SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN EXPOSITION,
ANALYSIS, AND SYNTHESIS OF THE
METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
THEORIES OF GEORGE H. MEAD,
TALCOTT PARSONS, AND
GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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This is to certify that the

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METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE THEORIES OF
GEORGE H. MEAD, TALCOTT PARSONS,
AND GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

By

John Clifford McKinney

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
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AN ABSTRACT

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THESIS ABSTRACT

The primary object of this study has been to point out important areas of convergence in selected diverse sociological systems. Convergence has been operationally defined as "similarity of statement or treatment". This has been an attempt to demonstrate the thesis that the adaptation of the scientific point of view to social behavior, even though manifest in different frames of reference, leads to certain similarities of treatment. It has been hypothesized here that there are basic and important similarities underlying diverse treatments of social phenomena.

Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg were chosen as being representative of different and important theoretical positions. It is generally conceded that their approaches to sociological phenomena are quite "different" and that they are representative of different intellectual continuities.

Examination of the validity of the central hypothesis and its subordinate propositions was made in terms of a three-element procedure. First, an exposition was made of the theoretical positions of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg from _their_ points of view, and in terms of _their_ problems. An attempt was made to lay out the major components of their systems as they had developed them. This means that the three expositions were made independent of one another, and independent of the major hypothesis.

Second, running concurrently with the expositions of the major components of their systems, is an analysis from _our_ point of view involving three criteria. Commentary was made on the systems of Mead, Parsons, and

Lundberg in terms of: (1) implications for the field of sociology, (2) internal inconsistency in their exposition, and (3) the holding of an "extremist" position relative to one more generally held in the field of sociology.

Third, similarities of statement or treatment were selected out of the three independent expositions and labeled as categories of convergence. These categories were inductively arrived at; they were not developed prior to the examination of the three independent expositions. Wherever the three theorists appeared to be making similar general statements about similar general phenomena, those statements constituted an area of convergence, and thus could be labeled as a category. Convergence was discovered by working on the three levels of: (1) what they say, (2) what they do, and (3) what they mean. This resulted in two kinds of convergence: (1) explicit, and (2) implicit.

This procedure resulted in the extraction of twelve general areas of convergence from the diverse systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. These theorists manifest considerable methodological similarity in the general categories of: Science and Research; the Object World; Uniformities and Causal Imputation; and Process: Structure and Function. In the substantive field substantial convergence was found in the general categories of: Interaction; Values, Motives, and Action; The Social System; The Regularities in Social Behavior; Symbolic Systems; and Social Change.

The extraction of these categories of convergence give evidence that seems to be substantial enough to warrant at least a tentative holding

of the hypothesis that the treatment of social phenomena from the
institutionalised general position of science leads to important con-
vergence of theory, even though different frames of reference are used.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The Area of the Study

The area of this study lies in the sphere of systematic sociological

theory.[1] It is conceded that sociological theory in the sense of "system"

is somewhat "primitive" as compared to systems existent in other scientific

areas.[2] Nevertheless that does not negate its existence and importance.

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[1]The term theory is used here to designate the analysis of data in
order to discover general principles in the form of statements of relations
that will make the concrete empirical phenomena comprehensible. Socio-
logical theory, as distinct from other theory, is concerned with the search
for and exposition of general principles necessary to an explanation and
understanding of sociological phenomena. Sociological phenomena is here
conceived of as consisting in the relations engaged in by persons that
sustain or develop the group. The fundamental abstraction is the "social
act", which is defined by Mead as being an act "in which the occasion, or
stimulus which sets free an impulse, is found in the character or conduct
of a living form that belongs to the proper environment of the living form
whose impulse it is. I wish, however, to restrict the social act to the
class of acts which involve the cooperation of more than one individual,
and whose object as defined by the act,....is a social object. By a social
object I mean one that answers to all parts of the complex act, though
these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals. The ob-
jective of the act is then found in the life process of the group, not in
those of the separate individuals alone." G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and
Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7.
     The regularities of behavior emergent out of such action; significantly
manifest as institutionalized patterns of behavior, constitute the primary
substantive material of the discipline called sociology. In addition these
regularities constitute the base of prediction of the discipline, and there-
by serve as the scientific base of sociology.

[2]It is generally accepted that the ideal of science is to achieve a
systematic interconnection of facts. This means a systematic interconnection
of observations made of some aspect of the universe. Isolated propositions

In one sense every integrated conceptual scheme constitutes a system.[3]

Therefore, scientific procedure, which invariably makes use of some con-

ceptual scheme, always implies "system" of some sort. It must be recognized

that these systems may vary tremendously with regard to degree of generality,

complexity, integration, coherence, and closure.[4] Further they may be

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(2 cont'd) do not constitute a science. Such propositions merely create
the opportunity to find the connection between them and other propositions.
Such an arrangement of propositions attains coherence as a "whole". Parsons
defines "systems" as being "...a body of logically interdependent generalized
concepts of empirical reference. Such a system tends, ideally, to become
'logically closed', to reach such a state of logical integration that every
logical implication of any combination of propositions in the system is
explicitly stated in some other proposition in the same system...." Talcott
Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois,
The Free Press, 1949, pp. 16-17.
    Nothing approximating this ideal has ever been attained in the field
of sociology. It is important to note however that it is an ideal, and
consequently only attainable in some degree of approximation. The sociologi-
cal approaches of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg thus can be treated as being
"systematic", in so far as they are tendencies in the direction of system.

[3]A conceptual scheme is taken to mean a set of concepts that stand in
relation to one another and wherein each individual concept assumes "meaning"
relative to the others. Integration of such a scheme is a matter of degree,
and reflects the extent to which each concept is a function of the relation-
ship pattern. According to Parsons such a scheme performs two functions.
One consists in furnishing the "frame of reference". This is the most
general framework of categories within which empirical work takes shape and
"makes sense". The second function of a conceptual scheme is to provide
structural categories. This implies that in empirical reality phenomena
are interrelated and thus constitute systems. Structure is then the static
aspect of the descriptive treatment of a system. The conceptual scheme
enables one to view a system "structurally" as it is composed of units and
their interrelations. See Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory:
Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, pp. 18-19.

[4]Scientific systems may vary in terms of a number of different character-
istics. All such systems are abstract therefore they vary in terms of their
"construction". The characteristic of "generality" means the inclusion of
many particulars or specifics under a common rubric. The question of "how
general" refers to the relative number of particulars that have been subsumed
under a given category.
    "Complexity" as a characteristic refers to the intricacy of the system

differentiated on the basis of "level" of organization in terms of their

structuring as classificatory systems, categorical systems, theoretical

systems, and empirical-theoretical systems.[5]

(4 cont'd) in terms of the stated relations of its parts. The use of broad "general" categories would mean simplicity, in contrast to the use of numerous specific categories which would make the interrelationship of the parts more complicated.

The characteristic of "integration" refers to the internal unity of the system. This is manifest in the degree to which relations within it are derivable from the logical presuppositions of the system. This refers to the extent to which an alteration in relationships can be foretold upon the basis of the manipulation of a part.

"Coherence" refers to the internal consistency of the system; the extent to which its elements sustain the system.

"Closure" as a characteristic of a system refers to the exclusion of all concepts not definable within the framework and through the principles of the system itself. It is based upon the act of closure which means to encompass, or shut-off, and thereby establish the boundaries of the system. This is the terminating act of the abstraction.

[5]Parsons makes a distinction between these four "levels" of systematization. The classificatory system "involves the use of more or less arbitrary classes for the sake of making summary statements about the subject matter. No attempt is made to fit the classes to the subject matter in such a way that the relations among the classes will be patterned upon the relations among the items of the subject matter summarized by these classes".

The categorical type of system "involves a system of classes which is formed to fit the subject matter, so that there are intrinsic relations among the classes, and these are in accord with the relations among the items of the subject matter. Thus, in these systems, the principles of classification, themselves, include statements of certain relationships among classes. The elements are so defined as to constitute an interdependent system. And the system has sufficient complexity and articulation to duplicate, in some sense, the interdependence of the empirical systems which are the subject matter....A categorical system...is always logically prior to the laws which state further relations between its elements. The laws state generalized relationship between variables in the system.

"A theoretical system is a categorical system whose laws relating elements have been formulated. The classical mechanics is the commonest example of what we mean here by a theoretical system. By logical manipulation of this system it is possible to make detailed predictions about the consequences of specific changes in the values of specific variables; this is because the general laws of the system are known. It should be noted, however, that the classical mechanics does not tell us how empirical systems

In general it may be stated that the field of sociology is in the "categorical system" phase of development. This means that the field has only a fragmentary knowledge of the "laws" or "principles" of the behavior that it is concerned with, but it does have a rough grasp of the general patterns of that behavior. This results in a delineation of structural categories that are not merely "ad hoc", but are bound together in a state of interdependence that roughly fits the interdependence of the subject matter. There is an articulation of the categories commonly used that reflects the natural state of a phenomenon as it empirically exists. These relations are not spelled out to any great degree as propositions however, and consequently they are not verified as "laws" to any significant extent.[6]

Of the specific systems this study is concerned with, that of Parsons is the best example of the "categorical" type in that it consists of an arrangement of categories expressed as structural or action forms that are interdependent, but wherein there are no verifiable propositions stated.[7]

(5 cont'd) will actually behave; it tells us how they might behave if an ideal set of scientific or 'standard' conditions were to exist....

"We speak of an empirical-theoretical system whenever a sufficient number of relevant variables can be brought together in a single (theoretical) system of interdependence adequate for a high level of precision in predicting changes in empirical systems outside special experimental conditions. This is the long-term goal of scientific endeavor".

See Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 50-51.

[6]"Law" is used here in the sense of being a statement with empirical reference, and involves the stating of an order or relation of phenomena under given conditions.

[7]A verifiable proposition is one that is stated in such a fashion that it is subject to empirical examination.

The same is essentially true of the system of Lundberg, although it is not as elaborate. It is true to a lesser extent of Mead's system for there are in it numerous suggestions of proposition, either implicit or explicit, but at the same time there is less emphasis on the categories of the system as such. Such categories as "status", "class", "role", "group", "attitude", "expectation", and "institution" as expressed in the analyses of all three of these men are interdependent on the basis of general knowledge and inference, not on the basis of any significant statement of "laws". They do, however, constitute important conceptual frameworks that have a role in the development of sociological knowledge.

Such systems or conceptual frameworks as those of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg seemingly can perform two major functions. First, they aid in the codification of our accruing concrete knowledge. Discrete hypotheses and observations can be unified under general categories. They can be tentatively "placed" in a larger context, consequently their "meaning" can be assessed or interpreted in the light of more general implications. Second, theory of this order can serve as a guide to research. It enables us to locate and define the areas of our knowledge and ignorance by pointing up problematic areas. In the light of system one can "see" problems of interest and significance relative to presumed "interconnections" or relationships. Problems in a sense are a function of ways of looking at things, and to look at behavior from the point of view of a system of categories gives the possibility of establishing a set of hypotheses that are also interrelated. This consequently can increase the possibility of correlating empirical observation with theoretical systems possessing coherence.

Systematic theory is being looked at here, then, because it seemingly has scientific "usefulness". Such theory has not advanced yet to the point wherein "personal systems" and "warring schools" have been eliminated, and yet there appears to be an increasing convergence of these diverse systems in terms of similar treatment of similar components of behavior. It is this area of convergence that serves as the focus of this thesis.

2. The Purpose

It is not the purpose here to make a comparative study, in the usual sense, of diverse theoretical systems. The prime object of this study is to point out important areas of convergence in selected diverse systems. This is an attempt to demonstrate the thesis that the adaptation of the scientific point of view to social behavior, even though manifest in different frames of reference, inevitably leads to certain similarities of treatment. This is analagous to the anthropological notion that there are certain universals in culture, and that underlying the fabulous diversities of behavior there are certain constant components. That notion is taken and applied here to the field of sociological theory in an attempt to show that there are basic and important similarities underlying diverse treatments of social phenomena. This is not a denial of the differences and their significance, but on the contrary, is merely a methodological concentration upon the similarities which are more frequently neglected. In the typical comparative study it is the "differences" which attract attention. This study deals with those differences only when necessary, and the primary focus of attention is upon the areas of convergence.

3. The Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that the treatment of social phenomena from the institutionalized general position of science leads to an important convergence even though different immediate frames of reference are used.[8] In turn this convergence may be looked upon as a "hard core" of sociological theory that is gradually emerging as "unproblematic" in the sense of being a common point of departure for sociologists in general. Further, this convergence can be conceived of as evidence of the growing institutionalization of sociology as a science.

To examine this hypothesis and its two major implications, Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg have been chosen as being representative of diverse theoretical positions. They are rarely spoken of in the same context, and are generally held to be independent of one another. It perhaps would be legitimate to say that in the thinking of most sociologists, the

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[8]Science is herein conceived as possessing a unity based upon several common procedural characteristics. Regardless of what "special" science one might be speaking of, and what distinguishing characteristics it might possess, it still will be bound to the other sciences in terms of some assumptions, premises, procedures and aims. It can be said that science is a technique for establishing relatively stable beliefs about the nature of the universe. Moreover science represents a search for the recurrent and repetitive in contrast to the unique. Science assumes the uniformity of nature and then attempts to make general statements about such uniformities. The foregoing implies a standardization of activity as well as a standardization of expectation, and hence institutionalization. Science has its own "norms" and therefore is institutionalized in its own particular way. Parsons pointed up several of these major norms. "The basic norms of scientific knowledge are perhaps four, empirical validity, logical clarity or precision of the particular proposition, logical consistency of the mutual implications of propositions, and generality of the 'principles' involved, which may perhaps be interpreted to mean range of mutually verified implications". Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 335.

theoretical positions held by these men are conceived of as being almost mutually exclusive. This is an important point, in that it would have been easy to pick systems of greater convergence; however, if the hypothesis is to be demonstrated at all, it is necessary to utilize theoretical positions that are habitually regarded as products of separate intellectual continuities. It is the contention of this writer that underneath the facade of electron-proton configurations, mechanisms, equilibriums, cathected objects, etc., there is considerable similarity "implied" in the treatment of social phenomena.

4. The Procedure

Examination of the validity of the central hypothesis and its subordinate propositions is made in terms of a simple and yet difficult procedure. First, an exposition is made of the theoretical positions of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg from _their_ point of view, and in terms of _their_ problems. This entailed taking the _role_ of each one of these men successively in an attempt to grasp their particular relationships to the phenomena under analysis. This relationship between the observer and the observed is expressed in the term _perspective_. There is a mutual interdependence between observer and observed, and it is the relationship itself that accounts for meaning, and hence for the "point of view" of the conceptualizer.[9] In order to grasp the conceptual system of the analyst, then, it was deemed necessary to grasp his "perspective".

[9]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. 163-164.

Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg are each interested in different problems concerning social phenomena, consequently their perspectives are different. Parsons for instance, is primarily interested in the problem of a comprehensive theory of social behavior, Lundberg concerns himself mainly with the problem of the measurement and quantification of social phenomena, and Mead's central interest is in the problem of how man as a rational being, manifested in the mind and self, is emergent out of interaction. Such diverse problems, coupled with different perceptual susceptibilities, obviously lead to analysis from different perspectives, consequently any attempt at the articulation of such perspectives necessitates their individual exposition.

The technique used in the attempt to attain these diverse perspectives was that of role-taking. "We" attempted to put "ourselves" in the position of each one of these men by taking "their" attitude, and thus look at social phenomena as "they" looked at them. This meant a laying out of their analyses in terms of "their" major components. The criteria used for distinguishing what appear to be the major components are: (1) extent of emphasis in the analysis, and (2) extent of elaboration in the analysis. Such criteria bring forth certain components that would probably be found by any analyst of their systems. For example; it is doubtful that any analyst of the position of Mead would deny primacy to such components as the "mind", "self", and "meaning". The same would hold true for an analyst of the Parsons position with regard to "the social system", "action", and "structure-function". Likewise, the analysis of Lundberg's position by other persons would undoubtedly bring forth such components as

"quantification", "measurement", and "interaction". The initial element of this analysis, then, is seen to be an exposition of the systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg undertaken from their perspectives.

Second, running concurrently with the exposition of the major components of their systems, is an analysis from "our" point of view involving three criteria. These are criteria that have been arbitrarily selected, and yet they are "common" in a general way to many comparative and interpretive studies. Commentary is made on the systems of Mead, Parsons and Lundberg in terms of: (1) implications for the field of sociology, (2) internal inconsistency in their exposition, and (3) the holding of an "extremist" position relative to one more generally held in the field of sociology.

The first criterion may be illustrated by the drawing of implications for the Sociology of Knowledge from Mead's treatment of "meaning" (See Section 9, Chapter II), or the drawing of implications for motivational theory from Lundberg's treatment of tension and imbalance (See Section 9, Chapter IV). The second criterion may be illustrated by Lundberg's concomitant treatment of "operationalism" and "scientific system" (See Sections 3 and 5, Chapter IV), or Parsons' treatment of "change" (See Section 7, Chapter III). The third criterion is also illustrated by Lundberg's treatment of "operationalism" (See Section 3, Chapter IV), and Parsons's treatment of "change" (See Section 7, Chapter III).

The third element of this analysis involves the selection of similarities of statement or treatment out of the three independent expositions. These similarities, when they appear on a "general" level are treated as

categories of "convergence". Whenever the three men appear to be saying similar things about similar phenomena, regardless of terminological differences, it is held to constitute convergence. Convergence, then, is operationally defined as similarity of exposition. This thesis is concerned with convergence, consequently the many differences involved in the three approaches are ignored to the extent possible, and the methodological focus is put upon the areas of essential agreement or congruence.

The twelve categories of convergence that are included in Chapter V are arrived at inductively. They were not established prior to the study, and were not hypothesized prior to the three independent expositions of the systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. These expositions were made independent of the hypothesis of this study, and consequently do not intentionally reflect our attempt to establish convergence. The development of the exposition from the perspective of the man who made it, through the use of the role-taking technique, is held to be the primary "protective" device in this respect.

In so far as each exposition was made independently, then it is important to note that these same expositions could be used to extract the major differences, and material is available in the expository chapters for a full comparative treatment. A comparative treatment is dual in nature because it involves a selection out of both similarities and differences. The hypothesis of the study does not call for a treatment of this order, however, and consequently only the elements of similarity have been extracted from the available data.

The extraction of the similarities of statement from the three expositions was made on a general level. Such categories as Science and Research, Systematic Theory, The Social System, and Social Change, for instance, represent areas that each of these men have devoted considerable attention to, and have made numerous similar specific statements about. As such they constitute "patterns" of congruence that are "there" in the three independent analyses, and thus in making them explicit as categories "we" have inductively arrived at them.

Convergence is actually arrived at by working on three levels: (1) what they say, (2) what they do, and (3) what they mean. This results in the use of two categories of convergence throughout: (1) explicit, and (2) implicit. "What they say" refers to close agreement that is clearly explicit to the point of similarity of terminology. "What they do" refers to a convergence that is the product of an unintended achievement. For instance, Mead achieves a sociological system although there is no reason to assume that he intended to. Lundberg arrives at a "difference" in the object world, despite his assertions to the contrary. "What they do" appears either as explicit or implicit convergence. "What they mean" refers to implications we have drawn on the basis of premises stated in their exposition. This is clearly inferential, and falls into the category of "implicit" convergence.

No attempt has been made to equate the categories of convergence we have arrived at, with regard to level of generality. Consequently, it is presumed that other persons utilizing the same expositions could conceivably emerge with either more or fewer categories, representing greater

generality or specificity. However, it is the assumption here that the categories "we" have emerged with, thus the patterns of convergence they represent, would be included in the analyses of other persons, although they might be subsumed under different labels. Moreover, it is the assumption here that if other persons started with the general categories "we" have emerged with, and if they then analyzed the systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg, they would discover the evidence to justify the extraction of these categories as patterns of convergence. These assumptions are made in the absence of corroborating studies.

It is the avowed intent of this study to focus on convergence, and yet there are places in Chapter V where these approaches have been contrasted at considerable length. This pointing out of differences is engaged in only when it is necessary to "qualify" an area of convergence. There is never a perfect "fit" of the systems, therefore "we" are working in terms of similarities, not in terms of identities. These areas of convergence are never more than approximations, consequently the degree of approximation must be stated in terms of qualifying remarks. These qualifying remarks appear as "differences". Differences are treated, therefore, only when they are essential to the establishment of an area of convergence.

It must also be pointed out that the order of the expository chapters is not accidental. There was no original intent to have any particular order for the presentation of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. However, in the search for convergence, it was discovered that there was a general tendency for the positions of Mead and Parsons to be in closer alinement

than those of Parsons and Lundberg. Moreover, the positions of Mead
and Lundberg tend to be in closer alinement than those of Parsons and
Lundberg. Consequently Mead tends to occupy a central position relative
to Parsons and Lundberg, and this is made evident in Chapter V on con-
vergence. It was not an expected result, and was evident only after the
study of convergence itself was undertaken, but Mead emerged as the "base
man" in the area of convergence. Therefore, Mead is presented first.

The data utilized to "represent" the positions of Mead, Parsons,
and Lundberg from which convergence was extracted, were taken from sources
that are considered to be representative of the sociological positions
they had developed at the time this study was undertaken. In the case of
each man, anything written by them is held to be good "background", but
everything written by them is not relevant to their recently developed
sociological positions. Selection has to be made in terms of what is
here considered to be constitutive of their "systems".

In the case of Mead this involves the use of all four of his post-
humously issued books with the incorporation of none of his articles not
included in them. Mind, Self, and Society,[10] Movement of Thought in The
Nineteenth Century,[11] and The Philosophy of the Present,[12] are relevant

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[10]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934.

[11]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1936.

[12]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court
Publishing Company, 1932.

in their entirety. In The Philosophy of the Act[13] only parts of each

major section are relevant due to the fragmentary and diversified nature

of the material.

In the case of Lundberg the major components of his position are

taken from his Foundations of Sociology,[14] with some implementation and

elaboration coming from his Can Science Save Us.[15] Lundberg's other books

and essays are disregarded as being either repetitious or irrelevant.

In the case of Parsons, the problem is somewhat different in that he

manifests a "development" that neither Mead nor Lundberg do. By that is

meant that Parsons has drastically altered his position over the years,

whereas Mead and Lundberg have not. Mead's final views were really more

refined elaborations of those that he had held many years earlier. His

analysis is characterized by a "depth" due to his consistent concentration

on the same problems over a period of many years. Lundberg also has what

might be called "one" position involving little modification or reshaping

over the years. In constrast, Parsons' current publications represent a

major overhauling of his earlier position. His work has not been a

"building on to" as in the case of Mead, but has involved a drastic

"remodeling". Consequently his current system has been constructed here

primarily out of The Social System,[16] with implementation from Chapters

[13]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1938.

[14]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, the Macmillan
Company, 1939.

[15]G. A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us, New York, Longmans, Green
and Company, 1947.

[16]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free
Press, 1951.

I and II from Essays in Sociological Theory,[17] and Part II of Toward a

General Theory of Action.[18] The Structure of Social Action[19] is no longer

directly relevant. It is important in only two ways, first for the ex-

cellent critical work it contains, and second to show where Parsons came

from. Neither of these features are relevant to our problem, consequently

it is disregarded.

[17]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied,
Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949.

[18]Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils (eds.), Toward A General Theory
of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951.

[19]Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, 2d ed., Glencoe,
Illinois, The Free Press, 1949.

CHAPTER II

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE IN THE THEORETICAL
POSITION OF GEORGE H. MEAD

It is generally conceded that the three main lines of thought ex-
pressed in the social theory of George H. Mead are philosophical, histori-
cal, and social psychological. Explicitly that seems to be the case and
those phases have all been treated with the rather considerable interest
due them. However it can be contended that there is a broad stratum of
sociological thought implicit in Mead's social theory that has been
relatively neglected. In his pervasive interest in human behavior it was
inevitable that elements of his approach would fall within the sphere
typically held by the sociologist. Although he was not a sociologist in
the formal sense and contributes nothing to the corpus of facts of that
science, he may be considered to be a marginal contributor whose insights
and concepts constitute a fertile ground for the sociological system
builder. Mead appears capable of adding much to the ideational and con-
ceptual structure of sociology as a science.

Such terms as evolution, emergence, dynamics, process, and sociality
are basic to Mead's approach to behavior, and that approach may be further
characterized by such generally descriptive terms as pragmatic, empirical,
biosocial behavioristic, naturalistic, voluntaristic, instrumental, and
functional. A position identified by such characteristics cannot help but
be of sociological relevance because it involves a movement away from
traditional epistemology toward a sociology of knowledge.

Epistemology under the Meadian treatment is transformed into an empirical study of the way knowing proceeds <u>within</u> the context of experience, the philosophy of science becomes concerned with the genesis of scientific categories within the social act, and a relating of the world of science to the world of common perception and the problems emergent in action.[1]

In all of Mead's thinking the central position of research science is evident and his grappling with methodology is of particular significance to the sociologist because it hits him where he is most vulnerable. Mead accepted the method of scientific research as underlying all recent important developments in thinking, but that did not deter him from expecting, and demanding a constant reconstruction of it. His basic assumption was that the description of experience in any of the scientific fields must be made in terms of processes rather than absolutes, must be dynamic rather than static, hypothetical rather than final, systematic and yet problem oriented. Such expectations pose severe methodological problems, many of which are still unsolved by the sociologist. They naturally arose however in Mead's attempt to handle the problem he set for himself. Stated in its simplest form it is the problem of how man the rational animal arose, if one started with evolutionary conceptions. How the impulsive, biological, organism acquired the capacity for self-awareness, thinking, purposive behavior, moral discrimination.[2] In short, he

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[1]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. X-XI.

[2]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, pp. XV-XVI.

attempted to show that mind and self are social emergents without

residue, and that language constituted the mechanism for that emergence.[3]

Such emergence will obviously be of interest to the psychologist and the

social psychologist, but due to the fact that the emergence took place

out of social process and structure, the abstracted sphere of the sociolo-

gist, it will inevitably be of interest to him also.

1. Mead's View on Science

Mead's own approach is pragmatic, and among the various forms that

position has taken, his is one that definitely is attached to the pro-

cedures and assumptions involved in research science. He avoided the

paradox of wherein science has traditionally prided itself on being em-

pirical in that it demanded the final test of observation for its theories,

and at the same time relegated the data of observation to the "subjective",

"mental" sphere through a denial of the "natural" character of experience.[4]

Mead pragmatically holds that the world of science must be traced in

experiential terms therefore it is incapable of depreciating scientific

experience as being "mental" or "social". The physical things of primary

interest in several sciences are socially derived in the order of experi-

ence. The realm of science is composed of that which is common to various

observers, the world of common, necessarily social experience as it is

symbolically formulated. The experienced world is conceived of as being

a realm of natural events that are no more the property of the organism

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[3]Ibid., pp. XV-XVI.

[4]Ibid., pp. XVIII-XIX.

than they are of the things observed.[5] There is a necessary relationship between observer and observed, therefore, the fundamental thing is the direct and common accessibility to both observer and observed. The completeness of the accessibility will vary, both with reference to object and observer, but the fact that it must be common is essential to the method of science and goes unquestioned. If it is common, it is social, therefore there is nothing more purely social than the discipline of science.

Mead is impressed by the fact that the scientist has no generalized problem of knowledge in spite of the fact that it is his particular business to know.[6] Knowing is not a matter of getting from the uncertain effects in the individual to the world beyond which is supposed to cause those effects--for research science always posits on unquestioned world of existence within which its problems appear and are tested. Any part of this world may become problematic and therefore become an object of the knowing process. To know for the research scientist is not be have existences and meanings given but is rather the initiation of an inquiry into some part of the common world that has become a part of the problematic area, an inquiry that necessarily proceeds through the formation of hypotheses and their testing in the unquestioned world that surrounds it. Mead insists, that for the purposes at hand, the instruments, the controls, the laboratories, the fellow-workers (the verifiers) are a part

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[5]Ibid., pp. XVIII-XIX.

[6]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. X-XI.

of the unproblematic world that is "there" as a world of things in
which theories can be tested.[7] Knowledge in a scientific sense is not
contemplation, but discovery through hypotheses tested in action by
"things" which are for the moment unquestionably real, although in other
situations they can be a part of the problematic area. This position
would be unacceptable if experience did not have a social dimension, but
that is the major task of Mead, to indicate that the so-called mental,
and subjective, lies within a context that is common and social. If
observation is to be the ultimate test for the scientist then it must
have a social base in order to assure its objectivity.

Mead refuses to accept any epistemology which denies the reality of
perceived things, because the entire procedure of the research scientist
is at the mercy of those perceptions. These very things circumscribe
both overt measurements and scientific decisions involving the acceptance
or rejection of an hypotheses and the identification of exceptions by the
scientist.[8] The scientist starts with an unquestioned world that is
manifest in his research problem. From there he proceeds by inference
to the formulation of an hypothesis, and in the process of that formulation
he will be symbolizing relations in a world that is "there", and he will
be searching among those relations for results that will overcome con-
flicts between objects and their meanings, or between different meanings
of things in terms of a hypothetical reconstruction. The resolutions

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[7]Ibid., pp. XV-XVI.

[8]Ibid., p. XIX.

which he is seeking will be in terms of "observations" and "things" that are real, that are part of an unproblematic world. His cognitive task proceeds from an accepted perceptual world through conflicting meanings or inhibited responses on to a world that is reconstructed in terms of new meanings.[9] He will criticize his perceptual experience and demonstrate errors and illusions but that criticism is always founded on objects that are "there". His criticism does not invalidate the objects of perception because he ultimately must appeal to them for the verification or confirmation he seeks.

Mead's position then is that an external world is objectively "there" independent of our experiencing of it. Another way of saying it is that research work is work of discovering, and we can only discover what is in existence.[10] Although external objects exist independently of the experiencing individual, nevertheless they possess certain characteristics by virtue of their relations to his experiencing of them that they would not otherwise possess.[11] These characteristics are their "meanings" for him, and, in a scientific sense, for us. The distinction between physical objects or reality and the experiencing of that reality lies in the fact that the latter is constituted by and concerned with meanings. Only that which is experienced can have meaning. (See Section 9, Chapter II on "meaning") For Mead the physical object is an abstraction which we make

[9]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, p. 140.

[10]Ibid., p. 7.

[11]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 131.

from our social response to nature. He defines the physical object as one in which there is no social response to call out again the social response of the experiencing individual. It is an object with which it is impossible to carry on social intercourse, therefore it is physical although socially derived.[12] This establishes an initial distinction between a science of physical objects and one of socially responding organisms. A distinction typically ignored by the positivists.

Pragmatically Mead has placed the process of knowing inside of conduct. Cognition is a development of the selective attitude of an organism toward its environment and the readjustment that follows upon such a selection.[13] In knowledge there is necessarily the presupposition of a world that is there to provide the basis for the inferential and ideational process of cognition.[14] This automatically restricts cognition to that which has within it an inevitable strain of inference. In refusing to go along with the so-called epistemological problem he denies that knowledge is to be identified with a "content" of experience. Knowledge for Mead is a process in conduct that so organizes the field of action that delayed and inhibited responses can take place. The test of the success of the process is the test of truth. That test is found in the discovery of such objects that will mediate our conflicting or checked activities and thereby allow the action to proceed.[15] Knowing is a process

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[12]Ibid., p. 184.

[13]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. 350.

[14]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, p. 5.

[15]Ibid., p. 68.

of adjustment in that it involves a continuing reconstruction of mean-

ings. Truth then viewed in this fashion is tested only through the

ability to continue a process which has been inhibited. This is perhaps

of particular significance to the sociologist due to his interest in

the social process, and the interaction of people in social systems.

The independence of data as implied above is frequently interpreted

as a metaphysical affirmation of a real world independent of observation

and speculation. Mead would maintain that there is no such necessary

implication in scientific methodology.[16] A metaphysical affirmation is

of a reality that is final, whereas in the scientists procedures no such

finality is contemplated. On the contrary, his procedures contemplate

continued reconstruction in the face of the "brute" fact and events

emerging in ceaseless novelty. Data are isolated elements in a world of

things and their isolation is overcome by the scientists hypothesis.

He cannot stop with the data, they do not speak for themselves, they are

but a phase of the investigation involved in his cognitive advance. How-

ever tentative, however, uncertain he may be of its stability, the

scientist inevitably will effect a relationship between data, bringing

them into some sort of an ordered whole. This gives them at least a

provisional reality not attached to them as mere data.[17]

In creating this ordered whole, even provisionally, the scientist

is postulating a uniformity of nature. The uniformity of nature is of

course a major premise of science, and all of its endeavors are predicated

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[16]Ibid., pp. 101-102.

[17]Ibid., pp. 94-95.

upon it, therefore there is sometimes a tendency to treat the uniformity

as being more than a postulate. The law of probabilities is sometimes

spoken of as demonstrating the uniformity of nature, then if one is to

ask why the probabilities were found, the answer is because the uniformity

has already been assumed. One cannot demonstrate the uniformity of nature

by assuming it in advance, one must merely accept it as a necessary postu-

late. On a pragmatic basis we can continue to "explain" the world in

terms of uniformities, and do so with confidence because the assumption

has always worked.[18]

Science, then, states its laws in terms of uniformities, but by the

very nature of its procedures, is always ready to change any statement

it has made with reference to any uniformity. Science has gotten away

from its older tendency of stating what the nature of things "is", and

simply goes on placing the events of observation in order.[19] For Mead,

all universals used by science are postulates, and they are acceptable

only as long as they agree with the facts of observation. (See Section 9,

Chapter II on "meaning") Science deals with hypothetical universals and

its conclusions are hypothetical propositions. By virtue of being infer-

ential in its structuring the entire procedure of science from beginning

to end is hypothetical. Scientific research does not attempt to establish

"laws" as absolutely given.[20] The laws of science are postulates not

dogmas. The method of research science always conflicts with fixed dogmas,

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[18]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1936, pp. 6-7.

[19]Ibid., p. 275.

[20]Ibid., pp. 266-267.

and Mead points out that wherever the two have come into conflict the former has always been successful.[21]

In so far as the scientific method is hypothetical, it is a method of extrapolation. It is a way of speculating as to what a result _may_ be, and then justifying the theory by means of a result. One is not justified however in assuming the finality of that result, for one never makes a complete statement about all that is involved in anything that happens, the process of abstraction demands that the result, just as the initial theory, remain hypothetical.

The results looked for by science are uniformities, and it states them in terms of probabilities. Mead finds probability in the character of the process going on in experience.[22] In making statements about uniformities one is stating that, given a set of conditions, a given result will probably follow. It involves an assumption that the happening of earlier events carries with it a probability as to the nature of later events. Mead, non-mechanistically, maintains that the basis for the determination of the future is found in the fact that something is taking place which has a temporal spread.[23] The "knife-edge" reality of the mechanist, the abstracted instant, ignores the fact the earlier stages must be the conditions of later phases within the temporal spread or process. All of our speculation with regard to the future is tied to

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[21]Ibid., pp. XX-XXI.

[22]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, p. 14.

[23]Ibid., p. 33.

the irrevocable past and the occurring change. When one asks a scientist to state uniformities one is asking him to predict. He has to seek out in the environment a statement of the conditions under which an emergent has arisen in the past, and consequently the conditions under which the emergent must exist, even though the emergent has altered that environment by its mere appearance.[24] Science cannot mechanically limit itself to the instant according to Mead, but is charged with the undertaking of finding out what is going on in process, inclusive of change.

In the process the new past is different from the old that it replaces. The problem for the scientist is not simply a matter of "seeing" what is "out there". Mead points out that "seeing" in any significant sense depends upon our looking, and looking will inevitably reflect a whole system of interests, theories, and purposes that will lead us to seek one character rather than another in the thing under consideration. For Mead, as for the research scientist, contrary to the positivistic doctrine, data is always taken rather than given. Our considerations are guided on theories that lend direction to our looking, and we expect to have to modify or even completely reject those theories. In fact, Mead indicates that one important aspect of research is the conscientious attempt to break down the very theory that is guiding an investigation at a given time.[25] It is the peculiar characteristic of a discipline looking for uniformities that finds its problems arising out of the exceptional event. Observation is not merely a matter of opening ones eyes or ears, but

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[24]Ibid., p. 42.

[25]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, pp. XXIX-XXX.

rather is always directed in terms of some sort of a problem and expresses some sort of an interest.[26] It is the exceptional event that attracts interest in that it seems to run contrary to previous observations or laws as they have been accepted. By the nature of its exceptional character it poses a problem for the scientist in his quest for uniformity--there is a compulsion to develop a statement that will enable him to account for it in the realm of uniformity, whether that statement merely involves the elaboration of older theories, or the rejection of them and the development of newer more inclusive hypothetical explanations.

The research scientist is not involved in giving a systematic account of the universe as such, but on the contrary, his work starts from a specific problem that involves an exception to what has been regarded as a law. Given the exception, he undertakes to supply a hypothesis which will ultimately solve the problem.[27] The genius of the research thinker lies in the fact that he does not merely wait for the exceptional instance to turn up, but rather devotes his energy to ferreting out particular cases for which existent theory give an inadequate explanation.[28] Such an approach as this, could, in the hands of a radical pragmatist, lead to a negation of systematic theory, but that is not true in the case of Mead. Mead points out that the approach to the problem may be from either of two sides: that of the particular experience that controverts the theory, or that of the developed relational theory that offers new objects

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[26]Ibid., pp. 281-282.

[27]Ibid., pp. 264-265.

[28]Ibid., p. XI.

for scientific investigation.[29] Theory is not only the beginning but
the end of research, and is implicit in the procedures of the inquiry.

In the procedure of research science the perspective of the particu-
lar observer is transcended by the finding of that which is common to
many, or ideally, all observers. Science in one sense is a recording in
symbolic form of the universal aspects of a common world. In so far as
what the individual does or says is understandable by, traceable by, or
accepted by, any other individuals implicated in the common activity of
science, then what is said or done has a type of universality--social
universality.[30] A community of meaning is built around the common
activity. What is given to the individual alone is transcended when,
through communication his experience becomes that of others so that it
then falls under the same universal. The individual perspective then is
a social perspective in that it is experientially shared. By being
assured through communication that the events present the same appearance
to others one attains that which is common, and the objectivity of science
lies in that which is common. In this sense Mead, makes objectivity
synonomous with universality.

The question arises as to whether there can be such a thing as uni-
versality in a world of experience. To ask for a law of nature is to
ask for a uniformity, but to ask just where that uniformity is found is
to get the answer that it is found in the experience of men who observe.

[29]Ibid., p. XI.

[30]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, pp. XXVIII-XXIX.

They obtain certain impressions and find them uniform. It must be re-membered however that for Mead these impressions belong in their totality, neither to the observers, nor to the observed, but their significance lies in the relationship between observer and observed, and it is through this relationship that one can obtain universality in experience.

The assumption made by science that the world is explicable is also an assumption that it is intelligible. A knowledge of it therefore is never a mere contact of the organism with objects in it, but something taking on a more universal character. To know a thing, to explain it, we put it into the texture of uniformities. To establish a uniformity, one is relating an event to the conditions under which it occurs. This is causation in its broadest sense and is the sense in which Mead primarily uses causation. Mead accepts the scientific tenet that natural effects have natural causes, but rejects the mechanistic assumption that accompanies this, that consequently every effect can be reduced to its causal condi-tions. Mead contends that the appearance of the effect constitutes an emergence, and that the emergent itself effects an environment which, therefore, could not be known before its emergence.[31] The relation of the event to its preceding conditions is a factor in itself, and establishes an aspect of uniqueness in that a new past has been created for the event. Hence knowledge for Mead must be expressed in terms of dynamics, of process, and consists of the coordinating of perspectives. He simply substitutes for the idea of cause as a force, a uniformity that has been discovered and may be expected to continue. Thus he avoids cause and effect in a

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[31]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. XLV-XLVII.

mechanical sense and comes back to statements of probability.[32]
Probability is based not only upon the imperfect hypotheses and observations of man, but also upon the element of novelty contained in the emergence of events that cannot be reduced to the conditions of their emergence.

For Mead it is necessary to express the nature of the world in terms of dynamics. As opposed to the "static" representation of the world at an instant in a "knife-edge" present, he presses for representation of it as it is in process. This means that stress is not only placed upon the interrelationship and interdependence of the parts within a given system, but also upon the place of process in the persistence of the system. In this fashion, Mead, treating the biological form, brings in the environment of the form and stresses the mutual interdependence of the form and environment in their existence.[33] An attempt to explain either in separation from the other would deny process, would be a static explanation, and would ignore what is going on between the form and the environment.

Mead makes a distinction between the sciences on the basis of process.[34] He uses the examples of the physicist and the biologist, but the sociologist could be substituted for the biologist, and the validity of the distinction would remain. The difference lies in the goals that the sciences

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[32]G. H. Mead, Movement of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. 276.

[33]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. XLV-XLVII.

[34]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, p. 35.

contemplate, for their procedures answer to their goals. That of the physical scientist is reduction and that of the biologist is production. The biologist's investigation is of a going life process. There must, of course, be physical means for this process. These physical means can be legitimately reduced to energy by the physicist and a mechanical statement given. For the biologist to leave it at that however is to deny the reality of the emergence of the life process out of the physical means. To deny reality to the continuity of the life process and the conditions under which it maintains itself is to put himself out of business because he has eliminated the very perspective from which biology works. To maintain the reality of the life process makes him a teleologist, but that view comes into conflict with the view of the physicist only if he should attempt to state the physical qualities of the organism solely in terms of the process. The analogy with sociology is clear. To deny a reality to "social" behavior simply because the people manifesting it can be physically reduced to energy is tantamount to violation of the principle of scientific abstraction and moreover would eliminate any justification for the sociologists existence.

Mead also distinguishes between the sciences by pointing up the relation of the physical thing to "acceleration" and the organism to "response". "A physical thing is a spatial volume whose activity at each instant tends to repeat the same state of rest or uniform motion."[35] It follows that change in its activity will only bring about quantitative

[35]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. XLV-XLVII.

differences in its existence at different times. Change in the activity

of physical things can only be in acceleration of rate or direction of

movement through space. Spatial change does not imply a qualitative

difference in the body that is moving. This is in contrast with an

organism which is a physical thing whose activities at any moment tend

to bring about a different qualitative state in the organism. This is

due to the organism's ability to respond.

