ENFQWL GRQUPS “‘5 THE LEGESLATWE PROCESS:
A STUBY OF THE MCHIGAN HOUSE
OF REPRE$ENTATNES

Thesis for tha [Degree of Ph. D.
MKHlGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Stephen V. Monsma
1965

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thesis entitled ‘3
INFORIAIAL GROUPS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A STUDY
OF THE MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

presented by

Stephen V. Monsma

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

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0-169

ABSTRACT

INFORMAL GROUPS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
A STUDY OF THE MICHIGAN HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES

by Stephen V. Monsma

The study examined certain functions performed by
informal groups--both primary and secondary--in the
legislative process and several possible bases for the
formation of informal groups. Several hypotheses were
formulated and tested in the 1964 session of the Michigan
House of Representatives. Published data and data
gathered through systematic interviewing of 105 of the 110
members of the House were used in testing the hypotheses.

It was found that identifiable primary and secondary
informal groups existed within the House, and that these
groups possessed distinctive characteristics. Among these
characteristics were the smaller size, the greater
internal cohesion, and the fewer ties with members outside
the groups shown by primary groups. The evidence also
indicated that the informal groups increased the co-
hesiveness of certain outputs of their members: roll call

voting, perceptions of the rules of the game, and role

STEPHEN V. MONSMA
orientations. The two—party groups were an exception to
this-—in their case there was little or no discernible
effect. In the case of roll call voting, the effect was
greater for partisan than nonpartisan issues. However,
contrary to expectations, the secondary groups tended to
have a greater effect than the primary groups had.

There were also indications that the informal
groups served as sources of information for their
members, and aided in the process of negotiation and the
formation of coalitions. However, the evidence for these
findings was indirect and lacked precision.

It was also found that personal backgrounds,
physical closeness in the seating arrangement on the
floor of the House, partisan allegiance, attraction to
certain leaders, Opinions and attitudes, and constituency
characteristics all tended to serve as bases for the
informal groups. Primary and two-party groups tended to
rest on the first two bases (personal factors) and the
secondary and one-party groups tended to rest on the
last four bases (political factors). Thus it was found
that the groups which tended to rest upon personal
factors were the same ones which tended to have re-
latively weak cohesion in outputs; the groups which
tended to rest upon political factors were the same
groups which tended to have relatively strong cohesion in

outputs.

INFORMAL GROUPS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
A STUDY OF THE MICHIGAN HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES

By

‘—\

Stephen Vi Monsma

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1965

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many individuals to whom I am indebted for
the help they gave me in my preparing and writing this
dissertation. Without their help I am sure that this
study never could have been completed.

I would especially like to thank Professors Robert
Scigliano, Joseph Schlesinger, Charles Press, and James
McKee of Michigan State University. It was Professor
Scigliano who first stimulated my interest in legislative
research, who contributed ideas at almost every stage of
the study, and who carefully read the first draft and
suggested many improvements. Professor Schlesinger gave
much help in the vital, early stages of formulating and
thinking through the problem that was studied. Professor
Press contributed many useful ideas, especially in
increasing my understanding of the Michigan House of
Representatives. And Professor McKee was particularly
helpful in guiding my explorations into the fields of
group dynamics and small group research.

I must also give my thanks to the members of the
1963-64 Michigan House of Representatives for their
willingness to submit to what must have seemed like an
endless stream of questions. Without their cooperation
and frankness this study could not have been made.

ii

Finally, I owe my thanks to my wife, Mary, whose
valuable help in typing was overshadowed in importance by
her constant encouragement.

The responsibility for all errors of fact and

interpretation is, of course, my own.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

LIST OF
LIST OF
LIST OF
Chapter
I.

II.

III.

IV.

TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FIGURES . . . . . . .

APPENDICES

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Statement of the Problem. .
The Social System . . . . . .
The Legislative System . . . . .

PREVIOUS RESEARCH.

Small Group Research . .

Inputs for Legislative Systems. .
Informal Groups and Legislative Research
Hypotheses . . .

INFORMAL GROUPS IN THE MICHIGAN HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: AN OVERVIEW . .

The Tools Used . .

The Michigan House of Representatives
Primary and Secondary Choices: An Overview
The Informal Group Structure: An Overview.

THE FUNCTIONS OF INFORMAL GROUPS.
Informal Groups and Legislative Outputs.
Informal Groups and Sources of Information.

Informal Groups and Legislative
Negotiations . . .

THE BASES OF INFORMAL GROUPS

Introduction.
Personal Characteristics.

iv

Page
ii
vi

vii
viii

O‘\UOl-’ l—'

58

60
61
66
85
104

10“
131

13U
135

135
136

Political Characteristics
Cohesiveness of Outputs and the Bases of
Informal Groups.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH.

Summary . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusions.
Suggestions for Further Research.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

APPENDICES

*T’
5—4 DE
On) CO
0 \ (D

t—J
C‘s
LA)

165
165
166
168
172

177

Table
3.1
302

3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7

4.3

4.4

5.5

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Reciprocal Choices . . . . . . . . . . 69
Index of Potential Attractiveness and Choices

Received . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Primary Groups . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Cohesiveness of Primary Groups . . . . . . 91
Secondary Groups. . . . . . . . . . . 95
Cohesiveness of Secondary Groups . . . . . 99
Choices Received, Group Membership, and Index

of Potential Attractiveness . . . . . . lOl
Informal Group Membership and the Index of

Agreement on the Rules of the Game. . . . lll
Informal Group Membership and the Index of

Agreement on Role Orientations . . . . . ll9
Informal Groups Membership and the Index of

Voting Agreement. . . . . . . . . . 124
Informal Group Membership and the Index of

Voting Agreement by Subject Area . . . . 128
Party Indices of Voting Agreement . . . . . 131
Purposes of Conversations. . . . . . . . I32
Informal Group Membership and the Index of

Similarity in Backgrounds. . . . . . . 138
The Leader Orientation of Informal Groups . . 1A3

TheLeader Orientation of Informal Groups. . . 1A9

Informal Group Membership and the Index of
Similar Opinions. . . . . . . . . . 152

'Informal Group Membership and the Index of

Similar Constituencies. . . . . . . . 156
vi

Figure

wwwwwww

.1:

CDNOUI

LIST OF FIGURES

Primary Choices Made Per Member

Intra—Party and CrossmParty Primary Choices .
Primary Choices Received Per Member.

Primary and Secondary Choices Made
Intra—Party and Cross-Party Secondary Choices
Primary and Secondary Choices Received.
Multigroup Membership

Group Size, Cohesion, and Outside Connections

vii

Page

Appendix
A.

B
C
D.
E

LIST OF APPENDICES

THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

INDICES USED IN THE STUDY
IDENTIFYING THE INFORMAL GROUPS
RULES OF THE GAME AND SANCTIONS

INDICES OF ALL INFORMAL GROUPS

viii

Page
178
185
202
206
210

CHAPTER I

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Statement of the Problem

From the time man is born into a family to the time
he dies he is involved in formal organizations composed of
individuals occupying clearly defined positions of authority
or subservience. This is especially true in modern, western
society where to obtain recreation one joins a fish and
game club, to defend one's country one Joins (perhaps invol-
untarily) the armed forces, and to earn a livelihood one
joins a corporation. Western society seems to be marked
by the almost universal presencecfl‘highly structured
organizations.

Yet sociologists have found that within these formal,
highly structured organizations informal patterns of inter-
action tend to arise. This has been found to be the case
in the armed forces, factories, offices, and communities.1

This has led some political scientists to inquire whether

informal groups play an important role in formal political

 

1See Chapter II for a discussion of these findings.

organizations also.2 Given the demonstrated relevance of
informal groups within a wide variety of other formal
organizations, it is surprising that relatively little
empirical research has dealt with informal groups in the
political process.

The legislative process is one area where group
research gives promise of being able to offer theories and
hypotheses, but where there have been few efforts to
deveIOp and test hypotheses.3 It must be recognized, of
course, that a legislature is a particular organization,
with some very distinctive characteristics, so that what
group research has found to exist in other organizations
cannot be immediately assumed or even hypothesized to
exist within legislatures. The possible presence of
strong party and constituency influences are Just two of
these distinctive characteristics. Yet the mass of evidence
group researchers have collected very definitely indicates
that informal groups at least exist within legislatures
and do perform certain functions. Therefore, this problem
was formulated for investigation and study: what are the

bases of informal groups and their functions in the

 

2See, for example, Sidney Verba, Small Groups and
Political Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961).

 

 

3For a discussion of the few studies that have
attempted to do so see Chapter II.

decision—making process of legislative systems? The rest
of this chapter presents the conceptual framework within

which this problem was studied.

The Social System

 

In order to construct a conceptual framework for the
study of informal groups within legislatures, it is help-
ful to consider Parsons and Shils' concept of social
systems.

A social system is a system of the actions of indivi-
duals, the principal units of which are roles and
constellations of roles. It is a system of differen-
tiated actions, organized into a system of differen—
tiated roles. Internal differentiation, which is a
fundamental prOperty of all systems requires integra—
tion. It is a condition of the existence of the
system that the differentiated roles must be coordin—
ated either negatively, in the sense of the avoidance
of disruptive interference with each other, or
positively, in the sense of contributing to the
realization of certain shared collective goals through
collaborated activity.“

Central to Parsons and Shils' concept of the social
system is the concept of role——roles and patterns of
interacting roles form the principal units of social

5

systems. Parsons and Shils define role as follows:
"The role is that organized sector of an actor's orientation

which constitutes and defines his participation in an

 

interactive process. It involves a set of complementary
uTalcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a
General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

 

University Press, 1959), p. 197.

5Ibid., pp. 23 and 190.

expectations concerning his own actions and those of others

6

with whom he interacts." When an individual comes into
contact with other persons in certain situations, he
develops a pattern of expectations in regard to how he
ought to behave and.how the other persons ought to
behave towards him. Thus one individual may play several
different roles, switching roles as he moves from one
interactive situation to another.7
These roles of individuals are marked by differentia-
tion and integration. The different individuals have
different roles to play within a social system. "The
different individual actors participating in the social
system will each have different roles, and they will
accordingly differ in their specific goals and cOOperative
orientation."8 But a social system is not merely an assort-
ment of differentiated roles; instead these roles are
integrated with each other. This means that the roles will
not be in such conflict as to disrupt the interaction of

the individual actors, but instead will aid in the attain—

ment of certain goals that the social system as a whole has.

 

Ibid., p. 23.

 

7For an excellent explanation of the concept of roles
see Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander w. McEachern,
Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1958), Chapter II.

8Parsons and Shils, 0p. cit., p. 196.

Parsons and Shils also distinguish between a total
social system and subsystems, which are found within a
total social system.

A total social system which, for practical purposes,
may be treated as self—subsistent-—which, in other
words, contains within approximately the boundaries
defined by membership all the functional mechanisms
required for its maintenance as a system-~is here
called a society. Any other is a subsystem of a
society.9

Thus three conceptual levels emerge—-the individual,
with his roles; the total social system, or the society,
of which the individual is a part; and various subsystems
that fall between the individual's roles and the total
social system. The subsystems have all the marks of a
total social system, except they do not possess within
their membership all the requisites for their continual
existence as a social system--to some extent they are
dependent upon some other social system.10

One further elaboration of Parsons' conceptualiza-
tion of social systems if necessary. This is the con—
cept of there being a flow of inputs and outputs, such as

demands, expectations, and decisions, between the units

of a social system, and between the social system and its

 

91bid.

10Parsons and Shils also speak of personality systems,
below individual actors' roles, and cultural systems,
above total social systems. However, these have little
relevance to present purposes, and therefore it is not
necessary to be concerned with them here. See ibid.,
pp. 54-56.

 

environment. This flow if inputs and outputs is what con-
stitutes process within a social system, such as a
decision-making process or a support generating process.

Process in a system must be conceived as a process

of interchanging inputs andoutputs between units
(subsystems) of the system on the one hand, and
between the system, through the agency of its units,
and its environment on the other. There is thus a
"flow" of such inputsand outputs as between all pairs
of classes of units, whether the relation be internal
or external. 1

The Legislative System

 

This framework can be applied with profit to the
study of legislative behavior. The political system can
be conceptualized as a subsystem within a society's
total social system, if it is defined as the subsystem
that authoritatively allocates values for a society.12
The political system would be conceptualized as consisting
of patterns of interacting roles (either of individuals
as individual actors or of individuals as members of other

subsystems) that are differentiated and integrated. The

roles of the state legislator, the state department

 

llTalcott Parsons, "Some Considerations on the
Theory of Social Change," Rural Sociology, XXVI (September,
1961), p. 224.

12See David Easton, The Political System (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 129. For a discussion of the
pQIitical system as a subsystem of a society's total —__
social system see ibid., pp. 97—98; and Gabriel A. Almond,
"Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Politics,
XVIII (1956), pp. 391—409.

 

 

administrative officer, and the Supreme Court Justice are
differentiated, but are also integrated into the total
political system.

One of the subsustems within the political system is
the legislative system; at least this would be the case
in modern, liberal-democratic political systems. For
again there is a pattern of interacting roles that are
differentiated and integrated. The basic unit of analysis
of a legislative system would be the roles of individual
actors in the legislative system. These would include not
only the roles of the legislators, but also the roles of
lobbyists, professional staff, clerks, and others.

There also would, no doubt, be subsystems within the
legislative system. The houses of the legislature (if it
is bicameral), formal committees, and party groups are all
possible subsystems. These subsystems are linked together
by means of inputs and outputs, such as demands, debates,
and roll call votes, which also link the legislative
system to the political system and to the society as a
whole.

A simplified example can be based on the British
legislative system. The House of Lords, the House of
Commons, the Parliamentary Conservative Party, the Parlia—
mentary Labor Party, the cabinet, the shadow cabinet, and
the members of the tOp hierarchy of various ministries

could all be considered subsystems of the general legislative

system. Inputs come into, say, the cabinet from various
sources--backbenchers, the party's annual conference,
the ministries, the shadow cabinet, and other such
sources-—in the form of demands for certain actions.
These are discussed and decisions are made within the
cabinet. These decisions come out as outputs and become
inputs when they reach the M.P. within the parliamentary
party as demands to vote certain ways on various issues.

John C. Wahlke and his associates used a theoretical
framework of this type in their study of four state
legislatures. They summarize the chief characteristics
of this type of theoretical model in this fashion:

It is through the input—output transactions that
subsystems are coupled to constitute a whole
system--in our case the legislative system (as a
whole, itself a subsystem of the political system).
Outputs from one system are "fed back" as inputs

into another system and generate fresh outputs

from that system. The process through which inputs
are transformed into outputs is, of course, at the
core of inquiry into what is usually called "the
legislative process." In this process, however, the
legislature's own needs for maintenance and survival
make for characteristic outputs as well. Legisla-
tive behavior, therefore, is not simply a response

to "pressure" brought to bear on the legislature from
outside (inputs), but involves absorption of these
pressures and their integration with the legislature's
own needs before they are "processed" into outputs.

 

l3Jonn c. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan,
and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explora-
tions in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1962), p. 382. For the authors' deVeIOpment of
this concept see ibid., pp. 377-83.

Thus the various demands that are made upon the
legislature enter at various points as inputs. These move
from one subsystem to another, changing from inputs to
outputs, and are modified and combined with other inputs
as they move from subsystem to subsystem. These inputs
must be thought of as arising both outside of and within
the legislative system. Finally outputs emerge as the
outputs of the total legislative system and become inputs
for the political system and the society as a whole. The
legislative decisionvmaking process consists of this
process, by which inputs are changed into outputs (both in
terms of the legislative system as a whole and the sub—
systems that comprise it).lu

It is in the light of this model that informal
groups within legislative systems were studied. Particular
attention was placed upon the theoretical conception of
the legislative decision—making process described in the

previous paragraph, and the part informal groups play in

this process.

 

1“It should be recognized that some interchanging
of inputs and outputs is not part of the decision-making
process. A letter from a legislator to a constituent
helping him in some dealing with the government bureau—
cracy must be considered an output, and the process leading
up to it must be analyzed in terms of the framework Just
constructed; but it is not part of the decision—making
process.

CHAPTER II

PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Small Group Research

"Politics are peOple." The truth of this well known
and often quoted saying has been generally accepted, but
until recently many of its implications were ignored by
those engaged in political research. In the past much
political research acted as though politics were codes of
law, formal institutions, and formal procedures. However,
more recently political scientists have come to concen-
trate upon peOple who are involved in politics, and have
studied political phenomena in terms of the political
actors.1 This has led the political scientist to become
concerned with some of the theories and findings of socio-
logy and psychology, for these disciplines have made many
significant contributions to the understanding of man and
his behavior. Much of this knowledge that sociology and
psychology have built up has relevance to man as a political
actor, and therefore is very helpful in understanding

political processes.

 

1This is part of what is generally called the behav—
ioral approach to the study of politics. See Evron M.
Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on
Traditional Political Science," in Austin Ranney, ed.,
Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 12.

 

lO

11

As was noted in the previous chapter, one area where
sociology and psychology have developed theories and a
body of knowledge that has great relevance for the study
of legislative behavior is that of group interaction.

This section of the chapter first of all defines the
various types of groups that group research has been con-
cerned with, and then discusses some of the findings of
group research that are relevant to a consideration of
legislative behavior. The existence of groups within
social systems, the functions that these groups have been
found to perform, and the bases for the formation of

groups, will be discussed.

Definitions.-—The term "group" has been defined

 

as pluralities "of individuals who are in contact with

one another, who take one another into accout, and who

are aware of some significant commonality."2 The key
features of a group are that (1) it is composed of two or
more individuals, (2) who are in contact with each other,
(3) take each other into consideration, and (4) are aware
of having something in common which they perceive as

being important. Groups varying from a husband and wife
to a labor union would fall within the bounds of a defini—

tion such as this. Clearly, more precise types of groups

must be delineated.

 

2Michael S. Olmsted, The Small Group (New York:
Random House, 1959), p. 21.

 

12

The "small group" is a term frequently used, and has
been at the center of much research.

A small group is defined as any number of persons
engaged in interaction with each other in a single
facevto-face meeting or a series of such meetings, in
which each member receives some impression or percep-
tion of each other member distinct enough so that he
can, either at the time or in later questioning, give
some reaction to each of the others as an individual
person, even though it is only to recall that the
other person was present.

A small group is distinguished from simply a group
in that the members (1) are in face—to—face contact with
each other and (2) are aware of each other as distinct
individuals. The size of groups that can fit this
definition has been found to range from two up to about
twenty.“ Groups fitting this definition include groups
artificially created in a laboratory situation, legislative
committees, family units, and office cliques.

Another common distinction made in group research

5 Informal

is that between formal and informal groups.
groups can be distinguished from formal groups in that
(1) they do not have formal rules guiding their internal

Operation, and (2) they are not legally or formally provided

 

3Robert F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cam-
bridge: Addison—Wesley Press, Inc., 1950), p. 33.

“See Verba, 0p. cit., p. 12 and Olmsted, 0p. cit.,
pp. 22-23.

5See the discussion of ibid., pp. 13—15.

l3

for as parts of the larger organizations of which they are
parts. The following discussion will concentrate upon
theories and findings in regard to informal small groups,
since it is these that were studied in the context of the
legislative system.

But another crucial distinction remains to be made--
that of primary groups and secondary groups. It is
difficult to delineate clearly between primary and second-
ary groups, and some groups no doubt occupy the grey area
between the two. However, primary groups are generally
marked by the members having "warm, intimate, and ‘per-
sonal' ties with one another; their solidarity is unself—
conscious, a matter of sentiment rather than calculation."6
Cooley lists three types of primary groups which he
believes are universally found: the family, play groups
among children, and informal associations among elders.7
Almost all primary groups are also small groups (a monastery
where the members live in love and intimacy may be an
exception), and most will be informal, although some,
such as a hierarchical family, may be considered formal.

Affective group is another tern often used to denote

basically the same thing as primary group.

 

Ibid., p. 17.

 

7Charles H. Cooley, ”Primary Groups," in Paul A.
Hare, Edgar F. Bargatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds., Small
Groups: Studies in Social Interaction (New York: Alfred

Knopf. 1955). pp. 15-20.

 

13

for as parts of the larger organizations of which they are
parts. The following discussion will concentrate upon
theories and findings in regard to informal small groups,
since it is these that were studied in the context of the
legislative system.

But another crucial distinction remains to be made—-
that of primary groups and secondary groups. It is
difficult to delineate clearly between primary and second-
ary groups, and some groups no doubt occupy the grey area
between the two. However, primary groups are generally
marked by the members having "warm, intimate, and 'per-
sonal' ties with one another; their solidarity is unself-
conscious, a matter of sentiment rather than calculation."6
Cooley lists three types of primary groups which he
believes are universally found: the family, play groups
among children, and informal associations among elders.7
Almost all primary groups are also small groups (a monastery
where the members live in love and intimacy may be an
exception), and most will be informal, although some,
such as a hierarchical family, may be considered formal.

Affective group is another tern often used to denote

basically the same thing as primary group.

 

6Ibid., p. 17.

 

7Charles H. Cooley, ”Primary Groups," in Paul A.
Hare, Edgar F. Bargatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds., Small
Groups: Studies in Social Interaction (New York: Alfred
KnOpf. 1955). pp. 15-20.

 

14

In contrast to primary groups there are secondary
groups. Relations among secondary group members are marked
by being "'cool,' impersonal, rational, contractual, and
formal. People participate not as whole personalities

8 Included

but only in delimited and special capacities.”
within secondary groups would be a professional associa—
tion, a Congressional committee, and a group of business
executives who meet informally to exchange ideas. Second-
ary groups may be either large or small groups; most will
be formal groups, but some will be informal, as the last
one in the examples above. Instrumental or task-oriented
groups are other terms used to describe approximately the
same type of group called secondary here.

The following discussion will be concerned with
both secondary and primary informal, small groups. Parti-
cular attention will be paid to informal small groups
within larger, formal organizations, since informal
groups within legislative systems is the subject of this
study. There will also be an emphasis upon primary
groups, instead of secondary groups, simply because very

little research has been done on informal secondary groups.

The existence of informal groups.-~The discovery, or

 

"rediscovery" as it is usually called, of the importance

of informal, and especially primary, small groups within

 

8Olmsted, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

15

larger organizations is a rather recent develOpment in
social science.9 Since the 1930's small groups have been
found to play significant roles in area after area. One
of the earliest studies that came across the importance
of the primary group within larger, formal organizations

was the now famous Hawthorne studies.lo

Six girls

were placed in a separate room of a Western Electric fac-
tory, assembling radio relays, and were subjected to
varying working conditions in order to determine the
effect of the various working conditions upon produc-
tivity. To the surprise of the researchers, no matter

how the working conditions were varied, and even when they
were returned to the original ones; worker output continued
to increase. Further study revealed that a team spirit
had deveIOped among the six girls because of the novelty
and challenge of the experimental situation. This led

the researchers to ask whether perhaps similar informal

interaction existed in the rest of the plant, even without

an artificial experimental situation. Further studies

 

9For a historical overview of the "rediscovery" of
primary groups and the develOpment of primary group research
see Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group? in
Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, The Policy Sciences
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 44-69.

10This account is based on the report by George C.
Homans, "Group Factors in Worker Productivity," in Eleanor
E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartly,
Readings in Social Psychology (3rd ed.; New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1958), pp. 583—95.

 

16

in the plant revealed that there were informal groups
present among the workers that primarily functioned to pro-
tect the workers from management. Social pressure within
the groups was used,for example, in order to prevent one
from working too hard (a "rate buster") or from not working
hard enough (a "chisler"). In short, informal primary
groups were found within the larger organization of the
factory and they played a significant role in the pro—
cesses of the factory.

A second formal organization within which informal
groups were found to play a significant role was the army.
During World War II an extensive study of the attitudes

11 Again

of soldiers in the American army was conducted.
and again primary groups were found to be important in
influencing the attitudes or actions of the soldiers.

They helped keep the men going in tough combat situations,
they gave the men the motive for fighting, and they
influenced morale. In all of these, however, it was

found that primary groups operated in conjunction with

other factors such as tacit patriotism and political

ideals. Thus researchers again came across a formal

 

llSee Samuel A. Stauffer, et al., The American Soldier:
Studies in Social Psychology (Vols. I and II, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1949). The account given here
is based upon Edward A. Shils, "Primary Groups in the Ameri-
can Army," in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld,
Studies in the Sc0pe and Method of "The American Soldier"
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 16:39.

 

17

organization with informal groups within it, affecting the
functioning of the formal organization. But it must be
pointed out that the informal groups acted in conjunction
with, and within the bounds set by factors such as ideals,
patriotism, and feelings of obligation.

Communications research has also demonstrated the
existence and importance of informal groups. Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet, in their 1940 Erie County study,
found that mass media apparently had very little effect
upon the Opinions and attitudes of the people.12 They
found personal contacts were a much more important source
of influence and information. But they also found that
the opinion leaders-—those who talked to others about the
1940 election—-paid more attention to the mass media than
the rest of the population did. The authors therefore
formulated the "two—step flow Of communication" hypothesis,
i.e., "that ideas often flow £33m radio and print :2 the
opinion leaders and £32m them to the less active sections

"13

Of the populations. In short, a network of informal

groups would be crucial in communication.

 

12Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel
Gaudet, The People's Choice (2nd ed., New York: Columbia
University Press, 1948). Especially Chapter 16.

 

l3Ibid., p. 151. Emphasis present.

