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EIBRARY ‘*
Michigan State I

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

SEDENTARIZATION: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION
AMONG THE KORDSHULI PASTORAL NOMADS
OF SOUTHWESTERN IRAN

presented by

Gary Michael Swee

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. Anthropology

degree in

 

 

   

Major professor

May 21, 1981

 

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Place in book return to remove
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COpyright by
GARY MICHAEL SWEE
1981

SEDENTARIZATION: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION
AMONG THE KORDSHULI PASTORAL NOMADS
OF SOUTHWESTERN IRAN

By

Gary Michael Swee

A DISSERTATION

 

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Anthropology

1981

 

 

ECOHI

 

T——_’

ABSTRACT
SEDENTARIZATION: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION
AMONG THE KORDSHULI PASTORAL NOMADS
or SOUTHWESTERN IRAN
By

Gary Michael Swee

This study concentrates on social change among a
pastoral nomadic group in southwestern Iran, the Kordshuli.
The changes that have occurred and are still occurring are
examined through changes in the social, political, and
economic environment of this one group. A major focus will
be sedentarization, Viewed as the deliberate action among a
localized population of restricting or eliminating its
migratory behavior as a response to changing environmental
circumstances. Both the nature of and the rate of
sedentarization have changed considerably in the last two
decades as increased State control and expanding agricul-
tural development have made it more difficult to maintain a
pastoral nomadic adaptation.

The study has three primary objectives: 1) to
identify causal factors involved in the process of social
change SEE sedentarization; 2) to examine and critique
Fredrik Barth’s commonly accepted model of sedentarization;
and 3) to increase our general knowledge and understanding

Of the pastoral nomadic adaptation.

The final objective is met throughout the disserta—

tion but primarily in two chapters which provide a brief

 

 

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ethnographic overview of the Kordshuli, focusing on the
various organizational levels of the group.

The second objective is addressed primarily in the
penultimate chapter. Barth's model is criticized on a
number of points (e g., internal contradictions; Barth's
assumptions on pastoral capital; the denial of the cultural
context of sedentarization; and the presentation of
sedentarization as an absolute, irreversible process). The
point made is that Barth's model is inadequate at various
levels: it cannot adequately explain the sedentarization
process even as it worked for the Basseri at the time of his
research; it does not take into account the social, economic,
and political shifts which have resulted in an increased
rate of sedentarization for many nomads in southern Iran;
nor does it consider variations in the sedentarization
process (e.g., dispersed economic households, marginal
nomadism, and group sedentarization). TheSe variations are
discussed and the suggestion is made that a different model
may prove more useful in understanding the nature of change
and sedentarization as relative shifts in the degree of
nomadism or sedentism practiced by any group.

The primary objective is met through an examination
of change in the political system over time (chapter five),
Change in the economic system of the group (chapter six),
and the impact of these changes on the Kordshuli (chapter
seven). A major focus of these chapters is the effect of

increased State control on the political and economic

 

t————

processes of the Kordshuli with particular reference to the
changes that have directly affected the Kordshuli's access
to resources: land, water, and labor.

Traditional means of alleviating pressure on re—
sources (e.g., warfare) or the consolidation and fragmenta—
tion of camp groups have been eliminated by the State
except fission in the direction of sedentarization. Land
reform, nationalization of rangeland, and agricultural
encroachment on traditional pastureland (supported by
government development projects) have all made a pastoral
nomadic existence difficult, if not impossible for some,
to maintain.

Thus, the general conclusion reached in this study
is that sedentarization for the Kordshuli seems, in many
ways, inevitable. In the face of major changes in the
political and economic structures of both the Kordshuli
and the larger State the ability of most nomadic pastoral
households to maintain this lifestyle is drastically
diminished. The small groups which continue to be in
evidence as larger organizational units break down and are

dispersed by State action are left with few alternatives:

'attempt to remain nomadic under increasingly difficult

conditions or settle down.
As a final statement, it is pointed out that the

recent revolution in Iran has modified these conclusions.

 

 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While it is impossible to adequately thank all those
who in some way aided me in my attempts to complete this
work, I would like to acknowledge the special contributions
of some.

I would first like to acknowledge the support,
criticisms, and suggestions of my doctoral committee: Drs.
Harry Raulet, Robert McKinley, and John Hinnant.

I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. David
Stronach, Director of the British Institute of Persian
Studies, for his hospitality, congeniality, and assistance
when I first arrived in Iran. I would also like to express
my gratitude to Clive Newell and Paul Boveé, two other
students of Persian culture, who lent me the use of their
couch for two weeks and watched me hang on for seven months
trying to get an elusive research permit from an entrenched
bureaucracy.

A special debt of gratitude is owed Dr. Colin
MacKinnon, Director of the American Institute of Iranian
Studies, for his continued patience and persistence in
assisting me in my quest for a research permit.

I am also in debt to Dr. Sekandar Amanolahi of
Shiraz University (formerly Pahlavi University) who not only

helped me choose the group, the Kordshuli, with whom I lived

ii

 

 

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but also was willing to agree to an official, yet nominal,
collaborative work effort so that the government would issue
me a research permit.

I must also thank Dr. Peter Prindle, his wife, Tamae,
and daughter. They provided me with a home away from home
in Shiraz. They offered friendship, sharing and caring.

And perhaps (jokingly) most important, I could take a hot
shower at their home after a month or more of wandering.

Among the Kordshuli, with whom I lived and worked,
there are a few people who deserve special thanks. While I
appreciate the assistance and hospitality of all the
khavanin (the chief and his relatives) who live in Khongesht
and Kaftar, two men and their families deserve further
mention. First, I thank the deposed kalantar (chief) of
the Kordshuli, Amir Hossein Setudeh, and his wife and
children who offered assistance, hospitality, and friendship
in a strange environment, Second, I deeply thank Amir Qoli
Setudeh and his wife, Fereshteh, who provided friendship
and hospitality far beyond that normally accorded strangers.
With them I found respite, comfort, and a most congenial
atmosphere.

Certainly, many thanks must go to all of the nomadic
Kordshuli who put up with my presence, and especially to the
5EE§§QQ§§ (headmen) with whom I lived. I would, however,
like to express special appreciation to Mirza Qoli Morovat
and his brother, Eskandar Morovat, and their families for
treating me as a friend and equal, as a member of their

family.

 

 

Finally I would like to thank my edito-, Brenda
Davidson, who had no say about style, only punctuation, and,
of course, my typist and friend, Beth Handrick, who faced
deadlines as if that word, deadline, were to be taken

literally.

 

iv

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables
List of Figures
Chapter

I. THE STUDY . .
Introduction and the Statement of the
Problem
Purpose of the Study
Methodology
Theoretical Framework
Dissertation Format

II. THE SETTING .

Environmental/Geographic Dimension
Sarhad . . . .
Central Zone
Garm—e sir .

Social Landscape and Migratory Round
Eilaq (Summer Pastures) .
Qeshlaq (Winter Pastures)
Rah—e Kuch (Migration Route)

Historical Dimension . . .

III. TAIFEH KORDSHULI .
Huneh Level (Household)
Beileh Level (Camp)
Tireh Level (Section)
Taifeh Level (Tribe)

IV. SOCIAL PROCESSES .
Marriage Preferences and Marriage Types
The Marriage Contract and the Wedding
Post— Marital Residence ~
Inheritance -

V. POLITICAL PROCESSES .
Historical Political DevelOpment
Incursive Period . .
Qashqa' 1 Period
Independent Period
Entezamat Period
Afsar— e Entezamat-—D1sc1plinary
Officer . .

V

129
133

136

 

Chap

 

Chapter

Kadkhoda . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kalantar

Power and ContrOl in the Tireh
Post— Entezamat Period

VI. ECONOMIC PROCESSES . .
Taifeh Level——Independent Period
Sarhad (Summer Pasture Area)
Rah—e Kuch (Migration Route) .
Garm—e Sir (Winter Pasture Area)
Taifeh Level——Entezamat Period
Tireh and Huneh Level

VII. SEDENTARIZATION .
Barth's Model of Sedentarization
”Succeed or Surpass” Model
Upper Crisis Zone .
”Failure and Fall— —Away” MOdel
Lower Crisis Zone

Variations in the SedentarizatiOn PrOCess

Dispersed Economic Household
Case 1: Kakakhan . .
Case 2: Haji Ali Mirza
Marginal Nomadism .
Group Sedentarization
Kordshuli Tirehs and Sedentarization
Babamaleki . . . . . . .
Lori Almas
Lori Jamshid
Impact of Political Shifts
Impact of Economic Shifts

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Barth's Model of Sedentarization
Change and Sedentarization among the
Kordshuli . . . . . . . .
Further ConsideratiOns

Glossary

.Notes

Bibliography

vi

143
149
150
166

172
173
174
176
178
186
193

210
211
214
220
236
238
250
251
252
254
258
261
263
264
267
272
276
292

306
306

311
315

319
321

323

 

 

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30.10.46

 

 

LIST OF TABLES

 

Table
3.1 Household Composition by Tireh . . . . .‘. . . 58
3.2 Kordshuli Tirehs——1977 . . . . 77
4.1 Distance of relationship of wife to husband . 94
6.1 Flock size/household heads dependent on that
flock . . . . 199
6.2 Flock size/nomadic tent hOusehold and
dispersed economic household formation . . . 202 ,9
.1 Recent land purchases-—Babamaleki . . . . . . 264 l'
7.2 Lori Almas tireh——land ownership . . . . . . . 269
7.3 Lori Jamshid tireh——land ownership . . . . . . 273

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure
2.1 Fars Province, Iran . . . . . . 21
2.2 The range of Kordshuli aetivity in Fars
Province: quid to Mobarakabad . . . . . . 22
2.3 Location of Kordshuli tirehs in summer
pastures . . . 29
2.4 Selected pastoral nomadic migration routes——
Fars Province (after Salzer 1974) . . . . . . 30 .

2.5 Northern portion of migration route of the
Kordshuli and neighboring tribes (not to

 

scale) . . . . 40
2.6 Southern portiOn of migration route Of the

Kordshuli (not to scale) . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.7 Genealogy of Kordshuli chiefs . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1 Kordshuli tents. chador and hajir . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Origins of Kordshuli tirehs . . . 78
4.1 Post—marital residence with natal househOlds . 111
5.1 Changing political influence and control

among the Kordshuli . . . . . . 134
5.2 Location of Kordshuli tirehs in summer

pastures--(eilaq) . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.1 Average flock size in each tireh . . . . . . "205
7.1 Sedentarization through capital loss or

accumulation (after Vandervert 1972) . . . . 214
7.2 POpulation flow before effective State

control . . . 282
7.3 Population flow with increased State cOntrol . 284
7.4 Fission and fusion of Kordshuli organizational

units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

viii

 

 

CHAPTER I

THE STUDY

Introduction and Statement of
the Problem

 

Many of the cultural groups and modes of human adap—
tation traditionally studied by anthropologists are fast
disappearing as the modern world overwhelms traditional
adaptations. Once such adaptation is that of pastoral
nomadism.l The reasons for the diminishment of nomadism
throughout the world are multifold, but in all cases, the
changes which occur in the adaptive strategies of individuals
and groups are, at least partially, the result of nomads
settling down—-sedentarization.

The problem of sedentarization has been given ethno—
graphic treatment by Fredrick Barth in Nomads of South Persia
(1961). Barth’s model of sedentarization basically claims
that sedentarization is the normal consequence of extreme
capital accumulation or extreme capital losses, and that it,
thus, accounts for the social/economic homogeneity of the
Basseri pastoral nomads as well as for the demographic
balance of the total tribal population that obtains in the
area.

Barth's study stimulated many researchers to build on

his foundations, or to criticize his View as being inadequate

 

 

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or, at best, overgeneralized. Many of the researchers to
follow Barth have shown that sedentarization for other
nomadic groups does not necessarily support his model.

Their Objections include the fact that nomads may settle for
other than economic reasons, (e.g., political factors), and
that Barth's model could not account for forms of sedentarie
zation other than individual settlement (e.g., the group
settlements of entire communities), (cf. Irons 1972, Swidler
1973, Bates 1973). Other researchers merely accepted Barth's
model as valid for the Basseri and used it as the spring-
board for comparison, or they applied it to other groups to
validate its cross—cultural applicability (of. Beck 1980,

Vandervert 1972). I personally, felt that Barth's lead was

fruitful but that he had only investigated limited aspects
of this form of social change.

My original intent when I began this project was to
study further the process of sedentarization, perhaps'even
among the Basseri with whom Barth had worked. I felt that
while Barth had made a brilliant contribution to the anthro—
p010gy of pastoral nomadism, there were a number of problem—
atic areas in his study. A number of these problems arose,
no doubt, because Barth had spent only three months with one
group of Basseri, most of that time during spring migration,
Most of his data, then, were based on informant interviews
rather than on personal observation. I felt it likely that
there were possible problems with Barth's interpretation

since he could not really put his analysis into the

 

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appropriate cultural context. The fact that he camped and
migrated almost exclusively with the chief's retinue made
suspect his attempts to generalize to the entire group. The
chief's camp is not likely to be representative of nomad
camps in general. For instance, it is likely to have
greater access to some of the better pastures as well as
access to more and better information about the prospects
for sedentarization. In retrospect, this latter concern
seems even more reasonable since many of the sedentarized
Kordshuli work as share croppers on land belonging to the
khavanin (the chief and his family). Thus, sedentarization
may be more appealing if one has a reasonable likelihood of
finding adequate work. That is, for example, the degree of

poverty that ''forces” sedentarization may, in many cases, be

 

a function of prior knowledge of employability.

Also, I felt that Barth, in his study, viewed
sedentarization too much as an absolute, irreversible pro—
cess rather than as part of a larger nomadism/sedentism
continuum.2 Certainly, changes in the economic environment
of any pastoral nomad group could lead to sedentarization
but changes in the circumstances that led to this shift
could also allow a return to nomadism. Sedentarization
should not be seen as only the complete abandonment of
nomadism but rather as a relative shift in the degree of
nomadism to the degree of sedentism. While it may include

an absolute form, it must also include relative forms.

 

 

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Another point which Barth overlooked in his limited
economic model is that changes in the cultural environment
of the Basseri (e.g., increasing control of resources by the
central government), could also affect the ability of the

nomads to maintain their adaptation. I believed that a

 

fuller understanding of the process could be gained by
examining better the reasons for settling (out of nomadic
life). That is, there are not only economic processes but
also environmental, political, demographic, and cultural

processes which may direct a shift toward increased

 

sedentism. Similarly, many of these may be reversible as
conditions change, thereby increasing the degree of nomadism
(cf. Salzman 1980: 6).

The final impetus for this study of sedentarization
came from my belief that, despite the adequacy or inadequacy
of Barth's study, it was necessary to examine the results of

'the deposition of the chiefs and the takeover of tribal
affairs by the central government, which had only just
occurred at the time of Barth's research.

Unfortunately, as I mention in more detail below, I
was unable to carry out the research as planned due to

government restrictions on my movements as well as on that

 

of the nomads. Still, I maintained my interest in sedentari—
zation and saw that the rate of sedentarization, as well as
the number of nomads sedentarizing, had increased greatly in
the past two decades. The nomads attributed this to the

fact that migration was troublesome and that it was difficult

 

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to find adequate pastures for the animals. The problem, as
I perceived it, was to put into perspective the nature and
scope of the changes in the environment of the Kordshuli
that have contributed to these expressed feelings, and their
responses to these changes. The options that the Kordshuli
activate, while perhaps expectable at some level, are still
only part of the range of options available to them. Some
readers might argue that the shift to a settled life is a
:31: accompli among nomads in developing countries. In
response, I would only point out Shahrani's study (1979), ‘h
which shows that ”the Kirghiz case further demonstrates that
in the context of political developments in modern nation—
states the direction of social change in a pastoral society
need not be always toward an agricultural or urban way of
life; the possibility of change within a pastoral regime
exists and can provide a practical and successful alterna—
tive" (p.: xxiii). The idea that sedentarization is a
response to specific political and economic shifts in the
environment of a nomadic group is only a hypothesis which
must be tested and made explicable in terms of actual events

in the area.

Purpose of the Study

 

This study concentrates on social change among a
pastoral nomadic group in southwestern Iran, the Kordshuli.
The changes that have occurred and are occurring will be
examined through changing social, political, and economic

systems. A major focus will be sedentarization, which is a

 

 

 

 

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function of these changing systems, within the framework of
a changing external environment. Sedentarization will be
viewed, in this context, primarily as a strategic adaptation
(i.e., the deliberate action taken by a localized population
to restrict or eliminate its migratory behavior and pastoral
pursuits as a response to changing environmental circum—
stances).

The study has three major objectives. The material
presented in this study will serve to increase our knowledge
and understanding of the pastoral nomadic adaptation
generally, and processes of social and cultural change,
specifically. Despite the increase in the number of studies
on pastoral nomads, there is still a dearth of information
on the nature of the adaptation in general terms. That is,
we have specific information on economic systems or political
adaptations for a few nomadic groups (e.g., Bates 1973,
Fazel 1971, Irons 1972), but the overview is still incom—
plete. The possible range of variation becomes apparent
only with more ethnographic examples.

The second objective of the study is to present,
with a general ethnographic sketch, a view of sedentarization
which, although derived from the study of the Kordshuli,
should prove more useful in understanding change and seden—
tarization than Barth's (1961) commonly accepted, yet
inadequate, model. This is important because Barth's model,
seemingly, has been accepted without question and because, at

the time of this research, there was a notable lack of data

 

on 11

11.115

9113

1111

 

on the sedentarization process for other groups.

The third objective of this study is to identify
causal factors involved in the processes of social change
gag sedentarization, within a general ecological framework.
A further statement of this perspective will be made later

in this chapter.

Methodology

The research for this dissertation was carried out

between November 1975 and August 1977 in two major stages.

The first stage included general library research in Tehran
and Shiraz while I was attempting to secure a research
permit from the Iranian government. The second stage was
from September 1976 to August 1977 when I lived with the
Kordshuli pastoral nomads in Fars Province.

All interviews and discussions, except some with two
sons of the kalantar (chief), were conducted in Persian or
Lori, a dialect of Persian. The discussions with Pasha Khan
and Mahmud Khan Setudeh were primarily in English since both
of these men had studied in the United States.

The intent of my original research project had been
to study both a group of nomads and a recently sedentarized
portion of that group to understand better the complete
range of the sedentarization process. The government of
Iran, however, had given me permission to live with the
nomads only, not to do research in the nearby villages.

This meant that from the very beginning I was stymied in my

attempt to gather complete information about sedentarization

 

 

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and the processes of social and cultural change. Still, I
felt that I could gather adequate information from the
nomads that would, at least, give some additional insight
into the processes involved.

Even this attempt was stymied to some extent by the
government's ”request” that I move every month or so to live
with another kadkhoda (headman) of the various sections
(tiggh)3 of the Kordshuli. There are eight kadkhodas and I
was to live with each one for a rather short period of time.
While it may have given me the chance to experience more
fully the nomadic lifestyle, it created more than a few
problems for data gathering. It is, for example, very
difficult to gain rapport with any group when they have no
time to become familiar with the stranger in their midst.
0f the eight groups, two of the kadkhodas were reserved to
taciturn towards me fearing I was a government agent trying
to find youths without identity cards. Four of the others
treated me as a guest which, while culturally appropriate,
disallowed certain types of questions. The final two
treated me more like a friend, but I did not have the time
to gain enough of their confidence to ask many personal
questions or to pry into the details of their economic
situation. >

Due to these constraints on my ability to ask
questions, a lot of my material is based on a combination of
participant observation and very broad—based questions.

Informal interviews were useful but hardly could ever go

 

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into the depth that I would have desired as a data gathering
exercise. There were also a number of problems with basic
census gathering. While I would have liked to visit each
tent household, it was impossible. Many of the camps were
too greatly dispersed for me to reach many of the households._
While a local assistant would have proved invaluable, I did
not have the funds to hire the few young men who could read
and write and who were neither in school nor acting as
shepherds for their family's flock. Therefore, I depended

on the kadkhodas for most of my primary information. When-
ever possible this information was corroborated by actual
household heads or, secondarily, by friends and neighbors.
Not all data were thus cross—checked; however, the data that
were cross—checked indicate a fairly high level of relia-
bility.

Throughout the dissertation there will be little
reference to one of the sections, Moradshafi'i. This is
because the kadkhoda and his family were unwilling to share
any of their information with me and the rest of the section
was not camped close enough for me to attempt personal inter—
views. However, I feel that any generalizations that I
might make for the rest of the sections are likely to hold
true for this one group, too.

Due to the nature of data gathering, more or less
forced on me by circumstance, the reader may find some
subjective statements which seem to have no objective data

bases. I have gained a subjective awareness of the Kordshuli

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10

that is based on the totality of my life with them. Not
only the directed interviews but also the daily banter which
is found in all groups served to reinforce my understanding
of the Kordshuli and to fill in the gaps that participant
Observation creates when we cannot always understand the
behavior before us. This subjective appreciation, while
perhaps not quantifiable, adds a level of understanding
beyond that of any ”objective” data that may have been
collected, and certainly allows for a richer and fuller
picture of that group of people who call themselves

Kordshuli.

Theoretical Framework

 

 

The primary approach used in this study, while not
always explicit, may generally be considered a form of
ecological anthropology. This is partly because of the
amenability of this perspective to the study of pastoral
nomads as well as because of the specific subjects that I
was interested in. The usefulness of an ecological approach
in the study of pastoralists, especially nomadic pastoral-
ists, has been quite apparent in the ethnographic literature.
Even some of the early structural—functional/social struc—
tural researchers noted the importance of the relationship
of social and political forms to the ecological needs of
animals.

A prime example of this awareness is shown in Evans—
Pritchard's classic monograph, The Nuer, which, while focus-

ing on political institutions, recognizes the importance of

 

 

 

 

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11

ecological variables: ”political institutions are its [the
study] main theme, but they cannot be understood without
taking into account environment and modes of livelihood”
(Evans—Pritchard 1971: 4; orig. 1940).

-Of course, The Nuer is but one of a number of
studies that relate to or explicitly use an ecological per-
spective. Certainly, there has been a long tradition of
utilizing an ecological perspective in certain areas of the
world to enhance our understanding of pastoral societies
(e.g., in East Africa (cf. Gulliver 1955; Dyson—Hudson 1966;
Dahl 1979) and in the Middle East and Central Asia (cf.
Krader 1955, 1957; Barth 1961; Bates 1973; Shahrani 1979)).
In many cases it may be that an ecological approach appeals
to pastoral nomadic studies because there is often less
elaboration of social, political, and religious practices
among many pastoral nomads than there is among their settled
counterparts. That is, such factors as movement/migration
may disallow or inhibit extreme elaboration of many forms
which might otherwise attract the interest of the researcher.
Since modern pastoral nomads usually are to be found in
marginal environments, much of the energy of the group
seemingly is directed towards overcoming the ”hardships” of
the environment. Thus, the ecological approach in these
cases is aptly suited for the description, examination, and
analysis of the relationship and adaptation of the group to

its environment.

 

 

 

 

 

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It may also be the case that an ecological approach
has proven useful in the study of pastoral nomads because of
the particular focus of many of these studies. That is,
such topics as the use of resources and sedentarization show
a concern with many aspects of a group‘s adaptation that an
ecological anthropologist would find interesting and impor—
tant for understanding change (and stability) within that
group.

In the context of this dissertation I am not trying
to make any broad statements concerning the overall utility
of an ecological perspective other than the fact that it is
generally amenable to the major topical concerns of this
study. Thus, while I accept the usefulness of a general
ecological approach for this study, I am not trying to say
that it is the only way, nor in all cases the best way to
examine social change. The general premises of ecological
theory which focus on the interaction of culture and environ—
ment—-natural and cultural——provide a general framework
within which my analysis can be ordered.

However, I do not situate this study solely in the
realm of an ecological tradition. To more fully understand
the changes that the Kordshuli are experiencing, I also use
some elements of other traditions which lend themselves to
the study of sedentarization. For example, structural
Marxism which allows for an examination of any contradiction
that obtains between infrastructure and superstructure (e.g.,

between forces and relations of production), gives some

 

addition
of sede1
npproacl
tionnl
inhibit
These 1
desired
region:
furthe:

sedent;

I feel
Shahra

study

 

1_—

13

additional insight into the reasons for the intensification
of sedentarization among the Kordshuli which an ecological
approach does not allow. Thus, I am able to show how tradi—
tional organizational features and values of the Kordshuli
inhibit productivity by limiting labor resource options.
These limited labor resources, which are only a function of
desired modes of activity not of an actual shortage of
regionally available labor, then may have the result of
further limiting the Options of the nomadic household making
sedentarization even more likely.
Similarly, I include a historical perspective which
I feel is necessary to understand present adaptations.
Shahrani, who uses a cultural ecological framework for his
study of the Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan, points out:
No ecological process is fully comprehensible in a
time vacuum . . . therefore . . . an historical
perspective is adopted along with a cultural ecological
framework, based on a belief that it is not possible
’to fully comprehend the nature, direction, and magni—
tude of the adaptive success or failure of any kind of
systematic change unless the dynamic relationship among
the parts within a system, as well as its relationships
within the larger complex, are assessed under different
conditions at different times (1979: xxi).
I have, therefore, attempted to show how shifts over time in
political, economic, and social spheres have contributed to
increased sedentarization. Some of these changes have been
forced on the Kordshuli either directly by the central
government, or indirectly by the changing environmental
situation; other changes have been chosen from a number of

possible options. It is only through an examination of the

changes in the leadership roles and the changes in the

 

 

 

 

fun

1101
nor
Sti
ecc
snz
pr:
on

in

11

fl)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

14

function of organizational units that a fuller understanding
of change and sedentarization can be realized.

I have drawn upon approaches other than those tradi—
tionally considered ecological in an attempt to provide a
more open-ended approach to the study of sedentarization.
Still, I do focus on many of the traditional topics of an
ecological approach. The interaction of larger populations,
small groups, and individuals with their environments is of
primary interest. These environments include not only
natural environmental features such as climatic variation
but also cultural environmental features such as settled
populations and the central government. I examine the way
in which changes in the cultural environment of the
Kordshuli (e.g., increased State control or competition for
resources), affect the adaptation of the Kordshuli nomad
as well as the way in which certain changes in the natural
environment (e.g., drought), create varied options for the
Kordshuli, some of which involve quitting the nomadic
system.

Many of the studies which have been labeled ecological
do not attempt to take macro—structures into account nor are
they always sensitive to the larger cultural or historical
context of certain phenomena. This is more than evident in
Barth's work on the Basseri where he claims to ”present the
analysis in terms of a general ecologic viewpoint” (1961:
foreword). If, indeed, Barth had been more direct in his

attempt to use an ecological framework, he would not have

 

 

 

 

isolat
conten
from 2
econor
Barth
to th
Barth
least
ecolc
1955‘,

such

15

isolated the phenomenon of sedentarization from its cultural
context as he did. Rather, Barth approached his study more
from a model of strategic actions derived from the field of
economics. As I mention at the end of this dissertation,
Barth's focus on economic transactional analysis blinded him
to the cultural context of the sedentarization process.
Barth's study would have benefitted greatly if he had at
least been sensitive to the relationship between cultural
ecology and levels of soOiocultural integration (Steward
1955) or even to the awareness by other earlier researchers
such as Lattimore (1962) of the impact of larger level
political units on encapsulated local level groups.

Still, while I claim the utility of an ecological
perspective, there is recognition of the fact that an eco-
logical approach, although useful at a mulitude of levels
within any system, has a number of difficulties which need
to be overcome; one of the most impOrtant problems being that
of scope. That is, when the Kordshuli were part of a
”traditional” nomadic system, their interactions with the
natural and cultural environment were plausibly manageable
within an ecological framework. Even though there may be
influence from the larger governmental sphere, this influence
and its effects on the nomadic sphere are relatively easy to
discern. Unfortunately, with the breaching of system
boundaries through increasing governmental control and
through a shift from primarily subsistence herding to a com-

bination of subsistence and market—oriented herding, the

 

 

large
sideI
lhilc
levei
been]

and

stra
ecol
com
the
may
luv

par

fir

16

larger system which an ecological approach would have to con—
sider becomes unmanageable in both size and complexity.

While the approach should be applicable and viable at the
level of the wider system, we find that, practically, it
becomes overburdened with variables based on local, national,
and even international events.

Still, while I may not be able to identify all con—
straints/hazards and incentives as would be desireable in an
ecological analysis, it is possible to point out some of the
conflict and contradiction that occur within the system at
the local level. For example, one set of variables which
may be examined at the individual or small group level
involves the concept of choice which can be considered one
part of this ecological approach as it fits in with problem
solving and decision making processes (Bennett 1969: 11).
Also, the use, albeit minimally, of other approaches or
directions of inquiry is part of an attempt to better under—
stand the processes involved. All of this is, of course,
but one step in understanding this form of change. Hope—
fully, it may lead to further studies which can put the
process into the broader perspective which will View the
effects of the development of a global system on this one

group of people.

Dissertation Format

 

The format of the dissertation will be in three

 

broadly sketched, although not explicit sections. The first

section, chapters one and two, will include a statement of

 

the p
discu
The s
ecolc
tific
the 1

11511

an e
will
cure

580.1

no
non
zat
res
1'11

ch:

 

 

 

17

the problem and the direction of the study, as well as a
discussion of the theoretical orientation (Chapter one).
The second chapter will deal broadly with the environoment,
ecology, and history of Kordshuli. This will include iden-
tification of both the natural and cultural environments of
the Kordshuli, as well as a brief discussion of their
history.

The next section, chapters three and four, will be
an enthnographic overview of the Kordshuli. Chapter three
will describe the various levels of Kordshuli social struc—
ture: the tent household (huneh), the camp (beileh), the
section (EEEEE)’ and the tribe (taifeh). This will include
a discussion of the social, political, and economic func—
tions at each level and how they relate to the pastoral
nomadic adaptation. Chapter four will examine social organi-
zational features such as marriage patterns, post—marital
residence patterns, and inheritance. This chapter, then,
will include some of the processual features of the preceding
chapter.

The final section, chapters five, six, and seven,
will form the body of the analysis of change within the
political and economic spheres. Chapter five will focus on
the changing political system of the Kordshuli over time.
The changes will be examined as they affect the various
structural levels of the Kordshuli throughout five major
historical periods: Incursive period, Qashga'i period,

Independent period, Entezamat period (tribal affairs office),

 

and Post
will dea
at the v
Mush
period.

sedentai
of sedeI
of win
The rem:
politic
are ehh
cussion
hake pr
changes

Cihding

T--------------—-—-——————————'rt { ‘--H——'*

18

and Post—Entezamat period. The next chapter (chapter six)
will deal first with the general nature of economic processes
at the various social structural levels——taifeh, tirgh, and
hungh--and changes that have occurred since the independent
period. The final chapter (chapter seven) will focus on
sedentarization. One of the most commonly accepted models
of sedentarization (Barth 1961) will be critiqued and forms
of sedentarization among the Kordshuli will be discussed.
The remainder of the chapter will focus on the impact of
political and economic change on the Kordshuli and how these
are enhancing the prospects for sedentarization. The dis-
cussion will identify elements of causation and will also
make predictions by hypothesizing the outcomes of the
changes discussed in the previous chapters. A general con-

eluding statement will follow in chapter eight.

 

 

1101111

are

 

CHAPTER II
THE SETTING

The Kordshuli are primarily a group of pastoral
nomads who inhabit, occupy, and migrate through specific
areas of Fars Province in southwestern Iran during their
annual productive cycle. The Kordshuli number approximately
353 households (excluding the chiefly family), 296 of which
live as pastoral nomads in goat hair tents throughout the
entire year. The rest of the families that are recognized
as Kordshuli are either settled landowners, agricultural
laborers, share croppers, or wage laborers who still recog—
nize the authority of the kadkhoda (headman) of their £1322
(section). Most of these families live either in sarhad
(summer pasture area) or in the central zone between winter
and summer pastures. Some of these families continue to
engage in some pastoralism either through the formation of
dispersed economic household units where one family member
cares for the joint flock and others care for other joint
property, or through a form of marginal or seasonal nomadism
where the family lives in a tent for part of the year. The
average household size among the nomadic portion of the
group is 5.5 persons, making the entire nomadic population

approximately 1,320 individuals. Aspects of social,

19

 

 

 

 

economic, and P‘
following chapt'
Variati«
scape all play
Kordshuli. Thi
Kordshuli in sp
cuss both envir

of the Kordshul

g
Pars P1
graphically ‘dor.
located betweei
KOl‘dshuli util:
1i 250 miles 1,
Tough1y from t
north, to the
1”the south.
while Figure 2
actiVity, The
hohethe prc

Zone
, and
m

The nc

some
Sard ' .
Q .

with much of .

(Q. 6,900 fee

 

20

economic, and political organization are detailed in the
following chapter.

Variations in climate, topography, and social land—
scape all play an important role in the yearly cycle of the
Kordshuli. This chapter is an attempt to locate the
Kordshuli in space as well as in time. That is, I will dis-
cuss both environmental/geographic and historical dimensions

of the Kordshuli.

Environmental/Geographic Dimension

Fars Province, with its hot and dry climate, topo—
graphically dominated by the Zagros mountain range, is
located between latitudes 27° 37' and 55° 38'E. The
Kordshuli utilize a portion of this broad area, approximate—
ly 250 miles long and 20 to 50 miles wide. It extends
roughly from the town of quid, south of Abadeh, in the
north, to the city of Jahrom (and the village of Mobarakabad)
in the south. Figure 2.1 locates Fars Province in Iran,
while Figure 2.2 shows the general range of Kordshuli
activity. The climate and topography of Fars effectively
divide the province into three broad zones: sarhad, central

. 1
zone, and garm—e Sir.

Sarhad
The northern part of Fars is called sarhad (or by
Some §E£Q§1£ = cold region). It is a very mountainous region
With much of the region above an elevation of 2,100 meters

(C- 6,900 feet). The highest elevation in sarhad is
l

 

 

21

 

 

 

 

Turkey U.S.S.R. N
Caspian
Sea
- Tehran

g

- Esfahan 3

Iraq '3

m

r

u

‘2

Shiraz
FARS
:
m
J.)
U)
r
x
m
a
Persian
Gulf
FIGURE 2.1 Fars Province, Iran

 

 

 

 

22

     

FARS PROVINCE

° Shiraz

  
  

 

 

 

.Jahrom
O

   

Mobarakabad

  

 

 

 

FIGURE 2.2 The range of Kordshuli activity in Fars
Province: quid to Mobarakabad

 

 

Kuh-e Dina at 4;
The highest peal
rt approximatelj
severe, with tel
Topogra
tain ranges int
systems wherein
comnunities. W
culture is prov
many fresh wate
There are also
111 the higher n
and in some of
The pr;
personal COflSlll
are bOth Very
bread is the 11]
cause they 0 f t
animals it the
also a pODUIar
tenths) beans
the 011) are E
Erow DOplar t1

iChlefs) of ti

7—

23

Kuh—e Dina at 4,276 meters (slightly more than 14,000 feet).
The highest peak in or near Kordshuli territory is Kuh—e Bul
at approximately 13>OOO feet. The winters can be quite
severe, with temperature minimums below 14°F (—10 C).

Topographically, the region is made up of wide moun—
tain ranges interspersed with a number of small valley
systems wherein are located numerous small agricultural
communities. While some of the water for irrigation agri—
culture is provided by pump wells, most water comes from the
many fresh water springs and streams fed by mountain snows.
There are also a number of uncultivated pasture areas, both
in the higher mountains where cultivation is impractical,
and in some of the open valleys where water is limited.

The primary crops grown in the valley areas for both
personal consumption and sale are wheat and barley. These
are both very important for the Kordshuli: wheat because
bread is the most important food for the nomads; barley be—

cause they often have to provide extra fodder for the

 

animals if the season is particularly dry. Sugar beets are
also a popular cash crop. In addition, such products as
lentils, beans, chick peas, and sunflowers (primarily for
the oil) are grown. Some of the wealthier land owners also
grow poplar trees as a cash crop. Many of the khavanin

l (chiefs) of the Kordshuli are among this latter group.

 

 

 

 

l have <
Persian name Si‘:
Kordshuli, this
quarters, betwe
warmer winters.
wear. Summer or
minimum in mint
cipitation, the
the winter moot

The are
many broad exp;
With a wide rat
tlese cultivatw
0rby Wells. .
land that are .

Pastoral nomad

 

24
Central Zone

I have chosen not to refer to this region by a
Persian name since the Kordshuli themselves do not. For the
Kordshuli, this is only the area between summer and winter
quarters, between areas of cooler summers and those with
warmer winters. Temperatures are fairly mild throughout the
year. Summer may sometimes be hot,c. 102°F (39°C)——but the
minimum in winter does not often fall below freezing. Pre-
cipitation, therefore, is usually in the form of rain during
the winter months and averages around 10 inches annually.

The area is less mountainous than sarhad and has
many broad expansive plains, most of which are cultivated
with a wide range of vegetables and fruits. Almost all of
these cultivated fields are irrigated either by river water
or by wells. There are very few areas of useable pasture—
land that are uncultivated, making it extremely difficult for

pastoral nomads to find adequate resources during migration.

Garm—e sir
The southernmost region of Fars is very hot and arid;

garm—e sir means ”hot region.” The average elevation of the

 

area is less than 1,000 meters (0. 3,280 feet), with the
maximum elevation being approximately 2,300 meters (c. 7,550
feet). The summers are extremely hot and dry, with tempera—
ture maximums between 100° and 105°F (38° to 40°C) with
little if any rainfall. Winter temperatures rarely fall

below freezing and precipitation in the form of rain, except

 

 

 

on the higheSt p
this season.
Except i
graphy of this 1
central zone--f:
llany oi the val
cultural villagr
fruits and date
connected by um
ground water to
the walley--prc
lation. Mostc
illitebarreny (
lliube trees (3
For th.
and precipitat
seasonal avail
the various pa
h the team
wear, Therefc
teats migrate
0f theSe Dastr
siderable dis-
it has been S
because they

attire, and D8.

 

25

on the highest peaks, averages less than 8 inches during
this season.

Except for the lower overall elevation, the topo—
graphy of this region is quite similar to that of the
central zone——fairly broad valleys with high mountains.

Many of the valleys are sparsely populated by small agri—
cultural villages, which focus their cultivation on citrus
fruits and dates. Tube wells and ganats——a series of wells
connected by underground channels that allow higher region
ground water to be brought to the surface in lower parts of
the valley——provide most of the water necessary for irri—
gation. Most of the uncultivated land in this region is
quite barren, covered only with sparse grasses and scattered
jujube trees (Zizyphus; Persian kggar).

For the Kordshuli, these differences in temperature
and precipitation are critical since they determine the
seasonal availability of pastures. Because of these factors
the various pasture areas within the total region utilized
by the Kordshuli become viable at different times of the
year. Therefore, the nomads and their flocks of sheep and
goats migrate according to the availability and productivity
of these pastures. Although the Kordshuli migrate a con—
siderable distance through the course of their yearly cycle,
it has been said that they practice ”vertical nomadism”
because they exploit altitudinal variations in water, temper-

ature, and pastures (Johnson 1969: 158; Salzer 1974: 8).

 

_S_o_c_:
While i‘
different pastu‘
do not, unfortu
as it becomes v
sedentary agric
occupy at varic
Kordshuli utili
We. Much of
both the avoid:
of the movemen‘
tlumen the sat
or winter past
The va
Contact and th
large degree,
locum. F01
°f time and Sr
time of Year 2
leiSions dist
functional di
is m only a
the area of K
sents bOth pa
literary Cyc
directly rel;

 

26

Social Landscape and Migratory Round

While it is necessary that the Kordshuli utilize
different pasture areas at different times of the year, they
do not, unfortunately, have unimpeded access to any pasture
as it becomes viable. Rather, there are a number of groups,
sedentary agriculturalists and other pastoral nomads, that
occupy at various times some of the territory that the
Kordshuli utilize at different times during their annual
cycle. Much of the task of the nomadic migration involves
both the avoidance of cultivated areas and the coordination
of the movements of various nomadic groups who must pass
through the same constrained area to reach their own summer
or winter pastures.

The various groups with whom the Kordshuli come into
contact and the nature of their interaction depend, to a
large degree, on both the season of the year as well as the
location. For the Kordshuli, there is not a strict division
of time and space. Rather, a location represents a certain
time of year and vice versa. That is, the environmental
divisions discussed above relate directly to temporal,
functional divisions made by the Kordshuli. Thus, sarhad
is not only a specific climatic/topographic zone; it is also
the area of Kordshuli summer pastures (gilaq) which repre—
sents both pasture use/availability and the season. The
migratory cycle is thus divided into three parts, which
directly relate to the seasonal utility of the climatic/

topographic zones above. All three represent different parts

 

 

 

of Kordshuli tel
flag (summer p:

huch (migration

Often w
pastures after
snow on many of
colored wild fl
caravan crosses
can finally loc
flu is part,
510W iov; t]
to be the home
security and r
°f the migrati
itfl) and sal
relilaced by th
Springs, whicy
animals Here
the Women havg
the anima1S h:
(hopefmy) V‘
In th

the higher mo
Droperty of t

over its use

 

27

of Kordshuli territory at different times of the year:
eilag (summer pasture), qeshlaq (winter pastures), and rah—e

kuch (migration route).

Eilaq (Summer Pastures)

Often when the Kordshuli first arrive in summer
pastures after the spring migration, there is still some
snow on many of the higher mountain pastures and brightly
colored wild flowers dot the countryside. As the migrating
caravan crosses the last mountain pass, so that the nomads u
can finally look down on the open valley of which their
eilaq is part, some of the women may ululate as an expres~
sion of joy; they have arrived home. Eilaq is considered
to be the homeland (gatan) of the Kordshuli; a place of
security and relative comfort. The thieves and predators
of the migration route have been left behind. The bitter
(Iglq) and salty (shur) water of winter quarters has been
replaced by the sweet (shirin) water of the natural mountain
springs, which is considered better for both humans and
animals. Here, the flocks do not require constant attention;
the women have more time to weave carpets and tent sections;
the animals have some time to get fatter off the fresh, lush
(hopefully) vegetation before many are sold at market.

In the past, the open pasture land and even many of
the higher mountain pastures were considered the private
prOperty of the kalantar (chief). He had absolute control

OVer its use. Now, most of these pastures are State

 

 

controlled. TI‘
(LUBE): accord
when the govern
The pin
Kordshuli SEE
This plain is t
steep mountains
sidered to be i
M extends
in the east (5
ever, as Figur
are much more
unusual to see
Likewise, ther
"Will, and soc
the general mg
of hrs. 1 h:
(tribes) that
with the KOrd‘
Qfishqa'i‘
Withi
smalr agricul
househoyds to
the householc‘
Kordshuli) a]
nor are they

settlement a]

 

28

controlled. Traditional usufruct rights of the sections
(Eireh), according to the general allocative scheme in effect
when the government took over, are still maintained.

The plain around Khongesht, the largest village in
Kordshuli eilaq, runs a northwest to southeasterly direction.
This plain is from 6 to 12 miles wide and is flanked by
steep mountains which are also part of the total area con—
sidered to be Kordshuli eilaq. The Kordshuli say that their
eilaq extends roughly from Ab Barik in the west to Amirabad
in the east (see Figure 2.3), approximately 50 miles. How—
ever, as Figure 2.3 indicates, most of the sections (Eireh)
are much more centralized than this. In fact, it is not
unusual to see Qashqa'i tents between Alibad and Ab Barik.
Likewise, there are a number of Basseri camps to the east,
north, and south of Kordshuli pastures. Figure 2.4 shows

the general migration routes of many of the pastoral nomads

'of Fars. I have given the names of those Qashqa'i taifeh

(tribes) that camp relatively close to or come into contact
with the Kordshuli; the others are referred to only as
Qashqa'i.

Within the area of Kordshuli eilaq are a number of
small agricultural villages ranging in size from 3 to 4
households to about 300 households at Khongesht. Many of
the households that comprise these villages are settled
Kordshuli, although most of these do not refer to themselves
nor are they referred to by the nomads as Kordshuli. With

settlement and loss of contact with the nomadic group, most

     

Cfififiw ammo

  

zoncn<

 

3rd! H.

 

can—nuulw. I

29

 

Adidafiovrrmosswmda soEESm as mzosflp Hassmpsox mo scepdooq m.m 35on

pmou upwm III
mw05xwmx Mo COHuMOOA IIAU
thamx r x

   

e.eue;meeeoz r 2

cheeses ages 1 es

meeH< egos r <4
exceeeenem . m

new mssfiz umvnmas< I 2<

sesxexms Heeamen< r s<

, «enema: pavemeu< r :<

  

esmhae

       

\

- \@t was». .., a sea

 

 

      

 

  

a wEmmwzo SJ.
4» .s ..
, C
/ .
.
. .. e
’
Nepazm . // . u
I t, .
g
/ .
Z .9
e ..
D 2N; it: Wow
. lusmuwco;¥4.1 m
. pfificm .wmm.MWWmmom Nmpflsm so

   

sesame .
cmsmwmm

   

 

  

Z¢MH

 

 

 

cnzmmmm.

Ti

H \ 4
. ‘
/O\ \ 2
(\Q E

mun

Pu.

I

i F

ii
iii

 

 

 

 

 

30

 

  
  
  
 
 
 
    

———- Qashqa'i
A—Amaleh
SB-Shishboluki
G—Gellezan

---- Khamseh
B—Basseri
K—Kordshuli

.... Kuhgiluye

 

g

 

 

FIGURE 2.4 Selected pastoral nomadic migration routes——
Fars Province (after Salzer 1974)

of these househ
ation. Some of
members of Kord
chapter seven).
heroes of the s
the latter is r
Khan, while Khv
Conflict situa
settled agricu
Space availabl
agricultural d
should arise,
act as mediatc
group. They i
ETOups; by ti
”*3 Terr Wealtl
traditional p,
The in
been denuded
Wood aS fireu
number of Var
for bOth the
sheep and go:

of the KOI‘ds]

Few of the n

uouutain has

these pastur

 

31

of these households are referred to by their village affili—
ation. Some of these villages are the home of settled
members of Kordshuli dispersed economic households (cf.
chapter seven). Khongesht and Kaftar are the primary resi-
dences of the settled khavanin (chiefs) of the Kordshuli;
the latter is the home village of the kalantar, Amir Hossein
Khan, while Khongesht is the home of his four brothers.
Conflict situations between the nomadic Kordshuli and the
settled agriculturalists are not frequent because of the
space available for Kordshuli use and because of the lack of
agricultural deveIOpment in the area. Even if conflict
should arise, it is common for members of the khavanin to
act as mediators despite their separation from the nomadic
group. They have power and are shown respect by both
groups: by the agriculturalists because of their position
as very wealthy landowners; by the nomads because of their
traditional position as leaders of the Kordshuli.

The mountains bordering the valley have generally
been denuded of trees by the local villagers, who used the
wood as firewood or building timbers. There are still a
number of varieties of plants and grasses that provide food
for both the nomads' flocks as well as for the numerous wild
sheep and goats that live throughout these mountains. Many
of the Kordshuli hunt these wild animals whenever possible.
Few of the nomadic households actually camp in the higher
mountain pasture areas, yet most take their flocks up to

these pastures daily. Even if pastures are adequate at

 

 

lower elevations
because of the r
are particularl‘
it will not onl
also produce sw
and the nights
mountains into
The non
summer or early
that signal the
Kordshuli are j
Unless the me
Say that pastu
begin 111isratio
sometime in Se
mi‘tlidtion towa

Bates 1973; 15

The Kr
territorially
different are
Some are Sepa
of three of t
lobarakaba d ,
Flthre 2‘2).
depth

of this

ticay The ‘

 

32

lower elevations, many Kordshuli prefer the mountain pastures
because of the abundance of a plant called jashir. The sheep
are particularly fond of this plant and the nomads say that
it will not only make the sheep more robust but that it will
also produce sweeter milk. As the days start to grow shorter
and the nights colder, the nomads start to move down from the
mountains into the open valley floor.

The nomads stay in Ellflfl from late spring until late
summer or early fall. The two most important parameters
that signal the end of summer for nomadic groups like the
Kordshuli are lack of adequate pastures and/or cold weather.
Unless the previous winter had been very dry, the Kordshuli
say that pasturage is still available and adequate when they
begin migration. Rather, it is the onset of cold weather,
sometime in September, which signals the beginning of fall
migration toward winter quarters (in contrast, see, e.g.,

Bates 1973: 19).

Qeshlaq (Winter Pastures)

The Kordshuli qeshlaq is much harder to delimit
territorially than Ellfifl' In fact, there are a number of
different areas utilized by the different tirehs (sections).
Some are separated by 50 to 60 miles or more. The qeshlags
of three of the tirehs are located around the village of
Mobarakabad, about 50 kilometers southwest of Jahrom (see
Figure 2.2). Another tireh's qeshlaq is located quite a bit
south of this village so that frequent interaction is imprac—

tical. The two closer tirehs can visit the village daily to

 

 

 

 

purchase minima
tions is locate
is located betw
located in the
en portion of
of these varior
The K01
areas; it is m
by strangers a:
pastoral nomad
many places ar
llso, many of
cut locations
villagers who
10 harrass the
Teasons for tl
The 35
mouhtains (lire
We t0 their
short while 0
ever, the Tea
helps Were to
usual, thus it
would have If
village ha (1 8

land “39 in t

 

T___i

33

purchase minimals supplies. The qeshlaq of two other sec—
tions is located in the mountains around Jahrom. One other
is located between Xafr and Jahrom, while the final one is
located in the area of Xafr. Figure 2.6, showing the south—
ern portion of the migration route, indicates the locations
of these various winter pasture areas.

The Kordshuli do not feel secure in Winter pasture
areas; it is not their home. They feel they are surrounded
by strangers and enemies. There are a number of other
pastoral nomadic groups-~Qashqa'i, ’Arab, Basseri—~who in
many places are competing for the same pasture resources.
Also, many of the villagers and their flocks in the differ—
ent locations may compete for limited pasturage. Some
villagers who dislike these nomads may go out of their way
to harrass them. A few brief examples will illustrate just
reasons for the concern by the Kordshuli.

The geshlag of tireh Bababmaleki is located in the
mountains directly north of Mobarakabad. Before the nomads
move to their winter campsite, they usually camp first for a
short while on the plain that leads into the foothills. How—
ever, the year that I travelled with the group, many house-
holds were forced to move into the mountains earlier than
usual, thus using up precious pasture areas sooner than they
would have liked. The previous year, the headman of the
village had asked for extra money from the Kordshuli for

land use in this area even though the land was not under his

rcontrol. The Kordshuli had refused to pay, so this year,

!

 

 

 

 

 

before the Kort
this pasture r
been set, yet
headman had to
judge so that
The sa
with a Qashqa'
was a very hea
have escalatec
with governmer
SElective tribe
Officers repr.
leaders to de'
case, it Was
exDressed the
times Could d
that the Offi
they could be
While
llolenCQ, it
to throw root
flocks. This

previous Yea

her.

be called ma

Kordshuli to

 

 

34

before the Kordshuli arrived, a fire ”accidentally” destroyed
this pasture resource. The Kordshuli knew that the fire had
been set, yet they had no legal recourse. They said that the
headman had too much money and could bribe both lawyers and
judge so that he would not lose a court fight.

The same tirgh also became involved in a conflict
with a Qashqa'i group over rights to pasture areas. There
was a very heated argument, which the Kordshuli say would
have escalated in the past into physical violence. Now,
with government control, both groups contacted their re—
spective tribal gendarmarie posts. The two Disciplinary
Officers representing these groups had to meet with camp
leaders to determine which group was in the right. In this
case, it was the Kordshuli group. Still, the Kordshuli
expressed their concern that different officers at different
times could decide against them, depending on the knowledge
that the officers had about pastoralism and on how easily
they could be bribed.

While this confrontation did not lead to physical
Violence, it is not unusual for shepherds of competing groups
to throw rocks at one another while they are tending their
flocks. This happened to two non—Kordshuli groups the
previous year and one of the shepherds died from the encoun_
ter.

Sometimes the nomads must put up with what can only
be called malicious mischief. It is customary for many

Kordshuli to construct a rock and dirt foundation for their

 

 

 

 

tent on their 1
(headman) of 01
to his usual 3
torn apart and
larger stones
been some of t
Kordshuli, but
foundation.

