This is to certify that the

thesis entitled
The Effect of Young and Middle Age Crises

On Identity and Moral Reasoning

presented by

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has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in ~~Psychology~~

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Date 10/23/80

THE EFFECT OF YOUNG ADULT AND MIDDLE AGE CRISES ON IDENTITY AND MORAL REASONING

By

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Psychology

1981

ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF YOUNG ADULT AND MIDDLE AGE CRISES
ON IDENTITY AND MORAL REASONING

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Young and middle age adults were tested to determine whether or not the experience of a crisis would constitute a sufficient source of disequilibrium to motivate an individual toward a morally principled, identity achieved, androgynous, and intrinsically religious identity. Crisis was defined as an event which affected a central component of an individual's life structure, seriously threatening the pattern of roles and meanings which had provided stability for an individual's life. To internally resolve the implications of such a crisis the individual would have to risk the possibility of a moderate to drastic change in his life style. Eighty subjects were divided into young adult and middle age adult, crisis and noncrisis, groups following completion of Rahe et al.'s[1] Life Change Scale and an oral interview centering on the subject's major life events. Each group was composed of 10 males and 10 females. Each crisis/noncrisis-age-sex group was further divided into five college (completion of a four year degree) and five noncollege subjects. Each subject completed Kohlberg's[2] moral dilemmas, Marcia's[3] Ego Identity Status questionnaire, Bem's[4] Sex Role Inventory, and Hoge's[5] Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale. A multivariate analysis of variance yielded a significant crisis effect due primarily to higher Ego Identity Statuses among crisis subjects. A series of Chi Square analyses were performed. A significant relationship was found between the experience of a crisis and the use of principled

moral reasoning. Principled moral reasoning was also related to completion of a four-year college degree. Correlational analyses yielded a significant positive correlational between subjects' Ego Identity Statuses and their stages of moral reasoning. The effects of a crisis were not a function of a subject's age or sex. Crisis was not related to androgyny or intrinsic religious motivation. The possibility is entertained that crisis and noncrisis individuals vary not so much in the events which are imposed upon them but in their willingness to allow the implications of those events to challenge their stable life structure. Individuals may also vary in the extent to which they allow themselves to be found in situations where their current life style may be threatened. The willingness to risk the possibility of life style changes may be a major factor in determining whether or not an individual will allow himself to internally experience a crisis to the extent that it may serve as an impetus for ego identity and moral growth.

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Kohlberg, L. & colleagues. Moral stage scoring manual. Unpublished manuscript. Harvard University, June 1976.

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[4]Bem, S. L. The measurement of psychological androgyny. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1974, 42, 155-162.

[5]Hoge, D. R. A validated intrinsic religious motivation scale. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1972, 11, 369-376.

To Sarah

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Throughout the years of changed proposals, data collection and evaluation, and intermissions due to teaching and mothering responsibilities, the one individual whose support I felt most clearly was my advisor, Hiram Fitzgerald. His ability to combine a demand for excellence without condemnation in the times that my life circumstances made it difficult to progress on my degree, helped me to feel that he would still be there believing in me and encouraging me to do well when I could return to my work.

When this time came, the willingness of my husband Bill, and my step-daughter Karla, to take over some of my home responsibilities while I concentrated on my data analysis was crucial to my completion of the degree. My 3-year-old daughter Sarah was amazingly understanding of her mom's inability to always be there for her. I would like to thank my friends Phyllis Slutsky, Carol Perchonock, and Hedy Cerwinka for providing quality care for Sarah so that I would be able to study.

Statistical analysis of the data would have been extremely difficult without the patient help of Jay Greiner who spent hours of his own time helping me to prepare my data for the computer. I also appreciate Karen O'Quin who came to my rescue when it seemed we would never figure out how to perfect the instructions for the computer's analysis.

Thoughtful comments of my dissertation committee, Hiram Fitzgerald, John McKinney, Ellen Strommen, Lucy Ferguson, and Elaine Donelson, during

my oral examination are appreciated for their assistance in the final revisions which allowed me to smooth the rough edges and make the elaborations needed for clarity and comprehensiveness in the final version of the paper.

I am grateful to Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota, for a $1000 grant which gave me the funds necessary to pay my subjects. With this money I could show them in a small way, my appreciation for their participation in the study. I will forever be overwhelmed and thankful for their willingness to open up their lives to me. The honesty and personal probing evident in the interviews enabled me to gain insights a superficial discussion would never have allowed.

As I enter the last stages of completing my dissertation, I gratefully and somewhat nostalgically entrust to Rita Dudley the responsibility for typing the final version. With her help, I bring to a close a significant chapter in my personal and academic life.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Until recently research on psychological changes in the life cycle has concentrated on the childhood, adolescent, and old age periods neglecting the early and middle adult years. In so doing psychologists have implied that no significant changes occur from 20 to 65 and that individuals should consequently expect their lives during this period to be characterized by relative stability. The works of Erikson (1968) and Jung (1960) are among the very few protesting the lack of research on what are realistically the prime years of the life cycle. In spite of Erikson's biographical study of Martin Luther (1962) indicating profound moral changes at midlife, work by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) clearly suggested that the growth of moral reasoning was complete by the mid-twenties. Much of this has begun to change. Spurred both by changes in their own lives and the increasing clamor by the adult public to understand the causes of internal turmoil symptomized by discontent in marriage and work roles, researchers and theoreticians (Eisendorfer & Lawton, 1973; Keen, 1976; Levinson, Darrow, Klein, Levinson, & McKee, 1974, 1978; Neugarten, 1968a; Sheehy, 1974, 1976; Valliant & McArthur, 1973; Gould, 1972) have begun to lay the groundwork for a detailed description of psychological stages in the adult years. Moral development researchers (Kohlberg, 1973a; Gibbs, 1977, 1979; Murphy & Gilligan, 1980) have independently been forced by the inconsistencies between their Piagetian theoretical framework and their adult data to acknowledge the possibility of adult development. The finding of

relativistic and existential thinking in adults suggested that the end of Piagetian structural changes in adolescence did not necessitate the end of the development of moral reasoning. Relativistic, contextual, and meta-ethical thought might be adult moral forms dependent upon the experiences of moral choice and responsibility usually encountered only after late adolescence.

Research by Levinson et al. (1978) on the stages of adult male development suggests that those who experience a midlife crisis are usually faced with an intense inner questioning which demands incorporation of aspects of themselves left dormant in young adulthood. The purpose of the present research was to determine empirically whether the crises experienced in midlife might serve as a catalyst for progress in adult moral reasoning and encourage incorporation of previously undeveloped personality dimensions. To delineate clearly the reasoning leading to this question, prior research and theory on adult stages and the later phases of moral development will first be described.

Adult Developmental Stages

Levinson and colleagues (1974, 1978) have developed a framework of age-linked male social-psychological developmental stages. These stages were derived from in depth interviews with forty men ranging in age from 35 to 45. The description which follows will be primarily organized around their work with elaboration within and beyond these stages as they have been perceived by other investigators. The stages of adult development are primarily based upon male samples. The main exception is Sheehy's (1976) work with one hundred fifteen men and women ranging in age from 18 to 55. A common thread winding through the theories of adult personality (Jung, 1960; Erikson, 1976; Levinson et al., 1978) is that only by

pentrating problems does the possibility for widening consciousness develop. This means that it is through confrontation and working through a crisis that the individual gains knowledge of the unknown aspects of himself. A fuller acknowledgement of one's own positive and negative potentials may prompt a greater acceptance and desire to affirm the equal rights of others and thereby lead to an advance in moral reasoning. According to Sheehy (1974) the effect of crisis events may depend upon the individual's particular place in the adult life cycle. Thus it is important to be aware of the major tasks confronting the adult which may affect his reaction to and ability to learn from the crisis event.

The first adult stage is called the 'Early Adult Transition'. This stage begins from 16 to 18 and ends from 20 to 24 years-of-age. The major task is to make the transition into adult life and away from ties to the family of origin. This break is frequently not complete until the mid-life stage around age 40 (Levinson et al., 1974; Sheehy, 1974). From the standpoint of ego development this overlaps with the tasks of Erikson's (1950, 1968) crisis of 'Identity versus Role Diffusion'. As with each of Erikson's crises (1976) the issue is not that one side or the other (identity or role diffusion) wins out but that there is a dynamic balance in favor of the more positive side. The adolescent's fear of instability may lead to too early a conclusion of this phase and in so doing sacrifice a measure of confusion needed for openness to change and variability in later choices. The adolescent seeks an inner sense of continuity and sameness in establishing an identity of his own, but he is at the same time concerned with how others see him. The latter concern may take precedence over establishing his own unique self. As Sheehy (1974) notes, although the individual feels his beliefs are his own, his lack of experience in

living outside the family leaves him with a value system often indistinguishable from his parents. While groping toward autonomy, the adolescent male still needs nurturance and will often find a companion in marriage who will continue to fulfill the mothering needs he requires (Jung, 1954; Sheehy, 1974). If he adopts the adult marriage roles at this time, the dependence on his family is likely to be prolonged and his growth toward self sufficiency impeded. As Valliant and McArthur (1973) note, the problem with a prolonged adolescent identity crisis is that it may never end. The young man in this period is still psychologically tied to his family and it is tipping the balance toward a more independent existence that will move him into the next developmental stage.

The next stage is labeled 'Entering the Adult World'. It begins in the early twenties and extends to 27 to 29. This is the stage of exploration and provisional commitment concerning adult occupation, memberships, and social relationships. The task here is to fashion a life structure which will link the valued self with the wider adult world. The concept of life structure throughout Levinson's stages includes both the overall pattern of roles and the personal meanings they have for the individual. Levinson et al. (1974) link the ego development of this stage with Erikson's (1968) crisis of 'Intimacy versus Distantiation'. Before an individual can give of himself in intimacy (either to an individual or to a job) he must have developed a sense of identity. Without this his individuality is apt to be lost in his union with the other. Levinson et al. (1978) found that most men were not ready in their twenties to make enduring inner commitments to a wife and family and were not capable of highly loving and intimate commitments. According to Jung (1954) men and women at this age have not consciously incorporated their own opposite sex characteristics, tending instead to relate to them in projection upon their

mate. Since their mate is clouded in the projection which may closely resemble a parental figure, the man or woman is unable to relate to the actual spouse behind the projection. It is not until later when the projections are withdrawn and one's own identity is more fully known that true intimacy can be attained.

The desire for intimacy but fear of loss of self is seen in two impulses which Sheehy (1974) sees at work during this stage. One is the urge to build a safe structure for the future through strong commitments; the other is the urge to explore, keeping any structure tentative. Men who follow the first impulse completely accept the 'system' -- becoming good at following rules, anxious for promotion, but are poor at self reflection (Valliant & McArthur, 1973). Rather than question their marriage and career choices, they are content to live in an atmosphere of self deception. The transients who exclusively follow the impulse to explore tend to live a fragmented and chaotic existence moving from one cause to another unable to invest too much of themselves in any one of them. If they did, self reflection which they are trying to avoid, might be required. Unfortunately, if an individual does not at least make a provisional commitment in the twenties or at the latest the mid-thirties, his opportunity for change and growth later on will be gravely stunted (Levinson et al., 1974; Sheehy, 1974). The difficulty with both of these patterns is that they are devoid of self reflection. To win acceptance by a spouse or employer, the young adult creates a socially acceptable persona which requires repression or rejection of many aspects of himself. A man may repress his sensitivity to others in order to advance in the work world. A woman may accept her spouse's need for a nurturing mother substitute to the detriment of her assertive logical capabilities that would enable her to thrive in the work

world. Repression of characteristics in one's self often leads to condemnation of others who dare to exert the same traits (Jung, 1959; Erikson, 1968; Levinson, 1978). Through such processes the individual becomes increasingly estranged from his inner self. It is only when the individual feels sufficiently strong in his own identity, that he can question that identity, accept the previously unknown parts, and accept those parts in others. This typically is an outgrowth of the middle age crisis.

Levinson (1974) has observed three major patterns in coping with the tasks remaining from the twenties: (A) In the most frequent pattern a man makes a provisional occupational commitment during his twenties. In the interval from 28 to 32 he enters a transitional period in which he must decide whether to make a deeper commitment or to make a change before it's too late. Most decide to stay in the original occupation, marry or reaffirm the existing marriage and enter the next phase of 'Settling Down'. (B) Some men at 30 decide that the original occupational choice is too constraining, that it is beyond their capabilities, or most importantly, that it is a betrayal of an earlier dream which must now be pursued. In these cases a career change occurs at about 30. If the sense of betrayal of a dream is not faced now, it may reoccur at the 40-year crisis. (C) The third pattern is that of the transient in the twenties who, feeling the need for stability, tries to settle down as he nears 30.

