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G) 1979

DENNIS MICHAEL O'NEILL

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE ATTITUDES OF AMOS, HOSEA, JEREMIAH
AND DEUTERO-ISAIAH CONCERNING THE
MAN/GOD RELATIONSHIP: A STUDY

IN HEBRAIC MONOTHEISM

BY

Dennis Michael O'Neill

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Interdisciplinary Program

College of Arts and Letters

1979

ABSTRACT
THE ATTITUDES 0F AMOS, HOSEA, JEREMIAH
AND DEUTERO-ISAIAH CONCERNING THE

MAN/GOD RELATIONSHIP: A STUDY
IN HEBRAIC MONOTHEISM

By

Dennis Michael O'Neill

This study seeks to examine the nature of the Man/God
relationship, specifically as it is treated by the literary prophets
Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero—Isaiah in their effort to forge a
monotheistic faith. It is initially determined that the concept of
monotheism, specifically as it is utilized by contemporary scholars,
is not sufficiently full and complete, to be suitably employed in
analytical investigations.

It is suggested that the meaning of this concept necessarily
be expanded to incorporate treatment of the essential nature of the
deity being investigated. The analysis of the prophetic perception
of the Man/God relationship is predicated on the position, espoused
by Ludwig Feuerbach, that the essential nature of God is isomorphi—
cally related to that of man.

The discovery of the essential nature of man is grounded in
Aristotle's view that man, as man, has a proper and peculiar function.
It is maintained that an analysis of the proper function of the ancient
Hebrew, as perceived by Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah,
may be instrumental in disclosing their views as to what constitutes

the essential nature of Yahweh. It is hypothesized that

Dennis Michael O'Neill
if the prophetic position dealing with the nature of the Man/God
relationship held that the ancient Hebrew shared the same essential
nature with Yahweh and that this essential nature was determined to
be simple and a unity, then the prophets' systems of belief could
truly be designated as monotheistic.

Through an extensive analysis of the combined writings of
Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah, it is determined that only
the writings of Jeremiah warrant that designation. The point is made
that, while not constituting monotheistic systems of belief, the
writings of Amos, Hosea and Deutero-Isaiah display the efforts of
each of these prophets to grapple with clarifying the nature of the
Man/God relationship.

Chapter 1 seeks to establish the fact that the views of Old
Testament scholars concerning the provenance and nature of Hebraic
monotheism are divisive. The divergence of the opinions of Old
Testament scholars concerning the origins of Hebraic monotheism is
shown to range from claims that it was present in the beliefs of the
Patriarchs to claims that an expression of true monotheism is to be
found only in the writings of Deutero-Isaiah and perhaps those of
Jeremiah. The lack of a consensus of opinion among Old Testament
scholars as to when and with whom Hebraic monotheism may be said to
have originated is attributed to the use, by these scholars, of the
term "monotheism" along with its accepted definition. More precisely
it is maintained that the accepted definition of monotheism lacks
virtually any analytical value or discriminative function whatso-

ever, consequently it is contended that the use of the term

Dennis Michael O'Neill
"monotheism" with its accepted definition by Old Testament scholars
contributes more to the proliferation Of problems in the field of
Old Testament studies than to their solution.

Chapter 1 also analyzes the various types Of monotheisms
which have been promulgated by a number Of contemporary scholars,
especially in their attempts to characterize the writings of the
literary prophets. The criteria adopted by contemporary scholars in
order to determine the type Of monotheism present in a given system
Of beliefs have been isolated and examined in an effort to determine
their relative value. It has been shown that there does not exist a
consensus of opinion, by these scholars, as to what criteria are
deemed absolutely necessary for such a determination to be made
unequivocally.

Chapter 2 seeks to develop theoretical support for the view
that an expanded definition of the concept monotheism is absolutely
necessary if that concept is tO display any analytical utility.
Three systems Of belief concerning the nature Of the Man/God rela-
tionship are examined in order to obtain a paradigm case which
utilizes this expanded conception. A reconstruction of Aristotle's
theology is adopted, as is his view that man, as man, has a proper
and peculiar function. It is shown that his system Of thought ful-
fills the criteria Of the expanded concept and that the treatment of
his system displays the utility of that expanded concept.

Chapter 3 contains the introduction to the analysis proper of
the combined writings Of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah.