Two of
south of Mobar
pastoralists,
the year. Thu
way be somewhg

Apart
ease or diffic

tions, Some (

tiOns may be :
populatmn.
“Shut, the

relatively ea

In areas Wher

llladequhte, D

“80’ it may

to gain a use
Kordshuli ter

a .
nd Wlnter r;

 

35

tent on their most permanent winter camp site. The kadkhoda
(headman) of one of the sections camped near Jahrom returned
to his usual site only to find the rock foundation had been
torn apart and insults had been chalked on some of the
larger stones in the area. He knew that the culprits had
been some of the settled 'Arabs in the area who disliked
Kordshuli, but there was nothing to do except to rebuild the
foundation.

Two of the sections with their qeshlag on the plain
south of Mobarakabad must compete with tent-dwelling
pastoralists, the Kuhaki, who reside in the area throughout
the year. Thus, when the Kordshuli group arrive, pastures
may be somewhat depleted in some areas.

Apart from the social landscape that may affect the
ease or difficulty of a pastoral nomadic existence, the
nomads must also contend with natural environmental fluctua—
tions. Some of the problems that result from these fluctua—
tions may be solved through interaction with the sedentary
population. In some villages, where water is scarce or
distant, the nomads must pay villagers in order to gain
relatively easy access to pump—well water for the flocks.
In areas where the nomads find the traditional pastures
inadequate, private property may be available for rent.
Also, it may be possible to bribe the Disciplinary Officer
to gain a use permit for pastures outside of normal
Kordshuli territory. Winter pastures are dependent on fall

and winter rains. If the rains fail to materialize the

 

 

nomad may be f<
with no guaran'
too, the nomad
M of ea
Disciplinary O
officially all
As spr
the mountains
bills. While
winter, most c
Site where the
months. The -
is on the Per:

Spring ,

It is
the migration
importance.
as "the Cent]
Tapper (1979~
migration anc
hush-1011 b1
Barth, hOWev.
ritual Chara
because of t

acts and 9X0

 

 

36

nomad may be forced to begin migrating earlier than usual
with no guarantee that greener pastures will be found. Here,
too, the nomad is dependent on sedentary society since the
kadkhoda of each section must secure a permit from the

Disciplinary Officer (afsar—e Entezamat) before migration is

 

officially allowed.
As spring approaches, the nomads who are camped in
the mountains slowly begin to migrate down into the foot-

hills. While there is some periodic movement during the

. 391:4 '
‘ -...-5_-_'- 5.14 .

winter, most of the nomads have a reasonably permanent camp
site where they will stay for one month to one and one—half

months. The traditional time that spring migration starts

 

is on the Persian New Year, which is on the first day of

spring.

Rah—e Kuch (Migration Route)

It is apparent, even to the casual observer, that
the migration of any pastoral nomadic group is of the utmost
importance. In fact, Barth has characterized the migration
as ”the central rite of nomadic society” (1961: 153).

Tapper (1979) has also focused on the ritual significance of
migration and views the semi—annual migrations as ”rites of
transition between winter and summer quarters” (p. 179).
Barth, however, felt that his attempt to demonstrate the
ritual character of Basseri migration was made more difficult
because of the absence of ”technically unnecessary symbolic

acts and exotic paraphernalia” (cf. Tapper 1979: 178). I

 

 

 

will not dwell
say that the b
is marked by a
piles of brush
about 20 feet
the two brush
pack animals t
Once through,
look back to w
should only lc
atime of p191
pastures; any
would not fo1j
marked by sym‘

AS in

 

 

37

will not dwell on this aspect of the nomadic round except to
say that the beginning of spring migration for the Kordshuli
is marked by a ”technically unnecessary symbolic act.” Two
piles of brush were set up in a general north/south line
about 20 feet apart. When the caravan animals were packed,
the two brush piles were set on fire and the nomads led the
pack animals through this 'entryway' to the migration route.
Once through, the Kordshuli said it would be bad luck to
look back to where they had been. Rather, they said, one
should only look forward to the coming spring and summer as
a time of plenty. The fires symbolized a break with winter
pastures; any problems that had occurred during the winter
would not follow them to sarhad. Fall migration is not so
marked by symbolic action.

As indicated, there are two migrations during the
year: one in the spring, one in the fall. Spring migration
begins on or about Now Ruz (Persian New Year) and takes 30
to 50 days to complete. Migration does not occur everyday.
If the nomadic camp arrives in an area with good pastures,
they will usually stay for two or three days. Also, the
nomads will not migrate if there are heavy rains. When
migration does occur, the nomads usually start to break
Camp at dawn. They pack the animals after having some bread
and tea, and start the migration in approximately one hour.
They usually migrate for three to four hours, depending on
the resources in the areas in which they arrive. If there

are extemely poor pastures or little water, they will often

 

 

 

 

migrate again :
This is much In:
spring.

Most 0
that of the Ba
the ends (i.e.
route is occup
Basseri throug
with the Kords
winter had bee
tion earlier 1
other groups,
migrate early
that members .
other during :
would have be
Now, however,
contact with
is happening
bl car. The:
migration r01
lncreasw the
have a rebut;
if the 83889;

min Worry

The

mountain has

 

 

38

migrate again in the late afternoon for a couple of hours.
This is much more common during fall migration than during
spring.

Most of the Kordshuli migration route is the same as
that of the Basseri (Barth 1959). It differs primarily at
the ends (i.e., gilag and geshlag), and in the time that the
route is occupied. In the spring the Kordshuli preceed the
Basseri through most of the route. The year that I traveled
with the Kordshuli was slightly different than normal. The
winter had been quite dry, so the Kordshuli started migra-
tion earlier than usual. However, the dry winter affected
other groups, too, so that the Basseri also started to
migrate early. Traditionally, it would have been unlikely
that members of the two tribes would have encountered each
other during migration because the chiefs of the two groups
would have been closely involved with the entire process.
Now, however, the Disciplinary Officer is not in constant
contact with the group and he has little way of knowing what
is happening in the mountainous areas that are inaccessible
by car. Therefore, there were a number of places on the
migration route where nearby camps were Basseri. This
increased the anxiety of the Kordshuli, since the Basseri
have a reputation in the area of being good thieves. Even
if the Basseri camps had not been nearby, the Kordshuli would
still worry about the possibility of animal theft.

The area which the Kordshuli must traverse is charac—
terized by a series of progressively higher plains and

mountain passes. Much of the migration route passes through

 

 

heavily cultive
making the tasl
portion of the
Figure 2.5, wh:
this route, as
the Kordshuli.
Spring

the number of
bypass with th
difficult to a
adequate roads
where land own
nomadic animal
usually demanc‘
Cases where g6
disflutes. If
would have to
time op TESOu;
most settle 11
There

lhlte dangero
which to move
route near the

way that 001m

flock) which

 

39

heavily cultivated regions, particularly in the central zone,
making the task of herding even more difficult. The northern
portion of the Kordshuli migration route is indicated in
Figure 2.5, while Figure 2.6 shows the southern portion of
this route, as well as the general winter pasture areas of

the Kordshuli.

 

Spring migration is particularly trying because of
the number of recently planted fields that the nomads must
bypass with their flocks and pack animals. It is very
difficult to avoid conflict with villagers and still find
adequate roadside forage. There were a number of places
where land owners stood guard over their fields. If any
nomadic animals caused crop damage, the villager would
usually demand payment on the spot. There were only a few

cases where gendarmes had to be called in to help settle

 

disputes. If a dispute remained unresolved, the nomad
would have to appear in court. Since few nomads have the
time or resources to deal with the urban judicial system,
most settle immediately.

There are also a few areas where the migration is
Quite dangerous because there is very limited space in
which to move the flocks. For example, part of the migration
route near Marvdasht is along the shoulder of the major high—
Way that connects Esfahan and Shiraz. Heavy traffic is
Often only a few feet away. One non—Kordshuli man lost
approximately 15 animals when a large truck ran into his

flOCk, Which had been startled into running across the road.

 

 

 

 

Shiraz

 

4O

 

 

       
 

K
h 0 Ab Barik v;
.' a . \
1.x -- , \ .
. . \‘ g
.0 As as Khon esht -
‘ p g \- Dehbid
.' K' \. o
\ \' \
O. \I \
\ Kaftar . \ \ .\
'. "‘ 4» _ g .— o ~ ‘ \
\
\ Didgan
\ l
I‘ ‘
\ l .
"\ Si\rbanu \
'. n
\ \~
2 \
K
\ \
' '¢
' \
\ Sivand ’
1 Saadatabad
\
\
. K ’4~++
\- Jamshid 0rdshn11
. (Persepolis) BaSSeri ._._._
Shishboluki,._.‘_
Joint Migration
Route
0
Band-e
Shiraz Amir
t

 

FIGURE 2.5 Northern portion of migration route of the
Kordshuli and neighboring tribes (not to
scale)

 

 

 

 

6
n4
E
R
U
G
I

F

 

41

 

Shiraz

 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  

Kordshuli -+—+—+
Basseri

 

_ _ _ t
Amaleh ——++——
1 Joint Migration
v I Route ——————-
Kavar * Qeshlaq EZ:2
\
Asemangerd
we
“.0
Xafr
\.
\
I!
\\- ¢
'-— M!
\ §‘p\
.‘y \¢’\$ Q b b d .
\ ot a a
‘\~
\ .
\
”I
\
\
*D
\ o JAHROM
/+-+ \
' \ f 1x “mm
Qir o \ up $ ,
Karzin & . \
Mobarakabad \
g W a

 

FIGURE 2.6 Southern portion of migration route of the
Kordshuli (not to scale)

 

 

 

 

 

While ‘
gm, their pt
Yoruk of Turke
summer encamprn
ductive period
18).

Fall n
Spring migrati
work and orgar
migration to l
the weather tt
migrate out 0:

begins in ear
usually migra
on resource (
Effort involv
narrow migrat
unconcerned 1-
harVested fie
only in thosg
or When he w:
fact, Some v-
their fields
fertiliZQr 1
Many

101‘ the 1189

33886“ prec

 

42

While the Kordshuli look forward to their arrival in
Eilaq, their perspective is much the same as that of the
Yoruk of Turkey: ”the trek between the stable winter and
summer encampments is more a set of obstacles than a pro—
ductive period within the migratory schedule” (Bates 1973:
18).

Fall migration is neither as trying nor as long as
spring migration, although it still requires considerable
work and organization. There is no set date for fall
migration to begin as there is with spring migration. As
the weather turns colder, groups of nomads slowly start to
migrate out of the summer pasture area. Once migration
begins in earnest, sometime in September, the nomads
usually migrate every day, sometimes twice a day, depending
on resource (water and pasture) availability. There is less
effort involved in herding the animals through the often
narrow migration route since the Villagers are usually
unconcerned if the sheep feed off the stubble left in
harvested fields. This becomes a problem for the Kordshuli
only in those cases where the villager has sheep of his own
or when he wants to charge for the use of his fields. In
fact, some villagers want the nomads' sheep to come into
their fields so as to reap the benefits of the natural
fertilizer left behind.

Many of the fields which might have been available
for the use of the Kordshuli are often depleted, since the

Basseri precede the Kordshuli on most of their migration

 

 

 

 

(Barth 1959).
there is littI
areas.

The rn
because of in
went on tradi
not very frus
migration is
the central 2
animals throu
because there

At an
environmentai
existence is
VaI‘iatiOnS 0:
l0 COHSider .
including se
DaStoralistS

State, Many

depth in lat

Itj

historical l
Kordshllli at

The Origin ;

T___7

43

(Barth 1959). Still, because of the speed of the migration,
there is little chance to overgraze even limited pasture
areas.

The migration route, today, is narrowing rapidly
because of increased agricultural development and encroach-
ment on traditional pastures. While fall migration is still
not very frustrating, many Kordshuli feel that spring
migration is becoming impossibly difficult, especially in
the central zone. Many say that they have to run all their
animals through the area with little or no time to graze
because there are too many cultivated fields.

At any rate, it is important to realize that the
environmental dimension of Kordshuli pastoral nomadic

existence is not just based in the climatic/topographic

 

variations of Fars Province. Rather, it is also important
to consider the cultural environment of the Kordshuli
including sedentary agriculturalists and other nomadic
pastoralists, as well as the imposed presence of the larger
state. Many of these variables are considered in greater

depth in later chapters.

Historical Dimension

 

It is very difficult to place the Kordshuli in
historical perspective, since there is no written history of
the group. There are very few references of any kind on the
Kordshuli and those that do exist are often contradictory.

The origin and age of the Kordshuli tribe is unknown. Barth

 

 

 

 

(1961: 133) be
may have been
from the large
Kordshuli have
clear from th.
within the Qa:
102), on the .
entered Persi
were affiliat
the century,
prior to this
iasr Khan, pa
the Kordshuli
The h
believe that
Years and the
of the QaShqz
Perhaps to t]
when Jami Ag:

cl

0y

aims that

Of Pars prOV

a
re consider

the bOOk.

powerful and

the shill .

 

44

(1961: 133) believes that the nucleus of the Kordshuli tribe
may have been formed by some Qashqa'i camps that broke away
from the larger group and that, as an independent group, the
Kordshuli have existed no more than fifty years. It is not
clear from this statement whether or not the group existed
within the Qashqa‘i with the name Kordshuli. Magee (1945:
102), on the other hand, believes that the Kordshuli tribe
entered Persia with the Qashqa'i. Certainly, the Kordshuli
were affiliated in some way with the Qashqa'i at the turn of
the century, but whether they existed as an independent unit
prior to this time is uncertain. Magee (ibid.) reports that
Nasr Khan, past chief of the Qashqa'i confederacy, claims
the Kordshuli are purely a Qashqa‘i tribe.

The khavanin (chiefly family) of the Kordshuli
believe that the group has been in Fars for at least 700
years and that they entered the province before the arrival
of the Qashqa'i. The Qashqa'i, as a cohesive unit, date
perhaps to the time of Shah 'Abbas the Great (1587-1629),
when Jani Agha Qashqa'i was given authority over the tribes
in Fars (Boyle 1976: 8). One of the khans of the Kordshuli

claims that in the Fars Nameh—ye Nasiri, a classic history

 

of Fars Province (Fasa'i 1313 A.H.; 1876 A.D.), the Kordshuli
are considered to be the second tribal group to enter Fars.
However, in reality, the Kordshuli are nowhere mentioned in
the book. Rather, the two groups mentioned as the most
powerful and numerous tribes in Fars are the Shebankareh and

the Shul. Part of the Shebankareh later became the main

 

section of the
hammasani trib
intriguing, si
to have split
Kordshuli spea
hammasani.

To fun

the group, the

 

which, they c
if? of Atabakhan
nately 700 ye
focuses on th
west Asia. T
1530. Thus,
would place t
ltried to V6
during the er
purchased th
but the K01, d:
Story, the 3,,
equivalent 1‘.

Ohm , .

their book t

 

error in Per

thn. The P

Shebakal‘i ar.

Shebakari, t

 

 

 

45

section of the Boyr Ahmad, while part of the Shul became the
Mammasani tribe (cf. Fazel 1971: 27). This latter fact is
intriguing, since one of the sections of the Kordshuli claim
to have split off from the Mammasani, and most of the
Kordshuli speak the Lori dialect of Persian as do the
Mammasani.

To further support this belief in the antiquity of
the group, the Kordshuli khans refer to an historical novel
which, they claim, mentions the Kordshuli during the reign
of Atabakhan in Fars, which the khans believe was approxi—
mately 700 years ago. However, they also say that the book
focuses on the Mogul and Safavid periods in south and south—
west Asia. These empires coexisted no earlier than around
1530. Thus, even if they are correct in the reference, this
would place the Kordshuli in Fars only around 450 years ago.
I tried to verify this account but the book was unavailable
during the entire year that I lived with the Kordshuli. I
purchased What I thought was the same book, Shams va Toqra,
but the Kordshuli khans said that, although it was the same
story, the author was different. Still, they found the
equivalent reference which reads, ” . . . Shebakari—o—Gord—
o—Shul . . .” (Xosravi 1329 A.H.; 16). They claim that in
their book the ”G” in ”gord” is a ”K”, a simple typographical
error in Persian. Even here there is a choice in transla—
tion. The phrase may refer to either two groups——the
Shebakari and the Kordoshul——or to three groups——the

Shebakari, the Kord and the Shul—-since ”0” may be part of

 

 

 

 

the name or 51
of the Shebank
as likely as t
khans.

Other
ception of K01
were called Kc
Hossein Khan <
Kordshuli. He
name Kord-e S]
this group ha;
believes the '
his grandfath
was 700 years
Amir Pasha a1
near Kordesta

leave.

There
K01‘dshu1 i Or],

help. ”Shul'

their name HIE
Sp0ken diam
source of his
is the 111163,:
generatiOnS

MOst

ature 011 Far

 

 

 

46

the name or simply a connective. The known early existence
of the Shebankari and the Shul make the latter possibility
as likely as the hopeful interpretation of the Kordshuli
khans.

Other members of the khavanin have their own con—
ception of Kordshuli history. Amir Mansur Khan says they
were called Kord-e Shaderli prior to 100 years ago. Amir
Hossein Khan disagrees and says that they have always been
Kordshuli. He says there is a tribe in Kordestan with the
name Kord—e Shaderli with whom they may be related, but that
this group has always been Kordshuli. Amir Pasha Khan
believes the Kordshuli to be 700 years old because, he says,
his grandfather, Ata Khan, found a grave near Khongesht that
was 700 years old. I found no verification of that story.
Amir Pasha also thinks that the group came from the west,
near Kordestan, after intratribal disputes forced them to
leave.

There is obviously no easy answer to the question of
Kordshuli origins. Even the derivation of the name cannot
help. "Shul” means village so that a direct translation of
their name makes them Kurdish villagers; however, their
spoken dialect is quite different from Kurdish. The only
source of historical agreement among the Kordshuli khavanin
is the lineal ancestry of the present kalantar through three
generations (see Figure 2.7).

Most of the references to the Kordshuli in the liter-

ature on Fars focus on their relationship to the Qashqa'i

 

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Hassmwuoswmnxmu<AH.wvcmmov amgxoumox
o <n. o k < n o <
_ _ H _ N _
.Eommmm «unammm
< < A v0 u < < <
N

 

 

_ _ _
_

meme—.2 MHHoE

_

Ammaaoz enemy Haemamsx

vaaamamuaom

.L

 

 

 

 

confederacy .
list of tribe;
Curzon (1966;
Qashqa'i trib
(1919) also p
although all
sources. He
Qashqa'i Anal
and Magee (19
from Kordshul
gave a differ
other source.
Some
there is a or
during the e;
Sykes Points
Were the Kur:
Kashgais (sit
hOWQVer, 118
While Magee
the Chi

of Very

nominal
L0tiali
best as

Barth adds t

[the Basseri
Kurdshuli (

Qashqa'i cor

E

 

 

 

48

confederacy. Usually they aI only another name in a long
list of tribes and sub—tribes affiliated with the Qashqa'i.
Curzon (1966; orig. 1892) includes the ”Kur—i—shuli” as a
Qashqa‘i tribe in 1875 but not on an 1890 list. Christian
(1919) also places the Kurdshuli (sic) within the Qashqa'i,
although all of his information is not consistent with other
sources. He does say that this group migrated with the
Qashqa'i Amaleh, which agrees with data from Field (1939)

and Magee (1945), as well as with data I was able to gather

£731 1 .

.1..~“’¢—

from Kordshuli and Qashqa'i informants. However, Christian
gave a different name for the kalantar of the group than any
other source.
Some of the later references are confusing in that
there is a question about the independence of the Kordshuli
during the early and middle part of the twentieth century.
Sykes points out that in 1917 ”among the professional robbers
were the Kurshulis (sic), who had broken away from the
Kashgais (sic)” (1963: 481; orig. 1921). Peiman (1968: 224),
however, lists the Kordshuli as part of the Qashqa'i in 1931,
while Magee (1945: 103) points out that:
the chief of the Kordshuli, Atta Khan, holds a position
of very doubtful independence. He is obliged to bow to
the wishes of Nasr Khan in all affairs of his tribe yet
nominally his people come under the administration of
Lotfali Qavami, the Khamseh Governor. The latter at
best assumes responsibility for their behavior.

Barth adds to this confusion by writing that ”adjoining them

[the Basseri] in most of their route is the smaller

Kurdshuli (sic) tribe . . . politically connected with the

QaShqa'i confederacy” (1961: 2), but that during migration

 

 

 

the Basseri a]
which is at p]
confederacies‘
The dc
Kordshuli wer:
Even though ti
administratio
that the Kord
Khamseh. Now
of the Khamse
of the young
In ch
historical 01
considering 1
there have a2
However, eac]
some other g:
care tOgethe
the group re
and of Wheth
have no easy
sections and
of these See
or With the
determined.
Specifies 0:

period, “or

49

the Basseri are ”followed by the Kurdshuli (sic) tribe,
which is at present unconnected with either of the big
confederacies” (1961: 94).

The deposed kalantar of the Kordshuli says that the
Kordshuli were independent throughout most of this century.
Even though the_Kordshuli have nominally been under Khamseh
administration since 1943, it was only in the late 19503
that the Kordshuli began to consider themselves a part of
Khamseh. Now, all of the Kordshuli View themselves as part
of the Khamseh confederacy, a nominal unit itself, and many
of the young people think that this has always been the case.

In chapter three I briefly point out the varied
historical origins of the Kordshuli sections (tireh). When
considering the larger collectivity, the Kordshuli say that
there have always been five, and just five, named sections.
However, each individual section claims its own origin from
some other group. The questions of when these groups first
came together, of whether there was ever a central core of
the group represented by the khayanin called the Kordshuli,
and of whether there were ever fewer or additional sections
have no easy answers. Magee (1945: 105) lists only four
sections and implies that there are no kadkhgggg (headmen)
Of these sections. Whether this is a problem With his data
or with the selective memory of the Kordshuli cannot be
determined. Thus, any further attempt to elaborate the
SpeCifics of Kordshuli history, except for the most recent

period, would be conjectural and would contribute little to

 

 

 

 

a better undei
economic shif

history are e

50

a better understanding of the Kordshuli. The political and
economic shifts of the most recent period of Kordshuli

history are examined in some detail in later chapters.

 

 

 

This
of the Kordsh
economic unit
smallest unit
M (camp?
Organization:
Kordshuli we:
(confederacy
Present, by .
Zation is pe
better Shows
histOriCal S
KordShuli.
be made abou
these forms;

interim1 Whi

elite. I Wi]

 

CHAPTER III
TAIFEH KORDSHULI

This chapter presents a brief ethnographic overview
of the Kordshuli, emphasizing their primary social and
economic units. In organizational form these begin with the
smallest unit, hungh (tent household), and go through the
beileh (camp) and tirgh (section) to the largest relevant
organizational form, taifeh (tribe). In the past the
Kordshuli were also part of an even larger organization, i1
(confederacy), and, in fact, are defined similarly, at the
present, by the government. However, this level of organi—
zation is peripheral to the present discussion. Chapter six
better shows the status of this political form and its
historical significance in the political development of the
Kordshuli. At the end of this chapter a brief statement will
be made about the functional changes that have appeared in
these forms; in particular, I will consider the loss of
function which has reduced some groups to a nominal exist~
ence. I will seek to answer the question of why such

nominal groups are maintained.

51

 

 

 

The p
is the tent h
Kordshuli as
and the immed
(M). Whil
latter is a f
holds and the
the annual cy
hors (@5333
0f from apprc
Vocal commun:
If one must 1
HEighbors. r
Social unit .
those Kordsh'
confines of
consider the
Presence of

The

g0at hair t6

52

Huneh Level (Household)

 

The primary social and economic unit of the Kordshuli
is the tent household. It is defined by the nomadic
Kordshuli as the space bounded by the black goat hair tent
and the immediate space surrounding the tent, the campsite
(ygrt). While the former space is a well—defined area, the
latter is a function of the social relations between house—
holds and the availability of space at different times in
the annual cycle. Those households considered to be neigh—
bors (hamsayeh; lit., same shade) are separated.by a distance
of from approximately 15 feet to a distance in which loud
vocal communication can take place and be totally understood.
If one must yell to communicate, then the others are not
neighbors. The huneh is more generally defined as that
social unit which uses one common hearth (glaq). Thus,
those Kordshuli who settle may, in fact, live within the
confines of one enclosed, segmented building, yet still
consider themselves independent social units because of the
presence of separate glaqs.

The hungh is spatially defined directly by the black
goat hair tent. Most of the Kordshuli have two different
tents: a heavy, tightly woven one for winter and late
autumn (chador), and a lighter weight one used in spring and
summer (halir). (See Figure 3.1). Some may also have a
medium grade tent used for the early autumn when there is a
Slight possibility of rain, however, it is not very common.

The chador is made up of four or five pieces of woven goat

 

 

CHADOR - h

reed sex
0 O .

1J7”,
++

+

+

x kids
l and
n lambs
s

i

i

y.

X

3c
7r

f
0 up“

i.
I
X

53

 

CHADOR — Winter Tent

reed screen

   
 

}.,,

 

 

 

 

 

 

O C) l 0 o o 0
xx
! + +195 x" g
f o O+tent
+ o
1 kids i m pole
I and 2‘ 3
01 lambs x 0 firepit
s f»
$ s m ,
07. 7» 4-" l; 8 (0139)
a), ’2‘; x a o
o . . . g
k if ’*$ water skins+$j //
‘ o O 0 Q q;

   

 

 

HAJIR - Summer Tent

 
  

 

O O O 0’
household goods
0

water skins

t

OE:} O o C).
1::3 (Ojag)

 

 
 

 

 

FIGURE 3.1 Kordshuli tents:

chador and hajir

 

 

 

hair fabric (
the size of t
the family.
length, 10 tc
in height. 5
(M) 0:
winter camps:
foundation u]
more space a:
Usua
Winter camps
month, those
tents from t
up this base
30th males a
While female
between the
although the
The founder:
height, but
about three
tucks Diled
wide, inSid
way arOUnd.

TEQtangl e W

 

54

hair fabric (lataf). As is true of the Basseri (Barth 1961),
the size of the tent varies according to the resources of

the family. A typical chador may be about 18 to 20 feet in
length, 10 to 12 feet in width, and approximately 7 to 8 feet
in height. Since many of the nomads, especially the headmen
(kadkhoda) of the sections (tireh) try to return to the same
winter campsite (ygrt) each year, many have built a rock
foundation upon which to set the tent walls. This provides
more space as well as a more water'resistant shelter.

Usually in the late autumn, before they move to the
winter campsite where they will stay for approximately one
month, those nomads who have rock foundations for their
tents from the preceding year will spend a few days fixing
up this base by adding dirt, replacing fallen rocks, etc.
Both males and females help: males move the heavier rocks,
while females get extra dirt and gravel to fill the spaces
between the rocks. There is no attempt at shaping rocks,
although they do try to find rocks that fit together well.
The foundation is usually not a complete rectangle of even—
height, but rather has the front built up to a height of
about three feet, while the rear wall may be only a couple of
rocks piled on top of each other. The foundation may be as
wide, inside to outside, as one and one—half feet all the
way around. Still, the general shape of the structure is a
rectangle which will fit the tent. Two openings are left in

the front two corners as entrances.

 

 

 

While
women alone,
ing flock, tt
women togethe
up well so ti
This is becai
arelatively
winter winds
primarily, I"
provides pro
are born in
from the out
lethally is
The househol
bags (m
tent. The}
Side and pr<
tent, The.
smaller Se c
used to hol
large enoug
toting are k
that they w

the lambs E

55

While tents during migration are often set up by
women alone, since the men may still be herding the migrat—
ing flock, the winter tents are usually pitched by men and
women together. There is great concern that the tent be set
up well so that there will be no unnecessary slack places.
This is because the tent will have to stand in one place for
a relatively long period under the periodic onslaught of
winter winds and rain. The tent is not only, nor necessarily
primarily, for the comfort of the human nomads. It also
provides protection for the young goat kids and lambs that
are born in late autumn. Thus, while the chador appears
from the outside to be one undifferentiated unit, it
actually is divided into two approximately equal sections.
The household belongings and foodstuffs, packed in woven
bags (xorjin and hurreh) are placed along the midline of the
tent. The hearth (9133) is dug near the entrance to one
side and provides the only heat and cooking source in the
tent. The other side of the tent is usually subdivided into
smaller sections by reed screens. These makeshift pens are
used to hold and protect the young animals that are not
large enough to graze with the rest of the flock. The very
young are kept separate from the others for a short while so
that they will not be suffocated by the close huddling of
the lambs and kids in their attempts to stay warm.

Hajirs (summer tents) are smaller than chadors since
there is no great need to shelter a lot of lambs and kids

from the weather. Since there are fewer young animals born

at this time
available f0]
lambs. Also
the effectivw
The h_a;jir is
piled length
little priva
Basseri. 0n
noon sun, r0
ground as a
households h
goatskin cor
the proximit
front of the
fact, is of-
Of normal a,
way from t
of fresh mi
”Shins 010
M- Ast
different 5
shade and E
or windier
flak“) ma:
means
the w

This helps

56

at this time of year, a household only needs to keep space
available for a reed screen to enclose four or five kids and
lambs. Also, the front of the halir is left open so that
the effective working area of the tent increases greatly.
The hall; is unpartitioned. The household belongings are
piled lengthwise along the rear of the tent; there is no
little private area as Barth (ibid.) says exists for the
Basseri. On one side, usually away from the intense after—
noon sun, rocks and/or shrubs (botteh) are placed on the
ground as a base for the goatskin water containers. Most

households have at least two and some have up to five water

 

goatskin containers (mashk) depending, to a large degree, on
the proximity of water. The fire pit is placed near the
front of the tent, although the location may vary and, in
fact, is often changed if it seems to be getting in the way
of normal activity. There is often another glaq dug further
away from the tent where it is easier to heat the large pots
of fresh milk in preparation for making yoghurt. Water for
washing clothes, hair, etc., is often heated on the outside
913g. As the position of the sun changes throughout the day,
different sides of the tent may be lifted to allow for more
shade and greater airflow. Also, in the event of a colder
or windier day, additional pieces of woven tent sections
(lggaf) may be added to the front to better protect the
occupants. The floor space which is partially enclosed by
the hall; is sometimes covered with small pebbles or gravel.

This helps keep the dust down when dry, and it also acts as

 

adrainage sy
the tent, the
In th
various sizes
mental cycle
(Table 3.1) s
Kordshuli. l
which can shr
ideal of the
nomadic sphe:
bias for the
family unit v
He to live i
alleltiod of
tion of expe
able to prov
there is eno
meet its lab

are Often CC

any case, ti
for a year (

lent SlZe t(
Den€1th tent
last) the an
after marri;

This Chanse

each group

57

a drainage system for anything wet that is dropped within
the tent, thereby keeping mud to a minimum.

In the confines of these tents live families of
various sizes and composition, depending on the develop—
mental cycle of each family group. The following table
(Table 3.1) shows family compOsition for various tireh of the
Kordshuli. The ideal family unit is the nuclear family
which can show explicitly the realization of the cultural
ideal of the independent, self—sufficient (within the
nomadic sphere) household. There is also a strong cultural
bias for the temporary maintenance of the extended or joint
family unit where adult males with wife and children contin—
ue to live in the father's tent or with an elder brother for
a period of time after marriage. This is not just a func—
tion of expedience: many newly married couples are easily
able to provide for their own needs, while, at the same time,
there is enough additional labor in the larger household to
meet its labor needs. Those sons who move out too quickly
are often considered disrespectful by other Kordshuli. In
any case, this extended or joint household will usually last
for a year or more, longer if the flock is not of a suffic—
ient size to provide an adequate flock for the newly inde—
pendent tent household. The Kordshuli say that, in the
past, the amount of time spent within the father's household
after marriage was greater, on the average, than it is today.
This change may be due in part to the greater dispersal of

each group that has occurred with increasing rural security.

 

 

 

 

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exmadEdde

NF

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kHflEdN AHNWHUBEv

WHQEHW

MNlNQQYU

 

l//lll/llf

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

msomsog 1. U Q .o .m>
m so . . m psop\msomso Ho 2 <
p p HvN .mpcmp Ho 02 HdeH Mmcomhom MHN.H ”posoUHmnoo .Qom Hmpoe
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\mcomsom Ho .02 .o><
me am
llllllllllllllllllIlllWWWilllllllmmWIllllllHWMll mm mm mcHonomsom eo .oz Hepoe
o o o H o Amo>HB 03p
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H o o H .no + Aeovaoeea
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o m H m H Amcom UoHssmE osoE so oso
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v o m o ms.cpm + .Edw oHQEHw
HH me on me we as we seesaw AseoHosav weasem
meaasenem HHoHax messages new «uses schemes mesH< eflnmses

seenane< eecnens< sausages anon egos

noses an :oHpHmoasoo eHosomsom H.m memes

\

 

 

All
their deveI
problem of
through pa:
Kordshuli
goats. Th
resources
except for
animal pro

Th
taking car
consumptic
Older boys
households
flocks but
DTEdators
awoman o:
the famiij
at that t
as a hous
unit we“
females,
their flo
grOUps dc
migratim
Sible age

Thinning :

59

All of these tent households, at whatever stage of
their developmental cycle, still must come to grips with the
problem of maintaining the viability of the household
through pastoral production. The household economy of the
Kordshuli is based primarily on the herding of sheep and
goats. There are some families that do own agricultural
resources but here, too, the primary source of income,
except for a very few extreme cases, is based on animals and
animal products.

There is a noticeable division of labor involved in

 

taking care of the flocks and garnering their products for
consumption or sale. Almost invariably it is the men and
older boys who act as shepherds. Although most nomadic tent
households own dogs, they are not used to help herd the
flocks but rather act only as a warning system against
predators and thieves. For the few times that one might see
a woman or girl tending the flocks, it is safe to assume that
the family unit is quite small or that no males are available
at that time. Owing to the cultural desire for independence
as a household unit, it should be expected that any family
unit would rather use their own labor resources including
females, than try to find an extra—familial shepherd or merge
their flocks with another as a joint herding unit, as many
groups do (cf. Barth 1961). Sometimes, for example, during
migration, a daughter of a family with no sons of a respon—
sible age may have to help her father keep the flock from

running into planted fields while the mother and any other

 

 

 

family membe
belongings.
as shepherds
so that it t
scription, v
animal‘s thi
ritually 1111}
In ‘
ent househoi
smaller ilo
done becaus
the area bu
footed enou
hen take in
children ma
hS these hi
availablel
is Once agz
entire flot
A1-
are abOut ,
“Shaliy en-
their Earl
the tent h
ing and to
charging an

disruptiVe

 

60

family members cope with the pack animals carrying household
belongings. One reason given for not normally using women
as shepherds is that if anything should happen to an animal
so that it had to be slaughtered according to Islamic pre—
scription, women would be disallowed from slitting the
animal's throat since, otherwise, the meat would become
ritually impure (haram).

In the winter pasture area (qeshlag), many independ—
ent household units attempt to split their flock into two
smaller flocks: one of sheep, the other of goats. This is
done because there are some good high mountain pastures in
the area but the Kordshuli say that the sheep are not sure—
footed enough to risk the climb up and back. So, while the
men take the goats to higher pastures, the women and smaller
children may watch the sheep as they graze around the tent.
As these higher pastures are depleted and the amount of
available pasturage around the tent is diminished, the flock
is once again combined and the male shepherd will take the
entire flock to more accessible pastures.

Although boys start to help with the flock when they
are about eight years old (sometimes younger), they are not
usually entrusted with the care of the entire flock until
their early teens. The young boys can often be seen around
the tent helping to bring the flock in, especially for milk—
ing and young animal feeding, by running behind them and
Chasing and hitting them with a stick. Often, this is more

disruptive than helpful. Sometimes a younger boy, or girl

 

 

 

 

if a young
taking care
graze with
separated c
older membe
can no long
take on the
will still
household.
Ma
family; S
and their
family in
live in it
always enc

hold. Sor

hOusehold;
these hou
hearth) w
agricultu
”disperse
fa111in me
ingrease
families
in main t:
unit has

may DI‘OV

61

if a young male is not available, will stay around the tent
taking care of the kids and lambs not yet old enough to
graze with the larger flock or those which have been
separated out so that they will not suckle. Sometimes an
older member of the household, especially an older man who
can no longer walk with the flock through the mountains, may
take on the task of watching the kids and lambs; thus, he
will still feel himself to be a productive member of the
household.

Many households are composed of more than one nuclear
family: sometimes a joint family with two or more brothers
and their dependents living together, sometimes an extended

family in which married sons and their dependent families

 

live in the father's tent. In these cases there is almost
always enough labor to easily handle the needs of the house-
hold. Sometimes there is social/spatial separation of
households within joint or extended family units (i.e.,
these households have their own household with its own
hearth) while economic ties are maintained especially when
agricultural land is owned. It is not uncommon among these
”dispersed economic households” (cf. chapter seven) for
family members to cross productive spheres when labor needs

increase according to the annual cycle. Settled agricultural

 

families may send older children to help the nomadic family
in maintaining the joint flock. Likewise, if the nomadic
unit has more than enough labor for their own needs, they

may provide an additional labor source for their agricultural
)

 

 

 

counterparts
early harves
tural group
since migrai
transfer of

Sphere, sin:
sources and
independent

turalists a
primarily b

possible ic

agriculture

needs.

St:
division 0:
Men and b0:
ceSeine of
(dig), our
Sometimes,
buys Churn
is not far
compomic

Tl
M in re
gather mo:
tof1161 t

a llttle

62

counterparts during periods of intense activity (e.g.,

early harvest). Labor is rarely provided for the agricul—‘
tural group from the pastoral group during autumn harvest
since migration itself requires considerable labor. Most
transfer of labor is in the direction of the pastoral
sphere, since the agriculturalists have access to labor
sources and because, at a general level, the ideal of the
independent household unit is not as strong among agricul—
turalists as it is among the nomadic pastoralists. This is
primarily because of the realization that it is more
possible for the small nomadic household than for the small
agricultural household to meet more than just subsistence

needs.

 

Still, within the pastoral sphere itself the
division of labor, while not absolute, is strongly marked.
Men and boys are shepherds while women do most of the pro—
cessing of dairy products: yoghurt (mast), buttermilk
(Egg), curd balls (kashk), clarified butter (rogan), and,
sometimes, dried whey (qarreh). It is possible to see young
boys churning butter and rolling kashk balls, but this again
is not favorable and is due primarily to family size and
composition.

The complementarity of these roles is further expres_

 

sed in relation to fires and cooking. Men or older boys must
gather most of the firewood (himeh) and shrubs (botteh) used
to fuel the fire. Girls, women, and younger boys may gather

a little, enough for tea or, occasionally, bread, but the

 

 

 

 

more difficr
the desert l
stay with t]
in these evI
mood or bru;
fuel. Dung
with the as
In
the men als
shearing, f
for many of
products (6
saddle bag,
itself to j
gOathair f;
buying and
animals ant
perty of t]
where to s:
wool, ka\Sh
finished p
some of th

hOId prOdu

In fact) a

fur any SC

 

 

 

63

more difficult task of chopping heavier firewood or uprooting
the desert brush in quantity is left to the men. During my
stay with the nomads, I often found myself helping to bring
in these ever—necessary products. In the few areas where no
wood or brush was to be found, the women used animal dung for
fuel. Dung was almost always gathered by females, sometimes
with the assistance of young boys.

In addition to shepherding and firewood collection,
the men also are primarily responsible for sheep and goat
shearing, for packing up the animals before migration, and
for many of the minor repairs or finishing touches on fiber
products (e.g., sewing together the sides of a flat—woven
saddle bag, finishing a rope by sewing the end back into
itself to inhibit fraying, and repairing holes in the tent's
goathair fabric). They are also responsible for most of the
buying and selling that the household does. Since the
animals and their products are considered the private pro—
perty of the household head, he most often decides when and
where to sell the fruits of his family's labor: animals,
wool, kashk (curd balls), clarified butter, and spun yarn or
finished products, Despite the fact that sons will inherit
some of the flock when they marry and separate from their
father's household, they have no say over the use of house—
hold products unless their father gives them this privilege.
In fact, although it is culturally expected, there is no way
for any son to guarantee that he will indeed receive a share

Of the flock as an inheritance. Some men who were on poor

 

 

terms with '
pay any brir
Worn
tasks: coo
facture for
goods and f
winter camp
up the tent
general pre
gathered by
who are arc
woven saddl
woman may 2
ham or old:
has been p:
801
eX'lSteIICe
Women and
uncommon t
the heads
B0th males
animals tr.
waiting tc
Wl
labor it I
more effit

is the Ca:

 

64

terms with their sons refused to give any inheritance or to
pay any brideprice.

Women are responsible for most general domestic
tasks: cooking, cleaning, child care, and product manu—
facture for household use, as well as production of pastoral
goods and finished products for sale or trade. Except for
winter camps, the women are usually responsible for setting
up the tent during migration periods, as well as for the
general preparation of the camp site. Stones and brush are
gathered by the women, as well as by youths of either sex 4
who are around, to act as the foundation for water skins and ,
woven saddle packs. If the ground is not too hard, the
woman may also dig the fire pit, but in most cases it is a
man or older male youth who digs the fire pit after the tent
has been pitched.

Some of the other tasks associated with a pastoral
existence are shared by men and women. While it is primarily
women and girls who milk the sheep and goats, it is not
uncommon to see men helping milk while a male youth holds
the heads of the animals to keep them from running away.

Both males and females of any age are used to force the
animals through a phalanx and keep the animals which are
waiting to be milked from retreating.

While there is, ideally, a highly marked division of
labor it is not unusual to see crossovers which make for a
more efficient use of the available labor. This, of course,

is the case only in regard to certain enterprises. Men, for

 

 

 

example, do
Women, if H
harder or e:
very few in
close male
will conduc
would. Her
is accepted
men in the
economic tr
wherewithal
who have be
as men. A:
aware of t]
0f male tr
women say
but that a
women say
hen cannot
Spoke With
that a Won
for the ar
W1
°°nsumnts
units in
or the gr
between a

tionship

 

65
example, do not spin wool, weave, roll EEEBE, or the like.
Women, if there is a male available, do not act as primary
herder or engage in selling pastoral products, except in a
very few instances, to itinerate traders. If a widow has no
close male relatives and no sons of a responsible age she
will conduct the economic affairs of the household as a man
would. Her position is recognized within the community and
is accepted as a function of her situation. Although the
men in the group will often say that women cannot engage in
economic transactions because they lack the knowledge and
wherewithall to suceed, it is the case that the few women
who have been forced into this role have been as successful
as men. As Beck points out for the Qashqa'i, ”women are
aware of the external contracts of men and of the subtleties
of male transactions” (1978: 354). Many of the Kordshuli
women say that they could make a living without a husband
but that a man could not do likewise without a wife. The
women say that they are able to do male tasks but that the
men cannot do many of the female tasks. Some of the men I
spoke with agreed with this assessment, although most said
that a woman needs a man because he knows best how to care
for the animals, or market, or whatever.

While tent households are the primary production/
consumption units among the Kordshuli, they become secondary
units in the spheres of social and political organization
of the group, since these latter forms calls for interaction
between a number of households. That is, it is the rela—

tionship of household to household which is of primary

 

 

 

 

importance.
occur withi
of women, t
side of the
ulative, in
household 6
subsequent
household l
tasks, lim:
husband in
and acted r
to a large
involved,
dominance ‘
the range
hOUSehold,
effe<1tive
are actual
It
Statement
Visitors 1
ital decig
huspitabl‘
ity deman,
on Percei.
Shhuld be

“39d fOr

66

importance. There are, however, some interactions which
occur Within the household, particularly concerning the role
of women, that can affect social and political action out—
side of the tent. For example, women are often quite manip—
ulative, implicitly, in the political arena by making intra—
household decisions which affect the household head and his
subsequent political (and social) interaction with other
household heads. She may refuse to perform certain domestic
tasks, limit sexual availability, or merely harrass her
husband in her attempt to have her point of View accepted
and acted on. The effectiveness of this approach is based
to a large degree on the personal strength of the parties
involved. The cultural ideal is for unequivocal male
dominance both within and without the household. However,
the range of variation from this ideal is great within the
household. There are some cases where the majority of
effective political decisions ”made” by the household head
are actually made by his wife.

It is not unusual for a woman to make a political
statement by the way she attends to social interaction with
Visitors to her tent. If the woman disagrees with a polit—
ical decision made in concert with a visitor she may be less
hospitable than is culturally expected. Rules of hospital—
ity demand spatial and temporal priority for guests, based
on perceived status. When a male guest arrives a carpet
should be set down, rather than the felt rug that is usually

used for the family. The middle of the carpet against the

 

 

 

pile of hou.
(See Figure
should also
offered. T
where the w
out the car
at all, or
these cases
self byicai
there may 1
the slight
forthcomin
household
Controlled
men are, t
behavior 5
than as a'
mOSt fami}
tent Wall:
some behi:
arises f1,
Sehce of
W
Stron81y
external
been Shep

halls int,

 

67

pile of household belongings is the highest status position
(See Figure 3.1). The person sitting in this position
should also be the first to receive tea and food if they are
offered. There were more than a few cases that I observed
where the woman expressed her discontent by failing to lay
out the carpet, by serving the responsible party last or not
at all, or by not offering food at a meal hour. In most of
these cases, the household head was forced to ”demean” him—
self by carrying out the unfulfilled tasks himself. While
there may be some remarks about feisty or intractable women,
the slight felt by the visitor is apparent and jokes may be
forthcoming in the community about the inability of the
household head to head his household. Men should not be
controlled by women, according to the ideal. While most

men are, to some degree, manipulated by their wives, this
behavior should be kept within the household unit rather
than as a matter for public scrutiny. It is the case that
most families cannot keep domestic quarreling a secret since
tent walls do not contain sound very well. This may provoke
some behind—the—back humor, but not of the intensity that
arises from a wife's ”inappropriate” behavior in the pre—
sence of others.

While we have seen, or implied, that men participate
strongly in both internal domestic affairs as well as
external affairs, especially in terms of market, women have
been shown only in the internal domestic sphere. Women also

have interactions in external domains, although they are

 

 

 

constrained
domestic be
advantage c
general box
It
the market
man will at
children, '
actions wh
women ofte
is possibl
occur. Th
well as sm
usually ha
not uIlusua
has What t
and the wc
traders wl
paid for ;
Tl
Children 1
if the Co:
not let h
Sive. I f
with the
herself.

to get me

68

constrained by the cultural proscriptions on their extra—
domestic behavior. The three primary loci which women take
advantage of are the market (for food), the bazaar (for
general household goods and clothes), and the doctor.

It is very uncommon for any Kordshuli woman to go to
the market or bazaar unaccompanied by a man. Usually, the
man will accompany a couple of women, and perhaps their
children, to the location and then carry out his own trans—
actions while the women carry out theirs. At the market the
women often buy vegetables and spices with cash, although it
is possible that some trading for wool and spun yarn will
occur. The bazaar is the primary resource for clothing as
well as small incidentals. Unlike the men, the women
usually have no traditional trading partner, although it is
not unusual to deal with the husband's trading partner if he
has what they want. He, however, is not usually a clothier
and the women prefer the wider selection provided by those
traders who Specialize in clothing. Here the products are
paid for in cash.

There are numerous times when a woman or one of her
children requires some form of medical assistance. Often,
if the complaint is not physically obvious, her husband will
not let her go because it is too time consuming and expen-
sive. If the complaint persists and her husband is busy
with the flock, she may be forced to go to the doctor by
herself. For the husband there is a definite bias in trying

to get male children to the doctor expediently, while female

 

children an
they may be
forced, the
out with tt
times a nei
her childre
neighbor w<

of the nex-

 

Th
camp alone
gl‘OUpS of
emphemeral
t0 consang
exhectauc
Often cont
natal hour
more Ofte:
that of In,

W
affinal t

Ship and

 

affihal is
better re

courSe 1
’

 

 

69

children and wives are often told to wait since, as females,
they may be exaggerating the complaint. Some women are
forced, therefore, to go to the doctor while the husband is
out with the flock and face the consequences later. Some—
times a neighboring woman may accompany her or look after
her children which are left in camp. The fact that this
neighbor woman is present sets the stage for a consideration

of the next level of social organization, the beileh (camp).

Beileh Level (Camp)

 

There are, indeed, tent households which always
camp alone; however, most households camp and migrate in
groups of two to four tent households. These groupings are
emphemeral with longer lasting ones correlating, usually,
to consanguineal and affinal ties. Because of the cultural
expectations of continued fraternal interaction, brothers
often continue to camp together after separation from the
natal household. The labor force of these households is
more often combined in communal labor activities than is
that of most non—related or distantly related neighbors.

Within a tirgh (section), both consanguineal and
affinal ties serve to form a basis for extended camp member-
ship and unity. In cases where men camp with extra—tireh
affinal kin, it is usually because these kin have access to
better resources within their traditional pasture areas. Of
course, the use of this land requires the permission of the

kadkhoda who heads the group in the area with better

 

pastures. This sharing of resources, usually in the form of

 

pastureland
relationshi
camps are c
economic or
the househ<
households
(W;
they migra
of each ot‘
camps must
actual dis
Witt there
Who their
this role
Ec
thong Heig
time as wt
of a neig]
from I‘Unn
C0Oberati
as time a
ation als
flecks of
Duck an“
some famj
send One

While th<

7O

pastureland, is one of the few economic components of a camp
relationship and does not occur with any regularity. Most
camps are comprised of a social grouping rather than an
economic or political one. The camps stay together because
the households enjoy each other's company. The various tent
households of a camp group refer to each other as neighbor
(hamsayeh; lit., same shade), so defined by the fact that
they migrate together and are within easy speaking distance
of each other. There are places during migration where many
camps must pitch their tents very near others so that the
actual distance between all these tents is not very great,
yet there is still the awareness by all these camps as to
who their neighbors are and the minimal obligations that

this role implies.

Economically, there is some cooperative labor effort
among neighbors, but it usually is passive labor or sharing
time as when women help neighbors make bread or when members
of a neighbor's family help to keep the animals being milked
from running away merely by standing passively behind them.
Cooperation of this kind is usual and reciprocity is expected
as time and circumstance allow. This kind of casual cooper—
ation also plays a role during migration. Although the
flocks of the separate households are herded separately, the
pack animals migrate together as a group. This means that
some families with inadequate labor resources are able to
send one or two members of the household with the flock

while those families with additional labor help with the

 

 

 

donkey cart
wfll migrai
reached, 3:
migrate a1<
the greate:
with incre
difficult
ofthis mu
have to do
A
active ser
the flocks
Cases of 1
Camps--om
through a
W911, in I
Camp, whi
Vide wate
COOherati
cleared t
the moutr.
get Wate]

Was carr:

WOrk '

and, to

fI‘Om his

 

71

donkey caravan. Even some of the households which camp alone
will migrate with others until the destination has been
reached, since the Kordshuli say that it is ugly (zesht—e) to
migrate alone with such a small caravan. Unfortunately, with
the greater dispersal of household units that has occurred
with increasing rural security, many households find it
difficult to travel with adequate labor resources. Because
of this much of their migration is harried and the shepherds
have to do much more work than they would like to.

A very few of the camp groups cooperate in a more
active sense in their attempts to secure adequate water for
the flocks and for their households. Only three obvious
cases of this kind of cooperation were observed. In two
camps-—one of two tents, one of four tents--wells were dug
through a cooperative effort of the males of all tents. The
well, in one case, was primarily for household use of the
camp, while in the other case the well was also used to pro—
vide water for the flocks. In the other case of active
cooperation among households, a number of household heads
cleared the opening of a spring and dug a long trench from
the mouth of the spring so that all of their flocks could
get water. This latter work took a few days to complete and
was carried out as the individuals found time to come and
work.

The kadkhoda (headman) of a tigeh may also expect
and, to some extent, depend upon the extra labor derived

from his ”clients” who camp near him part of the year. Many

 

of the poor
may be cons
seven). II
have been 1
their t_ir_e_l
these fami
him for me
bands for
and live w
permission
granted wi
assistance
sedentary
Tl
0liganizat
I"Whetion,
Other eco
WaStoral
household
exDressir
Various 1
“0a m
of cOnfl
“haw
area but
not Want

tent and

72

of the poorer Kordshuli who do not migrate to winter pastures
may be considered marginal or seasonal nomads (cf. chapter
seven). In the summer they take their small flocks which
have been penned up all winter and once again join up with
their tirgh with the permission of the kadkhoda. Many of
these families camp near the kadkhoda and provide labor to
him for menial tasks such as making tent stakes, braiding
bands for small carrying cases, and helping with shearing
and live wool washing. Their only expectation in return is '
permission to camp with the group, which would probably be
granted without the labor input, as well as some minimal
assistance from the kadkhoda in their dealing with the
sedentary world, if only in the form of advice.