 

18

Other studies have tended to substantiate this
hypothesis and to emphasize generally the importance of
informal networks, based on face—to-face contacts, in the
communication of information and the exercise of in—
fluence.lu Although informal groups may not be as
structured nor have the continuity in this area that they
do in the other areas noted, informal small groups once
again seem to play a significant role in a larger
organization (this time in the social structure of the
community).15

This leaves the question Of secondary groups—-is
there any evidence that informal secondary groups exist
within larger, formal organizations? The evidence is far
from conclusive, but there is some evidence which seems
to indicate that they do exist. In experimental small
groups Bales demonstrated that persons named by the other
members of the group as being best-liked (a quality closely
associated with primary groups), usually did not corres—

pond tO the persons possessing certain leadership

 

1“See, for example, Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld,

Personal Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955).

 

15For other areas in which informal primary groups
were found see W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, The Social
Life of a Modern Community (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1941), George C. Romans, "The Cash Posters: A
Study of a Group of Working Girls," The American Sociolo-
gical Review, XIX (December, 1954), pp. 724-33, William
Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society, (2nd ed; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1955), and Leon Festinger,
Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back, Social Pressures in
Informal Groups (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. ‘ '
|

qualities}6 The leadership qualities were initiating
interactions and receiving interactions, as measured by
observation, and sharing the best ideas and doing the
most to guide the discussion, as determined by question-
naires filled in by the group members. "It is apparent
that the Best—Liked role is the most specialized, in the
sense that the man playing this role is least likely to
play another role simultaneously.”17 The conclusion is
that there is a "tendency towards incompatibility between
sociometric stardom and instrumental leadership."l8
This suggests (1) that primary groups (based on mutual
affection) and secondary groups (based on leadership
qualities) may bOth exist, and not necessarily coincide,
within larger organizations, and (2) that being well

liked and being a member of a primary group may not

)

nece

(I

-sarily lead to influence and power.

The fungtlons or informal group=.——This still leaves

 

the question of what indications small group research
gives in regard to the functions that informal small
groups perform within larger organizations. Out of the

many functions that small group research suggests, the

 

i6Talcott Parsons, Ropert F. Bales, and Edward A.
Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe:

The Free Press, 1953), pp. 140-61.
J“7min. , p. 152.

lalbid., p. 160.

 

20

two general types that have the most relevance for legis-
lative systems will be discussed: influencing attitudes,
Opinions, and behavior; and communicating information.
Festinger, Schachter, and Back conducted an impres—
sive study that deals with two college married housing
developments--one where the tenants were relatively new
and therefore where there had been no tinm.forinformal,
affective groups to develOp; and one where the tenants
had lived for some time, so that there had been time for
informal, affective groups to develop.19 The findings
tend to indicate that in the develOpment with recently
arrived tenants individual needs and preferences
played the dominant role in the tenants' attitudes toward
the college housing council, and in the other develOpment
with older tenants group standards were much more
important.
In Westgate West, where individuals were reacting
more or less independently in terms of their own
needs and preferences, we find a significant and
appreciable degree of relationship between how much
longer they expected to stay in the project and
whether or not they became active in the affairs of
the tenants' organization. In Westgate, group
influences were important. A major determinant
of an individual's activity was whether or not
others in his group were active. There was, conse—
quently, no relationship at all between how long one
expected to stay there, or how much benefit one would

derive from the organizational activities, and
whether or not one became active.

 

l98ee Festinger, Schachter, and Back, OE-_9£E'a
pp. 3—11 and 72—100.

20Ibid., p. 90.

21

In short, individuals' attitudes, Opinions, and even
behavior were being affected by group standards.

Asch conducted an impressive experimental study
that shows the ability of a group to change a person's

21 Asch set up 50 groups of

Opinion and his behavior.
eight persons each, and each person was to examine two
lines and then publicly state which he believed to

be longer. One line was so constituted as to be clearly
longer than the other. However, seven of the eight
members of each group were instructed beforehand to
state that the line which actually was the shorter one
was the longer one. The one "innocent" subject in

each group was observed to note his reaction to the
conflict between his senses and the unanimous opinion

of the others in his group. About one—fourth gave the
right answer every time, but about one-third gave the
wrong answer (agreeing with the others in their groups
and going against their own senses) over one—half of the
time. Asch divides the one-third that yielded over one-
half of the time into three categories. The first was

composed of those whose perception was distorted so that

they saw the line which actually was shorter as being

 

218. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the
Modification and Distortion Of Judgments," in Dorwin
Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Groungynamics: Research
and Theory (2nd ed.; Evanston: Row, Peterson, and
00., 1960), pp. 189—200.

 

 

22

longer. Only a few fell into this category. Others Judged
that their perception must be wrong and that the others must
be right. Most of the persons fell into this category.
Finally, some did not believe their perceptions were

wrong, but yet yielded simply to an overpowering feeling

of a need to conform, a fear of being all alone.

Asch has shown that even in a clear cut, unambiguous
situation many persons will go against what they see as being
correct, either changing their opinion or even changing
their behavior without changing their Opinion. It is also
important to note that experimental groups, where affective
bonds were not present, were used, suggesting that secon-
dary, as well as primary, groups can affect attitudes
and behavior.

One final study can be cited. A study by Siegel
and Siegel was based on the choices of women college
students to live in one of the Bow houses, which had high
prestige value, or in a non-Row house, which had no special
prestige value.22 Those who were to live in the Row houses
were selected by lot by the college out of those who had
applied. All who had applied to live in Row houses were
given tests before and after the school year in order to

determine the degree of authoritarianism of all the women.

 

2‘éAlberta E. Siegel and Sidney Siegel, "Reference
Groups, Membership Groups, and Attitude Change," in
Cartwright and Zander, Op. cit., pp. 232-40.

23

The results showed that at the end of the year the
women in Row houses were more authoritarian than those
who lived in non—Row houses, with those in non—Row houses
showing a significant change over the course of the year
and the women in Row houses showing very little change.
Again it appears that group membership does affect one's
attitudes.

There is little empirical evidence available on the
ability of groups to maintain attitudes and opinions. How-
ever, it is reasonable to assume that if group members A,
B, C, D, and E are able to change the attitude of F to con—
form to theirs, they would also be able to keep C from
deviating and abandoning the attitude of the group. It
should be noted that this is something different from the
entire group changing to some new opinion or attitude. "The

group context then, is like extra weight——it makes f r momen—

(J

H)

tum, as well as or inertia. And in the social world, as in

the physical world, bodies do not continie forever on the

. . . 2“
same path without being subJect to contrary forces " 3

Studies have shown that standards and behavior patterns

- . . 2A
of whOie groups can be changed under certain conditions.

 

23

2”See Kurt Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change,"

in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L.
Hartley, eds., Readings in Social Psychology (3rd ed.;

New York: Henry Holt, 1958), pp. 197—21l; and Jacob Levine
and John Butler, "Lecture v. Group Decision in Changing
Behavior," Journal of Applied Psychology, XXXVI (February,
1952), pp. 29—33. How applicable these findings are to
ongoing groups is questionable, however.

Olmsted, oo, cit”, p. 71.

 

24

In the Hawthorne studies discussed earlier workers
whose output was increased or decreased by group pressure
would be another example of behavior being affected by

informal groups. The American Soldier also demonstrates

 

that behavior can be affected by informal groups«eas was
noted earlier, readiness to fight and risk one's life was
greatly affected by primary group loyalties. In summary,
various studies have demonstrated that attitudes, Opinion,
and behavior can be significantly affected by a person's
membership in informal small groups.

Related to these functions is the function of pro-
viding for communication of information. Studies have
shown that informal groups serve as communication networks.
Festinger, Schachter, and Back report the transmission
of a rumor in a low rent housing project.25 The rumor
Spread to 62 per cent of those who had close friends in
the project, to 42 per cent of those who had only acquain-
tances in the project, and to 33 per cent of those who
claimed no friends at all in the project. The authors
conclude that: "Although the relationship obtained here
is far from perfect, the data certainly tend to support the
conclusion that friendships indicate active channels of
communication. The information did apparently tend to

flow along friendship lines.“6

 

25Festinger, Schachter, and Back, Op. cit., pp. 124—27.

Ibid., p. 126.

25

The authors studied the role of friendship groups
in the communication of information by planting two rumors
in the student housing projects discussed earlier.27
The spread of the rumors was studied to determine whether
they tended to follow friendship lines. The authors con—
cluded "that once a social group is formed the connec—
tions within it also function as channels of communication
along which information and Opinions flow."28 However,
other factors were also demonstrated to be relevant,
either stOpping the flow of information or causing infor-
mation to spread beyond friendship groups.

The communications studies discussed earlier also
indicate that networks of informal groups are important

a,

in the spread o1 information.

One concluding note to this section is that
different groups within a larger organization may perform
the same function in different subject areas, or different
groups may perform different functions.‘ The same group
will not necessarily perform different functions or even

the same function in different areas. A person may be

affected by one group in forming attitudes about for

 

27See 4bid 11“ ‘
a ., pp. -3l.

 

281bid., p. 130.

ngee Katz and Lazarsfeld, Op. cit., pp. 332—34.

26

whom to vote and another group in forming attitudes about

which moveies are best to see.

Bases of informal small gropps.——Small group studies

 

have demonstrated several different bases for the forma-
tion of informal groups. One is physical contact and prox—
imity. In the study by Festinger, Schachter and Back
mentioned previously the authors found, at least in a
homogeneous population such as they were studying, that
friendships and groups often grew up between persons who
lived close to each other or who frequently met because

of their location in relation to each other.30 "These
ecological factors determine not only specific friendships

l
”3 Homans also

but the composition of groups. . .as well.
reports that location and resulting physical contact is an
important determinant of social groups among cash posters
in an office.32 When a new girl was hired, she tended to
become friends with those working near her. However,
when she would later be moved, the original friendships
tended to persist, and new friendships were not formed

with those who were then near her.

 

3OFestinger, Schachter, and Back, Op. cit., pp. 35—
59. Also see Seymourrfl Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James
S. Coleman, Union Democracy (Glencoe: The Free Press,
1956), pp. 154—63.

31

32Homans, "The Cash Posters: A Study of a Group
of Working Girls," p. 729.

 

Festinger, Schachter, and Back, Op. cit., p. 58.

27

Homans also noted that there were some, but not
great, differences between the informal groups in back-
ground, attitudes, and interests.33 For example, one
group "contained a higher prOprotion of girls [than one
of the other groups] that lived in the suburbs of the
city——particularly the 'better' suburbsw—and they engaged
in what were, in their view somewhat more SOphisticated
activities."3u

Lipset, Trow, and Coleman found in their study of
the International Typographical Union that printers in
larger shOps, with wide Opportunities for friendship,
tended to form friendships on the basis of shared values
and sentiments, as well as similar status backgrounds.35
On the other hand, printers working in small shOps tended
to have more friendships outside of the shOp. The authors
eXplained this on the basis of persons not finding others
with similar interests and attitudes in their own small
shop, and as a result the seeking out of friends by means
of other contacts. This indicates that mere physical
proximity is not enough for the formation of primary
groups; common interests and attitudes are also very cru—

cial factors.

 

33Ibid., pp. 729-30.
3“Ibid., p. 729.

35See Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, pp. cit., pp. l7l-75.

The 1948 Elmira study f voting also demonstrates

C)

the importance of shared attitudes in the formation of
friendship groups. It was found that of the voters
interviewed, over one-half supported the same political
party as their three best friends, and only twenty-
five per cent had even one close friend from the oppo-
site party.36
Of course, in some OI
objected that perhaps the groups were formed on some
basis other than shared attitudes and values, and that
the group itself worked to create similar opinions and

e

U)

attitudes. It is difficult to establish clear cau

LU

and effect relationship here, although the demonstrated

U“:

relevance of status background in the Lipset and Homan‘

studies generally demonstrate that background, attitudes,

and opinions all do play a part in group formation. The
most plausible hypothesis is that a feedback process is

in action here, with attitudes and opinions aiding in
group formation and then the group acting on the atti-

tudes and opinions, causing even greater uniformity.

 

36Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William
N. McPhee, Votin (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1954 , pp. 93-101.

29

A final basis Of informal, small groups is certain
qualities that inhere in a person and enable him to gather

a group about him.37

Chowdhry and Newcomb have shown that
leaders (chosen by a sociometric test) are better able than
non-leaders to estimate group Opinion (i.e., of the larger,
formal group) on issues of high relevance to the group, but
are not superior on issues of little relevance to the
group.38 This was demonstrated to be true in a religious
group, a political group, a medical fraternity, and a
medical sorority. From this it can be concluded that
leaders are persons who are more perceptive and sensitive
to the Opinions and issues the larger organization is con-
cerned with.

Some persons may be able to rise to pOSitions of
leadership, with groups formed about them due to actual

39

or attributed expertise. They are looked upon as

)

valuable sourc~s of information and help.

I

(

 

57Newoomb has attempted to build a general theory of
attraction between individuals. See Theodore M. Newcomb,
”Varities of lnterpresonal Attraction," in Cartwright and
Zander, Op. cit., pp. 104-19.

38Kamla Chowdhry and Theodore M. Newcomb, "The
Relative Ability of Leaders and Non—Leaders to Estimate
Opinions of their own Group,” in Hare, Borgatta, and

Bales, Op. cit., pp. 235-45.

ngee John R. P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, "The
Bases of Social Power," in Cartwright and Zander, op. cit.,
pp. 620-621.

3O

Lippitt and his associates studied children in two
camps over an extended period of time.“0 Sociometric
tests and Observed behavior were used to obtain an index
Of attributed power. Those with high indices Of attri-
buted power (i.e., the leaders) tended to be high in
social activityenuiinteraction, to have physical super—
iority, to be superior in campcraft, and to be well liked.
In short, they possessed qualities that would be admired
and useful in a camp situation.

Finally, there is something that perhaps could simply
be called personal attractiveness or personal appeal.
Some individuals seem to possess certain personality
qualities, that attract certain other persons to them.
Social scientists have not yet completely broken such
attractiveness down into all its component parts, although

, 41
some of those Just mentioned no doubt enter in.

Conplusipns.—-On the basis of these findings of
group research, several conclusions or propositions
which have relevance for the study of informal groups in
legislative systems can be stated. These propositions

are based purely on group research, and therefore must

not be considered hypotheses suitable for testing in a

 

uoRonald Lippitt, Norman Palansky, Fritz Redl, and
Sidney Rosen, "The Dynamics of Power," in Cartwright and
Zander, Op. cit., pp. 745-65.

ulSee Newcomb, op. cit. and French and Raven,
op. cit., pp. 618-20.

31

legislative system. In the following sections of this
chapter these prOpositions will be considered in the light
of legislative research, and then will be reformulated
into hypotheses.
l. Both primary and secondary informal groups
exist within social systems, and these groups
are not coterminous.

the same iniormal group tend to:

(7*
r—+

2. Members

a. be situated near to each other physically,
and/or

b. have background characteristics, attitudes

and values in common, and/or

('3

be attracted by the iniormal group leader
who:
kl) can accurately analyze and Judge the

formal organization and/or

~ \
‘ ' ‘ '.

. f" ' '-~.r v. 17:. .. ”r V O i ' .- . «- rm
\C, lldb 8?.Eo.citlo'o .21 roizcr bt{.;...;s3 .‘.l.' a.

9.;
(I)
m
m

A

the group.

C
U)
(D
H
i

F

(‘7
(:3

3. Informal group membership influences the
members' attitudes, op*nions, and behavior
a. Different informal groups influence their
members' attitudes, Opinions, and behavior

in different areas.

32

b. Primary groups influence their members'
attitudes, Opinions, and behavior more
than secondary groups influence their

members'.“2

u. Informal group members serve as sources Of infor-

mation for other members of the same group.
Inputs for Legislative Systems

This section of the chapter presents findings of
legislative research that deal with the major sources
of inputs for legislative systems. The major sources of
inputs will be considered (both those originating outside
the legislative system and those originating within the
system), as well as their relative strength in influencing
outputs. In this way it is hOped the basic setting within
which informal legislative groups Operate and the major
forces that they work with will be shown. The discussion
will center upon five empirical studies that consider

major legislative inputs and their relative strengths.

Turner's ”Party and Constituency: Pressures on
Congress."--Julius Turner attempted through the use of roll

call analysis to determine the relative influence of party

 

“2There is very little direct evidence for this
proposition. It is based largely on the mass of evidence
pointing to the great significance of primary groups in
attitude formation.

LA,
LA)

. . . z A“
and constituency upon the behavior of congressmen. 3

He used Rice's index of cohesionuq to determine the amount
of cohesion the two parties showed on all the roll call
votes of the sessions studied. In order to discover the
impact of constituency pressures, he determined the amount
of division on roll call votes between congressmen from
metropolitan and rural districts, between congressmen
from predominantly foreign bornémnipredcminantly native
born districts, and between congressmen from districts
in one section of the nation and districts in other
sections. By means of the chi-square test, he determined
in each case whether or not the amount of division present
was significant.

Turner concluded that constituency pressures were
an important factor in roll call voting behavior——members
from districts that were differentiated by the three
characteristics he used showed significantly different
voting patterns. However, "with the completion of the
study of each selected factor in voting behavior, we turn

to party as the attribute most closely associated with a

 

u3Ju1ius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures
on Congress (Baltimore: VJohn HOpkins Press, 1951). This
study is based on the House sessions of 1921, 1930—31, 1937
and iguu.

uuFor a description of this index see Stuart A.
Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1928), pp. 208—209.

 

 

 

34

“3

roll call behaVior."

(I)

congressman' In short, both
constituency and party pressures were important in roll
call voting, but party pressures were more important than
constituency pressures. Put in terms of the conceptual
framework used in this study, both party and constituency
are sources of inputs, and of these two, party inputs
tend to predominate. But it should be noted that "con—
stituency inputs" is a rather nebulous term. Whether
constituency inputs consist of inputs originating for
constituency—based interest groups, shared attitudes and
beliefs of a constituency and its representative, or per“

ceived threat OI voter retaliation is not considered by

Turner.

MaoRae's study or the Massachusetts House of Repre—

sentatives.-—Duncan MaoRae also attempted to determine the

 

impact of constituency and party upon legislative

Ab

behavior. tud

(n

In his : of the 1931—52, igui and i95l

CI"

essions Of the Massachusetts House of Representatives,

(1‘

he determined the percentage of owner occupancy of the
dwelling units in each of the legislative districts, and

found that Democrats tended to come from low owner

 

u
5Turner,

 

240Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation between Roll
Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House
of Representatives," American Political Science Review,
XLVI (1952), pp. 1046—55.

 

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7Pertte Pesonen, ”Clos and Sale State Elections in
Massachusetts," Midwest Journal of Political Soien1e, VII
(February, 1963), pp. 53—70 A study by Th mas R. Dye f
the 1957 session of the PennsyLVanla Legislature is also
in general agreement With MaJRae's study. Sge Thomas R.
Dye,”A com parison of Consti‘uency Influences in Th» Upper
a.d Lower Chambers of a State legislaiure,” Western Politi
Quarterly, XIV (Jure isol), b73—80.

 

36

study, and indicates that what is true in the Congress may

be true in state legislatures as well.

Truman's "The Congressional Party."——David Truman

 

used bloc analysis in order to study the parties in the
Eighty—first Congress.48 He selected 296 roll call votes
(divided into four groups of 74 each) for each party in
the Senate, and 138 roll call votes (divided into one
group of 7a and one of approximately 64} for each party

in the House of Representatives. The groups of votes

were formed on the baois of the degree of party cohesion
as measured by Rice's index of cohesion, after eliminating

the votes with highest cohesion. On the basis oi these

*‘5

roll calls he computed the agreement score fo each pair

a

of legislators (taking eacn or his groups of roll calls
separately). Next by means of inspection, blocs were

formed with arbitrary cutting cif points being set as to

4—

the minimum number of agreements necessary in order to

. u‘ . y. .
have a bloc. 9 On the basis or thes b‘ocs Truman was

(I)

then able to reach conclusions concerning the parties'
solidarity, the basis of their divisions, and the in—

fluence of formal leaders and the President upon them.

 

\

uaDavid B. Truman, The Congressional Baggy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., l959).

 

ugFor a fuller description of Truman's methodology
see ibid., pp. 320—30.

37

is findings cast light on the existence and relative
importance of four different sources of legislative input--
party, constituency, formal leadership, and the chief
executive. He found that "the material drawn from these
sets of votes [in the Senate] points clearly to
differences between the parties on a wide range of sub-
stantive policy matters."50 Thus he tends to confirm
what Turner had found in his earlier study.
But of greater interest are the conclusicns Truman
reached in regard to sectional or regional (i.e., con—
stituency) influences as explanations for intraparty
divisions.
Superficially [in the Senate] the basis of the
intraparty cleavages, of these stable clusters, was
geographic or sectional, and regional differences in
economic activity, in attitude, and in political
tradition undoubtedly were relevant in their make-
up andijithe pattern of preferences. It is important
to bear in mind, however, that only one of the
identified blocs, the minority wing of the Democrats,
was regionally homogeneous. All the others were in
varying degrees intersectional, though several of them
drew their members disproportionately from one or
another major region.5

In short, as Turner had found, geographical influences do

seem to have an effect upon congressional voting, but they

are far from determinative and do not explain all the intra—

party cleavages. This is further confirmed by Truman's

 

50;g;g., p. 91. Truman found this to be true in the
House also. See ibid., p. 191.

Sllbid., p. 91.

38

finding that state delegations can apparently be influen—
tial groups in roll call voting.
strong tendency for senators from the same state to turn
up in the same bloc and to rank very close to one another
in that bloc."53

Truman spent a great deal of space discussing the
role of formal leaders. Generally, it can be said on the

basis of his findings that formal leaders within the

“.1

parties are significant sources of inputs or the other
legislators. One of the indications of the power of formal
leaders cited by Truman was that the majority leader in the
Senate more often than not was able to carry a majority

f his party with him when he and the chairman of the

committee that had considered a measure differed in their

H
4

UI

votes on that measure. The amount of power or influence

of leaders, however, wil vary from person to person, since

"the power of the Floor Lead

{~fi

he Hou

L..J

ff)

e

r‘ f.
To L11":

(Ii

apeils , e Jen

}—’

more clearly than in the Senate, as interstitia and personal

n55

rather than formal and authorized. But the amount of

influence a formal leader has also varies among the

 

52See ibid., pp. 2&9-69. This also, of course, has
implications in regard to informal groups in the legislature.

 

53Ib1d., p. 269.

BuSee ibid., pp. i39—1uu.

55Ibid., p. 2M5.

lo,-

33

different legislators. Truman fcund, for example, that
in the Democratic party in the House members who were
recently elected or were from electorally competitive
districts tended to be more closely aligned cn roll call
votes with Democratic floor leaders than were other
56
Democratic members.
Truman also reached the conclusion that the chief
executive was a very important influence in establishing
voting patterns and structures.
Nevertheless, one cannot escape the inference that
without the initiatives and the known program pre—
ferences of a President from the same electoral party
the distinctive features of the majority Congressional
party that have appeared here would not have existed
or would have emerged greatly modified from the com-
plexities of the legislative scene.57
In short, Truman documented (sometimes well and some—
times weakly) the existence of party, constituency, formal
leaders, and the chief executive as sources of legislative
input. And, Just as signiiicantly, he demonstrated that
these are not clearly distinct sources, but that they
intertwine and overlap. It is eSpecially difficult to
distinguish party and formal leadership inputs, or in the
case of the majority party, formal leadership, and chief
executive inputs. It is difficult to say anything about

the relative importance of these inputs, largely because of

their overlapping and intertwining nature.

 

56Ibid., pp. 210—219.

57Ibid., p. 286. Also see i id., pp. 286-308-

40

MacRae's "Dimensions of Congressional Voting."—-
Duncan MacRae used cumulative scaling in order to analyze
the roll call votes of the members of the House of Represen—
tatives of the Eighty-first Congress.58 His most important
findings, for present purposes, deal with the association
of certain constituency characteristics and the scale
positions of representatives. He characterized each of
the House districts in terms of the percentage of the pOva
lation that were managers or professionals (this was
used as a measure of the socio—economic status of the
districts) and percentage of farmers and farm laborers.

He found that the degree of association between
differing districts and their representatives' scale posi-
tions varied greatly, depending upon the region the district
was in, the party being considered, the scale being con—
sidered, and the degree of electoral competition in the
district. For example, he found that on the agriculture
scale for the Democrats "there was a fairly uniform asso—
ciation of congressmen's scores with the prOportion of
farmers in their districts, as might be eXpected. Only in

the South was there a departure from this relationship

."59 In regard to the foreign aid scale, there was

 

58Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

K)

59Ibid., p. 27

41

very little association between the Democrats' scale scores
and the occupational characteristics of their constituencies,
while for the Republicans there were clear associations.6O
When MacRae examined the effect of electoral competitive—
ness upon the association ofsnnrkapositions and constituency
characteristics, he found that "the Republicans in this
Congress showed some indication of heightened responsive?
ness to constituency characteristics when they had narrow
election margins, but that the Democrats did not."61
On the basis of these and other similar findings
MacRae drew five conclusions that deal with influences
upon representatives' roll call voting.62. Some of these
conclusions were admittedly inferred very indirectly from
the concrete data, and must be treated cautiously. How—
ever, they are very relevant to the present question of
legislative inputs and thus may prove helpful. His
first conclusion was that "the direct relation between
interest groups and roll call votes is strongest in the

field of agriculture."63 He felt that in this subject

area party pressures, ideological leanings, and regional

 

 

6OIbid., pp. 276-78.
6llbid., p. 286,
62Ibid., pp. 278-80.

