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*SHAME AND GUILT:
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ABSTRACT

SHAME AND GUILT: ACTIVATORS, ASSOCIATED UNCONSCIOUS DANGERS, AND DEFENSES

By

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The present research investigated the relationships between proneness to shame or guilt and a number of variables hypothesized to be related to these phenomena. A single shame score and a single guilt score was obtained for each participant by standardizing and then summing the relevant measures from the following group: The Korpi Shame-Guilt Scales, the Cattell Embarrassing Circumstances Test, the Revised Stanford Shyness Survey, and the Mosher Forced Choice Guilt Scales. The relationships between these composite scores and: (a) the scores on the subscales of the Interpersonal Dependency Inventory, and (b) the prevalence of a variety of themes produced in TAT stories, were then examined.

The results were mixed, although a number of interesting findings did emerge. First, as predicted, shame-proneness correlated positively with dependency, as well as with the prevalence of TAT "Rejection" themes. These findings supported the notion that the experience of shame is initially associated with an event through an experience of rejection, and that, as a consequence, rejection becomes an unconscious danger associated with a shame-inducing event.

Secondly, several findings converged to provide support for the Kaufman/Tomkins model in which shame is a unitary state with a single affect underlying its variations, and guilt refers to a group of affective states--shame among them--with moral transgression as the activator unifying the category. This was in contrast to the Lewis model in which shame and guilt are seen as different, but parallel, unitary processes, each associated with opposite ends of a continuum of psychological differentiation.

A third finding stemmed from an analysis of the items of the Korpi Shame Subscale, and suggested that shame activators can be meaningfully organized into groups of such activators to which individuals are differentially sensitive.

Finally, though short of significance, sex differences emerged in proneness to shame and to guilt. In contrast to most previous research, males were found to be more shame-prone, and females, more guilt-prone.

To Dori:
For her help when I asked for it
For her emotional support when I needed it
For her patience when I shouldn't have expected it
And for her love always.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Guilt	Composite Guilt Measure
Shame	Composite Shame Measure
KG	Korpi Guilt Subscale
KS	Korpi Shame Subscale
Task Competence (TC)	Shame Subscale--Task Competence
Social Incongruity (SI)	Shame Subscale--Social Incongruence
Body (B)	Shame Subscale--Body
Relationship (R)	Shame Subscale--Relationships
Feelings (F)	Shame Subscale--Feelings
EMB	Susceptibility to Embarrassment Scale
SHY	Revised Stanford Shyness Survey
MSG	Mosher Sex-Guilt Subscale
MHG	Mosher Hostility-Guilt Subscale
MMCG	Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt Subscale
IEMREL	Emotional Reliance on Others Subscale
ILSOCO	Lack of Social Self-Confidence Subscale
IAUT	Assertion of Autonomy Subscale
TAT	Thematic Apperception Test
Exposure of Inadequacy (TAT1a)	TAT theme involving exposure of inadequacy
Moral Transgression (TAT1b)	TAT theme involving moral transgression

Rejection/Abandonment (TAT2a)
 TAT theme involving rejection or abandonment

 Punishment (TAT2b)
 TAT theme involving punishment

 Exposure Reduction (TAT3a)
 TAT theme involving reduction of exposure

 Punishment-Atonement (TAT3b1)
 TAT theme involving punishment for wrongdoing

 Compensation-Atonement (TAT3b2)
 TAT theme involving amends made for wrongdoing

 Total Atonement (TAT3b1 + TAT3b2)
 TAT theme involving punishment or amends made for wrongdoing

 Independence (TAT4a1)
 TAT theme involving independence, power or competence

 Positive Evaluation (TAT4a2)
 TAT theme involving positive evaluation or attractiveness

 Total Nonrejection (TAT4a1 + TAT4a2)
 TAT theme involving independence or positive evaluation

 Evil-Projection (TAT4b1)
 TAT theme involving nonhero-originated hurtful acts

 Moral Goodness (TAT4b2)
 TAT theme involving morally good deeds by hero

 Total Moral Purity (TAT4b1 + TAT4b2)
 TAT theme involving Evil-Projection or Moral Goodness

Introduction

Francis Broucek recently wrote that "shame is to self psychology what anxiety is to ego psychology--the keystone affect" (Broucek, 1982, p. 369). Nevertheless, shame, described by Rycroft (1968) as the "Cinderella of the unpleasant emotions" (p. 152), has received relatively little attention in the literature and what has been written has failed to yield a consensus as to its nature.

The sociologist Helen Merrell Lynd (1958) attributed the neglect of shame to the lack of clarity about the meaning of the word, which she claimed is often used interchangeably with, or subsumed under the heading of, "guilt." According to Lynd, guilt is about a deed or a behavior whereas shame is about the self. Guilt is a response to moral transgression, the commission of a wrongful act; shame entails the exposure of a basic inadequacy of one's self. As a result of the neglect of this distinction in conjunction with the pervasive focus on guilt proper by writers since Freud, shame has been largely ignored.

Helen Block Lewis (1971) has written that the concern with guilt--to the neglect of shame--is a consequence of the disparate emphases placed on two of the mechanisms of identification, aggressive and anacletic. She cited three reasons for this (Lewis, 1979). The first deals with sex differences in superego development. Freud described superego development in terms of a male model. It is formed out of identification with the father, stemming from the internalized castration threat. Through this process, the parental threat becomes

attached to certain impulses which results in the experiencing of these impulses as wrong (i.e., guilt). However, Freud also described anacletic identifications which involve the threat of loss of parental love. The loss of parental love becomes loss of "self-love" via loss of esteem in the eyes of the parents. According to Lewis, both males and females develop anacletic identifications out of which shame arises, but:

because the anacletic identifications begin early in relation to mother and because males must renounce some of their feminine identifications (while females need not), androcentric thinking automatically assigned shame an inferior place to guilt in a hierarchy of controls. (Lewis, 1979, p. 379-380)

Lewis claimed that the second reason for the differential emphases on shame and guilt concerns the dominance of an individualistic view of human nature. She stated that:

Hartman's concept of an autonomous ego deepened psychology's commitment to an individualistic concept of human nature. The superego . . . is understood to function in the service of the developing autonomy of the ego, with guilt its prevailing mode. (p. 376)

The third reason concerns the distinction between the self and the ego. The ego has been described as an individual's on-going "motivational-cognitive structure built up around the self" (Chein, 1944, p. 314), while the self has been described as a content but not a constituent of the mental apparatus (Kohut, 1982). That is, the self is the mental representation that an individual has of himself or herself at a particular moment in time. The study of the self has taken a back seat to that of the ego and its negotiations with the instincts. Thus shame, the affective response to the experience of one's self as inadequate, has been neglected in favor of guilt, the response to one's giving in to "bad impulses."

Beyond these explanations, however, lies the question of motivation: What are the dynamics behind the great concern with guilt and the virtual neglect of shame? Guntrip (1969) wrote that we prefer to see people as "bad but strong" rather than "weak and afraid":

Historically in ideology and psychologically in the individual, the area of bad impulses, control, guilt and depression lay right across the path of psychodynamic investigation and blocked the way to deeper insight, as it was intended to do. (p. 138)

It is less disturbing to think of our pain as stemming from the possession of mighty animal instincts than from the fact that "deep within our makeup we retain a weak, fear-ridden infantile ego that we never completely outgrow" (p. 125). This notion bears directly on the question of why shame has been so neglected. We prefer to focus on guilt-producing conflicts stemming from the powerful forces within us, rather than on the shame-producing conflicts that stem from a fragile, needy self plagued with self-doubt and the fear of rejection and abandonment.

This research was originally intended to be a study of the experience of shame. It soon became clear, however, that any discussion of shame would necessitate a consideration of guilt as well. The project thus evolved into an investigation of both shame and guilt, with its primary focus being a side-by-side comparison of these two phenomena along a number of dimensions to be discussed below.

Shame and Guilt: A Comparison

A number of writers have compared shame and guilt (Alexander, 1938; Lewis, 1971; Piers & Singer, 1953; Wallace, 1963). Franz Alexander

(1938) pointed out the difference between guilt and what he referred to as "inferiority feelings"--which will be seen shortly to correspond quite closely to later descriptions of shame. He argued that while both inferiority feelings and guilt involve a tension between the ego and the ego ideal, they are "fundamentally different psychological phenomenon." The sense of guilt is always felt as an unpleasant tension stemming from the expectation of a deserved punishment. It is the "intrapsychic reduplication of the fear of an external danger, the fear of retaliation on the part of those persons whom one has attacked, is attacking or wants to attack" (p. 42), but who one believes does not deserve to be attacked. Thus a sense of justice must be present in order for there to be feelings of guilt.

The feeling of inferiority, on the other hand, requires no sense of justice. According to Alexander:

(the feeling is not so much not being good in a moral sense but being weak, inefficient, unable to accomplish something. In inferiority feelings it is not implied, as it is in guilt feelings, that the self-condemnation is the result of wrongdoing. (p. 44)

The deepest source of inferiority feelings is the early conflict between the wish to grow up and the regressive pull to passive dependency. The ego, which identifies itself with the independent attitude, reacts to intrusions of the wish to regress with feelings of inferiority. Thus for Alexander, "inferiority feelings are pre-social phenomena, whereas guilt feelings are results of social adjustment" (p. 47).

In a classic monograph on shame and guilt, Piers and Singer (1953) elaborated on the difference between these experiences. Their major distinctions can be restated in the following way. First of all, shame stems from tension between the ego and the ego ideal and so is a

response to a shortcoming--the failure to reach an ego ideal goal. Guilt is generated by tension between the ego and the superego; it occurs when a superego boundary is violated. Thus "guilt accompanies transgression; shame, failure" (p. 11). Secondly, the unconscious threat involved in shame is abandonment--the fear of expulsion or ostracism and its consequences for a dependent self. Behind the fear of shame is the fear of parental contempt and the consequent abandonment and death by emotional starvation. The unconscious threat involved in guilt, on the other hand, is mutilation or castration--the fear of active punishment by a superior. Piers and Singer also described what they called the "shame-guilt cycle." This refers to the situation where shame and guilt are alternately activated, creating a spiral of increasingly intense shame and guilt states.

Leon Wallace (1963) described both shame and guilt as defenses against the feeling of annihilation. However, whereas shame protects the individual from the loss of external narcissistic supplies (as discussed below), guilt protects against the loss of supplies from the superego. Shame, according to Wallace, precedes the development of the superego and thus also guilt. It is a more primitive mechanism whose activation decreases as superego introjections become more complete so that the source of narcissistic supplies is shifted inward.

In Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, Helen Block Lewis (1971) discussed the relationship between shame, guilt, identification, and the superego. She expanded on Freud's hypothesis that the development of the superego involves identification as a response to the oedipal conflict. According to Freud, by identifying with one's parents the child is able to resolve the conflict between the love for them and the fear of

castration by them in reprisal for sexual and aggressive wishes. Lewis described two mechanisms by which identification takes place. The first involves the "incorporation of the castration threat, so that the person experiences it 'from within'" (p. 20). This process is an attempt by the child to escape from the role of passive victim by "becoming" the aggressor. (It should be noted that "castration anxiety", while originally referring to the male fear of literally losing his penis, is today more generally interpreted metaphorically. That is, it is seen as referring to the fear of being harmed and thus losing one's power--originally thought of as a masculine trait. Despite its original meaning, as well as its sexist implications, it is now generally seen as a concept relevant to both men and women.) In this way, the threat from the parent attaches itself to particular impulses and these impulses are then labeled as "wrong." This is the experience of guilt. The second mechanism of identification is the "emulation of an admired or beloved parental figure" (p. 21). It involves the "incorporation of an ego ideal: an admired imago who serves as a positive model for the child's activities" (p. 21). This identification process is an attempt by the child to live up to this internalized, admired imago and so avoid the loss of parental love. Loss of parental love becomes loss of self-love via loss of esteem in the eyes of the parents. This is the experience of shame. Thus shame and guilt are seen by Lewis as different but equally advanced superego functions developed along different routes of identification. Both shame and guilt are superego states which, though they differ in their phenomenology, have a common source in internalized aggression.

Lewis explored further the relationship between shame and guilt by looking at individuals differing in "psychological differentiation" (i.e., "field-dependence" versus "field-independence"). The differentiation construct, a construct that encompasses a wide range of differences in personal style, successfully predicted that proneness to shame or guilt would be related to other personality characteristics. Field-dependent persons have a perceptual and cognitive style that can be described as less differentiated than field independent-persons. They tend, for example, to find it more difficult to perceive an item as separate from an imbedding context, are more likely to produce human figure drawings that lack articulation and differentiation of body parts, and are more influenced in their judgments by the opinions of others (Lewis, 1971; Witkin, 1950; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968). Lewis found that the experience of shame occurs within a self-organization pattern of field-dependence and porous self-boundaries suggesting a self that is inadequately differentiated from the environment. The self-organization associated with guilt, on the other hand, involves field-independence and solid self-boundaries (Lewis, 1971; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968). These findings appear to be consistent with Wallace's notion that individuals experiencing shame attribute self-esteem regulating capacities to the environment while those experiencing guilt attribute it to themselves (superego).

Shame and the Instincts

A number of psychoanalytic writers have described shame as a force that serves to counter the instinctual drives (Fenichel, 1937; Freud,

1905/1962, 1914/1963, 1924/1963; Jacobson, 1964; Levin, 1967; Mayman, 1967; Wurmser, 1981). Freud (1905/1962), in discussing the sexual instincts, wrote that there is an aptitude for polymorphously perverse sexuality in all of us. However, this sexual instinct has to "struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances" (p. 28). These, he wrote, are shame, disgust, and morality. Freud argued further that while the inhibition of instinctual drives is largely learned, the learning process is built on certain constitutional inhibitory forces that develop as the child matures. In 1914 Freud elaborated on the function of shame, writing that it serves to insure narcissistic satisfaction by seeing to it that the ego measures up to the ego ideal. In 1924 Freud wrote that shame acts as a signal to redirect and limit the expression of sexual energy to avoid rejection.

Fenichel (1945) described shame as arising from early punishment experiences in response to loss of or lack of bladder control. Shame thus becomes the "specific force directed against urethral-erotic temptations" (p. 69)--the two-fold pleasures of phallic-sadistic intrusion and the passive foregoing of control. Fenichel also described shame as a motive for defense directed primarily against exhibitionism and scopophilia. He quoted Freud in stating that:

"I feel ashamed" means "I do not want to be seen." Therefore persons who feel ashamed hide themselves or at least avert their faces. However, they also close their eyes and refuse to look. This is a kind of magical gesture arising from the magical belief that anyone who does not look cannot be looked at. (cited in Fenichel, 1945, p. 139)

Although not explicitly stated by Fenichel, the aversion to being seen presumably stems from prior "shaming" parental reactions to the child's lack of bladder control.

According to Jacobson (1964), shame is an early reaction formation to pregenital strivings, especially those that are anal and exhibitionistic. It is originally provoked when one's "loss of instinctual control, physical defects and failures are exposed to others" (p. 43-44). Normally, shame reactions become early manifestations of an internalized conflict and thus may appear whenever we become aware of something that others have labeled disgraceful after our internalization of that judgment.

⑨ Sidney Levin (1967) highlighted the adaptive role of shame, referring to it as a "basic component of the normal homeostatic mechanisms regulating the sexual drive" (p. 270). The pleasantness or unpleasantness of the affective response to sexual stimuli inform the individual as to whether the stimulus will be satisfying or dangerous. According to Levin, shame is one of the affects that directs the sexual drive away from danger. The importance of shame thus lies in its protection of the individual from "the trauma of overexposure to others and ultimately from the trauma of rejection" (p. 268).

Martin Mayman (1974) described shame as a reaction formation against phallic impulses--specifically excitation. He stated that all shame-prone people experience a heightened sense of audience that always makes them feel on display. Behind this

anguished self-consciousness lie repressed memories of the giddy experiences of libidinal arousal which stem from (these phallic sources) . . . each with its own distinctive consequences for character development. (p. 58)

At the core of phallic-exhibitionism is a sense of:

potency and magnetism of one's innate capacity to please that person to whom one is most drawn. . . . (However), at its height, this wish to show oneself off in all one's glory becomes its own undoing. With the impulse to show oneself

off, there may come a searing sense of one's ludicrous insufficiency . . . leading to fears not only that what he exposes will be laughed at, but that what he does with his inadequate equipment will fall pathetically short of the height to which he aspires. (p. 58-59)

Behind the fear of phallic-urethral excitation lies the fear of loss of control:

a fear which, most often in women, equates sexual discharge with the humiliating loss of bowel or bladder control, and which in both men and women looks upon spontaneous discharge of feelings as if it were an emotional incontinence as impermissible as sphincter incontinence. (p.59)

According to Mayman, the shame personality "is at heart a ham, eager to show himself off before others . . . yet he trips over an intrapsychic warning not to expose himself unabashedly" (p. 59). Such phallic-libidinal impulses have "long since given way to reaction formation" (p. 59-60).

More recently Leon Wurmser (1981) has pursued Fenichel's notion of shame as a motive for defense against scopophilia and exhibitionism. He described scopophilia and exhibitionism as narrower versions of what he termed, respectfully, theatophilia and delophilia. Theatophilia is defined as "the desire to watch or observe, to admire and be fascinated, to merge and master through attentive looking, operating as a basic inborn drive from earliest infancy" (p. 158). Delophilia is "the desire to express oneself and to fascinate others by one's self-exposure, to show and to impress, to merge with the other through communication" (p. 158). The primary conflict involved in theatophilia is one's desire to exert power and control over the object despite its efforts to overpower and control oneself. The primary conflict involved in delophilia is the desire to love and be loved, to merge with the other in the face of its cold disregard or its absence. According to Wurmser,

whenever the demand for power or love is thwarted, shame anxiety--the specific form of anxiety evoked by the imminent danger of shame--arises, which leads, in turn, to the reaction formations of hiding and the refusal to look.

Shame, Ego Functioning, and the Self

Shame has also been discussed in terms of its relationship to ego functioning and the self (Broucek, 1982; Erikson, 1950, 1959; Grinker, 1955; Kaufman, 1980; Kinston, 1983; Lewis, 1971; Lichtenstein, 1963; Lynd, 1958; Tomkins, 1963; Wallace, 1963; Wurmser, 1981). Erikson (1950, 1959) described eight psychosocial stages of the life cycle. Each stage consists of a primary crisis, the resolution of which provides the ego development necessary for facing the crisis that emerges as the next stage unfolds. The crisis facing the child in the second stage, roughly the second year of life, is the problem of autonomy versus shame and doubt. According to Erikson (1959):

The overall significance of this stage lies in the maturation of the muscle system, the consequent ability (and doubly felt inability) to coordinate a number of highly conflicting action patterns such as "holding on" and "letting go", and the enormous value with which the still highly dependent child begins to endow his autonomous will. (p. 68)

This stage becomes a battle for autonomy, and the anal zone, the arena in which the conflict between two contradictory desires is expressed. The role that the parents play in helping the child to acquire the control involved in this process is an important one:

Denied the gradual and well-guided experience of the autonomy of free choice . . . the sensitive child may turn against himself all the urge to discriminate and to manipulate. . . . He will develop a precocious conscience that does not let him really get away with anything, and he goes through life habitually ashamed. (Erikson, 1959, p. 72)

From a sense of self-control comes a "lasting sense of autonomy and pride; from a sense of muscular and anal impotence, of loss of self-control, and of parental overcontrol comes a lasting sense of shame and doubt" (Erikson, 1950, p. 254). Thus for Erikson a sense of shame and doubt are products of an environment that failed to adequately support ego development at a time when the child was struggling to gain autonomy over his or her own bodily functions via holding and letting go of his or her feces.

Erikson described the experience of shame as involving the sense of exposure; the individual is self-conscious--conscious of being looked at. This is expressed in the impulse to "bury one's face." The shamed person would like to force the world to ignore his exposure, to "destroy the eyes of the world." Instead he must "wish for his own invisibility."

Grinker (1955) viewed shame as a response to a failure in realizing one's growth potential, that is, the capacity to develop newer organizations for the expression and satisfaction of primary desires. He wrote that:

man, more than any other animal, is excessively and for long periods of time dependent on parental figures. Because of excessive dependency or restrictions on growth or because of lack of sufficient stimulation or satisfaction, individual inertia against personal growth often increases. For one of such reasons the organism becomes fixed or held in a more or less dependent position and is not capable of utilizing its growth-potential. If it is able to develop to any degree, the inertia or longing for its previous dependent relationships make it vulnerable in times of stress or disappointment to regress to the old states of dependency. (p. 249)

Shame arises upon recognition of one's wish to regress to a more primitive psychic organization in conjunction with the belief that he or she "ought to" or is expected by others to have the capacity to deal with

the situation at hand in a more mature way than he or she wishes to do.

Helen Lynd (1958) listed four characteristics that she believed to be essential to the experience of shame: a sense of exposure, the element of unexpectedness, the feeling of inappropriateness, and confusion. Exposure refers to the exposure of "peculiarly sensitive, intimate, vulnerable aspects of the self" (p. 27). Unexpectedness is "astonishment at seeing different parts of ourselves . . . suddenly coming together . . . with aspects of the world we have not recognized" (p. 34). The feeling of inappropriateness stems from the awareness of a "discrepancy . . . between us and the social situation" (p. 35). Confusion is understood as a "loss of identity one thought one had" (p. 37). Thus Lynd concludes that "shame is an experience that affects and is affected by the whole self" (p. 49). Like most other writers in the area Lynd acknowledged the painful character of the experience of shame, but unlike others, she saw in the experience of shame the opportunity to realize one's uniqueness: "If experiences of shame can be fully faced, if we allow ourselves to realize their import, they can inform the self and become a revelation of oneself" (p. 71). She claimed that the transformation of the whole self brought about by such an experience could be described "in Plato's words, (as) a turning of the whole soul toward the light" (p. 51).

Tomkins (1963) also described shame as a central motive that stands close to the self. He wrote that this is because the self lives in the face, and in particular, in the eyes. "Shame turns the attention of the self and others away from other objects and to this most visible residence of the self, increases its visibility and thereby generates the torment of self-consciousness" (p. 133). Shame is an experience of

the self by the self. It is felt as a sickness within the self. In shame, one wishes to look and be looked at, but at the same time does not want to do so. It is primarily a response of facial communication reduction involving an ambivalent turning away of the eyes from the object and toward the self and the primary locus of the self, the face. Blushing is thus a consequence of, as well as a further cause for, heightened self-consciousness.

Wallace (1963) described shame as an inborn physiological response in service of the ego. It is involved in the effort to gain narcissistic (oral) supplies. Thus shame is a "defense against the feeling of annihilation that occurs if . . . (external) supplies are withdrawn" (p. 82). He regarded as inadequate Piers' notion that shame is the direct result of the tension between the ego and the ego ideal, claiming that this fails to take into account the element of the feeling of being looked at. According to Wallace, the fantasy of being looked at--albeit laughed at or despised--is an important element in the shame experience, but painful though the experience may be, it constitutes the fulfillment of a wish. Thus, he considered the feeling of being looked at as "an effort to receive narcissistic supplies (affection or approval) after the narcissistic loss involved in . . . failure" (p. 83). The feeling of being small and the desire to hide--further aspects of shame--constitute the fear of being abandoned and helpless. At the same time, it is a way of gaining the approval of the other via: (a) self-imposed punishment, and (b) a willingness to remain childlike. In short, shame, for Wallace, is related to the oral stage of psychosexual development. It is involved in seeking libidinal supplies from an external person so that:

the fantasy of being looked at in shame is primarily the fulfillment of a wish to be looked at and loved, along with the fear of abandonment; and secondarily, a self-imposed punishment and confession in the pursuit of external libidinal supplies. (p. 85)

Heinz Lichtenstein (1963) postulated that a person lives in a constant state of tension between identity maintenance and the temptation of what he termed "metamorphosis," the loss or abandoning of the human quality of identity. According to Lichtenstein, shame is a "sudden, unexpected break-through of yearnings to yield to the ever-present temptation to abandon human identity, i.e., to accept metamorphosis as an alternative" (p. 214). The physiological symptoms of blushing, warmth, etc., reflect the "powerful urge to yield to this temptation and indicate the lustful anticipation of the 'marvelous death' of one's identity" (p. 214). Instead of viewing shame as a tension between the ego and the ideal, as suggested by Piers, he claimed that it is the breakdown of the capacity for identity maintenance. A person who has exposed something of himself or herself for which rejection is feared yearns for a shortcut to a "reunion with the matrix" (p. 215).

Shame, according to Lewis (1971), "is about the self." It is a narcissistic reaction triggered by a deviation from the ego ideal. She cites R. D. Lang (1960) in stating that in shame there is an "implosion of the self." At the same time that the self attempts to disappear, it may be dealing with an excess of autonomic stimulation that is experienced as a flood of sensations. In shame the self is divided. It is simultaneously experiencing condemnation and acute self-awareness, which together make it difficult for the self to function effectively. The self feels overwhelmed and paralyzed by the hostility directed against

it:

The self feels small, helpless and childish. Hostility against the rejecting other is almost always evoked but this shame-based rage is readily turned back against the self, both because the self is in a passive position vis-a-vis the other and because the self values the other. (Lewis, 1971, p. 37)

In shame, unlike guilt, the content of consciousness is likely to be about the sense of identity. This automatically disturbs the "sense of identity that normally functions silently" (p. 65). In guilt, on the other hand, identity is not relevant. Thus the self functions more smoothly when feeling guilty than when feeling shamed.

