\ IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 3 1293 10537 1821 {IV1ESI_J RETURNING MATERIALS: P1ace in book drop to uamuuss remove this checkout from ”- your record. FINES win be charged if book is returned after the date stamped be10w. ‘1‘“? . /’ (5/ c7!“ ”“2 O “3;...If' .- /1ta declined from 76 in 1970 to 70, 66, and 58 in the 1971, 1972, and 1973 periods, respectively (Christensen, 1981). UDIIis situation aggravated the state of malnutrition, which in turn increased the vulnerability of the Voltaic population to sickness and disease. 1The term Sahel is an Arabic word for shore, in this eatse meaning "edge of the desert". Q 2The eight Sahelian countries are: Cape Verde, had, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Seregal, and Upper Volta. 2 Even prior to the advent of the 1968 drought, domestic and external efforts and financial resources com- bined to alleviate the food crisis. The government of Upper Volta, like that of many other Sahelian countries, has labelled agricultural development as the centerpiece of its rural development program. The domestic effort to Ipromote agricultural development was spearheaded through the Lleadership of the Office of Regional DevelOpment Organiza- t:ions (ORDs). The first ORD was created in 1966 and was Imeadquartered in Ouagadougou. Subsequently 10 more ORDs vvere established in the country. The Eastern ORD was ini- tziated in 1968 and was officially established in 1974, about riine years after the creation of the first ORD. Basically, an ORD is responsible for rural develOp- rnent in its respective area. Although the core of each ORD 5.5 the extension service, it is intended as a means to offer 21 range of services--such as marketing, veterinary care, Itoads, etc.--required for a broadly-based approach to devel— Czpment. This approach was a departure from the former one- Commodity or one-technical-package programs (promoting one <21xmn such as rice, cotton, etc.) that many francophone West 1African countries pursued in the 19603. In 1975, the ORDs were mandated to create regional development plans as agen- <=:ies of integrated development, including activities outside Q :E agriculture . The implicit but significant rationale in the incep- ‘tdion and establishment of the ORDs was the desire to promote 3 decentralization and coordinated administration of develop- ment activities at the regional and local level. Two sig- nificant benefits were expected to result from decentraliza- tion. First, decentralization enables decisionmakers to formulate relevant policies in catering to the well-being of .people in smaller regions by taking into consideration .regional differentiation of resources and preferences as a Iaasis for responding to perceived local problems. Secondly, t:he decentralization process was also anticipated to encour- Eige greater local participation in determining the sc0pe of C)RD activity and the beneficiaries of the program. The posi- t:ive attributes of greater local participation were to facil- thate effective mobilization of local resources for both Inegional and national purposes. The intent of the adminis- txrative coordination was to provide a horizontal integration C>f administrative and technical activities at the regional level rather than the prevailing overcentralized vertical Organization. During the early stages of the drought, each indi- ‘7tLdual Sahelian country was soliciting donors for relief Eisssistance. In 1973, however, these countries formed a joint <=<3mmittee now commonly known as CILSSl. Although the initial <:3.ILSS objective was geared toward donor resource solicita- 1:~i_on for temporary relief purposes, its focus has evolved \ 1: 1CILSS is a French acronym for the Interstate Commit- ee for Drought Control in the Sahel. 4 over time to be a mechanism for coordinating the Sahelian activity toward regional long-term development. Currently, the CILSS secretariat is headquartered in Ouagadougou, the capital of Upper Volta. Later, the principal donors, in consultation with the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization :for Economic Co-0peration and Development (OECD), succeeded :in creating a body known as the "Club du Sahel". It (zomprised as members the eight Sahelian states, plus 12 kailateral and eight multilateral donor organizations. The tnno primary goals identified by the club were (a) achieve- nment of food self-sufficiency and (b) eventual self- sustaining economic develOpment. With regard to the food self-sufficiency goal, for instance, the effort is targeted toward the region as a ‘flflnole, rather than intending to achieve absolute sufficiency 1L1) food production at the national level. Even though coun- 1:1:ies endowed with comparative advantages are capable of Ei1:taining the objective, it is recognized that others are leicapable of attaining the same without a high cost in ‘Cicamestic resources. It is further assumed that intra- 5ITGEgiona1 trade will balance out the food deficit of individ- t1éil countries, provided that some undue hindrances are ‘c3J1.eared to facilitate smooth inter-regional flow of goods 3 11d services . While the weather-induced Sahelian crisis was pro- Safitressing, the community of scholars and institutions was 5 echoing its growing concern over the declining economic status of the poor in many of the developing countries. In an article entitled "The Meaning of Development", Dudley Sears, 1970, stressed, among other things, the need for a fundamental re-thinking of planning. He pointed out that, "The medium term (e.g., five-year) plans now published need to be reconstructed to form steps towards long- term targets for the reduction of poverty, unemploy- ment and inequality, instead of being means of achieving national income targets." In their book Development Reconsidered, Owens and Shaw, 1972, isolated the economic fallacies of past development .assistance and many capital-intensive investment programs vihile indicating the benefits of adopting labor-intensive Igolicies. In an African Rural Employment Paper, Byerlee and Eicher, 1972, presented detailed analysis of rural employment issues with pertinent empirical evidence from Africa, above all other things assessing possibilities for synchronizing growth, employment and income distribution objectives. The most often quoted statement on poverty by Mr. McNamara was also aired during this period. Mr. McNamara said that: "Growth is not equitably reaching the poor. And the poor are not significantly contributing to growth. Without rapid progress in smallholder agriculture throughout the developing world, there is little hope either of achieving long-term stable economic growth or significantly reducing the level of absolute pov- erty . . . The fact is that very little has been done over the past two decades specifically designed to increase the productivity of subsistence agricul- ture . . . the most difficult problem in fashioning a strategy for the world-wide deve10pment of small- holder agriculture is the design of an appropriate organizational structure . . new forms of rural 6 institutions and organizations that will give much attention to promoting the inherent potential and productivity of the poor." (McNamara, 1973). As the concern for the poorest 40 percent gained increased publicity in the international press, bilateral and multilateral assistance continued flowing to the drought- and famine-stricken Sahelian countries. In addi- tion to the short-term relief aid, there was also long-term assistance that led to the initiation and establishment of .several broad (integrated) rural deve10pment projects. {These projects emanated from various sectors, such as agri- <:ulture, rural water supply, livestock, fisheries, forestry, 'transportation, education, and health, deemed to have lpriority in the strategy of Sahelian development. In Upper Volta, the ORD structure served as a mecha- nism for channeling external assistance aimed at improving agricultural productivity and rural welfare. For instance, substantial assistance funds have been supplied by FAC, FED, CID, etc., to various ORDs as far back as 1966 (Plan quin- gpennal, 1972-76). As one of its first drought recovery projects in the Sahel, USAID financed a $4.4 million1 inte— grated rural development program in the Eastern ORD. Addi- tional funds were also contributed by numerous donors, including UNDP. The USAID financing was intended to provide appropriate technological packages to small farmers and herders. Its components were envisaged to include programs 1The budget in Appendix 6 reflects the budget as of late 1979. 7 for: strengthening the region's extension and marketing activities, providing facilities, improving wells water control, farm-to-market roads and range management, and promoting increased food production and better diets (Cohen, 1979). Cognizant of the additional resource requirement for pursuing further development activities, the donor members of the Club du Sahel agreed in their 1977 meeting to con- tribute $10 billion for financing varied programs within the framework of food self-sufficiency and self-sustaining devel— <3pment, to be achieved in the year 2000 (AID, 1978). Like many of the drought-stricken countries, Upper \Jolta has attempted to increase the availability of the food supply by increasing food imports dramatically. The value of food imports rose from 3 billion CFA1 in 1972 to over 8 billion CFA in 1974. Quantitatively, the cereal imports increased from 25 thousand tons to 94 thousand tons in 1974 (BCAD, 1977). In spite of the increased resource flow and accelera- tion of foresighted project activities, as well as the increase in imports, the prevailing food availability record is not encouraging either in Upper Volta or in the other Sahelian countries. According to current statistics (Berg, 1981), the average annual growth rate of agriculture in Upper Volta was negative (-3.3%) for the 1970-1979 period. 1Using the 1977 rate of $1 us - 220 CFA. 8 In comparison, the average annual growth rate of agriculture for the Sahel in the 1970-1979 period was 0.28%. In the same period, the food production index for Upper Volta declined by about 13 percent, from 76 in 1970 to 67 in 1979. The declining per-capita food production in Upper Volta was accompanied by inadequate calorie intake. According to a 1977 study, the intake represented only 79 percent of the nutritional requirement (Christensen, 1981). Several studies have been completed to date assessing ‘the problems and prospects of food production in different £3ahe1ian countries, including Upper Volta. Lele (1975) and IDupriez (1978)1 have independently analysed many of the laroad-based (integrated rural development) projects, basi- cally searching for common factors contributing to their success and/or failure. Each of these authors underscored numerous location-specific constraints, among which were: distortion of markets at all levels; low level of human capital formation; poor program design and implementation, etc. Gray and Martens, 1980, have also presented a micro- and macro-level analysis of recurrent cost problems of devel- Opment programs in the countries of the Sahel. Their report observes that "mention of the recurrent cost problem inevi- tably evokes visions of dilapidated schools, hospitals 1Lele's analysis includes a project from Mali, and Dupriez's analysis includes cases from Niger, Chad, and Upper Volta. 9 without drugs, abandoned irrigation ditches, impassable roads, new tractors immobilized in the field, etc.", illus- trating the inability of host countries to cover continuing costs. Christensen et a1., 1981, Berg et a1., 1981, and Eicher and Baker, 1982, have also very well documented the Inagnitude of the problem on a much broader framework, taking into account the total area of sub-Saharan Africa.1 Christensen et a1. characterized the whole area as 'the only region of the world where the per capita food pro- ciuction declined over the last 20 years. The Berg report states that agriculture in Africa is aapproaching a dangerous state. Over the last 20 years, (export crop production has stagnated, and food production has declined. Africa's share of the world market for agri- cultural products has slumped while food imports have soared. The income for many rural producers has steadily dropped. He says, "It is no exaggeration to talk of crisis," and warns, "We are faced with an urgent need to understand what has gone wrong and what must be done to assure a better future for Africa‘s peOple." Eicher and Baker have just completed a critical and very instructive assessment of past and current agricultural research in sub-Saharan Africa, including research on migra- tion, employment, income distribution, rural non-farm E 1Sub-Saharan Africa contains about 41 African countries, including the Sahel. 10 employment, markets, storage, processing, consumption and trade. Among their various contributions, one finds empiri- cal evidence to challenge the fallacious assumption that poor African farmers are passive peasants; their data vividly illustrate that the peasants are ready to respond for appropriate economic incentives and to assume the asso- ciated risks, within the limits of their resources, in order to improve the welfare of their families. With respect to 'the future, Eicher and Baker suggest that research priori- 'ties for the 19805 be based on smallholder farmers, herders, and small-scale entrepreneurs. Most of these documents, while furnishing data on ‘the overall problems of rural development in Africa, repeat- ¢edly underscore the need for carrying out a space- and/or jprogram-specific study on a continuous basis in order that lessons can be drawn to improve the performance of current and future rural develOpment programs. 2. Need for the Study Two major reasons can justify the study. First, the EORD/IRDP represents one of the many IRDPs that were imple- lnented during the earlier period while the popularity of the IRDP approach was still on the rise. Towards the latter part (of the 1970s, however, its appeal had already started (declining, as an increasing number of scholars continued to point out limitations in the IRD approach similar to those first ascribed to the earlier community deve10pment program. 11 For instance, Holdcroft, 1978, stresses that if many of the new IRDP programs employ the same organizational methods as CD (i.e., government change agents, aided self-help proj- ects, and collaboration with elitist leaders), the results achieved by IRD will probably mirror the CD experience. Nonetheless, IRD has meant different things to different (peOple, and hence the literature presents varied meanings and connotations to the integrated rural development concept. IFor instance, to Kotter, 1973, IRD means rural transforma- -tion, and hence the application Of a package program includ- ing change not only of method of production and of economic institutions, but of social and political infrastructure as Inell, and transformation of human relationships and oppor- tunities. To Clapp, 1977, IRD efforts are programs in the rural area, with a local focus; they are multi—sectoral in concept; they are potentially self-sustaining; and there is an element of coordination among the implementing agents for the projects. Ahmad, 1975, also asserts that the term integrated is a concept of administration: the planned supply of simultaneous services that enables a rural devel- Opment program to become Operational. According to a group of FAO experts, the term integration alone has several meanings: - integration of the rural poor into the mainstream of development; - a strategy taking into account the interdependence of political, technical, economic, and socio- 12 cultural elements, as well as the urban sector; - a poverty-oriented approach, aimed at releasing the productive potential of the poor; etc. Idachaba, 1980, also distinguishes a five-point analytical framework for integrated rural development: a. integrated supply of farm inputs and marketing facilities; b. equitable supply of farm inputs and marketing facilities; c. integrated farm and rural non—farm production and marketing; d. integrated supply of farm and rural non-farm inputs, markets, and social amenities; e. integrated rural develOpment and the political process. In View of this definitional ambiguity, there is a need to assess IRD projects and to isolate the lessons learned in different contexts. Secondly, the first phase of the EORD/IRDP initiated in 1974 was completed at the end of June, 1981. Currently, the EORD is prepared to launch the next phase of its food production program at a cost of over $30 million in contributions from different sources. Vari- ous studies have been conducted on specific asPects Of the EORD program. In this study, however, the attempt will be made to assess the overall performance of the EORD/IRDP in institution building and stimulating agricultural production 13 in the area. The ultimate purpose is to outline lessons learned during the 1974-1981 experience. This assessment will generate information which can be utilized at different levels. It can assist EORD deci- sionmakers in improving future project performance. The lessons to be derived are equally relevant for both high- level Voltaic government, for USAID, as well as for other donors in designing future programs that have the potential to effectively stimulate performance in expanding agricul- tural output. 3. Scope of the Study The EORD, also known as the Eastern Department, covers an area of 50,000 square kms., and according to most recent estimates contains about 442,559 inhabitants. The EORD is mandated to plan and implement rural develOpment programs for the whole region. The programs of EORD are financed by contributions from various donors. Aside from the USAID, for instance, UNDP and the FAO have collaborated in financing different activities, such as lowland water control, delivery of inputs including animal traction equip- ment, vegetable production, and support of personnel. Nellis et a1., 1982, reports that these activities were implemented in the Fada sector, costing UNDP and FAQ $3,207,000 since 1975. The EORD has also received other contributions from CCCE, CTS, the World Bank, FENU, etc. 14 However, because of the scattered nature and the lack of adequate data on the other funding arrangements, the current study focuses only on the EORD/USAID/IRDP. Aside from exploring the institution-building effect of the IRDP, the major focus of the current assessment is to determine the impact of the IRDP on agricultural production and income. The initial objectives of the EORD/IRDP are pre- sented in the logical framework prepared by the design team Stacy et al. in 1974. This framework is attached as Appendix 1. In 1978, a mid-term evaluation of the USAID/IRDP was conducted by a team--Poulan et a1" 1978. The team found the indicators in the original project paper unrealistic, and prOposed an alternative set of indicators based on output eXpectation of the project being imple- mented. The revised logical framework, which is also the frame of reference for the present study, is attached as Appendix 2. 4. Objectives of the Study The six principal objectives Of the study are to: a. provide a descriptive analysis of agriculture in Upper Volta and the Eastern Region; b. identify and analyze the methodological issues involved in evaluating integrated rural develop- ment schemes; c. assess the role of the individual EORD/IRDP components in institution building; 15 d. evaluate the impact of the EORD/IRDP on agricul- tural output, income, and equity Objectives; e. examine the viability of the proposed Phase II EORD food production program (1982-1987); and f. draw lessons to be learned from the 1974-1981 experience and suggest alternative policy options for improving future program design and implementation. 5. Sources of Data The two primary sources of data for the present study are the Base Line Farm Survey and the Inventory of Village Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Eastern Region. These surveys were carried out in 1978-1979 and early 1980, respectively, by Michigan State University teams in collaboration with EORD staff. During the 1980-1981 production period, representative has-fonds areas were also surveyed to understand the economics of bas-fonds production in the Eastern Region. Based on data from these surveys, over 70 reports and three dissertations have been produced, covering a wide range of tOpics and different aspects of the integrated rural development components. Four more dissertations, including the current study, are to be completed in the very near future. The farm level data and the various project reports ‘will be used in the evaluation of the impact of the EORD/IRDP on agricultural output and income. However, there 16 is no sufficient primary data base for assessing the institution-building effect Of the IRDP. Therefore, secon- dary data will be used, from published research reports and Official documents obtainable in the MSU Library and the Sahel Documentation Center, in assessing the pattern of success and failure of the institution-building effort of the IRDP service components. 6. Organization of the Study There are seven chapters in this study. Chapter II outlines and discusses the major methodological issues that are encountered in evaluating agriculture-oriented rural development schemes. Implications for evaluating institu- tion building and the impact on agricultural production of the EORD/IRDP are examined. Chapter III provides background information. It will present a brief overview of the physi- cal, economic and institutional setting Upper Volta, focusing on its development objectives, development priori- ties, administrative arrangements, linkages between planning and policy formation, financing and project management, cul- tural and physical factors. The latter portion of the chapter will present a descriptive analysis of agriculture in the Eastern Region, followed by a brief discussion of the EORD program. Chapter IV is concerned with the achieve- ments and limitations of the EORD/IRDP service components in institution building. The assessment is focused on the agricultural credit, agricultural extension, agricultural l7 marketing, and socio—economic studies components. Chapter V evaluates the effects of the IRDP on output and income. In Chapter VI, an overview of the Phase II EORD food produc- tion program, lessons from the 1974-1981 experience, and the implications of Phase II design are given. Finally, Chapter VII presents a concluding summary and recommendations. CHAPTER II EVALUATION OF INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES: MAJOR METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 1. Introduction The expansion of integrated rural development schemes in many African countries has led to a requirement of donors to evaluate the results of IRDP over time.1 However, as Johnston and Clark, 1982, point out, debates over development strategies have tended to flit from fad to fad rather than building a cumulative body of fact and informed consensus. They conclude that the develOpment community has failed to learn from experience, repeating the same mistakes over and over again. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the major methodological issues that are involved in evaluating inte- grated rural development schemes.2 The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section describes process and impact evaluation--the two major types of evaluation for an 1Major studies of West African focus include: Dupriez, 1978; Lele, 1975 and 1979; Odell, 1978; and Okador, 1978. 2The broad issues in evaluation research are adequately documented in the following sources: Carruthers et a1., 1977; Cernea and Tepping, 1977; Danel, 1979; Dominique, 1982; Gittinger, 1982; Korten, 1980; Mishan, 1982; Nunnally et a1., 1975; Rossi et a1., 1979; Rutman, 1977; and Weiss, 1972. 18 19 agricultural production based integrated rural develOpment project. The second section discusses the major methodologi- cal issues related to IRD program conceptualization, project criteria selection, measurement and valuation. The third section explores the implications for evaluating the EORD/ IRDP. 2. #Types of Evaluation There are diverse vieWpOints about the appropriate types of evaluation. For instance, Clayton, 1981, discusses evaluation as part of a Monitoring and Evaluation framework. Monitoring is defined as a process of measuring, recording, collecting, processing and communicating information to assist project management decision making. In relation to agricultural and rural projects, this process focuses on their operation, performance and impact.1 On the other hand, evaluation involves the comparison of actual project opera- tion, performance, and impact with those originally specified or planned. Evaluation can also attempt to determine causal relationships between project inputs/activities and outputs and the influence of external constraint/support factors on project performance and outputs. lProject Operation covers the many tasks performed regularly or intermittently and required for the prOper func- tioning of a project. Project performance refers to the degree of achievement of project targets. Project impact deals with the effects of project operation and performance on rural people. For further details see Clayton, 1981. 20 Similarly, Slade, 1981, states that Monitoripg is the timely gathering of information on project input, oupputs and complementary activities that record the progress of a project towards the achievement of its objectives. It requires a simple, cheap and easily Operated system based on the careful definition of the parameters to be observed. Slade further observes that, evaluation is primarily the comparison of actual project effects and impacts against established plans and can be both on-going or ex-post. In general it operates within a much longer time frame than monitoring and requires more specialist skills. Based on the findings in much of the evaluation literature, the present study delineates process and impact as two major types of project evaluation. These two types of evaluation, which are aimed at achieving different purposes, are known by varied names. For instance, some evaluators label process evaluation as formative evaluation, implementation assessment farmer assessment, monitoring, ongoing evaluation, and/or ipput evaluation. On the other hand, impact evaluation is often identified as summative, ex-post, effect and/or oupput evaluation.l lFor variation in terminology see: Barclay, 1980; Cernia, 1979; Freemand, 1977; Korten, 1980; Macy and Marvis, 1982; Morris and Brandel, 1982; Rakodi, 1982; and Wolfson, 1981. 21 2.1. Process Evaluation Process evaluation refers mainly to those types of evaluations undertaken during the developmental phase of a program. Process evaluation aims at attaining at least three specific purposes. First, it assesses the availa- bility of administrative capacity to implement a program. At the macro-level, it assesses existing capability for policy analysis, resource allocation, project selection and management. At a micro-level, it examines the extent to which basic implementation tasks such as policy interpreta- tion, finalizing design, recruitment of staff, specifying Operating procedures, readying facilities, delineating action sites, inter- and intra-agency coordination, etc., are undertaken according to stated guidelines and specifica- tions in the project program design. Second, it attempts to ascertain whether or not the program is approaching the appropriate target population or target area. The third and most significant purpose of process evaluation, particularly in relation to agricultural projects, is farmer assessment. Farmer assessment, also referred to as "evaluation of technology" or "monitoring of farmers' experiences with tech- nology," has been described by Dillon, as follows: "Once research is underway and results begin to come to hand, evaluation can begin. Full evaluation is not possible until farmer utilization or trials of the new technology provide real-world data. Until then, only relatively soft data will be available. But this should not deter the start of evaluation. Indeed, the early evaluation of research station and field trial data will be very important to extension design 22 activities. Necessarily, ex-post evaluation activi- ties will duplicate much of the ex-ante activity. Data on research and farmer results will need to be collected and appraised, leading in turn to further research guidance. In this sense, particularly when an ongoing program of research is underway, ex-ante and ex-post guideline activities meld together in a continuing cyclical process." (Dillon, 1979, p. 176) Similarly, Anderson and Hardaker define an important role for the evaluation of technology: "Evaluation can be thought of as an on-going process of monitoring seemingly useful changes in technology. It can and should take place in the various contexts discussed below and it provides information for groups--most immediately to the develOpers and pur- veyors of new technology, then to the various com- municators of information." (Anderson and Hardaker, 1979, p. 13) Hildebrand, 1978, also writes that farmer assessment Of new technology is included in the process Of technology genera- tion because ". . . small farmers will, and do accept change when the available resource base changes or new and appro- priate technology becomes known. Otherwise, they could not be efficiently adjusted to alternatives they now have. But it is important to understand that this efficient adjustment is in terms of the farmers' own understanding and interpretation of his situation, and it is not necessarily efficient according to the perceptions of well meaning, but incompletely-informed third persons." (Hildebrand, 1978, p. 31) Harrington, 1981, notes that: the above authors are all referring to more or less the same concept, though the terms used vary. He then defines: "Farmer assessment of recommended technology: An interative process whereby the collection and analysis of information from farmers, concerning the way in which they employ a recommended technology as well as the advantages they perceive in it and their decision regarding the wisdom of employing it, is used in 23 subsequent decision-making on research and 25522- gdpp priorities, and on policies affecting farmers' adOption decisions." (Harrington, 1981, p. 10) By assessing the technology in question, farmers can provide three kinds of information to researchers: (1) the exact fashion in which they employ the technology, (2) the advantages and disadvantages of using the technology, and (3) their decision regarding use or non-use of the tech- nology, given these advantages and disadvantages (Harrington, 1981). Ultimately, process evaluation aims at enhancing coordination, permitting problems to be diagnosed at an early stage, and putting suggestions forward to eliminate bottlenecks in carrying out project management duties. In recent years, process evaluation of current admin- istrative capacity and augmenting administrative capability as well as farmer assessment, have gained significant atten- tion in the development literature.1 The growing significance of process evaluation results partly from the persistent failure of numerous devel- Opment projects in many countries, particularly as reflected by the inability of the projects to insure continuation of benefits and growth after the expiration of initial funding arrangements. In most countries, the projects are initially 1See Eicher, 1982; Hondale, 1980; Korten, 1980; Johnson and Clark, 1982; Lele, 1979; Murelius, 1981; Wildav- sky, 1978; and Wolfsen, 1981. 24 funded through resources generated from external sources, possibly, with a small contribution from the central government's budget in the respective countries (see Martens and Clive, 1980). In discussing the growing significance of process evaluation, Clayton and Pétry observe that: "Although many rural development projects have produced favorable results, others have proved dis- appointing. Ex-post evaluations have often brought to light unforeseen operational difficulties or negative effects of well-performed activities too late for corrective action to be taken. The need for continuous evaluation and close monitoring of agricultural and rural development projects is there- fore felt more and more strongly by national govern- ments, as well’as by international funding agencies." (Clayton and Petry, 1981. p. iii) Underlying the emphasis on process evaluation is the desire to promote the formation of human capital and the need to adopt a strategy which gives priority to institution building for rural development. Above all other things, the learning effect from the feedback of a continuous evaluation of experiences is expected to promote the attainment of self-sustaining rural development. For instance, Lele, 1979, stresses that making the process of rural development self-sustainingl requires the develOpment of the appropriate skills and project imple— menting capacity at the local, regional, and national levels l"Self-sustaining" here refers to "involving, as distinct from simply reaching, the subsistence populations through development programs." 25 to ensure the effective use of existing resources and to foster mobilization of additional financial and human resources for continued development of the subsistence rural sector. Similarly, Johnson and Clark, 1982, under- score two major failures of contemporary development organi- zation. First, they indicate that the organization has failed to increase the ability of the rural poor to solve their problems. Secondly, they stress the inability Of the organization to sustain a long-term perspective in its problem-solving activities. On the same line, Eicher, 1982, raises numerous relevant issues in reference to long-term planning, aid coordination, food policy strategy, technology transfer, and private enterprises, emphasizing the need to correct the apparent weaknesses of the many crash food pro- duction and integrated rural development projects prevalent in numerous African countries. Two points are worth noting at this juncture. First, the increased emphasis on development of human capital forma- tion has given rise to increased specification of training and research components in agricultural projects. The intangible benefits emanating from such components have given rise to a host of methodological problems of evalua- tion, particularly in valuating the benefits in monetary terms.l Secondly, in order to generate timely and relevant lIntangible benefit valuation issues are taken up with the input and output valuation issues in a later section of this chapter. 26 information that is capable of resolving potential and pre- vailing project constraints, it will be essential to handle certain problems emerging from various aspects of evalua- tion. Deboech and Ng, 1980, Observe that the organizational aspect1 of evaluation contains numerous items of signifi- cance deserving careful scrutiny during the planning phase of process evaluation. It pertains to such points as in-house vs. outside evaluation arrangements. According to much of the evaluation literature, for instance, process evaluation is considered to be an in-house activity and an integral part of the management information system. Data could be generated by using either regular or periodic reporting practices on pertinent problems or particular issues of concern. Other organizational questions are likely to emerge in Specifying the role of consultants, staffing, and additional resource requirements of evaluation. 2.2. Impact Evaluation Impact evaluation usually refers to the final evalu- ation of a program, and is concerned with gauging the extent to which a program achieves its intended Objectives. It can be both on-going and ex—post. However, since the on-going 1The two other aspects Of evaluation identified by the authors are managerial and technical aspects: The managerial aspect refers to issues related to establishing rationales for undertaking evaluation and on the expected outcome of an evaluation. The technical aspect of evaluation refers to issues regarding data collection, processing, and presenta- tion of results. 27 aspect of impact evaluation belongs in the process evalua- tion category, the presentation in this section focuses only on the ex—post impact evaluation. There are two main purposes of an ex-post impact evaluation. First, it provides data on the project itself regarding whether it has been a success or not; secondly, it provides information to the planning process based on lessons gained from the experience. In the aggregate, the information helps in making decisions regarding the programs future--its replication and/or dissemination. An integrated rural development program with an agricultural production oriented objective focuses on expand- ing output. The increase in total production results either from the eXpanded use of resource inputs such as physical inputs, capital, labor, etc., and/or from improved input productivity emanating from such efforts as increased research, training, and effective management of basic tasks. The most significant impacts from an agricultural produc- tion oriented integrated rural development program include: physical impact, economic impact, social impact, and environ- mental impact. The physical impact emanates from the increase in crop and/or animal production resulting from project inter- vention. Yield effect is a commonly-used indicator for gauging project performance in physical terms. Other physi- cal effects Of projects are also specified in appr0priate 28 physical units, such as kilometers of roads, canals built, number of hectares planted, number of farmers visited, number of animals vaccinated, quantity of fertilizer distributed, loans allocated, food aid distributed, etc., depending on the type and nature of intervention components. The economic impact refers to the expected returns, valued in monetary terms, that accrue to the target bene- ficiaries. Household income is the most frequently used economic impact indicator at the farm level. The income component may include revenue generated from crop produc- tion, livestock production and all other Off-farm sources. The social analysis is concerned with gauging a range of issues in relation to employment, income distribution and specific issues such as the extent of tenant eviction or con- flict arising among farmers due to such causes as unclear land titles, anticipated and/or unanticipated effects of the project on the role of women or age groups, effects on the pattern of settlement, etc. Similarly, the environmental impact assessment focuses on considerations such as the preservation of ecosystems, primarily in reference to soil, forest, or range resources and human health (see Lee, 1982, for ecological considerations in designing agricultural projects for tropical regions). 3. Major Methodological Issues The discussion in this section concentrates on three broad problem areas. The first discusses definitionalpmoblems 29 in conceptualizing integrated rural develOpment programs followed by a brief discussion of the problems associated with identification of performance criteria. The final section treats subsequent issues of measurement and valua- tion of inputs and outputs from both financial and economic analysis perspectives. 3.1. Definitional Problems 3.1.1. IRD Program Definition As most evaluation literature suggests, the first stage in any evaluation research entails assessing the evaluability Of the program.1 This task requires assuring the existence of a clearly-defined goal and effect, and a stated rationale linking the stated goal to the program and its effects. An attempt to accomplish this task with respect to IRD schemes gets to be too complicated, mainly because the strategy of integrated rural development schemes assumes many and varied definitions.2 Cognizant Of the pre- vailing conceptual ambiguity, Sweet, 1978, states: "My dif- ficulty with the term 'integrated rural development' is that it has become a guise for almost any effort directed at a rural area. I have heard many definitions, but few appear to represent viable development approaches." Steedman, 1977, also commented that, ". . . the integrated rural development 1See for instance Rossi et a1., 1979. 2See Ahmad, 1975; Clap, 1979; FAO, 1978; Kotter, 1973. 30 concept suffers from the weakness of overreaching itself . . . the dilemma of IRD is that in trying to do everything it may end up doing nothing." Ruttan, 1975, dismisses IRD by saying that it is "an ideology in search of a methodology or a technology." In their recent book, Johnson and Clark, 1982, also attest that, though the concept of IRD is dis- tinguished by its focus on rural rather than agricultural development as well as by its emphasis on integration, it has not been possible to discover an Operational definition of integrated rural development. They warn their readers that their three-pronged strategy--which visualizes the strategic advantages of pursuing production consumption, and organizational programs simultaneously, with explicit recog- nition of their relationship--should not be misunderstood as an argument for tactical integration of all development activities. Subsequently, any systematic examination of IRDP activities to specify goals and effects is likely to reflect some of the following problems: - Fuzziness--ambiguous definitions attempting to satisfy a variety of interests in order to insure broad-based support for the project, etc. - Disagreement among project staff and/or policy makers on the goals of the project and priorities among stated goals. - Differentiation between goals which can be achieved 31 during the course of implementation and those which are of a more long-term nature. In view of such prevailing ambiguities, the evalua- tion task entails obtaining a clear goal statement at the initial stage of the evaluation. Once the relevant goal is clearly specified, the remaining challenge in the defini- tional domain continues to be the reduction of the statement of desired state into evaluable Operational Objectives. The current study anticipates tackling this task by the focusing on agricultural production objectives of the EORD/IRDP. 3.1.2. The Concept of Apppopriate Agricultural Technology The growing interest in the area of apprOpriate agricultural technology and technological change in LDCs seems to have stemmed from the persistent food shortage and malnutrition that most developing countries are experiencing. Since development programs emphasizing increased use of traditional input have contributed only modestly to agricul- tural output gains, economists have increasingly been favor- ing technological change as the major "engine of growth." (Peterson and Hayami, 1972) The expressions "technological change" and "technical change" are interchangeably used to denote the same phenome- non. Schmookler, 1966, however, preferred to use the term technological change to denote the act of producing new knowl- edge, and technical change to denote the incorporation of this new knowledge in the production process of firms. 