 

63Ibid., pp. 278-279. MacRae seemed to make the
questionable assumption that a correlation between scale
scores and constituency characteristics indicates con—
stituency based interest group pressure was present.

differences were all subserVLent to local interest group
pressure.

His second conclusion was that "in the area of Fair
Deal and welfare, the degree of association between
interest group strength and scale position is less [than

"64 Thus he felt party,

in the area of agriculture].
ideological leanings, and regional influences would be
greater in these areas.

His third conclusion was that there was a general
liberal—c nservative cleaiage in both parties, which, he
hypothesized, was based partially on ideological and
regional cultural commitments. Another conclusion was
that congressmen from a single state tended to vote as
a bloc, in cases when direct counteracting pressures
were lacking. 5 Finally, Macfiae concluded that on
foreign aid issues, members of the Foreign Affairs

to support administrative

(T‘
Q.

Committee tend
Put in terms oi the conceptual framework used in
this study, it can be said on the basis of MacRae's
findings that party pressures, inter est group pres sures,
ideological and cultural leanings of individual congress-
men, and fellow congressmen (as evidenced by state dele—

gations and the Foreign Affairs Committee members voting

 

641m, p. 279.

65Thi: agrees with a similar finding of Truman, which
was cited earlier.

143

together) all constitute sources of legislative input.
Whether an input will be stronger thanswxmaother input
seems to depend upon circumstances such as institutional
factors and inter-party competition, although the exact
relationships between these circumstances and the strength

of the inputs is not clear.

The state legislature study by Wahlke, et al.—«One
of the few studies that deals directly with the question
of interest group inputs (and apart from the rather
nebulous concept of constituency influence) is a recent
study by John C. Wahlke and his associates.66 This is
a study of four state legislatures--California, Ohio,

New Jersey, and Tennessee—-based upon systematic inter—
viewing of the legislators. The chief focus of this
research is the role orientations of tne legislators, the
assumption being that these significantly affect the overt
behavior of the legislators.

When questioned concerning interest groups, the
California legislators referred to some 125 interest
groups, the New Jersey legislators to 101, the Ohio
legislators to iuu, and the Tennessee legislators to 102.67
This in itself demonstrates that the legislators were

perceiving the existence of interest groups. But of greater

 

66Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, 00. cit.

Ibid., p. 313.

44

importance for present purposes is the face that in the four
legislatures the authors were able to classify from 23 to

A3 per cent of the legislators as "facilitators," i.e.,
persons who "have a friendly attitude toward group activity

n68

and relatively much knowledge about it. The authors
stated that the evidence suggests that these facilitators
"are the principal vehicles for pressure politics in the
69

overall legislative system." This is further supported
by the fact that 70 per cent of them reported that they
felt the views of interest groups were very important in

70

shaping their opinions on school needs. In short, the
evidence indicates that interest groups are a source of
inputs, but that some legislators are more susceptible
to access by interest groups than cthers are.

This leaves the question whether anything can be
‘ - ,- ' 3 sh ' ‘2 . "4,. . ’71
said about which legislators tended to be Iacilicators.

character: tic the

C‘
H
U”
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(
xi
(Re
*1
(J
K
S
Q.

C

FJH
U

F.)

The on y demograph
authors found that was associated with the role of
facilitator was education. Those legislators with more

education tended more often than others to be facilitators.

The authors also found that the percentage of facilitators

 

68Ibid., p. 325.

Ibid., p. 328.

 

“5

in the legislatures varied from state to state, even when
education was controlled, indicating that the general
political culture was also important in shaping the role
orientation of facilitator.
The authors also concluded that the evidence suggests

that:

American state legislators like to picture themselves

Operating somehow or other as ”the government" (or

as a significant part of it), somehow or other "re—

presenting" the total body politic, and utilizing

pressure groups in the process rather than being used

by them.7d
The authors were unable to conclude on the basis of their
data whether this was actually the situation that existed
or not, but they felt that this was probably partially
the case.73 To the extent that it was, attitudes and
values of the legislators would also have to be considered
an input into the legislative system.

This study also touched on the part parties play

_in the legislative system. "in summary, party conflicts
are perceived as highly relevant in New Jersey, moderately
important in Ohio, and of little significance in

"74

California and Tennessee. Generally this pattern held,

with partisanship and the impact of party on the legislative

 

721bid., p. 339.

 

73See ibid., pp. 339-40.

7uIbid., p. 351.

 

46

process varying from state to state, and even fram chamber
to chamber and from party delegation to party delegation
within a chamber.75 But more importantly, the authors
were also able to conclude that the extent of partisanship
"depends upon the competitive situation and the majority«
minority status of the legislators and upon their orien—
tations toward party acquired through their cultural
background."76
Therefore, party must be considered a legislative
input, with its strength depending upon whether there is
a competitive situation in the legislature, whether the
legislator is a member of the majority party, and whether

he has a favorable attitude towards parties.

Summary.--The five studies that have been briefly
surveyed reveal seven sources of inputs for legislative
bodies, and give some, although often rather unclear,
indications of their relative strength. First are party
inputs. These inputs will generally be strong in fairly
well balanced, competitive legislatures, especially in

the case of the majority party.

 

753ee ibid., pp. 343-76.

76Ibid., p. 376. These findings generally agree with
what Jewell found in his study of eight state legislatures.
He also found that the importance of the roles parties
play in legislative voting varies greatly, with parties
tending to be important in states with strong two party
systems and with the parties fairly evenly balanced in
the legislature. See Malcolm E. Jewell, ”Party VOting in
American State Legislatures," American Political Science
Review, XLIX (1955), pp. 773—91.

 

 

47

Two ether important input sources can be mentioned
together-—constituency and interest groups. Although
these often coincide, yet they do not necessarily do so,
as in cases of interest groups that are broader than a
legislator's constituency, or in cases where constituency
inputs arise from shared attitudes or fear of direct
reprisals at the polls (or hopes :fi‘ direct rewards).
Studies show that both interest groups and constituencies
are important sources of inputs, at times strong enough
to override party pressures and any other input. How—
ever, precise information on conditions and circumstances
that strengthen or weaken constituency and interest group
inputs is lacking. There is, however, evidence that
electoral competitiveness increases the strength of con-
stituency inputs, and that education and a political
culture favorable to interest groups increase strength
of interest group inputs.

Less well documented, but also a rently serving

p)

P

’(1

as sources of inputs are formal le

‘

D”
(D

ders i t

{D

legis—
lature, the chief executive, fellow legislators (other
than the formal leaders), and the attitudes and values

of the individual legislators. However, it is impos ible

(I)

to rank these inputs in terms of importance or strength
due to a lack of evidence, although they do appear to be

weaker than party, constituency, and interest group.

d that

f I.)

(D

On the basis of these findings it i expect

party and constituency would be very important factors

in the background of the legislator , influencing the forma—

H
U
:3
0

f informal groups. These findings also tend to con—
firm the existence of informal groups in legislatures, as
evidenced by the inputs formal leaders and other legislators
have. The evidence points to the fact that informal groups
based on party and constituency may be very cohesive, since
party and constituency are powerful forces wor ing for
cohesion in and by themselves, roups based on shared
attitudes and values may be more cohesive than other groups,

but less cohesive than groups based on party and constituency.

Informal Groups and Legislative Research

 

U)

IL
Despite the relevance of mall group research to the
study of legislative behavior, and despite available
evidence which point to the existence and importance of

. _ 77 _ _

informal groups in iegislative systems, relatively few
studies have attempted to investigate this area systemati—
cally. In fact, there appear to be only four published

studies that study empirically and systematically t

If

e

O

C T“

Fl

bases and functions of informal groups in le isla ve

0Q

systems. This section of the chapter will be devoted to
discussing these four studies in light of the propositions
that were formed on the basis of small group research.

Their relevance to legislative research will be demonstrated,

 

77For example, see William S. White, Citadel (New
York: Harper and Bros., 1956).

“9

and modifications or additions that prior legislative
research in this area indicates are necessary in order to

construct meaningful hypotheses will be discovered.

Routt's study of the Illinois Senate.——The earliest

 

study that attempted to analyze in a systematic manner
informal groups in a legislative body is Routt's study

of the 1937 Illinois Senate.78 In this study Routt
recorded all personal contacts between senators on the
floor of the Senate during certain sample periods of time
while the Senate was in session. He did this for all

the senators, and then for a representative sample of
eleven. He was most likely getting at secondary groups
or relationship rather than primary. Since it can pro-
bably be assumed that most contacts on the floor would

be for work,enuinotfkdendshlp purposes. However, he did
not make the distinction between secondary and primary
relations himself.

His findings show that contacts tended to center
upon those who played important roles in the legislative
process as shown by other indices such as formal leader—
ship, that party membership tended to affect personal
contacts (members of the same parties conferred with each

other more than with members of the opposite party), and

\

 

v1

78Garland C. Routt, "Interpersonal Relationships
and the Legislative Precess," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, XCCV (January,
1938), pp. 129—36.

 

 

that neither length of service in the legislature nor sec~
tional differences seemed to have an effect on the number
of contacts.

Routt himself pointed out that his study must be

considered purely eXploratory and tentative. This certainly

U)

i the case, especially if it is looked upon as an attempt
to describe the informal group structure of a legislature.
This is true because of his methodology——it is uncertain
what he was getting at in observing personal contacts on

the floor of the legislature while it was in session——and

because his findings are not clear-cut or unambiguous.

on's study of the Wisconsin Assembly.——

fatter

(I!

Patterson's study was based upon a scciometric test he

administered to most of the members of the 1957 isconsin

79

Assembly. In this manner he hoped ”to determine (1)
what the informal pattern of organization was in the 1957

As ychclcgical

(I)
m

embly, and (2) whether, as social-p
research has indicated, legislators who have [formal]

leadership status tend to receive more friendship choices
than non-leaders."80

Patterson found that informal sociometric groups

did exist, and that the different groups had different

 

79Samuel C. Patterson, "Patterns of Interpersonal
Relations in a State Legislative Group: the Wisconsin
Assembly," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIII (Spring, 1959),
pp. lOl—lO9.

 

bases, althougn party and sectional factors seemed to be
espeCially important. Among the other bases for socio—
metrio groups were seating arrangements on the floor,
rewress in the legislature, and personal attraction.

He also found that formal leaders received more socio—
metric choices than non-leaders. It is interesting

considerable difference in the voting

A

bl .- ,- . i ,
behavior" on rOii call votes OI two of the Democratic

groups, although he cites no figures and does not discuss
the voting behavior of the other groups.

Thus Patterson reports some very helpful, although
limited, findin s. It should be pointed out that by
depending solely cn the sociometric test, he was getting
at only affective or primary group‘, and not secondary
groups; and thus his claim to be determining "the informal

pattern cf organization” in the 1957 Assembly seems a bit

U. S. House of Representatives.—-Fiellin stufied the New
York Democrats in the U. S. House of Representatives

during the 85th Congress. He found that the seventeen

 

8115mm, p. 105.

82 H r“.

 

 

Alan Fiellin, lhe Pun-tians of Informal Groups
in Legislative Institutions,” Journal of Politics, XXIV
\Eebruary, l9bE), pp. 72-9l.

52

members of the delegation iormed an informal group within
the House, with thirteen making up a highly cohesive,
relatively closed group. He used a combination in inter-
Views, observation, hd information gathered from other
accounts of the legislative process, which by his own
admission were ”not rich in systematic analyses of informal
groups,"83 in order to study the manifest and latent
functions performed by this informal group.

Fiellih's study is hampered by the fact that he
mixed conclusions based upon statistical data, interview
data, his own observations and conjectures, and others'
observations Without clearly distinguishing them. Yet
he develOped and partly supported many helpful hypotheses
about functions performed by iniormal legislative groups.

One function that Fiellin believed was to be ex—

treme y importantvmu;communicating information on bills

. In fact he concluded that

U:

and legislative politic
"probably the most important function of informal groups
and relationships result from their use as communication
+.. "8%1 >1~4 2
networks. Fieiiin also reported that cues for voting
decisions were also communicated within the group, with

the group often voting as a bloc, although no exact

evidence was cited to support this. He also found the

 

83Ibid., p. 75.

8“ibid., p. 78.

_'—-.—-

53

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tended to choose each other, and

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(I)

 

85

T‘ -" ' -- r- 9- ' ’- ,-- - - ' a " “ -4 1 1 s .
Wablne to al., 936 :lt., Etptclally LCELCGPS 9

In regard to secondary groups, the authors asked
the legislators whom in the legislature they considered
to be experts. They found that most of the legislators
could name people they considered to be experts in one
or more fields, that there was substantial agreement
between those named as experts and those holding corres—
ponding formal positions, and that the legislators tended
to pick as experts members of their own party.

It is unknown to what extent the legislators would
consider these persons as experts, but never confer
personally with them, or to what extent they would con-
sider them expert, and frequently confer with them. In
the second case there would be a secondary group and in
the first not. Thus it is not completely certain
whether the authors were getting at secondary groups

or not.

Summary.——These four studies, along with the studies

discussed in the previous section, of this chapt

(D

r:
indicate that the findings of small group research may
also be true in legislative systems. But they also
suggest refinements and additions that may be necessary
before they can be applied to legislative systems. All
four studies confirm that informal groups do exist within
legislatures as well as within other formal organizations.
Three of the studies demonstrate the importance of parties

and one the importance of constituencies in the formation

o hiirming that would be expected

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this chapter. This indicates tiat in a legislative

th legislative research cited earlier in

setting background characteristics ment tioned in proposi—

tion 2(b) would include party allegiance and consti—
tuency characteristics.

These studies also indicate (although not very

strongly) that length o service in the legislature and

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Tegisl ature may also be important in the formation of
groups, which agrees closely with small g oup research.

The findings also agree with small group research in

indicating that groups form around individuals who have

skills that are useful to the group. Both formal leads
ship position and expertise in subieo: area: of legis—
lation \ln the latter case it is uncertain whether info
groups were ir actual existence) seem to be skills or

assets possessed by indiViduals around whom groups may

indicate that

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common informal group are more cohesive than out—

lators who are not members of a

87

fl)

puts of legi

common informal group.

(a) The cohesiveness of the outputs of the
members of informal groups based upon
personal characteristics is less than the
cohesiveness of the outputs of members of

l

'3

.iormal groups based upon political
characteristics.

(b) The cohesiveness of the outputs of the
members of informal primary groups is

greater than the cohesiveness of the mem—

0..

ers of informal secondary groups.

4. in ormal groups tend to serve as sources of infor—
mation on legislation and legislative procedures
for their members.

5. informal groups aid in the process of negotiation,

Q.

compromise, an formation of coalitions.

 

certain leaders who possess qualities useful in a legisla-
tive system. Qualities that are useful in a legislative
system are legislative experience, formal leadership posi-
tions, expertise in subject areas oi legislation and in leg—
islative procedures, and ability to judge and analyze the
legislative system accurately. Included in personal charac--
teristics are religious ethnic, occupational, class, and ed—
ucational backgrounds; and physical closeness in seating
arrangements on the floor of the legislature.

8{Outputs here are conceived of consisting of roll
call votes, perceptions of the legislative process, and role
orientations. The latter are not outputs in and by themselves,
but will be considered such here on the assumption that they
will be communicated to others and that they will affect
other outputs. See Chapter IV.

lNrORMAL GECUPS lN THE MICHIGAN HOUSE

CF REPRESENTATIVES: AN CVERVIEW

This chapter attempts to give brief descriptions
of the methods used in this study and the legislature in
which the study was conducted, as well as an overview
of the findings. It is hOped that this chapter will thus
furnish basic information which will help in understanding
later chapters which report the test ng of the specific
hypotheses.

in developing a research design to be used in testing
the hypotheses, limitations of time and available
resources had to be considered. Tlerefore, the basic

pproacn used was that of the case study, not that of a

Q)

study of many legislatures or of one legislature over a
period of time. It was felt that more was to be gained
by being able to speaK precisely and in detail concerning
one session of one legislative house than by being able
to speak vaguely and in general concerning a broader
area. But it must be remembered that the case study
approach seriously restricts the weight that can be
attached to the generalizations formed: immediate accep—
tance of generalizations based on a single case is inde—

fensible.

\fl
(1)

The l960 session oi the Michigan House of Represen—
tatives was selected as the testing ground for the

hypotheses. This choice was made for several reasons.

The first was that a single legislative house was small
enough to be studied intensively in the time and with the
resources that were available. More important, the
Michigan House of Representatives was near and accessible
to the researcher. The Michigan House was selected

rather than the Senate because it is larger in size (110
members compared with 3H members). It was eXpected that
this larger size would lead to a greater number and variety
of informal groups, thereby enabling the hypotheses to

be tested more easily. AlthOugh the selection of the
Michigan House of Representatives for study was to a large

extent due merely to its location, it was felt that it

was well suited to the type of analysis that was to be
conducted. The members :1 the Wichigao House com: from

:3-

constituencies that are diverse demograp ically and

- . . - i l l. l .
sectionally, it is a competitiVe, two—party House, and
roll call votes on the final passage of all bills and
amendments are recorded.

The selection of the l904 session as the session

during which to study the House was due largely to the

 

1From 1955 to 1964 the parties were fairly evenly
balanced with neither party possessing an overwhelming
majority of the seats in the House.

accidents of timing, not
it out as an es3ecially

was felt that this sessi
no recent, disruptive re

ture had been elected in
time during the regular
l963 for the freshmen we
informal group structure
by any major occurrences
the session unique or ob
sessions. It is true th

60

(3
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singled

proper session for study. But it
on was well suited for the study:
apportionment had taken place

in l954); the legisla—

there had been

ession of

([1

integrated into the

g was not marked

which would have clearly made

v different from other

([1

1'7

.2
.LCu

at struggles over reapportionment

and changes in election laws, both highly partisan issues,
toow place in this session and these may have resulted
in a somewhat higher rate of party voting than in most
sessions.
ZEE_§24£§_E§EQ

The basic tools used in this stul, of informal
groups in the hi higan House of Representatives during
the l96u session were systematic interviewing and published
reports and documents. One hundred and five of the 110
members of the House were personally interviewed between
January and May, 196“. Of the five w.c were not inter
Viewed, (one Republican and four Dem crater, one flately re-
fused to he interviewed, and the other fou; made excuses eaon
time they were approached t. -theruise evaded being interviewed.

6;

\7

53 committee cha rman or other members occupying formal
leadership positions were among the five not interviewed.
Cf the 105 interViews, three were seriously incomplete
due to a lack of cooperation on the part of the legis—
lators, and a fourth was seriously incomplete because the
legislator broke otf the interview and attempts to
reestablish contact failed. The interview schedule that
was followed took trom twenty—tive minutes to an hour to

n

a . 4 , - .
complete. Census data, *ublisned election statistics,

*7

cuse Journals, and published biographical sketches of

the members were used to gather other needed data.

The Mlch'

 

There are several characteristics of the Michigan
House oi Representatives whic should be noted in order
fully to understand and evaluate the findings of this

study. The fir: n competitiveness. The R pub-

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licans had been in contihucus control of the House since
the 1937—38 session, although by only small majorities

since the l954 election. During the igeu session 58
Republicans and 52 Democrats wer serving. From l949 to
l963 the Democrats controlled the governorship, but in
1962 a Republican was elected and was, of course, serving

during the 196Q session.

 

2i ., , , - _
see Appendix A for a copy oi the interView scnedule
that was followed.

O\
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P"
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etitiveness between the

(‘3

(,y

Despite the overall c

9

parties in the Michigan House, most of the members were
secure in their seats, facing strong competition in
neither the primary nor general elections.3 Becker and
his associates found that 8l.3 per cent of the Republican
seats and 76.7 per cent of the Democratic seats were won
by 56 per cent or more of the vote. And 102 of the

110 seats were won by the same party in all four elections
during this period. Only 5.5 per cent of the incumbents
running for reelection were defeated in primary contests.
In spite of this great stability in partisan control
there were changes in the membership of the House. In
196“ there were 28 members with over ten years seniority
(16 Republicans and 12 Democrats), 30 with ten to seven
years (1“ Republicans and 16 Democr“ts), 29 with six to

three years (18 Republicans and ll Democrats), and 23 with

only one year (l0 Republicans and ij Democrats).
The stability in party control oI seats was due to

the strong regional division of party strength in Michigan.
Wayne County (Detroit) and a few surrounding areas were
heavily Democratic; several seats were frequently won by
the Democrats in Muskegon, Genesee, Bay, and Saginaw

counties; and the Upper Peninsula regularly sent several

 

3Robert W. Becker, Frieda Foote, Mathias Lubega,
and Stephen V. Monsma, ”Correlates of Legislative Voting:
Michigan House of Representatives, 1954—1961,” Midwest
Journal of Political Science VI (l962), pp. 385—90.

 

oemocrati: representatives to Lansing. Otherwise the out—
state area was Republican territory.

Earlier studies indicate that the parties in Michigan,
as is true in the large, industrialized, two—party states
generally,are signiiicant influences in roll call voting.
Scigliano found in the l954 session an index of cohesion
of 73 for the Democrats and 49 for the Republicans on all

calls.“ After

’-_a

but unanimous or near unanimous rcl
studying the votes on forty—nine Key liberal—conservative
issues from l955-l96l, Becker and his associates concluded:
Clearly the Republicans tended tovcte conservative
and did so with a high degree of party cohesive—
ness. The Democrats, on the other hand, tended to
vote liberal and with a slightly higher degree of
party cohesion than was evidenced by the Republican
representatives.

Another characteristic of the parties in Michigan
that should be noted is that they both tend to be closely
aligned with——some would say captured by——certain interest
groups: the Democratic party with the AFL-Clo and the
Republican party with the large automobile manufacturers.

Brief mention should also be made of the committee

system in the Michigan House. There are forty—eight

 

 

 

u i , - -

Robert G. Scugliano, Michigan Legislative Report,
£253 (East Lansing: Government Research Bureau, Michigan
State College, 1955), p. 31.

5

Becker et al., op. cit., p. 393.

 

 

6, . . . .

See Stephen B. and Vera H. Sarasohn, Political
Party Patterns in Micligan (Detroit: Wayne State Univer—
sity Press, l957).

standing conti-tees, rangirg in size from five to fifteen
members. Most comm Htt es receive very few bills, and some
do not receive any during an entire session. Only fourteen
committees received more than thirty bills or rest lu ti ns
in the 196fi session The Speaker has full power to select
committee chairmen. In doing so, he sometimes appoints "a
person as chairman of an influential committee with little
regard to sen;i ority. This latter, however, is not the

prevailing practice and most members
committees rank relatively high

Ancther factor that
tiv
of the period between l949 and 1963,

p

Democratic governors and Republican

F.»

loc k marked the relationsh b be etween

tions. Many of the go ern ors'

_ .. - - n

j ame

or r:

(II

C \J'us

‘ .C-
\-

eto overridden.

both the legi

1964,

seniority—wise.
should be noted is

—legis lative relationship in Mich

, V l
dill:

GI'IlC‘I‘

the relationship between the two

of the important

”7
the execu-

igan. During much

when Michigan had

legislatures, dead—

the two ins titu—

were rejected,

r»
L

‘

(I;

controlled
ship during l963 and

institutions was

 

7Scigliano, cit., p. l7.

v 0

Governors' vetoes have been

throughout Michigan political history

rarely

overridden
See Malcolm E.

 

Jewell, The State Legisla tur e: Politics and Practice
New York: Random House, lab: ), p. lid, and William Keefe
and Morris Ogul, The Lmerican Legislative Proces Con-

 

 

gress and the St ates (Englewood Clii
Prentice- -Hail, 1904) p. 397.

 

I" 3

J

New Jersey:

ctr —\ v— A ' 'fir ‘ ’ r r . 1 I“ ‘ r-.. r“ 1 - - . ‘ ~' r‘ ~
was e:ten Iar Ilofl cordial. lne leuislature in a late

CB

proposed tax reform program. Most of the governor’s

emed to stem from

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difiiculty with the legislature
the behavior of a number of strengly conservative mem—

be-s in his own party. These members opposed the governor,
who was identified with the moderate or "liberal"

wing of the party, on some of his pro rams. That conflict
existed in l96s was videnced by the complaint one of

these conservative Republicans made in the course of his

interview:

Just because a Republican governor proposes some—
thing they eXpect me to support it, even though I
Opposed 1 when the Democrats wanted it. I don't
like it. 1 think a man should vote for what he
believes is right and not change Just because now a
Re ublican governor says we need it.

A brief note on how the members cf the House are
assigned their seats is also relevant to this study‘ At

all members

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the start of each newly elected legis

elected in the same year choosing in alphabetical order.
Tne freshmen representatives draw numbers to determine

the order in which they choose their seats. Thus a

U)

legi lator's seat is deterrined in part by self—selection

and in part by what seats arearaijable. Obviously the

less seniority a representative has tne less freedom of

choice he will have.

‘S

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see, in their study :1

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v, ‘
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Primary

__...—___.-_-_-

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was hypothesized that two

could be identified within legislfl

troops

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in order to reveal the diiferent types

order to an over primary relationships th

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friends in the Louse—-I mean tne members
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parties and ctner social gatherings?” No
of choices was asked for, nor was there a

which the interviewer probed. Rather the

W&S

were probed until it

list of their closest friends had been

t

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felt that a relat

Schubert and

of state

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specific number
set number for
reSpondents

ively complete

obtained.

