemporary thinker against whom Habermas directed his most aggressive critique.

the social organization that must advance emancipatory action. It is particularly this aspect of the work of the Critical Theorists that I find in fundamental conflict with the central precepts of their Hegelian-Marxian heritage.

Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas had identified a pernicious positivist component in the prevalent transcendental-revolutionary schema of Marxian praxis. Marx, of course, had set out to realize an immediate commitment--to overcome the political economy of capitalism. I think it must be granted that the class struggle that Marx adopted as an intermediate vehicle was vulnerable to certain criticisms advanced by Mannheim and the Critical Theorists. Marx's involvement in the class struggle was indeed often characterized by positivistic exclusion of critical dialogue, not to mention maneuvering for power, within the socialist movement itself that seemingly precluded rational dialogue.

But here Habermas et al. fail to link whatever deficiencies may exist in Marx's incomplete theory to limitations in the context of praxis. Indeed, I will contend that the overall thrust of Marx's theory establishes the ideal of a close linkage between theory and praxis that belies charges of a deep-running positivism and that specifies that substantial advances beyond the ideal of Gemeinwesen detailed in his earlier works must occur within an organization of emanicpation that is emancipation--within collective existence. That is, emancipatory theory must be linked to emancipatory praxis. This should have made it encumbent on Habermas to either refute Marx's claim or to orient his own work to the fact that Marx's problem was less in the preliminary status of his theory than in the limitations

of the social-historical context of his praxis.

Mannheim and particularly the Critical Theorists failed to fully acknowledge the import of social interaction in Marx's theory. Instead they attributed its minimal appearance in Marx's later work to an oversight rather than to the absence of a context that permitted it to develop according to Marx's specification--dialectically in relationship to praxis. Had their orientation been focused on the social-historical context as much as on the elaboration of abstract theory protected from the exigencies of praxis, it is doubtful that those critics would have missed the central thrust of Marx's work. I refer to the pivotal prerequisite that to meet the highest emancipatory ideal of self-realization, theory must be formulated and promulgated in a collective emancipatory way of life. Had they been more cognizant of history, it is doubtful that they would have failed to recognize that Marx had to make do with a context that seemingly could not accomodate a collective support structure and that he chose an admittedly more risky course intended to bring humankind only a step closer to the time of fruition. Indeed, I argue that Marx had no intention of further elaborating his theory of interaction until that effort could be linked to an amenable context of praxis.

I contend that further theoretical work in the realm of emancipatory theory beyond a direct linkage to praxis invites elements of intellectual dilettantism that have little chance of moving humankind in the intended direction. Further, and perhaps more importantly, I contend that to be consistent with Marx's essential thesis to which the Critical Theorists professed allegiance, the course to follow is not in the abstract critique of Marx's theory but to address the

point of ambiguity in the linkage between Marx's theory and his praxis. While elements of positivism clearly exist in Marx, at most they warrant a footnote of historical interest. On the other hand, his humanism and anti-positivism represent a vastly more potent force. Hence the applicability of Marx's theory is better served by an analysis of the real constraints on his praxis, and by a determination to overcome similar contemporary limits on praxis, than by further elaboration of abstract theory. In short, emancipatory theory must develop from critical implementation at the juncture of consciousness and existence--theory and praxis.

To initiate an emancipatory theory for today we should again remind ourselves that Marx inherited a class struggle in process which did not lend itself to a full realization of his (and Hegel's) ultimate vision of human emancipation. Hence, his theory was incomplete and required further development. Due to the nature of the particular revolutionary period in which he lived, it was generally impossible to undertake a vast collective negation of the full range of extant bourgeois institutions. The immediate issue was the negation of the bourgeois state. This left the immanent quality of personal change and the inherently intimidating concomitants of that transformative process for a later era.

The personal concomitants of change from a possessive egoistic society include the radical excising of significant components of our essential being. Given our tenuous grip on mortal existence, the mere contemplation of such radical measures of self-negation elicits primordial terror and deeply entrenched defenses not only in the oppressors but in the oppressed as well. It was this knowledge

together with his relatively bourgeois status that no doubt moved Hegel to look to evolutionary means and to eschew such vehicles as politically oriented activism. He would not risk the surrender of rational prerogatives to the power and passion of the political arena. He would not subject himself to the personally intimidating implications of change, especially since during his lifetime there were few signs of organized resistance to the bourgeoisie.

Of course, Marx had emphasized what I term historical liberation. Organized resistance had begun in his time and he set about to take advantage of the momentum. He set aside for the moment the immanent personal concomitants of change emphasized by Hegel. He temporarily set aside certain personal ramifications of alienating tension linked to radical change not because they would ultimately be irrelevant but because they had no immediate relevance to the successful conclusion of class conflict. Indeed, preoccupation with the implications of a loss of dependence on the old, even when that loss resulted in alienation, was deemed detrimental to the immediate revolutionary goal--a singular determination on the part of a united proletariat to overthrow bourgeois power. This was not merely a theoretical problem nor was that fact lost to Marx. Rather it was a problem bound to an attempt to extend our human potential to the extent that the historical context permitted.

To Marx, the possibilities of change must be grounded in the possibilities raised by the prevailing contradictions of society at large. Though certain of his contemporary critics believed that alternatives existed, Marx did not. Whether his orientation to class conflict represented the fullest extension of the possibilities of his

time is an issue left to the mysteries of the ages. But the issues raised may be instructive in determination of the relative efficacy of the model of class conflict for our time. On the assumption that one adopts the fundamental core of Hegel and Marx, I will contend that the message is clear. (1) We must seek, as Marx anticipated, a broader conceptual basis than that of class conflict. (2) We must undertake that pursuit in direct relationship to the context of praxis if it is to be effective. The context of Marx's time permitted him to enter into a struggle in which he would attempt to set people free from the immediate oppressive yoke of capitalism. He was aware that ultimately it would take more than power to release humankind from the coercive forces of the bourgeois state. As typical configurations of bourgeois power became outmoded, we would learn to be free as the social activity of our collective essence. For Marx, the collective realization of freedom was a dream, seemingly beyond his era. The time was "not yet ripe" for dialectic transcendence, but it was clearly the next step.

The three theorists of this study denied him credit for this insight and denied his fundamental principles. I believe that the Hegel-Marx heritage left open to the Critical Theorists a vastly more fruitful course than the one they selected. I will question the basis on which the Critical Theorists, particularly Habermas, identify themselves as Marxists while simultaneously formulating an abstract theory about praxis which is itself removed from that ideal. For guidelines to a more effective theory linked to praxis, I will return to Hegel and Marx.

From Critical Theory: A Return to the Fundamental Basis in Hegel and Marx

I have indicated that while Marx's critique of his Hegelian heritage is basically correct, Hegel likewise provided an implicit critique of Marxian praxis, perhaps less applicable in Marx's time than today. Hence, I will construct a dialogue deduced from the pertinent works of the two giants. This project is ventured in the belief that each emphasized a distinctly different but necessary component of the ideal of collective emancipatory action. They believed that their times did not permit the linkage of those two critical dialectic moments, but I proceed on the assumption that the times are currently more receptive.

I will base my synthesis on the thesis that it was essentially the lack of a supportive context that prevented Marx from undertaking a more systematic integration of some of the key themes of Hegel's dialectic into the emancipatory activity of a century or more ago. My reevaluation of Hegel's dialectic will be centered on the crucial concepts of negation, transcendence, and alienation, and the necessary linkage of these theoretical concepts to emancipatory praxis.

Probably the most potent weapon in the Hegelian conceptual arsenal was his treatment of negation. For Hegel, human activity was substantially negative--the very course of lives destroyed, transforming what was for something new. Change, then, was not merely a cumulative layering upon the personal and cultural edifices of the past. Rather, it involved simultaneous destruction and reconstruction. This transcendence (Aufheben) was the result of negating activity. Indeed, negation was a crucial aspect of a transcendence which preserved

through destruction. Negation was inseparable from change. It was the necessary death of the old.

I will show that it is the Marxian moment of concrete material transcendence, when united with the Hegelian concept of negation and taken to its logical conclusion that leads us to an affirmation of the communal necessity of emancipatory change. For not only must each new social and cultural form be constructed by the might and wisdom of all humanity, but the horrendously terrifying psychological concomitants of negation (identifiable even in a preliminary contemplation of change) can only be reckoned with in acknowledgment of our communal obligation and necessity. My argument will be based on a historical analysis of the intellectual tradition of Hegel and Marx. Thus I will contend that the synthesis was inherent in Marx. Theory only awaited a context in which it could be realized in praxis. Marx's own life had been taken up with a conflict conditioned by the context. Death brought his work to an abrupt end. Hence, he never reached a point at which he could systematically expand upon the limited focus of political economy to include broader-ranging social, psychological, and esthetic components implicit in his total existential concept of humanity as Gemeinwesen. What is more, his progeny have been reluctant to grant the incomplete status of his work. As Mannheim and the Critical Theorists have cogently observed, these latter-day Marxists have reified the incomplete model based on political economy as a scientized positivistic orthodoxy.

In effect, Mannheim and the Critical Theorists had recognized a weakness in Marxism. But their formulation of alternatives skirted certain central precepts of Hegel and Marx that pertained to the

linkage of theory and praxis and returned in certain respects to a Weltanschauung more compatible with liberal philosophy.

As previously outlined, my evaluation of Marx's material synthesis (of theory and praxis) will be based on two oppositional moments analytically distinguishable in Hegel's concept of the dialectic. Marx initiated a synthesis of these moments. However, due to circumstances to which I have already made note and which I will later elaborate, he passed only lightly over certain critical psychological implications. As I have said, the first moment (negation) implied a breaking down and death--the surrender of functioning though outmoded forms of social existence. But Hegel's fondness for the allegory of the Phoenix already suggested that there was a simultaneous moment integral in the dialectic. It was the realization--out of the ashes--of the new. That was the essence of our human creative capacity--of our social-cultural nature. It was not, then, a capacity for which a single individual was sufficient. If one's past was destroyed, it must be replaced and that occurred in Hegel's model through a process of socially dependent objectification--through an eternal intersubjective juxtaposition and dialogue across the full reaches of human history.

Hegel properly identified the individually intimidating aspects of negation. He properly identified the intersubjective nature of negation and rebirth of human consciousness. He clearly established a preeminent role for the social order. But in some critical spheres, he was ambiguous about whether his position obsoleted earlier conceptions of the collective interest as an abstract essence. Hegel made society and culture the source of those alternatives from which we

chart our existence. But he never resolved an ambiguous conception of a separated individual and collective transcendence. At times we find him seemingly firm in his intent to ground negation and transcendence--the process of overcoming--as an integral function of the collectivity. At other times, especially in his deferences to the model of the Prussian State and in his later work following the general disillusionment with the aftermath of the French Revolution, we find him inconsistently grounding transcendence (in a seemingly aggressive-destructive self opposed to the collective nature) inherently in an alter-ego.

Implicit here was a concomitant ambiguity in the concept of freedom which Marx set out to correct. He found the Hegelian ambiguity conducive to the gestation of a self-fulfilling prophecy of inherent egocentricity whose assumed absolute limits have been shrunken repeatedly in the emancipatory struggles of humankind. If this erroneous mystification were allowed to persist, freedom would become "objectified" in each individual as a differentiated self-and collective moment, and conceptual stagnancy would become more than a portent. Not only would the availability of alternatives so crucial to the dialectic become inhibited, but each individual would become opposed, both to others and to the collective, and uninhibited interaction would be discouraged.

To Marx, the collective was not opposed to the freedom of every individual; it was "the nature and being of every single individual." Marx correctly recognized that to be consistent with the fundament of Hegel's own work, Hegel himself must grant that since it was a social act, the realization of freedom also demanded the simultaneous

development of a concrete social context conducive to the fullest realization of our creative essence--an organization of emancipation.

Now the collectivity was not merely an abstract passive context but an active, rationally constituted organization created by humanity for the purpose of self-realization. What was called for was a concrete negation of the negation of our collective essence--a declaration that alienation had reached its destination in history. Marx had firmly established the organized collectivity as the basis of transcendental change by correcting the ambiguity in Hegel.

Yet,integral to any transcendence including collective emancipatory transcendence were the psycho-social concomitants of negation--the dialectic relationship of social change to the personal concomitants of change--the immanent presence of destruction and death--the reality of self-eradication. Marx's work never systematically treated this aspect of Hegel's philosophy.

The synthesis I propose makes it incumbent on any modern emancipatory theory to establish a social context that encourages and supports a readiness on the part of ever larger numbers of people to relinquish any historically situated particular level of existence long enough to consider and test promising alternatives. That theory would not be so dependent on the whim of an erratic fate to offer up a few conscious and stalwart revolutionary vanguards. It would concretely acknowledge not only political-economic oppression but also an often, though not necessarily, linked terror of degeneration and death, and specify collective bases for over-riding their horrendous impact. An accelerated emphasis on freedom as historical transcendence would necessitate an eternal readiness to accomodate negation. After all, that

is the basis on which Hegel emphasized that humankind must bear up psychologically under eternal alienation. For his part, Marx was confronted by a historically specific alienation socially linked to appropriation of the means of production. By conceiving alienation within the framework of his immediate dilemma as social-historical, Marx, consistent with his insistence on contextual grounding, oriented his theoretical elaboration to those forms of alienation that could be eliminated as an eternal plague on humankind. He was more immediately concerned with a conscious collective than a collective consciousness.

Given a currently more amenable social context, we may now attempt a synthesis of the psychological and social aspects of alienation. In light of Marx's concept of Gemeinwesen, that synthesis must neither minimize the formidable nature of strictly political economic factors nor become transfixed upon the exigencies of direct confrontation. My critical exploration of a possible synthesis of the Marxian historical moment and the Hegelian existential moment will begin with a historical development of the pertinent theoretical issues, themselves the product of a historical social context which must be reevaluated for certain crucial logical implications.

I will contend that Marx's so-called "failure" to structurally embed the critical role of tension in the realities of emancipated consciousness (outside that form which appeared in class conflict) was less a failure than a measure of the limitations of his times. As a consequence, he had simply not yet fully developed the thesis that a system that both anticipated and reckoned with the self-alienating accompaniment of all significant creativity was necessitated if we were to extend the qualities of our communal nature. Implicit is a

guideline for would-be successors to the Marxian heritage. Without this structure not only would scholars like Mannheim and Habermas be forced to function in a sterile and intimidating context, but so too would humankind in whose behalf their work was so hopefully undertaken.

My argument is based on the thesis that an extension and elaboration of the fundamental Marx-Hegel precepts would posit the communal social system both as an immanent necessity and as an external support system. For its part, the support system, penetrating to the fundament of our lives, would provide not only the ideal, the essence, but the concrete existential strength necessary to undergird a radical transcendence, Aufheben. I will contend that without this structure, the mechanism of change would be so obscure and so intimidating that any significant social change would invite either (1) resort to coercive or manipulative power or (2) utopian withdrawal from the arena of praxis, whether political or intellectual. I will attempt to demonstrate that in the West, to remain consistent with fundamental Marxist precepts, a vastly more extensive and humane support system would be demanded than that which could be accomplished by (1) a mere political-military insurrection (even with subsequent equal distribution of property and resources); (2) an escape to utopia; or (3) an abstract rationalized mechanism of communicative competence. Rather it would demand a system that would radically restructure our existence from possessive relationships in our sex lives to private property and, perhaps most of all, which would give us a concrete experience of our existence in others as ourselves so crucial to a realistic confrontation with our ego needs and the ultimate negation--personal

death.

I will take the position that to meet Marx's insistence that our communal being is not opposed to the single individual, we must fully acknowledge the prerogatives of each unique individual. As such, change would have to be undertaken on the basis of each individual's capacity and inclination to adopt it. It would have to occur where the pace of a multiplicity of dialogues is variable and immanently determined. The problem would not be solely to understand a rationally constituted admonition to change, nor would it be merely to understand and ultimately overcome the mechanism of external coercion. It would also be to objectify within ourselves a convincing restructuring of a multiplicity of extant cultural forms, each of which is simultaneously reflected in a portion of our inner being. That action might initially imply less a vision of utopia than a certain destruction of the only self we could currently experience.

Clearly, that course would be potentially terrifying. Clearly, it would have to occur in interaction with those whose collective existence (support system) we shared. Clearly, it would have to occur in the dialogue and work of our lives. We would have to be in a position to check or examine each step, explore each facet, and satisfy ourselves that our awakening existence would be progressively acknowledged and mutually preferred. The theory of transcendence, if embedded in the act, would have to provide a concrete vehicle of transcendence that permitted us to encompass and overcome our negation in manageable and self-limiting doses.

Essentially, this position would demand an acknowledgment of a profound alienation in life, regardless of our class or status. It

would demand that humankind seek out social structural means by which what I term "creative tensions" between and among people would be welcomed, not as a competitive possessive negation of communal essence (against ourselves). That is, where the essence of the self is acknowledged as residing in the community then tension would not, of necessity, take the terrifying form of a potential for personal alienation. On the contrary, it would imply the negation of a negation (of loneliness and competitively induced antagonisms). It would preserve a sense of dissonance, a prerequisite to the dialectic encounter of alternative perspectives and ways of life. That is what I define as creative tension and it is to be distinguished from interpersonal and individual-collective antagonisms.

Marx never developed and probably could not have developed the ideal set out in his early writings in which he identified "human nature as the true communal nature of man." Had he done so, it will be my contention (based on a logically deduced extension and synthesis of his own precepts and those compatible precepts of his Hegelian heritage) that he would have been compelled to deal more systematically not only with the historically contingent aspects of capitalistic alienation, but also with those forms of tension-linked alienation necessitated in even the most conscious and humane utopia. For humanity constitutes a total being neither abstractly political-economic nor rational. Individuals, even as communal beings, consist of and must confront that totality. Individuals, even as communal beings, confront alienation ranging from that inherent infinite particularity and death to the particularity of creative interpersonal tension and transcendence. That confrontation demands a realistic consciousness

of the degree to which self-defensive institutional forms necessitated by competitive self-interests have penetrated to the core of our being. This lances through capitalism to the psycho-personal defenses, present in any conceivable utopia, that can only be mastered by radical "de-differentiation" and restructuring of the system that demands defenses. The new system must accomodate and acknowledge inevitable alienation but not in the context of an inevitable conflict between us. Put another way, even would-be emancipators require immersion in the concrete act of emancipation if we are to meet the demands of dialectic transcendence. Theory separated from praxis cannot be thoroughly radical enough to meet the larger Marxian-Hegelian precepts of a transcendental secularization.

CHAPTER II

KANT

Kant: A Categorical Challenge to Feudalism

Kant is generally acknowledged as one of the most, if not the most, influential thinkers in modern Western society. His ideas form the core of the scientific and moral thought of bourgeois society. He has often been referred to as the bourgeois philosopher par excellence.

> If it is correct to infer this link between Kant's philosophy and the ideas of the two major eighteenth-century revolutions, the significance of Kant's political thought becomes clear; for the American and French revolutions constituted an open break with the political past. An appeal was made to a secular natural order and to the political rights of individuals for the purpose of initiating large scale political action (Reiss, 1977, p. 4).

The fundamental issues that he dealt with were the intellectual expressions of the problems encountered by bourgeois society in its metamorphosis from the age of feudalism--how to overcome dogmatism and establish individual freedom while maintaining order. This issue found its clearest political expression in the debates centered around the American Revolution, particularly those between Hamilton and Jefferson. Philosophically, this critique of feudalism was centered in the epistemological debates that began with Descartes and culminated with Kant. Thus, just as any critique of bourgeois political philosophy must deal with the ideology of the American Revolution,

so does any critique of bourgeois thought have to deal with its philosophical foundation: Kant.

Kantian philosophy is the culmination of a long struggle to establish a viable intellectual program to oust the authoritarian thought of the Middle Ages.

> The sceptical refusal to accept traditional political authority is consonant with scepticism towards authority in general. This critical attitude towards authority led to an incessant questioning of all accepted values, particularly those of religion (Reiss, 1977, p. 6).

Just as the political philosophers of the emerging middle class (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke) attempted to overcome the divine authority of the king, so did early critics of feudal Scholasticism focus on making human beings, rather than God, the foundation of knowledge.

> In other words, modern philosophy sets itself the following problem: it refuses to accept the world as something that has arisen (or e.g. has been created by God) independently of the knowing subject, and prefers to conceive of it instead as its own product (Lukacs, 1971, p. 111).

This effort began with Descartes, who, with his "cogito ergo sum" argument, and his methodological doubt, established individual reason as the fundamental authority in epistemological questions. Even his proof of the existence of God was predicted on the necessities of reason. The tradition of Descartes continued through the work of Leibniz and Spinoza.

> From systematic doubt and the Cogito ergo sum of Descartes, to Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz there is a direct line of development whose central strand, rich in variations, is the idea that the object of cognition can be known by us for the reason that, and to the degree in which, it has been created by ourselves (Lukacs, 1971, p. 112).

The limitation of Rationalism was its highly abstract and theoretical nature. It was able to critique the power and authority

of the church only by fleeing into an abstract, deductive reasoning. Its model of the world was deduced from a priori postulates of reason, without directly confronting the concrete political domination existing in the world. Thus, much of its theoretical effort was centered in abstract mathematics (Descartes--geometry, Leibniz--calculus) where reason could move freely without directly confronting an authoritarian reality.

The Rationalist critique of Scholasticism merely replaced the dogma of the church with the dogma of a reason that had no necessary connection with the real world. It created, to a certain extent, a dream world of reason that did not deal with the concrete, empirical world of facts, customs, politics, etc. Part of its conscious program was the distancing of itself from history and common sense, which it saw as the bastions of tradition and dogma.

The strongest critique of Rationalism came from thinkers whose primary interests were political--that is, justification of bourgeois political interests. Commercial interests in overcoming the isolated and limited nature of Rationalism grew from direct political struggle with the power structure that Rationalism dealt with only intellectually.

The advanced political and economic situation of the English bourgeoisie provided a friendlier environment for a materialist perspective than the still feudal continental Europe.

> Once the individual had been freed from political and ecclesiastical bonds, his dependence upon external perceptions and upon his own sensations, feelings and instincts seemed much less dangerous to English thinkers than to the continental rationalists.
>
> This attitude was further reinforced by other factors which are really only consequences of the first, namely:
>
> . . . the decisive fact that the most important English thinkers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, wrote at a time when the

> bourgeoisie had already seized political power, and were no longer in opposition as they were in France at the time of Descartes, or in Germany at the time of Kant (Goldman, 1971, p. 38).

Locke's main concern was the establishment of individual rights and freedoms against the domination of a static, hierarchical society. So he, like Descartes, located legitimation in the individual. However, unlike Descartes, Locke wrote at a point in history when the direct confrontation and take over of the power structure was a political reality for the bourgeoisie. Thus, Locke was not satisfied with locating in the individual a merely theoretical reason that did not directly deal with the empirical world. For Locke, knowledge of the world, or science, came directly from the individual's confrontation with the empirical world. One's picture of the world was to be dependent only on one's own experience in it. In order to attain true knowledge, one needed to free oneself both from the dogma of the church and also from the dogma of an abstract reason. Locke tried to free thought (and political activity) from dependence on any a priori categories that could function as authority over the individual. Descartes rejected the senses as valid sources for knowledge in his attempt to purify philosophy of tradition and authority. Now, for Locke, the sense organs of the free individual achieved priority over reason. (Much of this is probably due to the fact that the notion of the free individual only became a material possibility in Locke's time.)

In Locke's system, reason was relegated to the role of organizer and compiler of the sense data. Mind, or reason, was nothing in itself--it could deduce nothing out of itself. Rather, it was a "tabula rasa," a blank slate, whose real content was the pure sensory data derived out of experience. This perspective was clearly an

advance in terms of the historical process of making knowledge and science more accessible to all people and less dependent on higher authority. However, there were still some serious limitations in Locke's thinking that only the harsh scepticism of Hume could bring out.

Hume very effectively pointed out the one-sidedness present in both the Rationalist and Empiricist perspectives on knowledge. He agreed with the Empiricist critique of Rationalism. However, he also devastated Empiricism as the basis for any valid scientific knowledge. His point was that the observation of facts in themselves gave the observer no logical basis from which to deduce scientific laws or regularities. Each empirical observation was distinct and separate and contained in itself no necessary relation to other empirical facts. Cause and effect was not a scientific law, or proof; rather, it was merely the custom of expecting certain phenomena to follow others. (That is, it cannot be rationally deduced that the sun will rise tomorrow from the fact that it has done so the past four billion years. We say that it will rise tomorrow out of custom and habit, not out of rigorous scientific method.) Hume reduced science and order to mere custom and habit--chance. He drove bourgeois thought to an intellectual crisis, a crisis that reflected some of the fundamental concerns of the bourgeoisie.

This crisis developed out of certain basic interests of the rising middle class in its struggle against the feudal and aristocratic power structure. What it found most objectionable was the arbitrary, subjective mode of the feudal power structure.

> The modern capitalist concern is based inwardly above all on calculation. It requires for its survival a system of justice and an administration whose workings can be rationally calculated, at least in principle, according to fixed general laws, just as the probable performance of a machine can be calculated. It is as little able to tolerate the dispensing of justice according to the judge's sense of fair play in individual cases or any other irrational means or principles of administering the law . . . as it is able to endure a patriarchal administration that obeys the dictates of its own caprice, or sense of mercy and, for the rest, proceeds in accordance with an inviolable and sacrosanct, but irrational tradition (Weber, in Lukacs, 1971, p. 96).

Being essentially men of commerce, they had an interest in a stable, identifiable, and predictable organization of society that was not dependent on the subjective whim of powerful individuals. Businessmen needed guarantees of freedom and predictability if they were to engage in large scale business ventures.

> For these modern businesses with their fixed capital and their exact cacluations are much too sensitive to legal and administrative irrationalities. They could only come into being in the bureaucratic state with its rational laws where . . . the judge is more or less an automatic statute-dispensing machine in which you insert the files together with the necessary costs and dues at the top, whereupon he will eject the judgment together with the more or less cogent reasons for it at the bottom: that is to say, where the judge's behaviour is on the whole predictable (Weber, in Lukacs, 1971, p. 96).

The uncertainty of arbitrary absolutism seriously hampered commercial operations. This struggle could also be seen in the slow advancement of science against the dogma of religion. Scientists found themselves having to recant scientific truths for political reasons (e.g., Galileo).

The bourgeois ideal of freedom from arbitrary rule became institutionalized in natural law. That is, if society and nature operated on the basis of identifiable laws that were independent of any individual, individuals would be freed from the subjective caprice

of divinely proclaimed rulers. Each individual would have the same natural rights, and would be free to live in a world regulated by natural rather than divine law. Thus bourgeois society was grounded fundamentally in the assumed validity of natural law. It was not surprising then that Hume's critique of natural law had a shattering impact on bourgeois theory. A second element in the intellectual crisis was also related to natural law. How free is the individual when operating in a world determined by natural law?

So the tasks faced by Kant were massive: (1) to preserve natural law against the powerful scepticism of Hume and (2) at the same time maintain individual freedom in a world determined by natural law.

His first task was the defense of the natural sciences. Kant was moved to develop his system of thought by Hume's critique of the natural sciences.

> I openly confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction (Kant, 1950, p. 8).

Hume's threat to the natural sciences fundamentally undermined the theoretical basis of the middle class, for the fight against arbitrary power of church and king found its first intellectual expression in natural science. Rather than indulge in dangerous speculation about the nature of man or state, natural science focused on understanding the natural world as the basis of reason. The material world could be analyzed, observed, and understood on the basis of the regular appearance of natural phenomena that owed nothing to the subjective whims of those in power. Of course, this was not as easy a task as it

seemed (the example of Galileo comes immediately to mind). However, it must be remembered that the rise of the natural sciences as independent from philosophy and theology was the intellectual expression of the political and economic movement of the rising middle class against arbitrary rule. The natural sciences were (and still are) the theoretical extensions of the merchants and rising industrialists. Indeed, such fields as navigation, mechanics, chemistry, engineering were developed primarily from an everyday problem solving level. They were of use to merchants whose ships increasingly undertook long voyages, industrialists who built workshops, and so on. This is not to say that the feudal power structure ignored scientific progress (Prince Henry's interest in navigation, for example), but rather that in the long run, science favored the development of an active middle class more than a more pastoral, land-based aristocracy.

This spectacular progress in the natural sciences was not, however, complemented by progress in the understanding of what it actually meant to do science--that is, what it meant for humanity to be engaged in scientific discourse, to claim to discover natural laws, to see reason and not God in nature. One experienced contradiction in a world where nature was controlled, predicted and understood at the same time that concepts of reason, freedom, and humanity were maintained that were fundamentally theological, and thus anti-scientific. The contradiction between rational science and a dogmatic world view posed a crucial philosophical problem: to understand what it meant for human beings to rationally control their own destiny in the mechanical world of Newton as opposed to the arbitrary and organic world of the Middle Ages.

The task of philosophy, then, appeared to be the development of a conception of what it meant to be a human being that would be adequate to the model of progress and rationality that was presented by the natural sciences.

> The examples of mathematics and natural science, which by one revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to induce us to consider, what may have been the essential element in that intellectual revolution which has proved so beneficial to them, and to make the experiment, at least so far as the analogy between them, as sciences of reason, which metaphysic allows it, of imitating them (Kant, 1966, p. xxxiii).

In fact, the story of modern Western philosophy has been its attempt to emulate and gain acceptance of the natural sciences (with, of course, some very important exceptions).

The progress of metaphysics, however, was not quite as smooth as that of physics. The various schools made a few attempts at integration. They usually chose some central principle (pure reason, pure sense data) and held to it dogmatically, making any sense of agreement or general progress impossible. So while the natural sciences were enjoying universal progress and admiration, philosophy was caught in a series of dogmatic, esoteric debates with little agreement. This "in fighting" thoroughly discredited philosophy as that high discipline that was to give a sense of ultimate purpose and to locate the place of humanity in the world.

> . . . while as to any unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and what is worst, in groping among mere concepts (Kant, 1966, p. xxxii).

While Rationalists gave reason the power to understand everything, the Empiricists gave human reason almost no power at all--except to follow the dictates of natural law. And of course, Hume declared the whole issue poppycock, saying that the so-called universality of natural law was mere custom while the claims of pure reason were dangerous superstition. It was in this undirected confusion that Kant directed his philosophy, focusing on the concepts of experience and perception.

While the political philosophy of the Empiricists was quite effective (witness the influence of Locke on the Declaration of Independence), their epistemology, the theoretical foundation of natural science, was bankrupt. Locke located perception entirely within the passive individual, naively allowing the world to impress itself upon the brain, apart from any other influence--especially that of church or king. This individualistic philosophy led to a problem that was to be the focus of Hume's critique: if perception was entirely individualistic, then there remained no basis upon which to make universal laws. In locating perception completely in the individual, Locke did not develop any mechanism that would allow these perceptions to become intersubjective. That is, there was no structural reason why the human community as a whole could not accept any given observation as true. In Empiricism, there was no rational basis for the intersubjective validity of claims concerning the nature of the world--only tradition, habit, and authority. Thus the scepticism of Hume.

The fundamental fact of scientific progress (rational intersubjective agreement among scientists), however, pointed toward even more fundamental inadequacies of the Empiricist model than those

pointed out by Hume. Hume critiqued only the consequences of Locke's epistemology--he did not go back to the issue of experience itself, for he failed to recognize that the deficiency was not in the concept of universal laws but rather in a fallacious analysis of experience that precluded universal laws. Kant, however, disagreed with Locke's concept of experience. He sought to develop a rational basis by which to explain intersubjective agreement.

> We can now understand the meaning of the question which forms the foundation of classical philosophy: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" How do isolated and independent men who take no account of one another and who recognize their own reason as the sole judge and the highest court of appeal not only not understand one another, but necessarily understand one another? What is that minimum of shared presuppositions which must be recognized even by two men with diametrically opposed views if they are to communicate and to conduct a conversation (in the widest sense of the term)? What is that minimum of community which exists in any dialogue and makes men not independent monads but members of a great whole, of one community, of one world? (Goldman, 1971, p. 152).

As Goldman points out, Kant's task involved much more than just the natural sciences. Kant was searching for the basis upon which people were able to have communicable experiences, a structure that went beyond, or transcended the individual. He did not proceed in the fashion of the Rationalists, spinning theories in isolation--rather, he attempted to give a rational explanation for an empirical event--human communication.

Kant looked for the communicability of experience in the act of perception itself. He argued that perception was not merely a passive reception of the outside world. Rather, he argued, if perception was to be communicable at all it must have a certain structure, and this structure was located not in the world, but rather in the intellect.

This was the Rationalist element in Kant. For while he believed that all knowledge was based on empirical perception, this perception found its universal, or communicable structure not in the material world, but in the mind. Thus, just as science did not merely understand nature, but also shaped it, so too was the mind not merely the collater of experience, but also the architect of experience. The rational structure of the universe derived just as much from the rational structure of experience as from nature itself. This was a fundamental transition in epistemology that kept pace with the political revolutions of the middle class. For humanity was no longer merely a passive reactor in an unintelligible reality--rather the world was not an intelligible reality shaped by the structure of a reason that was shared by humankind.

Kant analyzed this structure from the perspective of the needs of science, i.e., the orderly perception of the universe. Kant asked how it was possible to derive an orderly, predictable, and communicable perception of the world from the mass of empirical perceptions that bombard us every second. On what basis did the mind organize the overwhelming mass of sensory input, that without a rational framework would be merely a whirling kaleidescope, without definition, shape, or connection?

> If every single representation stood by itself, as if isolated and separated from the others, nothing like what we call knowledge could ever arise, because knowledge forms a whole of representations connected and compared with each other (Kant, 1929, p. 74).

That is, as Hume pointed out, there was nothing inherent in sensory input that allowed that output to be rationally organized. In the next step, Kant turned to the intellect to function as the organizing

agent.

> The spontaneity of our thought requires that what is manifold in the pure intutition should first be in a certain way examined, received, and connected, in order to produce knowledge of it. This act I call synthesis (Kant, 1929, p. 64).

Thus the mind served to synthesize and give structure to the incohate mass of input, allowing us to connect perceptions in the forms of space, time, cause and effect, etc. Only within those parameters, or categories, as Kant called them, could objects be perceived in an orderly fashion.

> But phenomena are only representations of things, unknown as to what they may be by themselves. As mere representations they are subject to no law of connection except that which is prescribed by the connection facility (Kant, 1929, p. 93).

Here Kant introduced another key concept--because we only knew things through the screen of the mind's categories, we did not have a direct, intelligible linkage between noumena, or things in themselves, and phenomena, or things as we experience them. For Kant, all we could know were phenomena. Noumena, or things as they are in themselves, were unreachable by the human intellect. The only secure knowledge that man could have was about those perceptions that were organized under the categories--in other words, perceptions concerning the natural world. These perceptions were subject to the laws of categories, such as cause and effect. Thus the world of our perceptions, the empirical world, was one of strict determinism and predictability.

Kant gave philosophical justification to the premier sciences of the bourgeoisie. But what happened to the political ideology of the bourgeoisie, freedom? For, as Kant pointed out, we cannot "infer it from experience for experience gives us the knowledge only of the law of phenomena, and hence of the mechanism of nature, the direct

opposite of freedom" (Kant, 1929, p. 339).

The problem faced by Kant was how to reconcile the determinism of the natural sciences--the technical world of the bourgeoisie--with the political ideology of individual freedom. After having justified the epistemological basis of the natural sciences, Kant devoted his intellectual work to a reconciliation of determinism with his belief in human freedom.

> We must conclude that Kant's chief concern was to preserve man's spiritual autonomy at all costs, proclaiming that neither the world of nature nor the Deity can rob him of his moral freedom (Greene, 1929, p. lxi).

Kant was forced to isolate freedom not only from the Church, but also from the natural world, which was that of Newton. He had to establish a sphere for freedom that was independent of the empirical world. It had to be abstracted from that world.

> In this sense, freedom is a purely transcendental idea, which, first, contains nothing derived from experience, and, secondly, the object of which cannot be determined in any experience . . . (Kant, 1929, p. 220).

Thus, freedom was relegated to a world divorced from the realm of actual experience, a world of thought, intent, and abstraction. For him, the key to freedom was freedom of thought, as freedom of action was obviously impossible in a deterministic natural world. Regardless of the actual physical situation, we could always think what we wished and thus maintain our freedom.

> Now, however, as morality requires nothing but that freedom should only not contradict itself, and that, though unable to understand, we should at least be able to think it, there being no reason why freedom should interfere with the natural mechanism of the same act . . . (Kant, 1966, p. xxxix).

Freedom, then, could exist with a material state of total non-freedom.

> Our problem was whether freedom is contradictory to natural necessity in one and the same action: and this we have sufficiently answered by showing that freedom may have relation to a very different kind of conditions from those of nature, so that the law of the latter does not affect the former, and both may exist independent of, and undisturbed by, each other (Kant, 1929, p. 232).

Thus his concept of freedom was not dependent on actual empirical conditions, nor did it have any real relation to them; rather it was based on consistency with abstract, ahistorical concepts.

This dualism between the empirical world of determinism and an abstract world of freedom, dovetailed with the dualistic nature of bourgeois society where all people were supposedly equal under law, even when people were unequal in their day-to-day lives. The world of law and morality was supposed to ignore one's place in life and deal with people simply as "human beings."

> This uniform equality of human beings as subjects of a state is, however, perfectly consistent with the utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions, whether these take the form of physical or mental superiority over others, of fortuitous external property and particular rights with respect to others (Kant, 1977, p. 75).

Freedom applied only to people as universal abstract beings because as empirical beings they were bound to the deterministic laws of the empirical world. Thus material inequalities, oppression, and any other experiential factor, had no direct bearing on one's freedom.

As we have seen, Kant struggled with two fundamental problems--on what could we base secure, predictable knowledge, and in the face of such knowledge, how could we maintain our freedom? His answers clearly reflected the structure of bourgeois society; for empirical determinism coexisted with abstract freedom. That position told us, in effect, that while we may all be equal before the law, we are not

equal before the dollar. Speaking of Kant's linkage to bourgeois thought, Reiss reminds us

> He may be the philosopher of the American and French Revolutions, but it should not be forgotten that the former was essentially a revolution of landowners and the latter a revolution of the bourgeoisie (Reiss, 1977, p. 27).

Kant's systematic isolation of the empirical world from the sphere of moral judgments also laid the philosophical groundword of the positivistic perspective in the sciences. Hence, any systematic critique of Kant also became a systematic critique of some of the basic concepts and intellectual structures of bourgeois society.

However, there is one theme in Kant's thought that pointed beyond bourgeois thought, and laid the groundwork for what was to become Marxism. That was the concept of the universality of reason, or the rational community of humans. To that point, Goldman observes "The categories are, in spite of their reification, the theoretical expression of the human spirit and the human community" (Goldman, 1971, p. 154). Kant, however abstractly, laid a theoretical, structural, basis for the collectivity, and took us a step beyond the naive individualism of the Empiricists.

> . . . Against Hume and empiricism Kant shows that the ability of men to communicate with one another and to agree at least in their general categories of thought is not a contingent circumstance, but part of the very essence of man. There are synthetic judgments a priori (Goldman, 1971, p. 156).

To be sure, this was abstract, being located in universal structures of reason quite separate from everyday life. There was no necessary connection between the universal nature of humanity as reason, and the particular nature of our historical, social being.

> As I have said, Kant never passed from the I to the we as the subject of action; confined within an individualistic

> framework, he continued to conceive the possibility of harmony and concord between men in terms of universalitas, of universality, rather than universitas, real and concrete community (Goldman, 1971, p. 178).

It was this link between the universal and the particular, between our human ideals and our actual existence, that was to be forged by Hegel.

CHAPTER III

HEGEL

In direct response to Kant, Hegel established the communal grounding of secularized reason. Prometheus, after all, tendered the prerogatives of the gods to the entirety of our human community. And after two thousand years, Hegel, representing a most deliberate humanity, systematized that first insight born so innocently in the mythology of the ancients. Kant had discovered a meaning in the categories of the human mind. But the categories were not of our making. We were still not full participants in the rational act of our own self-creation. Hegel substantially advanced the secularization of reason when he demonstrated that the categories were not a priori but were historically conditioned frames of reference through which our perceptions passed to give meaning. The implication is that meaning is to some extent determined by the historical context in which it is conceived.

Hegel elaborated on his insight by developing the vital concept of self-objectification which, as we shall see, placed each individual in a position not only to participate in his/her own self-creation, but, by implication, to participate in the formulation of those frames of reference that established meaning for the total human community. The relationship was reciprocal--a dialectic

interaction. Thus, Hegel had initiated a linkage between belief--our consciousness--and our historical existence. It was left to Marx to clarify certain aspects of the ambiguous linkage between consciousness and existence, theory and praxis.

But Hegel was not to be so easily dismissed. For while Marx grounded the linkage of consciousness to existence in a concrete organization of emancipation, that organization was destined to experience its own limitation in that Marx insufficiently accounted for the negation which Hegel had properly identified as a crucial component of social change. Change, after all, was the essence of emancipation and its core was an omnipresent tension whose adverse aspects could only be controlled by a support system capable of easing the trauma that accompanies loss of known institutions.

While Hegel in many ways followed the tradition of Western philosophy begun by Descartes, he decisively broke with that tradition in the fundamental importance he gave to history. History was by no means merely the chronical of human error and foolishness. Rather, it was the carrier of what was fundamentally human, the locus of our humanity. He did not seek the basis of intersubjectivity in pure reason, as Kant did with his categories. Rather, Hegel sought the categories in history itself, in the actual development of people.

> What sets Hegel apart from all other philosophers since Heraclitus--I am tempted to say what sets him above them--is the fact that for him the fundamental categories themselves are not eternal, rigid and given once and for all, but realize themselves in and through their development (Goldman, 1971, p. 70).

This was the fundamental thesis of Hegel--that what we are, and what we see was determined not by distant, abstract commandments, but rather by what we have been and what we are in the process of becoming.

This thesis had several consequences that we shall examine, both in relation to Kant and as they point toward the further development of critical thinking.

(1) Philosophical truth became intimately linked with historical development; Kant's abstract dualism of science and freedom was overcome

(2) Hegel incorporated in his system not only the experience of the natural sciences but also the whole of experience

(3) Philosophy was no longer abstract, and distant, as with Kant, but rather the expression and property of all people.

In his critique of Kant, Hegel followed Kant's fundamental theme that our perceptions were not "immaculate," as Locke would have us believe, but that they were formed by categories of the mind, or reason.

> For modern post-Kantian philosophizing the knowing subject is the source of the order of the (categorical) objectivity of objects which takes shape in the concept. Hegel remains faithful to this "turn" (W. Marx, 1975, p. xxi).

However, the abstract manner in which Kant developed his concept of reason resulted in some deep-running difficulties. The primary one, as we pointed out earlier, was the divorce of theoretical reason (the logic of the sciences) from practical reason (the logic of morality). While science dealt with the natural world, it did not deal with the moral world. Conversely, the practical reason of morality, or human conduct, was totally divorced from the material world. This dualism divorced the practice of theory from that of material existence. "For Kant, however, knowledge and action, theory and practice, were

almost totally separate; the impossibility of uniting them constituted . . . the upper limit of his philosophy" (Goldmann, 1971, p. 155). For Hegel, however, the development of theory was the reflection of the development of practical experience. To him, Kant's categories were far too abstract and constricted, and resulted in an apparently inescapable dualism.

> Hegel argues that in Kant and Fichte there is a division between the rigid and lifeless set of institutions on the one hand, and the empty abstract inwardness of moral man on the other. Hegel defends an opposing view in which there is a continuous interaction between all the moments of the dialectical movement according to which men make their society with all its institutions, a society in which they then work and live as independent beings (Lukacs, 1976, p. 294).

Hegel located the transcendence of this dilemma in the reintegration of reason and material, historical existence. The structures that shaped our perception of the world were derived out of our interaction with this very world. Kant's categories became Hegel's 'world views.' The concern then was not only to understand natural science, but also to understand the whole of human experience, for this experience was the basis of all our knowledge.

> It also differs from them [German Idealists] on another, no less important score. The experience that consciousness works through here is not only theoretical experience, knowledge of the object; it is the whole of experience (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 10).

By basing the categories in actual human development he reunited theoretical and practical reason--the everyday conduct of people became the basis upon which our perceptions were structured. Here a key concept was introduced, one that became central to all modern critical thought--that human beings created their own world out of their own experience.

> The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man--true, because real man--as the outcome of man's own labor (Marx, 1964b, p. 177).

This was in direct disagreement with Kant's separation of human freedom (abstract morality) from the theoretic reason which operated in the deterministic material world. Hegel tried to unite reason and freedom and make them necessary to each other.

> His [humanity's] very existence is the process of actualizing his potentialities, of molding his life according to the notions of reason. We encounter here the most important category of reason, namely, freedom. Reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. The fulfillment of these ends belongs only to the subject who is master of his own development and who understands his own potentialities as well as those of the things around him. Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to gain and wield this power (Marcuse, 1960, p. 9).

The development of reason could only occur within the framework of the individual's developing consciousness of self as possessor of this reason and the consequent ability to practice in terms of it. History was the history of humanity's self-education, or self-consciousness. That is, the movement of history was the movement of our becoming conscious of the fact that we form our own world--or in other words, that we were free. The self-consciousness of humanity, then, was also the consciousness of its freedom.

> The term that designates reason as history is mind (Geist) which denotes the historical world viewed in relation to the rational progress of humanity--the historical world not as a chain of acts and events but as a ceaseless struggle to adapt the world to the growing potentialities of mankind (Marcuse, 1960, p. 10).

Thus, for Hegel, the French Revolution, though aborted, expressed the truth of humankind (Hegel himself claimed to be the philosophical expression of this truth) when it, without recourse to religion or nature, proclaimed all human beings free and equal. The impact of this event reverberated through all of Hegel's work. "In Hegel's view, the decisive turn that history took with the French Revolution was that man came to rely on his mind and dared to submit the given reality to the standards of reason" (Marcuse, 1960, p. 5-6). The significance of the French Revolution on Hegel's thought appeared in his location of intersubjectivity not in abstract categories but in actual human existence. For while Kant sought collective intersubjectivity, or the universal, in abstract categories, Hegel found it in the development of a rational concrete collectivity expressing the highest truths of humankind. Individuals achieved intersubjectivity, or a community of reason, only in the context of the real living human collectivity. ". . . [T]he whole movement of individual consciousness--which has reason--has been directed toward a world that is both subjective and objective, toward the spiritual community, 'the I that is a we and the we that is an I'" (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1974, p. 69; for reasons of clarity I have used this translation in preference to Hegel, 1967, p. 227). Thus, for Hegel, the collective impulse was not to be sought in abstract philosophy, but rather in the history of the development of humanity's self-consciousness. Philosophical systems of universality were the expressions of a developing material universality. "For Hegel philosophic doctrines are not abstract doctrines, they are ways of life" (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 49).

This reintegration of reason and history had some direct

consequences on the nature of philosophy, or critical thinking. For Kant's method had separated philosophy from the people--in perceiving the universal as existing outside of rather than in the process of human development, he also located philosophy outside of that development. "For Kant, the critique of knowledge was a critique that the philosopher exercised on common consciousness and on scientific consciousness . . . Common consciousness did not criticize itself; the philosopher's reflection was added to it" (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 8). In making human development the center of his philosophy, Hegel drew philosophy into the actual lives of people. He was not, as was Kant, merely interested in understanding a static structure of the mind; rather his concern was with the actual developing consciousness of humankind. His focus was on the common, not scientific consciousness, as it developed from a relatively primitive state to one of self-consciousness, freedom,and science.

> Hegel begins with the experience of the ordinary consciousness in everyday life. He shows that this mode of experience, like any other, contains elements that undermine its confidence in its ability to perceive 'the real,' and force the search to proceed to ever higher modes of understanding. The advance to these higher modes is thus an internal process of experience and is not produced from without (Marcuse, 1960, p. 93).

Thus, every consciousness was capable of attaining the level of science, or self-consciousness and freedom. For self-consciousness came from the interaction between the subject and the world, rather than from without.* Thus, for Hegel, the goals of philosophy were goals attainable by everyone--and were only attainable through everyone

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*This view was to reappear in Marx's position that the proletariat could become self-conscious and revolutionary on its own, without being led by elites.

in the process of history. Philosophy attained its goals by describing this process. Rather than impose categories on the subject from the outside, he let the subject itself develop the categories.

> Hegel, on the contrary, describes common consciousness much more than he constructs it. The philosopher disappears in the face of the experience he apprehends, and naive consciousness enters into its own experience and thus sees both itself and its object change. Reflection is not added to it from without (as for Kant) . . .; rather, it is literally a history of this consciousness (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 9).

This relation between the movement of philosophy, reason, and freedom as the truth of humanity and our particular experiences formed the core of Hegel's much heralded dialectic. It should be immediately noted however, that, according to Hegel, we were not dealing with a philosophical method, a sophistical tool used to expound a particular view of reality; rather, we were simply reflecting reality itself. Philosophy appeared dialectical only because it reflected the fundamentally dialectical nature of human existence.

> If one wants to speak of a "dialectical method" used by History, one must make clear that one is talking about methods of war and of work. This real, or better, active, historical dialectic is what is reflected in the history of philosophy. And if Hegelian science is dialectical or synthetical, it is only because it describes that real dialectic in its totality, as well as the series of consecutive philosophies which corresponds to that dialectical reality (Kojeve, 1969, p. 185).

This dialectical nature of existence for Hegel was based on what he termed the negative quality of reason.

Negation and the Dialectic

The dialectical process (or history) of philosophy is merely the history of the development of reason. It attempts to understand and grasp the logic behind this process. For at first glance, history appears to be a formless, chaotic collection of events, whose last

characteristic appears to be the possession of any reason or logic. Much as Kant asked the question of the possibility of orderly experience in a very abstract fashion, Hegel asked the same question of history:

> But in contemplating history as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed, a question necessarily arises: To what principle, to what final purpose, have these monstrous sacrifices been offered? (Hegel, 1953, p. 27).

This purpose Hegel found in the development of reason as the expression of human self-consciousness and freedom. The problem then was to understand how self-consciousness, or reason, developed itself in material experience--how did human consciousness "move" in the apparently hostile world of history? The key was that reason, consciousness, "moves itself"--neither god, nor kings, but consciousness itself, was its own moving force. The dialectic of philosophy was the description of this dialectical movement of consciousness through history.

The central category of this movement was that of negation, the simultaneously destructive and transformative quality of human reason. Negation was a quality not only of reason, but of material existence as well.

> In contrast to the knowledge that keeps man in a passive quietude, Desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action. Born of Desire, action tends to satisfy it, and can do so only by the "negation," the destruction, or at least the transformation, of the desired object: to satisfy hunger, for example, the food must be destroyed, or in any case transformed (Kojeve, 1969, p. 4).

The lack, or emptiness felt by the subject's body had to be filled through the destruction of a natural reality, food, and its transformation into a different substance that maintained the survival of the subject. Thus negation also involved a transformative, or transcendent

quality.

> . . . negating action is not purely destructive, for if action destroys an objective reality, for the sake of satisfying the Desire from which it is born, it creates in its place, in and by that very destruction, a subjective reality. The being that eats, for example, creates and preserves its own reality by the overcoming of a reality other than its own, by the "transformation"of an alien reality into its own reality, by the "assimilation," the "internalization," of a "foreign," "external" reality (Kojeve, 1969, p. 4).

However, Hegel did not put primacy on the negating quality of material action (as Marx was to do); instead, he put primacy on the negative character of reason (a focus that was to return in the theories of the Frankfurt School).

Just as eating was negating activity developing out of a physical want, so the negating activity of reason developed out of a mental want, or lack: the desire to understand the world and in doing so, understand oneself; in other words, the desire for freedom.

> Consciousness, for Hegel, must in no case remain "natural" in the sense of having to remain dominated by quite specific circumstances of a total situation. On the contrary, further education leads increasingly to a liberation from such bondage (W. Marx, 1975, p. 4).

Reason's "education," then, involved the confrontation and overcoming, or transcendence, of its context. It was an interactive process whereby the subject's perceptions of the world were modified and its differing perceptions in turn modified the object, or what it perceived. The object was not positivistically cut off from the perceiving subject; rather, they "contained" and "reflected" each other--consciousness "saw itself," or at least its own limitations in the object. The object, by not coinciding with the subject's perceptions, forced it to turn back into itself, to become self-critical--to "negate itself." Reason transformed itself out of internal contradiction,

resulting from experience of the gap between what the mind claimed and desired, and what it actually knew. Again,

> . . . ordinary consciousness in everyday life. . . . contains elements that undermine its confidence in its ability to perceive 'the real,' and force the search to proceed to ever higher modes of understanding. The advance to these higher modes is thus an internal process of experience and is not produced from without (Marcuse, 1960, p. 93).

However, in transforming itself, consciousness also transformed the object. When it perceived the object according to different modes of interpretation, the object likewise changed (for that consciousness). The subject was "objectified"--that is, the object reflected the structure of perception of the subject. The subject, in a sense, was "contained" in the object, and in perceiving the object, also perceived itself. A critique of the object, then, also involved a critique of the perceiving subject. In objectifying itself, the subject "distanced" itself from itself and thus was able to engage in self-critique. Only by putting itself in the object was the subject able to gain a concrete image of itself to study and critique. Self-consciousness, then, was not possible as an internal, individual act, but rather only through seeing and developing itself as it perceived itself in the world. Consciousness of the world was self-consciousness.*

This process of self-education through negation and objectification was most vividly expressed in Hegel's famed master-slave

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*This has become the basic theme of the sociology of knowledge--that the structure of perception, or point of view modified and at the same time could be discovered in its object. The sociology of knowledge studies consciousness by studying the context within which that consciousness developed. For example, laissez-faire economics modified its object in claiming that reality existed in a certain fashion, and at the same time made these claims deriving from its position in that reality. As Marx was to point out, to criticize the one was to criticize the other.

relationship (in the Phenomenology of Mind). Here he graphically traced the dialectic of human emancipation through the confrontation between the oppressor (the master) and the oppressed (the slave). The scenario he painted was one where two individuals confront each other, and desire to be recognized, or be given recognition by the other for one's humanity. Just as in any other desire, this desire initially translates itself into negating activity toward the other consciousness or object--that is, the desire to consume, to transform the other consciousness into something that perpetuates, or "feeds" the subject. As both subjects have this desire, it becomes a direct confrontation, or as Hegel put it, a fight to the death. Each subject is trying to force the other to recognize self as subject. At a certain state, one subject, fearing death more than a lack of recognition, gives in to the other, who becomes the master.* The slave becomes the worker for the master--the master's desires are not translated into negating action by the master, but rather by the slave. The slave transforms nature for purposes of the master's consumption. However, in this process the slave achieves self-recognition, or self-consciousness, in that the slave is objectified in nature. By modifying nature the slave puts a personal stamp on the natural world, and thus becomes objective to him/her self. Unlike the master, whose self-recognition is achieved through domination, the slave achieves recognition through his/her own work, his/her own development. In forcing the slave to work for him, the master created the conditions

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*As will be pointed out later, this recognition by Hegel of the importance of fear and insecurity, made him in many ways more sensitive to problems of social change than Marx.

that would eventually free the slave. (This short section of the Phenomenology was to have a large influence on Marx.)

The dialectic then was the process of reason interacting with the object--its objectification. At every stage, the objectified subject (the world as our perceptions construct it) undermined the claims of the subject and forced the subject to question itself as to its truth claims. It was the subject's very own claims, as objectified in the object, that became the basis for its negation or transformation. The material would that confronted the subject was not an external reality, but rather one of the subject's own making--the goal of self-consciousness was the realization of this fact. Here, as Marx was to later say, lay the "rational kernel" of Hegel's method --that self-consciousness or freedom meant that human beings were conscious of their ability to make their own world and create the basis for their own transformation, or negation. The method was reflected in Marx's internal critique of capitalism, developing out of his analysis of capitalism's own creation--the proletariat. Marx, instead of arguing for a dialectic based on the objectification of human reason, "turned Hegel on his head," and based his analysis on the objectification of labor. That is, each individual objectified him/her self primarily through his/her labor--the transformation of the material world, rather than through his/her perceptions of the world. Just as Hegel claimed that we become free when we realize that the reason of the world is our own, so Marx claimed that we become free when we realize that labor is our own objectification and that we should control it.

This development of consciousness was not merely the development

of particular consciousness; rather, the particular consciousness only developed out of its connection with the collective, or universal. "The Philosophy of Mind, and in fact the whole of the Hegelian system, is a portrayal of the process whereby the 'individual becomes universal' and whereby 'the construction of the universality' takes place" (Marcuse, 1960, p. 90). That is, the consciousness of freedom (or self-consciousness) was not the consciousness of a particular consciousness, for the very content of the individual was the world around him, which is the world of human interaction.

> Indeed, the individual, child of his time, possesses within himself the whole substance of the spirit of that time. He needs only appropriate it to himself, make it present to himself again . . . (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 39).

The objectified world was not one of the individual consciousness' construction, but rather that of the entire collectivity (which for Hegel was the Spirit). For the world into which the individual was born was already the product of human activity. In developing in this world the individual reflected this larger, more universal development.

> The particular individual, so far as content is concerned, has also to go through the stages through which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once assumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road which has been worked over and levelled out. Hence it is that, in the case of various kinds of knowledge, we find that what in former days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level of information, exercises, and even pastimes, for children; and in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's culture delineated in faint outline. This bygone mode of existence has already become an acquired possession of the general mind, which constitutes the substance of the individual, and, by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature (Hegel, 1967, p. 89-90).

Thus the development of the individual, and of consciousness in general, has been tied to a historically developing human

collectivity. Unlike Kant's abstract universality, Hegel grounded his universal concept in the actual development of consciousness in the world. Again,

> The philosopher disappears in the face of the experience he apprehends, and naive consciousness enters into its own experience and thus sees both itself and its object change. Reflection is not added to it from without . . . rather, it is literally a history of this consciousness (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 9).

Rather than construct an abstract model of individual consciousness from the outside, Hegel claimed to let consciousness "speak for itself."* This once again was an abstract expression of what was to become, for Marx, the ability of the proletariat to revolutionize itself from its own conditions, apart from any superior, elite leadership. Whereas Kant fought to withdraw philosophy from existence (very much, as we shall see, as the Frankfurt School did), Hegel pointedly tied them together. "For Hegel, philosophic doctrines are not abstract doctrines, they are ways of life" (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 49). The way of life that his philosophy pointed toward was that of a free, self-conscious collectivity. However, the abstract nature of his dialectic, coupled with the disillusionment of the French Terror and the unreceptive conditions of early 19th Century Germany, seriously crippled the emancipatory nature of Hegel's philosophy. The primacy of reason as the central feature of the dialectic, rather than conscious material existence, was evidence that Hegel did not completely transcend the Kantian dualism between theory and praxis. This was reflected in the ambiguous connection in his political philosophy between reason as

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*Marx's problem is how to do this. Since there are opposing forces, he employs the organization of emancipation.

the expression of human freedom, and the elitist monarch as expression of the human collectivity.

Established Dialectic Context of Freedom

The massive influence of Hegelian thought was that it elevated the concept of the collectivity from obscurity to a central functional category. The principal thrust of his thesis was that our human potential for an emancipated consciousness was only realizable collectively, in history. In effect, he initiated a conceptual system which undertook to realize a unification of our self- and our communal nature in a concrete social structural form. As we have seen, Hegel insisted that to establish meaning and consciousness, raw perceptions must pass through frames of reference conditioned by historic-cumulative social structures (by the collectivity).

Hegel's critique of Kant was significant because it elevated the concept of collectivity to the highest ideal to which humankind could aspire and established it within the tangible world. To accomplish this he simply substituted historical existence for the abstract Kantian categories. He then proceeded to establish the concept of common interest in the concrete structural form of the state.

Hegel's critique of the liberal tradition held that there was a human potential in the individual but that it was only realizable collectively. Hence, individual interest was in an important sense inseparable from collective interest. Now the communal--the highest human potential--had a concrete historical form in the state. The radical concept of the collective interest as necessity had been introduced and even partially grounded in social existence.

Hegel made one of the last attempts to create an encompassing philosophy of the world with the rational idea as the main force and structure. This followed the tradition of philosophy beginning with Plato and continuing through Aristotle, the Rationalists, and Kant. "Hegel was the last to interpret the world as reason, subjecting nature and history alike to the standards of thought and freedom" (Marcuse, 1960, p. 252). However, the roots of the break with traditional philosophy were contained within Hegel. This meant basically that human freedom was a historical process that could be rationally understood. It broke from the more static ontologies of the past that conceived history and process as indicative of imperfection and irrationality. Hegel put it this way: "[W]orld history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom--a process whose necessity we have to investigate" (Hegel, 1953, p. 24). Freedom, then, was the goal of both humanity and philosophy, a goal that could only be understood in terms of the progressive realization of consciousness across the broad course of human history. However, this process took different shapes and forms in its external, or apparent, manifestations. This realization of consciousness was the driving force, the underlying thread of human life. It changed life from a collection of accidents to a definite process with an underlying structure. This underlying structure or internal necessity (the Idea in Hegel) was expressed or manifested in a variety of ways over time. "The external necessity . . . is the same as the internal: it lies in the form and shape in which the process of time presents the existence of its moments" (Hegel, 1967, p. 70). Thus Hegel introduced a notion that would later be used by his own critics; that

what is, becomes, and can be understood in terms of a process of internal necessity--or contradiction.*

Hegel, then, assumed that the "spirit" of emancipated consciousness would also result as a "necessary" course of existence. He was alleged in a posthumous publication to have said:

> Spirit is essentially the result of its own activity; its activity is the transcending of immediate, simple, unreflected existence--the negation of that existence, and the returning into itself (Hegel, 1956, p. 78).

The "spirit" of consciousness or mind existed not as a mysterious extra-human force but immanently as a dialectic realization of our highest human potential--self-consciousness.

> The history of mind is its own act. Mind is only what it does, and its act is to make itself the object of its own consciousness. In history its act is to gain consciousness of itself as mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself. This apprehension is its being and its principle, and the completion of apprehension at one stage is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher. To use abstract phraseology, the mind apprehending this apprehension anew, or in other words returning to itself again out of its rejection of this lower stage of apprehension, is the mind of the stage higher than that on which it stood in its earlier apprehension (Hegel, 1952b, par. 343, p. 216).

Consciousness, in his view, determined human destiny prior to existence and was manifested, especially in his later political economics, in the concept of the state. This vision of the state then must be identified, not in the contemporary definition, but at least in part, as symbolic of the need for self-consciousness to achieve expression

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*This is essentially the attitude taken by Marx in his critique of capitalism. That is, capitalism was not a fixed phenomenon, but rather an epoch of a historical process whose true character was not revealed by the immediate bare 'fact.' "If the facts are to be understood, this distinction between their real existence and their inner core must be grasped clearly and precisely. This distinction is the first premise of a truly scientific study which in Marx's words, 'would be superfluous if the outward appearance of things coincided with their essence'" (Lukacs, 1971, p. 8).

in a concrete structural form. Implicit here is a fundamental Hegelian principle identified earlier. Self-consciousness could only be realized in relationship to others: "Self-consciousness allows its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 162). Existence of the "other" became the "necessary" ontological condition of one's own consciousness. Generalizing from this, self-expression could only occur where two or more self-conscious human beings interact. In short, the self became "objectified" through others in a concrete social context.

Hegel designated the state as the idealization of this universal collective. It appeared at once, and somewhat ambiguously, as the ideal--the principle--the final outcome which was to be a fully conscious collective structure.

Hegel's Paradox: The Abstract "Ground" of Collectivity

Hegel's historically conditioned social structure remained in several critical respects abstract and static. While he located the collective "spirit" in society, he separated the holder of the spirit (the state) from the actual collectivity (civil society). Individual development--the empirically grounded processes of dialectic transcendence (the development from sense-certainty to self-consciousness embedded in the concepts of objectification, negation, and transcendence) --occurred within what Hegel termed civil society. It was there that individual interests were played out, mediated by the legislature and the constitutional monarch. Within empirical reality, we became "objectified" or concretized in the process of our labor and in the course of our alienating pursuit of survival and desire. It was here

that our individual interests were grounded materially.

On the other hand, the collective aspect of the individual was located apart from and often antagonistic to material essence (civil society). Within Hegel's model, the universal essence, the humane spirit, was seated in the state and embodied in the monarch. Here the humane essence was abstracted from the individual and grounded with the power to enforce its will as a single entity separated from the people to be affected. The specific mediating structures were to be a legislature (not elected) and a hereditary constitutional monarch. The paradox was that Hegel "grounded" the collective essence only abstractly in the state and provided no concrete historical model on which that essence might have been realized in each individual.

This is precisely the point of the Marxian critique of Hegel to which we will later return. While Marx exaggerated certain deficiencies and failed to note crucial insightful qualities, he did, I believe, properly bring his mentor to task for the abstract element in Hegel's separation of essence from existence. Hegel's models of civil society and the state were, in effect, reifications of the prevalent liberal model. "The criticism of the German philosophy of the state and law, which attained its most consistent, profound, and final formulation with Hegel, is at once a critical analysis of the modern state and the actuality connected with it . . ." (Marx, 1967, p. 256). As is obvious from this quote, Marx believed that Hegel had apprehended his time so well in thought that to criticize Hegel was to criticize contemporary society. What Hegel did was to describe what existed in terms of what was necessary. However, the necessity of society for Hegel appeared to be an external necessity. That is, the essence

of society did not lie within society itself; it lay in the concept, the Idea. "The point of departure is the abstract Idea whose development in the state is the political constitution. Thus it is a question not of the political idea, but rather of the abstract Idea in the political element" (Marx, 1970, p. 12). This Marx saw as an essentially upside-down perspective on society. Adopting Feuerbach's transformative method* to a criticism of Hegel's philosophy, he accused Hegel of making the true subject,"man," the predicate of the concept. So, the subject for Hegel was not humanity in actual life, but rather humanity as exhibited in the ideal of life, the development of the rational Idea. This was evident in his analysis of the development of law: "The historical origin of the judge and his court may have had the form of a patriarch's gift to his people or of force or free choice; but this makes no difference to the concept of the thing. . . . The point is that legal and political institutions are rational in principle and therefore absolutely necessary, and the question of the form in which they arose or were introduced is entirely irrelevant to a consideration of their rational basis" (Hegel, 1952b, par. 219, p. 141). Thus the actual development of a social organization was not its historical, existential development, but rather its development as an idea, as something rational. This allowed Hegel to take the irrationality of bourgeois society (irrational in the sense that it is left to the 'invisible hand' and not to rational human control) and make it rational on the basis of bourgeois society's reflection of a rational concept and not on the basis of a rational existence.

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*We will return to this at a later point.

By placing the essence of human existence outside the day-to-day life of all citizens, Hegel put primacy on a rather mystical universal. "While their [states, nations, and individuals] consciousness is limited to these and they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them" (Hegel, 1952b, par. 344, p. 217). Thus Hegel explained society in a manner that made individuals simply pawns of the real force of society--"absolute spirit."

The disagreement between Hegel and Marx centered around the use of the dialectic in their notions of the world. With Hegel, the dialectic was the dialectic of the Idea playing itself out in the world. That is, it was not people who created the world through social interaction, but rather the Idea that made itself evident in the world, and thus to itself.

Marx's basic aim was to locate the essence of human society in the actual life of human beings.

> . . . men who develop their material production and their material relationships alter their thinking and the products of their thinking along with their real existence. Consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness. In the first view the starting point is consciousness taken as a living individual; in the second it is the real living individuals themselves as they exist in real life, and consciousness is considered only as their consciousness.
>
> This view is not devoid of premises. It proceeds from real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. These premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixation, but in their real, empirically perceptible process of development under certain conditions (Marx, 1967, p. 415).

Here Marx took his stand against the idealism present in much of Hegel's philosophy.

Given that overview, a more detailed examination of Hegel's philosophy of the state and its implications for an emancipated

consciousness will follow.

Civil Society

My treatment of Hegel's perspectives on civil society and the state will undertake an analytical identification and examination of selected elements. It is not intended as a systematic critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state. It should be pointed out that Hegel's state was not defined as a contract of formerly independent individuals as it was for the English liberals. Rather, it was conceived as the process of generations of humankind engaged in the continuing realization and expansion of a historical community. It was an epochal journey developed across the reaches of time in the transitional context of their communal life and social existence. This journey was marked by struggle and consequently the state was the seat of power which, through a combination with the cultural heritage, had formed a nation, subjugated a people in a common historical experience, and constituted a mediating influence (based on the evolving principles of their collective essence) over the self-seeking struggles of atomized individuals.

The following passage is indicative of Hegel's frame of reference:

> The organization of this body called the German constitution was built up in a life totally different from the life it had later and has now. The justice and power, the wisdom and courage of times past; the honour and blood, the well-being and distress of generations long dead; and the relationships and manners which have perished with them; all these are expressed in the form of that body (Hegel, 1964, p. 146).

The present state developed from the death of the past in a process whose sequence might have differed given historical circumstances, but

whose end was the same--the full realization of our human essence.

However, Hegel had recognized the dangers (evident in all the structures of society inclusive of political economy) of the abrupt destruction and rebirth of previous forms. Clearly the current state had not and could not realize the ultimate consciousness of an "infinite progression" whose "spirit" was an idealization the realization of which would be an outcome of the day-to-day struggles of the people. For that reason he had not, like Marx, insisted on an immediate unification of social existence (civil society) with the ideal seated in the state. Rather, civil society became the locus of human struggles whose consequences might be assessed with retrospective insight by scholars who would then make available to great men whatever infinite truths were revealed. These great men would incorporate them into the constitution of the state. The state in turn, representing the fullest realization of human essence to date, would mediate the otherwise fragmenting struggles of civil society.

Civil society for Hegel consisted of social interests, ethnic groups, craft associations--the full constellation of entities that represented identifiable interests. He defined this constellation, later defined as civil society, as encompassing the "internal social arrangement. . . made by the free action of the citizens" (Hegel, 1964, p. 161). Elsewhere he observed that civil society ". . . may be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it" (Hegel, 1952b, par. 183, p. 123). Civil society was conceived as the matrix of independent authorities and autonomous bodies that furthered individual interests. It was oriented to the advancement of individual rights,

and the realization of mutual obligation.

Hegel's concept of civil society was a direct consequence of his interpretation of history. It was an interpretation that reflected a dialectically oriented analysis of the vital linkage between Greek and modern bourgeois society. It embodied an effort to retain the individualistic component of the European culture of his time and to unite it with the communal essence manifested in the Greek concept of Polis.

> . . . the creation of civil society is the achievement of the modern world which has for the first time given all determinations of the Idea their due (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 182, p. 266).

> The Greek polis absorbed its members so completely and its ethos was so sacrosanct that it was inconceivable to them to question the fundamental principles of the polis or to assert any claims to the satisfaction of their own particular interests when they participated in politics. Moreover, the citizens' identification with the community was unconscious and spontaneous. It was brought about by customs, traditions and civic education, and reinforced by art, literature, philosophy and religion, which were all integral parts of the Greek way of life or 'the spirit of the people' (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 6-7).

The distinguishing characteristics of the linkage of individualism and the collectivity that was indigenous to Hegel (the Prussian State) was its incorporation of the individualistic precepts not only of the doctrine of natural law but also of Christianity.* These frames of reference integral to the bourgeois interest** in unconstrained commerce were based on the premise that individuals conceived

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*In paragraphs 182 and 185, 1952b, Hegel mentions Roman law and Christianity as the ultimate causes of individualism.

**"In The German Constitution Hegel speaks of 'the bourgeois sense, which cares only for an individual and not self-subsistent end and has no regard for the whole.' When the bourgeoisie became a political power through the growth of imperial cities its spirti became one of the main causes of the decline of the German Empire. Cf. Political Writings, pp. 190, 191" (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 7).

themselves

> . . . not just as members of communities but also--and sometimes primarily--as bearers of private rights against the state and possessors of legitimate particular and group interests. In Hegel's view Christianity had an equally profound effect on European culture, especially after it had been developed by the Reformation and secularized by the Enlightenment. Under its influence men came to regard themselves as moral agents, acknowledging no higher authority than their own conscience or reason. Hegel calls the first tendency 'particularity' and the second 'subjectivity'; the two together constitute the pecularily modern and European phenomenon of individualism. . . . Long before Tocqueville and Marx, Hegel perceived that it was the bourgeoisie which formed the chief social base of individualism and through whom the traditional, community-conscious Europe of the Middle Ages had been undermined (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 7).

It was the overall historic component of individualism then that Hegel attempted to dialectually link with the aforementioned historic "necessity" of our collective essence.

The Hegelian intent was succinctly phrased in his expression of the dilemma faced by modern society.

> What is of the utmost importance is that the law of reason should be shot through and through by the law of particular freedom, and that my particular end should become identified with the universal end, or otherwise the state is left in the air. The state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their own self-hood and it is stable only when public and private ends are identical (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 265, p. 281).

This concern that the sphere that represented our individual "particularity" not be confused with and overrun by an equally important "universal" quality, not merely reflected bourgeois influence in his time but seemed to adopt that aspect of the bourgeois political structure. His affinity to the prevalent bourgeois mentality was further expressed in his advocacy of a strong middle class.

> It is a prime concern of the state that a middle class should be developed, but this can be done only if the state is an organic unity . . . it can be done only by giving authority

> to spheres of particular interests, which are relatively independent, and by appointing an army of officials whose personal arbitrariness is broken against such authorized bodies. Action in accordance with everyone's rights, and the habit of such action, is a consequence of the counterpoise to officialdom which independent and self-subsistent bodies create (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 297, p. 291).

Hegel appeared in these passages to assume the prevalence of narrowed class interests and intergroup rivalry that would always require mediation and did not systematically anticipate a structure within which the presumed expansion of the collective or universal spirit might be realized. Rather, civil society seemed almost ontologically established as a structure that preserved rather than overcame the self-seeking element.

> Civil Society--an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system--the means to security of person and property--and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests (Hegel, 1952b, par. 157, p. 110).

Each "corporation" or group representing the trades, agriculture, or the various institutional structures resulting from the division of labor, represented a critical link between self-interest and the collective interest. Again, it was a functionally fixed (as opposed to transcendental) structure based on the presumed "necessary" ascendency of a consciousness of freedom.

