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L1 I: . R Y
Mic} if???“ 513”
University

fiméfislfi

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
The Relationship of Neurotic Styles to
Rorschach Variable Patterns

presented by

Linda S. Cohen

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Masters degree in PSYChOlOgy

Major professor

Date X/Z//Z/7X

0-7639

THE RELATIONSHIP OF NEUROTIC STYLES

TO RORSCHACH VARIABLE PATTERNS

BY

Linda S. Cohen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1978

ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP OF NEUROTIC STYLES
TO RORSCHACH VARIABLE PATTERNS

BY

Linda S. Cohen

The present study was designed to assess the relation-
ship between Shapiro's Neurotic Styles and Rorschach vari-
able patterns. The sample consisted of 42 undergraduate
subjects whose two raters on the Neurotic Styles Peer Rat-
ing form had agreed on neurotic style classification. The
Rorschach was given to each subject. A list of Rorschach
variables hypothesized to be associated with each neurotic
style was compiled. For each subject four Rorschach scores
were determined indicating the percentage of obsessive com—
pulsive, paranoid, hysteric and impulsive indicators repre-
sented by his record. T-test analyses were then carried
out to test 1) whether subjects characterized by a partic-
ular style would demonstrate a higher percentage of indi-
cators for that style than for the three remaining styles
and 2) whether those demonstrating a particular style would
show a higher percentage of indicators for each of the other

styles. These hypotheses were not supported by the data.

AC KNOWLEDGMEN TS

I would like to express my appreciation to my com—
'mittee, especially to Dr. Albert Rabin for his assistance
in formulating the problem and his understanding and pa-
tience. I would also like to thank Dr. Charles Hanley for
his support and statistical advice and Dr. Martha Karson
for her interest in my work. And finally a special thanks
to David Hayes for his help in administering and scoring

Rorschach protocols.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TALBES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l
The New Look Movement in Perception . . . . . . . 2
Ego Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cognitive Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Neurotic Styles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Rorschach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l7

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Scoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Statistical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
RESUETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Distribution of Neurotic Styles . . . . . . . . . 50
Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Additional Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Directions for Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A BEHAVIORAL STYLE RATING FORM . . . . . . . . . . 67

B RORSCHACH VARIABLES: SAMPLE MEDIANS MEANS AND
STANDARD DEVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

C T-TEST COMPARISONS OF BECK MEANS AND SAMPLE
MEANS FOR EACH RORSCHACH VARIABLE . . . . . . . . 74

iii

Page

D RORSCHACH VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
FOR EACH NEUROTIC STYLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

E MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH
NEUROTIC STYLE FOR MALES AND FEMALES . . . . . . 77

F MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH
NEUROTIC STYLE USING MEDIANS AS POINTS OF

REFERENCE 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O 78

G MEAN PERCENT OF RORSCHACH INDICATORS FOR EACH
STYLE USING BECK MEANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

iv

LI ST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Rorschach Variable Patterns Associated with
Each Neurotic Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

2. Interrater Reliability for Each Rorschach
Variable Using Pearson Product Moment Correla-
tion Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

3. DistributioncfiENeurotic Styles . . . . . . . . 50

4. Obsessive Compulsive Rorschach Indicators vs.
Indicators of Other Neurotic Styles for the
Obsessive Compulsive Style Group . . . . . . . 51

5. Obsessive Compulsive Indicators: Obsessive
Compulsive Groups vs Other Neurotic Style
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

6. Paranoid Rorschach Indicators and Indicators
of Other Neurotic Styles for the Paranoid
Style Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

7. Paranoid Indicators: Paranoid Group vs Other
Neurotic Style Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

8. Hysterical Rorschach Indicators and Indicators
of Other Neurotic Styles for the Hysterical
Style Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

9. Hysterical Indicators: Hysterical Style
Group vs Other Neurotic Style Groups . . . . . 55

10. Impulsive Rorschach Indicators and Indicators
of Other Neurotic Styles for the Impulsive
Style Group 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 55

ll. Impulsive Indicators: Impulsive Style Group
vs Other Neurotic Style Groups . . . . . . . . 56

12. Frequency Distribution of Association of
Neurotic Styles Determined by Peer Ratings and
Neurotic Styles Determined by Rorschach Indi-
cator Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

INTRODUCTION

Historically the fields of personality and cognition
have followed radically different paths of study. The in-
vestigation of personality particularly psychoanalytic
theory took place largely in the clinical setting, its
theory so closely linked to the clinical situation that
it was difficult to study concepts in a more controlled en-
vironment. In contrast, cognition was examined in the ex-
perimental laboratory context. Furthermore it was assumed
that each could be adequately investigated in isolation,
since personality involved the study of individual differ—
ences and cognition was presumed to develop uniformly in
all persons (Klein, 1970).

Formulation of the concept of cognitive styles repre—
sented a move toward the integration of these heretofore
alien disciplines, the result being a more comprehensive
understanding of human functioning. This concept emerged
out of a dissatisfaction with existing perceptual research;
its failure to account for a wide range of individual dif-
ferences, coupled with the rising influence of Hartmann's
(1958) ego psychological theory. Theory resulting from this
integration proposed and investigation corroborated that

people demonstrate consistent styles of perceiving that

are remarkably stable across a variety of cognitive tasks
and over long periods of time. These pervasive modes of
functioning were labeled cognitive styles (Klein, 1970).
Several theories of cognitive styles have been pro-
posed each with a somewhat different emphasis. The focus

of this research is on Shapiro's theory of neurotic styles

(1965). Shapiro hypothesizes an interesting link between j
cognitive structure and neurosis thus extending our under-
standing of functioning beyond that of cognition and per- ‘

sonality development into the realm of psychopathology.
He contends that this conceptualization explains two
phenomena which he feels have been inadequately accounted
for by psychoanalytic theory 1) development of character
and 2) choice of neurosis. While other theories of cog-
nitive styles have arisen from and been corroborated by
empirical research, Shapiro's theory of neurotic styles
has received little of this treatment. It is therefore

the goal of this study to begin such investigation.

The New Look Movement in Perception

 

The gradual integration of the fields of perception
and personality began in the mid 1940's. Until this time
Gestalt theory had been the theoretical orientation guid-
ing perceptual research. The assumption of the Gestalt
point of view was that perception was a self-contained
system.which was capable of communicating to the individ-

ual an accurate transcription of reality. However, there

was a growing dissatisfaction with the ability of these
laws and principles to account for the individual differ-
ences in perception. These differences could not it
appeared be accounted for simply through error (Klein,
1970).

Out of this sense of dissatisfaction emerged the New
Look movement of perceptual investigation. The New Look 1
represented an attempt to View perception from an organ—
ismic perspective. These psycholOgists felt that the
Gestaltists had failed to consider the creativity and ac-
tivity of the organism (Bruner and Postman, 1948; Klein
and Schlesinger, 1949), the influence of past and future
expectancies (Cantril, 1948) and other motivational
aspects of behavior (Krech, 1949).

Heavily influenced by classical psychoanalytic
theory, the New Look psychologists saw the individual as
one whose primary motive for behavior is need reduction
i.e. the satisfaction of aggressive and libidinal drives
and their derivatives. As one form of human behavior,
perception was then vieWed as an eXpression of the indi-
vidual's direction, purpose and motives. Therefore they
hypothesized, individual differences in perception are
attributable to differences in the motivational state of
the organism.

A number of studies were then undertaken in an attempt
to compensate for the shortcomings of Gestalt research and

to gain empirical support for the organismic hypothesis.

The most notable of these was a series carried out by
Bruner and his colleagues (Bruner and Goodman, 1947;
Bruner and Postman, 1947; Bruner and Postman, 1948).
These studies corroborated the hypothesis that needs and
values significantly altered perception. However the way
in which perception was changed was more difficult to
discern. While in one experiment they found that valued J
objects were judged to be significantly larger than their
actual size, in a second investigation subjects judged
valued objects to be smaller than they actually were. In
an attempt to reconcile these contradictions they concluded
that the direction and magnitude of accentuation is a func-
tion of the particular need or value involved.

In a series of two critiques of the New Look research
Klein and his colleagues levelled two major criticisms
(Klein and Schlesinger, 1949; Klein, Schlesinger & Meister,
1951) 1) that in concluding that perceptual distortion was
aifunctionwof the value and need involved they had just as
the Gestaltists, focused on the process and neglected the
importance of the individual and 2) that in their effort to
establish the distorting effects of motives on perception,
they proposed no mechanism which would account for the
accuracy perception generally affords. In an attempt to
formulate a more comprehensive theory the concept of cog—

nitive controls emerged.

Ego Psychology

 

Klein and his colleagues felt that classic psycho-
analytic theory had failed to provide an adequate basis for
the understanding of perceptual phenomena. He therefore
turned to Hartmann's (1958) theory of ego psychology which
seemed to offer a broader basis for human motivation.

Hartmann (1958) presented the individual as essen—
tially a social being whose primary concern is adaptation
to the enVironment. While much of the individual's be-
havior is concerned with the satisfaction of need, under-
lying this, is a primary motive of "maintaining equilibrium
between the individual and the average expectable environ-
ment" (Hartmann, 1958, p. 25). Thus an individual is
motivated by efforts at adequacy and control rather than
simply aggressive and libidinal drives.

In contrast to classic psychoanalytic theory the
primary focus of development is on the ego rather than
the id. Hartmann proposed that ego and id differentiate
out of a common matrix. Furthermore he suggests that there
are rudimentary elements of the ego called "ego apparatuses
of primary autonomy" (e.g. perception, intention, object
comprehension, thinking, language, motor development)
which exist at birth, function outside the realm of con-
flict and follow an innately determined maturational
path. Development occurs as these apparatuses progres-
sively mature, differentiate and reintegrate into a com—

plex organizing structure which guides the individual in

his adaptive endeavor. The form this organization takes
and therefore the manner in which adaptation occurs is
dependent on the innate capacity and maturational level

of the autonomous ego apparatuses and their interplay with
intrapsychic conflicts and the social environment.

But we have in this conception and psychoanalysis
did not have it before a biologically rooted nu-
cleus of psychological structure that influences
characteristic form tendencies of both adaptive
and defensive functioning from the beginning, a
nucleus around which other forces and influences
(such as social environment and intrapsychic con-
flict) assert themselves and accumulate (Shapiro,
1965, p. 10).

Congitive Controls

 

Klein's concept of cognitive controls represents an
attempt to define and articulate the organizing struc-
tures described by Hartmann (1958).

Cognitive controls refer to precisely those pro—

cesses which Hartmann has termed conflict-free.

Specifically they describe the characteristic ways

in which reality-adaptive events have become or-

ganized in the person; each constitutes for the per-
son his optimal adaptational level in the partic-
ular class of environmental situations to which it
is suited (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton & Spence,

1959, p. 10).

These organizing structures exist at birth in an undif—
ferentiated state. Through the interplay of the auton-
omous ego functions with social forces and intrapsychic
conflict these structures are differentiated and consol-
idated into stable "cognitive controls" which provide the

individual with certain consistent and reliable ways of

experiencing and responding to external and internal

“Ii“...

 

events. While these adaptive strategies differ from one
person to the next based on differences in innate capaci-
ties and developmental history they are equally effective
in promoting environmental adaptation.