The camp, while it is one of the more observable
organizational units, does not have an important economic
function. It provides minimal cooperative labor, while
other economic processes such as buying and selling of
pastoral products are usually carried out by the individual
households. The camp, rather, is a primary social unit
expressing social relationships as well as providing the
various households with partners in mutual trust and protec—
tion. The breaking up of such a unit can be an expression
of conflict or social distance. For example, the acting
kadkhoda of one of the tirehs wanted to migrate to a new
area but one of his neighbors (i e., in the same beileh) did
not want to move. The acting kadkhoda went over to Ali's

tent and threatened to hit Ali if he did not start to break

camp. Ali
hit, and p‘
distance b
to quite c
himself (w
until the
the small
with anotk
with the 1
Hr
distance I
than has '
Barth 196
disintegr
tents, th
“MW and
I
Door soci
Just decz'
rest of ,
Join Up ,
TecoaleS‘
agreemen
Sites, 0
213110“

brief ea

camp. Ali was frightened by the younger man, asked not to be
hit, and proceeded to break camp. However, he stayed a good
distance behind during the day's migration and never managed
to quite catch up with the group. He continued to camp by
himself (with his family) through the next week of migration
until the group arrived at a larger plain where several of
the small camp groups came together. Here, he joined up
with another camp group, thereby expressing his discontent
with the previous camp group.

However, for the Kordshuli the expression of social
distance manifested in spatial arrangements is less obvious
than has been reported in the ethnographic literature (e.g.,
Barth 1961; Bates 1973). The reason is that, since the
disintegration of the large camps into camps of one or two
tents, there are few gradations of spatial distance between
unity and separation.

Fission of camp groups is not always a response to
poor social relations. Sometimes one of the tent households
just decides to stay or leave at a different time than the
rest of the camp. It is likely that this household will
join up with another camp group for migration, or it may even
recoalesce with the tents of their previous beileh. Dis—
agreements on a number of subjects (e.g., weather, camp
sites, or available forage), may lead a camp to separate for
a short while with the expectation of reuniting later. A

brief example will illustrate how this may happen.

 

 

 

On
black and «
stones fol
seek an in
we had jus
since we c
acceptable
other two
retrace or
find anoti
We backtr:
returned ‘
011 its wa-
correct 1
However,
Other ten
until the
The DOini
that, if
the deg-1]
the Camp
tWeen ho
benign b
19“ (i
and "itu

in the(

74

On one day of migration, the sky, which had been
black and ominous, suddenly unleashed a barrage of hail-
stones followed by a driving rain, forcing the nomads to
seek an immediate campsite. The kadkhoda's wife said that
we had just passed a good campsite and that we should return
since we could not be sure of how soon we could reach another
acceptable campsite. One of the household heads of the
other two tents in the camp group said that it was silly to
retrace our steps since it was almost certain that we could
find another campsite as soon in front of us as we would if [W
we backtracked. As argument ensued and two of the tents h
returned to the known campsite, while the other continued
on its way. It turned out that the single tent had been
correct in assuming the availability of upcoming campsites.

However, despite the fact that this family was ahead of the
other tents, they did not start to migrate the following day
until the other two tents of the camp had caught up to them.
The point is that camp relations are based on loose ties so
that, if a consensus of the camp is not reached concerning
the desireability of any day's migration, the composition of
the camp may change.

The beileh, while expressing social relations be—
tween households, is also the primary source of social inter—
action beyond the confines of the tent. While at a higher
level (i.eu tirgh level), one can see the periodic social
and ritual affirmation of the solidarity of the group, with—

in the camp social interaction is continual throughout the

 

 

existence t
are contin'
is common
and spin y
household
to get wat
it is a cc
other wome
W
are often
guineally
interactit
time, 50m,
friendshi
to be m
DhStUrela
this dOes
“Pm me
Even affi
members I
til‘\eh at:
h“ the k
hiiity 0
intrutier
DhiitiCa

0n the f

75

existence of that one group. Neighbors, especially the women,

are continually visiting each other throughout the day. It
is common for a group of women to gather in one tent to sit
and spin yarn and gossip during periods when their separate
household chores have been completed. Women will often go
to get water together to continue this interaction and, if
it is a common water source for other camps, to talk with
other women whom they might not see very often.

While it is the case that longer lasting camp groups
are often households that are related affinally or consan—
guineally, there are still a number of camps where the
interaction has been maintained for an extended period of
time, sometimes a number of years, because of the close
friendship of the household heads. These camp groups tend
to be intra—tireh groups because of the variability of
extra-tireh resources. That is, one has the right to use
pastureland because of membership in one of the tirehs, but
this does not extend to the right to use pastures of other
tirehs merely because of the desire to be close to friends.
Even affinally based camps composed of different EEEEE
members may be forced to separate in lean years. The extra—
Egggh affine has to have the kadkhoda's permission to camp
in the kadkhoda's pasture area. Since the primary responsi—
bility of the kadkhoda is to his own tirgh, he will tell the
intruder to leave if resources are scarce. Thus, the
political position of the kadkhoda may have some influence

on the formation of camp groups, particularly when they

 

 

contain egg
that sets «

of the Kor

Th
ity to the
putative a
(section)
Eggs are
M (t1
divided i]
0f the 93
n0 univer;
hi’ the pr
the aegis
“it! ham
M or
hil‘Zajan
dascent g
in Some v
ti‘aceablE
hDiCal a]
Table 3',
hohent t
trump, I

h01d3 th

76

contain extra-tireh members. This is but one minor reason
that sets off the tireh as the most important political unit

of the Kordshuli.

Tireh Level (Section)

 

The name Kordshuli, apart from its wider applicabila
ity to the larger collectivity, implies membership through
putative agnatic descent in one of the five named tireh
(section) or quasi—descent groups of the larger unit. These
tirehs are the primary basis for identification within the
taifeh (tribe). Although two of the tirehs are further sub—
divided into smaller units, each the structural equivalent
of the gulad in other groups (cf. Barth 1961: 50), there is
no universal name applied to these groups. They are defined
by the presence of a kadkhoda for each. Each grouping under
the aegis of a kadkhoda is then referred to either by the
Egggh name coupled with the name of the kadkhoda or as the
beileh or ehshum (camp) of the kadkhoda (e.g., Arbabdar—e
Mirzajan or beileh—ye Mirzajan). The group is a quasi—
descent group in that all members feel that they are related
in some way, although the connection is not necessarily
traceable, depending on the tireh. There is no putative
apical ancestor of the tiggh, nor of the taifeh as a whole.
Table 3.2 shows the separation of the taifeh into its com—
ponent tirehs, as well as the subgroups contained in these
tirehs. Also, to give an indication of the size of each
group, I have~listed the approximate number of tent house—

holds that migrate semi—annually, as well as an approximate

 

number of
recognized
asfalling

group.

TABLE 3.2

Tireh

 

Wrbabdar
Lori
Xaleji

\

Woredshai

\

Babamalel
\

each oth
although
Show act
WUIporte
Selves 2
ity, it
ture of
from th
The Sup

FhEUI‘e

77

number of households which, while not fully nomadic, are still
recognized by the Kordshuli and, generally, by the government
as falling under the aegis of one of the kadkhodas of the

group.

TABLE 3.2 Kordshuli Tirehs—~1977

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. No. H'holds
Tireh Kadkhoda No. tents under kadkhoda

Arbabdar Kakakhan 44 6O
Mirza Jan 24 35 ,
Hajiboa 19 23 is

Lori Almas 24 29
Jamshid 23 26

Xaleji Shirkhan 89 100

Moradshafi'i Sanibag 55 63

Babamaleki Mirza Qoli 16 17

 

The Kordshuli do feel themselves to be related to
each other in some general way as members of one taifeh,
although there is no accepted genealogy which purports to
show actual shared descent. Each of the tirehs has its own
purported history, generally known only to the members them—
selves and to the khavanin (chiefs) of the larger collectiv—
ity. It is generally accepted Within the taifeh that the
core of the Kordshuli, including the chiefly dynasty, came
from the Bakhtiari confederacy, west of Kordshuli territory.

The supposed origins of all the tireh is summarized in

Figure 3.2.

 

 

Arbabdar (
Babamaleki
Waleji----
Woradshaf :‘
J amsl
Lori-

Alma:

FIGURE 3 .

D
in the pa
did not c
It seems
at differ
timeless
0f the S}
Part of .
Origins
their so
is this
as the r

increasg

“w 1

these d
hhrdshu
during

appeare

part Of

78

 

 

 

 

 

Arbabdar (perhaps incl. khavanin) ——————————— 1
:—-Bakhtiari

Babamaleki '
Xaleji Xalej village
Moradshafi'i Baharlu

Jamshid Qashqa'i
Lori—

Almas Mamassani

FIGURE 3.2 Origins of Kordshuli Tirehs

Despite these different origins, there is no point
in the past that the tribesmen will say that the Kordshuli
did not consist of these five Eigeh and only these five.

It seems obvious that the Kordshuli interpret their history
at different levels of temporal relevance. That is, this
timeless identification with the Kordshuli shows something
of the synchronic relevance that the tirehs place on being
part of a larger collectivity. The existence of putative
origins indicates one way in which the tirehs can maintain
their separate identities within the larger group, and it

is this separate identity which is becoming more important
as the role of the taifeh (tribe) continues to diminish with
increased State control.

It is, of course, more likely that the number of
tirehs has changed, since it does not seem possible that
these disparate groups joined up with the core of the future
Kordshuli taifeh at precisely the same time. In fact,
during the last thirty years, one of the tirehs almost dis—
appeared. The smallest £2392: Babamaleki, almost became

part of the Lori tireh on the orders of the last kalantar

 

because tl
to take 0‘
we: :
easily be
nephew, t
been Baba
the ident
still in

(1945) dc
ago.

1
by the K<
heredita:
istics 3
become t
did not
Prestige
Others 1

characte

 

79
because the kadkhoda's son was not strong enough personally
to take over even quasi—leadership of the group. The
kalantar felt that since the tireh was so small it could
easily be absorbed into another tireh. The kadkhoda's
nephew, though, complained saying that his family had always
been Babamaleki and that he would become kadkhoda to avoid
the identity shift. The kalantar agreed and the tireh is
still in existence. One interesting aside is that Magee
(1945) does not list Babamaleki as a sub—tribe thirty years
ago.

The above example supports the idea, also expressed
by the Kordshuli, that the position of kadkhoda is primarily
hereditary from father to son, but that personal character—
istics still play an important role in determining who shall
become the kadkhoda. Because the position, traditionally,
did not necessarily imply a higher status or greater
prestige, it was not highly sought after. The position of
Eggghgga was based largely on the ability of the man to have
others listen to him. His personality, strength of
character, and ability as a herdsman, which was evident at
least partially through his wealth, were of prime impor—
tance.

The political importance of the tireh and the
kadkhoda have increased greatly with the deposition of the
kalantar of the Kordshuli by the Iranian government. The
kadkhoda is now the major political mediator between the

nomads and the State (from their point of View). He is now

 

responsibl
young men
certain t1
identity
therefore
elaborate
T
significa
of 19235:
(of. char
social en
of any IE
Eiigh me]
darity a
feels re
usual ma
ship_ '1
manifest
noted a
the abij
taken a.
diSharm
COHSide
househc
conSide

for the

 

8O

responsible for securing a permit to migrate, for gathering
young men to be conscripted by the Iranian army, and to make
certain that members of his tireh have government—required
identity cards (shenasnameh). His political position and,
therefore, the political importance of the tireh is further
elaborated in chapter five.

The social importance and, indirectly, the economic
significance of the tireh may be seen through the frequency
of intra-tireh marriage-—greater than 80% of all marriages
(cf. chapter four, Figure 4.1). Weddings are the primary
social events which bring together most or all of the members
of any tireh. Because most marriages take place between
tireh members, they also serve to express its social soli—
darity and group unity. Also, since each member of a tireh
feels related in some way to all other tireh members, the
usual marriage serves to reaffirm this feeling of relation-
ship. That is, the bonds of close kinship are once again
manifestly strengthened by the marriage bond. It is quickly
noted and talked about if some members of the tigeh who have
the ability to attend the ceremony choose not to. It is
taken as a sign of a poor relationship as well as a sign of
disharmony within the tireh. Most of the tireh members
consider it bad form to avoid the celebration, even if the
households involved have had a disagreement. That is, it is
considered more proper to put aside temporary disagreements

for the sake of group harmony and cohesiveness.

 

 

 

]
attend ti
affinal l
and acqu:
members .
While th
prestige
gives pr
the marr
sometime
there is

guests.

to brin
example
In the

some ca
most yC
they at
There V
sion 0,
t“Hate

anothe

Often
The ti

requin

81

It is true that there are a number of others who may

attend the wedding besides members of the tireh. Extra—tireh

 

affinal relations, friends from other tireh, village friends
and acquaintances, and, if lucky or important, one or more
members of the khavanin may also be present at a wedding.
While the presence of important individuals gives direct
prestige to the marrying households, it also, indirectly,
gives prestige to the section of which they are a part. If
the marriage partners are from different sections, which is
sometimes the case, both families and sections feel that
there is prestige gained by the presence of important
guests.

There are few, if any, other celebrations which serve
to bring the group together. Most religious Observances, for
example, tend to be observed by individual tent households.
In the past, when camp groups were less dispersed, there were
some cases of group circumcision ceremonies. More recently,
most young males are circumcised by an urban doctor, when
they are taken to the city after they are a few years old.
There was an attempt by one headman to organize a circumci—
sion ceremony during the period of my fieldwork but, unfor—
tunately, the accidental murder of a Kordshuli man by
another put an end to possible festivities.

Because of spatial proximity, social interaction is
Often more pronounced within a tireh than between tirehs.

The tireh do have traditional pasture areas and these often

require that the nomads camp close together. Traditionally,

 

 

this proxz‘
need for g
with the i
still a g
sectional
T

evident 1
taken ple
householt
relative
tribal m:

were cam

ies. Th

tie, whe

marriage

much mor

direct ,
11lembers
usufruc
traditi
%
been me
now am
(disci,
Ship 1

Ell10We

82

this proximity was even greater because of the additional
need for group defense and security. Even now, though,
with the greater dispersal of tent households, there is
still a greater proximity intra-sectionally than inter-
sectionally.

The relative important of this spatial factor is
evident in the fact that most of the marriages that have
taken place between tirehs or taifehs have been between
households which camp, at least part of the year, in
relative proximity to each other. The cases of inter-
tribal marriage have been between households of groups that
were camping near the fringes of their respective territor—
ies. The point can be made, then, that any positive social
tie, whether spatial or kin-based, gets confirmed through
marriage. It is also obvious that the kinebased ties are
Amuch more important.

Earlier I mentioned the significance, albeit in-

direct, of intra—tireh marriage for the economic sphere. As

 

members of a named section, each household has access and
usufruct right to traditional pasture areas defined by

traditional use patterns and pre-Entezamat allocation by the

 

kalantar. The general boundaries of these territories have
been maintained by the Iranian government, although they are

now administered and assigned by the afsar—e Entezamat

 

(disciplinary officer).l It is through registered member—
ship in one of the named sections that any household is

allowed to use government—owned and government—controlled

 

 

 

 

 

 

rangeland
itself wi
to be in
still the
governmer
members <
pasture :
marriage;
househol
secure a
environm
have to
Callipsite
0f varie
return,
but the:
them wi-
territO:

mental

 

83

rangeland. Although the government does not usually concern
itself with checking the rights of any individual household
to be in a given area (unless there is a complaint), it is
still the responsibility of the kadkhoda to provide the
government with the names of each household head and the
members of his family. The integrity of these traditional

pasture areas is maintained and strengthened by intra—tireh

 

marriages. While extra—tireh affinal ties may provide some

 

households with access to additional resources, they are not
secure and usually they are unavailable in the event of
environmental crisis. These errant households would then
have to return to traditional areas where their access to
campsites and pasturage may be constrained by the formation
of varied alliances within the group. If they are forced to
return, they are, of course, allowed to use available areas,
but their short—term search for greener pastures may leave
them with fewer acceptable areas within the traditional
territory. Therefore, in the long run, this may be detri—
mental to the maintenance of the flocks.

One implication of the above discussion is that there
are no eXplicit economic processes which are activated on
the Eireh level. Certainly, access to the means of pro-
duction is based to some degree on membership on this level,
but even here it is better seen as a higher level (e.g.,

taifeh [tribe]), economic process. That is, either the

 

kalantar, traditionally, or the afSar—e Entezamat, recently,

are merely manipulating the components (i.e., tirehs), of

 

the larger
under ELLE
mumm-
manipulat:
makeshift
that thes
to pastur
territory
areas.

1
avery gr
the case
Kordshul
members
This rel
relation
the Korc
indivim
COmDOnel
interes
based,
Ship to

indivic‘

 

84

the larger group. There is some increased tireh involvement
under Entezamat because of the political importance of the

kadkhoda. Still, in this case, the afsar—e Entezamat is

 

manipulating a number of small groups, all parts of a larger
makeshift Khamseh confederacy. This is not meant to imply
that these groups are insignificant, but rather that rights
to pasturage are, in the long run, defined by the total
territory of the Kordshuli not by the smaller group pasture
areas.

There is one additional economic practice which, in
a very general sense, relates to tireh membership. It is
the case that urban trading partners (gust) often relate to
Kordshuli as members of a particular tireh. That is, most
members of the same Eireh tend to trade with the same dust.
This relationship may be created through the friendly
relationship of the kadkhoda to the trader, giving some of
the Kordshuli easier access to the shopkeeper, although
individual interpersonal interaction determines the economic
component of the relationship. That is, the amount of
interest charged and the level of indebtedness allowed are
based, to a large degree, on the closeness of the relation-
Ship to the trader. Thus, the interaction is primarily

individual and only secondarily related to the tireh.

Taifeh Level (Tribe)

 

Most of the traditional functions which were opera-
tive at this level have diminished drastically or disappear—

ed since the deposition of the kalantar. In chapter five,

 

 

tn tradi
ity are s
the Kords
mined. T
not profe
lost muci
depositir
in a rea
cannot r
except i
full rol
and powe
falls mc
giance :
importa
Kordshu
“M
the old
this 1;

part 0:

in aha
larger

tribut

,_,
p:
D
a.
,4.

77‘
if, p:
w ”H
9? =3

 

 

85
tht traditional political functions of the larger collectiv-
ity are summarized. With the change in leadership, however,
the Kordshuli as a meaningful unit is being severely under—
mined. There are a number of the younger Kordshuli who do
not profess any particular loyalty to a group which has
lost much of its definitional criteria. That is, with the
deposition of the kalantar, the political unity of the group,

in a real sense, has been eliminated. The afsar—e Entezamat

 

cannot replace the kalantar as head of a political unit,
except in a nominal sense, since he cannot carry out the
full role behavior expected of a kalantar. He has authority
and power but no following. As the burden of leadership
falls more on the kadkhoda, so, too, the political alle—
giance falls more to the tirehs as they become the most
important political units. The concept of the collectivity,
Kordshuli, is maintained primarily in the minds of the
khavanin (chiefs) and of some of the Kordshuli (eSpecially
the older ones), and in the papers of the government. In
this latter case, however, it is only a name representing
part of a larger makeshift confederacy.

The economic functions of the taifeh are summarized
in chapter six. The primary economic components of the
larger group were concerned with the politico-economic redisa
tributive role of the kalantar and the allocation of pasture
land to the various Eirgh. The redistributive role of the
kalantar has not been replaced in any real way by either the

ggsar-e Entezamat or by the kadkhodas. There are a few
i

 

 

 

 

 

 

cases of
based on
kadkhodas
have acce
territory
but acces
diminisht
become mt
Kordshul
control
or overc
M
avmyi
reducti.
rangela

DaSture

a numbe
feW tir
entire
most 0
tives

OCcasi

to pal

W
p:
,_1
p:
/E

as we

in th

 

86

cases of redistributive—like acts by the afsar but they are
based on bribery, while the redistributive acts of the

kadkhodas are minimal and infrequent because they do not

 

have access to adequate resources to fill that role. Tribal
territory has been maintained, to some degree, by the State
but access to intermediate zones of use and migration has
diminished with agricultural expansion. The tirehs have
become more important to the State than the larger group,
Kordshuli, if only because rights to pastures and, thereby,
control of land use is tireh oriented. If pastures are poor
or overcrowded, some nomads may be able to bribe the afsar—e

Entezamat to issue a permit for non—tireh land, but this is

 

 

a very rare occurrence and can in no way compensate for the
reduction in pastures brought on by government control of
rangeland and agricultural eXpansion into traditional
pasture areas.

While it is true that the taifeh, traditionally, had
a number of political and economic functions, there were very
few times when social functions manifested themselves for the
entire group. The unity of the larger group was expressed

most often through actions of the kadkhOdas as representa~

 

tives of their reSpective tirehs. There were festive

 

occasions when the kalantar would invite all the kadkhodas
to participate and share a meal. This would give the
kalantar a chance to give explicit instructions to each man
as well as to listen to the problems of each of the tirehs

in the context of the others. Still, this did not happen

 

 

 

 

frequentl
of the jg
group bec
nun-La
some of ‘

for his .

eXpressi
longer I
but one
of the i
EOt inv<
died in
Kordshu
A tuner
all Ell
hold he

n0 one

87

frequently and in no way brought together all of the members,
of the taifeh. It did serve to express the unity of the
group because of the participation of members (i.e.,
kadkhodas), of each tiggh, but understandably, this left

some of the common nomads with a much stronger identification
for his tireh than for the taifeh.

During the period of fieldwork, even this limited
expression of solidarity was absent because the kalantar no
longer represents the taifeh in all its aspects. There was
but one occurrence which brought together members of most ,fi
of the tirehs during my field research. One Kordshuli man V
got involved in an argument with another and one of them
died in the ensuing fight. It is only the second time in
Kordshuli memory when one Kordshuli was killed by another.
A funeral ceremony was held by the khavanin (chiefs) in which
all Eirgh except one were represented by a number of house—
hold heads. There was much indignation over the fact that
no one from that tireh was present.

In most ways it can be seen that the entire unit,

taifeh—ye Kordshuli, is now basically a nominal unit which

 

is maintained by the State for administrative purposes, and
by the khavanin to help further the fiction of group
solidarity, allowing them to continue to garner respect and
prestige as the tribal elite instead of having to interact
with others mainly in the role of large land owner.
Generally, then, there have been directed shifts in

economic and political functions which indicate that the

total grr
adaptive
Certainl
EEEEE le
continue

processe

level be

creating

With in

I the 313
E of the

is no a

be call

is stil

relati<

tary pt

bearin

this i

sent 1

organj

 

 

88

total group, Kordshuli, has lost most of its meaning as an
adaptive unit fulfillingeconomic or political needs.
Certainly, social processes have been maintained at the
Eigeh level, albeit at lessening degrees as piggh dispersal
continues. However, many of the political and economic
processes which were regulated traditionally at the taifeh
level have, to some extent, been absorbed by the pigeh,
creating quasi—tribal groups with quasi—autonomous leaders.
With increased interaction between the State and each of
the tirehs as a, more or less, separate unit, the existence
of the group Kordshuli is further threatened. While there
is no actual political, economic, or social unit that can
be called Kordshuli, there exists an ideological unit which
is still used by most members to define themselves in
relation to other pastoral nomadic groups and to the seden—
tary population at large. The continued impact of over-

bearing State control, however, will lessen the value of

 

this ideological until the appellation Kordshuli will repre-
sent little more than a remnant of a traditional form of

organization and adaptation in the area.

 

 

graphic
primary
mMMu
points

relatio
the die
the pre
may be
levels
Which

tenanc

Varion
that s
hUneh
POStq
While

HEWIy

indp

 

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL PROCESSES

In the preceding chapter, I presented a brief ethno-
graphic introduction to the Kordshuli, focussing on the
primary social organizational forms. This chapter is a
continuation and elaboration of Some of the ethnographic
points made in that chapter. Many of the processes and
relationships of social organization do not fit neatly into
the discrete social structural categories that were used in
the previous chapter. Rather, they show that while there
may be fairly specific functions at different structural
levels, there is an overlap when we examine the processes
which contribute to the deveIOpment, evolution, and main—

tenance of these social forms.

 

While there are many different processes at work at
various levels, I will present only the most important ones
that serve to maintain the primary units among the Kordshuli:
Egggh (tent household) and Eirgh (section). Marriage and
post-marital residence are the keys to tigeh maintenance,
while inheritance guarantees, for some, the viability of

newly formed household units.

Marriage Preferences and Marriage Types
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the
individual tent household, huneh is the most important

89

 

 

structur:
interact
most 0ft
there ar
from the
kinship

the idit
culturai
ierence

outside

oouSi
and t
idiom
Shin.

heCor

90

structural unit to the Kordshuli. Still, there is a need to
interact with other tent households. This interaction is
most often based on consanguineal and affinal ties. That is,
there are generalized spheres of interaction which radiate
from the household and which tend to be based on perceived
kinship distance. This is most strongly expressed through
the idiom of preferred marriage rules. There are no strong
cultural prescriptions for marriage but the cultural pre—
ferences which do exist work strongly to inhibit marriage

outside of the perceived acceptable kinship range.

firms“

Preferred marriage among the Kordshuli is with any
first cousin, although there is a saying that a marriage
with father's brother's daughter is a contract made by
Allah and seemingly, therefore, the best. There does seem
to be a slight preference for actual father's brother’s
daughter (FBD) marriage but there is no stigma attached to
any other cousin marriage. In fact, despite this preference
for cousins, there is no stigma attached to any marriage
that takes place within the pigeh (section), even if no
actual relationship is claimed. Quantitatively, it is intra—
Eigeh marriage that is most significant for the Kordshuli.
The cultural preference, although explicitly stated for first
cousins, is actually more relevant for the $1322 as a social
and territorial unit. Kin ties are recognized through the
idiom of agnatic descent as expressed through tireh member—
ship. The relative importance of this intra—tireh marriage

becomes apparent when we see that even with the extension of

 

kin ties
iicatory
of this

consider

accepta‘
or clas
in the
if ego'
cousins
daughte
1973: (
daught
likeli
Sister
conseq
cousir

(Ci, 1

Dresc
Other
Y0ruk
stand
brow
the ,
with

10m

 

91

kin ties through out—marriage, first cousins, real or classi—
ficatory, are usually selected from within the pigeh. Part
of this is the result of a desire to be near the total group
considered close kin.l

It is not unexpected that all cousin types are
acceptable marriage partners, since those which are not real
or classificatory father's brother's daughter still fit with—
in the definition of remote agnatic relationship. That is,
if ego's parents are related as patrilateral parallel
cousins, then it follows that any true mother's brother's
daughter to ego would also be an agnatic kinsmen (Bates
1973: 61). The higher the incidence of father's brother's
daughter marriage in previous generations, the greater
likelihood the father's sister's daughter and mother's
sister's daughter will be close agnatic kin. The structural
consequences of this preference for patrilateral parallel
cousin has been presented many times in the literature
(of. Ayoub 1959; Randolph and Coult 1968; Khuri 1970).

While there is not the rigid eXplicit custom or
prescription for father's brother's right that exists for
other groups such as the Kurds (Barth 1954: 164—171) and the
Yoruk (Bates 1973: 61), there is an implicit cultural under-
standing among the Kordshuli that where an actual father's
brother's daughter exists, the appropriate male should have
the first choice. The Kordshuli say that he is the person
with the right (haggdar). If two males of comparable geneo-

logical distance are vying for the same woman, other factors

 

 

 

 

 

 

such as
siblings

play.

beginnii
rights (
daughte
the gir
other 0
mother
sibling
prior 2
raised
her fa
off to
Status
Was no
no er
make 1
Were
Velid
eHter
mest
WOnlc

diStz

Ofte

92

such as relative status of their fathers, number of married
siblings, and respectability within the community come into
play.

As I was leaving the field, one such dispute was just
beginning to surface. Two men started arguing about the
rights of their sons to marry their mother's brother's
daughter. One of the men claimed that he had been promised
the girl for his son when they were both very small. The
other claimed that his son should be first choice since his
mother was older than the other man's mother (i.e., an elder
sibling). While most Kordshuli would say the man with the
prior agreement should have the choice, there were questions
raised about the agreement by the woman‘s guardian, since
her father was dead. The guardian wanted to marry the girl
off to the family without the agreement because of their
status in the tigeh, their wealth, etc. He claimed that he
was not a party to the agreement and that, since there was
no written record of the agreement, he should be allowed to
make the arrangements himself. In this case, however, there
were some others who recalled the agreement and supported its
validity. As tempers continued to flare, the kadkhoda
entered into the fray to help settle the dispute. It seemed
most likely when I left the field that the prior arrangement
would win out and that the other young man would marry a more
distant relative in another year or two.

When relating kinship ties, the Kordshuli will most

Often use the most direct genealogical links for close

 

 

relation
more dis
is alwag
distant
mmwe
tion),

rather

a link

set by
marriag

this d

lels t
brothe
as one
DTESGI
Kordsi
Class
betwe
actua
SCOpe
of ti
c0Us:
phrp
Ther

from

93

relationships, and patrilineal links when the kin ties are
more distant. That is, a true mother's brother's daughter
is always referred to in that way even if there is a more
distant agnatic relationship. However, if the relationship
is more distant (e.g., beyond the first ascending genera—
tion), then agnatic terms become preferable. MMBSS, would
rather be expressed in comparable patrilineal terms if such
a link exists.

Marriage prohibitions for the Kordshuli are those
set by Islamic law (cf. Levy 1965). The few other types of
marriages considered unfavorable will be discussed later in
this chapter.

The actual distribution of marriages closely paral—
lels the expectations set up by cultural norms. Father's
brother's daughter marriage occurs at least as frequently
as one might expect, given the statistical likelihood of the
presence of a marriageable cousin (Ayoub 1959). Among the
Kordshuli there is no real distinction made between real and
classificatory cousins. When asked about the relationship
between two people who are more distantly related than
actual first cousins, the Kordshuli will automatically tele—
scope down the relationship (if possible), eliminating many
of the agnatic links. This allows for more preferred first
cousin marriages (e.g., FFBSD will become FBD for marriage
purposes), although an actual FBD would still be preferred.
There are no linguistic devices used to separate out true

from classificatory kin, so that it is only through complete

 

 

geneologi
degree 0:
difficul‘
chapter
classifi
ascendin
through
scoped (
without
known.
were to
those c
were 5(

riages

TABLE .

Tireh

-.___
Bibama
A- Kai
it uh
A. Ha;
Xalej

L~ Ah
L. Ja

\

l

94

geneological information that one can discern the actual
degree of relationship. For this reason and because of the
difficulty in gathering complete census material (see
chapter one), I have chosen to present both actual and
classificatory kin as the Kordshuli would, through the first
ascending generation only. Those who may be traceable
through most distant genealogical links, without being tele-
scoped down, have been grouped as pigeh or taifeh members
without reference to actual relationship even if it was
known. As Table 4.1 shows, 22.3 percent of all marriages
were to actual or classificatory FBD. Of all marriages,
those contracted to actual or classificatory first cousins
were 50.4 percent. Approximately 80 percent of all mar-

riages occur within the same tireh.

TABLE 4.1 Distance of relationship of wife to husband

Other Other Out—
Tireh FBD FZD MBD MZD w/in w/in side TOTAL
tireh tribe tribe

 

 

Babamaleki 2 1 1 3 O 5 O 12
A. Kakakhan 13 2 5 6 22 6 1 55
A. Mirzajan 6 3 6 1 11 3 0 30
A. Hajiboa 4 1 3 O 10 0 2 20
Xaleji 16 4 14 4 51 5 2 96
L. Almas 7 4 5 2 6 2 O 26
L. Jamshid 13 5 3 4 1 6 3 35

TOTAL 61 20 37 20 101 27 8 274

% 22.3 7.3 13.5 7.3 36.9 9.8 2.9

 

 

cases wh
would sh
Polvavnv
ticed, 5
three on
and none
by most
or to a
may be

marry w
host wi
male re

married

Kordshi
expect:
has th
Claim

the re
1eVira
betwee
childi
othern

Wealt]

onels

 

95

Second marriages, either in cases of polygyny or in
cases where the first spouse died, if statistically analyzed,
would show a much lower frequency of first cousin marriage.
Polygyny, while culturally acceptable, is very rarely prac—
ticed, so it is statistically irrelevant; there are only
three or four nomadic Kordshuli who presently have two wives
and none who have more than two. There is some reluctance
by most fathers to marry their virgin daughters to a widower
or to a man who already has a wife (cf. Bates 1973: 65). It
may be the case that men marrying for the second time will
marry widows, although this occurred quite infrequently.
Most widows, if older, were taken care of by sons or other
male relatives. If the widows were young, they often re—
married according to the levirate.

Both the levirate and sororate are practiced by the
Kordshuli. Accepting the levirate, there is the cultural
expectation that the deceased's brother not only will but
has the right to marry the widow (haqq dare). The Kordshuli
claim that the wife, especially if she has children, is still
the responsibility of the husband's family and that the
leviratic marriage serves to maintain the relationship
between households, provide care for the woman and her
children, and, perhaps, provide a wife for some men who
otherwise may not easily find a wife because of lack of
wealth or personality or physical characteristics.

In the case of the sororate, the ”right” to marry

one's sister—in—law is less strongly expressed than in the

 

levirai
asks f(
have vr
being

it is

has be
ings h
short-
in his
he may

or to

levir
idiom
levir
any k
money
to g
somej

In t

only
usua
One
Dlm
mar

bro

 

96

levirate. Still, there is a belief that, if the widower

asks for the hand of his dead wife's sister, her father must
have very good reasons for refusing him; the best reason
being that she is already bethrothed. If the father refuses,
it is usually because he believes that the man, as a husband,
has been inadequate. While this may create some hard feel—
ings between the families involved, such feelings are usually
short—lived since most of the group will support the father
in his decision. Certainly, the father is also aware that
he may be able to create a more favorable bi—family alliance
or to gain more in brideprice from some other match.

One difference between the marriage ”rights” of
leviratic and sororatic marriages may be expressed in the
idiom of brideprice. It is extremely unusual in the
levirate for the widow's family to request or even expect
any brideprice. They say of the brother that ”he gives no
money” (pil nemideh). The family says that they do not want
to give their child to another person who might take her
someplace else (i.e., to a place she has not already gone).
In the sororate, however, it is usual for the widower to pay
a new and often comparable brideprice. I became aware of
only a few cases of the levirate or sororate, since they are
usually activated only when the couple is young. Only in
one case that I am aware of did the leviratic marriage take
place when the woman was middle—aged and had a daughter of
marriageable age. This occurred because the deceased's

brother had not yet married, since he was considered by most

 

 

 

to be i

acquir:
price
bride'
giving
leads
riages
to be
numbe:
of th
to ta
of re
break
the t
This
camp
eith
All
thei
Sitk
char

the:

the
Ero

Wan

 

97

to be too ”simple” (sadeh).
Certainly one of the more important aspects of

acquiring a bride is brideprice (shirbaha; bashloq). Bride—

 

price is the combination of animals and money given the
bride's father/family by the groom's father/family. The
giving of brideprice is the culmination of the process which
leads to the actual marriage. Most negotiations for mar—
riages are fairly secretive until the final, formal offer is
to be made. Usually, male relatives of the groom spend a
number of months in informal visiting, working out the terms
of the brideprice. While it is unusual for the groom-to—be
to take part in these diScussions, there have been a number
of recent cases where he has had some direct input. If a
breakdown in negotiations occurs, it is often the women of
the two households who work to break through the impasse.
This, of course, is possible only if the households are
camped close enough to each other for the women to visit
either at each other's tents or at a nearby well or stream.
All they can actually do is provide information between
their respective households about the kinds of concessions
either is willing to make. This is not viewed as a direct
channel, since the women pick up the information only as
they hear discussions in their own tent. The women involved
in this interchange are usually young and are working for
the best interests of the bride—to—be. Even the prospective
groom's sisters will try to help only if the young woman

wants to marry their brother.

 

 

 

 

 

tentati
primary
usually
the gr<
the pr
there
or non
is not
no ice
the vi
accep'
a mea
eaten
ators
trans

Verbs

98

When the final terms of the arrangement have been
tentatively agreed upon by the secondary negotiators, the
primary negotiators--the eldest male relatives responsible,
usually fathers—-will come together. The male relatives of
the groom-to—be, led by his father, will Visit the tent of
the prospective bride's father (talevuni). At this point
there are a number of non-verbal cues which show acceptance
or nonacceptance of the terms. For example, if the group
is not admitted to the tent, or if only tea is served with
no food, or if a felt rug is put down instead of a carpet,
the visiting party may assume that the marriage is not
acceptable. If the terms of the agreement are acceptable,

a meal will be served and then, only after the meal has been
eaten, will a final verbal agreement by the primary negoti—
ators be made, including a discussion of wedding dates and
transfer of the brideprice. Of course, there may be explicit
verbal statements, also.

There is a wide variation in the amount of brideprice
paid, depending on such factors as relationship, number of
daughters, family wealth, and so on. Marriages outside of
one's group tend to be more eXpensive unless they are-with
matrilateral first cousins. Certainly, one of the largest
brideprices paid was by the brother of a Kordshuli kadkhoda
to a neighboring Qashqa'i family. He paid 10,000T (1T =
c. $ 0.15) and 70 ewes (6OOT/pair of ewes). This man's
younger brother was initially asked for even more~~30,000T

and 100 ewes—-for a woman within his tireh because the

 

i

father <
negotia
range——
pay a c
(400T/p
iamily'
large.

animal:

price
given
close
sake i
still
he mo.
a bri
or p0
the d
wealr
Price
Door
no b
the
desi
r612
hen

had

99

father did not really want her to marry him. However,
negotiations brought the brideprice into a more plausible
range--only 10,000T. Another man who married his FZD had to
pay a considerable amount—-10,000T, 30 ewes, and 5 goats
(4OOT/pair of ewes; 200T/pair of goats)——because of his own
family's wealth. Most brideprices, however, are not this
large. An average range is about 1,000—3,000T and 15—30
animals (combination of sheep and goats).

There were a number of men who had to pay no bride-
price for their wives. A number of possible reasons are
given for this occurrence. Sometimes, if the couple are very
close kin (i.e., actual first cousins), brothers will for—
sake the transfer of stock and money, especially if they
still maintain a joint flock, since then the transfer would
be moot. Still, it is more common for even brothers to pay
a brideprice for the marriage of their children. The wealth
or poverty of the family may also play a role, depending on
the direction of the transfer. Above, I noted that a very
wealthy family may be asked for a more substantial bride—
price payment. Here, if the groom's family is relatively
poor or if the bride’s family is quite wealthy, there may be
no brideprice asked for. This decision is often based on
the closeness of the families (even as friends) or on the
desire of the bride‘s father to marry his daughter off
relatively quickly. Another reason given by a couple of the
men who paid no brideprice was that the father of the bride

had a number of daughters and that he, (the father),

thereio

each on

the ac<
exchan;
and da
is cal
time t
able c
family
'weal‘
more.
which
betwe
money
horde
(Per:
come

cont

reie
The
man
the
the
The

Dri

 

 

lOO

therefore, was not concerned if he received a brideprice for
each one.

The giving of brideprice may also play a key role in
the acceptability of certain marriages (e.g., sister
exchange). This practice of two families, each with a son
and daughter, exchanging daughters as brides for their sons
is called go-be-go (lit. cow to cow) marriage. The only
time that this form of marriage is not viewed as objection—
able or ugly (zesht-e) is when brideprice is paid. One
family is generally perceived as being relatively more
'wealthy' than the other and they, therefore, should pay
more. Even here, though, the marriage is not as good as one
which goes in one direction only. Sister—exchange marriage
between two poor families, where there is no exchange of
money, is the subject of much gossip and concern. The

Kordshuli say about this kind of marriage, ”omad, nomad”

 

(Persian: yeki amad, yeki neamad——one came, one did not

 

come). That is, they believe that only one of the marriages
contracted will produce offSpring; the other will be barren.

This same eXpression, ”omad, nomad,” is also used to

 

refer to marriages between two brothers and two sisters.

The Kordshuli give no other reason for believing that this
marriage is different than others. They do say that, in

the long run, it is better than sister exchange marriage but
that, since they are both bad, it makes little difference.
The marriage mentioned above in the discussion on bride—

price, relates to this issue. The kadkhoda of the tireh was

 

 

 

married to Haj
also wanted to
ierent mother.
of the match,
continuing neg
social sister]
hood. The in
whether consc
as it relates
we are aware
deleterious 1
if two sibliI
creased risk
While this a
sciously Sta
0f marriage
Within an 1r
Afte
the brideprj
marriage (:0
is usual f0
ConsecutiVe
when flock
only of the

101

married to Haji's daughter. The kadkhoda's youngest brother
also wanted to marry a daughter of Haji, albeit by a dif—

_ ferent mother. The question was raised as to the propriety
of the match, since the women were viewed as sisters. The
continuing negotiations worked to dispel the notion that
social sisterhood was the same as fully biological sister—
hood. The implication is that there is an awareness,
Whether conscious or not, of some aspect of genetic potential
as it relates to offspring. Certainly, in the western world
we are aware of the fact that close inbreeding may allow
deleterious recessive traits to manifest themselves. Thus,
if two siblings marry direct counterparts, there is an in—

creased risk that any recessive trait may be manifested.

 

While this aspect of these marriages forms is never con—
sciously stated, the social stigma attached to certain forms
of marriage works to reduce the potential for this problem
within an inbreeding population.

After all arrangements have been made for payment of
the brideprice, dates will be set for the writing of the
marriage contract (aghd) and the wedding itself (aggsi). It
is usual for these events to take place on two or three
cousecutive days. Most weddings take place in the summer
when flock care is less intense and when most camps, not
only of the tireh but also of the entire taifeh, are in

relative proximity to each other.

_T_i_1_e__
Whether
time, both the
occasions of gr
dancing. All c
chief dance, gr
hand, while th
tark-e bazi (5
leg of another
pole to block
from a nearby
adrum. Musi<
Of a moderniz:
used to proviu
their synthet
player, the v
batterW-Opera
While
before the we
the aCtual w.
for marriage
thil‘teen. 1
autumn in th
from her on]
(upland Cole
suihor the .

contract, I‘I

102

The Marriage Contract and the Wedding

Whether held on consecutive days or separated in
time, both the marriage contract and the wedding are
occasions of great celebration: feasting, music playing,
dancing. All dancing is unisexual--the women do a handker—
chief dance, gesturing with a scarf or handkerchief in each
hand, while the men engage in a dance/competition called
tark—e bazi (stick game), where one man tries to hit the
leg of another with a stick, the defender using a large
pole to block the attempt. Musicians are hired, usually
from a nearby city, to play a couple of different pipes and
a drum. Musicians are not always available and the effects
of a modernizing world become obvious as modern means are
used to provide music. In one case, the women danced in
their synthetic fiber skirts to a battery—operated tape
player, the volume of which was being magnified through a
battery-operated megaphone.

While the marriage contract is usually written right
before the wedding, it may, in fact, be written years before
the actual wedding. In one case, the girl was contracted
for marriage at age nine and was married when she was
thirteen. In another case, the bride was contracted in
autumn in the winter pasture area, where she was isolated
from her only adult male relatives who lived in sarhad
(upland cold region). She was then married to her unwanted
suitor the following summer. To complete the writing of the

contract, representatives of the bride and groom must

 

 

finally negOtiE
he woman's fan
mt occur or ex
mtions. Heatt
emse over the
myKordshuli i
paid.
One fa
that divorce i
the Kordshuli.
remember only
case, about i:
anh with her
City- Since
ity, no 93933
(ZELES) is up
negative aSpe
(W). I
Kordshuli als
hail) if a d
act for the
families. 1
to Carry out
Blame is rar
be eanally I
more to blah
”thong the K(

actions.

 

103

finally negotiate the amount of mahg, the money to be paid
the woman's family by the man's family if the marriage does
not occur or ends in divorce as a result of the man's
actions. Heated discussions and arguments always seem to
arise over the issue of map; despite the fact that none of
my Kordshuli informants can remember any time when mahg was
paid.

One fact that works against the payment of mahr is
that divorce is very uncommon, almost non—existant, among
the Kordshuli. Even the oldest Kordshuli informants can
remember only one divorce involving Kordshuli. In that
case, about fifteen years ago, the woman left her husband,
and, with her father's help, secured a divorce in a nearby
city. Since the separation was considered her responsibil—
ity, no map; was paid. The negative aspect of divorce
(galaq) is universally accepted among the Kordshuli. Most
negative aspects of Kordshuli life are considered ”ugly”
(zesht—e). Divorce, however, is not only ugly but the
Kordshuli also say that, ”there is fault“ (eib hast; mahp
gasp) if a divorce occurs. Divorce is not only a negative
act for the couples but also reflects poorly on their
families. It is seen as a statement of a couple's inability
to carry out their responsibilities as husband and wife.
Blame is rarely placed on one party; both are considered to
be equally responsible in moral terms, although, one may be
more to blame in legal terms. However, divorce is so rare
among the Kordshuli that it is negligible in terms of social

actions.

 

 

 

Once th
pleted, the mar
negotiators for
groom is preser
although the g]
with than take
specialist tha'
neighboring se
are religions
of the W
but there is r.
given religioi
religious use

The w.
day after the
Continued, a1
laviSh than I?
Signing, usue
fEither. In 2
ffor the Con.
nuDtial tent

Whil
teeDee made
younger fema
tent clappir
or Slightly
washed, bod'

104

Once the final negotiations for mahg have been com-
pleted, the marriage contract is signed by the primary
negotiators for the couple. Neither the bride nor the
groom is present during the contract-signing ceremony,
although the groom may appear later in the day, more to help
with than take part in the festivities. The religious
specialist that writes the marriage contract is from a
neighboring sedentary community; there are no Kordshuli who
are religious specialists. The specialist may be a friend
of the kadkhoda or of other household heads in the Eigeh,
but there is no direct nor developed relationship between a
given religious specialist and any tigeh such that the
religious needs of one tigeh are met by one specialist.

The wedding celebration itself most often occurs the
day after the contract is signed. The same festivities are
continued, although the primary feast of the day may be more
lavish than preceding meals. The wedding, like the contract
signing, usually takes place in the camp of the groom's
father. In addition to the guest tents, which remain set up
from the contract—signing ceremony, a bathing tent and a
nuptial tent (hejleh) are set up.

While the groom is in the bathing tent, a small
teepee made of a blanket wrapped around a wooden tripod, his
younger female relatives stand around the outside of the
tent clapping their hands, ululating, and singing happy and/
or slightly ribald songs. The groom, having had his body

washed, body hair cut, and feet and hands dyed with henna

 

 

for good luck,
pajama—like uni
in new clothes
that they have
and shoes that
higher quality
After the clee
groom finishes
change in sta'
Usual
change of sta
money to help
gives his mon
amount to the
as much as te
attempt to d:
variOUS hous-
given. If a
kLaVaLin, th
COI‘I‘elating’
of the groom

Afte
Ceremony is
as well as
groom's Cam

will “Shall

105

for good luck, emerges from the tent wearing only his
pajama—like underclothes (zir—e shalvar), and then dresses
in new clothes. For many young men, it is the first time
that they have owned a sportcoat. Also, the traditional hat
and shoes that are given to them by their families are of a
higher quality than any they might have owned earlier.

After the cleaning and after donning the new clothes, the
groom finishes this appearance change, as symbolic of his
change in status, by having his hair cut.

Usually after the groom completes this symbolic £4
change of status, the male guests give him shabash, gifts of
money to help defray the cost of the wedding. As each man
gives his money, a male relative of the groom calls out the
amount to the crowd; however, the amount called out is often
as much as ten times the amount actually given. There is an
attempt to deemphasize possible status differences among the
various household heads by not focusing on the actual amount
given. If a gift of money is given by any member of the
khavanin, the actual amount given is called out; the amount
correlating, in a general sense, to the status or prestige
of the groom's family.

After the shabash is collected, the final act of the
ceremony is begun. Male and female relatives of the groom,
as well as the musicians who have been performing in the
groom's camp all day, go to pick up the bride in her
father's camp. If the camp is far away, only a select few

will usually go to retrieve the bride (arus). Traditionally,

 

 

the bride woulc
male relatives
horses back am
Wow, the bride
up truck with
the young men
firing rifles
is much band C
While
was undergoing
too, dons new
act, in which
short, is a d
unlikely that
>139. Her be
When
directly to .
with a scarf
before her h'
WShered into
mother may s
ensure Drive
carries the
bride‘s Der:
Once in the
interactmn

hand, has m

106

the bride would have been brought in on horseback and young
male relatives of both families would have ridden their
horses back and forth shooting their rifles into the air.
Now, the bride is brought into camp in a little Nissan pick—
up truck with friends/relatives in the back, while some of
the young men ride back and forth on small motorcycles
firing rifles into the air. When the bride arrives, there
is much hand clapping and ululating.

While the groom (dumad) was being cleaned, the bride
was undergoing the same process at her father's camp. She,
too, dons new clothes and has her hair cut. This latter
act, in which only the front of the bride's hair is cut
short, is a definitive marker of the status of bride. It is
unlikely that her hair will be cut at any other time in her
life. Her hands and feet are also dyed with henna.

When the bride is brought into camp she is driven
directly to the nuptial tent (hejleh). Her head is covered
with a scarf so that no one will see her in this new status
before her husband does. Usually, after she has been
ushered into the hejleh, her mother and, often, the groom's
mother may sit down in front of the tent's entrance to
ensure privacy. The truck that brought the bride also
carries the bedding (33x1) for the newlyweds as_well as the
bride's personal goods. Little else is placed in the tent.
Once in the hejleh, the bride is isolated from normal social
interaction for three to five days; the groom, on the other

hand, has much more freedom of movement. In any case, once

 

 

 

the bride has e
wind down until
m'

Tradit:
the rig: the rat
the bride. Th
groom. Now, t
hold virginity
concern by mos
the case. It
to get along 2
some conflict
acheck of be
groom's famil
to retrieve it
said that evE
marl'i'clses WOI

important th;
Will make a 3

When
husbandrs ho
brings With
marriage We
are hollSehoj
some of the

five to ten

 

107

the bride has entered the hejleh, the festivities begin to
wind down until night falls and the groom also enters the
hejleh.

Traditionally, there was more concern about checking
the ggxt the morning after to verify the virgin status of
the bride. This was usually done by the mother of the
groom. Now, though, while the Kordshuli still profess to
hold virginity as a prime Virtue of brides, there is little
concern by most to assure themselves that this is actually
the case. It is more important today that the couple seem
to get along and that they accept each other. If there is
some conflict between the parties contracting marriage then
a check of bedding might be made; if no blood is found, the
groom's family has the right to call off the marriage and
to retrieve the brideprice. However, many of my informants
said that even traditionally, if blood were not found, most
marriages would still be maintained. They say it is just as
important that the bride have a good personality, that she
will make a good wife and, Allah willing, a good mother.

When the bride finally becomes a member of her
husband's household by moving into his father's tent, she
brings with her the final direct economic component of the
marriage process, her trousseau. Included in this trousseau
are household items, woven bags, tent sections, and usually

some of the animals given her father as brideprice, perhaps

five to ten animals.

 

 

The ab
orate the wedd
rather to add
social units.
will be discus
residence pat‘
cussion on ma:
marriage betw
create wide-s
itiurther re
and/or solidi
involved,

While
indicated by
economic tra
and it is th
WhiCh define
has given be
gaged in brj
paid a brldi
Should the

a trousseau
household u
to eStablig
transfers l
family has

hold.

108

 

The above discussion was not intended to fully elab—
orate the wedding ceremony and the marriage process, but
rather to add an ethnographic glimpse of the creation of new
social units. The way in which this creation is actualized
will be discussed below as the outcome of post-marital
residence patterns. Within the framework of the above dis—
cussion on marriage it is important to realize that a
marriage between Kordshuli families is not an attempt to
create wide—spread alliances between descent groups. Rather, d
it further reinforces agnatic ties within one descent group
and/or solidifies a relationship between the two families L
involved.
While the actualization of this relationship is
indicated by the social event of a wedding, it is the
economic transactions that play a key role in the process
and it is the economic components that may be activated
which define a great part of the relationship. The groom
has given bethrothal gifts to the bride, has sometimes en—
gaged in bride service for her father, has with his family
paid a brideprice, and has agreed on compensation (E933)
should the relationship end. The bride has brought with her
a trousseau which will help provide for the independent
household unit when the new couple garner the economic means
to establish themselves. Certainly, the direct economic
transfers have favored the bride's family; however, her
family has, in turn, lost a productive member of their house—

hold.

If the
marriage serve
either to past
or to other 1a
the relationsh
t_ir_eh, then ti
that group thi
traditional p2
possibility ft
variable acce
While w
fact that the
tional optiop
becomes press

areas.

