WlHlHWWW \ ‘HUHHUHHHIW W E (W REMOTE STORAGE E’s‘mnxz'rx‘mmnv ‘- ‘ . g. «c, H?— sgtg g - 5 WWW .m "INN"”Hm.”WWW" 01mm . {J 3: t; 31293 10583 0594 A. :1 _. ”I i? at»? ‘5‘ W'- ‘3; :32 5? (H... in? :3 , a r' i 35%?2 l " fig ~ T :57ch This is to certify that the thesis entitled MICHIGAN' S UPPER PENINSULA, AN IINIERNAL COLONY: THE SAULT SAINTE MARIE EXPERIENCE presented by Philip C. Bellfy has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for M.A. degree in Mag; 7 l 7// ’flajor professor Date e/Z/éy/ 0-7639 REMOTE STORAGE PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE o 8 2019 MICHIGAN'S UPPER PENINSULA, AN INTERNAL COLONY: THE SAULT SAINTE MARIE EXPERIENCE By Philip C. Bellfy A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Sociology 1981 ABSTRACT MICHIGAN'S UPPER PENINSULA, AN INTERNAL COLONY: THE SAULT SAINTE MARIE EXPERIENCE By Philip c. Bellfy The exploitation and poverty of Michigan's upper peninsula and the industrial growth and decline of the Upper Peninsula city of Sault Ste. Marie are examined within an internal colony framework using a six point paradigm devel- oped by Pablo Gonzales-Casanova. The six points are: (l) the economy of the internal colony is structured to compliment that of the colonial center; (2) the "develOpment" is tied to one predominant sector; (3) the monopoly structure is controlled by one colonial center; (4) there exists an obvious disparity in the standards of living between colony and center; (5) there exists a repressive conflict-resolution structure; and (6) there is a tendency for existing inequalities to increase over time. After a thorough exam— ination of the Upper Peninsula's and Sault Ste. Marie's experiences, it is concluded that the internal colony appellation is appropriate when speaking of the history of Michigan's upper peninsula. INTRODUCTION. TABLE OF CONTENTS The Colony Concept. Gonzales-Casanova: The Internal Colony Concept THE UPPER PENINSULA EXPERIENCE. The Colonial Fur Trade. Statehood . C0pper. Lumber. Iron. The Gonzales-Casanova Paradigm. The Post-World War I Upper Peninsula. The Gonzales-Casanova Paradigm — The Final Three Points. 1600 1800 1880 1890 1900 1910 1940 1950 1960 THE SAULT t0 t0 t0 t0 t0 t0 to to to STE. MARIE EXPERIENCE . 1800: 1880. 1890: 1900: 1910: 1940: 1950: 1960: 1970: Early Colonial Outpost The Boom Decade. Beginnings of an Industrial Age. Industrial Expansion . Decline and Depression . The PrOSperity of the War Years. Industrial Decline . The End of the Industrial Age. ii 10 10 12 13 16 19 21 22 29 32 32 34 36 39 40 43 44 . 45 50 Synthesis The Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario Experience. The 1970's: The Decline Continues. INTERNAL COLONY . BIBLIOGRAPHY. iii 52 55 57 60 64 INTRODUCTION The fact that Michigan's upper peninsula (U.P.) is an area of serious and persistant poverty is unquestioned (Haber, 1935; NMU, 1962; KISS, 1976). The reasons given to explain this poverty sound very much like the answer the old man gave when asked the secret of his longevity. He replied, "Living a long time". When asked why the U.P. is poor, the standard answer is "lack of money". The answer is representative of the miasma that a critical social scientist is confrontegwwigh while studying . _ fl “1:3,... ”dig U.P. poverty. The ”explanations" of U.P. poverty run the gamut from "distance from markets" (Garrison, 1966), and "too many peOple” (Haber, 1935), to "disadvantageous produc- tion costs" (Strassmann, 1958). But "lack of resources" is never given as an explanation for U.P. poverty for the simple reason that the U.P. during its 350-year history of exploita- tion, gave up a number of fortunes in fur, lumber, coEper and we. The ultimate question: why has the U.P.‘s vast wealth, nearly unrivalled in the whole of the United States, left the area with poverty nearly unriyglled in the whole of the United States? In order to answer this question it may be wise to abandon traditignalflegongmics and sociology. The answer’maywlig in an analysis of the U.P.‘s historical and ongoing role as a colony of the moneyed interests of the eastern and lake states. The outward signs of the U.P.'s colonial pattern are l 2 evident: persistent poverty, tremendous exploitation of natural resources, political impotence, lack of an integrated economy, etc. The problem, of course, is whether such a colonial appelation would be upheld by a detailed analysis of the U.P.‘s underdeveloPment. A1 Gedicks speaks of the upper Great Lakes region (UGLR) as an internal resource colony. He presents a picture of exploitation in the mining sector which convincingly points to a colonial pattern (CALA, 1974; Gedicks, 1973, 1976a, 1976b). The evidence he;ma£shals is informative but appar- ently he has yet to publish a detailed analysis of the colonial patterns which existed (and continue to exist) in the upper Great Lakes region. This paper is an attempt to present that detailed analysis with reSpect to the upper pen- insula of Michigan. Michigan's upper peninsula played a central role in the upper Great Lakes resource exploitation of which A1 Gedicks Speaks. Historically the Upper Peninsula was exploited for fur, c0pper, lumber and iron ore. But the reader should keep in mind that (l) the fur exploitation covered an area much greater than the U.P.; (2) the lumber eXploitation, while devastating the Upper Peninsula, had harsher effects on the northern half of Michigan's lower peninsula and spread to northern Minnesota and northern Wisconsin as well; and (3) the Upper Peninsula supplied the majority of the iron ore eXports of the UGLR Until nearly the turn of the century when Minnesota became the dominant source of Lake Superior 3 iron ore. COpper exploitation was essentially an Upper Pen- insula phenomenon. The Colony Concept The concept of "colony" is an emotional one, steeped in the five hundred year history of EurOpean expansion and ex- ploitation. Yet, due to this same long history, the colony concept can be of enormous value to the social scientist who is confronted with the question of poverty, exploitation, and underdevelOpment. It is true that the historical concept of "colony” evokes images of one country exPloiting another — clearly not the case with Michigan's upper peninsula. Yet most of the accounts of classic country-over-country exploi- tations sound hauntingly similar to the U.P. experience. For example, Andre Gunder Frank writes of an area of northeast Brazil that witnessed a ”Golden Age of DevelOpment". Frank notes that the deve10pment was "neither self-generating nor self-perpetuating" (Frank, 1972, p. 7) and this form of growth could only, in the long run, lead to a decline in the area. This pattern of growth and decline describes precisely the U.P. eXperience. Further, we see that in this type of deve10pment, the tendency for a colonial area that was ex- ploitated primarily for its mineral wealth was a degeneration into "ultra-underdevelOpment" when the extractive activity was abandoned by the colonial power (Frank, 1972). A clear description of this process is provided by Samir Amin in his book, Unequal Development (Amin, 1976). He states that history shows that areas that are important to 4 the development of capitalism at the center may "eXperience brilliant periods of very rapid growth. But...as soon as the product in question ceases to be of interest to the center, the region falls into decline: its economy stagnates, and even retrogresses...an 'economic miracle' that led nowhere" (Amin, 1976, p. 238-9). The upper Great Lakes region was once the world's major supplier of iron ore and c0pper, yet no thriving industrial community exists there. Instead, these regions, in spite of enormous out-migration, have slid to the depths of poverty and unemployment (CALA, 1974). The ”C0pper Country" - an economic miracle that led nowhere. Johnson, in "Dependence and the International System" (1972), gives a summary description of the dependency/colo- nial relationship that reflects the U.P. experience. He states that dependent areas have economies oriented toward the export of raw materials, this economic system being under the control of "foreign" capital. The dependent area serves as a market for imported manufactured goods. In addition, the area suffers chronic balance of trade deficits, imports large amounts of food, suffers political dependence, and,. when resources begin to dwindle, the area's economic and social well-being tend to deteriorate as well. Again, while it is true that the classic colonies were subject nation states (albeit artificially created), mgremrecent dependency theory tends to transcend national borders. After all, unequal deve10pment within a country poses to the social 5 scientists nearly the same questions that unequal development between countries pose. Thus the nation-over-nation colonial relationship has been reapplied to examine evidence of internal colonies, i.e. colonies that may exist within national borders. The obvious impetus for these internal colony formulations is the realization of the fact that pov- erty and exploitation rec0gnize no international borders, hence, dependency/domination and colonial paradigms may do well to transcend these international borders as well. In many cases, theorists do just that. Such theorists have abandoned the tendency to speak of dominance relation- ships in terms of nation over nation. Galtung (1971) bases his theory of the world dominance system on the concept of core versus periphery. Implicit in his theory is the nation- over-nation relationship, but the theory has been applied intranationally as well (Gilbert and Harris, 1978). Generally, theorists have abandoned the term "colony" (since there are very few de jure gplonies left) in favor of terms such as dependency, underdevelopment, uneven deve10p- ment, and center-periphery or core-periphery dominance systems. While the term colony was being abandoned interna- tionally its effectiveness in illuminating relationships within countries was being explored. Johnson proffered that internal colonies can "exist on a geographic basis or on a racial or cultural basis, in ethnically or culturally dual or plural societies" (Johnson, 1972a, p. 277). If one is to accept most formulations, the term "colony” 6 can mean anything from a subject nation state, geographically linguistically, culturally, economically, and developmentally distinct from the "mother" country —-a tightly defined para- digm — to the rather loose and all-encompassing definition offered by Johnson in the previous paragraph. Gonzales-Casanova: The Internal Colony Concept The concept of internal colony presents a new dimension which forces the social scientist to re—think traditional sociology vis-a-vis the colonial relationship and to see whether there exists within an internal colony paradigm a measure of applicability to a particular dependency relation— ship. First, of course, the relationship must be defined. While the colonial relationship quite possibly may be defined by as many different sets of characteristics as there are or were colonies, for this study a paradigm must be chosen that first of all sets out a precise definition of a colonial relationship and, secondly, addresses itself to the internal colony concept. In his paper, "Internal Colonialism and National Development", Pablo Gonzales-Casanova (1965) warns against using the internal colony concept "in a vague, emotional, irrational, or aggressive way" (p.121). He then sets out to list six characteristics that define the colonial relationship. Gonzales-Casanova implies that few, if any, "internal colonies" would exist if all underwent scrutiny based on his criteria. Because of this skepticism, the Gonzales-Casanova paradigm piqued the author's interest in the challenge thus presented, and the Gonzales-Casanova set of characteristics were chosen to be utilized in this study of the U.P. dependency relationship. Gonzales-Casanova's formulation has as its root the concept that the dominant power maintains a monOpoly over the client region in the areas of exploitation of natural re- sources, labor force utilization, import-exPort trade, and revenue (from these activities) distribution. The salient features of these monOpolies consist of the following: 1. The economy of the internal colony is structured to compliment that of the colonial center. Specifically, the exploitation of a natural resource is a function of the demand for that resource at the center. This inevitably leads to a distorted development of colonial sectors and regions, most often reflected in the irregular birth and growth of cities. This distorted development is further re- flected in the lack of economic integration in the interior of the colony, coupled with the lack of cultural integration and communication. 