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The probability of growth alternatives being chosen may be increased by: (a) enhancing the attractiveness of growth, (b) minimizing the dangers of growth, (c) making security less attractive, and (d) maximizing the fears of safety and defensiveness. These factors may be illustrated by considering a child's typical conflict in new surroundings: he may be torn between a growth alternative to explore and a desire to maintain the security offered by his mother's lap. The tendency to explore may be increased with the following conditions: (a) a number of interesting toys are in sight, (b) there are no other pe0ple around, (c) the child has been close to his mother so long that he is bored, and (d) mother punishes him when he comes near her. Although each of these conditions should theoretically increase the probability of a growth choice, mechanisms (a) and (b) will probably be more influential: the individual needs some assurance of safety for his higher needs to emerge; (c) and (d) may result in substitute behavior or immobilization. Greater Awareness as a Growth Choice Man is unique in his capacity to be aware. Compared to other animal life, he has a superior potential to stand back and monitor what is happening to him and symbolize this experience in awareness. As a result, human behavior is characterized by greater plasticity. The extent of this unique capacity has been stressed by a number of growth theorists as an indication of maturity. Rogers sug- gests that the process of becoming a "fully functioning person" involves an increasing openness to experience: the person moves "away from the pole of defensiveness" (196l, p. l88); he Hhas the capacity and tendency to symbolize experiences accurately in awareness" (1959, p. 234). Maturity for Maslow (l970) is epitomized in the self-actualizing individual, who has a superior awareness of himself: Our healthy subjects are generally unthreatened and unfrightened by the unknown, being therein quite differ- ent from average men. They accept it, are comfortable with it, and, often are even more attracted by it than by the known . . . they do not have to spend any time laying the ghost, whistling past the cemetery, or other- wise protecting themselves against imagined dangers (pp. 154-55). For both Rogers and Maslow, the more mature person is open to new infonnation. This characteristic, however, is not unique to the self-actualizing or fully functioning individual: to some extent all men possess a basic cognitive need to know and to understand (Maslow, 1970). Knowledge makes the uncertain familiar and helps us predict and control our environments; it also brings a unique satisfaction in itself. But simultaneously, we fear knowledge; it may threaten our esteem and make us feel inferior, it may entail responsibilities which we are not willing to accept. As a result we develop defensive mechanisms to protect us from unpleasant views of ourselves. This clash between the need to know and the fear of knowing is one aspect of the more general conflict between security and growth. The Nature of Self-Esteem Past experiences and inherited potentials are represented within the individual in the fonn of schemata. These internal representations give personality its relatively enduring, organized quality; in Bartlett's words (1932): All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build up an active, organizing setting: visual, auditory, various types of cutaneous impulses and the like, at a relatively low level; all the expe- riences connected by a common interest; in sport, in literature, history, art, science, philosophy and so on, on a higher level (p. 201). While psychologists have tended to emphasize the cognitive aspect of schemata (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961), I prefer to think of schemata as having three components: (a) cognitive, they include certain ideas and thoughts; (b) affective, they involve feelings and emotions; and (c) motivational, they embody expectations which influ- ence our future perceptions and actions. These three components are intimately connected; our emotional life, for example, involves thoughts and feelings and is affected by whether or not our expectations have been realized. Of particular importance are those schemata which become organized around a person's self (McClelland, 1951; Heath, 1965). The self-image which is thus formed acts as a superordinate schema and gives the individual his sense of identity and uniqueness. The affective component of this complex organization is referred to as self-esteem. A number of theorists have found it necessary to distinguish between phenomenological and behavioral self-esteem (Coopersmith, 1967; Crowne and Stephens, 1968). Because of its empirical basis, a focus on self-evaluative behavior is particularly attractive. Nevertheless, the point of view expressed here is that self-esteem is a totally private, subjective experience of the individual. Coopersmith's (1967) defini- t' n is appropriate: 駧S>By self-esteem we refer to the evaluation which the indi- vidual makes and automatically maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disap- proval, and indicates the extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, significant, successful, and worthy. In short, self-esteem is a personal judgment of worthiness that is expressed in the attitudes the individual holds toward himself (pp. 4-5). Major differences are assumed to exist in the experiential worlds of persons characterized by high rather than low self-esteem. In Rosenberg's (1965) words: ‘Z£§ghgn,we speak of high self-esteem, then, we shall simply mean that the