In addition to providing structural stability and
consistency to the individual, cognitive controls also
serve a drive discharge delaying function, much as de-
fenses do. They therefore provide a vehicle for drive i
expression in the context of adaptive requirements. Thus H
cognitive controls limit the degree to which need states
can distort reality, allowing distortion only to the extent
to which it services adaptation (Gardner et al., 1959).

In the course of innumerable empirical studies Klein,
Gardner and their colleagues have identified five cogni—
tive controls: 1) Levelling-Sharpening (Holzman and
Klein, 1954; Holzman, 1954), 2) Focussing-Scanning
(Schlesinger, 1954; Holzman, 1966; Gardner and Long, 1962),
3) Constricted-Flexible Control (Loomis and Moskowitz,
1958; Smith and Klein, 1953), 4) Equivalence Range
(Gardner, 1953) and 5) Tolerance for Unrealistic Exper-
iences (Klein, Gardner and Schlesinger, 1962). Further
research has demonstrated that these structures are con-
sistent across tasks and stable over time (Gardner, Jack—
son & Messick, 1960), lending empirical support to this

structural model.

Neurotic Styles

 

The theory of neurotic styles was formulated largely
on the basis of clinical observation rather than on exper-
imental research. As Shapiro (1965) became more famil-
iarized with the works of Hartmann, Klein and Gardner, he
began to reevaluate the phenomena he had witnessed in the
clinical setting as an assessor and therapist.

In testing Shapiro found that, particularly in the g
use of the Rorschach the way a person thinks and perceives
is used to make inferences about character traits, di-
agnosis and defense mechanisms. Furthermore slight vari—
ations in this style is often suggestive of adaptive
traits as well. He therefore reasoned that this general
style of thinking (i.e. cognitive style) might be viewed
as a psychological structure in its own right "a matrix
from which various traits, symptoms and defense mechan-
isms crystallized" (Shapiro, 1965, p. 2).

Shapiro proposes that there is an identifiable mode
of thinking, a cognitive style, associated with each
neurotic condition which is a manifestation not of the
neurosis itself but of the individual's cognitive struc-
ture formed in the course of normal development. The
individual's cognitive style serves as a matrix from
which his adaptive, traits, defenses and symptoms evolve.
It is therefore a significant factor in determining the
form a symptom might take and thus the type of neurosis

one might develop. Shapiro concludes that this

conceptualization accounts for two phenomena which have
never been adequately explained by psychoanalysis 1) de-
velOpment of character (here referred to as cognitive
style) and 2) choice of neurosis.

Shapiro's formulation of neurotic styles is not
simply a theoretical statement. It also articulates in
some detail four neurotic styles.

Following is a description of each of the four
neurotic styles described by Shapiro (1965): obsessive-

compulsive, paranoid, hysteric and impulsive.

Obsessive-Compulsive Style

The most outstanding characteristic of the obsessive
compulsive is his rigidity. "Behaviorally it may refer
to a stiff body posture, stilted social manner or a tend-
ency to continue in a course of action beyond its useful—
ness"(p. 24). Above all however it refers to a style of
thinking. The obsessive-compulsive lacks the ability to
shift from sharply focussed attention to more relaxed
impressionistic cognition. He rarely gets hunches or is
struck by things. In fact impressionistic experiences are
viewed as a discomforting distraction which interferes with
his intense concentration.

This mode of functioning clearly provides the obses-
sive compulsive with superior technical facility and an
impressive capacity for concentration in attempting to

solve a problem or engage in intellectual pursuit. At

10

times however the narrow attentional sc0pe prevents him
from maintaining a proper perspective on a situation.
Facts tend to be viewed in isolation gaining little sense
of their integration or emotional impact.

The obsessive compulsive's life is centered around
work. He is continuously involved in some goal-oriented
task which he pursues with deliberateness. WOrk is viewed
as an obligation to some higher authority which transcends
his own needs and desires. The obsessive compulsive is
thus continually plagued and guided by feelings of what
he should be doing. While this pressure is self imposed,
the obsessive compulsive's subjective experience is one
of continued stress and strain about which he frequently
complains. Despite this when such structure is eliminated
the individual with an obsessive compulsive style becomes
quite anxious and immediately seeks out another task to
pursue.

Such effortfulness and deliberateness is often ex—
pected in a work situation. However, for the obsessive-
compulsive it extends into all areas of life, even those
which to others seem fun. He attempts to direct not only
actions but also wants and emotions leaving little room
for whim, spontaneity or affective expression. Consequently,
relaxing is difficult, and doing things on impulse or
simply for fun is rare.

The decision making process is similarly difficult

for the obsessive compulsive. Typically his feelings are

ll

remarkably well balanced between alternatives. Essentially
cut off from his own desires he attempts to invoke some
rule or principle which will provide him with a "right"
answer. Therefore decisions are usually made abruptly
with a lack of internal certainty. He then defends against
this tenuousness through dogmatic adherence to his decision,
disregarding all facts which might instill doubt.

In sum, to others the obsessive compulsive is a
rational, controlled competent individual who has diffi-
culty relaxing and is ill at ease in situations until he

has figured out the appropriate role expectations.

Paranoid Style

The cognition of the paranoid is characterized by
rigidity, intensity and hyperalertness. He tends to have
preconceived ideas which are quite rigid and resistant
to change. Unlike the obsessive-compulsive who focusses
in on small details of the environment, the paranoid is
constantly scanning and searching for clues to support
his suspicions and ideas. He is thus acutely aware of
all aspects of the external world and shows a tendency and
need to integrate them into his framework. He therefore
does not disregard facts which do not fit as does the
obsessive, but idiosyncratically interprets them. These
non-confirmatory facts are viewed as appearance, masking
some more significant underlying meaning. Thus while ex-

ceedingly accurate in perception the paranoid is at times

 

12

amiss in judgment.

It is this type of cognition which lends itself to
the develOpment of projection as a defense. "The projec-
tive process is completed and a projection is said to exist
when the paranoid person,in a certain state of biased
expectancy vis a vis the external world, turns his atten—
tion toward the object and seizes on a clue, the signifi-
cance of which convinces him of some motive, intention, or
the like and thereby crystallizes his biased expectancy in
some concrete shape"(p. 70).

The paranoid individual is in a constant state of
mobilization always aware of the possibility of some
danger or threat. The aim however is not to avoid threat
but to avoid vulnerability to it. Thus there is a tendency
to anticipate the unexpected and integrate it into his
preexisting framework.

One of the primary sources of threat is that of
authority. The paranoid is "continuously occupied and con-
cerned about the threat of being subjected to some exter-
nal control or infringement of will" (p. 82). He is there-
fore acutely aware of power and rank and is quite sensi-
tive to the evaluation of authority figures, particularly
their rejection. His reaction is typically one of shame
or arrogance. Authority however is not the only source of
interpersonal discomfort. The paranoid tends to be gen-
erally suspicious of others. This results in remaining

distant from people, being cautious and not feeling

13

comfortable enough to relax and be spontaneous.

The result of this state of mobilization is that
"all action is purposeful, directed toward an aim with
an intensity close to what is normally reserved for emer-
gency (p. 76). He never does anything whimsically, im-
pulsively, for its immediate appeal or for its own sake"
(p. 81). Activities such as walking, talking and smiling
which are generally viewed as expressive or automatic are
kept under voluntary control. As a result there is a
general restriction of affective experience and the area
experienced as "self." The paranoid rarely laughs, is
uninterested in art and aesthetics and regards tenderness
and sentiment as effeminate or weak. As well bodily sens-
ual experience is constricted; sex becomes quite mechanical
and sensual pleasure limited. Furthermore there is a nar-
rowing of interests in general. Leisure time is usually
devoted to mechanical devices which the paranoid shows an

unusual fascination and respect for.

Hysterical Style

The hallmark of the hysteric is his impressionistic
cognitive style. Cognition is global, diffuse and lacking
in sharp detail. This appears to be associated with an im-
pairment in the capacity to actively organize, refine and
integrate mental contents. While the obsessive and para-
noid search out detail the hysteric is passively struck

by things. Thus he tends to respond to those aspects of

 

14

the environment which are most vivid, colorful and emo-
tionally salient, the subjective experience of the world
being one of color and excitement but lacking in sub—
stance or fact. When asked to describe a person or ob-
ject he is more likely to answer with general impressions
than descriptive detail.

Repression is facilitated by this style in two
ways; 9) the vagueness of the original cognition will re-
sult in less concrete facts being associated with it and
2) the memory recall process will be similarly diffuse.
Consequently the general absence of focussed attention
facilitates the individual not bringing into clear focus
that which may be experienced as uncomfortable.

This cognitive style pervades not only the defen-
sive structure but has far reaching intellectual, affec-
tive and behavioral effects. The hysteric is easily dis-
tractible and lacks the concentration and attention nec-
essary for intellectual pursuits. Thus although he may
possess more than adequate intellectual potential he lacks
the reflectiveness and perseverance necessary for sus—
tained intellecutal activity.

The hysteric consequently lives in a non factual
world where emotions and whim rather than reason serve as
primary guides. Judgments are therefore thought to be
questionable, rarely thought out or based on concrete
knowledge or facts. Highly suggestible, the hysteric is

likely to follow the newest fad or trend. Furthermore

15

he tends to fall in an out of love frequently, easily
infatuated and just as easily repulsed.

Not yet mentioned but perhaps the most striking and
frequently mentioned characteristic of the hysteric is his
emotional lability. The hysteric tends to change moods
with little provocation and is given to intense emotional
outbursts. While one might expect that the experience of
such vivid emotions is associated with a strong sense of
self, this is not the case with the hysteric. These out-
bursts tend to be seen by him as something that comes over
him rather than a reflection of his true feelings. He is
therefore often quite surprised that others take them ser-
iously. In general the hysteric appears to have little

sense of the impact his actions have on others.

Impulsive Style

Cognition of the impulsive individual tends to be
passive and concrete, captured by whim and demonstrating
a lack of active integration. The result of such a style
is an impairment of such processes as planning, objectivity,
concentration and reflectiveness.

Associated with this type of cognition is also an
impairment in normal motivation. Actions tend to lack a
sense of deliberateness and intention. Consequently judg-
ment in the impulsive is often said to be poor. He tends
to rush into things with little consideration for the

consequences and alternatives. As with all actions it

16

tends to be quickly executed and unplanned. In general

he acts consistently on whim. When asked why he has per-
formed an act the impulsive's reply is frequently, "I
couldn't help it. I just did it. I don't know why." The
subjective experience is of having performed "action which
does not feel completely deliberate or fully intended"

(p. 136).

The impulsive is also quite notably lacking in active
aims and interests which when present provides perspective,
continuity and direction to current actions. The impul-
sive, however, tends to have no long range personal or
professional goals. Furthermore he is uninterested in
cultural, intellectual, political or ideological matters.
Love and friendship relationships tend to be superficial
and there is little investment in family matters. Lacking
an integrated structure of aims and interests, immediate
gains, satisfactions and frustrations become primary.