> "A response is a spatial change which has three properties;
> (1) rate, (2) direction with respect to a perceived thing or
> things, and (3) the quality of existence which an organism
> becomes in the consummatory phase of a response".[36]

Mead indicated two basic differences between an acceleration and a

response. First, a response is more than a spatial movement toward an

object because it involves qualitative change from one kind of existence

to another. A food response, for example, is a motion in which an organism

passes from a state of hunger to a state of satiation, and the termination

of the response lies in the attainment of the new state of being. Second,

the beginning of any specific organic activity is an impulse phase for a

whole act with regard to perceived things.[37] The relationship between

the impulse and perceived things is not determined wholly by either,

consequently the change in rate or direction of response would not be

necessarily proportional to the applied stimulus force, nor have its di-

rection. Behavior, conceived of within an act, is teleological, not

mechanical in form. It is this that distinguishes the acceleration from

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[36]Ibid., pp. XXIII-XXIV.

[37]Ibid., pp. XXIII-XXIV.

the response, and is a distinction typically ignored by the positivists because of the obvious relative ease of quantifying "accelerations".

Mead also breaks down the stimulus object into three functionally distinct phases fitting into a complete response to perceptual things"... (1) those stimulus qualities which mediate locomotion, (2) those which mediate manipulations, and (3) consummatory qualities which complete a response."[38] Mead would maintain that this classification is based upon function, not upon intrinsic "sense" qualities. Their significance lies in the control they exert over structural parts of given responses. A stimulus, as contrasted to a "force", requires a potentiality for response, (including the consummatory phase), that can only be found in acting organisms. Again, behavior within the act is teleological.

Consistent with this, Mead assumes that thinking makes a difference in the order of natural events. Thinking, being as natural an emergent as any other, also plays a role in the occurring of events. This is in line with his general assumption that the form and its environment emerge simultaneously, and neither possesses independence. Thinking, manifest in its scientific form, gives mankind a degree of control over its environment that it otherwise would not have.[39] Science being the most universal of disciplines transcends the provincialism of other human communities and enables people to cope with the immediate conditions under which they live. Mead conceives science to be something that enters into the minutiae of life. It is not, therefore, divorced from behavior, but

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[38]_Ibid_., p. XXVI.

[39]_Ibid_., p. XLIV.

on the contrary is a form of behavior expressing the most universal

experiences, and consequently those experiences that are most applicable

to the problems of men. Science in its demand for freedom, constitutes

a demand for rational authority as opposed to any kind of arbitrary

authority.[40]

2. Emergence

The general principle of evolution incited Mead to stress the reality

of change, and gave him evidence of the genuine character of emergents.

In recognizing emergents, Mead questioned the adequacy of the mechanistic

statement of change. The mechanist tends to account for the emergent in

terms of efficient causes alone, thereby does not consider the import of

the emergent in effecting new orders of events. Mechanism, with its

necessary and sufficient causes alone cannot account for process.[41] In

contrast to the typical mechanistic interpretation, Mead acknowledges the

role of the future in determining action. In recognizing the on-coming

event as a determinent in action he converts sheer action into process.

That which is still in the future is the emergent and yet it pertains to

the present process. The mechanists treat an extensionless present,

thereby establishing the self-sufficiency of presents, but it is obvious

that one cannot establish continuity—process--out of a series of self-

sufficient presents.[42] Mead, therefore, deals with what he calls the

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[40]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. XI.

[41]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. XVIII.

[42]Ibid., p. LI.

"specious present" which is a duration including the push of the past and the pull of the future.[43]

The research scientist who welcomes facts that fail to accord with his theory must leave a place in his doctrine for such facts to appear. Mead would not account for such fact by saying that a mind had previously been in error and now the mistake was rectified to give a truer account of reality. That would involve an assumption of a static or ultimate reality. Mead treats such facts as emergents rather than as repugnant facts.[44] Rather than placing them in the experiencing mind, the category of error, he places them in the world that is being experienced.

Mead does not explain mind, self, and society by reducing them to the conditions necessary for their emergence--for that would be a denial of emergence. He recognizes the necessity for those conditions and also recognizes the process of emergence-- "...the interval between a system necessary for the emergence of another system and that other system."[45] The process is indicated in a plurality of relational systems that are irreducibly distinct and yet mutually implicated in passage. An object belonging to two or more such systems at once will import into each a character that has been endowed by the others. Its membership in one system will alter its relationship to another system as well as its

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[43]Ibid., p. LI.

[44]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, p. 99.

[45]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. XLII-XLIII.

relationships within that system. The process of readjustment in which the object maintains itself in each system concurrently, is for Mead, its sociality.[46]

Whenever emergence occurs, a new perspective of the past ensues which, in itself as a new relatedness, is a natural fact involved in the new situation that could not have been in the old. Mead's temporalist view denies the past "in itself" for that excludes the relationship of the past to the present which must always necessarily be new, and cannot be excluded as an aspect of the present.[47] The relationship of the past to the present is its only grounds for "pastness". This relation is a causal one, but if "becoming" is real, if the future's role in the act is admitted, then that causal relation cannot exclude emergence. That which constituted the future for an older present, being emergent in a present, becomes a part of the world of causal objects. The perspective of the past has changed, so that the past as it appears in the present is changed, for only through a perspective of the present can we grasp the past at all. Mead, thus, through the concept of emergence keeps his system indeterminate, probabalistic, and teleological. Mead's view makes knowledge a phase of process and does not assume that an object of knowledge can be static or remain unconditioned by the adjustment action going on between the form and its environment.[48]

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[46]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, p. XXXII.

[47]Ibid., p. XX.

[48]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. LXII.

3. The Past

Mead has a novel theory of the past in that he equates its problem with that of research science.[49] Research science is involved in relating the exceptional or particular event to that which is universal and is constantly modifying its theories in terms of that requirement. The past is continually being reconstructed by the novelty of emergence which creates a new relatedness between past and present and thereby creates a new perspective of it. The past, then, for Mead, is being continually reconstructed. This theory of the past as functioning in and being reconstructed in the present is a literal application of his instrumentalism to passage.[50] It is an instrumentalism that includes as a part of its "apparatus" the ideas and relations that pertain to the attainment of knowledge.

Mead's view of the past is that it is not just an antecedent present, and he expresses that view with unusual clarity in the following passage.

> "When one recalls his boyhood days he cannot get into them as he then was, without their relationship to what he has become: and if he could, that is, if he could reproduce the experience as it then took place, he could not use it, for this would involve his not being in the present within which the use must take place. A string of presents conceivably existing as presents would not constitute a past."[51]

The past then is irrevocable, which is a common historical assumption, but in Mead's sense it can refer only to what "must have" been. We cannot

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[49]G. H. Mead, Movement of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. XXIV.

[50]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. XIII.

[51]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, pp. XVI-XVIII.

go back to a past to test our conjectures about it. We can only test
our conjectures of the past in terms of the conditioning happenings of
the present and by later happenings of the future. The irrevocability
of the past is found in the extension of the necessity of what has
happened into the conditioning of what is emergent in the future.

Mead is saying that everything that is taking place is doing so under
necessary (causal) conditions; that the necessity of these conditions
does not determine the full reality of that which emerges; the past as
conditioning is "there" in the present, manifest in "conscious" experience,
memory, and historical apparatus; and the emergent character of the
present being responsible for a new relationship sets up a new perspective
of the past.[52] There can be no past without becoming; for Mead, the causal
determination involved in passage is a condition but not a realization.
If there is emergence, the reflection of it into the past takes place at
once. As Mead puts it: "There is a new past, for from every new rise
the landscape that stretches behind us becomes a different landscape".[53]
Knowledge for Mead always implies the attachment and coordination of per-
spectives, and the attainment of a new perspective means new knowledge.

The causal determination of the present by the past and the novelty
involved in emergence might be construed as contradictory, but they are
not in Meads usage. The irrevocable past holds for any given present,
whereas emergence refers to the relation of one such present with its past

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[52]Ibid., pp. 16-19.

[53]Ibid., pp. 9-10.

to another.[54] The irrevocable past is one whose determining conditions can be ideally, if not actually, stated in a given present. But, when a new present arises with an emergent character which could not have been contained in the former present, then it will necessarily have a new past. After the emergence has occurred then we endeavor to reconstruct experience in terms of it, we try to conceive of a past from which the novel element does follow and thereby eliminate the discontinuity of the present. The abruptness of the emergent is removed by a new standpoint, a perspective perhaps involving new laws or explanations that could not have existed prior to the emergence of the new facts. For Mead then, there cannot be a past independent of the present. The past is a construction which is constantly subject to reconstruction in the seat of reality, the present, and has its function in its conditioning passage of enabling rational conduct to proceed.[55] The implication of this position is that history is not merely the business of the historian, but is implicated in the work of the sociologist who potentially can play a real role in reconstructing the past.

4. The Present

For Mead, a present is not a mere abstraction from passage, it is not a piece cut out just anywhere from the temporal dimension of passing reality. On the contrary, past, present, and future belong to a passage attaining temporal structure through the event. The event involves the

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[54]Ibid., pp. XVI-XVIII.

[55]Ibid., p. 29.

occurrence of something which is more than the processes that have led
up to it and which will through its own character add to later passage
a content it otherwise could not have had.[56] Our experience is always
experience in passing, which involves extension into other experiences.
What has just happened, what is going on, and what is appearing in the
future are all implicated in the event, and give to it its unique char-
acter. There is never an experience at an instant. Mead maintains
that there is "...no such thing as the experience of a bare instant."
If the future is in the experience it influences the event. There is an
interpenetration of what we are going to do and what we have done into
what we are doing. Our ends are as truly real as our means. The teleo-
logical position adapted by Mead defies mechanistic treatment.

In passage from the past into the future the present is therefore
constituted by that which is both old and new. This also holds for the
relations to the other members of any system to which the object of the
present belongs. For example, a person belonging to a given social system
and having his character conditioned by his relations to members in that
system, will when he passes into a new systematic order carry over some-
thing of the nature of the members of the old into the process of re-
adjustment to the new. In a community the members will carry over their
characters as determined in the old order into the readjustment entailed
in social change. Mead illustrates this by pointing out the establishment
of an essentially "old" structure after the revolution has taken place.[57]

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[56]Ibid., p. 23.

[57]Ibid., p. 52.

Mead identifies sociality not only with system but with emergence.
The stage between the old and the new system is as truly social as are the
systems themselves. If emergence is to be a feature of reality then the
phase of adjustment that occurs between the ordered system before the
emergence has taken place, and the system after it has come to terms with
the emergent is a phase of reality. Mead places sociality in nature by
stating that emergence requires that objects be at one time in both the
old system and new. He utilizes the experimental proofs of relativity
to buttress this notion. "Relativity reveals a situation within which
the object must be contemporaneously in different systems to be what it
is in either."[58] Within the present in which emergent change takes place,
then, it is necessary for persons to maintain relationships in different
systems to be what they are.

Mead is thus pointing out two dimensions to sociality, and the distinction between them is temporal.[59] A system can be conceived of at a
given moment, and at that moment the social character of the individual
member would be what it is because of the mutual relationships involved.
However, an object can be a member of two divergent systems only in
passage, in which its nature in one carries with it the potentiality of
transformation into the other. Mead uses an example of a man on a train
to illustrate the reality of passage.[60] A man in a train passes from
the system of movement of his train to that of another. He as an object

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[58]Ibid., p. 63.

[59]Ibid., p. 77.

[60]Ibid., p. 81.

can obviously not be on both trains, but he can effect a transformation in passage because he is a minded individual. He can occupy both systems in passage by holding the attitude of each in comprehensible relationship to the other indicating that the passing of the trains is the same occurrence from two different perspectives. The two situations are mutually exclusive, but he can in passage occupy both.

In identifying passage itself as reality and recognizing that in passage there is change, and that objects can in passage occupy different systems, Mead is recognizing a system of transformations. It is possible to occupy at one time alternative systems that are mutually exclusive, through identification within them of identical objects from different perspectives.

The implication for the sociologist in Mead's treatment of the present is plain. To deal with social systems at a given moment is to deal with them only in a "knife-edge" present. To deal with them in a "specious" present gives them another dimension, a character in passage, that enables a comprehension of change. To coordinate the perspectives of divergent social systems requires a treatment of them involving the conditions of their past and the import of their future. To get at social change, one has to not only get at system, but at intervals between systems as they are viewed from the present.

5. The Social Act

The social act is the fundamental datum in the biosocial behavioristic approach of Mead to human conduct. It is the process from which all sociocultural behavior emerges; therefore it is the focal point of analysis.

The individual as a human personality is inevitably implicated in a social order. The individual biologic organism gains a "mind" and a "self" by participation in the social process of interaction. The individual, then, is an integral part of a social group, and it is only through interaction with other members of the group that he rises above the animal level and assumes the role of a human personality.

> "A social act may be defined as one in which the occasion, or stimulus, which sets free an impulse, is found in the character or conduct of a living form that belongs to the proper environment of the living form whose impulse it is. I wish, however, to restrict the social act to the class of acts which involve the cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act,....is a social object. By a social object I mean one that answers to all parts of the complex act, though these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals. The objective of the act is then found in the life process of the group, not in those of the separate individuals alone."[61]

The social act as defined by Mead is a complex organic process, a dynamic and continuing whole, sustained, but not constituted by the stimuli and responses involved in it. The act of the individual is a unit act, comprehensible in terms of interaction, of being a part of a complex social behavior pattern. Mead maintains a distinction between the unit act and the social act and does not attempt to build up the social act out of stimulus plus response, but rather takes it as a dynamic whole, something going on possessing a temporal spread, and cooperatively sustained. The individual act has a biological basis in that Mead attaches great importance to the "tendencies" to respond. The act is initiated by an impulse that functions to maintain the life process by selection of the

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[61]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7.

stimuli appropriate to the requirements of the organism.[62] Stimuli are
means then, and implicit in the act is purpose although it need not be
in view. The act is moving toward a goal, conscious or otherwise. This
is a natural teleology on the part of Mead, and indicates a strong bio-
logical orientation that perhaps results in an unnecessary biologic
residue. Whether the biologist can adequately demonstrate in empirical
fashion, this selective character of attention remains to be seen.

"The whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the
part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not
the whole in terms of the part or parts."[63]

This premise is basic to Mead's entire social psychology, and he
supports it with considerable evidence from behavioral development.
Furthermore, for the sociologist, it takes precedence over the teleological
aspects of the individual act. An individual's behavior is, within the
limits of physiological structure and capacity, pervasively social.
Behavior is the result of mutual activity of the group in association.
Association is a characteristic of society; therefore it is essential to
the development of the individual as an integrated part of that society.

The new born infant has the biological ability to become incorporated
into the social act, because it has a dynamic quality about it. It is
born as a distinct configuration of nerves, muscles, organs, and tissue
that is functioning as an organic whole. The organism is not passive, it
does not merely undergo the action of events, it has a dynamic quality in

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[62]Ibid., p. 6.

[63]Ibid., p. 7.

itself that allows it to participate in interaction. The individual
manifests a spontaneity by acting immediately and impulsively within its
limited surroundings. The individual is not merely accepting stimuli,
it is selecting stimuli relevant to its demands, and thereby demonstrating
a selective character of attention. This aspect of Mead's theory will
perhaps be unpalatable to the sociologist, who might prefer the assumption
of random behavior in infancy. The shift to that assumption away from
that of the selective character of attention would probably be unaccept-
able to Mead--but it would not cause difficulty with the system.

Mead deals with the actively selective behavior of the organism by
utilization of the concept of the initial attitude. Mead defines the
attitude as the beginning of an act. It is a tendency to act in a certain
way. A stimulus only becomes a stimulus when the organism adjusts to it
by assuming an attitude. The first acceptance of the mothers' breast,
or the first rejection of a pin-prick, involves the taking of an "attitude",
in its broadest sense, towards those events by the impulsive individual.

The social act will be instituted by the mother adapting a specific
attitude toward the infant and thus creating the beginning of the on-
going act.

> "An attitude of any sort represents the beginning, or potential
> initiation, of some composite act or other, a social act in
> which, along with other individuals, the individual taking the
> given attitude is involved or implicated."[64]

The attitude may be expressed as, "what one is _going_ to do"; there-
fore, it indicates how an organism will react to a specific stimulus.

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[64] _Ibid._, p. 100.

This tendency to act is what initiates the social act, and it begins

the process of the development of the biologic organism into a socio-

cultural personality.

The attitude as the beginning of an act is initially expressed in

the act by means of gestures. Mead refers to the gesture as being:

"that part of the act or attitude of one individual engaged in a social

act which serves as the stimulas to another to carry out his part of the

whole act."[65] The implied difference between attitude and gesture is

that the former is an adjustment not necessarily involved in interaction,

whereas the latter is the expression of an attitude selected by another

organism as a stimulus.

The elementary social act, feeding of the infant for example, is

conducted by means of a conversation of gestures. Initially these are

meaningful gestures on the part of the mother and impulsive gestures on

the part of the infant. The attitude of the mother, in a meaningful sense,

initiated the conversation of gestures that involved; manipulation of

the infant by the mother and final acceptance of the breast by the infant.

These gestures involving mutual adjustment are, then, the basic forms of

communication and interaction.

The gestures become significant symbols when the gesture comes to

mean the same thing for the organism making the gesture as it does to the

organism accepting it as a stimulus. For example: the baby's cry that

repeatedly results in its feeding comes to have the same meaning for both

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[65]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, Open Court
Publishing Company, 1932,

mother and infant; therefore it is an element of interhuman communication, the language of the social act. This gives the individual the means of gaining a mind and a self.

The verbal symbolization of language greatly facilitates the inter-actionary process by making possible great elaboration of expression. Crying, whining, and babbling, are representative of the beginnings of language in that they give the infant practice in vocalization. Real use of language is accomplished when the child and another person apply the same sound to a common object. The utterance, or word, now is a symbol because it stands for that object, even when the object is not there.

Mead differentiates between human behavior and that of the animal by use of the significant symbol. He points out that the human has the ability to participate in a reflective act as well as an unreflective act. The act may occur on a non-reflective level, and probably does in all animal behavior inasmuch as the operation of language symbols is absent. Mead distinguishes four stages of an act: impulse, perception, manipula-tion, and consummation. These need not involve reflection as can be seen by the following example:

> "The hungry animal has an impulse to eat; this impulse in turn determines what stands out as a distant stimulus to guide the ongoing action; the object that is approached is clawed, bitten, downed; with eating the impulse reaching its consummation."[66]

All of this occurs without the fusion of language symbols; and very definitely is a directed behavior. Directed by impulse and consummated by satiation.[67]

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[66]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. IX.

[67]J. C. McKinney, "A Comparison of the Social Psychology of G. H. Mead and J. L. Moreno", Vol. X, November, 1947, p. 340.

This level of action is representative of only the early phase of man's life. Because of man's emergent mind and self, animal impulse can be elaborated and guided, perception can include enduring objects, manipulation can be extended to the techniques of science, and consummation of impulse can be in terms of reasoning.

"Animals live in a world of events; man lives in a world of common meanings—and meaning for Mead is socially generated and sustained."[68]

With the coming of speech the child may more easily identify himself with others by responding to the relationship between sound, object, and act. Through the development of significant symbols the child acquires a greater potentiality for experience in more complex social acts. Anticipations and expectancies can be more clearly defined and expressed because a superior means of communication has been developed. He can more readily comprehend the meanings of certain acts by taking the roles of others. Taking the roles of others induces "selfhood" and "mindedness" in the Meadian sense.

6. The Self

To Mead the self is not primarily a content, but an activity, a part of the social process within which minds and selves arise. The self is a development, it is not initially present, but arises as a result of the experiential relations of the individual to the social process as a whole and to the other individuals involved in that process.[69] He contends

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[68]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. X.

[69]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 135.

that there is a temporal and logical pre-existence of the social process
to the selfconscious individual who is emergent in it.[70] Such a con-
tention if adequately verified, of course emancipates the sociologist
from any form of psychological precedence or determinism, and puts his
discipline on a cooperative level with psychology rather than having it
in a dependent status. To Mead selves were not psychical, but belonged
to an objective phase of experience.

> "The self has a character which is different from that of the
> physiological organism proper. The self is something which has
> a development; it is not initially there at birth, but arises
> in the process of social experience and activity, that is,
> develops in the given individual as a result of his relations
> to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that
> process."[71]

The self, then, is generated in the social act, and language is the
mechanism that is essential to its development. The characteristic that
distinguishes the self from the body and from other objects is that
it is an object to itself. Possession of this capacity and ability to
become an object to ones self is one of the fundamental elements of
difference between human behavior and animal behavior. Mead emphasizes
the importance of the "reflexive" character of the self, and it is this
characteristic that makes the self sociologically relevant. The self as
Mead develops it has no significance unless it can turn back upon itself
as an object and thereby distinguish itself in a plurality of other selves.[72]

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[70]Ibid., p. 186.

[71]Ibid., p. 135.

[72]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. XXXIV.

The individual becomes an object to himself, and thus a self, only

by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself, by assuming

the roles of others, and regarding himself from their perspective. He

becomes an object to himself in that he becomes aware of himself as

others are. This is accomplished through utilization of the mechanism

of communication which is essential to the emergence and maintainence of

social organization. The individual does not at first experience himself

directly as subject, but only indirectly from either the particular

standpoints of individual members of the group, or from the generalized

standpoint of the group as a whole to which he belongs.[73] He thus can

only become a self within the context of social relations and the experi-

ence they involve. The importance of "communication" here is that it

provides the form of behavior that enables the individual to become an

object to himself in such a social environment. Through this device Mead

firmly fixes the self in experience. He gives as evidence the achievement

of the reflexive form in languages, the form that recognizes the self

as both subject and object.[74] Communication is not treated as something

independent of cooperative processes, but rather as being more universal

than the processes, in that it is the medium for their conduct. Communica-

tion is not something that can go on by itself, but rather must always

involve something that can be communicated. It is a medium for such basic

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[73]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, pp. 138-139.

[74]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. XXXIV.

cooperative activities as exchange and assistance and therefore always

serves a social function of enabling what is communicated to be socially

utilized.[75] Communication, under Mead's treatment becomes one of the

more universal aspects of sociology.

Mead distinguishes two stages in the development of the self; play,

and the game. In play the child assumes various roles of individuals

who have entered his life. This role assumption is based upon his observa-

tion of them in activity but is not to be construed as "imitation". By

means of vocal gestures he stimulates himself in the same manner that he

stimulates others. In responding to himself as others would, he becomes

an object to himself.

> "The consciousness of the self arises when the individual in
> imitation takes the attitude of another toward himself. In
> acting out his role of another, the individual discovers that
> the activities belong to his own nature. We must be others
> before we can be ourselves."[76]

In the organized game a more advanced stage is reached in that the

child, rather than merely taking a specific role, takes the role of all

the other participants in the common activity. To effectively participate

in a game with other individuals it is necessary that one assume the

attitudes of all the other participants in order to insure complementary

and cooperative action. Each one of a persons own acts is determined by

his assumption of the action on the part of other individuals involved.

By assuming the roles of all the other participants in a common activity,

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[75]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, p. 259.

[76]C. J. Bittner, "G. H. Mead's Social Concept of the Self," Sociology
and Social Research, Vol. 16, September-October, 1931, p. 15.

the individual has generalized the attitude of role taking, thereby created the "generalized other". He becomes conscious of the position of the group, and in assuming these attitudes he, to a significant degree, directs his behavior in terms of the expectations of that group.

By creating the "generalized other" the individual evidences an awareness of the position of the group, and of a concomitant pattern of attitudes, that the individual, in terms of his own experience, identifies with that group. In assuming these attitudes, he is assuming his orientation to that group. For example: the baseball player can ask himself; "What will 'they' (the team) think if I muff this catch or throw to the wrong base?" The school teacher can ask himself; "What will 'they' (his class) think if I give 'them' a test today?" The politician can ask himself; "What will 'they' (his constituents) think if I vote for this bill?" In all of these cases it can be noted that the individual is reacting to a "general other" and not to any individual or specific set of attitudes evidenced by any one person. This is actually an imagined or imputed other that the individual creates for himself out of his experience with the responses of individuals in various groups. The individual, then, reacts in terms of what he thinks are the expectations of the "generalized other". The relation here to a sociological theory of social control is clear. The generalized other makes social control not merely a negative, but a positive orientation. Mead has united the individual and society as different aspects of a single behavior process through the notion of the generalized other.

The attitudes, specific and general, that have been assumed by
the individual in the foregoing situations constitute one phase of the
self. The pattern of organized attitudes that has been assimilated by
the individual is the "me" phase of the self. These are the experiences
that he has retained in terms of his response in social situations.
This "me", or empirical self, is the phase of the self that is emergent
out of the natural data of the sociologist.

The other phase of the self is the active agent, the "I". The "I"
is the impulsive, and active, element in the self that actually makes
the response to social stimuli. The "I" is the creative, or reconstruc-
tive, potential of the self. It is the dynamic factor in external
relations, that is always emergent in a given present, therefore unpre-
dictable in the present.

> "It is an act that makes use of all the data that reflection
> can present, but uses them merely as the conditions of the
> new world that cannot possibly be foretold from them."[77]

It is the factor that reacts in terms of past experiences, the "me" and
its organized attitudes, but independent of it. The response to a situ-
ation as it appears in an individual's experience is always uncertain,
and it is this that characterizes the "I". That aspect of the act that
involves a movement into the future constitutes the "I". It is something
not given in the "me".[78] The "I" is only known after it has become a
"me", only after it has appeared, therefore only as it has passed, not as

[77] Ibid., p. 12.

[78] G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, p. 177.

it emerges. We only know our response after we have made it, and the element of the novel involved in it is accountable for by the "I". The "I" both calls out the me and responds to it in experience, and together they maintain the functional unity of the self. Mead obviously adapted his "I" to his theory of emergence and the present, and intended the "I" to be representative of the biological impulse in behavior. However from the point of view of the sociologist it can apparently be nothing but a residual category. Individual in character, biologically based, and unpredictable, it would seem that the "I" serves no purpose to the sociologist except to keep his system "indeterminate" in the mechanistic sense.

The self to Mead is really a plurality of selves. An individual carries on a whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one person and another thing to another. A variety of selves exist for a variety of acquaintances in a variety of situations. There are different sorts of selves answering to different sorts of reactions. What determines the amount or sort of self that will get into communication is the social experience itself. The self cannot appear apart from experience. Interpreted sociologically this means that the various elementary or component selves which are organized into a complete, or unitary self answer to various aspects of the social structure. The complete self is a reflection of the complete social process.[79] This interpretation opens up the possibility of examining personality dissociation in terms of the break-up of the unitary self into its component

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[79]Ibid., p. 144.

selves which correspond to different aspects of the social process.
These different aspects are based upon the different groups that the
individual belongs to. Ambivalence or stress can then potentially be
traced to conflict objectively "there" in the social structure.

The crux of Mead's development of the self, from the point of view
of the sociologist, is his portrayal of the process through which the self
appears as a result of the assumption of various specific and general
roles. Roles are objective material for the examination of the sociolo-
gist. By rejecting the notion of an isolated, atomic, "given" self,
Mead emphasizes the process of self-conscious interaction and inter-
penetration with other selves. By making the processes of social movement
and the development of the self inseparable he has attached great im-
portance to the structure of the group.[80] His treatment is behavioral
rather than metaphysical, in that he fixes role-taking as the mechanism
for self appearance. The whole business of role-taking is comprehensible
only in a social context. If the individual self has its genesis in the
roles of others, then it is merely necessary to posit the pre-existence
of roles to selves, of the minimal society to individuality. Moreover
if we only become selves through the assumption of the roles of others,
then the self is not only in a position to criticize the self whose role
it has taken, but it is also in a position to criticize itself.[81] The
other self becomes a standard of comparison. By taking the parts of

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[80]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1926, p. XXXI.

[81]Ibid., pp. XXXIII-XXXIV.

other selves we become aware of the significance of their difficulties, problems and limitations. Self awareness is not only social, but self evaluation becomes social under this treatment.

7. Mind

Co-existent with the self, and a vital factor in its development is the mind. Mead behavioristically treats mind as simply the presence in behavior of significant symbols. "It is the internalization within the individual of the social process of communication in which meaning emerges."[82] External activity is made meaningful by bringing the social act into the individual. Through role taking, and the development of significant gestures and symbols, the mind develops as the ability to indicate to ones self the same response that ones gestures had brought out in others, and control the response in terms of it. Instead of beginning with an individual mind and working outward to a formation of society, Mead starts with the social process and works inward to the individual through importation of the process of communication by means of the gesture, particularly the vocal gesture. Mind is irreducibly social in that it is based upon the social act which inevitably involves others. By regarding the social process of experience, in a rudimentary form, as prior to the emergence of mind then it becomes possible to explain the origin of mind in terms of interaction. Mind arises through communication, not communication through mind.[83] Mead's behaviorism is a unique version of that approach.

[82]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. XXII.

[83]Ibid., p. 50.

Mind was not to be reduced to non-mental behavior, but rather to be seen as a type of behavior genetically emerging out of non-mental types.[84] Mead did not deny either the "private" or "consciousness"; behaviorism to him meant the approach to all experience in terms of conduct. The chief advantage and value of the behavioristic account of mind lies in its recognition of the fact that communication is central to the nature of mind. That recognition gives not only the social psychologist, but the sociologist something objective to analyze in his treatment of mental phenomena.

In his social theory of mind Mead denies any form of a substantive view in favor of a functional one. Intracranial or intra-epidermal characterizations are impossible in a truly social treatment. If mind is emergent out of the matrix of social interactions among individuals, then it follows that the field of mind must be co-extensive with the field of the social process of experience and behavior, and include all its components.[85] If mind is socially constituted, then the field of any individual mind must extend as far as the social activity involved in the relations which constitute it extend. It cannot have a locus bounded by the skin but must be inclusive of components that can only exist between people. In terms of a truly emergent and social theory mentality cannot be placed in the brain, but rather, is the relationship of the organism to the situation which is mediated by sets of symbols.[86]

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[84]Ibid., p. XVII.

[85]Ibid., p. 223.

[86]Ibid., pp. 124-125.

The reflexiveness identified with the self is also crucial to the development of mind.[87] Reflexiveness is an essential condition in the social process that enables the individual to turn experience back upon himself. It is reflexively that the individual takes the attitude of the other toward himself, which enables him to adjust consciously to the social process by enabling him to modify his behavior in any given social act in terms of its result.

The basic mechanism for both mind and the social process, as conceived by Mead, is the gesture. It is the gesture which makes possible the appropriate responses of individuals to one another in a common activity. Within any social act the necessary individual adjustments are by means of gestures which function as both stimuli and response. It is the vocal gesture that is of peculiar importance. It is the vocal gesture that primarily gives an individual the capacity to respond to his own stimulus as another would answer. It is in the reaching of a position wherein one can respond to himself as others would, that control over behavior is achieved. It is this element of control that is peculiarly human and is gestural in origin. Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is mind or intelligence possible for Mead. A gesture, visual or vocal, comes to stand for a particular act or response, namely, the response called forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is addressed and implicitly in the individual who makes it.[88] When those responses

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[87]Ibid., p. 134.

[88]Ibid., p. 47.

are identical then there is a significant symbol present. The internalization of gestures involved in the cooperative social act account for symbols, and because those symbols have the same meaning for other individuals implicated in the act, then they not only constitute the individual mind but remain a part of objective process.

Mead distinguishes between significant and non-significant symbols and attaches far greater importance to the former. The difference between the two may be likened to a comparison of genuine language with unconscious communication. If a gesture stimulates an observer but does not similarly affect the person making the gesture then it is merely a non-significant symbol. When a gesture calls out a response in the one making it, as it calls out a response in others and is controlled in terms of these effects, then the gesture has become a significant symbol. An individual, is aware of what he is about, there is purposiveness in his behavior, he has reached the stage of genuine language. For Mead it is the vocal gesture that serves as the fountainhead of language, for it is the gesture that is most susceptible to transformation into the significant symbol. We normally hear ourselves as others do, but we do not normally watch our own expressions or actions to the same extent. We do not normally carry mirrors so that we may observe our various gestures and thereby respond to them as others would. It is the vocal gesture, then, that plays the primary role in the development of the significant symbol and its derived forms.

Mind, then, is not a "thing" or an "organ" but a process. This does not deny the importance of the biologic individual and his capacity, it fully recognizes the essentiality of the biologic organism as being the

response mechanism, and as possessing the organic perceptors that enable the biologic organism to respond to social stimuli that will make of it a social individual. Sensory stimulations can only be received in the organism through the operation of the auditory, visual, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, or internal muscular-visceral channels. The stimulations are received by an organism that can respond to them in terms of experience, however, which means that a social organism that possesses symbols in its behavior patterns, functions also as a biological organism.

Mind is social in that it arises only through interaction and communication. It is a "continuity" involving temporal extension, not a "thing"; it is a phase of the social process and is preceded by and is dependent upon that process. The biologic individual, then with its physiological capacities becomes a minded organism through the agency of language. The mechanism of language is, therefore, the medium through which individuals develop "minded" behavior. Language, in making possible the taking of the role of the other and thereby establishing the basis for the emergence of mind, has its own basis in the act. The attempt on the part of individuals to complete acts started on the impulsive, biological level is the explanation of the emergence of language. Language appears in terms of gestures calling out common responses in the carrying on of concerted action.[89]

Mead's behaviorism is a social version not an individualistic one. He did not attempt to build his system upon discrete stimulus and response,

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[89]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1932, p. XLII.

for he retains the notion of the incipient response, the response that is already partly there in terms of tendency, and in terms of memory of past experiences. Mead's position is here voluntaristic. The stimulus is only a stimulus by virtue of the implicit response or interest which sensitizes the organism toward certain features of its world. Rather than the environment stimulating and thereby controlling the individual, there is a degree of control exerted by the individual over the environment. This control lies in the fact that what the organism is attentive to in the way of stimuli is in large part a function of impulse seeking expression. Mead, in this vein, contrasts a physical environment with a psychological environment, by pointing out that from the perspective of physics organisms are among the physical objects in the world, whereas from the perspective of the organism, there is a world standing over against it as the object of its action.[90]

Mead attaches great importance to the stimulus-response bond, but it is the social act that serves as the basic abstraction. In explaining reflective, creative, responsible, self-conscious mind, he brings in another factor--society.[91] In doing so he is forced to deny any form of idealism that maintains that our sensible world exists only relative to a perceiving mind, and any form of realism insofar as it denies that the sensible parts of things are ever psychical.[92] Mead's focus was upon the

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[90]Ibid., pp. VII-VIII.

[91]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. XII.

[92]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. XVII.

relationship between organism and things within the context of the act, therefore his approach is not only behavioristic, it is functional. The import of all this for the sociologist is that mind becomes as much his business as it is of the psychologist, and of the social psychologist. Not the individual mind as such, not its relations as such, but rather in the forms and patterns of communication which constitute it.

8. Thinking

"The "me" and the "I" lie in the process of thinking and they directly indicate the give and take which characterize it."[93] With the use of the concepts of the "me" as the backlog of experience and the "I" as the impulsive response mechanism, Mead has removed much of the mysticism from the process of thinking. Mead defines thinking as an internal conversation of significant gestures; the symbolic interaction of the "I" and the "me". Thought is merely an inner conversation in which the "I" calls out the "me" and responds to it. When we are thinking we are actually talking to ourselves in covert fashion as we can easily verify if we vocalize in overt fashion that which we are thinking about. The "I" both calls out the "me" and responds to it, and as they appear together in overt fashion they constitute what is conceptually unique about the individual.

Thinking is a process within the individual, but it has its basis and origin external to the individual. The mechanism used is the vocal

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[93]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 182.

gesture which is a part of social process. The symbol one uses belongs to others as it belongs to him, it is always a common symbol, possessing a meaning that is common to the group. Thinking as a process of conversation involves the taking of the attitude of the other, especially the attitude common to the group. Mead would maintain that only by taking the attitude of the generalized other can the process of thinking take place. Only through a taking of the attitude of the generalized other is a universe of discourse established as a system of common or social meanings, which thinking presupposes as its context.[94]

For Mead, our so-called laws of thought are abstractions from social intercourse. It is the social act that functions as the universal, and an internalizing of it makes it no less social, but on the contrary, leaves our whole process of abstract thought, technique, and method as social. The process of language brings the total social act into the individual as himself involved in the act, and thus makes rationality possible. Although the process of reason must be carried on in terms of language Mead does not hold that it is constituted by the latter. Rational conduct involves the ability to indicate to ones self what the stimuli are that will call out a complex response, and by the order of the stimuli determine what the whole response will be. A behavioristic account of reason maintains that all one is doing when one is reasoning is indicating to ones self the characters that will call out certain responses. Intelligence, in Mead's account, is essentially the ability to solve the problems of the present in terms of future consequences as

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[94]Ibid., p. 156.

implicated on the basis of past experience. It involves memory and foresight in that the problems of present behavior are met by reference to both the past and future. The process of exercising intelligence is the process of delaying, organizing, and selecting a response appropriate to the situation in terms of the known alternative possibilities. Intelligence, as does knowledge, lies inside the process of conduct and is observable. Thinking is a process of pointing out, to think about something is to distinguish it before acting. Even in its most personal-ized form it remains social in that it is based upon role-taking. Even the scientists reflection about physical nature is social, although the objects thought about are no longer social after their derivation. It must be recalled that physical objects, for Mead, are objects implicated in the social act whose roles we can take but which cannot in turn take ours. Thinking, then, whether of the most concrete, means-end sort, or of the most abstract, reflective sort is social in that it is a derivative of, or an aspect of the universal social act.

9. Meaning

Mead's treatment of meaning lies within the scope of the Sociology of Knowledge. Meaning for him is not individualistic, nor is it arbitrary, but on the contrary, it is a function of the social act. The field within which meaning exists is constituted by a relationship within the social act. The relationship is one between a given stimulus, as a gesture, and the later phases of the act of which it is an early phase. Meaning is not a psychical addition to an act, it is a development of something ob-jectively there as a relation between phases of the ongoing act. Mead

points out a three-fold relationship as being constitutive of the matrix

of meaning: a gesture by one organism, the resultant of the social act

of which the gesture is a phase, and the response of another organism to

the gesture. The triple relationship is of gesture to the first organism,

of gesture to the second organism, and of gesture to subsequent phases of

the social act.[95] Meaning is stated in terms of response, for the

gesture stands for a certain resultant of the social act to which there

is a definite response on the part of the individuals implicated in the

act.

There are two characters ascribed to meaning by Mead: participation

and communicability.[96] Meaning arises when some phase of the act that

one is arousing in the other is aroused in himself. Therefore there is

always participation, and its resultant is communicability in that the

individual can indicate to himself what he indicates to others--

Communication is without significance when a response is merely called

out in the other without having it called out in himself. Significance

does not exist for the individuals within the act unless the same tendency

to respond is called out in the individual making the gesture, as is

called out in the individual affected by the gesture who then puts himself

in the attitude of the other.

Consciousness is not necessary to the presence of meaning in be-

havior. It is the adjustive response of the second organism as given to

the gesture of the first organism, the resultant in the act, which gives

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[95]Ibid., p. 72.

[96]Ibid., p. 81.

that gesture the meaning it has. The mechanism of meaning is therefore present in the social act before awareness of meaning arises on the part of the participants.[97] The basis of meaning is thus objectively there in conduct. Meaning is a content of an object which is dependent upon the relation of an individual or group of individuals to it. It is not primarily a psychical content, for it need not be conscious at all, in fact, it is not conscious until significant symbols are present.[98] The symbol is distinguishable from the meaning it refers to, meaning is a forerunner of symbolization. Significant symbols are a later by-product of the meaning emergent in the act. Meaning is described, or accounted for in terms of symbols or language, but language merely lifts out of the social process a situation that is already implicitly there.

The significant symbol always presupposes for its significance the social process of behavior in which it arises. A significant symbol always implies a context within which it has significance, a universe of discourse. The universe of discourse is constituted by a group of individuals carrying on a common social process, within which these symbols have common meaning within that group, regardless of whether the members are making the gestures or responding to them.[99] A universe of discourse, even in the sense of the logician, is simply a system of common meaning, therefore a social system in a particular sense.

The symbol as a gesture is always a phase of an act and therefore, is not arbitrary but shares any universality that the act possesses.

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[97]Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[98]Ibid., p. 80.

[99]Ibid., pp. 89-90.

An act is universal in that many objects can function as appropriate
stimuli for its continuity. For Mead any object that one can sit on is
a seat, any object that drives nails is a hammer. The words "seat" and
"hammer" are not isolated particulars, but are themselves aspects of
involved attitudes. It is in the attitude of "sitting" or "hammering"
that their universality lies, and the individual repetition of the words,
just as the specific act of sitting or hammering are merely instances of
the universal. The attitude supplies the universality in that it supplies
the requirements of the act, and the attitude of hammering can be answered
to by an indefinite array of objects. Universality therefore is a func-
tional relation of symbolization between a series of gestures and objects,
which are instances of the universal. The objects have universality
only in relation to the act which they indifferently support, and the
act has universality in that it is supported indifferently by a wide
range of objects.[100] Universality is relative to the act, therefore is
empirical under this treatment. A universal is an abstraction based upon
conflict and inhibition. A wall is something to be avoided, something to
be jumped, and, while both, it is a concept.[101] It is the symbol that
enables us to hang on to such objects, therefore the relation of the
symbol to the universal is one of perpetuation. All that universals are
to Mead are: alternative ways of acting in an indefinite number of
particular situations, ways possessing a basic identity for an indefinite
number of individuals.[102] The meanings of universals lie in the social

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[100]Ibid., pp. XXVII-XXVIII.

[101]Ibid., p. 83.

[102]Ibid., p. 90.

acts in which they are implicated. Their significance is derived only from the social act.

10. Society

A society is a systematic order of individuals in which each, to some degree, has a differentiated activity. Mead uses the organismic analogy; "The relation of individual organisms to the social whole of which they are members is analogous to the relation of the individual cells of a multi-cellular organism to the organism as a whole."[103] Society is the organization of the perspectives of all. It is the organization of perspectives of real individuals, each having his own perspective that he is capable of asserting over against the group. Society and the individual reflect one another because they are part of one another. The principle of organization is interhuman communication. In taking the attitude of the other, especially the generalized other, the individual incorporates into his own roles, attitudes that are common to society. By taking over definite attitudes that people habitually assume under given conditions the structure of society is preserved in the individual.

Through the medium of society the impulsive organism becomes a rational organism, a man. Through the internalization of the social process of communication the individual acquires the mechanism of thought, the ability to direct action in terms of foreseeable consequences of alternative courses of action; acquires the ability to react to himself as an object, subject to self-criticism in the light of his conception of

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[103]Ibid., p. 164.

the other; and becomes a moral individual consciously pursuing ends-in-view.[104] In the emergence of such an individual society is supplying its own mechanism of transformation. The reflexive social self maintains its part in the social act, by having within itself the roles of others implicated in the common activity, and its behavior is adjustive to the potential effects upon others. Society presents to its members the social situations under which conduct must take place, but in the reflexive character of the self it supplies the potential for reconstruction. The "I" as creative, acts in terms of the social conditioning of the "me", but institutes novel reactions to the inhibitions or blocked responses of the act.

