

GEORGE BOYD: INDIAN AGENT
OF THE UPPER GREAT LAKES, 1819-1842

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JOHN HAROLD HUMINS
1975



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
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ABSTRACT

GEORGE BOYD: INDIAN AGENT OF THE UPPER GREAT LAKES, 1819-1842

By

John Harold Humins

George Boyd, Jr., served as a federal Indian agent at Michilimackinac from 1819 to 1832 and at Green Bay from 1832 to 1842. Situated at remote, wilderness outposts, Boyd had a unique position in Indian administration; he was a frontier diplomat for the War Department; it was his duty to execute Indian policies and to enhance the power and prestige of the American nation. His role was very difficult since he served as a middle-man in the government's dealings with the Indians within his agency; it was his responsibility, therefore, to assure peaceful inter-racial relations, distribute presents and annuities, and monitor the moods and activities of his charges. He was also expected to promote fair trade practices, oversee civilization efforts, supervise agency personnel, and execute many treaty provisions.

A political appointee, Boyd became an agent after unsuccessful ventures in business and public service. As an Easterner he was ignorant about the Indians and inexperienced with frontier life. His assignment to the

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Mackinac agency in 1819 was thus both an opportunity and a challenge.

Since Boyd did not act in a vacuum, it was necessary to establish the context in which he served. I have tried to place him in his setting by not only describing the environment of his assignments and the condition of the Indians under his supervision, but also by describing other important factors that influenced his activities. His efforts at Mackinac were affected by the strong influence that the British retained over the Indians in American territory; consequently, he became involved in the effort of the United States to end British influence and gain complete control of its own territory. Although he actively sought to blunt British prestige, it was the presence of the American military and the efforts of John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company that would be decisive in this matter. Astor's company quickly rose to monopoly status in the Lakes region after the War of 1812 and its power was most formidable, as Boyd's predecessor had learned when he was dismissed from office for acting contrary to Astor's interests. Boyd soon found that the company's dominant position hampered his freedom of action and helped to create his lackluster record in executing federal trade policy.

With his transfer to Green Bay in 1832, Boyd faced new concerns. Upon arrival he was immediately involved in the government's efforts to end the resistance of many

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Sauk-Fox to westward removal; he played a small but significant role in the Black Hawk War. When the war drums were silenced and the most belligerent tribal groups were pushed westward, American settlement slowly increased in the Green Bay area and underscored Boyd's responsibilities as middle-man in Indian-white contacts. Since an agent had the task of executing many treaty provisions, his role was broadened when the Indians of the area made treaties with the federal government. As the distributor of treaty annuities his position was enhanced among the tribes because the diminishing size of the tribal lands and the increasing scarcity of food supplies made the Indians quite dependent upon the annuities and, in turn, increasingly attentive to the agent's wishes. Boyd's position, however, was effectively challenged in the case of the Menominee -- the largest tribe under his jurisdiction -- by a small group of traders who controlled this tribe; several of these traders were half-breed relatives of the Menominee. By the mid-1830's these individuals faced a gloomy future as the fur trade declined. Consequently, they came into conflict with Boyd because they desired to control the Green Bay agency to insure their continued domination of the Menominee and that the Menominee annuities would benefit their mercantile interests. In the late 1830's these traders started a controversy about an annuity payment irregularity, which

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was largely not of Boyd's making, and soon this controversy mushroomed into an investigation of his finances. This led to the disclosure of his mishandling of agency funds and his resignation from office in 1842. An ill and broken man, he died a few years later indebted to the federal government.

Although Boyd served twenty-three years as an agent, he did not make any notable contribution to federal policy or government-Indian relations; nevertheless, he was worthy of historical study because of his extended service and because he clearly represented the average agent in his performance of duties. His long career, it should be noted, resulted more from his family connection with John Quincy Adams than from his dutiful execution of federal Indian policy.

A wide range of sources was used in this study. Boyd's personal and official papers, and the official correspondence of the Michigan Indian superintendency were the most important. Other manuscript collections were also used: the papers of Lewis Cass, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Morgan L. Martin, and Thomas L. Forsyth, and the Mackinac Letter Books of the American Fur Company. Also utilized were printed primary sources, such as reminiscences, government reports, travel accounts, and assorted document collections. Many secondary accounts also made important contributions to this case study of a relatively obscure politically-appointed, public servant.

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**GEORGE BOYD: INDIAN AGENT
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By

John Harold Humins

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1975

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To my mother and father
and their unfaltering love
and unending encouragement
which made this possible.

I am indebted
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Special recognition
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many fine people for their generous help in making this study possible. I must warmly thank the staffs at the Michigan State University Library, the Wisconsin Historical Society, the Burton Historical Collections, Detroit Public Library, the Clark Historical Library, Central Michigan University, and the State of Michigan Library, for their friendly assistance.

Special recognition must be given to my committee. I will always appreciate the interest, patience, and kindly guidance of Doctors Harry Brown, Madison Kuhn, Donald Lammers, and Charles Cleland. They are indeed fine scholars and understanding human beings.

I should also like to express my gratitude to my many friends and fellow graduate students who have shown interest and offered insight and encouragement.

Lastly, special thanks to Paula. Her sensitivity, understanding, and unfailing assistance made this project so much easier and more rewarding.

Even though many people made significant contributions to this work, I stand alone in being responsible for its shortcomings.

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CHAPTER 1

FROM MARYLAND TO MACKINAC

Little is known of the early life of George Boyd Jr.; even the date and place of his birth are uncertain. We do know that he was born about 1779 in eastern Maryland to a Scottish father, who emigrated to the New World before the War of Independence and practiced law.¹

Described as a man of talent and intelligence, with refined and gentlemanly manners,² Boyd must have been an

¹Herbert B. Tanner, "Sketch of George and James M. Boyd," Wisconsin Historical Collections, vol. XII (Madison: 1892), p. 266. (Hereafter the Wisconsin Historical Collections will be referred to as WHC.) Tanner was the son-in-law of George Boyd's son James, who was a volunteer in the Black Hawk War and a noted Wisconsin pioneer.

A plausible explanation for the paucity of information about Boyd's birth and early life is that the records of St. Mary's County, Maryland's oldest county, were practically all destroyed by fires in 1768 and 1831. Lost were all the register of wills, and most of the land and marriage records. (Morris L. Radoff, et al., The County Courthouses and Records of Maryland, part two: The Records, Publication No. 13, The Hall of Records Commission, State of Maryland (Annapolis: 1963), p. 157.)

²Elizabeth T. Baird, "Reminiscences of Life in Territorial Wisconsin," WHC, vol. XV (Madison: 1900), p. 240; and "Narrative of Morgan L. Martin," in an interview with Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., WHC, vol. XI (Madison: 1888), pp. 392-93. Elizabeth T. Baird was the wife of the Green Bay lawyer, Henry S. Baird, who settled there in 1829 and later became the first Attorney General of Wisconsin territory. Morgan L. Martin was the nephew of James Duane Doty, a famous Wisconsin politician. Martin came to Green Bay in 1827, with Doty's encouragement, and began a successful career as a lawyer, politician and land speculator.

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In the opening years of the 1800's Boyd was residing in Washington City, where he had probably spent much of his early life. It was here, while in his twenties, that he began his career of public service, which was to extend over thirty years. His adult years in the Capital alternated, however, between public and private endeavors.

In 1805, he married Harriet Johnson, daughter of Joshua Johnson, and gained entrance into two families of political importance -- Harriet was the niece of the influential first governor of Maryland, Thomas Johnson, and the sister-in-law of John Quincy Adams.³ Boyd recognized the political value of such solid family ties, as indicated in his attempt in 1808 to use the influence of his famous brother-in-law, the son of the second President of the United States, to obtain a position in the Jefferson administration.

Despite close ties to the Adams family, the attempt failed. The proud and principled Adams informed Boyd that he was unable to send a letter of recommendation to Secretary of State James Madison in support of Boyd's application for an appointment "as a messenger to bear dispatches to France." The unwillingness to use his

³Tanner, "Sketch," p. 268.

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influence, Adams explained in a letter, was not because he did not favor his brother-in-law, but because of his deep political differences with the Jefferson administration. Furthermore, a sense of propriety and a family rule, originating with his father, prevented Adams from interfering in political matters for friends and relatives.⁴ Oddly enough, Boyd then wrote to Madison and recommended himself for the position! On this matter, he wrote to Adams: "I wrote Mr. Madison yesterday - recommending George Boyd highly as a messenger - perhaps he may deem it presumptuous in me to ask favors in a style so novel."⁵

Failing to obtain the government position, Boyd continued as a merchant in Georgetown. Invoices indicate that he sold a general line of merchandise, including such items as coffee, tea, gunpowder, sugar, soap, French wine, lumber and glass products. His business activities also involved him in the sale of slaves.⁶

In addition to his occupation as a merchant, there is evidence that he was involved in banking matters in the

⁴John Quincy Adams to Boyd, May 14, 1808, The Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts (microfilm edition at Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant) roll 135, pp. 65-66. (Hereafter the Massachusetts Historical Society will be referred to as MHS.)

⁵Boyd to Adams, May 24, 1808, ibid., roll 135, pp. 98-100.

⁶J.A. Cassen to Boyd, July 15, 1809, Papers of George Boyd, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, vol. 1, p. 5. (Hereafter the Wisconsin Historical Society will be referred to as WHS.)

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first decade of the nineteenth century. A letter from John P. Van Ness, a former congressman and president of the board of the office of discount and deposit of the Branch Bank of the United States in Washington, D.C., to Boyd in December, 1809, shows that Boyd was in the employ of that office, which received and handled public monies.⁷

Boyd's fortunes took a favorable turn in the fall of 1811 when he was chosen by Secretary of War William Eustis to be his private secretary. He performed the same duties for Eustis' successor, General John Armstrong, until August, 1814, when President James Madison forced Armstrong to resign because of military failures in the War of 1812.⁸

Boyd's secretarial experience probably led to his being appointed a "bearer of dispatches" for the United States government in August, 1814, after Armstrong's resignation and the beginning of the peace negotiations with the British at Ghent. As bearer of dispatches, it was his duty to carry secret correspondence between the American capital and the peace negotiators in France. In his letter of special authorization and introduction to those with whom he was to come in contact, he was described as a man "...of the age of thirty-five years or thereabouts, five feet eight inches high, florid complexion, light hair, and hazel eyes."⁹

⁷John P. Van Ness to Boyd, December 19, 1809, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 6; also see H.W. Crew, Centennial History of the City of Washington, D.C. (Dayton, Ohio: 1892), pp. 351-54.

⁸Tanner, "Sketch," p. 268.

⁹James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Boyd, August 11, 1814, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, docs. 7 and 8.

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During the course of the last half of 1814 and early 1815, he diligently carried diplomatic correspondence to and from Ghent. One of the people he came in contact with was his brother-in-law, who was a member of the peace commission at Ghent, along with Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, Jonathan Russell, and James A. Bayard. On December 16, 1814, Adams advised Boyd, who was in Paris, that permission had been obtained from the British Office of Admiralty for the departure and unmolested voyage to any port of the United States of the schooner Transit so long as it had "no other Passengers on board, than a Bearer of dispatches from the American Commissioners at Ghent."¹⁰ Boyd was to be that courier and on Christmas Day, 1814, he received his passport and the information that the treaty of peace had been signed the previous day, and that he and Christopher Hughes, Jr., the Secretary to the Commissioners, were to carry the treaty as speedily as possible to America.

While in France performing his official duties Boyd managed to transact some private business. In pursuit of this private activity, not failing to see the advantage of his family connections, he tried once again to use his tie to Adams to gain special favors. On December 5 he requested Adams' permission "to put a cargo aboard" the Transit, in the hope that it would travel free or at low rates, thus

¹⁰ Adams to Boyd, December 16, 1814, Adams Papers, MHS, roll 138, pp. 215-16.

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¹⁴ Boy
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bringing him a "handsome" profit when it was sold in America.¹¹ Once again Adams failed to cooperate. Although he had earlier wished Boyd luck with his business efforts, on December 16 he informed him that, according to the terms of the British travel agreement, no cargo could be carried on the schooner.¹² Boyd returned to the United States on the Transit and soon resumed his occupation as a merchant.

His short service as a courier must have strengthened his commercial impulse, because in late summer 1815, along with a request for an appointment as an Indian agent from the acting Secretary of War, William H. Crawford, who was a close friend, he asked that a portion of the War Department contracts for supplying the military and Indians "be regularly assigned" to him.¹³ He failed in these efforts.

In March of the following year, however, Boyd tried again. At this time he sought from Crawford a contract to buy ten thousand stands of badly needed and highly prized French muskets for the government at ten dollars and fifty cents apiece.¹⁴ Having done so, Boyd quickly inquired of John Quincy Adams, who was now serving in London as U.S. Minister, of the feasibility of making such a purchase.

¹¹Boyd to Adams, December 5, 1814, ibid., roll 421.

¹²Adams to Boyd, November 14, 1814, ibid., roll 138, p. 189, and Adams to Boyd, December 16, 1814, ibid., roll 138, pp. 215-16.

¹³Boyd to Crawford, September 12, 1815, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 18.

¹⁴Boyd to Adams, March 16, 1816, Adams Papers, MHS, roll 430.

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Wisely, he contacted Adams to make the undertaking "less hazardous" and to insure the betterment of his personal fortune.¹⁵ In November of that year Adams informed Boyd that "no arms of the description mentioned in your Letter are to be obtained. Others might be procured, but probably not at the prices and for the qualities which would suit your purpose."¹⁶ Before this disheartening news reached Boyd, he had signed a contract with the Ordnance Department to go to Europe to purchase arms and other related items.

In late 1816 and early 1817 he was in Europe making the desired acquisitions. Besides the arms, he was also to procure tools and other materials for federal armories, a million and a half musket flints, a half million rifle flints, and a quarter million pistol flints. The arms were "to be of the best french pattern of the American calibre....," while the flints were to be of the "best kind and quality," and delivered in perfectly good order and condition.¹⁷ In addition, the War Department wanted him to procure the latest edition of the French Encyclopaedia, maps of France and Europe, and a collection of the best works on assorted military subjects. For this collection of books and maps,

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Adams to Boyd, November 13, 1816, ibid., roll 434.

¹⁷Contract between Boyd and the Ordnance Department, October 1, 1816, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 19.

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he was instructed to spend not more than twelve hundred dollars.¹⁸

In addition to the contract responsibilities for the War Department, Boyd was also an agent for the Commissioner of Public Buildings and was commissioned to acquire various items, such as carpets, pulleys, locks, hinges, knobs, bolts, door plates, and screws for federal buildings in Washington.¹⁹

In late December, Boyd informed the Ordnance Department that he found it impossible to negotiate the purchase of the maps and charts desired because of the "enormous" costs. He reported that he had concluded the purchase of the tools for the armories and was now completing the acquisition of other items. He asked for further instructions about the muskets desired.²⁰ This request suggested that he was having trouble fulfilling the contract requirements for the arms. This was made clear in May, 1817, when the government terminated the contract.

The termination of the contract hit him rather hard -- particularly so in view of the depressed economic condition

¹⁸William H. Crawford to Boyd, October 9, 1816, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 21; George Graham, acting Secretary of War for Crawford, to Boyd, October 26, 1816, ibid., doc. 24; for the list of works to be procured see ibid., docs. 39 and 40.

¹⁹Invoice from the Commissioner of Public Buildings to Boyd, January 1, 1817, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 28; also see Boyd to Baring Bros. & Co., London, January 25, 1817, ibid., docs. 30 and 31; and Broom, Harris & Co., London, to Boyd, February 15, 1817, ibid., doc. 35.

²⁰Boyd to Commanding Officer, Ordnance Department, December 22, 1816, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 25.

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of the nation at the time. Boyd's economic situation was expressed in a letter which he wrote from Washington to a mercantile source in Paris:

The times are miserable here - and the demand, or rather outcry, on account of the scarcity of money, unparalleled. I have not sold 200 dollars worth of any of the goods ordered from France on any arms account - however I am in hopes that the times will mend before long.²¹

The times did not mend; the long depression made matters worse for him.

In July, 1818, he sought to reopen the matter and obtain a just redress of what he thought was an arbitrary decision on the part of the War and Treasury departments. He questioned the logic and fairness of his contract which, with its "guarded phraseology," made him fall victim to the proviso that "the arms should be received and approved" before his drafts for the weapons were accepted. Because of this proviso, he had experienced heavy losses which, he declared, he would "not tamely bear."²²

The reopening of the matter led the head of the Ordnance Department, Decious Wadsworth, to explain to the Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, the reason the contract had been terminated. He wrote that Boyd's sample arm had been stripped and critically examined, and that it appeared

²¹Boyd to Thomas W. Storrow, Paris, July 25, 1817, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 36.

²²Boyd to Wadsworth, July 11, 1818, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 47.

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to be a musket "made up of detached limbs taken from old or damaged arms." He also told Calhoun that with the American military possessing too many arms of this type he could not "recommend the purchasing of arms of that Description at any Price."²³ Although there was some speculation that politics had entered the matter,²⁴ Wadsworth's explanation was probably the true one.

Recognizing Boyd's dismal economic position, Wadsworth made two attempts within a week after his letter to Calhoun to get Boyd another arms commission. He argued that the national supply of small arms was scanty and that unless some were obtained the national armories and state militias would be crippled. He recommended Boyd as the government agent to go to France to purchase the needed firearms; because the present contract with Boyd had worked out unfavorably, he thought that the United States government was obligated to "come into some arrangement with him satisfactory to all parties."²⁵ Wadsworth's suggestions did not find approval and were quietly shelved as funds were short and retrenchment in effect.

²³Wadsworth to Calhoun, July 16, 1818, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, W. Edwin Hemphill, ed., vol. II (Columbia, S.C.: 1969), pp. 389-90. See also William H. Crawford to Boyd, May 18, 1818, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 42.

²⁴Tanner, "Sketch," pp. 267-68.

²⁵Wadsworth to Calhoun, July 20 and 23, 1818, Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. II, pp. 408-09, and 421.

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Meanwhile Boyd's family connections apparently worked to his advantage and helped ease his difficulty. A letter from Secretary Calhoun to President James Monroe clearly reflected the situation: "I had previously directed the settlement to be made with Mr. Boyd on the most liberal terms; much more so in fact, than what he merits."²⁶ No matter how powerful his ties, his debts could not be eradicated completely.

Boyd's position worsened when French merchants brought a suit against him for about twenty thousand francs -- about four thousand dollars -- for the unsettled accounts of arms purchased from them and not paid for in full.²⁷ The French debt plagued him for years. During his stay in the Washington area in early 1820, while on official leave of absence from his Indian agency, for the purpose of moving his family west, he faced the humiliating experience of being arrested by his French creditors. To break their legal hold he had to surrender everything he owned to them. Even then he was still indebted to them. As late as 1829 a son of one of the Paris merchants wrote him of indebtedness

²⁶ Calhoun to Monroe, September 4, 1818, ibid., vol. III, p. 101.

²⁷ William Hickey to Boyd, April 8, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 55; Hickey was Boyd's agent in Washington.

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to his late father for over nine thousand francs,²⁸ which was about eighteen hundred dollars. There is no evidence that this debt was ever settled.

Boyd's contract difficulties with the government persisted until the mid-1820's -- by which time he had been an Indian agent for over five years. This difficulty brought him a great deal of concern and embarrassment. Furthermore, it provided a strong distraction from his work as an agent.

During the early twenties there existed a running argument between him and the federal government over the arms contract. As of February, 1821, the government claimed that he still owed over six thousand dollars for drafts he had made for the purchases, which had been redeemed by the government, and for which it demanded repayment. Boyd, on the other hand, had a counterclaim against the government for over twelve and a half thousand dollars for his expenses and unredeemed drafts.²⁹ During these first few years the situation lingered in an

²⁸Boyd, King George County, Va., "Private" letter to Calhoun, March 20, 1820, Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. IV, pp. 722-3; and E. Chauvin to Boyd, March 26, 1829, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 76. The estimation of Boyd's debts in dollars was made from figures obtained from Albert Gallatin to John Q. Adams, Paris, July 31, 1820, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. by Henry Adams, vol. II (New York: 1960 reprint), p. 159. In this letter Gallatin states that 107 francs were worth a little more than \$20; the franc was worth approximately 19 cents, but I have taken the liberty to round off its value at 20 cents.

²⁹Peter Hagner, Third Auditor, Treasury Department, to Boyd, October 13, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 75; and Boyd's Statement of Accounts between the U.S. Government and himself, February 24, 1821, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 5.

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investigation stage as there was a search for some of the original arms and the accompanying original invoices. This was a confusing and frustrating period for Boyd, who, hundreds of miles from the seat of the federal government and the investigation, had to plead his case through the mails with little concrete evidence to substantiate it. In the summer of 1823 the case began to move from the inquiry stage to that of a threatened court suit against him. But Boyd effectively thwarted the court action by demanding a delay in order to gather more information. At this time the government's claim against him was for about twenty-three hundred dollars, while he doggedly claimed eleven and a half thousand dollars.³⁰ The case continued until the spring of 1825 when his contract account was finally settled, but in the meantime other developments arose out of the difficulty.

When the government sought in 1821-1822 to settle the accounts of the disputed arms contract through the sale of the arms and putting the sales returns to his credit, Boyd came up with an alternative course of action. Disturbed that the government had condemned his contracted items and was selling them too cheaply, he suggested that the arms be sent at his expense to Mackinac, where he could obtain a better price for them from the Indians. In turn, he could

³⁰Boyd to Cass, August 15, 1823, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 48; and Boyd's claims against the U.S. Government, October 8, 1822, ibid., doc. 37.

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Boyd did not stop there. In a letter written in July, 1822, he requested Lewis Cass, the Governor of Michigan Territory and the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the upper Great Lakes region, to use his influence to obtain permission to purchase two hundred and seventy stands of rifles from him, provided they were not in poor or rusted condition, to be used as presents to the Indians from the government.³² This proposal never came to fruition.

In the meantime, Boyd used his friendship with Ramsey Crooks, who was the head representative of the American Fur Company for the upper Great Lakes area, to get the company to ship arms and other goods to him in the spring and summer of 1823. Not only did the American Fur Company send his goods to him along with their own goods, and at the same freight rates, but it also helped him sell some of the merchandise when it came into their hands in New York City.³³

The company, owned by John Jacob Astor, went one step further once the remaining goods arrived in the West. In the summer of 1823 it bought the guns from Boyd and sent them to its agent at Prairie du Chien, who disposed of them to the Indians. Furthermore, two agents of the Astor company,

³¹Boyd to William Lee, Second Auditor, Treasury Department, May 11, 1822, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 26.

³²Boyd to Cass, July 8, 1822, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 27.

³³Crooks to Boyd, April 10 and 21, 1823, ibid., vol. 2, docs. 44 and 45; and John J. Astor & Son, New York, to Boyd, August 20, 1823, ibid., doc. 71.

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Robert Stuart and Joseph Rolette, certified that the guns were of "good quality," at least as good "as guns imported for the Indians in 1815 and 1816."³⁴ Such actions greatly aided Boyd financially, and perhaps would help dispose him to treat the Astor company more favorably. And the sworn statements of Stuart and Rolette must have satisfied him immeasurably, because they served to vindicate his contract role and discredit the government at the same time.

When the contract dispute began in 1817 Boyd's personal situation was quite tense. Soon after the contract was terminated, however, he became chief of the Pension Office in the War Department in charge of three clerks. His job, for which he earned eight hundred dollars a year, was not difficult, although the number of applications for military pensions made it demanding.³⁵ He ran into trouble, however, when he imposed a rule requiring applicants to submit two sworn affidavits verifying their military service, if their names did not appear on the official muster rolls. In this zealous attempt to guard against fraud and pension abuse, Boyd created, in the opinion of Secretary Calhoun, a troublesome and time-consuming

³⁴Bill of Sale, August 4, 1826, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 94, and sworn statement by Joseph Rolette, August 4, 1826, ibid., doc. 95. The bill of sale and sworn statements were made before Judge James D. Doty certifying the purchase of the guns by the American Fur Company from Boyd in the summer of 1823.

³⁵Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. II, p. 113. See also Boyd to Henry Clay, August 30, 1817, The Papers of Henry Clay, James F. Hopkins, ed., vol. II (Lexington, Ky.: 1959), p. 375.

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procedure which slowed the administrative machinery. This angered the ambitious Calhoun, who had not been properly informed of the initiation of the rule.³⁶ The friction developing between the two men, combined with Boyd's failure to terminate successfully the contract matter, triggered Boyd's quick temper, and he suddenly quit his position on July 24, 1818.³⁷ He formally submitted his resignation on the twelfth of August.³⁸

Despite his rash actions, Boyd was soon to resume his service with the federal government. On August 13, he was sent official notification that he had been, "with the approbation of the President of the United States," appointed Indian agent at Michilimackinac with an annual compensation of fourteen hundred dollars. Meanwhile, awaiting Senate confirmation, he was to post bond with two sureties.³⁹

The speed with which Boyd acquired another government position on the heels of his departure from the Pension Office suggests that political influences were at work for him. During his service with the federal government he had

³⁶Calhoun to Thomas R. Peters, August 3, 1818, and Calhoun to Samuel Smith, September 23, 1818, Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. III, pp. 7, and 154-55.

³⁷Boyd to Calhoun, August 12, 1818, ibid., vol. III, p. 25.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Calhoun to Boyd, August 13, 1818, ibid., vol. III, pp. 27-8.

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gained many notable and influential friends, who in an hour of need gave him a new lease on life, even if his appointment carried him a thousand miles from what he knew and cherished. The role of his brother-in-law, however, must not be stressed since Adams consistently followed the rule of not doing any political favors for any friends or relatives regardless of the circumstances. The circumstances became quite complicated for the Adams' rule in 1818 when Boyd, after losing the arms contract, resigned "in a moment of anguish" his position as head of the Pension Office;⁴⁰ and while Adams adhered to the family rule, his wife, Louisa, thinking of her sister and the Boyd children, risked the ire of her husband by penning a compassionate letter to President Monroe imploring his assistance.⁴¹ The letter, however, was written a few days after Boyd had received notification of his appointment. Unaware of the appointment, Monroe quickly wrote to Calhoun asking him to do what he could for Boyd. Calhoun replied that Boyd had already received an appointment as an agent in spite of his contract problems and irrational resignation. In this letter Calhoun also indicated why Boyd had received the appointment. He wrote that he treated Boyd "with more kindness than he deserved," because of "his connexions."⁴²

⁴⁰ Louisa Adams to President Monroe, August 17, 1818, Dorothie Bobbé, Mr. & Mrs. John Quincy Adams: An Adventure in Patriotism (New York: 1930), p. 210.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 210-11.

⁴² Calhoun to President Monroe, September 1, 1818, Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. III, p. 87.

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Undoubtedly, the appointment was well received by Boyd. It could not have come at a better time. As mentioned previously, he had made a request in September, 1815, for an appointment as an Indian agent. This request was not honored, but the following March, acting Secretary Crawford offered Boyd a position among the Creek Indians in Mississippi Territory, if the arms contract proposal fell through. This offer, however, was unacceptable to his wife, who talked of leaving him if he took the position.⁴³ But by mid-1818, his economic plight made a change of situation more attractive and opportune. Yet his assignment to Michilimackinac was not completely to his liking as he desired a more southern assignment, but Calhoun informed him that all the new assignments had already been made.⁴⁴

Although Boyd received word of his appointment in August, 1818, it was not until June, 1819, that he arrived at Michilimackinac. At the time of his appointment the War Department expected him to leave immediately to assume his agency responsibilities, but on September 11 he requested a delay until spring. He desired the delay in order to be on hand when the last arms shipment arrived for delivery to the Ordnance Department so that he could obtain some credit for

⁴³Boyd to Crawford, September 12, 1815, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 18; and Boyd to John Quincy Adams, March 16, 1816, Adams Papers, MHS, roll 430.

⁴⁴Calhoun to Boyd, March 11, 1819, Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. III, p. 650.

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it and reduce his outstanding account with the government.⁴⁵ Furthermore, he had to sell his remaining mercantile properties, settle as many accounts as possible, and prepare for his long journey to his frontier assignment. His preparations included relocating his family, which with the exception of his eldest son, Joshua, was to stay at his farm in King George County, Virginia, until the spring of 1820. At that time he would return, sell the farm, and lead his wife, children, and one black male slave to their frontier home on Mackinac Island.⁴⁶

He must have left Washington with mixed feelings. Certainly the Capital city was identified with many fine associations; it was also, however, the scene of financial embarrassment and ruin. On the other hand, Mackinac was a remote settlement on a distant frontier where the common comforts of the East were distinct luxuries. For his wife, Harriet, who was raised in comfort, the transition must have been especially trying. But no matter how difficult the new situation may have been, it did offer Boyd a fresh opportunity to build anew and erase the blemishes of the past.

⁴⁵ Boyd to Calhoun, September 11, 1818, ibid., vol. III, p. 118; and Boyd to Calhoun, March 20, 1819, ibid., pp. 679-80.

⁴⁶ Contract between wagoneer Samuel Reed and Boyd, April 8, 1820, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 88; see also ibid., vol. 1, doc. 92, which details the items transported, and the costs, from Erie, Pa., to Detroit, and then to Mackinac.

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CHAPTER 2

THE MACKINAC AGENCY

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The scene of Boyd's assignment was a small island - only nine miles in circumference - situated in the straits of Michilimackinac which connect lakes Michigan and Huron. (See map, page 27) Mackinac Island boldly rises out of the water like the back of a turtle and, according to its visitors, majestically commands the straits.¹ Not thickly wooded because its trees had been cut down by the inhabitants over the years for firewood, it was still an isle that abounded in hardy greenery.

The settlement on the island was small.² A compact village, located on the southeastern edge of the island,

¹Thomas L. McKenney, Sketches of a Tour to the Lakes, of the character and customs of the Chippewa Indians, and of the incidents connected with the Treaty of Fond du Lac (Barre, Massachusetts: 1972), pp. 316 and 325. This latter work was originally published in 1832. The Indian name for the island means the "Great Turtle."

²Rev. J.A. Van Fleet, Old and New Mackinac (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 1880), pp. 123-4; Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal of Travels Through the Northwestern Region of the United States...to the Sources of the Mississippi River in the Year 1820 edited by Mentor L. Williams, (East Lansing, Michigan: 1953), p. 78; Elizabeth T. Baird, "Indian Customs and Early Recollections," WHC, vol. IX (Madison: 1909), pp. 318-9; and Baird, "Reminiscences of Early Days of Mackinac Island," ibid., vol. XIV (Madison: 1898), p. 34. In July 1820, Acting Governor William Woodbridge appointed Boyd justice of peace for Michilimackinac County.

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slid down from the base of the bluff where Fort Mackinac stood to the beach. The permanent population was about 450 people, who lived in about 150 houses. It was a real frontier outpost; it had no attorney, no regular religious services, no school, and the only physician in the area was assigned to the garrison. It did have a post office, a court of law, a justice of the peace, and a jail. Merchant houses, fur company offices and storehouses, a customs office and the Indian agency, clearly revealed that the island's chief economic activity was the fur trade. Furs indeed gave the island its life.

The permanent residents were mostly British and French connected with the fur trade. The French gave the community a distinct flavor with their penchant for lively socializing. They were Catholic and many of them regularly observed holy days and practiced their faith although they were visited only occasionally by a priest. The British and Americans were mostly Protestant and soberly looked askance at the French social practices, but religious tension was weak. Within a few years, however, when the settlement became overwhelmingly Americanized, and home missionaries came to work among the inhabitants, white and red, religious antagonisms developed.

Summer was approaching when Boyd arrived at Mackinac in June 1819. The forty year old Marylander's arrival coincided with a historic event. He was transported the three hundred miles from Detroit by the first steamboat of the Great Lakes,

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the Walk-in-the-Water, as it made its initial voyage north of Detroit. Its arrival presaged a new era in Great Lakes transportation and communication, and held great significance for this remote isle. Although excitement over the steamboat was electric in the frontier outpost, Boyd lost no time in assuming his duties as Indian agent by receiving, as instructed, the agency's public properties from the outgoing agent, William Henry Puthuff.³

The reception of these properties, which included agency books, papers, office furniture, tools and equipment, aptly symbolized the transfer of responsibility. With this act and the recital of instructions by Puthuff, Boyd found himself quickly immersed in a totally new endeavor in the wilds of the Old Northwest and amid the swirl of activities flowing by and through Mackinac.

Boyd's agency encompassed a large territory. It included all islands in the straits of Michilimackinac, Michigan's lower peninsula southeast to the River au Sable and southwest to Deadman's River, and Michigan's upper peninsula east to Sault Ste. Marie, west on Lake Michigan to the Menominee River, and all territory bordering upon

³Boyd to Cass, June 18, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 57; and Walter Havighurst, Three Flags at the Straits: The Forts of Mackinac (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 1966), p. 137.

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the southern shore of Lake Superior.⁴ When in 1822 the agency at Sault Ste. Marie was established under the charge of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Boyd no longer was responsible for Indians on the southern shore of Lake Superior and around the Sault. In contrast, when Boyd was transferred to Green Bay in 1832 his agency was defined less in territorial terms, and more by tribes; there his charges were essentially the Menominee and New York Indians.

Mackinac Island was an important location for an agency. To some it was the "Malta" of the upper Great Lakes because of its commercial and military value. It was accurate to say that whoever commanded Mackinac controlled the surrounding areas militarily, economically and politically. This idea was not foreign to Governor Lewis Cass of the Michigan Territory, who informed Secretary of War Calhoun that Mackinac, along with Sault Ste. Marie, was "of paramount importance in any systematic arrangement for the defense of this Country."⁵ Its economic and military importance had been known by fur traders for well over a hundred years.

⁴Circular, Cass to Agents in his superintendency, April 22, 1818, Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs, National Archives File Microcopy at Michigan State University Library, East Lansing, Michigan, roll 3, p. 345. Hereafter the Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs will be referred to as MSIA.

⁵Cass to Calhoun, June 17, 1820, ibid., roll 4, p. 215.

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American authority in the region was given strength by the presence of a small Army garrison at Mackinac. Originally occupied by American troops in late 1796, the island was retaken by the British in 1812 and remained in their hands until 1815, when at war's end it was re-occupied by Americans. In the years after the War of 1812, it assumed an important role in the federal government's plans to stop Indian trips to the British outpost on Drummond Island and to end British influence over the natives residing on American soil. In addition, the military's presence was aimed at eliminating impediments to American fur operations and settlement.⁶

Historically, the strait was the scene of commercial struggles between the great fur trade interests. Before the French and Indian War, which ended in North America in 1759, this region was controlled by the French. Through this war the British won control of it, but they were not to own it long. Its ownership passed to the new American nation when the rebellious thirteen American colonies gained their independence. Although the British relinquished territorial ownership in the Treaty of Paris (1783), they still maintained actual control of the area through their

⁶ Lawrence R. Schmeckbier, The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities, and Organizations (Baltimore: 1927), pp. 1-16; Henry Putney Beers, The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846 (Philadelphia: 1935), pp. 2, 30-1, 35 and 50; and Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895 (Madison: 1964), p. 89.

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traders and continued military presence. The weakness of the fledgling American republic and the distance from the Atlantic seaboard to the upper Great Lakes region made continued British control possible. The Jay Treaty of 1795 ended British military occupation of the area, but the process of ending British political and economic dominance was a slow one that only began to bring some measure of real American control in the years after the War of 1812. Even then, British agents and traders freely journeyed into the area and maintained friendly contacts and strong control over the Indians; slowly the influence ebbed, but the British still had strong influence in the 1830's. The federal government and American trade interests, especially John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company, were very eager to end British control and influence; and being centrally located in this area of great Anglo-American rivalry and tension, Mackinac was of supreme importance in any effort to rid the region of British power.⁷

Mackinac was also significant because to the Indians it was a shrine where some spirits (manitoes) resided, a gathering place for their medicine feasts, and a refuge during periods of extreme danger.⁸ Considering the island's significance to the Indian, it was in many ways fortunate that the United States government located an agency there.

⁷Schmeckbier, ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 11; McKenney, Sketches of a Tour, p. 316; and Van Fleet, Mackinac, pp. 121-2.

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
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When Boyd arrived there was no agency house at Mackinac. He was given \$350 a year by the War Department to rent a residence for his office and family. Thinking this expensive and the house he rented "hardly habitable," he frequently urged the government to have a house built. At first, he suggested that he build it and have the government continue to pay him the allotted rent, but the government chose to build it.⁹

Since the government sought the greatest economy in erecting public buildings, it usually had the military construct agency houses. The Mackinac agency house, however, was contracted to a private carpenter. After several delays, most of the work on it was done by the fall of 1823, and occupancy was possible while work continued into 1824 on the other agency buildings. Also constructed were a blacksmith shed, stable and storehouse. The total cost was thirty-five hundred dollars.¹⁰

⁹Calhoun to Boyd, February 17, 1820, Hemphill, ed., Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. IV, p. 669; Calhoun to Cass, February 22, 1820, MSIA, roll 7, p. 77; and Boyd to Cass, May 20, 1823, ibid., roll 12, p. 286.

¹⁰Boyd to Cass, December 26, 1820, MSIA, roll 7, p. 483; Boyd to Cass, August 6, 1821, ibid., roll 9, pp. 77-8; Boyd to Cass, October 12, 1821, ibid., roll 9, p. 197; Cass to Calhoun, January 12, 1823, ibid., roll 5, p. 120; Calhoun to Cass, April 9, 1823, roll 12, p. 177; Boyd to Cass, November 27, 1823, ibid., p. 467; Boyd to Cass, October 15, 1825, ibid., roll 17, p. 235; and Cass to Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, September 19, 1823, ibid., roll 13, p. 337. For information on the peacetime, non-military activities of the frontier army see Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Lincoln, Nebraska: 1967).



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The agency house was a two-room building situated at the foot of the bluff on which the fort stood and in the fort's east garden where fruit trees and arbor vines grew. Over the years briar roses slowly climbed its walls and chimney, blending it with its verdant surroundings. A brass knocker and metal plate inscribed "United States Agency" were affixed to the front door of the building, which served doubly as office and home.¹¹

Living at a distant outpost, Boyd faced the problem of procuring fresh food for his family. Near the agency house he planted a garden which provided fresh produce during the summer and by the mid-twenties he also had a few fruit trees. Supplementing the fruit and vegetables were the wild berries and nuts abundant on the island. The environment also furnished game, waterfowl, fish, maple syrup and maple sugar. Some of these foodstuffs were obtained in trade with the Indians.¹²

Not only did summer bring the greatest variety of foods, it also was the island's best social season. It was then that the pebbled shores were lined with canoes and the grassy

¹¹Draft to Samuel D. Carpenter by Boyd, November 27, 1823, MSIA, roll 14, p. 365; Mrs. John H. Kinzie (Juliette Augusta Magill), Wau-Bun: The "Early Day" in the Northwest (Chicago: 1932), pp. 16-7; Havighurst, Three Flags, p. 165. Mrs. Kinzie was the wife of John H. Kinzie, Indian agent at Fort Winnebago during the Black Hawk War, and niece of Dr. Alexander Wolcott, Indian agent at Chicago in the 1820's. She published Wau-Bun in 1856.

¹²Kinzie, ibid.; Boyd to William Woodbridge, July 25, 1827, Woodbridge Papers, BHC, box 2; Baird, "Indian Customs," WHC, vol. IX, pp. 317-8.

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areas were filled with wigwams as Indians gathered for trade, annuity payments and excitement. For a few weeks during mid-summer the tiny settlement expanded its population severalfold and was the scene of trading and outfitting, drinking and feasting, singing and dancing, and gambling and game-playing. The scores of traders and hundreds of Indians were joined by the permanent residents -- merchants, employees of the trade companies, the military, and civil servants of the agency and customs house -- to create a very lively atmosphere.¹³

Social life during the rest of the year, while not so lively, was still quite active. Game-playing, usually cards, and parties with dancing and singing were popular, especially with the French inhabitants. Reading and conversation were other means of diversion for those so inclined. The arrival of travellers and the mails always provided excitement; news about the affairs of the country, especially political, was eagerly sought and exchanged.¹⁴ And hunting and fishing, of course, provided a change from the everyday routine.

¹³Meade C. Williams, Early Mackinac (St. Louis: 1901), pp. 98 and 112; Havighurst, Three Flags, p. xiv.

¹⁴William Hickey to Boyd, December 30, 1823, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 55; Richard F. Cadle to Boyd, August 25, 1837, ibid., vol. 5, doc. 35; Boyd to Adam D. Stewart, November 3, 1830, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 132; Rev. Kemper, "Journal of an Episcopalian Missionary's Tour of Green Bay, 1834," WHC, vol. XIV (Madison: 1898), p. 428; and Kinzie, Wau-Bun, p. 30.

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Winters offered a special challenge to the hearty souls at Mackinac. They were not only cold, but during the four months of deep freeze the island was virtually closed off as communication was nearly impossible. Winters limited travelling and the flow of news. Usually the monthly mails were not delivered as mountains of ice piled on shore in exquisite shapes. As snow added to the harshness of winter, social activities were generally restricted to the indoor variety, although sleighing was a popular method of breaking the monotony.¹⁵

Agency business was greatly slowed during the winter. Activity was slack because all the traders were licensed and gone, most of the Indians had retired to their hunting grounds, and the harshness of the climate limited the number of visitors.¹⁶ Yet it was during this period that furs were being gathered throughout the region. The severity of the winters made animal pelts thicker, thus commercially more valuable.

b. The American Fur Company

Located in the narrow four mile water highway between lakes Michigan and Huron, Mackinac became a vital link in the fur trade traffic moving eastward from the upper Great Lakes region and areas farther west. Its importance in the

¹⁵Baird, "Indian Customs," WHC, pp. 317-8.

¹⁶Col. Samuel C. Stambaugh, agent at Green Bay, to Cass, December 3, 1830, MSIA, roll 27, p. 455.

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period after the War of 1812 was clearly indicated by the fact that it was the headquarters for the most powerful fur company in the region, the American Fur Company.

As the regional headquarters for this company, this small isle was the trade emporium of the Old Northwest. Every summer during this period Mackinac was the gathering point for upwards of two thousand Indians and traders -- some under contract to deliver furs, others to trade them. Thousands of pelts were brought to be graded, traded, bundled and shipped east to the fur markets of the world. During their visit, the traders and Indians also outfitted themselves for the next hunting season. When business was completed, the island became a scene of roisterous revelry.¹⁷ And even when Michigan was no longer a major fur producing area, fur trade was still big business there because it was still a great clearing house of the American Fur Company, which, by the mid-1820's had developed a huge network that stretched across the United States.