> Unless he is a member of an authorized Corporation . . . an individual is without rank or dignity, his isolation reduces his business to mere self-seeking and his livelihood and satisfaction become insecure. Consequently, he has to try to gain recognition for himself by giving external proofs of success in his business, and to these proofs no limits can be set. He cannot live in the manner of his class, for no class really exists for him . . . (Hegel, 1952b, par. 253, p. 153-154).
>
> The sanctity of marriage and the dignity of Corporation membership are the two fixed points round which the unorganized atoms of civil society revolve (Hegel, 1952b, par. 255, p. 154).

To this point Hegel had not specified the nature of the mediation that adjudicated conflict within and between the corporations and estates of civil society but it was essentially seated in (1) the middle class from whose ranks the civil servant was recruited, (2) the assembly of Estates, and (3) the Constitutional Monarch. "Civil servants and the members of the executive [who] constitute the greater part of the middle class. . . were "dispassionate, upright, and polite" (Hegel, 1952b, pars. 297 and 296, respectively, p. 193). Further, they were to have been selected by means of a plan that was a forerunner of the modern "meritocracy." It was derived of the regime of Napoleon, much revered by Hegel, and constituted an inherent critique of his native Prussian State.

> . . . individuals are not appointed to office on account of their birth or native personal gifts. The objective factor in their appointment is knowledge and proof of ability. Such proof guarantees that the state will get what it requires; and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it also guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants (Hegel, 1952b, par. 291, p. 190).

Hegel anticipated Marx's objection to property as a criterion of admissability to bureaucratic office. Rather, the criteria for office were to be objective.

> The individual functionaries and agents are attached to their office not on the strength of their immediate personality, but only on the strength of their universal and objective qualities . . . the functions and the powers of the state cannot be private property.
>
> The business of the state is in the hands of individuals. But their authority to conduct its affairs is based not on their birth but on their objective qualities. Ability, skill, character, all belong to a man in his particular capacity. He must be educated and be trained to a particular task. Hence an office may not be saleable or hereditary (Hegel, 1952b, par. 277 and addition, pp. 179 and 287).

The civil servant was to have been appointed by the monarch and was presumably to monitor "objective" qualities of the class. There was

no direct responsibility or linkage to the people.

> Once an individual has been appointed to his official position by the sovereign's act . . . the tenure of his post is conditional on his fulfilling its duties. Such fulfillment is the very essence of his appointment, and it is only consequential that he finds in his office his livelihood and the assured satisfaction of his particular interests . . . and further that his external circumstances and his official work are freed from other kinds of subjective dependence and influence. . . .
>
> What the service of the state really requires is that men shall forgo the selfish and capricious satisfaction of their subjective ends; by this very sacrifice, they acquire the right to find their satisfaction in, but only in the dutiful discharge of their public functions. In this fact, so far as public business is concerned, there lies the link between universal and particular interests which constitutes both the concept of the state and its inner stability . . . (Hegel, 1952b, par. 294, p. 191).

The social units charged with the principal function of mediation were the estates.

> Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the government in general on the one hand and the nation broken up into particulars (people and associations) on the other. Their function requires them to possess a political and administrative sense and temper, no less than a sense for the interests of individuals and particular groups. As the same time the significance of their position is that, in common with the organized executive, they are a middle term preventing both the extreme isolation of the power of the corwn, which otherwise might seem a mere arbitrary tyranny, and also the isolation of the particular interests of persons, societies, and Corporations. Further, and more important, they prevent individuals from having the appearance of a mass or an aggregate and so from acquiring an unorganized opinion and volition and from crystallizing into a powerful bloc in opposition to the organized state (Hegel, 1952b, par. 302, p. 197).
>
> The real significance of the Estates lies in the fact that it is through them that the state enters the subjective consciousness of the people and that the people begin to participate in the state (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 301, p. 292).

The legislative body of Estates became the linkage between the concrete existence of people and the abstracted representatives (seated in the political state), of the ethical and moral codes that would ultimately both reflect their way of life and function as a code of conduct.

The composition of the legislature was protected from direct "vulnerability" to civil society. Its members were not elected but were selected on the basis of a concern for the collective interest. He shied away from direct representation and condemned the liberal advocacy of universal suffrage.

> Not satisfied with the establishment of rational rights, with freedom of person and property, with the existence of a political organization in which are to be found various circles of civil life each having its own functions to perform, and with that influence over the people which is exercised by the intelligent members of the community, and the confidence that is felt in them, "Liberalism" sets up in opposition to all this that atomistic principle, that which insists upon the sway of individual wills; maintaining that all government should emanate from their express power and have their express sanction. Asserting this formal side of Freedom--this abstraction--the party in question allows no political organization to be firmly established. The particular arrangements of the govenment are forthwith opposed by the advocates of Liberty as the mandates of a particular will, and branded as displays of arbitrary power. The will of the Many expels the Ministry from power, and those who had formed the Opposition fill the vacant places; but the latter having now become the Government, meet with hostility from the Many, and share the same fate. Thus agitation and unrest are perpetuated. This collision, this nodus, this problem is that with which history is now occupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future (Hegel, 1956, p. 452).

One of the two houses was intended to be representative of the various interests embodied in conflicting organizations. Within this domain of the middle-class the individualistic interests of civil society were represented by deputies. These deputies were not elected for that would subject the state to the volatile "will of the many," but were selected as representatives of the business class whose "circles of associations . . .[were]already communities" (Hegel, 1952b, par. 303, p. 198).

> Since these deputies are the deputies of civil society, it follows as a direct consequence that their appointment is made by the society as a society. That is to say, in making

> the appointment, society is not dispersed into atomic units, collected to perform only a single and temporary act, and kept together for a moment and no longer. On the contrary, it makes the appointment as a society, articulated into associations, communities, and Corporations, which although constituted already for other purposes, acquire in this way a connection with politics (Hegel, 1952b, par. 308, p. 200).

The business class was to lend stability and "intelligence" to the assembly.

> In the business class, however, it is intelligence which is the essential thing, and natural products can be treated only as raw materials (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 203, p. 270).

> In the business class, the individual is thrown back on himself and this feeling of self-hood is most intimately connected with the demand for law and order. The sense of freedom and order has therefore arisen above all in the towns (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 204, p. 270).

The other legislative chamber was to have been composed of the agricultural Estates. This non-elective body of landed nobility was to have been designated on the basis of their "substantial" effect on social stability.

> The substantial (or agricultural) class has its capital in the natural products of the soil which it cultivates--soil which is capable of exclusively private ownership and which demands formation in an objective way and not mere haphazard exploitation. . . . this class has the substantial disposition of an ethical life which is immediate, resting on family relationship and trust (Hegel, 1952b, par. 203, p. 131).

The normative structure of inheritance, obligation of the nobility, and ownership of land were presumably to have constituted the basis of unreflective dependence and subservience to the prevailing ethics. It was a model not unlike Tonnies' model of "gemeinschaftliche" society.

> . . . the agricultural class will always retain a mode of life which is patriarchal and the substantial frame of mind proper to such a life. The member of this class accepts unreflectively what is given him and takes what he gets, thanking God for it and living in faith and confidence that this

> goodness will continue. What comes to him suffices him; once it is consumed, more comes again. This is the simple attitude of mind not concentrated on the struggle for riches. It may be described as the attitude of the old nobility . . . (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 203, p. 270).

For Hegel, the nobility or agricultural class

> . . . has little occasion to think of itself; what it obtains is the gift of a stranger, or nature. Its feeling of dependence is fundamental to it, and with this feeling there is readily associated a willingness to submit to whatever may befall it at other men's hands. The agricultural class is thus more inclined to subservience, the business class to freedom (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 204, p. 270-271).

This pre-eminent patriarchal structure of inherited wealth and stability presumably also possessed an inherent authority which commanded the respect and trust of other citizens and perfectly complemented the innovative entrepreneural class.

What emerged from Hegel's consideration of civil society was the establishment of a mediated linkage between individual interest and collective essence. This linkage at once explained the functional nature of extant institutions and protected against their wholesale abuse or dismissal. It became apparent that that the mechanism of change was not made directly available to the people (civil society). Rather, as we shall see shortly, it was embodied in the collective essence of humanity and was left to the self-realization of spirit. It was beyond the realm of the philosopher and played itself out in a manner wherein consciousness took conceptual account of each institutional structure and the massive ramifications of its negation. Hegel was assiduously opposed to a radical negation within the confines of a struggle dominated by self-interest. He insisted that transcendence should rather be placed under the guardianship of those charged with responsibility for administration of the collective essence of humanity.

It is to an examination of the embodiment of that essence in the political state to which we now turn.

The State

Pelczynski aptly observed that "To say that 'civil society' is 'the state as the Understanding envisages it' is a Hegelian way of saying that there is another, more adequate mode of conceiving the state" (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 10). Thus, from Hegel's perspective the existence of corporations, estates, and other bodies representative of the various interests, presupposed a structure that insured their growth and rational legitimation. The codes that promised the fullest attainment of human self-realization--the normative basis of civil society--presupposed a body to enact them. They presupposed an assembly of Estates representative of the interest structure of the society. Judicious enforcement of those codes together with mediation of conflicts that would result from disputes over their interpretation, presupposed a wise and unbiased body of civil servants. Finally then, effective functioning presupposed an ultimate authority over domestic and foreign affairs of state. The occupant of that critical role, the monarch, had to be sensitive to the public will but strong enough to enforce the collective interest. The liberal influence was distinctly visible.

Those functions then which transcended civil society were allocated by Hegel to the strictly political state and its constitution. (See Hegel, 1952b, par. 262, p. 162). The state as a political unity "universalized" the ethical order within a context that protected it from the machinations of individual "particularity." He had interpreted

civil society as a nebulous ethical structure.

> It is the system of the ethical order, split into its extremes and lost, . . . [and in which] particularity . . . [has] the right to develop and launch forth in all directions . . . (Hegel, 1952b, par. 184, p. 123).

On the other hand,

> The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. . . . while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom (Hegel, 1952b, par. 257, p. 155).

The ethical standards were the fundament of our collective essence

> . . . [the laws] are not something alien to the subject. On the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence, the essence in which he has a feeling of his self-hood, and in which he lives as in his own element which is not distinguished from himself. The subject is thus directly linked to the ethical order by a relation which is more like an identity than even the relation of faith or trust (Hegel, 1952b, par. 147, p. 106).

The state was conceived as the basis on which we might consciously realize our fullest collective potential while in a working relationship with supportive elements in the existing society.

> . . . (the state) works and acts by reference to consciously adopted ends, known principles and laws which are not merely implicit but are actually present to consciousness; and further it acts with precise knowledge of existing conditions and circumstances, inasmuch as its actions have a bearing on these (Hegel, 1952b, par. 270, p. 165).

Hence, the state must also reflect the will of the citizenry:

> The state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their own self-hood and it is stable only when the public and private ends are identical. It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is perfectly true. If all is not well with them, if their subjective aims are not satisfied, if they do not find that the state as such is the means to their satisfaction, then the footing of the state itself is insecure (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 265, p. 281).

But the process could not depend equally on every citizen. Indeed, it was effectively restricted to officials whose duty lay in promoting the collective interest.

> Unlike civil (or social) order, political order is brought about largely consciously and deliberately, by rules and institutions adopted for this end, manipulated by men whose interest and duty lie in promoting national unity and cohesion (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 12).

In effect, the state in the Hegelian conception was based on rational freedom ordered within a social context that supplemented mutual social interaction with the guidance of elites.* This was opposed to civil society wherein one might realize one's particular ends without regard to others.

Kojeve (in a particularly generous interpretation) believed that the Hegelian precepts would lead ultimately to a synthesis of universality and particularity that anticipated the Marxian concept of Gemeinwesen.

> In other words: Man can be truly "satisfied," History can end, only in and by the formation of a Society, of a State, in which the strictly particular, personal, individual value of each is recognized as such, in its very particularity, by all, by Universality incarnated in the State as such; and in which the universal value of the State is recognized and realized by the Particular as such, by all the Particulars. Now such a State, such a synthesis of Particularity and Universality, is possible only after the "overcoming" of the opposition between the Master and the Slave, since the synthesis of the Particular and the Universal is also a synthesis of Mastery and Slavery (Kojeve, 1969, p. 58).

Unlike Marx, however, Hegel exempted philosophy from concrete realization of that synthesis. Nonetheless, the degree to which Hegel anticipated Marx in his critical projection regarding capitalism is striking. One thing is certain; Hegel did not advocate a mindless

*The model bears striking resemblance to modern state capitalism as treated by Kolko, Baran and Sweezy, et al.

replication of the bourgeois state.

> 'Factories and mills base their existence upon the misery of a class.' Of course, the State stands above this business world, which is like a 'wild animal,' and surveys it from a universal standpoint. But 'its intervention must be hardly visible; one should not want to save what cannot be saved, but find other employment for the class that endures misery.' (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 60).

However, the differences must not be underplayed. The State, like the philosopher, was abstracted from the individual. Individuals could not be bonded together within the tenuous structure of a mere mutual acknowledgment of common interest. Sufficient consciousness did not prevail for that. Rather, social cohesion was to be realized in submission of the citizens to the ultimate public authority embodied in the monarch and the assembly of Estates. The triumph of the spiritual qualities of "noble consciousness" over the "base consciousness" had to occur in a context, but the context required a wise and impartial, but moderate, authority. We should not fall prey to the "leveling effects of pure democracy," which deluded itself with schemes to organize the state "from below, from the people itself" (Hegel, 1952b, p. 6). As we shall later see, Hegel became increasingly dubious of democracy, working in the aftermath of the French Revolution. As a consequence, the mediating authority of the state loomed ever more significantly in his model of the consciousness of freedom. An entire chapter of The Phenomenology of Mind was written in opposition to "absolute freedom and terror." Hegel's assessment of the Reign of Terror was that where freedom was "absolute" the collectivity as a common interest was betrayed. The risk of civil society to the political state was that the latter might be overcome in its function as guardian of the ethical ideal. In which case, the community would be

dissolved into a morass of self-seeking individuals. This concern was apparent in Hegel's critique of proposed voting qualifications for a provincial legislature.

> The most striking thing about it is that, according to such dry, abstract provisions as both of those cited, the electors appear otherwise in no bond or connection with the civil order and the organization of the state as a whole. The citizens come on the stage as isolated atoms, and the electoral assemblies as unordered inorganic aggregates; the people as a whole is dissolved into a heap. This is a form in which the community should never have appeared at all in undertaking any enterprise; it is a form most unworthy of the community and most in contradiction with its concept of a spiritual order. Age and property are qualities affecting only the individual himself, not characteristics constituting his worth in the civil order . . . Atomistic principles of that sort spell, in science as in politics, death to every rational concept, organization and life (Hegel, 1964, p. 262-263).

Concern with the need for an abstract entity apart from the particularity of the "multitude" was also reflected in his consideration of the military.

> A multitude of human beings can only call itself a state if it be united for the common defence of the entirety of its property. What is self-explanatory in this proposition must nonetheless be stated, namely that this union has not merely the intention of defending itself; the point is that it defends itself by actual arms, be its power and its success what they may . . . If a multitude is to form a state, then it must form a common military and public authority (Hegel, 1964, p. 153-154).

This authority then must be organized within a constitution and exercised by a supreme authority.

Hyppolite elaborated on the relationship of the abstract universal to the particular:

> . . . self-consciousness, the Idea must posit itself as a particular reality in the Constitution and the Monarch. In the phenomenal world, these two moments are separate; in true Reality it is the Idea itself which separates itself and offers itself to itself in order to reconcile itself unto itself in an eternal mediation. In the Hegelian philosophy of the State, however, this mediation is extremely obscure; it is expressed

> through public opinion, the representation of civil associations in the state, through bureaucracy and so forth; . . . (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 110).

Via the constitution the essential principles of the state were removed from the free-for-all of particularity (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 25). But it was critical that the state represented the true feelings of the people.

> A nation's constitution must embody its feeling for its rights and its position, otherwise there may be a constitution there in an external way, but it is meaningless and valueless. Isolated individuals may often feel the need and the longing for a better constitution, but it is quite another thing, and one that does not arise till later, for the mass of the people to be animated by such an idea (Hegel, 1952b, addition to par. 274, p. 287).

The legislature, as we have seen, served as a mediating body between conflicting interest--being non-elective, it was abstract from direct influence by the people. Likewise, in the absence of a universally emancipated consciousness, our highest human potential would be represented by a disinterested authority in whose role it existed on an abstracted idealized plane. Here each citizen's collective essence was embodied abstractly in the monarch.

> Taken without its monarch and the articulation of the whole which is the indispensable and direct concomitant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer a state. It lacks every one of those determinate characteristics . . .--which are to be found only in a whole which is inwardly organized* (Hegel, 1952b, par. 279, p. 183).

Pelczynski attempts to explain the rationale of Hegel's insistence on a hereditary monarch as follows:

> The hereditary character of the monarchy and the power of the crown in the constitution of the supreme public authority

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*This comment could be seen as applicable to post-Watergate United States. The highest priority of American politicians was to re-establish the prestige of the Presidency as crucial in overcoming the listless pessimism of the people.

> also become more intelligible now. Hegel's metaphysical deduction of the necessity of hereditary succession is both obscure and implausible. What seems to lie behind it, however, is the desire to anchor one element of the public authority to something independent of choice, and therefore make it immune to arbitrary subjective opinions and the influence of 'particularity.' By leaving the designation of the person of the monarch to the natural phenomenon of birth, the constitution guarantees an indispensable minimum of stability and security within the public authority. Hegel regards elective monarchy as 'the worst of institutions' because 'the nature of the relation between king and people implies that the ultimate decision is left with the particular will, and hence the constitution becomes a Compact of Election, i.e. a surrender of the power of the state at the discretion of the particular will.' Hegel justifies in a similar way his vesting of the ultimate constitutional authority in the monarch rather than in a representative assembly or the whole citizen body. The constitution--the organization of the 'political state'--is thus taken out of the arena in which particular interests can play their dangerous games and weaken the state power at its source. It also apparently acquires sanctity by being lifted out of the category of things which can be manufactured at will. The monarch's exclusive prerogatives over the executive, the civil service and the armed forces, and his right to veto the Estates' legislative proposals, are all explicable by Hegel's eagerness to prevent their domination by the forces of 'particularity' and 'subjectivity,' and by his belief that only the monarch's ultimate personal control can guarantee that they all remain first and foremost organs of the 'ethical community' (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 25).

It should be noted, however, that Hegel's concept of the monarchy was not of the absolute character of feudalism. The monarch's was not a right grounded in tradition and prescriptive title alone. Rather, it was based on the "rationality in the constitution" and was contingent on the monarch's respect for the "public freedom" (Hegel, 1952b, par. 286, p. 188). But the public recourse, in the event of a lapse in performance of the obligation, was vague.

The role of an elite, charged with the preservation of an abstract ethical ideal of the state, was chosen by Hegel in the absence of successful precedents in which that function was successfully

performed in direct linkage to the self-interested struggle of civil society. But again the authority must be receptive to the will and spirit of the people.

> This is not the place to argue at length that the center, as the public authority, i.e. the government, must leave to the freedom of the citizens whatever is not necessary for its appointed function of organizing and maintaining authority and thus for its security at home and abroad. . . .
>
> We also regarded that people as fortunate to which the state gives a free hand in subordinate general activities, just as we regard a public authority as infinitely strong if it can be supported by the free and unregimented spirit of its people (Hegel, 1964, p. 161, 164).

Further, the authority could not constitute a "mechanical hierarchy" aloof from the people it served. Anticipating the work of Weber, he observed that

> A mechanical hierarchy, highly intellectual and devoted to noble ends, evinces no confidence whatever in its citizens and can thus expect nothing from them. It has no assurance in any action not ordered, carried out, and arranged by itself; thus it bans free-will gifts and sacrifices; it displays to its subjects its conviction of their lack of intellect, its contempt for their capacity to assess and do what is compatible with their private interests, and its belief in general profligacy. Thus it cannot hope for any vital action, any support from its subjects' self-respect (Hegel, 1964, p. 163).

The authority must acknowledge the necessity detailed earlier, not to reflect an abstract spirit of the people but rather to reflect concrete public opinion. It was here that Hegel came into a closer affinity to modern democratic precepts.

> How dull and spiritless a life is engendered in a modern state where everything is regulated from the top downwards, where nothing with any general implications is left to the management and execution of interested parties of the people--in a state like what the French Republic has made itself--is to be experienced only in the future, if indeed this pitch of pedantry in domination can persist. But what life and what sterility reigns in another equally regulated state, in the Prussian, strikes anyone who sets foot in the first town there or sees its complete lack of scientific or artistic genius, or assesses

> its strength otherwise than by the ephemeral energy which a single genius has been able to generate in it for a time by pressure (Hegel, 1964, p. 163-164).

To Hegel, it was imperative that the ensemble of beliefs about the proper functioning of the state be expressed and considered seriously by the authority. "Political opinion represents what Hegel calls the critical 'moment of subjectivity' in the 'political state' . . ." (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 11).

Hegel, it is apparent, devoted considerable attention to the critical analysis of the collectivity as a context within which meaning and the consciousness of freedom were realized. Pelczynski summarized Hegel's predominant concern that the collective interest was endangered by a too close proximity to struggle within the realm of civil society.*

> [It] is dangerous because if the individualistic point of view characteristic of 'civil society' gains too strong a foothold in the 'political state,' the state power may cease functioning as the guardian of the community, ethical life may become subordinated to the free play of particular interests and subjective opinions of individual citizens, and the statewide 'ethical community' may eventually dissolve into the much looser kind typical of 'civil society' (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 23).

Hence, the state was conceptualized as an abstract embodiment whose only linkage to the raw empirical world was via the mediation of the assembly of Estates and presided over the wise and judicious rule of the monarch and his appointed officialdom.

Rather than retain the function of transcendence and negation within the realm of the concrete existence of people; rather than risk a rash decision on the part of all citizens to radically and

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*This previews Habermas who found the intellectual advocates of the collective interest threatened by a too close proximity to political struggle.

precipitously modify the constitutional structure and invite the confusion and terror of an earth-shaking negation of the total social fabric, Hegel set the stage for a mediated transition. He abstracted the ultimate transcendental mechanism of power from the people and channeled the flow of change, through the process of mediation, under the authority of the state. Consciousness in Hegel's terminology returned to itself via authority of a superior consciousness. He did not hold blindly to the status quo or defend the existing structure. He was primarily concerned that change, including the realm of political economy, be selectively and judiciously abstracted from the context of narrowed self-interest by wise and benevolent elites and rationally undertaken within the stabilizing support mechanisms of traditional institutions.*

From Unity to an Abstracted Social Being

We have noted that Hegel's work progressively manifested a tendency to identify and embody the humanistic collective "necessity" as an "abstractly universal power" separate from the single individual. I would like to examine that phenomenon and its historical context.

Hegel had not always advocated so sharp an opposition between civil society and the state as the one which he delineated in the Philosophy of Right only ten years before his death. The difference is noted by Suter. It appeared in an essay on natural law published in Jena in 1802. In the essay:

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*The self-understanding of politicians like Roosevelt and Wilson was also that of a "wise and benevolent elite" maintaining the stability of the country (Cf. G. Kolko). Once again, Hegel pointed not toward a reactionary feudal state, but toward what would become state capitalism.

> . . . Hegel directs sharp criticism at the political individualism of his predecessors and develops an organic conception of the state. . . . Hegel develops his own conception of politics. He intends to overcome the Kantian dualism between right and duty and to show that both are united in what he calls 'ethical life' or 'living morality' (Sittichkeit), to distinguish it from the 'abstract morality' (Moralitat) of Kant and Fichte. The unity of law and moral life resides, for Hegel, in the ensemble of customs and traditions which constitute a people. The people is that 'moral substance' in which there is no opposition between subjective demands and social prescriptions. Through his participation in the ethical life of the people, the individual is harmoniously integrated into the society to which he belongs.
>
> This harmony between the individual and society seems to Hegel to have been realized in the Greek city-state. He refers to the Greek notion of 'ethos,' the intimate union of law and subjective dispositions. Greek laws express the people's ideal of dignified and reasonable conduct. The serene national life testifies that the individual identifies himself with the community (Suter, 1971, p. 59-60).

I have already noted that for citizens there was no distinction between private person and political community in the Hellenic democracy.* Within the polis, individual life was in harmony with the city, the collective essence, and it was the model of the Greek city-state that prevailed in his early work. A sharp contrast is presented between a passage from this earlier period reported by Hyppolite and the later work. The young Hegel, after having expressed "'concern for the particular and concern for what is general'" (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 110), found the unfortunate separation of the two realms to be the cause of an unnecessary form of an omnipresent "unborn consciousness."

Why was his earlier advocacy of unity abandoned for a model in which organizational checks and balances were established between the people and the abstract embodiment of their collective essence? Pelczynski observed that ". . . it was during the so-called Jena

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*Of course, citizenship was denied to women, slaves, etc.

period of his life that he both rethought his political ideas and formulated his own philosophical system in conscious opposition to his previous philosophic masters" (Pelcynyski, 1971, p. 5). It was in Jena that Hegel expressed both increased dissatisfaction with the outcome of the French Revolution and increased admiration for Napoleon (Avineri, 1977, p. 63). His disillusionment had begun more than a decade earlier and has been amply documented by Hyppolite.

> Many German minds who at first welcomed with enthusiasm the French Revolution later failed to understand its course. By the end of 1794, Hegel had already expressed to Schelling his disgust with the bloody tyranny of Robespierre. The wars of the armies of the Republic, and later of the Empire, had caused second thoughts among the utopians. Hegel saw that war at close hand, villages half in ruins, churches demolished to the bare walls. New thoughts about the French Revolution began to appear. In 1793 Gentz translated into German Burke's conservative Reflections on the French Revolution, so important for its elaboration of the romantic and organic conception of the State.
>
> Like others Hegel experienced the wave of reaction, but in his own way and without changing his attitude to one of conservatism. His new position is best expressed in his essay on "The German Constitution." There he no longer regards the State as the product of a contractual association. The State imposes itself upon individuals as their destiny. The unity of the State is the creation of force and great political geniuses--such as Richelieu in France--and not of ideologies (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 41).

It was in the Jena period (1806) that The Phenomenology of Mind was written and, as we have seen, he had by that time arrived at his oppositional model of civil society and the state. Now in place of a unity the new model allowed that membership in civil society was open to all while the roles of the political state were hierarchically ordered and contingent upon hereditary pedigree and formal expertise.

In the post-Jena period he acknowledged the collapse of the Greek perspective and conceived a consciousness that simultaneously existed in "two worlds."

> The first world of spirit is the expanded realm of spirit's self-dispersing existence and of certainty of self in separate individual shapes and forms: just as nature disperses its life in an endless multiplicity of forms and shapes, without the generic principle of all the forms being present therein. The second world contains the generic principle, and is the realm of the ultimate inherent nature (Ansichseyns) or the essential truth, over against that individual certainty (Hegel, 1967, p. 597).

We may turn to literature to acquire a feeling for the intellectual mood of the time. It was that mood that appeared so faithfully in Hegel's conception of the base and noble consciousness that developed respectively into his models of civil society and the political state.* Hegel had been profoundly affected by a short piece written by Denis Diderot and published as Rameau's Nephew. It had been translated from the original French by Goethe and sent along to Hegel's friend and colleague, Schiller. Schiller wrote that

> . . . it is a dialogue which the (supposed) nephew of Rameau, the musician, has with Diderot. This nephew is the ideal of a Parasite, . . . but a hero of the class, and as he describes himself, he makes a biting satire on society and the world in which he lives and flourishes (Schiller, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 48).

Perhaps Hegel was affected by the fact that the work featured a dialogue between a philosopher and a Bohemian. The philosopher was perplexed by the simultaneous presence in the Bohemian of an essentially humane quality and a "baseness" expressed with unabashed candor.

> I was dumbfounded at such sagacity and such baseness, such alternately true and false notions, such absolute perversion of feeling and utter turpitude, and yet such uncommon candour (Diderot, 1966, p. 51).

Hyppolite pinpointed the philosophical dilemma that became so

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*It is to the research of Hyppolite and to insights gained in conversations with William Brazill that I am primarily indebted for my treatment of this historical phase of Hegel's intellectual life.

significant a component in Hegel's deliberation throughout the remainder of his life.

> The philosopher is unable to adapt his conscience to such an upheaval in morals and Hegel himself often attempts to escape the consequences of his own dialectical logic. But in this case truth is on the side of the Bohemian, for he describes everything in the social world for what it is, that is to say, the opposite of what it appears to be: 'Money is everything, but we should not say so.' The noble consciousness and the base consciousness are in reality the opposite of what they should be, the good is evil and the evil is good. The Bohemian lays bare the comedy of a social order which has lost its foundation in any substantial reality. The awareness of such a loss transforms action into comedy and intentionality into hypocrisy. The sole truth in such a context is the desire and greed for money and the will to power. But at this point, having candidly exposed 'what the world thinks but does not dare to say,' Rameau's nephew pulls himself up, proud of his unimpeachable candor, and raises his self above all this baseness by the very act of espousing it and thereby achieving identity with himself in the very depths of his disintegration (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 48-49).

Indeed, throughout his work a thread of the implicit ambivalence seemingly troubled Hegel's beliefs about the ultimate capacity of humanity to transcend its own self-interest. I think that it explains what appears to be a "blurred" distinction noted by Pelczynski, that Hegel believed he had clarified.

> 'Civil society' and 'political state' are areas of activity which include the private actions and subjective attitudes of their respective members, as well as objective laws and institutions. They are thus both manifestations of ethical life, and although Hegel tries to contrast the two spheres sharply, the distinction becomes rather blurred in the end. For instance, Hegel speaks of 'civil society' as the antithesis of ethical life; but at other times he admits that it produces and encourages at least some ethical attitudes. Similarly the 'political state' is not an exclusive preserve of ethical attitudes since, as we have seen, public opinion is essentially subjective and capricious. At least one class of 'civil society,' the 'universal estate' of civil servants, finds in public service the satisfaction of their particular needs and interests in the sense that they derive their income and social prestige from public service. Hence in the non-institutional respect there is also no clear-cut separation of the two spheres (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 12).

Hegel, I believe, reflected the ambiguity identified in Rameau's Nephew. He implied, in the liberal tradition, a certain latency about the collective good. The qualities of the collective good were necessary but latent consequences of self-interest.

> In enjoyment each individuality no doubt becomes aware of self-existence, aware of itself as single; but this enjoyment is itself the result of universal action, just as, reciprocally, wealth calls forth universal labour, and produces enjoyment for all. The actual has through and through the spiritual significance of being directly universal. Each individual doubtless thinks he is acting in his own interests when getting this enjoyment; for this is the aspect in which he gets the sense of being something on his own account, and for that reason he does not take it to be something spiritual. Yet looked at even in external fashion, it becomes manifest that in his own enjoyment each gives enjoyment to all, in his own labour each works for all as well as for himself, and all for him (Hegel, 1967, p. 520).

He had extended the humanistic range of liberalism both by insistence that it was through the collectivity that our individual essence was realized and by insistence on the ultimate triumph of the collective essence. But the concepts of noble and base consciousness conceptually depicted his tenuous dialectic linkage of liberalism and idealism. Hyppolite described the outcome of that endeavor.

> [1] The noble consciousness acquires its self-definition through proportioning itself to the social and political world and to the powers that dominate that world: the Power of the State and of Wealth. [2] The base consciousness, on the contrary, is always in a state of inequality. It is the element of revolt and, so to speak, the revolutionary ferment of the whole development. The base consciousness is, of course, obliged to obey the constituted authority. But if it yields, it is with a secret feeling of internal revolt. It, too, seeks the wealth which is the source of enjoyment, but it hates the benefactor. Furthermore, just as the slave is the truth of the master--or as the master is in fact a slave without knowing it--so the base consciousness is the truth of the noble consciousness (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 44).

In Hegel's own words:

> The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 260, p. 161).

> The essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being, that thus the interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state, although the universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular members, whose own rights must be maintained. Thus the universal must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized (Hegel, 1952b, addition paragraph 260, p. 280).

> The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit. The result is that the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the cooperation of particular knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 260, p. 160-161).

The overall picture was one of a progressive transition from an insistence on the unification of the individual and the collective essence to a model that "binds up" with qualifications two separate and distinct moments. But there was still the qualification that the universal be known and willed by the particular. The ultimate outcome remained somewhere in the mysteries of our humanistic potential.

Hegel's Flirtation with the Liberal State

Hegel, as we have seen, joined fellow intellectuals in a profound disillusionment with the outcome of the French Revolution. Hegel reacted conceptually with a withdrawal of the structure charged with preservation of the collective essence from the "dangers" of narrowed self-interest. The protector of that essence was a political state comparable in some respects to that which prevailed in the reformed Prussian State of his time, but which also previewed modern state capitalism. "Hegel had sought to define a social state that would be both a particular State and one which might embody and reflect the general interest" (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 118).

Marx's criticism was precisely that he had taken an outmoded phenomenon--the Prussian State--as a model. Marx believed that Hegel reified the traditional liberal social structure as the subject and not the object of human social action. The state became the vehicle that met the negative criterion of freedom--the absence of coercion--but the collectivity was crippled in meeting the positive criteria. That is, in the form of the Prussian State, the collectivity was crippled in its potential for providing the positive context, the fertile ground of dialectic transcendence for all the citizenry. In effect, he had surrendered the freeing potential of a historically cumulative structure. For how could he constitute a structure acknowledged as a transcending objectification (as an eternal Aufheben) while chained to the model of the Prussian State? That model insulated the state from contamination by exigencies of social intercourse, and it was these very exigencies that oppressed the people. In effect,that state told us "when I'm with humans, I'm least human. My only hope is a political

state where political power games inspired by aggressive self-interest can be played within the confines of established rules backed up by centralized authority." To Marx, however, the object was not mediation but eradication of oppression.

One highly significant consequence of this model was that it became much more difficult to criticize the existing world. Conflict resulting from the limitations of existing institutions must always be mediated. But what if existing institutions were patently oppressive? Within Hegel's model, the most irrational social institutions became rational due to an innoculation from the Idea. This was exemplified in Hegel's treatment of private property.

> The reason I can alienate my property is that it is mine only in so far as I put my will into it. Hence I may abandon . . . anything that I have or yield it to the will of another and so into his possession, provided always that the thing in question is a thing external by nature (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 65, p. 52).

That is, humanity was independent of property and controlled it. However, as Marx pointed out, Hegel based the landed nobility on primogeniture, and saw the sovereignty of property as a necessary element in society. Thus there was an ambiguity in Hegel's insistence that "Primogeniture is grounded on the fact that the state should be able to reckon not on the bare possibility of political inclinations, but on something necessary" (Hegel, 1952b, addition paragraph 306, p. 293). Within this contradiction Hegel established an illogical social relationship. The essence of mind was to be free and universal, and this universality was exhibited in one way as an essential factor in the process of objectification and transcendence through the ownership and alienability of property. However, the free and universal will of

the mind was inadequate to mere self-interested pursuits, so we should base the legislature on property, not people.

> In general then, the inalienability of private property is the alienability of universal freedom of will and ethical life. Here it is no longer the case that property is in so far as I put my will into it, but rather my will is in so far as it is property (Marx, 1970, p. 101).

Here, in Marxian terms, we find Hegel turning the world upside down. This is not to say that his description of the importance of primogeniture was inaccurate. It was accurate. The problem is that Hegel justified his position by making it necessary to the concept. It was not humanity that created this situation, but rather the intrinsic qualities of property that fit the scheme of the concept. "The subject is the thing and the predicate is the man. The will becomes the property of the property" (Marx, 1970, p. 106). Hegel had placed the essence of human society outside of human beings as conscious agents.

Not only was the essence of human society abstracted from everyday life of the people but he violated another of his critical insights, the historical nature of our beings. In the following he virtually discarded history as irrelevant to an understanding of our basic social institutions: "It is necessary that the finite--property and life--should be definitely established as accidental, because accidentality is the concept of the finite" (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 324, p. 209). In this sweeping statement, Hegel condemned all humanity and life to the realm of the accidental solely on the "demands" of the concept.

Marx believed that this attitude was simply Hegel's rationalization for support of the status quo. I think that this critique overlooked a vastly more sophisticated Hegelian rationale to be examined

under Hegel's concept of negation. But Marx was correct in his insistence that an absence of qualification in Hegel's model reified an isolation of the mechanism of change.

> . . . the German conception of the modern state in abstraction from actual man was possible only because and insofar as the modern state abstracts itself from actual man or satisfies the whole man only in an illusory way. In politics the Germans have thought what other nations have done (Marx, 1967, p. 257).

A further example of Hegel's pattern of reification of the Prussian State was manifested in his functional analysis of class. In a passage about the interdependence upon one another that was revealed by work and the division of labor, he remarked that

> As a result, the entire complex is built up into particular systems of needs, means, and types of work relative to these needs, modes of satisfaction and of theoretical and practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of which individuals are assigned--in other words, into class-divisions (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 201, p. 130-131).

Marx believed that such passages indicated that Hegel's notion of class was not a dynamic one that adequately reckoned with inherent abuses. It invited Marx's caustic fire. He rejected the functional implication. Though class was the essential mode of organization, it was not something to be criticized or transcended. Rather, class was that which one entered into in order to gain recognition in society and establish some element of moral and ethical stability in the jungle of bourgeois particularity. Class was something to which one must acquiesce, not criticize or overcome.

> In this class system, the ethical frame of mind therefore is rectitude and esprit de corps, i.e. the disposition to make oneself a member of one of the moments of civil society by one's own act, through one's energy, industry, and skill, to maintain oneself in this position, and to fend for oneself only through this process of mediating oneself with the

> universal, while in this way gaining recognition both in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 207, p. 133).

What Hegel was saying, then, was that it was through class that one gained identity, recognition, and security. This idea that class was the essential social organization on a macro-level was not foreign to Marx. However, the notion that one should accept one's class position and maintain it was a conservative notion inherited from the Middle Ages. From this perspective, akin in many respects to that of Talcott Parsons, society was viewed as a total organism where each group, or class, fulfilled a function and it was important that each class maintain this function. In Hegel, class served not only to give stability to society but also to satisfy the necessary development of the concept.

> The classes are specifically determined in accordance with the concept as (a) the substantial or immediate [or agricultural] class; (b) the reflecting or formal [or business] class; and finally (c) the universal class [the class of civil servants] (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 202, p. 131; translator's brackets).

Thus classes seemingly had a necessary relationship to each other and a necessary existence due to the logical constructs of the concept. Though people were obviously involved in the make-up of class, though the natural environment also played a large part in class, it was the inner necessity of the concept that gave shape to the phenomenon of class. On the other hand, the individuals involved believed that class was the work of their own will. "Hence what happens here by inner necessity occurs at the same time by the mediation of the arbitrary will, and to the conscious subject it has the shape of being the work of his own will" (Hegel, 1952b, paragraph 206, p. 132). Thus human subjects were "living instruments" of the "world mind,"

relegated to that position by the need to prevent a holocaust, a "bellum" of self-interested struggle.

Hegel had presented a valid point never developed by Marx, to which we will return in a later section, that the ramification of precipitous changes--of negation--within a context characterized by competitive self-interest was highly risky. But the oppostion of the world mind (as embodied in the state) to civil society, was inconsistent with the immanent core of Hegel's historicization of the Kantian a priori and with his insistence on objectification within a social context.

The Owl of Minerva

The profound influence of the intellectual disillusionment that characterized the post-revolutionary period was also exemplified in Hegel's pronouncements about the role of philosophy. His early writings placed philosophy in the unqualified role of protagonist against indolence and acquiescence to the status quo. Philosophers had the duty to oppose what ought to be to what is, for "by revealing how everything ought to be, it will sweep away the indolence of those who confer eternity upon everything as it is" (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 39). Letters written during the same period castigated the citizens of Bern for preferring the loss of liberty to payment of a tax. Finding the Bernese sense of civil duty wanting, he lauded the English. "The Englishman is free, he enjoys the natural rights of freedom, in short, he makes his own demands upon himself" (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 40). Similarly, his assessment of the American Revolution expressed his sympathies for egalitarian ideas and revolutionary zeal.

> The tax imposed by the English parliament upon tea imported into America was minimal, but the belief of the Americans that by accepting the payment of that sum, however insignificant in itself, they would be yielding at the same time their most precious right, made the American Revolution (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 40).

Hegel lived in Bern from 1793 to 1796. By the end of 1794 qualifications of the earlier, more radical mentality were already apparent. In that year he communicated to Schelling his revulsion over the Reign of Terror; he had seen the bloody consequences of war, its destruction and death first hand, and by 1807, the end of the so-called Jena period, a significant change in his perspective had congealed. Now his interest in reform was noticeably on the wane. Instead of a radical restructuring of conditions we find him intent on discovering in those same conditions a necessary "destiny." He was well on the route to his later pronouncement that "Philosophy escapes from the weary strife of the passions that agitate the surface of society into the calm region of comtemplation" (Hegel, 1956, p. 457). Hyppolite observes, "As we see it, Hegel's development prior to the Phenomenology is marked by the shift from a reformist attitude to an attitude of contemplation, from the 'sollen' to 'the comprehension of what is'" (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 42). This shift however, was not without its ambivalences. There persisted impassioned expressions that were more consistent with the fundament of his early challenge to the Kantian categories and the radical implications of a linkage of ideas with historical existence. As late as 1808 we find the following in his correspondence:

> Daily do I get more and more convinced that theoretical work achieves more in the world than practical. Once the realm of ideas is revolutionized, actuality does not hold out (Hegel, in Avineri, 1972, p. 68).

But from this point the trend to conceptualization of philosophy as a

retrospective rational construction seemed to predominate.

The comparison between this expression and a passage from the Philosophy of Right written some thirteen years later is startling.

> It is just this placing of philosophy in the actual world which meets with misunderstandings, and so I revert to what I have said before, namely that, since philosophy is the exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the apprehension of the present and the actual, not the erection of a beyond, supposed to exist, God knows where, or rather which exists, and we can perfectly well say where, namely in the error of a one-sided, empty, ratiocination (Hegel, 1952b, p. 10).

Now he has reduced his aspiration to the comprehension of "what is," not to the function of "teaching the state what it ought to be."

> This book, then, containing as it does the science of the state, is to be nothing other than the endeavor to apprehend and portray the state as something inherently rational. As a work of philosophy, it must be poles apart from an attempt to construct a state as it ought to be. The instruction which it may contain cannot consist in teaching the state what it ought to be; it can only show how the state, the ethical universe, is to be understood.
>
> Hic Rhodus, hic saltus.
>
> To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason (Hegel, 1952b, p. 11).

We may be cautioned, however, not to be tempted to a vulgarization of his definitive epigram: "What is actual is what is rational." (Was wirklich ist, ist vernuftig.) For the actual is rational only within the context of the heavenly city being progressively realized by a conscious understanding of its earthly grounding.

> To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual, the reconciliation which philosophy affords to those in whom there has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend, not only to dwell in what is substantive while still retaining subjective freedom, but also to possess subjective freedom while standing not in anything particular and accidental but in what exists absolutely (Hegel, 1952b, p. 12).

Our burden is that we can only recognize the essential in the temporal where the essential becomes realized. However, he did specify the

next logical step: that we must create a context typified by a sense of "reconciliation" that would be receptive to the essential element while negotiating the temporal and transient according to the dictates of our rational insight and experience.

> What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. . . . If reflection, feeling, or whatever form subjective consciousness may take, looks upon the present as something vacuous and looks beyond it with the eyes of superior wisdom, it finds itself in a vacuum, and because it is actual only in the present, it is itself mere vacuity. If on the other hand the Idea passes for 'only an Idea,' for something represented in an opinion, philosophy rejects such a view and shows that nothing is actual except the Idea. Once that is granted, the great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. For since rationality (which is synonymous with the Idea) enters upon external existence simultaneously with its actualization, it emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, shapes, and appearances (Hegel, 1952b, p. 10).

His conception of philosophy, perhaps still mindful of the Reign of Terror, remained spiked to the cross of the present. So constrained, he not merely reconciled us to the present but failed to unite the eternal essence with organizationally embedded negation which is immanent to and progressive with a resurrection and rebirth. History was betrayed perhaps less by the agony of the cross than by the Bastille.

> Philosophy has to do with Ideas, and therefore not with what are commonly dubbed 'mere concepts.' On the contrary, it exposes such concepts as one-sided and false, while showing at the same time that it is the concept alone (not the mere abstract category of the understanding which we often hear called by the name) which has actuality, and further that it gives this actuality to itself. All else, apart from this actuality established through the working of the concept itself, is ephemeral existence, external contingency, opinion, unsubstantial appearance, falsity, illusion, and so forth (Hegel, 1952b, par. 1, p. 14).

Reality was confined not as an admonition (as a warning not to stray too far from existence) but as an absolute to an analysis of the

present which could not stray beyond the present.

> Whatever happens, every individual is the child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes (Hegel, 1952b, p. 11).

But, and the critical point must not be overlooked, philosophy set the stage for rejection of the passe:

> One word more about giving instructions as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk (Hegel, 1952b, p. 12).

Clearly, since the past cannot be "rejuvenated" the only function of retrospective understanding was to provide a rational grounding for the negation of the past and the realization of the future.

Surely Hegel's stand could not be dismissed as a fundamentally conservative position--whether one took the position of left or right, Hegelian negation was not to be forsaken. Rather, if negation was to occur it had to be followed by an enlightened transcendence. It was here that the authority of tradition and the hereditary monarchy gave ascendency over the scholar to mediate an otherwise more precipitous change process occurring in the concrete but less conscious structure of civil society. In effect, they provided what he hoped would serve as an enlightened support structure that preserved the advances of the past by providing a check against the potential terror of a runaway

negation that might endanger the entire cultural substructure, and with it, our individual integrity. All, including the philosopher, must submit to that mediating authority.

What is striking is that in spite of all references to the dangers of negation derived from the intellectual disillusionment with abuses of power in the French Revolution, he manifested a naivete about the nature of power. He did not anticipate the competitive aggressive basis on which bourgeois society could exploit power to alienate the means of production and manipulate consciousness within the sphere of civil society. He had declared himself (with pre-Weberian cynicism about bureaucracy) in diametrical opposition to centralization and abuse of power.

> However, in recent theories, carried partly into effect, the fundamental presupposition is that a state is a machine with a single spring which imparts movement to all the rest of the infinite wheel work. . .
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> The pedantic craving to determine every detail, the illiberal jealousy of [any arrangement whereby] an estate, a corporation, etc., adjusts and manages its own affairs, this mean carping at any independent action by the citizens . . . is clothed in the garb of rational principles. On these principles not a shilling of the public expenditure on poor relief in a country of 20 or 30 million inhabitants may be incurred unless it has first been not merely allowed but actually ordered, controlled, and audited by the supreme government. The appointment of every village schoolmaster, the expenditure of every penny for a pane of glass in a village school or village hall, the appointment of every toll-clerk or court officer or local justice of the peace, is to be an immediate emanation and effect of the highest authority (Hegel, 1964, p. 161; translator's brackets).

But perhaps due to his failure to clearly distinguish between the state as essence and the strictly political state,* he seemed relatively

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*Pelczynski wrote that "Hegel has been so frequently misunderstood because he fails to make a clear and explicit distinction between 'the state' in the comprehensive sense and 'the strictly political state,' and because he uses the single term 'state' both when he has only the political aspect in mind, and when he thinks of the political

oblivious to the possibility that those to whom he appealed to fulfill the obligation of the "nobility" (and the noble consciousness) might betray that obligation. For the establishment of so strong a concentration of power, especially given the rise of a "base" but potent consciousness among the bourgeois, immediately threatened the potential realization of the state as an organization of emancipation. That is, transcendence must occur in a context. Mindless negation was a risk, but it was surely no less a risk to entrust that negation to a centralized structure. That invited usurpation and alienation whether it was entrusted to the benevolency of the monarch or the scholar. What is more, it established a fundamental inconsistency in his work. That inconsistency would hardly have been missed had he logically extended the implicit precepts of the master-slave relationship. If the slave does indeed gain emancipatory insight, that context can only sustain a continuing dialectic realization as a social organization conducive to emancipation. Thus, not only must we be in a sense reconciled to the present which is part of our being but we must acknowledge our eternal essence. That essence is also organizationally embedded negation. It is a negation immanent to and progressive with resurrection and rebirth.

From all his pronouncements, consciousness was for Hegel irrevocably a historical process. But history not merely ends but begins with yesterday. One would look in vain throughout Hegel's treatment

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together with the ethical aspect. While it is true, as Knox writes, that 'failure to realise this distinction has been responsible for numerous misrepresentations of Hegel's position and his attitude to "the state"', surely a large part of the blame must rest on the shoulders of Hegel himself" (Pelczynski, 1971, p. 14).

of objectification and transcendence in general and the master-slave relationship in particular for a specific qualification to the effect that consciousness could return to itself via the authoritarian supervision of a superior consciousness. Yet this is the contradictory route chosen in his treatment of civil society and the state. We will return to this point for it contains the most fruitful seed of the Marxian critique of Hegel.

The Support of Negation

Hegel believed that the universal collective moment might progressively encompass ever larger spheres of material reality. That is, objectification in the process of labor had been established as the model on which humankind might realize its potential within the collective structure. But he made no provisions for a concrete organization of emancipation. Rather, the consciousness of freedom was to have been organized within the existing system. The countervailing interests of an essentially pluralistic system were to have been mediated by the authorities of the political state and the fundamental support system of that structure was to have been retained. The alienated effects of precipitating change were to have been overcome by intrinsic rational control subject to the analysis of scholars and political authorities within the support systems of the extant tradition. They would preside over an evolving process of change. Radical change or any action leading to that end by scholars or others outside the support structure of the state was patently foolhardy. Witness the French Revolution.

Hegel had established the collectivity as human essence. He had

by no means regressed to the Kantian dichotomy. The individual was no longer directly in opposition to the collectivity. On the contrary, the state was the highest expression of humanity. Yet he retained an ambivalence that resulted in contradiction. It was the a priori assumption that the state must function in accordance with abstract principles administered by functionaries whose "objective" roles would counter the disintegrating consequences of self-interest.

His increasing reflection of the intellectual disillusionment of his time was manifested after the Jena period in a vastly more acute reaction to the psychological implication of negation. The implicating of alienation from the support structure to which our identity clings persuaded him more acutely to adopt a frame of reference compatible with the stabilizing aspects of the traditional structure. He was by no means unaware of either the limitations of bourgeois society or of the need to overcome them.

Thus, he wrote perceptively and not unlike Marx of the deleterious impact of industrialization and bourgeois society on widening the gap between civil society and the political state.

> With the change in manners and way of life each individual was more preoccupied with his own necessities and his own private affairs. By far the greater number of free men, i.e. the strictly bourgeois class [Burgerstand], must have had to look exclusively to their own necessities and their own living. As states became larger, those people who must have had to concern themselves exclusively with their own affairs formed a class of their own. There was an increase in the mass of things needed by the free man and the noble, who had to maintain themselves in their social position respectively by industry or by work for the state. The foreign relations involved in the greater complexity of national affairs became stranger to every individual. As a result of all these changes the management of national affiars became more and more closely concentrated in a center consisting of a monarch and the Estates. . . . (Hegel, 1964, p. 202).

He clearly distinguished the historically specific manifestation of production from the ontological definition of labor.* As we have seen, the bourgeois master was distinguished from the laborer. The alienated, negated relationship to the product of one's labor was initially, of course, emancipatory only to the laborer.

> Labour, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the form of the object, into something that is permanent and remains; because it is just for the labourer that the object has independence (Hegel, 1967, p. 238).

But labor in bourgeois society also had a fragmenting effect.

> . . . when,through the growth of the Imperial cities, the bourgeois sense, which cares only for an individual and not self-subsistent end and has no regard for the whole, began to become a power, this individualization of dispositions would have demanded a more general and more positive bond (Hegel, 1964, p. 190).

In the absence of that bond, he, like Marx, was not unaware of the conflict that would result from the alienation of labor in industrial society.

> There is thus an ever increasing mass of men who are condemned to unhealthy labor, without security, to the 'absurd labor of the factories and the mine . . . This entire mass is condemned to irremediable poverty. . . . It is then that the conflict between great wealth and great poverty emerges on the world scene--auftritt' (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 80).

While he recognized the dehumanizing element in alienated labor, he was vastly more cautious in assuming that individuals could adapt readily to change without what I shall term a support system. That system would fill the void already established by individualism,

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*My point is that he seems to have viewed the dichotomy between civil society and our collective essence as perhaps necessary for the time. In the larger picture, the possibility was left open that the outcome of class conflict might be to ease the opposition and render alienated labor less oppressive, i.e.,more as social labor--as creative tension.

industrialization, and the weakening of traditional "bonds."

Hegel stressed, and the full implication was seemingly lost to Marx, that the dialectic dismantling and rejection of all critical aspects of the familiar institutional form (on which security was based) demanded an acknowledment of ineludable pain and trauma of life, not to mention the ultimate alienation--death. This is a prerequisite to emancipatory rebirth.

In effect, Hegel posited an existential (eternal) alienation. That force of alienation, the consequence of negation, directed our attention to the potentially far-reaching and profound psychological implications of change.

The Role of Negation: Transcendence and Social Existence

As Marcuse so convincingly argues in Reason and Revolution, one of the most significant contributions of Hegel was the power of negative thinking or negation. For Hegel, human activity was essentially negative--that is, action was always destroying, transforming what is for something new. For change was not a simple building upon the old; rather, it involved simultaneous destruction and reconstruction of what was--what Hegel calls Aufheben and what has been translated as transcendence. Transcendence, or Aufheben, was the result of negating activity--that action which preserved through destruction, and made change possible out of the death of the old.

It is most important to note that Hegel saw pain, torment, and loneliness as attendant on any possible change. The new had to be wrenched from the present, not only from the obvious forces of evil, but also from oneself. One had to separate away from oneself,

undergo "self-alienation," in order to find the new, in order to engage in transcendence or Aufheben. These elements of negation revolved around the frightening, indeed, often debilitating, nature of fundamental change, the recognition of which was the first step toward the development of a systematic collective mechanism of change.

Clearly, negation in the Hegelian frame of reference was by no means limited to political economy. It also encompassed the psyche and all human qualities. The psychological concomitants involved individual entry into the unknown and often called for a relaxation of what frequently became a strangle grip on familiar images. For Hegel, and doubtless, each of us as well, the most profoundly terrifying manifestation was the ultimate personal negation--death.

We have seen that for Hegel existence transposed itself through history. Each historical moment was negated, yet simultaneously persisted that it might be surpassed. In order that conscious life might realize itself it became necessary to acknowledge this negation authentically and confont our own death. It was only then that death became ". . . the magic power that converts the negative into being" (Hegel, 1967, p. 93). For this frame of reference, simple dismissal of Hegel as a blind advocate of the status quo is not only empirically inaccurate but conceptually arbitrary and self-defeating. Indeed the advocate of change is better advised to explore the implications and ramifications of Hegel's concept of negation.

Since the universal and the individual interpenetrated, transcendental consciousness was dependent on negation. The whole of life was the negation of its particularity. Negation was a necessity but it was a necessity that possessed enormous potential for personal

intimidation. Negation ". . . consumes itself . . . transcends its own inorganic nature . . . feeds upon itself . . . organizes its own identity. . . . It is the very process that occurs within it" (Hegel, in Hyppolite, 1969, p. 10). Human life was perpetual self-negation and its successful pursuit demanded not merely a tolerance for dissonance but a terror-evoking capacity to consume familiar images of security for that ember of warm new life that rose out of its own ashes. Only by a willingness to negate our negation could we infinitely return to totality.

Since the ultimate negation was death, then a free and creative life must accomodate this immanent presence of pain and sorrow.

> Consciousness of life, of its existence and action, is merely pain and sorrow over this existence and activity; for therein consciousness finds only consciousness of its opposite as its essence--and of its own nothingness (Hegel, 1967, p. 252).

What was even more staggering was the realization that even as we ourselves as particularity must undergo eradication, so must the familiar form of our social reality be taken as an ephemeral quality that must elude our efforts to petrify and cling to it as a false monolith of security.

> It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it. This complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stability into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity . . . (Hegel, 1967, p. 237).

Hegel found in Old Testament Judaism a manifestation of the "unhappy consciousness" especially when contrasted with the Greeks. The Greeks sought and attained an advanced measure of harmony between ideas and existence. Not so the Jews. To them all particularity

stood as a distraction from the fullest realization of universal essence. Conflict in our particular love life inhibited our apprehension of universal love. Abraham was so fixated on realization of universality that he found himself alienated from all particular forms. His eternal striving to realize the fullest of our creative potential to become, made life a perpetual creative act which allowed no worldly dalliance. One could not attach oneself to any particular secular form to stablize one's being. As a result, this influence of Christianity was one of world and life negation. The Greeks harmonized this dialectic process but only because they identified with that creative aspect of the allegory of the Phoenix in which art and beauty were embraced as the positive aspect of the dialectic of freedom. That is, we must die in order that we may live in the full beauty of our creative essence.

We are compelled, given the collective essence of our being, to seek our freedom in a social context that threatens that very same being. The following links Hegel to the existentialist tradition:

> And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of life. Rather it is thereby guaranteed that there is nothing present but what might be taken as a vanishing moment--that self-consciousness is merely pure self-existence, being-for-self (Hegel, 1967, p. 233).

Small wonder we are reluctant to relinguish those social-structural amenities that offer some stability, however modest. Indeed, to do so without a linkage of reason to a concrete, rationally structured context is absurd.

We find the classic illustration of this fear of negation,

experienced by an individual bereft of a supportive social context, in Hegel's master-slave relationship. Entrapped within the relationship to a master, the slave compromised with reality. The slave sacrificed liberty for life, but ultimately gained freedom as a result of that act. To Hegel, this was necessary "For this consciousness [of the slave] was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master" (Hegel, 1967, p. 237).

Having experienced the fear of death, the slave was equipped even better than the master to accomodate it and yet to prevail. The slave had seen the promised land and had established a consciousness of his/her own ability to transcend finite being--to become one with our collective being--to participate in the highest of all creative forms: to participate in self-creation. We cannot grasp the full significance of negation in Hegel's schema unless we acknowledge the concomitant implications. And it is here that his concern with the mediating function of the political state acquired new clarity. Mediation preserved the stabilizing quality of the existing structure, not as a rigid conservative act but as an insistence that it provide a vital context--a support system, if you will--within which the terrifying component of negation might be constrained in reason and moderation. It is this point which Marx failed to grant.

Marx's criticism was valid in his opposition to Hegel's "abstractly universal power opposed to the single individual." For this permitted Hegel to delegate the vital power of objectification and transcendence to the authority of the existing political structure. Gemeinwesen, according to Marx's interpretation of Hegel, was

"the nature and being of every single individual." Not to reckon with that aspect of Hegel's own work was itself neither real nor rational. It resulted in a debilitating flaw in his philosophy of the state--vulnerability to the domination of economic elites.

CHAPTER IV

MARX

The Origins of Marx's Materialist Challenge to Hegel

> The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition which requires illusions (Marx, 1964a, p. 44).

Kant, it will be remembered, had provided the intellectual expression of the dilemmas that arose from the bourgeois transfiguration of the age of feudalism. Hegel had historicized the Kantian a priori and had modified the course taken by the secularization of reason in a manner that undermined the bearing points of bourgeois individualism. Thus, the "establishment" of the period into which Karl Marx was born had already encountered challenges to the order that had been emerging since the bourgeois revolutions of the late eighteenth century. It was a period in which the prerogatives of reason, having left the secure hostel in heaven and having descended into the secular world, had entered an arena of struggle in which they were being increasingly coveted by hitherto unimagined claimants.

Compounding the complexities of these struggles were questions as to whether the prerogatives of the secularization of reason and its logical concomitants: (1) the rational control of society, (2) the opportunity for self-realization, and (3) the benefits from technology, belonged properly to the feudal lord, the bourgeoisie,

the proletariat, the peasantry, the clergy, philosophers, or some other combination thereof. Beyond this were the inevitable questions of the means by which these prerogatives were to be realized.

A bourgeois political economy was in ascendency while a simultaneous unrest among the working class was also in gestation. The intellectual struggles stemming from this unrest were dominated in Marx's time by the fact that the Kantian objective of freedom was not being realized by the perspective of bourgeois individualism and its embodiment, the bourgeois political economy. A way of life whose rationale had been given an unwitting impetus by Kant was as yet unsuccessfully challenged by Hegel's abstract reason and the new humanism. Reason was still bourgeois reason, and its predominance was being imposed by a political economy in which the owners of the productive mechanism held prerogatives that were difficult to challenge, though challenges were arising. Further, those who undertook the challenge were confronted by the direct coercive power of the state in a period in which the bourgeois era was still young and on the rise, especially in Germany. Berlin notes that the first attack on bourgeois society

> . . . was made at a moment when it had reached the highest point of its material prosperity, in the very year in which Gladstone in a budget speech congratulated his countrymen on the 'intoxicating augmentation of their wealth and power' which recent years had witnessed, during a mood of bouyant optimism and universal confidence (Berlin, 1963, p. 21).

The prerogatives of the secularization of reason had been transformed from the feudal lords to the bourgeoisie at a time in which the latter was vigorous and able to defend its new found privileges. Society had been "rationalized" to the needs of commerce, and freedom

had been so conflated with those criteria that analytic separability of the concept of freedom from the bourgeois political economy was effectively precluded. If the bourgeoisie could prevail, freedom would forever be assessed within the framework of life, liberty, and property.

Marx embarked on a challenge to bourgeois constraints on the democratic grounding of freedom. It was a wide-ranging assault upon bourgeois perspectives and the political-economic foundations on which they rested. He would begin with the manifest unrest of working people. In the tradition of Hegel's socially grounded secularization of reason he would apply his systematic critical theory to the revolutionary contagion with which more and more working people and young scholars had been smitten.

This effort to apply critical reason to the realities of a revolution was consistent with his belief that theory must arise out of the concrete contradictions of day-to-day praxis. It was a belief to which Marx remained committed for the remainder of his life. The dilemma, which also encompasses the principle focus of this study, was how to link a continuous critically enlightened dialogue with the actual practice of conflict and change. It was not merely any sort of linkage that was sought. Previous linkages had all too often resulted in either a separation of irrelevant theory from praxis, or a subordination of the process of theory building to the exigencies of praxis. Hence, the linkage must occur as a continuous dialectical interaction. It must occur in a manner that at once preserved the non-coercive context-instructed development of thought and the idea-instructed rational critiques of the day-to-day process of social-

cultural existence. The Enlightenment had seemingly promised a rather easy secularization of reason, but formidable obstacles appeared. One way or another, the struggles centered around the realization of a simultaneous grounding of theory in an often turbulent praxis.

Marx had taken aggressive issue with Hegelian idealism for its failure to sufficiently ground abstract reason in concrete existence. Only after the dialectic linkage of reason with existence might talk about objectification in the products of daily existence be fully removed from the ethereal realm of absolute spirit and made effectual. There was impatience, a youthful zeal, and an insistence that the times permitted--and Hegel's logic demanded--that we make ourselves the concrete object of our own subjective will. "The philosophers," he passionately asserted, "have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it" (Marx, 1967, p. 402).

Marx's activism reflected the process already underway among libertarian radical scholars and especially the industrial proletariat of his time. Yet we have seen that the dilemma he faced was how to link the rational deliberation of scholarship and reason with the exigencies of revolutionary praxis. Hegel had handled the dilemma of his time by a withdrawal from revolutionary mentality and by an apparent effort to influence change from within bourgeois society. But Marx chose to enter the struggle and directly challenge the prerogatives of the bourgeois state, for which he believed Hegel had been reduced to an apologist. As we shall see, the times presented such formidable obstacles that they could scarcely be overcome within the brief period of struggles that occupied the entire latter period of Marx's life.

Those struggles were particularly acute in Marx's birthplace, Trier, a Rhineland village heavily influenced by its proximity to French culture. Here the prerogatives of the bourgeois mode and mentality took the form, on the one hand, of a fierce German nationalism still in reaction to a feudal order, and on the other, of an intense libertarianism advanced as the heritage of the French Revolution. But perhaps most importantly, the inconsistencies of bourgeois culture--the inequities resulting from "freedom of enterprise"--were pronounced in Trier. It was a winemaking community typically undercompensated for its agricultural product (Padover, 1978, p. 24). In 1830, Karl Marx's twelfth year, at least one in four was unemployed, the soup kitches provided 520 bowls of soup per day, and the poorhouse was occupied by 500 inmates. Beggars and prostitutes were common, while tales of the plight of the poor were, no doubt, conveyed to Trier from across the Western world (Padover, 1978, p. 26).

Marx's own life reflected the economic and political turmoil of the age. It reflected the ambivalence about the proper role of power. It also reflected the struggles to bring Germany under a coordinated national authority as over against the libertarian influence of the French. Finally it reflected ambiguity about the amenities of a bourgeois life style as over against the fraternal and egalitarian ideals being advanced by the French socialists and others of similar orientation.

Marx's father was a relatively well-to-do attorney who himself had grown up in poverty. Karl Marx fell in love in his teens and married Jenny von Westphalen, whose ancestry was closely linked to the nobility and who, to the extent that conditions permitted, had

reportedly maintained throughout her life an unabashedly bourgeois life style. What is more, the German communists with whom Marx was later to establish a close relationship were decidedly middle class. Indeed, they consisted of three physicians, approximately nine journalists, writers, and poets, and at least one industralist (Padover, 1978, p. 224-225). Marx's visits, especially to France during his early journalistic endeavors, brought him into frequent contact with working people for whose spirit and potential he developed both awe and respect. "In the meetings of the communist artisans," he wrote, "brotherhood is not a phrase but the truth, and nobility shines from the labor-hardened faces" (Padover, 1978, p. 183). Later in a letter to Ludwig Feuerbach, he wrote: "You have to attend one of the meetings of the French ouvriers to realize the virginal freshness and nobility that is generated among these workingmen" (Padover, 1978, p. 183). Nonetheless, despite his own poverty, his social life both at home and with friends reflected more of the character of a sophisticated bourgeois gentleman than a proletarian revolutionary.

Observations concerning Marx's bourgeois life style were also reported by a London correspondent for the New York World who interviewed the leader of the International Workingmen's Association in London one summer evening in 1874. He found Marx's dwelling to be less like the modest quarters of a workingman than that of a "well-to-do man of the middle class." The drawing room was described as comparable to the "very comfortable quarters of a thriving stockbroker," and the scene effused the aura of middle class "comfort personified" (Padover, 1978, p. 443). A like image was conveyed by a friend, Ferdinand Fleckles. He depicted Marx as a cultured thinker,

"interesting and captivating" in appearance.

> He is indubitably more philosopher than man of action and has more of the stuff of an historian of a movement in him, perhaps as a strategist, than a swordsman (Padover, 1978, p. 545).

Marx was seemingly most at home in the salons of Paris, in the gala life of Berlin, and in the other cultural centers of Europe (Padover, 1978, p. 333). Padover reports that

> When he could afford it, Marx dressed elegantly and expensively, and in his middle years he wore a monocle with all the aplomb of a bourgeois gentleman. The monocle, suspended from the neck, went well with his finely tailored frock coats.
>
> He loved music and the theater. When health and finances permitted, he and Jenny entertained guests with charm, gaity and amusing conversation. The girls played musical instruments and knew how to sing Leider, and so did their papa. At New Year's Eve parties, Marx, elegant and nimble, led his ladies in stately dances (Padover, 1978, p. 462).

The sense of ambivalence between his ideals and his life style is underscored in a dinner conversation in which a friend, Gertrud Kugelmann, was reported to have said to Marx, "I cannot think of you in a leveling society as you have altogether aristocratic tastes and habits." Marx replied, "I cannot either. That time will come but we will be gone by then" (Padover, 1978, p. 353).

While his preferences were in many respects middle-class, Marx's income as a revolutionary theoretician seldom if ever equaled the demands of that life style. The result of the frequent financial crises placed an increasing stress on his family life that resulted in much distress and during some periods even malnourishment and ill health. On the day before his forty-ninth birthday, he wrote to Engles from a vist to Hanover:

> What I . . . most fear is the return to London. . . . The debts there are considerable, and the Manichaeans [clamoring creditors] are waiting "urgently" for my return. Then once again the Familienjammer [family lamentations], the internal

> collisions, the rat race, instead of being able to go to work fresh and unhampered (Padover, 1978, p. 350).

His was an intellectually and politically active life to which he remained committed throughout, but the attendant poverty imposed monumental burdens on his family life as well as on his personal health. On May 29 of 1872, Jenny Marx wrote to Liebnecht in Leipzig. Her letter contained a hint of despair about the economic and political struggles encountered throughout her married life. Here she wrote of her daughter Jenny's engagement to former Communard and French journalist Charles Longuet:

> You have heard of Jenny's engagement. . . . I cannot help contemplating this marriage with fearful anxiety . . . I cannot but dread that Jenny's fate will be the anxieties and anguish that are inseparable from the wife of a political man (Padover, 1978, p. 477).

The poverty is also believed by Marx's biographers to have resulted in chronic illnesses as well as "psychologically rooted" problems of sleeplessness and frequent headaches. Marx himself remarked to Engels that "my illness always comes from my head" (Padover, 1978, p. 334-335).

We also find the turmoil of the times reflected in Marx's formal and informal education. While the works of Kant and Hegel formed the intellectual backdrop of his life, they in turn echo the larger context of general dissention within bourgeois society over the proper function of leadership, authority, etc., in the secularization of reason and in human emancipation. These issues continued into the 1830's and '40's, fueled by the bourgeois rear guard clash with feudalism over the organizational issues of German Confederation, and by both bourgeois French egalitarianism and the more radical French

socialism represented by Saint-Simon, Proudhon, and Fourier.

Being in an area which, while German, espoused the spirit of French Republicanism, the teachers of Trier typified the turmoil and the tentative status of the issues into which Marx was born. The bias was clearly pro-French. It was evident in the faculty of Fredrich Wilhelm Gymnasium where Marx received his pre-university schooling. Consistent with that mentality, the students were treated permissively and a generally libertarian attitude prevailed (Padover, 1978, p. 47). As such, Marx's education reflected the general Rhineland opinion that was decidedly anti-Prussian and pro-French and insistently egalitarian (Padover, 1978, p. 32-33).

Marx's own father was a contributor to the pro-French mentality at Trier. On one occasion he was placed on a list of "political unreliables" by the Prussian king after having joined with Trier's burghers in an open expression of hostility to Prussia. During a public banquet, they had defiantly sung the "verboten" Marseillaise, the Parisienne, and other songs of the French revolution. To make matters worse, the dinner revelers had had the temerity to break out a silken tricolor, fall to their knees, and kiss it. Young Marx was an impressionable sixteen (Padover, 1978, p. 33-34).

The Hegelian Heritage: The Exigencies of a Secularized Reason

During Marx's years as a student at the University of Berlin, he is said to have been profoundly influenced by two students of Hegel who served on the faculty, Karl Von Savigny and Edvard Gans. Each interpreted their former teacher from quite different perspectives. And each, particularly Gans, had a significant hand in stimulating

the young Marx's exploration of Hegelian thought.

Upon first exposure Marx found Hegel rough, unyielding, and less than a receptive harbor for his youthful idealism. In November of his first year, after having read Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Spirit) he wrote his father: "I have read fragments of Hegel's philosophy, the grotesque, rock-like melody of which did not appeal to me" (Padover, 1978, p. 74). But this was before Marx had been exposed to the full perspective of Von Savigny and Gans. One of Von Savigny's favorite themes was taken from his interpretation of Hegel's belief in historical continuity. He declared that no generation was "free and independent" of its past. "Each age does not act arbitrarily in an egoistic independence, but is entirely held to the past by common and indissoluble bonds" (Padover, 1978, p. 75). This position was later to be severely criticized and reconstructed by Marx but was paradoxically to be applied to his polemics with the utopians.

Edvard Gans had been brought to Berlin by Hegel in 1820, reportedly to counteract the conservative influence of the then established Von Savigny. Gans, a student of Hegel's in the Heidelberg years, established a reputation in advocacy of the more liberal interpretation of his mentor. That interpretation was later to inspire the Young Hegelians. Of the two scholars, Padover reports:

> . . . Chronologically, they were a generation apart. Gans, born in 1797, was eighteen years younger than von Savigny. The latter was descended from an old aristocratic family from Lorraine. Gans was a Jew from Berlin who was converted to Christianity in 1825, to quality for the position of Ordinarius [full professor] at the University. Von Savigny was a sluggish lecturer. Gans was a great orator, whose lectures attracted Berlin's fashionable world, government officials, army officers, society people and literary personalities.

> Von Savigny was a pillar of the existing order. Gans was a critic of militaristic Prussia. Once, when conducting a French savant around the campus on Unter den Linden, he pointed to a nearby barracks and said: "The University next to the armory--that is the symbol of Prussia."
>
> Each of the two Hegelians reflected a significant aspect of Hegel's thought. Von Savigny's historical approach to institutions implied support for the political status quo. . . . But keen students of Hegel, like Gans--and later, Marx--stressed another great element in Hegelianism, that of dialectics. Just as the "absolute idea" was static and retrospective, so the Hegelian concept of dialectics was evolutionary and forward looking. For in essence, and by definition, the dialectical process meant movement and change presumably for the better.
>
> Gans was a liberal and something of a Saint-Simonian socialist. He applied the dialectic notion of development through historic processes, including the struggle of classes, in his lectures on modern history, which he gave in addition to his courses on law. Braving the enmity of the Prussian government, Gans declared that the French Revolution, for example, was an historic movement that had had a beneficient effect on all of Europe (Padover, 1978, p. 75-76).

Inspired by Gans, whose pro-French, pro-libertarian interpretation touched his youthful idealism, Marx undertook the reading of Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Lectures on the Philosophy of History, . . . Phenomenology of the Mind, the Science of Logic, and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophic Sciences in Outline (Padover, 1978, p. 77). This led in turn to Marx's decision to join the Young Hegelians (the Doctors' Club) (Padover, 1978, p. 77). This group of students of Hegel were to develop a critical extension of the great philosopher's work and serve as a vital context of dialogue and growth in Marx's University years.

In November of 1837, he introduced a letter to his father with an analysis inspired by Hegel:

> Dear Father:
> There are moments in life which stand as landmarks, terminating the past and at the same time pointing firmly in a new direction. At such a point of transition, we feel compelled to contemplate, with an eagle eye of thought, the past and the present, in order to arrive at a true awareness of our actual

> situation. Indeed, world history itself loves such a retrospect, seeming to move backwards and to stand still, whereas in reality it leans back in the armchair to understand itself and to penetrate intellectually its own action, the action of the mind (Padover, 1978, p. 102).