While clearly impaired, integrative processes are
not totally absent. "The individual is neither over-
whelmed by his impulses nor acts them out chaotically
without consideration for reality" (p. 143). Rather this
type of cognition facilitates effective completion of
short range immediate aims. The impulsive is not hampered
by rumination over possible alternatives or consequences.
He acts quickly and competently in tasks which service his
immediate needs. Furthermore, he shows a remarkable de-

gree of self confidence and a freedom from inhibition and

l7

anxiety. As well the impulsive is known for his sociabil-
ity. He tends to be seen by others as charming, enter-
taining, witty, engaging and playful. However this social
facility is often used as a way of manipulating people

to service his needs rather than in developing any long—

standing relationships.

The Rorschach

 

The Rorschach lends itself quite well to the inves-
tigation of neurotic styles. It provides an objective,
valid and reliable method for assessing the formal char-
acteristics of thought, affect and behavior. Furthermore
the Rorschach was one of the primary sources of clinical
data used by Shapiro (1965) in formulating his theory.

The investigator therefore decided to use it as one of
her primary research instruments.

Following is a review of the literature of the Ror—

schach variables being used in this study.

Response Number (R)

R is the total number of responses given to the ten
Rorschach plates. It is dependent on both the ability
to look at an object from several different perspectives
and on the wealth of associations (Rapaport, Gill and
Schafer, 1968). Thus it is said to be related to intel-
ligence level and range of interests (Beck and Molish,
1967; Rapaport et al., 1968). Those of superior intel-

ligence produce significantly greater numbers of responses

 

18

than those within the normal range, while the feebleminded
produce significantly less responses than both of the pre-
ceding groups (Exner, 1974).

Affective factors, however, also play a significant
role in determining R, with depression and constriction
reducing and elation increasing R production (Beck, 1945;
Exner, 1974; Rapaport et al., 1968; Rorschach, 1942). As
well high R may be indicative of overambitiousness rather
than simply intellecutal excellence, the overachiever
producing quantitatively equal but qualitatively poorer
responses (Rapaport et al., 1968).

In addition, studies of pathological groups have
found high R to be associated with mania (Rorschach, 1942),
overideational preschizophrenics, mixed neurotics and ob-
sessive compulsives. In contrast, low R is correlated with
neurotic and psychotic depressives, simple schizOphrenics,
paranoids (Rapaport et al., 1968) , and those with organic

brain damage (Exner, 1974).

Location (W, D, Dd)

Location scores W, D, Dd reveal the way in which the
individual approaches the world. W indicates a global,
theoretical approach, D a practical concrete approach and
Dd an approach attuned to the finer, sometimes obscure
details of the environment (Beck, 1945).

The majority of research on location scores has

focussed on W. Rorschach (1942) postulated that W was

 

19

related to organizing ability and thus intellecual func-
tioning. However, investigations have produced conflict-
ing evidence regarding the intellect hypothesis, some
studies demonstrating a positive correlation between Ia
and W (Abrams, 1955; Armitage, Greenberg, Pearl, Berger &
Daston, 1955) while others finding no such relationship
(McCandles, 1949; Wittenborn, 1950).

Exner (1974) attributes these contradictory results
to the failure to account for qualitative differences in
W. Beck (1945) identifies two types of W, the organized
W in which the analysis-synthesis process is in evidence
and the lazy W which is characterized by easy and diffuse
perception. Other investigators have shown that when the
quality of W is considered, a positive correlation is
found between organized W and intellect (Friedman, 1952),
the lazy W reflecting limited intellectual potential or
below capacity functioning due to illness, affective fac-
tors or defensive guardedness (Beck, 1945).

Little research has been conducted investigating D
and Dd alone, Beck indicating that D represents reactiv-
ity to the obvious, Dd-attention to the minute.

While there is some value in interpreting location
scores in isolation from each other, their interpretive
significance lies primarily in their proportional occur-
rence to each other in a record. Adherence to the ex-
pected proportion W = 19.81%, D = 71.94%, Dd = 8.23%, re-

flects adaptive flexibility in coping with the environment,

20

aware of the practical reality demands (D), and yet cog-
nizant of global implications (W) and subtle distinctions
(Dd) when necessary (Beck, 1945; Exner, 1974).

For those who depart from these expectancies, the
direction to which the proportion shifts, reveals import-
ant differences in style of approach to the world. Evi-
dence shows that an emphasis on W reflects a tendency to
be overly theoretical, intellecutal and abstract at the
expense of more mundane considerations. In contrast over-
emphasis on D indicates over concern with the practical and
concrete often reflecting a reluctance to test out intel-
lectual resources (Exner, 1974). And finally Dd over-
production reveals a tendency to pursue what others dis-
regard. Valuing precision and exactness, the Dd emphasizer
has difficulty coping with the ambiguity and global impact
of the environment (Beck, 1945).

Furthermore investigation of pathological groups has
found high incidence of D in depressives, Dd in obses-
sives and W in conditions exhibiting moderate elation, the
number of W's in the elated decreasing as attention becomes

more flighty (Beck, 1945).

Organization (Z)

The Z organizational score initially conceptualized
by Beck (1933) represents the tendency to organize separ-
ate parts of an inkblot stimulus into a meaningful percept.

The Beck Z score consists of a weighted score assigned

21

according to type or organization and the complexity of
the location used and is purported to reflect the ability
to organize, integrate and abstract (Beck, 1945; Hertz,
1960).

Thus Beck Z is generally conceived of as an indica-
tion of intelligence showing high correlations with stand-
ard IQ tests (Sisson and Taulbee, 1955; Wishner, 1948),
particularly the verbal reasoning, picture completion and
digit span subtests of the WISC (Wishner, 1948), showing
low or negative correlations with other subtests. Further-
more, Hertz and Beck concur that the Z score reflects more
than simply intellectual ability, also indicating the drive
to achieve and the creative and efficient use of intel-
lect.

Consequently while intelligence is a prerequisite for
Z score, high intelligence does not necessarily result in
High Z. Z has been found to vary with response style
(Exner, 1974). It is higher in manics than schizophrenics
(Schmidt and Fonda, 1953), low in depressed patients (Hertz,
1948; Varvel, 1941) and high in patients prone to projec-

tion (Beck, 1952).

Movement (M)

Rorschach (1942) hypothesized that M, the perception
of movement in the inanimate stimulus blot, is an indica-
tion of introversiveness. It reflects the tendency to

function in the intellectual sphere and to be more

 

22

oriented toward intrapsychic living than living in the
external world. Thus Rorschach viewed the M producer as
one who because of inhibition engages in adaptive wish—
fulfilling mental activity instead of overt behavior.

Beck (1945, 1967), Hertz (1951) and Klopfer et a1.
(1954) concur with Rorschach's hypothesis that M repre-
sents an internalization process reflecting an attempt to
deal with external reality demands through internal thought
processes rather than through action i.e. through fantasy
and dreams. Much research has corroborated the positive
relationship between M production and internal activity.
They have demonstrated a positive correlation between M
and such processes as daydreaming (Page, 1957), dream and
sleep deprivation (Page, 1957), fantasy (Dana, 1968) and
intellect (Hersh, 1962).

Although Piotrowski (1957) agress with Beck, Hertz
and Klopfer that M represents internalized activity, in
contrast to the above theorists he feels that it is also
positively correlated with overt behavior, reflecting the
attitude one assumes in relationship with others. Studies
attempting to investigate the presence or absence of kin—
esthesia with M have reported conflicting results. Some
have shown a positive relationship between motor inhibi-
tion and M thus supporting Rorschach's position (Klein
and Schlesinger, 1951; Singer, 1960), while others have
corroborated Piotrowski's view (Cooper and Castron, 1970).

Rapaport (1968) has advanced a theory which appears

23

to effectively integrate these apparently contradictory
points of view. He postulates that M is indicative of
response delay rather than a tendency towards internaliza-
tionixithe form of dreams and fantasies or in overt be—
havior, the behavior being a product of deliberate and
cognitively sophisticated thought processes rather than
impulsive action. The internal fantasies appear to func-
tion as a means of formulating alternative responses which
at times results in adaptive manipulation of the environ-
ment while at other times remains internally contained.
Whether or not overt activity occurs will depend on how
the individual has learned to most effectively deal with

external demands and conflicts (Exner, 1974).

Color (C, CF, PC)

A color response is one in which a color other than
black, gray or white has played a role in determining a
percept. There are three basic types of color responses:
1) Pure Color (C) in which color is the sole determinant,
2) Color-Form (CF) in which color is the primary determin-
ant but some form elements are also involved and 3) Form-
Color (FC) where color contributes to the response but is
only of equal or secondary importance to the form deter-
minant (Rapaport et al., 1968).

Rorschach (1942) hypothesized that use of color is
associated with affect and such characteristics as sen-

sitivity, irritability and impulsiveness. There has been

24

a great deal of controversy over this relationship. How-
ever Exner (1974) appropriately suggests that studies often
cited as evidence against the color-affect relationship
(Hamlin, Stone & Moskowitz, 1955; Keehn, 1954; Siipola,
1950) have in fact been investigations of the color-shock
hypothesis. In studies that have more directly researched
the color-affect link, validating evidence has been re-
ported (Crumpton, 1956; Forsyth, 1959; Wallen, 1948).

The rationale for this hypothesis has been exten-
sively studied. The findings have demonstrated that color
perception is essentially a passive (Schachtel, 1943)
and immediate (Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1943) process, requir-
ing minimal cognitive articulation and organization activ4
ity and a relaxation of tension discharge delaying capacity
(Rapaport et al., 1968). In a 1960 review Shapiro reports
supporting data showing that color has the most signfii-
cance in all cases in which organizing capacity has not yet
been achieved or has been impaired.

The following hypotheses have been proposed for each
of the three basic types of color responses. Production
of Pure C is associated with blunted affect, impulsive
actions and uncontrolled emotional outbursts (Beck, 1945;
Klopfer et al., 1954; Rapaport et al., 1968; Rorschach,
1942; Shapiro, 1960). Underlying the C response is the
temporary relaxation, immobilization or absence of inte-
grative and tension discharge delaying functions (Shapiro,

1960).

25

CFirsassociated with both vivid and labile emotional-
ity or impulsive action with only minimal regard for real-
ity considerations. In this case there is also an impair-
ment of organizing and delay functions but to a lesser
extend than with pure C response (Shapiro, 1960).

Finally the FC response is one in which the emotional
response is made but it is integrated with reality demands
resulting in good judgment, planning and empathic rapport
with others. Underlying this is an effective delay of dis-
charge which allows organization and articulation of form
determined percept in which color is used to facilitate
percept identification rather than impede it as is the

case with C and CF responses (Shapiro, 1969).

C+CF:FC

C+CF:FC is the ratio of color dominated to form dom-
inated chromatic responses. The expected proportion in an
average record is 1:2 (Rapaport, et al., 1968).

The predominance of FC over C+CF is an index of the
degree to which an individual is able to control impulsive
action and emotionality. The person is capable of respond-
ing appropriately with affect and action (Klopfer et al.,
1954). Therefore it indicates capacity for adaptive rap-
port with others (Beck, 1945). However, when FC is too
numerous one would expect an overly compliant individual
who is primarily concerned with pleasing others and has
difficulty asserting his own needs (Rappaport et al., 1968).

