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SEDENTARIZATION: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION
AMONG THE KORDSHULI PASTORAL NOMADS
OF SOUTHWESTERN IRAN

presented by

Gary Michael Swee

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Anthropology

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SEDENTARIZATION: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION AMONG THE KORDSHULI PASTORAL NOMADS OF SOUTHWESTERN IRAN

By

Gary Michael Swee

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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1981

ABSTRACT

SEDENTARIZATION: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION
AMONG THE KORDSHULI PASTORAL NOMADS
OF SOUTHWESTERN IRAN

By

Gary Michael Swee

This study concentrates on social change among a pastoral nomadic group in southwestern Iran, the Kordshuli. The changes that have occurred and are still occurring are examined through changes in the social, political, and economic environment of this one group. A major focus will be sedentarization, viewed as the deliberate action among a localized population of restricting or eliminating its migratory behavior as a response to changing environmental circumstances. Both the nature of and the rate of sedentarization have changed considerably in the last two decades as increased State control and expanding agricultural development have made it more difficult to maintain a pastoral nomadic adaptation.

The study has three primary objectives: 1) to identify causal factors involved in the process of social change qua sedentarization; 2) to examine and critique Fredrik Barth's commonly accepted model of sedentarization; and 3) to increase our general knowledge and understanding of the pastoral nomadic adaptation.

The final objective is met throughout the dissertation but primarily in two chapters which provide a brief

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ethnographic overview of the Kordshuli, focusing on the various organizational levels of the group.

The second objective is addressed primarily in the penultimate chapter. Barth's model is criticized on a number of points (e.g., internal contradictions; Barth's assumptions on pastoral capital; the denial of the cultural context of sedentarization; and the presentation of sedentarization as an absolute, irreversible process). The point made is that Barth's model is inadequate at various levels: it cannot adequately explain the sedentarization process even as it worked for the Basseri at the time of his research; it does not take into account the social, economic, and political shifts which have resulted in an increased rate of sedentarization for many nomads in southern Iran; nor does it consider variations in the sedentarization process (e.g., dispersed economic households, marginal nomadism, and group sedentarization). These variations are discussed and the suggestion is made that a different model may prove more useful in understanding the nature of change and sedentarization as relative shifts in the degree of nomadism or sedentism practiced by any group.

The primary objective is met through an examination of change in the political system over time (chapter five), change in the economic system of the group (chapter six), and the impact of these changes on the Kordshuli (chapter seven). A major focus of these chapters is the effect of increased State control on the political and economic

processes of the Kordshuli with particular reference to the changes that have directly affected the Kordshuli's access to resources: land, water, and labor.

Traditional means of alleviating pressure on resources (e.g., warfare) or the consolidation and fragmentation of camp groups have been eliminated by the State except fission in the direction of sedentarization. Land reform, nationalization of rangeland, and agricultural encroachment on traditional pastureland (supported by government development projects) have all made a pastoral nomadic existence difficult, if not impossible for some, to maintain.

Thus, the general conclusion reached in this study is that sedentarization for the Kordshuli seems, in many ways, inevitable. In the face of major changes in the political and economic structures of both the Kordshuli and the larger State the ability of most nomadic pastoral households to maintain this lifestyle is drastically diminished. The small groups which continue to be in evidence as larger organizational units break down and are dispersed by State action are left with few alternatives: attempt to remain nomadic under increasingly difficult conditions or settle down.

As a final statement, it is pointed out that the recent revolution in Iran has modified these conclusions.

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I am also in debt to Dr. Sekandar Amanolahi of Shiraz University (formerly Pahlavi University) who not only helped me choose the group, the Kordshuli, with whom I lived

but also was willing to agree to an official, yet nominal, collaborative work effort so that the government would issue me a research permit.

I must also thank Dr. Peter Prindle, his wife, Tamae, and daughter. They provided me with a home away from home in Shiraz. They offered friendship, sharing and caring. And perhaps (jokingly) most important, I could take a hot shower at their home after a month or more of wandering.

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CHAPTER I

THE STUDY

Introduction and Statement of the Problem

Many of the cultural groups and modes of human adaptation traditionally studied by anthropologists are fast disappearing as the modern world overwhelms traditional adaptations. Once such adaptation is that of pastoral nomadism.[1] The reasons for the diminishment of nomadism throughout the world are multifold, but in all cases, the changes which occur in the adaptive strategies of individuals and groups are, at least partially, the result of nomads settling down--sedentarization.

The problem of sedentarization has been given ethnographic treatment by Fredrick Barth in Nomads of South Persia (1961). Barth's model of sedentarization basically claims that sedentarization is the normal consequence of extreme capital accumulation or extreme capital losses, and that it, thus, accounts for the social/economic homogeneity of the Basseri pastoral nomads as well as for the demographic balance of the total tribal population that obtains in the area.

Barth's study stimulated many researchers to build on his foundations, or to criticize his view as being inadequate

or, at best, overgeneralized. Many of the researchers to follow Barth have shown that sedentarization for other nomadic groups does not necessarily support his model. Their objections include the fact that nomads may settle for other than economic reasons, (e.g., political factors), and that Barth's model could not account for forms of sedentarization other than individual settlement (e.g., the group settlements of entire communities), (cf. Irons 1972, Swidler 1973, Bates 1973). Other researchers merely accepted Barth's model as valid for the Basseri and used it as the springboard for comparison, or they applied it to other groups to validate its cross-cultural applicability (cf. Beck 1980, Vandervert 1972). I, personally, felt that Barth's lead was fruitful but that he had only investigated limited aspects of this form of social change.

My original intent when I began this project was to study further the process of sedentarization, perhaps even among the Basseri with whom Barth had worked. I felt that while Barth had made a brilliant contribution to the anthropology of pastoral nomadism, there were a number of problematic areas in his study. A number of these problems arose, no doubt, because Barth had spent only three months with one group of Basseri, most of that time during spring migration. Most of his data, then, were based on informant interviews rather than on personal observation. I felt it likely that there were possible problems with Barth's interpretation since he could not really put his analysis into the

appropriate cultural context. The fact that he camped and migrated almost exclusively with the chief's retinue made suspect his attempts to generalize to the entire group. The chief's camp is not likely to be representative of nomad camps in general. For instance, it is likely to have greater access to some of the better pastures as well as access to more and better information about the prospects for sedentarization. In retrospect, this latter concern seems even more reasonable since many of the sedentarized Kordshuli work as share croppers on land belonging to the khavanin (the chief and his family). Thus, sedentarization may be more appealing if one has a reasonable likelihood of finding adequate work. That is, for example, the degree of poverty that "forces" sedentarization may, in many cases, be a function of prior knowledge of employability.

Also, I felt that Barth, in his study, viewed sedentarization too much as an absolute, irreversible process rather than as part of a larger nomadism/sedentism continuum.[2] Certainly, changes in the economic environment of any pastoral nomad group could lead to sedentarization but changes in the circumstances that led to this shift could also allow a return to nomadism. Sedentarization should not be seen as only the complete abandonment of nomadism but rather as a relative shift in the degree of nomadism to the degree of sedentism. While it may include an absolute form, it must also include relative forms.

Another point which Barth overlooked in his limited economic model is that changes in the cultural environment of the Basseri (e.g., increasing control of resources by the central government), could also affect the ability of the nomads to maintain their adaptation. I believed that a fuller understanding of the process could be gained by examining better the reasons for settling (out of nomadic life). That is, there are not only economic processes but also environmental, political, demographic, and cultural processes which may direct a shift toward increased sedentism. Similarly, many of these may be reversible as conditions change, thereby increasing the degree of nomadism (cf. Salzman 1980: 6).

The final impetus for this study of sedentarization came from my belief that, despite the adequacy or inadequacy of Barth's study, it was necessary to examine the results of the deposition of the chiefs and the takeover of tribal affairs by the central government, which had only just occurred at the time of Barth's research.

Unfortunately, as I mention in more detail below, I was unable to carry out the research as planned due to government restrictions on my movements as well as on that of the nomads. Still, I maintained my interest in sedentarization and saw that the rate of sedentarization, as well as the number of nomads sedentarizing, had increased greatly in the past two decades. The nomads attributed this to the fact that migration was troublesome and that it was difficult

to find adequate pastures for the animals. The problem, as I perceived it, was to put into perspective the nature and scope of the changes in the environment of the Kordshuli that have contributed to these expressed feelings, and their responses to these changes. The options that the Kordshuli activate, while perhaps expectable at some level, are still only part of the range of options available to them. Some readers might argue that the shift to a settled life is a fait accompli among nomads in developing countries. In response, I would only point out Shahrani's study (1979), which shows that "the Kirghiz case further demonstrates that in the context of political developments in modern nation-states the direction of social change in a pastoral society need not be always toward an agricultural or urban way of life; the possibility of change within a pastoral regime exists and can provide a practical and successful alternative" (p.: xxiii). The idea that sedentarization is a response to specific political and economic shifts in the environment of a nomadic group is only a hypothesis which must be tested and made explicable in terms of actual events in the area.

Purpose of the Study

This study concentrates on social change among a pastoral nomadic group in southwestern Iran, the Kordshuli. The changes that have occurred and are occurring will be examined through changing social, political, and economic systems. A major focus will be sedentarization, which is a

function of these changing systems, within the framework of a changing external environment. Sedentarization will be viewed, in this context, primarily as a strategic adaptation (i.e., the deliberate action taken by a localized population to restrict or eliminate its migratory behavior and pastoral pursuits as a response to changing environmental circumstances).

The study has three major objectives. The material presented in this study will serve to increase our knowledge and understanding of the pastoral nomadic adaptation generally, and processes of social and cultural change, specifically. Despite the increase in the number of studies on pastoral nomads, there is still a dearth of information on the nature of the adaptation in general terms. That is, we have specific information on economic systems or political adaptations for a few nomadic groups (e.g., Bates 1973, Fazel 1971, Irons 1972), but the overview is still incomplete. The possible range of variation becomes apparent only with more ethnographic examples.

The second objective of the study is to present, with a general ethnographic sketch, a view of sedentarization which, although derived from the study of the Kordshuli, should prove more useful in understanding change and sedentarization than Barth's (1961) commonly accepted, yet inadequate, model. This is important because Barth's model, seemingly, has been accepted without question and because, at the time of this research, there was a notable lack of data

on the sedentarization process for other groups.

The third objective of this study is to identify causal factors involved in the processes of social change qua sedentarization, within a general ecological framework. A further statement of this perspective will be made later in this chapter.

Methodology

The research for this dissertation was carried out between November 1975 and August 1977 in two major stages. The first stage included general library research in Tehran and Shiraz while I was attempting to secure a research permit from the Iranian government. The second stage was from September 1976 to August 1977 when I lived with the Kordshuli pastoral nomads in Fars Province.

All interviews and discussions, except some with two sons of the kalantar (chief), were conducted in Persian or Lori, a dialect of Persian. The discussions with Pasha Khan and Mahmud Khan Setudeh were primarily in English since both of these men had studied in the United States.

The intent of my original research project had been to study both a group of nomads and a recently sedentarized portion of that group to understand better the complete range of the sedentarization process. The government of Iran, however, had given me permission to live with the nomads only, not to do research in the nearby villages. This meant that from the very beginning I was stymied in my attempt to gather complete information about sedentarization

and the processes of social and cultural change. Still, I felt that I could gather adequate information from the nomads that would, at least, give some additional insight into the processes involved.

Even this attempt was stymied to some extent by the government's "request" that I move every month or so to live with another kadkhoda (headman) of the various sections (tireh)[3] of the Kordshuli. There are eight kadkhodas and I was to live with each one for a rather short period of time. While it may have given me the chance to experience more fully the nomadic lifestyle, it created more than a few problems for data gathering. It is, for example, very difficult to gain rapport with any group when they have no time to become familiar with the stranger in their midst. Of the eight groups, two of the kadkhodas were reserved to taciturn towards me fearing I was a government agent trying to find youths without identity cards. Four of the others treated me as a guest which, while culturally appropriate, disallowed certain types of questions. The final two treated me more like a friend, but I did not have the time to gain enough of their confidence to ask many personal questions or to pry into the details of their economic situation.

Due to these constraints on my ability to ask questions, a lot of my material is based on a combination of participant observation and very broad-based questions. Informal interviews were useful but hardly could ever go

into the depth that I would have desired as a data gathering exercise. There were also a number of problems with basic census gathering. While I would have liked to visit each tent household, it was impossible. Many of the camps were too greatly dispersed for me to reach many of the households. While a local assistant would have proved invaluable, I did not have the funds to hire the few young men who could read and write and who were neither in school nor acting as shepherds for their family's flock. Therefore, I depended on the kadkhodas for most of my primary information. Whenever possible this information was corroborated by actual household heads or, secondarily, by friends and neighbors. Not all data were thus cross-checked; however, the data that were cross-checked indicate a fairly high level of reliability.

Throughout the dissertation there will be little reference to one of the sections, Moradshafi'i. This is because the kadkhoda and his family were unwilling to share any of their information with me and the rest of the section was not camped close enough for me to attempt personal interviews. However, I feel that any generalizations that I might make for the rest of the sections are likely to hold true for this one group, too.

Due to the nature of data gathering, more or less forced on me by circumstance, the reader may find some subjective statements which seem to have no objective data bases. I have gained a subjective awareness of the Kordshuli

that is based on the totality of my life with them. Not only the directed interviews but also the daily banter which is found in all groups served to reinforce my understanding of the Kordshuli and to fill in the gaps that participant observation creates when we cannot always understand the behavior before us. This subjective appreciation, while perhaps not quantifiable, adds a level of understanding beyond that of any "objective" data that may have been collected, and certainly allows for a richer and fuller picture of that group of people who call themselves Kordshuli.

Theoretical Framework

The primary approach used in this study, while not always explicit, may generally be considered a form of ecological anthropology. This is partly because of the amenability of this perspective to the study of pastoral nomads as well as because of the specific subjects that I was interested in. The usefulness of an ecological approach in the study of pastoralists, especially nomadic pastoralists, has been quite apparent in the ethnographic literature. Even some of the early structural-functional/social structural researchers noted the importance of the relationship of social and political forms to the ecological needs of animals.

A prime example of this awareness is shown in Evans-Pritchard's classic monograph, The Nuer, which, while focusing on political institutions, recognizes the importance of

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ecological variables: "political institutions are its [the study] main theme, but they cannot be understood without taking into account environment and modes of livelihood" (Evans-Pritchard 1971: 4; orig. 1940).

Of course, The Nuer is but one of a number of studies that relate to or explicitly use an ecological perspective. Certainly, there has been a long tradition of utilizing an ecological perspective in certain areas of the world to enhance our understanding of pastoral societies (e.g., in East Africa (cf. Gulliver 1955; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Dahl 1979) and in the Middle East and Central Asia (cf. Krader 1955, 1957; Barth 1961; Bates 1973; Shahrani 1979)). In many cases it may be that an ecological approach appeals to pastoral nomadic studies because there is often less elaboration of social, political, and religious practices among many pastoral nomads than there is among their settled counterparts. That is, such factors as movement/migration may disallow or inhibit extreme elaboration of many forms which might otherwise attract the interest of the researcher. Since modern pastoral nomads usually are to be found in marginal environments, much of the energy of the group seemingly is directed towards overcoming the "hardships" of the environment. Thus, the ecological approach in these cases is aptly suited for the description, examination, and analysis of the relationship and adaptation of the group to its environment.

It may also be the case that an ecological approach has proven useful in the study of pastoral nomads because of the particular focus of many of these studies. That is, such topics as the use of resources and sedentarization show a concern with many aspects of a group's adaptation that an ecological anthropologist would find interesting and important for understanding change (and stability) within that group.

In the context of this dissertation I am not trying to make any broad statements concerning the overall utility of an ecological perspective other than the fact that it is generally amenable to the major topical concerns of this study. Thus, while I accept the usefulness of a general ecological approach for this study, I am not trying to say that it is the only way, nor in all cases the best way to examine social change. The general premises of ecological theory which focus on the interaction of culture and environment--natural and cultural--provide a general framework within which my analysis can be ordered.

However, I do not situate this study solely in the realm of an ecological tradition. To more fully understand the changes that the Kordshuli are experiencing, I also use some elements of other traditions which lend themselves to the study of sedentarization. For example, structural Marxism which allows for an examination of any contradiction that obtains between infrastructure and superstructure (e.g., between forces and relations of production), gives some

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additional insight into the reasons for the intensification of sedentarization among the Kordshuli which an ecological approach does not allow. Thus, I am able to show how traditional organizational features and values of the Kordshuli inhibit productivity by limiting labor resource options. These limited labor resources, which are only a function of desired modes of activity not of an actual shortage of regionally available labor, then may have the result of further limiting the options of the nomadic household making sedentarization even more likely.

Similarly, I include a historical perspective which I feel is necessary to understand present adaptations. Shahrani, who uses a cultural ecological framework for his study of the Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan, points out:

> No ecological process is fully comprehensible in a time vacuum . . . therefore . . . an historical perspective is adopted along with a cultural ecological framework, based on a belief that it is not possible to fully comprehend the nature, direction, and magnitude of the adaptive success or failure of any kind of systematic change unless the dynamic relationship among the parts within a system, as well as its relationships within the larger complex, are assessed under different conditions at different times (1979: xxi).

I have, therefore, attempted to show how shifts over time in political, economic, and social spheres have contributed to increased sedentarization. Some of these changes have been forced on the Kordshuli either directly by the central government, or indirectly by the changing environmental situation; other changes have been chosen from a number of possible options. It is only through an examination of the changes in the leadership roles and the changes in the

function of organizational units that a fuller understanding of change and sedentarization can be realized.

I have drawn upon approaches other than those traditionally considered ecological in an attempt to provide a more open-ended approach to the study of sedentarization. Still, I do focus on many of the traditional topics of an ecological approach. The interaction of larger populations, small groups, and individuals with their environments is of primary interest. These environments include not only natural environmental features such as climatic variation but also cultural environmental features such as settled populations and the central government. I examine the way in which changes in the cultural environment of the Kordshuli (e.g., increased State control or competition for resources), affect the adaptation of the Kordshuli nomad as well as the way in which certain changes in the natural environment (e.g., drought), create varied options for the Kordshuli, some of which involve quitting the nomadic system.

Many of the studies which have been labeled ecological do not attempt to take macro-structures into account nor are they always sensitive to the larger cultural or historical context of certain phenomena. This is more than evident in Barth's work on the Basseri where he claims to "present the analysis in terms of a general ecologic viewpoint" (1961: foreword). If, indeed, Barth had been more direct in his attempt to use an ecological framework, he would not have

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isolated the phenomenon of sedentarization from its cultural context as he did. Rather, Barth approached his study more from a model of strategic actions derived from the field of economics. As I mention at the end of this dissertation, Barth's focus on economic transactional analysis blinded him to the cultural context of the sedentarization process. Barth's study would have benefitted greatly if he had at least been sensitive to the relationship between cultural ecology and levels of sociocultural integration (Steward 1955) or even to the awareness by other earlier researchers such as Lattimore (1962) of the impact of larger level political units on encapsulated local level groups.

Still, while I claim the utility of an ecological perspective, there is recognition of the fact that an ecological approach, although useful at a mulitude of levels within any system, has a number of difficulties which need to be overcome; one of the most important problems being that of scope. That is, when the Kordshuli were part of a "traditional" nomadic system, their interactions with the natural and cultural environment were plausibly manageable within an ecological framework. Even though there may be influence from the larger governmental sphere, this influence and its effects on the nomadic sphere are relatively easy to discern. Unfortunately, with the breaching of system boundaries through increasing governmental control and through a shift from primarily subsistence herding to a combination of subsistence and market-oriented herding, the

larger system which an ecological approach would have to consider becomes unmanageable in both size and complexity. While the approach should be applicable and viable at the level of the wider system, we find that, practically, it becomes overburdened with variables based on local, national, and even international events.

Still, while I may not be able to identify all constraints/hazards and incentives as would be desireable in an ecological analysis, it is possible to point out some of the conflict and contradiction that occur within the system at the local level. For example, one set of variables which may be examined at the individual or small group level involves the concept of choice which can be considered one part of this ecological approach as it fits in with problem solving and decision making processes (Bennett 1969: 11). Also, the use, albeit minimally, of other approaches or directions of inquiry is part of an attempt to better understand the processes involved. All of this is, of course, but one step in understanding this form of change. Hopefully, it may lead to further studies which can put the process into the broader perspective which will view the effects of the development of a global system on this one group of people.

Dissertation Format

The format of the dissertation will be in three broadly sketched, although not explicit sections. The first section, chapters one and two, will include a statement of

the problem and the direction of the study, as well as a discussion of the theoretical orientation (chapter one). The second chapter will deal broadly with the environoment, ecology, and history of Kordshuli. This will include identification of both the natural and cultural environments of the Kordshuli, as well as a brief discussion of their history.

The next section, chapters three and four, will be an enthnographic overview of the Kordshuli. Chapter three will describe the various levels of Kordshuli social structure: the tent household (huneh), the camp (beileh), the section (tireh), and the tribe (taifeh). This will include a discussion of the social, political, and economic functions at each level and how they relate to the pastoral nomadic adaptation. Chapter four will examine social organizational features such as marriage patterns, post-marital residence patterns, and inheritance. This chapter, then, will include some of the processual features of the preceding chapter.

The final section, chapters five, six, and seven, will form the body of the analysis of change within the political and economic spheres. Chapter five will focus on the changing political system of the Kordshuli over time. The changes will be examined as they affect the various structural levels of the Kordshuli throughout five major historical periods: Incursive period, Qashqa'i period, Independent period, Entezamat period (tribal affairs office),

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and Post-Entezamat period. The next chapter (chapter six) will deal first with the general nature of economic processes at the various social structural levels--taifeh, tireh, and huneh--and changes that have occurred since the independent period. The final chapter (chapter seven) will focus on sedentarization. One of the most commonly accepted models of sedentarization (Barth 1961) will be critiqued and forms of sedentarization among the Kordshuli will be discussed. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the impact of political and economic change on the Kordshuli and how these are enhancing the prospects for sedentarization. The discussion will identify elements of causation and will also make predictions by hypothesizing the outcomes of the changes discussed in the previous chapters. A general concluding statement will follow in chapter eight.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

The Kordshuli are primarily a group of pastoral nomads who inhabit, occupy, and migrate through specific areas of Fars Province in southwestern Iran during their annual productive cycle. The Kordshuli number approximately 353 households (excluding the chiefly family), 296 of which live as pastoral nomads in goat hair tents throughout the entire year. The rest of the families that are recognized as Kordshuli are either settled landowners, agricultural laborers, share croppers, or wage laborers who still recognize the authority of the kadkhoda (headman) of their tireh (section). Most of these families live either in sarhad (summer pasture area) or in the central zone between winter and summer pastures. Some of these families continue to engage in some pastoralism either through the formation of dispersed economic household units where one family member cares for the joint flock and others care for other joint property, or through a form of marginal or seasonal nomadism where the family lives in a tent for part of the year. The average household size among the nomadic portion of the group is 5.5 persons, making the entire nomadic population approximately 1,320 individuals. Aspects of social,

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economic, and political organization are detailed in the following chapter.

Variations in climate, topography, and social landscape all play an important role in the yearly cycle of the Kordshuli. This chapter is an attempt to locate the Kordshuli in space as well as in time. That is, I will discuss both environmental/geographic and historical dimensions of the Kordshuli.

Environmental/Geographic Dimension

Fars Province, with its hot and dry climate, topographically dominated by the Zagros mountain range, is located between latitudes 27° 37' and 55° 38' E. The Kordshuli utilize a portion of this broad area, approximately 250 miles long and 20 to 50 miles wide. It extends roughly from the town of Eqlid, south of Abadeh, in the north, to the city of Jahrom (and the village of Mobarakabad) in the south. Figure 2.1 locates Fars Province in Iran, while Figure 2.2 shows the general range of Kordshuli activity. The climate and topography of Fars effectively divide the province into three broad zones: sarhad, central zone, and garm-e sir.[1]

Sarhad

The northern part of Fars is called sarhad (or by some sardsir = cold region). It is a very mountainous region with much of the region above an elevation of 2,100 meters (c. 6,900 feet). The highest elevation in sarhad is



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

FIGURE 2.1 Fars Province, Iran



FIGURE 2.2 Th



FIGURE 2.2 The range of Kordshuli activity in Fars Province: Eqlid to Mobarakabad

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Kuh-e Dina at 4,276 meters (slightly more than 14,000 feet). The highest peak in or near Kordshuli territory is Kuh-e Bul at approximately 13,000 feet. The winters can be quite severe, with temperature minimums below 14°F (-10 C).

Topographically, the region is made up of wide mountain ranges interspersed with a number of small valley systems wherein are located numerous small agricultural communities. While some of the water for irrigation agriculture is provided by pump wells, most water comes from the many fresh water springs and streams fed by mountain snows. There are also a number of uncultivated pasture areas, both in the higher mountains where cultivation is impractical, and in some of the open valleys where water is limited.

The primary crops grown in the valley areas for both personal consumption and sale are wheat and barley. These are both very important for the Kordshuli: wheat because bread is the most important food for the nomads; barley because they often have to provide extra fodder for the animals if the season is particularly dry. Sugar beets are also a popular cash crop. In addition, such products as lentils, beans, chick peas, and sunflowers (primarily for the oil) are grown. Some of the wealthier land owners also grow poplar trees as a cash crop. Many of the khavanin (chiefs) of the Kordshuli are among this latter group.

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Central Zone

I have chosen not to refer to this region by a Persian name since the Kordshuli themselves do not. For the Kordshuli, this is only the area between summer and winter quarters, between areas of cooler summers and those with warmer winters. Temperatures are fairly mild throughout the year. Summer may sometimes be hot, c. 102°F (39°C)--but the minimum in winter does not often fall below freezing. Precipitation, therefore, is usually in the form of rain during the winter months and averages around 10 inches annually.

The area is less mountainous than sarhad and has many broad expansive plains, most of which are cultivated with a wide range of vegetables and fruits. Almost all of these cultivated fields are irrigated either by river water or by wells. There are very few areas of useable pasture-land that are uncultivated, making it extremely difficult for pastoral nomads to find adequate resources during migration.

Garm-e sir

The southernmost region of Fars is very hot and arid; garm-e sir means "hot region." The average elevation of the area is less than 1,000 meters (c. 3,280 feet), with the maximum elevation being approximately 2,300 meters (c. 7,550 feet). The summers are extremely hot and dry, with temperature maximums between 100° and 105°F (38° to 40°C) with little if any rainfall. Winter temperatures rarely fall below freezing and precipitation in the form of rain, except

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Except for the lower overall elevation, the topography of this region is quite similar to that of the central zone--fairly broad valleys with high mountains. Many of the valleys are sparsely populated by small agricultural villages, which focus their cultivation on citrus fruits and dates. Tube wells and qanats--a series of wells connected by underground channels that allow higher region ground water to be brought to the surface in lower parts of the valley--provide most of the water necessary for irrigation. Most of the uncultivated land in this region is quite barren, covered only with sparse grasses and scattered jujube trees (Zizyphus; Persian konar).

For the Kordshuli, these differences in temperature and precipitation are critical since they determine the seasonal availability of pastures. Because of these factors the various pasture areas within the total region utilized by the Kordshuli become viable at different times of the year. Therefore, the nomads and their flocks of sheep and goats migrate according to the availability and productivity of these pastures. Although the Kordshuli migrate a considerable distance through the course of their yearly cycle, it has been said that they practice "vertical nomadism" because they exploit altitudinal variations in water, temperature, and pastures (Johnson 1969: 158; Salzer 1974: 8).

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Social Landscape and Migratory Round

While it is necessary that the Kordshuli utilize different pasture areas at different times of the year, they do not, unfortunately, have unimpeded access to any pasture as it becomes viable. Rather, there are a number of groups, sedentary agriculturalists and other pastoral nomads, that occupy at various times some of the territory that the Kordshuli utilize at different times during their annual cycle. Much of the task of the nomadic migration involves both the avoidance of cultivated areas and the coordination of the movements of various nomadic groups who must pass through the same constrained area to reach their own summer or winter pastures.

The various groups with whom the Kordshuli come into contact and the nature of their interaction depend, to a large degree, on both the season of the year as well as the location. For the Kordshuli, there is not a strict division of time and space. Rather, a location represents a certain time of year and vice versa. That is, the environmental divisions discussed above relate directly to temporal, functional divisions made by the Kordshuli. Thus, sarhad is not only a specific climatic/topographic zone; it is also the area of Kordshuli summer pastures (eilaq) which represents both pasture use/availability and the season. The migratory cycle is thus divided into three parts, which directly relate to the seasonal utility of the climatic/topographic zones above. All three represent different parts

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of Kordshuli territory at different times of the year: eilaq (summer pasture), qeshlaq (winter pastures), and rah-e kuch (migration route).

Eilaq (Summer Pastures)

Often when the Kordshuli first arrive in summer pastures after the spring migration, there is still some snow on many of the higher mountain pastures and brightly colored wild flowers dot the countryside. As the migrating caravan crosses the last mountain pass, so that the nomads can finally look down on the open valley of which their eilaq is part, some of the women may ululate as an expression of joy; they have arrived home. Eilaq is considered to be the homeland (vatan) of the Kordshuli; a place of security and relative comfort. The thieves and predators of the migration route have been left behind. The bitter (talq) and salty (shur) water of winter quarters has been replaced by the sweet (shirin) water of the natural mountain springs, which is considered better for both humans and animals. Here, the flocks do not require constant attention; the women have more time to weave carpets and tent sections; the animals have some time to get fatter off the fresh, lush (hopefully) vegetation before many are sold at market.

In the past, the open pasture land and even many of the higher mountain pastures were considered the private property of the kalantar (chief). He had absolute control over its use. Now, most of these pastures are State

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The plain around Khongesht, the largest village in Kordshuli eilaq, runs a northwest to southeasterly direction. This plain is from 6 to 12 miles wide and is flanked by steep mountains which are also part of the total area considered to be Kordshuli eilaq. The Kordshuli say that their eilaq extends roughly from Ab Barik in the west to Amirabad in the east (see Figure 2.3), approximately 50 miles. However, as Figure 2.3 indicates, most of the sections (tireh) are much more centralized than this. In fact, it is not unusual to see Qashqa'i tents between Alibad and Ab Barik. Likewise, there are a number of Basseri camps to the east, north, and south of Kordshuli pastures. Figure 2.4 shows the general migration routes of many of the pastoral nomads of Fars. I have given the names of those Qashqa'i taifeh (tribes) that camp relatively close to or come into contact with the Kordshuli; the others are referred to only as Qashqa'i.

Within the area of Kordshuli eilaq are a number of small agricultural villages ranging in size from 3 to 4 households to about 300 households at Khongesht. Many of the households that comprise these villages are settled Kordshuli, although most of these do not refer to themselves nor are they referred to by the nomads as Kordshuli. With settlement and loss of contact with the nomadic group, most


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

FIGURE 2.3 Location of Kordshuli tirehs in summer pastures--(eilaq)

FIGURE 2.4



FIGURE 2.4 Selected pastoral nomadic migration routes--
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of these households are referred to by their village affiliation. Some of these villages are the home of settled members of Kordshuli dispersed economic households (cf. chapter seven). Khongesht and Kaftar are the primary residences of the settled khavanin (chiefs) of the Kordshuli; the latter is the home village of the kalantar, Amir Hossein Khan, while Khongesht is the home of his four brothers. Conflict situations between the nomadic Kordshuli and the settled agriculturalists are not frequent because of the space available for Kordshuli use and because of the lack of agricultural development in the area. Even if conflict should arise, it is common for members of the khavanin to act as mediators despite their separation from the nomadic group. They have power and are shown respect by both groups: by the agriculturalists because of their position as very wealthy landowners; by the nomads because of their traditional position as leaders of the Kordshuli.

The mountains bordering the valley have generally been denuded of trees by the local villagers, who used the wood as firewood or building timbers. There are still a number of varieties of plants and grasses that provide food for both the nomads' flocks as well as for the numerous wild sheep and goats that live throughout these mountains. Many of the Kordshuli hunt these wild animals whenever possible. Few of the nomadic households actually camp in the higher mountain pasture areas, yet most take their flocks up to these pastures daily. Even if pastures are adequate at

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lower elevations, many Kordshuli prefer the mountain pastures because of the abundance of a plant called jashir. The sheep are particularly fond of this plant and the nomads say that it will not only make the sheep more robust but that it will also produce sweeter milk. As the days start to grow shorter and the nights colder, the nomads start to move down from the mountains into the open valley floor.

The nomads stay in eilaq from late spring until late summer or early fall. The two most important parameters that signal the end of summer for nomadic groups like the Kordshuli are lack of adequate pastures and/or cold weather. Unless the previous winter had been very dry, the Kordshuli say that pasturage is still available and adequate when they begin migration. Rather, it is the onset of cold weather, sometime in September, which signals the beginning of fall migration toward winter quarters (in contrast, see, e.g., Bates 1973: 19).

Qeshlaq (Winter Pastures)

The Kordshuli qeshlaq is much harder to delimit territorially than eilaq. In fact, there are a number of different areas utilized by the different tirehs (sections). Some are separated by 50 to 60 miles or more. The qeshlaqs of three of the tirehs are located around the village of Mobarakabad, about 50 kilometers southwest of Jahrom (see Figure 2.2). Another tireh's qeshlaq is located quite a bit south of this village so that frequent interaction is impractical. The two closer tirehs can visit the village daily to

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The Kordshuli do not feel secure in winter pasture areas; it is not their home. They feel they are surrounded by strangers and enemies. There are a number of other pastoral nomadic groups--Qashqa'i, 'Arab, Basseri--who in many places are competing for the same pasture resources. Also, many of the villagers and their flocks in the different locations may compete for limited pasturage. Some villagers who dislike these nomads may go out of their way to harrass them. A few brief examples will illustrate just reasons for the concern by the Kordshuli.

The qeshlaq of tireh Bababmaleki is located in the mountains directly north of Mobarakabad. Before the nomads move to their winter campsite, they usually camp first for a short while on the plain that leads into the foothills. However, the year that I travelled with the group, many households were forced to move into the mountains earlier than usual, thus using up precious pasture areas sooner than they would have liked. The previous year, the headman of the village had asked for extra money from the Kordshuli for land use in this area even though the land was not under his control. The Kordshuli had refused to pay, so this year,

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before the Kordshuli arrived, a fire "accidentally" destroyed this pasture resource. The Kordshuli knew that the fire had been set, yet they had no legal recourse. They said that the headman had too much money and could bribe both lawyers and judge so that he would not lose a court fight.

The same tireh also became involved in a conflict with a Qashqa'i group over rights to pasture areas. There was a very heated argument, which the Kordshuli say would have escalated in the past into physical violence. Now, with government control, both groups contacted their respective tribal gendarmarie posts. The two Disciplinary Officers representing these groups had to meet with camp leaders to determine which group was in the right. In this case, it was the Kordshuli group. Still, the Kordshuli expressed their concern that different officers at different times could decide against them, depending on the knowledge that the officers had about pastoralism and on how easily they could be bribed.

While this confrontation did not lead to physical violence, it is not unusual for shepherds of competing groups to throw rocks at one another while they are tending their flocks. This happened to two non-Kordshuli groups the previous year and one of the shepherds died from the encounter.

Sometimes the nomads must put up with what can only be called malicious mischief. It is customary for many Kordshuli to construct a rock and dirt foundation for their

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tent on their most permanent winter camp site. The kadkhoda (headman) of one of the sections camped near Jahrom returned to his usual site only to find the rock foundation had been torn apart and insults had been chalked on some of the larger stones in the area. He knew that the culprits had been some of the settled 'Arabs in the area who disliked Kordshuli, but there was nothing to do except to rebuild the foundation.

Two of the sections with their geshlaq on the plain south of Mobarakabad must compete with tent-dwelling pastoralists, the Kuhaki, who reside in the area throughout the year. Thus, when the Kordshuli group arrive, pastures may be somewhat depleted in some areas.

Apart from the social landscape that may affect the ease or difficulty of a pastoral nomadic existence, the nomads must also contend with natural environmental fluctuations. Some of the problems that result from these fluctuations may be solved through interaction with the sedentary population. In some villages, where water is scarce or distant, the nomads must pay villagers in order to gain relatively easy access to pump-well water for the flocks. In areas where the nomads find the traditional pastures inadequate, private property may be available for rent. Also, it may be possible to bribe the Disciplinary Officer to gain a use permit for pastures outside of normal Kordshuli territory. Winter pastures are dependent on fall and winter rains. If the rains fail to materialize the

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nomad may be forced to begin migrating earlier than usual with no guarantee that greener pastures will be found. Here, too, the nomad is dependent on sedentary society since the kadkhoda of each section must secure a permit from the Disciplinary Officer (afsar-e Entezamat) before migration is officially allowed.

As spring approaches, the nomads who are camped in the mountains slowly begin to migrate down into the foothills. While there is some periodic movement during the winter, most of the nomads have a reasonably permanent camp site where they will stay for one month to one and one-half months. The traditional time that spring migration starts is on the Persian New Year, which is on the first day of spring.

Rah-e Kuch (Migration Route)

It is apparent, even to the casual observer, that the migration of any pastoral nomadic group is of the utmost importance. In fact, Barth has characterized the migration as "the central rite of nomadic society" (1961: 153). Tapper (1979) has also focused on the ritual significance of migration and views the semi-annual migrations as "rites of transition between winter and summer quarters" (p. 179). Barth, however, felt that his attempt to demonstrate the ritual character of Basseri migration was made more difficult because of the absence of "technically unnecessary symbolic acts and exotic paraphernalia" (cf. Tapper 1979: 178). I

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will not dwell on this aspect of the nomadic round except to say that the beginning of spring migration for the Kordshuli is marked by a "technically unnecessary symbolic act." Two piles of brush were set up in a general north/south line about 20 feet apart. When the caravan animals were packed, the two brush piles were set on fire and the nomads led the pack animals through this 'entryway' to the migration route. Once through, the Kordshuli said it would be bad luck to look back to where they had been. Rather, they said, one should only look forward to the coming spring and summer as a time of plenty. The fires symbolized a break with winter pastures; any problems that had occurred during the winter would not follow them to sarhad. Fall migration is not so marked by symbolic action.

As indicated, there are two migrations during the year: one in the spring, one in the fall. Spring migration begins on or about Now Ruz (Persian New Year) and takes 30 to 50 days to complete. Migration does not occur everyday. If the nomadic camp arrives in an area with good pastures, they will usually stay for two or three days. Also, the nomads will not migrate if there are heavy rains. When migration does occur, the nomads usually start to break camp at dawn. They pack the animals after having some bread and tea, and start the migration in approximately one hour. They usually migrate for three to four hours, depending on the resources in the areas in which they arrive. If there are extemely poor pastures or little water, they will often

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migrate again in the late afternoon for a couple of hours. This is much more common during fall migration than during spring.

Most of the Kordshuli migration route is the same as that of the Basseri (Barth 1959). It differs primarily at the ends (i.e., eilaq and qeshlaq), and in the time that the route is occupied. In the spring the Kordshuli preceed the Basseri through most of the route. The year that I traveled with the Kordshuli was slightly different than normal. The winter had been quite dry, so the Kordshuli started migration earlier than usual. However, the dry winter affected other groups, too, so that the Basseri also started to migrate early. Traditionally, it would have been unlikely that members of the two tribes would have encountered each other during migration because the chiefs of the two groups would have been closely involved with the entire process. Now, however, the Disciplinary Officer is not in constant contact with the group and he has little way of knowing what is happening in the mountainous areas that are inaccessible by car. Therefore, there were a number of places on the migration route where nearby camps were Basseri. This increased the anxiety of the Kordshuli, since the Basseri have a reputation in the area of being good thieves. Even if the Basseri camps had not been nearby, the Kordshuli would still worry about the possibility of animal theft.

The area which the Kordshuli must traverse is characterized by a series of progressively higher plains and mountain passes. Much of the migration route passes through

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heavily cultivated regions, particularly in the central zone, making the task of herding even more difficult. The northern portion of the Kordshuli migration route is indicated in Figure 2.5, while Figure 2.6 shows the southern portion of this route, as well as the general winter pasture areas of the Kordshuli.

Spring migration is particularly trying because of the number of recently planted fields that the nomads must bypass with their flocks and pack animals. It is very difficult to avoid conflict with villagers and still find adequate roadside forage. There were a number of places where land owners stood guard over their fields. If any nomadic animals caused crop damage, the villager would usually demand payment on the spot. There were only a few cases where gendarmes had to be called in to help settle disputes. If a dispute remained unresolved, the nomad would have to appear in court. Since few nomads have the time or resources to deal with the urban judicial system, most settle immediately.

There are also a few areas where the migration is quite dangerous because there is very limited space in which to move the flocks. For example, part of the migration route near Marvdasht is along the shoulder of the major highway that connects Esfahan and Shiraz. Heavy traffic is often only a few feet away. One non-Kordshuli man lost approximately 15 animals when a large truck ran into his flock, which had been startled into running across the road.



FIGURE 2.5



FIGURE 2.5 Northern portion of migration route of the Kordshuli and neighboring tribes (not to scale)



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

FIGURE 2.6 Southern portion of migration route of the Kordshuli (not to scale)

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While the Kordshuli look forward to their arrival in eilaq, their perspective is much the same as that of the Yoruk of Turkey: "the trek between the stable winter and summer encampments is more a set of obstacles than a productive period within the migratory schedule" (Bates 1973: 18).

Fall migration is neither as trying nor as long as spring migration, although it still requires considerable work and organization. There is no set date for fall migration to begin as there is with spring migration. As the weather turns colder, groups of nomads slowly start to migrate out of the summer pasture area. Once migration begins in earnest, sometime in September, the nomads usually migrate every day, sometimes twice a day, depending on resource (water and pasture) availability. There is less effort involved in herding the animals through the often narrow migration route since the villagers are usually unconcerned if the sheep feed off the stubble left in harvested fields. This becomes a problem for the Kordshuli only in those cases where the villager has sheep of his own or when he wants to charge for the use of his fields. In fact, some villagers want the nomads' sheep to come into their fields so as to reap the benefits of the natural fertilizer left behind.

Many of the fields which might have been available for the use of the Kordshuli are often depleted, since the Basseri precede the Kordshuli on most of their migration

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(Barth 1959). Still, because of the speed of the migration, there is little chance to overgraze even limited pasture areas.