The man who owned this growing enterprise was John Jacob Astor, a New York German emigré who gained his fortune in real estate and mercantile activities. In 1808, after nearly twenty-five years in the fur business, and aware of the trade's great potential and profits, he formed this company and had it incorporated by the State of New York. Interested in giving it a patriotic identity, he named it

¹⁷Williams, Early Mackinac, p. 98.

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the American Fur Company. Rich and ambitious, he shrewdly plotted his course toward carving out his share of the fur trade in the United States. Confidently, he saw his share in terms of an empire.¹⁸

He acted quickly to develop his fur operations. His first move was to raid Canada for able lieutenants to carry out his plans. Soon afterwards he established his company at Michilimackinac; simultaneously he was devising a grand scheme for a Pacific Coast trade system. His Astoria plan was ill-fated, but he made rapid inroads at Michilimackinac and the upper Lakes region. There a rivalry quickly developed between his interests and those of the North West Company, which was the powerful British operation in the area. The rivalry and international climate, however, created fears which brought the companies together to form the South West Company in January 1811. The British company feared Astor's financial strength and did not want to be involved in a competitive and fatal struggle, so an agreement was readily accepted. The ambitious Astor may have had his own misgivings; he was probably very uneasy about the troubled relations between the United States and Great Britain. He could clearly recognize what a war would do to his fur interests, especially in the Lakes region where the

¹⁸Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor: Business Man, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1931), pp. 164-7; and John Upton Terrell, Furs by Astor (New York: 1963), pp. 131-48. See these works for a complete coverage of Astor's fur operations.

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British had military dominance; thus, by creating the South West Company, in which he had a fifty per cent interest, he would insure his position in the Lakes area. The agreement specified that the North West Company was to abandon its operations on American soil and was to control no more than one-sixth of the new company. This agreement greatly served Astor's interests because it helped to eliminate his stiffest competition in the Lakes trade and insured his trade interests in case of war. Anglo-American tensions turned to war in 1812 and Astor's Pacific operation came to a disastrous conclusion, but his Lakes operations, although greatly disrupted, survived.¹⁹

Often described as America's struggle for economic independence, the War of 1812 did bring a flush of patriotic pride to many Americans. This was particularly true after General Andrew Jackson's much celebrated defeat of the British invaders at New Orleans in 1815. Although this victory came after, and had no effect upon, the "status quo ante bellum" peace settlement with Great Britain, it greatly affected the outlook and actions of the American people and their national government. Among the many expressions of this nationalistic feeling was the move to expel the British from American territory. The government's attempt to accomplish this goal greatly aided Astor's quest of empire;

¹⁹Porter, Astor, vol. 1, pp. 253-4; Terrell, Furs by Astor, pp. 164-6; and James D. Horan, The McKenney-Hall Portrait Gallery of American Indians, with a biography of Thomas L. McKenney, (New York: 1972), p. 34.

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on the other hand, the rise of the American Fur Company to monopolistic proportions reinforced the government's effort.

Seeking to end foreign influence among American Indians while stimulating American fur enterprise, Congress in an act passed in April 1816, provided for the granting of trading licenses to American citizens only. This act was passed with the aid of Astor, who urged his many friends in Washington to support it. Knowing that the federal government was moving toward this prohibition of foreigners, he cleverly agreed with his Canadian partners to extend the life of the South West Company, which was about to expire in early 1816. He did this to hurt his partners financially and repay them for their involvement in the North West Company's seizure of his Astoria operations in 1813.²⁰ The passage of this law put the handwriting on the wall for the Canadians; excluded from the trade, they sold their part of the company to Astor in 1817. With the help of Congress, Astor masterfully became the largest and strongest fur trader in the Great Lakes region. He further strengthened his position in mid-1817 when he purchased the territorial rights of the Fond du Lac region from the North West

²⁰U.S., Statutes at Large, III, p. 332; Porter, Astor, vol. II, pp. 694-5; Terrell, Furs by Astor, pp. 248-9; Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828, vol. I (New York: 1944), p. 168.

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Company; his purchase extended his tentacles westward to the upper Mississippi River region, although his company was to face bitter competition there from the Hudson's Bay Company.²¹

Attaining a dominance in the upper Lakes fur trade, Astor quickly moved to consolidate his position. After gaining control of the South West Company, he reorganized and renamed it; once again, it was called the American Fur Company, and its field operations were put under the supervision of Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart. These two Scotsmen had come to Canada when they were young men and had been associated with Astor since 1810. Intelligent and enterprising, they were promoted to be Astor's chief lieutenants; Crooks was paid \$2,000 annually, while Stuart received \$1,500, and both were given three-year contracts, with business expenses paid and five per cent of the company's stock. In return, they were to devote their energies to Astor's fur enterprise. Devotion to his business meant, of course, driving all competition from the field.²²

²¹Terrell, ibid., pp. 254-6; Wayne E. Stevens, "The Michigan Fur Trade," Michigan History, XXIX (October, 1945), pp. 501-2; Ramsay Crooks to William Morrison, June 20, 1817, American Fur Company, Mackinac Letter Books, WHS, vol. 1, p. 23. Hereafter the American Fur Company's Mackinac Letter Books, which are available in microcopy at the Clark Library, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, will be referred to as AFC, Letter Books.

²²Ida Amanda Johnson, The Michigan Fur Trade (Lansing, Michigan: 1919), pp. 123-5; Porter, Astor, vol. II, p. 700; and Terrell, ibid., p. 255.

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Astor's plans to rid the trade of all competition encountered a small, but bothersome delay. The difficulty was the agent at Mackinac, William Henry Puthuff, who did not approve of Astor's drive for empire. A temporary appointee who hoped for a permanent assignment, Puthuff zealously followed the letter of the law. He was vigilant against unscrupulous and illegal traders, and when Congress forbade all foreigners from participating in the trade, he faithfully performed his duty. Refusing to grant licenses to aliens, Puthuff faced the problem of having unlicensed traders venture into the Indian country. He responded to these violations by seizing trade goods and furs.²³ In doing so, however, he was bucking the South West Company.

As the first Indian agent stationed at Mackinac, Puthuff's zeal caused quite a controversy. Consequently, Governor Cass informed him that a rigorous application of the law was not necessary for American interests. He was told that he should use his "discretionary powers" in issuing licenses; if a foreigner applied for a license, Cass asserted, the agent should inquire of his character, former activities, and present situation. And if there was anything about him that would do injury to the interests of the United States, Puthuff should not license him; otherwise, if the applicant's character was "above suspicion,"

²³Puthuff to Cass, June 20 and 27, MSIA, roll 2, pp. 243-9 and 259-61.

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he was to grant a license. Puthuff followed Cass' directive, but still refused licenses to many British-Canadians who had served with the British Indian Department during the war. He persisted in his vigilance because it was his "task to counteract the secret machinations of private and deeply self-interested mercenary Enemies," (i.e., the North West Company and Astor), who were working against the real interests of the United States. He took it upon himself to battle these forces and expose their intentions.²⁴

Adamant in preserving the fur trade for Americans, Puthuff soon confronted the enormous power of John Jacob Astor. To the German emigré the April 1816 law was intended to force his Canadian partners to sell their half of the South West Company and to eliminate completely foreign competitors from the trade; he certainly did not want foreign traders excluded from the trade, because he wanted to use their expertise and established Indian contacts for his own operations. Astor and his lieutenants knew that they could not gain control of the Lakes trade without the employment of foreign traders. They argued that since not enough Americans were qualified and experienced in the trade the employment of foreigners was necessary; actually Crooks preferred Canadians over Americans because Yankees were on the whole "too independent," whereas "Canucks" and half-breeds had better temperaments for the wilderness and were

²⁴Cass to Puthuff, July 20, 1816, ibid., pp. 270-80; Puthuff to Cass, August 4, 1816, ibid., p. 293; and Puthuff to Cass, October 29, 1816, ibid., pp. 355-7.

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more submissive to company demands.²⁵ Even if foreigners were forbidden from the trade, the New York merchant expected to obtain several "special licenses" from the President for his own purposes. These licenses were to be obtained through a loophole in the 1816 law which gave the President sole power to decide who could trade; and since Astor had a close relationship with President Monroe, he expected to get the "special licenses" and trade advantages. Nevertheless, Puthuff's views had to be changed in order to prevent future harassment.²⁶

Cass tried once again to moderate Puthuff's zeal in the spring of 1817. Requested by acting Secretary of War George Graham to give Astor's agents "every facility in your power consistent with the laws and regulations," Cass liberally interpreted this message and conveyed it to the Mackinac agent. Puthuff was informed by the governor that Astor had purchased the South West Company and that he should "afford every assistance" to Ramsay Crooks, who "should have the selection of such persons to enter the Indian country and conduct business as he may require." Cass stretched the meaning of the instruction from Graham when he also told Puthuff to grant as few licenses as possible; thus Astor's company was to receive the licenses it needed while other trading concerns were not. As the

²⁶ Puthuff to Cass, June 20 and 27, 1816, MSIA, roll 2, pp. 248-9 and 260-1; and Horan, McKenney-Hall Portrait Gallery, p. 34.

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former commandant of the Detroit garrison, Puthuff recognized his subordinate position and dutifully followed orders. He became less vigilant in his licensing policy and consequently upset the other Indian agents and factors (government trading house agents) of the Lakes region; they in turn complained to the Indian Office that notorious Britishers were receiving licenses and ruining the trade for Americans.²⁷ The Mackinac agent was as a result caught between the American Fur Company and the War Department.

Meanwhile the Astor company was working to get rid of Puthuff. In the spring of 1817 Crooks harshly described the agent as "a man who unceasingly tries to annoy Us in every way," and told Astor that he must be removed from office.²⁸ The attack on Puthuff continued despite the company's knowledge that Cass had directed him "to attend particularly to [its] wishes." The Astor interests wanted him gone simple because he had prevented the company from getting a larger part of the trade.²⁹ Desiring his dismissal, the company accused him of several serious abuses.

²⁷George Graham, acting Secretary of War, to Cass, May 4, 1817, "The Fur-Trade in Wisconsin - 1815-1817," R.G. Thwaites, ed., WHC, vol. XIX, pp. 457-8; Cass to Puthuff, June 8, 1817, MSIA, roll 3, pp. 69-70; Porter, Astor, vol. II, pp. 702, 704 and 729; Horan, McKenney-Hall Portrait Gallery, p. 34.

²⁸Crooks to Astor, April 26, 1817, AFC, Letter Books, WHS, vol. I, p. 17.

²⁹Crooks to Astor, June 23, 1817, ibid., p. 29.

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The accusations included illegally seizing company trade goods, charging fifty dollars apiece for licenses, arbitrarily obstructing the business operations of the Astor company, being partisan to other traders, aiding British traders against the interests of the United States and those of the American Fur Company, participating in and ignoring the liquor trade, failing to stop smuggling, and "shameful" derelictions of duty.³⁰ Astor went to Washington armed with these charges and with the purpose, as expressed by Crooks and Stuart, of relieving the trade "from the persecutions of such petty tyrants."³¹ Using his influence, Astor got the government to investigate the charges. Led into a false sense of security by Cass, who also offered a brief and belated defense, Puthuff was dismissed from office.³² Such was the fate of Boyd's predecessor. Diligent in the pursuit of his duties, resolute in his belief of competitive enterprise, and disciplined to follow the orders of his superiors, Puthuff was deceived, maligned and discharged. He had fallen victim to Astor's power. A lesson was clear in the assault on and the arbitrary dismissal of Puthuff: no individual, not even an Indian agent, could fight the American Fur

³⁰Crooks and Stuart to Astor, January 24, 1818, MSIA, roll 3, pp. 269-91.

³¹Ibid., p. 288.

³²Cass to Calhoun, October 20, 1818, Hemphill, ed., Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. III, p. 222.

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Company and expect to win. People and their reputations meant little to an ambitious man and his sprawling empire.

Upon his arrival to the northern outpost, Boyd was to learn very quickly that the American Fur Company and its interests were paramount at Mackinac. Furthermore, the power of the company was not restricted to this isle -- it was also strong in the nation's capital. And even the Lakes Indians felt the overpowering dominance of this growing monopoly.

c. Indians of the Mackinac Agency

Although no precise figures are available, an estimated one hundred thousand Indians -- approximately ten per cent of the aboriginal population north of Mexico -- lived in the upper Great Lakes region when Europeans arrived on the continent.³³ The area's tribes -- Chippewa, Ottawa, Huron, Potawatomi, Miami, Kickapoo, Menominee, Winnebago, Sauk and Fox -- had a great deal of linguistic and cultural diversity, yet they also had very similar patterns of woodland culture.

During his twenty-three years of Indian service, Boyd was to be in contact with several Great Lakes Indian groups. At Mackinac, the Chippewa, Ottawa, and a few refugee Hurons were under his supervision. When he was transferred to Green Bay in 1832, he dealt most often with the Menominee and the recently emigrated New York Indians, although he also had official contact with some Winnebago.

³³George Irving Quimby, Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes: 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1800 (Chicago: 1960), p. 4.

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The largest and most important tribe under Boyd's supervision at Mackinac was the Chippewa. This Algonquian tribe had between twenty-five and thirty-five thousand members when the Europeans arrived in the New World.³⁴ They were scattered in numerous small bands over the vast area of the northern reaches of the upper Great Lakes in both present-day Canada and United States. Their homelands encircled Lake Superior in the north, stretched westward from the northern shore of Lake Huron to the Red River region of Minnesota, and dipped southward into the northern parts of Wisconsin and Michigan's lower peninsula. At the time of Boyd's arrival at Mackinac there were approximately ten thousand Chippewa living on American soil.³⁵

Adapting to the harsh environment of the northern latitude of the temperate zone, the Chippewa distributed themselves in small bands in order to assure survival.

³⁴Ibid., p. 122. Information on the Chippewa was obtained from the following works: Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 122-7; Jedidiah Morse, A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs...1822 (New Haven: 1822); W. Vernon Kintetz, The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann Arbor: 1940), pp. 317-29; Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal; William W. Warren, A History of the Ojibwa Nation (Minneapolis: 1957); James E. Fitting, The Archaeology of Michigan: A Guide to the Prehistory of the Great Lakes Region (Garden City, New York: 1970), pp. 192-5; Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Bulletin 86, (Washington: 1929); and John R. Swanton, The Indian Tribes of North America (Washington: 1953), pp. 260-4.

³⁵Morse, Report, p. 49; and Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal, p. 153.

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These bands generally had from five to twenty-five families. During the summer, a band usually lived at a good fishing site where the bandsmen fished with hooks, spears, and nets. This season furnished the greatest variety of food as they also hunted, and gathered berries, nuts and roots. The Chippewa of Michigan's lower peninsula also supplemented their food supply with a limited amount of farming. Many other Chippewa, however, who did little or no farming, were engaged in a trade with the Ottawa and Huron in which they exchanged fish, hides, and maple sugar for corn, tobacco, and other agricultural products. In the fall a band separated into extended family units to hunt designated portions of its traditionally allotted territory. This season also brought to a close the Indian's gathering cycle when the wild rice was harvested. During the winter the families generally hunted game for food, which was supplemented by the foods remaining from their fall gatherings. In the spring they collected maple sap which they boiled and made into syrup and sugar for consumption or trade.

Broken into numerous bands, the Chippewa did not have highly organized socio-political structures. There was no tribal chief or leader, and since the Chippewa were classless and egalitarian there was no tribal ranking system. Leadership in the bands, where most members were related, was based upon a man's hunting ability, physical strength, warring prowess, and the highly esteemed talent of eloquence.

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A leader had no delegated power, but he did have a great deal of influence arising from his accomplishments and reputation. The Chippewa, like the other tribes of the area with the exception of the Huron, were patrilineal in their social and political organization. The tribe was made up of several kinship groups called clans, which traced the line of descent of an individual and determined social and economic relationships. Clan membership was patrilineal and marriage patrilocal. Marriage within the same clan was forbidden as it thwarted inter-band unity; tribal unity was based upon common language, kinship and clan membership.

Closely related to the Chippewa, and the Potawatomi as well, were the Ottawa.³⁶ At the coming of the white man, they numbered between three and four thousand, and generally resided in villages of bark-covered lodges in the northwest two-thirds of Michigan's lower peninsula.³⁷ This Algonquian tribe was semi-sedentary and followed a subsistence pattern similar to that of the Chippewa, except that during the summer they cultivated gardens of corn, peas, potatoes, beans, squash, pumpkins and melons. Often they sent their surplus produce, including maple sugar, to

³⁶Information of the Ottawa was gathered from the following sources: Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 128-32; Fitting, Archaeology of Michigan, pp. 195-7; Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, pp. 226-306; and Swanton, Indian Tribes of North America, pp. 244-6.

³⁷Quimby, Indian Life, p. 4.

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Mackinac for money and goods; the Chippewa did the same with their surplus maple sugar, hides, rice and white fish. The Ottawa also traded with other Lakes tribes, especially the Chippewa and Huron. It was their propensity to trade and act as middlemen between tribes that gave them their name, which signified "to trade." As with the Chippewa, their first contact with white man came in the early 1600's; this contact led to the advent of the fur trade, which increased the importance of hunting among them, because without the valuable pelts they could not obtain European trade goods.³⁸

Much like the Chippewa, the Ottawa had a political system based upon tribal level organization. Divided into numerous small bands, which were politically independent of each other, they were connected through ties of clan, kinship and dialect. As with the Chippewa, their clans were patrilineal and intra-clan marriages were strictly forbidden.

The division of labor among the Lakes Indians was similar. The women tended the fields, harvested the crops, gathered wild foods (seeds, nuts, berries, and rice), cooked the food, tended the children, transported family belongings, made clothing and pottery, and wove mats and baskets. On the other hand, the men cleared the fields, hunted, engaged in warfare, made tools, weapons and canoes, and were the major participants in the political and religious activities.

³⁸Fitting, Archaeology of Michigan, p. 195.

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The Lakes tribes were clearly male oriented and dominated, and the position of the woman was one of subservience.

The Hurons were a tribe with a sad and strange history.³⁹ Originally they were a populous Iroquoian tribe residing in the St. Lawrence River valley and the southern part of the province of Ontario. After the coming of the Europeans, they were greatly reduced in numbers and weakened to the verge of extinction by disease, famine, and war; this process culminated in the mid-1600's when they were decimated and driven westward by their arch-enemies and distant relatives, the Iroquois of New York. In the early 1700's, after wandering around the upper Lakes regions, most of the remnant settled in the southeastern corner of Michigan and the neighboring area of Ohio; a few of their people, however, were intermingled with the Ottawa.⁴⁰

The Huron also had a mixed economy that was shaped by their environment. Agriculture, however, was more important

³⁹The following works provided information on the Hurons: Kinitz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, pp. 1-160; Fitting, Archaeology of Michigan, pp. 200-1; Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 128-32; Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States (Garden City, New York: 1967), pp. 131-2; and Swanton, Indian Tribes of North America, pp. 233-6.

⁴⁰In the late 1700's there was great intermingling and cohabitation among the Lakes tribes. As disease, war, famine and cultural disruption whittled away at the vitality of these peoples, they often resorted to mixed villages. This was especially true of the Chippewa, Ottawa, Potawatomi, and Huron in the northern parts of Michigan's lower peninsula. The blood intermixture was further extended by the propensity of the Europeans to take Indian women for wives.

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in their economy than in that of any other Lakes tribe. They raised corn, beans, squash, sunflowers, and tobacco; corn was the staple of their diet. Surpluses were readily used as trade items with the other Lakes Indians. Hunting and fishing probably accounted for only about one-fourth of their food supply. Hunting was still quite important, however, because of the hides it provided for clothing and the fur trade.

The social organizations of the Hurons differed from those of their Indian neighbors. They were also composed of families, bands and clans, but village life played a very important role in their society since it best complemented their sedentary lifestyle. Like their distant Iroquoian relatives of New York, they had matrilineal clan identifications. Because of this all male chiefs held their positions through hereditary rights that flowed through the female line. Although Huron women performed many of the same functions as the women of the Lakes tribes, they were not in a position of subservience. The matrilineal foundations of their society gave women a position of power.

As people of nature, the Lakes Indians had a religion oriented toward the natural world. Their orientation was animistic, and their practices closely intertwined religion, magic and medicine. Generally they believed in a world inhabited by powerful beings (manitoes) that controlled the forces of nature. The Algonquian Indians believed in

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a master spirit of life, but essentially their religion was polytheistic. The Indians envisioned their destinies in the hands of these supernatural spirits; accordingly, they had sacrifices and ceremonies to honor and satisfy both the good and the bad spirits.⁴¹

By the time of Boyd's arrival at Mackinac contacts with whites had already taken place over a long period and greatly changed the Indian. And by the time of his departure from the Indian service further contacts and attempts at acculturation had brought about even greater deterioration of the native cultures.

The arrival of European explorers, missionaries and traders in the seventeenth century led to many changes in the native cultures. Initially the changes were not great, but they became more rapid and pronounced as the contact increased. The first changes affected the Indian's material culture, i.e., tools, utensils and weapons. European trade goods brought the substitution of iron knives and axes for those of stone, iron hoes for those of wood, bone or shell, iron and brass arrow heads for those of chipped stone, and, eventually, firearms for bows and arrows. Brass kettles competed with and soon displaced pottery vessels of native

⁴¹Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 119-20, 126, 131-2, and 141-2; Wissler, Indians of the United States, pp. 123-5; and Kinietz, Indians of the Western Great Lakes, pp. 122-60, 284-307, and 326-9. The Chippewa religion best survived the white man's civilization as this tribe inhabited the regions north of and remote from white farming communities.

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manufacture. The trade clearly showed the deep technological gap between the native Americans and the Europeans, as the Stone Age material culture was quickly supplanted by the advanced European Iron Age culture.⁴² There was not much socio-political change in the native cultures during the initial stages of contact.

By the mid-1700's most of the Indians of the upper Lakes region were materially dependent upon European trade goods. So strong was this dependency that many Indians no longer made their own tools, utensils and weapons; as a result, the Indians began slowly losing their native skills and handicrafts. This economic dependency also changed their traditional relationship to the land by disrupting their subsistence cycle and hunting patterns. Because the Indians could not obtain the desired trade goods without the furs, which were the currency of the trade, they placed greater emphasis upon hunting and trapping. Tribes that had farmed for subsistence did less farming as they focused more on obtaining furs. The Indians were now venturing into the wilderness for more than food; they were engaged in a commercial quest involving the slaughter of animals for their pelts. And as the fur supply dwindled in their home area, many Indians at great risk went beyond their

⁴²George Irving Quimby, Indian Culture and the European Trade Goods (Madison: 1966), pp. 3 and 8; and Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 111-2 and 147.

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own territory into that of their enemy. Often these hunts would take them so far from their camps that only the furs could be carried back and the once invaluable meat was left to rot.⁴³

As decades passed other aspects of the tribal cultures began to change. The degree of European penetration into Indian culture has led one leading anthropologist to write: "By 1760 there had arisen in the Upper Great Lakes region a uniformity of tribal culture brought about by contact with white men and change in native economic systems brought by the fur trade."⁴⁴ The Indians, however, were still quite independent in respect to politics and religion, despite some inroads by the French traders and missionaries.

Eventually contacts with white men also brought great changes in the political structures of the tribes. Those tribes that were classless and egalitarian slowly adopted more defined political structures to meet the challenges

⁴³Jacob Franks, Montreal, to John Lawe, Green Bay, May 1, 1818, "The Fur Trade in Wisconsin, 1812-1825," WHC, vol. XX (Madison: 1911), p. 52; and Warren, History of the Ojibway Nation, pp. 125 and 385. Warren, a half-breed, travelled among and lived with the Chippewa in the early 1800's and his book details many of his observations on their lifestyle.

⁴⁴Quimby, Indian Life, p. 147; also see Fitting, Archaeology of Michigan, p. 192. Fitting notes that "the arrival of the Europeans heralded the beginning of 'pan-Indianism.'"

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of the white men. The chieftainship underwent the greatest change; initially weak, with perfunctory powers, it gradually became more powerful.⁴⁵ The leadership positions, however, reached their highest stages of development during the war and treaty-making phases of contact with whites. Sustained military campaigns against whites needed the direction and leadership of strong individuals, such as Pontiac, Tecumseh, and Black Hawk. Chiefs received their greatest power and responsibility during the land cession negotiations and treaty councils with the American government. Since the whites found it easier to deal with a few Indians rather than with a whole tribe, they placed great emphasis upon developing and using Indian leaders instead of tolerating the egalitarian nature of these cooperative societies.

Other insidious and destructive forces were introduced by the whites that hastened the breakdown of Indian culture. Whiskey was an important trade item that had a most devastating impact upon the Indian. Not only did it disrupt the Indian culturally, but it made him an easy victim in the fur trade since he was easily cheated when he was drunk. The Indian's strong attraction to whiskey was seen in his readiness to barter personal or family goods for it; often he would go hungry or illclothed to satiate his thirst.

⁴⁵Swanton, Indian Tribes of North America, p. 244.

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Disease was another devastator of the Indians. Epidemics of smallpox and other fatal diseases brought by the white men would ravage and decimate them.

Another difficulty that the Indian faced, which was as devastating as any disease, was the shallow and imperfect knowledge that many whites, particularly the Americans, had about the Indians. Even in the 1820's and 30's, many whites considered that all Indians were the same. Whether Eastern Woodland or Plains Indians, they were viewed as savages with cultures based strictly upon nomadic hunter existence. It was not widely realized that many tribes engaged in agriculture. John Quincy Adams thought the Indians to be on a lower rung of civilized progress. They were seen as nomads whose lives fluctuated between wild indulgence and indolence. The practice of polygamy was looked upon as a clear indication of their benighted condition. Indian religious practices and beliefs were deemed paganistic and based upon witchcraft and superstition. What the Indians needed, Adams declared, was a fixed place of habitation, and a unity of conjugal love and divine worship.⁴⁶ In essence, he was arguing that what the Indians needed was a farm and Christianity. Such was the view of many Americans.

⁴⁶Roy Harvey Pearce, The Savages of America: A Study of the Indians and the Idea of Civilization (Baltimore: 1953), pp. 109 and 156-7.

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When Boyd was sent to Mackinac, he was unacquainted with the ways of the Indians; nevertheless he was asked to deal with the many problems that confronted the most experienced and knowledgeable agents.

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CHAPTER 3

THE IMMEDIATE CONCERN: BRITISH INFLUENCE

The most pressing problem that confronted Boyd upon his arrival at Mackinac was the powerful influence that the British exerted over the Indians residing within his agency. This influence resulted from many years of contact between the two parties. The fur trade provided a most important means of and reason for aligning the red men with the British cause. The dependence of the Indians upon English trade goods created a strong desire among the Indians for harmonious relations with the British; and since the Indians were the most basic element in the lucrative trade, as they hunted and trapped the fur-bearing animals and exchanged the valuable pelts for trade goods, the British also desired friendly relations. Liberal policies in respect to gift giving over the years reinforced the British efforts to keep the Indians amicable. This policy appealed to the Indians who believed in reciprocity. Cordial relations with the natives were also sought because the British had only a small military force in Canada and the Indians were the military allies they needed to maintain their strong imperial position in North

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America, especially against the upstart American Republic.¹ Reciprocally, Yankee aggressiveness and land greed drove many of the Lakes Indians to the British for protection, supplies and counsel.

As an agent on the frontier, Boyd was the eyes and ears of the federal government. One of his major tasks was to watch the activities of the red men and report on their condition and progress. It was also his duty to report regularly his own activities and those of his British counterparts. Since the Indian Office was constantly interested in obtaining solid data about Indians, he was instructed to detail fully the location of Indian villages, their population, and their distance and direction from Michilimackinac. He was also requested to indicate the best and most frequented route from Washington to his agency, furnish estimates of the number of whites in the vicinity, describe the area's terrain and resources, and provide facts about the quality of the soil and healthfulness of the region's climate. (Occasionally, Boyd was even asked to

¹Johnson, Michigan Fur Trade, pp. 65-6; Frank B. Woodford, Lewis Cass: The Last Jefferson (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 1950), pp. 95 and 100; Suggestions by George Ironsides, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Amherstburg, relative to Indian forces, March 16, 1846, "Copies of Papers on File in the Dominion Archives at Ottawa, Canada, Pertaining to Michigan as found in the Colonial Office Records, Indian Affairs, and other Official Papers," Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, vol. XXIII (Lansing: 1895), p. 175. Hereafter the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections will be referred to as MPHC.

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obtain information for private citizens; generally, he was requested either to gather scientific data or inquire about persons believed to be Indian captives. If possible, he was also to use his influence to gain the captive's release.) As an intelligence source, the agent was therefore an important link in establishing an effective Indian policy and monitoring the moods and moves of the Indian peoples and their British friends.²

Although the problem of British influence over the red men in the Lakes region became Boyd's immediate concern, it was an old one for the United States. Ever since the American people asserted their independence from British rule, they had had difficulties arising from foreign influence over Indians residing within their territorial limits. These outside forces made it very troublesome for the young Republic to have peaceful relations with the Indians.

The American government made early efforts to end this difficulty. Congress, which was constitutionally responsible for administering to Indian affairs, passed intercourse acts establishing Indian policy. The War Department, which

²Circular from Governor Cass to the Agents of his Superintendency, April 22, 1818, MSIA, roll 3, pp. 346-7; Cass to Agents at Michilimackinac, Green Bay, and Chicago, May 7, 1819, ibid., roll 4, p. 75; Circular to Indian Agents from Thomas L. McKenney, chief of the Office of Indian Affairs, June 19, 1824, ibid., roll 14, p. 379; Cass to Boyd, July 19, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 61; and also see Cass to Puthuff, August 19, 1815, MSIA, roll 1, pp. 113-4. By the late 1820's, the practice developed in which agents provided such data in their annual reports to the Indian Office.

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was to enforce these policies, slowly developed the administrative machinery to implement them and attain harmonious contacts with the Indian peoples. Because dealings with the Indians were in shambles and hostilities were boiling on the frontier, Congress authorized the President in March 1793 to appoint "temporary agents" to reside among the Indians and execute policy.³ These agents soon became permanent and important members of the system of Indian administration. Tense relations with the western tribes continued, however.

Knowing the importance of fur trade in achieving friendly ties with the Indians, the federal government established in 1796 its own trading houses in the Indian country. The factory system was founded during a period when the private sector was unable to satisfy Indian trade needs. One of its chief goals was to eliminate the troublesome foreign trading operations among American Indians and end British and Spanish influences that instigated Indian hostilities toward the United States. Another major objective of the government was to win the friendship, confidence, and allegiance of the Indians by eliminating dishonest traders and by selling them trade goods at low prices while receiving their furs and other items at reasonable exchange rates. The government understood that

³U.S., Statutes at Large, I, p. 331.

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since the Indians were dependent upon the trade, they could easily be manipulated through this trading system. It hoped to gain control of trade through the trade factories, thus acquiring political, military, and economic domination of the red men.⁴ This hope never materialized.

The War of 1812 was the turning point in the struggle for control of the Lakes Indians. The predominance of the British in the upper Lakes region during the pre-war years encouraged the Indians of the Old Northwest to challenge and resist American westward expansion. Although defeated in 1794 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, the Indian's position was still very strong. The War of 1812 tested the strength of American destiny against the British-Indian alliance. At first, most of the laurels went to the allies; but with Commodore Perry's decisive victory in the Battle of Lake Erie in September 1813, which gave Americans naval control of the lakes and thereby helped to disrupt British supply lines and contributed to the defeat of the allies in

⁴Thomas L. McKenney, Memoirs, Official and Personal; with Sketches of Travels among the Northern and Southern Indians... (New York: 1846), p. 19; for the most complete coverage of the factory system see Ora Brooks Peake, A History of the United States Indian Factory System: 1795-1822 (Denver: 1954). Also see President T. Jefferson to War Secretary Henry Dearborn, August 12, 1802, The Territorial Papers of the United States: Indiana, Clarence E. Carter, ed., vol. VII (Washington: 1939), pp. 67-70; in this letter Jefferson cited the usefulness of the trading houses as a means of getting the Indians indebted and thereby forcing them to cede their land.

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early October at the Battle of the Thames, the United States began to assert its dominance in the region. British presence, however, was still quite strong.

The presence of British agents on American soil was the most effective means of continuing British influence over the Indians. Many of the agents were traders who operated out of Canada and secretly travelled among the Indians dispensing presents and counsels with a view to winning support for the British.⁵ Since the border was long and the number of Americans to watch it small, they acted most freely. A more common source of influence, however, were those inhabitants and traders who retained their allegiance to Britain even though they lived and worked in American territory. The American government tried to deal with them by requiring that they declare their loyalty to the United States and assume American citizenship; foreign traders, particularly those known to be hostile to American interests, were forbidden to trade in the United States.⁶

⁵William H. Puthuff to Gov. Cass, May 14, 1816, MSIA, roll 4, p. 207; and Boyd to Adam D. Stewart, Customs Collector for the port of Michilimackinac, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 64.

⁶Puthuff to Cass, March 4, 1818, "The Fur Trade in Wisconsin, 1812-1825," WHC, vol. XX (Madison: 1911), p. 32; Jacob Franks, Montreal, to his nephew, John Lawe, Green Bay, March 11, 1818, ibid., p. 36; John Bowyer, agent at Green Bay, to Cass, May 16, 1818, ibid., p. 57; Request for citizenship, Louis Grignon to Cass, August 27, 1819, ibid., p. 120; Adam D. Stewart, customs collector, to John Bowyer, September 2, 1819, ibid., pp. 120-1; Calhoun to Cass, September 6, 1819, ibid., p. 123; the citizenship stipulation for licensing traders caused many legal problems, see O.N. Bostwick to Solomon Sibley, Detroit District Attorney, September 10, 1819, ibid., p. 124.

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As the United States made the activities of British agents more difficult, the British relied upon open invitations to tribes residing on American soil to visit their posts in Canada. The post at Malden, near the mouth of the Detroit River, attracted Indians from Michigan's lower peninsula and the regions southward and westward; the post on Drummond Island, situated at the northern end of Lake Huron and the southern end of the Straits of St. Mary's, was most frequented by the Indians of the upper region. It was Boyd's duty to stop the three to four thousand Indians from making their annual summer visits to this island, which was forty-five miles east of Mackinac. Because Drummond was determined to be American territory by the Treaty of Ghent boundary commission in 1822, the British, who stalled their evacuation, finally relocated their operation at Penetanguishene on Manitoulin Island in late 1828. Although not so close as Drummond, this post was still easily accessible to the red man. There the Crown's agents could continue to maintain their prestige and influence among the Lakes tribes and thereby help deny the United States dominance of the upper Lakes region and easy access to the region's resources, and thus impede the growth of the Yankee Republic.⁷ The British even left an

⁷Puthuff to Cass, May 14, 1816, MSIA, roll 1, pp. 205-6; Puthuff to Cass, August 14, 1816, ibid., pp. 290-3; Henry Gratiot, subagent at Gratiot's Grove, to War Secretary Cass, November 19, 1832, ibid., roll 31; pp. 252-3; Woodford, Lewis Cass, pp. 95-6; Morse, Report, p. 54; Samuel F. Cook,

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agent at St. Joseph's Island, which is just north of Drummond, to direct the Indians to the new post.⁸

Most of the tribes of the upper Lakes region and the neighboring areas made visits to the British. The agents at Mackinac -- Puthuff, Boyd, and Schoolcraft -- saw hundreds of bands travel the straits on their way eastward to the British posts. Often these Indians would beach their canoes on the island and ask Boyd for provisions and presents. It was not government policy to aid them during such trips; the agent was expected to use the occasion to persuade them to go home. Once rested, however, many continued on their way. The Chippewa and Ottawa living around Michilimackinac easily visited nearby Drummond Island, but distance was no obstacle to other Indians making summer journeys. Such distant tribes as the Menominee, Winnebago, and Sauk and Fox made their way to Drummond Island, while to the South, Potawatomi, Miami, Kickapoo, Wyandot, and others journeyed to Malden.⁹

Drummond Island: The Story of British Occupation: 1815-1828 (Lansing: 1898), pp. 5-6, 69, and 115-6; Returns of Indians visiting the British and receiving presents during the years 1818, 1819, and 1820, "Copies of Papers on File....," MPHC, vol. XXIII, p. 188; and Extract from the Commissioner's Report relative to His Majesty's North American Provinces, September 9, 1825, ibid., p. 443.

⁸Thomas G. Anderson, Drummond Island, to William Solomon, November 11, 1828, "Copies of Papers on File....," MPHC, vol. XXIII, pp. 152-3.

⁹Puthuff to Cass, August 20, 1817, MSIA, roll 3, p. 167; Charles Jouett, agent at Chicago, to Cass, June 26, 1817, ibid., p. 114; Cass to Sec. Calhoun, October 8, 1819,

While some of the travels were distinguished by the hundreds of miles traversed, others were made notable by their violence. Governor Cass reported that the Indians, often short of provisions as they travelled to the British posts, resorted to robbing frontier settlements. On the return trip, fired up by British propaganda and desiring additional provisions, they once again harassed and looted farmsteads. In the post-war period until the mid-twenties, southern Michigan and northern Ohio and Indiana settlements were frequently alarmed and tense because of these depredations.¹⁰

These raids, whose seriousness was probably exaggerated by Cass, were not conducted with violent intentions, but rather they resulted from economic necessity -- the same necessity that drove the Indians to see their British friends. The Indians wanted to keep good relations with

ibid., roll 4, pp. 122-36; Cass to Calhoun, December 16, 1820, ibid., p. 257; Thomas Forsyth, agent at Fort Armstrong, to Calhoun, July 7, 1823, ibid., roll 13, p. 70; H.J.B. Brevoort, agent at Green Bay, to Cass, August 18, 1824, ibid., roll 15, pp. 11-2; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, pp. 249 and 294; Donald Jackson, ed., Black Hawk: An Autobiography (Urbana, Illinois: 1955), p. 110; Colonel William McKay to Colonel William Claus, Drummond Island, July 29, 1820, "Copies of Papers on File...", MPHC, vol. XXIII, p. 105. The British claimed that some Indians travelled as far as fifteen hundred miles from areas west to Drummond. See Colonel W. Claus to the Secretary of Indian Affairs, ibid., p. 128.

¹⁰Cass to Sec. Calhoun, May 27, 1819, Cass Papers, BHC; A.G. Whitney to Cass, October 8, 1819, ibid.; Cass to Calhoun, August 3, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 99-100.

their old allies, especially as the Americans became more aggressive, not only because they desired British presents, which they saw as rewards for their military services, but because these gifts took on economic significance in the post-war period. Because of the decrease in the number of fur-bearing animals and the simultaneous decline in the fur trade, these presents became essential items in the red man's struggle for survival. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, the agent at Sault Ste. Marie, understood this; in 1822 he wrote that the "increasing intercourse" of the Indians with the British was due to "the failure of their usual means of support." With the scarcity of game and fish, the Indians were in a state of impoverishment and misery, but their needs were in part satisfied by the Crown.¹¹

Lewis Cass, the governor of Michigan Territory, also saw the association between the impoverishment and misery of the Indians and their annual journeys to Canada. Recognizing that British presents of food, clothing, blankets, guns, powder, and other items were necessary for

¹¹Schoolcraft to Gov. Cass, July 18, 1822, MSIA, roll 11, pp. 72-3; also see Cass to C.J. Lanham, January 19, 1820, Cass Papers, BHC. British presents included blankets, broadcloths, handkerchiefs, hats, shawls, calicoes, guns, swords, tomahawks, flints, ball, short, gunpowder, axes, knives, scissors, awls, thread, rope, twine, sewing needles, combs, looking glasses, silver works (armbands, gorgets, broaches and earbobs), flags, medals, pipes, tobacco, kettles, traps, fish hooks, and whiskey. See Proceedings of a Board of Survey at Drummond Island, July 1, 1822, "Copies of Papers on File...", MPHC, vol. XXIII, pp. 210-3.

the Indians to protect themselves from the winter and assure their survival, he wrote to Secretary of War Calhoun about the Indian's "state of want and wretchedness" and the need for government aid. He thought this aid was "in consonance with the dictates of policy and humanity," because the assistance would benefit the Indians physically and end their need of travelling to Canada. He further argued that the aid was essential in order to maintain the "reputation" of the Republic as a just and humane nation.¹²

The governor was also very much aware of the importance of presents to Indians. Not only did they help the Indians when in need, but they also encouraged the red men to visit and talk to their agents rather than to the British. A parsimonious gift policy, however, hurt the American cause, because it damaged the prestige of the young Republic among the natives, and in turn encouraged them to see their old British friends, who lavishly distributed presents and provisions.¹³

In the decade after the war the United States government showed its determination to break British influence

¹²Cass to Calhoun, October 24, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, p. 330. For the Indians' view of the importance of British presents see Transcription of a speech delivered by the Potawatomi chief, Metias, in the summer of 1822, MSIA, roll II, pp. 280-6.

¹³Cass to Calhoun, December 16, 1820, Cass Papers, BHC; and Cass to Solomon Sibley, January 26, 1822, ibid.

over the Indians. It was convinced that the Crown was motivated by the desire "to alienate the Indian from the American government and people," and attach him to British interests.¹⁴ Strong evidence for such a claim was seen in the War of 1812 when the Lakes Indians solidly allied themselves with the British against the United States. American authorities were also greatly alarmed by British activities because the political and economic position of the United States was still vulnerable in the Lakes region. The first action to sever the close ties between the Indians and the British occurred at the end of the war when the American government, following the recommendations of War Secretary Calhoun, established a string of military posts and several agencies in the Lakes region to assert its authority. Another step was taken by Congress in April, 1816, when an act was passed forbidding foreigners to participate in Indian trade on American soil. In the years that followed, foreigners, especially traders, living and working in American territory were steadily pushed toward naturalization.¹⁵ These actions gave American trading companies, particularly the Astor interests, an upper hand in the fur trade with Indians residing within the United

¹⁴Puthuff to Cass, May 16, 1816, roll 1, pp. 206-7.

¹⁵Circular, Cass to Agents at Mackinac, Green Bay, Chicago, Fort Wayne and Piqua, October 11, ibid., roll 4, pp. 137-8.