 

9

endon Schubert and Charles Press
” Averican Political Sci

”Measuring
ReView,

 

 

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GI
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19

Malappo
( 64), pp.

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This is exactly the rate oi non-response obtained
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studies. see wahlke ct 'l., op. cit., p. (a; and Patterson,
_¢_._.— —¢v—- —L._ __-_—._.__

r‘ 4 T-
V E o .L U o

Members

68

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Figure 3.l.—-Primary

Choices

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,g_:ces made, :59 wdl.Uper cent) were intra~party Choices.
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gut as I_gtre 3.: shows, Republicans clearly tended to

:32: e felltw Republicans more than Democrats tended to

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cheese fellow Democrats. And jo.A per cent of the choices

of Democrats made by fellow Democrats were returned, while

choices of Republicans by Demo—

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were not recipi--ated. ins most i-K€l CYLeraolOn for

this phenomenon seems to be that the members of the party

whicn had been out of power for twenty—file years felt a

need to associate with the ma;ority party members. As a
1

result they perceived certain Republ

the majority par-d members felt no similar need fer the
minority party ut'teis, ehl .ere not a tem_tirg to associa
w tn them. Ihus th:, d i not psiceive them as :riends.
Figure 3.3 shows the hunter 3: time: members were
named as iriends. The situation here difiers slightly
from what bahlwe and his associates found in that they

had more legislators who received only one or two choices
and more who received eight or more choices. As far as

inter-party differences are concerned, the fact that

 

 

 

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toroorats CFC:€ Rspubiicans more than Republicars chose
1». .. .3 1 -

Democra-s oac o‘ce again be seen Repuoiicans tended to

receive more choices than Democrats did (an average of 4.7
per member cmp ared with only 3 2 for Democrats). And
61.1 per cent of the Republicans receiving choices were

named by at least one Democrat, while only 35.7 per cent

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d there was not a large number
Cf individuals who were heavily over—chosen, although there
were ten members who received ght cr mc re choices. On
the basis of the earlier studies cited in Chapter II, it

was expected that these individuals would occupy posi-

‘ a - .-- -. A ' -~ n rm 4 a».

tions oi formal -eadersnip and would possess ctner swilis
‘ .‘o 0‘ ‘ r 4 I. ‘1 R 4 r~ 5 y r~ m I ~ rx-‘fr A ‘ . ‘n'x

usefui in a -egis_ativs system. this proved to be true

to a considerable extent. Six of the ten over-chosen

positions in the House, such as speaker, floor leader, or
. . . c: . .
cnairman of one o the important committees. While of
the twenty—four members who received only one or no choices,

non occupied a formal leadership position.

 

12 u: v“? H

rta; committe ee was s”
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indices used

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structed.

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Who are the memters you most oi-

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iniormaticn about the operations Oi

 

 

 

 

 

e
t. rle «.Av .86
other members ever asK you for information or
advice abou the operations of the House? Which
ones?

Do you ever personally discuss legislative matters
with any of these members” which ores? (This question
immediately followed one dealing With experts. See
Appendix A).

TABLE 3.2--Index of Potential Attractiveness and Choices
Received.
Primary Choices Secondary Choices
N EBA N IPA
Under—chosen
Members 24 .la 3i .lS
Over-chosen
Members 10 .53 13 .71
At the start oi the anal"sis of the persons named

in response to these quentions, it was decided to eliminate

~se to it. This was done for three reasons. ihe

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first is that a large numbe

”5

or persons refused to name

anyone. Of the lOe members asked this qu stion, 38 (36.5

(D

per cent) either stated they discussed the operations of
the House with no one or evaded the question in some other

way. The second reason is that during the course of the

interview it became apparent that the question was ambiguous.

Some took the "operations of the House” to refer to parlia—

mentary procedure, others to strategy and tactics, and

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till others answered in terms of obtaining information
about bills in committee.11+ The third reason for the
decision to disregard the responses to this question is
that many legislators who did answer it seemed to take the
easy way out and named an obvious individual. The
Speaker, for example, was named by thirty—two persons,
even though it is extremely doubtful whether that many
persons had ready access to the Speaker. Since there
were enough responses to the other two questions to be
able to discuss secondary relationships, it was felt that
it would be better to eliminate this question, than to
run the risk of contaminating the findings by including
responses of doubtful validity.

Of the 104 members asked either one or both of the
remaining questions, eleven (10.6 per cent) failed to

name a single individual, a slightly better rate of

(T‘

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TESpCI’l26 trial] to) tne Crinlaf’y CIlJiCE (.414 Scion. oi the

L L

eleven, one flatly reiused to answer, and most of the

remaining ten said that the mecbers with whom they
discussed legislation varied with the subject matter. As
one of them put it: "It all depends on the subject matter.

At one time or another I talk to almost everyone in here."
Figure 3.4 reveals the number of secondary choices

the members made, and compares this with the number of

 

114 .~ 5 - t 1
See the questions immediately preceding tnis one

in the interView schedule in Appendix A.

77

Average number of secondary
choices per member = 5.0

 

 

 

 

Members

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

22 Average number of primarly
" choices per member = A.2
20
18.. =
16 e :E
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12 .‘t—i I :
0 -. _. Primary Choices
10 “ :2 Secondary Choices
'1 1'- --
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Choices more

 

Figure 3.4.—-Primary and Secondary Choices Made.

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s m-oe. it shows tnat members tended to

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name more secondary than primary contacts, although the

difference is not to: great and may be merely the result
of the secondary contacts being based on the responses
to two questions and the primary contacts on one question.

0f the 518 secondary choices made 60 (11.6 per cent) were

reCiprocated, a figure considerably lower than the 3U.0

{/1

per cent for the primary choices. ( ee Table 3.1.) This
difference may be due partly to the fact, as will be
shown shortly, that a relatively small number of indivi—

duals were very heaVily over-chosen, receiving 17 to 25

chOices. These over-chosen individuals, of course,

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eoiprocated only a Iew of t'e JO ces they received.

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u also, no doubt, reflects
the more loosely knit nature of secondary relations than
primary relations.

There was \irtuaily no diiierence between the

parties in the number or secondary choices made: tne

Democrats named an average of 5.0 members and the

Republicans an average of A.9 members. in regard to
party differences in the number of reciprocated choices,
the same pattern that existed for primary choices was

present, although it was not a st on Of the Republican

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choices, 13.5 per cent were reciprocated and only 9.3 per

s the case with

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primary choices, tn

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difference can be eXplained on the

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basis that L: Democrats were mak-ng roe cross-“arty

‘ i *i ‘i-.i i ,-'~..,.- , ~i ~\.4 -.
choices than *ne .epucl cans were making, and these choices

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t Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1.)

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cf the intra—party choices of the Democrats, 12.7 per

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J

The members of both parties made more secondary

than primary choices across party lines. iCompare Figures
3.2 and 3.5. EEpLCl‘"&U cross-part” choices rose from 9.0

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characteristics , nhereas one ”:u d seek but and trust
politically cir‘lar perscn. :or _:: :r-tion ard help in
legislative matters. Cn tne other hard, dalllEF research
h's pointod out that persons terd to seek Fl: others with

vutlooks, and backgrounds as friends

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ome nepubiicans to pass their legislative prIposais,

and Republicans needed the Sup”0ft oi Democrats to pass

80

Republican choices

of Republicans HIlIIHlLUHHLIIHHI II! IT I HIH 85.1%

Democratic choices W
of Democrats 60-2%

Republican choices
of Democrats m ”3%

Democratic choices ‘HIIIIIIIIIIHH 39 97
of Republicans - ° °

Total Republican Choices - 282

 

 

Total Democratic Choices - 236

Figure 3.5.-—Intra-Party and Cross Party Secondary Choices.

Hue r legislative pr cposa s if even a iew of their fellow
Republicans defected or were absent. This need for support
from some members of the opposite party was the case in

As a result it would

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committee as we
be expected that cross—party secondary relations were

important f r member

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of botn parties, but more so for
the Democrats than the Republicans. The pattern of cross—

y choices fits this expectation exactly: members of

8‘ ’8
(f

oth parties made cross pa rty choices, and Democrats made

more than Republicans d:d.

O\
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(ix
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Figure 3. the number of secondary choices
received by the legislators and compares these with the
number oi primary choices received. There were more over-
in terms of

chosen and more under-cho sen le islator

0Q
U I

(D

cndary choices received than had been the case for
pri' mary choices. Twenty—one members received eight or
more se lardai§ choices, hi le only ten rec eiJed that many

1

primary Choices. And jl received one or no secondary

C)

choice, while 2M received one or no primary choice.
Clearly primary relations tended to enclose a larger
number of the legislators, while secondary relations
tended to be more co.centrated. This is in harmony with
the tendency of persons to establish secondary contacts
with indivisu ls who possess specific Knowledge or other
abilities-—characteristics not equally shared by all

legislators.

Members

82

MH- Primary Choices

Secondary Choices

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

20w
18 4|- : Uh j?
.. ‘. t ," Average number of secondary
16" 1. ” l 4' choices received per member
- JP 3’ :L = Li ' 7
Hi, i; :: v
1 p".? +_ l y 1 Average number of primary
12 _ 3f 4. L Y i? choices received per member
I- j: ‘ 1* 3:11; 4‘ = u o O
10 F 1: N 1
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8 }

 

 

 

 

 

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O l 2 3 H 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll l2 l3 1“ 15 16 17
or

Choices Received more

Figure 3.6.—-Primary and Secondary Choices Received.

83

As far as inter-party diiferences are concerned
much the same pattern held as did with primary choices.
Republicans tended to receive more secondary choices than
Democrats did {an average of 5.8 per member as compared
with 3.5 per member for the Democrats). And 73.1 per
cent of the Republicans receiving choices were named by
at least one Democrat, while only 35.7 per cent of the
Democrats receiving choices were named by at least one
Republican. As was revealed earlier by the choices made,
more secondary choices in both parties were received
from across party lines than had been the case with pri—
mary choices.

This leaves the question of who were the members
that were over-chosen or under—chosen. Ci the thirteen
members receiving ten or more chOices, six were chairmen
of important committees, four occupied other formal
leadership positions, and only three did not occupy any
official leadership position. Thus it was true here,
even more th n was the case with primary choices, that
members who were over—chosen tended to occupy formal
leadership positions. But it should be noted that a
perfect correlation between occupation of formal leader-
ship positions and being over-chosen did not exist.

Three members who were over—chosen were not in formal
leadership positions, and some members who were in formal

leadership positions were not over-chosen.

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loans

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The thirteen

IPA of .71.

igher than the

Those who

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Clearly there was

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as received. What is also of

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the most impo-tant patterns that emerge

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party lines more than

cross—par y secondary

primaly choices, there was a direct
en being ;ver—chosen and possessing

ive sxills, and this correlation was
dary ch ices than icr primary choices.

 

 

 

 

Given the maze of primary and secondary choices, the

next problem was how to uncover cliques or clusters of

CT

idered inzormal groups. It

(1)

individuals that could e con
was felt that an acceptable method should meet at least

t criterion is that of reliability

U!

three criteria. The fir
i.e., it should be such that any researcher using the

same method would arriv at the same results. As a second
criterion it was felt that an acceptable method should

lators

(n

take into account three possible situations: legi

(3

hoc

(I)

ing eacn other, a letislator cnoosing members of a
‘1 .. .4 * .. 4' , A , " .y 15

Clique without be_ng chosen by the CliQue members,
and cliouue members choosirfi a lec;siator outside the

clique without being chosen in return. To define groups

only in terms of mutual choices would unduly restrict

h \ ‘ «0 . .\A a - v-‘v I.‘ ~ A " ‘ A.-.
The :crmztion -i Er ups, especially giJen the relatiVely

v‘ ~ a. ’ ¢ 1“ fl ‘9‘ ‘ -4 .fl , ,. .1
large siZe o the house ion tne resul-irg greater iikel-—

have used methods of discovering

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argely on simply inspecting the choices

made and then grouping together persons with a high rate

 

i5For present purposes the term ”cl1que” Will be
used to refer to a cluster of legislators who chose each
other to a considerable extent, but whicn has not yet been
formally identified as an informal group.

86

of ch ceing each other. These methcds do not possess the
desired reliability and with 110 subjects they would be
too cumbersome and time consuming. Another method that
has been used is reported by Festinger, Schachter, and

Back.16

It places all the choices made in a matrix, and

by a series of manipulations cliques of all mutual choices

and of two persons connected by way of one or two other

persons are revealed. However, it was rejected because

of its cumbersomeness and also because, as the authors

themselves point out, "the best criteria for distinguishing

subgroups of less than the extreme degree [i.e., those

based completely on mutual choices] must still be deter—

mined."17
Therefore a method was devised which utilized cer—

tain aspects of several previously used methods.18 Basi—

cally, it started with the cliques in which every member

 

 

16Festinger, Schachter, and Back, op. cit., pp.
137-A7.

l7Ibid., p. iué.

18

Ideas and techniques were especially drawn from
the following studies: Elain Forsyth and Leo Katz, "A
Matrix Approach to the Analysis of Sociometric Data:
Preliminary Report," Sociometry, IX (1946), pp. 3AO—A7:
Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 0p. cit., pp. 135-47;
and Frank A. Pinner, "Relationships Between High School
Group Structure and the Development of Orientations
Toward Public Affairs," Unpublished report to the
office of Education, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.

 

 

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tha: tic cf the five Democratic groups were

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dyads, and none of the nine Republican groups was a dyad.
This reflects the pattern revealed in the previous sec-

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Ropuolican cr mixed—party groups. This may be a reflec—
tion of tre is:.ated position CI the .inority party vis—a—

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In otherwcids, did the informal primary groUp structure
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C 3 3 3 4 5 O i L 3 A 5
Number of Groups Number oi Groups
;g*_1;1 is in Legislators In

Figure 3.7.——Multigrocp Membership.

KO
u)

respresentatives who appeared in several groups. Who were
these persons? And who were the persons who were included
in no group? The 31 persons in no group had a fairly low
average Index of Potential Attractiveness (.22), and none
of them occupied a formal leadership position. This is
what was expected due to the lack of formal leadership
positions and the low IPA's of under—chosen individuals,
as reported in the previous section of this chapter.
However, the average IPA of the legislators not in any
group (.22) was slightly higher than the average IPA of
the under—chosen legislators (.l9). Only three of the
twelve representatives in three or iour groups occupied

a formal leadership position (compared with six of the
ten over—chosen representatives), and they had an average

IPA of .A? (ccmpared with the over-chosen members'

higher IPA oi .5

LJJ

). Being over—chosen did not mean a

(T)

P rson would be in se\eral groups, and being under—
cncsen did not mean one would be in n; group.

What distinguished those who were over—chosen from
those who were in several primary groups was that those
in several groups made more choices of friends: an average

of 6.5 compared With only 3.3 for the ten over—chosen

es received were concerned

0

legislators. As far as choi
the difference was not great (an average oi 9.7 choices
received for the over—chosen compared with an average of

7.8 for those in several groups). In short, the legislators

sen members,

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Mixer}. eil‘iupi [Iiilillll’ihfl

 

*1531- a-c net ;nc1uded in these figures
“ grimary groups is 19, and for second

(1)

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ac.y be ex La on the basis

prcb

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intra—party Republican secondary c

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primary choices (compar Flgur s

basis of the larger size of the He

r a s (See Tables 3.4 and 3.6.!

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3.2 and 3.5)

the

(I)

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eccndary groups. .t
one measure that would
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member—-was the measure

(I)

a were distingdished

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were composed e tirely
blican and four Demo—

n Th1 wa aim

(I)

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t e case for primary
5 a cross-party group,

lmary e.

gr ."UZCS .

U fewer

of there beinO
hoices than there were
and on the

publican secondary

98

Table 1.6 shows that although there were some differ-
ences, the Democratic, Republican, and cross—party groups
did not differ greatly in size, cohesion, and outside
connections. T.e iewer intra-party choices of the
Democrats showed up in the smaller size of the Democratic
groups. The more closely knit and isolated nature of the
Democratic primary groups was also the case for their
secondary groups. Their average IGC was higher than the
Republican and mixed—party groups' IGC's,and their average
outside connections per member was lower. The cohesion

than that of either

([1

of the mixed—party grzups was les
the Democratic or Republican groups, indicating as would
be expected, that when mixed—party groups did form, they
were not as closely knit as single party groups. This was
true for both primary and secondary groups.

it is also important to note that for all three

Again this Vas what was expected: that secondary groups

}

would be more casual and Open than primary groups.

lso considered in regard to

in

A question that was

'am persons included in

(D
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primary groups was: were th

many different groups and many persons in no group at all,

J
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or were most of th lators included in the informal

(D
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leg.

*ixty-four (58.2 per cent) of the

H

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group structu’

legislators were in at ‘east one secondary group, leaving

 

 

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Republican Mean

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#6 (Al 8 per cent} in no group at all. \See FiNure 3.7.
The pattern was basically the same as it was for the
primary groups. Although there was a somewhat larger
number of legislat:rs in no group at all, a smaller
number of persons po sse essed multi— —group membership (except
at the extreme—ethere were three persons in four or
five secondary groups and only two were in that many pri-
mary groups). The larger number of persons not in any
secondary group ref ects what was noted earlier: the
tendency for secondary relationstmibe more concentrated
and primary relations more dillb’i ed. The slightly larger
number of persons who were in fo‘r or iive secondary groups

1 A "'4 '-
aiEC I‘LLS t

:3”
H
(1‘)
71

at ern, yet the cverall existence of

difficult to

U1

fewer persons with multi —group membership 1
eXplain at first glance. Tnere were only 23 legislators
with we ondary multi-group membership, compared with 3D
with primary multi—group membership. Due to tne fact
that more members were over—onesen, and members tended to
make more choices in their secondary relations than in
their pr ary relations, it might be expected that there
would be more le egis lators with secondary than primary
multi— group membeIshin. The most likely explanation is
that due to the greater looseness of secondary relations
fewer groups could be identified, and therefore this
phenomenon can be explained on the simple basis of there

eing fewer identifiable secondary groups.

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in regard to

with

expected that

IPA‘s than
in three

than persons

second of these expecta—

not (Table 3.7.)

ip, and the

 

 

 

 

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choices
House) but

lower than

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.i9 (N = 24; .lS (N = 31)
.ug (N 2 l2) .50 {N = 9}
.53 \n 2 i0! .7; (N = ;3:
f the choices made and
appear in any group showed

made (which

only 2.0

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choices received

of the

made by these

3.

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were not perceived by the other legislators as objects of
informal relations and whose own perceptions of with whom

‘ v ‘ f p A Q - r- . ~ .
ney nad in:-rma. contacts did not match those who id

cf

cite them. This last factor probably indicates very weak
and sporadic contacts. Some legislators who received

were included in

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even fewer cho
groups because they had more reciprocated choices.

In summ ry, ‘he most important patterns that emerge

Q“)
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from this overview of the informal groups are: (1)

there were fewer Democratic than Republican primary and

secondary informal groups; (2) Democratic groups tended
to be more cohesive and to have fewer contacts with members

of the House outside of their groups than the Republisan
grOUps; (3) informal secondary groups tended to be

larger, to be less cohesive, and to have more connec—

- 4’ TL“

+‘-Ir ,- K -.....I ,-. .— - ~-i ‘.-. . ‘ ,-.. -_ "-"I ‘..
tions “it. legislators -utside c. .nem than primary groups;
' ‘ .;.. -_,... , ~,.. 1,. A . . --,.-.. n..' ‘h

is, mixed—pa-.y groups tended t- be less cohesive than

one-party groups; (a) multi-erCup membeFShiP was “at as

(1‘:

legislative skill
as was being over—chosen; and (6) membership in groups
was determined by the number of choices made, choices
received, and choices reciprocated.

Hypotheses One and One (a) stated: ”identifiable
primary and secondary informal groups exist within legisla—

tive systems. The various primary and secondary groups

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informal groups that could be identified, in fact,
existed. This cnarter also clearly showed that these
primary and secondary groups were different and distinc—

‘4'1 Or‘. ~ -r\ 4 .r‘\"‘
tive, i.e., were not cotermincus.

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105

one obvious output that is easily measured because of its
public and recorded nature is roll call voting, although
it has been recognized that roll call voting is not
necessarily the most important stage of the legislative
process,1 Individual legislators were conceptualized in
Chapter 1 as constantlx producing outputs which flow into
the legislative system. Floor speeches, committee votes,
private conversations, and introduction of bills are all
examples of outputs of individual legislators (and are, of
course, inputs into the legislative system as seen from
another perspective). The problem that was faced was how
to measure outputs such as these in such a way that the
impact of informal group associations upon them could be
determined, Private conversations with other legis-
lators were rejected both because informal groups were
found at least in part on the basis of reports of frequent
conversations, and because of a lack of means to determine
the frequency and content of private conversations.
Introduction and co-sponsorship of bills were rejected
because of the extremely time consuming and tedious work
necessary to analyze them. After considering several of
these alternatives it was decided to measure, in addition
to roll call voting, the representatives‘ perceptions of

the legislative rules of the game and their role

 

lSee Walhke t al., 0 . cit,, pp. 238-3(

-‘
/
—-———_.——-

106

I '

orientations towards their positions as legislators,2 Lt
was Ivecognizwmi ‘lx t trwwvv ir1;mnd tarifliemselflw=s aiva not (wit—
puts, yet it was felt that it could be safely assumed that
they st orglv lnITzurrn output ,2 For eV‘Wle, whether
legislator views the legislative process as a legallv de-
firuai serdexs oi :fiieps tjirougfii wnicr1i: bill_rtust {mass (Dr is
a process of intorn l rvgotiation and working out of
acceptable agreemantsvflifliother leg'slators, will no doubt
influence with vumm.2nui how he stwwlm;+»vv)thets in private
conversations,

'Thf‘ Sewlfltgi pxwgbltaw 17u3etl by; ttwe leaswfisretnsr ijs ttw t

of attempting t) {Stabllsh Cause and effect relationships.

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existermmjrvaa qflllwldil(fll betWeen uguvmgmert iri legislati\M3

r—"

te another

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agreement, do A» V» woull ac“-3?llulx vxcludirg the

possibilities 91 th» agr~:w~rf l= ling To Tn~ informal

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BRole theory d firit lv indiwa‘es this to be the ccs~

o ' “ ‘ , 1 H it, The study of

s associates vmusailso t sad tnltlrezissumption
' t ov»rt behavior, See

 

Thus the three outputs select
selected in part in an atternt to

s, call

possibilitie

not cause formation of groups,

VlO‘
$40

is a shifting, changi factor,

would have to be made and unmade

J.

ception of the rules of an

role orientation definir

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the legislative

system are NOT: thir

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ator is likely to bring into the

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is more likely to dove then as t

formatdxni of itfilxfiwll groups vmnlld most liloaly be

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puts Em: herwe contme

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third fa. ,

exclude

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lator‘s

legislature with him;

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for an; ysis were

the first of these

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bv itself could

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or roll call voting

and groups based on it

A cone

and a complete set of

participation in

freshman legis—

h e

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legislative out—

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outputs and common group n tbership—-prlt, allagiance—-
has been cor‘_o’L:l for, s will be s a ' \‘ l nls‘
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enteringgiml<yai r»: tw— 71T1€TEl§ ll , t *u lhmm ~l. ,‘
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that the informal group membership 'l :gleer vi to output
are not echillE it ~l':l+t icoilti n, b * That the rewb‘r—
strip 343 I'ljlflflfll’ll‘q ii e 1LT later?

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ee ltpenjix B for a complete description of how this

..l..... ._ ._.-...._.F_-._.__.v____._._ .—_.__,..._._ ___._._._

those composed completely of Eepub litens, and those com-

posed of both Democrats and Re ublicers 7 All the groups

T)

were then exawined in order to determine, in the case of

the one-party groups, whether the groups3 iARG s were

l1)

higher than their parties’ lARG’s, and in the case of th
mixed-party groups, whether the groups; IARG s were

I , .-l. . , . ., 8

higher than the entire legiSIature s IARG,

It was found that members of infornel groups tended

Q

to agree with each thgr on the rules of the game to a
slightly higher extent than they oid with other members of

the legislature 7

."\

See Table 4 l.) Informal group member-

w

(f

ship certainly did not always result in gr a er agreement

 

7The dbdq“*li0 nenbe‘ groups--were eliminated from

this and the fcllowirg erulyses, Due to their distinctiVe
nature it was i:lt that includirg thew with the other
groups would tend to distort the r~sultsj And due to the
fa 3t tflnat trm; i»3 werw? only'et few Cd tjigm (ftuu‘ prinerfg<jyuos
and one second r\ dyed), considering them separately would
nCH: he\ne lTTCT%HJS%Hi tlie inaline ed“ the; stiuiy» IIIC7BSEHS wtrere
they confirmed the Lettemiiikxumi for the larger groups,
hey would not have all i very much, and in cases wherr

' devieted frow the juitein found for the la: ger groups

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y‘vmnild not runwe jetruxfixni veiy'nunfii.

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not be Lsed to deterrine whether the grorps were over or
under the ' Rey were compared with to a significant
extent. This was the case due to the nature of the figures
upon which they were based, However, since an entire
universe, and not a sample, was being considered here such
tests of significance were not considered essentie.l. Any
difference-~no matter how Still--reflects an w‘t‘il differ—
ence , and not one that could have CDTG about due to
sampling error,

01

9See Appendix E for figures showing the exact IARG
of each group,

 

”‘»-—. .—~ _. - .