2. The internal colony in question has its "develop- ment" tied to a predominant sector, i.e. mining or agricul- ture, and to a predominant product within that sector, for example, iron ore or cocoa. This "specialization" leads to various forms of internal colonies. These monOpolies may concentrate in fiscal areas, natural exploitation, foreign trade, etc. 3. In order to maintain the monopoly structure one 8 would expect to find that the land, water, and/or mining con- cessions are granted only to interests within the one colo- nial center. 4. We should discover an obvious disparity in the standards of living between the colony and its center. 5. Resolutions of class conflicts resulting from these disparities will be regulated by a repressive conflict- resolution structure (either formal or informal). 6. Over time, the center-internal colony system has a tendency to increase the economic, political and cultural inequalities existing between the two areas. During the course of examining the U.P. experience, pre— liminary evidence suggested that Gonzales-Casanova's criteria could be appr0priately applied to the U.P. experience. It also became evident that the history of the U.P. from earliest times to the present must present an unbroken pattern of ”colonialism" as defined above. The history of each subunit would also be required to fit this same pattern. That is, the history of lumbering must fit the pattern, the history of mining must fit, the history of each city must fit, the political history must fit, etc. While a study encompassing all features mentioned above is well beyond the sc0pe of this work, an alternative approach was devised. It was felt that the history of the U.P. could first be examined with the express purpose of de- termining whether or not the U.P.‘s experience fits Gonzales- 9 Casanova's paradigm. Secondly, if this preliminary examina- tion suggested the appropriateness of using the internal colony notion, then a subunit could be extensively examined using the internal colony concept. Then, if this subunit examination seemed to confirm the accurateness of the inter- nal colony appellation, the more thorough examination of the U.P.'s history and present underdeveloPment, as mentioned above, could be undertaken. This paper will present the fruits of the first two examinations suggested above. First, there is a presentation of the history of the upper peninsula of Michigan with a dis— cussion of Gonzales—Casanova's six points. Secondly, there is a discussion of the history of Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, with emphasis on its role in the larger U.P. experience. Sault Ste. Marie was chosen for this study because of its early settlement, its importance as a French colonial outpost, and its unique history as the Upper Peninsula's only manufac- turing center of any consequence. Briefly, then, we shall be examining the following questions. Does the history of the U.P. suggest the appro- priateness of the internal colony designation? Does the history of Sault Ste. Marie confirm the apprOpriateness of this appellation? Let us now consider the history of the Upper Peninsula keeping in mind Gonzales-Casanova's six points. THE UPPER PENINSULA EXPERIENCE It has been known for some time that ancient peOples mined the c0pper of Michigan's upper peninsula. The archeol- ogical evidence suggests that these peOple were not native to the area, apparently mining c0pper in the summer months and returning south for the winter. The c0pper, thus mined, found its way into the Toltec society of ancient Mexico (Drier and DuTemple, 1961). It should be noted that during this period other native peoples did live in the c0pper regions year around but had very little use for the c0pper. So as far back as 3,000 years the U.P. was afforded the distinction of being a resource center of the vast Toltec empire. With the fall of the Toltec empire the copper re- sources waited for the 19th century before they were again subjected to eXploitation, as we shall see. The Colonial Fur Trade The Upper Peninsula became a colony in the classical sense in the early 1600's when the French laid claim to a large portion of North America. The French recognized the enormous fur resource of the upper Great Lakes region and began eXploitation in earnest; so earneSt, in fact, that by the late 1600's the world fur market was glutted and the French closed many of its trading centers to reduce supply (Johnson, 1919). The lucrative fur trade was part of the cause of friction between the French and the British in their 10 11 fight for control of North America. The French dominated until 1760 when control fell to the British who in turn lost control to the Americans after the War of 1812. During these periods of French, then British, then American control, one element remained unchanged: fierce exploitation of the area's fur resource. The first real fortune in fur was made by John Jacob Astor. In the early 1800's he established the American Fur Company, headquartered on Mackinac Island. Through shrewd and at times ruthless dealing he managed to control the fur trade in the entire Great Lakes region, northwest to the Pacific, and south to the Gulf of Mexico (Johnson, 1919). He easily became a millionaire — perhaps America's first — and was clever enough to sell out in 1834, just as the furbearing animals were diminishing to scarcity (Catton, 1976). During the entire period of intensive fur harvest, from the 1630's to the 1830's, the Great Lakes was the center of all fur trading activities. This is not to say that the Great Lakes land areas contributed most to this trade, for when we speak of the Fur Trade in Michigan we mean just that: fur Egadg. This vast commercial enterprise, spanning two centuries, was conducted on the shores of the Great Lakes because everything moved by water —fur, and the foods, trinkets and brandy traded for them. The principal centers of this trade were Sault Ste. Marie, Mackinac Island and Detroit. Since the pelts came from all over the North Ameri- can continent, we have no way of ascertaining which portions 12 of the various fur fortunes came out of the U.P. But for the argument presented in this paper, the pattern of eXploitation is the crucial matter. This pattern was summed up by a writer for the Detroit Gazette (of January 4, 1822): "It must be allowed that the amount of fur collected annually and sold by the traders and inhabitants is considerable in our list of articles for transportation, indeed it is almost the only article worth note. How much more con— soling it would be could we feel that even a small portion of our fur could return to our territory in cash to be expended in erecting mills... Instead all furs which are collected by our merchants go as toward payments of debts contracted for foreign fabrics or in exchange for them, not only the fur but the money received for them." (Quoted in Johnson, 1919, p. 144) Statehood The War of Independence brought a new phase of domina- tion to the U.P. The French had given way to the British who had given way to the American nation. The sparsely pOpulated areas within the new American sphere were divided into terri- tories, the U.P. being at times Split between the Northwest Territory and the Indiana Territory. As areas organized and became states the U.P. was still virtually unsettled. The 1810 pOpulation of northern Michigan was estimated to be about 4,800 (excluding native peOples) (Dodge, 1973). How the U.P. became part of the state of Michigan is part tragedy, part comedy. Due to an early cartographic error, both Michigan and Ohio claimed a narrow band of land known as the Toledo Strip. As the dispute escalated, both states amassed their "armies" along the disputed territory. 13 After the very brief "Toledo War", the United States Congress asserted its authority and granted the Toledo Strip to Ohio. The Congress then offered Michigan the Upper Peninsula as a H "consolation for its loss of Toledo. After much political arm-twisting, Michigan reluctantly accepted this compromise, and in 1837 both peninsulas became the State of Michigan (Hertzel, 1976). Thus began the new phase: domination of the Upper Peninsula by the interests of lower Michigan. This domination led to the establishment of the Separate Statehood movement in 1851, a movement which survives up to the present (Washington Post, 6-9-75; Evening News, 7-10-80). Statehood brought eXploitation of the vast mineral and timber wealth of the Upper Peninsula to a height unparalleled in its history, and is hauntingly reminiscent of the class- ical colonial experience. CoEper The 1840's ”c0pper rush" to the U.P. was the first major mining boom of the United States. By 1846 about one thousand mining permits had been issued by the government for explora- tion and mining on government land. But without land owner- ship the miners were reluctant to make capital investments and to do much actual mining, many preferring instead to speculate on the permit sale market. Consequently, little ore was mined and the U.S. government collected very little in royalties. In May, 1846, therefore, the government st0pped selling permits, and later that year began selling 14 the land outright. Capitalists from the East, notably Boston, soon became the leading investors in the U.P. c0pper country (Gates, 1951). The Pittsburgh and Boston Company was the first to pay a dividend, in 1848, and by 1870 when it closed, it had paid over two thousand percent on invested capital. The Minesota (sic) Mining Company paid almost two million dollars in dividends, doubling its investors money in its heyday (1852- 1856) and by 1876, it had returned nearly $30 for each dollar invested (Beeson and Lemmer, 1966). Many companies of course had no such good fortune and most paid no dividends. Yet the potential for high profits lured many, and at the end of the Civil War, there were thirty-six companies mining c0pper in the U.P. (Gates, 1951). Most of these companies were quite small, twenty-nine of them producing less than one-half million pounds per year, yet the members of two Boston financial groups sat on the boards of 85% of the companies that made any money at all during the Civil War (Gates, 1951). This concentration of control continued to be the dominant pattern in c0pper mining companies. The Calumet and Hecla Company, a Boston capitalist en- terprise, became the dominant force in the production of United States c0pper after the Civil War. Between 1869 and 1879 it shipped one-half of all U.S. c0pper. Its share of Michigan copper for the one-hundred year period from 1846 to 1946 was 48%. By 1884, Calumet and Hec1a had become the sole 15 selling agent for all Michigan c0pper, and together with three other mines (all Boston companies also) produced 71% of the c0pper mined in Michigan (Gates, 1951). Boston capitalists looked upon the c0pper of the U.P. as their private preserve. In 1904 two companies, Calumet and Hecla and Quincy, and two financial interest groups, those of Paine-Stanton and Bigelow-Lewisohn, controlled mines account- ing for 95.8% of the Michigan output. Both companies and both groups were composed of Boston capitalists (Gates, 1951). In light of this concentration, let us return to the subject of dividends. During the period 1846 to 1946, twenty-seven companies paid out dividends totalling 350 million dollars. The two giants of the industry, Calumet and Hecla and COpper Range (of the Paine-Stanton group) accounted for 67% of all dividends paid. (Calumet and Hecla paid 57% of all dividends paid.) The estimated value of the c0pper shipped from Michigan up to 1946 was over $1.5 billion (Gates, 1951), but almost none of this vast wealth stayed in the Upper Peninsula. Instead, the profits were paid in dividends or used to explore and develop c0pper sources in other parts of the U.S., and in Africa and South America as well (CALA, 1974). Due in large part to this internationalization of the copper monopoly, the U.P. share of U.S. copper production fell from 96% in 1849 to 3.6 in 1946; its share of the world market declining from a high of 18% in 1891, to only 1.1% in 1946 (Gates, 1951). 