TWO hypotheses are submitted, the verification of which is held

Dennis Michael O'Neill
necessary for the determination to be made concerning the monotheis-
tic nature Of their individual works. These hypotheses are: (1) the
prophets hold that man, as man, has a proper function; and (2) the
essential nature Of Yahweh is held by the prophets to be simple, and
a unity, and isomorphically related to that Of man. Also, a Deter-
minant Theory of Knowledge is developed, based on the ethical systems
of both Plato and Aristotle, which is held to represent an epistemo-
logical theory present in the writings Of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and
Deutero-Isaiah.

Chapter 4 contains the analysis of the combined writings of
Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah. Thirty-one passages,
taken from their combined works, are analyzed in an effort to sub-
stantiate the hypotheses put forth in Chapter 3. Also, it is shown
that each Of these passages is authentic, thus expressing the views
of the prophets.

Chapter 5 summarizes the study as a whole and specifically
the findings Of Chapter 4. It is determined that only the position
of Jeremiah is to be designated as a monotheism, for it alone, un—
equivocally, fulfills the criteria Of the expanded formulation Of

that concept.

To
My Parents
Patricia Helen Verhage
and

William Ronald O'Neill

ii

PREFACE

The value inherent in the creation Of a scholarly work is
perhaps best understood at least initially in terms of the immediate
benefits which accrue to the individual researcher from the activities
Of critical study and analysis. Viewed objectively, however, the value
of any scholarly work may be determined only through a critical assess-
ment of precisely what contribution it makes to the solution of the
problem it purports to address.

The particular problem which is treated in this dissertation
deals with discovering the attitudes espoused by the prophets Amos,
Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero—Isaiah in their attempts to illuminate
the nature of the Man/God relationship. The vehicle through which the
analysis Of the respective attitudes of these prophets is attempted
is the concept monotheism. In this dissertation, the concept mono-
theism is determined to be instrumental not only in describing man's
perception Of his God, but further, monotheism is held to be descrip-
tive Of man's perception of himself and not simply of himself as an
instantiation of man generally conceived but as indicative of that
which constitutes the very best in man, that which he perceives to
determine his very humanity. Historically, the concept of monotheism
has not been called on to perform this dual function.

Only a casual acquaintance with the writings of Old Testament
scholars is necessary to insure the reader that the term "monotheism"

iii

Ilk-

as it has been traditionally employed by Old Testament scholars has
displayed a definite utility in assisting these scholars in advancing
our level of understanding concerning the growth and development of
the Hebraic religion from the time Of Abraham down to and including
the period of the exile. The fact that Old Testament scholars have
heatedly debated the question of how the term "monotheism" is to be
unequivocally employed is indicative of the awareness on the part of
these scholars Of the dynamic and ever evolving nature of our under-
standing Of the ancient past rather than Of any inability on the part
Of these scholars to clearly conceptualize the problem.

It is perceived to be the strength Of this dissertation that
it is imbued with a spirit which arises directly from its inter-
disciplinary approach. The eclectic manner in which the fields Of
Philosophy, History and Religion have been called upon to perform a
certain task may be viewed by some as artificial and contrived. It
is nonetheless the lot Of interdisciplinary studies that there does
not exist at present a well grounded tradition which may be used tO
guide the researcher.

There is present in every scholarly work the desire to discover
the definitive solution to problems which have thus far eluded our
colleagues. That that which is truly achieved falls well short Of
that goal should hardly give rise to despair. If this dissertation
proves to Offer but one small advance tO that collective body Of
knowledge which presently constitutes the proper subject matter of
the disciplines Of Philosophy, History and Religion, its worth is

assured.

iv

There is present in this dissertation no radical or categor-
ical rejection of the conclusions and views which have found accept-
ance in the fields of Philosophy, History and Religion. Rather there
is present in this dissertation a blending of various ideas selected
from those disciplines which has given rise, at the very least, to a
new vantage point from which to consider and appreciate the manner in

which ancient man came to terms with his God.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge indebtedness and express my gratitude
to the members of my committee, Dr. Eleanor Huzar, Dr. Alford Welch,
Dr. Harold Walsh and Dr. Robert Anderson, who, individually, extended

their help and advice in the preparation Of this dissertation. I

 

would like to offer a special thanks to Dr. Walsh, whose enthusiasm
proved to be quite infectious. I wish, also, to extend a special
thanks to Dr. Anderson, without whose patience, understanding, and
encouragement this dissertation may well have not come into being.
Further I wish to acknowledge that it is to Dr. Anderson, primarily,
that I owe my scholarly debt, for it was under his guidance that I
have acquired any insights which may be present in this work.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to a personal friend and
colleague, Mr. John A. Odell, whose continued encouragement Often

proved to be the best remedy for discouragement.