32 Technological change is usually defined in terms of either a production function or a productivity index. Ruttan, 1956, defines it as a change in the parameters of the production function or a creation of a new production function. Thus, technological progress can be viewed as an upward shift in the production function. In a productivity index context, Ruttan defines technological change as the production of a greater output with a given quantity of conventional inputs, or an increase in output per unit of input. Tecle, 1973, stresses that both contexts of the defi- nition are consistent with each other because a productivity index implies the existence of a production function, and vice versa. In order to have changes in output per unit of input, or shifts in a production function, there should be changes in the quality of inputs. Thus, observing changes in productivity implies that some inputs have changed in quality (or new inputs have been used) and these quality changes are not reflected in the total input measure. Tollem 1969, points out two approaches to the analysis of techno- logical change, the "no-quality change" approach which employs input measures that are not adjusted for quality changes, and the "explain everything" approach which allows adjustments to be made when dealing with productivity. Peterson and Hayami, 1972, make the point that it is possible to measure only conventional inputs (excluding input quality adjustments), and then explain the residual by measuring the 33 contribution of any new, non-conventional inputs or making quality adjustment in the conventional inputs. However, the literature on technological change presents varied approaches regarding the evolution of appro- priate technology in a given setting. For instance, McInerney argues that: "It is folly to isolate only the technical aspects Of production:--Many unhappy experiences in the last two decades with the transfer of available highly produc- tive farm technology to developing agricultures have made it abundantly clear that technology change does not merely modify the productive activities of a society. Rather, it triggers an array of adjustment throughout the entire socio-economic system. . . Since technology is never exclusively a production phenomenon, then neither selection of the most appro- priate technology for a given situation nor the pre- diction of its consequences can be treated solely within the restrictions of a technical framework. . . The necessity for extended examination in the design phase of all facets of innovation projects because the ultimate aim is not simply to transfer tech— nology, but to make technological change an inter- nally induced phenomenon." (McInerney, 1978, p. 32) and concludes that: "What is 'appropriate' must Obviously grow out of the characteristics of a particular development situa- tion, and cannot be defined in general and universal terms." (McInerney, 1978, p. 43) As an alternative to McInerney's holistic views Mickelwait et a1., 1979, advocate the process approach, which is also the focus of this particular study. At the outset, they distinguish between process and holistic approaches based on the views of each approach on uncertainty: - A fundamental tenet of the process approach--(is) that it is impossible to determine in advance all project activities that may be appropriate. 34 - The conventional approach assumes that solutions to the problems of the rural poor are known and that projects are vehicles for applying them. - The emphasis of the conventional approach is on upfront planning and highly specific and detailed mapping and schedules prior to the beginning of implementation. 3.1.3. Farmer Assessment of ApprOpriate Technology In the process approach, farmer assessment of new technology is an indispensable mechanism for gathering infor- mation from farmers regarding their reaction to available technology. Its widespread use resulted from an increasing insistence, on the part of international agricultural research centers and national research programs, that agri- cultural research and extension lead to the rapid develop- ment of technologies usable by farmers. This is consistent with a similar call by economists for increased multi- disciplinary collaboration between biological scientists and social scientists in work directed towards this same objec- tive. Norman, for example, advocates agricultural research that is multidisciplinary, centered on farmers' circumstances and proceeds by building on current farmer practice (Norman, 1978). Dillon favors research that uses knowledge of current technology (and how it relates to the farmer's culture and needs) to identify innovations whose adoption is feasible; this suggests that research emphasis be "tailored toward 35 technology that matches the farmer's resource, financial and climatic environment. . ." (Dillon, 1979) The main purpose of farmer assessment of new tech- nology is to provide feedback from farmers. The farmer provides information to researchers and policy—makers on the consistency of recommended technology with his goals and constraints, on needed improvements to be made in the technology, and/or modifications in the technology he has adopted. Researchers use this information to formulate testable hypotheses. If the information obtained from farmers is confirmed, i.e., if the hypotheses are accepted, the information may be used in six different ways, as listed below (Harrington, 1980). (l) Re-analysis of the results of past agronomic trials. (2) Re-design of individual on-farm agronomic experiments. (3) Re-design of the on-farm eXperimental program. (4) Feedback to experiment station research. (5) Allocation of funds to research vs. extension. (6) Analysis of agricultural policy. As Harrington, 1980, pointed out, farmer assessment of new technology is not the only possible kind of study of farmers' reaction to innovations. Diffusion research, as advanced by sociologists who specialize in the study of com- munications, contains many examples of such research. The basic purpose of such research is to "understand how new 36 ideas spread from their sources to potential receivers and understand the factors affecting the adOption of such innovations" (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). To achieve this purpose, communications specialists have engaged in such activities as modeling the innovation-decision process, listing the attributes of innovations and how they affect the rate of adoption, forming adopter categories, conducting empirical research on the role of opinion-leaders and change agents, etc. Results from communications research aid in conceptualizing farmer assessment. For example, communica- tions research informs us that the attributes of innovations that are likely to be adopted include relative advantage, compatibility with current activities and values, simplicity, trialability (easy to try on a limited basis), and observa- bility. Nonetheless, research in the tradition of communi- cations does not usually have an immediate problem-solving application to a real-world program. Farmer assessment is designed specifically as problem-solving research, and therefore, requires collabora- tion among various disciplines especially between economics and agronomy. They also require the participation of the farmers. Also researchers conducting farmer assessment are usually those in charge of the rest of the technology- generation process, or have immediate access to them. In the research process, the farmers are divided into different categories as users, ex-users and non-users of the practices that form the new technology. Each farmer is then 37 called to provide ex-ante information on problems and prac- tices so that experiments may be planned, to provide experi- mental locations, and to assess the usefulness of resulting recommendations when implemented in his own complex environ- ment of multiple goals and limited resources. Finally, these procedures are required to be sufficiently simple and inexpensive that national research programs with limited resources can implement them, even when small farmers com- prise the target group (Harrington, 1980). 3.2. Identifying Evaluation Criteria The integral part of an evaluation system rests on finding a satisfactory set of criteria for gauging the level of performance both in the process and impact evalua- tion category. Many writers in this area (see, for instance, Pfiffner and Sherwood, 1960), suggest that any serious con- sideration of judgment about implementation and the effec- tiveness of performance turn to the question of objectives to ascertain the extent to which the anticipated target is being approached. In addition to clearly defined program objectives, the essential evaluation task entails specifying quantifiable indicators, with explicit stipulation of the expected effects at the relevant points--such as the farm, regional, and/or national levels. For instance, Pétry, 1981, suggests numerous indicators (see Appendix 3 and 4) of moni- toring systems for agricultural projects. However, he notes that the corresponding indicators for each project must be 38 defined precisely in relation to the management requirements and data availability in that situation. In addition to the indicators of input, output, per- formance, and impact, Pétry also suggests the following variables as useful indicators of external conditions: - Input prices - Input availability - Farm produce prices - Demand for farm produce - Cost of credit - Climate . . . rain, temperature - Pests and diseases . . . crops, livestock However, as Carruthers and Clayton, 1977, attested, the choice of criteria often poses a major methodological problem inhibiting a systematic approach to evaluation. The issues range from conceptual deficiency to common practical hindrances. For example, multiple-objective of an integrated rural develOpment program raises a conceptual problem if, and when, it attempts to maximize all Objectives simultaneously. The problem primarily arises due to the lack of a valid common denominator to serve as a criterion for gauging the performance of the multiple objectives. This forces evalu- ators to introduce some form Of weighting system to pass comparative judgment on achievement levels of differing Objectives. Even if the weighting procedure is accepted in principle, it further leads to another practical problem in deciding whose responsibility it is to determine the weights. 39 Another theoretical problem arises when some Objec- tives are mutually exclusive. Such problems are likely to emerge in cases where objectives are decided on the basis of bargaining and compromise among interest groups during the stage of policy formation. If an interest group has been persuaded to accept the policy with the hOpe that the implementation version would be in its favor, such a group is likely to contest the outcome as undesirable during the latter phase. Other practical difficulties are likely to emerge in comparing results achieved by the end of the project with the objectives set in the initial stage. The problem arises in accounting the reasons for the failure to attain project Objectives. Disparities between expected and achieved outcome levels can result from varied causes. For instance, over- estimation of achievable Objectives at the outset leads to large disparities. In such cases, farm level yields cannot be achieved as expected, if the projection was based on experimental research results, revenues may not approach anticipated levels, if assumed prices did not consider seasonal effects on price levels, and so forth. Though Optimistic projections can be done to convince financing agencies of the viability of the project, it can also lead to participant disappointment, thereby distorting prOSpects for similar undertakings in the future. 40 A similar disparity can also result due to external conditions, at times unconnected with the project. Exogen- ous circumstances such as changes of political regimes, reorganization of institutions, changes of policy in input and product prices, input availability, inflation, drought, pests and diseases, etc., are also capable of altering reasonably feasible Objectives at the formulation stage into unrealistically ambitious-looking objectives by the end of the project. The outstanding challenge to the evaluator lies in attributing the failure to achieve the anticipated objec- tive to the correct factor, so that future Operations can benefit from the experience. 3.3. Measurement and Valuation Issues Nunnally and Wilson, 1975, said: "Although tomes have been written on the nature of measurement, in the end it boils down to something rather simple--measurement consists of rules for assigning numbers to Objects to represent quan- tities of attribution." However, accomplishing this task is not so straightforward, particularly when the attributes are quite difficult to measure. Several issues of measurements can be encountered during survey design, specification of inputs and outputs, valuation of inputs and outputs, as well as in selecting the appropriate tools of analysis. The initial task in the measurement process requires clear identification of the differences to be measured. Measurable Options include the hypothetical difference between 41 the situation where commitment to policy has been made and the projected situation, as well as the range of situations prevailing in the time period after application of the policy. Once the measurable difference has been identified, the subsequent evaluation task involves two distinct steps. First, the specific inputs and outputs will have to be iden- tified. Secondly, both the inputs and the outputs will have to be valued, using the proper price tag. 3.3.1. Physical Input and Output dpecification The inputs and outputs of an agricultural-oriented integrated rural development scheme could vary, depending on the nature and components of the intervention. Generally, however, inputs can be categorized as capital (investment) and operating (recurrent) inputs. The outputs can be cate- gorized, also, as primary,1 secondary,2 and intangible.3 While specification of direct inputs and outputs can be handled with only a reasonable degree of difficulty, quanti- fication of the secondary and intangible inputs and outputs poses a tremendous challenge to an evaluator (see Prest and Turvey, 1966; Mishan, 1971; and Gittinger, 1982). 1Primary outputs represent the immediate goods and services which emanate from the project. 2Secondary outputs represent the added value induced by the project. 3Intangible output generally refers to benefits to which value can nor be assigned in monetary terms. 42 In most integrated rural develOpment projects, labor and foreign exchange items are important direct input compo- nents requiring considerable attention. For instance, the quality of labor varies according to the age, sex, health, nutrition, education and experience of the labor force. Categorizing the labor input in such a detailed manner assists in analyzing and understanding the contributions of every attribute of the input. However, such details are costly and sometimes unmanageable. Hence, use of aggrega- tion techniques such as the following, become inevitable: a) skilled labor component, comprising extension agents, nurses, home economists, tractor drivers, surveyors, etc., b) unskilled labor component, comprising farm family labor (household head, wife, children under a specific age, and other relatives), hired labor, and exchange labor (return or non-return). With respect to foreign exchange, the input specifi- cation task is straightforward, particularly if handled sys- tematically. Basically, it entails a project-by-project examination to identify the input component utilizing foreign exchange resources. In many cases, this will include items such as fertilizer, sprays, insecticides, tractors and acces- sories, roadbuilding facilities, well-drilling equipment, etc. 43 3.3.2. Input and Output Valuation After having specified the relevant inputs and outputs, the next step requires selecting a price for measur- ing value. For instance, financial and economic analysis procedures could be employed for calculating economic costs and benefits. The financial analysis focuses on projecting revenue, cost, project life and discount rate in an attempt to reveal the extent of benefit that accrues to actual and prospective participants in the project. Financial analysis permits the analyst to examine the levels and distribution of project among participants and to assess the attractive- ness of the project to participants, prevailing prices are used to measure the costs and benefits. Economic analysis, on the other hand, measures the costs and benefits of a project which accrue to the nation as a whole. For example, income transfers such as government subsidies and eXport taxes are excluded in an economic analysis. In addition, shadow prices are used to remove distortions which may exist in the prices of foreign exchanges, inputs, and outputs (see Gittinger, 1982: decision tree for determining economic values). Shadow pricing is a technique whereby observed prices are corrected so as to reflect the true cost of inputs and the true value of output in face of distorted markets. Squire and van der Tak, 1979, indicate the kinds of distortions shadow prices are used to correct: 44 "Shadow prices are defined as the value of the contri- bution to the country's basic socio-economic Objectives made by any marginal change in the availability of commodities or factors of production. Thus, shadow prices will depend on both the fundamental objectives of the country and the environment in which the mar- ginal changes occur. The economic environment typically will be determined by the physical con- straints on resources and by various constraints that limit the government's control over economic develOpment. Any changes in objectives or con- straints will therefore necessitate a change in the estimated shadow prices." (Squire and van der Tak, 1979) Three alternative ways can be employed for shadow pricing of project labor transferred from agriculture (Ward, 1975): l. The Opportunity cost approach: this approach entails measuring the marginal product of the worker in his previous occupation or the output foregone by the worker in his previous occupation. Several issues can be raised around the stated claims. However, it can be safely assumed that the oppor- tunity cost or marginal value product (MVP) of agri- cultural labor varies according to the season, but never reaches zero even in the dry season because of non-agricultural activities and the social value placed on leisure. Hence, the need for a minimum wage rate which must be paid to provide incentive for work is established. 2. The supply price (reservation price): this approach suggests a price at which a laborer is just able to meet the out-of-pocket Opportunity and psychic costs of accepting employment in the project activity. In 45 the absence of externality, the supply price of labor provides a good measure of welfare change, since it includes consideration of (a) alternative employment opportunity and (b) direct cost of the new job. 3. The social cost of labor (social accounting price): this approach incorporates into the shadow price of labor the relative value of saving and consumption. As William Ward, 1975, suggested, the "appropriate" shadow wage will depend upon the objective sought. For instance, if "efficiency" is the only objective, the supply price of labor provides the best estimate of the welfare costs; while the social cost of labor's shadow price becomes more apprOpriate in the case of a dual objective of effi- ciency and growth. Use of the supply price of labor approach assumes absence of major externalities, while the social cost of labor approach requires above all other things acquisition of a social time preference rate which is impossible to establish empirically. If the labor market is assumed to be competitive, the market price for labor could be designated as "best estimate of the opportunity cost of labor approxi— mating MVP." It is also important to consider expected peak labor demand variation in the computation, since it occurs in agriculture and similar industries. Conventionally the shadow wage rate (SWR) for unskilled labor is taken to be the opportunity cost of a worker removed from agricultural production in the traditional 46 sector plus the cost to the economy of any increase in con- sumption occurring as a result of his higher wage. Assuming a very high marginal propensity to consume or zero saving among low peOple in poor countries, and given that a certain percent of the minimum wage represents transfers paid by workers (social security and other taxes) the increase in consumption resulting from Formal Public Sector employment created can be calculated as follows: Salary of Produc- Net Increase the Lowest - gigngfiizz + tion = in Con- Category Foregone sumption This net increase in consumption can be considered as a benefit or a cost to the economy depending on the value a government gives to increases in consumption for low income wage earners. For all develOping countries in the world, the fight against hunger and malnutrition is a major concern of the time. As expressed in recent development plans in many LDCs, prevailing heavy subsidies of consumer goods, agricul- tural inputs and food production policies, attest to that concern. For these reasons, one can safely assume that any increase in consumption by unskilled workers is a benefit to the economy. Consequently, the shadow wage for unskilled labor simply equals the opportunity cost of a worker removed from agricultural production in the traditional sector. In most develOping countries, however, wages for unskilled workers are fixed by the government and are lower 47 than the Opportunity cost Of such labor, even including taxes and transfers. For this reason and given that overvaluation of foreign exchange is Offset by undervaluation of unskilled labor in domestically produced consumption it can be assumed that the (SWR) for skilled labor is equal to the actual wage rate. On the average, the shadow exchange rate (SER) indi- cates how much a unit of foreign currency will buy in the world market, compared to what a unit of local currency will buy domestically. The significance of SER in economic analy- sis of projects is emphasized when foreign exchange is undervalued such that domestic goods become more costly than their equivalents in world markets. In most develOping coun- tries foreign exchange scarcity is often a major problem. A decrease in available foreign exchange following a decline in export prices can compromise the development plans of a country highly dependent upon imported goods. In searching the shadow exchange rate, Gittinger, 1982, hints that estimating shadow prices for foreign exchange is time consuming and at times tricky, and then points out that using the shadow exchange rate Of the central planning unit enhances the comparability of the various alternative investment opportunities Open to a nation. If this option is unavailable, however, one could choose calculating methods from numerous alternatives now in use (see Ward, 1979; Little and Mirllee, 1974; Squire and van der Tak, 1975; UNIDO Guidelines, 1972). As Ward, 1975, summarizes it, the 48 approaches to shadow-price foreign exchange can be cate- gorized according to three different assumptions: (a) the foreign exchange shadow price should reflect the value in terms of welfare to the economy of an additional unit of foreign exchange, (b) the foreign exchange shadow price should reflect the opportunity cost of a foreign exchange unit in other uses, and (c) the foreign exchange shadow price should be the "equilibrium" exchange rate, with varying assumptions about what the equilibrium rate may be. In principle, the first two approaches are similar, because the opportunity cost should reflect the marginal value (welfare) in alternative uses. The Harberger, 1965, approach falls under such a heading. According to this method, SER is an attempt to estimate an "index" Of domestic prices compared to world market prices, since domestic prices are usually separated from world price by import duties in the case of imports and taxes or subsidies in the case of exports. An approximation of a price index of traded goods may be obtained by taking the weighted average tariff rate on traded goods, the weight in each case being the marginal change in imports and exports induced by the project. Simi- larly, the Little-Mirllee, 1974, approach uses a two-stage procedure: (a) valuing tradeables at border prices, and (b) converting nontradeables using the standard conversion factor (SCF). Domestically produced goods are valued at market prices on the assumption that the higher shadow rate for 49 foreign exchange more or less offsets the lower shadow wage for unskilled labor. However, valuation issues arise in the case of multiple objective integrated rural development programs, when intangible benefits emanate from such project components as education, health, research, nutrition, etc. Researchers have used different procedures to value benefits from such components in monetary terms. For instance, educa- tion has been valued by comparing the earnings of an educated man with those of one who is uneducated; health and sanita- tion benefits have been valued in the number of lost work hours avoided by decreasing the incidence of disease; nutri- tion benefits have been valued in terms Of increased produc- tivity; etc. In most instances, however, the results are considered unsatisfactory, mainly because the outcome tends to understate the value of the intangibles. The value Of education is much greater than just the increase in income, while good nutrition is desirable for reasons other than increased productivity. Even though valuation of intangible benefits may not be a direct concern in many agricultural projects, the problem is conSpicuous in dealing with agricultural-oriented projects that include such components as extension, agricul- tural education, agricultural research, etc. The valuation of such activities can be handled using the least cost1 1It is often identified as the "cost effectiveness" approach, particularly when the effectiveness of programs in achieving a goal (an effect) is linked to cost. 50 approach. This method requires identifying and quantifying the benefits (kinds Of education provided, number of persons trained, number of jobs created, etc.) and determining on a present-worth basis the least expensive alternative combina- tion of tangible costs that will realize the same intangible benefits. 3.4. Choice of Analytical Tools Depending on the purpose of the evaluation, researchers have a wide spectrum of Options for selecting tools of analysis during evaluation. Besides the cost- effectiveness approach described earlier, tools that can be used in project analysis include farm budgeting, cost-benefit analysis, linear programming, regression analysis, internal rate of return, and net present value technique. The first two methods (farm budgeting and cost-benefit analysis) are among the tools that are often employed in agricultural project analysis. Likewise, the intended uses of the evaluation results also determine the suitability of quantitative and/or more qualitative methods in conducting the evaluation research.1 Although each of these analytical tools reflects different strengths and limitations, they all share some of the common lSee Dominique, 1982, for discussion on theoretical and Operational issues regarding rate of return on capital criterion, Harberger-Sandmo—Dreze criterion, Little-Mirllee criterion and Dasgupta-Marglin-Sen criterion. 51 methodological problems associated with input-output speci- fication and valuation, as well as in the determination of the apprOpriate discount rates. 3.4.1. Farm Budgeting Farm budgeting is a farm management technique mainly used to derive performance standards for a total farm opera- tion. It can also be used for comparing effects of a new enterprise mix (additions as well as deletions) or produc- tion technique in a partial budget framework. The task of a partial budget analysis can be accomplished by comparing costs and benefits under the following framework: EEEEE Benefits a. Added costs: c. Added benefits: b. Reduced benefits: _____ d. Reduced costs: Total: Total: An analysis of this nature focuses on the performance outcome of the farm in a one-year planning period. If the required gestation period involves more than one year, the capital budgeting approach can be used to account for the time value of money, particularly for assessing the present worth of future cash inflows for comparison with current cost outlays. However, there are numerous methodological issues to be addressed in constructing budgets, especially from cross- sectional data (see Dillon et a1., 1980). In a broader 52 framework, Eicher and Baker, 1982, outline the following methodological problems: - Lack of a standard approach in deciding what to include in farm budgets - Valuation of inputs and outputs, including valuation of capital services - Inability to account for changes over time and space budgets based on cross-sectional data - Problem of interpreting results from budgets con- structed from average input/output relationships on surveyed farms. 3.4.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis Cost-benefit analysis purports to measure and compare the respective magnitude of aggregate costs and aggregate benefits for alternative projects over time. If a project lasts more than one year, future cost and benefits streams are discounted to reflect their present value. There are three discounted measures commonly used for agricultural projects: the benefit-cost ratio, the net present worth and the internal rate of return. The expression: n t Z t _ t = 1 (l + 1) C.B. - n C t Z t t = l (1 + i) 53 where: B = Benefits in each year i = interest (discount) rate t = l,2,...., n C = Costs in each year n = number of years implies a criterion that project acceptability rests on aggregate benefit exceeding aggregate costs. Dominique, 1982, provides two major reasons contributing to a wide use of cost-benefit analysis in developing countries. First, he points out, lack of skilled manpower and adequate statistics limits engaging in economy-wide model building. Secondly, the limited sc0pe of rival tools such as operations research and the cost effectiveness approach have enhanced the increased use of the cost-benefit analysis in project evalu- ation, particularly in making long-term project investment considerations. The following are some of the major methodological issues associated with the cost-benefit approach that demand the evaluator's attention: - quantification and valuation of costs and benefits; - identification of opportunity cost of capital; - development of discount rate weighting procedures, if desired to account for income distribution effects (see Mishan, 1982, for issues in valuation); - recognition that cost-benefit analysis is partial, and hence assumes that project effects are not big enough to change price structure. 54 3.5. Issues 1J1 Data Collection 3.5.1. Lack of Solid Data Base The uncertainty of available statistics in most less developed regions, especially in the Sahel, has been ade- quately documented (see Eicher et a1., 1976; Berg, 1977; Moris and Brandel, 1982). With regard to the eastern region of Upper Volta, for instance, Eicher et a1., 1976, indicates that the socio—economic and technical data base is woefully inadequate, and strongly expresses the need for baseline studies and development of a system for recurrent collection Of agricultural information for use in making improved program decisions. Berg, 1977, also observes that it is conventional, in writing about less develOped countries, to point out the weakness and uncertainty of available statis- tics, then to proceed to use whatever numbers are at hand . . . particularly in the least develOped countries, many numbers which are in common circulation have such enormous margins of error that they should probably not be used at all. It is especially important for consumerswpcfl cam mbma mamcmu "momsom .coaumasdom muao Asoauaz u\ .ucmfiunwmwc oco ca mum memo OHOmsmm cam onom one .muofluumac omo may OA Hmowusmcfl waged: mum can vema SH cocSSOm ouo3 mucoEuummwo one H\ Goe.~ o.ma ooo.pvm mma.m Hmuoe med m.o~ mme.na mmm mnfiusomsom mmm «.ma Goa.mm omo I I muaoz muao> Hmm m.oa NAH.me mmq ~\H\mmomcmm can onom and m.e mam.ae «mm «\msusou.z momm Gwa G.m mmm.om 4mm Hmsmm NMH a.mm AGN.HH mow I mawdsox mmm G.A~ amm.A~ ANA «\somsooaox ham «.mm mkm.H~ mam mama mam H.Hv mm~.~H mom I mmawum» cos ~.mm ~mm.a~ Nae «\somsoommmso Amsooo.v Amer Ame .ncAv 1 ex coo.v Aooo.v H\mucmeAumdmo Bond >ufimc0o N mmu< coaucasmom coum>fiuaso SOMDMHSQOm Hmuoe Hmuoe mbma .weHmzmo oneaqomom oza mama .onaaqomom N.m mqmdfi 71 Opportunities. In 1977 it was estimated that 1 million workers from Upper Volta were in other countries, mainly in Ivory Coast and Ghana, doing seasonal work on farms, indus- tries and service trades. As in other countries of the region, environmental degradation limits the productive capacity Of Upper Volta's natural resources. Aside from the soil degradation emanating from erosion and loss of fertility, there is a widespread deforestation and overgrazing. Deforestation has limited the availability of wood for domestic fuel and lumber products for construction. Overgrazing is jeopardizing the maintenance Of the estimated 7 million heads of livestock in the country which is composed of 2.6 millions of cattle, 4.2 millions Of sheep and goats, and 0.15 million of pigs. 2.2. The Economic and Institutional Setting 2.2.1. General Observations Upper Volta is one of the poorest countries of the world.1 Recently, Upper Volta was given a physical quality of life index (PQLI)2 of 16. In terms of 1979 dollars, the GNP per capita was estimated to be $180.00. In the same period the total GDP was represented by $860 million, the 1United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 2768 (XXVI), Nov. 18, 1971. 2The three components of Morris' PWLI are the infant mortality rate, life expectancy at age one, literacy rate of population over age 15. PQLI for other Sahelian countries is reported to be 48 - Cape Verde; 18 - Chad; 25 - Gambia; 15 - Mali; l7 - Mauritania; 13 - Niger; 25 - Senegal. 72 distribution of which was 38%, 20%, and 42% from agriculture, industry and services, respectively. Upper Volta has a predominantly subsistence rural economy based on agriculture. The agricultural sector provides a living to over 90% Of the pOpulation, and furnishes nearly 90% Of the exports. The farms, however, are characterized by low productivity, reflecting the combined unfavorable effects of physical, technological, human and institutional factors. As cited earlier, for instance, the overall adult literacy in 1979 was 5%, and the fertilizer consumption on farms during the same year was as low as 1 kg per hectare. The annual average growth rate of agriculture in Upper Volta for the 1970-79 period was negative (-3.3%). The food production index has also declined about 13% during the same period. The per capita annual cereal consumption in the 1975-77 period was 186 kg. By comparison the annual average growth rate in industry1 and services2 was 1% and 2.9% respectively, for the 1970-79 period. Upper Volta obtains its foreign exchange mainly from export of live animals, cotton and oil seeds. Migrants' remittances and foreign aid are also significant sources of l I O O O O Comprises mining, manufacturing, construction, elec- tricity, water and gas. 2All other branches of economic activity not in agri- culture or industry. 73 foreign exchange. On the import side, the major items are fuel and chemicals, industrial raw materials, foodstuffs and capital equipment. The main trading partners of the country include: France, Ivory Coast, Germany, United Kingdom and Japan. 2.2.2. Administrative Arrangements In the pre-colonial period, the indigenous peOple of what is now Upper Volta were not organized into unified states. In those days, Coulibaly asserts, villages selected their own chiefs and tended to be politically autonomous (Coulibaly, 1972). In 1896, the French claimed the present area of Upper Volta; it was in 1920 that the present area of the country was formed by uniting portions from Ivory Coast, Niger and Mali. Like all other West African French colonies, Upper Volta was under the French colonial administration from 1896 until the institution of the French Loi Cadre in 1956, which gave increased self-government status to Upper Volta. In 1958 Upper Volta became an autonomous republic in the French community until it achieved its independence in 1960. During the colonial period, Upper Volta along with the other colonies of Afriqud docidentale Francaise (AOF) was administered by a governor general located in Senegal. The Governor General was assisted by a Lieutenant Governor who was designated for each constituent colony. Even though the Governor General had a federal Advisory Council and the 74 Lieutenant Governor had a Conseil d'administration, neither of them had legislative power. In all cases, the Governor General, who was responsible to the Minister of Colonies in Paris, made all legislative proposals to the Minister resid- ing in Paris. Consequently, the Minister in Paris issued the necessary decrees as he saw fit. Thus, Upper Volta was closely tied to the centralized Paris administration until its independence. Presently, Upper Volta is a republic with an office of the Presidency, the Premier, and 19 Ministries. Each Of the Ministries, including the two offices, has a cabinet and a secretariat as well as one or more general directorates, services and other offices, including affiliated quasi- autonomous organizations. The country is divided into 10 departments for ter- ritorial administration. These are further divided into sous:prefectures, Arrondissements and Communes or villages. Table 3.2. presents the 10 territorial administrative divi- sions with their areas, populations and other relevant data. The department, sous-prefecture and arrondissements are administered by a Prefect, sous:prefect and Chef d'Arron- dissement, respectively. Each is staffed by decree in the council of ministers on recommendation of the Minister of Interior and Security. The Prefect is the representative of the government and each Ministry in his/her department. He sees that the laws, regulations and government decisions are carried out. 75 The Regional DevelOpment Offices (Organismes Regionaux des Developpements) are also post-independence creations in Upper Volta for administering rural develop- ment. Each Department, with the exception of Bobo, has an ORD. BObo has two. The territorial setting of ORDS is illustrated on Figure 3.2. The ORDS are semi-autonomous public agencies admin- istered by a Director. The Director is named by a decree in the Council of Ministers on recommendation of the Minister of Rural Development. The ORD administration theoretically consists of a local policy group known as Assemblé General which in turn chooses a Steering Committee from among the assembly members. The assembly constituents are expected to represent a wide range of area residents, and are to meet once a year to deliberate on broader policy matters. The Steering Committee is expected to deliberate on ORD issues in a monthly meeting. As the head of an organization attached to the ministry of rural development, the ORD Director is officially responsible to the permanent secretary of the MDR. The ORD Director also reports to the Steering Committee. Other organizations attached to the MDR include the following: - schools and colleges for agriculture, veterinary and forestry training - schools for high-level training of engineers and techni- cians for rural equipment 76 I 0 I O - D I O U L A 8 8 O 8 O 0 T H - 800000- IIIA Figure 3.2 The ORDS of Upper Volta 77 - CILSS; National Office for Waters; For Dams and Irrigation - Rural Development Fund; National Cereals Office - Applied Research Organization; Development of Animal Resources, etc. Other rural oriented development activities in the area of public health, education, public works, environ- mental programs, planning, etc., are administered under independent ministries mainly by dispatching field repre- sentatives to the respective departments. 2 . 2 . 3 . Develgpment Objpctives and Priorities The country's development strategy Since the 1960's has been guided by policies defined in a national develop- ment plan. Even though there have been planning attempts since 1963, it is only since 1967 that they were taken seri- ously. The latter four plans are: the plan cadre 1967-1970, the Intermediate plan 1971, the five year plan 1972-1976, and the 1977-1981 plan. As in many developing countries, the plans have been "TOp Down" oriented sets of project proposals, heavily relying on external sources of financing. In addition to specifying the desired goals, the plans also project the required investments by sectors. The aggregate intended resource allocation in the last four plans is presented in Table 3.3. Some problems faced in implementing agricultural strategies include: uneven population distribution, 78 Amman Acmsdoam>ma new» m>Am BAABEI .mkma was mocflm SOHHMHTQOOU paw mcflccmam mo >HUmflcwz on» mm :3ocx .muumwsflz mcflccmam Amhma .somsoccmmso .whmalmhma Hmccmsmmwsv swam 5c umnoum .oumumcwz HOflEoum ..>.m.m “thma .somSO©mmmsov Huma wuflwEflHmucfl moccm .muao> muswm mp mupmuIIcmam .wsqwansmmm ma on ucmcflmmum ..>.m.m «Ammma mflnmmv onmaInme mnpmo cmam .>.m.m ”mousom ooa m.mam ooa mvm.mm mme.m ooa mam.nm Hmuoa In I. m.> mam.e H.m mam m.m mmo.H Amnuo an «.mm m.ma mmm.m G.m mmm 4.5H Hmm.e Hmfioom cm H.