Sheehy (1974, 1976) and Levinson et al. (1978) elaborate upon the 28 to 33-year-old stage as the 'Age Thirty Transition'. As they approach 30, both men and women seem to sense an impatience with their narrowness, a sense of being restricted, and wanting to break out. Sixty two percent of the men in Levinson et al.'s study (1978) went through a moderate or severe crisis at this time. If involved in a career, a woman may want to have children. If in graduate school, a man may sense an overwhelming

desire to get into his profession. A common pattern is the tearing up of the life established in the twenties. This often involves a divorce and/or serious evaluation of the marriage. The marriage is frequently in what Sheehy has termed a 'Catch-30' condition. When the typical couple marries in their early twenties, the wife decides to stay home and have children and the man enters the career world where by the time he is 30 he begins to feel competent as an acknowledged adult. In the early years of the marriage, his needs for substitute mother figure were met by his wife, but as he nears 30 his increased sense of his own ability leads him to desire more of a companion than a child and mother figure. While he wants a companion, his desire for nurturance keeps him from allowing his wife complete freedom to develop her own. While this battle goes on within the male, his wife is going through her own 30-year crisis. As part of the earlier plans she was to be a mother and didn't have to get out in the world. She could follow her own mother's pattern. Besides, she hasn't had the experience in the outside world and feels uneasy about joining it. As long as she ignores the impulses to broaden she can retreat into her illusions of safety and a happy life as a woman at home. She senses a backlash from her spouse were she to give in to her inclinations to live a more expansive life, and so retreats into the home trying to take him with her. He feels trapped. The nuturant home is no longer a safe place but a danger to his growth. Levinson (Sheehy, 1976) surmises that the personality integration of a woman in her twenties is not sufficient to enable her to successfully incorporate both the domestic and extrafamilial occupational responsibilities at that time. This combination becomes possible in the thirties but the woman needs her husband's help with the household tasks. Without his help the woman's need for

expansion will either go unrealized or marital conflict may ensue. The older woman who experiences the same frustration may be able to take advantage of her urge to grow because of the lessening of home responsibilities that comes as the children leave home. Even if the wife does individuate during the 30-year transition, it takes time. According to Levinson, the earlier stages of getting into the adult world can not be skipped. The marriage is in a 'Catch-30' condition. The unsynchronized rhythm of development in the two sexes may bring the marriage to a point of crisis frequently resulting in divorce (Jung, 1954; Sheehy, 1974).

In the early thirties the man enters what Levinson et al. (1974, 1978) call the stage of 'Settling Down'. This stage continues until the late thirties or early forties. The man makes deeper commitments to his work and family thus providing himself with a sense of order, stability, and control. At the same time he establishes a timetable for his major goals. The focus is on external goals and as a number of investigators have noted, many men's lives become very boring (Keen, 1976; Sheehy, 1974; Valliant & McArthur, 1973). The settled down structure can not last. It is based upon illusions--illusions about the importance of one's goals, the happiness making it in the work world will bring, the delights and fulfillment of marriage and family, and the autonomous independent nature of one's life. No one can enter the adult world without certain assumptions about the nature and meaning of the career and family roles he or she will hold. But by 35 or so, the contradictions between the subjective assumptions and the external facts begin to emerge (Jung, 1960). The structure developed in 'Settling Down' does not reflect all of oneself.

Somewhere in the mid to late thirties the man realizes that regardless of his accomplishments to this point, he is not in all senses of the word his own man. The substage Levinson et al. call 'Becoming One's Own Man'

begins. The man typically feels a sense of constraint both in work and marriage. An important force in his career has frequently been a colleague eight to 15 years his elder who served as an experienced and much appreciated co-worker and model when the younger man began in the occupational world. As the young man increases in competence becoming more equal with the mentor, a break in the relationship will occur. Termination of the relationship is often bitter with the younger man accusing the elder of being destructively critical and attempting to make him over in the elder's image rather than encouraging his individual growth. For women the problem of a mentor is a difficult one. There are very few professional women who feel strong enough vis à vis men that they could take on the role of mentor. Unfortunately the relationship between male mentors and women frequently gets stalled by the male's depreciation of the woman as a potential equal solely because of her sex. Those women who do have good mentors have similar problems terminating the relationships. With the break of this valued relationship, the man or woman may be ready to move on to become a mentor for others (Levinson et al. 1978; Sheehy, 1976). Levinson et al. (1974) suggest that becoming a mentor may be of crucial importance in initiating and working on Erikson's crisis of 'Generativity versus Stagnation'. No longer is the individual content to be the promising young novelist; he now wants to be the established writer in his own right. No longer is he growing up. He is growing old. During this stage the man desperately seeks affirmation of his most valued roles. There is typically some key event, for example a promotion, which carries for him the message of affirmation or devaluation by society. For the woman, whether she has chosen to be at home or in the outside world, there are the beginnings of the realization that time is rapidly waning in which she can develop the side of her life that has been put aside. As these

feelings and events become solidified, the man or woman enters the stage of crucial concern for the present research--the 'Mid-Life Transition' (or as frequently called the mid-life crisis).

The 'Mid-Life Transition' is a developmental transition between two relatively stable stages of 'Settling Down' and 'Restabilization' in middle adulthood. For women this period is likely to begin around age 35 and for men around 40 (Sheehy, 1976). Whether an individual is affirmed in the previous stage or not, the crisis is likely to occur. An individual may achieve success but experience it as hollow. He did what he was told would bring rewards. He reached the goal but the promised illusion of happiness did not result (Keen, 1976). The matter of crucial importance here is the "goodness of fit between the life structure and the self" (Levinson et al., 1974, p. 254). The life cycle (Erikson, 1976) tends to round itself out as a coherent experience. If this is so, there is a need for concordance between one's earlier dreams and where one sees himself at middle age. If this is not possible, goals may need to be reformulated so there can be a better fit between goals, dreams, and reality. In making the choices required for settling down, certain values, character traits, etc. were either consciously or unconsciously rejected or left dormant. These excluded components of the self demand to be heard (Jung, 1960; Levinson et al., 1978). The young adult in his twenties and early thirties is so busy establishing a family and his niche in the work world that he (really) doesn't take stock of what he is doing and why (Jacques, 1965; LeShan, 1973). In joining the adult world, the youth fits himself into whatever pattern is valued at the time. He denies the other aspects of himself and lives under the illusion that he is living an autonomous life based upon his own independently developed belief system. In reality he is as noted earlier, very much the product demanded by his environment

for success (LeShan, 1973).

Middle age is a time when the incomplete identity crisis of adolescence demands completion (Rogers, 1973; LeShan, 1973). It is not always the contradictions between preconceptions about adult roles and reality of them that brings on reevaluation, but there seems in addition to be a deep seated change in the psyche that demands that the characteristics of self that have been denied or repressed be acknowledged and incorporated as part of the conscious whole. The process of incorporation of these traits to form a more complete identity is called the process of individuation (Jung, 1961). According to Levinson et al. (1978) the possibility of initiating individuation begins in the 'Age 30 Transition' but the ego strength is often unequal to the task and therefore the individual forfeits the opportunity to face himself, his illusions and limitations until the 'Mid-Life Transition'. For eighty percent of Levinson et al.'s middle aged subjects confrontations with the unexplored dimensions of their lives were experiences which reached crisis proportions. Such dimensions can be spoken off in terms of opposites. One pole is that which is known; the other that which is unknown or repressed. The opposites are not, as commonly thought in young adulthood, mutually exclusive. They can be combined in a dynamic tension which is experienced as a unity within one's being. Four pairs of opposites were common among Levinson et al.'s subjects: (A) Young/Old: Young symbolizes growth and possibility. Old symbolizes death and wisdom; (B) Destruction/Creation: Not only does one have the power to create but in creating one has also destroyed, perhaps causing more harm than good; (C) Masculine/Feminine: Individuals have within themselves the capacity for the opposite sex characteristics. Incorporation of such traits is a primary task of the middle adult years. Theoretically this process would

lead to a more androgynous perception of one's own sex role. Neugarten (1968) has found that by old age women are more tolerant of their aggressive, egocentric impulses and men are more accepting of their nurturant, affiliative desires; (D) Attachment/Separation: To be attached is to be engaged with the external world. Separation refers to an individual who is primarily involved in their inner world. The ramifications of these basic conflicts will be evident as the present discussion of the characteristics of the 'Mid-Life Transition' continues.

Just as old age demands a life review (Butler, 1968), the onset of middle age does likewise. No longer does the individual look on his life as time since birth, but instead life is measured by the time left to live (Neugarten, 1968). It is the sense of the finiteness of life bounded by death that requires the middle aged adult to stop and reflect upon the meaning of his own existence (Fried, 1976; Jacques, 1965). Generally as the person ages, preoccupation with the inner life increases although adaptation appears to remain relatively stable (Neugarten, 1964). The attempt to come to terms with one's own aging and death is the attempt to incorporate the old pole of the Young/Old pair of opposites. The exploration of the inner world exemplifies the middle aged adult's confrontation with the separateness pole of the Attachment/Separation dimension. During the middle adult years the quality and content of work changes. In the twenties and early thirties creative works seem to come with an intensity and spontaneity as if ready made. With the onset of middle age the inspiration may be just as intense, but the product comes as a sculpted, worked, and reworked product. Radical desire and the impatience of young adulthood are replaced by a much more philosophical nature. For some the 'Mid-Life Transition' is not bridged and creativity dies. For those who

do pass through the crisis, working through the inevitability of one's own death brings a deepened awareness of self and acceptance of one's own and others' shortcomings. There is a constructive resignation to the fact that goals may not be met and a sense that life will go on and that one's life will continue through his works and his loved ones, if not through immortality (Jacques, 1965). The caring for others and what will follow one's own death is characteristic of Erikson's crisis of 'Generativity versus Stagnation' (Erikson, 1968).

For men who do face the 'Mid-Life Transition', the crisis tends to peak sometime in the early forties. In the middle forties a stage of 'Restabilization' and concentrated work on generativity begins. Those who don't have a crisis seem to lose the vitality needed for continued development (Levinson et al., 1974, 1978). Sheehy (1976) reports a study with women vice-presidents and presidents that illustrates this loss of vitality. The women in the study had deferred considering the nurturing role until they were 35. At this time, those who allowed themselves to feel the tensions raised by the thought of never experiencing motherhood, gave themselves a moratorium period in their jobs during which they purposively were engaged in more social activities. Those who found someone at this time, married. When they went back to work, the quality of their work experience had changed. They felt happy in their work, not merely satisfied and rewarded. A control group who refused to allow the crisis of incorporating their nurturing side were found to be lonely in their fifties and never reached the same professional heights as the group that allowed themselves to act upon the tensions within.

In addition to the loss of creativity and vitality, refusal to face the mid-life crisis may bring an increase in moral rigidity as one nears

50. It is as though the existence of one's moral principles is endangered if they are questioned. They must therefore be protected all the more (Jung, 1960). The individual who in his forties and fifties refuses to face the crisis may in his later years have to face the inadequacies of the life he has led. But then it will be too late to start again. The 40-year-old still has time to incorporate the unexplored domains. For the 70-year-old going through the life review process, the experience of facing the unknown aspects of one's self for the first time may be devastating (Butler, 1968).

The expression of mature intimacy and the exercise of power in family, work, and community become focal areas of conflict during the 'Mid-Life Transition' (Fried, 1967). No longer is the man the young promising executive, he now assume the roles his parents' generation held. A positive resolution of the crisis of 'Generativity versus Stagnation' demand that one willingly accept the authority appropriate for his age and use it constructively to create, nourish, and insure the future of his children's generation. On the shoulders of the portion of the population from 40 to 60 lies the major responsibility for running the country. While power may be a source of pride, it brings with it the depressing implications of aging. This realization comes even more clearly if a promotion comes with the death or retirement of a member of the previous generation. Given the opportunity for promotion or a change of job, there is often the tendency to feel that one is not yet ready. But if the opportunities are not taken when they occur, stagnation, the negative side of middle age crisis, will result. The transition required here may be more difficult for the woman than for the man. He must adjust to changes in the work world. The woman whose sense of self worth has resolved primarily around her

children, must with their departure begin a whole new way to spend the remaining 30 to 40 years of life. In the present society there are few guidelines to help her. If she refuses to look for meaningful new goals, she like her husband will stagnate (Fried, 1967).

Just as the youth enters his career with false expectations for meaning and happiness, so does he enter marriage. At the time of marriage the individual is not yet completely conscious of himself as an individual apart from the original family. As noted earlier, the young adult usually suppresses his contrasexual side, relating to it primarily in projection upon his spouse. Both the man and the woman must withdraw their projections and the sense of security embodied in them if they are to know their own and their partner's unique selves. When the man enters 'Mid-Life Transition' he seeks affirmation of his newly awakened self. Unless the spouse's stage of development is comparable, communication breaks down. Relating as parent to parent instead of spouse to spouse for the last 20 years may also severely limit the intimacy and depth of understanding present in the husband-wife relationship. Now that the children are or soon will be gone, husband and wife face each other often with the coldness, unfamiliarity, and uncertainty of strangers (Pineo, 1968). If one partner has begun the process of individuation, his new complexity may further confuse the spouse and dampen communication. The need for companionship through the crisis is not met. One may wait for the other to catch up, but frequently the individuating partner turns outside of the marriage (Jung, 1954). Not completely aware of the dimensions of his needs he may focus on the sexual shortcomings of his spouse, or boredom within the marriage, and therefore seek a younger person to fulfill those needs. For a man, his own decrease in sexual vigor (Masters & Johnson,

1974) may also prompt him to look outside the marriage to prove to himself that he is still attractive to younger women (Fried, 1967; Hudson, 1974). A parallel phenomenon occurs in women in their mid to late thirties. No longer preoccupied with childcare; aware that their appearance will soon be failing; at the height of their sexual peak with a husband so tied up in occupational advancement that he comes home with less sexual desire; the woman in her late thirties is at the most common age for infidelity (Sheehy, 1976). Even if the partners do not look outside the marriage, a reaffirmation of that marriage is required. In either case, divorce is often the result. Here divorce is not necessarily a failure but an outgrowth of the increased clarity in personal values. It may represent a courageous attempt to affirm one's ideals (AMA, 1974; LeShan, 1973).