Mead attaches great importance to social institutions in that he contends there could be no mature social selves without them.[105] Institutions are organized manifestations of the social process. They embody both organized attitudes and activities, and are developments within the socialized life process. As such they are not necessarily subversive of individuality, narrowly fixed, and determinate for specific patterns of acting under any given circumstances. On the contrary, they can define the social patterns of individual conduct in a broad general sense, affording scope for originality and flexibility in that conduct. In fact, as the main formalized functional aspects of the social structure, flexibility is a factor insuring their durability and persistence under stress. Their function is primarily one of providing the social

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[104]Ibid., pp. XXV-XXVI.

[105]Ibid., pp. 262-263.

organization within which the individual can apprehend his own experience.

Mead assumes that the authority of our institutions lies in the rational nature of individuals.[106] Rather than assuming that people have been "trained", he assumes that there flow from man's rational nature certain judgments which attain universality and thus make institutions possible. One wills for himself what he wills for everyone, and obeys the volitions of others because his own have been derived from them. Institutions evolve as do selves and are not to be confused with "conventions" which to Mead are arbitrary in character, and are isolated social responses as compared to the social responses involved in institutions which are organically related in the act. Conventions do not play the essential role in the maintainence of the act and the emergence of the self that institutions do. Institutions are forms of social organization that have evolved as answers to basic problems of a society. Mead uses the example of the individual responding to the odor of food and cites it as a biological process, and the community responding to the need of food by developing industry, agriculture, and transportation as being a form of social organization that is just as real an evolution as any biological form.[107]

In the highly developed, complicated social communities that have been evolved by man, Mead contends that there are always two kinds of

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[106]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. 20.

[107]Ibid., p. 383.

social relations carried on with two different socially functional

classes or subgroups.[108] He distinguishes between concrete social classes,

and abstract social classes. He cites such units as political parties,

clubs and corporations as being concrete functioning social units wherein

the individual members are directly related to one another. He lists

such groups as a class of debtors and the class of creditors as being

abstract social classes in terms of which the members are only indirectly

related, but which afford the possibility of widening and enriching the

social relations among the individual members of society as a whole.

A given individual's membership in several of these abstract classes makes

possible his entrance into social relations, indirect to varying degrees,

with an almost infinite number of others who are included in such classes

that cut across the functional lines of demarcation of the concrete

classes. The most universal of such abstract classes is the universe of

discourse, the system of universally significant symbols. It is such

abstract classes that provide not only a differentiation in society, but

a functional unity based upon a linking of individuals in a fabulous

number of social relations.

Social control, to Mead, is not through convention, nor blind habit,

neither is it negative in character. The principle of social control is

given in the taking of the role of the other, the assumption by the individ-

ual of the same attitude toward himself that the community assumes toward

him.[109] The individual in taking the attitude of others, especially the

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[108]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, pp. 157-158.

[109]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1936, p. 377.

common attitudes, finds that the attitudes are his own. His orientation

is not primarily a negative one, it is basically positive. Social

control thus operates as self-criticism, and exerts itself pervasively

through individual behavior. This serves to integrate the individual and

his actions into an organized social process. He is not only self-

conscious, but self-critical, and in terms of its origin self-criticism

is social criticism. Social control in this sense cannot be conceived

of as crushing individuality, but on the contrary, as being inextricably

associated with individuality.[110] To speak of a free society would be a

contradiction for Mead, for freedom as a concept is essentially negative,

asking nothing more than freedom from restraint. Such a conception can-

not, therefore, operate as the positive organizing force in society.

The primary problem of society, as Mead sees it, is one of change.

Societies develop, just as animal forms, by adjusting themselves to the

problems before them. Mead takes evolution seriously, therefore it is

natural that he should focus his attention upon such questions as: How

can order and structure be preserved in society and yet have the necessary

changes take place? To bring about change is seemingly to destroy the

existent order, and yet societies must change, for change is implicit in

the action that constitutes society. How can society find a method for

changing its own institutions? Mead's answer here is in the pragmatic

tradition. In his treatment of science Mead obviously incorporated it

as a method of society, therefore it follows that he should look upon it

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[110]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, p. 255.

as the method for securing the changes most appropriate to the existent problems. In patterning his conception of science upon the procedures of research he recognizes it as a method of handling problems involving the inhibition of some sort of a process. The scientist has no particular goal to work toward, he is merely involved in finding out why his system does not work, and the test of the solution of his difficulty is that the system starts to work again. Society too, has its problems, processes that seem to be inhibited or checked. Science then, can attempt to find out what those existent problems are and what processes have been checked. It can then ask itself how those processes can be so reconstructed that they are freed from obstruction and start to run again. Science in that respect constitutes that aspect of society that gives it a method of change and reconstruction.

The scientist is committed to the notion that the world is comprehensible. The reduction of natural phenomena to uniformities, or statements of law, has met with considerable success. This has led to the frequent assumption that the extension of scientific knowledge has, or will ultimately reduce man to a mechanism. Mead adopts the paradoxical view that the more we explain and comprehend nature, the greater is man's freedom.[111] Mechanical, or reductionist science does not mechanize human conduct, but on the contrary gives man control over processes of nature, including those generally termed social. Our control over nature is proportionate to our understanding of it. Our control over social

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[111]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, pp. XXI-XXII.

processes and the problems implicit in them, is therefore proportionate to our understanding of them. To Mead, pragmatically, intelligence expresses itself in the solution of problems and science is the ultimate in intelligence. The inclusion of science in the approach of society to its problems alters its outlook. The perspective of science gives a more comprehensive and understandable view of that which is "there" than does any other perspective. Science, therefore, gives man greater control over his environment and in so doing frees him from it to a greater degree. It is in this sense that freedom has validity for Mead, and he considers science to be the greatest single source operating for freedom in society.

The task of understanding society as a functioning organization is the task of sociology as defined by Mead. The significance of this is pointed up when one realizes that "minds" and "selves", the social individual, are emergent from it. The habits which in the form of institutions, give structure to society, in turn give structure to the selves who compose it. The task of finding out what the conditions are under which the organization of society operates, and the problems that arise in its continuity constitutes the field of sociology. The primary contribution of sociology, like its sister sciences, is that it gives man understanding, therefore, greater control over that which it examines.[112]

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[112]Ibid., p. 375.

CHAPTER III

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE IN THE
THEORETICAL POSITION OF TALCOTT PARSONS

Talcott Parsons is the modern day counterpart of some of the older

"system-builders" of sociology. As such he is carrying on a tradition

that has been in disrepute in the United States for many years, but never-

theless one that is still vital to the progress and development of sociology

as a specialized science. The lack of research "utility" and "applicability"

of the older systems inevitably brought about a negative reaction on the

part of the empirically oriented Americans, which resulted in an appreci-

able reduction of emphasis on this activity in recent years. That de-

emphasis, however, does not eliminate the "brute fact" that sociologists

inevitably have to face up to the problem of systematizing if their

discipline is to attain any real scientific stature.

Parsons, in recognizing the problem, and in attempting to do something

about it, gives evidence of what appears to be a resurgence of "theory" in

American sociology. Whether that resurgence is premature or whether it

will be fruitful is problematic and cannot be answered arbitrarily.

Parson's central concern is with the development of systematic theory

as such, the deductive development of a generalized conceptualized scheme

that will bring order out of the empirical chaos. In so doing he deals

with three fundamental areas of theoretical sociological problems, two of

them in detailed and sustained analysis, and one briefly and perfunctorily.

Starting from the "action" frame of reference Parsons attempts first to derive the major structural components of the social system so that inter-relations could be worked out in terms of variables. His second major concern is with the analysis of motivational processes within the system and their "explanatory" necessity. Thirdly, in attempting to logically complete his approach he directs his attention to processes of change of the system, that is, processes resulting in changes in the structure of the system.[1]

1. Scientific Theory

Before picking up the thread of Parsons' substantive analysis however, it is essential to know the theoretical premises that he works from. he establishes five basic postulates for systematic sociological theory. (1) He holds that systematic theory itself is of fundamental importance to any science. In so doing he does not deny the importance of morphologies, classifications, and empirical generalizations, but on the contrary merely points out that the predictive potential of a science increases relative to its systematic theory. (2) The theoretical system must be broader than the science itself. In other words the theoretical system on which sociology is based must be more comprehensive than the science of sociology itself. This is merely a way of saying that the field of sociology must be articulated with other social disciplines which are part of the same broader system. (3) The systematic theory which is most useful for sociology

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[1]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 480.

is necessarily "structural-functional." This is the type prevalent in

the biological rather than the physical sciences. This does not imply

that he feels it is superior, but on the contrary, accepts it as a second-

rate sort of theory which is the best attainable in our current state of

knowledge and methods. He expresses considerably more admiration for the

theoretical system best examplified by analytical mechanics but holds

that it is currently unattainable. In connection with this he points out

the lack of empirical fruitfulness of Pareto's attempt at such a system.

He therefore contends that as a substitute measure it is imperative that

structural categories be used in order to simplify the dynamic problems

ᵛ to the point of making them empirically manageable. (4) Parsons further

contends that the theory must be formulated within the "action" frame of

reference. This in effect says that theory must find a place for subjective

categories. The point of view of the actor, his goals, sentiments, and

attitudes are an integral part of his relational system of action. Further-

more Parsons holds that this postulate is necessary in order to achieve

any significant articulation with psychology. (5) The theoretical system

must be framed in "operational" concepts as far as possible. This is not

to be confused with the doctrine of "operationalism", but rather must be

taken to mean that Parsons pictures the ideal as the situation wherein

the theoretical categories are of such a character that the empirical values

of the variables involved are the immediate products of observational

procedures. In other words, the articulation of empirical observation and

its standardized procedures with the theoretical categories of the system.[2]

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[2]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, pp. 4-5.

In keeping with these five postulates then, the sense in which Parsons uses the term "theoretical system" is with reference to a body of logically interdependent generalized concepts of empirical reference. A system of that sort ideally is "closed" when it reaches a state of integration wherein every logical implication of any combination of propositions within the system is explicitly stated as a proposition within the system as well.[3] The two most general functions of such theory are the facilitation of description and analysis. Parsons distinguishes between the two but recognizes their intimate connection by stating that accurate analysis only becomes possible in terms of careful, systematic description of essential facts about phenomena. For Parsons adequacy of description is only secured when determinate answers can be given to all of the scientifically important questions involved. What questions are of importance however is primarily determined by the conceptual scheme which is employed. It is the theoretical system that enables one to "order" the observations so that one is enabled to select from the indefinite number of descriptive observations that can be made about any concrete phenomenon, so as to give "coherence" to the observations. This enables researchers to work with problems that are both significant and manageable.

The general theory, for Parsons, does not contain any empirical generalizations as such. The theory is just a conceptual set of tools which must be coupled with adequate data _before_ empirical generalizations can be arrived at. To make empirical generalizations the central focus

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[3]_Ibid._, pp. 17-18.

of theory in a science is the same as operating backwards in the view of Parsons. Any sound system of empirical generalizations implies a previously conceived theoretical system to Parsons. He supports this view by citing analytical mechanics and general physiology.[4]

The descriptive functions of a generalized conceptual scheme are two.[5] One consists in furnishing the "frame of reference." This is the most general framework of categories within which empirical work takes shape and "makes sense". The function of the "frame of reference" is to provide a test of determinacy of the description of a system. Implied in the conceptual system is the fact that there will be a limited number of categories for which specific values must be obtained before description can be determinate. It gives one the basis for deciding "what" must be known about a given phenomenon to make it comprehensible within a system.

The second function of the generalized conceptual scheme is to provide structural categories. This implies that in empirical reality phenomena are interrelated and thus constitute systems. Structure is then the static aspect of the descriptive treatment of a system.[6] Viewed structurally a system is composed of "units" and their interrelations.

The functions of the frame of reference and of structural categories descriptively are to state the necessary facts for dynamic analysis of problems. This dynamic analysis, to Parsons, is the ultimate goal of

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[4]Ibid., p. 24.

[5]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[6]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

science. It implies, however, the pre-existence of description. There
are two aspects to achievement of this goal. First, there is "causal
explanation" of past phenomena and prediction of future events; and secondly
there is the attainment of generalized analytical knowledge of "laws" which
can be applied to indefinite numbers of specific cases.[7] The attainment
of these two aspects of the goal of science involves their mutual inter-
dependence. Specific causal explanation is attainable only through the
application of some generalized analytical knowledge, and the extension
of analytical generalization is only possible in terms of generalization
from empirical cases and the verification that they supply. The "ideal"
for Parsons would be the extension of dynamic analysis to the point wherein
a body of interdependent phenomena would be treated simultaneously in the
mathematical sense.[8] He admits however that this state of affairs has
been attained only in systems of differential equations of analytical
mechanics. Sociology just as all other sciences is limited to a more
"primitive" level of theoretical analysis.

Being confined to this more primitive level means that sociology can-
not "dissolve" its structure into process as can mechanics by virtue of
its operation on the dynamic plane. By pointing this up Parsons does
recognize that structure is not an ontological reality in itself but refers
only to a relative stability of process, in other words, the relatively
stable uniformaties of process. Structural categories then consist of a

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[7]Ibid., pp. 19-21.

[8]Ibid., pp. 19-21.

pragmatically convenient way of looking at phenomena in process. The problem then becomes one of linking these "static" structural categories to the dynamic variables of the system. This link is supplied by the basic concept of "function".[9] It is "function" that plays the crucial role of providing the criteria of relative importance of the variables within the system. The variables assume importance only in terms of their functional significance to the system, which in turn can only be determined by analysis of functional relations between the parts of the system, and of the relation of the system to its environment.

Function implies the conception of empirical systems as "going concerns". Empirical observation in this light shows what structural patterns "tend to be maintained" or "tend to develop".[10] Function is therefore inherently teleological in this sense. A process or set of conditions either contributes to the maintainence or development of a system or is "dysfunctional" in the sense that it hampers its operation by lessening its integration. Functional conception, then, has reference to the relation obtaining between a process or a set of conditions and the state of a system as a "going concern". In so doing, function provides the tool by which dynamic interdependence of variable factors in a system can be analyzed. Thus it is the substitute for the mathematical manipulation of analytical mechanics.[11]

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[9]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[10]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[11]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

The general theoretical system under discussion here is a "structural-
functional" system. It contains two different sets of categories that
make it capable of describing an empirical system at a given time. It
includes a set of structural categories which must be capable of giving
a determinate description of the empirical system. In addition the
theoretical system must also contain a set of functional categories to
serve as dynamic variables. These functional categories must be directly
articulated to the structural categories, in other words, they must describe
processes that either maintain or develop the system, or they must describe
processes that upset either the internal relations of the system, or those
of the system to the environment. This means that a dynamic process must
be "placed" structurally in the empirical system. Over and beyond that
however it is necessary to have some test of the significance of the
generalizations involved. The test obviously lies in the functional rele-
vance of the process to the system. Parsons here suggests an "operational"
test, that consists of asking the question; "what would be the differential
consequences for the system of two or more alternative outcomes of a dynamic
process?"[12] Such a test of course demands the manipulation of a given
process as a variable under comparative circumstances in order to assess
its significance.

Parsons conceives of the "structural-functional" approach as being
the only way for sociology to retain the advantages of systematic theory.
He looks to it to provide the framework for codification and orderly growth

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[12]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free
Press, 1951, pp. 20-22.

of dynamic knowledge. It overcomes the basic weakness of raw empiricism

by describing phenomena as parts of or processes within empirical systems.

This gets at their "relevance" in a dynamic sense, and in a way that is

impossible through use of a raw empirical approach. Parsons stresses the

importance for sociology of categorizing social systems so as to get at

the modes of differentiation within those systems.[13] In so doing however,

he maintains that this morphological job is not an end in itself, but

rather, constitutes an essential step toward dynamic analysis. A suffi-

ciently generalized set of structural categories furnishes the "setting"

within which dynamic processes may be observed comparatively so as to get

at the research problems of crucial interest.

In espousing the "structural-functional" approach as being essential

to the development of sociology Parsons is indicating that he conceives

of it as being the most "fruitful" or "useful". His final test and

justification is therefore the pragmatic one. In line with his contention

that every empirical investigation is in terms of a conceptual scheme that

is either implicit or explicit Parsons states that "the sole sanction of

such a conceptual scheme is its utility, the degree to which it works in

facilitating the attainment of the goals of scientific investigation."[14]

In another context he displays the same pragmatic contention. In discuss-

ing the Marxian variables he contends that there is no inherent reason why

those variables should be ultimate.[15] Further, the _only_ scientific test

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[13]_Ibid._, pp. 20-22.

[14]Talcott Parsons, _Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied_,
Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, p. 66.

[15]_Ibid._, p. 155.

as between those of Marx and another (such as his own), is the pragmatic one according to Parsons. The test is; which are the more illuminating in the understanding of empirical problems? Ultimately then, in spite of his often imputed anti-empiricism, Parsons definitely links theory to empirical investigation, and poses as the test of that theory its "utility" in expanding the sphere of knowledge. This means that in spite of his deductive establishment of general theory which consists of an articulation of concepts, the major problem consists of articulating adequate concepts in such a way that empirical hypotheses may be derived from them. To be empirical hypotheses they must be susceptible to investigation, test, and refinement, therefore a satisfactory state of articulation of concepts is inevitably subject to the checking process of empirical research. The deductive operation engaged in by Parsons has its inherent scientific limits. The crucial point about the systematic theory as constructed by Parsons is whether or not it will prove to be of value in future empirical research. Earlier system builders have constructed comprehensive, logical, and impressive systems, and yet the systems have not contributed greatly to the scientific development of sociology. The fate of the emerging Parsons "general theory of action" remains problematic.

2. The Action Frame of Reference

The frame of reference utilized by Parsons in the analysis of human behavior is termed that of "action". "The frame of reference concerns the "orientation" of one or more actors--in the fundamental individual case biological organisms--to a situation which includes other actors."[16]

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[16]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 4.

The scheme is therefore a _relational_ scheme in that it does not concern itself with the internal structure of the units, the actors, except in so far as it bears directly upon their relational system. Its focus is upon the structure and processes built up by actors out of their relations to situations including other actors.

By virtue of his definition of situation Parsons manages to separate action into three major aspects, the personal, social, and cultural systems. He accomplishes this by defining the situation as consisting of objects of orientation.[17] The orientation of a given actor is differentiated on the basis of the different classes of objects which constitute his situation. A three-fold classification is used by Parsons whereby he differentiates between "social", "physical", and "cultural" objects. A social object is an actor, or a collectivity of actors who are capable of "responding to" or "interacting" with an actor treated as point of reference. A physical object is an empirical entity that functions only as means or conditions for action in that it cannot "interact" with the actor. Cultural objects are conceived of as symbolic elements of the cultural tradition. They are ideas, beliefs, expressive symbols, or values, which are cultural objects in so far as they are situational objects, in other words objects of orientation to the actor and are not internalized and therefore constitutive of his personality.[18]

"Action" is delimited by Parsons to behavior that has motivational significance to the actor or the collectivity of actors. Only in so far

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[17]_Ibid._, pp. 4-6.

[18]_Ibid._, pp. 4-6.

as the actors relation to his situation is motivationally relevant does
Parsons treat the behavior involved as action. This means that action
flows along the main axis of situational gratification or deprivation.
Parsons does not tie these gratifications and deprivations to the organic
needs of the organism, although he does state that the "energy" factor of
action obviously must come from organisms. To escape the limitations of
such a tie he simply takes the "energy" or "drive" content as given and
focuses his attention upon motivations which are analyzed in terms of
their situational emergence. He justifies this by pointing out that re-
sponses in action are not "ad hoc" relative to particular stimuli, but
tend to become systematized as "expectations" relative to objects of the
situation. These expectations are structured according to the gratifica-
tion-deprivation balance of the actor contingent upon the various al'
ternatives of action potentially open to him. Interaction with social
objects is particularly significant here in that it involves a dimension
not characteristic of relations to either physical or cultural objects.
Part of the actor's expectation consists in the probable reaction of his
"alter" to his act, a reaction that comes to be anticipated and therefore
partly determinate of the act for it will affect the actors own choices.

Relative to any class of objects, however, elements of the situation
come to have meanings for the actor as "signs" or "symbols" and thereby
structure his expectation system.[19] Based upon social interaction common
meanings emerge and serve as media of communication between actors. When
symbolic systems that are capable of mediating communication have emerged,

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[19]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Parsons speaks of them as an aspect of culture which forms part of the action system of actors. Further, it is only when systems of interaction function at this cultural level that Parsons conceives of it as action in the relevant sense. This means that action as it is here conceived consists of three irreducible components; social, cultural, and personality systems.

The social system, in bare essentials, consists of a plurality of actors interacting with one another in a situation possessing a physical aspect, actors who are concerned with optimizing their gratification and are thereby motivated, actors whose relations to their total situations inclusive of one another are defined and mediated in terms of a shared and structured set of symbols.[20]

The personality, on the other hand is the relational system of a living organism interacting with a situation.[21] Its integrative base is different than that of the social system in that its focus is the organism-relational unit as an empirical entity. The personality system is comprised of the interconnections of the actions of an individual actor.[22] These actions are structured by a set of need-dispositions which are socially derived but become uniquely characteristic of the given actor.

Cultural systems are of a different order than social and personality systems and are characterized by Parsons in a way that makes them an aspect of action, but not an empirical action system in and of themselves.

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[20]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[21]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[22]Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 55.

A culture system to Parsons is a pattern of culture whose component parts are interrelated to form value systems, belief systems, and systems of expressive symbols.[23] It is not a system of interactions, as is the social system, nor a system of actions as is the personality, but rather the pattern of values, norms, and symbols which guide the choices of individual actors and which limit the types of interaction that take place. These elements which guide action are not random or discrete, but are organized and possess consistency. Therefore cultural systems are abstractions from the empirical action systems. They constitute the standards and media for conducting action, they are not action in themselves.

All of these three systems are essential to the complete structuring of any concrete system of social action. Parsons treats them as being theoretically independent and interdependent. They are not reducible in terms of one another but rather stand in a relation of interpenetration. Personality and social systems are in a sense parallel in that they are both empirical action systems in which motivational and cultural elements are combined. They are distinguished on the basis of different foci of elements of action. Parsons makes very clear the point that he does not consider the relevance of interaction to be the distinguishing feature.[24] He considers interaction to be just as much constitutive of personality as of a social system. The focus of organization and integration is the

[23]Ibid., p. 55.

[24]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 17-18.

basis for distinguishing them, although they are made of the same "stuff".
In view of the fact the organism-personality is treated as a unit, the
mechanisms of the personality must be understood relative to the func-
tional problems of that unit. The system of social relationships is con-
stitutive of personality, but even though the "roles" of those relation-
ships be uniform they are not integrated into the actor in the same way.
Each role is integrated into a different personal system of roles and
therefore will not "mean" the same thing to any two persons involved.
The relationship between personality and social system is therefore not a
macrocosm-microcosm relationship but one of interdependence based upon
different functional problems.[25] On the other hand, the basis of inte-
gration of the cultural system is pattern consistency, not pattern-
consistency plus functional adequacy in a concrete situation as is the
case with both personality and social systems. For Parsons culture doesn't
function it just "is".[26]

Each of the systems is indispensable to the other two in the concrete
manifestation of action, and this makes "transformations" possible between
them, but does not constitute theoretical reducibility. This is an im-
portant point by Parsons because it gets at some of the root difficulty
of social psychology. Two notable conflicting tendencies in that field
may be attributed directly to a failure to discern the independence of
these three aspects of action. On the one hand there have been numerous
attempts to extrapolate from individual psychology and give motivational

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[25]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[26]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

interpretations of social phenomena, and on the other hand there have been the metaphysical postulates of the "group" mind. The Parsons conceptualization seems capable of avoiding the difficulties inherent in either of the above approaches.

The theory of action conceives of behavior as being oriented toward the attainment of ends in situations by means of normatively regulated efforts.[27] Behavior therefore takes place in situations, in terms of anticipated states of affairs, is motivated, and is normatively regulated. The starting point is therefore the <u>orientation</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>actor</u> <u>to</u> <u>the</u> <u>situation</u>. Parsons divides this orientation into two analytically independent categories; one of elements of <u>motivational</u> orientation, and one of elements of <u>value</u> orientation and then puts each category into a threefold classification.

Motivational orientation refers to the aspects of an actor's concrete orientation to his situation which are related to actual or potential gratification or deprivation of his need-dispositions.[28] The term need-disposition must be understood here as being very different from ordinary usage of "needs" with its biological permutation. Need-disposition is something that for Parsons, "evolves" and therefore becomes a social disposition. It is distinguished from "need" by greater complexity, higher degree of organizations, and the fact that it includes motivational and evaluative elements that are not vicerogenic in origin. Parsons uses it in this manner to indicate the dual nature of motivation, first as it is

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[27]Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.), <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 53.

[28]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 58.

involved in the equilibrium of the actor, and secondly as it indicates a disposition to act relative to objects.[29]

The need-disposition system of the individual actor then has two primary aspects, the "gratificational" and the "orientational". The first concerns <u>what</u> he gets out of his object world, and what its costs are to him. The second concerns <u>how</u> he is related to the object world, the ways in which his relations to it are organized.[30] The former is called the "cathectic" mode of orientation in that it refers to the actors relations to the object world in terms of his own gratificational-deprivation balance. The latter is referred to as the "cognitive" mode of orientation and is treated as the actors definition of the situation in terms of its relevance to his interests. This involves the processes by which an actor sees an aspect of the object world relative to his need-dispositions.

Both the cathectic and cognitive modes of orientation will be involved in any concrete act, but they still do not give adequate explanation of action in the systematic sense. Acts are not discrete, independent units, but rather, are organized into systems. Therefore accountability for system integration must be made, and that cannot be done by use of the cathectic and cognitive modes alone. Gratification needs have alternatively possible objects situationally presented, and cognitive process has alternatives of judgment situationally presented in terms of what objects "mean". Therefore there must be some order of selection among these alternatives,

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[29]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 10.

[30]Talcott Parsons, <u>The Social System</u>, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 6-8.

and Parsons gives the name "evaluation" to this process.[31] The evaluative

mode of orientation involves the various processes by which the actor

resolves conflicts of "interest" in the attempt to optimize gratification,

and also the processes by which conflict among interpretations is resolved

through "choice" by virtue of selective mechanisms including those that

are scientific.

Parsons, then, categorizes action in the broadest sense as consisting

of three basic modes of orientation and an object system. These three

modes will appear in any system of action, but with varying degrees of

primacy. All three are tied to the concept of "expectation" and serve to

emphasize again the teleological character of the Parsons system. An

expectation inevitably has a temporal aspect. It involves the "duration"

in memories of past actions as related to anticipated developments. Action

is therefore structured in "time" by Parsons, which means that it is

developmental, and by virtue of the modes of orientation the actor has a

share in the determination of that action. Action is therefore neither

entirely a push from the rear nor a pull from the future, it is rather,

a structured development of the future from out of the past based upon

pursuit of ends and adherence to norms.

Parsons has pointed out the scientific implications of conceiving of

action in terms of orientation to norms and ends.[32] First of all if one

can impute to an actor the will to attain ends or conform to norms, it

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[31]Ibid., pp. 6-8

[32]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, p. 161.

must be possible to formulate the content of those ends and norms as an idea system. It is then possible to hypothesize functional relations between the variations in this content and the system of action. The significance of this position to the sociologist, and particularly to the sociology of knowledge is immediately discernible. Ideas play a positive role in social action, and what that role is, is a legitimate concern of sociological research.

The analytic running mate of motivational orientation in the Parsons system is the category of value orientation. Parsons emphasizes the logical independence of these two variables although he points up the direct parallel between the two.[33] The three-fold classification of modes of motivational orientation provides a framework for analyzing problems in which the actor has an "interest". In contrast, the three-fold classification of modes of value orientation which Parsons develops, provides the "standards" of satisfactory solution of those problems. Value-orientation refers to the aspects of the actors total orientation which commit him to adherence to norms, standards and criteria of selection whenever he is in a situation involving choice.[34] Whenever an actor has alternatives in view, no matter whether they are relative to means, ends, or need-dispositions, his value-orientations will guide him in his choices. These value-orientations are not random but tend to become organized as a set of rules. On the cultural level therefore there will be an organized set

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[33]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 14-15.

[34]Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.), op. cit., p. 59.

of standards and rules, abstracted from action. On the personal level there will be a commitment to these rules and standards, which is the actors value-orientation, which in turn is a part of his need-disposition.

Parsons speaks of three modes of value-orientation which parallel the three modes of motivational orientation. The cognitive mode of value-orientation involves the commitment to standards by which the validity of cognitive judgments is assessed. These standards are most explicit and formal in science although they pertain to other areas of action. These standards include such factors as relevance of data, and the importance of various problems.[35]

The appreciative mode of value-orientation involves the commitments to standards by which the appropriateness or consistency of a cathexis is assessed. These standards exist as rules for attainment of particular gratifications. They do not as such concern themselves with the consequences of a cathexis for a system of action of either a person or a collectivity. Their concern is with whether or not an object or pattern will have gratificatory significance.[36]

The moral mode of value orientation involves the commitment to standards by which the consequences of actions may be assessed relative to their effect upon the systems of action, personal or collective. These standards define the actors responsibility for the consequences of his acts. They give guidance to the actor in choosing his alternatives of action relative

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[35]Ibid., p. 60.

[36]Ibid., p. 60.

to the consequences of that action. Consequences for both personality

and social systems will figure in the development of a moral mode of

orientation.

The two sets of categories of motivational and value orientation are

obviously related in any concrete action, but Parsons stresses their

independent variability. In doing so Parsons makes a fundamental dis-

tinction between problems of interest to the actor and the standards by

which adequate solutions to those problems might be achieved.[37] One is a

"psychological" variable and a maintainence of the distinction between the

two would seem to lessen the possibility of either psychological or cultural

"deterministic" explanations being made. Further the distinction gives

Parsons additional justification in claiming the independence of social,

cultural, and personal systems of action. The concept of motivational-

orientation is used as a device for articulating "psychological" behavior

into the broader system of action. The concept of value-orientation in

turn is used to articulate the cultural tradition into the action system.

It must be understood that these modes of orientation are constructed

types and therefore Parsons has the problem of "setting" them in concrete

action. He points out that the cognitive and cathectic modes of motivational

orientation are the minimal components of any act of orientation.[38] They

are simultaneously given and are separable only in the analytic sense.

One cannot "orient" without discriminating objects, and one can not

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[37]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press,
1951, pp. 14-15.

[38]Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.), op. cit., p. 68.

discriminate objects without arousing interest of some sort. There can be no orientation to the gratificatory (cathectic) significance of an object without discrimination between objects that are potentially gratificatory or merely noxious within a given situation. This means that cognitive mapping of a situation is an essential aspect of an actor's orientation to it. There can be no cognition without cathexis and vice versa.

The third motivational mode cannot be understood independent of the cognitive-cathectic process.[39] Parsons utilizes it as the organizational or integrative aspect of an actor's system of action. It operates whenever a selection problem is present for the actor and choice must be made. It regulates selection among alternatives when several courses of action are open to pursuit. The evaluative mode concerns itself with weighing and choosing alternatives therefore it disciplines the cathectic and cognitive modes by establishing relative primacy within an action system. Parsons distinguishes sharply between this act of choosing, the evaluative mode, and the standards on which choices are based which are the three aspects of the value-orientation.[40]

The cognitive component of motivation corresponds to the cognitive component of value-orientation, but it is not the same thing. The former refers to the organization of cognitive content and perception, whereas the latter refers to the standards of cognitive validity. These standards

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[39]Ibid., p. 70.

[40]Ibid., p. 71.

of cognitive validity enter into the construction of expectations, and on the scientific level, predictions. They are standards by which know-ledge is adjudged, not knowledge in itself. Content as such, constitutes the first component.

The cathectic mode of motivational-orientation has as its counterpart the appreciative mode of value-orientation. Again, the former refers to motivational content, and the latter refers to standards. These are the standards applied in the evaluation of alternatives of cathectic choices. Appreciative standards "discipline" choice by demanding a sacrifice of some gratifications and indicating "cost" in excluding alternatives.[41]

The evaluative aspect of motivational-orientation also has its value-orientation counterpart, in the category of _moral_ value standards.[42] Evaluation as such is concerned with the problem of integrating the cognitive-cathectic modes in action. Both cognitive and appreciative standards are involved in this in that _every_ act is both cognitive and cathectic. However, a primacy of either one still leaves the problem of integrating the action in terms of the other. This means that in an action system there must be a set of evaluative standards which are neither cognitive nor appreciative as such, but rather, are a synthesis of both. These may in affect be called standards for evaluating evalua-tion. They are _moral_, in that they are directly concerned with consequences and costs of action for personal and social systems. This category is of particular significance to the sociologist because of its obviously social

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[41]_Ibid._, p. 73.

[42]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 13-14.

character. This definition of the system of mutual rights and obliga-
tions that a given actor utilizes is a crucial aspect of his orientation
to a situation, and is indicative of the constraining and channelizing
power of the social system which is of prime interest to the sociologist.

Parsons in rigorously articulating the categories of motivational-
orientation with those of value-orientation is obviously attempting to
find a place for subjective categories of action in sociological theory.
He is convinced that motivation should play a central role in any socio-
logical theory that has any "dynamic" explanatory value. He indicates that
personalities and social systems are made up of the same material, but
that this material must be conceptually organized in different ways for
purposes of analysis of the two systems.[43] Any articulation of the two
systems will take place in terms of "motivation". It must be noted that
what Parsons has formulated here is not a "theory" in the sense that he
usually uses that term.[44] No explicit statement of "laws" or relations
between them are involved. The articulation of systems was achieved
through the conceptualization of motivational process in terms of mechanisms,
not laws. This formulation is therefore a paradigm rather than a theory.
Even so, it must be granted that Parsons achieved some important process
"distinctions" which can potentially be related to laws. Further it must
be admitted that achievement of any degree of systematization here could
not take place except on the paradigmatic level in view of the present
fragmentary state of sociological knowledge.

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[43]Ibid., p. 45.

[44]Ibid., pp. 484-85.

3. Dilemmas of Orientation and the Pattern-Variable Scheme

Parsons contends that he has derived from the action frame of reference, five dichotomies that are inevitably involved in any specific orientation, and consequently any action. In starting his analysis with an actor in a situation Parsons contends that any actor must make a series of five choices before the situation will have a determinate meaning for him. Meaning does not automatically emerge in a situation, but rather, is based upon the actors selections from the five sets of alternatives posed for him in any situation. These dichotomies are termed the pattern-variables with respect to action, and the matter of choice between them are termed the dilemmas. They are set up as true dichotomies, not continua therefore a choice must always be made between opposite poles in any concrete action. The pattern-variables are listed as follows:

1. Affectivity-Affective neutrality
2. Self-orientation-Collectivity-orientation
3. Universalism-Particularism
4. Ascription-Achievement
5. Specificity-Diffuseness[45]

Each of them represents a dilemma of choice that an actor faces in ascribing meaning to a situation.

Affectivity vs. Affective Neutrality is the Gratification-Discipline dilemma and involves the problem of accepting an opportunity for gratification without regard for its consequences, or conversely, evaluating it with regard to its consequences. It is a matter really of whether evaluation will take place or not in a given situation.

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[45]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

Self-Orientation vs. Collectivity-Orientation is the Private vs. Collective Interest delemma and involves the problem of considering an act with respect to its personal significance, or considering it with respect to its significance for a collectivity or a moral code. This dilemma concerns the primacy of moral standards in a procedure of evaluation.

Universalism vs. Particularism is the dilemma of choice between types of Value Orientation Standards, and involves evaluating an object of action in terms of its relations to a generalized frame of reference, or relations to the actor, and his specific object-relationship situation. This dilemma is one concerning primacy of cognitive or cathectic standards.

Achievement vs. Ascription is the dilemma of the choice between "Modalities" of the Social Object, and involves the actors seeing the social object as a composite of performances or actions, or conversely, seeing the social object as a composite of ascribed qualities. This dilemma concerns the seeing of objects as "attribute" or "action" complexes.

Diffuseness vs. Specificity is the dilemma of the Definition of the Scope of Interest in the Object, and involves the concession to a social object of an undefined set of rights to be delimited only by conflicting demands, as over against the concession to a social object of a clearly specified and limited set of rights. This dilemma concerns the scope of significance of the object in action.[46]

Parsons contends that these pattern-variables are the single most important thread of continuity in the action frame of reference and that

[46]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

they enter in at four different levels. On the concrete level of empirical action they exist as five discrete choices an actor must explicitly or implicitly before he can act. They enter on the personality level as habits of choice, in that an actor will tend to choose one side or the other of a dilemma habitually relative to certain situations. This is an aspect of an actor's value-orientation standards. The pattern-variables enter on the collectivity level as aspects of role definition, wherein actions of role-incumbents tends to be specified or defined in terms of one side or another of a dilemma. The variables also enter on the cultural level as aspects of value standards, in that value-standards are rules governing action and in so far as an actor is committed to a standard he will habitually choose the horn of the dilemma specified by adherence to that standard.[47]

Parsons maintains that these pattern-variables are directly derived from the action frame of reference, and further that they are the only ones that so derive, therefore they are exhaustive.[48] In imputing both inevitability and exhaustiveness to them Parsons is implying that there are just five dilemmas of action. The justifiability of such imputation is questionable for there is always the possibility of incorrect derivation based upon different levels of generality, and furthermore the possibility that they do not really constitute a closed system. One cannot readily ascertain whether or not the variables are really "derived" or are based

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[47]Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.), op. cit., p. 78.

[48]Ibid., p. 77.

upon presumtions having nothing to do with the structure of action.[49]

The more serious question however concerns the "utility" of the variables.[50]

The empirical applicability seems remote, and there are seemingly no

leads to such applicability in the Parsons treatment. Further the pre-

dictive orientation of the variables cannot be discerned. They are not

cast in any sort of predictive form, they are formulated as aspects or

categories that do not seem too susceptible to manipulation in propositional

form.

4. The Social System

In extracting three major foci of elements from the action frame of

reference, Parsons established the theoretical independence within action

of three major systems, personality, cultural and social systems. Although

this is not a new conception, it certainly is one of the major achieve-

ments of Parsons' work, in that no one has spelled out this analytic

separability in such a thorough-going manner.[51] The social system is

delineated as a _social_ system and not as a projection of personalities,

nor an emanation of a cultural system. Psychology as the science of per-

sonality, is thus not the foundation of the theory of social systems.

Neither is anthropology as the science of cultural systems, identical on

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[49]H. A. Finch, Review of Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.),
op. cit., The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Vol. 28, May, 1952, pp. 216-219.

[50]Howard Becker, Review of Talcott Parsons, and E. A. Shils, (eds.),
op. cit., Social Forces, Vol, 30, May, 1952, pp. 464-65.

[51]Howard Becker, Review of Talcott Parsons, "The Social System",
Social Forces, Vol. 30, May, 1952, pp. 463-464.

the theoretical level with sociology the perspective of which is the social system as such. Parsons' stress upon dealing with personality in a manner other than as "the subjective aspect of culture", or "society writ small" is an enlightenment of great empirical significance. His accompanying stress upon dealing with culture systems as systems in their own right and not mere extensions of social systems is of equal significance. On the initial level of extraction it would seem that Parsons' work constitutes an elucidation of a line of thought that had already assumed important proportions, and thereby contributes to the clarification of the "spheres of interest" of the social sciences.

The focus of Parsons' attention within the action schema is upon the social system. He is concerned with personality and cultural systems, not for their own sakes, but rather for their bearing upon the structure and function of social systems. Parsons' treats the social system both as an empirical organization of real action and as a focus of theoretical analysis.[52]

Parsons' fundamental starting point, then, from the point of view of the sociologist, is the concept of the social system of action. The interaction of actors takes place under such conditions that it constitutes a process that is susceptible to treatment as a system in the scientific sense. It is a major assumption on the part of Parsons that the social system can be subjected to the same order of theoretical analysis that has been successfully applied by other sciences to other systems.[53]

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[52] Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 18-19.

[53] Ibid., p. 3.

Social system is defined as "a mode of organization of action elements relative to the persistence or ordered processes of change of the interactive patterns of a plurality of individual actors."[54] Admitting enormous variability in the stability and structural organization of such systems, Parsons conceives of the development of a scheme for analysis of such systems to be of pressing scientific importance.

The social system is treated in terms of four units, or points of reference, of varying degrees of complexity. The first, and most elementary unit of the system is the social act, performed by an actor and oriented toward another actor or other actors as objects. The act is a unit in the social system in so far as it is a part of a process of interaction.

The second unit, at a higher level of complexity, is the role-status unit. This is an organized sub-system of acts of actors occupying reciprocal statuses and acting toward one another via reciprocal orientations. This unit, for Parsons, is the key unit in the structure of the social system in that the system is constituted by a network of such relationships. Each actor is involved as a participant in a plurality of such patterned interactive relationships. This participation revolves around the two reciprocal perspectives inherent in interaction. Each participating actor is an object of orientation, and in so far as this object significance derives from the actors position in the social relationship it is a status significance. Each actor is also oriented toward other actors, and in this capacity is not an object, but is acting and is

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[54]Ibid., p. 24.

therefore playing a role. The feature of crucial significance here to the sociologist, is that Parsons does not treat this status-role "bundle" as an attribute of the actor, but rather as a <u>unit</u> of the social system.

The third unit is the <u>actor</u> himself as an organized system of all the statuses and roles referable to him as a social object, and as the enactor of a system of role activities. This is the actor as a <u>point of reference</u> in the system, not as a personality. This unit, the actor, is a composite <u>bundle</u> of statuses and roles. As a composite unit the actor is linked to many different actors in many different role and status situations.

The fourth unit is the <u>collectivity</u>, treated in the system both as actor and object. A collectivity is a system of concretely interactive roles. It is an intersection of action systems of individual actors. The sector of action can then be used to abstract the actors from their other role-statuses and they can be treated as a collectivity. In this abstraction therefore, the collectivity can appear as both actor and object. It is important to note here that the second unit, the role-status, is a unit for both the action system of the individual and of the collectivity. It is thus the articulating unit of the social system.[55]

Because Parsons conceives of the social system as being a "real" empirical organization, he is committed to the "norm" of an empirically self-subsistent social system.[56] He arbitrarily adds the consideration of making it transcendent to the life span of an individual, which makes

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[55]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 24-26.