The migration route, today, is narrowing rapidly because of increased agricultural development and encroachment on traditional pastures. While fall migration is still not very frustrating, many Kordshuli feel that spring migration is becoming impossibly difficult, especially in the central zone. Many say that they have to run all their animals through the area with little or no time to graze because there are too many cultivated fields.

At any rate, it is important to realize that the environmental dimension of Kordshuli pastoral nomadic existence is not just based in the climatic/topographic variations of Fars Province. Rather, it is also important to consider the cultural environment of the Kordshuli including sedentary agriculturalists and other nomadic pastoralists, as well as the imposed presence of the larger state. Many of these variables are considered in greater depth in later chapters.

Historical Dimension

It is very difficult to place the Kordshuli in historical perspective, since there is no written history of the group. There are very few references of any kind on the Kordshuli and those that do exist are often contradictory. The origin and age of the Kordshuli tribe is unknown. Barth

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(1961: 133) believes that the nucleus of the Kordshuli tribe may have been formed by some Qashqa'i camps that broke away from the larger group and that, as an independent group, the Kordshuli have existed no more than fifty years. It is not clear from this statement whether or not the group existed within the Qashqa'i with the name Kordshuli. Magee (1945: 102), on the other hand, believes that the Kordshuli tribe entered Persia with the Qashqa'i. Certainly, the Kordshuli were affiliated in some way with the Qashqa'i at the turn of the century, but whether they existed as an independent unit prior to this time is uncertain. Magee (ibid.) reports that Nasr Khan, past chief of the Qashqa'i confederacy, claims the Kordshuli are purely a Qashqa'i tribe.

The khavanin (chiefly family) of the Kordshuli believe that the group has been in Fars for at least 700 years and that they entered the province before the arrival of the Qashqa'i. The Qashqa'i, as a cohesive unit, date perhaps to the time of Shah 'Abbas the Great (1587-1629), when Jani Agha Qashqa'i was given authority over the tribes in Fars (Boyle 1976: 8). One of the khans of the Kordshuli claims that in the Fars Nameh-ye Nasiri, a classic history of Fars Province (Fasa'i 1313 A.H.; 1876 A.D.), the Kordshuli are considered to be the second tribal group to enter Fars. However, in reality, the Kordshuli are nowhere mentioned in the book. Rather, the two groups mentioned as the most powerful and numerous tribes in Fars are the Shebankareh and the Shul. Part of the Shebankareh later became the main

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section of the Boyr Ahmad, while part of the Shul became the Mammasani tribe (cf. Fazel 1971: 27). This latter fact is intriguing, since one of the sections of the Kordshuli claim to have split off from the Mammasani, and most of the Kordshuli speak the Lori dialect of Persian as do the Mammasani.

To further support this belief in the antiquity of the group, the Kordshuli khans refer to an historical novel which, they claim, mentions the Kordshuli during the reign of Atabakhan in Fars, which the khans believe was approximately 700 years ago. However, they also say that the book focuses on the Mogul and Safavid periods in south and southwest Asia. These empires coexisted no earlier than around 1530. Thus, even if they are correct in the reference, this would place the Kordshuli in Fars only around 450 years ago. I tried to verify this account but the book was unavailable during the entire year that I lived with the Kordshuli. I purchased what I thought was the same book, Shams va Toqra, but the Kordshuli khans said that, although it was the same story, the author was different. Still, they found the equivalent reference which reads, " . . . Shebakari-o-Gord-o-Shul . . ." (Xosravi 1329 A.H.: 16). They claim that in their book the "G" in "gord" is a "K", a simple typographical error in Persian. Even here there is a choice in translation. The phrase may refer to either two groups--the Shebakari and the Kordoshul--or to three groups--the Shebakari, the Kord and the Shul--since "o" may be part of

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the name or simply a connective. The known early existence of the Shebankari and the Shul make the latter possibility as likely as the hopeful interpretation of the Kordshuli khans.

Other members of the khavanin have their own conception of Kordshuli history. Amir Mansur Khan says they were called Kord-e Shaderli prior to 100 years ago. Amir Hossein Khan disagrees and says that they have always been Kordshuli. He says there is a tribe in Kordestan with the name Kord-e Shaderli with whom they may be related, but that this group has always been Kordshuli. Amir Pasha Khan believes the Kordshuli to be 700 years old because, he says, his grandfather, Ata Khan, found a grave near Khongesht that was 700 years old. I found no verification of that story. Amir Pasha also thinks that the group came from the west, near Kordestan, after intratribal disputes forced them to leave.

There is obviously no easy answer to the question of Kordshuli origins. Even the derivation of the name cannot help. "Shul" means village so that a direct translation of their name makes them Kurdish villagers; however, their spoken dialect is quite different from Kurdish. The only source of historical agreement among the Kordshuli khavanin is the lineal ancestry of the present kalantar through three generations (see Figure 2.7).

Most of the references to the Kordshuli in the literature on Fars focus on their relationship to the Qashqa'i


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

FIGURE 2.7 Genealogy of the Kordshuli chiefs. I have also shown some of the marriages that have taken place between tribes.

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confederacy. Usually they ar only another name in a long list of tribes and sub-tribes affiliated with the Qashqa'i. Curzon (1966; orig. 1892) includes the "Kur-i-shuli" as a Qashqa'i tribe in 1875 but not on an 1890 list. Christian (1919) also places the Kurdshuli (sic) within the Qashqa'i, although all of his information is not consistent with other sources. He does say that this group migrated with the Qashqa'i Amaleh, which agrees with data from Field (1939) and Magee (1945), as well as with data I was able to gather from Kordshuli and Qashqa'i informants. However, Christian gave a different name for the kalantar of the group than any other source.

Some of the later references are confusing in that there is a question about the independence of the Kordshuli during the early and middle part of the twentieth century. Sykes points out that in 1917 "among the professional robbers were the Kurshulis (sic), who had broken away from the Kashgais (sic)" (1963: 481; orig. 1921). Peiman (1968: 224), however, lists the Kordshuli as part of the Qashqa'i in 1931, while Magee (1945: 103) points out that:

> the chief of the Kordshuli, Atta Khan, holds a position of very doubtful independence. He is obliged to bow to the wishes of Nasr Khan in all affairs of his tribe yet nominally his people come under the administration of Lotfali Qavami, the Khamseh Governor. The latter at best assumes responsibility for their behavior.

Barth adds to this confusion by writing that "adjoining them [the Basseri] in most of their route is the smaller Kurdshuli (sic) tribe . . . politically connected with the Qashqa'i confederacy" (1961: 2), but that during migration

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the Basseri are "followed by the Kurdshuli (sic) tribe, which is at present unconnected with either of the big confederacies" (1961: 94).

The deposed kalantar of the Kordshuli says that the Kordshuli were independent throughout most of this century. Even though the Kordshuli have nominally been under Khamseh administration since 1943, it was only in the late 1950s that the Kordshuli began to consider themselves a part of Khamseh. Now, all of the Kordshuli view themselves as part of the Khamseh confederacy, a nominal unit itself, and many of the young people think that this has always been the case.

In chapter three I briefly point out the varied historical origins of the Kordshuli sections (tireh). When considering the larger collectivity, the Kordshuli say that there have always been five, and just five, named sections. However, each individual section claims its own origin from some other group. The questions of when these groups first came together, of whether there was ever a central core of the group represented by the khavanin called the Kordshuli, and of whether there were ever fewer or additional sections have no easy answers. Magee (1945: 105) lists only four sections and implies that there are no kadkhodas (headmen) of these sections. Whether this is a problem with his data or with the selective memory of the Kordshuli cannot be determined. Thus, any further attempt to elaborate the specifics of Kordshuli history, except for the most recent period, would be conjectural and would contribute little to

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a better understanding of the Kordshuli. The political and economic shifts of the most recent period of Kordshuli history are examined in some detail in later chapters.

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CHAPTER III

TAIFEH KORDSHULI

This chapter presents a brief ethnographic overview of the Kordshuli, emphasizing their primary social and economic units. In organizational form these begin with the smallest unit, huneh (tent household), and go through the beileh (camp) and tireh (section) to the largest relevant organizational form, taifeh (tribe). In the past the Kordshuli were also part of an even larger organization, il (confederacy), and, in fact, are defined similarly, at the present, by the government. However, this level of organization is peripheral to the present discussion. Chapter six better shows the status of this political form and its historical significance in the political development of the Kordshuli. At the end of this chapter a brief statement will be made about the functional changes that have appeared in these forms; in particular, I will consider the loss of function which has reduced some groups to a nominal existence. I will seek to answer the question of why such nominal groups are maintained.

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Huneh Level (Household)

The primary social and economic unit of the Kordshuli is the tent household. It is defined by the nomadic Kordshuli as the space bounded by the black goat hair tent and the immediate space surrounding the tent, the campsite (yort). While the former space is a well-defined area, the latter is a function of the social relations between households and the availability of space at different times in the annual cycle. Those households considered to be neighbors (hamsayeh; lit., same shade) are separated by a distance of from approximately 15 feet to a distance in which loud vocal communication can take place and be totally understood. If one must yell to communicate, then the others are not neighbors. The huneh is more generally defined as that social unit which uses one common hearth (ojaq). Thus, those Kordshuli who settle may, in fact, live within the confines of one enclosed, segmented building, yet still consider themselves independent social units because of the presence of separate ojaqs.

The huneh is spatially defined directly by the black goat hair tent. Most of the Kordshuli have two different tents: a heavy, tightly woven one for winter and late autumn (chador), and a lighter weight one used in spring and summer (hajir). (See Figure 3.1). Some may also have a medium grade tent used for the early autumn when there is a slight possibility of rain, however, it is not very common. The chador is made up of four or five pieces of woven goat



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

FIGURE 3.1 Kordshuli tents: chador and hajir

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hair fabric (lataf). As is true of the Basseri (Barth 1961), the size of the tent varies according to the resources of the family. A typical chador may be about 18 to 20 feet in length, 10 to 12 feet in width, and approximately 7 to 8 feet in height. Since many of the nomads, especially the headmen (kadkhoda) of the sections (tireh) try to return to the same winter campsite (yort) each year, many have built a rock foundation upon which to set the tent walls. This provides more space as well as a more water resistant shelter.

Usually in the late autumn, before they move to the winter campsite where they will stay for approximately one month, those nomads who have rock foundations for their tents from the preceding year will spend a few days fixing up this base by adding dirt, replacing fallen rocks, etc. Both males and females help: males move the heavier rocks, while females get extra dirt and gravel to fill the spaces between the rocks. There is no attempt at shaping rocks, although they do try to find rocks that fit together well. The foundation is usually not a complete rectangle of even-height, but rather has the front built up to a height of about three feet, while the rear wall may be only a couple of rocks piled on top of each other. The foundation may be as wide, inside to outside, as one and one-half feet all the way around. Still, the general shape of the structure is a rectangle which will fit the tent. Two openings are left in the front two corners as entrances.

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While tents during migration are often set up by women alone, since the men may still be herding the migrating flock, the winter tents are usually pitched by men and women together. There is great concern that the tent be set up well so that there will be no unnecessary slack places. This is because the tent will have to stand in one place for a relatively long period under the periodic onslaught of winter winds and rain. The tent is not only, nor necessarily primarily, for the comfort of the human nomads. It also provides protection for the young goat kids and lambs that are born in late autumn. Thus, while the chador appears from the outside to be one undifferentiated unit, it actually is divided into two approximately equal sections. The household belongings and foodstuffs, packed in woven bags (xorjin and hurreh) are placed along the midline of the tent. The hearth (ojaq) is dug near the entrance to one side and provides the only heat and cooking source in the tent. The other side of the tent is usually subdivided into smaller sections by reed screens. These makeshift pens are used to hold and protect the young animals that are not large enough to graze with the rest of the flock. The very young are kept separate from the others for a short while so that they will not be suffocated by the close huddling of the lambs and kids in their attempts to stay warm.

Hajirs (summer tents) are smaller than chadors since there is no great need to shelter a lot of lambs and kids from the weather. Since there are fewer young animals born

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at this time of year, a household only needs to keep space available for a reed screen to enclose four or five kids and lambs. Also, the front of the hajir is left open so that the effective working area of the tent increases greatly. The hajir is unpartitioned. The household belongings are piled lengthwise along the rear of the tent; there is no little private area as Barth (ibid.) says exists for the Basseri. On one side, usually away from the intense afternoon sun, rocks and/or shrubs (botteh) are placed on the ground as a base for the goatskin water containers. Most households have at least two and some have up to five water goatskin containers (mashk) depending, to a large degree, on the proximity of water. The fire pit is placed near the front of the tent, although the location may vary and, in fact, is often changed if it seems to be getting in the way of normal activity. There is often another ojaq dug further away from the tent where it is easier to heat the large pots of fresh milk in preparation for making yoghurt. Water for washing clothes, hair, etc., is often heated on the outside ojaq. As the position of the sun changes throughout the day, different sides of the tent may be lifted to allow for more shade and greater airflow. Also, in the event of a colder or windier day, additional pieces of woven tent sections (lataf) may be added to the front to better protect the occupants. The floor space which is partially enclosed by the hajir is sometimes covered with small pebbles or gravel. This helps keep the dust down when dry, and it also acts as

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a drainage system for anything wet that is dropped within the tent, thereby keeping mud to a minimum.

In the confines of these tents live families of various sizes and composition, depending on the developmental cycle of each family group. The following table (Table 3.1) shows family composition for various tireh of the Kordshuli. The ideal family unit is the nuclear family which can show explicitly the realization of the cultural ideal of the independent, self-sufficient (within the nomadic sphere) household. There is also a strong cultural bias for the temporary maintenance of the extended or joint family unit where adult males with wife and children continue to live in the father's tent or with an elder brother for a period of time after marriage. This is not just a function of expedience: many newly married couples are easily able to provide for their own needs, while, at the same time, there is enough additional labor in the larger household to meet its labor needs. Those sons who move out too quickly are often considered disrespectful by other Kordshuli. In any case, this extended or joint household will usually last for a year or more, longer if the flock is not of a sufficient size to provide an adequate flock for the newly independent tent household. The Kordshuli say that, in the past, the amount of time spent within the father's household after marriage was greater, on the average, than it is today. This change may be due in part to the greater dispersal of each group that has occurred with increasing rural security.

TABLE 3.1 Household Composition by Tireh

	Lori Jamshid	Lori Almas	Arbabdar Hajiboa	Arbabdar Mirza Jan	Arbabdar Kakakhan	Xaleji	Babamaleki
Simple (nuclear) family	18	19	16	15	34	72	11

TABLE 3.1 Household Composition by Tireh

	Lori Jamshid	Lori Almas	Arbabdar Hajiboa	Arbabdar Mirza Jan	Arbabdar Kakakhan	Xaleji	Babamaleki
Simple (nuclear) family	18	19	16	15	34	72	11
Simple fam. + add'ns (usually Mo or Bro)	0	5	0	4	4	6	2
Extended fam. (man and one or more married sons)	0	1	1	3	1	3	0
Joint fam. (two or more married brothers)	1	0	1	1	2	2	0
Fragment:							
widow(er) + ch.	1	0	0	1	2	1	0
single man +	1	0	1	0	1	5	2
Polygamous fam. (man + two wives)	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
Total No. of Households	23	25	19	25	44	89	16
Ave. No. of persons/ tent household	5.7	5.4	4.8	6.5	5.9	5.1	5.5

Total pop. considered: 1,319 persons; total No. of tents: 241 tents
Ave. No. of persons/tent: 5.5 persons

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All of these tent households, at whatever stage of their developmental cycle, still must come to grips with the problem of maintaining the viability of the household through pastoral production. The household economy of the Kordshuli is based primarily on the herding of sheep and goats. There are some families that do own agricultural resources but here, too, the primary source of income, except for a very few extreme cases, is based on animals and animal products.

There is a noticeable division of labor involved in taking care of the flocks and garnering their products for consumption or sale. Almost invariably it is the men and older boys who act as shepherds. Although most nomadic tent households own dogs, they are not used to help herd the flocks but rather act only as a warning system against predators and thieves. For the few times that one might see a woman or girl tending the flocks, it is safe to assume that the family unit is quite small or that no males are available at that time. Owing to the cultural desire for independence as a household unit, it should be expected that any family unit would rather use their own labor resources including females, than try to find an extra-familial shepherd or merge their flocks with another as a joint herding unit, as many groups do (cf. Barth 1961). Sometimes, for example, during migration, a daughter of a family with no sons of a responsible age may have to help her father keep the flock from running into planted fields while the mother and any other

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family members cope with the pack animals carrying household belongings. One reason given for not normally using women as shepherds is that if anything should happen to an animal so that it had to be slaughtered according to Islamic prescription, women would be disallowed from slitting the animal's throat since, otherwise, the meat would become ritually impure (haram).

In the winter pasture area (qeshlaq), many independent household units attempt to split their flock into two smaller flocks: one of sheep, the other of goats. This is done because there are some good high mountain pastures in the area but the Kordshuli say that the sheep are not sure-footed enough to risk the climb up and back. So, while the men take the goats to higher pastures, the women and smaller children may watch the sheep as they graze around the tent. As these higher pastures are depleted and the amount of available pasturage around the tent is diminished, the flock is once again combined and the male shepherd will take the entire flock to more accessible pastures.

Although boys start to help with the flock when they are about eight years old (sometimes younger), they are not usually entrusted with the care of the entire flock until their early teens. The young boys can often be seen around the tent helping to bring the flock in, especially for milking and young animal feeding, by running behind them and chasing and hitting them with a stick. Often, this is more disruptive than helpful. Sometimes a younger boy, or girl

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if a young male is not available, will stay around the tent taking care of the kids and lambs not yet old enough to graze with the larger flock or those which have been separated out so that they will not suckle. Sometimes an older member of the household, especially an older man who can no longer walk with the flock through the mountains, may take on the task of watching the kids and lambs; thus, he will still feel himself to be a productive member of the household.

Many households are composed of more than one nuclear family: sometimes a joint family with two or more brothers and their dependents living together, sometimes an extended family in which married sons and their dependent families live in the father's tent. In these cases there is almost always enough labor to easily handle the needs of the household. Sometimes there is social/spatial separation of households within joint or extended family units (i.e., these households have their own household with its own hearth) while economic ties are maintained especially when agricultural land is owned. It is not uncommon among these "dispersed economic households" (cf. chapter seven) for family members to cross productive spheres when labor needs increase according to the annual cycle. Settled agricultural families may send older children to help the nomadic family in maintaining the joint flock. Likewise, if the nomadic unit has more than enough labor for their own needs, they may provide an additional labor source for their agricultural

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counterparts during periods of intense activity (e.g., early harvest). Labor is rarely provided for the agricultural group from the pastoral group during autumn harvest since migration itself requires considerable labor. Most transfer of labor is in the direction of the pastoral sphere, since the agriculturalists have access to labor sources and because, at a general level, the ideal of the independent household unit is not as strong among agriculturalists as it is among the nomadic pastoralists. This is primarily because of the realization that it is more possible for the small nomadic household than for the small agricultural household to meet more than just subsistence needs.

Still, within the pastoral sphere itself the division of labor, while not absolute, is strongly marked. Men and boys are shepherds while women do most of the processing of dairy products: yoghurt (mast), buttermilk (dug), curd balls (kashk), clarified butter (roqan), and, sometimes, dried whey (garreh). It is possible to see young boys churning butter and rolling kashk balls, but this again is not favorable and is due primarily to family size and composition.

The complementarity of these roles is further expressed in relation to fires and cooking. Men or older boys must gather most of the firewood (himeh) and shrubs (botteh) used to fuel the fire. Girls, women, and younger boys may gather a little, enough for tea or, occasionally, bread, but the

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more difficult task of chopping heavier firewood or uprooting the desert brush in quantity is left to the men. During my stay with the nomads, I often found myself helping to bring in these ever-necessary products. In the few areas where no wood or brush was to be found, the women used animal dung for fuel. Dung was almost always gathered by females, sometimes with the assistance of young boys.

In addition to shepherding and firewood collection, the men also are primarily responsible for sheep and goat shearing, for packing up the animals before migration, and for many of the minor repairs or finishing touches on fiber products (e.g., sewing together the sides of a flat-woven saddle bag, finishing a rope by sewing the end back into itself to inhibit fraying, and repairing holes in the tent's goathair fabric). They are also responsible for most of the buying and selling that the household does. Since the animals and their products are considered the private property of the household head, he most often decides when and where to sell the fruits of his family's labor: animals, wool, kashk (curd balls), clarified butter, and spun yarn or finished products. Despite the fact that sons will inherit some of the flock when they marry and separate from their father's household, they have no say over the use of household products unless their father gives them this privilege. In fact, although it is culturally expected, there is no way for any son to guarantee that he will indeed receive a share of the flock as an inheritance. Some men who were on poor

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Women are responsible for most general domestic tasks: cooking, cleaning, child care, and product manufacture for household use, as well as production of pastoral goods and finished products for sale or trade. Except for winter camps, the women are usually responsible for setting up the tent during migration periods, as well as for the general preparation of the camp site. Stones and brush are gathered by the women, as well as by youths of either sex who are around, to act as the foundation for water skins and woven saddle packs. If the ground is not too hard, the woman may also dig the fire pit, but in most cases it is a man or older male youth who digs the fire pit after the tent has been pitched.

Some of the other tasks associated with a pastoral existence are shared by men and women. While it is primarily women and girls who milk the sheep and goats, it is not uncommon to see men helping milk while a male youth holds the heads of the animals to keep them from running away. Both males and females of any age are used to force the animals through a phalanx and keep the animals which are waiting to be milked from retreating.

While there is, ideally, a highly marked division of labor it is not unusual to see crossovers which make for a more efficient use of the available labor. This, of course, is the case only in regard to certain enterprises. Men, for

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example, do not spin wool, weave, roll kashk, or the like. Women, if there is a male available, do not act as primary herder or engage in selling pastoral products, except in a very few instances, to itinerate traders. If a widow has no close male relatives and no sons of a responsible age she will conduct the economic affairs of the household as a man would. Her position is recognized within the community and is accepted as a function of her situation. Although the men in the group will often say that women cannot engage in economic transactions because they lack the knowledge and wherewithall to suceed, it is the case that the few women who have been forced into this role have been as successful as men. As Beck points out for the Qashqa'i, "women are aware of the external contracts of men and of the subtleties of male transactions" (1978: 354). Many of the Kordshuli women say that they could make a living without a husband but that a man could not do likewise without a wife. The women say that they are able to do male tasks but that the men cannot do many of the female tasks. Some of the men I spoke with agreed with this assessment, although most said that a woman needs a man because he knows best how to care for the animals, or market, or whatever.

While tent households are the primary production/consumption units among the Kordshuli, they become secondary units in the spheres of social and political organization of the group, since these latter forms calls for interaction between a number of households. That is, it is the relationship of household to household which is of primary

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importance. There are, however, some interactions which occur within the household, particularly concerning the role of women, that can affect social and political action outside of the tent. For example, women are often quite manipulative, implicitly, in the political arena by making intra-household decisions which affect the household head and his subsequent political (and social) interaction with other household heads. She may refuse to perform certain domestic tasks, limit sexual availability, or merely harrass her husband in her attempt to have her point of view accepted and acted on. The effectiveness of this approach is based to a large degree on the personal strength of the parties involved. The cultural ideal is for unequivocal male dominance both within and without the household. However, the range of variation from this ideal is great within the household. There are some cases where the majority of effective political decisions "made" by the household head are actually made by his wife.

It is not unusual for a woman to make a political statement by the way she attends to social interaction with visitors to her tent. If the woman disagrees with a political decision made in concert with a visitor she may be less hospitable than is culturally expected. Rules of hospitality demand spatial and temporal priority for guests, based on perceived status. When a male guest arrives a carpet should be set down, rather than the felt rug that is usually used for the family. The middle of the carpet against the

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pile of household belongings is the highest status position (See Figure 3.1). The person sitting in this position should also be the first to receive tea and food if they are offered. There were more than a few cases that I observed where the woman expressed her discontent by failing to lay out the carpet, by serving the responsible party last or not at all, or by not offering food at a meal hour. In most of these cases, the household head was forced to "demean" himself by carrying out the unfulfilled tasks himself. While there may be some remarks about feisty or intractable women, the slight felt by the visitor is apparent and jokes may be forthcoming in the community about the inability of the household head to head his household. Men should not be controlled by women, according to the ideal. While most men are, to some degree, manipulated by their wives, this behavior should be kept within the household unit rather than as a matter for public scrutiny. It is the case that most families cannot keep domestic quarreling a secret since tent walls do not contain sound very well. This may provoke some behind-the-back humor, but not of the intensity that arises from a wife's "inappropriate" behavior in the presence of others.

While we have seen, or implied, that men participate strongly in both internal domestic affairs as well as external affairs, especially in terms of market, women have been shown only in the internal domestic sphere. Women also have interactions in external domains, although they are

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constrained by the cultural proscriptions on their extra-domestic behavior. The three primary loci which women take advantage of are the market (for food), the bazaar (for general household goods and clothes), and the doctor.

It is very uncommon for any Kordshuli woman to go to the market or bazaar unaccompanied by a man. Usually, the man will accompany a couple of women, and perhaps their children, to the location and then carry out his own transactions while the women carry out theirs. At the market the women often buy vegetables and spices with cash, although it is possible that some trading for wool and spun yarn will occur. The bazaar is the primary resource for clothing as well as small incidentals. Unlike the men, the women usually have no traditional trading partner, although it is not unusual to deal with the husband's trading partner if he has what they want. He, however, is not usually a clothier and the women prefer the wider selection provided by those traders who specialize in clothing. Here the products are paid for in cash.

There are numerous times when a woman or one of her children requires some form of medical assistance. Often, if the complaint is not physically obvious, her husband will not let her go because it is too time consuming and expensive. If the complaint persists and her husband is busy with the flock, she may be forced to go to the doctor by herself. For the husband there is a definite bias in trying to get male children to the doctor expediently, while female

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children and wives are often told to wait since, as females, they may be exaggerating the complaint. Some women are forced, therefore, to go to the doctor while the husband is out with the flock and face the consequences later. Sometimes a neighboring woman may accompany her or look after her children which are left in camp. The fact that this neighbor woman is present sets the stage for a consideration of the next level of social organization, the beileh (camp).

Beileh Level (Camp)

There are, indeed, tent households which always camp alone; however, most households camp and migrate in groups of two to four tent households. These groupings are emphemeral with longer lasting ones correlating, usually, to consanguineal and affinal ties. Because of the cultural expectations of continued fraternal interaction, brothers often continue to camp together after separation from the natal household. The labor force of these households is more often combined in communal labor activities than is that of most non-related or distantly related neighbors.

Within a tireh (section), both consanguineal and affinal ties serve to form a basis for extended camp membership and unity. In cases where men camp with extra-tireh affinal kin, it is usually because these kin have access to better resources within their traditional pasture areas. Of course, the use of this land requires the permission of the kadkhoda who heads the group in the area with better pastures. This sharing of resources, usually in the form of

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pastureland, is one of the few economic components of a camp relationship and does not occur with any regularity. Most camps are comprised of a social grouping rather than an economic or political one. The camps stay together because the households enjoy each other's company. The various tent households of a camp group refer to each other as neighbor (hamsayeh; lit., same shade), so defined by the fact that they migrate together and are within easy speaking distance of each other. There are places during migration where many camps must pitch their tents very near others so that the actual distance between all these tents is not very great, yet there is still the awareness by all these camps as to who their neighbors are and the minimal obligations that this role implies.

Economically, there is some cooperative labor effort among neighbors, but it usually is passive labor or sharing time as when women help neighbors make bread or when members of a neighbor's family help to keep the animals being milked from running away merely by standing passively behind them. Cooperation of this kind is usual and reciprocity is expected as time and circumstance allow. This kind of casual cooperation also plays a role during migration. Although the flocks of the separate households are herded separately, the pack animals migrate together as a group. This means that some families with inadequate labor resources are able to send one or two members of the household with the flock while those families with additional labor help with the

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donkey caravan. Even some of the households which camp alone will migrate with others until the destination has been reached, since the Kordshuli say that it is ugly (zesht-e) to migrate alone with such a small caravan. Unfortunately, with the greater dispersal of household units that has occurred with increasing rural security, many households find it difficult to travel with adequate labor resources. Because of this much of their migration is harried and the shepherds have to do much more work than they would like to.

A very few of the camp groups cooperate in a more active sense in their attempts to secure adequate water for the flocks and for their households. Only three obvious cases of this kind of cooperation were observed. In two camps--one of two tents, one of four tents--wells were dug through a cooperative effort of the males of all tents. The well, in one case, was primarily for household use of the camp, while in the other case the well was also used to provide water for the flocks. In the other case of active cooperation among households, a number of household heads cleared the opening of a spring and dug a long trench from the mouth of the spring so that all of their flocks could get water. This latter work took a few days to complete and was carried out as the individuals found time to come and work.

The kadkhoda (headman) of a tireh may also expect and, to some extent, depend upon the extra labor derived from his "clients" who camp near him part of the year. Many

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of the poorer Kordshuli who do not migrate to winter pastures may be considered marginal or seasonal nomads (cf. chapter seven). In the summer they take their small flocks which have been penned up all winter and once again join up with their tireh with the permission of the kadkhoda. Many of these families camp near the kadkhoda and provide labor to him for menial tasks such as making tent stakes, braiding bands for small carrying cases, and helping with shearing and live wool washing. Their only expectation in return is permission to camp with the group, which would probably be granted without the labor input, as well as some minimal assistance from the kadkhoda in their dealing with the sedentary world, if only in the form of advice.

The camp, while it is one of the more observable organizational units, does not have an important economic function. It provides minimal cooperative labor, while other economic processes such as buying and selling of pastoral products are usually carried out by the individual households. The camp, rather, is a primary social unit expressing social relationships as well as providing the various households with partners in mutual trust and protection. The breaking up of such a unit can be an expression of conflict or social distance. For example, the acting kadkhoda of one of the tirehs wanted to migrate to a new area but one of his neighbors (i.e., in the same beileh) did not want to move. The acting kadkhoda went over to Ali's tent and threatened to hit Ali if he did not start to break

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camp. Ali was frightened by the younger man, asked not to be hit, and proceeded to break camp. However, he stayed a good distance behind during the day's migration and never managed to quite catch up with the group. He continued to camp by himself (with his family) through the next week of migration until the group arrived at a larger plain where several of the small camp groups came together. Here, he joined up with another camp group, thereby expressing his discontent with the previous camp group.

However, for the Kordshuli the expression of social distance manifested in spatial arrangements is less obvious than has been reported in the ethnographic literature (e.g., Barth 1961; Bates 1973). The reason is that, since the disintegration of the large camps into camps of one or two tents, there are few gradations of spatial distance between unity and separation.

Fission of camp groups is not always a response to poor social relations. Sometimes one of the tent households just decides to stay or leave at a different time than the rest of the camp. It is likely that this household will join up with another camp group for migration, or it may even recoalesce with the tents of their previous beileh. Disagreements on a number of subjects (e.g., weather, camp sites, or available forage), may lead a camp to separate for a short while with the expectation of reuniting later. A brief example will illustrate how this may happen.

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On one day of migration, the sky, which had been black and ominous, suddenly unleashed a barrage of hailstones followed by a driving rain, forcing the nomads to seek an immediate campsite. The kadkhoda's wife said that we had just passed a good campsite and that we should return since we could not be sure of how soon we could reach another acceptable campsite. One of the household heads of the other two tents in the camp group said that it was silly to retrace our steps since it was almost certain that we could find another campsite as soon in front of us as we would if we backtracked. As argument ensued and two of the tents returned to the known campsite, while the other continued on its way. It turned out that the single tent had been correct in assuming the availability of upcoming campsites. However, despite the fact that this family was ahead of the other tents, they did not start to migrate the following day until the other two tents of the camp had caught up to them. The point is that camp relations are based on loose ties so that, if a consensus of the camp is not reached concerning the desireability of any day's migration, the composition of the camp may change.

The beileh, while expressing social relations between households, is also the primary source of social interaction beyond the confines of the tent. While at a higher level (i.e., tireh level), one can see the periodic social and ritual affirmation of the solidarity of the group, within the camp social interaction is continual throughout the

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existence of that one group. Neighbors, especially the women, are continually visiting each other throughout the day. It is common for a group of women to gather in one tent to sit and spin yarn and gossip during periods when their separate household chores have been completed. Women will often go to get water together to continue this interaction and, if it is a common water source for other camps, to talk with other women whom they might not see very often.

While it is the case that longer lasting camp groups are often households that are related affinally or consanguineally, there are still a number of camps where the interaction has been maintained for an extended period of time, sometimes a number of years, because of the close friendship of the household heads. These camp groups tend to be intra-tireh groups because of the variability of extra-tireh resources. That is, one has the right to use pastureland because of membership in one of the tirehs, but this does not extend to the right to use pastures of other tirehs merely because of the desire to be close to friends. Even affinally based camps composed of different tireh members may be forced to separate in lean years. The extra-tireh affine has to have the kadkhoda's permission to camp in the kadkhoda's pasture area. Since the primary responsibility of the kadkhoda is to his own tireh, he will tell the intruder to leave if resources are scarce. Thus, the political position of the kadkhoda may have some influence on the formation of camp groups, particularly when they

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contain extra-tireh members. This is but one minor reason that sets off the tireh as the most important political unit of the Kordshuli.

Tireh Level (Section)

The name Kordshuli, apart from its wider applicability to the larger collectivity, implies membership through putative agnatic descent in one of the five named tireh (section) or quasi-descent groups of the larger unit. These tirehs are the primary basis for identification within the taifeh (tribe). Although two of the tirehs are further subdivided into smaller units, each the structural equivalent of the oulad in other groups (cf. Barth 1961: 50), there is no universal name applied to these groups. They are defined by the presence of a kadkhoda for each. Each grouping under the aegis of a kadkhoda is then referred to either by the tireh name coupled with the name of the kadkhoda or as the beileh or ehshum (camp) of the kadkhoda (e.g., Arbabdar-e Mirzajan or beileh-ye Mirzajan). The group is a quasi-descent group in that all members feel that they are related in some way, although the connection is not necessarily traceable, depending on the tireh. There is no putative apical ancestor of the tireh, nor of the taifeh as a whole. Table 3.2 shows the separation of the taifeh into its component tirehs, as well as the subgroups contained in these tirehs. Also, to give an indication of the size of each group, I have listed the approximate number of tent households that migrate semi-annually, as well as an approximate

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number of households which, while not fully nomadic, are still recognized by the Kordshuli and, generally, by the government as falling under the aegis of one of the kadkhodas of the group.

TABLE 3.2 Kordshuli Tirehs--1977

Tireh	Kadkhoda	No. tents	No. H'holds under kadkhoda
Arbabdar	Kakakhan	44	60
	Mirza Jan	24	35
	Hajiboa	19	23
Lori	Almas	24	29
	Jamshid	23	26
Xaleji	Shirkhan	89	100
Moradshafi'i	Sanibag	55	63
Babamaleki	Mirza Qoli	16	17

The Kordshuli do feel themselves to be related to each other in some general way as members of one taifeh, although there is no accepted genealogy which purports to show actual shared descent. Each of the tirehs has its own purported history, generally known only to the members themselves and to the khavanin (chiefs) of the larger collectivity. It is generally accepted within the taifeh that the core of the Kordshuli, including the chiefly dynasty, came from the Bakhtiari confederacy, west of Kordshuli territory. The supposed origins of all the tireh is summarized in Figure 3.2.

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

FIGURE 3.2 Origins of Kordshuli Tirehs

Despite these different origins, there is no point in the past that the tribesmen will say that the Kordshuli did not consist of these five tireh and only these five. It seems obvious that the Kordshuli interpret their history at different levels of temporal relevance. That is, this timeless identification with the Kordshuli shows something of the synchronic relevance that the tirehs place on being part of a larger collectivity. The existence of putative origins indicates one way in which the tirehs can maintain their separate identities within the larger group, and it is this separate identity which is becoming more important as the role of the taifeh (tribe) continues to diminish with increased State control.

It is, of course, more likely that the number of tirehs has changed, since it does not seem possible that these disparate groups joined up with the core of the future Kordshuli taifeh at precisely the same time. In fact, during the last thirty years, one of the tirehs almost disappeared. The smallest tireh, Babamaleki, almost became part of the Lori tireh on the orders of the last kalantar

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because the kadkhoda's son was not strong enough personally to take over even quasi-leadership of the group. The kalantar felt that since the tireh was so small it could easily be absorbed into another tireh. The kadkhoda's nephew, though, complained saying that his family had always been Babamaleki and that he would become kadkhoda to avoid the identity shift. The kalantar agreed and the tireh is still in existence. One interesting aside is that Magee (1945) does not list Babamaleki as a sub-tribe thirty years ago.

The above example supports the idea, also expressed by the Kordshuli, that the position of kadkhoda is primarily hereditary from father to son, but that personal characteristics still play an important role in determining who shall become the kadkhoda. Because the position, traditionally, did not necessarily imply a higher status or greater prestige, it was not highly sought after. The position of kadkhoda was based largely on the ability of the man to have others listen to him. His personality, strength of character, and ability as a herdsman, which was evident at least partially through his wealth, were of prime importance.

The political importance of the tireh and the kadkhoda have increased greatly with the deposition of the kalantar of the Kordshuli by the Iranian government. The kadkhoda is now the major political mediator between the nomads and the State (from their point of view). He is now

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responsible for securing a permit to migrate, for gathering young men to be conscripted by the Iranian army, and to make certain that members of his tireh have government-required identity cards (shenasnameh). His political position and, therefore, the political importance of the tireh is further elaborated in chapter five.

The social importance and, indirectly, the economic significance of the tireh may be seen through the frequency of intra-tireh marriage--greater than 80% of all marriages (cf. chapter four, Figure 4.1). Weddings are the primary social events which bring together most or all of the members of any tireh. Because most marriages take place between tireh members, they also serve to express its social solidarity and group unity. Also, since each member of a tireh feels related in some way to all other tireh members, the usual marriage serves to reaffirm this feeling of relationship. That is, the bonds of close kinship are once again manifestly strengthened by the marriage bond. It is quickly noted and talked about if some members of the tireh who have the ability to attend the ceremony choose not to. It is taken as a sign of a poor relationship as well as a sign of disharmony within the tireh. Most of the tireh members consider it bad form to avoid the celebration, even if the households involved have had a disagreement. That is, it is considered more proper to put aside temporary disagreements for the sake of group harmony and cohesiveness.

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It is true that there are a number of others who may attend the wedding besides members of the tireh. Extra-tireh affinal relations, friends from other tireh, village friends and acquaintances, and, if lucky or important, one or more members of the khavanin may also be present at a wedding. While the presence of important individuals gives direct prestige to the marrying households, it also, indirectly, gives prestige to the section of which they are a part. If the marriage partners are from different sections, which is sometimes the case, both families and sections feel that there is prestige gained by the presence of important guests.

There are few, if any, other celebrations which serve to bring the group together. Most religious observances, for example, tend to be observed by individual tent households. In the past, when camp groups were less dispersed, there were some cases of group circumcision ceremonies. More recently, most young males are circumcised by an urban doctor, when they are taken to the city after they are a few years old. There was an attempt by one headman to organize a circumcision ceremony during the period of my fieldwork but, unfortunately, the accidental murder of a Kordshuli man by another put an end to possible festivities.

Because of spatial proximity, social interaction is often more pronounced within a tireh than between tirehs. The tireh do have traditional pasture areas and these often require that the nomads camp close together. Traditionally,

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this proximity was even greater because of the additional need for group defense and security. Even now, though, with the greater dispersal of tent households, there is still a greater proximity intra-sectionally than inter-sectionally.

The relative important of this spatial factor is evident in the fact that most of the marriages that have taken place between tirehs or taifehs have been between households which camp, at least part of the year, in relative proximity to each other. The cases of inter-tribal marriage have been between households of groups that were camping near the fringes of their respective territories. The point can be made, then, that any positive social tie, whether spatial or kin-based, gets confirmed through marriage. It is also obvious that the kin-based ties are much more important.

Earlier I mentioned the significance, albeit indirect, of intra-tireh marriage for the economic sphere. As members of a named section, each household has access and usufruct right to traditional pasture areas defined by traditional use patterns and pre-Entezamat allocation by the kalantar. The general boundaries of these territories have been maintained by the Iranian government, although they are now administered and assigned by the afsar-e Entezamat (disciplinary officer).[1] It is through registered membership in one of the named sections that any household is allowed to use government-owned and government-controlled

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rangeland. Although the government does not usually concern itself with checking the rights of any individual household to be in a given area (unless there is a complaint), it is still the responsibility of the kadkhoda to provide the government with the names of each household head and the members of his family. The integrity of these traditional pasture areas is maintained and strengthened by intra-tireh marriages. While extra-tireh affinal ties may provide some households with access to additional resources, they are not secure and usually they are unavailable in the event of environmental crisis. These errant households would then have to return to traditional areas where their access to campsites and pasturage may be constrained by the formation of varied alliances within the group. If they are forced to return, they are, of course, allowed to use available areas, but their short-term search for greener pastures may leave them with fewer acceptable areas within the traditional territory. Therefore, in the long run, this may be detrimental to the maintenance of the flocks.

One implication of the above discussion is that there are no explicit economic processes which are activated on the tireh level. Certainly, access to the means of production is based to some degree on membership on this level, but even here it is better seen as a higher level (e.g., taifeh [tribe]), economic process. That is, either the kalantar, traditionally, or the afsar-e Entezamat, recently, are merely manipulating the components (i.e., tirehs), of

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the larger group. There is some increased tireh involvement under Entezamat because of the political importance of the kadkhoda. Still, in this case, the afsar-e Entezamat is manipulating a number of small groups, all parts of a larger makeshift Khamseh confederacy. This is not meant to imply that these groups are insignificant, but rather that rights to pasturage are, in the long run, defined by the total territory of the Kordshuli not by the smaller group pasture areas.

There is one additional economic practice which, in a very general sense, relates to tireh membership. It is the case that urban trading partners (dust) often relate to Kordshuli as members of a particular tireh. That is, most members of the same tireh tend to trade with the same dust. This relationship may be created through the friendly relationship of the kadkhoda to the trader, giving some of the Kordshuli easier access to the shopkeeper, although individual interpersonal interaction determines the economic component of the relationship. That is, the amount of interest charged and the level of indebtedness allowed are based, to a large degree, on the closeness of the relationship to the trader. Thus, the interaction is primarily individual and only secondarily related to the tireh.