Later in the same letter he identified the inspiration of the initial perspective:

> During my illness, I cane to know Hegel's works, as well as most of his disciples, from beginning to end. As a result of several meetings with friends at Starlow, I got into a Doctors' [of philosophy] Club, which had among its members Privatdozenten [university instructors] and my most immediate Berlin friend, Dr. Rutenberg. In the course of our discussions, many an opposing opinion can to light and I clung ever more tightly to my own world outlook, of which, in truth, I had believed myself free, but any resounding ideas I might have had were muted; and so I was seized with a rage for irony, as so often happens where there is that much negativism. This was aggravated by Jenny's silence. I could not rest until I had grasped modernity (Hegel) and the point of view of modern scholarship (Padover, 1978, p. 102-103).

In certain senses, the images presented by the more conservative and the more liberal interpretations of Hegel were to find their ways to Marx's thought and political activity. I have already noted that Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state played a critical role in his political programs. Marx also used the Hegelian perspective to establish his polemic that advanced his brand of socialism over the less formidable credentials of his "Utopian" critics. Perhaps most importantly, Hegel's ideas served as the object of his noted transformative critique.

Transformative Method: Origins of Secularized Reason

I have indicated that Hegel advanced an ambiguous view of philosophical praxis. We are reminded that though he intimately linked the development of philosophy with the history of humanity, he isolated philosophy from the agitation of immediate reality. He believed that

for his time

> Philosophy escapes from the weary strife of passions that agitate the surface of society into the calm region of contemplation; that which interests it is the recognition of the process of development which the Idea has passed through in realizing itself--i.e. the Idea of Freedom, whose reality is the consciousness of Freedom and nothing short of it (Hegel, 1956, p. 457).

Conversely, Marx contended in his theoretical work that the locus of humanity's development lay in material struggle inseparable from a socially grounded dialectic of reason. Collective rational interaction was our "nature and being." Especially in his early writings, we encounter vehement rejection of what he believed to be Hegel's withdrawal of the collective essence (the state) from the day-to-day pursuit of individual interests. The collective essence was not a thing apart but integral to our nature.

His argument was based on a transformative critique by Feurerbach who contended that God had not created our human essence. Rather, our human essence had created God as an idealization of humanity.

> . . . Feuerbach set out to develop his own materialist philosophy as an inversion of Hegelianism. He transformed the traditional subject of idealist philosophy, thought, into a predicate, and the traditional predicate, man, into a subject. This, Feuerbach's transformative method, postulated a completely new starting-point for philosophy, based on turning Hegelian philosophy upside down: if one starts with man, with the concrete, man can be liberated from the subservience imposed on him by Hegelian philosophy (Avineri, 1975, p. 12).

Marx asserted that Hegel inverted reality by positing the Spirit as subject and humanity as predicate. Marx's position was that ideas do not determine existence. Instead, social existence as a dialectic interaction determines the development of reason.

Marx acknowledged his indebtedness to Hegel when he asserted that humanity actualized its essence in a concrete way by

self-objectification through work.

> The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man--true, because real man--as the outcome of man's own labor. The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species being, or his manifestation as a real species being (i.e., as a human being), is only possible by the utilization of all the powers he has in himself and which are his as belonging to the species--something which in turn is only possible through the cooperative action of all of mankind, as the result of history--is only possible by man's treating these generic powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement (Marx, 1964b, p. 177).

But, Marx contended that Hegel's tenuous linkage of the formation of consciousness to existence, theory to praxis, represented a basic fallacy that paid scant heed to Hegel's own discovery of the origins of our being in the material world.

> Man relates to the objects of the external world as means for the satisfaction of his needs. But men never start 'to be in that theoretical relationship to the objects of the external world.' They start, like any other animal, by trying to ascribe to themselves certain objects of the external world through deed and thus to satisfy their wants; they start therefore with production. By the repetition of this process, the attributes of those objects as 'satisfying their wants' impregnate themselves on their mind; men, like animals, learn also to differentiate 'theoretically' those external objects that serve to satisfy their needs from all other objects. At a certain stage of development, after both their needs and the activity through which they are satisfied, have been enlarged and augmented, they will baptise with their language this category with which they have become acquainted by their experience (Marx, in Avineri, 1975, p. 74).

Marx found it absurd to conceptually isolate the individual from the social context. Any reference to an individual was concurrently a reference to the individual's environment. For Marx, material existence was integrally linked to consciousness.

This was the central impact of Feuerbach's critique of speculative philosophy. His transformative insight had underscored the critical role of material existence in the formulation of our belief. Now material existence had been reunited with essence and the mystical and abstract content of Hegel's philosophy (which was at the core of the Hegelian "inversion") had been laid to rest.

Hegel's idealism presumably led him to view abstract concepts as the subject of human life while the actual sentient being was relegated to the role of the predicate. Feuerbach reasserted the primacy of the finite--of material reality. He asserted that our understanding must be based on actual perceptible interrelationships, not on the abstracted movements of concepts.

Feuerbach began with humanity, in social existence, as a subject and asserted that in order to find the truths hidden within the inverted world of speculative philosophy, one needed only "transform" what was formerly an abstract (or divinely imposed) consciousness into a predicate and identify a now socially-embedded humankind as the subject. One must systematically reverse the relationship by recognizing that it is social existence that conditions consciousness as well as the reverse.

Marx believed that Feuerbach had removed philosophy from the region of theology and had posited material existence as the essence of philosophy.

> Feuerbach's great achievement is:
> . . . The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, hence equally to be condemned as another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; . . . (Marx, 1964b, p. 172).

Marx adopted Feuerbach's materialist perspective that religion was an

expression of human alienation; he also agreed that religion was the transfer of subjective human hopes for this life into an otherworldly sphere.

> Man makes religion, religion does not make man. And indeed religion is the self-consciousness and self-regard of man who has either not yet found or has already lost himself. But man is the world of men, the state, society. This state and this society produce religion which is an inverted consciousness of the world because they are an inverted world (Marx, 1967, p. 250).

Feuerbach had argued that it was not divine essence that had created material existence but it was material existence that had created essence. In like manner, Marx had contended that philosophy incorporated an abstracted and alienated conception of humanity.

> The important thing is that Hegel at all times makes the Idea the subject and makes the proper and actual subject, like 'political sentiment,' the predicate. But the development proceeds at all times on the side of the predicate (Marx, 1970, p. 11).

And further,

> This inversion of the subjective in the objective and the objective in the subjective (which stems from the fact that Hegel wants to write the life-history of the abstract substance, the Idea, that therefore human activity must be shown as the activity and result of something else, that Hegel wants to show the essence of man as an imaginary individuality, instead of allowing it to come forward in his real, human existence), has the necessary result that uncritically an empirical existence is taken as the real truth of the Idea; for what is concerned here is not that empirical existence be brought to its truth, but that truth be brought to an empirical existence, and so here an immediate existence is developed as a real moment of the Idea (Marx, in Berki, 1971, p. 203).

The incongruency of Hegel's conception of reality was exposed by the realization that the Idea as subject was a non-organic lifeless concept while humanity, the predicate, was the active, actualizing, existing reality. Marx asserted that the growth of human consciousness

was not simply abstract conceptual progression, but a dialectical process of human interaction and objectification. For Marx, like Feuerbach, reality was a human reality. The human body was neither an instrument of reason, nor its negation, but rather a basis on which culture and history established and conditioned human thought and interaction. It was our actual social existence--a unity of body and mind--that afforded us the means of objectification and transcendence of the past. Material existence, then, provided a positive linkage with nature and with others. Marx wrote

> . . . as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him. Activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social mind. The human essence of nature first exists only for social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with man--as his existence for the other and the other's existence for him--as the life-element of human reality. Only here does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him. Thus society is the unity of being of man with nature--the true resurrection of nature--the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfillment (Marx, 1964b, p. 137).

Thus, although Marx adopted Feuerbach's transformative method, he was critical of what he considered the latter's narrowly conceived materialism. Marx asserted that Feuerbach neglected the objectifying aspects of human existence because he saw humanity only in passive harmony with nature. Humanity did not actively shape nature. In his "Theses on Feuerbach" he wrote

> The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object or perception [Anschauung], but not as sensuous human activity, practice [Praxis], not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the active side was developed by idealism--but only abstractly since idealism naturally does not know actual, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects

> actually different from thought objects; but he does not comprehend human activity itself as objective (Marx, 1967, p. 400).

Thus, Marx asserted that humanity was more than subject; it was object as well. Humanity might become its own object. It was, after all, a differentiated humanity consisting of conflict and self-objectifying change. Indeed, awareness of the objective and objectifying nature of humanity was as important to emancipated consciousness as was an awareness of our subjective nature. For only then might we participate in our own self-creation (objectification) as social historical objects.

> To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing (Marx, 1964b, p. 181).

Feuerbach's conception of humanity as Essence betrayed a non-historical, non-transcendent, and hence, abstract conception of human species-existence. He spoke of "Man" rather than of the particular social-historical individual. His model lacked positive actualization (objectification) in the relations of production. Feuerbach did

> . . . not see that the world surrounding him is not something directly given and the same from all eternity but the product of industry and of the state of society in the sense that it is a historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing further its industry and commerce, and modifying its social order according to changed needs (Marx, 1967, p. 417).

Further,

> This mode of production must not be viewed simply as reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of their activity, a definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode of life. As indiviudals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides

> with what they produce, with what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions which determine their production (Marx, 1967, p. 409).

It was for neglecting this self-objectifying nature of material existence and production that Marx faulted both Feuerbach and Hegel. Marx took the self-objectifying aspect of Hegel's idealism and combined it with the material aspects of Feuerbach's non-objectifying materialism. The outcome was a socially grounded organization of emancipation.

The Transformative Method and the Philosophy of the State

It was on the basis of the transformative method that Marx undertook his critique of the Hegelian philosophy of the state. He believed that the acknowledged aim of Hegel's political philosophy was to develop the state as a transcendent entity, separated from the social and historical forces of every day reality. Hegel, reflecting the ideology of the German bourgeoisie, depicted civil society as a calculated individualistic struggle for survival that required mediation by the state (monarch) as the expression of universality and human community. This dichotomy resulted, according to Marx, from Hegel's failure to base the state on actual human existence.

> Instead of recognizing this actualization of the person as the most concrete thing possible, Hegel favors the state. . . . In Hegel what is rational is not found in the reason of the actual person becoming actual but rather in the moments of an abstract concept becoming actual (Marx, 1967, p. 170).

This fundamental separation between essence and existence led Hegel to systematically invert human and political relations, and Marx took him to task for this transformation.

> He [Hegel] has made the subject of the idea into a product and predicate of the Idea. He does not develop his thought out of what is objective [aus dem Gegenstand], but what is objective in accordance with a ready-made thought which has its origin in the abstract sphere of logic. It is not a question of developing the determinate idea of the political constitution, but of giving the political constitution a relation to the abstract Idea, of classifying it as a member of its (the Idea's) life history. This is an obvious mystification (Marx, 1970, p. 14-15).

And further,

> . . . the development of the state or of the political constitution to differences and their actuality is an organic development. The actual differences, or the different parts of the political constitution are the presupposition, the subject. The predicate is their determination as organic. Instead of that, the Idea is made subject, and the differences and their actuality are conceived to be its development and its result, while on the other hand the Idea must be developed out of the actual difference. What is organic is precisely the idea of the differences, their ideal determination (Marx, 1970, p. 12).

Marx broadened his critique of Hegel's non-materialist, non-humanist conception of human existence into a more universal criticism of speculative philosophy. The point was not to interpret the world, but to change it. Thus, Marx argued that the philosophy of state must be founded on material human relations, with humanity as subject, in order to realize its potential as more than a mere speculative political philosophy.

It is important to recognize here that Marx's primary concern was not with Hegel's logic. His brilliant precursor had delivered a logically tight and, for the most part, empirically accurate analysis of the current basis of the bourgeois state. Marx's criticism was less of Hegel's theory of the state than of the reality it did too little to change. The reality was that of bourgeois society. It was a reality that instutionalized aggression, competition, and private property. Marx criticized Hegel's conception of the state precisely because it

did not concretely challenge the validity of the bourgeois assumption, particularly the primacy of property. Hegel had conviently based the state on reason, but reason, as Marx had shown and as a logical extension of Hegel's thought would demonstrate, was a reflection of a particular socio-historical condition. Hegel's Reason, due to lack of critical involvement, had become that of bourgeois society. Marx contended that Hegel's inverted conceptions were a result of his passive reflection of that same bourgeois reality.* The very human species-existence he advocated was precluded by his emphasis on an egoistic, individualist component--private property and private privilege. Marx wrote:

> Far from viewing man here in his species-being, his species-life itself--society--rather appears to be an external framework for the individual, limiting his original independence. The only bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the maintenance of their property and egoistic persons (Marx, 1967, p. 237).

And yet again:

> Thus, at its highest point the political constitution is the constitution of private property. The highest political inclination is the inclination of private property. . . .
> . . . What Hegel presents as the end, the determining factor, the prima causa, of primogeniture is, instead, an effect, a consequence of the power of abstract private property over the political state, while Hegel presents primogeniture as the power of the political state over private property. He makes the cause the effect and the effect the cause . . . (Marx, 1970, p. 99-100).

Hegel's justification of private property and primogeniture was a compound contradiction. For property was presented as a quality more

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*I have already suggested that Hegel's thought was less a reflection of bourgeois reality than a concession to its power and to his resultant revolutionary inertia. I think that his treatment of primogeniture and property, however, constitute lapses in that logic that could only have been redressed had Hegel sought a more radical change in the social order.

basic to human existence than any other, including freedom and community. What is more, the primacy of property and primogeniture revealed that the apex of Hegel's state was not actually Reason, but the reason of private property. Marx minced no words:

> This is precisely the romantic itch of the nobility of primogeniture, namely, that here private property, and thus private wilfulness in its most abstract form--the totally ignorant, unethical, crude will--appears to be the highest synthesis of the political state, the highest renunciation of wilfulness, the hardest and most self-sacrificing struggle with human weakness; for what appears here to be human weakness is actually the humanizing, the humanization of private property (Marx, 1970, p. 101).

The inalienability of property over social existence meant that property was the subject and humanity was once again the predicate. The isolated individual, personal property, and the bourgeois state that protected and perpetuated these institutions, took precedence over the larger social community on which they were based.

By insisting on private property rights, Hegel's state dichotomized individual interest and the larger, social interest. True to his bourgeois roots, Hegel developed the state as a mediator between these supposedly divergent interests. Marx rejected this separation, contending that we were "species-beings"; that the individual interest was not necessarily distinct from communal interest, but that they were convergent. Hegel assumed that there were inherent oppositions that required mediation to avoid a war of all against all. But Marx contended that this was valid only within the limited confines of the bourgeois state.

A youthful Marx delineated an alternative in an unpublished notebook dated 1844. It encapsulated a view of human values that was to guide his work throughout the remainder of his life. Its references

to Hegel appeared both as an indebtedness and as a critical transcendence. But most important for this analysis, it directly conjoined those individual and communal essences that Hegel, in the liberal tradition, had seemingly conceived as eternally antagonistic.

> The exchange of human activity within production itself as well as the exchange of human products with one another is equivalently the species-activity and species-spirit whose actual, conscious, and authentic existence is social activity and social satisfaction. As human nature is the true communal nature, or communal being (Gemeinwesen) of man, men through the activation of their nature create and produce a human communal being (Gemeinwesen), a social being (gesellschaftlich Wesen) which is no abstractly universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the nature or being (Wesen) of every single individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth . . . Men as actual, living, particular individuals not men considered in abstraction, constitute this being. It is, therefore, what they are (Marx, in O'Malley, 1970, p. xliii) (A slightly different English version appears in Easton and Guddat, p. 271-272).

Clearly, the Hegelian concept of an "abstractly universal" power embodied in the state and opposed to the single individual was rejected. Rather, Marx described an immanent unity inherent in our human potential. This communal quality was not imposed externally by the state as a separate entity. When the collectivity was fully realized it became integral with the state.

Since Hegel's separation of individual and collective interest was a dichotomy arising from the bourgeois emphasis on the primacy of property rights, Marx rejected mediation because it maintained the exploitative nature of capitalist society. Marx proposed to overcome the external nature of Hegel's state by arguing for the elimination of the class oppositions it mediated and thus maintained. With the death of these oppositions, the major function of the Hegelian (bourgeois) state withered away.

Hegel's liberal bourgeois conception of the state as mediator put severe limitations on the process of human development. Marx argued that since the state was tied to private property, a dichotomized conception of humanity was perpetuated, which jeopardized the possibility of human emancipation.

That dichotomy constituted the basis of Marx's critique of political emancipation (in the bourgeois state). For that variety of "emancipation" touched neither on the issue of property nor human emancipation in the larger sense. Political emancipation which did not penetrate to the essence of our total human condition was "abstract and limited."

> . . . man frees himself from a limitation politically, through the state, by overcoming the limitation in an abstract, limited, and partial manner, in contradiction with himself (Marx, 1967, p. 224).

Marx, especially in the early years, criticized the limitations of purely political emancipation and called instead for a more radical social-human emancipation. This emancipation had to take account of humankind's social-communal existence. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx wrote:

> My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being.
>
> Above all we must avoid postulating "Society" again as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His life, even if it may not appear in the direct form of a communal life in association with others--is therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man's individual and species life are not different, however much--and this is inevitable--the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular, or more general mode of the

> life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or more general individual life (Marx, 1964b, p. 137-138).

Species existence entailed the collective, rational self-determination of social life. It was based upon the total human community and the direct creative participation of all. As I have indicated elsewhere, this communal expression of social existence placed the individual in democratic harmony with the collectivity which has its political expression in democracy. Democratic political institutions and values were dictated by human relations; not a reality superimposed upon human existence, but developed out of it. In a democratic structure, humanity became the ruled and the ruler, the producer and the product, the essence and the existence. The human state had a collective human foundation.

> Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man into the subjectified state; democracy starts with man and makes the state objectified man (Marx, 1970, p. 30).

Our social being must thus be realized in a democratically ordered organization whose interests are ultimately inseparable from those of the individuals who compose it. A crucial quesiton remained: How was that democratic organization of emancipatory transcendence to be realized?

Marx and Hegel: The Organization of Emancipation as Embodiment of "Species-Being"

Marx's challenge to Hegel's collective essence cannot be separated from daily life. Marx believed that there was a fateful naivete in Hegel.* Above all, he could not abide Hegel's expression of faith

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*Despite a host of Marx-Hegel treatises, I believe that significant insights are still to be gained from a critique of Marx's lifelong

in the functional capacity of the bourgeois state and its leaders to provide a basis on which a transcendental consciousness of freedom might evolve. Marx doubted the willingness and capacity of the state to engage in "change from above." There was neither grace nor charm in his merciless condemnation of those (Hegel) who clung to a faith that the leaders of bourgeois society, inspired by "noblese oblige," would willingly preside over their own preemption. Socialists must not be so naive as to dream of a significant transformation without struggle.

> The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favored. Hence they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society? (Marx, 1971a, p. 105)

Instead he called for an organization of emancipation, a revolutionary structure that would act in the name of the people. As far as it went, it was a persuasive and effective argument. However, I will attempt to show that he failed to heed Hegel's equally persuasive, sometimes eloquent warning about the potentially horrendous and debilitating effects of negation of existing social structures. That is, while he advocated the abandonment of the "support systems" of bourgeois society retained by Hegel, he did not give a correspondingly intensive analysis of the immanent alienating aspects of the

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dialogue with the spirit of Hegel. These insights appear not only in what Marx acknowledged and challenged in Hegel but also in certain aspects of the Hegelian system, noted in the last chapter, that he failed to acknowledge.

class struggle he advocated. The consequence, examined in the next chapter, was to leave certain ambiguities in the transformation from a hierarchically ordered organization of emanciaption into the new communal order.

Marx's insightful challenge to his mentor lay in his insistence that the collective essence could not be separated from civil society and the day-to-day struggles of individuals. Rather that "essence" was the "nature and being of every single individual." He firmly rejected any dogma which included a necessary antagonism between individual interest and the interest of the collectivity (state). Rather, he insisted that individual interest was not only of necessity integral to, but ultimately inseparable from, its interactional consequences for the larger communal interest. Marx's critique of Hegel was that for Hegel

> His [man's] existence as citizen is an existence lying outside the realm of his communal existences, and is hence purely individual. . . . The separation of civil society and the political state appears necessarily to be a separation of the political citizen, the citizen of the state from civil society, i.e., from his own actual, empirical reality; for as a state-idealist he is a being who is completely other, distinct, different from and opposed to his own actuality. . . .
>
> . . . man is not the subject, rather he is identified with a predicate--the class. . .
>
> . . . This uncritical spirit, this mysticism, is the enigma of the modern constitution . . . as well as the mystery of Hegelian philosophy, especially the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of Religion (Marx, 1970, p. 78, pp. 83-4).

Marx's critique was of a reification that separated family life, economic variables, and interpersonal relations in general (civil society) from the ideal, the larger interest of the whole as manifested in the state. Indeed, his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right subjected the whole fabric of Hegel's model to a tempestuous and

relentless assault. The gist of his critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state was precisely that the power and prerogative of the state should not be seated in a "differentiated and opposed actuality" but rather should be acknowledged as both the power by which humanity had historically transcended the savagery of the jungle and the necessary and rightful prerogative of human freedom. Individual and community were of a unified totality. "The individual is the social being" (Marx, 1964b, p. 158). The communal essence was the "nature and being of every single individual." It was humanity as "actual, living, particular individuals, not . . . considered in abstraction" who constituted this being and who implicitly shared the capacity and power to change it.

Those human powers and prerogatives were elaborated on a further revision of the transformative method. Marx insisted that it was surely not the ideal of the mind symbolically represented by the state and embodied in the monarch that had brought us the great art, literature, poetry, science, technology--the vast and diverse forms of culture--the mode of social intercourse--the vast totality we encompassed in the human epoch. But rather it was the subject of that process, humankind itself, that created the ideal and it was humanity as a self-conscious collective to which the subjective power belonged. Humanity was, after all, the subject. Indeed, it was that Hegelian position that had given the initial impetus to Marx's own critical study.

> The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a critical re-examination of the Hegelian philsophy of law; . . . My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general

> development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term "civil society"; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy (Marx, 1978a, p. 20).

It followed then that those functions allocated to the state must be identified as originating in the life of the people (here restricted to political economy) and in a direct relationship to their daily lives if humanity was indeed to be the subject. Since Marx opposed the reification,if not deification, of the Prussian State, in what form could he establish a transcendent objectification in which the universal of Gemeinwesen and the particular individual related in a dialectic and not antagonistic orientation? In what form might a context conducive to the synthesizing moment of freedom prevail? Clearly it was a form that negated the negation and demanded the active practice of freedom. A form of freedom as praxis! Surely it made no sense within a philosophy based on our collective essence that the pursuit of freedom be performed by the surrogates of the people. To be consistent with his own precepts Hegel's consciousness of freedom had to be objectified in its own realization--as a function and essential component of self-realization--as a communal act. It followed further that social change, if it was to lead to a consciousness of freedom, must be undertaken as a consciousness of freedom--as a communal act. There must be an organization of emancipation that <u>is</u> emancipation.

It was Marx's contention that Hegel, to be consistent with his own work, must grant that since the realization of freedom was a social act, it also demanded the simultaneous development of a concrete social

context conducive to the fullest realization of our collective essence. Previously, within the liberal Weltanschuung, the critique of freedom could be realized immanently. Assuming the absence of external coercion, minimal attention need be accorded any social structural criteria of freedom. Now the social structure was thrust into a role of critical necessity. Hegel had led us to that realization but had not drunk of the chalice of wisdom which he had placed before us. Had he done so, he could scarcely have avoided the realization that emancipatory theory itself required objectification. It, too, must meet the criterion that the act of becoming free is itself a social construct. Freedom required grounding in an organization of emancipation in which values could be constituted and sustained in a moving and socially determined equilibrium.

Marx was correct that Hegel ultimately lost sight of this original insight and Marx properly conceived a timely uplifting of the positive transcendental moment--that of rebirth and emancipation. His compassion was with the wretched--the oppressed of the earth. His vision and political activity were driven toward the origination of a concrete emancipatory structure that could offer revolutionary hope to the bulk of humankind captivated in ignorance, frozen in debilitating fear of a war of all against all, and hobbled in economic deprivation. For him then, what was demanded was not so much a <u>conceptual</u> accomodation of the necessity for an abstract negation of oneself; what was demanded was the realization of a rigorous "negation of the negation" of a fulfilled life--a radical terminus of alienation. This demanded essentially a realization of oneself as both the subject and object of transition together with a corresponding effort to step

beyond retrospective analysis to a concrete realization of the material basis of that transcendence in social action. Humankind must consciously and collectively participate in its own self-creation.

> As we have seen, it is only when the object becomes a human object, or objective humanity, that man does not become lost in it. This is only possible when man himself becomes a social object; when he himself becomes a social being and society becomes a being for him in this object.
>
> On the one hand, it is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the reality of human faculties, human reality, and thus the reality of his own faculties, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The objects then confirm and realize his individuality, they are his own objects, . . . (Marx, 1964a, p. 160-161).

In subsequent pages I will document and extend the implications of Marx's insistence, despite an inability to realize the ideal in his own time, that the realization of our essence had to occur simultaneously and contiguously with our communal, material life. Self-realization or freedom was an organizationally embedded process. Hence, if negation required the abandonment of an old system, it also simultaneously demanded the realization of a newer system that incorporated insights gained from observation of the past. For the slave (re: the master-slave relationship) analysis must be focused on the reality thrust before him/her in the process of self-objectification, i.e., in the concrete socially grounded negation of oppression. This was nothing more nor less than a social organization of emancipation. There was no reason why hereditary elites, often the source of oppression, should be mysteriously qualified by Hegel as experts in mediation of disputes concerning possible advocacy of new social forms (potential organizations of emancipation), while philosophers (or any other concerned citizens) were restricted to retrospective analysis of the organization of oppression. Emancipatory transcendence

was impossible when screened through a middle-class perspective that expressed little faith in the capacity of the slave (proletariat) to overcome self-interest and that had its own "class interest" reified in the Hegelian model.

A distinct organization of emancipation was needed that commanded the full attention of expertise and demanded the full participation of those whose transcendental, material realization was in process--the people to be affected. However, Marxists, including Marx himself, have failed to adequately reckon with the fact that an oppressive system may result in a reduction and constraint on an individual's capacity to tolerate negation or critical transformation. This applies to oppressor and oppressed alike! Yet Marx never fully acknowledged or treated Hegel's persuasive argument about negation and its psycho-social concomitants.*

On the basis of the previous critique Marx attempted to lay out a programmatic position. His position differed from Hegel at three crucial points. (1) He conceived an organization of emancipation that was based on the assumption that there existed in his time a human potential to overcome self-seeking impulses. It was a vision that projected the triumph of our collective essence, neither by annihilation of others nor by mediation with them (as if the interests of the others were the distinct obverse of our own), but by acknowledgment of a dialectically shared universality. (2) He insisted that the

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*This criticism is not general but applies specifically to Marx's failure to provide an adequate alternative to the absence of a collective "support system" (advocated conceptually by both Hegel and Marx) within the first stage of his organization of emancipation--the class struggle.

organization of emancipation develop itself out of a critique of "bourgeois" society. (3) Marx was surely consistent with Hegel's implicit criterion that a triumph over bourgeois individualism and power must itself be an act of objectification--not merely self- but communal objectification. However, his praxis did not adequately compensate for Hegel's implicit call for a transitional support structure that not only restrained external coercion but that structurally marshalled its resources against the inner trauma that the secularization of reason wrests, in Promethean audacity, from divine protection and places squarely with us. He did not acknowledge, as did Hegel, that to assume this ultimate humanistic function is to pass through the valley of the shadow of our own negation and ultimate death--to submit to our own self-alienation. He did not acknowledge that it must be a pilgrimage in which the only salvation is in the awesome power of a unified humanity communally organized to consciously advance its own socio-cultural transcendence.

Marx, following Feuerbach, undertook a vast and articulate assult against the Hegelian propensity to effectively isolate our collective essence in an abstract spirit embodied in the Monarch. Humanity had the capacity to participate in its own humanization. We could consciously marshal the intellectual and social forces necessary to triumph over those political-economic forms that discouraged realization of our humane potential without separating that quality in a "differentiated and opposed actuality." We could identify and eliminate those forms that fostered the competitive impulses because they merely presided over and mediated self-interested conflict. They did nothing to concretely circumvent it. What is more, we could

accomplish this end by exploiting the resource of systematic rationality seated in philosophy and science within a context of praxis.

With the guidance of systematic critical thought we might achieve an emancipated consciousness but only through collective action.

> . . . the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only in this way will separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world, and be able to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of men) (Marx, 1967, p. 429-430).

We have noted that Marx's concept of community and collective transcendence was the result of a logical extension of the transformative method. It was that ideal that he had in mind when he critiqued the "liberal" emphasis on the "rights of man."

> Thus none of the so-called rights of men goes beyond the egoistic man, the man withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his private choice, and separated from the community as a member of civil society. Far from viewing man here in his species-being, his species-life itself--society--rather appears to be an external framework for the individual, limiting his original independence (Marx, 1967, p. 236-237).

Consistent with Hegel, Marx insisted on the significance of the community, but he took the additional step that materially linked the individual to the collectivity. Emancipation of humanity must occur in a concrete historical context, not by the exposition of abstract demands and mechanisms of self-realization. There are specific needs that must be met.

> . . . real liberation can be achieved only in the real world and with real means, that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam engine and the spinning jenny, that serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that people on the whole cannot be liberated so long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, shelter and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. "Liberation" is a historical and not a mental act (Marx, 1967, p. 437).

Not only was the real world, the existential context, necessary to the conceptualization of emancipatory transcendence, but it was inseparable from the concrete process by which freedom could be realized. One could not divorce the end from the means of its attainment, not merely because that would deny the freedom of those to be affected by the end to participate in its realization, but also because history was not restricted to a single external conceptual source. That is, it is a cumulative-temporal process whose reason is its own reality known to me but only through us in the course of our journey. Hence, ". . . in revolutionary activity the changing of oneself coincides with the changing of circumstances." This was expressed where the laborer simultaneously transformed himself as well as the object of his endeavor within a division of labor which was also changing. There was a collective (social) basis of self-realization in which society and individual simultaneously realized their potential in dialectic interaction.

> Suppose we had produced things as human beings: In his production each of us would have twice affirmed himself and the other. (1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality and its particularity, and in the course of the activity I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the object I would have experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power. (2) In your satisfaction and your use of my product I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my work satisfied a human need, that it objectified human nature, and that it created an object appropriate to the need of another human being. (3) I would have been the mediator between you and the species and you would have experienced me as a redintegration of your own nature and a necessary part of your self: I would have been affirmed in your thought as well as your love. (4) In my individual life I would have immediately confirmed and realized my true human and social nature (Marx, 1967, p. 281).

Collective action became simultaneously the basis of transcendental consciousness. That consciousness was the expression of society.

> When communist artisans form associations, teaching and propaganda are their first aims. But their association itself creates a new need--the need for society--and what appeared to be a means has become an end. The most striking results of this practical development are to be seen when French socialist workers meet together. Smoking, eating and drinking are no longer simply means of bringing people together. Society, association, entertainment which also has society as its aim, is sufficient for them; the brotherhoood of man is no empty phrase but a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their toil-worn bodies (Marx, 1964a, p. 176).

Hence, the organized collective structure represented the positive moment of negation that was a necessary concomitant of the realization of our communal being.

> Communism is the phase of negation of the negation and is, consequently for the next stage of historical development, a real and necessary factor in the emancipation and rehabilitation of man. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future (Marx, 1964a, p. 167).

The question was whether the mid-nineteenth century presented a historical site in which the organization of emancipation envisioned by Marx might be conceived and flourish. As it happened, Marx decided that the time was not ripe and that he must settle on an intermediate expediency.

The Strategic Origins of Class Conflict

Marx's insistence on concrete collective transcendence, as I have indicated, is less a critique of Hegel's conceptual system than of his praxis. I think a similar observation applies to Marx. For in his own concrete development of the organization of emancipation, he was unable to realize collective transcendence. Instead, he settled on a selected group within the larger society, the industrial proletariat, whose unique class position gave it, in Marx's view, the best chance to spearhead the transition to a classless society. Indeed, one

might be tempted to join Marx's critics in a simplification of his revision of Hegel by describing it as a transfer of essence from spirit to social class. To be sure, his description of collective self-realization was reflective of his preoccupation with political economy. But it was also clear that he intended a vastly more humanistic quality than that relatively narrow focus of political economy. Since a class struggle was underway, he would adapt it to the struggle for the ultimate realization of our communal essence. The proletariat, the "class that is the dissolution of all class," would then divine, by a means left obscure, the universal interest.

> Each new class which displaces the one previously dominant is forced, simply to be able to carry out its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all members of society, that is, ideally expressed. It has to give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making revolution emerges at the outset simply because it is opposed to a class not as a class but as a representative of the whole of society (Marx, 1967, p. 439).

What are the origins of his choice of the industrial proletariat as the social vehicle of Gemeinwesen? What aspects of Marx's milieu caused him to select an intermediate group to advance the cause of a yet to be realized collective transformation?

Kant, as we have seen, had undermined the bearing points of bourgeois individualism. Hegel had advanced the secularization of reason in a spectacular leap in which the social origin of the human condition was acknowledged as historical process. Marx sought to extend and clarify a Hegelian position, in which the separation of the human ideal from civil society left some ambiguity as to whether secularization meant merely a swift transfer of prerogative from priest to sovereign.

Even more than Hegel, Marx strove, especially in his early writings, to further extend the process of secularization. He did so particularly in his description of "a species-activity" and "species-being" whose potential permitted the realization of the highest egalitarian ideal of the French socialists. Yet the constraints of poverty and the struggles to sustain the politically oriented revolutionary organization of his time conditioned the development of the emancipatory ideal in actual praxis. It was a first bloom in those two score years that spanned the 1840's to the 1880's--the early spring of a movement whose fruition had perhaps not yet found its season. It was not Marx's time to do with as he pleased and he, no more than Hegel nor any mortal, could command the time of harvest--though some within his movement believed he tried. Nonetheless, the spirit of revolution had been kindled and he determined that his alternatives were either to enter the fray with a determination and singleness of purpose that inspired confidence in its feasibility or to abandon a dream whose pursuit might at least move things in the direction of greater emancipation.

We shall see that Marx and Engels later conceded that they were "wrong" about the propitiousness of the time. Perhaps the early excess of their overtly expressed optimism concealed profound doubts, even in the forties. Marx's confession to Frau Kugelmann would seem to support this deduction. In any event, the realization of a revolutionary consciousness in that time confronted the obstacles of ignorance, fear, and the machinations of a vital bourgeois culture which held out rich rewards for those workers who were lured into the competitive arena of "possessive individualism."

Marx enjoyed a following of a few scholars and enlightened bourgeois, a multitude of unlettered urban workers, and a vast range of isolated and (by his assessment, at any rate) naive peasants and lumpenproletariat. His judgment, though surely not that of his utopian and anarchist contemporaries, was that, given the dismally low level of consciousness among the people, the first step for the proletariat was to gain political power, return the means of production to the people by way of class struggle, and leave the realization of an egalitarian relationship of production to the collective praxis. Coordinated by the International Working Men's Association,* class struggle was to be an action that only anticipated the first phase of transition to community. But he believed that it was the best he could do given the formidable obstacles and the general level of consciousness at his disposal.

Not only did the critics of his time take up the challenge, as I have noted, but his contemporary critics further allege that he adopted the vestige of rationalism in Hegel, and inverted and "bureaucratized" the Hegelian Geist by selecting the proletariat as a reification of that myth. They allege that by so doing he defaulted a concrete communal transformation to a purposive-rationalism that represented a logical extension of Hegelian thought.

This position, as we shall see, is generally taken by Habermas. It is also advanced by Dick Howard. Howard designates Marx the "last Hegelian," the "rationalist," and attributes the "myth of the proletariat" to this sort of rationalism.

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*Note: also to be referred to subsequently as the International.

> . . . there is the myth of the proletariat as the Subject-Object of History, an inverted materialist form of the Hegelian Geist or, seen politically, his bureaucracy. Of greater import is the critique in action of Marx's linear view of History, of History as the Progress of Humanity towards its Self-Realization through the elimination of Otherness (Howard, 1977, p. 35).

I will contend that these critics compound the error that Marx attributed to Hegel. That is, even as Hegel believed that the "Spirit" embodied in the monarchy would provide a stable vehicle of transition to the secularization of reason, Marx grasped at the proletariat and the class struggle as a transitional vehicle to the secularization of reason. Marx's ultimate vision was no more to conflate the purposive-rational aspect of political-economic emancipation--the class struggle--with emancipatory interaction (in a manner that obscured the latter) than was Hegel's intention to forever separate the political ideal from the "other differentiated and opposed actuality"-- the total interactional component of life.

The great bulk of Marx's discussion of humanity as Gemeinwesen makes this point profoundly clear. Yet if it was not his intention to neglect the critical interactional function at the expense of instrumental goals, why does the record of his political and organizational activity lead his critics to charge him with that kind of narrowed determinism? To be sure, his interpretation of the context led him to ambiguous activity that confused both critic and partisan alike. However, there is ample evidence to give credence to my contention that the fullest development of his emancipatory theory was necessarily separated from his revolutionary praxis by a hostile climate much as a similarly adverse climate had intimidated Hegel from any significant social action at all. Hence, I contend, in opposition

to the critics to be examined in this study, that both Marx and Hegel conceptually (theoretically) envisioned a unity of the theory of our collective essence with praxis that was precluded (to a lesser degree with Marx) by the real exigencies of their respective historical contexts.*

We shall return to a closer examination of the perspective of Marx's critics at a later point. I should like to begin with an examination of Marx's concepts of the revolutionary organization in relationship to the context of its origins.

Marx's Political Grounding

After Marx received his doctorate, he returned to the Rhineland to edit the Reinische Zeitung (Cologne). This journal increasingly reflected and developed widening pro-French sentiment against the Prussian king. Cologne was at that time an emergent industrial hub whose businessmen and predominantly Catholic population wasted no affection on Berlin. The Cologne Rhinelanders sustained the tradition of Marx's youth in their rejection of Prussia as a feudal anachronism (Padover, 1978, p. 139). As a mouthpiece of this powerful faction, the Reinische Zeitung repeatedly took stances in unabashed criticism of the Prussian state. The journal was acknowledged for its relentless criticism. The Prussian Monarch ordered the journal to cease printing as of March 31, 1843.

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*On the surface, this may perhaps be dismissed as a rather pedestrian issue that smacks of a melodramatic quest to establish individual credit or blame for successes or failures in the Communist movement of the past. On the contrary, it seeks to preserve the Marxian archives as a rich (if somewhat obscured by ambiguity) source of guidelines in the realization of what Marx believed was our collective essence.

From this editorship, Marx sought a position outside Germany. Due to the prevalent "enslaving" atmosphere, he decided to go to Paris to join with Arnold Ruge, a "utopian" socialist, in the publication of the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher. The journal itself was short-lived, its first and last issue being published in February, 1844. It succumed to a combination of political and economic pressures. But Marx stayed in Paris enjoying the relatively libertarian atmosphere. It was here that he expanded his contact with the utopian socialists and communists. It was here also that he became a communist and that his Germanic roots in authority and order helped congeal a fateful restraint on his anti-authoritarian zeal. The experiences from which that constraint developed are reflected in anecdotes from his life with the utopian socialists, particularly Proudhon, and later the Russian anarchist, Bakunin. We shall return to this at a later point. Suffice now that Marx's positions on political and authoritarian issues were conceived in a unique Franco-German womb with a decided conceptual bias to the egalitarian French tradition, but with persisting ambiguities about the place of authority.

The growing number of disenchanted citizens of Marx's time addressed the turmoil of the age with a variety of remedial proposals, ranging from violent revolution to apolitical utopianism. It was a period still relatively close to the initiation of a secularized reason as a public issue and that phenomenon enjoyed the benefit of fewer experiences and even less theoretical material on which to enlighten its practitioners than we do today.

What is more, the period was one of dawning consciousness in which the newly released spirit, by Marx's and Engels' assessment,

was exuberant, vitalized, and perhaps more sanguine in its expectation than wise in its selection of goals and means to their attainment. Marx and Engles were caught up in the fervor. Marx's involvement is reflected in his satiric, often vitriolic, attack on the bourgeois order.

On one instance in 1848-1849, during his editorship of the Neue Reinische Zeitung, he was indicted and brought to trial on several counts including written insult of the gendarmerie, satirization of the Junkers, and "incitement to rebellion" in an anti-tax campaign (Padover, 1978, p. 272). During a courtroom speech in his defense he had boldly shouted defiance of the prevalent political system coupled with a blatant call for overthrow of the regime. "The first duty of the press is, therefore, to undermine all the foundation of the existing political system" (Padover, 1978, p. 273). At this time, Marx conducted a successful defense but when the government ultimately closed the Neue Reinische Zeitung Marx further expressed the defiance and revolutionary zest that typified his intense involvement. In the last issue, he printed a blunt warning of impending revolution:

> We are ruthless, we ask no consideration from you. When our turn comes, we will not conceal our terrorism. But the royal terrorists, the terrorists by the Grace-and-Law of God, are brutal, contemptible and vulgar in practice, cowardly, covert, and deceitful in theory, and dishonorable in both (Padover, 1978, p. 278).

The period of the 1840's to the 1870's, that in which Marx's most productive work took place, involved social, economic, and political upheavals that culminated in increasing pessimism about the class struggle. Throughout the period from the revolution of 1848, the wars between France and Germany, and the struggles of the Paris

Commune in 1870, Marx outwardly maintained an optimism about the chances of revolutionary overthrow of the prevalent bourgeois regime.

Particularly after the fall of the Commune, greater pessimism became apparent. Jenny Marx wrote Leibnecht in April 1871 that

> I cannot begin to tell you in what a state of agitation, fear and despair we all find ourselves in our house. . . . Above all, the death of Gustave Flourens has shocked us most deeply. We were personal friends. . . . Flourens, now assassinated . . . was a noble soul through and through. Audacious to the point of rashness, knightly, humane, compassionate, gentle . . . he had a richly developed mind, being himself a scholar and a representative of modern science; young, wealthy and endowed with fine, courageous manners, he had a warm and impulsive nature that made him turn toward the poor, the oppressed, the disinherited. . . . (Padover, 1978, p. 438).

In May she wrote

> You cannot imagine what we have gone through here in London since the fall of the Commune. All this unspeakable misery, this boundless grief! And, in addition, the almost unbearable work for the International. As long as Moor [Marx] did all the work, exerted every effort through diplomatizing and tacking about to hold together the refractory elements, protected the Association [International] from its squadron of enemies and ridicule before the world, infused with courage the scared and anxiety-ridden in the trembling herd . . . the rabble kept silent. But now the enemies have dragged him into the limelight . . . the pack has assembled, and policemen and democrats are howling together the same refrain about "Despotism, Power-hunger, Ambition!" (Padover, 1978, p. 414).

And in June she wrote to Peter Imandt

> You cannot imagine what we have gone through these last weeks, what grief and rage. It took more than 20 years to bring up such gallant, skilled, heroic men, and now they are almost gone. There is still some hope for some; the best have been murdered--Varlin, Jaclard, Rigault, Tridon, etc., and above all, the true heroes who, without leaders, fought for eight days in Villettem Belleville, and St. Antoine--men and women workers! (Padover, 1978, p. 439).

Marx himself had written his publisher, N. Danielson, in May that:

> I am so overworked, and in fact so much interfered with in my theoretical studies, that, after September, I shall withdraw from the commercial concern, the International, which, at this moment, weighs principally upon my own shoulders, and

> which, as you know, has its ramifications all over the world, Mais, est modus in rebus [But there is a limit to things], and I can no longer afford--for some time at least--to combine two sorts of business of so very different a character (Padover, 1978, p. 415).

Stress, family tragedy, and the failure of the two great emancipatory thrusts of the previous three decades had taken their toll. Clearly, earlier images required a reworking. But Marx's death never permitted him to finish the task he projected.

Marx's positivism is ambiguous. But I think it unlikely that his intention was to reverse his lifetime commitment to a close linkage of theory and praxis. What is more likely is that he came to doubt the strategy and expediencies of the class struggle and withdrew in search of an alternative mode of praxis.

Clearly, Marx and Engels came close in these final years to an acknowledgment that they had erred in their assessment of the readiness of the time for a successful socialist revolution. But they were not always so publicly equivocating. Indeed, the arguments between Marx and other partisans in the early years of the movement often took on a dogmatic air of certitude in which a wary eye was always kept on prospective converts (whose level of conceptual sophistication was seen as minimal). Such issues as peasant or proletarian control of the party, the proper locus of authority, the nature of that authority, and the fundamental character of the revolutionary party raged across the International Working Men's Association, which in its early years was master-minded by Marx.

Marx, in those years, advocated a disciplined revolutionary organization. He quite persuasively argued that the functionaries of the state whose essence was embodied in the monarch could hardly be

expected to preside over their own negation. What was required was a revolutionary organization of emancipation whose first objective would be to coordinate an assault on the political power of the bourgeois state.

What Marx failed to adequately anticipate was that, assuming a successful revolution, the socialist leadership, while schooled in the rational purposes of their immediate economic and political objectives, might not be capable of presiding over their own negation when it came time for the state to "wither away." Above all it was this concentration of political power that, as we shall see, brought fear and trembling to the utopians and anarchists, that developed painful animosity between their leaders and Marx and that ultimately caused a momentous split in the International.

While the thought of Saint-Simon and other utopian socialists is credited with having influenced Marx in the direction of Communism, an examination of Marx's later animus with the anarchists and utopians is enlightening for such an analysis sheds considerable light on his decision to adopt the proletariat as his revolutionary avant-garde and to tighten his control over the International.

The Utopians

As early as 1842, Marx undertook an intensive study of the French utopians and socialist authors. This was a logical extension not only of the enchantment of German scholarship (Hegel et al.) with French libertarian thought but of Marx's Rhineland and Southern German origins. He read Étienne Cabet's Voyage in Icarie (1842), Victor Considérant's Destinéé Sociale (1834-1838), Theodore Dézamy's

Calomnies et Politique de M. Cabet (1842), Charles Fourier's Théorie des Quatre Mouvements et des Destinées Générales (2nd ed., 1842), Pierre Leroux's De l'Humanité (1840), and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's Qu'est-ce que la Propriété? (1841) (Padover, 1978, p. 144). These works did not immediately convert him to the cause of communism. He was enchanted by their vision, but they also reflected certain open-ended, disorganized, and utopian components that he was to disparage mercilessly.

The period of the Marxian sojourn in Paris brought him into intimate contact with the great literary and artistic figures of the period (Balzac, Hugo, Chopin, etc.). Many among them had also been intrigued by utopian thought and some had actually participated in Fourierist, Saint-Simonian, and other experiments in cooperative living. Among those who had actually lived for a while in a communal experiment inspired by Fourier and Saint-Simon was George Sand (See Padover, 1978, p. 177-78).

During the same period (1844) the Marxs were approached by Arnold Ruge to join with another couple in a Fourierist type experiment in cooperative living. The proposal envisioned a common household in which the cooking, cleaning, sewing, and general housekeeping was to be shared, presumably by the wives. Whether Marx would have entered into the experiment is not known, for the proposal was promptly declined by Jenny Marx. Her friend Emma Herwegh wrote that it would be impossible for "Frau Ruge, the nice little Saxon woman, to get along with the very intelligent and even more ambitious Madame Marx, who was far superior to her in education" (Padover, 1978, p. 175). Marx's attitudes toward this particular plan were not improved by his

disagreement with the utopians with whom Fourier had been identified. For whatever reasons, the thoroughly middle-class life style of the Marxs never again approached cooperative or communal living. This was despite occasionally crippling poverty, not to mention Marx's frequent theoretical advocacy of community.

By 1846 Marx's ideas were congealing in increasing opposition to the utopians. His attitudes were probably not made the more sympathetic by the noted utopian Proudhon's ignorance of economics together with his somewhat "provincial" way of life (Padover, 1978, p. 237). Clearly the decline in Marx's linkage to utopian thought was given a great impetus by personal animus between Marx and Proudhon. On a conceptual level, the conflict centered around a disagreement between the German socialists, represented by Marx, who advocated a centralized authority over the emancipatory organization (later the International), and the French, who called for "grass roots" participatory control.

The actual conflict began on May 5, 1846, when Marx invited Proudhon to join a Communist Correspondence Committee.

> The primary objective of our Correspondence, however, will be to bring German socialists in contact with French and English socialists, to inform foreigners about socialist movements in Germany and Germans in Germany about the progress of socialism in France and England. In this way, differences of opinion come to light, and one can attain an exchange of ideas and impartial criticism. This is a step which the socialist movement, in its literary manifestation, has to take in order to get rid of nationalistic limitations (Padover, 1978, p. 238).

Proudhon declined the invitation. Tied to his rejection of Marx's internationalism was a libertarian fear about powerful organizations and the power which he believed was invariably tied to them. In his letter of rejection, he warned Marx not to make the same errors as

Martin Luther, who after his victory over Catholicism, had realized his own "apparatus of excommunication and anathemas" (Padover, 1978, p. 238). Continuing, he pleaded for an organization in which all opinion would be welcomed and freely discussed. "Let us not make ourselves the leaders of a new intolerance" (Padover, 1978, p. 238). From this he moved on to Marx's reputation as a revolutionary. He wrote against "bloodshed" and "extermination" and after having established his family's credentials as bona fide working people, he later reminded Marx that "Our proletarians have such a great thirst for knowledge that you would receive short shrift from them if you offered them only blood to drink" (Padover, 1978, p. 238). Marx reacted strongly to what he considered a stinging rebuke and a permanent animus ensued between Marx, Proudhon, and other utopian thinkers.

Marx soon had a chance to retaliate. The conflict probably reached its peak in Marx's condemnation of Proudhon's Philosophy of Poverty in his Misère de la Philosophie (Poverty of Philosophy). The essence of his attack on Proudhon was also contained in a letter to his friend Annenkov. In the letter Marx attacked Proudhon's ahistorical approach and expressed both a perceptive analysis of the pertinence of praxis and a rather narrowed determinism (that became increasingly evident in his polemics) in his assertion that we are "not at all" free to choose this or that social form.

> What is society, whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal activities. Are men free to choose this or that social form? Not at all. Presuppose a particular state of development of men's faculties, and you will have a corresponding form of commerce and consumption. Presuppose a certain stage of development of production, commerce and consumption, and you will have a corresponding form of social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, orders or classes, in a word, a civil society (Padover, 1978, p. 240).

Communication came to an end after the publication of Marx's highly critical book. The book, Marx wrote two decades later, "ended our friendship forever" (Padover, 1978, p. 241). Indeed, there is no sign of further rational dialogue between the "utopians" and Marx after the late 1840's.

Clearly linked to the utopians were the anarchists whose guiding light in the early years was Michael Bakunin. Marx had similar quarrels with him. He and Bakunin fought fiercely over "Marxist communist dictatorship" and "Bakuninist anarchism." In the end Bakunin wrote:

> In origin, Herr Marx is a Hebrew. He unites in himself, one may say, all the characteristics and shortcomings of this gifted tribe. Nervous, as they say, to the point of cowardice, he is extradordinarily ambitious and vain, quarrelsome, intolerant and absolutist like Jehovah, the Lord God of his ancestors, who is, like Marx himself, vengeful to the point of madness. There is no lie or calumny that he is not capable of inventing against anyone who has had the misfortune of arousing his jealousy or, which is the same thing, his hatred (Padover, 1978, p. 180).

Marx firmly denied such criticism, particularly accusations about absolutism and vanity.

> Neither of us [Marx and Engels] cares a straw for popularity. A proof of this, for example, that, because of aversion to any personality cult, I have never permitted the numerous expressions of appreciation from various countries with which I was pestered during the existence of the International to reach the realm of publicity, and have never answered them, except occasionally by a rebuke. When Engels and I first joined the secret Communist Society we made it a condition that everything tending to encourage superstitious belief in authority was to be removed from the statutes. (Later on Lassalle exerted his influence in the opposite direction.) (Marx, 1972, p. 521).

Nonetheless, substantial factions within the early Communist movement vehemently rejected Marx's disclaimer and found increasing fault with his "control" over the party. Clearly, the animosity of the vitriolic

exchanges helps explain why there was little further dialogue between the Marxist wing and the utopian and anarchist factions of the Communist movement. I contend that the context predisposed a clash between the several factions of a multifaceted ideal whose unifying essence became strained beyond its point of tolerance. It was a context in which the exigencies of a class struggle under way prior to Marx's time precluded dialogue between himself and those who insisted on a more immediate realization of the humanistic ideals of socialism.

The Proletariat

In contradistinction to the Utopians and Anarchists whom Marx found politically naive, he placed his faith in the immediate potential of the industrial proletariat. The proletariat was already engaged in an incipient struggle with the bourgeois owners of the productive means. It was already embroiled in a "class" conflict with its oppressor that seemingly had some reasonable chance of success. He committed himself to that chance. And, since the proletariat was in the midst of a struggle with a wily and potent opposition, he reasoned that dialogue and deliberation between conflicting factions would compromise the singleness of purpose he deemed essential to the success of that immediate struggle. Rather than deal with the Utopians and Anarchists, the proletariat must in effect merge with society as its general representative and by some means sustain enthusiastic confidence and support.

> No class in civil society can take this role without arousing an impulse of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses, an impulse in which it fraternizes and merges with society at large, identifies itself with it, and is experienced and recognized as its general representative--an impulse to which its claims and rights are truly the rights and claims of society itself and in

> which it is actually the social head and the social heart. Only in the name of the general rights of society can a particular class claim supremacy. Revolutionary energy and intellectual self-confidence are not by themselves sufficient to seize this emancipatory position and hence the political control of all spheres of society in the interest of its own (Marx, 1967, p. 260-261).

Thus, the tension between universal and particular reached its terminus in the victory of the proletariat. As the representative of all spheres of society this "class to end classes" would seize power. It was a proletariat without natural boundaries that would carry the universalistic essence of Gemeinwesen.

> In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family-relations; modern industral labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. . . .
>
> The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: (1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. (2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. . . .
>
> The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself <u>the</u> nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.
>
> National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.
>
> The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. . . . (Marx, 1972, p. 482, 483, 484, 488).

At this point the proletariat was defined as a class in conflict with the bourgeois. But Marx insisted that it must destroy the phenomenon that subjugated it--private property. Hence, it must ultimately

negate itself as well.

> Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain its own existence and at the same time that of its antithesis, the proletariat. It is the positive side of the contradiction--private property sufficient in itself.
>
> The proletariat as proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled to abolish itself and at the same time its conditional antithesis, private property, which makes it the proletariat. It is the negative side of the contradiction, its internal restlessness--private property dissolved and dissolving (Marx, 1967, p. 367).

Within Marx's model the proletariat must negate itself as a class. That is, he implied that it must first negate itself in a fundamental political economic sense. However, his projection was not explicitly inclusive of a simultaneous total cultural change involving social, psychological, and other factors involving all aspects of collective existence. Aufheben, or critical transformation, which he had earlier insisted was a unified dialectic process, now must apparently be dererred until after the abolition of bourgeois economy and power. Hegel's universalistic ideal of evolution could be accomplished, but not in a context of class antagonism. The master-slave relationship of labor to the owners of the means of production must end,resulting in the withering away of labor itself. "It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions" (Marx, in Avineri, 1975, p. 237). We are left with the dilemma of a total human collective transcendence that must be delayed to a period subsequent to a political-economic transcendence. Who then is to accomplish it and how may it be accomplished if oppressive conditions preclude dialectic transcendence inclusive of the totality of those to be affected? What is to dissuade the proletarian with

power, whose roots and identity are still linked to bourgeois society, from returning to that more familiar and comfortable way of life?

Given the prior existence of what he deemed a potentially fruitful class struggle, not to mention his reading of the prevailing mentality, he adopted the objective of the immediate conflict--accumulation of sufficient political-economic consciousness and power to overthrow the capitalists. This intermediate function congealed under the rubric of crude communism. The attainment of power became the primary objective. ". . . The first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy" (Marx, 1972, p. 490). Its goal was

> . . . the reabsorption of the State power by society as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses of themselves, forming their own force instead of the organised force of their suppression--the political form of their emancipation, instead of the artificial force (appropriated by their oppressors) . . . of society wielded for their oppression by their enemies (Marx, in Avineri, 1975, p. 209).

It was clearly intended as a gradual transformation and was even developed in a relatively more programmatic format.

> The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degress, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.
>
> Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.
>
> These measures will of course be different in different

countries.

Nevertheless in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c., &c. (Marx, 1972, p. 490).

While the transitional objective following seizure of power was outlined, he did not demonstrate how the revolutionary proletarians would themselves be guided in their surrogate function to make selfless (communal) decisions for the people during the necessarily protracted period of transition. The first phase involved the realization of a stabilized political-economic base and a seizure of power and prerogatives of those who controlled the vast industrial might of society. Clearly the subsequent stages were to be dependent on the way being cleared by a destruction of bourgeois power. As a result of the proximity of deprivation and oppression during the fledgling stage--the first form--of crude communism, "immediate physical possession would become the obsession of life and existence."

> Finally, communism is the positive expression of annulled private property--at first as universal private property. By

embracing this relation as a whole, communism is:

> . . . In its first form only a generalization and consumation of this relationship. As such it appears in a twofold form; on the one hand, the dominion of material property bulks so large that it wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as private property. It wants to do away by force with talent, etc. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical possession. The task of the laborer is not done away with, but extended to all men. The relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things.
>
> Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the animal form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women, in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism. Just as woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man's objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community. In negating the personality of man in every sphere, this type of communism is really nothing but the logical expression of private property, which is its negation. General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed reestablishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way. The thought of every piece of private property--inherent in each piece as such--is at least turned against all wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. The crude communism is only the culmination of this envy and of this leveling down proceeding from the preconceived minimum (Marx, 1964b, p. 132-133).

At this point he alluded to the non-political-economic element of the larger humanism which emancipatory transcendence must ultimately realize, but which was not to be within the material, conceptual, or emotional grasp of the crude communist.

> How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it.
>
> The community is only a community of labor, and of equality of wages paid out by communal capital--the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised

> to an imagined universality--labor as a state in which every person is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and power of the community (Marx, 1964b, p. 133-134).

Realization of our "communal being" must apparently occur subsequent to* the formation of the "community as universal capitalist."

The nineteenth century was a period which knew the oppression of child labor, twelve to sixteen hour work days, dangerous and demeaning working conditions, and a generally miserable lot for the proletariat. Hence, the consciousness of the proletariat, presumably, must of necessity be focused on realization of an immediate amelioration of material want and the realization of personal security.

> What we have to deal with here is a communist society . . . which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society--after the deductions have been made--exactly what he gives to it . . . The same amount of labour which he has given to society in one form he receives back in another.
>
> Here obviously the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his labour, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption . . .
>
> Hence, equal rights here is still in principle--bourgeois right, although principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads. . .
>
> In spite of this advance, this equal right is still constantly stigmatised by a bourgeois limitation. The right of the producers is proportional to the labour they supply; the equality consists in the fact that the measurement is made with an equal standard, labour.
>
> But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer time; and labour, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity; otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it

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*As a consequence of the differential emphasis in Marx's more propagandistic rhetoric, there is some doubt as to whether he actually believed that "crude communism" was indeed a necessary moment.

> tacitly recognises unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Right by its very nature can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard in so far as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only, for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else is being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth . . .
>
> But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society (Marx, 1972, p. 530-531).

Significantly, Marx did not make clear how the proletariat (or their leaders), who must seize and apply the political economic power that accrued, were to be purified of the "inevitable" individualistic "defects" of the first phase. To do so would likely have been to compound the turmoil of the class struggle in process. But the foregoing passage made clear that the deference to purposive-rational goals was by no means a conceptual deference. Communal-interactional objectives were to follow on the realization of an intermediate historical phase. Hence, I believe that he wound up with a dilemma similar to Hegel's. It was a similarity that he never acknowledged wherein each depended upon a monarch or a proletariat to establish a context conducive to transcendence. It was perhaps the best each could do, given his context. And although one might be inclined to cast ones lot with Marx's challenge over Hegel's compromise, he left some unresolved problems. For the risks attendant on negation of an old form are all too likely to impinge on the members of an organization, themselves bereft of the traditional support structures. That is, the negation of exploitative political-economic structures does not guarantee immunity from the total cultural expressions of these structures, which existed not only

in the exploiters but the exploited as well.*

There was thus a risky hiatus between an organization of emancipation abstracted from the collective totality (political-economic emancipation) and the organization of total human transcendence. That hiatus, as I shall further document, was deemed necessary by Marx due to the exigencies of revolutionary praxis in his era.

Toward a Transcendental Support System: Beyond Class Conflict

Marx's thought never coalesced around any systematic criteria by which the collective essence (Gemienwesen) might be effectively linked to the revolutionary organization of emancipation. The process of transition from the "first phase" of the class struggle to a classless society was most often simply promised by Marx as a scientifically verifiable outcome. However, a faint image appears if we combine and logically extend his rather sketchy projections about how society might overcome class differentiation with certain proposals including universal suffrage.

To begin with, control over the political economic regime of the organization of transition was to be held by the proletariat. But eventually, the very class distinctions that seemingly demanded centralization would be negated.

> In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class in civil society that is not of civil society, a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering and claiming no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it; a sphere that can invoke no traditional title but only a human title, which does not

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*It is likely that Marx would agree with this assessment but he believed that there was no evident alternative. His first priority was to feed the starving.

> partially oppose the consequences but totally opposes the premises of the (German) political system; a sphere, finally, that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society, thereby emancipating them; a sphere in short that is the complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity (Marx, 1967, p. 262-263).

In Hegel's model, we may recall, the monarch was charged with the function of unifying an otherwise inchoate, formless mass. His was a rather demeaning image of the people.

> The Many, as units--a congenial interpretation of 'people,' are of course sometimes neglected, but they are connected only as an aggregate, a formless mass whose commotion and activity could therefore only be elementary, irrational, barbarous and frightful (Hegel, 1952b, p. 198).

Marx, however, believed that given an emancipated consciousness, the democratic structure would provide the necessary social cohesion. There humanity became the subject not the predicate.

> Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth of democracy. Monarchy is necessarily democracy in contradiction with itself, whereas the monarchial moment is no contradiction within democracy. . . . In monarchy one part determines the character of the whole; the entire constitution must be modified according to the immutable head. Democracy is the generic constitution; monarchy is a species, and indeed a poor one. Democracy is content and form; monarchy should be only form, but it adulterates the content (Marx, 1970, p. 29).

The people would themselves form a united community without the symbolic unity of the constitutional monarchy. In the communal state,

> . . . Not every single person should share in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern, because the individuals share in deliberating and deciding on matters of concern as the 'all,' that is to say, within and as members of the society. Not all individually, but the individuals as all (Marx, 1970, p. 117).

The unity of the people must be realized in their consciousness of a shared collective essence. Universal suffrage together with democracy within the factory would ultimately tender political power to

the people and would replace the prevailing system characterized by substantial hierarchical structures. The Paris Commune presented a model.

> Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, . . . nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchical investiture (Marx, 1971a, p. 351).

That democratic structure would be coordinated nationally. He again referred to a model presented by the Paris Commune.

> The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centres of France. The communal regime once established in Paris and the secondary cities, the old centralised Government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers. In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts, the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely short term of service. The rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the mandat imperatif (formal instruction) of his constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally mis-stated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal Constitution and to become a reality . . . (Marx, 1971a, p. 350-351).

A second critical guideline to the construction of the communal ideal concerned the nature of work, the division of labor and leisure. Labor, where conditioned by a dehumanizing necessity, was incompatible with freedom. Marx built upon Hegel's insight that we constituted ourselves in the collective process of our labor. That is, we realized our social essence, our species-being, in work.

> It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a species being. This production is his active species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man's species life . . . (Marx, 1964b, p. 114).

Again the dialectic relationship between social existence and consciousness is identified.

> The act of reproduction [of physical existence of individuals] itself changes not only the objective conditions--e.g. transforming village into town, the wilderness into agricultural clearings, etc.--but the producers change with it, by transforming and developing themselves in production, forming new powers and new conceptions, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new speech (Marx, in Avineri, 1975, pp. 73-74).

Labor constituted the necessary basis of transcendental consciousness but labor as pure satisfaction of material necessity is not sufficient to the realization of a more humanistic existence.

> In fact, that realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy, of their human nature. But it nonetheless remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite (Marx, in Avineri, 1975, p. 236).

It is implicit in Marx's work that the division of labor then may be conceptualized in two oppositional models. The first, the bourgeois model, was oriented to profitable productive efficiency,

dehumanized and alienated labor. The second, the collective model afforded the opportunity to simultaneously expand individual consciousness and reproduce ourselves via both productive labor and leisure time. Of course, the abolition of surplus labor which resulted from a negation of capitalism, would contribute to the realization of this ideal by freeing individuals from the rigid efficiency of the profit incentive to realize the more humanistic objectives that a flexible and diverse work and leisure schedule might provide.

> Furthermore, the division of labor implies the conflict between the interest of the individual or the individual family and the communal interest of all individuals having contact with one another. The communal interest does not exist only in imagination, as something "general," but first of all in reality, as a mutual interdependence of those individuals among whom the labor is divided. And finally, the division of labor offers us the first example for the fact that man's own act becomes an alien power opposed to him and enslaving him instead of being controlled by him--as long as man remains in natural society, as long as a split exists between the particular and the common interest, and as long as the activity is not voluntarily but naturally divided. For as soon as labor is distributed, each person has a particular, exclusive area of activity which is imposed on him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and he must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood. In communist society, however, where nobody has an exclusive area of activity and each can train himself in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production, making it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of our own products into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, and nullifying our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development so far, . . . (Marx, 1967, p. 424-425).

It is at this juncture that humanity made its own species its object and self-consciousness had been materially realized. Previously labor had been external to the interest of the laborer.

> . . . labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being . . . in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himelf, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification. . . . the external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently of the individual--that is, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity--so is the worker's activity not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self (Marx, 1964b, p. 110-111).

With transcendental consciousness (communal organization) labor became a basis of self- and other realization and fulfillment. We came to recognize ourselves as the objects of our own creative labor. We participated in the ultimate creative act--our own self creation.

> Indeed, labor, life-activity, productive life itself, appears in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need--the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life engendering life. The whole character of a species--the species character--is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species character. Life itself appears only as a means to life.
>
> The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly emerges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activities. It is just because of this that he is a species being. Or rather, it is only because he is a species being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity (Marx, 1964b, p. 113).

Only in the supportive system of the collectivity could the fullest

potential of a Raphael be truly realized. This is because the artist's life would not be restricted to the particularity of an inhuman division. On the contrary, art would devolve from the universalistic perspective of the collective experience in which, as a consequence of our acknowledgments of interdependence, we simultaneously create and experience the rich diversity of a closely shared existence.

> With a communist organization of society . . . there disappears the subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from division of labour, and also the subordination of the artist to some definite art, thanks to which he is exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc., the very name of his activity adequately expressing the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters but, at most, people who engage in painting among other activities (Marx, in McLellan, 1973, p. 150).

Marx believed that by way of Communism he had overcome the dilemma that Hegel attempted to resolve by a separation of essence (within the authority and prestige of the state) from the narrowed self-interest of civil society.

> Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being--a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equal naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man--the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution (Marx, 1964b, p. 135).

For reasons already noted, Marx's major work, Capital, together with the bulk of his praxis, was focused more on the political-economic ramifications of the "abolition of private property" than on the equally, if not more, perplexing implications and ramifications of a

total communal interaction and the self-alienating concomitants. Yet, from the preceding pages it is clear that Marx never conceptually separated the two phenomena. Using the Feuerbachian transformative method, he proposed that humanity not only acknowledge its potential as subject in its self-creation, but acknowledge its communal essence by constituting a concrete social organization of emancipation dedicated to that end. Compared to his development of the communal ideal, his sketchy references to a supportive mechanism by which a hierarchically structured class struggle might be transformed into a conscious collective organization of emancipation stood in stark contrast. We are left with few structural components. There is only the hope, more bourgeois than communal, that individuals will resist power struggles while the state "withers away." Thus we find that:

> When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character . . .
>
> In the place of the old civil society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all (Marx, 1972, p. 490-491).

There were no embryonic structural mechanism, no linkages to systematically outlined criteria of a communal support structure within the International. There were no transformative vehicles that offered a realistic extension of Gemeinwesen beyond the hierarchical structure of the crude materialism which pervaded the "first phase" of the fledgling class struggle.

Marxism, in the absence of a support system that provided an amenable context for the realization of an emancipatory consciousness

for all citizens, has too often remained enmired in the political-economic struggles of "crude communism."* Those struggles have too often encased the tender and sensitive qualities of Gemeinwesen in a shroud of fear and struggle for power. While we have seen that Marx was himself not unaware of the need to extend the struggle to include the communal ideal, the self-appointed vanguards, the military cadres, have found it difficult to accomodate this transition. Marx himself, while having realized a highly cogent, if sometimes sneering attack of Hegel, never acknowledged the salient, though insufficient rationale behind his mentor's insistence on evolutionary transcendence of the prevailing support system. He convinces us that passive "evolutionary transcendence" must be replaced by an organization of emancipation charged with responsibility for the realization of community but his own political praxis provides few clues about how the organization may be protected not only from its external enemies but from itself. In effect, the gap between political citizen and communal being is re-instated in another, though higher, form.

The guidelines presented in the previous pages outlined a humane vision of collective life.

> Only in community do the means exist for every individual to cultivate his talents in all directions. Only in community is personal freedom possible. In previous substitutes for the community, in the state, etc., personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the ruling class and only insofar as they belong to this class. The illusory community, in which independent individuals have come together up till now, always took on an independent existence in relation to them and was at the same time not only a completely illusory community but also a new fetter because it was the combination

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*Of course, much of this has been due to both cultural and military power of capitalism.

> of one class against another. In a real community individuals obtained their freedom in and through their association (Marx, 1967, p. 457, my italics).

It is an ecstatic dream, but the misty image becomes too quickly distilled in the chilling terror we experience when beckoned to relax our tense grip on the concrete edifice of our current being. There is a dim sense that the concrete structure of the present is tenuous or illusory. But the old possessive patterns and competitive struggles provide us with immediate security, however tenuous. Even for those who share Marx's dreams, it is ever so easy for the tremors of our fears to reduce us to the false security of our illusions. In the light of so transparent a need for a support structure, it is a paradox* that those emancipatory organizations which have been inspired by the communist dream have seldom been structured as themselves communal in praxis. To more fully understand this paradox, we may go back to Marx's origins both intellectually and in the larger social context.

The Hegelian Critique of Marx: The Pitfalls of Concrete Negation Without Communal Praxis

While it should be acknowledged that Marx ingeniously and properly applied the transformative method to Hegel's more conservative analytical application of critical reason--while he drove the Owl of

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*Note: This is not to be interpreted as a paradox in theory. Rather it is a seeming paradox imposed by the realities of power. Since World War II, most, if not all, attempts to establish socialistic, worker-oriented or worker-controlled structures have been physically and economically attacked by powerful capitalist forces. One might cite Chile (1973), Vietnam (1945-1974), Iran (1953), Greece (1944-1949), Italy (1944-1950), France (1944-1945), etc. Thus the paradox is in large part the consequence of bourgeois power to thwart collectivization. This, in turn, had repeatedly called for a comparable countervailing force whose power has tempted abuse.

Minerva into the light of day, and with that flight, realized a concretization of a previously mystified criterion of self-consciousness--his call for revolution based on the concept of community has been repeatedly reduced to the benevolent despotism of elite vanguards. I think that his critics, including Mannheim and particularly Horkheimer and Habermas, were correct in asserting that Marx did not systematically project means by which those to be affected by the intended emancipation might both come to an awareness of the need for action and consumate a sufficiently realistic plan to warrant taking the risk. But I think his problem was not primarily conceptual. Indeed, guidelines were implicit, especially in his early writings. Marx simply never found the opportunity to strategically incorporate mechanisms for the collective realization of change. Therefore, I intend to construct, in skeletal form, a model based on a synthesis of Marx's guidelines deduced from his early writings, with pertinent insights selected from Hegel's concept of negation.* This then will be applied to the work of contemporary critics.

My position generally agrees with the Marxian critique outlined earlier, that Hegel erred, or was at least ambiguous about whether there was a necessary existential antagonism between humankind as individual interest, and the other aspects of our social essence, but that he properly insisted on an omnipresent tension in human interaction. I hold that Marx properly called for an attack on alienation

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*In this endeavor, I am greatly indebted to the scholarship of J. Hyppolite, A. Kojeve, and H. G. Gadamer. Particularly Kojeve and Hyppolite have contended that there is a vast and fruitful range within the Hegelian concept of negation upon which Marx's thought touched only lightly, preoccupied as it was with political economy.

linked to the political economy of capitalism, alienated labor, and the competitive element of historical self-interest. I will further support Marx in his insistence that this attack be carried by an organization of emancipation. However, I will contend on the basis of a critical application of Hyppolite's analysis that Marx missed a Hegelian insight in his assertion that Hegel opposed any interpretation of the circumstances of negation as a historical as well as ontological phenomenon.

> The act of supersession plays a strange part in which denial and preservation, denial and affirmation, are linked together. Thus, for example, in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, private right superseded equals morality, morality superseded equals the family, the family superseded equals civil society, civil society superseded equals the state, and the state superseded equals world history. But in actuality private rights, morality, the family, civil society, the state, etc. remain; only they have become "moments," modes of existence of man, which have no validity in isolation but which mutually dissolve and engender one another. They are "moments" of the movement (Marx, 1964a, p. 211)).

Marx believed that despite an acknowledgment of the deleterious effects of bourgeois economics, Hegel could not apprehend the historical, transient qualities of bourgeois existence and link those often deleterious effects to a context of private property, primogeniture, and authoritarian rule.