individual respects himself, con- siders himself worthy; he does not necessarily consider himself better than others, but he definitely does not consider himself worse; he does not feel that he is the ultimate in perfection, but, on the contrary, recognizes his limitations and expects to grow and improve. .n- -7— Low self-esteem, on the other hand, implies self-rejection, self-dissatisfaction, self-contempt. The individual lacks respect for the self he observes. The self—picture is disagreeable, and he wishes it were otherwise (p. 31). The low self-esteem individual lacks a basic trust in himself; he is self-conscious and tends to be preoccupied with his own personal problems. On the other hand, the person with high self-esteenLagggpts yhimself—for_uha1_h§_1§gvfig_§g§§_hifl§§lffla§_gpod enough, not necessarily super' is ideal self. This conception of high self-esteem is different from that used in most research of the self-concept. Influenced by Rogers (1954), many studies distinguish between the real self and the ideal self; the self-ideal discrepancy score is then used as a measure of self-esteem. But for most people, failure to realize certain as ects of their ideal s2lMes_i§_nQI_Ihat_im29[EEEEL- In my fantasy life, I may picture myself as a Don Juan or a Wilt Chamberlain, but not being like these people is not particularly traumatic. As James (1892) has noted, a more important factor is "what we back ourselves to be" (p. 187). Regardless of which potential self is more important, each individual strives to maintain or elevate his level of self-esteem. The man who feels worthless tends to shy away from situations which threaten to accentuate his feelings of inadequacy. In contrast, the man who thinks well of himself is not intimidated by potentially threatening situations; he seeks to overcome his inadequacies, usually with the expectation of success. To counterbalance his low estimate of himself, the former individual may become preoccupied with an insatiable drive for social recognition or power; the person with high self-esteem, however, aspires to lofty goals with minimum regard for the impression his achievement makes on others. In either case, the behavioral ramifications of subjective feelings of worth are considerable. Self-Esteem and Awareness One of the oldest issues in the literature on the self—concept focuses on a distinction between the self as knower and the self as known. In James' (189 ) tenninology, these two aspects of consciousness are the t16\§nd th “N9" the “I" is the subject which actively experi- ences; the "Me" is the object of experience. An intimate connection is implied between both of these. If the affective component of the self as known is largely positive, that is, the individual has high self— esteem, the self as knower should be influenced. The theories espoused by the growth psychologists suggest that the self as knower is more willing to expand its area of awareness when esteem is adequate. Maslow (1970) postulates a basic need for self- esteem which must be satisfied before self-actualizing behavior emerges. For Rogers (1959) self-esteem is equivalent to "positive self—regard“ which is necessary to become a fully functioning person. Perhaps the growth-theory which is least laden with implicit values about man's nature is White's (1959): he suggests one central value of competence, which refers to “an organism's capacity to interact effectively with its environment" (p. 297). Nevertheless, he also postulates a definite relation to esteem: self-esteem is rooted in "feelings of efficacy" and “the more general cumulative sense of competence" (1963, p. 134). As we have mentioned earlier, the self-actualizing individual, the fully functioning person, and the mature personality in general are all char- acterized by a greater openness to experience. A relationship between level of esteem and awareness is also implicit in "James' Law" (1892): Self-Esteem = flea? Such a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator as by increasing the numerator. To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as to get them gratified (p. 187). The first step toward eliminating our pretensions is recognition of them. Awareness and eventual acceptance of our inadequacies makes growth possible: now we can change our inaccurate assumptions; now we can set more realistic goals. Self-insight can also acquaint us with many abilities (i.e., potential successes) which we formerly were only dimly aware of. In either case, if our pretensions and potential successes remain hidden, our self—esteem is inevitably lower than necessary. Self-Esteem and Defensiveness In contrast to the views expressed above, a number of studies appear to indicate that individuals with high self-esteem are more defensive than those with low self-esteem. Cohen (1968) explains the rather general finding that high self-regard is associated with low susceptibility to persuasion by suggesting that this type of individual protects himself more from negative self-evaluations: Persons of high self-esteem appear to take on early in life a defensive mode which handles challenging experi- ence by a strong self-protective facade. They repress, deny, ignore, or turn about their potentially disturbing impulses in contrast to persons who express those impulses more directly by projection or regression (p. 388). In other words, persons with high self-esteem develOp "avoidance defenses" which lead them to turn away from potentially unfavorable experiences and emphasize those which enhance their self-picture; individuals with low self-esteem prefer more "expressive defenses" which allow them to play out disturbing impulses. Evidence to support this