vi

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Chapter
1. THE PROVENANCE AND NATURE OF
HEBRAIC MONOTHEIS}I O I O O O I O O O O O 0 O O O O O 0 1
THE PROVENANCE OF HEBRAIC MONOTHEISM . . . . . . . . . 4
Patriarchial Monotheism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Mosaic Monotheism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Monotheism in the Monarchy and the
Former Prophets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Monotheism Of the Literary Prophets and
the Authors Of Deuteronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

MDNOTHEISTIC TENDENCIES IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE LITERARY PROPHETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Incipient, Implicit, and Speculative
MOnotheisms Of H. H. Rowley . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Empirical and Philosophical Monotheisms
Of Ivan Engnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Theoretical and Practical Monotheism
of Theophile Meek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2. TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF MONOTHEISM . . . . . . . . . 38
THE NATURE OF THE MAN/GOD RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . 38

IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Mosaic Mbnotheism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Radical MOnotheism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Aristotelian Monotheism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

3. THE NATURE OF THE TASK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

THE PROPHETIC CONCEPTION OF THE
ESSENTIAL NATURE OF MAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Vii

Chapter Page
A DETERMINANT THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE . . . . . . . . . . 68

Plato's and Aristotle's Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4. THE MAN/GOD RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
AUTHENTICITY OF THE SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

PROPHETIC MONOTHEISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Amos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Hosea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Jeremiah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Deutero-Isaiah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

 

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

viii

Chapter 1

THE PROVENANCE AND NATURE OF HEBRAIC MONOTHEISM

The dual problem inherent in the study Of Hebraic monotheism,
viz., the accurate locating of its provenance accompanied by an
intelligible discussion Of its internal composition, has plagued Old

Testament scholars for over a century.1

While the problem dealing
with the identification of the source of Hebraic monotheism has been
vigorously attacked by Old Testament scholars, the problem of the
nature of Hebraic monotheism has received far less attention.2

The solution tO the problem of ascertaining the nature of

Hebraic monotheism, as well as that of monotheism generally, would

 

1Although the traditional view concerning the prophetic
provenance Of Hebraic monotheism had been propounded by Julius Well—
bausen as early as 1878 in his Prolegomena to the History of Ancient
Israel (New York: Meridian Books Library Edition, 1958), pp. 111-125,
and apparently this view had gained acceptance by his contemporaries,
see especially the views of A. Kuenen and C. G. Montefiore in the
latter's Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated
by the Religion Of the Ancient Hebrews (London: William and Norgate,
1893), pp. 134-136, H. H. Rowley has stated in "Mose und der Mono-
theismus," Zeitschrift fur die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, BAND
69, 1957, p. 1, "Eine der aktullen Fragen der alttestamentlichen
Forschung betrifft das Alter des israelitischen Monotheismus."

 

 

 

 

2Raffaele Pettazzoni, in his Essays on the History of Religions

 

(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), pp. 1-10, has leveled a quite similar
criticism directed at scholars working on the problem of "primitive
monotheism," however, and but with only a slight shift in meaning it
may apply to Old Testament scholars grappling with the problem of
identifying the origin Of Hebraic monotheism, "The different theories
(those concerning primitive monotheism) were not so much the resultant
Of research having for its Object monotheism itself, as the indirect
outcome of acceptance or rejection of evolutionism," p. 4.

1

2
appear to reside in the development of a clear and precise definition
on the term "monotheism." However, it has been in the construction of
such a definition that Old Testament scholars may be said to have
failed.

The current, accepted definition of the term "monotheism," to
wit, "The doctrine that there is only one God,"3 which has been
utilized by Old Testament scholars to ascertain the antiquity Of
Hebraic monotheism, has proved to be sufficiently vague as tO have
called for the use and invention, by Old Testament scholars, of a

' which have

number Of related terms, e.g., "henotheism" and "monolatry,'
themselves been employed by Old Testament scholars in an inconsistent
manner.4 Beyond having shown itself ineffectual in helping Old
Testament scholars to solve the problem Of unequivocally locating the
origin Of Hebraic monotheism, the accepted definition Of that term,

due to its absolute simplicity, is hardly suited to the task of help-

ing to expose the internal structure of the Hebraic religion.