The Hegelian position was not so simplistic. As we saw in Chapter III, he did indeed recognize the limitations of bourgeois society but he did not believe that the political-economic situation in the Germany of his era lent itself to a direct frontal challenge. He clearly envisioned an ultimate triumph of the world spirit--the realization of our humane potential. While he did not project an alternative emancipatory organization, neither did he proclaim the

ontological character of extant institutions (including the monarch). His primary concern, following the French Revolution, seemed to have been the preservation of a context conducive to the gradual evolution of a transcendental consciousness of freedom. Hence, he implicitly insisted on a supportive structure that allowed a rational deliberation and transcendence. Hegel raised the question of freedom and Marx properly took him to task for going no further.*

> But in order to rise it is not enough to do so in thought and leave hanging over one's actual, sensuous head the actual, sensuous yoke which is not refined away by ideas. Nevertheless absolute criticism has at least learned from Hegel's Phenomenology the art of transforming real, objective chains existing outside me into merely ideal, merely subjective chains existing in me and hence the art of transforming all external, sensuous struggles into mere struggles of thought (Marx, 1967, p. 379).

Yet Hegel still holds a valid point against Marx that is recognized by Hyppolite.

> Hegel's philosophical answer is unlike the practical and historical response from Marx. Marx explains this calamity in terms of history. He denounces the process of production and believes that it is possible to show that objectification only becomes alienation as a result of certain historical circumstances that have a historical origin and are destined to disappear in history. Objectification, though not in itself a form of alienation, becomes such in fact. The description of capitalism--as Marx later presents it in Capital--is the monumental description of the total alienation of human labor necessitated at a certain moment of history in order to raise the total productive forces of man to the highest level (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 83).

Hyppolite correctly identifies Marx's practical commitment to a concrete effort to end alienation, but goes on to an interpretation that is itself characterized by a generous admixture of perceptive analysis

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*My use of the term "properly" here applies to Marx's time, not necessarily Hegel's. Hence it is not judgment about what Hegel should have done. Hegel lived under an even more oppressive regime than Marx where the exigencies of emancipatory praxis were perhaps too formidable to have gone much beyond theoretical critique.

and acute inaccuracy. Contrary to Hyppolite's claims, nowhere does Marx denounce the "process of production." Only alienating production is rejected. Nor, outside Marx's instrumental polemics against capitalism, can he be convincingly depicted as contending that objectification only becomes alienation under "certain historical circumstances." To be sure, alienation from the means of social production can occur and it may be attacked by (1) overcoming private property and (2) overcoming necessity itself. Marx is relentless and often single-minded in his assaults. However, he is not so naive in the development of his theory as to hold that "objectification only becomes alienation" as a result of certain eradicable "historical circumstances." To be sure, in his organizational praxis and his prolific development of a rationale against capitalism, he effectively abandoned the concept of tension that Hegel established as an accompaniment of all change. He did not and believed he could not at that time organizationally acknowledge that form of alienation associated with self-negation. The eternal confrontation of humankind with its own finite limitations required a receptive context. This was the transcendent alienation that was a constant companion to the creativity of our collective essence. But the time to fully objectify the potential inherent in that essence had not yet come.

I contend that the inability to provide organizationally for this aspect of Hegel's concept of negation has been a central nemesis of Marxists from Lenin to Habermas. I further hold that Hyppolite properly credited Hegel with underscoring this vital aspect of alienation.

> . . .[Hegel]cannot have confused the historical alienation of the human spirit with objectification without some valid reasons, other than those one might find in the economic structure of the period and the stage reached by the capitalist system. By objectifying himself in culture, the State, and human labor in general, man at the same time alienates himself, becomes other than himself, and discovers in this objectification an insurmountable degeneration which he must nevertheless try to overcome. This is a tension inseparable from existence, and it is Hegel's merit to have drawn attention to it and to have preserved it in the very center of human self-consciousness (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 86-87).

Marx saw all objectification as praxis--as activity. This is why he called capital "congealed labor." He set out, in theory, to replace a conceptual tension with activity--praxis. And praxis implied struggle, growth, change. This is the principle rationale of his inspired revolutionary activity. Yet his conceptual replacement of tension by a concept of praxis does not adequately deal organizationally with the inevitable tension identifiable with all change. The organization of emanicpation may actively function to eradicate coercion, but did he organizationally account for the need to provide love, emotional sustenance, and support in the realization of a new life style. Did he organizationally obsolete the old egoism with its defenses, its need to possess, its self-seeking? This is the positive function in emancipatory struggle that Marx so well recognized in theory, despite Hyppolite's failure to grant this to Marx. On the other hand, Hyppolite is correct that "scientific socialism," the ordered centralization of the struggle for power, provided no precedents to that end. It had narrowed its sights to the immediate transcendence of coercion. It skirted the risk that if the revolutionaries became preoccupied with the struggle to realize organizationally the immediate instrumental task, they might indefinitely postpone the

tension-embedded personal self-criticism associated with change. Marx, more than Hegel, was aware of the radical changes necessary to realize an emancipated consciousness free from bourgeois defenses.

Since Marx did not organizationally account for this tension, he accorded minimal attention to any possible psychologically or individually threatening aspects of negation and transcendence. To be sure, he provided us with a vision of the future. The future consciousness could only be realized, he told us, if the obstacles in bourgeois society were removed. He had elsewhere repeatedly reminded us that a dialectic process of objectification and transcendence must presumably occur simultaneously within each individual involvement. It is no "abstractly universal power opposed to the single individual; it is the nature and being of every single individual." However, since the context of individual involvement was not ripe, he had not presumed to speculate further.

As we have seen, Marx paid limited attention to the realization of an internal support system--but he occasionally expressed awareness of the existence of a formidable barrier to the realization of an effective organization of emancipation. Of the internal barriers, he wrote in his early years:

> Even greater than the external obstacles seem to be the inner ones. Even though there is no doubt about the "whence," there does prevail all the more confusion about the "whither." It is not only the fact that a general anarchy has broken out among the reformers; each one will have to admit to himself that he has no exact idea of what is to happen. But that is exactly the advantage of the new direction, namely, that we do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through criticism of the old. Until now the philosophers had the solution to all riddles in their desks, and the stupid outside world simply had to open its mouth so that the roasted pigeons of absolute science might fly into it. Philosophy has become secularized, and the most striking

> proof for this is the fact that the philosophical consciousness itself is drawn into the torment of struggle, not only outwardly but inwardly as well. Even though the construction of the future and its completion for all times is not our task, what we have to accomplish at this time is all the more clear: relentless criticism of all existing conditions, relentless in the sense that the criticism is not afraid of its findings and just as little afraid of the conflict with the powers that be (Marx, 1967, p. 212).

Marx was consistent with his life-long abhorrence of a priori, abstract philosophy in his warning about the dangers of a dogmatic preconception of what the world must be. He believed that the exigencies of his time forced him to begin not at the end of a utopian version but where the German people were or where the industrial proletariat were. For example:

> I am not for setting up a dogmatic standard. On the contrary, we must attempt to help the dogmatists make their dogmas clear to themselves. Especially communism thus is a dogmatic abstraction; I have in mind the actually existing communism, as Cabet, Dézamy, Weitling, etc., teach it, not some other imagined or possible one. This communism is itself only a separate phenomenon of the humanistic principle, infected by its opposite, private advantage. Dissolution of private property, therefore, is in no way identical with communism, and communism saw the origin of other socialistic doctrines like those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc., not accidently but necessarily in opposition to itself, because communism itself is only a special,one-sided realization of the socialistic principle.
>
> And the entire socialistic principle, in turn, is only one side of the reality of true human nature. We have to be concerned just as much with the other side, the theoretical life of man. Hence, we have to make religion, science, etc., the object of our criticism. Moreover, we wish to influence our contemporaries, our German contemporaries. The question is how to go about it. Two facts cannot be denied; religion and politics are matters now forming focal points of Germany's interest. No matter how these may be, we must begin with them . . . (Marx, 1967, p. 212-213).

Nowhere was his dilemma more clearly laid before the world. He must influence, particularly the "German contemporaries." He must begin where they were--clearly oriented to power and dogmatic certitude in

religion and science--yet move in the direction of the "true human nature"--Gemeinwesen. He would begin where they were and enter the political arena while acknowledging its limited potential.* Ideally he advocated a subordination of the state and its power to the "control of man." This appears in the quote that follows, but only implicit is the acknowledgment that to enter by the rules of the traditional game risks a corruption by the very power which is at stake.

> Reason has always existed, but not always in rational form. The critic, therefore, can start with any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and develop the true actuality out of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and goal. As far as actual life is concerned, the political state especially contains in all its modern forms the demands of reason, even where the political state is not yet conscious of socialistic demands. And the political state does not stop here. Everywhere it claims reason as realized. Equally, however, it everywhere gets into the contradiction between its ideal character and its real presuppositions.
>
> Social truth, therefore, can be developed everywhere out of this conflict of the political state with itself. Just as religion is the table of contents of the theoretical struggles of mankind, the political state is that of the practical ones. The political state, therefore, expresses all social struggles, needs, and truths within its form sub specie rei publicae. By no means, then, is the most specific political problem--such as the difference between the estate system and the representative system--to be the object of our critique on account of the hauteur des principes. For this question merely expresses in a political way the difference between the control of man and the control of private property. The critic not only can but must enter into these political problems, which crass socialists regard as below their dignity. By developing the advantage of the representative system over the estate system the critic gets a large party interested practically. By elevating the representative system from its political context to a general context and by claiming the true significance that is due to it, he at the same time forces this party to go beyond itself, for its victory is simultaneously its loss (Marx, 1967, p. 213-214).

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*This, of course, put him in a "dogmatic" position vis-a-vis certain of his revolutionary colleagues and this, as we shall see, is precisely the basis on which they reject his leadership.

Marx proceeded to tell us that nothing prevented us from beginning our critique on the level of politics; but reform, he reminded us, must occur in process, not out of abstract fancy.

> Nothing prevents us, therefore, from starting our criticism with criticism of politics, with taking sides in politics, hence with actual struggles, and identifying ourselves with them. Then we do not face the world in doctrinaire fashion with a new principle, declaring, "Here is truth, kneel here!" We develop new principles for the world out of the principles of the world. We do not tell the world, "Cease your struggles, they are stupid; we want to give you the true watchword of the struggle." We merely show the world why it actually struggles; and the awareness of this is something the world must acquire even if it does not want to (Marx, 1967, p. 214).

In a concluding paragraph, he declared the need for the realization of a reformed consciousness, but linked it to tradition, and implictly, its support structure. But for our knowledge of its source, we might readily attribute it to Hegel.

> The reform of consciousness exists merely in the fact that one makes the world aware of its consciousness, that one awakens the world out of its own dream, that one explains to the world its own acts. Our entire purpose consists in nothing else (as is also the case in Feuerbach's criticism of religion) but bringing the religious and political problems into the self-conscious human form.
>
> Our slogan, therefore, must be: Reform of consciousness, not through dogmas, but through analysis of the mystical consciousness that is unclear about itself, whether in religion or politics. It will be evident, then, that the world has long dreamed of something of which it only has to become conscious in order to possess it in actuality. It will be evident that there is not a big blank between the past and the future, but rather that it is a matter of realizing the thoughts of the past. It will be evident, finally, that mankind does not begin any new work but performs its old work consciously (Marx, 1967, p. 214-215).

Marx's vision here surely embraced the concept of a sustaining support system, and was cognizant of the traditional values and structures (of civil society and the state) which conditioned the realization of our collective nature. But the circumstance was rather as

Hegel described it; that is, bourgeois configurations of power and oppression prevailed and the consequences of that oppression hobbled public consciousness. For Marx, that seemingly demanded an initial revolutionary action that did not encompass the larger cultural "superstructure." Marx believed that the circumstances initially predetermined a transitional phase--a class struggle. For the structure of the classes is

> . . . already determined by the division of labor, classes which form in any such mass of people and of which one dominates all the others. It follows from this that all struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, the struggle for franchise, etc., etc., are nothing but the illusory forms in which the real struggles of different classes are carried out among one another (the German theoreticians do not have the faintest inkling of this fact, although they have had sufficient information in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher and The Holy Family). Furthermore, it follows that every class striving to gain control--even when such control means the transcendence of the entire old form of society and of control itself, as is the case with the proletariat--must first win political power in order to represent its interests in turn as the universal interest, something which the class is forced to do immediately (Marx, 1967, p. 425).

It was this context in which the early revolutionary action had to take root. This required a radical restructuring in order that communism might evolve in a context conducive to emancipation. The dominant political economic substructure must be eradicated.

> A revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way but also because the class overthrowing it can succeed only by revolution in getting rid of all the traditional muck and become capable of establishing society anew (Marx, 1967, p. 431).

But the revolution must itself employ power, and its leaders must also function in a context that merely anticipates transcendence--a context enshrouded in the institutional vestiges of the traditional dichotomy--the separation of essence from existence.

What is clear is that in order to realize wider participation of the citizenry in radical action, we must solve the problem of the linkage of an adequate support system to a concrete organization of emancipation. In effect, the linkage must be realized in a manner that overcomes the hiatus between theory and praxis. To date, we have been forced to content ourselves with programs whereby vanguards of emancipatory transcendence have bridged the gap of tension, loneliness and fear between our individual insecurity and our collective essence.

Hyppolite believes that Marx's failure to acknowledge the necessary element of tension in all creative human action contributes to the dilemma of Marxism.

> We can now see the presuppositions of Marxian thought in contrast with those of the Hegelian system. Marx conceives the possibility of an authentic existence of man, compatible with his social nature (unfortunately, he never exactly defines this social nature of man, and his ambiguity on this point has dire consequences for the future). Assuming such a possibility, it remains to understand why the true nature of man has not been realized existentially. Marx discovers historical causes for it in the struggle between social classes. But once this class struggle is resolved within the heart of bourgeois society, the contradiction between the social nature of man and his existential condition should be resolved; it should disappear <u>in reality</u> and not merely <u>in idea</u>, as in religion or the philosophical mediations of Hegel, which are simply intellectual acrobatics. The Hegelian dialectic still preserves the tension of conflict at the very core of the mediation, whereas Marx's real dialectic works for the complete suppression of that tension. It aims at achieving this <u>within reality itself</u> (Hyppolite, 1969, p. 116).

Hyppolite does not make his point that Marx conceptually missed this "reality." Indeed, the massive weight of Marx's great life work was a sophisticated analysis of the sustaining contradiction between our social nature and our existential condition. His problem was hardly a primarily conceptual one. He simply believed that for the International a provision for this kind of "tension" should not be made. Given the totality of his expressions, scholarly and political, a

more reasonable conclusion would be that such ambiguity would compromise his "influence," particularly over Germans who were less than inspired by equivocation. He simply did not believe that the time was ripe for the development of a concrete system that adequately reckoned with the self-alienating accompaniment of all significant creativity.

The polemics of Marx's revolutionary praxis emphasized those aspects of negation typically identifiable with capitalist economics. This required a refinement and specification of the broader Hegelian concept of alienation.

The outcome of that effort is analyzed by Bertell Ollman. Ollman identifies four broad categories within which alienating relationships may be ordered in the Marxian genre. First we must experience alienating relationships in our productive activity. This is indeed inevitable in a capitalist mode of production in which the division of labor results in an effective isolation of workers as individual entities whose self-identities are subordinated to the demands of profitable production. Also, work is herein torn from its objectifying function in human self-realization. Rather, "objectification" becomes the subjective pawn of the owners of the means of production. Hence we are led to a second category. Within the capitalist division of labor, we become alienated from the products of our own labor. These products do not appear as expressions of our human potential and creativity, but as objects which seem to exercise power and control over us. Thirdly, we are alienated in our interpersonal relationships. For as we compete for survival and identity, the delicate function of our mutual interdependence and necessity becomes blurred. Paradoxically, friends become enemies in the struggle to accumulate and

achieve. Fourthly, we become alienated in our species relationships because we are denied the full realization of our potential as Gemeinwesen (see Ollman, 1971).

Marx employed these categories in his early writings with no partiality. However, the next chapter points out that as his thought and organizational activity progressively confronted the exigencies of praxis, he became increasingly preoccupied with what Habermas terms the "purposive-rational" component of his scientific socialism. Particularly during the polemics within the International, the purposive-rational perspective on production became the primary focus. It was this aspect of alienation that was historically linked to capitalism and the class struggle and that in turn had worked people sixteen hours a day and kept them hungry. It was a form of alienation directly resulting from appropriation of the means of production and as such represented a denial of freedom through coercion and usurpation. Also, this coercive form exacerbated alienation in our interpersonal relationships and obscured the reality of our essential communal character. But since the state's coercive power was at issue, Marx believed that for the organization of emancipation the seizure of the state's power over the means of production took on a higher strategic priority than other alienating elements. In effect, he reasoned that "I may survive physically--to live another day--where possessive interpersonal relationships prevail or where my potential for the personal realization of my communal essence is stifled but I cannot survive in a situation where another possesses the food and shelter essential to my survival as such." There was a material basis of transcendence.

Marx's concept of alienation included the several modes

identified by Ollman, but he believed that the nature of the condition in which he found himself dictated a class struggle which, as a first phase, would assure the proletariat control over the means of production, preclude overt coercion and pave the way for a dialectically embedded "superstructural" change. But herein was the rub--a mindset had been established that oriented Marxian praxis, as represented by the International under Marx and Engels, to vehicles traditionally linked to the competitive capitalist state--the power to coerce and to overcome the coercion were, after all, dangerously related. These measures only minimally addressed the fact that control over, and emancipation of, the means of production did not necessarily result in an end to those possessive interpersonal relationships which were not merely indigenous to capitalism and capitalists but to those fear-driven and possessive aspects of ourselves. These also required negation--a capacity for self-criticism or self-negation.

Indeed, Marx himself argued that power over others, whether in the name of capitalist, peasant, or proletariat, precludes that full realization of our human potential. To overcome alienation in interpersonal relationship (and from ourselves) demanded a self-negating quality. But these ideals, he believed, were not and could not be fully realized in a revolutionary program whose first phase was satisfied by a seizure of the state's power by the oppressed.

This raised questions that perplexed his critics. If the remaining interpersonal categories of alienation persisted; if the leaders pushed the program beyond the capacity of the great bulk of the people to link their critical concepts with their feelings--their total feeling-thinking existence--revolutionary action was in danger

of betraying its own ideals by turning in on itself.

Beyond the purposive-rational aspects of production, this approach to change failed to systematically treat the inter- and intrapersonal concomitants of negation and transcendence. And in the absence of such treatment, the ideal risks self-destruction. Yet these are the aspects of alienation (Hegel) that must be associated with any changes. They are personally threatening aspects. They are concomitants of the tension experienced by all humankind in the throes of change. They are part of the abandonment of familiar forms--structures that have constituted the framework of our being--for a new and unknown quality. They are brought to us by the mere existence of others as differing from ourselves. They are the alternatives brought to us by our very being in a dynamic world in which we have choices. Of course, the consequences of any one such choice may range from ecstasy to the realization of our ultimate mortal fate--death.

Thus, alienation as a distorted form of self-consciousness may be analytically distinguished from alienation as a necessary, even desirable concomitant of emancipatory self-consciousness. On the one hand, alienation may then take a form consistent with any of the four Marxian categories identified by Ollman and result in a dead-end loss of human essence. That form would isolate our human potential from us and call forth a fetishism, driven by fear and ignorance, as a dehumanizing mystification of what would otherwise become concrete advances in our collective interest and reify a given historical form of oppression. On the other hand, alienation may, also consistent with Ollman's categories, appear as a necessary part of our nature--as inevitable to growth and transcendence. Within that context, we

find ourselves compelled if we are to survive and flourish in a dynamic world, to stand apart from ourselves, criticize our own self-consciousness and inevitably relinquish familiar and stabilizing support.

Now it is most important to note that the historical form lends itself to a vastly more effective transcendence in which we may employ a scientific-rational critique to an entity that threatens our psychophysical being essentially from without. It is a form which may be elicited under the harshest of tyrannies and the more overt and oppressive that structure might be, the more readily may the resistence to it be inspired. Here what is needed on the part of revolutionary advocates is a basis on which a rational critique of historically formed oppression may be revealed, together with a level of oppression deemed intolerable by those subjected to its yoke. Here our existence is threatened by a force outside ourselves and the alienation in question is one that threatens our survival as a distinct entity. Here our objective is to take the first step--to overcome external coercion and assert our freedom as a reaction against coercion. For Marx this requires political organizations that advance individual and group prerogatives.

But there is another form of freedom (and Marx knew it well) whose criteria are met not merely upon demonstration of an absence of coercion. It is a form that is built on the ready availability of human and social resources both as personal support structures and sources of alternative perspectives. This form demands not only that we negate threats outside ourselves but that we relinquish parts of ourselves in order that we may be rid of those deleterious aspects of a prior way of life on which we have become personally, perhaps

even morbidly, dependent. It demands not merely protection from others, but support during a period in which we negate a portion of ourselves. It may penetrate to the totality of our being and render us vulnerable to the very power complex we have assembled to protect our group from external coercion. This form of alienation is essential to our being, for it is not merely the capitalist who adopts the possessive and instrumental mechanisms of bourgeois society; it is its victims as well. That is, we must not only struggle against competitive possessiveness when it is employed to destroy our total being, but we must submit ourselves to a negation of that self-same aspect of our own being. This requires support in the reconstruction of every aspect of our lives where competition and possession may have infested our being. We must enlist support to struggle against ourselves and for the death of the pernicious aspects of our being. This requires a positive constructive action--community--and at this point the Hegelian support system raises a question about Marx's organization of emanicpation. It reminds us that Marx himself defined us not merely as creatures of work or as creatures of language but most of all as creatures of community.

Hegel, as we have seen, recognized both forms of alienation--the historical and the necessary. He would eliminate oppression but his plan was to achieve a gradual transition within an evolutionary process in which the slowly evolving cultural form might sustain its function as a support structure with, at most, insignificant disruption. That evolving culture would provide a stabilized and secure structure on which the great minds of the age might coordinate a reasoned change personally manageable by those most to be affected

by it. His attention was focused on both forms of alienation, the necessary and the dehumanizing, but he believed that the act of eradication of historically linked oppression could not be separated structurally from that form of alienation that accompanied all change without profound consequences. A support structure was demanded. That is, historically specific and eradicable alienation as a social condition must be overcome as a social action which is, even in its humane mission, an inescapably alienating act. To eliminate violence to our potential requires a support system to deal with that necessary form which itself becomes debilitating without a structure of support grounded in others that provides a multipronged capacity to meet those fundamental social and psychological prerequisites deemed important by participants.*

Clearly, alienation in this form may occur even within the kind of organization of emancipation conceived by Marx (the class struggle) or even upon confrontation with a mere idea of theory of emancipation. In any event, alienation that accompanies advocacy of change was seen by Hegel to be horrendous. Even granting what some consider a conservative elitist streak in Hegel, he made one point. It was that the advocate of change--any would-be liberator--must attempt to realize to the fullest extent a concomitant support structure that ameliorates those primordial fears that must surely accompany revolutionary change.

Implicit in the Hegelian position was an acknowledgment that when we enter into a process of change we are not a tabula rasa; we

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*It must be granted to Marx that in a tyrannical society this becomes a conservative argument. The position will be taken in the final chapter that only in the contemporary bourgeois democracy that permits (or cannot fully oppress) a counter-cultural organization does the critique apply. Surely it did not in Marx's time.

have human needs and dependencies on older, tried, and tested forms (even where these forms are themselves alienating); and that we must acknowledge ourselves as we are, as total feeling, experiencing, reasoning creatures. In short, we derive from a community of relationships, and the act of transition itself must retain that community.

Marx made a persuasive case against Hegel that interpersonal conflict had not been demonstrably established as an ontological onus on the human condition. The bourgeois perspective that reified and enshrined institutions that fulfilled the prophecy of this conflict could indeed be transcended. But did that action presuppose triumph over all alienating tension? This is where a critique of Marxism from a Hegelian perspective is pertinent. Marx was under no illusion. Tension was indeed necessary to our creative essence and must hold a primary focus in the ultimate organization of emancipatory praxis. Objectification and its concomitant alienation were inextricably linked. Negation and death were the fear-enshrouded elements in the unknown quality of creativity. What Marx missed, or planned to address in due time, was that given the formidable nature of that fear, together with the capacity of the bourgeoisie to obscure its concrete condition, it was not likely that even dedicated revolutionaries would undertake a voluntary transcendence as isolated vulnerable creatures. The risks of the concomitant negation (alienation) were too great, and there were no readily identifiable support structures. While Marx's conception always retained a vision of the ultimate triumph over this form of alienation, he never developed a systematic theory. That was precisely because he believed that theoretical formulation was inextricably bound to the concrete contradictions of one's times, not because his vision

could not accomodate such concepts.

If the time is ripe today, what guidelines do the theories of Hegel and Marx, together with those of their critics, suggest for a contemporary theory and praxis? Each of us is indeed lonely in the particular mortality of our being. It is a profound and debilitating loneliness. But it is not a loneliness bereft of hope. Indeed, the essence of the soul is not lonely for therein we are all part of one another's "immortality." We speak here of our communal nature, whose fundamental precepts are discernable in a logical extension and critical linkage of the ideas of Hegel and Marx. I will undertake such a "logical" extension in the following and concluding chapters after having further explored the existential basis of Marx's "failure" to deal systematically with the full implications (for the emancipatory organization) of the omnipresent forms of alienation.

Hyppolite, while guilty of a failure to grant Marx's conceptual identification of the integral character of tension in dialectics, does remind us that Hegel's work on negation and transcendence provides guidance in the development of a personal support structure within the organization of emancipation. Hegel reminded us that, after all, we are mortals who, like Prometheus, require the strength of our collective essence to overcome the inner chains--the profoundest terror of our self-inflicted negation. And Marx gave us the vehicle and the angry determination.

CHAPTER V

MARX AND BAKUNIN

Marx and the Hegelian Dilemma

As we have seen, the central criticism that Marx applied to Hegel's Philosophy of Right was of the separation of the social -- the interactional aspect of life -- from the ideal embodied in the monarch. This, in effect, separated the political realm from the other aspects of the social condition and legitimated a transfer of power from the priests to the bourgeois state and its constitutional monarch. Given Marx's humanistic predisposition, the immediate question was how the perogatives and commensurate duties could be transferred from the state to the people. What means might be employed that would result in reuniting our "existence as citizen" with our "communal existence" in order to realize a corresponding allocation of the monarch's power to the people?

Marx's proposed solution was to assign the first phase of that task to the proletariat and a seemingly inevitable class conflict. We have seen that that conflict was already in an incipient form during the years of Marx's schooling. The turmoil of the thirties and forties established a frame of reference whose momentum might be exploited to pave the way for a subsequent realization of Gemeinwesen.

The immediate problem confronting the revolutionaries, in Marx's view, was to establish an organization whose tactics attained a rigor and discipline sufficient to counter the ruthless and oppressive action of the prevailing bourgeois state. However, the honing of a winning edge often stood in conflict with the demands of a free dialectic exchange and tolerance for scholarly dissonance. The disciplined tactics of a revolutionary organization came into conflict with the need to entertain alternative views and deliberate at length about the appropriation of tactics. Here the emphasis on centralization of leadership prevalent in Germany, embodied in the von Savigny interpretation of Hegel, was forced to the fore. This essentially political resolution envisioned, according to Marx's reading of the nature of the times, a disciplined revolutionary organization and took precedence over the French egalitarian socialist dialectics advanced by Gans and the Young Hegelians. This, ironically, forced Marx to approach the sort of separation he condemned in Hegel. Not only did it place him in conflict with the fundament of his conceptual structure, but since rigor and tight organizational efficiency took precendence with Marx, it put him in immediate conflict with the libertarians, particularly the so-called utopians and anarchists within the International.

I would like to examine Marx's conflict with the anarchists and utopian socialists to shed more light on his exclusion of dialectic interaction and criticism from the organization of emancipation. (Bakunin's expulsion is a case in point. Bakunin was probably the most successful of Marx's opposition within the International and

the loss of his following was a severe blow to the Marxist faction.) To grasp the crux of the conflict I will examine Marx's concept of class struggle as essentially the exclusive task of the industrial proletariat. I will then explore briefly the role of leadership, power, and authority as manifested in his writings and in his leadership of the first universal worker organization, the International. An examination of the great debates and maneuvering for control of the international Communist movement is intended to place the issues in context and to clarify the seemingly capricious fortunes of the struggle to secularize reason--to realize an egalitarian bonding of theory and praxis.

If we may return to the Marxian critique of Hegel, it is clear that certain of Marx's critics in the International were in substantial agreement with his humanism. Bakunin was a thorough-going devotee of the secularization of reason and the grounding of humanity's social essence.

> Man [he wrote] completely realizes his individual freedom as well as his personality only through the individuals who surround him, and thanks only to the labor, and the collective power of society. Without society he would surely remain the most stupid and the most miserable among all the other ferocious beasts. . . . Society, far from decreasing his freedom, on the contrary creates the individual freedom of all human beings. Society is the root, the tree, and liberty is its fruit. Hence, in every epoch, man must seek his freedom not at the beginning but at the end of history. It can be said that the real and complete emancipation of every individual is the true, the great, the supreme aim of history. . . .
>
> The materialistic, realistic, and collectivist conception of freedom, as opposed to the idealistic, is this: Man becomes conscious of himself and his humanity only in society and only by the collective action of the whole society. He frees himself from the yoke of external nature only by collective and social labor which alone can transform the earth into an abode favorable to the development of humanity.

> Without such material emancipation the intellectual and moral emancipation of the individual is impossible (Bakunin, 1972, p. 236-237).

He then proceeded to stress the importance not only of a struggle against oppression but also of a transformation which required a social context conducive to its realization.

> . . . [one] can emancipate himself from the yoke of his own nature, i.e., subordinate his instincts and the movements of his body to the conscious direction of his mind, the development of which is fostered only by education and training. But education and training are preemmintly and exclusively social . . . hence the isolated individual cannot possibly become conscious of his freedom.
>
> To be free . . . means to be acknowledged and treated as such by all his fellowmen. The liberty of every individual is only the reflection of his own humanity, or his human right through the conscience of all free men, his brothers and his equals.
>
> I can feel free only in the presence of and in relationship with other men. In the presence of an inferior species of animal, I am neither free nor a man, because this animal is incapable of conceiving and consequently recognizing my humanity. I am not myself free or human until or unless I recognize the freedom and humanity of all my fellowmen (Bakunin, 1972, p. 237).

The theme was similar to that adopted by Marx in a citation from Rousseau:

> He who dares to undertake the making of a people's institutions ought to feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human nature, of transforming each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his life and being; of altering man's constitution for the purpose of strengthening it; and of substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence nature has conferred on us all. He must, in a word, take away from man his own resources and give him instead new ones alien to him, and incapable of being made-use of without the help of other men (Rousseau, 1952, p. 400).

The capacity to change human nature is repeatedly cast by Marx as a "species-activity." This, as we have seen, was a recurring theme of his early writings. But in the revolutionary years, circumstances

demanded that if he was to take advantage of the moment he must find a strategic basis by which the immediate unrest might be tranformed into an impetus to the ultimate realization of our collective essence. If the International was to coordinate the struggle against a sophisticated adversary, authority was seemingly demanded.

Minimal attention was given to the risk of retaining a model of power as a vehicle of transition that retained a potential for abuse similar to that of the traditional bourgeois state. When no longer needed, the traditional bourgeois forms would wither away.

Engels, writing in direct refutation of Bakunin, wrote in 1872:

> While the great mass of the Social-Democratic workers hold our view that the state power is nothing more than the organisation with which the ruling classes--landlords and capitalists--have provided themselves in order to protect their social privileges, Bakunin maintains that it is the state which has created capital, that the capitalist has his capital only by the grace of the state. As therefore, the state is the chief evil, it is above all the state which must be done away with and then capitalism will go to blazes of itself. We, on the contrary, say: Do away with capital, the concentration of all means of production in the hands of the few, and the state will fall of itself (Engels, 1972, p. 728).

He went on to specify his meaning

> The difference is an essential one: Without a previous social revolution the abolition of the state is nonsense; the abolition of capital is precisely the social revolution and involves a change in the whole mode of production (Engels, 1972, p. 728-729).

There is a subtle and, given the context, understandable interjection of faith. The social revolution of which Marx and Engels spoke must take place prior to the political revolution and presumably within the oppressive state. But to accomplish this, either the great bulk of the population would have to be emancipated, or a

smaller, educated, and emancipated minority would have to assume responsibility for the enlightened guidance of revolutionary action. Clearly the International was seen by Marx and Engels as the body in which those already emancipated and enlightened might advance that cause.

Bakunin had no such faith in the International and repeatedly questioned the wisdom of a concentration of power in the organization. The International itself must, if it is not to fall prey to its own bureaucratic structures, be formed within the context of a realistic transition--with full participation of the people it serves.

This, to the Marxist faction, would have encumbered a politically oriented organization embroiled in the effort to weld together a tactically formidable attack force. Marx and Engels disparaged the plan.

> Now, as the International, according to Bakunin, was not formed for political struggle but in order that it may at once replace the old state organisation as soon as social liquidation takes place, it follows that it must come as near as possible to the Bakuninist ideal of the society of the future. In this society there will above all be no authority, for authority = state = an absolute evil (Engels, 1972, p. 729).

But Engels, perhaps due to lack of dialogue with Bakunin, misinterpreted Bakunin and failed to anticipate the worker participation of recent decades. He continued:

> (. . . how these people propose to run a factory, operate a railway or steer a ship without having in the last resort one deciding will, without single management, they of course do not tell us.) The authority of the majority over the minority also ceases. Every individual and every community is autonomous; but as to how a society, even of only two people, is possible unless each gives up some of his autonomy, Bakunin again maintains silence (Engels, 1972, p. 729).

The assertion that in Bakunin's model the "authority of the majority over the minority ceases" is simply not accurate. Bakunin accepted majority rule within a federation of "Communes" but believed that power should be generated from local concensus-based participation units and not from a central authority with power to enforce rather than dialectically construct concensus.

I will return to this; suffice for now that whatever potential existed in Bakunin's position was lost to Marx in a polemic linked to immediate survival. On the other hand, the telling critique of the Marxian wing--that of utopian impracticality--was lost to the Bakuninists in like manner.

> Now then, inasmuch as to Bakunin the state is the main evil, nothing must be done which can maintain the existence of the state, that is, of any state whether it be a republic, a monarchy or anything else. Hence complete abstention from all politics. To commit a political act, and especially to take part in an election, would be a betrayal of principle. The thing to do is to carry on propaganda, heap abuse upon the state; organise, and when ALL the workers are won over, that is, the majority, depose all the authorities, abolish the state and replace it by the organisation of the International. This great act, with which the millennium begins, is called social liquidation.
>
> All this sounds extremely radical, and is so simple that it can be learnt by heart in five minutes; that is why this theory of Bakunin's has speedily found favour in Italy and Spain among young lawyers, doctors and other doctrinaires But the mass of the workers will never allow itself to be persuaded that the public affairs of their countries are not also their own affairs, they are by nature political and whoever tries to make out to them that they should leave politics alone will in the end be left alone. To preach to the workers that they should in all circumstances abstain from politics is to drive them into the arms of the priests or the bourgeois republicans (Engels, 1972, p. 729).

I believe that there might have been other forms of "social liquidation" had there followed upon these dogmatic polemics a dialogue and interaction consistent with the dialectic method espoused

by the contending factions. In any event, I intend to show that the conduct of the revolutionary vanguards was decidedly non-dialectic. Indeed it was combative, dogmatic, and characterized, particularly where the Marxists were concerned, by a positivist crutch, "scientific socialism," specifically conjured up as a weapon forged for the polemics. In this context a massive deference to the pursuit of political power as the instrumental function of a vanguard, undermines the ideals of a total participatory dialogue enriched by the multitude of perspectives represented by those to be affected.

Marx conceived an essentially political method as a temporary expediency whose power and authority was to be dispensed with in due course. This is indicated in a passage from Marx's lengthy polemic with Arnold Ruge.

> But without revolution, socialism cannot come about. It requires this political act, insofar as it needs overthrow and dissolution. But where its organizing activity begins, where its own aim and soul emerge, there socialism casts away the political hull (Marx, 1971, p. 22).

The issue raised by Bakunin et al. was whether a revolutionary means that was not itself a communal act would risk regression to a mode of power and possession which its leaders had not necessarily transcended themselves.

Only months before his death, Engels acknowledged that he and Marx had been "wrong" on some points.

> The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses, is past. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of the social organisation, the masses themselves must also be in it, must themselves already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for, body and soul. . . . the Socialists are realising more and more that no lasting victory is possible for them, unless they

> first win the great mass of the people, that is, in this case, the peasants. Slow propaganda work and parliamentary acitivty are recognised here, too, as the immediate tasks of the party (Engels, 1972, p. 570).

But this was 1895, more than a decade after Marx's death and precedents had been set that were not to be "revised" easily.

Marx had previously defined the class struggle and scientific socialism in a narrowed, historically specific frame of reference but soon even his close collaborators had squeezed the totality of socialism into the same bag. Socialism slowly became conflated with the historically constructed political forms of the class struggle. Thus, Engels wrote that from Marx's

> . . . time forward socialism was no longer an accidental discovery of this or that ingenious brain, but the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes--the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. . . . From this point of view, the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in men's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch (Engels, 1972, p. 700-701).

The definition realizes a sufficiency from this perspective once one has divined the relationship of the class (proletariat) to the means of production. It risks cannonization of a proletariat detached from other "classes" (i.e., peasants) regardless of the current capacity of that body to consciously order and advance its own interest. While not equated, this hints of Hegel's glorification of the constitutional monarch. Even as Hegel had separated "our existence as a citizen" from our "communal existence," Marxism, in praxis, tended to a separation of the proletariat, in relationship to the means of production, from its full communal being.

Castoriadis wrote with a certain overkill that

> One sees here the profound duplicity of all the Marxists: that revolutionary class, to which the superhuman tasks are attributed, is at the same time profoundly irresponsible: one cannot impute to its action what happens to it, nor even what it does; it is innocent in the two senses of the term. The proletariat is the constitutional monarch of History. Responsibility belongs to its ministers; to the old leaderships which erred or betrayed--and to us, who once again, against all opposition, are going to construct new leadership . . . (Castoriadis, in Howard, 1977, pp. 272-273).

If indeed, this is the case, then in the absence of a sufficient capacity to effectively organize and execute that praxis, the leadership of the class will exercise its symbolic prerogative. Bakunin properly asked why the peasantry cannot also be represented symbolically. Marx's reply was neither wholly satisfactory nor consistent.

> It means that where the peasant exists on a mass scale as a private land proprietor, where he even forms a more or less considerable majority as in all the countries of the West European continent, where he has not disappeared and been replaced by agricultural laborers, as in England--the following will take place: either the peasant will start to create obstacles and bring about the fall of any worker revolution, as he has done heretofore in France, or else the proletariat (for the peasant proprietor does not belong to the proletariat; even when his situation places him in it he thinks that he doesn't belong to it) must, as the government, take steps as a result of which the situation of the peasant will directly improve and which will therefore bring him over to the side of the revolution; steps which embryonically facilitate the transition from private ownership of the land to collective ownership, so that the peasant will himself come to this by economic means . . . (Marx, 1972, p. 543).

Clearly, the forceful action must be undertaken by the representatives of the proletariat.

> . . . so long as other classes continue to exist, the capitalist class in particular, the proletariat fights it (for with the coming of the proletariat to power, its enemies will not yet have disappeared, the old organization of society will not yet have disappeared), it must use measures of force, hence governmental measures; if it itself still remains a class and the economic conditions on which the class struggle and the existence of classes have not yet disappeared, they

> must be forcibly removed or transformed, and the process of their transformation must be forcibly accelerated (Marx, 1972, pp. 542-543).

The problem here, however valid was Marx's analysis of the rejected peasants, is that this places a proletariat who by Marx's own definition is not ready to handle its own affairs in a non-dialectical dominance over others. Further, the qualities that justified this action are not to be found in the praxis but in the a priori class structure and clearly establish the existence of the proletariat as a class outside its own communal existence. An incipient elite vanguard is given reign.

The debate with Bakunin was characterized by a repeated appeal to adapt the revolutionary mode to the conditions that prevailed and this engendered a pronounced reluctance to acknowledge the risk of concentration of power in the industrial proletariat. This appears distinctly in Marx's conspectus on Bakunin's Statehood and Anarchy published in 1873.

To Bakunin's concern that the German industrial proletariat would subordinate other less "sophisticated"groups Marx fell back on the positivistic dogma of "scientific" socialism that came more often to the fore during polemics* that surrounded his efforts to weld the International as a disciplined unit.

> Schoolboy drivel! A radical social revolution is connected with certain historical conditions of economic development;the latter are its presupposition. Therefore it is possible only where the industrial proletariat, together with capitalist production, occupies at least a substantial place in the mass of the people (Marx, 1972, pp. 543-544).

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* A further example may be found in his letter to Bebel, Liebnecht, and Brocke. Here he chastises his opposition for their failure to pay proper deference to his "new science."

Many of the Marxian arguments have a point; certainly the economic variables of a time condition the form of revolutionary action and, as we shall see, Bakunin was occasionally negligent of this important reality. What appears in Marx, however, is a persistent failure, probably for public relation reasons, to acknowledge that he took risks in allocation of prerogatives of the struggle against bourgeois egoism and possessiveness to the party of the industrial proletariat.

> . . . Herr Bakunin . . . understands absolutely nothing about . . . social revolution; all he knows are its political phrases. For him its economic requisites do not exist. Since all hitherto existing economic formations, developed or undeveloped, have included the enslavement of the working person (whether in the form of the wage worker, the peasant, etc.), he thinks that a radical revolution is possible under all these formations. Not only that! He wants a European social revolution, resting on the economic foundation of capitalist production, to take place on the level of the Russian or Slavic agricultural and pastoral peoples and not to overstep that level; although he does see that navigation creates a difference between the brothers, but only navigation, for that is a difference all politicians know about! Will power and not economic conditions is the basis of his social revolution (Marx, 1972, p. 544).

It would appear, if Marx remained consistent with his own stance on dialectic transcendence, that it is in fact both will power and economic conditions. Indeed, it is precisely Marx's assumption of a sufficient communal "will power" and its implicit concomitants on the part of the industrial proletariat and its leadership, that Bakunin and others within the International questioned. Marx assured us that the "class struggle" would come to an end after power had been taken by the proletariat and Bakunin et al. later questioned whether the "will power" of the leadership could indeed accomplish a miraculous transition to a participating consensus about the future course of communal life. Marx argued that the "dictatorship" of the proletariat

> . . . means that the proletariat, instead of fighting against the economically privileged classes in each individual instance,

> has acquired sufficient power and organization to use the general means of coercion against them; however, it can use only such economic means as abolish its own character as wage worker, hence as a class; so its complete victory coincides with the end of its domination, for its class character comes to an end (Marx, 1972, p. 544).

Marx repeatedly made clear that the class struggle is a transitional political act, like Hegel's monarchy, but one whose leaders would voluntarily, and with omniscient "will power," relinquish its power to all people. All this is made contingent on a revolutionary seizure of power and a subsequent imposition of propitious conditions from the apex of acquired political power.

> Economic conditions first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have already noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle.
>
> An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes. The emancipation of the oppressed class thus implies necessarily the creation of a new society. For the oppressed class to be able to emancipate itself it is necessary that the productive powers already acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side by side. Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself. The organization of revolutionary elements as a class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which could be engendered in the bosom of the old society (Marx, 1972, p. 218).

Marx clearly did not envision a sustaining concentration of power in the party or a highly stratified continuation of the class struggle.

> Does this mean that after the fall of the old society there will be a new class domination culminating in a new political power? No.
>
> The condition for the emancipation of the working class is the abolition of every class, just as the condition for the liberation of the third estate, of the bourgeois order, was the abolition of all estates and all orders.
>
> The working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will

> exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society (Marx, 1972, p. 218-219).

Given the exigencies of a revolution in process he was not as liberal in declaring the hypotheses relevant to the criteria by which the "substitution" would occur, as he was in boldly declaring that it would mysteriously transpire on the will power of the party leadership.

Again science was called upon to justify the non-dialectic realization of the first revolutionary stage.

> Do not say that social movement excludes political movement. There is never a political movement which is not at the same time social.
>
> It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that "social evolutions" will cease to be "political revolutions." Till then, on the eve of every general reshuffling of society, the last word of social science will aways be:
>
> Combat or death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is inexorably put (Marx, 1972, p. 219).

As inspiring as the closing sentence (quoted from George Sand) may have been to the revolutionaries of the time, it is not difficult to see how such admonitions based on the "truth of science" have been adduced to the catechism of Marxian orthodoxy. Nor is it surprising that it contributed a powerful note in the chorus of Marx's contemporary socialist critics.

It becomes increasingly clear that during the period of the class struggle, dialectics as a full participatory act for all to be affected by the resultant consciousness, had been, at least to some degree, suspended. This dilemma is identified by Howard following Lefort.

> . . . the proletariat cannot operate through representatives. It is itself only when it struggles, not as represented in a separate political sphere. This means that if the Prince/Party is the truth and universal, then it cannot be criticised,and a truth which cannot relate to or account for its origins is nothing but ideology (Howard, 1977, p. 248).

Marx here approached the very dichotomy he condemned in Hegel in that the separation of the political-emancipatory function of the proletariat from its own cultural emancipation was again deemed a necessary expediency.

The Exigencies of Praxis: Solidarity Versus the Dialectic

At the very end of his life, Engels spoke of the revolutionary years from the perspective of the turn of the century. Now the burdens of leadership of a revolution-in-process were gone. The restrictions imposed by the need for strategically discreet policy releases were past and his only concern was to provide a legacy for the effective advancement of the cause to which he had dedicated his life.

> When the February Revolution broke out, all of us, as far as our conceptions of the conditions and the course of revolutionary movements were concerned, were under the spell of previous historical experience, particularly that of France. It was, indeed, the latter which had dominated the whole of European history since 1789, and from which now once again the signal had gone forth for general revolutionary change. It was, therefore, natural and unavoidable that our conceptions of the nature and the course of the "social" revolution proclaimed in Paris in February 1848, of the revolution of the proletariat, should be strongly coloured by memories of the prototypes of 1789 and 1830 (Engels, 1972, p. 559).

I have already suggested that the dilemma engendered in this inherited revolutionary praxis was to force an artificial separation of philosophy from experience in a manner that in this instance weighted purposive-rational experience against the interactional criteria and precluded a full dialectic relationship. The dilemma

was that mechanisms could be conceived by which one might more effectively advance emancipatory praxis but reality seemingly presented only one politics and only one revolution. That is, it was the alienating quality of the revolutionary period that demanded a certain deception, not dialogue or a dialectic relationship between theory and praxis. The demands of political action dictated "solidarity" in order to achieve "world domination by the proletariat." The solidarity critical to the movement is highlighted in a speech by Marx given before a conference of the International after the fall of the Paris Commune:

> Citizens, let us think of the basic principle of the International: Solidarity. Only when we have established this life-giving principle on a sound basis among the numerous workers of all countries will we attain the great final goal which we have set ourselves. The revolution must be carried out with solidarity; this is the great lesson of the French Commune, which fell because none of the other centers--Berlin, Madrid, etc.--developed great revolutionary movements comparable to the mighty uprising of the Paris proletariat.
>
> So far as I am concerned, I will continue my work and constantly strive to strengthen among all workers this solidarity that is so fruitful for the future. No, I do not withdraw from the International, and all the rest of my life will be, as have been all my efforts of the past, dedicated to the triumph of the social ideas which--you may be assured!--will lead to the world domination by the proletariat (Marx, 1972, p. 524).

The Proletariat: A Selected Image of Solidarity

There were those who criticized Marx's leadership because it had failed to "cultivate good taste" and "learn good form" and who sought a closer relationship with the "circles of the educated and propertied classes" (Marx, 1972, p. 550). We have seen that Jenny Marx's letters indicate that the Marxs sometimes felt under seige from both right and left. Marx himself made frequent references to the need for solidarity. He feared that such criticism would lead to weakening and co-optation of the International's thrust and

sought to allay these risks by countering with a disciplined organization strong enough to resist such appeals.

I elsewhere detail Marx's ultimate commitment to the realization of a universal emancipated collectivity. I think that a further effort to clarify his conception of class and class struggle as a transitional instrument may shed light on his occasional wishful projection of the "proletariat" made larger than life, into the position of a guardian of the preliminary effort to realize a formidable collective consciousness. Marx believed that the demands imposed by revolutionary struggle together with the realities of daily life did not, at that time, permit the realization of a community whose consciousness was generated in mutually supportive interaction. A revolutionary context permitted no such luxury. Rather, he believed a disciplined organization was demanded and the industrial proletariat, unlike other factions among the oppressed, was already in the throes of uprising against the owners of the production means and well on the way to an incipient realization of class consciousness. For their part, Proudhon and his utopians, Bakunin and his "peasants," were too undisciplined in thought and erratic in behavior--too spirited to be yoked to the authority and discipline of a transitional struggle and too reluctant to wield the power, which had already become the object of the revolutionary struggle even before Marx entered the picture. Indeed, they eschewed such power and at times seemed naively oblivious to the power of the bourgeois state to thwart their dream of a spontaneous revolution. To Marx, the proletariat became the best and ultimately the only hope for the first phase of the struggle.

Much later, Horkheimer was to point up the risk in such an expediency.*

> The intellectual who only announces with open-mouthed awe the creativity of the proletariat, and finds his satisfaction in adapting to it while transfiguring it, does not see that any swerving of theoretical effort which he allows through the passivity of his own thought, as well as any avoiding of the temporary opposition to which his own thought could bring him, only makes these masses blinder and weaker than they need be (Horkheimer, in Howard, 1977, p. 105).

I have indicated that Marx's common cause with the proletariat was given a more or less inspired impetus while he was a fiery young journalist in Paris. It was there that he worked out his belief that the proletariat constituted the basis of transition to a classless society. By 1852, this position appeared in a letter to Joseph Weydemeyer:

> . . . the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, . . . that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, . . . that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society (Marx, 1972, p. 220).

Marx claimed in the same letter to have "proved" the above principle and in an effort to be persuasive among a constituency that he believed was noted for substantial authoritarianism, he pleaded his projection as a corollary of scientific socialism. Such tactics had their adverse consequences.

To begin with, these tactics had the immediate positivistic effect of removing the revolutionary process from the realm of social "objectification" and placing it in the realm of monothetic laws, well

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* Note: Horkheimer, however, failed to sufficiently distinguish between Marx's conception of the total revolution and the expediency to which circumstances forced him to submit.

beyond the powers of human interaction and transcendence. This is noted by Howard following Merleau-Ponty:

> Positivism in a sense--ironically--produces the same result as the absolute negation or the negative absolute of Hegel: i.e., the hidden sense of history, combat of the gods (Howard, 1977, p. 218).

To paraphrase Marx's own critique of Hegel--as (scientific) idealist, humanity is completely torn from its other differentiation and opposed actuality. It is small wonder that many of his contemporary socialists believed that Marx was a dogmatist for whom any further dialogue between the scholars of the proletariat and the people was deemed superfluous, for in effect, he had already proclaimed truth. What does follow on this is a precedent that commandeers the dialectic prerogative of those to be affected by the action. That precedent places dialectics, temporarily, to be sure, under the jurisdiction of the revolutionary organization.

The circumstance is identified and challenged rhetorically by Claude Lefort:

> Can thought ever postulate that there is an empirical place where history and society uncover themselves in their totality where all equivocation is dissipated, where the institutions, collective behaviors and symbols become transparent, where all the significations of the event are recuperated in the same truth? (Lefort, in Howard, 1977, p. 245).

Its consequences follow:

> If the proletariat is taken as the Truth which coincides with the Real, and if its project is defined outside its control, then the empirical proletariat and its activities no longer enter into the dialectic interaction. . . . The task of political theory is not to explain and express our attachment to a society and a history which determine us. On the contrary: what must be restored is the fundamental indetermination of our historical situation (Howard, 1977, p. 242-243).

Here Marx implies, albeit for political reasons, that he has found the incarnate truth--the proletariat--but the consequence is that he sets a precedent that, due to its inconsistency with the basic socialist principles, lays the groundwork for fragmenting dissent. The proletariat has not provided a vehicle by which the alienating tensions that accompany profound change may be coped with and conquered. The realization of that vehicle has merely been put on an indefinite hold. It may be argued that this is a conceptual error attributable to Marx's roots in Hegelian tradition--to the assumption of a kind of linear progression of truth. It may represent a pattern consonant with Hegel's faith in a potential that would bring ultimate triumph to human reason. But that faith is not so pernicious! The error, if error it be, was a largely tactical error, an expediency, that failed to fully acknowledge the limits of Marx's time and that rather rashly neglected the possible consequences of the precedents set.

In any event, Marx's failure to fully acknowledge the mythical element in his model of the proletariat as the subject-object of history seems comparable to Hegel's expediency. Each was caught up in a context hostile to his visionary projections, over which he had minimal control, and each became vulnerable to criticism because he adopted an intermediate structure* with which he made do, given the realities of alienated consciousness in his time.

This vulnerability was seized by Marx's opponents within the International Working Men's Movement. Bakunin was particularly

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* To be sure, Marx moved several stages forward from monarch to industrial proletariat.

concerned with the exclusion of the dissenting faction in the communist movement and with the consequent impairment of instructive dialogue. Indeed, he made an argument against reliance on the proletariat that Marx never satisfactorily countered. In addition, he misrepresented Marx's rationale, perhaps due to ignorance of its precise content, in an unforbearing manner that had now become familiar to both Marxist and the anti-Marxist forces in the International.

> We revolutionary anarchists who sincerely want full popular emancipation view with repugnance another expression in this program: it is the designation of the proletariat, the workers, as a class and not a mass. Do you know what this signifies? It is no more nor less than the aristocratic rule of the factory workers and of the cities over the millions who constitute the rural proletariat, who, in the anticipations of the German Social Democrats, will in effect become the subjects of their so-called People's State. "Class," "power," "state" are three inseparable terms, one of which presupposes the other two, and which boil down to this: the political subjection and economic exploitation of the masses.
>
> The Marxists think that just as in the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie dethroned the nobility in order to take its place and gradually absorb and then share with it the domination and exploitation of the workers in the cities as well as in the countryside, so the proletariat in the cities is exhorted to dethrone and absorb the bourgeoisie, and then jointly dominate and exploit the land workers . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 280).

While the intermediate function of the proletariat intended by Marx was not granted, Bakunin did express a criticism of Marx's exclusion of other factions of the movement. What is more, he tendered what proved in later years to be a prophetic critique of the industrial proletariat.

> Marx speaks disdainfully of this Lumpenproletariat . . . but in them, and only in them--and not in the bourgeois-minded strata of the working class--is crystallized the whole power and intelligence of the Social Revolution. In moments

> of crisis, the masses will not hesitate to burn down their own homes and neighborhoods . . . they develop a passion for destruction . . . of itself this negative passion is not nearly enough to attain the revolutionary heights. . . . But without it, revolution would be impossible. Revolution requires extensive and widespread destruction, a fecund and renovating destruction, since in this way, and only in this way, are new worlds born (Bakunin, 1972, p. 14).

To Bakunin, the proletariat had bought too many of the ideals of bourgeois society and were then subject to co-optation.

> To me the flower of the proletariat is not, as it is to the Marxists, the upper layer, the aristocracy of labor, those who are the most cultured, who earn more and live more comfortably than all the other workers.[*] Precisely this semibourgeois layer of workers would, if the Marxists had their way, constitute their <u>fourth governing class</u>. This could indeed happen if the great mass of the proletariat does not guard against it. By virtue of its relative well-being and semibourgeois position, this upper layer of workers is unfortunately only too deeply saturated with all the political and social prejudices and all the narrow aspirations and pretensions of the bourgeoisie. Of all the proletariat, this upper layer is the least social and the most individualist (Bakunin, 1972, p. 294).

It is an irony whose full implications are still to be drawn that this spirit was embraced by some of the more effective revolutionary figures of the twentieth century: Franz Fanon, Regis Debray, Huey Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, and Herbert Marcuse (in Bakunin, 1972, p. xvi-xix). Their appearance could not have been forseen by Marx. He had become part of a movement with powerful impulses already having been directed to the seizure of political power by the industrial proletariat.

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* Re: Samuel Gompers and the American labor movement.

The Industrial Proletariat and the Struggle for State Power

The Marxists believed that they faced a foe so formidable that they must establish a strategy whose tactics, deployed within the bourgeois state, would ultimately place the proletariat in a position to seize power. The utopians often eschewed power struggles and the anarchists, fearing co-optation and abuses if power were amassed by the Party, sought an immediate revolution with no intermediate class rule. It was particularly against the anarchists, whose proposals were deemed (perhaps with considerable validity) unworkable and adventurist, that the Marxist tactics for seizure of power devolved.

Engels cited a passage from Morgan that depicted the position taken by the Marxist faction.

> Since the advent of civilisation, the outgrowth of property has been so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and its management so intelligent in the interests of its owners that it has become, on the part of the people, an unmanageable power. The human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its own creation. The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property, and define the relations of the state to the property it protects, as well as the obligations and the limits of the rights of its owners. The interests of society are paramount to individual interest, and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relation (Morgan, in Engels, 1972, pp. 758-59).

Property, of course, meant control over the means of production and this was the basis for the classic critique by Marx himself:

> For the proletarians, on the other hand, the condition of their existence, labour, and with it all the conditions of existence governing modern society, have become something accidental, something over which they, as separate individuals, have no control, and over which no social organisation can give them control. The contradiction between the individuality of each separate proletarian and labour, the condition of life forced upon him, becomes evident to him himself, for he

> is sacrificed from youth upwards and, within his own class, has no chance of arriving at the conditions which would place him in the other class.
>
> Thus, while the refugee serfs only wished to be free to develop and assert those conditions of existence which were already there, and hence, in the end, only arrived at free labour, the proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, will have to abolish the very condition of their existence hitherto (which has, moreover, been that of all society up to the present), namely, labour. Thus they find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the State. In order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State (Marx, 1972, p. 199-200).

This placed the bourgeois state in direct opposition to any emancipatory effort. Engels described the consequences:

> As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labor and capital (Engels, 1972, p. 753).

The industrial proletariat, as it happened, was already engaged in a struggle against that power. To take advantage of that momentum it followed that the power must be seized by the proletariat and the state's prerogative be redirected in the interest of the working class. Marx described what must be done. The International as a political structure must have a single mission.

> The economic emancipation of the working class by the conquest of political power. The use of that political power to the attainment of social ends. . .The Association does not dictate the form of political movements; it only requires a pledge as to their end. It is a network of affiliated societies spreading all over the world of labor (Marx,in Padover, 1978, p. 445).

"By the end of the century," wrote Engels,

> we shall conquer the greater part of the middle strata of society, petty bourgeois and small peasants, and grow into the decisive power in the land, before which all other powers will have to bow, whether they like it or not (Engels, 1972, p. 571).

It is in this context that we must view Marx's seemingly dogmatic or even grandiose claims for economic science and scientific socialism. It was a part of the scientific technological age. Positivism was on the rise and Marx, who admired Darwin and had frequent social contact with the scientific community, was no doubt affected. But I think his projection for the ultimate course of socialism, scarce as the guidelines may be, could by no means be lumped under the rubric positivist. His conception of the laws of social science was clearly of an ideographic, not a nomothetic science. Thus Engels spoke of those laws as

> The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social organisation, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself (Engels, 1972, p. 715).

The welding of a revolutionary catechism could hardly admit in Marx's judgement of equivocation that might be perceived as weakness. It was, after all, a struggle for power, not yet for Gemeinwesen As a consequence, his communication to the proletariat was so constituted as to elicit both self-confidence of the proletariat and confidence in the strength of a wise and firm leadership. In this attitude, he often abandoned the rational issues and resorted to insistence that his followers defer to his scientific authority.

> Instead of thoroughly studying the new science themselves to begin with, each of them preferred to trim it to fit the point of view he already had brought along, made himself forthwith a private science of his own and at once came forward with the pretension of wanting to teach it (Marx, 1972, p. 554).

This is exemplary of Marx's polemics. But a careful reading of Marx belies charges of context-oblivious dogma of positivism. Rather it was a Machiavellian concession to the expediency of centralized leadership.

> This is the law of all history hitherto. What, therefore, had to be done here, instead of setting down general phrases about "labour" and "society," was to prove concretely how in present capitalist society the material, etc., conditions have at least been created which enable and compel the workers to lift this social curse (Marx, 1972, p. 527).

The "proof" referred to here is clearly qualified by the phrase "in present capitalist society." His "science," to be sure assumes a pedagogic function which is profoundly inconsistent with his repeated calls for a dialectic realization of consciousness. The purpose of "scientific socialism" was to enhance understanding of historical conditions in order that the transcendence might be made subsequently.

> To accomplish this act of universal emancipation is the historical mission of the modern proletariat. To thoroughly comprehend the historical conditions and thus the very nature of this act, to impart to the new oppressed proletarian class a full knowledge of the conditions and of the meaning of the momentous act it is called upon to accomplish, this is the task of the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, scientific socialism (Engels, 1972, p. 717).

If an error was made, it was not so much Marx's epistemological analysis of science as in his failure to specify and employ linkages to a psycho-social support mechanism by which the people might realize self-emancipation within the party structure. This was the

core of both his and Hegel's ideal for an emancipatory "objectification" and transcendence. I shall return to this at a later point for the distinction is crucial to the development of a functionally relevant critique of Marxism. But first I will examine the issues pertaining to the treatment of power within the International.

Power in the International

In the immediate absence of a support system, Marx was forced to rely upon an interim deference to leadership and authority. It was over these "authoritarian" tactics and their organizational concomitants that the issue was drawn in the First International and that ultimately resulted in its atrophication and ultimate demise as a vital political force. The struggle played itself out within the party organization. Padover describes it as an

> . . . intense and bitter conflict between the Marxists and the Bakuninists. Apart from personal antipathies, it was a struggle for the soul of the radical movement in Europe: the Marxists believed in guided central authority and in organized political action; the Bakuninists and anarchists rejected both in favor of individual and local autonomy, including activities through secret societies. Specifically, the anti-Marxists challenged the right of the General Council in London to enforce its decisions and suspend recalcitrant Sections and federations (Padover, 1978, p. 421).

The International was founded in September of 1864 and by September of 1872 the conflict had matured to full bloom. It is referred to in a speech by Marx to the Hague Congress of that year. Marx's position, motivated by his above-mentioned commitment to destruction of bourgeois power, called for a temporary (transitional) organizational vehicle characterized by a strong centralization of power adapted to the conditions prevailing at any given time or place. Again the character of the formidable bourgeois opposition

was cited as a rationale but the call for a concentration of power is explicit.

> . . . A strong centralization of power in the hands of the General Council is urgently indicated, in view of the pending [Great Power] Congress of Berlin, which, in the view of the speaker, can be expected to make a general attack on the proletariat and the persecution and oppression of the working class. So long as the International does not appear as a firmly unified body, so long as its movement is not centralized . . . its efforts will be in vain (Marx,in Padover, 1978, p. 424).

The method was purposely left open-ended and would be context-specific but Marx, in an interview with an American reporter, gave an example of how the state's power would be overthrown in the first phase of the revolution in Britain. The first object would be

> . . . to set aside the Queen, the House of Lords, and declare the republic. . . . Then we would proceed to the transformation of all great properties, such as manufactures--all the land, in favor of the state, which should work them for the benefit of every person engaged in producing. The drones, or those who would not work, should have nothing (Padover, 1978, p. 448).

The immediate plan would be to establish a series of joint stock companies run by the state. The first phase would not necessarily be violent.

> We do not intend to make war. We hope to be able to gain our rights in a legal and lawful way by act of Parliament, and it is the aristocracy and the moneyed men who will rebel. It is they who will attempt a revolution. But we have the force of numbers. We shall have the strength of intelligence and discipline (Padover, 1978, p. 448).

Clearly "strength" and "numbers" were important to his plan and centralization of power in the International was a crucial prerequisite. It would be this organization that would spearhead an interim struggle on the drive to realize a communal society. Again, in "The Critique of the Gotha Program," we find an exemplary reference to the "laws

of science" to validate his point.

> The question then arises: what transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In other words, what social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to present functions of the state? This question can only be answered scientifically, and one does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousandfold combination of the word people with the word state.
>
> Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat (Marx, 1972, p. 538).

Again he employed the fallacious logic of expert opinion (science) in a concerted effort to gain adherents. He sought credibility for he believed that Bakunin constituted a challenge to his leadership. Bakunin had chided the Marxists for a certain naivete about their faith that the state would "wither away."

> They say that their only care and aim will be to shape and elevate the people [cafe politicians!] both economically and politically to such a degree that all government will soon be superfluous and the state, having lost all political, i.e. dominating, character, will all by itself turn into a free organization of economic interests and communes. If their state is going to be really a people's one, why should it abolish itself, but if its abolition is necessary for the real liberation of the people, how can they dare to call it a people's state? (Bakunin, in Marx, 1972, p. 547).

Marx's retort provides insight not only because it fails to provide a convincing rejoinder but also because it reveals his acknowledgement that he was, in effect, seemingly compelled to use the bourgeois political modes of power and authority, means that are indigenous to a competitive context. His argument that the state will "fade away" was not convincing to Bakunin.

> . . . during the time of struggle to destroy the old society the proletariat still acts on the foundation of the old society and therefore still gives its movement political forms that more or less belong to the old society, in this time of struggle it has not yet attained its final organization

> and uses means for its liberation which will fall away after the liberation . . . (Marx, 1972, p. 547).

Engels broached a similar expectation:

> State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not "abolished." It dies out (Engels, 1972, p. 713).

Continuing the theme, a similar mystification appears in correspondence:

> The dream that the end of the world was near inspired the early Christians in their struggle with the Roman Empire and gave them confidence in victory. Scientific insight into the inevitable disintegration of the dominant order of society, a disintegration which is going on continually before our eyes, and the ever-growing fury into which the masses are lashed by the old ghostly governments, and the enormous positive development of the means of production taking place simultaneously--all this is a sufficient guarantee that as soon as a real proletarian revolution breaks out the conditions of its immediate next modus operandi (though it will certainly not be idyllic) will be in existence (Marx, 1975, p. 318).

Given this "scientifically assured" eventuality, there was obviously little need to worry about any possible complications resulting from the centralization of power and authority within the party. Indeed, Marx believed that those who opposed centralization of power would render the revolutionary organization vulnerable to an already extant organization of bourgeois heads of state. The existence of that formidable foe demanded that the old political system be overthrown. Only then could the "old institution" be modified.

> In our midst there has been formed a group advocating the workers' abstention from political action. We have considered it our duty to declare how dangerous and fatal for our cause such principles appear to be.
>
> Someday the worker must seize political power in order to build up the new organization of labor; he must overthrow the old politics which sustain the old institutions,

> if he is not to lose heaven on earth, like the old Christians who neglected and despised politics.
>
> But we have not asserted that the ways to achieve that goal are everywhere the same (Marx, 1972, pp. 522-523).

He called for greater authority for the General Council, specifically to realize a more disciplined unit and expel dissenters from the organization that was to wield that power.

> . . . the congress of The Hague considered it proper and necessary to enlarge the authority of the General Council and to centralize all action for the approaching struggle, which would otherwise be impotent in isolation. And, moreover, where else could the authorizations of the General Council arouse disquiet if not among our enemies? Does the General Council have a bureaucracy and an armed police to compel obedience? Is not its authority entirely a moral one, and does it not submit its decisions to the judgement of the various federations entrusted with their execution? (Marx, 1972, p. 523).

Regardless of his references to "moral authority" the practice of the party under Marx's leadership was, as the subsequent reference to Bakunin suggests, more of the character of a struggle for power in which the authority of the General Council was already being used, not temporarily against the bourgeois, but against fellow socialists. In one such instance, it was used to expel Bakunin and his followers from the International.

For whatever reasons, those who called for the organization of emancipation to be itself reflective of a broad dialogue and more closely linked to the totality of nonpolitical life-experience were expelled from the International (Padover, 1978, pp. 422-423). The tensions necessary to confront and overcome the larger totality of the bourgeois life style, its possessive mode, and its competitive structure were postponed (not disregarded, as Hyppolite et al. suggest), and a precedent was set in which the political structure became

not merely a necessary but sufficient vehicle to the first phase of the revolution. This is precisely the outcome that a continuing dialogue with Bakunin, for example, might have helped to at least partially circumvent.

Bakunin*: In the Absence of Historical Dialogue

Although he never succeeded in delineating practicable measures for accomplishing a total revolutionary transformation--for accomplishing a total negation of the opposition bourgeois culture--Michael Bakunin expressed a prophetic critique of Marx's tactical programs. The Bakuninists also advanced the need for organization but were highly wary of the Marxists' proclivity to centralization. This appeared at two interlinked levels. The first level was a wariness of the Marxist image of the future socialist society. The second was of the structure of the Marxist organization of emancipation itself.

Opposition to centralization and to any form of a "tight federalism" was one of the central themes of Bakunin's Revolutionary Catechism.

> The political and economic organization of social life must not, as at present, be directed from the summit to the base--the center to the circumference--imposing unity through forced centralization. On the contrary, it must be reorganized to issue from the base to the summit--from the circumference to the center--according to the principles of free association and federation (Bakunin, 1972, p. 77).

He repeatedly called for organization beginning with the individual's

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* Bakunin's writings emitted bursts of profound feeling with little recognizable order. What follows has been taken from his writings and placed in a sequence that attempts to reach the latent logic in his thinking.

daily "social life."* This organization must be undertaken

> . . . from the bottom up, beginning with the social life of the masses and their real aspirations, and inducing them to group, harmonize, and balance their forces in accordance with the natural diversity of their occupations and circumstances. . . . This is the true function of the trade union section (Bakunin, 1972, p. 258).

He heavily emphasized "voluntary unity" in which

> It goes without saying that artificial frontiers created by the present governments will be swept away by the Revolution. The communes will freely unite and organize themselves in accordance with their economic interests, their language affinities, and their geographic circumstances (Bakunin, 1972, p. 379).

While the Commune of reference here was probably more on the order of a French township, the democratically ordered commune, not the state, was seen as the basic transitional unit:

> The basic unit of all political organization in each country must be the completely autonomous commune,constituted by the majority vote of all adults of both sexes (Bakunin, 1972, p. 83).

> The development of each commune will take as its point of departure the actual condition of its civilization (Bakunin, 1972, p. 207).

> The commune consists of all the workers living in the same locality. Disregarding very few exceptions, the typical commune can be defined as the local federation of groups of producers. This local federation or commune is organized to provide certain services which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction or capacity of any particular corporation [industrial union] but which concerns all of them, and which for this reason are called <u>public services</u> (Bakunin, 1972, p. 364).

Within the commune,workers would organize "worker associations" based on "categories of industry:"

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* I think it must be granted that certain of Bakunin's aristocratic origins show through here, for he makes the assumption of a sufficient "social life" to warrant undertaking an effort to realize emancipatory consciousness.

> For workers operating within the first category of industry, collective work is not a necessity; and in many cases the tailor or the cobbler may prefer to work alone in his own small shop. It is quite natural that in every commune there will be one or perhaps several workers employed in each of these trades. Without, however, wishing to underestimate in any way the importance of individual independence, we think that wherever practical, collective labor is best; in a society of equals, emulation stimulates the worker to produce more and heightens morale; further, work in common permits each worker to learn from the experience and skill of the others and this redounds to the benefit of the unit as a whole.
>
> As to the workers in the remaining two categories, it is evident that collective labor is imposed by the very nature of the work and, since the tools of labor are no longer simple individual tools but machines that must be tended by many workers, the machines must also be collectively owned.
>
> Each workshop, each factory, will organize itself into an association of workers who will be free to administer production and organize their work as they think best, provided that the rights of each worker are safeguarded and the principles of equality and justice are observed (Bakunin, 1972, p. 362-363).

The Bank of Exchange would handle cooperative production agreements and "trade" between the several communes.

> The Bank of Exchange will not only receive products belonging to the workers of the commune; it will correspond with other communes and arrange to procure goods which the commune is obliged to get from outside sources, such as certain foodstuffs, fuels, manufactured products, etc. (Bakunin, 1972, p. 367).

The communes would be coordinated by a loosely-knit federation.

> . . . all organizations must proceed by way of federation from the base to the summit, from the commune to the coordinating association of the country or nation. . . . there must be at least one autonomous intermediate body between the commune and the country, the department, the region, or the province. . . . The province must be nothing but a free federation of autonomous communes (Bakunin, 1972, p. 82-83).

There were frequent references to the communal organization from the ground up in Bakunin's writings. By modern standards they

reflect a certain provincialism with, to say the least, sketchy proposals for implementation; but the theme that has inspired modern revolutionaries is his vehement insistence on organized checks and balances against hierarchically structured centralized society and a sustained commitment to participatory democracy. Thus, while the fundamental spirit of Bakunin's and Marx's projections of the future society were similar, Bakunin expressed concern that the International--the organization of emancipation--also be organized on the basis of those principles.

> It is now understandable why Mr. Engels, following this logic, wrote in a letter to our friend Carlo Cafiero that Bismark as well as King Victor Emmanuel of Italy (inadvertently) had greatly helped the revolution because both of them created political centralization in their respective countries. I urge the French allies and sympathizers of Mr. Marx to carefully examine how this Marxist concept is being applied in the International (Bakunin, 1972, p. 310).

Bakunin's opposition to centralization was by no means a rejection of organization as such. Rather, it advanced a powerful advocacy of libertarianism and a humanistic quality consistent with Marx's own ideal of Gemeinwesen. As such he insisted on a consistency in the organization of the International corresponding to, and compatible with, that projected for the new society. To that end he would:

> . . . create within the old society the living seeds of the new social order . . . they are creating not only the ideas, but the facts of the future itself . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 20).

Bakunin found the Marxists inordinately authoritarian and wrote on many occasions of that opposition. He spoke of the bourgeois transformation of theology in a frame of reference similar to Hegel and Marx, but his pronouncements on authoritarianism reflect rejection

of Marxian revolutionary praxis. It appears where he spoke of

> . . . the revolt of the individual against all divine, collective, and individual authority.
>
> The first revolt is against the supreme tyranny of theology, of the phantom of God. As long as we have a master in heaven, we will be slaves on earth. Our reason and our will will be equally annulled. As long as we believe that we must unconditionally obey--and vis-a-vis God, no other obedience is possible--we must of necessity passively submit, without the least reservation, to the holy authority of his consecrated and unconsecrated agents, messiahs, prophets, divinely inspired lawmakers, emperors, kings, and all their functionaries and ministers, representatives and consecrated servitors of the two greatest institutions which impose themselves upon us, and which are established by God himself to rule over men; namely, the Church and the State. All temporal or human authority stems directly from spiritual and/or divine authority. But authority is the negation of freedom. God, or rather the fiction of God, is the consecration and the intellectual and moral source of all slavery on earth, and the freedom of mankind will never be complete until the disastrous and insidious fiction of a heavenly master is annihilated (Bakunin, 1972, p. 238).