[56]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 19.

biological reproduction and socialization of emerging generations

aspects of the system. A social system then which is capable of meeting

its functional prerequisites from within its own resources is called a

society. Empirical interdependence with other societies as systems is

not relevant here, the point is that the society contain within it the

elements that make it an independently subsisting system. Any other

social system, to Parsons, is a "partial" social system. In view of the

fact that virtually all of the empirical work done by sociologists is

with these "partial" social systems, and is not concerned with societies

as "wholes" this might be a little confusing. It must be understood

therefore that Parsons is using society as a "norm", with the view of

insuring that these "partial" social systems be placed in the context of

the society of which they are a part. The purpose is one of articulation

of elements within a larger "whole".

If a social system is to constitute a persistent order and undergo

orderly process of change, as stated in its definition, certain functional

prerequisites must be met, according to Parsons. It is here that he uses

functional analysis in such a way that it may become an instrument of

conservative ideology rather than a tool of analysis. It must be noted

that this is not inherent in functionalism as such, but rather, is a

possibility of the particularistic application of it by Parsons to the

"prerequisites of the system".

Starting from his point of theoretical independence and variability

of the three systems within action, Parsons concludes that the variability

of any one of them is limited by its compatibility with the conditions of

functioning of the other. From the perspective of the social system, it

cannot be so structured as to be radically incompatible with either the

conditions of functioning of its component actors as personalities, or

with the relatively stable integration of a cultural system. Also the

social system requires an essential minimum of support from the other

systems. It must have a sufficient proportion of its actors adequately

motivated to act in accordance with its role system, thereby fulfilling

"expectations" and abstaining from too much deviation. Further it must

avoid commitment to cultural patterns which either fail to adequately

define an order, or place impossible demands upon actors, thereby encourag-

ing deviance and consequently instability in the system.[57] This is what

Parsons terms the "motivational problem of order", and is related to the

specific problems of allocation of opportunity, prestige, and power.

The statement of the problem in terms of "necessary" and "minimum"

conditions, "adequate" motivation, "too much" deviance, and functional

"prerequisites" as Parsons puts it, seems to be a dangerous usage of

"functional" analysis.[58] Can one actually say that what is "given" is

"necessary"? How can one tell what the "minimal" conditions actually are

except through the exploration of functional alternatives? If a pattern

is judged to be necessary ahead of time, merely because it seems reason-

able, does that not constitute a violation of the use of "function" in

the scientific sense? The question here is that of whether Parsons is

justified in "deriving" his prerequisites merely because he derived his

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[57]Ibid., pp. 26-28.

[58]L. A. Coser, Review of Talcott Parsons, "Essays in Sociological
Theory", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LV, March, 1950, pp. 502-504.

systems, or whether at this point he should be scientifically compelled to resort to "comparism" in order to justify his use of function. Empirical science will undoubtedly say the latter, in that it questions the "indispensability" of any pattern. Functional analysis founded upon presumed indispensability of patterns constitutes a "defense" of a system rather than an analysis.

Apart from this aspect of his treatment of the social system, which would seem to be of limited value to the sociologist, Parsons seems to be aiming at the development of the main outlines of a scheme for analyzing structure and process of social systems.[59] Within the action frame of reference, giving consideration to the articulation of the systems within it, and further giving consideration to the units within the social system, it seems inevitable that Parsons should base that scheme upon a delineation of institutionalized roles and the motivational processes organized by them.

5. Institutions as the Theoretical Focus of Sociological Science

Parsons maintains that sociology should not attempt to be the encyclopedic science of all social behavior, but should find its place as a special science among the social sciences. The methodological advantages of this position are self-evident. The focus of the science should be, according to Parsons, upon institutions. This is not to be interpreted as saying that sociology should be confined to any formal classificatory treatment of institutions. On the contrary, institutions are the <u>focus</u>

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[59]Talcott Parsons, <u>The Social System</u>, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. VII.

of interest, but that does not eliminate the necessity of dealing with other elements of the social system. Specifically, Parsons holds that any component of the social system which bears upon the functional and dynamic problems of institutions should be treated sociologically. From this point of view he develops the view that sociological theory should essentially fall into five divisions.[60]

One, there should be systematization of the comparative analysis of structural differentiation and institutional patterns. This should not be merely a formal morphology, but should involve analysis of the relations of structure and its variation to the functional requirements of social systems.

Two, there should be treatment of the dynamic interrelationships of institutions and culture. This is a point of articulation between sociology and anthropology as an independent theoretical systems. Here again it is evident that the bulk of the empirical work done in anthropology, is in this view, the "sociology" of primitive peoples, and as such is not theoretically independent. It is only when anthropology concerns itself with the theory of culture as such that it becomes theoretically independent. Thus a treatment of interrelationships between institutions and culture constitutes an articulation, not a duplication. It is in this section that Parsons also finds a place for the Sociology of Knowledge. The Sociology of Knowledge, as it is emerging, is primarily concerned with the relation of knowledge, no matter of what sort, to other existential phenomena. Its concern then, is with special aspects of culture and their

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[60]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, pp. 10-12.

relationships to institutions as they are maintained and changed.

The third area of sociology delineated by Parsons is that of the motivation of institutional behavior. He centers this theory about the concept of role, which is the motivationally integrating unit for the individual within the social system. This area is a point of articulation between sociology and psychology.

The fourth branch concerns itself with the balancing between conforming and deviant behavior within the general framework of a theory of motivations and institutions. This is the problem of motivation of deviant behavior and social control. The situational sources of deviant motivations and the mechanisms of social control which "contain" deviance are the focus of attention here.

The final branch of sociological theory according to this view concerns itself with institutional change. Parsons maintains that this branch is truly synthetic, and any achievement in it will be based upon a knowledge of three things: knowledge of the structural base from which any given process of change starts; knowledge of the possibilities of new situational definitions implicit in the prevailing culture; and knowledge of the relevant motivational problems. Parsons looks upon this area as the culminating aspect of the theoretical achievement of sociology, which means that he doesn't hold much hope for its early development.[61]

From the above scheme it can be seen that Parsons is not greatly limiting the scope of sociology, but is focusing upon the theory of institutional behavior as the major aspect of sociological theory.[62] Parsons

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[61]Ibid., pp. 10-12.

[62]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 43.

utilizes the concepts of "institutions" and "institutionalization" in
the following manner. "A pattern governing action in a social system
will be called "institutionalized" in so far as it defines the main modes
of the legitimately expected behavior of the persons acting in the relevant
social roles, and in so far as conformity with these expectations is of
strategic structural significance to the social system. An institutional
pattern is thus a culture pattern to which a certain structured complex
of motivations and social sanctions has become attached.[63] An institu-
tionalized pattern is therefore an ideal pattern, not in the utopian sense,
but in the normative sense. It is normative in that conformity to it is
legitimately expected. An institution is a complex of such institutional
patterns that may be conveniently treated as a structural unit of the
social system. In conceiving of an institution in this manner, Parsons
again uses the ultimate test of pragmatic expediency. It is "convenient"
to look at certain patterns as institutions. This means that Parsons
attaches the term "institutionalized" to behavior of people in situations,
and the term "institution" to the methodology of the observer.

Parsons conceives of institutions as constitutive of the main link
between social structure and the actor, in that they are at the same time
related to the functional needs of actors and to those of the system
they compose.[64] The link evolves around the normative-voluntaristic aspect
of the structure of action. The roles that individuals play in a social
system are defined in terms of goals and standards. From the point of

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[63]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied,
Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, p. 14.

[64]Ibid., pp. 34-36.

view of the actor, then, his role is defined by the normative expectations of the members of the group as they are formulated in the cultural tradition. These expectations are always an aspect of any situation within which an actor is acting. His conformity or deviation brings consequences in the form of approval or reward, and condemnation or punishment. These expectations are not only aspects of culture, they are internalized as aspects of the actor's personality. In the process of socialization the actor internalizes, to varying degrees, the standards of the group so that they become motivating forces in his own conduct independent of external sanctions. The relation between role-expectations and sanctions is a reciprocal one. Sanctions to the actor are role-expectations to alter and vice-versa. The institutionalization of a set of role-expectations and sanctions is always a matter of degree based upon two sets of variables.[65] The variables affecting the actual degree of sharing of value-orientation patterns, and those determining the motivational commitment to the fulfillment of expectations. Institutional behavior cannot be conceived of in "self-interest" terms, but it can be said that any individual actor can seek his own self-interest only by conforming to some degree to the institutionalized expectations.[66] As social structure, then, one has a system of patterned expectations defining the proper behavior of actors in specified roles that is positively enforced both by the actors own motives

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[65]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 38-39.

[66]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, p. 170.

for conformity and by the sanctions of others. These well-established

patterns of expectations in the perspective of a social system are called

institutions. These institutions constitute the structurally stable

element of social systems, and their prime function lies in defining the

roles of the constituent actors. Viewed functionally institutionalized

roles constitute the mechanisms by which varied human tendencies become

integrated into a system capable of dealing with the problems of a society

and its members.[67]

Parsons also addresses himself to the problem of the structure of

institutions themselves as a system. He suggests a three-fold scheme of

classification and thereby differentiates between "situational",

"instrumental", and "integrative" institutions.[68] Situational institutions

are those involving organization of roles about aspects of the situation

in which actors and social systems are placed. He gives as an example,

kinship roles organized about the feature of biological descent. Instru-

mental institutions are those patterned about the attainment of goals as

such. For example the technology of medicine is pursued within the frame-

work of the institutionalized role of the physician. Integrative institu-

tions are those that are oriented toward regulating the relations of

individuals so as to promote cooperation and avoid conflict. His primary

examples are social stratification and the institutionalization of authority.

All three types are functionally conceived in terms of what they do within

the social system.[69]

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[67]Ibid., pp. 34-36.

[68]Ibid., pp. 34-36.

[69]Ibid., pp. 34-36.

Parsons stresses the fact that institutions should be considered to be higher order units of the social structure than roles are. Indeed, they are constituted by a plurality of interdependent role patterns. An institution is said to be a complex of institutionalized role integrates of strategic structural significance to the social system.[70] In establishing an institution as being of this character he clearly distinguishes it from a collectivity. "A collectivity is a system of concretely interactive specific roles."[71] An institution is a complex of role-expectations which may apply to an indefinite number of collectivities. On the other hand, a given collectivity may be the focus of a whole series of institutions. For example the institutions of marriage and parenthood will both be constitutive aspects of a particular family as a collectivity. The value-standards which define institutionalized role-expectations assume a moral significance. A sharing of common value-standards entails a sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of obligations, and thus creates a solidarity among those adhering to common values. The actors concerned within the relevant area of these values constitute a collectivity.[72]

In imputing a crucial position to institutions within the social system, Parsons is pointing up the important sociological insight that being bound to conformity with a shared system of value-standards is a basic condition for the stabilizing of an interaction system in the interests

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[70]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 39-40.

[71]Ibid., p. 39.

[72]Ibid., p. 41.

of the actors.[73] There is a dual feature to this binding. First, the internalization of the standard makes conformity with it a matter of expressive and/or instrumental significance to the actor. Secondly, the reactions of alter as sanctions, is tied to conformity with the standard. Conformity, therefore, is not only a direct mode of fulfillment of his own need-dispositions, it is a condition for eliciting favorable responses of others. When the optimizing of need-fulfillment and reactions of others are both a function of conformity to a standard, that standard may safely be adjudged as "institutionalized". The problem of integration of stable systems of social interaction, then focuses upon the integration of the motivations of actors with the normative cultural standards.[74]

6. Cultural Systems

It was previously pointed out that the social system is the central focus of Parsons' attention within the action frame of reference and that the concomitant personality and cultural systems constitute objects of analysis only in so far as they have direct bearing on the social system. It will also be recalled that personality and social systems were termed empirical systems of action, whereas culture systems were treated as abstractions from the operation of the empirical systems of action. As an abstraction from concrete action, it is more imperative that the sociologist concern himself with culture than it is that he concern himself with personality, the other action system.

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[73]Ibid., p. 38.

[74]Ibid., p. 36-37.

Culture, as it is conceived of in this approach, consists in systems of symbols which serve as objects of orientation of action, internal components of personalities, and as institutionalized patterns of social systems.[75] The appearance of culture in those three roles is what gives it its independence as an abstraction, and its crucial significance to the understanding of a social system. The point of significance to the sociologist of the Parsons conceptualization is that cultural elements mediate and regulate communication, providing for the mutuality of orientations essential to the interaction process.

Three basic characteristics are ascribed to culture in that it is maintained that culture is transmitted, learned, and shared.[76] In that culture is transmitted it constitutes a heritage. Transmissability serves as an important criterion for distinguishing culture from the social system by virtue of the fact that culture can be diffused from one social system to another. For a particular social system, culture is a pattern element that is abstracted from it. As a pattern element it is not completely integrated with the other elements of the social system but is susceptible to independent analysis.

It is as a shared symbolic system functioning in interaction that culture must inevitably be dealt with by the sociologist. Even the most elementary orientation of action involves "signs" which are the rudiments of symbols. It is quite clear that any elaboration of human action systems

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[75]Ibid., p. 327.

[76]Ibid., p. 16.

is impossible without relatively stable symbolic systems wherein "meaning" is not a function of the immediate stimulus response situation but is general. This is a way of stating that meaning cannot be predominantly contingent upon particularized situations in any elaborate action system. The concept of expectation, which is basic to both the modes of orientation and interaction, inevitably involves some sort of a generalization from past particular experiences. The implication of this generalization from the particular is the possibility of communication itself. The situations of no two actors is ever identical, therefore it is essential that they develop the capacity to extract meaning from particular situations if they are to communicate. Signs, although important in the emergence of symbols, do not in themselves constitute nor function as communication. True symbolization obviously cannot arise without the interaction of actors and any given actor can only acquire symbols in behavior through interaction with social objects.[77] No individual develops language without participating in a socially structured learning process. This process must be a part of a system of social relations. Conversely no social system can exist without language and other minimum patterns of culture such as pragmatic knowledge. This is once again indicative of the interdependent and interpenetrating relations of cultural and social systems.

In keeping with his frame of reference Parsons starts his classification of cultural elements from what he terms the "three basic functional problem contexts of action-orientation in general, the cognitive, the

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[77]*Ibid.*, p. 11.

cathectic, and the evaluative."[78] Conceiving of these as the major

problematic aspects of orientation consequently leads him to classify

culture patterns as; (1) belief systems, (2) systems of expressive symbols,

and (3) systems of value orientation. Belief systems are characterized

by cognitive primacy, systems of expressive symbols by cathectic primacy,

and systems of value orientation by evaluative primacy.

Belief systems are handled in terms of a dual classification by

which Parsons distinguishes between empirical and non-empirical references

and also between existential and evaluative relevance to the system of

action.[79] Various combinations of these variables give different per-

spectives to the actors concerned. For example, the combination of

empirical and existential constitutes science, that of non-empirical and

existential constitutes philosophy, that of empirical and evaluative con-

stitutes ideology, and that of non-empirical and evaluative constitutes

religion.

The relationship of belief systems to processes of social action is

one of crucial significance. In so far as one of the fundamental func-

tions of a common culture is communication, it is apparent that the comple-

mentarity of expectations necessary for interaction would not be possible

without a relative stability of shared meanings. The pre-eminence of

cognitive symbol systems is obvious, but there is also a normative element

involved. Parsons contends that adherence to the conventions and standards

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[78]Ibid., p. 327.

[79]Ibid., p. 331.

of language and belief system is always a condition of communication.[80]
The paramount function of cognitive orientation is termed "reality test-
ing", the adequacy and accuracy of cognition of the various classes of
objects, but, in the interaction process there is always another aspect,
the sharing of beliefs. Beliefs are internalized as part of the person-
ality, therefore it is perhaps just as important that a belief system
should be shared by actors as that it should stand the test of "reality".
Cognitive distortions (as distinguished by science for instance) can have
a positive function in interaction. If ego and alter share a belief
about some object, a belief that is distorted in the light of scientific
evidence, nevertheless it constitutes a condition of their interaction.
If one "corrects" his belief, and the other does not, a consequent strain
will be introduced into their pattern of interaction. It is this feature
of belief that constitutes one of the major forces of resistance to
reality testing or science.[81]

The second major type of culture pattern consists in the systems of
expressive symbols. Expressive symbols constitute the patterning of action
wherein the interest is neither instrumental nor evaluative, but rather
is aimed at immediate gratification. This is action characterized by
cathectic primacy. This does not imply hedonism, but merely implies that
within the situation priority is given to the acting out of a need-
disposition rather than subordinating gratification to a goal or to a
restrictive norm. There are appreciative standards in the cultural

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[80]Ibid., pp. 327-328.

[81]Ibid., pp. 327-328.

tradition that constitute the basis for judgment of expressive interests and actions. These standards lend <u>order</u> to the systems of expressive symbols.[82]

The relation of expressive symbolism to the social system can again be seen from the reference point of interaction.[83] Specific expectations of actors tend to become organized around the reciprocal general attitudes of actors toward one another and toward the general cultural patterns which define the interaction process between them. Expressive symbolism is the element of culture most directly integrated with the cathectic interests of the actor. When these cathectic interests are focused upon <u>reciprocity</u> of attitude, then expressive symbols will be organized relative to these attitudes, which may be considered to be incipient interaction.

The expressive symbols which are thus a part of interaction serve a three-fold function. Parsons points up that they aid in communication through the transmission of cathectic meanings, they assist in normatively organizing interaction through the imposition of appreciative standards, and they serve as direct objects of gratification for the situational need-dispositions.[84] In interaction, expressive symbols are at the same time elements of gratification to ego and signs to alter of what egos' attitudes toward him are.

The third major culture pattern consists in the systems of value-orientation. They need not be treated here in detail, for they were

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[82]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 384-385.

[83]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 385-387.

[84]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 385-387.

analyzed previously relative to their motivational counterparts. It is
essential however that the distinction between belief systems and systems
of value-orientation be brought out. Belief systems evolve around the
attempts of actors to cognitively understand a "reality" that has proper-
ties independent of their cognition. The actor must within the structure
of his beliefs adapt himself to that reality. In contrast, patterns of
value-orientation formulate the directions of choice in the dilemmas of
action. As patterns they are guided by beliefs, but are not determined
by them since beliefs constitute only one of the factors in their organi-
zation.[85]

Patterns of value-orientation are ways of organizing all of the modes
of interest involved in concrete action, the cathectic and evaluative
as well as the cognitive which has primacy in a belief system. A value-
orientation is really a commitment to accept the implications of cognition,
cathexis, and evaluation as they are related to a given situation within
which they merge. In possessing a value-orientation an actor is committed
to accepting the consequences of a set of cognitive beliefs, and is also
committed to his gratification interests, and to the patterns of expressive
symbolism. The point of organization of these factors relative to each
other in action constitutes a value-orientation system. It is obviously
structured at a different level of complexity than belief systems and sys-
tems of expressive symbols and performs a different function in the
conduct of interaction.

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[85]Ibid., pp. 380-381.

In delineating these three sets of symbols as the major components of culture, Parsons has imputed great importance to them in the conduct of action. As symbolic systems they are not action systems themselves, but they lie _in_ action. They serve as objects of orientation of action, they are internalized as aspects of personality orientation, and they are institutionalized in social systems. The pervasive influence of culture in social systems, then, is a matter of great significance to the sociologist.

7. The Theory of Social Change

It may be recalled that the statement was made that Parsons in his theory of social systems has attempted to handle three major theoretical problems. He has attempted to derive the major structural components of the social system so that they could be treated as variables in working out interrelations. He has attempted to further the analysis of motivational processes within the system through derivation of the "mechanisms." Thirdly, he has attempted to logically close his system by focusing upon the processes of change of systems. His handling of the first two problems may be described as "rigorous" regardless of ones methodological leanings. The same cannot be said for his handling of the problem of change. Although he indicates certain important insights into the processes of change, it can be said without qualification that Parsons has no theory of change, apparently no hope for one, and therefore it is evident that his theory of social systems is really a static theory of social systems--systems in a "knife-edge present". In so far as his theoretical treatment of systems

is confined to a static approach, obviously it does not "fit" with the
very evident empirical reality of change. Therefore, one can only con-
clude that Parsons has failed to achieve closure of his theory of systems.
An explanation of a social system in terms of structural categories, and
functional interrelatedness of parts that does not as the same time explain
the obvious change of that system does not constitute a determinate
explanation.

Parsons approaches the problem by initially distinguishing between
the processes of change within the system and processes of change of the
system itself.[86] He contends that it is possible to theorize about particu-
lar processes of change within a system without building up a theory of
change of the system itself. He is committed to this distinction through
his use of the concept of "equilibrium" relative to the social system.
His particular application of it to the social system is what makes it a
"boundry-maintaining" system. It is the emphasis upon this aspect of the
system that gives the Parsons treatment its peculiarly static quality.
He makes the theoretical assumption that the stabilization of the processes
of mutual orientation within complementary roles is the fundamental tendency
of interaction.[87] It is an assumption lieing at the very core of his
theory. Interaction itself is not problematic, it goes on, but it tends
to stabilize into an equilibrium. An equilibrium which can be a moving
equilibrium which supposedly accounts for orderly processes of empirical
change.

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[86]Ibid., pp. 480-483.

[87]Ibid., pp. 480-483.

Viewed in this manner the motivational processes within the system are geared toward the maintenance of equilibrium. This equilibrium revolves around two major processes, that of socialization and of social control. Socialization involves the acquisition of the orientations necessary for the performance of roles in the social system. Social control involves the process concerned with the motivations and mechanisms counterbalancing tendencies to deviate and thereby geared toward restoration of a stabilized interactive process. Both of these major processes then are constraining processes tending toward equilibrium, toward the maintainance of the system as is. Boundary-maintainance is again seen as the fundamental function of the action processes within the system. When Parsons speaks of a system as being boundary-maintaining, he is saying that relative to its environment it maintains certain constancies of pattern, which are empirical, and which therefore do not "have" to be maintained, Parsons imputes to the social system the single dominant characteristic which "types" it as being boundary-maintaining and therefore establishes it at a necessary equilibrium. This conception of the social system as being a boundary-maintaining unit is entirely acceptable and it would seem to be a necessary attribute of a system. However, that does not justify the conceptualization of a social system solely in terms of that attribute. There is nothing "inherent" in systems that requires that all of their energies, motivations or mechanisms must be devoted to maintainance. Indeed the obvious facts of change seem to indicate otherwise. It is difficult to see how Parsons justifies a complete focus upon the maintainance feature, and at the same time ignores the "developmental"

feature of social systems. Inevitably such questions as these arise.
If there are mechanisms for maintainance, are there not mechanisms for
development? If there is a fundamental tendency to maintain, is it not
also possible to conceive of a fundamental tendency to develop, thereby
inducing change? how can one maintain that there are conditions under
which a system will remain constant without making the admission that
there must be conditions under which it will be altered? How is it possible
to use the concept "process" without implying change. If there are "laws"
or "principles" of process in a social system, are they not at the same
time principles of "change". The answer to these and numerous other
questions that might be raised are not answered in the Parsons treatment.

The difficulty encountered by Parsons in the analysis of change is
then in part based upon the notion of equilibrium as emphasized in the
"boundary-maintaining" quality of the social system. This is in turn
related to another consideration, the fact that Parsons is operating within
the "structural-functional" frame of reference. The two considerations
are interdependent because Parsons holds that structural-functional cate-
gories can only be applied to a boundary-maintaining system because only
such a system can be delimited and therefore susceptible to structural-
functional treatment. This is evident, but for Parsons the major signifi-
cance of structural-functional theory lies in the fact that it makes
possible the use of the concept system "without a complete knowledge of
the laws which determine processes within the system".[66] With nothing but

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[88]Ibid., p. 483.

a fragmentary knowledge of the "laws" of process it is still possible to

conceive of system in terms of structural categories according to Parsons.

Through use of such categories one achieves systematic description of

the states of the systems in terms of similarities, differences, and vari-

ations in time. Such description carries with it the possibility of

articulation of the deductively derived categories with the empirically

observed variables. Further there is the possibility of taxonomic systemati-

zation which can in turn be empirically useful.[89]

It can be seen that Parsons contends that it is only through the use

of structural-functional theory that the social system can be legitimately

investigated. The major value attributed to it is that it "transcends"

our lack of complete knowledge of laws of process. In what scientific

system is there a "complete" knowledge of anything? The notion expressed

here and elsewhere by Parsons, reflecting the view that knowledge is an

ever-closer approximation to a finite and final picture of reality is not

even slightly akin to the premises of modern research science. It is

possible to conceive of a system of logic as being "complete", but that is

not relevant to any system that is aimed at depicting the object world.

Parsons can defensibly say that his system is "deductive" and that his

structural categories are "derived" from the theory of action, but the

scientific significance of those categories lies in their relation to the

object world. It is presumed that their utility lies in their structuring

of the object world. The structural categories therefore, although derived,

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[89]Ibid., p. 483.

are of empirical reference. This points up the fact that social systems are empirical as well as theoretical systems. Empirical systems change, therefore any theoretical system that does not acknowledge and make provision for that change is refusing to face up to the facts of life.

Parsons is maintaining that it is necessary to use the structural-functional approach in that it makes possible the use of the concept system. Further, a general theory of change of social systems is not possible in our present state of knowledge.[90] His reason for this is that such a theory implies (to him) a complete knowledge of the laws of process of the system, and obviously sociologists do not possess such knowledge. Neither does any one else. No science even pretends to have complete knowledge of the theoretical laws of empirical systems. The "necessity" of the structural-functional approach therefore is questionable, as is the necessity of any methodology.

Parsons makes a spirited defense of structural-functional theory in dealing with its imputed "static" bias.[91] In responding to the argument that the problems of change are outside its purview, and in that the problems of change are the important ones, the theory loses its empirical utility, he points out that there is the possibility of dynamic development of his categories. In the treatment of change itself, though, Parsons has done little to combat the allegation of "staticness", indeed he is probably responsible for some of the continuing ambiguities of the structural-functional approach. The fact that structure and function are aspects of

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[90]Ibid., p. 486.

[91]Ibid., p. 535.

process is typically ignored by Parsons. The reification of them inde-
pendent of process merely adds to the difficulty of analyzing that
process.

The foregoing comments are aimed at Parsons' conception of a general
theory of change based upon the complete knowledge of the laws of process
of the system. In holding such a theory to be impossible, and it obvious-
ly is in terms of his conditions, he nevertheless holds that it is
possible to theorize about change. This theory will concern sub-processes
of change within social systems rather than the change of social systems
as such. This distinction is insisted upon by Parsons. It is possible
to raise the question here as to how it is possible to have change within
a system that is not at the same time change of the system. In so far as
any system is a configuration, any system is a "function" not only of its
parts, but of the relations obtaining between those parts. Any alteration
in a part alters the relationships between parts which inevitably alters
the configuration. Are not these "sub-processes" of change then what the
sociologist is interested in after all? The research sociologist does
not focus upon the social system as such, but upon the "partial" systems
which compose it. Empirically then the lack of closure of the Parsons
general theory is not as important as it might seem. Parsons is his
illustrative treatment of the institutionalization of science and technology
gives admirable indication of that.

CHAPTER IV

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE IN THE THEORETICAL
POSITION OF GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

1. Sociology and Science

George Lundberg possesses an orientation that is abstracted from

several important lines of thinking in American sociology. Such diverse

but yet obviously related perspectives as "positivism", "empiricism",

"behaviorism", "pragmatism", "operationalism", and "quantitative systemati-

zation" all enter into the various facets of Lundberg's general position.

In view of the fact that these are all developmental lines that have

yielded or will possibly yield increasing influence over research oriented

sociologists, particularly in America, it is of interest to examine this

convergence.

Lundberg is "committed to the belief that the problems that confront

(society)...are to be solved, if at all, by judicious and systematic

observation, verification, classification, and interpretation of social

phenomena".[1] This approach is generally referred to as "positivistic"

and is one that may be described as double-barreled in nature. It is a

position oriented around that of physical science, particularly its

methodology, and a striving for a unified view of the world of phenomena

through an adaptation of the procedures of physical science to all phenomena.

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[1]G. A. Lundberg, Social Research, 2d ed. rev. New York: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1942, p. 1.

The other aspect is the typical pattern of "moral" and "practical" considerations featured by positivists in their desire for a scientifically articulated world. We will postpone treatment of this aspect until after an analysis of some of the implications of the methodology.

Lundberg starts with the premise that all inquiry begins with experiencing of a tension or imbalance in the organism.[2] This "tension" or "imbalance" reflects a state of disequilibrium and indicates an imperfect adjustment on the part of the organism-in-environment. When these tensions are verbalized they tend to take the form of questions about some aspect of the universe. The statement of tentative answers to these questions constitute hypotheses. Hypotheses may be and are used in a variety of ways but the most reliable way of verifying them is through use of the technic of science. Therefore, to Lundberg science is the "technic of adjustment", because through establishment of relatively reliable answers to the questions at the base of the imbalance, the tensions are removed and the organism regains his equilibrium. This conception of science inevitably leads to a concentration on "problems" and indirectly de-emphasizes the role of systematic theory.

Lundberg denies the validity of the notion that "physical" and "social" spheres of science are intrinsically different. Positivistically to him all science is "physical". All data that are accrued consist of the responses of the organism-in-environment. The data are the symbolic adjustments we make to a particular environment. Data is always in terms of

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[2]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 5.

response: therefore, it represents a form of behavior regardless of what

field of science it is being procured in. The securing of data not only

is dependent upon human reaction but also lies in human reaction. The

symbols with which the organisms respond constitute the data of any of the

special sciences and therefore of all science. He consequently holds that

such categories as "physical", "natural", "cultural", and "social" are not

only synthetic constructs but undesirable constructs.[3]

Lundberg's statement of what he considers to be the basic postulates

of science makes the foregoing explicit. He develops these as follows:

> "1. All data or experience with which man can become concerned
> consist of the responses of the organism-in-environment. This in-
> cludes the postulate of an external world and variations both in it
> and the responders to it.
> "2. Symbols, usually verbal, are invented to represent these
> responses.
> "3. These symbols are the immediate data of all communicable
> knowledge, and, therefore, of all science.
> "4. All propositions, or postulates, regarding the more ulti-
> mate 'realities' must always consist of inference, generalizations,
> or abstractions from these symbols and the responses which they
> represent.
> "5. These extrapolations are in turn represented symbolically,
> and we respond to them as we respond to other phenomena which
> evoke behavior."[4]

The main line of these postulates is empirical in character in that

they claim a sensory base for the accumulation of all knowledge or the con-

struction of any system depicting that knowledge. They locate the data

of science in the behavior of man and thereby set the stage for the assump-

tion that there is no inherent difference in type of phenomena, but rather

there is an essential commonality--reaction to a phase of environment.

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[3]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[4]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

This is quite an assumption, especially in view of the fact that he has postulated an external world with variations in it. Obviously then organisms are responding to "something" and to arbitrarily equate this "something" with the responses made to it does not necessarily give one justification for assuming no differences in the "something". Rather, however, it contributes to a confusion between the act of "knowing" and "being known", "to be" and "to be perceived".[5] Pragmatists in general consider this to be a pseudo problem however and thus Lundberg establishes this element of his orientation. In going along with his assumption of no intrinsic differences in data, however, one is led to his next assumption to the effect that all statements about the nature of the universe are symbolizations of responses to that which evoked the responses, one reaches the point of his argument. That is, the establishment of the premise that the differences between the special sciences lie not in the intrinsic nature of their data but rather in the ways we have gathered our data.

With this establishment of the positivistic premise, then, Lundberg has opened the door to the notion of the "unity" of all science, and justifies his claim that the methods that have been successfully developed in "physical" science can be adapted to any area of research, because the data is always in terms of "behavior". He maintains that this is not a "forcing" of sociological data, for example, into the units of any other science but rather gives one an opportunity to share in the fruits of previous labor.

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[5]Ledger Wood, "Recent Epistomological Schools" in A History of Philosophical Systems, Ferm Vergilius (ed.), New York, The Philosophical Library, pp. 518-519.

For social scientists the implication is that they are as unlimited in their research procedures and establishment of general statements as the physical scientists are.

Lundberg conceives of science as being abstract, general, hypothetical--but above all useful. The pragmatic touch again, and the touch becomes the dominant theme of his science. "In its maturest form the content of science consists of a body of verified propositions so related that under given rules (logic) the system is self-consistent and compatible with empirical observation. The more universally applicable these propositions are, i.e., the greater the variety of phenomena covered by the propositions the more adequate is our knowledge of the field which they cover."[6] Science is thus a systematic search for sequences in any phenomena but the question, whether the "regularities" lie in the behavior of men or in that which is external to them, is not handled. Science aims at the statement of specified relationships which are generally true within rigidly specified conditions, according to Lundberg, and therefore is essentially predictive. This predictive characteristic gives us both positive basis for action in that it presents us with alternatives, and also relieves us negatively of a body of fears and misconceptions.[7]

All scientific activity is treated as being in pursuit of a vision in that its hypotheses give meaning and direction to its enterprise. In so far as these hypotheses, however, are restatements of "problems"

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[6]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 6.

[7]G. A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us, New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1947, p. 2.

reflecting tension they constitute another natural limitation on the
role of systematic theory and contribute to diffused, independent action
on the part of researchers.

In his desire to make sociology "scientific" Lundberg has engaged in
considerable polemics but has consistently pressed for the incorporation
in to sociological method of certain techniques that he conceives of as
being responsible for the observable predictive success of the physical
sciences. If science is the most conspicuously successful of all adjust-
ment technics then sociology, the discipline dealing with the "communicable
adjustment technics which human groups have developed in their long struggle
to come to terms with each other and with the rest of their environment",[8]
is obligated to become scientific. Moreover he holds the position here
that a sociology of adjustment is more necessary now than ever before due
to the increased application of science in all spheres which has given
rise to a disastrous cleavage in our culture. This problem is central to
his entire system and he maintains that it can not be solved except through
a unified attack, which means the extension of scientific technic and appli-
cation to the realm of human behavior including the so-called subjective
aspects. This is in the Comtean tradition but it may also be noted that
the problem is really only a statement of the "cultural lag" theory which
is recognized as a very partial and inadequate theory of social change.

Apart from the "utilitarian" or "application" phase of his sociology,
for the moment, we shall give consideration to the elements of his methodology

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[8]G. A. Lundberg, _Foundations of Sociology_, New York, The Macmillan
Company, 1939, p. 5.

that constitute its basis as science. "Everyone probably agrees that the backbone of any science is a series of relevant, verifiable, consistent generalizations called principles, or laws".[9] Sociology must therefore establish "principles" or "laws" and furthermore systematically interrelate them. "Law" must mean the same thing in sociology that it does in the other sciences which to Lundberg is a "generalized, verifiable statement, within measurable degrees of accuracy, of how certain events occur under stated conditions".[10] This is an empirical law, based upon probability occurrence, therefore never absolute; general in character, therefore applicable to classes of events rather than unique occurrences; is verifiable, which means the operation by which it was established may be repeated; and is stated conditionally, which means that it constitutes prediction rather than prophesy.

The ability of sociology to establish such laws is questioned by many but is stoutly maintained by Lundberg. He here goes back to the assumption that differences between the achievements of the sciences lie not in the nature of their data but in the ways in which that data has been gathered and handled. If the data of repetitive, relational human behavior were only gathered and handled in the same way that the "physical" scientists operated, then we would have laws similar in character, and consequently a science of sociology. The accomplishment of this is based upon "objectivity", "quantification", "classification", "operational definitions", and a "frame of reference".

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[9] Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[10] Ibid., p. 133.

Lundberg regards objectivity as a characteristic of responses rather than of things. The framework of science affords a place for all known or knowable data, and the relative objectivity of gathering them resides in the technics used that are subject to corroboration, therefore verifiability. Verifiability is the test of objectivity, which means that a problem of communication is posed as basic to the attainment of objectivity. The procedures or technics must be susceptible of communication to others so that corroboration of other qualified persons may be obtained and the element of "subjectivity" thereby removed. There is no "subjective" datum as such, only a "subjective" response which must be eliminated. Such phenomena as "taboos", "beliefs", "ideas", "attitudes" are as "tangible" to Lundberg as any other form of data. He adopts the behavioristic position that data is irrelevant only when it deals with non-observable behavior; therefore, is unverifiable. Such things as "ideas" and "attitudes" are observable however in the behavior they manifest. They are reactions of sense receptors to internal or external stimuli in no different a fashion than the experiencing of a rock or tree. For example, if a person reacts to a "moral taboo" by refusing to proceed further, the behavior he evidences may be just as objectively studied as if it were a "tangible", "material" barb wire fence that had stopped the forward movement of a person--if the device of observation is as adequate. The difference lies not in the characteristics of the data, but in the tools used to secure the data.

This, then, leads him to the conclusion that success in the process of objectifying data lies in the improvement of the operation involved.

The improvement of the operation involved necessitates the statement of the problem objectives, hypotheses, and resultant generalizations in terms of the operation involved. This means the improvement of the required symbols and the definition and the use of those symbols in terms of observable physical operations.

2. The Symbolic Equipment of Science

The immediate data of science being entirely symbolic in character, the initial problem then for Lundberg is the establishment of a set of symbols that mean the same thing for different people involved in the procedures. The communicability of these symbols is central to the issue. The same symbols must "mean" the same responses in order to insure the repetition of the same operation so as to obtain the desired objectivity.

The symbols that man uses in every day life are from Lundberg's point of view inadequate for this purpose. Many of the things that scientists wish to communicate cannot be adequately transmitted through the acoustic stimuli of oral discourse. The complexity of the data to be communicated necessitates the elimination of the "folk" language that is indefinite in character. Consequently he places his faith in the language of mathematics, in a set of written graphic symbols which provide enduring and precise meaning to the responses that have been made. The use of mathematical symbols has other implications, discussion of which we will postpone for the moment and turn briefly to a criticism of his treatment of symbols.

Sorokin makes the following remarks:

"Being a duly registered behaviorist he (Lundberg) naturally finds such a term as 'fear' reprehensible, and he wants to replace it by a more scientific 'operational and behavioristic' definition. So

the behavior of paper flying before the wind and of a man
fleeing in fear from a pursuing crowd are defined as the
'behavior of an object of specified characteristics reacting
to stimulas of specified characteristics within the specified
field of force'. Does it not sound scientific? No, it does
not. One word 'fear', gives to all of us a much better,
fuller, and more precise knowledge of the phenomena designated
by the term than the whole 'deaf mute' definition given above".[11]

Sorokin is effecting an unreasonable comparison in this case, but it

is a typical one. He is comparing a definition, "fear", with a framework

for a definition. He is comparing a definition with the principles of

stating a definition. Sorokin applies the words "deaf mute" and "empty"

to the "definition", "behavior of an object of specified characteristics

within the specified field of force." It is empty, it is _not_ the defini-

tion. It constitutes merely the terms of the definition, the mechanical

framework for the data of the definition. It merely states what data

should be obtained in order to "explain" or "define the situation". It

calls for the supplying of data as to the behavior, object, stimulus, and

situation, which constitutes a major problem in its own right. According

to Lundberg, if those data were supplied in quantitative terms, one would

have a far more precise and meaningful "definition" than could possibly

be obtained from the statement "man fleeing in fear from a pursuing crowd".

Sorokin states that a "precise" knowledge of the phenomenon taking

place is given by the word "fear". That is doubtful, because "fear" can

mean any variety of responses from extreme caution all the way to hysteria.

The point is that most current sociological concepts are of the same order.

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[11] P. A. Sorokin, "Review of Foundations of Sociology", _American
Journal of Sociology_, Vol. 45 (March, 1940), p. 797.

Lundberg would not exclude "meaning" in its traditional sense but rather would provide for a greater accuracy in communication which would in turn facilitate scientific statement.

Woolston renders an objection to this type of refined symbolization in the statement:

> "Paraphrasing common terms in mathematical symbols does not add clarity and depth to explanation for persons who can not read curves and equations. In fact some formulae thus expressed are merely esoteric signs for the cognoscente."[12]

This statement would hardly call for comment except for the fact that it is an expression of the thinking of many professional sociologists as well as being reflective of lay opinion. One can say that the problem of people not being able to read a specialized symbolization is one of education, and does not constitute any invalidation of the specialization itself. Lundberg considers the development of the ability to handle such symbols a necessary part of professional preparation and defends the notion through use of the physical science "model" again.

Lundberg points out that the continued use of current sociological symbols dooms the discipline to "subjectivity". The lack of agreement as to the "meaning" of even common concepts, the typical use of them in a variety of senses, the fact that they mean many things to many people is considered fatal to the scientific approach. For Lundberg the "...only way of defining anything objectively is in terms of the operations involved."[13]

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[12]Howard Woolston, "Review of Foundations of Sociology", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 209 (May, 1940), p. 245.

[13]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 69.

This involves the defining of concepts in terms of observable physical operations. This means the elimination of concepts based upon "essence" or "property" and a cessation of the pursuit of essential natures, and the focusing of attention upon the method of employing concepts.

3. Operationalism

There are controversial aspects to "operationalism" and Lundberg contributes his share of obscurantism. The central notion, developed by Bridgeman as an offshoot of pragmatism and accepted in toto by Lundberg is as follows: "In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonomous with the corresponding set of operations....The meaning of a proposition is its verifiability."[14] This leads to such traditional statements as "intelligence is what intelligence tests test", the circularity of which bears an odd resemblence to the tautological propositions of the older "science" that they profess such an anethema for. Such statements are an inevitable consequent of the monistic premise involved and give another indication of the limitations upon the role of systematic theory in Lundberg's approach. Apparently there can be as many "intelligences" as there are "tests". If so, eclecticism severely limits any system.

There is another type of statement included under the rubric "operationalism" that Lundberg subscribes to. This particular statement was made by Alpert and is of a somewhat different character than that about

[14]P. W. Bridgeman, The Logic of Modern Physics, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932, p. 5.

intelligence: "Law is the probability that a rule of conduct will be enforced by the courts. The operational test is clear and verifiable; what the courts do is really observable...."[15] The implication here is that there are two different operations, one that of the courts, and the other than of the observer of the courts' actions in natural situations. This is different from the implication in the "intelligence" proposition where the focus is entirely on the operation of the observer in a "constructed" situation that entirely ignores the function of the behavior being examined. By defining laws in terms of verifiable operations of the courts, however, one is limited by the fact that the probability statement will have to be in terms of known violations of the rule of conduct. The number of times that a rule of conduct is enforced as compared to the number of known violations brings about a probability statement that necessarily omits the countless unknown violations. This severely limits the validity of the initial "operational definition", because that definition in its own premise requires the unknown as well as the known violations. The operationalist would say that "new technics of observation must be invented" to reduce the number of unknown infractions and in so saying they would have come a long way from their pragmatic beginning.