Gershen Kaufman (1974a, 1974b, 1980) has written about the relationship between shame and the self. According to Kaufman, shame is originally induced interpersonally, when the interpersonal bridge with a significant other--typically a parent or parental figure--is broken by the other. He wrote that:

the interpersonal bridge is built upon certain expectations which we have come to accept and to depend on. . . . Shame is likely whenever our most basic expectations of a significant other are exposed as wrong. (Kaufman, 1980, p. 15)

Thus, for example, a child whose need for affection is responded to with anger, scorn, or neglect will convert the need to a bad feeling and so experience shame.

Although originally induced interpersonally, shame is later internalized and thus able to be activated by the self without an inducing external interpersonal event. Prior to internalization, shame is generated and then passes on; once it has been internalized, it becomes part of one's identity. It is no longer one affect among many. It becomes linked to drives, needs or other affects so that the awareness of these parts of one's self triggers a shame response. Shame that has been internalized produces a sense of one's self as defective. Exposure

of one's self becomes exposure of one's inherent defectiveness as a human being. Kaufman described a number of strategies that are then employed to protect the individual from the shame of exposure. These include: the interpersonal transfer of shame, rage, contempt, striving for power, striving for perfection, the transfer of blame, and internal withdrawal.

Internalization of shame can lead to what Kaufman called the "disowning of the self." The child learns to treat part of himself or herself in the same way that his or her parents do. The child attempts to maintain the interpersonal connection with the parents by splitting his or her self into a part that is "not-me" and a part that becomes the parents' ally. It is as if the child is saying, "Don't reject me; we'll all unite and reject that other bad self."

Wurmser (1981) also discussed the relationship between shame and the self. The threat in shame, he claimed, is contemptuous rejection and thus isolation. The basic fear is loss of love, a version of separation anxiety. Thus the fear, ultimately, is loss of self. While shame functions as a motive for defense, in content it is the pain of feeling unloved and unlovable. Centered around this feeling is the belief that one is weak, dirty, and defective. The individual is thus faced with the paradox that he or she desires attachment but must hide to avoid being rejected because of his or her repulsiveness.

Francis Broucek (1982) described shame as an important factor in the development of the self. The child is able to experience shame prior to the development of objective self-awareness, but with the advent of this new ability, which ordinarily occurs between 18 and 24 months of age, the shame experience acquires new meaning. There is a

"painful, heightened awareness of the self as an object of observation for others, with an attendant wish to withdraw or hide oneself" (p. 371). Thus abandonment and isolation anxieties associated with "large toxic doses" of shame may lead to clinging attachment behavior and so undermine the separation-individuation process. On the other hand, in "small doses" shame assists the individuation process because it involves awareness of one's separateness from the significant other. Moderate shame experiences may thus enhance self and object differentiation.

Broucek also looked at the role of shame in the development of narcissistic personality types. Shame disrupts the "silent automatic functioning of the self" so that shame is, for Broucek, the "basic form of unpleasure in disturbances of narcissism" (p. 376). The grandiose self, the pathologically exaggerated ideal self or ego ideal, is thought to be a compensatory formation which develops largely in response to primitive shame experiences. As the child acquires the capacity for objective self-awareness, the inevitable discrepancy between the grandiose self and objectively derived notions about the actual self gives rise to a shame crisis. The grandiose self is then either incorporated in the central sector of the personality which then refuses to recognize negative information about the "actual self" or else the central sector refuses recognition of the grandiose self leading to its dissociation. The first defensive maneuver leads to what Broucek referred to as the "Egotistical Type" and is the "type of narcissist who is unabashedly self-aggrandizing and . . . utterly shameless" (p. 376). The second defensive strategy leads to the "Dissociative Type." In these individuals the central sector of the personality recognizes the actual self

and disowns the grandiose self. The split-off grandiose self is then projected in the form of an idealized and omnipotent object. The central sector of the personality identifies with the depreciated actual self resulting in low self-esteem.

Warren Kinston (1983) has recently written that shame appears in the state of "self-narcissism" associated with the urge to move to "object-narcissism." He defined self-narcissism as any activity (mental or physical) which serves to "maintain a self-representation which is integrated, has continuity over time and can be given a positive (affective) value" (Kinston, 1980, p. 384). Object narcissism is defined as a defensive mode of object relating that isolates the "needy-dependent-emotional part of the person from potentially meaningful and gratifying relationships" (p. 384). Drawing from the work of Lichtenstein, Kinston writes that persons oscillate between individuation and self-assertion, on the one hand, and symbiosis encouraged by the parent, on the other. Shame is the signal, affective and cognitive, that the individual:

faced with painful self-awareness (similar to "identity" in Lichtenstein's terminology) and still with the capacity to relate meaningfully to another, wishes to abandon this and to adopt a state of mind which is . . . characterized by a denial of all that is human: need, dependency, conflicts, meaning, imperfection. (Kinston, 1983, p. 217)

Once the person has moved to object-narcissism the experience of shame recedes. Shame, he argued, is not experienced simply because of discrepancies between how one is and how one would like to be; nor is it "an unpleasurable experience associated with the maintenance of narcissistic equilibrium" (p. 224).

Shame and Affect Theory

A number of writers have described shame as a primary affect that can be experienced prior to the development of a sense of self (Broucek, 1982; Kaufman, 1980; Tomkins, 1963). Tomkins (1963) presented a general model of the human being in which the affects comprise a separate motivational system. He argued that the affect system is the primary motivational system and that the drive system is secondary because the drives require amplification from the affects. He conceived of affects as primarily facial expressions which, when fed back and transformed into conscious form, have characteristics that can be either punishing or rewarding. He identified seven primary affects--two positive and five negative. One of the negative primary affects he labeled "shame-humiliation." According to Tomkins' theory (1963), shame, shyness, and some experiences of guilt (Tomkins, personal communication, November 20, 1982) while experienced differently on a conscious level, are not distinguishable from each other at the level of affect; the affect of shame-humiliation is a component of all three of these. It arises in the wake of negatively attenuated positive affect. The general sources of shame are the barriers to objects of excitement or enjoyment which "reduce positive affect sufficiently to activate shame but not so completely that the original object is renounced" (p. 185). Thus shame is activated by the incomplete reduction of interest: for example, the sudden realization that a person one has greeted is a total stranger. Tomkins hypothesized that since an unanticipated friend-stranger differential can elicit shame, as soon as the infant is able to distinguish the face of the mother from the face of a stranger--approxi-

mately seven months old--the infant becomes vulnerable to shame.

"Henceforth," he writes, "shame is inevitable for any human being insofar as desire outruns fulfillment sufficiently to attenuate interest without destroying it" (p. 185).

Kaufman (1980), while writing about shame in terms of its relationship to the self, agreed with Tomkins' view that shame is a primary affect that is activated before the development of self. According to Kaufman, shame is a pre-verbal experience that is early on activated interpersonally. This affective response can then become attached to other affects, drives, or needs and may eventually be internalized and made a part of one's identity, but it is a primary affect. Thus there is a distinction between shame as one affect among several that is activated and then passes, and shame as an affect that becomes part of and thus poisons the self.

Broucek (1982) wrote that if shame arises from contact with strangers, as thought by Tomkins, then:

it seems likely that shame can also arise in the infant's contacts with the mother at those times when mother becomes a stranger to her infant. This happens when the infant is disappointed in his excited expectation that certain communicative and interactional behavior will be forthcoming in response to his communicative readiness. (p. 370)

Broucek suggested that, in addition to shame arising in interactions with strangers or the "strange mother," there are other situations that produce what appear to be shame reactions in infants. These situations are characterized by:

acute distress associated with the infant's inability to influence, predict or comprehend an event which the infant expected, on the basis of previous experiences, to be able to control or understand. (p. 370)

There is, wrote Broucek, an element of "cognitive shock" involved in the

release of shame--"whether it be the shock of the face of the stranger or the shock of failed efficacy expectations vis-a-vis the environment" (p. 370).

In contrast to the above affect theorists who describe shame as a primary affect, Leo Spiegel (1966) has posited a theory of affects in which shame is a "dampened" affect. According to Spiegel, desire, anxiety, longing, and pain are affects that correspond to absolutes--the absolute possession of a love object or the absolute loss of the object. However, we are often faced with situations that are less extreme; object possession and object loss are usually more or less partial. Partial object loss is also accompanied by painful affect, but it is an affect that is less painful than the anxiety and pain which are associated with absolute object loss. It is the "narcissistic affects of humiliation and shame", he suggests, "which represent dilution of the more powerful unpleasurable affects of anxiety and pain" (p. 84). The mechanism by which the person is able to attenuate the object loss (and thus the unpleasure of associated negative affect) arises via the introduction of the ego ideal into the mental apparatus. The ego ideal, which arises from the memory traces of the early coupling of efficacy in object attainment with gratification and inefficacy in object attainment with pain, serves to hold off the effect of external object loss from the ego for a period of time. Absolute loss is thus converted into diluted loss and the affect which results from this relative independence from the external object is no longer pain, but rather, humiliation. Shame, for Spiegel, is humiliation experienced when someone else looks on.

Shame: Discussion and Synthesis

There is considerable overlap among the various theories of shame. However there are a number of discrepancies as well. Some of these differences can be accounted for, in part, by the lack of clarity in the use of the term "shame." An important distinction that is generally overlooked is that between shame affect proper and shame anxiety. Shame anxiety is not the actual experience of this affect; rather, it is the cue that serves to help avoid a shame-inducing event or escape from shame that is already being experienced (Wurmser, 1981). It is likely that Freud, when referring to shame as "a signal that serves to redirect and limit the expression of sexual energy in order to avoid rejection" was describing shame anxiety and not shame proper. Thus, rather than shame itself being a reaction formation against instinctual drives (e.g., Jacobson, 1964), it may be that anxiety about shame gives rise to reaction formations. These then serve as a defense against the shame potentially triggered by responses to instinctual drives.

An apparent distinction between two shame experiences that may not really be separate phenomena is that between shame as an affect involving the self in relation to others, and what appears to be an earlier, more primitive version of this affect. This "primitive" shame is a primary affect that is released by the cognitive shock involved in an infant's "inability to influence, predict or comprehend an event which the infant expected, on the basis of previous experience, to be able to control or understand" (Broucek, 1982, p. 370). It results according to Tomkins (1962) from the incomplete reduction of positive affect so that excitement or enjoyment is reduced but the object of

excitement is not renounced. Shame as an interpersonal phenomenon has been described as the affective response to the breaking of the interpersonal bridge with and by a significant other (Kaufman, 1980) and as the loss of self-love resulting from the loss of esteem in the eyes of the parents (Lewis, 1971). The apparent gap between these shame experiences is bridged by the fact that both involve a violated expectation about the world that disrupts the "silent automatic functioning of the sense of self which is unself-conscious, that is, not aware of itself as an object of observation" (Broucek, 1982, p. 372). The "primitive" shame experience involves the violation of a more general expectation whereas the "interpersonal" shame experience has to do with violated interpersonal expectation. In either case, the individual is unreflectively depending on events to proceed in a way that will not disrupt his or her narcissistic expectations. Shame experiences jolt the individual out of what Winnicott (1963) referred to as "going-on-being." Broucek (1982) has written that shame is the basic form of unpleasure in disturbances of narcissism. This unpleasantness serves as a painful reminder of one's self as a separate, finite being in a world that cannot be trusted to support one's dependency, and gives rise to shame anxiety, the force behind the control of impulses that are potentially shame-inducing.

Shame has been discussed in connection with the displeasure associated with being looked at or caught looking at someone else (Fenichel, 1945; Kaufman, 1980; Wallace, 1963; Wurmser, 1981). Despite the pain associated with being looked at or being caught looking, behind this is a wish to look and be looked at. For Wurmser both of these wishes are part of the wish to merge with another. The wish to look

(scopophilia or theatophilia) is essentially the desire to merge by identifying with and becoming part of the other. The wish to be looked at (exhibitionism or delophilia) is the desire to merge by absorbing the other into one's self. But psychological merging leaves one vulnerable to shame because of the ease with which this "going-on-being" may be suddenly disrupted. Thus there arises shame anxiety over the possible shaming consequences of either form of merging. This leads, in turn, to the reaction formations of the avoidance of looking and the avoidance of being looked at.

In sum, it is thought that shame, more than any other affect, involves the self. Triggered initially by violated expectations of one's world, shame jolts the individual out of what Winnicott referred to as "going-on-being." It disrupts the silent automatic functioning in which there is no consciousness of oneself as a separate being, and in so doing assists in the development of a conscious sense of self. Shame is thus a painful reminder of the fact that despite one's regressive wishes to escape the solitude of identity, psychological merging will be supported conditionally, at best. Still, the wish to merge remains and so the avoidance of shame becomes a motive for the erection of defenses against vulnerability to shame. The wish to merge through the absorbing of the other--expressed as exhibitionism--and the wish to merge by becoming part of the other--expressed as scopophilia--are defended against through the reaction formations of hiding and the refusal to look. The avoidance of shame also becomes a motive for the hiding of parts of oneself that have come to be associated with rejection. Thus the exposure of inadequacies and the expression of feelings or needs which have been associated with rejection--either

active rejection, or the absence of a validating response, a reaction also experienced as rejection--are avoided in an effort to protect against the experience of shame.

Guilt

According to Freud (1930/1962), guilt, the price paid for civilization, is the feeling produced by the tension between the ego and the harsh superego. In an effort to retain the love of a person who one is dependent on for protection--especially from punishment--one's own aggression is internalized. That is, it is directed towards one's own ego. It is, in fact, taken over by a portion of the ego as a superego. It is now able to activate against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that it originally would have liked to turn against others. This tension is experienced as a need for punishment and, while initially is triggered only in response to actual transgressions, as the superego develops this phenomenon may take place in the absence of overt behavior; that is, guilt is now experienced in response to forbidden wishes or impulses as well as in response to forbidden behaviors.

Freud summarized the process as, first, the renunciation of instinct owing to fear of aggression by the external authority. This is followed by the erection of an internal authority, and renunciation of instinct owing to fear of it, at which point bad intentions are equated with bad actions, either of which produces a sense of guilt and a need for punishment. Thus:

A threatened external unhappiness--loss of love and punishment on the part of external authority--has been exchanged for a permanent internal unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt. (p. 75)

Alexander (1948/1963) also wrote that guilt feelings originate in the child-parent relationship: "if the child does something which has previously evoked parental disapproval and punishment he reacts to it with the fear of punishment" (p. 118). He atones by being punished and a good relationship with the parents is re-established. This sequence of events--misbehavior, anxiety, punishment and atonement, forgiveness--is repeated. The expectation of punishment leads to the need for punishment because only in this way can the anxiety caused by transgression be reduced. After parental attitudes have been incorporated in the conscience, the whole process is internalized. Thus, not only do acts which were once punished cause anxiety, but every impulse to commit such acts as well. This "fear of one's conscience," claimed Alexander, "is . . . the sense of guilt" (p. 118).

In a discussion of guilt and superego development, Fenichel (1945) wrote that an important step in maturation occurs when prohibitions set up by one's parents become effective in their absence. This internalization of the parents takes place through the introjection of proscriptions and prohibitions and marks the beginning of the formation of the superego. Fenichel referred to these introjects as "anti-instinctual forces" and wrote that they "have an instinctual character because they are derivatives of instincts" (p. 103). One's instinctual attitudes (typically of the child toward the parents) are "turned into forces hostile to the instincts. . . . Through the influence of the external world, instinctual impulses have been transformed into anti-instinctual impulses" (p. 103).

With the establishment of the superego, anxiety about external dangers--loss of love or castration--becomes secondary to guilt feelings

about inner dangers--the inner representation of loss of love or castration. The loss of the superego's protection or the inner punishment performed by the superego is felt as a painful decrease in self-esteem and, in extreme cases, as the feeling of annihilation. According to Fenichel, as long as this fear exists one feels the need to abolish it:

just as urgently as it feels an instinctual drive. . . . (The ego thus) develops a need for absolution. . . . The pain of punishment is accepted or even provoked in the hope that after the punishment the greater pain of guilt feelings will cease. (p. 105)

Erikson (1950) suggested that a "sense of guilt" is a possible outcome of an inadequate resolution of the developmental crisis facing a child of four or five years of age, that of initiative vs. guilt. The child, energized by the successful resolution of the crisis of autonomy vs. shame and doubt directs energy outward in the form of planning and attacking. "The danger of this stage," wrote Erikson, "is a sense of guilt over the goals contemplated and the acts initiated in one's exuberant enjoyment of new locomotor and mental power" (p. 255). He suggested that initiative brings with it "anticipatory rivalry" with better equipped elders who often possess that which one's initiative is directed toward. Infantile jealousy and rivalry "now come to a climax in a final contest for a favored position . . . (with) the usual failure lead(ing) to resignation, guilt and anxiety" (p. 256). This stage is, for Erikson, the point at which:

infantile sexuality and incest taboo, castration complex and superego all unite . . . to bring about that specifically human crisis during which the child must turn from an exclusive, pregenital attachment to his parents to the slow process of becoming a parent, a carrier of tradition. (p. 256)

As mentioned earlier, Piers and Singer (1953) echoed the notion voiced by Freud and Fenichel that guilt is generated by tension between the ego and the superego. For these writers guilt is the affect of the superego while shame is a more primitive phenomenon which arises prior to the development of the superego. Whereas Freud and Fenichel did not see the fear of loss of love and the fear of punishment as distinct from each other, for Piers and Singer they were not only distinct, but they provided an important way of distinguishing conceptually between guilt and shame. In guilt the unconscious threat is punishment by a superior; in shame it is abandonment and the consequent death by emotional starvation.

Lewis (1971) also described guilt as the internalization of the castration threat in an effort to protect oneself against the external threat. Like Piers and Singer, she drew a distinction between the fear of loss of love and the fear of punishment, with the former associated with shame, and the latter, with guilt. Her theory departed from that of Piers and Singer in its view of superego development. Whereas Piers and Singer saw the superego as the source of self-esteem and internal punishment only, both of which arise through the internalization of the castration threat, for Lewis the superego develops through two mechanisms of identification. The first, guilt, involves the incorporation of the castration threat in an effort to escape from the passive role of victim in the external world. The second, shame, involves the incorporation of the standards of an admired imago in an attempt to avoid the loss of parental love.

According to Tomkins (personal communication, November 20, 1982) guilt does not describe a unitary affective experience. Rather, it

refers to a group of affective inner states, all of which concern, or are activated by, moral infractions. Guilt comprises any of the following experiences: (a) shame about moral matters; (b) self-disgust, contempt against the self by the self, or what Tomkins called self-dissmell, all for moral infractions; (c) anger at the self for moral infractions; (d) distress at the self for moral infractions; (e) fear at the self for moral infractions; (f) any combination of these affects and judgements against the self by the self; or (g) any of these experienced as coming from an internalized "other" toward the self. The critical feature of guilt, he claimed, is the ethical judgment of immorality. The affects can be quite varied, producing a broad spectrum of inner states, all of which are usually referred to as "guilt." To Tomkins' list of guilt states Kaufman (1980) added "self-blame" for moral infraction.

It should be noted that it is primarily the phenomenon of guilt that sets apart the theories of Kaufman and Tomkins, on the one hand, and that of Lewis, on the other. While all three theorists have described shame as a single affective state, they differ on this issue in regard to guilt. First, Lewis described guilt as a unitary affective state, different from, but parallel to, the experience of shame. Kaufman and Tomkins, on the other hand, conceive of guilt as a group of affective states with moral wrongdoing serving as the trigger common to them all. Secondly, Lewis has claimed that proneness to guilt is associated with "field-independence" while shame-proneness is associated with "field-dependence"; thus shame and guilt are seen as different states. Kaufman and Tomkins, on the other hand, have described the two experiences as

overlapping. That is, it is thought that shame is often the affective component of the experience of guilt.

Previous Research

To date, though a moderate amount of research has been published which studies the experience of guilt (e.g., Galbraith & Mosher, 1970; Gambaro & Rabin, 1969; Janda & Magri, 1975; Mosher, 1966; Otterbacher & Munz, 1973; Persons, 1970), very little empirical work has dealt with shame (Pilkonis, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c; Zimbardo, 1977), or studied the two phenomenon in tandem (Perlman, 1958; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968). Much of what has been done are unpublished Doctoral dissertations and Master's theses (Binder, 1971; Crouppen, 1977; Glassman, 1975; D. Jones, 1981; J. Jones, 1980; Korpi, 1977; Negri, 1974, 1978; Smith, 1972; Weigel, 1975).

Mosher and his colleagues found that: guilt over hostility prevented the expression of verbal hostility in a verbal conditioning paradigm (Mosher, 1965); individuals predisposed to feeling guilty showed significant increases in guilt over hostility after being aggressive in a laboratory experiment (Okel & Mosher, 1966); inmate scores on a morality-guilt scale were correlated with a number of the subscales of the MMPI in a pattern that supported the notion that guilt acts as an inhibitor (Mosher & Oliver, 1968); higher sex-guilt was associated with attenuated sexual arousal and reduced enjoyment and increased frequencies and/or intensities of guilt, shame, distress, fear, surprise, disgust, anger, and contempt in response to erotic guided imagery (Mosher & White, 1980); and high hostility-guilt men increased in affective guilt following participation in an experimental

condition in which they unfairly distressed a stranger. The affective guilt of these same high hostility-guilt men declined after they submitted to a procedure involving self-punishment through painful electric shocks (Mosher, O'Grady & Katz, 1980).

Gambaro and Rabin (1969) found that low-guilt experiment participants exhibited significant decreases in diastolic blood pressure after committing an aggressive act toward someone who had just frustrated them, whereas high-guilt participants exhibited a nonsignificant increase under the same conditions.

Fehr and Stamps (1979) found scores on the Mosher sex-guilt, hostility-guilt, and morality-conscience-guilt scales to be positively correlated with measures of religiosity.

Zimbardo (1977) and Pilkonis (1977a, 1977b, 1977c) have investigated a trait that is closely related to shame--that of shyness. Shyness might be thought of as an interpersonal style that evolves so that the individual can avoid the exposure of self associated with shame. Pilkonis used a revised version of the Stanford Shyness Scale developed by Zimbardo and found that participants who described themselves as "shy persons" had lower scores on a measure of extroversion, and higher scores on measures of neuroticism, self-monitoring, self-consciousness and social anxiety (Pilkonis, 1977b). He also found that self-described shy persons were less likely than non-shy persons to initiate and structure conversations, and that there were sex differences in the manner in which shyness was expressed. During interactions with a confederate, shy males became more withdrawn and avoidant, while shy females made more efforts to be pleasing, showing increased head nodding and smiling.

Perlman devised an objective measure of proneness to shame- or guilt-anxiety (Attitude Anxiety Survey) in order to look at differences between guilt-prone and shame-prone individuals. His findings suggested that the central problem for guilt-prone persons had to do with the struggle for control over aggressive impulses whereas the central problem for shame-prone persons appeared to relate to questions about adequacy.

As mentioned earlier, Witkin, Lewis and Weil (1968) coded transcripts of therapy tapes according to the prevalence of shame- or guilt-related themes. Patients who had been found to be field-independent were more prone to feelings of guilt, while those who were field-dependent were more prone to feelings of shame.

Binder, in a dissertation at the University of Michigan (Binder, 1971) also looked at differences between shame-prone and guilt-prone individuals. None of his hypothesized differences in character style were supported. He did find, however, that women tended to be more shame-prone, while men tended to be more guilt-prone.

A dissertation by Robert Smith (1972) used a modified version of the Beall Shame-Guilt Test (Beall, 1972) and found that: (a) shame-prone individuals tend to be more intro-punitive than guilt-prone individuals, while guilt-prone individuals tend to be more extra-punitive than shame-prone individuals; (b) shame-prone individuals tend to be more depressed than guilt-prone individuals; and (c) shame-prone, depressed individuals tend to have a passive-aggressive-hysterical character structure, and guilt-prone, depressed individuals tend to have an obsessive-compulsive-paranoid character structure.

The results of a dissertation by Glassman (1975) led him to conclude that shame feeling states can be more adequately understood in terms of "the development and vicissitudes of the self and its strivings for autonomy than in terms of object-instinctual or narcissistic conflicts." He found that the participants experienced themselves as devalued when ashamed. Prior to the experience of shame they felt themselves as somehow different from others; this was accompanied by a sense of separateness and loneliness, at which point they felt they were different, but not devalued, in relation to others. By devaluing themselves, the participants were able to establish a type of bond with others while they were ashamed which relieved their sense of isolation at the expense of denying or obscuring ways in which they were different.

In a dissertation at Michigan State University, Weigel (1975) used the Cattell Susceptibility to Embarrassment Test to measure proneness to shame and found that: (a) women are more prone to shame than men, and (b) the threat of loss of the father's relationship via love withdrawal appears to have a negative impact on the development of guilt feelings in middle class boys.

In a dissertation by Crouppen (1977), visual field orientation was found to be a valid indicator of whether participants were more prone to experiencing shame or guilt, with field-dependence predicting shame-proneness and field-independence predicting guilt-proneness.

A dissertation by Korpi (1977) using a different modification of the Beall Shame-Guilt Test than that used by Smith (1972) failed to support hypothesized relationships between proneness to guilt or shame and political ideology.

In his Master's thesis at Michigan State University, Negri (1974) found that individuals could be classified into a group of those who were more likely to create TAT stories with references to shame themes, and a group of those who were more likely to produce stories with references to guilt themes. Negri also studied shame and guilt in his dissertation (1978) and found that contrary to his predictions: proneness to both shame and guilt, as measured by the Attitude Anxiety Survey developed by Perlman, were positively associated with a sensitization (as opposed to repression) style of defense, as well as with a field-independent perceptual style. Another unexpected finding was that femininity was positively associated with guilt, and masculinity, with shame.