Taifeh Level (Tribe)

Most of the traditional functions which were operative at this level have diminished drastically or disappeared since the deposition of the kalantar. In chapter five,

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the traditional political functions of the larger collectivity are summarized. With the change in leadership, however, the Kordshuli as a meaningful unit is being severely undermined. There are a number of the younger Kordshuli who do not profess any particular loyalty to a group which has lost much of its definitional criteria. That is, with the deposition of the kalantar, the political unity of the group, in a real sense, has been eliminated. The afsar-e Entezamat cannot replace the kalantar as head of a political unit, except in a nominal sense, since he cannot carry out the full role behavior expected of a kalantar. He has authority and power but no following. As the burden of leadership falls more on the kadkhoda, so, too, the political allegiance falls more to the tirehs as they become the most important political units. The concept of the collectivity, Kordshuli, is maintained primarily in the minds of the khavanin (chiefs) and of some of the Kordshuli (especially the older ones), and in the papers of the government. In this latter case, however, it is only a name representing part of a larger makeshift confederacy.

The economic functions of the taifeh are summarized in chapter six. The primary economic components of the larger group were concerned with the politico-economic redistributive role of the kalantar and the allocation of pasture land to the various tireh. The redistributive role of the kalantar has not been replaced in any real way by either the afsar-e Entezamat or by the kadkhodas. There are a few

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cases of redistributive-like acts by the afsar but they are based on bribery, while the redistributive acts of the kadkhodas are minimal and infrequent because they do not have access to adequate resources to fill that role. Tribal territory has been maintained, to some degree, by the State but access to intermediate zones of use and migration has diminished with agricultural expansion. The tirehs have become more important to the State than the larger group, Kordshuli, if only because rights to pastures and, thereby, control of land use is tireh oriented. If pastures are poor or overcrowded, some nomads may be able to bribe the afsar-e Entezamat to issue a permit for non-tireh land, but this is a very rare occurrence and can in no way compensate for the reduction in pastures brought on by government control of rangeland and agricultural expansion into traditional pasture areas.

While it is true that the taifeh, traditionally, had a number of political and economic functions, there were very few times when social functions manifested themselves for the entire group. The unity of the larger group was expressed most often through actions of the kadkhodas as representatives of their respective tirehs. There were festive occasions when the kalantar would invite all the kadkhodas to participate and share a meal. This would give the kalantar a chance to give explicit instructions to each man as well as to listen to the problems of each of the tirehs in the context of the others. Still, this did not happen

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frequently and in no way brought together all of the members of the taifeh. It did serve to express the unity of the group because of the participation of members (i.e., kadkhodas), of each tireh, but understandably, this left some of the common nomads with a much stronger identification for his tireh than for the taifeh.

During the period of fieldwork, even this limited expression of solidarity was absent because the kalantar no longer represents the taifeh in all its aspects. There was but one occurrence which brought together members of most of the tirehs during my field research. One Kordshuli man got involved in an argument with another and one of them died in the ensuing fight. It is only the second time in Kordshuli memory when one Kordshuli was killed by another. A funeral ceremony was held by the khavanin (chiefs) in which all tireh except one were represented by a number of household heads. There was much indignation over the fact that no one from that tireh was present.

In most ways it can be seen that the entire unit, taifeh-ye Kordshuli, is now basically a nominal unit which is maintained by the State for administrative purposes, and by the khavanin to help further the fiction of group solidarity, allowing them to continue to garner respect and prestige as the tribal elite instead of having to interact with others mainly in the role of large land owner.

Generally, then, there have been directed shifts in economic and political functions which indicate that the

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total group, Kordshuli, has lost most of its meaning as an adaptive unit fulfilling economic or political needs. Certainly, social processes have been maintained at the tireh level, albeit at lessening degrees as tireh dispersal continues. However, many of the political and economic processes which were regulated traditionally at the taifeh level have, to some extent, been absorbed by the tireh, creating quasi-tribal groups with quasi-autonomous leaders. With increased interaction between the State and each of the tirehs as a, more or less, separate unit, the existence of the group Kordshuli is further threatened. While there is no actual political, economic, or social unit that can be called Kordshuli, there exists an ideological unit which is still used by most members to define themselves in relation to other pastoral nomadic groups and to the sedentary population at large. The continued impact of overbearing State control, however, will lessen the value of this ideological until the appellation Kordshuli will represent little more than a remnant of a traditional form of organization and adaptation in the area.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL PROCESSES

In the preceding chapter, I presented a brief ethnographic introduction to the Kordshuli, focussing on the primary social organizational forms. This chapter is a continuation and elaboration of some of the ethnographic points made in that chapter. Many of the processes and relationships of social organization do not fit neatly into the discrete social structural categories that were used in the previous chapter. Rather, they show that while there may be fairly specific functions at different structural levels, there is an overlap when we examine the processes which contribute to the development, evolution, and maintenance of these social forms.

While there are many different processes at work at various levels, I will present only the most important ones that serve to maintain the primary units among the Kordshuli: huneh (tent household) and tireh (section). Marriage and post-marital residence are the keys to tireh maintenance, while inheritance guarantees, for some, the viability of newly formed household units.

Marriage Preferences and Marriage Types

As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the individual tent household, huneh is the most important

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structural unit to the Kordshuli. Still, there is a need to interact with other tent households. This interaction is most often based on consanguineal and affinal ties. That is, there are generalized spheres of interaction which radiate from the household and which tend to be based on perceived kinship distance. This is most strongly expressed through the idiom of preferred marriage rules. There are no strong cultural prescriptions for marriage but the cultural preferences which do exist work strongly to inhibit marriage outside of the perceived acceptable kinship range.

Preferred marriage among the Kordshuli is with any first cousin, although there is a saying that a marriage with father's brother's daughter is a contract made by Allah and seemingly, therefore, the best. There does seem to be a slight preference for actual father's brother's daughter (FBD) marriage but there is no stigma attached to any other cousin marriage. In fact, despite this preference for cousins, there is no stigma attached to any marriage that takes place within the tireh (section), even if no actual relationship is claimed. Quantitatively, it is intra-tireh marriage that is most significant for the Kordshuli. The cultural preference, although explicitly stated for first cousins, is actually more relevant for the tireh as a social and territorial unit. Kin ties are recognized through the idiom of agnatic descent as expressed through tireh membership. The relative importance of this intra-tireh marriage becomes apparent when we see that even with the extension of

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kin ties through out-marriage, first cousins, real or classificatory, are usually selected from within the tireh. Part of this is the result of a desire to be near the total group considered close kin.[1]

It is not unexpected that all cousin types are acceptable marriage partners, since those which are not real or classificatory father's brother's daughter still fit within the definition of remote agnatic relationship. That is, if ego's parents are related as patrilateral parallel cousins, then it follows that any true mother's brother's daughter to ego would also be an agnatic kinsmen (Bates 1973: 61). The higher the incidence of father's brother's daughter marriage in previous generations, the greater likelihood the father's sister's daughter and mother's sister's daughter will be close agnatic kin. The structural consequences of this preference for patrilateral parallel cousin has been presented many times in the literature (cf. Ayoub 1959; Randolph and Coult 1968; Khuri 1970).

While there is not the rigid explicit custom or prescription for father's brother's right that exists for other groups such as the Kurds (Barth 1954: 164-171) and the Yoruk (Bates 1973: 61), there is an implicit cultural understanding among the Kordshuli that where an actual father's brother's daughter exists, the appropriate male should have the first choice. The Kordshuli say that he is the person with the right (haqqdar). If two males of comparable geneological distance are vying for the same woman, other factors

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such as relative status of their fathers, number of married siblings, and respectability within the community come into play.

As I was leaving the field, one such dispute was just beginning to surface. Two men started arguing about the rights of their sons to marry their mother's brother's daughter. One of the men claimed that he had been promised the girl for his son when they were both very small. The other claimed that his son should be first choice since his mother was older than the other man's mother (i.e., an elder sibling). While most Kordshuli would say the man with the prior agreement should have the choice, there were questions raised about the agreement by the woman's guardian, since her father was dead. The guardian wanted to marry the girl off to the family without the agreement because of their status in the tireh, their wealth, etc. He claimed that he was not a party to the agreement and that, since there was no written record of the agreement, he should be allowed to make the arrangements himself. In this case, however, there were some others who recalled the agreement and supported its validity. As tempers continued to flare, the kadkhoda entered into the fray to help settle the dispute. It seemed most likely when I left the field that the prior arrangement would win out and that the other young man would marry a more distant relative in another year or two.

When relating kinship ties, the Kordshuli will most often use the most direct genealogical links for close

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relationships, and patrilineal links when the kin ties are more distant. That is, a true mother's brother's daughter is always referred to in that way even if there is a more distant agnatic relationship. However, if the relationship is more distant (e.g., beyond the first ascending generation), then agnatic terms become preferable. MMBSS, would rather be expressed in comparable patrilineal terms if such a link exists.

Marriage prohibitions for the Kordshuli are those set by Islamic law (cf. Levy 1965). The few other types of marriages considered unfavorable will be discussed later in this chapter.

The actual distribution of marriages closely parallels the expectations set up by cultural norms. Father's brother's daughter marriage occurs at least as frequently as one might expect, given the statistical likelihood of the presence of a marriageable cousin (Ayoub 1959). Among the Kordshuli there is no real distinction made between real and classificatory cousins. When asked about the relationship between two people who are more distantly related than actual first cousins, the Kordshuli will automatically telescope down the relationship (if possible), eliminating many of the agnatic links. This allows for more preferred first cousin marriages (e.g., FFBSD will become FBD for marriage purposes), although an actual FBD would still be preferred. There are no linguistic devices used to separate out true from classificatory kin, so that it is only through complete

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geneological information that one can discern the actual degree of relationship. For this reason and because of the difficulty in gathering complete census material (see chapter one), I have chosen to present both actual and classificatory kin as the Kordshuli would, through the first ascending generation only. Those who may be traceable through most distant genealogical links, without being telescoped down, have been grouped as tireh or taifeh members without reference to actual relationship even if it was known. As Table 4.1 shows, 22.3 percent of all marriages were to actual or classificatory FBD. Of all marriages, those contracted to actual or classificatory first cousins were 50.4 percent. Approximately 80 percent of all marriages occur within the same tireh.

TABLE 4.1 Distance of relationship of wife to husband

Tireh	FBD	FZD	MBD	MZD	Other w/in tireh	Other w/in tribe	Outside tribe	TOTAL
Babamaleki	2	1	1	3	0	5	0	12
A. Kakakhan	13	2	5	6	22	6	1	55
A. Mirzajan	6	3	6	1	11	3	0	30
A. Hajiboa	4	1	3	0	10	0	2	20
Xaleji	16	4	14	4	51	5	2	96
L. Almas	7	4	5	2	6	2	0	26
L. Jamshid	13	5	3	4	1	6	3	35
TOTAL	61	20	37	20	101	27	8	274
%	22.3	7.3	13.5	7.3	36.9	9.8	2.9	

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Second marriages, either in cases of polygyny or in cases where the first spouse died, if statistically analyzed, would show a much lower frequency of first cousin marriage. Polygyny, while culturally acceptable, is very rarely practiced, so it is statistically irrelevant; there are only three or four nomadic Kordshuli who presently have two wives and none who have more than two. There is some reluctance by most fathers to marry their virgin daughters to a widower or to a man who already has a wife (cf. Bates 1973: 65). It may be the case that men marrying for the second time will marry widows, although this occurred quite infrequently. Most widows, if older, were taken care of by sons or other male relatives. If the widows were young, they often remarried according to the levirate.

Both the levirate and sororate are practiced by the Kordshuli. Accepting the levirate, there is the cultural expectation that the deceased's brother not only will but has the right to marry the widow (haqq dare). The Kordshuli claim that the wife, especially if she has children, is still the responsibility of the husband's family and that the leviratic marriage serves to maintain the relationship between households, provide care for the woman and her children, and, perhaps, provide a wife for some men who otherwise may not easily find a wife because of lack of wealth or personality or physical characteristics.

In the case of the sororate, the "right" to marry one's sister-in-law is less strongly expressed than in the

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levirate. Still, there is a belief that, if the widower asks for the hand of his dead wife's sister, her father must have very good reasons for refusing him; the best reason being that she is already bethrothed. If the father refuses, it is usually because he believes that the man, as a husband, has been inadequate. While this may create some hard feelings between the families involved, such feelings are usually short-lived since most of the group will support the father in his decision. Certainly, the father is also aware that he may be able to create a more favorable bi-family alliance or to gain more in brideprice from some other match.

One difference between the marriage "rights" of leviratic and sororatic marriages may be expressed in the idiom of brideprice. It is extremely unusual in the levirate for the widow's family to request or even expect any brideprice. They say of the brother that "he gives no money" (pil nemideh). The family says that they do not want to give their child to another person who might take her someplace else (i.e., to a place she has not already gone). In the sororate, however, it is usual for the widower to pay a new and often comparable brideprice. I became aware of only a few cases of the levirate or sororate, since they are usually activated only when the couple is young. Only in one case that I am aware of did the leviratic marriage take place when the woman was middle-aged and had a daughter of marriageable age. This occurred because the deceased's brother had not yet married, since he was considered by most

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Certainly one of the more important aspects of acquiring a bride is brideprice (shirbaha; bashloq). Brideprice is the combination of animals and money given the bride's father/family by the groom's father/family. The giving of brideprice is the culmination of the process which leads to the actual marriage. Most negotiations for marriages are fairly secretive until the final, formal offer is to be made. Usually, male relatives of the groom spend a number of months in informal visiting, working out the terms of the brideprice. While it is unusual for the groom-to-be to take part in these discussions, there have been a number of recent cases where he has had some direct input. If a breakdown in negotiations occurs, it is often the women of the two households who work to break through the impasse. This, of course, is possible only if the households are camped close enough to each other for the women to visit either at each other's tents or at a nearby well or stream. All they can actually do is provide information between their respective households about the kinds of concessions either is willing to make. This is not viewed as a direct channel, since the women pick up the information only as they hear discussions in their own tent. The women involved in this interchange are usually young and are working for the best interests of the bride-to-be. Even the prospective groom's sisters will try to help only if the young woman wants to marry their brother.

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When the final terms of the arrangement have been tentatively agreed upon by the secondary negotiators, the primary negotiators--the eldest male relatives responsible, usually fathers--will come together. The male relatives of the groom-to-be, led by his father, will visit the tent of the prospective bride's father (talevuni). At this point there are a number of non-verbal cues which show acceptance or nonacceptance of the terms. For example, if the group is not admitted to the tent, or if only tea is served with no food, or if a felt rug is put down instead of a carpet, the visiting party may assume that the marriage is not acceptable. If the terms of the agreement are acceptable, a meal will be served and then, only after the meal has been eaten, will a final verbal agreement by the primary negotiators be made, including a discussion of wedding dates and transfer of the brideprice. Of course, there may be explicit verbal statements, also.

There is a wide variation in the amount of brideprice paid, depending on such factors as relationship, number of daughters, family wealth, and so on. Marriages outside of one's group tend to be more expensive unless they are with matrilateral first cousins. Certainly, one of the largest brideprices paid was by the brother of a Kordshuli kadkhoda to a neighboring Qashqa'i family. He paid 10,000T (1T = c. $ 0.15) and 70 ewes (600T/pair of ewes). This man's younger brother was initially asked for even more--30,000T and 100 ewes--for a woman within his tireh because the

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

father did not really want her to marry him. However, negotiations brought the brideprice into a more plausible range--only 10,000T. Another man who married his FZD had to pay a considerable amount--10,000T, 30 ewes, and 5 goats (400T/pair of ewes; 200T/pair of goats)--because of his own family's wealth. Most brideprices, however, are not this large. An average range is about 1,000-3,000T and 15-30 animals (combination of sheep and goats).

There were a number of men who had to pay no brideprice for their wives. A number of possible reasons are given for this occurrence. Sometimes, if the couple are very close kin (i.e., actual first cousins), brothers will forsake the transfer of stock and money, especially if they still maintain a joint flock, since then the transfer would be moot. Still, it is more common for even brothers to pay a brideprice for the marriage of their children. The wealth or poverty of the family may also play a role, depending on the direction of the transfer. Above, I noted that a very wealthy family may be asked for a more substantial brideprice payment. Here, if the groom's family is relatively poor or if the bride's family is quite wealthy, there may be no brideprice asked for. This decision is often based on the closeness of the families (even as friends) or on the desire of the bride's father to marry his daughter off relatively quickly. Another reason given by a couple of the men who paid no brideprice was that the father of the bride had a number of daughters and that he, (the father),

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The giving of brideprice may also play a key role in the acceptability of certain marriages (e.g., sister exchange). This practice of two families, each with a son and daughter, exchanging daughters as brides for their sons is called go-be-go (lit. cow to cow) marriage. The only time that this form of marriage is not viewed as objectionable or ugly (zesht-e) is when brideprice is paid. One family is generally perceived as being relatively more 'wealthy' than the other and they, therefore, should pay more. Even here, though, the marriage is not as good as one which goes in one direction only. Sister-exchange marriage between two poor families, where there is no exchange of money, is the subject of much gossip and concern. The Kordshuli say about this kind of marriage, "omad, nomad" (Persian: yeki amad, yeki neamad--one came, one did not come). That is, they believe that only one of the marriages contracted will produce offspring; the other will be barren.

This same expression, "omad, nomad," is also used to refer to marriages between two brothers and two sisters. The Kordshuli give no other reason for believing that this marriage is different than others. They do say that, in the long run, it is better than sister exchange marriage but that, since they are both bad, it makes little difference. The marriage mentioned above in the discussion on brideprice, relates to this issue. The kadkhoda of the tireh was

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married to Haji's daughter. The kadkhoda's youngest brother also wanted to marry a daughter of Haji, albeit by a different mother. The question was raised as to the propriety of the match, since the women were viewed as sisters. The continuing negotiations worked to dispel the notion that social sisterhood was the same as fully biological sisterhood. The implication is that there is an awareness, whether conscious or not, of some aspect of genetic potential as it relates to offspring. Certainly, in the western world we are aware of the fact that close inbreeding may allow deleterious recessive traits to manifest themselves. Thus, if two siblings marry direct counterparts, there is an increased risk that any recessive trait may be manifested. While this aspect of these marriages forms is never consciously stated, the social stigma attached to certain forms of marriage works to reduce the potential for this problem within an inbreeding population.

After all arrangements have been made for payment of the brideprice, dates will be set for the writing of the marriage contract (aghd) and the wedding itself (arusi). It is usual for these events to take place on two or three consecutive days. Most weddings take place in the summer when flock care is less intense and when most camps, not only of the tireh but also of the entire taifeh, are in relative proximity to each other.

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The Marriage Contract and the Wedding

Whether held on consecutive days or separated in time, both the marriage contract and the wedding are occasions of great celebration: feasting, music playing, dancing. All dancing is unisexual--the women do a handkerchief dance, gesturing with a scarf or handkerchief in each hand, while the men engage in a dance/competition called tark-e bazi (stick game), where one man tries to hit the leg of another with a stick, the defender using a large pole to block the attempt. Musicians are hired, usually from a nearby city, to play a couple of different pipes and a drum. Musicians are not always available and the effects of a modernizing world become obvious as modern means are used to provide music. In one case, the women danced in their synthetic fiber skirts to a battery-operated tape player, the volume of which was being magnified through a battery-operated megaphone.

While the marriage contract is usually written right before the wedding, it may, in fact, be written years before the actual wedding. In one case, the girl was contracted for marriage at age nine and was married when she was thirteen. In another case, the bride was contracted in autumn in the winter pasture area, where she was isolated from her only adult male relatives who lived in sarhad (upland cold region). She was then married to her unwanted suitor the following summer. To complete the writing of the contract, representatives of the bride and groom must

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finally negotiate the amount of mahr, the money to be paid the woman's family by the man's family if the marriage does not occur or ends in divorce as a result of the man's actions. Heated discussions and arguments always seem to arise over the issue of mahr despite the fact that none of my Kordshuli informants can remember any time when mahr was paid.

One fact that works against the payment of mahr is that divorce is very uncommon, almost non-existant, among the Kordshuli. Even the oldest Kordshuli informants can remember only one divorce involving Kordshuli. In that case, about fifteen years ago, the woman left her husband and, with her father's help, secured a divorce in a nearby city. Since the separation was considered her responsibility, no mahr was paid. The negative aspect of divorce (talaq) is universally accepted among the Kordshuli. Most negative aspects of Kordshuli life are considered "ugly" (zesht-e). Divorce, however, is not only ugly but the Kordshuli also say that, "there is fault" (eib hast; mahn hast) if a divorce occurs. Divorce is not only a negative act for the couples but also reflects poorly on their families. It is seen as a statement of a couple's inability to carry out their responsibilities as husband and wife. Blame is rarely placed on one party; both are considered to be equally responsible in moral terms, although, one may be more to blame in legal terms. However, divorce is so rare among the Kordshuli that it is negligible in terms of social actions.

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Once the final negotiations for mahr have been completed, the marriage contract is signed by the primary negotiators for the couple. Neither the bride nor the groom is present during the contract-signing ceremony, although the groom may appear later in the day, more to help with than take part in the festivities. The religious specialist that writes the marriage contract is from a neighboring sedentary community; there are no Kordshuli who are religious specialists. The specialist may be a friend of the kadkhoda or of other household heads in the tireh, but there is no direct nor developed relationship between a given religious specialist and any tireh such that the religious needs of one tireh are met by one specialist.

The wedding celebration itself most often occurs the day after the contract is signed. The same festivities are continued, although the primary feast of the day may be more lavish than preceding meals. The wedding, like the contract signing, usually takes place in the camp of the groom's father. In addition to the guest tents, which remain set up from the contract-signing ceremony, a bathing tent and a nuptial tent (hejleh) are set up.

While the groom is in the bathing tent, a small teepee made of a blanket wrapped around a wooden tripod, his younger female relatives stand around the outside of the tent clapping their hands, ululating, and singing happy and/or slightly ribald songs. The groom, having had his body washed, body hair cut, and feet and hands dyed with henna

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for good luck, emerges from the tent wearing only his pajama-like underclothes (zir-e shalvar), and then dresses in new clothes. For many young men, it is the first time that they have owned a sportcoat. Also, the traditional hat and shoes that are given to them by their families are of a higher quality than any they might have owned earlier. After the cleaning and after donning the new clothes, the groom finishes this appearance change, as symbolic of his change in status, by having his hair cut.

Usually after the groom completes this symbolic change of status, the male guests give him shabash, gifts of money to help defray the cost of the wedding. As each man gives his money, a male relative of the groom calls out the amount to the crowd; however, the amount called out is often as much as ten times the amount actually given. There is an attempt to deemphasize possible status differences among the various household heads by not focusing on the actual amount given. If a gift of money is given by any member of the khavanin, the actual amount given is called out; the amount correlating, in a general sense, to the status or prestige of the groom's family.

After the shabash is collected, the final act of the ceremony is begun. Male and female relatives of the groom, as well as the musicians who have been performing in the groom's camp all day, go to pick up the bride in her father's camp. If the camp is far away, only a select few will usually go to retrieve the bride (arus). Traditionally,

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the bride would have been brought in on horseback and young male relatives of both families would have ridden their horses back and forth shooting their rifles into the air. Now, the bride is brought into camp in a little Nissan pick-up truck with friends/relatives in the back, while some of the young men ride back and forth on small motorcycles firing rifles into the air. When the bride arrives, there is much hand clapping and ululating.

While the groom (dumad) was being cleaned, the bride was undergoing the same process at her father's camp. She, too, dons new clothes and has her hair cut. This latter act, in which only the front of the bride's hair is cut short, is a definitive marker of the status of bride. It is unlikely that her hair will be cut at any other time in her life. Her hands and feet are also dyed with henna.

When the bride is brought into camp she is driven directly to the nuptial tent (hejleh). Her head is covered with a scarf so that no one will see her in this new status before her husband does. Usually, after she has been ushered into the hejleh, her mother and, often, the groom's mother may sit down in front of the tent's entrance to ensure privacy. The truck that brought the bride also carries the bedding (raxt) for the newlyweds as well as the bride's personal goods. Little else is placed in the tent. Once in the hejleh, the bride is isolated from normal social interaction for three to five days; the groom, on the other hand, has much more freedom of movement. In any case, once

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the bride has entered the hejleh, the festivities begin to wind down until night falls and the groom also enters the hejleh.

Traditionally, there was more concern about checking the raxt the morning after to verify the virgin status of the bride. This was usually done by the mother of the groom. Now, though, while the Kordshuli still profess to hold virginity as a prime virtue of brides, there is little concern by most to assure themselves that this is actually the case. It is more important today that the couple seem to get along and that they accept each other. If there is some conflict between the parties contracting marriage then a check of bedding might be made; if no blood is found, the groom's family has the right to call off the marriage and to retrieve the brideprice. However, many of my informants said that even traditionally, if blood were not found, most marriages would still be maintained. They say it is just as important that the bride have a good personality, that she will make a good wife and, Allah willing, a good mother.

When the bride finally becomes a member of her husband's household by moving into his father's tent, she brings with her the final direct economic component of the marriage process, her trousseau. Included in this trousseau are household items, woven bags, tent sections, and usually some of the animals given her father as brideprice, perhaps five to ten animals.

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The above discussion was not intended to fully elaborate the wedding ceremony and the marriage process, but rather to add an ethnographic glimpse of the creation of new social units. The way in which this creation is actualized will be discussed below as the outcome of post-marital residence patterns. Within the framework of the above discussion on marriage it is important to realize that a marriage between Kordshuli families is not an attempt to create wide-spread alliances between descent groups. Rather, it further reinforces agnatic ties within one descent group and/or solidifies a relationship between the two families involved.

While the actualization of this relationship is indicated by the social event of a wedding, it is the economic transactions that play a key role in the process and it is the economic components that may be activated which define a great part of the relationship. The groom has given bethrothal gifts to the bride, has sometimes engaged in bride service for her father, has with his family paid a brideprice, and has agreed on compensation (mahr) should the relationship end. The bride has brought with her a trousseau which will help provide for the independent household unit when the new couple garner the economic means to establish themselves. Certainly, the direct economic transfers have favored the bride's family; however, her family has, in turn, lost a productive member of their household.

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If the marriage partners are first cousins, then the marriage serves to reinforce family access to resources, either to pasture land through shared membership in a tireh or to other landed property through direct family ties. If the relationship is more distant, yet still within the same tireh, then the marriage serves to maintain the unity of that group through the restricted use of and access to traditional pastures. Inter-tireh marriages set up the possibility for an economic component of the relationship--variable access to extra-tireh resources--to manifest itself. While extra-tireh affinal ties may not be activated, the fact that they exist for some is enough to provide an additional option for any one family if population density becomes pressing or if resources fail within traditional areas.

It is through marriage and the subsequent formation of new household units that the tirehs may be maintained as meaningful units. Thus, while marriage practices allow for the formation of new household units, it is the nature of post-marital residence that allows the social reproduction of each tireh as a semi-autonomous part of the larger collectivity, taifeh Kordshuli.

Post-Marital Residence

The maintenance and formation of camp groups and tirehs are based to a large degree on the formation of new household units, which occurs after marriage. As I

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mentioned above, the newly married bride and groom live in the nuptial tent for three to five days; after this time, they move in with the groom's father. Thus, post-marital residence is, at first, patrilocal. However, the independent nuclear household unit is still the cultural ideal, and it is with this end in mind that sons eventually separate from their natal household. The amount of time spent living patrilocally may vary from approximately one year to indefinitely--there are those who say they never separated and live alone now only because their parents died. Figure 4.1 shows a rough plot of the number of years that household heads remained in their father's household after marriage. In the category, "never separated," I have included both those household heads who are now independent yet who never separated from their parents (i.e., their parents died), as well as married men who are still part of their father's household. Also included in this group are those men who remained part of a joint household after the death of the father.

It is easily noted in the figure that approximately 40 percent of the sample did not or have not socially/economically separated from their father's household. A large number of those in this "not separated" category are youngest sons. It is customary for the youngest sons to remain with the household as a dependent until the father dies and then, if his elder brothers have separated, to become household head in his mother's household. When she



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

FIGURE 4.1 Post-marital residence with natal households (total sample: 187 couples)

dies, he inherits the material household. This, of course, depends on the age of the child. Sometimes it is a younger son of marriageable age who inherits the household but who then must provide for still younger siblings. If there are no sons of responsible age, then the mother becomes household head until a son reaches an appropriate age. If there are no sons, it is likely that that one household unit will cease to exist with the death of the adults. If, on the other hand, there are a number of married sons living together as a joint family after the father's death, the eldest assumes responsibility for the household.

There are a few men who separated from their father's household in less than a year's time after marriage but this is unusual and indicates considerable strife in the family. Most Kordshuli say that a year is an adequate period of time

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

to wait to separate, others say that a couple should wait until they have a child of their own. All my informants agree that it is extremely disrespectful to move out of one's natal household too quickly, unless it is the case that the father is already dead. If a man is living with his brothers, then it is possible for any younger brother to move out after a few months without any negative comments about his behavior.

While social separation works for the formation of the independent household, the Kordshuli will often give a variety of reasons why separation takes place without reference to the cultural ideal. The two most common reasons for separation of household units are overcrowding and friction between family units, especially between the wives of two married men. In the first case, overcrowding is considered a problem when more than one son has married and they have their wives and children living in the same tent as the rest of the family. If conditions become too stifling, then usually the second eldest of the brothers will move out first. If a younger sibling is the first to move out, again, it is an indication of friction within the family unit. One reason this act is considered improper is that with separation comes the actual separation of the flock. Since inheritance is based on the flock size at the time of separation, it is proper that the eldest eligible male child, who also is the first to marry, is the first to receive his share of the previous communal property.

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

The other reason commonly given for separation of household units is that friction develops between the wives of the married men in the tent, whether the relationship is father/son or brother/brother. In the former case, it is accepted that the young couple will accede to the demands of the parental couple, especially for the young bride to respond as a subordinate to her mother-in-law. Still, friction may develop between these women, especially after children are born to the young couple. The friction that develops in these cases, however, should not be expressed if possible. That is, it is considered inappropriate for the son's wife to challenge her mother-in-law in regard to household authority. Still, she may complain to her husband, who then may decide to separate if he has lived a respectable period of time with his father. In a joint family where married brothers live together, the likelihood of conflict is much greater and, in fact, is expected by most Kordshuli men. Many times, wives of brothers are of comparable age and social abilities. While, according to the ideal, the eldest brother and his wife fill the parental position, in actuality there is often rivalry over access to resources for each nuclear family. Often, younger brothers feel that the eldest is not sharing resources properly. This rivalry may be intensified through the actions of their wives. The younger brother's wife may feel that preparation of food is inadequate or that distribution of food favors the eldest brother's family. She may want to give something extra to

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her own children and is denied this by the "wife of the household." If the bickering continues, it is even possible that separate hearths will be used for food preparation by the individual families. If this occurs, it is expected that the younger brother will separate from the joint family unit. This is in contrast to the situation where conflict does not obtain.

This social and, at least, partially economic separation means that the couple will move into their own tent. While, in a general sense, the couple can be said to be living virilocally because of the territorial constraints of tireh membership, the Kordshuli would view this shift in residence as being neolocal.[2] The individual camps, rather than the tireh, are seen as being the primary categories for defining residence for the Kordshuli. Since they have traditional usufruct rights to pasture only in the areas allocated to their tireh, and since the vast majority of marriages take place within the same tireh, there is little choice in where a new household unit may be set up.

However, within the larger traditional area of the tireh, the Kordshuli man may choose to maintain certain ties with any given household, including his father's household, by becoming a neighbor (hamsayeh) to that person. Most young men prefer to set up camp away from their father's camp because it better shows the status change from dependent son to independent household head. This spatial separation is more common today with the greater dispersal

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of small camp groups throughout tireh territory. Traditionally, camp groups were much larger for protection and defense; sons, therefore, often camped closest to friends who were in the same camp group as their fathers.

There are also a few men, approximately 10 percent, who marry outside of their tireh (see Table 4.1). In a very few of these cases, the couple will reside with the bride's father after marriage. This situation usually indicates to other Kordshuli that there is a conflict between father and son or that the resources of the groom's father are severely limited. It is not a desirable situation since it works against the maintenance of the unity of the patrilineal family as well as of the tireh. Some of these couples, in fact, continue to reside 'uxorilocally' after separation from the bride's father's household, and their descendents may then be recognized as part of this matrilateral tireh. These types of tireh shifts have continued to lessen as the government, through control, attempts to maintain the artificial boundaries that separate tireh from tireh, both spatially and politically.

Marriage and post-marital residence, then, work to affirm the unity of the tireh and serve to maintain the tireh itself through the formation of new independent household units. The formation and survival of these household units, however, is dependent on their ability to be not only an independent social unit, but also a productive and reasonably self-sufficient economic unit. As with other nomadic

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households, productivity and economic survival depend primarily on the flock which belongs to the household heads. The primary source for a man's initial flock is from inheritance.

Inheritance

Among the Kordshuli there are three major types of inheritable property: animals (usually specified as ewes--mish--, or flock--gelleh); the tent household with its material items (huneh); and land (zamin) or especially agricultural land (zamin-e molk). The most important of these for the maintenance of a pastoral existence, because it provides the initial capital which may allow for economic self-sufficiency, is animal inheritance. The Kordshuli practice a form of anticipatory inheritance which closely parallels that practiced by the Basseri (Barth 1961: 19). While most Kordshuli, like the Basseri, say that the allocation of the patrimony takes place at the marriage of a son, it actually occurs, most often, at the time of social separation (savad shodan).

The number of animals given as patrimony is based on the number of male children in the household. Although, according to Islamic prescription, daughters should receive a half portion of male inheritance, most Kordshuli men do not consider their daughters when figuring out the proportional distribution of animals for inheritance. When a married son separates from his natal household, he inherits a share of the flock which represents the equal division

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of the flock among the household head and all his male children, with an additional number put aside for his wife so she might have some extra were he to die in the immediate future. For example, if there are three sons, then the first to marry and separate would receive approximately one fourth of the larger flock. The next son would then receive one third of the flock at the time of his separation. The sons who thus separate may make no additional claims on the animal property of their father. If one happens to mismanage his own flock, his father does not have to nor will he usually provide additional animals.

As was noted in Figure 4.1, a large number of married men do not separate from their natal household. These men, then, receive no animal inheritance until the death of their father. All or most of the animals of the larger flock are considered the private property of the household head until he allocates them according to the principles of anticipatory inheritance or until he dies. After the death of the head of the household, the eldest married son still living in the tent becomes the household head and will then distribute animals as younger siblings separate. If all married brothers who still have a claim on the property, as well as perhaps a young unmarried adult or teenage brother, decide to separate completely from one another, then the flock is divided equally among this group. It is not unusual for this division of the joint flock to create friction among the brothers as each tries to maximize

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his own gains. If there are no male heirs on the death of a household head, other agnatic relatives will try to gain control over many of the animals.

Inheritance of the tent household (huneh) itself, unlike inheritance of animals, occurs only after the death of the father and tends to be impartible. At this stage of the family developmental cycle, it is usual that adult sons, except the youngest, will have married and separated. It is expected that the youngest son after his marriage will stay in the tent to care for his ageing parents. When his father dies, he will become household head. This means that he becomes owner of the tent and its material contents and is, as well, charged with the care of his mother if she is still living. If, however, the father dies before his sons have separated, it is usually the eldest married son who becomes household head. Younger brothers, in turn, will separate from him and he will become sole owner of the material household. In many of these cases, the mother may decide to move out with any one of her sons depending on resource availability.

The final form of inheritable property is land, which, like the tent household, is inheritable on the death of the father. While it is the case that inheritance of land is partible, most Kordshuli choose to maintain the joint holding because of the increased productivity of one large plot over several small ones. The products of this land are divided equally among all sons of the previous owner. There

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are a few cases where daughters have received some portion of the profits of the land, but this has usually only been in cases where the family is quite wealthy. Since most of the land presently owned by Kordshuli households was purchased in the last generation, there has been little if any division of property among heirs. It is not unexpected that conflict will arise among brothers as to the division and location of land parcels after an increase in inheritors makes it difficult to maintain an adequate level of productivity for each family unit. There have been a few cases where a brother has sold his share of the land to another brother. The seller in these cases, however, has always been in the process of sedentarizing in an area removed from the location of the joint property.

An additional inheritable property that I did not mention because it is not as common as the others is cash. If there is any money left after the death of a man, his sons divide it equally among themselves with perhaps some small amount going to the man's widow.

Nonetheless, as I mentioned, the most important form of inheritable property to ensure, at some level, the viability of a nomadic pastoral household is the flock of animals. Thus, while marriage preferences and rules of post-marital residence allow for the formation of new household units, it is through the anticipatory inheritance of animals that most of these units are able to maintain themselves as economically self-sufficient units. However, as pasture

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land becomes more scarce and as agricultural land becomes more important to the Kordshuli due to an increase in sedentarization, it will be the inheritance of this latter form of property--land--which becomes critical for the survival of individual households. That is, even if the households inherit animals, there may be no easy way to care for them.

As we shall see in the following chapters, the prospect for maintaining a pastoral nomadic existence in the face of political and economic change is not great. As more Kordshuli settle because of these pressures and constraints, the ability of many individual households to survive will depend on more than the number of animals they inherit; it will depend to a large degree on their ability to diversify their interests and realize gain from more than just their pastoral interests. Whether this is possible for most Kordshuli remains to be seen.

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CHAPTER V

POLITICAL PROCESSES

This chapter is concerned with shifts in the political structure of the Kordshuli over time and how recent shifts have contributed to increased sedentarization. This increased sedentarization has come about in part because these political shifts have weakened the larger group ties of the taifeh (tribe), thereby undermining the unity of that collectivity. Also, with these political changes, interaction with sedentary populations, whether local agriculturalists or the State apparatus, has become more restricted making the maintenance of a pastoral nomadic adaptation more difficult.

I will first present some background information on the political position and development of the Kordshuli in Fars Province and, briefly, describe some of the functions of the various office holders within the group. As the political form changes so, too, do some of these functions. Some of these shifts, which without outside interference would lead to a renewed cycle of political development, have now, with increased government involvement and interference, brought on what appears to be the end of this cycle. Thus, two major cyclical processes that, in the past, have characterized many of the nomadic groups of the Middle East have

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become non-replicating. That is, the coalescing of small groups and the subsequent disintegration of large groups to begin the process again elsewhere has essentially terminated. Also, the cyclical nature of the sedentarization/nomadization process has become essentially unidirectional as the options for the nomad decrease and sedentarization seems inevitable.

Historical Political Development

There are five main historical periods within which I will discuss the shifting political groupings of the Kordshuli: the Incursive period; the Qashqa'i period; the Independent period; the Entezamat period; and the Post-Entezamat period. These periods are unequal in time and not as clearly delimited as the list implies. However, they serve to underscore the major administrative shifts which are recognized by both the Kordshuli and the larger State.

Incursive Period

There are a number of possible scenarios for the development of the group during this period. These scenarios are based on Kordshuli oral history, as well as on information in the literature on the Middle East about group formation and political development. Barth's (1961) comments on the formation of the Basseri collectivity also provide some insights into the process.

In one scenario, the central core of the Kordshuli probably first entered their present summer pasture area (eilaq) as a small related camp group. As was mentioned in

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chapter two, the khavanin (plural of khan - chief) of the Kordshuli feel that they entered the area from the West and were probably originally a part of the Bakhtiari confederacy. The larger tribes and confederacies that were to later occupy the area had not been formed or had not yet arrived. Organization, therefore, was probably only in the form of camp or herding units based on consanguineal and affinal ties. It is also likely that other small splinter groups from other areas filtered into the same valley system. If there were enough pasture land and water for the small groups to interact and coexist with minimal or no conflict, there would have been no need to coalesce. If, however, pasture conditions changed or external groups attempted to encroach on the limited pastures, thus upsetting the human-animal-land balance, the small groups might have coalesced for protection and defense. Then, the strongest, or largest, or richest may have become the dominant group, setting the scene for the emergence of a chiefly dynasty.

It is also possible that when the other small splinter groups entered the area, they readily attached themselves to the central core of the Kordshuli, creating a political organization in which one group was dominant. This dominance could have been justified and maintained both by initial access to resources and by military strength.

There also might have been initial conflict within the area for the limited pasture land and, again, the militarily dominate group, either independently or in concert

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with others who chose to align themselves with this group, might have gained control. This would have enabled this dominant group to begin to control the allocation of resources (e.g., pasture land). Thus, loyal supporters of the dominant group would have received "rewards" in the form of access to the better pasture areas.

In all of these scenarios, the beginning of some type of stratification, albeit minimal, can be seen. It is likely that the dominant group, probably a localized lineage, with its alliances, either politically or affinally motivated, could have established and maintained control. Once the control had been established, the emergence of the primary camp group may have been the beginning of the chiefly dynasty. It is possible, then, to see the emergence of sections (tirehs) from camp or herding units, and from these sections the formation of a larger collectivity under the control of one family grouping. This information is consistent with the belief of many Kordshuli that they are descended from a number of ancestors. (In contrast, many other nomadic groups in the Middle East trace their origins to a single apical ancestor.) Rather, each tireh has its own traditional history. The tirehs believe they are part of the Kordshuli only because they recognize and accept the leadership of the kalantar (chief)[1] of the Kordshuli.

At that time, it is unlikely that the kalantar had as many administrative functions as he had later in the political development of the group. Most of the present khavanin

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feel that the Kordshuli had not yet begun to migrate to garm-e sir (lowland winter pasture areas). This is supported by Sykes for the early part of this century. The Kordshuli "instead of travelling from the lowlands to the uplands according to the season, moved only a few miles" (1963: 481). Thus, there was little need to regulate migration, one of the major functions of the kalantar in the later political development of the group. There was, however, a need to regulate the use of pastures so that, with demographic fluctuations, there probably were periodic reallocations of pastures to the various camps and sections under the kalantar's control.

It is also likely, judging from the oral histories of the Kordshuli and other similar groups, that there were rivals for the kalantar's position, both from within his family and from the other "client" groups. In the latter case, most of these rivals were probably men who had been leaders of their respective groups and who, therefore, wished to retain or extend their power or control.[2] The oral tradition of the present khavanin says that the ancestors of the present khavanin were the first, or one of the first, groups in the area and that the other groups which followed coalesced with them. There is no record in their oral history of any serious in-fighting between members of the khavanin for control of the group. They mention only one power play that took place two generations ago between brothers. This is in contrast to the number of rival

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pretenders among their neighbors, the Basseri (Barth 1961: 73). Thus, according to oral tradition, there was one group during this incursive period which gained control and has maintained it through the present.