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States. Giving American fur interests an advantageous position in the upper Lakes area was also beneficial to the young Republic. Certainly the growth of strong American trading companies would create economic forces powerful enough to displace British companies and help bring the Indians under the domination of the United States. The government realized that without a viable trade alternative, it could never woo the Indians away from the British. Yet whether it purposely sought to create a virtual monopoly for the American Fur Company in the upper Lakes region to achieve its end is debatable; evidence, however, strongly suggests that governmental actions allowed for the growth of such a monopoly. And as they did, they also doomed the government's factory system.

Despite government actions in the years immediately after the war, British influence remained strong and by 1819 Indian crimes and aggressions on the frontier filled American pioneers with dread. The high tide of Indian visits to Canada at this time and the increased activities of the British aroused the apprehension that a plan was afoot to unite the Indians in "a general confederacy" against the Americans.¹⁶

¹⁶Cass to Calhoun, November 22, 1819, ibid., roll 4, p. 162; Cass to Colonel Henry Leavenworth, St. Peters, January 1, 1819, Cass Papers, BHC; Cass to Sec. Calhoun, August 3, and December 25, 1819, The Territorial Papers of the United States: Michigan Territory, Carter, ed., vol. X (Washington: 1942), pp. 852-5 and 885-7.

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One of the main purposes of the Northwest Expedition of 1820, led by Governor Cass, was to ascertain the degree of British influence among the Indians. Cass found that the British influence was indeed powerful, especially in the Lake Superior region, and that the British policy of giving presents and advice was well rewarded.¹⁷ One of the consequences of this expedition was the stationing of an Army garrison and Indian agent at Sault Ste. Marie in 1822 as a means of stopping the flow of Indians to Drummond Island and denying the British further unchallenged influence in that area.¹⁸

During this period the government contemplated removing the Indians of Michigan Territory westward. Secretary of War Calhoun, like former President Thomas Jefferson, dreamed of gathering all the Indian tribes of the Mississippi River, where they could live out of the reach and influence of the British and deceitful white men.¹⁹ Such a program, of course, would allow the opening of vast stretches of rich farm lands and fulfillment of Jefferson's politico-philosophical dream of having

¹⁷Cass to Calhoun, June 17, 1820, MSIA, roll 4, p. 215. Also see Schoolcraft's Narrative Journal which details the activities of the 1820 tour.

¹⁸Cass to Boyd, April 7, 1822, MSIA, roll 4, p. 388.

¹⁹Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun: American Portrait (Boston: 1950), p. 131.

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independent farmers clear and till the land, thus providing a stronger agrarian backbone to American democracy. As much as such a general removal plan would have benefitted Michigan Territory by taking away the chief impediment to settlement, it was deemed unrealistic at the time. Cass considered the plan impractical because the Indians would not readily leave as they had traditional enmity toward the western Indians and would naturally suspect government motives. Also, the Indians were still valuable participants in the fur trade in the early 1820's, especially in the northern and western parts of the territory. Cass believed, however, that as the Indians were surrounded by white settlements and their hunting areas grew smaller, they would "be more disposed to migrate."²⁰ Undoubtedly he had great confidence in the pioneer's ability to offend! In the meantime, Cass wanted the size of military forces in Michigan increased to stop the embarrassing and annoying Indian journeys, thus diminishing British influence and allowing further settlement of the Territory's thinly populated frontier.²¹

²⁰Cass to Calhoun, September 30, 1819, Territorial Papers: Michigan, Carter, ed., vol. X, pp. 864-5.

²¹Cass to Calhoun, May 27, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 78-9; Cass to Calhoun, June 11, 1823, Cass Papers, BHC; Woodford, Lewis Cass, pp. 96-7 and 107-8.

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Cass' pleas for a larger military force, however, brought no substantial change. Despite the establishment of Fort Brady at the Sault in 1822 and the brief existence of a post at Saginaw (1822-1823), the number of troops in the Lakes region actually decreased after 1817, mainly because of post-war demobilization and a combination of Indian and border troubles in the South. The average aggregate military strength in and neighboring Michigan Territory from 1819 to 1826 was between 750 and 1,050 men. This was a rather small force considering the size of the region.²²

In the early 1820's the government initiated the policy that most affected Boyd. This policy called for the agent, with the help of the military, to thwart Indian-British contacts. Since one of the main routes to Drummond Island was the Straits of Michilimackinac, Boyd was instructed to take those measures which would be necessary to stop the Indian visits. He was advised, however, that the government wanted to attain its object "by mild rather than forcible means." A display of force could be used to achieve the desired goal, but he was urged to use his influence with the Indians in order to have them "remain

²²See American State Papers: Military Affairs, serials 016, 017, and 018, pp.: 016: 813-22; 017: 36, 455, 558, 706, 832; 018: 115 and 339, for an annual listings of troop deployment in the Great Lakes region.

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in their Country," so that "no violent measures [would] be necessary." The government instructed him that to force conformity among the Indians, it would "be proper to withhold all supplies of provisions and presents from those, who are not disposed to follow your advice." Boyd thus became an instrument of control for the federal government. He went among various tribal groups in his agency to advise them that such persons who disregard the government's wishes would not be considered friends of the United States; he also addressed the chiefs and principal men of these groups in order to make them "responsible for the conduct of the young men and warriors." (By addressing the headmen of the various bands and holding them responsible, the government was reinforcing its attempt to create responsive political tribal hierarchies.) Boyd also tried to counteract the counsels of the British by informing the Indians under his charge that the British were telling them lies in order to poison relations between them and the United States.²³ He thus undertook basic diplomacy to get the Indians to terminate their bothersome contacts with the Crown.

In a real sense, Boyd was a frontier diplomat. He was to deal with the Indians' needs and complaints in

²³Cass to Boyd, April 7, 1822, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 388-91; and see Boyd to Cass, May 12 and June 20, 1822, ibid., roll 10, pp. 222 and 380.

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order to keep them peaceful and friendly. He was also to guard their rights from the machinations of whites and initiate prosecutions against those who violated these rights. Only if he did so could the government achieve its policy aim of ending British influence and allowing an orderly westward advance. Consequently, Boyd was placed in a delicate position where he needed diplomatic skills to win the Indians' friendship, influence their behavior, and keep them peaceable in order to bring about an untroubled transferral of lands by the government from Indian to white possession. The federal government desired an orderly exchange because it knew that conquest was an expensive way of obtaining land, especially from a people who accepted war as a part of their culture. Being new to his position, however, Boyd did not yet have the personal influence required to change the behavior patterns of the Indians.²⁴

To best serve American policy and perform his duties successfully, Boyd had to gain the confidence of his charges.

²⁴Cass to Sec. Calhoun, December 27, 1821, ibid., roll 4, p. 360; Thomas L. McKenney, chief of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Cass, February 7, 1827, ibid., roll 20, pp. 81-83; Boyd to Cass, December 1, 1827, ibid., roll 21, p. 489. The duality of an agent's role was clearly stated by President Jefferson: "In keeping agents among the Indians, two objects are principally in view: 1. The preservation of peace; 2. The obtaining of lands." See Jefferson to General Andrew Jackson, February 16, 1803, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., vol. X (Washington: 1908), pp. 357-8.

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This was the thought of Governor Cass, who, as Boyd's superintendent, advised him during his first years as an agent that it was "essentially necessary" for an agent to "become personally acquainted with the leading Indians,... [and] acquire their confidence by a vigilant, impartial and kind administration." Only then, Cass concluded, would an agent's official and personal influence be extended throughout his agency and would he be an effective organ of communication between the government and the Indian communities.²⁵

In the attempt to secure their confidence as well as serve their welfare, a good agent was mindful of the health of the native peoples. Historically, disease was a great decimator of the first Americans. Since the Indian was highly susceptible to virulent, contagious diseases, reports of the presence of any contagious disease were enough to frighten the strongest Indians and the most concerned whites. During Boyd's years as an agent, small-pox, cholera, and measles swept through the natives under his supervision. Hundreds died because of the contagions.²⁶ Having a humane

²⁵Cass to Calhoun, December 27, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, p. 361.

²⁶Louis Grignon to William Belcher, November 18, 1830, Louise P. Kellogg Papers (Notes and transcriptions in relationship to Indian Treaties, 1794-1836; transcriptions and translations in relationship to social and military Wisconsin, 1805-1848), WHS, Ms. MR, Box No. 42; Boyd to Alpheus T. Mason, Governor of Michigan Territory, September 30, 1830, MSIA, roll 32, p. 202; and Robert Irwin, Winnebago Rapids, to Boyd, July 13, 1836, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 3.

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concern for the Indians, Boyd sought permission of the Secretary of War to acquire the services of a surgeon or surgeon's mate from the military to tend to their medical needs.²⁷ Throughout most of his years as an agent he succeeded in obtaining the services of a doctor, usually the surgeon assigned to the nearby garrison, to administer to the serious needs of the Indians. Surgeons employed by him normally received \$100 a year from the Indian Office.²⁸ Boyd's concern was so great at times that he personally tended to the needs of the Indians and furnished medicines from his own cabinet. He explained that he could not "see one of these poor people die before [my] door, for the want of a little advice or medicine."²⁹

Traditionally, a most effective means of establishing friendly relations with and influence over the red men was to distribute presents and provisions among them. The British, as has been mentioned, had a generous gift policy,

²⁷Boyd, "Private & Confidential," to Sec. Calhoun, January 25, 1820, Hemphill, ed., Papers of John C. Calhoun, IV, pp. 598-9.

²⁸Receipt of payment for services, signed by R.S. Satterlee, July 20, 1826, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 93; Receipt of payment signed by Satterlee, July 21, 1827, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 23; Receipt of payment signed by William Beaumont, June 10, 1828, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 51; Receipt of payment signed by Satterlee, March 31, 1831, ibid., vol. 4, doc. 3; and Receipt of Dr. Ward for \$175, March 23, 1840, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 66.

²⁹Boyd to Cass, October 12, 1821, MSIA, roll 19, pp. 198-9.

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but the young American Republic had neither the means nor the disposition to spend adequate sums for gifts. Moreover, many Americans thought that a liberal gift policy would do great injury to the Indians by making them idle and undermining all efforts to advance them agriculturally.³⁰

Indeed, gift-giving had a negative aspect when viewed in relation to the government's desire to make the Indians into self-reliant farmers; it only reinforced their dependence upon white men. This was especially true as the animal supply dwindled and the all important fur trade declined. As this occurred, the presents, particularly provisions, took on added significance in the life of the red men. The need of the Indian could be manipulated to force him to stop seeing the British; certainly dependence limits a man's alternatives and makes him more easily controllable.

Inadequate allocations for presents by the Congress, however, created difficulties for Boyd. He was forced to confine gift-giving almost entirely to aged Indians, who were incapable of laboring for themselves, to the unfortunate who suffered from various disabilities, "to the helpless women and children, and [to] one or two favored families of Indians, such as Wing." Such a policy, Boyd admitted,

³⁰James Duane Doty, "On the Manners and Customs of the Northern Indians," appendix A, in Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal, Williams, ed., p. 449; and Morse, Report, p. 45.

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scarcely satisfied anyone. Those Indians who received little or nothing were quite upset and saw little reason why they should not visit their British friends. Boyd himself was not happy with the policy he followed, because it undermined his influence and the government's prestige among the Indians.³¹ The government gained nothing from the situation because the Indians continued to view the British as their friends and protectors, while the Americans were seen as niggardly and inattentive to their needs. Boyd reacted to this situation by imploring Secretary Calhoun to obtain more funds for his agency. In 1820 he argued that with meagre funds at hand -- \$5,000 per annum, with about \$800 available for presents and provisions, for an agency that had a total Indian population of about 6,000 -- it was impossible to meet properly the needs of the Indians and counter effectively the influence of the British.³² His pleas were in vain. The pleas, however, of his charges remained. The standard Chippewa cry, "I am poor, show me pity and charity," often forced Boyd to supply them with goods paid for out of his own pocket. While humanitarian concern probably inspired much of his charity, the practical result of

³¹Boyd to Cass, June 13, 1828, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 57.

³²Boyd, "Private & Confidential," to Sec. Calhoun, January 25, 1820, Papers of John C. Calhoun, Hemphill, ed., vol. IV, pp. 597-8.

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preventing plunderings of the area's white inhabitants was also achieved.³³

Medals and flags were also valuable in dealings with the Indians. It was a long-standing custom among the French and English to present peace medals and flags to Indian chiefs and leaders as marks of friendship and political allegiance. The Americans continued this practice and had medals struck in honor of each president for presentation to Indian leaders on important occasions, such as visits to the capital or the signing of treaties.³⁴

Medals, along with flags, had special diplomatic value in the upper Lakes region. Trying to expand American authority, Boyd utilized peace medals and flags to win and maintain peace and friendship with the area's natives. They were distributed to the principal chiefs and headmen to offset the influence and power of the British. Policy required that the British medals and flags be collected from the Indians, and, in turn, be replaced by those of the United States. Such a policy indicated American determination to erase all evidence of Indian allegiance to the British and

³³Cass to Calhoun, August 13, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, p. 105; and Cass to Boyd, June 24, 1828, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 60.

³⁴Andrew Oliver, Portraits of John Quincy Adams and his Wife (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1970), pp. 117-8 and 122.

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create a strong Indian connection with the American Republic. These presents were generally given to Indians whose allegiance and friendship was sought and whose image enhancement among fellow tribesmen was vital to American interests. On the frontier, they were distributed during annuity payments and treaty and peace councils, as well as individually by the agent.³⁵

Another valuable means of winning the respect and allegiance of Indians were visits to Washington. Journeys to the nation's capital and tours of the East were very effective in impressing the Indian with the prowess of the United States. Despite their effectiveness the government frowned upon them, unless the visitors had been invited, because of their great expense and inconvenience.³⁶

An important factor in the agent's successful dealings with the Indians under his supervision was his relationship with the military in his district. Although responsible

³⁵ Francis Paul Prucha, Indian Peace Medals in American History (Madison: 1971), pp. 32 and 34-5; Boyd to Cass, January 31, 1822, MSIA, roll 10, p. 60; and Boyd to Gov. Alpheus T. Mason, September 30, 1834, ibid., roll 35, p. 202.

³⁶ War Department Circular, Sec. Calhoun to Superintendents and Agents, February 14, 1820, MSIA, roll 28, p. 223; Thomas L. McKenney, head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Cass, September 7, 1824, ibid., roll 15, p. 121; D. Kurtz, acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Gov. Mason, November 12, 1834, ibid., roll 35, p. 285; and Woodford, Lewis Cass, pp. 175-6. By 1834, the desire to economize moved the government to put restrictions on Indian visits to Detroit. It was thought that little was accomplished by most visits, thus the government desired to limit them to those who had business to conduct.

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for maintaining orderly and tranquil relations with the Indians, Boyd did not have any power, other than his influence, to execute his decisions; thus he was highly dependent upon the military.³⁷ Garrisons were located near Boyd's quarters at both Mackinac and Green Bay.

The army was literally the "policeman of the frontier" and its role in relationship to Indian affairs was large. Among its major duties were: removing all intruders from the Indian country and bringing them to justice; overseeing the Indian trade by preventing the introduction of liquor into Indian hands and stopping all illegal trade in the Indian country; keeping Indians on lands reserved for them and curtailing their wanderings, especially their visits to Canada; restraining Indian hostilities with whites and between themselves; helping conduct treaty sessions, conferences, and annuity disbursements; displaying power to overawe and influence the activities of the red men; and, lastly, escorting Indians removing westward.³⁸

With the army performing such a wide range of duties essential to Indian affairs, Boyd needed its cooperation.

³⁷ Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Lincoln, Nebraska: 1967), pp. 12-3.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 55-80 and 91-2; Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (London: 1969), pp. 193-209; Prucha, Formative Years, pp. 63 and 65; and Henry Putney Beers, The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846 (Philadelphia: 1935), p. 50.

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Cooperation was the ideal, and was officially required by the intercourse acts and was reinforced by directives from Washington, particularly from the Secretary of War, who had jurisdiction over both military and Indian affairs; but the ideal was often difficult to attain. Personality conflicts often caused problems, but usually the lack of cooperation had other reasons. The main reason seemed to be that many military officers were quite sensitive about taking orders from civilian officers of the federal government, even though, in respect to Indian affairs, law and tradition were on the side of civilian agents.³⁹

The military's sensitivity seemed especially acute when a new, inexperienced agent arrived on the scene. Boyd's difficulties with the military were particularly sharp during his first few years of Indian service. During his second year he sought the removal of Colonel William Lawrence as commandant of the Mackinac garrison because the colonel's conduct had been "in every shape," since Boyd's arrival, "hostile and oppressive." It was Boyd's

³⁹Prucha, Formative Years, pp. 63-4. Understanding and cooperation were also essential since the military commander of the nearby post was often called upon to take over the duties of the agent. By the act of 1834, this policy was formalized and military officers could be required by the War Secretary to perform both his military duties and those of an agent simultaneously.

conclusion that it was "impossible" for him to execute his duties "without the friendly and cordial cooperation of the military."⁴⁰ Troubles with the military did not end there. Boyd soon accused the military of dragging its feet in building the agency house. Normally the military did the work of constructing agency buildings, but a private contractor was hired to erect them at Mackinac. The friction between Boyd and the military may have dictated this course of action although it may have been due to the garrison's preoccupation with other more important matters. During this same period in the early twenties, Boyd complained that he was having difficulty obtaining firewood for his agency because of the military's policy of reserving the island's best firewood sector for itself.⁴¹ Another incident, but of far greater significance, occurred in 1821 when Boyd reported that the military was unwilling to enforce government trade policies. The military claimed that it had no orders on the subject. This reasoning, according to Boyd, was "ridiculous," because it was clearly impossible for an agent and two interpreters to enforce trade laws by themselves.⁴² The continuance of such

⁴⁰Boyd, "Private," to Sec. Calhoun, November 12, 1820, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 106.

⁴¹Boyd to General Alexander Macomb, December 26, 1820, ibid., doc. 114.

⁴²Boyd to Cass, October 12, 1821, MSIA, roll 9, pp. 197-8.

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misunderstanding and lack of cooperation could not be tolerated if the government desired effective implementation of its policies.

Boyd's supervision of his agency personnel was also important in determining the degree of his success in dealing with the Indians. Blacksmiths, who were often gunsmiths as well, were essential members of any agency because they shod horses, made farming and fishing equipment, and repaired guns, traps, farm implements, knives, axes, and other things brought to them by the Indians. This repair service was vital because the economic condition of many Indians made it impossible for them to replace essential utensils and equipment. Consequently, blacksmiths were often requested by tribes during treaty councils and provided for in treaties. It was Boyd's duty to see that the blacksmith performed his services faithfully and well without waste or loss of material.⁴³ Evidence suggests that blacksmiths were directly used in the struggle with the British over domination of the Indians of the Lakes region. One Indian told the British that an American agency blacksmith refused to repair the gun that had been

⁴³Boyd's instructions to John Campbell, blacksmith at Mackinac, September 15, 1819, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 73; Boyd to Joseph Jourdain, blacksmith at Green Bay, July 30, 1835, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 195-6; and Ruth A. Gallaher, "The Indian Agent in the United States before 1850," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, vol. 14, (Iowa City: 1916), p. 49.

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given to him by the British. This was probably because the gun was foreign and represented the bond between the Indian and British that the American government wanted severed.⁴⁴

The interpreter was another essential member of an agency. Since most agents, including Boyd, could not speak the language of their charges, interpreters were needed for everyday communications. The language proficiency and experience of the interpreters greatly aided the agent in dealing with Indians and effectively administering government policies. Furthermore, their faithful service in distributing rations and presents, and as translators during councils with the natives, helped the agent gain the confidence of and influence among his charges. So important were their roles that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1834 provided interpreters for each agency and each tribe; significantly, employment preference was to be given to men of Indian descent.⁴⁵

While faithful service was the ideal, it was far from being the everyday reality. Over the years Boyd had problems with his interpreters. Henry Gravreat, who served under him at Mackinac, was habitually drunk, thus "altogether unfit" for his position and a poor example for the Indians.⁴⁶

⁴⁴See Speech delivered by the Winnebago chief, Nayocantay, at Drummond Island, June 28, 1828, "Copies of Papers on File...", MPHC, vol. XXIII, p. 145.

⁴⁵U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 737.

⁴⁶Boyd to Gov. Cass, May 24, 1830, MSIA, roll 26, p.

Richard Prickett, who was a captive of the Indians for many years, continued to live like an Indian when he became an interpreter, even though he lived in the Green Bay community. Boyd had no confidence in him and found it impossible to communicate with the Indians because of his incompetence.⁴⁷ The interpreter, however, who gave Boyd the most trouble was John Tanner. Tanner was captured by the Indians when he was a boy and lived among them for thirty years. Like Prickett, he continued to live like an Indian when he returned to the white man's world. He was distrusted and ostracized by whites because he was reputed to be cruel, violent, and too Indian in his ways.⁴⁸ As an interpreter for Boyd, and later for Schoolcraft, he carried out his duties awkwardly because, although he spoke Chippewa as well as anyone, he had never learned to speak English adequately. Boyd's troubles with Tanner peaked in 1827-1828 when the irascible interpreter sought a leave of absence to go East in connection with the publication of the book John Tanner: Narrative of his Captivity and Thirty Years residence among the Indians..., written by Dr. Edwin James from Tanner's

⁴⁷ Jackson Kemper, "Journal of an Episcopalian Missionary's Tour to Wisconsin, 1834," WHC, vol. XIV (Madison: 1898), pp. 424-5; and Boyd, "Private," to Sec. Cass, August 25, 1834, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 135.

⁴⁸ Elizabeth T. Baird, "Reminiscences of Early Days on Mackinac Island," WHC, vol. XIV (Madison: 1898), pp. 48-9, 52 and 54.

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narrations. At first, Boyd was willing to grant Tanner a six-month leave, but changed his mind because the interpreter was on bail for an appearance at the District Court for threatening a man's life. Since Boyd had provided the bail money, he decided not to jeopardize it by letting Tanner go East. Tanner's behavior became irrational at this point. He was reputed to have threatened the life and reputation of Boyd's son, Joshua. Boyd soon dismissed the interpreter because of his "outrageous" conduct and general unreliability.⁴⁹ Such individuals made Boyd's efforts to gain the Indian's trust and respect most difficult.

Considering the problems that Boyd experienced at Mackinac, it is little wonder that the Indians continued their visits to Canada and the British retained great influence over them. Lacking the money to distribute adequate amounts of presents and provisions among the red people, experiencing troubled relations with the military during his early years as an agent, burdened by unreliable agency personnel, and taxed personally by financial problems until 1825, Boyd had the deck stacked against him. Furthermore, when it is recalled that he had not been at Mackinac

⁴⁹Dr. Edwin James, Mackinac, to Cass, August 18, 1827, MSIA, roll 21, p. 145; Boyd to James, Sault Ste. Marie, May 9, 1828, *ibid.*, roll 22, p. 323; Boyd to Cass, June 2, 1828, *ibid.*, roll 23, p. 9; and Dr. Edwin James, ed., A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner...during thirty years residence among the Indians in the Interior of North America (Minneapolis: 1956), pp. 253 and 280. This work was originally published in 1830 and had one essential theme: how a white man became like a savage as a result of living among the Indians.

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very long when the government made its most concerted efforts, one realizes that the deck was being handled by an inexperienced dealer.

Indian visits to Canada continued until the late 1830's despite American efforts and restrictions. Some Indians followed the dictates of their great Father in Washington. Many, however, openly defied the restrictions and continued to make their annual journey.⁵⁰ Yet others tried unique ways of dealing with the prohibition. A most comical attempt was made by an old Chippewa headman, Wing, to convince Boyd that Governor Cass had given permission to the Indians to go to Drummond Island that summer to receive their presents. The attempt failed and Boyd through "threats and close examination" forced the old Indian to confess before his tribesmen that he had lied.⁵¹ Wing, a good friend of the American government, was not punished beyond being humiliated; diplomacy dictated such a course.

The number of Indians travelling to the British posts, however, began to decline in the mid-twenties. By then many of the region's Indians had ceded their lands and were being pushed westward. Accordingly, in the mid-thirties, the British decided that their policy of inviting the Indians to their posts was no longer profitable. By this

⁵⁰See Boyd to Cass, August 7, 1822, ibid., roll 11, p. 255.

⁵¹Boyd to Cass, July 8, 1822, ibid., pp. 28-9.

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time the fur trade had declined sharply in importance, a sizable Indian population to provide a strong military ally was gone, and the policy of giving foodstuffs and presents to the Indians had proven too costly for the doubtful benefits derived.⁵²

Although Boyd was deeply involved with trying to end Indian trips to Canada during his first years as an agent, this was not his only concern. He had several other major areas of responsibility. He was expected to manage and supervise all contacts between whites and Indians, especially the fur trade, oversee efforts to civilize and educate his charges, prevent illegal intrusions into Indian country, stop the flow of whiskey into Indian hands, settle frontier disputes and help prevent hostilities among the native Americans, persuade the Indians to cede their lands, distribute gifts, provisions, and treaty annuities, and keep accurate financial accounts of his receipts and expenditures. While stationed at Mackinac, his most important duty was the regulation of trade contacts.

⁵² A Message from the President (Martin Van Buren), U.S. Congress, House, 3rd Sess., Executive Sess., January 22, 1839, doc. 107, found in Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 6, doc. 5. This message contained the information that as of 1839 the British would no longer distribute gifts to Indians residing in upper and lower Canada and the United States.

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CHAPTER 4

INDIAN TRADE: A PAWN IN ASTOR'S EMPIRE

Stationed on the island which was the center of fur trade in the upper Lakes region, Boyd should have been a most important link in the government's efforts to regulate Indian trade. Authorized to control the penetrations of white men into the Indian country, he gave traders, travellers, and explorers the needed approval to enter Indian territory. Passports were given to those who were traversing Indian lands, exploring for minerals, or shipping merchandise to a frontier outpost. Licenses, however, were required in all trade contacts with red men. Even the simple act of purchasing a horse from an Indian required one. Delegated the responsibility for regulating fur trade contacts with the Indians of his agency, Boyd was to issue licenses, collect bonds and securities, prevent infractions of the laws, and bring violators to justice. In his annual reports, he was to list all traders that he had licensed, and specify the monetary value of their goods and the locations where they were to trade.¹

¹Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to Boyd, September 3, 1827, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 28; also see *ibid.*, vol. 4, docs. 31, 33, 37, 104 and 105; Cass to Calhoun, December 27, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, p. 360. As a means of preventing conflict of interests, federal law forbade

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Despite his legal powers, Boyd was not in an enviable situation. Upon assuming his position he was told that as an agent "the internal police and concerns of the Indians" within the limits of his agency would be under his "exclusive management and control," and that he would have discretionary power in granting licenses in order to eliminate undesirable traders.² Yet Boyd would not have "exclusive management and control" of the Indian trade in his district. This was mainly because of the overpowering position of the American Fur Company. His predecessor had learned that the company was not to be impeded in any way and that its needs had to be satisfied; Puthuff had indeed learned a valuable lesson on power, but it cost him his job. Boyd thus inherited a delicate situation.

Limitations on his powers also arose because of governmental policies. While the government wanted thorough supervision of Indian trade to assure satisfactory Indian relations, it also sought to undermine British prestige among American Indians. Realizing that British traders helped immensely to strengthen the Crown's influence over the Lakes Indians, Congress prohibited foreigners to trade on American soil. But exceptions were

agents from any business interests in Indian trade. See Intercourse Act of 1802, U.S., Statutes at Large, II, p. 143.

²Circular, Cass to agents in his superintendency, April 22, 1818, MSIA, roll 3, pp. 343-7.

made for the American Fur Company because not enough Americans were involved in the trade. Astor's enterprise was permitted to have foreign traders licensed to enable it to have better and more stable trade relations with the red men and drive the British traders from American soil. Yet within a few years the federal government forced these traders to become naturalized citizens because of the strong protests by agents and military officers. By that time, however, the American Fur Company was well advanced in asserting its dominance and driving out its competition, which did not have the same privileges. Moreover, Astor's special status continued throughout the 1820's. Boyd was thus in a situation where the national aim of terminating British prestige and influence in the Lakes region gave the American Fur Company its opportunities to create a monopoly and greatly restricted his authority in trade matters.

Bent on establishing a fur empire, Astor's company used its advantages to eliminate all competition. With the British legally excluded from the trade, the only American competition remaining on the northern Lakes scene generally were small independents. Competition with these smaller trading firms was keen at first, but by 1820 the American Fur Company had most of them beaten. On December 4, 1819, Crooks told Astor that their remaining competitors at Mackinac and the Sault were "crippled"

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and that these smaller firms would soon be under their control.³ Thereafter Astor's company enlarged the area of its dominance. It attacked the other small trade concerns in the region and drove most of them out of business or into its grasp. At the same time it was also trying to destroy the government's factory system, which cut into Astor's domestic markets and offered competition even though it was weak in comparison to the American Fur Company. Since the Mackinac factory had been closed at the beginning of the War of 1812, Boyd never clashed with a factor; (the agent and the factor often did not get along because they both vied for the Indian's favor.) Nonetheless, Boyd had a negative attitude toward the factory system because it traded inferior goods, and thus embarrassed the United States and lowered his prestige among the Indians.⁴ He was gratified in May, 1822, when Congress responded to the efforts of the American Fur Company and its free enterprise friends, particularly Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, and abolished the system, which was already moribund in the Lakes region.

³Crooks to Astor, July 21, 1817, AFC, Letter Books, vol. I, p. 35; Crooks to Astor and Sons, June 21, 1819, ibid., vol. II, p. 193; and Crooks to Astor, December 4, 1819, ibid., pp. 250-60.

⁴A postscript to a letter written sometime between 1820 and 1822, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 7, doc. 89.

In the Lakes region the demise of the public trade system was not so important to Astor's company as the government's whiskey policy. Alcohol had played a vital and destructive role in Indian-white contacts, and as a result it created many difficulties on the frontier. To curb its disruptive nature, Congress gave the President in 1802 the authority to take such measures as might be "expedient to prevent or restrain the vending or distributing of spirituous liquors" among the Indians.⁵ Nevertheless, traders willingly defied the law and its penalties because they considered whiskey an essential item for successful trade; as a result, thousands of gallons were brought annually to the Indians. Controlling this situation was almost impossible for the agent because of the vast area to be supervised, the ease of trespass, and the proximity of white settlements. The problem of stopping the flow of "fire water" was made more difficult by the Indian's strong attraction to it. The government's effort to have agents halt the flow of whiskey by licensing only traders of integrity was idealistic; since it was a necessity in the trade there was little hope of its exclusion. It was even more difficult, if not impossible, to exclude when a company as large and powerful as Astor's American Fur Company was on the scene and the accomplishment of company goals depended

⁵U.S., Statutes at Large, II, pp. 139-46.

upon its use. Furthermore, the federal government became quite ambivalent about the use in the Lakes region after the War of 1812.

The government did indeed make several abortive attempts to stop its flow, but each attempt was compromised to satisfy trade needs and national aims. For instance, in 1818, when the government in Washington appeared adamant about ending the use of "spirituous liquors" in the trade, Governor Cass gave Puthuff permission to allow the introduction of spirits among the Indians by traders as a means of counteracting British efforts to capture American Indian trade through the free use of alcohol.⁶ Cass's instruction helped the Astor company immeasurably, especially in its struggle with its competitors. Calls from Washington in 1819, however, for stricter enforcement of the law briefly ended the cooperation with fur interests. This policy was short lived and traders, once again, were allowed to take whiskey into the Indian country. In 1822, however, when the factory system was abolished, Congress authorized Indian superintendents, agents and military officers to search trade goods and stores for whiskey being taken into the Indian country. When found, it was to be seized and the persons responsible were to be brought to justice. But this act still allowed the introduction of whiskey by traders if the circumstances demanded it.⁷ Of course the

⁶Cass to Puthuff, July 4, 1818, MSIA, roll 4, p. 12.

⁷U.S., Statutes at Large, III, pp. 682-3.

situation in the upper Lakes region required it to end the Crown's preeminent status.

Meanwhile, competition accentuated the use of whiskey in the Indian trade by the American Fur Company. Astor's company was initially against its introduction into the Indian country. This opposition arose not only because it had "pernicious" effects upon the Indians and hindered their involvement in hunting and trapping, but also because the company's rivals (domestic and international) were given an equal chance of getting furs from the red men. Crooks wrote to Astor in mid-1817 that business was bad because of the "clandestine introduction of ardent spirits by those opposed to our men ...[and with] the introduction of Spirits being prohibited, we sent out people ... without a drop, and thus by adhering strictly to the law, have suffered in the trade."⁸ Since it was impossible for the government to stop effectively the introduction of liquor into the Indian country, the American Fur Company found it "absolutely necessary" to do as their competitors did; otherwise, business would suffer.⁹ Each year after 1818 the company imported thousands of gallons of alcohol; in 1821, Crooks estimated that the company annually needed "from 3,000 to 6,000 Gallons [of] whiskey, with 1,000 to

⁸Crooks to Astor, June 23 and July 21, 1817, AFC, Letter Books, vol. I, pp. 30 and 33.

⁹Stuart to William B. Astor, president of the American Fur Company, April 25, 1825, ibid., vol. III, p. 165.

1,500 Gallons [of] High wines." For the 1824 trade year the company purchased 8,000 gallons of whiskey and 2,000 gallons of high wines.¹⁰

Throughout the post-war period the company used the British threat as a means of acquiring its whiskey privileges. It repeatedly asked the government to be allowed to bring "limited" amounts of whiskey into the Indian country; and Astor's men cleverly disguised their continued requests in terms of diminishing British influence over the Indians. Arguing that it was better to sell the Indians a little whiskey than have them travel to British posts where they might obtain counsel as well as whiskey, the company neatly played upon American fears and shrewdly obscured the real reason for the use of alcohol: advancing its own trade interests.¹¹ Although the government was opposed to the introduction of whiskey into the Indian country, it gave Astor's men permission to carry small amounts in order to rid the region of British influence.

The legal entry of even small amounts was a curse to the Indians and the government's representatives. Small

¹⁰Crooks to Messrs. William Smith & Company, Fredonia, New York, September 2, 1823, ibid., vol. III, p. 16.

¹¹Stuart to Cass, June 24, 1827, MSIA, roll 20, pp. 689-91; William B. Astor to War Secretary Cass, July 25, 1832, Kellogg Papers, (Notes and transcriptions...), WHS, Mss. HR, Box No. 42; and American State Papers: Indian Affairs, serial 08, pp. 658-61.

quantities were easily watered down and converted into larger amounts of spirits that would satisfy the Indian and would bring even greater profits to the trader. Throughout the 1820's army officers and Indian agents reacted frequently to Astor's privileges with strong complaints about the perennial whiskey abuses and with recommendations of complete prohibition.¹² Although Boyd did not make such complaints during the 1820's, he also faced the problem of whiskey being taken into the Indian country both legally and illegally. The government's vacillating policy gave the American Fur Company the privilege of using alcohol in the trade, but it also compounded the agent's problem by inviting large-scale abuses and obscured the government's legal position.

Finally in July 1832, while the Black Hawk War was being fought, Congress put a total ban on whiskey's use in Indian trade. This time Congress asserted that "no ardent spirits shall be hereafter introduced, under any pretense, into the Indian country."¹³ The permission given in June 1831 to the American Fur Company to take whiskey to their trading outposts was not, however, immediately rescinded. But in September, Secretary of War Cass decided that the War Department "had no discretion under the late Act," and

¹²Colonel Samuel C. Stambaugh, Green Bay agent, to Secretary Cass, November 19, 1831, MSIA, roll 30, p. 86.

¹³U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 564.

accordingly applied the prohibition to all despite the past privileges of some. Boyd was directed to execute the letter of the law and permit "no evasion" of it. The agent, then stationed at Green Bay, soon after notified the area traders, who promised to abide by the law. Boyd, however, had his doubts: "Their promises are very fair, but we shall see in the end how they conform to them. My own belief is, that their avarice will get the better of their patriotism." Boyd was correct; large quantities of whiskey still reached the Indians.¹⁴

In spite of the government's strict prohibition, enforcement was extremely difficult. Robert Stuart knew this; although he cautioned Green Bay traders Jacques Porlier and one of the Grignons, about the restriction, he doubted whether whiskey sales could be detected and stopped.¹⁵ Boyd doubted it also! He told Elbert Herring, the first Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that even rigid enforcement of the law would not prevent traders from trafficking in "spirits." He queried: "Will the Oceans furnished annually by open Contract for the American Fur

¹⁴John Robb, acting war secretary, to Governor George Porter, Michigan Territory, August 16, 1832, MSIA, roll 31, pp. 187-8; Robb to Porter, September 11, 1832, ibid., p. 303; Robb to Boyd, August 30, 1832, Boyd Papers, vol. 4, doc. 38; Boyd to Green Bay traders, December 15, 1832, ibid., doc. 63; Boyd to Governor Porter, January 1, 1833, ibid., vol. 8, p. 62; and Boyd to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Elbert Herring, May 21, 1825, ibid., p. 187.

¹⁵Stuart to Messrs. Porlier and Grignon, April 22, 1823, Kellogg Papers, (Notes and transcriptions...), WHS, Mss. HR, Box No. 42.

Company, and others, remain in their vaults to acquire age and flavor?" He responded negatively to his own question because he knew that the close proximity of white and Indian settlements made control of liquor traffic impossible. It was Boyd's opinion that "the only means of enforcing the exclusion of ardent spirits from the Indian ... was to give them a Country of their own apart from the Whites and under the guardianship of the President ... or else take the Indian trade into our own hands, and thereby get rid of another dangerous monopoly."¹⁶

By 1830 a hostile tone was evident in Boyd's references to the American Fur Company. In a true Jacksonian vein, he called it a "great-monied Aristocracy"; the reasons he cited were its severe mistreatment of Indians and traders, and its brutal destruction of all opposition. Because of its rapacious nature, he recommended that a Board of Controls be established in the War Department to put a check upon it and its monopolistic tactics.¹⁷ It is possible that Boyd's desire for a reassignment at this time was in considerable part the result of his distaste for the policies of the Astor company. Certainly, he must have realized how the power of the company had dwarfed his position as agent: he had been and was a pawn among pawns!

¹⁶Boyd to Commissioner Herring, October 10, 1833, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 112-3.

¹⁷Boyd, "Confidential," to James B. Gardiner, August 18, 1830, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 122.

Despite his harsh criticism of the American Fur Company in the 1830's, Boyd responded positively to its powerful position during his early years as an agent. Indeed during his first years he acted decidedly in favor of Astor's interests. His actions were so accomodating that a contemporary described Boyd as "a great favorite" of the American Fur Company. During his first summer as an agent he authorized William Morrison, an American Fur Company trader, "to seize upon every description of goods introduced within the American limits" in the Fond du Lac and Red Lake regions by foreigners and others illegally involved in the Indian trade. Morrison was also ordered to "destroy all spirituous liquors, as soon as detected" and prevent Indian councils being held by "improper persons." New to the job and the surroundings, Boyd probably made this illegal authorization unwittingly; naively or consciously, he gave a private trader official governmental powers.¹⁸ He also helped the Astor interests by revoking all licenses issued to Charles O. Ermatinger, one of Astor's strongest competitors; this greatly weakened Ermatinger even though he continued for awhile to trade without licenses.¹⁹ William Farnham, a small independent trader, was also driven from the trade in the Mackinac region by Boyd; he subsequently became a

¹⁸Ebenezer Childs, "Recollections of Wisconsin since 1820," WHC, vol. IV, p. 151; Boyd to Morrison, July 17, 1819, Boyd Papers, vol. 1, doc. 82; Porter, Astor, II, p. 707; and Terrell, Furs by Astor, pp. 279-80.

¹⁹Terrell, Furs by Astor, p. 280.

trader for Astor. In 1822 Boyd granted William Morrison permission to establish a new trading post in the western wilderness and take liquor for the purpose of procuring provisions from the Indians. Morrison's new post was a part of an American Fur Company plan to drive the British from the trade on the southwestern shores of Lake Superior; the whiskey was to be used to counteract British trade inroads among the Indians.²⁰ Although Boyd had "discretionary" power to exclude the most "odious" foreigners from the trade and did use his authority against certain individuals, he was accused by Colonel William Lawrence, commandant of the garrison at Mackinac, of licensing many foreigners. His early licensing policy may have been a major cause of his friction with the military at Mackinac, because the military was generally opposed to Astor's use of foreigners.²¹ Boyd did Robert Stuart a great favor in 1824 when he delayed putting into action the law requiring that traders transact their business at designated locations. While giving the American Fur Company an extra year before implementing the law, he firmly asserted that in the future the regulation would be rigorously enforced. Thereafter

²⁰Passport to William Morrison, July 23, 1823, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 33.

²¹Cass to Boyd, June 22, 1819, MSIA, roll 6, pp. 90-1; Crooks to William W. Mathews, Montreal, November 5, 1819, AFC, Letter Books, vol. II, pp. 256-7; and Colonel William Lawrence, acting agent at Mackinac, to Cass, November 20, 1819, MSIA, roll 6, pp. 416-8.

Boyd took a more neutral position in the trade, but he never would directly confront Astor's company.

Several factors can possibly explain his early partisan behavior. First, his poor economic condition and the prolonged contract dispute during the first half of the 1820's made him an easy mark for the Astor representatives, who would gladly extend credits to an Indian agent; indeed, as early as the fall of 1819, Boyd was indebted to the American Fur Company.²² The company's purchase of his French muskets in 1824 greatly improved his financial position and showed the company's friendly and cooperative tendency. Second, the friendship of Ramsay Crooks greatly assisted Boyd on a few occasions. Astor's lieutenant made arrangements for and helped oversee the education of Boyd's eldest son, Joshua, in the East. When Boyd desired some servants for his household, Crooks used company channels to try to get them. Third, inexperience may have played a large part in his actions which were favorable to the company.