Levinson et al. (1978) tentatively suggest that after 'Restabilization' the middle aged male continues through three additional developmental stages before entering the late adult stages. From 50 to 55 years of age the work of the 'Mid-Life Transition' may be furthered or modified through the 'Age 50 Transition' stage. A second middle adult structure is built in a 55 to 60 year stage analogous to the 'Settling Down' period in the late thirties. Finally from 60 to 65 the 'Late Adult Transition' terminates middle adulthood and begins the late adult stages.

The final life crisis which has been delineated by Erikson (1968, 1976) is that of 'Integrity versus Despair'. Although Erikson's crisis typically begins around 60-years-of-age, this like all his crises, has its beginnings in the earlier stages of development. It is that fact which is of concern here. The possessor of integrity accepts the finiteness of life bounded by death. He senses a comradeship with men and women of different times who have striven to convey human dignity and love. He is aware of

the relativity of all lifestyles but is ready to defend his own. On the other hand, he who is overcome by despair cannot accept his own death and is likely to hide his despair with a show of disgust for others. The 'Lover' in Keen's (1976) terminology is similar to the man of integrity. He knows his own uniqueness but also his oneness and interrelatedness with others. He is at home in the world. His life is not dramatic but tends to be in harmony rather than in conflict with the forces around him. Most who enter this stage are simultaneously in the 'Outlaw' stage. This is Keen's terminology for 'Mid-Life Transition'. In the 'Outlaw' stage the individual demands that he govern his own life; that he decide what is good and evil. He questions his identity and finds within himself a baffling diversity of traits--both good and bad; both under his control and somehow governed by something beyond him. But recognizing the confusing conflicting nature of his own life he is ready to enter the 'Lover' stage where he can accept the oneness with others who also have these traits. The illusions of the absolutist view of my side as good and other ways as evil can no longer be held. For the evil is within me and within those institutions such as marriage and my career which I support (Creation/Destruction polarity). Without the illusions of youth, the middle aged individual can be more accepting of others and himself and with a more realistic vision, can continue adulthood.

The difficulty with all of the stages so far described is that not all people go through them. Many adults do stagnate and are left at the level of growth attained in their thirties--the level characterized by incomplete identity, illusion, and boredom (Levinson et al., 1978; Jung, 1960; Fried, 1967).

Intellectual, Ethical, and Identity Development

Perry (1970) and Marcia (1966) have introduced schemas for understanding psychological growth during the college years. If interpreted as adult developmental processes, these schemas provide a valuable edition to the stages already described.

Perry (1970) traces the intellectual and ethical development of college students through nine positions. The general progression is as follows. The student in the early positions sees the world in terms of absolute right and wrong. We know the right; all others are wrong. The job of authorities is to transmit the right. Where diversity of opinion exists, this is due to poorly qualified authorities. As more diversity is encountered, areas of knowledge are recognized where authorities have not yet found the answer, although the absolute answer does exist. Later on in development the student perceives uncertainty to be extensive and comes to feel that in such areas of uncertainty everyone has a right to his own opinion. He does not realize that although this may be the case, opinions do differ in quality as a function of the logic and available data from which they are derived. There still are areas where absolutes do exist. The student then enters a phase where all knowledge and values including authority's is relative. Later he realizes that while relativity is truely the nature of reality as we know it, one must make some personal commitments to a stand which he can use to orient himself in the relativistic world. The remainder of development consists in making commitments, and refining and revamping those commitments as experience warrants. Clearly not all individuals pass through all the stages. While very little work has been done with adults beyond the college years, it may be the case that the pressures outside of the sheltered college

environment force a reworking and/or deepening of one's position in these stages (Perry, 1976). The young adult who is absorbed in the illusion of his work's importance may have recycled from a more relativistic position in college to a more absolutist position when he became involved in the work world. The middle age man facing the 'Mid-Life Transition' may be entering or reentering a position of acknowledging relativity. As he emerges in 'Restabilization', the adult may for the first time be making a commitment based upon recognition of the relativity of life. Even if the stages are not replayed in adulthood, perhaps Perry's concepts of temporizing, retreat and escape are applicable. Temporizing is a long pause in development. Retreat is a regression to absolutist thinking. Perhaps the young adult finds retreat necessary when faced with the demands of establishing himself in family and work life. Escape is the refusal to recognize the responsibilities required by a relativistic world. This may characterize the transient adult who refuses to make a commitment and settle down. While developed with a college population, Perry's positions clearly describe many individuals in the early adult and mid-life stages.

A similar progression has been proposed by Marcia (1966, 1967, undated manuscript) and by Henry and Renaud (1972) in the form of four ego identity statuses. The achievement of an identity in Marcia's schema requires commitment in the areas of occupation, political ideology, and religious belief and a period of crisis in which active choosing among alternative occupations and beliefs takes place. While developed for adolescent identity formation, the same problems that face the adolescent may face the middle aged adult. It may be that the failure in adolescence to achieve a relatively complete identity in the individual's own terms

necessitates the crisis at middle age. The four identity statuses are: (A) Identity Achieved: The individual after a period of crisis has commited himself to an occupation and a political and a religious ideology while remaining open to change and growth; (B) Moratorium: The individual is in an active process of struggle and is attempting to know the alternatives and make commitments in the areas of occupation, religion, and politics. He however has not yet made a commitment; (C) Foreclosure: The individual typically is committed to the roles and beliefs of his parents having experienced no period of crisis in which questioning and evaluation occurred; (D) Diffusion: The individual has neither struggled nor made a commitment. The four statuses differentiate themselves along the dimensions of commitment/lack of commitment to occupation and political and religious ideologies, and crisis of struggle/lack of struggle with alternative occupations and ideologies. Achieved and foreclosed individuals have made a commitment; the others have not. Achieved and moratorium individuals have struggled; the others have not. Foreclosures are most likely to accept traditional cultural values and endorse authoritarian values (Marcia, 1967; Marcia & Freedman, 1970). The foreclosed student is out of touch with his own feelings, handles difficult situations by conforming, and responds to differences in values as intolerable conflict which must be avoided (Henry & Renaud, 1972). Foreclosed women generally have a high sense of self esteem and low anxiety level probably due to the societal support they receive. Identity achieved women are lower in self esteem probably due to the societal difficulties inherent in breaking with traditional roles (Marcial & Freedman, 1970). Could the general characteristics of foreclosed individuals parallel those of the individual who fails to face the middle age crisis? Is Marcia's

status of 'Moratorium' similar to Levinson et al.'s 'Mid-Life Transition' and could Marcia's status of 'Identity Achievement' be a state similar to Levinson et al.'s 'Restabilization'.

Adult Moral Development

Theory. Investigation and theory concerning moral reasoning in adulthood is limited and for the most part hypothetical in nature. By the age of 32, none of Kohlberg's longitudinal subjects had reached his highest clearly formulated level of moral development (stage 6) and certainly none had reached his newly hypothesized stage 7 (Kohlberg, 1973a). Recent research emphasizing the clarification of personal values during the middle age crisis prompted the current investigation into the role this crisis might have in furthering the growth of moral reasoning in adulthood. In order to determine if this is logically within the framework of Kohlberg's theory, the major points of his theory will be reviewed.

Kohlberg has described seven stages of moral reasoning. He claims that his first six stages form an invariant universal sequence culminating in the formal deontological ethical theory of a stage 6 principled thinker. His theory deals only with the process of moral judgment concerning one's duties and rights with no claims as to ultimate moral aims or personal virtues. As a formalist, Kohlberg believes that there is a prescriptive principle of justice which ought to guide moral decision making (Kohlberg, 1971). Progress through the stages is a function of Piagetian cognitive maturation and role taking experiences. As these change the individual finds himself in situations of moral disequilibrium; this is, the old decision making system is unable to resolve what the individual now sees as conflicting moral claims. For disequilibrium to occur, it seems that it is not enough for the individual

to see a model dealing with a moral conflict; he must deal with the conflict himself. Resolution of the conflict leads to a new stage that can handle more ethical questions and as such is more comprehensive, differentiated, and equilibrated than the prior stage. Each higher stage brings a new understanding of justice whereby each of the conflicting parties agrees that each has been fairly awarded 'his due'. The more heterogeneous one's environment, the more likely disequilibrium and the consequent growth in moral reasoning will occur. These equilibrating assumptions place Kohlberg in line with the formalistic philosophies from Kant to Rawls. Formalists require that rational moral judgments be reversible (fairness as impartiality so that all could agree on the decision), universal (what if everybody used this principle of choice?) and consistent (the same decision would be made in any context). If inequalities must be accepted it is only fair if it is to the advantage of the least advantaged person. Through the process of differentiation and integration of his judgments, the individual may reach stage 6 in which he chooses justice as the consistent, reversible, universal presciptive principle upon which to base his moral decisions (Kohlberg, 1970, 1971, 1973a, 1973c). Because the processes of differentiation and integration of the same moral content are required on both the 'is' side in the process of what it is that necessarily develops as the highest principle of moral judgment and the 'ought' side in the process of philosophical rational justification, Kohlberg (Boyd and Kohlberg, 1973) claims that differentiation and integration span the 'is-ought' gap and allow him to go from his empirical findings to the prescriptive statement of what ought to be the highest moral principle.

A general outline of the stages follows. It should be noted that the first six stages are divided into three levels. The levels separate the stages in terms of three general bases upon which moral judgments are made.

I. Preconventional level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation: Right action consistes of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours", not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyality to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or groups involved in it.

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy--nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently

judged by intention -- "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice".

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion". The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. (Kohlberg, 1973c, pp. 631-632.)

> Stage 7: An attempt to answer the question: Why be moral? A sense of being a part of the whole of life; cosmic rather than universal humanistic perspective of justice; begins with a sense of the finite, meaningless of life in the face of death; resolved by valuing life from the standpoint of the infinite with a sense of the whole and oneself as part of the whole; no single stage 7 structure. (Adapted from Kohlberg, 1973b.)

In addition to the above stages, a reanalysis of 1969 (Kohlberg & Kramer) data necessitated the formulation of a Stage 4B (Kohlberg, 1973a). In the 1969 data, longitudinal subjects who had scored as a stage 4-5 mixture in high school appeared to retreat to a stage 2 in their college years. Upon further analysis the quality of their responses was found to differ from stage 2 individuals thus requiring that a transitional stage 4B be devised. The developmental challenges to which these students were responding were the relativity of moral expectations and opinions and the gap between conventional moral expectations and the behavior they observed in the college environment (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Like a stage 2 individual, the stage 4B student asserted that the morally right is relative to the actor's wishes or needs and requires no further validity. But unlike stage 2, the reasoning for the relativity resulted from a questioning of the validity of social norms (Kohlberg, 1973a).

Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969) found that most adult females stabilize in stage 3 and males stabilize in stage 4 presumably because stage 3 is functional for women but not for men. Subjects at lower stages (1-3) often continued to develop to stage 4 between 16 and 24 years with stabilization occurring among the higher stage subjects. This led to the conclusion that adult development is primarily the dropping out of lower stages rather than the progression to new ones. According to Kohlberg, principled morality is an adult development not reached until at least the late twenties. Progression through the preconventional and

conventional levels during childhood and adolescence does not require a great deal of personal experience, but is based primarily upon cognitive conflict (Kohlberg, 1973a). Unlike the first two levels, principled thinking is not merely a more adequate perception of what the system is but is a postulation of principles concerning what ought to be. The principled thinker sees the basis for committing himself to a society in which he consistently acts according to these principles. Principled morality requires the sense of equal justice as a universal human ethic governing all action (Kohlberg, 1970). The individual whose moral reasoning is based upon the principle of justice cannot limit his reasoning to that which best describes the system operating in his own environment but must move beyond the conventional to his internally derived principles. Two personal experieces which typically do not occur until early adulthood, seem to be important in the movement to principled morality: (A) experience of the relativistic college atmosphere, moratotium, and identity questioning together with stimulation to cognitive moral reflection; and the (B) experience of anticipated and later actual sustained irreversible responsibility for the welfare of others (Kohlberg, 1973a). Successful methods of moving subjects through the moral stages have failed to move students into the principled level until they reach college (Boyd, reported in Kohlberg, 1973a). Identity questioning and commitment to responsibility for others does not guarantee principled thinking. Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) report Podd's dissertation analysis of the relationship between Marcia's ego statuses and moral stages. Two-thirds of those in principled stages were in the achieved status. Forty percent of those in conventional stages had an achieved identity and sixty percent were primarily in a foreclosed identity status.