When C+CF is predominant over FC there is weak control

26

over emotionality. The individual tends to be character-
ized by affective lability, impulsivity, irritability, sen-
sitivity and suggestibility (Beck, 1945). He also tends to
know others only in a superficial way, be self-centered,
demanding and lack social responsibility. Thus he has dif-
ficulty developing or maintaining deep friendships (Phillips

and Smith, 1953).

Sum C

Sum C is the total amount of chromatic color used in a
Rorschach protocol. In this sum a pure C response merits
1.5 units, a CF response 1 unit and an FC response .5 units.
This sum represents the emotional reactivity of the individ-
ual and the extent to which the individual's affective en-
ergy is available for response to the environment (Beck,
1945; Klopfer et al., 1954; Rapaport et al., 1968). The
greater the total C the more capable the individual is of
feeling contact with the world (Beck and Molish, 1967).

A higher than average sum C however would indicate
more emotional reactivity and available affective energy
than is available to most other people. Thus it may re-
flect normal impulsiveness, hysterical affective lability
or preschiZOphrenic dilation. Those records which show a
low sum C (less than 3) reflect a suppression of affect,
shyness, tense alertness and inhibition which is charac-
teristically found in depressives, prepsychotics and schiz-

ophrenics (Rappaport et al., 1968).

27

Experience Balance (M:C)

The experience balance represents the ratio of movement
responses to the sum of weighted chomatic color responses
assigning .5 units to FC, 1 to each CF and 1.5 to each C
(Rorschach, 1942). '

Rorschach (1942) hypothesized that the experience bal-
ance represents a constitutional response tendency which
reflects an introversive (M>C), extratensive (M<C) balance.
He defined the introversive individual as one who tends to
get his needs gratified primarily through inner resources.
He experiences the world more in a cognitive than an affec-
tive manner and is characterized by individualized intelli-
gence, creative ability, significant inner life and stable
affective and motor reactions.

The extratensive person, in contrast, relies on the
interactions with the enviornment for need satisfaction.

He tends to be characterized by stereotyped intelligence,
reproductive rather than creative ability, outward life
orientation and labile affectivity and motility.

Rorschach (1942) explicitly states that this dimen-
sion does not correspond to the Jungian concept of intro-
version-extraversion. However, there has been considerable
controversy among major Rorschach theorists as to whether
these concepts are essentially the same. Klopfer et a1.
(1954) sets forth theoretical arguments supporting their
equality while Beck (1945) and Piotrowski (1957) support

Rorschach's original position. Exner (1974) concurs with

28

them that whereas the Jungian introvert is generally con-
ceptualized as withdrawn and isolated from others, Ror-
schach's notion of introversiveness focusses on use of re—
sources and the manner in which the world is experienced
but does not necessarily imply behavioral correlates.

This controversy has given rise to a great deal of
research exploring the personality correlates of the intro-
versive and extratensive balance. Singer (1960) and Molish
(1967) both cite evidence indicating that introversives ex-
hibit more fantasy activity, form associations more rapidly
and have a higher general intelligence than extratensives.
In contrast, the extratensive individual shows more auto—
nomic arousal, rapidity of movement and has a low threshold
for affective response. The research further demonstrates
no correlation between introversion as measured by the ex-
perience balance and questionnaires measuring social intro-
version thus lending support to Rorschach's original hy-
pothesis. On the basis of these studies Exner (1974)
concludes that the experience balance provides an index of
whether the individual relies on inner life and the asso-
ciated delays or is prone to affective discharge.

Among pathological groups M prevalence occurs in acute
schiZOphrenics, overideational preschizophrenics and obses-
sive compulsives, while color is prevalent in hysterical,
depressive and some types of schizophrenic disorders

(Rapaport et al., 1968).

29

Form (F%)

Pure form responses are those which are determined
solely by the form quality of the blot. Rorschach (1942)
hypothesized that F is an index of concentration—attention
processes. Other theorists have expanded this concept.
Rapaport et a1. (1968) proposes that pure form reflects the
capacity for formal logical reasoning. It is uninfluenced
by affective and unconscious factors and reflects the cap-
acity for delay of impulse discharge.

While Klopfer et a1. (1954) and Beck (1945) concur in
the affect-delay proposition, in a more conservative formu-
lation they suggest that F may occur in the presence of and
may even be promoted by affect or conflict which is con-
trolled by deliberate and conscious thought processes. In a
review Exner (1974) cites research indicating that experi-
mental data appears to support the Klopfer-Beck hypothesis.
Studies demonstrate that those in a defensive position i.e.
influenced by conflict, show a higher proportion of pure F re-
sponses. Further in those conditions where impulse is impaired
as in characterological disorders and organic conditions
pure F is lowered (Buhler & LeFever, 1947; Hafner, 1958).

The expected F% is 60-80%. This reflects a balance
in delay of impulse expression. Thus thinking is essen-
tially in conformity with reality demands without sacrific-
ing spontaneity. Therefore F% is greatest among those
groups characterized by rigidity, compulsiveness or inhi-
bition. Among pathological groups this includes paranoid

schizophrenics, simple schizophrenics, depressives and

 

30

obsessive compulsives. Low F% is found in those individuals
characterized by impulsivity particularly hysterics, acute

schizophrenics and psychopaths (Rapaport et al., 1968).

Form Quality (F+%)

F+% is the measure of the form quality of a percept pro-
duced in response to a Rorschach blot. According to Beck
(1968) Rorschach hypothesized four basic components under-
lying the F+ response: 1) the ability to concentrate
2) availability of clear memory images into consciousness
and 4) the ability to select from among those images the
one most fitting for the stimulus.

F+% represents the degree to which the subject is
attentive to or departs from the reality represented in
the blot and is therefore purported to be a measure of ego
strength (Korchin, 1960). In support of this hypothesis
research has shown that F+% is a good indication of the
capacity for effectively dealing with stress (Exner, 1974)
and furthermore tends to increase as a result of therapeu-
tic change (Beck, 1967; Piotrowski, 1939).

Beck (1945) has also proposed the F+% is a measure of
intellect. Whereas F+% has been found to be significantly
correlated with mental retardation (Beck, 1932, Klopfer and
Kelley, 1942) there is no evidence to indicate that it is an effec-
tive predictor of intellect in the normal range (Exner, 19 74) .

The low F+% represents the degree to which a percept
has been distorted by the influence of affective and uncon-

scious factors and reflects a failure in the delay of

31

impulse gratification (Beck, 1945; Korchin, 1960; Rapaport
et al., 1968). A consistent correlation has been demonstra-
ted between low F+% (F+<60%) and severe psychOpathology
(Beck and Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1938); Beck and Molish, 1967).
This is found primarily in schizophrenics but may be present in
neurathenics and preschizophrenics (Rapaport et al., 1968).

As with the F% a high F+% indicates decreased spon-
taneity and an inhibition of fantasy and affective pro—
cesses (Korchin, 1960). This may reflect underlying control
which has become rigid and overly accurate resulting in
meagerness of productivity and rigid thinking. This often
is characteristic of paranoid, depressive and obsessive

conditions (Rapaport et al., 1968).

Vista (V)

When an individual uses vista (V) he is using the
shading to give the blot a structured three dimensional
effect. He sees the material as having depth and perspec-
tive with some objects closer and others farther away.

Rorschach (1942) gave little attention to the use of
vista proposing simply that it was related to feelings of
inadequacy. Therefore the interpretation of this response
has been elaborated upon by other Rorschach theorists . Beck
(1945) suggested that V represents an introspective, intra-
punitive process which results form feelings of inadequacy
and is associated with a dysphoric mood. In a somewhat more
adaptive View Klopfer and Kelley (1942) hypothesized that

V reflects an attempt to handle anxiety through introspection

32

by creating distance from oneself in order to gain per-
spective. They view it as a stabilizing influence in that
it allows the individual to tolerate anxiety.

While initially Beck (1945) tended to see V as a
pathological sign, in a later work (Beck and Molish, 1967)
he has suggested that in some cases it may indicate more
adaptive functioning, specifically an appreciation for
spatial relationships and an interpersonal sensitivity.

Unlike many of the other Rorschach variables very
little empirical data has been gathered to validate hypoth-
eses relating to V. However, in a series of studies con-
ducted by Exner (1974) evidence indicates that the vista
response does relate to introspective activity which may
or may not be associated with subjective pain and depres-

sion, essentially supporting both Beck and Klopfer hypotheses .

Diffuse Shading (Y)

The scoring of shading is the most refined of all the
Rorschach variables in that it indicates whether shading re—
flects a response generated by textural quality, vista effect or
diffuseness (Rapaport et a1. , 1968) . While all systematizers
have included some way of scoring diffuse shading, the symbols
and the scoring criteria utilized differ. The Beck system, that
used in this study, designates Y to indicate this variable.

There is general agreement among Rorschach theorists
that Y is an indication of anxiety. Klopfer et a1. (1954)
suggests that diffuse shading reflects free floating anxiety

which further indicates a situation which the individual has

33

not built up adequate defenses to deal with. Elaborating

on this concept Rapaport et a1. (1968) suggest that the de—
gree to which form is integrated into a response using shad-
ing indicates how adequately the individual is handling the
anxiety. Pure Y refers to free floating anxiety. However
when F is secondary to Y anxiety is associated with a specific
situation or idea and when form predominates anxiety is rel—
atively well controlled or displaced into body symptomatology.

Beck (1945) in a somewhat different formulation sug-
gests that Y is indicative of inactivity or passivity which
the individual uses to defend against affective expression.
Furthermore this is associated with a dysphoric mood.

There have been numerous studies investigating the
shading-anxiety and shading-passivity hypotheses. While
research has consistently supported the passivity hypothe-
sis, more equivocal results have been reported regarding
the relationship between shading and anxiety. In a review
Exner (1974) suggests that this is largely due to the use
of different scoring criteria and the failure to differen-
tiate different types of anxiety. He further proceeds to
give a rather comprehensive formulation of the meaning of
shading production. He concludes that Y reflects psycho-
logical helplessness which may or may not be accompanied
by anxiety but is associated with some form of painful
affect. The degree to which an individual is able to c0pe
with this experience is demonstrated in the degree to which
form is also integrated into the response. In those cases

where form is dominant the experience is controlled and

34

overt response is delayed and organized. However when form
is secondary or absent there is an increased probability
of direct expression and an associated feeling of being over-

whelmed.

Number of Content Categories

The number of content categories manifested in a
Rorschach protocol has been consistently demonstrated to
reflect high intelligence (Beck, 1945; Pauker, 1963) and
a wide breadth of life interests (Piotrowski, 1957; Schafer,
1954). A high number of categories, however, not only in-
dicates intellectual capacity but also the degree to which
the individual has actively sought to develop it through
formal education, advanced training and life experiences
(Beck, 1945).

Conversely, the use of only a small number of cate-
gories has been shown to be correlated with low intellec-
tual endowment (Beck, 1945; Piotrowski, 1957; Schachtel,
1966; Schafer, 1954). However, it may also indicate an
inefficiency of functioning. This may be the result of a
passive overconventional approach to life, anxiety, inhibi-
tion, repression, psychomotor retardation or psychotic
blocking (Beck, 1945; Hertz, 1949; Rapaport et al., 1968).