It it
Of new house
meaninngl u
the formatio
hOSh‘marital
of each E

COllectivitt

The
tll‘\ehs are

hOUSEhold u

109

 

If the marriage partners are first cousins, then the
marriage serves to reinforce family access to resources,
either to pasture land through shared membership in a £3323
or to other landed property through direct family ties. If
the relationship is more distant, yet still within the same
tigeh, then the marriage serves to maintain the unity of
that group through the restricted use of and access to
traditional pastures. Inter-tireh marriages set up the
possibility for an economic component of the relationship——
variable access to extra—tireh resources——to manifest itself. ih
While extra—tireh affinal ties may not be activated, the
fact that they exist for some is enough to provide an addi—
tional option for any one family if population density
becomes pressing or if resources fail within traditional
areas.

It is through marriage and the subsequent formation
of new household units that the tirehs may be maintained as
meaningful units. Thus, while marriage practices allow for
the formation of new household units, it is the nature of
post-marital residence that allows the social reproduction
of each pigeh as a semi—autonomous part of the larger

collectivity, taifeh Kordshuli.

Post—Marital Residence

 

The maintenance and formation of camp groups and

tirehs are based to a large degree on the formation of new

household units, which occurs after marriage. As I

l

mentioned above
the nuptial tei
they move in W:
residence is, .
dent nuclear h
it is with thi
from their nat
ing patrilocal
indefinitely--
and live alone
Figure 4.1 Sh(
household hea
marriage. In
included both
yet who never
parents died:
0f their fat}
are those me:
the death of
it i
40 percent 0
economically
large number
yhhnsest SO]
remain with
(ties and th

become hous

110

mentioned above, the newly married bride and groom live in
the nuptial tent for three to five days; after this time,
they move in with the groom's father. Thus, post-marital
residence is, at first, patrilocal. However, the indepen—
dent nuclear household unit is still the cultural ideal, and
it is with this end in mind that sons eventually separate
from their natal household. The amount of time spent liv—
ing patrilocally may vary from approximately one year to
indefinitely—~there are those who say they never separated
and live alone now only because their parents died.
Figure 4.1 shows a rough plot of the number of years that
household heads remained in their father's household after
marriage. In the category, ”never separated,“ I have
included both those household heads who are now independent
yet who never separated from their parents (i.e., their
parents died), as well as married men who are still part
of their father's household. Also included in this group
are those men who remained part of a joint household after
the death of the father.

It is easily noted in the figure that approximately
40 percent of the sample did not or have not socially/
economically separated from their father's household. A
large number of those in this ”not separated” category are
youngest sons. It is customary for the youngest sons to
remain with the household as a dependent until the father
dies and then, if his elder brothers have separated, to

become household head in his mother's household. When she

 

 

60

50
40
Married 30
men

20
10

1

FIGURE 4.1 P

dies, he inhe
depends on t]
son of marri:
then must pr
n0 sons of r
hold head un
are 110 sons,
cease to exi
other hand,
together as
eldest assu‘
The
household 1
is unuSual

Most K01, ds}

111

60 '
5O

40

Married 30
men '

20

10 -

 

‘ o

l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10 not
separated

Number of years after marriage until
separation from natal household

FIGURE 4.1 Post—marital residence with natal households
(total sample: 187 couples)

dies, he inherits the material household. This, of course,
depends on the age of the child. Sometimes it is a younger
son of marriageable age who inherits the household but who
then must provide for still younger siblings. If there are
no sons of responsible age, then the mother becomes house—
hold head until a son reaches an appropriate age. If there
are no sons, it is likely that that one household unit will
cease to exist with the death of the adults. If, on the
other hand, there are a number of married sons living
together as a joint family after the father's death, the
eldest assumes responsibility for the household.

There are a few men who separated from their father's
household in less than a year's time after marriage but this
is unusual and indicates considerable strife in the family.

Most Kordshuli say that a year is an adequate period of time

 

 

to wait to Sep
untilthey hav
agree that it
one's natal hc
that the fath<
his brothers,
to move out a
about his beh
While
the independe
variety of re
reference to
sons for sep;
friction betr
0f two marri
COIISidered a
they have th
as the rest
ing, then us
mOVe out fir
Out, again,
family unit
that With s
f10ck. Sin
the time of
ible male c

first to 1‘6

112

to wait to separate, others say that a couple should wait
until they have a child of their own. All my informants
agree that it is extremely disrespectful to move out of
one's natal household too quickly, unless it is the case
that the father is already dead. If a man is living with
his brothers, then it is possible for any younger brother
to move out after a few months without any negative comments
about his behavior.

While social separation works for the formation of
the independent household, the Kordshuli will often give a j;
variety of reasons why separation takes place without ‘
reference to the cultural ideal. The two most common rea—
sons for separation of household units are overcrowding and
friction between family units, especially between the wives
of two married men. In the first case, overcrowding is
considered a problem when more than one son has married and
they have their wives and children living in the same tent
as the rest of the family. If conditions become too stifl-
ing, then usually the second eldest of the brothers will
move out first. If a younger sibling is the first to move
out, again, it is an indication of friction within the
family unit. One reason this act is considered improper is
that with separation comes the actual separation of the
flock. Since inheritance is based on the flock size at
the time of separation, it is proper that the eldest elig—
ible male child, who also is the first to marry, is the

first to receive his share of the previous communal property.

The ot
household unit
of the marriec‘
father/son or
accepted that
the parental i
respond as a
friction may
children are
develops in t
possible. Ti
son's wife tr
hold authori
the“ may dec
DSI‘iod of ti
married brot
is much gree
men. Many .
and Social ,
eldESt brot
actuality t
for Each m
the Eldest
may be intr
Winger brl
inadequne

brother , S

113

The other reason commonly given for separation of
household units is that friction develops between the wives
of the married men in the tent, whether the relationship is
father/son or brother/brother. In the former case, it is
accepted that the young couple will accede to the demands of
the parental couple, especially for the young bride to
respond as a subordinate to her mother—in—law. Still,
friction may develop between these women, especially after
children are born to the young couple. The friction that
develops in these cases, however, should not be expressed if ;4
possible. That is, it is considered inappropriate for the
son's wife to challenge her mother—in—law in regard to house—
hold authority. Still, she may complain to her husband, who
then may decide to separate if he has lived a respectable
period of time with his father. In a joint family where
married brothers live together, the likelihood of conflict
is much greater and, in fact, is expected by most Kordshuli
men. Many times, wives of brothers are of comparable age
and social abilities. While, according to the ideal, the
eldest brother and his wife fill the parental position, in
actuality there is often rivalry over access to resources
for each nuclear family. Often, younger brothers feel that
the eldest is not sharing resources properly. This rivalry
may be intensified through the actions of their wives. The
younger brother's wife may feel that preparation of food is
inadequate or that distribution of food favors the eldest

brother's family. She may want to give something extra to

her own childi
household." 1
that separate
the individua
that the youn
unit. This i
does not obta
This
separation me
tent. While,
be living Vi]
0f tir‘eh memi
residence as
than the ti_r
for defining
traditional
allOCated tc
marriages t2
chOiCe in w]
How.
tireh, the :
With any gi
by becoming
young men E
camp beCaus
dent 8011 R

Separatmn

114

her own children and is denied this by the ”wife of the
household." If the bickering continues, it is even possible
that separate hearths will be used for food preparation by
the individual families. If this occurs, it is expected
that the younger brother will separate from the joint family
unit. This is in contrast to the situation where conflict
does not obtain.

This social and, at least, partially economic
separation means that the couple will move into their own
tent. While, in a general sense, the couple can be said to
be living virilocally because of the territorial constraints
of tireh membership, the Kordshuli would View this shift in
residence as being neolocal.2 The individual camps, rather
than the tireh, are seen as being the primary categories
for defining residence for the Kordshuli. Since they have
traditional usufruct rights to pasture only in the areas
allocated to their tireh, and since the vast majority of
marriages take place within the same tireh, there is little
choice in where a new household unit may be set up.

However, within the larger traditional area of the
tireh, the Kordshuli man may choose to maintain certain ties
with any given household, including his father's household,
by becoming a neighbor (hamsayeh) to that person. Most
young men prefer to set up camp away from their father’s
camp because it better shows the status change from depen—
dent son to independent household head. This spatial

separation is more common today with the greater dispersal

of small camp i
ally, camp gro*
iense; sons, t
were in the sa
There
who marry outs
few of these c
father after u
other Kordshui
son or that t]
limited. It
against the in
family as wel
fact, continu
from the brid
may then be I
These tTpes c
government, 1
ficial bound:
Spatially an‘
Mar
affirm the u
tir\9h itself
hold Unite
units: howex
an independ.

Sonably Sel‘

115

of small camp groups throughout tireh territory. Tradition!
ally, camp groups were much larger for protection and de-
fense; sons, therefore, often camped closest to friends who
were in the same camp group as their fathers.

There are also a few men, approximately 10 percent,
who marry outside of their tireh (see Table 4.1). In a very
few of these cases, the couple will reside with the bride’s
father after marriage. This situation usually indicates to
other Kordshuli that there is a conflict between father and
son or that the resources of the groom's father are severely

limited. It is not a desirable situation since it works

against the maintenance of the unity of the patrilineal
family as well as of the tireh. Some of these couples, in
fact, continue to reside 'uxorilocally‘ after separation
from the bride's father's household, and their descendents
may then be recognized as part of this matrilateral tireh.
These types of Eirgh shifts have continued to lessen as the
government, through control, attempts to maintain the arti—
ficial boundaries that separate tireh from tireh, both
spatially and politically.

Marriage and post—marital residence, then, work to
affirm the unity of the tireh and serve to maintain the
Eiggh itself through the formation of new independent house—
hold units. The formation and survival of these household
units, however, is dependent on their ability to be not only
an independent social unit, but also a productive and rea—

sonably self—sufficient economic unit. As with other nomadic

households, p‘
marily on the

The primary 5

tance.

Among
inheritable ]
w“, or f‘

material ite:
cultural lan
for the main
vides the ir
SufficienCy,
a form of a1
that practi.
Kordshuli,
patrimohy t
Occurs, mos
311M).

The
the nunlber
according .
a half por
not Consi d
tiOnal dis
married SC

a Share oi

116

households, productivity and economic survival depend pri-
marily on the flock which belongs to the household heads.
The primary source for a man‘s initial flock is from inheri—

tance.

Inheritance

Among the Kordshuli there are three major types of
inheritable property: animals (usually specified as ewes-—
mish—-, or flock-—gelleh); the tent household with its
material items (hungh); and land (Eamig) or especially agri— W
cultural land (zamin-e molk). The most important of these
for the maintenance of a pastoral existence, because it pro— ‘ t
vides the initial capital which may allow for economic self-
sufficiency, is animal inheritance. The Kordshuli practice
a form of anticipatory inheritance which closely parallels
that practiced by the Basseri (Barth 1961: 19). While most
Kordshuli, like the Basseri, say that the allocation of the
patrimony takes place at the marriage of a son, it actually
occurs, most often, at the time of social separation (EEZEQ
shodan).

The number of animals given as patrimony is based on
the number of male children in the household. Although,
according to Islamic prescription, daughters should receive
a half portion of male inheritance, most Kordshuli men do
not consider their daughters when figuring out the propor—
tional distribution of animals for inheritance. When a
married son separates from his natal household, he inherits

a share of the flock which represents the equal division

 

 

of the flock :
children, wit
so she might
future. For
first to marr
fourth of the
one third of
sons who thus
animal prope:
manage his 0‘
he usually p
As w
married men
These men, t
death of the
1araer floc}
hOusehold h,
Principles ,
After the d
married son
head and Wi
Separate.
on the Pro:
0r teenage
Wither, t]
It is not 1

create fI‘i

117

of the flock among the household head and all his male
children, with an additional number put aside for his wife
so she might have some extra were he to die in the immediate
future. For example, if there are three sons, then the
first to marry and separate would receive approximately one
fourth of the larger flock. The next son would then receive
one third of the flock at the time of his separation. The
sons who thus separate may make no additional claims on the
animal property of their father. If one happens to mis-
manage his own flock, his father does not have to nor will 3
he usually provide additional animals. . ,
As was noted in Figure 4.1, a large number of
married men do not separate from their natal household.
These men, then, receive no animal inheritance until the
death of their father. All or most of the animals of the
larger flock are considered the private property of the
household head until he allocates them according to the
principles of anticipatory inheritance or until he dies.
After the death of the head of the household, the eldest
married son still living in the tent becomes the household
head and will then distribute animals as younger siblings
separate. If all married brothers who still have a claim
on the property, as well as perhaps a young unmarried adult
or teenage brother, decide to separate completely from one
another, then the flock is divided equally among this group.
It is not unusual for this division of the joint flock to

create friction among the brothers as each tries to maximize

his own gains
a household h
control over

Inhei

unlike inheri
of the fathe:
the family (it
except the y
expected tha
in the tent

dies, he wil
becomes owne
as well, ch;
living, If,
Separated, ;
household h.
from him an

hold_ In In
out with an
ability.

The
which, like
of the fat}
land is pa:
holding be
Not War

leided Sq

118

his own gains. If there are no male heirs on the death of
a household head, other agnatic relatives will try to gain
control over many of the animals.

Inheritance of the tent household (EEEEQ) itself,
unlike inheritance of animals, occurs only after the death
of the father and tends to be impartible. At this stage of
the family developmental cycle, it is usual that adult sons,
except the youngest, will have married and separated. It is
expected that the youngest son after his marriage will stay
in the tent to care for his ageing parents. When his father
dies, he will become household head. This means that he
becomes owner of the tent and its material contents and is,
as well, charged with the care of his mother if she is still
living. If, however, the father dies before his sons have
separated, it is usually the eldest married son who becomes
household head. Younger brothers, in turn, will separate
from him and he will become sole owner of the material house—
hold. In many of these cases, the mother may decide to move
out with any one of her sons depending on resource avail—
ability.

The final form of inheritable property is land,
which, like the tent household, is inheritable on the death
of the father. While it is the case that inheritance of
land is partible, most Kordshuli choose to maintain the joint
holding because of the increased productivity of one large
plot over several small ones. The products of this land are

divided equally among all sons of the previous owner. There

 

are a few 0215
the profits c
cases where 1
land present
in the last i
of property
will arise a
land parcels
cult to main
family unit.
has sold his
seller in t1
cess of sedt
0f the join
An
mention bec
If there is
divide it E
dinount g0i1
N0}
of inherit:
bility of
animals.
marital I‘e
units, it
that In0st

QQOnOmiCa:

119

are a few cases where daughters have received some portion of
the profits of the land, but this has usually only been in
cases where the family is quite wealthy. Since most of the
land presently owned by Kordshuli households was purchased
in the last generation, there has been little if any division
of property among heirs. It is not unexpected that conflict
will arise among brothers as to the division and location of
land parcels after an increase in inheritors makes it diffi—
cult to maintain an adequate level of productivity for each
family unit. There have been a few cases where a brother
has sold his share of the land to another brother. The
seller in these cases, however, has always been in the pro—

cess of sedentarizing in an area removed from the location

 

of the joint property.

An additional inheritable property that I did not
mention because it is not as common as the others is cash.

If there is any money left after the.death of a man, his sons
divide it equally among themselves with perhaps some small
amount going to the man's widow.

Nonetheless, as I mentioned, the most important form
of inheritable property to ensure, at some level, the via—
bility of a nomadic pastoral household is the flock of
animals. Thus, while marriage preferences and rules of post—
marital residence allow for the formation of new household
units, it is through the anticipatory inheritance of animals
that most of these units are able to maintain themselves as

economically self—sufficient units. However, as pasture

 

 

land becomes
more importa
sedentarizaf
form of prop
vival of inr
holds inher:
them.

As '
pect for ma
face of pol
more Kordsh
straints, i
survive wil
inherit; i'
to diversi-
Just their

most Kords

120

land becomes more scarce and as agricultural land becomes
more important to the Kordshuli due to an increase in
sedentarization, it will be the inheritance of this latter
form of property——land——which becomes critical for the sur-
vival of individual households. That is, even if the house-
holds inherit animals, there may be no easy way to care for
them.

As we shall see in the following chapters, the pros—
pect for maintaining a pastoral nomadic existence in the
face of political and economic change is not great. As
more Kordshuli settle because of these pressures and con-
straints, the ability of many individual households to
survive will depend on more than the number of animals they
inherit; it will depend to a large degree on their ability
to diversify their interests and realize gain from more than
just their pastoral interests. Whether this is possible for

most Kordshuli remains to be seen.

 

 

 

 

This
cal structui
shifts have
increased Si
these polit
of the mi;
collectivit
action with
alists or t
making the
difficult.

I v
the politn
FarS Provii
of the var
Political
Some Of th
would lead
now, With
brought on
tho majOr

teriZed m2

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL PROCESSES

This chapter is concerned with shifts in the politi—
cal structure of the Kordshuli over time and how recent
shifts have contributed to increased sedentarization. This
increased sedentarization has come about in part because
these political shifts have weakened the larger group ties
of the taifeh (tribe), thereby undermining the unity of that
collectivity. Also, with these political changes, inter-
action with sedentary pOpulations, whether local agricultur—
alists or the State apparatus, has become more restricted
making the maintenance of a pastoral nomadic adaptation more
difficult.

I will first present some background information on
the political position and development of the Kordshuli in
Fars Province and, briefly, describe some of the functions
of the various office holders within the group. As the
political form changes so, too, do some of these functions.
Some of these shifts, which without outside interference
would lead to a renewed cycle of political development, have
now, with increased government involvement and interference,
brought on what appears to be the end of this cycle. Thus,
two major cyclical processes that, in the past, have charac—
terized many of the nomadic groups of the Middle East have

121

 

 

 

 

become non-re
groups and th
begin the prc
Also, the cyc
process has i

for the noma<

Ther
I will discu
Kordshuli:
Independent
W 136
as clearly (
serve to uni

are recogni

122

become non-replicating. That is, the coalescing of small
groups and the subsequent disintegration of large groups to
begin the process again elsewhere has essentially terminated.
Also, the cyclical nature of the sedentarization/nomadization
process has become essentially unidirectional as the options

for the nomad decrease and sedentarization seems inevitable.

Historical Political Development

 

There are five main historical periods within which
I will discuss the shifting political groupings of the
Kordshuli: the Incursive period; the Qashqa'i period; the
Independent period; the Entezamat period; and the Post-
Entezamat period. These periods are unequal in time and not
as clearly delimited as the list implies. However, they
serve to underscore the major administrative shifts which

are recognized by both the Kordshuli and the larger State.

Incursive Period

There are a number of possible scenarios for the
develOpment of the group during this period. These scenarios
are based on Kordshuli oral history, as well as on informa—
tion in the literature on the Middle East about group forma—
tion and political development. Barth's (1961) comments on
the formation of the Basseri collectivity also provide some
insights into the process.

In one scenario, the central core of the Kordshuli .
probably first entered their present summer pasture area

(eilaq) as a small related camp group. As was mentioned in

 

 

 

 

 

chapter two,
Kordshuli fee
were probably
The larger 1:]
occupy the a:
Organization
camp or herd
ties. It is
from other a
there were e
to interact
would have t
conditions (
0d the limit
land balancr
tectioh and
richest may
scene for t
It
ter groups
to the Gen t
Organizatic
could have
access to 1
The
the area f‘

militarily

 

123

chapter two, the khavanin (plural of khan — chief) of the
Kordshuli feel that they entered the area from the West and
were probably originally a part of the Bakhtiari confederacy.
The larger tribes and confederacies that were to later
occupy the area had not been formed or had not yet arrived.
Organization, therefore, was probably only in the form of
camp or herding units based on consanguineal and affinal
ties. It is also likely that other small splinter groups
from other areas filtered into the same valley system. If
there were enough pasture land and water for the small groups £4
to interact and coexist with minimal or no conflict, there i ,
would have been no need to coalesce. If, however, pasture
conditions changed or external groups attempted to encroach
on the limited pastures, thus upsetting the human-animal—
land balance, the small groups might have coalesced for pro—
tection and defense. Then, the strongest, or largest, or
richest may have become the dominant group, setting the
scene for the emergence of a chiefly dynasty.

It is also possible that when the other small splin—
ter groups entered the area, they readily attached themselves
to the central core of the Kordshuli, creating a political

organization in which one group was dominant. This dominance

 

could have been justified and maintained both by initial
access to resources and by military strength.

There also might have been initial conflict within
the area for the limited pasture land and, again, the

militarily dominate group, either independently or in concert

 

with others v
might have g2
dominant gror
sources (e.g
dominant grO‘
access to th
In a
type of stra
likely that
with its all
vated, coulc
the control
nary camp g3
dynasty, 1-
Sections (3
Sections th

Control of

 

Sisteht Wit
descended i
Other “Omac
to a Single
own tradit;
0f the Kort
leadership

At
many admin

cal deVelc

 

124

with others who chose to align themselves with this group,
might have gained control. This would have enabled this
dominant group to begin to control the allocation of re-
sources (e.g., pasture land). Thus, loyal supporters of the
dominant group would have received "rewards” in the form of
access to the better pasture areas.

In all of these scenarios, the beginning of some
type of stratification, albeit minimal, can be seen. It is
likely that the dominant group, probably a localized lineage, .
with its alliances, either politically or affinally moti— d
vated, could have established and maintained control. Once t
the control had been established, the emergence of the pri—
mary camp group may have been the beginning of the chiefly
dynasty. It is possible, then, to see the emergence of‘
sections (tirehs) from camp or herding units, and from these
sections the formation of a larger collectivity under the
control of one family grouping. This information is con—
sistent with the belief of many Kordshuli that they are
descended from a number of ancestors. (In contrast, many
other nomadic groups in the Middle East trace their origins

to a single apical ancestor.) Rather, each tireh has its

 

own traditional history. The tirehs believe they are part
of the Kordshuli only because they recognize and accept the
leadership of the kalantar (chief)1 of the Kordshuli.

At that time, it is unlikely that the kalantar had as
many administrative functions as he had later in the politi—

cal deveIOpment of the group. Most of the present khavanin

 

 

feel that the
garm—e sir (l
ported by Syl
Kordshuli "i1
uplands acco
(1963: 481).
tion, one of
later politi
ever, a need
demographic
allocations
under the g
It
0f the Kord
rivals for
family and
case, most
leaders of
Wished to 1
Oral tradi-
tOrS of th
first: gro
followed c
Oral histc
the 3§3235
One POWer

brothers.

 

125

feel that the Kordshuli had not yet begun to migrate to
garm—e sir (lowland winter pasture areas). This is sup—
ported by Sykes for the early part of this century. The
Kordshuli ”instead of travelling from the lowlands to the
uplands according to the season, moved only a few miles”
(1963: 481). Thus, there was little need to regulate migra—
tion, one of the major functions of the kalantar in the
later political development of the group. There was, how-
ever, a need to regulate the use of pastures so that, with i
demographic fluctuations, there probably were periodic re— dd
allocations of pastures to the various camps and sections
under the kalantar's control.
It is also likely, judging from the oral histories
of the Kordshuli and other similar groups, that there were
rivals for the kalantar's position, both from within his
family and from the other ”client” groups. In the latter
case, most of these rivals were probably men who had been
leaders of their respective groups and who, therefore,
wished to retain or extend their power or control.2 The

oral tradition of the present khavanin says that the ances—

 

tors of the present khavanin were the first, or one of the
first, groups in the area and that the other groups which
followed coalesced with them. There is no record in their
oral history of any serious in—fighting between members of
the khavanin for control of the group. They mention only
one power play that took place two generations ago between

brothers. This is in contrast to the number of rival

 

 

 

pretenders ar
73). Thus, :
during this
maintained 1
As l1
mflt for the
allocation 3
collectivity
via the leac
ing within ‘
were generai
lit. white '
w (n
messenger,
greater beg
the role of
Structural
actUal Sim
eXcept as :
It
groups, E
at this st
the SMe f
and that t
that at or
ferent Si]

groups in

 

126

pretenders among their neighbors, the Basseri (Earth 1961;
73). Thus, according to oral tradition, there was one group
during this incursive period which gained control and has
maintained it through the present.

As his control increased, it would have been diffi—
cult for the kalantar to transmit information about pasture
allocation and other matters to all members of the larger
collectivity. Therefore, he would transmit the information
via the leaders of the various camp groups who had a follow—
ing within their own group. At this time, these camp leaders
were generally known only as respected elders (rish sefid;
lit. white beard) but some eventually came to be known as
kadkhoda (headman), with the designated role of chiefly
messenger. As the need for information transmission became
greater because of increasing interaction with other groups,
the role of kadkhoda became more important. Still, the
structural position of the kadkhoda was more nominal than
actual since he had more responsibility but no real power
except as spokesman for the kalantar.

It is difficult to ascertain the number of smaller
groups, tireh, that came under the aegis of these kadkhodas
at this stage of development. The Kordshuli maintain that
the same five tireh have always been part of the Kordshuli
and that this number has never varied. It seems more likely
that at one time the number or form of the tireh were dif—
ferent since this has been the case with most of the other

groups in Fars Province. Peiman points out for the Qashqa'i

 

 

 

that the org:
remained cons
collectivity
groups. Man
no longer ex
settled in V
As I
that they er
The Qashqa'i
union of ser
As other Tu:
9W) came
size and p0
Beck 1978).
their small
with this 1
both nomad:
K0rdshuli .
WhiCh Woul.
their fl
access to
take large

T)
aCtUally .

know that

127

that the organization and composition of the taifeh never

remained constant: tirehs either separated from the larger
collectivity or added on as new parts to already existing

groups. Many that were originally part of the confederacy
no longer exist, having migrated to other areas or having

settled in villages and cities (Peiman 1968: 220—221).

As I mentioned in chapter two, the Kordshuli believe
that they entered Fars Province before the Qashqa'i arrived.
The Qashqa'i confederacy had come into existence from the
union of several taifeh exhibiting linguistic homogeneity.
As other Turkic speakers (as well as Lurs, Persians, Kurds,
etc.) came under the dominion of the Qashqa'i leaders, the
size and power of the confederacy increased (Peiman 1968;
Beck 1978). Aware of their vulnerability resulting from
their small size, the Kordshuli chose to ally themselves
with this larger confederacy. Thus, as population density,
both nomadic and sedentary, continued to increase, the
Kordshuli entered into a political and economic alliance
which would enable them to maintain access to resources in
their sarhad (summer pasture area), as well as to provide
access to resources in garm—e sir after they began to under—
take large scale migrations. This, then, begins the second

historical period.

Qashqa'i Period
There is no historical record of when the Kordshuli
actually became part of the Qashqa'i confederacy. We do

know that at the beginning of this century they had been

 

part of the
ent. Sykes
professional
away from tl
As 1
tribe has i
and nominal
kalantars a
llkhani and
(Christian
W we
assign anot
change had
A 1
time was t
to the E
Wielded cc
was mitiga
COniederau
aCtiVely ]
or regUla-
was enOug
by Withdr
demiSe of
boring gr
)'

the imflle<

128

part of the Qashqa'i and shortly thereafter became independ—

ent. Sykes (1963: 481) points out that in 1917, ”among the,

professional robbers were the Kurshulis (sic), who had broken
away from the Kashgais (sic).”

As part of the the Qashqa'i confederacy, ”each sub—
tribe has its kalantar [or chief] appointed by the Ilkhani
and nominally subservient to him. In practice, however, the
kalantars are often so powerful as to be able to defy the
Ilkhani and remain aloof in an attitude of passive hostility”
(Christian 1919: 23). Still, as Peiman notes (1968), if a
kalantar was not doing an adequate job the ilkhani might
assign another kalantar to lead the group, although this
change had to be acceptable to the group.

A primary responsibility of the kalantar at this
time was the collection of revenue from his group to pass on
to the khans of the larger confederacy. While he, no doubt,
wielded considerable power within his own group, this power
was mitigated by the needs and desires of the khans of the
confederacy. It is unlikely that the Qashqa'i khans
actively participated in the allocation of Kordshuli pastures
or regulation of their short—distance migration. Still, it
was enough for the kalantar to know that the threat posed
by withdrawal of Qashqa'i support could easily lead to the
demise of the Kordshuli through conflict with larger neigh—
boring groups.

With a decrease in the influx of nomadic groups into

the immediate area and a lessening of aggressive encroachment

 

by neighbor:
. political a
Instead, th
although th

relationshi

By
Kordshuli,
481) . How
some confu
chapter tw
it is most
were aligr
Khamseh.
Of this p1
of Qavam,

T

independe

 

leader in
the 5313i
Confeder;
the POWe:
becOme up
paStUre

With 0th

Of g00ds

before,

129

by neighboring groups, the Kordshuli relinquished the formal
political and economic relationship with the Qashqa’i.
Instead, they began a period of general independence,
although they did maintain a close, non-control political

relationship with the leadership of the Qashqa'i.

Independent Period

By at least the second decade of this century, the
Kordshuli, seemingly, were an independent unit (Sykes 1963:
481). However, in the sparse literature available, there is
some confusion as to the actual status of the group (cf.
chapter two). According to the widest range of informants,
it is most likely that the Kordshuli were independent and
were aligned more closely with the Qashqa'i than with the
Khamseh. However, it is probably true that towards the end
of this period they nominally fell under the administration
of Qavam, head of the Khamseh confederacy.

The differences between the kalantar’s duties as an
independent leader when compared to his role as a secondary
leader in a confederacy are not great. With independence,
the kalantar took on many of the duties that the khan of the
confederacy had been responsible for, often just reinforcing
the power he already exercised within his own group. He did
become more responsible for regulating migration to maximize
pasture use with other groups and for general interaction
with other groups outside of the Kordshuli. Also, the flow
Of goods and revenue shifted more to the kalantar. Whereas,

before, he had received some wealth from the group, he had

 

 

 

also been r<
to the khan:
was maintai
Kordshuli,
power, not
competing i
position oi
71):
The p
tion
crati
toric
in th
and n
comma
rathe
Sc
(Chief) w:
the TOle 1
though, S
occurred
Chance t1
haViQr 0:
be usefu
Will be

Chief, a

130

also been responsible for collecting and passing on revenue
to the khans of the confederacy. With independence, a tax
was maintained, but it went directly to the kalantar of the
Kordshuli, thus increasing his wealth and consequently his
power, not only within his own group but also in the eyes of
competing tribal groups and sedentary populations. The
position of the kalantar is aptly described by Barth (1961:
71):
The pivotal position then in the whole tribal organiza—
tion is that of the chief. He is the central, auto—
cratic leader of the tribe. In keeping with the his—
torical forms of centralized leadership found elsewhere
in the Middle East, he is traditionally granted a vast
and not clearly delimited field of privilege and
command, and power is conceived as emanating from him,
rather than delegated to him by his subjects.
Some of the following discussion on the kalantar
(chief) will be drawn from Barth (1961). His discussion of
the role of the kalantar is comparable to the data I was
able to collect in the field about the Kordshuli kalantar
before governmental deposition. Caution must be applied,
though, since the deposition of the tribal chiefs had already
occurred at the time of Barth's study. Thus, there is a
chance that some of the descriptions of the power and be—
havior of the chief are more ideal than real. Still, it will
be useful to examine his position, albeit briefly, so that it
will be easier to understand the shifts in the political

structure which started occurring with the deposition of the

chief, and the role these shifts have in the sedentarization

process .

 

 

 

 

Bart

EEEEEEE as:
allotir
the tr:
him; a1
in pol:
author

With the pO'

exercised g

control, ge

the land.

part of thi
migrate vei
south, pas'
themselves
sedentary

Often the

and the .19
Much of tp
been under

under tha'

MObarakab

 

tureS in
The impor
QEEE in

t0 pastul

make dec;

ThOSe Wh

131
Barth (1961: 76) summarizes the functions of the
kalantar as:
alloting pastures and co-ordinating the migrations of
the tribe; settling the disputes that are brought to
him; and representing the tribe or any of its members
in politically important dealings with sedentary
authorities.
With the power to assign pastures sectionally, the kalantar
exercised greatest authority in areas directly under his
control, generally implying that he or his relatives owned
the land. This power was most important during the earlier
part of this historical period since the Kordshuli did not
migrate very far. When they did begin to migrate further
south, pastures usually had to be secured by the tirehs
themselves. The kalantar did aid in negotiations with
sedentary and other pastoral nomadic owners, but it was more
often the relationship between the kadkhoda of the tireh
and the kadkhoda of the village that set the use pattern.
Much of the land used for winter pastures is said to have
been under the control of Nasr Khan of the Qashqa'i and later
under that of the kadkhoda of the main village in the area,
Mobarakabad. Fees were paid annually for the use of pas—
tures in winter quarters throughout most of this period.
The importance of maintaining some political ties with the
khags in the Qashqa'i can readily be seen if initial access
to pastures were to be secured, even if payment was required.
Internally, it was the kalantar alone who could
make decisions, which others were compelled to follow.

Those who disobeyed him were subject to punishment, ranging

 

 

 

from corpor:
pastures di:
ammer past
his relativ
nomads but
of the comm
livered dir
sengers, ei
personal re
or male.
p.
that of mi
sedentary
tween the
or greater
Khamseh ar
mQSt of t]
migration
former ca
Whole of
group, in

power rel
mOSt of .

differen

132
from corporal punishment (e.g., slapping) to exile from
pastures directly under the kalantar’s control (i.e.,
summer pastures). Even in later periods, the kalantar and
his relatives retain some of this power, not only among the
nomads but also among some of the settled Kordshuli. Most
of the commands that the kalantar might give were not de-
livered directly by the kalantar but by one of his mes—
sengers, either a kadkhoda of a tiggh or a member of his
personal retinue, the whole of which is known as dowrre bar
or amaleh.

Perhaps the most important role of the kalantar was
that of middleman or mediator between the Kordshuli and
sedentary populations, including the State, as well as be~
tween the Kordshuli and other nomadic groups of comparable
or greater structural complexity (e.g., the Basseri of the
Khamseh and the Qashqa'i confederacy). In the latter case,
most of the interaction was concerned with the regulation of
migration or disputes over rights to pasturage. In the
former case, it was the kalantar who represented both the
whole of the Kordshuli, as well as individual members of the
group, in many dealings with the sedentary world. This was
particularly true for dispute settlement.

Through this period, there were few major shifts in
power relations and political functions within the group;
most of these were quantitative. With the beginning of the
next period, Entezamat, there began to appear qualitative

differences in political relationships. These shifts are

 

 

 

schematical
The figure
changing rc
not always
shifts are

State cont:

A
group bega
1m a
post in ch
tribes was
Posts (93
Disciplin:
tWard th
the Kords
0f the Kh
Sible fOr
an indepe
Cising f1
Kordshulz
defined j
confeder
Nafar, B
Settled

one Kord

133

schematically summarized for the four periods in Figure 5.1.
The figure represents a very general statement about the
changing roles and power positions; the historical fact has
not always been so clearly demarcated yet the indicated
shifts are clear enough to indicate the effects of increasing

State control.

Entezamat Period
A major shift in the political structure of the
group began in the mid-1950s with the deposition of the
kalantar and, later, the creation of a special gendarmarie
post in charge of tribal affairs. Initial control of the
tribes was given to the army after the deposition of the
kalantar, but in the early 1960s it was shifted to gendarme

posts (qaragah—ye Entezamat) under the command of a

 

Disciplinary Officer (afsar—e Entezamat). The government,

 

toward the end of the ”independent period,” had allowed that
the Kordshuli were under the nominal control of Qavam, leader
of the Khamseh confederacy. That is, Qavam was held respon-
sible for Kordshuli activity. Yet, they still appeared as
an independent unit, with their kalantar, Ata Khan, exer—
cising full control. With the formation of Entezamat the
Kordshuli officially became part of the administratively
defined Khamseh confederacy. At its formation the Khamseh
confederacy had been composed of five tribes: Basseri, 'Arab,
Nafar, Baharlu, and Ainalu. The latter three have either
settled or been absorbed by the Basseri and 'Arab, although

one Kordshuli tireh claims to have come from the Baharlu.

 

 

 

Hasnwphom esp macaw Hospsoo one camouflage HdOHPHHOQ wcflwcdno H.m mmDUHm

OOQQSHWQH PWQMNQS t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t ®0Q®SH%QH HW®WQOHPW

 

134

 

  

 

_aeonaeax
_ .

 
 
 

 

pdEwNopGMIpmo pdedmopqm oocmcqomopsH howsopowsoo
H Rwanda

Thus, althc
of the KhaI
aligned wi'
confederaC‘
part of Kh
in itself
one of a s
shifted, i
still rete
C
internal 1
brought al
chiefly f'
familiar
evolved t
Other int
was not 5
iSter the
later as
Well as 2
given cor
the now

(Barth 1

eVents 8
Say that

fOr the

 

135

Thus, although the Kordshuli were never really an active part
of the Khamseh confederacy and were, in fact, more closely
aligned with a sometime enemy of the Khamseh, the Qashqa'i
confederacy, the younger generations all say that they are a
part of Khamseh and always have been. This political shift
in itself is interesting since the Kordshuli appear to be
one of a small minority of tribes in the area which has
shifted, in any way, from one confederacy to another and
still retained some integrity as a meaningful unit.

Of greater importance for this discussion are the
internal political shifts which deposition of the kalantar
brought about, as well as the immediate effects of putting
chiefly functions into the hands of government officers not
familiar with the political adaptations that the tribes had
evolved to deal with inter—tribal migration routes and
other interaction nodes. Among the Qashqa'i this continuity
was not so strained since an army officer was sent to admin—
ister the tribes jointly with the khang; first as advisors,
later as the directors (Beck 1978). Among the Kordshuli, as
well as among the Basseri and 'Arab, an army officer was
given complete charge of administering the tribes as part of
the now governmentally defined tripartite Khamseh confederacy
(Barth 1961).

There is some confusion by the Kordshuli as to the
events surrounding this change in status. Many Kordshuli
say that there were, initially, two separate army commands

for the tribes in this area: one for the Basseri and 'Arab

 

 

 

93a Khamse]
unit. A18!
captain in
the admini
gendarmari
they were

confusion

officer tc
latter, b5
winter pa:

ities.

effective
tribal le
(Barth 19
deSpite t
leaders v
of EEEE ,
Officer

the effe
tailed,

t0 the g

and the

Afs -
-133~§1

En ‘
w

136

qua Khamseh, and one for the Kordshuli as an independent
unit. Also, the Kordshuli say that there has always been a
captain in charge. However, if in fact they were part of
the administratively defined Khamseh group—-as the tribal
gendarmarie post, Entezamat, and as Barth (1961) say--then
they were under the command of a colonel. Some of.this
confusion may be a result of the shift from regular army
officer to Disciplinary Office of the gendarmarie. The
latter, by having command posts set up near both summer and
winter pasture areas, was more able to police tribal activ—
ities.

The deposition of the kalantar was not at first
effective as a means of removing power from the hands of the
tribal leadership. The Kordshuli, similar to the Basseri
(Barth 1961), continued to pay tribute to the kalantar
deSpite the fact that the powers and duties of the group
leaders were abolished by the State, as later were the titles
of khan and kalantar (Beck 1978). As the power of the

officer in charge (afsar—e Entezamat) became more visible and

 

the effective power of the kalantar became noticeably cur—
tailed, the nomads realized that they would have to turn more
to the afsar to handle dispute settlement, migration control,

and the like.

Afsar—e Entezamat——Disciplinary Officer
The installment of the Disciplinary Officer (afsar—e
Entezamat) as head of the gendarmarie post and in charge of

administering the Basseri, 'Arab, and Kordshuli (Qaragah—ye

 

 

 

le—e

Entezamat-
affected t
the settle
pasture en
men of eqt
hands of c
army offic
the outcor
many accu:
solicited
will be a
goods. M
officer t
desirable
butter [3
an impli<
favors t:

favor.

one para
t0 accrr
cOutede]
wbile t]
DaSt, i
the gal

the kal

137

Entezamat-e Basseri, ‘Arab va Kordshuli), of necessity,
affected the relations among these tribes. Whereas, earlier,
the settlement of diSputes concerning migration routes,
pasture encroachment, and the like had to be handled by two
men of equivalent stature, the chiefs, it was now in the
hands of one man. This meant that relationships to this
army officer could influence the way in which he would decide
the outcome of various disputes. Among the nomads there are
many accusations of solicited bribery by this officer. Un—
solicited bribes are also offered in hopes that conflicts
will be adjudicated in the favor of the group offering the
goods. Many groups try to influence the decision of the
officer by providing to him pastoral products that are highly
desirable and usually in scarce supply (e.g., clarified
butter [rgqan]). In other cases, there seems to have been
an implicit agreement that the group which can give more
favors to the officer would have the case decided in its
favor.

Unlike the confederacy system where there was also
one paramount leader, the present system allows less power
to accrue to the leaders of the smaller sub-groups (i.e.,

kadkhodas of tireh), than accrued to the leaders of the

 

confederacy sub—units (i.e., kalantars of taifeh). That is,

 

while the kadkhodas have considerably more power than in the
past, it is not directly comparable to the power wielded by
the kalantars as part of the confederacy. This is because

the kalantar within the framework of his own tribal structure

 

 

 

had non—re
to the cen
affairs at
A
highest le
hhggs exce
Basseri cc
to gendarr
ually ask.
no return
officer w
transferr
there is

tained ox

deSpite '
tion to

ity in t
whom the
flict Si
flicts “
Contact.
the gror
State a1
directe.

critiCa

{————— ' w
138
had non-restricted power while the kadkhoda is responsible
to the central government for his decisions on internal
affairs at all levels.

Another difference between the systems at the
highest level is that there is a means of replacing the
afsar—e Entezamat while this was not true of the Qashqa'i
khans except, perhaps, by revolution. A few years ago the
Basseri complained vociferously about the afsar—e Entezamat
to gendarmarie headquarters in Shiraz. This captain contin—
ually asked for money and pastoral products while offering

no return except the maintenance of the status quo. The p?

 

officer was replaced. It is also the case that the afgar is
transferred to another post after a couple of years so that
there is no certainty that any given policy will be main—
tained over a relatively long time period.

At this stage of political development, then,
despite the shift from individual taifeh (tribe) administra-
tion to ”confederacy” administration, there is some continu-
ity in the sense that there is still one primary leader to
whom the nomads can turn for assistance in dealing with con—

flict situations, especially inter-tribal disputes and con—

 

flicts with the sedentary populations with whom they come in
contact. That is, there is still but one effective leader of
the group who can act as a powerful mediator between the
State and the tribe, although his bias is governmentally
directed or self-serving. This structural position is

critical for tribal unity. Barth (1961: 71) points out,

 

”it is the
which in tl
stitutes t1
However, tl
has been a
to a share
I
officers i
tants are
same confe
Officer) x
the dispu
officers

will show

Certain 1
area).
that sep:
Kordshul
QaShqa' 1
than usu
Pastures
abuse 81
adult m:
the Qasl
The She

had roc

 

139

”it is the fact of political unity under the . . . chief
which in the eyes of the tribesmen and outsiders alike con—
stitutes them into a single 'tribe‘ in the Persian sense.”
However, the increased power of the kadkhoda means that there
has been a shift in focus from one larger collectivity leader

to a shared focus with the kadkhodas as tireh leaders.

 

Inter—tribal conflict is mediated by the gendarmarie
officers in charge of the confederacies of which the dispu—
tants are members. If the disputants are members of the
same confederacy, the afsar-e Entezamat (tribal Disciplinary
Officer) will resolve the conflict by himself. If, however,
the disputants are from different confederacies, then the
officers in charge must agree to a solution. A case example
will show this process at work.

During my research a dispute arose over the use of
certain pastures in the Kordshuli qeshlaq (winter pasture
area). It was not clear where the actual boundaries were
that separated the qeshlaq of the Babamaleki tireh of the
Kordshuli from those of part of the Amaleh tireh of the
Qashqa’i. When the Qashqa'i group tried to migrate closer
than usual so that they could take advantage of the mountain
pastures which the Kordshuli believed to be theirs, verbal
abuse stopped just short of physical violence. Many of the
adult males of the Kordshuli group rushed to the scene where
the Qashqa’i group had begun to unload their pack animals.
The shepherds' staffs were held up and some of both groups

had rocks in their hands. Luckily, Violence was averted when

 

 

 

 

the acting
kadkhoda,
'ur you w:
I am read:
Qashqa'i

then went
to compla
would mos

governmer

charge 0:
Kordshul:
Of these
council,
welfare
cums,
imity Of
were set
ettes We

nobilit}

deCisio
argumen
or thre
thrning
unusual

the prc

 

140

the acting headman of the Babamaleki showed up. This
kadkhoda, Eskandar, said to the leader of the other group,
”If you want to quarrel, I am ready; if you want to fight,

I am ready; if you want to go to court; I am ready.” The
Qashqa'i group chose, for the moment to move. Each party
then went to its respective administering gendarmarie post
to complain. Both leaders said that, in the past, fighting
would most certainly have occurred, but with the threat of
governmental reprisals a formal complaint is safer.

The complaints led to a meeting of the Colonel in
charge of the Qashqa'i group, the Captain in charge of the
Kordshuli, the kadkhodas of the two groups, representatives
of these kadkhodas, and a member of the nearby village
council, who claimed that the conflict could affect the
welfare of the village. Guest tents were set up in both
camps. An Official government tent was set up in the prox-
imity of the Qashqa'i camp. In the Kordshuli camp carpets
were set out, a goat was slaughtered, and candy and cigar—
ettes were brought from the village; it was as if tribal
nobility were coming.

The actual discussions were comparable to other
decision-making modes among the nomads: open discussion and
argument within and among small groups at high volume; two
or three people leaving for a private discussion, then re—
turning; disagreements and lots of shouting; and, as is not
unusual, one of the primary parties walking out. Part of

the problem, in this specific case, was that there were two

 

 

documents
the 539399
The Captai
charge anc
tially iri
decision.
there wou
This hick
shepherds
the mount

which had

from his
meeting ‘
moving.
moment,
Strolled
It Seeme
the qua]
a leisu:
Camp, t?
ments b
the Kor
knowled

able tC

inter‘.

C1UGed

141

documents which suggested different boundaries, and which

the kadkhodas of both groups had signed in the recent past.
The Captain pointed out that he and the Colonel were in
charge and that any objections of the kadkhodas were essen—
tially irrelevant for them, the officers, to render a
decision. One of the fears expressed by both groups was that
there would be continual bickering without a just solution.
This bickering might manifest itself as rock throwing between
shepherds of the two groups as they tended their flocks in
the mountains. The previous autumn had seen such a quarrel
which had left one young man dead.

The kadkhoda of the Babamaleki, who had come down
from his village home to participate, walked out of the
meeting to protest the direction in which the discussion was
moving. This effectively stOpped the discussions for the
moment. Shortly thereafter, the two officers casually
strolled together until they reached the Babamaleki camp.

It seemed as if they were trying to remain disinterested in
the quarrel and had just come upon the camp in the course of
a leisurely walk. After twice refusing an invitation to the
camp, they at last accepted and the discussions and argu—
ments began anew. A decision was finally made in favor of
the Kordshuli, primarily because the Captain had a greater
knowledge of the needs of the pastoralists and was better
able to show how ”his” group needed the area.

The point of this example is that the forms of
inter-tribal conflict resolution, which in the past had in—

cluded violent confrontation, have now, with greater State

 

control, be
of two tril
with the al
Now, howevr
little mori
If the Dis
of pastora
decisions
the nomads
T
that of ir
the speci:
pointed or
for any a:
defined K
theft, EH
prit as W
ber of th
brought L
Cally not
Possible

COrrect .

trYing t
that all
to the l
hhle to

was

 

142

control, become more powerful. Before, whenthe kalantars

of two tribes met to settle disputes, their concerns were
with the ability of their group to make an adequate living.
Now, however, the decisions of the officers are based on
little more than their conscientiousness in doing their job.
If the Disciplinary Officer has little awareness of the needs
of pastoral nomads (as the Qashqa'i officer did), then
decisions may be made which adversely affect the ability of
the nomads to maintain their lifestyle.

The role of the afsar—e Entezamat though is net only

 

that of inter-tribal mediator. As the sargeant—in—charge of
the specific Entezamat post under the command of the Captain
pointed out to me, the Captain and his post are responsible
for any and all tribal matters within the administratively
defined Khamseh confederacy. If a nomad is involved in a
theft, Entezamat is responsible for apprehension of the cul—
prit as well as for interim incarceration. Any time any mem—
ber of the tribe is involved in any legal matter that is
brought up before a court of law, the court will automati—
cally notify Entezamat and they will intercede as much as
possible on the tribesman's behalf, at least in terms of
correct protocol.

Entezamat is also responsible, at some level, for
trying to guarantee that all nomads have identity cards and
that all eligible young men are considered for the draft in—
to the Iranian army. This information is not always avail!
able to Entezamat and must be conveyed to them by cooperating

kadkhodas in charge of each tireh.

 

 

 

lé—e

Kadkhoda

f
also chang
messenger
tional di'
ianism3 0
has, in m
kalantar,
as I ment
mediator
all cases
tacted t]
same rep;
We
matters

members.

have tal
deposed
comPletr
and a m
final s
Side hi
areas.

Ship of

lands .

C

mental

143

Kadkhoda

At this stage in time, the role of the kadkhoda has
also changed significantly. Previously he had been a chiefly
messenger and nominal figurehead, with little if any func-
tional differentiation that could set him above the egalitar—
ianism3 of the group as a whole. Now, though, the kadkhoda
has, in many ways, taken over many of the functions of the
kalantar, albeit limited in scope and power. For example,
as I mentioned above, the kadkhoda functions in many ways as
mediator between the State and the common nomad. In almost
all cases where a government representative would have con-
tacted the kalantar in the previous political period, the
same representative, or a representative of the afsar—e
Entezamat, will deal with the kadkhoda of a given tireh in
matters pertaining to the actions of any of that tireh's
members.

There are, also, other areas in which kadkhodas
have taken on, in some form, some of the functions of the
deposed kalantar. Whereas, previously, the kalantar had
complete say about pasture allocation in summer pasture areas
and a major influence in other areas, the kadkhoda now has
final say, within governmental limits, as to who from out—
side his tiggh may camp in any of their traditional pasture
areas. The kalantar1§ control was based primarily on owner—
ship of resources. Today, most of the traditional pasture
lands are owned by the State, so it is only through govern—

mental recognition and approval of traditional rights that

 

 

 

the ggggng
uncommon i
sion to or
some Kord:
a fee. U.
land, if

uterine k

close rel
ture lanc
(winter I
Populati<
pastures
unsegmen
use past
timers.
the Xale
this is
Crowding

Pastoraj

mention
gOVernm
identit
ihperta
the 33!

days oi

144

the kadkhoda may exercise this limited power. Still, it is
uncommon for any member of another tribe to be given permis-
sion to camp on Kordshuli land, although it is the case that
some Kordshuli have camped in Qashqa'i territory, usually for
a fee. Usually those who are given permission to use pasture
land, if they are not members of that tireh, are affines or
uterine kin.

This extra—tireh land use is based not only on
close relationship, but also on relative access to good pas—
ture land. Each Eigeh has its own traditional qeshlaq
(winter pasture area). As the tirehs get larger through
population increase, overcrowding and equal access to good
pastures become problematical. Thus, within the largest
unsegmented Eireh, Xaleji, more households try to find and
use pastures in other regions than do households of smaller
tirehs. This is because the traditional winter pastures of
the Xaleji, near the city of Xafr, are not that desirable;
this is due to occasional winter snow and because of over-
crowding of these pastures by the nomadic group and by local
pastoralists using some of the same pastures.

The role of the kadkhoda has also expanded, as I
mentioned above, in that he is more responsible to the
government in matters of conscription and the procurement of
identity cards for his Eigeh members. Although he had an
important role in these affairs under the kalantar because
the kalantar could not be aware of all births and the birth—

days of all Kordshuli, it was the kalantar himself who was,

 

 

 

 

in the las
breaches i
responsibi
Th
education
or feeling
There are
cards, ju:
gone into
usually t
identity
they are
P
real neec
however,
governme]
the cerer
out havi;
Sometime
is still
often in
case 00c
the 33}:
Card, T
of his 1
“the of
Was 81v.

head ma

145

in the last instance, responsible to the government for any
breaches in these matters. Now the kadkhoda enjoys this
responsibility.

There seems to be some correlation between the
education or sophistication of the kadkhoda and his/desire
or feeling of duty in these matters of governmental concern.
There are a number of Kordshuli who do not have identity
cards, just as there are a number of young men who have not
gone into the army. Young men without identity cards are
usually trying to avoid the draft, while females without
identity cards tend to be neglected in this regard until
they are of marriageable age.