The results of a dissertation by Jeanne Jones (1980) suggested that there is a systematic relationship between mother and daughter shame-basedness. Mothers and daughters who scored high on the shame scale of the Smith Shame-Guilt Test were found to make fewer positive statements and more negative statements about themselves than mother/daughter pairs who scored low on this same test of shame-proneness.

A related dissertation conducted by Dick Jones (1981) investigating the relationship between nonverbal interaction patterns between mothers and daughters and proneness to shame (as measured by the Smith Shame-Guilt Test), found that high-shame mother/daughter pairs made fewer gesticulations than low-shame pairs, and that they oriented their heads more directly in line with each other.

Hypotheses

Shame and guilt appear to be distinct phenomena, each of importance both theoretically as well as clinically and thus the neglect of their empirical study is in need of change. This research was an attempt to study these two frequently confused phenomena by looking at a number of dimensions of these experiences. Of particular interest was the activator of each, the unconscious fear or threat associated with each, and the defenses used to both escape from and avoid these experiences.

The study of these phenomena is made difficult, however, by two related problems. As mentioned earlier, Piers and Singer (1953) have discussed what they termed the "shame-guilt cycle", in which a particular situation can alternately activate both shame and guilt. The implications of this for the study of shame or guilt in isolation is obvious. An additional complication results from a similar problem discussed by Lynd (1958). Guilt is triggered by an immoral act while shame is triggered by the exposure of an inadequate self. An immoral act, however, will often trigger involvement of the self. Thus, hurting a friend may trigger guilt about one's deed, but it may also trigger the self-statement "How could I be such a person?" and thus induce shame as well. Despite these complications, as well as the capacity of all of us to experience, at various times, both shame and guilt, previous research has shown that some individuals are more prone to experiencing one or the other of these two states (Lewis, 1979; Negri, 1974, 1978). This suggests that shame and guilt might be investigated by studying persons differing in their propensity to experience one or the other of these two states.

The few measures of shame and guilt known to the author (Korpi, 1977; Perlman, 1959; Smith, 1972) all measure proneness to guilt or shame by listing a number of situations that have been pre-rated as "shame-inducing" or "guilt-inducing" and requesting the respondents to indicate how disturbing each of these situations would be. High scores on the latter items indicate proneness to guilt, high scores on the former, proneness to shame.

The Random House Dictionary defines shame as "the painful feeling arising from the consciousness of something dishonorable, improper or ridiculous" and guilt as "a feeling . . . of remorse for . . . having committed some offense, crime, violation or wrong especially against moral or penal law." These definitions are consistent with the notions of shame and guilt discussed above. In light of these definitions, as well as the theories described above, the following hypotheses were generated:

- 1) a) Shame is triggered by the awareness of one's inadequacy, defectiveness or social inappropriateness. Thus shame-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with these themes.
- b) Guilt is triggered by moral transgression. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with this theme.

As mentioned earlier, Lewis and her colleagues (Lewis, 1971; Witkin, 1950; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968) found that psychological differentiation was related to proneness to shame or to guilt.

Shame-proneness was found among individuals with a self-organization pattern of field-dependence and porous self-boundaries, suggesting a self that is inadequately differentiated from the environment. The self-organization associated with proneness to guilt, on the other hand, was found to involve field-independence and solid self-boundaries. In the present study it was inferred from this that individuals prone to shame would be more dependent on others than guilt-prone individuals. It was thus hypothesized that:

- 2) a) The unconscious danger associated with shame is rejection or abandonment. Thus:
 1. Shame-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with rejection or abandonment.
 2. Shame-proneness is positively associated with level of interpersonal dependency.

Guilt has been described as the experience of the need for punishment by Freud (1930/1962) and Alexander (1948/1963), and more recently, as the expectation of punishment by Persons (1970). Thus it was hypothesized that:

- 2) b) The unconscious danger associated with guilt is punishment. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with punishment.

Shame has been described as the feeling of wanting to hide or "bury one's face" (Kaufman, 1980; Tomkins, 1963). A related possibility is that the wish to hide is an attempt to protect oneself from further

exposure, to escape from or reduce the experience of shame. Shame stems from the belief that "there is something wrong with me and it is being exposed." Thus there is no immediate way to rectify this; one can only attempt to hide one's inadequate self. Guilt, on the other hand, can be atoned for because it is not associated with one's self, but rather, with an immoral act or behavior that one has performed (Lynd, 1958). One cannot immediately change or make up for an inadequate self, but an immoral act can be atoned for. Guilt has been described as anxiety about punishment (Freud, 1930/1962; Alexander, 1948/1963)--an anxiety which ceases once the transgressor has received his/her punishment, or acts in such a way as to make amends for the wrongdoing. This led to the following hypotheses:

- 3) a) Shame can be reduced by reducing exposure of the self. Thus shame-proneness is positively associated with the wish to reduce self-exposure.
- b) Guilt can be reduced through an act of atonement. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with atonement. This can be of two sorts:
 - 1) Receiving punishment for moral wrongdoing.
 - 2) Attempting to compensate or make amends for moral wrongdoing.

The focus of shame is one's self, a self that is experienced as "rejectable." Attempts to avoid the experience of shame (in contrast to the defensive maneuvers described in number three above, which are of an escape nature) lead to a defensive style which protects the individual from the pain of rejection. This can be accomplished in two ways.

First of all there is the denial of the need for others. By striving to be strong and powerful, rather than weak and in a position of dependency, the individual attempts to protect himself or herself from the pain associated with interpersonal rejection. Secondly, one may strive to be positively evaluated, likeable, or attractive, in an attempt to protect oneself from actual rejection. By being attractive to others one protects against rejection and thus vulnerability to shame.

The focus of guilt, on the other hand, is one's immoral deed(s). Thus it was felt that a compensatory defensive style would be characterized by concern with the morality of deeds and behaviors. The wish or impulse to behave in a way that violates one's superego proscriptions triggers guilt, the anxiety signalling punishment, and so, is a source of pain. Such impulses are the target of one's contempt and are experienced phenomenologically as "evil." The avoidance of guilt is thus attempted through the externalization of these unacceptable, dangerous impulses, as well as through the "moral cleansing of the self" via the doing of morally good deeds. Individuals prone to experiencing guilt would thus be expected to be more likely to see "immoral" behavior and/or intentions in others, and would be expected to strive for "purity" of their own thoughts and behaviors--both of which are performed in an attempt to rid oneself of "evil" and thus the threat of guilt. It was hypothesized that:

- 4) a) Shame can be avoided by protecting against the pain of rejection. Thus shame-proneness is positively associated with the preoccupation with the avoidance of the pain of rejection. This entails:
 - 1) Striving for perfection, power, and independence in an attempt to neutralize the impact of rejection.
 - 2) Striving to be liked, positively evaluated, or attractive to others in an attempt to avoid actual rejection.
- b) Guilt can be avoided by the avoidance of "immoral" thoughts or deeds. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with the preoccupation with the "moral purification of one's self." This entails:
 - 1) Projection of "evil" impulses onto the external world.
 - 2) Acting in "morally pure" ways--for example, doing "good deeds" for others.

These hypotheses are summarized in Table 1 on the following page.

It was also hypothesized that proneness to shame and to guilt would be related to gender. Previous findings have, for the most part, suggested that males are more guilt-prone, and females, more shame-prone (Binder, 1971; Weigel, 1975; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968). In addition, proneness to shame and to guilt have been found to correlate with psychological differentiation, with field-dependence correlated with shame-proneness and field-independence correlated with guilt-proneness (Crouppen, 1977; Witkin, Lewis & Weil, 1968). Field-dependence is conceptually linked to nurturance and communality--personality traits found to be more prevalent among women--while field-independence is

Table 1
Summary of Hypotheses

	Shame	Guilt
Activator/Trigger (precipitating event)	Exposure of inadequacy, failure or social inappropriateness	Violation of one's moral code
Associated Unconscious Threat or Danger	Rejection or abandonment (stemming from high level of dependency)	Punishment
Escape Defenses	Wish to reduce exposure	Wish to atone: (1) Receiving punishment for moral wrong- doing (2) Attempting to make amends for moral wrongdoing
Avoidance Defenses	Striving to avoid the pain of rejection: (1) Denying weakness, need, and dependency to neutralize the power of rejection (2) Becoming "lovable" to avoid actual rejection	Striving for "moral purity": (1) Projection of "evil" onto external world (2) Acting in "morally pure" ways

conceptually linked to instrumentality and agency--traits found to be more prevalent among men (Bem, 1974; Berzins, Welby & Wetter, 1978). Thus, despite an unexplained finding by Negri (1978) that femininity was correlated with guilt, and masculinity, with shame, it was predicted that in the present study, males would be more guilt-prone, and females, more shame-prone.

Methodology

Participants

The participants were 107 introductory psychology students at Michigan State University who were given extra credit for their participation in this two-hour study. Five participants omitted items or pages of items so their data was excluded from the analyses. The final total sample was composed of the remaining 102 participants (51 females, 51 males).

Procedure

The measures were administered in a group setting with groups composed of approximately five to ten students. They were each provided with a pen, blank lined paper for their TAT stories, and copies of the Interpersonal Dependency Inventory, the Korpi Shame-Guilt Test, the Cattell Susceptibility to Embarrassment Test, the Mosher Forced Choice Guilt Scales and the Revised Stanford Shyness Survey (all described below). The participants were administered the TAT first, after which they were given a short break. Following the break the objective questionnaires were administered with their order counterbalanced across all participants, with the exception of the Revised Stanford Shyness Survey, which was administered last for every participant.

The TAT cards were presented via slide projector onto a screen at the front of the room. The participants were read the following instructions prior to beginning:

For the first hour or so you will be looking at some pictures which will be shown on the screen at the front of the room and making up stories for each. Following this you will be given a short break. The second hour you will be asked to complete several questionnaires.

In a moment a number of pictures will be shown one at a time on the screen. Your task is to write down as dramatic a story as you can for each. Please write what has led up to the event in the picture, describe what is happening in the moment--including what the characters are thinking and feeling--and give some kind of outcome for the story. Write the thoughts as they come to you. You will be given up to about five minutes per story, but the slides will be changed once the entire group has completed the task so please signal when you have finished your story by quietly placing your pen on the desk in front of you. Are there any questions? Okay, we'll begin. Remember to let your imaginations go and please write neatly.

After the subjects returned from their post-TAT break they were read the following instructions:

You will notice that you each have in front of you a set of questionnaires. Please read the instructions for each questionnaire and record your answers in the spaces allotted on each questionnaire. Be sure to do them in the order that they have been arranged. When you have completed one questionnaire you may read the instructions to the following questionnaire and begin it. Once you have finished a questionnaire please consult me if you decide you would like to change any of your answers to a previous questionnaire. You will note that none of the questionnaires begin with the number one--don't worry about that. Be sure to respond to every single item. Feel free to ask any questions now or whenever they come up. Are there any questions? Okay, begin.

Testing Instruments

Korpi Shame-Guilt Test

The Korpi Shame-Guilt Test is a revision of the Beall Shame-Guilt Test (Beall, 1972), a Likert format test that presents 103 situations

and requires the respondent to evaluate, on a one through five scale, how upsetting each would be for him or her. Beall developed her item pool and then had several clinicians rate each item as either shame-inducing or guilt-inducing to establish content validity. She removed items that were not classified as either. Shame items were defined as situations that implied exposure of self, failure to live up to an ideal, self-deficiencies and being embarrassed. The guilt items were situations involving violations of moral code and injury to self and others (Jones, 1981). Beall's test was the basis for two subsequent revisions: the 36-item Korpi Shame-Guilt Test (Korpi, 1977), and the 40-item Smith Shame-Guilt Test (Smith, 1972). None of these three tests have been published and the present author found only the Beall Test cited in published research (Wood, Pilusuk & Uren, 1973).

In the present study the length of the testing session was of concern so a decision was made not to use the Beall Test. The rationale for the use of the Korpi S-G Test rather than the Smith Test was based on the preliminary findings of a study (Bupp, personal communication, June 20, 1983) which found that the correlation between shame and guilt scores on the Korpi Test was lower than that for the Smith Test (data unavailable as of yet).

Korpi (1977) performed a multiple regression analysis on the Beall Test to reduce its length. His final form was a 36-item test with a Cronbach-alpha reliability coefficient of .76 (cited in Jones, 1981).

Susceptibility to Embarrassment Test

The Susceptibility to Embarrassment Test (Embarrassing Circumstances) is a 56-item test that lists potentially embarrassing situations and asks the respondents to indicate for each whether he or

she would consider it "not embarrassing," "somewhat embarrassing," or "very embarrassing" if it were to happen to him/her.

The test is one of ten scales which comprise the Cattell Objective-Analytic Anxiety Battery (Note: this is to be distinguished from the Cattell Objective-Analytic Personality Factor Battery). According to Cattell and Scheier (1960), more than three decades of interlocking research identified and replicated several dozen personality factors measurable by objective test procedures. Each of these is identified by a Universal Index number (U.I.), one of which is U.I. 24, or Anxiety. One of the subscales of the Anxiety subtest is the Susceptibility to Embarrassment Test. The authors reported that in the two studies conducted on the subtest, Susceptibility to Embarrassment, the average loading was .39 and its average split-half corrected reliability was .90.

Although not explicitly a measure of proneness to shame, the Susceptibility to Embarrassment test appears to have good face validity as a measure of this trait and has been used as such in previous research (Weigel, 1975).

Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scales

The Mosher F-C Guilt Scales are two forms (male and female) of a guilt inventory developed by Donald Mosher (1966, 1968) to measure "the personality disposition of guilt." They each contain a number of sentence stems followed by two completion choices. There are 78 items in the female form (77 of which were used in the present study--the item "Women who curse: (a) usually want to bring attention to themselves, or (b) in private are still ladies", was eliminated because it was thought to be outdated) and 79 items in the male form, both of which are derived

from the Mosher Incomplete Sentences Test (MIST), a guilt inventory composed of three subscales: sex-guilt, hostility-guilt, and morality-conscience-guilt (Mosher, 1961).

The male form (1966) was developed by selecting 504 completed sentences from the MIST and asking 100 male students to indicate, for each item, whether or not that was true for them. This yielded three guilt scores for each participant. An item analysis based on a comparison of the upper and lower 27 percent of the participants was conducted for each of the three subscales. Of the 504 items, a total of 328 was found to discriminate between these two groups for the three subscales. A separate group of 129 male students was administered the 504 completed MIST items with instructions to indicate whether the items would be regarded as reflecting a desirable or undesirable viewpoint by a majority of college men. A social desirability rating was computed for each item by finding the percentage of the males who regarded the item as reflecting a socially desirable opinion. The forced-choice guilt inventory was constructed by taking guilty and nonguilty completions to the same stem which had been found to discriminate on the item analysis and which were matched within fifteen percent on their social desirability ratings. This yielded a total of 79 items: 28 sex-guilt items, 29 hostility-guilt items and 22 morality-conscience-guilt items.

The female form (Mosher, 1968) was developed by selecting 809 completed sentences from the MIST and administering them to 100 female students using a true/false format. Guilt subscale scores were computed and internal consistency item analyses were conducted for each of these three subscales via a comparison of the upper and lower 27 percent of the scores. Items were retained if they both: (a) differentiated the

extreme groups, and (b) did not pull greater than 75 percent of the responses of the "extreme" participants. The latter restriction was employed as a way of eliminating the social desirability procedure used in the previous study since independent social desirability ratings in the earlier analysis of male guilt completions eliminated items of this sort. The forced-choice inventory was constructed by selecting 78 guilty and nonguilty responses to the same stem from these items (39 sex-guilt items, 22 hostility-guilt items, and 17 morality-conscience-guilt items). It should be noted that Mosher used a weighted scoring system for this inventory but later found that guilt scores computed with weightings correlated .99 with the scores computed without the weightings (Mosher, personal communication, October 6, 1983).

The Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Scales have been used fairly widely as a research instrument. The utility of the subscales has been demonstrated in a number of studies which have found the subscales to be correlated with such traits as religiosity (Fehr & Stamps, 1979), several of the 15 manifest needs of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (Abramson, Mosher, Abramson & Woychowski, 1977), and affective and behavioral responses following commission of a hostile act (Mosher, O'Grady & Katz, 1980).

Revised Stanford Shyness Survey

The Stanford Shyness Survey is a 44-item questionnaire developed by Philip Zimbardo that asks the respondents a number of objective and open-ended questions about the nature and degree of their shyness. A shortened version of this survey was used by Paul Pilkonis who found a relationship between shyness and social anxiety, neuroticism (as measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory), public self-conscious-

ness, introversion, and proficiency at monitoring one's own behavior (Pilkonis, 1977a, 1977b) as well as a relationship between shyness and speech anxiety and the ability to initiate and structure conversations (1977c). Approximately 41 percent of all of these participants responded "yes" to the question, "Do you consider yourself to be a shy person?" This single yes/no variable was found to correlate negatively with extraversion, sociability, and capacity to monitor social behavior, and positively with social anxiety and neuroticism (Pilkonis, 1977b). On the basis of these results, although six of the items from the original Stanford Shyness Survey were included in the present study, this single yes/no item was used as one of the measures of proneness to shame, a phenomenon closely related to that of shyness.

Interpersonal Dependency Inventory

The Interpersonal Dependency Inventory is a 48-item Likert-type self-report instrument that assesses interpersonal dependency in adults (Hirschfeld, Klerman, Gough, Barrett, Korchin & Chodoff, 1977). Participants are requested to indicate, on a four point scale ranging from "not characteristic of me" to "very characteristic of me," the degree to which each item describes them. On the basis of a factor analysis performed by Hirschfeld et al., three subscales emerged, each of which measures a different component of interpersonal dependency. These components were described in the following way: (a) Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)--assesses the degree and intensity of a relationship to a single other person. It is a scale which measures "a wish for contact with and emotional support from specific other persons, . . . (the) dread of loss of that person, (and a) general wish for approval and attention from others" (Hirschfeld et al., 1977);

(b) Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOC0)--addresses the relationship to people in general. It is a scale which measures "a wish for help in decision-making, in social situations, and in taking initiative"

(Hirschfeld et al., 1977); (c) Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)--addresses the degree to which an individual is indifferent to or independent of the evaluations of others. It is a scale that measures "preferences for being alone and for independent behavior", and expresses the conviction that one's "self-esteem does not depend on the approval of others" (Hirschfeld et al., 1977).

Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)

The TAT, conceived by Henry Murray in 1935, has not only been widely used in clinical practice and research, but it has served as a model for the development of many other instruments (Anastasi, 1971). It has been employed as a method to help make inferences about themes in a person's life--the salient "needs" and "presses" in the underlying dynamics of his or her personality (Rapaport, Gill & Schafer, 1946).

In the present study ten TAT cards (Cards 1, 2, 3BM, 3GF, 6BM, 7BM, 8BM, 13MF, 14, 18GF) were used to measure the presence of a number of different issues which preoccupy the psyches of the participants. The cards were selected from among the total set in the following way: A study by Negri (1974) employed six TAT cards in studying proneness to shame or guilt among college students. His criteria for the presence of a shame or guilt theme in a story was fairly broad but essentially followed traditional thinking about these phenomena. For each card he listed the number of stories, from among his total sample, that were scored as containing a shame or a guilt theme. The cards chosen for the present study were those cards for which more than 25 percent of the

stories written were rated as containing a shame or guilt theme. There were four such cards (1, 3BM, 3GF, 7BM). The remaining six cards used in the present study were selected simply on the basis of what appeared, in the clinical judgement of the experimenter, to be the apparent capacity of these cards to pull for themes related to shame and guilt.

The issues of interest to be examined via the TAT stories are described below; the criteria used to determine their presence can be found in the rater training manuals in Appendix D:

- 1) a) Inadequacy--Any reference to inadequacy, failure, deficiency, social inappropriateness, defectiveness, or negative evaluation.
- b) Moral Transgression--Any reference to the violation of a moral code or a transgression against another person by the hero.
- 2) a) Rejection--Any reference to rejection or abandonment of the hero.
- b) Punishment--Any reference to the hero being hurt or punished by someone or something with some power in relation to him or her.
- 3) a) Exposure Reduction--Any reference to the hero hiding himself or herself (face, body, property, work, etc.) or avoiding others.

b) Total Atonement

1. Punishment-Atonement--Any reference to some form of punishment for moral wrongdoing.
2. Compensation-Atonement--Any reference to compensation by a wrongdoer, that is, making amends for a wrongdoing.

4) a) Total Nonrejection

1. Independence--Any reference to power, ambition, achievement, perfection, independence, or competence of the hero.
2. Positive Evaluation--Any reference to positive evaluation or attractiveness of the hero.

b) Total Moral Purity

1. Evil-Projection--Any reference to bad, evil, immoral or hurtful actions or intentions by characters other than the hero.
2. Moral Goodness--Any reference to morally good deeds by the hero.

TAT Ratings.

Sixteen undergraduate psychology students received course credit in exchange for serving as raters. They were trained in the interpretation of the TAT stories in groups of four, with each group learning a different set of variables (The training manuals can be found in Appendix D). Training consisted of three or four two-hour sessions for each group, with the number of sessions depending on an assessment of each group's coding skills. When the experimenter determined that all four members

of a particular group were coding the sample stories in a manner consistent with that intended, the training for that group was terminated. Following the completion of the training sessions the raters were free to score the stories on their own but met as a group for weekly "refresher" training sessions.

There were 1020 stories in all--ten stories by each of the 102 experiment participants--with each rater coding 510 of these. The stories were assigned to the raters in such a manner that each set of variables in every story was coded by two raters, with different combinations of raters scoring those variables for each story. For every story a score was computed for each theme by averaging, for the two raters, the number of times that theme was scored as present. Average scores for each story thus ranged from zero to one. The scores within each category were summed across the ten stories, yielding fourteen TAT scores per participant. Thus the scores for each participant could range from zero (if no story received a "present" rating) to ten (if all ten stories received a "present" rating by both raters). The four groups rated the following variables:

Group 1 (Activator/Trigger):

- a) Concern with inadequacy
- b) Concern with moral transgression

Group 2 (Unconscious Threat/Danger):

- a) Concern with rejection
- b) Concern with punishment

Group 3 (Escape Defenses):

- a) Concern with exposure
- b) Concern with atonement
 - 1) Punishment for wrongdoing
 - 2) Making ammends for wrongdoing

Group 4 (Avoidance Defenses):

- a) Striving to avoid pain of rejection
 - 1) Neutralizing impact of rejection via denial of dependency, weakness
 - 2) Preventing rejection by being attractive, liked by others
- b) Striving for "moral purity" of the self
 - 1) Projection of evil
 - 2) Moral Goodness

At this point it would be of interest to comment briefly on the experimenter's impressions of the rater training system devised for the present study. In general, the raters employed in the present study appeared to be conscientious about their task, and all sixteen of them completed coding their 510 stories within the four weeks required of them. It is now felt that 510 stories may have been an excessive number for each rater to code. It is possible that this resulted in a decrease in overall inter-rater reliability due to what one of the raters described as an increasing amount of boredom with the task. It was, however, not possible to verify this empirically.

While there are no statistics available to confirm this, it appeared that the weekly refresher training sessions were important in minimizing the extent to which the raters diverged in their scoring patterns following each of group session. On the basis of this impression, it is suggested that future training of raters include such refresher sessions.

Predictions

The predictions generated by the primary hypotheses are presented below. They are presented along with the hypotheses from which they were generated.

- 1) a) Shame is triggered by the awareness of one's inadequacy, defectiveness or social inappropriateness. Thus shame-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with these themes. Prediction: Proneness to shame will be positively associated with Inadequacy scores.
- b) Guilt is triggered by moral transgression. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with this theme. Prediction: Proneness to guilt will be positively associated with Moral Transgression scores.
- 2) a) The unconscious danger associated with shame is rejection or abandonment. Thus:

1. Shame-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with rejection or abandonment. Prediction: Proneness to shame will be positively associated with Rejection scores.
 2. Shame-proneness is positively associated with level of interpersonal dependency. Prediction: Proneness to shame will be positively associated with IEMREL and ILSOCO, the objective measures of dependency.
- b) The unconscious danger associated with guilt is punishment. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with punishment. Prediction: Proneness to guilt will be positively associated with Punishment scores.
- 3) a) Shame can be reduced by reducing exposure of the self. Thus shame-proneness is positively associated with the wish to reduce self-exposure. Prediction: Proneness to shame will be positively associated with Exposure Reduction scores.
- b) Guilt can be reduced through an act of atonement. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with preoccupation with atonement. This can be of two sorts:
- 1) Receiving punishment for moral wrongdoing. Prediction: Proneness to guilt will be positively associated with Punishment-Atonement scores.
 - 2) Attempting to compensate or make amends for moral wrongdoing. Prediction: Proneness to guilt will be positively associated with Compensation-Atonement scores.

- 4) a) Shame can be avoided by protecting against the pain of rejection. Thus shame-proneness is positively associated with the preoccupation with the avoidance of the pain of rejection. This entails:
- 1) Striving for perfection, power, and independence in an attempt to neutralize the impact of rejection.
Prediction: Proneness to shame will be positively associated with Independence scores.
 - 2) Striving to be liked, positively evaluated, or attractive to others in an attempt to avoid actual rejection.
Prediction: Proneness to shame will be positively associated with Positive Evaluation scores.
- b) Guilt can be avoided by the avoidance of "immoral" thoughts or deeds. Thus guilt-proneness is positively associated with the preoccupation with the "moral purification of one's self." This entails:
- 1) Projection of "evil" impulses onto the external world.
Prediction: Proneness to guilt will be positively associated with Evil-Projection scores.
 - 2) Acting in "morally pure" ways--for example, doing "good deeds" for others. Prediction: Proneness to guilt will be positively associated with Moral Goodness scores.