Critisms of Kohlberg's theory. In evaluating the results of research employing Kohlberg's moral dilemmas it is important to be aware of the criticisms other investigators and theoreticians are making of Kohlberg's schema. Such criticisms may add insights which can be of assistance in accurately interpreting the data. The following discussion reviews the criticisms which are relevant for the current study.

Kohlberg's assertion that his theory stems from the cognitive structural model of Jean Piaget has opened him to a barrage of criticism from his reviewers. John Gibbs (1977, 1979) states that Kohlberg's claims that his stages satisfy the Piagetian stage criteria are accurate only with regard to the first four moral stages. Piaget advocates the naturalistic argument that cognitive (and therefore moral) stages are an expression of a sequential, unconscious developmental process which occurs universally throughout the species. Gibbs notes that Kohlberg is implicit but not explicit about following the universal and unconscious criteria. Piaget states that mental behavior consists of structures at all levels of development which are constantly under construction as a function of biological maturation and interaction with the environment. If ethical statements are to follow this theory, the moral structures would relate holistically rather than existing as an accumulation of discrete virtures. Role taking opportunities would be the moral development requirement paralleling the cognitive developmental need for interaction with the environment. The upward movement through the stages would be gradual and consecutive with no instances of regression. Development would be accelerated in a rich environment. Each of these characteristics can be verified in the preconventional and conventional levels of moral development. (See Holstein below for a criticism of the consecutive criterion). The metaethical principled stages, however, appear to fall under an existential

rather than a naturalistic psychological theme. Instead of the progression occurring unconsciously, the principled stages require an awareness of self and an effort to come to terms with that awareness. Kohlberg (1973a) says that the principled stages require a specific questioning of ethics from a position outside of society. Cross cultural studies have failed to find much evidence of principled thinking in primitive cultures. Failure of the naturalistic and universal criteria bring into question whether or not stages 5 and 6 satisfy the Piagetian requirements. It is not clear that stages 5 and 6 override 3 and 4 in the same way that a person at stage 3 or 4 would no longer use 1 or 2 stage thinking. Stages 3 and 4 are useful adult stages for conducting everyday affairs. Gibbs notes that when faced with a life vs. property conflict, the same patriotic Soviet scientist who uses stage 4 on a daily basis, may show principled thinking. Such a finding violates the hierarchical requirements of the Piagetian scheme.

Kohlberg's (1973a) finding of regression among his principled high school students to a stage 2, only to return to a stage 5 later, calls into question Kohlberg's claim to an invariant sequential stage progression (Gibbs, 1977, 1979). Even if one revamps the scoring system to include a 4B, regression has still occurred. If moral stage progression requires a change in the underlying cognitive structures, Kohlberg runs into difficulties with the principled stages (Gibbs, 1979). Stage 5 can be aligned with a third stage of formal operations, but there is no corresponding cognitive stage to parallel stage 6. Flavell (cited in Gibbs, 1979) feels that the uniformity and inevitability of change in a certain direction must be limited to the childhood and adolescent stages. It is only in these years that the biological maturation of the nervous system which would allow for mental changes is occurring. Given the above considerations, Gibbs (1979) hypothesizes that it is necessary to separate Kohlberg's

moral stages into two phases: a standard phase which incorporates the Piagetian based naturalistic preconventional and conventional levels; and an existential phase which applies to the principled level.

Other investigators have questioned Kohlberg's claim for the cross cultural universality of his six stage sequence (eg. Simpson, 1974). Kohlberg has tested subjects in at least nine cultures using modified moral dilemmas but he has scored them with the standard scoring manual. Cultural differences in the comprehension and meaning of the situations tested in the dilemmas and the varying cultural perceptions of the right to life and property call into suspect any conclusions such studies may have reached. Simpson urges that rather than accept large number of humanity as morally deficient, it may be preferable to ask if the same paradigm is applicable cross culturally. Simpson feels that whether there is thinking at the principled level in other cultural groups is still open to question.

In a related vein, Sullivan (1977) accuses Kohlberg of adopting a modified natural law theory in which the conception of justice rests on a model in which justice is disinterested, abstract, formal, ideal, and universal. In Rawls' 'original position', justice is derived from an ideal state in which persons of equal status knowing nothing of their position in a society of the future, must form a compact concerning the rules which would govern that society. According to Rawls, the most logical decision on which to base their rules is the principle of justice as fairness. Kohlberg concurs with this position. The determination of morality, independent of contingent motives such as affect, represents for Sullivan a blatant distortion of man in his totality. Man comes into a world which is already in momentum and into a society which molds him

before he is able to choose. The liberal conception of man making choices in an a-historical society is more ambiguous than universal. This man to which they allude is highly intellectual, analytical, and rational but is devoid of affect. He is a nonentity. If Kohlberg is claiming that higher order moral decisions require this man in the role of an impartial judge, his theory is cultually biased. Only in western culture could this phenomenon be widely present. Sullivan proclaims what he feels is a more universal ethic: instead of becoming more detached from one's own attachments, one should see their full force and acknowledge their limitations. One would then be able to realize the limitations of others' views but also their worth in giving a fuller glimpse of the whole of moral truth.

In critizing Kohlberg, it must always be kept in mind that he is espousing a theory of moral obligations and duties. He is consistently reprimanded for failing to include affect, virtues, habits, conscience, ultimate religious meaning etc. in his theory (Alston, 1971; Aron, 1977; Friquegnon, in press; Peters, 1971, 1975). Kohlberg (Boyd & Kohlberg, 1973) realizes that no matter how thoroughly one analyzes the facts of a moral conflict, it is not until a part of the self is added that an internal sense of moral ought emerges. While Kohlberg recognizes that more than the rational is included in morality, he has chosen to limit his studies to the deontological (rights and duties) and should not be criticized for this. Criticism should be directed to those aspects of his deontological theory which are inadequately or erroneously developed. Criticism regarding the lack of an affective component is only merited when the affective is conceived as a crucial part of the decision making process (Sullivan, 1977) rather than as another aspect of morality which could be incorporated without altering Kohlberg's basic premises (Alston,

1971).

Findings by Holstein (1976) and Gilligan (1977) indicate that not only is Kohlberg's theory culturally biased, it may also show sex-related biases. Holstein found that subjects do tend to progress in an invariant sequence from level to level but that stages within the levels tend to be skipped as a function of sex. The bias lies in the subordinational of stage 3 (interpersonal concordance) to stage 4 (law and order). Women's morality seems to be closely tied to the issues of responsibility and care (Gilligan, 1977). They are therefore more likely to be found in stage 3. Males are often uncomfortable in such a role and so have tended to more rapidly progress to stage 4. These findings have in the past been interpreted in terms of the moral inferiority of women. Holstein found that females tended to move from stage 2 to 3 and then to 5; whereas males moved from 1 or 2 to 4 and then to 5. This indicates that stages 3 and 4 may be parallel rather than sequential in nature. In addition to the sex-related biases which contradict the universality assumptions, such data also challenges the Piagetian requirement that the stages be found in an invariant sequence.

Failure of Kohlberg's principled stages to resist regression poses a severe test to its assumed foundations in Piagetian theory. Murphy and Gilligan (1980) counter Gibbs assertion that moral development which is based upon cognitive change stops in late adolescence. They hypothesize instead a cognitive transformation at that time. Inspired by Perry's (1970) finding that adults move from formalistic to contextual relativistic thought to making a commitment in a relativistic world, Murphy and Gilligan investigated the possibility that such a formulation could explain the regression findings in the Kohlberg data. Murphy and Gilligan

note that Piaget found that with maturation there was an increase in relativity and contextual judgments leading to a more refined sense of justice. These notions have never been incorporated into Kohlberg's higher stage definitions. As an outgrowth of their data, Murphy and Gilligan propose that the problem with the Kohlberg scoring manual is the failure to recognize that there are two kinds of relativism, each standing in a different relationship to principled thought. The first is Perry's position 4, relativistic multiplicity, in which the individual recognizes that there may be many answers to a moral problem but that he has no way of choosing among them. This corresponds to Kohlberg's 4B. The second form of relativism is Perry's position 5, contextual relativism, in which the individual realizes that no answer is objectively right for all contexts, but some answers and ways of thinking are better than others. Position 5 implies the ethical responsibility compatible with principled stage 5 thinking. It is however relativistic and context dependent--characteristics Kohlberg has not allowed into his formalistic system (Kohlberg, 1971). Kohlberg has confused contextual relativism for regression in order to maintain a context free principle of justice as the only basis for the highest moral thinking.

Murphy and Gilligan propose a two category typology for postconventional thinking: Postconventional formal in which moral solutions are derived from formal criteria such as social contract (stage 5) and justice (stage 6); and Postconventional contextual in which social contract or justice is seen as only one among several potential decision making guides depending upon the context. In the postconventional contextual mode, the individual bears personal responsibility for the consequences of his choices in the same situation. Incorporation of these ideas into

Kohlberg's schema would allay the criticisms of many who reject Kohlberg's theory because of its formalistic orientation. It would also solve the problem of regression. Those adolescents who scored as principled but then seeing shades of grey became less absolutist, would remain in the postconventional level rather than regress to conventional 4B thinking.

Kohlberg's attempt to bridge the gap between the 'is' of empirically observed behavior and the 'ought' of formalist ethical philosophy has incited the criticism of those who feel that one can not go from developmental facts to moral philosophy or that one can not assume that one principle, justice, can serve as the universally highest principle of moral choice. While Kohlberg (1971) realizes that his arguments are not completely successful, he feels that philosophical analysis should take into account the empirical facts his moral investigations have produced. One possible fallacy is that because he refuses to allow relativistic contextual viewpoints to be included in his postconventional stages, he has eliminated the possibility that developmentally something other than justice could emerge as an advanced basis for moral judgment. His insistence upon the rational as the primary mode of judgment limits his view of Sullivan's universal ethic (1977) but it does give him a system through which he can progressively arrive at a most adaptive moral judgment. Kohlberg claims that justice is the highest principle because it is the only principle for solving moral conflicts of obligation which men would want to adopt in all situations (1971). Kohlberg maintains that denial of justice as the highest principle is denial of a formal deontologial concept of morality rather than an assertion that another principle would be better. His claim that the higher, more differentiated, and integrated stages are more morally adequate and therefore parallel to rational philosophically generated principles, is questionable given indications that his stages

are neither universal nor sequentially invariant. His assertion that stage 6 subjects are better able to consistently make moral judgments may be true because the principle of justice does provide a guide for their behavior. But the ability to resolve all conflicts does not necessarily make stage 6 morally superior (Friquegnon, in press). Neither does that ability mean that their judgments are more moral than those of Murphy and Gilligan's (1980) postconventional contextual subjects who were also capable of meta-ethical reflective thinking but chose not to accept one principle as the determiner of their moral judgments. Aron (1977) questions Kohlberg's statement that higher stages are better because they represent a more differentiation and integration are so narrow that their standing as independent criteria are questionable. Why, asks Aron, is it more rational to consider the intrinsic value of life or the social contract rather than another criterion before making a judgment. Why should higher stage differentiation be that of the separation of life from property or obligation from sentiment. This may be a bogus criticism for both the social contract and property require life to have any meaning and as such would be subordinate to it in value. If Aron is correct, his doubts may be significant for it is the criteria of differentiation and integration on both sides of the 'is-ought' gap which form the bridge between the developmental facts and the philosophical oughts. Friquegnon (in press) questions the use of justice rather than Hume's idea of benevolence as the highest principle. Kohlberg (1971) counters that concern for the welfare of others is required before one can experience a moral conflict. But it is not a means of solving conflict. It is possible as Simpson (1974) suggests that stage 6 thinkers are not really as autonomous and culture free as Kohlberg maintains. They may

instead be responding to a subculture of intellectual elites rather than to the cultural majority. This would coincide with the criticism that stage 6 subjects are just more verbally facile (Friquegnon, in press; Simpson, 1974). It is true that principled subjects are better educated than conventional ones (Kohlberg, 1973a), but the scoring system requires a conceptual match between the subjects statements and a written example. It is unlikely that the subject's verbal facility would cause a great deal of scorer bias (Scoring Manual, 1976).