~HH m.om mmh.ma H.o~ aon.a H.o~ mom.m Acumcozv wuumsecH mm oo.mea m.nm mae.>a m.me ~m>.m m.om mmm.m musuosupmmumaH Hm m.mh m.Hm Amm.ma v.m~ emm.a m.m~ mam.» Hausa w #:5024 A unsosm w Assosa A Assosa Hmmaunhma mnaaumema Head memanemma xzH amzzaqm m.m mqm<9 79 maintaining recurrent project costs, inadequacy of infra- structures, organizational shortcoming; distortion in input and output markets, weak and at times counterproductive incentive systems. 3. Characteristics of Dgyland Farming dystem in the Eastern Region 3.1. Agroclimatic Characteristics1 The Eastern Region, officially known as the Eastern Department, comprises the same land area covered by the EORD (Organisme Regional de Develqpment). It accounts for 18% of the national territory making it the largest of the 10 depart- ments (see Figure 3.2, Tables 3.2 and 3.3). As the ORD covers a large geographic area, there are substantial differ- ences in the agroclimatic and demographic characteristics of the various sections of the region. Table 3.4 presents the agroclimatic characteristics of the 12 zones of the Eastern Region. The region has two climatic conditions: Sahelian type in the North, characterized by average annual rainfall of about 600 mm, and Sudanian type in the South with annual rainfall of around 1,000 mm. During the dry season, humidity is low with the Harmatan, a dry hot wind, blowing from the Sahara. The aver- age monthly temperature varies between 25 degrees centigrade in January, to 31 in April. 1For an extended discussion of the physical attributes of the Eastern Region see Mehretu, 1979, 1980, and 1982. 80 mumow mmOBOO SOHO .ammsm .mauumu + umHHaE + Ednwuom ofim hpsmw tam mmHO mapsou m.qfi :owcmam«m .w maomfiuum> OHLO amonm masseusouw .mmnaou Iuosoupxz wsfizma .mHuumo .mumow + Esswuom + umaafia com Ium>o hmao xuman ammo: o.mH deco» .n :Ouuoo kmao hpcmm wauumu .mHOQSD .moau .Ouwme no Smao xumfip .mumow .dmmnm .mwnSou + Esswuom oom oaseuosouvzs mapsoo N.¢N mwmfiuumm .o mumps» .OOHH .muSSpcsoum Augusmuv mauumo .mapmwz + Esswuom SOHO .mumow .Ommnm .mmOBOO + ssnwuom com mpSmm Ou Sudan mapsoo wo.oq sonowoq .n mow» .muscpsaouw Hfiom .dmmsm .mumow .mmn3ou + uOHHHB owm owufiumuma noon ammo: m.eq sonowoq .q mauumo moan .mussccsouw HHOm .ammsm .mumom .msmmmm + umaaaa omn seamm emsumma «assoc ~.Nm mHmAm .m muSSSSSOHw HfiOm mumow .ammnm .msmmwm + Esswuom ode Spawn pmnommfi mEusoo mw.nH acmz .N muscpcsouw .mEmmmm Hfiom ammnm .mumow + asnmuom + umHHAa oas Assam emnomma menace e1.hm mecmmom .1 momma xuOumO>aA macho scum: Hammcfimm wonky dsouu A ex chN omwmpm>< Hamm HOmm: cannum \mcomumdv "mucmquOEH mo umpuo he pmumHA sumuwsog ucmswaon xufimcmo tmumafiumm mowumasaom oumafixound< mmzom Qmwm>mam mo moHHmHmMHomn mvcom 3v cowuumufln .:mEh:oo.z wwmm "umm.a 0v amo.H mcmw mmaooauw<.ouv%m mummEmwmcmE< mmH Ham mmmnuczm: .wcfluvams .h Ecumu .mmmfi .umsw:< .muHo> Hmmna .mahsoo.z mvmm .umm.a mw Qmo .:x=mo uasz mfimmmm.v smmmmm :D.w coaumflamuwcH.H mw ma> cm mmcmonom mmaon mmw :OfiumcfiEhouwn: .mHOUHuw< coauoswoum mw ammunm Boumn .Aom .a .m «acme .ommHv xuooafis wcm aumusmz Baum cmxmu mmumefiuwm mnmfim .Nw¢H .pwufimwmq hpowmuo wan mama %m>u:m sham ”mumDOm mafia .:0uuoo .mquSu . vafiz xmau uncmm Angusmuv + 8:: wow 5 Ho >mHo xuwan wauumo .mumom .mma3oo + Esnwuom oooH ownapoEopvxs mausoo n.~ mamm .NH mumow mufime .awmnm .wHuumo .mma3ou + asswuow owm hmao mausou fie.m soumwso .HH acuuou .uoacma mumow .mNHme .momaoo hmau .mwmnm .mauumu + umHHHE + Eszwuom 0mm accmm ou zvcmm «Epsom m.¢ Humnuucmx .oH couuou .muscvc:0pw ammnm .mEmmmm + mmnBou + kmao xoman .mumow .mauumu + umHHfiE no abnwuow mmw vaw %mHo mvcmm mausoo £m.¢~ souom .m mwmhfi xuouwm>HA macho “ohm: oHHmmGHmm mmahe macho A Ex mcom mwmum>< Hfimm newm: ownsum \waomumav "mucmuuonEH we pmvuo >n vmuqu Ehmuwcoa ucmcHEon m>ufiwcmn vmumeumm coaumasmom mumafixouam< cmaafiuaoouq.m mqmfluummwm «nu mo mumEHumm swsou m ma wfisym .vwm: maoucmu mwamwom wcm mamoo Hem huamflmnm .nmm: acusmo coanh now xuwmcmav .Ameuaou.z mwmmv aowcwaman can .Amaamw + mwamafi>v souom .Amamoov flaw: .A:0H:H + mwamwomv mwcmwom "wmma mum: mmwmnm>m HMfiOfiwmu .wwmaafi> mm>u=w m you woscfiuaoouq.m magma 83 The region represents a vast plain with very few topographic features. The highest elevation is in the Soula hills, West of Coala with a peak of 437 meters. The lowest elevation is found in the South portion of the region where Ouale river reaches the border with an elevation of about 138 meters. The area is covered with soils of different charac- teristics. Based on soil potential analysis, most of the region's soils are described to be of a medium potential for dry land agriculture; there are also soils unusable for crops but could be used for extensive livestock raising, reforesta- tion and tourism (see Table 3.4 for description of soil types). Water is relatively abundant in the rainy season, but most rivers dry up in the dry season, leaving temporary water holes in the form of ponds in the low lands. Shallow rural wells are also dug to serve as water sources. It is not however uncommon for these water sources to dry up towards the end of the dry season causing a general shortage of water for both humans and animals. The main road system in the region is the one all weather road from Ouagadougou to Niamey. It passes through Fada, the center of the region. In most of the year, particu- larly in the rainy season, access to many areas is quite limited, and delivery of inputs or marketing of products is hardly possible. 84 3.2. Farmland and Household Characteristics Like all other departments, the Eastern Region is administered by a Prefect, and according to the 1974 decree (RHV, 1974) the department is subdivided into goug- Prefecture, Arrondissement, Commune or village. The village is the smallest unit of territorial administration, and there were 639 villages based on the 1975 census. According to a recent estimate, the Department contains about 442,559 inhabitants which is about 7% of the nation's pOpulation. Having an average population density of 9 persons per sq. km., the region is the least densely populated of all the departments. The Region is inhabited with three major ethnic groups. The Gourmantche, Mossi and Peuls (or Fulani), com- prising 64%, 28% and 7% of the pOpulation, respectively. The Housa and Zerma represent the balance of the population (see Table 3.4 for the dominant group in the settlement pattern). The overall distribution of the population indicates that most of the people of the EORD are concentrated in two regions: one extending from Coala to Soudougui, in the west, and the second around Diapaga and Logobou in the east. Some 16,000 sq. km. in the south of the ORD is almost uninhabited (see Table 3.4 for approximate pOpulation density). Historically shifting cultivation has been the domi— nant agricultural pattern of Gourmantche farmers. In this system of cultivation, a farmer cultivates a piece of land, 85 and after some time abandons it to fallow, and moves on to clear a new piece of land. Presently, two common farming techniques in the region comprise hoe farming and animal traction farming. 3.3. Main Household Enterprises 3.3.1. Crop Production CrOpping practices in the Eastern Region follow the soil and rainfall patterns. But the most widely grown food crOps are Sorghum and Millet. Major cash crOps grown are peanuts or ground nuts and sesame, rice, cowpeas (niebe) and cotton. Other minor food crOps grown are corn, ground peas, okra, red pepper, etc. Yams are grown in pama area both as food and cash crOp. 3.3.2. Livestock Production In addition to crOp farming livestock is an important enterprise in the Eastern Region. The cattle population in the region ranges from 350,000 to 400,000 with 450,000 sheep and goats. The value of herdsl per household ranges from 148,965 FCFA in hoe farming households to 349,385 FCFA in households using animal traction. 3.3.3. Off-Farm Activities Off-farm activities are also important sources of income for many farmers in the Eastern Region. The 1Calculation of herd value includes cattle, sheep, goats and fowl. 86 compositions of the major off-farm activities and their relative importance as a source of income will be explored further below. 4. An Overview of the EORD Program The EORD was created by decree No. 68/279/pres in 1968 (RHV, 1968), but was officially constituted with Assemblé General and Comité de Direction in 1974 (RHV, 1974). Having arranged for outside donor assistance (Societé d'Intervention), the EORD was set out to attain the follow- ing objectivesl: 4.1. Objectives of the EORD 1. Promote rural productive activities by: a. Intensivying agricultural activity and increas- ing the volume of output in the production of crops, livestock, vegetables and fishing b. Improving the quality of agricultural output c. Assisting rural producers to improve techniques of harvesting, storage and sales of their products d. Providing a mechanism for the provision of inputs in rural production 2. Improve rural productive infrastructure by: a. Organizing arrangement and management of water wells 1Objectives as paraphrased by Mehretu, 1979. d. 87 Organizing land use zones for rural production Organizing management of bottom lands (bas fonds) and plains Improving the habitat of rural households Promote social activities in rural areas by: a. b. Organizing functional training for farmers Formation of functional agricultural production teams Organizing producer groups (Producer Association) for farmers as well as for artisans Providing information and animation to rural communities in rural development practices. The ORD statutes are generally uniform. As Gregory's (1974) report on Ouagadougou and Sud-Ouest ORDS indicates, operational actions of these two ORDS were geared towards: l. aiding rural pOpulation through extension services and technical training pOpularizing improved techniques in order to improve production aiding in the collection, processing, and marketing of products assisting in giving credit improving rural crafts helping improve the land, and organizing the rural population at the Village level. 88 4.2. Organizational Arrangements cu? the EORD The EORD is headed by Director, assisted by a local policy group called Assemblé General. The purpose of the group is to elaborate general policies for the ORD, in a meeting held once a year. It can contain 30 to 60 members including high-ranking local civil servants, political notables and representatives of religious groups of the community. From the group, a 10- to lS-member Steering Committee known as Comité de Direction is selected to meet once a month and deliberate on policy matters concerning the EORD. The ORD director reports to the Steering Committee as well as to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Rural Development. The most recent organizational structure of the EORD and its link with MDR is charted on Figure 3.3. As signified by the chart, the EORD headquarters in Fada is composed of six bureaus (departments) each with a number of sections and subsections. In early 1980, there were 343 employees of the ORD, of which 115 were assigned at head- quarters. The rest of the employees were located in the field at three different levels: 8 sectors, 24 subsectors and 144 extension units. The budget for EORD comes from a civil service budget covering salaries and allowances for permanent civil servants and an ORD budget including salaries and allowances for exten- sion agents, operation and capital expenditures. 89 Qmom on» NO muzuoouum HmcoflumNHcmmuo ucmunou m.m muomflm .muZpdcwtOOu. £3039 acted). asucflztoco 09‘s.)” 9 acufictu :uflcds duo-tuna saga REE a fining a unapoUIO—[aal — 3303:: ‘ C‘sfimifl r «a: J— FSQBJ r 0381— —.¢oz¢>—z.aou I1— resignd 3!. DE. ES... 7.2.1. 9‘00. % la . a F... J”. E Inu- a E. a n t: 3238 .- 3.2:: d 3:6! 4331 3.55-6.33 a 393.5 32.83.. _ _ _ — Sflcaolv—a 2.55.4 9.6208 _ .zufozfio _ _ 62.5393 2983.333 x2530: — _ 222.53» :2 Ugh; Scrum: .5890 Euguag‘ — pluflsg 18:8 3 ran—8.. — 90 The overall budget1 of the EORD which was 70 million francs CFA in 1972, reached a level of 147 million francs CFA in the 1977-78 fiscal year.2 In the 1972 period, the personnel budget3 was 28 million francs CFA. It increased to 61 million and 135 million francs CFA in the 1977-78 and 1979-80 period respectively. 4.3. The EORD Integrated Rural Development Project Within the framework of the stated operational mandate, the EORD has launched a number of specific rural development programs, some specific elements of which included the following4: l. Diffusion of new methods of farming and technological components 2. Management of rural resources, particularly has fonds (bottom land) and water courses 3. Improving market gardening practices 4. Improving practices in the cultivation of cash crops with particular emphasis on peanuts and cotton 5. Assisting in building rural infrastructure, including construction of grain storage and water wells 1Does not include rural credit loan allocations (see Chapter IV). 2Fiscal year in Upper Volta runs from April 1 to March 31. 3For permanent employees and extension agents, does not include other covered under operations costs. 4Programs as outlined by Mehretu, 1979. 91 6. Expanding the capabilities of young peOple by creating youth clubs for developmental purposes 7. Creation of Groupements Villageois for the purpose of development of market gardening and the like 8. Livestock breeding especially to improve stock for farm work 9. Afforestation programs with particular emphasis on reducing or preventing soil erosion. The Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) was designed in 1974 by USAID, to provide technical and finan- cial assistance to the EORD. The project was formulated with twofold purposes. First, to develop and expand the capacity of the EORD, and second, to increase agricultural production and rural income in the region. In order to put in place the technical assistance component of the project, a contract was signed with the Department of Agricultural Economics at Michigan State University beginning in 1977. According to the original project paper, there were 26 separate outputs expected from the project (USAID, 1974). The overall objective was to create four intensive development centers in high-potential areas, called Centers of Progress (Growth Regions) (Foyers de Progress) and provide concentrated extension and related supporting services. However, the concept of Foyers de Progress has not been completely implemented due to con- straints encountered in the initial phase of the Operation. 92 Consequently, the MSU technical assistance team undertook an ORD-wide applied research, including a regional planning survey, and an implementation program in production, mar- keting, credit and c00peratives, livestock and range manage- ment activities. An audiovisual program was added to the project component in September 1978. In mid-1980, the composition of the technical assistance was scaled down to two areas: the credit and cooperative component, and a farming systems survey based on low land (bas fond) rice farming. The technical assistance in the credit area continued until the Michigan State Uni- versity technical assistance contract ended on June 30,1981. 5. Concluding Summary This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the factors that have the potential to influence the tech- nical possibility, economic feasibility, socio-cultural acceptability and the administrative workability of agricul— tural policies in the Voltaic setting. The presentation presumes that effective policy formulation or realistic per- formance assessment entails a good understanding of such variables emanating from the physical, economic and institu- tional aspects of the society. As was pointed out, Upper Volta does not possess natural resource endowment conducive for stimulating agricul- tural production. Aside from the potential inherent in its large number of the rural population, the country is broadly 93 characterized by its poor soil, irregular rainfall, and shortage of water. Its unfavorable natural resource poten- tial is further aggravated by environmental degradation such as soil erosion, deforestation, and overgrazing; its landlocked position, absence of mineral wealth, and a con- tinuing out migration of large numbers of people in the working age, not only from rural to urban centers but also from the country. Consequently Upper Volta is one of the poorest countries in the world. GNP per capita in 1979 dollars was $180.00. Its predominantly rural economy (agriculture sup- ports 90% of the population) is characterized with low level of productivity. The annual average growth rate of agricul- ture in Upper Volta was negative (-3.3%) in the 1970-79 period. In the same period, the food production index has declined about 13%. The country's development strategy since indepen- dence has been guided by series of development plans. The plans which are of "top down" orientation stipulate goals and investment allocations to various sectors. According to the 1977-81 develOpment plan, for instance, the projected investment allocation was 21%, 38%, 30% and 11% for rural, infrastructural, industrial and social sectors respectively. Much of the projected allocations were made in anticipation of substantial funding to come from external sources. One cause for concern in the food production strategy formulation is the uneven pOpulation distribution such as the 94 dense population in the Mossi highlands vis-a-vis the scattered settlement in most portions of the EORD. In this regard, the critical policy question facing decision makers includes determining trade offs between intensification strategy in the first as Opposed to implementation of settlement options in the latter case. The overall priority concern in improving agricul- tural productivity and rural income is centered on promoting dryland farming while at the same time expanding irrigated agriculture. The focal point of the effort is on increasing yield, promoting marketing and pricing policies and foster- ing human capital formation. The current administrative arrangement in Upper Volta has its roots in the French Colonia1.Administration which prevailed from 1896 until independence in 1960. It is now divided into 10 Departments for territorial administration. There are Regional DevelOpment Offices (Organismes Regionaux des Developpements) in each department for promoting coordinated rural development programs. The first ORD was created in 1965. There are now 11 ORDs in the country. Even though the creation of ORDS is an indication of awareness of Voltaic authorities of the merits of insti— tuting "bottom up" development strategies, the question regarding the adequacy of local involvement in the planning and overall development process leaves much to be desired. The Eastern.ORD region is the largest department in Upper Volta, comprising 18% of the land area and 7% of the 95 country's pOpulation. On the whole, the region is charac- terized by a heterogeneous agroclimatic condition, with different types of soils and varied levels of water availa- bility. It has a Sudano-Sahelian climate with rainfall ranging from 600 mm in the north to 1,000 mm in the south. The average monthly temperature varies between 25 degrees centigrade in January to 31 degrees centigrade in April. The cropping pattern follows the soil and rainfall conditions. Sorghum and Millet are the most widely grown food crops. Major cash crops are peanut, ground nut, sesame, rice, cowpeas and cotton. The average area cultivated per household is esti- mated to be 7.09 hectares with average number of six working unit per households. Population is concentrated in the western and southern and eastern portion of the Department, with a density ranging from a low of 2 to about 40 persons per sq. km. The region is inhabited by three major ethnic groups: Gourmanche, Mossi, and Peul, all engaged in farming, live- stock raising and various forms of off-farm activities. The Eastern ORD is the organization responsible for rural development in the eastern Department. It was created in 1968 and got official status in 1974 about nine years after the creation of the first ORD in the country. Its goal, like all other ORDs, is to promote decentralization and 96 coordinated administration of develOpment activities at the regional level. It also serves as a mechanism for channel- ing external assistance aimed at improving agricultural pro— ductivity and rural welfare. Having the extension service as its core, the EORD has attempted to deliver different services to the rural population with the objective of promoting integrated rural development in the region. The EORD is administered by a Director and a local policy group called Assemblé General, which in turn elects a steering committee known as Comité de Direction. The ORD director reports to the steering committee as well as to the permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Rural Development. Presently, the EORD's headquarters is composed of six bureaus, each with various sections, and field offices at three different levels. In 1972, the EORD had 79 employees and 28 million francs CFA personnel budget. This increased to 343 employees and 135 million francs CFA personnel budget in the 1979-80 fiscal period. Perhaps due to the rapid growth in the number of employees, the EORD is often characterized by budgetary con- straint, high maintenance cost, low quality staff, high staff turn over and overall inefficient management. The EORD-IRDP was a major joint undertaking by USAID and the EORD. Its objective was to expand the Ord's admin- istrative capacity and to increase agricultural production 97 and rural income in the Eastern Region. The project was designed with the intent to create "Centers of Progress" for intensive program of intervention, and thereby experi- ment on provision of concentrated extension and related supporting services. However, operational problems cur- tailed implementation of the concept. Consequently, ORD-wide applied research and limited implementation programs were undertaken by the Michigan State University technical assistance team from May 1977 until June 1981. CHAPTER IV THE ROLE OF THE EORD/IRDP IN INSTITUTION BUILDING, 1974-1981 Introduction One of the most important objectives of the IRDP was institution building or the process of strengthening the operational and administrative capacity of the ORD to carry out its mandate. The means envisaged for achieving these objectives were the provision of technical assistance, training, improvement of roads, building and other infrastructure. While the provision of assistance to improve the infrastructure started in late 1974, technical assistance services were not started until May of 1977. The technical assistance team carried out studies of agricultural credit, production and marketing, and assistance in strengthening the agricultural credit and audio-visual services. The task performed by the long term technical advisors were often supplemented by assistance from short-term consultants. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the role of foreign assistance in strengthening the capacity of the ORD to design and implement various programs over the 1974-1981 period. As suggested in Chapter II, institution building will be examined through such indicators as 98 99 numbers of ORD personnel trained, efficiency in coordinating services, loan repayment performance, etc. The production and income effects of the services such as agricultural credit will be analyzed in the next chapter. 2. Agricultural Credit 2.1. The Role of Agricultural Credit in the EORD/IRDP The agricultural credit component1 is, if not the single most significant factor, certainly one of the key components of the strategy to increase food production, food security and income of the people of the eastern region. It is quite apparent that the credit component has derived its significant role from the worldwide characterization associated with the idealized potential of credit programs. As Long (1976) pointed out: In idealized form, the scenario for a public sector program of credit for small farmers goes as follows: the government or central bank loans money to an agri- cultural bank which in turn relends the funds either directly or through cooperatives to small farmers. The farmers use the funds to purchase productive inputs such as fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, etc. which are combined with family labor to produce more output. The additional output is sold and the proceeds are sufficient to repay the loan and leave the farmer better off. The payments received from the farmers by the agricultural bank are sufficient to regenerate lending capacity, to cover administrative costs and to pay the interest on the government loan. Such a program consumes no resources; the money committed simply constitutes a revolving fund. The loans are repaid and the interest charges are sufficient to cover costs and any defaults. 1For a detailed discussion of credit programmes in Upper Volta in general, and the Eastern Region in particular, see Tapsoba (1981). 100 However, despite the potential of lowering the cost of capital (and hence the cost of production per unit) as well as alleviating farm cash flow, very few credit programs have been successful in the developing countries. Jones (1971) stresses that credit should not be considered in isolation, but rather viewed as it relates to other institutions which can significantly influence its performance. To be successful, not only should a credit program be linked to new technologies, but these technologies should be financially profitable to the farmer. Such a profitable package depends on a host of interdependent factors, among which the most important are price incentives, marketing, availability, timeliness of farm input, extension, and other support services (repair shops, veterinary care, etc.). The literature on credit delineates the role of credit in augmenting output and income through an increase in yields obtained per unit of land and/or an increase in expansion of the area under cultivation. Based on this premise, there are three situations in which credit may be extended to achieve this objective: - When no technology is available, and where the aim is to increase the use of existing factors of production; - When there are relatively inexpensive innovations, and the goal is to use credit as a catalyst for the adoption of these innovations; and - When the modern technology being promoted involves 101 capital requirements that surpass the investment capability of small farmers. The credit component of the IRDP was based on two assumptions. First, it assumed that credit was needed so farmers could purchase the required agricultural inputs with special emphasis on animal traction. Second, it assumed that a government agency (ORD) was needed to distribute the credit to the farmers. From this perspective, a revolving fund was established within the National Development Bank (BND) to channel the funds through the EORD to local farmer associations (groupements villageois). 2.2. Brief Program Description Two types of credit programs are in use in the Eastern ORD. The first type is designed to provide a short-term (one production season) credit to farmers. This entails delivery of production inputs in kind, such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. Within this category are also other miscellaneous loans for small enterprises such as village shops, village pharmacies, cereal banks, etc. The second type of credit program provides medium-term credit for farmers with emphasis on animal traction packages. The medium term loan has a repayment period of four or five years. The typical medium term loan for a more or less complete animal traction package has a maximum term of four years for donkey equipment and five years for oxen-drawn equipment. In both cases there is a one-year grace period, but the 102 farmers may start repayment the first year if they choose to do so. All ORD credit is provided in kind except-~until recently--the purchase of draft animals. Each type of credit is provided under different terms. For instance, the interest rate for the short-term credit varies from item to item, averaging about 12 percent. In the miscellaneous group, the cereal bank loans are given at a rate of 8 percent. The medium-term credit was given at a 5.5 percent interest until the recent increase instituted by Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA). The financial resources of the Eastern ORD's credit operations are derived from internal and external sources. The internal portion of credit funds comes from the ORD's own generated funds (marketing and other com- mercial activities), but mostly from the National Development Bank. The external source of credit is provided by bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as by a non— profit organization. USAID is the most important bilateral contributorl, followed by the French Caisse Centrale d3 Cooperation Economique (CCCE) and the Cooperation Technique Suisse (CTS). Multilateral institutions include the FAO, the UNDP Fond d'Equipement des Nations Unies (FENU), the Entente Fund, and the Fonds de Developpement Rural (FDR) of the World Bank. The only private non-profit organization 1The Ministry of Rural Development's Secretariat Permanent du Comité (he Coordination du Developpement Rural (CCDR) has been channeling USAID's money to various ORDS for credit purposes since 1975. The CCDR was replaced in 1980 by the General Secretariat. 103 involved in credit activities is the Association Francaise pgur 1e Developpement International (AFDI). Each of the various donors is interested in certain types of credit. For example, USAID and AFDI provide loanable funds for animal traction and village cereal banks. FAO, FENU and the Entente Fund provide credit for cereal banks; CCCE was providing both medium-term credit (animal traction) and short-term credit (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.): FDR engaged in short-term credit provisions to village groups for more specific agricultural activities, such as rice and vegetable production in irrigated schemes and lowlands; CCDR funds were used pri- marily for animal traction equipment. 2.3. Policies and Procedures 2.3.1. Administrative Procedures The procedure for extending and collecting the repayment of both the short- and medium-term credit involves various bureaus and/or sections and sub-sections, sector chiefs, sub-sector chiefs, and extension/credit agents. For instance, the Bureau of Community Development (BCD) is responsible for the approval, disbursement and collection of loans. This specific duty is assigned to the Credit and Rural Institutions Section, which is one of the four sections in BCD. The Bureau of Agricultural Production (BAP) is responsible for collecting orders for traction equipment and draft animals as requested by sector chiefs. The BAP is also responsible for distributing inputs and other 104 equipment, and for the training of draft animals, as well as providing technical assistance on animal feeding and care. Extension agents, with the support of the BAP, provide technical training to farmers so that they can prOperly use the new animal traction technology. The Bureau of Livestock and Veterinary Services (BLV) provides animal health care services. In processing short-term credit disbursement, extension agents are required to start by completing two sets of forms. The first set is filled out in quadruplicate and supplies the following information: - number of the borrower, which is the number on the village group membership card; - unit credit price of the various inputs; down payment; balance due; and the date of input delivery. The four c0pies are sent to different destinations: the white, pink, and yellow c0pies are sent to the sub- sector chief; the fourth copy remains with the borrower. The second form which the credit agent fills out consists of a summary statement of all credit transactions by borrower number and by village. This statement is sent to the sub-sector chief, along with the three copies of individual short-term credit forms. At the sub-sector level, the sub-sector chief fills out a summary statement form by extension unit, and keeps the yellow copies of the 105 individual short-term credit forms. At the sector level, the sector chief goes through basically the same process. At the end of this procedure, the credit office at the headquarters in Fada holds three separate sets of summary statements (by village, by extension unit, and by sub- sector) and a number of pink credit forms corresponding to the number of borrowers. The procedure involved in providing medium—term loans is about the same as that of the short-term credit. For each farmer who is eligible for medium-term credit, the credit agent prepares an "individual medium-term credit card" (IMTCC). The information on this card includes: - the source of the loan; - the date of delivery of the credit items; - the number of the farmer and the number of his village; - a description of the items being purchased; - the amount of the installments and their due dates; - the total amount of the loan, including interest payments; - the down payment, if any; and - the signatures of both the president of the village group or the village chief1 and of the credit agent. lFor illiterate presidents of village groups or village chiefs, fingerprints are used as a substitute for signatures. ' 106 In collecting short-term loan repayments, the first step involves sending the white form to the extension/credit agents. When a farmer repays his loan, the extension/credit agent returns the white copy and a receipt to the farmer. The extension/credit agent transmits the green form and repayment funds to the sector chief through the sub-sector chief. Summary statements of repayments are prepared following the same procedural steps as were explained earlier. The sector chiefs prepare several loan repayment statements, which are handed over to the ORD cashier along with the repayment funds. One summary statement of repayment is sent to the Credit Office for control. The Credit Office prepares a monthly short-term credit situation for both loans and repayment received. The oxen loan package is repaid in a five-year period with one year's grace: three equal installments of 20 percent and a final payment of 40 percent of the total loan. The loan for the donkey package is for four years, with a one-year grace period and equal repayments in years two, three, and four. All repayment figures are given in a credit manual issued by the Ministry of Rural Development and used by credit agents to fill out the various documents described above. 2.3.2. Eligibility for Loans There are several stipulations governing the distribution of credit to the farmers. First, credit is distributed through farmers' organizations such as village 107 groups and/or village cooperatives. The village organiza- tion screens and endorses the application of individual farmers seeking credit. Individual farmers are required to pay a group membership fee. The membership fee payments are kept by the ORD in a separate account to repay arrears. The annual membership fee costs 200 CFA for a short-term loan. The medium—term fee costs 500 CFA, and is valid for five years. The second condition is that no member of any farmers' organization is eligible for a loan if the arrears of his village group or cooperative exceed 10 percent for the preceding year. This restriction may be waived by the lending institution in cases of unusual circumstances such as a natural disaster (e.g., drought), death, or if the ORD failed to deliver the inputs or equipment on time. The third and fourth conditions require the loan applicant to make a down payment of at least 10 percent of the total medium-term loan, and that each potential borrower commit himself to plant at least one-third of his acreage to cash crOps. The fifth criteria of eligibility for medium-term credit requires an assessment of the profitability of the farm business, as well as the credit carrying capacity of the farm. In addition, those farmers who benefit from the animal credit program are required to subscribe to an animal insurance policy which is prepaid as part of the total credit 108 package. The insurance premium amounts to 750 CFA per year for one donkey and 3000 CFA a year for a pair of oxen. Although there is no fixed asset, such as land, required as collateral in the EORD credit program, provisions are made to cover default risks in the following ways: village membership fees, - insurance premiums, - subscriptions of cooperative members, — repossession of equipment and draft animals, - the profitability of the farmers' operation, and - peer group and social pressure on delinquent farmers. 2.4. Performance of the Credit Program The purpose of this subsection is to assess the performance of the EORD/IRDP credit program. Three items will be discussed: (1) amount loaned and persons served, (2) loan repayment performance, and (3) farmer understanding of the credit program. The cost of lending and borrowing will be examined in the next chapter, in connection with an analysis of the overall effectiveness of the EORD strategy. 2.4.1. Amount Loaned and Persons Served Table 4-1 presents the amount of money distributed, the number of loans, and persons served by the short- and medium-term credit program during the 1975-76 to 1980-81 period. As shown in the table, the 9,282 persons served during this period represents about 15.5 percent of the 109 moa «baa mama mmmm Hmpoe Um>nmm mCOmumm mo .02 mm New omm meme Hmuoe mason mo .02 ca Hem mom mmmm EH08 uuonm Um>umm mcomumm mo .02 H saw an Hmmm Emma uuonm mcmoq mo .02 H ma m ma Enos uuosm w mm mom mmoa vvvm Enos .pwz om>uom mcomumm mo .02 mm mew mom vaa EH09 .UOE mcmoq mo .02 mm mm am am Emma .omz w onm.omv.v mmv.vam.ma mm~.~oo.mm mma.mmm.ooa uso cocoon ucooad unsound pcom ucnoood pooh EmuH .nsmIonmD uwpouo Hmuom .QomIaHmmm mZOmmmm 92¢ mZ¢OA m0 mmszZ .QflZdOA BZDOE¢ HIV mqmflfi 110 60,000 families residing in the Eastern Region. This level of achievement is below the lower bounds of the targeted attainment level. As was indicated earlier, the revised project objective envisaged extending the services to 10-15,000 farms of the region by the end of the project. Table 4-2 also shows the evolution of the medium-term credit program in the Eastern region for the 1975-76 to 1980-81 period. As shown in the table, the value of loans for both oxen and donkey traction has risen from about 837 thousand CFA in the 1975-76 period to about 20 million CFA in the 1980-81 period. The number of loans has risen from 20 to 245 during the same period. 2.4.2. Loan Repayment Performance The collection ratio is one useful measure of the repayment performance of a credit program. Other repayment measures include the percentage of the portfolio in arrears, proportion of borrowers meeting repayment obliga- tions, repayment index, etc. The collection ratio indicator is the ratio of the volume of loan collection to the volume of amount due. It is a comparison between the value of installments falling due and the actual volume of repayment. This ratio is conventionally computed for an accounting period (i.e., a month, a quarter, or a year). Mathematically the collection ratio is expressed as follows: G = ECn n SSH lll Hmma .MQOmmma pom mucsoooé uflpouu Qmom "mouoom omm.mam.~a mow mom.mmm.mm use Hmuoe mme.¢am.ma mam Hmnomma om¢.h>m.va mmm mme.ano.v «ma mmm.moe.m Goa omnmhma mma.aam.m mma mmm.mmm.m no mmo.mma.n mm menmema oom.e~h.mm Ham mmm.mmm.m mom mem.mmm.om mmm mensema «mm.mmo.m mma omm.aem NH wee.mmm.e GHH seionmfl omm.mmm on o o omm.mmm om enumema Ammov women no Aamov mcmoq mo Aamoe memos «0 name mGMOA MO HTQESZ mans MO HODESZ meOA .HO ngz msam> mdam> m5am> Hmuoa cowuomue mmxcoa cowuooua cmxo ommalmhma DMD 2mm9m 02¢ mmmEDZ le mqmdfi 112 where G = collection ratio for period 2 (expressed as a lo percentage) Cn = volume of repayments collected during period 3 Sn = volume of installments matured in period n Table 4-3 indicates that the collection ratio1 for both the short-term and medium-term credit has increased from 25 percent in 1976-77 to 37 percent in 1980-81. This resulted in an ocerall collection ratio of 32 percent for the 1976-77 through 1980-81 period. On the other side, the delinquency rate has declined from 75 percent in 1976-77 to 63 percent in the 1980-81 period, with an overall delinquency rate of 68 percent. Thus, the loan repayment record in the EORD/IRDP has not been very encouraging. An overall delinquency rate of 68 percent is indeed unsatisfactory by most standards. The percentage of portfolio in arrears has also risen steadily from 2 percent in 1977 to 28 percent in 1980. Much effort has been exerted over time to understand the causes and to improve the poor performance. For example, 1The calculation of the collection ratios as well as the delinquency rates in Tables 4-3 and 4-4 include in- terest charges in both the numerator and denominator. It also contains repayments for arrears in the "amount paid" category. 113 TABLE 4-3 EORD/IRDP LOAN REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE (BY YEAR) Collection Ratio Delinquency Rate Year (Percent) (Percent) 1976—77 25 75 1977-78 41 59 1978-79 32 68 1979-80 25 75 1980-81 37 63 Unweighted Average 32 68 Source: EORD Credit Accounts, 1981 114 a study in 19781 attempted to pinpoint the causes of loan repayment default in the ORD's credit program. The study revealed that 37 percent of the cases of delinquency were attributed to the farmers themselves, 37 percent to the credit institution (the ORD), and 26 percent were due to natural causes. The survey revealed that the single most important reason for the delinquency is that a substantial number of farmers consider the loan from the ORD as a 'one-time deal.‘ Since no future loan is expected, there is no need to meet repayment obligations. An important reason why farmers repay private money lenders is the shame that delinquency entails: the survey revealed that evading a loan repayment to the ORD is not perceived as being as shameful or dis- graceful as failing to meet loan obligations with a private lender. Also, the ORD's collection procedures are perceived as being "soft" as compared with the tougher methods used by private lenders to insure repayment. Second, the survey also revealed that the ORD was responsible for 37 percent of all cases of delinquency. The overriding reason is administrative neglect. The 37 percent of the cases of delinquency attributed to the ORD were broken down to the following problems: 1The findings of this study were summarized in Thomas Stickley & Edouard Tapsoba, "Loan Repayment Delinquency in the Eastern ORD of Upper Volta," in Borrowers and Lenders, edited by John Howell, Overseas Development Institute, London, 1980. 