He then clarified his opposition to authority. In a brief passage which he did not systematically elaborate, he suggested that since the individual is a product of oppressive society, he/she must also participate in a social change him/herself to overcome the previously inculcated oppressive mentality. Even if the revolutionary cadre is successful in wresting authority from the state there remains the risk of "social tyranny," now in the hands of the revolutionary, still an egoist-individualist in many aspects of his/her social being.

> This is naturally followed by the revolt against the tyranny of men, individual as well as social, represented and legalized by the State. At this point, we must make a very precise distinction between the official and consequently dictatorial prerogatives of society organized as a state, and of the natural influence and action of the members of a non-official, nonartificial society.
>
> The revolt against this natural society is far more difficult for the individual than it is against the officially organized society of the State. Social tyranny, often overwhelming and baneful, does not assume the violent imperative

> character of the legalized and formalized despotism which marks the authority of the State. It is not imposed in the form of laws to which every individual, on pain of judicial punishment, is forced to submit. The action of social tyranny is gentler, more insidious, more imperceptible, but no less powerful and pervasive than is the authority of the State. It dominates men by customs, by mores, by the mass of prejudices, by the habits of daily life, all of which combine to form what is called public opinion.
>
> It overwhelms the individual from birth. It permeates every facet of life, so that each individual is, often unknowingly, in a sort of conspiracy against himself. It follows from this that to revolt against this influence that society naturally exercises over him, he must at least to some extent revolt against himself. For, together with all his natural tendencies and material, intellectual, and moral aspirations, he is himself nothing but the product of society, and it is in this that the immense power exercised by society over the individual lies (Bakunin, 1972, p. 239).

It was for this reason that Bakunin opposed authority. It was by no means a mindless opposition to organization as such. Exercise of authority would preclude the necessary social context of the dialectic of freedom.

> . . . Equality without freedom is the despotism of the State. . . . the most fatal combination that could possibly be formed, would be to unite socialism to absolutism; to unite the aspiration of the people for material well-being . . . with the dictatorship or the concentration of all political and social power in the State. . . . We must seek full economic and social justice only by way of freedom. There can be nothing living or human outside of liberty, and a socialism that does not accept freedom as its only creative principle . . . will inevitably . . . lead to slavery and brutality (Bakunin, 1972, p. 4).

"The trouble," he continued, "lies not in any particular form of government, but in the very existence of government itself (Bakunin, 1972, p. 5).

If authoritarian deference to divine right is to be formally overcome, if the dialectic of freedom is to be given free reign, then authority and its centralization in the state must be abolished.

> The immediate, if not the ultimate, goal of the Revolution is the extirpation of the principle of authority in all its possible manifestations; this aim requires the abolition and, if necessary, the violent destruction of the State,because the State, as Proudhon demonstrated so well, is the younger brother of the Church (Bakunin, 1972, p. 202).

Bakunin,however,was faced with the development of a transitional consciousness in a manner not unlike Marx. The tactics he advocated began with the strike.

> The strike is the beginning of the social war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, a tactic that remains within the limits of legality. Strikes are a valuable tactic in two ways. First they electrify the masses, reinforcing their moral energy and awakening in them the sense of profound antagonism between their interests and those of the bourgeoisie. Thus strikes reveal to them the abyss which from this time on irrevocably separates the workers from the bourgeoisie. Consequently they contribute immensely by arousing and manifesting between the workers of all trades, of all localities, and of all countries the consciousness and the fact itself of solidarity. Thus a double action, the one negative, the other positive, tending to create directly the new world of the proletariat by opposing it in an almost absolute manner to the bourgeois,world (Bakunin, 1972, p. 304).

Bakunin, however, never satisfactorily answered the question Marx might have asked (had dialogue between the two powerful figures occurred on a sustained basis). Why were not labor unions, organized in the interest of workers associated with parent industries, as vulnerable to co-optation and rejection as were the Marxian advocates of political involvement? He spoke convincingly of the risk of co-optation by worker politicians of the Marxian genre.

> The new worker deputies, transplanted into a bourgeois environment, living and soaking up all the bourgeois ideas and acquiring their habits, will cease being workers and statesmen and become converted into bourgeois, even more bourgeois-like than the bourgeois themselves. Because men do not make positions; positions, contrariwise, make men. And we know from experience that worker bourgeois are no less egotistic than exploiter bourgeois, no less disastrous for tne International than the bourgeois

> socialists, no less vain and ridiculous than bourgeois who become nobles. . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 172).

Were not labor organizations subject to the same risks?

Again he spoke convincingly of the risks of authority but never indicated how, beyond the vaguest of ideals, consciousness might be "germinated."

> Collectivism could be imposed only on slaves, and this kind of collectivism would then be the negation of humanity. In a free community, collectivism can come about only through the pressure of circumstances, not by imposition from above but by a free spontaneous movement from below . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 200).

Marx may be excused for doubt about the practical mechanisms of a "spontaneous" action on the part of the people. For there was no more reason to advance the strike as a primal tactic than to advocate tactical political activity. "Herr Bakunin" never made his point, but he does sustain his position that Marx does not show that a takeover of state's power, as a <u>first step</u>, is worth the risk.

> The authoritarian system necessarily leads to the triumph of naked reaction. The second will erect the Revolution on natural and unshakeable foundation.
>
> By way of illustration, we maintain that if the abolition of religious cults and the expulsion of the priests is decreed by law, even the least religious peasants will come to their defense, primarily because there is in men an inborn irresistible urge--the source of all freedom--to rebel against any arbitrary measure . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 194).

> What, then, should be done? Since the revolution cannot be <u>imposed</u> upon the rural areas, it must <u>be germinated within the agricultural communities, by stirring up a revolutionary movement of the peasants themselves, inciting them to destroy, by direct action, every political, judicial, civil, and military institution, and to establish and organize anarchy through the whole countryside</u> (Bakunin, 1972, p. 204).

While he doesn't convince us, given the traditional reactionary stance of the European peasantry, that this tactic applied to his time would be effective, he was prophetic in his case against

authoritarianism in the formation of the International. He began with a rejection of authority based on the claims of positivistic science. He clearly set out to separate authority from expertise and retain the latter.

> But while rejecting the absolute, universal, and infallible authority of men of science, we willingly accept the respectable, although relative, temporary, and restricted authority of scientific specialists, asking nothing better than to consult them by turns, and grateful for their precious information as long as they are willing to learn from us in their turn. In general, we ask nothing better than to see men endowed with great knowledge, with great experience, great minds, and above all great hearts, exercise over us a natural and legitimate influence, freely accepted, and never imposed in the name of any official authority or established right; for every authority or established right, officially imposed as such, becomes at once an oppression and a falsehood, and would inevitably impose upon us . . . slavery and absurdity (Bakunin, 1972, p. 230-231).
>
> The doctrines of the past have always taken advantage of the people's ignorance and gladly sacrificed them to the abstractions, which are incidentally very lucrative to their actual flesh-and-bone proponents. Positive science, admitting its absolute inability to conceive and take an interest in real individuals must renounce all claims to the government of societies. By meddling in this, it would only sacrifice continually the living men it ignores to the abstractions which constitute the sole object of its legitimate preoccupations (Bakunin, 1972, p. 231).

The reference to scientifically "substantiated" polemics was another unmistakeable slice at Marx. Beyond its "mission" to alleviate the general causes of suffering

> . . . the action of social science can be only impotent and deadly. Beyond these limits are the doctrinaire tensions to governing authority of its licensed representatives, its priests. It is time to have done with all the popes and priests; we want no more of them, even if they call themselves "Social Democrats." . . .
>
> On the one hand, science is indispensible to the rational organization of society; on the other, being incapable of concern for the real and living, it must not interfere with the real or practical organization of society. How to solve this antinomy?
>
> This contradiction can be resolved in only one way: by the liquidation of science as a moral authority apart from the life of the people and represented by a body of accredited "savants" (Bakunin, 1972, p. 232).

He was particularly vehement in his opposition to an official theory based on "positive science" that precluded the dialogue necessary for the dialectic of freedom.

> . . . it is precisely the very existence of an official theory that will kill such discussion by rendering it absolutely useless instead of living and vital, and by inhibiting the expression and development of the worker's own feelings and ideas. As soon as an official truth is pronounced--having been scientifically discovered by this great brainy head laboring all alone--a truth proclaimed and imposed on the whole world from the summit of the Marxist Sinai, why discuss anything? (Bakunin, 1972, p. 302).

Everyone in the new socialist state should have a basis in science.

> . . . of encyclopedic minds and advanced sociologists there will be very few. It would be sad for mankind if at any time theoretical speculation became the only source of guidance for society, if science alone were in charge of all social administration. Life would wither, and human society would turn into a voiceless and servile herd. The domination of life by science can have no other result than the brutalization of mankind.
>
> We, the revolutionary anarchists, are the advocates of education for all the people, of the emancipation and the widest possible expansion of social life. Therefore we are the enemies of the State and all forms of the statist principle. In opposition to the metaphyscians, the positivists, and all the worshippers of science, we declare that natural and social life always comes before theory, which is only one of its manifestations but never its creator. From out of its own inexhaustible depths, society develops through a series of events, but not by thought alone. Theory is always created by life, but never creates it . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 327).

The risk, if the power of the state falls to the industrial proletariat, is that it will constitute an instrumental mechanism basing its bureaucracy on scientific management of society.

> And, in fact, what do we find throughout history? The State has always been the patrimony of some privileged class: a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois class. And finally, when all the other classes have exhausted themselves, the State then becomes the patrimony of the bureaucratic class and then falls--or, if you will, rises--to the position of a machine (Bakunin, 1972, p. 318).

This is the great risk of linking pseudo-science to the state--a "privileged elitism."

> The theory of statism as well as that of so-called 'revolutionary dictatorship' is based on the idea that a 'privileged elite,' consisting of those scientists and 'doctrinaire revolutionists' who believe that 'theory is prior to social experience,' should impose their preconceived scheme of social organization on the people. The dictatorial power of this learned minority is concealed by the fiction of a pseudorepresentative government which presumes to express the will of the people (Bakunin, 1972, p. 323).

> But according to Mr. Marx, the people not only should not abolish the State, but, on the contrary, they must strengthen and enlarge it, and turn it over to the full disposition of their benefactors, guardians, and teachers--the leaders of the Communist party, meaning Mr. Marx and his friends--who will then liberate them in their own way. They will concentrate all administrative power in their own strong hands, because the ignorant people are in need of a strong guardianship; and they will create a central state bank, which will also control all the commerce, industry, agriculture, and even science. The mass of the people will be divided into two armies, the agricultural and the industrial, under the direct command of the state engineers, who will constitute the new privileged political-scientific class (Bakunin, 1972, p. 332-333).

At another point he had challenged whether the state with its concentration of power and authority could be transformed as a compatible transitional vehicle.

> 'Poverty produces political slavery, the State.' But he [Marx] does not allow this expression to be turned around, to say: 'Political slavery, the State, reproduces in its turn, and maintains poverty as a condition for its own existence; so that to destroy poverty, it is necessary to destroy the State!' And strangely enough, Marx, who forbids his disciples to consider political slavery, the State, as a real cause of poverty, commands his disciples in the Social Democratic party to consider the conquest of political power as the absolutely necessary preliminary condition for economic emancipation! (Bakunin, 1972, p. 282).

Bakunin made a case against the traditional state and its inherent hierarchical structure which, due to the lack of dialogue and the prevailing combative atmosphere, was probably never fully entertained by the Marxists.

> These men are so accustomed to the order created by an authority, and feel so great a horror of what seems to them to be disorder but is simply the frank and natural expression of the life of the people, that even before a good, salutary disorder has been produced by the revolution they dream of muzzling it by the act of some authority that will be revolutionary in name only, and will only be a new reaction in that it will again condemn the masses to being governed by decrees, to obedience, to immobility, to death; in other words, to slavery and exploitation by a new pseudorevolutionary aristocracy (Bakunin, 1972, p. 151).

Elsewhere Bakunin wrote:

> The International Workingmen's Association did not spring ready-made out of the minds of a few erudite theoreticians. It developed out of actual economic necessity, out of the bitter tribulations the workers were forced to endure and the natural impact of these trials upon the minds of the toilers. For the International to come into being, it was necessary that the elements which went into its making--the economic factors, the experiences and aspirations and attitude of the proletariat--should have already provided a solid base for it. It was necessary that all over the world there should be pioneering groups or associations of advanced workers who are willing to initiate this great workers' movement of self-emancipation. . . . It is not enough that the workers can free themselves by way of international solidarity. It is also necessary that they have confidence in the effectiveness of this solidarity and in their coming deliverance (Bakunin, 1972, p. 252).

In keeping with the grass roots origin of the International, it was appropriate that its basis as a "popular movement" be preserved.

> Our aim is the creation of a powerful but always invisible revolutionary association which will prepare and direct the revolution. But never, even during open revolution, will the association as a whole, or any of its members, take any kind of public office, for it has no aim other than to destroy all government and to make government impossible everywhere. . . . It will keep watch so that authorities, governments, and states can never be built again.
>
> I wonder how Marx fails to see that the establishment of a . . . dictatorship to perform, in one way or another, as chief engineer of the world revolution, regulating and directing a revolutionary movement of the masses in all countries in a machinelike fashion--that the establishment of such a dictatorship would be enough of itself to kill the revolution and distort all popular movements.

> . . . in the Social Revolution, individual action was to be almost nil, while the spontaneous action of the masses had to be everything. All that the individual can do is to formulate and propagate ideas expressing the instinctive desires of the people, and contribute their constant efforts to the revolutionary organization of the natural power of the masses. This, and nothing more: all the rest can only be accomplished by the people. Otherwise we would end up with a political dictatorship--the reconstitution of the State . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 10).

While there remained a vagueness surrounding his use of the term "spontaneous" and while it was unclear how the association would prevent the formation of powerful states, without power and disciplined, tactically proficient reserves, he insisted that policy must be established on a participatory basis.

> Then there will be created, though of course not all at once, the grand policy of the International--not from a single head, ambitious, erudite, but nevertheless, incapable of embracing the thousand needs of a proletariat no matter how brainy it may be but by the absolutely free, spontaneous, and concurrent action of the workers of all countries (Bakunin, 1972, p. 298).

The theme was repeated again and again in Bakunin's writing. His case against authority was strong, but he provided no convincing alternatives to Marx's insistence on political consciousness and involvement as a vital counter-cultural tactic. Sadly, the conflict remained unenlightened by a systematically structured dialogue between the contending factions.

Can a revolutionary organization evade a Bakunin-like opposition to a politically conscious strategy and escape a Marxist-like oppressive character of tight control from the top? Bakunin himself approached a partial solution. It was in the "self-organization" of the people into autonomous bodies as something akin to what the late Arnold Kaufman and others have recently termed

participatory democracy.

> Throughout the world the authoritarian revolutionists have done very little to promote revolutionary activity, primarily because they always wanted to make the Revolution by themselves, by their own authority and their own power. This could not fail to severely constrict the scope of revolutionary action because it is impossible, even for the most energetic and enterprising authoritarian revolutionary, to understand and deal effectively with all the manifold problems generated by the Revolution. For every dictatorship, be it exercised by an individual or collectively by relatively few individuals, is necessarily very circumscribed, very shortsighted, and its limited perception cannot, therefore, penetrate the depth and encompass the whole complex range of popular life; just as it is impossible for even the most gigantic vessel to contain the depths and vastness of the ocean. . . .
>
> What should the revolutionary authorities--and there should be as few of them as possible--do to organize and spread the Revolution? They must promote the Revolution not by issuing decrees but by stirring the masses to action. They must under no circumstances foist any artificial organization whatsoever upon the masses. On the contrary, they should foster the self-organization of the masses into autonomous bodies, federated from the bottom upward. This could be done by winning the cooperation of the most influential, the most intelligent, and the most dedicated individuals in each locality, to ensure that these organizations, as far as possible, conform to our principles. Therein lies the secret of our triumph (Bakunin, 1972, p. 196).

Bakunin advanced an argument with a certain naivete, to be sure, that the organization of emancipation must itself be emancipated; that the organization that seeks to realize a dialectic of freedom must be established as a dialectic of freedom; that an organization that seeks to overcome alienation must itself be non-alienating.

This quality of the organization of emancipation was demanded due to the tenacious hold that the traditional society proferred upon humankind.

> It is certainly not surprising that the ideas passed on by the collective mind of society should have so great a hold upon the masses of the people. What is surprising, on the contrary, is that there are among these masses individuals who have the ideas, the will, and the courage to go against the

> stream of conformity. For the pressure of society on the individual is so great that there is no character so strong, nor an intelligence so powerful as to be entirely immune to this despotic and irresistible influence . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 241).

It followed then that

> The constructive tasks of the Social Revolution, the new forms of social life, can emerge only from the living experience of the grass-roots organizations which will themselves build the new society according to their manifold needs and desires (Bakunin, 1972, p. 18).

It further followed that

> The Revolution will therefore begin by destroying, above all, all the institutions and all the organizations, churches, parliaments, tribunals, administrations, banks, universities, etc., which constitute the lifeblood of the State. The State must be entirely demolished and declared bankrupt, not only financially, but even more politically, bureaucratically, militarily (including the police force) (Bakunin, 1972, p. 100).

The bourgeois state must not be "taken over" but annihilated together with its hierarchical structure.

> There is an infallible sign by which workers can recognize a phony socialist, a bourgeois socialist; if he says that the political must precede the social and economic transformation; if he denies that both must be made at the same time, or shrugs his shoulders when told that the political revolution will be meaningful only when it begins with a full, immediate and direct social liquidation. . . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 170).

It was only on the basis of a complete rejection of the state that this full communal support structure might be released, to itself become the transitional context.

> The Social Revolution, as envisioned and hoped for by the Latin and Slav workers, is infinitely broader in scope than that advanced by the German or Marxist program. For them it is not a question of the emancipation of the working class, parsimoniously doled out and realizable only in the remote future, but rather the completed and real emancipation of all workers, not only in some but in all nations, "developed" and "undeveloped." And the first watchword of this emancipation can be none other than freedom. Not the bourgeois political freedom so extolled and recommended as the first

> step in the conquest of full freedom by Marx and his followers, but a broad human freedom, a freedom destroying all the dogmatic, metaphysical, political, and juridicial fetters by which everyone today is loaded down, which will give everybody, collectives as well as individuals, full autonomy in their activities and their development, delivered once and for all from inspectors, directors, and guardians (Bakunin, 1972, p. 284).

At another point he cited the annals of the First Congress of the International (Geneva, 1866).

> Considering that the emancipation of the workers must be the task of the workers themselves; that the efforts of the workers to achieve their emancipation must not be to reconstitute new privileges, but to establish, once for all, equal duties and equal rights; that the enslavement of the workers to capital is the source of all servitude--political, moral, and material; that for this reason the economic emancipation of the workers is the great aim to which must be subordinated every political movement, etc. (Bakunin, 1972, p. 288).

But Bakunin believed that this declaration refuted the "chief of the German authoritarian communists" who had proclaimed that "the conquest of political power is the first task of the proletariat." (Bakunin, 1972,p. 288) Indeed, he believed that Marx was in direct conflict.

> This is what the Geneva Congress (1866) understood better than Mr. Marx. The effective power of our association, the International, was based on eliminating from its program all political and philosophical planks, not as subjects for discussion and study but as obligatory principles which all members must accept (Bakunin, 1972, p. 291)

Bakunin called for a vastly broader scope for the emancipatory organization, but its objective was similar to Marx.

> Therefore, the government will be uprooted, along with the Church, the army, the courts, the schools, the banks, and all their subservient institutions. At the same time the Revolution has a positive goal, that the workers take possession of all capital and the tools of production (Bakunin, 1972, p. 358).

The revolutionaries would further "take collective possession of the vast tracts of land and work them in common." Bakunin insisted that the organization would not stop at the level of economic transformation. It would assess every social institution and subject all to radical criticism. The process would extend all the way down to the family. Children, for example, would no longer be considered possessions of their parents, but would be placed under the custody of society.

> There are people who assert that the program of placing the child in the custody of society means "the destruction of the family." This doctrine is devoid of sense. As long as the concurrence of two individuals of different sexes is necessary for procreation, as long as there are fathers and mothers, the natural connection between the parents and the child can never be obliterated by social relations.
>
> Only the character of this connection will be modified. In antiquity the father was the absolute master of the child. He had the power of life and death over him. In modern times paternal authority has been subject to certain restrictions. What, then, could be more natural, than that a free egalitarian society should obliterate what still remains of this authority and replace it with relations of simple affection?
>
> We do not claim that the child should be treated as an adult, that all his caprices should be respected, that when his childish will stubbornly flouts the elementary rules of science and common sense we should avoid making him feel that he is wrong. We say, on the contrary, that the child must be trained and guided, but that the direction of his first years must not be exclusively exercised by his parents, who are all too often incompetent and who generally abuse their authority. The aim of education is to develop the latent capacities of the child to the fullest possible extent and enable him to take care of himself as quickly as possible. It is painfully evident that authoritarianism is incompatible with an enlightened system of education (Bakunin, 1972, p. 374-375).

In any event, this total, penetrating, cultural transition must meet the people at their level of concern and involvement. These must be linked to a communal structure intended to realize "complete solidarity."

> If the International had been composed only of the central sections, the latter would probably have succeeded in organizing conspiracies for the overthrow of the existing order but would have been unable to achieve its goal. For it could have attracted only a mere handful of heroic workers while the remaining millions of workers would have remained outside this small circle. And the social order cannot be destroyed without winning the support of these millions. Only a relatively small number of individuals are moved by an abstract idea. The millions, the proletarian masses (and this is true also for the privileged classes) are moved only by the force of facts . . . by their immediate interests and their momentary passions.
>
> In order to interest and involve the whole proletariat in the work of the International, it is necessary to approach them not with vague generalizations but with realistic understanding of their daily concerns. To win the confidence of uniformed workers, and the vast majority of the proletariat are unfortunately in this group, it is necessary to begin by talking to the worker, not of the general troubles of the proletariat of the world, nor the general causes responsible for them, but only of his own trade and the working conditions in his own locality, his working hours, the cost of living, and to suggest practical measures to alleviate these evils and better his conditions. It would be a mistake to speak to him first about things like the abolition of hereditary property, the abolition of juridicial rights of the State, and the replacement of the State by the free federation of producers' associations. He probably will not understand these theories. No! Propose in simple language such ideas as will appeal to his good sense and which he can verify by his daily experiences. These measures are: the establishment of complete solidarity. . . (Bakunin, 1972, p. 250).

Clearly Marx and Bakunin confronted a social context not yet receptive to the conceptual level of their theory. Each chose a separate institutional complex on which to focus his attention. Marx, given the exigencies of the currently raging struggle and the centrality of his role in it, found any dialogue with Bakunin, whom he believed politically naive, to be a risky manifestation of ambiguity whose outcome might be a loss of confidence in the leadership. Bakunin found excessive risks in Marx's tactics. Hence, each continued to develop his perspective in isolation of the wisdom and experience

of the other. Marx advocated the adoption of a tactic in conflict with his own early critique of Hegel that called for a total social transformation. He recognized the power of the extant political state to place horrendous obstacles in the way of the realization of a dialectic of freedom--a complete social transformation. He was simply unrealistic or wishful about the assumed ability of the revolutionaries not to abuse that power in the transitional period. For his part, Bakunin was more prophetic about the authoritarian complication of a transformation that sought political power as a first step. He perceptively advocated a total social transformation and attached a rough communal support structure that penetrated to the core of social life but was unrealistic about the political feasibility of what he assumed would be a successful proletarian revolution in the face of the overwhelming power of the bourgeois state.

The Function of a Leadership Beyond the People

Marx clarified his perception of the need for a strong stance against the "ruling classes" in a letter to Friedrich Bolte, an American member of the International, on November 23, 1871. The letter also revealed an attitude toward the then current capacity of the proletariat to conduct a successful campaign.

> Where the working class is not yet far enough advanced in its organisation to undertake a decisive campaign against the collective power, i.e., the political power, of the ruling classes, it must at any rate be trained for this by continual agitation against this power and by a hostile attitude toward the policies of the ruling classes. Otherwise it remains a plaything in their hands. . . (Marx, 1975, p. 255).

The "toiling people," Marx further explained in "The Critique of the Gotha Program," require education because it was not "ripe for ruling"

without expert help:

> But what does "control by the rule of the people of the toiling people" mean? And particularly in the case of a toiling people which, through these demands that it puts to the state, expresses its full consciousness that it neither rules nor is ripe for ruling! (Marx, 1972, p. 536).

Not only were the people unready for the responsibilities of ruling but authority was necessary to render the revolutionary action efficacious in the struggle against a strong and wily bourgeoisie. Engels emphasized the point in a debate with the anarchists in which he insisted on a retention of "authority" in the revolutionary organization.

> Authority, in the sense in which the word is used here, means: the imposition of the will of another upon ours; on the other hand, authority presupposes subordination. Now, since these two words sound bad and the relationship which they represent is disagreeable to the subordinated party, the question is to ascertain whether there is any way of dispensing with it, whether--given the conditions of present-day society--we could not create another social system, in which this authority would be given no scope any longer and would consequently have to disappear (Engels, 1972, p. 730).

Given the highly organized structure of industry since the industrial revolution, the question is raised, how can authority be avoided?

> Everywhere combined action, the complication of processes dependent upon each other, displaces independent action by individuals. But whoever mentions combined action speaks of organisation; now, is it possible to have organisation without authority?
>
> Supposing a social revolution dethroned the capitalists, who now exercise their authority over the production and circulation of wealth. Supposing, to adopt entirely the point of view of the anti-authoritarians, that the land and the instruments of labour had become the collective property of the workers who use them. Will authority have disappeared or will it only have changed its form? (Engels, 1972, p. 731).

No doubt is left about the answer to the rhetorical question.

> Wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself, to destroy the power loom in order to return to the spinning wheel (Engels, 1972, p. 731).

Marx was perhaps less rigid about the question of authority in industry. The point was broached in one of his less inflammatory retorts to Bakunin. Bakunin had charged that the revolutionary authority would " . . . look down on all ordinary workers from the heights of the state . . ." and " . . . represent not the people but themselves in their claims to govern the people."

To this Marx responded:

> If Herr Bakunin knew even one thing about the situation of the manager of a workers' cooperative factory, all his hallucinations about domination would go to the devil. He would have to ask himself what form the functions of administration can assume on the basis of such a worker state, if it pleases him to call it that (Marx, 1972, p. 546).

Clearly, while Marx was convinced of the need for a disciplined authority over the revolutionary organization (particularly the International) he believed that excesses of that authority could be controlled within the bureaucratic-administrative organization. Change in the larger constellation of characteristics, linked to the realm of civil society, was not mentioned in this exchange. He was torn between the alternate ideal of non-authoritarian Gemeinwesen and the immediate need to weld together a consciousness having sufficient solidarity to, in effect, buy a transitional period that he believed would be conducive to the later realization of an emancipatory organization. Then Marx, in a singularly candid revelation, acknowledged that the phrase "scientific socialism" was used specifically pursuant to the polemic with the "utopians"

and was essentially a weapon of persuasion--not a fundamental cornerstone of his frame of reference. It was used,in effect, to undergird his authority with "scientific" credibility.

> . . . the words "learned socialism," never used before, and "scientific socialism," [were] used only in opposition to utopian socialism, which tries to impose new hallucinations and illusions on the people instead of confining the scope of its knowledge to the study of the social movement of the people itself . . . (Marx, 1972, p. 546).

Engels spoke further of the need for an intermediate authority.

> But the necessity of authority, and of imperious authority at that, will nowhere be found more evident than on board a ship on the high seas. There, in time of danger, the lives of all depend on the instantaneous and absolute obedience of all to the will of one . . .
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Why do the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out against political authority, the state? All Socialists are agreed that the political state, and with it political authority, will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society. But the anti-authoritarians demand that the authoritarian political state be abolished at one stroke, even before the social conditions that gave birth to it have been destroyed. They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be the abolition of authority. Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon--authoritarian means. . . (Engels, 1972, p. 732-733).

He rather typically concluded his critique with a quite dogmatic assertion that left little room for dialogue.

> . . . either the anti-authoritarians don't know what they are talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion; or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the movement of the proletariat. In either case they serve the reaction (Engels, 1972, p. 733).

While I have already shown that Marx was not so extreme as Engels, I think that the overall precedents they set, whether or not

those expediencies were necessary, suspended the dialectic and left the movement open to the kind of misinterpretation that not only misled their followers, but gave ground to the intellectual critics of Marxian thought itself. Typical is the following Merleau-Ponty pronouncement:

> What most concerns Marxist philosophy is not what the workers think, or what the Party believes they should think, but rather the recognition by the proletariat of its own action in the politics which the Party presents to it. History would wander aimlessly, and all the dialectics would fall away, if the Party would not allow itself a certain distance from which to view objectively the situation of the proletariat in the confluence of forces and to impose the decisions of the majority on everyone, or, similarly, if it omitted having the proletariat legitimize the decisions proposed to it. The Party, then, is at once all and nothing. It is nothing more than the mirror where the proletarian forces scattered throughout the world are concentrated, and it is all, since, without it, truth "in itself" would never become manifest or fulfill itself as truth (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 78).

While this is a gross misreading of Marx's philosophy by Merleau-Ponty, the critique of the ambiguities embodied in the emancipatory organization has some validity.

> The Party is transformed into precisely that impotent philosopher with no hold on reality--save that of force. The paranoiac politics by which the party, armed with the authority of Reason, substitutes itself for a proletariat whose 'objective possibility' is now incarnate in the party itself (Howard, 1972, p. 203).

I think that while the above is less a criticism of Marx than of Lenin (Bolshevism), this and similar misinterpretations were invited by the ambiguities imposed on the former by the limits of his time. For it was, indeed, the ambiguities in Marx's political-organizational life that became likewise sharpened in subsequent Marxist thought. Lenin, in the absence of a support system that would bring his people into a dialectic interrelationship in the formulation of both the goals and the tactics of their realization, called for a

behaviorally structured and disciplined party. Luxemburg, following Bakunin, challenged the Bolshevic interpretation on grounds that a paradox is presented in the fact that "the proletarian army is first recruited in the struggle itself," but "only in the struggle does it become aware of the objectives of the struggle" (Luxemburg, 1971, p. 289). Luxemburg found this to be a contradiction because this conflict presumably undertaken in the name of free people " . . . is not based on the immediate class consciousness of the working masses" (Luxemburg, 1971, p. 288). Instead the orthodox cant transforms the revolutionary army ". . . into pure implements of a pre-determined will lying outside their own field of activity--into tools of a central committee. . . ." It makes the "mass of comrades" into "a mass incapable of judging, whose essential virtue becomes 'discipline,' that is obedience to duty" (Luxemburg , 1971, p. 289).

Indeed, the work of Luxemburg stands as a reminder not only to the Marxists, but to the much heralded ghost of Marx himself, of the initial vision that constituted the essence of Gemeinwesen.

Ultimately Marx and Engels were to renounce signficant portions of a policy based on the expedient adaptation of their critical thought to an existing class struggle. As Bakunin had earlier advised, they were to give up a narrowed concept of class struggle, oriented to the bourgeois mentality, which they had adopted in the immediate struggle of the industrial proletariat. In place of a struggle bent on the primacy of a seizure of the state's power by a mass of workers led by relatively more conscious leaders, they came to accept "slow revolution" based on a concurrent growth of consciousness among all

the people to be affected. They still retained the objective of an overthrow of the state but not as a primary basis of strategy. Rather, it was relegated to a tactic in a larger campaign on the basis of the same criteria Marx used in The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right--a dialectic unity of our political role with the other aspects of our communal existence.

Thus, in the final years, Marx seemingly tended toward an about-face from the stance taken during the biggest part of his active life and took a more parochial view of any international proletarian movement.

> . . . I regard all workers' congresses or socialist congresses, in so far as they are not directly related to the conditions existing in this or that particular nation, as not merely useless but actually harmful. They will always ineffectually end in endlessly repeated general banalities (Marx, 1975, p. 319).

Some years after Marx's death, Engels further clarified the evolving mentality increasingly evident after reflection upon the turbulent years of the mid-century. History, he wrote:

> . . . has shown us too to have been wrong, has revealed our point of view of that time to have been as illusion. It has done even more: it has not merely dispelled the erroneous notions we then held; it has also completely transformed the conditions under which the proletariat has to fight. The mode of the struggle of 1848 is today obsolete in every respect, and this is a point which deserves closer examination on the present occasion (Engels, 1972, p. 560).

He then raised the question about the fruitfulness of a revolution conducted by a minority.

> All revolutions up to the present day have resulted in the displacement of one definite class rule by another; but all ruling classes up to now have been only small minorities in relation to the ruled mass of the people. One ruling minority was thus overthrown; another minority seized the helm of state in its stead and refashioned the state

> institutions to suit its own interests. This was on every occasion the minority group qualified and called to rule by the given degree of economic development; and just for that reason, and only for that reason, it happened that the ruled majority either participated in the revolution for the benefit of the former or else calmly acquiesced in it. But if we disregard the concrete context in each case, the common form of all these revolutions was that they were minority revolutions (Engels, 1972, p. 560).

The ruled majority, the proletariat, still remained an enigma. It was, as we have seen, noble, yet it had proven itself "passive" and "unresisting."

> Even when the majority took part, it did so--whether wittingly or not-- only in the service of the minority; but because of this, or even simply because of the passive, unresisting attitude of the majority, this minority acquired the appearance of being the representative of the whole people (Engels, 1972, p. 560-561).

Further, it had no sense of direction and could not direct its own destiny, yet it was already engaged in a spontaneous resistance and hence apparently needed discipline and a command.

> . . . in 1848 there were but a very few people who had any idea at all of the direction in which this emancipation was to be sought. The proletarian masses themselves, even in Paris, after the victory, were still absolutely in the dark as to the path to be taken. And yet the movement was there, instinctive, spontaneous, irrepressible. Was not this just the situation in which a revolution had to succeed, led, true, by a minority, but this time not in the interest of the minority, but in the veriest interest of the majority? (Engels, 1972, p. 561).

> . . . in development of the bourgeois republic that arose out of the "social" Revolution of 1848 had even concentrated real power in the hands of the big bourgeoisie--monarchistically inclined as it was . . . and, on the other hand, had grouped all the other social classes, peasantry as well as petty bourgeoisie, round the proletariat, so that, during and after the common victory, not they but the proletariat grown wise by experience had to become the decisive factor--was there not every prospect then of turning the revolution of the minority into a revolution of the majority? (Engels, 1972, p. 562).

There was at that time no reason to believe that "all the other social classes" were so alienated that they could not be led to grasp a "rational expression of their needs."

> If, in all the longer revolutionary periods, it was so easy to win the great masses of the people by the merely plausible representations of the forward-thrusting minorities, why should they be less susceptible to ideas which were the truest reflection of their economic condition, which were nothing but the clear, rational expression of their needs, of needs not yet understood but merely vaguely felt by them? To be sure, this revolutionary mood of the masses had almost always, and usually very speedily, given way to lassitude or even to a revulsion of feeling as soon as illusion evaporated and disappointment set in. But here it was not a question of false representations, but of giving effect to the highest special interests of the great majority itself, interests which, true, were at that time by no means clear to this great majority, but which soon enough had to become clear to it, in the course of giving practical effect to them, by their convincing obviousness (Engels, 1972, pp. 561-562)

Clearly, the rational expression of their needs appeared not so obvious after all, and Engels slipped momentarily into a bourgeois rationale in suggesting, in his disillusionment, that the failure to realize an emancipatory consciousness and objectification was attributable to "Lassitude" and "revulsion of feeling."

Returning to a more structured explanation, he again conceded error and pointed in the direction of the problem--a weakness in "the masses" that might have been eliminated with a support structure more conducive to that end.

> History has proved us, and all who thought like us, wrong. It has made it clear that the state of economic development on the Continent at that time was not, by a long way, ripe for the elimination of capitalist production . . . At that time the masses, sundered and differing according to locality and nationality, linked only by the feeling of common suffering, undeveloped, helplessly tossed to and fro from enthusiasm to despair; today the one great international army of Socialists, marching irresistibly

> on and growing daily in number, organisation, discipline, insight and certainty of victory. If even this mighty army of the proletariat has still not reached its goal, if, far from winning victory by one mighty stroke, it has slowly to press forward from position to position in a hard, tenacious struggle, this only proves, once and for all, how impossible it was in 1848 to win social transformation by a simple surprise attack (Engels, 1972, p. 562).

One wonders how much was gained by a trade-off that built a tight disciplined organization at the expense of alienating so vast a body of socialist comrades. Engels himself returned to the traditional Marxist theme of the necessity of breaking the political power of the bourgeois state. But it no longer was dependent on a highly centralized organizational structure. Given the

> . . . successful utilisation of universal suffrage, . . . an entirely new method of proletarian struggle came into operation, and this method quickly developed further. It was found that the state institutions, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organised, offer the working class still further opportunities to fight these very state institutions. The workers took part in elections to particular Diets, to municipal councils and to trades courts; they contested with the bourgeoisie every post in the occupation of which a sufficient part of the proletariat had a say. And so it happened that the bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the illegal action of the workers' party, of the results of elections than of those of rebellion.
>
> For here, too, the conditions of the struggle had essentially changed. Rebellion in the old style,street fighting with barricades,which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, was to a considerable extent obsolete (Engels, 1972, p. 566-567).

There was now a crucial qualification. Now the class struggle as a function of an enlightened industrial proletariat was abandoned and the communal nature of the struggle was more freely acknowledged.

> If conditions have changed in the case of war between nations, this is no less true in the case of the class struggle. The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions

> carried through by small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses, is past. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of the social organisation, the masses themselves must also be in it, must themselves already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for, body and soul. The history of the last fifty years has taught us that. But in order that the masses may understand what is to be done, long, persistent work is required, and it is just this work that we are now pursuing, and with a success which drives the enemy to despair (Engels, 1972, p. 570).

To be sure, he found no convincing existential vehicle save "suffrage," "propaganda work" and "parliamentary activity" (Engels, 1972, p. 570). But now the mechanism of "small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses" was renounced and the objective was set as the complete transformation of the "social organization." All this, long before the Critical Theorists demonstrated that the problem was less conceptual than existential. Unfortunately, the point clarified by Engels in the waning months of his life and deducible from the central thrust of Marx's work was never fully articulated and the issue has persisted down to the present. Luxemburg initiated the task in her pronouncement based on the core of Marx's thought

> The essence of socialist society consists in the fact that the great laboring mass ceases to be a dominated mass, but, rather, makes the entire political and economic life its own life and gives that life a conscious, free and autonomous direction (Luxemburg, 1971, p. 368).

Luxemburg neither totally abandoned the tactic of party politics nor placed it in a position superordinate to the broad range of social interaction. The party and organization were necessary but not <u>sufficient</u> as tactical weapons for seizure of power. Given a total dialectic transcendence when the time arrives

it will be possible to

> . . . organize the tactics of the political struggle in such a way that in every phase and in every moment of the struggle the whole sum of the available and already released active power of the proletariat will be realized in the battle-stance of the party; . . . see that the resoluteness and acuteness of the tactics of Social Democracy never fall below the level of the actual relation of forces but rather rise above it (Luxemburg, 1971, p. 247).

However, her position weakened considerably when she was called upon to suggest vehicles by which the people may develop consciousness. Until her murder she remained an enthusiastic advocate of "parliamentary democracy," "free trade unions," and the like, not with the objective of an immediate seizure of power but to facilitate a "long revolution," similar in many respects to Marx's and Bakunin's transitional tactics in which the people might ultimately realize a total emancipatory transcendence.

But not only do the mechanisms she, and later Engels, proposed fail to meet the abstract criteria of transcendence, but history has proven their insufficiency against the technically orchestrated manipulative power of bourgeois society. She properly set out to achieve a "transitional programme" (Howard, 1977, p. 57) that was oriented to the total existential transcendence of the people on a non-authoritarian basis, but it failed to provide the support mechanism sufficient to overpower the alienation implicit in the abandonment of a deeply entrenched possessive individualism, regaled by the vast manipulative structure of the bourgeois state.

Luxemburg's position was based on Marx's own visionary projections about the kind of society that might fulfill our highest communal ideal. I have already cited some of his earlier references

to Gemeinwesen. Extensions of these initial delineations occurred in "On the Jewish Question" (Marx, 1967, p. 216-248). Here Marx cited Rousseau to the effect that the realization of an emancipated state is dependent on a change in the nature of the people within its jurisdiction. The great failure of the French Revolution was that it merely changed the nature of the political structure. It did not simultaneously change the "egoistic and competitive civil society on which it rested" (Howard, 1977, p. 130). Indeed, it was this insight that led Marx to initiate a study of the means to a realization of that change via a critique of political economy.

The problem was that while developing his conceptual basis, he was attempting to influence a revolutionary program and organization whose momentum had been initiated even before he became active and whose basic principles reflected, by his own acknowledgement, a confused admixture of bourgeois and socialist perspectives. Hence, Marx was continually called upon to provide a sufficient solution to two distinctly different problems. First was the long term conceptual projections--the ideal of Gemeinwesen. Second was the immediate issue of the revolution in process; that seemingly demanded a more focused consciousness. The insidious effects of profit-oriented and egoistic mechanisms of bourgeois political economy required exposure and extinction. This was the immediate issue. However, the solutions were not sufficient; they were not intended to be. This was not, as later critics argue, due to an insufficiency of Marx's conceptual base alone or even primarily. To be sure,this led Marx to contribute to the search for a panacea. To some extent, his

actions set the stage for the myth of a disciplined party as a vehicle of transition, but this was not fundamentally a theoretical failure or a conceptual deficiency. Rather, it was due to the status of Marxian theory as an idea whose time was truly not yet ripe. Unlike Luxemburg, the later critics, including the Critical Theorists, minimize the early writings and fail to sufficiently weigh the existential barriers to the realization of a support system sufficient to overcome the power of the extant civil society of Marx's time. Rather, they have seized on the hypothesis of a fundamental conceptual error without sufficiently weighing the existential conditions. These hypotheses do little to overcome the limits of earlier Marxism for they do not attack the basic source of those limits. Further, little appears to be added by insisting, as Lefort does, that the proletariat must make its own revolution through experience. This is a mere rehash of Marx's (and for that matter, Hegel's) fundamental thesis. The question is how the dialectic linkage to existence may be structured. What guidelines does our examination of the social content of Marx's thought reveal?

The Collective Dependency of the Secularization of Consciousness: The Control of Alienation, Other and Self-Imposed

Marx, being convinced that the revolutionary fervor of his time was sorely in need of a conceptual basis--a more systematic consciousness--was faced with a dilemma. Levels of education among the people were dismally low, the media of communication were, more often than not, subject to the strict censorship of the prevalent authority, and deprivation and social isolation (currently eroded by technically

augmented forms) often resulted in a provincialism resistant to the conceptual enlightenment that Marx sought to infuse in the movement. It was a movement-in-process prior to Marx's own involvement. It was an incipient reaction to the abuses of bourgeois society that by no means enjoyed a well-articulated rationale. Marx was under no illusion that the proletariat shared his ideal for the social objectification of our communal essence. Rather, it was a class oriented economic struggle in process, of which there was no likelihood of an immediate transformation of the conceptual base. He believed that his first problem was to transform a more or less spontaneous phenomenon into a disciplined movement whose strategy was to advance a class consciousness while simultaneously seizing the state's power. Upon the subsequent demise of bourgeois coercion, the proletariat, now armed with the state's power, would spearhead a move to a true communal transformation.

The proletariat, whose clenched fist and stoic nobility depicted its yet to be realized consciousness, was represented by the International, the scholarly avant-garde of the class struggle. But the day-to-day life of the proletariat had no direct relationship to the International. It was Marx, Engels, and a few colleagues, not the proletariat, who masterminded the development of the International. Its immediate purpose was not yet to establish a microcosm of global community. Rather it was to coordinate and conceptually ground a disciplined struggle against a disciplined and formidable bourgeoisie, firmly backed by the power of the state. Belying the Bolshevic interpretation, the strength of the actual regional movements was to be the proletarians and not a tightly restricted elite. Yet the

nature of the ongoing class struggle so modified Marx's stance within the International as to establish authoritarian and non-dialectic precedents. Further, while the International was not Marx's only political or revolutionary involvement, it was his most visible one, and hence, had even greater impact as a precedent.

Further, it was truly enough an economically conditioned struggle--that between the industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie, for which Marx ultimately became the theoretician and political force to be reckoned with. It was a struggle, to be sure, with which Marx had little difficulty identifying himself for he had personally known the sting of poverty, and had grown up in a context increasingly sensitive to the plight of the economically downtrodden. But it was not, and probably could not have been, a struggle waged on the basis of a dialectic between the groups who represented the totality of the socialist movement. There were the utopians, the Saint-Simonian socialists, the Proudhonists,and the anarchists, each of whom had a stake in the outcome, and who, under less compelling conditions, might have been expected to contribute a rich diversity to the dialogue. But even if Marx had by some miracle completely escaped the egoism inherent in a bourgeois competitive system (and I think he had not), he believed that without a strong "competitive" party the movement could not survive within its context. Marx, confronting a revolution in process, believed a disciplined organization under a trained and effective leadership was necessary. After all, he was engaged in a struggle in which the opposition was the bourgeoisie, and the object, even before Marx entered the fray, was essentially

political-economic. The utopians expressed preferences for peaceful means and the Bakuninists both feared and abhorred any authority, especially any government or hierarchical structure. They would have no part of Marx's adopted struggle to gain control over the seat of bourgeois power (even though Marx himself found that power objectionable in its bourgeois form). Hence, Marx often inclemently sought to remove their influence from the International. And he did so largely by pointing up their divergence from the economically based focus of the class struggle.

From Marx's perspective, it was hardly a position that invited dialogue or that was amenable to the dialectic process. The party of the proletariat would seize power and proceed to help the more naive reach a capacity to realize the communal ideal in successive phases. Marx believed that he must offer a non-equivocating program to a people whose mood was revolutionary but who still reflected the pattern of the indigenous culture--a need for a strong charismatic father-figure leader who commanded their confidence. Clearly, the means selected to realize his conceptual scheme becomes an issue whose limits must be sought more in the context than in the concept. Indeed, Marx believed that his concepts of Gemeinwesen were visionary, vastly beyond the immediate capacity of the time to match them in inspired revolutionary praxis.

I have attempted to develop a background of the Marxian tradition and its struggle to overcome alienated existence in the light of criticism that it conceptually neglected the interactional aspect in favor of the economic (purposive-rational) source of

alienation. That critique, in effect, is that it retained traces of economic determinism. The critics, such as the Critical Theorists and Hyppolite, more or less directly accuse Marx of a predisposition to positivism and a commensurate attenuation of the larger social-interactional sphere. Thus, Habermas argues that Marx's problems were largely a result of theoretical-methodological ambiguity. I would argue that this ambiguity was not a source but a reflection of Marx's ambiguity as a revolutionary. In keeping with my earlier exposition, I am in substantial agreement with Ollman and others that Marx's fundamental orientation to science was in the sense of a "dialectic of inquiry" and "exposition" (Ollman, 1971, chapter 2) and that his concept of Gemeinwesen, taken on the basis of the total impact of his work, was decidedly anti-positivistic. I have indicated that Marx's own interpretation of the immediate social-historical context gave him some hope that a revolutionary zeal conceived in the tradition of the early bourgeois revolutions could be metamorphosed under wise and judicious leadership into a true "dialectic of freedom." Clearly, he deemed it expedient to at least temporarily adopt the science and revolutionary mode of bourgeois society, a decidedly positivistic form. It was a stance not entirely inconsistent with Prussian authoritarianism and the trends toward centralization of the fragmented feudal structure of the Germany of Marx's era that represented the conservative strain in his tradition. Yet, on the other hand, it stood diametrically opposed to the egalitarian orientation of his native Rhineland strongly influenced by Rousseau and French humanism. What is more, it was part of a vast matrix in which the key bearing

points of bourgeois individualism, including positivism itself, constitute the central object of Marx's assault. While there may have been ambivalence in Marx, he never refuted the conceptual precepts of the historicized a priori and communal essence integral to his concept of our "social being." To the extent that there was a focus on the purposive-rational component, I believe that it was largely due to the exigencies of the context and not to a narrow conceptual scope per se.

That being the case, a more reasonable explanation of his oversimplified, programmatic, positivistic, and deterministic statements was that in the absence of a dialectic transcendence in which consciousness was emancipated simultaneously with the negation of the traditional state, he would be forced to construct an intermediate strategy of expediency. It was an expediency that by no means reflected a blind bias against the interactional model, nor was it a conceptual structure dominated by purposive-rational criteria in a dull obliviousness to the criteria of Gemeinwesen. Rather, it adopted a pre-communal mentality and took up the cry of this ongoing class conflict that indeed was an instrumental focus. It fell back increasingly on Marx's scholarly arsenal in an effort to weld the needed solidarity in the party, though privately Marx was by no means so optimistic. More and more, "scientific truth" promised the ultimate triumph of the proletariat in the class struggle. Science itself promised that the triumph of the industrial proletariat was allegedly inevitable! There was every reason to take up arms. The new science promised that the proletariat couldn't lose. But it made

no pretense at coping with the self-alienating qualities of capitalism and possessive individualism that persisted by his own clearly stated acknowledgement not only in the bourgeoisie, but also in the proletariat and in himself as well. This would have required a support system beyond the possibility of the moment and perhaps even antithetical to the exigencies of political struggle. The first task as he saw it was to wrest power from the oppressor and he set out to do it. This is the only reasonable explanation for his otherwise self-contradictory assertion in"The Critique of the Gotha Program" that "Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon a society into one completely subordinate to it" (Marx, 1972, p. 537). Were we to accept this dogma on face value, it would convert the essence of his concept of Gemeinwesen by overemphasizing the political element of freedom at the expense of the interactional elements. For freedom, according to the fundmental precepts of Hegel and Marx, required a reciprocity in which every objectification, the state included, is reciprocally submitted to rational deliberation. That is, rational deliberation conditions social existence and social existence conditions rational deliberation. In Marx's own words, "Existence as a citizen" cannot be "outside communal existence."

Rather than to attempt the imposition of a theoretical consciousness which the historical circumstances could not, in his view, accomodate--rather than risk the solidarity of an ongoing movement and invite a rent in the propaganda role he adopted, he chose to defer the critical support structures needed to cope with, and bring under control, the qualities of egoism and possessive individualism--the bourgeois vestiges within the being of the revolutionaries

themselves. This would have demanded a totalistic counter-cultural transformation that involved availability of diverse perspectives, dialogue, and time for deliberation, quite a different context than that possible in the class struggles of the mid-nineteenth century. A successful class struggle was to be followed by gestures to the peasantry, the Lumpenproletariat, and the like, whose often reactionary position complicated their incorporation into the movement. He had to wring as much as possible out of a ready-made vehicle en route.

He surely took risks in these tactics--those appropriately recognized by Proudhon, Bakunin, and the other perceptive critics. But he saw no reasonable alternative and believed that the time was not ripe. What is important for those who would build from the Marxian heritage is that neither Marx nor Hegel missed the importance of a total transitional process. On the theoretical level, neither proposed a conflation of the political and the other social-interactional components of transcendence, but on the level of praxis each proposed a political form that risked a guardianship of the interactional qualities under a political structure that had no built-in defenses against abuse of power and that invited political dominance and control. Yet, even as Marx missed this in Hegel, not only Marx's latter-day critics but his partisans as well, have missed it in Marx. For Hegel and for Marx, emancipatory objectification and transcendence were total communal acts whose time had not come. It is to Marx's credit that he never surrendered to Rhodes. The leap that the time demanded was not so formidable that he would abandon his attempt to overleap and to glean a maximum advantage for human emancipation.

Perhaps the time was not ripe. Perhaps, had some mystic achieved a dialogue involving the community of the utopians, the participatory organization and anti-authoritarianism of the anarchists, and the political realism of the Marxists, a non-utopian, politically conscious, community-based counter-culture might have survived a hostile climate. But that is a moot point. What is pertinent is that the problem was less conceptual than existential. It is indeed crucial that we not lose sight of the fact that Marx's theoretical criticism of Hegel was at once material and that any critique of Marx must be the same.

What is missed by a continuous oversimplification that places too much emphasis on fallacious arguments that purport to identify a serious gap in logic and a presumed purposive-rational bias, is a failure to acknowledge the import of the context and total transition that both Hegel and Marx knew must be the ultimate weapon in the sequence. The ultimate weapon must be a social support system that acknowledged the tension linked to change and provided emotional sustenance consonant with the formidable nature of its initial theoretical concomitant, Marx's theory of Gemeinwesen. Theory and praxis must survive as distinct but devolve as closely as possible in a coordinated interlinkage--the dialectic process. Perhaps this was not the time but sadly the time was further away than the young Marx had realized.

Antithetical to the realization of such a support system (Gemeinwesen) is a society characterized and determined by a non-dialectically related political state or hierarchically structured

organization. We may be referred back to Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, precisely because he believed that for Hegel, "man's existence as a citizen" was an existence that was "completely outside his communal existence." Yet, to date, the struggling factions within the communist movement, whether by design or perceived necessity, have fallen prey to the exigencies and compensatory expedience of Hegel's own social objectification in the constitutional monarch. That is, each sought to realize an emancipatory consciousness and objectified the social context in a setting that was decidedly antithetical to that ideal--in a surrogate.

The utopian socialists separated civil society from the realities of the power struggles extant in the world. They separated existence as a citizen from communal existence by withdrawing the community from the ongoing political scene as if potentially oppressive power would simply go away (or could be contained) if ignored. Engels directed a telling criticism of the Saint-Simonians, the Fourierists, and the Owenites. "The utopians," he charged, attempted to "evolve" answers to social problems "out of the human brain" (Engels, 1972, p. 687).

> One thing is common to all three. Not one of them appears as a representative of the interests of that proletariat which historical development had, in the meantime, produced. Like the French philosophers, they do not claim to emancipate a particular class to begin with, but all humanity at once. Like them, they wish to bring in the kingdom of reason and eternal justice . . . (Engels, 1972, p. 685).

The utopians had retained the communal aspect but withdrew from a dialectic process. They withdrew from the value constraints of an oppressive system, not to reorganize as a counterculture, but as a

benign coexisting system that would not develop its institutions out of a dialectic linkage to existential conditions but out of more or less abstract rational conditions. The theme was not emancipation for all but a separation of a select community from the state's power and all political reality.

As we have seen, the anarchists took a similar position. Bakunin also retained the communal ideal but differed from the utopians in that he called for an all-out war against the state and would have no part of a withdrawal to an alternative culture within the extant political system. Nor would he countenance an overthrow of the state in order to "redirect" its power in the interest of a continuing revolution. He perceptively opposed conflation of the state's power with an abstractly conceived collective organizational structure, but his violent intolerance of any power-related political action precluded any protracted interrelationship between the revolutionaries and the state, even if the objective was ultimately to subordinate the political to the communal structure. He simply called for the annihilation of the state and all political action linked to it by means essentially of a spontaneous uprising of the people.

In effect, both anarchists and utopians called for preservation of the community as a transitional necessity, but as we have seen, Marx believed that both mystified community by failing to show how it could interact with and flourish surrounded by a vast, often belligerant majority, still alienated and under the manipulative spell of bourgeois perspectives and power. Even if utopian communities succeeded in surviving in a hostile climate, they could not realize their fullest interactional potential if they isolated

themselves from the central realities of their world, disregarded the dehumanizing consequences of an alienating division of labor and renounced their political-economic heritage. To settle for an escape from the world is by definition to escape the dialectic of freedom.

The anarchists also sought to preserve community by forming the "commune" from the "ground up" via the utilization of federations whose only power was the constituency of the representatives. That is, there would be no federal state with police or army, only a representative assembly. But again, they separated the function of citizen from communal existence by mystifying the latter's capacity to overpower the state without already having realized a disciplined, efficiently managed revolutionary organization. Unlike the utopians, the anarchists sought to form not merely a counterculture but one that depended upon "will and determination" to simultaneously overthrow the extant oppressive regime. They radically underestimated the power of the dominant state to hold power, exploit economic realities, and manipulate concensus. Further, the entire project was made dependent on the assumption that the people might, by some means not clearly specified, have been rendered simultaneously conscious of their oppression.

For their part, the Marxists "temporarily" postponed the communal aspect. On the basis of procedures already established in the uprisings of the 1840s they yielded the support structure of the community to overcome certain immediate "instrumental" bases of alienation--those linked to our basic struggle to survive. They chose a purposive-rational nostrum and separated community from the

state and its power by arguing that the state's power be seized by the industrial proletariat. This tactical move, prior to the realization of community, was seen as a temporary measure in which the newly acquired power of the state would be used to eliminate bourgeois obstacles to the realization of emancipatory consciousness. What they failed to acknowledge was that they sought to place power in the hands of a people who had not dialectically transcended their own egoism and possessive bourgeois characteristics. Without a support structure, what would prevent the traditional competitive-possessive pattern retained within their own being from exploiting that power long before the state "withered away?" It was here that theory, following Marx's precedent, became science and, in the view of Bakunin, Castoradis, et al., the party with its specialists became stand-in for the class (Howard, 1977, p. 283). Here, political power precluded the self-instituting function of community and the concomitant alienation of bourgeois individualism could not be systematically addressed. Hence, the only basis for constituting a formidable revolutionary force was the proletariat. Later they would be educated, freed, and rendered "conscious." Again, the dialectic was precluded but this time, unlike the case of the utopians and anarchists, it was not for the loss of the state and its transitional potential but for the loss of community. With the loss of community went the loss of a support system within the emancipatory unit itself, capable of providing alternatives and emotional sustenance during the time of significant social and personal upheaval. Yet, paradoxically, it was precisely this

upheaval which their own radical reforms promised to bring about. Clearly, if the struggle for political power precluded the self-instituting function of community, then the loss of community constituted a self-alienating function of the seizure of power.

Neither Marx nor any of the socialist factions prevalent in his time had succeeded in solving the dilemma that had earlier stymied Hegel--how to avoid a separation of one's power as a citizen from one's communal existence, in a manner that neither tempted one to abuse power nor rendered one vulnerable to the abuse of others. One group (the utopians and anarchists) retained the dialectic necessity of such a communally oriented social context and eschewed any political activism that demanded an interrelationship with the existing political structure. Another (the Marxists) echewed community in order that it might set the stage for a total dialectic transcendence presumably to follow the completion of a sequence beginning with the seizure of bourgeois power and ending with the ultimate atrophication of that power. In effect, each had taken an aspect of the Hegel-Marx tradition.

The Marxists had stressed an acknowledgement of the political realities of each age and locus. The utopians and anarchists had stressed the necessity of a communal transcendence. Each had attempted to attenuate the pace of tenacious egoism and possessive individualism. Each had abstracted a necessary but insufficient component from dialectic transcendence: (1) the Marxists stressed instrumental concerns, the struggle, the conflict to survive; and (2) the bulk of the opposition had chosen the broader context of social interaction.

Hegel and Marx laid out the principle and Bakunin continually reminded Marx of it, that since we are social beings, we diminish our humanity by any withdrawal (whether in self-protection or by choice), from a position of maximal dialectic social interaction. Since objectification of one's self occurs within a social matrix, any narrowing or inhibition of that matrix--the alienation of any of the diverse potentials extant in human culture--constricts the quality of that process and consciousness is correspondingly narrowed. In that sense, the Marxists' retreat to a political vehicle was no less a withdrawal or escape from dialectics than was that of the utopians. However, this escape from dialectics was not necessarily an escape from reality.

In the absence of a spontaneous revelation, emancipated consciousness is a laborious, painful process which occurs within society--a society with a cultural heritage, a history, a value constellation. If an alternative way of life is to be realized, it must not only undergo gestation and parturition, but also experience its fledgling years within a majority culture whose very existence constitutes a contradiction. Indeed, given the egoistic, competitive system against which it is juxtaposed, the climate must be assumed hostile.

Since the totality of human culture is a mixed blessing, it must be countered in its dehumanizing components; yet simultaneously preserved in its vast historical richness and diversity. For without tradition we would be reduced to grunts and savage mentality. In other words, while competition, egoism, and aggression are anathema

and the targets of a transcendental revolution, an ill-conceived and executed reaction to these obstacles may not only destroy the dehumanizing potential but neglect or obscure the cultural support vehicles on which even a radical objectification and transcendence must rest.

Marx is correct that unless an alternative form continues to win adherents and check the political power of the opposition, if necessary by judicious involvement in the political system itself, it is likely to fail. He is further correct in his assertion that as long as any peoples are oppressed and creative dialectic interaction with them is precluded, our own freedom is impaired. This says that the organization of emancipation must be aggressively counter to--and not merely neutral or tolerant of--the oppressive society. Cognizant of their value implications, it must employ those political tactics, effective not only in the preservation of the emancipatory organization, but in the total liberation of all humankind. Hence, these tactics must also include an attempt to foster a transcendental interactional dialectic vastly beyond that that might be realized by a merely non-bourgeois political economy.

Clearly Marx was not so naive as to make a simplified determinist argument. His and Hegel's identification of labor, objectification in the products of one's labor, the alienating consequences of egoistic control over the means of social production, and of labor as a commodity in an oppressive economy were vastly more sophisticated than that (surely more than anything Bakunin or any other of his contemporary critics acknowledge). His resort to an instrumental and constricted objectification of that larger perspective was merely

a necessary but insufficient first step. Marx knew that; although, for reasons already noted, he was less than prolific in his public acknowledgement of the limited aspect of that first step. Subsequent to a negation of capitalism, the next step would be to rebuild on the basis of the rich diversity--the totality of human culture--that permits the requisite species-activity, our communal nature, to flourish. It would not be to withdraw into utopia but neither could our communal essence be postponed. It is at this point that Hyppolite's critique attains a limited validity! For Marx did indeed gloss over the "historic alienation of the human spirit" in the interest of an "efficiently" managed class struggle.

Marx did not believe that a fully democratic International could capitalize on the immediate historical moment. Hence, at best he could only have hoped to move bourgeois society to a higher level of consciousness. His theoretical work forcefully advanced this thesis. But had he also been in a position to publicly acknowledge the limitations of his political activity, he would surely, in like manner, have been compelled to qualify his extravagant claims for a hierarchically structured International. (Bakunin was not entirely in error in his insistence that the International was, in many respects, bourgeois in its organizational configuration.) He would likewise have been compelled to publically qualify his purposive-rational claims based on the laws of positivistic science that once the proletariat had broken the power of the bourgeois state and transformed (Aufhebung) its power, oppression would obligingly wither away. Rather, that candor was offered up in sacrifice to

solidarity--in sacrifice to expedient measures--intended to sustain the dream of Gemeinwesen, floated over a sea of humanity as yet hardly conscious enough to apprehend its full implication. Like Hegel, the exigencies of the prevalent bourgeois perspective and power caused him to adopt a transitional vehicle that was in several respects characteristically bourgeois.

Marx, whose life style was admittedly bourgeois, was engaged in an ambiguous revolutionary praxis that still retained bourgeois competitive, egoistic, and non-dialectic elements. After all, the immediate end of the class struggle he adopted was not communism but the redress of oppression. He would merely seize the moment and attempt to bring about a political context more conducive to the ultimate realization of Gemeinwesen. Given the exigencies of the time, he was perhaps more realistic than Bakunin.

But Bakunin, the anarchist and utopian, in the spirit of Hegel, was more realistic than Marx. He prophetically cautioned that once Marxists, with their bureaucratic structure, acquired power, whether it was designated social democratic, socialistic, or cooperative, the state would not merely "wither away." Unless the organization of emancipation was itself emancipatory, it provided no transitional vehicle to humanistic communal being. For this had to be a total community in microcosm if the transcendence was to be truly social and characterized by a mechanism that fostered self-objectification. Only this could overcome the alienation that perplexed Hegel and which served as the valid element in Hyppolite's critique of Marx. Clearly, Marx's enthusiasm to capitalize on the

existing class struggle caused him, not as Hyppolite and the later Critical Theorists believed, to miss the importance of dialectic transcendence but rather to propagandize and engage in wishful assertions that the transition from a hierarchical structure to a communal society would occur through a miraculous faith in the proletariat and their theorists. He never fully confronted how what I term his intermediate bourgeois revolution would reach its goal before it turned in on itself.

But the time was not ripe. It had to wait for a propitious moment where the idea detailed by Hegel and Marx and structurally advanced by Marx, Bakunin, et al.,had a chance of realization. What implication does this convey in our time? Marx was correct. A counter-social component, the political component, was essential. Today this would call for a revised mode of conflict, perhaps not feasible in Marx's time. An immediate coup d'etat must be eschewed, first, because it is ludicrous in the face of the power of the state and second, because such power, if attainable, is antithetical to the flourishing of our communal being. This is where Bakunin is prophetic.

Bakunin was correct that a sufficiently radical plan would also retain this schema, born in the ideal of Hegel and Marx, to constitute an organization of emancipation that itself manifests a communal essence, one that penetrates to the core of civil society, to our jobs, to be sure, but also to our sex roles, our families, and our leisure and that also aggressively involves itself in the world as an exemplary manifestation of the vastly greater fulfillment

possible from a life of Gemeinwesen. Today in the "Western democracies" this would demand an involvement in politics (perhaps also not possible in Bakunin's time), not in an authoritarian struggle for power (Marx) or a destruction of that power (Bakunin), but on a basis of a flexible strategy. This would include selective tactical involvement on the political sphere with a primary focus on the creation of an increasingly receptive climate for the newly developing communal counter-culture. The emphasis would be on the realization of a non-coercive basis for fundamental structural change via the manifest preferability of a communal life style. For it is only on such an open collective basis that a revolution might be realized which left behind the oppressive cultural characteristics that persist in today's bourgeois "democracies." It would set about to expand and render the climate within bourgeois democracy more receptive to the newly devolving communal counter-culture. Its political function would not necessarily be served by a class struggle aimed at a take-over or destruction of the state's power. Rather it would carry with it some elements of coexistence. It would acknowledge, however, that if confrontation were ever called for, a successful outcome could be expected only in a context in which the strength of the organization of emancipation was based on internal emancipation.

Only then could the political counter-moves of Marx based primarily on a necessary but not sufficient social structural component--the political-economic--be linked to the broad expanses of the total cultural structure that is the image behind Marx's

concept of communal being. Only then could the abstracted utopian social organization of emancipation become the richly diverse counter-cultural organization of emancipation.

In the pages that follow, I will consider an exemplary group of theorists who extracted the theory of Marx from the conflict-embroiled context in which it was generated and found it conceptually wanting. I will contend that the problem which these theorists set out to solve is primarily a rehash of the dilemma confronted by Hegel and Marx, not because the conceptual basis of Hegel and Marx was weak, but because its extension and elaboration was not undertaken in a truly communal context. What Marx's theory requires of its modern advocates is an abandonment of abstract theory in deference to the searching-out of a more receptive climate than Marx enjoyed. Only then might one expect to initiate the most feasible next step beyond Marx's bourgeois-tainted revolutionary organization and simultaneously advance theory. But the modern theorists in question eschewed a counter-cultural community in which theory is both acknowledged and undertaken by all those affected by its enlightenment, in a true dialectic relationship with praxis. They failed to reach the ever more necessary deduction that the organization of emancipation must be the theorist of emancipation--the universal counter-cultural context of emancipation--to meet the core principles of Hegel and Marx.

CHAPTER VI

MANNHEIM

It was the intellectual crisis of Mannheim's time that led him to an investigation of the relationship between thought and social existence. This was the theme of his theoretical works in the sociology of knowledge and the basis of his later involvement in social planning. The value of theory for Mannheim (as well as Horkheimer) was in how it related to the understanding of social activity, and thus the overcoming of the chaotic social environment. However, the intellectual environment was not conducive to finding solutions and transcending the "iron cage" of modern technocracy and the totalitarian implication of thought control.

The apparently inexorable march of oppressive bureaucratic capitalism drove the great intellects of Mannheim's day into scepticism (Weber, Freud), subjectivist escapism (Husserl, Bergson), and fascism (Pareto). The exceptions, including not only Horkheimer but also Lukacs, Luxemburg, et al., were the heirs of the Marxian tradition. They claimed to have an answer, which hinged on the overthrow of the existing order.

This is where Mannheim parted company from the early Horkheimer. Mannheim saw himself caught in the middle between a defeatist bourgeois scepticism on the one hand and a far too radical dogmatic Marxism on the other. He was uncomfortable with any arrangement that precluded dialogue between antagonists, yet he believed that there was a solution to the chaos of Western civilization.

His emphasis on mediation--on compromise--reflected his strong liberal tendencies.* In his sociology of knowledge, Mannheim brought this liberalism to its outer boundaries through a constant emphasis on the unity of theory and praxis. "Only a mode of thought, only a philosophy which is able to give a concrete answer to the question 'what shall we do?' can put forward the claim to have overcome relativism" (Mannheim, 1953, p. 128-129). The crisis, then, was not to be overcome either by being ignored or by claiming new gods, but rather by creating a new mode of thinking whose validity would be based in social existence. It is with this understanding of his project that we are now able to turn to an analysis of his work.

While it is popular to analyze Mannheim's writing in terms of various stages (Metaphysical Stage, Historicist Stage, Planning Stage), I think that a close reading of Mannheim reveals that the basic concerns indicated above were present throughout his life. His thoughts about theory and social planning revealed persisting concerns, though they were asked and answered in different ways.

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* I draw here from a definition of liberalism in Kettler. "The modern liberal believes that in political thought, as in politics, conflicts are not 'insurmountable,' . . . they represent differences of opinion resolvable by some kind of transition and adjustment" (Cumming, in Kettler, 1975, p. 70).

Hence for purposes of this study, we shall assume a fundamental consistency throughout his productive years.

In his theoretical work, Mannheim's basic aim was to understand society as a totality. He wanted to overcome the particularity and self-proclaimed mutual exclusion of the myriad perspectives of his day.

> Since, however, all these points of view emerge out of the same social and historical current, and since their partiality exists in the matrix of an emerging whole, it is possible to see them in juxtaposition, and their synthesis becomes a problem which must continually be reformulated and resolved (Mannheim, 1936, p. 151).

Behind the antagonisms of society was a basic, collective unity out of which these perspectives derived. This concept of an underlying social totality had its origins in Idealist philosophy, primarily in Hegel and Dilthey.

For Hegel, as we have seen, the varied forms of social life exhibited throughout history were the particular and temporal expressions of the absolute essence of human freedom. History was determined by the necessary logical development of the concept of freedom. Truth, then, was not a fixed essence, eternally separate from us, but rather was expressed in the totality of our historical development.

Dilthey relativized this historical approach. For him, there was no unitary "Reason" in history. Rather, there was simply the wealth of experience expressed in the myriad of perspectives existing in life. The social sciences could not find reason in history--rather they were limited to an empathetic understanding of the various "world views" in order to get a sense of the totality of

human existence. Dilthey's historicism had a massive impact on Mannheim's thought. The quest for the whole of life, the transcendence of particularity is almost a trademark of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.

However, Mannheim could not retain this undifferentiated concept of the "whole of life" without serious modification. This modification grew out of the highly differentiated and chaotic environment of his day. This pointed toward a notion of ideas and truth being spawned out of the struggles of social existence. "As for myself, I shall always regard it as one of the most important questions to know how human consciousness is shaped and determined by the social struggle" (Mannheim, 1953, p. 191). That is, you cannot understand (Verstehen) a world view merely through empathy (Dilthey), but rather you have to understand a world view in terms of the social basis of its existence. This obviously has its origins in Marx: "The great revelation it [Marxian theory] affords is that every form of historical and political thought is conditioned by the life situation of the thinker and his groups" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 125). I will deal with his arguments with Marx later; nevertheless, he acknowledged his large debt to Marx throughout his work.

Mannheim saw himself as standing between the more specific positivistic Marxist perspective (see Mannheim, 1953, p. 161) and the undifferentiated "Verstehen" of Dilthey.

> . . . Max Weber's methodology . . . established sociology as the science which links the interpretive understanding of social behavior with causal explanations of its course and effects. Weber had moved sociology into a position of centrality; this lesson was not lost on Karl Mannheim (Remmling, 1971, p. 536).

Once again, the "middle way" shone through Mannheim's work. He saw sociology as a primary, synthesizing discipline that would try to get a sense of the totality of social life through the compilation and synthesis of all possible perspectives.

> Just because today we are in a position to see with increasing clarity that mutually opposing views and theories are not infinite in number and are not products of arbitrary will but are mutually complementary and derive from specific social situations, politics as a science is for the first time possible. The present structure of society makes possible a political science which will not be merely a party science, but a science of the whole (Mannheim, 1936, p. 149).

Here he attempted to overcome the powerful scepticism of Weber who thought such a science would have only a very limited value (the study of means). Mannheim thought it would be possible to bring irrational social action more and more under the scrutiny of critical, rational analysis. His sociology of knowledge was an attempt to maintain the spirit of the Enlightenment against defeatism and irrationalism.

> But our aim is not that of the Romantics--to escape the general rationalizing process of modern times. We want so to refine and extend the methods of rational analysis that they enable us to grasp scientifically the concrete object in its concrete context (Mannheim, 1940, p. 170).

Having given a rough overview of Mannheim's theoretical position, I have ignored what was stressed earlier--the intimate linkage between theory and praxis in his thought. "The thinker whom events cannot refute is prone to forget the principle purpose of thought: to know and foresee in order to act" (Mannheim, 1956, p. 160). We may now turn to an analysis of his theoretical position in light of his attitude toward practice, keying on two crucial

segments of his work: the analyses of ideology and of the intelligentsia.