Burgess makes the charge that: "It (operational sociology) tends to discount the role of concepts and would reduce them to operational definitions and to symbolic expression in quantitative symbols."[16] If

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[15]Harry Alpert, "Operational Definitions in Sociology", American Sociological Review, Vol. 3 (December, 1938), pp. 860-861.

[16]E. W. Burgess, "Sociological Research Methods", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 50 (May, 1945), p. 481.

Bridgeman's original statement is taken literally it does entail a remarkable limitation on concepts rather than implementation. The meaning of "magnitude" for example cannot be made synonomous with the "physical operations" involved in measuring magnitude. The physical operation of measuring magnitude never determines more than the magnitude of some specific object. The meaning ascribed to magnitude as a concept however determines the operations of measuring, for without knowing that meaning the physicist would be incapable of selecting a relevant measuring device appropriate to the object. To measure a plowed field with a thermometer and call it "size" is no more ridiculous however than to measure intelligence with an achievement test and call it "intelligence". A concept is "general", an operation always "specific" therefore subject to determination by the former. Radical operationalism of the Lundberg type discounts the role of rational thought in concept construction therefore becomes raw-empiricism. To retreat from that position and maintain simply and with far greater tenability that concepts should be made subject to inquiry and susceptible to hypothetical statement for purposes of examination is not "operationalism" but rather "instrumentalism" of the Dewey mode.[17] Lundberg does implicitly take this position frequently but nevertheless is still explicitly committed to the more extreme theory.

4. Quantification and Measurement

Related to the matter of symbolic equipment and its use in operations, Lundberg raises the whole problem of measurement and quantification for

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[17]D. S. MacKay, "Pragmatism" in A History of Philosophical Systems, Ferm, Vergilius (ed.), p. 388.

sociology and they become central to his scheme. He regards quantitative

statements as being merely stated amounts of qualitative attributes. He

assumes that all qualities are subject to distribution on a continuum in

terms of relative amounts, therefore they may be symbolically represented

and manipulated methematically.[18] He holds that the problem of measure-

ment with resultant statements in quantitative terms is crucial to the

development of "generalizations".

"Objectification of the technic of generalization invariably involves

quantification."[19] He maintains scientific generalization is always and

necessarily quantitative. "I mean by the verb _generalize_ the process of

determining from less than all the relevant data the probable prevalence

in a universe of a given datum or configuration of data. I mean by the

noun _generalization_ a statement arrived at by the above process."[20] If

general statements are to be an aim of sociology as they have been of all

science then the extent to which they are true becomes a problem. The

problem implies its own answer, measurement. Lundberg feels that we are

compelled to deal with measurement in sociology because it is implicit in

the process of establishing hypotheses as general propositions. He admits

the lack of instruments for any considerable measurement in the social

sphere but attributes that to the immaturity of the science and not to

any intrinsic characteristic of the data. He declares that the invention

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[18]G. A. Lundberg, _Foundations of Sociology_, New York, The Macmillan
Company, 1939, p. 63.

[19]_Ibid._, p. 54.

[20]_Ibid._, p. 54

of units and instruments with which to systematize observation for pur-
poses of generalizing is a major part of the scientific task.[21]

Apart from the immediate generalizations themselves the use of
measurement in examining hypotheses makes an important contribution to
sociological theory. The main stimulus for the reconstruction of theory
is its demonstrated inadequacy. The degree to which a generalization
does not hold is a challenge for the development of one that is more in-
clusive or applicable. Lundberg points out that the bulk of scientific
endeavor must always consist of the testing of the currently accepted
"principles", and a modification of them in the light of more adequate
accumulation of fact.[22] Measurement gives one that more adequate accumu-
lation of fact.

Lundberg discounts the role of interpretation here in his emphasis
on measurement, and implies that measurement enjoys an objective autonomy.
The selective aspect of measurement is ignored directly, although it
implicitly calls for interpretation on the part of any scientist. The
rude fact of deciding what to measure indicates a prior interpretation no
matter whether that decision is based on a deduction from theory or upon
empirical curiosity. The assumption here is a typically positivistic one;
that our data is "given" rather than "taken", that our world is made up
out of "facts" that are directly given in the experience of the observer.

Lundberg tends to equate observation with recognition and that simply
is not the case in research science. Observation always contains an

[21]G. A. Lundberg, <u>Can</u> <u>Science</u> <u>Save</u> <u>Us</u>, New York, Longmans, Green and
Company, 1947, p. 17.

[22]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 65.

element of the novelty in it. The data of observation is in one sense

unusual, because it is distinct in some way from the expected experience.

One "recognizes" that which may be expected, and one "observes" that

which differs in some respect from the expected. Lundberg postulates an

external world but does not face the problem of what is involved in the

scientist' abstraction from that world--the selective aspect of his

attention. This is the logical weakness of positivism and illustrates a

remarkable tendency to ignore a fundamental characteristic of the "science"

he professes such admiration for, that is, that science is always "research"

science. Research always implies a problem or an interest therefore the

objects of science always answer to an interest of some sort.[23] What

constitutes that interest is of extreme importance and represents the

context within which measurement takes place. To fail to make that context

explicit and admit the interpretation is a denial of positivism's own

canon of objectivism. It must be noted that Lundberg leaves room for this

interpretive context in his approach by explicitly recognizing "the

definition of the situation" as a selective response. By continually plac-

ing the emphasis on measurement, and in particular on the operations

involved, he manages to play down this aspect of his approach however.

Lundberg stresses the importance of the generalization and thereby

makes explicit the search for uniformity. He does not take cognizance of

the fact that "our discovery of uniformity implies that which is not

uniform..."[24] To have uniformity one must necessarily have it in that

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[23]G. H. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936, pp. 456-460.

[24]Ibid., p. 479.

which is not uniform. The contribution peculiar to research is its ability to abstract uniformities from an external world possessing fantastic diversity. The scientific point of view reflects a desire to escape being overwhelmed by a chaotic multiplicity of things and thereby establishes the task of searching for order and uniformity. The undertaking implies a searching for clues to identities and sequences in the disorder of our immediate experience. The following up of these clues makes it essential that we ignore part of our experience. Mead has pointed out that you "can only know a thing in so far as you can ignore something else."[25] We typically think of this as the process of abstraction, getting rid of that not essential to the task or thing.

This interpretive base for measurement is not faced by Lundberg. To admit, as he does, that there is a problematic base to research and then to fail to meet the implications of that admission is not justifiable theoretically.

The role of interpretation after the "measurement" is also minimized in Lundberg's system. "We say that anything is 'explained' or 'understood' when we have reduced a situation to elements and correlations with which we are so familiar that we accept them as a matter of course so that our curiosity rests. By 'element' we mean any component which we do not consider it necessary or possible further to analyze. Understanding a situation means, from the operational point of view, discovering familiar elements and correlations between them."[26] Explanation is in terms of

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[25] Ibid., p. 479.

[26] G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, pp. 6-7.

"element" and "correlations" that has allowed "curiosity" to rest due
to "familiarity". Note the applicability of our foregoing statement to
this. Then raise the question about this "familiarity" that allows our
"curiosity" to rest. Obviously the correlations have been put into a
context, an extrapolation has been made (Lundberg postulates the legitimacy
of extrapolation in his Basic Postulates) which constitutes a theoretic
leap. An extrapolation has to be a theoretic leap, it can never be
demonstrated in itself. This constitutes the logical limit of positivism
and indicates the contextual nature of measurement.

Lundberg ties in measurement to what he considers to be the basic in-
adequacy of sociology, its lack of "science". He points up the vagueness
of its generalizations and says that: "What we do not know is (1) under
what conditions these generalizations are true, and (2) to what degree
they are true under these conditions."[27] Statement of degree demands
quantification. The defect that he ascribes to "social laws" can in his
view only be remedied by the development of technics of measurement.

Mathematics presents a convenient, and accurate, way of symbolizing
our data so that the meaning is objective and held constant. Our response
to some behavior phenomenon is what gives meaning to our symbols; therefore,
a more accurate symbolization of the response will tend to objectify it.
Mathematics is then a tool by which societal phenomena may be quantitatively
analyzed and described. Use of quantitative units is the only way of
describing the tremendous gradation of societal phenomena. So called

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[27] G. A. Lundberg, "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology",
American Sociological Review, Vol. 1 (October, 1936), p. 476.

"qualitative" statements are valueless from the standpoint of predictive

significance unless they can be quantitatively validated.

MacIver gives typical expression to those who doubt the validity of

quantification.

> "Social phenomena are not, like certain physical phenomena, isol-
> able components of a situation. Social phenomena are aspects of
> a total non-mechanical, consciously upheld, system of relation-
> ships....We can say that land, labor, capital, and organization
> are all necessary to produce a steel rail, but the question how
> much does each produce remains not only unanswerable but meaning-
> less. If a number of factors are alike necessary to the production
> of a result, there can be no quantitative evaluation of their
> respective contributions. And if this is true of material categor-
> ies, themselves measurable, and their material products themselves
> also measureable, it is a fortiori true of the more subtle inter-
> actions of personalities."[28]

"If the components present in any situation are reduced to units of

some kind then the number or amount of these units present can certainly

be stated."[29] Thus replies Lundberg. The statement of the quantity or

degree to which a component is present in a whole aids greatly in the

description of the interaction of the components. Admittedly isolability

is not attainable except conceptually, but then it must be recognized that

"wholes" themselves are conceptual. To maintain that "wholes" are mystical

unknowns is not only to deny Lundberg his quantification but a denial of

the abstracting process of all science.

To fulfill the requirements of the "predictive" proposition one must

quantify the data. He expresses the optimistic hope, as witnessed by his

advertising of Dodd, that ultimately this quantification will be a calculus

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[28] R. M. MacIver, Society, A Textbook of Sociology, New York, Farrar
and Rinehart, 1937, p. 476.

[29] G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan
Company, 1939, p. 79.

of relations. This would entail the use of mathematical symbols for quantitative units of human behavior so that the "meaning" of their relationship is held constant. How far Dodd is from such a calculus has been pointed out by his reviewers and does not have to be taken up here.

The matter of prediction is held to be primary by Lundberg. He justifies the existence of a sociology in terms of its predictive value. "Broadly speaking, it is the business of social scientist to be able to predict with high probability the social weather, just as meteorologists predict sunshine and storm. More specifically, social scientists should be able to say what is likely to happen socially under stated conditions".[30] There is a very general agreement of scientists as to the primary significance of prediction in the context of the scientific process, but there is also frequent confusion as to where prediction stops and prophesy starts. Lundberg manifests that confusion in a failure to distinguish between prediction on the theoretical level and prophesy on the empirical level. When Lundberg talks of prediction in terms of generalizations being true to a degree under stated conditions he is talking in theoretical and probability terms. No modern science has any quarrel with that relative to procedure. The probability involved is evidently a statistical probability therefore holds for classes of events and is not predictive of the unique event. Furthermore the statement precludes the ability to "time-bind" it. When the conditions are operating independent of the scientist's control, he then is in no position to "predict" a given occurrence at a

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[30]G. A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us, New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1947, pp. 30-31.

given time. Lundberg disregards these limitations of "prediction" and even states the necessity for social scientists of predicting the probability of designated types of observable behavior in concrete cases."[31] This is the business of making sociology immediately "useful", something that has limited rather than enhanced its scientific respectability historically.

In posing for sociology the central task of formulating predictable sequences (principles) of behavior within stated conditions from which deviations can be measured Lundberg is actually pointing up the general character and abstractness of science. The principles or laws are not descriptive of actual occurrences in uncontrolled (symbolically or otherwise) nature. They are in effect "constructs", which requires that they be treated as such and not reified from time to time as Lundberg is wont to do.

5. The Scientific System

The necessary generality of scientific laws is attested to by Lundberg and furthermore gives him reason to express a need for their incorporation into a system. "Only within a carefully formulated system can cooperative effort as well as orderly verification or refutation take place."[32] The system involves compatibility of "laws" which inevitably means a statement of their relationship to one another. This system which Lundberg conceives

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[31]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 97.

[32]Ibid., pp. 115-116.

of as being comprehensive serves two purposes; it describes the behavior in the field and serves as a base for the correlation of research so as to make it bear with an economy of effort upon the problems the field presents. The first aspect is its predictive function, the second its accumulative, in that it tends to coordinate the research efforts within the field.

Lundberg would require of a system, comprehensiveness, parsimony, objectivity, and verifiability. He asks that it serve as a base from which reliable predictions of social behavior may be deduced. He asks that it function as a convenient, useful framework within which behavior can be correlated. Furthermore its propositions must be hypothetical and subject to the empirical test. It must function as a means for the extension, refinement, and verification of knowledge.[33] He gives credit to such diverse forerunners as Comte, Carey, LePlay, Spencer, Ward, Pareto, and von Wiese for their varied gallent attempts at the establishment of comprehensive frameworks. He then treats Dodd as the modern day counterpart and cites his contribution to this line of thinking.

The test of a system for Lundberg is a pragmatic one. Does it afford a rationale of the adjustments that have to be made (presumably by scientists as well as society), and does it aid in planning those adjustments.[34] A convergence of utilitarianism, pragmatism and positivism is reflected in that test. The tests of coherence, functional consistency, classification, and organic unity, are ignored, at least explicitly.

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[33]Ibid., p. 98.

[34]Ibid., p. 28.

"A sound scientific theory should satisfy the following basic
requirements: (1) A clear and unambiguous definition of terms
must be set forth. (2) The postulates upon which the theory
proceeds must be explicitly stated in these terms. (3) The
deductions from the postulates and the implications of them
must be worked out and exhibited step by step. (4) Theorems
must be formulated, stating specifically what should, according
to the theory, be the outcome of empirical observations and
experiments. These experiments or observations should be as
crucial as possible for the guidance of systematic research.
(5) The theorems must be susceptible of empirical test and not
be of a metaphysical character."[35]

Lundberg thus states his requirements of systematic theory and then con-

cludes that in all respects sociological theory is defective.

To compensate for the various defections of sociology Lundberg maps

out a specific program. In order to form a more suitable framework for

sociology he points up the necessity for: a survey of present sociological

theory in order to render its postulates explicit and sift out the

"metaphysics"; development of more adequate terms to represent the phenomena

of sociological interest; statement of those terms in "operational"

language; and, on the basis of this work, development of a comprehensive

theory possessing internal coherence. It is not clear, but one would be

led to think by Lundberg's treatment that this program is more than an

"ideal" statement. If it is, and it seems to be, then in its "purposiveness"

it is contrary to both the historical development of science and the

"principles" of his sociology.

6. The Utility of Science

Departing from the realm of methodology we can go back to the second

element of the "double-barrel" of positivism. That is the "use" of

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[35]G. A. Lundberg, "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology",
op. cit., p. 708.

science in "practical" consideration. Lundberg conceives of sociology

as being useful and essential to society. He considers science as such

as being non-moral, maintaining that there is nothing in scientific work

as such which dictates to what ends the products of science should be

used.[36] The scientist remains clear of the values which to him are merely

data. However he establishes a function for science with respect to the

ends to which scientific knowledge will be used. "As scientists, it is

their business to determine reliably the immediate and remote costs and

consequences of alternate possible courses of action, and to make those

known to the public."[37] He reserves for science merely the "modest"

function of telling people how to get their wants, and the costs and con-

sequences involved.[38] He then goes ahead and points out that by provid-

ing reliable estimates of the consequences of alternative courses of

action "science conditions the choices--the values--of men."[39] Moreover

he maintains that scientific conclusions carry with them their own com-

pulsion for acceptance due to their demonstrable superiority. Also that

their decisiveness as final arbiters goes unchallenged in a community once

the ideal or value of science has been accepted. What has started out as

means then, has invidiously become ends. The "modest function" has become

pervasive and all inclusive. The problem is simply one of inculcating

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[36]G. A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us, New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1947, pp. 28-29.

[37]Ibid., p. 29.

[38]Ibid., p. 97.

[39]Ibid., p. 102.

the populace with the value of science and the "problems" that confront

a society then are susceptible to elimination.

It is in this second-barrel of positivism that Lundberg reveals

himself as a reformer as well as a scientist, a remodeler of behavior as

well as an analyst of behavior.

"For all my emphasis upon science, scientific method, and the
importance of keeping clearly before us when we are acting in
the scientific role and when we are taking the citizens' role,
I have never lost sight, I think, of the fact that science is
an instrument of man's living on the earth and that in the end
our interest in the advancement of science is merely to provide
a more efficient tool for the attainment of whatever objectives
each generation may cherish as making life worthwhile."[40]

7. The Province of Sociology

Lundberg maintains that ultimately sociology, just as any other

science, must be defined in terms of a characteristic set of problems

dealt with by people who call themselves sociologists. To the extent

that these problems are unique, sociology is a specialized science, to

the extent that these problems overlap with those of other sciences

sociology merges or synthesizes with those sciences.[41] Sociology, there-

fore, represents a particular set of responses to the universe. The

problems characteristic of sociology are those of group or interrelational

behavior, therefore, that behavior constitutes the proper province of

sociology. This behavior can be observed and described on its own level

and in its own terms regardless of what the constituant parts of that

[40]H. W. Odum, American Sociology, New York, Longmans, Green and
Company, 1951, p. 206.

[41]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan
Company, 1939, pp. 230-231.

behavior might be. Group behavior is just as "real" and just as suscept-
ible to scientific analysis as any other form of behavior.

Lundberg defends this notion by attacking the "habitual" conception
of categories and units whereby some are reified and others are held to
be synthetic constructs.[42] The reality of such categories as group,
crowd, and public is often questioned, in that they seemingly are made
up of individuals who are more "real". This sort of thinking is mere
habituation according to Lundberg, and he points out that the same sort
of objection can be made to the "individual" as a unit. He illustrates
by suggesting that biologists could insist that it is improper for psy-
chologists to speak of the behaving individual, for after all, it is the
cells that behave. Further, suppose that the physicists should then
question the biologists in their usage by pointing out that after all, it
is the atoms, and molecules that behave. Such a controversy would be
ridiculous but it serves to illustrate Lundberg's point that the size of
the unit depends upon the focus of observation, which in turn is justified
by contributing understanding and explanation to the unit we are concerned
with. Lundberg pragmatically holds that the group concept is useful, and
that it serves the same purpose for sociology as the individual does for
psychology and therefore is no less real. In short, Lundberg is saying
that all units of observation are constructs of mans convenience, and it
is this convenience or utility that constitutes the sole justification of
their reality. The behavior of any given unit can be shown to be made up

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[42]Ibid., pp. 171-172.

of constituent units, and that in no way invalidates the use of the larger construct. It is just as permissible then to speak of social phenomena as individual phenomena, public opinion as well as individual opinion, and group action as well as individual action.[43]

Man's sensory and symbolic equipment is such that he is capable of dealing with only limited aspects of the universe at any one time. To focus upon something automatically means that one must ignore that which is not included. Therefore one selects through symbolic abstraction those aspects of the universe that seem relevant to a given problem. For some purposes it is suitable to take the individual and his attributes as the point of interest, in other situations the group may be the unit relevant to the problem. The problem will determine the perspective and the point of reference.[44]

In saying that there are problems that can be dealt with only by adopting the group and interrelational behavior as point of reference, Lundberg is justifying the existence of sociology as a special science. In minimal terms he also is saying that all social situations and behavior can be described in terms of "characteristics of people in space and time."[45] His system has both spatial and temporal aspects, and further, in that people do not have to be conceived of as individuals, but on the contrary, for some purposes (those of sociology) can be conceived of as groups, his system is essentially a relational one.

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[43]Ibid., pp. 171-172.

[44]Ibid., p. 528.

[45]Ibid., p. 459.

Lundberg points up that it is convenient for purposes of study to deal with such salient aspects as societal processes, societal structures and the spatial and temporal aspects of society.[46] Whatever sectors of the social universe are chosen and focused upon, however, Lundberg maintains that the prime job is the development of appropriate scales of measurement for each. Any sector chosen must be conceived of in terms of gradations on a continuum. For instance, Lundberg advances the view that all societal processes can be described as gradations of the common factor of communication which in turn can be conceived of in terms of gradations of association and dissociation.[47] The problem of measurement is foremost in any problem dealt with or any sector selected for attention by Lundberg.

In line with his notion that science aims at increasing comprehensiveness and unity of knowledge with the greatest parsimony of concepts, Lundberg adopts numerous categories which have been identified with "physical" science, but which he contends are applicable to any type of behavior. The use of such concepts as "transformation of energy", "fluctuation", and "equilibrium" gives his sociology an outward appearance of being novel, but actually it is quite traditional and contains little in it that is original. Lundberg's substantive contribution to sociology is minor, and his treatment of substantive material is primarily aimed at

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[46]Ibid., p. 279.

[47]Ibid., p. 279.

demonstrating his thesis that there is urgent need for measurement and quantification of social phenomena if there is to be a predictive science of sociology.

6. Dynamics of Behavior

In discussing the dynamics of behavior Lundberg contends that such concepts as energy, motion, and force are equally applicable to all behavior.[48] He points out that it is convenient to explain physical phenomena in terms of electrons and protons which are units of energy. The properties ascribed to these units are attraction and repulsion. The symetrical relations of electrons and protons constitutes matter. The structure of matter and of behavior is therefore a function of the electron-proton configuration. The sciences are classified on the basis of the level of behavior configuration which they concern themselves with. The social sciences, for, example are concerned with the behavior of electron-proton configuration called societal groups. The "substance" of those groups is identical with any other phenomena, it is an expression of energy.

The electron-proton movements along the attraction-repulsion continuum group them into various geometrical types.[49] These forms of energy are to some extent convertible into one another, as for instance, light into heat, magnetism into electricity, and water into steam. In conversion the pattern or symmetry of the electrons and protons changes spatially.

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[48] Ibid., pp. 203-204.

[49] Ibid., pp. 204-205.

This change from one system of symmetry to another is termed transform-
ation of energy. Energy transformations are a function of the movement
from one type of electron-proton symmetry to another. Energy is not an
attribute of substances, but is a term standing for amounts of changes
in relationships. Force is called the rate of such changes in time.
For Lundberg all phenomena of scientific concern consist of energy trans-
formations.[50] These transformations are manifest in movement. The move-
ments that are of peculiar significance to the sociologist are those
determining relationships in human groups.

The conversion of energy into human behavior takes place through
the metabolic process of combustion of food. A person may expend this
energy in diverse ways varying from random movements to highly systematized
habits. A community, likewise, may dissipate its energy through a variety
of mechanisms and channels. The general pattern of energy transformation
is held to be basic to all activity and it therefore is the common point
of departure for all sciences.[51] Activity of sociological significance
is merely a special case of energy transformation.

In that all phenomena of the universe consist in electron-proton
configurations which constantly rearrange themselves through transforma-
tion, it is possible to conceive of these configurations as systems.
For analytical purposes a single electron and proton can constitute a
system just as well as any aggregate of electrons and protons can.[52] For

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[50]Ibid., p. 203.

[51]Ibid., pp. 206-207.

[52]Ibid., pp. 209-210.

Lundberg, this is a justification for treating any segment of the universe

as a closed system. It is a closed system in that in the study of events

in that system, influences external to it are analytically ignored.

Science in its quest for prediction emphasizes that for any system there

is a next state of determinable probability. The uniformities which are

observed under given conditions are the basis for this prediction. The

uniformities involved in a given system constitute its basis of predict-

ability. The most probable state of a system is called its equilibrium.

"All natural movement therefore may be thought of as tending to establish

an equilibrium within the area where it operates."[53] A system therefore

is an equilibrating system, and must have equilibrating mechanisms.

Equilibrium does not mean a static condition, nor a return to a pre-exist-

ing or "normal" condition, but on the contrary, refers to the next most

probable state of the system.[54]

From these concepts of energy, motion, force, and system it is then

possible to proceed to the fundamental concept of interaction. The term

is employed by Lundberg to denote reciprocal or interdependent behavior

among any number of components in a situation. The situation is that

aspect of the universe to which we respond as a whole. Consequently, the

situation, for the purposes at hand, is treated as a closed system. The

simplest conceivable situation within which interaction could take place

would be a closed system containing two components mutually responding.[55]

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[53]Ibid., pp. 207-208.

[54]Ibid., pp. 208-209.

[55]Ibid., pp. 217-218.

The components may be of any character; for instance they may be ions, electrons, genes, cells, organisms, persons, or groups.[56] Any reciprocal action between the components of any system, whether regarded collectively or individually constitutes interaction. According to Lundberg when the interaction of the observable components in a system has been described all scientific purposes will have been served. In short, interaction is not only a focal point of attention, it is a substitute for causation. The imputation of cause is neither necessary not possible when description of interaction is laid down as the sole scientific requirement.

On the human level Lundberg uses the terms "interaction", "interhuman behavior" and "interrelational behavior" interchangably. Interaction involves transformation of energy, which involves movement, in which force can be figured as the rate of movement or change in time, within a system which is a situation. This can be reduced to its essentials by saying that interaction is movement in a social situation. Interactional behavior is classified from the structural point of view by Lundberg as types of groups. From the dynamic point of view these groups are distinguished by their behavior mechanisms.[57] Consequently, from the dynamic concept of interaction, Lundberg has extracted the major structural component of social behavior, the group, and also the mechanisms by means of which these groups function and equilibrate as systems.

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[56]Ibid., p. 217.

[57]Ibid., p. 184.

9. Societal Processes

The concept of interaction is treated as essential to all of scientific endeavor. All sciences study the interaction of the phenomena with which they concern themselves. Interaction among human beings is unique however, in that it takes place through communication by means of symbolic behavior.[58] Sociologists are therefore concerned with a special kind of interaction, that which takes place by means of communication through signs or symbols. Communication is therefore the initial subcategory under interaction and denotes a special form of interaction, that which is symbolic. In so far as it is this distinction between symbolic interaction and other forms of interaction that serves as the basis of abstraction of the social sciences, it follows that societal behavior should be statable in terms of kinds and degrees of communication.[59] Communication thus becomes the focal point of Lundberg's sociology, and communication is process. For Lundberg it is the most basic and general process involved in all human societal behavior.[60]

The next most general categories used in classifying human behavior in process are association and dissociation. These are terms that refer to the human version of the attraction and repulsion phenomenon which Lundberg conceives of as being universally present in all behavior. Association and dissociation are treated as being equivalent to degrees of

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[58] Ibid., p. 253.

[59] Ibid., p. 256.

[60] Ibid., pp. 256-257.

communication. They imply a particular kind of attraction-repulsion, that which involves the symbolic process. Communication thus is depicted as a continuum and association and dissociation are crudely representative of the ideal-type poles of that process which is gradational.

Lundberg, following tradition, breaks down these sub-categories into those of cooperation, competition, and conflict. They are held to be types of association and dissociation which are again indicative of gradations on a continuum. Lundberg poses the task of identifying and determining the degree to which any of these aspects (which are themselves gradations) are predominant in a situation.[61] The utility of the concepts lies therein.

Lundberg suggests that all of the above designations, which are processes definable in terms of degree of communication, are perhaps also measurable in terms of certain kinds of tension. It is here that he brings in the concepts of value and desire. He defines positive value operationally as being that toward which people behave so as to retain or increase their possession of it, and negative value is conversely that which people behave toward so as to lessen or avoid possession of it.[62] These values may be of any character, as for example, roles, mates, goods, or statuses. Desire is treated as a symbol representing a tension or imbalance in an organism having reference to certain aspects of behavior. By utilizing such concepts as value and desire, Lundberg suggests that it

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[61]Ibid., pp. 268-269.

[62]Ibid., p. 272.

is possible to express the various sub-categories of communication in terms of degree of tension present in a situation. This is implicitly another way of adding another dimension to interaction. Furthermore value and desire clearly lie in the motivational field that Lundberg expresses such distaste for. It is significant however, to point out that these motivations do not have to be treated in the traditional psychological terms but perhaps can be treated in terms of situational tensions and imbalances. This is another way of saying that they can be treated functionally with reference to the social system. The test of such an hypothesis, to put it in Lundberg's terms, awaits the development of more adequate measures of both communication and tension.

10. Mechanisms of Behavior

It is through his use of the term "mechanism" that Lundberg reveals the structural-functional character of his approach. Mechanism is taken to mean any arrangement or relation of parts involved in the production of an effect or event.[63] Viewed dynamically these effects are called behavior or "function". From a static point of view the same phenomena are called "structure". In any population there are patterns of characteristics corresponding to patterns of behavior. "Behavior (function) is, in fact, merely a series of changing characteristics (structures), while a characteristic (structure) is merely a persistent form of behavior (function)".[64] When it is recalled that behavior for Lundberg is always

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[63]Ibid., p. 339.

[64]Ibid., p. 458.

"adjustive" behavior the above statement contains no ambiguity. It re-
mains remarkably free of the confusion so frequently a part of the treat-
ment of structure and function. It is explicitly recognized that they are
the same phenomena, lieing in the same process and are only analytically
separable. By treating structure as merely a persistent function, and
function as a sequence of changing structures Lundberg is enabled to ex-
tract both mechanisms and groups from behavior. A societal mechanism is
defined in terms of the type of group it produces, and a group is defined
by the type of mechanism producing it.[65]

Lundberg stresses the point that the only justification for the segre-
gation and study of a mechanism lies in the fact that an arrangement of
conditions necessary to produce an effect are observed.[66] Mechanism,
therefore, can be used on any level, in any science, to represent a behavior
complex which can then with convenience be related to other phenomena. It
can refer to the relations or circumstances involved in any behavior,
whether it is "the jump of an electric spark, the thoughts of a human
being...the milling of a mob, or the vote of a deliberative assembly."[67]
It is to be noted that Lundberg includes "internal" mechanisms as well as
those that appear to be more overt. He qualifies this non-behavioristic
statement however by stating that these internal aspects should not be
approached without the proper tools. These phenomena cannot be a part of

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[65]Ibid., p. 339.

[66]Ibid., p. 195.

[67]Ibid., p. 163.

scientific explanation until they become amenable to the type of observa-
tion and verification recognized as scientific.[68] For Lundberg, of
course, this refers to the standards of physical science.

Lundberg deals with such phenomena as "values", "ends", "morals",
and "ethics" only in a very limited fashion but he does admit their exist-
ence in behavior, and therefore, is implicitly committed to treatment of
their function in behavior. Value for example, is conceived of as that ?
which people behave in terms of so as to retain or increase. It therefore
is an inference from observable behavior and would seem to be amenable to
treatment even under the current limitations of method in social science.
A group behavior pattern is itself indicative of some uniformity of values
and ends on the part of that group, and therefore any explanation of that
pattern will necessarily include a consideration of the role of those
values and ends, no matter how reluctantly Lundberg approaches the matter.

From Lundberg's point of view "morals" are standards of conduct that
obtain in a group.[69] They emerge naturally and obtain sanction through
utility in that they are deemed advantageous to the group. Lundberg holds
that it is entirely possible to systematically study the conditions under
which given standards tend to arise, as well as those causing modification,
thereby arriving at predictive generalizations regarding the moral aspect
of behavior.[70] Lundberg apparently, for the moment, loses his normal

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[68]Ibid., pp. 201-202.

[69]Ibid., p. 404.

[70]Ibid., p. 404.

reluctance to deal with inference of the "internal", for it is obvious

that any "standard" has to first be inferred before the conditions of

its emergence can be studied under the necessary comparative conditions.

In so far as Lundberg contends that the concept mechanism is applic-

able to any kind of behavior in the form of a category merely designating

certain uniformities of behavior under certain conditions, he is justified

in speaking of group as well as individual mechanisms. He takes the

position that interaction situations which operate to produce uniformities

in the behavior of people may be considered to be mechanisms of group

behavior.[71] He gives the same treatment to "tropism", "reflexes", and

"habits" which describe relationships of parts within an individual organ-

ism, as he does to "folkways", "customs", "mores", and "institutions"

which are group phenomena.

Lundberg retains the conventional terms employed above although he

deplores their "folklore" vagueness. His classification of mechanisms

is very traditional, indeed it is set forth merely to indicate the need

for categories that are scientifically more adequate. At present such

terms as custom, institution et al., merely designate in a general sense

various degrees of uniformity, generality, and persistence of conduct.

For Lundberg, a more adequate classification would involve the reduction

of these characteristics into measurable units, and the definition of the

categories in terms of arbitrary intervals on continuua.[72] He does not

make such an attempt himself, and is content to give a traditional treat-

ment.

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[71]Ibid., pp. 183-184.

[72]Ibid., p. 183.

Lundberg's classification of group mechanisms is tied to the concept of normality, and normality is identified as that which is statistically most frequent. Lundberg maintains that norms are purely statistical in nature and consequently they are always relative to a specified social system. Normal and abnormal activity can only be defined as kinds of activity with reference to their frequency of occurrence within a given system.[73] Explicit reference must be made to time, place, circumstance and frequency when discussing normality. These norms possess varying degrees of uniformity, stability, rigidity, formality, and persistence, and thus constitute the basis for classification, and ultimately for quantification of mechanisms.

"Folkways" are viewed in the Sumner tradition as the collective aspect of individual habits. It is a term used to designate the uniformities in the behavior of a group which develop relatively spontaneously and unconsciously relative to common life situations, and which are established through repetition.[74] Customs are viewed as folkways that persist over a long enough time so as to obtain formal recognition and transmission from one generation to another.[75] Traditions are memories and verbal reports of customs and past experiences, or reputed experiences of groups.[76]

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[73]Ibid., p. 213.

[74]Ibid., p. 181.

[75]Ibid., pp. 181-182.

[76]Ibid., p. 182.

Mores are behavior patterns to which conformity is required on the basis of group coercion.[77] It is interesting to note the non-behavioristic language for which no substitute is attempted by Lundberg in describing these mechanisms.

The mechanism that Lundberg attaches the greatest significance to is "institution", indeed, it is central to his scheme. Institutions are not treated as unique phenomena, but are differentiated from the afore-mentioned mechanisms only in degree of stability, formality, and generality. Institutions are types of group behavior that stand in sharp con-trast to the relatively unstable and informal. In so far as prediction is the explicit aim of a science of society, obviously those elements of behavior characterized by the greatest regularity and reliability will constitute the solid basis of that prediction.

Institutions are abstracted from interaction, just as groups are, and neither can be observed independent of interaction. Lundberg makes the point that it does not follow that the two are the "same" as phenomena of analysis.[78] "Group" is a category designating a plurality of people among whom interaction takes place. "Institution" is a term which refers to some types of group behavior patterns. For example, "'the Catholic Church' and 'the Italian state' are from one point of view classifications of people. The people so classified are groups. Their behavior with reference to religious and political matters can be described as behavior patterns of a kind we call institutions."[79]

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[77]Ibid., p. 182.

[78]Ibid., pp. 375-376.

[79]Ibid., pp. 378-379.

This general definition of institutions as designating group be-
havior patterns which are relatively stable, formal, and general is
clearly subject to extensive classification. Here Lundberg looks upon
Chapin's work as being the most able extant, and therefore takes over his
rudimentary classification of "nucleated" or "diffused-symbolic" institu-
tions, and "latent" or "manifest" institutions. Nucleated institutions
refer to those possessing a definite locus in a specified area and are
used to refer to particular families, schools, local political organiza-
tions, etc. Diffused-symbolic institutions are those lacking these
circumscribed reference points, are of a higher order of abstraction and
are designated by such terms as art, science, law, etc.[80] Latent and
manifest institutional patterns are used to get at another dimension of
behavior. Manifest patterns are those which are formally and explicitly
evident in such forms as law, roles, and ceremonies. Latent patterns are
those which are implicit or informally present in the same action or
situation, and may or may not coincide with those which are manifest.
Lundberg uses such phrases as "invisible government" and "power behind the
throne" to illustrate this dichotomy. Also, for example, "the public
professions of religious belief in church ceremonials (manifest) and the
actual beliefs (latent patterns) of the participants in these exercises."[81]
The two patterns may be practically mutually exclusive resulting in con-
flict between them or stagnation of one, or they may coincide to a high
degree and thereby indicate that the manifest institutions are firmly

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[80]Ibid., p. 376.

[81]Ibid., p. 379.

entrenched _functionally_. The utility of both of these classification
pairs is of course questionable on Lundberg's own operational grounds.
What can one do with them?

A couple of important points are made by Lundberg with reference to
institutions. For one thing, he has indicated that the only thing separat-
ing institutions from the other mechanisms such as folkways or customs,
is the relative uniformity, stability, permanence, formality, and generality
of the former.[82] Being a matter of degree then it is possible to arbi-
trarily draw the line in terms of workable measures of the characteristics
involved. Second, Lundberg indicates the legitimacy of using the term
institution to apply to any base of abstraction. There is no reason why,
for example, institutions cannot refer to both a major system and any
component of that system. "There is no reason why the stable and formal
behavior pattern of a bank should not be called by the same general name
as another pattern having the same essential characteristics but involving
a whole economic system."[83] In pointing up these two different features,
the degree of stability, and the scope of abstraction, Lundberg has hit
upon what sees to be two crucial aspects of observation of institutions.
At least they are areas of considerable obscurity in the literature.

Lundberg holds that the study of institutions is of major importance
in sociology. When conceived of as attributes of groups they are indica-
tive of whatever stability those groups have. It may be assumed that
they represent the most significant and persistent adjustment techniques

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[82]_Ibid._, pp. 378-379.

[83]_Ibid._, pp. 378-379.

of groups. They, consequently, are the major equilibrating mechanisms. Put in another way they perform essential "functions" for the group or society. Further, if sociological "laws" or "principles" are to be developed they will necessarily be formulated in terms of "regularities". Due to their relative stability and uniformity, institutions offer a fruitful area for the formulation of such regularities.

11. Societal Structure

From out of the basic concept of interaction Lundberg has extracted the two major components of what he calls "structure"; the group, and societal distance. Distance is obviously a spatial concept, whereas groups consist of people, therefore they are evidently quite different, and yet both are essential to the understanding of structure. First, it is necessary to consider the group, in that it is interaction viewed in its static aspect.

Lundberg classifies people into plurals, classes, aggregations, and groups. Plural designates any plural number of people which we respond to as a whole in contrast to the single units that compose it. Class designates any assortment of people with reference to specified similarities or differences. Aggregation stands for any plural in which the constituents are in geographic proximity. Group designates any plural within which observable interaction takes place.[84] By virtue of the fact that Lundberg has already defined the area of sociology as being constituted by interaction conducted by means of communication, the first three

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[84]Ibid., pp. 340-341.

elements of the classification are obviously irrelevant to his system.
It is only in "group" that interaction takes place, therefore it is only
group that is of significance here.

Lundberg likens a group to an organism, and indeed accepts Child's
definition of organism as a suitable description of a social group. He
speaks of it as a "more or less definite and discrete order and unity...
a pattern, which not only determines its structure and the relations of
its parts to each other, but enables it to act as a whole with respect
to the world about it".[85] Such an entity possesses unity based upon some
kind and degree of communication and possesses an ability to make "adjust-
ments" independent of its individual members.

Despite Lundberg's preoccupation with advancing the cause of quanti-
fication and extending the use of statistics, he has become increasingly
interested in the study of small groups. His interest in sociometry is
indicative of the notion that ultimately more light can be thrown on the
workings of society by engaging in more and more intensive studies of
increasingly restricted scope, than by continuing to focus primarily on
the larger whole. "Lundberg reminds us that he has personally been
interested for at least ten years primarily in what he calls micro-
sociology and will probably devote himself mainly in the future to the
exploration of fundamental human relationships to be observed in very
small groups and the attempt to generalize these observations into princi-
ples that may hold for human society in its largest reaches."[86] His study

[85]Ibid., pp. 169-170.

[86]H. W. Odum, op. cit., p. 208.

of "Social Attraction Patterns in a Village"[87] is an example of both the kind of work that he likes to do, and that he holds to be of major significance in the scientific development of sociology. The intensive study of the small group as a social system is held to be crucial.

Lundberg has no elaborate classification of groups but uses such traditional categories as "primary" and "secondary" to again press for refinement on a quantitative basis. He maintains that primary and secondary groups are distinguishable only on the basis of degree of adequacy and completeness of communicative processes within the groups in question. To Lundberg it is inconsistent to continue defining these groups in terms of geographic criteria such as "face to face" and "within the reach of the human voice". Technological development has made such criteria obsolete, therefore, it is justifiable to use the communicative process itself as the criterion for classifying groups as primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.[88]

Primary and secondary groups correspond to the process concepts of association and dissociation. A group possessing a high degree of communication will be highly integrated, and possess considerable "we-feeling". This corresponds to the notion of association. Conversely a group within which communication is relatively incomplete may be termed a secondary group and said to relatively dissociated.[89] In short, the distinction between groups is one of degree of integrative interaction.

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[87]G. A. Lundberg, "Social Attraction Patterns in a Village", Sociometry, Vol. 1, Jan. - Apr., 1938, pp. 375-419.

[88]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 317.

[89]Ibid., p. 317.

Lundberg suggests that the dichotomous classification is inadequate and points up the need of techniques for measurement of integrative interaction and a corresponding gradation of groups. Degree of primacy of one group over another would be based upon volume of communication exchanged within those groups.[90] The association-dissociation continuum would thus have its direct structural counterpart.

The second major component of structure is the <u>societal</u> <u>distance</u> implicit in interaction. Interaction takes place between persons in a situation conceived of as a closed system. Within that situation each of the interacting persons may be said to have a position or status. This status is always relative to the others necessarily present in the system, and also to the standards of ranking applied in that situation. Status consists in a behavior relationship in a situation, and evolves out of ranking based upon an evaluation according to some standard.[91] Lundberg suggests that there is no such thing as status in general, but that each person may have a different status with respect to each aspect from which it is possible to react to a situation. Status is therefore always specific and related to some criterion in the situation.

The status of anyone, according to Lundberg, always has reference to a given situation, and is the static aspect of his behavior or function in that situation. The groups appraisal of that behavior or function according to whatever standards applied constitutes status. This is really

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[90]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 310-311.

[91]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 311-312.

another way of saying that status is the obverse of role and that in re-
sponding to role people will impute status.

Lundberg's conception of status is notably particularistic. To con-
tend that status is always specific and has reference to a criterion in
the situation is to deny any general character to status. This is in
keeping with "operational" procedures, but at the same time seems to put
a major limitation on the usage of status. The carry-over effect of
status from one situation to another is seemingly not accounted for. This
treatment appears to "fragmentize" the social process by making statuses
discrete and thereby emphasizing the discreteness of situations.