Yet he may have consciously favored Astor's interests. After all, he knew that his predecessor had been discharged because of friction with Astor. Although his precarious situation was most clearly illustrated by Puthuff's dismissal, the limitations upon his position were also

²²Crooks to Stuart, October 17, 1819, AFC, Letter Books, vol. II, p. 248.

shown in the American Fur Company's actions against others who acted counter to its interests. This was most clearly demonstrated by the company's taking Lieutenant Colonel Talbot Chambers to court for refusing to recognize the licenses granted to it by Puthuff at Mackinac in 1817 for trade in the area of Prairie du Chien. Chambers, the commanding officer there, had ordered the Astor traders to St. Louis to receive valid licenses from Governor William Clark. They ignored his order prohibiting trading, were arrested, and had their boats and goods seized. Not only did Astor complain to President Monroe, but he also sued Chambers and in 1822 was awarded \$5,000 for the seizure and false arrests. The sum was reduced to \$211 in 1825. Legal threats against other military officers for actions harmful to the American Fur Company helped to nullify the trade laws and deterred agents and the military from properly performing their duties.²³

Another factor, perhaps the most important of all, was Boyd's position in the government's administration network. He was surrounded by those who favored Astor's interests. For instance, Governor Lewis Cass, Boyd's superintendent, was very sympathetic to the interests of the American Fur

²³Crooks to Cass, April 16, 1818, MSIA, roll 3, p. 335; Crooks to Stuart, February 8, 1823, AFC, Letter Books, vol. II, p. 399; Porter, Astor, II, pp. 705, 727-8 n. 58, and 806; Prucha, Formative Years, pp. 82-4; and Prucha, Sword of the Republic, pp. 202-3.

Company. His partisanship was probably motivated by his Anglophobia and his desire to encourage the settlement and development of Michigan Territory. A politically ambitious man, Cass recognized the importance of successfully developing it and moving it to statehood.²⁴ Certainly he realized that only by wresting the Indians from English domination could the territory grow, and that Astor's enterprise, the strongest American company in the region, could best accomplish it. Reciprocally, having Cass, the superintendent of Indian affairs for the Great Lakes region, sympathetic to the company's interest was extremely beneficial to Astor. The customs collector at Mackinac, Adam D. Stewart, was also very partial to Astor's interests. Indebted to the company for over four thousand dollars in 1819, he had a good reason for favoring the Astor interests; he was known on occasion to act as a lobbyist for the company and grant permits to Astor's men to take whiskey through the Indian country to Prairie du Chien. As customs collector at the Mackinac port of entry, he could serve Astor because it was here that most of the company's imported goods entered the United States. A great deal of smuggling, especially of whiskey, went on in the vicinity of Stewart's post, and there were charges that he allowed

²⁴See Woodford, Cass, ch. III; and Willis F. Dunbar, Lewis Cass (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 1970), p. 6.

much of the company's goods to pass unnoticed and duty-free.²⁵

Even President James Monroe was very attentive to Astor's interests. Monroe was indebted to the New York millionaire for \$5,000; he had incurred the debt during the war when he was financially hard-pressed and serving as the Secretary of State for President James Madison. The debt was not erased until three years after he left the White House, when Monroe, still experiencing financial problems, sold some slaves to repay Astor. Certainly a charge of conflict of interest can be made against Monroe, especially when it is realized that it was during the Virginian's two terms as President (1817-1825) that the American Fur Company rose to monopolistic proportions, particularly in the upper Lakes region, and received highly preferential treatment from the government.²⁶ The British were convinced that the American Fur Company had a favored status and was being permitted to develop a monopoly in

²⁵Crooks to Astor, September 1, 1819, AFC, Letter Books, vol. II, p. 232; Porter, Astor, I: pp. 500, 504, and 533, and II: p. 805; Terrell, Furs by Astor, pp. 273-4; and Boyd and A.D. Stewart to Robert Stuart, November 14, 1820, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 110. Stewart's name is also spelled Steuart.

²⁶Terrell, Furs by Astor, p. 282; Horan, McKenney-Hall Portrait Gallery, p. 43; W.P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 1946), pp. 474-5; and Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York: 1971), pp. 553-60.

the Lakes region in order to help the government gain complete control over the Indians.²⁷

Astor did have a very special status and Boyd had to cater to it. As a result, while stationed at a remote agency, mired in financial difficulties, and responsible for a large family, he probably saw his course as that of least possible resistance until the circumstances changed. And change they did in 1825 when his contract dispute with the government ended and his brother-in-law became President. Nevertheless, he would never take on Astor's company; a neutral stance was his most practical course.

The American Fur Company was not alone in restricting Boyd's authority. An examination of the activities of one trader, William Farnsworth, provides a good insight into Boyd's efforts and frustrations. An independent and unscrupulous trader, Farnsworth was caught in 1823 trying to import ten barrels of whiskey into the Indian country without a license. Several Indians sent by Boyd apprehended him and brought him back to Mackinac where he was released after his goods had been confiscated. A wily trader, Farnsworth went to Green Bay and received a license. While a trader at the Bay, he sued the Indians who had apprehended him for the loss of his goods. The justice of the peace for Michilimackinac County, John

²⁷Terrell, Furs by Astor, p. 280.

Dousman, who was also a merchant, dismissed the case and told the Indians that "they should not obey an order of the Indian Agent [because] Citizens had a right to pass through the Indian Territories when and where they pleased without a passport or license." The judge's complete disregard of the law revealed the attitude of many frontiersmen, and his open challenge to Boyd's authority clearly demonstrated the difficulty that agents faced in their efforts to enforce the laws. Although these suits were settled out of court, Boyd had to pay the fees and expenses out of his own pocket. The government's laxity made strict enforcement of trade laws impossible and allowed traders like Farnsworth to continue their illegal activities for years.²⁸

In 1824 the government tried to aid the agents in stopping the illegal flow of whiskey into the Indian country and ridding the trade of unprincipled and unlicensed traders. Congress passed a law requiring traders to do their business at designated trading locations. According to this legislation, the agents were to

²⁸ Boyd to Cass, August 16, 1823, MSIA, roll 13, pp. 84-5; Major Whistler, U.S. Army, to Boyd, August 21, 1824, ibid., roll 15, p. 35; Boyd to Cass, October 27, 1824, ibid., p. 235; and H.J.B. Brevoort, agent at Green Bay, to Cass, February 3, 1827, ibid., roll 20, p. 73. Also see Colonel Ebenezer Childs, "Recollections," WHC, vol. IV, pp. 155-59, Martin L. Martin, "Sketch of William Farnsworth," WHC, IX, pp. 397-40; and David Lavender, The Fist in the Wilderness (New York: 1964), pp. 329-30.

designate the sites and limit the number of traders at each location according to the needs of the red men; and each trader's license was to state the place where he was allowed to trade. Any departure from the terms of the license was to be considered a forfeiture of the license bond. These locations were to be reported to the War Department and were not to be changed without its approval. Although the government was insistent about establishing and maintaining designated trading locations, it was not against changing them or establishing new ones.²⁹

This law had the effect of greatly curtailing Boyd's licensing responsibility. As the agent at Mackinac where many traders were outfitted, he had issued many licenses to traders who operated outside of his jurisdiction. As a result, confusion over licensing occurred constantly. The designated spot policy gave each Indian agent more control over trade within his district and thus enabled each agent to void licenses obtained from Boyd at Mackinac. Because overlapping and confusion continued, McKenney directed in 1827 that each agent be responsible for the trade within his agency. This directive stated clearly that one agent

²⁹U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 35; McKenney to Cass, June 3, 1824, MSIA, roll 14, pp. 313-4; Cass to John Tipton, agent at Fort Wayne, October 16, 1824, Cass Papers, BHC; McKenney to Cass, May 23, 1828, MSIA, roll 22, p. 371; and Boyd to N. Goodall, Fort Winnebago, April 20, 1833, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 84.

could not issue a license for another agent nor interfere in trade operations in another agency.³⁰ This brought to an end Boyd's practice of licensing many traders who operated outside his jurisdiction.

Whether the statute did anything to enable Boyd to deal more effectively with traders operating within his agency is doubtful. The predominant position of the American Fur Company continued unaffected and it should be noted that the law was easily ignored because of the vastness of the wilderness and the difficulty of detection. Nevertheless, the War Department favored the law and did its best to enforce it.

Seemingly unwilling to challenge Astor's fur interests, there are only a few records of actions taken by him against traders after 1825. Evidence does not suggest any significant trade law enforcement while he remained at Mackinac. When stationed at Green Bay, however, he did check the activities of the firm of Farnsworth & Brush, which operated on the Menominee River. In 1822, Boyd wrote to the firm about its alleged establishment of a trading house among Indians who had credits with another trader; if indeed it had done so, Boyd wrote, the company was in violation of the law and should close the outpost.

³⁰ Boyd to Cass, August 26, 1824, MSIA, roll 15, p. 63; and McKenney to William Clark, superintendent of Indian Affairs, St. Louis, February 26, 1827, ibid., roll 20, pp. 130-1.

He was attempting to prevent harmful and sometimes dangerous rivalries between traders, and to stop the tendency among traders to ignore the law once they were in the wilderness. During the following year he had another problem with Farnsworth & Brush. In violation of the law this small company hired six foreigners who had deserted from other outfits. Boyd ordered "that these men must be immediately discharged" and be "directed to leave the Indian Country - or forthwith return" to their previous engagements. When four of these traders remained, Boyd sent his son George and one of his blacksmiths to remove them. Taking up arms, the traders refused to leave. Boyd quickly responded by dispatching the military to remove them forcibly.³¹

When an offender was brought to justice, the agent often assumed an active role in the prosecution. He gathered evidence and submitted it to the U.S. District Attorney or the War Department for legal action; sometimes, he appeared as a witness and assisted the prosecutor in other ways. In 1821 he was requested to provide information to be used as testimony in a case against Laurent Rolette

³¹Boyd to Farnsworth & Brush, December 15, 1832, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 48; Boyd to Farnsworth & Brush, March 11, 1832, ibid., pp. 67-8; Boyd to George Boyd, Jr., March 11, 1833, ibid., p. 68; Boyd Jr., to Boyd, Sr., March 18, 1833, ibid., p. 69; and Boyd to Brigadier General G.M. Brooke, Fort Howard, March 18, 1833, ibid., p. 68.

for illegally introducing trade goods from Canada into the United States.³²

Although stationed at the hub of Lakes trade during a very crucial period of American growth, Boyd seldom used his discretionary powers in regulating the fur trade. Dwarfed by the power of the American Fur Company, stymied by whiskey privileges that more often served the company rather than the public interest, and hampered by difficulties in apprehending and prosecuting trade law violators, Boyd's execution of his duties was greatly restricted by forces beyond his control. His problems were not to end when he was transferred to Green Bay.

³²Acting Governor William Woodbridge to Boyd, August 25, 1821, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 49.

CHAPTER 5

THE GREEN BAY AGENCY

a. Green Bay

In June 1832 Boyd was transferred from Mackinac to Green Bay. He had been trying for years to get reassigned to a more southern station in order to get a farm and better raise his children. When Dr. Alexander Wolcott, the agent at Chicago, died in late 1830, Boyd asked to be appointed to fill the vacancy.¹ His request was not honored, but a year later he intensified his efforts, probably encouraged by the appointment of Lewis Cass as Secretary of War.² No immediate action came, but in the spring of 1832, as the Black Hawk War was brewing, Boyd was directed to Green Bay to replace Colonel Samuel Stambaugh, whose appointment was not approved by the Senate because of his partisan behavior toward the Menominee in their land dispute with the New York Indians.³

¹Boyd to Cass, November 17, 1830, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 134; also see Thomas McKenney to Boyd, March 11, 1828, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 48.

²See Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 4, docs. 30 and 34.

³Albert G. Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians into Wisconsin," WHC, vol. II (Madison: 1903), pp. 432, 434 and 437-8. Ellis accompanied a delegation of New York Indians to Green Bay in 1821; and subsequently, he became a teacher, surveyor, newspaper editor, and Indian agent at the Bay.

The transfer came about because of a move by the first Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Elbert Herring, to consolidate and reorganize the Indian agencies to promote economy and efficiency. Moving to consolidate the agencies at Mackinac and Sault Ste. Marie, Herring put Henry Rowe Schoolcraft in charge of the Mackinac agency and reduced the other to a subagency. Such an action would have left the brother-in-law of John Quincy Adams without an assignment, but this situation was avoided by having Boyd replace Stambaugh.⁴

Boyd's reassignment necessitated the transfer of all the Mackinac agency properties to his successor. Regulations dictated that a form list be made of all the properties to be turned over and that the signature of the incoming agent be affixed acknowledging his receipt of the listed properties. Goods transferred included the agency buildings, blacksmith tools and equipment, office furniture and stove, official agency correspondence and instructions, and other items such as cord wood, coal, and farming

⁴J.H. Eaton, Secretary of War, to Cass, January 14, 1831, MSIA, roll 28, p. 13; Elbert Herring, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Gov. George B. Porter, February 13, 1832, ibid., roll 30, pp. 49-50; and Herring to Porter, April 10, 1832, ibid., p. 153. Porter replaced Cass as governor of the Michigan Territory and superintendent of Indian affairs in mid-1831 when Cass became the secretary of war. Cass had held the above territorial positions since 1813.

implements. The same procedure was repeated when Boyd arrived at his new station.⁵

Boyd went to Green Bay without his family because of the excitement of the Black Hawk War and the threat of an Indian attack upon that settlement. The outgoing agent stayed in the area because his services might be needed in the war; and in the meantime he helped Boyd with his duties and familiarized him with the new environment.⁶

Unlike Mackinac, Green Bay had an agency house when Boyd arrived. It was constructed in 1825 by Judge James Duane Doty and served as his home until 1830 when he sold it to the government for two thousand dollars. It was the first frame house erected at Green Bay.⁷ Several years after his arrival, Boyd bought the house and adjacent land from the government, and lived there for the rest of his life.

⁵List of Public Properties of the Mackinac agency turned over to H.R. Schoolcraft by Boyd, May 19, 1832, (signed by George Johnston for Schoolcraft), Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 4, doc. 43; Boyd to Gov. Porter, May 19, 1832, MSIA, roll 30, p. 257; and Col. Stambaugh to Porter, June 9, 1832, ibid., roll 30, pp. 317-8.

⁶Stambaugh was soon after placed in charge of the Menominee expedition during the Black Hawk War.

⁷Elizabeth T. Baird, "Reminiscences of Life in Territorial Wisconsin," WHC, vol. XV (Madison: 1900), p. 220; and Thomas L. McKenney to Cass, January 7, 1829, MSIA, roll 22, p. 9.

By the late 1820's, Boyd's dwellings, whether at Mackinac or Green Bay, were stopping places of prominent visitors. Since Boyd was known as "a courtly and accomplished Southerner," who was fond of good food and wine, his homes were welcome resting places. They were furnished with luxuries such as "tall silver candle sticks, oval mirrors in gilded frames, and handsome brasses" -- expensive additions to a frontier household.⁸

Maintaining such a way of life on the frontier was extremely difficult, but Boyd did everything he could to create a pleasant atmosphere for his family. He sought to contract help for household chores, but since white servants proved to be very difficult to obtain on the frontier, the Boyds probably used Indians for household help, as some of their neighbors did.⁹ To obtain goods

⁸Ella Hoes Neville, et al., Historic Green Bay (Green Bay: 1893), pp. 249-50; Jackson Kemper, D.D., "Journal of an Episcopalian Missionary's tour to Green Bay, 1834," WHC, XIV (Madison: 1898), p. 434; and Samuel Abbott to Boyd, August 7, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 33. Samuel Abbott was in the employ of the American Fur Company.

⁹Ramsay Crooks to William W. Mathews, AFC agent at Montreal, April 21, 1820, AFC, Letter Books, WHS, vol. II, pp. 294-5; and see Baird, "Reminiscences in Territorial Wisconsin," WHC, vol. XV, pp. 204-63.

that were difficult to get, such as French wines, Boyd regularly used the facilities of the American Fur Company.¹⁰

The town of Green Bay was similar in many respects to Mackinac. Located at the southern extremity of an appendage of Lake Michigan called Green Bay, and at the mouth of the Fox River, which penetrated deep into the region west of Lake Michigan (and by a short portage to the Wisconsin River connected with the Mississippi River and its vast river network), it was on the main water artery of the area. And as the main seat of white civilization in the region west of Lake Michigan and north of Chicago, it had great military and commercial significance.¹¹

Its military significance was recognized by the American government in the period after the War of 1812. Trying to strengthen its authority quickly in the area, where its actual control was quite weak, the United States government constructed a fort there. The fort, as in the case of Fort Mackinac, was established to end British influence among the Indians and assure that some of the fur trade profits would go into American hands. And while

¹⁰See Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 42, and vol. 4, doc. 42. Boyd had also used the services of Ramsay Crooks to supervise the education of his son Joshua in the East. Joshua subsequently joined the Navy, and returned to Mackinac in the late 1820's. He was murdered by a drunken Indian in the fall of 1832 while engaged in the fur trade for the American Fur Company.

¹¹Neville, Historic Green Bay, pp. 126-9.

Fort Howard was being built, the federal government also moved to establish an agency and a trading factory there.¹²

Green Bay became a garrison town in July 1816, when about two hundred troops arrived to erect Fort Howard on a grassy plain on the north bank of the Fox near the point of the river's entrance into the bay. According to Augustin Grignon, the elder head of the important French fur trading family at the Bay, the people of Green Bay were pleased with the arrival of the soldiers because the garrison would bring general prosperity and growth. The post, he thought, would stimulate business and society. Its establishment also meant that Green Bay would begin "to experience the benefits and convenience of Lake commerce." Furthermore, it would provide protection in the event of Indian troubles. The fort, however, was not an unmixed blessing; thievery by the soldiers was, for the townsmen, a source of constant annoyance.¹³

At the time of Boyd's arrival at Green Bay, settlement extended up the Fox River for eight miles on both sides. Fort Howard and some houses and farms were on the north side of the river, while across from the post was

¹²Ibid., pp. 148-9; and Prucha, Guide to the Military Posts, p. 79.

¹³Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal, p. 242; and Augustin Grignon, "Seventy-two Years Recollections of Wisconsin," WHC, vol. III (Madison: 1904), pp. 281-2.

the newly developing town of Navarino. Two miles up the river on the southern bank was Shantytown, the site of the agency house and the declining center of commerce and trade; during the 1830's it was replaced by Navarino as the commercial center. A few miles beyond Shantytown was the settlement of Depere, at the Rapid des Peres. The larger settlement at Green Bay made Boyd's role as Indian agent more difficult than at Mackinac because the proximity of white and Indian settlements created constant friction and tension.¹⁴

The social atmosphere of Green Bay was very similar to that of Mackinac. Social activities were practically identical, although activities associated with the summer trade were not so large and exciting as those of the island. The summer annuity gatherings in and around Green Bay, however, had their own excitement. The French social flair and flavor, which for a long time had dominated the community, began receding into the background by the mid-thirties as American settlement increased and made the French self-conscious of their cultural practices.

¹⁴Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal, pp. 241-2; Col. Charles Whittlesey, "Recollections of a Tour through Wisconsin in 1832," WHC, vol. 1 (Madison: 1903), pp. 67-8; and see U.S., Fifth Census; or the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States, 1830 (Washington: 1832).

The third decade of the nineteenth century saw the rapid advancement of American civilization at Green Bay. The town had a post office, hotel, regular church services, and a court and jail for Brown County, Michigan Territory; yet the town's only physician was attached to the garrison. By the early 1830's, the population of the Bay area was approximately one thousand.¹⁵ Consequently, the Americanization of the town was well underway when Boyd arrived. Although Americans were coming into the area in increasing numbers, many of the residents were French and British Canadians, and mixed bloods.

The main trading outfit in the area was the Green Bay Company, which was contracted to the American Fur Company. The dealings of the Green Bay Company with the larger company illustrates perfectly the way that Astor's monopoly milked the small, contracted companies. Formed in the summer of 1821 with the advice of Crooks, the Green Bay Company brought into partnership the principal Bay area traders -- John Lawe, Jacques Porlier, and Augustin, Pierre and Louis Grignon -- who previously had competed with each other. Individually they were already indebted to the American Fur Company and the forming of

¹⁵Green Bay was placed in Michigan Territory in 1818 when Illinois became a state; and it remained so until July 4, 1836, when Wisconsin Territory was created.

the new company sealed their fates. Contracted to the Astor company, the Green Bay concern had to purchase its trade goods from and sell its furs to the larger firm; but since it bought goods at high prices and sold furs at low rates, the partners soon found themselves further indebted to the Astor company.¹⁶ Their difficulties also resulted from depleted trade areas, in which the Indians had, according to Robert Stuart, become "indolent, dishonest and worthless," and from competition with another American Fur Company trader, Joseph Rollette of Prairie du Chien. A shaky agreement with Rollette helped little in their difficulty and the Green Bay Company required more credits from Astor's concern. Recognizing that the Green Bay partners were poor businessmen and generally unreliable, Crooks told Pierre Grignon that to get more credits his company must "Give us Security." Since the traders lacked money, the security desired, Stuart told Astor, was a claim on "their landed estates," of which they had "considerable" amounts. In 1823 the small company was in deep trouble as Stuart received mortgages

¹⁶Green Bay Company contract of partnership, July 20, 1821, "Fur-Trade in Wisconsin, 1812-1825," WHC, vol. XX, pp. 206-10; Crooks to J. Porlier, August 24, 1821, AFC, Letter Books, vol. II, pp. 119-20; Porter, Astor, II, pp. 735, and 849 n. 90; Neville, Historic Green Bay, p. 189; R.G. Thwaites, ed., WHC, vol. XX., Preface, pp. xviii-xix.

from Porlier, Lawe, and Louis and Augustin Grignon for over five thousand acres on the banks of the Fox River near Green Bay; in 1828 more lands were mortgaged.¹⁷

The result of using land as collateral was that Lawe and the Grignon family lost a great deal of property. "After years of toil and privation spent in the trade," Henry S. Baird wrote, these traders "came out with nothing - leaving to the great monopoly the lion's share of the profits." In 1834, when Astor's ownership of the American Fur Company ended, these mortgages were not paid and Astor, Crooks and Stuart received about 2,700 acres to settle the outstanding credits; this acreage was easily worth at least thirty-five thousand dollars.¹⁸

Lawe and the Grignons not only lost valuable alluvial lands in the Bay area; they also had little chance of recovery in the fur trade. Settlers were already putting greater pressure upon the depleted wildlife and the fur trade was practically dead by 1836.

¹⁷Stuart to J. Lawe, November 7, 1822, AFC, Letter Books, vol. II, p. 136; Crooks to J. Rollette, September 5, 1823, *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 17; Crooks to Stuart, January 4, 1822, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 206; Stuart to Crooks, November 10, 1822, *ibid.*, p. 437; Crooks to P. Grignon, October 2, 1821, *ibid.*, p. 152; Stuart to John Jacob Astor & Son, August 16, 1822, *ibid.*, p. 321; and Porter, Astor, II, pp. 736 and 859-60.

¹⁸Henry S. Baird, "Recollections of the Early History of Northern Wisconsin," WHC, vol. IV (Madison: 1906), p. 215; and Porter, Astor, II, pp. 736 and 859-60.

John Lawe feared that his reward after years of hard work was to "die Poor."¹⁹ Yet the members of this company -- who had become merchants when trading began its sharp decline -- did their best in the 1830's to serve their own interests. Having strong control of the Menominee, they had at their disposal a lucrative means of assuring their future.

Green Bay did not lose its vitality with the decline of the fur frontier, but rather experienced new growth with the coming of the farming frontier. As the settlers came, land prices soared to speculative levels, the town's economy flourished, and the farming of the rich alluvial lands became more important than the trapping of the dwindling number of fur-bearing animals.²⁰ The increasing American settlement in the region brought about the creation of the Territory of Wisconsin in 1836. Broken off from Michigan Territory, which was readying for statehood, the new Wisconsin Territory began its progression toward membership in the federal union. The

¹⁹Crooks to J. Lawe, August 17, 1836, Kellogg Papers, (Notes and transcriptions...), WHS, Mss. HR, Box No. 42; Crooks to Lawe, October 13, 1836, ibid.; Joseph Rollette to Robert Grignon, April 18, 1837, ibid.; and J. Lawe to his daughter, Rachel, October 11, 1838, ibid.

²⁰Neville, Historic Green Bay, pp. 161, 253-4, 257-8, and introduction by Reuben Gold Thwaites.

1830's was thus a crucial decade as many ambitious persons were attracted to Green Bay because they wanted to be on the ground floor of the developing region.

As the Green Bay area underwent its critical transition in the 1830's, American Indian policy became more sharply defined. This was a fortunate occurrence for Boyd as he faced many new problems at his new assignment. At its inception, Indian policy was very general and experimental; this was still true when Boyd became an agent in 1819. His responsibilities, however, slowly became more clearly defined as experience gave his role greater shape and direction. Late in the 1820's, Indian superintendents Cass and William Clark submitted an important report to the Secretary of War, based upon their experiences and knowledge, that made specific and comprehensive recommendations for establishing a consistent and viable Indian policy. Although the report was passed on to Congress, it was not acted upon until 1834 when Cass was the Secretary of War. The evolutionary process culminated in the Reorganization Act of 1834, which defined and codified the government's policies, particularly in reference to the field service.²¹

²¹Gallaher, "Indian Agent," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, vol. 14, pp. 5 and 40. For the best treatment of the evolutionary nature of Federal Indian policy during the early decades of the Republic see Prucha, Formative Years.

Generally speaking, this act was not a departure from previous policies, but rather the consolidation of past approaches. For the agent it spelled out his duties and responsibilities, and the courses of action he was to follow on different matters. Under it, agents were to be appointed, as before, for terms of four years, provide bonds of \$2,000, receive annual salaries of \$1,500, and be in charge of all intercourse with the Indians in their districts.²²

The new law also abolished some older, unnecessary superintendencies and agencies. The number of agencies was fixed at twelve, and while Green Bay was not abolished, it was not one of the agencies where continuance was expressly provided for. Agencies not provided for might be closed at any time by the President.²³ The closing of the Green Bay agency came two and a half years later. On December 31, 1836, Boyd turned over all of the agency's properties to General George M. Brooke.²⁴ Boyd, after

²²Ibid., pp. 42 and 43; Schmeckbier, Office of Indian Affairs, p. 28; and U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 736.

²³U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 736; and Gallaher, "Indian Agent," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, vol. 14, p. 42.

²⁴List of public property turned over by Boyd to General George M. Brooke, December 31, 1836, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 17.

eighteen years of service to the Indian Department, was quite surprised by his removal from office; he expected that "some other provision" would be made for him.²⁵ The brother-in-law of John Quincy Adams was not shelved for long, however; four months later he was appointed sub-agent at Green Bay in charge of the Menominee and New York Indians. Before he assumed this position he was required to transmit to the Office of Indian Affairs a bond of \$1,000 after it had been approved by either the area's District Judge or Attorney.²⁶ Under the Act of 1834, he received \$750 a year for his services, which were no different from his full agency responsibilities.²⁷

Boyd's demotion was the result of a passing frontier. As frontier conditions moved away from Green Bay and relations with the area's Indians became more stable, the need for a full agency in the Bay region was greatly

²⁵Boyd to Carey A. Harris, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 6, 1837, ibid., doc. 19.

²⁶Comm. Harris to Boyd, March 31, 1837, ibid., doc. 22; and Boyd to Harris, April 30, 1837, ibid., doc. 24.

²⁷U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 736; Gallaher, "Indian Agent," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, vol. 14, p. 43. Since a subagent "had the same services to perform," Henry Dodge, Boyd's superintendent, recommended to the Secretary of War that Boyd's salary be increased to that of a full agent. This was never done. See H. Dodge to Boyd, October 23, 1838, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 72.

diminished. Needs farther west became more urgent and the Secretary of War, Lewis Cass, thought the Green Bay agency more dispensable than any other.²⁸ The simple administrative decision to downgrade the Green Bay agency had a great impact upon Boyd's life; it forced him and his family to exist on a salary half its former size during a very difficult economic period.

c. Indians of the Green Bay area

The New York Indians were a small group of Indians under Boyd's supervision who had recently relocated in the Green Bay area. These Indians -- Oneida, Brotherton, Stockbridge, and Munsee -- were very different from their Indian neighbors since they had experienced years of acculturation and Christianization as a result of the work of various missionary societies.

Their removal westward came after a long, tragic history of warfare and tribal decline. The Oneida were a member of the once proud and powerful Iroquois Confederation, which had been weakened considerably after nearly two centuries of warfare. The American War of Independence was the last in a long series of wars that had enfeebled the confederation. It was after this war and all the destruction and tribal divisiveness that it

²⁸Gov. H. Dodge to Boyd, February 10, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 20.

wrought, that most of the Senecas and many Mohawks and Cayugas emigrated north to live among their British allies in Canada. The remaining Iroquois were placed on reservations with other fragmented tribal groups, such as the Brotherton and Stockbridge from New England, and the Munsee, a group of Delaware from northern New Jersey and southern New York. By 1818, about 4,500 of these Indians were scattered in upstate New York on fourteen reservations that contained over 265,000 acres.²⁹

By this time many had made notable progress toward an agrarian lifestyle similar to that of their white neighbors. They were not, however, recent converts to agriculture -- they had farmed for much of their subsistence over the centuries. Restricted to the reservations, they increasingly raised their own food supply, enlarged their cultivatable fields, and replaced their long houses with individual homes. Missionaries worked diligently among them, especially among the Oneida and Stockbridge, and made many into practicing and literate Christians. Strong tribal factionalism, however, developed between the traditional and Christian Indians, creating an atmosphere in which tensions developed

²⁹Wissler, Indians of the United States, pp. 127-30 and 136-7; Morse, Report, pp. 76-8 in the appendix.

concerning civilization and removal. Many of the New York Indians were in a state between their traditional ways and a new society emphasizing Christianity and acculturation. In the eyes of many whites they were changing from "an indolent, hunting, fishing life, to that of useful industry."³⁰

There were many reasons why the New York Indians removed to the Green Bay area. Since there were many white settlers surrounding their New York reservations, there were many friction-producing incidents. The large Indian land holdings, which were coveted by the Americans, were a major source of antagonism. These tensions also frustrated missionary efforts to Christianize and civilize the Indians. As a result, the Reverend Jedidiah Morse recommended their removal westward in his 1820 report to the Secretary of War. He thought that their removal to a suitable location where they could be centrally congregated would enable a few missionaries to work more effectively and cheaply. Their removal was also sought by the Ogden Land Company, which had preemptive rights to their New York lands. Tribal divisiveness also drove west many Indians who were accommodating to the white man's culture.³¹

³⁰Wissler, Indians of the United States, pp. 136-7; Morse, Report, pp. 25, and in the appendix: 78-82 and 85-6; and Charles C. Trowbridge to Cass, July 22, 1823, MSIA, roll 13, pp. 31-3.

³¹Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians," WHC, vol. II, p. 415.

What followed was a complex period of removal. After an abortive land purchase in Indiana, these Indians sent delegations with government representatives to seek an agreement with the Winnebago and Menominee. Initially, their efforts went smoothly. A treaty allowing settlement was concluded in the early fall of 1821; the tract purchased in this transaction was enlarged by another acquisition from the Menominee in October, 1822. The Oneida were to settle on a tract eight miles southwest of Green Bay, while the Stockbridge and Brotherton were to reside along with the Menominee on the east side of Lake Winnebago.³² Despite the intertribal agreements, the Menominee, influenced by the self-serving Grignon family and others, soon became intractable and denied that any arrangements had been made. The Menominee, however, allowed those New York Indians who had migrated and settled on the disputed lands to stay as their guests, but still refused to recognize the land claims.³³ Because of the controversy the migration of the New York Indians slowed

³²Cass to Charles C. Trowbridge, June 28, 1821, MSIA, roll 8, p. 310; Cass to Sec. Calhoun, October 22, 1821, ibid., roll 9, pp. 322-3; and Calhoun to Cass, May 8, 1822, ibid., roll 10, p. 200.

³³Trowbridge to Gov. Cass, September 7, 1821, ibid., roll 9, pp. 137-8; and also see Henry G.B. Brevoort, Green Bay agent, to Cass, July 2, 1824, ibid., roll 12, pp. 477-8. Trowbridge was the government representative to the Six Nation delegation seeking a land purchase in Wisconsin from the Winnebago and Menominee Indians.

to a trickle. Finally, by the treaties of February, 1831, and October, 1832, the land dispute was settled as the New York Indians were given half a million acres of Menominee lands west of Green Bay. Thereafter, the flow of these Indians continued until the mid-thirties when there were about one thousand of them living in their new homeland.³⁴

The Menominee was the main tribe in the Green Bay agency in 1832. They inhabited the region between the Menominee and the Fox rivers. With a peaceful history and a reputation for friendliness, this tribe maintained its population at approximately three thousand from the coming of the European to the arrival of Boyd.³⁵

Although the Menominee spoke a distinct and esoteric dialect of the Algonquian language, they had close relations with the Siouian speaking Winnebago. Historically, they were a sedentary people who resided in villages of dome-shaped wigwams. Politically, they had a hierarchy of

³⁴Treaties of February 8, 1831 and October 27, 1832, Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties: 1778-1883 (New York: 1972), pp. 319-25 and 377-82; and Boyd to Comm. C.A. Harris, June 14, 1838, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 286-9.

³⁵Quimby, Indian Life, p. 4; James W. Biddle, "Recollections of Green Bay in 1816-17," WHC, vol. I (Madison: 1903), p. 52-3; Morse, Report, pp. 51-2; Henry S. Baird, "Recollections of the Early History of Northern Wisconsin," WHC, vol. IV, p. 217; Grignon, "Seventy-two Years," WHC, vol. III, p. 266. General information on the Menominee was taken from: Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 142-3; and Morse, Report, pp. 47-52.

leadership based upon bravery, strength, eloquence, hunting ability, and hereditary ties. Hereditary ties, however, were not necessary to achieve a position of leadership. Their head chief in the 1830's was Osh-kosh, a grandson of the grand chief of the nation, the Old King, who died in 1827. Osh-kosh was reputed to be brave, intelligent, and able, but was also described as "a great slave to strong drink." According to contemporary reports, Menominee in general were greatly attracted to alcohol; they were also considered lazy and improvident.³⁶

The major cultural difference between the Menominee and their neighboring lakes tribes, besides language, was their subsistence patterns. The Menominee, or "Wild Rice People," lived on the region's wild rice to a greater extent than any other Lakes tribe. Like the other tribes, they also hunted, fished, farmed, and gathered, according to the season. Possessing good agricultural lands, they raised corn, potatoes, pumpkins, and squash.

Although they were peaceful and numerically stable, their tribal culture had undergone great changes by 1800. Their political unity, however, was still intact. Yet

³⁶Grignon, "Seventy-two Years," WHC, vol. III, p. 285; and Morse, Report, p. 48.

within a few decades, there were doubts about their political autonomy as the French inhabitants of Green Bay came to have a great deal of political, as well as economic, influence over them.³⁷

The other tribe that was native to the Bay area was the Winnebago. When the first Europeans landed in the Americas, about thirty-eight hundred Winnebago lived in the northeastern part of Wisconsin in the area of Lake Winnebago and in the southern part of the Door Peninsula, which creates the Green Bay appendage to Lake Michigan. Archaeological evidence indicates that their ancestors had lived there for hundreds of years.³⁸ Although their native tongue shows linguistic ties with the Siouan language family, their tribal culture was essentially like that of the Algonquian Sauk, Fox and Miami. In the early 1800's they numbered between two and three thousand and lived in permanent wigwam villages on the west side of Lake Winnebago, on the upper Fox, Wisconsin and Rock rivers.³⁹

³⁷Quimby, Indian Life, p. 145; and Charles C. Trowbridge to Cass, September 7, 1821, MSIA, roll 9, pp. 137-8.

³⁸Quimby, Indian Life, p. 4 and 140; and Quimby, Indian Culture and the European Trade Goods (Madison: 1966), p. 8.

³⁹Morse, Report, pp. 48-9 in the appendix. Lake Winnebago is thirty-six miles up the Fox River from Green Bay and is thirty-three miles long and eighteen miles wide.

Like the other Great Lakes Indians they followed a seasonal subsistence cycle. Since they possessed fertile lands, farming had an important place in their economy. They raised corn, potatoes, pumpkins, beans and squash. They also hunted, fished, and collected wild rice, berries, and acorns. Their subsistence cycle differed from that of the other Lakes tribes in that after the summer harvest they had a communal buffalo hunt on the nearby western plains.⁴⁰

The Winnebago probably had the most complex political system of the upper Lakes tribes. Tribal leadership was divided by two clans, Thunderbird and Bear. The Thunderbird clan adjudicated all disputes between tribal members. The chieftainship of the principal village, and probably of the tribe, was hereditary in this clan. The Bear clan controlled the war chieftainship and was in charge of all war and police activities; supervision of the annual buffalo hunt was among their police responsibilities.

As a tribe, the Winnebago never had very close ties with white men. Their reputation, on the whole, was generally bad. Although they were given credit for being "industrious, frugal and temperate," they were also

⁴⁰Quimby, Indian Life, p. 141; and Morse, Report, p. 48 in the appendix.

considered "cruel and treacherous," stealers and liars, and filthy in their physical characteristics.⁴¹ Perhaps much of their notoriety arose because there was imperfect communication with them, since their language was quite difficult to understand. Furthermore, their jealousies and fears of whites made them reluctant to deal with the strangers who came from the east.⁴²

Like the other Lakes tribes, the Menominee and Winnebago were dependent upon the fur trade. This dependency was so strong that the fur trade brought a great transformation of their tribal ways. The Indian's practice of kinship cooperation and reciprocity was severely disrupted as there was a shift toward greater emphasis upon the family. This shift came about because trade individualized the exchange system and eroded the custom of group sharing. As a result of individualizing the exchange system another subtle shift occurred in tribal customs: Indians were becoming involved in the fur trade's credit/debt system. Fur trading also slowly

⁴¹Henry S. Baird, "Recollections," WHC, vol. IV, p. 216. The name "Winnebago" in the Sauk and Fox languages meant "people of the stinking water;" the French called them "Les Puants," while the English simply referred to them as the "Stinkards."

⁴²Morse, Report, p. 48 in the appendix.

introduced the practice of dickering as definite prices were placed on furs and trade goods.⁴³ Then, too, it also greatly upset the traditional subsistence cycle of the Indians. As the trade assumed increased importance among them, as a result of their increasing dependence upon European goods, it made them devote more and more time to hunting and trapping. In the meantime, the other aspects of the economic cycle continued, but the quest for the valuable pelts received the greatest emphasis; according to some observers, the hunt became more of an effort to procure furs than to get meat.⁴⁴

The fur trade also had a great influence in altering the socio-political structures of the Lakes Indians. Changes in the political organization have been discussed previously; nevertheless, it should be noted again that tribal leaders were catered to by traders, thus accentuating their leadership positions.⁴⁵ Tribal social organizations

⁴³Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Bulletin 86 (Washington: 1929), p. 137.

⁴⁴Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal, p. 156; and Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, p. 256.

⁴⁵"Abstract of Minutes kept at the Agency of Sault Ste. Marie [by Henry Rowe Schoolcraft] during a part of the year 1828, embracing the period of the visits made to the Agency by deputations of the Interior Bands of Indians," Kellogg Papers, WHS, Mss. HR, Box No. 42.

also adapted to the fur trade; this was especially true of tribal groups like the Menominee and Winnebago who lived in semi-permanent villages. The Menominee, for instance, experienced a deep social restructuring because the fur trade forced them to shift to a band level, semi-sedentary organization.⁴⁶ Marriages between Indian women and European men, particularly the French, who were very sympathetic to native customs, gave these Europeans and their half-breed children a trade advantage: as members of a clan and tribe they had special tribal privileges and could develop favorable positions through kinship connections.

A strong affection for whiskey had a most disastrous effect upon Indian culture. Indeed it was both exploitative and disruptive. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft reflected upon its impact when he wrote: "Whiskey is a great means of drawing from [the Indian] his furs and skins. To obtain it, he makes a beast of himself, and allows his family to go hungry and half naked." It was quite apparent to Schoolcraft and other observers that whiskey was destroying Indian culture from within. An itinerant Congregationalist minister, Cutting Marsh, recorded a disheartening case when in 1834 he saw two poorly clad, dirty and

⁴⁶Quimby, Indian Life, pp. 145-6.

hungry Fox Indians trade all of their furs for a few gallons of spirits.⁴⁷ The Indian's thirst for alcohol also frequently drove him to exchange his valuables, such as a firearm or blanket, for whiskey; furthermore, his craving knew no obstacles as he often travelled great distances to obtain the destructive spirits.⁴⁸ This dissolution of the Indian's way of life through the use of whiskey had a dual nature: in some cases whiskey drove the Indians to violence and poverty, and in others it reinforced their dependence upon the white man.⁴⁹ "Mad water" increased their dependence because they were incapable of producing it themselves. It also had the disastrous effect of further individualizing the Indian's notion of exchange. Instead of trading furs to obtain goods for families and relatives, many Indians received whiskey strictly for themselves, thereby ignoring their traditional exchange responsibilities. There were many

⁴⁷Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, p. 98; and Cutting Marsh Papers, Diary of the Sauk-Fox Trip (June 12 to September 19, 1834), WHS, vol. 5, August 22, 1834.

⁴⁸Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, p. 295; Cutting Marsh Papers, Diary, WHS, vol. 4, August 10, and vol. 6, September 6; and Col. John Snelling to Secretary Barbour, August 23, 1826, MSIA, roll 19, p. 160.