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0-114

 

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w e l

112

on the rules of tr; g we, ultLUuEH it oiu so in a sigeble
majority of cases. it is also important to note the ex-

tent to which the IARG's that were over the IARG’s

(I
3
5
;

with which they were compared were over, and to compare
this with the extent to which the group IARGls that were

V

.RG s with which they were compared were under,

3

under the I'

When this done it was found that those indices of groups

1"
531‘
{/1

that w re over the lARG s they were compared with tended

CD

to be over them to a greater extent than what the indices
of groups that were under the iARG s they were compared
with were under them, {See Turin 4»l:)

As far as differences between primlry and secondary
grmrlps wence (tornserm eel. ttnere \NdS ‘verf; s ligdit swiptmdrt fru‘
Hypothesis Three (b)¢ A higher percentage of the primlry
groups were over the lARG s they were complred with then
was the case for the segondiry groups, and they tended to
be over these lARG s to a greater degree {an average of

,072 points compared with ,Obp points). (see Table 4,1,)

However there definitely wus not a very great distinction

(3

between the differ ht types of groups, In fa t, the primary
groups that were under the IARG s they were compared with
were even under them to e greater extent than the secondary
groups were, thereby running counter to expectations.

Party differeiges were watched for, even though no

hypotheses had been formed concerning them, in the hope

that they night help explain the patterns that emerged.

113

Membership in Republican groups terded to be related to
agreement on the rules of the game to a somewhat greater
extent than membership in Democratic groups did (as indicated
by the average number of index points they were over or
under the lARG’s they were compared with)~ (See Table
u.1.) The mixed-party primary groups tended to be either
high in agreement or low, with few occupying the middle
ground, Almost as many were under the legislative IARG
as were over it, indicating at best, a very weak re-
lationship between agreement on the rules of the game and
mixed-party group membership.

In summary, the evidence indicated that agreement on
the rules of the game tended to be correlated with informal
group membership, that membership in primary groups
tended to be slightly more correlated with agreement on the
'rules of the game then membership in secondary groups was,
that nwhnbership»ir1a1 Republitmhi groug>veh3 somewhat:rnore
highly correlated with agreement than membership in a
Democratic group was, and membership in a mixed—party group
was only very weakly correlated with agreement,

Role orientations,--A second measure that was used

 

to determine the effect of informal group membership upon
the legislators‘ perceptions of and orientations towards
the legislative process was their perceptions of their
own role in the legislature“ One hundred and five of the

legislators were asked:

, e 1;, how would you describe the job of
being a legislator--what are the most important things
you should do here? Are there any important diff-
erences between what you think this job is and
the way your constituents see it? What are they?
On the basis of the replies to these questions the legis-
lators were classified in terms of five different orien-
tationsolo The first orientation dealt with purposive roles.
At first it was attempted to classify the responses into
the same role orientations used by Wehlke and his asso-
ciates in the orientation they called purposive roles.ll
However, difficulty was experienced in determining into
which role many of the responses fell, and many responses
could not be classified at all, Therefore, three new role
orientations were established which, it was felt, dis—
criminated bettel between the reSponses. These cate—
gories were: Protector, Broker, and Interested Broker,
The Protector was a legislator who defined his role as that
of discovering and/or promoting the public interest, the
interests of his district, or the will of the people. A
Broker, on the other hand, defined his role as that of
balancing end/or compromising conflicting interests or

public demands. And an interested Broker combined the other

 

n- _.._...._.

10Replies to some of the other questions were also
used when they were relevant.

llWahlke et al., op, cit., pp, 245-60.

two roles, attempting to balance and compromise interests
or demands, but doing so in the light of some idea of the
general interest or will.

Of the lOS members interviewed, eight could not be
classified, and of the remaining 97, B8 (59.8 per cent)
were Protectors, 33 (34.0 per cent) were Interested Brokers,
and 6 (6.2 per cent) were Brokers.

The second orientation dealt with the legislators‘
representational roles.l2 A Trustee was a representative
who saw himself as making his decisions on the basis of his
own judgment--his own assessment of the facts and his own
conceptions of right and wrong. On the other hand, a
Delegate saw his job as being that of faithfully reflecting
the desires and instructions of certain other persons--
be they of his district, his party, or some other group.

A Politico occupied the middle ground between the Trustee
and the Delegate, viewing his job as being that of re-
flecting others' desires and using his own judgment.

There were eight response which could not be assigned to
any of the three role orientations, and M4 (45.u per cent)
of the representatives were Trustees, 36 (37.1 per sent)

were Politicos, and 17 (l7.5 per cent) were Delegates.

 

12The role orientations used here are the same as those
developed by Wahlke and his associates, See ibid., pp.

267—86.

116

The third orientation dealt with areal roles.l3 Here
the legislators were classified as being either District
Oriented (being primarily concerned with their districts‘
needs and interests), or State Oriented (being concerned
with state wide needs and interests), or State-District
Oriented (being concerned with both state wide and their
districts' needs and interests). Eleven members could not
be classified due to inadequate responses, and of the re-
maining 9H members, 33 (35.1 per cent) were District
Oriented, 31 (33.0 per cent) were State-District Oriented,
and 30 (31.9 per cent) were State Oriented.

A fourth orientation that was developed dealt with

m

the members' legislative .tyle. Some were classified as
Legalists, i.e., they stressed the use of formal channels
of communication and influence in performing their legis-
lative duties; others were classified as Pragmatists, i.e.,

they stressed the use of informal channels of communication

and influence. Only eight members (8.7 per Cent) were

found to be Legalists, while 8M (9l.3 per cent) were found
to be Pragmatists. Thirteen members could not be classi—
fied.

The fifth and final orientation concerned the members’

roles towards their constituents. They were considered

 

13The role orientations used here are again the same
as those developed by Wahlke and his associates. ibid.,
pp. 287-310.

Antagonistic if they rezerred to their constitutents as
lacking interest and/or knowledge in legislation or in
their activities agd_condemned them for this lack. Repre—
sentatives were considered Affective if they referred to
their constituents as possessing interest and/or know-
ledge in legislation r their activities. And repre-
sentatives were considered Neutral if they made mixed re—
ferences in regard to their constituents' interest and
knowledge, or indicated a lack of constituent interest
and/or knowledge, but without blaming them for this lack.
Of the 105 legislators interviewed 15 could not be classi-
fied, 17 (18.9 per cent) were Antagonistic, 54 (60.0 per
cent) were Neutral, and 19 (21.1 per cent) were Affective.
On the basis of these five orientations an Index
of Agreement on Role Orientations (lARO) was found by
means of the electronic computer for every possible pair
of representatiVes. A score of l.OOO indicated conolete
agreement on all five orientations, and a score of .000
indicated complete disagreement on all five orientations.lu
The mean index of all possible pairs of legislators in each
informal group was calculated in order to give the groups'

IARO’s. As was done for the rules of the game, the mean

IARO was also found for all pairs of le islators and for

 

lMSee Appendix B for a full description of how this
and the other indices used in this study were constructed.

all pairs of legislators in both of the parties, in order

to octain the legislative, Republican, and Democratic IARO‘S.
The effect that informal group membership had upon

agttnflnent (mi rolte<>rierMLaticwns was (Lateriirred if} the swnre

manner as was done in the case of the rules of the game.

The group lARO's of the one-party groups were compared with

their parties‘ IARO’s, and of the mixed-party groups with

H
r [1

the IARO of the enti‘. House. The general results

are given in Table £02.15 There was no correlation between
primary group membership and agreement on role orientations—-
no distinct pattern of any kind emerged. There was even

a slight tendency for more groups to be under the IARO s

they were compared with than to be over, although this

was offset by the fact tnat the groups that were over tended
to be over the lARO’s they were compared to a slightly
greater extent than what the groups that were under their

lARO‘s were under them. (See Table n.2,) There was a

F)

slight party difference with tne Dem crats having two
groups over their IARQ and only one under.

However, a rather surprising situation was found in
that secondary group membership was somewhat correlated
with agreement on role orientations. Nine of the fourteen

secondary groups (6A.3 per cent) were over the IARO’s they

were compared with, and they were a few more index points

 

15See Appendix F for figures showing the index of
every group.

119

BLE 4.2.-—lnformal Group Membershi
ment on Role Orientat

 

 

 

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Y?

over them than those that were under were under them (.C;4
versus .053). This tends to contradict Hypothesis Three
(b), which held that the cohesiveness of the outputs of
primary groups is greater than that of secondary groups.

The best explanation for this finding would seem to be that
in the context of a legislative system, legislators who

have developed instrumental, task-oriented relations will
influence each other s orientations towards their legis-
lative tasks. Primary contacts, on the other hand, not
being specifically task—oriented, will not have the same
impact upon orientations towards the representativesE
legislative duties. Of course, in line with what was stated
at the beginning of this chapter, persons may seek out

other members who already have similar perceptions of the
legislative system for task-oriented contacts, while for

primary--friendshi —-contacts one s perception of the legis-

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lative system would be considered more or les

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Another pa.tern emerged in regard to partisan differ—

groups seemed to have more of an

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effect upon the role orientations of their members than
Republican groups did upon theirs. Combining the primary
and secondary groups, the Democrats had five groups over
their IARO and only two under; while the Republicans had
six groups over their lARO and eight under. This is es—
pecially difficult to explain due to the opposite situation

1

in the case of the rules of the game: there the Republican

groups showed slightly more cohesiveness in outputs, one
possible explanation is that the Re ublicans, being the
majority party, were more concerned with and conscious of
the operations and procedures of the House than the
Democrats were. The Democrats, on the other hand, due to
their seemingly perpetual minoritv status, had grown more
concerned with and conscious of individual roles and goals,
not with the rules that were keeping the House running re-
latively smoothly,

In summary, primary informal group membership was not
correlated with agreewent on role orientations, secondary
informal group membership was somewhat correlated with
agreement on role orientation, and the Democratic groups
showed greater correlation between group membership and
agreenewfli on twile oriawfl31tions iflrin eitlrer the thaiolic n
or mixed—party groups did"

Roll. call ‘JOllffiga"FtDll (Kill votixig vris tire thiiii ttqy:

 

D

Oi output measured and aralrzed in relation to informal

roll calls recorded in the 195;

(1‘

group membershil, All th
session of the House of Representatives were included in
the study, except those in which less than 75 per cent of
the membership participated and those in which the losing
side consisted of less than l0 per cent of those voting.
In other words, those roll calls that were “nnnimous or
near unanimous were eliminated, as well as those which

provoked so little interest that more than one-fourth of

122

the members did not participatea The unanimous and near
irarirous vo wt es were eliminated because they would not
allow differing patterns of vcting among the members to
emerge, and those votes marked by high absenteeism were
eliminated because votes engendering little interest would
most likely not possess sufficient motivation to activate
informal channels of influence.16
Of the 700 roll call votes of the 196M session, 27A
met the established criteria.17 On the basis of these 27&
votes an Index of Voting Ag1~e‘ nt (IVA) was determined by
means of the electronic computer for all possible pairs of
legis la.tors The index for each pair of legislators was
based only on those roll calls in which both legislators
participated: if either legislator was absent on a roll
call, that roll call was eliminated from the computations

of their IVA018 As with the other indices used in this

 

l"Claow vot icrg could also conceivably indicate a great
deal of controversa aid resulting absenteeism to avoid taking
a public stand) However, this was not the case during the
1964 session of the Micligan House of Representatives; the
votes with the greatest pazt.icipatior were on the most con~
troversia.l questions, ior which both sides would rally their
supporterso

(

17Most of the votes that were liminated were elimi-
nated because the losing side consisted of less than lO per
cent of those voting» Relatively few were eliminated be-
cause less than 75 per cent of the neubeisnip participated
in them, The large number of unanimous and near unanimous
roll calls is due to the fact that record roll call votes are
required in Lichigan on final passage of all bills and amend-
ments,

18 - o ‘1 o o 0
See Appendix B for a iull description of how this
and the other indices used in this study were constructed.

A. ‘ 7 dr‘\;’\‘ ~— 5' .v 4— -v ,3 -~ , —. » ~r £- —‘.’ 1 1
C Ul Anka if” lCatSJ. "15.97;:“lcllt Ull 11.1.1.

and an index score of .390 indicated dis—

+
W
T)
"i
O
H
F—‘
0
L1
l._.
;_I
U:

agreeweuu: on all Iflra roll calls,
Whether there was a correlation between informal group
membership and voting agreement was detern irle d in the same

y'r‘

tent on the rules of

(1‘

0Q
'1

mann r as was done in regari to

me and the role orientations.

’Ll‘

the g
Table &,3 shows that there was a clear, even though

gr eement and member-

<1

oting

{1‘

not mt org, correlation between
ship in inforra .1 gr oups. And the unexpected pattern found
in regard to role orien tations--that of secondary group
membership having a. greater impa.ct than prima.ry group member-
ship--was the case here again,19

Fiftemn1zaf the 14- pflnalff‘;lflup3 ( his? {was cent) aware
over the IVA‘s they were compared with, although they were
not over to a very great extento But an even greater pro-
portion of the secondary groups were over the 135 s the;

‘~ ‘ " r" \ 1 ’7 I' ' . ' ”‘ .‘ AI . I' F. I “’ . ': a ‘ . / " . ‘5 ‘, , , v n 4’“ ' ‘ P, ’ ;-\
were comtazei w-tn (la out oI ll to: a pert: tlge oI b .I,,

anfl-‘erd,t 1D FLliljlljJ big-“(:11I,u-.:.4-lT..——u.)ll tall LLVT'ng": Lhrtuv W231":

"‘-\ ‘7”! r n "y 'I ~’ 7’ ,—\‘ x‘ V,. ' .‘ \ ‘4. It. "" '-'\ "'\‘1
Over the eir IxA s to a gneaten extent tnan the piimary Qiuhpn

the primary groups were (although in the latter case the dif-

ference was excee'ingly small)" (See Table 4»3-)

 

19It is irIeresting to note, however, that the origiral
hvpothesis did not rest upon strong p1evious 1 hsearch See
the footno e to PFOPOSitiOU 3 (b) at the close of the ‘irst
section of Chapt e1 ll;

M53.--lnformal Group Membershi

H)

1....

p.
Agreement)

he

Index of v

‘7

oting

 

 

 

 

CVer their lVA*s* Under their IVA’s*
Ava no Av, no
of index of index
Groups N % pts. over N % pts, under
Primary 13 78,9 ,053 K 2111 .OSM

(both parties)

Democrats

:0
1)
T3
I;
O“
H
'5—1.
~D
L\
<
( D
’ I

H
F\V\

OhdaFy
both part

Sec
/
K .

U}

H.
1,
L]

F—1
O
O

( in

U)

 

Democrats j f J 0/0 1 ?‘,U ,011
Republicans ZCC C 10?} O C “ ---—
,g . » _~ 1' «I . s - m a 1‘ ,/
Fixed 4 ;o,O ,o A 1 eq,b .dio
' , ' _ _ 1 '! _ 0 Y , ' ‘f i ,_ ' i ‘1-
*What i: We) t by Ibeir IMA‘b 3 t1: IVA‘s with
which the irfor'xl ET”JC l A’s we ”0'911ei,

Bitmali

to be the one advanced 1n regard to the rol
In a legislative Sister, 3 task-oriented gr

ie

V?

islative outputs

a...

nontesk-oriented groups wil

:7

chapter to be the case h;re) Apparently,
Wichigan legislators were so pressirg that

influence the greater
less important
thew

‘.\..\a

{/1

third

the

c agreenert
_k ,- i.,

.r

ba' on

w

r40
F“

V C l i if:

,1 V
F—lc

possibly we s r

a
,4
,A

forwal rela esentati

(1%

(prim

.‘v
\
I...

on would

eem
:3

orientations

oup will have

1, will

ary) groups

in the

demard

Q

(U

in t

{I}

contacts was

which helped

factors-such

j'

i—‘\
.4

1f]-

the

ves sought out

persons tith whit the; F ew they already agreej for
sccorde/L’lsorTC Is, :wij wire r*r“: wilii g tilefm:u;iish
primary relati/ c witl per37ns wi‘t wh w i? ii; gre u.
However, the fact that mor> secundar, than [TifiiTV thtiie
weqe made acrlss party lines seers to ouote’dict this r
planation In in; case, as wzs noted at the sta1t of thi
chapter, it is extrerelv difficult to deny that +here wow

Y‘,

A 4'

forcing prot

l .1
w

U)
f

goirg

O N

hen“e.

pI'B‘Jl<DliB

0‘

:roach to legislative decisions--

Certain partisan differences also emerged in regard

to informal group membership and voting agreement, As was
the case with the role orientations Democratic groups
showed slightly greater agreement than Republican groups
did: Democratic groups tended to be over their IVA to a
gr eater extent than Republican groups were over theirs.
This was true to only a small degree for the primary

1n

groups but to a considerao le :1

(D
#4)
0
b5
(‘1‘
)W
CD
(CD

rer pondary groups

(U
(IQ

(See Table #33) A plausible explanation for this would be
that the Democratic groups were more cohesive and united
(as measured by the Index of Group Cohesion and the average
number of outside connections per member) than the Repub-
lican gr ups were. As reported in Chap Ier l_ll this was in
fact the case, in the case of both primary and secondary
groups the Democratic groups had higher lGC s and fewer
outside connections per member. (Compare Tables 3.fl and
3I6~l Thus the greater cohesiveness in voting among the

Ikerocratic 23%)“ s corresptfirhg to their ‘being nwrwe closely

In regard to the nixed-groups a pattern which had

be
a

(D

n present to a very weak degree earlier, was more

evident in their voting, The mixed—groups tended to

A)

fluctuate more widely than the one—ptrty groups, with
some fairly far above the legis slative TVA and others
fairly far below it, (See Table fl,3.) However, this

condition can be explained on the basis that some of the

S

* fiiviied betweeh the two

[I

~rties, while others were composed predominatly of members

b
from one partyo Of the five groups in which members were
evenly divided between the two parties or in which one

party had only one more member than the other party had,

(T

four were below the legisla ive lVA: And of the Seven
groups in which one party was clearly in the eajority, all
seven were above the IVAO The IVA of a mixed-party group

0 have be largely ietersined by whether there

91
"(7
"O

(D

>11

'1

U)

(_f

(D

:3

J
O

was a predominance of member'

would tend to increase its ltAn anormal gloap membership

"D

f‘ct upon

Ft)

did.rm3t sewar tC)liave a ‘Jer3r<:lear CM“:signiiT1cent ea

I

the voting agreement of Kembers of nixed—part5 groupsa

Roll call votirg b? sobgect area --The roll call votes

0 _3 VI

in six sobdect areas-—“sproprietiors, educatiou, Jusiciary,

Ll

labor, local government, and taxatioh-—were analyzed

([1
T)
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pr
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correlation between ihiorm*l group HCWCerHlp am} voting

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agreenwnnt variewl from Lfll:

rt

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it was oiscoverea that in

h . , ,. ...‘,., 1 h ‘ -, 4. - , “- . ,.',t_ _ . .\- h ‘ V‘ . .. c m-
Eippr‘qprld.t10hb , 491,30: , filial tfiuufie :A.T~l-k,‘li pl lilil ,j' . Otlp JLU..AL'C3L

0%

ti did appear to be correlated with voting egeeemeht,

'U

r
y.

(See Table 4035) This we

(12
l,
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$ 10
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party groups, 2%)(3? whom were almmhs their perties‘ IVA s

and only 10 were below” This pattern also held for the

ooownsm :ofio :H ooozHoCH mHHso.HHos

Ho games; exp Op somog muse goom CH m.z o£B*

 

 

 

128

em u 2 mm H 2 mm H z \mw n 2 mm H 2 *HH u z
is oH is 0H m m Hm m is 9H Hi 0 Hesse
H e H s H e m m m m a m emtz
H 3 H 3 m m m m H x m m mgeoHHojgom
m m m m m m H m H n o e m eLQQEnm
mgzoec

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m 0H 9 0H m HH s NH 0 mH m :H Hesse
m e m e m m n x n y m m eutz
m o m e a r m o m o m @ mgesHHpssmm
m o H m H m H m o m 3 m musLsQEwa

masarHo
xasEHLm

 

m.<>H m.<>H m_<>H m,<>H m_<>H m,<>H m_<>H m.¢>H m_<>H m_<>H m_<>H m,<>H

 

Loocs Lo>o Loos: Lo>o Loos: Ho>o Loses Lo>o Lodz: Lv>o Loos: po>o
coHpoon .p>oo HmoOH zpmHoHUSh :cwpsosom Lopsd gmoeom<

 

odop<
poomosw mo ozoEooLw< wcHoo> Lo KoogH who Use angLoQEoz Q3090 HsE90sznu,:.: mHm<e

129

Democratic secondary groups, and the Republican secondary
groups in the case of labor issues. A survey of the
issues involved in each of the subject categories reveals
that apprOpriations and labor were the most partisan sub-
ject areas of the six areas selected; education was a semi-
partisan area; and judiciary, taxation, and local govern-
ment were largely non-partisan areas.21 Thus the pattern
emerged that partisan issues provided a greater correlation
between informal group membership (especially primary group
membership) and voting agreement than the non-partisan
issues did.22

The best explanation for this situation seems to be
that whenever an issue was defined as being of importance
to the party, members of informal groups tended not to
risk incurring the disapproval of their fellow informal
group members. If, on the other hand, the issue was de-

fined as being non-controversial or unimportant to the

 

21This division is based upon the relative number of
straight or nearly straight party votes. See Table ”.5 for
an indication of the cohesiveness of the parties in the
six subject areas.
‘2The effects of party have, of course, been controlled
for by using each party's index of agreement as the basis
for comparing the groups’ indices of voting agreement. The
voting agreement referred to here is over and above the
mean party agreement. It is interesting to note that this
pattern is the opposite of the one Truman found for Con-
gressional state party delegations. He found greater co-
hesion on unimportant, trivial issues and on issues that
split the parties than on issues on which the parties were
united. See Truman, op. cit., pp. 249-69.

130

party or was one that hopelessly divided the party anyway,
deviating from group norms (if there were any) did not incur
the same disapproval. This would also explain why the
Republican groups tended not to be as cohesive in voting

as the Democratic groups were (this was especially true

of their secondary groups, but it was true to some extent
of their primary groups as well). In all three of the par—
tisan areas, the Democrats had considerably more unity

than the Republicans had. (See Table u,5,) Further evi—
dence for this explanation is that in the one area-—
taxation--where the Republicans showed considerably more
unity than the Democrats the reverse of the pattern
mentioned earlier was found: membership in Democratic
groups tended not to be correlated with voting agree-

ment, but membership in Republican was correlated with
voting agreement. Apparently if an issue were de-

fined as being one in which unity was necessary and desira—
ble, group membership acted to increase that unity, but

in cases in which unity was not perceived as being neces-
sary or desirable, group membership did not act to in—
crease unity,

In summary, it can be concluded that informal group
membership (except for mixed-party groups) was correlated
with voting agreement, and that this was more true of (l)
secondary than primary groups, (2) Democratic groups than

Republican groups, and (3) partisan than nonpartisan issues.

l3l

TABLE A.5.--Party Indices of Voting Agreement.

 

 

 

Democrats Republicans
Appropriations .864 .753
Labor .871 .724
Education .791 ‘ .7ou
Judiciary .724 .678
Local Government .705 .736
Taxation .709 .837

 

Conclusions.--The evidence reported in this section

 

of the chapter lends support to Hypothesis Three. However,
this was the case only for the one—party groups; mixed-
party group membership did not seem to have an effect upon
the cohesiveness of outputs. The evidence tends to contra-
dict Hypothesis Three (b): in the 1964 session of the
Michigan House of Representatives membership in secondary
groups seemed to have a greater impact upon the cohesiveness
of legislative output than membership in primary groups

had.

Informal Groups as Sources of Information

 

Hypothesis Four states: HInformal groups tend to

serve as sources of information on legislation and legisla-

I

tive procedures for their members.‘ This hypothesis could

no- b: tests; “g .-.e} J.e to the n
available, but tnr.e H~s some EijwAC
give support to it

in the (owls: oi tseix inter‘i

A;
f:\‘ : L

l (.1
PACK

‘ Hi.)
‘1"? P: J. v

Lation vflifln other nxw bets cm txie Hous

with them,

i “0 , 7 .,‘ .i‘ ‘10 1 r ‘ A” p. '_ Al,
itvl81~tlve matter; ml*n otner member

.. .—. . p . . .. . r "I . r. . . fl .
responses 0 tHe renainiyg lC3 are su
“ I 1 r '* ‘, rv ‘F‘ L ) A 1 3 '\ r
whicn shows how many oi L3: is isla

rved each of the three

reported their conversations serVe. one oi the

irw conjiuwctiwni witti othewfi purpg

TABLE 4 6.--thtu£.

 

1A 'positicmu

mmarized in
tors

purposes,

' t w ,
CL o L). .

1\

th-Iweprfi

I

iriformaticmu

sentatives

W0

OP

did not dissuss
n P ‘71r.’_) H‘w‘ "3
3D 01. '. i\-- L)\J.S_.o

rted

T

(D

O

P

and how

you talk

rk

wha

their

purposes

Pd legisla°

COM“

many

 

 

 

P141 I‘p i-) x; h; K)? {V ‘ "y / — E g) 4 1.“?! L3 11‘! t .x' l l_ J: ('31 C“ J}. ~
w-_,. - m a .. c;
Iraiorrratixm; (m lyr 5b

iriiwatrnafl;ix3ri p iLiS ~\urr—1's
Persuasion only
PersuaSion plus otnvvs

Compromise only

Compromise plus others

0\

‘L'x
pA

*4.