Results

Reliability of TAT Raters

As described in the Method section above, each of the 1020 TAT stories was rated by two of the four possible raters for each of the eleven simple variables. Reliability scores for these ratings were computed in the following way. For each story, one of the raters was arbitrarily designated as Rater A, and the other, Rater B. Each participant, having written ten stories, received ten ratings from rater A and ten ratings from Rater B. Since each rating was of a present (1 point) or absent (0 points) nature, the sum of each rater's ten scores was an integer between zero and ten.

The final TAT scores for each participant were computed by averaging both raters' total scores for that participant. Reliability scores were determined for each of the eleven TAT variables by first correlating the two summed scores, and then using this correlation to compute the Spearman-Brown Reliability Coefficient, a coefficient which reflects the increased reliability resulting from the use of two raters.

The inter-rater correlation coefficients computed for these variables were as follows: (1a) Exposure of Inadequacy, $r = .53$; (1b) Moral Transgression, $r = .83$; (2a) Rejection/Abandonment, $r = .67$; (2b) Punishment, $r = .52$; (3a) Exposure Reduction, $r = .47$; (3b1) Punishment-Atonement, $r = .65$; (3b2) Compensation-Atonement,

$r = .19$; (4a1) Independence, $r = .55$; (4a2) Positive Evaluation, $r = .54$; (4b1) Evil-Projection, $r = .40$; and (4b2) Moral Goodness, $r = .43$.

The corrected inter-rater reliability coefficients computed for these variables were as follows: (1a) Exposure of Inadequacy, $r = .70$; (1b) Moral Transgression, $r = .91$; (2a) Rejection/Abandonment, $r = .80$; (2b) Punishment, $r = .68$; (3a) Exposure Reduction, $r = .64$; (3b1) Punishment-Atonement, $r = .79$; (3b2) Compensation-Atonement, $r = .32$; (4a1) Independence, $r = .71$; (4a2) Positive Evaluation, $r = .70$; (4b1) Evil-Projection, $r = .57$; and (4b2) Moral Goodness, $r = .60$.

Descriptive Data

The results are presented and elaborated on in later sections of this chapter. However, for the sake of increased clarity most of the descriptive data is also presented in Tables 2 through 11 below and in Tables 1 through 27 in Appendix A. The organization of the tables is described briefly below.

Mean scores on all of the variables of interest for males, females, and both males and females combined can be found in Tables 8 and 9 below. Those sex differences that were statistically significant are marked as such. Previously obtained norms for comparable populations were included when such data was available. The results were largely quite close to these norms with the exception of the IEMREL scale of the Interpersonal Dependency Inventory. The IEMREL scores obtained in the present study appear to be somewhat higher than those obtained by Hirschfeld et al. (1977). The results presented in these tables are

discussed below.

Mean scores for each of the eleven simple TAT variables for males, females, and both males and females combined, for each of the ten TAT slides, are presented in Tables 10 through 19 in Appendix A. The numbers presented are the mean scores for an individual participant and are thus quite small. The total number of times that a particular theme was scored for all males, all females, or all participants can be determined by multiplying these numbers by 102, 102 or 204, respectively.

Intercorrelations between the various simple and complex measures of shame and guilt can be found in Table 2 below. Significant correlation coefficients are marked as such, with the level of significance indicated as well. These correlations are discussed below.

Correlations of the various simple and complex measures of shame and guilt, with both the objective and projective (TAT) dependent variables for males, females, and both males and females combined, are presented in Tables 20 through 25 in Appendix A. The level of significance is indicated for those correlations that were found to be statistically significant. These correlations are discussed at length below.

The distribution of participants into the various Shame x Guilt groups is shown in Table 3 below, with the frequencies presented for males, females, and both males and females combined. This is discussed below.

Tables 1 through 8 in Appendix A and Tables 4 through 7 below present the mean scores on all of the variables of interest for males, females, and both males and females combined, broken down by Shame group

or by Guilt group. Differences between Shame or Guilt groups that are statistically significant are marked as such. These results are also discussed below.

Intercorrelations between Korpi Shame subscales, and correlations between these subscales and the remaining measures of interest can be found, respectively, in Tables 9, 26 and 27 in Appendix A. Significant correlations are marked as such. These are discussed below.

The intercorrelations between the TAT measures for males and females combined, as well as separated, are presented in Table 10 and 11 below. These correlations and the results of an elementary linkage analysis of these variables are discussed below.

Shame and Guilt Scores

In general the simple shame scales were found to correlate more highly with each other than with the simple guilt scales, with the intra-shame scale correlations ranging from $r = .27$ to $r = .58$ (the median correlation was $r = .33$), and the correlations between shame scales and guilt scales ranging from a low of $r = -.07$ to $r = .29$ (the median correlation was $r = .18$). Similarly, the guilt scales were found to correlate more highly with each other than with the shame scales, with the intra-guilt scale correlations ranging from $r = .21$ to $r = .58$ (the median correlation was $r = .39$). In addition, composite Shame scores were found to be significantly correlated with Composite Guilt scores, $r = .32$, $p < .001$. These correlations are presented in Table 2 on the following page.

Composite Shame and Guilt scores were determined as follows: A total Guilt score was computed for each participant by standardizing each of the four guilt measures (Mosher's Sex-Guilt [MSG], Hostility-

Table 2
Inter-Scale Correlations

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	ZMSG	ZMHG	ZMMCG
Shame	-								
KS	.82***	-							
EMB	.80***	.58***	-						
SHY	.69***	.33***	.27**	-					
Guilt	.32***	.23**	.30***	.20*	-				
KG	.15	.13	.28**	-.07	.59***	-			
ZMSG	.23**	.12	.16	.26**	.78***	.21*	-		
ZMHG	.21*	.13	.16	.19*	.75***	.22**	.50***	-	
ZMMCG	.34***	.29**	.28**	.22*	.81***	.31***	.58***	.47***	-

Note. The Mosher Guilt Scales (ZMSG, ZMHG, ZMMCG) were standardized within sex.

* $p < .05$
 ** $p < .01$
 *** $p < .001$

Guilt [MHG], and Morality-Conscience-Guilt [MMCG] Scales, and the Korpi Guilt Scale [KG]) and then summing these standard scores ($ZMSG + ZMHG + ZMMCG + ZKG$). A total Shame score was computed for each participant in a similar manner by standardizing and then summing the scores of the three shame measures (Cattell's Susceptibility to Embarrassment Scale [EMB], the Korpi Shame Scale [KS], and the revised Stanford Shyness Survey [SHY]). It should be noted that the male and female versions of the Mosher Guilt scales are not identical. Thus, unlike the other measures, which were standardized for all participants, the scores on these scales were standardized within sex.

A frequency analysis was made of these scores, on the basis of which the participants were then grouped into high, medium and low shame-proneness and also into high, medium and low guilt-proneness groups of approximately equal size. This was done for males, females, and both males and females combined. It should be mentioned, however, that the analyses performed within gender failed to yield any findings of note. Consequently most of the analyses performed were done with males and females combined.

For the analyses with males and females combined, participants with shame scores greater than .429, less than or equal to .429 but greater than -.487, or less than or equal to -.487, were assigned to the high, medium, or low shame groups, respectively. Participants with guilt scores greater than .298, less than or equal to .298 but greater than -.345, and less than or equal to -.345, were grouped as high, medium, or low in guilt.

Male participants with shame scores greater than .429, less than or equal to .429 but greater than -.295, or less than or equal to -.295,

were classified as having, respectively, a high, medium, or low proneness to experiencing shame. Similarly, males with guilt scores greater than .298, less than or equal to .298 but greater than -.345, and less than or equal to -.345, were classified as high, medium, or low in proneness to guilt.

Female participants with shame scores greater than .407, less than or equal to .407 but greater than -.554, or less than or equal to -.554, were classified as having a high, medium, or low proneness to experiencing shame, respectively. Similarly, females with guilt scores greater than .253, less than or equal to .253 but greater than -.356, and less than or equal to -.356, were classified as high, medium, or low in proneness to guilt. The number of males, females, and males and females combined in each of the nine cells in this shame level x guilt level matrix can be found in Table 3 on the following page.

Omnibus F-Test

An omnibus 2 x 3 x 3 F-test with gender, level of shame-proneness, and level of guilt-proneness as the independent variables was performed for each of the dependent variables. This section describes the results of these F-tests by presenting the significant main effects of sex, shame group and guilt group, followed by the significant interactive effects.

Sex Differences

A significant main effect ($p < .05$) of gender was found for the following dependent variables: Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)

($\bar{M}[\text{Male}] = 29.90$, $\bar{M}[\text{Female}] = 25.72$), $F(1,84) = 9.73$, $p = .002$; Moral

Table 3

Number of Males, Females, and Males and Females
Combined in Each of Nine Shame x Guilt Groups

			<u>LEVEL OF GUILT-PRONENESS</u>			Total
			Low	Medium	High	
<u>LEVEL</u> <u>OF</u> <u>SHAME-</u> <u>PRONENESS</u>	High	M	4	9	5	18
		F	2	5	10	17
		M + F	6	14	15	35
	Medium	M	7	3	10	20
		F	6	2	5	13
		M + F	13	5	15	33
	Low	M	6	4	3	13
		F	9	10	2	21
		M + F	15	14	5	34
	Total	M	17	16	18	51
		F	17	17	17	51
		M + F	34	33	35	102

Goodness (TAT4b2) ($\underline{M}[\text{Male}] = 1.36$, $\underline{M}[\text{Female}] = 2.26$), $\underline{F}(1,84) = 16.16$, $p = .001$), and Total Moral Purity (TAT4B1 + TAT4B2) ($\underline{M}[\text{Male}] = 3.26$, $\underline{M}[\text{Female}] = 4.51$), $\underline{F}(1,84) = 15.17$, $p = .001$.

Shame Group Differences

A significant main effect ($p < .05$) of level of shame-proneness was found for a number of the variables hypothesized to be related to shame-proneness. These findings support the predictive validity of the composite shame measure used. As predicted, a significant main effect for shame group was found for: Emotional Reliance on Others (IEMREL) ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 48.43$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 42.94$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 40.26$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 7.07$, $p = .001$; and Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO), ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 34.09$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 27.15$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 26.03$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 15.56$, $p = .001$. Significant shame group effects were also found for: Shy Intensity (S72) ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 3.43$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 2.90$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 2.47$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 4.01$, $p = .02$; Shy Frequency (S73) ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 3.17$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 2.48$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 1.85$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 11.80$, $p = .001$; Shy Comparison (S74) ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 3.26$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 2.79$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 2.06$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 10.36$, $p = .001$; Shy Problems (S75), ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 3.51$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 2.46$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 1.85$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 17.65$, $p = .001$; Introversion (S76) ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 4.11$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 3.39$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 2.85$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 4.02$, $p = .02$; and Total Moral Purity (TAT4b1 + TAT4b2) ($\underline{M}[\text{High}] = 3.84$, $\underline{M}[\text{Medium}] = 3.29$, $\underline{M}[\text{Low}] = 4.50$), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 4.40$, $p = .02$ (see Tables 4 and 5 on the following pages).

Guilt Group Differences

A significant main effect ($p < .05$) of guilt-proneness was found for the following dependent variables: Lack of Social Self-Confidence

Table 4
Mean Scores Grouped by Level of Shame-Proneness

	High-Shame	Medium-Shame	Low-Shame
Korpi Shame (KS)	59.37	51.91	44.26
Korpi Guilt (KG)	60.86 _a	60.88 _a	58.76 _a
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	118.91	109.27	96.47
Mosher Sex-Guilt (ZMSG)	.20 _a	.13 _a	-.33
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (ZMHG)	.12 _a	.13 _a	-.25 _a
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (ZMMCG)	.41 _a	.09 _a	-.51
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	48.43	42.94 _a	40.26 _a
Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO)	34.09	27.15 _a	26.03 _a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	27.54 _a	27.42 _a	28.47 _a
SHY (S71)	1.80	1.42	1.03
Shy Intensity (S72)	3.43 _b	2.90 _{a,b}	2.47 _a
Shy Frequency (S73)	3.17	2.48	1.85
Shy Comparison (S74)	3.26 _a	2.79 _a	2.06
Shy Problems (S75)	3.51	2.46	1.85
Introversion (S76)	4.11 _b	3.39 _{a,b}	2.85 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 5
Mean Number of TAT Themes Grouped by Level
of Shame-Proneness

	High-Shame	Medium-Shame	Low-Shame
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	1.07 _a	.61 _b	1.00 _{a, b}
Moral Transgression (1b)	2.37 _a	2.33 _a	2.76 _a
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.70 _a	3.14 _a	3.37 _a
Punishment (2b)	1.74 _a	1.94 _a	2.00 _a
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.66 _a	.50 _a	.53 _a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.90 _a	.82 _a	1.26 _a
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.04 _{a, b}	.02 _a	.12 _b
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	.94 _{a, b}	.83 _a	1.38 _b
Independence (4a1)	2.30 _a	2.42 _a	2.46 _a
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.66 _a	.76 _a	.69 _a
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	2.96 _a	3.18 _a	3.15 _a
Evil-Projection (4b1)	1.96 _{a, b}	1.83 _a	2.43 _b
Moral Goodness (4b2)	1.89 _{a, b}	1.45 _a	2.09 _b
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	3.84 _{a, b}	3.29 _a	4.50 _b

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

(ILSOCO) ($\underline{M}$ [High] = 32.29, $\underline{M}$ [Medium] = 28.94, $\underline{M}$ [Low] = 26.15), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 5.36$, $p = .006$; and Shy Comparison (S74) ($\underline{M}$ [High] = 2.89, $\underline{M}$ [Medium] = 3.00, $\underline{M}$ [Low] = 2.24), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 3.56$, $p = .03$ (see Tables 6 and 7 on the following pages).

Interactive Effects

A significant interactive effect ($p < .05$) of sex x level of shame-proneness was found for the following dependent variables: Moral Transgression (TAT1b), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 4.41$, $p = .02$; Punishment-Atonement (TAT3b1), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 3.47$, $p = .04$; Total Atonement (TAT3b1 + TAT3b2), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 3.25$, $p = .04$; and Moral Goodness (TAT4b2), $\underline{F}(2,84) = 3.83$, $p = .03$. For the all four of these variables, sex differences were minimal for both low and high shame participants. On the other hand, medium-shame males scored higher than medium-shame females on Moral Transgression, Punishment-Atonement, and Total Atonement, and lower than medium-shame females on Moral Goodness. This pattern is shown graphically in Figures 1 through 4 in Appendix B.

No significant interactive effects ($p < .05$) of sex x level of guilt-proneness, level of guilt-proneness x level of shame-proneness, or sex x level of guilt-proneness x level of shame-proneness was found for any of the dependent variables. (Mean scores broken down by sex and grouped by shame-level or guilt-level are presented in Tables 1 through 8 in Appendix A.)

Hypotheses

The primary hypotheses were organized around four dimensions thought to be of relevance to shame and guilt. The four dimensions of

Table 6
Mean Scores Grouped by Level of Guilt-Proneness

	High-Guilt	Medium-Guilt	Low-Guilt
Korpi Shame (KS)	54.20 _a	51.67 _{a, b}	49.82 _b
Korpi Guilt (KG)	63.71 _a	61.94 _a	54.79
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	111.66 _a	108.12 _{a, b}	105.06 _b
Mosher Sex-Guilt (ZMSG)	.84	-.14	-.72
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (ZMHG)	.81	-.08	-.76
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (ZMMCG)	.99	-.16	-.86
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	45.63 _a	43.85 _a	42.26 _a
Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO)	32.29	28.94 _a	26.15 _a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	27.26 _a	29.30 _a	26.94 _a
SHY (S71)	1.51 _a	1.46 _a	1.29 _a
Shy Intensity (S72)	3.06 _a	3.12 _a	2.65 _a
Shy Frequency (S73)	2.54 _a	2.67 _a	2.32 _a
Shy Comparison (S74)	2.89 _a	3.00 _a	2.24
Shy Problems (S75)	2.91 _a	2.73 _{a, b}	2.21 _b
Introversion (S76)	3.91 _a	3.27 _a	3.18 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 7
Mean Number of TAT Themes Grouped by Level
of Guilt-Proneess

	High-Guilt	Medium-Guilt	Low-Guilt
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.83 _a	.94 _a	.93 _a
Moral Transgression (1b)	2.30 _a	2.50 _a	2.68 _a
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.40 _a	3.64 _a	3.19 _a
Punishment (2b)	1.90 _a	1.85 _a	1.93 _a
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.63 _a	.58 _a	.49 _a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.91 _a	1.08 _a	1.00 _a
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.03 _a	.05 _a	.10 _a
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	.94 _a	1.12 _a	1.10 _a
Independence (4a1)	2.33 _{a, b}	2.02 _a	2.82 _b
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.64 _a	.85 _a	.62 _a
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	2.97 _a	2.86 _a	3.44 _a
Evil-Projection (4b1)	1.89 _a	2.21 _a	2.13 _a
Moral Goodness (4b2)	2.00 _a	1.73 _a	1.71 _a
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	3.89 _a	3.94 _a	3.84 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

interest were: (a) precipitating events; (b) associated unconscious dangers; (c) escape defenses; and (d) avoidance defenses. The hypotheses, the predictions generated by them, and the relevant results are discussed below.

Dimension One Hypotheses--Precipitating Events

(a) Inadequacy. Shame was hypothesized to be activated by the awareness of one's inadequacy, defectiveness, or social inappropriateness so that shame-proneness was thought to be associated with a preoccupation with these themes. Thus it was predicted that shame-prone individuals would show a greater preponderance of these themes in their TAT stories.

The results were not as predicted. The results of a Duncan multiple range test--which controls the error rate to take into account the number of groups being compared--found instead that both high ($\bar{M} = 1.07$) and low shame ($\bar{M} = 1.00$) participants wrote a greater number of stories containing these themes than medium shame participants ($\bar{M} = .61$), $F(2,99) = 3.27$, $p < .05$. (Note: The Duncan multiple range test was employed for all of the multiple comparisons described below.)

(b) Moral Transgression. Guilt was hypothesized to be triggered by moral transgression so that guilt-proneness was thought to be positively associated with a preoccupation with this theme. Thus it was predicted that highly guilt-prone individuals would have a greater number of stories containing this theme than less guilt-prone participants.

The results failed to support this hypothesis. Differences in Moral Transgression scores failed to reach significance for the three guilt groups.

Dimension Two Hypotheses--Associated Unconscious Dangers

(a) It was hypothesized that the unconscious danger associated with shame is rejection or abandonment:

(a1) Rejection. It was thought that shame-proneness would be positively associated with a preoccupation with rejection or abandonment--a preoccupation which would be reflected in a greater number of TAT stories containing these themes for shame-prone participants than for those less prone to experiencing shame.

The differences between shame groups on this variable failed to reach significance. However a pattern of relationships similar to that between shame-proneness and number of Inadequacy stories (described above) was found between shame-proneness and number of Rejection stories. High shame-prone persons wrote an average of 3.7 stories containing this theme, while medium and low shame-prone persons wrote an average of 3.1 and 3.4 such stories, respectively. Despite the lack of significant difference scores on the ANOVA, Rejection scores were found to correlate significantly with shame-proneness, $r = .13$, $p < .05$.

(a2) IEMREL, ILSOCO. It was further hypothesized that shame-prone individuals' sensitivity to rejection would be a reflection of a greater level of interpersonal dependency. Thus it was predicted that shame-prone individuals would have higher scores on the following Interpersonal Dependency Inventory scales: Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL) and Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO).

The results were largely as predicted. High shame participants received significantly higher IEMREL scores ($M = 48.43$) than either medium shame participants ($M = 42.94$) or low shame participants ($M = 40.26$), $F(2,99) = 8.92$, $p < .001$.

High shame participants received significantly higher ILSOCO scores ($M = 34.09$) than either medium shame participants ($M = 27.15$) or low shame participants ($M = 26.03$), $F(2,99) = 19.91$, $p < .0001$.

(b) Punishment. It was hypothesized that the unconscious danger associated with guilt is punishment. Thus it was thought that guilt-proneness would be associated with a preoccupation with punishment, and would be reflected in a preponderance of TAT stories containing this theme for guilt-prone participants.

The results failed to support this hypothesis as guilt group differences in number of punishment stories failed to reach significance.

Dimension Three Hypotheses--Escape Defenses

(a) Exposure Reduction. It was hypothesized that shame is reduced by a reduction in the exposure of the self. Thus it was thought that individuals prone to shame would be more concerned with hiding themselves and that this would be reflected in a relatively high number of TAT stories concerned with hiding, withdrawal, and escape.

The results failed to support this hypothesis. While high shame-prone participants told a greater number of stories containing this theme ($M = .66$) than either medium ($M = .50$) or low shame-prone participants ($M = .53$), none of these differences were statistically significant. It is interesting to note, however, the similarity in the pattern of relationships between these variables and that between shame-proneness and the number of both Inadequacy and Rejection stories, with all three producing V-shaped curves.

(b) It was hypothesized that guilt can be reduced via an act of atonement. Thus it was thought that individuals prone to guilt would be concerned with atonement and that this would be reflected in a relatively high number of TAT stories containing atonement themes. Two types of atonement were postulated:

(b1) Punishment-Atonement. Punishment for moral wrongdoing.

(b2) Compensation-Atonement. Making amends to the victim of a moral wrongdoing.

The results failed to support the hypothesized relationships between proneness to guilt and atonement of either type. No significant differences were found between any of the guilt groups for number of Punishment-Atonement stories, Compensation-Atonement stories, or Total Atonement stories combined. However, it should be kept in mind that the corrected inter-rater reliability coefficient for Compensation-Atonement was only $r = .32$.

Dimension Four Hypotheses--Avoidance Defenses

(a) It was hypothesized that shame can be avoided by protecting against the pain of rejection. Thus it was thought that individuals prone to experiencing shame would be concerned with the avoidance of the pain of rejection. Two ways of avoiding this pain were suggested:

(a1) Independence. Attempt to neutralize the importance and thus the hurtfulness of rejection by striving for power and independence. It was predicted that this would be reflected in a greater number of TAT stories written by shame-prone participants containing themes of power and independence.

(a2) Positive Evaluation. Attempt to avoid actual rejection by striving to be liked, positively evaluated, or attractive to others. It was predicted that this would be reflected in a preponderance of stories containing these themes for shame-prone participants.

Neither of these hypotheses (4a1, 4a2) were supported by the results as no significant differences between shame groups were found for either of these two TAT variables. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the pattern of relationships between shame-proneness and number of Positive Evaluation stories (inverted V-shaped curve) was the opposite of those found between shame-proneness and the number of Inadequacy, Rejection, and Exposure stories (V-shaped curves). Similarly, the relationship between Independence scores for medium and high shame individuals was also the opposite of that for Inadequacy, Rejection, and Exposure Reduction stories. The mean Independence scores for high, medium and low shame-prone participants were 2.30, 2.42 and 2.46, respectively. The mean Positive Evaluation scores for high, medium and low shame-prone participants were .66, .76 and .69, respectively. These relationships are shown graphically in Figures 5 through 9 in Appendix B.

(b) It was hypothesized that guilt can be avoided through the avoidance of "immoral" thoughts or deeds. Thus it was thought that proneness to guilt would be associated with a concern for the "moral purification of the self." This entails:

(b1) Evil-Projection. The projection of "evil" impulses onto the external world, a process that was predicted to be reflected in a greater number of TAT stories with "evil" in the external world among guilt-prone individuals.

(b2) Moral Goodness. The striving for "moral purity" via acting in morally good ways. Thus it was predicted that guilt-prone participants would write more TAT stories with morally good heroes.

No significant differences were found between any of the guilt groups for Evil-Projection, Moral Goodness, or Total Moral Purity (Evil-Projection + Moral-Goodness). However, while short of significance, the pattern of scores for Moral Goodness was as predicted, with high, medium, and low guilt group means of 2.00, 1.73, and 1.71, respectively. Evil-Projection scores were 1.89, 2.21, and 2.13, for the high, medium and low guilt groups, respectively.

Additional Results

The relationships between the above discussed variables were also examined by looking at the correlation coefficients between proneness to shame and : (a) Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL); (b) Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO); (c) Inadequacy; (d) Rejection; (e) Exposure Reduction; (f) Independence; (g) Positive Evaluation; and (h) Total Nonrejection. It was predicted that the correlations between these variables and shame-proneness would be significantly greater than that between these variables and proneness to guilt.

Only ILSOCO was found to have a correlation with shame-proneness that was significantly greater than its correlation with guilt-proneness ($r = .56$ vs. $r = .37$, $p = .025$). The correlation between Shame and IEMREL ($r = .35$) fell just short of being significantly greater than the correlations between Guilt and IEMREL ($r = .18$), $p = .06$. However when the correlation between Shame and IEMREL was computed with Guilt partialled out ($r = .32$), it was found to be significantly greater

($p = .03$) than the correlation between Guilt and IEMREL with Shame partialled out ($r = .08$). The differences between correlations with Shame and correlations with Guilt were not significant for Inadequacy, Rejection, Exposure Reduction, Independence, Positive Evaluation, or Total Nonrejection, even with the appropriate factors partialled out.

The relationships between proneness to guilt and the following variables were predicted to be significantly greater than that between these variables and proneness to shame: (a) Moral Transgression; (b) Punishment; (c) Punishment-Atonement; (d) Compensation-Atonement; (e) Total Atonement; (f) Evil-Projection; (g) Moral Goodness; and (h) Total Moral Purity.