⁴⁹Pearce, Savages in America, p. 59.

complaints from Indians themselves about the introduction of whiskey, but they were to no avail.⁵⁰

The Indian's increasing dependence upon the fur trade resulted in great pressure being put on the animal supply. As a result, fur-bearing animals, once so plentiful, diminished in number. This was a slow process, at first, but it was accelerated by the great competition of the American and British fur companies in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. For the Indians the diminishing animal supply meant disaster; tribes responded by venturing farther from their traditional hunting grounds. Distant hunts, however, only helped to stimulate intertribal tensions and hostilities; but such risks were necessary for survival. The scarcity of wildlife made the Indians even more dependent upon the fur trader. Governor Cass saw this process at work; he recognized that by the early 1820's even the expert hunter seldom gathered enough furs to purchase goods needed for survival. This grim situation was worsened by the high

⁵⁰Stockbridge to Cass, November 21, 1826, MSIA, roll 19, p. 319; Two Chiefs of the Ottawa Nation to Cass, April 20, 1829, ibid., roll 24, p. 133; Statement signed by Fifteen Chiefs of the Oneida Nation at Duck Creek, Wisconsin Territory, to Boyd, July 4, 1840, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 6, doc. 20; also see Donald Jackson, ed., Black Hawk: An Autobiography (Urbana, Illinois: 1955), p. 108.

prices on the trade goods; consequently, the red man received fewer items despite his "laborious exertions."⁵¹

Matters were made worse by the policies of the American Fur Company. Just as the Astor concern squeezed profits from the traders with its high markup rates on trade goods, the traders did the same to the Indians. Traders often cheated the Indians to maximize profits and offset the squeeze of Astor's policies. They also charged exorbitant prices for whiskey, which was often watered down, and justified the price by telling the red men that since they had to violate the law they had to be compensated for the risk. Indians found that they were forced in many areas to deal with only one trader, thus being compelled to sell him their furs and "to take what he pleases to give them in return." Guille Plat, a Chippewa, who made this charge to Schoolcraft, also complained that "the trader fixes his own prices, both on the furs, and on goods he gives in exchange." Consequently the Chippewa headman expressed the desire that Indians be given the freedom to trade with whomever they pleased. Such a request was in the Indian's interest, but it was not in that of the traders.⁵²

⁵¹Cass to Calhoun, October 24, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, p. 330; Jacob Franks, Montreal, to his nephew, John Lawe, May 1, 1818, "The Fur-Trade in Wisconsin - 1812-1825," WHC, vol. XX, pp. 52-3.

⁵²Terrell, Furs by Astor, pp. 262-3; Col. S.C. Stambaugh, Green Bay agent, to Secretary of War Cass, November 19, 1831, MSIA, roll 30, pp. 86-7; Undated letter

The American Fur Company's credit policy was also highly injurious to the Indians. It directed traders to give "no more credits [to Indians] than will barely enable them to hunt, and even that to such only as you know to be well disposed to pay." In extending credits, the company trusted Indians only with forty to fifty dollars in provisions and equipment, and it required that the Indian pay one hundred per cent interest. These were harsh terms considering the scarcity of animals, high prices, and the growing impoverishment of the Indians; indeed they usually made the Indians more destitute and further indebted to the traders.⁵³

By the 1820's great economic and ecological pressures were being put on the Indians of the Lakes region. The short supply of wildlife increased demand for other food sources and the failure of these other sources, such as wild rice, meant disaster. Cass explained: the amount of farming was so small, and the hunt so precarious, that

(circa 1840) to Boyd from the Chiefs and headmen of the Menominee, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 7, doc. 74; and "Abstract of Minutes kept at the Agency of Sault Ste. Marie...", by Schoolcraft, Kellogg Papers, (Notes and transcriptions...), WHS, Mss. HR, Box No. 42.

⁵³Morse, Report, p. 41; Neville, Historic Green Bay, pp. 189-90; and Stuart to Lawe and Michael Dousman, Green Bay, August 13, 1825, AFC, Letter Books, vol. III, p. 219.

many Indians must depend upon fishing and gathering foods; "and when these fail, as they often must, resort is had to roots and bark."⁵⁴

As these pressures mounted, the destructive process engendered by the fur trade came to a head. The depletion of the animal supply meant the loss of a valuable food and clothing source, but it also meant that the survival of the Indian depended upon the white man's goods and credits; this situation resulted in great indebtedness to the traders. And this indebtedness proved to be their political and cultural undoing, because their destiny was in the hands of others.

⁵⁴Cass to Calhoun, October 24, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, p. 329; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, p. 297; and Report to the Secretary of War by Lewis Cass and William Clark, 1828, U.S. House of Representatives, State Papers, 2nd Session, 20th Congress, doc. 107, serial 186, pp. 23-4.

CHAPTER 6

THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM: THE BLACK HAWK WAR

Boyd's reassignment to Green Bay came as the region was being alarmed by the Black Hawk War. Even though the war raged a hundred miles to the southwest, the Bay's citizens felt no remoteness. Having Indians as neighbors, they feared the unpredictability of war. This apprehension was made very keen by the presence of the Winnebago in the area; the tribe's warlike reputation and reported close relations with the warring Sauk-Fox gave credibility to the fear.¹ Understanding the dictates of caution, Boyd left his family to the safer environs of Michilimackinac, and understanding the gravity of war, he concentrated his efforts to bring about a speedy and successful conclusion to the war.

Difficulties arose from two controversial treaties that pitted the Sauk-Fox against the United States. The

¹Colonel Samuel C. Stambaugh, acting agent at Green Bay, to Augustin Grignon, June 4, 1832, Kellogg Papers, (Notes and transcriptions...), WHS, Mss. HR, Box 42. For a first-hand impression of one who lived close to the fighting and fully experienced the danger and tension, see Mrs. John H. Kinzie (Julie Augusta McGill), Wau-Bun: The "Early Day" in the North-West (Chicago: 1932). It was originally published in 1856. Mrs. Kinzie was the wife of John H. Kinzie, subagent at Fort Winnebago.

problem began in 1804 when the government's representative, William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, concluded a treaty with four Sauk chiefs who were not authorized by their tribe to do so. Primed with presents and whiskey, these chiefs ceded all Sauk-Fox lands east of the Mississippi and a portion of their hunting grounds west of it. The lands east of the mighty river were the chief areas of Sauk-Fox villages and agricultural fields. Naturally these peoples refused to recognize the validity of the cession. Their refusal seemingly was reinforced by the treaty's seventh article, which ambiguously permitted them to live and hunt on the land as long as it remained public domain. This article may have made sense to the Americans, but it did not to the Sauk-Fox. To them, as to the other tribes of the region, it was inconceivable that they sell and give up their land. In this vein a Fox chief said that the Sauk-Fox were not willing to give up this land because it contained their main villages, and because "a great number of their chiefs and friends were buried there."²

²Morse, Report, appendix, p. 124. Sources used in this section on the background to the war include: Kinzie, Wau-Bun; Thomas Forsyth Papers, vol. 6 (1820-33), Draper Collection, WHS; Donald Jackson, ed., Black Hawk: An Autobiography (Urbana, Illinois: 1955); Reuben Gold Thwaites, "The Story of the Black Hawk War," WHC, vol. XII (Madison: 1892); and William T. Hagan, The Sac and Fox Indians (Norman, Oklahoma: 1958).

The treaty made the Sauk-Fox very distrustful of Americans and strengthened their already close ties with the British. This relationship with the British and their fears of the greedy Americans, who relentlessly advanced westward at the expense of the Indians, brought many Sauk-Fox to support the Crown and its efforts against the United States in the War of 1812. British traders, who extended credits to the Indians and promised support of the native effort to repel the American advance, assured a viable alliance.

At the war's end the United States and the Sauk-Fox once again met in council to reestablish peaceful relations. Unvanquished in war, Black Hawk, who had led the Sauk-Fox in the war forays, was quite contemptuous of the Americans. Nevertheless, he and other chiefs signed the 1816 peace accord. In doing so, they confirmed the 1804 treaty. Later Black Hawk and other tribal leaders denied that they had done this. Vehemently protesting that no mention was made of land in the 1816 council, they claimed that once again they had been tricked into actions contrary to their interests by the Americans. Their hostility towards the United States had no time to abate as American pioneers encroached on their lands.

Keokuk, or Watchful Fox, who began his rise to tribal prominence during the war when he nobly aroused his tribesmen to defend their villages against a threatened American attack, favored removing west of the

Mississippi and avoiding a confrontation with the United States. Having made a trip to Washington in 1824, he saw the strength of the American nation and the comparative weakness of his peoples. Courted by the Americans since the early 1820's and recognizing the futility of war, he became friendly with the Americans, and worked hard to convince his brothers that resistance was foolish.

Black Hawk had not gone East and did not have this perception. Proud of his military accomplishments against Americans, he was still quite confident that he could defeat them. Moreover, his hatred for them was deep and undoubtedly was made deeper by a beating he received from some whites during the winter of 1822-1823. Consequently, his adamancy and the growing American settlement made a combustible mixture.

The situation came to a boil in the late 1820's. Miners were the first Americans to settle on Sauk-Fox lands. Lured by rich lead deposits in the Galena and Des Moines areas, they made their way onto these valuable tracts. By 1828, it was estimated that at least 8,000 whites were in the Galena area engaged in lead mining. This large-scale intrusion was worsened by the miners' refusal to allow the Indians to hunt in the area and by their disregard of the Indians' rights as they turned "their cattle and horses loose into the Indians' fields,"

thus destroying the crops.³ While the miners were advancing their interests at the expense of the Indians, pioneers fifty miles in advance of the frontier began to squat on Sauk-Fox lands in 1828-1829. In the finest tradition of squatting, these frontier settlers took the cleared, thus valuable, fields around Saukenuk. The whites did not stop there. They destroyed corn fields, burnt the Indian lodges, ploughed up Indian graves, and viciously beat Indians. All of this infuriated the Sauk-Fox. Tensions increased. The government responded by initiating the survey and sale of the lands. By doing so it gave tacit approval to illegal squatting on lands not opened for public sale. Consequently, the protection of article seven of the treaty of 1804 came to an end, and the government insisted that the Sauk-Fox move to lands set aside for them west of the Mississippi. Heeding the dictates of their Great Father in Washington, most of the Sauk-Fox followed Keokuk and went west. Subsequently, many returned to their homelands. Some went back because they were suffering from want, having found that farming on their new lands was difficult because of the thick grass of the prairies. Others simply refused to give up their heritage and homes.⁴

³George W. Stillman and J. Hunt, Green Bay, to Governor Cass, August 30, 1828, MSIA, roll 23, pp. 339-41.

⁴Jackson, ed., Black Hawk, pp. 111-21.

American settlement increased rapidly in the region, and by 1830 there was a strong fear of a general frontier war. A council was held at Prairie du Chien to cool the situation. Ultimately it made matters worse, for a group of Fox Indians on their return from the council were murdered by a group of Sioux. The Indian code of revenge thus demanded retaliation. The following year the Sauk-Fox attacked the Sioux and their other traditional enemy, the Menominee. The government tried to stop these hostilities and in the summer of 1831 attempted to get all the Sauk-Fox to emigrate west of the Mississippi. Agreement to remove west came in the Corn Treaty, which even Black Hawk signed because of the economic needs of his fellow tribesmen. He soon changed his mind. Encouraged by Fox retaliation against the Menominee and flattered by their appeal to his leadership, the aging warrior agreed to lead the struggle to retain their homelands. His decision was also greatly shaped by his rivalry with and jealousy of Keokuk, who had become leader of the majority that favored removal and friendly relations with the United States. Another most important factor influencing his decision was information he received about aid that was coming from the British and Indian allies. Although on this matter Black Hawk was soon to realize that he had been deceived, he was committed to keeping the lands of his ancestors. In the spring of 1832, he and his followers, who numbered about

two thousand, crossed the Mississippi from their winter hunt and approached their old homelands. Soon afterward, despite a last moment attempt by Black Hawk to avoid war, the bloody confrontation called the Black Hawk War began. News of the outbreak of hostilities sent tremors throughout the region.

The war brought new challenges to the area's agents. It threatened their influence and power over the Indians since Black Hawk was seeking alliances with the Potawatomi, Kickapoo, and Winnebago.⁵ An agent's influence was largely personal, but it was given strength by the strong military and economic hold that Americans had in the region. Although a general war might have challenged American presence in the region, a conflict with about six hundred warriors would not. The frontier army, with the aid of hundreds of militia volunteers, could easily handle this uprising. The area Indians could also be kept in line not only because they were dependent upon the white man's trade, but also because they were becoming increasingly dependent upon the government's annuities.

⁵See "A Journal of Events and proceedings with the Rock River band of Winnebago Indians, by Henry Gratiot, subagent, 1832," MSIA, roll 30, pp. 444-9; and Kinzie, Wau-Bun, pp. 407 and 468-9.

Area agents were quite successful in preventing the neighboring tribes from joining the Sauk-Fox. Their success was remarkable considering the charged atmosphere in which they were operating. The killing of Felix St. Vrain, the agent to the Sauk-Fox, made them mindful of the danger of their positions. Although some Potawatomi, Kickapoo and Winnebago did join Black Hawk, because their tribes were also facing removal, the overwhelming majority of these tribes remained neutral. This fact was very impressive considering the close ties between these tribal groups and the many intermarriages between the Sauk-Fox and the Potawatomi and Winnebago.⁶ Efforts to keep the troublesome Winnebago neutral were especially intense.

To keep the tribes neutral, the agents gave the Indians more than advice. Ordered to keep the Indians of the Green Bay agency "quiet," Colonel Samuel C. Stambaugh, Boyd's predecessor, invited many Indians to council and delivered presents and provisions, as well as advice.⁷ Annuity payments also provided an excellent means of assuring a tribe's neutrality and friendliness. Secretary

⁶Boyd to Governor Porter, July 23, 1832, MSIA, roll 31, p. 60; also see William Marshall, agent to the Potawatomi, to Governor Porter, June 5, 1832, ibid., roll 30, pp. 285-6; Council Proceedings at Porter's Grove, June 3, 1832, ibid., pp. 458-9; and Kinzie, Wau-Bun, p. 407.

⁷Stambaugh to Porter, June 9, 1832, MSIA, roll 30, p. 315.

of War Cass decided that where it was possible, annuity payments were to be paid as usual to friendly Indians, "but under no circumstances," were annuities to "be paid to any individual," or to any family headed by an individual, "who [has] been engaged in hostilities."⁸

The Indian's behavior could also be manipulated through the distribution of food. By an act of Congress, relief was provided for friendly Indians seeking "protection within the Indian agencies." Agents were directed to purchase flour or corn, beef or pork, and salt for distribution among non-belligerent Indians. The agents were admonished to be mindful of economy, as well as of the need of the red men. Boyd was informed by Cass that the "object of the government is to furnish temporary relief to such of the Indians as may be compelled, either by fear of their own people or of ours to seek refuge within our lines; and as little should be issued as will effect this object."⁹ To accomplish the government's object, Boyd was allowed to draw 8,000 rations from the commissary at Fort Howard.¹⁰ At first, he had no cause

⁸Secretary of War Cass to Governor Porter, June 22, 1832, ibid., p. 376.

⁹Secretary of War Cass to Boyd, June 19, 1832, ibid., pp. 360-2.

¹⁰Secretary of War Cass to Governor Porter, June 19, 1832, ibid., p. 352.

to issue any rations to his agency's Indians because none were "driven within our limits for protection."¹¹ By the end of September, however, he had issued about fifty-eight hundred pounds of pork, eighty-two hundred pounds of flour, one hundred bushels of corn and thirty gallons of whiskey.¹²

While his fellow agents were busy assuring the isolation of the Sauk-Fox, Boyd was performing another important service. Although a hundred miles separated him from the scene of action, he played a direct, supportive role in recruiting Indian support for the American effort. His efforts were directed at the New York Indians and the Menominee. Seeking volunteers from the New York Indians, he carefully explained that their services were desired in order to bring about a quick termination of the hostilities. He told them that their volunteers were to form a company to fight against the warring faction of the Sauk-Fox.¹³ Recruited late in the

¹¹Boyd to Secretary of War Cass, August 12, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd - 1832," WHC, vol. XII (Madison: 1892), p. 286.

¹²See Provisions Abstract, September 30, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 32-5.

¹³Boyd to "The Chiefs and Young Men of the [several] Bands of New York Indians in the Michigan Territory," July 25, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd," WHC, vol. XII, pp. 281-2; and Robert Irwin, Jr., of the local militia, to the chiefs of the Stockbridge Indians, July 19, 1832, Boyd Papers, WHS, Vol. 4, doc. 56.

campaign and short on supplies, the New York Indians never saw action. The Menominee did.

Boyd's major task upon arriving at Green Bay was to make arrangements for a company of from two hundred to three hundred Menominee to fight Black Hawk's warring forces. The Menominee were actively sought as allies by the government when it was thought that Black Hawk would attempt to take his half-starved followers to Canada. With few troops at Fort Howard, it was feared that Green Bay would be exposed to Indian assault; thus Indian allies were necessary for its protection.¹⁴ Runners were therefore sent to the dispersed villages of the Menominee.¹⁵ To encourage their participation, the Indians were promised rations, blankets and pay; they were also to be supplied with arms and ammunition. Gladly they would receive these items, but they needed little encouragement because they were eager to fight their traditional foes to avenge the death of several of their tribesmen, who had been killed by the Fox Indians the previous year.¹⁶ Within a

¹⁴Colonel Ebenezer Childs, "Recollections of Wisconsin since 1820," WHC, vol. IV (Madison: 1859), p. 185.

¹⁵Boyd to Brigadier General Henry Atkinson, July 20, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd," WHC, vol. XII, pp. 270-2; and Boyd to Governor Porter, July 20, 1832, ibid., p. 273.

¹⁶Alfred Brunson, "Memoir of Thomas Pendleton Burnett," WHC, vol. II (Madison: 1903), pp. 255-6; and Colonel Stambaugh, former agent at Green Bay, to Governor Porter, June 9, 1832, MSIA, roll 30, p. 316.

few days Menominee warriors arrived for action. They were put into a company under the command of Colonel Stambaugh, who was placed in charge of this unit not only because the Menominee requested him, but also because of Boyd's "feeble state of health."¹⁷ Others in the chain of command were Augustin Grignon, Sr., who was in charge of the first Menominee company, and Charles Grignon, Jr., and Robert Grignon, who were also officers in the first company. George Johnston was placed in command of the second company and James M. Boyd, Boyd's son, was second in command. All of the principal Menominee leaders, including Oshkosh, Souigny, Iometah, and Grizzly Bear, were in the expedition.¹⁸

Before this expedition could march to war, it had to be armed and supplied. Boyd quickly moved to obtain the necessary articles. The arms and ammunition were purchased from Green Bay merchants, area traders, and a Fort Howard sutler.¹⁹ In addition, he bought pork, corn, flour, salt,

¹⁷Boyd to Brigadier General Atkinson, July 20, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd," WHC, vol. XII, pp. 270-2.

¹⁸Boyd to Governor Porter, July 23, 1832, ibid., p. 279; and Augustin Grignon, "Seventy-two Years", WHC, vol. III, pp. 293-5.

¹⁹Boyd to Daniel Whitney, Green Bay merchant and trader, July 21, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd," WHC, vol. XII, pp. 274-5.

hard bread, sugar, and cattle from the area merchants and the fort's military stores. Boyd then sent the supplies to Colonel Stambaugh, who assumed responsibility for their management and distribution.²⁰

In spite of his efforts, the expedition was not well-armed; Boyd expressed his thoughts about the condition of the Menominee force in a letter to Governor George B.

Porter of Michigan Territory:

The Menominees are most wretchedly armed, or rather not armed at all - and I am afraid that with every effort and exertion, not more than 150 of this nation will be able to march efficiently armed. The whole number of Arms at our disposition, by purchase, rifle as well as shot guns, is only 110. I trust, however, that the balance will be found in the hands of the Indians - although not of a character fit for active service. A number of Spears, however, have been made and are still [being made] for their use, and which will in some measure compensate for the inferiority of their Arms.²¹

Two days after he wrote this grim description, Boyd communicated instructions to Colonel Stambaugh to proceed with his force to Prairie du Chien, where he was to report to the commanding general and await orders. The following morning, July 26, the Menominee expedition of two

²⁰Boyd to Stambaugh, July 28, 1832, ibid., pp. 284-5; and also see Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 4, doc. 58, for a partial list of goods given to Stambaugh.

²¹Boyd to Governor Porter, July 23, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd," WHC, vol. XII, p. 277.

hundred volunteers left Green Bay.²²

The contingent marched briskly to war, but its contribution was to be very small. Arriving at Prairie du Chien late in the campaign, some of the Menominee were used for scouting and hunting down remnants of the Sauk-Fox. The only combat action in which the expedition was involved was insignificant and unnecessary. Having learned that a trail of some Sauks had been discovered, nearly half the company went in pursuit. The next morning the Sauk camp was sighted near present-day Cassville. It was a small party of Indians -- Augustin Grignon wrote that "there were only two men, and a youth about twelve years old, three or four women, and many more children." With orders to take them prisoners, the force moved up, surrounded the camp and rushed in. Plans, however, went awry. Grignon recalled that the Menominee, "fierce for a fight," hastily "fired a volley at the two Sauks (the warriors), and when they fell, they were riddled with bullets by those coming in, who wished to share in the honor of having participated in the fight. In the melee, one of the children was wounded." The child died the next day. Lieutenant Robert Grignon was badly wounded in the side with a buckshot during this action. There was a

²²Boyd to Stambaugh, July 25, 1832, ibid., pp. 282-3.

question whether he had been shot by the young Sauk or by someone in the expedition, as shots were fired in every direction. Grignon recovered and later received a pension for his wound.²³

Late in August the services of the Menominee came to an end. Thinking that their services were deserving of reward, Boyd wrote to Governor Porter: "It would be very desirable that their services should be paid for, before the navigation ceases, and particularly so, as they are to receive nothing for the present year under their treaty stipulations and which has been a sore disappointment to them."²⁴ Their need was great since many had participated in the war and had not provided for their families. Consequently, the War Department decided to compensate the Menominee; chiefs were to receive \$8.00 a month, while \$6.66 a month was given to the warriors.²⁵ Later the War Department decided, in accordance with Boyd's wish, to allow the Menominee to keep as a "gratuity" the arms that had been issued to them.²⁶

²³Grignon, "Seventy-two Years," WHC, vol. III, pp. 294-5; and Colonel Charles Whittlesey, "Recollections of a Tour through Wisconsin in 1832," WHC, vol. I (Madison: 1903), p. 77.

²⁴Boyd to Porter, September 2, 1832, "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd," WHC, vol. XII, pp. 291-3.

²⁵John Robb, acting Secretary of War to Governor Porter, September 27, 1832, MSIA, roll 31, pp. 341-2.

²⁶Robb to Porter, October 3, 1832, ibid., p. 443.

Shortly after the Menominee ended their service to the United States the war came to an end. Black Hawk's feeble attempt to stem the tide of American advance had failed miserably. By early August his forces had been scattered and many had fled west of the Mississippi to join Keokuk's peaceful faction. Black Hawk and the other leaders tried to escape but were caught and imprisoned. Imprisonment meant starvation for many Indians, but most were soon released to the custody of Keokuk. Only the leaders remained in jail; ultimately, they too were freed.

As with every war, the living reaped the harvest of the dead. Losses, however, were not only in human lives. As a punishment for their hostilities and as a price for peace, the Sauk-Fox had to cede a fifty-mile strip of land running almost the length of present-day Iowa bordering the west bank of the Mississippi. This cession totaled six million acres.²⁷

The Winnebago were also forced to cede lands because of their involvement in the fighting. Although a post-war investigation of Winnebago war-time conduct found that only about a dozen warriors aided the Sauk-Fox, Winnebago chiefs were summoned to Fort Armstrong for a

²⁷ John H. Kinzie, subagent at Fort Winnebago, to Porter, August 9, 1832, ibid., pp. 163-4; Kinzie, Wau-Bun, pp. 524-5; and Treaty with the Sauk and Fox, September 21, 1832, Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties, pp. 349-51.

treaty council and were compelled to cede all their lands east and south of the Fox and Wisconsin rivers in exchange for a tract on the "neutral ground" in present-day northeastern Iowa and southeastern Minnesota.

Furthermore, those Indians who participated in the war were to be turned over to American authorities for punishment.²⁸ The Winnebago reluctantly submitted to the demands. They had little choice, however, as the strength of the American government, especially after the crushing defeat of the warring tribes, was overwhelming. They clearly recognized their weakness and the futility of their position. Chief White Crow had told a government representative while the war was still going on:

Father, when this War is over I think that I must wear a hat and coat like you. I have gone naked so long that I become to be as black as a black Frenchman [a negro]. I am tired of my mode of living. I must change it.²⁹

The power accruing to the United States from its victory and the abject position of the Winnebago allowed a harsh reprisal upon a neutral tribe. The government's reason

²⁸J.H. Kinzie to Porter, September 26, 1832, MSIA, roll 31, pp. 337-9 and Treaty with Winnebago, September 15, 1832, Indian Treaties, pp. 345-8.

²⁹Report of Oliver Emmell...employed by Henry Gratiot, subagent...at the request of General Henry Dodge to go and ascertain the position, strength, etc., of the hostile Indians," enclosed in Gratiot's letter to Governor Porter, June 30, 1832, MSIA, roll 30, pp. 440-3.

was indeed weak, but its position was undeniably strong!³⁰
The Winnebago, nevertheless, would continue to cause
troubles for Boyd and the United States.

Although Boyd's contribution to the war was relatively small, he energetically devoted himself to the American effort. Certainly, he demonstrated that agents and military officers could effectively cooperate to achieve War Department goals. Furthermore, he was mindful of the importance of satisfying American Indian allies and his efforts to have the Menominee satisfactorily rewarded for their service to the United States clearly should have helped him gain great influence over his charges. But the Menominee were still most strongly influenced by their traders. The Black Hawk War, it should be added, foreshadowed Boyd's problems at Green Bay as white settlers brought increasing pressure upon Indian lands.

³⁰Kinzie, Wau-Bun, pp. 525-6.

CHAPTER 7

ACCULTURATION

LEADING INDIANS FROM DARKNESS TO LIGHT

The relentless advance of American settlement gave Boyd another important task in executing federal Indian policy: he was to supervise the efforts within his jurisdiction to "civilize" and Christianize the red men. This role came about essentially because the American people wanted the lands of the Indians. Thinking that hunter societies used the earth inefficiently and that farmers deserved land, Americans would not tolerate "savages" keeping large parcels of it. As Americans conquered the wilderness and its inhabitants, their leaders also thought that the Indians must either become like white men or face extinction. Consequently, in March 1819, Congress agreed to allot \$10,000 annually for the civilization of those Indian peoples "adjoining the frontier settlements of the United States," to provide "against the further decline and final extinction of the Indian tribes." The law called for instruction in

industrial and domestic arts, as well as in reading, writing, and arithmetic.¹

These civilization attempts, however, had deeper implications than merely instructing the Indians in the ways of the white man. Civilizing the red man also meant destroying his tribal customs and society. Reflecting the broader aspects of acculturation, President Monroe stated in his second annual message to Congress:

To civilize them, and even to prevent their extinction, it seems to be indispensable that their independence as communities should cease, and that the control of the United States over them should be complete and undisputed. The hunter state will then be more easily abandoned, and recourse will be had to the acquisition and culture of land and to other pursuits tending to dissolve the ties which connect them together as a savage community and to give a new character to every individual.²

Boyd was to try to assure the accomplishment of these governmental aims. Although he was not the instrument that would perform the task of civilizing the Indians, his cooperation would greatly facilitate acculturation efforts. Indeed, it should be realized that Boyd himself was a civilizing agent; his influence and example were very important elements in the government's acculturation scheme.

¹U.S., Statutes at Large, III, pp. 516-7; War Secretary Calhoun to President Monroe, February 8, 1822, Papers of John C. Calhoun, Hemphill, ed., vol. VI, p. 679-80; also see Pearce, Savages of America, and McKenney, Memoirs, pp. 236-7.

²President James Monroe's second annual message

Since the government acknowledged that it had had little experience in civilizing efforts, Secretary of War Calhoun relied upon private institutions and benevolent societies to accomplish its goals of bringing the Indians into a "state of morality, civilization, and happiness." Following the letter of the law, which called for the employment of "capable persons of good moral character" to instruct the Indians, the Secretary made annual grants from the civilization fund to schools set up -- with Indian consent -- by Christian missionaries among tribes that bordered American settlement.³

The missionary zeal to carry the word of God among the Indians burned strong in the United States at the time. A revived religious fervor sent many dedicated Christians to the frontier to spread God's word and Christ's message. For instance, the Reverend Jedidiah Morse, while on his 1820 tour of the Indian country, spoke

to Congress, November 16, 1818, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Richardson, ed., vol. II, pp. 45-6.

³U.S., Statutes at Large, III, pp. 516-7; War Secretary Calhoun to President Monroe, February 8, 1822, Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. VI, pp. 679-80; Regulations concerning the Civilization of the Indians, Department of War, September 3, 1819, ibid., vol. V, pp. 295-6; and see Calhoun to the Reverend E. Chapman, Georgetown, D.C., May 3, 1820, ibid., p. 91; and Calhoun to the Reverend T.C. Henry, Columbia, South Carolina, March 7, 1821, ibid., p. 662.

his thoughts to the Ottawa and Chippewa gathered by Boyd at L'Arbre Croche for a land cession council. He strongly recommended that the Indians accept the civilization of the white man because their future was to be painful and precarious. Citing the disappearance of wild animals and the difficulty of the hunt on smaller tracts of land, he urged them to become farmers. Morse argued that since their traditional ways were dying, it was an indication that the Great Spirit did not favor them anymore; thus, he told them that they should become good, hard working Christians, and learn to read, write, and farm, and dress and speak like whites. To help them accomplish all this, he explained, their Great Father in Washington would send "good white men and women, to instruct them and their children in everything that pertains to the civilized and Christian life." Preaching "civilization or ruin", Morse declared that they must "accept this instruction or they will waste away and die." To be civilized meant to be Christian, and Morse told the gathered Indians: "We will bring you this blessed book the Bible ; we will teach your children to read it, that they may be happy, and comfort you; that they may know how to live, and to do good; and how to die, and to live forever."⁴ Such a magical book may have fascinated the animistic Indians;

⁴Morse, Report, pp. 9-14 in the appendix.

many tribes accepted missionaries among them. The L'Arbre Croche Ottawa, although initially opposed to missionaries, requested in 1821 that "a Minister of the Gospel" be sent to them.⁵ A Catholic missionary finally came in 1829.

In the 1820's missions began among the Indians of Michigan Territory. Lewis Cass, Boyd's superintendent, strongly favored the civilization of the Indians as he desired to open Michigan to greater settlement; and seeing the miserable and impoverished existences of the Indians resulting from the precarious nature of the hunt, he concluded that they had to increase their agricultural activities as a means of "procuring subsistence" and assuring survival.⁶ Missions were essential in attaining his goals.

Supervision of these missions devolved upon the agent. He was to oversee them because he was to monitor all contacts with the Indians and because government funds were being dispensed for mission efforts. Boyd thus served as the government's representative to check on the mission's operation and assure that the public investment was bearing fruit. He was instructed to inspect these establishments during the summer "to ascertain minutely

⁵Boyd to Governor Cass, October 12, 1821, MSIA, roll 9, pp. 205-6; and Morse, Report, pp. 24-5 in the appendix.

⁶Cass to Calhoun, December 27, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, p. 363.

the condition of the buildings and premises, and especially the kind of instruction given, the amount of good accomplished, the pursuits in which the pupils engage after leaving the schools, and the estimation in which they are held by the Tribe or Tribes."⁷ He was to submit reports dealing with these matters to the War Department before the end of the fiscal year; only a few of his reports, however, are available. The actual work of educating the Indians was left almost entirely to the missionaries.⁸

Missionaries generally had a good friend in Boyd. It was his firm belief that the Indians should be given "the inestimable advantages of Christianity and Civilization."⁹ Desirous of encouraging the missionary's good work, he advocated and sought government aid for his efforts.¹⁰

⁷Indian Commissioner E. Herring to Governor G. Porter, Michigan Territory, April 11, 1833, ibid., roll 32, p. 476.

⁸See Cass to the Reverend Isaac McCoy, July 16, 1822, ibid., roll 5, pp. 47-54.

⁹Boyd to the Reverend Cutting Marsh, November 7, 1832, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, doc. 45.

¹⁰Boyd to Thomas L. McKenney, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, November 20, 1826, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 101; and W. Ward, for Commissioner E. Herring, to Boyd, July 28, 1834, ibid., vol. 4, doc. 93.

Boyd was, however, not in favor of government aid to the Catholic mission at Green Bay. Perhaps reflecting the growing fear of Catholicism in America, he was suspicious of and opposed to Father Samuel Mazzuchelli's attempt to get some Menominee treaty education money for the Catholic mission at the Bay.¹¹ His fears were allayed when the War Department rejected Mazzuchelli's request because the mission sought money expressly "for religious instruction in the Chapel and in the Indian villages," and not for practical education purposes. That the Protestant missions also taught religion and morals was justified by the fact that they also emphasized agricultural, industrial and domestic education.¹² Not all Catholic efforts, however, were denied governmental assistance. In 1829, when the Reverend M. DeJean was interested in establishing a mission at L'Arbre Croche, Boyd was directed to assist in its foundation if the Ottawa wanted it. Although the Indians at L'Arbre Croche expressed their desire for the mission, the government could not give an

¹¹Boyd, Private, to War Secretary Cass, August 25, 1834, ibid., vol. 8, p. 137.

¹²Commissioner Herring to Governor S.T. Mason, October 9, 1834, MSIA, roll 35, pp. 253-4.

allotment from the civilization fund at that time, since the fund was "already fully committed."¹³ But in 1832, a small part of the fund was designated for the Catholic mission.

Boyd had his first encounter with an Indian mission at Mackinac. Although the Reverend Jedidiah Morse promised in 1820 that a minister would be sent to Mackinac, it was three years before one arrived. In 1823, the Reverend William Ferry, a Presbyterian, came to the island and quickly established an Indian mission. A large school and a boarding house were built and the mission was soon accomodating seventy students. The school's curriculum was typical in its emphasis upon the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic, and upon training in trade and the agricultural arts for the boys and household arts for the girls. Included, of course, was Christian moral training. By 1827 the mission had more than one hundred and fifty students, who, according to the touring Thomas L. McKenney, were also learning the importance of personal cleanliness and proper dress and behavior. Reaching its apex in the late twenties and early thirties, the missionary experiment soon after rapidly declined and by 1837 it was terminated.¹⁴

¹³Cass to Boyd, May 20, 1829, ibid., roll 24, p. 203.

¹⁴Boyd to Governor Porter, January 4, 1832, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 63.

Boyd's involvement with the civilizing efforts was far more extensive at Green Bay than at Mackinac. Not only was he to supervise the Green Bay mission for the Indians native to the region, but he was also responsible for overseeing the four small schools operating among the New York Indians. In addition, supervision of the construction and operation of the model farm for the Menominee was his responsibility.

Of the several missions with which he had contact at his second assignment, Boyd was most closely associated with the one near Green Bay. Three factors account for this situation. First, the mission was near the agency -- it was located a short distance up the Fox River at Duck Creek. Second, it received a great deal of government support. Third, Boyd had a deep respect for and a close relationship with the Reverend Richard Fish Cadle, the mission's superintendent.¹⁵

Although this Episcopalian mission was founded in 1823, it was not until Cadle arrived with his sister Susan in 1829 that it began to flourish. The year after he arrived, construction of the mission's buildings began; among the buildings erected were school and boarding houses.¹⁶

¹⁵Reverend J. Morse to Boyd, July 26, 1821, ibid., vol. 2, doc. 11; McKenney, Memoirs, pp. 217-9; and Meade C. Williams, Early Mackinac (St. Louis: 1901), pp. 130-5.

¹⁶Elizabeth T. Baird, "Reminiscences of Life in Territorial Wisconsin," WHC, vol. XV, p. 223; Reverend R. F. Cadle to Morgan L. Martin, October 30, 1832, Morgan L. Martin Papers, WHS; Secretary Calhoun to Governor Cass,

For the first three years Cadle had a fairly well-organized mission. He and his sister formed the heart of the staff; they both taught, and he was also the superintendent while she doubled as housekeeper. The staff also included a farmer who was to teach young Indians about agriculture. In explaining the arrangements that would be adhered to at the mission school, Cadle wrote:

The children boarding at the mission will be furnished with suitable and sufficient clothing, bedding and provisions; in sickness they will have medical attendance and nursing care; they will have their hours of recreation as well as of employment and study; they will be taught the usual branches of an English education, such as reading, writing, arithmetic and geography; and, in addition, it is contemplated to teach the girls house-keeping, sewing and knitting and eventually spinning and weaving - and the boys farming. Every indulgence will be showed to them that is consistent with the encouragement of industry and maintenance of discipline.

Of course, a "knowledge of the sacred scriptures" was also to be imparted to his young charges.¹⁷

April 30, 1823, MSIA, roll 12, p. 209; also see Howard Greene, The Reverend Richard Fish Cadle: A Missionary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Territories of Michigan and Wisconsin in the Early Nineteenth Century (Waukesha, Wisconsin: 1936).

¹⁷"The Arrangements of the mission," written by Cadle, December 14, 1830, "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church and Mission in Green Bay, 1825-41," WHC, vol. XIV (Madison: 1898), pp. 456-7; and Greene, Cadle, p. 56.

For the mission to carry out its purposes much money was required. It relied upon both private and public funds. Cadle raised what he could in the Green Bay area and the Episcopalian Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society in New York forwarded additional funds.¹⁸ Much of the mission's monies came from public sources. During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1832, the Green Bay mission received \$2,000 from the federal government and \$4,400 from the State of New York. Federal monies, however, did not come from the civilization fund, but rather from treaty funds set aside for the education of the Menominee, Winnebago, and Chippewa tribes. By the treaty of Butte des Morts in 1827, one thousand dollars was provided for the education of these tribes for three years, thereafter one thousand five hundred dollars was to be supplied annually. In the 1831 treaty with the Menominee another five hundred dollars was provided for the Green Bay mission. These monies were funnelled through Boyd to the mission superintendent.¹⁹ Public

¹⁸"Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 459-60.

¹⁹W. Ward, for Commissioner Herring, to Boyd, July 28, 1834, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 4, doc. 93; and see Menominee Treaty of February 1831, Indian Treaties, Kappler, ed., pp. 319-23; and William White, President of the Protestant Episcopalian Church, to Governor Porter, February 17, 1833, MSIA, roll 32, pp. 169-70.

monies were crucial to the missionary effort -- the erection of the mission's buildings cost over nine thousand dollars. According to federal regulations, the government paid two-thirds of the construction costs.²⁰ Because the Green Bay mission did receive large sums from the federal government, it is a good one to examine in respect to its aims, policies, and impact; a look at the mission will also show what Boyd witnessed.

The Green Bay mission reached its highest point of development under Cadle during Boyd's first year at the Bay. After his summer inspection of 1833, Boyd reported that there were 110 children at the mission. The sixty girls and fifty boys were divided into four different levels of learning. Describing the progress of the school, Boyd remarked that it "was altogether satisfactory," with "good order, health and cleanly appearance" among the children. He also stated that the school, using the older boys, had cleared and cultivated ten acres, and thus was giving the boys a working knowledge of farming. Meanwhile, the girls were being taught everything pertaining to housewifery.²¹

²⁰Commissioner Herring to Governor Porter, April 27, 1833, MSIA, roll 32, p. 623; and Boyd to Cadle, September 13, 1833, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 115.

²¹Report on the Mission, September 30, 1833, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 110-1.

Despite its initial accomplishments, the mission faced trouble. The religious atmosphere at Green Bay was tense because most of the long-time residents were French Catholics and their beliefs were incompatible with the increasing number of American Protestants who were moving into the area. Cadle, sensitive to the attacks of his mission, resigned in early 1833.²² Although he was back as head of the mission the following fall, his troubles were not over.

Christmas eve beatings of eleven Indian boys for "riotous" behavior proved to be Cadle's downfall. This incident, combined with haircuttings and further beatings on Christmas day, ignited into a full controversy. Although the rules of the mission school approved of whippings as a corrective for misbehavior, this policy was alien to Indian ways. Generally speaking, Indians taught by example and did not resort to corporal punishment as a means of correction. The whippings, which were called severe and cruel -- the boys required medical treatment -- increased the Bay's religious tensions. Although Cadle tried to vindicate his position and restore the good name of the mission, his efforts did nothing to cool the

²²Cadle to Boyd, May 27, 1833, "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 471-3; and Greene, Cadle, pp. 68-9.

situation. By treating criticisms with contempt, he only sealed his fate; finally, as the controversy lingered and his usefulness diminished, he resigned again on February 5, 1834.²³

Besieged by many problems, the Green Bay mission was to experience a quick decline. Irregular attendance and sudden removals of Indian youths by their parents were disruptions characteristic of most mission schools, and the Green Bay mission was no exception. Mission schools were generally attended with greater regularity during the winter -- the period of greatest privation and want -- when food, clothing, and warm shelter were provided for the Indian children. During spring, summer, and fall, when nature better provided for the Indians and the labor of the young was needed, the children were taken home by their parents. Even though Cadle was authorized by the Legislative Council of Michigan Territory to bring the removed Indian students back and to act "in loco parentis," the attendance problem continued.²⁴ This situation created

²³Cadle to Henry S. Baird, Green Bay, January 14, 1834, "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 479-80; Kemper, "Journal of an Episcopalian Missionary's Tour," WHC, XIV, pp. 409 and 414-5; "History of the Indian Tribes of North America," in Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall, The Indian Tribes of North America, vol. III (Edinburgh: 1934), p. 17; and see Greene, Cadle, pp. 69-80.

²⁴"Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 460-2; Greene, Cadle, pp. 64 and 66; Cadle to Morgan L. Martin, February 27, 1833, Morgan L. Martin Papers, WHS; see also Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions

trouble for the mission because the labor and money expended were bringing meagre results. Cadle bemoaned the fact that even with large government donations so few Indians, especially the Menominee, were receiving the benefit of Christian education.²⁵ Boyd shared Cadle's disappointment, but he was fatalistic about inducing the Indians to send their young to school; he wrote: "The evil countervailing influences all around and about them is [sic] too strong to be resisted for a season, by the exertions of a few men, however faithful."²⁶ If the Indians, who had an animistic orientation and a readiness to give meaning to portentous events, needed a symbol to justify their resistance to the mission, it was provided in the early spring of 1833 when Boyd was notified of a death of an Indian child at the mission. There is no evidence of Boyd's reaction, but he had a most delicate human and diplomatic problem at hand. The Indians deeply loved their young and the death of a child was a tragedy; the loss of a child while at a mission school could only add to their distrust of the white man's school and

and American Indian Response, 1787-1862 (Lexington, Kentucky: 1965).

²⁵ Cadle to Boyd, June 18, 1833, "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, p. 473.