The most commonly cit ed purpose of conversations w
other legislators was to give or obtain info mation. As
one legislator put it, ”I‘d say in most cases we like to
get tne facts-~get what is true, the right information.

Much of it [legislation] is of a technical nature and the

true information is needed.H Over oneehalf of the legis—
lators mer tio nej giJing or otta inirg info mat ion as at least

one of their purposes in talking with other legislators.
Clearly, exchanging information was a crucial function of
informal relations.

This leaves the question of whether informal groups
functioned as disseminators of information. Unfortunately,
there was no direct evidence with which to answer this
question. The interview questions on which this section
of the chapter is based were, however, asked just after the

question on friends and just before the question on whom

i
U)
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l

tlna‘represewfiyatives (flilfl
- 1 ‘ ”V . w « w /' ~- A ”x '- 1 ’\ - "u /'~ 7‘ . ,. ‘ 1 /\ ‘ ' ' ". O "" VI
qw1stions wnose re.ponses were used in the uncoveling o1

the irngmvril groups

what the legislators reported concerning the put po ses of
their conv rsations would apply to their informal group

M1t cts. But precision is lac ki 'ince nothing can be

In
(N
U 1

said concerning the particular infornal groups and the pur—

poses of the convers sa.tions oi7 th:e ir members with each other.

 

2 , .
2v’See Appendix A for a c0py of the complete interView

 

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.7.
.L.

CHAPTER V

THE BASES OF INFORMAL GROUPS

Introduction

 

The evidence presented in the previous chapters
demonstrates that informal groups existed in the Michigan
House of Representatives during the 1964 session and
that they had an effect upon the legislative process.
Given the existence and importance of informal groups
the question of what were their bases‘-why some representa-
tives were attracted to each other and not to others—~
becomes a significant question for the understanding of
the legislative process in the Michigan House of
Representatives.

It was hypothesized in Chapter ll that informal
groups would find their bases in the similar personal
and political characteristics of their members.
Hypothesis Two states: ”Informal groups tend to be
composed of legislators who share personal and political

” This chapter reports the testing of

question of what were the bases of informal group
membership.

13

U7

Personal Characteristics

 

As was stated in the footnote to Hypothesis Two,
two types of personal characteristics were expected to
be related to informal group membership. One consisted
of religious, ethnic, occupational, class, and educational

backgrounds, and the other consisted of the seating

Q)
o

algement on the floor of the House. Both types of

rsonal characterist’, were aria lyzed to detern mine

“(3
(1)
FA
('4
U)

whether or not they were related to informal group

membership,

 

Persoral ta'lgrollt .-—ln rder to determine if
members who possessed similar personal backgrounds tended

to be found in the same groups, an Index of Similar
Backgrounds (ISB) based on eight characteristics was de—

velo ped‘1 information was obtained from the inter—

V

views concerning tne re “’36Ht9th*”' religion, race,

mr- .w— t
l611tS

education, OCCUPitiON, DES, age, hometown, and P

to

8‘8. The lSB of every possible pair of legislators
was found,2 The index ranged from .000, indicating com—
plete dissimilarity, to 1.000, indicating complete

similaritv. The informal group lSB’s consisted of the

 

lSee ADDQNUlK B for a complete d;s c ription of how
this and the other in ices used in this st udy were con-
structed.

in this chapter were used

2This index and the others
r as the indices repOIted
l“

essentially in the same manne
in Chapter V, See supra, pf.

l. LJ
rd

0

1 Cr“ ;‘ -l r. ‘ my“ . V‘g “kg
icclol:tcL/-S ll; cit,

to
(i)
&\

J
0
”U
(f
:5”
(D
p l
f/ )
Ln
{ I
C

r-

9

PW)

Til. £,’leC 0

‘v‘ IN v-K

ve ibD consisted of the mean of the

(N
'f
U
i
T"
(I:
t l
D
\‘L‘
y—J
l
m
t).
UJ
*—
f
H.

TEE s of all tossible pairs of legislators; the Democratic

133, the mean of the lSB’s of all possible pairs of
Democrats; and the Republican TSB, the mean of all

To

P.
(D
_‘
(I:
\n.

possible pairs of Relubl ralyze the tendency

-‘

1i ar personal backgrounds to

O
H)
’1
(D
"O
,1
(D
(I)
(D
("f
Q?
(“f
F"
<
(D
(D
F“
C"
5‘
U)
H'
:3
t.)

\ear in the same informal groups, the D.

(D

mocratic group

P
TSB s were comp

ared with the Democratic TEE; the

Republican group LEE s, with the Republican £88; and the
mixed-party group I“B s, vith the legislative 185.

The results are shown in Table h.l. Representatives
who shared membership in an informal group tended to
have more similar backgrounds than the representatives

taken as a whole, although thi was nore true of

Cl)

primary thar;saamriiary groups aruixnoie lliN) of mixed~

party groups than ore—paltg groups.J

W O

the primary groups were

0
(0
(i
('1)
(J
r'"
3
(J
[l

Al?

1: (Di

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“lie clan p2 reed wl.tti. ammd. triej/ lLeilaf9J

—~ I‘ " ‘ v ’\ " “\ ‘ ', ‘» 4 '\ 3 ," <7 ‘ “ ‘ ’ ” ‘ V W 1‘ ' ‘ “ ' ) ‘. ' W
to be OVer them to a greater extent then What the groups

swa

that were under the 185 s tiey were compared with were
1‘" f‘. ; r" F A ". ‘ \ r ‘/‘ ~ ‘ 1' } ‘1 . '1 l l‘ "x ‘ ”1“ 714' "1
under then (.063 compared with .0e4). This patteln was

even more pronounced in the case of the mixed—party

primaPY'EfilepS, Wittléill seVen cm‘tfinmn 0V6fl”lflle legis—

 

gee Appendix E for the ISB of every informal group.

H
K ,U
(T)

-_ lfiember
y in Backgrounds.

I
lflr‘

D;

pfid the

 

 

 

ER

n' '.Y
14.3/ a

of Index
Pts 5 O‘V’Gr

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(7*

lati Hi IEEQ fixi trngv were) over if to a gflYJi er éa:tent iii n

what the one-oartv roucs were over their arties‘ ISB S
b J

talthough in the case of the Republican groups the dif—

" ‘u _ \ "‘| , .. -- -' , , ' . _-
Ierence was exceedingly small)» rurther evidence oi the

([3

formation of mixed-party groups emerged from the analy is

(“f

of h secondary groups” Only five of the nine one—party

(D

Q

n a" groups were over their parties: 155 8, while

(0
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O
0

four of the five mixed-party groups were over the legis-

Apparently a crucial factor in bringing persons of
different political parties together into informal groups
was similarity in their personal backgrounds, and not,

.c will be seen shortli, similarity in their political

(11
U

characteristics” This is in harmony with what was rcportec
in the previous chapter concerning mixed-party groups
havirg little, if anv, direct impact upon the legislative
Outputs analyzed, The patter» seems to be one of the

i

, c ,_ Mr ,i V. ’\~ V, \ .. i 7’, -0 .- , ,. \ J“ 7' h, ‘i 0 ,J :
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tics, and also

“I 1

nonpolitical, or personal, clara‘

(‘
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having little direct impact upon political, i.ee, legis-
lative, outputs. In short, the mixed—party groups appeared
to be nonpolitical in nature, However, it should be noted
that this still leaves the possibility that thev may have

V

had a more indirect impact upon outputs by acting as a

lUO

.91 _ “‘4 '4 “ !‘ §.-_ ‘P‘ —- 1 V’ . ~ - . '7 n » w w‘ ~ "V A <3 V' _ -— .- ‘7‘ w , -.« 7/ ,V‘
labiiwiallo .LlL ofltj icblolullvc L/LLJCCSD U1 bk; p61. lOl’lllffré
_ A _, o --
some other Such iunctionl

A

m

w s m ntioned earlier the backgrounds of primary

(ll
(II

group members tended to be more similar than those of
secordary group members. Fifteen (78,9 per cent) of the
primary groups were over the lSB‘s they were compared with,
and nine (64,3 per cent) of the secondary groups were,

And the primary groups were over an average of ,063 index
points; the secondary groups an average of $037 index
points, In one way this pattern conforms to the pattern
found within the mixed-party groupsn The mixed groups

had little direct eff ct upon legislative output, and their

(Tl

members fund sindltm“ backgrtxuris, The rndwmxry groups
tended to be similar to the mixed groups in that they

had less direct effect on output and greater similarity
in backgrounds than the secondary groups had. it appears
that to some extent the primary groups shared in the non—
political nature of the mixed-party groups, however, the

(I °

primary groups merelv leaned in th direction of the

kl)

mixed—party groups, for the primary groups both had more
effect upon output than the mixed groups had and possessed
less similarity in backgrounds than the mixedeparty
groups did.

The Republican primary groups showed greater similarity
in background than the Democratic groups did, The Demo-

cratic groups were found to be the exact opposite of

what would be expected from the above analysis: their

L

,v, 1,. _ .,. - ’—
\tv ) ‘lley' b“ \){$ .1 :4 ij‘ “ 5 14:2: blrrlle L’, tn Lz‘l-j.l

secordary grOups to have high lSB‘s conforms to the

'\ ’. ,‘ 'v v - ' ‘ - r ‘ . V, “‘“\ w .- /' -'- fx ‘ w , ’,— 1.» v. -._ “1"“ ‘v t,‘ ' ‘
gener;-l3 hign cohesiveness or the Democratic groUps it

Ontputs and their high sin;ila rity in personal and politicil

}_J
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H

and will be seen

{3“

9F

03
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, ‘ +—’ g,‘
characteristics \as seen

(D

in this chapter)1 An explanation for this high cohesion

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$4
+
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only makes the low EBB s of the Democratic
primary groups more puzzling, Why did they not fit this

CA

otherwise uniform pattern of high similarity? An in-

H.
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ion of the two groups that fell under the Demo

y—q

-evealed that both of them were fairly evenly

{0
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ded between Negro, Protestart repres eltatiVes an white,

P.
<
Ho

d
Catholic representatives, lhis at least in part ex-
plains tine low liifizsn Both cu‘ilrese grrnuss socrwai high

in re ELI i to the other personal characteristic to be
considered and in two of the three political characteris-
tics to be considered, lhis seemed to be a case of the
other personal che cieri tic and the political character—

istics overco l g a la.k of cown‘* personal backgrounds

V

in race arfilxnsligionl

\

(”i

stic the

H.

S r

ting arrargementq—-A second charactt

(D
{D

 

had been hypothe s1 ized to be related to informal group

membership was physicad,<ibmseness in the seating

in?

v_

gr'raiigyennetit cmi tf.e fl itir oi“ Tilt? ihnapsee, 111 liggtyt oi" VM1321
was found in regard to personal backgrounds, it was

also expeciefl——since again a personal rather than a

x.
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was at stake--thet primary
groups weald rank higher than secondary groups and mixed-

Ar than one-party groups}L In order

V‘\

party groups hi gh

(

to test this hypothesis each group was analyzed to
determine how many of its pairs of members were sitting

in such a manner that their desKs touch (either to the

CD

sides, frort or back, or diagonally). The number of such
pairs in each group was divided by the total possible
number of pairs in the group to give the percentage of

its pairs of members sitting next to each other out of the
total_rufirber of pairsa Timxus percents es vmnweeaveraged

for the groups broken down by party and type of group.

-

(Sce Table 5 20)

 

“It will be recalled from Chapter III that both self-
le%:.ion aumi t ci’rents 45f cirW3nmsiwm1ce éfilCEP iri the
a-ilotiiig air nggtszn ll efm rel itiryi t :twraen (ilos2r1esé3 iri

‘ i“ «rel grmmm3rmanbership ccndlilxaxbie in part
group menhers selecting seats near emch other.
:t the accidents fid‘tjiwwhtstance also ehter so that

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he 110‘

/

cvrre *t1(fll etweer. 11“ormul grfinqirnfinbersiip Biflitjlkg?‘
ness 1* .121‘ ng <Mfl‘u31 re ~yqitiineirgmuwély on tip: basis
of tervrembe s sw-lw311wg s—zflxS'near tfififill31hfr. llemJil-
tiOVg 115 has trash dismygsseyié%irliery ‘1 reirwknrzihg {HW)C%SS

wonlfi be expected to be present, with the original re—
1 5:1 ti 012-5111. p wh i h ‘ T: (3 ch 05; 1 pg nearby 5 ea t. s bei mg
strengthened,

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More interesti;

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cent,

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found her

character

of members

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pg.

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groups were,

Republican

ferences

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exp:

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pattern

evidencea

same

personal backgrounds

ather than political,

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The

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lightly stronger in the percentages

LA

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true of both

(73171 53h 0T1 h if I"-

though in all cas.

small.

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19‘ O f n”- H r; * .1,
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the secondary

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D 31Tt111g Ill:
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1.1. ': 9 ft»:
ewer newbers

each

the

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other;

groups

personal

O

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7 ~ 0 1 r l < A r ) 7 '
iigrml Ll ;,i llg - 3*to::its :,: a e»r3 g7: ~iidcl lJ

‘ 7 ‘ h v v . m N .. 1 ‘
in: Vuh~ ul P"“l LSJC mic-L311 giollsa 4E3 percentage;

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(3? group Weitwfi225i1ttirg hear e331;
fluidly lb: SJVfi Iui hlndj eh? Qfle‘puity glOupo, :VCH

hendicap to over-

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In sucmerg, it was icond that physijal closeness in
1 ~ 3 , -n— , 2 r ‘vv A ‘ a 9 I ' r v l V a
tie Segtl g girarg~:—u_ on the fluo: Oi tne house was le-

U
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., i , . .1 ;: ~ M, a'fl ,.,g. ,,
lated to gzoup webbeisnip, first this wu- more

true of primary than secondary groups, and that this was
almost equally true 0* filX€\ and one—party groups (despite
the party divisior in seitirg arrangements that mixed
groups red to ore some), The eviderce aided support to

l

Hypothesis Two. and the pattern of the less politic

L

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groups restirg more upon personal ChaffiCtgpi‘ it, than

 

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chaisrcteriiH3ics, <onirdxnas urni.sttiimtigs, amul the arttrsctium:

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would also be more

istics than mixed-party

gr

 

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that d

8:90;

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#351

more hi ly related to

al characteristics than primary group
hat one-party group membership

highly related to these character-

oup membership would be,

Partistc all giarce,—-As has been noticed all along
a majority of the groups were corpose” of members of only
one party, ;his was true Ff l2 of the 19 primary groups
(63,2 per cent) and 9 o: the 4 secordary groups
(64,3 per cent), The difference was very slight, but

there was a slightlr higqe
primary groups that were

4.

in ljjle witli the gratterri o

more directly politic

 

al than

proportion of secondary than

iriiiatuisa, whicfli was

f the secondary groups being

the primary groups, in

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secondary firmzigirurlry groups,
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lStlc tall Wn‘ *HJiyged to determine its leiitlorchlp to
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states that one of the p-l
nnanberss of if Foiccil gl<)tps

‘. ‘ "'- ‘s ' j ". - t I . ' l, I . I“ . 0 Km ' " c ;
liictt ghgladfeiloilcs tflai
teri to share is an a‘tra(tion
~ fl \ ’ , r‘ I’\'\ .- w r . L A,
leaders who possess QU1lltleS

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in order to test this hgpothesis the Index tr

Potential Attractiveness (IPA) descr

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was used‘ A group was considered a leader oriented

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two crdfixgria were +Hstatlishezf

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t3 groups

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150

this political characteristic than the one-party second—

ary groups (the more glitical groups),

'77

Opinions anfl attitudes,--The third political charac—

 

teristic that had been hypothesized to constitute a basis
of informal groups was opinions and attitudes in order
to arrive at a rough measure of the legislators‘ opinions
and attitudes one area was selected and the representatives
were asked four questions in this area, The area selected
was what is popularly considered political liberalism versus
0 R o 1 -
conservatism,“ The questions attempted to determine the
representatives‘ attitudes towards government action and
intervention in four fields: The questions were:
Now, I would like yrou p ri ion on some questions
that are fr qlentl/ discu ed b}; both legislators
and the gen Jeral public.
a, Generally, would you say that the state
government as a whole here in Michigr'

1 i
doing too fiuch, not enough, or the light
dWO‘Ml to help labor?

b. Generallgu vanild you sagfiflmat the st;t:
goveuwnrent sis a vdndle is Choirg tcx) much,
not enough, or the right amount for those
in special need, such as those in need
due to sicKness or old age?

c, Genet ll,, would you say that the state
government as a whole is doing too much,
not erough, or the right amount to help
business?

 

5Liberalism and conservatism are used here in the
pOphlar sense in which they refer to positive and negative
attitudes towalis governmental ownership, intervention,
and regulation of the economy; measures for promoting
equalitarianism and social we lfamr through government
action; etc.

151

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sent as a wholt is doilg too much, not enough,
' the right amount ior Negro rights?

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limihat i lro m the analysis
because during the course of the interviewing it became
apparent that the term ”business” was ambiguous, Some re~
presentatives understood it to refer to big business--
the large corporations--and others to all industries, and
still others to every form of business enterprise, in-
cluding even small retail storesc

On the basis of the three remaining questions an
index of Similar Opinions (ISO) was constructed in a
manner similar to the other indices...6 This index measured

the amot nt 01 agreement between every possible pair of

(i
D

i.s‘

(

legislators, The informal groups‘ indices, tr 1e par

indices, and the total legislature index were deter-

mined in the same manner as had teen done with the other
indices reptited earlier,
Table 5‘4 sunmariees the results.’ Overall,

representatives who shared membership in an informal
group tended to have more sinilar opinions and attitudes
than the representatives as a whole did, although this

was more true of seconVary than primary groups and did not

 

6See Appendix B for a full description of how this
and the other indices used in this study were constructed.

7‘See Appendix E for the 180 of every informal groiu a

}__;
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Over tneir ISO 3* Shae their LSO*S*

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conforms perfectly

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the primary groups
they were with,

secondary groups were, in
were over

over them

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to the pattern noticed earlier,
per

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153

, ,~. —V we, “WA ,
w.» gIOopco the

Of
cent were over the indices

cent of the

t 71,ll per

both cases the groups that

the ISO s they were compared with tended to be

to a considerably greater degree than the ones

that were under the 180’s they were compared with were under

them,

earlier,

larity of opinions and attitudes to

As had been expected from the pattern established

the mixed-party groups did not reflect simi-

a great extent, This

gave added evidence to the conclusion that bases for the

mixed—party groups,

which apparently

did not have a

directly political nature, must be sought among the

personal--not the political

When the mixed groups

-characteristics,

were removed tne or

pattern

tlma seccwmryry grtnnos beirgg relaTw—l to a :siriladdfity of‘
opinions and attitudes was efer strong~---and this V15 *l:
case for both parties, Reven of tne nine ngups were

over their parties‘ ISO’S, and they were over them to 2
greater extent than the two groups were that were unler

their parties‘ 180‘s were

There mmnme signiidxxmit diffEuwnrces

Republican and Democratic primary groups,

under

them,
between the
of

All three

the Democratic primary groups were over the Democratic

ISO, and only four

of the nine Republican primary gr0t

\A"!

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were over the Repuhlisgn T77. The failure of the Repu~
blican groups to be related to similarity of opinions——
a political chat acte‘: istic ——conformed to the general
pattern of the primary gIOdps tending to be non—
political in nature, An explanation of the Democratic
groups’ high relationship to similarity in Opinions is

given later in this chapter,

('1‘

In summary, i was found that secondary groups tended
to be more relatxxi‘to similarity cfl"<moinions than prim ta.r5
groups were, that mixed-party groups were not clearly re—
Lated to similarit57ixi Opinions, Emmi tnat Den ocra tic
primary groups were related to similarity in opinions and

Republican primary groups were not,

Constituercv chjtact ris tic s,--The footnote to

 

Hypothesis Two includes tne sectional and demographic
nature of the cc nsti tuon,1es as one of the political

Characteristics that members oi inlormal groups tend to

S”Eie, It Was 113? “VP””T€3 that tr: l’J”—Pa_ ' j‘i
p11 mer5 gremlns ui‘ -d c~> less ifleldc~il t» irils cra_’;cteli:tl_o

than the one—part5 secondary groups,

An index of Similar Constitutencies (188) was COL‘
structed in order to measure the extent to which members
rep esented similar constituencies.

based upon five constituency characteristics: the per-

 

ndix E for a cor' pl
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description of how this
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relatively low degree of

U)

imilarity in the constituencies
of the secondary one—party groups, whereas on the basis of

the pattern noticed earlier the opposite had been xpected,

(D

Only five secondary one-party groups were over their
parties: ISCES and four were under, However, closer in—
spection revealed that it was the Republican secondary

groups, not the D

(D

mocratic, that possessed this lack of
constituency similarity,

In summary, it was found that membership in mixed“
party groups was not related to similarity in constituencies,
but that membership in both primary and secondary one-party=
groups was, except in the case of the Republican secondary
groups- The pattern of nixed-party groups being related
to similarity in personal, but not political, characteristics
held, but the pattern of the prinary groups being more re—
lated to personal than political characteristics did not
(an explanatior for this latter condition is attempted in

the next section ot this chapter)-

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attraction, opinions and attitudes, and constituency
characteristics were all related to informal grtup member-
ship. This and the findings in regard to the per-

sonal characte’istics give great deal of support to

Q“

Hypothesis Two,

4. 7.1 A ,. . 1'
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than the one—

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groups w r‘, for the most part, Jas in evidence. None

(I
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of the four political characteristics was clearly re—

lated to mixed—party membership: there were no exceptions.
Thus it can be concluded that the mixed-party groups rested
upon personal, rather than political, characteristics, and

had very little effect upon their members5 legislative

than the

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however: the Democrat c primary groups were as much re-
lated tt similarity in opirions and attitudes and con-

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earlier, the Democratic groups tended to have higher’lndices

(

of Group Cohesion, to have fewer outside connec ions per
member, and to have greater agreement on outputs than the

Republican groups had, This was true of both the primary

(T;

and secondary groups, Thus it was not surprising that th

V)

Democratic groups tended to consist of members gossewsing

159

more characteristics in common than was true of the Repu-
blican groups,10 The pattern is a consistent one.

Of course, this leaves the question of why the Demo-
cratic groups had this tendency toward greater agree-
ment, similarity, and cohesion. The best explanation for
this must rest upon personal observation and in-
tuitive insight, and is offered as a basis for future,
more systematic research. The Democrats, as members of
an apparently perpetual minority party seemed to react in
one of three ways. Some attempted to work with the
opposition, compromising and negotiating for their ends,
and these persons tended to show up in the mixed-party
groups. Others seemed to withdraw themselves from the
whole legislative process, merely perfunctorily performing

the expected duties, and these per one tended not to be

_}._Jo

members of any group. St ll others t nded to be ”purists,’
sttwwtglg; arm.’untxmrprwmfiisiimgly‘vndrkirmg ltd“ tratiiticwaal
”liberal” programs, and these persons were the ones who
tended to compose the all Democratic groups. These

latter persons tended to come from the same type of con—

stituencies, to hold similar opinions, and also to be

highly cohesive in legislative outputs. While the Repub-

 

lOlt must be remembered that strictly speaking what
is being said here is that the Democratic groups possessed
greater agreement or similarity relative to the Democratic
indices, than what the Republican groups did relative to
the Republican indices.

 

 

status, tended to form groups more widely within their own
ranks, and thus their groups were not particularly marked
. _. u _. H
by being purist,
This would explain the general trend of the Democratic
primary, as well as secondary, groups to have high ISO 8

and ISO's, but would not yet explain the variance from the

expected pattern in regard to the Republican groups‘ lSC*

U)

Actually, there were two discrepancies from the expected
pattern: the large number of Republican primary groups with

high 186 s and the large number of secondary groups with

low ISC‘s. The best explanation for these variances seems

0‘
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to be one that t; *3 them separately, The re ationship

between primary group membership and similarity of con-

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in the politics oi the legislatuie. As a result they would

natura caSed upon

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But why were the Republican secondary groups not more

highly related to similarity of constituencie

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to a plausible explanation for this it was new
analyze in what ways a constituency can act as a political

factor affecting a legislatoro Two different answers

present them elves. The first is that a constituency from

CU

which a legislator comes may Jd’e molded his thinking and

outlook, Thus a representative from a rural small town

area will be more likely to think in conservative terms

‘\

than a legislator from a diverse, urban area, A con-
stituency can also become a political factor affecting a
legislator by means of the interests present in the con-
stituency which the legislator feels he ought, or perhaps
must, representfi Thus three different situations are
possible: a constituency may affect a representative’s

general attitudes, a constituency may affect a repre-

U)
(D

ntative‘s attitudes and actions toward certain specific
constituency interests, or there may be a combination of
the first two, with the two situations complimenting each
othero
There is evidence to indicate that the third

situation was the case with the Democratic groups and the
second the case vflflji lie Republican gntxuxs, 13f the three
Democratic secondary grou s that were over the Democratic

l"C, all three were also over the Democratic ISO, and the

C1

one Democratic group under the Democratic ISC was also

,ll Similarity of constituency

,fix
V

Cr)

under the Democratic I
and similarity of opinions and attitudes seemed to go hand

in hand, But this was not the case with the Republican

groups. Of the five Republican secondary groups only one

 

llSee Appendix E for the exact indices of all the
groups,

16?