The Analysis of Ideology

Mannheim's analysis of ideology is crucial if one is to understand the antagonism that Marxist thinkers exhibit toward him. This antagonism, however, should not blind one to the fact that much of Mannheim's thought is derived from Marx. For Mannheim, " . . . the sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation out of which individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 3). One can easily see that this perspective has its roots in Marx, for whom "ideas are the conscious expression--real or illusory--of their actual relationships and activities, of their production and commerce, and of their social and political behavior" (Marx, 1967, p. 414). Similar to Marx, Mannheim deepened his analysis to include the political element--namely ideology. "We begin to treat our adversary's views as ideological only when we no longer consider them as calculated lies and when we sense in his total behavior an unreliability which we regard as a function of the social situation in which he finds himself" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 61). Thus, one no longer analyzed an individual's position only in personal terms but, rather in terms of one's social situation. Marx made a similar point in the preface of Capital:

> To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But here individuals are dealt with in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments

> of particular class relations and class interests (Marx, 1906, p. 15).

However, Mannheim made clear his disagreement with Marx on a crucial issue. He rejected Marx's application of ideological analysis (the social-historical perspective on ideas) as a weapon in political struggle.

> Although the problem outlined above [ideology] has first been formulated in terms of the Marxian philosophy of history, we must, in studying it, be careful to renounce all materialist metaphysics and to exclude (or to reduce to the elements of truth in them) all propagandistic considerations (Mannheim, 1952, p. 182).

For Mannheim, rejection of materialist metaphysics meant rejection of what he perceived to be a dogmatic, one-sided perspective on society. One-sidedness, whether from the Left or Right, was what Mannheim saw as an obstacle to a sober consideration and resolution of the crisis in Europe. He believed that it was harmful to use ideological analysis as a "class weapon." Instead, what was called for was a more global, pluralistic use of ideological analysis that would not destroy one's opponent but would rather mediate and find areas of compromise.

> But we reject the 'realistic' practic of allocating--for political or religious reasons--priority to one particular grouping such as the class, race, church or nation, and we oppose the interpretation of all other social aggregations as derivatives of the one 'real' grouping. . . . We believe that the individual as such can be understood only thorugh his participation in a multitude of groupings some of which are coordinated while others overlap or even conflict (Mannheim, 1956, p. 110).

Thus, Mannheim removed ideological analysis from its political setting (Marxism) and saw it as the basis for analyzing all perspectives. "What was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of reserach in social and intellectual history

generally" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 78).

He did not like what he saw as a destructive function of ideological analysis, for he equated the "unmasking" of a perspective with its destruction. By a replacement of the "theory of ideology" with the sociology of knowledge, we could attain a perspective oriented to "positive," rather than destructive, social analysis. "In its first stage, this tendency neutralizes the various conflicting points of view (i.e. deprives them of their absolute character); in its second stage, it creates out of this neutralization a more comprehensive and serviceable basis of vision" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 302).

Mannheim tried to preserve the primacy of rationality in a social context increasingly dominated by bitter factions, fear, and violence. In a Germany torn by despair, and with irrationality and fascism rapidly becoming the primary mode of political action, he tried to find a place for rational dialogue. Despair over the brutal suppression of the post-war Marxist revolutions in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Germany) with the violent deaths of great theorists like Luxemburg and Liebknecht, led Mannheim to locate rational change outside of the struggle.

Mannheim's Neutralization of Ideology

As the basis of my critique of Mannheim's "neutralization" of ideology, I shall first go back to Marx. Marx would surely question the feasibility and reasonableness of the "neutralization" of ideology. For him:

> Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., but these are real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the relationships corresponding to these up to their highest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else except conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process (Marx, 1967, p. 414).

What is crucial here is the emphasis on the term "their actual life-process." When one speaks of different perspectives being based on different social conditions, one must also remember that to "neutralize" conflicts in ideas is to neutralize conflicts in actual living situations. The absolute character of a conflict in ideas is often based on an absolute conflict in social life, e.g.,the owners and the owned. The mental neutralization of conceptual conflicts only serves to conceal the concrete conflicts in society that most likely cannot be compromised away. This is not to deny the value of being self-critical and undogmatic; however, it is uncritical to cover over basic antagonisms in society by adopting the illusion that they can be talked away through a multiperspectivistic sociology of knowledge. Perhaps in this case Marx would apply his critique of the Young Hegelians: "A clever fellow once got the idea that people drown because they are possessed by the idea of gravity. If they would get this notion out of their heads by seeing it as a religious superstitution, they would be completely safe from all danger of water" (Marx, 1967, p. 405). Mannheim, true to his liberal perspective, believed that if only we would be reasonable and undogmatic, most problems would be overcome. His was an attempt to establish some basis on which antagonists could talk to, rather than past, each other. Sensing that strictly violent, non-rational confrontation

would result in a non-rational reality (a feeling which was to be verified in Hitler's Reich), Mannheim vainly hoped that a rational basis of discussion could overcome these deep-rooted social antagonisms.

This failure to relate actual social conditions to ideas was also demonstrated in Mannheim's analysis of the "unmasking" and thus "destructive" quality of ideological analysis. He wrote that the destructive character of ideological analysis could be applied equally to the proletariat as to the bourgeoisie. This equation of "unmasking" and destruction of a viewpoint would have been rejected by Marx. What the "unmasking" of a perspective did was to reveal its social basis. This unmasking could indeed be destructive of a viewpoint. That is, if "unmasking" revealed alternative modes, or if coercion and manipulation of belief were evidenced, then it could be destructive of an ideological stance. However, it might also help establish a firmer conviction and loyalty to a culture that was ethically consistent and a political-economic system that was in accord with the ideas generated and subscribed to by a free people. Thus a concept's validity is not necessarily brought into doubt by pointing out its social basis--rather,the validity of a concept must be ascertained through the questioning of the social basis itself. This questioning of conflicting social bases was something only barely touched upon by Mannheim. To him the symptoms of destructive and dangerous conflicts in society were to be found in "destructive" ideological analysis of the Marxian genre. For Marx, on the contary, "even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. comes into conflict

with existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into conflict with the existing force of production" (Marx, 1967, p. 423). Thus theoretical conflict cannot be transcended through the mere theoretical unmasking of its social origins; rather, one must actually change the social conditions which lead to this conflict. This proposition was never fully addressed by Mannheim.

That weakness in Mannheim's interpretation of Marx was evident when he asserted that now even the proletariat was subject to ideological analysis. "It is no longer the exclusive privilege of socialist thinkers to trace bourgeois thought to ideological foundations and thereby discredit it. Nowadays groups of every standpoint use this weapon against all the rest" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 75). Mannheim seems to have ignored the fact that one of the characteristics of Marxist thought from the beginning was to openly proclaim the social roots of ideas and to challenge the existing world through more than thought alone. Marxists had already "ideologicallly exposed" Marxism. Indeed the basis of the Marxist critique of capitalism was a self-understanding of its own social roots and goals. Of course, understanding at once embodied the transcendence of capitalism in the real world. To be sure, Marxists used ideological analysis to discredit other positions--but this was done by not merely "revealing" the roots of an idea, but also by discrediting these roots. Thus, if the opponents of Marxism wished to sustain their challenge it was not sufficient to merely oppose Marxism intellectually and expose it ideologically. Marxism had to be "disproven" in the realm

of political-economic struggle where its roots were to be found. It was this last aspect of "how men actually think" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 1) that Mannheim seemed to have forgotten. Meja observed that "This separation of the sociology of knowledge from the critique of ideology is part of the general process which split German society and the science of that society into bourgeois liberal and Marxist camps" (Meja, 1975, p. 58). This is crucial to an understanding of Horkheimer's and Habermas' critique of Mannheim.

The Analysis of the Intelligentsia

Closely linked to ideological analysis and to social criticism was the question of the role of the intelligentsia. Mannheim, contrary to the Critical Theorists, fought hard against the "ivory tower" intellectual and, both theoretically and personally, made a strong stand for political activism. For Mannheim, theory had to give a practical as well as theoretical orientation toward society. He centered his notion of practice on the intellectual. "Sociology of knowledge was to be the technique for discovering what it meant to be an intellectual; it was to provide a moral and practical orientation" (Kettler, 1967, p. 406). One of Mannheim's primary aims was to awaken intellectuals to their proper task--transcendence of provincialism and the propagation of the basic liberal message--the understanding of society as a whole. "The fate of the world of thought is in the care of a socially unattached, or barely attached, stratum whose class affinities and status cannot be precisely defined" (Mannheim, 1953, p. 128). Throughout his life, Mannheim dedicated himself to the advancement of the intellectual

as the mediator in society. The goal of intellectuals, he said, "consists precisely in becoming aware of their own social position and the mission implicit in it. When this is achieved, political affiliation or opposition will be decided on the basis of a conscious orientation in society and in accordance with the demands of the intellectual life" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 160). This strong concern for the critical social awareness of the intellectuals has led one interpreter to an assessment with which I concur--". . . Mannheim tried to do for the intellectuals what Marx had done for the workers." (Heeren, 1971, p. 14).

A closer look at his analysis of the intelligentsia reveals a direct linkage with his analysis of ideology. When Mannheim looked for the social basis of ideas, what he really examined was the social basis of the intelligentsia. He contended that "We can understand the transformation of the various ideologies only on the basis of changes in the social composition of the intellectual stratum corresponding to them" (Mannheim, 1952, p. 186). Here again, we see that "neutralizing" transformation of Marx. Instead of the actual social existence of all people, we now study the actual social existence of the intelligentsia. "We cannot relate an intellectual standpoint directly to a social class; what we can do is find out the correlation between the 'style of thought' underlying a given standpoint, and the 'intellectual motivation' of a certain social group" (Mannheim, 1952, p. 184).

So Mannheim, in the last analysis, strayed from his goal of describing "how men actually think." In the first few pages

of his magnum opus, Ideology and Utopia, he criticized philosophers for thinking only about what other philosophers thought--Mannheim wished to deal with how real historical people thought. Elsewhere he criticized the one-sidedness of Marxism: "If, however, the category of interest is elevated to the rank of an absolute principle, the result can only be the reduction of the role of sociology to that of reconstructing the homo economicus, whereas sociology in fact has to examine man as a whole" (Mannheim, 1952, p. 184). The contradiction in this position (ignoring his mistaking of "vulgar" Marxism for Marx) is that the sociology that wishes to examine "man as a whole" turns out to investigate the intellectual as though he/she were that whole.

Mannheim saw the intelligentsia as being a classless stratum. That is, their position in society was such that they had no strong material-economic interests of their own, so they were comparatively free to take a variety of perspectives. Their lack of concrete particular interests made it possible for them to transcend dogmatic provincialism to become the carriers of the pluralist message. It was that message which was in the interest of society as a whole. We must be careful here, though, not to fall into the common misinterpretation that Mannheim saw the intellectuals as some kind of transcendent class. "Let us re-emphasize at this point that intellectuals do not form an exalted stratum above the classes and are in no way better endowed with a capacity to overcome their own class attachments than other groups" (Mannheim, 1956, p. 105).

What put intellectuals in an important role then, was the fact that their own class attachments were weakened by education, and thus they were less bound to any one group. This consciousness of their position in society would permit a new science of politics, as was mentioned earlier. The "detached" nature of the intellectual allowed participation in politics and social action not on the basis of dogmatism, but rather on the basis of a careful synthesis of the conflicting perspectives that prevail in society. Faced with the shrill, dogmatic conflicts of German politics, Mannheim saw little hope for rational dialogue among those involved in the fight itself. The myriad of parties were so immersed in the struggle for their own survival that Mannheim saw them as unable to develop a non-provincial, or synthetic, perspective on society. The only synthesizers in society then, were to be those who had no actual political-economic power.

The bankruptcy of this conception of the intelligentsia became clear in his work on social planning. Mannheim ended his essay on the intelligentsia with the statement: "A stratum does not have to become a party or a pressure group to become conscious and to attain its ends" (Mannheim, 1956, p. 170). In his major work on social planning, Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction, he demonstrated exactly what the role of such an intellectual stratum would be: advisor to the ruling elites.

> It is true that even to-day ideas can create no new worlds by themselves, but it is decisive for future events whether or not sound thinking goes on to-day and whether it reaches the ruling elites (Mannheim, 1940, p. 366).

Thus the intelligentsia, with no power of direction of its own, was reduced to advising those who already had power. There was a sort of naive pleading in Mannheim. It was more of a hope that he might convince the ruling elites to operate in the interests of society as a whole. His constant emphasis on social harmony, pluralism, and compromise left out the possibility that in some conditions, particularly those involving manipulation of consensus, oppression cannot be overcome by compromise with the very powers who are convinced that their advantages are dependent on that oppression. It is clear that advocacy of pluralist harmony and compromise in such a circumstance may well play to the advantage of those in power, rather than to those oppressed people in need of liberation.

> To sum up, it is much more plausible to say that the parliamentary machinery ceases to work, not because the class war and other social maladjustments exist, but because the will and the ability to reform is lacking. That is to say, we do not provide the social and economic machinery for the broader changes in society and we allow social institutions and class interests to clash, until these unfettered maladjustments become so strong that the political framework of democracy and parliamentarism is too weak to hold such a society together (Mannheim, 1940, p. 344).

So, it was a "spirit of reform" that would overcome the crisis, by achieving a compromise between the various antagonistic positions in society. In a certain sense, he was right, and this correctness is precisely what the Frankfurt School feared: the sublimation of class conflict and the domination of humanity through subtle social control. Mannheim's intense concentration on the totality, unity, synthesis, and compromise blinded him to the dialectic notion of freedom. Lost was the critical role accorded negation, which we

have previously examined. Lost was collective, democratic, critical self-determination. Instead, Mannheim's only gurantee of freedom was that "wherever it is possible and the plan is not endangered every effort must be made to maintain the primary form of freedom--freedom for individual adjustment" (Mannheim, 1940, p. 379). The individual's freedom become adaptation, rather than positive creativity. Mannheim believed that the "social maladjustment" of class conflict and political struggle of the modern capitalist society could be overcome through the careful adjustment and adaptation of the individual to social needs. He concentrated on social-psychological techniques to guarantee the freedom and well-being of humankind. This ran in direct conflict to what could be seen as the emancipatory theme in the Hegelian-Marxist concept of the dialectic of freedom. "The demand to abandon illusions about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition which requires illusions" (Marx, 1967, p. 250).

Mannheim's apparently conservative political position should not be seen as a reaction and change from his earlier, more theoretical position. Rather, I think that much of his orientation toward practice could be derived from his theoretical analysis. This become clear where Mannheim justified the need for the sociology of knowledge. Speaking of positivism he said:

> Here, too, it could be said that as long as this method of splitting up reality continued to work smoothly in the sense that it corresponded to the kind of practice prevailing in that age no objection could be made to it. The most important criticism of this approach as the only possible scientific way of thinking arises, however, from the fact that at the stage of reconstruction and planning reality can no longer be mastered by the exclusive use of the older methods (Mannheim, 1940, p. 173).

Mannheim was concerned with the smooth working of both society and theory, and saw the two as intimately connected. Theory could only be objected to when it no longer "works smoothly" in relation to the "prevailing practice" of the day. His concerns with the sociology of knowledge and social planning were not separate parts of his intellectual career. Rather, taken together, they were evidence of his primary theme--the unity of theory and practice in a pluralistic society.

However, given the prominence of his pluralist ideology, his unity of theory and praxis was incomplete. For within the realm of pluralist praxis he adopted the bourgeois model which separated ethics from the "necessity" of a competitive economic structure. Thus while his conception of political dialogue was in many ways admirable, it was naive to the extent that there was no actual material basis for the fulfillment of his ideas. Though he was an ardent advocate of democracy, his theory never conceptually acknowledged the political economic necessities of democracy--the elimination of domination within the sphere of every day life.

The bourgeois model that separated ethics (freedom) from the necesssities of a laissez-faire economic system crept into his position at the level of organization. He did not make the error, which I have attributed to the Critical Theorists, of a separation of the theoretician and teacher from the life world and the necessary organizational base of emancipatory action. On the contrary, in his criticism of the history of ideas as an "abstract discipline" he stressed the "connectedness-with-existence" (Seinsgebendenheit)

which he saw as being in the nature of thought. However, he specified the nature of that involvement such that it corresponded with the criteria of a pluralistic intellectual synthesis. He neutralized participation in the organization of emancipation by placing the "relatively unattached intellectual" in a position to compromise away the principal aim of that organization--the eradication of oppression. The role of elite vanguardism was demanded by the substitution of an intellectual synthesis for a material synthesis based on the direct participation of those engaged in the struggle to overcome oppression.

This lack of an overriding criterion for social action became one of the foci of the Frankfurt School's critique of Mannheim. In the Communist Manifesto Marx anticipated the dilemma of well-intentioned liberalism.

> The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favored. Hence they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society? (Marx, 1971, p. 105).

CHAPTER VII

HORKHEIMER

Critical Theory

Being intellectuals, the Critical Theorists (known as the Frankfurt School), like Mannheim, wrote from the position of the German professor--a most honored and privileged position. They characteristically wrote not incognito or from behind the barricade like Lenin or Trotsky, and not from the poverty and struggle to survive typical of Marx's life, but from the relative tranquility of their desks. They wrote in a period of increasing disillusionment with the Stalinist malignancy on the Marxian dream and, perhaps as important to an understanding of their work, they wrote from the role of Jewish intellectuals during and subsequent to the rise of Hitler in Germany. They were intellectuals and hence had certain vested interests in the preservation of bourgeois social science and philosophy. They were Marxists disillusioned by the vulnerability of the revolutionary movement to the rise of Stalin. They were scholars deeply involved in utilizing scholarship in the interest of a humanitarian Marxism. They were Jews buffeted by the contradictory role of respected Herr Professor on the one hand and exiled as scapegoats of the Nazi tyranny on the other.

While they believed that Marxism had experienced massive failures in the U.S.S.R., particularly in the realm of free consciousness, unlike Mannheim, they considered themselves Marxists in good standing. Their central question of Marxism might well be put: How can we forge Marxism into a critical theoretical-scientific weapon that has strength independent of any given political struggle? While Mannheim's disillusionment with Marxism led him to choose a much more liberal position, the Critical Theorists attempted to maintain their beliefs, even in the face of Marxism's limitations.

Their criticism of Marx was that he didn't reflect enough on what it meant to be a critic. This lack of reflection on Marx's part led to an ambiguity in the relationship of the critic and revolutionary concerning the struggle as a total process. So their criticism of Marxists like Lenin and Trotsky was that they failed to achieve a truly human revolution, in some part due to their failure to clarify this ambiguity between the humane theories of Marx and the process of consistently and humanely implementing these theories in practice. It was a criticism involving theory and praxis. It was a criticism that asked why the outcome of such humane theories as these of Marx often resulted not in a consciousness of freedom, but in elite vanguardism and tyranny.

Their ultimate effort was to establish Marxian theory on the basis of an internal logic that made its ethical and intellectual aspects less vulnerable to the exigencies of praxis yet left the door open somehow to praxis. It was this effort to establish and propagate an unassailable logic insulated from the possible corruption

of the social organizations of emancipation and struggle that, in my assessment, compromised the Critical Theorists. It was this insulation from praxis that helped them forget why Critical Theory itself was developed. It was the impulse to create a pure theory and pedagogy, insulated from the people and their organized effort to overcome oppression,that resulted in non-dialectic theory building. Their categories of knowledge were clearly conceived in some significant measure apart from the development of the consciousness of those they were to liberate. They aimed, at best, at the achievement of consciousness through the remedial action of therapist-scholars on the pathologically warped perspectives of the so-called "masses."

Horkheimer

During the early thirties, Mannheim occupied an office in the same building with the members of the fledgling Frankfurt School (Jay, 1972, p. 72). They also shared a Kantian, Hegelian, and, in several respects, a Marxian tradition, but they were to develop careers as antagonists. Mannheim, concerned with disorder and social disintegration, consistently sought a social scientific synthesis as a solution to the dread fragmentation which had gripped Europe since the First World War. As a counter to irrationalism and class conflict, he advocated a middle of the road homeostasis and synthesis of extremes.

Horkheimer and the Frankfort School were also concerned with rationality, but like Max Weber, they found the greatest threat in overrationality, not only in modern capitalism but in their own

Marxist tradition as well. Given a turbulent history of inner group struggle within Marxism, the sinister image of Bolshevism and the rising tide of fascism and totalitarian government in Germany, the focus of Horkheimer's critical polemic was on the one hand,the neutralism of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge in the face of oppression,and on the other, positivistic social science. Positivism, together with the "rationality" associated with it, was condemned both in its "Marxian" and bourgeois forms as essentially the instrument of technologically orchestrated manipulation and suppression. Thus for Horkheimer, technology was readily compatible with the formidable spectre of fascism and tyranny. This compatibility under the Nazi regime and in Bolshevism was to have a profound effect on his hopes for a dialectically grounded praxis.

It began as a theme which was to occupy his thought in one form or another throughout his early career--the dangerous separation of values from technology. Writing of the "dualism" he attacked Max Weber, contending that

> . . . the division of all human truth into science and humanities is itself a social product . . . the physical sciences are endowed with so-called objectivity, but emptied of human content; the humanities preserve the human content, but only as ideology, at the expense of truth (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 75).

He deplored the reification of technology and methodology in the absence of a higher criterion of "truth" and action. The technical manipulation of society as in Mannheim's 1984-like scheme of social planning was his constant nightmare. Scholarship should provide more than positivist methodology, or "social techniques" for the ruling

elites. Rather, it should offer some basic criteria (or "truths") for emancipatory social action. However, it was the paradox of his career that while he condemned the separation of "truth into science and humanities" his own theoretical formulations were to lead to a dualism comparable to that which he had rejected both in Mannheim and vulgar Marxism.

The Critique of Positivism--Horkheimer's Early Flirtation with Materialist Dialectics

In his early work, prior to the full bloom of Stalinism and Nazi brutality, Horkheimer retained a certain optimism that a critical linkage of philosophy, science, and society could be forged into a strong, emancipatory weapon. Theory and other facets of intellectual work were to take place within "real social processes." He argued that

> . . . the fruitfulness of newly discovered factual connections for the renewal of existent knowledge, and the application of such knowledge to the facts, do not derive from purely logical or methodological sources but can rather be understood only in the context of real social processes (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 194).

Horkheimer, like Mannheim, believed that neither theory nor the application of theory was a mere question of methodology. They were social ones as well. One of Horkheimer's main objectives was to overcome abstractness in the theoretical endeavors of bourgeois science. In what was to become a prophetic self-critique, he warned in 1937 that

> The dualism of thought and being, understanding and perception is second nature to the scientist.
>
> The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific activity as carried on within the division of labor at a particular stage in the latter's development. It corresponds

> to the activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all the other activities of a society but in no immediately clear connection with them (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 197).

There was, to Horkheimer, a massive instrument of domination in the positivism of bourgeois science. This science was characterized by a rationale of means-ends relationships, which found its impetus in a political economic system that was rational in its means, but irrational and uncontrolled as to its ends.

> The total transformation of each and every realm of being into a field of means leads to the liquidation of the subject who is supposed to use them. This gives modern industrialist society its nihilistic aspect. Subjectivization, which exalts the subject, also dooms him.
>
> The human being, in the process of his emancipation, shares the fate of the rest of his world. Domination of nature involves domination of man (Horkheimer, 1974a,p. 93).

Horkheimer, like Kant, Hegel, and Marx, found the rationalism and "immaculate perception" of empiricism to be unreflective about the reference frames that gave meaning to raw perception. Indeed, like Marx and Hegel, he believed that ignorance of the social origins of these perspectives kept the object of study pristine, abstract, and apart from individual or social action and control.

> Logically, this unrestrained isolation of science rests on the hypostasis of the abstract concept of datum or fact. From Descartes on, only that which every individual could recognize as existing was to be accepted as such. Empiricism, however, by eliminating the subject has eliminated the critically discriminating factor, and has therefore obliterated all distinction between the concept of the datum and that of anything else, so that datum, fact, and object merely seem to possess determinate meaning (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 155)

This had the effect of destroying any discrimination between our various perspectives. It constituted a mechanism inimical to meaningful interpretation and criticism, and was conducive to unreflective

domination.

It is evident that Kant figured in the pantheon of Horkheimer's gods but it was not merely as an inhabitant of the Olympian heights. He also represented the underworld. After all, Kant had found in the rational mind the categorical reference frames through which raw perceptions passed to give them meaning. He was essential to a critique of empiricism but he had done so by dichotomizing the world into noumena and phenomena. Critical Theory was initially based on a fundamental rejection of this Kantian dualism.

> According to Kant, reason through mathematics could discover scientific truths concerning phenomena of the real world known to us through our senses. Reason, however, was incapable of attaining similar truths about the noumenal realm, the realm of human beliefs and values. The noumenal realm was to be seen as the preserve of free choice and human will; by erecting a barrier to reason, Kant sought to limit the role of reason to certain areas of human knowledge and to preserve individual autonomy and freedom in the noumenal realm (Farganis, 1975, p. 485).

Thus in Kant, the essential meanings and goals of human beings were left to the realm of the noumenal, or unknowable. This dualistic aspect of Kant's thought has led many critics (most notably G. Lukacs) to characterize him as the "bourgeois metaphysician." He enshrined in metaphysics that basic contradiction of laissez-faire economics: the combination of the rational manipulation of parts of the system and the completely uncontrollable and irrational nature of the system as a whole. In Kant the analytic separability of ethics from the necessity of scientific knowledge and the "Free Market" was reified.

A further pre-Marxian basis of Critical Theory was Hegel. It was (as we have seen) the ingenious process of Reason's logical development through human existence by which Hegel historicized

the a priori categories of Kant. Here cognitive knowledge was given meaning not by abstract categories of the mind but rather within the dialectic of history.

Of course, Hegel's Idealism had not transcended fully the notion of a universal mind, or essence, that lay outside our control. The two basic attempts to overcome the metaphysical component, Marxism and Positivism, were to have a massive influence on Horkheimer. Marx, through Feuerbach's transformative method, established as we have seen,an "inversion" of Hegel and grounded belief not on absolute Reason but on social existence. But there was a positivist component in vulgar Marxism. From the beginning, the positivists had attempted to refute the Idealist component of Hegel's Absolute Spirit by reliance on the previously discredited rationale of Empiricism, and a dualistic, Neo-Kantian component. As Martin Jay put it,

> 'In rejecting the ontological claims Hegel had made for his philosophy of Absolute spirit, the positivists had robbed the intellect of any right to judge what was actual as true or false.'* Thus the submergence of critical reason was a consequence of the achievements of the Enlightenment itself. In purging the metaphysical concepts of essence, soul transcendent being, God, etc., from reason, the Enlightenment paved the way for an empirical science and technology which culminated in tremendous advances in material culture (Aronowitz, 1972, p. xiv-xv).

A price had been paid. Whether due to the rationalist separation of essence from the phenomenal world as in the case of the

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* Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School and the Genesis of Cultural Theory," in The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin, eds. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 32.

distinction in the sciences, "advances in material culture" have been paid for by an isolation of values from knowledge which left the world open to domination through unreflective and manipulative technicians under the control of irrational elites.

> This principle is particularly significant in a world whose magnificient exterior radiates complete unity and order while panic and distress prevail beneath. Autocrats, cruel colonial governors and sadistic prison wardens have always wished for visitors with this positivistic mentality. If science as a whole follows the lead of empiricism and the intellect renounces its insistent and confident probing of the tangled brush of observations in order to unearth more about the world than even our well-meaning daily press, it will be participating passively in the maintenance of universal injustice (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 151).

It was the spectre of the scientific neutralization of values (manifest not only in Mannheim but also in the various shades of positivism) and a resultant heightened vulnerability of the public to the chicanery of totalitarianism that was not only to influence Horkheimer, but also to approach a level of obsession with him.

Critical Theory as Dialectic Synthesis Vs. Intellectualized Synthesis

Horkheimer's early thinking, at least formally, embraced the Marxian materialist dialectic. That stood in direct opposition to Mannheim's intellectual synthesis. Horkheimer's theme is succinctly put by Aronowitz:

> . . . the core of dialectical theory is the recognition that the world of perception is a 'product of human activity.' The object of cognition is humanized nature, and, to that extent, is transformed from a thing in-itself to a thing-for-us. Following Marx, Horkheimer denies the radical separation of subject and the object of cognition, but he neither subsumes the object in the contemplative subject in the manner of subjective idealism and its modern positivist variants, nor capitulates to the metaphysical idealism of Hegel and Fichte. The acting subject, aware of its own

> partisanship, is the only way to transcend the enslavement of social theory and practice to 'the mere recording and prediction of facts, that is mere calculation.' Horkheimer asks us to 'learn to look behind the facts; . . . to distinguish the superficial from the essential without minimizing the importance of either . . .' In short, Horkheimer calls for dialectical thinking as the precondition for the achievement of a radical community (Aronowitz, 1972, p. xiv).

In Horkheimer's own words, Critical Theory is a dialectic critique of political economy.

> . . . there is a human activity which has society itself for its object . . . its purpose is not, either in it conscious intention or in its objective significance, the better functioning of any element in the structure. On the contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presupposition about which one can do nothing. . . . the critical attitude of which we are speaking is wholly distrustful of the rules of conduct with which society as presently constituted provides each of its members (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 207).

> Its [Critical Theory's] subject is . . . a definite individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and with nature (Horkeheimer, 1972, p. 211).

As a dialectical critique of political economy, Horkheimer clearly envisioned the social basis of knowledge as a core concept of Critical Theory. His scheme accomodated Mannheim's sociology, grudgingly if at all, as an insufficient adjunct to a more encompassing Critical Theory. But an understanding of his disposition of sociology is important to the course his theory was to follow.

Throughout his early career, Horkheimer consistently rejected neutralization of the concept of ideology whether in Mannheim, empiricism, or positivistic scienticized Marxism. His early polemic focused on Mannheim and the sociology of knowledge. His position

was taken from the perspective of an unqualified materialist dialectic. There were at least five areas of differentiation between Horkheimer's interpretation of critique based on dialectic materialism and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. To Horkheimer, the task of persons of knowledge was to achieve (1) not merely understanding but a critical basis of action; (2) a concept of knowledge not linked to intellectual strata but to social and political interests; (3) a view of ideas based on contradiction, not on underlying unity; (4) a concept of ideas based not on pluralism but on dialectic criticism; and (5) a concept of the function of the intelligentsia as not to enlighten the ruling elite but to advise and emancipate the proletariat.

The early Horkheimer, while retaining a critique of vulgar Marxism, repeatedly professed allegience to his Marxian roots. He thoroughly rejected a concept of understanding as an end in itself or as a guide to practice in general (as it was for Mannheim). Critical Theory, to be sure, depended upon understanding but it was an understanding oriented toward a specific, emancipatory end. It was not to be neutralized for purposes of compromise with oppression.

> Research into ideologies, or sociology of knowledge, which has been taken over from the critical theory of society and established as a special discipline, is not opposed either in its aim or in its other ambitions to the usual activities that go on within classificatory science.
>
> In this reaction to critical theory, the self-awareness of thought as such is reduced to the discovery of the relationship that exists between intellectual positions and their social location (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 209).

The neutralization of thought and its confinement to "understanding" carried with it then an epistemological aspect which Critical Theorists rejected.

Mannheim, they contended, retained the classificatory component of Kantian thought, at least as it pertained to facticity. Mannheim had adopted certain essential elements in the Hegelian critique of Kant. Surely the a priori had been "historicized" in his thinking. He and Horkheimer were in agreement that

> . . . in so far as the objective realities given in perception are conceived as products which in principle should be under human control and, in the future at least, will in fact come under it, these realities lose the character of pure factuality (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 209).

But Mannheim had not fully developed the grounding of knowledge in critical human existence, an existence characterized by struggle for emancipation. Horkheimer, in criticism of Mannheim, believed that sociology of knowledge as a science was insufficient. What was called for was a comprehensive epistemological critique. Only a conscious order of priorities as to what one believed to be humane could be a sure guide to action. It was a necessary condition for emancipatory praxis. Indeed, Horkheimer was adamant in his rejection of a scientific model that was aimed at abstract correlations between ideas and social groups that were separated from the class conflicts and social interests to which they were historically linked.

> But it is not enough merely to correlate these ideas with some one social group, as that sociological school does. We must penetrate deeper and develop them out of the decisive historical process from which the social groups themselves are to be explained (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 263).

These social groups were conceived as constituting certain interests reflecting the political economic structure of society. What is more, intellectuals could not divest themselves of these interests by claiming a broad synthesis that would somehow transcend class conflict.

The Weltanschauung was to be seen as representing these views not abstractly but in the specific historical context--that of bourgeois capitalism. But social criticism must be not merely ideographic; it must be consciously, dialectically ideographic. Thus,

> . . . the basic form of the historically given commodity economy on which modern history rests contains in itself the internal and external tensions of the modern era . . . (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 227).

Horkheimer, like Marx, argued in the early years that there must always be a critical tension between what was and what could be. Social theory should not function merely to adjust us to different situations. Rather, it must always have a transcending and critical quality never satisfied with any existing "unity." If adjustment becomes the standard, ". . . then reality confronts the subject as absolute, overpowering" (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 96).

Given the absence of any sense of orienting truth, knowledge was rightly enough identified as a product of the social context, but to what end? Herein Mannheim was entrapped by the constraints of a vulgar pragmatism with no transcendent criteria for action.

> Unlike the older positivism, which claims the radical separation between value and truth, pragmatism asserts their unity. Subject and object are united and critical theory becomes pure poetry or literature . . . Thus it leaves no room for critical theory, which relies on the epistemological premise of objective truth, even if historically grounded (Aronowitz, 1972, p. xvi).

There was then in Mannheim's striving for unity a lack of a critical focus for social action. Horkheimer in those years critiqued this ommission substantially on the basis of traditional dialectics. That is, he held that the core of dialectics was the fundamental

analytic distinction between the ideal and the real, between theory and practice. This allowed the distance necessary to be both self-critical and engage in social action with a definite purpose. Unification of the ideal and the real removed the valid basis of criticism.

The Early Allegiance to Materialist Dialectic

Horkheimer and Mannheim shared a firm embrace on the historicity of knowledge. The early Horkheimer apprehended history as a process of transcendental interaction.

> . . . every piece of knowledge [should] be regarded, not of course as a purely arbitrary creation, but as a representation by particular men in a particular society, context, and moment of time, a representation which is a product but can become a productive force in turn (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 35).

For Mannheim, however, the "embrace on history" was one of the character of a "one night stand." That is, it was beautiful, but there was no deeper meaning; there were others to be had with more unfathomed qualities but none to be preferred. For Horkheimer, on the contrary, as a Marxist, there was clearly the intent of a longer term relationship with history, a sense that there was in human intercourse an emancipatory essence that constituted the highest form of human interaction. This was the core of materialist metaphysics and was clearly drawn from the Marxian definition of humanity as "species being" and species activity. Horkheimer, in the early years, approached the Marxian ideal. He too believed that humanity was inherently social but his emphasis was distinctly on the rational component.

> For the thrust towards a rational society, which admittedly seems to exist today only in the realms of fantasy, is really innate in every man (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 251).

Like Marx, this "innate" desire for a rational humane society did not come through the natural unfolding of truth with its intrinsic logical necessity. Rather, the "truth" of a rational society could only be brought about by action in historic process for a person "may not take his ease if the program is to come true" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 251). While his emphasis even in those years was clearly on the rational aspect as opposed to the communal-praxis focus of Marx, there was a cautious sense of urgency and a professed allegiance to the materialist dialectic. It made humankind an instrument in the constitution of truth. But we must remember that truth demands an awareness that

> A consciously critical attitude . . . is part of the development of society: the construing of the course of history as the necessary product of an economic mechanism simultaneously contains both a protest against this order of things, a protest generated by the order itself, and the idea of self-determination for the human race, that is the idea of a state of affairs in which man's actions no longer flow from a mechanism but from his own decision. . . . Every part of the theory pre-supposes the critique of the existing order and the struggle against it along lines deterimined by the theory itself (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 229).

The aim and realization of an inherent necessity was critical self-awareness.

> The concept of necessity in the critical theory is itself a critical concept; it presupposes freedom, even if a not yet existent freedom. . . .
>
> The inability to grasp in thought the unity of theory and practice and the limitation of the concept of necessity to inevitable events are both due from the viewpoint of theory of knowledge, to the Cartesian dualism of thought and being. That dualism is congenial both to nature and to bourgeois society in so far as the latter resembles a

> natural mechanism. The idea of a theory which becomes a genuine force, consisting in the self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution, is beyond the grasp of a mentality typified by such a dualism (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 230-231).

Here a step was taken to define what it was that made us human and what was necessitated if we were to evolve further in that direction. The necessity of Critical Theory then, was not an external, non-human necessity--rather it was the necessity that asserted our rational participation in our own historic development as necessary to the real meaning of being human. Though Mannheim would have denied it, Horkheimer would surely have argued that there was a latent metaphysics--a metaphysics of bourgeois thought--in Mannheim's "holistic" tendencies. Horkheimer's advocacy of materialism acknowledged assumptions but he attempted to distinguish epistemologically and ethically grounded assumptions based on a rigorous discursive logic from the noncritical "synthesis" of Mannheim's "bourgeois liberalism." These liberal, noncritical theories were dangerous in that they harmonized so well with the belief that

> . . . hardship is an eternal necessity for the great majority of men and that the individual must always surrender himself to the designs of the powers that be (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 132).

This followed because a noncritical approach offered no criterion of discrimination by which one could make specific proposals that would deal with the basic social conditions of injustice. The highest criterion was order. Thus while Mannheim maintained the metaphysics of a basic transcendent unity, even while denying all metaphysical leanings, Horkheimer made his metaphysical presuppositions clear.

The materialist, in contradistinction to Mannheim, acknowledged a metaphysics, but while stubbornly retaining its truth value, refrained from "traditional" transcendental objectives--the realization of a ubiquitous unity. What was important for the materialist was not transcendent unity or truth but rather that "the importance [of truth] arises not from theory alone but from the tasks which at any given period are to be mastered with the help of theory" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 20 [italics mine]). It was the existential grounding of materialist dialectics that gave social theory so prominent a role in establishing the foci of materialist metaphysics.

> The wretchedness of our own time is connected with the structure of society; social theory therefore forms the main content of contemporary materialism.
>
> . . . Idealism understands its various systems to be attempts at answering the same eternal question, the same eternal riddle, and it likes to speak of philosophers conversing with each other across the millennia, because they all deal with the same theme. But the materialist's views are essentially determined by the tasks to be mastered at the moment (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 24).

That principle also applied to similar patterns within materialism. The particular focus cannot in any "deterministic" sense be established externally by contradiction between the means and relations of production. "Today . . . the fundamental historical role of economic relations is characteristic of the materialist position. In this new context it has become impossible to give any supreme principle as such the final word" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 25). Contemporary materialism then stands opposed to any perspectives bent on the "revelation" of "essential nature" and tranquilized with the "faith" that essential nature was inherently

self-contained--as the future oak within the acorn.

> . . . contemporary materialism does not build up supratemporal concepts and abstract from the differences introduced by time. Even the possibility of establishing certain general human traits by considering man in his past history does not lead to a hypostatization of these traits as suprahistorical factors. Society, on which man's existence partially depends, is a totality which cannot be compared to anything else and is continuously restructuring itself (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 25).

Materialism insisted upon directing its gaze on the existential condition out of which consciousness was constituted. Thus materialism opposed ". . . every attempt to play down the importance of insight into the earthly order of things by turning man's attention to a supposedly more essential order" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 26). On the contrary, materialism "maintains the irreducible tension between concept and object and thus has a critical weapon of defense against belief in the infinity of the mind" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 28).

Speaking directly to Mannheim as well as to empiricist social sciences, Horkheimer asserted that

> Materialism is not interested in a world view or in the souls of men. It is concerned with changing the concrete conditions under which men suffer and in which, of course, their souls must become stunted. This concern may be comprehended historically and psychologically; it cannot be grounded in general principles (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 32).

In the materialist view conflict and change was clearly primary.

> Materialism requires the unification of philosophy and science. Of course it recognizes that work techniques differ in the more general pursuits of philosophy and the more limited tasks of science, just as it recognizes distinctions of method in research and the presentation of research. But it does not recognize any difference between science and philosophy as such (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 34).

It is clear that in the early years Horkheimer retained essentially the Marxian stance of materialist dialectics against Mannheimian social science. But events were to bring him into a closer coincidence with Mannheim in his later work. In the later years the affinity to dialectic synthesis (manifested especially in his critique of Mannheim's materialism) became undermined by political intimidation. Faith in materialist dialectics seemed to hold with erosion until the war years. Then an event occurred that brought forth what appears to have been both the apex of his very shaky optimism and the triggering of a more precipitous decline in his faith in the proletariat. His essay on "The Authoritarian State" was written in memory of Walter Benjamin, a beloved colleague in the Frankfurt School. Benjamin had just taken his life in a Nazi prison and Horkheimer wrote a now vitriolic, now deeply compassionate, but always ringing call for dramatically closing the distance between knowledge and existence, theory and practice.

It was an angry uncompromised call for activism and revolution.

> Present talk of inadequate conditions is a cover for the tolerance of oppression. For the revolutionary, conditions have always been ripe. What in retrospect appears as a preliminary stage or a premature situation was once for a revolutionary the last chance for change. A revolutionary is with the desperate people for whom everything is on the line, not with those who have time. . . . mankind was not betrayed by the untimely attempts of the revolutionaries, but by the timely attempts of the realists (Horkheimer, 1973, p. 11, 18-19).

From this high point the decline was the more profound by contrast. Now the scepticism about the capacity of the proletariat to overcome

the manipulative mechanism of the modern state that had marked his early writings became a full blown pessimism. With that pessimism came a mounting ambivalence about the linkage of critical philosophy to the exigencies of that materialist base.

Disillusionment: The Resurrection of the Bourgeois Philosopher

It is my contention that Horkheimer's intellectual perspective has always been fatefully ambiguous. It was grounded in the role of the German middle-class intellectual of his era and in a climate of the rise of both Nazism and Stalinism. In that context it vacillated between optimism and a debilitating pessimism about humankind. There was the optimism about human nature that inhered in his Marxian aspect. Humanity's actual, conscious, and authentic existence was "social." Self-realization was envisioned in a sharing communal context that developed concomitantly with the realization of our species being. But that delicate growth was implanted in a highly hostile climate. Indeed, it was pitted against an indigenous individualistic perspective that embraced an image of human nature in which self-reflective consciousness was dominated by primordial urges and self-seeking impulses. It was the rise of Nazism and Stalinism that seemingly assured the predominance of the self-seeking bourgeois component in his theoretical posture. Thus, from the 1930s to the late 1940s, we increasingly encounter: (1) pessimistic prognostications concerning the awesome manipulative potential possessed by the leaders of mass society; (2) anti-democratic statements framed in the context of a critique of mass society; (3) a

departure from opposition to an invariant "human nature" to overt Freudian overtones of biophysical determinism, aggressive impulses, repressed primordial urges in eternal conflict with social values; of course, (4) repeated reference to the grim tyranny of Nazism and Bolshevism; and finally, (5) a never overtly acknowledged retreat from advocacy of a dialectic synthesis of theory and praxis to a formal intellectualized synthesis.

As Horkheimer experienced the horror of the Nazi regime and the Stalinist atrocities in the name of socialism, his thinking manifested an increasing tendency to reify a distinction that had previously been made between subjective (instrumental) and objective (essential) reason.

He began with a concern about the tendency of the "modern world" to overrationalize and hence suffocate not only traditional values but all criteria by which truth could be established. He was painfully cognizant of the awesome power of technology in the hands of erstwhile oppressors and become increasingly pessimistic about the ability of "the masses" to achieve autonomy in the face of the formidable ideological weapons of modern thought control. Given the lack of optimism about the emancipatory potential of the oppressed and the immediate context of struggle, his thinking was seemingly left with no "realistic" alternative to intellectual synthesis. Thus the synthesis was not to occur in the struggles between concrete contradictions of daily existence but rather in the work of scholars who thought "for the masses." It is my contention

that this conception fundamentally violated criteria of dialectic synthesis (established in previous chapters). For, given those criteria, analytic distinctions are only useful if they remain vitally linked to actual conflict in society. Horkheimer, however, lost sight of the fact that his distinctions between subjective and objective reason were taken from the life world. Hence, his proposals were limited essentially to efforts to accomplish a theoretical synthesis. Ultimately he was left making the arbitrary demand that reason change in the context of a manacled social base. My effort in the following pages will be to examine the relationship of Horkheimer's synthesis of subjective and objective reason to emancipatory praxis. I will attempt to assess the mechanism by which (1) his treatment of that "synthesis" departed from the criteria of a non-vulgarized dialectic materialism to which he professed allegiance and (2) ultimately became reified in the manner of the "bourgeois" model that isolated the social theorist from the life world.

Especially between the 1930s and the immediate post-war years, Horkheimer fell back more and more on a model comparable to the dualism of Kantian philosophy that insulated pursuit of "truth" (ethics and epistemology) from what he perceived as the ravages of the "masses." He came to believe that it was, after all, the people whose actions were dominated by technologically proficient means of manipulation (science and technology) and a resultant "eclipse of reason." Thus by 1947, the focus of his work was on a formal intellectualized synthesis of subjective and

objective reason that could not be bungled by the people. It is significant, however, that despite admonitions to the contrary, his own life manifested no substantial direct involvment in emancipatory praxis.

Subjective and objective reason were not significantly different from Kant's dichotomy between necessity and freedom. Subjective reason

> . . . is essentially concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory. It attaches little importance to the question of whether the purposes as such are reasonable (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 3).

Subjective reason was to become identified with the sciences and those disciplines oriented in this view solely to the establishment of nomologic law, predictability, and purposive-rational control of the environment, e.g. laissez-faire economics. It involved fundamentally an invariant relation of humanity against nature the consequence of which was a continuing expansion of the instrumental control of nature.*

Conversely, objective reason

> . . . aimed at evolving a comprehensive system, or hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his aims . . . Its objective structure, and not just man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for individual thoughts and actions . . . The emphasis was on ends rather than means (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 4-5).

The latter category, which was to become the basis for emancipatory philosophy, was conceived as an ageless struggle based on the concept of Gemeinwesen, for creative expansion of human freedom and the

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* This is a precursor of Habermas' model of the empirical-analytic sciences.

realization of human essence. Early on, Horkheimer had feared the "scientistic" component of what he termed subjective rationality. By 1947 this fear had been not only exacerbated but had taken the form not of a crisis in capitalism but of a crisis of reason.

> The present crisis of reason consists fundamentally in the fact that at a certain point thinking became either incapable of conceiving . . . objectivity at all or began to negate it as a delusion . . . As reason is subjectivized, it also becomes formalized.
>
> . . . If the subjectivist view holds true, thinking cannot be of any help in determining the desirablity of any goal in itself. (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 7).

The subjectivization of reason was closely linked in his frame of reference invariantly to formal technological functions which were inimical to the ethical standards of objective reason. Subjective reason reminiscent of Bentham's utilitarianism saw all order in the world via a logical mechanism devoid of socially derived ethical criteria. Indeed, subjective reason seemingly reflected on the one hand a laissez-faire economic ideology that saw order in the market-place as deriving from self-seeking individualism, and on the other, a vulgar Marxism that focused on labor as an ego-oriented struggle for security at the expense of a larger dialectically constituted universal process. The danger in this form of positivism was that in the absence of an ethically oriented and vigorous analysis of the social basis of our belief the so-called struggle for survival was vulgarized. Deprived of a vigorous ethical critique (and I would add, historicity) simple adjustment to the formalized laws of vulgarized scientific Marxism, pluralistic homeostasis (Mannheim), or laissez-faire capitalism became

ritualistic.

> Therefore adjustment becomes the standard for every conceivable type of subjective behavior. The triumph of subjective, formalized reason is also the triumph of a reality that confronts the subject as absolute, overpowering (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 96).

Oddly enough this adoration of science and technology which Horkheimer deplored began with the attack of philosophy on religious absolutes and later relativism.

According to Horkheimer's reading of history, objective reason sought to ". . . replace traditional religion with methodical philosophical thought . . . and thus to become a source of tradition all by itself" (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 12). That form of reason typified the core of the classic philosophical tradition that had been oriented to the discovery and realization of eternal essences.

> The philosophical systems of objective reason implied the conviction that an all-embracing or fundamental structure of being could be discovered and a conception of human destination derived from it (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 12).

Consistent with its early precedents, objective reason had been more recently engaged in groping for an intellectual ground on which to wend a way through the Scylla of religious dogma on the one hand and the Charybdis of scientific relativism on the other. As a participant in that quest Horkheimer returned to Hegel and to his progenitor in Socrates himself.

> Socrates died because he subjected the most sacred and most familiar ideas of his community and his country to the critique of the daimonion, or dialectical thought, as Plato called it. In doing so, he fought against both ideologic conservatism and relativism masked as progressiveness but actually subordinated to personal and professional interests (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 10).

Ultimately objective reason was the more serious challenge to dogma and relativism. But religious dogma, as "mythology," had also been challenged by "subjective reason." The latter had compartmentalized its own scientific-technologic function from the religious function and thereby obviated the necessity for a show-down between the purposive rational domain and the world of values. Thus the "attack" of objective reason

> . . . on mythology is perhaps more serious than that of subjective reason, which, abstract and formalistic as it conceives itself to be, is inclined to abandon the fight with religion by setting up two different brackets, one for science and philosophy, and one for institutionalized mythology, thus recognizing both of them. For the philosophy of objective reason there is no such way out. Since it holds to the concept of objective truth, it must take a positive or negative stand with regard to the content of established religion (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 12).

The dichotomy between religion ("institutionalized mythology") on the one hand, and science and philosophy on the other, left philosophy crippled (within objective reason). Horkheimer wanted philosophy to replace religion as a basis for the establishment of meaning in life. A reflective critical philosophy was to supplant religious dogma. But in spite of what he deemed the manifest superiority of objective reason in the transcendence of dogma and relativism, reason as such was destined to undermine itself. Due to the compatibility of a technologically oriented subjective reason with the dominant bourgeois ideology, subjective reason prevailed. What is more, it persisted as a "practical" function separated from any objective criteria of truth. Values had been neutralized--"emasculated."

> Eventually the active controversy between religion and philosophy ended in a stalemate because the two were considered as separate branches of culture. People have gradually become reconciled to the idea that each lives its own life within the walls of its cultural compartment, tolerating the other. The neutralization of religion, now reduced to the status of one cultural good among others, contradicted its 'total' claim that it incorporates objective truth, and also emasculated it. Although religion remained respected on the surface, its neutralization paved the way for its elimination as the medium of spiritual objectivity and ultimately for the abolition of the concept of such an objectivity, itself patterned after the idea of the absoluteness of religious revelation (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 17).

In the end it was metaphysics itself that had been "killed" by the neutralization of religion and with it a rigorous ethical critique of knowledge.

It was in reaction to the loss of divine essence that Horkheimer's ambivalence is most strongly manifested. It appears that he accepted Plato's substitution of the philosopher gods for the traditional Olympian deities without substantial qualification.

> He undermined the sacred tradition of Greece, the Athenian way of life, thus preparing the soil for radically different forms of individual and social life. Socrates held that reason, conceived as universal insight, should determine beliefs, regulate relations between man and man, and between man and nature.
>
> Although his doctrine might be considered the philosophical origin of the concept of the subject as ultimate judge of good and evil, he spoke of reason and of its verdicts not as mere names or conventions, but as reflecting the true nature of things. As negativistic as his teachings may have been, they implied the idea of absolute truth and were put forward as objective insights, almost as revelations. His daimonion was a more spiritual god, but he was not less real than the other gods were believed to be. His name was supposed to denote a living force (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 11).

Reason herein

> . . . reveals itself as the vision of truth or as the individual subject's faculty to perceive the eternal order of things and consequently the line of action that must be followed in the temporal order (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 11).

Most important, it was seen as a structure inherent in reality that was self-evident to those who were thinking and feeling correctly.

> The term objective reason thus on the one hand denotes as its essence a structure inherent in reality that by itself calls for a specific mode of behavior in each specific case, be it a practical or a theoretical attitude. This structure is accessible to him who takes upon himself the effort of dialectic thinking, or, identically, who is capable of eros. On the other hand, the term objective reason may also designate this very effort and ability to reflect such an objective order. Everybody is familiar with situations that by their very nature, and quite apart from the interests of the subject, call for a definite line of action--for example, a child or animal on the verge of drowning, a starving population, or an individual illness (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 12).

It is important to recognize that Horkheimer's dialectic was precisely a formal, thinking dialectic. This appears in at least two points in the above statement. First he did not emphasize in this later writing the necessity of eros but the capability of it. It was a formal dialectic in which self-styled capability could be substituted for the exigencies of actual praxis. Second, it was formal in that it was cultural. That is, a "definite line of action" with regard to the drowning of an animal or even in some instances a small child is obvious only in the context of western humanism. These instances pervert his dialectics to a mere "discovery" rather than an actual creative, cumulative growth and permit a formal intellectualization of transcendence.

Now reason became more an organ for the apprehension of true nature than of reflection and its perceived jeopardy became a central focus of his attention.

> Reason as an organ for perceiving the true nature of reality and determining the guiding principles of our lives has come to be regarded as obsolete. Speculation is synonomous with

> metaphysics, and metaphysics with mythology and superstition (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 18).

He properly attributed that jeopardy to the bourgeois "idea" of tolerance a la Mannheim.

> All these consequences were contained in germ in the bourgeois idea of tolerance, which is ambivalent. On the one hand, tolerance means freedom from the rule of dogmatic authority; on the other, it furthers an attitude of neutrality toward all spiritual content, which is thus surrendered to relativism. Each cultural domain preserves its 'sovereignty' with regard to universal truth. The pattern of the social division of labor is automatically transferred to the life of the spirit, and this division of the realm of culture is a corollary to the replacement of universal objective truth by formalized, inherently relativist reason (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 19).

From this point the hesitance and ambivalence in his thought became more readily apparent (assuming his professed adherence to the dialectic ideal). For he equated what he believed was a central consequence of the enlightenment, the abandonment of the "autonomy of reason" with the bourgeois tendency to repressive "tolerance."

> Having given up autonomy, reason has become an instrument. In the formalistic aspect of subjective reason, stressed by positivism, its unrelatedness to objective content is emphasized . . . Reason has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the domination of men and nature, has been made the sole criterion (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 21).

While domination is a possible consequence of a reason "harnessed" (complete harnessing is patently inaccurate) to the social process, the question is whether that regretable outcome is the necessary consequence of a linkage of reason to the context of praxis--to the secularization of reason.

Given the limited parameters to which he restricted himself, he was left with a dilemma. That is, he allowed only that reason

was "inherent" in reality, or that it was a subjective quality of the mind.

However, assuming that we reject the latter there is at least one more alternative beyond the former--what he termed the "inherent" quality of objective reason. Reason may be either reposited "inherently" in social reality as he asserted or it may be generated,as Marx insisted,dialectically within the community of praxis. Given his skepticism about the "masses," it is not surprising that especially his later work paid little more than lip-service to the dialectic aspect of social reality and attempted a resurrection of the "autonomy of reason." Prior to his disillusionment and the setting of his intellectual course there were two routes he might have followed. One was to lament the loss of divine truth. The other was to acknowledge the transformative essence of dialectics and overcome the bourgeois constraints on reason. In short, the alternative to despair about the passing of absolutes was an absolute committment to the realization of a total transcendental freedom. He chose, however, an ideational freedom or "autonomy" apart from the exigencies of praxis, and dialectics was lost to eternal essences. To be sure, these essences were deemed inherent in social reality, but as inherent they could apparently be perceived immaculately by the "expert" exclusive of the dialectics on which all other transcendence was dependent. The essence which he ignored was that implicit in the concept of social reality as process. It was a process in which realization of the limitations of one's current circumstances results from a concrete self-objectivation--from the realization of one's

limitations in the products of one's social labor (or participation). It was a dialectic mode to which, for better or worse, mortals are ever tied. Horkheimer, however, never made a case for the special dispensation which he presumably accorded the emancipatory theorist. He somehow missed the fact that an intellectualized synthesis violated the dialectic ideal.

In fairness to Horkheimer it must be noted that he himself warned against the reification of either subjective or objective reason.

> The element of untruth lies not simply in the essence of each of the two concepts, [subjective and objective reason] but in the hypostatization of either one as against the other. Such hypostatization results from the basic contradiction in the human condition.
>
> . . . only a <u>definition</u> of the objective goals of society that includes the purpose of self-preservation of the subject, the respect for individual life deserves to be called objective (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 175) [italics mine].

However, the emphasis clearly shifted from critical dialectics to an abstract synthesis of the two categories. It was a synthesis devoid of the constraints of praxis. Driven by fears about the technically manipulated "masses" Horkheimer initiated a tacit dichotomy between necessity and freedom, theory and praxis. Unlike Kant, the conceptual dichotomy was denied but it was retained at the level of praxis. It was reified, despite rhetoric to the contrary, at the precise moment in which the intellectual usurped the prerogatives of participatory synthesis. Given his proclivity to lament the loss of objective truth, by 1947 his thinking manifested a preoccupation with a seeming erosion of the guiding principles of the past, however non-dialectic their proponents or function may have been. This retreat to the cultural

womb was manifested in his sympathetic account of the great philosophers of the past. The decidedly non-dialectic flavor was self-evident.

> Great philosophical systems, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, scholasticism, and German idealism were founded on an objective theory of reason. It aimed at evolving a comprehensive system, or hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his aims. The degree of reasonableness of a man's life could be determined according to its harmony with this totality. Its objective structure, and not just man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for individual thoughts and actions. This concept of reason never precluded subjective reason, but regarded the latter as only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality from which criteria for all things and beings were derived. The emphasis was on ends rather than means (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 4-5).

Horkheimer seemed almost to have despaired for a lost period in which philosophy, however undialectic, provided a value defense against a dehumanizing scientism and the manipulated masses. A trend was now established in Horkheimer's thinking in which technology and the material world were seen as such formidable threats to freedom and values that a dialectic relationship between them underwent a subtle but most signficant transition. It was a change where, as a reaction to instrumentalism, the intellectual would retain the prerogative to emphasize ends and to institutionalize that orientation within a critical philosophical theory that acknowledged the material element, not in a concrete dialectic interaction but by way of an intellectualized synthesis. The earlier theoretical hiatus between Mannheim and Horkheimer was now vastly diminished.

Transcendence of Traditional Dialectics--Toward an Intellectual Synthesis

Both Mannheim and the early Horkheimer held a deep sense of the relationship of thought to the forms of social existence. Consequently, both stressed the integral necessity of praxis. However, the praxis of Mannheim was oriented to the achievement of a pluralistic arena with a synthesis of ideas and a mentality of compromise. These syntheses were to be devised by sociologists of knowledge and were intended in turn to provide guidance in conciliatory interaction between leaders of oppressed and oppressors alike. This conciliatory function differed dramatically from Marx and the early Horkheimer who insisted that praxis be executed by a people advised by thinkers oriented to a struggle against oppression. Marx, as noted earlier, insisted that

> As philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds in philosophy its intellectual weapons, and once the lightning of thought has struck deeply in this unsophisticated soil of the people, the emancipation of the Germans to become men will be realized.
>
> . . . the head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot actualize itself without the elevation of the proletariat; the proletariat cannot raise itself without the actualization of philosophy (Marx, 1971, p. 426).

Likewise, commitment to a relatively substantial role for the proletariat was reflected in Horkheimer's early struggles to establish a fruitful relationship between the theoretician/philosophers and the proletariat. Unlike Mannheim, whose sociologists of knowledge actually devised syntheses of opposing views, for the early Horkheimer advice was to be made available to the leaders of the proletariat. The role of the expert was seen as advisory and not to devise a solution. He was careful in those years not to assume

the role of omniscient oracle. "The avant-garde in the political struggle need prudence, but not academic instruction on their so-called standpoint" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 223). Thus, the early Horkheimer called for a dialectical linkage of theory, as an advisory function, directly to the struggle.

As we have seen in previous chapters, materialism demanded a consistent dialectic linkage. It was not to be imposed by abstracted scholarship.

> Will theoretical needs be directly practical needs? It does not suffice that thought should press for actualization; reality must itself press toward thought (Marx, 1971, p. 422).

The relationship was to remain dialectic, devoid of privilege on the part of either the people or the theorists.

Horkheimer's position on this issue did not remain consistent. The exception first appeared in his conceptualization of the intellectual's relationship to the people. There was a vast differential between his 1937 critique of those intellectuals who engage in their craft " . . . alongside all the other activities of a society but in no immediate clear connection . . . " and his 1947 position. The latter stance accommodated the separate and distinct role for the intellectual which he had earlier renounced. By 1947, there was a decisively diminished emphasis on contradiction and concrete dialectical critique, and a noticeably greater propensity to an intellectual reconciliation. Here the task of scholarship was no longer social action but abstract reconciliation apart from the direct participation of the people.

> The task of philosophy is not stubbornly to play the one against the other [subject and object], but to foster a mutual critique and thus, if possible, to prepare in the intellectual realm the reconciliation of the two in reality (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 174).

There is a noteworthy similarity between this comment and a famous statement by Hegel, who is an often unacknowledged presence in Critical Theory:

> If the power of unification disappears from man's life, and opposites have lost their living relation and interaction and are gaining independence, the need for philosophy arises (Hegel, in Werner Marx, 1975, p. 20-21).

For Horkheimer's part, it becomes clear that theoretical unity as a function of philosophy was stressed over a dialectics that was integral to the larger life world. This position, in direct contradiction of the earlier view, was now compatible with Mannheim in that it paved the way for an intellectual synthesis not unlike that envisioned for the sociologist of knowledge.

During the early years Horkheimer asserted that ". . . ideals can become moving forces, in so far as men try to turn them from mere, even if justified, ideas into reality" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 46). Or again, "The issue, however, is not simply the theory of emancipation, it is the practice of it as well" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 233).

From this admonition to the theorist, written in 1937, a rather marked contrast was provided in his 1947 definition of the role of theorist as critical philosopher. The net result was clearly to further separate the theorist from praxis. There was now only a retrospective function of philosophy, a flight back to the Owl of

Minerva with no corresponding redefinition of the Critical Theorist's role in the direction of greater service to rational social struggle.

> Philosophy is neither a tool nor a blueprint. It can only foreshadow the path of progress as it is worked out by logical and factual necessities; in doing so it can anticipate the reaction of horror and resistance that will be evoked by the triumphal march of modern man (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 164-165).

I have suggested that Horkheimer's later work manifested a markedly increased reluctance to link critical thought and the thinker himself with the existential circumstance of struggle. I have further held that that reluctance correlated roughly with the rise of Stalinism and Nazism. World War II was in its early stages when his writing began to express a deeper pessimism than previously had been evoked.

> The only hope remaining is that the deaf ears in Europe imply an opposition to the lies that are being hammered at men from all sides and that men are following their leaders with their eyes tight shut. One day we may learn that in the depths of their hearts, the masses, even in fascist countries, secretly knew the truth and disbelieved the lie, like catatonic patients who make known only at the end of their trance that nothing has escaped them. Therefore it may not be entirely senseless to continue speaking a language that is not easily understood (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 290).

A corresponding pessimism was also evident in a comparison of his earlier and later projections about the possible triumph of socialism. He clearly anticipated difficulties in accomplishing a socialist society but particularly in the early works he seemed less intimidated and more willing to take them in stride.

> Above all, however, critical theory has no material accomplishments to show for itself. The change which it seeks to bring about is not effected gradually, so that success even if slow might be steady. The growth in numbers of more or less clear-minded disciples, the influence of

> some among them on governments, the power position of parties which have a positive attitude towards this theory or at least do not outlaw it--all these are among the vicissitudes encountered in the struggle for a higher stage of man's life in community and are not found at the beginnings of the struggle (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 218-219).

Particularly in the 1937 work, Horkheimer stressed "obstinancy" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 220) in critical reflection and praxis. This was an "obstinancy" whose incentive was the sustaining sense of "guilt" about a ubiquitous oppression across the capitalist world. However, it is apropos to remind ourselves that his theoretical orientation rendered his obstinancy and guilt rather subjective. Psychological motivations and self-seeking primal impulses were ever present, a close accompaniment of his later theoretical enterprise.

These highly subjective and weak critical grounds were bound to be annihilated by the pessimism engendered by both the social political disintegration and the absence of a systematic understanding of the"holocaust" as less a function of inherent human weakness than economic deprivation and oppression. Thus, by 1947,he expressed significant doubt about the ability of people to overcome the powers of the technocratic age. Of course, economic factors were not totally bypassed

> The objective mind in our era worships industry, technology, and nationality without aprinciple that could give sense to these categories; it mirrors the pressure of an economic system that admits of no repreives or escape.
>
> As for the ideal of productivity, it must be observed that economic significance today is measured in terms of usefulness with respect to the structure of power, not with respect to the needs of all (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 154).

But his thinking repeatedly returned to the "warped thoughts" and power to "infiltrate" minds that the "manipulative" power elites

posessed (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 146-148). He doubted more and more the ability of the people to withstand the "pressure [that] consists in the continual coercion that modern social conditions put on everyone" (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 98). In an obvious critique of Lukac's optimism about the proletariat and its potential for self-realization, he asserted that

> The intellectual is satisfied to proclaim with reverent admiration the creative strength of the proletariat and finds satisfaction in adapting himself to it and in canonizing it. He fails to see that such an evasion of theoretical effort (which the passivity of his own thinking spares him) and of temporary opposition to the masses (which active theoretical effort on his part might force upon him) only makes the masses blinder and weaker than they need be. His own thinking should in fact be a critical, promotive factor in the development of the masses (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 214).

By 1947 his pessimism was also reflected in his references to democracy:

> Deprived of its rational foundation, the democratic principle becomes exclusively dependent upon the so-called interests of the people, and these are functions of blind or all too conscious economic forces. They do not offer an guarantee against tyranny (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 28).

It is not that such statements (together with his disdaining remarks about "the masses") are completely invalid, but one is impressed by their unqualified form and his preoccupation with them.

From the present, he reached into history to document dubious assertions about the alleged conceptual swamp in which workers of the past were mired. "It is true," he asserted, ". . . that workers of earlier days did not have any conceptual knowledge of the mechanisms unveiled by social theory . . ." (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 140). What is more, their "undeveloped minds" required pacification by their leaders. He insisted as a case in point that:

> The reinstatement of Catholicism by Napoleon indicates that the masses could not bear the painful repression of natural urges imposed upon them by his political and social program without the solace of the transcendental (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 116).

Of course, an equally plausible explanation for the reinstatment of Catholicism might be that the ruling elite tried to finish the squashing of the lower classes begun by the bourgeoisie in the latter stages of the French Revolution and hence that it was in no way a helpful gesture of the ruling elite in the interest of the people as Horkheimer implied. Napoleon's act from the alternative perspective could be conceived less as the weakness of "the masses" than as an acknowledgement of their strength.

Indeed, Horkheimer's pessimism grew to the point where it seriously distorted his view of history. Far from progressive and forward thinking, his critique of industrial society reverted to a romanticized yearning for the past. As in C. W. Mills' White Collar, he conjured up a highly romantic and inaccurate picture of the middle class entrepreneur of the 1800's, presented "him" as being typical of the nineteenth century "man," and lamented "his" passing. Horkheimer darkly portrayed the mechanization and rationalization of modern life. On the other hand was the early entrepreneur--free, self motivated, individualistic, and humane.

> In that earlier day the father was in large measure a free man. The outcome of his action in society did not, of course, depend on him alone. At least, however, no other will--neither of leader nor of group--made his decisions for him. As long as he stayed within the law, he was subject to no one and responsible only to his own conscience. He was his own master and for that very reason his rule did not have to take the form of tyranny (Horkheimer, 1974b, p. 11-12).

Outside of the Hollywood Western or the Horatio Alger novel one would be burdened to find the idealized "father" as "free man" depicted in Horkheimer's fantasy. Perhaps if one restricted one's search to a priviliged class of males--but otherwise this description of the free man was oblivious to the fact that this middle class, this "free" entrepreneur, was in many ways responsible for the illiteracy, the fourteen to sixteen hour work days, the infant mortality rate, the prevalent powerlessness in the determination of social goals, etc., that typified the life of the vast majority one hundred years ago. (This is not to say that some of this does not exist today.)

There were sometimes periods of doubt whether Horkheimer was at all interested in "the masses." He spoke of Schopenhauer approvingly.

> He [Schopenhauer] would rather, as Goethe writes in the West-Östliche Diwan, converse "with clever men, with tyrants" than set out for the dictatorship of the "unified" people in the company of demagogues and fanaticized masses (Horkheimer, 1974b, p. 67).

He wrote nostalgically of the times when the "civilian used to expect the academic man to be, not a professional, but a more educated counselor, one superior to himself in humanistic ways" (Horkheimer, 1974b, p. 12). Continuing throughout was a distinct thread of scorn and derision in which he raised frequent questions about the capacity of the people to actively participate in their own enlightenment. That attitude approached ridicule of the "lower class" in his critique of education. "Education, in abbreviated or unabbreviated form, edited, filmed, and synchronized for sound,

is being given to a far greater majority, but in the process it suffers a radical change of function, somewhat as the city woman's robe, once transplanted into the villages by lady's maids and servants, became the peasant woman's costume" (Horkheimer, 1974b, p. 13).

This was the later "Critical Theory" of Max Horkheimer, a theory that was more comfortable with "clever men," "humanistic superiority," and "city robes," than "fanaticized masses" and "peasant costumes." The earlier traces of radicalism had taken on the character of cultural and intellectual superiority that isolated him increasingly from laypeople and threw him, however unwillingly, into the company of elites intent on protecting aristocratic privilege from the vulgarity of the common people. The theoretical lament of the Eclipse of Reason, that traditional metaphysics had been lost, found its material counterpart in the Critique of Instrumental Reason, where Horkheimer lamented the passing of what he thought was the traditional bourgeois life.

The people, the anathema of bourgeois life, were repeatedly depicted by Horkheimer as increasingly vulnerable to ever more sophisticated means of manipulation and matters were getting worse, not better. Thus the "minds and bodies" of the workers of the past

> . . . bore the marks of oppression; yet their misery was still the misery of individual human beings, and therefore linked them with any miserable people in any country and in any sector of society. Their undeveloped minds were not continually being prodded by the techniques of mass culture that hammer the industrialistic behavior patterns into their eyes and ears and muscles during their leisure time as well as during working hours (Horkheimer, 1974b, p. 149).

Horkheimer, in romanticizing past oppression as at least the "misery of individual human beings," did not draw the link between cultural domination and class struggle. It was precisely because minds were undeveloped, and thus not as sophisticated and critical, that refined cultural and social domination were likewise undeveloped. Thus, he disregarded the explanation that higher levels of sophisticated manipulation might also be seen as a reflection of increased sophistication on the part of the oppressed.

He disregarded the distinct possibility that the sophisticated manipulative techniques of the modern age were introduced due in signficant measure to a corresponding opposition on the part of the people. Why should ruling elites spend valued resources to manipulate those whom they did not have to fear? It seems that the ruling elites had a greater respect for the critical power of the people than Horkheimer.

Pessimism about "the masses" was also related to certain tendencies of the Critical Theorists to indulge in the more deterministic aspects of Freudian dogma. This attitude of Horkheimer was reflected in the earlier work:

> What comes to the fore when men most candidly reveal their inner selves, is precisely the predatory, evil, cunning beings whom the demagogue knows well how to handle. A pre-established harmony prevails between his outward purposes and their crumbled inner lives. Everybody knows himself to be wicked and treacherous, and those who confirm this, Freud, Pareto, and others, are quickly forgiven (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 280).

Apparently Bolshevism and the Nazi "blitz" had stunted Horkheimer's dreams. The effect of this development appeared to some extent in both his early and later writings. During the Nazi

era he saw the trend of events as "pushing mankind towards the surrender of all culture and relapse into darkest barbarism" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 241).

By 1947 though, he had become much more preoccupied with "primitive" impulses in the explanation of action.

> Hitler appealed to the unconscious in his audiences by hinting that he could forge a power in whose name the ban on repressed nature would be lifted. Rational persuasion can never be as effective, because it is not congenial to the repressed primitive urges of a superficially civilized people. Nor can democracy hope to emulate totalitarian propaganda, unless it undertakes to compromise the democratic way of life by stimulating destructive unconscious forces (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 120).

How different this was from his earlier warning that

> Understanding of the present becomes more idealist the more it avoids the economic causes of material need and looks to a psychologically naive elaboration of so-called "basic elements of human existence" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 26).

Now the cultural chaos, street fighting, decimation, dishonor, and despair were no longer explained as social manifestations of the crisis of capitalism. Now he regressed to psychologizing and the resurrection of the ubiquitous liberal individualist rationale--primitive urges and glandular domination. The trend in a score of years or less had moved from insistence on economic explanations to "basic" repressed "primitive urges." Now he moved closer to conceptualizing the power of reason and also of totalitarianism as resting on "unconscious destructive forces." He seemed to have distanced himself from his earlier stance that totalitarianism was often a consequence of crisis in bourgeois society. He did not question whether Hitler could have succeeded without the support

of giant industrialists who required an economically stable social order (see Fromm, Escape from Freedom).*

The existential conditions indicated above give us a basis on which to more fully analyze Horkheimer's application of his own concept of dialectic praxis. Although there were traces of ambivalence in Marx, we indicated that the bulk of Marx's work retained an ultimate faith in the participatory ideal of dialectics. Perhaps that ideal is best encapsulated by Marx four years before his death in a circular letter to Liebknecht et al. There he insisted that emancipation from oppression is the work of the working class:

> The emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself. We cannot, therefore, go along with people who openly claim that the workers are too ignorant to emancipate themselves but must first be emancipated from the top down, by the philanthropic big and petty bourgeois (Marx, 1971, p. 508).

As we have seen, the later Horkheimer, by contrast, expressed profound doubts about the ability of the "masses" to participate in their own emancipation. This, of course, was a reflection of the failures of the "historically necessary proletarian revolution," which had been an article of faith among Marxists. But rather than look for the failure of this movement in the structure of society--the disillusionment and slaughter of World War I, the debilitating despair

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* Note: This is not to deny psychological mechanisms, but rather to point out the consequences of giving primacy to these mechanisms. Mannheim himself saw monopoly capitalism as a form of fascism. Once again the "radical" Horkheimer seems to have lost sight of that all-important maxim of Critical Theory: that our actions are the result of an actual social-economic existence. Consequently his principle remaining explanatory recourses were biophysical factors.

of the Depression, and the tremendous manipulative machinery of the power structure--he regressed to psychological explanations about the blindness of the "masses." He seemed to locate the failure of the people in some primordial psychological make-up. Rather than link the susceptibility of people to fascism--rather than link the sobering evidence of manipulability to the ongoing struggle by the power structure to maintain its hold on society, his solution would seemingly be for intellectuals to assume a substantial proportion of critical thought for the the people. Indeed, he spoke with no qualification about thinking or acting "dialectically on behalf of the mass of people."