115 (l) 29 percent of the cases of delinquency were caused by the late delivery of animal traction equipment; (2) 3 percent were due to the fact that the draft animals purchased were too young and too small; (3) 3 percent were due to ORD credit agents dropping in unannounced to collect loan repayments without advance notice; and (4) 2 percent were caused by the fact that the agent who went to collect the repayment money was different from the one who actually processed the loan-—farmers were confused, and refused to repay an agent they did not already know. Thirdly, the survey attributed 26 percent of all cases of delinquency to bad weather (especially drought), death and sickness of both farmers and draft animals. In view of persistent poor performance, another attempt was made in 19811 to understand the causes of differences in repayment rates among the sectors. The diversity of the repayment level (see Table 4-4) portrayed by each sector is consistent with common knowledge about the heterogeneity of the agricultural condition (rainfall, soil type, farm size, crop mix, family size, etc.) in the eastern region. However, two different factors were repeatedly emphasized during the consultation as having contributed to success in Comin-Yanga and to poor performance in Diapaga sector. lSee Negash, Progress Report no. 8 and End of Tour Report 1981. 116 .mucsooo< “HGOHO Omom "wousom m.~m m.>m omo.vm~.ma mnn.mvm.am omo Hmuoe m.mm m.mm mmh.vma mmv.avm cofluomuwo ~.>N m.mh omm.mvm.~ emo.¢om.m mama o.~> o.m~ mav.mmo.a hmm.mom.m Hamoxufiumz o.mm o.~m ooo.m~o.~ mmv.mmm.m whosoucmm m.mm h.ov mnm.¢mn.~ mna.m>m.m ovum w.me ~.o~ mhm.pmo.~ mmm.amm.oa mangann m.aw H.mm mom.hm~.v Hov.mmH.HH onoao G.m~ q.me mme.mmm.a meo.mvm.a mmamsucaeoo m.am m.mm Hmm.nmm.m mmm.wmo.> mpcmmom mumm mocwsvcwama owumm coauomHHOU pawn unsos< pmuommxm unsoe< nouomm Hmma Auouoom mnv .Hm comm: moz¢2mommmm Bzmzwuom Eumm “mousOm o.OOH om OOH mv Hmuoe ~.H H m.~ H zocx #0: 0o m.m m m.m m mumnuo In I: h.- oH 6:8H mo muHHHuHmm m>oumEH II II m.~ H mmGOE ammo C30 m>mm OB m.H~ pH m.~ H umupmn xuoz o.m v m.mm 0H mscm>mu a UHmoum wmmmuocH «.mo mm a.ov mH :oHuoseoua mmmmuocH mmmucmonmm mumEHMh mmmucmoumm mHmEHmm mo Hmnaoz mo HmnEoz Emma EaHpmz EH09 Huonm mmomusm mhnman .zaoq mo mmommom mes mo onemmommm wlv MHm4B . mmsz—ANh "DMD 2mMBm4m 120 HmmH .mnommma one mama wm>uom Show “condom o.ooH mm OOH Hm 00H 5v 00H 5v Hmuoa H.mb Oh v.0m mm N.mm mm m.Hm mH 3onx u.GOQ o.MH NH m.mH mH m.HN OH m.Hm mH Hm3mcm ©HHM>GH m.oH 0H m.mH mH m.m~ NH N.mm NH Hmzmn¢ ©HHM> w mumeumm w mumaumm w mumsumm w mumeumm m0 .02 MO .02 MO .02 m0 .02 msHm> ammo msHm> uHemuo msHm> ammo msHm> aflcmuo ucmsmstm coHuomuB HmEHC¢ qumuU Emma uuosm nuHa pmmosouom meumemH .mZmeH ommamomom mo MDH¢> mm¢U 02¢ BHQMMU mmB ho HUDmHSOZM hlv mqm¢9 .mmmzm¢m uQmO 2mmam¢m 121 TABLE 4-8 EASTERN ORD: FARMERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR REPAYMENT OF SHORT TERM LOANS, 1978-79 Time (in months) Number of Farmers Percentage 6 13 25.5 7 3 5.9 12 27 52.9 After harvest 5 9.8 Do not know 3 5.9 Total 51 100.0 Source: Farm Survey Data 1978-79 122 Table 4-6 indicates that over 60 percent of the farmers are aware that the most important purpose of the loan was to increase production and revenue, which is consistent with the production objective of the EORD/IRDP. Table 4-7 shows that about 36 percent knew the credit value of the inputs they obtained on credit, 32 percent gave a wrong figure, and 32 percent said they did not know. Furthermore, 25.5 percent knew the cash price of the seasonal inputs, but 53 percent said they just did not know. Similarly, about 20 percent of the farmers who obtained medium-term credit knew the value of their loan package, while about 60 percent did not. Moreover, only 11 percent knew the cash value of their equipment package, while 76 percent did not. Table 4-8 shows that 53 percent of the 51 short-term borrowers gave the right answer (i.e., twelve months), whereas about 31 percent thought they had six or seven months to repay their loans. 2.5. Problems and Achievements Beginning with its early phase, the EORD/IRDP credit system was faced with problems emanating from two levels: problems arising from the central administration of the ORD, and problems concerned with the operation of the system at the field level. At the headquarters level, the credit system was faced with a steadily eroding portfolio because some of the fund was used for covering general operational expenses of the ORD and rural saving program was not initiated to supply new sources of credit 123 from internal sources. This shortage of funds, however, was curtailed temporarily by new injections of capital from various foreign assistance programs.1 Similarly, there were many problems at the field level when the credit program expanded. For instance, Stickley (1978) character- izes the initial stage of the credit system as follows: 4 Lack of systematic, regular, and accurate record- keeping and reporting of loan distribution, loan repayment, and distribution of agricultural supplies. - Low repayment rates of loans due to (a) the lack of a systematic loan collection system and (b) poorly motivated extension agents. - Poorly-organized work plans for extension agents as they relate to loan disbursement and collection. - Extension agents who delay (or avoid) forwarding to the Central Office money collected from farmers for loan repayments, cash sales of agricultural factors of production, payments associated with loan renewals (interest and insurance of traction animals), insurance premiums, the sale of membership cards, and down payments made when re- questing a loan. 1There were ten different international projects providing credit funds to the ORD as of March 31, 1981. AID has four: the Integrated Rural Development Project, the Entente Project, animal traction project (CCDR) and Strengthening Women's Role in DevelOpment (SWID). The United Nations had three: a World Bank project, FAO/UNDP, and an equipment project (FENU). France had two, the French Association for Industrial DevelOpment (AFDI) and the Central Bank for Economic C00peration (CCCE); and the Swiss had one, Swiss Technical Cooperation (CTS). 124 These problems were thoroughly documentedl through investigations carried out by the technical assistance team members in collaboration with the ORD personnel. Subsequently, various proposals have been made suggesting the implementation of new management procedures or requiring modification of existing Operating practices. One major step in this direction was the computer- ization of the credit management system. This system was designed to meet the following objectives: - To produce regular, accurate, and rapid statistical reports on the number and amounts of loans and loan repay- ments broken down by ORD sector, by loan purpose, and by source of funding. - To improve loan repayment rates. - To improve the productivity of ORD employees. - To improve the productivity of investments made with capital distributed through the agricultural credit system. - To achieve viability of the agricultural credit system-—that is, a self-supporting credit system in which revenues exceed the costs of operation. When the implementation was completed, the system continued to produce three types of outputs: statistical reports, functional tools to aid extension/credit agents, and calculations of commissions to be paid to extension/ credit agents based on loan repayments received. 1For further details, see Stickley (1977); Barrett, et a1. (1978); and Dahany et a1. (1978). 125 The statistical reports produced included: number of loans made, number of persons benefitting from the loans, the amount of money loaned, amount of loan repayments received as a percentage of loan repayments due, number of delinquent borrowers as a percentage of all borrowers with loan repayments due, and a list of uncollectable loans to be written off. The statistics are broken down by fiscal year, sector of the ORD, factor of production (loan purpose), and source of funding. The output produced to help the extension/credit agents to do their jobs more efficiently included: bills to borrowers, lists of such bills, lists of live loans, lists of overdue loans, lists of paid-off loans, lists of borrowers who were overcharged/undercharged interest according to the date repayments were made, loan repayment control sheets, monthly reports of loan payments received, and lists of borrower identification numbers already assigned. A commission system was adopted in order to encourage and motivate extension/credit agents to write and collect more productive loans. The calculation of commission to be paid to the agents was processed by the computerized credit system. To date, there has not been a systematic evaluation of the computerized credit system. However, indications are that the system has been very helpful in producing statistical reports, preparing individual reports to farmers, 126 reducing embezzelment, monitoring loan repayment status, etc. Regular and accurate statistical reports of the number and amount of loans and loan repayments are produced by sector of the ORD, factor of production (loan purpose), and source of funding. The bills sent to each borrower remind him of the amount due to be repaid and the date it is due. Consequently, embezzlement by agents is controlled, due to the pressure put on the agents by borrowers who receive bills for loans they have already repaid. In assessing the overall viability of the EORD/IRDP credit program, it is essential to note two related points. First, as was cited in earlier pages, over 90 percent of the revolving fund was obtained from external sources over the 1974-80 period. Also, a substantial portion of the fund is being used to cover other operating expenses of the ORD.1 Therefore, any attempt to improve the viability of the credit system requires an effort to mobilize internal saving, coupled with measures to increase revenues and reduce operating expenses of the ORD. Secondly, the existing 1The balance in the rural credit account on March 31, 1980 was 32,705,373 FCFA. This is equal to the balance in the bank of 446,330 FCFA, plus the difference between the amount the ORD owes the Rural Credit Fund (94,528,011 Francs CFA) and the amount the Rural Credit Fund owes the ORD (62,268,968 Francs CFA) or 32,259,043 Francs CFA. The 32,259,043 Francs CFA that the ORD owes the Rural Credit Fund presents a liquidity deficit problem for the Rural Credit System. The ORD Director took action to prevent this situation from deteriorating further in January 1980. At that time he ordered the ORD cashier to transfer directly to the Rural Credit bank account any money coming to the ORD cashier which was for the repayment of loans. 127 accounting system1 of the credit program is useful for tracing global cash flows as well as cash transfers between the ORD and the Rural Credit account. The system does not, however, allow one to prepare an income statement or a balance sheet to ascertain the viability or net worth status of the credit program. To produce such statements, it is essential among other things to: separate interest income from loan payments; take periodic inventory of stock items; delineate the grant from payable loans; and assess full cost of service delivery. 3. Agricultural Extension 3.1. Organizational Framework In the EORD, agricultural extension services are provided to farmers under the framework of the eight sectors (see Figure 3.3L.Each sector has a sector head who reports directly to the ORD director. At the center (Fada level), the extension service is supported by six departments comprising various sections and subsections. At the field level, the sectors are divided into 24 subsectors. Each subsector is headed by a subsector chief. The task of the subsector chief includes training and supervising extension agents under his jurisdiction, as well as channeling the paperwork of the staff back and forth in the ORD system. Each extension agent is responsible for an extension unit (unite d'encadrement). There are 144 extension units 1For further details see Negash, "Progress Report no. 8" and Negash, "End of Tour Report" (1981). 128 within the EORD system. The norms established for creating an extension unit states that there must be: - five villages per extension unit (although this can vary from three to six villages), - not more than 3,000 inhabitants in the five villages, and - no village more than 20-25 kms. from the center of the unit. Theoretically, each extension agent (encadreur) is responsible for the entire process by which farmers are exposed to, and adopt, technical themes and packages. His first task is to sensibilize the farmer to any theme or innovation which is to be expounded, or any input to be adopted. Once an individual farmer or group understands the innovation, his next task is to animate--to establish the necessary organization of structure for the adoption of the innovation. Thirdly, he must vulgarize, or expand the adoption of the innovation over a wider population or area. Finally, he must monitor the peasants who have adopted the package or innovation to ensure their proper use or handling of it. The total of these four tasks constitutes encadrement, and those who have been exposed successfully to the whole process are considered to be encadre. In 1974, there were 24 extension agents in the whole ORD system. By the end of 1980, the number had increased to 149 extension agents. The various catagories 129 of extension agents and their levels of training are further assessed in Chapter V. 3.2. Delivery of Inputs In order to obtain the technical input, a farmer will have to be a member of a village group (VG) in the area. Thus, after holding a few series of meetings on sensibilization, the extension agent is always under pressure to form as many VGs in his unit as possible. Briefly, the chain of qualification required of a farmer who wants to acquire inputs from the production package is a two- stage process: First of all, the farmer must be a member of a village group. Secondly, before the individual members of such a group can qualify for credit, the group must have met a series of basic requirements. The following are some of the criteria used in distinguishing strong and active groups from the less active ones: - longevity of the group, - stability of membership, - cohesiveness of members, - amount of money in the treasury, - record of loan repayment, - completion of successful projects, and - full participation of all members in group activities and in decision-making. According to the statistics on men's and women's village groups in the Eastern ORD many of the groups are considered to be not very active using the indicated 130 internal evaluation criteria. For instance, among the men's groups, 52 percent of the total were considered "not very active" in 1978. In 1980, the percentage of "not very active" groups had dropped to 50 percent, but the total number of men's groups had declined by about 13 percent from the 1978 level. In 1978, 49 percent of the women's groups were considered "not very active." This increased to 67 percent in 1980. In both the men's and women's groups, it is only a negligible proportion of those regarded as "strong and active" who are Operating viable self-help projects such as stores, pharmacies, grain mills and cereal banks. Consequently, numerous observers have registered concern about the role of village groups in promoting rural develop- ment in the region. For instance, Poulan, e£_al. (1978) writes that "the village groups are serving collective interests of the ORDS more than as a means to increase mass participation in the develOpment of decision-making." Similarly, Swanson (1979) points out that "pre-COOperative groups being formed by ORD extension agents, for the most part, do not take the form of pre-existing local structure usually found within rural communities in the Eastern ORD." The shortcomings of the input delivery mechanism is not limited to the formation of ineffective village groups; the delivery system is also inefficient in extending the traction animals and other technical facilities to farmers on time. To investigate the efficiency of the 131 Eastern ORD medium—term credit delivery system, a one- shot questionnaire was administered to 128 animal traction farmers (ANTRAC) in 1978-79 (Tapsoba, 1981). Farmers were asked whether they used their traction package the first year. Out of the 94 who receive credit from the ORD, 57 used their equipment the first year, 33 did not, and 4 did not answer the question (see also Table 4-9). The reasons why the 33 farmers did not use their equipment the first year include: 1. material was not delivered on time (34.4%), 2. animals were not trained (28.1%), 3. animals were too young (12.5%), 4. equipment was incomplete (6.3%), and 5. animals were not delivered on time (3.1%). As was described earlier, a number of bureaus, sections, and subsections at the headquarters level are involved in the ORD's credit program. However, there is no precise schedule of the various tasks which have to be performed by different services at the headquarters and by extension workers at the sector level. There are, at best, vague guidelines indicating that lending activities would take place from January to September, with no clear deadline set for orders of needed equipment. 132 HmmH .mQOmmmB mom mama mm>uom Emmm "mousom 0.00H Hmuoa O O voommmm v-i «HmMon O MNv-i r-(O‘Q‘Nv-lln mOOmmmH umnuo oEHu co OOHO>HHOO uoc mHmEHc< ucmEmHoqm mumHmEoocH 0:50» 00» mHmEHnm OOGHmHu uoc mHmEHc< mEHu co OOHO>HHOO poo HomEmHoqm mmmucmoumm meEHMnH MO mHmQEHHZ mGOmmom meumemH .mmmw emmHm was OZHmDO Bzmzmeom ZOHBU¢MB H¢SH2¢ mmD 802 GHQ mmmzm¢m NM M23 m20m¢mm "DMD 2mm9m¢m mlv mHm¢B 133 3.3. The Training Activities of the EORD/IRDP Contract Team in the Extension System After realizing the poor performance of the ORD extension system, the technical assistance team attempted to improve the operations of the extension program-~especially during the latter portion of the team's tenure in the field--by organizing various on-the-job training activities for the extension agents and other ORD staff at different levels. The training activities were initiated either by individual specialists or through a collaborative team arrangement. For example, the training activities in the animal traction area were given to sector chiefs and sub- sector chiefs, extension agents, and farmers using prepared technical manuals.1 The training covered the following subjects: - the association of plant and animal production, - the choice of traction animals (including a visit to the local herd), - the health and nutrition of animals, - shelter for the animals, - animal training, - proper adjustment and maintenance of animal traction equipment, lThe livestock technician has written a technical manual for extension agents on the following subjects: a) the association of crop and animal production, b) the choice of traction animals, c) care and feeding of the animals, and d) animal training. 134 - practical demonstrations of the use of the equipment, - a review of the different cultural practices which can be performed with the equipment, and - a budget analysis of animal traction. In training extension agents on the use of animal traction equipment, the livestock specialist covered the following areas: - objectives and benefits of plowing; - erosion control; - presentation of equipment for plowing, and assembly of equipment; - nomenclature of plow parts to facilitate the ordering of spare parts; - adjustment of equipment to regulate depth and width of plowing; - techniques of plowing; and - a practical demonstration of plowing. Using prepared technical manualsl, the training activity in agricultural credit also included the following topics: 1Fiche Technique sur le Credit Rural, by Amidou Dahany & ThOmas Stickley, Credit and Cooperatives Section, BDC, Eastern ORD, Fada N'Gourma, Upper Volta, March 1979. Comptabilitie des Micro Projets (Banque Cereal, Beutique Villageoise, Moulin a Mill, Etc.), by Kifle Negash, Sinare Mousa & Dahany Amidou, BDC, EORD, Fada N‘Gourma, Upper Volta, February 1981. 135 - credit policies currently in effect, - loan guarantees, - economic analysis of animal traction investment before loans are made, - animal insurance, - criteria for making the choice of village groups to receive group loans, - accounting systems for village groups, - credit renewal policies and procedures, - commission payments to those collecting loans, - handling accounts of borrowers who have died, - proper use of the Medium-Term Credit Contract, - calculating interest of those who pay before or after the exact due date of a loan, and - credit to village groups for cereal banks. The training method employed in the EORD is known as "cascade" training. This is theoretically a three-level training system. First a practical course is developed by central ORD personnel, the technical assistance team and their counterparts, who give it to middle-level personnel such as sector and sub-sector chiefs. They, in turn, present the material to the extension agents in their respective areas. Finally, the agents are expected to give the course to the farmers with whom they have worked. The farmer training given during the village group discussion days also follows the cascade principle. Selected village group representatives attend the meetings held every year 136 in each of the 24 sub-sectors of the EORD. The farmer representatives are supposed to share the information gained in the meeting with their membership at large upon returning to their respective villages. However, the training of both draft animals an farmers has always been a serious problem in the ORD animal traction program. Extension/credit agents are often tied up with paperwork, and frequently there is not enough time to teach farmers how to use their equipment. In order to supplement farmer training by extension agents, a group of farmer "animal trainers" (bouviers) was employed. Their job was to train oxen and instruct farmers in the correct use of the technical package. The use of animal trainers has been found to be quite helpful, even though the training sessions have imposed a serious problem. For example, Tapsoba (1981) recounts his experience as follows: Bouvier may arrive in the village and find that the farmers did not have any advance notice, or, alternatively, the Bouvier does not show up. The latter case is commonplace because there is not a clear understanding as to who (the BAP or the sector) should provide transportation. Obviously, farmers who cannot use their young animals, the first year, incur a number of costs such as feeding, veterinary care and insurance costs, while no benefit is derived. In view of the prevailing circumstances, there is a need to strengthen the training aspect of the EORD extension system. It is essential to improve the training activity not only on technical matters--such as plowing, weeding, and ridging techniques-—but also on administrative 137 procedures, such as the presentation by the technical assistance team on the administration of rural credits. The focus and the detail of material coverage should rely on the type of prospective clients: farmers, new extension agents, refresher courses for agents in service, or specialist courses for specialist agents in the areas of crop production, livestock production, managing credit, etc. 4. Product Marketing 4.1. Objectives of the EORD Marketing Activities The marketing operations of the EORD were aimed at achieving three principal objectiveslz (a) encouraging increased crOp production by the region's farmers through timely purchases at guaranteed minimum prices; (b) pro- viding revenue to the ORD from sales activities so as to facilitate other ORD programme Operations; and (c) providing some stabilization of seasonal price fluctuations in staple food prices. The marketing specialistz, in collaboration with the other assistance team members, has attempted to assist in the realization of these objectives by suggesting and implementing action and research activities in the areas of 1For details see Wilcock, Six Month Report, December 1977. 2The marketing specialist has also served as chief of the technical field team and the head of the BAEP. He assumed the latter responsibility during the first part of his contract period. 138 purchase and sale of crops, creation of village grain banks, and applied marketing research.1 4.2. Purchase and Sale of Crops In an attempt to achieve two of the stated objectives--encouraging increased production and generating revenue as a means of self-financing, the EORD was directly involved in the purchase, transport, and export of foodgrains. Table 4—10 shows the principal crops purchased in the 1974-75 EORD marketing campaign. According to the table, the ORD purchased about 2,300 MT of cereal and about 320 MT of peanuts and sesame for a sum of 64,871 million FCFA. In con-rast with this campaign, the purchases in the 1977-78 period amounted to about 33 million FCFA of agricultural products. The cost of grain purchased during this period was 26,965,476 FCFA (see Wilcock, 1978). As indicated earlier, the data base in the EORD has been weak at the initial phase of the EORD/IRDP. This, coupled with a poor communications network and inadequate record keeping, does not allow for a complete description of the ultimate fate of products purchased in various parts of the ORD. The following, however, are illustrative dispositions which are liekly to occur in different 1In addition to the marketing reports already written, a dissertation entitled A Socio—Economic Analysis of Farmers' Food Grain Marketing Linkages and Behavior in Eastern Upper VOlta is to be completed by Ouedraogo in 1983. 139 .:oHnmumEou cOHummpHm mhmH Hm um HO£OHm ”mniwhmH .comvmmHHmHoumEEoo mm momeEmUF “mouoom .mmcmmsonu :H «EO\I .mcHocoOH ou mom mHuomxo mom #0: Op mHmuou :HmpHmO\m Hem.vm mmo.~H emm.H~ mmH.OH HHm.o~ loco. «so Hmuoa mmH.H n: woe u- AHH Aoooe amo es H.mm u: o.eH In H.HH as memmmm mo~.~ nu mo~.H HmH ham Aooov «mo 92 m.vm In «.me m.e c.4m as mmHHmamcaumuscmmm Gme.m u- Hmm.e a- mMH.H Aooov «so as m.mo~ In m.meH u- m.m~ as mmHHmamumuscmmm HHv.¢ omo.H HOH mom.H GAA.H Aooov «mo as m.h~H s.a~ ¢.m m.ms H.Hm a: mafia smmmm omm u: n: on chH Aooov mmo as m.eH nu .. o.OH m.e a: sssmuom cam «Ha I- In mm Hem Aooov «mo BS H.mN II II N.H m.vm BE wNHmE mme.mH u- mm~.v eeH.m om~.m Aooov «mo 92 H.mmw e.mm «.mmH m.~mm m.mm~ as umHHHz meq.om mmo.HH mes.~ Hao.~ mam.a \mlooov «mo 92 m.GHm.H 4.4me «.mmm m.mm N.ems as ssamuom muHaz mmmmmHo mocmmom HH mmmm H mpmm omo \mHmuoa muouomm mono onamzmo mnuvsmH .moeomm wm OHlv mHm¢B BDO QH¢m ¢mU 92¢ Qmm¢mUmDm mmomu m0 mZOB UHmBME Homo zmmBm¢m 140 proportions (Eicher, gt_31., 1976): - Storage in local facilities of varying adequacy, and local resale before the subsequent harvest. - Timely bulking and evacuation by rented trucks before the rainy season. - Storage in ad hoc facilities (e.g., houses, old administrative buildings, etc.), no evacuation, stocks go through rainy season with substantial spoilage. - Temporary unprotected storage, no evacuation, grain totally spoilt. At the background of all these possibilities, Table 4-11 presents an overview of ORD commercial sales as of December 1975. As indicated in the table, there are numerous buyerscfi the products. However, the ORD has not been paid for over 80 percent of the sorghum and millet it delivered. This situation has led the ORD into financial difficulties to the extent that the ORD failed to repay the National Bank of Development (NBD) in order to qualify for a seasonal credit for the 1975-76 period. Consequently, these financial difficulties had forced the ORD to temporarily discontinue its purchasing Operations in general and to reduce the price of the newly introduced soybean crop by almost 50 percent, thereby reducing the trust of farmers in the Operations of the ORD. The establishment of a commericalization fund (CF) by USAID has reduced the magnitude of the financial dif- ficulties in the ORD's marketing operation. Even then, 141 .OOHO>HHOO coon wHHmsuom uoc pm: chHm man umsu mam ucooem mHsu mmmnouom on muHEOUImsom msu mo unmm man :0 GoHummHHnO cm mHmEHm mm3 .GHmHm mo 92 com .mOOHuommcmuu mamas no 620 use» muoz .mmHmm chum mom mam was pH amo mmH.som.mm Hmuou may no mmH.mm~.ms OUHEOUImoom may no mmu¢zmo Eonm OO>HOOOH #0: mm: amo cumummm mnu mhmH HOQEOOOQ mo m¢AH mhmH Hm um uOSOHm .wucsooom Dmo cumummm "mousom oHam Hom.em~.~ saxamo ooo.mm as mam.- uomuucoo me\sm\m mammmm AGOHummHHanmum mmmHmUV oumom muocmmm onm oo~.aea.eH ezxmmo ooo.mm as mm.HH~ coHumNHHHnmum mh\mm\o emHHmnm omum>HHme umHHHz ma 09 ooo.oom.mH ez\.~mH.mv loom.qu.~v mxomm mooo ”mmHmm mo umoo mme.vmm.vh omH.mmm.o~ (on sme.mm~.HH mmm.mmo.mm mmHmm Hmuoe Hmuom omumn mnume msuee mcmHmmEmU . Hm\Hm\m oe AA\H\H weH>Heo< azam onaaquaHommzzoo NHIv mqm¢9 144 4.3. Creation and Operation of Village Grain Banks In a preliminary investigation, the technical assistance team found that the farmers in the Eastern region are faced with a serious cash flow problem at harvest time for such expenses as payment of debt, traditional ceremonies, taxes, etc. To meet these obliga- tions, farmers sell their grain at the market while prices are quite low. Later, during the "hungry season" (the Soudre), farmers are obliged to buy back cereal grain to eat; paying very high prices, usually with money obtained at the time from the sale of green crops (vante en herbe) arrangement. The cereal bank program was initiated in the EORD to overcome grain storage problems. As indicated in section 4.2. above, the first cereal bank in the EORD started with USAID/EORD/IRDP demonstration funds. It was started with three village groups in Piela, Tapoa, and Logobou, all in the Diapaga sector. The starting process basically involved granting of loans to the village groups at harvest time so they could buy cereal from their group members, store it until the hungry season when open market prices are high, and sell the grain back to their members at prices lower than the open market prices. These actions are expected to benefit farmers in three ways: First, at the time the farmer sells his cereal to his village group, he sells it at a price higher than the Open market price just after the harvest. 145 Second, at the time the farmer buys cereal from his village group, he buys it at a price lower than the open market price during the hungry season. Thigg, the profit made by the village group (from the price mark-up less costs) stays with the village group of which the farmer is a member, and the farmer has a voice in deciding how the profits of the village group will be used. The first three village groups were given a total of 1,800,000 FCFA (i.e., 600,000 FCFA to each of the groups) at 8 percent interest during the 1977 harvest. In 1978, the program was enlarged to 16 village groups receiving loans through the ORD with funds originating with different development organizations. Subsequently, many cereal banks have been started in the region; some have used their own resources, without credit from the ORD. Table 4-13 presents data on cereal banks that are started with loans from the EORD. As shown in the table, the amount due for collection was 6,657,986 FCFA, of which 4,035,035 FCFA had been repaid by March 31, 1980—-resulting in a collection ratio of about 60 percent. 4.4. Agricultural Marketing Constraints in the EORD The major problems of the agricultural marketing system in the Eastern region, particularly during the initial phase of the EORD/IRDP, has been very well discussed in the report by Eicher, et al. (1976). Many of these problems 146 ommH .mmeoHum mam unmooom nammuo omom ”00H50m wm.om u omm.hmw.m d mmo.mmo.¢ umB¢m 92m2w¢mmm MHlv MHm¢B Hmm.-m.~ mmo.mmqs.mmm.mmm omm.aom.m mamaoa 0am mvm.oam o mem.oa ooo.oo~ Hammaxax mmmm mmmm gamma ¢a~.~H~ o qa~.~H ooo.oo~ somcmmaaa mamm msmm gamma mmo.mmm o mmm.mm ooo.oom Haanucma scammso gamma mmv.oma o -v.oa ooo.omH socuanso maama oam.va ooo.mm oam.- ooo.omm HHmsoxcma HHmsoomHumz gamma oam.mma ooo.ome oam.mm ooo.oom ammmmo aumamo Hammoomaumz oHao mo ommH .Hm ommH .Hm mmmamso ucsosm momHHH> unmm mm» mm: OOHSOm SONGS SOHO: umeOUGH CMOH HO GMOH am am Houomm moan: OHmmmm onmmm Hmumm umm uoz Hmuoa umm>umm uc508¢ mo Hmmw mamH ozm aamH .azmzammmm ozm azmzmmmsmmao zmoq xzmm Ammmmo "omom 147 still limit the marketing operations in the region. For instance, the marketing activities in the Eastern region are highly influenced by policy decisions from the national level as the decisions are translated to the local level through the actions of the four parastatal organizations involved in agricultural marketing: — OFNACER (Office Nationale des Cereal) has now assumed the total responsibility for maintaining cereal price stability and food security. It is engaged in policy formulation and implementation involving cereal purchase, storage, and resale. - SOFITEX (Societe des Fibres et des Textiles) handles the marketing and export of crOps such as cotton. - CSPPA (Caisse de Stabilization de Prix des Produits Agricoles) is responsible for exporting groundnuts, sheanuts, and seasame. - UVOCOM (Union Voltaique des COOperatives Maraichaeires) handles the export of fruits and vegetables. The extent of coordination among these parastatalw organizations leaves much to be desired. By limiting its involvement to cereal bank operations, the ORD has relieved itself of problems associated with the buying and selling of cereals. Nonetheless, the ORD's management effort in cereal banks faces numerous problems emanating from different angles (unstable prices, poor roads, lack of marketing information, poor extension systems, etc.). Some examples of the major problems in the cereal 148 bank operation include: - In areas of surplus production, it was difficult to get the cereal in the bank moved to deficit areas because of difficulties in arranging transport from remote sections. - In areas of deficit production, it was difficult to arrange to purchase cereal in remote areas and transport it into the deficit areas. - When the loan money arrived too late after the harvest, the full amount of the loan could not be spent because they could not find cereal to buy. - Some village groups which had no donkey carts or other means of transporting cereal had difficulty getting the cereal from the seller to the storage place of the village group. - Some village groups distributed funds for buying cereal among their members, but then had difficulty controlling this money and getting back either the money or the cereal. The lack of information on the whole agricultural marketing system in the region has been dealt with, to some extent, through the applied marketing research effort of the EORD/IRDP. At the end of the project, data were collected on the various aspects of marketing activity. For instance, on improving the marketability of certain agricultural products in the region, the preliminary data analysis indicates the advisability of pursuing further 149 investigation on the processing1 of shea butter and peanut oil extraction, soumbala production, rice processing, grain milling, etc. A specific proposal has been formulatedz, as a first step in this process, to investigate rice processing and millet and sorghum milling activities. Underlying the problem of fund control is the lack of a prOper accounting and management procedure. Most of the cereal banks, as well as village group-owned microprojects such as grain mills, small shops, etc., lack methods of controlling stocks of material and the treasury of the group. There are no mechanisms to show the volume of business, available revenue, or the various types of business expenses. At a later stage of the project, an accounting and reporting format was developed3 to assist both the credit agent and the respective owners of the enterprises in comprehending and monitoring the state of the business. The document has been adopted by the ORD's credit section for regular use in the future. Other relevant questions regarding, for instance, the 1Rural Small Scale Enterprises in Eastern Upper Volta, by David Wilcock, January 1981. 2An Economic Analysis of Sorghum/Millet Milling and Rice Processing Technology in the EORD, by Kifle Negash, March 1981. The proposal has been accepted by both EORD and AID/Ouagadougou, but has not been completed due to unexpected budget cuts. 3Comptabilite des Micro Projets, by Kifle Negash, et a1., February 1981. 150 impact of the public sector activities on the private traders' actions, linkages between farmers and traders, and farmers' understanding of their marketing problems are being analyzed by Ouedraogol. 5. Socio-Economic Research 5.1. Objectives of the Research Component The overall objective or the applied research component was to generate socio-economic data, both at the farm and the community level. While the ORD's targeted use for the data was to make a coordinated input into the national 1982-86 five-year plan, there were also two other underlying purposes to the data generation effort. First, the research was to provide data for evaluating the costs and returns of the animal traction (ANTRAC) prOgram of the EORD/IRDP. Secondly, the baseline information on the costs, returns, and overall productivity of the farming system is envisaged as a first step in the process of establishing an on-going data gathering and evaluation system within the EORD framework. In order to achieve these objectives, the technical assistance team, under the leadership of the production economist and in collaboration with the staff of the EORD, has been engaged in the preparation, executiOn, and analysis of the socio-economic survey. 1A Socio-Economic Analysis of Farmers' Food Grain Marketing Linkages and Behavior in Eastern Upper Volta, forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation by Ismael Ouedraogo, 1983. 151 5.2. Types of Data Collected At the outset, four general types of data collection activities were identified to provide the information needed for achievement of the specified purposes. Mehretu (1978)l outlined the specific details of the elements in the following four data categories: Review of existing data and analysis of them so that a general understanding of the problems of the region and data gaps could be identified. Such a process could help in a preliminary exercise of goal setting for develOpment. Baseline surveys for primary, census-type data and stoEk informatIOn of resources. This type of data collection affords a maximum possible coverage of the region, and its purpose would be to gather impor- tant development indicators and constraints. Baseline surveys will assist in identifying regions and sectors and will help define objectives which must then be studied in a more detailed fashion. Farm-level micro—socio-economic research. In an environmefit"Where’the major source Of sustenance is primary activity based on agriculture, this research exercise provides in-depth understanding of the productive factors and how they are organized at the farm level. The data from such surveys enables the develOpment of appropriate designs for rural develOpment interventions as well as evaluating the impact of new technology and cultural practices on development goals (output growth and/or improvement of levels of living). Specialized studies of important sub-set characteristics of the rural economy. Such study needs may emerge as a residual when the above studies pick up important phenomena in develOpment problems. Sometimes they are deliberately set aside for specialized investigation. Following this specification, a year-long farm level micro-economic survey was carried out during the lAssefa Mehretu, Regional Planning for Rural DevelOpment in the Eastern ORD of Upper Volta: Consultant's Report, Department of Agricultural Economics, MSU, March 1978. 152 1978-79 crop season. The survey involved 480 farm households living in twenty-seven villages located in 12 agro- climatic zones1 distributed across the entire region. Table 4-14 presents the distribution of the households by agro-climatic zones. The types of data collected in the survey covered the following general areas: - inventory of material and human resources - crop production and marketing - livestock production and marketing - animal traction - off-farm and non-agricultural activities - formal and informal credits. Various questionnaires were designed under each of the categories for gathering the required information. The final list of questionnaires used in the 1978—79 farm level survey is presented as Appendix 5. The farm level survey data has also been supplemented with secondary data and other special surveys. For instance, a rice farming system survey2 has been undertaken to determine the economics of lowland (bas fond) rice farming in the eastern region. Other studies have also been carried out under the general category of the regional planning framework: 1The different ecological zones were previously established by an FAO agronomist. J. Denis, Determination de Zones Homogenes en Vue de l'Installation d'un Reseau d'Essais Multilocauz. 2See Fotzo, Preliminary Results, March 1981; and forthcoming dissertation, 1983. 153 TABLE 4-14 DISTRIBUTION OF THE 480 SAMPLE AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS BY AGROCLIMATIC ZONE, VILLAGE AND SUB-SAMPLE, 1978-79 Number of Households in Each Village or Region Zone Village Animal Traditional Traction Bogande Gbanlamba 18 - Komboassi 18 - Mani Lanyabidi 18a - Bonbonyenga 18 - Piela Dabesma 18 - Piela - 18 Diablo Monkontore 18 - Lantaogo - 18 Diabo I - l7 Diabo II - 18 Logobou Namponkore 18a - Kindikombou 18a - Logobou - l8 Partiaga Bomondi l8 - Dubcaali 18 - Yonde Ouobgo l7 - Kondogo 18a - Diapangou Tilonti 18 - Diapangou — 18 Botoub Botoub 18a - Ougaroub 19a - Kantchari Mantchangou 17 - Moadagou 18 - Ougarou Poniokonli 18 - Ougarou - 18 Pama Tindangou 16 - Kpajali l6 - Total 355 125 aVillage chief included as a non-randomly selected household head. bNorth of Fada Source: Farm Survey Data, 1978-79 154 - A village-level "socio-economic inventory" questionnaire was administered in all villages of the region; and - The "Phase I" and "Phase II" questionnaires of a small enterprise survey was administered in a sample of the region's villages. The socio-economic inventory, part of the Eastern ORD's regional planning program, collected data on (among other things) the presence/absence and number of different types of small-scale industries in each of the 645 villages in the region.1 The small-scale enterprise survey was conducted in a sample of 192 villages. The ”Phase I" questionnaire recorded very basic information for the maximum number of enterprises: number of employees, type of work space, and use of machinery. The "Phase II" question— naire was used to record more complete information on enterpreneur characteristics, financial, and management practices of available enterprise owners. Table 4-15 contains a breakdown of the enterprises counted in the village inventory and sampled in the small-scale survey by eight enterprise groups and 25 specific enterprise types. 