None of these variables were found to have a correlation with Guilt that was significantly greater than their correlation with Shame. However, the correlation between Guilt and Moral Goodness ($r = .15$) fell just short of being significantly greater than the correlation between Shame and Moral Goodness ($r = -.01$, $p = .06$). In addition, when the correlation between Guilt and Moral Goodness was computed with Shame partialled out ($r = .18$), it was found to be significantly greater than the correlation between Shame and Moral Goodness with Guilt partialled out ($r = -.06$, $p = .03$).

Proneness to shame and guilt were also thought to be related to gender. Males were hypothesized to be more guilt-prone than females, with females more shame-prone than males. It was predicted that this would be reflected in higher guilt scores for males and higher shame scores for females. Three of the four measures of guilt were standardized within sex and were thus not amenable to cross-sex comparisons. Thus gender differences in proneness to both shame and guilt were

investigated by looking at the remaining simple measures of shame and guilt individually.

While none of the differences between males and females reached significance on the F -tests performed ($p < .05$), differences on all four simple measures were found to be in the direction opposite of that predicted. Mean Korpi Guilt Scale scores for males and females were 59.28 and 61.06, respectively. On the other hand, Korpi Shame, Cattell Embarrassability, and Shyness scores were 53.37 and 50.47, 108.67 and 107.96, and 1.47 and 1.37, for males and females, respectively. Mean objective and TAT scores grouped by sex are presented in Tables 8 and 9 on the following pages.

Correlations between gender and Shame scores, as well as that between gender and the sole guilt measure amenable to such a correlation, the Korpi Guilt Scale, were also computed. While both correlations failed to reach significance (Shame and sex, $r = .13$, $p = .09$; Korpi Guilt and sex, $r = -.13$, $p = .10$), the difference between these correlations was found to be significant ($p < .05$). In short, the data suggest that contrary to expectation, females may be slightly more prone to experiencing guilt than shame, while males may be more prone to experiencing shame than guilt.

An additional finding was the result of an elementary linkage analysis (see McQuitty [1957] for a description of the procedure) of the eleven TAT simple variables. The results of the analysis, presented in Table 10 on the following page and Figure 10 in Appendix B, suggested that the variables clustered into two groups. The first, and more typically relevant group, was composed of the following six variables (their typical relevancies are in parentheses): Punishment-Atonement

Table 8
Mean Scores Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Shame (composite score)	.101	-.102	.000
Guilt (composite score)	-.032	.032	.000
Korpi Shame (KS)	53.37	50.47	51.92
Korpi Guilt (KG)	59.28	61.06	60.17
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	108.67	107.96	108.31
Mosher Sex-Guilt (MSG)	1.40	1.24	--
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (MHG)	1.64	1.50	--
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (MMCG)	1.60	1.31	--
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	44.49 38.2 ^a	43.37 39.7 ^a	43.93 39.2 ^a
Lack of Social Self- Confidence (ILSOCO)	29.90 30.1 ^a	28.41 29.7 ^a	29.16 29.8 ^a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	29.90* 31.6 ^a	25.72 29.4 ^a	27.81 30.2 ^a
SHY (S71)	1.47	1.37	1.42 ^b 1.41 ^b
Shy Intensity (S72)	3.02	2.86	2.94
Shy Frequency (S73)	2.69	2.33	2.51
Shy Comparison (S74)	2.72	2.69	2.71
Shy Problems (S75)	2.76	2.47	2.62
Introversion (S76)	3.76	3.16	3.46

Note. -- indicates that a value was not recorded because such a value is not meaningful.

^a Norms obtained from Hirschfeld et al. (1977).

^b Norm obtained from Pilkonis (1977b).

* $p < .01$ (sex differences).

Table 9
Mean Number of TAT Themes Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.85	.94	.90
Moral Transgression (1b)	2.71	2.27	2.49
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.17	3.65	3.42
Punishment (2b)	2.03	1.76	1.89
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.59	.54	.56
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	1.09	.90	1.00
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.03	.09	.06
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	1.12	.99	1.05
Independence (4a1)	2.33	2.45	2.39
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.61	.79	.70
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	2.94	3.25	3.09
Evil-Projection (4b1)	1.90	2.25	2.07
Moral Goodness (4b2)	1.36*	2.26	1.81
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	3.26*	4.51	3.89

* $p < .001$ (sex differences)

Table 10
Elementary Linkage Analysis of TAT Variables

	3b1	1b	2b	4b1	3b2	3a	4b2	2a	4a2	4a1	1a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	(.9267)	.65***	.52***	.41***	.24**	.09	-.06	.07	-.06	.13	.13
Moral Transgression (1b)	.65***(.8779)		.52***	.35***	.15	.20*	-.16	.03	-.05	.04	.15
Punishment (2b)	.52***.52***(.7881)			.48***	.12	.05	-.20*	-.07	-.12	.19*	.19*
Evil Projection (4b1)	.41***.35***	.48***(.3547)			.16*	.01	-.08	.24**	-.11	.20*	.04
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.24**	.15	.12	.16* (.1397)	-.14		.16*	.06	.06	.19*	-.08
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.09	.20*	.05	.01	-.14 (.0521)		.02	.19*	-.07	-.19*	.10
Positive Evaluation (4b2)	-.06	-.16	-.20*	-.08	.16*	.02	(.2791)	.37***	.26**	.25**	-.11
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.07	.03	-.07	.24**	.06	.19*	.37**(.1439)		.05	-.01	.22*
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	-.06	-.05	-.12	-.11	.06	-.07	.26**	.05 (.1178)		.21*	.06
Independence (4a1)	.13	.04	.19*	.20*	.19*	-.19*	.25**-.01	.21*	(.1148)		-.09
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.13	.15	.19*	.04	-.08	.10	-.11	.22*	.06	-.09 (.0722)	

Note. Parenthesized numbers in the diagonal represent the typal relevance of that variable to the type it is in. This is computed by summing the squares of the correlations between that variable and each of the other variables in that type.

* $p < .05$
 ** $p < .01$
 *** $p < .001$

(.9267), Moral Transgression (.8779), Punishment (.7881), Evil-Projection (.3547), Compensation-Atonement (.1397), and Exposure Reduction (.0521).

The second group was composed of the following five variables: Moral Goodness (.2791), Rejection/Abandonment (.1439), Positive Evaluation (.1178), Independence (.1148), and Exposure of Inadequacy (.0722).

It was thought that there might be sex differences in the way in which these TAT variables clustered together. This possibility was investigated by comparing all 55 intercorrelations across sex. Of these, only three had sex differences that were significant at the $p < .05$ level. However this was approximately the number of significant differences expected on the basis of chance alone. For this reason, in addition to the fact that: (a) two of these three differences involved the variable Compensation-Atonement, a variable that was found an average of only .06 times per participant, and which had a corrected inter-rater reliability coefficient of only $r = .32$, and (b) none of the differences were significant at the $p < .05$ level, these sex differences in TAT intercorrelations were not pursued further. All of these intercorrelations are presented broken down by sex in Table 11 on the following page.

Table 11
TAT Intercorrelations for Both Males and Females

	3b1	1b	2b	4b1	3b2	3a	4b2	2a	4a2	4a1	1a
Punishment- Atonement (3b1)	-	.68	.47	.34	.23	.06	-.04	.05	-.11	.07	.14
Moral Transgression (1b)	.62	-	.55	.35	.12	.21	-.17	.05	-.16	.04	.29
Punishment (2b)	.03	.50	-	.37	.09	.06	-.20	.10	-.11	.18	.17
Evil Projection (4b1)	.51	.41	.62	-	-.03*	.15	-.09	.42	-.17	.08	-.01
Compensation- Atonement (3b2)	.31	.24	.20	.36*	-	-.19	.31*	.22	.12	.27	-.14
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.12	.19	.03	-.12	-.08	-	-.14	.15	-.11	-.32	.14
Positive Evaluation (4b2)	-.01	-.06	-.14	-.21	-.16*	.22	-	.13*	.26	.18	-.19
Rejection/ Abandonment (2a)	.11	.06	-.15	.06	-.15	.25	.54*	-	.01	-.16	.22
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.01	.12	-.11	-.09	-.08	-.02	.20	.06	-	.17	.10
Independence (4a1)	.18	.05	.21	.27	.12	-.10	.31	.07	.24	-	-.27
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.13	.01	.24	.09	-.01	.05	-.08	.22	-.01	.06	-

Note. Correlations among females are presented above the diagonal; correlations among males, below the diagonal.

* Indicates that sex differences for that correlation were significant at $p < .05$.

Discussion

The present research investigated the experiences of shame and guilt by looking at the relationships between proneness to shame or guilt and a number of other variables hypothesized to be related to these phenomena. The primary issues of interest were: (a) precipitating events, that is, what it is that triggers each of these experiences; (b) associated unconscious dangers (and for shame-proneness, a related personality trait); (c) escape defenses, that is, how one escapes from, or reduces the intensity of, these experiences; and (d) avoidance defenses, that is, how one protects oneself from experiencing shame or guilt altogether. Also of interest were sex differences in proneness to shame and to guilt as well as in characteristics thought to be related to shame and guilt.

Overall the results were mixed, although a number of interesting findings did emerge. First, as predicted, shame-proneness was found to correlate with dependency. Secondly, several findings converged to provide support for the Kaufman/Tomkins notion that while shame is a unitary affective state, the term guilt refers to a group of states, one of which has shame as its affective component. A third set of findings (albeit short of significance) were interesting by virtue of the fact that the trends were in the direction opposite of that predicted. Males were found to be more shame-prone than females, while females were more guilt-prone than males. And fourth, an analysis of the items of the Korpi Shame scale suggested that shame activators can be meaningfully

organized into groups of activators to which individuals are differentially sensitive. Before discussing the results it will be important to look at a number of methodological issues relevant to the interpretation of the data.

Methodological Issues

Validity of Shame and Guilt Measures

This research was exploratory. Shame and guilt--particularly shame--have received little attention by researchers and there are few measures of guilt and even fewer measures of shame. For this reason the present study used several measures of shame and several measures of guilt chosen largely on the basis of what appeared to be good face validity. As mentioned earlier, both the simple and complex shame and guilt measures were found to have significant intra-trait correlations. In addition, while not all of the simple shame and guilt measures had significant inter-trait correlations with each other, the composite shame and guilt measures did link significantly. It cannot at this time be determined which of the following this was a result of:

- (a) a tendency by some participants to endorse negative items and a tendency in others to endorse positive items; (b) a factor unrelated to either shame or guilt despite its presence in both measures;
 - (c) a factor correlated with both shame and guilt present in both measures; and/or (d) a direct relationship between shame and guilt.
- Support for the latter notion is discussed below.

While two of the three measures of shame have been cited in published research (Cattell's Susceptibility to Embarrassment and SHY [Do you consider yourself to be a shy person?]), neither was actually

designed to be used as a measure of proneness to shame, per se. The third, the Korpi Shame Scale was intended to measure shame but has yet to be empirically validated. Consequently, the composite Shame measure requires validation so that the results of this study, as well as any other studies employing these scales to measure shame-proneness, must be interpreted cautiously.

On the other hand, of the four simple measures of guilt, the three Mosher scales were designed to measure proneness to guilt and have been validated in a series of studies by their author and others (Abramson et al., 1977; Fehr & Stamps, 1979; Mosher, 1966, 1968; Persons, 1970). Still, the inter-scale correlations among the simple guilt scales ranged from $r = .58$ to as low as $r = .21$, and their correlations with the shame scales varied considerably. The range of correlations between the simple guilt measures and Shame, the Korpi Guilt Scale (KS), Embarrassability (EMB), and SHY was $r = -.07$ to $r = .28$, with considerable variation within specific simple shame measures (see Table 2 above). These discrepancies, in combination with the results of the validity studies mentioned above, suggest that these scales are measuring either: (a) different types of guilt; (b) different components of guilt; (c) different correlates of guilt; or (d) some combination of these.

The question of the validity of the measures of shame and guilt was not addressed in the present study. Instead, the data was discussed in light of the assumption that the validity of the measures is open to question, and that the measures are in need of refinement. Thus the interpretations of the data vis-a-vis the hypotheses were tempered to allow for the problems in measurement.

For example, a number of relationships involving level of shame-proneness support to the hypotheses generated in the present study if the low shame group is excluded from the analyses (see Figures 5 through 9 above). While the specific results will be discussed below, the question that this raises is why the low shame groups did not fit the hypothesized larger patterns. It is possible that while persons receiving high shame scores were indeed relatively high in their proneness to experiencing shame, and those receiving medium shame scores were in some sense "average" in shame-proneness, persons in the low shame-group were not necessarily low in shame-proneness. Rather, this group may have been composed of both low shame persons and persons relatively unwilling to acknowledge their capacity to feel shame (perhaps too ashamed of it?). It is not possible to confirm or disconfirm the validity of this notion in the present study, however this issue should be addressed in future research. The implications of such a possibility for the interpretation of the data will be discussed in a later section of this Discussion.

TAT Measures

In addition to the problems with the measurement of proneness to both shame and guilt, there were also problems with the TAT measures. First of all, the corrected reliability coefficients for the TAT variables ranged from $r = .91$ to as low as $r = .32$, with seven of the eleven variables having coefficients less than or equal to $r = .70$. This was likely a result of at least two factors. Some of the variables, particularly those involving multiple themes (and thus producing multiple measurement error), were relatively complex and thus,

despite the considerable training the raters received, were relatively difficult to code. Secondly, some of the themes occurred very rarely. For example, there was an average of only .06 Compensation-Atonement themes per participant. That is, a total of only six for all 1020 stories (see Table 9 above). With so few scorable themes, each discrepancy was a relatively large proportion of the total score and thus carried greater weight than was the case for variables that were more common. In addition, it is possible that coder's vigilance for a particular event lessens when the event is rare. The notion that the low inter-rater reliabilities were, at least in part, a result of the frequency of occurrence of these themes, is supported by the finding that inter-rater reliability and frequency of occurrence were moderately correlated ($r = .58$).

The low reliability of several of the TAT measures has obvious consequences for the sensitivity of the significance tests of the relationships of other variables with these TAT measures. It also limits the magnitude of the correlation coefficients involving these TAT variables. In addition, the low frequency with which the TAT themes were scored could in itself lower the magnitude of the correlation coefficient of the other variables with these variables by reducing the range of scores on these TAT variables.

An interesting finding involving the TAT variables stems from the results of an elementary linkage analysis. The analysis suggested that the eleven variables clustered into two groups. The first group was composed of Punishment-Atonement, Moral Transgression, Punishment, Evil-Projection, Compensation-Atonement, and marginally, Exposure Reduction. All of these variables, with the exception of Exposure

Reduction, were hypothesized to be related to guilt-proneness. However, these five variables all contain an element of aggression and thus their hypothesized link to guilt, while consistent with this finding, is not, on this basis, a necessary mediating variable. (The relationship between guilt and aggression is discussed below.)

A second cluster was composed of Moral Goodness, Rejection/Abandonment, Positive Evaluation, Independence, and marginally, Exposure of Inadequacy. The first three of these variables--Moral Goodness, Independence, and Positive Evaluation--are positive personality traits, while the fifth variable--(Exposure of) Inadequacy--represents the other side of this coin. The fourth variable, Rejection/Abandonment, appears to represent the response that possession of the first three traits helps to avoid, and which the fifth, elicits. Thus there appears to be a conceptual basis for grouping these five variables together. The relationship between four of these variables and proneness to shame is discussed below.

Findings

Shame and Dependency

While the hypotheses involving the measures of proneness to shame were not all supported, two of the seven relevant variables were significantly correlated with shame-proneness and several were either just short of significance or yielded relational patterns that were amenable to interpretations that were consistent with the hypotheses.

Of particular interest was the relationship between proneness to shame and scores on two related scales of the Interpersonal Dependency Inventory: Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOC0) and Emotional

Reliance on Others (IEMREL). Each measures forms of dependency.

ILSOCO, with items like "I am quick to agree with the opinions expressed by others" and "I have a lot of trouble making decisions by myself" was described by its authors as a measure of dependency reflecting a wish for help in decision-making, in social situations, and in taking initiative (Hirschfeld et al., 1977). Shame-proneness was moderately correlated ($r = .56$) with ILSOCO, a linkage that significantly exceeded the bond between ILSOCO and guilt-proneness ($p = .025$).

Similarly, IEMREL, with items like "The idea of losing a close friend is terrifying to me" and "I must have one person who is very special to me", was described by its authors as reflecting an awareness of the need for specific other persons, as well as a general wish for others' approval and attention. Shame-proneness was modestly correlated with IEMREL ($r = .35$) although the magnitude of this relationship was just short of being significantly greater than that between IEMREL and proneness to guilt ($p = .06$).

These results support the notion that shame is associated with dependency and rejection. A brief review of the theory of shame described earlier illustrates the degree of theoretical consensus regarding the role of dependency and rejection in the shame experience.

Both Freud (1924) and Levin (1967) described shame as an affect that serves as a signal to redirect and limit the expression of sexual energy in order to avoid rejection. According to Alexander (1938), the deepest source of shame ("inferiority feelings") is the early conflict between the wish to grow up and the regressive pull to passive dependency. The ego, which identifies with the independent attitude, reacts to regressive wishes with feelings of inferiority. Wallace

(1963) described shame as a "defense against the feeling of annihilation that occurs if . . . (external narcissistic) supplies are withdrawn" (p. 82). Individuals experiencing shame attribute self-esteem regulating capacities to external persons. Lewis (1971) wrote that the experience of shame is the loss of self-love that occurs via loss of esteem in the eyes of the "internalized" parents. She found shame-prone individuals highly field-dependent, suggesting a self that is inadequately differentiated from the environment. According to Kaufman (1980), shame is originally induced when the interpersonal bridge with a parent is broken by the parent. The child eventually attempts to maintain the interpersonal connection with the parents by splitting himself or herself into a "not me" and a part that, via this disowning, becomes the parents' ally. One thus rejects, and so shames, oneself in an effort to retain the love of one's parents. And Wurmser (1981) wrote that the threat in shame is contemptuous rejection accompanied by isolation. The basic fear, he thought, is loss of love, a version of separation anxiety. While shame functions as a motive for defense, in content it is the pain of feeling unloved and unlovable.

In light of this plethora of theoretical support, it was not surprising to find proneness to shame correlated with both dependency measures, ILSOCO and IEMREL. The basic assumptions sketched above, regarding the nature of the shame experience, seem compatible with the empirical findings. The results were largely consistent with the description of the relational component of shame summarized below.

Shame, more than any other affect, involves the self. Triggered initially by violated expectations of one's world, shame jolts the individual out of the experience of "going-on-being." It disrupts the

silent automatic functioning in which there is little consciousness of oneself as a separate being, thus facilitating the development of a conscious sense of self. Shame is thus a painful reminder of the fact that, despite one's regressive wishes to escape the solitude of identity, psychological merging will be only conditionally supported, at best. Still, the wish to merge remains. Thus the avoidance of shame becomes a motive for the erection of defenses against vulnerability to shame. The wish to merge through the absorbing of the other--expressed as exhibitionism--and the wish to merge by becoming part of the other--expressed as scopophilia--are defended against by the reaction formations of hiding and the refusal to look. The avoidance of shame also becomes a motive for the hiding of parts of oneself that have come to be associated with rejection. Thus the exposure of inadequacies and the expression of feelings or needs which have been associated with rejection--either active rejection or the absence of a validating response (a reaction which is also experienced as rejection)--are avoided in an effort to protect against the experience of shame.

Shame and the TAT Measures

As mentioned above, the relationships between shame-proneness and the hypothesized shame-related TAT measures were consistent with the hypotheses if analyzed with the low shame group excluded. These TAT variables were: Inadequacy, Rejection, Exposure Reduction, Independence, and Positive Evaluation. In addition to the exclusion of the low shame group, however, two other important mitigating factors should be noted. First, of the five relationships, only Inadequacy attained statistical significance ($F(2,99) = 3.27, p < .05$). Secondly, while high shame-prone persons told a greater number of stories containing themes

of inadequacy, rejection, and withdrawal (exposure reduction) than medium shame-prone persons, the opposite trend occurred for the number of stories containing themes of independence and positive evaluation. It is possible that the latter trends were due to the poor capacity of high shame-prone persons to protect against shame through these avoidance defenses and thus their relative absence of concern with these themes. By being attractive to or positively evaluated by others, one avoids the experience of rejection and possible exposure to the feeling of shame. By being independent of others one minimizes the impact of rejection and thus also avoids the experience of shame. In the present study, however, the discrepancies between medium- and high-shame participants on both Independence and Positive Evaluation scores were considerably short of significance and thus the possibility of their being due to chance must be considered.

Sources of Shame and the Division of the Korpi Shame Scale

A post hoc examination of the Korpi Shame Scale suggested that these shame-related items might be meaningfully grouped into several small subscales. This was investigated by listing several categories of events that these "shame-activators" appeared to be examples of, and asking four persons well-acquainted with the concept of shame to indicate which of these labels described each of the 17 shame items. Those labels which were scored for a particular item by three or more of the four raters were then used as the category into which that item was placed. The actual questionnaire used, as well as the categorizations of the items, can be found in Appendix G.

Fourteen of the seventeen items were grouped into one or the other of five categories of shame triggers. These categories were:

(a) Task Competence (TC)--lack of competence at work or in a task of some sort; (b) Social Incongruity or Inappropriateness (SC); (c) Body (B)--shame about some aspect of one's own body; (d) Relationships (R)--interpersonal incompetence or failure, or shame-producing relationship needs, interests, attitudes or activities; and (e) Feelings (F)--shame about one's experience or expression of feelings.

A number of correlations involving these five shame subscales were computed. The results indicated that, although these scales were generally moderately inter-correlated, participants did indeed respond differentially to the items in these scales. The inter-correlations among these subscales ranged from $r = .14$ to $r = .51$ (see Table 9 in Appendix A). In addition, the presence of sex differences, along with the fact that the correlations between the scores on these scales and that of the other measures varied among subscales, suggested that these subscales were tapping into different phenomena.

Two of these subscales yielded sex differences that were statistically significant. Males scored higher on the Feelings subscale ($r = .35$, $p = .001$), while females scored higher on the Body subscale ($r = -.18$, $p = .037$). These findings are consistent with popular notions about sex differences, with males being embarrassed by, or uncomfortable with, feelings, and females concerned about their bodies.

The notion of differential sensitivities to particular categories of shame activators has important implications. First, a shame-activator sensitivity profile provides information about the extent to which an individual is generally prone to experiencing shame, but also about the degree to which various situations are differentially shame-inducing for that individual.

Secondly, this highlights the importance of the representativeness of the items used to assess shame-proneness. An example of a potential problem that could result if this issue is ignored is the case where the items over-represent a particular category of shame-activators. Two individuals, who with a more representative sample of items would yield comparable shame scores, could be portrayed via an unrepresentative test as quite different in their proneness to shame simply because they differ in their sensitivity to this over-represented category. Such a problem may have existed in the present study, in which the Korpi Shame scale contained five Feeling subscale items (more shame-inducing for males) while only two Body subscale items (more shame inducing for females).

Sex Differences

It was originally hypothesized that females would be more prone to experiencing shame than guilt, while males would be more prone to experiencing guilt than shame. These hypotheses stemmed from the thinking that females, who have been found to be more field dependent than males (Lewis, 1971), would also be more interpersonally dependent. They were thought likely to be more vulnerable to rejection and, thus, more prone to experiencing shame. It was thought that males, who have been found to be more field independent, would be less concerned with rejection and more concerned with the negative consequences of their hurtful behavior. The assumption here was that males, with a greater level of defensiveness in regard to their need for others, would be more likely to see themselves as powerful and independent, and so, less in need of others. The danger for males was thus thought to stem from

their experience of themselves as powerful and thus potentially hurtful to others rather than weak, needy, and thus vulnerable to rejection. The danger itself was believed to be anxiety about punishment triggered in response to a (fantasied) misuse of their power.

Contrary to expectations, however, the data suggested that males were more shame-prone, and females more guilt-prone. These findings generally fell short of significance. However, the correlation between shame-proneness and gender was significantly different than between guilt-proneness and gender, in the direction opposite of that predicted. This was consistent with the results of the Negri (1978) study mentioned earlier, in which masculinity was found to correlate with shame-proneness, and femininity, with guilt-proneness. It was also consistent with the results of a study conducted by Hoffman (1975) which suggested that moral transgression is more likely to be associated with guilt in females than it is in males.

These results may be explained in the following way. It is possible that both shame and some guilt experiences involve the fear of loss of the relationship with another. Shame involves the fear of loss due to rejection in response to something wrong with oneself. Guilt may involve a feared loss (as well as other negative consequences) resulting from the perceived destructiveness of one's aggression. Both men and women may be concerned with loss, but women are concerned with loss resulting from (what is experienced as) the destructiveness of their aggression in the context of a relationship, while both men and women are concerned with loss due to rejection--each for different types of "deficiencies" of the self. In addition to the present finding that women are more prone to guilt than men, this notion is supported by the

following.

First of all, either the composite Guilt measure or at least one of the simple guilt measures were negatively correlated ($p < .05$) with each of the following "aggressive" TAT themes (see Table 18): Moral Transgression, Punishment, Punishment-Atonement, Compensation-Atonement, and Evil-Projection. This is consistent with the notion that guilt is related to conflicts about aggression. The findings (though short of significance) that men consistently told more TAT stories with aggressive content than did women (Moral Transgression, Punishment, and Punishment-Atonement) lends further support to the notion of women being more guilt-prone than men as a result of a greater reluctance to express aggression. It should be noted that Pollak and Gilligan (1982) obtained a similar finding in their study of undergraduate TAT stories, but interpreted their results differently. They also found that women wrote fewer total stories with aggressive content, but noticed that when the TAT stimuli were grouped according to whether the situations depicted in the pictures were illustrations of achievement or affiliation situations, a sex difference in the distribution emerged as well. That is, violence in men's stories was more frequent in response to situations of affiliation, whereas violence in women's stories appeared more often in response to situations of achievement. They interpreted this as implying that men and women perceive danger in different contexts and construe danger in different ways.