Among psychopathological groups the lowest range is
found among the feebleminded, organic brain syndrome, the
severely depressed (Beck, 1945) and schizophrenics (Pio-

trowski and Bricklin, 1961).

35

Animal Content (A%)

A% represents the proportion of responses which con-
tain percepts of animals or parts of animals. The animal
is the easiest and therefore the most prevalently produced
percept (Beck, 1945; Exner, 1974; Rapaport et al., 1968).
The mean production is 46.87%, the normal ranging from
30-65%.

Within the average range A% is viewed as a measure
of adaptive thinking (Beck and Molish, 1967). It reflects
the ability to intellectually recognize the common and mun—
dane (Beck, 1945) and to react in a routine and predictable
manner (Exner, 1974). Furthermore, when not produced to
excess it represents the ability to free oneself of stere-
otyped perceptual activity to produce more complex, artic-
ulated and creative responses (Beck, 1945; Beck and Molish,
1967).

There is general agreement that overproduction of A
reflects stereotypic thinking and a narrowness of interests
(Beck, 1945; Beck and Molish, 1967; Ezner, 1974; Klopfer
et al., 1954; Rapaport et al., 1968). Therefore one would
expect a high A% in those conditions which interfere with
complex articulation and integration of percepts. This
would include low intelligence, compulsive rigidity, de-
pression (Rapaport et al., 1968), simple schizophrenia
(Exner, 1974) and alcoholism (Rabin, Papania and McMichael,
1954).

An A% below expectancy is indicative of an individual

36

who tends to see the world in a highly idiosyncratic man—
ner, tending to ignore the mundane. Thus low A% occurs
among those individuals characterized by rich intelligence,
freedom of impulses (Rapaport et al., 1968), flightiness,
disorganized thought particularly in manic and schizo-

phrenics (Exner, 1974).

Popular Response (P)

Rorschach (1942) hypothesized that P reflects the
ability to perceive the commonplace in the stimulus fea-
tures of the blot or more generally to see things accord-
ing to social convention (Beck and Molish, 1967; Exner,
1974; Klopfer and Kelley, 1968; Rapaport et al., 1968).
More specific than A% which focusses on a class of per-
cepts, P score reflects the degree to which an individual
produces responses to particular blot areas which are the
same as those commonly produced by normal individuals. In
the nonpsychiatric population subjects produce an average
of 6 P, the normal ranging from 5 to 8.

An overproduction of P reflects an unusually strong
emphasis on conforming to the obvious (Exner, 1974) and
thus a lack of individuality and freedom of thinking
(Rapaport et al., 1968). This may relate to a defensive
clinging to conformity to avoid exposing more individual-
istic percepts particularly in a constricted record. In a
rich protocol however it may simply indicate an above aver-

age attentiveness to the obvious in the environment (Exner,

 

37

1974).

An absence or very low frequency of P indicates an
inability to see the world as others do. This often in—
dicates a weakness in ties to reality (Klopfer et al.,
1954) and tends to be reflective of severe psychopathology

(Exner, 1974; Rapaport et al., 1968).

White Space (S)

Beck (1945) and Rapaport et a1. (1968) concur with
Rorschach‘s hypothesis that the use of white space repre-
sents an oppositional or negativistic attitude. According
to Rapaport, these feelings may be directed inward resulting
in doubt or outward manifesting itself as stubborness.
Others however have suggested that S reflects independence
(Piotrowski, 1957) and self assertiveness (Klopfer et al.,
1954). Research has essentially supported both hypotheses.
Fonda (1951) reports a positive correlation between S pro-
duction and oppositional tendencies while in a later review
of the literature (Fonda, 1960), he cites evidence indicat-
ing a positive relationship between S and productivity,
flexibility, ingenuity and self-sufficiency.

At first glance these two former propositions appear
contradictory. However, Fonda (1960)iJ1a cogent review and
theoretical statement contends that the drive for autonomy
underlies both the self assertive and negativistic tendencies
and as such is an indication of ego strength. This is fur-

ther supported by Levy (1955) who concludes that the purpose

38

of Oppositionalism is to ensure the individual's separate-
ness and independence.

Beck and Molish (1967) have furthermore stated that
a moderate degree of oppositionalism is not only expected
but desired. In a healthy individual it represents a sense
of determination and will power. However, when this drive
for independence becomes excessive it no longer serves an
adaptive purpose. It is then manifested in extreme stub-
bornness, negativism and rigidity. This is characteristic
of the obsessive compulsive, paranoid and schizophrenic
conditions. In contrast an underproduction of S indicates
a passive dependent orientation in which the individual
feels he must placate others through submission and com-

pliance.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There is general agreement in the field of cognitive
styles that there are identifiable stylistic differences in
the way people think, perceive, feel and act. Furthermore,
these different styles are consistent within an individual
and stable over time (Kagan and Moss, 1963; Klein, 1970;
Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough and Karp, 1962).

The focus of the present study is Shapiro's (1965)
theory of neurotic styles. Shapiro proposes that there is
a cognitive style associated with each neurotic condition
which is a manifestation, not of a neurosis itself, but of
the individual's cognitive structure formed in the course
of development. Furthermore one's cognitive style is an
important factor in determining the type of neurosis that
might be developed.

The theory of neurotic styles has been the subject
of little empirical research to date. It is therefore the
goal of this study to begin such investigation. The prim-
ary objective of this research is to test the existence of
a relationship between neurotic styles and Rorschach vari-
able patterns based on hypotheses developed from Shapiro's

descriptions of the characteristics of each style.

39

METHOD

Instruments

 

The Neurotic Style Peer Rating Form is an instrument
developed for this study. It consists of a description of
each of the four neurotic styles described by Shapiro
(1965); obsessive compulsive, paranoid, hysteric and im—
pulsive (see Appendix). The styles were presented in ran-
dom fashion to eliminate an ordering effect. The subject
was given the following instructions:

The following pages contain a description of four

different styles of human behavior. In the space

provided on the last page of this form please rank
order these four styles according to how similar
each description is to the person who has asked

you to fill out this form. Thus write 1 next to the

style he is most like, 2 next to the style he is

next most like, 3 to the next and 4 to the one he is
least like. Please be sure to read through all four
descriptions before beginning the ranking.

The assumption underlying the use of this instrument
is that a person well acquainted with another is capable
of assessing the general way in which he thinks, feels and
acts, i.e. his cognitive style.

A pilot study was carried out with Michigan State
University undergraduate students to determine whether this

instrument was effective in identifying individuals of dif-

ferent styles. Forms were initially distributed to 72

40

41

individuals, 28 of whom returned the questionnaire and
therefore made up the sample. Each student was rated by
two persons of his choice and well acquainted with him
using the Neurotic Styles Peer Rating Form. A text of
association was then done to determine whether two were
able to agree on the style which best described the sub—
ject (i.e. both ranked the same style I) at a level sig-
nificantly better than chance. It was found that the

two raters agreed in 72% of the cases.

 

The Rorschach was the second instrument used to
assess neurotic styles. A list of Rorschach variables
thought to be associated with each neurotic style was
assembled. Literature was reviewed to determine the cog-
nitive, affective and behavioral correlates of Rorschach
variables. Modes of thought feeling and behavior associa—
ted with each style as described by Shapiro (1965) were
then matched to the corresponding Rorschach variables.
Thus a list of Rorschach variables ranging from 14 to 16
was assembled for each style (see Table 1). The reference
points used to determine whether a score was high or low

were Beck (1950) means (see Appendix B).

Scoring

Each of the Rorschach protocols was scored by one of
two raters according to the Beck scoring system (Beck,
1961). Two graduate students having completed a course on

Rorschach administration and scoring served as raters.

42

 

 

 

Table l. Rorschach Variable Patterns Associated with

Each Neurotic Style

O-C F H I

R High Low Low High
RT High High Low
w High High
D High
Dd High Low Low
Z High High Low Low
M High High Low Low
C+CF:FC C+CF<FC C+CF<FC C+CF>FC C+CF>FC
SUM C Low Low High High
M:C M>C M>C M<C M<C
F% High High Low
F+% High High Low Low
V High Low
Y Low Low High Low
CONT High Low
A% Low High High
P High High
S High High Low
H+Hd Low High High High

 

43

Interrater Reliability

After all protocols had been administered and scored
interrater reliability was determined. A random sample
of six protocols were scored by both raters. Protocols
were then categorized according to style based on which
of the four indicator scores for each protocol showed the
highest mean percent. For example if a subject showed 52%
obsessive indicators, 43% paranoid indicators, 64% hys—
teric indicators and 53% impulsive indicators, he would be

classified as a hysteric. The raters agreed on categori—

 

zation in only three of the six cases, therefore only
slightly above a level of chance.

Interrater reliabilities were also determined for
each of the Rorschach variables through use of the Pearson
Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. The correlations
between judgments for all but two of the variables ranged
from +.743 to +1.00 indicating a satisfactory degree of
reliability. However, scoring for Z and F+% were quite
unreliable showing correlations of .121 and .104 respec-

tively (see Table 2).

Hypotheses

l. a. Subjects characterized by an obsessive compulsive
style will demonstrate a higher percentage of ob—
sessive compulsive Rorschach indicators than in—
dicators of hysteric, paranoid and impulsive styles.

b. Similarly these subjects will demonstrate a higher
percentage of obsessive compulsive indicators than
those classified in the other style categories.

44

Table 2. Interrater Reliability for Each Rorschach Var-
iable Using Pearson Product Moment Correlation

 

 

Coefficient
Variable Pearson r p
R .996 < .001
RT 1.000 < .001
W% .924 < .01
D% .937 < .01
Dd% .972 < .001
M .956 < .01
Z .121 ns
Sum C .978 < .001
F% .743 < .10
F+% .104 ns
V .969 < .01
Y .816 < .05
CONTENT .947 < .01
A% .960 < .01
P .776 < .10
S .794 < 10

H+Hd .912 < .02

 

45

2. a. Subjects characterized by a paranoid style will
demonstrate a higher percentage of paranoid Ror-
schach indicators than indicators of hysteric, ob-
sessive and impulsive styles.

b. Similarly these subjects will demonstrate a higher
percentage of paranoid indicators than those class-
ified in the other style categories.

3. a. Subjects characterized by an hysterical style will
deomnstrate a higher percentage of hysterical Ror-
schach indicators than indicators of obsessive,
paranoid and impulsive styles.

b. Similarly, these subjects will demonstrate a higher
percentage of hysterical indicators than those
classified in the other style categories.

4. a. Subjects characterized by an impulsive style will
demonstrate a higher percentage of impulsive Ror-
schach indicators than indicators of obsessive,
paranoid and hysteric styles.

b. Similarly, these subjects will demonstrate a

higher percentage of impulsive indicators than
those classified in the other style categories.

Subjects

Experimental packets were distributed to 120 men
and women. Of the original 120, 97 returned completed
test forms indicating a desire to be included in the study.
Fifty—three of these people failed to meet criteria for
further participation and were therefore eliminated from
the sample. (For packet contents and criteria for par-
ticipation see procedure below.)