As his control increased, it would have been difficult for the kalantar to transmit information about pasture allocation and other matters to all members of the larger collectivity. Therefore, he would transmit the information via the leaders of the various camp groups who had a following within their own group. At this time, these camp leaders were generally known only as respected elders (rish sefid; lit. white beard) but some eventually came to be known as kadkhoda (headman), with the designated role of chiefly messenger. As the need for information transmission became greater because of increasing interaction with other groups, the role of kadkhoda became more important. Still, the structural position of the kadkhoda was more nominal than actual since he had more responsibility but no real power except as spokesman for the kalantar.

It is difficult to ascertain the number of smaller groups, tireh, that came under the aegis of these kadkhodas at this stage of development. The Kordshuli maintain that the same five tireh have always been part of the Kordshuli and that this number has never varied. It seems more likely that at one time the number or form of the tireh were different since this has been the case with most of the other groups in Fars Province. Peiman points out for the Qashqa'i

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that the organization and composition of the taifeh never remained constant: tirehs either separated from the larger collectivity or added on as new parts to already existing groups. Many that were originally part of the confederacy no longer exist, having migrated to other areas or having settled in villages and cities (Peiman 1968: 220-221).

As I mentioned in chapter two, the Kordshuli believe that they entered Fars Province before the Qashqa'i arrived. The Qashqa'i confederacy had come into existence from the union of several taifeh exhibiting linguistic homogeneity. As other Turkic speakers (as well as Lurs, Persians, Kurds, etc.) came under the dominion of the Qashqa'i leaders, the size and power of the confederacy increased (Peiman 1968; Beck 1978). Aware of their vulnerability resulting from their small size, the Kordshuli chose to ally themselves with this larger confederacy. Thus, as population density, both nomadic and sedentary, continued to increase, the Kordshuli entered into a political and economic alliance which would enable them to maintain access to resources in their sarhad (summer pasture area), as well as to provide access to resources in garm-e sir after they began to undertake large scale migrations. This, then, begins the second historical period.

Qashqa'i Period

There is no historical record of when the Kordshuli actually became part of the Qashqa'i confederacy. We do know that at the beginning of this century they had been

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part of the Qashqa'i and shortly thereafter became independent. Sykes (1963: 481) points out that in 1917, "among the professional robbers were the Kurshulis (sic), who had broken away from the Kashgais (sic)."

As part of the the Qashqa'i confederacy, "each subtribe has its kalantar [or chief] appointed by the Ilkhani and nominally subservient to him. In practice, however, the kalantars are often so powerful as to be able to defy the Ilkhani and remain aloof in an attitude of passive hostility" (Christian 1919: 23). Still, as Peiman notes (1968), if a kalantar was not doing an adequate job the ilkhani might assign another kalantar to lead the group, although this change had to be acceptable to the group.

A primary responsibility of the kalantar at this time was the collection of revenue from his group to pass on to the khans of the larger confederacy. While he, no doubt, wielded considerable power within his own group, this power was mitigated by the needs and desires of the khans of the confederacy. It is unlikely that the Qashqa'i khans actively participated in the allocation of Kordshuli pastures or regulation of their short-distance migration. Still, it was enough for the kalantar to know that the threat posed by withdrawal of Qashqa'i support could easily lead to the demise of the Kordshuli through conflict with larger neighboring groups.

With a decrease in the influx of nomadic groups into the immediate area and a lessening of aggressive encroachment

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by neighboring groups, the Kordshuli relinquished the formal political and economic relationship with the Qashqa'i. Instead, they began a period of general independence, although they did maintain a close, non-control political relationship with the leadership of the Qashqa'i.

Independent Period

By at least the second decade of this century, the Kordshuli, seemingly, were an independent unit (Sykes 1963: 481). However, in the sparse literature available, there is some confusion as to the actual status of the group (cf. chapter two). According to the widest range of informants, it is most likely that the Kordshuli were independent and were aligned more closely with the Qashqa'i than with the Khamseh. However, it is probably true that towards the end of this period they nominally fell under the administration of Qavam, head of the Khamseh confederacy.

The differences between the kalantar's duties as an independent leader when compared to his role as a secondary leader in a confederacy are not great. With independence, the kalantar took on many of the duties that the khan of the confederacy had been responsible for, often just reinforcing the power he already exercised within his own group. He did become more responsible for regulating migration to maximize pasture use with other groups and for general interaction with other groups outside of the Kordshuli. Also, the flow of goods and revenue shifted more to the kalantar. Whereas, before, he had received some wealth from the group, he had

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also been responsible for collecting and passing on revenue to the khans of the confederacy. With independence, a tax was maintained, but it went directly to the kalantar of the Kordshuli, thus increasing his wealth and consequently his power, not only within his own group but also in the eyes of competing tribal groups and sedentary populations. The position of the kalantar is aptly described by Barth (1961: 71):

> The pivotal position then in the whole tribal organization is that of the chief. He is the central, autocratic leader of the tribe. In keeping with the historical forms of centralized leadership found elsewhere in the Middle East, he is traditionally granted a vast and not clearly delimited field of privilege and command, and power is conceived as emanating from him, rather than delegated to him by his subjects.

Some of the following discussion on the kalantar (chief) will be drawn from Barth (1961). His discussion of the role of the kalantar is comparable to the data I was able to collect in the field about the Kordshuli kalantar before governmental deposition. Caution must be applied, though, since the deposition of the tribal chiefs had already occurred at the time of Barth's study. Thus, there is a chance that some of the descriptions of the power and behavior of the chief are more ideal than real. Still, it will be useful to examine his position, albeit briefly, so that it will be easier to understand the shifts in the political structure which started occurring with the deposition of the chief, and the role these shifts have in the sedentarization process.

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Barth (1961: 76) summarizes the functions of the kalantar as:

> alloting pastures and co-ordinating the migrations of the tribe; settling the disputes that are brought to him; and representing the tribe or any of its members in politically important dealings with sedentary authorities.

With the power to assign pastures sectionally, the kalantar exercised greatest authority in areas directly under his control, generally implying that he or his relatives owned the land. This power was most important during the earlier part of this historical period since the Kordshuli did not migrate very far. When they did begin to migrate further south, pastures usually had to be secured by the tirehs themselves. The kalantar did aid in negotiations with sedentary and other pastoral nomadic owners, but it was more often the relationship between the kadkhoda of the tireh and the kadkhoda of the village that set the use pattern. Much of the land used for winter pastures is said to have been under the control of Nasr Khan of the Qashqa'i and later under that of the kadkhoda of the main village in the area, Mobarakabad. Fees were paid annually for the use of pastures in winter quarters throughout most of this period. The importance of maintaining some political ties with the khans in the Qashqa'i can readily be seen if initial access to pastures were to be secured, even if payment was required.

Internally, it was the kalantar alone who could make decisions, which others were compelled to follow. Those who disobeyed him were subject to punishment, ranging

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from corporal punishment (e.g., slapping) to exile from pastures directly under the kalantar's control (i.e., summer pastures). Even in later periods, the kalantar and his relatives retain some of this power, not only among the nomads but also among some of the settled Kordshuli. Most of the commands that the kalantar might give were not delivered directly by the kalantar but by one of his messengers, either a kadkhoda of a tireh or a member of his personal retinue, the whole of which is known as dowrre bar or amaleh.

Perhaps the most important role of the kalantar was that of middleman or mediator between the Kordshuli and sedentary populations, including the State, as well as between the Kordshuli and other nomadic groups of comparable or greater structural complexity (e.g., the Basseri of the Khamseh and the Qashqa'i confederacy). In the latter case, most of the interaction was concerned with the regulation of migration or disputes over rights to pasturage. In the former case, it was the kalantar who represented both the whole of the Kordshuli, as well as individual members of the group, in many dealings with the sedentary world. This was particularly true for dispute settlement.

Through this period, there were few major shifts in power relations and political functions within the group; most of these were quantitative. With the beginning of the next period, Entezamat, there began to appear qualitative differences in political relationships. These shifts are

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schematically summarized for the four periods in Figure 5.1. The figure represents a very general statement about the changing roles and power positions; the historical fact has not always been so clearly demarcated yet the indicated shifts are clear enough to indicate the effects of increasing State control.

Entezamat Period

A major shift in the political structure of the group began in the mid-1950s with the deposition of the kalantar and, later, the creation of a special gendarmarie post in charge of tribal affairs. Initial control of the tribes was given to the army after the deposition of the kalantar, but in the early 1960s it was shifted to gendarme posts (qaragah-ye Entezamat) under the command of a Disciplinary Officer (afsar-e Entezamat). The government, toward the end of the "independent period," had allowed that the Kordshuli were under the nominal control of Qavam, leader of the Khamseh confederacy. That is, Qavam was held responsible for Kordshuli activity. Yet, they still appeared as an independent unit, with their kalantar, Ata Khan, exercising full control. With the formation of Entezamat the Kordshuli officially became part of the administratively defined Khamseh confederacy. At its formation the Khamseh confederacy had been composed of five tribes: Basseri, 'Arab, Nafar, Baharlu, and Ainalu. The latter three have either settled or been absorbed by the Basseri and 'Arab, although one Kordshuli tireh claims to have come from the Baharlu.



FIGURE 5.1 Changing political influence and control among the Kordshuli

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Thus, although the Kordshuli were never really an active part of the Khamseh confederacy and were, in fact, more closely aligned with a sometime enemy of the Khamseh, the Qashqa'i confederacy, the younger generations all say that they are a part of Khamseh and always have been. This political shift in itself is interesting since the Kordshuli appear to be one of a small minority of tribes in the area which has shifted, in any way, from one confederacy to another and still retained some integrity as a meaningful unit.

Of greater importance for this discussion are the internal political shifts which deposition of the kalantar brought about, as well as the immediate effects of putting chiefly functions into the hands of government officers not familiar with the political adaptations that the tribes had evolved to deal with inter-tribal migration routes and other interaction nodes. Among the Qashqa'i this continuity was not so strained since an army officer was sent to administer the tribes jointly with the khans; first as advisors, later as the directors (Beck 1978). Among the Kordshuli, as well as among the Basseri and 'Arab, an army officer was given complete charge of administering the tribes as part of the now governmentally defined tripartite Khamseh confederacy (Barth 1961).

There is some confusion by the Kordshuli as to the events surrounding this change in status. Many Kordshuli say that there were, initially, two separate army commands for the tribes in this area: one for the Basseri and 'Arab

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qua Khamseh, and one for the Kordshuli as an independent unit. Also, the Kordshuli say that there has always been a captain in charge. However, if in fact they were part of the administratively defined Khamseh group--as the tribal gendarmarie post, Entezamat, and as Barth (1961) say--then they were under the command of a colonel. Some of this confusion may be a result of the shift from regular army officer to Disciplinary Office of the gendarmarie. The latter, by having command posts set up near both summer and winter pasture areas, was more able to police tribal activities.

The deposition of the kalantar was not at first effective as a means of removing power from the hands of the tribal leadership. The Kordshuli, similar to the Basseri (Barth 1961), continued to pay tribute to the kalantar despite the fact that the powers and duties of the group leaders were abolished by the State, as later were the titles of khan and kalantar (Beck 1978). As the power of the officer in charge (afsar-e Entezamat) became more visible and the effective power of the kalantar became noticeably curtailed, the nomads realized that they would have to turn more to the afsar to handle dispute settlement, migration control, and the like.

Afsar-e Entezamat--Disciplinary Officer

The installment of the Disciplinary Officer (afsar-e Entezamat) as head of the gendarmarie post and in charge of administering the Basseri, 'Arab, and Kordshuli (Qaragah-ye

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Entezamat-e Basseri, 'Arab va Kordshuli), of necessity, affected the relations among these tribes. Whereas, earlier, the settlement of disputes concerning migration routes, pasture encroachment, and the like had to be handled by two men of equivalent stature, the chiefs, it was now in the hands of one man. This meant that relationships to this army officer could influence the way in which he would decide the outcome of various disputes. Among the nomads there are many accusations of solicited bribery by this officer. Unsolicited bribes are also offered in hopes that conflicts will be adjudicated in the favor of the group offering the goods. Many groups try to influence the decision of the officer by providing to him pastoral products that are highly desirable and usually in scarce supply (e.g., clarified butter [roqan]). In other cases, there seems to have been an implicit agreement that the group which can give more favors to the officer would have the case decided in its favor.

Unlike the confederacy system where there was also one paramount leader, the present system allows less power to accrue to the leaders of the smaller sub-groups (i.e., kadkhodas of tireh), than accrued to the leaders of the confederacy sub-units (i.e., kalantars of taifeh). That is, while the kadkhodas have considerably more power than in the past, it is not directly comparable to the power wielded by the kalantars as part of the confederacy. This is because the kalantar within the framework of his own tribal structure

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had non-restricted power while the kadkhoda is responsible to the central government for his decisions on internal affairs at all levels.

Another difference between the systems at the highest level is that there is a means of replacing the afsar-e Entezamat while this was not true of the Qashqa'i khans except, perhaps, by revolution. A few years ago the Basseri complained vociferously about the afsar-e Entezamat to gendarmarie headquarters in Shiraz. This captain continually asked for money and pastoral products while offering no return except the maintenance of the status quo. The officer was replaced. It is also the case that the afsar is transferred to another post after a couple of years so that there is no certainty that any given policy will be maintained over a relatively long time period.

At this stage of political development, then, despite the shift from individual taifeh (tribe) administration to "confederacy" administration, there is some continuity in the sense that there is still one primary leader to whom the nomads can turn for assistance in dealing with conflict situations, especially inter-tribal disputes and conflicts with the sedentary populations with whom they come in contact. That is, there is still but one effective leader of the group who can act as a powerful mediator between the State and the tribe, although his bias is governmentally directed or self-serving. This structural position is critical for tribal unity. Barth (1961: 71) points out,

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"it is the fact of political unity under the . . . chief which in the eyes of the tribesmen and outsiders alike constitutes them into a single 'tribe' in the Persian sense." However, the increased power of the kadkhoda means that there has been a shift in focus from one larger collectivity leader to a shared focus with the kadkhodas as tireh leaders.

Inter-tribal conflict is mediated by the gendarmarie officers in charge of the confederacies of which the disputants are members. If the disputants are members of the same confederacy, the afsar-e Entezamat (tribal Disciplinary Officer) will resolve the conflict by himself. If, however, the disputants are from different confederacies, then the officers in charge must agree to a solution. A case example will show this process at work.

During my research a dispute arose over the use of certain pastures in the Kordshuli qeshlaq (winter pasture area). It was not clear where the actual boundaries were that separated the qeshlaq of the Babamaleki tireh of the Kordshuli from those of part of the Amaleh tireh of the Qashqa'i. When the Qashqa'i group tried to migrate closer than usual so that they could take advantage of the mountain pastures which the Kordshuli believed to be theirs, verbal abuse stopped just short of physical violence. Many of the adult males of the Kordshuli group rushed to the scene where the Qashqa'i group had begun to unload their pack animals. The shepherds' staffs were held up and some of both groups had rocks in their hands. Luckily, violence was averted when

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the acting headman of the Babamaleki showed up. This kadkhoda, Eskandar, said to the leader of the other group, "If you want to quarrel, I am ready; if you want to fight, I am ready; if you want to go to court; I am ready." The Qashqa'i group chose, for the moment to move. Each party then went to its respective administering gendarmarie post to complain. Both leaders said that, in the past, fighting would most certainly have occurred, but with the threat of governmental reprisals a formal complaint is safer.

The complaints led to a meeting of the Colonel in charge of the Qashqa'i group, the Captain in charge of the Kordshuli, the kadkhodas of the two groups, representatives of these kadkhodas, and a member of the nearby village council, who claimed that the conflict could affect the welfare of the village. Guest tents were set up in both camps. An official government tent was set up in the proximity of the Qashqa'i camp. In the Kordshuli camp carpets were set out, a goat was slaughtered, and candy and cigarettes were brought from the village; it was as if tribal nobility were coming.

The actual discussions were comparable to other decision-making modes among the nomads: open discussion and argument within and among small groups at high volume; two or three people leaving for a private discussion, then returning; disagreements and lots of shouting; and, as is not unusual, one of the primary parties walking out. Part of the problem, in this specific case, was that there were two

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documents which suggested different boundaries, and which the kadkhodas of both groups had signed in the recent past. The Captain pointed out that he and the Colonel were in charge and that any objections of the kadkhodas were essentially irrelevant for them, the officers, to render a decision. One of the fears expressed by both groups was that there would be continual bickering without a just solution. This bickering might manifest itself as rock throwing between shepherds of the two groups as they tended their flocks in the mountains. The previous autumn had seen such a quarrel which had left one young man dead.

The kadkhoda of the Babamaleki, who had come down from his village home to participate, walked out of the meeting to protest the direction in which the discussion was moving. This effectively stopped the discussions for the moment. Shortly thereafter, the two officers casually strolled together until they reached the Babamaleki camp. It seemed as if they were trying to remain disinterested in the quarrel and had just come upon the camp in the course of a leisurely walk. After twice refusing an invitation to the camp, they at last accepted and the discussions and arguments began anew. A decision was finally made in favor of the Kordshuli, primarily because the Captain had a greater knowledge of the needs of the pastoralists and was better able to show how "his" group needed the area.

The point of this example is that the forms of inter-tribal conflict resolution, which in the past had included violent confrontation, have now, with greater State

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control, become more powerful. Before, when the kalantars of two tribes met to settle disputes, their concerns were with the ability of their group to make an adequate living. Now, however, the decisions of the officers are based on little more than their conscientiousness in doing their job. If the Disciplinary Officer has little awareness of the needs of pastoral nomads (as the Qashqa'i officer did), then decisions may be made which adversely affect the ability of the nomads to maintain their lifestyle.

The role of the afsar-e Entezamat though is not only that of inter-tribal mediator. As the sargeant-in-charge of the specific Entezamat post under the command of the Captain pointed out to me, the Captain and his post are responsible for any and all tribal matters within the administratively defined Khamseh confederacy. If a nomad is involved in a theft, Entezamat is responsible for apprehension of the culprit as well as for interim incarceration. Any time any member of the tribe is involved in any legal matter that is brought up before a court of law, the court will automatically notify Entezamat and they will intercede as much as possible on the tribesman's behalf, at least in terms of correct protocol.

Entezamat is also responsible, at some level, for trying to guarantee that all nomads have identity cards and that all eligible young men are considered for the draft into the Iranian army. This information is not always available to Entezamat and must be conveyed to them by cooperating kadkhodas in charge of each tireh.

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At this stage in time, the role of the kadkhoda has also changed significantly. Previously he had been a chiefly messenger and nominal figurehead, with little if any functional differentiation that could set him above the egalitarianism[3] of the group as a whole. Now, though, the kadkhoda has, in many ways, taken over many of the functions of the kalantar, albeit limited in scope and power. For example, as I mentioned above, the kadkhoda functions in many ways as mediator between the State and the common nomad. In almost all cases where a government representative would have contacted the kalantar in the previous political period, the same representative, or a representative of the afsar-e Entezamat, will deal with the kadkhoda of a given tireh in matters pertaining to the actions of any of that tireh's members.

There are, also, other areas in which kadkhodas have taken on, in some form, some of the functions of the deposed kalantar. Whereas, previously, the kalantar had complete say about pasture allocation in summer pasture areas and a major influence in other areas, the kadkhoda now has final say, within governmental limits, as to who from outside his tireh may camp in any of their traditional pasture areas. The kalantar's control was based primarily on ownership of resources. Today, most of the traditional pasture lands are owned by the State, so it is only through governmental recognition and approval of traditional rights that

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the kadkhoda may exercise this limited power. Still, it is uncommon for any member of another tribe to be given permission to camp on Kordshuli land, although it is the case that some Kordshuli have camped in Qashqa'i territory, usually for a fee. Usually those who are given permission to use pasture land, if they are not members of that tireh, are affines or uterine kin.

This extra-tireh land use is based not only on close relationship, but also on relative access to good pasture land. Each tireh has its own traditional qeshlaq (winter pasture area). As the tirehs get larger through population increase, overcrowding and equal access to good pastures become problematical. Thus, within the largest unsegmented tireh, Xaleji, more households try to find and use pastures in other regions than do households of smaller tirehs. This is because the traditional winter pastures of the Xaleji, near the city of Xafr, are not that desirable; this is due to occasional winter snow and because of overcrowding of these pastures by the nomadic group and by local pastoralists using some of the same pastures.

The role of the kadkhoda has also expanded, as I mentioned above, in that he is more responsible to the government in matters of conscription and the procurement of identity cards for his tireh members. Although he had an important role in these affairs under the kalantar because the kalantar could not be aware of all births and the birthdays of all Kordshuli, it was the kalantar himself who was,

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There seems to be some correlation between the education or sophistication of the kadkhoda and his desire or feeling of duty in these matters of governmental concern. There are a number of Kordshuli who do not have identity cards, just as there are a number of young men who have not gone into the army. Young men without identity cards are usually trying to avoid the draft, while females without identity cards tend to be neglected in this regard until they are of marriageable age.

Prior to strict governmental control there was no real need to record all marriages, births, deaths, etc. Now, however, all marriages are supposed to be recorded with the government. Therefore, the religious specialist performing the ceremony is hesitant to sign the marriage contract without having seen the identity cards of the parties involved. Sometimes, though, with a bit of fast talk and some luck it is still possible to avoid this requirement (fines are often imposed on adults without identity cards). One such case occurred in a camp that I was staying in. A woman in the tireh was to be married but could produce no identity card. The kadkhoda said that he had all the identity cards of his tireh at his house in the north. When asked the full name of the woman, there was a long pause before a last name was given. When identity cards are issued, the household head may choose whatever family name he likes. Because this

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woman's father had died and when living had been an illiterate mute, the family had no official name. The kadkhoda just chose the most common name, not only within his tireh, but among all the Kordshuli, Zareh (lit. cultivator, although the Kordshuli say it means animal husbandman).

At any rate, those kadkhodas who have had some education and greater contact with the sedentary community, usually through the possession of land, tend to be more concerned that they fulfill their "duty" to the government. Some others, though, claim they lack effective means to keep track of everyone's age, which usually means they feel that they can not sacrifice the labor of the young men or that they are too suspicious of the government.

Another function which the kadkhoda has acquired, to some extent, is some say about migration. Although the primary responsibility for migration control is in the hands of the afsar-e Entezamat, there is an overlapping responsibility of the kadkhoda in that he has to secure a migration permit (parvaneh) from the government. Thus, no member of his tireh is allowed to migrate until the kadkhoda determines the necessity or desirability of the move. When the kalantar was in control, it was by his orders alone that migration could occur. He had not only helped to order the migration patterns between his group and other groups but he also ordered the migration pattern of his own tribe so that there was no overgrazing in any specific area along those parts of the migration route which were common to two or

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more tirehs. This overlapping could occur in only a few areas, since within the total area of the Kordshuli rah-e kuch there were fairly specific routes that the various tirehs followed depending on the destination of these routes in either winter or summer pastures.

During the period of my research this aspect of migration control by the kadkhoda was somewhat circumvented, since the winter had been especially dry. Pastures which could normally have lasted until after the beginning of the new year (beginning of Spring) were extremely dessicated. Almost all of the groups started to migrate two weeks to one month earlier than usual. This meant that they started migration without governmental permission, since the government tries to coordinate the migration from Now Ruz (New Year's Day). At one point along the migration route between Jahrom (in winter pasture area) and Shiraz, the afsar-e Entezamat happened to be driving by and stopped to ask who had been given permission to start migration early. The afsar-e Entezamat was very angry, feeling that his power had been usurped. He told the leader of the group that the kadkhoda would have to return to Jahrom, the location of the winter post of Entezamat, to get a permit. Migration continued since, although any gendarmarie post (pasgah) along the route may stop a group of nomads to check their permit and stop them if they do not have one, they rarely do. The only point on the migration route where the permit is routinely inspected is at the crossing of the Kur River below

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Marvdasht, either Band-e Amir or Pol-e Khan. When we arrived at this point, the kadkhoda was prepared to return to Jahrom for a permit but there was no one at the bridge area to check permits so the group just continued its uninterrupted migration.

One additional function of the kadkhoda which parallels a previous chiefly function is that of entertainment, especially of outsiders (e.g., government representatives, villagers, and other anomalous persons, such as wandering anthropologists). Although hospitality is expected of all households as a cultural ideal, it is the kadkhoda who is expected to give more. Often this is because he is a little better off financially than many of his "constituents." There is no overt realization on their part that their position is, indirectly, validated by this display of hospitality. It is not a direct relationship, since other wealthy households that have some ability to influence the decisions of others are also expected to show greater than normal hospitality. Still, most of the kadkhodas do not like the increased responsibility of entertaining that they have acquired since the deposition of the kalantar. They feel that it takes too much time away from their own activities and that the entertainment costs are too great.

While the mediator role of the kadkhoda is of prime structural importance, the other tireh members, when asked what the kadkhoda does in the position of kadkhoda, usually focus on some of the internal dynamics of the position. That is, they stress those aspects of the position which may

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directly affect them and their families. While tireh members certainly are aware of some of the other responsibilities of the kadkhoda, the following functions are those commonly given as answers to non-directive questions. The kadkhoda can choose soldiers (i.e., he has primary responsibility for governmental conscription regulations); he can bring all of his relatives together to stay near him and thus offer him support (political, military, economic), although this is not known to have happened; he can allow others to camp in his tireh's qeshlaq (winter pasture areas); and he can decide if a family should be allowed to leave one camp area to go to another, and thus affect the dispersal of camps, particularly during migration.

Kalantar

The kalantar, although not an administratively functioning member of the tribe, still retains his prestige and respect, and a following within the tribe. Many different nomads told me that the kalantar has no business with the tribe anymore (kari nadare) but this does not convey the real state of affairs. Because of his wealth, his knowledge of the tribe, and his access to resources--be they in terms of material, of contacts with the sedentary community, or of information networks--the kalantar and the rest of the khavanin are often turned to in times of need. Within the summer pasture areas in Kordshuli sarhad, where the kalantar has settled, any decision that the kalantar makes with regard to the tribe is adhered to (as long as it does not

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oppose government policy). If the kalantar should choose to come to any nomadic camp, he is shown the same respect he would have been shown previously, including deferential gestures such as hand kissing, kneeling, or standing in his presence, etc. Also, the leader of the camp would most certainly slaughter a lamb for the occasion; this act, however, is probably as true for any really important personage, such as the chief of another tribe or the afsar-e Entezamat. Even young members of collateral branches of the khavanin are shown extreme courtesy including the killing of an animal, usually a goat kid, for a meal. If the kalantar or one of his immediate or collateral family should choose to visit a nomadic camp, it is usually the camp of the kadkhoda, although it may also be that of another wealthy tireh member.

Power and Control in the Tireh

During this period of enforced governmental control, the Entezamat period, another event occurred that illustrates one aspect of increasing control in the rural areas, and which also had a major effect on the nature of Kordshuli political and social interaction. Approximately 10 years ago, the government ordered the execution of two ringleaders of groups of thieves who had systematically robbed the nomads of their flocks as well as of their personal possessions. Prior to that time, the Kordshuli had usually camped in groups of 5 to 15 tents. Now, with the major threat of theft drastically reduced, the camp groups have separated and dispersed. Large groups had been very adaptive when the

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tribes were in competition with each other over rights to pasture, and when the central government was not strong enough to deal with these inter-tribal conflicts. But, with government control of the tribes and with relaxation of security needs, there was greater adaptive survival potential for the flocks if the tent households were more dispersed over the sparse pastureland. This would lessen the possibility of overgrazing and reduce the likelihood of localized drought and disease affecting a large number of flocks.

Politically, this shift means there is less contact among all the households of a tireh and also less contact between the tireh at large and the kadkhoda. Thus, while the kadkhoda has more responsibilities than he used to, he also has greater difficulty in meeting these responsibilities. Also, at the camp level during the independent period, there were a few very important figures who were roughly equivalent to the kadkhodas in power and prestige. Since the tirehs had been divided into only a few major camps, the power of these men was recognized, in some sense by the size of their following. Some of the kadkhodas were not very strong personally so that it was to these other important camp leaders (rish sefid; lit. white beard) that the group turned. In one case, for example, the kalantar did not think the son of the previous kadkhoda of the smallest tireh, Babamaleki, was competent enough to become the new kadkhoda. His decision at that point was to consolidate this tireh with another tireh, Lori. However, the nephew of the previous

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kadkhoda, who had greater personal power and charisma than his cousin, told the kalantar that he and his family had always been Babamaleki and he was not about to change now. He said that he would become kadkhoda. The kalantar agreed.

At any rate, with dispersal of the camps, the political power of most of these rish sefids necessarily suffered. This, coupled with governmental recognition of the traditional kadkhoda, meant that personal leadership qualities and wealth became less viable as power discriminatory factors. Still, there are two cases where men who had been camp leaders and not kadkhodas are recognized both by the nomads and by Entezamat as being more powerful than the actual kadkhoda with whom they now work, more or less, in concert. It is to these "secondary" leaders that government representatives will go it they have any business to conduct with the tireh.

Within the camp groups themselves (beileh), if there is more than one tent household, there is recognition of the superiority of one of the household heads, usually in terms of wealth or age. Although this superiority is usually not actualized in any behavioral sense, since each household tends to conduct its own affairs, it is shown nominally. That is, the other Kordshuli will call a given camp by the name of the perceived camp leader (e.g., the camp of Ali [beileh-ye Ali]). There is no definitive factor for determining leadership, but there are a couple of other factors besides wealth and age (although, they may follow from these) that bring greater respect and prestige. The first

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of these can be called "sophistication." This implies someone who can read and write, who has had considerable contact with sedentary village populations (usually because of his own wealth in land), and who has knowledge of urban, national, and international scenes. A second factor which is important as a quality of leadership, although again usually in concert with others, is that of religiosity. Most of the nomads claim to be Shiite Muslims, yet very few carry out the ritual prescriptions demanded by their faith. Therefore, those who regularly say their prayers, as required by Shiism, are looked upon favorably by the rest of the group. Even more extreme are those who have the time and/or money to be able to make a pilgrimage to one of the holy cities of Shiism. There are four such cities that command respect: the least important in these terms in Qom, considered the second holiest city in Iran; the next city of importance, considered the holiest city in Iran, is Mashhad, where the tomb and shrine of Imam Reza, an important Shiite figure, are located; the third most important city, which has not been accessible in recent times because of border problems between Iran and Iraq, is Kerbala, the site of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein, one of the three most important personages in Shiite Islam; the fourth and, of course, most important city is Mecca, the holiest city of the Islamic faith. Those who make pilgrimages to one of the latter three cities are either given a title from the name of the city or, in the case of Mecca, are referred to by the term '<u>haji</u>'--one who has made the

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haj (pilgrimage). Thus, anyone (male) who has made the trip to Mashhad is referred to as Mashhadi or its shortened form mashd-e (followed by his name). Likewise, those who, in the past had gone to Iraq were entitled Kebala-ye. All members of the Kordshuli who have earned the title of Haji are respected leaders. There is no easy way to judge how much effect religiosity might have by itself since the average nomad could not afford to leave his flock for that long of a period, either in terms of time or money. Therefore, all who have made the journey were wealthy before they left and were probably already respected camp leaders. This factor merely added to the list of qualities expected of group leaders.

As I mentioned earlier, wealth plays a major role in the acquisition of power. This wealth manifests itself as both animals and land; cash is less important as an indicator of wealth. All the families of the present kadkhodas own land that was purchased in the previous generation. Most have added on to this inheritance. In no case has there been a division of landed property among the joint inheritors of these estates. In fact, it is by maintaining this joint estate that families are able to maintain a high level of leadership. This leadership potential is intensified when the flocks of the brothers are also maintained as a joint flock.

The type of wealth and the family relationships of the kadkhodas have some import for political control, as well as for the possibility of future sedentarization. A

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brief examination of the situation of the eight kadkhodas of the Kordshuli will indicate the interaction between these variables. Three of the kadkhodas are settled in sarhad or just south of sarhad. These men do not go to garm-e sir at all except perhaps for a short visit. In all three cases, it is the brother of the kadkhoda who functions as the leader in the kadkhoda's stead. In another case, the kadkhoda comes to garm-e sir only during winter; at all other times his brother is effective leader of the group. Two of the other kadkhodas continue to migrate, but each of these men has a brother who is settled and cares for the jointly owned agricultural estate. One of the two remaining kadkhodas also migrates with his group but having no brother to care for his landed property, he has left it in the care of a close agnatic relative. The last of the eight kadkhodas migrated with his tireh the year that I was doing research, but he had been settled for the preceding eighteen years. He decided to migrate again because he felt he could gain additional income from his pastoral products to pay for the education of his sons. However, with no relatives or close agnates to watch his land, he must leave summer pastures later and winter pastures earlier than many other Kordshuli in order to oversee the planting and harvesting of his fields.

Although the kadkhodas are the official leaders of their groups, they do not usually actualize this leadership through the use of coercive power. In most cases where

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there has been any attempt to use coercive power, it was during or related to migration. Some examples will suffice, to show how these attempts at control manifested themselves. As will be seen, there often seems to be a stronger desire for control on the part of the brothers of the kadkhodas who have temporarily taken over that position, than by the actual kadkhodas themselves.

In one case, the acting kadkhoda (brother of the actual leader) was discussing the possibility of migrating the next day with three or four members of his tireh. Included in this meeting were the two sons of the previous kadkhoda of that tireh. The older of the two, had he been more competent and personally stronger, would have been kadkhoda. Instead, his cousin, with the approval of the kalantar had become kadkhoda; the younger brother had been too young at that time for consideration. During this discussion, the acting kadkhoda indicated that he wanted to leave the next day. All gave tacit agreement to the plan except this younger son of the last kadkhoda. An argument ensued which ended up with the latter walking out of the tent just as dinner was being served; a direct insult to the host. There were a few joking remarks made about youth and inpetuosity but the discussion was more concerned with the upcoming migration. I asked the acting kadkhoda what he would do if his cousin, Ahmad, did not migrate. He said that Ahmad would come and that if he did not, then he would take a tent pole and beat it over Ahmad's head until the young

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man saw reason. As it turned out, it was not certain that the young man had indeed moved until noon the following day.

While it may seem that this threat of violence was merely that, a threat, there is another example involving the same acting kadkhoda which shows that he is willing to actualize his threats. A dispute arose in geshlaq (winter pastures) over an upcoming marriage contract ceremony between two tireh members. The young woman, Mehri, wanted to change her mind about marrying Firuz because during the migration to winter pastures he had struck her. The acting kadkhoda, as well as his brother, said that she had to go through with the ceremony since she had accepted his betrothal gift of gold coins (ashrafi) six months earlier. The girl's mother was furious and there were constant arguments. However, as the young woman expressed it, she had little choice in the matter since there were no adult male relatives to argue her case. On the morning of the proposed ceremony, as the relatives of the groom's family arrived, the mother and daughter were sitting outside their tent weaving a goathair tent section. When the arrivals tried to convince the weavers to prepare for the ceremony, the mother started cursing the lot of them and a loud argument ensued. The acting kadkhoda told her to be quiet and to help prepare things. She only responded with more cursing. He cursed her back, picked up a rock, and threw it at her. The rock missed her but hit her daughter, who began to wail. This leader then picked up a tent pole to strike the woman

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but was restrained by others. Finally, he was led away by the others while the mother was calmed down by the older females of the group. The ceremony took place as planned, although the bride ended up crying tears of sadness instead of happy tears. She described it as a marriage by force (zur).

Another example of an attempt at direct coercive control took place during autumn migration within another tireh. Again, the brother of the kadkhoda was the acting headman at the time. There had been no decision made the previous evening as to whether the localized camp group would migrate the next morning or not. When morning arrived, however, the acting headman and some of the other members of his camp decided it would be good to move on. Mirza, an older member of the group and the headman's brother-in-law, said he did not want to migrate. The acting headman stopped packing his own belongings long enough to go to Mirza's tent where he threatened to hit him with his fist if he, Mirza, did not start to break camp. Mirza cowered from the threat and began to take down his tent. Mirza left the camp area much later than the other camp members and never made any effort to catch up to the group. Thus, while he did indeed move, he did not rejoin the same camp as a neighbor; the spatial distance was a reflection of the social tension that had been created by the hostile act of the headstrong acting kadkhoda.

In one case, where one of the actual kadkhodas of one of the tirehs tried to talk a tireh member out of his

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plans to migrate, the interaction was different. Although voices were raised, the kadkhoda knew that Hassan had no real reason to stay and Hassan knew that the kadkhoda would not overstep the bounds of restraint that could lose him the respect of other tireh members. Hassan did leave and the kadkhoda merely shrugged his shoulders saying that some things just happen that way.

There are two other examples that help to illustrate how not only personality, but also personal habits, may affect the perceived personal strength of a headman. In both cases, the headman is an opium addict and in neither case is he listened to with as much respect as a close relative of his. In one case, it is the brother of the kadkhoda who is looked upon as the primary force in the tireh. He is a more successful flock owner, whom others see as being more intelligent and dynamic than his brother; people are, thus, more willing to listen to his ideas and recommendations. In the other case, it is both the wife of the kadkhoda, who seeks to control both her own household and the other households in their small camp group, and another elder of the group, a Haji, who have power. During migration, the wife of this kadkhoda was effective head-of-household, since the kadkhoda, having no shepherd, had to take care of the flock himself (his teenage son goes to high school in the city). A major consideration that affected the length of each day's migration was the fact that the kadkhoda had to stop at regular intervals to smoke

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opium. Therefore, his wife made the primary decisions about where and when to stop for the migrating camp group. Sometimes, loud arguments with other camp members ensued, but she usually got her way. The one time that she did not, during my stay with the group, was during migration one day when it began to rain. She wanted to turn back and pitch camp in an open area that we had passed on the way. The head of another household said he thought it foolish to return when there would, no doubt, be some camp site further ahead. As it turned out, this one tent did go on ahead while the others turned back. They joined up with each other the next day. The other effective leader of this group was Haji Jan, a respected elder, who did not need to be vociferous. He did not demand respect but merely received it. Although his camp group was migrating independently of two or three others of the same section, when his pack donkeys got lost, these other groups stopped their migration short to help search for the animals. This type of cooperative effort is not usual between camp groups that are not migrating together as neighbors. It was out of respect of the Haji that migration plans were altered.

One aspect of power and control that we have not yet closely examined is its relationship to land ownership. As I mentioned, all the headmen own land; however, it is not only because they own land that they have power, since others also own land. Rather, the important point is that if they did not own land they could not remain as powerful.

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Power depends primarily on being able to attract and maintain a following of peers. Again, as I said, the kadkhoda traditionally does not have a structurally higher position in a ranked hierarchy. Rather he is chosen and maintained by the kalantar for his ability to carry out orders and to command respect within his own tireh. Perhaps, when the tirehs as smaller camp groups first arrived in Kordshuli territory and coalesced with the larger group, each had its own leading family group. For example, Moradshafii is that combination of tent households thought to have descended from the two brothers Morad and Shafii, who with their camps had come from the Baharlu tribe. In fact, prior to the time of my fieldwork there was a period when members of the two lineages were separated into named groups of the nature of what the Basseri called oulad (Barth 1961), although there is no indication that the Kordshuli ever actually defined that structural level except as a nominal unit of the tireh.

The acceptance of their leadership, though, was dependent on the kalantar, as we saw with the shift from son to cousin among the Babamaleki. Still, in most cases it would seem that leadership has been inherited from father to son, again with the kalantar's approval. However, the kalantar's acceptance depends to a large extent on the ability of the kadkhoda to command respect from their tirehs, and this respect is largely based on wealth and personal charisma. Wealth is not just a function of personal wealth but also of access to wealth. That is, sons who have

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separated from their fathers, or brothers who have separated from each other, are considered to have access to the wealth of their individual households only. Sons who remain with their father, or brothers who maintain a joint flock or joint estate in land, have in some sense access to that entire pool of wealth. The fact that a brother separates from the rest of the family may greatly influence the way in which he is viewed by the section.

For example, there are a couple of tirehs where one of the brothers of the kadkhoda has separated from the others and has set up an independent household. The rest of the brothers have remained together and retain a joint flock. The leadership qualities of the kadkhoda himself, as well as his government recognition, seem to extend to all of the brothers who have remained together. The brother who has separated, since his flock is of average size, is viewed no differently than any other section member. He may still be shown greater respect because of personal charisma, but no more than any other section member with the same qualities. Other families besides those of the kadkhoda who have wealth and have remained a dispersed economic household also receive considerable respect from the other nomads. As I mentioned, this wealth is usually combined with other qualities such as "sophistication," religiosity, and the like. In those cases where the kadkhoda is not extremely wealthy and other personal qualities are minimal, he commands little respect. It is in these cases that another

member of the tireh would seem to have actual leadership. As I pointed out earlier, even the government is aware of this and will send its representatives to deal with those who have effective personal power. In one case, the effective leader of the group is quite wealthy and he is one of the few Kordshuli who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

In the other case, the tireh is composed of two main lineages. The head of one is the kadkhoda. The head of the other, however, has greater personal power and garners more respect from the other tireh members than the kadkhoda does. Although this lineage head is not extremely wealthy, in terms of the tireh, he is one of the more sophisticated elders. The kadkhoda himself cannot read or write, a real hindrance in trying to deal with the settled populations. When I first arrived in the camp of the kadkhoda, I presented a letter from the government which he glanced over. I assumed that he could read. It was not until the other leader arrived and read the letter that I realized that the kadkhoda had no real idea of why I was there. As it turned out, this group never quite believed that I was not a government spy sent to ferret out young men without identity cards.

In all cases where the family of the kadkhoda has retained a joint economic estate, all members of the family (male members) share in the power given him. Any one of a group of brothers may be turned to in times of need or for advice. This, again, is dependent on whether

they have the personal characteristics that are important. In one case, for example, three of four brothers have been educated while the fourth cannot read or write. The three have settled down, while the fourth acts as shepherd for the joint flock. Since he travels with the animals he, of necessity, is the acting kadkhoda outside of summer pastures. Although superficially he is accorded the respect of a kadkhoda, few section members turn to him for advice. They usually wait to see one of his brothers or they talk with another elder of the group. Thus, although power accrues from wealth and position, other personal characteristics play an important role in the way leaders are perceived.