²⁶ Boyd to Commissioner Herring, February 23, 1835, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 182.

provide a symbol that strongly suggested the evil of the white man's school and instruction.²⁷ A fundamental weakness of the mission was the absence of an interpreter to assist in communicating with the Indian youth from several tribes. Tribes of which the Indian children were members included the Menominee, Winnebago, New York Indians, Sioux, Osage, Chippewa, and Sauk-Fox.²⁸

Financial difficulties also helped to bring a reduction in the mission's efforts. Even before Cadle's departure, the Episcopalian Mission Society decided to cut down the mission's activities to correspond to the money available. Operating with less money, Cadle's successor, the Reverend Daniel E. Brown, sharply decreased the number of students in school. The decline of the mission was made certain by the 1836 Menominee treaty, which ended the use of treaty monies for it. Oshkosh had been strongly opposed to the use of Menominee treaty monies to finance the mission; he had threatened to get a lawyer to go to Washington "and protest such proceedings to the President." This aroused Boyd's ire, and he responded by threatening to take Oshkosh's rank away if the chief followed that course of action. Nonetheless, Oshkosh got his way in the

²⁷Cadle to Boyd, March 31, 1833, "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, p. 467.

²⁸Boyd to Commissioner C.A. Harris, May 27, 1838, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 284-5.

1836 treaty. The mission thus met a serious economic blow. By April, 1836, the mission was reduced to sixty-one students. During late summer of the following year there were only thirty-five students and Brown was directed by the parent mission society to cut the number to twenty-five. These severe cutbacks were forerunners to the mission's phasing out. In June, 1838, Boyd was informed that it was going to be closed at the earliest possible date. Soon after the student body was reduced to twelve, and the staff was cut from five to three with the retirement of Brown and his wife.²⁹

The missionary efforts among the New York Indians were much smaller than those at Green Bay. Compared to the Indians native to the upper Lakes region, these emigrant Indians were well on the road to acculturation. They had already experienced the power of American settler advance that brought great pressures upon them by decreasing the size of their tribal lands and hunting

²⁹Brown to Louis Grignon, September 4, 1837, "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church," WHC, vol. XIV, p. 498; James D. Carder, Secretary and General Agent, Domestic Committee of the Board of Missions, New York, to Boyd, June 1, 1838, *ibid.*, pp. 501-2; Brown to Boyd, September 29, 1839, *ibid.*, pp. 503-4; Boyd, Private, to War Secretary Cass, August 25, 1834, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 133-9; Greene, *Cadle*, pp. 80-1 and 83; and see Menominee Treaty of September 3, 1836, *Indian Treaties*, Kappler, ed., pp. 463-5.

grounds, and putting greater demands upon their traditional lifestyles. Smaller hunting areas meant less game, and this was a strong stimulus to increase their farming activities. That they had long been farmers is true, but they were being pushed to full-time farming on their own individual plots and living in individual homesteads rather than communal longhouses.³⁰ Missionaries continued the acculturation drive in the Green Bay area.

Not all the acculturation attempts, however, were made by missionaries. The Menominee model farm community at Winnebago Rapids was independent of religious auspices. Although Cadle and his sister worked there among the Menominee for a short time, the project was mainly run by public employees with federal money and was directed at encouraging greater emphasis upon agriculture. If the Menominee lived in a settled community, it was thought that they would learn to till the soil, reap the harvest, and enjoy a more stable existence. Boyd's role was to oversee this project to assure its success; he was also to convince the Menominee, who generally resisted acculturation efforts, of the merits of having farmers and teachers among them to promote their advance toward the white man's civilization.³¹

³⁰Morse, Report, p. 82 in the appendix.

³¹Commissioner C.A. Harris to Boyd, October 30, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 39; see also Boyd to Commissioner Herring, January 2 and June 30, 1835, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 167 and 191.

Since this advance would be quite "imperfect and unfinished" without "a House of Worship," Boyd recommended using some surplus public monies to erect a church; it would greatly influence "the splendor-loving and untutored Indian" and provide a major "Corner-Stone" that would "bind all harmoniously together."³²

That Boyd wanted harmony could be seen in the code of behavior that he recommended for those employed at the Menominee farming establishment. He thought that whiskey should be prohibited, that there should be no "improper intercourse" with the Indian women, that the Sabbath should be observed as a day of rest, that the Indians should be counseled "to believe and feel that all that the United States are now doing for them, is for their good," that there should be no gambling. He also thought that it was his duty to tell the commissioner of Indian affairs of any violations of these regulations.³³

There were good reasons for suggesting such a code. A major one was that the sale of whiskey among the Menominee at the model farm was hampering the civilizing efforts. The many "shameful scenes of riot and drunkenness" also posed a threat to the government employees. Since

³²Boyd to Herring, December 8, 1834, ibid., vol. 8, p. 161.

³³Boyd to Herring, February 23, 1835, ibid., p. 177.

whiskey was being sold at a nearby island, Boyd sought the punishment of the vendor, beseeching the territorial court to bring him to justice. Such an effort was futile, however, because the flow of whiskey into the area was extremely heavy. The island, it should be pointed out, was owned by James Duane Doty, a leading Wisconsin Territory politician and lawyer whom, Boyd described as being "devoid of principle."³⁴

Another major reason for establishing a code was that Boyd was having difficulty in insuring "the faithful performance" of duties by the farm's staff. Distance, as well as his other numerous duties, prevented "constant supervision" of the employees; consequently, it was beyond his competence as an honest man, he said, to certify faithfully their labor. Mindful of the self-serving nature

³⁴Boyd to Herring, June 8, 1835, ibid., pp. 189-90; An unaddressed and undated letter by Boyd, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 7, doc. 85. Doty (1799-1865) was an important figure in early Wisconsin history; he was a lawyer, judge, territorial governor, and representative to congress. According to Boyd, Doty received the island near the model farm through some shady dealings. Boyd strongly inferred that Doty got the island while he was the district judge because he would not prosecute Oshkosh for murdering another Indian outside of the Indian country. Even though Oshkosh was within American jurisdiction Doty released him because he accepted Oshkosh's argument that it was a tribal affair. It was not coincidental to Boyd that Doty later received rights to the island and purportedly contemplated establishing a whiskey trade there; and since the trade would be on private property the authorities would not be able to search for and confiscate the whiskey without a warrant. Boyd to Commissioner Herring, December 8, 1832, ibid., pp. 161-2.

of some of these individuals, he recommended that an "oath of office" be instituted for these public employees; he was really seeking to reduce his supervisory responsibilities to relieve himself "from a painful duty."³⁵ Indeed, his reasons were clear. Two of the men employed at the farm settlement to help the Indians advance in the agricultural arts were deemed to be quite harmful to the effort. One reputedly sold whiskey to the Indians, while the other, besides being lazy, used whiskey to get the Menominee to work, and at times he had them work on the Sabbath.³⁶ The problems at Winnebago Rapids were compounded by the bad example and interference of the area's whites, who made the farm's progress extremely difficult, if not impossible. To assure proper supervision of the farm's personnel and the project's success, Boyd recommended that an Indian agent should be placed at the Menominee farm.³⁷

Like the civilization activities of the missionaries among the Menominee, the model farm experiment was short-lived. Although it resulted in the clearing of several heavily timbered acres, and the ploughing and planting of another seventy acres, its success in acculturating the

³⁵Boyd to Herring, June 30, 1835, ibid., p. 192.

³⁶Kemper, "Journal of an Episcopalian Missionary's Tour," WHC, XIV, p. 443.

³⁷Boyd to Herring, February 2, 1835, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 175.

Menominee was minimal. The effort ended in April, 1837, when the establishment's personnel were discharged and its cattle and farming equipment were readied for "final disposition."³⁸ The opposition of the Menominee was the major reason for the farm's brief and unimpressive existence. It was obvious to Boyd why they were against teachers and farmers among them: they saw large amounts of money being expended with "no corresponding benefit" for them as a whole. It is also very probable that their traders were opposed to these acculturation activities because they would rather have the money given to the Wild Rice People, who would spend it in trade. In the 1836 treaty, the Menominee had their way; the model farm experiment was ended and the monies previously set aside for this project and the Green Bay mission were put into a \$70,000 investment fund.³⁹ Despite all the pressures accounting for the project's failure, Boyd was criticized for not doing enough to encourage the Menominee toward civilization. Yet the criticism was not valid: over the years, he had been most helpful to the missions and was twice commended for his interest in and aid to the Green Bay mission. Greatly influenced by

³⁸Boyd to Harris, June 24, 1837, ibid., p. 237; also see Boyd to Herring, October 18, 1835, ibid., pp. 202-3.

³⁹Boyd to Harris, September 17, 1837, ibid., p. 243; Boyd to Herring, October 19, 1835, ibid., p. 204, and the Menominee Treaty of 1836, Indian Treaties, pp. 463-5.

French-Catholic traders, the Menominee would not move easily toward acculturation. Boyd believed that if the government truly wanted to civilize the Menominee, it would have to remove them westward, away from the harmful influence of their traders and half-breed relatives.⁴⁰

After many years of contact with civilizing efforts, Boyd developed his own ideas about them. He believed that large educational projects were "productive of very little benefit to the Indian." Recognizing that the Indian people were "fondly attached to their children," he realized that it was highly "impractical" to separate them from their young. Living in the hunter state and being as free "as the air we breath," Boyd wrote, the Indian strongly held to the idea "that the moment his child is [confined] within the Walls of a white-man's habitation (and more especially for a term of years) his child is no longer an Indian, but a slave." Such a situation made it necessary, he explained, "to encourage good men to reside permanently among them, in their several bands and villages, and to act in relation to them, in the double capacity of

⁴⁰Boyd to Harris, March 15 and 27, 1838, ibid., pp. 273-6 and pp. 284-5.

Ministers and teachers." Without mincing his words, he cynically added:

After all the Crocodile tears, if one would rely on the public prints, shed in behalf of the poor red man, from Maine to Georgia, there should be no lack of Christian Missionaries to seek the Indian in their wilderness habitations, and without fee or reward, lead them from darkness into light.⁴¹

Despite Boyd's plea and the many tears of the compassionate zealots that bleached the newsprint, the first great wave of governmental efforts ebbed in the late 1830's.

Several factors can possibly account for the decline of these efforts. The most obvious was shortage of monies among the missionary groups to finance their acculturating and proselytizing efforts. The nation's economic woes in the late 1830's further accentuated the shortage and contributed to the swift deterioration of most missions. Another factor was the prevalent notion that acculturation was a simple process whereby within a generation or two the Indian would give up his traditional ways and take to Christianity and farming. Such a simple faith would of course lead to failure. Because of internal limitations, acculturation efforts generally failed miserably. Americans did not understand the complex nature of acculturation; furthermore, they did not foresee stiff Indian resistance to culture change.⁴²

⁴¹Boyd to Harris, September 30, 1837, ibid., p. 252.

⁴²See Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage.

Cherishing their traditional lifestyle, most Indians were firmly opposed to change. A typical response, when asked if they would desire to become like whites, was: "The Master of Life made us Indians; seeing it was his will that we should be born Indians, why should we wish to alter our condition?"⁴³ During his 1834 travels, the Reverend Cutting Marsh conversed with a chief (probably a Fox) about education. The chief was not completely adverse to having two or three of his braves educated to enable them to become interpreters; "but he did not wish for schools, for he wanted his young men to be warriors." Furthermore, he expressed Indian abhorrence of being "confined to a house."⁴⁴ This chief's distaste for a settled existence underscored his dislike of farming. Preferring to hunt rather than to farm, he fatalistically parried Marsh's assertion that when Indian children grew up there would be no game by stating that "they would be all dead before that time." Marsh responded that this need not be the case "if they altered their manner of living." To this, the chief retorted that the Indian way was best and added that "if we should now change, we should all be sick or die."⁴⁵ That the Indian would be dissipated

⁴³Morse, Report, p. 21 in the appendix.

⁴⁴Cutting Marsh Papers, WHS, Diary of the Sauk-Fox Trip, August 28, 1834, vol. 5.

⁴⁵Ibid.

if his traditional way was disrupted was undeniable. Furthermore, it was alien to Indian custom for the warrior to farm; among the Lakes Indians farming was done entirely by the women, and it would have been an "indelible disgrace" for a warrior to do women's work. The warrior's masculinity was proven in the hunt and it would damage his pride and prestige to be involved in husbandry.⁴⁶ Consequently, the male's identification with the hunt and his ingrained abhorrence of farming frustrated attempts to "civilize" him.

Survival, however, dictated that the Indian become like his antagonist. Although he could choose to fight or flee, he was only delaying the inevitable: slowly he was to become like the white man or perish in resistance. The arrogant and intolerant nature of the American civilization with its numerical, organizational, and technological superiority, gave the Indian little choice. Living on small tracts of land, dependent upon the whites for economic necessities, and experiencing growing ecological pressures, the Indian had to sacrifice his ancient ways. Nevertheless, he was still reluctant to do so.

His acceptance of white ways, however, would be accelerated when the government pushed him off his lands. The resultant disruption was a key to the destruction of

⁴⁶"History of the Indian Tribes of North America," in McKenney and Hall, Indian Tribes of North American, vol. III, p. 14.

the Indian's traditional lifestyle because his land was more than a piece of property. Consequently, the policy of removing Indians from their homelands to assigned areas west of the Mississippi, which was ostensibly adopted to facilitate civilization efforts by separating them from white interferences, was of itself a deeply aggressive policy that wrenched the Indians from the lands of their forefathers and from the spirits that guided them in their everyday activities. Indeed, it is easy enough to move a people from one location to another, but to displace animistic peoples and transplant them into different and often alien environments was an act with highly destructive consequences. Boyd, of course, was not aware enough to understand this process that was affecting his charges even though he was a part of it.

CHAPTER 8

LAND

STANDING BETWEEN INDIAN HERITAGE AND AMERICAN DESTINY

As the government's frontier representative, Boyd had an important position in assuring the orderly advance of American settlement. He had a broad role in bringing about harmonious contacts between the races, having federal Indian laws faithfully executed, preparing the Indians for land cession councils, and executing treaty provisions. Boyd thus assumed that anomalous role of protecting Indian rights and properties while being instrumental in federal designs to negotiate land cessions with the first Americans and to provide for the orderly removal of these peoples before the arrival of the settlers. Although the government generally followed the policy of obtaining these lands by peaceful negotiation rather than by force, conquest was not considered unjust, if Indians resisted American designs -- this was vividly seen in the Black Hawk War.

That the American advance was not always peaceful was a result of the importance that both red and white cultures put on land. Indians deeply identified with their land. In it their heritage lay. Their needs were satisfied by it as the mother earth provided food, clothing, and shelter. These things were given to them by the Master Spirit to

sustain life. The land was also sacred to them. To those mystical powers that provided their needs, Indians were reverential. They understood that spirits controlled nature, and they also perceived that their survival was dependent upon satisfying these manitoes. Therefore, ceremonies and sacrifices were performed to appease and manipulate the spirits. Furthermore, their primal mother (the earth) reflected the seasons and lessons of life as she created, nurtured, withdrew, and denied. Denial could mean death, but even in death there was life: those buried nourished the plants, and in turn the animals, thus sustaining man. Accordingly, the Indians' close relationship with the land was strengthened by the presence of their forefathers' bones in the earth. Land, therefore, had deep traditional and spiritual value to the Indians. Furthermore, the red men were well adapted to their environments, and their adaptations greatly shaped their cultures. Thus, the taking of their land would be an act of great consequence to them.

The American pioneers also had a strong attachment to land, but their orientation was very different from and hostile to that of the red man. Land was owned and used by an individual for his own gain; just as individual ownership of land was alien to the Lakes Indians, so basically was the practice of common ownership and use to white Americans. Their different practices also included opposite attitudes toward nature. Indian cultures were

generally more in harmony with the natural realm, whereas the American civilization tried to control nature and all of its inhabitants. The white man's orientation thus grew increasingly apart from the natural order as it sought greater predictability, security, and individual gain through the uses of reason and technology. Another fundamental difference was that while Indian society was generally cooperative, white man's society was highly competitive. Protestant individualism, invigorated and reinforced by a selfish and competitive economic spirit, helped shape and direct the American people. Seeing the Indian hunting cultures as comparatively backward, Americans thought that the Indians' use of land was grossly inefficient: where a few Indians hunted and gathered, many more self-reliant farmers could flourish. And since the Indians' land use was considered so inferior, the advanced civilization believed that it had the right to dispossess the Indian of his land.¹

The surge of the American pioneer to get land always spelled trouble for an Indian agent. Settler pressures and encroachments created constant friction with the natives.

¹Morse, Report, p. 67; Schmeckbier, Office of Indian Affairs, p. 35; and see: Pearce, Savages of America, and Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A Study of the Past and Present Status of the American Indian (New York: 1971)

As land-hungry settlers intruded into Indian country, it became the duty of the agent to protect Indian rights. By law all entries into Indian lands were forbidden except by persons with licenses or passports. Citizens were even prohibited from hunting, cutting timber, taking grass, grazing their livestock, and farming on Indian land. The cutting of timber on Indian lands was a problem that frequently occurred in the Lakes region. Needed for firewood as well as for building purposes, timber was a very valuable commodity; consequently, mill privileges on Indian lands were lucrative and desirable.² Agents and subagents had the duty and authority to remove trespassers from Indian country, and, if necessary, summon the military to drive intruders away. This approach became official policy in the act of 1834.³

²Cass to Schoolcraft, August 8, 1822, MSIA, roll 5, p. 72; Boyd to Cass, July 27 and August 7, 1824, ibid., roll 12, pp. 529-31 and 566-7; Fourteen Chiefs of the Oneida Nation, Duck Creek, to Boyd, July 24, 1839, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 6, doc. 31; Colonel Stambaugh, Green Bay agent, to Mr. Dusham, November 19, 1831, ibid., vol. 4, doc. 29; also see correspondence between H.B. Brevoort, Green Bay agent, and Major D.E. Twiggs, subagent at Fort Winnebago, May 25 to April 27, 1829, MSIA, roll 25, pp. 5-21; and see the Intercourse Act of 1802, U.S., Statutes at Large, II, pp. 139-46.

³Judge Daniel LeRoy to Governor Cass, September 25, 1829, MSIA, roll 25, p. 275; and Indian Act of 1834, U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, pp. 729-38.

The cooperation of the military was not always forthcoming as the army officers were reluctant to get involved with removing intruders, especially squatters, because many officers had suffered "heavy damages" from adverse court decisions. Skeptical about the feasibility of removing white trespassers, General George M. Brooke, the commandant at Fort Howard as well as acting agent at Green Bay in early 1837, wrote that without specific authorization from the President the military's position was weak and vulnerable.⁴ With the military reluctant to get involved in checking the advance of pioneers, Boyd's position was also weak and his actions would probably have been futile at best. Evidence indicates, however, that he did not face the squatting problem until the late 1830's.

Evidence also suggests that Boyd did not follow a vigorous policy in dealing with these trespassers. For instance, in 1839 he responded to Stockbridge complaints about three pioneers living on their lands by telling their sachem, A.E. Quinney, to notify the intruders "to move at once...or be subject to prosecution."⁵ Nothing more was

⁴General George M. Brooke to Governor Dodge, Wisconsin Territory, February 19, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 232.

⁵Boyd to Quinney, December 25, 1839, ibid., p. 376.

said or done. During the same period Boyd also received a complaint from the Oneida that trespassers were on their lands. They too desired his assistance in removing them, but there is no record of his reaction.⁶ Boyd possibly did not execute the law energetically because of the prevailing atmosphere on the frontier. Indeed there was a tolerant attitude among Americans toward whites who violated laws meant to protect the Indians: the military was hesitant to enforce the law and the courts generally were unwilling to prosecute since juries were made up of frontiersmen who were resentful of any authority; furthermore, ambitious territorial politicians had the tendency to please their constituents and neglect the Indians. Boyd's ill-health in the late 1830's was also a probable factor in his failure to act more vigorously.⁷

Boyd did, however, deal with a situation in which a white man directly interfered in Oneida tribal politics. In 1839 the Oneida were confronted with the machinations of J.S. Horner, who was attempting to become their "legal agent" and take care of their affairs. That he was up to

⁶Fourteen Chiefs of the Oneida Nation, Duck Creek, to Boyd, July 24, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 31.

⁷See Boyd to Governor Dodge, May 28, 1839, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 344-5; in this letter Boyd referred to his old age and being "almost incapable of active service." Also see Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: 1973), chapter II, pp. 138-156.

mischievous was apparent when he tried to enlist Dr. David Ward, the physician often employed by Boyd, to use the influence the doctor had among the Indians to accomplish his goal. Horner promised Ward twenty dollars for every five he normally charged for his services, if he cooperated. Boyd so notified Governor Henry Dodge and put an end to Horner's intrigues.⁸

Although white crimes were rarely penalized, the government did actively seek to punish Indians for their offenses against whites. Ironically, the demands for punishment were motivated more by the desire to teach the Indians a lesson than to serve justice. Some American officials thought that Indians had to be prosecuted and punished for their crimes to teach them respect for the United States and its laws, prevent further crimes, and avert open interracial frontier hostilities.⁹ Accordingly, the government pursued an aggressive policy. This was especially true in murder cases. "An Indian, who commits murder within the jurisdiction of our Courts, whether upon a white

⁸Boyd to Governor Dodge, May 28, 1839, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 344-5.

⁹Benjamin O'Fallon, agent at Council Bluffs, to Secretary of War Calhoun, June 23, 1821, Papers of John C. Calhoun, Hemphill, ed., vol. VI, p. 213; Colonel Henry Leavenworth, commandant at Fort Snelling, to Secretary Calhoun, June 27, 1821, ibid., p. 221; McKenney to Governor Cass, September 15, 1825, MSIA, roll 17, p. 99; and Secretary of War James Barbour to Cass, May 24, 1826, ibid., roll 18, pp. 255-7.

man or another Indian," Governor Cass wrote, "is responsible to our laws, and amenable to punishment." Accordingly, an agent was to impose civil authority and follow federal laws.¹⁰ For instance, in 1824, when some Chippewa killed four American Fur Company traders, War Secretary Calhoun directed Cass to adopt "efficient and prompt measures" to secure the trial and punishment of the perpetrators of the crime. Policy dictated that Boyd obtain the deliverance of the Indian murderers by the Chippewa. He was ordered to assemble the headmen of the tribe and demand that the offenders be turned over for prosecution. If they refused, wrote the Secretary of War, then a threat of reprisal by the government was to be made.¹¹ Indians were also told that when they had troubles with whites, rather than retaliate, they should go to their agent, who would inform "their Great Father" in Washington of their complaints and help redress their grievances.¹² Such an orderly procedure would have been

¹⁰Cass to John Tipton, agent at Fort Wayne, October 12, 1825, Cass Papers, BHC.

¹¹Secretary Calhoun to Governor Cass, September 25, 1824, MSIA, roll 15, p. 163; also see Robert Stuart to Governor Cass, September 6, 1824, AFC, Letter Books, vol. III, p. 103; and Cass to Calhoun, December 27, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 359-60.

¹²McKenney, Memoirs, p. 112.

satisfactory to the government, but it might not satisfy the Indian's code of revenge.

In minor Indian offenses Boyd had to remedy the situation as best he could. In the case of stolen horses, cattle, produce, or any other property, he had to try to get the goods returned. This was not always possible, as hogs and cattle were often quickly butchered and farm produce eaten. If remuneration was the only possible solution, the offended party could submit a claim and his evidence; and if Boyd knew anything of the matter he would attach his statement to the claim and send it to the War Department. All claims were then referred to the Treasury Department's auditors for approval and settlement. This procedure took at least a year.¹³

There was no assurance, however, that a claim would be honored. For instance, in 1835 Boyd forwarded one of "doubtful character" by Sally Hunt against the Menominee for goods stolen. At first, she claimed a modest sum of \$31.75 for two hogs, one hundred heads of cabbage, three bushels of turnips, and three hundred pumpkins. Her troubles, however, did not end there. Later the same year a large yearling bull was killed and a steer was injured. She added another twenty dollars to the claim. Boyd noted in his statement accompanying the claim that she was a

¹³Circular, Cass to Agents, October 20, 1820, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 41-2.

widow with four children, and declared that even though there was "no direct proof" against the Menominee, she was a woman of good character and respectable reputation, and that her claim was "a just one and should be paid." Three years later her claim was rejected by the Indian Office because it was not within the purview of the federal Indian laws.¹⁴ Rejection of a claim by the government did not close all channels of compensation. Claimants could attempt to obtain payment from the Indians; such a course of action generally meant obtaining the approval of the respective tribe at an annuity payment. This approval, however, was not always easy to get.¹⁵

Boyd was fortunate that the Indians of the Green Bay area did not experience any serious settler intrusions until the second half of the 1830's. Even then the violations, according to Boyd's records, were not numerous. Probably the depression of the late 1830's slowed the agrarian advance into the Bay region. A great influx of settlers into the region could have been a dangerous situation had not the government already defeated and cleared out the dangerous tribes of present-day Wisconsin in the Black Hawk War. As a result of this war the Sauk-Fox were forcibly removed, and the Winnebago, although

¹⁴See Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 4, doc. 111.

¹⁵Secretary Calhoun to Joseph Vance, a claimant from the Green Bay area, March 12, 1822, MSIA, roll 10, p. 124.

still troublesome, were retreating before American advance. The friendly Menominee were being pushed northward and their lands were being taken. By the late 1830's they had lost over six million acres. Pressures were also put upon the New York Indians to cede their recently acquired lands.

Agents played an important part in getting the Indians to consent to land transfers. They generally did not make the actual land agreement, but they did arrange and witness treaty negotiations. Shortly after arriving at Mackinac, Boyd was asked to sound out the Chippewa Indians living at Sault Ste. Marie about making a small cession. He was to make the inquiry because the government wanted to establish an Indian agency and military post at the Sault. Even though he did not confer with the Indians, Boyd informed Cass that "no great opposition would be made by them to the purchase...excepting a small piece of rising ground directly at the Sault - to which a more than ordinary value is attached by them - it being the burial place of their ancestors."¹⁶ He was wrong about the willingness of the Chippewa to cede any of the tract. The following summer (1820), while on his Northwestern tour, Governor Cass stopped at the Sault to negotiate the cession and experienced a great deal of hostility from the Sault Chippewa, who closely identified their interest with the British. Before

¹⁶Boyd to Cass, August 4, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 63.

the expedition continued the treaty was completed, but only after considerable difficulty.¹⁷

Although a land cession was usually handled by a special commissioner, Boyd was once instructed to negotiate one. During the summer of 1820, he made his way to the largest Ottawa village in his agency, L'Arbre Croche, which was approximately 36 miles south-southwest of Mackinac, to negotiate a treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa for the title of the St. Martin Islands in Lake Huron. These islands, which are just north of Mackinac Island, were rich in gypsum. The Reverend Jedidiah Morse, who was on his tour for the War Department, was with Boyd at the treaty council. He wrote in his report to the Secretary of War that Boyd had told the Indians that their Great Father in Washington was interested in these islands not because of the soil and valuable timber, but because he wanted the plaster deposits. To this the Indians replied: "Well, if our Father does not want the soil, nor the timber of these islands, but the Plaster only, we will keep the soil and timber, and he shall be welcome to the Plaster." Shortly after revealing their craftiness, the Indians relinquished the islands for \$600 in goods.¹⁸

¹⁷See Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal.

¹⁸Morse, Report, appendix D, pp. 8-9 and 14. For his extra expenses in negotiating the treaty Boyd was given thirty dollars by the Treasury Department; this payment was not made until nine years later. See Boyd to Cass, September 9, 1820, MSIA, roll 7, p. 279; and W.B. Lewis, second auditor, Treasury Department, to Boyd, April 9, 1829, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 87.

Although his lone experience in negotiating a treaty was of minor consequence, Boyd did witness several other significant treaties. He was a witness at treaty councils because tribal groups under his supervision were in attendance and because he at times had to lead them to the site of the negotiations. Furthermore, his influence and knowledge could be very helpful to the treaty commissioners.¹⁹

After his several experiences perhaps Boyd realized, as did his superintendent, Governor Lewis Cass, that the most helpful factor in getting the Indians to cede their lands was the distribution of presents. By design they were "given to the principal chiefs to secure their influence and co-operation;" this was done because without these traditional inducements, which included whiskey, few cessions would have been obtained. Any resistance to a land cession, however, was usually easily neutralized by the Indian's poverty. Indian superintendents Lewis Cass and William Clark, in their 1828 report to the Secretary of War, vividly expressed the idea that the Indian's impoverished

¹⁹McKenney, superintendent of Indian trade, to William Clark, superintendent of Indian affairs, St. Louis, October 9, 1820, MSIA, roll 7, p. 191. Also helpful was the presence of the military which was often crucial in maintaining order at a treaty council, and its ceremony served to impress the Indians.

condition was the greatest inducer for a land cession. They wrote:

The Indians...reach the treaty ground poor, and almost naked. Large quantities of goods are taken there by the traders, and are seen and examined by the Indians. The women and children become importunate to have their wants supplied, and their influence is soon exerted to induce a sale. Their improvidence is habitual and unconquerable. The gratification of his immediate wants and desires is the ruling passion of an Indian. The expectation of future advantages seldom produces much effect. ...It would be utterly hopeless to demand a cession of land, unless the means were at hand of gratifying their immediate wants; and when their condition and circumstances are fairly considered, it ought not to surprise us that they are so anxious to relieve themselves.

Such a depressing situation became the government's opportunity.²⁰

Having lost the ability to sustain themselves, many of the Lakes Indians faced grave economic problems. Experiencing food shortages, many became increasingly indebted to traders to assure their survival. Traders were of course interested in having these debts paid off, and they usually benefited from a land cession treaty since the government generally agreed to assume the Indian debt to the traders. Traders who submitted these claims were, therefore, very cooperative in inducing the red men to cede their land to the United States. Furthermore, they were

²⁰ A Report to the Secretary of War by Lewis Cass and William Clark, 1828, U.S., House of Representatives, State Papers, 2nd Session, 20th Congress, doc. 107, serial 186, pp. 12-7.

even brought into government service during land treaty councils to expedite the proceedings. This occurred in the negotiation of the 1836 Menominee treaty when Charles Grignon, a half-breed Menominee trader, was the interpreter, and John Lawe, a leading Green Bay merchant, trader, and friend of this Lakes tribe, played an important role in influencing the Menominee to make the cession. In this treaty the Wild Rice People gave up over four million acres west and north of Lake Winnebago and the Fox River.²¹

Claims against the Indians, especially those of the traders, gave Boyd an important task in preparing for a land council. He received all claims lodged against the tribe that was to make a cession -- the tribe being held responsible for the actions of its individuals. Claims given to Boyd had to enumerate the goods received by or services rendered to the Indians and their estimated value, and provide proof of validity.

These claims were big business for traders. For instance, Louis Grignon demanded \$16,650 for credits given "to individuals" of the Menominee tribe during the period from 1814 to 1836; he also requested payment of interest and remuneration for unspecified damages. He was to reap his harvest in the 1836 treaty. Grignon's case is

²¹Menominee treaty of 1836, Indian Treaties, Kappler, ed., pp. 463-5; and Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 7.

particularly interesting since he was a half-breed submitting a claim against the treaty monies of his relatives.²²

Although traders presented the most sizeable claims for treaty monies, others also submitted them to Boyd. The Reverend Samuel Mazzuchelli, the superintendent of the Catholic mission at Green Bay, asked for nearly eleven hundred dollars for services rendered in educating and instructing individuals of the Menominee nation. One thousand dollars of his claim was for the use of church seats and pews, and for services and expenses of his visits to their village. God's word indeed had its price! This claim was rejected by the Menominee.²³ Even Boyd sought compensation from the Menominee. In December, 1838, he entered a claim for \$3,000, which was to be put upon the account of the tribe "for payment in the event of a further sale of their lands to the United States." Two thousand dollars of his claim was for rations from Boyd's "own supplies," which he had furnished them while an agent at Michilimackinac and Green Bay from 1819 to 1838. The remaining thousand dollars was for four head of cattle, fifteen hogs, forty cords of wood, 2,000 rails that had been stolen, and damage to his meadow, raids on his

²²See Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 18, and vol. 6, doc. 20.

²³See ibid., vol. 4, doc. 98.

gardens, and "a variety of minor depredations" which were the responsibility of the "worthless part" of the Menominee nation. Boyd asserted that the Menominee would "not dare to object to it [his claim] , for they know it to be just." This claim was made during the economically depressed years of the late eighteen-thirties when Boyd was a subagent struggling on a halved salary; this was also the period when he began making increasing references to his health, and in the claim he even stated that he was seeking to provide security for his family in case of his death.²⁴ There is no evidence that his claim was ever paid.

All treaty claims had to be approved by the government and by the tribe in question. In relation to the claims attached to the Menominee treaty of 1836, the Senate required "that the validity and justice of each of the claims...shall be inquired into by the superintendent of Indian affairs, previous to the payment of them." In accordance with this requirement, Governor Henry Dodge, the superintendent of Indian affairs for Wisconsin Territory, designated June 28 to July 10, 1837, as the period for authenticating claims. Dodge sent notifications of this procedure to the claimants, such as John Lawe, Louis Grignon, and the American Fur Company.²⁵ A variant to this

²⁴Boyd's claim, December 15, 1838, ibid., vol. 5, doc. 20.

²⁵Governor H. Dodge to John Lawe, June 7, 1837, ibid., vol. 5, doc. 26; for Dodge's letters to the American Fur Company and Grignon, see ibid., docs. 27 and 28.

procedure was to have the treaty commissioner consider the claims and ascertain their validity.²⁶ The Menominee chiefs made their decisions about the claims at the treaty council. Although they were not adverse to turning down a claim such as Father Mazzuchelli's, it is doubtful that they refused many of those submitted by traders with whom they had years of contact and upon whom they were highly dependent for trade goods.

There is evidence that traders fared very well as a result of the land cession treaties. In the Winnebago Treaty of 1837, for example, nearly one hundred and fifty thousand dollars was set aside to settle the tribe's debts. Among the claims approved by the government and accepted by the Indians was one by the American Fur Company, which received over forty-eight thousand dollars directly and many thousands more indirectly from traders whose claims were also approved; for instance, the Grignons, John Lawe, and Jacques Porlier of the Green Bay Company, who were heavily indebted to Astor's concern, received over twelve thousand dollars, and Joseph Rollette of Prairie du Chien, also heavily indebted, was allowed eleven thousand dollars.²⁷ The Menominee treaty of 1836 provided about one hundred

²⁶See Notice to claimants with claims against the Winnebago Indians, July 12, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 28.

²⁷Ibid., vol. 7, doc. 97; and see Winnebago treaty of 1837, Indian Treaties, pp. 498-500.

thousand dollars to pay the claims. The Menominee, who were controlled by their relatives, the Grignon family, allowed this trading family and their partners, Lawe and Porlier, nearly seventy thousand dollars.²⁸ Besides granting this windfall to friends, the Wild Rice people also granted over one hundred and forty eight thousand acres of hardwood forest and rich alluvial land along the Fox River to Amable Grignon. The treaty also provided \$80,000 "to be divided among all...persons of mixed blood." The Menominee chiefs were to determine what persons were of mixed blood. Apportionments of this sum were to be made by a commissioner appointed by the President; many traders and their families were to be recipients of this "mixed blood" fund. The Grignons would be rewarded handsomely since this mixed blood family was large and its influence over the Menominee chiefs, especially Oshkosh, was great. The twenty-year annuity of \$20,000 that was awarded to the Menominee would also prove to be very lucrative to the Grignons and the other friendly traders and merchants. In the long run, the traders may have also benefited from the \$76,000 investment fund established for the Menominee in return for their releasing the government from the provisions of the 1831 and 1832 treaties that held

²⁸Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 9.

the United States responsible for the efforts, which the Wild Rice people did not welcome, to educate the Menominee children and run the model farm.²⁹

Treaties brought new responsibilities to an agent since he was required to aid in carrying out their provisions. He was to make annuity payments, supervise the erection and maintenance of mills, provide for the delivery of horses, cattle, and farm equipment, distribute rations and provisions, oversee Indian schools, and supervise the blacksmiths.³⁰

Boyd was also given the responsibility of assuring the satisfactory completion of the projects for the Menominee provided for in the 1831 treaty. Given this duty, as a result of the death of Governor George B. Porter in mid-1834, Boyd was to oversee the construction of the model farm at Winnebago Rapids, making sure that the costs did not exceed the \$9,000 stipulated in the treaty.³¹ Although delayed by a cholera epidemic, the construction of the buildings was completed by late 1835. Several buildings were constructed to aid the acculturation of the

²⁹The Menominee treaty of 1836, Indian Treaties, pp. 463-50.

³⁰Governor Cass to War Secretary Calhoun, December 27, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 360-1.

³¹William Ward, acting for E. Herring, Commissioner of Indian affairs, to the acting superintendent of Indian affairs, Michigan Territory, Stevens T. Mason, July 31, 1834, MSIA, roll 34, pp. 412-3.

Menominee: a grist and saw mill; a miller's house; a blacksmith's shop; twenty Indian houses; and two houses for the white farmers. Boyd was directed to inspect them upon completion.³²

Once the model farm was completed Boyd was expected to supervise the project and its personnel. Working among and educating the Menominee about farm living were five white farmers and housekeepers, and a miller. Boyd had a hand in selecting individuals to fill these positions. The Reorganization Act of 1834 provided, however, that qualified Indians be given preference for these positions. Since no qualified Indians could be found, whites were hired.³³

The 1831 treaty brought other duties for Boyd. The treaty made provisions for the assignment of two blacksmiths to the Menominee. Having two qualified smiths working for the agency, he nominated them to fill the positions. The treaty also stipulated that within six months the government would distribute \$8,000 in clothing, \$1,000 in flour and "wholesome provisions," and \$1,000 in

³²Boyd to Commissioner Herring, September 25, 1834, Boyd Papers, vol. 8, pp. 148-9; Boyd to Herring, July 25, 1835, ibid., pp. 194-5; and Boyd to Herring, October 19, 1835, ibid., pp. 203-4.

³³Boyd to Mason, October 15, 1834, MSIA, roll 35, p. 297; William Ward, acting for Commissioner Herring to acting superintendent Mason, August 16, 1834, ibid., p. 41; Herring to Mason, September 15, 1835, ibid., p. 144; Boyd to Mason, September 24, 1834, Boyd Papers, vol. 8, p. 147.

specie among the Wild Rice people. The government also promised to distribute \$1,000 annually in provisions for the four years thereafter, "by which time it is hoped their hunting habits will cease, and their attention ... turned to the pursuits of agriculture."³⁴ The government truly expected some miraculous changes!

The Menominee treaty of 1836 extended Boyd's duties. It stipulated that for twenty years the federal government would annually distribute \$20,000 in cash and provide \$3,000 in provisions as well as 2,000 pounds of tobacco and thirty barrels of salt to the Menominee in consideration of their land cession. Also to be provided annually was the sum of \$500 for the purchase of farming equipment and cattle; this sum was to be expended under the direction of the superintendent and/or agent. The superintendent usually supplied the salt and tobacco, while Boyd took care of the other disburseable items.³⁵

³⁴Menominee treaty of February 1831, Indian Treaties, pp. 319-23. Boyd, who was to distribute the annuity goods, was instructed to make the requisitions from the commissariat at Fort Howard for the provisions, such as pork and corn; see Herring to Mason, September 9, 1834, MSIA, roll 35, pp. 121-2.

³⁵H.R. Schoolcraft, acting superintendent of Indian affairs, Mackinac, to Boyd, August 5, 1839, Boyd Papers, vol. 6, doc. 32. The 1836 treaty also provided for two blacksmiths to be located among the Menominee. In 1837, one thousand dollars was finally appropriated for the erection of two blacksmith shops with all the necessary equipment. Boyd was to use any excess money to build a house for the smiths. See Menominee treaty of 1836, Indian Treaties, pp. 463-5; and Commissioner Carey A. Harris to Boyd, October 30, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 39.

The proper distribution of the annuities was a most important duty for Boyd in fulfilling treaty obligations. An annuity was that annual payment of money and/or goods to the Indians for relinquishing lands or particular rights to the federal government. These payments, which might be for a specified number of years or in perpetuity, were also means of assuring continued friendship. Until 1834, the Indian superintendents officially disbursed the annuities. Because of the increasing number of annuity payments and the distances to each payment site, agents and subagents increasingly assumed the work. By the Reorganization Act of 1834 the agent was delegated to make the payment. Thereafter, Boyd regularly drew annuities from the military commissariat at Fort Howard and distributed them to the Indians.³⁶ Because of the great sums of money involved in many annuity payments, all agents who handled amounts over \$10,000, as Boyd did in the 1830's, were legally required to post bonds for \$20,000; these bonds had to be certified by a district judge or attorney.³⁷

³⁶Indian Act of 1834, U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, pp. 729-38; also see Ward, acting for Herring, to Mason, July 31, 1834, MSIA, roll 34, pp. 416-7; D. Kurtz, acting commissioner, to Mason, November 10, 1834, ibid., roll 35, p. 277; and Boyd, Private, to War Secretary Cass, August 22, 1834, Boyd Papers, vol. 8, pp. 133-9.

³⁷Secretary of War Calhoun to Governor Cass, May 29, 1822, MSIA, roll 10, p. 257. Although some American political leaders, like Calhoun, thought that the payment of annuities had the "pernicious effect" of encouraging "idleness and dissipation" among the Indian peoples, these payments could readily serve to coerce the first Americans.

The actual distribution of the annuity was a troublesome chore. The practice generally was to notify the Indians of the date and site of the payment weeks in advance; usually the date set was during the summer. Payment was to be made to the Indians gathered "as a body" or to "a deputation of chiefs," who were delegated by their tribesmen to receive it for them.³⁸ Since there were many complaints that annuities were unequally divided, the government attempted to assure proper and complete notification of the payment and fully regulated disbursements. The government also moved away from the practice of giving chiefs lump sums to distribute among Indians who were not present. Funds might still be given to relatives of those absent, but if no relative was present, the payment had to be made directly to those absent individuals, "and not to the Chiefs."³⁹ Consequently, the Indians were made to look to the agent for their annuity; this gave him greater prestige and influence among his charges.

As the Indians became impoverished, these monies and goods took on greater importance, and once the Indian became dependent upon them, he could be manipulated to behave acceptably or suffer their denial. See Calhoun to Cass, March 27, 1819, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, J. Franklin Jameson, ed., American Historical Association Report for 1899, vol. II (Washington: 1900), pp. 157-8.

³⁸McKenney, chief of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Cass, September 13, 1826, MSIA, roll 19, p. 139.

³⁹McKenney to Cass, June 18, 1830, MSIA, roll 26, p. 273. Boyd had the responsibility to take care of annuity payments to mixed-bloods and orphans.