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m
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<r both th C and l~C,

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Republican
Similarity of constituency and similarity of opinions and
attitudes did not go hand in hand. To the extent con-
stitutencies were a political factor for the Republicans,
it probably was a matter of sharing a concern over certain
interests, Apparently this was not a strong enough factor

to result in the formation of seco dary groups;

J

instead they were formed on the basis of similarity in
opinions and attitudes, Intuitively this seems reasonable:
a legislator would confide in and trust someone he
generally agreed with before someone with whom he merely
happened to share a specific interest,

It can be concluded that primary groups tended to
rest more upon personal instead of political characteristics
than what the secondary gronps did—~although the pattern
was not completely consistent--and that the primary groups
also tended to have lees effect upon legislative outputs

ter lV)

thari whafi; tree seccnidaijy grxmlps (lid (rxs semni in \dld

"C3

A gradaldlflliWES present: time secondamgrcwme—party grmnmxs

had the greate t impact upon legislative outputs, the

U)

(1)

-ca e ‘ ‘c p;' l° tt J .3Tic, c-a”ac.ec'sc'cs an (he
gre t” t relationship o politi al h r t ll ti , d t
least relationship to personal characteristics; the mixed—
party groups had the least impact upon legislative outputs,

the least relationship to political characteristics, and

the greatest relationship to personal characteristics; and

th

( D

primaxj/ one-pwg"*

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of the one-party econdary groujs and the mixed—party
groups.

conceives of Oltni s and Bases of
lrformal Groups

 

 

“am-

H3 potln asis Three (b) states: lne oh

(1*

SlVGflBS

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{.24

of the outputs of the members of lfO mal groups bas

is less than the cohesive: less

Ho

upon persorl al cha racterist

U}

of the outputs of members of informal groups based upon
political characteristics,” In short, v;hat relationship
exister between the bases 0; a group and the cohesiveness
of its outputs? On the basis of this hypothesis it was
expected that groups with high 18B 8 and/or with a high
percentage of their members sitting near ea.c h other, but

with partisan difierences, with low lSC’s, with low lSC's,

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high ISO 8, titn nian lSJ’s, aid o”1ertel conqll a leader,

but without necessarily having high 338's or without a high

have relatively highly cohesive outputs,

he generefl_ rattern reiémd hi to throughout this

.7

SD

C

d

pt‘r supports this hypothesis. The Oioups based the

\

most up on personal chJIj ts risti s--similarity in back—

grounds and the seat ir;g arrangement--and the leas; upon

.3

political characte‘istics-— artisan allegiance, similar

w
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a +4 1— , .7
oOIJD‘ -i Ultitfgbl’

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\lk.’ , x, L-..1 k'1 L ‘2‘]... L....’. \Jxlxi ‘2...- J A ~ v.5 o 1. Hut: ’3 _, -JLJ

attractive leadership--were the mixed-party groups. And
these were the gioups, as noticed in Chapter IV, that had
the least cohesive outputs. The one-party secondary groups,
which were weakest in personal characteristics and strong-
est in political characteristics, had the most cohesive
outputs, The priwary groups fell somewhereirioetween the
mixed-party groups ah: the tne-party secondary groups in

terms of both the cohesiveness of their outputs and the

J. \1

’1}

types of their ba,es, Thus the evidence clearly supports

the hypothesis,

CHAPTER VI

CQtfljlugljflés IUJD EHIGGEITTLERJS IWJR

FURTHER RESEARCH

in the first two chapters of this stuuy a conceptual

framework for the analvsis of legislative systers was con—

J

struct d, the literature relevant to the consideration of

, . ‘ v P ’3 K v - 3 ‘ § ‘ »n a. \ r" .' ' r\ 'fi r r ~ H \ ‘ ,’\ ‘1'
in ormal groups within legislative svstems was surveyeu,

y.ive informal

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the Michigan House of Represe

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bv systemati!

eoondarg informal

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was found that iuertifiable primary ard

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had an effect upon the outputs o1
except'oh of membership in mixed—partv groups——in their
case there was little or ho diseerrible effeet, In the
case of roll call voting, the effect was greater for

partisan than non—partisan issues, however. contrary to

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BXLfl‘JLu -‘JtlQ, ell- .3er Liji‘- J E: \Jvtr‘: t9» :‘ ft) ’1; 7:) E ijqefi'T—eh

liere were also indications that the informal groups

served as sources of inforhation for their memcers, and

(A)
H.
t" I
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u

in the process of negotiation and the formation of

coalitionsg Hiwever, these lindihgs rust be considered to

ice the eviderce for them was indirect

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be very te
and lacked precision,
it was also found that personal backgrounds, physical

closeness in the seating arrangement on the floor cf the

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Primar3 and letu'pait! gLUUp: teried to rest on the first
two case“ (pezsonal lactors) and the secondary and one~

., ., , V ,V i , . _, v , -‘ ,5 -, i ,. i ,e A. 0 i V i- .. _ F, / j ‘ n: .i ’
party gzoups tensed to IeSt on tne last lUUI bases tpoll_1gsl

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I’J'JL '5.) Lil Curl‘ji 2,, LT \IJ .‘ JVKJL/ ‘ lfla: T! C, E,L\)1\CD ‘11]. ’

fenced to rest upon peisoral factors were the sap: ores
which tended to have relativelv weak cohesion in out—

puts; Ifie grtnums whicii terxhai to 3%fi3t UpCHJ polititxll

factors were the same groups which tendei to have relatively

strong crhesion in outputs,

 

:e
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H. .A ‘p :. '.. ,N' ‘. ., i w .. 5 . 4, ‘7
Viv-31.5 Wufi llzdi 87:1 ital 3.1 thr— bsrjl T. GIL silitrfiiwgi _‘ l l,

O

the basic method of research usec in the stuiv reported

167

here was the case stuoy: one session of one house of e

‘et7s it"e was the so out J" "cae;-ci. ., 7 'n a
is 1*l' ur V'” re oh'ec ct res rso lt 1s not krorn

)

whether the finiihgs Summarized above hold true for other
legislatures, or even whether they held true or will hold

true for other sessions of the Michigan legislature.

,0

F—

ievertheless the followihg tentative generalizations ere

 

offered in the hOpe that they will be tested in other
legislatures and under various conditions so that they
can be accepted, rejected, or modified as necessary
1. identifiable primary and secondary informal
groups exist in legislative systems. These
two types of informal groups can be dif-

ferentiated and have distinctive charac-

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CW. Ttmase i: for mil gfl'fihtkE var; bz~<3ivicugi it;
political and non—political groups. Se oudury,

one-party groups tend to be political groups,

~_, g

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f] f\ * . y . - ‘ ". c f- ' j ry . é; -" _ ’\ .4 ') r .v (‘1‘ ‘I, v - ~ '3 x ‘ - . :i
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L. . '. L

 

1‘ ‘1. a ‘ ‘f _ ,0 3"“
LIn addition to the diite

' , 1 , v: ,. , : W ,. -_ .,~ ,. . -. — .

CW3, tfld LLCL Jiiiclth:S jl: bled, LU, mo ;
t .‘ ,— -J _‘ — ~‘ .. ‘I ,—-. ,.— ‘ A K ‘m » ‘ - ' . . ‘ ~ » ,—\

numerous e and the ieer connections With members

S,
outside t e groups shown by primary groups.

168

a. lhe political grolts:

(l) possess members who tend to have more
cohesive outputs than is the case for
the legislature as a whole.

(2) tend to be based upon politically
relevant factors instead of personal
factors.

b, The non-political groups:

(1) possess members who tend to have

£7.)

outputs no more, or only slightly mor;

,
cohesive than is the case for the
legislature as a whole.

(2) tend to be based upon personal factors

instead of political factors.
5. Members of one—party groups tend to vote more
cohesively on partisan than nonpartisan issues,
even with the effects of party controlled.

‘fi

rve as sources of ini

5

Q" '-

K

i4. lxifornerl grcnuxs termi‘to S“
mation for their membership.
n. Informal groups tend to aid in the processes of

compromising, negotiating, and forming coalitions.

‘ ‘ I " V“ . . “‘ - F] .1 ' 'l >‘ f‘ “\ "“ I' r: "
Suggestions ior Eu1the1 Reseaich

 

Of the many interesting and significant avenues
of possible future research this study has brought out,

five of the more interesting and significant ones are men—

tioned here. One question which definitely ought to be ex-

plored nmnne fully is tin: diifersmkxns and sinJthrities
between primary and secondary informal groups. is the
somewhat surprising pattern that was found here generally
the case in legislative systems? If so, why is it that
groups marked by relatively loose, impersonal ties have
more of an impact than groups with closer, more affective
ties? Is it, as was suggested in Chapter IV, the strong
task oriented nature of the legislature? Or are there
other factors as well?

A especially interesting question is raised by the
finding that the groups seemed to have a greater effect on
roll calls which dealt with partisan issues than roll calls
\NhiCh dealt with nonpartisan issues. Whether informal
Egroups are a means of obtaining party unity is a question
tunich needs exploring, One of the party leaders ex-
EDressed, during the interviewing, a distrust and dislike

i7or informal groups within his party’s repreSentatives,

)

' ' _ . o o 7 1 , V - —
.l'm in a s ecial position here,...iou nave to be the

{

lweader of the whole party, not of a clique. In fact, l
tl?y to prevent others from establishing cliques--they
Orily divide us, and make my job harder.H In actuality,
{Deerhaps informal groups may help in creating party unity
hNY‘bringing the sanctions of the group against members
VV}10 deviate from party positions~-sanctions which an im-

Ehersonal ”party” would not have, The whole question

C1ertainly deserves further investigation,

170

Another problem for research is the question of ex-
actly what functions the mixed-party and primary groups per-
form. The evidence indicates that the mixed groups and
(to a lesser extent) the primary groups do not play a
major role in directly influencing legislative outputs.
Whether they perform functions such as disseminating
information, aiding negotiation, and aiding the formation
of coalitions was not adequately explored at all. Intuition
and the evidence this study found, indicating that informal
groups are involved in disseminating information, negotiating,
and forming coalitions, suggest that they may very well
be performing functions in these areas.

A fourth question centers around partisan differences.
The Democratic groups tended to possess greater cohesive-
ness in many areas. Was this due to certain peculiar cir—
cumstances surrounding the Democrats in the Michigan House
at the time of the study? Or was it due to the minority
status of the Democratic party, and did it flow from
factors which usually adhere to minority parties? Further
research is needed to answer these questions.

A final area of needed research is that of cause and
effect in regard to the informal group structure of legis-
lative systems. At several points in the study, honesty
dictated caution in drawing conclusions due to the un-
certainty of what was causing what. The existence of a

relationship between two factors does not necessarily

1

able to cast more light on this diff

icult

This list of suggestions for further

meant to be exhaustive. l

rea also.

a;

research is

rather

to dr

not

CL"

attention by way of example to potentially fruitful areas

W

of resear h. The careful rea‘er will

I

so that greater and more accurate know

svstems and their functions id today‘s world may be

.\~_
\A

be

t.

a.

this

b

l

.‘

Q

d

Wi 1 .1 be

(3 OH :2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

172

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Bales, Robert F. Interaction Process Analysis. Cambridge:
Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1950.

 

Berelson, Bernard, Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and McPhee, William
N. Voting. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

1954.

Easton, David. The Political System. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1959.

 

Festinger, Leon, Schachter, tanley, and Back, Kurt. Social
Pressures Informal Groups. New York: Harper and
Bros., 1950.

 

Gross, Neal, Mason, Ward 8., and McEachern, Alexander W.,
Explorations in Role Analysis. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1958.

 

Jewell, Malcolm E. The State Legislature: Politics and
Practice. New York: Random House, 1962.

 

Katz, Elihu, and Lazarsfeld, Paul F. Personal Influence.

 

 

Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955.
Keefe, William, and Cgul, Morris. The American Legislative
Process: Congress and the States. Englewood Cliffs:

 

Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1964.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Berelson, Bernard, and Gaudet, Hazel.
The People‘s Choice.' 2nd ed. New York: Columbia
University Press, 19A8.

 

Lipset, Seymour, Trow, Martin A., and Coleman, James S. Union
DemOCFagyg Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956.

MacRae, Duncan. Dimensions of Congressional Voting.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

 

Olmsted, Michael S. The Small Group. New York: Random
House, 1959.

 

173

 

Parsons, Talcott, Bales, Robert R., and Shils, Edward A.
Working Papers in the Theory of Action. Glencoe:
The Free Press, 19:3

Parsons, Talcott, and Shils, Edward A Toward a General
Theory of Action. Cambridge: Halwv rd Univeisity
Press, 1959.

 

 

Rice, Stuart A. Quantitative Methods in Politics. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.

 

Scigliano, Robert G. Michigan Legislative Report, 195A.
East Lansing: Government Research Bureau, Michigan
State College, 1955.

 

Truman, David B. The Congressional Party. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959.

 

Turner, Julius. artr and Constituency: Pressures on
Congress. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.

 

Verba, Sidney. Small Groups and Political Behavior.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

 

Wahlke, John C., Eulau, Heinz, Buchanan, William, and
Ferguson, LeRoy C. The Legislative System:
Explorations in Legislative Behavior. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1962

 

 

White, William S. Citadel. New York: Harper and Bros.,
1956.

.rticles and Periodicals

 

Almond, Gabriel A. HComparative Political Systems,”
The Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 391—409.

Asch, S. E. ”Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification
and Distortion of Jud gnerts,H in Cartwright, Dorwin,
and Zander, Alvin. Gzoip Dynamics: Research and
Theor'. 2nd ed Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co.,

1960,189-200.

Becker, Robert W., Foote, Frieda, Lubega Mathias, and
Monsma, Stephen V. "Correlates of Legislative
Voting: Michigan House of Representatives, 19 A- 1961,
Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (1962,
38A‘396.

 

 

H

175

Chowdhry, Kamla, and Newcomb, Theodore M. "The Relative
Ability of Leaders and Non-Leaders to Estimate
Opinions of their own Group," in Hare, Paul A.,
Borgatta, Edgar F., and Bales, Robert F. Small
Groups: Studies in Social Interaction. New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1955, 235-2A5~

 

 

Cooley, Charles H. ”Primary Groups,” in Hare, Borgatta,
and Bales, pp. cit., 15-20.

Fiellen, Alan. ”The Functions of Informal Groups in
Legislative Institutions,” The Journal of Politics,
XXIV (February, 1962), 72-91.

 

Forsyth, Elaine, and Katz, Leo. ”A Matrix Approach to the
Analysis of Sociometric Data: Preliminary Report,”
Sociometry, IX (1946), 3uo-3A7.

 

French, John R. P., Jr., and Raven, Bertram. ”The
Bases of Social Power,” in Cartwright and Zander,
.pp. cit., 607-623.

Homans, George. "The Cash Posters: A Study of a Group of
Working Girls,” The American Sociological Review,
XIX (December, 1954), 725L733.

 

”Groups Factors in Worker Productivity,” in
Maccoby, Eleanor E., Newcomb, Theodore M., and
Hartley, Eugene. Readings in Social Psychology.
3rd ed. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958,

 

583-595-
Jewell, Malcolm E. HParty Voting in American State
Legislatures,'I American Political Science Review,

 

XLIX (1955). 773—791.

Lippitt, Ronald, Palansky, Norman, Redl, Fritz, and Rosen,
Sidney. HThe Dynamics of Power,” in Cartwright and
Zander, pp, cit., 75A—765.

Levine, Jacob, and Butler, John, ”Lecture v. Group Decision
in Changing Behavior,H Journal of Applied Psychology
XXXVI (February, 1952), 29-53.

 

MacRae, Duncan, “The Relation between Roll Call Votes and
Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Repre-
sentatives,” The American Political Science Review
XLVI (1952), 104641055.

 

Newcomb, Theodore M. "Varieties of Interpersonal Attraction,”

in Cartwright and Zander, pp. cit., 104-119.

Parson

176

s, Talcott. "Some Considerations on the Theory of
Social Change,” Rural Sociology XXVI (September,
1961), 221-227.

 

Patterson, Samuel C. ”Patterns of Interpersonal Relations

in a State Legislative Group: the Wisconsin
Assembly,H Public Opinion Quarterly XXIII (Spring,
195 ), 101-109.

 

Personen, Pertte, ”Close and Safe State Elections in

Massachusetts,” Midwest Journal of Political Science
VII (February, 1963), Ea-70.

Pinner, Frank A. ”Relationships between High School Group

Routt,

Structure and the Development of Orientations

toward Public Affairs,” Unpublished report to the
office of Education, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.

Garland c. “Interpersonal Relationships and the
Legislative Process,” Annals of the American Academy

 

of Political and Social Science, xccv (January, 1938),’
129-136.

 

Schubert, Glendon, and Press, Charles, HMeasuring

Shils,

Malapportionment,” The American Political Science

Review LVIII (196A), 302-327.

 

Edward A. HPrimary Groups in the American Army,”

in Merton, Robert K, and Lazarsfeld, Paul F. Studies
in the Scoupe and Method of HThe American SoldIger—_
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1930, 10-59»

 

 

. HThe Study of the Primary Grown In ler er
Daniel, fifid Lasswell, Harold D. The P“1iof‘S“ien/es.
Stanford: Stanford UniverSIty Preso, 1951, +r‘C”.
. _ , .n . . ‘ H _ . - 1r ‘
Siegel, Alberta E., and Siegel, Sidney. Relerence Groups,
V 9 ‘ O ” 1' O
Membersnlp Groups, and Attitude Change, in

State

Cartwright and Zander, op. cit., 232—240.

Public Documents

 

of Michigan. Directory, Senate and House of
Representatives. April, 1963.

 

 

. Journal of the House of Representatives, 196M,

. The Michigan Manual, 1963—196A.

 

United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the

Census. United States Census of Population: 19/0,

APPENDICES

177

APRENDEX A

THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

"‘ 1

Before we begin I d like to explain that the purpose

of this project is to study how, in actual practice,

legislators go about their work. The information and opin-

ions you give will be tabulated alorg with the material from

the other members of the legislature. No names will be used,

and what you say will, of course, be off the record and will

be kept strictly confidential.

1 o

R)

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f-Jo

in
O

*b.

"3

t, a few questions about your background:

m
w
L_/
$.11
U)

Where were you born? (City tate.)

Did you spend most of the years Whgfl y01 were growirg
up in a city, a small town, or on a farm? (If R

' . —- ——~ . ,.. v- ';r\ I I' .- r.’ - '. ’ 0 7‘1’ ' ‘2 \ -‘ "
113,9{1 1T1 Sthtlzil plaiCt’S tittl’l‘.“ hlS \‘y‘JUth, 1’118 (1')“

‘xfi “ ‘F‘ “\ P"\" “ f " ”f- )A " I V. "‘ ‘1 ‘fi 7"‘
flubt tu.lji: years you were gatwnuag up was used.)

)1

And what is the TZfRE of the p'ace VJKHFE you were

i

nt up: (City and state.)
What was your father’s job or occupation? (Tried to
get a realistic description adequate for appraisirg

V

socio-economic status.)

*6.

*8...

*b.

179

How much formal education did your father have?

How much formal education did your mother have?

And where was your father born? (City and state.)
And where was your mother born? (City and state.)

IF EITHER PARENT WAS FOREIGN BORN: IS your father--

mother also of descent?

 

Now, generally, how would you describe the job of
being a legislator--what are the most important
things you should do here? (Were probed fully.)

Are there any important differences between what you
think this Job is and the way your constituents see
it? (A quick no wasn't accepted. Tried: Do some

of them over want you to do something you don’t
think is worth doing?)

Can you name four or five individuals or groups whose
opinion is most important to you as a legislator?
What individuals or groups do you feel pay the most
attention to your legislative activities here in

Lansing?

Now, I’ve been told that every legislature has its un—

official rules of the game——certain things members are

expected to do and things they are expected not to do if

they want the respect and cooperation of their fellow

members.

O

-_..J

H - r -0 «i 7.- 1- -.-r.. 1 .1
l ,6. ea . 1-31 elitist I..l--g3""1..11::;>€: 15.11158 Of I1“?

t a member must observe, to hold the res-

.—

pect arc cooperation of his fellow members?

(J
’1
(f
K,

Would name four or five members regardless of pc
or position who are most widely reSpected for
following these rules of the game--l mean peOple

'1

that a new rember sho la look up To when he’s just

0

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Some n=mbers don't seem to gain as much respect and

croperaticwlifinxn their fellow nendxnms as others do

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tiles <3f tin? game.
rixvzio the othel*lmanbers RCMKB things diidfixrilt for

these people because they don t follow the rules

* r ‘\ r‘ ' 7v F1 F‘ 1 .
.16 ’c s ’: oi Join rt-s o‘ CGISW l ii:ercs in

Y ' ‘ "‘1 1' h ‘ v‘ r‘ .. ' ~ " r ' ,A. ‘ V ' ' 1—‘_ “ ‘ ‘ I) ' A y" 1" 1 4’
110’)b€"" 1. P3331 1112:“ ilk-smile! S you See THOSE OI lt—u. UL —

I ' ,.1 , ‘— n

in ‘l “or“, .* 1L*Nh o1 Jinnez, o t :ties n.d

\ ,1 f‘ ) .. . _\ .' ,. .- ‘ ‘.'w‘ r‘ ft m h. .I‘ h -: ‘I I: -2 "'\ N A
La yau lrequeatl, discuss p opasea legislatior llth
other "ZKCTIIS Jf the 1:? se? (ligi.’t a«vw:pt a qtaafl<

no. Tried: Do you mean that yOu never discuss the

Plugs enid ”unis (if tdfllls ititll otlnar ntutberts?)

\O

181

Cs: When you talk with them, is it usually
to exchange informatior, work out compromises,

persuade them to your ptsitioh, or what?

3 If: VED WY) 853 Can 3%); UhUE‘ five cu” six HEHWDEITS of
the House with whom you frequently discuss pro-

(Probed for as complete a

LO
d
H.

O

1
O

posed legislu

)
These next questiors deal with how you obtain the infor—
mation you heed about the operations of the House-—some-
thing which many persons outside the legislature find
a puzzle,
a° When you have a question concerning parliamentary
procedure, how do you obtain the information you
need? (If other legislators were not mentioned,
tried: 1)) you exec” Tihi‘ hit from rfifirir legisl u ors

who may be in a position to know?)

r‘?‘

4.
‘1,

he (fliahcets aze IOI‘Ei bill

1;
d

V.- - l TE.

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b, How do you find r

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v “ A '. . ‘ hs'Px A’: . 5 I .1 [3+ ‘ . ‘— :7 r
you are interested in to repoiue, QUh b3 a

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committee, or whether hearings are going to b
held on it? (If other legislators were not mentiohed,
tried: Do you ever discuss this with members of

c. Generally, do you frequently obtain information
about the operations of the House from other legis—

lators when they are in a position to know?

103

ll.

*ao

*b,

(i
,44
0

Now,

are

182

IF INFGRMAL CONTACTS WERE MENTIONED: Who the

‘7
H
(1)

members you most often depend on for information
about the operations of the House? (Probed for as
complete a listing as possible,)

Do other members ever ask you for information or
advice about the Operations of the House? Which
ones?

Would you say that there is sort of a division of
labor within the legislature, with certain members
recognized as having special knowledge or being
expert in certain fields of legislation?

IF YES: Could you name five or six members of the
House whom you consider to be particularly expert
in some field of legislation? In what fields are
they expert?

Would you say that there are some members who are

experts in knowing about the operations of the House

Who?

1F H HAS NAMED MEMBERS: Do you ever personally dis-

cuss legislative matters with any of these members?

Q

Which on;

t

D
U)

I would like your opinion on some questions that

frequently discussed by both legislators and the

general public,

h

I.
1

R)

F—J
(fr)
bk)

v

,4, Gerei ally, twoultlgyou s35; that tin} staff? goveruu ext
as a whole here in Michigan is doing too much, not
enough, or the right amount to help labor?

b, Generally, would you say that the state government

as a whole is doing too much, not enough, or the

H
O
W

’ight amount i those in special need, such as
those in need due to sickness or old age?

0 Generally, would you say that the state government
as a whole is doing too much, not enough, or the
right amount to help business?

d, Generally, would you say that the stat“ government
as a whole is doing too much, not enough, or the

right amount for Negro rights?

Finally, I'd like a little information in order to com-

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a, In regard to your educatior——how much formal Gddél—

.

—‘ , ,fi ‘ \nq.
aficifi; lb, ~11 S-

f 1)
r‘f

ht, Vltrat, i-, §’QL I‘ p1“e:3e32t- C>otrrt;a ti cm; t3 31e1'
lattnfl? (Itiexl‘to get :ns full.entd atxutrate a,th —
scription as possible.)

3. And what is 5mnu¢tflmcrch affiliatiemfl

d. Are you a member of any lodge? Which one(s)?

e, Including your legislative salary, into which of
these four income groups does your total annual in—

come fall? $8,000 to $10,000, $10,000 to $15,000,

$13,000 to $17,000, or over $17,000.

f"-i

164

f, R is a: White--Kegzg

male-—female

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*13. Is there anything else about the legislature and how
you go about your work here that you think I ought to

pay attention to in this study?