One of the points to be made is that there is not only an economic advantage in brothers remaining together but also a political one. This latter advantage is not only a result of joint wealth but also of "extended power" (i.e., the power and respect given the person of the kadkhoda extended to other close male relatives). To maintain his political position in terms of his ability to influence the decisions of others (and not in his mediator position, which is defined by the State), the kadkhoda shows increased hospitality (although some complain about this role) and must be willing to sacrifice an animal if as the representative of his tireh he is entertaining outsiders.

This "extended power" parallels in many ways, although to a lesser degree, the allocation of power among the khavanin (chiefly family). The kalantar is the most powerful person in the tribe, followed closely in power by

his brothers and then by collateral relatives. The eldest son of the previous kalantar did not inherit the position because of weak personal qualities. Magee (1945: 105) says of him, "very unimpressive. Small and unhealthy in appearance. Is his father's henchman but appears to take little interest in the affairs of the tribe." Therefore, the second eldest son became kalantar. One of the other three brothers is also very charismatic and is considered to be fair and just when dealing with tribesmen. The other brothers are not well liked by the nomads and command face-to-face respect partly because of their own wealth and partly because of their status as a member of the khavanin; they are not respected nor approached for assistance if it is at all possible. On a broader scale, all collateral male relatives of the kalantar have power, not only through their own wealth, but also through their relationship to the kalantar. Thus, a son of one of these collaterals will be shown great respect so as not to offend, in a general sense, the entire chiefly family. That is, they "deserve" respect just because they are related to the kalantar.

In a general sense, then, the kadkhoda during the Entezamat period has acquired many of the functions that the kalantar used to have, albeit with less overall power because of State domination. Tireh functions and activities, which were more important than those of the larger group (the taifeh) during the Independent period, have now acquired some of the functions of that larger group also. The

nomads are aware of these shifts and some are beginning to express this awareness implicitly. Throughout most of the first four historical periods, an individual belonging to the larger collectivity would identify himself to outsiders as a Kordshuli. Today, however, there are those Kordshuli who identify themselves to outsiders as members of a specific tireh rather than as a member of the larger group, Kordshuli. That is, he would say, "I am Lori (a tireh name)" rather than "I am Kordshuli." This separation from the larger group, as well as the intensification of tireh identity parameters, will play a major role in the further disintegration of the group Kordshuli during the next historical period, Post-Entezamat.

Post-Entezamat Period

In 1976, Entezamat was dissolved by the government. The implication, at least generally, is that the government is no longer concerned either with the threat of the tribes militarily, or with the development problems brought on by the existence of the tribes. Rather than having one gendarmarie post concerned primarily with tribal affairs, the "tribes" will now come under the jurisdiction of the local gendarmarie posts (pasgah) of the areas in which they are located. This means that during migration the gendarmarie posts along the route will handle any disputes or conflicts within the tribe as well as between nomads and settled folks.

This state of affairs may put the nomads at a definite disadvantage, since in cases of conflict between nomads and settled folk it is more likely that the resolution of the dispute will favor the settled group. This is because the settled groups have more opportunity to interact with the leaders of the pasgah and to provide extra bribes that may serve to influence the outcome of any dispute. The nomads, on the other hand, are just passing through the area, so their interaction with the pasgah can not be sustained for any period of time. Although some of the pastoral products are more desirable than many of the agricultural products, it is continuity in giving prestations that will play the more important role. This is not to imply that disputes involving nomads and sedentary people will always be decided in favor of the settled folk. Rather, it means that many of the cases brought before the pasgah that are not all that clearcut and that do not require court action may be decided in favor of the villager because of time and influence. While, perhaps, there may not be that many conflict situations arising, it is still a fact that this situation introduces another factor which is perceived by the nomads as making migration, in particular, and the pastoral adaptation, in general, difficult to maintain. As will be discussed in the following chapters, sedentarization in many cases is as much a product of this mental set (i.e., the difficulty of "doing" pastoralism), as of anything else. The importance of this latest shift has yet to be seen, but

nonetheless I would like to suggest some of the possible outcomes of and responses to the change.

The organization and unity of the Kordshuli, like that of the Basseri, has been dependent upon the autocratic leadership of the kalantar. As Barth points out for the Basseri,

> The scattered and constantly shifting tents of the Basseri are held together and welded into a unit by their centralized political system, culminating in the single office of the chief . . . it is the fact of political unity under the Basseri chief which in the eyes of the tribesmen and outsiders alike constitutes them into a single "tribe" in the Persian sense . . . the pivotal position then in the whole tribal organization is that of the chief (1961: 71).

With the dissolution of the chieftainship, there has been some shift away from this unity, but the replacement of the kalantar by another seemingly autocratic leader, the afsar-e Entezamat, and the maintenance of an administrative unit known as the Kordshuli has forestalled a greater separation and dispersal than has already occurred. With the dissolution of Entezamat, it should be expected that these processes will be intensified. As instances arise which require advice and assistance in interacting with the sedentary community, the nomads will find that there may be no one to help. That is, although some of the kadkhodas are competent and will be able to provide assistance, there are some who are not "sophisticated" enough to deal with the crises that may arise. In many of these cases, a number of nomads will probably turn once again to the kalantar and his family for help. Some will need help in dealing with conflict

situations that require going to court; others will need assistance when they decide to settle, since they may not know much about banking procedures, loans, etc. In some tirehs, the kadkhoda has taken out loans for the use of tireh members in building houses. It is likely that those who do not have access to this assistance from the kadkhoda will turn to settled relatives, or, in the final instance, to the kalantar or his family to accomplish their goals. Many of these issues relate more directly to economic processes and will be discussed in that context in the next chapter.

The point to be made is that the unity of the group Kordshuli is now more a function of territoriality and spatial proximity, especially in summer pastures in their sarhad, than it is of political integration. Even here, though, there is continually greater dispersal throughout the hills and plains of the extended valley system which is the summer pasture area (eilaq) of the Kordshuli. That is, the area where members of different tireh tend to congregate, the plain above Hosseinabad, is used more by the kadkhodas and their close relatives than by the rest of the tireh. This latter group tends to be widely dispersed throughout the hills north of the village. As the map, Figure 5.2, indicates, tirehs remain to a large extent separated. Even within the traditional "territory" of the tireh, dispersal is increasing. With increasing sedentarization, this dispersal is likely to increase since there is



FIGURE 5.2 Location of Kordshuli tirehs in summer pastures--(eilaq)

more land available per household unit, at least in eilaq.

There tend to be core villages about which the various tirehs camp. Most tireh have members settled in one of the villages of their sarhad and, therefore, camp near it for the social and sometimes economic interaction. In most cases, the village is one in which the kadkhoda owns property. Thus, with the kind of dispersal that we can see on the map, the kadkhoda has less actual daily contact with the members of his tireh. The ideal of the socially and economically independent household is more and more being realized. However, as we shall see in chapter seven, the difficulty with this is that the labor needs of the individual household increase as the availability of pasture land decreases and as the migration route continues to shrink from agricultural encroachment.

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC PROCESSES

Many of the political changes directing the Kordshuli towards sedentarization that were discussed in the preceding chapter have been accompanied by equivalent changes in the economic system. Political changes have led to increasing control by the State over economic resources, especially land. Indeed, some of the changes which enhance the prospect for sedentarization are the direct result of the shifting political situation and of the effects of these shifts on the economic sphere. Some changes are a response to such factors as improved technology, greater dependence on a market system that is out of the direct control of the nomads, and government incentives aimed at making a sedentary existence more attractive and profitable than a nomadic pastoral one. However, the changing social structure of the Kordshuli and the maintenance of the independent household as a cultural ideal also have ramifications for economic processes. As these larger factors come to bear on the ideals of independence and freedom contained within the nomadic "mystique," the perceived difficulty (zahmat) of "doing" pastoralism increases for the individual nomadic household.

This chapter examines some of the economic processes of the Kordshuli, and how changes in them during the past few decades have contributed to an increasing rate of sedentarization. These economic processes will be described at both the taifeh (tribe) level and the tireh (section) and huneh (household) levels to show how both changing political factors and changing economic factors contribute to changes in the Kordshuli pastoral nomadic adaptation. At the taifeh level, I will discuss first the system as it functioned during the "Independent Period" (cf. chapter five), and then focus on some of the changes during the period of field research, the "Entezamat Period." At the tireh and huneh levels, I will focus primarily on the "Entezamat Period."

Taifeh Level--Independent Period

The traditional political functions of the kalantar were as much a part of the economic system of the Kordshuli as they were an expression of power by the kalantar. Allocation and reallocation of land, control of migration, and mediation between nomadic and sedentary folk, as well as mediation within the nomadic community, were, and are, major factors in the economic viability of the group. To understand better the effects of changes that have occurred in the political and economic spheres, it will be useful to examine the nature of the kalantar's traditional economic role.

The economic role of the kalantar is based, to a large degree, on his ability to gain, maintain, and control

access to resources. This, in turn, is based on the geographical location at which the nomads find themselves in the annual cycle. The territory utilized by the Kordshuli may be divided into three broad sections: sarhad or eilaq (summer pasture area), rah-e kuch (migration route), and garm-e sir or qeshlaq (winter pasture areas).

Sarhad (Summer Pasture Area)

Traditionally (i.e., before deposition of the kalantar by the State), most of the land in sarhad used by the Kordshuli was the property of the kalantar. He had the right, therefore, to refuse the use of that land to any group or individual. He could, in fact, sell the land if he so desired. The tirehs (sections) of the taifeh were allocated certain portions of that territory. Any member of the tireh, therefore, had usufruct rights to some pasture-land in sarhad. The areas were apportioned according to the size and wealth of the tireh, as well as on the basis of personal favoritism. Also, reallocation of the various regions by the kalantar could be expected with changes in the size and composition of the groups, as well as in changes in the ability of the natural environment to support the nomads with their flocks.

The ecological requirements of a nomadic existence enabled the kalantar to maintain and increase his power in many ways. With control over access to pastures, the kalantar could limit the ability of possible rivals to increase their wealth and prestige through flock expansion by

assigning smaller and poorer pastures to them. In this way, many who might have become rivals of the kalantar (usually accessible only through a liaison with one of the kalantar's brothers or a collateral relative) were inhibited from making large gains in wealth. This also inhibited any increase in power that would be gained through garnering a following by means of prestations as well as nonmaterial assistance. If these wealthier nomads continued in their attempts to subvert the kalantar's power, the kalantar could easily force them to leave the area of summer pastures completely. This act, however, was considered very drastic and none of the Kordshuli can recall it ever having happened.

While no potential rivals were forced to leave the area, forced movement within Kordshuli eilaq (summer pasture areas) was not unknown. Certain households were asked to move from one area to another in the general region in order to help alleviate stresses that had developed as a result of acute conflict between these households and others. Usually there was enough space within the land allocated to each tireh to enable households in conflict to separate and avoid continued contact. If the hostility was extreme, such that serious injury or death might result, the kalantar stepped in and attempted to adjudicate; and failing this, he would see to an extreme separation of the parties.

An example of this type of action occurred while I was in the field.[1] In this instance, one young man got into a quarrel with another. Words were thrown back and forth

and, as is often wont to happen, the ever-present shepherd's staff (chuq) was raised in anger. Although these kinds of arguments usually end in bruised bones and feelings, this time one of the blows proved fatal. While there was official action taken by the government (e.g., incarceration of the guilty party), there was also action taken by a member of the khavanin (chiefly family). He ordered a tractor taken to the household of the murderer's father to aid in moving the tent and belongings to the far side of the valley system that comprises Kordshuli eilaq (summer pastures). Because tempers were extremely volatile, the "chief" feared that more unnecessary violence would occur if the family did not move. As a point of interest, this also shows that one's family (at least members of the same tent household) may be considered as liable for a crime as the perpetrator; responsibility for the affront rests with the family and, therefore, it is just that vengeance be sought from a very close relative.

Rah-e Kuch (Migration Route)

After leaving sarhad, the kalantar's control over temporal and spatial aspects of migration was lessened. Since little, if any, of the land along the migration route was owned or in any way controlled by the kalantar, he could not always direct the spatial arrangement of the various tirehs. However, the rah-e kuch (migration route) was as much a period in time as it was a place in space (Barth 1959, 1961). It was in this aspect that the kalantar could

exercise great control It was he alone who could determine when the various tirehs might begin migration and how far and how fast they might travel.

The decisions of the kalantar were based not only on the need to regulate pasture usage and minimize overgrazing but also on the time tables utilized by other tribal groups that might cause them to cross or intertwine with the Kordshuli migration route. The different tirehs did have traditional routes within the 20 to 50 mile wide rah-e kuch. These were usually based on the specific destinations located in summer or winter pastures that the nomads were travelling toward. Thus, in the same way that traditional pastures were flexible, depending on the desires of the kalantar and the immediate ecological needs of the nomads, so too might the migration route for any section change, depending on available pastures and water, and on obedience to the kalantar. The issue of obedience was of primary importance, for it was only through membership in the corporate group that one gained access to needed pasturage. Without the approval of the kalantar, no household could migrate during the same period of time as the rest of the taifeh. Since other tribes who passed through these areas might also keep these "stranger" households from utilizing pastures during the time of their own migration, the renegade would find it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a pastoral nomadic existence. The point, as is obvious, is that political allegiance was as important as environmental

circumstance in maintaining the pastoral nomadic adaptation.

Garm-e Sir (Winter Pasture Area)

The relationship between the kalantar's political power and the common nomad's access to needed resources in sarhad and during migration is obvious from the preceding discussion. However, when the group reached garm-e sir, the ability of the kalantar to use his political position to affect the distribution of resources was drastically reduced. The kalantar did not own the land that the group used for winter pastures. Most of it was controlled by villagers or other tribal groups. When the Kordshuli were part of the Qashqa'i, some of those lands in garm-e sir that were owned by the khans of the confederacy were assigned to the Kordshuli. Even here, though, there were few rigid boundaries between expanding village lands and the pastures that the nomads used. During most of the Independent Period, the Kordshuli continued to use areas that they had used traditionally, however, they were often required to pay "rent" for the use of lands within the village area, after securing permission from the headsmen (kadkhoda) of the village. The kalantar could help to mediate economically, since he had a reasonably friendly relationship with the headman of the main village in Kordshuli winter pastures, Haji Safar. Despite his intercession, the availability of lowland pastures, even for rent, was a function of climatic and environmental conditions. If the year were especially dry, the nomads could expect little help from the villagers,

who had their own small flocks to contend with. The mountains surrounding the village area were considered open rangeland, although they were less productive then the lower areas. Therefore, during lean years, the nomads would be forced to stay in the mountains longer than usual and the flocks suffered accordingly. The uncertainty of this situation added to the nomads' feelings that they were surrounded by enemies in an inhospitable environment, whereas sarhad was considered their homeland (vatan). Also, because of the limited space in any one region of garm-e sir, some households had to look elsewhere for sufficient pastures. This often meant paying still higher rents and often being surrounded by other tribal groups, heightening the fear of thievery. As we shall see shortly, this situation has intensified, making the job of doing pastoralism even more difficult.

Although the kalantar was considered to possess power from birth, he was only able to maintain it through the continued ability to quash rivals and to retain his own following. This latter condition was a function of his ability to maintain military superiority, as well as to carry out his duties as his followers believed them to be. These duties included giving prestations to visitors and fellow tribesmen, giving feasts, and presenting a strong image when interacting with other tribal leaders and with sedentary groups, including government representatives. All of these duties were contingent upon the kalantar's ability

to maintain or increase his wealth through his own flocks and land, or through revenue collected from the other Kordshuli. These duties, then, accentuated the redistributive role of the kalantar, which was of paramount importance for his economic and political power. As Fazel (1979: 43) points out similarly for the Boyr Ahmad chief, "the . . . chief serves as a center for the redistribution of practically everything he collects or receives. Moreover, this function is . . . pivotal to his political power and prestige and to the tribe's economic productivity."

There were a number of ways in which the kalantar could raise revenue, although not all were of equal importance or of equal value. His main source of income, apart from the products of his own flocks and land, was a tax based on the number of animals that each tireh owned. While not given an explicit name by any of my informants, this form of tax is called galeh-begiri (flock taking) among the Boyr Ahmad (Fazel 1979: 40) and galeh giri among the Qashqa'i (Peiman 1968: 432). The tax was irregular and was based primarily on an immediate need by the kalantar for increased revenue. The tax usually amounted to one sheep in every hundred, although it might go as high as three in every hundred. Many of the adult household heads say that this tax has never been imposed, yet most of the kadkhodas and all of the khavanin say that it has been imposed as needed. Noncompliance, without adequate support of other households, could jeopardize the right of the evader to use

any tribal lands. That is, other households would have had to be willing to militarily support any evading household if they felt that the evader was correct in his position. If the kalantar were, indeed, being unreasonable and a large group felt unjustly taxed, it might force the turnover of the leadership of the tribe to another male relative of the kalantar, either a brother, uncle, or son. The Kordshuli say that this has never happened.

Another source of revenue, albeit quite small, were the gifts (didani) brought by visitors to the kalantar's tent. These could include any number of a variety of pastoral products, as well as gifts from the urban market or, from the wealthier visitors, horses and guns. The Kordshuli visitors making the prestations usually thought of them as a contribution to the ongoing position of the kalantar and thus were not only expressing political allegiance but also expected some return in favors or a return gift (cf. Fazel 1979: 40-41).

Also in the past, the Kordshuli were known as notorious robbers (Sykes 1963: 481). Thus, when conditions were difficult for pastoralism, the kalantar might havr organized a raiding party either on nearby tribes or on agricultural villages. This, no doubt, was especially true when the nomads found it hard to get needed vegetable produce. Raiding has not been a factor in the raising of revenue in recent times.

Most of the wealth of the kalantar came from his own property. Unlike the Boyr Ahmad chiefs, where a single

source (i.e., animal and land taxes), gave economic support to their leadership and power, the Kordshuli chiefs, like the Qashqa'i and Basseri chiefs, "had amassed considerable wealth in agricultural land, huge herds, commercial citrus orchards, and real estate . . .; and they had pursued the opulent lifestyle of the sedentary elite" (Fazel 1979: 47). This considerable wealth helped to maintain the kalantar in his status as landed elite in both nomadic and sedentary society. While he could fulfill many of his duties that required economic outlay by using the income from taxes, he often would use his personal resources to provide gifts, feasts, and so forth.

This latter point does not seem to have been the case for the wealthy Qashqa'i and Basseri chiefs, who "no longer felt obligated to invest time and resources on behalf of a tribal constituency. In the new political arena, tribal affiliation . . . became a liability" (ibid.). The Kordshuli khavanin seem generally to have been more concerned with the individual Kordshuli. Even today, when interaction between the khavanin and the nomadic tent dweller has been severely curtailed or eliminated by government takeover of tribal affairs, two of the khans continue to be very concerned with tribal affairs; they consciously and conscientiously interact with the kadkhodas of the tirehs, as well as with the common nomad when possible

As I mentioned, it was primarily the personal wealth of the kalantar that helped maintain him in his position of

leadership. Much of this personal wealth was considered, in the past, part of what constituted tribal property, particularly land. Much of the land presently owned by the kalantar and his agnatic relatives was parceled off from the estate of the kalantar's father, Ata Khan. Most of this estate made up summer pasture areas for the Kordshuli. Still, as was mentioned, all tribal land was considered to be the private property of the kalantar who might allocate it to the tirehs of the tribe. Usufruct rights were given to those who followed and supported the kalantar as members of one of the named tirehs. Of course, if the entire group rebelled against the form of land apportionment, the kalantar could do little to prevent a takeover. This event has never occurred among the Kordshuli, and is very unlikely.

It is difficult to estimate how much land the khavanin, not to mention the kalantar himself, own today. At one point they owned the entire valley system which comprises Kordshuli eilaq (summer pastures). Much of this land, though was unavailable for agricultural development either because of inadequate water sources or because the government had enough control to limit the amount of land that could be transformed from pasture to farm land. Later, as we shall see, with the advent of land reform, the amount of land under the direct control of the kalantar diminished drastically.

Agricultural land was and is used primarily to grow cash crops such as wheat, barley, and sugar beets. Other crops, while often grown, have not been important money

makers. Also, all of the khans of the Kordshuli own orchards, which produce fruit for both market and personal consumption. About thirty years ago, within the khavanin of the Kordshuli, all of the brothers except the kalantar himself settled down and devoted the major portion of their time to their agricultural holdings. The kalantar did not settle until forced to do so by the action of the State about fifteen years ago. His house, as a result, is smaller and his land is less developed than that of his brothers.

Today, as in the past, the other major source of income for all of the khavanin are their flocks of sheep and goats. Sheep are better money-makers than goats (although goats are hardier and more easily cared for) so the proportion of sheep to goats is much higher among the flocks of the khavanin than it is among those of most of the common nomads. In fact, a couple of the brothers have flocks of sheep only. The same products that the common nomad uses and produces to provide a livelihood for himself are used and sold by the khavanin. The flocks are seen primarily as a capital investment and, traditionally, the return was quite high. All of these flocks are taken care of by shepherds who are part of the lower strata of nomadic life. These shepherds receive wages and are allowed to keep or sell some of the products from the larger flock. In addition, since they are tending the animals of one of the khans, they usually can gain access to better pastures

than they ordinarily might with their own flocks. It is not unlikely that the khan will pay villagers for the right to use private property that provides better pasturage for the flock.

The role of the khavanin, and especially the kalantar, as members of the economic elite was enhanced by their ownership of houses in Shiraz, the provincial capitol. Although not as prosperous as the khans of the Qashqa'i confederacy, they still could be characterized as members of the urban elite, perhaps at what is often called the "lower-upper class" level. However, their position in the city was not based only on economics but also on social relationships. The khans had, and still have, many networks of friends and acquaintances both in and out of government, many of whom could provide assistance through their power positions. Thus, while the kalantar may have lost most of his effectiveness as a political mediator, he might still influence some decisions concerning the tribe through his social relationships with other economic elite who have access to channels of authority.

The redistributive role of the kalantar was not only dependent on his giving direct prestations, but also, in some sense, on the allocation of land which was considered both his private property and the property of the tribe, in general, under his control. As a return for allegiance, prestations, service, taxes, and the like, the common nomad could receive usufruct rights to pasture land as a member of

one of the Kordshuli tirehs. Also, the kalantar, partly to ensure allegiance and partly out of real concern for the common nomad, would often given prestations to some of the taifeh members. These might be as large as horses and rifles or as small as sugar and tea. Sometimes the kalantar might give a feast; this would help promote the unity of the entire taifeh, instead of just sectional unity promoted by wedding feasts. It would also give him the opportunity to display some of his power derived from wealth and from the size of his following.

Taifeh Level--Entezamat Period

At the time of my research, the role of the kalantar had changed dramatically from the traditional role described above. His role as a political mediator has been severely restricted and almost eliminated by State control. He retains some aspects of his position as an economic mediator, although with loss of official political power this role has become more personalistic. The kalantar, as well as one of his four brothers, maintain fairly close contact with the rest of the tribe. Kadkhodas continue to seek advice from these two men and the common nomad will willingly approach both men for advice and assistance. This is more often the case when conflict situations need resolution, although economic assistance is also asked for in some cases.

One case will illustrate this assistance. A nomad who had had a sheep stolen came to the home of the kalantar's brother to request assistance. He had tracked

the sheep to the city where the urban merchant refused to return it, saying that he had purchased it legally. The khan, rather than offering any direct political assistance, asked the tribesman what should be done. The nomad said that it was costly to lose a sheep and that he wanted either the sheep or its cash value returned. The khan took out his wallet, and after ascertaining the value of the sheep, gave cash to the injured party. No further attempt was made to apprehend the original culprit, although there had been a prime suspect.

Although the kalantar does not often visit the nomadic camps, his position is such that his coming would be met with great celebration. This continued contact with the tribe, both direct and indirect, makes it easier for the common nomad to get economic advice or assistance from the kalantar if others in his section, including the kadkhoda, are unwilling or unable to help. The kalantar, then, is more often a last resort for this kind of assistance. His awareness and knowledge of the market system help to make him an invaluable source of information on marketing procedures, the state of the market, government price fixing, land purchase, procurement of loans, and the like. Because the khavanin are relatively wealthy, they are able to retain some of the power that they formerly enjoyed, especially in the urban arena. This allows greater flexibility in their interactions with the urban merchant. Most nomads are reluctant to turn to the khavanin for assistance unless they

are quite poor or in other ways feel they must forsake the image of independence to resolve a problem that, seemingly, cannot otherwise be resolved.

It is more likely that the independent household head will take his own products to market (or send them with a friend or relative) and trust to the fairness of others. Without proper awareness of the nature of loans and interest rates, some nomads find that they owe more than they can afford, which may eventually force them out of the nomadic system. However, this is not common among the Kordshuli. While indebtedness is familiar to most nomadic households, over-indebtedness usually occurs when the nomad sets up new trading networks with unfamiliar merchants. It is much more common for a nomad to develop a fairly consistent relationship with one or two traders who are widely known by the larger group. More about these relationships will be discussed below.

Certainly, as would be expected, most of the changes in the economic role of the kalantar have resulted directly from the political shifts that led to the dissolution of the chieftainship. Fazel (1979: 44-46), in his perceptive article on the economic bases of political power among the Boyr Ahmad chiefs, presents three major reasons for the decline of the chieftainship among this group: 1) political division of the tribe in the previous generation, 2) expansion of a market economy and the greater dependence of the nomads on a debtor/creditor relationship, and 3) the role of

the State. I would argue that comparable reasons account for the decline in unity and solidarity within the Kordshuli, but that it was primarily the role of the State that brought about the decline and demise of the chieftainship.

Among the Kordshuli, the deposition of the kalantar has led to a political division of the tribe by the State. The government's recognition of the various kadkhodas as political mediators, coupled with the expanded chief-like role of the kadkhodas (cf. chapter five), has helped to undermine the unity of the group by creating eight quasi-tribal groups. At the same time, the expansion of a market economy and a greater dependence on debtor/creditor relationships has lessened the need of many nomads for a tribal economic mediator. As I pointed out earlier, some nomads still require assistance and/or advice, which the kalantar or kadkhoda can provide. Still, it becomes easier to realize the cultural ideal of a totally economically independent household, in the sense that the household head can now carry out and accept full responsibility for his own household's business.

Fazel also argues that the town traders engage in "systematic exploitation" of the nomads by charging high interest rates--up to 100 percent semi-annually--thus burdening the nomads with perpetual indebtedness. He points out that his data, as well as that of others (e.g., Afshar-Naderi 1971) contradict Barth's observations among the

Basseri that interest rates are quite low or non-existent. However, my data for the Kordshuli corroborate Barth's observations. The trading partners called dust (lit. friend) are usually just that, friends of the nomads. In Jahrom, for example, there is one shopkeeper to whom most members of four different tirehs, as well as a few of the others, go to obtain household goods and extra foodstuffs during the winter. Those with whom the trader is close are often not charged any interest. Others in the group are usually charged 5 to 30 percent, depending on the nature of the relationship. The other tirehs usually have a comparable dust. The role of this dust is most important in winter pastures; the nomads must wait until spring or early summer to sell their pastoral products, yet need sugar, tea, soap, flour, and other household goods throughout the winter. The trader is often content to make most of his profits from his sedentary clientele while enjoying access to highly desired pastoral products provided by trade with the nomads.

As I pointed out in chapter five, the kalantar did not lose all power immediately after his deposition by the State. Many of the nomads continued to maintain the vertical flow of goods to the kalantar. That is, although his real political power had been usurped, his effective political power was partially maintained through the continuation of the flow of goods and services. Beck makes a similar point for the Qashqa'i a few years after the initial deposition of the khans of the confederacy:

> In 1960 the government abolished the title khan and its duties and powers (collection of taxes, assignment of land use, supervision of migrations, formation of armies, settlement of tribal disputes) . . . Several years were to pass before military officers had any degree of success in handling affairs, and in the meantime many tribespeople continued to deal with khans in customary fashion (1979: 4).

With the increasing effectiveness of the gendarmarie and the increased power of the afsar-e Entezamat (tribal Disciplinary Officer), as well as awareness by the Kordshuli that the kalantar could not continue to provide the services called for by continued support, a shift occurred in the form and direction of the vertical flow of goods. This implies some continuity in the nature of prestations which are given to guarantee access to resources. However, the redistributive role of the kalantar was abrogated and replaced by an individualistic, rather than group-oriented, power base. Where the kalantar had been interested primarily in the welfare of the group while at the same time trying to maintain his power position, the afsar-e Entezamat is more concerned with maintaining his personal power position in relation to the governmental power structure and, at the same time, enjoying the fruits of a pastoral existence by showing a self-serving interest in the welfare of those who will provide desirable pastoral products to him. The Kordshuli say that most of the Disciplinary Officers, who usually serve one- to two-year assignments, were more than willing to take bribes with no real guarantee that a return would be forthcoming. Whoever could offer the most would often get preferred treatment in, for example, the

adjudication of conflicts or in the allocation of camp sites among competing households in extra-tribal territory under State control. When the son of the deposed chief of the Basseri threatened to report the last afsar-e Entezamat to gendarmarie headquarters in Shiraz for his corruption and bribe taking, the officer mockingly replied that there was no direct proof and, since all the officers do it, there would be no concern shown by his superiors.

Therefore, although the vertical flow of goods was maintained in some forms, the shift from concern for the welfare of the group (exemplified by the kalantar), to individual gain (as shown by the afsar-e Entezamat), threatened the economic viability of many households, as well as group unity, by accentuating wealth differences through preferred access to resources. Those nomads with more wealth could gain easier access to scarce resources (i.e., pastures), while those who were already financially stricken could find themselves in less productive areas, thereby lessening the chances for their survival as pastoralists. While this is not a major factor in the process, this shift helps to illuminate how the primary shifts in political and economic processes may be reinforced, adding to the difficulty of the nomads in maintaining their life-style. That is, there is no longer an effective buffer between the Kordshuli and the negative elements in their environment.

Tireh and Huneh Level

It is very difficult to attempt a discussion of the changes in the economic processes of the various tirehs because there is little data available from the past. One important variable that would have affected the economic interactions of the Kordshuli is flock size. The Kordshuli say that flocks were much larger in the past and that recent droughts, especially that of 1962-1964, drastically decimated the flocks. Many Kordshuli who now have an average-sized flock claim that prior to that drought they had 800 to 1,000 animals but that over 80 percent died of malnutrition and disease during the drought. It is unlikely that all the nomads who make this claim for larger flock size are correct, at least, in terms of land availability. It is true that in the recent past the migration route was larger than today, but the available pasturage in winter and summer quarters has not yet diminished drastically. Since a number of the nomads today find it difficult to secure adequate pastures in the traditional areas, it is unlikely that they would have been able in the past to provide for their flocks with even more animals vying for the limited pasturage. Certainly some did have larger flocks but there is no way of accurately determining how many.

Some of the wealthier households with large flocks did expend some of the animal capital to acquire land. This land acquisition was geared primarily towards making their pastoral existence more secure. That is, a primary reason

for land purchase was to permit the production of grain, which could both offset rising prices for grain in the market and provide grain for the flocks during lean years. It is important to realize that most of the families that own agricultural land (a very small percentage of all Kordshuli households) do not own enough to meet all of their own grain needs. There are a very few men outside of the khavanin (chiefly family) who produce enough agriculturally to meet the needs of family and flock. These men are wealthy enough to sustain some losses to their flocks by the improper handling by extra-familial shepherds, if there are no family members to assist him. Actually, except for the khavanin, all of these men who have "hired" shepherds and are still considered to be part of the Kordshuli collectivity practice marginal or seasonal nomadism (cf. chapter seven). That is, they stay in summer pasture area to oversee crop production but move into tents in winter pastures after the agricultural cycle has been completed.

As I mentioned in chapter three, unlike many of the other nomadic groups in the Middle East including their neighbors the Qashqa'i and the Basseri, the Kordshuli do not have a variety of shepherding contracts. Most of the Kordshuli household heads prefer to shepherd their own flocks or to entrust it to a son. Most of the hired shepherds who are not from the immediate family are young men who are distant relatives of the household head. These young men are taken into the household and provided minimal

food and clothing; they occupy a very low status in the household and have very little say about flock management. Those few shepherds who are hired from other groups usually set up their own tent in the area of their employer or, if the employer is not present, they camp and migrate in the company of the employer's tireh. These men are given an annual salary as well as other incidentals such as tea, sugar, and some pastoral products. All of these shepherds tend to be poor; shepherding provides them with pasturage for their own small flocks as well as a better opportunity to increase the size of their flock through the increased productivity and ease of handling that comes with a larger flock. The general point is that, except for the very wealthy, the Kordshuli prefer to set the maintenance of the flock as the major focus of their allocation of time and resources.

Concerning the issue of fluctuating flock size, it is not unlikely that there have been times in the past when the flocks were much larger but could not be maintained for an extended period of time because of changing environmental circumstances. It has been suggested that there are periodic droughts throughout the Middle East which follow six- to eight-year cycles, with each of these droughts lasting for a few years (Dahl and Hjort 1976: 127). Although the severity of the droughts is variable, an awareness of this cycle is perhaps culturally manifested through the efforts of the nomads to maximize flock growth. While larger herds may require more labor output, they help

to ensure the viability of the pastoral household by offsetting the devastating effects of drought that could lead to impoverishment and eventual sedentarization.

Flock composition (i.e., the ratio of goats to sheep), is also partially a response to the possibility of drought. Goats fare better in adverse conditions than do sheep. During some of the bad droughts of the past, it was possible sometimes to migrate with only goats while the sheep are left behind in sarhad to be fed purchased grain. Therefore, despite the fact that the Kordshuli speak more favorably of sheep and even use the term for sheep (gusfand) to refer to sheep and goats alike when talking about their flocks, most of the Kordshuli have more goats than sheep. There is an overall trend for nomads at the lower end of the economic continuum to have mostly goats while those at the upper end focus on sheep, as I mentioned for the khavanin earlier (p. 186). Sheep do give a better return in terms of live sale and wool, but they are also more difficult to care for and to milk.

Flock size, while it may vary according to environmental circumstance, still acts as a general indicator of wealth among the Kordshuli. A number of families also own land, however land wealth generally correlates with animal wealth; that is, those families that own land usually also have large flocks. There are, of course, a number of families that have large flocks and own little or no land, yet are still considered wealthy by other Kordshuli. Thus,

to consider the relationship of wealth to sedentarization, as Barth (1961) does when presenting his model of sedentarization and the mechanisms involved in the process, it will be instructive to look at the flock sizes within and among tirehs. The question raised is: is there any relationship between wealth and sedentarization and, if so, does it manifest itself as Barth's model suggests (i.e., that wealthy and poor nomads are led to settle). In the next chapter I will further address the question of this relationship for some of the tirehs of the Kordshuli.

The following tables show the range of flock sizes indicating, generally, variations in wealth within and between tirehs. The range of flock sizes in the following charts has been divided into seven sections based on general responses given by the Kordshuli. That is, even if the correct number of animals is known, many of the pastoralists merely give a round estimate for the flock size. The usual error from the quoted amount and the number of animals that I personally counted in a flock averaged 15 animals. These differences were most often based on whether the nomads counted newborn lambs and kids, whether they feared I was checking out the flocks for tax purposes, or whether they wanted to impress me with their herdsmanship. The Kordshuli say that a three-person family can be comfortable with a flock of around 100 animals and that 40 to 60 animals are needed to survive. The average family of five individuals requires 150 to 250 animals to live comfortably.

Table 6.1 presents a summary of the flock size per adult household head dependent on that flock. That is, where brothers have merged their flocks or, more usually, where they have not divided the joint flock after the death of their father, I have included each as flock owner with an equivalent share of the flock. This is consistent with the fact that, if the brothers were to divide their property tomorrow, the flock would be divided in this way. One can see in the chart that there are very few nomads at the level of impoverishment (i.e., below 50 animals). Most of these families are able to remain nomadic because they also act as shepherds for larger flock owners or because they receive some assistance from sedentary relatives who wish to share some of the pastoral products.

A household with 300 or more animals is considered by the Kordshuli to be relatively wealthy. There are some families that own 600 to 800 animals; however, I have not separated them out, since wealth differentiation is not that relevant within this higher stratum, at least not in terms of flock size. As is obvious from Table 6.1, there are not many wealthy flock owners who still function as nomadic pastoralists. Less than 10 percent of the total group fall in this range.

The question does arise as to whether these wealthy families, as well as the poor ones, constitute such a small portion of the group because they have sedentarized, as Barth's model would have us believe, or whether there is a

TABLE G.1 Flock size/household heads dependent on that flock

Tireh	Flock Size							Number of Households
	50	51-99	100-149	150-199	200-250	251-300	300+	
XALEJI	2	1	17	16	26	26	18	100
ARBAB. HAJIBOA	0	2	9	3	7	1	1	23
ARBAB. KAKAKHAN	0	1	16	17	17	5	4	60
ARBAB. MIRZAJAN	2	3	18	4	5	3	0	35
LORI JAMSHID	2	11	6	4	1	2	0	26
LORI ALMAS	2	2	9	5	7	1	3	29
BABAMALEKI	0	0	2	4	7	2	2	17
TOTAL	8	20	77	53	70	34	28	290
%	2.8	6.9	26.7	18.2	24.1	11.7	9.6	100

hidden dimension to the question that the figures cannot show. In correspondence to the simplest understanding of Barth's model, it is true that many of the poorer nomads are unable to maintain a nomadic existence without an adequate flock. However, the wealthy nomads may in many ways decrease effective flock size so that apparent wealth in animals in within the "average" range. For example, many of the wealthy nomads who have sedentarized have remained part of a dispersed economic household, in which part of the family unit is settled, controlling jointly owned lands, and another part remains nomadic, tending the joint flock (cf. chapter seven). In this way any increase in flock size is equally distributed among all the socially independent household heads who are part of this joint economic unit. This offsets any greater increase in a single flock separated out from the larger one that might occur because of such factors as better herding practices, access to better pastures, or more distant separation from possible disease and predation. That is, if the joint flock were divided up into its component parts, it is possible that any one of these smaller flocks would increase greatly in size under the watchful eye of its own shepherd, thus making its owner a "wealthy" flock owner. If the other flocks do not increase, then these owners remain less "wealthy." However, if an increase occurs within one part of a joint flock, then the increase is distributed among all the household heads so that no one is separated out as

being wealthier. Also, increases in joint flock size can be channeled into jointly owned agricultural land, thus maintaining "average" flock size for the nomadic household units. It is also possible that major expenditures, such as brideprice needed by a younger male, will be taken from the joint flock without economic differentiation of the independent flock of the boy's father. Thus, the equal share of all primary flock owners are reduced.

Table 6.2 shows that on-the-ground flock sizes (i.e., the flocks that are in the care of any given tent household), are quite different than those shown in Figure 6.1, where flocks are divided among all the socially independent owners of the joint flock. It is apparent that a number of flocks have been consolidated and are under the care of one shepherding family. This consolidation tends to take two forms: 1) a dispersed economic household, or 2) a hired shepherd with his own and his employer's stock.

Consolidation into a dispersed economic household formation has the effect that others perceive an increase in wealth for those who maintain the economic unity of the family. This in turn affects the nature of intra-group influence and power. Table 6.2 shows that 84 percent of all dispersed economic households fall in the upper range of 300+ animals. If, however, the joint flocks were divided into their component parts, the individual owners would not be considered wealthy, nor would they retain all of the power that accrued to them as wealthy tireh members. All

TABLE 6.2 Flock size/nomadic tent household and dispersed economic household formation

Tireh	Flock Size							# of tent h'hlds	# of dispersed econ. h'hlds	# of dispersed econ. h'hld in 300+
	50	51-99	100-149	150-199	200-250	250-300	300+			
Xaleji	1	1	9	16	22	10	30	89	9	8
Arbabdar Hajiboa	0	1	4	3	6	1	4	19	2	2
Arbabdar Kakakhan	1	0	4	9	12	3	15	44	13	11
Arbabdar Mirza Jan	1	1	8	3	7	0	5	25	5	3
Lori Jamshid	0	10	7	2	1	0	3	23	1	1
Lori Almas	2	2	5	2	6	1	7	25	0	0
Babamaleki	0	0	2	4	5	2	3	16	1	1
TOTAL	5	15	39	39	59	17	67	241	31	26
%	2.1	6.2	16.2	16.2	24.5	7.1	27.8	100.1	13	84 (10.8 of total)

Kordshuli kadkhodas jointly own land and animals with other family members. Individual ownership of specific animals or specific plots of land is not recognized until the corporate property is broken down into its component parts by economic separation. Even before deposition of the kalantar, the maintenance of this joint wealth by the kadkhoda's family played an important role in defining their power within the group. In those cases where one of a group of brothers has separated from the others as both a social and economic unit, he has lost power and influence except those gained through his own personal qualities. It is likely that some of the household units that will sedentarize in the near future may attempt to emulate this approach to settlement, not because they seek power but rather because they see that it allows the maintenance of both the flock and the family unit.

The consolidation of flocks that occurs when middle-range or wealthy flock owners hire shepherds is much less frequent; most of the Kordshuli do not like to hire shepherds and would rather care for their own flocks. When these cases do occur, more influence does not accrue to the shepherd in charge of a large flock because he does not have access to the products of the larger flock. At any rate, less than 10 percent of the flocks that are in the range of 300+ animals are of this type. In most of these cases, the flock owner is an older man who has no sons and who feels it is too difficult or tiring to watch the animals himself.

What this consolidation accomplishes, then, is that the older man may lessen his work load and that the shepherd will reap the benefits of gaining access to better pasturage, of providing a better social environment for his small flock allowing for improved productivity, and of maintaining the desired lifestyle of a nomadic pastoralist.

The average flock size for the Kordshuli is approximately 170 sheep and goats. This number contrasts greatly to that given by Barth (1961) for the Basseri of 20 years ago, a time when the Kordshuli claim they had considerably more animals. Barth says that the average Basseri had less than 100 animals. In this regard, then, the Kordshuli as a unit are seen as relatively wealthy and productive herders. Parviz Khan, son of the deposed kalantar of the Basseri, told me that, "while the Basseri and 'Arab sleep, the Kordshuli herd their sheep." Still, there is a wide range of average flock size among all the tireh, as Figure 6.1 shows. The average flock size for Lori Jamshid is only 81.1 animals, while that of the Xaleji is over 240 animals.