Prior to strict governmental control there was no
real need to record all marriages, births, deaths, etc. Now,
however, all marriages are supposed to be recorded with the
government. Therefore, the religious specialist performing
the ceremony is hesitant to sign the marriage contract with-
out having seen the identity cards of the parties involved.
Sometimes, though, with a bit of fast talk and some luck it
is still possible to avoid this requirement (fines are
often imposed on adults without identity cards). One such
case occurred in a camp that I was staying in. A woman in
the Eireh was to be married but could produce no identity
card. The kadkhoda said that he had all the identity cards
of his tigeh at his house in the north. When asked the full
name of the woman, there was a long pause before a last name
was given. When identity cards are issued, the household

head may choose whatever family name he likes. Because this

 

 

 

leer

woman's f2
ate mute,
chose the
among all

Kordshuli

cation an
usually t
cerned tt
Some othe
track of
they can

they are

to some
primary
0f the E
bility (
permit

his £33
mines t
w
migrati
migratj
also 01

there ‘

parts ¢

 

146

woman's father had died and when living had been an illiter—
ate mute, the family had no official name. The kadkhoda just
chose the most common name, not only within his tireh, but
among all the Kordshuli, Zareh (lit. cultivator, although the
Kordshuli say it means animal husbandman).

At any rate, those kadkhodas who have had some edu-
cation and greater contact with the sedentary community,
usually through the possession of land, tend to be more con—
cerned that they fulfill their ”duty” to the government.
Some others, though, claim they lack effective means to keep
track of everyone's age, which usually means they feel that
they can not sacrifice the labor of the young men or that
they are too suspicious of the government.

Another function which the kadkhoda has acquired,
to some extent, is some say about migration. Although the
primary responsibility for migration control is in the hands

of the afsar-e Entezamat, there is an overlapping responsi—

 

bility of the kadkhoda in that he has to secure a migration
permit (parvaneh) from the government. Thus, no member of
his tireh is allowed to migrate until the kadkhoda deter—
mines the necessity or desirability of the move. When the
kalantar was in control, it was by his orders alone that
migration could occur. He had not only helped to order the
migration patterns between his group and other groups but he
also ordered the migration pattern of his own tribe so that
there was no overgrazing in any specific area along those

parts of the migration route which were common to two or

 

 

more tjgffl
areas, Si]
kuch ther«
magic

in either

migration
since the
could nor
new year
Almost a1
month ea:
gration ‘
tries to
Day). A

Jahrom (

 

M
had beer
ifSLr-e
been US]
Winter
tinned
the Ten
and Stc
only Dc

tinely

147

more tirehs. This overlapping could occur in only a few
areas, since within the total area of the Kordshuli rah:e
EEEE there were fairly specific routes that the various
tirehs followed depending on the destination of these routes
in either winter or summer pastures.

During the period of my research this aspect of
migration control by the kadkhoda was somewhat circumvented,
since the winter had been especially dry. Pastures which
could normally have lasted until after the beginning of the
new year (beginning of Spring) were extremely dessicated.
Almost all of the groups started to migrate two weeks to one
month earlier than usual. This meant that they started mi—
gration without governmental permission, since the government
tries to coordinate the migration from Now Ruz (New Year's
Day). At one point along the migration route between
Jahrom (in winter pasture area) and Shiraz, the afsar—e
Entezamat happened to be driving by and stopped to ask who
had been given permission to start migration early. The

afsar—e Entezamat was very angry, feeling that his power had

 

been usurped. He told the leader of the group that the
kadkhoda would have to return to Jahrom, the location of the
Winter post of Entezamat, to get a permit. Migration con—
tinued since, although any gendarmarie post (pasgah) along
the route may stop a group of nomads to check their permit
and stop them if they do not have one, they rarely do. The
only point on the migration route where the permit is rou-

tinely inspected is at the crossing of the Kur River below

 

Marvdasht
at this p
for a per
check per

migration

lels a p1
especialf
villager:
anthropol
househol-
expected
better 0
There is
POSitior
Pitalit3

Wealthy

 

decisiol
normal 1
the inc
aCQUire
that it

and tha

structt
What tl

18, th.

148

Marvdasht, either Band—e Amir or Pol-e Khan. When we arrived
at this point, the kadkhoda was prepared to return to Jahrom
for a permit but there was no one at the bridge area to
check permits so the group just continued its uninterrupted
migration.

One additional function of the kadkhoda which paral—
lels a previous chiefly function is that of entertainment,
especially of outsiders (e.g., government representatives,
villagers, and other anomalous persons, such as wandering
anthropologists). Although hospitality is expected of all
households as a cultural ideal, it is the kadkhoda who is
expected to give more. Often this is because he is a little
better off financially than many of his ”constituents.”

There is no overt realization on their part that their
position is, indirectly, validated by this display of hos—
pitality. It is not a direct relationship, since other
wealthy households that have some ability to influence the
decisions of others are also expected to show greater than
normal hospitality. Still, most of the kadkhodas do not like
the increased responsibility of entertaining that they have
acquired since the deposition of the kalantar. They feel
that it takes too much time away from their own activities
and that the entertainment costs are too great.

While the mediator role Of the kadkhoda is of prime
structural importance, the other tireh members, when asked
what the kadkhoda does in the position of kadkhoda, usually
focus on some of the internal dynamics of the position. That

is, they stress those aSpects of the position which may

 

 

 

directly
members 0
bilities
commonly
mama
bility fc
bring alI
offer hi]
this is
catnp in
can deci
area to

camps, I

Kalanta:

functio
and res
ent non
tribe 2
State (
the tr:

materi

149

directly affect them and their families. While tireh
members certainly are aware of some of the other responsi-
bilities of the kadkhoda, the following functions are those
commonly given as answers to non-directive questions. The
kadkhoda can choose soldiers (i.e., he has primary reSponsi-
bility for governmental conscription regulations); he can
bring all of his relatives together to stay near him and thus
offer him support (political, military, economic), although
this is not known to have happened; he can allow others to
camp in his tireh's qeshlaq (winter pasture areas); and he
can decide if a family should be allowed to leave one camp
area to go to another, and thus affect the dispersal of

camps, particularly during migration.

Kalantar

The kalantar, although not an administratively
functioning member of the tribe, still retains his prestige
and respect, and a following within the tribe. ‘Many differ—
ent nomads told me that the kalantar has no business with the
tribe anymore (kari nadare) but this does not convey the real
state of affairs. Because of his wealth, his knowledge of
the tribe, and his access to resources——be they in terms of
material, of contacts with the sedentary community, or of
information networks——the kalantar and the rest of the
khavanin are often turned to in times of need. Within the
summer pasture areas in Kordshuli sarhad, where the kalantar
has settled, any decision that the kalantar makes with re—

gard to the tribe is adhered to (as long as it does not

 

oppose go
come to a
would hai
gestures
presence
tainly s
is probe
as the c
young me
extreme
a goat l
iate or
camp, 1

also be

Power a

the Egg
one as]
which
901iti
ago, t
Of'grc
nomads
SiOnS
in gr.
theft

and d

150

oppose government policy). If the kalantar should choose to
come to any nomadic camp, he is shown the same respect he
would have been shown previously, including deferential
gestures such as hand kissing, kneeling, or standing in his
presence, etc. Also, the leader of the camp would most cer—
tainly slaughter a lamb for the occasion; this act, however,
is probably as true for any really important personage, such

as the chief of another tribe or the afsar—e Entezamat. Even

 

young members of collateral branches of the khavanin are shown
extreme courtesy including the killing of an animal, usually

a goat kid, for a meal. If the kalantar or one of his immed-
iate or collateral family should choose to Visit a nomadic
camp, it is usually the camp of the kadkhoda, although it may

also be that of another wealthy tireh member.

Power and Control in the Tireh

During this period of enforced governmental control,
the Entezamat period, another event occurred that illustrates
one aspect of increasing control in the rural areas, and
which also had a major effect on the nature of Kordshuli
political and social interaction. Approximately 10 years
ago, the government ordered the execution of two ringleaders
of groups of thieves who had systematically robbed the
nomads of their flocks as well as of their personal posses—
sions. Prior to that time, the Kordshuli had usually camped
in groups of 5 to 15 tents. Now, with the major threat of
theft drastically reduced, the camp groups have separated

and dispersed. Large groups had been very adaptive when the

 

tribes we
pasture,
enough t
governme
security
for the

over the
bility (

drought

among a
between
the Egg
also he
Also, 5
were a
to the
had be
these
follow
persox
leadel
In On
of th
Was c
SiOn

Other

151

tribes were in competition with each other over rights to
pasture, and when the central government was not strong
enough to deal with these inter—tribal conflicts. But, with
government control of the tribes and with relaxation of
security needs, there was greater adaptive survival potential
for the flocks if the tent households were more dispersed
over the sparse pastureland. This would lessen the possi—
bility of overgrazing and reduce the likelihood of localized
drought and disease affecting a large number of flocks.
Politically, this shift means there is less contact
among all the households of a tireh and also less contact
between the tireh at large and the kadkhoda. Thus, while
the kadkhoda has more responsibilities than he used to, he
also has greater difficulty in meeting these responsibilities.
Also, at the camp level during the independent period, there
were a few very important figures who were roughly equivalent
to the kadkhodas in power and prestige. Since the tirehs
had been divided into only a few major camps, the power of
these men was recognized, in some sense by the size of their
following. Some of the kadkhodas were not very strong
personally so that it was to these other important camp
leaders (rish sefid; lit. white beard) that the group turned.
In one case, for example, the kalantar did not think the son
of the previous kadkhoda of the smallest tireh, Babamaleki,
was competent enough to become the new kadkhoda. His deci—
sion at that point was to consolidate this tireh with an—

other tireh, Lori. However, the nephew of the previous

. Evil-:23“ I ' A <

 

 

kadkhoda,
his cousi
always be

He said t

ical powe
This, co:
tional k
and weal
factors.
camp lee
nomads 2
actual 1
concert
represe

with th

there j
of the
terms (
1y not
hold t
That 1

name c

152

kadkhoda, who had greater personal power and charisma than
his cousin, told the kalantar that he and his family had
always been Babamaleki and he was not about to change now.
He said that he would become kadkhoda. The kalantar agreed.

At any rate, with dispersal of the camps, the polit—
ical power of most of these rish sefids necessarily suffered.
This, coupled with governmental recognition of the tradi—
tional kadkhoda, meant that personal leadership qualities
and wealth became less viable as power discriminatory
factors. Still, there are two cases where men who had been
camp leaders and not kadkhodas are recognized both by the
nomads and by Entezamat as being more powerful than the
actual kadkhoda with whom they now work, more or less, in
concert. It is to these ”secondary” leaders that government
representatives will go it they have any business to conduct
with the tireh.

Within the camp groups themselves (beileh), if
there is more than one tent household, there is recognition
of the superiority of one of the household heads, usually in
terms of wealth or age. Although this superiority is usual—
1y not actualized in any behavioral sense, since each house—
hold tends to conduct its own affairs, it is shown nominally.
That is, the other Kordshuli will call a given camp by the
name of the perceived camp leader (e.g., the camp of Ali
[beileh—ye AliJ). There is no definitive factor for deter—
mining leadership, but there are a couple of other factors
besides wealth and age (although, they may follow from

these) that bring greater respect and prestige. The first

 

 

of these
one who 0
twith sede
own‘wealt
a1, and i
portant a
concert w
mads clai
ritual p1
those wh<
are look«
more ext
able to :
There ar
imDortan
hOliest
the holi
Shrine c
the thi]
in rege]
Iraq) 1:
one of
the fOu
the hol
grimage
a title

are ref

153

of these can be called ”SOphistication.” This implies some—
one who can read and write, who has had considerable contact
with sedentary village pOpulations (usually because of his
own wealth in land), and who has knowledge of urban, nation-
al, and international scenes. A second factor which is im-
portant as a quality of leadership, although again usually in
concert with others, is that of religiosity. Most of the no—
mads claim to be Shiite Muslims, yet very few carry out the
ritual prescriptions demanded by their faith. Therefore,
those who regularly say their prayers, as required by Shiism,
are looked upon favorably by the rest of the group. Even
more extreme are those who have the time and/or money to be
able to make a pilgrimage to one of the holy cities of Shiism.
There are four such cities that command respect: the least
important in these terms in Qom, considered the second
holiest city in Iran; the next city of importance, considered
the holiest city in Iran, is Mashhad, where the tomb and
shrine of Imam Reza, an important Shiite figure, are located;
the third most important city, which has not been accessible
in recent times because of border problems between Iran and
Iraq, is Kerbala, the site of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein,
one of the three most important personages in Shiite Islam;
the fourth and, of course, most important city is Mecca,

the holiest city of the Islamic faith. Those who make pil—
grimages to one of the latter three cities are either given
a title from the name of the city or, in the case of Mecca,

are referred to by the term 'haji'——one who has made the

 

 

 

n3; (pile
to Mashhz
past had
of the Kn
spected
effect r
nomad cc
a perioc
who have
were prf
merely

leaders

in the
as botl
cator <
Own la
Most b
there

inherj
this L
1eVel

Sifie

aSa

the k

Well

 

154

ha; (pilgrimage). Thus, anyone (male) who has made the trip
to Mashhad is referred to as Mashhadi or its shortened form
mashd-e (followed by his name). Likewise, those who, in the
past had gone to Iraq were entitled Kebala-ye. All members
of the Kordshuli who have earned the title of Haji are re—
spected leaders. There is no easy way to judge how much
effect religiosity might have by itself since the average
nomad could not afford to leave his flock for that long of
a period, either in terms of time or money. Therefore, all
who have made the journey were wealthy before they left and
were probably already respected camp leaders. This factor
merely added to the list of qualities expected of group
leaders.

As I mentioned earlier, wealth plays a major role
in the acquisition of power. This wealth manifests itself
as both animals and land; cash is less important as an indi—
cator of wealth. All the families of the present kadkhodas
own land that was purchased in the previous generation.
Most have added on to this inheritance. In no case has
there been a division of landed property among the joint
inheritors of these estates. In fact, it is by maintaining
this joint estate that families are able to maintain a high
level of leadership. This leadership potential is inten—
sified when the flocks of the brothers are also maintained
as a joint flock.

The type of wealth and the family relationships of
the kadkhodas have some import for political control, as

well as for the possibility of future sedentarization. A

 

 

 

.hiiflifiEitégria

brief exa
of the KO
variables
just souf
all exce}
it is thi
in the 3
comes to
his brot
other kg
has a bi
agriculi
also mi;
for his
close a
migrate
but he
He degj
additi<
Educat
agnate
later
in 0T6

fields

their

throu

155

brief examination of the situation of the eight kadkhodas

of the Kordshuli will indicate the interaction between these
variables. Three of the kadkhodas are settled in sarhad or
just south of sarhad. These men do not go to garmqe sir at
all except perhaps for a short visit. In all three cases,

it is the brother of the kadkhoda who functions as the leader
in the kadkhoda's stead. In another case, the kadkhoda
comes to garm—e sir only during winter; at all other times

his brother is effective leader of the group. Two of the

 

other kadkhodas continue to migrate, but each of these men

 

has a brother who is settled and cares for the jointly owned
agricultural estate. One of the two remaining kadkhodas
also migrates with his group but having no brother to care
for his landed property, he has left it in the care of a
close agnatic relative. The last of the eight kadkhodas
migrated with his tireh the year that I was doing research,
but he had been settled for the preceding eighteen years.
He decided to migrate again because he felt he could gain
additional income from his pastoral products to pay for the
education of his sons. However, with no relatives or close
agnates to watch his land, he must leave summer pastures
later and winter pastures earlier than many other Kordshuli
in order to oversee the planting and harvesting of his
fields.

Although the kadkhodas are the official leaders of
their groups, they do not usually actualize this leadership

through the use of coercive power. In most cases where

 

 

there ha
during 0
to show
As will
for cont
who have

actual ]

actual
the nex
Include
w
more cc
too yo]
cuesio
leave
except
ensued
Just 2
There
OSity
comin3
do if
Ahmad

a ten

 

156

there has been any attempt to use coercive power, it was
during or related to migration. Some examples will suffice,
to show how these attempts at control manifested themselves.
As will be seen, there often seems to be a stronger desire
for control on the part of the brothers of the kadkhodas
who have temporarily taken over that position, than by the
actual kadkhodas themselves.

In one case, the acting kadkhoda (brother of the
actual leader) was discussing the possibility of migrating
the next day with three or four members of his tireh.
Included in this meeting were the two sons of the previous
kadkhoda of that tireh. The older of the two, had he been

more competent and personally stronger, would have been

 

kadkhoda. Instead, his cousin, with the approval of the
kalantar had become kadkhoda; the younger brother had been
too young at that time for consideration. During this dis-
cuSsion, the acting kadkhoda indicated that he wanted to
leave the next day. All gave tacit agreement to the plan
except this younger son of the last kadkhoda. An argument
ensued which ended up with the latter walking out of the tent
just as dinner was being served; a direct insult to the host.
There were a few joking remarks made about youth and inpetu—
osity but the discussion was more concerned with the up—
coming migration. I asked the acting kadkhoda what he would
do if his cousin, Ahmad, did not migrate. He said that
Ahmad would come and that if he did not, then he would take

a tent pole and beat it over Ahmad's head until the young

 

man saw I

the young

merely tl
the same
actualiz«
pastures
tween tw
change h
gration
name
through
a1 gift
girl's
However
Choice
tives 1
ceremm
the m0-

WeaVin

 

ConVin
Starts
The ac
Dare '
CurSQ
rock.

This

 

157

man saw reason. As it turned out, it was not certain that
the young man had indeed moved until noon the following day.
While it may seem that this threat of violence was
merely that, a threat, there is another example involving
the same acting kadkhoda which shows that he is willing to
actualize his threats. A dispute arose in qeshlaq (winter
pastures) over an upcoming marriage contract ceremony be—
tween two tigeh members. The young woman, Mehri, wanted to
change her mind about marrying Firuz because during the mi—
gration to winter pastures he had struck her. The acting
kadkhoda, as well as his brother, said that she had to go
through with the ceremony since she had accepted his betroth—
al gift of gold coins (ashrafi) six months earlier. The
girl's mother was furious and there were constant arguments.
However, as the young woman expressed it, she had little
choice in the matter since there were no adult male rela—
tives to argue her case. On the morning of the proposed
ceremony, as the relatives of the groom's family arrived,
the mother and daughter were sitting outside their tent
weaving a goathair tent section. When the arrivals tried to
convince the weavers to prepare for the ceremony, the mother
started cursing the lot of them and a loud argument ensued.
The acting kadkhoda told her to be quiet and to help pre-
pare things. She only responded with more cursing. He
cursed her back, picked up a rock, and threw it at her. The
rock missed her but hit her daughter, who began to wail.

This leader then picked up a tent pole to strike the woman

 

 

 

 

but was
the othe
males of
althougl
of happ:

(£13).

control
tlrgh.
headman
previor
would n
hOWSVGJ
his car
Older]
said h
packin
tent w
Mirza,
threat
Camp 2
made :
did i
bor;
tensi

headE

0119 C

 

158

but was restrained by others. Finally, he was led away by
the others while the mother was calmed down by the older fe—
males of the group. The ceremony took place as planned,
although the bride ended up crying tears of sadness instead
of happy tears. She described it as a marriage by force
(5%)-

Another example of an attempt at direct coercive
control took place during autumn migration within another
tireh. Again, the brother of the kadkhoda was the acting
headman at the time. There had been no decision made the .t
previous evening as to whether the localized camp group
would migrate the next morning or not. When morning arrived,
however, the acting headman and some of the other members of
his camp decided it would be good to move on. Mirza, an
older member of the group and the headman's brother—in—law,
said he did not want to migrate. The acting headman stopped
packing his own belongings long enough to go to Mirza's
tent where he threatened to hit him with his fist if he,
Mirza, did not start to break camp. Mirza cowered from the
threat and began to take down his tent. Mirza left the
camp area much later than the other camp members and never
made any effort to catch up to the group. Thus, while he
did indeed move, he did not rejoin the same camp as a neigh—
bor; the spatial distance was a reflection of the social
tension that had been created by the hostile act of the
headstrong acting kadkhoda.

In one case, where one of the actual kadkhodas of

one of the tirehs tried to talk a tireh member out of his

 

plans to
voices w
real rea
not over
respect
adage

things ,

trate h
may aff
both ca
case is
relati‘
1%
mg.
as bei
DGOple
recomn
the g3
and t1
other
migra
house
take
high
affe<

that

 

159

plans to migrate, the interaction was different. Although
voices were raised, the kadkhoda knew that Hassan had no
real reason to stay and Hassan knew that the kadkhoda would
not overstep the bounds of restraint that could lose him the
respect of other tigeh members. Hassan did leave and the
kadkhoda merely shrugged his shoulders saying that some
things just happen that way.

There are two other examples that help to illus—
trate how not only personality, but also personal habits,
may affect the perceived personal strength of a headman. In
both cases, the headman is an opium addict and in neither
case is he listened to with as much respect as a close
relative of his. In one case, it is the brother of the
kadkhoda who is looked upon as the primary force in the
tireh. He is a more successful flock owner, whom others see
as being more intelligent and dynamic than his brother;
people are, thus, more willing to listen to his ideas and
recommendations. In the other case, it is both the Wife of
the kadkhoda, who seeks to control both her own household
and the other households in their small camp group, and an-
other elder of the group, a Haji, who have power, During
migration, the wife of this kadkhoda was effective head—of—
household, since the kadkhoda, having no shepherd, had to
take care of the flock himself (his teenage son goes to
high school in the city). A major consideration that
affected the length of each day's migration was the fact

that the kadkhoda had to stop at regular intervals to smoke

 

 

 

opium.
where a
times,

‘ she usu

1 during

1 when it
camp in
head of
return
ahead.
while ‘
other
group
be voc
ceived
dently
his p2
migra1
0f co<

are m

 

Spect

yet c
As I

not c
0the}

if ti

 

 

 

 

160

opium. Therefore, his wife made the primary decisions about
where and when to stOp for the migrating camp group. Some-
times, loud arguments with other camp members ensued, but
she usually got her way. The one time that she did not,

during my stay with the group, was during migration one day

 

when it began to rain. She wanted to turn back and pitch
camp in an Open area that we had passed on the way. The
head of another household said he thought it foolish to
return when there would, no doubt, be some camp site further
ahead. As it turned out, this one tent did go on ahead

while the others turned back. They joined up with each

 

other the next day. The other effective leader of this
group was Haji Jan, a respected elder, who did not need to
be vociferous. He did not demand respect but merely re—
ceived it. Although his camp group was migrating indepen—
dently of two or three others of the same section, when
his pack donkeys got lost, these other groups stopped their
migration short to help search for the animals. This type
of c00perative effort is not usual between camp groups that
are not migrating together as neighbors. It was out of re—
spect of the Haji that migration plans were altered.

One aspect of power and control that we have not
yet closely examined is its relationship to land ownership.
As I mentioned, all the headmen own land; however, it is

not only because they own land that they have power, since

 

others also own land. Rather, the important point is that

if they did not own land they could not remain as powerful.

 

Power d!
tain a
traditi
in a ra
by the
command
mea
territc
own 1e:
combin
from t
had co
of my
lineag
what 1
is no

that :

depen

to co

would

 

161

Power depends primarily on being able to attract and main—
tain a following of peers. Again, as I said, the kadkhoda
traditionally does not have a structurally higher position
in a ranked hierarchy. Rather he is chosen and maintained
by the kalantar for his ability to carry out orders and to

command respect within his own tireh. Perhaps, when the

 

tirehs as smaller camp groups first arrived in Kordshuli
territory and coalesced with the larger group, each had its
own leading family group. For example, Moradshafii is that
combination of tent households thought to have descended
from the two brothers Morad and Shafii, who with their camps
had come from the Baharlu tribe. In fact, prior to the time
of my fieldwork there was a period when members of the two

lineages were separated into named groups of the nature of

 

what the Basseri called gulad (Barth 1961), although there
is no indication that the Kordshuli ever actually defined
that structural level except as a nominal unit of the tireh.
The acceptance of their leadership, though, was
dependent on the kalantar, as we saw with the shift from son
to cousin among the Babamaleki. Still, in most cases it
would seem that leadership has been inherited from father to
son, again with the kalantar's approval. However, the
kalantar's acceptance depends to a large extent on the
ability of the kadkhoda to command respect from their tirehs,
and this respect is largely based on wealth and personal
charisma. Wealth is not just a function of personal wealth

but also of access to wealth. That is, sons who have

)

 

 

separat
from ea
of thei
their i
joint 6
tire pc
the re:

which 7

of the
and ha
brothe
The 16
as his
broth.
separ-
no di
be sh
no mo
ties.
Wealf
also
1 me]
qual
like
Weal

mand

 

162

separated from their fathers, or brothers who have separated
from each other, are considered to have access to the wealth
of their individual households only. Sons who remain with
their father, or brothers who maintain a joint flock or
joint estate in land, have in some sense access to that en-
tire pool of wealth. The fact that a brother separates from
the rest of the family may greatly influence the way in
which he is viewed by the section.

For example, there are a couple of tirehs where one
of the brothers of the kadkhoda has separated from the others
and has set up an independent household. The rest of the

brothers have remained together and retain a joint flock.

 

The leadership qualities of the kadkhoda himself, as well

 

as his government recognition, seem to extend to all of the
brothers who have remained together. The brother who has
separated, since his flock is of average size, is viewed

no differently than any other section member. He may still
be shown greater respect because of personal charisma, but
no more than any other section member with the same quali—
ties. Other families besides those of the kadkhoda who have
wealth and have remained a dispersed economic household

also receive considerable respect from the other nomads. As
I mentioned, this wealth is usually combined with other
qualities such as ”sophistication,” religiosity, and the
like. In those cases where the kadkhoda is not extremely
wealthy and other personal qualities are minimal, he com—

mands little respect. It is in these cases that another

163

member of the tireh would seem to have actual leadership.
As I pointed out earlier, even the government is aware of
this and will send its representatives to deal with those
who have effective personal power. In one case, the effec—
tive leader of the group is quite wealthy and he is one of
the few Kordshuli who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

In the other case, the tireh is composed of two
main lineages. The head of one is the kadkhoda. The head
of the other, however, has greater personal power and
garners more respect from the other tireh members than the
kadkhoda does. Although this lineage head is not extremely
wealthy, in terms of the tireh, he is one of the more so-
phisticated elders. The kadkhoda himself cannot read or
write, a real hindrance in trying to deal with the settled
populations. When I first arrived in the camp of the
kadkhoda, I presented a letter from the government which he
glanced over. I assumed that he could read. It was not
until the other leader arrived and read the letter that I
realized that the kadkhoda had no real idea of why I was
there. As it turned out, this group never quite believed
that I was not a government spy sent to ferret out young
men without identity cards.

In all cases where the family of the kadkhoda has
retained a joint economic estate, all members of the
family (male members) share in the power given him. Any
one of a group of brothers may be turned to in times of

need or for advice. This, again, is dependent on whether

 

 

164

they have the personal characteristics that are important.

In one case, for example, three of four brothers have been
educated while the fourth cannot read or write. The three
have settled down, while the fourth acts as shepherd for

the joint flock. Since he travels with the animals he, of
necessity, is the acting kadkhoda outside of summer pastures.
Although superficially he is accorded the respect of a
kadkhoda, few section members turn to him for advice. They
usually wait to see one of his brothers or they talk with

another elder of the group. Thus, although power accrues

;;a;;:,_

from wealth and position, other personal characteristics
play an important role in the way leaders are perceived.

One of the points to be made is that there is not
only an economic advantage in brothers remaining together but
also a political one. This latter advantage is not only a
result of joint wealth but also of ”extended power” (i.e.,
the power and respect given the person of the kadkhoda ex-
tended to other close male relatives). To maintain his
political position in terms of his ability to influence the
decisions of others (and not in his mediator position, which
is defined by the State), the kadkhoda shows increased hos—
pitality (although some complain about this role) and must
be willing to sacrifice an animal if as the representative
of his tireh he is entertaining outsiders.

This ”extended power” parallels in many ways,
although to a lesser degree, the allocation of power among
the khavanin (chiefly family). The kalantar is the most

powerful person in the tribe, followed closely in power by

 

165

his brothers and then by collateral relatives. The eldest
son of the previous kalantar did not inherit the position
because of weak personal qualities. Magee (1945: 105) says
of him, ”very unimpressive. Small and unhealthy in appear-
ance. Is his father's henchman but appears to take little
interest in the affairs of the tribe.” Therefore, the
second eldest son became kalantar. One of the other three
brothers is also very charismatic and is considered to be
fair and just when dealing with tribesmen. The other
brothers are not well liked by the nomads and command face—
to—face respect partly because of their own wealth and
partly because of their status as a member of the khavanin;
they are not respected nor approached for assistance if it
is at all possible. On a broader scale, all collateral
male relatives of the kalantar have power, not only through
their own wealth, but also through their relationship to
the kalantar. Thus, a son of one of these collaterals will
be shown great respect so as not to offend, in a general
sense, the entire chiefly family. That is, they ”deserve”
respect just because they are related to the kalantar.

In a general sense, then, the kadkhoda during the
Entezamat period has acquired many of the functions that the
kalantar used to have, albeit with less overall power be—
cause of State domination. Tireh functions and activities,
which were more important than those of the larger group
(the taifeh) during the Independent period, have now ac—

quired some of the functions of that larger group also. The

 

 

 

 

166

nomads are aware of these shifts and some are beginning to
express this awareness implicitly. Throughout most of the
first four historical periods, an individual belonging to
the larger collectivity would identify himself to outsiders
as a Kordshuli. Today, however, there are those Kordshuli
who identify themselves to outsiders as members of a specific
tireh rather than as a member of the larger group, Kordshuli.
That is, he would say, ”I am Lori (a Eireh name)” rather

than ”I am Kordshuli.” This separation from the larger
group, as well as the intensification of Eireh identity Ii
parameters, will play a major role in the further disinte—
gration of the group Kordshuli during the next historical

period, Post—Entezamat.

Post—Entezamat Period

In 1976, Entezamat was dissolved by the government.
The implication, at least generally, is that the government
is no longer concerned either with the threat of the tribes
militarily, or with the development problems brought on by
the existence of the tribes. Rather than having one
gendarmarie post concerned primarily with tribal affairs,
the ”tribes” will now come under the jurisdiction of the
local gendarmarie posts (pasgah) of the areas in which they
are located. This means that during migration the gendar—
marie posts along the route will handle any disputes or
conflicts within the tribe as well as between nomads and

settled folks.

 

167

This state of affairs may put the nomads at a
definite disadvantage, since in cases of conflict between
nomads and settled folk it is more likely that the resolution
of the dispute will favor the settled group. This is because
the settled groups have more opportunity to interact with
the leaders of the pasgah and to provide extra bribes that
may serve to influence the outcome of any dispute. The
nomads, on the other hand, are just passing through the
area, so their interaction with the pasgah can not be sus—
tained for any period of time. Although some of the pastoral 3
products are more desirable than many of the agricultural
products, it is continuity in giving prestations that will
play the more important role. This is not to imply that
disputes involving nomads and sedentary people will always
be decided in favor of the settled folk. Rather, it means
that many of the cases brought before the pasgah that are
not all that clearcut and that do not require court action
may be decided in favor of the Villager because of time and
influence. While, perhaps, there may not be that many con—
flict situations arising, it is still a fact that this
situation introduces another factor which is perceived by
the nomads as making migration, in particular, and the pas-
toral adaptation, in general, difficult to maintain. As
will be discussed in the following chapters, sedentarization
in many cases is as much a product of this mental set (i.e.,
the difficulty of ”doing” pastoralism), as of anything else.

The importance of this latest shift has yet to be seen, but

 

168

nonetheless I would like to suggest some of the possible out-
comes of and responses to the change.

The organization and unity of the Kordshuli, like
that of the Basseri, has been dependent upon the autocratic
leadership of the kalantar. As Barth points out for the
Basseri,

The scattered and constantly shifting tents of the
Basseri are held together and welded into a unit by
their centralized political system, culminating in the
single office of the chief . . . it is the fact of
political unity under the Basseri chief which in the ,
eyes of the tribesmen and outsiders alike constitutes 1
them into a single ”tribe” in the Persian sense .
the pivotal position then in the whole tribal organi—
zation is that of the chief (1961: 71) r
With the dissolution of the chieftainship, there has been
some shift away from this unity, but the replacement of the
kalantar by another seemingly autocratic leader, the afsar-e
Entezamat, and the maintenance of an administrative unit
known as the Kordshuli has forestalled a greater separation
and dispersal than has already occurred. With the dissolu—
tion of Entezamat, it should be expected that these pro—
cesses will be intensified. As instances arise which require

advice and assistance in interacting with the sedentary

community, the nomads will find that there may be no one to

 

help. That is, although some of the kadkhodas are competent
and will be able to provide assistance, there are some who
are not ”sophisticated” enough to deal with the crises that
may arise. In many of these cases, a number of nomads will
probably turn once again to the kalantar and his family for

help. Some will need help in dealing with conflict

 

 

169

situations that require going to court; others will need
assistance when they decide to settle, since they may not
know much about banking procedures, loans, etc. In some
tirehs, the kadkhoda has taken out loans for the use of
tigeh members in building houses. It is likely that those
who do not have access to this assistance from the kadkhoda
will turn to settled relatives, or, in the final instance,
to the kalantar or his family to accomplish their goals.
Many of these issues relate more directly to economic pro—
cesses and will be discussed in that context in the next
chapter.

The point to be made is that the unity of the group
Kordshuli is now more a function of territoriality and
spatial proximity, especially in summer pastures in their
sarhad, than it is of political integration. Even here,
though, there is continually greater dispersal throughout
the hills and plains of the extended valley system which is
the summer pasture area (eilaq) of the Kordshuli. That is,
the area where members of different Eireh tend to congre—
gate, the plain above Hosseinabad, is used more by the
kadkhodas and their close relatives than by the rest of the
tireh. This latter group tends to be widely dispersed
throughout the hills north of the village. As the map,
Figure 5.2, indicates, tirehs remain to a large extent
separated. Even within the traditional ”territory” of the
tireh, dispersal is increasing. With increasing sedentari-

zation, this dispersal is likely to increase since there is

 

 

 

 

 

170

 

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171

more land available per household unit, at least in eilaq.

There tend to be core villages about which the
various tirehs camp. Most Eigeh have members settled in
one of the villages of their sarhad and, therefore, camp
near it for the social and sometimes economic interaction.
In most cases, the village is one in which the kadkhoda
owns property. Thus, with the kind of dispersal that we can
see on the map, the kadkhoda has less actual daily contact
with the members of his ElEEE- The ideal of the socially
and economically independent household is more and more
being realized. However, as we shall see in chapter seven,
the difficulty with this is that the labor needs of the
individual household increase as the availability of pasture
land decreases and as the migration route continues to

shrink from agricultural encroachment.

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC PROCESSES

Many of the political changes directing the Kordshuli
towards sedentarization that were discussed in the preceding
chapter have been accompanied by equivalent changes in the
economic system. Political changes have led to increasing
control by the State over economic resources, especially
land. Indeed, some of the changes which enhance the pros-

pect for sedentarization are the direct result of the shift-

 

ing political situation and of the effects of these shifts
on the economic sphere. Some changes are a response to

such factors as improved technology, greater dependence on

a market system that is out of the direct control of the
nomads, and government incentives aimed at making a sedentary
existence more attractive and profitable than a nomadic pas-
toral one. However, the changing social structure of the
Kordshuli and the maintenance of the independent household
as~a cultural ideal also have ramifications for economic
processes. As these larger factors come to bear on the
ideals of independence and freedom contained within the
nomadic ”mystique,” the perceived difficulty (zahmat) of
”doing” pastoralism increases for the individual nomadic

household.

172

 

 

173

This chapter examines some of the economic processes
of the Kordshuli, and how changes in them during the past
few decades have contributed to an increasing rate of
sedentarization. These economic processes will be described
at both the taifeh (tribe) level and the Eigeh (section) and_
hgpgh (household) levels to show how both changing political
factors and changing economic factors contribute to changes
in the Kordshuli pastoral nomadic adaptation. At the taifeh
level, I will discuss first the system as it functioned
during the ”Independent Period” (cf. chapter five), and then
focus on some of the changes during the period of field
research, the “Entezamat Period." At the tigeh and hgpeh

levels, I will focus primarily on the ”Entezamat Period.”

Taifeh Level~—Independent Period

 

The traditional political functions of the kalantar
were as much a part of the economic system of the Kordshuli
as they were an expression of power by the kalantar. Allo-
cation and reallocation of land, control of migration, and
mediation between nomadic and sedentary folk, as well as
mediation within the nomadic community, were, and are, major
factors in the economic viability of the group. To under—
stand better the effects of changes that have occurred in
the political and economic spheres, it will be useful to

examine the nature of the kalantar's traditional economic

 

role.
The economic role of the kalantar is based, to a

large degree, on his ability to gain, maintain, and control

 

 

 

174

access to resources. This, in turn, is based on the geo—
graphical location at which the nomads find themselves in
the annual cycle. The territory utilized by the Kordshuli
may be divided into three broad sections: sarhad or eilaq

(summer pasture area), rah—e kuch (migration route), and

 

garm—e sir or qeshlaq (winter pasture areas).

 

Sarhad (Summer Pasture Area)

Traditionally (i.e., before deposition of the
kalantar by the State), most of the land in sarhad used by
the Kordshuli was the property of the kalantar. He had the
right, therefore, to refuse the use of that land to any
group or individual. He could, in fact, sell the land if he
so desired. The tirehs (sections) of the taifeh were
allocated certain portions of that territory. Any member of
the tigeh, therefore, had usufruct rights to some pasture-
land in sarhad. The areas were apportioned according to the
size and wealth of the Eigeh, as well as on the basis of
personal favoritism. Also, reallocation of the various
regions by the kalantar could be expected with changes in
the size and composition of the groups, as well as in
changes in the ability of the natural environment to support
the nomads with their flocks.

The ecological requirements of a nomadic existence
enabled the kalantar to maintain and increase his power in
many ways. With control over access to pastures, the
kalantar could limit the ability of possible rivals to in-

crease their wealth and prestige through flock eXpansion by

 

 

 

 

175

assigning smaller and poorer pastures to them. In this way,
many who might have become rivals of the kalantar (usually
accessible only through a liaison with one of the kalantar's
brothers or a collateral relative) were inhibited from
making large gains in wealth. This also inhibited any
increase in power that would be gained through garnering

a following by means of prestations as well as nonmaterial
assistance. If these wealthier nomads continued in their

attempts to subvert the kalantar's power, the kalantar

 

could easily force them to leave the area of summer pastures
completely. This act, however, was considered very drastic
and none of the Kordshuli can recall it ever having happened.

While no potential rivals were forced to leave the
area, forced movement within Kordshuli eilaq (summer pasture
areas) was not unknown. Certain households were asked to
move from one area to another in the general region in
order to help alleviate stresses that had developed as a
result of acute conflict between these households and others.
Usually there was enough Space within the land allocated to
each tireh to enable households in conflict to separate and
avoid continued contact. If the hostility was extreme, such
that serious injury or death might result, the kalantar
stepped in and attempted to adjudicate; and failing this, he
would see to an extreme separation of the parties.

An example of this type of action occurred while I
was in the field.1 In this instance, one young man got into

a quarrel with another. Words were thrown back and forth

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

176

and, as is often wont to happen, the ever-present shepherd's
staff (ghgq) was raised in anger. Although these kinds of
arguments usually end in bruised bones and feelings, this
time one of the blows proved fatal. While there was official
action taken by the government (e.g., incarceration of the
guilty party), there was also action taken by a member of
the khavanin (chiefly family). He ordered a tractor taken
to the household of the murderer's father to aid in moving
the tent and belongings to the far side of the valley system
that comprises Kordshuli eilaq (summer pastures). Because
tempers were extremely volatile, the ”chief” feared that
more unnecessary violence would occur if the family did not
move. As a point of interest, this also shows that one's
family (at least members of the Same tent household) may be
considered as liable for a crime as the perpetrator; respon—
sibility for the affront rests with the family and, there—
fore, it is just that vengeance be sought from a very close

relative.

Rah-e Kuch (Migration Route)

 

 

After leaving sarhad, the kalantar's control over
temporal and spatial aspects of migration was lessened.
Since little, if any, of the land along the migration route
was owned or in any way controlled by the kalantar, he could
not always direct the spatial arrangement of the various

tirehs. However, the rah—e kuch (migration route) was as

 

much a period in time as it was a place in space (Barth

1959, 1961). It was in this aspect that the kalantar could

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

177

exercise great control It was he alone who could determine
when the various tirehs might begin migration and how far
and how fast they might travel.

The decisions of the kalantar were based not only on
the need to regulate pasture usage and minimize overgrazing
but also on the time tables utilized by other tribal groups
that might cause them to cross or intertwine with the
Kordshuli migration route. The different tirehs did have

traditional routes within the 20 to 50 mile wide rah—evkuch.

 

These were usually based on the Specific destinations

located in summer or winter pastures that the nomads were
travelling toward. Thus, in the same way that traditional
pastures were flexible, depending on the desires of the
kalantar and the immediate ecological needs of the nomads,

so too might the migration route for any section change,
depending on available pastures and water, and on obedience
to the kalantar. The issue of obedience was of primary
importance, for it was only through membership in the corpor—
ate group that one gained access to needed pasturage. With—
out the approval of the kalantar, no household could migrate
during the same period of time as the rest of the taifeh.
Since other tribes who passed through these areas might also
keep these "stranger” households from utilizing pastures
during the time of their own migration, the renegade would
find it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a pastoral
nomadic existence. The point, as is obvious, is that politi—

cal allegiance was as important as environmental

 

 

 

 

 

 

178

circumstance in maintaining the pastoral nomadic adaptation.

Garm—e Sir (Winter Pasture Area)

The relationship between the kalantar's political
power and the common nomad's access to needed resources in
sarhad and during migration is obvious from the preceding
discussion. However, when the group reached garm—e sir,
the ability of the kalantar to use his political position
to affect the distribution of resources was drastically
reduced. The kalantar did not own the land that the group
used for winter pastures. Most of it was controlled by
Villagers or other tribal groups. When the Kordshuli were
part of the Qashqa'i, some of those lands in garm—e sir
that were owned by the khans of the confederacy were assign—
ed to the Kordshuli. Even here, though, there were few
rigid boundaries between expanding village lands and the
pastures that the nomads used. During most of the Indepen—
dent Period, the Kordshuli continued to use areas that they
had used traditionally, however, they were often required to
pay ”rent” for the use of lands within the village area,
after securing permission from the headsmen (kadkhoda) of
the village. The kalantar could help to mediate economical—
ly, since he had a reasonably friendly relationship with the
headman of the main Village in Kordshuli winter pastures,
Haji Safar. Despite his intercession, the availability of
lowland pastures, even for rent, was a function of climatic
and environmental conditions. If the year were especially

dry, the nomads could expect little help from the villagers,

 

 

 

 

 

179

who had their own small flocks to contend with. The moun—
tains surrounding the village area were considered open
rangeland, although they were less productive then the lower
areas. Therefore, during lean years, the nomads would be
forced to stay in the mountains longer than usual and the
flocks suffered accordingly. The uncertainty of this situ—
ation added to the nomads' feelings that they were surrounded
by enemies in an inhospitable environment, whereas sarhad
was considered their homeland (vatag). Also, because of the
limited Space in any one region of garm—e sir, some house—
holds had to look elsewhere for sufficient pastures. This
often meant paying still higher rents and often being sur-
rounded by other tribal groups, heightening the fear of
thievery. As we shall see shortly, this situation has
intensified, making the job of doing pastoralism even more
difficult.

Although the kalantar was considered to possess
power from birth, he was only able to maintain it through
the continued ability to quash rivals and to retain his own
following. This latter condition was a function of his
ability to maintain military superiority, as well as to
carry out his duties as his followers believed them to be.
These duties included giving prestations to visitors and
fellow tribesmen, giving feasts, and presenting a strong
image when interacting with other tribal leaders and with
sedentary groups, including government representatives. All

of these duties were contingent upon the kalantar's ability

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

180

to maintain or increase his wealth through his own flocks
and land, or through revenue collected from the other
Kordshuli. These duties, then, accentuated the redistri-
butive role of the kalantar, which was of paramount impor-
tance for his economic and political power. As Fazel
(1979: 43) points out similarly for the Boyr Ahmad chief,
”the . . . chief serves as a center for the redistribution
of practically everything he collects or receives. More—
0ver, this function is . . . pivotal to his political
power and prestige and to the tribe's economic productivity.”
There were a number of ways in which the kalantar
could raise revenue, although not all were of equal impor—
tance or of equal value. His main source of income, apart
from the products of his own flocks and land, was a tax
based on the number of animals that each Eireh owned. While
not given an eXplicit name by any of my informants, this

form of tax is called galeh-begiri (flock taking) among the

 

Boyr Ahmad (Fazel 1979: 40) and galeh giri among the

 

Qashqa'i (Peiman 1968: 432). The tax was irregular and was
based primarily on an immediate need by the kalantar for
increased revenue. The tax usually amounted to one sheep
in every hundred, although it might go as high as three in
every hundred. Many of the adult household heads say that

this tax has never been imposed, yet most of the kadkhodas

 

and all of the khavanin say that it has been imposed as
needed. Noncompliance, without adequate SUpport of other

households, could jeOpardize the right of the evader to use

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

181

any tribal lands. That is, other households would have had
to be willing to militarily support any evading household

if they felt that the evader was correct in his position.

If the kalantar were, indeed, being unreasonable and a large
group felt unjustly taxed, it might force the turnover of
the leadership of the tribe to another male relative of the
kalantar, either a brother, uncle, or son. The Kordshuli
say that this has never happened.

Another source of revenue, albeit quite small, were
the gifts (didani) brought by visitors to the kalantar's
tent. These could include any number of a variety of pas—
toral products, as well as gifts from the urban market or,
from the wealthier Visitors, horses and guns. The Kordshuli
Visitors making the prestations usually thought of them as
a contribution to the ongoing position of the kalantar and
thus were not only expressing political allegiance but also
expected some return in favors or a return gift (cf. Fazel
1979: 40—41).

Also in the past, the Kordshuli were known as notor—
ious robbers (Sykes 1963: 481). Thus, when conditions were
difficult for pastoralism, the kalantar might havr organ—
ized a raiding party either on nearby tribes or on agricul—
tural Villages. This, no doubt, was especially true when
the nomads found it hard to get needed vegetable produce.
Raiding has not been a factor in the raising of revenue in
recent times.

Most of the wealth of the kalantar came from his

own prOperty. Unlike the Boyr Ahmad chiefs, where a single

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

182

source (i.e., animal and land taxes), gave economic support
to their leadership and power, the Kordshuli chiefs, like
the Qashqa'i and Basseri chiefs, ”had amassed considerable
wealth in agricultural land, huge herds, commercial citrus
orchards, and real estate . . .; and they had pursued the
opulent lifestyle of the sedentary elite" (Fazel 1979: 47).
This considerable wealth helped to maintain the kalantar
in his status as landed elite in both nomadic and
sedentary society. While he could fulfill many of his
duties that required economic outlay by using the income
from taxes, he often would use his personal resources to
provide gifts, feasts, and so forth.

This latter point does not seem to have been the
case for the wealthy Qashqa'i and Basseri chiefs, who ”no
longer felt obligated to invest time and resources on be-
half of a tribal constituency. In the new political arena,
tribal affiliation . . . became a liability” (ibid.). The
Kordshuli khavanin seem generally to have been more con?
cerned with the individual Kordshuli. Even today, when
interaction between the khavanin and the nomadic tent
dweller has been severely curtailed or eliminated by govern—
ment takeover of tribal affairs, two of the khags continue
to be very concerned with tribal affairs; they consciously
and conscientiously interact with the kadkhodas of the
tirehs, as well as with the common nomad when possible

As I mentioned, it was primarily the personal wealth

of the kalagpar that helped maintain him in his position of

 

 

 

 

 

 

183

 

leadership. Much of this personal wealth was considered,

in the past, part of what constituted tribal property,
particularly land. Much of the land presently owned by the
kalantar and his agnatic relatives was parceled off from
the estate of the kalantar‘s father, Ata Khan. Most of
this estate made up summer pasture areas for the Kordshuli.
Still, as was mentioned, all tribal land was considered to
be the private property of the kalantar who might allocate
it to the tirehs of the tribe. Usufruct rights were given

to those who followed and supported the kalantar as members

 

of one of the named tirehs. Of course, if the entire group

rebelled against the form of land apportionment, the

 

kalantar could do little to prevent a takeover. This event
has never occurred among the Kordshuli, and is very unlikely.

It is difficult to estimate how much land the
khavanin, not to mention the kalantar himself, own today.
At one point they owned the entire valley system which
comprises Kordshuli eilaq (summer pastures). Much of this
land, though was unavailable for agricultural development
either because of inadequate water sources or because the
government had enough control to limit the amount of land
that could be transformed from pasture to farm land. Later,
as we shall see, with the advent of land reform, the amount
of land under the direct control of the kalantar diminished
drastically.

Agricultural land was and is used primarily to grow

 

cash crops such as wheat, barley, and sugar beets. Other

crops, while often grown, have not been important money

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

184

makers. Also, all of the khaps of the Kordshuli own

orchards, which produce fruit for both market and personal
consumption. About thirty years ago, within the khavanin
of the Kordshuli, all of the brothers except the kalantar

himself settled down and devoted the major portion of their

 

time to their agricultural holdings. The kalantar did not
settle until forced to do so by the action of the State
about fifteen years ago. His house, as a result, is
smaller and his land is less developed than that of his
brothers.

Today, as in the past, the other major source of
income for all of the khavagin are their flocks of sheep
and goats. Sheep are better money-makers than goats
(although goats are hardier and more easily cared for) so
the proportion of sheep to goats is much higher among the
flocks of the khavanin than it is among those of most of
the common nomads. In fact, a couple of the brothers have
flocks of sheep only. The same products that the common

nomad uses and produces to provide a livelihood for himself

 

are used and sold by the khavanin. The flocks are seen
primarily as a capital investment and, traditionally, the
return was quite high. All of these flocks are taken care
of by shepherds who are part of the lower strata of nomadic
life. These shepherds receive wages and are allowed to
keep or sell some of the products from the larger flock.

In addition, since they are tending the animals of one of

the khans, they usually can gain access to better pastures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

185

than they ordinarily might with their own flocks. It is
not unlikely that the khag will pay villagers for the right
to use private property that provides better pasturage for
the flock.

The role of the khavanin, and especially the

 

kalantar, as members of the economic elite was enhanced by
their ownership of houses in Shiraz, the provincial capitol.
Although not as prosperous as the khags of the Qashqa'i
confederacy, they still could be characterized as members
of the urban elite, perhaps at what is often called the
”lower—upper class” level. However, their position in the
city was not based only on economics but also on social
relationships. The khaps had, and still have, many networks
of friends and acquaintances both in and out of government,
many of whom could provide assistance through their power
positions. Thus, while the kalantar may have lost most of
his effectiveness as a political mediator, he might still
influence some decisions concerning the tribe through his

social relationships with other economic elite who haVe

 

access to channels of authority.

The redistributive role of the kalantar was not only
dependent on his giving direct prestations, but also, in
some sense, on the allocation of land which was considered
both his private property and the property of the tribe,
in general, under his control. As a return for allegiance,

prestations, service, taxes, and the like, the common nomad

could receive usufruct rights to pasture land as a member of

P

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

186

one of the Kordshuli tirehs. Also, the kalantar, partly to
ensure allegiance and partly out of real concern for the
common nomad, would often given prestations to some of the
_taifeh members. These might be as large as horses and
rifles or as small as sugar and tea. Sometimes the kalantar
might give a feast; this would help promote the unity of the
entire taifeh, instead of just sectional unity promoted by
wedding feasts. It would also give him the opportunity to
display some of his power derived from wealth and from the

size of his following.

Taifeh Level-—Entezamat Period

 

At the time of my research, the role of the kalantar
had changed dramatically from the traditional role described
above. His role as a political mediator has been severely
restricted and almost eliminated by State control. He re—
tains some aspects of his position as an economic mediator,
although with loss of official political power this role has
become more personalistic. The kalantar, as well as one of
his four brothers, maintain fairly close contact with the

rest of the tribe. Kadkhodas continue to seek advice from

 

these two men and the common nomad will willingly apprOach
both men for advice and assistance. This is more often the
case when conflict situations need resolution, although
economic assistance is also asked for in some cases.

One case will illustrate this assistance. A nomad
who had had a sheep stolen came to the home of the

kalantar's brother to request assistance. He had tracked

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

187

the sheep to the city where the urban merchant refused to
return it, saying that he had purchased it legally. The
khan, rather than offering any direct political assistance,
asked the tribesman what should be done. The nomad said
that it was costly to lose a sheep and that he wanted either
the sheep or its cash value returned. The khag took out
his wallet, and after ascertaining the value of the sheep,
gave cash to the injured party. No further attempt was made
to apprehend the original culprit, although there had been a
prime suspect.