 

3Oxford Universal English Dictionary on Historical Principles
(New York: Doubleday, Doron and Company, 1937), p. 1276.

4See, Norman K. Gottwald, A Light to the Nations (New York:
Harper and Row, 1959), p. 547, where he defines "monolatry" as being
"equivalent to henotheism"; Keith H. Beebe, The Old Testament (Belmont:
Dickenson Publishing CO., 1970), p. 160, where he asserts, "We can
conclude that Moses stood somewhere between totemism and monotheism.
A term to describe this position is henotheism"; Robert J. Christen,
Harold E. Hazelton, Monotheism and Moses (Lexington: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1969), p. xiv, have lamented the confusion connected with the
proper use of the term "henotheism"--"This term is Often used by many
scholars, including Rowley, as synonymous with monolatry . . .";
Theophile James Meek, Hebrew Origins (New York: Harper and Row, 1973),
p. 206, "The two terms, 'monolatry' and 'henotheism,' are much con-
fused by writers on religion and the present writer has been no
exception. Max Muller was the inventor of the latter term and pro-
tested vigorously against its use in the sense of monolatry."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3
While it is not the intent of the author to Offer here a new

5 it is my conviction that a number

definition of the term "monotheism,"
Of the problems which have arisen in the study of Hebraic monotheism
ultimately reduce to the problem of definition. Where Old Testament
scholars have attempted to shroud the accepted definition Of that term
with a philosophical cloak,6 the results have been particularly un-
satisfactory. For any such an endeavor must be viewed as an attempt

to salvage the accepted definition Of that term by supplying it with a
philosophical substructure and rationale which are not an explicit
aspect Of the definition itself. It is suggested here that any new
definition Of the term monotheism must contain an explicit reference

tO the nature of the Man/God relationship as it relates to the essen-
tial nature Of the deity in question. However, the development of such
a new definition must arise in response tO an established need.

It is, therefore, the aim of this chapter to establish the two
following positions: (1) that the views Of Old Testament scholars
concerning the provenance of Hebraic monotheism are divisive; and
(2) that where there does exist, more or less, a consensus of Opinion
among Old Testament scholars concerning the mere presence of monothe-
istic tendencies in the writings of the literary prophets, the nature

Of these phenomena have been so ill conceived by these Old Testament

 

5The present author's definition Of the term "monotheism" may
be found in Chapter 2.

6H. H. Rowley, From Moses to Qumran (New York: Books for
Libraries Press, 1971), p. 41, Rowley maintains that the accepted
definition Of monotheism is always understood "in an ontological
sense," for "surely this is just what monotheism means"; Theophile
James Meek, "Monotheism and the Religion of Israel," Journal of Bib-
lical Literature, 61 (1942), 22.

 

 

 

z.
scholars as to have given rise to the doubtful practice of generating
a veritable plethora of special types Of monotheisms, to account for
them. If these two positions are successfully established, the need
for a new definition Of the term "monotheism" should become self

evident.

THE PROVENANCE 0F HEBRAIC MONOTHEISM

That the term "monotheism" has been utilized by various Old
Testament scholars to describe the nature of certain beliefs found in
the Hebraic religion dating from the time Of the Patriarchs down tO
and including those of the post exilic prophet Deutero-Isaiah should
hardly be viewed as surprising, given the ambiguity inherent in the
term. Though the immediate goal of this section is simply to estab—
lish the position that the views of Old Testament scholars concerning
the question when Hebraic monotheism came into being radically differ,
one from another, an unavoidable consequence Of an examination of their
views is to raise serious doubts as to whether or not there is any
shared consensus Of opinion among Old Testament scholars concerning
the question of how and when the term "monotheism" is to be unequivo-

cally employed.

Patriarchial Monotheism

 

One of the oldest positions which deals with the provenance Of
monotheism generally conceived is, as Pettazzoni points out, the

". . . doctrine of the Church, according to which belief in one God

 

 

 

5

was revealed by God Himself to the first man."7

Keeping in accord
with the "doctrine Of the Church" a number Of scholars, the most
notable being Wilhelm Schmidt,8 have attempted to scientifically
establish the thesis that monotheism was the religion Of primitive
man. While still another group of scholars have attempted to locate
the provenance of monotheism in the cultures of the ancient Near
East.9
Writing in 1904, Alfred Jeremias was one Of the earliest

scholars to describe the religion of the Patriarchs as a monotheism.10
Jeremias developed the position that while the antecedents Of Hebraic
monotheism were to be found in the civilizations of the ancient Near
East, Abraham, acting as the author of a "monotheistic reform"11

brought Hebraic monotheism into the land of Canaan.