*NOTE: Questions marked by an asterisk are those that have
been taken from the interview schedule of Wahlke and his

associates, See Wahlke et al,, op, cit., pp. 492-504.

APPENDEX B
INDICES USED IN THE STUDY

Index of Agreement on Role Orientations (IARO)

This index measured the amount of agreement that
existed between legislators on role orientations. As was
explained in Chapter IV every legislator, except in a few
cases when the responses were inadequate, was classified
in terms of five different orientations. These orienta-
tions and the categories of each were as follows: purposive
roles: Protector, Interested Broker, and Broker; repre—
sentational roles: Trustee, Politico, and Delegate; areal
roles: District Oriented, State-District Oriented, and
State Oriented; legislative style: Legalist and Pragmatist;
and orientation towards constituents: Antagonistic, Neutral,
and Affective.

For all but one of these orientations there were two
extreme categories and a third one which fell in between
the two, combining the characteristics of the two extreme
categories. In one case, legislative style, there were only
the two extreme categories and no in between category.

For all five of the orientations two legislators were
assigned a score of two if they were both in the same

category, a one if one was in an extreme category and the

185

186

other in the middle category, and a zero if they were in
the opposite extreme categories.1 In the case of legisla—
tive style, however, since there was no middle category the
two legislators had to receive a score of either two or
zero.

Next the scores of the two legislators were added and
the total divided by the highest possible score (ten if
there was no missing information). The result was the
index for those two legislators, which ranged from 1.000
for perfect agreement on all five orientations to .000
for complete disagreement on all five orientations.

Missing information was also taken into account. If
it had been impossible to classify one of the two legis-
lat0“s being compared on a certain orientation, that
orientation was simply skipped for that comparison. The
index for that pair would rest on only four orientations.

By this means the index was found for every possible
pair of legislators in the House. As explained in Chapter
IV the mean of the indices of all possible pairs of
legislators in a group was found for each group and these
means were considered the group indices. For purposes
of comparison the means of the indices of all possible

pairs of Republicans, Democrats, and legislators in

 

1Michigan State University's CDC 3600 computer was
used in the construction of this index and most of the
other indices.

187
the entire Hoqse were also found. These were considered

the partieS' IARO’s and the legislature‘s IARO.

Index of Agreement on the Rules

 

H.)

o th: Gam LIARG)

(.
(D

 

As explained in Chapter IV the responses to the
quest'ons that dealt with rules of the game and sanctions
taken against violators were classified under thirteen
rules of the game and six sanctions.2 The Index of Agreement
on the Rules of the Game measured the amount of agree-
ment shown by legislators in naming these thirteen rules
and six sanctions.

This index was found by giving a pair of legislators
a score of one for each rule or sanction they both
mentioned. Next the total number of different rules and
sanctions mentioned by the two legislators was added up.

This w 8 divided into the number of rules and sanctions

w

9

which both had mentioned in order to give the index. This
was done for all possible pairs of legislators.

for most of the indices the mean of

:(>
U)
E.
$1)
(D
FT
5
(I
x J
U)
(T:

<a
the indices of all possible pairs of legislators in an
informal group was found for each group, and was considered

on the means

{I}

the group’s index. For purposes of compari

 

”T:
U)

2See Appendex D for a complete listing of the rul:
of the game and sanctions.

188

.0 4— : ms'r, -11 y- r y i g .. .9 4i.-. ‘ 1- ,l,
or the incites of a1. pnsaible p 1*s Di ,etublicans,

Democrats, and legislators in the entire House were also
found. These were considered the parties3 IARGls and the

IARG.

M)
\ '1‘
S.)
“‘1
(D
D

legislr

lndcx of Group Cohesion (TGCL

 

This index measured the extent to which the members
of each informal group named each other as friends or
secondary contacts. It was formed by dividing the number
of choices made by group members of fellow group members
by the total possible number of choices that could have
been made within a group. Thus the highest possible index

was 1.000, which would indicat that every member in a group

(I)

had chosen every other member in that group.

Index of Potential Attractiveness (IPA)

 

 

This index measured the degree to which each member

(‘1’

of the House possessed skills or other qualities tha would

. friaenthahig) arml acrvices WCflild

D

tend to mane him a person whos

/

.L

be valued. It was based equally upon four factors. For

)

each of these factors the legislators were placed into four

('

0

categories which ranged from the lowest to the highest in
attractiveness. Then legislators in the lowest category
were given a score of zero, those in the next highest

category a one, those in the next highest category a two,

and those in the highest category were given a score of

189

three. Each legislator's four scores were added up and
divided by twelve, the highest possible score, to give the
index.

The first factor that was considered was the number
of years of service in the House. If a member started
serving between 1939 and 1953 (inclusive) he was given a
score of three. There were 28 legislators in this category.
If a member started serving between 1955 and 1957
(inclusive), he was given a two. There were 30 legislators
in this category. If he started serving between 1959 and
1961 (inclusive), he was given a one. Twenty-nine legis-
lators were in this category. Finally, all the freshmen
legislators, who had started serving in 1963, were given
zeros. There were 23 freshmen.

The second factor that was considered was the
occupation of formal leadership positions. The categories
that were established, the scores given each category, and
the number of legislators in each category were as follows:
1. The Speaker, the Speaker pro tem, the majority and

minority party floor leaders, and the chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee. Score: three. Number in

this category: five.

190

2. Chairmen of important committees3 and all who
occupied formal leadership positions not included in
the first category. Score: two. Number in this
category: 16.

3. Members of two important committees, members of one im-
portant committee who were also the chairmen of an un-
important committee, and members of the Ways and Means
Committee. Score: 1. Number in this category: 50.

A. Members not qualified for any of the above categories.
Score: zero. Number in this category: 39.

The third factor that was included in the index was
the number of times a representative was chosen by his
fellow representatives as an expert in some field of legis-
lation. The highest category, whose members received a
score of three, consisted of legislators who were named
-18 to 37 times as being experts. There were nine in this
category. Those legislators receiving 6 to 16 choices
composed the second category and received a score of two.
Nineteen were in this category. If a member received two

to five choices he was in the third category and was given

 

3”Important committees” were defined as those that

had had at least thirty bills or resolutions referred to
then during the session. The fourteen following committees
qualified as important committees: Agriculture, Conserva-
tion, Education, Elections, General Taxation, Judiciary,
Labor, Liquor Control, Revision and Amendment of the
Constitution, Roads and Bridges, Rules and Resolutions,
State Affairs, Towns and Counties, and Ways and Means.

191

a score of one. There were 32 in this one. Members re—
ceiving one or no choice as expert were in the lowest
category and were given a score of zero. Fifty members
were in this category.

The fourth factor considered was the number of times
a legislator was chosen as an expert on procedural matters
or as one especially respected for following the rules of
the game. Here the first category consisted of members with
31 to 51 choices. There were six members who received
scores of three due to being in this category. Ten members
who were named 6 to 17 times received scores of two.
Twenty-seven members received five to two choices received
scores of one. The lowest category again was composed
of legislators who received one or no choices. There were
67 in this category and they all received a score of zero.

Each legislator thus received four scores ranging
from zero to three. As was noted earlier these four scores
were added up and divided by twelve, the highest possible
score, in order to obtain the index. A score of 1.00

meant a legislator was in the highest category for all

(I)

four factors, and a .core of .00 meant a legislator was
in the lowest categoiy for all four factors.
It is not claimed that this index is a complete

measure of all aspects of an individual's potential attrac-

tiveness as a legislator. Other important factors have been

n
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1,; E '51

members oi

 

. .r.‘ we r. 2.. ..r. F. 5,. r\ .11 i m x. 4. .V
. .7 l. ,n i O S -C -... as T. T. E t. .. .7 . .;. .l. n-“ )4 D... G .3.
i... :.. 2..” ,3 r. x _ m ,1. u. i L. 5. .11. p... we .. I ”H “I
if. V F: r... a: 2C A.-. a . .1 -L ,. . .1. L. 6 .8 05 J O a...
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193

‘ ”fl ’1 A r“ P”. “~" F flr‘ 'o r‘ A r“
j. 11c 101”:l eu.t;titr ta: the leg islattnu La) less than

high school, (b) high school and/or some college,

(c) college graduate.

u. The legislators‘ religion: (a ) Protestant, (b) Catholic.

5. Race of the legislators: (a) Negro, (b) White.
ed

egislators: SE8: (base on occupation, education,

0
’
:31.
(D
H

and inconeg): (a) low, (b)middle, (c) high.
7. The legislators’ a e; (a) 30-A8 years old, (b) u9-59

years Old, (c) 60-79 years old.

03

The legislators’ present occupation other than legis-
lator: (a) the professions, (b) business, (c) farming.5h
For all eight of these characteristics every pair of
legislators was given a score of two if the two legislators
were both in the same category, a one if one was in an ex-

treme category and the other in the middle category, and
a zero if they w re in the opposite extreme categories.

1 1

These scores for the eight characteristics were then a de C

'14

up and divided by their higtest possible score-—sixteen if

there was no missing information-—to give the index. In

O
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1

' ,: r 1 — ,— (“a ,—x 1, r, ‘. l 7
hlJlid categories, legislators

11 ,. 1 V, 1. .111-1.- .
1C:I‘(%XEpiPt:3{figretnxxfil or

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KL
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(
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B
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y—b
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complete disagreement. Thus an index of l.OoO indicated
complete similarity and an index of .000 complete dis-

similarity,

 

U)

latozs who were laborers could not be
wg ry.

Er?“ ‘ O
/th€€ 1 g1
4r
J1-

placed in any C"

l9U

if information was mis ing for a legislator for one

U)

of the characteristics--as was the case in a few instances
——that characteristic was simply eliminated from the compu—
tation of his indices with the other legislators.

By this means the indices were found for all possible
pairs of legislators in the House. As explained in
Chapter V the mean of the indices of all possible pairs
of legislators in a.groupvms found for each group and these
means were considered to be the group indices. And for
purposes of comparison the means of the indices of all
possible pairs of Republicans, Democrats, and legislators
in the entire House were also found. These were considered

the parties’ 188's and the legislature’s ISB.

Index of Similar Constituencies (ISO)

 

This index measures the amount of similarity between
the constituencies of all pairs of legislators in terms of
five characteristics. These five characteristics were:
percentage of persons nonwhite, percentage of persons of
foreign stock,6 SES level, percentage rural, rural nonfarm,
«and urban, and area of the state in which the constituencies

were located. Essentially the index was derived by placing

 

6Foreign stock is used here, as is done by the
United States Census Bureau, to refer to all persons who
either were born in a foreign country or who have at least
one parent who was born in a foreign country.

195

all the constituencies into one of three categories for
each characteristic and then determining the extent to
which the constituencies of two legislators fell into the
same categories. However, there was a complicating factor
for two of the characteristics, as will be seen shortly.

The percentage of nonwhite persons living in each
constituency was determined.7 Next all the constituencies
were ranked from the lowest to the highest percentage of
nonwhite. Those districts with a population of .08 per
cent to 5.9 per cent nonwhite were put in one category,
those with 6.7 per cent to 17.2 per cent in another, and
those with 19.7 per ccnt or abovc in the third.8

The same procedure was followed in regard to the
percentage foreign stock present in the constituencies.
Except here the lQWESt category ran from 5.3 per Went up
to 17.9 per cent, the middle category from 18.0 per cent
to 29.2 per cent, and the highest category from §0.2 pvr
cerfl: on Lip.

##th k._ _.._-,.__. I. 1,. . ‘~-w- A. . . v, — . . - . .. . . , .-. .. . - -- _ .

(196K) Germans (tittt Wrruj usewi to thwtcwwnirné all. the
demographic characteristics used in this index.

ETWO criteria Were followed in establishing the rate-
gordcws. First, tin: catngandxwa had tm)tiinorindnu1te, i.e.,
nearly all the constituhncies could not be in only one of
the categories, instead there had to be at least some dis-
tribution of constituencies among the catrgories. Secondly,
the categories had to reflect real differences, i.e.,
constituencies in one category had to differ significantly
from the constituencies in the other categories. Often
both of these criteria could not be fully met, but it was
attempted to meet both of them as fully as possible.

196

in order to include the area of the state a district
was located in as a constituency characteristic, the state
was divided into three areas: the Detroit Metropolitan
area, consisting of Wayne, Macomb, and Oaklandcounties; the
Southern Outstate area, consisting of the remaining part
of the lower peninsula south of the northern boundries of

Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Clare, Midland, and Bay counties;

p)

e rea, consisting of the remaining

ii

3
Cf

and the Northern Quest
part of the lower peninsula and all of the upper peninsula.
Depending on its location each constituency was placed in
one of these three categories.

For each of these three characteristics two legis-
lators were given ; scoze of six if their constituencies
were found in the same category, a score of three if one
of their constituencies was in one of tht extreme categories
and the other‘s in the middle category, and a score of
zero if their constituencies were in extreselv opposite
categories.

The remaining tmn><flilractrristics pmwstmmlxi a problem
in that there was no simple, comprehensive measure available
to measure the socio~economic levels and rural—urban nature
of the constituencies. Therefore, three separate measures
were used for each of these characteristics. To
measure the socio—economic levels of the constituencies the
percentage of families with an income of less than $4,000,

tne percentage of families with an income of more than

197

$9,000, and the percentage of persons in professional and

managerial occupations were determined for each constituency.

For each of these three, the constituencies were ranked

from the lowest to the highest and divided into the fol-

lowing categories:

1. Income under $4,000: (a) 19.6 per cent to 7.0 per cent,
(b) 32.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent, (c) 56.6 per cent
to 33.0 per cent.

2. Income over $9,000: (a) 58.0 per cent to 24.0 per cent,
(b) 23.9 per cent to 15.3 per cent, (c) 14.9 per cent
to 5.9 per cent.

3. Managers and professionals: (a) 16.5 per cent to 7.7
per cent, (b) 7.4 per cent to 5.1 per cent, (c) 4.9 per
cent to 1.9 per cent.

For each of these three factors two legislators were
given a score of two if their constituencies were in the
same category, a score of one if one of their constituencies
was in an extreme category and the other's in the middle
category, and a zero if their constituencies were in ex—
tremely opposite categories.

The same pattern was followed in regard to the rural—
urban characteristic. All the constituencies were ranked
in terms of the percentage of persons classified as rural-
farm, rural-nonfarm, and urban. For each of these three,
the ranked constituencies were then divided into the fol—

lowing categories:

- _ .- _ / , A. 0 . _
l. Fezcentage ruxal—farn: \3) 56.7 per cent to 18.9 per

cent, (b) 17.2 per cent to 7.1 per cent, (c) 6.0 per
cent to .0 per cent.

2. Percentage rural—nonfarm: (a) 74.0 per cent to 47.9
per cent, (b) 45.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent, (c) 18.7
per cent to .0 per cent.

3. Percentage urban: (a) 100.0 per cent to 86.2 per
cent, (b) 80.6 per cent to 41.0 per cent, (c) 38.3
per cent to .0 per cent.

For each of these three factors two legislators were
given a score of two if their constituencies were in the
same category, a score of one if one of their constituencies
was in an extreme category and the other s in the middle

category, and a zero if their constituencies were in ex-

Each of these last two thaiacteristics, both of which
were comtjsed of trree iaccoxs, c We out e z 1 in weight
to the earli:r CHqPECT€-iStiCS b186j upon only a single
factor. This was due to the fact that similarity or near

similarity on the characteristics comoosed of only a

.: 1.x ’W.—.., , .as“. ..i q, i , 1 4. 7 —‘ .-- ,.-.;“g
single tactor resulted in scores of six or three, while

3‘ O .1 T 7' f'\ rw . . - ‘ . V f‘\ . v-x (‘ , p ‘ ‘ -, ‘; «7 A r‘\ " ‘.(fi
similarity or near Similarity on each ol the tnltc factors

that made up the remaining characteristics resulted in
scores of only two or one.
Once the scores of two legislators on all the

constituency characteristics had been computed, they

199

were added up, and the total was divided by thirty, the
highest possible score. The result was the index for that
pair of legislators.

This was done for every possible pair of legislators
in the House. As explained in Chapter V the mean of the
indices of all possible pairs of legislators in a group
was found for each group and these means were considered
the group indices. And for purposes of comparison the
means of the indices of all possible pairs of Republicans,
Democrats, and all legislators in the House were also found.
These were considered the partiesi 180‘s and the legisla—

ture's 180.

Index Of Similar Opinions {1801‘

 

This index neaSured the degree of similarity in the
responses of the legislators to three questions that asked
their opinions regarding government involvement in three
.arees. As explained in Chap;cr V the legislat :
vdnather=tjiey tinnignt tin: govemiwtent renaliot irn/olved

enough in each of the areas, involved to about the righ

(‘1‘

extent, or involved to too great an extent.

If two legislators responded to a question in
exactly the same way, they were given a score of three,
0 ' _ 1 ”,0 .4- _4,f: ,‘I ,\-, ._ 4. 0
if one answered right amount ul goVernment involve—

+_ , ,1 «-fl n, g H , IV”, - H
ment and the other one not enough or too much

involvement, they were given a score of one, and if they

200

gave exactly opposite answers, they were given a score of
zero. This was done for all three questions and their
scores added up, and divided by six, the highest possible
score, to give their index. Thus an index of 1.000
indicated the legislators answered all three questions

in exactly the same way, and an index of .000 indicated
that they answered all three questions in exactly opposite
ways.

In this manner the index was found for every
possible pair of legislators in the House. As explained
in Chapter V the mean of the indices of all possible pairs
of legislators in a group was found for each group and
these means were considered the group indices. And for
_urposes of comparison the means of the indices of all
possible pairs Oi hepuhlieans, Demo rats, and l gisintois

in the entire House were also I urmm ‘Mm:se were on aidered

2. 1 i ‘ 1 ~ ~ - w ~ ,_ -
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_. .x. V ., ..l .‘ \_ ‘_ V-L;C' ‘.‘_;- x x... \ _ .‘i.‘/

 

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liliS lilelt3A intfltoLllhgd tilt, U:.L«.-.l‘a.t; CO Millpll Lilo levels;

included in the analysis. For each roll call vote on
whictxtmmo legislinrors voteilzilike tiaqxarere giveritnn;
point, and then their total number of points was divided
by the total number of roll call votes both legislators

participated in. The result was the Index of Voting

201

Agreement for those two legislators. Thus the problem of
absenteeism was handled by simply eliminating from the
computations for a pair of legislators, those roll calls
on which at least one of them had been absent.

The index was found for all possible pairs of legis-
lators in the House. The mean of the indices of all
possible pairs of legislators in a group was found for each
group and these means were considered the group indices.
For purposes of comparison the means of the indices of all
possible pairs of Republicans, Democrats, and legis-

lators in the entire House were also found. These wer

(T)

considered the parties2 lVA‘s and the legislature 8 16A.

APPENDLX C

lDEHTlFYlHG THE lNEORMAL GROUPS
Previously used methods of identifying informal groups
were inadequate for the needs of this research project.
lherefore, the following method was developed with the
three criteria mentioned in Chapter III in mind.1 The
six steps or phases of the method were as follows:
1. By means of inspection all mutual choices and cliques

of legislators based completely upon mutual choices

(I)
Q.

were determin.

2. The largest mutual choice clique (i.e., a clique in
which every member had chosen every other member)
was selected. in ease oi a tie, one of the tied
cliques was selected at random.

Next use was wide of a large sheet of graftirg paper.

DJ

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T‘L t 4,, LNLC *‘q :l s pl»rw . 4‘ r * as t): t'“7 entr [s
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wtl‘: plaCsal ill ., Jicd'Ul 1_L« that if 01 --;x: t: : L ._.,§3

paper, creating a matrix composed of the clique

rtembeqts and.eall true othEi‘ legit] iIOPS. ‘Theii the cfucioss

J)

 

1See supra, pp. 85.

202

203

made by the clique members were plotted on the matrix
by placing a diagonal line from the lower left to
upper right corners of the appropriate squares. Next
the choices re ceived by the clique members were
plotted by placing a diagonal line from the upper left
to lower right corners of the appropriate squares.
When this had been done it could be seen at a glance
for the entire House what choices had been extended
to and received from the clique members.

4. The next step was to count the number of choices ex~
tended to and received from the clique members for
every person in the House. The individual with the

hi nest score was added to the clique, provided that:

UQ

a. His score was equal to or more than one-half the
members already in the clique.

b. If there were two to four members in the clique,
he had connections (either chosen by or choices
extended to) with at least two clique members.2

c. if there were five or six members in the clique,

he had connections with at least three clique

 

5The provisions of (b), (c), (d), and (e) were 6
tablished because a mutual choice relationship resul
in a score of two, and as a result a person with a mu.

choice relationship with one or two clique members might
qualify for membership in a clique even though he would

not be connected with any other members. Thus a

cnaori oi nmmuxars, Wiiii eac nwnnber of tune cnadii con—
nected to one or two others but not to a wide assortment
of members, could have developed, instead of a true group.

0‘.

204

members, or with at least two clique members,
at least one of whom was a member of the original
mutual choice clique.

d. If there were seven to eleven members in the clique,
he had connections with at least three members in
the clique.

e. If there were twelve or more members in the clique,
he had connections with at least four members of
the clique.

After a new member had been selected, his name was

added to the column on the left and his choices re-

ceived and extended were plotted. Then the procedure
was started o.er again, adding the member with the
highest score providing he met the restrictions of step

A. This was done until theremv&xszno person outside

the clique who met the requirements of step Q. This

1.- r - , , - ‘ ‘ . ,5 ,. x‘ .." I _\ . . d —l .\ v .. t . “ 1' ‘l 7" . . >(,
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process was started over again by the selection of a
new nutual choice clique. This was repeated urtil
there were nn mutual choice cliques left.

One rema'ning problem need to be explained. What if

U)

D

under step e, two or mor persons had tie scores? In

<l)

such a case if one of the persons had closer ties with
the members of the original mutual choice clique than

the other personts) did, he was added. if there was

no distinction on this basis, the person who had both

205

extended and received choices with clique members was
selected before the person who had only extended or
only received choices. If there was no distinction
on this basis either, the person who had received the
most choices was added and finally if, as happened a
few times, the individuals who were tied could not be
distinguished on any of these bases, the persons

were merely added by alphabetical order.

APPENDLX D

RULES OF THE GAME AND SANCTICNS

Following are the thirteen general rules of the game
and seven sanctions under which almost all of the
specific rules and sanctions mentioned by the legislators
could be subsumed. Under each general rule and sanction
are listed the specific rules and sanctions that were

subsummed urder them.

Rules of the Game

 

1. Don t talk too much.
2. Work hard at the job, do your work.
a. Attend sessions and vote.

l3. .apocialize irizmi area aimllouow it well.

(4.)

Y -\ .1 ‘ r ‘,‘_ a ‘ ’: P“ F ‘ V . / ‘ A I v v ”x ‘4 , ~ ’
. Help and give advice to other erCCrS.

d. Eiuow an 1iflmerest lflijUP vunlt.

_ 4 ‘ A a ’\ f . ‘ ’_ ; _ A
ai1.si. try; csnicius ttii illLril.

a. Dun’t go 3

(JR

b. Support the leadership.
4. New Members should take it easy.
a. Don’t talK too much at first.

b. Should go slow at first.

206

O\

Q
Q,

ll.

12.

207

Be honest, keep promises,

a. Don t give out false information on bills.
b. Be sincere.

c. Keep committments.

Observe the committee system.

a. Don't vote to discharge committees.

b. Go along with the chairmen of committees.

c. Committee votes must be kept secret.

d. Respect seniority.

Be broad minded, not selfish or extreme.

a. Don‘t work only for publicity, for yourself.
b. Don t be extr me.

C. Be willing to compromise, to go along.

d. Gain experience gradually and silently.

e. Get bipartisan support.

Donft attack other members personally.

a.. Emmi‘t tflhtfllflliSS (other Itendmzrs.

Show normal
a. Show respect, courtesy on the flooi.

.3

c. Respect the rights of the other members.

Dtfll‘t/ cam r57 a EEEIYSCWM11 ggriuige .
a. Respect others, even when you dif
Maintain standards of personal behavior.

a. Don‘t get drunk or hang around with women.

Respect legislative rights of others.

U.)

k A.)

N

U
C)
:1

Loss of

(T

(I‘-

L: ‘3 r‘

C)

'r requests

”wer*.a_ «r»,v ~~w.aw . a~+ y'iln
"t-ouuce Luiku.1fbmbC-S ffi:u ell 0.

Don‘t attack a member s bill or offer an amendment

without first discussing it with him.

Help other members, vote for their bills if they

only affect their district.

member in his district.

good word for a member in his district if

”a... 4— ' -
.3 ‘1flC L1 Oil S

 

influence.
Bills do not get out of committee.

get passed.

l

Are not able to stop legislation.

Can not get amendments adopted.

Do not listen to them, are not depended LoOQ to?
iniormation.

. “I r > h _ ‘~ 1 (fl ». > o o .. 4 f (”V _‘ v .".‘, '__ _\ ~.. >'v‘
ct get 1:0mfl:;wle positio s CM”—m3ble Lento.

4 , .., ' .‘ fir‘cr . '3. A, i \
CQliLtL:S the; wan. I.“

U)
H
rt
5
H
i

become leader

‘5 .3
H
(r3.
U)

htumnad socieally.
the floor.

are objected to.
are not extended to them.

Floor courtesies

209

Are hurt electorally.

a. They will be defeated in elections.

b. His supporters back home will find out and they
will act against him.

Nothing can be done.

210

 

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