Although the kalantar does not often visit the
nomadic camps, his position is such that his coming would
be met with great celebration. This continued contact With
the tribe, both direct and indirect, makes it easier for the
common nomad to get economic advice or assistance from the
kalantar if others in his section, including the kadkhoda,
are unwilling or unable to help. The kalantar, then, is
more often a last resort for this kind of assistance. His
awareness and knowledge of the market system help to make
him an invaluable source of information on marketing pro—
cedures, the state of the market, government price fixing,
land purchase, procurement of loans, and the like. Because
the khavanin are relatively wealthy, they are able to retain
some of the power that they formerly enjoyed, especially in
the urban arena. This allows greater flexibility in their
interactions with the urban merchant. Most nomads are re—

luctant to turn to the khavanin for assistance unless they

 

 

188

are quite poor or in other ways feel they must forsake the
image of independence to resolve a problem that, seemingly,
cannot otherwise be resolved.

It is more likely that the independent household
head will take his own products to market (or send them
with a friend or relative) and trust to the fairness of
others. Without prOper awareness of the nature of loans
and interest rates, some nomads find that they owe more than
they can afford, which may eventually force them out of the
nomadic system. However, this is not common among the
Kordshuli. While indebtedness is familiar to most nomadic
households, over-indebtedness usually occurs when the nomad
sets up new trading networks with unfamiliar merchants. It
is much more common for a nomad to develop a fairly consis—
tent relationship with one or two traders who are widely
known by the larger group. More about these relationships
will be discussed below.

Certainly, as would be expected, most of the changes
in the economic role of the kalantar have resulted directly
from the political shifts that led to the dissolution of
the chieftainship. Fazel (1979; 44-46), in his perceptive
article on the economic bases of political power among the
Boyr Ahmad chiefs, presents three major reasons for the
decline of the chieftainship among this group: 1) political
division of the tribe in the previous generation, 2) eXpan—
sion of a market economy and the greater dependence of the

nomads on a debtor/creditor relationship, and 3) the role of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

189

the State. I would argue that comparable reasons account
for the decline in unity and solidarity within the
Kordshuli, but that it was primarily the role of the State
that brought about the decline and demise of the chieftain-
ship.

Among the Kordshuli, the deposition of the kalantar
has led to a political division of the tribe by the State.

The government's recognition of the various kadkhodas as

 

political mediators, coupled with the expanded chief—like

role of the kadkhodas (cf. chapter five), has helped to

 

undermine the unity of the group by creating eight quasi-
tribal groups. At the same time, the expansion of a market
economy and a greater dependence on debtor/creditor rela-
tionships has lessened the need of many nomads for a tribal
economic mediator. As I pointed out earlier, some nomads
still require assistance and/or advice, which the kalantar
or kadkhoda can provide. Still, it becomes easier to
realize the cultural ideal of a totally economically inde—
pendent household, in the sense that the household head can
now carry out and accept full reSponsibility for his own
household's business.

Fazel also argues that the town traders engage in
”systematic exploitation” of the nomads by charging high
interest rates-~up to 100 percent semi—annually——thus bur-
dening the nomads with perpetual indebtedness. He points
out that his data, as well as that of others (e.g., Afshar—

Naderi 1971) contradict Barth's observations among the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

190

Basseri that interest rates are quite low or non—existent.
However, my data for the Kordshuli corroborate Barth's ob—
servations. The trading partners called QEEE (lit. friend)
are usually just that, friends of the nomads. In Jahrom,
for example, there is one shOpkeeper to whom most members
of four different tirehs, as well as a few of the others,
go to obtain household goods and extra foodstuffs during
the winter. Those with whom the trader is close are often
not charged any interest. Others in the group are usually
charged 5 to 30 percent, depending on the nature of the
relationship. The other tirehs usually have a comparable
dgsp. The role of this QEEE is most important in winter
pastures; the nomads must wait until spring or early summer
to sell their pastoral products, yet need sugar, tea, soap,
flour, and other household goods throughout the winter. The
trader is often content to make most of his profits from
his sedentary clientele while enjoying access to highly
desired pastoral products provided by trade with the nomads.
As I pointed out in chapter five, the kalantar did
not lose all power immediately after his deposition by the
State. Many of the nomads continued to maintain the
vertical flow of goods to the kalantar. That is, although
his real political power had been usurped, his effective
political power was partially maintained through the contin-
uation of the flow of goods and services. Beck makes a
similar point for the Qashqa'i a few years after the initial

deposition of the khans of the confederacy:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

191

In 1960 the government abolished the title khan and its
duties and powers (collection of taxes, assignment of
land use, supervision of migrations, formation of
armies, settlement of tribal disputes) . . . Several
years were to pass before military officers had any
degree of success in handling affairs, and in the mean-
time many tribespeople continued to deal with khans

in customary fashion (1979: 4).

With the increasing effectiveness of the gendarmarie

and the increased power of the afsar-e Entezamat (tribal

 

Disciplinary Officer), as well as awareness by the Kordshuli
(that the kalantar could not continue to provide the services
called for by continued support, a shift occurred in the
form and direction of the vertical flow of goods. This
implies some continuity in the nature of prestations which
are given to guarantee access to resources. However, the
redistributive role of the kalantar was abrogated and re—
placed by an individualistic, rather than group-oriented,
power base. Where the kalantar had been interested primari—
ly in the welfare of the group while at the same time trying

to maintain his power position, the afsar-e Entezamat is

 

more concerned with maintaining his personal power position
in relation to the governmental power structure and, at the
same time, enjoying the fruits of a pastoral existence by
showing a self—serving interest in the welfare of those who
will provide desirable pastoral products to him. The
Kordshuli say that most of the Disciplinary Officers, who
usually serve one- to two~year assignments, were more than
willing to take bribes with no real guarantee that a return
would be forthcoming. Whoever could offer the most would

often get preferred treatment in, for example, the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

adjudication of conflicts or in the allocation of camp
sites among competing households in extra—tribal territory
under State control. When the son of the deposed chief of

the Basseri threatened to report the last afsar—e Entezamat

 

to gendarmarie headquarters in Shiraz for his corruption

and bribe taking, the officer mockingly replied that there

 

was no direct proof and, since all the officers do it,
there would be no concern shown by his superiors.
Therefore, although the vertical flow of goods was
maintained in some forms, the shift from concern for the
welfare of the group (exemplified by the kalantar), to

individual gain (as shown by the afsar—e Entezamat),

 

threatened the economic viability of many households, as
well as group unity, by accentuating wealth differences
through preferred access to resources. Those nomads with
more wealth could gain easier access to scarce resources
(i.e., pastures), while those who were already financially

stricken could find themselves in less productive areas,

 

thereby lessening the chances for their survival as pastor—
alists. While this is not a major factor in the process,
this shift helps to illuminate how the primary shifts in
political and economic processes may be reinforced, adding
to the difficulty of the nomads in maintaining their life—
style. That is, there is no longer an effective buffer

between the Kordshuli and the negative elements in their

environment.

 

 

 

 

 

193

Tireh and Huneh Level

 

It is very difficult to attempt a discussion of the
changes in the economic processes of the various tirehs
because there is little data available from the past. One
important variable that would have affected the economic
interactions of the Kordshuli is flock size. The Kordshuli
say that flocks were much larger in the past and that
recent droughts, especially that of 1962-1964, drastically
decimated the flocks. Many Kordshuli who now have an
average—sized flock claim that prior to that drought they
had 800 to 1,000 animals but that over 80 percent died of
malnutrition and disease during the drought. It is unlikely
that all the nomads who make this claim for larger flock
size are correct, at least, in terms of land availability.
It is true that in the recent past the migration route was
larger than today, but the available pasturage in winter
and summer quarters has not yet diminished drastically.
Since a number of the nomads today find it difficult to
secure adequate pastures in the traditional areas, it is
unlikely that they would have been able in the past to pro—
vide for their flocks with even more animals vying for the
limited pasturage. Certainly some did have larger flocks
but there is no way of accurately determining howmany.

Some of the wealthier households with large flocks
did expend some of the animal capital to acquire land. This
land acquisition was geared primarily towards making their

pastoral existence more secure. That is, a primary reason

 

 

 

 

 

 

194

for land purchase was to permit the production of grain,
which could both offset rising prices for grain in the
market and provide grain for the flocks during lean years.
It is important to realize that most of the families that
own agricultural land (a very small percentage of all
Kordshuli households) do not oWn enough to meet all of their
own grain needs. There are a very few men outside of the
khavanin (chiefly family) who produce enough agriculturally
to meet the needs of family and flock. These men are
wealthy enough to sustain some losses to their flocks by
the improper handling by extra-familial shepherds, if there
are no family members to assist him. Actually, except for
the khavanin, all of these men who have ”hired” shepherds
and are still considered to be part of the Kordshuli col—
lectivity practice marginal or seasonal nomadism (cf.
chapter seven). That is, they stay in summer pasture area
to oversee crop production but move into tents in winter
pastures after the agricultural cycle has been completed.
As I mentioned in chapter three, unlike many of the
other nomadic groups in the Middle East including their
neighbors the Qashqa'i and the Basseri, the Kordshuli do
not have a variety of shepherding contracts. Most of the
Kordshuli household heads prefer to shepherd their own
flocks or to entrust it to a son. Most of the hired shep—
herds who are not from the immediate family are young men
who are distant relatives of the household head. These

young men are taken into the household and provided minimal

 

 

 

195

food and clothing; they occupy a very low status in the
household and have very little say about flock management.
Those few shepherds who are hired from other groups usually
set up their own tent in the area of their employer or, if
the employer is not present, they camp and migrate in the
company of the employer's Eireh. These men are given an
annual salary as well as other incidentals such as tea,
sugar, and some pastoral products. All of these shepherds
tend to be poor; shepherding provides them with pasturage
for their own small flocks as well as a better opportunity
to increase the size of their flock through the increased
productivity and ease of handling that comes with a larger
flock. The general point is that, except for the very
wealthy, the Kordshuli prefer to set the maintenance of
the flock as the major focus of their allocation of time
and resources. .

Concerning the issue of fluctuating flock size, it
is not unlikely that there have been times in the past '
when the flocks were much larger but could not be main-
tained for an extended period of time because of changing
environmental circumstances. It has been suggested that
there are periodic droughts throughout the Middle East which
follow six— to eight—year cycles, with each of these
droughts lasting for a few years (Dahl and Hjort 1976: 127).
Although the severity of the droughts is variable, an
awareness of this cycle is perhaps culturally manifested
through the efforts of the nomads to maximize flock growth.

While larger herds may require more labor output, they help

 

 

 

196

to ensure the Viability of the pastoral household by off—
setting the devastating effects of drought that could lead
to impoverishment and eventual sedentarization.

Flock composition (i.e., the ratio of goats to
sheep), is also partially a response to the possibility of
drought. Goats fare better in adverse conditions than do
sheep. During some of the bad droughts of the past, it
was possible sometimes to migrate with only goats while the
sheep are left behind in sarhad to be fed purchased grain.
Therefore, despite the fact that the Kordshuli speak more
favorably of sheep and even use the term for sheep (gusfand)
to refer to sheep and goats alike when talking about their
flocks, most of the Kordshuli have more goats than sheep.-
There is an overall trend for nomads at the lower end of the
economic continuum to have mostly goats while those at the
upper end focus on sheep, as I mentioned for the khavanin
earlier (p. 186). Sheep do give a better return in terms
of live sale and wool, but they are also more difficult to
care for and to milk.

Flock size, while it may vary according to environ-
mental circumstance, still acts as a general indicator of
wealth among the Kordshuli. A number of families also own
land, however land wealth generally correlates with animal
wealth; that is, those families that own land usually also
have large flocks. There are, of course, a number of
families that have large flocks and own little or no land,

yet are still considered wealthy by other Kordshuli. Thus,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

197

to consider the relationship of wealth to sedentarization,

as Barth (1961) does when presenting his model of sedentari-
zation and the mechanisms involved in the process, it will
be instructive to look at the flock sizes within and among
tirehs. The question raised is: is there any relationship
between wealth and sedentarization and, if so, does it mani—
fest itself as Barth's model suggests (i.e., that wealthy
and poor nomads are led to settle). In the next chapter I
will further address the question of this relationship for
some of the tirehs of the Kordshuli.

The following tables show the range of flock sizes
indicating, generally, variations in wealth within and
between tirehs. The range of flock sizes in the following
charts has been divided into seven sections based on general
responses given by the Kordshuli. That is, even if the
correct number of animals is known, many of the pastoralists
merely give a round estimate for the flock size. The
usual error from the quoted amount and the number of animals
that I personally counted in a flock averaged 15 animals.
These differences were most often based on whether the
nomads counted newborn lambs and kids, whether they feared
I was checking out the flocks for tax purposes, or whether
they wanted to impress me with their herdsmanship. The
Kordshuli say that a three-person family can be comfortable
with a flock of around 100 animals and that 40 to 60 animals
are needed to survive. The average family of five individ—

uals requires 150 to 250 animals to live comfortably.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

198

Table 6.1 presents a summary of the flock size per
adult household head dependent on that flock. That is,
where brothers have merged their flocks or, more usually,
where they have not divided the joint flock after the death
of their father, I have included each as flock owner with
an equivalent share of the flock. This is consistent with
the fact that, if the brothers were to divide their prOp—
erty tomorrow, the flock would be divided in this way.

One can see in the chart that there are very few nomads
at the level of impoverishment (i.e., below 50 animals).
Most of these families are able to remain nomadic because
they also act as shepherds for larger flock owners or
because they receive some assistance from sedentary rela—
tives who wish to share some of the pastoral products.

A household with 300 or more animals is considered
by the Kordshuli to be relatively wealthy. There are some
families that own 600 to 800 animals; however, I have not
separated them out, since wealth differentiation is not
that relevant within this higher stratum, at least not in
terms of flock size. As is obvious from Table 6.1, there
are not many wealthy flock owners who still function as
nomadic pastoralists. Less than 10 percent of the total
group fall in this range.

The question does arise as to whether these wealthy
families, as well as the poor ones, constitute such a small
portion of the group because they have sedentarized, as

Barth's model would have us believe, or whether there is a

 

 

 

 

199

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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200

hidden dimension to the question that the figures cannot
show. In correspondence to the simplest understanding of
Barth's model, it is true that many of the poorer nomads
are unable to maintain a nomadic existence without an
adequate flock. However, the wealthy nomads may in many
ways decrease effective flock size so that apparent wealth
in animals in within the "average” range. For example,
many of the wealthy nomads who have sedentarized have
remained part of a dispersed economic household, in which
part of the family unit is settled, controlling jointly

I owned lands, and another part remains nomadic, tending the
joint flock (cf. chapter seven). In this way any increase
in flock size is equally distributed among all the socially
independent household heads who are part of this joint
economic unit. This offsets any greater increase in a
single flock separated out from the larger one that might
occur because of such factors as better herding practices,
access to better pastures, or more distant separation from
possible disease and predation. That is, if the joint
flock were divided up into its component parts, it is
possible that any one of these smaller flocks would increase
greatly in size under the watchful eye of its own shepherd,
thus making its owner a ”wealthy” flock owner. If the
other flocks do not increase, then these owners remain less
”wealthy.” However, if an increase occurs within one part
of a joint flock, then the increase is distributed among all

the household heads so that no one is separated out as

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

201

being wealthier. Also, increases in joint flock size can
be channeled into jointly owned agricultural land, thus
maintaining ”average” flock size for the nomadic household
units. It is also possible that major expenditures, such
as brideprice needed by a younger male, will be taken from
the joint flock without economic differentiation of the
independent flock of the boy's father. Thus, the equal
share of all primary flock owners are reduced.

Table 6.2 shows that on—the—ground flock sizes (i.e.,
the flocks that are in the care of any given tent house-
hold), are quite different than those shown in Figure 6.1,
where flocks are divided among all the socially independent
owners of the joint flock. It is apparent that a number of
flocks have been consolidated and are under the care of one
shepherding family. This consolidation tends to take two
forms: 1) a dispersed economic household, or 2) a hired
shepherd with his own and his employer's stock.

Consolidation into a dispersed economic household

 

formation has the effect that others perceive an increase in
wealth for those who maintain the economic unity of the
family. This in turn affects the nature of intra-group in—
fluence and power. Table 6.2 shows that 84 percent of all
dispersed economic households fall in the upper range of
300+ animals. If, however, the joint flocks were divided
into their component parts, the individual owners would

not be considered wealthy, nor would they retain all of the

power that accrued to them as wealthy tireh members. All

 

 

 

 

 

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203

 

Kordshuli kadkhodas jointly own land and animals with other
family members. Individual ownership of specific animals or
specific plots of land is not recognized until the corporate
property is broken down into its component parts by economic
separation. Even before deposition of the kalantar, the
maintenance of this joint wealth by the kadkhoda's family
played an important role in defining their power within the
group. In those cases where one of a group of brothers has
separated from the others as both a social and economic
unit, he has lost power and influence except those gained
through his own personal qualities. It is likely that some
of the household units that will sedentarize in the near

future may attempt to emulate this approach to settlement,

 

not because they seek power but rather because they see that
it allows the maintenance of both the flock and the family
unit.

The consolidation of flocks that occurs when middle—
range or wealthy flock owners hire shepherds is much less
frequent; most of the Kordshuli do not like to hire shep—
herds and would rather care for their own flocks. When
these cases do occur, more influence does not accrue to the
shepherd in charge of a large flock because he does not have
access to the products of the larger flock. At any rate,
less than 10 percent of the flocks that are in the range of
300+ animals are of this type. In most of these cases, the
flock owner is an older man who has no sons and who feels it

is too difficult or tiring to watch the animals himself.

 

;_

 

 

 

 

204

 

What this consolidation accomplishes, then, is that the
older man may lessen his work load and that the shepherd
will reap the benefits of gaining access to better pastur-
age, of providing a better social environment for his small
flock allowing for improved productivity, and of maintain-
ing the desired lifestyle of a nomadic pastoralist.

The average flock size for the Kerdshuli is approxi-
mately 170 sheep and goats. This number contrasts greatly
to that given by Barth (1961) for the Basseri of 20 years
ago, a time when the Kordshuli claim they had considerably
more animals. Barth says that the average Basseri had less
than 100 animals. In this regard, then, the Kordshuli as
a unit are seen as relatively wealthy and productive
herders. Parviz Khan, son of the deposed kalantar of the
Basseri, told me that, "while the Basseri and 'Arab sleep,
the Kordshuli herd their sheep.” Still, there is a wide
range of average flock size among all the tigeh, as Figure
6.1 shows. The average flock size for Lori Jamshid is
only 81.1 animals, while that of the Xaleji is over 240
animals.

There is no direct relationship between these aver-
age flock sizes and the prospect of sedentarization. If,
however, there is some likelihood that the wealthiest and
poorest nomads are among those who may try to maintain the
nomadic pastoral adaptation, as I point out in thenext
chapter (Sedentarization), then we might expect there to be

some correlation between the poorest and wealthiest tirehs

 

 

 

 

 

 

205

Average flock size/household head

# of household

heads
Babamaleki 17 ----------------- 217.6
Arbabdar Kakakhan 60 —————————————— 189.2
Arbabdar Mirzajan 35 ———————— 131.4
Arbabdar Hajiboa 23 ---------- 150.9
Lori Almas 29 ————————————— 187.9
Lori Jamshid 26 —-—— 81.1
Xaleji 100 ---------------------- 242.3

Average 171.4

FIGURE 6.1 Average Flock Size in each Tireh

 

 

 

206

and the acceptability of sedentarization as a positive
option for the majority of the Eireh members. Subjectively,
this holds true for the two extreme averages; that is, more
household heads of Xaleji and Lori Jamshid expressed a
desire to remain nomadic than was generally the case for
other tirehs. Even here, however, more household heads
would like to sedentarize if they had the means.

Thus, this subjective correlation follows from the
fact that there are more individual wealthy household heads
in the Xaleji Eigeh, and more poor ones in Lori Jamshid, in
proportion to the sizes of the tirehs. That is, the choice
or decision to sedentarize is still primarily individual,
although it is the case that the actions of others in the
Eigeh may affect this decision. In those tirehs where
there has been a more immediate move toward sedentarization
by many of the families within the Eiggh, especially
evidenced through the purchase of land, other households in
the Eireh may follow suit and purchase land in the same
general region. In a few cases, it Was the direct
action by the kadkhoda in securing building— and land—
purchase loans that played a major role in decision—making
by many of the independent household heads.

While the previous discussion has focussed on flock
size, it should be noted that this variable of flock size
should not be viewed, primarily, as an independent variable,
but rather as a dependent variable that is a function of

available labor and pasturage. In most of the household

 

 

 

 

 

 

207

units, the labor needs of a pastoral nomadic existence are
adequately met. However, in households where labor is in
short supply, flock size is limited either by the ability
of the household unit to care for the animals or by its
ability to find and utilize extra-household labor sources.
Because of the cultural ideal of the independent household
unit, this latter option is rarely chosen by the Kordshuli.

When there is enough labor to meet the needs of the
flock and household, then access to pasturage becomes an
important variable in the regulation of flock size. Where
the number of animals and the average size of flocks are
prohibitively high to be maintained on the traditional
pasture areas of the Kordshuli tirehs, then it is necessary
to achieve a better overall distribution of animals through-
out Kordshuli territory. Traditionally, better distribution
of animals could be brought about by reallocation of
pastures by the kalantar, as well as by the activation of
affinal ties. With the deposition of the kalantar, it is
now affinal ties that allow for, at least, a minimal redis—
tribution of some of the flocks over the available pasture.
While most marriages take place within the Eigeh (cf.
chapter four), there are a number of cases where either
Eigeh or taifeh boundaries are crossed. With overcrowding
in a given area, either because of the number of households
and animals or because of adverse environmental conditions,
these ties, which are usually dormant, are activated.

Nonetheless, the final decision on extra—tireh pasture use

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

208

is made by the kadkhoda. A few households can activate
distant affinal ties with the kadkhoda himself; however,
most households who wish to use pasture land in another
tireh's area utilize direct links with affinal relatives in

that tireh. These relatives will try to help gain the

 

kadkhoda's permission to allow the additional household into
the area. If permission is given, the affinal relatives
camp and migrate together. Of course, the ability of the
kadkhoda to give permission of this kind is dependent on the
whims of the government; it is only because the government
allows the kadkhoda some leeway in the maintenance of
traditional pasture areas that this option even exists.
While this is a possible short-term solution to the
problem of overcrowding, it is not often used by the
Kordshuli. Ideal residence patterns are virilocal and it
is considered culturally inapprOpriate, especially among
the less educated, for a man to move away from his tigeh.
In many of the cases where this move has taken place, the
household heads consider themselves good friends as much as
affinal relatives. It is, in many cases, more acceptable

to choose to camp with a friend than with an extra—tireh

 

relative.

If none of these means result in a better overall
distribution of animals, other mechanisms such as intra—
group conflict or sedentarization are likely to come into
play to decrease effective pOpulation density. However,

because of governmental influence and intervention,

 

 

 

 

 

209

intra-group conflict can no longer effectively work to
disperse the animal population. Sedentarization, obviously,
is one of the few Viable options left. Of course, it is
possible that any given household might rid itself of a
number of animals to ease the pressure, but this can only
work for those households that have a surplus. This would
rarely occur, since most of the Kordshuli feel that as long
as the flock can be maintained there really are no surplus
animals. The point is that while this latter option,
getting rid of animals, seems to be an easy solution to the
problem of overcrowding, it is neither a very acceptable nor
a desirable way to alleviate the problem.

In this chapter I have discussed some of the changes
that have occurred within the Kordshuli as a result of the
shift from a more—or-less independent existence to an
existence based on State control of both the tribe and
needed resources. This shift has had a strong impact on
the choices that individual Kordshuli households make with
regard to choosing a nomadic or settled existence. The
impact of these economic shifts, as well as the impact of
the political shifts discussed in the previous chapter, will

be examined more fully in the next chapter.

 

 

 

CHAPTER VII
SEDENTARIZATION

In the preceding chapters, I examined many of the
changes among the Kordshuli that have undermined at all
levels the viability of this group, politically, economical-
ly, and socially. Many of these shifts have led to the in—_
creased possibility or probability of sedentarization as
one of the only viable options to satisfy the nomad’s im—
mediate needs and to reduce the anxiety and difficulty of a
nomadic pastoral existence.

This chapter will examine futher the direct relation—
ship between political and economic shifts among the
Kordshuli and the process of sedentarization. Sedentari—
zation, here, refers primarily to behavior which restricts
or eliminates migratory activity. In the case of pastoral
nomadism it also usually implies a concomitant reduction in
pastoral activities, although this is as much a function of
ecological and economic necessity as it is of choice. For
example, the nomadic strain of sheep that is herded by the
Kordshuli do not fare well when forced to remain in one
temperature extreme for an extended period of time (Barth
1961: 6). So, when the nomads settle, they are forced to

reduce their flocks in order to reduce animal mortality. It

210

 

 

 

211

is necessary to keep in mind that while there is an absolute
form of sedentarization where nomads settle and retain no
direct contact with nomadism or nomads, there are many
variations of the process which fall on a nomadic/sedentary
continuum. ."For any nomadic pOpulation, settlement and, to
a lesser degree, nomadization are ongoing processes" (Beck
1978: 2).

A brief review of the literature would show that
many of the studies on pastoral nomads more often include
the variants that fall toward the nomadic end of the
continuum (of. Irons and Dyson-Hudson 1972, Spooner, 1973,
Anthropological Quarterly 1971). There is a lacuna in the
same literature when it comes to mentioning sedentarization
(but see, e.g., Swidler 1973). Usually, only the complete
abandonment of migratory behavior receives attention because
of the explicitness of the cultural and social changes which,
take place. Also, more often the focus is on the individual
(i.e., the family), than the group, although both forms of
sedentarization have occurred frequently throughout the
Middle East. A number of permutations, based on temporal
and spatial aspects of nomadism, also occur, but are rarely

considered.

Barth's Model of Sedentarization

 

One of the more important studies of pastoral nomads
that attempts to deal directly with the sedentarization
process is Fredrik Barth's (1961) study of the Basseri of

southern Iran, Nomads of South Persia. This work has served

 

 

 

 

 

as a major stimulus not only for this research, but for many

other studies on nomadic pastoralists as well. Although

the subject of sedentarization had been broached elsewhere,

either directly as an administrative problem of central

governments (of. UNESCO 1959) or indirectly as an aside in

the social structure studies of East African pastoral

groups (of. Spencer 1965, Gulliver 1955, Stenning 1959),

it was Barth who set the stage for many of the more recent

studies of nomads, particularly in the Middle East. I have

chosen to focus on Barth for two reasons. First, Barth

considers his work to be of comparative utility:
Since the relevant features of the environment, and
most of the cultural premises current among the Basseri,
seem to have a wide distribution in Fars and adjoining
areas, the processes which affect nomadic life else-
where in South Persia should be essentially similar to
those observed among the Basseri (1961: 123).

Second, Barth's study of the Basseri has had a great impact

on studies of pastoral nomads. Although Barth's study was

conducted over twenty years ago, even the most recent works

on nomads use Barth's model as a springboard for comparison

(cf. Beck 1980: 327; Salzman 1980: 12; Tapper 1979: 244).

 

The fact that his model of sedentarization has been implicit—
ly accepted makes it worthy of reconsideration. If Barth's
model of sedentarization is accurate, is of comparative
value, or is still applicable, it should apply to the
Kordshuli, whose cultural and geographical boundaries are

contiguous with those of the Basseri.

 

 

 

 

213

Barth's model is based on his understanding of the
characteristics of the pastoral form of capital. This form
of capital has four features, which he says have fundamental
implications for both social and economic organization of
the nomadic group and, therefore, indirectly for sedentari—
zation. The four features are:

(a) essentially all productive capital is in consumable
(b) :O:$gnificant fraction of the income is in the form
of capital gains ,
(0) there is a continual risk of total or partial loss
of capital
(d) the rate of income decreases with increased
capital (Barth 1964: 70, 71).
A basic assumption is that, for a nomadic pastoral herding
unit, be it a single household or any group of households,
there is a range of functional stability in terms of flock
size. This range is dependent on access to variable
resources; pasture, water, and land. Above this range of
functional stability, relative productivity and rate of
income decrease; below this range, the pastoral adaptation
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. If the
limits of this ”range of stability” are broached, sedentari—
zation is likely to occur. ”Sedentarization is the normal
result of great capital accumulation, or capital losses”
(Barth 1964: 77; emphasis mine). This process is diagram—
matically indicated in Figure 7.1.

The two aspects of Barth's model have been character—

ized elsewhere as the ”failure and fall—away” model and the

”succeed and surpass" model (Salzman 1980: 12). I will

examine, in turn, each of these aspects of the model to

 

 

 

|____#

214

sedentarization (wealthy

 

I,” landowner)
, /’
max1mum /r
herd //
size increased ,/ land
consumptio purchase upper crisis

   
   

Z0119

T

I.
Irange of

 

 

 

 

 

 

/ stability
/
+
lower crisis non- aid from
zone gpastoralist other
. . r s urc s t ralis s
minimum e 0 e Phi O t
herd \
size
N sedentarization
Time + (wage or farm

laborer)

FIGURE 7.1 Sedentarization through capital loss or
accumulation (after Vandervert 1972)

determine the applicability of the model not only in rela-
tion to the Kordshuli, but also in relation to the group;fixr
which it was devised, the Basseri. That is, is Barth's

model even a fair assessment of Basseri reality?

”Succeed or Surpass” Model

 

Barth points out that as a resglt of the attention
focused on the well—being of the flock, the major portion of
a nomad’s labor is given to the care of his animals. When
his flock exceeds his family's subsistence needs, the rate
of growth of the flock tends to increase. Thus, if there
are a number of successive good years, the flocks of some
of the tribesfolk may grow to 200 to 800 head (Barth 1961:

103). However, at this point, as indicated in (d) above,

 

 

 

215

“it is a characteristic feature of wealth in herds that its
net productivity rate for the owner declines as the size of
the herds increases” (ibid.: 107). Barth says that this
occurs primarily because of the herding and management
techniques practiced by the Basseri (1961: 103; 1964: 71).
Since a single shepherd cannot adequately care for
a flock of more than about 400 animals, the owner of a very
large flock must, therefore, divide his flock and entrust
shepherding duties to other persons. In fact, Barth points
out, ”since shepherding is a strenuous and exacting occupa-
tion, owners of herds larger than about 200 animals already
_tend to hire a shepherd” (1964: 71). The greater the
number of animals, the less effective is the owner‘s super-
vision of his shepherds and, as a result,
the less the flocks are under the owner's constant
supervision, the more he will be cheated out of his
profits while made to carry real or fictitious losses.
Shepherds can . . . and . . . inevitably will be more
careless of their master's flock than they would of
their own; they can sell livestock and claim the ani-
mals have been lost, pocketing the profits; if they
have some animals of their own, they can provide them
with lambs of other ewes in case of accident at lambing;
they will consume part of the product of the herd, and
sell part, claiming that production has been low, etc.
etc. (1961: 103).
Barth also points out in this regard that the flock is sub~
ject to unpredictable fluctuations and severe losses in
years of natural catastrophe. Such losses can average as
much as 50 percent in some years. The riSk of loss increases

when the flock is under the less watchful eye of hired

shepherds.

 

 

 

216

Using the above argument, Barth draws the conclusion
that "as a herd—owner's wealth grows, there are thus growing
economic incentives for him to transfer a part of his capi—
tal to another form than wealth in herds—~that is, to a form
in which it gives a greater marginal profit” (e.g., carpets,
jewelry, and especially land)(ibid.:'103—104). This trans—
formation of capital leading to possible sedentarization

”happens with considerable frequency” (ibid.: 106; emphasis

 

mine).

Before I present additional aspects and consequences
of this part of the model of sedentarization, it is necessary
to comment on some of the conceptual and empirical diffi—
culties that are raised by the preceding argument for the
Basseri. Barth's point that net productivity rate decreases
with increasing flock size is based primarily on his argu—
ment that non—familial shepherds are generally untrustworthy.
However, to accept this as a significant variable in a pro—
cess which happens with ”considerable frequency,” we should
expect it to be a standard practice among the Basseri. In
contrast, Barth makes the point that ”less than one house-
hold in ten has the means to employ outside labour (non—
familial shepherds) in this way (as an addition to, yet
separate from, the family unit)” (ibid.: 21; parentheses
mine). More importantly, ”to facilitate the herding and
tending of the flocks, Basseri households usually unite in
groups of 2-5 tents. These combine their flocks and entrust

them to a single shepherd” who is a member of one of these

 

 

 

 

 

 

217

households (ibid.: 21-22; emphasis mine).

Perhaps, then, Barth has overstated the case for
sedentarization brought on partially by declining rates of
productivity. Elsewhere he has noted that ”cases of
sedentarization through capital accumulation and land pur—
chase are by the nature of things relatively rare, and my
material for the above description consists mainly of a
handful of life histories” (1964: 78). He, in fact, admits
that he has ”no reliable data on the numerical frequency
of sedentarization as a result of capital accumulation, as
compared to the frequency of rapid fragmentation and redis-
tribution of such wealth” (1961: 107). Perhaps Barth does
not have reliable data on other aspects of the process
either!

We are further led to question Barth's conclusions
because of his seeming inability to differentiate actual
from ideal behavior. As I mentioned above, Barth says that
”all attention become focused on the well-being of the herd”
(1961: 102) and that ”a major part of the nomad's labour is
thus invested in the care of the flocks” (ibid.: 103). If
it is indeed the case that ”boys down to the age of 6 are
therefore frequently used as shepherds, while married men
only exceptionally do such work,” then this attention seems
less strongly directed than Barth implies (ibid.: 16).
Likewise, if the Basseri household head is so concerned with
his flock and at the same time aware that a hired shepherd

will be a problem, then why does he hire a shepherd for a

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

......-

218

flock of 200 head when ”the increased work involved in
shepherding a flock say of 300 instead of 100 is negligible"
(1964: 74)? ‘

Another assumption that must be questioned is

 

whether or not the nomad is concerned with the ”greater
marginal profit" that might be brought from capital in a

form other than animals. Barth makes the point that

 

the limiting factor on his [the nomad's] income is thus
the size of his privately owned flocks; any increase in
them brings a rich return in increased profits har—
vested from the communally owned pastures. The immense
interest in conserving and increasing the herds which
is characteristic of the Basseri——as apparently of most
nomadic peOple——thus has an economic justification
(Barth 1961: 101; emphasis mine).

 

 

Is the individual nomad more concerned with the smaller
marginal profit that accrues to him based on the pOSSibility
of a declining rate of net productivity than he is with
maintaining a flock of a size adequate to resist decimation
brought about as a result of periodic fluctuations in
drought, disease, and predation? For the Kordshuli, the
answer would be no! Barth, in fact, is not convincing in

his argument that the rate of net productivity does, in fact,

 

decline, since he bases it on the effects of herding and

management techniques which, according to Barth himself, are

 

not very common. Indeed, when the size of the flock sur—
passes 460 head, it may be the case that the nature of
flock care must change. However, data are not presented
which allow one to relate household developmental stage with
flock size. That is, how many households that have large

flocks also have sons who can care for the animals in

 

 

lg

 

219

conjunction with the primary shepherd? If shepherding is
done by family members, should we expect a comparable
decline in the rate of net productivity, and, if so, on what
basis should it occur? According to the data Barth has
presented, there should be no reason to expect a comparable
decline. Also, although the rate of net productivity may
decline (giving that assumption to Barth), there is still a
continued increase in overall productivity. If maximization
of flocks is a goal that is economically justified (see
quotation above), then why does Barth assume a model based
on the idea of marginal profits? That is, if the nomadic
pastoralist is more interested in marginal profits than in
the maintenance of his flock, then it would seem that there
should be more cases of sedentarization through capital
accumulation than there are. At this point, Barth might
bring in those ”features of Basseri organization which
prevent [sedentarization due to capital accumulation] from
becoming the predominant pattern” (1961: 106).
Barth points out that a number of factors tend to
inhibit capital accumulation in the form of large flocks:
e—accidental capital losses, differential consumption
rates and the diversion of labour from pastoral pro-
duction, accelerated division of household and capital,
polygyny and increased family size without correspond-
ing reduction of the inheritance shares of elder sons--
these all act together to inhibit the concentration of
wealth in the form of large herds” (1964: 76—77).
While it is impossible to judge accurately the effects of

these factors on the Basseri, it will be useful, in terms

of the comparative value of the model, to see how effective

 

 

 

 

 

 

220

they are in regulating flock size among the Kordshuli. If
. these mechanisms help to forestall or prevent sedentariza-
tion among the Basseri, then we should expect them to play
a comparable role among the Kordshuli. That is, are they
effective in keeping a Kordshuli household from entering
what may be called the ”upper crisis zone" (see Figure 7.1)?

The ”upper crisis zone” (of. Vandervert 1972) is
entered when the accumulation of wealth continues to accel-
erate at an eVer-increasing rate, so that more and more of
this wealth is siphoned for land purchase. ”The greater
these interests in land are, the more the owner becomes
motivated to supervise and control his property” until he
becomes a sedentary landowner (Barth 1961: 105—106). As we
examine the effects of the abovementioned factors, I will
show that the concept of an ”upper crisis zone” is ill—
conceived and does little to increase our understanding of

sedentarization at all economic levels.

Upper Crisis Zone

 

Accidental Capital Losses: While it is true that

 

 

”epidemics, famines, and losses of young animals in case of
late frost may all strike as sudden disasters and reduce the
herd in a fashion which is unpredictable” (Barth 1964: 75),
this factor must be considered tangential to Barth's central
argument or, in some cases, be considered the primary factor
in bringing about sedentarization rather than forestalling
it. It is tangential in most cases since Barth's capital

accumulation model is based on the assumption of ”a

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

221

succession of good years" (1961: 103). That is, if the
flocks do not have the necessary time to reproduce to "large
flock” status, then the model does not begin to work.

At the other extreme, when the flock owner has been
accumulating animal capital for some time, and transforming
it into land, then accidental capital losses ”seem to be a
common precipitating factor which drives [wealthy land-
owning nomads] to the village” (1964: 78; also see 1961:
106). It seems unlikely, although not impossible, that this
loss of animals, which averages ”as much as 50% in some
disaster years” (1961: 103), is a primary cause for settling
down by these wealthy nomads. Most of these men/families
are likely to have large flocks even after investing in land.
A loss of even 50 percent would still leave most of them
wealthy flock owners. In fact, according to Kordshuli in—
formants, it is precisely for this reason—-accidental capi-
tal loss--that maximization of flocks is rational economic
behavior; if a flock owners loses half of his flock, yet
still can continue to meet and, perhaps, surpass household
needs, then he is successful.

It is, of course, possible that the flock can grow
quite large, yet the flock owner invests in little or no
land. Barth gives us no idea of how large a flock might be
when the flock owner begins to invest in land, except that
as ”great herd-owners" they have ”flocks of 200 to 800 head,
and a few even more" (1961: 103). Certainly for some of
these herd—owners a loss of up to 50 percent would inhibit

the upward spiral of capital accumulation. However, for

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

222

those nomads who own 400 or more head, the effects of capi-
tal loss would decrease with increasing flock size. Even
with the figures that Barth gives for capital replacement
and capital gains, it seems that the set backs suffered
would be short-lived or not effective in reducing flocks
below some critical point in the model:
To maintain the full capital value of the herd, about
15 percent of the lambs must thus be set aside each
year to ensure replacement of the stock; the remaining
female lambs and a proportionate fraction of male lambs
may be regarded as capital gains and give a possible
capital increase rate of nearly 40 percent per annum
(1964: 71).
Thus, many of these great flock owners would need only two
years or less to recoup their losses and regain their pre—
vious economic status. The effect of accidental capital
loss, then, is minimal at best. It affects only a very
small range of flock owners at only very specific times
during the growth cycle of their flock.
For the Kordshuli and, I suspect, for the Basseri,
the maintenance of the flock is of primary importance. A
Kordshuli man might invest in land as flock growth continues
but he would not threaten the viability of the flock by
overinvesting in land. Barth says that capital losses occur
”which . . . the herd owner cannot anticipate in his stock
management” (1964: 75). I would argue that the Basseri
flock owner, like the Kordshuli flock owner, is always aware
of the fact that severe cases of accidental capital loss can

occur. Larger flocks gained through attempts at maximizing

flock growth are the result of a management technique which

 

 

 

 

223

 

can offset of minimize the effect of these losses.

Differential Consumption Rates and the Diversion of

 

Labour from Pastoral Production: Barth points out that

 

capital accumulation is inhibited by controls implicit in
Basseri consumption patterns, which have greater effects as
flock size increases:

The household with larger herds . . . increases its
consumption of luxuries and foodstuffs--that is lambs,
as well as tea, sugar, rice, etc.(1964: 75—76).

Furthermore, more and more of the labor of a wealthy house-
hold is directed away from pastoral production:

the men require greater leisure, and their efforts are
taken up by training and tending horses, hunting, and
political activity; the women weave and tie rugs (which
are never marketed); and the increased weight of house-
hold belongings and larger tents requires more beasts
of burden, including camels, which again means a need
for a separate camel herder. All these activities and
persons depend on the herd without significantly contri-
buting to its care and production; their presence will
serve as a brake on the rate of herd increase (ibid.:
76; emphasis mine).

It is not unlikely that wealthier households do in—

 

crease consumption of luxuries. However, Barth provides
little or no data that shows the transition from ”people of
fair means” who ”continue to deny themselves all luxuries”

(1961: 102) to wealthy nomads who choose to consume more.

 

It is also the case among the Kordshuli that the wealthier
families do tend to purchase more goods. This increased
consumption has little effect on their wealth in animals,
except in extreme cases where the effect is very short—
lived. There are a few major expenditures that can consid—

erably affect the size of the flock. For example, a number

   

 

 

 

 

224

of young men have purchased motorcycles and one headman's
family has purchased an automobile (discussed later in this
chapter). Increasing wealth for these families merely gives
them greater access to resources, be they land or luxury
goods. These expenditures are not part of any conscious
effort to reduce flock size but rather are activated only
when the nomad feels secure in his ability to provide for
himself and his family with fewer stock.

The second prOposition, that productive labor is
diverted from the pastoral Sphere, seems, at the least, to
be overstated. While it is true that the men probably de—
sire greater leisure, it is hardly a requirement of wealth.
Unless the Basseri are quite different than the Kordshuli,
it is also unlikely that the increase in household belongings
will require many, if any, extra pack animals. More impor-
tantly, the members of a wealthy family, at least among the
Kordshuli, while they may divert some of their activities
from the pastoral sphere, are still available as a labor
source when needed: the men for migration, lamb feeding and
milking; the women for all the normal.domestic tasks as well
as migration and milking. Generally, it would seem that
this factor is not very effective in reducing flock size for
very many households.

Accelerated Division of Household and Capital:

 

 

Barth (1964: 76; also 1961: 106—107) makes the point that
”greater wealth also generally leads to an earlier fragmen—

tation of the household” since marriage age for the sons of

 

 

 

 

 

225

wealthy nomads is 18 to 20, while in poorer households it
may be much later. This earlier marriage leads to earlier
dispersal of the household's capital because a man receives
a share of his father's flock as anticipatory inheritance
when he marries. For this practice to be effective in in-
hibiting capital accumulation, a number of factors must,
through some coincidence, occur in conjunction with each
other. The number of sons, the proximity of their ages, the
actual size of the flock, the reproductive capacity of the
flock, environmental shifts, and the like, would all affect
the rate of flock growth.

Barth also makes other assumptions which need not
always hold true. Because the sons of wealthy nomads marry
between the ages of 18 and 20, it is not necessarily true
that ”within about twenty years of his own marriage, the
dispersal of the successful herder's flock commences, giving
only a brief period of accumulation for the wealthy” (1964:
74; emphasis mine). This, of course, is true only of those
men who have a male child within the first year or two of
marriage. The assumption, also, is that 20 years is a short
period of time. This leads one to question what Barth means
by a ”succession of good years" (1961: 107) leading to
accumulation of animal capital. Another assumption is that
there is ”an early loss of the cheap and dependable labour
represented by adult, unmarried sons” (1964: 76). However,
for the practice of anticipatory inheritance to be effective

as a means of reducing flock size for any length of time,

 

 

 

 

 

226

one must assume a number of sons differing in age by no more
than a few years. If this is the case, “the marriage of the
last son is usually delayed . . . so the son can become head
of the new household in which the old parent(s) are permit-
ted to live” (ibid.: 75). Thus, labor may be available
throughout much of the life of the wealthy flock owner.

The point that I am making is not that Barth's
scenario does not occur, but rather that it is dependent on
a number of additional factors and, thus, is irregular and
probably infrequent. If the critical factors are present,
it would indeed seem that the patrimony a son receives at
his wedding could affect the economic position of his father
by seriously reducing flock size. HOwever, unlike the
Basseri, the Kordshuli do not usually divide the flock until
actual social separation, a year or more after marriage.
While the Kordshuli do say that the division takes place at
the time of marriage, it is unusual for the father to
specify which of the animals will go to the son. Among the
Basseri, the actual specification of animals takes place at
the time of marriage and the division of property is based
on the total number of animals at that time (Barth 1961: 19),
Among the Kordshuli, the son's share of the flock is more
often calculated at the time of actual separation. If the
flock size increases while the son and his wife remain a
part of his father's household, then he will receive a
greater number of animals when he does separate. If

additional male children are born before separation they

 

 

 

 

 

 

227

will not necessarily receive or have reserved a share
equal to that of the older son. It is possible that the
addition of another child will decrease the number of ani—
mals the marrying son will receive; but it will not be
directly proportional to the number of sons, since the
father expects the size of his flock to increase before the
young son grows up. If the separation of the married son
from his natal household will adversely affect the ability
of either the son or father to maintain a pastoral nomadic
existence, then it is likely that the son will remain in
the household unit until flock size allows for a better dis—
tribution of animals.

There are a number of cases among the Kordshuli
where the son has separated from his natal household with
barely adequate resources. This is most often caused by
quarrels between father and son, or between the wives of
father and son, or the wives of brothers. While the
Kordshuli say that they expect wives to argue because of
their desire to control their own domestic Spheres, it is
unusual and culturally disapproved for a father and son to
quarrel. As with most behavior that goes against the ideal,
they say it is ugly (zesht—e). At any rate, the effect of
anticipatory inheritance is usually not great enough to
drastically effect wealth. While it may produce a short—
term solution to the problems of an increasing flock size,
the effects continue to be functional in this regard only

in those families that have many sons who differ only

 

 

228

slightly in age, since llock growth is quite rapid. It
should be noted that it is unlikely that this implies any
conscious attempt to reduce flock size. If wealthy flock
owners were concerned with declining rates of productivity,
it seems more likely that they would not hold on to sole—
ownership and management of the flock until the social
separation of their married sons.

Polygyny and Problems of Inheritance: It is possible

 

 

that polygyny affects capital accumulation; however, to
adequately judge its effect, it is necessary to be more pre-
cise than Barth, who says only that ”it is common for wealthy
herd owners to contract plural marriages” (1964: 76). I
question this assumption only because polygyny is rarely
practiced by the Kordshuli. Among the Kordshuli there are
but a handful of men who have two wives and no man has more
than two wives. All of these men are extremely Wealthy by
Kordshuli standards. They all own land and are part of dis—
persed economic households or they practice marginal nomad—
ism (to be discussed later in this chapter). At least two
of the men married a second wife because the first was
barren. In these two cases, the men had been married to the
first wives approximately 20 years before they made the
decision to marry a second time. In only one of the poly—
gynous marriages did the man marry his second wife for
”love” (egg), in the opinion of other Kordshuli. The other
men who have married two wives married their second wife

with the acceptance, and sometimes urging of the senior wife

}

 

 

 

 

 

229

to provide an addition to the household labor force after
children had moved out. Although brideprice was greater for
the second wife than for the first, it did not affect the
wealth or perceived wealth of any of these men. That is, in
the Opinion of other Kordshuli, these men remained wealthy
and had investments in land and luxury goods already estab—
lished.

Barth (ibid.) also says that polygynous marriages
will sap more of a man's wealth because extended fecundity
means he will have to support more unproductive children for
a longer period of time. Also, because of anticipatory
inheritance, marrying sons will receive ”too large” shares
of their father's estate. In none of these polygynous
unions among the Kordshuli did either of these possible
limitations play an important role. Additional unproductive
children did not seem to place a burden on the household's
wealth and all of the men involved felt that their flocks
would grow to an acceptable size between the marriage of
eldest and youngest sons.

These factors, then, which Barth says ”are not
completely effective checks on the accumulation of wealth”
(1964: 77), play an even smaller role among the Kordshuli.
While any or all of these factors may inhibit capital ac—
cumulation by one household, they are not very useful for
understanding, at a group level, why some nomads settle and
others do not. If these factors are not working to inhibit

capital accumulation among the Kordshuli, then it would seem

 

 

 

230

that there should be many more Kordshuli investing in land,
and as a result many more sedentarizing as land owners.
There are, indeed, a number of wealthy Kordshuli who
have purchased land. However, contra Barth, these men do
not necessarily, or naturally, settle on it. Most of these
families have chosen to maintain their flocks through the
formation of dispersed economic households (discuSsed later
in this chapter) or by ”hiring” sharecroppers while continu—
ing to shepherd their own flocks. Most of the KOrdshuli
informants who have owned land for some length of time say
that they first purchased agricultural land to offset the
rising price of, or impeded access to, grain. Those who
built houses a number of years ago say they did it as a
response to drought conditions.' More importantly, many of
these families have lived in these houses during extremely
dry years (e.g., 1962—1964) and then have begun to migrate
again when conditions improved. These choices imply that,
for most, there is a greater desire to maintain their flocks
than to give in to the demands of their investment in land.
This is not the case for the wealthy Basseri man.
According to Barth's model, once the wealthy nomad has
invested in land and has erected a house, his concerns for
these matters increase, as does his desire for sedentary
comforts (1964: 78). He seems to have little choice but to
accept this "reluctant upward mobility” (1961: 111). Thus,
Barth, who has allowed the Basseri great economic SOphisti-

cation in determining profit margins and investment

 

 

 

 

 

 

231

practices, does not allow them the same level of SOphisti-
cation in recognizing the outcome of this "natural”
sedentarization process. For the Basseri, as for the
Kordshuli, ”sedentarization is never regarded as an ideal
among the nomads” (1964: 77). Further, in support of the
Kordshuli position stated above,”there is . . . no feeling
that land purchase implies sedentarization” (ibid.). Unfor—
tunately, the Basseri are seemingly not very far-sighted
since ”only towards the very end [of the gradual process of
land accumulation] do informants see sedentarization as its
natural end result” (ibid.: 78; emphasis mine).

Based on my knowledge of the Kordshuli, as well as
on discussions with some Basseri household heads, I feel
that Barth's point that land purchase does not necessarily
lead to sedentarization is more appropriate than his con-
trary position that the upward spiral of capital accumula—
tion will inevitably lead to sedentarization. There is no
doubt that some wealthy Basseri (and Kordshuli) have settled
on their own land. However, I do not think that it was
ownership of land that led to sedentarization, but rather it
was the desire (or need) to sedentarize that was eased by
prior ownership of land. If Barth had been able to gather
more direct data on both settled and nomadic Basseri, he
probably would have found an equivalent number of "middle
range” nomads who had also settled on their own land.
Certainly, many of these men would have had to sell all or

most of their animals in order to purchase either

 

 

 

 

 

232

agricultural or residential prOperty. However, the reasons
for choosing this action are probably comparable for both
groups. Amanolahi (1976) has indicated some of the push/
pull factors which have led many Basseri to settle in an
urban setting. Most of these reasons apply primarily to
poorer nomads, but there are some that can, and probably do,
apply to the 23 percent of Amanolahi's survey who owned
land prior to urban settlement (sample = 273 household
heads). These reasons are: inability to continue nomadism
(due to old age or debilitating injury or illness);
education for children; and comforts of city life. There
are also social, political and ecological reasons why any
nomad might settle that have little or nothing to do with
flock size at the time the decision is made.
It seems obvious that one of the major problems with
Barth's analysis is that it does not take into account the
total cultural context of Basseri life.
What is interesting, and perhaps surprising, to a
social anthropologist is the fact that it should be,
possible at all to show their Ithe characteristics of
pastoral capital] social implications by a discussion
involving relatively few 'cultural' facts-—that the
processes by which they are made relevant to social
action and features of a local social system seem to
implicate few of the other basic premises of Basseri
culture (Barth 1964: 81).
It seems, rather, that Barth sought to eXplain by his model
two general perceptions of Basseri existence—~that the
”total tribal pOpulation is and has been in approximate

demographic balance" (1961: 116) and that the Basseri

”constitute a population of striking social homogeneity”

 

 

 

 

 

233

due to the maintenance of general economic homogeneity
(1964: 75).