This idea was expanded on by Gilligan (1982), who extended Erikson's work on psychosexual stages, claiming that men and women take different life cycle paths. She stated that, whereas male conflicts over identity are dealt with before intimacy issues, the opposite is

true for women. She stated that "for boys and men separation and individuation are critically tied to gender identity since separation from mother is essential for the development of masculinity" (p.8). For girls and women, on the other hand,

issues of . . . feminine identity do not depend on the achievement of separation from the mother. Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy, while female gender identity is threatened by separation. Thus males tend to have difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have problems with individuation. (p. 8)

In a discussion of the work of Robert May (1980), who also found male TAT stories to contain more aggression than did female stories, Pollak and Gilligan (1982) criticized his assumption that the male preponderance of aggression is the norm so that the discrepancy between males and females is the result of defensiveness on the part of the females. They claim, instead, that the discrepancy is more accurately seen as the result of the male conflict over intimacy.

Whether one views these sex differences in aggressive responses to affiliative stimuli as a result of male conflict about intimacy, or female defensiveness over aggression, holds important implications for how one views men and women in general. It is my belief that these views are not mutually exclusive and that each has merit. That is, both of these factors are thought to contribute to the sex differences found in the production of aggressive content in TAT stories. Thus, this finding is seen as being interpreted in a manner that is not biased against women, but still supports the notion that women are more guilt prone than men because of their feelings about the interpersonal consequences of aggression.

The meaning of the finding that males were more shame-prone than females is unclear. As mentioned earlier, it is important to consider the representativeness of the sample of shame activators which the measure includes. While the present study found higher global Shame scores for males than for females, an analysis of the shame-activator subscales revealed sex differences in both directions, depending on the particular subscale. That is, males were more easily shamed by some things (e.g., expression of feelings) while females were more easily shamed by others (e.g., their bodies). Because the presently used measures failed to take such differences into account, it is difficult to discern whether or not the results reflected true sex differences in overall propensity to experience shame, or simply an overrepresentation of situations particularly shameful for males.

If the former notion is indeed correct, it is possible that this is the result of a greater number and variety of situations that are experienced as shameful for males. This question requires further investigation.

Shame and Guilt: A Comparison of Models

Lewis (1971) described shame and guilt as different but equally advanced superego functions. Implicit in her conceptualization was the assumption that each is a unitary phenomenon. That is, each is activated by a category of events unique to it and each evolves from a particular unconscious threat associated with it. In addition, she saw proneness to guilt and proneness to shame associated with opposite ends of a continuum of psychological differentiation. Shame-prone persons were thought to be field-dependent while guilt-prone persons were

thought to be field-independent.

In contrast, Kaufman (1980) and Tomkins (1963; personal communication, November 20, 1982) offered the following description of shame and guilt. Both see shame as essentially a unitary experience with a single affect, "shame-humiliation", underlying the variations of the experience. Guilt, however, is seen as a group of experiences with no unifying affect. Instead, the term guilt refers to any of a number of affective experiences, with the activator, rather than the affect, as the unifying factor. Thus guilt refers to moral transgression that triggers: (a) shame, (b) self-disgust, (c) contempt against the self by the self, (d) dissmell, (e) anger at the self, (f) fear at the self, or (g) self-blame. As a result, while shame and guilt are not identical, they can, and often do, refer to the same inner state.

A comparison of these two models of shame and guilt was not originally planned as part of the present study. However the results obtained do bear on such a comparison, so that, while there is obviously a need for further investigation, a discussion of these findings seems useful. Three findings, in particular, are relevant to this issue. First of all, proneness to shame and guilt were found to have significant positive correlations with both objective measures of dependency: ILSOCO and IEMREL. Since both models involve the notion that shame is related to rejection and, thus, dependency, the positive correlation between shame and these measures is consistent with both of these models. However, the finding that guilt was also positively correlated with ILSOCO and IEMREL, argues against the Lewis model. On the other hand, the Kaufman and Tomkins notion that the affect involved in guilt is often shame--that is, shame and guilt often overlap--is

consistent with this finding.

The second finding, that of a significant positive correlation between proneness to shame and proneness to guilt ($r = .32$, $p = .001$), provided more direct support for the Kaufman/Tomkins notion that shame and guilt often overlap. This conflicts with Lewis's notion that shame and guilt are associated with opposite extremes of a continuum of psychological differentiation.

The third finding of relevance here was that all of the positive correlations of Shame with IEMREL and ILSOCO--with Guilt partialled out--significantly exceeded the positive correlations of Guilt with IEMREL and ILSOCO--with Shame partialled out. This is consistent with the Kaufman/Tomkins model in which shame is present in some, but not all, guilt experiences. That is, if shame-proneness is seen as directly related to dependency, then an experience which has a shame component would be expected to be related to dependency in direct proportion to the extent to which that experience involved shame. If shame and guilt indeed overlap incompletely, as is thought to be the case, then one would expect to find guilt correlated with dependency, but not to the extent that shame is.

Summary

The present study investigated a number of aspects of shame and guilt. Several hypotheses were tested, with the results supporting some, but not all, of these. A number of interesting findings emerged.

First, as predicted, shame-proneness correlated positively with dependency. This was seen as supporting the notion that the experience of shame is initially triggered by rejection and thus shame-inducing

events are, in some sense, associated with this danger.

Secondly, several findings converged to provide support for the Kaufman/Tomkins model in which shame is a unitary state with a single affect underlying its variations, and guilt refers to a group of states--shame among them--with moral transgression as the activator unifying the category. This was in contrast to the Lewis model in which shame and guilt are seen as different, but parallel, unitary processes, each associated with opposite ends of a continuum of psychological differentiation.

A third finding was the result of an analysis of the items of the Korpi Shame scale. The data suggested that shame activators can be meaningfully organized into groups of such activators to which individuals are differentially sensitive. Males, for example, were found to have greater shame about the expression of feelings, whereas females had greater shame about their bodies.

A fourth set of findings, while short of significance, were sex differences in proneness to shame and to guilt. Males were found to be more shame-prone while females were found to be more guilt-prone. This was seen as supporting the notion that women experience aggression as more threatening to relationships than do men. The sex difference in proneness to shame was hypothesized to result from there being a greater number and variety of situations that are experienced as indicative of one's defectiveness or inadequacy--and thus shame-producing--for men than for women.

Directions for Future Research

The present research was viewed as an exploratory study, and its

purpose was thus seen largely as a springboard for future research. A much-needed first step is the improvement of the measures of shame and guilt. As discussed above, the presently used measures, particularly the shame measures, are in need of validation. In addition, on the basis of the finding that shame-proneness can be meaningfully grouped according to its various sources, an important direction to go toward the goal of refining the measurement of shame, would be to outline specific sources of shame so that a shame profile can be generated for each participant. Thus particular sources of shame for an individual or for a group could be identified.

Another direction for future research would be to address the question of the meaning of the "low-shame" category. That is, is a person who experiences shame relatively infrequently, and then only of moderate intensity, "well-defended" against shame or does the person actually have a lesser "amount" of "potential" shame to be activated.

A third direction would be to further investigate the defenses involved in both escaping from (or reducing), as well as avoiding, each of these experiences. This would likely involve a revision of the scoring system used with the TAT measures in the present study, the development of new categories, or perhaps the development of new measures. An important corollary to this is the importance of differentiating the actual shame and guilt experiences from the defenses against them, as well as from the thoughts and feelings associated with each.

And of course, the findings obtained in the present study--the sex differences found, the relationship between dependency and both shame and guilt, and the evidence supporting the Kaufman/Tomkins theory of

shame and guilt--will require replication. This is true of the significant findings but particularly true of the marginally and nearly significant findings.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TABLES

Table 1
Mean Scores for Males Grouped by Level of Shame-Proneness

	High-Shame	Medium-Shame	Low-Shame
Korpi Shame (KS)	60.11	51.75	47.24
Korpi Guilt (KG)	60.28 _a	60.25 _a	57.29 _a
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	119.61	110.50	95.35
Mosher Sex-Guilt (MSG) (ZMSG)	1.41 .06 _a	1.44 .17 _a	1.35 -.22 _a
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (MHG) (ZMHG)	1.64 .04 _a	1.67 .18 _a	1.60 -.22 _a
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (MMCG) (ZMMCG)	1.63 .14 _a	1.59 -.08 _a	1.59 -.07 _a
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	49.11 _a	43.69 _{a, b}	40.35 _b
Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO)	34.39	28.44 _a	26.53 _a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	28.78 _a	29.56 _a	31.41 _a
SHY (S71)	1.78 _a	1.56 _a	1.06
Shy Intensity (S72)	3.72 _a	2.94 _{a, b}	2.35 _b
Shy Frequency (S73)	3.56	2.50 _a	1.94 _a
Shy Comparison (S74)	3.17 _a	2.88 _{a, b}	2.12 _b
Shy Problems (S75)	3.67	2.25 _a	2.29 _a
Introversion (S76)	4.11 _a	3.69 _a	3.47 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 2
Mean Number of TAT Themes for Males Grouped
by Level of Shame-Proneness

	High-Shame	Medium-Shame	Low-Shame
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.92 _a	.78 _a	.85 _a
Moral Transgression (1b)	2.25 _a	3.00 _a	2.91 _a
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.67 _a	3.50 _a	2.32
Punishment (2b)	1.72 _a	2.22 _a	2.18 _a
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.69 _a	.59 _a	.47 _a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.78 _a	1.31 _a	1.21 _a
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.03 _a	.00 _a	.06 _a
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	.81 _a	1.31 _a	1.26 _a
Independence (4a1)	2.42 _a	2.42 _a	2.18 _a
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.56 _a	.66 _a	.62 _a
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	2.97 _a	3.06 _a	2.79 _a
Evil-Projection (4b1)	1.67 _a	2.00 _a	2.06 _a
Moral Goodness (4b2)	1.78 _a	1.06 _b	1.21 _{a, b}
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	3.44 _a	3.06 _a	3.26 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 3
Mean Scores for Females Grouped by Level of Shame-Proneness

	High-Shame	Medium-Shame	Low-Shame
Korpi Shame (KS)	58.06	50.83	42.00
Korpi Guilt (KG)	61.47 _a	62.11 _a	59.44 _a
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	118.18	109.50	95.38
Mosher Sex-Guilt (MSG) (ZMSG)	1.30 .35 _a	1.21 -.14 _a	1.20 -.21 _a
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (MHG) (ZMHG)	1.54 .20 _a	1.50 -.01 _a	1.46 -.20 _a
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (MMCG) (ZMMCG)	1.45 .70	1.27 -.19 _a	1.20 -.53 _a
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	47.71	41.83 _a	40.50 _a
Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO)	33.76	26.67 _a	24.69 _a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	26.24 _a	24.56 _a	26.50 _a
SHY (S71)	1.82	1.22 _a	1.06 _a
Shy Intensity (S72)	3.12 _a	2.78 _a	2.69 _a
Shy Frequency (S73)	2.76 _a	2.33 _{a, b}	1.88 _b
Shy Comparison (S74)	3.35	2.39 _a	2.31 _a
Shy Problems (S75)	3.35	2.33 _a	1.69 _a
Introversion (S76)	4.12	2.78 _a	2.56 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 4
Mean Number of TAT Themes for Females Grouped
by Level of Shame-Proneess

	High-Shame	Medium-Shame	Low-Shame
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	1.24 _a	.69 _a	.91 _a
Moral Transgression (1b)	2.50 _a	1.72 _a	2.66 _a
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.74 _a	3.47 _a	3.75 _a
Punishment (2b)	1.76 _a	1.89 _a	1.59 _a
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.62 _a	.42 _a	.59 _a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	1.03 _a	.61 _a	1.09 _a
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.06 _a	.08 _a	.12 _a
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	1.09 _a	.69 _a	1.22 _a
Independence (4a1)	2.18 _a	2.64 _a	2.53 _a
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.76 _a	1.00 _a	.59 _a
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	2.94 _a	3.64 _a	3.12 _a
Evil-Projection (4b1)	2.26 _a	2.11 _a	2.38 _a
Moral Goodness (4b2)	2.00 _a	2.44 _a	2.34 _a
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	4.26 _a	4.56 _a	4.72 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 5
Mean Scores for Males Grouped by Level of Guilt-Proneness

	High-Guilt	Medium-Guilt	Low-Guilt
Korpi Shame (KS)	52.89 _{a, b}	56.19 _a	51.24 _b
Korpi Guilt (KG)	64.06 _a	61.00 _a	52.59
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	111.39 _a	110.06 _a	104.47 _a
Mosher Sex-Guilt (MSG) (ZMSG)	1.58 .83	1.40 .03	1.20 -.90
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (MHG) (ZMHG)	1.77 .75	1.59 -.26 _a	1.54 -.56 _a
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (MMCG) (ZMMCG)	1.76 .84	1.62 .07	1.43 -.95
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	43.61 _a	46.06 _a	43.94 _a
Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO)	31.17 _a	31.56 _a	27.00 _a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	29.94 _a	30.44 _a	29.35 _a
SHY (S71)	1.39 _a	1.62 _a	1.41 _a
Shy Intensity (S72)	3.06 _a	3.31 _a	2.71 _a
Shy Frequency (S73)	2.56 _a	3.19 _a	2.35 _a
Shy Comparison (S74)	2.67 _{a, b}	3.25 _a	2.29 _b
Shy Problems (S75)	2.67 _a	3.12 _a	2.53 _a
Introversion (S76)	4.06 _a	3.50 _a	3.71 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 6
Mean Number of TAT Themes for Males Grouped
by Level of Guilt-Proneness

	High-Guilt	Medium-Guilt	Low-Guilt
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.83 _a	.84 _a	.88 _a
Moral Transgression (1b)	2.61 _a	2.84 _a	2.68 _a
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.33 _a	3.38 _a	2.79 _a
Punishment (2b)	2.14 _a	2.09 _a	1.85 _a
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.64 _a	.62 _a	.50 _a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	1.08 _a	1.19 _a	1.00 _a
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00 _a	.03 _a	.06 _a
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	1.08 _a	1.22 _a	1.06 _a
Independence (4a1)	2.31 _a	1.91 _a	2.76 _a
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.58 _{a, b}	.91 _a	.35 _b
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	2.89 _a	2.81 _a	3.12 _a
Evil-Projection (4b1)	1.69 _a	2.06 _a	1.97 _a
Moral Goodness (4b2)	1.39 _a	1.44 _a	1.26 _a
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	3.08 _a	3.50 _a	3.24 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 7
Mean Scores for Females Grouped by Level of Guilt-Proneness

	High-Guilt	Medium-Guilt	Low-Guilt
Korpi Shame (KS)	54.56	48.06 _a	48.41 _a
Korpi Guilt (KG)	63.61 _a	62.50 _a	57.00
Cattell Embarrassability (EMB)	111.11 _a	106.88 _a	105.65 _a
Mosher Sex-Guilt (MSG) (ZMSG)	1.40 .87	1.16 -.39 _a	1.13 -.55 _a
Mosher Hostility-Guilt (MHG) (ZMHG)	1.65 .77	1.53 .16	1.30 -.96
Mosher Morality-Conscience-Guilt (MMCG) (ZMMCG)	1.52 1.08	1.23 -.39	1.15 -.76
Emotional Reliance on Another Person (IEMREL)	47.44 _a	41.75 _{a, b}	40.59 _b
Lack of Social Self-Confidence (ILSOCO)	32.83	26.75 _a	25.29 _a
Assertion of Autonomy (IAUT)	24.72 _a	28.12 _a	24.53 _a
SHY (S71)	1.61 _a	1.31 _{a, b}	1.18 _b
Shy Intensity (S72)	2.94 _a	3.06 _a	2.59 _a
Shy Frequency (S73)	2.44 _a	2.25 _a	2.29 _a
Shy Comparison (S74)	3.06 _a	2.81 _{a, b}	2.18 _b
Shy Problems (S75)	3.06 _a	2.44 _{a, b}	1.88 _b
Introversions (S76)	3.67 _a	3.12 _{a, b}	2.65 _b

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 8
Mean Number of TAT Themes for Females Grouped
by Level of Guilt-Proneness

	High-Guilt	Medium-Guilt	Low-Guilt
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.81 _a	1.06 _a	.97 _a
Moral Transgression (1b)	1.89 _a	2.28 _a	2.68 _a
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	3.47 _a	3.91 _a	3.59 _a
Punishment (2b)	1.61 _a	1.62 _a	2.00 _a
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.61 _a	.53 _a	.47 _a
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.78 _a	.94 _a	1.00 _a
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.06 _a	.06 _a	.15 _a
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	.83 _a	1.00 _a	1.15 _a
Independence (4a1)	2.36 _{a, b}	2.09 _a	2.88 _b
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.69 _a	.81 _a	.88 _a
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	3.06 _a	2.91 _a	3.76 _a
Evil-Projection (4b1)	2.08 _a	2.38 _a	2.29 _a
Moral Goodness (4b2)	2.67 _a	1.94 _a	2.15 _a
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	4.75 _a	4.31 _a	4.44 _a

Note. Common subscripts indicate that group differences were not statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Table 9
Intercorrelations Among Korpi Shame Subscales

	KTC	KSI	KB	KR	KF
KTC	-				
KSI	.51**	-			
KB	.32**	.31**	-		
KR	.32**	.28*	.14	-	
KF	.45**	.38**	.24*	.32**	-

* $p < .01$
** $p < .001$

Table 10
Mean Scores on TAT Card 1 Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.09	.10	.09
Moral Transgression (1b)	.07	.09	.08
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.21	.23	.22
Punishment (2b)	.21	.17	.19
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.02	.05	.03
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.06	.06	.06
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.00	.00
Independence (4a1)	.32	.24	.28
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.15	.19	.17
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.12	.19	.15
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.04	.05	.04

Table 11
Mean Scores on TAT Card 2 Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.00	.10	.05
Moral Transgression (1b)	.10	.06	.08
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.19	.15	.17
Punishment (2b)	.11	.10	.10
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.01	.05	.03
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.02	.01	.01
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.02	.00	.01
Independence (4a1)	.37	.63	.50
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.03	.08	.05
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.05	.04	.04
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.15	.26	.20

Table 12
Mean Scores on TAT Card 3BM Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.21	.23	.22
Moral Transgression (1b)	.31	.28	.30
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.55	.61	.58
Punishment (2b)	.29	.24	.26
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.12	.10	.11
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.20	.12	.16
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.02	.01
Independence (4a1)	.12	.10	.11
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.04	.03	.03
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.24	.26	.25
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.07	.17	.12

Table 13
Mean Scores on TAT Card 3GF Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.13	.11	.12
Moral Transgression (1b)	.26	.21	.23
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.40	.59	.50
Punishment (2b)	.21	.26	.24
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.15	.06	.10
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.10	.11	.10
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.00	.00
Independence (4a1)	.12	.07	.09
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.04	.06	.05
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.23	.41	.32
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.15	.23	.19

Table 14
Mean Scores on TAT Card 6BM Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.09	.06	.07
Moral Transgression (1b)	.18	.17	.17
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.40	.53	.47
Punishment (2b)	.16	.16	.16
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.05	.01	.03
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.14	.10	.12
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.01	.02	.01
Independence (4a1)	.18	.26	.22
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.14	.09	.11
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.14	.22	.18
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.22	.30	.26

Table 15
Mean Scores on TAT Card 7BM Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.05	.04	.04
Moral Transgression (1b)	.22	.12	.16
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.24	.20	.22
Punishment (2b)	.19	.17	.18
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.02	.05	.03
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.10	.04	.07
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.01	.00
Independence (4a1)	.38	.35	.37
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.08	.12	.10
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.12	.12	.12
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.24	.26	.25

Table 16
Mean Scores of TAT Card 8BM Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.02	.09	.05
Moral Transgression (1b)	.45	.39	.42
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.18	.23	.20
Punishment (2b)	.27	.22	.24
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.01	.03	.02
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.15	.15	.15
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.01	.00
Independence (4a1)	.38	.34	.36
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.06	.09	.07
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.38	.28	.33
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.14	.15	.14

Table 17
Mean Scores on TAT Card 13MF Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.15	.09	.12
Moral Transgression (1b)	.51	.45	.48
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.40	.54	.47
Punishment (2b)	.24	.10	.17
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.08	.11	.09
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.09	.20	.14
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.02	.01
Independence (4a1)	.13	.12	.12
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.03	.08	.05
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.30	.38	.34
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.17	.37	.27

Table 18
Mean Scores on TAT Card 14 Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.09	.06	.07
Moral Transgression (1b)	.24	.15	.19
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.24	.24	.24
Punishment (2b)	.14	.13	.13
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.14	.09	.11
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.06	.03	.04
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.00	.00
Independence (4a1)	.18	.26	.22
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.03	.06	.04
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.06	.10	.08
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.04	.08	.06

Table 19
Mean Scores on TAT Card 18GF Grouped by Gender

	Males	Females	All
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.04	.08	.06
Moral Transgression (1b)	.39	.36	.38
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.36	.35	.36
Punishment (2b)	.23	.23	.23
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.00	.00	.00
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	.19	.11	.15
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	.00	.01	.00
Independence (4a1)	.16	.09	.12
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.02	.01	.01
Evil-Projection (4b1)	.26	.26	.26
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.17	.40	.28

Table 20
Correlations Among Males Between Shame and Guilt
Measures and Objective Dependent Variables

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	MSG	MHG	MMCG
IEMREL	.35 **	.46 ***	.25 *	.13	.08	.28 *	.01	-.04	-.04
ILSOCO	.54 ***	.45 ***	.37 **	.43 ***	.32 **	.19	.35 **	.22	.19
IAUT	-.16	-.09	-.18	-.10	.06	.08	.12	-.07	.05
Shy Intensity	.46 ***	.29 *	.28 *	.49 ***	.21	-.13	.33 **	.21	.24 *
Shy Frequency	.62 ***	.38 **	.37 **	.68 ***	.20	-.02	.36 **	.21	.07
Shy Comparison	.46 ***	.26 *	.20	.60 ***	.21	-.01	.33 **	.22	.08
Shy Problems	.64 ***	.52 ***	.35 **	.61 ***	.17	-.07	.24 *	.22	.13
Intro- version	.21	.12	-.01	.38 **	.12	-.11	.22	.16	.09

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

Table 21
Correlations Among Females Between Shame and Guilt Measures
and Objective Dependent Variables

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	MSG	MHG	MMCG
IEMREL	.34**	.33**	.30*	.16	.32**	.05	.24*	.23*	.38**
ILSOCO	.57***	.42***	.47***	.44***	.45***	.01	.39**	.30*	.59***
IAUT	-.07	-.10	-.17	.10	-.09	-.10	-.06	-.02	-.07
Shy Intensity	.16	-.06	.06	.38**	.12	-.12	.11	.18	.14
Shy Frequency	.44***	.17	.35**	.51***	.04	-.02	.05	-.02	.10
Shy Comparison	.45***	.19	.25*	.62***	.33**	.08	.24*	.21	.40**
Shy Problems	.52***	.41**	.29*	.51***	.32**	.19	.17	.16	.43***
Intro- version	.42***	.39**	.23*	.36**	.23*	-.02	.18	.09	.40**

*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001

Table 22
Correlations Between Shame and Guilt Measures and
Objective Dependent Variables

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	ZMSG	ZMHG	ZMMCG
IEMREL	.35***	.39***	.27**	.15	.18*	.17*	.12	.09	.16
ILSOCO	.56***	.44***	.41***	.44***	.37***	.09	.36***	.26**	.38***
IAUT	-.07	-.03	-.16	.02	-.02	-.03	.03	-.05	-.01
Shy Intensity	.33***	.13	.19*	.44***	.17*	-.13	.23**	.19*	.19*
Shy Frequency	.55***	.30***	.36***	.61***	.13	-.04	.23*	.11	.08
Shy Comparison	.45***	.22*	.22*	.60***	.26**	.03	.29**	.22*	.22*
Shy Problems	.58***	.47***	.32***	.57***	.24**	.03	.20*	.19*	.28**
Intro- version	.33***	.28**	.10	.38***	.16	-.09	.20*	.12	.23**

Note. The Mosher Guilt Scales (ZMSG, AMHG, ZMMCG) were standardized within sex.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 23
Correlations Among Males Between Shame and Guilt
Measures and TAT Variables

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	MSG	MHG	MMCG
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.01	-.01	.17	-.14	-.04	-.20	.15	.02	-.07
Moral Transgression (1b)	-.12	-.18	-.26*	.16	-.10	-.16	.05	.00	-.19
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.35**	.23*	.27*	.30*	.17	.01	.28*	.26*	-.04
Punishment (2b)	-.09	-.14	-.03	-.05	-.04	.11	.05	-.24*	-.06
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.12	.14	.12	.02	.09	.10	.10	-.04	.08
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	-.13	-.22	-.09	-.00	-.03	-.06	.15	-.21	.04
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	-.09	-.05	-.10	-.05	-.17	-.09	-.29*	-.17	.03
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	-.13	-.21	-.09	-.01	-.05	-.07	.10	-.22	.04
Independence (4a1)	.07	.02	.11	.04	-.14	-.13	-.08	-.03	-.16
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	-.04	-.03	-.11	.05	.21	.10	.20	.30*	.03
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	.05	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.07	.01	.09	-.13
Evil-Projection (4b1)	-.10	-.11	.04	-.18	-.19	.01	-.06	-.36**	-.18
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.21	.15	.05	.28*	.08	.00	.07	.24*	-.06
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	.07	.02	.07	.06	-.10	.01	.00	-.12	-.19