The phenomenon of status, in the view of Lundberg, being inextricably
tied to role, is therefore an aspect of every social situation. Since it
is always a relative concept, Lundberg contends it is most easily ex-
pressed in spatial terms. Consequently he adapts the term societal distance
to denote degrees of separation in status as denoted by the behavior of
the group under consideration. He is thus back at his problem of measure-
ment again, and the fundamental task becomes one of measuring degrees of
separation of status within groups in a situation.[92]

Societal distance may be used with reference to criteria other than
status, indeed, status is merely one important type of distance. Lundberg
suggests that distance is applicable to such criteria as felt interdepend-
ence or actual interaction independent of status considerations.[93] The
degree of cohesion, integration, and socialization of groups as depicted

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[92]Ibid., pp. 312-313.

[93]Ibid., p. 316.

by primary, secondary, tertiary, et al., classifications is also a

function of"distance" as Lundberg sees it. The relative degree of associ-

ation or dissociation is a reflection of distance in that it indicates

"closeness" or "remoteness" in relationships. For example, people of

widely different prestige status may belong to the same primary group,

whereas people of identical prestige status may be members of remote

secondary groups.[94]

Lundberg uses distance in two different dimensions then; one that is

concerned with ranking or status, and one that is concerned with degree

of association. With reference to both, the problem is the same, develop-

ment of more adequate measures of degree of distance. The concept is

equally applicable to relations within groups and between groups. The

concepts of group and distance together constitute the "structure" of

society.

12. Spatial Aspects of Society

From the foregoing treatment of "distance" in relation to structure

it is easily discernible that "space" is an important aspect of Lundberg's

system. It is important to note however that the kind of space central

to his system is "social" space as distinguished from "geographic" space.

His emphasis upon the objective treatment of symbolic behavior operating

within its own situation or system may be described as a kind of social

ecology. The structure of interaction has its spatial aspect, but it is

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[94]Ibid., p. 316.

space that can only be conceived of in terms of social relationships.
It is social space that is implicit throughout in his system.

Independent of the primary focus of his system, however, Lundberg
maintains that it is entirely legitimate to relate non-social factors to
behavior in the attempt to establish the significance of the influence
of those factors upon behavior. It is here that he brings in the concept
of geographic space and indicates that it has a peculiar relevance to social
behavior.

Lundberg expresses admiration for the growing ecological literature
and looks upon ecology as a fruitful approach. The study of interdepend-
ence of components within a region is of significance in that differences
of behavior may be observed which are directly related to the regional
factor. Region, it must be noted, consists in geographic rather than
social space. Lundberg points to the profitable use of such ecological
concepts as natural areas, dominance, succession, competition, and sym-
biosis to justify the systematic relating of social behavior to geographic
space.[95] This remains a special line of endeavor, however, and is im-
portant only in so far as significant sociological implications may be
drawn from the work. It is social space that remains central to his sys-
tem, and is a major source of problems of measurement.

13. Temporal Aspects of Society

In so far as Lundberg has concerned himself with processes he has
necessarily incorporated a temporal element into his system. Time is

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[95]Ibid., pp. 492-493.

implicit in every process, for every process involves movement from

one state to another in a continuity.[96] All processes imply successive

positions of some behavior, and our notion of time is based upon our re-

sponses to a succession of events as manifest in different states. Any

events that are observable may be used as the basis for the measurement

of time. The significance of time for the sociologist lies primarily in

the phenomena of change.

Change is attributed to the transformation of energy by Lundberg.

This transformation is not problematic for Lundberg, in that it is

postulated as the primary universal, and held to be implicit in all

phenomena. Lundberg has a theory of change in that he explains it by

postulate, but his definition does not point at what changes, but rather

at the observation of change. Change is said to be "merely a continuous

view of the successive positions which the components of a field of force

occupy at successive intervals."[97] The successive positions are attri-

buted to energy transformation, and the observation of them involves only

two major problems. The selection of appropriate intervals is one prob-

lem, and its solution lies in the purposes of the observer. Whether the

intervals are to be days, weeks, years, or whatever, is determined by the

particular focus and concern of the observer. Second, there is the

problem of adequate observation and description of a given state. This

consists in the description of the components in a field of force at a

given moment. For Lundberg, then, change is adequately described by

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[96]Ibid., p. 503.

[97]Ibid., p. 504.

reports of observations of successive states. Observation of change

consists in observing knife-edge presents that are held methodologically

constant, in terms of intervals that are determined by the particular

problem or interest of the observer. Change is admitted to be a continu-

ity, but observation of it consists of a series of extracts from that

continuity.

Beyond the problem of securing accurate observations of situations

at successive intervals, societal change contributes no theoretical or

practical difficulties from Lundberg's point of view. The problem as

Lundberg sees it is still the question of what phenomena to measure and

in what units. His pragmatic answer is in terms of what men need to

know at a given time, and the efficiency of certain measurements and units

in giving men that knowledge.[98] Societal change is approached in the

same way as any other phenomena, in terms of measurement. The purpose

of the measurement lies in the problem at hand for the sociologist.

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[98]Ibid., p. 527.

CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONVERGENCE IN THE THEORETICAL
POSITIONS OF MEAD, PARSONS, AND LUNDBERG

From the foregoing expositions of the theoretical systems of Mead,

Parsons, and Lundberg certain significant differences are readily dis-

cernible. These men are seen to be attacking different problems in that

they are interested in different things. Further, they are seen as view-

ing social phenomena from somewhat different perspectives with regard to

orientation. Epistemological divergence is manifest, as well as varied

degrees of theoretical sophistication. In brief, they are looking for

different things from different positions--but, they are all concerned

with the systematic analysis of social phenomena. It is our hypothesis

that the very fact that they are concerning themselves with social

phenomena within a scientific frame of reference leads them to make simi-

lar statements about similar phenomena. This is tantamount to saying

that there are important areas of convergence in the theoretical positions

of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg.

A. METHODOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE

1. Science and Research

With reference to the matter of science, its nature or characteristics,

and the extent of its applicability to human social behavior there is

rather considerable agreement among Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. In

Mead's thinking it is research science that occupies the central position.

Mead conceives of research science as underlying all recent important developments in thinking. He works from the premise that any thinking, to be scientific, must be subject to reconstruction, and it is the conduct of research that gives one the most solid grounds for reconstruction.

Although the problem central to Parsons is the establishment of a deductive comprehensive theoretical system which in itself has no direct applicability to research, for it contains no testable propositions, nor empirical generalizations, research is still the crucial factor. It is important to note that it is assumed that testable propositions can be derived from the system. This then will lead to the establishment of empirical generalizations. Parsons maintains that every empirical investigation is conducted in terms of a conceptual scheme, but explicitly states that the sole sanction of such a scheme is its "utility", the extent to which it "works" in facilitating scientific investigation.[1] The only scientific test of a theoretical system is the pragmatic one of whether or not it aids in the understanding of empirical problems.

Lundberg is also committed to the research basis of science. He starts with the premise that all inquiry begins with the experiencing of a tention or imbalance.[2] This tension or imbalance reflects a state of disequilibrium on the part of the organism-in-environment. When such tensions are verbalized they tend to take the form of questions about

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[1]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, p. 66.

[2]G. A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939, p. 5.

some aspect of the universe. The statement of tentative answers to these questions requires the formulation of hypotheses. Hypotheses enter into all spheres of living, but the most reliable way of verifying them is through the technic of science. This means research, and it is through research that the tension is removed and equilibrium re-established, through the arrival at relatively reliable answers to questions.

Research is thus pre-eminent in the systems of each of these men. Although Mead and Parsons in particular are primarily theorists who add little to the body of empirical "facts" extant, they still conceive of empirical research as constituting the ultimate test of both the validity and significance of any theory. This is often obscured in Parsons work by the nature of his deductive procedures, but never in that of Mead or Lundberg. Although obscured, it is nevertheless there as an inescapable commitment. Thus science in the systems of all three of these men, must ultimately be research science.

The realm of science, in the view of Mead, is composed of that which is common to various observers, the world of common, necessarily social experience as it is symbolically formulated. The experienced world is conceived to be a realm of natural events that are no more the property of the organism than they are of the things observed.[3] There is a necessary relationship between observer and observed, therefore the fundamental feature is the direct and common accessibility to both observer and observed. The completeness of accessibility will vary, both with reference to object

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[3] G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. XV-XVII.

and observer, but the fact that it must be common is essential to the
method of science. This is an unquestioned aspect of the procedure of
all science. In so far as it is common, it is necessarily social, there-
fore there is nothing more truly universal and social than the discipline
of science.

The foregoing is entirely in keeping with the approaches of Parsons
and Lundberg with two exceptions. Parsons tends to conceive of science
in more absolutistic terms wherein the emphasis upon the relationship
between observer and observed is not quite the same. In conceiving of
science as a technique of "reality" testing he is implying that science
is ever moving toward a more ultimate truth. This implies that it is only
improper or inadequate conceptualization that keeps us from the ultimate
capturing of that "reality". This is in contrast to Mead's emphasis on
the observer-observed nexus wherein "reality" belongs solely to neither,
but on the contrary, is a function of the relationship.

Lundberg also deviates here in one respect from both Mead and Parsons,
in that in spite of his postulate of an external world and variations in
it, he places the emphasis entirely upon the reacting organism. Any
"thing" that is not responded to has no existence, the data of science
consists entirely in the responses of men. This in effect emphasizes the
act of "knowing" abd depreciates that which is "known". The focus is upon
response rather than that which is responded to, and this position, of
course, has ramifications throughout the Lundberg approach.

Despite the aforementioned differences in emphasis and focus, it is
clearly distinguishable that there is agreement to the effect that science

is social, experiential, symbolic, and commonly accessible. There is an unquestioned world of existence postulated within which problems appear and are tested. Any part of this world may become problematic, and therefore susceptible to inquiry. Scientific knowledge does not imply existences and meanings which are given, but merely the initiation of an inquiry into a part of the world that for the purposes at hand is treated as problematic. This necessarily proceeds through the formation of hypotheses (no matter whether primarily derived from systematic-theory as in the case of Parsons, or emergent from empirical curiosity as in the case of Lundberg), and their testing in the unquestioned world containing the problematic area. Mead makes explicit, and it is implicit in both Parsons', and Lundberg's treatments, that the instruments, the controls, the laboratories, and the verifiers are a part of the unproblematic world that is "there" and goes unquestioned during the examination of a given theory. Scientific knowledge accrues only through the testing of hypotheses in action by "means" which necessarily are held to be real although they may in other situations be a part of the problematic-area.

Parsons and Lundberg take this for granted, but Mead seriously concerns himself with this aspect of science. Mead refuses to accept any existence or reality which denies the reality of perceived things, for the entire procedure of the research scientist is at the mercy of those perceptions. These perceptions control both the overt measurements and the scientific decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. If the empirical test of observation is to be the ultimate test for the scientist, and it is so conceived by all three of these men, then it

must have a social base in order to assure its objectivity. It is here that Mead's analysis renders a special contribution to the common positions, in that one of his major tasks is to demonstrate that the "mental" or "subjective" lies within a context that is "common" and "social".

2. The Object World

Mead, Lundberg, and Parsons all take the position that an external world is objectively "there" independent of our experiencing of it. From that point, however, Lundberg makes an important deviation from the relatively similar positions of Mead and Parsons. Mead contends that external objects are "there" independent of the experiencing individual, which makes research a work of discovery. Nevertheless these objects possess characteristics by virtue of the experiencing of them that they otherwise would not possess. These characteristics are their "meanings". The distinction between physical objects and the experiencing of those objects lies in the fact that the latter is constituted by and concerned with meanings. Only that which is experienced can have meaning. In the view of Mead the physical object is an abstraction made from our social response to nature. The physical object is one in which there is no social response to call out again the response of the experiencing individual. It is an object incapable of carrying on social interaction, it is therefore physical despite its social derivation. This line of thinking establishes a dichotomy based upon a distinction between objects. Therefore, there is a distinction between a science of physical objects and one concerned with socially responding objects.

Lundberg in the positivistic tradition explicitly denies this distinction made by Mead. To him all science is "physical" and the data of the sciences are not intrinsically different. All data, regardless of what field it is handled in, consists of the responses of the organism-in-environment. The data are the symbolic adjustments we make to a particular environment. Data is always in terms of response: therefore they represent a form of behavior regardless of what field they are procured in. The procurement of data is not only dependent upon human reaction, but also lies in human reaction. The symbols of the responding organisms constitute the actual data of all science. Lundberg consequently holds that a distinction between "physical" and "social" categories is an invalid and misleading construct.

However, Lundberg does not actually operate consistently from this position. When he comes to define sociology as a special science he puts aside this "physical" orientation and makes the same distinction Mead, and Parsons do. Lundberg takes pains to establish the concept of interaction as essential to all scientific endeavor. All sciences study the interaction of the phenomena with which they concern themselves. He admits, however, that interaction among human beings is unique, in that it is conducted through communication by means of symbolic behavior.[4] Sociology, as conceived by Lundberg, is concerned with a special kind of interaction, that which takes place by means of communication through symbols. In making this distinction between interaction and symbolic interaction Lundberg is implicitly admitting the existence of two classes

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[4]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., pp. 252-256.

of objects, those which are capable of responding and those which are
not. This corresponds directly with the distinction made by Mead. Further-
more, it is important in that communication becomes a focal point of
Lundberg's sociology.

Parsons classifies objects into a three-fold pattern rather than into
the two categories made explicit by Mead, and implicit in Lundberg's
approach. However, the content is the same. The three-fold classification
used by Parsons differentiates between "social", "physical", and "cultural"
objects. A social object is an actor, or a collectivity of actors who are
capable of "responding to" or "interacting" with an actor treated as
point of reference. A physical object is an empirical entity that func-
tions only as means or conditions for action in that it cannot interact
with the actor. Cultural objects are conceived of as symbolic elements
such as ideas, beliefs, expressive symbols, and values. They are cultural
objects in so far as they are situational objects, in other words objects
of orientation to the actor and are not constitutive of his personality.[5]

Parsons has merely broken down the "social" category of Mead by
creating a further abstraction. He has abstracted certain elements out
of social action and called them "culture". Obviously such elements as
beliefs and symbols can lie only in the behavior of people. Consequently
they can only be inferred from the social behavior of people. By treating
them as objects of orientation Parsons is abstracting them out of social
action by using a given actor as point of reference. Mead and Lundberg

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[5]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free
Press, 1951, pp. 4-6.

leave these same elements in action and treat them no differently, no matter whether they are functioning as objects of orientation or are a part of the orientation itself. They are the same thing; Parsons has, for methodological convenience in his system, created the abstraction of "cultural" object based upon the role it plays in a given situation.

From the foregoing, it is readily discernible that all three men actually distinguish between the social-cultural objects and physical objects. This despite the assertions to the contrary by Lundberg results in a "difference" between social and physical science. Mead and Parsons consistently hold to this position and accept numerous implications of it. Lundberg tends to vacilate between what he would like to believe in and adhere to, and what he is forced to do in order to study social behavior which is admittedly "different".

3. Uniformities of Nature

Relative to this object world science evokes the postulate of uniformity. The uniformity of nature is a major premise of science, and it of course lies in the systems of all three men. Due to the fact that all of the endeavors of science are predicated on this premise, there is a frequently observed tendency to treat uniformity as more than a postulate. This tendency is manifest in the work of Parsons. Uniformities seem to "inhere" in nature very frequently for Parsons. Probabilities are sometimes spoken of as being demonstrative of uniformities of nature. If one were to ask why the probabilities were found, the answer would have to be because the uniformity was assumed in the first place. The uniformity of nature cannot be "demonstrated" by assuming it in advance,

consequently "uniformity" remains merely a necessary postulate. Mead and Lundberg being more pragmatically inclined see no difficulty in the practice of explaining the world in terms of uniformities--because the assumption has always worked.

Despite the greater tendency on the part of Parsons to reify the postulate of uniformity, he agrees with Mead and Lundberg that science is merely stating laws in terms of uniformities. This means that it is always ready to change any statement made with reference to uniformities. This means that all universals used by science are postulates and are acceptable only as long as they agree with empirical perception. In so far as all three men have accepted observation as the ultimate test of theory, then, their systems can only deal with hypothetical universals, and any conclusions rendered will be hypothetical propositions. Science is an inferential process, therefore pervasively hypothetical. Scientific research does not attempt to establish "laws" as absolutely given. Parsons again demonstrates a tendency to state what the nature of things "is", although at the same time, like Mead and Lundberg, goes on concerning himself with placing the events of observation in order. The preoccupation of Parsons with a "deductive" system frequently obscures this, but it must be remembered that deduction and induction are not mutually exclusive, and even his, "derived" categories and types are based upon someones' observations and inferences, no matter how indirect.

4. Systematic Theory

The problem of placing the events of observation in order is not merely a matter of seeing what is "out there" for any of these men.

There is common agreement to the effect that seeing in any significant
sense means conceptualizing. Consequently our seeing is dependent upon
our looking which in turn will reflect a system of theory, or theories,
interests, and purposes. Our conceptual schemes will lead us to seek
one character rather than another in the object or object relationship
under consideration. This statement is less reflective of the position
of Lundberg than of Parsons and Mead, and yet is nevertheless generally
true. This distinction is based upon the tendency of Lundberg to conceive
of data as "given", while Mead and Parsons rigorously conceive of data
as "taken". Explicitly, however, Lundberg also faces up to the fact
that our treatments of data are guided by theories that inevitably lend
direction to our looking. This is indicated not only with reference to
discrete theories formulated as hypotheses, but Lundberg also gives evidence
of this awareness by virtue of his concern with systematic theory.

Observation is not merely a matter of establishing receptiveness to
the stimuli of the external world, but on the contrary is always directed
in terms of some sort of a problem and reflects some sort of an interest.
This is consistently expressed in the systems of all three men, although
Mead and Lundberg tend to stress discrete problems and theories more than
Parsons, who in turn stresses the "conceptual scheme" more. This leads
Parsons to concern himself much more with giving a systematic account of
the universe as such, whereas Mead and Lundberg tend to concern themselves
with specific problems wherein the "system" remains largely implicit.
This is due to the fact that Mead and Lundberg are more oriented to the
research "model", whereas Parsons is more "system" oriented. The two

positions are definitely not exclusive of one another. On the contrary,
it is a matter of emphasis.

In so far as Mead and Lundberg give more weight to the research
model they are influenced by the fact that a researchers' work starts
from a specific problem arising out of an exception to what is regarded
as "law", "principle", or "typical uniformity". Given the exception, the
undertaking involves the supplying of an hypothesis which will ultimately
resolve the problem. Indeed, Mead stresses the point that the genius of
the research thinker lies in the fact that he does not wait for the ex-
ception to turn up, but devotes considerable energy to ferreting out in-
stances wherein existent theory is inadequate in explanation. Mead,
Parsons, and Lundberg are in essential agreement to the effect that the
approach to the problem can be from either of two sides; from that of the
particular experience that controverts the theory, or from that of the
developed relational theory that offers new objects for scientific investi-
gation. Mead and Lundberg tend to emphasize the former, and Parsons the
latter. Both approaches are a part of the same process however, which
makes theory not only the beginning but the end of research in all three
systems. The sole difference here lies in the different degrees of
emphasis on discrete as opposed to systematic theory.

Parsons' central concern is with the development of systematic theory
as such, the development of a generalized conceptual scheme. The point
must be stressed that this system is non-empirical, entirely heuristic,
and is devised solely for methodological purposes. The system contains
no empirical generalizations, no testable propositions, and no assertions

of uniformity. The theory is just a conceptual set of tools which functions as a "frame of reference" and as the source of structural categories which will have empirical reference. The theoretical system merely facilitates description and analysis through the establishment of a framework within which empirical work makes sense. The categories of the system give a basis for judging "what" must be known about a given phenomenon so as to make it a comprehensible part of an ordered whole. In Parsons' view empirical generalizations cannot function as the central focus of theory, but, on the contrary, they are only arrived at on the basis of the pre-existence of a conceptual system. The arrival at empirical generalizations presupposes a point of departure, which inevitably will be a "conceptual scheme" of some sort. This point then leads Parsons to emphasize the scientific necessity and utility of developing a more adequate theoretical system or conceptual scheme, in order to conduct empirical work that will be both manageable and significant.

The "system" Lundberg talks about is not the same one that Parsons has primarily devoted his attention to, although it implicitly contains within it the features that Parsons has emphasized. The "system" that Lundberg is concerned with is one of interrelated empirical generalizations. These are "laws" in the form of probability statements that have been "systematized". Lundberg pays scant attention to the "conceptual scheme" that was necessarily used in the selection of problems, and development of hypotheses that resulted in a set of verified propositions. But it must be recognized that he uses one. His establishment of such forms, processes, and categories as energy, force, time, space, interaction,

communication, association, and dissociation indicates that he feels the same necessity for a conceptual scheme that Parsons does. He does not explicitly recognize the importance, or scientific priority of this deductive system as Parsons does however. Wherein Parsons contends that this system must be rigorously and deductively made comprehensive prior to any attempt at the establishment of any "laws" of uniformity, Lundberg leaves this system largely implicit and goes right to work on a system possessing verifiability. This is a system of hypothetical propositions that are subject to empirical test. Such a system would be a second level system for Parsons, which could only be emergent on the basis of a more rigorously developed conceptual system which in itself contains no propositions.

Essentially the same remarks made about Lundberg would hold for Mead in this case. His pragmatic acceptance of the "research" model and his lack of concern with a systematic account of the universe as such, also compels him to leave this first level of theory, the deductively drawn conceptual system, largely implicit. When he speaks of system he too is speaking of a relational pattern of propositions that are subject to test. When he concerns himself with matters of sociological relevance, however, he also utilizes a categorical frame of reference that underlies the hypotheses that are actually subject to test. His analysis proceeds only in terms of categories and processes that are "assumed" and are not problematic. The social act, roles, minds, selves, and communication are not testable as such, and yet they constitute elements of the framework within which Mead works. Only propositions made about these aspects of the

universe are testable. Therefore any system of verified statements that might be forthcoming about any of these Meadian elements will necessarily presuppose the prior deductive existence of the elements themselves.

From the foregoing it can be seen that all three men have deductively drawn conceptual schemes. Only Parsons however spends any considerable time on this scheme, and conceives of it as being worthy of prolonged and rigorous elaboration. Insofar as all three actually utilize a deductive conceptual system, then it seems reasonable to assume that the Parsons attempt to make it recognizably explicit is a step in the right scientific direction. This is dependent however on his recognition of the fact that any deductive system can be infinitely elaborated into units of increasing specificity which may or may not contribute to the "utility" of the theory. Parsons apparently does recognize this for he states in one of his five postulates for systematic theory that the theoretical system should be framed in operational concepts as far as possible.[6] This is not to be confused with "operationalism" but must merely be taken as meaning that the categories of the system are of such a character that the empirical values of the variables involved are the immediate products of verifiable observational procedures. For example, the cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative modes of orientation are merely constructed theoretical categories, but they are potentially observable in actual behavior as real variables, and are therefore susceptible to empirical statement regarding relative primacy. The extent to which one of these modes has

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[6]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, pp. 4-5.

priority within a given concrete course of action is potentially ob-
servable and measurable. This points up the fact then that Parsons
conceives of the _major_ scientific task as consisting in the articulation
of empirical observation and its standardized procedures with the theo-
retical categories of the system. Mead and Lundberg do not say this,
but it is what they are actually doing in their substantive analysis.

5. Uniformities and Causal Imputation

The articulation of empirical observations with theoretical categories,
means the development of categorical knowledge, which is merely another
way of saying uniformities have been observed. This of course requires
the postulate of the uniformity of nature, but at the same time requires
uniformity of observational procedure. Thus inevitably all three men are
committed to the canon of objectivity implied by uniformity of observation.
To ask for a law of nature is to ask for a uniformity, but to ask where
that uniformity is found is to get the answer that it is found in the
experience of men who observe. They obtain certain impressions and find
them uniform. This must be attributed to a uniformity of "looking" as
well as a uniformity of that which is "there". These impressions in their
totality belong neither to the observers, nor to the observed, but their
significance lies in the relationship between observer and observed, and
it is through this relationship that universality can be experienced.
Objectivity consequently is an aspect of universality and lies in that
which is common. The individual perspective can be the social or common
perspective only in so far as it is experientially shared. It is this

point that leads all three men to stress the significance of symbolic equipment and communication, for it is obvious that it is only through such means that events may present the same appearance to different people and thereby attain uniformity.

The foregoing means that all three men have made the assumption that the world (including social behavior) is both explicable and intelligible. Explicable in the sense that uniformities are "there", and intelligible in the sense that it may be objectively comprehended. A knowledge of the world is therefore never a mere contact of the organism with objects in it although Lundberg expresses this belief at times. To know a thing, to explain it, we put it into the context of uniformities. To establish a uniformity, one is relating an event to the conditions under which it occurs. This is causation in its broadest and least particularistic sense, and constitutes the level of usage at which all three men agree.

For Parsons, dynamic analysis of problems is the ultimate goal of science, and this implies the pre-existence of a frame of reference, structural categories, and description. There are two aspects to the attainment of this goal; "causal" explanation of past phenomena and prediction of future events, and the attainment of generalized analytical knowledge of "laws" which are applicable to an indefinite number of specific cases. The attainment of these two aspects of the goal of science is inseparable. Specific causal explanation is attainable only through the application of some generalized analytical knowledge, and the extension of analytical generalization is only possible in terms of generalization from empirical cases and the verification that they supply. Parsons again

attests to the ultimacy of the empirical test. Causality is an infer-
ential linking of empirical events.

Lundberg disowns the notion of cause as a relationship of one-sided
dependence between two or more phenomena.[7] He supplants it through usage
of the concept of interaction. Interaction is employed to denote recip-
rocal or interdependent behavior between or among any number of components
in a situation treated as a closed system. When the interaction between
the observable components of a situation has been described all scientific
requirements have been met, according to Lundberg. This ties interaction
to the "operations" involved in its observation. From out of the pattern
of interaction it is then possible to impute cause operationally to the
independent variable when it shows a high probability expectation in its
variations relative to other factors under constant conditions. Any factor
can conceivably be the independent variable, therefore, causation is
merely an operational imputation based upon a probability statement.

Mead accepts the scientific tenet that natural events have natural
causes, but rejects the mechanistic assumption that accompanies this, that
every effect can consequently be reduced to its causal conditions. Mead
contends that the appearance of the effect constitutes an emergence, and
that the emergent itself effects an environment which, therefore, could
not be known before its emergence.[8] The relation of the event to its
preceding conditions is a factor in itself and therefore the event cannot

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[7]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., pp. 217-218.

[8]G. H. Mead, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

be reduced to its preceding conditions. Consequently Mead substitutes a uniformity that has been discovered and may be expected to continue, for the idea of cause as a force. Thus he avoids cause and effect in a mechanical sense and speaks in terms of probability. Probability that is not based solely on imperfect and incomplete observation, but also on the element of novelty contained in the emergence of events that cannot be reduced to their conditions of emergence.

The foregoing makes evident the fact that all three men use causation only in its broadest sense. This involves the statement of uniformities in terms of relating an event to the conditions under which it occurs. In view of the fact that these are empirical uniformities they can only be stated in probability terms. Consequently, the probability statement in the form of empirical generalization replaces traditional causation in each of these three approaches.

6. Process: Structure and Function

For Mead it is necessary to express the nature of the world in terms of dynamics. As opposed to the "static" representation of the world in a "knife-edge" present he presses for the representation as it is in process. This means that stress is not only placed upon the interrelationship and interdependence of the parts within a given system, but also upon the place of process in the persistence of the system.[9] He uses the examples of the physicist and the biologist, but the sociologist could be

[9] G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1932, pp. 35-39.

substituted for the biologist and the validity of the distinction would remain. The difference lies in the goals that the sciences contemplate, for their procedures answer to their goals. That of the physical scientist is reduction and that of the biologist is production. The biologists' investigation is of a going life process. There must, of course, be physical means for this process. These physical means can be legitimately reduced to energy by the physicist and a mechanical statement given. To leave it at that however, is to deny the reality of the emergence of the life process out of the physical means. To deny reality to the continuity of the life process and the conditions under which it maintains itself would constitute an elimination of biological science for it would mean the elimination of the very perspective from which biology works. The analogy with sociology is clear. To deny a reality to social behavior merely because the people manifesting it can be physically reduced to energy is tantamount to violation of the principle of scientific abstraction. To the sociologist the continuity of interaction of people is just as real and just as legitimate an abstraction as the electron-proton configurations of the physicist.

Lundberg is also committed to the study of process as being essential to science. Lundberg takes the concept of interaction as basic to all scientific endeavor. All sciences study the interaction of the phenomena with which they concern themselves. Interaction involves transformation of energy, which involves movement, in which force can be figured as a rate of movement or change in time, within a system which is a situation. This can be reduced to its sociological essentials by saying that

interaction is movement in a social situation. Interactional behavior is classified from the structural point of view by Lundberg as types of groups. From the dynamic point of view these groups are distinguished by their behavior mechanisms. Consequently, from the dynamic concept of interaction (necessarily a process) Lundberg extracts the major structural component of social behavior, the group, and also the mechanisms by means of which these groups function and equilibrate as systems.

Interaction among humans is treated by Lundberg as unique among the forms that it takes, in that it takes place through communication by means of symbolic behavior. Sociologists are therefore concerned with a special kind of interaction, that which takes place by means of communication through signs and symbols. Communication is obviously a process, and it becomes the focal point of Lundberg's sociology. He subsumes under it various sub-categories such as association and dissociation, cooperation, competition, and conflict, and suggests that all of these designations are processes definable in terms of degree of communication.

Lundberg treats process in "structural-functional" terms, but clearly recognizes them as aspects of process. When he speaks of "mechanism", for instance, he is referring to any arrangement or relation of parts involved in the production of an effect or event.[10] Viewed dynamically these effects are called behavior or "function". From a static point of view the same phenomena are called "structure". "Behavior (function) is, in fact, merely a series of changing characteristics (structures), while

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[10]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., pp. 339.

a characteristic (structure) is merely a persistent form of behavior (function".[11] Lundberg is explicitly recognizing that they are the same phenomena, lieing in the same process and are only analytically separable. By treating structure as merely a persistent function, and function as a sequence of changing structures Lundberg is simply dealing with process in a particular methodological way.

Parsons also subscribes to the notion that analysis of process is the ultimate in scientific endeavor. He contends, however, that process cannot be gotten at "as such" in the current state of sociological knowledge. He expresses considerable admiration for sciences capable of dealing with processes, but maintains that sociology is methodologically incapable of emulating them at the present time. He insists that a "structural-functional" approach is the currently workable substitute for process analysis. He points up the methodological necessity of using structural categories in order to simplify the admittedly inportant dynamic problems to the point of empirical manageability.

In maintaining that sociology is methodologically confined to a somewhat primitive level, Parsons is really saying that sociology cannot "dissolve" its structure into process as can analytical mechanics by virtue of its operation on the dynamic plane. In pointing this up Parsons is recognizing the fact that structure is not an ontological reality in itself, but only refers to a relative stability of process, in other words the relatively stable uniformities of process. Parsons' "derived"

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[11]Ibid., p. 458.

structural categories therefore consist of a pragmatically convenient way of looking at phenomena in process. The problem then becomes one of linking these "static" structural categories to the dynamic variables of the system. This link is supplied by the basic concept of "function".[12]

Function implies the conception of empirical systems as "going concerns". Empirical observation of such systems indicates what structural patterns "tend to be maintained" and "tend to develop".[13] Function is therefore inherently teleological in this sense. A process or set of conditions either contributes to the maintainence or development of a system or is "dysfunctional" in the sense that it hampers its operation by lessening its integration. Functional conception, then, has reference to the relations obtaining between a process or a set of conditions and the state of the system as a going concern. Function consequently provides the tool by which dynamic interdependence of variable factors in a system can be analyzed. To speak of a social system at a moment in time is to speak of it "structurally", but to refer to it as a going concern implies the necessity for treatment of it in a "duration" of time. To speak of a system as a "going concern" is to speak of a configuration in process. Parsons then uses "function" to refer to the relation of a mode of action to the existence and continuity of social structures. Put in other words it refers to the contribution a mode of action makes to the creating or maintaining of the equilibrium of a social system. Function then is an imputed relationship between on-going action (process) and relatively stable process (structure).

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[12]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, pp. 22-23.

[13]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

The foregoing indicates that the concept "function" is required in Parsons' approach due to the inclusion of the concept "social system" which complicates the analysis of sheer process. In so far as structure is admitted to be nothing but process involving relatively stable action, and function can only be imputed on the basis of observation of process, it seems that Parsons is also accepting process as the point of departure for analysis. To speak of structure and function independent of process is inconceivable. Parsons, like Mead and Lundberg, is studying process, but due to our methodological inability to make analytic statements about it, calls his analysis structural-functional. His preoccupation with structural categories gives his work a "static" appearance that Mead's work in particular does not have. This is indicative of a different emphasis on a "stage" of analysis, and does not indicate a different ultimate end of analysis. When Mead speaks of the "me" phase of the self or of "institutions" he is speaking of "structure" in the same sense that both Parsons and Lundberg use the term. When he, for instance, speaks of the role of "gesture" in the emergence of symbolic behavior he is also imputing "function" in the same sense as both Lundberg and Parsons. Mead's more direct preoccupation with symbolic interaction and role-taking and indirect concern with the social system gives his analysis a more dynamic quality than that of Parsons who operates in the reverse fashion. Essentially the same may be said of Lundberg relative to Parsons, in that he devotes the major share of his attention to symbolic interaction and its sub processes rather than to a system as such.

B Substantive Convergence

7. Interaction

The fundamental datum in the substantive approaches of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg is human social interaction. The "social act" of Mead, the social aspects of "action" of Parsons, and the "interaction" of Lundberg are essentially the same phenomena, and typical sociological usage describes this behavior as interaction. It is the primary abstraction of the field of sociology, and in so far as it also is the primary abstraction of each of these three men there is justification for calling their systems sociological, even though both Mead, and Parsons deal with many facets of behavior that do not lie within the theoretical or research spheres of the field.

The social act as defined by Mead is a complex organic process, a dynamic and continuing whole, sustained, but not constituted, by the stimuli and responses involved in it. The act of the individual is a unit act, comprehensible in terms of interaction, of being a part of a complex behavioral pattern. Mead maintains a distinction between the unit act and the social act and does not attempt to build up the social act out of stimulas plus response, but rather takes it as a dynamic whole, something going on possessing a temporal spread, and cooperatively sustained. The social act involves the implication and cooperation of more than one individual, and the object as defined by the act is a social object. By social object Mead means one that answers to all parts of the complex act even though those parts are found in the behavior of different individuals. The objective of the act is found in the process of interaction, the

process involving a group, not in the unit acts of separate individuals. This is a purely sociological position in this respect.

The individual as a human personality is inevitably implicated in a social order. The individual biologic organism attains "selfhood" and "mindedness" only through participation in the social process of interaction. The individual, then, is an integral part of a social group, and it is only through interaction with other members of the group that he rises above the animal level and assumes the role of a human personality. "The whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts."[14] This premise obviously requires a consistent methodological abstraction on a sociological level.

The point of departure utilized by Parsons in the analysis of human behavior is what he terms "action" which is broader than interaction and yet which contains interaction as a rigorously abstracted entity. "The frame of reference concerns the "orientation" of one or more actors--in the fundamental individual case biological organisms--to a situation which includes other actors."[15] The scheme when the situation contains other actors is therefore a relational one in that it does not concern itself with the internal structure of the units, the actors, except in so far as it bears directly upon their relational system. Its focus is upon structure and processes built up by actors out of their relations to situations

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[14]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7.

[15]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 4.

including other actors. The focus for sociologists is clear cut, and
yet from Parsons point of view is explicable only in terms of the larger
frame work of action.

Parsons separates action into three major aspects, personal, social,
and cultural. He does this by virtue of his concern with the orientations
of actors and the concomitant objects of orientation. A social object is
an actor or a collectivity of actors who are capable of responding to or
interacting with an actor treated as a point of reference. It is that
aspect of action that is "social" in the same sense employed by Mead and
Lundberg, and is furthermore the methodological starting point for
sociology within the family of related sciences.

Action, and this necessarily includes interaction, is delimited by
Parsons to behavior that has motivational significance to the actor or
collectivity of actors. Only in so far as the actor's relation to his
situation is motivationally relevant does Parsons treat the behavior in-
volved as action. To Parsons this means that action flows along the main
axis of situational gratification or deprivation. This is "situational"
in that he points out that responses in action are not "ad hoc" relative
to particular stimuli, but tend to become systematized as "expectations"
relative to the objects of the situation. These expectations are structured
according to the gratification-deprivation balance of the actor contingent
upon the various alternatives of action potentially open to him. When
Parsons deals with interaction, he has to include a dimension not character-
istic of relations to either physical or cultural objects. This is based
upon the expectations of others involved in the continuity of interaction.

Part of the actors' expectation consists in the probable reaction of his "alter" to his act, a reaction that comes to be anticipated and therefore partly determinate of the act for it affects the actors own choices of alternatives of action. This is in direct alinement with the position of Mead.

The term interaction is employed by Lundberg to denote reciprocal or independent behavior among any number of components in a situation. On the human level Lundberg uses the terms "interaction", "interhuman behavior", and "interrelational behavior" interchangably. The emphasis is heavily upon the stimulus-response bond, and in a sense he "builds" interaction out of it, nevertheless he insists upon the legitimacy of interaction as an abstraction in itself. Interaction among human beings is conceded to be unique by Lundberg, in that it takes place through communication by means of symbolic behavior. Communication is therefore the initial sub-category under interaction and denotes a special form of interaction, that which is symbolic. It is Lundberg's contention that social behavior should be stable in terms of kinds and degrees of communication.[16] Such phenomena as association, dissociation, cooperation, competition, and conflict are treated in that view. From the dynamic process of interaction Lundberg extracts both the major structural component of social behavior, the group, and also the mechanisms by means of which these groups function and equilibrate as systems. Consequently it can be seen that Lundberg conceives of symbolic interaction as the most general process involved in all human societal behavior.

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[16]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 256.

Despite the differences involved in their approaches to interaction there is a hard core of agreement either explicit or implicit among Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg with reference to the concept. There must be a plurality of persons; there must be reciprocal action between them; communication through signs and symbols must take place; the act has a "duration"; the act is a continuity and thereby possesses a past, present, and future; insofar as a future is necessarily involved, an anticipated state of affairs in part determines the act; consequently the act will have an "object" whether it is "in view" or not; the "meaning" ascribed the act therefore cannot lie in the behavior of a single individual but lies in the act itself; the act is therefore not explicable solely in terms of unit acts but stands as a legitimate abstraction in its own right. All of these statements may be attributed to interaction as used by all three men despite such significant differences as Mead's emphasis on the configuration, Parsons' emphasis on the motivation of the actor, and Lundberg's emphasis on stimulus-response.

8. Values, Motives, and Action

Parsons' theory of action conceives of behavior as being oriented toward the attainment of ends in situations by means of normatively regulated efforts.[17] Behavior therefore takes place in situations, in terms of anticipated states of affairs, is motivated, and is normatively regulated. Both Mead and Lundberg are in agreement with this. The point of difference which arises is the point of departure itself. For Parsons

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[17]Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils, (eds.) Toward A General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 53-54.

it is the starting point, whereas neither Mead nor Lundberg use the individual as point of reference in that way. They focus upon the total act in such a way that the orientation of any given actor is merely one more element in a complex action pattern. Parsons' concern with the orientation of the actor leads him to pay considerably more attention to problems of motivation than does either Mead or Lundberg. He establishes a three-fold category of motivational orientation and a corrolary three-fold category of value orientation. Despite their elaboration by Parsons, the same elements are implicit in the approaches of both Mead and Lundberg.

Parsons' usage of "motivational orientation" refers to the aspects of an actors' concrete orientation to his situation which are related to actual or potential gratification or deprivation of his need-despotitions. Need-disposition is something that for Parsons, "evolves" and therefore becomes a social disposition. Consequently it can be equated with "attitude" as used by both Mead and Lundberg. It is "pre-dispositional" in character and therefore like the "initial attitude" of Mead it assumes the "selective character of attention". The need-disposition system of the individual actor has two primary aspects, according to Parsons, the "gratificational" and the "orientational". The first concerns what he gets out of his object world, and what its costs are to him. The second concerns how he is related to the object world, the ways in which his relations to it are organized.[18] The former is called the "cathectic" mode of orientation in that it refers to the actors relations to the object world in terms of his

[18]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, pp. 6-8.

own gratificational-deprivation balance. The latter is termed the "cognitive" mode of orientation and is treated as the actors definition of the situation in terms of its relevance to his interests. This involves the processes by which an actor sees an aspect of the object world relative to his need-dispositions.

Parsons recognizes the fact that while cathectic and cognitive modes of orientation are involved in any concrete act, they cannot alone give adequate explanation of action for acts are not discrete independent units, but on the contrary, are organized into systems. Gratification needs have alternatively possible objects situationally presented, and cognitive process has alternatives of judgment situationally presented in terms of what objects "mean". Consequently, there must be some order of selection among these alternatives, and Parsons gives the name "evaluation" to this process.[19] The evaluative mode of orientation involves the various processes by which the actor resolves conflicts of "interest" in the attempt to optimize gratification, and also the processes by which conflict among interpretations is resolved through "choice" by virtue of selective mechanisms.

The three modes of orientation of Parsons are certainly not novel, and they definitely exist in the systems of Mead and Lundberg under the more familiar names of "knowing", "desiring", and "valueing". Lundberg expresses considerable antipathy for the motivational field, and yet this is not due to a denial of motive, but rather is due to our lack of

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[19]Ibid., pp. 6-8.

instruments for dealing with them. Behavioristically he starts with the overt, and infers any covert elements such as motives. Our current inability to rigorously handle this particular kind of inference is what concerns Lundberg, not the existence or lack of existence of such elements.

Lundberg defines positive value operationally as being that toward which people behave so as to retain or increase their possession of, and negative value is conversely that which people behave toward so as to lessen or avoid possession of.[20] This obviously implies selection of alternatives, resolution of conflicts of interest, and optimization of gratification just as the Parsons approach does. Further it may include the value of "science" as such so that priority may be given to scientific criteria as a basis of interpretation. This coincides with Parsons' evaluation in terms of "selective" mechanisms.

Desire is treated by Lundberg as a symbol representing a tension or imbalance in an organism having reference to certain aspects of behavior. This imbalance implies the same sort of equilibrium posited by Parsons in his concept of gratification-deprivation balance system.