While further comments at this point serve as a cri4
tique of the entire model, I feel it is useful to examine
briefly these perceptions. I have chosen not to present the
”failure and fall-away” part of the model until after the
discussion, since it appears in mostways to be more accu—
rate than the capital accumulation model. That is, there
are real constraints on the poor nomad that can force him
out of the nomadic system. These same kinds of pressures
do not exist for the wealthy nomad.

The perception of demographic balance implies that
there are processes which can drain off a major fraction of
any natural p0pulation increase. These processes are
necessary if demographic balance is to be maintained, since
Barth posits a trebling of the nomadic population every
three to four decades (1961: 115). The two processes that
accomplish this fact are emigration and sedentarization
(ibid.: 116). Barth downplays the role of emigration when
he points out that because of possible in—migration it is
difficult to ascertain the net effects of these movements
(i.e., whether they increase or decrease pOpulation pres—
sure). Thus, sedentarization becomes the more important
process in explaining demographic balance.

Rather than enter upon a prolonged discussion of these
points, I wish only to briefly comment on them. First, I

believe that Barth's figure of an average 7.2 live members

 

 

 

 

 

 

234

per sibling group (ibid.: 115) is too high for the tribe as
a whole. His data are from the section which comprises the
chief's retinue. That is, this section is more likely to
have had continual access to good pastures as well as to
possible assistance from the chief in times of crisis.
While the rate of increase for the Basseri, and for the
Kordshuli, may indeed be high when cOmpared to rural village
populations, it seems more likely, based on Kordshuli data,
‘that it is considerably less than Barth supposes. Thus,
with a more moderate pOpulation increase, the intensity of
sedentarization need not be so great. Also, if emigration
plays even a minimal role in alleviating pOpulation pres-
sure (as I would argue it did in the past for the Kordshuli)
then sedentarization, while still important, need not be the
overwhelming phenomenon that Barth's data implies.

Barth's perception that sedentarization is the most
important means of nomadic population control raises the
questions of who is actually settling and why. Barth finds
the answers to these questions manifested in the ”striking
social homogeneity” of the Basseri (1964: 75). Barth argues
that this social homogeneity is the result of economic homo-
geneity which, in turn, occurs because certain economic
features (commented on earlier in this chapter): 1) inhibit
wealth concentration and thus work against the emergence of
status differences based on wealth, and 2) tend to encourage
sedentarization of those who differ significantly in wealth

from the average (ibid.). While this latter point may be

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

235

true for impoverished nomads (as I will point out below), I
have already argued against it for wealthy nomads.

The social homogeneity that Barth perceives for the
Basseri is also generally true for the Kordshuli. However,
as I pointed out earlier, wealth concentration for the
Kordshuli is not necessarily inhibited to any great degree.

Thus, there can be a wide range of economic variation ex—

 

pressed through flock size. The range in size of flocks
belonging to men who engage only in nomadic pastoralism is
from 50 to 800 head. I think it likely that had Barth been

able to collect data from a reasonable sample of Basseri

 

households he would have found a comparable range of flock
sizes. Among the Kordshuli, there are some men who have
more social status for a variety of reasons (see chapter
five), but most Kordshuli household heads occupy roughly

the equivalent status of independent, economically self-
sufficient (within the pastoral sphere) flock owner. All
have the same relatively unimpeded access to pasture because
of their membership in one of the named sections (tireh) of
the Kordshuli. The point is that social homogeneity can
exist in the presence of economic heterogeneity if the values
of the society are such that households from various

economic categories have access to pastures.

 

In my Opinion, Barth became trapped in his attempt
to understand and eXplain demographic balance and his per—
ception of social qua economic homogeneity by his use of an

over—simplistic non—contextual model of sedentarization.

 

 

 

 

 

 

236

While sedentarization plays a role in both of these situa-
tions, there are a number of other cultural variables which
he virtually ignores. The ”upper crisis zone” is not a
powerful vortex which sucks wealthy nomads into the abyss
of inevitable sedentarization. Rather, increased wealth
leads to increased Options in terms of production diversity,
investment practices, and the like. The ”succeed and sur—
pass" model obscures the reality of the situation and, thus,
is counterproductive for understanding change and structure

in pastoral nomadic society.

”Failure and Fall-Away” Model

 

This model stems from the same principle as the
”succeed and surpass” model—-that is, if the size of any
individual's flock falls outside the ”range Of stability”
(see Figure 7.1), then sedentarization is likely to occur.
In this case, those pastoral nomads who fail to maintain a
viable household productive unit, and thus cannot support
themselves and their families through pastoralism, "fall-
away” from the pastoral nomadic sector and must seek employ-
ment in the sedentary agricultural or urban wage—labor
sectors (cf. Salzman 1980: 12). The process, according to
Barth, is very simply explained:

accident, sickness or poor management of a small herd
leads to losses, and thus to an annual production be—
low what is required for the purchase of food and
clothing. But the herd itself is a large food store,
and hunger easily drives the nomad to invade this his
only productive capital, reducing the pastoral output
further, in a vicious circle. The only alternative is

to seek additional sources of income . . . mainly found
in sedentary society . . . But frequently such work

 

 

 

 

237

disturbs the nomad' S migratory cycle, and thus
leads only to reduced pastoral production and further
animal losses . The Basseri feel that once a house—

hold s flock falls Significantly below the minimal
level of sixty adult head

this downward spiral is
pretty ineVitable and quite rapid (1964 78)

The equivalent process obtains among the Kordshuli

since
they, like the Basseri,

are highly individuated with a low
level of corporateness

few solidarity groups and limited
mutual support structures (cf Salzman 1980: 12). Thus, if
disaster strikes there is no place to turn for even limited
assistance.

The mechanisms to compensate for loss of flocks

which come into play in an attempt to forestall or reverse
the trend toward sedentarization

are summarized by Barth
reduced consumption

debts at interest rates appre—
ciably lower than the rate of production of pastoral
capital, postponement of the normal process of sub-

diViSion and multiplication of households by the mar-
riage of sons

and occaSional shepherding of animals
Of others on advantageous terms (1961 111)

How aifective are these mechanisms in keeping the nomadic

household from entering the ”lower criSis zone

(see Figure
7.1)? The ”lower crisis zone”

is the range of flock sizes
where productiVity is too low to support the household unit

and where the downward spiral of capital loss draws the
nomad further away from the pastoral nomadic sector until
he is eventually integrated into the sedentary community in
the status of propertyless villager (Barth 1961 109) For
the Basseri, it would seem, these mechanisms are not very
effective——”Sedentarization through impoverishment

is
a constant threat for many and has.a high empirical frequency,

 

 

 

 

238

of the order of one person in every three in the groups of
my censuses" (1964; 78).

Lower Crisis Zone

Reduced Consumption: While this mechanism may fore-
stall sedentarization for a while,

it can not be maintained
long if flock productivity does not increase.

If cOntinued
impoverished conditions lead to increased consumption of

pastoral capital, then the nomad and his family will be un—
able to maintain a pastoral nomadic adaptation.

That is,
decreased consumption of goods and resources can only be

suffered for a limited time, and thus is not an effective
long—term solution to the problem of decreasing capital.

This is as true for the Kordshuli as it is for the Basseri.

Low Interest Debts: Barth says that the carrying of
large debts from one year to the next is the first stage in
the downward spiral leading toward sedentarization.

If debts
and/or interests are too great, then the herder is forced to

invade his productive stock (1961: 108).

The problem of
large debts seems to be a problem only if there is a succes—
sion of bad years;

”nomads often succeed in recouping in the

course of a year of two in spite of heavy indebtedness”
(Barth 1964: 72).

Similarly, for the Shahsevan nomads of
northwestern Iran,

 

”the 1964 and 1965 seasons were bad and
expensive in fodder and losses for the nomads . . . and many
advances were not paid off. But the 1966 winter was so

mild . few nomads seemed to be left in debt by the
spring” (Tapper 1979: 72—73). Thus, if debts are not

 

 

 

 

T—I—w

239

carried very long, they may serve to maintain a nomadic
household's viability within the pastoral sector. Most of
these debts are incurred for the purchase of flour, other

foodstuffs, and, in bad years, for animal fodder. This

 

mechanism is functional only if there has been no disaster
reducing the level of flock productivity below household
needs. That is, access to trading partners who sell on

credit helps prevent the loss of productive capital. If

 

flock productivity is already in a state of rapid decline,
debts can only temporarily lengthen the limited time re-
maining to the nomad in this productive sector.

Postponement 9f Subdivision and Reproduction 9f

 

 

Households: Barth points out for the Basseri that the

 

division of a flock to provide a marrying son with the
necessary capital to start an independent household unit
usually occurs at his marriage. However, if the flock is
too small, the marriage of the son is postponed until the
young man is 30 to 35 years Old (1961: 107). Barth does

not say what will happen to the son of a poor nomad if

 

enough capital has not been accumulated. Presumably, he

will not get married. For the Kordshuli, on the other hand,

 

the marriage is not necessarily postponed, although the
actual division of the flock may wait until actual social
separation into independent household units. Certainly,
providing flocks for the newly married is the key act in
the reproduction of the social relations of production for

these nomads. Without separation of household units or

i

 

   

 

 

240

division of the flock, this reproduction cannot occur. If
capital accumulation does not increase, then the demands
on productive capital will increase to meet the needs of the
extended family. In this regard, the Basseri system may be
more responsive to the existing economic pressures. That
is, by postponing marriage, the Basseri also postpone addi—
tional drains on limited productive capital. Nonetheless,
if the flock does not grow, the whole process will have been
just a holding mechanism that may break down under increased
environmental stress.

Shepherding and SeasOnal Occupations: Employment as
a wage or agricultural laborer is not common for those who
wish to remain nomadic. There are, however, some poor
Kordshuli nomads who do act as shepherds for wealthier kin
and some who are Shepherds for the flocks of the khaVanin
(chiefs). This may give these nomads the opportunity to
increase flock Size and, perhaps, eventually regain inde—
pendent status. That is, some traditional forms of employ—
ment could make the loss of herds a reversible condition.
These positions were limited in number. Since few wealthy
Kordshuli have extra-familial shepherds, even distant kin,
this is not a viable Option for most of the poorer nomads.
Those who do become shepherds for wealthier kin are usually
taken into the household as a lower status member of the
family, where they have few, if any, rights over the flock
or even over decisions in their own lives. To work as a

wage or agricultural laborer almost always leads to complete

 

 

 

 

 

 

241

sedentarization. Comparably, Barth points out for the
Basseri that most of the temporary or seasonal occupations
open to the nomad necessitate periods of sedentism and the
deveIOpment of closer ties with one particular sedentary
community. Thus, the rate of reduction of the nomad's
remaining stock is accelerated because of the interference
with the normal migratory cycle. This leads to further loss
of animals, loss of spatial continuity with the nomadic
group, increased sedentary dependence, and eventual assim~
iliation into the sedentary community (Barth 1961: 109).

There are some nomads who remain marginal or seasonal nomads,

 

 

 

 

joining the nomadic group in the summer, but for most it
means abandonment of any form of nomadism. Still, many of
these nomads would be more than ready to return to nomadism
if climatic, economic, and political circumstances permitted.
That is, they remain, as Afshar Naderi has SO aptly stated,
”nomads on the waiting list” (Mohammed 1973).

The ”lower crisis zone,” unlike the ”upper crisis
zone,” is a real concern for the nomad. At this level, the
choices of the poorer nomad are concerned with economic
survival, not merely with directions of productivity.
Sedentarization by impoverishment ”is felt as a threatening
and live possibility in a number of households of the lower
economic range" (Barth 1961: 108).

We can see, then, that Barth's model of sedentari~
zation is inadequate and often inaccurate, if we are to

explain how and why certain phenomena occur. Nomads from

 

 

 

242

 

all economic strata settle. It is not surprising that poor
nomads who fail to maintain adequate pastoral resources for
subsistence quit the paStoral sector. The implication, how—
ever, is that these poorer nomads may begin tO settle before

subsistence needs go unmet because ”the Basseri, like Other

 

Persian nomads, are but a segment of a larger pOpulation

 

where assimilation by sedentarization into peasant villages
and urban centers is possible and frequent” (Barth 1964: 77;
emphasis mine). This comparison is not always valid, de-
spite the fact that sedentarization due to impoverishment
may still occur. As Salzer points out for the Kaskuli
Kuchek of the Qashqa'i confederacy (who live quite near
the Basseri):
When sedentarization has occurred, it has been as a
consequence of impoverishment. This is, however, said
to have been rare, in contrast to the Basseri
When I asked my informants why there was a difference,
they answered that the Basseri are nearer, both
Spatially and in life style, to sedentary peoples,
and that there were more villages and farming land in
the Basseri area and therefore more ”work ” available
In fact . . . trying to find a sedentary source
of income was generally more difficult than trying to
maintain migration. As a consequence, families re_
duced to an extremely low standard of living have
continued migration” (1974: 115).

Also, Barth presents sedentarization as essentially
an economic process at extreme ends of productive capabil-
ities that is primarily concerned with the redirecting of
productive aims. He does not effectively consider the
relative importance of social and political decisions. The

wealthy/impoverished dichotomy does not tell us much more

about why nomads settle than that the wealthy are more able

 

 

 

 

 

 

243

to afford to buy land and thus have additional Options,
while the poor are less able to survive in the pastoral
sector and thus have fewer Options.

Indeed, in the recent past, most of the Kordshuli
who have settled either in sarhad (summer pasture area) or
along the migration route--typically between Marvdasht
(above Shiraz) and Qasrodasht (above Sivand)--were either
relatively wealthy or poor when they settled. Most of this
sedentarization was group settlement (discussed later in
this chapter) rather than individual families alone deciding
to leave the nomadic system. Many of these wealthy nomads,
however, did not settle after having invested in land over
a period of time. Instead, most decided to settle and then
sold resources to buy land. Many were merely tired of
nomadic life, others were old and infirm, and the like.

Many of the poorer nomads who settled in the same area as
these wealthy men were members of the same section as the
wealthy men. Also, many of these poorer nomads had not yet
entered the "lower crisis zone” and might have been able to
recoup recent losses. However, many foresaw the possibility
of increased difficulty in maintaining a pastoral nomadic
existence, and decided to maintain Social and political ties
with the wealthy men, many of whom had been descent group

or camp leaders. Some of these political ties would have
been unable to be adequately expressed within the pastoral
nomadic sector because of the demands made by a pastoral

existence and the general social homogeneity that obtains

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

244

from these demands.

It may be the case that the economic component is of
primary importance, but even here Barth searches for static
functional explanations based on his own notions of capital
investment rather than on those of the nomads. While in-
vestment in land may be more secure than investment in.
animals, returns are more constrained despite the risk in—
herent in pastoralism. If investment in land inevitably
leads to sedentarization, as Barth believes, then investment
in land can only lead to limited profits from maximization
of land use (i.e., the land can only produce so much). The
nomad, with apprOpriate labor, can continue to increase pro-
fits, even if at a reduced rate. For example, one man who
had been settled for 18 years began to migrate again in
order to increase the Size and profitability of his flock so
as to gain extra income to pay for education of his sons.
Tapper (1979: 73) points out for the Shahsevan of north—
western Iran that ”the anticipation of heavy losses and
eXpenses leads the nomads to calculate in terms less of
Simply meeting projecting outgoings, than of minimizing risk
and expenditure and maximizing profit and surplus.” For
the Kordshuli, this profit and surplus is usually generated
in the pastoral sector.

Another major difficulty with Barth's model is its
presentation Of sedentarization as the complete abandonment
of migratory activity, with no range of variation; it is

described as both absolute and irreversible (cf. Salzman

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

245

1980: 12). There are, however, a number of variations of

the sedentarization process (to be discussed below) that a

model such as Barth's does not and cannot deal with effec-

tively. Salzman (ibid.: 13) makes the point well:
Thus, while it may seem to the unacquainted [perhaps we
Should include Barth] that nomadism and sedentism-are
worlds apart, that the vast gap, crossed only under the
greatest of duress, could hardly be recrossed, that we
are considering two entirely incompatible types, the
realities of social formation and historical process,
unburdened by ideal—typical conceptualization and tidy
classificatory schemes, indicate otherwise. The fact
is that both individual experience and collective
institutions can encompass, to a very great degree, the
variations that fall under the labels 'nomadism' and
'sedentism' (parentheses mine).

The Barthian model which predicts the sedentarization
of wealthy and impoverished nomads offers little help in
understanding the recent Shift among the Kordshuli to pri-
marily ”middle range” sedentarization (i.e., the sedentari—
zation of those nomads that fall within the ”range of
stability")(see Figure 7.1). This shift is largely a func—
tion of the increased difficulty of doing pastoralism be—
cause of increased State control over resources as evidenced
through land reform programs, the Forest and Range Nationali-
zation Act, etc., as well as of the increased difficulty of
sedentarization for the poor because of increasing land
prices and economic inflation. Because the majority of the
Kordshuli fall within the ”middle range,” these factors also
play a major role in the increase in sedentarization gener—
ally. Still, they are only major environmental Shifts and

constraints that affect the choices available to the nomadic

household. That is, they certainly affect those choices,

 

 

 

 

 

246

but the process which leads to a decision to settle also
includes political and social components both within and
without the group, as well as the relationship between
pastoral nomadic ideology and a settled existence.

For several years I have been engaged in the attempt to
present a more suitable model of the sedentarization process
than those in the literature on pastoral nomads—-one that
focussed more on the concept of choice mentioned above (e.g.,

Swee 1979). In the past year (1980) a newly published book,

 

When Nomads Settle (Salzman 1980), has proposed and briefly
elaborated aspects of a model which adequately addresses my

concerns. Salzman has called this the "adaptation and

 

response” model. According to this model, ”sedentarization
is seen not SO much as a forced, coerced, unavoidable pro—
cess, to which no conceivable alternative but annihilation
could exist, but rather as (in very many cases) a voluntary,
uncoerced shift from one available pattern to another in
response to changing pressures, constraints, and opportun—
ities both internal and external to the society” (1980: 14).
Rather than paraphrase the rest of Salzman's well—written
summary on this model, I will present much of it below.
Here, I will only offer my concurrence that it is a more
adequate model than earlier ones for understanding continuity
and change among pastoral nomads.
The 'adaptation and response' model does not stress, as
do other models, a mass of peOple buffeted by irresis—
table forces or individuated actors without socially-
based resources. Rather it stresses the Options

available to actors and the institutionalized resources
that largely define the Options and make them possible.

 

 

247

This is of course not to say that all societal change
is generated entirely by the preferences of the actors,
for changing constraints and pressures not of their own
making are consequences of environmental, demographic,
and external political and economic processes. Nor is
this to suggest that irresistable fOrceS are unknown or
even uncommon. The sad fact is that peOple, nomads in-
cluded, are all too frequently subject to environmental
catastrOphes and overwhelming coercion . . . What the
'adaption and response' model does point out is that in
many cases sedentarization is the result of processes
which have a long voluntary component and which make
use of societal resources in the form Of institutional-
ized alternatives, and that the various mechanisms of
societal multiformity provide a flexibility in indi—
vidual behavior, organizational patterns, and ideology
which makes reversal of direction in social change
possible (ibid.).
As the parameters of the ”adaptation and response”
model are elaborated, it will be easier to understand many
of the recent shifts in the form and SCOpe of sedentarization
(e.g., the case of the Kordshuli) where primarily "middle
range” nomads are choosing sedentarization as a viable option
to c0pe with increasing environmental stress. Conversely,
among the Kordshuli, it is the rich and poor nomads who may
continue to migrate. The rich can afford to move all of
their animals and their belongings by truck and may, in fact,
own land in both summer and winter pasture areas. The poor,
on the other hand, may try to continue to maintain their
small flocks fearing the unknown of a non—pastoral existence.
Since these flocks are necessarily small, it is not as
difficult as it may be for others to herd them through the
narrowing migration route. This is not to imply that this
latter group, the poor nomads, will not eventually sedentar-

ize, but rather that the poor nomad feels that there is no

recourse but to migrate (cf. Salzer 1974: 115).

 

 

 

 

248

These shifts in form have also brought Shifts in
some of the traditional values and preferences of the
Kordshuli. The stereotype of the pastoral nomad's dislike
Of agriculture may have been true of the Kordshuli nomad of
two to three decades ago (cf. Barth 1961: 9). Now, with the
recent shifts in the political and economic spheres, the
desirability or utility of sedentarization, in some form,
has increased. Many nomads realize the usefulness of
diversifying their productive regime; thus, agriculture has
become more acceptable, although it is still considered to
be of secondary importance by most Kordshuli.

With this increased acceptance of agriculture,
there has been a change in the nature of the ideal of the
independent, self-sufficient household unit. While most
Kordshuli still value this ideal, many realize that it is
easier to meet household needs through the formation of dis—
persed economic household units, which function as agro~
pastoral partnerships among socially independent household
units of the same larger family. The formation of these
dispersed economic households is a response to environmental
constraints rather than a Shift away from the desirability
of economic self—sufficiency, especially in the pastoral
sector. Pastoral nomadism, if unconstrained, is still
favored as the primary lifestyle by the Kordshuli. However,
with political and economic constraints, as indicated in
chapters five and Six, many Kordshuli have eXpressed the

desire to settle. There is no naturally negative response

 

 

 

249

to sedentarization as Marsden (1974) and Afshar-Naderi
(1974) would have us believe. .Many of these nomads have
not settled because they feel they lack the means, not
because they do not want to.

It must be noted that these Shifts in acceptance of
sedentarization and Settled lifestyles are highly correlated
with shifts in the economic and political systems of the
larger State. Constraints on mOvement, impeded access to
pastures, etc., on the one hand serve as push factors,
while the lure of cheap foreign-made luxury items, etc. on
the other hand act to pull the nomad away from his tradi~
tional lifestyle. If these conditions were to change, it
is not improbable that many nomads would choose not to
settle, or that those who had settled might choose to become
nomadic again. Certainly, the factors which lead to
sedentarization are always reversible: ”a bad year is
followed by a good one. The military strength of rival
tribes and central governments wanes as well as waxes. And
temporary setbacks, such as epidemics, result in low animal/
pasture rations, Opening the area once again to aspiring
pastoralists" (Salzman 1980: 13). At the time of my re—
search it seemed highly unlikely that the strength of the
Shah's government could or would wane. In hindsight, as I
will mention in my conclusions, the assumption of stability
at any level is never fully justified.

This Shift to ”middle range” sedentarization also

presents an interesting paradox in terms of Barth's economic

 

 

 

250

model (wealthy/impoverished). One of the major variables
influencing sedentarization (or actually non-sedentarization)
is the price of land. In the past five years, the price has
doubled, and in some cases tripled. As a result many of the
nomads who have expressed the desire to settle feel that the
price Of land is prohibitively high. Thus, without full
awareness that it is probable that the price of land will
continue to rise faster than the price of their animal pro—
ducts, many will not purchase land now. When, in the future,
the hardships of migration become overwhelming because of
the crowded conditions, these nomads will, for the most
part, be forced to settle as landless laborers. Thus, they
will become "poor” ex—nomads without ever having entered the
”lower crisis zone”! Some will be able to find employment
in their home regions, but certainly many will be forced to
seek employment in larger cities, adding to the urban pro-
blem of the unskilled, illiterate worker.

Variations in the Sedentarization
Process

 

As I mentioned earlier, sedentarization need not be
an all or nothing proposition. There are a number of vari—
ations which, when examined, allow for a more astute per—
ception of the nomadic/sedentary continuum than that gained
from an absolutist model such as Barth's model. Two major
variations, which were not effectively dealt with by Barth,
can be called: 1) the dispersed economic household, and 2)

marginal (or seasonal) nomadism. A third variation, group

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

251
sedentarization, is mentioned by Barth but not integrated

into his model.

Dispersed Economic Household

The dispersed economic household occurs when a joint
or extended family unit separates into socially and, usually,
spatially distinct units. Often they can be viewed as inde-
pendent consumption units that still maintain production ties
(i.e., they are still an economic unit). The form is usually
that of a group of brothers or of a father and adult sons,
one of whom, at least, maintains the joint flock while the
others either farm or earn money through some other venture.
Farming is the usual and preferred activity for these groups.
Sometimes the joint economic household takes the converse
form of one member farming while the rest herd, with the
farmer's flock being parceled out according to the ability
of the others to handle extra animals or to gain access to
adequate pasturage. Many variations fall within these ex—
tremes depending on the number of male family members that
are willing to maintain joint flocks (all adult males usually
own a share of family land).1

While economic separation of sons from fathers or
brothers from brothers invariably means dividing the joint
flock, it usually does not imply a division of jointly owned,
landed prOperty. Inheritance of land, like inheritance of
animals, is partible but most Kordshuli realize the advan—
tage of planting one continuous plot over the planting of

many small scattered plots. Because most of the land has

 

 

 

 

...i-adi‘il I -—- V

 

252

been owned only since the last generation of household heads,
the natural eXpansion of multiple family units has yet to
play a part in land division. This, also, is partly a
function of the fact that inheritance in animals tends to
be anticipatory, while inheritance of land does not take
place until the previous owner's death. Division of agri-
cultural produce garnered from jointly held land is usually
equally distributed among all socially independent household
heads. This is the case even when the households are other—
wise economically independent (i.e., with their own flocks).
Perhaps the easiest way to understand the operation
of a dispersed economic household unit is to examine a couple
of cases. It should be realized that most of the families
that fall within this category tend to be, on the average,
wealthier than Single independent households. .The two

examples I will present are families of kadkhodas (headmen),

 

but there are a number of other families which also fit the

same pattern.

Case 1: Kakakhan

 

The kadkhoda and his three brothers of the tireh

 

Arbabdar—e Kakakhan make up four socially distinct household
units (so defined by the presence of separate hearths), yet
their economic resources are held in common. Three of the
brothers are farmers and control work done on the land
inherited by the family unit from their father. The three
not only work the land, but also oversee the labor of some

SharecrOppers (settled Kordshuli) who live on the property.

 

 

 

 

 

 

253

The decision to use sharecrOppers was a joint decision re-
quiring the approval of all the household heads, or at least
the acquiescence by the younger two to the wishes of the
Older ones. The fourth brother is in charge of the joint
flock. Not only have these families pooled their economic
resources, they have also combined some of their independent
labor forces. Because of the occasional need for extra labor
in the nomadic camp, the two eldest offspring of the eldest
brother live and work with the nomadic household unit. This
is actually more a case of easing the load of the adult I
members of the nomadic household than of insuring the eco—
nomic viability of this family. The young man is the shep—
herd for the joint flock, while the young woman helps with
domestic tasks around the tent such as baking bread and
washing clothes. This nomadic family unit, however, could
easily manage without the extra labor; it is just that there
is a greater possible need for extra labor within the nomadic
camp than in the agricultural field, especially during
migration.

All agricultural and pastoral products are the joint
property of all of the households, except for those consumed
by the individual households during the course of the pro—
ductive cycle. That is, the nomadic household prepares all
the pastoral products for their own consumption, for division
among all the households, and for sale, the profits from
which are divided among all the households. For example,

the nomadic family produces and eats yoghurt (mast), some

 

 

 

 

 

 

254

butter (karreh), and buttermilk (gpq) from the middle of
spring through much of the summer. This is considered theirs
and does not figure into the division of the products later
in the summer or autumn. Lambs and wool are sold in late
spring to early summer and the money-is divided equally among
the four households. Clarified butter (quap), curd balls
(gaspk), and the like are divided'into four equal shares.

If the year has been quite productive, any excess beyond the
needs Of the joint consumption unit will be sold and the pro—
fits equally distributed. Likewise, in the agricultural
sphere, all produce or cash from the sale of excess produce
is divided into four equal Shares. The land was inherited

as a package from their father and has not been divided,

even mentally, into sections. Neither has the flock, antic—
ipatory inheritance notwithstanding, been divided into four

jointly herded groups.

Case 2: Haji Ali Mirza

In this case the dispersed family is composed of a
man and two of his three sons. Haji Ali Mirza and his
eldest son, Mirza Qoli, control the joint agricultural pro-
perty. Most of the farming is done by sharecrOppers who
settled as impoverished nomads. Eskandar, the youngest son,
controls the joint flock. Another son, Hajiqoli, has sepa—
rated his flock from the others and is involved only in the
production of his own pastoral products. He still has a
share of the jointly owned land and receives an equivalent

Share after harvest; however, because of his social and

 

 

 

 

 

255

economic separation, he does not share in the power that
accrues to the wealthy. His own flock is rather small and
he is Viewed by other KOrdshuli as being totally independent
rather than as a member of a larger wealthy family that has

power as kadkhoda of the tireh.

 

While Mirza Qoli is the actual kadkhOda of the group,

 

it is usually Eskandar who functions as acting kadkhoda

 

since he lives and migrates with the nomads. Because
Eskandar only has young children, Mirza QOli's two eldest
daughters also live with and assist Eskandar and his wife.
A more distant male relative also lives with Eskandar and
acts as Shepherd for the joint flock, although he has no
claim to any of the animals. As in the previous case,
agricultural and pastoral products are distributed, except
that agricultural products are distributed among all house-
holds including Hajiqoli's, while pastoral products are
distributed among only three households.

While there is an economic advantage to being part
of a joint economic household, there is also a political one.
There is not a great degree of eXplicit social differentia—
tion among the Kordshuli. Within the nomadic sphere, while
flock Size may differ considerably, it is the ability to
maintain a reasonably independent existence which is most
important for economic status differentiation. Black points
out that in Luri social structure, ”stratum membership is
defined in the final analysis as a function of the economic

viability of the family” (1972: 623). If a Kordshuli

 

 

 

 

256

household without landed property can maintain its indepen—
dence without recourse to external assistance, there is
little perceived status differentiation relative to other
households, even to those with larger flocks. The economic
viability of the family is more secure, however, if they
also own land. Certainly, the more able the land is to meet
the grain needs of the family, the higher the implicit
status.

However, the status differentiation which Black
attributes to the Lurs cannot be seen manifested in the same
way among the Kordshuli. While Black sees it in terms of
a definite power motif where ”the wealthy enforce their will
upon the abjectly poor and the poor can see no other alter-
native but to accept this situation in a spirit of implac-
able resignation (ibid,: 625), among the Kordshuli there is
a difference in influence but not necesarily in enforceable
power. Indeed, there is a strong power component involved
in the interactions of the very wealthy with the very poor,
who are forced to maintain their pastoral nomadic adaptation
as shepherds. It is usually the case that ”the freedom of
lower stratum men is a pure fiction; for even if they pas~
Sionately hate their patron, they do not rescind their
cOntract but continue to bear with and evince respect for
him, since they are aware that to find a replacement is no
easy matter" (ibid.: 630). Even here, however, it is not
a contract as rigid as Black implies, at least among the

Kordshuli. One young man who was the Shepherd for the

 

 

 

 

 

 

257

kadkhoda of one section hit an intractable Sheep with his

 

staff (chug) and the animal died. It is a common practice
for Shepherds and herd owners to soundly hit their animals

out of anger and frustration. The kadkhoda, however, became

 

incensed and struck the young man quite severely. That
night, despite the insecurity of his position, the Shepherd
ran away and only months later found a job as a shepherd for
an urban flock owner. The Kordshuli with whom I Spoke felt
that an injustice had been done to the Shepherd and that it
was apprOpriate for the young man to leave as he did. Many ‘
of his close relatives even talked of seeking revenge, but
others agreed that such talk was only a Show of family
solidarity and no real threat to the flock owner. For the
Kordshuli, at any rate, there are so few of these lower—
stratum clients that this form of relationship is relatively
unimportant in the general scheme of social differentiation.
The general point to be made is that with dispersed
economic household formation there is both an economic
advantage, in terms of easier and less eXpensive access to
resources, as well as a political advantage, in terms of
ability to influence the decisions of others. Once seden—
tarization takes place, the wealth differences between
families may become a more rigid indicator of status in the
sedentary community. In those villages where there is al—
ready a traditional sedentary community, the nomads must
enter into a well—defined class structure (Keddie 1972;

Ajami 1969). In villages composed primarily or solely of

 

 

 

 

 

258

settled nomads, stratification may develOp based on these
wealth differences as well as on the genealogical and tribal
relationships among the households. Within the nomadic
sphere, social differentiation, while present, is not rigidly
defined but rather is one factor which combines with sophis—
tication, education, religiosity, etc., to set certain
individuals and their households apart from others in terms
of authority and decision-making ability. Consensus is still
the order of the day, except for those few direct patron/
client relationships.

Dispersed economic household units, while in many
ways more effective within the nomadic community than purely
pastoral nomadic households, may also lead to a better over-
all adaptation, as economic and political changes within
the larger environmental setting continue to impinge upon
the ability of the nomads to make a living. Beck makes a
comparable point for the Qashqa'i:

Where pastoral and agricultural economies are coordin—
ated, it tends to be beneficial to both parties.
Those assigned to pastoral functions maintain the
necessary pack animals, permits, and contracts conduc-
ive to productive pastoralism while those in charge of
agriculture buy or rent land and equipment and expand,
urban and market ties. These Qashqa'i will probably
have better Opportunities to adapt successfully than
those who do not diversify their economies (1979: 22).
Marginal Nomadism
While the configuration for many of the wealthier

families is that of a dispersed economic household, others

from all economic strata that in many ways are sedentarized

 

 

 

 

 

259

still retain a form of marginal or seasonal nomadism. That
is, there is part of the year when many households, or parts
of extended family households, will move once again into
goathair tents and be generally indistinguishable from the
regular nomadic population. This practice is also true of
some villagers, except that they do not fall under the
aegis of the kadkhoda of the pirgh. They also have only a
limited area available as a campsite (yggt), Since during
seasonal occupancy traditional pastures are primarily for
use by nomads who are members of one of the named tirehs

of the tribe.

There is a definite relationship between the nature
of and reasons for sedentarization and the time of year
that certain families choose to become ”part—time” nomads.
Some families that fit into the configuration of the
dispersed economic household also fit into this pattern of
marginal nomadism. Often those members of the dispersed
economic household who are in charge of the agricultural
part of the productive system will join their nomadic
counterparts in the winter, when the agricultural land in
sarhad is under snow. This means that they may contribute
additional labor to help care for lambs and kids, to help
grainfeed the animals if the winter is dry, or to help
with any number of other domestic tasks. This pattern is
quite common among the wealthy families where the father
is still alive and manages the land holdings. Many of these

older men consider themselves to be settled villagers, but

 

 

 

260

lament the loss of the freedom and cleanliness of a nomadic
life.

Some of the wealthy families that practice marginal
nomadism do not migrate, but rather put all their belongings
and their animals in the back of a large Mercedes Benz truck
and transport them down to winter pastures in a Single day.
Some of these families also own land in winter pasture
areas, which makes it unlikely that they, unlike many of
the other nomads, will be ”forced” by tightening circum—
stances to settle. In the summer they once again move into
permanent structures, and either keep their flocks in pens
or diSperse them among the flocks of other relatives.

On the other hand, it is more usual for members of
the lower economic strata, who have settled in or near
sarhad, to take their small flocks that have been penned up
during the winter and join the rest of the pigeh during the
summer. Most of these household heads are wage laborers or
self—employed handymen. Many will camp near the tent of the
kadkhoda and help out with menial tasks around his tent.

This, they believe, will help them secure the kadkhoda's

 

assistance in dealing with problems that may arise within
the sedentary community. These poorer marginal nomads feel
that this summer nomadism will provide better fodder for
their flocks and, thus, help the animals get through the
winter if they are unable to provide adequate amounts of

grain.

 

 

261

Group Sedentarization

While the forms mentioned above indicate that there
are numerous Variations in the sedentarization process that
relate to individual households, it is also important to
realize that much of the sedentarization that has taken
place among the Kordshuli, and in the Middle East in general,
has been in the form of group sedentarization. Barth (1961)
does mention group sedentarization for the Basseri but
does not relate it to the general model that he presents or
to its effect on decision—making within the group.

Among the Kordshuli there are two basic forms which
this group sedentarization has taken: intra—tirgh sedentari—
zation and inter—tireh sedentarization. In the first case,

a strong, elder member of a $1322 or lineage would settle
because of age, or dispersed economic household formation,

or numerous other possible reasons; few would say that it was
because investment in land was more secure. Poorer members
of the lineage, many of whom had not yet entered the ”lower
crisis zone” (see Figure 7.1), followed this reSpected
leader. Some of these poorer nomads were probably consider—
ing sedentarization anyway, but it is likely that many made
the decision based on the action of the group at large.

Most of this sedentarization would take place during a dry
year when pastoral production was down and a greater uncer—
tainty existed as to the future of the flocks. The rich
family would buy land or settle on land previously purchased,

and the poor would become sharecroppers on the land. This,

262

in form, approaches a patron/client relationship, except
that there need not be very much social differentiation
since the two groups still claim relationship through de—
scent as members of the same piggh. Over time, many of
these poorer nomads may also become sharecroppers for other
landowners from different groups that live in the same
general vicinity. This would enable some to have greater
access to the limited available resources. However, the
initial decision to settle was probably as much a function
of their economic situation as it was of their certainty in
being able to make a living through the resources of the
wealthy lineage member. That is, many probably would not
have settled when they did if they had not had the prior
knowledge that there would be land on which they could live
and work.

Another form of group sedentarization——inter—tireh
sedentarization, where the individual households come from
more than one section——has also been in evidence among the
Kordshuli. In these cases, sedentarization was almost
uniformly the result of impoverishment. Many of the indi—
vidual households had seen the oncoming necessity for
sedentarization but had not yet begun to consider the
particulars of the move (i.e., where to settle and when).
Working along networks of friendship and affinity, the
individual households of various sections came to a general
consensus as to the time and location of settlement. This

guaranteed that there would be a larger labor force to draw

 

263

upon for building houses, digging wells, etc. This process
has occurred in a number of different locations. For
example, in 1341 A.H. (1962), the first year of a prolonged
drought in the region, 20 families from three piggh settled
together in Hosseinabad in Kordshuli sarhad. Social and
economic differentiation was minimal among these families.
Most of these settling families became sharecroppers for
settled landowners, usually for the khavanin of the

Kordshuli. i

Kordshuli Tirehs and Sedentarization

 

Up to this point, I have been concerned with the
mechanisms involved in and the variations of the sedentari—
zation process. To understand the reasons behind the
increase in sedentarization in both scope and frequency, it
is necessary to examine the effects that political and
economic shifts discussed in previous chapters have had on
the nomadic adaptation. First, however, it will be instruc—
tive to look at some of the nomadic Kordshuli tirehs to see
their response to these shifts. That is, we are concerned
with the question of who is likely to settle and why.

Rather than attempt an overview of all tirehs, I will focus
on three groups: Babamaleki, Lori Almas, and Lori Jamshid.
While the remaining five groups may differ somewhat in their
specific behavioral responses, a general picture will still
emerge which shows how these groups are choosing to re—

spond to changes in their environment.

264

Babamaleki

All household heads of the Babamaleki have expressed
the desire to settle. All believe the nomadic adaptation,
particularly migration, is too much trouble (zahmat) and
that there is little profit to be made in pastoral nomadism.
By this, they do not mean direct monetary profit but rather
the equivalent as a return on time and labor. The risky
business of pastoralism is now even riskier. This desire to
settle is manifest by the recent purchase of residential
property by some of the household heads.

Only the dispersed economic household of the
kadkhoda has owned any land for any length of time. In
1976, five other households bought land near some owned by
the kadkhoda in an area between sarhad and Shiraz (which is
approximately midway between summer and winter pastures).
This area does not usually pose the problem of temperature
extremes, which would preclude the maintenance of any flock.
All five say they bought enough land on which to build a
house, but not enough to grow crops or provide for a reason—
ably sized flock. The following chart shows the amount of

land purchased and the price that each was required to pay.

TABLE 7.1 Recent land purchases——Babamaleki

Amount of Land Price
1. 540 sq. m. 2160 T (1 Toman = @ $.15)
2. 540 sq. m. 2160 T
3. 540 sq. m. 2160 T
4. 670 sq. m. 2760 T
5. 1000 sq. m. 4000 T

 

265

All five believe this land is rather inexpensive, but say
they probably would not have purchased it had not the
kadkhoda secured a low—interest loan for all of them. It
is also likely that the price of this land would have in—
creased greatly within a short time period. An example of
this inflation for a household head in another £1322 will
suffice to make that point: this family group bought thirty
hectares of land in 1972 for lOOOT/hectare; now (1977), land
of similar quality neighboring their land is selling for
6000T/hectare.

All of these household heads say that they really
do not know when they might settle. They must be able to
pay off the cost of the land, and then be able to afford to
build a house. Much will depend on their desire to maintain
some of their flock. If they settle they know they will
have to sell much of their existing flock to pay for a
house. Also, none of these men know what they will do when
they do, in fact, settle. A couple have said that they may
try to find work as wage laborers. The other three have not
thought through the consequences of sedentarization. Indeed,
if they can keep some of their flock with nomadic relatives,
they may be able to minimally survive by using and selling
pastoral products, albeit at a more impoverished level than
when they were nomadic.

The question of whether there is any relationship
between wealth and sedentarization is difficult to answer

in terms of the Babamaleki. In chapter six, I presented a

 

266

chart (Table 6.1) that shows flock size in general categories
for each pipep. The Babamaleki have no households which
possess fewer than 50 animals and only two households with
more than 300 animals. Both of these latter households have
less than 400 sheep and both say that they had fewer animals
the previous year. Thus, all the Babamaleki, including

those two ”wealthy" households, actually fall into a

”middle range” of wealth. The fact is, at least within this
one group, it is not just those at the economic extremes -g
who are settling but those at all levels of wealth in if
animals.

When I asked about past cases of sedentarization
within the piggp, the kadkhoda and others would mention
only those families that had sedentarized and yet continued
to recognize the authority of the Babamaleki kadkhoda.

About 40 years ago, during the period of enforced settlement
by Reza Shah, three men settled in Hosseinabad in Kordshuli
sarhad. The seven sons of these men still say they are
Babamaleki and are recognized as such by the nomadic
Kordshuli. Social interaction is partially maintained dur—
ing the summer, at least by the kadkhoda, and some of the
animals of these families are herded along with those of a
couple of the nomadic households.

Seventeen years ago, three brothers also settled in
Hosseinabad after a bad drought. Another brother remained

nomadic. The three settled as sharecroppers and are still

 

sharecrOppers today, although they may, individually, work

 

 

 

 

267
for a different person each year. At the time of their
sedentarization, these three men had more "pr0perty" (i.e.,
animals), than the remaining nomadic brother. However, they
sold their animals to buy and build houses. The nomadic
brother felt he was too poor to do this, so he kept migrat—
ing. Now he has a good—Sized flock and has bought land of
his own on which to build a house. A point here is that,
even at the time of Barth's research, there were other
criteria than just impoverishment which played a role in the *
decision by some Kordshuli to sedentarize.

One pattern that can be seen emerging is that piggp
members are likely to settle in close proximity to each
other. For the Babamaleki, all purchased land in the same
village, except for some agricultural land owned by the

kadkhoda's family near Hosseinabad, where other Babamaleki

 

settled earlier. The reason given for buying land in an
area other than sarhad was that the winters are too harsh

in sarhad and the mountain pass is closed through most of

 

the winter. This means that there is no access to any
reasonable medical facility should it be needed. Thus, for
the safety of the family members, the kadkhOda and those who
have now followed him decided to live in a region that had

milder winters and continued access to urban facilities.

Lori Almas
While among the Babamaleki most household heads ex—
pressed the desire to settle and some have recently purchased

land with that end in mind, among the Lori Almas most of the

 

   

 

   

 

268

household heads already own land and most say they would
_like to remain nomadic until it becomes too difficult.
However, while 67 percent of the households own land, only
15 percent own houses, In most cases, the house was built
at the time the land was purchased. However, in two cases a
different response implies that these families will settle
in the very near future. One case exhibits a usual pattern;
land was purchased five years ago and this year when the
household's wealth was secure enough, they built a house.

It is likely that this pattern will be followed by a number
of the other households as conditions for pastoralism con—
tinue to worsen. In another case, the household head pur—
chased a house seven years ago in anticipation of settling,
but then felt that he could not settle Since he had no real
resources. Now, however, he has just purchased a parcel of
land for 30,000T and plans to settle as soon as possible.

In Table 7.2 one can see that the general pattern
of £1322 proximity after settlement holds for Lori Almas.
Unlike Babamaleki, Lori Almas has used three major locations
when sedentarizing or purchasing land: Saqalat, Sirbanu, and
Cheshmeh Rana. In the four cases that do not follow this
pattern, the families purchased land near settled affinal
relatives. The different locations are based on the time of
settlement or land purchase, as well as on the location of
affinal relatives. Approximately 10 years ago, many
Kordshuli families bought land after rebuilding their flocks

from decimation caused by the 1962—1964 drought. As I

 

 

 

269

TABLE 7.2 Lori Almas tireh--land ownership

Length of Sample
Location Amount of Land Ownership Cost
Saqalat a vaqehl 5 yrs
Saqalat l vaqeh 5 yrs
3. Saqalat l vaqeh 5 yrs
Cheshmeh Rana 1 vaqeh 10 yrs
4. Saqalat % dung 5 yrs
Cheshmeh Rana 1 charaq 10 yrs
5. Saqalat 1 vaqeh 5 yrs
Cheshmeh Rana 1 vaqeh 10 yrs
6. Saqalat 1 vaqeh 7 yrs 12,000T
7. Saqalat % vaqeh 5 yrs
8 Saqalat 1 vaqeh 10 yrs
9 Saqalat 1 vaqeh 10 yrs
10. Cheshmeh Rana % dung 10 yrs
11. Sirbanu 1.5 dung 10 yrs
12. Sirbanu % vaqeh < 1 yr 6,000T
13. Sirbanu 1 charaq < 1 yr 12,5OOT
14. Sirbanu % vaqeh < 1 yr 12,000T
(with well)
15. Sirbanu % dung 10 yrs 20,000T
Sirbanu % dung < 1 yr 30,000T
16. Sa'adatabad 5 hectares 5 yrs
17. Sivand house 3 yrs
18. Xongesht % dung < 1 yr 30,000T
Xongesht house 7 yrs

Nine household heads own no land

1 dung (dang in Persian) = 1/6 of any piece of real
estate; 4 charaq = 1 dung; 2 vaqeh = 1 charaq; so 1 vaqeh =

1/8 dung

 

 

270

pointed out earlier, ippgp—piggp group sedentarization did
occur among many impoverished nomads. One village in which
many Kordshuli settled was Cheshmeh Rana. Thus, when some
11322 members decided to buy land to help offset the effects
of future droughts, they bought in the same village as some
of their settled relatives. This village was in a fairly
central location in sarhad and had been developed for some
time because of the presence of a natural spring (Cheshmeh).
Both Sirbanu and Saqalat were much less developed
10 years ago and neither had agricultural land as good as
that of Cheshmeh Rana. Nonetheless, a couple of families
decided to settle in Saqalat because the land was relatively
cheap and they liked the fact that it was not crowded (one
reason nomads give for liking their way of life). One of
the families that purchased land in Saqalat was that of the
kadkpgda. After pump wells were dug and houses built, other
31322 members began to see the potential of the area. Five
years after buying his land, the kadkhoda decided to settle
as part of a dispersed economic household; he farmed while
his brother herded. When the kadkhoda settled, several
other piggp members decided to buy land in the same area,
which explains Table 7.2 showing number of families buying
land approximately five years ago. While not as central as
Cheshmeh Rana, Saqalat is still within the general valley
system that comprises Kordshuli Eilaq (summer pastures).
Sirbanu, on the other hand, is outside the bounded

valley system comprising Kordshuli eilaq. It is located on

 

;._ .

 

 

271

the plain which some Kordshuli, particularly Lori Almas and
Lori Jamshid, migrate over on the last day before arriving
in the summer pasture region. The previous kadkhoda of
Lori Jamshid bought land and built a house in the Sirbanu
area approximately 15 years ago as a response to the 1962—

1964 drought. Two affinal relatives of this kadkhoda, who

 

were members of Lori Almas £1322, decided,in concert, to
purchase some land in the same general region approximately
10 years ago. Both of these men have Since become part of ‘
dispersed economic households and are now marginal nomads in 1
that they will move into tents with the rest of the Eiggh
during the winter. Others who have recently purchased land
in the same area are close agnates of the marginally nomadic
household heads. At least one of these recent purchasers of
land plans to settle within a year or two as part of a dis—
persed economic household with his brother.
Although the most recent purchasers of land have
bought land in the Sirbanu region, it is unlikely that any
other households of this £1329 will also buy land in this
area. All of those who have settled in this area are very
closely related. It would be expected that any future land
purchase by £1328 members who are presently landless would
be near Saqalat. There are two reasons for this: 1) most
Elggp members have settled or purchased land in this area,
and 2) after sedentarization, settling nomads would have
access to the kadkhoda's knowledge about economic and

political issues. In point of fact however, Since four of

 

 

 

 

272

the household heads who own no land have fewer than 100
animals, they could not buy land even if they desired, at

least not at the present.

Lori Jamshid

Many household heads of Lori Jamshid have expressed
the desire to settle but most feel they lack the means. In
terms of average flock size, Lori Jamshid is the poorest
piggp of the Kordshuli (see Figure 6.1), While the family
of the past kadkhoda——his socially separated sons, and his
daughters' husbands——jointly own a considerable amount of
property, very few of the other £1322 members own any land,
Fifty percent of all household heads own no land at all.
The following table (Table 7.3) shows this distribution of
property, as well as the location of this property. The two
primary locations of land purchase are Din Mahdi and Jahrom.
Din Mahdi is located near Sirbanu, which is just south of
Kordshuli Ellflfl- The Jahrom site is actually a little
north of both that city and Kordshuli qeshlaq. This is the
only Kordshuli group, in memory, that has either purchased
land or settled in or near qeshlaq. While the pattern is
quite common among other nomadic groups, the Kordshuli prefer
to settle near sarhad, which they consider their homeland
(m).

The other site of land ownership shown on the table
is Aliabad. This land is owned by the kadkhoda at the very
edge of Kordshuli 31133. It is very close to Hosseinabad,

one of the central villages in sarhad. However, Aliabad

 

 

 

 

 

 

273

TABLE 7.3 Lori Jamshid tireh—-land ownership

location amount of land length of ownership

1. Aliabad (sarhad) l dung 15 years

Din Mahdi 3 dung @15 years
Bandarbas

(Jahrom) 6 dung pump well 2 years

2. Jahrom little 2 years

3. Jahrom little 2 years

4. Jahrom 2—3 hectares 2 years

5. Jahrom 1—2 hectares 2 years

6. Din Mahdi little , 6 years

Marvdasht house 15 years

(inherited)

7. Din Mahdi unknown 14 years

Thirteen household heads own no land.

 

has been settled for a very long period and little of its
land has ever been accessible through purchase. The
kadkhoda of this piggp bought the land when an urban—based
land owner decided to rid himself of the land before land
reform forced him to sell it below cost. The kadkhoda

also built a house and used this area to maintain family and
some flock during the drought of 1962—1964.

As mentioned in chapter six, some wealthy nomads
will continue to migrate, even as conditions worsen, because
they can transport animals and possessions by vehicle and/
or because they own land in both summer and winter pasture
areas. This is indeed the case with the kadkhoda's family
of Lori Jamshid. While the family has not yet begun to

transport everything by vehicle, they do transport

274
a lot of household items with the Land Rover that they
recently purchased. The kadkhoda says that they will trans—
port their flocks by truck, if it becomes necessary because
of increasing encroachment by agriculturalists on their
traditional pastures on the migration route. The family

does own land which can be used for summer and winter

 

pastures. Also, with one other family they bought a pump
well in Bandarbas, near Jahrom, as well as some land sur-
rounding it.

The other households that bought land near Jahrom
at the same time as the kadkhoda bought the well did so in
anticipation of the increased difficulty of finding adequate

winter pastures. Three of these households have fewer than

 

100 animals, although they say they had more which they sold
to purchase land. Still, these households have purchased
the land with the desire to maintain their flocks as long as
possible. Now they say they cannot afford to settle, al—
though they say that if they could afford agricultural land,
they would not be adverse to sedentarizing.