Theophilus G. Pinches, in his work, The Old Testament: In

 

Light Of the Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia, held the
monotheistic nature Of the religion Of Abraham to be self evident.

Pinches, therefore, simply states that Abraham's religion was a

 

7Pettazzoni, Op. cit., p. 1.

8Wilhelm Schmidt, Origin and Growth of Religion (New York:
Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1972).

9For a concise statement Of this position see, S. H. Langdon
in Problems in Ancient History, Vol. I, ed. by Donald Kagan (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 69-71; a critical
review of this general position may be found in Meek, Hebrew Origins,
op. cit., pp. 184-221.

 

 

10Alfred Jeremias, Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten
Orients (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1904), p. 182.

11Adolphe Lods, Israel from its Beginning tO the Middle of the
Eighth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1948), p. 257.

 

 

 

 

 

6
monotheism and even goes so far as to claim that the religious beliefs
of Terah, Abraham's father, may also have been monotheistic.12
Theophile James Meek has claimed, "NO modern scholar Of any
standing today believes that the Hebrews Of the Patriarchial Period

."13 It would appear to be the

were anything but polytheistic .
case, however, that Meek's claim is at Odds with the views Of at least
two "modern scholars."
Harry M. Orlinsky has asserted:
It would be going tOO far to attribute to the patriarchial
Hebrews a belief in the existence of one and only one God. In
a sense they may be said to have practiced--but without
defining--monotheism.14
The distinction Orlinsky draws between the practicing Of a monotheistic
religion by the patriarchial Hebrews and their failure to define their
practicing of such a religion must be viewed primarily as a hedge
employed by Orlinsky to escape the consequences Of simply stating a
position which he apparently feels unable tO defend. The intent Of his
statement, however, viz., to attribute a practical or "practiced
monotheism" to the patriarchial Hebrews, nonetheless, remains clear.
Orlinsky's evasiveness concerning a straight forward assessment of the
nature Of the religious beliefs of the patriarchial Hebrews constitutes

a prime example Of the tensions inherent in the problem Of locating

the provenance of Hebraic monotheism. A further example of this

 

12Theophilus G. Pinches, The Old Testament: In the Light of
the Historical Records and the Legends of Assyria and Babylonia (New
York: E. and J. B. Young and CO., 1902), p. 198.

 

 

13Meek, "Monotheism and the Religion of Israel," op. cit.,
p. 21.

14Harry M. Orlinsky, AncientfiIsrael, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1960), p. 28.

 

7
tension is expressed in the views of the second "modern scholar" who
has grappled with the problem of assessing the nature of the religious
beliefs of the patriarchial Hebrews.
Joseph Jensen has Observed:

Whether we call the faith Of the Patriarchs monotheistic or not
will depend largely on how we define that term. A covenant

would seem to involve exclusive adherence to one God from whom all
good things are hoped. The power of the God of the fathers
extends to all places, all ages, and all men: Abraham hears His
call in Haran and experiences His help in Egypt: He disposes of
the land at His will and works out His plan in history. We find
here no repudiation of the existence of other gods, but that is
hardly to be expected at this point. On the other hand, there is
no later moment at which Israel's developing faith switched from I
many gods to one God; that point has already been passed. It is

reasonable to postulate revelation as the beginning of Israel's

unique faith. Israel's tradition names the Patriarchs as the

first recipients, and critical investigation finds no grounds

for rejecting that tradition.

 

Jensen's attempt to qualify his view of the Patriarchs as the founders
Of Hebraic monotheism by questioning the very meaning of the term
"monotheism" reflects a concern quite prevalent in the field of Old
Testament studies, viz., how the term is to be unequivocally employed.
His apparent hesitancy in claiming that the religious beliefs Of the
Patriarchs were absolutely monotheistic is predicated upon the fact
that there is to be found no explicit denial, issuing from the
Patriarchs, of the existence of other gods. Though the value and
absolute necessity of the presence of a statement which explicitly
denies the existence of other gods in any system of religious beliefs
purporting to be monotheistic is treated fully in a later section of

this chapter, it may be instructive to note here that Jensen treats

 

15Joseph Jensen, God's Word to Israel (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1968), p. 107.