16 Lumber This mining activity also brought lumber capitalists into the area. A study published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1913 gives a dramatic picture of the concentra- tion of ownership within the U.P. lumber industry. Fully 47% of the total U.P. land area was owned by 32 holders, all own- ing 40,000 acres or more. The Cleveland—Cliffs Company alone owned 1.5 million acres — 14.2% of the total Upper Peninsula. The biggest single capitalist was J. M. Longyear, a member of the "Albany Group”. He was involved with the four next largest landholders (after Cleveland-Cliffs) who together controlled about one million acres (Dept. of Commerce, 1913). Much of the remaining Upper Peninsula was divided among such companies as U.S. Steel, the Calumet and Hecla Mining Company, Lake Superior Iron and Chemical, and others. In 1929 the U.S. Department of Agriculture published a bulletin by William N. Sparhawk and Warren D. Brush entitled "The Economic ASpects of Forest Destruction in Northern Michigan". The authors quote the Michigan Tax Commission's 1919-20 report. "(Because of) the destruction of Michigan forests ...we have seen numerous cities and communities greatly reduced in wealth and pOpulation, industrial enterprises closed down or moved away, capital transferred to other sections while forests still remain...(the complete destruction of forests) will mean thousands of peOple forced out of their regular employment...the disappearance from the tax roll of a large amount of taxable prOperty, and the withdrawal of millions of additional capital...” (Sparhawk and Brush, 1929, p. 3). 17 Despite the admonitions and warnings of the Tax Commis- sion, it was already too late. By 1920 Michigan forests had been laid to waste. The study states that in the period be- tween 1825 and 1925, out of Michigan's original 380 billion board feet, 244 billion feet were cut for lumber and other lumber products, while 108 billion board feet were burned or wasted. This represents 92% of available forest. The value of the cut timber was ten times the value of all the gold taken out of Alaska — three billion dollars worth of lumber and mill products (Sparhawk and Brush, 1929). While the Sparhawk and Brush study was concerned with all of Michigan, they divided the state into regions, so that the U.P.'s devastation can be factored out. While lower Michigan had only about three percent of its land area sup- porting merchantable timber, in 1920, the U.P. was still sup- porting merchantable timber stands on 31% of its land. In 1920, Sparhawk and Brush cite this figure as evidence that the lumber industry of the Upper Peninsula can be maintained "on a large scale for several decades" (p. 9). This Optimistic statement was made in the late twenties, yet other evidence tends to contradict this prognosis of continued prOSperity. In the decade from 1910 to 1920, the total U.P. pOpulation increased only two percent and ten of the twelve principle cities showed p0pulation losses for this period. The percentages of males between the ages of 18 and 44 decreased from 28% to 21% of the U.P. pOpulation for this same ten-year period. And, although in both the tax rate per 18 1,000 population and a per capita breakdown of those taxes showed the U.P. to be the most heavily taxed region of the state, illiteracy was the highest in the state, and the roads were the worst. Farming, which utilized the cut-over regions of southern Michigan, could never be expected to take hold in the U.P. because ”it is doubtful if...there is any known way of making (the cut-over lands of the U.P.) profitable to the farmer" (Sparhawk and Brush, 1929, p. 71-72). The authors of the U.S.D.A. study offer perhaps the most eloquent statement supporting this paper's exploration of the colonial aSpects of lumbering in northern Michigan: "The removal of the forests in most parts of northern Michigan...has not been followed by the utilization of a considerable proportion of the land, either for farming or for anything else. Comparatively few of the loggers were permanent settlers; most of them came north in the winter to earn cash wages, which they either ”blew in" at the end of the season or took south to live on while develOping farms in southern Michigan, Ohio, or Indiana. The greater part of the supplies and equipment consumed in exploiting the forests was produced by farms and factories in other regions. Few of the fortunes gained from lumbering were utilized for the ben- efit of the timber region itself. For the most part, they were invested in other businesses, or reinvested in stripping the timber from other States. Even the towns and cities that grew up around sawmills and wood-working factories were mostly only temporary centers of trade and industry, doomed to inevitable decline, if not complete extinction, with the passing of the forests which supported them. The conclusion is inevitable that the eXploitation of the forest wealth of this great territory, embracing an area almost as large as the State of Indiana, has not been of lasting benefit to the region itself. On the contrary, northern Michigan has been impoverished for the benefit of other parts of the country, and its productiveness has been so impaired that not for many years to come can it 19 support as many peOple and industries as were in the region 30 years ago (1900)." (Sparhawk and Brush, 1929, pp. 12-20) Using Sparhawk and Brush's figures it is estimated that the U.P.'s share of the lumber value taken from Michigan forests is about one billion dollars. Again we see, as was the case with fur and c0pper, that almost none of the money remained in the U.P. and only limited use was made of the lumber in situ: ”export" was the name of the game. In fact, during the height of the lumbering boom from 1880 to 1890 Michigan shipped four and one-half times as much lumber as it consumed. Yet by 1912 Michigan was a net importer of lumber (Sparhawk and Brush, 1929). Iron Iron mining in the U.P. follows much the same pattern that was evident in the c0pper industry: control by outside interests and no secondary industries to utilize the ore in the U.P. The first mining company to ship iron ore (in 1850) was the Jackson Mining Company, organized by capitalists from Jackson, Michigan and soon bought out by Pennsylvania finan- ciers (Besson and Lemmer, 1966). From the very beginning the control of Michigan iron mines was centered in the lower lake ports. Of the 96 mines in the U.P. in 1950, two-thirds were owned by companies headquartered in CleVeland, 25% were in Chicago and Pittsburgh. The one mining company that was headquartered in Michigan, the North Range Mining Company of 20 Negaunee, Michigan, owned four mines. Together these four mines shipped only 1.7% of all ore shipped from the U.P. before 1950 (Lake Superior Iron Ore Association (LSIOA), 1952). The concentration of control is duplicated by the con- centration of consumption. Within the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were 77% of all blast furnaces dependent, in 1950, on iron ore from the Lake Superior region. Unfortunately data for consumption does not differentiate the source of iron ore; in 1950, Minnesota shipped 81.7% of ore shipped, Michigan shipped 16.2% and Wisconsin, 2.1% (LSIOA, 1952). Obviously, by 1950, Michigan iron ore was playing a poor second fiddle to Minnesota ore. (In 1900 the ratio was 47.6 for Michigan to 49.5 for Minnesota.) However, this does not weaken the arguments with which we are presently con- cerned, i.e. that the U.P. iron ore industry is mightily controlled by the interests of one center and that local con- trol and utilization is virtually nonexistent. The author did find an account of one attempt to produce pig iron in the U.P. utilizing the available resources. This occured in the 1870's, but output never reached even five percent of the U.S. total and the Operation was abandoned. Had attempts such as these been repeated, perhaps these secondary indus- trial concerns could have helped to break the colonial extraction pattern we have seen thus far. 21 The Gonzales-Casanova Paradigm The history of the U.P. fur trade, lumbering, and c0pper and iron mining shows a definite pattern of eXploitation which conforms to the patterns established in Gonzales- Casanova's first three points. Concerning the first point, the economy of the U.P., woefully underdeveloped, has always been directly tied to resource extraction for the benefit of outside interests. The lack of economic integration is obvious; the eXploitation returned nothing to the U.P:; no secondary industries arose to utilize the natural resources of the area. Also, the irregular birth, growth and decline of its cities is phenomenal. When comparing the 1970 pOpula- tion of cities to the 1930 figures, 71% of these places show a declining pOpulation (Rodefeld, 1976). Gonzales-Casanova's second point comes even closer to the U.P. experience. The "development" of the U.P. has al- ways been tied to one predominant factor — resource extrac— tion. The fur trade was finished by the time c0pper and iron ore mining began in the 1840's. Mining soon dominated the U.P. economic picture. The U.P. was the most important source of both iron ore and c0pper up to and during the Civil War (Beeson and Lemmer, 1966). While both c0pper and iron ore mining continued to prosper into the 1900's, the import- ance of these mining fields diminished. By the mid-1880's Michigan's share of U. S. c0pper production drOpped below 50%. Prior to 1884 Michigan iron ore was the only ore shipped from the Great Lakes region, yet by 1901 Minnesota was shipping 22 more ore than the Michigan fields. In Gonzales-Casanova's paradigm one should find that concessions granted in the eXploitative process will be granted to interests in one colonial center. In c0pper mining we have seen that Boston capitalists were in complete control: by 1918, three Boston companies controlled 92% of Michigan output. In the iron ore industry, we have seen that 92% of Michigan mines were controlled by either Cleveland, Chicago or Pittsburgh interests (in 1950). The Post—World War I Upper Peninsula Before turning to the last three points in Gonzales- Casanova's paradigm, the history of the U.P. should be ex- plored further. The great lumbering boom lasted from about 1870 to about 1905. The best year for iron ore was 1916 when 20.5 million tons were shipped. Coincidentally, 1916 was c0pper's best year: 266.8 million pounds of c0pper were shipped (LSIOA, 1952; Sparhawk and Brush, 1929; Gates, 1951). The eXpansion of the U.S. economy for WOrld War I was a short respite in the decline which began about 1909 in copper and iron ore mining. After the war, production continued to decline and when the Depression came it found an already depressing scene. During the early 1930's, the Depression era, the number of U.P. families on relief was about 33%, compared to 17% for the rest of Michigan. In c0pper mining Keeweenaw County, three out of four families were on relief and eight of the 23 fifteen U.P. counties had relief loads Of over 40%. At this time, only one out of forty iron mines in Dickinson County was Operating. Mining employment in Keeweenaw County drOpped from 6,700 in 1930 tO 2,071 in 1933. The State Relief Admin- istrator stated that "at least 50,000 persons must eventually move (out of the U.P.)