point of view is provided by Leventhal and Perloe (1962): high self-esteem subjects were influenced more by optimistic, potentially self—enhancing communications than by pessimistic, threatening ones; low self-esteem subjects showed the opposite effect. The apparent defensiveness of people with high self-esteem may, however, be an artifact of the instrument used to measure esteem. Both Cohen (1968) and Leventhal and Perloe (1962) employed a Q-sort technique: the correspondence between actual and ideal sorts was used as an indica- tion of level of self-esteem. Because of the importance of maintaining an adequate self-image, conscious evaluations of the phenomenological self are often idealized to protect the individual from more basic feelings of inadequacy. While all self-evaluative responses are undoubtedly influenced by defensive behavior and social desirability (Crowne and Stephens, 1968), the responses to an undisguised Q-sort may be particularly susceptible. A number of studies support this interpretation. Butler and Haigh (1954) suggest that high self-ideal correlations may indicate self-satisfaction or they may result from defensive sortings in which the person gives a distorted, positive picture of himself. Block and Thomas (1955) found that people who describe themselves as being close to their ego-ideal tend to "deny and suppress threatening features of themselves" (p. 258). After an exhaustive review of the literature, Wylie (1961) proposes a curvilinear trend in self-regard as one moves from normals through neurotics to psychotics. In a relatively non-threatening situation where the purpose of the investigator is concealed, persons with high self-esteem may be less defensive. Coopersmith (1967) speculates that high self-esteem, in itself, serves as a defense against threat: it makes an individual feel confident that he can deal effectively with any adversity. In contrast, persons with low self-regard lack a basic trust in their ability to handle threatening situations; to protect themselves, they develop other, often inappropriate defenses. Coopersmith's research indicates that persons with positive self-attitudes have lower manifest anxiety scores, have fewer psychosomatic symptoms, are less likely to display marked problems, and are less sensitive to criticism (p. 247). Their high self-esteem provides a stability which frees them from other types of defense. The Generality of Self—Esteem Our discussion thus far has been concerned with the self as a superordinate schema and with self-esteem as its global, relatively constant, affective component. This is the level at which theorizing and research has tended to focus. Recently, however, it has been recognized that self-acceptance may be expressed in a number of ways and that people with the same level of self-esteem may behave very differently; Rosenberg (1965), for example, reports that some of his high self—esteem adolescent subjects were "expansive, outgoing, spontaneous personalities whereas others were fairly subdued and showed little affect" (p. 275). The result has been increased inter- est in the stability of self-esteem across situations, across time, and in relation to different aspects of the self (Crowne and Stephens, 1968). The situational character of self-image has a relatively long tradition in social science. Cooley's (1922) concept of the “looking-V glass self" suggests that the.EQHEE95199—9f2531f.!33EEEMEEB§99199_9§__ ,Ehéwfmjrrgrfi which iszpresenda More recently, Turner (1968) has dis- tinguished between -sitzuationslesl fzimages .and the more-snégtiflg-§_9_lf:,_ (cgngeptjgn, and has investigated the relation between them; situational _ ,self-images—f4eetuate»frommmomentutosmnmentgzhutwthe—selinconceptinn- mfiQ—inthmsensesgtflhemrw A number of studies have also been concerned with the temporal stability of self-acceptance. Diggory (1966) has demonstrated that induced success may momentarily inflate self-esteem; induced failure, deflate it. The generality of self-acceptance in reference to different aspects of the self has received less attention. James (1892) has noted that relatively few of our many potential selves are singled out as particularly important and defended at all cost: Our thought, incessantly deciding, among many things of a kind, which ones for it shall be realities, here chooses one of the many possible selves or characters, and forth- with considers it no shame to fail in any of those not adopted expressly as its own (p. 186) For Coopersmith (1967), the individual's values are critical: successes are filtered through personal values and aspirations; self-esteem is influenced more by success in valued areas. He proceeds, however, to report that the evidence is scant and that the relation between value preferences and esteem has not been studied directly (p. 42). These studies indicate that we need a more multidimensional classification to make accurate predictions. The self schema integrates a number of lower level schemata which provide different conceptions of self, each with its own affective component; an individual with very positive feelings about his occupational ability, for example, may lack confidence in social relations. When the global evaluation of self is used to make predictions about one of these lower level conceptions, gross errors are often produced. Introversion Versus Extroversion One dimension of major importance in differentiating individuals concerns the kinds of experiences they are oriented toward. Some people fbcus predominantly on objects and events in the external world; they are interested in relating to people and activities outside themselves. Other people value the inside world of feelings