By 1848, the government officially moved to the policy of paying annuities to the heads of families instead

Boyd's position could also be enhanced by his supervision of the distribution of rations to the Indians at annuity payments, as well as at treaty councils. Ration distribution, however, was generally a problem for the agent. Not only was the distribution a difficult task, but the shortage of rations, which was a constant complaint from Boyd, created diplomatic problems with the Indians. For the 1834 payment, Boyd was authorized 4,000 rations. With that amount, he wrote to Secretary of War Cass, "the heads of families alone will be allowed to attend the payment."⁴⁰ Since the Indians came to the meetings as families, Boyd probably found himself in a difficult situation.

The Menominee payment of 1834 brought Boyd an unusual amount of trouble. This annuity payment was to be made during the first days of October after the wild rice harvest. Such a late date had its advantages, Boyd thought, because "in October they [the Indians] are making arrangements for their Winter hunt and support, and will not so readily part with their silver for whiskey, as when they are paid earlier in the season." The lateness of the

of to the chiefs. This was done with the hope that tribal identifications would be weakened and that the power of the chiefs sharply diminished. Annuities thus assumed deep political overtones. See U.S., Statutes at Large, IX, p. 264.

⁴⁰ Boyd, Private, to Secretary of War Cass, August 25, 1834, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 135.

annuity gathering, however, caused "considerable embarrassment" for Boyd as he was pestered by the Menominee, particularly Oshkosh. Boyd became upset with the young chief, whom he considered "a bad man...totally unworthy of his rank," because the chief had told him that he was not Boyd's chief, but rather "the Trader's chief."⁴¹ Boyd's troubles did not come to an end until December when the payment was finally made. By that time the Menominee chiefs were "loud" in their complaint of "the lateness of their payment," and the "total failure of their fall hunts" which they attributed to the late payment. These complaints, Boyd explained, were "seconded by some of the half-breed malcontents at the Bay." He thus expected further problems because the Menominee had been conferring with their Green Bay friends.⁴² The lateness of the annuity assemblage had been a great irritation to the Wild Rice people and their traders because it delayed the winter hunt and upset the trade and credit system that revolved around the payment.

Another difficulty experienced by Boyd during the 1834 payment was the indiscriminate rejection by the Menominee chiefs of several compensation claims. About five thousand dollars in claims that were submitted by traders and inhabitants of the Green Bay area were unanimously refused

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 133-9.

⁴²Boyd to Commissioner Herring, December 8, 1834, ibid., p. 160.

because the money was needed for the survival of the tribe. Within a few days Boyd reevaluated the claims and sent them to the Indian Office with his recommendations. His observations were extremely important because the government relied upon him to provide accurate information in order to help determine the merits of each claim since evidence supporting a claim was often scanty. In reference to the rejected 1834 claims, Boyd recommended that Dr. Ward be paid for vaccinating some Menominee, and that John Lawe and another trader have their claims satisfied, but at reduced rates. If the government accepted Boyd's suggestions, then the claims would be paid and the sums deducted from the following Menominee annuity payment; such a policy, however, by-passed the Indian's right to accept or reject a claim.⁴³

Despite his problems with the 1834 payment, Boyd preferred a late payment date. Although December was too late, he saw, as mentioned above, advantages in a distribution after the wild rice harvest. Not only would a late payment help prevent whiskey purchases since the Indians would be making arrangements for the winter, but also, he reasoned, it would prevent their starvation during the hard, cold months of winter. Boyd's concern about the plight of the Indian thus moved him on several

⁴³Ibid.; and Boyd to Herring, December 23, 1834, ibid., p. 166.

occasions to suggest that some treaty monies that were due to the Indians be retained by him for use during the winter to prevent starvation. "They will starve without it," he wrote in 1837, "and their sufferings will as usual be charged to the improvidence and want of care on the part of the agent." During the previous winter he had used \$2,000 from annuity monies to sustain the Menominee.⁴⁴

Because of his experiences in seeing the want of the Indian, he was firmly against paying annuities in money since these sums were quickly "transferred to the Pockets of the White Man." He knew that whiskey wasted much of the Indian's small annuity share, and in many cases left little or nothing for essential goods. The only way to remedy this situation, Boyd thought, was to select an honest merchant-trader and allow the head of the Indian family to obtain the goods he needed at a fair price; Boyd probably would have selected Daniel Whitney -- the only successful rival to the American Fur Company in the Green Bay area -- because he was the only merchant-trader who did not sell whiskey to the Indians. Then "at the End of the Year, or at the next annual payment, the account against each head of family [would] be examined," and the merchant would be paid what was due him, and the

⁴⁴Boyd to Commissioner C.A. Harris, September 17, 1837, ibid., pp. 243-4.

balance, if any, would be given to the Indian. The main object of this arrangement, Boyd asserted, was that it would "effectually destroy the Whiskey-Trade," since the Indians would have no hard money with which to buy the fire-water.⁴⁵ Boyd's remedy had obvious flaws, since the nightmarish accounting system could easily be abused and the Indians could trade their goods for whiskey. The greatest obstacle to the adoption of Boyd's plan, however, was the desire of the Menominee, as well as their influential traders, for annuity payments in hard cash and not in goods.

So strong was this desire for the payment of annuities in cash that the Menominee sent a printed memorial to the President. Government policy was to give the Indians the right to choose whether they wanted their annuities in goods or money - unless a treaty stipulated what the payment should be.⁴⁶ The Menominee treaty of 1836 specifically stated that the annuities would be paid in silver. After receiving goods in the 1837 payment, fifteen Menominee chiefs petitioned their Great Father in Washington in February, 1838, to comply with the treaty provision. Meeting with Boyd, who was to send the

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Commissioner Herring to Mason, acting superintendent of Indian Affairs, Michigan Territory, December 12, 1834, MSIA, roll 35, p. 491; and the Indian Act of June, 1834, U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, pp. 139-46.

memorial to President Martin Van Buren, the chiefs declared their determination "to refuse to receive any more goods from the United States, in payment of their annuities under the existing treaty." Speaking for his people, Oshkosh argued that "when we are paid in goods, we cannot make such a division of them as will satisfy our people," and, in addition, "we are always cheated" when paid in goods. Citing the distribution of goods the previous August, he stated that his people were told that blankets were to be five dollars a pair, but were given only one for every five dollars. Furthermore, the goods were generally of poor quality; for example, Oshkosh related, all the axes "broke to pieces." Therefore, the Menominee wanted their payment in money because of its easy divisibility and because they could choose those articles they wanted most from their trusted traders who provided high quality goods.⁴⁷

While the Menominee memorial clearly represented the interest of the area merchants and traders, the request was also valid and the charges accurate. Even Boyd had complained that the goods (blankets, clothing, guns,

⁴⁷Menominee memorial to the President, February 28, 1838, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 50; also see Boyd to Commissioner Harris, February 28, 1838, ibid., vol. 8, p. 264.

calicoes, and axes) the Menominee had received in 1837 were inferior in quality; and he also thought that they were overpriced by twenty-five percent. Conscious of the wrong committed against the Menominee and the damage done by it to his position and the image of the government, he urged the government to pay the Indians \$3,250 in compensation.⁴⁸ This suggestion went unheeded.

The official government reaction to the memorial, however, was quick and harsh. Boyd was criticized for having it printed, and he was strongly reprimanded for the "impropriety" of his actions. Commissioner Carey A. Harris also scolded him in these words:

You must have been aware that it was not the intention of the government at any time to force goods upon the Indians; the agents were instructed to offer them, and advise, not urge, their acceptance, and you might naturally have inferred that no stronger measures would, or could legally, be taken hereafter....It would seem to have been due to the government and to yourself as its agent, no less than to the Indians, to have met their apprehension that goods would again be delivered to them, to have made full representations to this effect, to have assured them in the spirit and under the authority of the instructions of the last year, that the annuities would not be paid in any way unacceptable to them. By the course pursued, however, encouragement has been given to their dissatisfaction with the government, and countenance and strength to the representations and pernicious influence of the traders. It has further

⁴⁸ Boyd to Harris, September 17, 1837, and February 5, 1838, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 242 and 260-1.

indicated a distrust on your part of the good faith and integrity of the Executive.⁴⁹

Although blame was heaped upon Boyd for creating the annuity problem, the War Department agreed to resume the payment of the Menominee annuity in specie.⁵⁰ Nevertheless Boyd's problems with annuity payments would continue -- as will be seen in the next chapter.

Land cession treaties also gave Boyd the important and difficult duty of assuring the untroubled removal of the Indians from their relinquished lands. When Indians remained at or returned to their old homes, Boyd was expected to push them off diplomatically, if possible; he could if necessary have an annuity payment suspended or have the military sent to persuade the Indians to leave.

After their forced land cessions following the Black Hawk War, the Winnebago did not remove west of the Mississippi as the American government wished. The government had told them that they must leave their ceded lands by June 1, 1833, but "no positive stipulation" had been made that they had to remove west of the Mississippi by a certain date. The Winnebago still had lands north of the Wisconsin River.⁵¹ They preferred living on these lands,

⁴⁹Harris to Boyd, April 2, 1838, ibid., vol. 5, doc. 51.

⁵⁰Governor Dodge to Boyd, September 15, 1838, ibid., vol 6, doc. 47.

⁵¹Commissioner Herring to Governor Porter, March 30, 1833, MSIA, roll 32, pp. 341-2.



where there was no threat from the feared Sioux Indians. The government tried to ease their apprehensions by reassuring them that a "permanent mounted force" would be provided for their security on the Plains frontier. Nevertheless, the Winnebago frustrated the government's aims by moving north of the Wisconsin.

Their move north, however, proved to be temporary. In the spring of 1834 many Winnebago returned to their old lands around Lake Winnebago and along Rock River to hunt, fish, and farm. By mid-summer many more had returned and they ignored instructions of the area agents to leave. Warned that they would forfeit their annuity monies if they did not abide by the treaty stipulations, these Winnebago finally went north again after the rice harvest.⁵² The following spring a few Winnebago bands once again came back to the Lake Winnebago area, which was within Boyd's jurisdiction. They requested permission to plant corn on Menominee lands, but Boyd refused their request and advised them to go back to Fort Winnebago, to ask "forgiveness" of their agent, and to obey strictly his orders in the future. Although they promised Boyd that they would leave, the Winnebago defiantly planted corn on

⁵²R.A. McCabe, subagent at Fort Winnebago, to Governor Porter, March 25, 1834, ibid., roll 34, pp. 145-6; McCabe to Porter, April 1, 1834, ibid., p. 193; Boyd to Porter, June 30, 1834, ibid., p. 354; Lieutenant Colonel E. Cutler, commandant at Fort Winnebago, to acting governor Mason, August 12, 1834, ibid., roll 35, p. 5; and Herring to Mason, September 12, 1834, ibid., pp. 136-7.

Menominee land. But threatened with military action and the loss of their annuities, they once again withdrew. This annual confrontation with the Winnebago should have ended with the Winnebago Treaty of 1837, when they ceded all of their land east of the Mississippi and agreed to occupy the western lands set aside for them by the 1832 treaty.⁵³

The Winnebago, nevertheless, were to remain troublesome for Boyd as many continued to live on Menominee lands. By the spring of 1839 this situation became explosive. War between the tribes seemed distinctly possible when it was reported that the Winnebago had killed a young Menominee who belonged to Oshkosh's band. Because of governmental policy aims, it became an important concern for Boyd to maintain peaceful relations between these tribes. He was thus expected to intervene in and mediate these troubles and assure that they did not erupt into full-scale wars that would threaten American settlements, army posts, and fur trade operations. The government took the view that Indian wars could only be restrained by the impartial exercise of power by the United States; agents

⁵³Boyd to Cutler, May 2 and 10, 1835, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 185-6 and 186; and the Winnebago treaty of 1837, Indian Treaties, pp. 498-500.

played an important role in implementing this view because they, along with the military, represented American power on the frontier.⁵⁴

Bad blood existed between the Menominee and Winnebago because the Winnebago had occupied some of the best Menominee hunting grounds. These two tribes were traditional friends, as they were closely related by marriage, but these ties did not provide the means of alleviating the growing tensions that came about because of their huge land losses and Winnebago presence on Menominee land.⁵⁵ The murder made the situation more tense, and the unfortunate affair became complicated when Boyd was informed that it was the Menominee who had slain a Winnebago and that claims of a Menominee death were unfounded. Boyd then instructed Oshkosh to meet with the Winnebago and "offer the customary presents in order to restore peace and harmony to the two tribes."⁵⁶ Although

⁵⁴Cass to Calhoun, April 5 and December 27, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 280-1 and 360; also see Boyd to Schoolcraft, agent at Mackinac, February 14, 1834, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 121.

⁵⁵Boyd to Governor Dodge, May 7, 1839, (post-script on May 8), Boyd Papers, vol. 8, p. 340; and Boyd to Major W.V. Cobb, commandant at Fort Winnebago, May 21, 1839, ibid., p. 342.

⁵⁶Boyd to Robert Grignon (for Oshkosh), May 21, 1839, ibid., pp. 342-3.

the Menominee had caused this incident, Boyd criticized the Winnebago for creating the problem by refusing to leave Menominee land. Boyd believed that the bloodshed would continue as long as they remained.⁵⁷ Boyd was soon told that the Menominee had paid their adversaries between three hundred and four hundred dollars in presents to settle the dispute; but the tensions increased when a Menominee was killed by some retaliating Winnebago. Boyd then quickly moved to settle the problem by requesting that Governor Dodge direct the subagent to the Winnebago to have his charges offer some presents to the family of the deceased Menominee.⁵⁸ But the Winnebago refused to render satisfaction for the alleged murder. Boyd was informed that they denied committing the crime, and that if they had done so, they would offer no presents because the Menominee had not satisfactorily redressed the murder of one of their brothers.⁵⁹ A deepening crisis was averted when Governor Dodge recommended that a council be held with delegations from both tribes. By the end of the

⁵⁷Boyd to Governor Dodge, May 21, 1839, ibid., p. 343; and Dodge to Boyd, May 11 and 25, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, docs. 17 and 19.

⁵⁸Boyd to Dodge, June 8, 1839, ibid., vol. 8, p. 347.

⁵⁹Dodge to Boyd, October 19, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 44.

year Boyd assembled a group of Menominee chiefs to meet with the Winnebago to settle their difficulties. In spite of government efforts these intertribal tensions persisted as long as the Winnebago continued their intrusions on Menominee land over a period of years.⁶⁰

Another difficulty that Boyd faced was Indian interference with the government's survey of ceded lands. In 1835 he was notified that some boundary markers had been destroyed and several survey mounds had been levelled by Indians after the survey team had left the area. Boyd gathered several bands of Menominee and Winnebago, who lived on land contiguous to the surveyed area, to discuss the matter. At first, the Indians denied doing these things, but later admitted that some of their young may have cut down a few markers and levelled a few mounds. Boyd cautioned them about such acts, but in the end concluded that the situation had been exaggerated and that there was no calculated plan to defeat the objective of the government.⁶¹

The government's goal of removing Indians west of the Mississippi also gave Boyd a role in aiding the migrations of these peoples. In the mid-thirties he aided the

⁶⁰Ibid.; and Boyd to Dodge, December 18, 1839, ibid., vol. 8, p. 378.

⁶¹Boyd to Secretary of War Cass, August 21, 1835, ibid., p. 198.

migration of some Delaware and Munsee to a settlement south of the Missouri River. This small group, which had emigrated from Canada, requested food and two boats. Boyd got the boats and provisions, but since these Indians had no formal agreement with the American government they were expected to repay the government for the assistance within twelve months.⁶² Within a few years many of the Stock-bridge and Munsee Indians who had resided in the Green Bay area for several years also went westward. Boyd did not help them as they made their trek independently to the present-day Kansas area.⁶³ Boyd did not aid their migration because the government did not want them to leave the Green Bay area where they were being acculturated. After they had left abruptly, troubles arose over claims amounting to three thousand dollars advanced to them by Green Bay and Detroit merchants for transportation, clothing and provisions.⁶⁴ Boyd did not have migration problems with the Menominee as they simply moved northward after ceding their lands.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 249-51.

⁶³Boyd to Dodge, December 18, 1839, ibid., p. 373.

⁶⁴Boyd to Dodge, October 6, 1840, ibid., p. 414.

The Menominee retreat north -- to a homeland greatly reduced in size -- began before Boyd arrived at Green Bay. It started in late fall of 1830 when a Menominee delegation went to Washington to conclude a treaty. The group was led by their agent, Colonel Samuel C. Stambaugh, and Iometah, an aged chief who was the brother of the deceased great chief, Tomah. Oshkosh, the tribe's principal chief, was expected to lead the party, but the Green Bay traders, who had great influence over him, and who were opposed to the scheduled treaty, advised him not to go because the treaty would include accommodations with the New York Indians over standing territorial differences.⁶⁵ The delegation, nonetheless, went to Washington with the authority of the whole tribe. On February 8, 1831, a treaty was concluded that established the boundaries of Menominee land. The tribe relinquished five hundred thousand acres north of the Fox River to the New York Indians; this was amended in 1832 to allow over seventy thousand out of five hundred thousand acres to be located south of the river and on the east side of Lake

⁶⁵ Albert G. Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians into Wisconsin," WHC, vol. II (Madison: 1903), pp. 430-1. Ellis was an agent at Green Bay in the 1840's.

Winnebago as a reservation for the Stockbridge, Munsee, and Brotherton Indians. For this cession, the Menominee received twenty thousand dollars. By this treaty the Wild Rice people also ceded all their lands southeast of Lake Winnebago, the Fox River, and Green Bay; this area encompassed approximately two and a half million acres.⁶⁶

A few years later they lost an even greater portion of their land. In late summer of 1836, the Menominee led by Oshkosh gathered at Cedar Point on the Fox River near Green Bay to meet a government delegation led by Governor Dodge, and which included Boyd. At this council, the Menominee ceded over four million acres of their lands west and north of Lake Winnebago and the Fox River.⁶⁷ This cession, which gave great impetus to American settlement of Wisconsin, was, according to a contemporary, "done specially to open the country to the lumberman," whose business interests had been encouraged by the great and growing demand for lumber.⁶⁸ It should be mentioned that the Grignons were pioneers in the lumbering business in northern Wisconsin.

⁶⁶See Indian Treaties, Kappler, ed., pp. 319-23, 377-82, and 463-5.

⁶⁷The Menominee treaty of 1836, ibid., pp. 463-5.

⁶⁸Albert G. Ellis, "Upper Wisconsin Country," WHC, vol. III, (Madison: 1857), pp. 435-52.

Even though Menominee lands were greatly reduced in size, talk quickly spread of taking the rest of their land and removing the Wild Rice people west of the Mississippi. Boyd, at first (September, 1837), was against this idea. He did not think that the Menominee should be asked to give up their remaining lands in Wisconsin because it would be a long time before these lands would be required for settlement. Since they were friendly people, Boyd stated, "I see no good reason for a further purchase of their wilderness land and for driving them west of the Mississippi."⁶⁹ Within six months he changed his mind. He thought that "their remaining lands may be purchased at a reasonable rate" and that it would be good to remove them westward because:

This tribe, above all others, is identified with the whites by trade and marriage, that the best councils sic , of the best and honest agents of the Government are totally lost upon them unless sanctioned by the advice and consent of their half-Breed Canadian Relatives -- and the sooner they are removed from such councils sic the better.

Furthermore, he said that their removal west would help destroy this negative influence, or at least neutralize it, and "induce them to look with more unprejudiced feelings at the humanity and justice of the measures of this

⁶⁹Boyd to Comm. Harris, September 17, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 242.

Government," which were "intended solely to preserve them from utter destruction."⁷⁰ Of course, the Grignons, of whom he was writing, totally disagreed with him; their interests required that the Menominee remain in Wisconsin. Boyd nevertheless continued to believe that this tribe should be removed. During his last years as an agent, he firmly asserted that the Menominee were "completely under the control of their traders" -- the Grignons and John Lawe -- and that "Wisconsin will not fill up with Settlers...as long as these Indians are retained within her bosom, and they will continue to go from bad to worse as long as their Traders are their Chiefs, and their head men nothing." He further declared that "five or six" of these traders had "made the treaty of 1836," and that they now controlled Oshkosh, "the greatest scoundrel of the Nation."⁷¹

That the future was not bright for the Menominee is obvious if one accepts Boyd's remarks. Not only were they no longer politically autonomous, which translated into the uneasy fact that their lands were controlled by others, but their futures also looked grim because, as Boyd wrote: "Since their treaty of 1836, they have in a great measure ceased to labor or to hunt, but look to

⁷⁰Boyd to Harris, February 28, 1838, ibid., pp. 264-5.

⁷¹"Menominee Remarks" by Boyd, ca. early 1840's, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 80.

their annuity alone [as] a support."⁷² Controlled and dependent, their destiny was in the hands of others. Boyd thus envisioned their steady decline unless they moved west and were separated from their half-breed relatives.⁷³

Boyd did not write of such dire consequences for the New York Indians. Despite their getting legal ownership of five hundred thousand acres of land in the Green Bay area by the treaties of 1831 and 1832, they experienced pressure in the mid-thirties to relinquish their lands and migrate westward. To this most of the New York Indians were resistant.⁷⁴

Instead of agreeing to remove west, they accepted the idea of apportioning their land in individual allotments. In February, 1838, the Oneida, made up of the First Christian and Orchard parties, agreed to cede all their excess land to the United States after each individual received a plot of one hundred acres. These people, whose allotments were in the vicinity of Duck Creek, which was about ten miles from Green Bay, received over

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³General Abstract by Boyd, September 30, 1840, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 410-1.

⁷⁴Kinzie, Wau-Bun, p. 494; Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians," WHC, vol. II, pp. 436-44.

thirty-three thousand dollars as a reimbursement for their loss.⁷⁵ Although a report stated that some of the Oneida were starving in early 1838 -- Boyd responded by sending them provisions -- they progressed quickly and steadily. Besides periodical crop failures, they experienced interference in their tribal affairs. Once rid of such annoyances, the Oneida, according to Boyd, made great strides toward being good, self-reliant citizens.⁷⁶

The Brotherton also faced pressures upon their lands similar to those of the Oneida. They, however, were not to be so fortunate as the Oneida since each tribal member got only fifty acres when they apportioned their land. Nevertheless, they would become fairly prosperous American citizens; this perhaps was made easier since many had intermarried with whites, had learned the ways of the white man, and spoke English very well.⁷⁷

Not all the New York Indians would experience such good fortune. The Stockbridge and Munsee Indians were

⁷⁵Treaty of February 3, 1838, Indian Treaties, pp. 517-8.

⁷⁶Boyd to Dodge, May 28, 1839, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 344-5; Boyd to Commissioner Harris, March 9, 1838, ibid., pp. 269-70; and "Oneida Remarks" by Boyd, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 80.

⁷⁷Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians," WHC, vol. II, p. 448.

unhappy in the Green Bay region -- probably because of the religious tensions that existed among them; many were very much dissatisfied with the tribal disharmony caused by the restrictive religious discipline of Christianity. Witnessing tribal divisiveness, many wanted to sell their Wisconsin lands and migrate west. In 1836 they sold their lands, but the Senate rejected the treaty.⁷⁸ What they could not accomplish through legal channels, they did on their own, and in the fall of 1839 most of them "removed in a body to the West."⁷⁹ In migrating to the Kansas area, the Munsee and Stockbridge left about forty seven hundred dollars in debts and claims against them which Boyd was to help settle.⁸⁰ Not all of them left the Bay area. The remaining Stockbridge also had their lands apportioned; although they wrote their own constitution and devised their own system of government, their move

⁷⁸Boyd to Governor Dodge, July 25 and December 25, 1838, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 301 and 324-5.

⁷⁹Boyd to Dodge, December 18, 1839, ibid., p. 373.

⁸⁰Boyd to Dodge, October 6, 1840, ibid., p. 414.

to allotted properties and citizenship was very troubled. Their premature attempt was marred by tribal divisions between the pro-citizenship and traditional parties over the allotment scheme.⁸¹

Meanwhile Boyd's career as an agent was coming to end. This was largely determined by the same factor that sent him to the frontier in 1819: his handling of finances - both public and private. An examination of his handling of government monies is in order.

⁸¹"Declaration of Rights and Frame of Government," Papers of John W. Quinney, WHS; Census and Report for the Relief of the Stockbridge Indians, to the President of the United States, September 12, 1843, ibid.; Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians," WHC, vol. II, p. 448.

CHAPTER 9

FINANCES: "BETWEEN TWO FIRES"

Congress, which had constitutional control of the purse strings of the Federal government, demanded fiscal accountability for all its appropriations. As a result, the Executive branch had its fiscal arm, the Treasury Department, exact accountability from all the Executive departments. Each department, in turn, exercised supervision over its numerous subdivisions.¹

The Indian agent was part of the War Department system. While he had no control over the amount of money that was appropriated for his agency, he did have direct responsibility for the funds allocated for his official use. Thus, it was Boyd's duty to give regular accounting for the funds entrusted to him.

An elaborate procedure evolved to supervise and check his expenditures of public funds. Since he would handle considerable sums of federal money, he was required to submit bonds to assure faithful performance of duty. At

¹See Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861 (New York: 1954), chapter seven.

first his bond was \$10,000, but at the time of his second bond renewal (1829), he had to post a \$12,000 bond, with two or more sureties certified by a United States judge or attorney.² The simplest way, however, to accomplish the object of giving the agent power to expend public money without misusing it was to keep the money out of his hands. This was done by putting the funds in a distant depository. During his first year of service Boyd's agency funds came from a federal Receiver of Public Monies, usually Governor Cass at Detroit, but after January, 1820, the Bank of Michigan at Detroit served as the depository for most of the remainder of Boyd's career. Since the depository was four hundred miles from Mackinac Island and even farther from Green Bay, the agent could not personally withdraw public funds; withdrawals were made through drafts written by the agent and given to the creditor of the United States. The recipient, in turn, would draw his money from the agency's funds at the established depository. At the beginning of Boyd's service, before the holder of the draft could redeem his money, it had to be approved by the superintendent. Funds

²See Boyd to Cass, May 10, 1824, MSIA, roll 14, p. 267; McKenney to Boyd, October 27, 1829, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 103; Boyd to McKenney, May 12, 1830, ibid., doc. 120; Boyd to Comm. Herring, April 4, 1835, ibid., vol. 8, p. 184; and Boyd to Comm. C.A. Carey, July 25, 1837 ibid., p. 239.

were then put into the agency's account at the depository for withdrawal by the draft holder. By early 1820 the draft no longer needed the approval and endorsement of the superintendent. Under the new system the drafts were taken directly to the bank by the holder for payment, and, in turn, the bank forwarded the draft to the superintendent to enable him to make adjustments on his accounting sheets. As a further means of preventing financial irresponsibility, the agent was required, whenever an expenditure was made, to have the receiver of the draft sign a receipt voucher. In turn, these vouchers were forwarded every quarter to the Treasury Department by the superintendent for examination and verification. Ultimately, every draft had to receive the approval of the War Department and second auditor of the Treasury Department. It should be noted that a voucher was also used in an annuity payment and was to be signed by the chiefs before being sent to Washington.³

This procedure was also designed to prevent an agent's spending more money than was allocated to his

³Cass to John Woodbridge, Detroit, Bank of Michigan, December 6, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 169-70; Cass to Boyd, May 23, 1820, ibid., p. 210; Cass to William Lee, 2nd Auditor, ibid., vol. 5, pp. 369-70; and also see Boyd to Gov. Dodge, October 13, 1839, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, p. 371; and ibid., pp. 127-31.

agency. To assure that the agent did not spend more than he was allocated, the War Department constantly impressed upon him the need for rigid economy. If, however, the agent did spend more than he was allowed, the superintendent would not approve further expenditures and his drafts would not be honored. Normally if additional expenditure was justified the superintendent would ask the Secretary of War for more money, but if none was forthcoming the charge was carried over to the agency's account for the next quarter; and if it was not justified the agent either received a stiff reprimand or faced dismissal, depending upon the circumstances.⁴ At first this system of accountability was not neatly defined; thus further refinements were constantly introduced, but the modifications were minor and did not change the substance of the procedure.

The procedure for verifying the expenditures of the agent did not end with the scrutiny of his drafts and

⁴Cass to Boyd, June 25, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, p. 91; Cass to Boyd, April 30, 1821, ibid., pp. 288-9; Calhoun to Cass, August 3, 1821, ibid., roll 9, p. 69; Cass to Boyd, June 26, 1822, ibid., roll 5, p. 21; McKenney to Cass, June 14, 1830, ibid., roll 26, p. 269; Boyd to William Lee, 2nd Auditor, Treasury Department, August 31, 1823, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 51; Cass to Boyd, December 13, 1827, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 47; and Cass to Boyd, June 25, 1830, ibid., doc. 95.

vouchers; the system of accountability also demanded that he submit quarterly and general abstracts of expenditures. In the early years of Boyd's career, when Lakes travel was unreliable, he was required to make quarter and semi-annual reports -- which generally were rather haphazard in style. Soon this system gave way to a more standardized procedure in which annual rather than semi-annual abstracts were required; this general abstract covered pay to agency personnel, contingencies, rations, presents, and later, annuities. These annual abstracts were to be submitted as soon after August 31st as possible because law required that abstracts of the year's expenditures be submitted to Congress near the beginning of a session.⁵

Many procedural changes were made during the 1820's, and by the early thirties the system had become more standardized. At the end of every quarter Boyd was now required to write up and transmit an abstract of his accounts to the superintendent; this was to be transmitted to Washington along with the vouchers of the quarter. The annual reports also became standardized in form. At the end of the third quarter of each year a "General Abstract" of all expenditures for the past year was

⁵Boyd to Cass, August 10, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 65; and Circular from War Secretary Calhoun to Cass, March 18, 1823, MSIA, roll 12, p. 129.

forwarded to the superintendent for his approval. Along with this general statement was included another abstract of the persons employed at the agency. This statement provided the names of the agency's employees as well as information concerning their duties, salaries, and places of birth. It was also at this time of annual statements that the agent submitted the list of trade licenses granted by him during the course of the past year.⁶

All abstracts, quarterly and annual, were forwarded by the superintendent to the second auditor's office of the Treasury Department for examination and verification. Upon completion of the examination of the abstracts by the auditor's office, the agent was notified of its findings. If there were errors in the accountings the agent was required to correct them and resubmit his accounts for reexamination.⁷ If inaccuracies were still present an investigation into their origin was made, which either absolved the agent or resulted in a demand for his removal from office and the possible confiscation of his bond. The War Department regularly received a report from the auditor concerning the status of the accounts of the Indian agents.⁸

⁶See Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 139-44.

⁷See ibid., p. 150.

⁸Cass to John Bowyer, Green Bay agent, October 11, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 139-40.

During his years as an agent Boyd constantly had difficulty with his accounts. Early in his career he was tersely but firmly reprimanded for submitting his accounts late. In the future, he was instructed by Secretary of War Calhoun, he was to "render them punctually immediately after the close of every quarter." Nevertheless, Boyd continued to be tardy with his accounts over the years.⁹ He was criticized in late 1827 by Governor Cass for his accounting methods and was instructed by the governor in the proper procedures. As a means of rectifying Boyd's irregular financial abstracts, Cass sent the agent copies of the necessary forms, observing that "You will find, that a rigid adherence to them will greatly facilitate the settlement of your accounts." Cass also reproved Boyd: "I very much regret, that you have not forwarded the annual abstracts required by the regulations. I have kept all the others back, waiting for

⁹Quote from War Secretary Calhoun to Boyd, August 7, 1822, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 34; also see Calhoun to Cass, July 24, 1824, MSIA, roll 9, p. 51; Boyd to Cass, October 27, 1824, *ibid.*, roll 15, p. 243; McKenney to Cass, November 30, 1824, *ibid.*, p. 331; William Lee, 2nd Auditor, to Cass, November 18, 1825, *ibid.*, roll 17, p. 289; McKenney to Cass, January 31, 1828, *ibid.*, roll 22, p. 1; and Cass to Boyd, September 11, 1821, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 2, doc. 16.

yours, in hopes the whole returns would be complete."¹⁰ As a result of this letter, Boyd's difficulties with financial matters lessened considerably: his accounting sheets becoming more neat and orderly, and his accounting more systematic and regular. That his troubles with the abstracts, however, were not over is shown in a letter he received from the second auditor's office in late 1841. Boyd was told that his accounts, which were being examined for settlement, "...were found so very unintelligible, irregular and informal, as to make it indispensably necessary for them to be restated."¹¹ The accounts were unintelligible and irregular because they were hiding financial irregularities that brought to an end Boyd's service as an Indian agent. Thus it was the accountability procedure that revealed his abuses and determined his fate as agent.

The superintendent apportioned the sum he received from the War Department to the agencies in his jurisdiction. The money he received varied from year to year: for instance, in fiscal year 1819-1820, \$45,000, and during 1827-1828, \$24,000. Generally, the sum was between

¹⁰Superintendent Cass to Boyd, December 13, 1827, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 3, doc. 47.

¹¹William B. Lewis, 2nd Auditor, to Boyd, October 5, 1841, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 23.

\$30,000 and \$40,000. The superintendent, following the dictates of strictest economy, apportioned his funds according to his own judgment.¹²

The monies given to Boyd were to be used to pay his salary and the salaries of the agency personnel, for various contingency expenses, and for rations and presents for the Indians.¹³ Generally, from 1819 to 1836 Boyd received between \$3,600 and \$4,200 annually for agency expenses.¹⁴ During his five years as a subagent, his agency budget was greatly reduced. His subagency expenses for 1839-40 were limited to \$1,200; this covered his salary of \$750, his interpreter's salary of \$300, and contingency expenses of \$150.¹⁵

¹²Calhoun to Cass, May 29, 1822, MSIA, roll 10, p. 258; McKenney to Cass, March 15, 1827, ibid., roll 20, pp. 217-8; and Cass to Calhoun, May 7, 1819, ibid., roll 4, p. 73.

¹³Gov. Cass to Secretary Calhoun, August 13, 1819, ibid., roll 4, pp. 124-5.

¹⁴Cass to Calhoun, May 4, 1821, ibid., p. 294; Cass to Boyd, June 26, 1822, ibid., roll 5, p. 22; Cass to Boyd, April 29, 1823, ibid., pp. 146-7; Cass to Boyd, April 16, 1826, ibid., roll 18, p. 183; Annual Account of Boyd, October 20, 1829, ibid., roll 25, p. 321; Boyd to Cass, April 28, 1830, ibid., roll 26, p. 161; Annual Abstract, October 1, 1832, to September 30, 1833, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 102-3; and see quarterly abstracts in MSIA for years 1833 to 1836.

¹⁵See Statement of Expenditures, July 22, 1839, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 6, doc. 30.

The sums generally given to Boyd were not very large considering his needs. In fiscal year 1825-26, he was allocated \$3,900 for his agency. From this amount were to be extracted his salary (\$1,400) and those of the agency employees (\$1,000); of the remainder, \$800 was earmarked for presents and rations and \$700 for contingencies. Contingencies included building repairs, a medical allowance (\$100), purchase of coal, iron, and steel for the blacksmiths (\$200-\$300), provisions, cord wood, farming equipment, postage, and stationery.¹⁶

Boyd made several complaints about the inadequacy of funds for his agency. He believed that his post was of such importance that it deserved greater consideration. His pleas were especially strong during his first years as agent when he was instructed to stop Indian journeys to Canada; nevertheless, he demands were not met.

As a matter of fact, things got worse.¹⁷ Because the allocation to the Indian Office was halved to \$100,000 during fiscal year 1821-1822, Cass allocated only \$3,600 to Boyd and instructed him to reduce all outlays to barest essentials. Consequently, the construction of the agency

¹⁶Cass to Boyd, April 16, 1826, MSIA, roll 18, p. 183.

¹⁷Boyd to Calhoun, August 10, 1819, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 67; Boyd to Cass, May 12, 1822, *ibid.*, vol. 2, doc. 27; also see Boyd to Cass, April 28, 1830, MSIA, roll 26, p. 161.

buildings had to be delayed. And with somber realism, Cass concluded a communique with the thought: unless the appropriation was increased, which was highly unlikely, there was no way possible to "be useful to the Indians or to the Government. The Indians can not receive nothing [sic], however pressing may be their needs."¹⁸ Cass took his case to the War Department. He wrote Secretary Calhoun that the great reduction in the Indian Office appropriation would bring much embarrassment to the U.S. Government and his superintendency. He thought that the British would increase their influence among the Indians of Michigan Territory because of their "lavish expenditures;" he feared that their generosity would be contrasted with the meagre American efforts to the detriment of the prestige of the United States. He expressed the view that congressional budgetary retrenchment was imprudent at that time.¹⁹ The superintendent's efforts were rewarded with more money; Boyd was given an additional \$1,500 to enable him to proceed with the construction of the agency buildings.²⁰ Despite this increased allowance, Boyd was

¹⁸Cass to Boyd, April 30, 1821, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 288-9.

¹⁹Cass to Calhoun, May 4, 1821, ibid., pp. 292-4.

²⁰Cass to Boyd, September 11, 1821, ibid., 318; and Cass to Calhoun, October 19, 1821, ibid., pp. 321-2.

operating on a small budget considering the magnitude of his task, which included gaining the Indians' friendship and ending British influence among Indians residing on American soil.

The largest disbursement of agency funds, other than annuity payments, was for salaries of agency employees. Salary payments were made in quarterly installments. As an agent, Boyd received \$1,400 a year while at Mackinac; this sum was increased to \$1,500 when he was transferred to Green Bay. In 1837, however, when he became a sub-agent, his pay dropped to \$750 a year, despite the fact that his responsibilities remained the same.²¹ He was also entitled to obtain provisions from military stores at the same rates as army officers and "in sufficient quantities to meet the actual demands" of his family.²² Furthermore, he was required to insure that his personnel also got their rations regularly from military stores.

The pay to the interpreters varied over the years. When Boyd first arrived at Mackinac, his interpreters were

²¹By the Indian Reorganization Act of 1834, sub-agents received \$750 a year for their services: U.S., Statutes at Large, IV, p. 736.

²²George Gibson, office of the Commander General of Subsistence, Washington, D.C., to George W. Jones, (date unknown), found in the Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 6.

receiving one dollar a day; in addition, they received \$10.50 a month for house rent and fuel, and two rations a day from the military commissariat. By early 1827, the two interpreters were being paid at an annual rate of \$300, and were still receiving two rations a day and a fuel allowance of \$5.25 a month. By 1829 the agency had only one fully qualified interpreter, who was paid only \$250 a year. But the loss of an interpreter was compensated for by the addition of Boyd's son Joshua to the agency's personnel as clerk and assistant interpreter at \$30 a month. At Green Bay, Boyd's interpreters received \$480 a year.²³

The pay rates for the agency blacksmiths also changed over the years. Upon Boyd's arrival at Mackinac, the blacksmith received the same pay as the interpreter. By 1823, however, the blacksmith was receiving only \$300 annually, plus two rations per day. This situation continued until 1829 when the blacksmith's pay was decreased to \$250 per annum, but he still received his two rations per day. When Boyd went to Green Bay he had two blacksmiths at his disposal, each receiving \$480 per annum. While their pay did not change during the next ten years, the nature of their assignments did. By the treaty of

²³See Boyd Papers, WHS: vol. 1, doc. 98; vol. 2, doc. 48; vol. 3, doc. 3, 4, and 77; and vol. 8, pp. 33 and 46.

September 3, 1836, the Menominee had two smiths assigned to them; and they were to be located conveniently among the Wild Rice people.²⁴

Generally, each blacksmith had an assistant, called a striker, to help him in his many chores. Strikers were usually apprentices who were learning or refining their skills as blacksmiths. During the 1820's the strikers were usually paid \$100 per annum and received two rations a day. There was one notable exception to this standard of pay: Canadian born Simon Allard in the early 1820's received \$200 a year and two rations per day. The explanation for this seeming irregularity is that Allard was a journeyman rather than an apprentice. Later in the 1820's he became an agency blacksmith. The pay for the ordinary striker remained at \$100 per year until 1830 when Allard's son, Antoine, received an annual increase of twenty dollars. Still better days were ahead; the Menominee treaty of 1836 provided that the two strikers receive \$240 a year. Boyd's son William became one of them.²⁵

Boyd often used his position to gain government employment for his sons. He could hire the personnel he

²⁴See Boyd Papers, WHS: vol. 2, docs. 13 and 48; vol. 3, docs. 77 and 139; vol. 6, doc. 23; vol. 7, doc. 31; and vol. 8, p. 33.

²⁵See Boyd Papers, WHS: vol. 2, doc. 48; vol. 3, docs. 27, 77, and 139; vol. 7, doc. 24.

needed for the daily operations of the agency -- as long as his appointments were approved and the cost did not exceed his appropriation.²⁶ Given the turnover in the agency's personnel and the influence of the agent with his superiors, the chances of adding relatives to the agency's staff were quite good. As early as 1820 Boyd asked Cass to use his influence to get his son Joshua appointed as subagent at Mackinac. The appointment, he assured Cass, would "be of great relief to me in pursuit of pressing [financial] matters." While this early attempt failed, Boyd's efforts in late 1827 proved to be more fruitful -- Joshua became the agency's clerk and assistant interpreter.²⁷ His employment lasted until 1829; he subsequently became a trader for the American Fur Company. Boyd's efforts on behalf of his family continued at Green Bay, and they became especially urgent after he was reduced to a subagent in early 1837, a year that marked the beginning of a severe depression. It was at this time that he tried to get the government to appoint his son Thomas as agent, or at least subagent, to the Winnebago; Boyd explained that his son was "well known" to the

²⁶Cass to Boyd, June 25, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, p. 91.

²⁷Boyd to Gov. Cass, November 15, 1820, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 111; and McKenney to Boyd, March 11, 1828, MSIA, roll 23, p. 89.

Winnebago, not only as his son, but also as an "honest and human" trader.²⁸ Boyd's efforts were rewarded and Thomas became the subagent to the Winnebago at Fort Winnebago; his service lasted two years until the sub-agency was moved west of the Mississippi.

After Boyd had paid his agency personnel, the remainder of his appropriation could be spent at his discretion.²⁹ Despite this discretionary power, the agent's spending was largely shaped by the needs of the agency. Much of Boyd's funds were spent on essential services such as renting an agency house and the blacksmith's shop and coal house during the first five years of service; outlays were also made for medical expenses, building repairs, and postage and mail carrier fees.³⁰ Other expenditures included \$8.00 for having coffins made for two Indians,

²⁸ Boyd to Comm. Harris, April 30, 1837, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, doc. 24.