There is no direct relationship between these average flock sizes and the prospect of sedentarization. If, however, there is some likelihood that the wealthiest and poorest nomads are among those who may try to maintain the nomadic pastoral adaptation, as I point out in the next chapter (Sedentarization), then we might expect there to be some correlation between the poorest and wealthiest tirehs

Average flock size/household head

	# of household heads	
Babamaleki	17	---------- 217.6
Arbabdar Kakakhan	60	---------- 189.2
Arbabdar Mirzajan	35	-------- 131.4
Arbabdar Hajiboa	23	---------- 150.9
Lori Almas	29	---------- 187.9
Lori Jamshid	26	---- 81.1
Xaleji	100	---------- 242.3

Average 171.4

FIGURE 6.1 Average Flock Size in each Tireh

and the acceptability of sedentarization as a positive option for the majority of the tireh members. Subjectively, this holds true for the two extreme averages; that is, more household heads of Xaleji and Lori Jamshid expressed a desire to remain nomadic than was generally the case for other tirehs. Even here, however, more household heads would like to sedentarize if they had the means.

Thus, this subjective correlation follows from the fact that there are more individual wealthy household heads in the Xaleji tireh, and more poor ones in Lori Jamshid, in proportion to the sizes of the tirehs. That is, the choice or decision to sedentarize is still primarily individual, although it is the case that the actions of others in the tireh may affect this decision. In those tirehs where there has been a more immediate move toward sedentarization by many of the families within the tireh, especially evidenced through the purchase of land, other households in the tireh may follow suit and purchase land in the same general region. In a few cases, it was the direct action by the kadkhoda in securing building- and land-purchase loans that played a major role in decision-making by many of the independent household heads.

While the previous discussion has focussed on flock size, it should be noted that this variable of flock size should not be viewed, primarily, as an independent variable, but rather as a dependent variable that is a function of available labor and pasturage. In most of the household

units, the labor needs of a pastoral nomadic existence are adequately met. However, in households where labor is in short supply, flock size is limited either by the ability of the household unit to care for the animals or by its ability to find and utilize extra-household labor sources. Because of the cultural ideal of the independent household unit, this latter option is rarely chosen by the Kordshuli.

When there is enough labor to meet the needs of the flock and household, then access to pasturage becomes an important variable in the regulation of flock size. Where the number of animals and the average size of flocks are prohibitively high to be maintained on the traditional pasture areas of the Kordshuli tirehs, then it is necessary to achieve a better overall distribution of animals throughout Kordshuli territory. Traditionally, better distribution of animals could be brought about by reallocation of pastures by the kalantar, as well as by the activation of affinal ties. With the deposition of the kalantar, it is now affinal ties that allow for, at least, a minimal redistribution of some of the flocks over the available pasture. While most marriages take place within the tireh (cf. chapter four), there are a number of cases where either tireh or taifeh boundaries are crossed. With overcrowding in a given area, either because of the number of households and animals or because of adverse environmental conditions, these ties, which are usually dormant, are activated. Nonetheless, the final decision on extra-tireh pasture use

is made by the kadkhoda. A few households can activate distant affinal ties with the kadkhoda himself; however, most households who wish to use pasture land in another tireh's area utilize direct links with affinal relatives in that tireh. These relatives will try to help gain the kadkhoda's permission to allow the additional household into the area. If permission is given, the affinal relatives camp and migrate together. Of course, the ability of the kadkhoda to give permission of this kind is dependent on the whims of the government; it is only because the government allows the kadkhoda some leeway in the maintenance of traditional pasture areas that this option even exists.

While this is a possible short-term solution to the problem of overcrowding, it is not often used by the Kordshuli. Ideal residence patterns are virilocal and it is considered culturally inappropriate, especially among the less educated, for a man to move away from his tireh. In many of the cases where this move has taken place, the household heads consider themselves good friends as much as affinal relatives. It is, in many cases, more acceptable to choose to camp with a friend than with an extra-tireh relative.

If none of these means result in a better overall distribution of animals, other mechanisms such as intra-group conflict or sedentarization are likely to come into play to decrease effective population density. However, because of governmental influence and intervention,

intra-group conflict can no longer effectively work to disperse the animal population. Sedentarization, obviously, is one of the few viable options left. Of course, it is possible that any given household might rid itself of a number of animals to ease the pressure, but this can only work for those households that have a surplus. This would rarely occur, since most of the Kordshuli feel that as long as the flock can be maintained there really are no surplus animals. The point is that while this latter option, getting rid of animals, seems to be an easy solution to the problem of overcrowding, it is neither a very acceptable nor a desirable way to alleviate the problem.

In this chapter I have discussed some of the changes that have occurred within the Kordshuli as a result of the shift from a more-or-less independent existence to an existence based on State control of both the tribe and needed resources. This shift has had a strong impact on the choices that individual Kordshuli households make with regard to choosing a nomadic or settled existence. The impact of these economic shifts, as well as the impact of the political shifts discussed in the previous chapter, will be examined more fully in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII

SEDENTARIZATION

In the preceding chapters, I examined many of the changes among the Kordshuli that have undermined at all levels the viability of this group, politically, economically, and socially. Many of these shifts have led to the increased possibility or probability of sedentarization as one of the only viable options to satisfy the nomad's immediate needs and to reduce the anxiety and difficulty of a nomadic pastoral existence.

This chapter will examine futher the direct relationship between political and economic shifts among the Kordshuli and the process of sedentarization. Sedentarization, here, refers primarily to behavior which restricts or eliminates migratory activity. In the case of pastoral nomadism it also usually implies a concomitant reduction in pastoral activities, although this is as much a function of ecological and economic necessity as it is of choice. For example, the nomadic strain of sheep that is herded by the Kordshuli do not fare well when forced to remain in one temperature extreme for an extended period of time (Barth 1961: 6). So, when the nomads settle, they are forced to reduce their flocks in order to reduce animal mortality. It

is necessary to keep in mind that while there is an absolute form of sedentarization where nomads settle and retain no direct contact with nomadism or nomads, there are many variations of the process which fall on a nomadic/sedentary continuum. "For any nomadic population, settlement and, to a lesser degree, nomadization are ongoing processes" (Beck 1978: 2).

A brief review of the literature would show that many of the studies on pastoral nomads more often include the variants that fall toward the nomadic end of the continuum (cf. Irons and Dyson-Hudson 1972, Spooner, 1973, Anthropological Quarterly 1971). There is a lacuna in the same literature when it comes to mentioning sedentarization (but see, e.g., Swidler 1973). Usually, only the complete abandonment of migratory behavior receives attention because of the explicitness of the cultural and social changes which take place. Also, more often the focus is on the individual (i.e., the family), than the group, although both forms of sedentarization have occurred frequently throughout the Middle East. A number of permutations, based on temporal and spatial aspects of nomadism, also occur, but are rarely considered.

Barth's Model of Sedentarization

One of the more important studies of pastoral nomads that attempts to deal directly with the sedentarization process is Fredrik Barth's (1961) study of the Basseri of southern Iran, Nomads of South Persia. This work has served

as a major stimulus not only for this research, but for many other studies on nomadic pastoralists as well. Although the subject of sedentarization had been broached elsewhere, either directly as an administrative problem of central governments (cf. UNESCO 1959) or indirectly as an aside in the social structure studies of East African pastoral groups (cf. Spencer 1965, Gulliver 1955, Stenning 1959), it was Barth who set the stage for many of the more recent studies of nomads, particularly in the Middle East. I have chosen to focus on Barth for two reasons. First, Barth considers his work to be of comparative utility:

> Since the relevant features of the environment, and most of the cultural premises current among the Basseri, seem to have a wide distribution in Fars and adjoining areas, the processes which affect nomadic life elsewhere in South Persia should be essentially similar to those observed among the Basseri (1961: 123).

Second, Barth's study of the Basseri has had a great impact on studies of pastoral nomads. Although Barth's study was conducted over twenty years ago, even the most recent works on nomads use Barth's model as a springboard for comparison (cf. Beck 1980: 327; Salzman 1980: 12; Tapper 1979: 244). The fact that his model of sedentarization has been implicitly accepted makes it worthy of reconsideration. If Barth's model of sedentarization is accurate, is of comparative value, or is still applicable, it should apply to the Kordshuli, whose cultural and geographical boundaries are contiguous with those of the Basseri.

Barth's model is based on his understanding of the characteristics of the pastoral form of capital. This form of capital has four features, which he says have fundamental implications for both social and economic organization of the nomadic group and, therefore, indirectly for sedentarization. The four features are:

> (a) essentially all productive capital is in consumable form
> (b) a significant fraction of the income is in the form of capital gains
> (c) there is a continual risk of total or partial loss of capital
> (d) the rate of income decreases with increased capital (Barth 1964: 70, 71).

A basic assumption is that, for a nomadic pastoral herding unit, be it a single household or any group of households, there is a range of functional stability in terms of flock size. This range is dependent on access to variable resources: pasture, water, and land. Above this range of functional stability, relative productivity and rate of income decrease; below this range, the pastoral adaptation becomes difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. If the limits of this "range of stability" are broached, sedentarization is likely to occur. "Sedentarization is the <u>normal</u> result of great capital accumulation, or capital losses" (Barth 1964: 77; emphasis mine). This process is diagrammatically indicated in Figure 7.1.

The two aspects of Barth's model have been characterized elsewhere as the "failure and fall-away" model and the "succeed and surpass" model (Salzman 1980: 12). I will examine, in turn, each of these aspects of the model to



FIGURE 7.1 Sedentarization through capital loss or accumulation (after Vandervert 1972)

determine the applicability of the model not only in relation to the Kordshuli, but also in relation to the group for which it was devised, the Basseri. That is, is Barth's model even a fair assessment of Basseri reality?

"Succeed or Surpass" Model

Barth points out that as a result of the attention focused on the well-being of the flock, the major portion of a nomad's labor is given to the care of his animals. When his flock exceeds his family's subsistence needs, the rate of growth of the flock tends to increase. Thus, if there are a number of successive good years, the flocks of some of the tribesfolk may grow to 200 to 800 head (Barth 1961: 103). However, at this point, as indicated in (d) above,

"it is a characteristic feature of wealth in herds that its net productivity rate for the owner declines as the size of the herds increases" (ibid.: 107). Barth says that this occurs primarily because of the herding and management techniques practiced by the Basseri (1961: 103; 1964: 71).

Since a single shepherd cannot adequately care for a flock of more than about 400 animals, the owner of a very large flock must, therefore, divide his flock and entrust shepherding duties to other persons. In fact, Barth points out, "since shepherding is a strenuous and exacting occupation, owners of herds larger than about 200 animals already tend to hire a shepherd" (1964: 71). The greater the number of animals, the less effective is the owner's supervision of his shepherds and, as a result,

> the less the flocks are under the owner's constant supervision, the more he will be cheated out of his profits while made to carry real or fictitious losses. Shepherds can . . . and . . . inevitably will be more careless of their master's flock than they would of their own; they can sell livestock and claim the animals have been lost, pocketing the profits; if they have some animals of their own, they can provide them with lambs of other ewes in case of accident at lambing; they will consume part of the product of the herd, and sell part, claiming that production has been low, etc. etc. (1961: 103).

Barth also points out in this regard that the flock is subject to unpredictable fluctuations and severe losses in years of natural catastrophe. Such losses can average as much as 50 percent in some years. The risk of loss increases when the flock is under the less watchful eye of hired shepherds.

Using the above argument, Barth draws the conclusion that "as a herd-owner's wealth grows, there are thus growing economic incentives for him to transfer a part of his capital to another form than wealth in herds--that is, to a form in which it gives a greater marginal profit" (e.g., carpets, jewelry, and especially land)(ibid.: 103-104). This transformation of capital leading to possible sedentarization "happens with considerable frequency" (ibid.: 106; emphasis mine).

Before I present additional aspects and consequences of this part of the model of sedentarization, it is necessary to comment on some of the conceptual and empirical difficulties that are raised by the preceding argument for the Basseri. Barth's point that net productivity rate decreases with increasing flock size is based primarily on his argument that non-familial shepherds are generally untrustworthy. However, to accept this as a significant variable in a process which happens with "considerable frequency," we should expect it to be a standard practice among the Basseri. In contrast, Barth makes the point that "less than one household in ten has the means to employ outside labour (non-familial shepherds) in this way (as an addition to, yet separate from, the family unit)" (ibid.: 21; parentheses mine). More importantly, "to facilitate the herding and tending of the flocks, Basseri households usually unite in groups of 2-5 tents. These combine their flocks and entrust them to a single shepherd" who is a member of one of these

households (ibid.: 21-22; emphasis mine).

Perhaps, then, Barth has overstated the case for sedentarization brought on partially by declining rates of productivity. Elsewhere he has noted that "cases of sedentarization through capital accumulation and land purchase are by the nature of things relatively rare, and my material for the above description consists mainly of a handful of life histories" (1964: 78). He, in fact, admits that he has "no reliable data on the numerical frequency of sedentarization as a result of capital accumulation, as compared to the frequency of rapid fragmentation and redistribution of such wealth" (1961: 107). Perhaps Barth does not have reliable data on other aspects of the process either!

We are further led to question Barth's conclusions because of his seeming inability to differentiate actual from ideal behavior. As I mentioned above, Barth says that "all attention become focused on the well-being of the herd" (1961: 102) and that "a major part of the nomad's labour is thus invested in the care of the flocks" (ibid.: 103). If it is indeed the case that "boys down to the age of 6 are therefore frequently used as shepherds, while married men only exceptionally do such work," then this attention seems less strongly directed than Barth implies (ibid.: 16). Likewise, if the Basseri household head is so concerned with his flock and at the same time aware that a hired shepherd will be a problem, then why does he hire a shepherd for a

flock of 200 head when "the increased work involved in shepherding a flock say of 300 instead of 100 is negligible" (1964: 74)?

Another assumption that must be questioned is whether or not the nomad is concerned with the "greater marginal profit" that might be brought from capital in a form other than animals. Barth makes the point that

> the limiting factor on his [the nomad's] income is thus the size of his privately owned flocks; any increase in them brings a rich return in increased profits harvested from the communally owned pastures. The immense interest in conserving and increasing the herds which is characteristic of the Basseri--as apparently of most nomadic people--thus has an economic justification (Barth 1961: 101; emphasis mine).

Is the individual nomad more concerned with the smaller marginal profit that accrues to him based on the possibility of a declining rate of net productivity than he is with maintaining a flock of a size adequate to resist decimation brought about as a result of periodic fluctuations in drought, disease, and predation? For the Kordshuli, the answer would be no! Barth, in fact, is not convincing in his argument that the rate of net productivity does, in fact, decline, since he bases it on the effects of herding and management techniques which, according to Barth himself, are not very common. Indeed, when the size of the flock surpasses 400 head, it may be the case that the nature of flock care must change. However, data are not presented which allow one to relate household developmental stage with flock size. That is, how many households that have large flocks also have sons who can care for the animals in

conjunction with the primary shepherd? If shepherding is done by family members, should we expect a comparable decline in the rate of net productivity, and, if so, on what basis should it occur? According to the data Barth has presented, there should be no reason to expect a comparable decline. Also, although the rate of net productivity may decline (giving that assumption to Barth), there is still a continued increase in overall productivity. If maximization of flocks is a goal that is economically justified (see quotation above), then why does Barth assume a model based on the idea of marginal profits? That is, if the nomadic pastoralist is more interested in marginal profits than in the maintenance of his flock, then it would seem that there should be more cases of sedentarization through capital accumulation than there are. At this point, Barth might bring in those "features of Basseri organization which prevent [sedentarization due to capital accumulation] from becoming the predominant pattern" (1961: 106).

Barth points out that a number of factors tend to inhibit capital accumulation in the form of large flocks:

> --accidental capital losses, differential consumption rates and the diversion of labour from pastoral production, accelerated division of household and capital, polygyny and increased family size without corresponding reduction of the inheritance shares of elder sons--these all act together to inhibit the concentration of wealth in the form of large herds" (1964: 76-77).

While it is impossible to judge accurately the effects of these factors on the Basseri, it will be useful, in terms of the comparative value of the model, to see how effective

they are in regulating flock size among the Kordshuli. If these mechanisms help to forestall or prevent sedentarization among the Basseri, then we should expect them to play a comparable role among the Kordshuli. That is, are they effective in keeping a Kordshuli household from entering what may be called the "upper crisis zone" (see Figure 7.1)?

The "upper crisis zone" (cf. Vandervert 1972) is entered when the accumulation of wealth continues to accelerate at an ever-increasing rate, so that more and more of this wealth is siphoned for land purchase. "The greater these interests in land are, the more the owner becomes motivated to supervise and control his property" until he becomes a sedentary landowner (Barth 1961: 105-106). As we examine the effects of the abovementioned factors, I will show that the concept of an "upper crisis zone" is ill-conceived and does little to increase our understanding of sedentarization at all economic levels.

Upper Crisis Zone

Accidental Capital Losses: While it is true that "epidemics, famines, and losses of young animals in case of late frost may all strike as sudden disasters and reduce the herd in a fashion which is unpredictable" (Barth 1964: 75), this factor must be considered tangential to Barth's central argument or, in some cases, be considered the primary factor in bringing about sedentarization rather than forestalling it. It is tangential in most cases since Barth's capital accumulation model is based on the assumption of "a

succession of good years" (1961: 103). That is, if the flocks do not have the necessary time to reproduce to "large flock" status, then the model does not begin to work.

At the other extreme, when the flock owner has been accumulating animal capital for some time, and transforming it into land, then accidental capital losses "seem to be a common precipitating factor which drives [wealthy land-owning nomads] to the village" (1964: 78; also see 1961: 106). It seems unlikely, although not impossible, that this loss of animals, which averages "as much as 50% in some disaster years" (1961: 103), is a primary cause for settling down by these wealthy nomads. Most of these men/families are likely to have large flocks even after investing in land. A loss of even 50 percent would still leave most of them wealthy flock owners. In fact, according to Kordshuli informants, it is precisely for this reason--accidental capital loss--that maximization of flocks is rational economic behavior; if a flock owners loses half of his flock, yet still can continue to meet and, perhaps, surpass household needs, then he is successful.

It is, of course, possible that the flock can grow quite large, yet the flock owner invests in little or no land. Barth gives us no idea of how large a flock might be when the flock owner begins to invest in land, except that as "great herd-owners" they have "flocks of 200 to 800 head, and a few even more" (1961: 103). Certainly for some of these herd-owners a loss of up to 50 percent would inhibit the upward spiral of capital accumulation. However, for

those nomads who own 400 or more head, the effects of capital loss would decrease with increasing flock size. Even with the figures that Barth gives for capital replacement and capital gains, it seems that the set backs suffered would be short-lived or not effective in reducing flocks below some critical point in the model:

> To maintain the full capital value of the herd, about 15 percent of the lambs must thus be set aside each year to ensure replacement of the stock; the remaining female lambs and a proportionate fraction of male lambs may be regarded as capital gains and give a possible capital increase rate of nearly 40 percent per annum (1964: 71).

Thus, many of these great flock owners would need only two years or less to recoup their losses and regain their previous economic status. The effect of accidental capital loss, then, is minimal at best. It affects only a very small range of flock owners at only very specific times during the growth cycle of their flock.

For the Kordshuli and, I suspect, for the Basseri, the maintenance of the flock is of primary importance. A Kordshuli man might invest in land as flock growth continues but he would not threaten the viability of the flock by overinvesting in land. Barth says that capital losses occur "which . . . the herd owner cannot anticipate in his stock management" (1964: 75). I would argue that the Basseri flock owner, like the Kordshuli flock owner, is always aware of the fact that severe cases of accidental capital loss can occur. Larger flocks gained through attempts at maximizing flock growth are the result of a management technique which

can offset of minimize the effect of these losses.

Differential Consumption Rates and the Diversion of Labour from Pastoral Production: Barth points out that capital accumulation is inhibited by controls implicit in Basseri consumption patterns, which have greater effects as flock size increases:

> The household with larger herds . . . increases its consumption of luxuries and foodstuffs--that is lambs, as well as tea, sugar, rice, etc.(1964: 75-76).

Furthermore, more and more of the labor of a wealthy household is directed away from pastoral production:

> the men require greater leisure, and their efforts are taken up by training and tending horses, hunting, and political activity; the women weave and tie rugs (which are never marketed); and the increased weight of household belongings and larger tents requires more beasts of burden, including camels, which again means a need for a separate camel herder. All these activities and persons depend on the herd without significantly contributing to its care and production; their presence will serve as a brake on the rate of herd increase (ibid.: 76; emphasis mine).

It is not unlikely that wealthier households do increase consumption of luxuries. However, Barth provides little or no data that shows the transition from "people of fair means" who "continue to deny themselves all luxuries" (1961: 102) to wealthy nomads who choose to consume more. It is also the case among the Kordshuli that the wealthier families do tend to purchase more goods. This increased consumption has little effect on their wealth in animals, except in extreme cases where the effect is very short-lived. There are a few major expenditures that can considerably affect the size of the flock. For example, a number

of young men have purchased motorcycles and one headman's family has purchased an automobile (discussed later in this chapter). Increasing wealth for these families merely gives them greater access to resources, be they land or luxury goods. These expenditures are not part of any conscious effort to reduce flock size but rather are activated only when the nomad feels secure in his ability to provide for himself and his family with fewer stock.

The second proposition, that productive labor is diverted from the pastoral sphere, seems, at the least, to be overstated. While it is true that the men probably desire greater leisure, it is hardly a requirement of wealth. Unless the Basseri are quite different than the Kordshuli, it is also unlikely that the increase in household belongings will require many, if any, extra pack animals. More importantly, the members of a wealthy family, at least among the Kordshuli, while they may divert some of their activities from the pastoral sphere, are still available as a labor source when needed: the men for migration, lamb feeding and milking; the women for all the normal domestic tasks as well as migration and milking. Generally, it would seem that this factor is not very effective in reducing flock size for very many households.

Accelerated Division of Household and Capital: Barth (1964: 76; also 1961: 106-107) makes the point that "greater wealth also generally leads to an earlier fragmentation of the household" since marriage age for the sons of

wealthy nomads is 18 to 20, while in poorer households it may be much later. This earlier marriage leads to earlier dispersal of the household's capital because a man receives a share of his father's flock as anticipatory inheritance when he marries. For this practice to be effective in inhibiting capital accumulation, a number of factors must, through some coincidence, occur in conjunction with each other. The number of sons, the proximity of their ages, the actual size of the flock, the reproductive capacity of the flock, environmental shifts, and the like, would all affect the rate of flock growth.

Barth also makes other assumptions which need not always hold true. Because the sons of wealthy nomads marry between the ages of 18 and 20, it is not necessarily true that "within about twenty years of his own marriage, the dispersal of the successful herder's flock commences, giving only a brief period of accumulation for the wealthy" (1964: 74; emphasis mine). This, of course, is true only of those men who have a male child within the first year or two of marriage. The assumption, also, is that 20 years is a short period of time. This leads one to question what Barth means by a "succession of good years" (1961: 107) leading to accumulation of animal capital. Another assumption is that there is "an early loss of the cheap and dependable labour represented by adult, unmarried sons" (1964: 76). However, for the practice of anticipatory inheritance to be effective as a means of reducing flock size for any length of time,

one must assume a number of sons differing in age by no more than a few years. If this is the case, "the marriage of the last son is usually delayed . . . so the son can become head of the new household in which the old parent(s) are permitted to live" (ibid.: 75). Thus, labor may be available throughout much of the life of the wealthy flock owner.

The point that I am making is not that Barth's scenario does not occur, but rather that it is dependent on a number of additional factors and, thus, is irregular and probably infrequent. If the critical factors are present, it would indeed seem that the patrimony a son receives at his wedding could affect the economic position of his father by seriously reducing flock size. However, unlike the Basseri, the Kordshuli do not usually divide the flock until actual social separation, a year or more after marriage. While the Kordshuli do say that the division takes place at the time of marriage, it is unusual for the father to specify which of the animals will go to the son. Among the Basseri, the actual specification of animals takes place at the time of marriage and the division of property is based on the total number of animals at that time (Barth 1961: 19). Among the Kordshuli, the son's share of the flock is more often calculated at the time of actual separation. If the flock size increases while the son and his wife remain a part of his father's household, then he will receive a greater number of animals when he does separate. If additional male children are born before separation they

will not necessarily receive or have reserved a share equal to that of the older son. It is possible that the addition of another child will decrease the number of animals the marrying son will receive; but it will not be directly proportional to the number of sons, since the father expects the size of his flock to increase before the young son grows up. If the separation of the married son from his natal household will adversely affect the ability of either the son or father to maintain a pastoral nomadic existence, then it is likely that the son will remain in the household unit until flock size allows for a better distribution of animals.

There are a number of cases among the Kordshuli where the son has separated from his natal household with barely adequate resources. This is most often caused by quarrels between father and son, or between the wives of father and son, or the wives of brothers. While the Kordshuli say that they expect wives to argue because of their desire to control their own domestic spheres, it is unusual and culturally disapproved for a father and son to quarrel. As with most behavior that goes against the ideal, they say it is ugly (zesht-e). At any rate, the effect of anticipatory inheritance is usually not great enough to drastically effect wealth. While it may produce a short-term solution to the problems of an increasing flock size, the effects continue to be functional in this regard only in those families that have many sons who differ only

slightly in age, since flock growth is quite rapid. It should be noted that it is unlikely that this implies any conscious attempt to reduce flock size. If wealthy flock owners were concerned with declining rates of productivity, it seems more likely that they would not hold on to sole-ownership and management of the flock until the social separation of their married sons.

Polygyny and Problems of Inheritance: It is possible that polygyny affects capital accumulation; however, to adequately judge its effect, it is necessary to be more precise than Barth, who says only that "it is common for wealthy herd owners to contract plural marriages" (1964: 76). I question this assumption only because polygyny is rarely practiced by the Kordshuli. Among the Kordshuli there are but a handful of men who have two wives and no man has more than two wives. All of these men are extremely wealthy by Kordshuli standards. They all own land and are part of dispersed economic households or they practice marginal nomadism (to be discussed later in this chapter). At least two of the men married a second wife because the first was barren. In these two cases, the men had been married to the first wives approximately 20 years before they made the decision to marry a second time. In only one of the polygynous marriages did the man marry his second wife for "love" (esq), in the opinion of other Kordshuli. The other men who have married two wives married their second wife with the acceptance, and sometimes urging of the senior wife

to provide an addition to the household labor force after children had moved out. Although brideprice was greater for the second wife than for the first, it did not affect the wealth or perceived wealth of any of these men. That is, in the opinion of other Kordshuli, these men remained wealthy and had investments in land and luxury goods already established.

Barth (ibid.) also says that polygynous marriages will sap more of a man's wealth because extended fecundity means he will have to support more unproductive children for a longer period of time. Also, because of anticipatory inheritance, marrying sons will receive "too large" shares of their father's estate. In none of these polygynous unions among the Kordshuli did either of these possible limitations play an important role. Additional unproductive children did not seem to place a burden on the household's wealth and all of the men involved felt that their flocks would grow to an acceptable size between the marriage of eldest and youngest sons.

These factors, then, which Barth says "are not . . . completely effective checks on the accumulation of wealth" (1964: 77), play an even smaller role among the Kordshuli. While any or all of these factors may inhibit capital accumulation by one household, they are not very useful for understanding, at a group level, why some nomads settle and others do not. If these factors are not working to inhibit capital accumulation among the Kordshuli, then it would seem

that there should be many more Kordshuli investing in land, and as a result many more sedentarizing as land owners.

There are, indeed, a number of wealthy Kordshuli who have purchased land. However, contra Barth, these men do not necessarily, or naturally, settle on it. Most of these families have chosen to maintain their flocks through the formation of dispersed economic households (discussed later in this chapter) or by "hiring" sharecroppers while continuing to shepherd their own flocks. Most of the Kordshuli informants who have owned land for some length of time say that they first purchased agricultural land to offset the rising price of, or impeded access to, grain. Those who built houses a number of years ago say they did it as a response to drought conditions. More importantly, many of these families have lived in these houses during extremely dry years (e.g., 1962-1964) and then have begun to migrate again when conditions improved. These choices imply that, for most, there is a greater desire to maintain their flocks than to give in to the demands of their investment in land.

This is not the case for the wealthy Basseri man. According to Barth's model, once the wealthy nomad has invested in land and has erected a house, his concerns for these matters increase, as does his desire for sedentary comforts (1964: 78). He seems to have little choice but to accept this "reluctant upward mobility" (1961: 111). Thus, Barth, who has allowed the Basseri great economic sophistication in determining profit margins and investment

practices, does not allow them the same level of sophistication in recognizing the outcome of this "natural" sedentarization process. For the Basseri, as for the Kordshuli, "sedentarization is never regarded as an ideal among the nomads" (1964: 77). Further, in support of the Kordshuli position stated above, "there is . . . no feeling that land purchase implies sedentarization" (ibid.). Unfortunately, the Basseri are seemingly not very far-sighted since "only towards the very end [of the gradual process of land accumulation] do informants see sedentarization as its natural end result" (ibid.: 78; emphasis mine).

Based on my knowledge of the Kordshuli, as well as on discussions with some Basseri household heads, I feel that Barth's point that land purchase does not necessarily lead to sedentarization is more appropriate than his contrary position that the upward spiral of capital accumulation will inevitably lead to sedentarization. There is no doubt that some wealthy Basseri (and Kordshuli) have settled on their own land. However, I do not think that it was ownership of land that led to sedentarization, but rather it was the desire (or need) to sedentarize that was eased by prior ownership of land. If Barth had been able to gather more direct data on both settled and nomadic Basseri, he probably would have found an equivalent number of "middle range" nomads who had also settled on their own land. Certainly, many of these men would have had to sell all or most of their animals in order to purchase either

agricultural or residential property. However, the reasons for choosing this action are probably comparable for both groups. Amanolahi (1976) has indicated some of the push/pull factors which have led many Basseri to settle in an urban setting. Most of these reasons apply primarily to poorer nomads, but there are some that can, and probably do, apply to the 23 percent of Amanolahi's survey who owned land prior to urban settlement (sample = 273 household heads). These reasons are: inability to continue nomadism (due to old age or debilitating injury or illness); education for children; and comforts of city life. There are also social, political and ecological reasons why any nomad might settle that have little or nothing to do with flock size at the time the decision is made.

It seems obvious that one of the major problems with Barth's analysis is that it does not take into account the total cultural context of Basseri life.

> What is interesting, and perhaps surprising, to a social anthropologist is the fact that it should be possible at all to show their [the characteristics of pastoral capital] social implications by a discussion involving relatively few 'cultural' facts--that the processes by which they are made relevant to social action and features of a local social system seem to implicate few of the other basic premises of Basseri culture (Barth 1964: 81).

It seems, rather, that Barth sought to explain by his model two general perceptions of Basseri existence--that the "total tribal population is and has been in approximate demographic balance" (1961: 116) and that the Basseri "constitute a population of striking social homogeneity"

due to the maintenance of general economic homogeneity (1964: 75).

While further comments at this point serve as a critique of the entire model, I feel it is useful to examine briefly these perceptions. I have chosen not to present the "failure and fall-away" part of the model until after the discussion, since it appears in most ways to be more accurate than the capital accumulation model. That is, there are real constraints on the poor nomad that can force him out of the nomadic system. These same kinds of pressures do not exist for the wealthy nomad.

The perception of demographic balance implies that there are processes which can drain off a major fraction of any natural population increase. These processes are necessary if demographic balance is to be maintained, since Barth posits a trebling of the nomadic population every three to four decades (1961: 115). The two processes that accomplish this fact are emigration and sedentarization (ibid.: 116). Barth downplays the role of emigration when he points out that because of possible in-migration it is difficult to ascertain the net effects of these movements (i.e., whether they increase or decrease population pressure). Thus, sedentarization becomes the more important process in explaining demographic balance.

Rather than enter upon a prolonged discussion of these points, I wish only to briefly comment on them. First, I believe that Barth's figure of an average 7.2 live members

per sibling group (ibid.: 115) is too high for the tribe as a whole. His data are from the section which comprises the chief's retinue. That is, this section is more likely to have had continual access to good pastures as well as to possible assistance from the chief in times of crisis. While the rate of increase for the Basseri, and for the Kordshuli, may indeed be high when compared to rural village populations, it seems more likely, based on Kordshuli data, that it is considerably less than Barth supposes. Thus, with a more moderate population increase, the intensity of sedentarization need not be so great. Also, if emigration plays even a minimal role in alleviating population pressure (as I would argue it did in the past for the Kordshuli) then sedentarization, while still important, need not be the overwhelming phenomenon that Barth's data implies.

Barth's perception that sedentarization is the most important means of nomadic population control raises the questions of who is actually settling and why. Barth finds the answers to these questions manifested in the "striking social homogeneity" of the Basseri (1964: 75). Barth argues that this social homogeneity is the result of economic homogeneity which, in turn, occurs because certain economic features (commented on earlier in this chapter): 1) inhibit wealth concentration and thus work against the emergence of status differences based on wealth, and 2) tend to encourage sedentarization of those who differ significantly in wealth from the average (ibid.). While this latter point may be

true for impoverished nomads (as I will point out below), I have already argued against it for wealthy nomads.

The social homogeneity that Barth perceives for the Basseri is also generally true for the Kordshuli. However, as I pointed out earlier, wealth concentration for the Kordshuli is not necessarily inhibited to any great degree. Thus, there can be a wide range of economic variation expressed through flock size. The range in size of flocks belonging to men who engage only in nomadic pastoralism is from 50 to 800 head. I think it likely that had Barth been able to collect data from a reasonable sample of Basseri households he would have found a comparable range of flock sizes. Among the Kordshuli, there are some men who have more social status for a variety of reasons (see chapter five), but most Kordshuli household heads occupy roughly the equivalent status of independent, economically self-sufficient (within the pastoral sphere) flock owner. All have the same relatively unimpeded access to pasture because of their membership in one of the named sections (tireh) of the Kordshuli. The point is that social homogeneity can exist in the presence of economic heterogeneity if the values of the society are such that households from various economic categories have access to pastures.

In my opinion, Barth became trapped in his attempt to understand and explain demographic balance and his perception of social qua economic homogeneity by his use of an over-simplistic non-contextual model of sedentarization.

While sedentarization plays a role in both of these situations, there are a number of other cultural variables which he virtually ignores. The "upper crisis zone" is not a powerful vortex which sucks wealthy nomads into the abyss of inevitable sedentarization. Rather, increased wealth leads to increased options in terms of production diversity, investment practices, and the like. The "succeed and surpass" model obscures the reality of the situation and, thus, is counterproductive for understanding change and structure in pastoral nomadic society.

"Failure and Fall-Away" Model

This model stems from the same principle as the "succeed and surpass" model--that is, if the size of any individual's flock falls outside the "range of stability" (see Figure 7.1), then sedentarization is likely to occur. In this case, those pastoral nomads who fail to maintain a viable household productive unit, and thus cannot support themselves and their families through pastoralism, "fall-away" from the pastoral nomadic sector and must seek employment in the sedentary agricultural or urban wage-labor sectors (cf. Salzman 1980: 12). The process, according to Barth, is very simply explained:

> accident, sickness or poor management of a small herd leads to losses, and thus to an annual production below what is required for the purchase of food and clothing. But the herd itself is a large food store, and hunger easily drives the nomad to invade this his only productive capital, reducing the pastoral output further, in a vicious circle. The only alternative is to seek additional sources of income . . . mainly found in sedentary society . . . But frequently such work

> . . . disturbs the nomad's migratory cycle, and thus leads only to reduced pastoral production and further animal losses . . . The Basseri feel that once a household's flock falls significantly below the minimal level of sixty adult head, this downward spiral is pretty inevitable and quite rapid (1964: 78).

The equivalent process obtains among the Kordshuli, since they, like the Basseri, are highly individuated with a low level of corporateness, few solidarity groups, and limited mutual support structures (cf. Salzman 1980: 12). Thus, if disaster strikes there is no place to turn for even limited assistance.

The mechanisms to compensate for loss of flocks, which come into play in an attempt to forestall or reverse the trend toward sedentarization, are summarized by Barth

> reduced consumption, debts at interest rates appreciably lower than the rate of production of pastoral capital, postponement of the normal process of subdivision and multiplication of households by the marriage of sons, and occasional shepherding of animals of others on advantageous terms (1961: 111).

How affective are these mechanisms in keeping the nomadic household from entering the "lower crisis zone" (see Figure 7.1)? The "lower crisis zone" is the range of flock sizes where productivity is too low to support the household unit and where the downward spiral of capital loss draws the nomad further away from the pastoral nomadic sector until he is eventually integrated into the sedentary community in the status of propertyless villager (Barth 1961: 109). For the Basseri, it would seem, these mechanisms are not very effective--"Sedentarization through impoverishment . . . is a constant threat for many and has a high empirical frequency,

of the order of one person in every three in the groups of my censuses" (1964: 78).

Lower Crisis Zone

Reduced Consumption: While this mechanism may forestall sedentarization for a while, it can not be maintained long if flock productivity does not increase. If continued impoverished conditions lead to increased consumption of pastoral capital, then the nomad and his family will be unable to maintain a pastoral nomadic adaptation. That is, decreased consumption of goods and resources can only be suffered for a limited time, and thus is not an effective long-term solution to the problem of decreasing capital. This is as true for the Kordshuli as it is for the Basseri.

Low Interest Debts: Barth says that the carrying of large debts from one year to the next is the first stage in the downward spiral leading toward sedentarization. If debts and/or interests are too great, then the herder is forced to invade his productive stock (1961: 108). The problem of large debts seems to be a problem only if there is a succession of bad years; "nomads often succeed in recouping in the course of a year of two in spite of heavy indebtedness" (Barth 1964: 72). Similarly, for the Shahsevan nomads of northwestern Iran, "the 1964 and 1965 seasons were bad and expensive in fodder and losses for the nomads . . . and many advances were not paid off. But the 1966 winter was so mild . . . few nomads seemed to be left in debt by the spring" (Tapper 1979: 72-73). Thus, if debts are not

carried very long, they may serve to maintain a nomadic household's viability within the pastoral sector. Most of these debts are incurred for the purchase of flour, other foodstuffs, and, in bad years, for animal fodder. This mechanism is functional only if there has been no disaster reducing the level of flock productivity below household needs. That is, access to trading partners who sell on credit helps prevent the loss of productive capital. If flock productivity is already in a state of rapid decline, debts can only temporarily lengthen the limited time remaining to the nomad in this productive sector.

Postponement of Subdivision and Reproduction of Households: Barth points out for the Basseri that the division of a flock to provide a marrying son with the necessary capital to start an independent household unit usually occurs at his marriage. However, if the flock is too small, the marriage of the son is postponed until the young man is 30 to 35 years old (1961: 107). Barth does not say what will happen to the son of a poor nomad if enough capital has not been accumulated. Presumably, he will not get married. For the Kordshuli, on the other hand, the marriage is not necessarily postponed, although the actual division of the flock may wait until actual social separation into independent household units. Certainly, providing flocks for the newly married is the key act in the reproduction of the social relations of production for these nomads. Without separation of household units or

division of the flock, this reproduction cannot occur. If capital accumulation does not increase, then the demands on productive capital will increase to meet the needs of the extended family. In this regard, the Basseri system may be more responsive to the existing economic pressures. That is, by postponing marriage, the Basseri also postpone additional drains on limited productive capital. Nonetheless, if the flock does not grow, the whole process will have been just a holding mechanism that may break down under increased environmental stress.

Shepherding and Seasonal Occupations: Employment as a wage or agricultural laborer is not common for those who wish to remain nomadic. There are, however, some poor Kordshuli nomads who do act as shepherds for wealthier kin and some who are shepherds for the flocks of the khavanin (chiefs). This may give these nomads the opportunity to increase flock size and, perhaps, eventually regain independent status. That is, some traditional forms of employment could make the loss of herds a reversible condition. These positions were limited in number. Since few wealthy Kordshuli have extra-familial shepherds, even distant kin, this is not a viable option for most of the poorer nomads. Those who do become shepherds for wealthier kin are usually taken into the household as a lower status member of the family, where they have few, if any, rights over the flock or even over decisions in their own lives. To work as a wage or agricultural laborer almost always leads to complete

sedentarization. Comparably, Barth points out for the Basseri that most of the temporary or seasonal occupations open to the nomad necessitate periods of sedentism and the development of closer ties with one particular sedentary community. Thus, the rate of reduction of the nomad's remaining stock is accelerated because of the interference with the normal migratory cycle. This leads to further loss of animals, loss of spatial continuity with the nomadic group, increased sedentary dependence, and eventual assimiliation into the sedentary community (Barth 1961: 109). There are some nomads who remain marginal or seasonal nomads, joining the nomadic group in the summer, but for most it means abandonment of any form of nomadism. Still, many of these nomads would be more than ready to return to nomadism if climatic, economic, and political circumstances permitted. That is, they remain, as Afshar Naderi has so aptly stated, "nomads on the waiting list" (Mohammed 1973).

The "lower crisis zone," unlike the "upper crisis zone," is a real concern for the nomad. At this level, the choices of the poorer nomad are concerned with economic survival, not merely with directions of productivity. Sedentarization by impoverishment "is felt as a threatening and live possibility in a number of households of the lower economic range" (Barth 1961: 108).

We can see, then, that Barth's model of sedentarization is inadequate and often inaccurate, if we are to explain how and why certain phenomena occur. Nomads from

all economic strata settle. It is not surprising that poor nomads who fail to maintain adequate pastoral resources for subsistence quit the pastoral sector. The implication, however, is that these poorer nomads may begin to settle before subsistence needs go unmet because "the Basseri, like other Persian nomads, are but a segment of a larger population where assimilation by sedentarization into peasant villages and urban centers is possible and frequent" (Barth 1964: 77; emphasis mine). This comparison is not always valid, despite the fact that sedentarization due to impoverishment may still occur. As Salzer points out for the Kaskuli Kuchek of the Qashqa'i confederacy (who live quite near the Basseri):

> When sedentarization has occurred, it has been as a consequence of impoverishment. This is, however, said to have been rare, in contrast to the Basseri . . . When I asked my informants why there was a difference, they answered that the Basseri are nearer, both spatially and in life style, to sedentary peoples, and that there were more villages and farming land in the Basseri area and therefore more "work " available . . . In fact . . . trying to find a sedentary source of income was generally more difficult than trying to maintain migration. As a consequence, families reduced to an extremely low standard of living have continued migration" (1974: 115).