5.3. Data Processing to Date The initial data processing task for the 1978-79 farm survey was carried out at the computer center in 1For a detailed presentation of the results of this inventory, see Mehretu (1981) and Wilcock (1981). 2For a detailed presentation of the data-gathering methods and additional details, see Wilcock (1981). 155 u a a- HHH omm.H mHmnsmom .GH 1 H n- mm ~H~.~ nmuusm mmsm .mH n m an em wNv HHO usammm .vH mchmmooum . NH n- mmH Hmm.H mcaxmz oHom .mH Hmusuasonmm .m mm mm mm mm mm mcaxmm .NH om Hm me me mOH mcaHHas :Hmuo .HH mcammmooum moom .m u u «H 4H mm onmm .OH mm Hm mm mm mm wanuouoz .m maHmmmm .o ma ma mm mm mam mcamm auOHo .m N m mm ama mmq.~ mma>mm3 .a «N mm moa mHH mmv mmauoaama .m maaauoHo .o n 1 mm mm mu xmoaumaummq .m m a ma em GNH.H mamuuom .4 mm mm m m mm amummmmmo .m muammo .m u . ea «H mu mmamamz .m mmm mmm HOH HmH ace mmaauHsmxomHm .H xmozamumz .a HH mmmsm H mmmcm HH mmmsm H mmmnm muoucm>cH mmhe mmHHQHmucm moouw OmHumumpcm mmmHHH> HmuoH. HO unmoumm mm mm>asm mHmom HHmEm >O>H5m onom HHmEm mmmHumaoucm Ho HOQEDZ 00%9 mmHmmmmBZM N0 wm>mDm mH¢Um HH¢Sm 2H 0MH02¢m 02¢ NmOBZH>2H MU¢HHH> 2H 0082000 mmmHmmmmfizm mo 20H900HmBmH0 9200000 02¢ 000202 mHlv WHm¢B 156 .mmHuommumo pom>mHmH How tho pmumHsono mHmuou HOH mommucooummo meom HHmEm On» Ho COHuHom HH mmmcm may EOHH pwpoHoxm muw3 mmmhu .mnouco>cH ommHHH> map :H moussoo uoc mumz mmmmH HmmH .xOOOHHB mam m>m>HOm mmHamamucm OHmom HHmEm mom Huoucm>GH mmHamnmucm mmmne .mm>u3m n mmHHmumucm ommnem mmmHHH> “mmouoom owHH owOH mam mmm.H mmm.HH mH¢BOB MH MH w 0 mm mumnumm .mm AN am m m Ha mumammumouosm .sm mm mm mm Hm mv mpcmum mmHHoo .mm om mm om mm mmH mucmusmummm .NN hm mm mm av HmH mumm .HN mmOH>Hom Hmcuo .m mm mm mm mm mom mmuoum Hmumomo .om Hm Hm m m mm mmHomEHmnm .mH . . me me m- mcaHHmm mmo .mH coausnaaumam I I m m m: mcoHumum mmu .bH HHmumm .0 HH mmmnm H Ommnm HH ommsm H ommnm haoucm>cH mama mmHumHmusm macaw mmHHmHmucm mmmHHH> Hmuoe Ho ucmoumm mm >m>usm mHmom HHmEm >m>usm mHmom HHmEm mmmHHmHmucm Ho nonfioz OmscHucouulmHlv mHm¢B 157 Ouagadougou (CENATRIN). Though serious delays were encountered in the process, much of the editing, aggregation of files, and compilation and reporting of preliminary results took place from CENATRIN. The files were then brought to Michigan State University for further cataloging and documentation at the MSU Computer Center. The entire data set, which consists of 88 basic data files aggregated into 6 master files, is now available at both the MSU Computer Center and CENATRIN. The CENATRIN data base is accessible to interested users with authorization from the EORD director. Presently, many reports have been produced that can provide detailed information on the rural economy of Eastern Upper Volta, on a wide range of topics: farming systems, agricultural credit, animal traction, agricultural marketing, small-scale enterprises, regional planning, etc. (See Wilcock, 1981 for the list of reports and documents produced as of 1981). 5.4. Achievements and Limitations The applied research effort of the technical assistance team was exerted on two fronts. First, the attempt was geared towards improving the functioning of the implementation program. As was pointed out earlier, the initial efforts of the respective technicians have been to fully understand the nature of the problem within the framework of the EORD's program. Many of the activities 158 outlined under each of the EORD/IRDP service components were undertaken based on preliminary findings of the initial research efforts. The more comprehensive data collection efforts at both the farm and community levels had multiple objectives, among which was the creation of a knowledge base that could facilitate better understanding of the limitations and potentials of the region's rural economy. At the end of the project a substantial farm level data base had been generated to describe the characteristics of the farming system; this can as well serve as a solid information source in evaluating and planning alternative investment options in the region. The implications of the findings, particularly as they pertain to the animal traction program, will be discussed in the next chapter. Also, basic information is now available on the composition and characteristics of the rural small-scale enterprises of the Eastern region. Nevertheless, more work needs to be done in this area, most importantly to investigate the costs and returns associated with the prevailing practices in the production and marketing of outputs of the priority enterprises. The data-gathering effort has also given Voltaics the opportunity to acquire different types of training. For instance, two Voltaics have participated in the data- gathering activity in the field: one as an MSC, and the other as a Ph.D.-level student in the MSU Department of Agricultural Economics. Their final output is listed 159 among the reports and documents of the project. Furthermore, over 14 medium- to lower-level ORD personnel1 have re- ceived on-the-job training in the areas of data collection and data processing. As was cited earlier, the computer center in Ouagadougou was able to acquire its first experience in farm level data processing. The technical assistance team has also exerted some effort to institutionalize research activity in the EORD system. An attempt was made to strengthen the applied research section of the BAEP by giving it a clear sense of direction, defining its area of intervention and its relation to national and international research organizations. First, the need to follow the farming systems approach has been strongly recommended to the EORD, so that the applied research section can engage in both technology assessment and data gathering aimed at permitting problems to be diagnosed at an early stage, and in putting suggestions forward to eliminate bottle-necks in carrying out project management duties. One major shortcoming of the applied research activity resulted from the absence of an agronomist to participate in the research program. Even though the pro— ject design envisaged full participation of a UNDP/FAQ 1Due to budget limitations, however, almost all enumerators were fired by the EORD; the first group in June 1980, and the next in February 1981. Those who wished to re- turn and stay with the EORD were sent for extension re- training to a training center (Martourkou). Upon their re- turn they are to be assigned as extension agents, to be drawn to field research activities when funding permits BAEP research section reorganization. 160 agronomist in the research activity, the participation of the agronomist was constrained at two levels. First, the agronomist had a limited orientation toward farmer assessment research approaches; secondly, a budget cut in the UNDP/FAQ further restricted the work of the agronomist to testing and develOping improvements in crop production, such as improved tillage practices, soil erosion control, soil fertility improvement, new seed varieties, fertilizer application, insecticides, etc. Although some such activities were attempted by the animal traction and .production specialists, the primary focus of the EORD/IRDP applied research program was the collection of the socio- economic baseline data. 6. Summagy This chapter highlights the achievement and limitations of the EORD/IRDP service components--agricultural credit, agricultural extension, product marketing and socio- economic studies over the 1974 to 1981 period. The credit program, comprising short-term and medium- term credit, is the centerpiece of the various programs undertaken to expand food production, food security, and farm incomes in the Eastern Region. Credit is primarily used to purchase donkeys, oxen and animal traction equipment. The average interest rate for short-term credit is about 12 percent and 5.5 for the medium-term loans until it was in— creased to 11 percent in late 1980. The oxen loan package is to be repaid over a five-year period as follows: year 161 one grace period; equal installments of 20 percent in years two, three and four and a 40 percent payment in year five. The donkey package is given for four years, with a one-year grace period and equal repayments in years two, three, and four. There are several stipulations, such as down payment requirements, profitability of operations, group membership requirements, etc., governing the distribution of credit to the farmers. Over the 1975/76-1980/81 period, a total of 4843 loans were extended to 9282 families, or about 15.5 percent of the families in the Eastern Region. Despite a major extension program to encourage repaymentcHEloans, the average loan repayment rate was only 32 percent during the 1976/77-1980/81 period. The poor performance of the credit program is linked to a number of technical and administrative problems. The lack of a viable technical package is the Achilles' Heel of the EORD's credit program. Even the relatively larger farmers adopting the animal traction program experienced a severe cash—flow problem. Among the achievements of the credit program is the development of a rural credit account to facilitate proper accounting of cash flow, and initiation of management procedures capable of producing statistical data useful in improving the management process. Nonetheless, there is still a great need to refine the accounting procedure so that an income statement and a balance sheet can be prepared to ascertain the viability and/or net worth of the credit program periodically. In the final analysis, however, 162 development of a self-sustaining rural credit program in the EORD entails initiating and carrying out an effective saving mobilization activity. The agricultural extension system of the EORD has grown from 47 field agents in 1974 to 171 in 1980. But the extension network is characterized as a one-way system, devoted to transmitting the available technical package to the farmer. It lacks a systematic feedback mechanism for incorporating problems of farmers into the design of research programs. The input delivery system is weakened by the formulation of an increasing number of ineffective village groups. Furthermore, the input delivery mechanism is incapable of extending a complete set of the needed technical package to the right place at the right time. The technical assistance team attempted to improve the operation of the extension program by organizing various on-the-job training activities for the extension agents and other ORD staff at different levels. The training activity was focused both on technical matters such as plowing, weeding, and ridging techniques and on administration of rural credit. Despite the obvious need to accelerate the training activities, the project leaders from both the ORD and the donors' side did not place the emphasis on the training of personnel. For example, in the 1976-1981 period, only 10 percent of the allocation for training was expended, because of limitations on timely identification of viable candidates as well as 163 failure to schedule the necessary logistical arrangements. The marketing Operations of the EORD/IRDP were initially focused on the purchase and sale of crops. It is indicated that this activity was carried out during the 1977/78 to 1980/81 period at a financial loss to the EORD. Thus, the intent to generate revenue for the ORD from the commercialization activity has not materialized. Consequently, the EORD has gradually relieved itself of the crop purchasing and selling activity. However, the ORD has continued its involvement with grain banks even though the management of cereal banks faces various problems. The rate of repayment, although better than animal traction credit rates, averaged only about 60 percent during the 197841980 period. Some limitations of cereal bank management in the EORD include poor transportation facilities, inadequate stocking capacity, unstable prices, lack of market infor- mation, 23 poor extension network, etc. The socio-economic study has generated a vast amount of data covering various areas. The type of data collected includes: - inventory of material and human resources - crop production and marketing - livestock production and marketing - animal traction - off-farm and non-agricultural activity, and - formal and informal credit. 164 Over the 1978-1981 period, 72 reports have been produced, covering a wide range of topics: agricultural credit, farming systems, agricultural marketing, regional planning, small—scale enterprises, etc. (A lot of raw data remains in the computer files, still waiting to be analyzed.) These various reports have well described the structure of the EORD rural economy, identified outstanding problems, and in some cases suggested likely Options for resolving a particular problem. As indicated in Appendix 6, the achievement of the infrastructural objective of the EORD/IRDP has been more or less exemplified during the life of the project through the construction of offices, warehouses, animal traction equip- ment assembly plants, and the provision of office equipment, tools, operating funds, purchase of vehicles, etc. However, full develOpment and subsequent realization of the anticipated benefits of the other institution-building project components will indeed require a longer period than the horizon stipu- lated within the 1974 to 1981 period. CHAPTER V THE IMPACT OF THE EORD/IRDP ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to assess available empirical evidence on the impact of the IRDP activities on agricultural production and farm income. The main issue addressed is the role of animal traction1 in helping small farmers in the Eastern region. The results of a major farm level survey in 1978/79 will be analyzed to assess the acreage, yield, and income effects. The costs and returns of production with donkey and oxen animal traction will shed evidence on the profitability of ANTRAC, the rate of adoption and the availability of net cash revenue over time to cover recurrent expenditures and repay loans on schedule. The introductory portion of the chapter also assesses the role of the EORD in promoting agricultural develOpment, with special emphasis on planning and implementing its agri- cultural prodUction and marketing programs. We conclude with an overall assessment of the viability of the technical packages which extension agents recommend to farmers in the EORD. 1The Animal Traction Package comprised the main strategy of IRDP for increasing output and income in the EORD. 165 166 2. Role of the EORD in Promoting Agricultural Development The redefining of the role of ORDS, in 1975, as agencies of integrated rural develOpment brought additional responsibility to the EORD. Aside from the specific duties outlined in Chapter III, the new mandate required the EORD system to create regional development plans and coordinate development activities (agriculture, feeder roads, education, health, water supplies, etc.). This additional responsi- bility, however, was given to the ORD without enhancing th ORDs' organizational and budgetary capability for shoulder- ing and carrying out the new mandate. 2.1. EORD Organizational Arrangement and Staffing As shown in Figure 3.1, the EORD is linked to the ministry of rural development (MDR). As an autonomous regional agency, its director is appointed by the government's council of ministers and reports to the minister of rural development. Its headquarters in Fada is composed of six bureaus (departments), each with specific sections and subsections designed to facilitate the functioning of the existing programs of agricultural production and marketing. There were about 93 ORD employees in 1974. The number of employees had expanded to about 400 in 1980. The number of employees and their level of training in the- various positions within the extension system, are shown in Table 5.1 for the 1974 and 1980 periods. One conspicuous difference between the two periods is marked by an increase 167 Hoonom meHImmmH .mucmEsOOO pomnoum omom mOOHum> 80am OmHHmEOO "moasom mmumOHHHuamo cOHumHmEoo Hoosom mumEHum Ho Humocoomm Ho mamm» 03» HmuHm mm>HmomH mumOHHHuumonnuo>mum HQ mumOHHHuumo coHuOHmEoo Hoonom mumocoommllummuomHmoomm Hm "mmuoz ucmmd HmH he mnucoe omHH concmuxm m+ IHmmmHo Hm>mH mHmHm .m.m.m.u uoz Hsmummocm HmHnU monommunsm Hm mm .mm» 4+ Ammaae mmHHmHommm \m.m.m.m.o o mHooHamm mqucnomB ucmm< mmHao monomm m m .mua m+ Hmaaov mmmHHmHommm \m.m.m.m m mmHOOHHm¢ xsm>mue mm usmuoomsoo = H m .maa 4+ H Haaav .U.¢.m d mmHOOHHm¢ xmm>mHB mp HochmmcH = o o .mum m+ H HmoHv Hmusm .O.¢.m ¢ ucmEmeon>ma mp HochmmcH HOHnu mOH>Hmm m o .mam m+ mm HmHv msoconmm \uouomuHo Qmo \m.o.¢.m HschmmcH HHHHHnHmcommmm ommH vmmH mchHmHB muomoumo non awnEsz Ho Hm>mH SMBmMm 20Hm209xm H¢MDBHDUHMO¢ H.m 0H0¢9 028 2H29H3 mZOHBHmom 168 in the number of personnel. From none in 1974, the number of Ingenieur Agronome has increased to 5 in 1980. However, most of them possessed only a limited work experience. The greatest personnel increase occurred among field extension agents. As will be discussed later, this group contains personnel of very low-level formal training as well as little, if any, practical training. During the same period, the farm family/extension agent ratio has changed from 1:1600 in 1974 to 1:319 in 1980. The budget for EORD comes from internal and external sources. The internal source is accounted for on two lines. One is funding from the government, which covers salaries and allowances for permanent civil servants working in the ORD. The second source is an ORD budget covering salaries and allowances for contract employees, operation and capital expenditures. The external source is composed of funding from various donor agencies covering different expenditure categories, including rural credit loan allocations. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the ORD's budget for 1972, and from 1977 to 1980, by expenditure category. As reported earlier, external funding constitutes the most important part of the EORD's budget. For instance, in the 1977-78 period, external funding accounted for 70.2 percent of the total budget. The external funding increased to 85.1 percent in the 1979—80 period. Since its official establishment in 1974, the EORD has concentrated on expanding the number of extension 169 TO #05650 TU umnoum nmhmH “@0650 0% uwnOHm uhhmH ummwsm .umm.H b 0mO dmu oom.mmv.NHH HOH mmmcmmxm Hmnuo pom qumHO HOH mocsH mmOOHOGH maomHH mHne om comm: on H HHamm omnmm mOHoamxm.H "woasom n "ummm HmomHH m HOH mH muquH mHan In: ooo.oam.mH nun mumnuo mmm.amo.ma OHG.Ho~.mm amo.m~m.mm mucmmm HHOOHO\GOHm:mpxm moo.aHm.mvH mmm.mmm.mmH mmm.mem.GOH ooo.ooo.m~ "wmmmmmxm HmccOmmmm .m omH.mmv.m~ oov.mmm.mm ooo.om~.mm III mmmcmmxo mchmammo Hmnocmu .N mHH.mmm.mm ooo.mHm.em ooc.maH.~H nu: mmmmwmxm mcHumammo OHOH£m> .H Hem.mmm.mmH omm.mHH.omm mmm.HOH.maH momcmmxm waHumammo .HH ooo.mm~.oaH ooo.va.mm coo.OHm.ms --- ummsmHsmm .m nu: nun ooo.oom.mm In- mmouomuu m mmHoHam> .m ooo.oma.mHm ooo.mHm.mm mmo.amm.mmH nu: mmchHHsm .H ooo.mmo.mme ooo.ame.meH mmo.amm.vm~ In: mucmsumm>ca .H nHea.ao~.ama mmm.mvm.emm Ham.Hom.OHe ooo.ooo.oa ummmmm Hmuoa om\mamH maxmaaH ma\aaaH mmamH Ammo :HV ommH oa mamH 20mm ozm mamH mom amooom omo zmmammm mma N.m WHm¢B 170 agents in order to facilitate increased agricultural production.1 But, overall performance in many respects has not been as expected. For instance, the new mandate of the ORDs--to execute multi-sectoral functions as well as coordinate the activities of national departments and ministries other than rural development--was evaluated by a government commission in 1980. The commission's findings were that most ORDs, including the EORD, did not have the capacity to implement--or even coordinate--activities out- side of agriculture. The commission then recommended that their mandate be limited to agricultural development. The commission also proposed that an economic and social coordinating committee be set up at the departmental level, headed by the perfect (World Bank, 1982). Likewise, recent research findings2 indicate that the general farming system of the EORD is still characterized by low productivity and a low level of monetization. The specific factors associated with these two characteristics will be examined in the following subsection. 1The specification of the conceptual framework for regional planning and the collection of regional planning data in the EORD/IRDP research program was an attempt to satisfy the new regional planning mandate imposed on the EORD in 1975. 2Presented in various EORD/IRDP research reports. 171 2.2. Programs of Agricultural Production and Marketing The EORD has been involved1 in a large-scale effort to promote the use of animal traction for increasing dryland agricultural production since its formal establishment in 1974. The traction technology is also used in bottom lands crop production, particularly in seedbed preparation, after an initial plowing by tractors. However, animal traction programs are not new in the Eastern Region. In fact, there have been six different attempts to introduce the use of animal traction in the region prior to the inception of the EORD program. Barrett, 19802, described the efforts between the 19405 until the late 19605 as partial or complete failures. Unfortunately, as will be shown by the various indicators in Section 4, the current EORD effort since 1974 has also been only a very limited success. Moreover, the monopoly of cereal purchase and sale responsibility bestowed upon the ORD since 1974 has not succeeded in facilitating prOper Operation of agricultural product marketing in the Eastern Region. As shown in Table 4.12, the purchase and sale of crops was Operated, during most of the period, at a financial loss to the ORD. 1The EORD has been involved in the distribution of animal traction technology packages since its inception in 1968, but the large-scale effort started with the EORD/IRDP funding in 1974. 2See Barrett, 1980, for the details of the history of animal traction schemes in Eastern Upper Volta. The report also discusses the problems associated with the earlier ANTRAC programs in the Eastern Region. 172 Consequently, the ORD's objective of accumulating revenue from sales activities so as to cover recurrent expenditure of other ORD program operations has not materialized. Indeed, there are many factors associated with the poor performance of the current EORD agricultural production program. Above all else, much of the farming system in the region is characterized by high variability in production conditions, such as rainfall and soil quality. In most areas, rainfall is irregular and the soil is poor and sandy. The overall regional economy is also subsistence oriented. Less than 10 percent of most farmers' production passes through market channels, thereby limiting the availability of cash for the purchase of inputs as well as credit repayments. Moreover, experience has indicated that the EORD has not been able to provide, among other things, either an effective training and extension service or stable markets for the smallholder farmers in the region. As indicated in Chapter IV, the agricultural exten— sion system of the EORD is encumbered with a multitude of limitations. It is characterized as a one-way extension system lacking an effective research unit, hence poor research and extension linkages. Other major shortcomings of the extension system include: poor coordination among internal units of the ORD, as well as between the ORD and MDR; high cost of input delivery; inadequate training and insufficient logistical support for extension agents. The lack of biologically stable and economically 173 profitable technical packages within the EORD agricultural program has been adequately discussed in the previous pages. Obviously, the absence of a viable message to extend, coupled with the lack of a systematic research effort, is one major factor curtailing the effectiveness of the ex- tension program. The field agents also have only minor academic training, and little if any practical training (see Table 5.1). Field personnel who are inadequately trained, inexperienced, and without support from a research unit that can generate a viable technical message to extend, are indeed incapable of effectively practicing their prOper role as two-way communication agents between farmers and researchers/planners. The EORD extension program is also characterized by a lack of coordination. As shown in the ORD's organiza- tional chart, various departments, sections, sectors and subsectors are involved in the extension program. All department and sector heads are directly responsible to the ORD director. With the gradual increase in the number of ORD personnel, the structure has resulted in a very broad span of control, making it difficult for one man to handle effectively. Given the lack of day-to-day coordination of activities, the poor state of the roads, the lack of vehicles, and poor vehicle repair aggravate the problem further; leading, in the final analysis, to late or incomplete delivery of animal traction equipment and 174 spare parts. In evaluating the institutional performance of the EORD input delivery system, for instance, Tapsoba, 1981, finds a high cost of credit administration: about 28 CFA/100 CFA of total loan portfolio outstanding.1 The coordination at the national level is also weak. In theory, the MDR is expected to provide technical guidance to the ORD. The secretary-general of MDR is to coordinate the activities of the ORD with the technical departments of the ministry. To date, however, the EORD has not received adequate support from the technical services; the link between the two institutions remains quite weak both in the area of training and in the coordina- tion of the national and regional applied research efforts. The state of other supporting services, such as veterinary services, ANTRAC insurance, logistical support, and product marketing, leaves much to be desired. For instance, the veterinary services are so understaffed and underfunded that they are mostly unable to provide even minimal veterinary care on a regular basis for ANTRAC animals. Due to lack of proper veterinary care, morbidity rates and lost work time are very high for ANTRAC animals. Barrett, gt_al., 1981, reports that 22 percent of surveyed draft oxen teams lost an average of 10 days of work time during the May to mid-July plowing season of 1978 due to the 1For a detailed assessment of the credit program, refer to Section 4.1 in Chapter IV. The administration cost is estimated by using 10 percent of the salary costs of EORD credit personnel from central staff to field staff level, and 10 percent of EORD operating costs including vehicle operation. 175 illness of at least one animal. During the same period, 6 percent of the surveyed donkeys lost an average of 5 days of work time due to illness. Mortality rates were 4.5 percent for oxen and 1.2 percent for donkeys during the 1978-79 agricultural season. The lack of sufficient logistical support for extension agents is frequently discussed, particularly among the extension agents.l With regard to pay, for instance, extension agents believe that they are unfairly treated, pointing out that the wage scale which applied to them is far lower than those for people of similar qualifications and duties who are on related ORD pay scales, such as teachers (F.J.A.) and technical assistants (A«-T .A..S). The position classification and the associated salary of an extension agent in comparison to others in the Voltaic civil service system is shown in Table 5.3. The other frequently heard complaint from extension agents regards the inadequacy of transport allowances. Although agents do receive a loan to purchase a motorcycle, their dissatisfaction is related to the continued rise in fuel prices without a corresponding adjustment to their allowances. These factors have bred low motivation and morale in the extension personnel, leading to an ineffective farmer education and/or draft animal training program. A similar weakness in the extension system of the EORD is manifested lInformation acquired through an informal personal contact with ORD field level extension agents in late 1980 and early 1981. 176 AN.HH V mac on mmwmmmo Am.ocmv \mmmz cu pmwamno H.5mm Hmu0unsm m.m oowq comm oqu owww I I ooowq m a IAmaH ammuooocoo o.m oooom comm CONN oncoH I I oooom q ~< Amue aochmwcH o.mm oooon comm ooom OnwwH I I ooomoH NN H< Aamm HH>HU A.u% mmscom MwaH> ANmV ANm.va monoom uaommcmae HumHmm H Hm>mH \SOHHHHZ Hmscc< mOvaz IcOHuoEoum IkuHaooom \n moocm3OHH< \m m< mowamnu COHmH>oam Hmccomamm HmHOH ammw pom sumo: Mme comamm awe ammo mmHm amnuHa m OOH muOOooom muHOOHOmm mwmam>m OoawHfi OHocu .mma mOOHam> wuH nmnoacu nmo mnu Ha mooOmOHm on OO mum muOmEHmm wOHOHmEmO onu “muOm>amm HH>HU mam 0:3 Hmmum HMO How umwpsn maumHOHz msu as HHOOOHHO voocmOHH HHuOmm Imam mam OoHuoeoue OOH OonH>oue mOm muOmshmm HuHuoomw HmHoom .wooOmsoHHm hHHSmH .mumHmm mama mnu mHOo \m .mOonmH mH OOOmOHH HH pHmm on uOO zma Hon .mumwpsn nmo maom OH OOOOHOOH mam muOmEHmm mmosh \o .mam£ vmumHOOHmo Ommb uOO mm: haowmumo Hoe uOmskmm mwmam>m Om non .muOm>amm HH>Ho ou pmmH>oum omHm mam AuOmmOmOmm Hoe cow mOom HH>H0 comm OH mHmovH>HmOH HomHom How ummem HmOOHumz osu OH mmvH>OHO mum muHHHnHmOoemma OOH wouOm3OHH< .mamx OOOOHOOH uOO mam menu .Qmo wOm uomfioud an mHumoum hum> mmoOmBOHHm HmOuom mmmsu moOHm .wOHmOo: no upon ImOmuu HOH mmoOm3OHHm mumOOHHm OOO moom .OOH>umm HH>Ho mnu OH OOHuOmHO HmOOOmw muomHHma £0H£3 .umwmam HmOOHumz mnu .moOmOHH uoOom wOH>Hmomu memo onu OH mmoom3OHHm mHmO Omumo mam muOm>amm HH>HO HmOmH>HmOH :wOo£uH< \n .zaowmumo nomm OH pHmO HamHmm mwmam>m mmo£MHm3 muOmmmOOmm .ome .umwosm mp umfioam uOm>< .OOOEOOHO>OQ Hmasm Ho kaumHOHz aoum \m “mmaoz Nme .uaommm xOmm wHOoz .uOmEOOHm>mn Hmaom Ho apumHOHz BOOM meHmuno Aome OH omwOmzocov ammH OOH mHO>OH wOHHHmum "MUMDOm Am.cmwv Qmo ou mmwamso Am.oqmv om: ou mmwamso q.ncoH Hmuow m.mow coonm comm qu mmcc \mbooN \mooom \woOomm mmMH m mamxaoz OOHwOmuxm meOOOmOuOoo A.H> mmOOom munH> Ava ANm.wHV wOHwOoz oaoamOmHH kumHmm H Hm>mH \OOHHHHZ HmOOO< AmOHmmz IOoHuoanm IHOHOOomm \p mOOOmBOHH< \m m< mmwamso OOHmH>oam HOOOOOOOH Hmuos amo» Omm :uOoz Hoe Oomamm amm mm Oo mnOonmc uOmezmd Hmauom Ova .mmoOmBOHHm OuommOmau mOm wOHmOon ou moHuHuOm mam mamxao3 OOHmOmuxm umoE .qum>Omm HH>HU mxHHOD .muowmsn nmo OH HHOOOOOOOH umoa mmHHo mmonu mam Om>Hw mmaowHH.u=n .mnmo wOoEm mHHmHuOmumHOm Ham> mOOOmsoHH< \: .OHmomemO Hoxao3 OonOmuxm owaH pmmH>mu mnu Ho OOHmnom AmH Ho uOov :uHOom m£u um hHmHmm mnu OO mucommoauoo OH .ommH OH opom wOm maomOmm .Oowoomoox .momm mo mmmo oau OH wOHHHm>mOm mwmao>m mmustos map aoum meHmuno OH oaowHw mHnu .OOH>aom maHuOo ozu OOH mHanHm>m OOO wH mamHmm mwmam>m OvuanOS m moOHm \w mmsmaucooumIm mamaa 179 by the high level of personnel turnover. Fotzo, 1983, reports, for example, that nearly 50 percent of the extension agents dealing with bas-fonds had been in their posts for less than one year during the 1980-81 survey, reflecting poor knowledge of their area of responsibility and of their client farmers. Indeed, the poor performance of the agricultural production and marketing program of the EORD is not limited to dryland farming activity. The ORD's attempt to increase output and income on bottom lands through water control mechanisms is also quite disappointing. Fotzo's investigation of four major bas-fond rice production systems differing in degrees of water control showed that, given current technolgies and yield levels, production under improved water control results in negative income returns. His findings also showed that the least costly (and most economically profitable) technique for producing rice in the Eastern ORD is traditional cultivation in unimproved swamps. The major funding for dam irrigation in the EORD comes from the FAO/PNUD arrangement described in Chapter I. After realizing the insignificant role of the ORDs, particularly in grain marketing, the government abolished the monopoly granted to ORDs in 1978. At the same time, some changes were introduced in the structure and operation practices of the national cereal agency (OFNACER). First, OFNACER was transferred from the Ministry of Commerce to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rural Development. 180 Secondly, OFNACER's grain acquisitions from farmers were now to be effected either through direct purchase by its purchasing agents or through licensed merchants and village groups as intermediaries. These new changes are perceived by many as positive steps towards improving the efficiency of moving agricultural products from producers to consumers. For instance, the association of OFNACER with MDR increases, at least in principle, its awareness of and relevance to the marketing problems at the farm level. Secondly, the increased involvement of the private sector in grain marketing would also enable OFNACER to concentrate its efforts more on supplying price information, developing transport and storage facilities, and thereby increasing grain trader competition locally as well as in neighboring states rather than directly intervening in the actual cereal marketing activity. Following the changes at the national level, the EORD also gradually relieved itself of the grain marketing operation. However, based on donor financing, the EORD has continued its involvement with the creation and operation of cereal banks. As pointed out earlier, the management of cereal banks faces varied problems. The rate of loan repayment, although better than the animal traction credit rates, averaged only about 60 percent. Other problems of cereal bank management in the EORD include poor transport facilities, inadequate stocking capacity, unstable prices, lack of marketing information, poor extension 181 network, absence of processing units, etc. Nonetheless, with an increased farmer initiative, and participation in the financing, the grain banks may have a potential to serve as mechanisms for pooling local human and capital resources for stocking surpluses as well as for redistribution in the future at the local and regional levels. Aside from mini- mizing transportation costs and delays in future redistri- bution, such an arrangement can improve farmers' managerial ability, eventually enhancing a greater role for private sector marketing participants. 3. Potential Contributions of Animal Traction to the Farmer The major mechanism of the EORD/IRDP for increasing agricultural output and income has been the expanded use of draft animals1 in agricultural operations. The use of draft animals in farming Operations is expected to contribute to higher output, as a result of the intensification2 and the extensification3 of land use. Theoretically, the use of draft animals is expected to raise the efficiency of resource use such as land and labor, thereby resulting in increased leen and donkeys are the two most widely used draft animals in the EORD; such programs are popularly labeled in the literature as animal traction (ANTRAC) programs. 2 O 0 I I I O IntenSification refers to improvement in production per unit area. 3 i I O O O I ExtenSification refers to increases in production due to expansion of the area under cultivation. 182 output. For instance, the most commonly cited scenario of effects leading to higher output includes the following: - Antrac increases yield by enabling a farmer to work more rapidly--operations can be more timely enabling earlier planting to maximize the short rainy season, faster and more frequent weeding to reduce competition for scare nutrients; - Deeper plowing conserves water by increasing infiltration of rainfall; - Plowing improves soil structure by loosening particles to facilitate root develOpment; - Plowing makes it easier to incorporate crop residues, which may raise soil fertility and reduces the runoff of rainfall; - By saving time during critical periods of the season, a farmer can cultivate more land. In addition to the above, use of draft animals on the farm is also expected to provide other benefits, such as manure that can be used to raise soil fertility, means of transport (donkey or ox cart for transporting 183 inputs/outputs), beef from slaughtering older oxen.l All three benefits can be transacted in the appropriate context2 to generate cash, and thereby improve the level of household income. The most widely cited disadvantage of an expanded use of animal traction is the'likelihood of increased soil erosion.3 Aside from stressing contour plowing and closed ridges, no-tillage farming4 is often cited as the most effective way to control soil erosion. 1The following benefits are also often cited when comparing animal traction to tractor mechanization: - The acquisition price of oxen and equipment is within reach of many more small farmers. - The purchase of animal-drawn equipment will require less expenditure of foreign exchange per unit of output than tractor mechanization (tractors, equipment, spare parts, fuel, etc.). - Animal power will require less investment in supportive services and skilled manpower. - Returns on investments in animal power are less sensitive to yield and price fluctuations. - The costs of failure for an animal—powered mechanization scheme will be less because of higher relative salvage prices for the inputs. - Animal-powered mechanization is less sensitive to poor management than tractor mechanization. 2Refers to likely gains resulting from selling beef from older traction oxen as well as income derivable from renting carts. According to some estimates, annual production of manure by a team of oxen can substitute for up to 24,000 CFA worth of commercial nitrogen. 3Research results suggest, however, that the erosion problem is not inherent in the ANTRAC technique. For instance, reports from IRAT indicate that the amount of soil lost under ox plowing is 4.09 Mt/ha, compared to 3.69 Mt/ha under manual cultivation. 4Usually requires the use of chemical herbicides. 184 In most instances, however, much of the literature concerning these potential advantages and disadvantages are based on either limited pilot farm projects or experimental station trials. Thus, the results from such sources cannot be expected to reflect the likely effects of on—farm animal traction programs. The historical evolution of the animal traction program in varied geo- graphical locations and the various complex factors limiting its success are well documented by various authors.1 However, the EORD/IRDP is one of a few projects that has attempted to assess the on-farm impact of the introduction of animal traction (see Lassiter, 1981; Barrett gt_al., 1982; and Wilcock et a1., 1982). 4. Empirical Results 4.1. The Data Base The analysis in this chapter relies very heavily on the 1978-79 farm level data and subsequent studies completed by the EORD/IRDP technical assistance team.2 As indicated in earlier chapters, the 480 sample households consisted of 355 randomly selected hoe-farming households, and 125 purposely selected animal traction households (see Table 4.14 for distribution of the sample by zone, village lSee deWilde et a1., 1976; Kline et a1., 1969; Weil, 1970; Migot—Adholla, 1972; Monnier, I975; Oluwasanmi, 1975; Zerbo and Le Moigne, 1977; Le Moigne, 1980; Whitney, 1981; Sargent et a1., 1981. 2See’Chapter 4, Section 5, for discussion of the farm level data- 185 and sub-sample). As shown in the table, the data represents three types of technologies: hoe cultivation, oxen traction and donkey traction. The animal (oxen and donkey) traction data is categorized by the type of traction1 as oxen zone or donkey zone. The hoe users are included as controls in both zones for the purpose of comparison. The performance of oxen and donkey traction is compared to that of hoe farming within the relevant zone: Diabo and Ougarou for the oxen zone; Piela, Diapangou, and Logobou for the donkey zone. A weighting procedure was used in calculating mean values in order to correct variation in sample size within the individual zones (see Barrett gt_al., 1982). Nonetheless, the results of the comparative analysis need to be interpreted in the light of two limitations. First, comparisons between hoe and animal traction farmers are based on a single farm year survey. Secondly, the purposely sampled animal traction farmers represent the most successful animal traction farm households; they tend to be more educated and innovative types, and hence are not on the same footing with the randomly selected typical hoe farmers. The summary characteristics of farm households in the oxen and donkey zones are given in Table 5-4. 1In the oxen zones, 90 percent of animal traction farmers use oxen traction. Among animal traction farmers in donkey zones, 85 percent use donkeys. For additional details, see Barrett et a1., 1982. 