²⁹ Cass to John Hays, agent at Fort Wayne, October 11, 1820, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 228-9.

³⁰ For evidence on renting agency facilities see Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 97, and vol. 2, docs. 15 and 68; evidence on maintaining agency buildings can be found in ibid., vol. 3, docs. 20, 26, 33, and 126; evidence on postage costs: ibid., vol. 3, docs. 7 and 129, and vol. 4, doc. 28.

\$4.00 for the boat passage of two Indian chiefs from the Green Bay area to Mackinac and return, and payments to Indians for delivering dispatches from Cass to Schoolcraft during the late fall when the upper Lakes began to freeze.³¹

From the agency funds Boyd also had to purchase supplies for agency operations. Among his primary needs was a large amount of wood for the agency house through the long cold winters. But in pursuit of economy, the government restricted his allowance in the 1830's to seventy-five cords a year -- too small an amount, Boyd thought. His annual consumption in the mid-thirties had not "been less than one hundred and fifty" cords.³² As a result of the government's economy measure Boyd was forced to buy wood with his own money. Resourcefully, he began to use a pair of oxen that belonged to the Menominee model farm, but were not being used, to gather and haul fire wood.³³ Another essential outlay was for coal, iron,

³¹Receipt of payment to James Finch, August 29, 1820, ibid., vol. 1, doc. 99; Receipt of payment to Captain A. Walker, June 26, 1827, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 16; and Receipts of payment, November 22 and 30, 1830, ibid., docs. 130 and 131.

³²Boyd to Comm. Carey A. Harris, September 17, 1837, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 245-6; and also see: William B. Lewis, 2nd Auditor, Treasury Department, to Gov. Porter, December 31, 1832, MSIA, roll 31, p. 809; and Sec. Cass to Lewis, April 19, 1832, ibid., p. 811.

³³Boyd to Harris, September 17, 1837, Boyd Papers, vol. 8, pp. 245-6.

steel, and equipment for the blacksmith's operations. Stationery and other office supplies were also needed. Other requirements included agricultural equipment for the Indians, as well as nail, shingles, shovels, trowels, bricks, lime, paint and many other items for the maintenance of the agency buildings.³⁴

Boyd was instructed to keep an exact accounting of all presents and provisions distributed to the Indians. This was indeed a most difficult task considering the hundreds of issuances each year and the thousands of Indians under his supervision. Although the gifts were distributed by the interpreters, Boyd had to be present to assure proper distribution and accounting.³⁵

Initially, Boyd purchased the provisions and presents locally, if possible, to save the cost of transportation from the East. Many items, such as fish, corn, and other agricultural products, could easily be bought locally, and items like flour and salt could be secured from merchants at Detroit, Mackinac and Green Bay.

³⁴Receipt of August 31, 1827, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 31; receipt of payment, September 19, 1827, ibid., doc. 32; receipt of October 12, 1827, ibid., doc. 38; receipt of August 31, 1830, ibid., doc. 125; and payment receipt to the American Fur Company, June 31, 1828, ibid., doc. 22.

³⁵Circular, Cass to Agents at Michilimackinac, Green Bay, and Chicago, October 7, 1819, MSIA, roll 4, pp. 121-2; and Boyd to Cass, August 10, 1819, ibid., roll 1, p. 67; and Boyd to Calhoun, January 20, 1828, ibid., roll 22, pp. 57-9.

Many different goods and provisions were given to Indians. Hats, tin pails, brass kettles, gunpowder, soap, candles, strouds, cloth, ribbons, blankets, and pipes were among the goods distributed. The amount spent for such items was, however, much smaller than that spent for rations. The rations usually consisted of corn or flour, pork or beef, bread, salt, tobacco and whiskey. Not all of these things, it should be noted, were distributed at the same time. For instance, in 1820 Boyd bought 29 barrels of pork (\$348), 47 barrels of flour (\$211) and 310 gallons of whiskey (\$165) for distribution among the Indians.³⁶ Although it is not surprising that he was distributing "fire water" at this time, the quantity is greater than one might expect. This can be explained in terms of Boyd's efforts to combat British influence. Over the years he distributed alcohol among his charges in small amounts; its use seemed necessary to gain and hold the Indian's ear and friendship. At this point it is worth reiterating that presents and rations were given to the Indians primarily to assure their friendship and secondarily to satisfy their needs.³⁷ For instance, during

³⁶See receipt of June 28, 1820, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 1, doc. 94.

³⁷Boyd to Cass, August 10, 1819, ibid., doc. 67; Receipt of payment, September 15, 1820, ibid., doc. 104; and receipt of payment, June 24, 1827, ibid., vol. 3, doc. 15.

the first four months he was stationed at Green Bay -- when the Black Hawk War was in progress -- Boyd issued 5,873 pounds of pork, 8,201 pounds of flour, 103 bushels of corn, and thirty and one-half gallons of whiskey to keep the Indians of his agency peaceful and friendly to American efforts. All of these provisions except the corn were drawn from stores at Fort Howard. By this time Boyd was obtaining all his rations from military stores, because it was cheaper for the government to buy large quantities of meat, flour, whiskey, tobacco, salt, and even corn, than to have the agent purchase such items locally.³⁸

In spite of the government's diplomatic aims, Boyd was instructed early in his years of service not to distribute rations indiscriminately among the Indians. Because distribution was too costly and had the effect of making Indians dependent upon the government, he was to issue rations only when it was necessary, such as at councils, treaty meetings, and annuity assemblages.³⁹ It should be noted that although the government did have a problem in respect to Indian dependence, Boyd did not have to worry about indiscriminate distribution because he

³⁸Abstract of provisions issued June through September, 1832, September 30, 1832, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 32-5.

³⁹Calhoun to Cass, September 15, 1819, MSIA, roll 7, pp. 193-6.

rarely had excessive amounts to distribute. Even the 2,400 pounds of pork and 3,200 pounds of flour issued during the last quarter of 1832 were insufficient to meet the needs of the Indians, who were steadily becoming less self-supporting.⁴⁰

Increasingly during the 1830's, annuities supplied most of the provisions given to the Indians, who became increasingly dependent upon them. Boyd saw this happen to the Menominee; in 1840 he remarked: "These people in general do not raise enough from the ground to support their families two months in the year. They look to the annuity as their main support and are consequently idle and dispirited."⁴¹ Boyd followed the provisions of the 1834 law, which required him to draw the annuities from the Commissariat, Fort Howard, distribute them among the Indians with the help of his interpreter, and send the payment receipt to the Indian Office and second auditor of the Treasury Department. During the Menominee annuity gathering of 1839, Boyd distributed \$26,000 in currency and \$3,860 worth of provisions provided for by the treaty; the provisions were 250 barrels of flour, 73 barrels of pork, 30 barrels of salt, and 2,000 pounds of tobacco.⁴²

⁴⁰Abstract of provisions issued to the Indians, October to December 1832, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 8, pp. 54-5.

⁴¹Boyd's General Abstract of 1840, ibid., pp. 410-1.

⁴²See Provisions issued, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 62; and Statement of Expenditures, July 22, 1839, ibid., doc. 30.

It is interesting to note that no whiskey was given by the government during this assemblage and the one the following year. Its stoppage may have induced the Indians to squander their annuities by buying whiskey from private vendors.

It was Boyd's involvement in the 1839 annuity payment that led to the end of his government service. Accused of irregularities, he faced the biggest predicament of his career. His accusers were several Menominee chiefs, the Grignon family, John Lawe, and the special legal agent of the Menominee, Morgan L. Martin.⁴³ They were irked because, as an article in the Wisconsin Democrat stated, "upwards of six thousand five franc pieces were paid" to the Menominee. The newspaper added that "the principal sufferers" of "this Beautiful operation are our merchants," who were "compelled to take francs for more than their worth." Consequently, Boyd was charged with fraud. This newspaper and Martin demanded an investigation of the swindle and other abuses during the annuity payment.⁴⁴

⁴³Payment receipt for \$250 to Martin for "legal services" to the Menominee, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 46.

⁴⁴See Martin to Gov. Dodge, December 24, 1839, Martin Papers, WHS, box 5; also see Martin to Dodge, December 24, 1839, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 6, doc. 58.

These charges were made because Boyd's accusers wanted him out of office so that they might get one of their own as his replacement.⁴⁵ They probably knew that he had recommended the Menominee's removal westward. Such a recommendation was against their interests. The franc controversy thus became a means of besmirching Boyd's reputation and removing him from office.

The situation was very confusing. The distribution of franc pieces was not a common policy of the War Department, but it was probably done because hard American currency was not circulating freely during the depressed late 1830's. That the Green Bay merchants were compelled to take the francs was not Boyd's concern, unless it could be proven that he was responsible for the substitution of francs for dollars. And this they could not do.

Rather quickly an investigation began. Governor Henry Dodge immediately instituted "a rigid examination" of the annuity payment. In addition, the War Department soon initiated its own investigation and demanded that Boyd explain his side of the controversy. The besieged agent quickly responded to the charges and also had

⁴⁵Morgan L. Martin, Green Bay lawyer, to J.S. Fisk, February 20, 1839, Morgan L. Martin Papers, WHS, box 5.

eyewitnesses submit testimony in his support.⁴⁶

The testimony of the eyewitnesses did not completely exonerate Boyd. Captain M.E. Merrill testified that the payment proceedings went too quickly and that certain Indians received extra shares. Both statements were accurate. Another eyewitness, Alexander J. Irwin, explained to Commissioner of Indian Affairs T. Hartley Crawford that Boyd proceeded with the payment quickly because of his "enfeebled state of health" and his desire to allow the Indians a speedy return to their homes. He admitted that some Indians were paid more than others; some extra funds had been divided among the Menominee chiefs at the end of the payment. Irwin, who was to be the new agent if the Grignons had their way, also stated that in "the hurry of business," and "the confusion of the moment," it had been discovered that a "sum of between three and four hundred dollars" still remained in Boyd's possession. (Boyd, however, claimed that all the monies had been given to the Indians.) Irwin suggested that the agent be allowed to retain this money, which had come to

⁴⁶Gov. Dodge to Boyd, December 24, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 55; Comm. T.H. Crawford to Boyd, December 31, 1839, ibid., doc. 56; and Boyd to Crawford, January 31, 1840, ibid., doc. 61. And for eyewitness accounts see Alexander J. Irwin to Gov. Dodge, January 8, 1840, ibid., doc. 58; Captain M.E. Merrill to Dodge, January 8, 1840, ibid.; Charles R. Brush to Dodge, January 13, 1840, ibid.; and Irwin to Comm. Crawford, January 30, 1840, ibid., doc. 60.

him by accident, in payment of a claim Boyd had outstanding against the Menominee. Such testimony naturally encouraged further investigation.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, Boyd moved to defend himself. He called the charges "slanderous and unjust," and claimed that they were not made by the Menominee people, but by their "unprincipled and interested" friends and advisers.⁴⁸ He told his superiors that the motive behind the actions of Morgan L. Martin, who was "aided by some half dozen half Breeds, was to supplant me in the Agency and ultimately to give these Rascals the entire control of the Menominee annuity for 20 years!" He also got six Menominee chiefs to support him by signing a memorial claiming that he had kept the Menominee from losing all their annuities to four traders.⁴⁹ Boyd even got support from the chiefs of the Oneida in the Green Bay area. Calling him a good and honest man, whom they trusted and respected, they asked that he be continued as their agent. They wanted their "faithful agent and...valued friend" to stay on as their protector because they feared that the evil white men

⁴⁷Dodge to Boyd, January 31, 1840, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 64; and J.G. Knapp to Boyd, March 21, 1840, ibid., doc. 65.

⁴⁸Boyd to Comm. T.H. Hartley, February 17, 1840, ibid., vol. 8, p. 390.

⁴⁹Part of an undated letter, ca 1840-1, by Boyd to the War Department, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 83; and part of an undated letter by Boyd to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, ca 1840, ibid., doc. 93.

would crowd around and defraud them. "The agent to protect us," they said "must stand between us and them. He must turn his back to them while his face is towards us. This places him between two fires." And although they recognized that Boyd was "scorched" by the annuity problem they still preferred him as the protector of their interests.⁵⁰ Such support greatly strengthened Boyd's case, but events were working against him.

The investigation continued into 1841 and pressures began to mount. Like bloodhounds, the federal investigators continued their search into Boyd's predicament. His agency accounts were scrutinized and found to be made in a most "informal manner;" they were considered defective and unreliable, and he was requested to make "necessary correction." When Boyd failed to do so, he was warned that "unless the requisite abstracts and accounts current are speedily furnished and properly made out, and the balances regularly stated from quarter to quarter, your accounts will not only have to be suspended, but I shall feel constrained, in the discharge of an imperative duty, to report the facts for the consideration and action of the Secretary of War."⁵¹ Boyd's troubles continued as he

⁵⁰Principal chiefs of the Christian and Orchard Parties, Oneida Nation, to Comm. Crawford, February 24, 1840, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 63.

⁵¹Comm. Crawford to Boyd, June 16, 1841, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 11; and see William B. Lewis, 2nd Auditor, to Crawford, June 16, 1841, ibid., doc. 10.

was tardy once again transmitting his financial statements. Worse yet, he had errors in his accounts for the third and fourth quarters of 1841. Certainly he was wearing thin the patience of his supervisors; he was requested in early 1842 to send monthly abstracts of his expenditures with accompanying vouchers. He was also warned that noncompliance would be reported at once to the War Department.⁵²

The end was near for the sixty-three year old agent. Under increasing pressures, he resigned his office on March 1, 1842. Citing age, ill-health, and poverty, he explained that he was worn down; and referring to his difficulties in recent years, he maintained that he had "been slandered and persecuted," and that his "very poverty" bespoke his honesty.⁵³ No watch nor citation was given to this public servant of twenty-three years; instead, the Treasury Department, after a close examination of his disbursements between September 30, 1838, and March 1, 1842, determined that a balance of \$7,256.13 was due to the United States.⁵⁴ Notified of his debt in late

⁵²James D. Doty, superintendent of Indian affairs, to Boyd, February 14, 1842, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 44.

⁵³Boyd to Daniel Parker, Boyd's friend in the War Department, March 1, 1842, ibid., doc. 45; Parker handed in Boyd's resignation.

⁵⁴William B. Lewis, 2nd Auditor, to Boyd, late subagent at Green Bay, December 16, 1842, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 46.

1842, Boyd responded in early 1843 by writing to Henry Dodge, now Wisconsin Territory's delegate in Washington, for assistance in settling this matter; accompanying his letter Boyd enclosed a series of statements, letters, and explanatory vouchers supporting his case. He told Dodge that his balance was "caused by the rejection and suspension of certain items of debit in my account." Nevertheless, his debt remained.⁵⁵

At this point it is appropriate to ask what led to this debt. Did Boyd's tendency to bungle his accounts cause this situation or did he consciously take public funds for his own purposes? Having noted his tendency to deal carelessly with monetary matters, one may surmise that a part of his debt was a result of his own mismanagement. But it is rather difficult to comprehend that this accounted for over seven thousand dollars. If it was not carelessness, was he simply stealing from the government? Obviously, he misused government funds, yet circumstances help to explain his actions.

Good fortune seemingly came to Boyd when he was transferred to Green Bay, because the area was in its initial stages of Americanization. As settlers moved in

⁵⁵Boyd to H. Dodge, Washington, January 19, 1843, ibid., doc. 47.

the value of land rose and brought great opportunities for land speculation. Evidence indicates that this great frontier practice consumed a part of Boyd's energies. During the mid-thirties he began to purchase plots in the Madison, Milwaukee, and Green Bay areas.⁵⁶ His contemporaries at Green Bay, such as Morgan L. Martin, James D. Doty, and the Grignon family, were also speculating and were well aware of Boyd's activities. The speculative bubble burst as a result of President Andrew Jackson's specie circular of 1836, which aimed at stopping non-resident proprietorship and speculation, but only undermined a bloated banking structure that was erected on unsound financial practices. With the ensuing Panic of 1837 the American economy tumbled into its second great depression in twenty years. This nationwide phenomenon affected Boyd as he was left with land that was nearly impossible to sell.

Having been demoted to subagent in early 1837, he received half his usual salary and consequently faced

⁵⁶ John F. Schmerhorn, Tecumseh, Michigan, to Boyd, September 30, 1836, ibid., vol. 5, doc. 13; Boyd to Louis Grignon, September 10, 1837, ibid., doc. 38; James D. Doty to Boyd, July 29, undated (ca. 1836-7), ibid., vol. 7, doc. 82.

financial disaster as the depression deepened. In mid-1837, he tried to sell a portion of his land at Milwaukee even if it required selling it at a reduced price. To this his agent, Bryon Kilbourne, responded:

Although the property possesses much real value, and might under other circumstances be sold at a fair price, yet money is now so scarce and sales of real estate are now so limited that it is out of the question to realize any considerable amount of cash from the sale of your land at present - even at the reduced price you mention.⁵⁷

Hard times had indeed hit the frontier.

At this point it is worthwhile to speculate about what happened to Boyd. His land speculations had suffered because of the depression. As the depression deepened his situation probably worsened considerably. This would be especially true if he had obtained bank loans to finance his speculations. Very much concerned with providing security for his family, he might have used government monies to pay his loans and strengthen his personal finances. Experiencing ill-health, Boyd, who was in his late fifties, might have been motivated by a desire to provide security for his family.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Quote from Kilbourne to Boyd, August 3, 1837, ibid., vol. 5, doc. 32; and see Boyd to Kilbourne, Milwaukee, June 10, 1837, ibid., doc. 29.

⁵⁸Boyd to James D. Doty, Wisconsin Territory delegate at Washington, February 1, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 7.

Although it is not possible to give an exact explanation of his misuse of government funds, it is possible to state that Boyd was not using his subagency funds correctly. In late summer 1839 because his personnel were distressed, he asked Governor Dodge for \$1,000 "to pay arrearages due to the Blacksmiths and assistants for year 1837." This was an odd request and highly irregular because he was not permitted to use funds designated for a specific outlay, such as salaries, for other purposes.⁵⁹ He explained to Dodge that if he had already received these funds "they must have been expended in meeting demands against the Department for 1838, as those of 1838 have been employed to meet those of 1839." Apparently, he had used the salary monies for other purposes.

It was also during this same period that he complained that his subagency's contingency allowance was too small. He argued that it was impossible to take care of the subagency's business with \$150 a year. How does one, he asked, furnish enough cords of wood, and pay for the paper, ink, quills, postage, and the various required forms from this sum?⁶⁰

⁵⁹Quote from Boyd to Gov. Dodge, September 4, 1839, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 355-6; and see Comm. Hartley to Boyd, July 17, 1841, ibid., vol. 7, doc. 15.

⁶⁰Boyd to Dodge, August 25, 1839, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 352-3.

During these troubled times Boyd submitted a claim to the United States for compensation for past services. He claimed \$350 for travel allowances: for his expenses during trips -- three times a week -- to the Navarino post office four and a half miles away. Although the Treasury Department approved it, the Indian Office rejected it because the trips should have been financed from the agency's contingency fund.⁶¹ Meanwhile, Boyd began to charge the government \$12.50 per quarter to provide "a man and horse" to bring public documents (and presumably his private mail) from the post office. He kept the money himself since he performed the services.⁶² In January 1840 he submitted another claim for past services. He sought \$450 for mail transportation from June 1832 to March 1841, \$150 for expenses and damages to his properties incurred during the treaty negotiations with the Menominee in 1832, \$100 for the service of a man and horse during the summer of 1832 when he was equipping and supplying the Menominee for their expedition against the Sauk-Fox, and \$21 for repairs to the agency house.

⁶¹See Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 5, docs. 69 and 71; and Comm. Crawford to Gov. H. Dodge, March 16, 1839, ibid., vol. 6, doc. 12.

⁶²See ibid., vol. 7, doc. 28.

Although his claims added up to \$721, Boyd's figure was \$811.65.⁶³ There is no record that the claim was ever approved and paid.

In the early fall of 1840, when he was already deep in a financial imbroglio with the government, Boyd sought economic relief from his friends. He wrote to Ramsay Crooks and Samuel Abbott, the agent for the American Fur Company at Mackinac, but both were encountering their own financial problems and were unable to help.⁶⁴ Again in late 1841, when his difficulties with the government were coming to a head, he turned to them for assistance, and once again they were unable to provide any.⁶⁵

Since there was no relief from his economic woes and since government pressures were increasing, Boyd submitted his resignation effective March 1, 1842. Ironically, he left the Indian service as he entered it: humiliated and impoverished. Furthermore, he faced the realization that he had little or no chance of restoring his reputation and financial security since his age and health were working against him: sixty-three years old and failing in health, his future was indeed bleak.

⁶³See ibid., vol. 7, doc. 28.

⁶⁴S. Abbott to Boyd, October 14, 1840, ibid., doc. 79.

⁶⁵S. Abbott to Boyd, September 8 and October 21, 1841, ibid., vol. 7, docs. 20 and 40.

EPILOGUE

THE LAST YEARS

Like the early period of his life, Boyd's last few years were spent in obscurity. A sad and broken man, he wrote few letters and left little record of his activities. Although he was probably a very sick man, he broke the silence twice in mid-1844 when he tried to raise money. In June he attempted to mortgage his farm and property for twelve to fifteen hundred dollars; simultaneously, he tried to get a loan.¹ There is no evidence that either effort was successful. During this period he once again tried to borrow money from Abbott and Crooks, but since the fur business was in a steep decline, both had their own problems and could do nothing for him.²

Boyd's world, however, had not completely collapsed. His wife's relatives came to the rescue. Early in 1844 Harriet Boyd made an agreement with Charles Francis Adams whereby she received a five-year loan of \$1,500; in return she relinquished to him her "right and title" to the

¹Boyd to W.S. Baird, Green Bay, June 9, 1844, Boyd Papers, WHS, vol. 7, doc. 52.

²S. Abbott to Boyd, July 29, 1844, ibid., doc. 53.

interest for five years on a \$5,000 trust fund willed to her by her brother, Thomas B. Johnson.³ Some relief thus came to Boyd, but it was not enough.

Late in August 1846 Boyd died owing more than seven hundred dollars to the government.⁴ This situation continued until 1850 when James D. Doty, who had not been well liked by Boyd, tried to settle the account. Doty, a member of Congress from Wisconsin, sought the settlement for the sake of Boyd's children and the honor of Boyd and his wife -- Harriet Boyd had died earlier in 1850.⁵ He got the debt reduced to \$215, but was unable to have it completely erased despite the fact that Boyd's estate was "wholly insolvent."⁶

Insolvency was not a fitting memorial to a man who had given twenty-three years to Indian service. He was not gifted with extraordinary talents and he came to the

³Contract between Harriet Boyd and C.F. Adams, March 16, 1844, ibid., doc. 51; Adams was the executor of the will.

⁴George Boyd, Jr., (the son), to S. Abbott, August 29, 1846, ibid., doc. 57.

⁵J.D. Doty to George Boyd, Jr., (the son), March 8, 1850, ibid., doc. 63.

⁶Doty to P. Clayton, 2nd Auditor, Treasury Department, April 23, 1850, ibid., doc. 64; and P. Clayton to Representative Doty, the legal representative of the Boyd family, July 20, 1850, ibid., doc. 66.

Lakes frontier as a political appointee who was blemished by personal failure, hounded by debts, encumbered by an ignorance of the West and its inhabitants, and hampered by inexperience in an environment where experience was a key to success. Quickly he gained experience and learned the ways of the frontier, but success was still denied him as fortune turned against him and left him an impoverished and broken man. He had learned what most people experience: man is not the master of his own fate.

During his years in the Indian service Boyd made no notable contributions to Indian policy or Indian relations. A close examination of his official acts show a lack-luster performance of duties as he was not particularly effective in executing Indian policy. Furthermore, he did not possess much personal influence over his charges; thus as a field representative of the federal government, he could not excel as a frontier diplomat. But he did not have to excel. He was hundreds of miles from his superintendent, a thousand miles from Washington, and his remoteness protected his daily activities from scrutiny by his superiors. Administrative bunglings, well illustrated by several of his financial reports, were easily corrected and then forgotten, especially since he had family connections with John Quincy Adams. Remote from the inspection of his superiors and shielded by his tie to the Adams family, Boyd did not have to demonstrate

a high degree of competence. The overpowering position of the American Fur Company also prevented him from executing his duties energetically. Although lax in his performance of public duties, he was a man who was constantly striving to gain financial strength and security. He had a deep concern for his family, and it was probably this concern that led him to misuse government funds and thus brought an end to his Indian service.

In concluding this case study, it is worthwhile to consider the role of an Indian agent in federal Indian relations. As a field representative for the American government it was his responsibility to execute federal Indian laws and follow the orders of his superiors. Federal policy, however, put the agent in a difficult position. He had to deal with the Indians daily and gain their confidence, and then use his influence to persuade the Indians to do things that were, in many cases, alien to their interests and customs.

Inherent in American Indian policy was an arrogance toward the first Americans. White Americans generally believed that the Indians were inferior and primitive peoples who had no rights to their land when white Americans wanted it, and whose ultimate salvation would come from their giving up their tribal customs and becoming acculturated to the ways of the white man.

The agent was a frontier diplomat who was expected to keep the Indians peaceful while they were being fleeced.

And fleeced they were by a society which coveted Indian lands. The frontier was a vast area of opportunity for the white man and the Indians were an obstacle to be removed by whatever means possible. It was hoped that they could be dispossessed peacefully, but it was not uncommon for the American government to use force, coercion, and deceit. The agent who was sympathetic to the Indians' plight was consequently encumbered by an Indian policy that aimed at opening the wilderness for the use of white men, and only secondarily considered the Indians' welfare. Could an agent help the Indians in any way? Other than moderating the disruption of their cultures, it is doubtful that there was much an agent could do. The American people were too aggressive and federal Indian policy was too one-sided. Consequently, one may conclude that it was impossible for an agent to serve equally well the needs of the Indians and the goals of American Indian policy. As a frontier diplomat he primarily served the United States and its destiny. And American destiny was in conflict with the best interests of the Indians: the Indian's decline was a prerequisite to the white man's progress.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

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Two sources form the backbone of this study. The first is the eight volumes of George Boyd's papers, which are mostly his official correspondence, at the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison. The second is the National Archives File Microcopy of the Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs, which is available at the Michigan State University Library, East Lansing. The superintendency papers are fundamental to any examination of the government's execution of Indian policy in the Great Lakes region. Boyd's papers contain much official correspondence and many documents not found in the archival materials.

Other important manuscript collections that give breadth to any study of Indian affairs in the Michigan Territory during Boyd's service are the papers of Lewis Cass and Henry Rowe Schoolcraft at the Burton Historical Collection in the Detroit Public Library. Both are extremely valuable in understanding the government's administration of Indian affairs.

Any study of early federal Indian administration also necessitates the use of publications of the United States Government. These include the Statutes at Large, and the

American State Papers: Indian Affairs, serials 07 and 08, and American State Papers: Military Affairs, serials 016 and 017. The 1828 Report to the Secretary of War by Lewis Cass and William Clark, U.S., House of Representatives, State Papers, 2nd Session, 20th Congress, doc. 107, serial 186, is another essential document. Census reports also proved to be very useful.

Other basic works for the examination of the government's role and activities on the Michigan frontier are Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties: 1778-1883 (New York: 1972 reprint), Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States: Michigan Territory, vols. X-XII (Washington: 1942, 1943, and 1945), and Felix S. Cohen, Federal Indian Law (Albuquerque, New Mexico: 1973 reprint).

Several secondary works make important contributions to understanding the government's role and activities. An excellent article which treats the development and role of Indian agents in dealing with the first Americans is Ruth A. Gallaher, "The Indian Agent in the United States Before 1850," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, vol. 14 (1916), pp. 3-55. Francis Paul Prucha, in his work American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Lincoln, Nebraska: 1970) presents a thorough study of American Indian policies during their experimental years; this work, however, does little to show the impact of these policies

upon the Indian. Ora Brooks Peake, A History of the United States Factory System: 1795-1822 (Denver: 1954) is a useful study, although it is poorly organized and provides no thorough understanding of the factory system and its effect upon trade. Two essential administrative histories are Laurence F. Schmeckbier, The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities and Organizations (Baltimore: 1954; a publication of the "Institute for Government Research"), and Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861 (New York: 1954). White's work is a full and scholarly study of a subject that is not of itself very interesting, but that is basic to the understanding of the development of bureaucratic institutions. A recent scholarly contribution to administrative history is Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business: The Settlement and Administration of American Public Lands, 1789-1837 (New York: 1968). Other significant and scholarly accounts that deal with the public domain are: Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies (Madison: 1965 reprint), and Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (Lincoln, Nebraska: 1962); also useful are Paul W. Gates, "The Role of the Land Speculator in Western Development," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, July 1942, vol. LXVI, and Allan and Margaret Bogue, "Profits and the Frontier Speculator," Journal of Economic History, March 1957, vol. XVIII.

Many important journals, reports, and narratives were left by contemporaries of Boyd who participated in Indian affairs and administration. These include: Thomas L. McKenney's Memoirs, Official and Personal; with Sketches of Travels among the Northern and Southern Indians... (New York: 1846) and Sketches of a Tour to the Lakes, of the Character and Customs of the Chippeway Indians, and of the incidents connected with the Treaty of Fond du Lac (Barre, Mass.: 1972 reprint); and H.R. Schoolcraft's Personal Memoirs of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indians on the American Frontier...1812 to 1842 (Philadelphia: 1845), Narrative Journal of Travels Through the Northwestern Region of the United States...to the Sources of the Mississippi in the year 1820, edited by Mentor L. Williams (E. Lansing, Michigan: 1953), and Oneota, or Characteristics of the Red Race of America (New York: 1845). The works of both men are generally quite insightful about Indians and Indian relations. McKenney also made an important contribution to the understanding of the American Indian when he teamed with James Hall and produced The Indian Tribes of North America, 3 volumes (Edinburgh: 1934 reprint). A valuable study by a resourceful and observant man is Jedidiah Morse's A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs...1822 (New Haven: 1822).

Boyd's contemporaries of the upper Great Lakes region left many significant accounts and reminiscences which, in many cases, were very useful. These include A Narrative

of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner...during thirty years residence among the Indians in the Interior of North America, edited by Dr. Edwin James (Minneapolis: 1956 reprint), and Mrs. John H. Kinzie (Juliette Augusta Magill) Wau-Bun: The "Early Day" in the North-West (Chicago: 1932 reprint). Wau-Bun is easily criticized because it tends to be romantic, but it is useful for the light it throws on the social aspects of frontier life. Valuable reminiscences, also treating social topics very well, include three pieces by Elizabeth T. Baird: "Indian Customs and Early Recollections," WHC, vol. IX, pp. 303-26; "Reminiscences of Early Days on Mackinac Island," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 17-64; and "Reminiscences of Life in Territorial Wisconsin," WHC, vol. XV, pp. 205-63. And an invaluable statement on Wisconsin fur trade from the mid-1700's to mid-1830's is Augustin Grignon's "Seventy-two Years Recollections of Wisconsin," WHC, vol. III, pp. 197-295.

There are numerous other useful reminiscences: Henry S. Baird (the husband of Elizabeth T. Baird), "Recollections of the Early History of Northern Wisconsin," WHC, vol. IV, pp. 197-221; James W. Biddle, "Recollections of Green Bay in 1816-17," WHC, vol. I, pp. 49-63; Colonel Ebenezer Childs, "Recollections of Wisconsin since 1820," WHC, vol. IV, pp. 153-95; Albert G. Ellis, "Fifty-Four Years Recollections of Men and Events in Wisconsin," WHC, vol.

VII, pp. 207-68; and James H. Lockwood, "Early Times and Events in Wisconsin," WHC, vol. II, pp. 98-196.

Secondary accounts that trace the histories of important locations in the upper Lakes country also have made significant contributions to this dissertation. The most important ones include Samuel F. Cook, Drummond Island: The Story of the British Occupation, 1815-1828 (Lansing, Michigan: 1896), Walter Havighurst, Three Flags at the Straits: The Forts of Mackinac (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 1966), Ella Hoes Neville, et al., Historic Green Bay (Green Bay, Wisconsin: 1893), The Reverend J.A. VanFleet, Old and New Mackinac (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 1880), and Meade C. Williams, Early Mackinac (St. Louis: 1901).

As a long time public servant, Boyd had many contacts with national and territorial politicians. The Adams Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, is a huge collection of this great family; I made use of the microfilm edition at the Clark Library, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant. A collection of documents that sheds much light on early Wisconsin and Green Bay is found in the Morgan L. Martin Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison. A modern biography of Martin would add to our knowledge of Green Bay and Wisconsin. A useful source is The Papers of John C. Calhoun, edited by W. Edwin Hemphill, vols. II-VI (Columbus, South Carolina: 1963-1973). Other published

document collections helpful in this study include: The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb; The Writings of James Monroe, edited by Stanislaus M. Hamilton; The Papers of Henry Clay, edited by James F. Hopkins; and Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, edited by J. Franklin Jameson, in vol. II of the American Historical Association Report for 1899. Also very useful is A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents: 1789-1897, edited by James D. Richardson.

Boyd himself is dealt with in "Sketch of George and James M. Boyd," by Herbert B. Tanner, WHC, vol. XII, pp. 266-9. This short essay by the husband of one of Boyd's granddaughters presents essential information about Boyd.

There are numerous biographies of many of Boyd's contemporaries. There are two modern biographies of Lewis Cass: Frank B. Woodford, Lewis Cass: The Last Jefferson (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 1950) is a good, full-length biography, but lacks citations; Willis F. Dunbar's Lewis Cass (Grand Rapids: 1970), is a short, scholarly, sympathetic, and satisfying biography. James D. Horan has written a brief and appealing biography of Thomas L. McKenney to accompany his work, The McKenney-Hall Portrait Gallery of American Indians (New York: 1972); a full and scholarly treatment of this important figure of early Indian administration is Herman J. Viola, Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy, 1816-

1830 (Chicago: 1974), but this biography was published too late to make a contribution to my work. Alice E. Smith's James Duane Doty: Frontier Promoter (Madison: 1954) is a solid biography of this Wisconsin politician and it provides much useful detail about Wisconsin affairs during Boyd's years at the Bay. Other biographies that made noteworthy contributions to this study are: Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun: American Portrait (Boston: 1950); Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828, vol. I (New York: 1944); W.P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill: 1946); and Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York: 1971).

A powerful political, as well as economic, force of the upper Lakes region during Boyd's Indian service was the fur trade. An important collection of documents dealing with the fur trade and other aspects of early Wisconsin history is the Louise P. Kellogg Papers, (Notes and transcriptions in relationship to Indian Treaties, 1794-1836; transcriptions and translations in relationship to social and military Wisconsin history, 1805-1848), Mss. HR, Box no. 42, Wisconsin Historical Society. One of the most important sources on fur trade in the upper Lakes region in the post-War of 1812 period is the Mackinac letter books, 1816-1830, of the American Fur Company; these three volumes are found at the Wisconsin Historical Society; a microfilm edition is available at

the Clark Library, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant. Another essential document source is "The Fur Trade in Wisconsin, 1812-1825," WHC, vol. XX, pp. 1-393.

Secondary accounts on fur trade include Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob Astor: Business Man, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1931), John Upton Terrell, Furs by Astor (New York: 1963), and David Lavender, The Fist in the Wilderness (Garden City, New York: 1964). Porter's work gives a full, non-critical treatment of Astor's business interests with much coverage of his trade operations; it is not, however, very well written or organized. Terrell's work is a highly readable account that is not friendly to Astor; it is also without footnotes, and appears to be largely indebted to Porter's work. Lavender's study is a balanced and full treatment of Astor's fur empire; it is a comprehensive effort which goes deeper than Porter and Terrell in understanding the activities of the American Fur Company. Ida Amanda Johnson's The Michigan Fur Trade (Lansing: 1919) is still helpful although superficial and dated. "The Michigan Fur Trade," by Wayne E. Stevens, in Michigan History, October, 1945, vol. XXIX, pp. 489-505, is scholarly and informative.

After the fur trade had brought great cultural changes to the Indians, more formal American attempts were made during Boyd's term of service to acculturate the Lakes Indians to white ways. Boyd's official correspondence as found in his papers and in the papers of the Michigan

Superintendency of Indian Affairs provide much material for the study of acculturation efforts. Also see Cutting Marsh's Diary of the Sauk-Fox trip (June 12 to September 19, 1834), which is among his papers at the Wisconsin Historical Society; it is a very interesting work that gives rich insights into an itinerant missionary's efforts to Christianize the Indians. "Documents Relating to the Episcopal Church and Mission in Green Bay, 1825-41," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 450-515, is very valuable, but many of the documents were taken from Boyd's Papers. Another useful source is the Reverend Jackson Kemper's "Journal of an Episcopalian Tour to Green Bay, 1834," WHC, vol. XIV, pp. 394-449. Secondary sources that were quite valuable are: Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian Response, 1787-1862 (Lexington, Kentucky: 1965); and Howard Greene, The Reverend Richard Fish Cadle: A Missionary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Territories of Michigan and Wisconsin in the Early Nineteenth Century (Waukesha, Wisconsin: 1936). Berkhofer's work is a penetrating analysis of American Protestant work among the Indians; it ranks high among recent studies of American acculturation efforts. Greene's biography is highly sympathetic to Cadle, but it still merits the consideration of a researcher.

American efforts to deal with the Indians largely depended upon the army. Boyd was indeed virtually

powerless without the help of the American military.

Francis Paul Prucha has produced three very fine works about the military on the frontier: A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895 (Madison, Wisconsin: 1964), Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Lincoln, Nebraska: 1967), and The Sword of the Republic: The United States on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (London: 1969). Other works about the military which are useful are: Henry Putney Beers, The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846 (Philadelphia: 1935), and Edgar B. Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study of the Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis: 1935).

Over the years much has been written about the Indians of the upper Great Lakes. A History of the Ojibway Nation (Minneapolis: 1957 reprint), by William W. Warren is a rich account about the Chippewa; Warren, who is part Chippewa, presents much information which is firsthand. Another very fine work is W. Vernon Kintz's The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann Arbor: 1940); this book is especially detailed in treating the Ottawa. George Irving Quimby has produced two excellent anthropological studies of the Lakes Indians: Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes: 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1800 (Chicago: 1960) is a short, concise, and valuable work; and Indian Culture and the European Trade Goods (Madison: 1966) is a fine study of archaeology of the historical period showing

changes in Indian culture brought by the fur trade. Another archaeological work which was useful is James E. Fitting's The Archaeology of Michigan: A Guide to the Prehistory of the Great Lakes Region (Garden City, New York: 1970). Other very useful anthropological works are: Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Bulletin 86, (Washington: 1929), and Walter James Hoffman, "The Menominee Indians," 14th Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology, Part I (Washington: 1896), pp. 11-292; neither of these studies provides much historical coverage of the respective tribes, but both are rich in ethnographic materials.

The history of the New York Indians in the Green Bay area is very confusing, but the following items helped to clarify it. The Papers of John W. Quinney (and other Stockbridge Indian Papers) 1824-1874, at the Wisconsin Historical Society, contain only a few, but valuable, pieces on the early period of the Stockbridge in the Bay area. Also useful is Thomas Commuck, "Sketch of the Brotherton Indians," WHC, vol. IV, pp. 291-8; Commuck was of Narragansett Indian ancestry and a Brotherton Indian. The most valuable aid in making sense of the New York Indians' movement to and settlement in the Bay region is Albert G. Ellis, "Advent of the New York Indians into Wisconsin," WHC, vol. II, pp. 415-49; Ellis was an agent at

Green Bay in the 1840's. The New York Indians in the Green Bay region are deserving of a thorough study; their situation provides an early and rare view of Indian peoples in a cultural limbo as they struggled awkwardly between the red and white worlds.

Much attention has been devoted to that short, but bloody confrontation between the two races: the Black Hawk War. An essential, although controversial work is Black Hawk: An Autobiography; originally published in 1833, its authenticity has been questioned. Although Cutting Marsh relates in his 1834 Diary that Black Hawk told him that it was not genuine, it is my opinion that the autobiography is authentic, although it may have been altered somewhat in the translation and transcription of Black Hawk's interview. A very scholarly edition of this autobiography, edited by Donald Jackson, was published by the University of Illinois Press in 1955. Also fundamental to understanding the Black Hawk War are the Thomas Forsyth Papers, Draper Collection, Wisconsin Historical Society; Forsyth was the Indian agent of the Sauk-Fox stationed at Rock Island during the 1820's. For published documents of Boyd's role during the war see "Papers of Indian Agent Boyd - 1832," edited by Reuben Gold Thwaites, WHC, vol. XII, pp. 270-298; this published collection is not complete: there are many more relevant pieces in Boyd's Papers. Reuben Gold Thwaites also wrote "The Story of the

Black Hawk War," WHC, vol. XII, pp. 214-65, which is still a good source on the war and its background. Also very fine is chapter seven -- "The Rivalry of Black Hawk and Keokuk" -- in Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Patriot Chiefs (New York: 1958). Lastly, another excellent study of the Sauk-Fox Indians and their troubles with the United States is: William T. Hagan, The Sac and Fox Indians (Norman, Oklahoma: 1958).

There are several other secondary works on the Indians that were particularly helpful. These include: Wilbur R. Jacobs, Dispossessing the American Indian: Indians and Whites on the Colonial Frontier (New York: 1972); Roy Harvey Pearce, The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilization (Baltimore: 1953); Francis Paul Prucha, Indian Peace Medals in American History (Madison: 1971); Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A Study of the Past and Present Status of the American Indian (New York: 1971); and Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States (Garden City, New York: 1967). Two valuable handbooks on the Indians are: Frederick Webb Hodge, Handbook of American Indians, North of Mexico (New York: 1959 edition), and John R. Swanton, The Indian Tribes of North America, Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution (Washington: 1953). An essential tool in studying the American Indian is: George Peter Murdock, Ethnographic Bibliography of

North America (New Haven, Connecticut: 1960).

Other secondary works provided general background information and insights. They include Willis F. Dunbar, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 1965); Laurence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: 1973); George Dewey Harmon, Sixty Years of Indian Affairs: Political, Economic, and Diplomatic, 1789-1850 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 1941); Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812 (E. Lansing: 1967); and Francis S. Philbrick, The Rise of the West: 1754-1830 (New York: 1965).

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