Table 24
Correlations Among Females Between Shame and Guilt
Measures and TAT Variables

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	MSG	MHG	MMCG
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.10	.11	.11	.01	-.18	-.07	-.13	-.19	-.14
Moral Transgression (1b)	-.01	-.04	-.07	.09	-.26*	-.28*	-.06	-.28*	-.16
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	-.07	-.12	.05	-.08	-.16	-.07	-.23	-.08	-.08
Punishment (2b)	.08	.09	.13	-.04	-.08	-.10	.08	-.12	-.10
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.07	.12	.00	.05	.02	-.00	.10	-.08	.03
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	-.06	-.03	-.11	-.01	-.16	-.17	.07	-.21	-.16
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	-.18	-.17	.01	-.25*	-.07	-.12	-.11	.08	-.07
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	-.10	-.06	-.10	-.06	-.16	-.18	.04	-.18	-.16
Independence (4a1)	-.18	-.10	-.13	-.20	-.10	-.07	-.06	-.03	-.13
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	.01	.03	.03	-.03	-.00	.04	-.06	.00	.02
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	-.13	-.06	-.08	-.17	-.08	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.09
Evil-Projection (4b1)	-.10	-.14	-.02	-.08	-.15	-.11	-.04	-.14	-.14
Moral Goodness (4b2)	-.15	-.15	-.10	-.09	.20	.19	.00	.30*	.09
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	-.19	-.21	-.09	-.13	.04	.06	-.03	.11	-.04

Table 25
Correlations Between Shame and Guilt Measures
and TAT Variables

	Shame	KS	EMB	SHY	Guilt	KG	ZMSG	ZMHG	ZMMCg
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.05	.05	.14	-.06	-.11	-.12	-.01	-.10	-.11
Moral Transgression (1b)	-.04	-.08	-.17*	.14	-.18*	-.22*	-.00	-.13	-.17*
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.13*	.02	.17*	.11	.03	-.01	.04	.10	-.06
Punishment (2b)	-.01	-.02	.03	-.03	-.06	.02	.06	-.19*	-.07
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.10	.13	.06	.04	.05	.05	.10	-.06	.06
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	-.08	-.10	-.09	.00	-.09	-.12	.11	-.21*	-.05
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	-.16	-.15	-.05	-.17*	-.11	-.08	-.19*	-.03	-.02
Total Atonement (3b1 + 3b2)	-.11	-.12	-.10	-.02	-.10	-.12	.08	-.20*	-.05
Independence (4a1)	-.04	-.04	.01	-.06	-.12	-.10	-.07	-.03	-.15
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	-.03	-.02	-.04	-.00	.11	.08	.06	.14	.03
Total Nonrejection (4a1 + 4a2)	-.04	-.04	-.01	-.05	-.05	-.05	-.03	.04	-.11
Evil-Projection (4b1)	-.12	-.15	.01	-.14	-.16	-.02	-.05	-.25**	-.15
Moral Goodness (4b2)	-.03	-.09	-.04	.04	.15	.13	.03	.25**	.02
Total Moral Purity (4b1 + 4b2)	-.11	-.17	-.02	-.07	-.01	.08	-.01	.00	-.10

Table 26
Correlations Between Korpi Shame Subscales
and Objective Variables

	TC	SI	B	R	F
Guilt	.10	.12	.12	.01	.28**
KG	.04	-.00	.11	.03	.15
EMB	.60***	.41***	.22**	.27**	.37***
ZMSG	.02	.04	.04	.00	.19*
ZMHG	.05	.06	.07	-.02	.19*
ZMMHG	.19*	.25**	.14	.00	.28**
IEMREL	.36***	.26**	.18*	.31***	.21*
ILSOCO	.37***	.42***	.08	.19*	.27**
IAUT	-.06	-.10	-.10	.05	.07
SHY	.18*	.08	.13	.15	.37***

Note: The Mosher Guilt Scales (ZMSG,ZMHG, ZMMHG) were standardized within sex.

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

Table 27
Correlations Between Korpi Shame Subscales
and TAT Themes

	TC	SI	B	R	F
Exposure of Inadequacy (1a)	.08	.11	.06	.24**	-.14
Moral Transgression (1b)	-.16*	-.15	-.10	.11	.04
Rejection/Abandonment (2a)	.08	.02	-.09	.03	-.04
Punishment (2b)	-.12	-.02	-.11	.18*	.14
Exposure Reduction (3a)	.11	.16*	-.01	.09	.15
Punishment-Atonement (3b1)	-.09	-.13	-.17*	-.01	.02
Compensation-Atonement (3b2)	-.09	-.10	.02	-.01	-.18*
Independence (4a1)	.03	-.13	.14	-.10	-.02
Positive Evaluation (4a2)	-.00	-.09	.11	-.05	-.08
Evil Projection (4b1)	-.17*	-.09	-.10	.07	-.11
Moral Goodness (4b2)	.01	-.14	.09	-.19*	-.10

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

APPENDIX B

FIGURES

Figure 1. Number of stories containing Moral Transgression themes as a function of shame-proneness and gender.




Figure 2. Number of stories containing Punishment-Atonement themes as a function of shame-proneness and gender.




Figure 3. Number of stories containing Punishment-Atonement or Compensation-Atonement themes as a function of shame-proneness and gender.




Figure 4. Number of stories containing Moral Goodness themes as a function of shame-proneness and gender.




Figure 5. Number of stories containing Inadequacy themes as a function of shame-proneness.




Figure 6. Number of stories containing Rejection themes as a function of shame-proneness.




Figure 7. Number of stories containing Exposure Reduction themes as a function of shame-proneness.




Figure 8. Number of stories containing Independence themes as a function of shame-proneness.





Figure 9. Number of stories containing Positive Evaluation themes as a function of shame-proneness.






Figure 10. TAT variables grouped by type.

Note. Correlations between variables are shown in parentheses between those variables.

↔ Indicates a reciprocal pair of variables.

→ Indicates that the correlation of the variable at the tail of the arrow is highest with the variable at the head, while the inverse of this is not the case.

APPENDIX C

INSTRUMENTS

Korpi Shame-Guilt Test

(KS = shame items, KG = guilt items)

Susceptibility to Embarrassment

Mosher Forced Choice Guilt Scales

(MSG = Sex-guilt items

MHG = Hostility-guilt items

MMCG = Morality conscious-guilt items)

(1) Female form

(2) Male form

Interpersonal Dependency Inventory

(A = Assertion of Autonomy Items--IAUT

E = Emotional Reliance on Others--IEMREL

L = Lack of Social Self-Confidence Items--ILSOCO

Revised Stanford Shyness Survey

Below are a number of situations in which you might find yourself, or which you may have experienced. Please indicate how upset or uncomfortable you think you would feel in each of the situations described by marking, in the space to the left, the number that best corresponds to how you think you would feel. For each situation described rate how you would feel along a scale which ranges from "not at all upset" to "very upset". Be sure to respond to every item.

- 1) Not at all upset
- 2) Somewhat upset
- 3) Fairly upset
- 4) Pretty upset
- 5) Very upset

- _____ 11) You don't report all of your income so your taxes won't be such a drain. (KG)
- _____ 12) Your entire class has to read an article for a paper due the next day. You don't have time to read it in the library and the article cannot be checked out. You rip it out of the magazine and take it with you. (KG)
- _____ 13) You work for a small company. One day you take a couple of folders and a box of paper clips from the office storeroom home with you because you were running out. (KG)
- _____ 14) You are unbelievably awkward trying to play a new sport. Your friends are trying to teach you and you feel as if you are all arms and legs. (KS)
- _____ 15) You're paying the bill after a superb meal in one of the city's best French restaurants. The waiter in returning your change gives you too much. You keep it, acting as if you didn't notice. (KG)
- _____ 16) You are caught unexpectedly by someone talking to yourself. (KS)
- _____ 17) A friend provokes you. In an angry moment you tell him a secret about his wife that he doesn't need to know and that you know will hurt him. (KG)
- _____ 18) Your boss has planned a big meeting where your presentation is to be the highlight. You fail to live up to his expectations and your company loses the account. (KS)
- _____ 19) You are finally involved sexually with someone you have seen as very attractive but uninterested in you. Suddenly you find yourself to be a poor partner. (KS)
- _____ 20) You're telling a joke and suddenly realize you are the only one laughing. (KS)
- _____ 21) You accidentally let it slip in a conversation something that was told to you in strict confidence. (KG)

- 1) Not at all upset
- 2) Somewhat upset
- 3) Fairly upset
- 4) Pretty upset
- 5) Very upset

- _____ 22) You have a mild case of epilepsy. You forget to take your pills and have a convulsion before friends who didn't know. (KS)
- _____ 23) Everyone in your neighborhood takes pride in keeping the neighborhood clean. You're unwrapping a package and casually toss the wrapper on the street, hoping that no one will see you. (KG)
- _____ 24) You and a friend are both looking at houses. He shows you a house he has in mind and it's exactly what you were looking for. He delays and you are afraid that someone else will get it, so you take it. (KG)
- _____ 25) A friend asks you to write a letter of reference and is really depending on your letter. You don't honestly feel you can recommend him highly, so you write a mediocre one, but don't tell him. (KG)
- _____ 26) You are trying to park your car when you smash into the car behind you, denting the fender. You see someone walking toward the car so you drive off, figuring the damage was small. (KG)
- _____ 27) You're usually very calm when discussing heated subjects. All of a sudden you hear your own voice and realize you're almost shouting. (KS)
- _____ 28) You're reading an old diary and can't believe you wrote such nonsense. You feel ridiculous to have written down such things. (KS)

The following statements describe traits, feelings or personal characteristics that might fit you. Please rate each statement according to how characteristic it is of you, from "not at all" like you to "very much" like you, by marking your answer in the space to the left. Be sure to answer every question.

- 1) Not at all true of me
- 2) Rarely true of me
- 3) Somewhat true of me
- 4) Pretty true of me
- 5) Very true of me

- _____ 29) I don't gossip about others. (KG)
- _____ 30) I blush when someone notices something about me I wasn't aware of. (KS)

- 1) Not at all true of me
- 2) Rarely true of me
- 3) Somewhat true of me
- 4) Pretty true of me
- 5) Very true of me

- _____ 31) I like to think of myself as not caring about public opinion and am bothered when I find it isn't so. (KS)
- _____ 32) I worry about making foolish mistakes and wonder what other people would think. (KS)
- _____ 33) I feel nagged about little things around the house that I failed to do. (KG)
- _____ 34) I can't stand to see others' feelings hurt. (KG)
- _____ 35) I worry about giving myself away. (KS)
- _____ 36) I sometimes worry about cheating or lying. (KG)
- _____ 37) I have a tendency to make up excuses to avoid situations that would make me uncomfortable. (KS)
- _____ 38) When someone else is accused of something, I sometimes worry I might have done something wrong. (KG)
- _____ 39) When I have done something wrong I feel better if I talk about it to someone. (KG)
- _____ 40) I hate to cry in front of anyone. (KS)
- _____ 41) I feel bad even if I think bad thoughts about others. (KS)
- _____ 42) I try to use kid gloves when saying something unkind. (KG)
- _____ 43) I often deceive others into believing things about me that aren't so. (KS)
- _____ 44) Sometimes I accuse someone else of something I did to cover my own guilt. (KG)
- _____ 45) I am very modest about my own body, especially about being seen naked. (KS)
- _____ 46) I worry more about failing to live up to my my moral obligations than failing to achieve my ambitions. (KG)

EMBARRASSING CIRCUMSTANCES

Everyone knows that some things are more embarrassing than others. That is, some things make one blush, or feel like blushing, or otherwise uncomfortable. Below is a list of things which have happened to most people, and could happen to anybody. For each happening, place a 1, 2, or 3 in the space to the left of each to indicate whether if it happened to you today, you would consider it "Not embarrassing", "Somewhat embarrassing", or "Very embarrassing."

Give your first impression, once you've read and understood the description of the event, and be sure to answer every question.

- 1) Not embarrassing
- 2) Somewhat embarrassing
- 3) Very embarrassing

- _____ 51) Your boss asks you a question you can't answer.
- _____ 52) You show fear in front of friends.
- _____ 53) You have to have something explained to you several times.
- _____ 54) You have to ask for a cheaper product in a store, because you don't have enough money.
- _____ 55) You fall down on a crowded sidewalk.
- _____ 56) You are approached for money by a beggar.
- _____ 57) You tell a joke, but nobody laughs.
- _____ 58) You overhear, by chance, some gossip about yourself.
- _____ 59) You are one of the last ones picked when sides are chosen for a team game.
- _____ 60) M: Dancing with a woman who's taller than you.
F: Dancing with a man who's shorter than you.
- _____ 61) You are called on unexpectedly for a speech.
- _____ 62) You get a big hug or kiss from a close relative, in front of non-family friends.
- _____ 63) You get a low mark in a school course.
- _____ 64) You ask the dentist for a pain-killing shot.
- _____ 65) You are the butt of a practical joke. For example, you have a "Kick me" sign pinned on your back.
- _____ 66) You forget the name of a former friend upon meeting them again.

- 1) Not embarrassing
- 2) Somewhat embarrassing
- 3) Very embarrassing

- _____ 67) You are reprimanded (bawled out) by a superior in front of your co-workers.
- _____ 68) You step on your partner's feet while dancing.
- _____ 69) You find dirt on your face after being with people.
- _____ 70) You get a "wrong number" when telephoning.
- _____ 71) Your gossip about someone gets back to them, and they tell you about it.
- _____ 72) Someone insults you and challenges you to fight, but you do not.
- _____ 73) You buy personal clothing items for a member of the opposite sex.
- _____ 74) You have to kiss a person you don't know in a party game.
- _____ 75) With several people of the opposite sex, you see a movie which turns out to be quite sexually explicit.
- _____ 76) You lose a game of tennis to an eight-year-old boy.
- _____ 77) You have a complete physical examination.
- _____ 78) A friend cries in your presence.
- _____ 79) A policeman gives you a ticket for speeding.
- _____ 80) You leave a small tip when you're short of money.
- _____ 81) You are caught cheating in a card game with friends.
- _____ 82) You meet your boss soon after you called to say you're sick and will have to stay out of work.
- _____ 83) You use a washroom without adequate soundproofing.
- _____ 84) You make a criticism of a religious or racial group, then realize that a member of that group is present.
- _____ 85) You put on someone else's coat by mistake.
- _____ 86) You get angry at a good friend without real cause.
- _____ 87) You are laughed at by friends.
- _____ 88) You accidentally spray saliva (spit) when talking.

- 1) Not embarrassing
- 2) Somewhat embarrassing
- 3) Very embarrassing

- _____ 89) You swear in front of a member of the opposite sex.
- _____ 90) You forget your lines in a play.
- _____ 91) You attend a social function dressed very differently from the other people there.
- _____ 92) You are thrown out of a public place.
- _____ 93) You hear a dirty or obscene joke in a group of men and women.
- _____ 94) You applaud at the wrong time during a show or concert.
- _____ 95) You get hiccups in a crowded bus.
- _____ 96) A member of the opposite sex shows obvious affection for you while in a public place.
- _____ 97) You buy personal articles in a drugstore.
- _____ 98) A member of the opposite sex tries to "pick you up."
- _____ 99) You make a "slip of the tongue."
- _____ 100) You are reminded a second time to pay a bill.
- _____ 101) Your dentist tells you you have bad breath.
- _____ 102) You discover a rip in the seat of your clothes while in a large group of men and women.
- _____ 103) You forget your own address or telephone number.
- _____ 104) You make some remark which is ignored at a meeting or in a fairly large conversational group.
- _____ 105) You say hello to someone, then discover you don't know them.
- _____ 106) You spill water in a crowded restaurant.

Mosher F-C Inventory (F)

This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements or opinions which have been given by college women in response to the Mosher Incomplete Sentences Test." These women were asked to complete phrases such as "When I tell a lie. . ." and "To kill in war. . ." to make a sentence which expressed their real feelings about the stem. This questionnaire consists of the stems to which they responded and a pair of their responses which are lettered A and B.

You are to read the stem and the pair of completions and decide which you most agree with or which is most characteristic of you. Your choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you believe, how you feel, or how you would react, and not in terms of how you think you should believe, feel, or respond. This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Your choices should be a description of your own personal beliefs, feelings, or reactions.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both completions or neither completion to be characteristic of you. In such cases select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Do not omit an item even if it is very difficult for you to decide; just select the more characteristic member of the pair.

Mark your answer by circling the letter A or B corresponding to the response which you most agree with. Be sure to answer every question.

- | | | |
|------------|--|------|
| _____ 121) | I punish myself . . .
A. very infrequently.
B. when I do wrong and don't get caught. | MMCG |
| _____ 122) | If I killed someone in self-defense . . .
A. I would be glad to be alive.
B. I would be a murderer. | MHG |
| _____ 123) | When anger builds inside me . . .
A. I let people know how I feel.
B. I'm angry at myself. | MHG |
| _____ 124) | If in the future I committed adultery . . .
A. I hope I would be punished very deeply.
B. I hope I enjoy it. | MSG |
| _____ 125) | Obscene literature . . .
A. is all right if you like it.
B. ought to be completely abolished. | MMCG |
| _____ 126) | "Dirty" jokes in mixed company . . .
A. do not bother me.
B. are something that make me feel very uncomfortable. | MSG |
| _____ 127) | Masturbation . . .
A. helps one feel eased and relaxed.
B. is wrong and will ruin you. | MSG |
| _____ 128) | I detest myself for . . .
A. nothing, I love life.
B. my sins and failures. | MMCG |
| _____ 129) | Sex relations before marriage . . .
A. should be permitted.
B. are wrong and immoral. | MSG |
| _____ 130) | If in the future I committed adultery . . .
A. I would be unworthy of my husband.
B. I would have good cause. | MSG |
| _____ 131) | I should have been punished for . . .
A. many things I kept secret.
B. very few things. | MMCG |
| _____ 132) | Capital punishment . . .
A. is totally acceptable for capital crimes.
B. is wrong and should be stopped. | MHG |
| _____ 133) | If I committed a homosexual act . . .
A. it would be my business.
B. it would show weakness in me. | MSG |

- _____ 134) When caught in the act . . . MMCG
 A. I make a fool of myself.
 B. I try to get out of it the best I can.
- _____ 135) After a childhood fight, I felt . . . MHG
 A. guilty and ashamed.
 B. that I had triumphed.
- _____ 136) When I was a child, sex . . . MSG
 A. was not talked about and was a feared word.
 B. was fun to think about.
- _____ 137) When I have sexual dreams . . . MSG
 A. I sometimes wake up feeling excited.
 B. I try to forget them.
- _____ 138) When I was younger, fighting . . . MHG
 A. didn't bother me.
 B. never appealed to me.
- _____ 139) Arguments leave me feeling . . . MHG
 A. elated at winning.
 B. depressed and disgusted.
- _____ 140) "Dirty" jokes in mixed company . . . MSG
 A. can be funny depending on the company.
 B. are in bad taste.
- _____ 141) Capital punishment . . . MHG
 A. is a good deterrent to crime.
 B. does not deter crime, so why keep it.
- _____ 142) Obscene literature . . . MMCG
 A. makes interesting reading.
 B. is for people with sick minds.
- _____ 143) I detest myself for . . . MMCG
 A. nothing at present.
 B. being so self-centered.
- _____ 144) Petting . . . MSG
 A. is an expression of affection which is satisfying.
 B. I am sorry to say is becoming an accepted practice.
- _____ 145) Unusual sex practices . . . MSG
 A. are not so unusual.
 B. don't interest me.
- _____ 146) After a childhood fight, I felt . . . MHG
 A. good if I won, bad otherwise.
 B. hurt and alarmed.

- _____ 147) If I hated my parents . . . MHG
 A. I would need psychiatric help.
 B. I would rebel at their every wish.
- _____ 148) "Dirty" jokes in mixed company . . . MSG
 A. disgust me.
 B. do not bother me as long as they are just in fun.
- _____ 149) If I had sex relations, I would feel . . . MSG
 A. very dirty.
 B. happy and satisfied.
- _____ 150) Sex . . . MSG
 A. is good and enjoyable.
 B. should be saved for wedlock and childbearing.
- _____ 151) After an outburst of anger . . . MHG
 A. I usually feel quite a bit better.
 B. I feel ridiculous.
- _____ 152) I punish myself . . . MMCG
 A. when I make mistakes.
 B. rarely.
- _____ 153) After an argument . . . MHG
 A. I feel proud in victory, understanding in defeat.
 B. I wish that I hadn't argued.
- _____ 154) A guilty conscience . . . MMCG
 A. does not bother me too much.
 B. is worse than a sickness to me.
- _____ 155) When I have sexual desires . . . MSG
 A. I enjoy it like all healthy human beings.
 B. I fight them for I must have complete control of my body.
- _____ 156) Prostitution . . . MSG
 A. makes me sick when I think about it.
 B. needs to be understood.
- _____ 157) After a childhood fight, I felt . . . MHG
 A. that it was partly my fault.
 B. much better, but made friends afterwards.
- _____ 158) Unusual sex practices . . . MSG
 A. might be interesting.
 B. are disgusting and revolting.
- _____ 159) The idea of murder . . . MHG
 A. is inconceivable to me.
 B. is understandable at times.

- _____ 160) Sex relations before marriage . . . MSG
 A. are disgusting and unnecessary.
 B. are O.K. if both partners are in agreement.
- _____ 161) Masturbation . . . MSG
 A. is sickening.
 B. is understandable in many cases.
- _____ 162) One should not . . . MMCG
 A. say "one should not."
 B. lose his/her temper.
- _____ 163) If in the future I committed adultery . . . MSG
 A. I would resolve not to commit the mistake again.
 B. I would hope there would be no consequences.
- _____ 164) Unusual sex practices . . . MSG
 A. are all in how you look at it.
 B. are unwise and lead only to trouble.
- _____ 165) Obscene literature . . . MMCG
 A. helps people become sex perverts.
 B. is fun to read once in a while.
- _____ 166) Capital punishment . . . MHG
 A. is the only thing some criminals can understand.
 B. is legal murder; it is inhuman.
- _____ 167) Petting . . . MSG
 A. is just asking for trouble.
 B. can lead to bigger and better things.
- _____ 168) After an outburst of anger . . . MHG
 A. my tensions are relieved.
 B. I am jittery and all keyed up.
- _____ 169) When I have sexual desires . . . MSG
 A. I know it's only human.
 B. I usually express them.
- _____ 170) If I had sex relations, I would feel . . . MSG
 A. guilty, sinful, and bad.
 B. happy if I loved the man and he loved me.
- _____ 171) I punish myself . . . MMCG
 A. for very few things.
 B. by denying myself a privilege.
- _____ 172) Masturbation . . . MSG
 A. is stupid.
 B. is a common thing in childhood.

- _____ 173) Sin and failure . . . MMCG
 A. are the works of the devil.
 B. do not depress me for long.
- _____ 174) Unusual sex practices . . . MSG
 A. are the business of those who carry them out and no one else.
 B. are dangerous to one's health and mental condition.
- _____ 175) After an argument . . . MHG
 A. I feel happy if I won or still stick to my own views if I lose.
 B. I am disgusted that I let myself become involved.
- _____ 176) Petting . . . MSG
 A. is justified with love.
 B. is not a good practice until after marriage.
- _____ 177) After a childhood fight, I felt . . . MHG
 A. like I was a hero.
 B. as if I had done wrong.
- _____ 178) When I have sexual desires . . . MSG
 A. I try to go to sleep and forget them.
 B. I become easily aroused.
- _____ 179) I detest myself for . . . MMCG
 A. not always listening to those who know better.
 B. very little.
- _____ 180) If I had sex relations I would feel . . . MSG
 A. cheap and unfit for marriage.
 B. warm and very good.
- _____ 181) Sex relations before marriage . . . MSG
 A. ruin many a happy couple.
 B. might help the people to understand each other and themselves.
- _____ 182) I regret . . . MMCG
 A. the way I have behaved.
 B. few things in my life.
- _____ 183) Masturbation . . . MSG
 A. is a normal outlet for sexual desires.
 B. is wrong and a sin.
- _____ 184) After an argument . . . MHG
 A. if I have won, I feel great.
 B. I am sorry for my actions.
- _____ 185) Petting . . . MSG
 A. depends on whom I'm with.
 B. is against my better judgement but hard to resist for some.

- _____ 186) After a fight I felt . . . MHG
 A. relieved.
 B. it should have been avoided for nothing was accomplished.
- _____ 187) Masturbation . . . MSG
 A. is all right.
 B. is a form of self destruction.
- _____ 188) Unusual sex practices . . . MSG
 A. are all right if both partners agree.
 B. are awful and unthinkable.
- _____ 189) If I committed a homosexual act . . . MSG
 A. I would want to be punished.
 B. I would be discreet.
- _____ 190) When I have sexual desires . . . MSG
 A. I attempt to repress them.
 B. I sometimes think of past experiences.
- _____ 191) If I had sex relations, I would feel . . . MSG
 A. all right, I think.
 B. I was being used not loved.
- _____ 192) Arguments leave me feeling . . . MHG
 A. that it was a waste of time.
 B. as if I might have accomplished something.
- _____ 193) Sin and failure . . . MMCG
 A. depress me more than any other acts.
 B. are not necessarily related.
- _____ 194) If I felt like murdering someone . . . MHG
 A. I would be ashamed of myself.
 B. it would be for a good reason.
- _____ 195) Sex relations before marriage . . . MSG
 A. are not good for anyone.
 B. with the person I hope to marry is o.k.
- _____ 196) After an outburst of anger . . . MHG
 A. I feel much better.
 B. I usually hate myself for being so silly.
- _____ 197) "Dirty" jokes in mixed company . . . MSG
 A. should be avoided.
 B. are acceptable up to a point.