Kurtines and Grief (1974) are the primary source of criticism of Kohlberg's measurement techniques. The first part of their article criticizes the procedure and tools used in administering moral judgment interviews. Most of their arguments are outdated and do not apply to the revised scoring manuals (Scoring Manual, 1975, 1976). In the 1976 edition, for example, there are only two interview forms each composed of three dilemmas. This relieved the time problem of administering nine dilemmas and encourages investigators to use the entire interview. The scoring system is considerably easier than the 30 moral aspect system they describe. The investigator groups the subject's responses into six moral issues and then compares them to the examples in the Scoring Manual in order to obtain a stage score on each issue. The one major problem is scorer bias. This can not be avoided in the process of comparing the subject's responses to those in the manual. It is however reduced by the criterion of strict correspondence between the subject and the manual. If the subject's response is at all ambiguous, it receives a lesser weight in the scoring process. The final score is not a single stage but a moral maturity score which indicates the extent to which the

subject's responses fit a single stage or overlap with adjoining stages. The criticism that the main characters are all male, no longer applies. If in a given study, half of the subjects are given each of the two forms, the number of male and female characters will be approximately the same. The observation that the scale is prone to subject-interviewer interaction biases can not be helped except by having more than one interviewer per subject. More damaging criticisms involve the reliability and validity of the scales. According to Kurtiness and Grief there were at the time of writing no reported reliability estimates of the scale. The reader is encouraged to turn to the method section for a description of reliability studies on the Kohlberg scoring system. There is minimal data concerning the predictive validity from moral stage to behavior, but it is not sufficient to claim a strong judgment-action correlation (Aron, 1977). There is also no clear evidence supporting the assumption of sequential invariance and as shown earlier there is evidence that this assumption may be incorrect.

The above criticisms of Kohlberg's theory and research influence the possible interpretations of data derived from the current research. If crisis promotes moral development toward Kohlberg's postconventional stages, the effects might be enhanced or clarified by incorporation of contextually relative thinkers into the postconventional level. It could be that subjects who choose to use justice as a criterion in responding to Kohlberg's dilemmas, thought of justice as only one of a number of criteria which could be chosen depending upon the context. Those who used another meta-ethical criterion would not be distinguished in the data from lower level thinkers. It would be interesting to know whether or not a crisis diminished one's certainty that any one principle could be

relied upon in decision making. The question of whether justice is necessarily the highest 'ought' may mean that subjects who had grown morally through their crisis experiences but had either chosen a different criterion or a contextually relative one would not be discovered by their responses to the dilemmas. The findings that stages 3 and 4 may be parallel rather than sequential could alter the interpretation of any sex related differences in moral growth. Clarification of Kohlberg's theory as solely relating to questions of rights and duties restricts the tendency to assume that a higher stage necessitates more moral behavior. In so doing it explains any glaring discrepancies between a subject's life story and his moral maturity score. The failure to prove universality restricts the findings of the present study to western societies. Failure of the regression criterion and the consequent possibility of two phases of moral thought--the standard and the existential--help to clarify the past findings of the necessity of a college education among principled thinkers. College may be a main road to abstract reflective thinking. It may also be important in alerting individuals to the relativity of values. As such college may also be highly associated with contextual relativistic thought. The importance of considering the criticisms of Kohlberg's system is evident from the above possible implications those criticisms may have in understanding the data resulting from the present research.

Hypotheses

With the possibility of adult development reopened, the question arises as to whether the experience of a crisis in adulthood constitutes a source of sufficient disequilibrium to motivate an individual to progress to the principled level of moral reasoning. For the purpose of the

present research a crisis must have affected a central component of an individual's life structure. That is, the pattern of roles and meanings which provide stability for his life must have been seriously threatened. The crisis must have been of sufficient magnitude that in order to internally resolve its implications for his life the subject would have to risk the possibility of a moderate to drastic change in his life style. A crisis subject in the present study need not have taken that risk. It was hypothesized that a crisis of that degree would particularly for college educated subjects, provide the impetus for the significant identity questioning required by Kohlberg as a prerequisite for principled morality. The crisis experience would thus lead to more principled thinking than in subjects without such an experience. It was also hypothesized that the crisis would encourage self reflection in other areas of the subjects' lives thus leading to more achieved identities in crisis subjects. In addition to the major hypotheses it was predicted that the self reflection generated by the crisis would encourage the confrontation of opposites described by Levinson et al. (1978) as so central to the tasks of the 'Mid-Life Transition'. In particular, it was hypothesized that subjects who had experienced a crisis would be more androgynous in their self perceptions as a result of incorporation of their contrasexual characteristics. It was hypothesized that incorporation of the separateness pole of the Attachment/Separation dimension would be evident in a higher degree of intrinsic religiosity among crisis subjects. To determine if the effects of crisis were specific to the middle adult years young adult crisis and young adult noncrisis control groups were included. It was predicted that the growth producing effects of a crisis would be greater for the more internally looking middle aged adult than for the more

externally directed young adult. It also was hypothesized that in some cases the accumulation of life experiences by middle age would substitute for the necessity of college as a prerequisite for principled moral thought. For most subjects, however, this educational requirement would be necessary.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were obtained through newspaper ads, personal referrals, and organizations such as Parents Without Partners in the Fargo, North Dakota, Moorhead, Minnesota, community. The newspaper ads asked for individuals in the 25 to 35 and 40 to 55 year age ranges who would take part in research on middle age crisis. Each subject was paid ten dollars for participating. Subjects were divided into young adult and middle age adult crisis and noncrisis groups following an oral interview centering on the subjects' major life events and the ways they perceived and dealt with those events. Crisis was defined in accordance with the definition given in the hypotheses section above. A total of 99 subjects were interviewed and tested with a final sample of 80 being used in the research. Some of the 19 extra subjects were tested only because a commitment had been made to see them, even though by the time of the interview they were no longer needed. Others whose crisis/noncrisis status was unclear from the initial telephone contact were tested only to find that they did not meet the criteria of the group they were intended to fill. Middle aged noncrisis college educated men were difficult to find. By this time in their lives many men of this age and education are currently in or have been through a time of significant questioning and evaluation of their lives. As noted above,

subjects were divided into four experimental groups. Each was composed of 10 males and 10 females. The four groups and the mean ages of the subjects within the groups were as follows: (A) Young adult crisis, ages 25-35, mean age 29.9 years; (B) Middle age crisis, ages 40-58, mean age 48.9 years; (C) Young adult noncrisis, ages 26-34, mean age 29.9 years; (D) Middle age noncrisis, ages 41-59, mean age 47.6 years. Within each sex subgroup, half of the subjects had completed a four year college degree and half had not. (See Figure 1 for clarification of the research design.)

Instruments

Each subject completed a modified version of the Life-Change Scale (Rahe, McKean, and Arthur, 1967); the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974); Hoge's (1972) Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale; an oral interview concerning the subject's life history with particular emphasis upon adult crisis events; an oral interview based upon a modified version of Marcia's (undated manuscript) oral and written Ego Identity Status questionnaires; and Kohlberg's standard moral dilemmas (Kohlberg et al., 1975, 1976).

The Life Change Scale was originally intended as a measure of the subjects' experience of crises in their lives. The scale (see Appendix A, Life Events) lists a number of significant life changes and is scaled according to the degree of adjustment required in coping with each change. The scale was developed as a means of predicting illness for military men as a function of the accumulated experience of life changes in the previous year. The items listed had to be slightly modified to be applicable to the current subject population. In addition to noting which events had happened since age 20 for the young adults and since age 35 for the middle age adults, the subjects were asked to rate on a 1 to 7

scale the extent of the impact they perceived the events to have had on their lives. Each subject was to receive a score composed of the sum of each of the impact scores multiplied by its respective adjustment score. The original intent was to place subjects in crisis or noncrisis groups as a function of their placement above or below the median of all the scores in their age/sex/education group. The Life Change Scale was rapidly seen to be inadequate for the present study. Subjects had experienced personal tragedies, frequently in health related areas which were not even tapped by the scale. The subjects' 1 to 7 impact score did not always coincide with the life story that unfolded in the course of the interview. In testing the subjects it quickly became apparent that they could be quite easily differentiated in terms of whether or not they had experienced a crisis event which touched and had the possibility of transforming a central aspect of their lives. (See hypotheses for a full definition of a crisis). The subjects continued to fill out the Life Change Scale but it became a springboard for discussion of the subjects' life events rather than the primary means of assigning them to crisis or noncrisis groups. The experimenter would ask the subjects to give a brief overview of their lives. Then she would ask for an elaboration of events marked on the scale. The experimenter would often probe to determine the subjects' evaluation of how the crisis events had affected their feelings and attitudes about life. The goal of the questioning was to determine whether or not the event had had a major impact upon a central component of the life structures such that the subjects' previously stable roles and assumptions had been seriously challenged. The subjects were also encouraged to discuss events not covered by the Life Change

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:				DEPENDENT VARIABLES:
CRISIS/NONCRISIS (determined by interview)	AGE	SEX	EDUCATION	ALL SUBJECTS RECEIVED:
CRISIS (40)*	Young Adult (20)	Female (10)	Noncollege (5)	1. Life-Change Scale (Rahe et at. 1967)
			College (5)	2. Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974)
		Male (10)	Noncollege (5)	3. Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale (Hoge, 1972)
			College (5)	4. Ego Identity Status Questionnaire (Marcia, undated manuscript)
	Middle Age Adult (20)	Female (10)	Noncollege (5)	5. Kohlberg's Standard Moral Dilemmas (Kohlberg et al., 1975, 1976)
			College (5)	
		Male (10)	Noncollege (5)	
			College (5)	
NONCRISIS (40)	Young Adult (20)	Female (10)	Noncollege (5)	
			College (5)	
		Male (10)	Noncollege (5)	
			College (5)	
	Middle Age Adult (20)	Female (10)	Noncollege (5)	
			College (5)	
		Male (10)	Noncollege (5)	
			College (5)	

* Number of subjects

Fig. 1. Research Design

Scale. The experimenter used the subjects' elaboration of their life events and the emotional intensity of the description of the impact of those events to place subjects into crisis or noncrisis categories. Sixteen subjects representing each of the crisis/age/sex/education subgroups were evaluated independently by an second judge to determine the inter-rater reliability of the crisis versus noncrisis placement. An inter-rater reliability of 100% was found.

The Bem Sex Role Inventory was used to determine the subjects' self perceptions of their own androgyny (See Appendix A, Self Description). The Inventory is composed of 20 masculine, 20 feminine, and 20 neutral traits. The subjects used a 7-point scale to indicate the extent to which the personality characteristics described themselves. The scale ranges from 1 (never or almost never true) to 7 (always or almost always true). Four initial scores are calculated from the subject's responses: masculinity, femininity, social desirability, and an androgyny difference score. Masculinity and femininity are the mean ratings on all the masculine and feminine items respectively. The higher the score the more masculine or feminine is the subject's self perceptions. The neutral items allowed for a measure of the extent to which a subject described himself in a socially desirable manner with regard to non sex-typed characteristics. The social desirability score was determined by reversing all the scores on the unfavorable items and then calculating the mean endorsement score across the 20 items. The higher the score the more the person tends to describe himself in a socially desirable manner. In Bem's (1974) earlier research, androgyny was defined as the difference between the subject's masculinity and femininity scores. The closer the difference score to zero, the more androgynous the subject was considered

to be. More recent research by Spence, Helmreich, and Stapp (1975) has updated the definition of androgyny to include only those subjects who are above the median in both masculinity and femininity. Bem (1977) and Bem et al. (1976) agree with this revised conceptualization. This change was made because of findings indicating that high masculine-high feminine subjects score higher than low masculine-low feminine subjects on measures of self esteem. In the revised classifications, high sex-typed individuals are those who score high on either masculinity or femininity but not on both. Subjects with low masculinity and low femininity are designated as undifferentiated. Test-retest reliability for Bem's Inventory (1974) has been found to be $\underline{r}$ = .90 for masculinity; $\underline{r}$ = .90 for femininity; $\underline{r}$ = .93 for an originally defined androgyny difference; and $\underline{r}$ = .89 for social desirability .

Hoge's Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale (See Appendix A Religious Views) is a 10-item evaluation of the extent to which an individual is intrinsically or extrinsically motivated with respect to their religious beliefs. An individual who is more intrinsically motivated would see religion as an ultimate whereas an extrinsically motivated individual would see religion in more instrumental terms. Subjects responded to a 4-point Likert Scale (1: strongly agree; 2: agree; 4: disagree; 5: strongly disagree). Three items (2, 6, and 9) are extrinsic. Scoring of these items is reversed so that in the final average the lower the score, the more intrinsic the subject's motivation. Hoge's scale has been found to have a Kuder Richardson formula 20 reliability coefficient of .901 (Hoge, 1972).

Marcia has developed oral and written evaluative techniques for determining an individual's Ego Identity Status. For the present study it seemed most appropriate to incorporate the standard oral interview as an extension of the discussion of the individual's life crisis. In addition questions from the written form were asked orally if they were needed to clarify the subjects' positions in Marcia's Ego Identity Statuses (See Appendix A). Each subject's Ego Identity Status was given a 0-6 designation as a function of whether their responses exhibited (0) identity diffusion; (1) a combination of diffusion and foreclosure; (2) foreclosure; (3) a combination of foreclosure and moratorium; (4) moratorium; (5) a combination of moratorium and achieved; or (6) achieved. The 6-point scale was used instead of the 4-point scale used by Marcia because many adult subjects tended to fall between the four main statuses. A subject's status is the average of his Ego Identity Status designations in the three areas of politics, religion, and occupation. Marcia's sentence completion written form has a total score reliability of .73. The interview method has an average percentage of agreement reliability among three judges of 75% (Marcia, 1966). Using the combined written and oral forms and the 6-point scale, the present study found an inter-rater reliability of $\underline{r}$ = .90 for 16 subjects representing each of the crisis/sex/age/education subgroups. It should be noted that a subject's score on Marcia's scale differs from the crisis/noncrisis classification because Marcia taps only the areas of religion, politics, and occupation all of which were rarely areas of significant crises for adult subjects. It is possible that a crisis in one of these three areas would affect the Ego Identity Status designation. Theoretically there would not need to be a positive correlation between any particular status and a crisis in

these areas. An individual experiencing a crisis for example in his occupation could be in a foreclosure, moratorium, or achieved status. He need only at some time to have made a substantial enough commitment to his occupation that it became a central element of his life structure. He need not have questioned his particular choice of occupation. Even if he made a commitment at one time, at time of testing he may be in a period of questioning that commitment. Thus, crisis in a given area does not determine the presence or absence of commitment or questioning in that area and therefore does not predetermine the subject's Ego Identity Status.