> When dialectical thought, anticipating the annihilation of the human race in wars and endless barbarism, takes it upon itself to speak of a general interest, to separate what is relevant from what is not, and to construct its ideas in this light, it does not always find unwavering support for its statements. Its difficulties are all the greater because the mass of people is still blind and ready to disavow anyone who thinks or acts in its behalf (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 166).

This statement embodied an unmistakeable separation of the functions of thought from the "masses" in whose behalf the scholar thought. On the other hand, the scholar eschewed activism. For we likewise find increasing discomfort with questions of activism in the later works. Only immediately after the death of Walter Benjamin was there a noticeable exception (noted above) to the rule that activism be either ignored or disdained. Otherwise activism was downgraded.

> Is activism, then, especially political activism, the sole means of fulfillment . . . I hesistate to say so. This age needs no added stimulus to action . . . If philosophy is to be put to work, its first task should be to correct this situation [confusion of age]. The concentrated

> energies necessary for reflection must not be prematurely drained into the channels of activistic or non-activisitic program (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 184).

Or again

> . . . the author is not trying to suggest anything like a program of action. On the contrary, he believes that the modern propensity to translate every idea into action, or into active abstinence from action, is one of the symptoms of the present cultural crisis: action for action's sake is in no way superior to thought for thought's sake, and is perhaps even inferior to it (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. vi).

In no instances did he make systematic proposals by which scholars might become actively involved in organizations engaged in struggle for emancipation of the oppressed. While Horkheimer spoke of the task of the Critical Theoretician--"to reduce the tension between his own insight and the oppressed humanity in whose service he thinks" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 221)--he made no substantial proposal by which this should be accomplished, save to lament the blindness of the "masses" in their readiness to disavow "anyone who thinks or acts in its behalf" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 166). While it is true that the possibilities of social action were limited and that theoretical work was at times probably the most productive option, this does not explain the elitist nature of his theorizing. Though progressive action was not always a concrete possibility, progressive theorizing was--that is, theorizing that would attempt to develop a basis upon which a link with the people could be forged. Lamenting the "failure" of the "masses" was neither progressive nor consistent with the emancipatory precepts identifiable in a logical extension of Hegel and Marx. If anything, it reinforced an image of the "common" person that the power structure fostered through its

powerful manipulative apparatus. Instead of directing the potential of theory to an understanding of the structures of domination (in order to develop structures of emancipation that would make dominstion less effective),he was derisive of the people for having been taken in. Rather than lament the disavowed of those who thought in the peoples "behalf" (a fundamentally elitist perspective) a more consistent critical focus was demanded. That goal would have been the development of structures, albeit at this point only theoretical, that had as their goal the realization of a level of consciousness in which people might think and act critically for themselves in a relationship with expertise that preserved their dignity. One is moved to ask whether anyone but the Critical Theorist could do it and,whether there need be vastly greater attention directed to a critique of both the Critical Theorist, as thinker and actor, and of "the people" as Critical Theorists.

Concerning the focus of Horkheimer's Critical Theory, it would seem safe to say that unlike Mannheim, he believed that the duty of the intellectual was to advise the proletariat and not devise solutions. But he tended more and more to the role of cloistered cleric who on occasion descended to touch "the masses," and even on occasion to experience a sense of oneness with them, but who could find no "safe" basis on which to mingle freely.

As a consequence, his epistemology moved in the direction of a generally descending enamourment with dialectics. There was, of course, always a theoretical dialectic between consciousness and existence but he maintained the role of intermediary advisor to "the masses" by separating the philosophical from the material

moment in his intellectual action. Unlike Marx, who had insisted on a close linkage of theory with the concrete contradiction within society, Horkheimer reduced the Promethean dream to laments about the insufficiency of humankind.

Horkheimer's Legacy to the Critical Theory of Habermas

This chapter evidences an initial ambivalence and what is predominatly an increasing disillusionment on the part of Horkheimer, not only with the current status of humanity but with human nature itself. Implicit in the later pessimism was a fundamental ambivalence about the ultimate communal nature of homo sapiens. Since that communal nature constituted a core assumption of Hegel and of Marx's dialectical materialism, Horkheimer found himself in a generally unacknowledged conflict within his own intellectual roots. What Horkheimer seemingly required was a model that did not preclude a linkage between necessity and freedom, theory and praxis, but that at the same time protected ethics and the grounding of belief from the vulnerable "masses" and the manipulative potential of politically corrupted technology. Given this dilemma and the corresponding anxiety about political organizational participation, he was driven progressively back to a parallel to the Kantian dichotomy which he had presumably rejected. That is, the analytic distinction between subjective and objective reason became reified in the bourgeois model that tended toward isolation of the philosopher-theorist from the direct exigencies of struggle (particularly political intimidation) in the life world. What is most important to his legacy is that that

inconsistency constituted precedents whereby Habermas also tended toward an ahistorical abstracted synthesis. Like Horkheimer, that synthesis was also at the expense of an integral linkage of the dialectic of freedom to emancipatory action. In short, it slighted a historical sequence of self- and group consciousness formation in the life world.

Horkheimer had earlier called for an ". . .irreducible tension between concept and object (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 32). But by 1947 the intensity of that call was muted. Horkheimer himself acknowledged the transition from the earlier, more optimistic outlook when he wrote with Adorno in 1947 that upon setting out to discover

> . . . why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism. We underestimated the difficulties of interpretation, because we still trusted too much in the modern consciousness (Horkheimer, 1972, p. xi).

His writing of these years, as we have seen, depicted the contemporary status of consciousness in grim and somber tones. That consciousness was, in his words, characterized by "warped thought," and exceeding vulnerability to manipulation. Furthermore, while there was scant attention given to the accomplishment of oppressed peoples, there was a tendency to interpret the historical role of the oppressed in a demeaning light.

What was most telling was that the vulnerability to warpage and manipulability was less often presented as a historically conditioned variable. Rather, what now came through was a persistent reference to biologically grounded "psychological" states, less a

function of our social condition than of our nature. Humanity was now presented in a rhetoric that reflected in its moments of despair a hint of misanthropic invective. During these moments, we were little more than beast--the "predatory evil, cunning beings we all are." Occasionally the tones might have been likened to hell-fire and brimstone admonitions of the Great Awakening religious fundamentalists. Humankind was "wicked," "treacherous," driven by an "unconscious repressed nature" to succumb to the hate-mongering of Hitler, Stalin, and presumably, future tyrants who might be cast in their image.

Immersed in despair, perhaps Horkheimer, like Hegel before him, negotiated what in Horkheimer's own words was a "personal peace treaty between the philosopher and an inhuman world" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 204). In his behalf,one must allow that few of us today are as close to the stench of Buchenwald, Bergen-Belson, or the Warsaw ghetto, nor as a consequence are we so vulnerable to the miserable view of human nature posited in the more dogmatic elements of Freudian psychology. In the face of this havoc, disillusionment is not surprising. But despite that observation,we must acknowledge the effect of the exclusion of dialectics which it reinforced.

It was an effect that a consistently critical relationship to Marxian theory itself might have precluded. Once again, those who merely interpret the world will be surprised by events both because they have no hand in the process of becoming,and because they consequently have no first hand intimate knowledge of the

potential either for change or for their efficacy in that process. Like the "establishment" sociologists of the sixties who could offer precious little insight to the civil rights or war protest movements, they felt betrayed by reality. Critical Theory, it would seem, is as much dependent on achieving a dialectic synthesis as is any other thought if it is to claim allegiance to an emancipatory ideal. Thus, Horkheimer said that "arduous labor for a meaningful end may be enjoyed and even loved. [But] A philosophy that makes labor an end in itself leads eventually to resentment of all labor" (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 153). A less "repressed" Marxian critique should have injected a correction. For to reject labor as an end is to allocate labor to a mere means, which is the liberal bourgeois definition of labor. As Marx pointed out, when labor is merely a means to an end, workers themselves become merely means to attainment of that end (e.g., production of surplus value). Also, as Horkheimer himself has told us, one of the objects of labor, nature, also becomes merely a means, rather than an end. Thus, when labor is perceived merely as a means, the outcome is the domination of humanity and nature. Horkheimer, in rejecting labor (objectification) as an end (as the self-expression of humanity in its interaction with itself and nature) takes the bourgeois definition of work and extends it as a sufficient definition of work in general. Instead of confronting capitalism with a political-economic critique a la Marx, he attempts to escape the capitalist organization of work through social and intellectual isolation. He at least temporarily surrenders the people over to the power structure, while trying to

build a small haven for philosophy. Hence, a Marxian critique should have revised Horkheimer to read "meaningful labor is a meaningful end and may be enjoyed and even loved. A philosophy that links meaningful labor inextricably to its ends may well avoid resentment and command the confidence of all laborers (humanity) and achieve its end: the transcendence of oppression." Instead, Horkheimer restricted the role of the philosopher to that of humankind's abstract memory and conscience.

> Philosophical theory itself cannot bring it about that either the barbarizing tendency or the humanistic outlook should prevail in the future . . . philosophy would be mankind's memory and conscience, and thereby help to keep the course of humanity from resembling the meaningless round of the asylum inmate's recreation hour (Horkheimer, 1974a, p. 186).

Philosophy can and should be more than a "memory and conscience"of humankind. Indeed, it must be if it is to meet the criteria set for it by Horkheimer himself. Clearly, unless Horkheimer renounced dialectical materialism, which he did not, then philosophical theory must be inextricably linked to the concrete social and physical world dialectically. It follows,then,that it is infeasible for emancipatory theory to remain exclusively on the level of pure philosophy and/or science. That is, since his declared intention was to establish an emancipatory discipline in the dialectic tradition (and it is reasonable to assume that expertise in the realm of emancipatory praxis would benefit from a rigorous and coordinated conceptual structure) then it must meet ipso facto the criteria of dialectic synthesis.

Horkheimer's advocacy of a philosophical synthesis resulted in a direct contradiction. According to the Hegelian-Marxian concept of the dialectic we initially achieve consciousness by apprehending ourselves in the concretized products of our own labors (in the struggle to survive). Hence,it is incumbent on any discipline which excludes praxis to establish concrete mechanisms by which its practioner might maintain a dialectic interaction. Otherwise,the philosopher must either document a case for the sufficiency of his/her own capacity to encompass reality beyond science, epistemology and ethics, or acknowledge that his/her expertise is limited and not sufficient as a replacement for actual praxis. Further, while I would agree that "to transform the critical theory of society into a sociology is, on the whole, an undertaking beset with serious difficulties" (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 239) and while I would advocate no such transition, I would insist that his attempt to transform Critical Theory into philosophy is beset with even more serious difficulties. We search in vain in his later writingsfor a qualification of his assumption (based on his miserable view of human nature and the "masses") that the philosopher-theorist might "think" or "act" in "behalf of the masses." At no point did he explain how it followed that thinking or acting dialectically could be performed via intellectual surrogates (philosophers),in behalf of the people (particularly in respect to application of that thought within the normative structure of Western "democracies." This assumption again violated the primal essence of the Hegel-Marx conception of consciousness formation. For self-apprehension

and transcendence according to that perspective occurred only in concrete conjunction with the struggle to survive as free people. What he substituted was an abstract intellectual synthesis in "behalf of the masses." This action was advocated by Horkheimer, presumably on the basis of his authority as an expert, for he established no basis on which a mandate to assume the synthesizing function might be granted by the people. It is a paradox that in his early writing he rejected bourgeois political authority by contending that the

> . . . genuine alternative to the bourgeois concept of authority takes the form of detaching authority from egoistic interests and exploitation (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 96).

Yet, he never renounced or even systematically assessed the profound implications involved when the intellectuals assumed the authority to think in behalf of the people.

This contradiction betrayed the previously established criteria that a truly dialectic synthesis was possible only if one acted knowledgably on a belief in the ultimate ability and resolve of people to create a humane and decent world. Clearly, Horkheimer's later model met neither the prerequisites of knowledgeability nor belief. It is to his credit that he eschewed the "neutral" position of a synthesizing arena for one directly in advocacy of emancipation. But he did not show what context might bring the philosopher, the sociologist, and the people themselves together in a manner that effectively coped with their joint oppression, while maintaining a dialectic of freedom.

My findings concur with Jacoby's contention that much of the work of "the Frankfurt School . . . [was] distant both from praxis and questions close to praxis, e.g., problems of organization, strategy, etc." (Jacoby, 1975, p. 261). Lukacs contended that "intellectuals can only as individuals become revolutionary; they must leave their class in order to participate in the class struggle of the proletariat" (Jacoby, 1973, p. 23). I will explore these direct and implicit criticisms further in the subsequent chapters. That effort will comply with Jacoby's admonition that:

> In any case, if one is to bring up the charge of flight from praxis, it is incumbent to outline the real possibilities and alternatives from which the Frankfurt School supposedly fled: what in short, should they be doing? (Jacoby, 1974, p. 235).

We are left immediately with the question of how Horkheimer's intellectual progeny treated his legacy.

CHAPTER VIII

HABERMAS

Probably the most notable scholar currently associated with Critical Theory is Jurgen Habermas. Habermas' work is wide-ranging. For purposes of this study I will make minimal reference to his more recent explorations of ethnomethodology, Parson's and Luhmann's systems theories, etc. The focus here is on consciousness as well as on theory and praxis. Hence, due to the greater pertinence to my purpose, attention will be centered on his theory of communicative competence together with its principle conceptual bases. I will also examine his employment of the psychoanalytic model by which that competence is to be made available to the public for the expansion of emancipatory consciousness.

Habermas, as a Critical Theorist, remains highly concerned with what he sees as the vulnerability and manipulability of those he, with Horkheimer, identifies as the "masses." So he continues Horkheimer's emphasis on the development of a logic or theory of emancipation that does not derive its legitimation from popular struggle. True to the precedents established by Horkheimer, he seeks a linkage between theory and praxis while at once protecting the scholar from the perceived manipulability of the "masses" in particular and the exigencies of praxis in general. He attempts to establish a basis on which the

intellectual might participate in the process of change, but, paraleling Mannheim, it is a position of minimal vulnerability.

Habermas sets out to extend Horkheimer's critiques of both the dogmas of positivistic Marxism and the relativism of Mannheim. The undertaking is initiated essentially on his elder mentor's model of an intellectualized formal synthesis on behalf of the people, but Habermas grants social science a far more substantial role. Horkheimer had, in the view of his progeny, bequeathed the task of systemization. So Habermas sets out to create a formal emancipatory social science! Horkheimer's rather scattered and polemical Kulture Kritik must be worked into an ordered conventional model if it is to become the basis of a formal discipline. Specifically, the philosophical distinction between subjective and objective reason has to be transformed into a model compatible with intellectual research. Horkheimer left merely the observation that

> . . . the division of all human truth into science and humanities is itself a social product. . . . the physical sciences are endowed with so-called objectivity, but emptied of human content; the humanities preserve the human content, but only as ideology, at the expense of truth (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 75).

So Habermas carries the notion of an intellectual synthesis of subjective and objective reason to its logical end. He advocates a new discipline that unites science and epistemology. That discipline is to be the crucible in which science (as the institutional manifestation of an "invariant relation of man against nature") is to be blended "dialectically" with the hermeneutic disciplines (the institutional bases of reflective symbolic interaction). Habermas might have retained a tight linkage of theory and praxis had he maintained his conceptualization of the struggle to survive (purposive-rational

action) and communicative action (symbolic interaction) as mere analytic distinctions. But despite a strong declaration of intent to do so, he fails. That is, he reifies the former by making the struggle to survive equivalent to the bourgeois and the vulgar Marxist struggle to survive. Consequently, the science of survival becomes the bourgeois positivistic science of survival. Within the bourgeois model, a historically conditioned, technically augmented domination of nature is effectively attributed by Habermas to an invariant or natural "interest" of all humankind in technically augmented domination. Similarly, he reifies the latter by making reflexive reason (the linguistically mediated struggle for the realization of new human possibilities) equivalent to contemporary culture. Again, the models extant in the dominant hermeneutic disciplines of contemporary culture are concretized as the singular manifestation--the only expression of social science and the humanities. Here a historically specific orientation toward values and humane existence is attributed by Habermas to an invariant interest of the species.

Since he and Horkheimer (with some validity) argue that Marx mistakenly emphasized primarily the purposive-rational (economic) moment, Habermas sets out to establish a unification of the purposive-rational and symbolic interactional moments as an explicit reformulation of Marx's implicit intent. But the categories through which he constitutes his "synthesis" are based on traditional, often abstract, scholarship, not the concrete experiences of our shared struggle for transcendence and self-realization. Contemporary disciplines are taken for the equivalent embodiments of our praxis, and a quasi "dialectic" synthesis is then effected by way of his emancipatory

science. That science, too, becomes the embodiment of an invariant emancipatory interest. His inconsistency, simply put, is that the formal unification of two abstract models does not an emancipatory science make. The point that I shall attempt to document on the following pages is that while Habermas and the Critical Theorists make a perceptive critique of Marx, they do not provide a solution consistent with the underlying precepts of Marxism to which Habermas expresses fidelity. He has not demonstrated that a dialectic restricted to formal thought processes, conducted within a monologic context, using abstract models, provides a realistic non-elitist basis for the transcendence of oppression or the realization of an emancipated consciousness.

Habermas, Hegel, and Marx

The intent of emancipatory science and the theory of communicative competence is to establish a systematic rational mechanism by which the principle strategy of oppression in contemporary Western democracies, manipulation of consensus, can be revealed to citizens. To begin, Habermas adopts Hegel's grounding of transcendental meaning in history. He rejects what he sees as absolute in Hegel's philosophy of history--he specifically disavows the belief that the realization of Absolute Spirit, the so-called consciousness of freedom, is the absolute destiny of humanity. Nor is he less vehement in his unwillingness to countenance the notion that progress is guaranteed in the rational development of human destiny. But he accepts the idea that reality occurs when perceptions are passed through historically contingent frames of reference that in turn constitute meaning. In short,

Habermas accepts Hegel's grounding of Kant's transcendental meaning in history, but rejects what he identifies as an a priori essence inherent in the concept of Absolute Spirit.

At the same time, his revisions of Hegel (due to the persisting concern for a protection of theorizing from certain exigencies of praxis) lead him, like Horkheimer before him, to embrace elements of Kant's bourgeois epistemology rejected by Hegel and Marx. In so doing, he circumvents the effect of a historicized objectification and transcendence, retaining Horkheimer's tendency to assume the prerogative of a formal synthesis at the expense of dialectics. Hegel had rejected the Kantian categories precisely because he believed that those categories achieved transcendence abstractly, apart from the historical development of consciousness from which these categories were derived. He contended that these categories must not be developed abstractly and universally but rather in terms of the concrete existential circumstances of history. Habermas accepts the Hegelian historicizing of the Kantian a priori but sceptical of the current capacity of the oppressed to participate in theory-building, like Mannheim, he places primary responsibility for the advancement of emancipated consciousness on the experience-based wisdom (which I shall define as knowledge in perspective) of the social scientist together with an invariant category of cognitive "interest" presumably present in all social groupings. Unlike Hegel and Marx, Habermas' categories, as we shall point out, are derived not from direct experiential historical development of consciousness, but rather through the presentation of an ahistorical (and thus Kantian) ideal which the scientist presumably finds "embedded" in an abstract anthropology.

Habermas generally accepted both Hegel's and Marx's view that humanity achieved self-realization through labor. Marx challenged the Hegelian view that the realization of human potential was the necessary course of world history. Marx argued that it was not the universal consciousness that was synonymous with freedom but that it was via the organized process of social labor that humanity realized its freedom. Habermas extends that thesis via the contention that neither Marx nor even the early Critical Theorists, namely Horkheimer, sufficiently exhausted those theoretical issues that pertain to the human potential for rational self-realization. Like Mannheim, he seeks a clear analysis of the consciousness-freedom nexus (apart from political-economic emancipation) that was never systematically developed by Marx. He questions particularly why Marx never constructed an alternative theory of consciousness and freedom based on communicative as well as economic interaction. But he eschews a historical critique of Marx at the juncture of theory and praxis. Indeed, he undertakes an analysis of Marx's theory separated from the context of its origins. From this position, Habermas initiates his critique of dialectical materialism via the theory of communicative competence.

A Critique of Materialism: Toward an Intellectualized Material Synthesis

Three points are central to an understanding of Habermas' critique of Marxian materialism.

(1) He accepts the primacy that Marx placed in productive labor--in his terms"purposive-rational action"(zweckrational action). But he also recognizes as an important part of Marx's concept of social labor a critical element involving symbolic interaction or communicative action. This can also be conceived as the discursive (or

theoretical as opposed to praxis) function.

(2) Habermas argues that these analytically separable elements are anticipated in dialectical materialism. However, to prevent further vulgarization they should be made explicit and elaborated in a systematic reformulation. (By vulgarization he means a separation of theory from praxis that lends itself to totalitarian and other complications. Here he separates Lenin, Stalin, et al. from dialectical materialism and designates their position as "metaphysical materialism" because they presumably theologized the role of work.)

(3) One is struck by the paradox implicit in Habermas' critique. For as much as he finds a metaphysical component in the practitioners, his own position is subject to a similar criticism. That is, if he does indeed impose an intellectualized, formal synthesis; if he does, in the tradition of Horkheimer, concern himself more with the separation of theory from praxis than of praxis from theory; then his own theory is susceptible to a comparable charge of metaphysics. He censures the practitioners for the assumption of "elite" prerogatives to impose arbitrary, as opposed to "objective" standards for the fixation of a course of action, but how much less arbitrary is the role of scholarship in a self-appointed formal synthesis?

Habermas seeks to avoid the limitations of Marx's materialist dialectic by extending the emphasis on political economy to certain implicit elements evidenced in the earlier Marxian manuscripts. He attempts to elaborate the analysis of that which Marx termed "the exchange of human activity" within social-cultural production to include linguistic interactional components (Marx, 1967, p. 271). His object is to further develop these aspects so central to Marx's

belief in the capacity of homo sapiens to participate in our own self-creation. He contends here (and I think, correctly) (1) that these components of Marx's thought were never fully developed in his later writings and (2) that future praxis would benefit by such extensions.

But consistent with the traditional concerns of Critical Theorists about vulnerability of "the masses" to the guilements of the oppressor, Habermas insistently maintains a separation of both theory-building and enlightenment from the more threatening exigencies of praxis. Yet, this rejects more of the Hegelian-Marxist transcendental mode than he realizes, or at least overtly acknowledges. Thus, in seeing Hegel's position as basing self-realization on labor, Habermas forgets that equally important to Hegel in the master-slave relationship was the mutual recognition of the subjects. That is, self-realization for Hegel and Marx derives not only from self-objectification through labor, but also from the communicative experience of mutual recognition. In Marx, to be sure, labor becomes primary while the latter is only implicit. However, he retains in the materialist dialectic of negation an inseparability of consciousness from the experiences of human self-realization. Habermas misses this critical distinction.

The last section of The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts documents the common basis shared by both Hegel and Marx.

> The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology--the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle--is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and transcendence of this alienation, and that he, therefore, grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man (true because real man) as the result of his own labour (Marx, 1964a, p. 202).

Habermas, in the Horkheimerian tradition, replaces the dialectic developed

out of a socially conditioned alienation engendered in the rigors of radical consciousness formation with a Kantian epistemology. It replaces the consciousness developed out of existential conditions, á la Hegel and Marx, with an epistemology whose criteria are partially satisfied by abstract categories of meaning. Habermas (similar to Kant) asks not what is the existential substructure, but what are the logical conditions for an ideal communicative structure. Yet, neither the latter question nor its answers bear any necessary linkage to the existing historical context. Consequently, realization of this ideal is not integral to its "truth."

Given the absence of the often impelling realities of direct participation in social organizations of emancipation, Habermas is forced to reduce the sources of impetus and direction that influence the emancipatory theorist to the combined experience and analytic capacities of the community of emancipatory theorists (removed by his own mandate from the struggle), and an alleged "interest" in emancipation also mediated by the scientist.

Knowledge-Constitutive Interests

Habermas' model posits the invariant interests referred to above as categories of consciousness. Thus, consciousness conforms to three categories of interests: (1) purposive-rational (technical), (2) hermeneutic (understanding), and (3) emancipatory (linguistic-rational). He conceives these interests as ". . . basic orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the human species, namely work and interaction" (Habermas, 1971, p. 196). Interests are "invariant" to the extent

that each member of the human species must (1) survive in the physical world, (2) communicate with understanding, and (3) function in a rational context allegedly demanding the freedom to engage in reflexive interactions about our human possibilities. They are context-conditioned theoretical orientations. They are non-instinctual, being derived not only from nature but from the cultural break with nature. The cultural context conditions the particular form taken.

Now, at some point in evolution, these interests must be systematized to more effectively advance the "self-formative" process of the species. As the outcome of an advancing critical consciousness they become formulated as systematically ordered enterprises. At this point, the knowledge-constitutive interests appear. They become the sciences of our basic orientations to life. "Knowledge-constitutive interests can be defined exclusively as a function of the objectively constituted problems of the preservation of life that have been solved by the cultural form of existence as such" (Habermas, 1971, p. 196).

Being dependent upon the particular context for their specific character they cannot be conceived as aiming at the gratification of ". . . immediately empirical needs but at the solution of system problems in general" (Habermas, 1971, p. 196). The interests are, as invariant, present in every human society but the particular manifestation of the knowledge-constitutive interests is unique to the culture in question.

The interest itself ". . . establishes the unity between this constitutive context in which knowledge is rooted and the structure of the possible application which this knowledge can have" (Habermas, 1973, p. 9). The science is conditioned by that interest, not as a

direct and immediate communally shared interest, but via the intermediation of the scientist both as discoverer and interpreter of the interest. (The only exception would be if the concept formulation of the theorists and the application of enlightenment were egalitarian--participatory--in nature.)

The three categories of the science of consciousness, including emancipatory science, remain dependent on a personal, ahistorical, non-processual, and internalized "dialectic" abstracted from reality and deriving its intensity and quality only by interests interpreted by the scientist.

Habermas proceeds to develop emancipatory science as the task of Critical Theory. But that task is to be performed in the anti-septic atmosphere of the academic study, not in relationship with the people who are to participate in the newly objectified revolutionary consciousness. This again replaces the Marxian thesis that emancipatory theory must itself be developed in an emancipatory manner (e.g., communally and politically) with a liberal perspective based on abstract categories.

Habermas' categorization resulted in a formal separation of the material from the understanding and emancipatory functions of consciousness in a manner wherein only the scientist could attain a satisfactory reunification. This model, embodied in the theory of communicative competence risks the separation of the critical emancipatory function from that which Marx found deeply embedded in the material element of our species-being.

The implicit nature of the linkage between the critical and productive elements in Marx's thought occurs in the first of his theses on

Feuerbach. There Marx calls for an advance beyond both idealism and traditional materialism:

> The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the object or perception, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism, the active side was developed by idealism--but only abstractly since idealism naturally does not know actual, sensuous activity as such (Marx, 1967, p. 400).

Marx conceived "sensuous human activity," or praxis, as productive labor. Habermas' criticism is that this material production serves as the basis on which his followers have rested. It would appear that Habermas anticipated that two possible complications were invited by what he saw as Marx's failure to rigorously conceptualize his notion of social labor (the communal essence). The first is a vulgarized reductionism by Marx's followers. The second is an overreaction by his critics. In regard to the first possible predicament, what is given insufficient attention by Marxists after Marx is, for Habermas, the critical-conceptual component contained in the concept of social labor. This was sketched out for us in the previously cited unpublished notebook dated 1844. I repeat it here.

> The exchange of human activity within production itself as well as the exchange of human products with one another is equivalently the species-activity and species-spirit whose actual, conscious, and authentic existence is social activity and social satisfaction. As human nature is the true communal nature, or communal being (Gemeinwesen) of man, men through the activation of their nature create and produce a human communal being (Gemeinwesen), a social being (gesellschaftliche Wesen) which is no abstractly universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the nature or being (Wesen) of every single individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth . . . Men as actual, living, particular individuals, not men considered in abstraction, constitute this being. It is, therefore, what they are (Marx, 1970, p. xliii).

Habermas' argument is that Marx unintentionally set the stage

for a reduction of praxis to instrumental action in the sense that material production and social interaction were not viewed as two irreducible dimensions of praxis. Instead the social interaction was incorporated in the concept of production. This means, to Habermas, that in Marx's critique of capitalism all social conditions must be explained in terms of material production.

Habermas identifies one of the best known statements of Marx to explain why his followers have fallen prey to reductionism (that is, the reduction of his beliefs to dogmatic materialism). It is here that Marx writes

> In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations which are independent of their will, namely relations of productions appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness (Marx, 1978, p. 20-21).

It is this passage from Marx's "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" that, according to Habermas, is most often held to by the reductionists. Remember that Habermas does grant that Marx's frame of reference encompassed critical thought, symbolic interaction, self-realization, and the role of cultural tradition in praxis. He grants that Marx surely included in his thinking both a critique of political economy and a critique of ideology--he was both a revolutionary and a theorist.

However, the critique of ideology was incomplete and not adequately integrated in Marx's writing. This resulted in Marxism

developing in a positivistic direction. After the Second International this positivism developed as what McCarthy called

> . . . a general ontology of nature, history and thought enabling its practioners to discover their laws of development. The discovery of the laws of motion of society and history would permit prediction and control of social processes. In this form "DiaMat" [dialectical materialism] could assume the ideological function of legitimating party politics and technocratic social management . . . The critique of political economy, viewed as a deterministic science of the 'iron laws' of development and inevitable downfall of capitalism, could legitimate the sundering of 'revolutionary practice' from the formation of class consciousness . . . (McCarthy, 1975, p. xx).

To be sure, we have identified a positivistic bias in Marx's orientation. After all, it was well known that Marx disdained philosophy and to some extent revered science. Science not only contributed to the provision of material needs but also constituted a model in which truth was proven in praxis. However, we have seen that Marx was not to be confused with certain vulgarized practioners who virtually abandoned the cultural component for economic reductionism. Nonetheless, Habermas appropriately pointed out the legitimate Marxian deficiency while keeping in mind the second possible predicament related to reductionism.

Early Critical Theory had overreacted. Marx had excluded philosophy in his insistence that the point was not to philosophize about the world but to change it. But for early Critical Theory the process had been reversed. To Horkheimer, social science (its latent potential for positivism inherent in Marx's emphasis in the production of material goods) was made a virtual outcast. Social science was conceived as setting the stage for a totalitarian manipulation of consciousness, whether it occurred in capitalism or communism. Conversely, de-ontologized and de-absolutized philosophy--in which the essence of

truth was freedom to engage in non-distorted discourse--was called up as the Cinderella whose banishment to the scullery of social action by later Marxist practioners should be reprieved. It was this philosophical element that was to be wedded to a critique of both contemporary capitalism and non-dialectical Marxism. Implicit in Habermas' work is the belief that this philosophical emphasis of early Critical Theory constituted an excessive response to reductionism. In fact, it was so great an overreaction that social science had taken the place of philosophy as the rejected Cinderella and, as a consequence, the materialistic core of Marxism was damaged. So Habermas undertakes a two-fold campaign; he engages in the struggle against Horkheimer's nemesis, positivism, and he undertakes a latter day rebirth of the Kantian effort to save science--this time social science--not from a reaction of epistemology against its excesses but from a possible overreaction. He attempts to correct the reaction of early Critical Theorists by a more "balanced reformulation." In that reformulation he contends that purposive-rational action (the materialist view), when taken alone, lends itself to technical control. Likewise, critical thought (or symbolic interaction) when given predominance tends toward an idealist view of freedom that is not realizable. It is only when both are taken together in synthesis that humanity can be emancipated.

Numerous of his critiques are timely and brilliantly executed, but it is the nature of his "synthesis" that constitutes a central focus of this study. Habermas, in calling for the "irreducibility" first of material production and then of social interaction, sought to achieve their analytic separability and consequently the logical

place of critical interaction from the corruption of praxis. But it will become increasingly apparent that when one looks at his treatment of traditional science and hermeneutics (not as he subjects them to formal criticism but as they are embodied [synthesized] in (1) his own scientific method, (2) his own theoretical formulations [communicative competence], and (3) his conception of therapeutic enlightenment) the analytic distinction has become reified in the form of the traditional disciplines, as abstract categories of human existence--as "emancipatory science." What is more, given the universal character of these interests and the inevitable appearance of corresponding knowledge-constitutive interests, the synthesis is accomplished by intellectual-therapists duly safeguarded within the refuge of abstract scholarship. We shall begin with a look at his theory of communicative competence and follow that with a critique of his scientific and pedagogic method.

The Theory of Communicative Competence

When attempting to understand the theory of communicative competence an important point should be kept in mind. Habermas is looking for a systematic rational way to achieve an emancipated consciousness. He believes that this cannot be adequately accomplished if the ambiguities in Marx's notion of emancipated social labor persist. His objective is to augment Marx's notion of emancipated social labor with a theory of emancipated consciousness formation through undistorted or free communication.

Habermas bases his critique in a linguistic framework. "Today," he says, "the problem of language has replaced the traditional problem

of consciousness" (Habermas, in McCarthy, 1973, p. 136). One cannot cancel out the priority of the "interest structure that joins subject and object a priori," but, according to Habermas, reflection can somehow overcome it. Reflection is assumed to have a singular rational purpose. "What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language (Sprache). Through the structure of language, Mündigkeit [maturation with freedom and responsibility] is posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intentions of universal and unconstrained consensus (Konsensus)" (Blanchette, 1974, p. 331). Marx's emphasis on class struggle left the process of the actual transformation of consciousness vague and in the hands of revolutionary interpreters who were not necessarily dialectic or democratic in their programs. So Habermas creates a model of critical consciousness based on free open dialogue and consensus or what he calls communicative competence.

Habermas, like Horkheimer, believes that rigorous criteria of truth and self-reflection are vital due to modern methods of thought control. Those oppressive mechanisms were more open with Stalin and Hitler and more subtle in the contemporary West. Being concerned with thought control, Habermas' starting point is emancipation from distorted or manipulated communication. Since all communication is normative (not factual in the scientific sense), it can be systematically distorted, or in Marxian terms, communication can be open to the possibility of false consciousness.

Discourse is necessary where the validity of norms or of truth-claims is at issue. The element of scientific validation then distinguishes discourse from simple communicative action. Discourse follows

on the need to validate a truth claim. That claim ultimately rests on consensus. But the quality of the discourse determines whether the consensus of consciousness is false.

There are several characteristics of the linguistic resolution of truth claims:

(1) Truth claims must be (a) understandable, (b) true, (c) sincere, and (d) right or appropriate.

(2) In discourse one or all of the claims is problematic, where the prevailing consensus is questionable.

(3) A new consensus can be attained by (a) theoretical discourse (where truth claims are involved) and (b) practical discourse (where normative claims are involved).

(4) A new consensus (in discourse) requires the "suspension of the constraints of action" (what Habermas calls virtualization) where judgment is suspended during the process.

(5) We assume (in the communicative act) accountability; participants in the communicative act can account for their belief.

(6) We maintain an awareness that the assumption of accountability is "counterfactual" in some cases.

(7) Where the beliefs are counterfactual they are sustained by systematically distorted communication. Legitimation of the "ruling system of norms" demands that "discursive will formation" be prevented. "That is the paradoxical achievement of ideologies whose individual prototype is the neurotic disturbance . . ." (Habermas, in McCarthy, 1973, p. 140).

From this point Habermas is led to ask, What are the criteria of true vs. false consciousness or consensus?

He believes that the consensus theory of truth is critical to a freely structured consciousness. It is based on the belief that ". . . the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intentions of the good and true life" (Habermas, 1971, p. 317). But the determination of what constitutes a consensus is left to the scholar.

The first point made by Habermas is that truth can only be tested discursively. "Experiences support the truth claim of assertions. . . . But a truth claim can be redeemed only through argumentation. [Note that this involves no reference to praxis, only talk.] A claim founded on experience is by no means a justified claim" (Habermas, in McCarthy, 1975, p. xvi). Consistent with the Hegel-Marx critique of empiricism he holds that what is real is not merely what is perceivable. Rather, truth must be tested in dialogue; that is, in rational, discursively structured intersubjectivity.*

If truth can only be tested discursively, to what criteria does the discursive interaction appeal? The criteria identified by Habermas are the linguistic equivalents of truth, freedom, and justice. They are established in the form of hypotheses via theory, and conveyed to the "masses" by enlightenment in a form analogous to psychotherapy.

To begin, the rational outcome of discursive interaction depends

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*The fallacy here is that consistent with his tradition, the theoretical argument itself must be structured dialectically. To the extent that the participation in theory-building is restricted to theoreticians, the dialectical process is compromised or limited to artificially constricted perspectives. While Habermas does focus on communicative competence as a means by which people can participate, that participation is, as will be seen, of a dubious quality in that it is between a therapist and a client, a client who is apparently pathologically afflicted by systematically distorted communication.

upon "symmetrical" prerogatives to engage in discourse.

> An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles demands that no side be privileged in the performance of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists only when there is complete symmetry in the distribution of assertion and disputation revelation and hiding, prescription and following among the partners of communication. As long as these symmetries exist, communication will not be hindered by constraints arising from its own structure . . . (Habermas, 1970b, p. 143).

These symmetries should appear in three forms: (1) "unrestricted discussion" where prejudices can be criticized and where it would be feasible to develop strategies for reaching unconstrained consensus;" (2) respect for individual prerogatives--individuality could be preserved because symmetry would demand mutually "unimpaired self-representation," and (3) universally recognized norms and the concomitant understandings. These three "symmetries" represent to Habermas ". . . a linguistic conceptualization for that which we traditionally apprehend as the ideal of truth, freedom, and justice" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 144).

The Ideal Speech Situation

These symmetries should in turn prescribe an ideal, free from systematically distorted communication, within which the "force of the better argument" should prevail. This is the model for rational discourse--the "ideal speech situation."

> . . . the ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a reciprocal supposition unavoidable in discourse. This supposition can, but need not be, counterfactual; but even when counterfactual it is a fiction that is operatively effective in communication. . . . This anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and tested (Habermas, in McCarthy, 1975, p. xvii-xviii).

This concept of consensus, says Habermas, also allows an assessment of a given communicative action (ranging from systematically distorted to competent) based on consensually attained concepts of truth, freedom, and justice.

The criteria which may be drawn upon to recognize and prevent systematically distorted communication appear in the theory of communicative competence. Habermas defines communicative competence as "the mastery of an ideal speech situation" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 138). This, in turn, requires the dialogue constitutive universals. The dialogue constitutive universals both generate and describe the form of intersubjectivity that makes mutual understanding possible in the ideal speech situation. "If one . . . analyzes the structure which we generate and describe by pure dialogue constitutive universals, one arrives at a number of symmetrical relations for the ideal speech situation" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 143). The speaker then must have not only linguistic competence (in Chomsky's sense of knowledge of an abstract system of linguistic rules) but also the ". . . basic qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role-behavior) at his disposal, to achieve communicative competence" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 138).

These basic qualifications that Habermas assumes under the rubric dialogue constitutive universals can be exemplified by the differentiation between (1) propositions, having a logical content on the "locutionary" level and (2) utterances having a context related meaning on the "illocutionary" level. Given that framework, communicative competence would be contigent on a mastery ofand sensitivity to the illocutionary force of the utterance in question. This force then is

what Habermas means when he refers to the

> . . . universal pragmatic power of utterances. Such expressions do not retain any given pragmatic feature of contingent speech situations; they explain the meaning of certain idealized features of speech situations in general, which the speaker must master if his competence is to be adequate for participating at all in situations of potential speech. A theory of communicative competence can thus be developed in terms of universal pragmatics (Habermas, 1970b, p. 139).

Communicative competence involves for Habermas a linguistically determined state, not an empirical condition.

> The 'verbalization' of pragmatic features inherent in speech situations simply lifts that illocutionary force, which is already generated with the structure of speech situations itself, onto the level of linguistic communication. Utterances are never simply sentences. Even if they do not expressly make pragmatic relations their subject, they are integrated from the beginning into a form of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding owing to their illocutionary force (Habermas, 1970b, p. 140).

What are the dialogue constitutive universals inherent in utterances?

Dialogue Constitutives (Pragmatic) Universals

Habermas identifies five classes of dialogue constitutive universals (see McCarthy, 1973, p. 139): (1) Personal pronouns (permit role playing, "you," "me," "I," etc.) and derivatives, (2) forms of address and speech, introduction (vocative, greeting, etc.) correlated with roles assumed by speakers, hearers, participants, etc., (3) deictic expressions, that show or point out place and time, (4) performative verbs (promise, command, etc.) that relate the speaker, the hearer, and the utterance, and (5) non-performative intentional verbs correlated with the intentional attitudes of the speaker.

The problem faced by a theorist of communicative competence would be to develop a logic for the uses of these dialogue constitutive or pragmatic universals. To take an example given by McCarthy, under the

so-called performatives Habermas includes: (1) constatives which make possible the distinction between a public world (that which really is) and a private world (appearance), (2) representatives which ". . . makes possible the distinction between the individuated self and the various utterances, expressions and actions in which it appears" (McCarthy, 1973, p. 138), and (3) regulatives that make possible the "distinctions between what is and what ought to be" (McCarthy, 1973, p. 138).

The dialogue constitutive universals then establish "the form of intersubjectivity between any competent speakers capable of mutual understanding" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 140).

> Communicative competence is defined by the ideal speaker's mastery of the dialogue constitutive universals irrespective of the actual restrictions under empirical conditions (Habermas, 1970b, p. 141).

The symmetrical relations inherent in the ideals of truth, freedom, and justice are, according to Habermas, the logical outcome of the "pure dialogue constitutive universals." It therefore follows that the speech situation defined is an "idealization."

> The mastery of dialogue constitutive universals is not synonomous to the capability of actually establishing the ideal speech situation. But communicative competence does mean the mastery of the means of construction necessary for the establishment of an ideal speech situation. No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied with the structure of potential speech; for every speech, even that of intentional deception, is oriented towards the idea of the truth. This idea can only be analyzed with regard to a consensus achieved in unrestraint and universal discourse. Insofar as we master the means for the construction of an ideal speech situation, we can conceive the idea of truth, freedom, and justice . . . For on the strength of communicative competence we can by no means really produce the ideal speech situation independent of the empirical structures of the social system to which we belong: we can only anticipate this situation (Habermas, 1970b, p. 144).

Given the linguistic model, Habermas attempts to combine

Marxism, a rigorous value critique, and Freudian analysis. The analyst-theorist would presumably employ the model of communicative competence to achieve non-distorted emancipatory consciousness. Using the knowledge-constitutive universals (universal pragmatics) the therapist seemingly would attempt to reveal false consciousness and achieve, via the dialogue of the ideal speech situation, working models for the attainment of truth, freedom, and justice. But this model clearly separates means from ends. That is, the means by which we achieve our freedom have no necessary connection with that freedom concretely. Communicative competence is then a tool just like a hammer. It may or may not be useful or effective. Since it is not integral to existence, since it does not intrinsically demand change, it permits a reworking of dialectics that more effectively insulates theory and enlightenment from the sometimes tumultuous context of praxis. The scholar may then train the activist in the application of this tool without direct involvement.

In a sense, while Habermas' scholarly focus is praxis-oriented theorizing based on linguistic analysis, the focus of Marxist practitioners is on theory-oriented praxis of revolution based on the organization of emancipation. Both are involved in establishing the inseparability of theory and praxis and, not surprisingly, both encounter similar problems in achieving a participatory consciousness. For example, Lenin, in his abortive effort to realize the principles of Marxism, sought temporarily to resolve the problem of popular consciousness via the elite vanguardism of a political hierarchy. Habermas seeks to resolve it through a remedy that is analogous to and taken from Freudian psychoanalysis. Habermas is committed to the

emancipation of people from the yoke of both material deprivation and linguistic distortion--not by taking charge of a revolution but by taking charge of their therapy. The new elite vanguardism implicit in Horkheimer now takes substantive form.

In effect, Habermas would take the theory of communicative competence (using the concepts of the ideal speech situation, the consensus theory of truth, and systematically distorted communication) and by not fully specified means, achieve undistorted consciousness in a model patterned on psychoanalysis. This would be accomplished, presumably with the intellectual taking the role of the theorist, and the client (just like psychoanalysis) being brought to a clarification via logical analysis and within a condition of "suspended judgment."

Habermas' emancipatory science sets out to extend and clarify Marx's material synthesis. Habermas' version is encumbered not because it attempts a synthesis of natural and hermeneutic science on the basis of an emancipatory philosophical interest but because it does so as a synthesis of natural science and hermeneutics under the guidance of a dualistic philosophy which is formalistic, abstract, and insulated from the people whose emancipation is sought and whose direct participation has been shown to be integral to the Hegel-Marx ideal of objectivation and transcendence. In short, the dialectic ideal to which he professes loyalty is violated. It is violated by attempting to overcome the dichotomy between theory and praxis by a synthesis of merely revised bourgeois science and bourgeois philosophy. I contend that his revisions of those disciplines failed to fully excise that dichotomy which was subtly and intricately interwoven throughout the entire fabric of bourgeois scholarship.

It begins with Freud. Freud had developed a model oriented substantially to the adjustment of pathologically affected individuals to the middle class life world of Vienna at the turn of the century. It employed linguistic clarification of repressed impulses and distorted perceptions in which the parameters were confined largely to the indivdual's relationship with that aspect of the socio-cultural system mediated by the family and the primary reference group. It had acknowledged the effect of the social context, mediated by the family, on individual consciousness. But it had centered primarily on aberrations in the conflict, presumably bio-psychological in nature, that occur universally in the inevitable exigencies of socialization. By virtue of this liberal individualist orientation, it never attained a systematic conceptualization of the relationship of power and politics to consciousness.

For its part, Marxism had insisted on the acknowledgment of political-economic realities as they affect individual consciousness and had recognized the primacy of power in the manipulation of consciousness beyond the psychologized determinants of Oedipus, Electra, and Onan. But it had never developed a systematic conceptualization of language and its utility in the realization of communicative competence and resistance to distorted and manipulated consciousness. Marxism and Freudian psychology had transcended the limitations of subjective reason and had attempted to orient both the sciences and the linguistic arts (subject to the above criticism) to the realization of an emancipated consciousness. But they had done so without a sophisticated value critique attainable only through the cumulative wisdom of philosophy (objective reason).

Habermas, in the Marxian tradition, sets out to reweave (synthesize) a sophisticated value critique with Freudian psychology and linguistic analysis and in turn to make the resultant critical awareness (communicative competence and the capacity to recognize systematically distorted consciousness available to the leaders of the struggle against oppression) to an enlightened non-positivist Marxism. His point of vulnerability is that he too readily adopts the assumptions of bourgeois science and bourgeois philosophy. He assumes the mantle of emancipatory science but beneath reposes the lingering vestiges of bourgeois scholarship.

That is, his synthesis accepts the bourgeois model of natural science and its instrumental assumption that the struggle of humanity against nature constitutes an "invariant" relationship. Since our fellow homo sapiens are a part of nature, that struggle against our fellows, with inevitable victory and defeat, is part of that nature as well. Not surprisingly he accepts the concomitant hierarchical implication that with struggle there must be mastery based on superiority. Authority is linked with expertise by uncritically adopting the hierarchical structure of laissez-faire economics and scholarship in direct contradiction of the dialectic ideal.

He likewise adopts the second moment which he finds in his revision of Marx's material synthesis. That is, bourgeois philosophy does indeed seek truth, freedom, and justice but it is to be handed down to the "masses" by their priests, or later their scholars, cloistered from the excesses of the secular world. Here the reflexive personal and class struggle for the realization of our fullest human potential is acknowledged as part of our nature but, like the struggle

to survive, its achievements are attributed to scholars alone--the scholars have presumably achieved their degrees individualistically--independently of the cumulative struggles of all humanity. They are not primarily the consequence of the cumulative dialectic essence but of the beneficient discourse of a tacit fraternity of "wisemen" across the ages. These assumptions are surely present in the models on which he draws for his intellectualized synthesis--namely bourgeois science, bourgeois hermeneutics, Freudian and linguistic analysis. Evident are the authority of the therapist, the hierarchical structure and deference to the authority of the hierarchically structured disciplines, the sequestering of the intellectual enterprise from the people, the abstract generalization of formalistic pure science and the like. Each of these will next be examined in greater detail.

A Critique of Pure Discourse

The question is whether a theory of communicative competence and therapeutic pedagogy external to the actual social organization of struggle, conforming to the a priori criteria of traditional science and traditional epistemology, and inspired essentially by an abstract "interest" in reason or emancipation can actually play a significant part in the realization of emancipation. Can a theory and pedagogy synthesized in monologic discourse and applied in an authoritarian psychoanalytic model provide sufficient linkage or unity with an intended emancipatory praxis? My contention is that a theory which gives so little attention to the concrete context in which it is embedded and which restricts its input to a priori models of bourgeois scholarship not only violates the essence of the Marxist tradition it

professes but is unlikely to achieve that freedom it seeks.

The nature of the context is critical. Hence the interest is invariant only in the abstract sense. We are quickly convinced that all human beings must produce to survive and that all must be free to communicate without distortion. But this does not tell us how emancipatory science must be constituted in a specific life world. I contend that Habermas does not provide convincing guidelines by which the social scientist could constitute that special science and its key theoretical concepts and structures while personally enmired in an unfree context and with no systematic linkage to an emancipatory organization. In short, Habermas does not show us how emancipatory science is to be linked effectively to the organized struggle of the people who must accept and advance the responsibility to preserve emancipatory praxis.

The earlier analysis of Marx and Hegel provides some of the core concepts in my critique of Habermas' emancipatory theory. Freedom, to Hegel and particularly Marx, was an immanent developmental process in which transcendence, impelled by alienation, was inseparable from the context of action. I shall attempt to demonstrate that Habermas' transcendental mode is based on an externally imposed framework isolated from actual human experience. It is a model constructed by deduction out of the rules of language and impelled not by insight and motivation born of viable current existential interaction, but by a combination of an alledged interest in reason and a dubious faith that citizens will acknowledge and acquiesce to the "wisdom" of the enlightened therapist. It is a model in which the only public participation is that of a client subordinate to the therapist-scholar. It is a model that demonstrates the dogged persistence of the bourgeois

dichotomy between theory and praxis.

While we may acknowledge his basic assumptions--that there are "interests" which are a function of "objectively constituted problems" whose source and logic are culturally embedded in the natural and hermenuetic disciplines--while Habermas may in his future work be able to substantiate the thesis of an "interest" in emancipation--he has not demonstrated how his emancipatory theory or science is adequate to the problem he initially addresses. How can formalistic science justify a predominant role for itself in the achievement of undistorted consciousness? How can undemocratic and authoritarian prerogatives be assumed by the scholar, especially in the West where technically augmented means of consensus manipulation functioning within liberal parameters keep a vigilant eye on any possible violation of much lauded and convincingly proclaimed ideals of democracy and self-sufficiency?

He began with the problem inherited from Horkheimer (that of elite political-economic vanguardism) but he has not demonstrated how he would avoid succumbing to the danger of elite intellectual vanguardism. While he acknowledges that knowledge is conceived and conditioned within a context, we shall see that he "temporarily" withdraws emancipatory theory from that context in a manner that protects theory from oppression. Further, it may be reintroduced solely at the discretion of the theorist-therapist.

There is, I will demonstrate, a certain naivete in Habermas' stubborn insistence on the freedom to engage in pure exclusive discourse. For he assumes, as did Mannheim, a representative capacity of relatively unattached intellectuals to (1) encompass the prevailing

significant perspectives, (2) to assess their relative value, (3) to synthesize them, and (4) to simultaneously convince the oppressed both that the scholar has transcended oppression and of the wisdom of adopting that scholar's theory voluntarily. To remain consistent with the core of Marxism and attain credibility among lay people, must not the scholar demonstrate more than a formal capacity for the articulation of intellectually impressive edifices in pure discourse? To date, abstract theory has not elicited the self-initiated support of the people. What is additionally required is a capacity for achieving a concrete praxis based, to be sure, on free dialogue but not merely on techniques presented a priori, as fait accompli vehicles to truth. Thus the Marxian rejoinder might be--Don't just tell me how to discover I'm being oppressed by manipulative talk; also join me in the struggle to become free!

Habermas, in an attempt to answer early critics, agrees that theory must be linked to praxis, but with the proviso that discretionary authority as to the time, place, and nature of that linkage be retained by the expert--the enlightened theorist-therapist. He accomplishes this objective conceptually by insisting on (1) the appropriate separability "between communication (which remains embedded within the context of action) and discourses (which transcend the compulsions of action)" (Habermas, 1973, p. 19); (2) the separation of the organized function of enlightenment from scientific discourse and struggle; and finally, (3) the separability of the organizational structure of emancipation from discourse. Thus, once the theorist has constituted the theory, the esoteric content requires that the theorist translate theory into praxis (see Habermas, 1973, p. 25) in a form understandable

by the "masses" (e.g., psychotherapy).

Theory and Praxis

There is in Habermas' determination to link theory and praxis the ubiquitous spectre inherited from Horkheimer of intellectual vulnerability to the grip of tyranny. His development of the methodological concomitants and the substantive content of emancipatory theory, not to mention his mode of "therapeutic" application, offer a consistent ground on which the intellectual gatekeepers might protect emancipatory theory from political elites and non-elites alike. These grounds appear not only in the hegemony which he accords the so-called "experts" in the realm of theory-building and enlightenment but also in the rigorous standards exacted from the social scientists in theory construction. He insists,and quite rightly so,that

> . . . a theory can only be formulated under the precondition that those engaged in scientific work have the freedom to conduct theoretical discourse . . . (Habermas, 1973, p. 33).

But he is also unswerving in his commitment to ". . . the formation and extension of critical theorems, which can stand up to [rigorous standards of] scientific discourse . . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 32). Thus, the "freedom" he advocates is conceived in a highly constricted womb of bourgeois social science. It is conflated with the a priori criteria of abstract science that without qualification bypass the Hegel-Marx tradition with which he normally identifies his work. That concept of science demands a concrete context-embedded dialectical-interactional moment to which the freedom of those to be affected by action and intellectual self-realization are inseparably linked <u>within</u> the life world. It is noteworthy in this regard that Habermas'

discussion pertaining to rigor in theoretical discourse and his appeals for intellectual freedom contain not a whit of reference to the dialectic aspects of theory-building and enlightenment. Of course, he intends to maintain the linkage of theory and praxis but the substantive writing emphasizes the rigor and essentially antiseptic qualities of theory-building and therapy in which authority rests solely with a therapist-scholar whose work is never linked by any concrete guidelines to the struggle or the organizations that wage it.

Discourse is conceived as the logical basis on which the "claim to the truth . . . or on the other hand, the appropriateness of norms for valuation which we are to follow" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20) are proven. Indeed, "these are claims of validity which can be proven only in discourse. The factual recognition of these claims bases itself in every case, even that of error, on the possibility of the discursive validation of the claims made. Discourses are performances, in which we seek to show the grounds for cognitive utterances" (Habermas, 1973, p. 18). Not just anyone is qualified to participate in this esoteric endeavor. According to the criteria of traditional science to which he subscribes, ". . . opinions can only be specified, and their derivation made clear, in languages of a specific form and can only be tested by methods of a specific kind . . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 20).

Not only do the functions require sophisticated skills but praxis itself must be "virtualized" or suspended. For Habermas, the virtualizing of praxis permits "discursive testing of <u>hypothetical</u> claims to validity and thus the generation of <u>rationally grounded</u> knowledge" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20). Once formed, the "discursively

substantiated theoretical statement" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20) can be "translated back" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20) for the people but this occurs under the authority of the therapist-scholar (Habermas, 1973, p. 20).

Clearly Habermas conceives scientific discourse as the theorist's exclusive prerogative. He assures a separation of the context of action and the people who constitute that context from the discursive act by arbitrary requirements that theory be executed on a "high level of generalization" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20). Above all, theory and enlightenment are to be separated from struggle and the organizations that advance the interest of emancipation. What is significant is that that separation receives considerable attention in his work. However, one is wont to find systematic guidelines concerning the degree to which theory (or the subsequent therapeutic application) is influenced, not only by the formal criteria of "pure" science but also the normative consequences of practical application (praxis). We find ample attention being given to the separability of theory and "enlightenment" from the struggle for freedom. What is significant is the extent of the inattention to their linkage when compared to their separability. The result, despite declared intentions to the contrary, is that key elements in the dialectic linkage of theory and praxis are rendered, unwittingly, mutually exclusive, and the scientist retains the key prerogative for not only discourse but the later "therapeutic" application of the theory generated by that discourse. "Virtualization" of praxis is, of course, intended to effectuate a non-coercive "free" range for the scholar in a kind of "diplomatic immunity." But Habermas does this by attempting to circumvent the direct linkage to praxis

which is requisite to the implementation of a dialectic of freedom. As we have seen, the dialectic of freedom demands an intimate linkage of theory and praxis. That is, it demands not merely that we escape the talons of coercion negatively, by destroying or outwitting our oppressors, but that we positively affirm the collective necessity to achieve trust, rapport, and efficacy (normally at first through labor) with the oppressed. Seemingly his only alternative to a trusting participation with people is to assume a pedagogic-therapeutic role intended to unmask the guilement of oppression and that is precisely the option he elects.

This differs from Mannheim's model in two respects. First, it formally overcomes Mannheim's neutralization of the cause of the oppressed. Second, it negates that advance by withdrawal from the political organizational context. Mannheim's concept placed the scholar under obligation to effect a compromise between issues generalized out of genuine organizational confrontation. The scholar was seen as a neutral mediator. It was a synthesis of real problems undertaken by an intellectual. He neutralized truth (the interest of the oppressed) in praxis. Habermas proposes a truly abstract intellectual synthesis in which the scholar has no necessary existential role. Indeed, he mandates no direct bond whatsoever between the scholar and the organization of emancipation. He neutralizes the efficacy of praxis itself.* He does insist, and this should not be lost sight of, that the source

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*Indeed, in an interview,Habermas specifically argues against "de-differentiation of the several roles" (Frankel, 1974, p. 46) played by scientists. "De-differentiation" is a euphemism for compartmentalization in which he uncritically contends that bourgeois science and bourgeois life styles are compatible with the functions of radical scholarship.

of theoretical work be a broad experiential base:

> The opinions which form the input of discourse--and thus the raw material which is subjected to argumentation with the aim of substantiation--do indeed have their origin in the diverse interrelations of experience and action (Habermas, 1973, p. 20).

But the process by which this is to occur is for the most part either disregarded or left to the insight of the theorist who, for example, experiences these diverse interrelations, who interprets them, and who challenges or critiques the fledgling theory. We shall return to this point. First, I would like to examine the more explicit guidelines by which Habermas distances theory and discourse from either edification or action.

Levels of Generalization

A broad-ranging theory of concept formation in emancipatory thought must surely raise the question of the level of generalization in which concept and theory are framed. If the scientist's objective is emancipation, then a decision between the higher level of abstraction demanded by nomothetic science and the lesser generalization characteristic of ideographic science would be contingent on the freeing function that emancipatory science is intended to serve. Habermas does not address this question in detail. He is preoccupied with the uninhibited maintenance of discourse at a "high level of generalization" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20). He is preoccupied with the question of the freedom of "pure" science to proceed in that high level of unencumbered discourse. But this preoccupation deals only with the immediate threats to freedom that are consequences of coercion from an external source. The subtle constraints on freedom that may result in an inflexibility with regard to his own application of scientific

method is given scant attention.

Indeed, freedom in the emancipatory sciences may be contingent on a more systematic extension of that critical position which conceives ideographic and nomothetic science on a flexible continuum whose level of generalization is conditioned horizontally by pragmatic criteria and vertically by the state of the concept as a historically and culturally embedded process. Thus Kaplan insists that

> One of the most important differentiations among laws is that based directly on the way in which they arise and function in inquiry. On this basis, descriptive generalizations are contrasted with theoretical laws . . . Descriptive generalizations stem from fairly direct observations, and so are on a comparatively low level of abstraction (Kaplan, 1964, p. 113-114).

While the descriptive generalization remains on a lower level of abstraction it is not atemporal but rather processual. Kaplan continues:

> Such a descriptive law is usually arrived at by simple induction, or at most by way of extensional generalization from other descriptive laws. As intermediates are identified it moves in the direction of theoretical generalization (Kaplan, 1964, p. 114, my italics).

Given the sense of process or movement it is then

> . . . the capacity for prediction and explanation which makes the distinction between descriptive and theoretical laws so significant. Yet the difference between them is, after all, a matter of degree (Kaplan, 1964, p. 114).

What is clearly called for is a flexible model in which a "movement" in the direction of greater generalization occurs by degree as the criteria of emancipatory praxis specify. There is then at least as much risk that the emancipatory scientist will take the safer route into the intellectual dilletantism and disillusionary irrelevancies of arbitrarily aggrandized levels of generalization and abstraction, as that freedom of the scientist will be obstructed by

direct coercive measures. The risk is also exacerbated by Habermas' insistence on the retrospective posture of reflection.

Retrospective Posture of Reflection

One is reminded on encounter of Habermas' insistence on a retrospective posture of reflection (Habermas, 1973, p. 38) of Hegel's dictum that the Owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk. As we examine the several facets of that position, the similarity is the more striking.

Specifically, Habermas claims that objectivity must be based on a "virtualization of the pressures of experience and decision" (Habermas, 1973, p. 20).* Only this permits discursive testing of hypothetical claims to validity and the generation of rationally grounded knowledge. The focus is on the realization of scientific discourse as a retrospective reflection and analysis. It is by this means that he achieves a "virtualization of the pressure of experience and decision."

Given a withdrawal of theory from the life world, the return of the theoretical construct to the people must now be undertaken under the watchful authority of the theoretician. For the theoretical statement formulated by the scientist likewise must be translated for the people in order that we may reach knowledge oriented toward action.

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*One might observe here that in the real world it is not by way of a retrospective virtualization of the exigencies of praxis that impetus is given to rigorous thought and establishes both its practical and logical limits, but the urgency of necessity and the critical participation of urgently driven participants. It is then both the guidance provided by this immanent presence and the range and breadth which a people (for whom the instrument is fashioned) may reasonably be expected to apprehend and apply, that helps determine the level of generalization demanded. Further, this may vary depending on the circumstances from hour to hour--day to day. I would contend that Habermas has not made his case that the theorems of emancipatory theory may be constituted on a "high level of abstraction" retrospectively without regard to the existential contingencies.

> . . . the discursively substantiated theoretical statements (which survive argumentation) can in turn be relevant only to specific contexts of application: statements about the phenomenal domain of things and events (or the deep structures which manifest themselves in terms of things and events) can only be translated back into orientations for goal-directed rational action (in technologies and strategies); statements about the phenomenal domain of persons and utterances (or about the deep structures of social systems) can only be translated back into orientations for communicative action (in practical knowledge). The interests which direct knowledge preserve the unity of the relevant system of action and experience vis-a-vis discourse; they retain the latent reference of theoretical knowledge to action by way of the transformation of opinions into theoretical statements and their retransformation into knowledge oriented toward action (Habermas, 1973, p. 20, my italics).

Clearly the special function of translation is retained by the "emancipatory" theorist whose action with regard to theory seemingly remains aloof from the combined threats of ignorance or caprice. It is the social theorist to whom we must look. The theorist must "single-mindedly" overcome an oppressive context on the wings of logic and bring us to the promised land.

Thus Habermas conceives the function of emancipatory theory as

> . . . primarily to enlighten those to whom it is addressed about the position they occupy in an antagonistic social system and about the interests of which they must become conscious in this situation as being objectively theirs (Habermas, 1973, p. 32).

This neatly removes theory and enlightenment from the process of emancipatory struggle. Indeed, Habermas views struggle in all its forms as antithetical to discourse and enlightenment. He bypasses without comment the tactical flexibility that Marx inextricably associated with struggle. Theory is to ". . . legitimize . . . the work of enlightenment, as well as providing its own refutation . . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 33). Its purpose is clearly to retrospectively legitimize enlightenment; and enlightenment, in turn, becomes a pure and "validated" tool

to be applied only by the intellectual who functions on a sufficiently high level of abstraction.

Separation of Enlightenment from Praxis

Lenin took the occasion of an appearance before the Soviet Youth League to reiterate a recurrent theme about pedagogy.

> One of our greatest evils and misfortunes left to us by the old, capitalist society is the complete rift between books and practical life . . . Without work and without struggle, book knowledge . . . is absolutely worthless, for it would continue the old separation between theory and practice . . . (Lenin, 1975, pp. 662-663).

Habermas shares this sentiment but injects an intermediate qualification that both single out the scholar (and not the community as a whole) as teacher and authority and shield the pedagogic role from corrupted power. He seizes upon the psychoanalytic model. He perceives that it is in this model that the prerogatives of logical discourse can be brought into controlled linkage with critical thought and later action by the teacher-therapist.

He is quick to emphasize that self-reflective analysis is not the same as rigorous theoretical discourse. Theoretical discourse has already brought reasoned reconstructions of rule structures prior to self-reflective analysis.

> . . . the psychoanalytic dialogue is not a discourse, and reflection on oneself does not provide reasoned justification (Habermas, 1973, p. 22).

Reasoned justification, as the product of scientific discourse, is present in the psychoanalytic process thanks to its introduction by the theorist-therapist.

> What is reasoned justification within the context of acts of reflection on oneself bases itself on theoretical knowledge which has been gained independently of the reflection on oneself,

> namely, the rational reconstruction of rule systems which we have to master if we wish to process experience cognitively or participate in systems of action or carry on discourse (Habermas, 1973, p. 22).

Self-reflection here provides the context-specific content (ideographic praxis). It is united in the psychoanalytic model with a universal component previously dichotomized from praxis (nomologic law). But he does not acknowledge the historicity and limits of its discursively achieved precepts. Herein we must ask, on what level of generalization? How tenuous the concepts? What is the experiential basis of the theorist? Who mediates the products of his/her discursive logic? What Habermas winds up with as a result of disregarding the historical dialectic nature of discourse itself is the obvious illogic of the previous quote when apprehended in relationship to the theorists' exclusive monopoly on discourse. He is forced to claim that we must master rule systems achievable only by discourse. But who first conceived the esoteric discourse, and was it by immaculate conception? If not, then it must have been constructed in a non-exclusive dialectic with non-scientists--the great unwashed. Here, he is square on with his dilemma. Where are the grounds and bases on which the emancipatory theorist justifies the scientist's own transcendence and singular prerogative in that self-appointed position? At what point and on the basis of what "objective" criteria did the scientist acquire this power to lead us to freedom? In any event, Habermas sets about to establish the theorist-therapist as the agent of freedom through critical reflection.

The Teacher-Analyst as Authority

By Habermas' model, guided self-reflection provides an indirect linkage between theoretical truth and praxis. In the process,he attempts to unite emancipatory reflection with a conceptual substructure (communicative competence) via the psychoanalytic model.

> Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual formation (Bildung) which ideologically determine a contemporary praxis of action and the conception of the world. Analytic memory thus embraces the particulars, the specific course of self-formation of an individual subject (or of a collective held together by group identity). Rational reconstructions, in contrast, deal with anonymous rule systems, which any subjects whatsoever can comply with, insofar as they have acquired the corresponding competence with respect to these rules (Habermas, 1973, p. 22).

But both the emancipatory concepts and the concepts of therapeutic transcendence are conceived essentially on a monologic basis and dichotomized from praxis. Habermas, like Kant, strives to bring the scientific-epistemological universal attained in rational discourse by the guardians of knowledge into a well controlled relationship with particular lay people--this, of course, by the psychoanalytic model. The "masses" are herein permitted to approach theoretical concepts and perhaps even achieve the capacity to wield the laws but on a subordinate basis to the social analyst who enlightens.

Note the careful retention of the doctor/patient roles in his distinction between psychoanalytic dialogue and discourse:

> . . . the psychoanalytic dialogue between doctor and patient, is not a discourse, but effects, at the same time, both more and less than a discourse. The therapeutic 'discourse' effects less, as the patient by no means takes up a symmetrical posture vis-a-vis the doctor from the very beginning; the condition for a participant in discourse are precisely what is not fulfilled by the patient (Habermas, 1973, p. 23).

Now when the patient has learned not to abuse the role, a position of

what we might term meta-equality is reached.

> It is only the successful therapeutic discourse which brings, as its result that which in ordinary discourse must be required from the very outset; the effective equality of opportunities in perceiving the roles within the dialogue, and in general, in the choice and exercise of speech acts, must first be established between partners in a dialogue who are so unequally equipped (Habermas, 1973, p. 23).

Having established the protective measures against those "so unequally equipped," he grants them the possibility of a semi-discursive common function in the "therapeutic discourse" which is "not a discourse" (Habermas, 1973, p. 23). Given this ambiguity the scientific function can then be brought into the proximity of praxis in a "peculiar way."

> On the other hand, the therapeutic discourse effects more than the ordinary one. Because it remains contained in a peculiar way within the system of action and experience, and thus is not a discourse cut free from action or experience, which has as its theme exclusively questions of validity and must import all contents and information from the outside, successful self-reflection results in insight which satisfies not only the conditions of the discursive realization of a claim to truth (or correctness) but in addition satisfies the condition of the realization of a claim to authenticity (Wahrhaftigkeit), which normally is not to be attained discursively at all (Habermas, 1973, p. 23-24).

It is clear that Habermas does not err, and we must be careful not to impute such error to him, that emancipatory theory can be conducted in a context-exclusive atmosphere. Quite the contrary, "claims to authenticity as a rule can only be tested within the context of action" (Habermas, 1973, p. 24). But his insistence on the "patient's acceptance of the 'worked-out' interpretations which the doctor suggests to him" (Habermas, 1973, p. 24) as the sole access to the theoretical discursive function and hence as the only basis for a "<u>true and authentic</u>" interpretation and action accomplishes a separation of

theory and praxis to be abridged if and when the discretionary prerogative of the theorist-therapist is exercised.*

There are several elitist elements linked to Habermas' choice of the Freudian model. They render him as vulnerable to charges of authoritarianism as was the Bolshevism that his own work is directed in some measure against. They, in turn, elicit corresponding questions. Specifically:

(1) Who establishes the criteria of non-distorted communication?

(2) Since discourse should be non-coercive,how does the client (society) come to know that help is needed?

(3) How does the psychoanalytic model itself accomodate the

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*The theoretical basis on which Habermas separates the therapeutic-interactional function from praxis was attacked during the celebration of the Lenin Centennial in Frankfurt. Habermas and Critical Theory were subjected to criticism for the dichotomy between work and interaction that according to my assessment led Habermas to posit an emancipatory interest and facilitated the resurrection of psychotherapeutic authority.

> "One of Habermas's central misconceptions is said to consist in his juxtaposition of 'work' and 'interaction' and in the notion that, focusing on the purely instrumental labour aiming at control over nature, Marx was unable to grasp the dimension of historical and social experience. This notion, . . . ignores Marx's stress on the dialectical linkage of 'forces' and 'relations of production' and his insistence that labour is always an essentially social and historical process. What Habermas accomplishes is merely a dualistic segregation of nature and 'ideas,' of a 'de-economized history' and an 'ahistorical economy,' in place of Marx's materialistic-monistic conception according to which 'men, in one and the same process of material activity, produce and reproduce the forces and relations of production'" (Dallmayer,1972, p. 226).

Although this criticism fails to acknowledge any weaknesses in Marx's treatment it does point up a latent liability in reifying the dichotomy between "purposive-rational" aspects of production and linguistically embedded dialogic forces of emancipatory action. This sets the stage for a kind of idealistic individualism that only partially escapes a return to the transcendental non-social unity of Kant, and grounds the sequestering of the therapeutic enlightenment function from praxis.

"ideal speech situation" in which there must be a symmetry or balance in discourse?

(4) How does the analyst overcome the possibility of significant class bias or simply the limits of a singular perspective? and if Habermas cannot tell us this, does he not risk blurring the extant realities of class antagonisms?

Lenin expressed a semi-intuitive skepticism of Freudian analysis. It was probably conceived in the activist abhorance of bio-psychic mechanisms in which the focus is on individual accomodation to reality at the expense of the organization of struggle to change it.

> Freud's theory has now become a fad. I mistrust sex theories expounded in articles, treatises, pamphlets, etc.--in short the theories dealt with in that specific literature which sprouts so luxuriantly on the dung heap of bourgeois society (Lenin, 1975, p. 688).

Habermas' critics in the Lenin Centennial were more analytical. They saw his view of emancipation

> . . . more as the removal of communication barriers than as the dismantling of concrete domination; liberation thus evaporates into a symbolic exercise, social criticism into 'critique of ideology.' Translated into the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, social conflict is reduced to a process of reciprocal self-reflection, class struggle to 'large-scale psychotherapy' (Dallmyer, 1972, p. 227).

One immediate outcome of the development of a monologic discursive model is that it must be presented as a fait accompli to the "client"--as a mystical ameliorative to the unenlightened. This immediately raises the question of the client's potential receptivity. How is this to be received as differing from any other occult or metaphysical panacea? Specifically, on what grounds does Habermas deduce that emancipation ". . . can only be realized in the successful process of enlightenment, which lead to the acceptance by those concerned,

free of any compulsion, of the theoretically derivable interpretations" (Habermas, 1973, p. 37). Why should we wait passively for a self-appointed "enlightened" theorist-therapist (whose credentials as an active participant in the struggle are less than formidable) to provide us a fait accompli theory? Habermas does grant us the prerogative of "accepting or rejecting" the preconceived theory. But that is beclouded by the weighty presence of the theorist whose "superiority" Habermas insists upon. "The vindicating superiorty of those who do the enlightening over those who are enlightened is theoretically unavoidable . . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 40). Even though this "superiority" is diminished in the process of therapy, the psychoanalytic model links expertise to authority in a "self-vindicating" manner which is both presumptive and evasive of the critical involvement of those to be affected by it. Thus Habermas reserves for the theorist-therapist the determination of a "suitable circumstance" in which the "correction" is to occur.*

Presumably then, it is on the basis of faith in the "superiority" of one's enlighteners that we are to undertake the sacrifices and struggle of emancipatory education. Habermas declares that the

> . . . processes of enlightenment (if they are to avoid exploitation and deception) can only be organized under the precondition that those who carry out the active work of enlightenment commit themselves wholly to the proper precautions and assure scope for communications on the model of therapeutic "discourses" (Habermas, 1973, p. 33-34).