...Or remain permanently dependent" (Haber, 1935, p. 10). The expansion Of the economy for World War II also failed to reverse the Upper Peninsula's downward slide. Un- employment in the c0pper counties was 39% in 1940, and the area's share Of U.S. c0pper production drOpped to 4.2% by 1944 (Gates, 1951). In 1920 there were 150 Operating iron mines; in 1959, 30 mines; in 1965, 15 mines; and by 1976, there were only six iron mines Operating in the U.P. In the c0pper industry, from a peak of 36 mines, production drOpped to ten mines in 1959, two in 1976 (Wall Street Journal, 1964; M.D.N.R., 1976), and only one today (1981). The total extractive work force of the U.P. fell from 47,486 in 1930 to 9,998 in 1970, a drOp of nearly 80%. And while the rest of Michigan saw a pOpula- tion growth Of 89% from 1930 tO 1970, the Upper Peninsula's pOpulation actually declined by 4.5% (Rodefeld, 1976). Between 1950 and 1960 the upper Great Lakes region as a whole lost 61% Of its 20- to 24-year-old pOpulation and 42% of its 25- to 29-year—Olds (Loomis and Wirth, 1967). This migration of working age persons created a dependency ratio that 24 underscores the persistant economic woes Of the U.P. During this period, the Upper Peninsula city of Sault Ste. Marie showed a dependency ratio Of 100:116 which compares to a ratio Of 100:74 for urban Michigan (ratio formed as follows: ages 20 to 64: all others) (Thaden and Moots, 1960), In 1960 it was estimated that the U.P. had a 30.7% unemployment rate, compared to a 16.6% rate for the Appalachian region (N.M.U., 1965). These unemployment and population figures do not tell the whole story. Using the Appalachian region as the basis for comparison, the U.P.'s standard of living can be shown to have been worse in most reSpects during the 1960's. The U.P. per capita income was slightly less than Appalachia's; labor force participation was about ten to twelve percent less. About one quarter of the U.P.'s adult pOpulation had a tenth grade or better education, compared to about one third for Appalachia, and the U.P. housing quality was considerably worse than Appalachia's (N.M.U., 1965). Although the pre- ceding data are from a 1965 study, the author has found no evidence to suggest that the trends have not continued through the 1970's. With the increasing deterioration Of the U.P.'s economy since the early 1960's, and the continual loss Of pOpulation, the situation most probably has continued to worsen. A study called "Upper Midwest Commodity Flows, 1958" by Bruce F. Duncombe (1962) isolated the U.P. trade picture and deliniated its trade relations with other areas Of the U.S. 25 It is worthwhile to discuss some background to this study before discussing the results themselves. The Upper Peninsula is included in the Ninth Federal Reserve Bank District (Minneapolis) which is oriented toward agriculture. The rest of Michigan is in the Seventh District (Chicago) which has a greater orientation toward industry. (This split has helped to insure a lack Of financial exper- tise and backing necessary for industrial deve10pment in the U.P. (N.M.U., 1962)). Due to this split Of the Michigan pen- insulas, the U.P. was included in the Duncombe study along with Montana, North and South Dakota, Minnesota and the twenty-six northwest counties Of Wisconsin. (These areas comprise the Ninth Federal Reserve Board District.) The bottom line Of the study shows a $32.5 million "balance Of trade" deficit for the U.P. for the year of 1958. The ele- ments Of this trade deficit are illustrative of the dependen- cy pattern Of the U.P. trade and economic activities. In the import column we find that the U.P. must import 98% Of its textile products and apparel, 97% Of its tranSpor- tation equipment, 85% Of its furniture and fixtures, 68% of its meat consumption, 42% Of its dairy products consumption, and over 60% Of other food consumption. In Spite Of the U.P.'s vast timber resources, it imports 98% Of its paper and allied products and 52% Of its lumber needs. And, although _its iron and cOpper resources are enormous, it imports 75% Of its fabricated metal products. The Upper Peninsula exports 100% Of its iron ore, 100% 26 of its c0pper, 99% Of its paper and allied products, 92% of its furniture and fixture production, 80% Of its non-metallic minerals, 72% Of its lumber and wood products, and 54% Of its dairy products. If we compare the exports and imports, we see that while the U.P. is exporting a large prOportion of certain products it is at the same time importing these same products (paper, lumber, dairy and textile products, furni- ture). It would be unfair to assume (for example) that the paper exported is the same type and grade as the paper that is imported, yet it Should be Obvious that local industry is not serving the needs Of the Upper Peninsula, but serving outside corporate interests, centered mainly in the Lake States and in the East (all import-export data from Duncombe, 1962). In politics, the affairs of the U.P. Show the same control by outside interests that is present in trade and economics. The state and federal governments can and do ignore the U.P.'s needs. The winter navigation problems of the eastern Upper Peninsula, the possibility of uranium mining, the ongoing Seafarer-ELF controversy, the (successful) fight to keep lower Michigan's toxic waste out of Chippewa County, and state "wetlands" legislation provide recent examples. Because Of its low pOpulation densities, the Upper Peninsula's problems are overshadowed by the represen- tation of Michigan's largely urban and industrial pOpulation. It would be useful tO explain the preceding problems within a politics -versus- "development" paradigm. The fight 27 to keep a toxic waste incinerator out of Chippewa County pro- vides a case in point. Due to the closing Of Kincheloe Air Force Base in 1977, Chippewa County's economy was in a shambles. (This will be discussed at some length later in this paper.) The State Of Michigan had hOped the depressed economy Of the area would allow them to install a toxic waste incinerator at the former Air Force Base without public dissent. This incinerator was to dispose of the wastes for all Of Michigan and possibly for other parts of the Midwest as well (Evening News, 11-18-77). The incinerator had many supporters, almost all of whom viewed any industrial deve10p- ment as desirable. New industry meant new jobs and in the U.P. job creation is considered a sacred goal. Yet Opposi— tion to the incinerator spread widely and swiftly. A meeting was called (by this author) to organize the Opposition; four days later over three thousand signatures had been collected in a county with about 30,000 peOple. The County Commission voted four to two to Oppose locating the incinerator in Chippewa County. This case is representative of a hOst of conflicts con- fronting the U.P. Almost all Of the "projeCts" suggested for the U.P. are viewed by many as being designed to aid outside interests, most Often to the detriment of the U.P. residents and their environment. Winter navigation — that is, year- round shipping on the Great Lakes — is Opposed in part by those who dislike the idea Of federal subsidies for the iron ore industry. State "wetlands" legislation was Opposed in 28 part by those who saw the legislation as an attempt to force curtailment of the logging and mining industries while assuring that downstate interests would keep the U.P. in the position of a virtual state park for Lower Peninsula tourists. The situations that many U.P. residents see as problems with state and federal governments are far from resolved and the U.P.'s small pOpulation makes it hard for these peOple to be heard. Many other aspects of the political landscape create additional problems for local governments. The state and federal governments own over 30% of the total U.P. land area, and nearly 10% more is owned by six companies (Smith, 1974). The land owned by these lumber and mining interests is nearly tax-exempt. Michigan Public Act 218 of 1970 exempts certified commercial forests from the ad valorem tax rolls; Public Act 66 of 1963 does the same thing for iron ore deposits, and Public Act 68 of 1963 exempts c0pper ore deposits (Smith, 1974). Coupled with the fact that there is virtually no industrial tax base, these laws have obviously resulted in a situation in which the local governments lack the resources needed to provide basic services to peOple living in the area. Another result is the continual battle over rising taxes as poverty and unemploy- ment create greater social costs with fewer and fewer resources to meet those costs. 29 The Gonzales-Casanova Paradigm.e-The“Final‘Three Points We are now in a position to examine the final three points in the Gonzales-Casanova paradigm. The comparison of the U.P. living standards to those of Appalachia showed that in many respects the U.P.'s living standards were below those of Appalachia, an area of unquestioned poverty. So it is Obvious that a comparison of U.P. living standards to those evidenced in those cities identified as centers of U.P. control - Boston, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago — would place the U.P. in a very disadvantaged position vis-a-vis these centers. Gonzales-Casanova's fifth point, that there exists a formal or informal repressive structure for the resolution of conflicts between the center and the colony would have to come under the "informal" category. By definition, an inter— nal colony is part of the "mother country", subject to the same laws, etc. But we have seen how the state and federal governments tend to ignore the wishes of the U.P. and how the State has joined with the mining and lumber industries to all but eliminate the possibility of raising necessary tax revenue through the pr0perty tax structure. Gonzales-Casanova's last point is that the economic, political and cultural inequalities between the two areas increase over time. In the economic Sphere the continued decline of the mining industry has spelled worsening economic woes for the U.P. Unemployment levels hover around twelve to fifteen percent even in the beSt of times. As for 30 increasing political inequalities, the best indicator is the U.P.'s continual loss of pOpulation in the face of growing population in lower Michigan. As we have seen, from 1930 to 1970 the rest of Michigan saw a growth in pOpulation of 89% while the U.P.'s pOpulation declined 4.5% (Rodefeld, 1976). This population loss represents the ebbing away Of the U.P.'s already miniscule political clout in the State Capitol. The third aspect of the sixth point is that of "increas- ing cultural inequality". Gonzales-Casanova places a large measure of importance on racial, ethnic or cultural distinc- tiveness between the two areas. A thorough examination of the two areas (the U.P. and the lower lake states) with an eye to discerning cultural differences presents problems of definition. The author admits that he is unable to identify what might be a "cultural inequality" let alone being able to discern an increase in such a commodity as satisfaction for the final aspect of Gonzales-Casanova's sixth point. (Al- though "true" cultural differences are not found, "surface" manifestations of culture that ordinarily and naturally ac- crue to industrially developed centers — such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Boston, and Chicago — are, with minor exceptions, absent in the Upper Peninsula. These "cultural" events in- clude theater, dance, opera, symphony orchestras, etc.) The U.P.'s economy has been shown to have always been complimentary to the demands for resources at the center. The irregular birth, growth and decline of cities has been 31 directly tied to natural resource eXploitation. The U.P.'s lack of economic integration is obvious from the "export- import" data presented on pages 25 and 26 of this thesis. Intra-peninsular tranSportation provides an additional case- in-point. There exist no major highways transversing the peninsula; the only existing section of interstate highway is fifty miles long and links lower Michigan with the Canadian