To determine the subjects' stages of moral reasoning, forms A and B of Kohlberg's standard moral dilemmas were given. Approximately half of the subjects responded to each form. Each protocol was transcribed and later scored by the experimenter without knowledge of the subject's crisis, age, sex, or educational classification. The process of administering the dilemmas consists of reading stories in which moral dilemmas are posed and then asking the subjects questions about what the characters should do. The questions probe for the subjects' reasoning regarding the moral issues of life, law, punishment, conscience, affiliation, and contract. Each subject's position in Kohlberg's stages was represented by two scores: (A) a Moral Maturity Score from 100 to 500; and (B) a Global Score from 1 to 5. A Moral Maturity Score of 200 indicates a pure stage 2; a score of 300 represents a pure stage 3; a score of 339 indicates a protocol between stages 3 and 4 with slightly more stage 3 responses. A Global score represents the stage containing the majority of responses and any stage representing at least 25% of the subject's entries. A score of 4(5) means that the majority of the responses were

in stage 4 but at least 25% were in stage 5. The highest score a subject could obtain was a stage 5 because Kohlberg et al. (1975, 1976) in developing the Scoring Manual did not have enough stage 6 subjects to have the number of examples necessary for the manual. Kohlberg and Colby (1978) report an inter-rater reliability of $\underline{r}$ = .88 for scoring the moral dilemmas. The Harvard Center for Moral Education (1979) reports a test-retest reliability on Form A of .96 for Rater 1 and .99 for Rater 2. On Form B for Rater 2 a reliability of .97 is reported.

Procedure

Each subject was interviewed and tested individually at a quiet location of their choice. After signing a consent form (Appendix A), each subject completed the Life Change Scale, noting the impact of the changes; the Bem Sex Role Inventory; and the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale in that order. When those were completed, the experimenter asked for an extensive elaboration of the items marked on the Life Change Scale and any other significant events in the subjects' adult lives which the scale had not included. The experimenter then conducted the Ego Identity Status interview and gave Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. All interview data were taped on a Sony cassette recorder. The entire testing session lasted between two and five hours depending on the length of the subjects' report of their life experiences.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

A multivariate analysis of variance (Finn, 1973) was performed using as independent variables the subject characteristics of crisis versus noncrisis, young adult versus middle age adult, male versus female, and college (completion of a four year degree) versus noncollege (no four year degree). The dependent variables were Bem's masculinity, femininity, androgyny difference score, and social desirability; Hoge's Intrinsic Religiosity score; Marcia's Ego Identity Status; and the Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score (see Appendix B, Tables 1, 2A, 2B, 3).

There was a significant main effect of crisis ($F = 3.57$, $df = 7/58$, $p < .003$). A significant univariate effect of Ego Identity ($F = 22.28$, $df = 1/64$, $p < .001$) accounted for most of the crisis effect. The mean Ego Identity Status score for crisis subjects was 4.19 and for noncrisis subjects was 2.91, indicating as hypothesized, that subjects with higher Ego Identity Statuses were more likely to have experienced a crisis in their adult lives. It also means that noncrisis subjects on the average had not experienced a moratorium questioning period.

There was a significant main effect for sex ($F = 2.70$, $df = 7/58$, $p < .02$). This was due primarily to significant univariate effects of masculinity and femininity ($F = 8.03$, $df = 1/64$, $p < .006$; and $F = 4.77$, $df = 1/64$, $p < .03$, respectively). For males the mean masculinity score was 5.00 and mean femininity score was 4.56. For females the mean

masculinity score was 4.49 and the mean femininity score was 4.81. That is, for males the masculinity score was higher and for females the femininity score was higher thus precipitating the main sex effect.

In light of Kohlberg's (1973) finding that only college students attained principled morality, it should be noted that the near significant effect of educational level ($F = 2.08$, $df = 7/58$, $p < .06$) was due primarily to a significant univariate effect of the Moral Maturity Scores ($F = 7.81$, $df = 1/64$, $p < .007$). The Mean Moral Maturity Score for college subjects was 349.68 and for noncollege subjects was 305. That is, subjects with a college degree were likely to have a higher Moral Maturity Score than subjects without a degree.

Analysis of variance using the Moral Maturity Scores does not make a distinction between subjects' positions in two stages within a moral level and in two stages which span moral levels. For the present research it was important to know whether or not subjects in different experimental groups are in different levels (i.e. stage 4, conventional morality, versus stage 5, principled morality) rather than just differing within a level (i.e. stage 3, conventional morality, versus stage 4, conventional morality). To overcome this difficulty Chi Square analyses using the frequency of principled versus nonprincipled thinking were run to determine if moral reasoning differed as a function of the subject variables of crisis, age, sex, and education (see Appendix B, Table 4). Global scores of 1 to 4 were considered nonprincipled. Global scores of 5 were considered principled. In addition, Global scores of 3 and 4 which had principled thinking in at least 25% of the responses were considered principled. These subjects were included because of Gibbs' (1977) suggestion that those who are capable of principled thought may not use it on a day to

day basis but only when pressed with issues threatening the sanctity of life. At other times they would use conventional morality. A score of 25% principled thought was considered to be sufficient evidence of the presence of the capacity for this level of moral thought. Holstein's (1976) data indicating that stages 3 and 4 may be parallel rather than sequential required that both 3 and 4 be considered as conventional stages that could accompany stage 5 thought.

Chi Square analyses using the Yates correction (Hays, 1963) for small cell frequencies, found as predicted in the hypotheses, that both subjects' educational levels and experience of crises in adulthood had a significant relationship to their positions in principled versus non-principled stages. The level of education and level of moral reasoning were related at the $p < .005$ level with $X^2 = 10.01$, $df = 1$. Of the 15 principled subjects only 2 had not completed a college degree. The experience of crisis was related to the level of moral reasoning at the $p < .05$ level with $X^2 = 4.10$. Of the 15 principled subjects only four had not experienced a crisis. Seven of the eight subjects with a strictly principled score of 5 had experienced a crisis and had completed a college degree.

Chi Square analyses were also performed on the scores obtained by dividing the masculinity and femininity scores at their medians in order to obtain sex-typed, androgynous, and undifferentiated subject designations (see Appendix B, Table 5). The median for masculinity was 4.7. This was moved to 4.69 on inspection because of multiple scores at the median and the desire to make the high and low ends of the scale more equal. The median score for femininity was 4.69. Once the medians were

determined the scores were divided into high and low masculinity and femininity. As noted earlier, subjects with high masculinity (above the median) and low femininity scores were classified as masculine sex-typed. Nineteen subjects were in this category. Subjects with high femininity and low masculinity were feminine sex-typed. Seventeen subjects fit this description. Twenty-two subjects had both high masculinity and femininity. These were called androgynous. The twenty-two subjects with scores below the median on both masculinity and femininity were designated as undifferentiated. Each of the independent subject variables was analyzed for differences among the sex-typed, androgynous and undifferentiated subjects. As would be expected, a significant sex effect was found ($\underline{X}^2 = 10.05$, $\underline{df} = 3$, $\underline{p} < .025$). The effect was due to the finding of 13 masculine sex-typed males versus six females; and three feminine sex-typed males versus 14 females. No other significant Chi Squares were found.

In light of Kohlberg's findings (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969) of more females in stage 3 and males in stage 4 of the conventional moral level, a contingency table was determined for the number of men versus women whose major Global score was in stage 3 or 4 (see Appendix B, Table 6). No sex differences were found. There was an equal number of men and women in both stages. There were 22 men and 22 women in stage 3 and seven of each in stage 4.

Correlational analyses were performed upon the dependent variables of masculinity, femininity, androgyny difference score, Intrinsic Religiosity, Ego Identity Status, and the Moral Maturity Score (see Appendix B, Table 7). The correlation between Moral Maturity Scores and Ego Identity Statuses was .417, $\underline{df} = 78$, which is significant at the $\underline{p} < .001$

level. This finding is clarified by looking at the relationship between Ego Identity and the Global scores. Seven of the eight strictly principled thinkers (Global score of 5) had experienced moratorium Ego Identity. Twelve of the 15 principled subjects with at least 25% principled thinking had experienced moratorium. These data substantiate Kohlberg's (1973a) claim that a moratorium period is a prerequisite for principled moral reasoning. There was also a significant correlation between intrinsic Religiosity and social desirability ($\underline{r} = -.313$, $\underline{p} < .01$). That is the higher the social desirability score, the more intrinsic the subjects' responses on the Intrinsic Religiosity measure. The lower the Intrinsic Religiosity score, the more it represents intrinsic religious motivation. The correlation between Intrinsic Religiosity and Ego Identity Status was also significant ($\underline{r} = -.278$, $p < .02$). This means that the higher the Ego Identity Status, the more intrinsic the religious motivation.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The main results of the present study confirm the hypotheses that crisis is significantly related to a more achieved, morally principled identity but failed to find the hypothesized relationship between crisis and one's androgyny or Intrinsic Religious Motivation. Contrary to predictions, a subject's age was not an important differentiating factor. However a college education, even among middle age subjects, was found to be practically a prerequisite for principled moral thought.

Crisis Effects

Jung's (1960) and Erikson's (1976) belief that crises provide a crucial opportunity for widening conscious awareness of one's attributes and increasing one's potentials is given substance by the findings of significant relationships between crises and one's Ego Identity Status and level of moral reasoning. Jung says that in order to penetrate problems one must not resist the ways that lead through darkness and obscurity. Nor must one wish to find unequivocal results when one emerges from the darkness. In other words, to face a crisis and learn from it one must risk experiencing Marcia's moratorium phase or Perry's relativism in which for a time one feels afloat in a sea of unknowns freely and perhaps painfully questioning personal and conventional assumptions. If one emerges from the darkness it is likely to be in a state where relativism continues but the necessity of commitment with openness to change is

affirmed. Murphy and Gilligan's postconventional contextual and formal subjects could both fit in here as long as the formal subjects remained open to the possibility of discovering a more inclusive guiding principle. Only six of 40 crisis subjects had not experienced Marcia's moratorium status. This means that in addition to the precise area of their personal crises, most of the subjects had dared to question in the religious, political, and occupational areas tapped by the Marcia questionnaire. Listening to the life events of the crisis and noncrisis subjects, the experimenter found many cases where an objectively similar event in the lives of noncrisis and crisis subjects had not been fully experienced by the noncrisis subjects to the point of causing real inner questioning. An example of such an event would be the difference between a noncrisis subject's resigning himself to his occupational dissatisfactions in middle age instead of dealing with the implications of those dissatisfactions for how he has lived or will continue to live the remaining part of his occupational life.

It may be that subjects who experience a crisis are not so different in their life events but in the extent to which they risk being vulnerable to the changes evaluation of those events might bring. It is also the case that while events may be the same, their importance varies from individual to individual thus changing their motivational power for generating change. Crises occurring at the age 30 and 40 transitions may often be events which one chooses to make into a crisis rather than events which are entirely out of the control of the individual. That is, a crisis such as a divorce or change of job might not occur if the individual chose to ignore the discrepancies the marriage or job required between his inner self and his life style. Levinson (1978) claims that

a positive outgrowth of a transition phase should be a better fit between the life structure and the self. It may also be that some of the crises are brought upon themselves by the life styles crisis subjects chose consciously or unconsciously to live. For example, one principled crisis subject had to deal with the implications of raising biracial children in a conservative community; another had to deal with the frustrations and sorrows brought on by marrying an unreformed convict. The latter subject was a social worker who must have been clearly aware of the risks her spouse's background meant she might be taking. When an individual has a crisis imposed upon him from the outside he may or may not be ready to learn from that experience. Others may feel like the crises have originated outside and independent of themselves, when in reality they have played a major role in the crises formations. A 45-year-old female subject whose first husband became an alcoholic after three years of marriage, whose second husband had an extended affair after 20 years of marriage, and whose third husband died after six months of marriage, viewed herself as the victim of a tragic series of events. She totally removed herself from any possible role in the dissolution of the first two marriages. Without acknowledging that there may have been something in her manner of relating to her first two husbands that led to their particular destructive means of coping, the possibility of her increasing her awareness of aspects of herself and thus growing through crisis, is probably minimal. In contrast to the struggles of many of the crisis subjects, the noncrisis subjects' average Ego Identity Status indicated that they had not yet experienced the questioning period of moratorium. Such a distinction suggests that within the crisis subjects there may be a subgroup of individuals who chose to live a life in which they periodically challenge their beliefs and ways of living and by so doing

increase their knowledge of their potentials, limitations, and values. Affirmation of one's self in the face of one's limitations may be a factor which encourages respect for the rights of others who share the imperfections of being human. Such respect is the basis of principled morality.