186 TABLE 5.4 SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN THE OXEN AND DONKEY ZONES, 1978-79 All ANTRAC Zones Oxen Zones Donkey Zones HOE ANTRAC HOE ANTRAC HOE ANTRAC Number of Households Evaluated 106 110 36 65 70 45 Persons per House- hold 7.75 11.21 6.67 11.14 8.83 11.27 Adult Workers per Household 3.50 4.71 3.04 5.27 3.96 4.14 Total érea Cultivated (ha) 4.30 6.59 3.96 7.13 4.64 6.04 Proportion of Area in: Millet and Sorghum (Z) 80.1 74.7 79.1 77.5 81.0 71.8 Groundnuts 9.6 9.6 10.3 6.8 8.8 12.4 Maize 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.8 2.7 2.9 Cotton 0.2 1.9 0.1 2.1 0.3 1.7 Rice 2.2 2.8 1.9 3.5 2.4 2.0 Soybeans 0.5 3.8 0.5 3.9 0.4 3.6 Other Crops 4.6 4.0 4.8 2.4 4.4 5.6 Total Area Cultivated per Person (ha) 0.560 0.588 0.593 0.640 0.526 0.536 Total Area Cultivated per Actif (ha) 1.26 1.39 1.29 1.33 1.22 1.45 Value of Livestock Owned (FCFA) 122,491 316,545 139,185 372,767 105,320 258,510 Percent of Non-Farm Income 18.7 12.5 32.0 7.5 0.6 21.5 Age of Household Head (years) 53 43 60 44 46 42 Education of Household Head (years) .42 1.06 .44 .64 .40 1.65 a . Because of time and resource constraints, complete area data was collected for only two-thirds of these households. third sub-sample only sorghum and millet fields were measured. harvest data was collected on all crops for all households, area data presented in this table are based only on measurements from two-thirds sub-sample. In a random one- While bEstimated for the entire sample by using household size in the one- third subsample to project the non-sorghum/millet area. SOURCE: Farm survey data and Barrett et al. 1982 187 4.2. Physical/Technical Effects 4.2.1. Acreage Effects As shown in Table 5-4 cultivated areas are larger in animal traction households than in those of hoe farmers. Using the actif/area ratio as an indicatorl, the area cultivated per actif is about 10 percent larger for animal traction farmers than to hoe farmers. The effects were 18 percent greater for surveyed donkey traction farmers, while they were 4 percent greater for oxen farmers. The increases in acreage per worker were larger for traction farmers who used animal traction for both plowing and weeding.2 Table 5.5 presents more detailed data on household size, area cultivated by zone, and use of animal traction. The overall difference in cropping mixture between animal traction and hoe farmers is insignificant. Both animal traction and hoe farmers devote 75 to 80 percent of their land to sorghum and millet. It is not uncommon, how- ever, to find animal traction farmers growing more cash crOps than the hoe farmers. With respect to household labor allocation, survey data indicated a reduction in field labor 1Actif refers to a person of 15 to 55 years of age engaging in farming activities. 2It should be noted that even though labor may have been saved, expansion of cultivated area may not result if there is a shortage of land. In such instances, off- farm employment becomes a strong, viable option. On the other hand, labor savings may not be realized with poorly trained farmers and animals, or if the animal is in unsatisfactory condition early in the rainy season. 188 TABLE 5.5 HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND AREA CULTIVATED BY ZONE AND USE OF ANTRACa l 2 Number of Number of Household Active Workers Members (Persons During 15-54 Years Tyge Rainy Season Old) Draft Zone Animal Hoe ANTRAC Hoe ANTRAC Diabo Oxen 6.83 11.34 3.08 5.26 Ougarou Oxen 7.92 12.10 3.92 6.20 Sub-totalc Oxen 7.09 11.52 3.28 5.41 Piela Donkey 6.33 10.67 2.83 4.44 Logobou Donkey 9.48 11.73 4.54 3.91 Diapangou Donkey 7.75 12.00 3.33 4.70 Sub-totalc Donkey 8.26 11.53 3.81 4.24 TOTAL C ALL FARMERS 7.68 11.53 3.55 4.83 aThese figures are calculated only for the households for which there was area data, which includes only two thirds of the sample in each zone. Thus, they differ slightly from those in Table 2.1 which provides estimates for the entire sample. Donkey or horse farmers in areas where oxen traction predominates were excluded. Thus, 1 farmer from Ougarou and 4 from Diabo are eliminated. Likewise, oxen farmers in areas where donkey traction predominates were excluded so that 3 from Piela, 1 from Logobou, and 2 from Diapangou are eliminated. Another farmer is missing from Ougarou because he had no area data. bThe zonal averages for Column 4 and 5 are the averages of each.household's value. In earlier reports we presented a figure which represents the zone treated as one farm, i.e. we have divided the average farm size by the average number of household members and active workers to arrive at the figure. CFor the sub-totals, and totals, village averages were weighted differently because sub-sample sizes differed. See footnote 1, page 13. Source: Farm Survey Data and Barrett et a1 1981. 189 TABLE 5.5--Continued 4'b b 3 4 5 6 Total Area Area Area Percentage Cultivated Cultivated Cultivated Change in Area per per House- per per Active Household hold Member Active Worker Worker Due (Hectare) (Hectare) (Hectare) to ANTRAC Hoe ANTRAC Hoe ANTRAC Hoe ANTRAC 3.98 7.44 0.63 0.70 1.40 1.49 + 6.4 3.61 5.15 0.48 0.46 0.95 0.85 +10.5 3.89 6.89 0.59 0.64 1.29 1.34 + 3.9 3.56 5.18 0.59 0.50 1.29 1.32 + 2.3 4.68 4.91 0.47 0.54 1.11 1.51 +36.0 4.12 6.35 0.57 0.56 1.39 1.43 + 2.9 4.26 5.34 0.53 0.54 1.22 1.44 18.0 4.08 6.10 0.56 0.59 1.20 1.39 10.3 190 use per hectare for animal traction farmers. Also, traction households spend a greater proportion of their time on livestock raising and agricultural trading (see Barrett et a1., 1982). 3.2.2. Yield Effects The crop yields per hectare for animal traction subsamples are generally higher for most cash crops (see Table 5.6). However, it is only corn in all zones and ground nuts in oxen zones that have statistically significant yield increases. There are several reasons, however, why the yield differences between hoe and animal traction farmers do not provide conclusive evidence of the impact of animal traction: l. Inadequate control provision — despite the paired zonal comparison method used in the study, the large agro-climatic variability wihtin the eastern region makes yield comparison very difficult. In some instances, fields within even one kilometer of each other can receive substantially different amounts and patterns of rainfall. 2. Use of average yields - the yield data reported in Table 5.6 were averaged from both plowed and unplowed fields, thereby understating the potential yield impact of animal traction. 3. Use of incomplete package - few animal traction farmers use the complete animal traction package in the survey area. Subsequently, the yields for animal traction farms were averaged across all cultivated fields, whether 191 TABLE 5.6 YIELDSa FOR MAJOR CROPS UNDER HOE, OXEN AND DONKEY CULTIVATION IN ANTRAC STUDY ZONES, 1978-79 (kgs/hectare) All ANTRAC Zones Oxen Zones Donkey Zones Crops HOE ANTRAC HOE ANTRAC HOE ANTRAC Millet and Sorghum 466 468 555 554 377 381 Groundnuts 213 238 59 179 366 296 Maize 425 686 500 746 349 585 Cotton 108b 171 118b 253 97b 88 Rice 442 465 329 630 554 300 Soybeans 283b 197 241b 294 324b 99 aYields presented here are weighted averages per hectare based on estimates of total household production in 1978-79. They are calculated only for the two-thirds random subsample of farmers for which complete cultivated acreage was measured. bThese estimates are based on a small number of obser- vations representing less than one hectare of cropland per zone. Source: Farm Survey Data and Barrett et a1 1982. 192 or not they were plowed or weeded with animal power. A regression analysis of sorghum/millet yields showed that the use of animal traction was not significantly related to yields. However, yields were positively related to number of workers and labor inputs per hectare, and negatively related to farm size. 4. Drought effect - in the 1978-79 growing season, two communities in the donkey zone, Piela and Diapangou, have suffered a severe drought which cannot be disregarded in comparing the performance of donkey and oxen traction versus hoe across zones. 4.3. Economic/Financial Effects As pointed out in earlier chapters, farm level incomes are derived from various sources: crOp production, livestock raising, crop and livestock trading, crop processing, as well as other sources of income such as pensions, inheritance, and cash gifts. The focus of the analysis in this subsection is to determine whether ANTRAC increased farm income. 4.3.1. Costs of Production The various farm revenues reported in Table 5.7 are associated with variable and fixed costs of production. The cost effects are quite significant, particularly for the traction farmers in the crop production enterprise. As shown in Table 5.7, the variable costs per household, in 1978-79 for crop-producing oxen farmers 193 TABLE 5.7 FARM HOUSEHOLD ANNUAL INCOME STATEMENT, 1978-79 Oxen Zones Donkey Zones TRAD ANTRAC TRAD ANTRAC Number of Households 36 64 72 46 1. Crop Production Enterprise Revenue Value of Crop Productiona 85,591 149,356 83,601 94,012 of Which, Value Sold 6,661 9,680 9,569 13,798 Contract Plowing Revenues O 524 0 70 Contract Taansport Revenues 0 136 0 + 1,635 Variable Costs Purchased Seed a - 484 583 — 784 1,273 Value of Household Seed - 4,175 7,930 - 4,444 6,981 Fertilizer and Insecticides - 28 402 - 153 788 Wage Labor - 250 490 - 217 315 Grain Purchased for " nvi- tation" Field Labor 0 31 0 48 ANTRAC Feed Grain (Purchased) 0 640 0 328 ANTRAC Feed Grain (Va ue of Household Grain) 0 1,672 0 2,826 Other ANTRAC Maintenance Costs 0 3,232 0 980 Fixed Costs Repairs to ANTRAC Equipment 0 68 0 26 Replacement Parts for ANTRAC Equipment 0 1,012 0 1,075 Interest Payments for ANTRAC Credit 0 1,915 0 47 Depreciation on ANTRAC Equipment 0 5,229 0 5,095 Depreciatgon on ANTRAC Animals 0 22,645 0 2,081 Repairs of Other Tools and Equipment - 36 67 - 61 77 Depreciation on Other Tools and Equipment — 1,996 3,170 - 2,324 2,678 Net Revenue Net Revenue from Crop Production 78,622 146,220 75,572 71,099 194 TABLE 5.7-Continued Oxen Zones Donkey Zones TRAD ANTRAC TRAD ANTRAC II. Livestock Enterprise Reveggg Sales of Animals 3,652 27,693 17,337 33,281 Sales of Animal Products 345 5,434 1,684 680 Costs Animal Purchases - 5,556 - 26,961 —10,127 -30,924 Feed and Maintenance - 441 - 1,031 — 3,076 - 1,641 Expenses Net Revenue Sub-total - 1,970 5,135 5,818 1,396 111. Agricultural Trading Revenue Value of Sales (Net of Transport Costs) 1,594 2,877 7,867 17,913 Costs Value of Purchases (Net of Transport Costs) - 1,358 - 3,406 - 6,682 -l9,402 Depreciation - 61 — 599 - 234 — 215 Change in Value of Inven- tories 0 + 2,058 - 9 + 3,626 Net Revenue Sub-total 175 930 942 1,922 IV. Agricultural Transformation & Gathered CrOps Revenue Sales of Transformed Crops 1,052 2,744 1,994 8,185 Sales of Gathered Crops 513 3,406 994 631 Costs Purchases of Variable Inputs - 797 — 2,718 - 1,489 - 9,897 Depreciation on Equipment - 240 - 254 797 - 339 Net Revenue Sub-total 528 3,178 702 - 1,420 NET FARM INCOME 77,355 155,463 83,026 72,997 195 TABLE 5.7-Continued Oxen Zones Donkey Zones TRAD ANTRAC TRAD ANTRAC Other Sources of Income Revenue Gross Returns to Non-Ag. Trading & Artisanal Activities 38,422 14,822 8,858 34,385 Salaries 11 484 0 4,817 Pensions 0 5,807 9 860 Inheritance & Net Cash Gifts - 382 14 - 2,673 5,972 Costs Variable Costs of Non- Ag. Trading & Artisanal Activities — 1,120 - 7,943 - 5,156 —24,457 Depreciation - 572 — 641 - 527 - 1,535 Net Revenue Sub-total 36,359 12,543 511 20,042 TOTAL NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME 113,714 168,006 83,537 93,039 SOURCE: Farm Survey Data and Barret, et al. 1981. 196 amounted to 14,980 FCFA; costs were 13,539 FCFA for donkey traction farmers. In contrast, the variable cost for average oxen/donkey zone hoe farmers amounted to 4,268 FCFA during the same period. The Operating ratio (variable expenses/income ratio) for the crop production enterprise is .10 for oxen traction, .14 for donkey traction, and .06 for the hoe farmers. In contrast, the fixed ratio is .08 for oxen traction, .12 for donkey traction, and .03 for hoe farmers. These figures indicate that 18 cents per dollar of the gross crop enterprise income is spent on variable and fixed costs by oxen traction farmers. Similarly, 26 and 9 cents per dollar of gross crop enterprise income are spent on variable and fixed income costs by donkey traction and hoe farmers respectively. This leaves a margin of 82 cents on each dollar of sales for oxen farmers, 74 cents for donkey traction farmers, and 91 cents for hoe farmers. Table 5.7 shows the costs associated with the various sources of income. The depreciation schedule and the explanatory notes accompanying Table 5.7 are presented in Table 5.8. As the income from crop production has not been adequate, animal traction farmers rely on revenues from carting as well as other non-farm sources to cover the various categories of expenditure. OHmam mo mommaoasa ammo ommae .acmfiwma OOHxIOH mamEHHa maa mam noon Esamaom OOm OOOH SOHOS OH OHOamO HmOOOaHomH m HO mmHaama xaos o>HammH oa maomma HoamH :OOHamaH>OH=O .mmO aaoamOmaa OOH ammo maa HO HmaOou oaa mHOO aOa .OOO3OHHH mm scam .maoapoaa poaamo HO OHmm maa OUOHOOH aOO mooc mHaB .mOOH>Hmm HmaOoa ammo oa muowoma 197 .aoao comm OOH OOHaa memm spoNHHmoas mmmao>m maa am OOOHm>m .HmmH .Hm am .aaouama OOm mama >o>nsm Eamm "moacom mvH.~ OOO.m h OO0.0H woxcoa H vhm.v OOO.N OH mmm.vv ammo mam OON m mmH.m mmHHommoood mum oom O omm.v ammOHm mmm.H oom.H m OON.OH Hmcmoz NMO.H OOO.H OH omm.HH 3on "OOHaomHB meOoa OO0.0H+ OOO.mm v OOO.mm x0 H vhH.¢ OOO.m OH mmn.vq ammo mmm.H omm m m-.> mmHaommmooa 43H 8... m 03.6 ammmsm Hmm.m oom.H m mmm.mH Homooz mmm.H OOO.N OH omm.mH 30Ha "OOHaomaB Omxo Hamomv Hmmomv Hmummav Hmmomv aoaH ommazm OOHamHomaaoa OOHm> OHHH OOHxaoz OOHHm mmmH HmOOOO omm>Hmm OoamEHamm WHDOmmom 20HB¢Hummmm0 mlm 0H0¢8 198 .omOmaxo Om Omaa Hmaama OOOO>OH m msaa pOm .OOHamHoouamm aOO maOmmOHama mommOanama OH mOOHm>H .Oofismmm mH mOHHoaOO>OH xooamo>HH OH omOmOo oz .moHHH mamO mammmmooc maa HO mHthmOm HO xomH oa map .OBOOHOO mam ammm maa Ho>o mOHHoaOm>OH Mooamo>HH Ho OOHm> oaa OH mmmOmao Hmanao .OOOmOoaOHmE HmEHOm ammuc OOH mOOHOHOoE OOm .aHmm .mmmOoaxo OOHOOOH OHmHmIOOO HHHOHOOO .OHmHm commaoaOa OmOa Hmaama .mxooam OOOH OHOOOmOOO mmNHHHaO MHHHmEHOa SOHO: HoamH OOHamaH>OH Ho mamoo Hmma OOa mamamHOOOO MHHmHaOmamaOm moooaasoonmum mamaa 199 4.3.2. Revenue 4.3.2.1. Crop Production Enterprise Table 5.9 presents the total value of crop production1 by hoe and ANTRAC farmers for the 1978-79 production season. As shown in the table, the average value per farmer of crop production is 84,596 FCFA, 149,356 FCFA, and 94,013 FCFA in the hoe, oxen, and donkey farmers‘ households respectively. In all three cases, sorghum, millet and niadi are the most important crops, representing over 70 percent of the total crop value for the 1978-79 period. Out of the total value of the crops, the proportion of value sold is very insignificant (see Table 5.7). On the average, the value of crops sold from the hoe household members of the oxen and donkey zones is 8115 FCFA. The value of crops sold from the oxen traction households is 9680 FCFA, while it is 13,798 FCFA for the households in the donkey traction zones. 1A detailed crop enterprise budget has been prepared by Lassiter for sorghum/millet, maize, ground nuts, soybeans, cotton and rice in Cropping Enterprises in Eastern Upper Volta, 1981. Fotzo, The Economies of Bas-Fond Rice Production’In the Eastern Region of Upper Volta: A Whole Farm Approach, 1983, aISO provides enterprise budgets for crops in the lowland farming system. 200 ~.m oma.a m.m amH.a 4.4 aoa.a o.~ 44a.H ~.oa mon o.H GHA H.o ma ~.H mHm.H H.o mm 4.a4 souaoo 4.o Hem m.o H~4 o.o an o.o o o.am osmnom H.H mHo.H m.o «mm a.~ mom.4 m.o amm 4.~a nsmmnaom o.a Hmm.e a.a mOH.m a.o mmo.OH H.o NaH.m ~.ma nmomzoo ~.H mOH.H m.H AOH.H m.o ~4~.H m.H HOH.H o.mm mosz mumnsmm m.~H a44.HH 4.H 4HH.H m.m amm.4 m.~ Ham.H m.m4 maososooao 4.4 aNH.4 4.m amm.~ m.4 aoa.4 H.m mom.~ 4.mm omHmz H.HH GH4.0H m.m mHm.a o.o 4H o.o o m.m4 oHomHz H.4H HH~.mH m.am maa.mH o.AH oo~.mm a.4H «ma.~H m.m4 aoHHHz ~.mm Ham.om o.m4 m44.om H.4m aoH.Hm m.a4 Hmm.am m.m4 sosonom w «mom a «mom m «mom 4 amom m.os\ooHum mono ommazm mom oamazm mos OOOON wmeoa mOOON Ooxo 20HBUD0000 0000 00 MDH¢> mlm 0H0¢B 201 .moam Ooaomoa mOa OH O3oam wamHam> aOHHHE Oommom aHOOm .HmOIOO On .OOHHOQ >m>usm OOIOOOH mOa OOHHOO mOHOOOmOOO OHaEmm ma OONHHmOH OOHHa OOHHHom ommam>m OmaOon3 maa macommaaoa mHOBm .NOOH .aoaHmmma OOm mama >O>HOm Emma “mumaom v.¢m vmm.om m.wh mmmsmm m.mh hmmsOHH m.vw Mstmh HOmHZ cam .amHHHZ seaamaom «Ho.4m Hom.mm 4mm.m4H Ham.mm mmono HHO mom Hmaoa 4 amom m amom m mmom m «mom m.mx\ooaum mono ommaza mom oamazm I mom mmOoN woxOoa mOOON Omxo III UOSGHHOOOIImIm 0Hm¢9 202 4.3.2.2. Other Sources of Family Income Even though crop production is the largest source of family income, livestock raisingl, agricultural tradingz, and agricultural processing are also major components of farm income in the Eastern Region. For instance, the reported revenue of the livestock enterprise arises from the sale of animals and animal by-products. In the case of oxen traction, however, the growth in value of farm livestock inventories over the 1978-79 season is not included in the income statement calculation. Income generated from agricultural trading, agricultural transfor- mation, and other sources are accounted for in Table 5.7. Other contributions to household income arise from non- agricultural and artisanal activities, salaries, pensions, inheritance,_and gifts. The relative importance of the different Sources of household income and selected efficiency measures are presented in Table 5.10. In addition, the traction farmers have also reported income from contract lEstimated appreciation value of an ox (10,000 CFA) has not been included in the statement. It should be noted, also, that donkey cart revenue in Table 5.7 may substantially underestimate potential revenue from carting in certain areas. In heavily populated areas such as Diapangou, Piela and Logobou, there is a flourishing market for firewood sold largely from the household in small bundles. In general, this is a substantial potential source of revenue; in some areas, donkey wood haulers can easily net 10,000 FCFA per month (Wilcock, 1981). 2See Ouedraogo on crop and livestock trading, forth- coming dissertation, 1983; and Wilcock on small-scale rural enterprises in the Eastern ORD. Also see Negash, Research Proposalifor Rice and Sorghum/Millet Processing in Eastern Upper Volta, 1981; also see Fenton for analysis of livestock enterprises in the Eastern Region, forthcoming dissertation, 1983. 203 mmOoN mmeoa mmOON Ooxo Haa.HH am~.eH mom.e~ 4mm.mH onmoomm mom msoooa osHmmono aoz 4HH.aH 4mo.mH m4a.a~ mom.mm moxmos aHOOO awn OEOOOH OOHQQOOU aoz mom.o mmm.m 4NH.HH ama.HH comamm mom osoosa monmomo aoz Hamomc Hamomv Hmmomv Hamomv monommoz HosoHoHaam m.HN o.o m.a o.mm osoooa ao noouoom compo .> m.HI m.O O.H m.O OOHamEHonOmOB HmHOaHOOHHOO .>H H.H H.H o.o . ~.o mchmaa mono .HHH m.H o.a H.H H.H: monHmm xooamo>HH .HH 4.4a m.om o.am H.mm HHmaoa ao 4O soHaosmonm mono .H AUGOOHOAHV AHGOOHOQV AUGOOHOQV AUGOOHOQV mHGOCOQEOU OEOOGH MO OOCMHHOQEH O>HHMHOM mmo.mm amm.mm ooo.moH 4Ha.mHH OzoozH onommmoom amz amm.~a omo.mm m44.mmH mmm.aa mmzoozH zmam amz ~4o.o~ HHm m4m.~H amm.om osoooH mo moonoom nosuo .> o~4.HI Nos AHH.m mam soHamSmoamomna HmmoaHoonoa .>H mma.H ~4a ema maH osHmmna mono .HHH omH.H mHm.m mmH.m oam.HI msHmHmm xooamo>HH .HH moo.Ha ~am.ma o-.44H www.ma coHaoomoum mono .H H¢mumv H¢momv Admumv HOOUOO maOOOOmEOU OEOOOH HOnmz HO OOHm> camaza mom ommaza mom mUHBmHmMBU¢m¢20 MSOUZH 0Hommm002 mo wm¢220m OH.m 0Hm¢B 204 .>H OOOOHOa H maOOOanOo OEOOOH HommE MO San maa mH OEOOOH Emma amzm .HAAH ..Hm no .aamaumm mom mama mo>mom snmm “momoom 4°4.mH moo.mH mom.m~ eHa.m~ mnmuoom mom osoosa mHosonoom Doz HH4.- mmo.H~ mam.Hm mam.Hm Hoxaoz aHOOO mom OEOOOH CHOOOmOom aoz om~.m H44.m Hmo.mH 44o.aH sonnom mom msoosa mHosonoom ooz mmo.~H 4mm.aH 4cm.H~ 4mm.mH onmaomm mom osoosa Emma aoz ~mo.aH mem.o~ om4.m~ 444.m~ nmxnoz DHoma mom osoosH eamm aoz aa4.o mo4.m mmm.mH amm.HH somnom mom osoosa summ amz HOOOOHaOOOO mmasmmmz hOOOHOHHHm oamaza mom ommaza mom mOOoN mmeoa mOOoN Omxo OOOOHaOOOIIOH.m maaae 205 plowing and transport revenues. Based on the 1978-79 study, the income effects of animal traction at the farm level were found to be negligible. Oxen farmers attained a 16 percent increase in net farm income per active worker from crop production. However, the major portion of the increase is attributable to appreciation in the value of oxen through weight gains. Donkey traction farmers' incomes were found to be lower than those of hoe farmers in the same zones, mainly due to adverse (drought) conditions that affected about 70 percent Of the donkey zones during the 1978-79 period. 4.3.3. Cash Flow Analysis Table 5.11 shows the household annual cash flows (difference between cash receipts and cash expenses) for the oxen and donkey zone farmers. The annual net cash flow for hoe farmers (averaged for both the oxen and donkey zones) is a positive 21,479 FCFA. The net flow for the donkey traction farmers is also a positive amount, of 8,525 FCFA. However, the net cash flow figures are negative for the oxen farmers to the amount of 643 FCFA. The net cropping cash surplus is negative for all three categories. The absolute values of the annual cash flow for all categories, and the value of cash inputs into crop production, are extremely low. However, the absolute value 1It should be noted, however, that the actual sales value of marketed production is about 10 percent of the total reported crOp value; hence the reported margin is actually unattainable. 206 TABLE 5-11 ANNUAL CASH FLOW STATEMENT Oxen Zones Cash Flow Item Donkey Zones Hoe ANTRAC Hoe ANTRAC Crop Production (FCFA) (FCFA) (FCFA) (FCFA) Value of Sales 6,661 9,680 9,569 13,798 Non-ANTRAC Inputs -l,752 -2,682 -2,879 -2,621 ANTRAC Related Current Cash Expenses 0_ -4,502 9 -2,409 ANTRAC Related Revenues O 660 0 1,705 Net CrOpping Cash Revenue 4,909 3,156 6,681 10,473 Major Food Purchases -4,966 -11,617 -9,505 -20,782 Net Cropping Cash Surplus -57 -8,461 -2,824 -10,309 Livestock Production Revenues 3,997 33,127 19,021 33,961 Expenditures -5,967 -27,992 -13,203 -32,565 Agricultural Trading Revenues 1,594 2,877 7,867 17,913 Expenditures -1,358 —3,406 -6,682 -19,402 Agricultural Processing and Gathering Revenues 1,565 6,150 2,988 8,816 Expenditures -l,037 -2,972 -2,286 -10,236 Other Sources of Income Revenues 38,051 21,127 6,194 46,034 Expenditures -l,120 -7,943 -5,156 -24,457 Capital Expenditures Non-ANTRAC Equipment Purchased ~183 -126 -504 -276 ANTRAC Equipment Purchases -333 -640 -0 —2,399 Credit Inflows 1,155 6,853 2,854 9,169 Outflows -1,870 -19,237 —3,138 -7,724 NET ANNUAL CASH FLOW 34,437 -643 5,131 8,525 a I I 0 Net Farm Income 15 the sum of major income components I through IV. SOURCE: Farm survey data and Barrett et al. (1981) 207 of cash inputs into crop production is quite large if viewed relative to the amount of cash revenue generated from crOp production. In the two zonal aggregates of hoe cultivation, the cash inputs are 28 percent of the value of sales. For the oxen traction farms, net current cash costs comprised 67 percent of crop sales, leaving a net cash revenue of only 3,156 FCFA. The expenses for donkey traction are less than those for oxen--24 percent of crop sales. The median animal traction farmer had three years of experience. Hence, with the typical package (a pair of oxen and a plow, or one donkey and a plow) this implies that the typical oxen farmer surveyed should have paid 22,600 CFA a year, while a donkey farmer's repayment burden amounts to 14,175 FCFA for a year. If these repay- ment values are taken into account (net of ANTRAC credit repayments already included in Table 5.11), the net cash flow on an annual basis becomes -10,546 FCFA for oxen farmers and -5,366 FCFA for donkey farmers. The net monthly cash flow position for hoe farmers is also low throughout the year except during the post-harvest period (November to early May). (The May through August period corresponds to what is generally known as the "hungry season", and one would expect some farmers to purchase food during this period. The net monthly cash flow fluctuates more for ANTRAC farmers than for hoe farmers, mainly due to ANTRAC-related cash costs. 208 The cash deficit becomes relatively substantial when the food purchases of the May-July period are subtracted from the net cropping revenue. Thus, the increase in the magni- tude and timing of production costs poses a serious cash flow problem, particularly for oxen farmers. To be succes- sful, oxen traction adopters are obliged to search out and utilize alternative sources of liquidity, such as sale of livestock, non-farm cash sources, and credit from formal and informal sources (see Table 5.10 for details on possible sources of revenue in the EORD). 4.4. An Assessment of the Animal Traction Package's Viability The purpose of this subsection is to examine the viability of the ANTRAC package as currently delivered to the EORD farmers. The relevant issues will be discussed in three areas: rate of adoption, scope for increasing future profitability of the package, and the need for adoptive farmer assessment research orientation. 4.4.1. Rate of Adoption During the 1974-1981 period, the rate of adoption of the animal traction package has been fairly satisfactory. In 1974, the number of farmers using animal traction was 180. This increased to 1,360 in 1979 and to 1,540 to 1981. These figures imply an eight-fold increase in adoption between 1974 and 1981. However, there are reasons that call for a cautious interpretation of this impressive rate of adoption. First, it should be noted that only about 3 209 percent of the EORD households have had access to the program. Secondly, as indicated in Chapter IV, the rate of animal traction loan repayment, which averaged 32 percent for the last few years, is quite weak by most standards. Above all else, the animal traction package demonstrated only a limited technical and financial viability at the farm level. With respect to the technical impact, for instance, only a 10 percent increase in culti- vated acreage per active worker was associated with animal traction use, and no appreciable increase in yield per hectare was observed among the adOpters. Subsequently, this limited increase in output is reflected by insufficient net revenue from crOp production, aggravating the cash flow problem at the farm level. 4.4.2. Scope for Increasing Profitabilipy Although the current performance is disappointing, the scope for increasing future profitability of traction enterprises in the Eastern Region appears encouraging. Results of both on-farm trials1 and a lO-year capital budgeting analysis2 provide some cause for optimism. A field trial was conducted in 1979 to test the effects of animal traction on output. As shown in Table 5.12, the increase for sorghum and millet is 16.7 percent over 1Based on harvest data obtained from 24 sorghum fields and 19 peanut fields; see Barrett gt al., 1982. 2See Lassiter, 1982. 210 .mamH .mHmHOa oamsmmoam\ooH3on «mm omom "monoom 44.~H + m~.mH 46.4H + ma.mH Don HoaaOoo ao>o ommOOOOH aOooaom .HONHHHaHmH OO .OOH3oHa Udmsza "VB 4H.Hm + 44.4~ m~.m~ + 4o.mo uon Hoausoo ao>o OmmOHOOH aOooaom .OamOamoaa .me emH mam msHson ommazm “ma wv.HH + w4.HH mm.ON + w~.OM OHOHH aOHm HoaaOoo ao>o OmmOHOOH aOmoaom .oamsmmosm .mx omH “OOmO ha aoaa OOmH "we m.m~HH H.HAm m.aHHH e.Hmm mm\os HammHHHonom os OOmO ha .aoaa OOmHO aoHa HOHaOoo Ho OHOHH "HE Ho>oa maHOmom Ho>ma maHOmom aOmEammaB maOHmaaoo aOmEamwaB maOHmaOOU aOmEamOHB wmm am wmm am Hm>aoaOH Hm>amaOH OOOOOHHOOU OOOOOHHOOU maOOOOOOHU amHHH2\EOOmaom mhmH 2H ZOHOHm 2008m¢0 028 2H 009000200 mH¢HmB 02H30H0 02¢ mmNHHHBmmm 08¢20m020 H¢mDB¢2 00 mBHDmmm NHIm 000¢B 211 the control plot when practising only animal traction plow- ing, while the simultaneous practice of animal traction plowing and phosphate fertilizer application1 provides an impressive yield increase of 65 percent over the control plot for sorghum and millet. Similarly, a lO-year capital budgeting analysis has indicated a positive potential for animal traction cultivation, assuming different levels of technology adoption. The 10-year planning horizon of the capital budgeting analysis has assisted in incorporating the learning factor in the derivation of expected net revenue at varying stages of technology adOption. In both instances, however, it is apparent that practicing traction plowing alone, which represents the technique most commonly used by EORD animal traction farmers in the 1978-79 period, is not a viable technical package. However, the incremental income more than triples for an analysis which assumes a complete package adoption (plowing, weeding, and application of phosphate fertilizer). This performance in sorghum and millet production has great significance for the Eastern Region, where over 80 percent 1The natural rock phosphate used comes from Kodjari in the Diapaga sector of the EORD. It is composed of 64 percent tricalcium phosphate and has 30 percent content in phosphorus pentoxide (P O ) and a 40 percent content of quicklime or calcium ox1de (CaO). It is crushed to a fineness such that 90 percent of the particles are smaller than 0.09 millimeters in diameter. The solubility of the phosphate varies between 25 and 33 percent per year depending on rainfall and other factors. The official EORD price is 20 FCFA/kg. 212 of the cultivated cropland is devoted to its production. Therefore, one of the available options1 for narrowing the gap between the realized and the potential rates of return calls for a persistent effort to facilitate a complete, but gradual, adoption of the package by the farmers. 4.4.3. Need for Farmer Research Orientation The various elements of the technical package articulated at the initial stage of the EORD/IRDP to achieve sustained increase in small farmer agricultural production included such themes as use of animal traction, improved cultural practices, use of improved seed varieties and use of mineral fertilizer. However, these technical themes originated from experiment station research conducted outside the EORD, mainly in the western part of Upper Volta. Although western Upper Volta possesses ecological conditions distinct from those in the Eastern region, the various technical themes were distributed to farmers located throughout the Eastern Region. Moreover, as pointed out in Chapter III, the agricultural conditions within the Eastern Region are heterogenous with respect to labor availability, pest problems, water availability, soil type and structure, etc. The missing link is an on-farm research program 1Additional step required to improve overall farm viability and farmer loan repayment capacity entails pro- moting selected cash crops/enterprises in the farming system. 213 with farmer assessment research orientation. Using this mechanism, data can be generated from farmers regarding their reactions as well as other information that can be used for checking the adoptability and the consistency of the various technical themes with the conditions in the region. Within such a framework, the process of enhancing the viability of the technical themes (the traction package) requires, first of all, recognizing the diveristy of the region's agroclimatic zones; and, second, identifying the priority research areas (seed variety, soil fertility, development for drought resistance, storage improvements, etc.) for the priority crops. Experience suggests that long years of an applied research program of on-farm orienta- tion, backed up with an experimental station research effort, are essential to develOp the relevant space-specific technical information on better seed varieties, appropriately tested tillage techniques, correct rates of fertilizer ap- plication, proper calendar of farm operation, etc. As discussed earlier, this type of technical information is indispensible to maintain an effective farmer-extension agent-research/planner linkage. 5. Synthesis The potential capacity of animal traction programs for increasing agricultural output and income of smallholder farmers has long been realizedknrresearchers and policy makers in many West African countries. The effort exerted to expand animal traction programs in the Eastern ORD is one 214 clear manifestation of such realization. Unfortunately, as indicated by the various technical and economic indicators, the project performance during the 1974-1981 period reflects a significant gap between the expected and the realized outcomes. Nonetheless, results of on- farm trials and budget analysis with different assumptions on levels of technology adOption suggest an encouraging prospect and a wide scOpe for inducing adjustments in policy and operating practices to facilitate increased long-run farm-level returns for the smallholder farmers in the region. Two outstanding problems curtail the current performance of the EORD agricultural production and marketing program. First, the technical themes delivered to the farmers, as practiced currently, are incapable of generating satisfactory returns, mainly because the current themes are based on experiment station research output that did not incorporate, during its design phase, farmer objectives, farmer resource endowments, and other farm level constraints that are prevalent in the Eastern Region. Moreover, due to lack of an on-farm research program, there is no continuing effort to generate space-specific technical information on better seed varieties, tested tillage techniques, correct rates of fertilizer application, prOper calendars of farm Operation, etc. Consequently, it has not been possible to maintain an effective farmer-extension agent-researcher linkage within the EORD extension system. 215 Secondly, the EORD, which was assumed to be an effective mechanism for planning and implementing the necessary support services required to facilitate increased output of smallholder farmers, has not been able to discharge its responsibilities successfully. Several shortcomings of the policies and operating practices of the EORD have been noted, especially with respect to personnel and financial management, input delivery, and product marketing activities. The extent to which these limitations eventually contributed to the poor performance of the EORD/IRDP has also been briefly traced. Now that the IRDP is completed, the EORD is prepared to launch the next phase of its food production program. This, then, leads to one most timely and relevant question--what has the EORD learned from its experience in the 1974-81 period that it can gainfully utilize for improving its future performance? Indeed, the first phase in internalizing such experience requires isolating and prioritizing the relevant issues that are likely to influence future performance. In the final analysis, however, the usefulness of the learning experience depends to a greater extent on provisions laid out during the design phase to minimize recurrence of similar problems during future implementation. The main focus of the next chapter is to pursue and explore such questions in the light of the 1982-1987, Phase II, EORD program proposal. 216 6. Summapy This chapter provides the highlights of the EORD/IRDP animal traction package's farm-level production impact from 1974 to 1981. The first portion of the chapter assesses the role of the EORD in promoting agricultural develOpment within the Eastern ORD setting. The second portion of the chapter discusses the potential contribution of animal traction programs to higher farm output and in- come resulting from intensification and extensification of land use. The presentation in the third portion focuses on empirical results from the EORD/IRDP oxen and donkey traction experience. The assessment of the technical and economic effects is based on the 1978-79 farm level data and subsequent studies completed by the EORD/IRDP technical assistance team. With respect to the area expansion effect, for example, the data indicates that, using the AEEAE/area ratio as an indica- tor, the area cultivated per 333;: is over 10 percent larger for animal traction farmers compared to hoe farmers. The increase in acreage per worker was larger for traction farmers who used ANTRAC for both plowing and weeding. With respect to household labor allocation, the survey data indicates a reduction in field labor use per hectare for animal traction farmers. Even though traction farmers tend toward growing more cash crOps and allocate a greater proportion of their time to livestock raising and agricultural trading, both ANTRAC and hoe farmers devote 75 to 80 percent of their land to sorghum and millet. 217 With the exception of corn and groundnuts, the yield increase per hectare has not been significant. How- ever, because of a multitude of factors--such as inadequate control, limitations of use of average yields, incomplete techniques, and the effects of drought-~the yield difference between hoe and animal traction farmers is insufficient to provide conclusive evidence of this impact of the animal traction program. Farm-level incomes in the EORD are derived from various sources: crop production, livestock raising, crop and livestock trading, crOp processing, as well as other sources such as pensions, inheritance, and cash gifts. Based on the 1978-79 study, the income effects of animal traction at the farm level were found to be negligible. Oxen farmers attained a 16 percent increase in net farm income per active worker from crop production. Donkey traction farmers' incomes were found to be lower than those of hoe farmers in the same zones. The cost effects are found to be significant, parti— cularly for the traction farmers. For instance, 18 cents per dollar of the gross crop enterprise income is spent on variable and fixed costs by oxen traction farmers. Similarly, 26 and 9 cents per dollar of gross crop enter- prise income are spent by donkey traction and hoe farmers respectively. The income from crop production has not been adequate to cover the various categories of expenditure. In the two zonal aggregates of hoe cultivation, the cash 218 inputs were found to be 28 percent of the value of sales. The cash costs comprised 67 and 24 percent of crop sales for the oxen and donkey traction farms, respectively. Thus, the magnitude and timing of production costs poses a serious cash flow problem, particularly for oxen traction farmers. To be successful, the traction adopters are obliged to discover and use alternative sources of liquidity, such as the sale of livestock, and non-farm cash sources including formal and informal credit. As indicated by the various technical and economic indicators, the project performance during the 1974—81 period reflects a significant gap between the expected and the realized outcomes. However, results of on-farm trials and budget analysis suggest an encouraging prospect and a scope for inducing adjustments in policy and Operating practices to facilitate increased long-runfarmrlevel returns for the smallholder farmers in the region. It is also noted that the technical themes delivered to the farmers, as practiced currently, are incapable of generating satis- factory returns. Moreover, due to lack of an ongoing on- farm research program, there is no space-specific technical information to maintain an effective farmer-extension agent- researcher linkage within the EORD system. Similarly, several shortcomings of the policies and Operating practices of the EORD have been noted, illustrating its inability to provide the necessary support services required to facilitate increased output and income of smallholder farmers. 219 The need to learn from past experience has been stressed as a means to minimize recurrence of similar problems in future programs in the Eastern Region. CHAPTER VI LESSONS FOR THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE II ACTIVITIES: 1982-1983 1. Introduction In 1978, while the EORD/IRDP was still in progress, the government of Upper Volta requested CILSS to finance a food production project in the Eastern region of Upper Volta. This was followed by a meeting of the Voltaic government and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for an initial round of negotiation. In 1979, the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE), the-United Nations DevelOpment Program (UNDP), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) joined IFAD, making the funding arrangement a multi-donor effort. Being anxious to move the process quicklyl, IFAD offered to undertake preparation of the project design on behalf of the other donors. The project preparation document was prepared by FAO at the request of IFADZ. The report was later appraised by the African DevelOpment Bank3, and continued to be cited as "The 1To meet the deadline for fund obligation. 2Rapport de la Mission de PrepAration du Projet de Developpement Ruralfidans ITORD degl‘Est, Centre d'Investis- sement, FAO, 1980. 3Rural DevelOpment Project in the EORD: Appraisal Report, 1981. 220 221 Eastern Region Food Production Project (Projet Vivrier)". In the process, however, the collaborative effort encountered several difficulties--such as differences among donors in programming cycles, analytical requirements of design, Operating policies and procedures, etc. The inability to satisfactorily resolve such hurdles led USAID to define discrete project components for implementation during the same period.1 The first portion of this chapter has three ob- jectives. First, it provides an overview of the overall IFAD-led EORD Food Production Project. Secondly, the elements of the proposed USAID/EORD Food Production Management Assistance Project will be briefly discussed. The third section will deal with the major issues raised by the MSU round table presentation made during August 1982 in Fada N'Gourma. In the second portion of the chapter, lessons learned from the 1974-1981 experience are summarized, followed by a brief assessment of the implications of Phase II to determine the extent to which Phase II design incorporated the lesson from the Phase I experience. Finally, the factors influencing the Phase II design effort will be explored, to draw some lessons for similar future multi-donor project design undertakings. 1Eastern Region Food Production Management Assistance Project: Project Paper, USAID, 1981. 222 2. An Overview of Phase II: IFAD Proposal 2.1. Project Objective and Components The two major objectives of this project are increased agricultural production by target households, and increased capacity of the EORD to implement its development programs. The priority zones selected for the project comprise four sectors out of the eight in the EORD: Bogande, Kantchari, Diapaga, and two subsectors of Matiakoali. The following are the main components of the project: - The provision of short- and medium-term credit to buy production inputs, draft animals and equipment, and to establish cereal banks; - the establishment of a Village Development Fund to finance community facilities such as small maternity hospitals, dispensaries, village wells, grain warehouses, and to stimulate village enterprises; - the improvement of draft animal health through the rehabilitation and construction of vaccination units and the supply of vaccines; - erosion control (5,000 ha) and also land develop- ment for rice cultivation on 1,000 ha of swampland; - the strengthening of an agricultural production support centre, including a seed farm and applied research and training; - the improvement and construction of rural tracks; - the strengthening of the ORD through a reorganization 223 and a training programme for, e.g., supervisors and project staff and through the provision of technical assistance; and, - monitoring and evaluation. 