The final subject sample consisted of 42 students
between the ages of 17 and 22; 18 men and 24 women. All
were college students at Michigan State University. The
subjects were obtained through psychology classes in which

students are given extra credit for participation in ongoing

46

research. The investigator placed sign up sheets in each
of two classrooms. These sheets contained information re-
garding the name of the experiment (Behavioral and Inter-
personal Styles), the number of credits to be awarded,

and the place and time to meet with the investigator if

interested.

Procedure
All subjects met with the investigator at a speci—
fied time and place. At that time each subject received
an envelope containing two Neurotic Style Peer Rating Forms
and the following instructions which the investigator re—
viewed with him/her at the time of distribution:
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this
study. Enclosed in this envelope you have been
given are two style rating forms. Please give one
to each of two people you feel knowns you best.
Ask them to fill it out and return the completed
form to the envelope. Then bring the envelope to
class and place it in a box provided at the front
of the room. Please no not discuss the ratings
with the raters.
The subjects were then told that there were two parts to
the study and that not all of them would be asked to par—
ticipate in the second part. They were further told that
they would be recontacted when this decision was made
but were given no further information on what basis that
discrimination would be made.
The style rating forms (see Appendix A) were

checked for reliability after they were returned. Those

subjects for whom their two raters had disagreed as to

47

the style most characteristic of him i.e. had ranked two
different styles as l_were recontacted, thanked for

their cooperation and told that no further assistance
would be necessary. Those persons whose first place rat-
ings were identical were called and a further testing
session was arranged. At the specified time the Rorschach
was administered to each subject. Each of the Rorschachs
were scored by one of two raters according to the Beck
scoring system (Beck, 1961). Two graduate students having
completed a course in Rorschach administration and scor-
ing served as raters and interrater reliabilities were

determined.

Statistical Analysis

 

For each subject four percentage scores were deter-
mined indicating the percentage of obsessive compulsive,
paranoid, hysteric and impulsive Rorschach indicators
represented in his Rorschach record. A mean percentage
score was then calculated for each of the four style
groups to indicate the mean percent of obsessive compul-
sive, paranoid, hysteric and impulsive Rorschach indica—
tors present for each of the style groups.

Twenty-four T-test comparison of means was then
carried out to test 1) whether subjects characterized
by a particular style will demonstrate a higher percentage
of Rorschach indicators for that style than for the remain-

ing three styles and 2) whether those individuals

 

48

demonstrating a particular style will show a higher per—

centage of Rorschach indicators for that style than indi-

cators for any of the other styles. Following is a list

of the six t-tests that were carried out to test Hypothe-

sis l.

Hypothesis la

For those identified as having an obsessive compul—

sive style the following comparisons were made:

1)

2)

3)

mean percentage of obsessive compulsive Ror—

schach indicators and the mean percentage of

 

paranoid Rorschach indicators.

mean percentage of obsessive compulsive Ror—
schach indicators and the mean percentage of
hysteric Rorschach indicators.

mean percentage of obsessive compulsive Rorschach
indicators and the mean percentage of impulsive

indicators.

Hypothesis lb

b)

5)

the difference in the mean percentage of ob-
sessive compulsive Rorschach indicators demon—
strated by those subjects having an obsessive
compulsive style and those having a paranoid
style.

the difference in the mean percentage of obses-
sive compulsive Rorschach indicators demonstra—

ted by those subjects having an obsessive

49

compulsive style and those subjects having an
hysteric style.

6) the difference in the mean percentage of obses-
sive compulsive Rorschach indicators demonstra-
ted by those subjects having an obsessive com-
pulsive style and those subjects having an
impulsive style.

Six tests were then carried out in a similar manner

to test the remaining three hypotheses.

 

RESULTS

Distribution of Neurotic Styles

 

The distribution of neurotic styles obtaind from
the Neurotic Styles Peer Rating Form is shown in Table 3.
This is not a random distribution but consists of 42 pro-

tocols selected from the original 97 subjects.

Table 3. Distribution of Neurotic Styles

 

 

 

Sex of Ss Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
Men 4 7 2 5
N = 18
Women 11 4 2 7
N = 24
Total ~ 15 ll 4 12
N = 42
Hypotheses

 

Hypothesis la

It was predicted that those individuals having an
obsessive-compulsive style would show a higher mean per-
cent of obsessive-compulsive Rorschach indicators than
paranoid, hysteric and impulsive indicators. A t—test

comparison of means revealed that as expected the

50

 

51

obsessive compulsive style group showed a higher mean
percent of obsessive indicators than hysteric and impul-
sive indicators, the difference being significant at the
.01 level in the latter case. However, in contrast to
prediction this group had a higher mean percent of para-
noid indicators than obsessive indicators, although the
difference was not significant (see Table 4).

Table 4. Obsessive Compulsive Rorschach Indicators vs.

Indicators of Other Neurotic Styles for the
Obsessive Compulsive Style Group

 

 

Rorschach Indicators Mean Percent df t* p
Obsessive Compulsive 50.83

Paranoid 53.81 24 .67 ns
Hysteric 46.67 17 .97 ns
Impulsive 38.97 25 2.51 < .01

 

*One tailed test.

Hypothesis lb

The hypothesis that those subjects characterized by
an obsessive compulsive style would demonstrate a higher
mean percent of obsessive Rorschach indicators than those
classified in the hysteric, paranoid and impulsive cate-
gories was not supported by the data. The obsessive com-
pulsive style group showed a higher mean percent of ob-
sessive indicators than the hysteric and impulsive group
and a lower mean percent than the paranoid group. How-

ever, these differences were not significant (See Table 5).

52

Table 5. Obsessive Compulsive Indicators: Obsessive-
Compulsive Group vs Other Neurotic Style Groups

 

Mean Percent of

NeurOtlc Styles Obsessive Indicators

 

Obsessive-Compulsive 50.83

Paranoid . .52.27 24 .323 ns
Hysteric 46.88 17 .623 ns
Impulsive 50.00 25 .165 ns_

 

-Hypothesis 2a

The prediction was that those demonstrating a para-
noid style would show a higher mean percent of paranoid
indicators than indicators of the remaining three styles.
The results were in the predicted direction but only the
difference in mean percent between paranoid and impulsive
indicators reached a level of significance (see Table 6).
Table 6. Paranoid Rorschach Indicators and Indicators

of Other Neurotic Styles for the Paranoid
Style Group

 

 

Rorschach Indicators Mean Percent df t* p
Obsessive Compulsive 52.27 24 .641 ns
Paranoid 55.20

Hysteric 44.09 13 1.20 ns
Impulsive 42.05 21 2.78 < .01

 

*One tailed tests.

53

Hypothesis 2b

It was hypothesized that those individuals charac—
terized as having a paranoid style would demonstrate a
higher mean percent of paranoid Rorschach indicators than
those having an obsessive, hysteric and impulsive style.
This was not supported by the results. The paranoid style
group showed a lower mean percent of paranoid indicators
than both hysteric and impulsive groups and a higher mean
percent only in relation to the obsessive style group.
In none of the above cases were these differences sig—
nificant (see Table 7).

Table 7. Paranoid Indicators: Paranoid Group vs Other
Neurotic Style Groups

 

 

. Mean Percent of
Neurotic Styles Paranoid Indicators df t p
Obsessive Compulsive 53.81 24 .28 ns
Paranoid 55.20
Hysteric 58.93 13 .546 ns
Impulsive 58.33 21 .364 ns

 

Hypothesis 3a.

The expectation was that those identified as having
an hysterical style would show a higher mean percent of
hysterical Rorschach indicators than indicators of the re—

maining three styles. There were no significant differences

54

between means for the three comparisons made. Furthermore,
while the mean percent of hysterical indicators exceeded
mean percents of obsessive and impulsive indicators, the
hysterical style group showed the highest mean percent of
paranoid indicators. Therefore the hypothesis was clearly
not supported by the data (see Table 8).

Table 8. Hysterical Rorschach Indicators and Indicators

of Other Neurotic Styles for the Hysterical
Style Group

 

 

Rorschach Indicators Mean Percent df t p
Obsessive Compulsive 46.88 17 .491 ns
Paranoid 58.93 13 1.11 ns
Hysteric 50.00

Impulsive 40.63 14 1.44 ns

 

Hypothesis 3b

It was predicted that those individuals exhibiting
an hysterical style would show a higher mean percent of
hysterical Rorschach indicators than those characterized
by obsessive, paranoid and impulsive styles. The results
were in the predicted direction, but the differences

were of nonsignificant magnitude (see Table 9).

Hypothesis 4a
This hypothesis predicted that those subjects ident-

ified as having an impulsive style would show a higher

55

Table 9. Hysterical Indicators: Hysterical Style Group
vs Other Neurotic Style Groups

 

Mean Percent of

 

Neurotic Styles Hysterical Indicators df t p
Obsessive Compulsive 46.67 17 .503 ns
Paranoid 44.09 13 .464 ns
Hysteric 50.00

Impulsive 49.82 14 .035 ns

 

mean percent of impulsive Rorschach indicators than in-
dicators of the other three styles. The results of the
t-test comparisons of means were significant but in the
opposite direction than predicted. The impulsive group
showed a significantly lower mean percent of impulsive
indicators than indicators of obsessive, paranoid and hys-
terical styles (see Table 10).

Table 10. Impulsive Rorschach Indicators and Indicators

of Other Neurotic Styles for the Impulsive
Style Group

 

 

Rorschach Indicators Mean Percent df t* p
Obsessive Compulsive 50.00 25 2.966 < .01
Paranoid 58.33 21 2.72 < .02
Hysteric 49.82 14 2.68 < .02
Impulsive 35.38

 

*Two tailed tests.

56

Hypothesis 4b

It was hypothesized that those characterized by an
impulsive style would demonstrate a higher percentage of
impulsive Rorschach indicators than those classified in
the obsessive, paranoid and hysteric categories. As in
hypothesis 4a the results were in the opposite direction
than predicted. However in this case the differences
were nonsignificant thus failing to support the hypothe-
sis (see Table 11).

Table 11. Impulsive Indicators: Impulsive Style Group
vs Other Neurotic Style Groups

 

 

Mean Percent of

 

Neurotic Styles Impulsive Indicators df t p
Obsessive Compulsive 38.97 25 .712 ns
Paranoid 42.05 21 1.469 ns
Hysteric 40.63 14 .859 ns

Impulsive 35.38

 

Additional Results

 

A chi square test of association was also performed
to assess association of neurotic styles to Rorschach
style indicators. A nonsignificant chi square value of
3.996 with df = 9 was found. For distribution of styles
determined by the peer rating form and styles determined

by the Rorschach see Table 12.