Perry's (1970) findings that some college students preferred to actively deny the urge to progress and reorganize their intellectual structures for dealing with the relativism of knowledge and values adds credence to the possibility that noncrisis and crisis subjects, particularly crisis subjects with principled moral reasoning, exemplified two very different ways of dealing with life's problems. Jung's (1960) work with middle age patients found a similar resistance to change among certain individuals. Jung also found that those who in their forties chose to retain their cherished convictions tended to grow increasingly rigid especially in areas of morality to the point of fanaticism around age 50. It was as though the possibility of endangering their principles made it necessary to emphasize them more. The present experimenter found in a number of her nonprincipled crisis subjects a sense of bitterness and resolute acceptance of their lives which seemed to be replaced by a thoughtful questioning attitude in principled subjects. It was as if going beyond the need to conform to conventional bases of moral decision making released the principled subjects of the need to rigidly control and defend their behavior. An example of a nonprincipled crisis subject's attitude is the 31-year-old male who summarized his life, "Definitely, I've had a mighty fine life, no doubt about it". This was a man who claimed to have been involved in motorcycle gangs, hangings, rape, murder, gunfights, and now due to an automobile accident was paralyzed, relying on

an elaborate CB radio system to make contact with his friends.

As noted earlier, Kohlberg (1973a) claimed that movement to principled morality is enhanced by (A) experience of a personal period of moratorium and identity questioning brought on by immersion in a relativistic college atmosphere, and by (B) anticipated and later sustained irreversible responsibility for the welfare of others. The significant correlation between Ego Identity Status and moral development (Moral Maturity Scores) reflects this relationship and extends Podd's findings (reported in Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) with college students to include young and middle age adults. The higher one's Ego Identity Status, the higher one's Moral Maturity Score. All but one of the eight subjects with a Global morality score of 5 (i.e. the majority of responses were principled) had experienced a moratorium period. The significant Chi Square between crisis and principled moral thought also reflects this relationship. It must be remembered that for the purposes of the present study, a subject was placed in the crisis category only if internal resolution of his crisis necessitated a re-evaluation of a central portion of his life structure. A crisis of this sort would for many subjects satisfy Kohlberg's prerequisite of a moratorium phase. It is possible however for a subject to have experienced a crisis and have attained an achieved identity without being a principled moral thinker. Levinson (1978) found that if a man's early adulthood is dominated by poverty and the inability to find a reasonably satisfactory place in society, his adult development will be stunted. Such was the case of a woman in the present study who clearly placed as a 6 (achieved) in Marcia's Ego Identity Statuses, but only obtained a Moral Maturity Score of 204 and a Global score of 3(1). Her life circumstances including poverty, divorce, rape,

and delinquent children allowed her no time for meta-ethical reflection. Her lack of even a high school education may have left her without the intellectual tools for abstract reasoning in the principled domain.

The crises experienced by the principled crisis subjects were either interpersonal in nature or what was termed an emotional crisis. The latter involved extensive inner questioning and turmoil. The former for the most part met Kohlberg's criterion for principled thought of experiencing an anticipated or later irreversible responsibility for the welfare of others. An example of a frequent interpersonal concern would be the effect of one's divorce upon others. It is interesting to note that none of the principled subjects experienced solely a health related crisis whereas health crises did occur among the nonprincipled subjects. This may have just been chance but it does fit in with the pattern that there may be personality differences in the willingness to risk moratorium, at the basis of the crisis relationship to principled thought. Health crises for the most part are out of one's control and do not differentiate individuals along the dimension of willingness to risk a basic life style change.

The rationale behind the hypothesis that crisis would lead to principled thinking was the assumption that crisis would encourage one to reflect upon the basic values guiding one's life. In this vein, it is important to note that the three subjects who were included in the crisis groups for experiencing emotional crises were found upon analysis of their Kohlberg dilemmas to all be principled thinkers. The extensive internal questioning of these subjects is precisely the aspect of the crisis experience that was hypothesized to lead to principled thought.

Education Effects

The significant Chi Square relationship between educational level and principled versus nonprincipled thought suggests that attainment of principled morality is highly dependent upon a college education. This finding replicates Kohlberg's findings that a college education is a prerequisite for principled thought but it does not specify what aspect of a college education is necessary. Is it the experience of the diversity of viewpoints which encourages one to question one's own? Is it the training in abstract reasoning which allows one to think in terms of principles? Is it the period set aside for individual development which gives the time necessary for self reflection? Is it the economic security after college which frees one from an overwhelming preoccupation with basic life necessities even during a crisis and therefore gives more time for reflection. The role of the economic derivatives of the college degree as well as the need for abstract reasoning is exemplified by the identity achieved woman described above whose impoverished conditions and lack of training in abstract thought may have prohibited her attainment of principled thought. The findings of (A) a significant positive correlation between one's Ego Identity Status and Moral Maturity Score and (B) that all but one of the Global score of 5 principled subjects had experienced moratorium, supports the hypothesis that it is the questioning of one's values in the college environment that influences the attainment of principled morality. It does not however rule out the other possibilities. Whatever the vital component, the need for a college education fuels the criticism that Kohlberg's stage theory is elitist (Simpson, 1974; Fraenkel, 1976; Friquegnon, in press). It may in fact be that for most people the college experience is necessary to bridge the

gap between what Gibbs (1979) terms the naturalistic preconventional and conventional levels of moral thought and the existential self reflective postconventional level of adult reasoning.

Sex and Age Effects

The only sex related findings were the significant relationship between a subject's sex and their evaluation of their own masculine and feminine traits and the relationship between their sex and their placement in the highly sex-typed categories. In contrast to Kohlberg and Kramer's (1969) findings, the results of the present study showed no differences in the frequency of men and women in stages 3 and 4 conventional morality. In fact, both men and women were more likely to be in stage 3 than in stage 4. A possible explanation for this discrepancy with the Kohlberg and Kramer findings is the strong familial orientation in the cultural values of the Fargo-Moorhead community. Such an orientation would foster stage 3 (interpersonal concordance) reasoning in response to the moral dilemmas. There was no relationship between a subject's placement in the androgynous category and their position in the crisis, age, sex, and educational groups. The failure to find the predicted increase in androgyny with age may be because the incorporation of opposite sex characteristics that frequently begins in middle adulthood had not progresses sufficiently to be statistically significant. It may take until old age to find the increase in androgyny noted by Neugarten (1968). It may also be as Neugarten (1964) reported, that the most effective measures for uncovering differences between older and younger adults are projective. She claims that the ability of adults to display learned behavior long after internal changes have occurred frequently results in failure of objective measures to uncover group differences.

The failure to find age differences in any of the variables may also be reflective of the times in which the young and middle age adults were growing up. It could be that while the individuation process of Jung (1960) and Levinson's (1978) middle age subjects did indeed peak in the second half of life, individuation for young adults in the mid-1970's may for some reason begin at an earlier stage of development. Levinson's description of the 30-year transition closely parallels that occurring around age 40. Both are times of reappraisal of a previous life structure and creation of a more satisfactory structure for the future. Sixty-two percent of Levinson's subjects went through a moderate or severe crisis at the age 30 transition. Levinson notes that there is no firm basis for comparing the difficulties of this transition for different generations. There may however be a difference between today's young and middle age adults in the tools available for coping with the dissatisfaction they experience(d) at the age 30 transition. Such social changes as an increase in job opportunities for women and the acceptibility of divorce and single parenthood may lessen the risk, mollify the fear and encourage the possibility of significant life style changes in the late twenties and early thirties. In previous times individuals may have been more inclined to wait until the responsibilities for children had declined or ceased before they felt the freedom to dissolve a marraige or seek alternative employment that could possibly put the family in jeopardy. These similarities between young and middle age subjects may have been sufficient to eliminate differences due to the age factor. This would apply to noncrisis as well as crisis subjects. In the non-crisis groups, subjects of both ages faced their respective transition stages and chose as of testing not to be totally involved in the

reevaluation and restructuring of their life styles. This may not apply to the younger subjects in the young adult group who may still be on the verge of the age 30 transition dilemmas.

Future Research

Future research is needed to determine whether or not there actually are personality differences in the willingness to face a crisis experience when the possibility is high that a change in one's life structure may be required. Confirmation of such a personality dimension would have implications for counseling techniques. It may be that not all individuals can gain from facing a crisis and would in fact be hurt if forced to do so. It may also be that some individuals require extra support and encouragement when they dare to take the risk of squarely facing their problems. Empirical evidence that crisis is associated with a higher Ego Identity Status and level of moral reasoning does add hope to the process of grappling with problems in the counseling situation.

Crisis itself as a phenomenon of empirical investigation needs to be more objectively defined. The emotional tone of the subject's responses could be rated through analysis of their voice qualities. This however would not be a sufficient indicator of crisis. A technique would have to be devised which could take into account and objectively evaluate the subject's description of the process of facing and working through a crisis event.

Jung's (1960) belief that penetrating a problem requires the willingness to risk moratorium and the possibility that one will emerge from moratorium to a world of relative values, suggests the importance of making Murphy and Gilligan's (1980) postconventional formal and contextual distinctions in understanding the relationship between crisis and

postconventional morality. It would be illuminating to know whether the experience of a crisis which shatters a person's stable life structure would make the individual reluctant to invest himself in a single decision making principle. If this followed, postconventional contextual morality would be more prevalent in subject's following a crisis than would the postconventional formal mode. In the present study it is possible that some of the principled thinkers could have been postconventional contextual subjects who decided to use the principle of justice in guiding their decisions concerning the Kohlberg dilemmas.

Failure to find a relationship between Intrinsic Religious Motivation and crisis may be a problem with the limited nature of the measuring device. A number of divorced subjects who no longer felt accepted by their past church affiliations questioned their old allegiances, indicating that crisis did affect their religious life. Future research should employ Fowler's (1975, 1976) detailed interview method of determining the developmental stage of crisis versus noncrisis subjects' faith systems. At the time the present study was developed, the experimenter was not aware of Fowler's stages. Hoge's measure was used to test the hypothesis that the increase in self reflection accompanying a crisis would be reflected in a move to a more individualized faith, set apart from the authority of established institutions. Hoge's measure does not directly examine this hypothesis but looks at the extent to which an individual allows religious concerns to enter into his daily behaviors. It was thought that a more intrinsic religious motivation would reflect a more individualized faith. Fowler's system is much more inclusive than Hoge's. Among the areas he explores are (A) the authority to whom the individual turns to validate his personal orientation toward the ultimate

conditions of existence; (B) the challenges the individual's faith is currently facing; and (C) the individual's criteria for weighing and appropriating insights and claims regarding faith issues. His last stages epitomize the middle age challenge of confrontation and unification of the opposites. Fowler's stages parallel Erikson's psychosocial and Kohlberg's moral stages. The general progression is from external authorities to internally derived beliefs. The increase in detail, the parallels with middle age concerns and with Kohlberg and Erikson's schemas make Fowler's instrument more appropriate for determining the relationship of faith to the variables of concern in the present study.

Summary

To summarize, the possibility of attainment of principled moral thought is higher in those who have experienced a significant life crisis and the completion of a four year college degree. Individuals who have experienced a crisis which threatened a central aspect of their life structure are more likely to have dared to question their own political, religious, and occupational views. Such findings apply to young and middle age adults and to both male and female subjects. The possibility is entertained that personality differences in the willingness to risk major life changes may influence the degree to which a crisis event can serve as an impetus for growth.

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APPENDIX A

INSTRUMENTS

ADULT DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH

The present study is an attempt to determine the effects one's experiences in the adult phase of development have upon one's orientation toward social and moral values in life. In an attempt to begin to study this area, you will be asked to fill out a few questionnaires and to answer questions concerning your life experiences, how you have perceived them, and the values you currently hold. You will also be asked to make some decisions concerning hypothetical moral dilemmas. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions you will be asked. I am merely looking for patterns in people's lives that tie together their experiences and the perceptions of the world which they hold. Your participation is very much appreciated.

CONSENT FORM

Realizing that my responses given in the present study will be used for research purposes only and that all data will be anonymous, I agree to participate in the present study and give permission for my responses to be used as part of the research data.

Name_____ Date_____

SUMMARY

If you would like to receive a summary of the results of the present study, please write your name and address below. Remember that your name will not be kept with your data, so I will be only able to provide you with a general summary of all the data collected.

Name (please print) _____

Address _____

_____

ADULT DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH: LIFE EVENTS

Number _____
Age _____
Sex _____
Education _____
Employment _____
Marital Status _____

For each of the following possible events, please indicate which of these have happened to you since age ___ by circling the appropriate number. After you have done this, go back to each one you have circled and mark on the scale from 1 to 7 how significant this event was for you in terms of its emotional impact and the changes it made in your life. A '1' indicates very little impact from the event and a '7' indicates that the event caused profound changes in your activities and thoughts regarding your daily life. Place your rating of the event on the blank to the left of the circled items.