2.2. Project Costs and Financing Arrangements The project is to be implemented over a period of 5 years at a total cost of 29.7 million dollars to be contributed from 5 sources. The details of the proposed financing plan is shown in Table 6.1. The largest contri- butions from CCCE and IFAD are given as loans. For instance, the terms of loan for the 14.5 million dollar contribution from IFAD is set for a 50-year period, with a 1 percent service charge per year excluding a grace period of 10 years. 2.3. Expected Project Impact The FAO report (original project paper) anticipates significant physical and economic impacts from the proposed project. The project is expected to reach 8,000 farm families in the four sectors. It is anticipated, for instance, that the assistance results in increased annual crop production of approximately 12.5 percent over current ORD production to about 24,000 tons/year. The planned additional annual cereal production by the end of the project is broken down as follows: Crop Tons Millett/Sorghum 6200 Maize 900 Rice 2300 224 TABLE 6.1 FINANCING PLAN (USS million) IFAD CCCE UNDP USAID Govt. Totali/ Credit a. Short Term 1.7 b. Medium Term 3.3 3.3 Village Dev. Fund 1.1 1.1 veterinary Services 1.1 1.1 Lowland Dev. 2.5 2.5 Rural Tracks Support Centre 3.0 3.0 Technical Assistance 1.4 2.0 0.7 Project Management 1.0 1.6 Extension Services 2.4 0.8 3.2 Monitoring and Evaluation 1.4 1.3 2.7 Total 14.9 9.2 2.0 2.0 1.6 29.7 A] Physical and price contingencies are included in the above figures. 225 Annual livestock production is also expected to increase by 200 tons by the end of the project. Other anticipated outputs of the project include: area lowland 208 kilometers of road an agricultural training unit 16 warehouses for agricultural input 30 cereal banks building administrative housing in the project financing 60 grain mills vaccination parks anti-erosion installation on 5000 hectares water control structure for 1500 hectares of establishing village development fund, etc. The typical farming household which adOpts animal traction and the other recommended innovations is expected to have a cash income of 675 dollars (after debt service) by the end of the project. The estimated overall internal rate of return for the project is about 20 percent. The export of products promoted by the project--such as cotton, ground nuts, and meat--would generate an annual foreign exchange of 3.2 million dollars, broken down as follows: Product Value in $ cotton 1,200,000 ground nuts 1,600,000 meat 400,000 Total 3,200,000 226 In reviewing the overall project design, AID/ Ouagadougou identified various discrepancies in programming systems between AID and IFAD. Nonetheless, the PID, which is the first of the necessary steps in AID's programming process in project approval, was arranged using information from the FAO document and the AFDB appraisal report as well as data from the on-going EORD project. But neither the FAO document nor the African Development Bank appraisal report, nor the combination of the two, fulfilled the requirements for an AID project paper. Hence, it became necessary for AID/Ouagadougou to mount an additional design effort to strengthen the document in order to present AID/Washington a prOposal with sufficient detail to insure approval of the new Eastern ORD project. Aside from AID's reservation about the Optimistic project outputs, other limitations of the IFAD-led project included lack of studies on environmental impact, social soundness, and range management, and lack of details on certain components such as the training program, recurrent cost financing, and the evaluation plan. For example, while IFAD's policy admits that an evaluation plan would be negotiated with the Voltaic government after negotiating the project itself, AID's approach requires an evaluation plan to be part of a project paper that would be negotiated with the government. In February 1981, USAID/Ouagadougou representatives met with IFAD, UNDP, and CCCE representatives to discuss 227 USAID participation in the Eastern Region food production project. The major points of discussion revolved in the following areas: - USAID was not in a position to commit funds to any component, due mainly to the lack of a project paper (PP). - USAID would not be in a position to commit resources across the board because the project document (AFDB report) had not undergone the kind of analysis and planning which is needed for a PP. The prevailing differences and deficiences could only be resolved by further technical analysis, not by high-level discussion. - USAID would propose to AID/Washington that AID/Ouagadougou finance certain project components which could be justified on their own merit, and by analysis which could be completed quickly. - In conformance with audit recommendations, the AID funding level would be reduced and there would be no further AID funding if the Phase I credit funds were not properly accounted for. In reviewing project Options, IFAD proposed that USAID finance lowland development, roads, or applied research, but did not agree to forego financing of monitoring and evaluation since it has particular expertise in this field. As USAID representatives also expressed interest, it was prOposed that financing of this component be shared between IFAD and USAID. At the end of the meeting, however, it was clear to AID representatives that satisfying the 228 design requirement would entail pursuing further the idea of the discrete financing Option. 3. The USAID/EORD Food Production Management Assistance Project Following the February meeting, USAID/Ouagadougou decided to design an EORD Food Production Management Assis- tance Project. The three project components are high-level training, special studies, and technical assistance for evaluation, costing 3 million dollars during the life of the project. Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 provide the indica- tive budget for the training, special studies, and evaluation components respectively. 4. Michigan State University Round Table Proposal From July 26-28, 1982, a round table meeting was held in Fada N'Gourma to discuss the major research findings of the EORD/IRDP. The meeting was sponsored by the EORD's Bureau of Economic Analysis and Planning and the GOUV Ministry of Rural Development. Four members (Hi the MSU technical assistance team members attended the meeting and discussed the main findings from both the socio-economic and the regional planning studies. The summary presentations and recommendations for future programs are reported by Lassister, et a1.1 1The report is entitled Applied Research in Eastern Upper Volta: Major Findings and Recommendations for Futurg Pro rams, August 1982, by G. Lassiter, A. Mehretu, and D. Wilcock. 229 HmmH .0H¢mD "mUmDOm maOaOH Ho OOHEHa pmaommoaa Oo Ommma .OOO.mmw u mocmmOHaOOO mOHaam s s s O OOO OOO OOO mom OOO mmm OOO mew H auma HOBOB ooo.maH ooo.om ooo.maH mmHocmocHacoO mHHOHO ooHnm m HmoHnacm .m OOO.mmm OOO.m- .m.D .mmmOHmaa m .m coo.OOH ooo.oOH mOHaOO ammz .mmmchOa 4 .H EamaImOoH mHaOOOOIHOIaOo .a OO0.04 OO0.04 OO0.04 HmmmOHmaa 40 Emma Iaaoam muaOOOOIHOIaOO .O OO0.00 OO0.00 HmmmOHmaa NO EamaImOoH mHaOOOOIOH .a ooo.o~ OO0.0H ooo.OH ooo.OH OmOHEmm HmcoHamz .m OO0.00 OO0.00 OO0.00 Haomm mamm3 O .mOonmmm 40 OOHmmHz OoHamOHm>m a OOHOHmHB .4 OO0.00 OOO.m4 OOO.m4 OOO.mH Hamm3IO NO mamOHEmm OOHOHmHB .m ooo.om ooo.om annmcHemm oeIH NO omo.m .m coo.OH ooo.OH Hmmmcamua we ommmo .H EamaIaHOOm mOaOOOOIOH .O 920200200 02H2H¢mB .H HaoaomaaOoov Haaoa xm Rm OH 140 aomcomm mam mom amoosm m>Ha¢OHozH N.w 0H0¢B 230 HmmH .0H¢m0 "mUmDOm ooo.ooa ooo.maH ooo.m~m Ha Dumm Hmaoa ooo.omH .ooo.ma ooo.ma aommsH HmacmssoaH>cm .m ooo.om ooo.om aommaH HmHOom w OOHaQOOO .a coo.00H coc.00H ocHDoxnmz a OOHOOmHa HmOoHOmm .O ooo.om~ ooo.om ooo.oom mamanam_mcHsamm .m ooo.emH oco.om coo.OOH mam>aom .4 azmzomzoo mmaooam HmHommm .HH Hmaoa Huoaommacoov xm OH m.m 0Hm¢a Ame aomoomm OH< mom amooom m>HaOOHozH 231 OO0.0mH O OO0.0mH Humam Hmooa .a OOO.mmN OO0.0~H OOO.m~H OO0.00H aaoaaom aOIxomm a mmHaHHHomm .U OO0.0m OO0.0m OO0.0m HmOaOOE O0 amHaOmHom HmaOmEOOHH>Oa .m OO0.00 OO0.00 OO0.0m HmOaOOE OHO aumaxa OOHOHmHB .H mmuomH>O< Eamalaaoam .m OO0.00~ OO0.00N OO0.00N Hwamma NO amaamamomo OHEOOOoa .m OO0.00N OO0.00N OO0.00N Hmammm NO amHm -oHomonaDcm\DmHooHoHoom .m OO0.0mm OO0.0mm OO0.0mm Hmammm m0 ampmma EmmB\amHEOOOHm< .H mmHOmH>O¢ EamaImOoa .< Bzazoazoo WUZOBmHmmO HOOHzmuaB .HHH HOBOB HuoaomaaOooO xm OH 20 Ame aomnomm OHO mom amooom O>HamOa HmOoHamOOmaOH OOm maHHmOma\mmHOmHmm OmOmaEOOOmm ooo.ooo.m coo.OH4.H ooo.omm.H ooo.o~o.H .Haaoa ozmmo ooo.oom.H ooo.mo~.H ooo.omm.H ooo.om~ HH\aOmm Hmaoa ooo.o0H ooc.ocH ooo.o0H aocomcHacoO mOHOa .a ooo.m4 coHamsHm>m sOmaImHz aomnOOm OOH mOOmamHmm¢ HmOHOOomB EOmaIaOOOm .m Haaoa HOoaommucooO xm OH CODEHHEOUIV.0 WHm¢B 233 The results of the micro-economic study indicate that, as of the 1978-79 season, the farming systems in the Eastern Region are characterized by low levels of producti- vity and monetizationl, and high variability in production conditions such as rainfall patterns, soil fertility, etc. Similarly, the results of the regional planning study have also revealed, among other things, detailed structural characteristics of the Eastern Regionz: - Lack of spatial association between population pressure and physical resource potential--the southern region of the ORD, which is rich in physical resources (precipitation, river discharge, vegetation cover), is the least inhabited. - The region is one of the least densely populated areas of Upper Volta, with a mean density of about 8 persons/km, but the population of the region resides in only about 30 percent of the area in densities varying from 10 to 80 persons per square km. - Assuming that areas within a ten kilometer corridor on each side of a road have accessibility, only 15 percent of the region is accessible to all-weather roads. The total length of all roads and trails is about 2823 kilometers. Most of these roads, however, are not motorable 1Many of the factors associated with poor performance of the EORD agricultural production and marketing activities are discussed in parts of Chapter V and VI. 2For details of the structural characteristics of EORD, see Mehretu, 1982. 234 in the rainy season. Based on the above assumptions, about 37 percent of the region is accessible to these roads. - Of the total number of school—age children, 7.8 percent are enrolled in elementary school. This re- presents about half of the national average. The Fada, Diapaga and Bogande areas account for over 55 percent of the region's total enrollment although they have only about 30 percent of the pOpulation. - As measured by an effective service radius of 5 km, only about 4 percent of the region's total area is within easy access to the 27 dispensaries, maternities, and hospitals located in 25 villages. - Although 80 percent of villages surveyed reported having water supply wells, only 60 percent reported wells with water in them all year long. Thirty-nine percent of the wells have water all year round. Ninety percent of the villages reported that during the dry season they go from less than 1 to 2 km distance to fetch water; 10 percent reported going 3 kilometers or more. - The region has 178 village markets, 52 of which serve populations in other villages besides their own. About 27 of these markets have a significant level of centrality, serving 5 or more villages. Based on such research findings, the Michigan State University technical assistance team members drew the following conclusions: A. EORD does not possess a set of technical packages 235 which are biologically stable and economically profitable at the farm level for the vast majority of rural households. The ANTRAC package which is available is not well adapted to farm conditions. I B. The time required to develop a self-sustaining animal traction program was seriously underestimated. The development of an animal traction technology and basic support services is a complex, long-term process. 5. Synthesis As noted in Chapter II, the Phase I project of the EORD was formulated with a two-fold purpose. First, to expand the capacity of the EORD to design and implement development projects and, secondly, to increase food production, food security and income of the rural people in the Eastern Region. As the project moves into a second phase, the project components are identified as a follow-up to the activities of Phase I, defining its purpose to be the achievement of the same early project goals. While the funding of the IRDP was about 4 million dollars, coming from a bilateral arrangement with USAID, the Phase II project is supported by a budget about eight times larger, contributed by five participants, including the GOUV. The multilateral donor financing arrangement has elevated the amount of financial backing for the ORD's projects. As pointed out earlier, the main activity of the IRDP has been institution building-—with about 90 percent of project financial resources allocated to ORD Operations 236 through technical assistance, commodities, construction, training, etc. Nonetheless, the first phase project has not succeeded in developing the capacity of the region, nor in securing a viable agricultural production package. Once the Voltaic government and the international donors agree to maintain a funding priority to increase food production, food security, and income among the rural peOple, the project preparation team needs to focus on designing a program with self-sustaining potential. The first step in accomplishing the design of a Phase II activity requires setting a clear project objective, and then conducting a systematic analysis of the region to determine the limitations and possibilities of approaching the desired objectives. From this perspective the accumu- lated experience from Phase I activity is indispensible in designing and implementing a solid Phase II program. 5.1. Lessons From the 1974—1981 Experience As pointed out in Chapter I, the purpose of this study is to see what we can learn from the 1974-1981 experience to help the EORD and the government of Upper Volta, as well as donors wishing to provide development assistance, in the preparation of similar future projects. The various data accumulated on the activities of the integrated rural develOpment project are capable of generating multifaceted policy implications useful in guiding similar future undertakings. The following are some lessons to be learned from the EORD/IRDP experience. A. financial 237 In spite of the effort exerted through the IRDP and technical assistance, the EORD does not have the capacity to: B. coordinate regional development activities--agri- culture, health, education, public works, etc. deliver support services for even the more focused agricultural development program--credit, extension, research, and product marketing motivate and manage its personnel, and handle its financial resources to satisfy donor requirements generate adequate self-supporting revenue from its commercialization activity to cover its recurrent cost requirements. The EORD/IRDP has not succeeded in stimulating small farmer investment in food production mainly because: C. EORD/IRDP does not possess viable technical themes suitable to the diverse agro-climatic conditions characterizing the region priority investment was allocated to institution building for capacity develOpment largely at the headquarters--on vehicles, construction, equipment for ORD, budget support, etc. Uncoordinated multidonor intervention, particu- larly involving donors on different Operating schedules and reporting requirements, not only aggravates the management problem for the host country agency but can adversely affect overall project results if individual donors fail to 238 implement planned intervention. D. A project with the magnitude of EORD/IRDP can greatly benefit from instituting a management information system to assist management in assessing implementation and technology, as well as in checking the flow of expected benefits to the target population or area. Several specific lessons have also been learned in pursuing the performance of the individual components of the IRDP. For instance, in the agricultural credit scheme, the interest rate for medium-term credit was 5.5 percent, at a time when inflation was in the 12 to 15 percent range. As a result, there was a 10-fold increase in the borrowing of animal traction credit during the 1974—1981 period. But in the absence of a viable production package and the inability of the EORD administrative frame- work to furnish the necessary support services, the credit repayment rates are low and farmers are constantly faced with severe cash flow problems. Moreover, by giving loans at a low rate of interest, the credit program also under- mined efforts to mobilize rural savings in the region. Two policy implications emanate from the credit experience. The first implication suggests that planners and policy makers should develOp a sound food production package before encouraging wide distribution of subsidized credit. In the light of prevailing EORD circumstances, this implies the need to improve the scientific base by investing in research and training. 239 The second implication suggests the need to raise the interest rate in line with the opportunity cost of capital. It appears that the policy makers in Upper Volta have learned this lesson; they recently agreed to raise the interest rate for the medium-term loans. But there should be a concerted effort to mobilize rural savings by raising interest rates on saving accounts. The product marketing effort of the IRDP has not been satisfactory. First, the ORD's marketing program handled only an insignificant volume of the region's farm products. Even then, the Operation was conducted at a loss, basically due to its high Operating costs. Subsequently, though self-financing in principle, the ORD is characterized as a drain on the national budget and its persistent recurrent cost problem is mostly met by continued financing by varied external donors.l 5.2. Implications of Phase II In assessing the IFAD-led project paper, one can easily observe that the designers have by and large overlooked certain lessons from the Phase I experience. The subsequent design by the USAID team, which defined a discrete Eastern Region Food Production Management Assistance Project, has raised many of the issues that were overlooked and tried to incorporate the Phase I experience in the Phase II project lLassiter, et a1., 1982 reports that EORD has re- ceived zero funding from GOUV in the past two years. 240 design. However, the link between the USAID project components and the IFAD-led program is still undefined. 5.2.1. Technical Package The IFAD proposal is based on the assumption that a package of improved practices exists and that farmers are receptive to the introduction of this technology.1 However, this assumption is not in line with the performance of the IRDP over the 1974-1981 period. For instance, the crop yield figures used in the IFAD project paper are highly optimistic when compared with the household pro- duction data generated in the 1978-79 farm survey by the MSU team. As shown in Table 6.5, the yield estimates (kgs/ ha) for the major crops in the IFAD paper are significantly higher than the figures presented in Table 5.3. In Table 6.5, Stage I estimates represent the level without the project. Stage II yields are anticipated to result from better soil preparation, use of improved seeds, fertili- zers, and insecticides or pesticides; likewise, Stage III yields are attributed to the use of more fertilizers and more apprOpriate rotation systems around selected cash crOps. Based on such hypothetical yield figures, the anticipated effects of the project also appear overly Optimistc. For example, the African DevelOpment Bank estimates that over the life of the project annual household 1Upper Volta Rural Development Project in the EORD: Appraisal Report, 1981} 241 ommH .omm ”moOoom m.H m.H I I I I CDHO a.o a.o 4.o 4.0 ~.o m.o mmm3oO m.o o.H I m.o I I coaaoO o.~ 4.m 4.H H.H o.H H.H mNHmz o.H ~.H m.o m.o m.o c.o maoomsooao o.H H.H m.o o.H O.o a.o amHHHz H.H H.H a.o H.H a.o m.o ascoaom HmOOmz OoHaomOB HmOOmE OOHaomOB HmOOmE OoHaomOB Hmchm Hmch< Hmch< saHz caHs caHs HHH momam HH mmmam AaomHoOm noocasz H ommam Hms\mxv mmaazHamm mama» m.o HHm¢B 242 income in target households would increase from 110,000 FCFA to 242,000 FCFA in households using animal traction and to 198,000 FCFA in households cultivating by hand. The IFAD paper also assumes an average of 5 persons in the household instead of the 7-11 persons observed in the EORD/IRDP sample households. As reported in Chapter V, a series of lO-year investment analyses based on different levels of technology shows that there is a large initial investment cost and deferred benefit associated with the adOption of the existing animal traction package. This analysis shows that, for level of technology represented by the complete tillage plus fertilizer application package for donkey and oxen traction, the first four years of the investment period are represented by deficit incremental net benefits. In both instances, higher levels of positive incremental net benefits are generated late in the investment period (see Lassiter, 1982). The total net incremental benefits for the different levels of assumed technology become minimal in accounting for the relative timing of costs and benefits over the investment period. Table 6.6 shows the net present value (NPV) of the incremental benefits calculated at three interest rate levels. The zero rate shows the incremental benefits without regard to the time value of money. The 5.5 percent discount rate is used to reflect the opportunity cost of ANTRAC investment credit. As discussed earlier, the 243 mmmH .OmDHmmmH "momoom ~4m.HOH 4H4.oaH mmm.4om OmNHHHaOmm + mmmHHHa cmxo mamHmsoO 4ma.Hm 4H~.ma m4a.4a ommHHHa coxo muonsoO mma.~I www.mm mHm.mm aommam coHaosmoOm Baas .ocHonm cmxo ~aa.om- mmm.oaI omm.amI Doomam soHDosooOm oz .mcHson smxo om~.aHH omm.amH mom.mH~ OONHHHaOmm + momHHHa amxcoo mamHmaoO H44.mm cma.4HH cam.~aH momHHHa amxcoo maonsoO 04a.m4 mm~.mm omo.mm aomaam coHaooooOm OOH: .mcaonm amazon HHm.mmI am~.m0HI m-.mmHI aomaam coHaoomoOm oz .son amxcoo mama mama mamm aOOoomHa aOOoomHa aOOoomHa 4o.0H mm.m oz "OOH aHHmOma amz HmaOmEmOOOH Ho >az hOOHOanmB Ho Hm>ma 020H9006000 02002H 0¢0w OH 20 00m¢0 0¢092¢ 00 mBH00200 H¢92020002H 005 00 0DH¢> 920m000 B02 008 0.0 0Hm¢B 244 1978-79 medium term loan for animal traction farmers was given at 5.5 percent interest. The 10 percent discount rate is chosen as a more likely representative interest rate for loans given by alternative institutions. As shown in the table, the incremental benefits are reduced by applying the discounting procedure. The higher the discounting rate, the more the incremental net benefit is reduced. For instance, the 96,000 FCFA net benefit without discounting has no incremental net benefit at a 10 percent discount rate. The annual expected recurrent cost burden to be generated by the project is about 4 times the state tax revenue. During the life of the project, donors pay 25 percent of the salaries of central ORD staff and contri— bute to general operating expenditures of the ORD, including the financing of additional office buildings at ORD headquarters. A list of Voltaic personnel to be financed by the project is presented in Table 6.7. In the long run, increased income from agricultural production is expected to stimulate an increased tax base. This, coupled with a better system of tax collection, is hoped to generate sufficient revenue to cover project maintenance costs. However, in the light of the unsatisfactory technical package at the farm level, the project is unlikely to generate the expected output and income base in the immediate post- project period, implying the need to explore all other possible avenues of local revenue generation. 245 TABLE 6.7 VOLTAIC PERSONNEL FINANCED BY THE PROJECT ORD administration: 25% of general staff time Accountants 2 Clerks 6 Agricultural Support Center: Center Director 1 Deputy Center Director 1 Assistants 8 Extension Service: Sector chief assistant 8 Extension agents 53 Road Brigade: Work site chiefs 2 Skilled laborers 3 Manual laborers 6 Livestock Health: Nurse 1 Vaccinators 10 Drivers 2 Manual laborers 4 Lowland development: Topographer 1 Assistants 2 Driver 1 Monitoring and Evaluation: Enumerators 5 Source: FAO, 1980 246 5.2.2. Agricultural Support Center The Phase II project intends to develOp an agri- cultural support center in Diapaga sector. The planned budget allocation for the support center is about 3.3 million dollars. The main expenditure items include: construction and equipment of offices, laboratories, a lecture room, warehouses, a garage, a workshop, housing for center staff and trainees, as well as vehicles and their operating expenses. The location of the support center in the proposed EORD organizational framework is presented in Figure 6.1. The three activities of the proposed agricultural support center are seed multiplication, applied research, and training. 5.2.2.1. Seed Multiplication The seed multiplication program is considered as a follow-up to the on-going CCCE-financed seed program in the EORD. The current project expands the facilities to produce seeds to satisfy demands for maize, sorghum, millet, and rice seeds. The seed multiplication effort is to be supplemented with a network of plots for field trials. 5.2.2.2. Applied Research The main focus of the applied research component is to coordinate the regional research effort of the International Research Centers found in the country. Among these institutions are CERCI, on irrigated crops, 247 aOmOU HmOoHamNHOmmOO HmEOOOU.z «admv amom OmmoaOOa .H.O mOOmHm s )1 MW a n ... mm m m 11 am .— - . W h .4 W W m. OOH—5O... on .482... a a a. . 4. umOHtmm Sea—am — NOHOomOHnOu :30 T 404 M w. I ”We. - - z a o . m a A «:0..an ma mucus: 4 9.35503 usmauunama amongh T .u (. 3 _ acmluucama . . use: 32.0: Hmccouumm _ uOHluuuoum a 9:63ch . H25.— Hausa-unamma I. H I» _ onHHzamHszea +II _ czazzcam *II _ zoaaazuao _ H23 H8333: I0 ”ESEBEOA_ IILI . ._EE§&a 248 particularly rice; IRCT, for cotton; IRAT, for cereals; and ICRISAT on general agronomic practices. While the IFAD proposal wishes to maintain a distinction between the applied research and the evaluation activities, the MSU round table proposal emphasizes the need to orient the applied research activity within the farming system frame- work. The USAID proposal, for instance, indicates the existence of ample research opportunity in connection with the evaluation activities of the proposed evaluation unit. The $700,000 funding by USAID for special studies is based on such a premise. 5.2.2.3. Training The agricultural support center anticipates training project staff, extension agents, and farmers. Other than the plan to recruit a Senior Training Officer to coordinate all training activity, the project paper does not treat the kinds of skills provided to the different participants in the training activity. The AID proposal also defines a follow—up to the Phase I training program, a high-level training activity supported by a budget of $800,000. In contrast to Phase I, this budget is a substantial increase over the original $200,000 allocation. However, in spite of the need for accelerated training activities, only about 10 percent of the allocation was expended during the Phase I period, mainly because of limitations on timely identification of capable candidates as well as in making the necessary 249 logistical arrangements on the side of both ORD and USAID representatives. The current proposal anticipates minimizing such problems by encouraging increased participation of the MDR's Directorate of Planning, Human Resources and Professional Training over the process of identifying candidates and scheduling training periods. This proposal further identifies the likely training institutes for short- and long-term training both in the country and abroad. However, in light of the fact that the UNDP Senior Training Officer is charged with the responsibility of managing the overal Training activity, there is no clear mandate defining the role of the USAID project personnel in implementing the USAID Phase II training component. 5.2.3. Agricultural Extension According to the proposed organizational structure of the EORD (see Figure 6.1), the extension service will be located in the operations division as a department. The main thrust of the planned extension activity is the Training-Visit (T&V) system of extension. The training activity of the extension program is to be headed by a senior training officer provided through UNDP technical assistance. The senior training officer will be assisted by subject matter specialists and agricultural officers to form the hierarchial system of supervisory and training teams to ensure that village extension workers carry out their visits with farmers on a regular basis. Problems not 250 adequately treated in the IFAD project paper, but likely to arise during implementation, include a shortage of qualified personnel to assume duties at the various levels, as well as logistical problems emanating from the poor transportation network characterizing the Eastern Department. 5.2.4. Agricultural Marketing As in the case of the presupposition of viable package availability, the IFAD-led project states that the existing marketing network is capable of collecting and distributing the anticipated production surpluses to be generated by the projectl. While it relies on OFNACER for marketing cereals, and on CFDT for marketing cotton, the extra production of ground nuts and niebe are to be absorbed through increasing processing capacity in rural areas. For improving rice marketing, the AFDB report proposes the following conditions to be pursued by SOVOLCOM: - SOVOLCOM will be commited to purchasing the paddy delivered to Fada N'Gourma (the collection will be ensured by the traditional system) - The Equalization Fund2 (Caisse de Perequations) will agree to subsidize the additional transport costs, which will amount to about 14 francs per kg for the EORD. 1Given the nature of the technological base assumed, surplus production may not be generated and no subsequent pressing marketing problems may follow. 2Refers to subsidization of transport of local rice from where it is produced to milling and final point of sale; fund is to come from the rice import tax. 251 As discussed in earlier chapters, however, the current performance of product marketing in the Eastern Region is quite unsatisfactory. For instance, Fotzo, 1983, describes rice marketing in the EORD as follows: In fact, in 1980, the regional director of OFNACER for the Eastern Region suspended all the paddy buying operations from his program because of inadequate storage and processing facilities. Throughout the whole EORD, only two small pro- cessing units (130-160 kg of paddy per hour) were in operation during the survey period. This scarcity of processing units coupled with the fact that batches of paddy were not homogenous resulted in a poor quality of milled rice (60 percent of broken rice), making the imported rice preferred to domestic rice. 5.2.5. Monitoring and Evaluation The IFAD-led project intends to establish a monitoring and evaluation unit in the ORD's headquarters in Fada N'Gourma. The unit will be independent in its advice to ORD management and donors, but will be accountable to the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD). The procedures of operation are to follow IFAD's guidelines, and will be directed by a long-term technical advisor funded by IFAD. The anticipated office construction to house the unit is also to be financed by IFAD. As described earlier, AID provides short- and long- term technical assistance in various fields. The purpose of AID's technical assistance is to improve monitoring and evaluation of the multi-lateral program management and impact, and to inform the use of AID training and special studies components. 252 Under IFAD's guidelines, the MEU has two main functions. The first function is to follow the program's receipt of funds, technical assistance, and commodities from the donors projects and the GOUV and to record the results of program activities. The second function is to assess the effect of program output and the impact of these effects on food production, income and the quality of life in the target group. The establishment of a monitoring and evaluation unit is not at issue. In fact, one obvious limitation of the Phase I project was the lack of a built-in evaluation mechanism to continually assess project activity. The types of evaluation tasks outlined in Chapter II, such as farmer assessment, implementation assessment, and gauging benefit flows, although they require a coordinated informa— tion system, are likely to contribute to the success of the project, particularly if accomplished in a systematic and timely manner. Indeed, the current effort in Phase II to institute an evaluation mechanism is an improvement over Phase I. However, a close examination of the proposed structure suggests the need to further redefine certain aspects of the MEU in order to ensure its implementation on a sustain- ‘ able basis: - Although funds are allocated for applied research, special studies and monitoring and evaluation components, the proposed structure is not conducive to facilitating 253 coordinated and effective implementation of an evaluation program to conduct farmer assessment, implementation assessment, and gauging of benefit flows. - The proposed independence of the MEU from the ORD is likely to promote objectivity in evaluation, and the hook-up with MDR could facilitate micro- and macro- policy linkages; but the ORD may not approve the recurrent expenditures to maintain such a structure at the end of the project. - At the end of Phase 1, several vacant offices were released at the ORD headquarters in Fada; these could accommodate many oftfluaPhase II project components. How justifiable will it then be to use project funds for further office construction? 5.3. Collaborative Project Design Minimizing Pitfalls It is obvious by now that the Phase II project which started as a bilateral project has evolved over time into a multidonor project involving five donors, including the Government of Upper Volta. In tracing the evolution of the project, however, it has also been demonstrated that accomplishing a collaborative design, although highly desirable, is not found to be a simple task. Many factors contribute to the apparent difficulty. The primary factors is the inability of participating donors to judge and appreciate the strength and limitations of each other's Operating policies and procedures in the light 254 of the problems at hand. In general, for instance, while bilateral agencies are known to be limited by their own governments, auditors, and public opinions, multilateral agencies are constrained by their own financial and administrative structure. Subsequently, as observed in the case of Phase II design process, AID's persistance in basing the project paper on a solid data base, stemming from the programming cycle and analytical requirements inherent in its procedures, has not been adequately appreciated by the IFAD representatives, who saw meeting their funding obligation deadline as the foremost priority. Even though the challenges of collaborative design are likely to continue, given that different donors maintain different requirements, making some provisions at earlier stages of the design effort can assist in overcoming certain pitfalls: - Donor representatives entering into the design effort should be individuals adequately aware of each others' requirements and procedures. - It is essential that one criteria of collaborative design be required representation and full participation by all collaborators in the design process. - The ultimate success of the design, to a large degree, depends on the extent to which the design effort attempts to deal with the key constraints prevailing in the environment under consideration. In the case of the Eastern Region, for instance, the factors include the lack of improved technology, shortage of trained manpower, and 255 lack of Operating cost for recurrent expenses. Host country representatives play a useful role in the harmoniza- tion process, provided that host institutions possess some desirable level of capacity. 6. Summary The Phase II EORD program consists of two projects: the overall IFAD-led project (with less early USAID planned contribution) and the USAID/EORD Food Production Management Assistance Project. Both projects are to be implemented during the 1982-1987 period. The overall IFAD-led project, having the same goal as the Phase I project, intends to expand the capacity of the EORD and to increase food production, food security, and income of the rural people in the four sectors of the Eastern ORD. The project anticipates a 27.7 million dollar contribution from four participants: IFAD, CCCE, UNDP, and the government of Upper Volta. The funds from IFAD and CCCE are largely loans, while that of UNDP are on a grant basis. The 14.5 million dollar contribution from IFAD, for instance, is given as a loan for 50 years, with a 1 percent service charge per year excluding a grace period of 10 years. The project is expected to reach 8,000 farm families in the project area. Anticipated physical results of the project include: increased annual crop production of approximately 12.5 percent, 208 kilometers of roads, 30 cereal banks, 60 grain mills, a training unit, etc. The typical farming household which adopts animal traction 256 and other recommended innovations is expected to have a cash income of 675 dollars by the end of the project. The estimated overall internal rate of return for the project is about 20 percent, and the export of project- produced agricultural products would generate an annual foreign exchange of 3.2 million dollars. The second project, the USAID/EORD Food Production Management Assistance project, resulted because the IFAD-led project paper was found inadequate to fulfill the requirements of an AID project paper. When the IFAD representatives refused to engage in further analysis, AID representatives decided to define a discrete project. Its three major components are high-level training, special studies, and technical assistance for evaluation, costing 3 million dollars during the life of the project. In an attempt to draw some lessons for Phase II, major findings of the MSU micro-economic and regional plan- ning study results were briefly reviewed. For instance, the EORD is characterized by its low levels of production and monetization, high variability in rainfall patterns and soil fertility, lack of spatial association between population pressure and physical resource potential, etc. Subsequently, some lessons to be learned from the 1974-1981 EORD/IRDP Phase I experience have been outlined: - That EORD/IRDP does not possess viable technical packages suitable to the diverse agro-climatic conditions characterizing the region. 257 - That the EORD not only lacks the capacity to motivate and manage its personnel, but is also unable to effectively deliver support services for even its more focused agricultural development programs. - That instituting a management information system can contribute to the success of a project, particularly if systematically used for assessing not only routine implementation tasks but also farm technology, as well as the flow of expected benefits to the target population or area. - That uncoordinated multidonor intervention not only aggravates the management problem for the host country agency, but can adversely affect overall project results if individual donors fail to implement planned intervention. - That the period from 1974-1981 is quite short to allow the evolution of project impact beyond that of physical construction. Other specific lessons and subsequent policy implications emanating from the performance of the individual components of the IRDP, such as the agricultural credit and product marketing activities, have also been presented. In assessing the IFAD-led project paper, it is observed that the designers failed to incorporate significant lessons learned from the 1974-1981 experience. For example, the IFAD proposal assumes that a package of improved practices exists for the region, contrary to the 258 reality reflected by the various indicators of the 1974-1981 experience. The crop yield figures used in the IFAD project paper, perhaps pulled from experiment station trial reports, are highly optimistic when compared to the 1978-79 farm-level data. Aside from the unrealistic expectations embedded in the revenue figures, the return calculation also overlooks the fact that there is a large initial investment cost and deferred benefit associated with the adoption of the existing animal traction package. As a lO—year investment analysis shows, the first four years of the investment period for oxen traction and the first two years for donkey traction are represented by deficit incremental net benefits. In both instances, higher levels of positive incremental net benefits are generated late in the investment period. The expected export tax revenue to accrue to the central government amounts to about 250,000 dollars per year. But the annual recurrent cost requirement of the project goes as far as 1,000,000 dollars per year towards the end of the project. In the short run, 25 percent of the salaries of central ORD staff and some operating expenditures are to be picked up by the donors. However, adequate provisions are not made to eXplore all other possible avenues of local revenue generation to sustain the development effort at the end of Phase II. The final portion of the chapter discusses the strengths and limitations of other elements of the project, 259 which are of concern to both the Voltaic government and the donors, such as the proposed support center, agricultural extension, agricultural marketing, and the monitoring and evaluation unit. Then the factors that contributed to the impasse in the Phase II collaborative design process are examined, followed by some suggestions for consideration to facilitate harmonization in similar future undertakings. CHAPTER VII SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Concluding Summary Upper Volta is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its Gross National Product in 1979 dollars was $180. Its predominantly rural economy (agriculture supports 90 percent of the population) is characterized by a low level of productivity. The annual average growth rate of agriculture in Upper Volta was negative (-3.3 percent) in the 1970-1979 period. In the same period, the food produc- tion index declined about 13 percent. As one of its first drought recovery projects in the Sahel, USAID financed a $4.4 million integrated rural develOpment project (IRDP) in the Eastern region of Upper Volta (EORD/IRDP). Additional funds were also contributed by numerous donors, including UNDP. The USAID financing was intended to provide appropriate technological packages to small farmers and herders. Its components were envisaged to include programs for: strengthening the region's exten- sion and marketing activities, providing facilities, improv- ing wells water control, farm-to—market roads, range manage- ment, and promoting increased food production and better diets (Cohen, 1979). 