market (from the Mackinac Bridge at St. Ignace to The International Bridge at Sault Ste. Marie). To fly from the eastern U.P. to the central or western U.P. (and vice versa) one must fly to Traverse City, Michigan or Milwaukee, Wiscon- sin first. The railroads were built almost exclusively for resource extraction. (The only clear exception was the rail from Minneapolis to Sault Ste. Marie which will be discussed later in this study.) We have seen that the U.P.'s "deve10pment" was tied to resource extraction in four areas: fur, c0pper, lumber, and iron ore. The capital to eXploit these resources came from Boston, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago. We eXplored the U.P.'s standard of living and found that it is most likely worse than that of Appalachia. We have seen the U.P.'s scant economic and political viability being further eroded by declining pOpulation. We have presented and discussed Gonzales-Casanova's Six points and found the U.P. to fit a pattern of colonial domination. We are now in a position to move to the second phase of this study: a presentation of Sault Ste. Marie's history, to see whether an 32 individual piece of the internal colony puzzle will exhibit the same adherence to the colonial paradigm. THE SAULT STE. MARIE EXPERIENCE 1600 to 1800: Early Colonial Outpost For more than 300 years Sault Ste. Marie has stood at the foot of Lake Superior and watched the wealth of an area now composed of Michigan's upper peninsula, northern Wiscon- -mrm sin and Minnesota, and northern Ontario float down the St. Mary's river to points south and east. When Etienne Brule, the first white person to see the area now called Sault Ste. Marie, came up the St. Mary's river in the 1620's he found thousands Of native people camped and fishing along what came to be called the St. Mary's rapids. (Sau(l)t de Sainte Marie is French for "rapids of the St. Mary's".) These peOple are now called the Chippewa and the Sault was the summer meeting place of the Chippewa Nation. The rapids, formed as Lake Superior's waters fell eighteen feet to the level of Lake Huron, com- posed one of North America's foremost fishing grounds. Despite this tremendous resource, most Chippewas chose to come to the rapids only for the fishing season, and perhaps as few as two hundred lived on the river year round. (It would be unfair to refer to the Chippewa's use of the area's resources as colonial exploitation since their way Of life 33 held no notion of "colony".) The French, however, had a different View of the plentiful natural resources of the area. In 1671 Sieur de Saint Lussen, on an order of King Louis XIV Of France, came to Sault Ste. Marie (because of its central location amidst these holdings) to claim formal possession of the vast French holdings in North America. In a pompous ceremony in the Sault on June 4, 1671, Saint Lussen claimed "all of the vast region 'aS well discovered as to be discovered' bounded on one side by the 'northern and western seas' and on the other side the Sea of the South, or the Pacific" (Bayliss and Bayliss, 1955, p. 19). Thus began Sault Ste. Marie's role as Official colonial outpost, subservient to Montreal and ultimately to the King of France. Its role as the center of French colonial activity for most of North America lasted until the end of the seventeenth century when British harassment from the north forced the French to retreat to Mackinac Island. The continuing deterioration of their influence caused the French, at the pleading of the Mackinac commandant, Antoine Cadillac, to establish a new outpost and fort at Detroit. In 1706 the French missionaries burned the mission in St. Ignace at the Straits of Mackinac, and abandoned Mackinac Island. The mission at Sault Ste. Marie had been abandoned some years before, and, as a French colonial outpost, forgotten. With the decline Of French domination of this area in the 1760's the British began exploiting the north with the same fervor shown by the French. For a while, the Sault witnessed 34 a flurry of activities surrounding British eXploitation of the fur wealth of the upper Great Lakes. But it was no longer the center of that activity; the colonial center was again at Mackinac Island. Yet Sault Ste. Marie was main— tained as a trading center and held the distinction of being an important colonial outpost for British activities. After the Jay Treaty of 1794 which resolved the question of control over the north country, the British moved their activities to the Canadian Side of the St. Mary's River, causing another _L‘-. m-—_ L. decline in the fortune of Sault Ste. Marie. 1800 to 1880 In a short time, Sault Ste. Marie found itself embroiled in the War of 1812. John Johnston, the Sault's leading citizen and furtrader, along with other Sault men, both Indian and white, fought on the side of the British. The British, of course, lost and the Americans burned John Johnston's house in Sault Ste. Marie, and the American Fur Company's outpost on the Canadian (British) side of the river in retaliation. Subsequently, the Americans built a fort at Sault Ste. Marie in 1822 to keep the border free of British incursion, perhaps with an eye toward keeping the errant John Johnston, an Irishman by birth, and others, in the patriotic fold. With the Great Lakes territory firmly in American control for the first time, residents in the area began 35 agitating for statehood. After the brief and comic Toledo war, Michigan accepted the Upper Peninsula as a concession for losing Toledo, and both peninsulas were admitted to the Union as the State of Michigan in 1837. This unnatural union brought protest from the start, and as early as 1851 the peOple of the U.P. agitated for separate statehood (Hertzel, 1976), an agitation which procedes unabated to this day. With statehood came eXploitation and the Americans re- discovered the U.P.'S vast copper wealth. The copper rush to the U.P. rivalled the gold rush to California of a few years hence. The c0pper activity brought expansion and prOSperity to the Sault because of its location at the foot of Lake Superior. Everything in this part of the country moved by water, and to get to and from the c0pper country the rapids at the Sault had to be overcome. For many years a lively trade was made by portaging cargo from ships in Lake Superior to ships below the rapids and vice-versa. A refinement on this theme saw whole ships being dragged on rails from one level to another. After a few false starts and much agitation in the United States Congress and the Michigan Legislature, the State of Michigan Opened a lock at Sault Ste. Marie in 1855, immediately rendering obsolete the jobs of the portage laborers in the Sault. A few years later, in 1857, when an accident ruptured the lock, a call went out to the portage men of the Sault for help. They refused, striking perhaps 36 one of the first blows in the war of the workingman against automation (Newton, 1923). In the words of Chase Osborn, owner of the local news— paper and a future governor of Michigan, the Sault "lost much of its commercial prestige and these years (1855 to 1870) witnessed a decadence instead of an advance" (Osborn, 1887, p. 13). In 1870 the federal government opened its first lock in the Sault. Because its use was toll free and the state charged a per ton levy for its lock, the state lock was abandoned by shippers and the state was forced to turn its lock over to the federal government. The abandonment of the state lock in deference to the federal lock is significant. Low shipping costs meant that raw materials need not be utilized in manufacture at the point of extraction. The basic raw materials of steel — iron ore, limestone, coal, and coke — comprise oVer 75% of all upper lakes shipping, and yet the United States has no steel mills in the upper Great Lakes region (U.S. Army Corps, 1976). 1880 to 1890: The Boom Decade The Boom of 1887 must have been one of the most colorful and exciting eras of the Sault's history. The city was in- corporated in 1887 and a number of deve10pments brought in a coven of fourteen boomers: land speculators dressed in ”mink- skin coats and plug hats" (Newton, 1923). Lots offered for $25 before the boom fetched a price of $6,000. 37 The deve10pment which brought in the boomers were: the completion of the international railroad bridge between the two Saults; four rail line companies laying track for the Sault; the Sainte Mary's Falls Water Power Company's invest— ment of $500,000 in real estate and rights of way; the first electric street railway; city-supplied water beginning in 1886 and the running of sewer lines; the laying of gas lines; and the introduction of electricity to Sault homes. City records Show that in 1886 the value of new build- ings was $43,000. In 1887, the value was $1,208,000. Popula- tion growth showed the same meteoric rise: in 1880 the Sault's population was 1,947, by 1890 it had risen to 5,760 (13th Census of the U.S., 1913). These developments prompted Chase Osborn to make the following statement and prediction: "At present (1887) the old city is enjoying a legitimate revival...(and enterprises) will make it a most important manufacturing and commercial center of large proportions" (Osborn, 1887, p. 14). Chase Osborn Offers unrelenting praise for Sault Ste. Marie, the ”Mecca of the manufacturer, the capitalist...”. It is both enjoyable and instructive to quote extensively from his pamphlet entitled: "The 'SOO', The New MetrOpolis, The Coming City Of The Great Lakes, The Gem Of The New North". Thousands of eyes have been attracted by the prominent and important location Of Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., the hub of the central North, the city with a great future, surrounded, as it is, by many of the greatest advantages ever bestowed upon an earthly region...The 'Soo' with its key-like location, its grandest water-power in 38 the world, its great locks, the bracing, cooling, exhilarating, healing atmosphere, the solidity that characterizes its present rapid growth, the coming of transcontinental railways, the hundreds of large vessels that pass its great canals daily, the vast local and governmental improvements projected and under way, its unsurpassed agricul- tural resources, great forest resources, extensive mineral deposits close at hand, splendid school system and local government, elegant churches of many denominations, and many other things that constitute the foundation of a great metrOpOlis, will be a city of 25,000 inhabitants within three years, and its great growth will not cease or diminish (Osborn, 1887, p. 1). As mentioned, railroads were coming to the Sault. The first of these was the Soo Line, built by Minneapolis flour milling capitalists. These capitalists saw the route through the Sault and Canada as a competitive force against the rail interests in Chicago. It is indeed Shorter, through the Sault, to the east from Minneapolis, and these capitalists felt the pressure of an alternative route would force lower prices upon the more southern rail lines (800 Line Rail Road Co., 1976). Although the railroad could be looked upon to bring a measure Of prOSperity to Sault Ste. Marie, it was not built with that intent. Rather it was built to serve the interests of Mineapolis capitalists. The water power syndicate is another example of outside interests coming to the Sault to exploit the natural resources. HOping to harness the power of the rapids and bring the Sault into the industrial age, the syndicate, com- posed of capitalists from Chicago, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, began to purchase canal rights of way in the late 39 1880's (Osborn, 1887). While calling the Sault "the Mecca of the Capitalist”, Chase Osborn proceeds to list those capitalists who invested in the Sault: six from Iowa, three from Chicago, fifteen from Michigan's lower peninsula and three from the Upper Peninsula (Osborn, 1887). In the words of Osborn, because of the investment these men were making in the Sault, "Sault Ste. Marie will be pOpulous and wealthy...enter(ing) upon a phenomenal growth" (Osborn, 1887, p. 40). 