 

8
the problem in a rather light manner, to wit, " . . . but that is
hardly to be expected at this point."

Jensen's initial Observation that the religion of the

Patriarchs may or may not be labeled a monotheism depending on ,

II I

. . . how we define that term,‘ serves well to illustrate the point
that as recently as 1968 the problem of having secured a viable and
agreed upon definition for that term, by Old Testament scholars, was
far from solved. The problem of locating the provenance of Hebraic
monotheism does not end with an examination of scholarly Opinion con-
cerning the religion of the Patriarchs. Indeed, the controversy may

reach its highest pitch when the origin Of Hebraic monotheism is

claimed to be found in the faith Of Moses.

Mosaic MOnotheism

 

The question concerning the nature of the faith of Moses has
not been generally construed as one Of polytheism versus monotheism,
for to the best Of my knowledge no Old Testament scholar either early
or recent has maintained that Moses was a polytheist, but rather one
of henotheism or monolatry versus monotheism. That is to say that
those Old Testament scholars who have denied that Moses was the founder
Of Hebraic monotheism have labeled his faith either a henotheism or a
monolatry in an attempt to establish the position that the faith of
Moses is best characterized as an intermediate step between the poly—
theism of the Patriarchs and the monotheism of the literary prOphets,

especially as expressed in the writings of Deutero-Isaiah.16

 

16The validity of employing either one of the terms "heno-
theism" or "monolatry" to describe a transitional or intermediate

 

 

9

The most noteworthy proponent of the position which holds
that Moses was a monotheist, is William Foxwell Albright. In that
his views concerning the nature of the faith of Moses are treated
fully in the following chapter, his position concerning the nature
of monotheism alone will be dealt with here.

One of the most instructive aspects of Albright's thought
dealing with the nature of monotheism is his questioning of the
viability Of the accepted definition of the term itself.17 Con-
sequently, it is hardly surprising that the major detractors Of his
position have attacked this facet of his thesis with the greatest
zeal.18 In an effort to expand and clarify his own definition of

"monotheism" found in his work, From the Stone Age to Christianity,

 

Albright subsequently offered the following definition to Theophile
Meek, one of his most ardent antagonists:

Monotheism is the belief in one God. This does not imply
anything about the essential nature of God, other than the
universally held belief in the unique power and goodness Of
God. cod may be represented or conceived to exist in any
suitable form--anthropomorphic or celestial. God may be a
simple or a complex essence; there is nothing in the definition,
either historically or philosophically, to preclude trinitarian
monotheism. Nor does monotheism exclude the coexistence of
other spiritual or superhuman powers in the world, as long as
these entities are in no way comparable with God in his
essential qualities, such as power and goodness.

 

stage in the development Of a religion from a polytheistic beginning
to an eventual monotheism is at best questionable, for it presupposes
a developmental process which is not readily demonstrable, at least as
far as the religion of Israel is concerned. For a statement of this
problem see Rowley, op. cit., p. 43.

17William Foxwell Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 271-272.

 

18Rowley, op. cit., p. 41; Meek, "Monotheism and the Religion
of Israel," op. cit., p. 23.

19Meek, ibid.

 

 

10
Though there are a number of claims present in this definition
which the present author would wish to debate,20 Meek's terse response

has been, "To my mind this is not a definition Of monotheism at

all . . . ."21

One of the strongest supporters of the position which advances
the view that the provenance of Hebraic monotheism is to be found in
the Mosaic period is C. J. Labuschagne:

Only in the Mosaic period do we find all the conditions
required by true monotheism: the appearance of a revolutionary
reformer, recognition Of one single God, rejection of poly-
theism, intolerance of other religions, a complete negation of
the significance of other gods, and a tendency toward
universalism.22

Yehezkel Kaufmann is equally firm in his conviction that the
provenance of Hebraic monotheism is to be found in the teachings of
Moses:

With Moses the sin Of idolatry--particularly as a national sin--
comes into existence. Before, idolatry was nowhere interdicted
and punished. The stories depicting idolatry as a national sin
presuppose the existence of a monotheistic people. Since such
stories begin only with Moses, we infer that it was in his time
that the great transformation took place. By making Israel
enter a covenant with the one God, he made it a monotheistic
people that alone among men was punishable for the sin of
idolatry.23

 

20What may well be the first "scientifically grounded" con-
ception of monotheism may, in principle, represent a historical as
well as a philosophical objection to any notion of a "trinitarian
monotheism," see Wilhelm Windelband, A History of PhiloSophy, Vol. I
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), pp. 145-146.