and thoughts; they are 9" 13 more interested in internal adventures. In personality theory, these two types are usually labelled extroverts and introverts. The terms introvert and extrovert were first used by Jung (1923) to identify two major attitudes or personality types. Summarizing Jung's conception,Fordham (1966) writes: The extraverted attitude is characterized by an out- ward flowing of libido, an interest in events, in people and things, a relationship with them, and a dependence on them. When this attitude is habitual to anyone Jung describes him or her as an extraverted t e. . . . The introverted attitude, in contrast, is one of withdrawal; the libido flows inward and is concentrated upon subjective factors, and the predominating influence is "inner necessity." When this attitude is habitual Jung speaks of an "introverted type" (pp. 29-30). Whether the individual's instinctual energies are directed mainly toward the outer world or toward inner experiences and feelings is the main distinguishing factor. Other traits are associated with this major difference in orientation. From the statistical treatment of various questionnaire responses, a more complete picture emerges: The extravert [is] . . . sociable, optimistic, talkative group-dependent, a bit thick-skinned, trusting, and adaptable. The introvert is shy, not very fond of people en masse, individualistic, and a bit rigid and suspicious (Cattell, 1965, p. 123). Such a definition, however, confounds extroversion with gregariousness, emotional stability, and adjustment in general, especially as it is defined in Western society. A dimension of introversion-extroversion which is closer to Jung's original conception is thinking introversion-extroversion. It was first isolated by Guilford and Guilford (1939) and referred to as ,-.~— . habitual thinking of a meditative sort; it is independent of the social and emotional aspects. Introverts have a tendency towards reflective, meditative thought. This observation, however, does not imply that only introverts think about themselves; extroverts do as well, but they think in different ways and focus on different aspects of themselves. The introvert is concerned with inner thoughts and feelings; the extro- vert, with how he relates to external activities and people. Summary and Hypotheses The capacity to be aware is one of the latest evolutionary developments in man. The force-for-growth theorists like Rogers (1959) and Maslow (1970) suggest that there are individual differences in ability and tendency to accurately symbolize events in awareness. For them, the healthier person is more likely to make the growth choice to expand his zones of awareness; the less healthy individual typically chooses the safer route to remain uninformed. These same theorists also maintain that the more mature individual is characterized by high self-esteem; Maslow (1970), for example, postulates that self—actualizing behavior emerges only after the need for self-esteem has been at least partially satisfied. The desire to maintain or elevate his self-evaluation is assumed to be a major motivating force in man. The individual who Hacks respect for himself tends to avoid situations which might threaten his shaky self- estimate. In contrast, the person who thinks well of himself has a basic trust in his ability to cope with adversity; the growth choice to seek greater awareness presents less of a danger to his self- conception. Hypothesis I.--Individuals with high self-esteem actively seek out information which may increase their awareness of themselves. Conversely, individuals with low self-esteem make the safer choice to remain uninformed. A recurring issue in theorizing about the self-concept con- cerns the relative value of viewing the self as a single entity or as multiple in character. In the first hypothesis, the self is regarded as a single entity and self-esteem is its rather global affective com- ponent. An important theoretical question is whether self-acceptance is general in relation to all aspects of the self or whether there is a specific level of esteem associated with each of a person's multiple self-conceptions. An individual's self-concept may be conveniently divided into one aspect which relates to the inner world of thoughts and feelings and another which is concerned with external activities. Depending on which of these aspects is more developed, the person has an introverted or extroverted thinking style. The introverted thinker values thoughts related to his inner world; the external world is foreign territory which he knows less about and is probably less confident in. In con- trast, the extraverted thinker is more confident with information related to his external world; the internal world is less familiar and presents more uncertainty. Depending on one's level of self-esteem, information which focuses predominantly on one of these aspects will be differently valued by introverted and extroverted thinkers. Since the person with low -fi )5- 16 self-esteem tends to avoid threatening situations, he is more attracted to information about that aspect of himself which he knows best. The high self-esteem person, however, is not threatened by the unknown; because of a basic trust in himself, he finds the unknown more attractive (Maslow. 1968). Hypothesis II.