In all these cases of piggp sedentarization, it may
be noted that the primary location for the purchase of land
or for sedentarization is usually near land of the kadkhoda.
In the case of Lori Jamshid, the kadkhoda owns land in more
than one location and EEEEE members have, therefore, pur—
chased land in either of these areas. In some of the cases
where land has been purchased in areas other than those

near the kadkhoda, the purchase was based on an initial

 

 

 

 

 

 

275

affinal relationship and reinforced later by close cOnsane
guineal relatives. That is, initial land purchase was made
by affinal relatives of Kordshuli who had already settled
and/or purchased land in a given area. Close agnatic rela—
tives may then follow in order to maintain close family ties.
One point of interest is that land ownership, in and of
itself, does not necessarily imply that sedentarization is
likely to follow. Also, it has not been the case very
often that the common nomad will continue to add to his
initial land purchase. A number of middle range nomads buy
property usually as a hedge against drought or other crisis
situations, although they recognize its value if sedentari—

zation becomes feasible or necessary. While they may ex—

 

press a desire to sedentarize, most realize that they do
not have the resources to purchase enough land to provide
adequately for the families and at the same time maintain
some of their animals.

Nonetheless, while individual decisions may work for
the maintenance of a pastoral nomadic existence, imposed
constraints at a group level are exerting more pressure
in the direction of sedentarization. Many nomads have
expressed the desire to settle; many have bought land. As
the pressures brought on by political and economic shifts
continue to increase, the trend towards a settled existence
will intensify. In the traditional nomadic system, if some
nomads sedentarized because of pressure on resources, others

would be more able to meet their own needs. However, now

 

 

 

 

276

the pressure on resources is more a result of agricultural
encroachment and government control, so that continued con—
straints on access to pastures is still very real, even if a
number of individual households sedentarize. I will now
examine the reasons why these shifts are directing more

Kordshuli towards a settled life.

Impact of Political Shifts

 

The political shifts described in chapter five can
be seen mainly as a response to changing ecological factors.
Still, as Friedman (1974: 464) points out, ” . . . the
demo—techno-environmental givens are necessary but not
sufficient to explain the existence of a social formation.
On the contrary, the properties of the social system itself
are crucial in determining its development as well as its
present behavior within the bounds of a given technology.”
Historically, among the nomads of the Middle East, one can
see the transformation of the social and political form as
a cyclical process; history is not compartmentalized into
absolute phases and stages except by the analyst. The
nomadization/sedentarization process is easily the most
widespread, but there are also other cycles which may differ
from group to group. In Iran, for example, many of the
nomadic groups of the South coalesced as the State became
more powerful, while among other groups there was often
greater dispersal in the attempt to separate the group from

strict governmental controls (of. Irons 1975).

]

 

 

 

277

With the entry of the Kordshuli into Fars Province,
we can see the beginning of the replication of the cycle of
the Shift from small group (lineage, camp) into larger
groups (tribes, confederacies), and the subsequent breakdown
into smaller groups again. It would seem, however, that the
cycle has run its course and that because of political,
economic, and ecological factors the cycle, either as it
existed within the nomadic system or as part of the nomadi—
zation/sedentarization process, has become nonreplicating. 3
That is, with the greater power of the State, the ability ‘ it
of a nomadic group to escape or successfully challenge this
authority has greatly diminished. The small groups that
may continue to be in evidence as the larger tribal and
confederacy systems break down are left with few alter—
natives: remain nomadic under increasingly difficult con—
ditions or settle down. Most of the Kordshuli are choosing
the latter. The political shifts which have come about have
contributed to this decision both explicitly, by changing the
nature of the political group so that group unity as well as
the ability to interact with sedentary populations is im—
paired, and implicitly, by making the job of pastoralism
more difficult despite a more natural ecological distribution
of flocks and tent households. This latter point as it
relates to production and labor needs will be discussed in
the next section on the impact of economic shifts.

Prior to the strict governmental control of the

Entezamat period, sedentarization was but one of a number of

 

 

278

options to help alleviate environmental stress. As popu—
lation pressure, real or effective, increased, war and
fission were more viable alternatives than sedentarization
because they worked to maintain the desired nomadic adapta—
tion. Groups could seek virgin territory, take territory
from others, or jointly use the territory with others who
were already there. At this point Barth's perception that
sedentarization plays an important role in the maintenance
of demographic balance may be relevant. That is, sedentari—
zation, especially of impoverished nomads, may be seen to W
account for some of the population shifts in a given region
as population density increases. Still, he tends to down—
play the possible effect of fission and emigration (1961:
113—121). Also, Barth does not seem to perceive any possible
interdependence between sedentarization and population
density. That is, he sees sedentarization as being the
primary variable in maintaining demographic balance but he
does not focus on the possibility that demographic imbalance
could be an important variable leading to sedentarization
for some. In other words, he sets causality in one direction
only while it may, in fact, be a circular process, the ori-
gin of which is indeterminate.

Summarizing, Barth (1961) says that it is most
likely that the wealthy and impoverished will be the first,
or primary, groups to sedentarize. The rich settle because
their investment in land becomes more important to them than

their investment in animals. The poor settle because such

 

   

 

   

279

events as droughts, disease, and predation decimate their
flocks making it effectively impossible to maintain a
pastoral nomadic adaptation. I have argued in detail against
his model of wealthy sedentarization at the beginning of
this chapter. While I agree with much of Earth's model on
the sedentarization of impoverished nomads, I also discussed
his limited approach earlier in this chapter. Other condi—
tions argue against the universality of this model (e.g.,
in other areas shepherding contracts, loans, or family j
assistance are available and can help mitigate the im— i
poverished state which might otherwise lead to sedentari— V
zation)(cf. Irons 1972: 98). Among the Kordshuli, as among ‘
the Basseri, these are not viable options, but they do indi-
cate that sedentarization brought on by impoverishment may
be a function of the social relations of production rather
than only an environmental given.
However, rather than focus only on the fact that
sedentarization may alleviate pOpulation pressure, as Barth
does, it is also necessary to take note of the effects of
population pressure on the nomadic population. That is,
Barth's implication is that population pressure never be—
comes a significant problem for the nomads since it is always
alleviated by sedentarization before it can become too
great. Barth does point out, though, that within any
nomadic population there may be unequal growth of the
various sections. Since these sections have direct access

only to a certain bounded territory, there is some indication

 

   

280

that pOpulation density may at least affect small local pOpu—
lations. As population density increases, there is an in—
creased possibility of overgrazing as well as of a greater
destructive potential for disease and drought. The effects
of drought become more profound if flocks cannot be widely
distributed over available territory; disease becomes a
greater threat, especially for lambs and kids, if the ani—
mals do not have access to adequate pastures. If these

events occur there is a greater likelihood of impoverishment

..fi‘»; 1.... .

and, thus, sedentarization. The point to be made is that
nomads who occupy a constrained area are subject to the
possible effects of population pressure. Indeed, sedentari—
zation may alleviate population pressure, but it may also
have been ”forced” on the nomads by increasing population
density in the first place rather than by the normal effects
of accidental capital loss or mismanagement. That is, in-
creasing population density may intensify the factors which
Barth sees as natural aspects of a pastoral nomadic
existence.

It is often the constraints created by the political
(or politico—military) nature of the group and the cultural
environment which may affect, in the long run, the natural

ecology of the area, as well as the nature of the social and

 

economic adaptations of the group. Cultural boundaries are
not necessarily clear—cut. If the natural ecological area
is not discontinuous, then it is these cultural parameters

which become critical for understanding change. These

 

 

 

281

boundaries may become more or less flexible over time as
changes occur in both the natural ecological sphere (e.g.,
drought or disease), and in the cultural ecological sphere
(e.g., settlement of other groups or greater State control).
The traditional territory of the Kordshuli includes
summer pastures (Eilaq), winter pastures (qeshlaq), and the

migration route (rah—e kuch) which connects the two. This

 

corporate estate of the Kordshuli is effectively bounded by

other nomadic and sedentary groups. Within this bounded

...».ek- -1 .

area, population density is likely to increase over time
either through actual population growth or, indirectly,
through encroachment by neighboring groups which reduces
available territory. Figure 7.2, following, diagrammatically
shows the options that traditionally could be activated
among the Kordshuli. With increased population density,
reallocation of pastures within tribal territory may serve
as a short-term solution since tirehs reproduce at different
rates. However, it can only alleviate the problem tempor—
arily.

Another solution to the problem of increasing popu—
lation density is to battle with other groups for rights to

pastures. There is no evidence, however, within Kordshuli

 

oral history or within the histories of other groups in that
area, that the Kordshuli ever engaged in warfare to gain

more land. They have fought against other groups to retain

 

the territory that they already were using (e.g., against

the Basseri in summer pastures and against groups of

 

 

 

 

282

 

 

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283

Qashqa'i and 'Arab in winter pastures.)

Another alternative would be through group fission-
ing. Some of the Kordshuli could seek new territory, much
as the original core of the Kordshuli did when they first
migrated to Fars Province, or small groups could move into
new territories already occupied and coalesce with the
group there, as did other groups when they became part of
the Kordshuli. If we consider the territory under control
or use by the Kordshuli as a bounded system, then these
alternatives often lead out of the system, as would seden—
tarization. Even when moving into new areas, occupied or
not, the same pressures will eventually come to bear on the
group. These processes could conceivably continue until
marginal lands were saturated and there was no additional
territory to occupy. Then, the only viable alternative
would be sedentarization. This is, in effect, what has
happened with government control of the nomads and of all
unoccupied lands. Expansion, fissioning, and warfare have
lost their viability as possible options. Figure 7.3 shows
the effect of this governmental control. Even short term
”solutions”-—reallocation of tribal pastures and extra—
tribal seasonal pasture usage—~have been closed Off. Al—
though the nomads were given usufruct rights to their
traditional Eilaq and qeshlaq, they lost the flexibility to
move into other areas if conditions were poor. Also,

Entezamat, in order to keep track of the nomads, maintains

 

 

 

 

 

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sonmHh Qdosw

284

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285

a record of the identity and number of households in each
area. Thus, although some individual households might be
able to use extra—sectional pastures, there is no way to
balance total group use.

Therefore, in general terms, sedentarization becomes
the only viable option for decreasing population density as
State control increases. This is not meant to imply, at
this point, that sedentarization will necessarily occur as
population density increases. Rather, sedentarization, by
decreasing pOpulation density and actual population, allows
the continuance of the temporal and Spatial parameters of
population growth without putting undue stress on the system,
stress which would otherwise affect production (i.e., the
welfare of the flock). Yet, even as sedentarization
sloughs off (excess) population from the system, continued
agricultural encroachment on pasture land continually puts
pressure on those remaining by increasing effective popula—
tion density. If density reaches a point (certainly below
saturation point) where productivity declines because of the
increased possibility and occurrence of overgrazing, disease,
effects of drought, etc., then others may sedentarize
because of the increased difficulty of ”doing” pastoralism.
As we Shall see, with greater disperal and, yet, still
greater labor needs, few nomads desire to maintain their
nomadic lifestyle.

Within this general framework of increasing State

control, it is possible to see how political constraints

 

 

 

 

 

286

have affected the nomads' ability to interact effectively
with their environment, both natural and cultural. It would
seem that in the past in southern Iran, as part of the
coalescing/fractionalizing process, group fission was used
effectively to distribute human and animal pOpulations over

an extensive and, generally, ecologically continuous zone,

 

while fusion helped maintain the integrity of the group by
placing it wholly within a larger grouping which could
mitigate the effects of natural and cultural adversity.

In this area of southern Iran there are six possible
organizational forms, hierarchically ordered on the basis of

increasing complexity: huneh, beileh, oulad, tireh, taifeh,

 

and i1 (household, camp, descent group, section, tribe, and

confederacy). All of these organizational forms are not

 

present in all groups and there exists some confusion over
the use of some of these terms. The Kordshuli do not use
the term gulad and, although they admit to having had that-
organizational level within the piggp level, it was never
a separate form.

The coalescing or fusion of two or more of these
groups can take place at two levels. First, any two or
more units of equivalent complexity may coalesce to form
the next higher level (e.g., two or more hppgp may form a
beileh, two or more taifeh may form an il)r Secondly, any
unit smaller than the confederacy level may attach itself
to a larger (i.e., more complex) unit. However, in order

to do so, it must first become part of the next higher unit

 

 

 

287

within the larger grouping. That is, a huneh can join a

beileh, tireh, taifeh or an i1 but it must do so at each

 

consecutive level. To join a confederacy, it must join a
camp which may be part of a section which is part of a
tribe of that confederacy.

The ability of groups to consolidate in these ways,
however, has effectively been stopped by the State. The
flexible cultural boundaries that once existed have given
way to the inflexible boundaries impoSed by the government.

More importantly, for the Kordshuli, the fractional—
izing process that had allowed many households and groups
to fission off from the larger group has also been closed
Off except in the direction of sedentarization. This
fractionalization or fission could have been brought on by
a number of factors, including decreasing external or extra—
tribal hostilities, increasing internal hostilities, and
increasing population density, which may relate directly
to the other two factors. Historically, one can see that
many groups coalesced for defense of pastures and protection
from other groups, but when couditions improved some of
these groups would split off to become independent again, as
the Kordshuli did from the Qashqa'i. One reason for the
commencement of hostility could be increased regional
population density, which could limit access to adequate
pastures. There are still quarrels over rights to pastures,
especially those in garm—e sir (warm regions), but with

government control the nature of the conflict is usually,

 

 

 

 

 

 

288

limited to verbal duels.

Intra—group conflict could also lead to fissioning.
Although this could involve a group the size of an gulgd,
it more likely would be households or small camp groups
that would move on to greener pastures. It is also likely
that in this case the conflict may be~a function of in—
creased population density, either of the entire group or
sectionally, since the sections were assigned a specific
territory. There are a number of cases where intra—sectional
conflict has led to a household moving into another section's
territory and attaching itself to that group with the ap—
proval of the headman and the chief.

As population density increases it may become more
difficult to find adequate pastures for the entire group,
especially in dry years. This certainly could lead to
sedentarization by impoverishment for some, but it could
also lead to group fission within the nomadic Sphere as some
of the smaller units seek pastures elsewhere, perhaps
coalescing with others already in the new area. It is not
unlikely that intra— and inter—group conflict will increase
as pasture accessibility decreases or as pasture conditions
decline with greater population density in the region.

Thus, the fractionalizing/coalescing process has also
become unidirectional. Groups can no longer use consolida—
tion as a means of coping with adverse conditions, since the
government has defined the territory within which each small

group may attempt to maintain its pastoral adaptation. The

 

 

 

 

 

289

fissioning process used to be adaptational and cyclical
within the nomadic sector. Now, fractionalization can, and
does, occur, but without access to new pasture areas, seden—
tarization is the only route that these splinter groups can
take (Figure 7.4). A general point to be made is that an
analysis like Barth's fails to take into consideration
some major processes which are important for understanding
change.
Within the group, the change in leadership roles as

a response to State control have already been discussed in
chapter five. The changes are diagrammatically summarized
in the chapter in Figure 5.1. The point to be made is that
although some kadkhodas and the kalantar may continue to act
as economic mediators in terms of loans, land purchases,
and the like, they no longer can function effectively as
political mediators since this is now dependent on govern—
ment recognition and control. However, with the narrowing
migration route, the likelihood of conflict situations
arising between nomads and sedentary cultivators increases.
Previously, the kalantar or kadkhoda had the means to care
for his own flock while still representing a ”constituent”
in court or helping to come to an equitable settlement in
conflict situations. The average nomad, as Barth points
out, would find this difficult:

The farmer's community and land are stationary; though

his crops require attention, they readily survive a

week's neglect. The nomad camp must move, for the sake

of the herds; so to remain a member of his community

the nomad can at most linger one or two days in any
locality. His prOperty cannot be left in the charge

 

 

 

 

 

 

290

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291

of ”neighbors”, since it requires many hours of work

each day to move it with the camp; his flocks are held

together only by his constant shepherding, so his

whole means of livelihood will be lost by a single

day's neglect (1961: 78).
The Kordshuli would say that Barth's statement is a bit
extreme since it is often not that difficult for the camp to
stay on in one area for a few extra days and have a friend
or relative help with the flock. This is true, though, of
a camp group larger than two tents. With greater protection
from thieves and enemies because of governmental control,
the larger camp groups of a couple of decades ago have
broken down into smaller, more dispersed units. At the
same time, however, it has become more difficult to find
needed labor when the household head is drawn away from the
tent for whatever reason. He can no longer leave the tents
and flock in order to participate in the urban judicial
system when conflict arises without endangering his liveli—
hood. That is, labor sharing has decreased due to smaller,
more dispersed camp groups, so it is difficult to receive
adequate representation in court should a conflict arise with
sedentary folk. This is, Similarly, becoming the case for
many kadkhodas. Without adequate knowledge or sophisti—
cation, the average nomad is left with the predicament of
perhaps trying to face the judicial system of the State by
himself, while somehow trying to maintain his flocks. Many
of the Kordshuli would say that the effort is not worthwhile

and that sedentarization solves the problem.

 

 

 

 

 

 

292

The preceding analysis is not meant to imply that
sedentarization is a necessary outcome of increased State
control. Rather, it means that sedentarization becomes the
only viable option for those nomads who are forced out of
or desire to quit the system (i.e., Kordshuli nomadic
pastoralism), for whatever reason, Also, sedentarization
continues to function as one means of maintaining demos
graphic balance. The main point is that the political
shifts are part of a series of events that are negatively
affecting the ability of the Kordshuli nomad to main a ;
migratory existence. State control has not only affected
the flexibility of boundaries but also has lead to an
erosion of power within the Kordshuli. This shift in
power relations not only threatens group unity but also has
made the task of interaction between nomads and sedentary
populations more difficult by undermining or elminating
the mediator role which was held in the past by the tribal
elite. Nomadic pastoralism for the Kordshuli has not only
become more difficult physically, in terms of the actual
difficulty of moving flocks and caravan, but also more
difficult behaviorally, in terms of the options available to

and the constraints imposed upon the Kordshuli.

Impact of Economic Shifts

 

Increasing State control has not only affected the
political nature of the group but also has had dire ramifi-
cations for the economic well—being of the Kordshuli. Many

of the reasons for the shift to ”middle range”

 

 

 

 

 

293

sedentarization and the increase in sedentarization, gener—
ally, has been the increased level of State control over
resources. Land reform, rangeland control, and the formation
of the tribal gendarmarie post (Entezamat) had far reaching
effects on the ability of the nomads to maintain their life—
style.

The Land Reform Law of January 1963 and its additional
articles in the following year, as well as later amendments,
did not provide for seasonal pasture use by pastoral nomads.
Land distribution was supposed to be based on permanent
occupancy, a criterion which migrating pastoralists could
not meet. While the Kordshuli did not have to face the
extreme difficulties that other groups did (e.g, the
Qashqa'i, who cultivated in both summer and winter pasture
areas), there were still problems created by the improper
administration of the program, especially along the migra—
tion route and in winter pastures. Because Of the number of
Kordshuli who were already settled in summer pastures, the
loss of cultivated plots to non—Kordshuli, as occurred among
Qashqa'i, was not the major factor that it was in other
tribal areas. Beck points out for the Qashqa'i that
”because the non—Qashqa'i cultivators were settled and close
to the news media, they knew of the scheduling and operation
of land reform and were the first to register the land in
their own names” (1978: 7).

Many land owners tried to add to their holdings by

skirting the law. Certain types of land, such as gardens,

 

 

 

 

 

 

294

mechanized agricultural lands, and lands with motorized

pump wells, were exempt from land reform and many land—

owners tried to indicate prior usage based on these criteria.
Especially detrimental . . . was the rush by the wealthy
landowners to buy tractors or other agricultural
machinery and quickly work large tracts of land by
mechanized means, using wage laborers. This was not in
accord with the law, and much of this land was not
theirs even by customary right. But due to . . .
migrations, . . . these practices went largely unno—
ticed until it was too late. The land was then titled
to those who had made the effort to mechanize. Much
of this land was plowed but never planted, even to
this day. With vegetation and topsoil turned under,
wind erosion works quickly, and pasturage is destroyed
(Beck 1978: 8).

Many of the traditional pastures along the migration
route as well as in some areas of Kordshuli winter pastures
have suffered this degradation. Land reform resulted in
many traditional pasturelands being turned into less pro-
ductive, or non—productive, agricultural lands. Beck (1978)
and Fazel (1971) see the same processes occurring within
Qashqa'i and Boyr Ahmad territories. This loss of valuable
pastureland coupled with restrictions by the government on
other pastureland makes it increasingly difficult for the
Kordshuli to provide for their flocks. It also limits the
amount of available land for the whole group, thus putting
more pressures and the threat of destruction by overgrazing
on those remaining areas.

Another factor which greatly affected the ability of
the Kordshuli to maintain their flocks was the Forest and

Range Nationalization Act of 1963. Most of the unculti~

vated rangeland, including most traditional pasture areas,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

295

of the Kordshuli, became government property. Much of this
land was declared to be national preserves and the nOmads
were not permitted to use or cross through these areas,
while other areas were open to limited access only. However,
because the Forest and Range Organization of the Ministry of
Agriculture, which was given responsibility for the control
and allocation of national rangelands, believes that range—
management regulations on the original users are unenforce—
able, the improved rangelands have not been reopened for
use (Beck 1978: 9). Katouzian, writing on the problems
this control has for agricultural expansion, accurately
points out that the process has gone too far:
the decision to nationalize pastures drastically re—
duced the chances of expansion even within settled
agriculture. The discouraging effect was due not so
much to the letter of the policy as to its applica—
tion. Nationalisation of pastures may have been a
wise policy for the maintenance of their long—term
fertility as well as supervision over the use and
allocation of this agricultural (and pastoral) resource.
'What in practice happened was not nationalisation in
that sense, but expropriation and exclusion (1978: 367;
parentheses mine).
Similar changes occurred some years ago around
Shiraz, forcing some of the sections of the Kordshuli to
drastically alter their traditional migration route, thus
putting them in closer proximity to the Basseri with whom
the Kordshuli had a hostile relationship. This shift coupled
with agricultural expansion, which I will discuss below, re—
duced the available land for migration and lowered the

survival chances for the flocks during lean years. The

government did assign traditional pastures to the various

 

 

 

 

 

 

296

sections but, usually, based only on as they were during a
good year (i.e., with adequate rainfall and pastures). The
normal adaptation of pastoral nomads includes being able to
expand past their flexible boundaries when environmental
circumstances demand. These shifts also account for the
coalescing of different groups throughout the region. With
the flexibility of these boundaries diminished or eliminated
by government control, available land for expansion is also
reduced, and dry years may lead to extreme reduction in
flock size. Many of the Kordshuli lost up to 80 percent of
their flock during the prolonged drought of 1962—1964.
Although it would seem that the nomads are free to
roam in and out of protected areas because of the difficulty
of continuous governmental observation, this is not the
case. Throughout most of the migration route, the rural
gendarmarie posts try to keep an eye on the nomads. When
the nomads go further afield into the mountainous regions,
there are Sporadic checks by officials and representatives
of the Department of the Environment and other government
agencies. At some particularly critical points where the.
nomads have to be ”reminded” of which areas they may
actually use, it is not uncommon to see government repre—
sentatives clarifying sanctioned routes. Also, in certain
protected areas where the nomads have limited access, there
are often wandering representatives making sure that live
wood is not being used for firewood and that the goats are

not destroying trees in the region.

 

 

 

 

297

At the same time that the government is limiting
land use along parts of the migration route, agricultural
landowners also continue to encroach upon traditional pas—
ture areas. Prior to effective State control, even with the
beginning of agricultural expansion based on improved tech—
nology, the nomads had more than enough room to meet the
migration needs of a pastoral existence. Now, however, they
are being hemmed in from both sides and migration is becom—
ing more difficult, especially for large— and middle-range
flock owners. With government land on one side, agricultural
land on the other, and other tribes and tirehs in front of
and behind them, the Kordshuli realize the increased pos—
sibility of overgrazing and that there is a real possibility
that there will be inadequate pasturage during dry years.

Part of the reason for the substantial increase in
agricultural land use has been the introduction of better
technology, the implementation of some projects by local
governments, and the State's support of agriculture. Tradi—
tiOnally, the usual method of providing water for irrigation
was based on the qapgp system, a series of underground
channels that work to bring subsurface water above ground.
Now, many farms in summer pastures and most along the migra—
tion route and in winter pastures depend on motorized pumps
to draw water. Most of these pumps are hand-started pumps
from Great Britain which can bring water up from the ever—
decreasing water table for irrigation as well as for flocks

of sheep and goats. These pumps have allowed some

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

298

agriculturalists to expand the amount of land under culti—
vation, of which some, in the past, was considered too
marginal for adequate agricultural productivity. It is
indeed the case that sometimes the water requirements of
this new parcel of land may be working against the whole
future of agriculture in the region since, with imprOper
irrigation techniques, the amount of water wasted threatens
to lower the water table to a less than useable level in the
near future. Also, with increased agricultural potential in
the region there is always the chance of further settlement
buildup thus increasing the number of families engaged in
agricultural activities who are expanding into pasture
areas.

Within the area of winter pastures there have also
been some developments which may in the long run eliminate
more pasture areas from those available for the Kordshuli.

A number of sections of the Kordshuli are centered around
the village of Mobarakabad, southwest of the market center
of Jahrom. North of the village, the nomads are severely
limited in land use, being forced to camp in the foothills
or over the mountains in the next small valley. The flat
plain is almost all agricultural land, some of it not yet
highly developed. South of the village, though, much of the
open plain is accessible to the nomads and they spend both

a part of late autumn and a part of late winter or early
spring grazing along this plain with only daily trips into

the lower foothills with the animals. Some of this land

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

299

used by the Kordshuli has in the past been cultivated, but
with marketing difficulties much was left to fallow. While
I was in the area, however, the road between Mobarakabad
and Jahrom was widened and resurfaced, making it not only
easier but also cheaper to get produce to the market. It
may be expected, then, that much of the land that in the
past was left to fallow will once again be developed agri-
culturally and much of the accessible lowland pasturage will
not be available for use by the nomads. The agricultural
potential of this area can be seen in recommendations made
to the Plan and Budget Organization by a French consulting
firm. They expect much greater agricultural development in
the area (Scetiran 1977).

Another reason for agricultural expansion throughout
the region is that the central government is often more
willing to help agriculturalists develop a piece of land,
both through the use of subsidies and by, implicitly, making
agriculture a more profitable venture than pastoralism.
This is similar to the processes at work among the Qashqa'i:
”the prices . . . for pastoral products rose slower than the
demands for and amounts of land rents, bribes to government
officials, agricultural and consumer products, and urban and
travel expenses, largely because of inflation, imports of
meats and dairy products under protective tariffs, and
government—subsidized meat and dairy prices" (Beck 1980:

341-342).

 

 

 

 

 

 

300

With this increased cultivation and encroachment on
traditional pastures,

it is more likely that conflict situ—

ations will arise and that they will be decided more often
in the agriculturalist's favor as it becomes harder to keep

the nomad's animals out of the planted fields.

While these factors, primarily related to land use
and availability, have worked to lessen the desirability of

nomadic pastoralism as an acceptable lifestyle, other
factors,

primarily access to luxury goods and town—based
services,

have worked to make a settled existence more
attractive to the nomad.

Amanolahi's study of sedentarized
Basseri in Marvdasht,

a major market city north of Shiraz,
shows that 20 percent of his informants settled because of
the ”comforts of city life,” (i.e., ”electricity, access to
shops, entertainment, variety of foods, recreation and

access to hospitals and perceived luxuries)(1976: 12).

While it is more common for the Kordshuli to com—
plain about the difficulties of a nomadic pastoral existence,

many also express the positive nature of settlement. Many
young men want to have motorcycles and tape cassette/radios.
Those who have them as nomads point out the difficulty of
transporting them during migration. Many women have
expressed the desire to settle for more direct access to
shops and to health care facilities. Amanolahi also cites

”education for children” and ”the opportunity for a better

job” as additional ”pull factors” drawing the nomads to the
city (1976: 11).

 

 

 

 

301

I have noted in the preceding sections how a multi-
plicity of factors can affect any given nomadic pastoral
household. That is, how decreasing pastureland, a break—
down in group unity, the perceived advantage of access to
luxury goods, and the like, can and have directed many
nomads towards sedentarization. Implicit in this, though,
is a systemic explanation which‘includes an important

economic component as well as the political component which
I discussed in the previous section. In this latter case,
it was shown that, because of the direction of change in

the political domain, sedentarization becomes the only

viable option for leaving the system represented by the

pastoral nomadic community called Kordshuli.

Why, though,
has this option become more acceptable or necessary? In
general,

it may be said that the changes in the environment

of the Kordshuli have brought about a 'contradiction'
(defined by Friedman [1974] as ”the limits of functional

compatibility") between the forces of production and the

social relations of production. This

‘contradiction' may
be summarized in two sets of statements, one of which
relates to the actual state of Kordshuli organization, the
other to the systemic implications.

1.

Prior to effective State control: There was more avail-
able land for pastures and less agricultural land.

Thus, labor needs could be met by individual households;
it was not difficult to find pastures, nor was it dif—
ficult to avoid planted fields. However, the group was
largely coalesced for defense so additional, albeit
unnecessary, labor was available.

 

 

 

302

With increased State control: Agricultural expansion,
as well as nationalization of pastures,

etc., made land
for pasture use less available. However, labor needs
increased as it became harder to find adequate pastures

while avoiding cultivated fields with flocks and pack
animals. But, increased governmental control of rural
areas has allowed camp groups to disperse into smaller
units better adapted to the natural environment (i.e.,

units which are better able to avoid the effects of
localized drought and disease),

so that additional
labor when needed is scarce or unavailable.
That is, from point 2 above, as land scarcity increases,
pastoral nomadic labor needs intensify, and pastoral
productivity decreases since flock size and pastoral
productivity are dependent on available pasture re—
sources. However, additional labor may help to in—
crease productivity.‘ If additional labor is unavail-
able because of the traditional organization and social
relations of production of the society (rather than
because of the lack of any real labor source), then
the difficulty of maintaining an adequate level of
productivity for the household is increased.

This implies that a disjunction between productivity
and labor arises which necessitates a change in either the

social relations of production or in the value system of

the group if 'system breakdown‘ (in this case, sedentariza-

 

tion) is to be avoided. This disjunction sets up a further

contradiction between the relations of production and the
superstructure (i.e.,

in this case, the value system of the
Kordshuli). That is,

a value system which focusses on the

primacy of the independent household does not mesh with the
changed natural and cultural environmental conditions.
Prior to the current political situation, which
includes effective State control, the various tribes and
sub—tribes were organized into large camp groups for
defense, protection, and continued access to pasture land.

Yet, this organization, while adaptive in terms of the

 

 

 

 

303

cultural environment, did not allow for.efficient use of the
natural environment. Access to pasturage was limited for a
given localized nomadic group as population continued to
increase and as cultural boundaries effectively inhibited
expansion. These constrained areas, then, became subject to
possible overgrazing as well as to the effects of localized
drought, disease, and predation.

However, with increased State control and better
security in the rural areas the large camp groups broke up
into smaller units which could utilize the natural environ—
ment more effectively. This allowed the nomads to more
closely realize their cultural ideal of the independent,
self—sufficient household. The Kordshuli generally dis—
persed into camps of one, two, or three tent households.
This is not to imply that the independent household is
necessarily the most efficient adaptation. In fact, it is
likely that a camp group of five or so tents would be better
able to provide for the labor needs of the entire camp and
still effectively utilize the sparse yet extensive pastures
that characterize Kordshuli territory. Thus, the retention
of this cultural ideal has worked unfavorably for the
Kordshuli in terms of the changed cultural environment.
State control means that access to most natural resources is
beyond the direct control of the nomads. For the Kordshuli
to maintain their lifestyle, or at least to lessen the
difficulties inherent in the recent changes in their

environment, it would require their realizing that

 

 

 

304

independent households, the ideal notwithstanding, cannot
continue to function effectively as land scarcity increases.
Sanford (quoted in Beck 1978: 40), points out that the
Forest and Range Organization favors the formation of
cooperatives or corporations ”to whom large blocks of
grazing land can be allocated on a fixed—term contract sub—
ject to specific development (investment) and operating

(. . . approved range management practices) conditions.”
That is, individual households are being selected againSt

while larger groups are favored: ”in future allocations of

 

licenses to use both improved and unimproved grazing land
these corporations will be given favored treatment; and it
appears that individuals or pastoral societies that refuse
or are slow to form corporations may lose their present
grazing permits.”

From my conversations and interviews with the
Kordshuli, it would seem that they are generally unwilling
to modify the nature of their labor organization. That is,
they still think it is improper not to herd their own
flocks (unless it is herded by a close relative--a member of /
the nuclear family, or at most of the extended family unit). ,
It seems likely that were the Kordshuli to form cooperative
herding units or to hire shepherds, many more of them would
be able to maintain a pastoral nomadic existence for some
time to come. A major reason given for not attempting these
possible solutions is because of the cultural importance of

the ideal of the independent, self—sufficient household. To

 

 

 

 

 

305

be unable to herd one's own flock implies, to most Kordshuli,
an inability to be an adequate Kordshuli household head.
While some have chosen the route of forming dispersed eco—
nomic households, it is noteworthy that these partnerships
are within family groups only, unlike the agro-pastoral
combines of the Lurs (Black 1972) or even the minimal

herding units of the Basseri (Barth 1961).

Without changing the nature of their organizational
patterns the Kordshuli have even fewer options available as
circumstances continue to worsen and sedentarization, if
not a chosen goal, becomes forced on them as their way of

life becomes maladapted to the changing environment.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study had as its goal three primary objectives:
1) to add to the ethnographic literature on pastoral nomads;
2) to discuss the process of sedentarization in light of
Barth's commonly accepted yet inadequate model;1 and 3) to
identify causal factors of change and increased sedentari—
zation among the Kordshuli. The first objective should not
require further statement. The latter two, however, will
be summarized briefly both in terms of directions of
research and in terms of the conclusions reached. In these
summary statements I will refer only to the most salient
points; a fuller explanation of all analytical points is to

be found in the body of the dissertation.

Barth's Model of Sedentarization

 

Barth's (1961, 1964) model of sedentarization has
been widely accepted in the anthropological literature on
nomadic pastoralism and, thus, whether intended or not, has
served as a general model of the sedentarization process.
His major point is that extreme capital accumulation
(initially in the form of animals) and extreme capital loss
lead naturally to the elimination of wealthy and impover—

ished pastoralists from the nomadic community (i.e., to

306

 

 

307

sedentarization). Thus, sedentarization is used to explain
both social/economic homogeneity within the group and the
demographic balance of the total tribal population in the
region.

Much of the critique of Barth's model is directed
at those aspects of the model which are based on the con-
cept and consequences of capital accumulation. Apart from
the criticism of the internal contradictory remarks in
Barth's work, there are also a number of criticisms based
on Barth's assumptions about pastoral capital and pastoral
nomadic values. Barth's primary assumptions seem to focus
on the idea that economic rationality involves seeking
greater marginal profits. That is, when the rate of pro—
ductivity of the flock decreases then the nomad invests in
land because of the increased security and greater marginal
profits. An implication of his approach is that there
exists an ”upper crisis zone” within which the accumulation
of wealth accelerates and leads the nomad to invest in more
and more land until this investment becomes so great that
the nomad is drawn into a sedentary existence. Barth says
that this does not happen as frequently as it might because
there are factors which serve to inhibit the accumulation of
wealth: accidental capital loss; differential consumption
rates and the diversion of labor from pastoral production;
accelerated division of household and capital; polygyny and
the inheritance of ”too large” shares of pastoral wealth. I

point out that these factors do not inhibit wealth to any

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

308

great degree among the Kordshuli and, in fact, the Kordshuli
strive to maximize flock growth within the constraints
created by culturally available labor sources. It is more
plausible that there exists greater wealth differentiation
among the Basseri than Barth assumes.

I make the point that the ”upper crisis zone” does
not exist as such. Rather, a zone of increased options is
created in which the wealthy nomad may make individual
decisions regarding directions of productive labor and in—
vestment. Certainly, the wealthy nomad may choose to trans—
form pastoral capital into other forms but the choice to
settle, I argue, is not based on the accumulation of wealth,
per se, but rather that sedentarization, as one option among
many, is made easier by prior wealth in land.

I also discuss the ”failure and fall—away” model
which is based on the loss of capital. That is, as capital
productivity decreases with loss of animals, the nomad is
drawn into a downward spiral which eventually leads him
to sedentarize. It is not surprising that nomads who fail
to maintain the level of productivity required for a pastoral
nomadic existence must quit this lifestyle.

One of the more general problems with Barth's model
is that Barth fails to place sedentarization within the
total cultural context of the Basseri. He does not, for
example, consider cultural values (e.g., the importance of
the flock and the maintenance of a nomadic existence), as

critical variables in his attempt to explain what he

 

 

 

rel-“

 

 

309

perceives as primarily economic concerns. Nor does he con—
sider the social and political decisions that individual
households may make regarding sedentarization (e.g., settl—
ing when other nomads do even though flock size is still
within the range of viable productivity). "Economic
rationality” is not explicable only in terms of profit
margins and investment practices. Barth tends to equate
rational behavior with strategic behavior thereby inhibiting
an examination of the institutional framework of change and
adaptation. Perhaps this approach would be more applicable
or, at least, justified if the Basseri were fully integrated
into a capitalist system. However, one must question the
application of a model of strategic action and transactional
analysis derived from the field of economics to a pastoral
nomadic group that is only partially integrated into the
wider capitalist system. Certainly, there are implicit
directions to inquiry within any discipline which may dis-
allow the formation of many different types of questions.
The point is that there are implicit constraints in any
approach which must at least be addressed if validity is to
be assumed, at some level, for the stated conclusions.
Barth, it seems, failed to consider these constraints.
Another analytical difficulty inherent in Barth's
model is that, at least implicitly, it presents sedentari—
zation as an absolute and irreversible process. While Barth
does briefly note in his study that some settled nomads

do indeed begin to migrate again, he fails to incorporate

 

 

 

 

 

310

this fact into his model. Sedentarization is not seen as a
temporary fluctuation of a larger oscillating nomadism/
sedentism cycle which may occur as a result of shifting
cultural and natural environmental influences. Also, Barth
views sedentarization only as the complete abandonment of
migratory behavior, rather than as a relative shift in the
degree of nomadism to the degree of sedentism. Thus, Barth
is not able to consider variations in the sedentarization
process (e.g., dispersed economic households, marginal
nomadism, and group sedentarization). Nor can he explain
the shift to ”middle range” (i.e., nomads with neither too
large nor too small flocks) sedentarization, which has
become the pattern for the Kordshuli.

Barth's model, then, is not only inadequate, in many
ways, for explaining the sedentarization process of the
Basseri (and Kordshuli) of 20 years ago, it also cannot
take into account the social, economic, and poltical shifts
over time which have resulted in an increased rate of
sedentarization for many pastoral nomad groups in, at least,
southern Iran.

The ”adaptation and response” model (Salzman 1980),
while still requiring greater elaboration, addresses many of
the major concerns mentioned. However, it also seems too
externally directed (i.e., it may not deal directly with
constraints placed on the system by specific social organi—
zational features or by certain pastoral nomadic values).

Still, it allows for a wider range of variation in the

 

 

 

 

 

311

manifestations of sedentarization than does Barth's model,
as well as for a greater awareness of the fact that many of
the factors which may direct (however actively) many nomads
toward a more sedentary existence are, in fact, reversible.
This is not to imply that irreversible change does not occur.
In the context of this dissertation, the general conclusions
reached were based largely on the assumed irreversibility of
the effects of a powerful and, seemingly, unshakeable
governmental structure. As I will comment further below,
the recent revolution in Iran and the collapse of the Shah's
regime has increased the number of options available to
nomads who wish to remain mobile, while decreasing the
desirability of a sedentary existence, at least, for the
moment.

Change and Sedentarization among
the Kordshuli

 

The general conclusion reached in this study is that
sedentarization, for the Kordshuli, seems, in many ways,
inevitable. In the face of major changes in the political
and economic structures of the Kordshuli and of the larger
State, the survival options of the average nomadic Kordshuli
household have diminished. The small groups which continue
to be in evidence as the larger tribal and confederacy
organizational units break down under the effects of in—
creasingly effective State control are left with few alter—
natives: attempt to remain nomadic under increasingly diffi-

cult conditions or settle down.

 

 

 

312

Most of these increasingly difficult conditions have
resulted from the deposition of the kalantar (chief) of the
Kordshuli (and of other tribal leaders in the region) in the
late 1950s as well as from the restrictions placed on access
to resources, either directly by the nationalization of
pastures or indirectly by the governmental promotion of
agricultural development.

Politically, the deposition of the kalantar has led
to an effective political division of the taifeh (tribe).
The government's recognition of the kadkhoda (headman) of
each Eiggp (section) as the official representative of that
small group has tended to create quasi—tribal groups with
quasi-autonomous leaders thus undermining the unity and

solidarity of the larger collectivity. Indeed, the tirehs,

 

as political units, have increased in importance while the
kadkhodas have taken on, in limited fashion, many of the
traditional functions of the traditional kalantar (e.g.,

the role of political mediator, some control over migration,
increased responsibility for conscription, entertainment,
etc.).

Even with these increased functions, the unity of
these small groups is also threatened by the increased dis—
persal of household units throughout Kordshuli territory
allowed by increasing rural security. That is, the
kadkhoda has fewer face—to—face contacts with pipgp members,
as do 21128 members with each other. Despite this stress,

the unity of the group should be maintained for some time

 

 

 

 

 

313

because of the retention of social procesSeS (e.g., mar—
riage), which serve to solidify ties within the tireh.

Under the leadership of the afsar-e Entezamat

 

(Disciplinary Officer), the unity of the larger group was,
at least, nominally and administratively maintained. In

terms of interaction, the unity of the group at this point

 

is more a function of territoriality and Spatial proximity,
as well as of the continued identification by most nomads
with the larger collectivity, than of political or economic
integration. With the dissolution of Entezamat in 1976,

it is expected that the separation and dispersal of the
group will intensify and even nominal identification with
the larger group, Kordshuli, will decrease as access to
resources becomes more dependent on the £1322 or on the
independent household.

At a more general level, the historical processes of
political development, which functioned through processes of
consolidation and fragmentation of nomadic groups, have
essentially ceased under the impact of the Shah's government.
Traditionally, when pressure on resources increased, either
because of internal growth or external encroachment, seden—
tarization was but one of a number of options to help
alleviate environmental stress; nomadic grOups could also

seek virgin territory, take territory from others, or

 

jointly use already occupied territory. Increased State
control has eliminated these latter options leaving only

sedentarization as a viable option for coping with increasing

 

 

 

 

 

 

314

pressure on and constrained access to resources.

This constrained access to resources has been exac-
erbated by governmental programs leading to land reform and
the nationalization of rangeland, as well as by increased
agricultural development with its Concomitant encroachment
on traditional pastureland. These limitations on pasture
availability not only make the semi—annual migration more
difficult, but also increase the risk of conflict with
sedentary agriculturalists. Also, it is expected that much
of the pastureland utilized in summer and winter areas will
be developed agriculturally, further limiting access to
available pastures and thus, making the adaptation even more
difficult to maintain. Many Kordshuli have expressed the
desire to settle, not because of a dislike of nomadism, but
because of the difficulty involved in moving animals through
the migration route.

While the above mentioned factors have lessened the
desirability of nomadic pastoralism as an acceptable life-
style, other factors such as access to luxury goods and
town—based services make a sedentary existence more attrac—
tive to the nomad.

At a higher level of abstraction, the limited Options
available to the Kordshuli are not only the result of exter—
nal constraints but also reflect the contradiction that
obtains between the forces of production and the social
relations of production. Certainly, in any pastoral society

access to labor within the herd-owner's family or from other

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

315

culturally acceptable sources is vital. One major goal in
the pastoral strategy is to achieve a balance between the
available labor force and the flock (cf. Dahl 1979: 273).
The labor that was available to nomadic camps was greater
in the past when camp groups were larger; however, with
more pasture land available and fewer constraints on migra—
tion, most households could meet their own labor needs. AS
increased State control allowed for the dispersal of large
camp groups by increasing rural security, it also limited
access to traditional pastures, as did agricultural expan—
sion. However, the traditional social relations of pro— ,3
duction, which are based on the cultural value of the
primacy of the independent, self—sufficient household, do
not function adaptively to maintain pastoral nomadism as a
viable lifestyle in the face of increasing labor needs and
decreasing availability of land. Without changing organi—
zational patterns and, perhaps, their value system, the
Kordshuli have limited options as environmental circumstances
worsen. Thus, sedentarization, if not a desired change, will
be forced on most, as nomadic pastoralism as practiced by

the Kordshuli becomes maladapted to the changing environment.

Further Considerations

 

Many of the factors which led to my conclusion that
sedentarization was seemingly inevitable for the Kordshuli
were based on an assumption of the stability and maintenance
of the Shah of Iran's regime, as well as on the continuation

of the economic and political programs instituted by that

 

 

 

 

 

316

government. While I accepted the idea of reversibility of
most factors which may lead to sedentarization, I did not
bring this issue to bear on the possibility of changes in
the state—level political apparatus. It seemed, at the time
of my research, unlikely that any major shifts in the cen-
tral government would or could occur in the coming decade.

However, in 1978—1979, a revolution in Iran overthrew
the shah and has replaced his government with one organized
around the conservative precepts of Shiite Islam, at least
as espoused by the Ayatollah Khomeini. As a result of this
turn of events, my conclusion on the inevitability, under
certain circumstances, of sedentarization for the Kordshuli
is uncertain since the change is no longer directly observ-
able. I would contend, though, that had the revolution not
occurred the majority of Kordshuli would have been settled
within a decade and the group, at all levels, would have had
little meaningful significance.

The effects of the revolution have had great impact
on the tribes of Iran. The following extensive quotation
from Lois Beck, who was able to see first hand some of these
effects on the Qashqa‘i whom she visited in September 1979,
Shows how some pastoral nomads have responded to the changes
in State level political organization:

With loss of government control, tribes are again as—
serting their autonomy and, in particular, their rights
to use traditional pastures. Land reform and pasture
nationalization, which had great detrimental effects on
nomadic pastoralists, are associated with the now—

regarded illegal and illegitimate regime of the shah
and many individuals and groups are reclaiming their

 

 

 

 

317

land . . . Many nomads who had severed their connec—
tions with the land have now returned, many who had
sedentarized are back on the migrations and most of
those who sought urban wage labor have returned to the
mountains.

Relations of production——such as those between no—
mads and moneylenders, or between hired shepherds and
employers—-have also rapidly changed. With the Islamic
Republic's appearance, interest—taking was forbidden
and religious authorities enforced the nomads‘ demands
that their debts be renegotiated so that only the
actual value of borrowed goods and money needed to be
repaid. Many nomads were then able to discharge their
total debts in the new regime's first months. In the
absence of government control and in light of the great
national demand for meat, many poor and middle—range
Qashqa'i are now able to assume economic independence.
Pressure on land was the major factor creating differ-
ential access to it; once the pressure is decreased—-as
it is under current revoluntionary conditionS-—former
pastoralists can easily locate pastures for their
flocks. What will happen as government control gradu—
ally reasserts itself is not clear (1980: 348—349).

It should be expected that the Kordshuli have been respond—
ing as the Qashqa'i have so that many nomads who have
recently settled will once again begin to migrate and many
nomads who were likely to settle in the near future may now
remain nomadic until future changes make pastoral nomadism'
less desirable.

Certainly, as Beck has pointed out, we can not know
what will happen as the Islamic government slowly overcomes
the political and economic problems brought on by the revo—
lution and once again begins to reassert control in the
rural areas. However, it is not unlikely that, without a
major shift in government policy in terms of the use of
marginal environments, the same constraints on the nomads
will once again develop, making nomadic pastoralism a

difficult and undesirable activity. To further the goals of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

318

the revolution, which include making Iran more politically
and economically independent, the government would do well
to consider the fact that some form of pastoral nomadism or
transhumance is needed to effectively exploit the rangeland
of Iran (which comprises approximately 75 percent of the
total land area of the country). Otherwise, it would seem
that Iran will again face the problem of not being able to
produce enough food to feed its own inhabitants.

The revolution in Iran, if it has shown little else,
has at least shown how the nomadic adaptation functions,
and has functioned throughout history, in response to higher
level political change. As central governments and control-
ling regimes are undermined or overthrown, controls on
mobility are lessened and nomadism becomes increasingly
viable for a growing segment of the population. The
sedentism/nomadism cycle in southern Iran has not yet be-
come unidirectional and, in fact, may not if the central
government works to improve and thereby perpetuate some form
of extensive animal husbandry. Only time will Show us the

long—range effects of the recent changes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GLOSSARY

 

 

 

GLOSSARY

Kordshuli words occurring on more than one page and not
always glossed in the text.
afsar—e Entezamat: Disciplinary Officer; see Entezamat

'Arab: a tribe in southern Iran; part of the Khamseh
confederacy .

Basseri: a tribe in southern Iran; part of the Khamseh
confederacy

beileh: camp group, usually two to four tent households
chador: Kordshuli winter tent

dung: one sixth of any piece of real estate

dust: trading partner; friend

eilaq: summer pasture area

Entezamat: short for qaragah—ye Entezamat, the government—

created gendarme post in charge of tribal affairs headed
by the afsar—e Entezamat

 

 

garm~e sir: warm region; the area of lowland winter
pastures

hajir: Kordshuli summer tent

hamsayeh: neighbor; a person in the same camp (beileh) but
in a different tent

huneh: house, tent household

il: confederation of tribes, united under a paramount
chief (khan)

kadkhoda: headman of a tireh or of a village
kalantar: chief of a taifeh (tribe)

kashk: dried and rolled milk curds

319

 

 

 

 

 

 

320

Khamseh: a confederation of tribes in southern Iran in—
cluding the Kordshuli, Basseri and 'Arab

khan: chief; either paramount chief of an 11 or the title
of address given to any male member of the tribal elite

khavanin: plural of khan; refers to all members of the
chief's immediate and collateral family; essentially,
tribal elite

lataf: sections of tent made of woven goat hair

mahr: Islamic deferred dower

ojaq: hearth; firepit

pasgah: army or gendarme (rural security forces) post

qaragah—ye Entezamat: see Entezamat

Qashqa'i: one of the largest confederations of tribes in
Iran; located in southern Iran, primarily Fars Province

Qeshlaq: winter pasture area

rah—e kuch: migration route

sarhad: cold region; the area of highland summer pastures
taifeh: tribe, united under a kalantar

tireh: section of a taifeh; a quasi-descent group united
under a kadkhoda

vatan: homeland; for the Kordshuli the area which they
consider their own territory in sarhad

yort: campsite

zesht: ugly; said of any thing or act that is considered
inappropriate

zesht—e: ”it is ugly”; see zesht

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOTES

Chapter One
1.

Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms pastoral
nomadism, nomadic pastoralism, nomadism and pastoralism
interchangeably. Although it is desirable sometimes to
separate the productive regime (pastoralism) from the
factor of mobility (nomadism), the adaptation of the
Kordshuli and the subsequent changes in it largely are
concerned with both aspects of that lifestyle.

It is perhaps easier to View this continuum as an oscil—
lating pendulum rather than as a linear model where
nomadism and sedentism are conceptualized visually as

periodic oscillatory shifts rather than as polar op—
posites.

The actual Persian plural of most Persian words is rarely

used; most plurals are indicated by context or by the
addition of an ”s”.

Chapter Two

1.

The northern and southern zones are also known as sardsir
and garmsir by other groups.

Chapter Four

1.

One woman who had married a relative in a different sec—
tion would often sit alone outside the front of their
tent while her husband was away and loudly lament the
fact that none of her close kin were around either to

talk with or to offer support to her in the event of a
domestic quarrel.

Actually, it is possible to view residence as also being
uxorilocal, since it is common for both husband and wife
to come from the same tireh.

Chapter Five

1. The use of this title may not have been applied to the
leader of the Kordshuli until they were part of the
Qashqa'i confederacy.

 

321

 

 

 

 

322

 

2. While power struggles of this kind are not really part
of the oral history of the Kordshuli, many Kordshuli
think it likely that they did indeed exist.

3. This is not meant to imply total equality since wealth
differentiation does exist. Rather, there is a major
separation between the khavanin (chiefs) and the rest of
the nomads. Differentiation of any kadkhoda from others
in this latter group would be for reasons other than
political position. Black (1972) notes the problem of
analytical egalitarianism in another Iranian group.

Chapter Six

1. This section, of course, occurred in a different histori—
cal period than the one being discussed, but the general
process is similar enough to allow the comparison.

Chapter Seven

1. Rosman and Rubel (1976) note one variation of this form
of economic household unit where brothers annually
reverse the role of farmer and herder.

 

Chapter Eight

1. It should be mentioned that Barth has presented a more
recent model (1973) that attempts to show better the
range of variation that exists along a nOmadic/sedentary
continuum. While the paper does not address itself
directly to sedentarization it does provide a more
adequate portrayal of differences in resource utilization

in a given region.

 

 

 

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