1890 to 1900: Beginnings of an Industrial Age While the Sault failed to live up to Chase Osborn's dream, the late 1880 and 1890's saw the Sault grow, while not phenomenally, certainly with an enthusiasm which bordered on the incomprehensible. In 1900 the population soared to 10,538, up from 5,760 in 1890, making Sault Ste. Marie one of the fastest growing cities in Michigan. Its "industrial age" was inaugurated by the establish- ment of the Soo Woolen Mills about 1890, the only woolen mill in the U.P. (Sawyer, 1911). The Woolen Mills was to supply the lumbering industry with heavy woolen clothing. The loca- tion was well chosen. Not only was Sault Ste. Marie the fastest growing major city of Michigan, Chippewa County was "the heart of the finest cattle and sheep country in the United States if not in the world" (Chipley, 1925), providing an ample source of wool. Another industrial concern begun during this period was 40 the Union Carbide Company. In the mid-1890's experimental work was done in Sault Ste. Marie on a proceSs of forming calcium carbide. The company, then called the Lake Superior Carbide Company, was formed by a group of Chicago business- men tO obtain acetylene to enrich gas used to light Chicago city streets. In 1898 this company joined with the Electric Gas Company to form the Union Carbide Company (about which more will be said later in this study). 1900 to 1910: Industrial ExPansion Although it was a city of substantial size and of even more substantial promise, at the turn of the century Sault Ste. Marie was not an industrial giant. In 1900 it was the fourth biggest Michigan city north of Bay City. It was larger than Adrien, Birmingham, Ecorse, Escanaba, Grosse Pointe, Hamtramck, Highland Park, Holland, Lincoln Park, Midland, Monroe, MOunt Clemens, Pontiac, River Rouge, Royal Oak, Traverse City, Wyandotte, and Ypsilanti (U.S. Census, 1942). And of its three northern rivals, Ishpeming and Menominee were already in their decline and Alpena showed only a 4.6% growth from 1890 to 1900 (13th Census of the U.S., 1913). Despite Sault Ste. Marie's burgeoning manufacturing potential, and its importance as a commercial and trade center, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the vast c0p- per, iron and timber wealth of northern Michigan only indirectly benefited the peOple and the communities of this ltW' 41 vast and rich region. The bulk of the wealth followed the flowing waters of the St. Mary's River and the upper Great Lakes to the lower lake states and the east. Sault Ste. Marie entered the twentieth century with construction of the world's largest tannery (built by Boston capitalists in 1900) and bouyed by the hope that the power canal under construction would bring even greater prosperity to the Sault region. For more than half a century men had been able to ignore the rapids impediment to shipping, first by portaging, and now through the federal locks system. All that remained was to harness the tremendous water power. With an eighteen-foot fall, and Lake Superior as a mill pond, the power potential was staggering: enough power "to light Detroit and Chicago and all the cities lying between" (Sawyer, 1911, p. 246).. In 1902 the power canal was complet- ed and the world's longest hydro generating plant began to produce electricity. Both the tannery and the Union Carbide Company provide clear examples of colonial exploitation. The Northwestern Leather Company factory (called "the tannery") was built in the Sault because the Sault offered "the most advantageous location" in the whole of the United States. The shipping of hides from the Chicago slaughterhouse did not represent an economic disadvantage when compared to the tremendous natural resources of pure water from Lake Superior and vast forests of hemlock providing tanning bark — both essential materials in the hide tanning process at that time. (One source states 42 that raw hides came from Australia and Argentina and the tanned hides were in great demand in EurOpe (Sawyer, 1911).) The other major concern established during this period was the Union Carbide Company. Now twenty-one on the Fortune 500, a multinational corporation with nearly five hundred plants, factories, laboratories, mines and mills around the world. Union Carbide had its humble beginnings in Sault Ste. Marie in 1898 as the Lake Superior Carbide Company. (For the details of its formation, see pages 39-40 of this study.) The power canal was finished in 1902 and in 1903 Union Carbide returned to the Sault from Niagra Falls to take advan- tage of the canal's hydro-electric power. There was no other reason to relocate in the Sault. Coke and limestone are the raw materials from which calcium carbide is made. The coke came from the Canadian Sault and from Detroit and other lower lake ports. The limestone came from Rogers City in lower Michigan. Coal was also needed and it too came from lower lake ports (Bayliss and Bayliss, 1955). For many years Union Carbide tried to lure a customer to the Sault to utilize the calcium carbide on site. They had no success and all of its production had to be shipped out of the Sault. Equally futile were the efforts to lure other industries besides Union Carbide to the Sault to utilize the hydro-power of the Michigan Northern Power Company. The power company consequently failed and was bought by Union Carbide and 43 called the Union Carbide Power Company. Union Carbide con- tinued to advertise for a factory to utilize surplus power, which, in 1920, was almost one-fourth of the total power available (Chipley, 1925). 1910 to 1940: Decline and Depression In 1887 Chase Osborn said that Sault Ste. Marie's "great growth will not cease or diminish" (Osborn, 1887, p. 1). He was wrong on both counts. In the twenty years from 1880 to 1900 the Sault's pOpulation had grown over 440%, from a frontier town of 2,000 peOple to a thriving, growing city of over 10,000. The years from 1900 to 1910 saw a modest growth of only 20%; and from 1910 to 1920 the Sault lost 4.1% Of its pOpulation. The picture, while not nearly as rosy as Chase Osborn envisioned, was not totally dismal. The major companies continued to be viable enterprises and maintained a steady growth, and some new industries were established in the Sault during this period. Foremost among these new companies was the Cadillac-Soo Lumber Company. Capitalized to the tune Of five million dollars by downstate financiers in 1923, the Cadillac-Soc Lumber Company established the largest sawmill in the Upper Peninsula in the Sault. In summary, in the early twenties Sault Ste. Marie had twelve factories, was served by fifteen passenger steamship lines and four rail lines, and had eight miles of street 44 railway (Chipley, 1925). But industrial growth was nearly at a standstill and pOpulation was deClining: the dream was over. In the words Of a pamphlet published in 1928: ”We (the Sault) are not trying to grow, we are trying to improve." And perhaps more poignant is this statement from.the same pamphlet: "The...people who live in Sault Ste. Marie have long forgotten the time when they dreamed of a metrOpoliS of the north, when, in their fancies, they saw Skyscrapers, double boulevards, and a smoke-filled sky (Sault News Printing CO., 1928). Shortly after this pamphlet was written, the United States plunged into the Great Depression. And nowhere was that plunge more precipitous than in Michigan's upper penin- sula. Three out of four peOple were on relief in the c0pper— mining county of Keweenaw; Upper Peninsula counties as a whole averaged a relief load of 33% of all families (Haber, 1935). Yet the Sault's industrial advantage over the rest of the U.P. permitted it to weather out the Depression in relative prOSperity. Times were hard in the Sault, but no harder than in the Lower Peninsula. 1240 to 1950: The Prosperity of the War Years At the outbreak of World War II, Sault Ste. Marie found itself in fairly good straits. The small population decline in the decade from 1910 to 1920 was reversed and in 1940 the Sault was still a fairly large and prosperous city. It was 45 larger than Adrian, Birmingham, Ecorse, Escanaba, Grosse Pointe, Holland, Lincoln Park, Midland, Mbunt Clemens, Traverse City, and Ypsilanti. And as for its northern rivals of 1900, its pOpulation outstripped the cities of Ishpeming, Menominee and Alpena. World War II meant government contracts for both the Soo Woolen Mills and Northwestern Leather Company. Union Carbide continued its steady production of calcium carbide. The prosperity of the war years can be attested to by the employ- ment figures for the leading Sault industries. Northwestern Leather - - — - 850 Union Carbide -------- 600 Cadillac Soo Lumber Co.- - - 154 800 Woolen Mills ------ 65 Lock City Marine & Machine - 200 Our Own Bakery ------- 75 Table 1: Early 1950's employment figures for Sault Ste. Marie's major employers (various sources). 1950 to 1960: Industrial Dec1ine' Shortly after the Korean War the entire Michigan (and U.S.) economy began to suffer irreversible changes, changes that saw production shift from durable to non-durable goods. The first sign of this shift in the Sault community was the announcement in November of 1953 that the Soo Woolen Mills was closing because of a lack of orders. It managed to re- Open but closed again in January of 1955, never again to resume production. Late in January, 1955, a group of Sault businessmen who were considering buying the mill abandoned their plans. A study conducted under their direction showed 46 there no longer existed a market for heavy woolen goods. And woolen mills were for sale "all over the country" (EVening Ngwg, 1—22-55). The $00 Woolen Mill equipment was sold and the plant was razed. Sixty-five workers lost their jobs. In another deve10pment, Northwestern Leather, the Sault's largest employer, laid off one hundred employees early in 1955 and eight more in August (Evening NeWs, 3-31-55; 9—15-55). In 1956, the Cadillac-Soo Lumber Company board met in Grand Rapids, and on March lst they announced the Cadillac- Soo mill in the Sault would close as soon as the logs remain— ing in the yard were cut. They cited distance from markets and a declining wood source as reasons for the closure. The company still owned 48,000 acres in the U.P.; 6,000 of these acres were of virgin timber. In June of 1956 the mill closed, the equipment was sold and the buildings were razed. Another 154 workers were unemployed. Simultaneously, on June 8, 1956, Union Carbide announced a permanent reduction of one hundred employees, offering the following explanation: "fundamental changes in the method of operation...necessari1y brings about a substantial reduction in the work force" (Evening_News, 6-8-56). Also in 1956 (December) a joint bakery operation serving the U.P. and baking in Marquette and in the Sault, ceased operating in Sault Ste. Marie and moved that portion of its production to Marquette. The company, called Our Own Bakeries, laid off most of its seventy—five Sault employees. Lock City Marine and Machine, which repaired boats and 47 engines, and built boats and landing craft for the Army and Navy, also closed in 1956. The bakery and the Lock City Marine closures brought another 250 peOple into the ranks of the unemployed. In January, 1957, the 300 to 400 workers left at North— western Leather ratified a new three-year contract. Faced with the staggering economic blows of 1956, the union agreed to a contract which called for "a re-evaluation of wage rates and production standards” (Evening News, 1-26-57). In addi— tion to these union concessions, the city had given the tannery help in its taxes and in its power and water rates (Evening News, 3-25-58). During these negotiations, Northwestern Leather was sounding the same marketing alarms sounded by the Woolen Mills, Cadillac-Soc, and others. The timbre of these alarms was this: Sault Ste. Marie is fast losing its viability as a manufacturing center. The January, 1957 contract allowed for either the com- pany or the union to instigate new negotiations twelve months hence, if warranted