260 261 The EORD/IRDP was a major joint undertaking by USAID and the EORD. Its objective was to expand the ORD's administrative capacity and to increase agricultural produc- tion and rural income in the Eastern Region. The project was designed with the intent to create "centers of progress" for intensive programs, and thereby to experiment with pro- vision of concentrated extension and related supporting services. However, operational problems curtailed imple- mentation of the concept. Consequently, ORD-wide applied research and implementation programs were undertaken by the Michigan State University technical assistance team from May 1977 until June 1981. The main focus of this study is to assess the overall performance of the EORD/IRDP in institution building and stimulating agricultural production in the area. The ulti- mate purpose is to outline lessons learned during the 1974- 1981 experience. The specific objectives of the study are to: a. identify and analyze the methodological issues involved in evaluating integrated rural development schemes; b. assess the role of the individual EORD/IRDP compo- nents in institution building; c. evaluate the impact of the EORD/IRDP on agricultural output, income, and equity objectives; d. examine the viability of the prOposed Phase II EORD food production program (1982-1987). 262 The two primary sources of data for the present study are the Base Line Farm Survey and the Inventory of Village Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Eastern Region. These surveys were carried out in 1978-1979 and early 1980, respectively, by MSU teams in collaboration with EORD staff. The credit program, comprising short-term and medium- term credit was the centerpiece of the various programs undertaken to expand food production, food security, and income in the Eastern Region. It assumes that the provision of credit would allow farmers to purchase donkeys, oxen and animal traction equipment in order to expand farm size and increase food production and farm income. The average interest rate for short-term credit is about 12 percent; the interest rate for the medium-term loans was 5.5 percent until it was changed by CNCA to 11 percent in late 1980. The oxen loan package is to be repaid in a five-year period with one year's grace, in three equal installments of 20 percent and a final payment of 40 percent of the total loan. The donkey package is given for four years, with a one-year grace period and equal repayments in Years Two, Three, and Four. There are several stipulations, such as down payment require- ments, profitability of operations, group membership require- ments, etc., governing the distribution of credit to the farmers. Over the 1976/76 - 1980/81 period, a total of 4843 loans were extended to 9282 families, accounting for about 15.5 percent of the families residing in the Eastern Region. 263 Despite the continued effort to alleviate the existing problems, the average loan repayment rate was 32 percent during the 1976/77 - 1980/81 period. The poor performance of the credit program is associated with several problems emanating from the central administration of the ORD as well as from the field level. However, as cited earlier, the lack of a viable technical package represents the major shortcoming of the EORD's credit system. Subsequently, even the relatively larger farmers adopting the animal traction program experienced a severe cash-flow problem. Among the achievements of the credit program is the development of a rural credit account to facilitate prOper accounting of cash flow, and initiation of management procedures capable of producing statistical data useful in improving the management process. Nonetheless, there is still a great need to refine the accounting procedure so that an income statement and a balance sheet can be prepared to ascertain the viability and/or net worth of the credit program periodically. In the final analysis, however, develOpment of a self-sustaining rural credit program in the EORD entails initiating and carrying out an effective savings mobilization activity. It is also pointed out that the agricultural exten- sion system of the EORD has grown rapidly from 47 field agents in 1974 to 171 in 1980. But the extension network is characterized as a one-way system, devoted to transmitting the available technical theme to the farmer. Above all, it lacks a systematic research program and feedback mechanisms 264 for incorporating farmers' views and ideas in the decision- making process. The marketing Operations of the EORD/IRDP were ini- tially focused on the purchase and sale of crops. It is indicated that this activity was carried out during the 1977/78 to 1980/81 period at a financial loss to the EORD. Thus, the intent to generate revenue for the ORD from the commercialization activity has not materialized. Conse- quently, the EORD has gradually relieved itself of the crop purchasing and selling activity. However, the ORD has con- tinued its involvement with grain banks even though the management of cereal banks faces various problems. The rate of repayment, although better than animal traction credit rates, averaged only about 60 percent during the 1978-1980 period. Some limitations of cereal bank management in the EORD include poor transportation facilities, inadequate stocking capacity, unstable prices, lack of market informa- tion, a poor extension network, etc. The socio—economic study has generated a vast amount of data covering various areas. Over the 1978-1981 period, 72 reports were produced, covering a wide range of topics: agricultural credit, farming systems, agricultural marketing, regional planning, small-scale enterprises, etc. (A lot of raw data remains in the computer files, still waiting to be analyzed.) The assessment of the technical and economic effects is based on the 1978-79 farm level data and subsequent studies 265 completed by the EORD/IRDP technical assistance team. With respect to the area expansion effect, for example, the data indicate that, using the actif/area ratio as an indicator, the area cultivated per actif is over 10 percent larger for animal traction farmers as compared to hoe farmers. The increase in acreage per worker was larger for traction farmers who used ANTRAC for both plowing and weeding. With respect to household labor allocation, the survey data indi- cate a reduction in field labor use per hectare for animal traction farmers. Even though traction farmers tend toward growing more cash crOps and allocate a greater proportion of their time to livestock raising and agricultural trading, both ANTRAC and hoe farmers devote 75 to 80 percent of their land to sorghum and millet. With the exception of corn and groundnuts, the yield increase per hectare has not been significant. However, because of a multitude of factors--such as inadequate control, limitations of use of average yields, incomplete techniques, and the effects of drought--the yield difference between hoe and animal traction farmers is insufficient to provide con- clusive evidence of this impact of the animal traction program. Farm-level incomes in the EORD are derived from various sources: crop production, livestock raising, crOp and livestock trading, crOp processing, as well as other sources such as pensions, inheritance, and cash gifts. Based on the 1978-79 study, the income effects of animal 266 traction at the farm level were found to be negligible. Oxen farmers attained a 16 percent increase in net farm income per active worker from crop production. Donkey traction farmers' incomes were found to be lower than those of hoe farmers in the same zones. The cost effects are found to be significant, par- ticularly for the traction farmers. For instance, 18 cents per dollar of the gross crOp enterprise income is Spent on variable and fixed costs by oxen traction farmers. Simi- larly, 26 and 9 cents per dollar of gross crop enterprise income are spent by donkey traction and hoe farmers respec- tively. The income from crOp production has not been ade- quate to cover the various categories of expenditure. In the two zonal aggregates of hoe cultivation, the cash inputs were found to be 28 percent of the value of sales. The cash costs comprised 67 and 24 percent of crOp sales for the oxen and donkey traction farms, respectively. Thus, the magnitude and timing of production costs poses a serious cash-flow problem, particularly for oxen traction farmers. To be suc- cessful, the traction adopters are obliged to discover and use alternative sources of liquidity, such as the sale of livestock, and non-farm cash sources including formal and informal credit. As indicated by the various technical and economic indicators, the project performance during the 1974-1981 period reflects a significant gap between the expected and 267 the realized outcomes. However, results of on-farm trials and budget analysis suggest an encouraging prOSpect and a SCOpe for inducing adjustments in policy and operating practices to facilitate increased long-run farm-level returns for the smallholder farmers in the region. It is also noted that the technical themes delivered to the farmers, as practiced currently, are incapable of generating satisfac— tory returns. Moreover, due to lack of an ongoing farm research program, there is no space-specific technical information to maintain an effective farmer/extension agent/ researcher linkage within the EORD system. Similarly, several shortcomings of the policies and operating practices of the EORD have been noted, illustrating its inability to provide the necessary support services required to facili- tate increased output and income of smallholder farmers. The need to learn from past experience has been stressed as a means to minimize recurrence of similar problems in future programs in the Eastern Region. In an attempt to draw some lessons for Phase II, major findings of the MSU micro-economic and regional planning study results were briefly reviewed. For instance, the EORD is characterized by its low levels of production and monetiza- tion, high variability in rainfall patterns andsmfiJ.fertility, lack of spatial association between population pressure and physical resource potential, etc. Subsequently, some lessons to be learned from the 1974-1981 EORD/IRDP Phase I experience have been outlined: 268 - That EORD/IRDP does not possess viable technical themes suitable to the diverse agroclimatic condi- tions characterizing the region. — That the EORD not only lacks the capacity to motivate and manage its personnel, but is also unable to effectively deliver support services for even its more focused agricultural develOpment programs. - That instituting a management information system can contribute to the success of a project, particularly if systematically used for assessing not only routine implementation tasks but also farm technology, as well as the flow of expected benefits to the target pOpulation or area. - That uncoordinated multidonor intervention not only aggravates the management problem for the host country agency, but can adversely affect overall project results if individual donors fail to imple- ment planned intervention. Other specific lessons and subsequent policy impli- cations emanating from the performance of the individual components of the IRDP, such as the agricultural credit and product marketing activities, have also been presented. The Phase II EORD program consists of two projects: the overall IFAD-led project (with less early USAID planned contribution) and the USAID/EORD Food Production Management 269 Assistance Project. Both projects are to be implemented during the 1982-1987 period. The overall IFAD-led project, having the same goal as the Phase I project, intends to expand the capacity of the EORD and to increase food production, food security, and income of the rural people in the four sectors of the Eastern ORD. The project anticipates a $27.7 million con— tribution from four participants: IFAD, CCCE, UNDP, and the government of Upper Volta. The funds from IFAD and CCCE are largely loans, while those of UNDP are on a grant basis. The $14.5 million contribution from IFAD, for instance, is given as a loan for 50 years, with a 1 percent service charge per year excluding a grace period of 10 years. The project is expected to reach 8,000 farm families in the project area. Anticipated physical results of the project include: increased annual crop production of approximately 12.5 percent, 208 kilometers of roads, 30 cereal banks, 60 grain mills, a training unit, etc. The typical farming household which adopts animal traction and other recom- mended innovations is eXpected to have a cash income of $675 by the end of the project. The estimated overall internal rate of return for the project is about 20 percent, and the export of project-produced agricultural products would generate an annual foreign exchange of $3.2 million. The second project, the USAID/EORD Food Production Management Assistance Project, resulted because the IFAD-led project paper was found inadequate1x)fulfilltflmerequirements 270 of an AID project paper. When the IFAD representatives refused to engage in further analysis, AID representatives decided to define a discrete project. Its three major com- ponents are high-level training, special studies, and tech- nical assistance for evaluation, costing $3 million during the life of the project. In assessing the IFAD—led project paper, it is observed that the designers have failed to incorporate significant lessons learned from the 1974-1981 experience. For example, the IFAD proposal assumes that a package of improved practices exists for the region, contrary to the reality reflected by the various indicators of the 1974-1981 experience. The crop yield figures used in the IFAD project paper, perhaps pulled from experiment station trial reports, are highly optimistic when compared to the 1978-1979 farm level data. Aside from the unrealistic expectations embedded in the revenue figures, the return calculation also overlooks the fact that there is a large initial investment cost and deferred benefit associated with the adoption of the existing animal traction package. As a 10-year invest- ment analysis shows, the first four years of the investment period for oxen traction and the first two years for donkey traction are represented by deficit incremental net benefits. In both instances, higher levels of positive incremental net benefits are generated late in the investment period. The expected export tax revenue to accrue to the central government amounts to about $250,000 per year. But 271 the annual recurrent cost requirement of the project goes as far as $1,000,000 per year towards the end of the project. In the short run, 25 percent of the salaries of central ORD staff and some operating expenditures are to be picked up by the donors. 2. Recommendations Some recommendations resulting from the implications of the 1974-1981 IDRP experience include the following: a. The major thrust of the Phase II EORD food produc- tion program should be to generate a viable tech- nical package suitable to the various agroclimatic zones found in the region. The focus of the research would be to test and develOp new varieties, forage crOps, improved tillage practices, crOp storage, soil erosion control, soil fertility improvement, fertilizer, and insecticides. Accom- plishing this task requires a multidisciplinary team (economists, agronomists, etc.) supported by ade- quate funding. The team's activity should also include a continuous assessment of project activi- ties to gauge its progress: the project's adher- ence to its work programs, extent of target fulfill- ment, resource utilization, etc. Integrating the proposed evaluation unit into the ORD structure not only saves additional expenditure on new office con- struction, but facilitates the institution-building process through counterpart training. 272 Maintaining a motivated and trained extension team and other personnel is essential to the success of the Phase II project. It is therefore important to: reward the extension personnel systematically implement the proposed training activityrcarefully develop a well-thought-out formal and inservice training program for both farmers and agents promote research and extension linkages, Given the generation of viable packages, additional provisions to improve the low level of loan repay- ment rates include the following conditions: Inputs should be delivered on time. Farmers should be informed ahead of time when credit agents will be collecting repayment, so that they are not taken by surprise and will have no excuse to evade repayment. Credit agents should not be removed or reassigned to other areas before the end of the loan collec- tion period, because new agents will not be known to the farmers. Revise the terms of repayment of medium-term loans to allow for longer periods of repayment. Given that the medium-term credit program is very costly relative to farmers' incomes, a longer period of repayment with smaller installments should be less of a burden. Furthermore, there is a slow learning curve for farmers who are using donkeys or oxen for 273 the first time; it takes about three to four years before a farmer knows how to competently use a complete package of donkey and/or oxen traction equipment. - Stricter repayment enforcement measures should be taken against farmers who are delinquent in repay- ing their loans. For instance, local government should COOperate in taking defaulters to court. - Based on the on-farm studies, develOp--and encour- age farmers to produce--profitable cash crops or other enterprises to generate cash for production costs. - DevelOp a budget that reflects the loan repayment capacity of households. - Tougher measures, including firing and/or court action, should be taken against credit agents guilty of embezzlement; but an incentive system should be established to reward good credit agents. Given the considerable amount of external technical and financial assistance supporting the EORD food production Phase II project, at least two provisions are essential to ensure its eventual success: - Design a gradual decline of assistance, rather than abrupt withdrawal. - Draw clear specifications of duty for the partici- pant donors so that repective donors can discharge their roles in a timely manner. 274 e. Some priority areas for future research are: - investigation of the possibilities and necessary arrangements for mobilizing saving in rural areas - development of cost and return figures on the most promising rural small-scale enterprises - an EORD road system study prioritizing strategy for improvement of the road network. APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 LOGICAL FREMEWORK EORD, UPPER VOLTA, ORIGINAL xuflomdmo abouow Ivan mu“ «0 ammo mcu ou Qmo ocu buoadsm Ou on: Iflucoo HHfi3 >300 .H mEOUCM mufldmo pod Hmpsp :H xaamcowum: mommouocfl oabmusmmoz .m moofl>uom coflumospm paw coamoc amass pocmwfinmummm .N Ho>mH Hmcowum: ocu co :owuospoua xo0umo>wa pcm amusuaso emquHQ Qmo >200 may mafiuuoaozm >2 muHo> pond: :fl nobomm amusu may mo ucoeaofio>mp HHmpo>o mnu ca bmflmmm OH .H monHmZDmm< Hzo cw mmmouocH .H onH mo mz >qm>HHompmo Ask\om\k emume .HmCHwatov zmmm: I sue zmmem0ta Hfiflz mmomfiam aflm; Hafiz bcosowmcme paw unoEdo 1Ho>op mmouaomou Houmz nobomw wCHbHEHH m on uo: Haw; pcmq .opzusm oabmoom Iouow :H whammmua :oflu ImHDQOd Eoum powwow Do: HHH3 omo mpmm mbcmcopoe uno o>Hup ob mm woflpd m cwfln om no: ban pmosp0pd on» how moflud uwuuob m :Hmucflme ou muwm ucowoflwmsm no on Haw: emquLQ mcflmmcouzd monsoon .cfimuw amo one pouma bmcfimwm pousmmoe .m mm .>o>u:m mafia ommm .q moflumfiumom xooumo>flq mpuooou sz .m .mowumflumum xubmflCHz .N moowum Hmooq .H mpaoflx QOpo pom» pom acmw ou muwdwo pod wa AfioumeflxOMQQm Eouw osoo:fl mflnmmod .m Imwp wuHamo hon pmmmmuUCH N02 cu NIH Afiwums IHxOpddm eoum a: mafia Imam manmmOQmwQ .:0fluo=p .q loud xooumm>fia vommouocH wcwocwcww luamm on Hafiz Qmo .m an uflemto azm wca>fio>mm ooflua accommom owm Iuo>m pocwflc um momsaausw .m . wo wcflbmxume pmmmouocH :ucoeoppmoco: an pocomou mmoum :H monsoon pom ooflb .Eszwbow .uoHHwE mo mpaowx .H :w mommouocw manmpsmmoz wcwpcmumcuwzoo: mowumwm> oflbmeflfio .N .amo was mafia luso wouoxbme on coo nowz3 momma; lusm paw moflfiddsm poow mafimmouo Icfl >Ho>wmmouwoun an Afifitmsflta nmo mpmm onu :H omea Hobos mo xuflfimnc .H ozu mumpwd: 09 .fl monFQZDmm< Hz mo mzwfi pcm mono EOHM noon .mmwfid Imam poom pmmmmuocH .m coflumwwcmwuo 3m: mo wcfi Immmum pcm cowumaamumcH Am 277 Qmo mpmm mcu mo :ofluospoud xooumm>HH cam Hanan wcfiwwmum cam cowumuflcmwpo Qmo mo mmmmm maofipm> pcm mpmm :mmzumn mcofiu Imowcsesoo pm>ouaEH Ab msmmwoua 3m: ob peOQmmu ou coaumuwcmwmo mo :oflu Impmufi< .Hm>mH mmeHH> may um zaumfisofluumq pcm .Hmumcmw cw Qmo may Iasofluwm msaduzm mom Qmo wo :oflumUAMHum> An pmucmo m>wm=mucfi mo xuwomdmo ucmemmmcme umxums Apmmu m ma om comm cw :musmupmo mam .owemmwoud mscflucoo Hafiz mumnh .N :OfluomdmcH Am .N Icm: OH mo ucmemomam Am .N .Hmoflczomu pm>ouaEH .N mwcmco ob >bfl>wudmomp mam .Hmflucmuod wcfiumxpms .uuowmm coflwcmuxm mo mocmmmud .mmmoom mmflno nobommnbam .Hflom an pm:HEumbmp mm mam>mH mo musedmb Hmwomdm An mcowumooH zuwaflnfimmOQ Hmsbo: zaumm: muoe mmmum m>flmcmucfl awe: um mmmucmo :bcme ob cmsumu HHH3 :oHDmEpOMCfl umd mmflaflemw Epmm OOOH Immpmocm: m>flmcmucfl mcumuumd Hammcflmm .H msmcmo .cofiuomdmcH Am .H 10mm mo :ucmEmbpmocm: .H q mo ucmezmwanmummm .H monHAZDmm< Hz<9momzH onH mo mz mhzmebo >Am>HBUMfimo 278 muzcms mo mm: An mcoHumHmm mmmm3 \Hflom mafi>oudEH Am "xb mpfimwz mmmmmpoafi AmxmeOp gov :mxo saw: wcw3on Ampmxpo3 mlmv mfiflemw HHmEm m zn pm IEmmm ma :mu umcu mmum mHn50p Hafiz magnoms cmfl3 mHmecm xuoz umfip HmooH mpmpwa: ob ucmdm zfiummd mp HHH3 mEoocw pmmmmmUCH .q mumodmm mac .0 muuoamu Qmo .m moflbmflumum .mupOQmu Qmo Ab msmch\c0HuomdmcH Am .q :mmur—Orm mmm: :fl HmwucmDOQ wcfiadomo mH250p mo coeummum Icoemp stmmmoonm Am :ofiu Im>wuH=o amps: pcmfi :p:0m mmn: mo mmumu Iom: oqo aamumeflxoudd< Aumucmo pmd mmfiawsmm Eumm OOOH lemmv .uum .mHmEHcm wo mpmmun pm>oudsfl wcwmflmu .wmabmummm> wcflum> Ifiuaao .pmmm 3m: wcflms .pmmwafluumm wcfluoma IHoo .cofluommu Hmswcm wcflm: mumsmmm mo umbesz efiomuzwflm xamumefixouadm pmmmmuo Ice umEumw :pmppmocm: mo mEooCH Hmsccm mwmmm>m mbmucmo q afiv mHm>mH mEOUCH umEpmm :ofiu nonpOHQ xo0umm>HH cam maouo mo mmHmm umummuo Am .q coflbmwfluuw HHmEm mow mmeODm Emp mafiumfixm mo mm: pcm wmscflczomu Homo Icoo pmumz pm>0mdefl wo mm: nmsomcu A:wp:ow Immn:v mmmpm mHHummw wcwxfilzoa wo mm: :H .ommmmuocfi ucmoflWchHm mmmeHfl> :oHu Impsumm m>Hmcmucfl :fl zafimflomdwm mmoflu nomad Hmmsufisofluwm pm>omasfl mo mocmmmm .m noom m>fimcmbxm mp0: mumEumw HHmEm wcoam meoocfl mHnmmOQme pcm mm Imsadusm maambmxume mo mHm>mH umnwflm .q monHmzsmm< Hz<9momzH ZOHH mo mz >Am>HHom5mo mHDLHDO 279 wca upmmw Hmeflcm no“ mowma 30H m um mabmfiflm>m ma Hafiz .pmmm acuuoo mpmum 30H AHHmflomdmm .wcwmmmooud musuaso Ifluwm sou“ muo3p0pd>m Aumxume Hmcoflumcumbcfl mcu pom cemuoo o: mmpfl>0pd xfiucmmuso Qmo mchv .nmo mcu mow mHnm IHfim>m we xadasm m mw manmuflmoud ma pasoz Empwoma couuoo mzu >b pmwfipflmbsm mmofimd um mmwflafluumw mo mm: mmowpd xufipoesoo pcm mmflmmflpm> QOHo mam lumfixm now: mfinmuwMOpd mo: ma mmoflua capo: ucmuuso um umuflfiwmumm .m muuodmp mmo Au moflumwumum ammo amen ago As mquQmm Qmo Am moflbmflummm HOOcmm Mmmsm Am mbHOQmm nmo Eoum mucmcomme mo “massz .0 .w .m Amxosmmv mpwmuso ago “mac: umzmwanmbmm mpmwflpn uflmdmu pmom An mpmou pm>0pdEH mo max pcm amass: cw mmmmmo:H Am mumucmo m>Hmcmu=H :fi pmpmwwo mm>Hucmocw umcbo pcm mwpmuo mo mm: An mnsufisofluwm umucm 0:3 wHoocom Hmbsm wo mmumzpmmw mo mwmu Icmobmd cw mmmmuocH Am maamz Umuushumcouwh vcm 30: oNH mo coaumfiaeoo Au mpmou umxumEIOD IEpmm cw mmmoom .o mmeHH> pm>oudEH wHoocom Amman mo mmumspmuw xn wcwEumw so mmwa amusp coca mo .mlcmuuam m>wuom muoz mHHmz :3mpp cam: 3m: mo cofluosuumcoo cam :oflumufiawnmnmu HHmz stounu umum3 Ham: wo saadsm mo socmb .n Imwmcoo umummmu .m monHmzamm< Hz mo mz >4m>H90mme mHDQHDO 280 mmmmucsao> um mo muHOQmm Am amo cumummm mnu cw pmcmflanmbmm mm mm: muaummd :o Hafiz .fimcmucfl bothMQ QH< mumpmdmm pcaoum mcowumooH m an pmocmcflm umucmo mm>ummmu ouCH bad pmuumamm ca acmemwm coflumofladwuane pmmm .NH mDMOQmu omo Am .NH mmpsummd mo mmnesz Am .NH acme mwcmu pm>opdEH .NH mummucsao> cowumumao Qmo on we mDMOQmm Am Ammucmo\:meoz OOOHV pew pmbmumcmw meoo mwcflumms Hausa Icfl sue: pcm mumosp mmwzo nobomm Iasofluwm wcwpcmuum loud ob muflwmcma zuflz Insm mo muMOQmm An :mEo3 mo “massz An mmeHH> mam :H acuuoo pcm muscmmnm memuwoud m>fluonp .memmmm .mbscmma Hoozom Hmmsu noun mam :H cmeoz wo wcflumxmme mcu cw lasufimwm wcflpcmuum pom :oflumdfloflummd mcm>mmucfi :mu mmo msh .fiH mDHOQmu Qmo Am .Ha cmeo: mo amassz Am .HH cam mHou umummmu .HH mmeCfl :fimuOLQ umummuw >m>u=m .cofludezmcoo\coflbo3poud Hmcowmflbmsz An mabmumwm> mo mocmudmoo< An mumflp oatmeo: umucmo uwmnu m>omdefl ob mcu cufiz pmcommm upoamu somm CH pcm pmcwmuu cwwmn Hafiz Qmo mzu ma :mo mucmemmuw< .OH umzodcms mmo Am .QH mucmwm meo: ofimuao> Am .OH mo :oflumfisdoq ch .OH monBAZDmm< Hz<9momzH onH¢onHmm> mo mz mbamhao >4m>Hkumpmo 281 AmpflofluommCHv :cflmpw Imeemw: mo mm: pmpflz NOH om NON soum pcm “momma cwsomcu mumoamu Qmo .mH mmoH mwmuODm pmospmm .mH mmoH mmeODm pmozcmm .mfi A=maflu= m emaamu pmcflmucoo umuflHIoN m mH whswmmE Uhmccmumv Qmo msm >m>u=m Hmaomdm Ab pmNHHmflommEEoo me mumspmw ummco cw mpmou zumccoomm . umcu :Hmuw co Nemlofi mo om mucmzoume an pmm: amusuasofiuwm pmuomamm cusumm mmEumw pmmmmmocH :mmeflo: pmmfimum>o mo wcfipmuwds mcm :.mm:fiu: pumpcmum 000 MO ucmflspamuw mo coflm xpsum Hafiz xcmm meme nmo mcu unocwsomzu cOHu lmmmddsm nwzoucu msoo IQon>mm mowum< mcH .qH momOQmu Qmo Am .qfilsnfluumfip mam musuommscmz .6H s“ mmsumw mmmmuocH .qH umucmo wcflcfimmh MHH ob wH scum soxpzobmz :musmupmocm: mo mmbsac scum muuoamm An cw mmmmuocw Hamum>o An mucmpzmm mow :oxu50umz OOH\H mm mm zpouHEHOp ob pmuomdxm we mmmum 3mm mo coflumadeoo Am m>Hmcmucfi cw mumEpmm omo mzu cw mafiummm :pmupmocm: ou :musmppmo Qmo mpmm pom Hmumfium> m>Hudmpm lam: mo oHumm .umm» :mmsmhpmocm: pmcwmuu pmmwamooH mpfl>0pd comm Qmo mom pmcflmuu mo pmnszc mam :fl ob mHnm ma HHflz H mo mz vepmhbo >4m>HBQmeO 282 muomaxcos m cow: on :fl mbcmwm ocmwm meoc pcm .um> mEoc pcm mom> xoOom xoODmm>HH :.mu=mupmo Im>wH :.mmmmmpmocm: muu0dmp Qmo .©H lam: comm mo coflmfl>oum .oH mo aowawcoe pmummmo .oH mocmwm Hmmso Ifisoflpwm wcflcflmmumc cmpmwmo msmuwoum cwmoucu ucmemwmcme wcwcwmpo mpmcwsmm Hmoflccomu mo Hm>mH mDHOQmm amo .wH .mmmpsoo mo pmcesz .wH mco a“ ucmEm>omaEH .wH mucoommlcsm upmmcfim mo: mum cowcz mmmocmo m>Hmcmocw mco mo xcm :H pcm Hmuwdmoc mcu .Qmo mcu .mAOuomm Qmo mcu :H Icmm «H a“ mc0flomum Icufl3 mmfloflfiwomw coao mquQmm Qmo .NH cowomoflcmseoo owpmm .NH Imoficmeeoo pmmmmpuch .NH mQOuo cmmo mcofloommcmmo domo mmcoo umcuo pcm moscmma mam umcmmd :0 mac ac mo mHmm pcm upoqmcmuo umwpzc Qmo Ac pmcpmm mapsomu cwsomcu .mmmcopmd mcu cwmoucu mcoflumumdo mo wcw omo mcu Ou chmHHm>m mouoamu Qmo Am .oH Iocmcflm Qmo pmmmmuocH .cH mmousommu pmmmmmocH .oH szHhmzzmm< Hz mo mz mHDLHDO >4m>HHUMfimO 283 mcocmEmsoo cam acmmm wcfl Icmmaw pcm .xoo~mm>wa :H Am mouOQmu amo .qN mmsmupmocm meflmpH Ampcmwom .mwmdmflm .mpmmv mmaomflo m wo comm cw wcwumcmdo wuuoamm Qmo .mm pom pmdawmam docmcuoz mco .oom :mpcow mmc: .xummumm mmuo mDMOQmm Qmo .NN .xoOomm>fiH .mummo somflum> pmmflcmwuo m:0wumwoomwm mmeHH> ON .pmoompomcoo mHHmz ONH .pmmosmomcoo mmflummcmd Imam N .pmuosuomcoo mmomad mopodmm Qmo .Hm wcwomms mmeHH>\mHoocom q mdsxowd Hamem ©..mxomuu COoIm.© .xosuu couln H "Emprpd ac pmpfi>oma mxosmo muHOQmm Qmo .ON mo quu pcm pmcemz mmofloomua cam mpmmcc xoOUmm>flH pm>omn .qm law mo combospomocH .qm ucmEdwsvm Emma pwmdmu cam mcmE ob maocmxuo: mmmCHcomE .mm Emmm mo cofiudeEoo .mm mumocmo m>flmcmocfi q mco mo comm a“ webmw coflumm .NN Iommosmp mo coflummuo .NN mupowmm dec Imamw cwsouco wmmocmo m>Hmcmucfl q mo comm :H .fim ocmeaofim>mp xbwcseeoo .Hm moan loud mo mmmcousd pcm mumdcfl mo cowuscflmu Imam “mummpw wCflonHm .Qmo mo mmommommu .ON upodmcmuu mmummmu .ON szHhmzsmm< Hz<5momzH ZOHH mo mz4m>Hhumwmo mmOH mHDAHDO APPENDIX 2 LOGICAL FRkMEWORK EORD, UPPER VOLTA, REVISED pmbmmmms xficmwamc mc :mo xmcu umco comm mum mmacmflpm> pcm pflam> mum m>m> Imam :fl pmm: mmmcflccomu mafiademm Am .N .>:00 mcu no who:0p mmcoo eomw wcfleoocumow mc Hafiz QH< zc pmocmcflm mo: mmwofl>woom pcm mbsch Ac .mmofi>umm pcm mosacfl zmmmmmom: mco cm>flamp om xufiomqmo Hmoficcomo pcm Hmfimmwmcms mcu mmc 0m0 mcH Am .H ”cowummcm>m pcm wcflccmfid mo“ mmmc mump Emma .N .mEumm 000.mHI0H om pmpw>oud mcflmc mmow>umm wcfiouoadmm xpmmmmomz .H ocmEm>cho< mmoausm 0o pmmc ob mucmem>mwco< osmoso mom .>:00 mco xc mmmmmuppm >Hm>floommmm mc HHH3 musom: :fl Hmcofium: mum umco acme Iqum>mp Hmcowwmu ob mocwmuumcou .m .mmofl>umm wcflou0ddsm xummmmomc mpw>oma ob muwmmp pcm mamme mco m>mc Haw: >200 mcH .N .pmaofim>mp mc :mo omo :pmommm mcu Om pmodmpm mmwmxomd Hmoflccomo pm>oudEH .H mmomum ooQfiOEQ mo cam ocmem>mwco< Hmo0 pcm pmmc ob ucmem>mfico< mmOQHDA mom ob ocmme me DH .coflommfi Im>m mwco mo mm0dusd mco co“ we xmozmsmpw Hmoflwofi mflch * .mmcou m>Hmcmocw mcu :H cowoompoua mew Immmuocfl :flwmc pcm "mmEoocfl cam cofluompoud amusbasoflmwm uflmcu mmmmuocfl ob nmo mpmm mco :H mumEumm HHmEm umfimmm om xoflomdmo m.>:00 mmmmpocH mmomusm amo mpmm ca cofloma laden Hmmmu mo“ mwwfi mo xuflammc pcm meoocfl .cofloompOEQ pmmmmuocH Hmo0 wcofiod55mm< zmx mmwuflocmmo cam mHHmoma * cmmH>mm . mmmm: .Qmom ¥m0302wccw wcwcommu cam pmcmfiacmomm Emuwomd :oflomompm HmspowIcoz .m .mmecmw ob mccmcmmoom mw cam memomam wcflcmflxm :mcu m>Hoo=coud mmoe we cmoDUOpocfl mafimc mwmxomd Hmowccomo mcb Ac .mmcom m>flmcmbcfl mcc cfi :OHuompoua .m>ocm AH mm memm Am .q cmmmmcoCH ocmopmd aDWHm .q .cde ocmEdon>mc Hmconmp mcw pow mflmmc mco mm mcuqum 0Huommmm :m came memomam cflcmmo I .Emmc IdeeH cam mmw>mc ob chm ma amo mco cam asIonHow cowmcmcxm cam unmadflscm ammmmmomc mco cue: mmepmm wcflcfl> Iomd ob mmHomcmco o: mum mpmch Ac .poHumd mmma mmucc 0o 03o m mm>o wCHomxumE I coeoommc Hmeflcm ccflz mocmflpmdxm I mEmumam weasumw I mmwmxomd Hmowccomc I mmocsommm Hmuscm: I COHcm3Hm>m mco ac cmccmEEoomm mcofloom mco mo meow wo meoooso mcu co wcflccmamc pmuflzump mc amE cuo3mEmuw Hmofiwoa mwcc :H mmwcmco .cmcwflmmp aHucmm Imud mm oomhoud mcu mcflmommc mcoficd85mm< amz mmflcflccmmo cam mfiwmcmo 286 wm>omq cmcomcaoo mc ob mumc co mdoom ccm meflc cc m>aucm mmmcommmmmp cm: I .mmwcw>floom copmmmmm cmcc umcomm Hmcofiomcmao ob mewc m.Emmc amz mcc mo ommd mumooHHm Om mafiaflfiz mH.ucmEmwm:mE amo mch xuoz camcu Eomm pmmmw cam cmflmflccmpfl mc cmo mmmcflmub memomam Ecmm cm>0pdefl mEom pcm HmCOMuHcmco com mump mumma N Am .N mccmcazmcoo Eumcchocm Am ago casual mcofioocsw Hmcoflomumdo co ocmdw 2.3 .58 am: mo N I 2 .U :mdm wcficwmuu amoczooIcw IIIII.Am maficwmuo Ecmulupocm mom ucmm ammum AN pmoucm maficflmpo EmmoncoH mow ucmm mwmcm AH .c ucoaamm omwcsm ma cameawacm cam mmHoHcm> Ac mmOcomuccoo mow mmmmoc m Am mmwsocmumz mwchUm m Am mmHuHHHomm mmomz cam pmzom Am ,umccmo wcficwmmo :oxumoumz AN mmmcpmsccmmm AH .m wcflccmcn cam commmmmm .N mocmcmwmmm Hmoficcome .o wCHCHmuH .c mmwuflafiomm camww cam Hmmocmo .m meowodesmm< amz mmflcflucmso cam mfiwmcma 287 .owoc aaumm ac cmcwmoco mc :mo mwcflpCflm Hawwcficmms omco comm mw auflawcmawm>m momc I .mmmcoummmmc 0m: mcu cmflmmm Ou chmHHm>m mum mcmzmfl>mmocw cam mommdumocsoo I .msofluwcsm Imm>o co: cam chmmwmcmE mc ou AmmmEcmw 00~Ima\ucmwm av mmofi>cmw coflmcmoxm pmfimwmcmucfl ob cmmoaxm magma 000.< oo 000.m Ac mdsouw mmeHH> ob mpcmw coflumpowcoemc mo mmm: Ao mmcou m>flmcmccfl mcu mcflmuso ucmsdwscm mOM mcmoa Ac mmcou m>wmcmccw mco :fl camEaflscm cam mfimsficm com mcmofi Am .mcofiomsoomdw mJHpq .mucwmmomcoo .mmmmaapmm pmcmxume mo mucsoe< Ac .mEmcmam vCHEpmm wcwumwxm oo m:OIppm cofloomcomd Hmeflcm pcm cofloomuo Hmeficm ~00 mmfluflaflcwmmom Ao .memficmcome chHmmoa pcm mflpmpo Emma cmE cam ouocm pom camemc cam aaddsm Ac .cofloaesmcoo paoc Immsoc cam mccmuumd wcHQQOco .mm: pocma .cmumxume mmam> .coflcoscOca mo msam> cam mcwoo "mewcsfiocfl Hm>mH Emma mcu um mcoficcm>pmucfl wcflomxume cam coaooSpOEL .m mcoHcQE2mm< amx mmficwccmao cam mfiflmuma APPENDIX 3 Input and output indicators APPENDIX 3 Input and output indicators Type Elements to be monitored Data collection methods Data analysis Inputs staff — arrival date records recording — work plan staff meetings network analysis - cost records accomting equipment - arrival date records netmrk analysis - quality technical check recording - cost accomts accounting - stocks held book-keeping stock management. - maintenance " agric. Inputs — arrival date - quality ibid ibid - cost - stocks held recurrent Budget - receipts accounts accounting + audit — expenses accounts " credit facilities obtained records recording Activities activities internal reports aggregation and operation achieved % netmrk analysis activities [— infrastructure - technical checks comparison with quality — services -— beneficiaries inter- standards views activities cost-accounting cost—accounting cost Achieve- infrastructure internal reports aggregation and ments (in construction comparison with 70 of plan objective distribution of fertilizer, and in pesticides, seeds, etc. book—keeping " physical terms) agricultural services provided (by type and book—keeping type of farm) loans allocated book—keeping 288 APPENDIX 4 Performance and impact indicators APPENDIX Performance and impact indicators Type Elements to be monitored Ihta collection methods Ihta analysis Agricultural rotation survey and/or aerial statistical analysis production photography system input use surveys " disbursing book farm equiprent survey " labour and work calculation based on " calendar standard coefficients production practices extension mrkers reports, " surveys and observations on selected plots agricultural production surveys, and crop—cutting " experiments, harvest records marketing of farm surveys " products records Farmers farm incme surveys and farm budget " and agrarian calculations structure household incare surveys " consumption nutrition assets health status farmers attitude towards innovation farmers associations land tenure, etc. social structure household surveys and " shops data measurement, calculation based on standard coeffi- cient surveys (interviews or direct count) officials records and surveys " statistical analysis sociological study statistical analysis H sociological study 289 290 Type Elements to be monitored Ihta collection methods Data analysis Ecology soil fertility sample laboratory test erosion punctual meeemmemrmu: cartography aerial photography statistical analysis hydrological balance pmctual measurement statistical analysis ecological systems bibliography and simulations and measurements statistical analysis Economic effects on survey and accounts study onvironment agro—industry registered data " effects on state budget effects on balance of trade and balance of payment effects on other agents effects on population registered data census and surveys statistical analysis APPENDIX 5 Final List of Questionnaires N° de \DmVC‘U'I-L‘bowb—Ié 41 42 43 45 51 52 53 55 APPENDIX 5 Final List of Questionnaires Used in the EORD/IRDP, 1978-79 Farm Survey 1135.3. Semences, fumures, et produits phytosantitaires utilises Recoltes des champs Recol tes des carres de renderent Temps de travail perdu du a des indispositions des membres du manage Achats et reparations des facteurs de production ventes des produits ceuillis par le menage Achats des semences et produits agricoles Ventes des produits agricoles produits par le manage Oomerce des produits agricoles lkhaflsdhmfimawx Ventes d'animaux et produits animaux Dapenses pour l'élevage Alimentation des animaux Gardiénage et maladies des animaux de trait Cofits et revenus provenant d'occupations non-agricoles Prets en especes ImeuSenreUne IEmhxmsemmfisrrcms Emmundseneepxes EmmunuSenlrnune Redrmramenflseffixiues CakewxdamEs Cakxmx1m$us Paiements recus pour les ventes a credit Paiements effectués pour les achats a credit Transformation des produits agricoles: achats et ventes Precisions sur les depenses pour les animaux de trait Temps de travail de chaque membre du manage anrlecjamp: Temps de travail au champ par des personnes extérieures aux manages Traction animale: utilisation des attelages dans les champs Traction animale: transport par charrette Temps de travail des menbres du menage dans les champs d'autrui Temps de travail des membres du manage dans toutes les activites d'hier Temps du travail en élevage de chaque membre du m’enage Recensement initial des membres du ménage ikrememeu;hfifflfl.d§;cmmm5(hlmaege Historique des champs Inventaire du cheptel mort et materiel agricole Valeur du cheptel mort et du.materie1 agricole Inventaire du cheptel vif 291 292 List of Questionnaires Used (con 't) N° de FICHE 56 57 58 59 6O 61 62 63A 63B 64 65 66 67 68 69 7O 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 80 81 83 85 87 88 89 1(1) 102 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 113 114 TITRE Changement denographique dans les manages Stockage des récoltes Masurage des superficies des champs, cultures présentes, et carrés de densité Recenserent des vendeurs et services aux marches locaux Recenserent des occupations non agricoles Récapitulatif des champs Gengement dans la taille des troupeaux (achats et ventes exclus) et les impacts des maladies Situation des préts en fin d'année Situation des emperts en fin d 'année Historique des animaux de trait Récapitulatif des infirmtites Précision sur la productivité des différentes categories de travailleurs Prix aux marches locaux Revenus recus au cours de 1 'annee écoulee Problémes spécifiques des cultures Stock de materiel et équiperent utilises dans les activites non agricoles Ration Alimentaire du ménage Historique de 1'utilisation de la traction animale Achats de biens de consormation Cofits des invitations de cultures Institutions traditionnelles d'épargne et attitudes envers l'épargne et le crédit Systere formal de crédit et cofits implicites Contact avec 1'ORD Listes des manages recensement 1975 Superficies des champs Valeur de cheptel vif Codes des secteurs et villages Prix trimestriels des prodits agricoles Prix de vente de sorgho/mdl Evaluation de la qualité des donnees par les enqueteurs Tirage de l 'échantillon Renseigneient sur les animaux de trait Poids des unites de mesure utilisées sm‘ les fiches 02 et 13 Inventaire de l'équipeient traction animale Mesurage des animaux de trait Poids des louches et calebasses Comparaison de la campagne 1978 aux campagnes précédantes Reseignements supplémentaires sur les champs Parcage aux champs Dégats aux champs Questionnaire supplémentaire sur la traciton animale Verification des données des récoltes, des ventes, et des stocks 293 List of Qiestionnaires Used (con't) N° de FTCHE TTIRE 115 Systéme formel de crédit et couts implicites 116 Essais du Phosphate Naturel et Labour attelé 117 Pertes en stockage 158 Coordonnées rectilignes 161 Récapitulatif des champs pour utilisation avec fiche 58 204 Fiche de dépouillerent (donnees au niveau des ménages) 205 Fiche de dépouillement (donnéc au niveau des villages) APPENDIX 6 EASTERN ORD INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT BUDGET APPENDIX 6 ETHEWJOM)INHKRADI)RMVl/UQEUJTENT PROJECT BUDGET ($ Thousand) Total AID Contribution to date 1. US Personnel 1 project Manager Institutional contract, 8 man-years Mktg. & Transport Econ., Credit & Coops Spec., An. Hus./Range Mgmt. Spec. plus consultants Commodities & Equipment a. ORD Central Equipment - 15 Vehicles: 9 pick—ups, 2 station— wagons for ORD, 3 pick-ups and 1 station—wagon for contract team — 1 7-8 T Truck — 6 3-5 T Truck — 225 mobylettes for agents, animatrices, interviewers, livestock agents, admin. personnel, sub-sector and sector chiefs - Central repair shop tools and equipment - Farm equipment workshop and tools and equipment - Generator(s) totaling 100 KVA - Radio communications network - Office equipment & furnishings; ORD sector and sub—sector - 2 trailers - Technical euqipment and supplies 294 710.9 560.2 (457.4) 89.2 13.0 78.0 70.0 20.0 15.0 30.0 73.0 53.2 b. 295 Marketing (includes use of ORD Central Equipment as well) - 600 grain meansures — Marketing equipment and supplies - Rice decorticator Rural Engineering (includes use of ORD Central Equipment as well) — 8 brick making presses — 1 tractor 75 hp. disc plow and attachments Animal Husbandry/Range Management (includes use of ORD Central Equipment as well) - 8 refrigerators 3 freezers 1 ice-maker - Veterinary equipment and supplies Demonstrations & Training - 5 sets of equipment, tools, fertilizer, seed, breeding stock, etc. 3. Other Costs a. Training participant Training; details provided in individual PIO/P's In-country training; in operating budget support Construction Encadreur Center, Matourkou ORD Admin. Complex 3—Village/Sector storage facilities AID Contractor Houses (29.6) 4.6 20.0 5.0 (30.6) 3.2 27.4 (17.6) 3.1 3.0 6.5 5.0 (25.0) 25.0 1,590.9 (134.0) 92.0 42.0 (404.1) 35.5 230.0 28.6 110.0 296 c. Research (51.3) Contracts, two Voltaic research organizations Group organization and ag credit 19.7 Sedentarist-nomad eco—social relationships 31.6 d. Special Funds (350.0) Operating Budget Support 350.0 Revolving Funds 651.5 Medium Term rural Credit 466.5 Marketing Fund; cash crops, etc. 185.0 GOUV Contribution §£fl49_ 1. Personnel 384.0 2. Operating budget, excl. personnel 117.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Dale W. (1978). Mobilizing Household Savings Through Rural Financial Markets." Economic DevelOpment and Cultural Change, Vol. 26, No. 3, TApril), pp. 517-560. Agency for International Development. 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