Knowing is placed firmly in behavior by Lundberg in that it does not exist independent of the responses of organisms. Just as for Parsons and for Mead, it refers to how one is related to the object world, and the ways in which his relations to it are organized through symbolic systems up to the level of the complex scientific system. What one is interested in knowing is situational, but in so far as it reflects a "tension" it is

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[20]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 272.

motivational. The contribution of Lundberg here is his suggestion that motivations perhaps don't have to be treated in traditional psychological terms, but perhaps can be treated in terms of situational tensions and imbalances.

The categories corresponding to "cathexis", "cognition", and "evaluation" are also present in the approach of Mead. They lie in the "act", and Mead describes the act of an individual as an abstracted fragment of a social act, a participation in a larger whole. The individual act has a biological basis in that Mead attaches great importance to the "tendencies" to respond. The act is initiated by an impulse that functins to maintain the life process by selection of the stimuli appropriate to the requirements of the organism.[21] Stimuli are means then, and implicit in the act is a goal, although it need not be in view. The "tendencies" to respond appearing in initiating attitudes represent pre-dispositional theory in the same way that Parsons' need-dispositions do. The selection of appropriate stimuli implies a selective or evaluating process. The requirements of the organism imply "tension" or "disequilibrium" in the same sense as Parsons and Lundberg. The maintainence of the life process implies "functionalism" in the same sense as Parsons. The act when carried out on a symbolic level also implies cognition, or definition of the situation in order to make possible the selection of the stimuli appropriate to the process. A definition of the situation defines what one wants out of it in terms of interest, consequently cathexis is a part of

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[21]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934, pp. 6-8.

the act. The four stages of the act distinguished by Mead, impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation cannot proceed independent of the processes of knowing, valuing, and desiring.

The three modes of orientation, although labeled differently, appear in the systems of Parsons, Mead, and Lundberg. These three modes apparently will appear in any system of action with varying degrees of primacy. In interaction, it is interesting to note that all three categories are tied to the concept of "expectation". Expectation is particularly significant to Mead due to its central position in his role theory, but it is also implicit in Lundberg's concentration on reciprocal behavior, and explicit in Parsons concern with the social system. In interaction the modes of orientation of the actor will in part be determined by expectations of the other. An expectation inevitably has a temporal aspect. It involves the "duration" in memories of past experiences as related to anticipated developments. Interaction, consequently, is structured in "time" by Mead, Parons, and Lundberg, which means that is is developmental and that the actor has a share in the determination of that action.

The analytic counterpart of motivational orientation in the Parsons system is the category of value orientation. The three-fold classification of modes of motivational orientation provides a framework for analyzing problems in which the actor has an interest. In contrast, the three-fold classification of modes of value orientation provides the "standards" of satisfactory solution of those problems. Value orientation refers to the aspects of the actors orientation which commit him to adherence of norms, standards, and criteria of selection whenever he is in a situation involving choice. On the cultural level there is an organized set of

standards and rules, abstracted from action. The internalization of
these standards and rules by the actor gives him his value-orientation
which will consequently appear as his need-disposition or attitude.
Mead, and Lundberg are in agreement with this although it is only Mead,
of the three, who has supplied the mechanism to explain this internaliza-
tion. This mechanism is the "generalized other". It is through the
generalized other that an individual attains access to the organization
of social attitudes characteristic of the group. Although the "mechanism"
is lacking in the approaches of both Parsons and Lundberg, the standards
are "there", both culturally and personally.

Parsons speaks of three modes of value-orientation which parallel
the three modes of motivational orientation. The "cognitive" mode of
value-orientation involves the commitment of standards by which the
validity of cognitive judgments is assessed. These standards and the
commitment to them are of explicit interest to both Mead and Lundberg.
Both attest to the primacy of research, and thereby commit themselves to
a primary interest in the criteria of validity. The "appreciative" mode
of value-orientation involves the commitments to standards by which the
appropriateness of a cathexis is assessed. These standards exist as
rules for attainment of particular gratifications. This is really the
assessment of gratificatory significance and is not treated as such by
either Mead or Lundberg. "The "moral" mode of value orientation involves
the commitment to standards by which the consequences of actions may be
assessed relative to their effect upon personal or social systems. This
is really the "cost" of action. These standards define the actors

responsibility for the consequences of his acts. They give guidance to the actor in choosing his alternatives of action relative to the consequences of that action. Lundberg and Mead are in substantial agreement as to the existence of this mode. The relative "cost" of alternative actions is in fact central to Lundberg's version of positivism. It is Mead however, who furnishes the mechanism of this mode, and again it is the "generalized other". It is by means of the generalized other that standards of the community are inculcated into the individual and thereby function as a value orientation. Consciousness of the consequences of action can be looked upon as the expression of the generalized other, which enables the individual to see the appropriateness of his act in the light of community attitudes.

From the foregoing it can be seen that values and motives are important to varying degrees in the systems of all three men. Parsons attaches the greatest significance to them due to his concern with the actor as point of reference in the social system. Mead attaches less significance to them due to his consistent focus upon the social act and its "meaning" rather than upon any of its component acts. Lundberg lays even less stress upon value and motive, but with him the justification is methodological. He apparently would be glad to deal with them if he knew how. By that is meant, if there were more scientifically acceptable techniques available.

9. The Social System

In view of the central role of interaction in the analyses of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg, it is inevitable that social systems should be a

part of their conceptualization. Interaction, as used by all three men, implies "system", consequently the social system comes in for varying degrees of explicit treatment in their approaches. The system, as such, is of greater concern to Parsons than it is to either Mead or Lundberg, due to his greater interest in structural categories of action. This is a methodological distinction, however, rather than a substantive one, for the action contemplated by Mead and Lundberg is structured in systems, and the system focused upon by Parsons is still a system of action. In short, the social system is made more explicit in the work of Parsons due to his emphasis on structure, and remains largely implicit in the work of Mead and Lundberg due to their greater emphasis on the process of inter-action.

The focus of Parsons' attention within the action schema is based upon the social system. The personality and cultural systems that he has also abstracted out of action are not treated for their own sakes, but rather for their bearing on the structure and function of social systems. Parsons conceives of the social system as both an empirical organization of real action, and as a focus of theoretical analysis.[22]

Parsons' point of departure, from the sociological point of view, is the concept of the social system of action. The interaction of actors takes place under such conditions that it constitutes a process that is methodologically susceptible to treatment as a system in the scientific sense. It is an assumption on the part of Mead and Lundberg as well as

[22]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, 1951, pp. 18-19.

Parsons, that the social system can be subjected to the same order of theoretical analysis that has been successfully applied by other sciences to other systems.

Parsons gives a variety of definitions of the social system; perhaps the simplest is as "a mode of organization of action elements relative to the persistence or ordered processes of change of the interactive patterns of a plurality of individual actors."[23] Every one of the elements included here is explicitly present in the analyses of Mead and Lundberg.

The social system is broken down by Parsons into four units, or points of reference, of varying degrees of complexity. The first, and most elementary unit of the system is the social act, performed by an actor and oriented toward another actor or other actors as objects. This social act is not synonomous with Mead's usage in that Mead requires reciprocal action before he calls it a social act. It is obviously an essential aspect of Mead's social act however. The same is true of Lundberg's concept of interaction, in that it also would include what Parsons delineates as the social act.

The second unit, at a higher level of complexity, is the role-status unit. This is an organized subsystem of acts of actors occupying reciprocal statuses and acting toward one another via reciprocal orientations. This unit, for Parsons, is the key unit in the structure of the social system in that the system is constituted by a network of such relationships. Each actor is involved as a participant in a plurality of such patterned interactive relationships. This participating actor is an object of

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[23]Ibid., p. 24.

orientation, and in so far as this object significance derives from the actors position in the social relationship it is a status significance. Each actor is also oriented toward other actors, and in this capacity is not an object, but is acting and is therefore playing a role. The feature of sociological significance here is that Parsons does not treat this status-role "bundle" as an attribute of the actor, but rather as a unit of the social system.

The approaches of Mead and Lundberg are entirely in alinement with the foregoing, with minimal differences of emphasis. Mead tends to concern himself more with "role" rather than status, consequently his system appears to be more "dynamic" than those of Parsons and Lundberg wherein status is given more detailed treatment. It can be stated without reservation, that to date, no one has handled the concept of role as adequately as Mead. One can cautiously speculate and say that it is perhaps the most significant aspect of Mead's approach viewed sociologically. In view of its obvious tie to the "social system" it can conceivably serve as a point of reference in an increasingly dynamic treatment of such systems. It seemingly has that potential for the sociologist.

The third unit delineated by Parsons is the actor himself as an organized system of all the statuses and roles referable to him as a social object, and as the enactor of a system of role activities. This is the actor as a point of reference in the system, not as a personality. This unit, the actor, is a composit bundle of statuses and roles. As a composite unit the actor is linked to many different actors in many different role and status situations.

This is in complete agreement with Mead's position, not however with that of Lundberg. Lundberg simply never uses the actor as point of reference, he "loses" him in the stimulas-response bond elaborated as interaction. Mead, however, with the exception of the motivational aspect, concerns himself with the actor as point of reference in the social system even more than Parsons. His concepts of the "self" and "generalized other" are indicative of this. The self to Mead is really a plurality of selves. An individual carries on a whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one person and another thing to another. A variety of selves exist for a variety of acquaintances in a plurality of situations. There are different sorts of selves answering to different sorts of reactions. What determines the amount or sort of self that will get into interaction is the social experience. Interpreted sociologically, this means that the various component selves which are organized into a complete, or unitary self answer to various aspects of the social structure. The "generalized other" is the mechanism suggested by Mead as the individual's means of interpreting the requirements or expectations of the social system. In generalizing the attitude of role taking the individual becomes conscious of the position of the group as an entity, and consequently can adapt his behavior to the expectations of that group. Such a mechanism is lacking in the system of Parsons, therefore it seemingly could be profitably incorporated without doing violence to the system.

The fourth unit in the social system of Parsons is the collectivity. A collectivity is a system of concretely interactive roles. It is an intersection of action systems of individual actors. The sector of action

can then be used to abstract the actors from their other role-statuses and they can be treated as a collectivity. In this abstraction, therefore, the collectivity can appear as both actor and object.

The positions of Mead and Lundberg are in complete agreement with that of Parsons on the inclusion of this unit in the social system, however, they use the more familiar term "group" for the same phenomenon. Parsons never uses the term group, Lundberg never uses the term collectivity, whereas Mead uses them both interchangeably; the point of significance however, is that they refer to the same general phenomenon, but that Parsons' collectivity is a limited case.

For Parsons the collectivity is a social system having the three properties of collective goals, shared goals, and of being a single system of interaction, the boundaries of which are defined by the roles constituting the system.[24] The action of the collectivity may be viewed as the concerted action of a plurality of actors. It is this feature that justifies the treatment of the collectivity as either actor or object.

Lundberg adopts a similar position in that he likens the group to an organism and thus establishes it as both actor and object also. He speaks of the group as a more or less definite and discrete order and unity, a pattern which not only determines the relations of its parts to each other, but enables it to act as a whole with respect to the world about it.[25] Such an entity possesses unity (shared and collective goals) based upon some kind and degree of communication (involving roles) and

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[24]Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils (eds.), op. cit., p. 61.

[25]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

possesses an ability to express action in concert. Lundberg, like

Parsons, distinguishes the group from plurals, classes, and aggregates

on the basis of integrative interaction.

Mead here holds a position wherein he includes the group or

collectivity and imputes to it the same characteristics that Parsons and

Lundberg do, however, he goes beyond that and also includes an aggregate

that is not sociologically relevant for either Parsons or Lundberg. It

is Mead's contention that in the highly developed, complicated social

systems that have been evolved by man, that there are two kinds of social

relations carried on by two different socially functional classes or sub-

groups.[26] He distinguishes between concrete social classes or subgroups,

and abstract social classes or sub-groups. Lundberg in particular objects

to this classification as being mischievous. Mead cites such units as

political parties, clubs and corporations as being concrete functioning

social units wherein the individual members are directly related to one

another. He lists such groups as, a class of debtors and the class of

creditors as being abstract social classes in terms of which the members

are only indirectly related, but which afford the possibility of widening

and enriching the social relations among the individual members of the

society (social system) as a whole. A given individuals membership in

several of these abstract classes makes possible his entrance into social

relations, indirect to varying degrees, with an almost infinite number of

others who are included in such classes that cut across the functional

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[26]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, pp. 156-158.

lines of demarcation of the concrete groups. It is such abstract classes, as the participants in a universe of discourse for instance, that provide not only a differentiation in society, but a functional unity based upon a linking of individuals in a large number of social relations. In short, membership in a variety of abstract classes creates the possibility of entering into actual relations and qualifying for participation in cohesive concrete groups. This functional relationship maintained by Mead is lost in the systems of Lundberg and Parsons, but that does not negate the fact that the group is essentially the same to all three.

From the foregoing it can be readily seen that the "units" that compose the social system as elaborated by Parsons are also present in the conceptual schemes of Mead and Lundberg. Parsons, however, carries the analysis beyond the units and manages to equate the social system with that which is society to both Mead and Lundberg. Parsons commits himself to the "norm" of an empirically self-subsistent social system. He adds to the units the criterion of being transcendent to the life span of the individual, and thereby makes biological reproduction and socialization of the emerging generations aspects of the system. A social system then which is capable of meeting its functional prerequisites from within its own resources is a society. Any system other than a society is a "partial" social system to Parsons. It is obvious that virtually all of the empirical work done by sociologists is concerned with these "partial" social systems, and is not concerned with societies as wholes. It is equally obvious that both Mead and Lundberg are primarily concerned with "partial" social systems, but it must also be recognized that Parsons is also.

It must be understood that Parsons is using society as a "norm", with the view of insuring that these partial social systems be placed in the context of the society of which they are a part. The purpose is one of articulation of elements within a larger "whole". The technique is a manifestation of Parsons' particularistic brand of "functionalism" in that it involves the arbitrary establishment of the functional "prerequis- ites" of the system. This leads Parsons to place an emphasis on the "equilibrium" of the system, and thereby to stress the "maintainence" factors in a fashion very similar to Lundberg.

Lundberg contends that any segment of the universe can be conceptually treated as a closed system. It is a closed system in that in the study of events in that system, influences external to it are analytically ignored. Consequently Lundberg does not commit himself to a "norm" or "going concern" and hence the "functional prerequisites" as does Parsons. However, he does stress the point that for any system there is a next state of determinable probability. The uniformities which are observed under given conditions are the basis for this prediction. The uniformities involved in a given system constitute its basis of predictability. The most probable state of a system is called its equilibrium. All action may be thought of as tending to establish an equilibrium within its area of operation.[27] Any conceived system, then, to Lundberg, is an equilibrating system. Equilibrium does not mean a static condition, nor a return to a pre-existing or "normal" condition, but on the contrary, refers to the

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[27]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., pp. 207-211.

next most probable state of the system.[28] The methodological weakness

shown here is tied to the initial assumption that any segment of the

universe can be treated as a system and consequently as an equilibrating

unit. This is typical of Lundberg's stress upon "looking" which tends

to ignore what is being "looked at". As Parsons points out any equili-

brating unit must be a "boundary-maintaining" unit, which means the

boundaries must be "taken" from that which is "there", and not arbitrarily

"assigned" as Lundberg would have it.

To Mead a society (complete social system to Parsons) is a systematic

order of individuals in which each, to some degree, has a differentiated

activity (consequently function, in the sense of both Parsons and Lundberg).

Mead uses the organismic analogy; "The relation of individual organisms

to the social whole of which they are members is analogous to the relation

of the individual cells of a multi-cellular organism to the organism as

a whole."[29] Society is the organization of the perspectives of all. It

is the organization of perspectives of real individuals, each having his

own perspective that he is capable of asserting over against the group.

This may be taken as a statement in other terms of what to Parsons is the

key concept of "role-status bundle".

The principle of organization, for Mead, is interhuman communication.

In taking the attitude of the other, especially the generalized other,

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[28]Ibid., pp. 208-209.

[29]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, p. 164.

the individual incorporates into his own roles, attitudes that are common
to society. By taking over definite attitudes that people habitually
assume under given conditions, the structure of society is preserved in
the individual. In devoting his primary attention to this area Mead is
indicating that it is the individual-society nexus that is of supreme
interest to him rather than "equilibrating systems" as such, as is the
case for Parsons, and to a lesser degree Lundberg. Mead tends to keep
his analysis more sharply focused on "process", leaving the social system
largely implicit, whereas Parsons in particular sets up the "stable"
equilibrating social system as primary. Lundberg shows tendencies to go
in both directions, when he concerns himself with system it is a stable,
mechanical system, but the fact remains that his approach is still pri-
marily oriented toward process.

10. The Regularities in Social Behavior

By virtue of the fact Parsons, Mead and Lundberg each commit them-
selves to the belief that sociology is or can be a science they have
necessarily taken the postulate of uniformity of nature to be inclusive
of human social behavior. Consequently, if "laws" or "principles" of a
sociological character are to be developed they will have to be formulated
in terms of empirically observed regularities. Such "laws", then, inevit-
ably depict those elements of behavior possessing the most observable
and verifiable stability and uniformity. The social elements possessing
the highest degree of uniformity, stability, formality, and generality
are called "institutions" in the usage of all three men. Both Parsons
and Mead flatly state that the primary business of the sociologist is the

study of institutions. Lundberg doesn't go quite that far, but the study of institutions is still central to his analysis.

Parsons utilizes the concepts of "institutions" and "institutionalization" in the following manner. "A pattern governing action in a social system will be called "institutionalized" in so far as it defines the main modes of the legitimately expected behavior of the persons acting in the relevant social roles, and in so far as conformity with these expectations is of strategic structural significance to the social system. An institutional pattern is thus a culture pattern to which a certain structured complex of motivations and social sanctions has become attached."[30] An institutionalized pattern is therefore an ideal pattern in the normative sense. It is normative in that conformity to it is legitimately expected. An institution is a complex of such institutional patterns that may be conveniently treated as a structural unit of the social system. In conceiving of an institution in this manner Parsons is resorting to the pragmatic test of expedience. Oddly enough, neither of the more pragmatically inclined Mead or Lundberg make that test explicit in their treatments of institutions. Parsons attests that it is "convenient" to look at certain patterns as institutions, and this is of course a scientific convenience. This means that Parsons attaches the term "institutionalized" to the behavior of people in situations, and the term "institution" to the methodology of the observer.

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[30]Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, p. 14.

Parsons, like Mead and Lundberg, conceives of institutions as constitutive of the main link between social structure and the actor. The roles that individuals play in a social system are defined in terms of goals and standards. Using the actor as reference point, then, his role is defined by the normative expectations of the members of the group as they are habitually formulated. These expectations are always an aspect of any situation within which an actor is acting. His conformity or deviation brings consequences in the form of approval or condemnation. These expectations are not only aspects of culture, they are internalized as aspects of the actor's personality. In the social process the actor internalizes, to varying degrees, the standards of the group so that they become motivating forces in his own conduct independent of external sanctions. This statement of Parsons almost duplicates that of Mead in his development of the "generalized other". In this case it is Mead rather than Parsons who makes the approach through the mechanism.

Parsons, in the above statement, points up the reciprocal relation between role-expectations and sanctions. Sanctions to the actor are role-expectations to the object and vice versa. As social structure, then, one has a system of patterned expectations defining the proper behavior of actors in specified roles, that is positively enforced both by the actors own motives for conformity (explicitly socially derived for both Parsons and Mead) and by the sanctions of others. Parsons calls these well established patterns of expectations in the perspective of a social system, social institutions. These institutions constitute the structurally stable element of social systems, and their prime function

lies in defining the roles of constituent actors. Viewed functionally by Parsons, these institutionalized roles constitute the mechanisms by which varied human tendencies are integrated into a system that is a going concern capable of meeting its problems.

Mead has a view of institutions strikingly similar to Parsons. Mead attaches great importance to social institutions in that he contends that there could be no mature social selves without them. Institutions are organized manifestations of the social process, and as such are a positive force in the development of the minds and selves that evolve in that process. Institutions embody both organized attitudes (expectations and sanctions in Parsons' sense) and activities (roles), and are developments within the socialized life process. They are not necessarily inflexible, determinate, or subversive of individuality. On the contrary they can perform the necessary function of defining the social patterns of individual conduct in a general way, affording scope for originality and flexibility in that conduct. Indeed, Mead views the retention of flexibility in the institution as a factor insuring its durability and persistence under stress. In that Mead holds institutions to be the main formalized functional aspects of the social system, that means that the ability of the social system (society) to persist is in part based upon the flexibility of its institutions.

Mead imputes to social institutions the primary function of providing the social organization within which the individual can apprehend his own experience, and thus himself. Institutions supply the "structure" necessary for the evolution of the complex self. The crucial aspect of

Mead's development of the self, from the sociological point of view, is his portrayal of the process through which the self appears as a result of the assumption of various specific and general roles. Many of these roles will inevitably be institutionalized. By rejecting the notion of an atomic, "given" self, Mead emphasizes the process of self-conscious interaction and interpenetration with other selves. By making the processes of social action and the development of the self inseparable, he has attached great importance to the structure of the group. This structure consists in the institutionalized roles and the complexes of those roles which may be called institutions. Institutions not only have a function relative to the development of the self, but their internalized aspects constitute the primary structure of the self. The conceptualizations of Parsons and Mead, with respect to the foregoing, could hardly be closer.

Institutions evolve as do selves and are not to be confused with "conventions" which to Mead are arbitrary in character, and are isolated social responses as compared to the social responses involved in institutions which are organically related in the act. Parsons and Lundberg are in full agreement with respect to this organic relationship, although Parsons typically uses the term "function" and Lundberg typically uses the term "mechanism" to express the same meaning. Conventions, in Mead's view, do not play the essential role in the maintainence of the act and the emergence of the self that institutions do. Institutions are forms of social organization that have evolved as answers to the basic problems of a society. Here again, the notions of Lundberg and Parsons are

identical with that expressed by Mead. Institutions furnish the primary, generalized, working definitions essential to the conduct of individual behavior.

Lundberg approaches the same regularities of behavior that have been of concern to Mead and Parsons via the concept "mechanism". It is through his use of the concept mechanism that Lundberg reveals the structural-functional character of his approach, the same as that which is explicit throughout the work of Parsons, and with which in respect to institutions is also explicit in the approach of Mead. Mechanism is taken to mean any arrangement or relation of parts involved in the production of an effect or event.[31] Viewed dynamically these effects are called behavior or "function". From a static point of view the same phenomena are called "structure".

Lundberg stresses the point that the only justification for the segregation and study of a mechanism lies in the fact that an arrangement of conditions necessary to produce an effect are observed.[32] Mechanism, therefore, can be used on any level, in any science, to represent a behavior complex which can then with convenience be related to other phenomena. Parsons expresses this same relationship as "functional", and Mead as "organic". In so far as Lundberg contends that the concept mechanism is applicable to any kind of behavior in the form of a category designating certain uniformities of behavior under certain conditions, he is justified in speaking of group as well as individual mechanisms. He

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[31]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 339.

[32]Ibid., pp. 192-196.

refers to such phenomena as "tropisms", "reflexes", and "habits" as
individual mechanisms, and "folkways", "customs", "mores", and "institu-
tions" as group mechanisms.

Lundberg's classification of group mechanisms is tied to the concept
of normality, and normality is identified with that which is statistically
most frequent. In contrast to Mead and Parsons, Lundberg maintains that
norms are purely statistical in nature. Normal, and abnormal activity
can only be defined as kinds of activity with reference to their frequency
of occurrence within a given system according to Lundberg.[33] These
norms possess varying degrees of uniformity, stability, rigidity, formality,
and persistence, and thus constitute the basis for classification, and
ultimately for quantification of mechanisms. It is interesting to note,
however, that in Lundberg's treatment of the mechanisms that he differen-
tiates mores and institutions from the other group mechanisms (norms),
not only on the basis of stability and regularity, but also on the basis
of coercive power. In other words he has added the concept "sanction" to
the mere statistical frequency. If these particular norms (mores and
institutions) have greater coercive power than the other mechanisms, then
obviously their role in directing and controlling behavior is a function
of the intensity of expectations of conformity, as well as of statistical
frequency of occurrence. Granted that "intensity of expectation" is
verbally quantitative, and that it is potentially measurable as Lundberg
would say, it does not eliminate the fact that he has added sanctions to
certain norms and thereby made them "normative" in the same sense as
Parsons and Mead.

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[33]Ibid., pp. 213-215.

The mechanism that Lundberg attaches the greatest significance to is "institution", indeed, it is central to his scheme. Institutions possess a high degree of stability and uniformity. They are types of group behavior that stand in sharp contrast to the relatively unstable and informal. Consequently they are the major "structural" features of a society. Lundberg's interest in prediction inevitably leads him to focus upon institutions as the elements of behavior characterized by the greatest regularity and reliability, for they consequently constitute the basis for that prediction.

From the foregoing it can be seen that Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg are in essential agreement as to the character and significance of "institutions". Institutions constitute the major regularities of social behavior, and consequently are of scientific interest due to their predictive value. Institutions constitute the major structural features of a society, and consequently function as "definitions" of that society for individuals participating in it. Institutions thereby constitute the major link between the actor and society, and therefore function so as to both maintain society and develop the individuals suited to operate in it. This area of agreement between the three approaches is clear cut and is paramount despite certain differences. For instance, Lundberg uses such classifications of institutions as "nucleated" or "diffused-symbolic", and "latent" or "manifest" which are structural classifications. In contrast, Parsons uses such classifications as "instrumental", "situational", and "integrative", which are functional classifications of institutions. In turn, Mead attempted no classification at all. Despite classificatory differences,

the "institutions" treated by Parsons, Lundberg, and Mead still consist in the major regularities of social behavior.

11. Symbolic Systems

Systems of symbols play a major role in the analyses of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. By virtue of the fact that Parsons abstracts the symbolic systems out of action he labels them culture, whereas both Mead and Lundberg leave the same phenomena in action and consequently do not deal with "culture" as such. Parsons conceives of culture as consisting in systems of symbols which serve as objects of orientation of action, internal components of personalities, and as institutionalized patterns of social systems.[34] This is a functional classification which is also "there" in the analyses of Mead and Lundberg although they do not treat such systems of symbols as an abstract independent entity and consequently do not have to label it. The point of sociological significance here is that in the approaches of all three men, these symbolic elements mediate and regulate communication, and thereby provide the reciprocal orientations essential to the interactive process. If interaction is the sociological point of departure, then, it is inevitable that the sociologist must deal with shared symbolic systems through which interaction is maintained.

Parsons points out that even the most elementary orientation of action involves "signs" which are rudiments of symbols. He further states that any elaboration of human action systems is impossible without relatively

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[34]Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, p. 327.

stable symbolic systems wherein "meaning" is not a function of the stimulas-response situation but is general. This means that meaning cannot be predominantly contingent upon particularized situations in any elaborate system of human action. The concept of expectation which is basic to interaction, inevitably involves some sort of generalization from past particular experiences. It is the generalization from the particular that implies the possibility of communication. The situations of no two actors is ever identical, therefore it is essential that they develop the capacity to extract meaning from particular situations if they are to communicate. True symbolization, beyond the level of sign, cannot arise without the interaction of actors and any given actor can only acquire symbols in behavior through interaction with social objects.[35] No individual acquires language without participating in a socially structured learning process, and this process must be a part of a system of social relations. Conversely no social system can persist without language and the symbolic knowledge derived from it.

The positions of Mead and Parsons are quite similar with regard to systems of symbols, although the focus is different and Mead has a much greater elaboration of their behavioral role. For Mead the fundamental datum is the social act, and the means of participating in it is communication. Through communication an individual is enabled to take over into himself the social act in which he is playing a part, a part which he can control to a degree if the relationship of his part to the whole act is

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[35]Ibid., pp. 10-11.

understood by him. Mind, as involving the symbolic internalization of the social act, and the self as an object that has itself for an object, are seen in the view of Mead as social emergents made possible through the linguistic communication within the social act.[36] Complex human action systems could obviously not be carried on without minds and selves as Mead uses those terms, consequently he is saying the same thing as Parsons in this regard.

Mead conceives of human relationships as existing only in communication: language, or a system of symbols, is the highest form of communication and indicates a mature development of the gestural situation. Language itself is a social emergent and is important because it is the means by which an individual may convey his attitudes and assume the roles of others. Language necessarily presupposes a minimal society and certain physiological capacities in the individual organisms. This minimal society, for Mead, consisted in biologic individuals participating in a rudimentary social act and using the early stages of each others' actions as gestures (signs), or guides to the completion of the act. This is the most rudimentary form of communication, and is itself the earliest form of language when the gesture becomes a symbol to a participant in the act. Mead is thus saying that language lies within the context of the social act, and consequently that more than stimulus and response is involved.

It is this conception that enables Mead to distinguish between symbols and meaning and arrive at a position similar to that of Parsons with regard to "meaning". Meaning for Mead is a function of the social act.

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[36] G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. IX.

Meaning is not a psychical addition to an act, it is a development of
something objectively there as a relation between phases of the ongoing
act. Mead distinguishes a three-fold relationship as being constitutive
of the matrix of meaning: a gesture by one organism, the resultant of
the social act of which the gesture is a phase, and the response of another
organism to the gesture. It is the adjustive response of the second
organism as given to the gesture of the first organism, the resultant in
the act, which gives the gesture the meaning it has. The mechanism of
meaning is therefore present in the social act before awareness of meaning
arises on the part of the participants.[37] The basis of meaning is thus
objectively there in conduct. The symbol is distinguishable from the mean-
ing it refers to in that meaning is a forerunner of symbolization.
Significant symbols are a later by-product of the meaning emergent in the
act. Meaning is described in terms of symbols or language, but language
merely lifts out of the social process a situation that is already
implicitly there. The significant symbol always presupposes for its
significance the social process of behavior in which it arises.

The symbol as a gesture is always a phase of an act therefore is not
arbitrary but shares any universality that the act possesses. An act is
universal in that many objects can function as appropriate stimuli for its
continuity. In the view of Mead, any object one can sit on is a seat,
any object that drives nails is a hammer. It is in the attitude of "sitting"
or "hammering" that their universality lies, and these attitudes are

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[37]G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1934, pp. 77-78.

necessarily generalized, in the sense of Parsons. The individual repetition of the words, just as the specific act of sitting or hammering are merely instances of the universal. Universality is a functional relation of symbolization between a series of gestures and objects, which are instances of the universal. By a different route Mead has arrived at the same position as Parsons in that the above implies that in any elaborate system of human action meaning will arise in specific concrete acts as a particular manifestation of that which is more general. It will reflect the generalized experience of individuals from which the attitudes supporting a concrete act are extracted.

Lundberg also attests to the crucial importance of systems of symbols in that it is communication that is the focal point of his sociological system. He is concerned with a special kind of interaction, that which takes place by means of communication through signs and symbols. Communication is therefore the initial sub-category under interaction for Lundberg, consequently he grounds it in action just as Parsons and Mead do. Symbols "represent" responses, therefore they are merely ways of hanging on to the meaning lieing in the responses themselves. Although Lundberg is bound more closely to the stimulus-response unit than either Mead or Parsons he still admits the necessity and function of inference, generalization, and abstraction. This implicitly commits him to the position similar to Mead and Parsons, that meaning is predominantly general rather than contingent upon particular situations. He of course deviates radically from this position in his doctrine of "operationalism" and this can be interpreted as an inconsistency in Lundberg. In his methodology "meanings" are operationally defined, and in so far as any operation is "particular" he is

"building up" meaning out of specific instances. This does not eliminate
the fact however that he recognizes the substantive reality of expecta-
tion, inference, extrapolation, abstraction, and generalization. These
are all a part of Lundberg's explicit treatment of social behavior, and
consequently he is attesting to the "general" character of meaning and to
its symbolic representation just as Mead and Parsons have.

Mead and Parsons devote their attention to symbols primarily in terms
of their "function" in the maintainence of the social process. This is
best exemplified by Parsons' attempt at a functional classification of
symbolic systems into belief systems, systems of expressive symbols, and
systems of value orientation. On the other hand Lundberg's primary con-
cern here is with the measurement of symbolic interaction, in terms of
such concepts as association, dissociation, competition, conflict, and
cooperation, so as to get at degrees of integration of groups. Despite
this tremendous divergence there is common recognition of the necessity
of examining symbols, symbolic systems, and the function of symbols in
behavior. There is common recognition of the fact that the complementarity
of expectations necessary for interaction would not be possible without a
relative stability of shared meanings, made possible only through symboli-
zation. It is also recognized that human action systems could not be
maintained nor elaborated independent of symbolic systems. Further, it
is agreed that systems of symbols serve as objects of orientation, we
respond to them as we respond to other data. In addition explicit atten-
tion is given to the fact that symbolic systems serve as internal com-
ponents of personalities. We react to that which is about us in terms of

symbols we have internalized through our participation in interaction.
Moreover, there is consensus to the effect that symbols appear as
institutionalized patterns, in the form of language, value systems, and
belief systems inclusive of science itself.

12. Social Change

Despite significant differences in the approaches of Mead, Parsons
and Lundberg regarding the problem of change, there are still elements of
convergence in evidence. In the views of Mead and Parsons change is <u>the</u>
problem of society, and consequently of any science studying aspects of
that society. Lundberg does not identify change as <u>the</u> problem but never-
theless looks upon it as a major problem area and one of vital significance
to the sociologist. These assumptions on the part of all three men imply
the necessity of scientific procedures capable of handling the phenomena
of change.

Mead's approach takes greater immediate cognizance of change than do
those of either Parsons or Lundberg due to his more consistent concern
with process. For Mead it is necessary to express the nature of society
and hence any part of it in terms of dynamics. As opposed to the "static"
representation of the society at an instant in a "knife-edge" present he
presses for the representation as it is in process. This means that stress
is not only placed upon the interrelationship and interdependence of the
parts within a given system, as in the case of Parsons, but is also upon
the role of process in the persistence of the system. By analogy, Mead
in treating the biological form stresses the mutual interdependence of the

form and environment in their existence.[38] He contends that an attempt

to explain either in separation from the other would deny process, in

that it would ignore what is going on between the form and the environment.

This would be a static explanation in terms of structural categories alone.

In contrast to Parsons, Mead extracts the structural categories from

a preliminary description of process, whereas Parsons takes as his point

of departure the deductive establishment of structural categories which

he then hopes to give dynamic expression to through the imputation of

"function". This is illustrative of the inductive emphasis of Mead's

methodology in contrast to the deductive emphasis of Parsons. It must be

recognized however that both look upon structural categories as a necessary

"part" of scientific explanation; but they do not in and of themselves

constitute that explanation. The same statement holds for Lundberg

despite his mechanistic tendencies and emphasis on quantification, for if

sociology ever attains the procedural stature that Lundberg ambitiously

plans for it, then it will be a "calculas" of human relations and will

necessarily subordinate its structural categories to dynamic expression.

Mead takes the general principle of evolution seriously and utilizes

it as evidence of the genuineness of emergents. In recognizing emergents,

Mead puts in question the adequacy of any mechanistic statement of change.

The mechanist tends to account for the emergent in terms of efficient

causes alone, thereby does not consider the import of the emergent in

effecting new orders of events. Mechanism, with its necessary and efficient

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[38]G. H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1938, pp. XLV-XLVII.

causes alone cannot account for process.[39] On the surface this might
seem to eliminate any convergence with Lundberg, but that is not so.
Lundberg, in substituting "interaction" for "causation" with its neces-
sary and sufficient conditions opens the door for the same sort of treat-
ment as that accorded phenomena by Mead and Parsons. Interaction is em-
ployed by Lundberg to denote reciprocal or interdependent behavior among
any number of components in a situation. According to Lundberg when the
interaction of the observable components in a system has been described
all scientific purposes are served. Interaction, however, is not as re-
strictive as "causation" for necessary and sufficient antecedent conditions
do not have to constitute all of the observable components, and in the
view of Mead will not. If the emergent itself is a natural fact, as Mead
contends, then it also is a component in the situation that must be in-
cluded in the "interactive" explanation.

Mead has made most explicit the role of the future in determining
action. In recognizing the on-coming event as one of the determinants in
action he converts sheer action into process. Parsons obviously does the
same thing in that his approach is consistently teleological as is Mead's.
It is interesting to note however, that Lundberg, largely implicitly,
commits himself to a similar position. In speaking of such matters as
"techniques of adjustment", "anticipated future state of affairs", "values"
and "ends", no matter how camouflaged they might be, Lundberg is committing
himself to a continuity that is process, and is admitting the role of the
future in determining present action. That which is still in the future

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[39]Ibid., pp. XLVIII-L

is the emergent and yet it pertains to the present process. Consequently, the extensionless present, can no more meet the requirement of Lundberg's approach than it can of either Mead or Parsons. The reason is that the extensionless present implies the self-sufficiency of presents, but it is obvious that one cannot establish continuity, process, out of a series of self-sufficient presents. The inclusion of the "conditions" of the past as well as the "conditions" of the future in the determination of the present, makes it a "specious present". Therefore, it is a duration including both a push from the past and the pull of the future, and to be adequately depicted must be methodologically treated as such. This is made most explicit by Mead, is recognized by Parsons, and is tacitly admitted by Lundberg.

Change is a matter of concern to Lundberg for he has included a temporal element in his system. He attributes change to the transformation of energy. This transformation is not problematic for Lundberg as it is postulated as the primary universal, and is held to be implicit in all phenomena. Lundberg has a theory of change in that he explains it by postulation, but due to his "operational" orientation his definition does not point at what changes, but rather at the observation of change. Change is said to be "merely a continuous view of the successive positions which the components of a field of force occupy at successive intervals".[40] Observation of change implies only two problems to Lundberg. First, there is the selection of appropriate intervals, and its solution lies in the purposes of the observer. The intervals are determined solely by the

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[40]G. A. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 504.

particular focus and interest of the observer. Second, there is the problem of adequate observation and description of a given state of a system. For Lundberg, then, change is adequately described by reports of observations of successive states. Observation of change consists in observing knife-edge presents that are held methodologically constant, in terms of intervals that are determined by the particular problem of the observer. Lundberg has freely admitted that change is a continuity of action, but observation of it consists of a series of extracts from that continuity. This is tantamount to saying that we are not procedurally equipped to handle change as we know it "is", but are restricted by the limitations of our operations to depicting it as we know it "isn't".

It has been pointed out earlier, however, that there is a "latent" aspect of Lundberg's position that can be "adapted" in such a way that the treatment of change would be synonymous with that which Mead attempts and that which Parsons would like to attempt. This consists in his "interactive" concept, or the description of the components in a field of force at a given moment. If the past and future are included as components in the field of force then Lundberg would obviously be dealing with change in the way held to be desirable and necessary by Mead and Parsons. Lundberg's reluctance is a procedural reluctance, in that he does not see the tools available for such a pursuit; if they were he would undoubtedly use them.

Parsons, although admitting the primary significance of change, and looking upon the scientific explanation of it as the "ultimate" in potential accomplishments, nevertheless adopts a "hopeless" attitude toward that

accomplishment. His problem is also methodological and procedural and is not based upon a failure to meet the implications of process. It is Parsons' contention that a general theory of change of social systems is not possible in our current state of knowledge. Parsons approaches the problem by initially distinguishing between the processes of change within the system and processes of change of the system itself. He contends that it is possible to theorize about particular processes of change within a system (with reference to partial social systems) without building up a theory of change of the system itself. He contends that a general theory of change of social systems requires a complete knowledge of the laws of process of the system. This refers to the change of a system as a system. Obviously sociologists do not possess such knowledge. It is equally obvious however that no science even pretends to have complete knowledge of the theoretical laws of empirical systems. By raising such an impossible requirement a general theory of change is impossible. More important, Parsons holds that it is possible to theorize about change. This theory will concern sub-processes of change <u>within</u> social systems (societies) rather than the change of social systems as such. It is possible to raise the question as to how it is possible to have change within a system that is not at the same time change of the system. In so far as any system is a configuration, any system is a "function" not only of its parts but of the relations obtaining between those parts. Any alteration in a part alters the relationships between parts which inevitably alters the configuration.

Independent of that question, however, there is the importance of these "sub-processes" of change themselves. These are processes of change

of social systems in the views of Mead and Lundberg, and of "partial"
social systems in the view of Parsons. These are the processes that the
sociologist is interested in, for after all, these are the processes that
can be examined as they empirically exist. They are "manageable" in
terms of research procedure. The research sociologist does not focus upon
the social system as such (as Parsons defines it), but upon the "partial"
systems which compose it. The lack of a Parsons "general" theory of
change then seems to be empirically irrelevant. His own brilliant
illustrative treatment of the institutionalization of science and technology
gives evidence of that. The point of significance here is that Parsons
admits that change may be empirically observed, and that generalizations
may be formulated. His lack of ability to tie change to his "norm" social
system is not of vital concern.

From the foregoing it can again be seen that there is an area of con-
vergence with respect to the analysis of social change in the systems of
Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. To deal with social systems at a given
moment is to deal with them in an extensionless present. Both Lundberg
and Parsons tend to do that. However the requirements of their own systems
of analysis demand that they deal with them in a "specious" present.
There is explicit recognition of this on the part of Parsons, and it is
implicit in Lundberg. The conception of systems in a specious present
gives them another dimension, a character in passage, that enables a com-
prehension of change. To handle systems from that view requires a treat-
ment of them involving the conditions of their past and the import of
their future. Insofar as all three men admit the significance of the

past and future in the determination of the present, this is a methodo-
logical requirement. To get at social change, one has to not only get at
system, but at intervals between systems as they are viewed from the
present.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The primary object of this study has been to point out important

areas of convergence in selected diverse sociological systems. This has

been an attempt to demonstrate the thesis that adaptation of the scientific

point of view to social behavior, even though manifest in different frames

of reference, inevitably leads to certain similarities of treatment. We

have held that there are basic and important similarities underlying diverse

treatments of social phenomena. This does not constitute a denial of the

significance of the differences in the systems we have examined, but on

the contrary, merely indicates a methodological concentration upon the

similarities which tend to be taken for granted.

Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg were chosen as a "sample" of diverse

theorists who have dealt with sociological phenomena. It is generally

conceded that their approaches are quite "different" and that they are

representative of different intellectual continuities. In the foregoing

expositions of the theoretical systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg,

significant differences were readily discernible, and as theorists they

were seen to be attacking different problems from different perspectives.