by economic conditions. In January, 1958, the company did feel further negotiations were warran- ted and again called upon the union to re-evaluate the wage structure and productivity standards. Only this time, the outcome was different: the union overwhelmingly rejected the company's attempt to further erode their living standard (Evening News, 2-3-58). The company board members returned to Boston, called together the stockholders and advised them 48 to liquidate the company. They voted to do so on February 18; the company ceased Operations in mid-April and on May 7, 1958 the prOperty and machinery were auctioned. A Sault businessman, acting on behalf of the Sault com- munity and hOping to keep the tannery in Operation, submitted what he felt was the highest bid for both the land and the machinery. But because of the company's interpretation of his bid and the "rules" of the auction, his bid was deter- mined to be $5,000 short of the high bid. The company refused to reconsider his bid and the tannery was sold in pieces. The sold equipment was removed and the buildings were razed. The tannery action outraged the community and left another three hundred workers jobless (Evening News, 5-8-58). Exacerbating this calamitous situation, Union Carbide, in 1958, cited high taxes, high freight rates and increased power costs as elements creating the possibility of its closing the "Soo Works". This prompted the company to peti- tion the city for tax relief, citing the lower taxes paid at its other calcium carbide production sites. The Sault community viewed these Union Carbide disclo- sures with understandable alarm. The 1950's saw Michigan's manufacturing grow six percent while the Sault's declined sixty-three percent. The Sault's remaining production workers in late 1958 represented only 22% of its 1947 level and Union Carbide employed nearly all of those 370 production workers. The "great growth that would not cease or diminish" 49 touted by Chase Osborn, had ceased years ago and the Sault's industrial strength was dimishing in earneSt. The 1960 census brought the decline official status. The Sault's pOp- ulation in 1960 stood at 18,722, 800 more than the 1950 census figure, but down steeply from an estimate of 19,680 made in 1957 (Thaden and Mbots, 1960). The outmigration included many peOple of laboring age: Sault Ste. Marie lost 14% of its labor force in the 1950's. Its 5,232 laboring age peOple of 1960 was actually below its 1940 figure. The manufacturing labor force in 1960 stood at 566, down from 1,545 in 1950 (Villian—Leman, 1963). In 1960 its dependency ratio revealed that for every 100 people be- tween ages 20 and 64 there were 116 other people, compared to a 100:74 ratio for urban Michigan (Thaden and Moots, 1960). In 1960, Michigan's unemployment rate stood at 6.9%, Sault Ste. Marie's at 12.8%. The new decade found the once- proclaimed "gem of the new north” in seriously hard times. The nearly 150-year association with the federal military also showed signs of decline: Fort Brady closed in late 1945, the Navy hydrological station closed in 1954, and on March 29, 1960, the Army‘s Camp Lucas closed; transferring 610 military personnel out of the Sault and adding another one hundred civilian employees to the Sault's swelling ranks of unem- ployed (KISS, 1976). 50 1960 to 1970; The End of the'InduStrial'Age' Union Carbide produced (among many other products) cal- cium carbide, which, when mixed with water, released acety- 1ene gas. Acetylene was the chemical source of the early plastics industry. Bayliss and Bayliss, in their book, River of Destiny_(1955), sing the praises of acetylene: "Synthetic organic chemicals produced from acetylene figure in the manufacture of sulfa drugs and other pharmaceuticals, I lacquers for coating automobiles, photographic supplies, i dyes, and dry-cleaning f1uids...synthetic rubber and aspirin" (Bayliss and Bayliss, p. 148). They state that the uses of acetylene are "almost unlimited". In 1955 the future of acetylene looked bright indeed, but by the late 1950's chemists were discovering that natural gas could be substituted for acetylene in the plastics and related industries. It was during this period that Union Carbide began to complain that the substitution of natural gas for acetylene was affecting the marketability of calcium carbide, the 800 Works only product. On February 22, 1961, the Union Carbide Company issued a statement which said, in part, "Tax relief...is absolutely essential to have a chance of becoming competive and obtain- ing and holding new markets." That plea fell on the deaf ears of the city fathers, and on August 1, 1962 Union Carbide announced the closure of the Sault plant. Most of the reasons listed were well known to Sault residents: distance I 51 from markets, high taxes, high freight rates, and the reduc- tion of power output due to lower water levels in Lake' Superior. Union Carbide's closure dealt the death blow to the Sault's Industrial Age. The company that dominated the Sault's industrial scene for sixty years was leaving, taking with it a tax base that paid nearly 30% of all the taxes levied by Chippewa County and the City of Sault Ste. Marie. (Sault Ste. Marie is the county seat of Chippewa County.) They laid off 270 workers whose average service to the com- pany was about twenty-five years (Evening News, 8—1-62). Union Carbide officially ceased its operations in the Sault on November 30, 1963. They sold the canal and power generating plant to Edison-S00 Electric Company, the local electric utility, which was owned by investors in St. Louis. The carbide plant equipment was either moved to other Union Carbide operations or sold, and the buildings Were razed to reduce Union Carbide's prOperty tax levies. 1970 census data records the serious toll the industrial decline had taken on the Sault area in the previous decade. The steady population loss of the late 1950's was accelera- ted. The Sault's population fell to 15,136, a level previously attained sometime in the late 1930's. Its non- worker ratio soared to 1.70. At the same time, surrounding Chippewa County suffered a net loss of 19.7% through migra- tion as more working-age peOple moved out of the county.. During the 1960's employment in the United States grew 52 23.4%, while total employment in ChippeWa County actually declined slightly. The big employment losers were agricul- ture, forestry and fisheries, down 73%, and manufacturing, down 49%. The loss in the manufacturing sector occured at the same time the U.S. manufacturing sector grew 13.6%. The only area that showed any substantial growth was the public. administration area, up 21% from 1960. And yet even this growth was 10% behind the public administration growth rate for the United States as a whole (KISS, 1976). Synthesis Many would believe that the preceding data forces a locational explanation upon the problems Of Sault Ste. Marie. There is no lack Of official company statements to that effect: Cadillac-S00 Lumber, Northwestern Leather, Union Carbide, and Our Own Bakeries all complained of marketing and transportation problems. Yet upon closer examination it seems that location fac- tors fail to explain the entire relationship between the eastern Upper Peninsula and the industrial demands Of the United States. We must attempt to discern the underlying pattern Of underdevelopment that created the boom and bust Of the Sault area; in this way the Gonzales-Casanova pattern Of exploitation becomes evident. The lock system was in no way intended to serve the interests of the Sault, indeed, it had the Opposite effect: 53 from its inception it was intended to move goodsthrough the Sault faster and cheaper. The first railroad to the Sault was not intended tO serve the Sault, but was built as a route through the city, again intending to serve outside interests. The lumbering era Of Chippewa County and of the entire U.P. did not serve the peOple of the area: the intention was to eXploit the area's timber resources. The Sault's industrial era mirrors this exploitative pattern. Northwestern Leather was here to exploit the pure water and forest resources; Union Carbide to exploit the cheap hydro-electric power; Cadillac-S00: the lumber re— sources. All the industrial concerns that abandoned the area sold their equipment tO outside interests and razed their factory buildings, insuring that local control and/or Opera- tions would be completely impossible. Northwestern Leather and Union Carbide did leave some- thing behind: a legacy Of toxic wastes. The tannery site, completely devoid Of buildings, is nonetheless laced with toxins, including arsenic, cyanide, mercury, lead, and chromium. The chromium and cyanide are both found in concen- trations in excess Of Environmental Protection Agency standards (Evening News, 10-24-80). In a testament to under- statement the Evening News states: "(the) original tannery owners...have left the Sault and chances Of their being I v | forced to come back and clean up the site may be very slim... (Evening News, 10-24-80, p. 1). Acetylene gas is produced by mixing calcium carbide and 54 water — the by-product of this chemical process is calcium hydroxide, or lime. Union Carbide disposed Of this by- product by merely piling it near their plant. This 375,000 cubic yard mountain, given to the city when Union Carbide left the Sault, is in many places chemically active just be— low the surface and poses a serious threat to the children who play on and around the pile. Following an article in the Sault Evenings News on October 20, 1980, public concern became acute. The news— paper reported the findings Of a Michigan Department of Nat- ural Resources (M.D.N.R.) investigation which found unusually high concentrations Of cyanide in the pile which may pose a threat to ground water supplies. The Union Carbide ad slogan Of a few years back — "Today, something we do will touch your life" — has taken on a new meaning for Sault residents in light Of the M.D.N.R. findings. The full potential Of the health threat posed by both the tannery and the Union Carbide wastes is yet to be real- ized. Yet it seems clear that these and the other companies who moved from Sault Ste. Marie did so with very little re- gard for the local economy and with less regard for the area's people. To place the colonial designation and the concommitant economic factors in clearer perspective, one need only look across the St. Mary's River from Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan tO Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. The U.P.'s colonial status 55 has resulted in a radically different form Of deve10pment for the American Sault when compared to the Canadian Sault. The Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario ExPerience‘ In 1901, when the Sault was a thriving city Of over 10,000 peOple, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario was a city of 7,169, and this difference was maintained until the early teens. However, in the decade from 1910 to 1920, the Michigan Sault lost 4.1% Of its pOpulation, while Sault, Ontario nearly doubled its pOpulation, growing from 10,984 in 1911 tO 21,092 in 1921. More recent comparison Of the two Saults continues this startling contrast. In the early 1950's, Sault, Ontario's Algoma Steel Corporation employed about 7,000 peOple. At the time, its steel mill was the largest in all Of Canada (Bay— liss and Bayliss, 1955). The Abitibi Power and Paper Company, utilizing Lake Superior water power and northern Ontario timber to produce neWSprint, employed over 600 peOple. At this time (1951) the Canadian Sault supported a population of 32,452 (Sault, Michigan: 17,912). In the fifties — the de- cade of Sault, Michigan's precipitous industrial decline — the Algoma District (Sault, Ontario its major city) showed a manufacturing growth rate of between ten and twenty percent, and a pOpulation gain Of over 25% (Dean, 1969). Sault, Michigan's decline is nearly as powerful as the growth Of Sault, Ontario. Sault, Michigan's pOpulation fell 56 19% in the 1960's; Sault, Ontario grew 44% in this same