Mosher F-C Inventory (M)

This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements or opinions which have been given by college men in response to the "Mosher Incomplete Sentences Test." These men were asked to complete phrases such as "When I tell a lie. . ." and "To kill in war. . ." to make a sentence which expressed their real feelings about the stem. This questionnaire consists of the stems to which they responded and a pair of their responses which are lettered A and B.

You are to read the stem and the pair of completions and decide which you most agree with or which is most characteristic of you. Your choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you believe, how you feel, or how you would react, and not in terms of how you think you should believe, feel, or respond. This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers. Your choices should be a description of your own personal beliefs, feelings, or reactions.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both completions or neither completion to be characteristic of you. In such cases select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Do not omit an item even if it is very difficult for you to decide; just select the more characteristic member of the pair.

Mark your answer by circling the letter A or B corresponding to the response which you most agree with. Be sure to answer every question.

121. When I tell a lie . . . MMCG
 A. it hurts.
 B. I make it a good one.
122. To kill in war. . . MHG
 A. is a job to be done.
 B. is a shame but sometimes a necessity.
123. Women who curse. . . MMCG
 A. are normal.
 B. make me sick.
124. When anger builds inside me. . . MHG
 A. I usually explode.
 B. I keep my mouth shut.
125. If I killed someone in self-defense, I. . . MHG
 A. would feel no anguish.
 B. think it would trouble me the rest of my life.
126. I punish myself. . . MMCG
 A. for the evil I do.
 B. very seldom for other people do it for me.
127. If in the future I committed adultery. . . MSG
 A. I won't feel bad about it.
 B. it would be sinful.
128. Obscene literature. . . MMCG
 A. is a sinful and corrupt business.
 B. is fascinating reading.
129. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company. . . MSG
 A. are common in our town.
 B. should be avoided.
130. As a child, sex play. . . MSG
 A. never entered my mind.
 B. is quite wide spread.
131. I detest myself for. . . MMCG
 A. my sins and failures.
 B. for not having more exciting sexual experiences.
132. Sex relations before marriage. MSG
 A. ruin many a happy couple.
 B. are good in my opinion.
133. If in the future I committed adultery. . . MSG
 A. I wouldn't tell anyone.
 B. I would probably feel bad about it.
134. When I have sexual desires. . . MSG
 A. I usually try to curb them.
 B. I generally satisfy them.

135. If I killed someone in self-defense, I. . . MHG
A. wouldn't enjoy it.
B. I'd be glad to be alive.
136. Unusual sex practices. . . MSG
A. might be interesting.
B. don't interest me.
137. If I felt like murdering someone. . . MHG
A. I would be ashamed of myself.
B. I would try to commit the perfect crime.
138. If I hated my parents. . . MHG
A. I would hate myself.
B. I would rebel at their every wish.
139. After an outburst of anger. . . MHG
A. I usually feel quite a bit better.
B. I am sorry and say so.
140. I punish myself. . . MMCG
A. never.
B. by feeling nervous and depressed.
141. Prostitution. . . MSG
A. is a must.
B. breeds only evil.
142. If I killed someone in self-defense, I. . . MHG
A. would still be troubled by my conscience.
B. would consider myself lucky.
143. When I tell a lie. . . MMCG
A. I'm angry with myself.
B. I mix it with truth and serve it like a Martini.
144. As a child, sex play. . . MSG
A. is not good for mental and emotional well being.
B. is natural and innocent.
145. When someone swears at me. . . MHG
A. I swear back.
B. it usually bothers me even if I don't show it.
146. When I was younger, fighting. . . MHG
A. was always a thrill.
B. disgusted me.

147. As a child, sex play. . . MSG
 A. was a big taboo and I was deathly afraid of it.
 B. was common without guilt feelings.
148. After an argument. . . MHG
 A. I feel mean.
 B. I am sorry for my actions.
149. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company. . . MSG
 A. are not proper.
 B. are exciting and amusing.
150. Unusual sex practices. . . MSG
 A. are awful and unthinkable.
 B. are not so unusual to me.
151. When I have sex dreams. . . MSG
 A. I cannot remember them in the morning.
 B. I wake up happy.
152. When I was younger, fighting. . . MHG
 A. never appealed to me.
 B. was fun and frequent.
153. One should not. . . MMCG
 A. knowingly sin.
 B. try to follow absolutes.
154. To kill in war. . . MHG
 A. is good and meritable.
 B. would be sickening to me.
155. I detest myself for . . . MMCG
 A. nothing, I love life.
 B. not being more nearly perfect.
156. "Dirty" jokes in mixed company. . . MSG
 A. are lots of fun.
 B. are coarse to say the least.
157. Petting. . . MSG
 A. is something that should be controlled.
 B. is a form of education.
158. After an argument. . . MHG
 A. I usually feel better.
 B. I am disgusted that I allowed myself to become involved.
159. Obscene literature. . . MMCG
 A. should be freely published.
 B. helps people become sexual perverts.
160. I regret. . . MMCG
 A. my sexual experiences.
 B. nothing I've ever done.

161. A guilty conscience. . . MMCG
 A. does not bother me too much.
 B. is worse than a sickness to me.
162. If I felt like murdering someone. . . MHG
 A. it would be for good reason.
 B. I'd think I was crazy.
163. Arguments leave me feeling. . . MHG
 A. That it was a waste of time.
 B. smarter.
164. After a childhood fight, I felt. . . MHG
 A. miserable and made up afterwards.
 B. like a hero.
165. When anger builds inside me. . . MHG
 A. I do my best to suppress it.
 B. I have to blow off some steam.
166. Unusual sex practices. . . MSG
 A. are O.K. as long as they're heterosexual.
 B. usually aren't pleasurable because you have preconceived feelings about their being wrong.
167. I regret. . . MMCG
 A. getting caught, but nothing else.
 B. all of my sins.
168. When I tell a lie. . . MMCG
 A. my conscience bothers me.
 B. I wonder whether I'll get away with it.
169. Sex relations before marriage. . . MSG
 A. are practiced too much to be wrong.
 B. in my opinion, should not be practiced.
170. As a child, sex play. . . MSG
 A. is dangerous.
 B. is not harmful but does create sexual pleasure.
171. When caught in the act. . . MMCG
 A. I try to bluff my way out.
 B. truth is the best policy.
172. As a child sex play. . . MSG
 A. was indulged in.
 B. is immature and ridiculous.
173. When I tell a lie. . . MMCG
 A. it is an exception or rather an odd occurrence.
 B. I tell a lie.
174. If I hated my parents. . . MHG
 A. I would be wrong, foolish, and feel guilty.
 B. they would know it that's for sure!

175. If I robbed a bank. . . MMCG
 A. I would give up I suppose.
 B. I probably would get away with it.
176. Arguments leave me feeling. . . MHG
 A. proud, they certainly are worthwhile.
 B. depressed and disgusted.
177. When I have sexual desires. . . MSG
 A. they are quite strong.
 B. I attempt to repress them.
178. Sin and failure. . . MMCG
 A. are two situations we try to avoid.
 B. do not depress me for long.
179. Sex relations before marriage. . . MSG
 A. help people to adjust,
 B. should not be recommended.
180. When anger builds inside me. . . MHG
 A. I feel like killing somebody.
 B. I get sick.
181. If I robbed a bank. . . MMCG
 A. I would live like a king.
 B. I should get caught.
182. Masturbation. . . MSG
 A. is a habit that should be controlled.
 B. is very common.
183. After an argument. . . MHG
 A. I feel proud in victory and understanding in defeat.
 B. I am sorry and see no reason to stay mad.
184. Sin and failure. . . MMCG
 A. are the works of the Devil.
 B. have not bothered me yet.
185. If I committed a homosexual act. . . MSG
 A. it would be my business.
 B. it would show weakness in me.
186. When anger builds inside me. . . MHG
 A. I always express it.
 B. I usually take it out on myself.
187. Prostitution. . . MSG
 A. is a sign of moral decay in society.
 B. is acceptable and needed by some people.
188. Capital punishment. . . MHG
 A. should be abolished.
 B. is a necessity.

189. Sex relations before marriage. . . . MSG
 A. are O.K. if both partners are in agreement.
 B. are dangerous.
190. I tried to make amends. . . . MMCG
 A. for all my misdeeds, but I can't forget them.
 B. but not if I could help it.
191. After a childhood fight, I felt. . . . MHG
 A. sorry.
 B. mad and irritable.
192. I detest myself for MMCG
 A. nothing, and only rarely dislike myself.
 B. thoughts I sometimes have.
193. Arguments leave me feeling. . . . MHG
 A. satisfied usually.
 B. exhausted.
194. Masturbation. . . . MSG
 A. is all right.
 B. should not be practiced.
195. After an argument. . . . MHG
 A. I usually feel good if I won.
 B. it is best to apologize to clear the air.
196. I hate. . . . MHG
 A. sin.
 B. moralists and "do gooders."
197. Sex MSG
 A. is a beautiful gift of God not to be cheapened.
 B. is good and enjoyable.
198. Capital punishment. . . . MHG
 A. is not used often enough.
 B. is legal murder, it is inhuman.
199. Prostitution. . . . MSG
 A. should be legalized
 B. cannot really afford enjoyment.

Please look at each of the 48 items below and indicate the extent to which each is characteristic of you by marking, in the space to the left of each item, the number that best corresponds to how you see yourself. Be sure to respond to all 48 items.

- 1) Not characteristic of me
- 2) Somewhat characteristic of me
- 3) Quite characteristic of me
- 4) Very characteristic of me

- ___ 11) I prefer to be by myself. (A)
- ___ 12) When I have a decision to make, I always ask for advice. (L)
- ___ 13) I do my best work when I know it will be appreciated. (E)
- ___ 14) I can't stand being fussed over when I am sick. (A)
- ___ 15) I would rather be a follower than a leader. (L)
- ___ 16) I believe people could do a lot more for me if they wanted to. (E)
- ___ 17) As a child, pleasing my parents was very important to me. (E)
- ___ 18) I don't need other people to make me feel good. (A)
- ___ 19) Disapproval by someone I care about is very painful to me. (E)
- ___ 20) I feel confident of my ability to deal with most of the personal problems I am likely to meet in life. (L)
- ___ 21) I'm the only person I want to please. (A)
- ___ 22) The idea of losing a close personal friend is terrifying to me. (E)
- ___ 23) I am quick to agree with opinions expressed by others. (L)
- ___ 24) I rely only on myself. (A)
- ___ 25) I would be completely lost if I didn't have someone special. (E)
- ___ 26) I get upset when someone discovers a mistake I've made. (E)
- ___ 27) It is hard for me to ask someone for a favor. (L)
- ___ 28) I hate it when people offer me sympathy. (A)
- ___ 29) I easily get discouraged when I don't get what I need from others. (E)

- 1) Not characteristic of me
- 2) Somewhat characteristic of me
- 3) Quite characteristic of me
- 4) Very characteristic of me

- _____ 30) In an argument, I give in easily. (L)
- _____ 31) I don't need much from people. (A)
- _____ 32) I must have one person who is very special to me. (E)
- _____ 33) When I go to a party, I expect that other people will like me. (L)
- _____ 34) I feel better when I know someone else is in command. (L)
- _____ 35) When I am sick, I prefer that my friends leave me alone. (A)
- _____ 36) I'm never happier than when people say I've done a good job. (E)
- _____ 37) It is hard for me to make up my mind about a tv show or movie until I know what other people think. (L)
- _____ 38) I am willing to disregard other people's feelings in order to accomplish something that's important to me. (A)
- _____ 39) I need to have one person who puts me above all others. (E)
- _____ 40) In social situations I tend to be very self-conscious. (L)
- _____ 41) I don't need anyone. (A)
- _____ 42) I have a lot of trouble making decisions myself. (L)
- _____ 43) I tend to imagine the worst if a loved one doesn't arrive when expected. (E)
- _____ 44) Even when things go wrong I can get along without asking for help from my friends. (A)
- _____ 45) I tend to expect too much from others. (E)
- _____ 46) I don't like to buy clothes by myself. (L)
- _____ 47) I tend to be a loner. (A)
- _____ 48) I feel that I never really get all that I need from people. (E)
- _____ 49) When I meet new people, I'm afraid that I won't do the right thing. (L)
- _____ 50) Even if most people turned against me, I could still go on if someone I love stood by me. (E)
- _____ 51) I would rather stay free of involvements with others than to risk disappointments. (L)

- 1) Not characteristic of me
- 2) Somewhat characteristic of me
- 3) Quite characteristic of me
- 4) Very characteristic of me

- _____ 52) What people think of me doesn't affect how I feel. (A)
- _____ 53) I think that most poeple don't realize how easily they can hurt me. (E)
- _____ 54) I am very confident about my own judgement. (L)
- _____ 55) I have always had a terrible fear that I will lose the love and support of people I desperately need. (E)
- _____ 56) I don't have what it takes to be a good leader. (L)
- _____ 57) I would feel helpless if deserted by someone I love. (E)
- _____ 58) What other people say doesn't bother me. (A)

Please mark, in the space to the left, the number that corresponds to your answer. Be sure to answer every question.

- _____ 71) Do you consider yourself to be a shy person?
1. no
2. yes
- _____ 72) How shy are you when you feel shy?
1. only slightly shy 4. quite shy
2. somewhat shy 5. very shy
3. moderately shy 6. extremely shy
- _____ 73) How often do you experience (have you experienced) feelings of shyness?
1. rarely, once a month 4. often, nearly every other day
2. occasionally, less than once a week 5. almost every day
3. one or two times a week 6. every day
- _____ 74) Compared to your peers (of similar age, sex and background), how shy are you?
1. much less shy
2. less shy
3. about as shy
4. more shy
5. much more shy
- _____ 75) Is (or was) your shyness ever a personal problem for you?
1. never
2. rarely
3. yes, occasionally
4. yes, sometimes
5. yes, often
- _____ 76) Do you consider yourself more of an introvert or an extrovert?
1. strongly extroverted
2. moderately extroverted
3. slightly extroverted
4. neither
5. slightly introverted
6. moderately introverted
7. strongly introverted

APPENDIX D
TRAINING MANUALS

Each rater was given a training manual composed of the following sections: General Guidelines, Scoring Instructions, Scoring Criteria, a sample scoring sheet and a sample time sheet. Only the scoring criteria differed between rating groups; thus, in the interest of conserving space and avoiding redundancy, rather than include all four manuals in their entirety, the sections common to all four group manuals are presented first, followed by each of the four sets of scoring criteria.

GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. All coding is to be done in Room 112 Psychology Research Building.
2. Under no circumstances may the TAT stories or the scoring sheets ever leave the research room.
3. Each group will be assigned a file cabinet drawer which will contain:
 - a) an extra copy of the scoring criteria (try to remember to bring your own when possible)
 - b) a manila folder for each rater containing his/her scoring sheets and time sheets
4. There will be two open bins on top of the file cabinet each containing a copy of the TAT stories that have been completed by the experiment participants up to that time.

Each story will be assigned a bin number (one digit, circled at the top of the page) and is to be returned to the appropriate bin when you are finished with it.

5. Keep track of your hours by recording the times (starting and finishing) you spend scoring TAT stories on the time sheet in your folder.
6. Also record, in the appropriate column on the time sheet, the number of stories coded during that time period.

SCORING INSTRUCTIONS

1. In addition to a circled bin number, each TAT story will also have a five-digit Story Code Number. This number is to be used for identification purposes when scoring the stories.
2. Before scoring a story, read it in its entirety.
3. For each story, mark the letter of the theme(s) found in that story in the box or boxes on the scoring sheet corresponding to the theme(s) found in that story, in the row reserved for that story, if and only if that theme(s) is present. Use the guidelines listed in the Scoring Criteria of the Training Manual to determine whether or not a particular theme is present. If none of the themes are present, place a check in the column to the far right.
4. Be sure to include your name and group number on every scoring sheet you complete.
5. Be sure to score all 500 stories assigned to you by referring to the code number on each story.

Group _____

Time Sheet

[illegible]

SCORING SYSTEM - GROUP 1

Theme A

Any reference to thought or behavior involving any of the following themes, or fear of any of these, will be coded as Theme A:

- 1) inadequacy
- 2) failure
- 3) deficiency
- 4) social inappropriateness
- 5) ineffectiveness
- 6) weakness
- 7) defectiveness
- 8) negative evaluation by self or others (not of a moral nature)
- 9) fragility
- 10) ineptness
- 11) loss of control of bodily functions (e.g. wetting one's pants)
- 12) inferiority

Theme B

Any reference to wishes, intentions or intentional behavior by the main character - i.e. the character who the story writer seems to be most strongly identified with - involving any of these, will be coded as Theme B:

- 1) violation of what appears to be a moral value of the story writer (e.g. "I felt terrible about sleeping with a stranger." but not: "I had wonderful sex with a guy I just met.")
- 2) violence or the threat of violence
- 3) abuse of power
- 4) lying, malevolent deception
- 5) cheating
- 6) stealing
- 7) dishonesty
- 8) betrayal
- 9) adultery
- 10) intentional disregard for the wishes or welfare of another
- 11) intentionally harming someone or something in any way
- 12) vandalism

SCORING SYSTEM - GROUP 2

Theme A

Any reference to the main character - i.e. the character who the story writer seems to be most strongly identified with - having experienced or being concerned with experiencing any of the following themes, or fear of any of these, will be coded as Theme A:

- 1) being rejected
- 2) being abandoned
- 3) being ostracized
- 4) exclusion by others
- 5) loneliness
- 6) loss of loved one(s)
- 7) loss of another's support
- 8) loss of love or affection of another

Theme B

Any reference to the main character **experiencing**, having experienced, or being concerned with experiencing any of the following, or fear of any of these, **will** be coded as Theme B:

- 1) being physically hurt or punished by someone or something (e.g. God) with some power in relation to that person
- 2) being verbally hurt or punished by someone or something with some power in relation to that person
- 3) interpersonal abuse of power - i.e. a person with some power or authority misusing this to somehow hurt another for their own gain
- 4) being the victim of revenge, retaliation

SCORING SYSTEM - GROUP 3

Theme A

Any reference to thought or behavior by the main character - i.e. the person who the story writer seems to be most strongly identified with - involving any of the following themes, or the wish to do any of these, will be coded as Theme A:

- 1) hiding oneself
- 2) withdrawing/escaping from others
- 3) becoming small
- 4) covering some part of oneself - e.g. face, body, property, work
- 5) avoiding others
- 6) uncomfortableness with exposure of one's self or some aspect of one's self to others
- 7) uncomfortableness with attention of any sort
- 8) escaping from exposure of oneself or part of oneself

Theme B

Any reference to thought or behavior involving any of the following themes will be coded as Theme B:

- 1) punishment (or a wish or attempt to be punished) for any of the following:
 - a) violation of what appears to be a moral value of the story writer (e.g. "I felt terrible about sleeping with a stranger." But not: "I had wonderful sex with a guy I just met.")
 - b) violence or the threat of violence
 - c) abuse of power
 - d) lying, malevolent deception
 - e) cheating
 - f) stealing
 - g) dishonesty
 - h) betrayal
 - i) adultery
 - j) intentional disregard for the wishes or welfare of another
 - k) intentionally harming someone or something in any way
 - l) vandalism
- 2) Self-denial or self-punishment for any of the above (a - l)

Scoring System - Group 3 (cont.)

Theme C

Any reference to a wish or an attempt by a transgressor to make amends for any of the transgressions listed in the column to the left (a-l) with any of the compensations listed in the column to the right (1 - 6) will be scored Theme C. At least one of these from each column must be present for this theme to be scored.

Transgressions

- a) violation of what appears to be a moral value of the story writer
- b) violence or the threat of violence
- c) abuse of power
- d) lying, malevolent deception
- e) cheating
- f) stealing
- g) dishonesty
- h) betrayal
- i) adultery
- j) intentional disregard for the wishes or welfare of another
- k) intentionally harming someone or something in any way
- l) vandalism

Compensations

- 1) kindness
- 2) generosity
- 3) helping others
- 4) altruism
- 5) charitability
- 6) good deeds

SCORING SYSTEM - GROUP 4

Theme A

Any reference to thought or behavior by the main character - i.e., the person who the story writer seems to be most strongly identified with - involving being, becoming or striving to become any of the following will be scored as Theme A:

- 1) perfect, flawless
- 2) achievement-oriented
- 3) respected, highly regarded
- 4) powerful
- 5) ambitious
- 6) competent
- 7) independent
- 8) successful
- 9) outstanding
- 10) invincible

Theme B

Any reference to **concern or behavior** by the main character involving being, becoming or striving to become any of the following will be scored as Theme B:

- 1) positively evaluated
- 2) pleasing to others
- 3) liked by others
- 4) attractive
- 5) approved of

Scoring System - Group 4 (cont.)

Theme C

Any reference to thoughts, intentional behavior, intentions or wishes by people other than the main character involving any of the following themes will be coded as Theme C:

- 1) violation of what appears to be moral value of the story writer (e.g. "I felt terrible about sleeping with a stranger." But not: "I had wonderful sex with a guy I just met.")
- 2) violence or the threat of violence
- 3) abuse of power
- 4) lying, malevolent deception
- 5) cheating
- 6) stealing
- 7) dishonesty
- 8) betrayal
- 9) adultery
- 10) intentional disregard for the welfare of another
- 11) intentionally harming someone or something in any way
- 12) vandalism

Theme D

Any reference to thoughts, behavior, intentions or wishes by the main character involving any of the following themes will be coded as Theme D:

- 1) kindness
- 2) generosity
- 3) altruism
- 4) charitability
- 5) good deeds
- 6) helping others
- 7) selflessness (i.e. not selfish)
- 8) righteousness, piety
- 9) concern for the welfare of others

APPENDIX E
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH CONSENT FORM

1. I have freely consented to take part in a scientific study being conducted by Chet Mirman, under the supervision of Professors Elaine Donelson and Gershen Kaufman.
2. I understand that the study will involve the following:
 - a. For the first hour I will view a number of picture slides and be asked to make up a story for each.
 - b. The second hour I will be asked to complete five questionnaires.
3. I understand that the study is concerned with different feelings that people have: how they are different from each other, what kinds of things trigger these feelings, what sort of things are associated with the feelings and how we deal with them.
4. I understand that I am free to discontinue my participation in the study at any time without penalty.
5. I understand that the results of the study will be treated in strict confidence and that I will remain anonymous. Within these restrictions, results of the study will be made available to me at my request.
6. I understand that my participation in this study does not guarantee any beneficial results to me.
7. I understand that, at my request, I can receive additional explanation of the study after my participation is completed.

Signed: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX F
DEBRIEFING FORM

Debriefing

Thank you for your participation in this study. Your efforts will, I believe, help to increase our understanding of the nature of some affective experiences. In this study a number of dimensions of these phenomena will be looked at: what triggers the experience, what expectations are associated with these experiences, how we react to these experiences, and how we learn to cope with them.

Because of the anonymity in this study I will be unable to give any of you individual feedback about your scores. I would be more than happy to share the global results of the study with you and will be available to discuss this or any other aspects of the project once all of the data has been collected (this should be in a few weeks). Until that time I would appreciate it if you would refrain from discussing the study with others. If you have any questions or are interested in discussing the study, feel free to call me.

Thank you,

M. Chet Mirman
355-9561

APPENDIX G

SHAME-ACTIVATOR SUBSCALES

Questionnaire given to raters

Final subscale items

(TC = Task Competence Item
SI = Social Congruity Item
B = Body-related Item
R = Relationship Item
F = Feeling-related Item)

- (1) TC - Task Competence; lack of competence at work or in a task of some sort
- (2) SI - Social Incongruity. or inappropriateness
- (3) B - Body; shame about some aspect of one's own body
- (4) R - Relationships; interpersonal incompetence or failure; shame-producing relationship need(s), interests, attitudes or activities
- (5) F - Feelings; shame about one's experience or expression of feelings
- (6) None of the above

[illegible]

- (TC) 14. You are unbelievably awkward trying to play a new sport. Your friends are trying to teach you and you feel as if you are all arms and legs.
- (SI) 16. You are caught unexpectedly by someone talking to yourself.
- (TC) 18. Your boss has planned a big meeting where your presentation is to be the highlight. You fail to live up to his expectations and your company loses the account.
- (R) 19. You are finally involved sexually with someone you have seen as very attractive but uninterested in you. Suddenly you find yourself to be a poor partner.
- (SI) 20. You're telling a joke and suddenly realize you are the only one laughing.
- (B) 22. You have a mild case of epilepsy. You forget to take your pills and have a convulsion before friends who didn't know.
- (F) 27. You're usually very calm when discussing heated subjects. All of a sudden you hear your own voice and realize you're almost shouting.
- (F) 28. You're reading on old diary and can't believe you wrote such nonsense. You feel ridiculous to have written down such things.
- _____ 30. I blush when someone notices something about me I wasn't aware of.
- _____ 31. I like to think of myself as not caring about public opinion and am bothered when I find it isn't so.
- (TC) 32. I worry about making foolish mistakes and wonder what other people would think.
- (F) 35. I worry about giving myself away.
- _____ 37. I have a tendency to make up excuses to avoid situations that would make me uncomfortable.
- (F) 40. I hate to cry in front of anyone.
- (F) 41. I feel bad even if I think bad thoughts about others.
- (R) 43. I often deceive others into believing things about me that aren't so.
- (B) 45. I am very modest about my own body, especially about being seen naked.

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