--If self-esteem is low, introverted thinkers seek to become aware of their internal worlds; in contrast, low self- esteem extroverted thinkers search out information about how they relate to the external world. If self-esteem is high, introverted thinkers pursue more frequently information about how they relate to the external world; high self-esteem extroverted thinkers seek to become more aware of their internal worlds. qr CHAPTER II METHODS The conditions necessary to test hypotheses concerned with awareness-seeking behavior are present in every psychological experiment with human subjects. Ethical considerations demand that research be explained to those who participate in it. When the research topic is personality or beliefs about oneself, a subject's desire to obtain feed- back is a ready measure of his interest in becoming more aware of him- self. By modifying the type of feedback information available, various potential areas of awareness may be experimentally created. In this study, subjects completed a personality test or "Belief Questionnaire" (see Appendix A) and their desire for two types of feedback determined. The "Belief Questionnaire" The questionnaire contained two parts: (a) forty true—false items designed to gauge level of self-esteem, thinking introversion- extroversion, and social desirability and (b) a measure of the respond- ent's interest in receiving feedback. The questions relevant to each personality variable and the scoring methodology are presented in Appendix B. r-fl Self-esteem.--The measure of self-esteem employed was a ten-item Guttman Scale originally developed by Rosenberg (1965). These items were scattered throughout the questionnaire with positive and negative statements alternated to reduce the effect of an acquiescence response set. The adequacy of the scale as a measure of self-esteem is indicated by the face validity of the items and the association of scale scores with other data in a theoretically meaningful way: Rosenberg (1965) reports that respondents with low self-esteem scores appear more depressed to independent raters, express feelings of unhappiness and discouragement, have more psychosomatic symptoms, and have lower sociometric status in the groups to which they belong. In the present study, the scale's coefficient of reproducibility (Stouffer §t_gl,, 1950) was .91 and its coefficient of scalability (Menzel, 1953) was .60. Thinking introversion-extroversion.--To measure thinking introversion-extroversion, eleven items from Smith's (1968) Introversion Versus Extroversion Scale were used. These items form a single dimen- sion which has been defined as "the degree to which an individual is inward or outward in his perception of the environment" (Hershey, 1958). In the present study the reliability of this measure was .60. Eleven other items from Smith's general Introversion Versus Extroversion Scale were also used as buffer items. Social desirability.--Because of a tendency by certain respondents to reply in a socially valued direction, self-rating scales inevitably generate some invalid answers. To alleviate this problem, an 8-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964) was employed: those subjects who showed a high social desirability response set were eliminated from further study. Interest in Feedback Scale.--Part Two of the questionnaire was a 4-item semantic differential designed to measure each subject's interest in receiving feedback. A respondent could score 0 to 4 on each bipolar item; his total score over the four items provided an indication of his desire for feedback information. Subjects Approximately 570 subjects were solicited from the intro- ductory psychology courses at Michigan State University to complete the "Belief Questionnaire.“ 0n the basis of their responses, four different groups were created: high esteem-introverted thinking (n=40), high esteem-extroverted thinking (n=56), low esteem- introverted thinking Q1=36), and low esteem-extroverted thinking (g =24). The subjects in each of these groups scored in the first or fourth quartile on the self-esteem scale and the thinking introversion- extroversion scale; respondents who scored above the 80th percentile on the social desirability scale were eliminated. There were an equal number of male and female subjects in the total sample. 20 Procedure The telephone call.--Each subject was telephoned by the experimenter and asked if he would like to make an appointment to receive feedback on his responses to the questionnaire. By modifying his explanation of the type of information available, the experimenter created two feedback conditions. Half of the subjects in each of the groups mentioned above were randomly assigned to the internal condition; they were led to believe that the feedback would relate to their inter- nal worlds. The experimenter's telephone conversation with them went as follows: In psychology class a couple of weeks ago you completed a belief questionnaire which I handed out. I have finished scoring these now and I can give you some feedback about your responses. The type of information which I can provide is concerned with your personal style of thinking and feeling; that is, how your internal processes work. For example, it indicates how you normally use ideas, how you use fantasies. I'm calling now to find out if you would like to make an appointment to receive such information. The other half were informed that the feedback would focus on their external worlds; specifically,they were told: In psychology class a couple of weeks ago you completed a belief questionnaire which I handed out. I have finished scoring these now and I can give you some feedback about your responses. The type of information which I can provide is concerned with your personal style of behaving with tasks and other people; that is, how you interact with the external world. For example, it indicates how you deal with environmental situations, how you deal with practical matters. I'm calling now to find out if you would like to make an appointment to receive such information. 