57

Table 12. Frequency Distribution of Association of Neur-
otic Styles Determined by Peer Ratings and
Neurotic Styles Determined by Rorschach Indica-
tor Patterns

 

 

 

Peer Rorschach Determined Styles
Determined

Styles Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive Total
Obsessive 3 7 3 2 15
Paranoid 1 6 3 1 11
Hysteric 0 3 1 0 4
Impulsive 3 6 3 0 12
Total 15 ll 4 12 42

 

 

One additional analysis was attempted. A chi square
test of association was attempted to determine whether
there was a significant association between those ident-
ified as having a particular style and those who have
been found to be most characteristic of that style accord-
ing to the Rorschach. For example, since there were 15
obsessive compulsive, one would need to identify the 15
most obsessive people according to the Rorschach. For all
four styles this was not possible since the variability
of individual scores was not great enough (i.e. there were
too many people with the same scores) thus the appropriate
cut off points could not be adhered to. The analysis was

therefore not completed.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study clearly suggest that there
is no relationship between Rorschach variable patterns and
Shapiro's (1965) Neurotic Styles. In none of the within
group comparisons did those individuals identifed as hav—
ing a particular style produce a significantly higher mean
percent of the proposed Rorschach indicators associated
with that style than indicators of the remaining three
styles. Nor was it the case that between groups those
characterized by a particular style demonstrated a higher
mean percent of Rorschach indicators of that style than
the three other style groups.

Quite in contrast to predicted results each of the
four style groups showed the highest percentage of para-
noid Rorschach indicators and the lowest percentage of
impulsive indicators, with obsessive compulsive being
second and hysteric ranking third in all but one case
where the latter two were reversed. One possible explana-
tion of this is that several of the variables hypothesized
to be associated with both paranoid and obsessive com-
pulsive styles have experimentally been found also to be
related to intelligence level and achievement motivation.

Thus one might expect these variables to be more prevalent

58

59

in a college population, particularly among students seek-
ing out extra credit as was the case in the present study.
This appears to be supported by the data which shows a
significantly higher W%, M, Z, and number of content cat-
egories in this sample than in the Beck (1950) sample (see
Appendix B). All of these are scores empirically related
to intelligence.

Consequently, the applicability of the Beck means
to a college population was questioned. A reanalysis of
the data was therefore done using sample medians as points
of reference in place of the Beck means. This too pro-
duced no significant results supporting the hypotheses
(see Appendix F). However, as expected, the consistent
rank ordering of indicators across style groups found in
the original analysis disappeared.

An alternative hypothesis concerns sex differences.
Researchers in the field of cognitive styles have found
that men demonstrate more consistent stylistic differences
across tasks and over time than women do (Gardner, Jack-
son and Messick, 1960; Witkin, Lweis, Hertzman, Machover,
Meisner and Wapner, 1954). One might therefore speculate
that the inclusion of women in this investigation may
have obscured more clear-cut results. However, on inspec-
tion of the data, when sex differences are accounted for
no significant results in support of the hypotheses are
revealed (see Appendix E).

Before one can consider these results to be a

 

60

decisive refutation of the hypotheses several issues need
to be explored. It therefore seems appropriate at this
point to reexamine the theoretical constructs, their Oper-
ational definitions and the psychometric methods used to
measure them in an attempt to gain a better understanding
of the data.

This study suffers from a host of problems that is
inherent in exploring new theoretical ground. Unlike
other cognitive style classification systems which were
experimentally derived, the neurotic style categoriza-
tions were formulated largely on the basis of clinical
observation and experience. The theory consequently
neither provides a precise delineation nor an opera—
tional definition of the theoretical constructs. The
Neurotic Styles Peer Rating Form represents an initial and
admittedly unsophisticated attempt at such an operational
definition. While possessing face validity, it is ques-
tionable whether this form effectively groups people into
the categories described by Shapiro (1965). It is quite
conceivable that those characteristics which are most
central in identifying a particular style i.e. cognitive
structuring and thought processes, were not the ones most
salient to the peer raters, since 1) cognitive processes
are, of all characteristics, least accessible to observa-
tion and 2) one might hypothesize that interpersonal char-
acteristics were most salient for the peer raters because

this is the sphere in which they most directly function

61

with the subject. The need for a more precise delineation
of the theoretical constructs and a valid and reliable
way of measuring them is evident.

Let us now turn our attention to the theory of neur-
otic styles itself and its implications for use of the
Rorschach. Shapiro states that the styles he describes do
not in reality exist in the pure form in which they are
presented. Rather there is a great deal of overlap, with
individuals demonstrating a predominant style, but also
showing elements of other styles. Although not directly
stated by Shapiro, one might imply from the theory that
a style exists in its purest form in the neurotic state
implying a certain rigidity of functioning. Furthermore
as one moves along the continuum to more "normal function-
ing" one might expect greater accessibility to alterna-
tive ways of responding to the world and therefore greater
overlap in styles. In their most extreme forms the over-
lap between paranoids and obsessives and between hysterics
and impulsives theoretically is considerable. Thus when
dealing with the "normal"population, the need for an in-
strument which has the capacity to make such fine discrim-
inations is essential.

One might question whether the Rorschach possesses
this sensitivity. On the basis of the reliability data
one might conclude that the Rorschach is clearly ineffec-
tive in differentiating individuals according to neurotic

style. Data shows that raters identically categorized

62

subjects in only three out of six cases used for reliabil-
ity testing, thus only slightly above the level of chance
despite the fact that scoring reliability on all but two
of the individual Rorschach variables was significant.
Furthermore inspection of the data indicates that miscal—
culation was not a function of the two unreliably scored
variables. With reliability on individual variables so
high and reliability in classification so low one might
certainly be skeptical of the utility of the Rorschach.

An alternative conclusion is that it is not the Ror-
schach per se but the sign approach to the Rorschach used
in this study which might account for the poor classifica-
tion reliability.

A number of authors have addressed themselves to the
problems of the sign approach in differentiating groups of
subjects (Goldfried, Stricker and Weiner, 1971; Weiner,
1977; Zubin, Eron and Schumer, 1965). One of the major
criticisms is that it fails to capture the essence of the
Rorschach technique. The Rorschach represents a holistic
approach to personality assessment. Its interpretation is
not simply made by using a set series of interpretations
for a particular pattern but reflects the skill, talents
and sensitivities of the interpreter.

. . . most clinicians base their interpretations

on a series of implicit and sometimes explicit

"hypotheses" as to the meaning of a particular re-

sponse, score, group of scores, configuration of

scores, or the quality of a particular record--

sometimes weighting one or the other of these in
accordance with the "flavor" of the whole record,

 

63

or the intensity or "vividness" of the ratio, re—
sponse, score involved (Zubin et al., 1965; p. 195).

Clearly the sign approach fails to account for these
factors.

Weiner (1977) however does not suggest abandoning
the sign approach since some attempts at using it have
been quite successful (Goldreid, Stricker and Weiner,
1971). He does however reiterate the need for more meth-
odological sound research design, which most importantly
includes 1) the validation of signs, 2) the use of repre-
sentative criterion groups and 3) the use of homogeneous
diagnostic categories. The small number of subjects per
group particularly in the hysterical group which contained
only four subjects, the considerable overlap in Rorschach
indicators ("signs") between styles, the use of mean per-
cents rather than absolute numbers of indicators and the
implicit assumption that all indicators are of the same
weighting are all methodological flaws of the current in-
vestigation which must be corrected for in future research.

Perhaps even more essential however is the need for
validation of the signs. The signs used in the present
study were based on assumptions rather than on experimental
validation. Thus these assumptions were in themselves
speculative and therefore quite possibly incorrect. The
data in fact indicates that many of the hypothesized indi-
vidual signs were not characteristic of the predicted

style group. The obsessive compulsive group exhibited

 

 

64

only six of the sixteen predicted signs, the paranoids
showing nine of the hypothesized fourteen, the hysterics
six of fifteen and the impulsives four of fifteen. Whether
this is a result of misclassification of subjects, a non-
representative sample, the small number of subjects per
group or in fact incorrect hypotheses will need to be de-

termined by future research.

Directions for Future Research

 

The preceding discussion has included several sug-
gestions for further research. The need for a clearer
articulation of the concept of neurotic styles, for the
development of a reliable and valid measure of these
styles, and for the validation of Rorschach signs indica—
tive of them are clearly in evidence.

However this study also possesses implications for
Rorschach research apart from its use as a tool for the
investigation of neurotic styles. Quite obviously there
is a need for more normative Rorschach studies if it is
used effectively in either a clinical or research setting.
As it applies to research this seems to be particularly
important for a college population since this is a primary
source of subjects used in investigation. Without totally
abandoning the present approaches to Rorschach research it
also seems desirable to refocus some energies in further
objectifying the interpretive process. While one attempt

at this has been proposed by Zubin et al. (1965), its

65

utility has not yet been investigated.

The study of neurotic styles also provides an oppor-
tunity to look at the way in which adaptive modes of func-
tioning relate to psychOpathology. One might be able to
determine which characteristics transcend this boundary
and which distinguish normal from pathological states.

One might also investigate whether there are certain types
of environmental conditions which are more stressful for
individuals of one style more than for another which may
facilitate the development of preventive mental health
approaches.

A final important area of investigation would be a
more precise clarification of the process by which neur-
otic styles develop. There is some evidence to suggest
that there is a correlation between child temperament and
cognitive styles (Keagon, Rosman, Day, Albert and Phillips,
1964). More in depth study of the relationship of these

two variables seems appropriate and desirable.

S UMMARY

The present study was designed to assess the rela-
tionship between Shapiro's Neurotic Styles and Rorschach
variable patterns. The sample consisted of the 42 under-
graduate subjects, 18 male and 24 female whose two raters
on the Neurotic Style Peer Rating Form had agreed on neur-
otic style classification. The Rorschach was given to
each subject. A list of Rorschach variables, hypothesized
64 to be associated with each neurotic style as compiled.
For each subject four Rorschach scores were determined in-
dicating the percentage of obsessive compulsive, paranoid,
hysteric and impulsive indicators represented by his
record. Ninety-nine T-test analyses were then carried
out to test 1) whether subjects characterized by a partic-
ular style would demonstrate a higher percentage of indi-
cators for that style than for the three remaining styles
and 2) whether those demonstrating a particular style
would show a higher percentage of indicators for that
style than indicators for each of the other styles.

These hypotheses were not supported by the data.

66

APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

BEHAVIORAL STYLE RATING FORM

APPENDIX A

BEHAVIORAL STYLE RATING FORM

Instructions:

The following pages contain a description of four
different styles of human behavior. In the space pro-
vided on the last page of this form please rank order
these four styles according to how similar each descrip-
tion is to the person who has asked you to fill out this
form. Thus write 1 next to the style he is most like,

2 next to the style he is next most like, 3 to the next,
and 4 next to the one he is least like. PIease be sure
to read through all four descriptions before beginning
the ranking.

When finished please check to see that there is a
number in front of each style and that no number has been
repeated.

67

68

Style A

A person representing this style has very good pow-
ers of attention and concentration. She/he is particu—
larly observant and seems to have a talent and a need for
integrating all available information to gain an overall
perspective of things. Often this results in a perceptive
and accurate evaluation of a situation. However, this
individual also has a tendency to have rather strong pre—
conceived ideas and this sometimes results in a somewhat
biased interpretation of the facts.

This seems to be particularly true in her/his rela—
tionships with people. She/he is especially sensitive to
criticism by those in positions of authority. She/he
may misinterpret rules, requests or demands made by a
teacher, boss or parent as a criticism, reacting either
with arrogance and superiority, or with apprehension.