/ 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 /

Event had little impact — Event had profound impact

___ 1. Guilty of a minor infraction of the law

___ 2. Took a vacation

___ 3. Marked change in eating habits

___ 4. Substantial change in family get-togethers

___ 5. Marked change in sleeping pattern

___ 6. Took on a mortgage or loan less than $10,000

___ 7. Substantial change in social activities

___ 8. Substantial change in the usual amount and/or type of recreational activity

___ 9. Substantial change in church activity

___10. Substantial change in working hours or conditions

___11. Change of residence

___12. Changed high schools or colleges

___13. Eligible for promotion but cut by quota system

___14. A lot more or less trouble with superiors

___15. Substantial change in personal habits

___16. Substantial change in living conditions

___17. Spouse started or stopped working outside the home

Number _____

/ 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 /

Event had little impact — Event had profound impact

___18. Either began or ceased attending high school or college

___19. Personal successes

___20. A lot more or a lot less in-law trouble

___21. A son or daughter married or moved out of the home

___22. Major change in responsibilities at work (either in home or outside of home)

___23. Experienced a foreclosure on a mortgage or loan or received a letter of indebtedness

___24. Took on a mortgage or loan greater than $10,000

___25. A lot more or a lot less arguments with spouse

___26. Change to a new line of work or a new type of work than done previously

___27. Loss of close friend by death

___28. A lot more or a lot less financial problems

___29. Gain of a new family member

___30. Major change in the situation of parents (divorce, etc.)

___31. Major change in dating habits

___32. Change in health or behavior of a family member

___33. A lot more or a lot less association with spouse due to demands of your job such as change of location

___34. Loss of job

___35. Marriage

___36. Loss of close family member by death

___37. Held in a jail

___38. A lot more or a lot less than usual association with your spouse due to marriage trouble

___39. Divorce

___40. Loss of spouse through death

Number _____

ADULT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: SELF DESCRIPTION

Please indicate how well each of the following characteristics describes you as you now see yourself. Use the 7-point scale described below. A number 1 indicates it is never or almost never true of you and a number 7 indicates it is always or almost always true of you. Mark your answers in the blank to the left of each item.

/ 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 /

Never or almost never true of me — Always or almost always true of me

___ 1. Self-reliant
___ 2. Yielding
___ 3. Helpful
___ 4. Defends own beliefs
___ 5. Cheerful
___ 6. Moody
___ 7. Independent
___ 8. Shy
___ 9. Conscientious
___10. Athletic
___11. Affectionate
___12. Theatrical
___13. Assertive
___14. Flatterable
___15. Happy
___16. Strong personality
___17. Loyal
___18. Unpredictable
___19. Forceful
___20. Feminine
___21. Reliable
___22. Analytical
___23. Sympathetic
___24. Jealous
___25. Has leadership qualities
___26. Sensitive to the needs of others
___27. Truthful
___28. Willing to take risks
___29. Understanding
___30. Secretive
___31. Makes decisions easily
___32. Compassionate
___33. Sincere
___34. Self-sufficient
___35. Eager to soothe hurt feelings
___36. Conceited
___37. Dominant
___38. Soft spoken
___39. Likeable
___40. Masculine

Number _____

/ 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 /

Never or almost never true of me — Always or almost always true of me

___41. Warm

___42. Solemn

___43. Willing to take a stand

___44. Tender

___45. Friendly

___46. Aggressive

___47. Gullible

___48. Inefficient

___49. Acts as a leader

___50. Childlike

___51. Adaptable

___52. Individualistic

___53. Does not use harsh language

___54. Unsystematic

___55. Competitive

___56. Loves Children

___57. Tactful

___58. Ambitious

___59. Gentle

___60. Conventional

Number _____

ADULT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: RELIGIOUS VIEWS

Please respond to the following statements in terms of the scale below. Mark the number corresponding to your response in the blank to the left of the item.

/	1	/	2	/	4	/	5	/
Strongly Agree							Strongly Disagree	

___ 1. My faith involves all my life.

___ 2. It doesn't matter so much what I believe as long as I lead a moral life.

___ 3. One should seek God's guidance when making every important decision.

___ 4. In my life I experience the presence of the Divine.

___ 5. My faith sometimes restricts my actions.

___ 6. Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.

___ 7. Nothing is as important to me as serving God the best I know how.

___ 8. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.

___ 9. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in life.

___10. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.

EGO IDENTITY INTERVIEW

Opening questions: clarification of marriage status, employment, education -- HOW LONG SINCE CHANGES OCCURRED?

Ego-Identity Status

1. For me, success would be _____

2. When I consider my goals in the light of my family's goals _____

3. I'm at my best when _____

4. Sticking to one occupational choice _____

5. When I let myself go I _____

6. I chose to go into my particular job after _____

   Most parents have plans for their children, things they would like them to do; did yours have any such plans; did that affect your career choice?
   How willing would you be to change if something better came along?
   Have you ever seriously considered changing employers or looking into a completely different line of work?

7. I know that I can always depend on _____

8. Choose one: I am _____ I am not _____

9. It seems I've always _____

10. I wish I could make up my mind about _____

11. Getting involved in political activity _____
    Do you have any particular political preference? Any issues you feel strongly about? How do your beliefs compare with parents? Any particular time you decided upon your political beliefs?

12. What happens to me depends on _____

13. As compared with when I was (20, 35), I _____

14. I belong to _____

15. To change my mind about my feelings toward religion _____
    Do you have any particular religious affiliation? Are you very active in a religious group? Do your current beliefs vary much from those you were raised with? Were there times when you doubted your beliefs? When? How did you resolve your questions? How do you feel about them now?

16. If one commits oneself _____

17. Ten years from now, I _____

18. It makes me feel good when _____

APPENDIX B

DATA SUMMARIES

TABLE 1

Multivariate Analysis of Variance of: Crisis/Noncrisis, Young Adult/Middle Age, Female/Male, Noncollege/College by Masculinity, Femininity, Androgyny Difference Score, Social Desirability, Intrinsic Religiosity, Ego Identity Status, Moral Maturity Score

Source of Variation	df	F	p
Crisis	7/58	3.57	<.003
Age	7/58	.54	
Sex	7/58	2.70	<.02
Education	7/58	2.08	<.06
Crisis X Age	7/58	.87	
Crisis X Sex	7/58	.82	
Crisis X Education	7/58	1.15	
Age X Sex	7/58	1.71	
Age X Education	7/58	1.13	
Sex X Education	7/58	.34	
Crisis X Age X Sex	7/58	.52	
Crisis X Age X Education	7/58	.87	
Crisis X Sex X Education	7/58	1.64	
Age X Sex X Education	7/58	.14	
Crisis X Age X Sex X Education	7/58	.63	

TABLE 2A

Cell Identification and Frequencies from Table 1 Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Use in Reading Table 2B: Observed Cell Means

Cell Number	Crisis(1) Noncrisis (2)	Young (1) Middle (2)	Female (1) Male (2)	Noncollege (1) College (2)	Frequency
1	1	1	1	1	5
2	1	1	1	2	5
3	1	1	2	1	5
4	1	1	2	2	5
5	1	2	1	1	5
6	1	2	1	2	5
7	1	2	2	1	5
8	1	2	2	2	5
9	2	1	1	1	5
10	2	1	1	2	5
11	2	1	2	1	5
12	2	1	2	2	5
13	2	2	1	1	5
14	2	2	1	2	5
15	2	2	2	1	5
16	2	2	2	2	5

TABLE 2B

Observed Cell Means From Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Table 1

Cell	Masculinity	Femininity	Androgyny Difference Score	Social Desirability	Intrinsic Religiosity	Ego Identity Status	Moral Maturity Score
1	4.80	4.62	1.00	4.98	2.36	4.33	330.0
2	4.49	4.81	.68	4.85	1.94	5.13	387.2
3	4.90	4.71	.75	5.29	2.86	3.20	280.4
4	5.11	4.59	.58	5.31	2.32	4.76	376.8
5	4.87	4.85	.72	5.27	2.72	4.53	299.2
6	4.15	4.95	.80	5.04	2.68	3.93	349.0
7	4.24	4.39	.37	5.24	2.32	3.67	336.4
8	4.90	4.60	.48	4.86	2.90	3.93	361.4
9	4.17	5.50	1.45	5.27	2.20	2.38	282.8
10	4.70	4.41	.77	4.79	2.30	3.66	361.4
11	5.16	4.91	.67	5.09	3.06	2.60	310.2
12	5.30	4.31	1.01	5.02	3.22	2.66	319.6
13	3.81	4.58	1.23	5.27	2.22	2.33	285.4
14	4.92	4.78	.38	5.22	2.42	2.83	286.8
15	5.33	4.43	.96	5.23	2.20	3.40	315.6
16	5.08	4.57	.63	5.15	1.78	3.40	355.2

TABLE 3

Means and Variances of Crisis, Age, Sex, Education by Masculinity, Femininity, Androgyny Difference Score, Social Desirability, Intrinsic Religiosity, Ego Identity Status, and Moral Maturity Score Cells

N = 40 for Each Cell	Masculinity Mean M.	Masculinity Variance Var.	Femininity M.	Femininity Var.	Androgyny Difference M.	Androgyny Difference Var.	Social Desirability M.	Social Desirability Var.	Intrinsic Religiosity M.	Intrinsic Religiosity Var.	Ego Identity M.	Ego Identity Var.	Moral Maturity M.	Moral Maturity Var.
Crisis	4.68	.63	4.69	.23	.67	.24	5.11	.31	2.51	.72	4.19	1.69	340.05	6622.41
Noncrisis	4.80	.84	4.69	.35	.88	.66	5.13	.28	2.42	.73	2.91	1.30	314.63	3806.09
Young Adult	4.83	.81	4.73	.34	.86	.56	5.07	.37	2.53	.78	3.59	2.27	331.05	5474.31
Middle Age	4.66	.64	4.64	.24	.70	.35	5.16	.21	2.40	.66	3.50	1.56	323.63	5257.42
Female	4.48	.79	4.81	.37	.88	.48	5.09	.36	2.36	.60	3.64	2.06	322.73	5929.59
Male	5.00	.54	4.56	.18	.68	.42	5.15	.23	2.58	.82	3.45	1.76	331.95	4786.77
Noncollege	4.66	.94	4.75	.34	.89	.46	5.21	.29	2.49	.65	3.31	1.84	305.00	4105.74
College	4.83	.52	4.63	.24	.67	.44	5.03	.28	2.45	.81	3.79	1.87	349.68	5630.74

TABLE 4

Chi Square Contingency Tables for Nonprincipled and Principled Moral Reasoning by Crisis, Age, Sex and Education Groups.

	Nonprincipled Morality	Principled Morality	Nonprincipled Morality	Principled Morality
Noncrisis	36	4	Noncollege 38	2
Crisis	29	11	College 27	13
	$\underline{X}^2 = 4.10$, $\underline{p} < .05$ Yates Correction		$\underline{X}^2 = 10.01$, $\underline{p} < .005$ Yates Correction	
Young Adult	30	10	Female 34	6
Middle Age	35	5	Male 31	9
	$\underline{X}^2 = 2.05$, NS		$\underline{X}^2 = .74$, NS	

TABLE 5

Chi Square Contingency Tables for Masculine Sex-Typed, Feminine Sex-Typed, Androgynous, and Undifferentiated by Crisis, Age, Sex, and Education Groups

	Masculine Sex-Typed	Feminine Sex-Typed	Androgynous	Undifferentiated
Noncrisis	10	8	11	11
Crisis	9	9	11	11
	$X^2 = .110$, NS			
Noncollege	5	11	12	12
College	14	6	10	10
	$X^2 = 6.09$, NS			
Young Adult	10	10	12	8
Middle Age	9	7	10	14
	$X^2 = 2.4$, NS			
Female	6	14	10	10
Male	13	3	12	12
	$X^2 = 10.05$, $p. < .025$			

TABLE 6

Chi Square Contingency Table for Sex by Stages 3 and 4 Moral Reasoning

	Stage 3	Stage 4
Females	22	7
Males	22	7

$X^2 = 0$, NS

TABLE 7

Correlations Between The Dependent Variables: Masculinity, Feminity, Androgyn Difference Score, Social Desirability, Intrinsic Religiosity, Ego Identity Status, and Moral Maturity Score

N = 80	Masculinity	Femininity	Androgyny Difference Score	Social Desirability	Intrinsic Religiosity	Ego Identity Status	Moral Maturity Score
Masculinity	1.00						
Femininity	.05	1.00					
Androgyny Difference Score	.14	-.08	1.00				
Social Desirability	.19	.07	-.12	1.00			
Intrinsic Religiosity	.03	-.06	.18	-.31**	1.00		
Ego Identity Status	.01	-.08	-.24	.05	-.28*	1.00	
Moral Maturity Score	-.13	-.23	-.12	.02	.01	.42***	1.00

* $p<.02$
** $p<.01$
*** $p<.001$