21 The number of subjects who made an appointment and kept it constituted the major measure of awareness-seeking behavior. A check on the feedback manipulation.--When each subject who desired feedback arrived for his appointment, a check was made to deter- mine whether the telephone call had successfully created two feedback conditions. Feigning that he was not sure which study the subject was in, the experimenter asked each individual to describe the nature of the information he expected to receive. Invariably subjects could not say whether they expected feedback about their internal style of think- ing and feeling or about how they interacted with the external world. This uncertainty indicates that by the time the subject arrived for his appointment, the information given during the telephone conversation has been forgotten. At best, the two feedback conditions influenced only the subject's initial decision to make an appointment. The feedback session.--Depending on whether he scored high on introverted thinking or extroverted thinking, each subject was then handed a folder containing a two-page typewritten sketch of a typical introvert or extrovert. Both sketches were constructed largely from information provided by Smith (1968) and were of equal length; a copy of each appears in Appendix C. By Means of a hidden stopwatch, the experimenter accurately measured the length of time each subject spent reading the feedback information; this served as a third measure of awareness-seeking behavior. The subject was then handed a Feedback Evaluation Scale (see Appendix D) which was designed to measure how 22 valuable he thought the feedback was. Responses to this five-item semantic differential were scored similarly to the Interest in Feedback Scale and constituted a final measure of the dependent variable. Those subjects who completed the original questionnaire but whose scores did not place them in either of the experimental groups received a letter requesting that they telephone the experimenter for feedback. Summary of Methods Those subjects who scored at the extreme ends of a self-esteem scale and a thinking introversion-extroversion scale were telephoned to determine their interest in receiving feedback information. Irrespec— tive of scores on the introversion-extroversion scale, half of the subjects were promised feedback about their inner world of thoughts and feelings; the other half were told that the information concerned their interaction with the external world of people and activities. These three independent variables--level of self-esteem, thinking style, and type of feedback promised--were analysed in a 2 x 2 x 2 design. There were four dependent variables: (a) scores on an Interest in Feedback Scale, (b) the number of subjects who arrived for an appoint- ment to receive feedback, (c) the length of time each subject spent reading the feedback information, and (d) scores on a Feedback Eval- uation Scale. CHAPTER III RESULTS Global Self-Esteem and Awareness The major hypothesis guiding the study was not supported by any of the dependent variables. 0n the Interest in Feedback Scale and the Feedback Evaluation Scale, there was no significant differences in the scores of high and low self-esteem subjects. 0n the other two dependent variables, whether the subject came for an appointment or not and time spent reading the feedback information, the results were opposite to that predicted: low self-esteem subjects demonstrated more interest than those with high self-esteem in increasing their self-awareness. Interest in Feedback Scale.-—High and low self-esteem subjects expressed equal concern for receiving feedback on the Interest in Feed- back Scale,which was completed with the "Belief Questionnaire"; for both types of subjects the mean score was 11.72 (see Table 1). Similarly, there is no significant difference between introverted and extroverted thinkers on this measure. An analysis of variance using the unweighted- means solution (Winer, 1962) is presented in Table 2. 23 24 TABLE 1 Mean Scores on Interest in Feedback Scale for Each Type of Subject High self-esteem Low self-esteem Introverted Extroverted Introverted Extroverted thinking thinking thinking thinking 12.20 (40) 11.38 (56) 11.86 (36) 11.50 (24) 11.72 (96) 11.72 (60) Note.--Ng=156; numbers in parentheses indicate cell ps. TABLE 2 Analysis of Variance on Interest in Feedback Scores Source g: MS E Self-esteem (A) l .36 .05* Thinking style (B) 1 12.46 1.81* A x B l 2.14 .31* Within error 152 6.88 fp = n.s. 25 Feedback Evaluation Scale.--At the end of the feedback session, low self-esteem subjects evaluated the feedback more highly than high self—esteem subjects; the mean scores were 15.40 and 14.58, respectively. This difference, however, is not significant. Table 3 shows the means for each type of subject in the internal and external feedback condi- tions; Table 4, an analysis of variance by the unweighted-means pro- cedure. Because of a large within cell variance, no treatment source of variation is significant. Time spent reading the feedback.--This variable produced significant evidence that low self-esteem subjects are more interested in increasing their self-awareness. Low self-esteem subjects spent an average of 2.35 minutes reading the feedback information; high self- esteem subjects spent 1.99 minutes (f=4.93, p< .05). Thinking style also appears to be an important factor; extraverted thinkers read an average of 2.35 minutes and introverted thinkers an average of 2.02 minutes (_F_=5.07, p< .05). Apparently, subjects with an extroverted thinking style are more interested in absorbing the information. 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