Like Mannheim, Habermas has not demonstrated that the theorist-therapist should be permitted to assume the mantle of surrogate in the

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*Habermas, for example, has already determined that such reflective enterprises cannot occur "under the conditions of a political struggle" (Habermas, 1973, p. 38).

transcendental process. He simply has not indicated how the confidence of lay people ought be summoned up. The only option that he leaves them is one of dependency on the "precautions" of intellectuals whose rather dismal record of vulnerability to manipulation and control is historically documented and whose range of experience in the life world is restricted to a role attached by tradition to the "Ivory Tower."

The problem of obtaining the "client's" confidence has been addressed by the German hermeneuticist Hans Georg Gadamer. He deems the psychoanalytic model an "overextension" of reason that results in a limitation on free consciousness formation. In psychoanalysis, says Gadamer,

> . . . the patients' suffering and desire to be cured provide the basis for the therapeutic efforts of the doctor who, relying on his authority and not without pressure, attempts to uncover repressed motivations; implied in this relationship is a voluntary subordination of one to the other. In social life, by contrast, reciprocal resistance between opponents is the common practice of all participants (Gadamer, in Dallmyer, 1972, p. 223).

Habermas' writings manifest a rather glaring ambivalence about these criticisms. While he acknowledges deficiencies, he continues to insist that the psychoanalytic model is the ". . . only one in which claims to truth can be tested 'discursively' together and simultaneously with a claim to authenticity . . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 24). He has recently acknowledged some element of validity in the criticisms (not only of Gadamer, but also of H. J. Giegel) of his efforts to transfer the psychoanalytic model to larger groups. That transfer does not enjoy a prerogative granted by a patient conscious of a problem. This is in contrast with the psychoanalytic model in

which authority has indeed been granted by the patient.

> H. G. Gadamer and H. J. Giegel quite rightly criticize undifferentiated attempts to transfer a model borrowed from psychoanalysis to large groups: "A critique which confronts the other, or dominant social prejudices generally, with its compulsory character, and, on the other hand, raises the claim to dissolving such complexes of deception communicatively, will find itself . . . in a false position. It must ignore fundamental differences. In the case of psychoanalysis, the suffering and the desire for cure of the patient serve as the tenable basis for the therapeutic activity of the doctor, whose assertion of authority and urging for the clarification of repressed motives are not without compulsion" (Habermas, 1973, p. 29-30).

Nor is he by any means intransigent in attending to refinements of the theory in light of certain criticism. However, he ultimately is driven to refinements that reduce the applicability of theory to specified organizational and scientific functions. What is more, he has not as yet undertaken a reconstruction of the theory to expand its applicability.

What he rules out is organized struggle regardless of the intensity and/or nature of the conflict. And it is in this struggle that Marx et al., find not only a crucial educative function, but also a transcendental reconstitution of reality.

> If we confine ourselves to the Marxist example of the organized class struggle . . . then it is evident that the strategic confrontation between classes and the interaction between doctor and patient are not the same thing (Habermas, 1973, p. 30).

Then comes a limitation that seems to abandon the primary problem of emancipatory consciousness that originally impelled the Critical Theorists.

> This model can only be used for normatively structuring the relationship between the Communist Party and the masses who let themselves be enlightened by the Party concerning their own situation (Habermas, 1973, p. 30).

It is his contention that the theory must be distinguished from its mode of application.

> We must distinguish between the level of theoretical discourse and the organization of processes of enlightenment in which the theory is applied (Habermas, 1973, p. 31).

Here he criticizes Marx, who in his opinion,did not distinguish theory from the organization of enlightenment. To Habermas, the same theory may be used in more than one way. It may be used to enlighten à la Freudian analysis, wherein "confirmation" occurs in communication with those to be affected; however, it may also be used to construct hypotheses which can be logically validated by the usual scientific discourse.

> I can apply theories such as psychoanalysis (and the Marxian critique of ideology) in order to guide processes of reflection and to dissolve barriers to communication; the authenticity of the recipient in his relations with himself and with others is an indicator of the truth of the interpretation which the analyst (or the Party intellectual) has suggested. But I can also use this same theory to derive an explanatory hypothesis, without having (or taking) the opportunity of initiating communication with those actually concerned, and thus confirm my interpretation by their processes of reflection. In this case I must remain satisfied with the usual procedures of scientific discourse: . . . Then, to be sure, that genuine confirmation of the critique remains unattainable, a confirmation which can only be gained in communication of the type of therapeutic "discourse," that is, precisely in successful processes of education [Bildung] voluntarily agreed to by the recipients themselves (Habermas, 1973, p. 30-31, translator's bracket).

It is significant that Habermas does not perceive the contradition in this omnibus application of theory. For the principles of dialectics would again lead us to a rejection of this position. Unless he is inclined to repudiate the fundament of his own tradition, Habermas must explain how changes in the use of a theory escape a seemingly inevitable modification of the theory itself. Dialectic method would tell us that every theory fundamentally points toward some mode of praxis

or reflects one. Thus, Marxian theory was conceived as a sustaining concomitant of emancipatory praxis. Likewise, Freudian theory is tied to a specified mode of application. As we have seen, there are both latent and manifest components of hierarchy and authoritarianism. His concept of the omnibus applicability of theory encourages him to attempt a wholesale transference of a theoretical model conceptually bound to its origins in middle-class psychopathology. His work is devoid of convincing proposals about how that model, conceived as a therapeutic tool, provides a working basis for the establishment of rapport with a people who are both proud and sane. He does not address the fundamental criticisms of the Freudian model. His argument, for example, leaves us perplexed about how he would inspire confidence in, or enthusiasm for, mastery of his rather sterile linguistic techniques by the "masses" without involving himself together with the "unenlightened," both in the conception of his theory and in its application as a dialectic not exclusive of struggle. It is significant that the only praxis which he envisions takes the form of an "application" of a theory-therapy to the rank and file of a party by its leaders. What is more, that theory has been conceived a priori by a scholar who has no necessary direct linkage to that party or to the struggles of the oppressed. The hierarchical overtones in these later revisions are unmistakable. What remains is a series of refinements based on earlier criticisms (i.e., Gadamer) that neither satisfy those criticisms, nor those raised in this study.

If the criticisms have not already done so, Habermas' own refinements fatally cripple the psychoanalytic model as a primary weapon in this arsenal of struggles to achieve emancipatory consciousness.

For he has not demonstrated how that model of abstracted theoretical constructs and authoritarian enlightenment could be instituted in the Western democracies where resistance to such overtly authoritarian appeals has traditionally been formidable.

The Separation of Theory and Enlightenment from Struggle: Habermas' Rationale

Habermas has faulted Marx for not distinguishing processes of enlightenment from the organization of action. It is, I think, doubtful that Marx missed this distinction. However, he surely would have insisted that an analytical distinction not be reified and that it be applied with flexibility dependent on the historically specific context of reference. But Habermas contends that

> . . . Marx specified the objective conditions under which the communists, already theoretically enlightened, were to organize the process of enlightenment for the mass of the workers. The economic compulsion for forming "workers' coalitions" and the socialization of labor within the factory system produced a common situation in which the workers would naturally be forced to learn to defend their common interests; the "real subsumption of wage labor under capital" produced the equally real basis on which the participants could be made conscious of the political significance of their economic struggles (Habermas, 1973, p. 32-33).

The point is made in an effort to make a case for the separation of enlightenment from the organization of action. "Economic compulsions" alone have not resulted in the widespread occurence of workers' coalitions or other emancipatory organizations in the West. The owners of the means of production, party elites, or functionaries in their behalf have indeed garnered the modern technical means of consensus manipulation. Emancipated consciousness is no "natural" outcome of either the inevitable decline of capitalism or of the rise of socialism. This tells us that it is necessary to distinguish enlightenment

from other aspects of the problem of consciousness. It does not, however, mandate on either strategic or ethical grounds an authority to separate the concrete structure of emancipation from the organization of struggle.

Marx repeatedly called for an acknowledgment of the historical specificity of tactics of emancipation. He also admonished us, as a strategic necessity, to maintain the linkage of the act of enlightenment with the collective organization of struggle. Since the nature of that struggle was not specified, one must assume that with struggle goes an acknowledgment that the tactics may not prove effective. It is incumbent on Habermas to demonstrate that the failure of a particular tactic of enlightenment negates the larger strategy before he so readily repudiates the strategy. Thus we may learn by experience that when a revolutionary organization or party merely makes certain programs of "enlightenment" available to a justly sceptical population, enthusiastic "students" or "clients" are not forthcoming. But a tactic that does not produce desired results does not of necessity negate the strategy. Might not one argue as well that the failure of Marx's prediction supports, not denies, his insistence on close ties between enlightenment and action? Have we not seen that enlightenment separated from action may be co-opted or ignored--that action separated from enlightenment is in immanent danger of becoming fascistic? Might I not argue that an alternative tactic where the "enlighteners" enter the struggle in a manner that minimizes the gap between the theorists-enlighteners and their objects might be more effective than a separation of enlightenment from struggle altogether? Habermas views the struggle as antithetical to both discourse and enlightenment and seems

clearly to bypass the flexibility that Marx intended for tactical action.

Habermas believes that the function of theory, in turn, is to "legitimize . . . the work of enlightenment, as well as . . . [to provide] its own refutation" (Habermas, 1973, p. 33). He separates theory emphatically from political and organizational struggle. However, he has not shown why concepts and theories may not be generated within condition of disagreement or even struggle, nor has he shown why observed regularity cannot be constructed as hypothesis and tested (with the aid of the scientist) in the process of struggle. He has not shown that struggle by definition precludes rational critique. Whether we like it or not, emancipatory science is embedded in the struggles of the oppressed.

Thus, theory may be perceived as a strategy of which success of tactical measures constitutes the test and in which sustaining consultation with those groups to be affected is necessary to any rational interpretation by a community of scholars. There is clearly a distinction between rarified rational critique monopolized by a select group and rational critique as logically conceivable in an extension of Hegel and Marx. While we must distinguish "the organization of action" from the "process of enlightenment" (Habermas, 1973, p. 33), we should not allow ourselves to reify an analytical separability.

Habermas is quite right that theory "can by no means legitimize a fortiori the risky decisions of strategic action" (Habermas, 1973, p. 33). Neither, we might add, can ex post facto abstracted analysis of strategy, legitimize theory as the basis of an emancipatory science. Too often that has brought us only trivial observations about the way

we have been manipulated, disjointed from any relevant objective to which such "truth" might be applied.

Habermas is probably on target when he announces that

> The sole advantage which Marx could have been permitted to assure to a proletariat acting in solidarity would have been that a class, which with the aid of a true critique constitutes itself as a class, is only then at all in a position to make clear to itself in practical discourse how it is to act politically in a rational manner . . . (Habermas, 1973, p. 33).

Marx would no doubt agree. However Habermas must envision "true critique" as always occuring in a context and not in the necessarily limited frame of reference of the social scientist.

Risks in the Theory-Praxis Nexus

In defense of his efforts to separate theory and enlightenment from struggle, Habermas cites Lukacs. Lukacs insisted on the inseparability of theory and enlightenment from organized struggle. Much later in his career he was forced to publicly recant certain beliefs by the very Hungarian Party which he had linked "inseparably" to his own intellectual life. Hence, in the light of this humiliation (not to mention the previously examined intimidation of earlier Critical Theorists and similar occurrences of historical record), Habermas determines that the theorist's intellectual endeavors must be rendered less accessible to party or organizational authority. That is reasonable. However his solution, in the Horkheimer tradition, is to isolate both the theoretical and enlightenment functions from the organization of emancipation. His subsequent rationale has neither demonstrated the possibility of that resolution in the West nor, if accomplished, that it would satisfy the criteria of a rational progression to free consciousness. Several problems occur. How does he

conceive intellectual freedom apart from that of the oppressed? Is the solution to estrange oneself from emancipatory action or to create an emancipatory organization, party, or structure in which non-consensual authority is forsworn? The strength of argument presented by Habermas, to the extent that he addresses these questions at all, is less than formidable.

Lukacs perceived the role of theory and the constitution of knowledge as taking place in the world and not in a realm apart. To him, theory must be advanced in the context of a struggle that is waged within a coordinated collective organizational structure.

> But only an analysis oriented towards organisation can make possible a genuine criticism of theory from the point of view of practice. If theory is directly juxtaposed to an organised action without its being made clear how it is supposed to affect it, i.e. without clearly expressing their connectedness in terms of the organisation, then the theory can only be criticised with regard to its own internal contradictions (Lukacs, 1971, p. 300-301).

Significantly, Habermas deduces from this an unsubstantiated conclusion to the effect that "any scope for scientific discourse within the Party is . . . prohibited" (Habermas, 1973, p. 34-35). This does not follow of necessity from my reading of Lukacs. Lukacs merely calls for an organizational orientation and this in the context of praxis is eminently reasonable.

Nor is the scope of scientific discourse constricted by Lukacs to the equally reasonable observation that

> On the level of pure theory the most disparate views and tendencies are able to co-exist peacefully, antagonisms are only expressed in the form of discussions which can be contained within the framework of one and the same organization without disrupting it. But no sooner are these same questions given organizational form than they turn out to be sharply opposed and even incompatible.
>
> Every 'theoretical' tendency or clash of views must

> immediately develop an organisational arm if it is to rise above the level of pure theory or abstract opinion, that is to say, if it really intends to point the way to its own fulfilment in practice . . . (Lukacs, 1971, p. 299).

Again Habermas misses the point. Habermas reduces these words to the conclusion that "Lukacs does not want to tolerate any indecision concerning the validity of the hypotheses. Theoretical deviations are therefore to be immediately subjected to sanctions on the organizational level" (Habermas, 1973, p. 35). What Lukacs is really saying is that theoretical contradictions can become clear only when connected to the reality they reflect.

Lukacs does not advocate an intolerance or suppression of any indecision. Habermas would more adequately identify Lukacs' crippling impediment if he had focused his attention on the power of the party hierarchy or even of the "democratic" majority over "freedom" of thought. Oppressive power must be separated from theorizing. The point is not well made by Lukacs. But Lukacs does make an impressive case that defense against oppression, together with its relevant theoretical points, can be made in linkage with an organization. Habermas does not offer a convincing refutation of this point.

Habermas, consistent with his tradition, separates the pure tactics of "emancipatory science" from the practical life and the organization of emancipation in which it is embedded. There is manifested here a subtle slippage, never clarified. What begins as a seemingly analytical distinction in critique of Marx's theory, now takes on the character of a reification--a fetish. He does not now take the position that we must merely eatablish analytical distinctions between (1) theory and enlightenment and (2) the organization

of emancipation. Now the separation becomes a rule of praxis--a strategic necessity which Lukacs, in his naivete, simply misses.

It must be clear here that in Habermas' tendency to return truth to the prerogative of social science he establishes a new invariant pure rationality which evades the transformative method at the sole discretion of the "pure" scientists. The problem occurs for Lukacs, as it did for Marx and as it has recurrently, in the initiation of an enlightened emancipatory transcendence--how to foster self-reflection in the midst of a chaotic interpersonal and intergroup struggle. His solution is for the Party or organization to steer a course to consciousness by acting representatively for the people. Habermas quoted Lukacs:

> . . . if the "conflict between individual consciousness and class consciousness in every single proletarian is by no means accidental," then the Party as the embodiment of class consciousness must act representatively for the masses, and not allow itself to be made dependent on their spontaneity. The Party takes the first conscious step; it steers a still backward proletariat into a struggle, and only during the course of that struggle will it constitute itself as a class. In the Party the still backward class may see a consciousness, anticipated but as yet inaccessible to it, at least as a fetish: "The organizational independence of the Party is necessary, so that the proletariat can directly preceive its own class consciousness as a historical figure . . . (Habermas, 1973, p. 35-36).

Habermas appropriately identifies authoritarian potential inherent in the "steering" function of the Party. He contends that "Stalinist praxis has furnished the fatal proof that a Party organization which proceeds instrumentally and a Marxism which has degenerated into a science of apologetics complement each other only too well" (Habermas, 1973, p. 36). He agrees with Lukacs that "correct theoretical insight is the absolute precondition" (Lukacs, in Habermas, 1973, p. 36). But he has not demonstrated that the solution is to return from

whence the struggle for emancipation began--to an abstracted theory of knowledge.

Had he begun with a historical analysis of Marx's problems at the juncture of theory and praxis, he might also admonish us to begin where we are and to reorganize the structure (the organization in which the emancipatory act is to be initiated) as a free and critical context receptive to emancipated concept formulation and theory. A gilded cage is still a cage and the scientist as well as his ideas must be set free.

Mao Tse Tung, in an effort to break the tradition of the gilded cage, attempted a specification of the Lukacs position within the organizational context. He based his advocacy of an intimate linkage between the theorist and the organization of action on a "dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge."

> If the dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem would be dealt with. And as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice (Mao Tse Tung, 1968, p. 14).

The problems implicit in an acquisition of theoretical knowledge through practice and its subsequent return to practice have been addressed by Mao in an effort to integrate scientific work directly

into the work place itself. Habermas was asked about that effort in a recent interview. Does he too envision "a new form of society which overcomes the distinction between pure scientific theory and everyday life"? (Frankel, 1974, p. 46). He indirectly, almost grudgingly, acknowledges a potential for a more humane application of science and quite correctly insists on the necessity of "scientific theoretical work." But he remains dubious about any "serious progress" in theoretical endeavors.

> I suppose these attempts are meaningful for a more humane application of science and a more stimulating input into science from practical life. But I don't think that a serious progress in theory formation can be gained or made more rapid by these types of de-differentiations. I think that these attempts produce much more closer connections and interactions between science and different areas of political and professional practice, but they wouldn't abolish scientific theoretical work (Frankel, 1974, p. 46-47).

His meaning is further clarified in a follow-up question as to whether such attempts would " . . . substantially alter pure theoretical problems." He first acknowledges their value for "sensitizing the scientists" to the "political content of their work" and then again expresses skepticism about their substantial impact on "pure theory."

> It is difficult to answer these questions in general. These attempts are in any case relevant for sensitizing the scientists, making them aware of the political content of their work, especially in those fields, e.g. physics, which up until now seem to be quite distant from social practices. On the other hand, we have in recent years seen some attempts of action research in the social sciences, for instance, in educational research or in industrial sociology which are designed to continue immediate research and political action; it is sometimes meaningful but I don't think that these attempts have an impact on the development of social theory so that the whole course of theory formation would be changed. . . . I don't want to exclude it from the very beginning, but I am skeptical in the long run (Frankel, 1974, p. 47).

Habermas' response is almost flippant. One wonders how familiar

he is with the Chinese experience. He is seemingly bent on not relinquishing the security and built-in defenses of the pure scientist and that rigidity seems to explain the reluctance either to study or seriously evaluate the implications of the Lukacs-Mao argument. He clings instead to an insistence on an "inner scientific world" in which the scientist-theorist is sequestered from the very real threats of the political realm.

> I don't think that we can go back behind a given level of the division of labor. So, I don't think that we can just demand that scientists should de-differentiate their several roles which they have anyway--that is, as a scientist, as a citizen, as a family member and so on. This, I think, would not make much sense to me. But there can be political and organizational steps, or pushes in the direction of raising the political consciousness of scientists so that they can first at their working place, try to get influence, efficient influence on the direction and course of their investigations; that means that on the level of co-determination, self-determination and self-administration of scientific institutes, universities, etc., there can be a political organization of the decision-making processes within the scientific community which might have some impact on the directions and overall priorities of research development (Frankel, 1974, p. 46).

Here the sanctuary of the "academic community" is summoned forth and an arbitrary limit on scientific participation is drawn where disruption of the "scientist's" secure existence is implied. Unless he can demonstrate that "de-differentiation" is invariably accompanied by political control, on what rational basis does he rule out broader-ranging participation in the struggle for emancipation than that provided by the "political organization and decision-making process within the scientific community"? He does allow now for "certain political and organizational steps" to raise political consciousness but their purpose is to "try to get influence" over matters pertaining to the scientists' own freedom <u>from</u> coercive measures.

A more analytical concept of freedom than Habermas employs would not merely insist that theoretical work is preconditioned on the "freedom to conduct scientific discourse." For as we have seen, freedom is more than an absence of coercion. It is also contingent, as Marx would remind us, on the availability of a context conducive to a process of creative growth. Habermas leaves us at a loss to know how an emancipatory act can be accomplished by abstractly "virtualizing" the context. The scientist is embedded inescapably in the world and, as an emancipator, is by definition on the side of the oppressed. Freedom under oppression is a contradiction. It is an objective never fully obtained and is inseparable from the structure in which the process takes place. It follows that the scientist who acknowledges embeddedness in that process and who acknowledges the generation of concepts and theory as themselves either self-sanctioned or consensus dependent will have met the first prerequisite toward the trust of his/her non-theoretician colleagues. While the social context cannot be allowed a coercive function in reaching theoretical decision, Habermas has not shown why those to be affected should not be a party to them as well as to the determination of the breadth and scope of the theory. Otherwise are we not to conclude that the "coercive" function has simply been replaced by a "determinate" function of the social scientist?

Habermas makes a convincing case that ". . . political struggle can only be legitimately conducted under the precondition that all decisions of consequence will depend on the practical discourse of participants. . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 34). But he does not raise the question of whether the capacity to do this will depend not only

on a communicative competence between the people and their wise "leaders" but also on a meta-communicative confidence that develops in a concrete sustaining interaction with people to be affected (that includes not only talk but also a manifest capacity to tackle all facets of our shared problems and to generate theory out of the real world). He did not question whether the struggle demands that a position be taken and that an organization advance it. Unless Habermas seeks divine intervention or is awaiting a charismatic savior, why does not Marx's transformative method apply to him? Why is not the task of the emancipatory theorist to prevent the structure of the organization from becoming oppressive by his critical pressence? How, by separating himself from the context to instruct the activists while himself in pristine isolation, is his "enlightnement" to be confidently received?

> Habermas is correct, there are dangers
>
> > . . . even if this organization is successful according to the usual criteria of merciless history, as Lenin's party was, it exacts the same price for its success which ambivalent victories have always exacted till now in the unbroken continuity of a history subject to "natural" uncontrolled causality (Habermas, 1973, p. 34).

But he has not shown that the resolution is to deny the world of struggle and attempt to control it by the imposition of quasi-abstract truth. He has neither acknowledged the theoretician's full embeddedness in that world nor the implications of this commitment to change. Simply put, if dialectics is to be more than a club wielded undiscerningly, he has not shown how it can be undertaken without a continuing delicate sensitivity to the nuances and subtleties of those who must apprehend and apply it, and that seems to occur inescapably in

struggle.

Assessment of a theory designed for enlightenment, according to Habermas, demands that "The first step of corroboration is scientific discourse; there the claim to truth of theoretically derived hypotheses is supported or refuted in the usual form of scientific argumentation" (Habermas, 1973, p. 37). Perhaps in certain laboratory conditions this may be true, but in other instances (by far more prevalent in the Western "democracies") where power is formidable and manipulative capacity profound, he neither shows us how the first step could be taken nor examines alternatives. Consistent with the Hegel-Marx tradition, that first step would far more likely lead to participation of those to be affected on the level of assumptions, in the constitution of the concepts, in the controlled experimental development of the constructs (tactical measures), in the coordinated construction of the theory, in the establishment of emotional-personal confidence in the "scientist" and his/her expertise, and in the development of corroborative discourse and corroborative <u>action</u> guided over time by continual revision and reassessment. In the light of these criteria, it is dubious that Habermas' mode of theory construction has substantial potential as a vehicle to emancipated consciousness.

The Separation of Theory from Struggle

For Habermas, reflection is impossible "under the conditions of political struggle." So "the groups which look upon themselves as theoretically enlightened . . . must choose, with a view to their opponents, in each instance between enlightenment and struggle . . ." (Habermas, 1973, p. 38). This is consistent with the Freudian model

which gives minimal attention to the possibility that neurosis can be relieved or eliminated by political involvement in changing the class or general social condition of the victim but instead focuses on the individual adjustment of the libidinal impulses to the repressions and tensions suffered in its eternally antagonistic relationship with society. The vehicle of transcendence is herein primarily within oneself (to be freed in interaction with one's therapist). Freedom, as conceived by Hegel and Marx,also involves a crucial modification of the social vehicle of transcendence--a socially bound dialectic--not an immanent one. While Habermas is correct that Marx is weak in regard to the interpersonal aspect, he does not return to the dialectic of freedom and the Marx-Hegel tradition to find a solution. Rather, freedom is reified in a category separated from the phenomenal world. Again Kant triumphs; again the "bourgeois" mentality; again Zeus tightens the Promethean bonds.

Given his Weltanschauung,he has failed to consider the possibility that strategic action may be successfully accomplished in free interaction; that is, there may be a tactic of dialectic interaction in which the end is mutually agreed to by all participants as a synthesis and process, not a confirmation of a priori "hypotheses" unilaterally conceived. His perspective results in the perception of practical discourses of strategy, as distinctly different from the theoretical discourse. Hence it cannot serve as a function of enlightenment. He does not see that wedding the level of discursive generalization with the process of struggle is a function of historically specific variables, including the wisdom with which strategists conceive and execute their action. At least this legitimate issue for applicable

emancipatory theory is bypassed.

Why then must we accept his assumptions that within a context of struggle, communications, whether discursive or not, must "directly serve the organization of the struggle, and not enlightenment"? Why must there be a necessary "breaking off of communication" in which an "opponent . . . has been excluded" (Habermas, 1973, p. 38)?

To be sure, these possibilities could prevail but it is equally possible that struggle could enlighten and/or that communication would not be broken off with the "opponent." For example, we could conceive of instances wherein a "democratic" structure might well include the people to be affected in the theory construction. (This would probably be necessitated if the public support were ever to be enjoyed in the Western "democracies.") We could also conceive of other instances, seemingly more often the rule than the exception, where Habermas' supportive example would not apply. Perhaps interaction would have to be suspended if the struggle were allowed to reach a highly violent, war-like level. For then, communication could "only be involved virtually." In the absence of dialogue an "objectivating application of the theory" might be helpful. Herein we might "presuppose counterfactually an uninterrupted natural . . . relation between the opponents" (Habermas, 1973, p. 38). Here we could " . . . abstract from the condition that our own group must claim, with the help of the same theory, to have understood the natural interrelationship, and thereby already have transcended it" (Habermas, 1973, p. 38). And finally, in this specific instance,reflective theory might "only be applied without contradiction under the conditions of enlightenment and not those of strategic action" (Habermas, 1973, p. 38).

That would have to be determined by those to be affected. What is not warranted is the conclusion that struggle must precede reason as "a consequence of the retrospective posture of reflection" (Habermas, 1973, p. 38)--the retrospective interval of which is determined solely by the social scientist. He does not tell us why struggle, especially if it involves what I have called creative tension, cannot relate directly with reason. He does not tell us why the Owl of Minerva must be confined to darkness.

Theory as Emancipatory Struggle

What Habermas fails to acknowledge is that struggle may be conceived (indeed must be, if emancipatory theory is to be applicable as more than a constricted post-mortem on purified segments of the larger struggle) as a series of tactical manuevers and repeatly reconstituted strategies in a historical process. One critical element of the struggle is a communal act in which we acknowledge both that part of the struggle is against our own fears and paranoias and that they cannot be overcome without a theory embedded in an active redefinition of the larger context (itself in process). That is, he simply does not question whether, in the twentieth century, his aims can be accomplished without the dialectic process which is based on close interaction with others and which occurs within an organizational context. He does not indicate what he would substitute for the vital experiences and support systems required by "practical" theoretical activists, not only as bases of their conceptual development (as an objectification in process), but also as the felicity of a trusting and meaningful interaction with those who must advance the struggle.

Indeed, he has not yet shown how, if he wishes to transcend the objectivistic bias of positivism in general and of positivistic Marxism in particular, he would adequately compensate for his exclusion of those to be affected by logical discourse withdrawn from the immediate context of its formulation. He acknowledges no uneasiness with the image which is conjured up of the theorist-teacher presenting us with an intact edifice of theory and enlightenment much as next year's models of new cars are released for our "free" choice. Nor does he qualify the image of that edifice as a sacred temple not to be defiled by direct contact with any but the theorist and the avant-garde--save by their own discretion.

How does he avoid the question of how to determine when and how to open the edifice (both in its construction and use) to public participation and what, if any, obligation does he have to do so? Further, how is a theory having broad-ranging ramifications to be "taught"? Even if we could be convinced that it was representative of all pertinent current ideational and experiential resources, how might we determine the relative impact of the myriad components and assess the appropriate level of abstraction abstractly? How, when the scientist is not the only object of that theory can he/she divine the level of abstraction needed to grasp it and test it abstractly? Instead of exploring the structural ramifications of both theory construction and the mode of its dissemination on the basis of democratic emancipatory precepts, he simply commandeers the prerogatives in the name of academic freedom. Although he has presented the theory as emancipatory, he has presented no convincing basis on which the theorist could justify more or less "freedom" than that available to

anyone else. If we accept that premise, then it follows that eventually the theorist must reach a consensus with those to be affected. If not, the logical edifices--even impressive ones--will remain only that.

Now Habermas has not, of course, followed this line of argument. Consistent with his failure to criticize Marx's historical context, relatively little consideration is given the social-contextual obligation that is to accompany the freedom he demands for pure theory. He speaks of the need on the part of theoreticians to consult their constituency but not on the basis of establishing concrete structural guidelines or modes of dialectic interaction. It is an ahistorical nonprocessual consultation solely at the behest of the theoretician--at his/her discretion. So, like Mannheim before him, he is forced to a three step process in which the theorist first self-conceives the theory, consulting if and when so disposed. The theorist-therapist then advises the avant-garde and assumes that they, in turn, will initiate practical edification in action.

Clearly, elite vanguardism again sustains. The pie is merely divided between intellectual and avant-garde. To avoid the trap, the scholar must seek not only his/her freedom from coercion but also the structural basis on which we may all be assured freedom both to theorize and to express what to believe. Habermas has not done this and his freedom remains an abstract demand for a coercion-free intellectual elite. It is an elite which is not an established part of any concrete emancipatory action and not likely to become such. Further, part of the process of enlightenment may well be not only within the class or group, but with opponents who are willing to enter into

dialogue or even discursive exchange. At least this possibility, though risky, should not be precluded given the realities of modern conflict.

In none of these instances has he shown why emancipatory theory and enlightenment may not at times be both retrospective and utopian. So conceived, struggle and the theory of enlightenment are by no means mutually exclusive. Habermas' or any other emancipatory theory would indeed be hard pressed to explain the exclusion. Given that kind of exclusion, Habermas' theory seems to assume that all struggle must resolve itself into hierarchical structure and oppression--intensity and terrorism. This, in turn, demands that the context--the environment--of theory and enlightenment be placed under the full jurisdiction of the theorists. Again he returns to the Mannheimian position in which he must demonstrate the representativeness and "relatively unattached" status of the intellectual. He simply does not make this case.

On Value Freedom Revisited

In the summary of one of his defenses against his critics, Habermas returns to a contention that the scientist can point the way to truth but remains, if not value neutral to the exigencies of the actual struggle going on about him/her, at least scientifically detached. That is, the scientific function is essentially reduced to one of analysis and enlightenment. Again returning to a position similar to Mannheim, his theory overcomes distorted communication without imposing any position of its own.

> Thus the theory that creates consciousness can bring about the conditions under which the systematic distortions of communication

> are dissolved and a practical discourse can then be conducted; but it does not contain any information which prejudges the future action of those concerned. The psychoanalyst does not have the right, either, to make proposals for prospective action; the patient must draw his own conclusions as far as his actions are concerned (Habermas, 1973, p. 38-39).

This does not follow; the very roles played by "patient" and "therapist" parallel the authority relation between oppressor and oppressed and lend passive credence to modes of resolution handed down from a hierarchical structure. They advance rather than diminish the avant-garde mentality and stand in conflict with the realities of public consciousness such as it exists in the Western "democracies" (those social systems whose problems of manipulated concensus Habermas' theories are intended to ameliorate).

The point is, and I here employ the early Horkheimer stance, that the social scientist cannot and should not profess neutrality. For the scientist, too, is in the world, not merely creating a process of self-reflection via memory but also via his/her own presence and example. That is the essence of dialectics and Habermas interprets that process in a manner that attempts to circumvent the dialectic process.

> The retrospective posture of reflection has the result that the enlightenment it offers does enable us to extricate ourselves from a (dialectical) interrelationship of distorted communication. But to the extent to which the theory brings us enlightenment about our captivity within this interrelationship, it also disrupts the latter. Therefore the demand to act dialectically with insight is senseless (Habermas, 1973, p. 39).

Here he assumes that the "therapist" is passive and that the dialectic process is merely a negation. But what if, on the contrary, out of the ashes of the old, all parties including the theorist constitute new theories and concepts by way of overcoming the troublesome structure? If freedom is not dichotomized from rational, ordered critique,

the dialectic process carries a synthetic utopian moment that is surely insight dependent and that demands a "science" whose level of generality is oriented to freedom per se as an even higher priority than scientific freedom. It is in this light that his dictum that "claims of validity can be proven only in discourse" does not follow. For he makes the error of fixing theory as an atemporal category, not a process which itself transcends its own limitations. Thus he contends:

> We only act within an interrelationship of systematically distorted communication as long as this interrelation perpetuates itself because it has not been understood in its falseness by us or anyone else. Therefore theory cannot have the same function for the organization of action, of the political struggle, as it has for the organization of enlightenment (Habermas, 1973, p. 39).

If the theory is processual and historical, he has not shown that it must be at one moment oriented to action and at the next to enlightenment. It is a concomitant process, the facets of which are not ordinarily indistinguishable. It contains separate functions, but functions necessary to the emancipatory process and functions which would be impaired if artifically separated into "abstract" and "concrete" moments by the arbitrary will of a scientist needlessly divorced from the action.

The problem which such a separation poses is evident in the following passage.

> The practical consequences of self-reflection are changes in attitude which result from insight into the causalities in the past, and indeed result of themselves. In contrast, strategic action oriented toward the future, which is prepared for in the internal discussions of groups, who (as the avant-garde) presuppose for themselves already successfully completed processes of enlightenment, cannot be justified in the same manner by reflective knowledge (Habermas, 1973, p. 39).

Here again he divorces freedom and the emotive element from rational tactics and dichotomizes in the Kantian mode. Most important, here he insists on a traumatic excising of knowledge from the world. First there is a psychologized attitudinal change on the level of therapy that neglects structural-organizational criteria. Clearly he conceives this as occurring without attention to the fact that both the theorist and the "patient" exist in a world that is unfree and that constrains the thought and action of even the therapist. Nor does he acknowledge the existence of any possible prohibition by a context that in all practicality inhibits trusting interaction between the theorist and lay persons prior to the construction of a concomitant structure in which they share the risks and in their world establish mutual support and trust.

Instead he transplants knowledge formation out of the world. Here the only unifying principle is an abstract reason which will achieve consciousness on the psychological attitudinal level via an interest in emancipatory discourse. This psychologizes and renders atemporal emancipatory theory.

Finally, there is a strategic action to be led by an avant-garde who already claim to have "completed the process of enlightenment." This defies basic democratic ideals.

This pursuit of knowledge is not in this world. Indeed, it is "out of this world" and stands involate, in isolated purity against the fundamental precepts, the quasi-democratic presupposition of the West to which Habermas' theory is addressed. That theory then achieves a purpose. The theorist is safe, for the powerful are not threatened by the theory. Nor does it tempt the powerless by its attractiveness;

it is just then somewhere out of this world.

There is, to be sure, a need to refine the technical procedure by which any group sustains participation and protects against distorted communication and manipulative action within its ranks. Further, refined procedures for the identification of manipulative phenomena by social scientists may be helpful. But if we are to go back to the Marxian problems that inspired Mannheim and particularly the Critcial Theorists, one is wont to discover how Habermas' analysis, drawn from Freud, materially contributes to our capacity to overcome the difficulty confronted by revolutionary movements which attempt to realize emancipated consciousness and existence.

One looks in vain for a flexible frame of reference in which a consideration of critical analysis is applied to the multitude of tactical circumstances which any rational program of change must surely include in its arsenal. In a less than enthusiastic proposal and an even less persuasive one, Habermas answers his critics who call for a linkage of the theory of communicative competence to a concrete program of change:

> In the face of various sectarian enterprises, one might point out today that in advanced capitalism changing the structure of the general system of education might possibly be more important for the organization of enlightenment than the ineffectual training of cadres or the building of impotent parties (Habermas, 1973, p. 31-32).*

While consistent with his tendency to shift decision making criteria from political to intellectual elites, significantly there is no mention of the dubious function of education--of its dismal record in the instigation of significant revolutionary change. Likewise,

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*This is also the theme of his book Toward a Rational Society.

the constriction of his critique of organizations of emancipation to revolutionary cadres and traditional parties excludes optional models of a collective transcendence from the Israeli kibbutz to the numerous experiments in communal living from China to the United States.

It becomes clear that his "synthesis" based on traditional science and hermeneutics is inadequate as a direct consequence of its bourgeois origins. Thus the dichotomy between theory and praxis, necessity and freedom, predisposes a separation of the "truth-giving" sciences and humanities. Further, once separated, he has, in effect, accepted the resultant disciplines with the scholars who administer them, as the sole source of alternative perspectives out of which his new discipline is to be synthesized. Thus liberal individualism and the authoritarian concomitants of competition are distinctly evident in (1) the abstract monologically constituted level of generalization, (2) his insistence on the retrospective posture of reflection, (3) the belated resurrection of a Mannheimian value freedom, (4) the individualistic authoritarian qualities of the psychoanalytic model, and (5) the separation of theory and enlightenment from struggle and the accompanying absence of attention to an organization of emancipation. When taken together these factors constitute barriers which, to date, Habermas has not circumvented. The final chapter will extend the preceeding critique with an eye toward the realization of an alternative dialectic linkage of theory and expertise to emancipatory praxis. An alternative will be sought that transcends the individualistic-authoritarian dichotomy of intellectual elite vanguardism.

CHAPTER IX

THE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPREHENSION: THE EXIGENCIES OF COLLECTIVE NEGATION AND TRANSCENDENCE IN SOCIAL THEORY

A vision materializes with increasing clarity throughout the course of this work. It is an image of the formidable constraints confronted by humankind in the struggle to be free. It is perhaps most awesomely portrayed in the epochal Promethean bondage, both immanently and externally imposed, as the price of our audacious seizure of self-formative prerogatives. We follow the historical journey of the symbolic bearer of secularized reason through a host of actors. Across the stage of history, Prometheus was played by Kant, Hegel, Marx, Bakunin, Mannheim, Horkheimer, and Habermas, among others; now by philosopher, now by political activist, now by social scientist. Yet in each instance the exigencies of the social context demanded that the role of humankind, symbolized by Prometheus, be played within the confines of scholarly disciplines or social movements which singularly assumed the burden for a vastly more diverse but preconscious humanity.

Each actor in the Promethean tradition depicted humanity as an essentially collective being. Each depicted human existence and freedom cumulatively as dependent on the collective self-determination of humanity as social and collective being. The visionary actors

depicted humankind as originating in streams that distilled from the mists of a host of virgin societies. And these,in turn,had converged in a vast proliferation of new eddies and currents whose total configuration presented a mosaic--the totality of human culture. But each (as a consequence of the limits of the age) found him/herself advocating collective self-realization in the tradition of pre-Promethean individuation, either monologically or within a closed revolutionary structure.

This study in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge examined that seeming paradox in terms of the historical context of the aforementioned thinkers. It was intended to shed light on the dilemma of scholarly appeals for collective transcendence in the absence of an interactional collective structure. It was intended to assess the exigencies of a praxis that seemingly precluded collective self-realization, but more than this, the focus of the study was oriented to those phenomena whose current opaqueness obscures analysis of our own times in terms of their ripeness for collective emancipation. In effect,we examined the relationship of ideas and the people of ideas (theory) to the context of Western industrial society. Hence, we selected several contemporary scholars oriented to the tradition of Hegel and Marx who had likewise attempted to apply those precepts to the unique problems of industrial society.

Theory and Emancipatory Praxis

We found that removal of theory and enlightenment from the organization of struggle has several consequences that are particularly pertinent to emancipatory theory. First, theory becomes

abstract, like classic economic theory. As indicated, this is directly related to the formulation of universal nomological laws about "man in general" (re: Marx's critique of Feuerbach's anthropology). Second, theory becomes externalized like physics. It is formulated in a "laboratory condition" of freedom, while itself removed from direct intimidation. It is also external in that the theoretical product is to be applied by others whose fundamental problems are of a practical nature vastly different from those of the scientist-teacher (whose problem is, in significant measure, truth). This takes us back to Kant. Third, theory becomes formal. It calls for freedom of thought with little regard to the social organization necessarily linked to any struggle for freedom. Just as political or religious freedoms are trivialized when our existence is determined by strictly economic criteria, so too is "theoretical freedom" when the theorist's own existence is substituted for continuing interaction. None of the contemporary theorists in question indicated how the intellectual is to accomplish the feat of being at once attached and unattached (relatively) to the context of which he/she derives. So their view of freedom remains formal; that is, incomplete, for critical prerogatives are retained exclusively by the theorist during the construction of the theory. Fourth, theory becomes undialectic in that freedom of thought is only indirectly generated out of social existence with a corresponding greater reliance on abstract contemplation. This reflects bourgeois economics in that external factors are manipulated by a theory that is not connected to them.

A certain security may well result from an abstract undialectic theory whose externality and formalism is inherent. But its

withdrawal from praxis, as we have seen, also results in a loss of freedom for both theorists and lay persons alike. That assessment points up an inconsistency with the core assumptions of the Marxist tradition with which the Critical Theorists claim allegiance. Yet they do not acknowledge that inconsistency. Nor is an adequate rationale for departure from the essential elements of the tradition to which they claim allegiance forthcoming. In each case the ultimate objective became more a formalized a priori emancipation than concrete emancipatory praxis.

We have observed a development in which Mannheim sought to bypass conflict by avoiding what he perceived as a "bias" in Marxism. He strove to achieve a balance of perspective--a neutralization of ideology that assumed a significant value in each contending position. Given that frame of reference, he held that the Marxists were not interested in resolution of issues by peaceful means, but rather were bent on destruction of their opponents. The Critical Theorists, on the contrary, interpreted "mental neutralization" as a mechanism that obscured the underlying concrete conflict. This position was subscribed to by both Horkheimer and Habermas.

While all three scholars acknowledged the social basis of their theories, the exigencies of conflict were to impose a timidity about that aspect of social existence that they deemed conflict embroiled. Mannheim compromised it away. Horkheimer in the early years was less shy than during the postwar period. By that time, he had relinquished his unqualified insistence that the Critical Theorists recognize and actively advance their "class interest." Now he registered a distinct antipathy to the "activist" linkage of

theory to existence. Particularly the early Horkheimer (as well as Habermas), made the point against Mannheim's view that mere compromise between oppressors and oppressed substitute for transcendence. They contended, as did Marx, that transcendental theory must remain cognizant of existential conditions and take a position with regard to oppression. Later, they attempted to negate the threatening consequences of the life world on scientific activity by withdrawing theory from the organization of emancipation (solely at the discretion of the scientist). Herein they reached a functional convergence with Mannheim. Were other options open? Perhaps the purposes of emancipation demanded flexible levels of abstraction. Perhaps they needed a new organizational structure that linked the scientist to the people whom science serves and who in turn provide both their confidence and support. But uneasiness about the tribulations of theoretical praxis prevailed.

In any event, the Critical Theorists never acknowledged the inconsistency of formalistic theory. There was no clarification about how theoretical conflict could be adequately resolved--externally, abstractly--by a mere theoretical unmasking of its social origins (communicative competence). Why should theory be excluded from the insights of the dialectic method? Why must we, in the case of theory as in the remaining aspects of life, not change the social conditions to achieve a theoretical and existential transcendence simultaneously?

Needless to say these questions have not been fully answered and perhaps could not be with as mean a view of our nature. What, indeed, could be expected from us if we (or our analyst) confirm our "wicked" or "treacherous" nature as "everyone knows himself to be"?

It was Horkheimer, we may remember, who spoke these phrases and his progeny reflect the inherent assumptions. In the same treatise he not only praised Freud and Pareto for having revealed these truths but also set the stage for Habermas' adoption of the psychoanalytic model. This perspective provides not only the intellectual Weltanschauung for a return to psychological techniques with authoritarian components,but also the tendency on the part of the later Horkheimer and Habermas to equate class conflict and political struggle with social maladjustment and the "wicked" and "treacherous" nature of humankind.

It is true that whereas Habermas, unlike Mannheim, was less rigidly opposed to struggle, he surely excluded any conflict situation from the formulation of theory or enlightenment, and spurned with notable disinterest "revolutionary cadres" and all other measures (including Chinese efforts to bring theory into the work place) intended to more directly link intellectuals with the actual organization of emancipation. Apparently,potential treachery made application of the dialectic method to theory itself too great a risk for the critical scholars.

This is surely far removed from the concept of humanity as gesellschaftliche Wesen or Gemeinwesen. It places minimal confidence in the functional applicability of the dialectic as intended by Marx and Hegel and takes refuge in dichotomizing the intellectual realm from direct interaction with the people.

The linkage of theory and the organization of emancipation appeared implicitly in Hegel and Marx. Marx's concept of dialectics was based upon it. I contend that had the Critical Theorists gone

back to their own immediate origins rather than to the more secure Kantian position, that linkage would have been inescapable. Instead they find themselves encaged by a paradox. It is a paradox constructed in the deep-reaching intellectual disillusionment with Marxism. But I think it was, at times, a too ready and too well-rewarded despair. There may have been reasons not to radically "de-differentiate" their personal lives. But to fail to acknowledge the limitations of their decisions not to risk radical personal negation and transcendence and to act as though there were inherent barriers to the emancipatory capacity of the people, seems to reduce the fundamental precepts of their tradition to the assumptions of psychologized self-interested liberalism. Perhaps without a support system it provided at least a rationalization for a tenuous hold on security. It was tenuous and fading but better than Bergen-Belsen, better than a dark visit on an even darker night. It was perhaps a rationalization that permitted a negotiated settlement with the unknown, a "virtualization" of the spirit of self-realization embodied in phenomenological reflection. It was further compatible with the quiescence of the academy, traditional family life, suburban routine, and the bourgeois ideal of epistemology, science, and pedagogy. Above all, it was a rationalization, at least for Horkheimer, which, given no apparent option, invited a trade-off of freedom for security, a trade-off that seemed to demand the ambiguity of both an authoritarian and submissive role for the intellectual. At one level or another, it at least temporarily separated the scholar from organized threat.

As seen in the foregoing light, freedom and emancipation are directly a social act whose criteria, as Hegel and Marx so well

demonstrated, are met not merely by an absence of coercion but are coextensive with humanity as a total reasoning, feeling embodiment. Thus, it is not enough to reveal manipulation or systematic distortion--one must have access to the alternatives, originating in the total community out of whose existence old forms must be critically overcome.

Since the Critical Theorists, particularly Habermas, remain so transfixed on the coercive function of distorted communication, they disregard the organizational structure on which transcendence of oppression is to occur and fail to acknowledge that inconsistency in their professed Marxism. They simply disregard the dialectic necessity which Kaplan attributes to pragmatic theoretical formulation.

> To believe a proposition is not to lay hold of an abstract entity called "truth" with a correspondingly abstract "mind"; it is to make a choice among alternative sets of strategies of action (Kaplan, 1968, p. 43).

To remain at the level of identification of coercion in this circumstance is to remain abstract. Theory itself must concede that it is conceived in variables, whose existence is in process, which extend beyond the scope of distorted communication to the need for positive programs within a concrete emancipatory organizational context. These are the positive programs that give meaning and direction to otherwise abstract theories. These are the actions that establish consistency between theoretical endeavor and the transformative rationale. These are the concrete contradictions on which Marx insisted that theory must develop. Marx challenged Hegel's dialectic of freedom precisely because he could not envision that dialectic under the protectorate of any surrogate. Rather, it was a

process inconceivable beyond, or outside, a group within which the prerogatives and consequences of its action were constantly achieved.

There are clearly limits to emancipatory science as an abstract discipline. Unless one wishes to claim that emancipatory science is equivalent to life there must be limits. Indeed,one might conjecture that emancipation is to the dialectic of freedom less a science or epistemology than an art--that it is at least as much affective as logical. So it is a quality that not only demands freedom of but from vanguards, whether political or intellectual. A neo-transformative model is called for that retains scientific expertise but that forswears authority claims advanced in the hyperbole of fear-driven scientific adherents. What is called for is a realistic supportive context in which theory and praxis may be formulated in a close interlinkage.

Expertise and Authority in Struggle

We do not speak, then, of a totally new science, a totally new epistemology or hermeneutics as such. At least, I will not presume to suggest alternatives sufficient to the conceptual and instrumental mechanism of Western social thought. I cannot presume to significantly improve upon those high points in a rich, diverse, and sometimes politically conscious and socially concerned heritage of social science and philosophy. My focus then must be on the linkage of theory and praxis. It must be in the interest of emancipatory scholarship, not on a totally new science, but on radically breaking down the protective barriers (between scientist-philosophers and the people who are to be affected by their expertise) that characterize

bourgeois scholarship. The role of expertise is crucial but the hiatus existing between scholars and the people of their life world has resulted in not only vulnerability to political manipulation but also in insulation from the potential enlightenment function of both the expert scientist and the source of practical wisdom--the people. This calls for a transformative model. Hence, we are well advised to explore the source of that method for promising hypotheses--the Hegel-Marx tradition itself.

To begin, those who advocate a separation of theory and enlightenment from the organization of struggle fail to provide a convincing basis on which the intellectual can obtain a positive ground where his/her own academic freedom can be realized. A mere appeal for academic freedom is less than likely to be well received by a sophisticated opposition. I speak here of an organized harassment of "professors," not merely in the dramatic moments--the McCarthy era, the Hungarian revolution, the Vietnam war, Alexander Solzhenitsyn--but the appointment of deans and the composition of faculties of universities and institutions in which only the most naive can fail to see the sustaining hand of corporate interest via state legislatures, boards of trustees, political commissars, and the like. How, outside a counter organization, is the intellectual to fight this reality? Surely not by glumness or cynicism. Habermas, while conceding a political non-involvement, winds up by telling us that his only hope is a handful of student activists. (Significantly, his history is one of minimal rapport with them.) But at the same time he disdains proposals to bring intellectuals into closer working relationships with the life world.

Mannheim believed in direct political involvement for the intellectual but neutralized the impact by compromise. Marx, like Mannheim, insisted on involvement but was embroiled in preliminary struggles. The Critical Theorists, like Bakunin, sceptical of political solutions, took a step Bakunin would not take and chose isolation from the risks of organizations of emancipation. In the process, they abandoned theory and enlightenment to a formal externalized and undialectic fate.

Marx confronted what Mannheim compromised away and the Critical Theorists skirted--the reality of struggle. He perceived that the struggle for emancipation demanded integration of an articulated, organizational (or party) struggle with theory if the power of oppression was to be overcome. The reality of power and of organizational necessity required tactical contingencies developed in relationship with a concrete emancipatory organization.

However, he did not realize a means by which the articulated organizational linkage could be fashioned democratically with the full participation of those to be affected. The situation differed from that prevailing in the Western "democracies" today. The contemporary message from Marx is that we are not dealing with a monologic individual psyche alone, as an externalized epistemological problem of science or humanity. Rather, epistemology and science are embedded (and not at the discretion or by concession of the scientist) inescapably in some form of institutional structure within the life world. The question is not how can truth be generated in a structure of conflict, but how can truth be generated from a structure based on lies and oppression? From the Marxian perspective we cannot escape

the charge of arrogance if we assume that we can generate truth or effect change in a vacuum or in a vacuous academy. We do not represent the life world in its totality nor does any individual or "community of relatively unattached intellectuals." Implicit is the contention that the social scientist, like the rest of humankind, must build bridges from roles and patterns embedded in the past and redefine context-embedded modes. Why can we not--why indeed must we not--insist upon theory-as-tactics--a theory-as-strategy? Why must we not acknowledge that theory belongs no more in the minds of theorists than in the homes, hearts, and workplaces of the oppressed.

This is the essence of Hegel's effort to historicize the a priori and of Marx's insistence on the transformative method as a concrete realization. This is the essence of dialectics. For Marx, the times were never ripe and Lukacs fell prey to the only organization with which he might have dialectically aligned himself. Hungary was not after all a Western democracy with a formally established freedom of assembly. We are left, then, with a question. Can the notion of direct involvement in the life world--in the organization of struggle--advocated timidly by Mannheim and more brashly by Lukacs, be reconciled with theory and enlightenment in a manner that protects consciousness from the oppressive power whose presence intimidated the Critical Theorists and induced a withdrawal to a tacit dualism between theory and praxis? Can the transformative ideal be realized in the organization of emancipation? We are brought back to the synthesis with which we closed our treatment of Hegel, Marx, et al. It becomes clear that not only is an organization of emancipation called for, but it must be conceived in a form that is cognizant of

debilitating fear as the universal accompaniment of objectification and transcendence--the eternal companion of freedom.

Toward a Theory of Emancipatory Praxis

Collective Synthesis

The Marxists as well as the Bakuninists and other anarchists shared a passionate commitment to praxis. Conceptually they also shared a humanistic vision that anticipated a world of economic abundance and political freedom for all humankind. Integral to the realization of the political-economic ideal was a mechanism of objectification through social interaction, and their writings are replete with implicit and explicit references both to the survival necessity of the purposive-rational moment and the interactional moment. Yet none of these factions of the First International realized their projections. Each sought a transition far more profound than the times would allow. And each settled for a necessary but insufficient fragment of the larger transcendence whose time had not yet arrived. Marxist praxis tended in the direction of the purposive-rational criteria of class struggle while the anarchists and utopians emphasized the immanent interpersonal criteria of interaction. But each held tenaciously to a necessary dialectic linkage of theory and praxis.

Their problems were not essentially theoretical; rather they occurred at the juncture of theory and praxis. The dilemma of the humanistic challenge to individualism was to initiate a mode of praxis that made organizationally coordinated inroads against a disciplined and wily opposition while still preserving a vital emancipatory potential in the movement. The question was not merely how to overcome

external constraints. Each would-be emancipator was also embedded in the bourgeois mentality and mode of life and each required vastly more than logically tight techniques of self-realization. Indeed, the vital core of their own precepts led directly to the necessity of a collective support structure during the traumatic transition that penetrated immanently, beyond abstract theoretical formulations, to the deepest emotional levels. Total emancipation demanded that we learn to be free in a supportive context which could benefit from our historically and culturally embedded essence as well as from abstract logic. It was only at this point that abstract rationality became critical rationality.

Marx adopted a preliminary attack on bourgeois coercion in an effort to set the stage for a subsequent collective self-realization. The anarchists and utopians sought an immediate realization of a total transformation, but to survive, utopias required a praxis that denied or escaped from the larger political reality. The utopians and anarchists risked vulnerability to the realities of a bourgeois power they never realistically confronted. The Marxists, if victorious, risked vulnerability to abuses of power from within their own movement. For theirs was a movement of revolutionaries still embedded in, and reflective of, a competitive bourgeois mentality whose intricately woven mechanisms of defense were beckoned forth by the exigencies of the class struggle they had adopted.

The secularization of reason had encountered a barrier that Mannheim and the Critical Theorists set out to overcome. But rather than return to a historical analysis of the conditions that precluded the synthesis of both purposive-rational and the humanistic components,

the Critical Theorists attempted a theoretical synthesis that relied heavily on abstract logic. As a consequence, these theorists initiated a pause in the secularization of reason and forged a new link in the chain that still constrains our Promethean humanism.

I have advocated a synthesis of the interactional and purposive-rational moments. It rejects an abstract critique of Marxian theory and advances a concrete synthesis instructed by historical precedent and consistent with the Marxian prerequisite that emancipatory theory devolve from a politically conscious organization of emancipation.

The Collectivity as Transcendental Unity

Marx, in the assessment of this study, became involved materially in a political-economic struggle-in-process in which he spent the remainder of his life. Since he rejected the separation of theory and praxis, he neither had occasion to systematically develop the rationale of Gemeinwesen nor to develop the concomitant social-psychological implications of negation necessary to realize that ideal. The time was not ripe. There were also prior personal commitments, not to mention a dearth of communal experimentation in his time. The absence of a context of praxis denied the opportunity to objectify the immanent aspects of the communal projections of his youth.

He did leave us guidelines. However, the unfinished state in which Marx left the structure of revolutionary transcendence opened the door to his progeny to disregard the guidelines and undertake "shortcuts" to emancipation. This has been the dilemma recognized by Mannheim and the Critical Theorists (validated, in part, in the

fates of Lukacs and Luxemburg). In Habermas, the culmination of their effort departed from the central core of Hegel and Marx by attempting to generate emancipated consciousness spontaneously by theoretician surrogates of the people. We have seen that to be consistent with Hegel and Marx, consciousness had to be objectified in the process of becoming--the process of our revolutionary social existence.

Marx never relented in his insistence on a linkage of theory and praxis. However, the progressive-cumulative nature of consciousness formation had become linked in a most awkward union with the immediate needs of the adopted class struggle. Practically, the realities of power struggles seemingly demanded that emphasis be placed on a frontal assault on the political-economic coercion of capitalism. This meant that minimal energies remained conceptually or existentially for the development of social structural means for coping with the inherent vicissitudes of change. In short, exigencies seemingly demanded that the prerogatives of purposive-rationalism, including power, precede, not accompany, consciousness and that consciousness remain separated from social existence.

Marx was not unaware that change ipso facto demands that social-structural resources be devoted to more than the elimination of external coercion. He bypassed the simultaneous realization of a social context conducive to transcendental objectification and mastery of the accompanying fear of negation that rested within ourselves. But that was not due to deficiency in his initial theoretical image. Rather, it was attributable to limitation in the context of his praxis.

It has been the forced constriction of the process of

transcendence to the marshalling of a sufficient political-economic might to overcome the hegemony of capitalism which has in turn provided an unforseen structure of magnitude and power within Marxism itself. That power has preceded the consciousness of freedom which would otherwise have been its guide. That structure has tempted abuse and betrayal of the original ideals. Reliance on traditional mechanisms of change based on naked power, where successful, has too often been instrumental in a transfer of the resulting power to revolutionary organizations, well-intended or otherwise, that have paid lip-service to "Aufheben" (critical transformation) but which have retained the competitive-possessive mode of bourgeois life.

Thus, in defense of the Critical Theorists, one may well grant that within a given historical period theory building has had to be withdrawn from the context. (Lukacs' experiences seems here to validate these points.) Clearly, bureaucratization and oppression have appeared not only in capitalism but in socialism as well. Indeed, one could scarcely disagree with the judgment that at some point of coercion, emancipatory theory building could not be undertaken at all. Surely within an adverse context the outcome would likely be, at best, crippled or stillborn. The Critical Theorists might indeed be perfectly justified in concluding that it would be better to withdraw from such a context than to abstain from any action whatsoever. But that answer does not address the question at issue--could such expediencies qualify as emancipatory theory given not only our logical extension of the fundamental Hegel-Marx precepts, but the manifest failure of Habermas' emancipatory theory to have won adherents and to have achieved operational status? Here those committed to praxis

gain a valid point over Critical Theory.

I will not presume to argue that the formulation of social theory is infeasible isolated from a communal context. Indeed, Marx made a highly persuasive argument that revolutionary programs required flexibility to unique regional and historical conditions. I will claim, however, that a theory about transcendental objectification which does not itself employ the mechanism of transcendental objectification as central to its emancipatory objective--a theory which seats the essence of transcendence (like Kant's abstract categories or Hegel's constitutional monarch) in the abstracted role of the theorist--reifies that role and sanctifies the particular theorist as a sufficient substitute for the communal mode of transcendence.

The point is that I, as theorist, can escape coercion in a self-imposed exile--I may "free myself from coercion by withdrawal;" I may even contribute to the ultimate arsenal of transcendence, but I as theorist cannot summon up through desire or the wizardry of my abstract reason the transcendental emancipation, creative tension, and concomitant support system which we as communal beings must agonize through in the course of our real historical existence. I may theorize and, indeed, even theorize productively, but I as theorist do not an emancipatory theorist make; not, at least, within the framework of Marx-Hegel precepts.

Within those precepts the obstacle to freedom is more than "systematically distorted communication." It is the alienation of the entire person including an immanent alienating accompaniment of all change. It follows that the structural determination of this total alienation necessitates a reassessment of the whole structure of

existence. But can a theoretical model be conceived and realized which does not eradicate its own transcendental epoch upon the sequestering of its essence from existence? Can we collectively sustain creative tension in the midst of a larger context of oppressive tension?

Habermas only briefly explored and abandoned the possibility of a consciously conceived structure of creative tensions and the collective realization of theory. Indeed, he prepared a therapeutic-pedagogic mechanism--communicative competence--by which we learned to identify the mechanism of coercion "regardless of actual restrictions under empirical conditions." He transcended the context. Now one might argue that Habermas accepted the linkage of theory and praxis, but that he did not deem the time propitious for any more than a meta-theory about how to identify systematically distorted communication. However, he did rather misleadingly term his theory emancipatory. More importantly, he rejected as fruitless,proposals that the quality of emancipatory theory would be enhanced by a commitment to more effectively realize the Marx-Hegel ideal of collective transcendence in theory building. In the interview noted earlier, he knowingly used Marx's very terminology to defend his insistence on the isolation of the intellectual role from the exigencies of praxis. Where Marx assaulted differentiation, Habermas insisted that the intellectual life with its attendant prerogatives cannot and should not be "de-differentiated" (Frankel, 1974, p. 46). Where Marx argued against "political idealists" who were "completely torn from" their "other differentiated . . . actuality" as landowner, as worker, etc., Habermas advocated precisely that differentiation for scholars. That is,

the intellectual in Habermas' model was insulated from the social "actuality" of change--the organization of emancipation. Instead, the intellectual was to have been trusted to conceive an effective basis for realization of the ideal of Gemeinwesen. This was to have been mysteriously accomplished by a relatively immaculate objectification while leading a compartmentalized existence within the competitive arena of possessive relationships, publishing demands, and individualism inherent in the traditions of contemporary social science and philosophy. With this "mystification" Habermas violated the essence of Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and dichotomized the role of intellectuals from the social organization of emancipation and transcendence.

Even as Habermas missed the Marxian critique of Hegel, he also ignored the implicit Hegelian critique of Marx's concept of alienation. He attempted (by way of his advocacy of differentiated, compartmentalized scholarship) to flee from, rather than directly confront, the alienating, tension-wrought aspect of existential transcendence that must be confronted not only by the theorist but those to be affected by theory. Alternatively, a possible synthesis of the Hegel-Bakunin insistence on a transcendental interactional support structure, with a logical extension of Marx's theory of emancipatory organizations, has been anticipated in this study.

Synthesis: The "Aufheben" of Alienation

I have argued that socialist revolutionary transcendence never enjoyed a context that permitted the full realization of its own precepts. Full transcendence remained a communal act to be participated

in by all to be affected, but only on the conceptual level. Throughout modern history we have consequently witnessed the paradox of revolutions in the name of community, undertaken in the absence of community. We may set aside for the purposes of this study the question of whether this paradox was attributable to historical necessity. With due respects to antecedents, I have questioned the argument that such expediencies are needed or even functional today. In any event, I have advocated a synthesis in which transcendence occurs at the juncture of theory and praxis. This synthesis was implicit in Marx but was lost to the melancholy of fond dreams which had not yet found their time.

I attempted to partially systematize Marx's references to community in an earlier chapter. It is surely not a new concept, having repeatedly appeared in the annals of socialist thought. During the final weeks of Lenin's life, political elite vanguardism had culminated in a power-struggle in which Stalin's grim intent surfaced with increasing clarity. Perhaps in an effort to identify a vehicle by which that fateful concentration of power could be countered, a fatally ill Lenin pleaded with the Soviets to take steps to realize the communal essence of Marxism and to initiate movement toward direct involvement of the people in the conduct of their personal affairs.

> It seems to me that not enough attention is being paid to the co-operative movement in our country. . . . the only task, indeed, that remains for us is to organize the population in co-operative societies (Lenin, 1975, p. 707).

Mao, too, envisioned the realization of a similar spirit when he called for a communal linkage of the scientist-theorist to the work

place.

Based on consensus, the community would provide a structure of non-hierarchical support that was not envisioned by the scholars of this inquiry. Such a community is the embodiment of the transformative method. It is this ideal that Marx had in mind when he critiqued the "liberal" emphasis on the "rights of men."

> Thus none of the so-called rights of men goes beyond the egoistic man, the man withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his private choice, and separated from the community as a member of civil society. Far from viewing man here in his species-being, his species-life itself--society--rather appears to be an external framework for the individual, limiting his original independence (Marx, 1967, p. 236).

Indeed, the ultimate emancipation of humanity could only occur in the concrete context of community.

> Only in community do the means exist for every individual to cultivate his talents in all directions. Only in the community is personal freedom possible. In previous substitutes for the community, in the state, etc., personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the ruling class and only insofar as they belonged to this class. The illusory community, in which individuals have come together up till now, always took on an independent existence in relation to them and was at the same time not only a completely illusory community but also a new fetter because it was the combination of one class against another. In a real community individuals obtained their freedom in and through their association (Marx, 1967, p. 457; my italics).

It is only in intimate interaction within the community that citizens, including intellectuals, may expect to function with support against provincialism, covert manipulation and overt thought control.*

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*Existence in an "open community" (based on Gemeinwesen) would also demand that attention be given to the eradication of traditional possessiveness, sexism, and hierarchical structure (including prominently a separation of expertise from authority). Also called for would be the establishment of opportunity for mutual rapport, and

> . . . the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only in this way will separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world, and be able to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth . . . (Marx, 1967, p. 429).

There is implicitly in this ideal a linkage not only of intellectuals to a scholarly community but of the whole of humankind to a community based on Gemeinwesen.

> The exchange of human activity within production itself as well as the exchange of human products with one another is equivalently the species-activity and species-spirit whose actual, conscious, and authentic existence is social activity and social satisfaction. As human nature is the true communal nature, or communal being (Gemeinwesen) of man, men through the activation of their nature create and produce a human communal being (Gemeinwesen), a social being (gesellschaftliche Wesen) which is no abstractly universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the nature or being (Wesen) of every single individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth . . . Men as actual, living, particular individuals, not men considered in abstraction, constitute this being. It is, therefore, what they are (Marx, MEGA I, 3, p. 535-536; in O'Malley, 1970, p. xliii; a slightly different English rendition is in Easton and Guddat, 1967, p. 271-272).

Thus the synthesis which this study has sought to realize would demand not only an acceptance of Marx's insistence on a systematically structured organization of emancipation but also an acknowledgment of

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support designed to provide independence from externalized structures (e.g., universities, foundations) dominated directly by oppression. Likewise a de-authoritization of expertise demanded by the ideal of Gemeinwesen, with its inherent concept of freedom, would place scholars on a day-to-day working relationship with a fledgling organization of emancipation. Here a consciousness might develop, between the theorist-teacher and the people, which was not immediately predicated on political victory over oppressive forces. Here the context might also provide a receptive ground for relatively covert political gestation. Further, that consciousness might be tested in a receptive but by no means "virtualized" organizational context. In effect, it would make both scholarship and expertise accessible to the entire community and provide unbroken availability of the context of praxis to theorists and those occupied primarily with enlightenment.

the necessary Hegelian component of self-alienation. It could not offer the false promise that once the capitalists had been liquidated that all alienation would be relegated to entombment in history. The capitalist is only one externalized obstacle and there is not just a little of his/her fear driven greed and exaggerated need for security and recognition still latent in all of us. What is called for is a critical synthesis that links an aggressive organization of emancipation with the dialectically based interactional support system anticipated in Hegel and in Marx's own early work, and expanded in the specific projections of the utopians and anarchists. What is called for is not theorizing about the collective,but a unity of theory and praxis in collective life.

To date revolutionaries and scholars, including the Critical Theorists, have been unsuccessful in providing a concrete basis on which humanity might constitute a collective support system necessary to reveal and cope with the alienation integral with the process of communal transcendence and creative life--a continuing revolution. The mystification which Marx correctly rejected persists. It is not merely Hegel's onus, nor is it restricted to the celebrated mystification of the capitalists. A decidedly distinct likeness of a dour cigar-chomping Bourgeois Gentilhomme is also too often harbored in the revolutionaries themselves. Still embedded in a competitive system we manifest the expected insecurities and fears. Indeed, history has amply demonstrated (reflecting as it does an essentially competitive social context, where human spiritual and physical survival has been in more or less continual jeopardy) a reluctance to relinquish a relatively secure position for an unknown. Hegel implicitly reminds

us that we cannot expect people who have learned the rules of survival in agony and struggle to venture to change those rules on the basis of a utopian dream or a rationally tight argument alone. They would require support and a demonstrably effective context to accompany a rationale of radical change.

Together with Hegel, we must surely acknowledge not merely a transcendental potential but also an element of terror. We must acknowledge--for the vast reaches of human history have given ample testimony--that not merely the creative inspiration of the positive moment of our rationally constituted dream, but the negation, the decay of mortality--of death--is immanent in ourselves. The acknowledgment of terror then is not ipso facto a concession to meaninglessness and death. Rather, it may provide impetus to an affirmation of life. Indeed, if we are to remain consistent with Hegel and Marx, emancipatory theory can only be realized in the emancipatory praxis of daily life. Any other measure, while professing a socialist-Marxist ideology, is an illusion that has historically borne capricious entrapment.

To be sure, for any age such radical action must be undertaken with trepidation. The withering prospect of individual transcendence in the face of an overpoweringly traditional context is awesome; indeed, terror evoking. While I have acted on the assumption that this age presents an opportunity for collective transcendence, the obstacles remain formidable. They are not merely restricted to the economic system; nor are they solely the connivances of a technically orchestrated manipulation of our consensus. They are, if the fundament of socialist theory is valid, integral to the

roles on which our very identity rests. They inhere in professionalism, careerism, the eight-to-five job, the possessive diad, the nuclear family, the suburban life, in neighborhood protection associations. They are in chairpersons, and in the multitude of tinkerings intended to humanize a fundamentally exploitative system that saps our energies and time in surplus labor and planned obsolescence and drains our resources in easy-pay thirty-year mortgages and a glut of consumer titilations. Here are generated the sops on which the intimidated portion of our being feeds. Here are generated the illusions that individual ego-recognition and reward can be sufficient to allay the primordial fear of nothingness, stem our loneliness, and render tolerable the despairing knowledge of our individual finitude.

What is missed by so many "radicals" is that this way of life penetrates to the roots of their own being, as well as to that of the "capitalists;" and that to meet even the minimum criteria of Marxism those tenacious roots can only be excised in a context of praxis that provides sufficient support.

It is perhaps in awareness of our collective necessity as well as in our dreams of ecstatic experience that we will be tempted to relax our illusions for the fearful alienation of an unknown but promising dream in process--community. As such, each of us, capitalist and socialist alike, has stood with Edvard Munch terrorized by the primordial SCREAM. But each of us, as well, has been lifted to whatever stage of consciousness we enjoy by that ecstatic spirit of the human adventure. We have felt the passion and--if fortunate--ventured to hope. For Hegel and Marx, that passion was more than promises of physical security, recognition, or ego-gratification could satisfy.

It was more than self-love or its minimal extension in the closed possessive love of another finite creature. It was love for, and the realization of oneness with, all past and present humankind. They insisted that only if community sustained was our faith in others warranted. All humanity had known the absence of community, its profoundest terror, its loneliness, and the debilitating inversion of a self-defensive preoccupation with personal and possessive expediencies. In individual isolation, that despair must ultimately conquer. If this followed, then our only victory, even over death itself, was that communality from whence we had received our essence and which carried that essence through the somber cloak of death to the yet unbroken byways of the human adventure.

Clearly, any organization of emancipation must also provide not only vital dialogue and diversity, but personal support for the precarious journey into immanent negation. And that is the common dialectic chorus from which the voices of Hegel, Bakunin, the utopians, and Luxemburg speak to Marx. Marx's response--by now familiar--is to agree but to remind them that it is not enough to call for a utopian dream that coexists within a structure of dehumanization and preprogrammed environmental disaster. It is not enough either to coexist, protected within a utopian support structure or to mindlessly set out to overthrow capitalism. We must also concretely advance an enlightened political and economic critique intended to ease the immediate threats to our humanity by an oppressive system.

To realize this ideal, a forthright material synthesis is demanded wherein humanity must not only become involved positively in political-economy and overthrow of external oppression, but must also

create a context that dialectically lends its support immanently to the fearful confrontation which all of us as communal individuals must endure in the eternal negation of traditional roles, including the ultimate confrontation--our own death. It must be more than the melodramatic liberal despair of passive handwringing existentialism; it must incorporate a continuing acknowledgment of potentially debilitating alienation if the context is to be creative and free. And creativity and freedom compose the positive ecstasy which finds its realization simultaneously in the pain of death and rebirth.

Thus, the synthesis anticipated by this study must build on the historical lessons of the past. Unlike the struggles of Marx's era, we do not speak of social conflict alone; the age of class conflict is past. Our task is also to simultaneously overcome the effects of bourgeois power on ourselves as well. Thus we no longer speak merely of <u>counter-social</u> organizations -- like classes in conflict or economic emancipation--we seek a total <u>counter-cultural</u> transcendence. It penetrates to the totality of our individual and collective being. It is not limited by the constrictions of class consciousness, but draws from the best in the confluence of the total multitude of cultural streams. To be sure, it is a task to be undertaken by us--organizationally--within our human community. However, the organization must be constituted out of a critique of the totality of human culture and must benefit from the concomitant structure intended to provide not only the dialectic basis of free choice but support for the inherent exigencies of change. Hence, we speak of a <u>counter-cultural organization of emancipation</u>.

Clearly the counter-cultural organization of emancipation must

be at once a supportive structure whose day-to-day being is constituted of a full intersubjective (participatory) dialectical transcendence and a structure whose members will not hesitate to soil themselves in the exigencies of struggle. It must be a community whose acknowledged grounding is in an enlightened and collective critique of our cultural heritage. It must be a creative, supportive collectivity whose guidelines were latent in Hegel. Marx and his socialist colleagues had then within their grasp, but they were lost to the urgency of struggle and the marches of time.

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