In that they were interested in different problem areas and possessed

somewhat different orientations it is inevitable that there is no perfect

"fit" of their systems. Despite this, however, it has been our contention

that underlying the differences there is considerable similarity involved

in their treatment of social phenomena. We have put forward the hypothesis that the treatment of social phenomena from the institutionalized general position of science inevitably leads to an important convergence of theory, even though different frames of reference are utilized. We have further hypothesized that this convergence may be looked upon as a "hard core" of sociological theory that is gradually emerging as "unproblematic" in the sense of being a common point of departure for sociologists in general. In addition, we have hypothesized that this convergence may be conceived of as evidence of the growing institutionalization of sociology as a science.

In examining these hypotheses we have been able to indicate six general areas of methodological convergence and six general areas of substantive convergence. In the area of methodology we have indicated considerable general convergence in the general categories of: Science and Research; the Object World; Uniformities of Nature; Systematic Theory; Uniformities and Causal Imputation; and Process: Structure and Function. In the substantive field we have found substantial convergence in the general categories of: Interaction; Values, Motives, and Action; The Social System; The Regularities in Social Behavior; Symbolic Systems; and Social Change.

A. METHODOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE

1. SCIENCE AND RESEARCH:[1] With reference to the matter of science, its nature or characteristics, and the extent of its applicability to human

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[1]See pp. 19-35, 77-82, 130-138, 182-187 of Thesis.

social behavior there is rather considerable agreement among Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. Despite differences in emphasis and focus, it is clearly distinguishable that there is agreement to the effect that science is social, experiential, symbolic, and commonly accessible. There is an unquestioned world of existence postulated within which problems appear and are tested. Any part of this world may become problematic, and therefore susceptible to inquiry. Scientific knowledge does not imply existences and meanings which are given, but merely the initiation of an inquiry into a part of the world that for the purposes at hand is treated as problematic. This necessarily proceeds through the formulation of hypotheses (no matter whether primarily derived from systematic-theory as in the case of Parsons, or emergent from empirical curiosity as in the case of Lundberg), and their testing in the unquestioned world containing the problematic area. Mead makes explicit, and it is implicit in the treatments of both Parsons and Lundberg, that the instruments, the controls, the laboratories, and the verifiers are a part of the unproblematic world that is "there" and goes unquestioned during the examination of a given theory. Scientific knowledge accrues only through the testing of hypotheses in action by "means" which are necessarily held to be real although they may in other situations be a part of the problematic area. All three men refuse to accept any existence or reality which denies the reality of perceived things, for the entire procedure of the research scientist is at the mercy of those perceptions. These perceptions control both the overt measurements and the scientific decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. The empirical test of observation is the ultimate test for

the scientist, consequently research is given primacy in the views of all three men. This means that the ultimate significance of any "theory", even in the view of Parsons, lies in what it "does" for the facilitation and extension of research.

2. THE OBJECT WORLD:[2] Mead, Lundberg, and Parsons all take the position that an external world is objectively there independent of our experiencing of it. Mead contends that external objects are "there" independent of the experiencing individual, which makes research a work of discovery. Nevertheless these objects possess characteristics by virtue of the experiencing of them that they otherwise would not possess. These characteristics are their "meanings". In the view of Mead the physical object is an abstraction made from our social response to nature. The physical object is one in which there is no social response to call out again the response of the experiencing individual. It is an object incapable of carrying on social interaction, it is therefore physical despite its social derivation. This line of thinking establishes a dichotomy based upon a distinction between objects. Therefore, there is a distinction between a science of physical objects and one concerned with socially responding objects.

Lundberg explicitly denies this distinction. To him all science is "physical" and the data of the sciences are not intrinsically different. Data always exists in terms of response, consequently they represent a form of behavior regardless of what field they are procured in. The symbols

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[2]See pp. 22-23, 31-34, 85-89, 131-133, 187-190 of Thesis.

of the responding organism constitute the actual data of all science. Lundberg, therefore, holds that a distinction between "physical" and "social" categories is an invalid and misleading construct.

However, it must be noted that Lundberg does not operate consistently from this position. When he defines Sociology as a special science he puts aside this "physical" orientation and utilizes the same "object" distinction as Mead and Parsons. Lundberg establishes the concept of interaction as essential to all scientific endeavor. All sciences study the interaction of the phenomena with which they concern themselves. Sociology, as conceived by Lundberg, is concerned with a special kind of interaction, that which takes place by means of communication through symbols. In making this distinction between interaction and symbolic interaction Lundberg is implicitly admitting the existence of two classes of objects, those which are capable of responding, and those which are not. This corresponds directly with the distinction made by Mead.

Parsons classifies objects into a three-fold pattern rather than into the two categories made explicit by Mead, and implicit in Lundberg's approach. However, the content is the same. The three-fold classification used by Parsons, differentiates between "social", "physical", and "cultural" objects. Parsons has merely broken down the "social" category of Mead by creating a further abstraction. He has abstracted certain elements out of social action and called them "culture". Mead and Lundberg leave these same elements in action and treat them no differently, no matter whether they are functioning as objects of orientation or are a part of the orientation itself. They are the same thing; Parsons has, for methodological

convenience in his system, created the abstraction of "cultural" object

based upon the role it plays in a given situation.

It is readily discernible, then, that all three men actually dis-

tinguish between the social-cultural objects and physical objects. This

despite the assertions to the contrary by Lundberg results in a "difference"

between social and physical science.

3. UNIFORMITIES OF NATURE:[3] Relative to this object world science

evokes the postulate of uniformity. The uniformity of nature is a major

premise of science, and it of course lies in the systems of all three men.

Despite the greater tendency on the part of Parsons to reify the postulate

of uniformity, he agrees with Mead and Lundberg that science is merely

stating laws in terms of uniformities. This means that it is always ready

to change any statement made with reference to uniformities. This means

that all universals used by science are postulates and are acceptable only

as long as they agree with empirical perception. In so far as all three

men have accepted observation as the ultimate test of theory, then, their

systems can only deal with hypothetical universals, and any conclusions

rendered will be hypothetical propositions. Science is an inferential

process, therefore pervasively hypothetical. Scientific research does

not attempt to establish "laws" as absolutely given. Parsons again demon-

strates a tendency to state what the nature of things "is", although at

the same time, like Mead and Lundberg, goes on concerning himself with

placing the events of observation in order. His preoccupation with a

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[3]See pp. 24-30, 77-85, 134-136, 190-191 of Thesis.

"deductive" system frequently obscures this, but it must be remembered that even his "derived" categories and types are based upon someones' observations and inferences, no matter how indirect.

4. SYSTEMATIC THEORY:[4] The problem of placing the events of observation in order is not merely a matter of seeing what is "out there" for any of these men. There is common agreement to the effect that seeing in any significant sense means conceptualizing. Consequently our seeing is dependent upon our looking which in turn will reflect a system of theory, or theories, interests and purposes. Our conceptual schemes will lead us to seek one character rather than another in the object or object relationship under consideration. Observation is not merely a matter of establishing receptiveness to the stimuli of the external world, but on the contrary is always directed in terms of some sort of a problem and reflects some sort of an interest. This is consistently expressed in the systems of all three men, although Mead and Lundberg tend to stress discrete problems and theories more than Parsons, who in turn stresses the "conceptual scheme" more. This leads Parsons to concern himself much more with giving a systematic account of the universe as such, whereas Mead and Lundberg tend to concern themselves with specific problems, wherein the "system" remains largely implicit. This is due to the fact that Mead and Lundberg are more oriented to the research "model", whereas Parsons is more "system" oriented. The two positions are definitely not exclusive of one another, on the contrary, it is a matter of emphasis.

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[4]See pp. 19-34, 77-85, 151-153, 191-197 of Thesis.

In so far as Mead and Lundberg give more weight to the research model they are influenced by the fact that a researchers' work starts from a specific problem arising out of an exception to what is regarded as "law", "principle", or "typical uniformity". Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg are in essential agreement to the effect that the approach to the problem can be from either of two sides; from that of the particular experience that controverts the theory, or from that of the developed relational theory that offers new objects for scientific investigation. Mead and Lundberg tend to emphasize the former, and Parsons the latter. Both approaches are a part of the _same_ process however, which makes theory not only the beginning but the end of research in all three systems.

Parsons central concern is with the development of systematic theory as such; the development of a generalized conceptual scheme. This system is non-empirical, entirely heuristic, and is devised solely for methodological purposes. The system contains no empirical generalizations, no testable propositions, and no assertions of uniformity. The theory is just a conceptual set of tools which functions as a "frame of reference" and as the source of structural categories which will have empirical reference. The theoretical system merely _facilitates_ description and analysis through the establishment of a framework within which empirical work makes sense.

The "system" that Lundberg and Mead talk about is not the same one that Parsons has primarily devoted his attention to, although it implicitly contains within it the features that Parsons has emphasized. The "system" that Lundberg and Mead concern themselves with is one of interrelated

empiricalgeneralizations. These are "laws" in the form of probability
statements that have been "systematized". Neither Lundberg nor Mead
pay such attention to the "conceptual scheme" that was necessarily used
in the selection of problems, and development of hypotheses that resulted
in a set of verified propositions. Both use one however. Lundberg's
establishment of such forms, processes, and categories as energy, force,
time, space, interaction, communication, association, and dissociation,
and Mead's use of roles, minds, selves, communication, time, and the
social act indicate that they also feel the same necessity for a concept-
ual scheme that Parsons does.

Mead and Lundberg do not explicitly recognize the importance, or
scientific priority of this deductive system as Parsons does. Wherein
Parsons contends that this system must be rigorously and deductively made
comprehensive prior to any attempt at the establishment of any "laws" of
uniformity, Mead and Lundberg leave this system largely implicit and
focus their attention upon a system possessing verifiability. This is a
system of hypothetical propositions that are subject to empirical test.
Such a system would be a second level system for Parsons, and ultimately
desirable, but could only be emergent on the basis of a more rigorously
developed conceptual system which in itself contains no propositions.

All three men have deductively drawn conceptual schemes. Only Parsons,
however, spends any considerable time on this scheme, and conceives of it
as worthy of prolonged and rigorous elaboration. This level of system is
a "phase" in the approaches of all three men. Parsons devotes the major
proportion of his attention to it for he feels that it is the essential

forerunner of a propositional system. Mead and Lundberg leave such a

system largely implicit and flexibly structured, but nevertheless use

one as a necessary preliminary to a propositional system that they also

aspire to.

5. UNIFORMITIES AND CAUSAL IMPUTATION:[5] Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg

all make the assumption that the world (inclusive of social behavior) is

both explicable and intelligible. Explicable in the sense that uniformi-

ties are "there", and intelligible in the sense that it may be objectively

comprehended. A knowledge of the world is therefore never a mere contact

of the organism with objects in it although Lundberg expresses this belief

at times. To know a thing, to explain it, we put it into the context of

uniformities. To establish a uniformity, one is relating an event to the

conditions under which it occurs. This is causation in its broadest and

least particularistic sense, and constitutes the level of usage at which

all three men agree. This statement of uniformities in terms of relating

an event to the conditions under which it occurs, is a statement involving

empirical uniformities. In so far as they are empirical uniformities they

can only be stated in probability terms. Consequently the probability

statement in the form of empirical generalization replaces traditional

causation in each of these three approaches.

6. PROCESS: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION:[6] For Mead it is necessary to

express the nature of the world in terms of dynamics. As opposed to the

"static" representation of phenomena in a "knife-edge" present, he presses

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[5]See pp. 29-31, 77-85, 136-138, 197-200 of Thesis.

[6]See pp. 19-20, 31-32, 35-37, 69-75, 81-85, 165-173, 200-205 of Thesis.

for the representation in process. This means that stress is not only placed upon the interrelationship and interdependence of the parts within a given system but also upon the place of process in the persistence of the system.

Lundberg is also committed to the study of process as being essential to science. Lundberg takes the concept of interaction as basic to all scientific endeavor. From the dynamic concept of interaction, which is necessarily a process, Lundberg extracts the major structural components of social behavior, the group, and also the mechanisms by means of which these groups function and equilibrate as systems. Lundberg treats process in "structural-functional" terms, but clearly recognizes them as aspects of process.

Parsons also subscribes to the notion that analysis of process is the ultimate in scientific endeavor. He contends, however, that process cannot be gotten at "as such" in the current state of sociological knowledge. He expresses considerable admiration for the sciences capable of dealing with processes, but maintains that sociology is methodologically incapable of emulating them at the present time. He insists that a "structural-functional" approach is the currently workable substitute for process analysis. He points up the methodological necessity of using structural categories in order to simplify the admittedly important dynamic problems to the point of empirical manageability. The concept "function" is utilized to give the structural categories a dynamic significance.

The concept function is required in Parsons' approach due to the inclusion of the concept "social system" which complicates the analysis of

sheer process. In so far as structure is admitted to be nothing but process involving relatively stable action, and function can only be imputed on the basis of observation of process, it seems that Parsons is also accepting process as the point of departure for analysis. To speak of structure and function independent of process is inconceivable. Parsons, just as Mead and Lundberg, is studying process, but due to our methodological inability to make analytic statements about it, calls his analysis structural-functional. His preoccupation with structural categories gives his work a "static" appearance that Mead's work in particular does not have. This is indicative of a different emphasis on a "state" of analysis, and does not indicate a different ultimate end of analysis. When Mead speaks of the "me" phase of the self, or of "institutions" he is speaking of "structure" in the same sense that both Parsons and Lundberg use of the term. When he, for instance, speaks of the role of "gesture" in the emergence of symbolic behavior he is also imputing "function" in the same sense as both Lundberg and Parsons. Mead's more direct pre-occupation with symbolic interaction and role-taking and indirect concern with the social system gives his analysis a more dynamic quality than that of Parsons who operates in the reverse fashion. Essentially the same may be said of Lundberg relative to Parsons, in that he devotes the major share of his attention to symbolic interaction and its sub-processes rather than to a system as such. Nevertheless "structure" and "function" are tools common to all three men in the analysis of process.

B. SUBSTANTIVE CONVERGENCE

1. INTERACTION:[7] The fundamental datum in the substantive approaches

of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg is human social interaction. The "social

act" of Mead, the social aspects of "action" of Parsons, and the "inter-

action" of Lundberg are essentially the same phenomena, and typical socio-

logical usage describes this behavior as interaction. It is the primary

abstraction of the field of sociology, and in so far as it is also the

primary abstraction of each of these three men there is justification for

calling their systems sociological, even though both Mead and Parsons deal

with many facets of behavior that do not lie within the theoretical or

research sphere of the field.

Despite the differences involved in their approaches to interaction

there is a hard core of agreement either explicit or implicit among Mead,

Parsons, and Lundberg with reference to the concept. There must be a

plurality of persons; there must be reciprocal action between them; com-

munication through signs and symbols must take place; the act has a

"duration"; the act is a continuity and thereby possesses a past, present,

and future; insofar as a future is necessarily involved, an anticipated

state of affairs in part determines the act; consequently the act will have

an "object" whether it is "in view" or not; the meaning ascribed to the

act therefore cannot lie in the act itself; the act is therefore not

explicable solely in terms of unit acts but stands as a legitimate abstrac-

tion in its own right. All of these statements may be attributed to

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[7]See pp. 43-49, 85-89, 161-165, 206-210 of Thesis.

interaction as used by all three men despite such significant differences
as Mead's emphasis on the configuration, Parsons' emphasis on the motiva-
tion of the actor, and Lundberg's emphasis on stimulas-response.

2. VALUES, MOTIVES, AND ACTION:[8] Parsons' theory of action conceives
of behavior as being oriented toward the attainment of ends in situations
by means of normatively regulated efforts. Behavior therefore takes place
in situations, in terms of anticipated states of affairs, is motivated,
and is normatively regulated. Both Mead and Lundberg are in agreement
with this. The point of difference which arises is the point of departure
itself. For Parsons it is the starting point, whereas neither Mead nor
Lundberg use the individual as point of reference in that way. They focus
upon the total act in such a way that the orientation of any given actor
is merely one more element in a complex action pattern. Parsons' concern
with the orientation of the actor leads him to pay considerably more atten-
tion to problems of motivation than does either Mead or Lundberg. He
establishes a three-fold category of value orientation. Despite their
elaboration by Parsons, the same elements are implicit in the approaches
of both Mead and Lundberg.

The three modes of orientation of Parsons, the cognitive, cathectic,
and evaluative, are certainly not novel, and they definitely exist in the
systems of Mead and Lundberg under the more familiar names of "knowing",
"desiring", and "valuing". Lundberg expresses considerable antipathy for
the motivational field, and yet this is not due to a denial of motives,

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[8]See pp. 43-57, 61-63, 69-70, 85-103, 164-168, 210-217 of Thesis.

but rather is due to our lack of instruments for dealing with them.
Behavioristically he starts with the overt, and infers any covert elements
such as motives. Our current inability to rigorously handle this particu-
lar kind of inference is what concerns Lundberg, not the existence or lack
of existence of such elements.

Parsons speaks of three modes of value-orientation which parallel the
three modes of motivational orientation. The "cognitive" mode of value-
orientation involves the commitment to standards by which the validity of
cognitive judgments is assessed. These standards and the commitment to
them are of explicit interest to both Mead and Lundberg. Both, for in-
stance, attest to the primacy of research, and thereby commit themselves
to a primary interest in the criteria of validity. The "appreciative"
mode of value-orientation involves the commitments to standards by which
the appropriateness of a cathexis is assessed. This is really the assess-
ment of gratificatory significance and is not treated as such by either
Mead or Lundberg. The "moral" mode of value orientation involves the
commitment to standards by which the consequences of actions may be
assessed relative to their effect upon personal or social systems. This
is really the "cost" of action. These standards define the actors responsi-
bility for the consequences of his acts. Lundberg and Mead are in sub-
stantial agreement as to the existence of this mode. The relative "cost"
of alternative actions is in fact central to Lundberg's version of positiv-
ism. It is Mead, however, who furnishes the mechanism of this mode in
the form of the "generalized other".

It can be seen that values and motives are important to varying degrees in the systems of all three men. Parsons attaches the greatest significance to them due to his concern with the actor as point of reference in the social system. Mead attaches less significance to them due to his consistent focus upon the social act and its "meaning" rather than upon any of its component acts. Lundberg lays even less stress upon value and motive, but with him the justification is methodological. His reluctance is based upon the lack of scientifically acceptable techniques available for dealing with them.

3. THE SOCIAL SYSTEM:[9] In view of the central role of interaction in the analyses of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg, it is inevitable that social systems should be a part of their conceptualization. Interaction as used by all three men, implies "system", consequently the social system comes in for varying degrees of explicit treatment in their approaches. The system, as such, is of greater concern to Parsons than it is to either Mead or Lundberg, due to his greater interest in structural categories of action. This is a methodological distinction, however, rather than a substantive one, for the action contemplated by Mead and Lundberg is structured in systems, and the system focused upon by Parsons is still a system of action. In short, the social system is made more explicit in the work of Parsons due to his emphasis on structure and remains largely implicit in the work of Mead and Lundberg due to their greater emphasis on the process of interaction.

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[9]See pp. 41-43, 44-45, 69-71, 103-109, 165-178, 217-227 of Thesis.

Parsons gives a variety of definitions of the social system; perhaps the simplest is as "a mode of organization of action elements relative to the persistence or ordered processes of change of the interactive patterns of a plurality of actors". Every one of the elements included here is explicitly present in the analysis of Lundberg and Mead. The social system is broken down by Parsons into four units, or points of reference, of varying degrees of complexity. They are: (1) the social act; (2) the role-status bundle; (3) the actor; and (4) the collectivity. The "units" that compose the social system as elaborated by Parsons are also present in the conceptual schemes of Mead, and Lundberg, with some variation in treatment and emphasis. Parsons carries his analysis beyond these "units" and manages to equate the social system with that which is society to both Mead and Lundberg. Parsons commits himself to the "norm" of an empirically self-subsistent social system. Any system other than a society is a "partial" social system to Parsons. Both Mead and Lundberg are primarily concerned with "partial" social systems, but it must be recognized that Parsons is also. Parsons is merely using society as a "norm", with the view of insuring that these partial social systems are placed in the context of the society of which they are a part.

4. THE REGULARITIES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:[10] By virtue of the fact that Parsons, Mead, and Lundberg each commit themselves to the belief that sociology is or can be a science they have necessarily taken the postulate of uniformity of nature to be inclusive of human social behavior.

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[10]See pp. 70-72, 109-116, 165-173, 227-235 of Thesis.

Consequently, if "laws" or "principles" of a sociological character are to be developed they will have to be formulated in terms of empirically observed regularities. Such "laws", then, inevitably depict those elements of behavior possessing the most observable and verifiable stability and uniformity. The social elements possessing the highest degree of uniformity, stability, formality, and generality are called "institutions" in the usage of all three men. Both Parsons and Mead flatly state that the primary business of the sociologist is the study of institutions. Lundberg does not go quite that far, but the study of institutions is still central to his analysis.

Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg are in essential agreement as to the character and significance of institutions. Institutions constitute the major regularities of social behavior, and consequently are of scientific interest due to their predictive value. Institutions constitute the major structural features of a society, and consequently function as "definitions" of that society for individuals participating in it. Institutions thereby constitute the major link between the actor and society, and therefore function so as to both maintain society and develop the individuals suited to operate in it. This area of agreement between the approaches of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg is clear cut despite certain differences which are primarily classificatory.

5. SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS:[11] Systems of symbols play a major role in the analysis of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. By virtue of the fact that

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[11]See pp. 47-49, 57-61, 65-69, 87-88, 116-123, 138-141, 163-165, 235-241 of Thesis.

Parsons abstracts the symbolic systems out of action, he labels them "culture", whereas both Mead and Lundberg leave the same phenomena in action, and consequently do not deal with "culture" as such. Parsons conceives of culture as consisting in systems of symbols which serve as objects of orientation of action, internal components of personalities, and as institutionalized patterns of social systems. This is a functional classification which is also "there" in the analyses of Mead and Lundberg although they do not treat such systems of symbols as an abstract independent entity and consequently do not have to label it.

Mead and Parsons devote their attention to symbols primarily in terms of their "function" in the maintainence of the social process. This is best exemplified by Parsons' attempt at a functional classification of symbolic systems into belief systems, systems of expressive symbols, and systems of value orientation. On the other hand Lundberg's primary concern here is with the measurement of symbolic interaction, in terms of such concepts as association, dissociation, competition, conflict, and cooperation, so as to get at degrees of integration of groups. Despite this important divergence there is common recognition of the necessity of examining symbols, symbolic systems, and the function of symbols in behavior. There is common recognition of the fact that the complementarity of expectations necessary for interaction would not be possible without a relative stability of shared meanings, made possible only through symbolization. It is also recognized that human action systems could not be maintained nor elaborated independent of symbolic systems. Further, it is agreed that systems of symbols serve as objects

of orientation, we respond to them as we respond to other data. In addition explicit attention is given to the fact that symbolic systems serve as internal components of personalities. We react to that which is about us in terms of symbols we have internalized through our participation in interaction. Further, there is concensus to the effect that symbols appear as institutionalized patterns, in the form of language, value systems, and belief systems inclusive of science itself.

6. SOCIAL CHANGE:[12] Despite significant differences in the approaches of Mead, Parsons and Lundberg regarding the problem of change, there are still elements of convergence in evidence. In the views of Parsons and Mead change is the problem of society, and consequently of any science studying aspects of that society. Lundberg does not identify change as the problem, but nevertheless looks upon it as a major problem area and one of vital significance to the sociologist. These assumptions on the part of all three men imply the necessity of scientific procedures capable of handling the phenomena of change.

Mead's approach takes greater immediate cognizance of change than do those of either Parsons or Lundberg due to his more consistent concern with process. Lundberg has a theory of change in that he explains it by postulate, but due to his "operational" orientation his definition does not point at what changes, but rather at the observation of change. Parsons, although he holds a "general" theory of change to be unattainable in terms of our present state of knowledge, nevertheless maintains that

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[12]See pp. 35-43, 123-129, 159-162, 179-181, 241-248 of Thesis.

it is possible to theorize about change. This theory will concern sub-processes of change within social systems (societies) rather than the change of social systems as such. These are processes of change of social systems in the view of Mead and Lundberg, and of "partial" social systems in the view of Parsons. These are the processes that the sociologist is interested in, for after all, these are the processes that can be examined as they empirically exist. They are "manageable" in terms of research procedure.

C. EVALUATIVE REMARKS

In view of the fact that we have been able to extract these twelve general areas of convergence from the diverse systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg it would seem there is some substance to our initial hypotheses. The evidence seems to be substantial enough to warrant at least a tentative holding of the hypothesis that the treatment of social phenomena from the institutionalized general position of science leads to important convergence of theory, even though different frames of reference are utilized. The twelve general areas of convergence that we have pointed up may also be taken as evidence that there is a "hard core" of sociological theory emerging that serves as a common point of departure. This is manifest in common categories and processes that possess "utility" in different approaches to social phenomena. The evidence that we have extracted here may also be taken in a very limited sense to give some support to the contention that sociology is becoming increasingly institutionalized as a science. Methodological and substantive convergence, when detected in the systems of men standing in different intellectual continuities does

give evidence of delineation and structuring of the field of sociology.

An implication of this study is that the idea of "convergence" can be applied on a much broader scale. Our treatment has been restricted to a treatment of three diverse systems. The results give reason to believe that many other systems could be treated in the same way and that convergence could be gotten at more generally within the field of sociology. The reverse is also true, convergence evidently can be examined on a more specific level than we have treated it. Many of the "specifics" of these systems have been "glossed over" in our search for major or "general" areas of convergence. It is suggested that the study of convergence might foster a greater congruence of conceptualization, and consequently foster a greater universality of procedure, facilitate communication, and contribute to cohesion of empirical efforts.

It must be pointed out, however, that convergence is legitimate only insofar as it recognizes the significance of "differences". There are, for instance, a tremendous number of significant differences implicit or explicit in the expositions we made of the systems of Mead, Parsons, and Lundberg. For the purposes of this study it was possible to ignore them in large part. However, they cannot be ignored generally within the field, for that would constitute a denial of "divergence" which can be the source of dynamic development or change in the field. The "comparative" study, then, with its emphasis on "differences" is a necessary running mate of the study of "convergence" with its emphasis on "similarities".

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF METHODOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE IN THE
THEORETICAL POSITIONS OF MEAD, PARSONS, AND LUNDBERG

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
1. Science and Research (See pp. 19-35, 77-82, 130-138, 182-187 of Thesis.)	Research orientation is primary.	Research is in secondary position, but is still recognized as ultimate test.	Research orientation is primary.
	Deductive comprehensive theoretical system is implicit and loosely structured.	Deductive comprehensive theoretical system is central concern, and is highly structured.	Deductive comprehensive theoretical system is present in the form of general categories.
	Sanction of a conceptual scheme is it's "utility".	Sanction of a conceptual scheme is it's "utility".	Sanction of a conceptual scheme is it's "utility".
	Only scientific test of a theoretical system is the pragmatic one.	Only scientific test of a theoretical system is the pragmatic one.	Only scientific test of a theoretical system is the pragmatic one.
	Science is social, experiential, symbolic, and commonly accessible.	Science is social, experiential, symbolic, and commonly accessible.	Science is social, experiential, symbolic, and commonly accessible.
	Emphasis on observer-observed nexus.	Emphasis on "reality testing".	Emphasis on "observer".
	Unquestioned world of existence.	Unquestioned world of existence.	Unquestioned world of existence.
	Emphasis on empirical curiosity.	Emphasis on systematic theory.	Emphasis on empirical curiosity.
	The instruments, controls, laboratories, and verifiers are unproblematic during the examination of an hypothesis.	The instruments, controls, laboratories, and verifiers are unproblematic during the examination of an hypothesis.	The instruments, controls, laboratories, and verifiers are unproblematic during the examination of an hypothesis.

APPENDIX A (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
1. Science and Research (cont.)	Empirical test of observation is ultimate test.	Empirical test of observation is ultimate test.	Empirical test of observation is ultimate test.
2. The Object World (See pp. 22-23, 31-34, 85-89, 131-133, 187-190 of Thesis.)	Object world is "there" independent of our experiencing it. Distinguishes between physical and social objects. Object distinction admittedly results in a difference between physical and social science.	Object world is "there" independent of our experiencing it. Distinguishes between physical, social, and cultural objects. Object distinction admittedly results in a difference between physical and social science.	Object world is "there" independent of our experiencing it. Denies distinction between physical and social objects, and yet uses it substantively. Denies this difference and yet "operationally" proceeds in terms of it.
3. Uniformities of Nature (See pp. 24-30, 77-85, 134-136, 190-191 of Thesis.)	Uniformity of nature a major premise. Science merely states "laws" in terms of uniformities. Universals are hypothetical. Propositions are hypothetical. Science an inferential process.	Uniformity of nature a major premise. Science merely states "laws" in terms of uniformities. Universals are hypothetical. Propositions are hypothetical. Science an inferential process despite a tendency to state what the nature of things "is".	Uniformity of nature a major premise. Science merely states "laws" in terms of uniformities. Universals are hypothetical. Propositions are hypothetical. Science an inferential process.

APPENDIX A (cont.)

4. Systematic Theory (See pp. 19-34, 77-85, 151-153, 191-197 of Thesis.)	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
	"Seeing" is any significant sense means conceptualizing.	"Seeing" is any significant sense means conceptualizing.	"Seeing is any significant sense means conceptualizing.
	"Looking" will reflect a system of theory, or theories, interests and purposes.	"Looking" will reflect a system of theory, or theories, interests and purposes.	"Looking" will reflect a system of theory, or theories, interests and purposes, despite a tendency to look upon data as "given".
	Treatment of data guided by theories that lend direction to our looking.	Treatment of data guided by theories that lend direction to our looking.	Treatment of data guided by theories that lend direction to our looking, despite display of radical "operationalism".
	Tends to stress discrete problems and theories more than system.	Emphasizes "conceptual scheme" as system from which discrete problems may be extracted.	Tends to stress discrete problems and theories more than system.
	Conceptual scheme as a "system" is largely implicit.	Conceptual scheme is formalized as a system of structural categories. This system is entirely heuristic, and contains no empirical generalizations, and no testable propositions.	Conceptual scheme explicit only in terms of broad, general categories.
	"System means a relational pattern of propositions that are subject to test.	Does not concern himself with a relational pattern of propositions that are subject to test, for such a system can only be emergent on the basis of a rigorously developed conceptual system that is entirely heuristic.	"System" means a relational pattern of propositions that are subject to test.

APPENDIX A (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
5. Uniformities and Causal Imputation. (See pp. 29-31, 77-85, 136-138, 197-200 of Thesis.)	Uniformities of nature are found in the experience of men who observe.	Uniformities of nature are found in the experience of men who observe.	Uniformities of nature are found in the experience of men who observe.
	Committed to canon of objectivity implied by uniformity of observation.	Committed to canon of objectivity implied by uniformity of observation.	Committed to canon of Objectivity implied by uniformity of observation.
	Stresses significance of symbolic equipment and communication in the attainment of the common perspective essential to the establishment of uniformities.	Stresses significance of symbolic equipment and communication in the attainment of the common perspective essential to the establishment of uniformities.	Stresses significance of symbolic equipment and communication in the attainment of the common perspective essential to the establishment of uniformities.
	The world (including social behavior) is explicable in the sense that uniformities are "there".	The world (including social behavior) is explicable in the sense that uniformities are "there".	The world (including social behavior) is explicable in the sense that uniformities are "there".
	The world is intelligible in the sense that it may be objectively comprehended.	The world is intelligible in the sense that it may be objectively comprehended.	The world is intelligible in the sense that it may be objectively comprehended.
	To establish a uniformity is to relate an event to the conditions under which it occurs.	To establish a uniformity is to relate an event to the conditions under which it occurs.	To establish a uniformity is to relate an event to the conditions under which it occurs.
	Probability statement in the form of empirical generalizations replaces traditional causation.	Probability statement in the form of empirical generalization replaces traditional causation.	Probability statement in the form of empirical generalization replaces traditional causation.

APPENDIX A (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
6. Process: Structure and Function. (See pp. 19-20, 31-32, 35-37, 69-75, 81-85, 165-173, 200-205 of Thesis.)	Study of "process" necessary for dynamic representation of the world.	Analysis of "process" is the ultimate in scientific endeavor.	Study of "process" necessary in scientific endeavor.
	Process implies a "going concern", a continuity.	Process implies a "going concern", a continuity.	Process implies a "going concern", a continuity.
	Equilibrating and developmental mechanisms conceived of. Stress on developmental.	Equilibrating and developmental mechanisms conceived of. Stress on equilibrating.	Equilibrating and developmental mechanisms conceived of. Stress on equilibrating.
	"Structure" refers to relatively stable process.	"Structure" refers to relatively stable process.	"Structure" refers to relatively stable process.
	"Structure" is a persistent form of behavior.	"Structure" is a persistent form of behavior.	"Structure" is a persistent form of behavior.
	Function as a concept furnishes the dynamic link between structural categories.	Function as a concept furnishes the dynamic link between structural categories.	Function as a concept furnishes the dynamic link between structural categories.
	Function has reference to the relations obtaining between structural elements in a process.	Function has reference to the relations obtaining between a set of conditions and the state of the system as a going concern.	Function has reference to a sequence of changing structures based upon the arrangement of the parts.
	Process is frame of reference and structure and function are frequently used conceptual tools.	Structure and function constitute the frame of reference, but in so far as they are abstracted from process always imply process.	Process is frame of reference although there is a consistent structural emphasis.

APPENDIX B

A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF SUBSTANTIVE CONVERGENCE IN THE
THEORETICAL POSITIONS OF MEAD, PARSONS, AND LUNDBERG

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
1. Interaction (See pp. 43-49, 85-89, 161-165, 206-210 of Thesis.)	The social act (interaction) the fundamental datum.	The social aspects of "action" (interaction) the fundamental datum.	Interaction the fundamental datum
	A complex organic process, a dynamic and continuing whole, sustained, but not constituted by the stimuli and responses involved in it.	The mutual orientation of actors to a situation which includes other actors.	Reciprocal or interdependent behavior among any number of components in a situation.
	There must be a plurality of persons; there must be reciprocal action between them; communication through signs and symbols must take place; the act has a "duration"; the act is a continuity and there-by possesses a past, present, and future; in so far as a future is necessarily involved, an anticipated state of affairs in part determines the act; consequently the act will have an "object" whether it is "in view" or not; the "meaning" ascribed to the act therefore cannot lie in the behavior of a single individual but lies in the act itself; the act is therefore not explicable solely in terms of unit acts but stands as a legitimate abstraction in its own right.	There must be a plurality of persons; there must be reciprocal action between them; communication through signs and symbols must take place; the act has a "duration"; the act is a continuity and there-by possesses a past, present, and future; in so far as a future is necessarily involved, an anticipated state of affairs in part determines the act; consequently the act will have an "object" whether it is "in view" or not; the "meaning" ascribed to the act therefore cannot lie in the behavior of a single individual but lies in the act itself; the act is therefore not explicable solely in terms of unit acts but stands as a legitimate abstraction in it's own right.	There must be a plurality of persons; there must be reciprocal action between them; communication through signs and symbols must take place; the act has a "duration"; the act is a continuity and there-by possesses a past, present, and future: in so far as a future is necessarily involved, an anticipated state of affairs in part determines the act; consequently the act will have an "object" whether it is "in view" or not; the "meaning" ascribed to the act therefore cannot lit in the behavior of a single individual but lies in the act itself; the act is therefore not explicable solely in terms of unit acts but stands as a legitimate abstraction in it's own right.

APPENDIX B (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
2. Values, Motives, and Action. (See pp. 43-57, 61-63, 69-70, 85-103, 164-158, 210-217 of Thesis.)	Behavior takes place in situations, in terms of anticipated states of affairs, is motivated, and is normatively regulated.	Behavior takes place in situations, in terms of anticipated states of affairs, is motivated, and is normatively regulated.	Behavior takes place in situations, in terms of anticipated states of affairs; is motivated, and is normatively regulated.
	"Attitude" is equated with "need-disposition" of Parsons.	"Need-disposition" is equated with "attitude" of Mead and Lundberg.	"Attitude" is equated with "need-disposition" of Parsons.
	"Knowing", "desiring" and "valuing" equated with Parsons' three motivational modes.	"Cognition", "cathexis" and "evaluation" equated with "knowing", "desiring" and "valuing" of Mead, and Lundberg.	"Knowing", "desiring", and "valuing" equated with Parsons' three motivational modes.
	Value orientation explicitly recognized.	Modes of value-orientation refer to commitments to "standards" of choice.	Value orientation reluctantly but explicitly recognized.
	"Cognitive" and "moral" modes explicitly recognized.	The "cognitive", "appreciative", and "moral" modes constitute value-orientation.	"Cognitive" and "moral" modes explicitly recognized.
	Places less emphasis than Parsons on values and motives due to his consistent focus upon the "social act" and its meaning.	Places more emphasis than either Mead or Lundberg on values and motives due to his use of the actor as point of reference.	Places less emphasis than either Mead or Parsons on values and motives due to the lack of instruments for their measurement.
3. The Social System. (See pp. 41-43, 44-45, 69-71, 103-109, 165-178, 217-227 of Thesis.)	The social system is largely implicit due to emphasis on process.	The social system is made very explicit due to emphasis on structure.	The social system is largely implicit due to emphasis on process.

APPENDIX B (cont.)

G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
	The social system is broken down into four units which are also present in less formal fashion in the work of Mead and Lundberg.	
(1) The social act is synonomous with interaction, and hence is inclusive of Parsons' social act.	(1) The social act performed by an actor and oriented toward another actor as object	(1) Interaction is inclusive of Parsons' social act, and synonomous with Mead's social act.
(2) In agreement with Parsons' except places greater emphasis on role and less on status.	(2) The role-status unit. An organized sub-system of acts of actors occupying reciprocal statuses and acting toward one another via reciprocal orientation.	(2) In agreement with Parsons, and places similar emphasis on status, although status is particularized and given no general quality.
(3) The actor as a point of reference.	(3) The actor as a point of reference.	(3) Actor is not used as a point of reference, and hence is "dissolved" in the system.
(4) The "group" inclusive of Parsons' collectivities. Also speaks of abstract collectivities which are ignored by Parsons and Lundberg.	(4) The collectivity--a special case of the "group" of Mead and Lundberg. Posesses three properties, collective goals, shared goals, and is a single system of interaction.	(4) The "group" inclusive of Parsons' collectivities with its properties.
Organismic view of society is equated with the "ideal" social system of Parsons. Emphasized "developmental" aspect.	Equates the "ideal" social system with what is society for both Mead and Lundberg. Emphasizes "equilibrating" aspect.	Organismic view of society is equated with "ideal" social system of Parsons. Emphasizes "equilibrating" aspect.
Empiric emphasis on "partial" social system.	Empiric emphasis on "partial" social system.	Empiric emphasis on "partial" social system.

3. The Social System. (cont.)

APPENDIX B (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
4. The Regularities in Social Behavior. (See pp. 70-72, 109-116, 165-173, 227-235 of Thesis.)	Postulate of uniformity of nature inclusive of human social behavior.	Postulate of uniformity of nature inclusive of human social behavior.	Postulate of uniformity of nature inclusive of human social behavior.
	The social elements possessing the highest degree of uniformity, stability, formality, and generality are called "institutions".	The social elements possessing the highest degree of uniformity, stability, formality, and generality are called "institutions".	The social elements possessing the highest degree of uniformity, stability, formality, and generality are called "institutions".
	Institutions are organized manifestations of the social process. They embody both organized attitudes (expectations and sanctions in Parsons' sense) and activities (roles), and are developments within the socialized life process.	An institutional pattern is a culture pattern to which a certain structured complex of motivations and social sanctions has become attached. An institution is a complex of such institutional patterns that may be conveniently treated as a structural unit of the social system.	An institution is a "mechanism", and the concept mechanism is applicable to any kind of behavior in the form of a category designating certain uniformities of behavior under certain conditions. Institutions differentiated from other mechanisms by "coercive" power (sanctions and expectations in the sense of Parsons and Mead).
	The major link between the actor and society.	The major link between the actor and society.	The major link between the actor and society.

APPENDIX B (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
5. Symbolic Systems. (See pp. 47-49, 57-61, 65-69, 87-88, 116-123, 128-141, 163-165, 235-241 of Thesis.)	Recognition of the necessity of examining symbols, symbolic systems, and the function of symbols in behavior.	Recognition of the necessity of examining symbols, symbolic systems, and the function of symbols in behavior.	Recognition of the necessity of examining symbols, symbolic systems, and the function of symbols in behavior.
	Recognition of the fact that the complementarity of expectations necessary for interaction would not be possible without a relative stability of shared meanings, made possible only through symbolization.	Recognition of the fact that the complementarity of expectations necessary for interaction would not be possible without a relative stability of shared meanings, made possible only through symbolization.	Recognition of the fact that the complementarity of expectations necessary for interaction would not be possible without a relative stability of shared meanings, made possible only through symbolization.
	Symbolic systems make possible the maintainence and elaboration of human action systems.	Symbolic systems make possible the maintainence and elaboration of human action systems.	Symbolic systems make possible the maintainence and elaboration of human action systems.
	Systems of symbols serve as objects of orientation, and as internal components of personalities.	Systems of symbols serve as objects of orientation, and as internal components of personalities.	Systems of symbols serve as objects of orientation, and as internal components of personalities.
	Symbols appear as institutionalized patterns, in the form of language, value systems, and belief systems.	Symbols appear as institutionalized patterns, in the form of language, value systems, and belief systems.	Symbols appear as institutionalized patterns, in the form of language, value systems, and belief systems.

APPENDIX B (cont.)

	G. H. MEAD	TALCOTT PARSONS	G. A. LUNDBERG
6. Social Change. (See pp. 35-43, 123-129, 159-162, 179-181, 241-248 of Thesis.)	Change is the problem of society.	Change is the problem of society and science	Change is a major problem of society, but poses no "different" methodological questions.
	Takes greater immediate cognizance of change than either Parsons or Lundberg because of his consistent concern with process, and emphasis on emergence.	Structural emphasis leads to minimal treatment of change.	Change is treated by reports of observation of successive states of a system.
	Makes explicit the role of the future in determining action. Teleological.	Makes explicit the role of the future in determining action. Teleological.	Largely implicitly Lundberg commits himself to a position similar to Mead and Parsons through acknowledgment of the continuity of process.
	Utilization of "specious" present, process, and dynamic concepts gives a treatment of change.	No general theory of change possible. Contends it is possible to theorize about change within a system. "Function" is dynamic concept that implies "specious" present.	Change implies two problems, the selection of intervals of observation, and adequate description of a state of a system. A sequence of static views is called change. "Specious" present is acknowledged.