Also, Barth presents sedentarization as essentially an economic process at extreme ends of productive capabilities that is primarily concerned with the redirecting of productive aims. He does not effectively consider the relative importance of social and political decisions. The wealthy/impoverished dichotomy does not tell us much more about why nomads settle than that the wealthy are more able

to afford to buy land and thus have additional options, while the poor are less able to survive in the pastoral sector and thus have fewer options.

Indeed, in the recent past, most of the Kordshuli who have settled either in sarhad (summer pasture area) or along the migration route--typically between Marvdasht (above Shiraz) and Qasrodasht (above Sivand)--were either relatively wealthy or poor when they settled. Most of this sedentarization was group settlement (discussed later in this chapter) rather than individual families alone deciding to leave the nomadic system. Many of these wealthy nomads, however, did not settle after having invested in land over a period of time. Instead, most decided to settle and then sold resources to buy land. Many were merely tired of nomadic life, others were old and infirm, and the like. Many of the poorer nomads who settled in the same area as these wealthy men were members of the same section as the wealthy men. Also, many of these poorer nomads had not yet entered the "lower crisis zone" and might have been able to recoup recent losses. However, many foresaw the possibility of increased difficulty in maintaining a pastoral nomadic existence, and decided to maintain social and political ties with the wealthy men, many of whom had been descent group or camp leaders. Some of these political ties would have been unable to be adequately expressed within the pastoral nomadic sector because of the demands made by a pastoral existence and the general social homogeneity that obtains

from these demands.

It may be the case that the economic component is of primary importance, but even here Barth searches for static functional explanations based on his own notions of capital investment rather than on those of the nomads. While investment in land may be more secure than investment in animals, returns are more constrained despite the risk inherent in pastoralism. If investment in land inevitably leads to sedentarization, as Barth believes, then investment in land can only lead to limited profits from maximization of land use (i.e., the land can only produce so much). The nomad, with appropriate labor, can continue to increase profits, even if at a reduced rate. For example, one man who had been settled for 18 years began to migrate again in order to increase the size and profitability of his flock so as to gain extra income to pay for education of his sons. Tapper (1979: 73) points out for the Shahsevan of northwestern Iran that "the anticipation of heavy losses and expenses leads the nomads to calculate in terms less of simply meeting projecting outgoings, than of minimizing risk and expenditure and maximizing profit and surplus." For the Kordshuli, this profit and surplus is usually generated in the pastoral sector.

Another major difficulty with Barth's model is its presentation of sedentarization as the complete abandonment of migratory activity, with no range of variation; it is described as both absolute and irreversible (cf. Salzman

1980: 12). There are, however, a number of variations of the sedentarization process (to be discussed below) that a model such as Barth's does not and cannot deal with effectively. Salzman (ibid.: 13) makes the point well:

> Thus, while it may seem to the unacquainted [perhaps we should include Barth] that nomadism and sedentism are worlds apart, that the vast gap, crossed only under the greatest of duress, could hardly be recrossed, that we are considering two entirely incompatible types, the realities of social formation and historical process, unburdened by ideal-typical conceptualization and tidy classificatory schemes, indicate otherwise. The fact is that both individual experience and collective institutions can encompass, to a very great degree, the variations that fall under the labels 'nomadism' and 'sedentism' (parentheses mine).

The Barthian model which predicts the sedentarization of wealthy and impoverished nomads offers little help in understanding the recent shift among the Kordshuli to primarily "middle range" sedentarization (i.e., the sedentarization of those nomads that fall within the "range of stability")(see Figure 7.1). This shift is largely a function of the increased difficulty of doing pastoralism because of increased State control over resources as evidenced through land reform programs, the Forest and Range Nationalization Act, etc., as well as of the increased difficulty of sedentarization for the poor because of increasing land prices and economic inflation. Because the majority of the Kordshuli fall within the "middle range," these factors also play a major role in the increase in sedentarization generally. Still, they are only major environmental shifts and constraints that affect the choices available to the nomadic household. That is, they certainly affect those choices,

but the process which leads to a decision to settle also includes political and social components both within and without the group, as well as the relationship between pastoral nomadic ideology and a settled existence.

For several years I have been engaged in the attempt to present a more suitable model of the sedentarization process than those in the literature on pastoral nomads--one that focussed more on the concept of choice mentioned above (e.g., Swee 1979). In the past year (1980) a newly published book, When Nomads Settle (Salzman 1980), has proposed and briefly elaborated aspects of a model which adequately addresses my concerns. Salzman has called this the "adaptation and response" model. According to this model, "sedentarization is seen not so much as a forced, coerced, unavoidable process, to which no conceivable alternative but annihilation could exist, but rather as (in very many cases) a voluntary, uncoerced shift from one available pattern to another in response to changing pressures, constraints, and opportunities both internal and external to the society" (1980: 14). Rather than paraphrase the rest of Salzman's well-written summary on this model, I will present much of it below. Here, I will only offer my concurrence that it is a more adequate model than earlier ones for understanding continuity and change among pastoral nomads.

> The 'adaptation and response' model does not stress, as do other models, a mass of people buffeted by irresistable forces or individuated actors without socially-based resources. Rather it stresses the options available to actors and the institutionalized resources that largely define the options and make them possible.

> This is of course not to say that all societal change is generated entirely by the preferences of the actors, for changing constraints and pressures not of their own making are consequences of environmental, demographic, and external political and economic processes. Nor is this to suggest that irresistable forces are unknown or even uncommon. The sad fact is that people, nomads included, are all too frequently subject to environmental catastrophes and overwhelming coercion . . . What the 'adaption and response' model does point out is that in many cases sedentarization is the result of processes which have a long voluntary component and which make use of societal resources in the form of institutionalized alternatives, and that the various mechanisms of societal multiformity provide a flexibility in individual behavior, organizational patterns, and ideology which makes reversal of direction in social change possible (ibid.).

As the parameters of the "adaptation and response" model are elaborated, it will be easier to understand many of the recent shifts in the form and scope of sedentarization (e.g., the case of the Kordshuli) where primarily "middle range" nomads are choosing sedentarization as a viable option to cope with increasing environmental stress. Conversely, among the Kordshuli, it is the rich and poor nomads who may continue to migrate. The rich can afford to move all of their animals and their belongings by truck and may, in fact, own land in both summer and winter pasture areas. The poor, on the other hand, may try to continue to maintain their small flocks fearing the unknown of a non-pastoral existence. Since these flocks are necessarily small, it is not as difficult as it may be for others to herd them through the narrowing migration route. This is not to imply that this latter group, the poor nomads, will not eventually sedentarize, but rather that the poor nomad feels that there is no recourse but to migrate (cf. Salzer 1974: 115).

These shifts in form have also brought shifts in some of the traditional values and preferences of the Kordshuli. The stereotype of the pastoral nomad's dislike of agriculture may have been true of the Kordshuli nomad of two to three decades ago (cf. Barth 1961: 9). Now, with the recent shifts in the political and economic spheres, the desirability or utility of sedentarization, in some form, has increased. Many nomads realize the usefulness of diversifying their productive regime; thus, agriculture has become more acceptable, although it is still considered to be of secondary importance by most Kordshuli.

With this increased acceptance of agriculture, there has been a change in the nature of the ideal of the independent, self-sufficient household unit. While most Kordshuli still value this ideal, many realize that it is easier to meet household needs through the formation of dispersed economic household units, which function as agro-pastoral partnerships among socially independent household units of the same larger family. The formation of these dispersed economic households is a response to environmental constraints rather than a shift away from the desirability of economic self-sufficiency, especially in the pastoral sector. Pastoral nomadism, if unconstrained, is still favored as the primary lifestyle by the Kordshuli. However, with political and economic constraints, as indicated in chapters five and six, many Kordshuli have expressed the desire to settle. There is no naturally negative response

to sedentarization as Marsden (1974) and Afshar-Naderi (1974) would have us believe. Many of these nomads have not settled because they feel they lack the means, not because they do not want to.

It must be noted that these shifts in acceptance of sedentarization and settled lifestyles are highly correlated with shifts in the economic and political systems of the larger State. Constraints on movement, impeded access to pastures, etc., on the one hand serve as push factors, while the lure of cheap foreign-made luxury items, etc. on the other hand act to pull the nomad away from his traditional lifestyle. If these conditions were to change, it is not improbable that many nomads would choose not to settle, or that those who had settled might choose to become nomadic again. Certainly, the factors which lead to sedentarization are always reversible: "a bad year is followed by a good one. The military strength of rival tribes and central governments wanes as well as waxes. And temporary setbacks, such as epidemics, result in low animal/pasture rations, opening the area once again to aspiring pastoralists" (Salzman 1980: 13). At the time of my research it seemed highly unlikely that the strength of the Shah's government could or would wane. In hindsight, as I will mention in my conclusions, the assumption of stability at any level is never fully justified.

This shift to "middle range" sedentarization also presents an interesting paradox in terms of Barth's economic

model (wealthy/impoverished). One of the major variables influencing sedentarization (or actually non-sedentarization) is the price of land. In the past five years, the price has doubled, and in some cases tripled. As a result many of the nomads who have expressed the desire to settle feel that the price of land is prohibitively high. Thus, without full awareness that it is probable that the price of land will continue to rise faster than the price of their animal products, many will not purchase land now. When, in the future, the hardships of migration become overwhelming because of the crowded conditions, these nomads will, for the most part, be forced to settle as landless laborers. Thus, they will become "poor" ex-nomads without ever having entered the "lower crisis zone"! Some will be able to find employment in their home regions, but certainly many will be forced to seek employment in larger cities, adding to the urban problem of the unskilled, illiterate worker.

Variations in the Sedentarization Process

As I mentioned earlier, sedentarization need not be an all or nothing proposition. There are a number of variations which, when examined, allow for a more astute perception of the nomadic/sedentary continuum than that gained from an absolutist model such as Barth's model. Two major variations, which were not effectively dealt with by Barth, can be called: 1) the dispersed economic household, and 2) marginal (or seasonal) nomadism. A third variation, group

sedentarization, is mentioned by Barth but not integrated into his model.

Dispersed Economic Household

The dispersed economic household occurs when a joint or extended family unit separates into socially and, usually, spatially distinct units. Often they can be viewed as independent consumption units that still maintain production ties (i.e., they are still an economic unit). The form is usually that of a group of brothers or of a father and adult sons, one of whom, at least, maintains the joint flock while the others either farm or earn money through some other venture. Farming is the usual and preferred activity for these groups. Sometimes the joint economic household takes the converse form of one member farming while the rest herd, with the farmer's flock being parceled out according to the ability of the others to handle extra animals or to gain access to adequate pasturage. Many variations fall within these extremes depending on the number of male family members that are willing to maintain joint flocks (all adult males usually own a share of family land).[1]

While economic separation of sons from fathers or brothers from brothers invariably means dividing the joint flock, it usually does not imply a division of jointly owned, landed property. Inheritance of land, like inheritance of animals, is partible but most Kordshuli realize the advantage of planting one continuous plot over the planting of many small scattered plots. Because most of the land has

been owned only since the last generation of household heads, the natural expansion of multiple family units has yet to play a part in land division. This, also, is partly a function of the fact that inheritance in animals tends to be anticipatory, while inheritance of land does not take place until the previous owner's death. Division of agricultural produce garnered from jointly held land is usually equally distributed among all socially independent household heads. This is the case even when the households are otherwise economically independent (i.e., with their own flocks).

Perhaps the easiest way to understand the operation of a dispersed economic household unit is to examine a couple of cases. It should be realized that most of the families that fall within this category tend to be, on the average, wealthier than single independent households. The two examples I will present are families of kadkhodas (headmen), but there are a number of other families which also fit the same pattern.

Case 1: Kakakhan

The kadkhoda and his three brothers of the tireh Arbabdar-e Kakakhan make up four socially distinct household units (so defined by the presence of separate hearths), yet their economic resources are held in common. Three of the brothers are farmers and control work done on the land inherited by the family unit from their father. The three not only work the land, but also oversee the labor of some sharecroppers (settled Kordshuli) who live on the property.

The decision to use sharecroppers was a joint decision requiring the approval of all the household heads, or at least the acquiescence by the younger two to the wishes of the older ones. The fourth brother is in charge of the joint flock. Not only have these families pooled their economic resources, they have also combined some of their independent labor forces. Because of the occasional need for extra labor in the nomadic camp, the two eldest offspring of the eldest brother live and work with the nomadic household unit. This is actually more a case of easing the load of the adult members of the nomadic household than of insuring the economic viability of this family. The young man is the shepherd for the joint flock, while the young woman helps with domestic tasks around the tent such as baking bread and washing clothes. This nomadic family unit, however, could easily manage without the extra labor; it is just that there is a greater possible need for extra labor within the nomadic camp than in the agricultural field, especially during migration.

All agricultural and pastoral products are the joint property of all of the households, except for those consumed by the individual households during the course of the productive cycle. That is, the nomadic household prepares all the pastoral products for their own consumption, for division among all the households, and for sale, the profits from which are divided among all the households. For example, the nomadic family produces and eats yoghurt (<u>mast</u>), some

butter (karreh), and buttermilk (duq) from the middle of spring through much of the summer. This is considered theirs and does not figure into the division of the products later in the summer or autumn. Lambs and wool are sold in late spring to early summer and the money is divided equally among the four households. Clarified butter (roqan), curd balls (kashk), and the like are divided into four equal shares. If the year has been quite productive, any excess beyond the needs of the joint consumption unit will be sold and the profits equally distributed. Likewise, in the agricultural sphere, all produce or cash from the sale of excess produce is divided into four equal shares. The land was inherited as a package from their father and has not been divided, even mentally, into sections. Neither has the flock, anticipatory inheritance notwithstanding, been divided into four jointly herded groups.

Case 2: Haji Ali Mirza

In this case the dispersed family is composed of a man and two of his three sons. Haji Ali Mirza and his eldest son, Mirza Qoli, control the joint agricultural property. Most of the farming is done by sharecroppers who settled as impoverished nomads. Eskandar, the youngest son, controls the joint flock. Another son, Hajiqoli, has separated his flock from the others and is involved only in the production of his own pastoral products. He still has a share of the jointly owned land and receives an equivalent share after harvest; however, because of his social and

economic separation, he does not share in the power that accrues to the wealthy. His own flock is rather small and he is viewed by other Kordshuli as being totally independent rather than as a member of a larger wealthy family that has power as kadkhoda of the tireh.

While Mirza Qoli is the actual kadkhoda of the group, it is usually Eskandar who functions as acting kadkhoda since he lives and migrates with the nomads. Because Eskandar only has young children, Mirza Qoli's two eldest daughters also live with and assist Eskandar and his wife. A more distant male relative also lives with Eskandar and acts as shepherd for the joint flock, although he has no claim to any of the animals. As in the previous case, agricultural and pastoral products are distributed, except that agricultural products are distributed among all households including Hajiqoli's, while pastoral products are distributed among only three households.

While there is an economic advantage to being part of a joint economic household, there is also a political one. There is not a great degree of explicit social differentiation among the Kordshuli. Within the nomadic sphere, while flock size may differ considerably, it is the ability to maintain a reasonably independent existence which is most important for economic status differentiation. Black points out that in Luri social structure, "stratum membership is defined in the final analysis as a function of the economic viability of the family" (1972: 623). If a Kordshuli

household without landed property can maintain its independence without recourse to external assistance, there is little perceived status differentiation relative to other households, even to those with larger flocks. The economic viability of the family is more secure, however, if they also own land. Certainly, the more able the land is to meet the grain needs of the family, the higher the implicit status.

However, the status differentiation which Black attributes to the Lurs cannot be seen manifested in the same way among the Kordshuli. While Black sees it in terms of a definite power motif where "the wealthy enforce their will upon the abjectly poor and the poor can see no other alternative but to accept this situation in a spirit of implacable resignation (ibid.: 625), among the Kordshuli there is a difference in influence but not necesarily in enforceable power. Indeed, there is a strong power component involved in the interactions of the very wealthy with the very poor, who are forced to maintain their pastoral nomadic adaptation as shepherds. It is usually the case that "the freedom of lower stratum men is a pure fiction; for even if they passionately hate their patron, they do not rescind their contract but continue to bear with and evince respect for him, since they are aware that to find a replacement is no easy matter" (ibid.: 630). Even here, however, it is not a contract as rigid as Black implies, at least among the Kordshuli. One young man who was the shepherd for the

kadkhoda of one section hit an intractable sheep with his staff (chuq) and the animal died. It is a common practice for shepherds and herd owners to soundly hit their animals out of anger and frustration. The kadkhoda, however, became incensed and struck the young man quite severely. That night, despite the insecurity of his position, the shepherd ran away and only months later found a job as a shepherd for an urban flock owner. The Kordshuli with whom I spoke felt that an injustice had been done to the shepherd and that it was appropriate for the young man to leave as he did. Many of his close relatives even talked of seeking revenge, but others agreed that such talk was only a show of family solidarity and no real threat to the flock owner. For the Kordshuli, at any rate, there are so few of these lower-stratum clients that this form of relationship is relatively unimportant in the general scheme of social differentiation.

The general point to be made is that with dispersed economic household formation there is both an economic advantage, in terms of easier and less expensive access to resources, as well as a political advantage, in terms of ability to influence the decisions of others. Once sedentarization takes place, the wealth differences between families may become a more rigid indicator of status in the sedentary community. In those villages where there is already a traditional sedentary community, the nomads must enter into a well-defined class structure (Keddie 1972; Ajami 1969). In villages composed primarily or solely of

settled nomads, stratification may develop based on these wealth differences as well as on the genealogical and tribal relationships among the households. Within the nomadic sphere, social differentiation, while present, is not rigidly defined but rather is one factor which combines with sophistication, education, religiosity, etc., to set certain individuals and their households apart from others in terms of authority and decision-making ability. Consensus is still the order of the day, except for those few direct patron/client relationships.

Dispersed economic household units, while in many ways more effective within the nomadic community than purely pastoral nomadic households, may also lead to a better overall adaptation, as economic and political changes within the larger environmental setting continue to impinge upon the ability of the nomads to make a living. Beck makes a comparable point for the Qashqa'i:

> Where pastoral and agricultural economies are coordinated, it tends to be beneficial to both parties. Those assigned to pastoral functions maintain the necessary pack animals, permits, and contracts conducive to productive pastoralism while those in charge of agriculture buy or rent land and equipment and expand urban and market ties. These Qashqa'i will probably have better opportunities to adapt successfully than those who do not diversify their economies (1979: 22).

Marginal Nomadism

While the configuration for many of the wealthier families is that of a dispersed economic household, others from all economic strata that in many ways are sedentarized

still retain a form of marginal or seasonal nomadism. That is, there is part of the year when many households, or parts of extended family households, will move once again into goathair tents and be generally indistinguishable from the regular nomadic population. This practice is also true of some villagers, except that they do not fall under the aegis of the kadkhoda of the tireh. They also have only a limited area available as a campsite (yort), since during seasonal occupancy traditional pastures are primarily for use by nomads who are members of one of the named tirehs of the tribe.

There is a definite relationship between the nature of and reasons for sedentarization and the time of year that certain families choose to become "part-time" nomads. Some families that fit into the configuration of the dispersed economic household also fit into this pattern of marginal nomadism. Often those members of the dispersed economic household who are in charge of the agricultural part of the productive system will join their nomadic counterparts in the winter, when the agricultural land in sarhad is under snow. This means that they may contribute additional labor to help care for lambs and kids, to help grainfeed the animals if the winter is dry, or to help with any number of other domestic tasks. This pattern is quite common among the wealthy families where the father is still alive and manages the land holdings. Many of these older men consider themselves to be settled villagers, but

lament the loss of the freedom and cleanliness of a nomadic life.

Some of the wealthy families that practice marginal nomadism do not migrate, but rather put all their belongings and their animals in the back of a large Mercedes Benz truck and transport them down to winter pastures in a single day. Some of these families also own land in winter pasture areas, which makes it unlikely that they, unlike many of the other nomads, will be "forced" by tightening circumstances to settle. In the summer they once again move into permanent structures, and either keep their flocks in pens or disperse them among the flocks of other relatives.

On the other hand, it is more usual for members of the lower economic strata, who have settled in or near sarhad, to take their small flocks that have been penned up during the winter and join the rest of the tireh during the summer. Most of these household heads are wage laborers or self-employed handymen. Many will camp near the tent of the kadkhoda and help out with menial tasks around his tent. This, they believe, will help them secure the kadkhoda's assistance in dealing with problems that may arise within the sedentary community. These poorer marginal nomads feel that this summer nomadism will provide better fodder for their flocks and, thus, help the animals get through the winter if they are unable to provide adequate amounts of grain.

Group Sedentarization

While the forms mentioned above indicate that there are numerous variations in the sedentarization process that relate to individual households, it is also important to realize that much of the sedentarization that has taken place among the Kordshuli, and in the Middle East in general, has been in the form of group sedentarization. Barth (1961) does mention group sedentarization for the Basseri but does not relate it to the general model that he presents or to its effect on decision-making within the group.

Among the Kordshuli there are two basic forms which this group sedentarization has taken: intra-tireh sedentarization and inter-tireh sedentarization. In the first case, a strong, elder member of a tireh or lineage would settle because of age, or dispersed economic household formation, or numerous other possible reasons; few would say that it was because investment in land was more secure. Poorer members of the lineage, many of whom had not yet entered the "lower crisis zone" (see Figure 7,1), followed this respected leader. Some of these poorer nomads were probably considering sedentarization anyway, but it is likely that many made the decision based on the action of the group at large. Most of this sedentarization would take place during a dry year when pastoral production was down and a greater uncertainty existed as to the future of the flocks. The rich family would buy land or settle on land previously purchased, and the poor would become sharecroppers on the land. This,

in form, approaches a patron/client relationship, except that there need not be very much social differentiation since the two groups still claim relationship through descent as members of the same tireh. Over time, many of these poorer nomads may also become sharecroppers for other landowners from different groups that live in the same general vicinity. This would enable some to have greater access to the limited available resources. However, the initial decision to settle was probably as much a function of their economic situation as it was of their certainty in being able to make a living through the resources of the wealthy lineage member. That is, many probably would not have settled when they did if they had not had the prior knowledge that there would be land on which they could live and work.

Another form of group sedentarization--inter-tireh sedentarization, where the individual households come from more than one section--has also been in evidence among the Kordshuli. In these cases, sedentarization was almost uniformly the result of impoverishment. Many of the individual households had seen the oncoming necessity for sedentarization but had not yet begun to consider the particulars of the move (i.e., where to settle and when). Working along networks of friendship and affinity, the individual households of various sections came to a general consensus as to the time and location of settlement. This guaranteed that there would be a larger labor force to draw

upon for building houses, digging wells, etc. This process has occurred in a number of different locations. For example, in 1341 A.H. (1962), the first year of a prolonged drought in the region, 20 families from three tireh settled together in Hosseinabad in Kordshuli sarhad. Social and economic differentiation was minimal among these families. Most of these settling families became sharecroppers for settled landowners, usually for the khavanin of the Kordshuli.

Kordshuli Tirehs and Sedentarization

Up to this point, I have been concerned with the mechanisms involved in and the variations of the sedentarization process. To understand the reasons behind the increase in sedentarization in both scope and frequency, it is necessary to examine the effects that political and economic shifts discussed in previous chapters have had on the nomadic adaptation. First, however, it will be instructive to look at some of the nomadic Kordshuli tirehs to see their response to these shifts. That is, we are concerned with the question of who is likely to settle and why. Rather than attempt an overview of all tirehs, I will focus on three groups: Babamaleki, Lori Almas, and Lori Jamshid. While the remaining five groups may differ somewhat in their specific behavioral responses, a general picture will still emerge which shows how these groups are choosing to respond to changes in their environment.

Babamaleki

All household heads of the Babamaleki have expressed the desire to settle. All believe the nomadic adaptation, particularly migration, is too much trouble (zahmat) and that there is little profit to be made in pastoral nomadism. By this, they do not mean direct monetary profit but rather the equivalent as a return on time and labor. The risky business of pastoralism is now even riskier. This desire to settle is manifest by the recent purchase of residential property by some of the household heads.

Only the dispersed economic household of the kadkhoda has owned any land for any length of time. In 1976, five other households bought land near some owned by the kadkhoda in an area between sarhad and Shiraz (which is approximately midway between summer and winter pastures). This area does not usually pose the problem of temperature extremes, which would preclude the maintenance of any flock. All five say they bought enough land on which to build a house, but not enough to grow crops or provide for a reasonably sized flock. The following chart shows the amount of land purchased and the price that each was required to pay.

TABLE 7.1 Recent land purchases--Babamaleki

	Amount of Land	Price	
1.	540 sq. m.	2160 T	(1 Toman = @ $.15)
2.	540 sq. m.	2160 T	
3.	540 sq. m.	2160 T	
4.	670 sq. m.	2760 T	
5.	1000 sq. m.	4000 T	

All five believe this land is rather inexpensive, but say they probably would not have purchased it had not the kadkhoda secured a low-interest loan for all of them. It is also likely that the price of this land would have increased greatly within a short time period. An example of this inflation for a household head in another tireh will suffice to make that point: this family group bought thirty hectares of land in 1972 for 1000T/hectare; now (1977), land of similar quality neighboring their land is selling for 6000T/hectare.

All of these household heads say that they really do not know when they might settle. They must be able to pay off the cost of the land, and then be able to afford to build a house. Much will depend on their desire to maintain some of their flock. If they settle they know they will have to sell much of their existing flock to pay for a house. Also, none of these men know what they will do when they do, in fact, settle. A couple have said that they may try to find work as wage laborers. The other three have not thought through the consequences of sedentarization. Indeed, if they can keep some of their flock with nomadic relatives, they may be able to minimally survive by using and selling pastoral products, albeit at a more impoverished level than when they were nomadic.

The question of whether there is any relationship between wealth and sedentarization is difficult to answer in terms of the Babamaleki. In chapter six, I presented a

chart (Table 6.1) that shows flock size in general categories for each tireh. The Babamaleki have no households which possess fewer than 50 animals and only two households with more than 300 animals. Both of these latter households have less than 400 sheep and both say that they had fewer animals the previous year. Thus, all the Babamaleki, including those two "wealthy" households, actually fall into a "middle range" of wealth. The fact is, at least within this one group, it is not just those at the economic extremes who are settling but those at all levels of wealth in animals.

When I asked about past cases of sedentarization within the tireh, the kadkhoda and others would mention only those families that had sedentarized and yet continued to recognize the authority of the Babamaleki kadkhoda. About 40 years ago, during the period of enforced settlement by Reza Shah, three men settled in Hosseinabad in Kordshuli sarhad. The seven sons of these men still say they are Babamaleki and are recognized as such by the nomadic Kordshuli. Social interaction is partially maintained during the summer, at least by the kadkhoda, and some of the animals of these families are herded along with those of a couple of the nomadic households.

Seventeen years ago, three brothers also settled in Hosseinabad after a bad drought. Another brother remained nomadic. The three settled as sharecroppers and are still sharecroppers today, although they may, individually, work

for a different person each year. At the time of their sedentarization, these three men had more "property" (i.e., animals), than the remaining nomadic brother. However, they sold their animals to buy and build houses. The nomadic brother felt he was too poor to do this, so he kept migrating. Now he has a good-sized flock and has bought land of his own on which to build a house. A point here is that, even at the time of Barth's research, there were other criteria than just impoverishment which played a role in the decision by some Kordshuli to sedentarize.

One pattern that can be seen emerging is that tireh members are likely to settle in close proximity to each other. For the Babamaleki, all purchased land in the same village, except for some agricultural land owned by the kadkhoda's family near Hosseinabad, where other Babamaleki settled earlier. The reason given for buying land in an area other than sarhad was that the winters are too harsh in sarhad and the mountain pass is closed through most of the winter. This means that there is no access to any reasonable medical facility should it be needed. Thus, for the safety of the family members, the kadkhoda and those who have now followed him decided to live in a region that had milder winters and continued access to urban facilities.

Lori Almas

While among the Babamaleki most household heads expressed the desire to settle and some have recently purchased land with that end in mind, among the Lori Almas most of the

household heads already own land and most say they would like to remain nomadic until it becomes too difficult. However, while 67 percent of the households own land, only 15 percent own houses. In most cases, the house was built at the time the land was purchased. However, in two cases a different response implies that these families will settle in the very near future. One case exhibits a usual pattern; land was purchased five years ago and this year when the household's wealth was secure enough, they built a house. It is likely that this pattern will be followed by a number of the other households as conditions for pastoralism continue to worsen. In another case, the household head purchased a house seven years ago in anticipation of settling, but then felt that he could not settle since he had no real resources. Now, however, he has just purchased a parcel of land for 30,000T and plans to settle as soon as possible.

In Table 7.2 one can see that the general pattern of tireh proximity after settlement holds for Lori Almas. Unlike Babamaleki, Lori Almas has used three major locations when sedentarizing or purchasing land: Saqalat, Sirbanu, and Cheshmeh Rana. In the four cases that do not follow this pattern, the families purchased land near settled affinal relatives. The different locations are based on the time of settlement or land purchase, as well as on the location of affinal relatives. Approximately 10 years ago, many Kordshuli families bought land after rebuilding their flocks from decimation caused by the 1962-1964 drought. As I

TABLE 7.2 Lori Almas tireh--land ownership

Location	Amount of Land	Length of Ownership	Sample Cost
1. Saqalat	½ vaqeh[1]	5 yrs	
2. Saqalat	1 vaqeh	5 yrs	
3. Saqalat	1 vaqeh	5 yrs	
Cheshmeh Rana	1 vaqeh	10 yrs	
4. Saqalat	½ dung	5 yrs	
Cheshmeh Rana	1 charaq	10 yrs	
5. Saqalat	1 vaqeh	5 yrs	
Cheshmeh Rana	1 vaqeh	10 yrs	
6. Saqalat	1 vaqeh	7 yrs	12,000T
7. Saqalat	½ vaqeh	5 yrs	
8. Saqalat	1 vaqeh	10 yrs	
9. Saqalat	1 vaqeh	10 yrs	
10. Cheshmeh Rana	½ dung	10 yrs	
11. Sirbanu	1.5 dung	10 yrs	
12. Sirbanu	½ vaqeh	< 1 yr	6,000T
13. Sirbanu	1 charaq	< 1 yr	12,500T
14. Sirbanu	½ vaqeh (with well)	< 1 yr	12,000T
15. Sirbanu	½ dung	10 yrs	20,000T
Sirbanu	½ dung	< 1 yr	30,000T
16. Sa'adatabad	5 hectares	5 yrs	
17. Sivand	house	3 yrs	
18. Xongesht	½ dung	< 1 yr	30,000T
Xongesht	house	7 yrs	

Nine household heads own no land

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1. 1 dung (dang in Persian) = 1/6 of any piece of real estate; 4 charaq = 1 dung; 2 vaqeh = 1 charaq; so 1 vaqeh = 1/8 dung

pointed out earlier, inter-tireh group sedentarization did occur among many impoverished nomads. One village in which many Kordshuli settled was Cheshmeh Rana. Thus, when some tireh members decided to buy land to help offset the effects of future droughts, they bought in the same village as some of their settled relatives. This village was in a fairly central location in sarhad and had been developed for some time because of the presence of a natural spring (cheshmeh).

Both Sirbanu and Saqalat were much less developed 10 years ago and neither had agricultural land as good as that of Cheshmeh Rana. Nonetheless, a couple of families decided to settle in Saqalat because the land was relatively cheap and they liked the fact that it was not crowded (one reason nomads give for liking their way of life). One of the families that purchased land in Saqalat was that of the kadkhoda. After pump wells were dug and houses built, other tireh members began to see the potential of the area. Five years after buying his land, the kadkhoda decided to settle as part of a dispersed economic household; he farmed while his brother herded. When the kadkhoda settled, several other tireh members decided to buy land in the same area, which explains Table 7.2 showing number of families buying land approximately five years ago. While not as central as Cheshmeh Rana, Saqalat is still within the general valley system that comprises Kordshuli eilaq (summer pastures).

Sirbanu, on the other hand, is outside the bounded valley system comprising Kordshuli eilaq. It is located on

the plain which some Kordshuli, particularly Lori Almas and Lori Jamshid, migrate over on the last day before arriving in the summer pasture region. The previous kadkhoda of Lori Jamshid bought land and built a house in the Sirbanu area approximately 15 years ago as a response to the 1962-1964 drought. Two affinal relatives of this kadkhoda, who were members of Lori Almas tireh, decided, in concert, to purchase some land in the same general region approximately 10 years ago. Both of these men have since become part of dispersed economic households and are now marginal nomads in that they will move into tents with the rest of the tireh during the winter. Others who have recently purchased land in the same area are close agnates of the marginally nomadic household heads. At least one of these recent purchasers of land plans to settle within a year or two as part of a dispersed economic household with his brother.

Although the most recent purchasers of land have bought land in the Sirbanu region, it is unlikely that any other households of this tireh will also buy land in this area. All of those who have settled in this area are very closely related. It would be expected that any future land purchase by tireh members who are presently landless would be near Saqalat. There are two reasons for this: 1) most tireh members have settled or purchased land in this area, and 2) after sedentarization, settling nomads would have access to the kadkhoda's knowledge about economic and political issues. In point of fact however, since four of

the household heads who own no land have fewer than 100 animals, they could not buy land even if they desired, at least not at the present.

Lori Jamshid

Many household heads of Lori Jamshid have expressed the desire to settle but most feel they lack the means. In terms of average flock size, Lori Jamshid is the poorest tireh of the Kordshuli (see Figure 6.1). While the family of the past kadkhoda--his socially separated sons, and his daughters' husbands--jointly own a considerable amount of property, very few of the other tireh members own any land. Fifty percent of all household heads own no land at all. The following table (Table 7.3) shows this distribution of property, as well as the location of this property. The two primary locations of land purchase are Din Mahdi and Jahrom. Din Mahdi is located near Sirbanu, which is just south of Kordshuli eilaq. The Jahrom site is actually a little north of both that city and Kordshuli qeshlaq. This is the only Kordshuli group, in memory, that has either purchased land or settled in or near qeshlaq. While the pattern is quite common among other nomadic groups, the Kordshuli prefer to settle near sarhad, which they consider their homeland (vatan).

The other site of land ownership shown on the table is Aliabad. This land is owned by the kadkhoda at the very edge of Kordshuli eilaq. It is very close to Hosseinabad, one of the central villages in sarhad. However, Aliabad

TABLE 7.3 Lori Jamshid tireh--land ownership

location	amount of land	length of ownership
1. Aliabad (sarhad)	1 dung	15 years
Din Mahdi	3 dung	@15 years
Bandarbas (Jahrom)	6 dung pump well	2 years
2. Jahrom	little	2 years
3. Jahrom	little	2 years
4. Jahrom	2-3 hectares	2 years
5. Jahrom	1-2 hectares	2 years
6. Din Mahdi	little	6 years
Marvdasht	house	15 years (inherited)
7. Din Mahdi	unknown	14 years

Thirteen household heads own no land.

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has been settled for a very long period and little of its land has ever been accessible through purchase. The kadkhoda of this tireh bought the land when an urban-based land owner decided to rid himself of the land before land reform forced him to sell it below cost. The kadkhoda also built a house and used this area to maintain family and some flock during the drought of 1962-1964.

As mentioned in chapter six, some wealthy nomads will continue to migrate, even as conditions worsen, because they can transport animals and possessions by vehicle and/or because they own land in both summer and winter pasture areas. This is indeed the case with the kadkhoda's family of Lori Jamshid. While the family has not yet begun to transport everything by vehicle, they do transport

a lot of household items with the Land Rover that they recently purchased. The kadkhoda says that they will transport their flocks by truck, if it becomes necessary because of increasing encroachment by agriculturalists on their traditional pastures on the migration route. The family does own land which can be used for summer and winter pastures. Also, with one other family they bought a pump well in Bandarbas, near Jahrom, as well as some land surrounding it.

The other households that bought land near Jahrom at the same time as the kadkhoda bought the well did so in anticipation of the increased difficulty of finding adequate winter pastures. Three of these households have fewer than 100 animals, although they say they had more which they sold to purchase land. Still, these households have purchased the land with the desire to maintain their flocks as long as possible. Now they say they cannot afford to settle, although they say that if they could afford agricultural land, they would not be adverse to sedentarizing.

In all these cases of tireh sedentarization, it may be noted that the primary location for the purchase of land or for sedentarization is usually near land of the kadkhoda. In the case of Lori Jamshid, the kadkhoda owns land in more than one location and tireh members have, therefore, purchased land in either of these areas. In some of the cases where land has been purchased in areas other than those near the kadkhoda, the purchase was based on an initial

affinal relationship and reinforced later by close consanguineal relatives. That is, initial land purchase was made by affinal relatives of Kordshuli who had already settled and/or purchased land in a given area. Close agnatic relatives may then follow in order to maintain close family ties. One point of interest is that land ownership, in and of itself, does not necessarily imply that sedentarization is likely to follow. Also, it has not been the case very often that the common nomad will continue to add to his initial land purchase. A number of middle range nomads buy property usually as a hedge against drought or other crisis situations, although they recognize its value if sedentarization becomes feasible or necessary. While they may express a desire to sedentarize, most realize that they do not have the resources to purchase enough land to provide adequately for the families and at the same time maintain some of their animals.

Nonetheless, while individual decisions may work for the maintenance of a pastoral nomadic existence, imposed constraints at a group level are exerting more pressure in the direction of sedentarization. Many nomads have expressed the desire to settle; many have bought land. As the pressures brought on by political and economic shifts continue to increase, the trend towards a settled existence will intensify. In the traditional nomadic system, if some nomads sedentarized because of pressure on resources, others would be more able to meet their own needs. However, now

the pressure on resources is more a result of agricultural encroachment and government control, so that continued constraints on access to pastures is still very real, even if a number of individual households sedentarize. I will now examine the reasons why these shifts are directing more Kordshuli towards a settled life.

Impact of Political Shifts

The political shifts described in chapter five can be seen mainly as a response to changing ecological factors. Still, as Friedman (1974: 464) points out, " . . . the demo-techno-environmental givens are necessary but not sufficient to explain the existence of a social formation. On the contrary, the properties of the social system itself are crucial in determining its development as well as its present behavior within the bounds of a given technology." Historically, among the nomads of the Middle East, one can see the transformation of the social and political form as a cyclical process; history is not compartmentalized into absolute phases and stages except by the analyst. The nomadization/sedentarization process is easily the most widespread, but there are also other cycles which may differ from group to group. In Iran, for example, many of the nomadic groups of the South coalesced as the State became more powerful, while among other groups there was often greater dispersal in the attempt to separate the group from strict governmental controls (cf. Irons 1975).

With the entry of the Kordshuli into Fars Province, we can see the beginning of the replication of the cycle of the shift from small group (lineage, camp) into larger groups (tribes, confederacies), and the subsequent breakdown into smaller groups again. It would seem, however, that the cycle has run its course and that because of political, economic, and ecological factors the cycle, either as it existed within the nomadic system or as part of the nomadization/sedentarization process, has become nonreplicating. That is, with the greater power of the State, the ability of a nomadic group to escape or successfully challenge this authority has greatly diminished. The small groups that may continue to be in evidence as the larger tribal and confederacy systems break down are left with few alternatives: remain nomadic under increasingly difficult conditions or settle down. Most of the Kordshuli are choosing the latter. The political shifts which have come about have contributed to this decision both explicitly, by changing the nature of the political group so that group unity as well as the ability to interact with sedentary populations is impaired, and implicitly, by making the job of pastoralism more difficult despite a more natural ecological distribution of flocks and tent households. This latter point as it relates to production and labor needs will be discussed in the next section on the impact of economic shifts.

Prior to the strict governmental control of the Entezamat period, sedentarization was but one of a number of

options to help alleviate environmental stress. As population pressure, real or effective, increased, war and fission were more viable alternatives than sedentarization because they worked to maintain the desired nomadic adaptation. Groups could seek virgin territory, take territory from others, or jointly use the territory with others who were already there. At this point Barth's perception that sedentarization plays an important role in the maintenance of demographic balance may be relevant. That is, sedentarization, especially of impoverished nomads, may be seen to account for some of the population shifts in a given region as population density increases. Still, he tends to downplay the possible effect of fission and emigration (1961: 113-121). Also, Barth does not seem to perceive any possible interdependence between sedentarization and population density. That is, he sees sedentarization as being the primary variable in maintaining demographic balance but he does not focus on the possibility that demographic imbalance could be an important variable leading to sedentarization for some. In other words, he sets causality in one direction only while it may, in fact, be a circular process, the origin of which is indeterminate.

Summarizing, Barth (1961) says that it is most likely that the wealthy and impoverished will be the first, or primary, groups to sedentarize. The rich settle because their investment in land becomes more important to them than their investment in animals. The poor settle because such

events as droughts, disease, and predation decimate their flocks making it effectively impossible to maintain a pastoral nomadic adaptation. I have argued in detail against his model of wealthy sedentarization at the beginning of this chapter. While I agree with much of Barth's model on the sedentarization of impoverished nomads, I also discussed his limited approach earlier in this chapter. Other conditions argue against the universality of this model (e.g., in other areas shepherding contracts, loans, or family assistance are available and can help mitigate the impoverished state which might otherwise lead to sedentarization)(cf. Irons 1972: 98). Among the Kordshuli, as among the Basseri, these are not viable options, but they do indicate that sedentarization brought on by impoverishment may be a function of the social relations of production rather than only an environmental given.

However, rather than focus only on the fact that sedentarization may alleviate population pressure, as Barth does, it is also necessary to take note of the effects of population pressure on the nomadic population. That is, Barth's implication is that population pressure never becomes a significant problem for the nomads since it is always alleviated by sedentarization before it can become too great. Barth does point out, though, that within any nomadic population there may be unequal growth of the various sections. Since these sections have direct access only to a certain bounded territory, there is some indication



that population density may at least affect small local populations. As population density increases, there is an increased possibility of overgrazing as well as of a greater destructive potential for disease and drought. The effects of drought become more profound if flocks cannot be widely distributed over available territory; disease becomes a greater threat, especially for lambs and kids, if the animals do not have access to adequate pastures. If these events occur there is a greater likelihood of impoverishment and, thus, sedentarization. The point to be made is that nomads who occupy a constrained area are subject to the possible effects of population pressure. Indeed, sedentarization may alleviate population pressure, but it may also have been "forced" on the nomads by increasing population density in the first place rather than by the normal effects of accidental capital loss or mismanagement. That is, increasing population density may intensify the factors which Barth sees as natural aspects of a pastoral nomadic existence.