Thus she/he sometimes tends to be suspicious of others

and at times questions their motives. This oversensitivity
sometimes results in her/his remaining distant from people,
being cautious and not feeling comfortable enough to re-
lax and be spontaneous. In general, it enables her/him

to be sensitive and empathic with others, allowing her/
him to form relationships in which she/he perceptively
takes into account the feelings of other people.

In addition this individual expends much energy an—
ticipating events and planning for them, trying to avoid
the unexpected. Thus he has only limited time to engage
in outside interests. She/he seems to be quite fascinated
with mechanical devices and with the available time pur—
sues hobbies related to this interest, finding little
satisfaction with more aesthetic endeavors such as art or
mu51c.

69

Style B

The person manifesting this style is almost always
engaged in pursuing some goal. She/he is a hard worker;
not easily distracted and has good capacity for long term
concentration. It is thus not surprising that this person
often performs quite well academically. She/he is partic-
ularly perceptive of the finer details of things and seems
to derive a great deal of satisfaction from technical
accomplishments.

When not actively engaged in pursuing her/his goals
she/he sometimes has difficulty relaxing and enjoying
her/himself, rarely doing things on impulse or simply for
fun. Instead she/he tends to be preoccupied with what
she/he should be doing to achieve her/his next goal.

In general, she/he tends to give a great deal of
thought to things before acting. While at times this
seems to facilitate well thought out solutions and good
judgment, at other times it results in a great deal of
difficulty making decisions. She/he tends to weigh all
the alternatives and often wavers back and forth between
choices as if there were an identifiable right and wrong
answer to everything. Once the decision is made, however,
she/he stands committed to it, avoiding any new informa-
tion which may shed doubt on its correctness. Thus in
discussions with others she/he sometimes appears dogmatic,
seeming to pay little attention to the arguments of others.

In general, this individual is more comfortable
dealing with matters concerning technical detail than
interpersonal contact. Upon meeting her/him she/he may
seem ill at ease until she/he has figured out what his
appropriate role for the situation is. Overall, she/he is
less emotionally expressive than others, appearing to
take an intellectual, rational approach to life.

70

Style C

The person exhibiting this style seems to have an
irrestible urge to act. She/he often does things on the
spur of the moment, without planning or consideration of
the consequences. When pressed about the reason for doing
something, she/he will often be unable to come up with an
adequate explanation or excuse; "I couldn't help it" or
"I just did it" being a common reply. Thus his judgment
is sometimes viewed as arbitrary or reckless and lacking
in reflection.

Despite this, she/he seems to be capable of accomp—
lishing his immediate goals and fulfilling her/his needs
with facility and speed. In general, she/he tends to
live for the present, having few long range plans or am-
bitions. Her/his interests seem Unchange frequently and
abruptly, showing no sustained commitment to any cultural,
political or aesthetic cause unless it in some way serves
her/his immediate needs.

In her/his relationships with others she/he is often
seen as a happy—go-lucky person; self-confident, uninhib—
ited and easy going. Socially she/he tends to be charming
and often times entertaining. However, she/he sometimes
has difficulty establishing deep commitments to any one
person. At times he/she uses his/her charm to manipulate
others for his/her own benefit with little consideration
for their feelings. Thus she/he tends to have a variaty
of acquaintances and only a few close friendships.

71

Style D

An individual showing this style tends to be spon-
taneous, speaking in a lively manner and responding to
those aspects of the environment that are most Vivid,
colorful and obvious. Often, however, she/he is unaware
of the more subtle aspects of things. When asked to de-
scribe a person or object she/he has seen, she/he is more
likely to answer with general impressions rather than with

detailed description: "The play was fantastic. I loved
it!" rather than "The play was about three men shipwrecked
on an island." When factual answers are required, she/he

may produce a correct answer but be totally unable to ex-
plain the process by which the answer was obtained. Thus
she/he often gives an impression of being flighty and
scattered although she/he may be quite competent.

In general, she/he is easily distractible and lacks
the concentration and attention necessary for academic
pursuits. Thus although she/he may possess more than
adequate intellectual potential, she/he lacks the intellec-
tual reflectiveness and perserverance necessary for sus—
tained intellecutal activity.

This individual prefers to get involved in tasks
and activities which require direct interaction with
others. Easily influenced by other people, she/he will
often get caught up in the newest fad or trend, showing
great enthusiasm for each new endeavor. Sentimental and
romantic, she/he is easily infatuated, falling in and out
of love frequently and has an optimistic attitude towards
life. Along with this optimistic enthusiasm are also
periods of emotional outburst. She/he her/himself is
often quite surprised at the intensity of these outbursts.
However, these periods pass quickly and are seen by her/him
as something that comes over her/him rather than a true
reflection of her/his feelings. She/he is thus surprised
when others take them seriously.

72

I HAVE FOUND THE FOLLOWING RANK ORDER TO BE MOST APPLICABLE:
1 INDICATING MOST LIKE, AND 4 LEAST LIKE:

Style A
Style B

Style C

Style D

If you have had any difficulty understanding the instruc—
tions or in understanding and ranking the styles, please
describe these difficulties in as much detail as possible.

Thank you for your cooperation.

 

APPENDIX B

RORSCHACH VARIABLES SAMPLE MEDIANS

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

 

 

73

APPENDIX B

RORSCHACH VARIABLES:SAMPLE MEDIANS

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

 

 

Variable Median Mean Standard Deviation
R 26.5 29.09 10.52
RT 21.05 21.82 10.77
W% 26.69 30.69 15.01
D% 63.17 63.07 13.02
Dd% - 4.18 5.36 6.65
M 5 00 6.01 3.33
Z 52.25 49.70 16.96
SumC 2 3.10 2.27
F% 49.24 52.52 13.54
F+% 72.50 68.11 11.47
V 2 1.75 1.60
Y 2.5 1.25 2 66
CONT 10 7.25 3.23
A% 41.5 58.35 15.60
P 5.5 4.5 1.83
S 2 1.25 2 21

H+Hd 6 3.00 4.63

 

 

 

APPENDIX C

T-TEST COMPARISONS OF BECK MEANS AND SAMPLE

MEANS FOR EACH RORSCHACH VARIABLE

 

 

74

APPENDIX C

T-TEST COMPARISONS OF BECK MEANS AND SAMPLE

MEANS FOR EACH RORSCHACH VARIABLE

 

 

Variable Beck Mean Sample Mean t p*
R 32.65 29.09 2.20 .05
RT 23.36 21.82 .93 ns
W% 19.81 30.69 4.69 .001
D% 71.94 63.07 4.35 .001
Dd% 8.23 5.36 2.78 .01
M 3.50 6.01 4.92 .001
Z 22.48 49.70 10.39 .001
SUM C 3.11 3.10 .03 ns
F% 70.17 52.52 8.44 .001
F+% 79.25 68.11 6.29 .001
V 1.84 1.95 .44 ns
Y 1.96 3.48 3.71 .001
CONTENT 6.60 9.90 6.60 .001
A% 46.45 46.09 .15 ns
P 6.79 5.38 5.03 .001
S 1.90 2.98 3.18 .01
H+Hd 5.80 6.88 1.50 ns

 

APPENDIX D

RORSCHACH VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

FOR EACH NEUROTIC STYLE

 

75

APPENDIX D

RORSCHACH VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

FOR EACH NEUROTIC STYLE

 

 

Variable Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
R

Mean 31.33 30.00 19.00 28.83

S.D. 11.62 5.76 3.46 12.76
RT

Mean 21.76 18.73 27.13 22.52

S.D. 13.08 7.43 12.82 9.95
W%

Mean 30.74 26.77 40.77 30.67

S.D. 20.57 9.57 4.51 12.63
D%

Mean 63.42 66.76 58.10 60.31

S.D. 16.57 9.28 6.30 13.50
Dd%

Mean 5.84 6.19 1.14 5.67

S.D. 8 55 5.72 2.28 5 74
M

Mean 6.07 4.55 3 25 6 83

S.D 2 49 2.94 2 63 4 30
Z

Mean 54.23 45.36 40.50 47.96

S.D. 15.80 17.30 13.29 18.86
Sum C

Mean 3.90 2.41 1.63 3.00

S.D. 2.59 1.99 .25 2.25
F%

Mean 48.34 60.43 52.27 51.17

S.D. 8.40 15.27 15.91 14.95
F+%

Mean 69.47 67.06 70.28 65.81

S.D. 8.79 16.37 5.41 8.37

76

 

 

Variable Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
V

MEAN 2.00 1.55 1.75 2.25

S.D. 1.59 1.44 2.22 1.71
Y

MEAN 4.87 2.82 1.25 3.25

S.D. 3.00 2.14 .96 2.45
CONTENT

MEAN 11.07 9.45 7.25 9.67

S.D. 3.67 3.30 1.26 2.61
A%

MEAN 41.67 49.03 58.35 44.85

S.D. 12.93 14.56 17.95 17.97
P

MEAN 5.73 5.18 4.50 5.33

S.D. 1.53 1.66 1.00 2.50
S

MEAN 2.73 3.36 1.25 3.42

S.D. 2.25 2.30 .50 2.27
H+Hd

MEAN 6.33 6.27 3.00 7.25

S.D. 3.22 4.24 2.71 6.42

 

 

 

APPENDIX E

MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH

NEUROTIC STYLE FOR MALES AND FEMALES

 

 

77

APPENDIX E

MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH

NEUROTIC STYLE FOR MALES (N = 18)

 

 

 

Rorschach Indicators
Style
Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
Obsessive 43.75 53.41 56.67 36.67
Paranoid 53.37 58.17 45.11 41.31
Hysteric 40.62 60.71 53.33 38.96
Impulsive 46.25 54.29 47.58 39.58

 

 

 

MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH

NEUROTIC STYLE FOR FEMALES (N = 24)

 

 

 

Style Rorschach Indicators

Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
Obsessive 53.41 53.25 43.03 39.81
Paranoid 50.00 50.00 42.29 43.33
Hysteric 53.13 57.14 46.67 42.29
Impulsive 52.68 61.23 51.43 32.28

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX F

MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH
NEUROTIC STYLE USING SAMPLE MEDIANS

AS POINTS OF REFERENCE

 

 

 

 

78

APPENDIX F

MEANS OF RORSCHACH STYLE INDICATORS FOR EACH

NEUROTIC STYLE USING SAMPLE MEDIANS

AS POINTS OF REFERENCE

 

 

 

Style Rorschach Indicators

Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
Obsessive 53.75 49.05 47.56 48.75
Paranoid 55.11 50.91 43.26 47.69
Hysteric 40.63 57.14 55.00 51.67
Impulsive 54.69 50.60 48.89 49.68

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX G

MEAN PERCENT OF RORSCHACH INDICATORS FOR

EACH STYLE USING BECK MEANS

79

APPENDIX G

MEAN PERCENT OF RORSCHACH INDICATORS FOR

EACH STYLE USING BECK MEANS

 

 

 

 

Style Rorschach Indicators

Obsessive Paranoid Hysteric Impulsive
Obsessive 50.83 53.81 46.67 38.97
Paranoid 52.27 55.20 44.09 42.05
Hysteric 46.88 58.93 50.00 40.63
Impulsive 50.00 58.33 49.82 35.38

 

 

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