per- iOd, to 76,000 in 1969. The seventies saw Sault, Michigan's population dec1ine to 14,039 (1980 census figure), while Sault, Ontario grew to an estimated 81,000 in 1978 (Squiqna, 1978). The industrial strength Of Sault, Ontario can be seen by the fact that, with Sarnia, Ontario, Canadian Sault industrial workers earned 50% to 75% more than the average Ontario wage earner (Dean, 1969). The essential difference in the history Of the Saults is that while the Upper Peninsula's resources were being exploited, northern Ontario's resources were being utilized at the point Of extraction. The resources are the same on either shore of Lake Superior: iron ore, timber, and water power. But while these resources brought people and prosper- ity tO Sault, Ontario, they brought neither to Sault, Michigan. It should be apparent that the standard capitalist geo- graphic argument used tO eXplain the economics Of the eastern Upper Peninsula fall flat when voiced with a knowledge Of Sault, Ontario's history. Distance from markets and trans- portation problems cease to be problems when considering Sault, Ontario's place within the Canadian economy. Sault, Ontario is as far from its major market areas —-Toronto and MOntreal - as Sault, Michigan is from its major markets. The fact that Sault, Ontario is at the U.S. border and situated in the middle Of Canada's only east-west transportation route insures that, despite its distance from markets, it will 57 remain within Canada's industrial core, albeit on the periphery. It would be impossible tO explain how two cities a river-width apart, both equidistant from their supposed markets and with identical "transportation problems" and with identical resources could result in two radically different economies unless there exists underlying structural compon- ents which forced the cities to take different paths to ”deve10pment". Sault, Ontario emerges as a partner to Canadian industry, sharing in the benefits accruing to indus- trialization, while the American Sault's picture traces a path from colonial trade center, through a neo—colonial industrial age, into the decline and decay in which it finds itself today. The 1970's: The Decline Continues What has been related thus far has been in terms Of history, but if the colonial appellation is valid, present conditions must continue to reflect this relationship. Official unemployment figures for Chippewa County since the closing of Union Carbide's SOO Works run the range Of 11.2% in the "good" year Of 1966 to an average of 21.8% for the first six months Of 1979. The 1979 figures also show a loss Of about 7.5% Of the area's civilian labor force since Janu- ary. Unofficial estimates of the unemployment rate during the recession year Of 1975 were placed at nearly 30% (KISS, 58 1976). Using the latest figures available, the unem— ployment rate for December, 1980 in Chippewa County was 22.6%. 1980 Census figures complete the dismal picture. Chippewa County lost 13.1% Of its 1970 pOpulation, which stands at 28,158. Sault Ste. Marie was down 7% tO 14,039, equal to its population during the early 1930's (Evening News, 7—22-80). Closures and loss Of jobs still dominate the employment picture Of the Sault and the surrounding area. In the closing months Of 1977 the U.S. Air Force phased out its Operation at Kincheloe Air Force Base (KAFB), 18 miles south of the Sault. One source prior to the closing estimated the employment loss for Chippewa County could be as high as 2,700 jobs. This would have meant that more than one out Of every four workers would lose his or her job. The closure Of KAFB did not result in the severe econo- mic problem that was anticipated, because Of a blitzkrieg move by the State Of Michigan which converted barracks hous- ing on the base into a medium security prison which became Operational on February 1, 1978, employing approximately 250 area peOple. Thus the 1978 unemployment figures show a rise of only about 2% for 1977 to 18.0% for 1978. Coming close on the heels Of the Kincheloe closing was an announcement by Essex Wire that it was closing its wiring harness assembly plant in Sault Ste. Marie. The Essex exper- ience is highly reminiscent of a third world country's exper- ience with an industrial multinational. The city lured Essex Wire to Sault Ste. Marie by granting them a five—year 59 tax break at a site in the Municipal Industrial Park. A slowdown in the auto industry delayed the Opening of the’ plant for almost two years, eating up two years Of their five-year tax break period. The city refused to extend this tax break period. About three years after beginning production and near the end Of their tax break period, Essex Wire issued a state- ment citing shipping costs, foreign competition and high turnover at the Sault plant as problems confronting its Oper- ation (Evening News, 9-7-78). Union negotiations were then underway for a new three-year contract, replacing one that was to expire on September 27, 1978. The workers, receiving ten cents per hour more than minimum wage, were demanding a substantial wage increase. (The company's statement was in response to this contract demand.) On September 14, 1978 (Evening News), Essex, the city's largest private employer, announced that it was closing, and on September 22, 1978 it discontinued Operations, throwing 250 more workers into the ranks Of the unemployed. Community sentiment expressed the belief that without the tax break and its near minimum-wage pay rate, Essex didn't care to remain in the Sault and intended to find another city with high unem- ployment and an advantageous tax rate to exploit. The Essex Wire experience, while tragic, is in imitation Of the area's pattern of eXploitation. In this case, the resources to be eXploited are not the natural resources Of timber, iron ore or c0pper, but those of low tax rates and an 60 impoverished work force willing to accept a job rate at half Of what the same job would demand in the "mother Country". near Detroit. Samir Amin places such experiences firmly within the colonial context. He points out that if "a resource (in this case, impoverished workers)...is suddenly Opened up...(attracting) a large influx of foreign capital, and...the tax burden...can be increasingly lightened... miracle growth" may visit an area (Amin, 1976, p. 291). But again Amin points out that this growth is not development, but rather the deve10pment Of underdevelopment. The Essex closing is a final testament to this colonial exploitation. The Essex pattern will be repeating itself, as company after company explores the possibility Of locating in the Sault area, enticed by various government funded ”development corporations" with the lure Of low interest loans, low rents, tax breaks, and destitute, but eager, workers. INTERNAL COLONY We have seen the upper Great Lakes region's furbearing animals harvested to scarcity; cOpper mined so fiercely that within one hundred years 9.6 billion pounds were shipped out Of the U.P. (now only one mine continues to produce); fever- ish iron mining that saw 1.2 trillion pounds of ore shipped from 1900 tO 1951 (today only four mines still produce); extensive lumbering, with over one billion board feet shipped 61 by 1926, leaving ten million acres deVastated. In the c0pper industry we saw that the Calumet and Hecla Mining Company of Boston shipped 48% Of all copper shipped out Of the U.P. from 1846 to 1946; in the iron ore industry in 1950, 67% Of all mines were controlled by companies headquartered in Cleveland; in 1910, 47% of the total U.P. land area was owned by thirty-two holders; and at the end of the fur era all trading throughout the entire region was controlled by one man. The wealth shipped out of the Upper Peninsula was enormous; the estimated value Of lumber shipped or wasted: $1 billion; the value Of c0pper shipped by 1950: $1.5 billion; the value Of the iron ore shipped between 1900 and 1951: $3.8 billion; and the value of the U.P.'s decimated fur resource: inestimable. And what has this Vast wealth accom- plished for the people Of the Upper Peninsula? Sometime during the 1920's the U.P. population began to decline and it has been declining ever since. The period from 1930 to 1970 saw the U.P. lose 4.5% of its population. And in the wake Of this declining population is a picture Of poverty that rivals the dismal vistas Of Appalachia. How does the Sault Ste. Marie eXperience compare with that for the Upper Peninsula as a whole? Northwestern Leather, a Boston company, located in the Sault in order to utilize the resources Of tanning bark and pure water and left a legacy Of heavy metal waste; Union Carbide, a powerful multinational, came tO the Sault to utilize its cheap hydro 62 power, and left behind a 375,000 cubic yard lime pile laced with deadly cyanide; the Cadillac-SOO Lumber Company estab- lished the U.P.'s largest sawmill in the Sault tO utilize the last Of the area's timber resources; Essex Wire was in the Sault only long enough to take advantage Of municipal tax breaks and cheap labor: when these two resources ran out, so did Essex. SO what happened to the U.P. and Sault Ste. Marie when the resources dwindled? The companies left, taking their fortunes and the livelihood of thousands Of families with them. They left in their wake dislocation, massive unemployment, a raped environment, persistent poverty, and social costs tOO great to imagine. Clearly the U.P./Sault experience mirrors that of a colony in the classic sense. Indeed, the data presented certainly support A1 Gedicks when he writes Of the upper Great Lakes region as a resource colony and leads one to an acceptance of Gonzales-Casanova's internal colony designation as well, even though Gonzales-Casanova is concerned that the term may be used "in a vague, emotional, irrational, or aggressive way" (Gonzales—Casanova, 1965, p. 121). Yet it may be some Of those very qualities which impart tO the internal colony notion a large measure Of utility. As D. L. Johnson explains, there exists within the notion Of internal colony a quality that contains "a sense Of magnitude and urgency (and having) the potential to awaken whatever humanity remains in man, of broadening consciousness, Of 63 stimulating action for deve10pmenta1 change" (Johnson, 1972, p. 301). It is precisely this national liberation implication that leads this author to the "internal colony" appellation when speaking about the Upper Peninsula. It is with Johnson's "sense Of urgency" that the U.P. has been studied within the colonial context, and the "potential for broadening consciousness" has forced a careful scrutiny Of the Sault's experience. It is hoped that the resultant study will encourage peOple to look upon the Upper Peninsula as less Of a State Park and Resource Center and more as an "emerging nation" with goals and aspirations yet tO be realized. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Amin, Samir 1976 Unequal Development. Translated by Brian Pearce. 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Duncombe, Bruce F. 1962 Upper Midwest Commodity Flows. Technical Paper No. 4. Minneapolis: Upper Midwest Research and DevelOp- ment Council and The University Of Minnesota. 64 65 The Evening News Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Cited the following dates: 1-22-55; 3-31-55; 9-15-55; 6-8-56; 1-26-57; 2-3-58; 3-25-58; 5-8-58; 8-1-62; 11-18-77; 9-7-78; 9-14-78; 7-10-80; 7-22-80; 10-20-80; 10-24-80. Frank, Andre Gunder 1972 "The DevelOpment Of UnderdevelOpment." In James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and UnderdevelOpment. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. Galtung, J. 1971 "A Structural Theory Of Imperialism”. Journal Of Peace Research, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 81-117. Garrison, Anne 1966 "Sault Ste. Marie; Economic Future and History." Michigan State Economic Record 8:1-3. Gates, William B., Jr. 1951 Michigan COpper and Boston Dollars. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gedicks, A1 1973 ”Guerrilla Research: Reversing the Machinery." 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