It is often the constraints created by the political (or politico-military) nature of the group and the cultural environment which may affect, in the long run, the natural ecology of the area, as well as the nature of the social and economic adaptations of the group. Cultural boundaries are not necessarily clear-cut. If the natural ecological area is not discontinuous, then it is these cultural parameters which become critical for understanding change. These

boundaries may become more or less flexible over time as changes occur in both the natural ecological sphere (e.g., drought or disease), and in the cultural ecological sphere (e.g., settlement of other groups or greater State control).

The traditional territory of the Kordshuli includes summer pastures (eilaq), winter pastures (qeshlaq), and the migration route (rah-e kuch) which connects the two. This corporate estate of the Kordshuli is effectively bounded by other nomadic and sedentary groups. Within this bounded area, population density is likely to increase over time either through actual population growth or, indirectly, through encroachment by neighboring groups which reduces available territory. Figure 7.2, following, diagrammatically shows the options that traditionally could be activated among the Kordshuli. With increased population density, reallocation of pastures within tribal territory may serve as a short-term solution since tirehs reproduce at different rates. However, it can only alleviate the problem temporarily.

Another solution to the problem of increasing population density is to battle with other groups for rights to pastures. There is no evidence, however, within Kordshuli oral history or within the histories of other groups in that area, that the Kordshuli ever engaged in warfare to gain more land. They have fought against other groups to retain the territory that they already were using (e.g., against the Basseri in summer pastures and against groups of



FIGURE 7.2 Population flow before effective State control

Qashqa'i and 'Arab in winter pastures.)

Another alternative would be through group fissioning. Some of the Kordshuli could seek new territory, much as the original core of the Kordshuli did when they first migrated to Fars Province, or small groups could move into new territories already occupied and coalesce with the group there, as did other groups when they became part of the Kordshuli. If we consider the territory under control or use by the Kordshuli as a bounded system, then these alternatives often lead out of the system, as would sedentarization. Even when moving into new areas, occupied or not, the same pressures will eventually come to bear on the group. These processes could conceivably continue until marginal lands were saturated and there was no additional territory to occupy. Then, the only viable alternative would be sedentarization. This is, in effect, what has happened with government control of the nomads and of all unoccupied lands. Expansion, fissioning, and warfare have lost their viability as possible options. Figure 7.3 shows the effect of this governmental control. Even short term "solutions"--reallocation of tribal pastures and extra-tribal seasonal pasture usage--have been closed off. Although the nomads were given usufruct rights to their traditional eilaq and qeshlaq, they lost the flexibility to move into other areas if conditions were poor. Also, Entezamat, in order to keep track of the nomads, maintains



FIGURE 7.3 Population flow with increased State control

a record of the identity and number of households in each area. Thus, although some individual households might be able to use extra-sectional pastures, there is no way to balance total group use.

Therefore, in general terms, sedentarization becomes the only viable option for decreasing population density as State control increases. This is not meant to imply, at this point, that sedentarization will necessarily occur as population density increases. Rather, sedentarization, by decreasing population density and actual population, allows the continuance of the temporal and spatial parameters of population growth without putting undue stress on the system, stress which would otherwise affect production (i.e., the welfare of the flock). Yet, even as sedentarization sloughs off (excess) population from the system, continued agricultural encroachment on pasture land continually puts pressure on those remaining by increasing effective population density. If density reaches a point (certainly below saturation point) where productivity declines because of the increased possibility and occurrence of overgrazing, disease, effects of drought, etc., then others may sedentarize because of the increased difficulty of "doing" pastoralism. As we shall see, with greater disperal and, yet, still greater labor needs, few nomads desire to maintain their nomadic lifestyle.

Within this general framework of increasing State control, it is possible to see how political constraints

have affected the nomads' ability to interact effectively with their environment, both natural and cultural. It would seem that in the past in southern Iran, as part of the coalescing/fractionalizing process, group fission was used effectively to distribute human and animal populations over an extensive and, generally, ecologically continuous zone, while fusion helped maintain the integrity of the group by placing it wholly within a larger grouping which could mitigate the effects of natural and cultural adversity.

In this area of southern Iran there are six possible organizational forms, hierarchically ordered on the basis of increasing complexity: huneh, beileh, oulad, tireh, taifeh, and il (household, camp, descent group, section, tribe, and confederacy). All of these organizational forms are not present in all groups and there exists some confusion over the use of some of these terms. The Kordshuli do not use the term oulad and, although they admit to having had that organizational level within the tireh level, it was never a separate form.

The coalescing or fusion of two or more of these groups can take place at two levels. First, any two or more units of equivalent complexity may coalesce to form the next higher level (e.g., two or more huneh may form a beileh, two or more taifeh may form an il). Secondly, any unit smaller than the confederacy level may attach itself to a larger (i.e., more complex) unit. However, in order to do so, it must first become part of the next higher unit

within the larger grouping. That is, a huneh can join a beileh, tireh, taifeh or an il but it must do so at each consecutive level. To join a confederacy, it must join a camp which may be part of a section which is part of a tribe of that confederacy.

The ability of groups to consolidate in these ways, however, has effectively been stopped by the State. The flexible cultural boundaries that once existed have given way to the inflexible boundaries imposed by the government.

More importantly, for the Kordshuli, the fractionalizing process that had allowed many households and groups to fission off from the larger group has also been closed off except in the direction of sedentarization. This fractionalization or fission could have been brought on by a number of factors, including decreasing external or extra-tribal hostilities, increasing internal hostilities, and increasing population density, which may relate directly to the other two factors. Historically, one can see that many groups coalesced for defense of pastures and protection from other groups, but when conditions improved some of these groups would split off to become independent again, as the Kordshuli did from the Qashqa'i. One reason for the commencement of hostility could be increased regional population density, which could limit access to adequate pastures. There are still quarrels over rights to pastures, especially those in garm-e sir (warm regions), but with government control the nature of the conflict is usually

limited to verbal duels.

Intra-group conflict could also lead to fissioning. Although this could involve a group the size of an oulad, it more likely would be households or small camp groups that would move on to greener pastures. It is also likely that in this case the conflict may be a function of increased population density, either of the entire group or sectionally, since the sections were assigned a specific territory. There are a number of cases where intra-sectional conflict has led to a household moving into another section's territory and attaching itself to that group with the approval of the headman and the chief.

As population density increases it may become more difficult to find adequate pastures for the entire group, especially in dry years. This certainly could lead to sedentarization by impoverishment for some, but it could also lead to group fission within the nomadic sphere as some of the smaller units seek pastures elsewhere, perhaps coalescing with others already in the new area. It is not unlikely that intra- and inter-group conflict will increase as pasture accessibility decreases or as pasture conditions decline with greater population density in the region.

Thus, the fractionalizing/coalescing process has also become unidirectional. Groups can no longer use consolidation as a means of coping with adverse conditions, since the government has defined the territory within which each small group may attempt to maintain its pastoral adaptation. The

fissioning process used to be adaptational and cyclical within the nomadic sector. Now, fractionalization can, and does, occur, but without access to new pasture areas, sedentarization is the only route that these splinter groups can take (Figure 7.4). A general point to be made is that an analysis like Barth's fails to take into consideration some major processes which are important for understanding change.

Within the group, the change in leadership roles as a response to State control have already been discussed in chapter five. The changes are diagrammatically summarized in the chapter in Figure 5.1. The point to be made is that although some kadkhodas and the kalantar may continue to act as economic mediators in terms of loans, land purchases, and the like, they no longer can function effectively as political mediators since this is now dependent on government recognition and control. However, with the narrowing migration route, the likelihood of conflict situations arising between nomads and sedentary cultivators increases. Previously, the kalantar or kadkhoda had the means to care for his own flock while still representing a "constituent" in court or helping to come to an equitable settlement in conflict situations. The average nomad, as Barth points out, would find this difficult:

> The farmer's community and land are stationary; though his crops require attention, they readily survive a week's neglect. The nomad camp must move, for the sake of the herds; so to remain a member of his community the nomad can at most linger one or two days in any locality. His property cannot be left in the charge



FIGURE 7.4 Fission and fusion of Kordshuli organizational units

> of "neighbors", since it requires many hours of work each day to move it with the camp; his flocks are held together only by his constant shepherding, so his whole means of livelihood will be lost by a single day's neglect (1961: 78).

The Kordshuli would say that Barth's statement is a bit extreme since it is often not that difficult for the camp to stay on in one area for a few extra days and have a friend or relative help with the flock. This is true, though, of a camp group larger than two tents. With greater protection from thieves and enemies because of governmental control, the larger camp groups of a couple of decades ago have broken down into smaller, more dispersed units. At the same time, however, it has become more difficult to find needed labor when the household head is drawn away from the tent for whatever reason. He can no longer leave the tents and flock in order to participate in the urban judicial system when conflict arises without endangering his livelihood. That is, labor sharing has decreased due to smaller, more dispersed camp groups, so it is difficult to receive adequate representation in court should a conflict arise with sedentary folk. This is, similarly, becoming the case for many kadkhodas. Without adequate knowledge or sophistication, the average nomad is left with the predicament of perhaps trying to face the judicial system of the State by himself, while somehow trying to maintain his flocks. Many of the Kordshuli would say that the effort is not worthwhile and that sedentarization solves the problem.

The preceding analysis is not meant to imply that sedentarization is a necessary outcome of increased State control. Rather, it means that sedentarization becomes the only viable option for those nomads who are forced out of or desire to quit the system (i.e., Kordshuli nomadic pastoralism), for whatever reason. Also, sedentarization continues to function as one means of maintaining demographic balance. The main point is that the political shifts are part of a series of events that are negatively affecting the ability of the Kordshuli nomad to main a migratory existence. State control has not only affected the flexibility of boundaries but also has lead to an erosion of power within the Kordshuli. This shift in power relations not only threatens group unity but also has made the task of interaction between nomads and sedentary populations more difficult by undermining or elminating the mediator role which was held in the past by the tribal elite. Nomadic pastoralism for the Kordshuli has not only become more difficult physically, in terms of the actual difficulty of moving flocks and caravan, but also more difficult behaviorally, in terms of the options available to and the constraints imposed upon the Kordshuli.

Impact of Economic Shifts

Increasing State control has not only affected the political nature of the group but also has had dire ramifications for the economic well-being of the Kordshuli. Many of the reasons for the shift to "middle range"

sedentarization and the increase in sedentarization, generally, has been the increased level of State control over resources. Land reform, rangeland control, and the formation of the tribal gendarmarie post (Entezamat) had far reaching effects on the ability of the nomads to maintain their lifestyle.

The Land Reform Law of January 1963 and its additional articles in the following year, as well as later amendments, did not provide for seasonal pasture use by pastoral nomads. Land distribution was supposed to be based on permanent occupancy, a criterion which migrating pastoralists could not meet. While the Kordshuli did not have to face the extreme difficulties that other groups did (e.g, the Qashqa'i, who cultivated in both summer and winter pasture areas), there were still problems created by the improper administration of the program, especially along the migration route and in winter pastures. Because of the number of Kordshuli who were already settled in summer pastures, the loss of cultivated plots to non-Kordshuli, as occurred among Qashqa'i, was not the major factor that it was in other tribal areas. Beck points out for the Qashqa'i that "because the non-Qashqa'i cultivators were settled and close to the news media, they knew of the scheduling and operation of land reform and were the first to register the land in their own names" (1978: 7).

Many land owners tried to add to their holdings by skirting the law. Certain types of land, such as gardens,

mechanized agricultural lands, and lands with motorized pump wells, were exempt from land reform and many landowners tried to indicate prior usage based on these criteria.

> Especially detrimental . . . was the rush by the wealthy landowners to buy tractors or other agricultural machinery and quickly work large tracts of land by mechanized means, using wage laborers. This was not in accord with the law, and much of this land was not theirs even by customary right. But due to . . . migrations, . . . these practices went largely unnoticed until it was too late. The land was then titled to those who had made the effort to mechanize. Much of this land was plowed but never planted, even to this day. With vegetation and topsoil turned under, wind erosion works quickly, and pasturage is destroyed (Beck 1978: 8).

Many of the traditional pastures along the migration route as well as in some areas of Kordshuli winter pastures have suffered this degradation. Land reform resulted in many traditional pasturelands being turned into less productive, or non-productive, agricultural lands. Beck (1978) and Fazel (1971) see the same processes occurring within Qashqa'i and Boyr Ahmad territories. This loss of valuable pastureland coupled with restrictions by the government on other pastureland makes it increasingly difficult for the Kordshuli to provide for their flocks. It also limits the amount of available land for the whole group, thus putting more pressures and the threat of destruction by overgrazing on those remaining areas.

Another factor which greatly affected the ability of the Kordshuli to maintain their flocks was the Forest and Range Nationalization Act of 1963. Most of the uncultivated rangeland, including most traditional pasture areas,

of the Kordshuli, became government property. Much of this land was declared to be national preserves and the nomads were not permitted to use or cross through these areas, while other areas were open to limited access only. However, because the Forest and Range Organization of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was given responsibility for the control and allocation of national rangelands, believes that range-management regulations on the original users are unenforceable, the improved rangelands have not been reopened for use (Beck 1978: 9). Katouzian, writing on the problems this control has for agricultural expansion, accurately points out that the process has gone too far:

> the decision to nationalize pastures drastically reduced the chances of expansion even within settled agriculture. The discouraging effect was due not so much to the letter of the policy as to its application. Nationalisation of pastures may have been a wise policy for the maintenance of their long-term fertility as well as supervision over the use and allocation of this agricultural (and pastoral) resource. What in practice happened was not nationalisation in that sense, but expropriation and exclusion (1978: 367; parentheses mine).

Similar changes occurred some years ago around Shiraz, forcing some of the sections of the Kordshuli to drastically alter their traditional migration route, thus putting them in closer proximity to the Basseri with whom the Kordshuli had a hostile relationship. This shift coupled with agricultural expansion, which I will discuss below, reduced the available land for migration and lowered the survival chances for the flocks during lean years. The government did assign traditional pastures to the various

sections but, usually, based only on as they were during a good year (i.e., with adequate rainfall and pastures). The normal adaptation of pastoral nomads includes being able to expand past their flexible boundaries when environmental circumstances demand. These shifts also account for the coalescing of different groups throughout the region. With the flexibility of these boundaries diminished or eliminated by government control, available land for expansion is also reduced, and dry years may lead to extreme reduction in flock size. Many of the Kordshuli lost up to 80 percent of their flock during the prolonged drought of 1962-1964.

Although it would seem that the nomads are free to roam in and out of protected areas because of the difficulty of continuous governmental observation, this is not the case. Throughout most of the migration route, the rural gendarmarie posts try to keep an eye on the nomads. When the nomads go further afield into the mountainous regions, there are sporadic checks by officials and representatives of the Department of the Environment and other government agencies. At some particularly critical points where the nomads have to be "reminded" of which areas they may actually use, it is not uncommon to see government representatives clarifying sanctioned routes. Also, in certain protected areas where the nomads have limited access, there are often wandering representatives making sure that live wood is not being used for firewood and that the goats are not destroying trees in the region.

At the same time that the government is limiting land use along parts of the migration route, agricultural landowners also continue to encroach upon traditional pasture areas. Prior to effective State control, even with the beginning of agricultural expansion based on improved technology, the nomads had more than enough room to meet the migration needs of a pastoral existence. Now, however, they are being hemmed in from both sides and migration is becoming more difficult, especially for large- and middle-range flock owners. With government land on one side, agricultural land on the other, and other tribes and tirehs in front of and behind them, the Kordshuli realize the increased possibility of overgrazing and that there is a real possibility that there will be inadequate pasturage during dry years.

Part of the reason for the substantial increase in agricultural land use has been the introduction of better technology, the implementation of some projects by local governments, and the State's support of agriculture. Traditionally, the usual method of providing water for irrigation was based on the ganat system, a series of underground channels that work to bring subsurface water above ground. Now, many farms in summer pastures and most along the migration route and in winter pastures depend on motorized pumps to draw water. Most of these pumps are hand-started pumps from Great Britain which can bring water up from the ever-decreasing water table for irrigation as well as for flocks of sheep and goats. These pumps have allowed some

agriculturalists to expand the amount of land under cultivation, of which some, in the past, was considered too marginal for adequate agricultural productivity. It is indeed the case that sometimes the water requirements of this new parcel of land may be working against the whole future of agriculture in the region since, with improper irrigation techniques, the amount of water wasted threatens to lower the water table to a less than useable level in the near future. Also, with increased agricultural potential in the region there is always the chance of further settlement buildup thus increasing the number of families engaged in agricultural activities who are expanding into pasture areas.

Within the area of winter pastures there have also been some developments which may in the long run eliminate more pasture areas from those available for the Kordshuli. A number of sections of the Kordshuli are centered around the village of Mobarakabad, southwest of the market center of Jahrom. North of the village, the nomads are severely limited in land use, being forced to camp in the foothills or over the mountains in the next small valley. The flat plain is almost all agricultural land, some of it not yet highly developed. South of the village, though, much of the open plain is accessible to the nomads and they spend both a part of late autumn and a part of late winter or early spring grazing along this plain with only daily trips into the lower foothills with the animals. Some of this land

used by the Kordshuli has in the past been cultivated, but with marketing difficulties much was left to fallow. While I was in the area, however, the road between Mobarakabad and Jahrom was widened and resurfaced, making it not only easier but also cheaper to get produce to the market. It may be expected, then, that much of the land that in the past was left to fallow will once again be developed agriculturally and much of the accessible lowland pasturage will not be available for use by the nomads. The agricultural potential of this area can be seen in recommendations made to the Plan and Budget Organization by a French consulting firm. They expect much greater agricultural development in the area (Scetiran 1977).

Another reason for agricultural expansion throughout the region is that the central government is often more willing to help agriculturalists develop a piece of land, both through the use of subsidies and by, implicitly, making agriculture a more profitable venture than pastoralism. This is similar to the processes at work among the Qashqa'i: "the prices . . . for pastoral products rose slower than the demands for and amounts of land rents, bribes to government officials, agricultural and consumer products, and urban and travel expenses, largely because of inflation, imports of meats and dairy products under protective tariffs, and government-subsidized meat and dairy prices" (Beck 1980: 341-342).

With this increased cultivation and encroachment on traditional pastures, it is more likely that conflict situations will arise and that they will be decided more often in the agriculturalist's favor as it becomes harder to keep the nomad's animals out of the planted fields.

While these factors, primarily related to land use and availability, have worked to lessen the desirability of nomadic pastoralism as an acceptable lifestyle, other factors, primarily access to luxury goods and town-based services, have worked to make a settled existence more attractive to the nomad. Amanolahi's study of sedentarized Basseri in Marvdasht, a major market city north of Shiraz, shows that 20 percent of his informants settled because of the "comforts of city life," (i.e., "electricity, access to shops, entertainment, variety of foods, recreation and access to hospitals and perceived luxuries)(1976: 12).

While it is more common for the Kordshuli to complain about the difficulties of a nomadic pastoral existence, many also express the positive nature of settlement. Many young men want to have motorcycles and tape cassette/radios. Those who have them as nomads point out the difficulty of transporting them during migration. Many women have expressed the desire to settle for more direct access to shops and to health care facilities. Amanolahi also cites "education for children" and "the opportunity for a better job" as additional "pull factors" drawing the nomads to the city (1976: 11).

I have noted in the preceding sections how a multiplicity of factors can affect any given nomadic pastoral household. That is, how decreasing pastureland, a breakdown in group unity, the perceived advantage of access to luxury goods, and the like, can and have directed many nomads towards sedentarization. Implicit in this, though, is a systemic explanation which includes an important economic component as well as the political component which I discussed in the previous section. In this latter case, it was shown that, because of the direction of change in the political domain, sedentarization becomes the only viable option for leaving the system represented by the pastoral nomadic community called Kordshuli. Why, though, has this option become more acceptable or necessary? In general, it may be said that the changes in the environment of the Kordshuli have brought about a 'contradiction' (defined by Friedman [1974] as "the limits of functional compatibility") between the forces of production and the social relations of production. This 'contradiction' may be summarized in two sets of statements, one of which relates to the actual state of Kordshuli organization, the other to the systemic implications.

1. Prior to effective State control: There was more available land for pastures and less agricultural land. Thus, labor needs could be met by individual households; it was not difficult to find pastures, nor was it difficult to avoid planted fields. However, the group was largely coalesced for defense so additional, albeit unnecessary, labor was available.

2. With increased State control: Agricultural expansion, as well as nationalization of pastures, etc., made land for pasture use less available. However, labor needs increased as it became harder to find adequate pastures while avoiding cultivated fields with flocks and pack animals. But, increased governmental control of rural areas has allowed camp groups to disperse into smaller units better adapted to the natural environment (i.e., units which are better able to avoid the effects of localized drought and disease), so that additional labor when needed is scarce or unavailable.

That is, from point 2 above, as land scarcity increases, pastoral nomadic labor needs intensify, and pastoral productivity decreases since flock size and pastoral productivity are dependent on available pasture resources. However, additional labor may help to increase productivity. If additional labor is unavailable because of the traditional organization and social relations of production of the society (rather than because of the lack of any real labor source), then the difficulty of maintaining an adequate level of productivity for the household is increased.

This implies that a disjunction between productivity and labor arises which necessitates a change in either the social relations of production or in the value system of the group if 'system breakdown' (in this case, sedentarization) is to be avoided. This disjunction sets up a further contradiction between the relations of production and the superstructure (i.e., in this case, the value system of the Kordshuli). That is, a value system which focusses on the primacy of the independent household does not mesh with the changed natural and cultural environmental conditions.

Prior to the current political situation, which includes effective State control, the various tribes and sub-tribes were organized into large camp groups for defense, protection, and continued access to pasture land. Yet, this organization, while adaptive in terms of the

cultural environment, did not allow for efficient use of the natural environment. Access to pasturage was limited for a given localized nomadic group as population continued to increase and as cultural boundaries effectively inhibited expansion. These constrained areas, then, became subject to possible overgrazing as well as to the effects of localized drought, disease, and predation.

However, with increased State control and better security in the rural areas the large camp groups broke up into smaller units which could utilize the natural environment more effectively. This allowed the nomads to more closely realize their cultural ideal of the independent, self-sufficient household. The Kordshuli generally dispersed into camps of one, two, or three tent households. This is not to imply that the independent household is necessarily the most efficient adaptation. In fact, it is likely that a camp group of five or so tents would be better able to provide for the labor needs of the entire camp and still effectively utilize the sparse yet extensive pastures that characterize Kordshuli territory. Thus, the retention of this cultural ideal has worked unfavorably for the Kordshuli in terms of the changed cultural environment. State control means that access to most natural resources is beyond the direct control of the nomads. For the Kordshuli to maintain their lifestyle, or at least to lessen the difficulties inherent in the recent changes in their environment, it would require their realizing that

independent households, the ideal notwithstanding, cannot continue to function effectively as land scarcity increases. Sanford (quoted in Beck 1978: 40), points out that the Forest and Range Organization favors the formation of cooperatives or corporations "to whom large blocks of grazing land can be allocated on a fixed-term contract subject to specific development (investment) and operating (. . . approved range management practices) conditions." That is, individual households are being selected against while larger groups are favored: "in future allocations of licenses to use both improved and unimproved grazing land these corporations will be given favored treatment; and it appears that individuals or pastoral societies that refuse or are slow to form corporations may lose their present grazing permits."

From my conversations and interviews with the Kordshuli, it would seem that they are generally unwilling to modify the nature of their labor organization. That is, they still think it is improper not to herd their own flocks (unless it is herded by a close relative--a member of the nuclear family, or at most of the extended family unit). It seems likely that were the Kordshuli to form cooperative herding units or to hire shepherds, many more of them would be able to maintain a pastoral nomadic existence for some time to come. A major reason given for not attempting these possible solutions is because of the cultural importance of the ideal of the independent, self-sufficient household. To

be unable to herd one's own flock implies, to most Kordshuli, an inability to be an adequate Kordshuli household head. While some have chosen the route of forming dispersed economic households, it is noteworthy that these partnerships are within family groups only, unlike the agro-pastoral combines of the Lurs (Black 1972) or even the minimal herding units of the Basseri (Barth 1961).

Without changing the nature of their organizational patterns the Kordshuli have even fewer options available as circumstances continue to worsen and sedentarization, if not a chosen goal, becomes forced on them as their way of life becomes maladapted to the changing environment.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study had as its goal three primary objectives: 1) to add to the ethnographic literature on pastoral nomads; 2) to discuss the process of sedentarization in light of Barth's commonly accepted yet inadequate model;[1] and 3) to identify causal factors of change and increased sedentarization among the Kordshuli. The first objective should not require further statement. The latter two, however, will be summarized briefly both in terms of directions of research and in terms of the conclusions reached. In these summary statements I will refer only to the most salient points; a fuller explanation of all analytical points is to be found in the body of the dissertation.

Barth's Model of Sedentarization

Barth's (1961, 1964) model of sedentarization has been widely accepted in the anthropological literature on nomadic pastoralism and, thus, whether intended or not, has served as a general model of the sedentarization process. His major point is that extreme capital accumulation (initially in the form of animals) and extreme capital loss lead naturally to the elimination of wealthy and impoverished pastoralists from the nomadic community (i.e., to

sedentarization). Thus, sedentarization is used to explain both social/economic homogeneity within the group and the demographic balance of the total tribal population in the region.

Much of the critique of Barth's model is directed at those aspects of the model which are based on the concept and consequences of capital accumulation. Apart from the criticism of the internal contradictory remarks in Barth's work, there are also a number of criticisms based on Barth's assumptions about pastoral capital and pastoral nomadic values. Barth's primary assumptions seem to focus on the idea that economic rationality involves seeking greater marginal profits. That is, when the rate of productivity of the flock decreases then the nomad invests in land because of the increased security and greater marginal profits. An implication of his approach is that there exists an "upper crisis zone" within which the accumulation of wealth accelerates and leads the nomad to invest in more and more land until this investment becomes so great that the nomad is drawn into a sedentary existence. Barth says that this does not happen as frequently as it might because there are factors which serve to inhibit the accumulation of wealth: accidental capital loss; differential consumption rates and the diversion of labor from pastoral production; accelerated division of household and capital; polygyny and the inheritance of "too large" shares of pastoral wealth. I point out that these factors do not inhibit wealth to any

great degree among the Kordshuli and, in fact, the Kordshuli strive to maximize flock growth within the constraints created by culturally available labor sources. It is more plausible that there exists greater wealth differentiation among the Basseri than Barth assumes.

I make the point that the "upper crisis zone" does not exist as such. Rather, a zone of increased options is created in which the wealthy nomad may make individual decisions regarding directions of productive labor and investment. Certainly, the wealthy nomad may choose to transform pastoral capital into other forms but the choice to settle, I argue, is not based on the accumulation of wealth, per se, but rather that sedentarization, as one option among many, is made easier by prior wealth in land.

I also discuss the "failure and fall-away" model which is based on the loss of capital. That is, as capital productivity decreases with loss of animals, the nomad is drawn into a downward spiral which eventually leads him to sedentarize. It is not surprising that nomads who fail to maintain the level of productivity required for a pastoral nomadic existence must quit this lifestyle.

One of the more general problems with Barth's model is that Barth fails to place sedentarization within the total cultural context of the Basseri. He does not, for example, consider cultural values (e.g., the importance of the flock and the maintenance of a nomadic existence), as critical variables in his attempt to explain what he

perceives as primarily economic concerns. Nor does he consider the social and political decisions that individual households may make regarding sedentarization (e.g., settling when other nomads do even though flock size is still within the range of viable productivity). "Economic rationality" is not explicable only in terms of profit margins and investment practices. Barth tends to equate rational behavior with strategic behavior thereby inhibiting an examination of the institutional framework of change and adaptation. Perhaps this approach would be more applicable or, at least, justified if the Basseri were fully integrated into a capitalist system. However, one must question the application of a model of strategic action and transactional analysis derived from the field of economics to a pastoral nomadic group that is only partially integrated into the wider capitalist system. Certainly, there are implicit directions to inquiry within any discipline which may disallow the formation of many different types of questions. The point is that there are implicit constraints in any approach which must at least be addressed if validity is to be assumed, at some level, for the stated conclusions. Barth, it seems, failed to consider these constraints.

Another analytical difficulty inherent in Barth's model is that, at least implicitly, it presents sedentarization as an absolute and irreversible process. While Barth does briefly note in his study that some settled nomads do indeed begin to migrate again, he fails to incorporate

this fact into his model. Sedentarization is not seen as a temporary fluctuation of a larger oscillating nomadism/sedentism cycle which may occur as a result of shifting cultural and natural environmental influences. Also, Barth views sedentarization only as the complete abandonment of migratory behavior, rather than as a relative shift in the degree of nomadism to the degree of sedentism. Thus, Barth is not able to consider variations in the sedentarization process (e.g., dispersed economic households, marginal nomadism, and group sedentarization). Nor can he explain the shift to "middle range" (i.e., nomads with neither too large nor too small flocks) sedentarization, which has become the pattern for the Kordshuli.

Barth's model, then, is not only inadequate, in many ways, for explaining the sedentarization process of the Basseri (and Kordshuli) of 20 years ago, it also cannot take into account the social, economic, and poltical shifts over time which have resulted in an increased rate of sedentarization for many pastoral nomad groups in, at least, southern Iran.

The "adaptation and response" model (Salzman 1980), while still requiring greater elaboration, addresses many of the major concerns mentioned. However, it also seems too externally directed (i.e., it may not deal directly with constraints placed on the system by specific social organizational features or by certain pastoral nomadic values). Still, it allows for a wider range of variation in the

manifestations of sedentarization than does Barth's model, as well as for a greater awareness of the fact that many of the factors which may direct (however actively) many nomads toward a more sedentary existence are, in fact, reversible. This is not to imply that irreversible change does not occur. In the context of this dissertation, the general conclusions reached were based largely on the assumed irreversibility of the effects of a powerful and, seemingly, unshakeable governmental structure. As I will comment further below, the recent revolution in Iran and the collapse of the Shah's regime has increased the number of options available to nomads who wish to remain mobile, while decreasing the desirability of a sedentary existence, at least, for the moment.

Change and Sedentarization among the Kordshuli

The general conclusion reached in this study is that sedentarization, for the Kordshuli, seems, in many ways, inevitable. In the face of major changes in the political and economic structures of the Kordshuli and of the larger State, the survival options of the average nomadic Kordshuli household have diminished. The small groups which continue to be in evidence as the larger tribal and confederacy organizational units break down under the effects of increasingly effective State control are left with few alternatives: attempt to remain nomadic under increasingly difficult conditions or settle down.

Most of these increasingly difficult conditions have resulted from the deposition of the kalantar (chief) of the Kordshuli (and of other tribal leaders in the region) in the late 1950s as well as from the restrictions placed on access to resources, either directly by the nationalization of pastures or indirectly by the governmental promotion of agricultural development.

Politically, the deposition of the kalantar has led to an effective political division of the taifeh (tribe). The government's recognition of the kadkhoda (headman) of each tireh (section) as the official representative of that small group has tended to create quasi-tribal groups with quasi-autonomous leaders thus undermining the unity and solidarity of the larger collectivity. Indeed, the tirehs, as political units, have increased in importance while the kadkhodas have taken on, in limited fashion, many of the traditional functions of the traditional kalantar (e.g., the role of political mediator, some control over migration, increased responsibility for conscription, entertainment, etc.).

Even with these increased functions, the unity of these small groups is also threatened by the increased dispersal of household units throughout Kordshuli territory allowed by increasing rural security. That is, the kadkhoda has fewer face-to-face contacts with tireh members, as do tireh members with each other. Despite this stress, the unity of the group should be maintained for some time

because of the retention of social processes (e.g., marriage), which serve to solidify ties within the tireh.

Under the leadership of the afsar-e Entezamat (Disciplinary Officer), the unity of the larger group was, at least, nominally and administratively maintained. In terms of interaction, the unity of the group at this point is more a function of territoriality and spatial proximity, as well as of the continued identification by most nomads with the larger collectivity, than of political or economic integration. With the dissolution of Entezamat in 1976, it is expected that the separation and dispersal of the group will intensify and even nominal identification with the larger group, Kordshuli, will decrease as access to resources becomes more dependent on the tireh or on the independent household.

At a more general level, the historical processes of political development, which functioned through processes of consolidation and fragmentation of nomadic groups, have essentially ceased under the impact of the Shah's government. Traditionally, when pressure on resources increased, either because of internal growth or external encroachment, sedentarization was but one of a number of options to help alleviate environmental stress; nomadic groups could also seek virgin territory, take territory from others, or jointly use already occupied territory. Increased State control has eliminated these latter options leaving only sedentarization as a viable option for coping with increasing

pressure on and constrained access to resources.

This constrained access to resources has been exacerbated by governmental programs leading to land reform and the nationalization of rangeland, as well as by increased agricultural development with its concomitant encroachment on traditional pastureland. These limitations on pasture availability not only make the semi-annual migration more difficult, but also increase the risk of conflict with sedentary agriculturalists. Also, it is expected that much of the pastureland utilized in summer and winter areas will be developed agriculturally, further limiting access to available pastures and thus, making the adaptation even more difficult to maintain. Many Kordshuli have expressed the desire to settle, not because of a dislike of nomadism, but because of the difficulty involved in moving animals through the migration route.

While the above mentioned factors have lessened the desirability of nomadic pastoralism as an acceptable lifestyle, other factors such as access to luxury goods and town-based services make a sedentary existence more attractive to the nomad.

At a higher level of abstraction, the limited options available to the Kordshuli are not only the result of external constraints but also reflect the contradiction that obtains between the forces of production and the social relations of production. Certainly, in any pastoral society access to labor within the herd-owner's family or from other

culturally acceptable sources is vital. One major goal in the pastoral strategy is to achieve a balance between the available labor force and the flock (cf. Dahl 1979: 273). The labor that was available to nomadic camps was greater in the past when camp groups were larger; however, with more pasture land available and fewer constraints on migration, most households could meet their own labor needs. As increased State control allowed for the dispersal of large camp groups by increasing rural security, it also limited access to traditional pastures, as did agricultural expansion. However, the traditional social relations of production, which are based on the cultural value of the primacy of the independent, self-sufficient household, do not function adaptively to maintain pastoral nomadism as a viable lifestyle in the face of increasing labor needs and decreasing availability of land. Without changing organizational patterns and, perhaps, their value system, the Kordshuli have limited options as environmental circumstances worsen. Thus, sedentarization, if not a desired change, will be forced on most, as nomadic pastoralism as practiced by the Kordshuli becomes maladapted to the changing environment.

Further Considerations

Many of the factors which led to my conclusion that sedentarization was seemingly inevitable for the Kordshuli were based on an assumption of the stability and maintenance of the Shah of Iran's regime, as well as on the continuation of the economic and political programs instituted by that

government. While I accepted the idea of reversibility of most factors which may lead to sedentarization, I did not bring this issue to bear on the possibility of changes in the state-level political apparatus. It seemed, at the time of my research, unlikely that any major shifts in the central government would or could occur in the coming decade.

However, in 1978-1979, a revolution in Iran overthrew the shah and has replaced his government with one organized around the conservative precepts of Shiite Islam, at least as espoused by the Ayatollah Khomeini. As a result of this turn of events, my conclusion on the inevitability, under certain circumstances, of sedentarization for the Kordshuli is uncertain since the change is no longer directly observable. I would contend, though, that had the revolution not occurred the majority of Kordshuli would have been settled within a decade and the group, at all levels, would have had little meaningful significance.

The effects of the revolution have had great impact on the tribes of Iran. The following extensive quotation from Lois Beck, who was able to see first hand some of these effects on the Qashqa'i whom she visited in September 1979, shows how some pastoral nomads have responded to the changes in State level political organization:

> With loss of government control, tribes are again asserting their autonomy and, in particular, their rights to use traditional pastures. Land reform and pasture nationalization, which had great detrimental effects on nomadic pastoralists, are associated with the now-regarded illegal and illegitimate regime of the shah and many individuals and groups are reclaiming their

> land . . . Many nomads who had severed their connections with the land have now returned, many who had sedentarized are back on the migrations and most of those who sought urban wage labor have returned to the mountains.
>
> Relations of production--such as those between nomads and moneylenders, or between hired shepherds and employers--have also rapidly changed. With the Islamic Republic's appearance, interest-taking was forbidden and religious authorities enforced the nomads' demands that their debts be renegotiated so that only the actual value of borrowed goods and money needed to be repaid. Many nomads were then able to discharge their total debts in the new regime's first months. In the absence of government control and in light of the great national demand for meat, many poor and middle-range Qashqa'i are now able to assume economic independence. Pressure on land was the major factor creating differential access to it; once the pressure is decreased--as it is under current revoluntionary conditions--former pastoralists can easily locate pastures for their flocks. What will happen as government control gradually reasserts itself is not clear (1980: 348-349).

It should be expected that the Kordshuli have been responding as the Qashqa'i have so that many nomads who have recently settled will once again begin to migrate and many nomads who were likely to settle in the near future may now remain nomadic until future changes make pastoral nomadism less desirable.

Certainly, as Beck has pointed out, we can not know what will happen as the Islamic government slowly overcomes the political and economic problems brought on by the revolution and once again begins to reassert control in the rural areas. However, it is not unlikely that, without a major shift in government policy in terms of the use of marginal environments, the same constraints on the nomads will once again develop, making nomadic pastoralism a difficult and undesirable activity. To further the goals of

the revolution, which include making Iran more politically and economically independent, the government would do well to consider the fact that some form of pastoral nomadism or transhumance is needed to effectively exploit the rangeland of Iran (which comprises approximately 75 percent of the total land area of the country). Otherwise, it would seem that Iran will again face the problem of not being able to produce enough food to feed its own inhabitants.

The revolution in Iran, if it has shown little else, has at least shown how the nomadic adaptation functions, and has functioned throughout history, in response to higher level political change. As central governments and controlling regimes are undermined or overthrown, controls on mobility are lessened and nomadism becomes increasingly viable for a growing segment of the population. The sedentism/nomadism cycle in southern Iran has not yet become unidirectional and, in fact, may not if the central government works to improve and thereby perpetuate some form of extensive animal husbandry. Only time will show us the long-range effects of the recent changes.

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

Kordshuli words occurring on more than one page and not always glossed in the text.

afsar-e Entezamat: Disciplinary Officer; see Entezamat

'Arab: a tribe in southern Iran; part of the Khamseh confederacy

Basseri: a tribe in southern Iran; part of the Khamseh confederacy

beileh: camp group, usually two to four tent households

chador: Kordshuli winter tent

dung: one sixth of any piece of real estate

dust: trading partner; friend

eilaq: summer pasture area

Entezamat: short for qaragah-ye Entezamat, the government-created gendarme post in charge of tribal affairs headed by the afsar-e Entezamat

garm-e sir: warm region; the area of lowland winter pastures

hajir: Kordshuli summer tent

hamsayeh: neighbor; a person in the same camp (beileh) but in a different tent

huneh: house, tent household

il: confederation of tribes, united under a paramount chief (khan)

kadkhoda: headman of a tireh or of a village

kalantar: chief of a taifeh (tribe)

kashk: dried and rolled milk curds

Khamseh: a confederation of tribes in southern Iran including the Kordshuli, Basseri and 'Arab

khan: chief; either paramount chief of an il or the title of address given to any male member of the tribal elite

khavanin: plural of khan; refers to all members of the chief's immediate and collateral family; essentially, tribal elite

lataf: sections of tent made of woven goat hair

mahr: Islamic deferred dower

ojaq: hearth; firepit

pasgah: army or gendarme (rural security forces) post

qaragah-ye Entezamat: see Entezamat

Qashqa'i: one of the largest confederations of tribes in Iran; located in southern Iran, primarily Fars Province

Qeshlaq: winter pasture area

rah-e kuch: migration route

sarhad: cold region; the area of highland summer pastures

taifeh: tribe, united under a kalantar

tireh: section of a taifeh; a quasi-descent group united under a kadkhoda

vatan: homeland; for the Kordshuli the area which they consider their own territory in sarhad

yort: campsite

zesht: ugly; said of any thing or act that is considered inappropriate

zesht-e: "it is ugly"; see zesht

NOTES

NOTES

Chapter One

1. Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms pastoral nomadism, nomadic pastoralism, nomadism and pastoralism interchangeably. Although it is desirable sometimes to separate the productive regime (pastoralism) from the factor of mobility (nomadism), the adaptation of the Kordshuli and the subsequent changes in it largely are concerned with both aspects of that lifestyle.

2. It is perhaps easier to view this continuum as an oscillating pendulum rather than as a linear model where nomadism and sedentism are conceptualized visually as periodic oscillatory shifts rather than as polar opposites.

3. The actual Persian plural of most Persian words is rarely used; most plurals are indicated by context or by the addition of an "s".

Chapter Two

1. The northern and southern zones are also known as sardsir and garmsir by other groups.

Chapter Four

1. One woman who had married a relative in a different section would often sit alone outside the front of their tent while her husband was away and loudly lament the fact that none of her close kin were around either to talk with or to offer support to her in the event of a domestic quarrel.

2. Actually, it is possible to view residence as also being uxorilocal, since it is common for both husband and wife to come from the same tireh.

Chapter Five

1. The use of this title may not have been applied to the leader of the Kordshuli until they were part of the Qashqa'i confederacy.

2. While power struggles of this kind are not really part of the oral history of the Kordshuli, many Kordshuli think it likely that they did indeed exist.

3. This is not meant to imply total equality since wealth differentiation does exist. Rather, there is a major separation between the khavanin (chiefs) and the rest of the nomads. Differentiation of any kadkhoda from others in this latter group would be for reasons other than political position. Black (1972) notes the problem of analytical egalitarianism in another Iranian group.

Chapter Six

1. This section, of course, occurred in a different historical period than the one being discussed, but the general process is similar enough to allow the comparison.

Chapter Seven

1. Rosman and Rubel (1976) note one variation of this form of economic household unit where brothers annually reverse the role of farmer and herder.

Chapter Eight

1. It should be mentioned that Barth has presented a more recent model (1973) that attempts to show better the range of variation that exists along a nomadic/sedentary continuum. While the paper does not address itself directly to sedentarization it does provide a more adequate portrayal of differences in resource utilization in a given region.

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