21

 

Meek, "Monotheism and the Religion of Israel," Op. cit.,
p. 23.

22C. J. Labuschagne, The Incomparability offiYahweh in the Old
Testament (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), pp. 148-149.

 

23Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel (New York:
Schocken Books, 1972), p. 230.

 

) I

11
The views, then, of Old Testament scholars pertaining to the
correctness of locating the provenance of Hebraic monotheism in the
faith of Moses, may be roughly divided into two groups. In addition
to the scholars noted above there exists a number Of other Old Testa—
ment scholars who share the View that the faith of Moses was truly
monotheistic.24 The views comprising the second group hold that the

25 or henotheistic26 in nature.

faith of Moses was either a monolatry
There does exist a third group of scholarly opinions, which question
the meaningfulness of the problem of whether or not the faith of MOses
is to be considered monotheistic. One of the major concerns of this
group of Old Testament scholars is their shared belief that the

problem is not one of history, but rather one of definition.27

 

24See, E. Jacobs, Theology of the Old TeStament (London:
Hadder and Stoughton Ltd., 1958), p. 141; Harry M. Orlinsky, Op. cit.,
p. 41; G. W. Anderson, The History and Religion Of ISrael (London:
Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 34; GeOfg Fohrer, History of
Israelite Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), p. 78; Th. C.
Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology (Wageningen: H.
Veenman and Zonen, 1970), p. 23.

 

 

 

 

 

25See, Adolphe Lods, op. cit., p. 319; C. G. Montefiore, Op.
cit., p. 30; Meek, Hebrew Origins, Op. cit., p. 208; George Mendenhall,
in The Bible and the Ancient Near East, ed. by G. E. Wright (New York:
Doubleday and CO., 1961), p. 41; Max Weber, Ancient Judaism (Glenco:
The Free Press, 1952), p. 138.

26See, Norman K. Gottwald, op. cit., p. 545; H. H. Rowley, Op.
cit., p. 43; H. Keith Beebe, op. cit., p. 160; Gerhard von Rad, gig
Testament Theology, Vol. I (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc.,
1962), p. 211.

27John Bright, A History of Israel, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia:
The westminister Press, 1974), pp. 153-154; Bernard W. Anderson,
Understanding the Old Testament (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), p. 65; George Mendenhall, Op. cit., p. 41.

 

 

 

 

 

 

12

Monotheism in the Monarchy
and the Former Prophets

 

Homer W. Smith has asserted:

As time went on Yahweh disposed of competing gods by the simple
expedient of absorbing them. Unlike other deities of the ancient
world he was a very jealous god, and the first commandment given
to Moses enjoined the Israelites from worshiping any other.
Consequently, when the tribes were united under David, when
Jerusalem was made the capital of Israel and when Yahweh was at
last enshrined by Solomon in the holy of holies of the national
temple, the religion of Israel was both monotheistic and purified
of idolatry to the extent of having no graven images except the
mysterious presence in the ark; nevertheless, Yahweh was still
the ethnic god of one small tribe and his presence did not extend
beyond the ark that had been his original abode. It required

the physical destruction of this embodiment, in the calamity that
was to come upon Jerusalem in the sixth century, to effect his
liberation and transformation into an omnipresent, etherealized
deity.28

Far more important than Smith's pinpointing of the exact moment Hebraic
monotheism became a complete reality, is his Observation that its origin
and existence was not predicated on the Hebrews perception of the
viability of the gods of their neighbors but rather upon their per-
ception of the internal composition and nature of their own religion.
The point being that even if the Hebrews at the time of Solomon had
vigorously denounced the existence of all gods other than Yahweh, their
perception of Yahweh, as being intimately associated with the ark, must
be viewed as a limiting factor of the nature of Yahweh, which would
preclude their religion being labeled an absolute monotheism. The
attainment by the Hebrews of the sixth century of an absolutely mono-
theistic faith, depended not on the eradication of foreign gods but

on the removal Of the limits placed on Yahweh by the Hebrews themselves.

 

28Homer W. Smith, Man and His Gods (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1952), p. 107.

 

13

For Smith, then, the provenance of Hebraic monotheism, at
least in principle, is to be located somewhere between the time of
Moses and the reign of Solomon. In actuality, Smith holds that Hebraic
monotheism arose in the sixth century after the destruction of the
temple. In either case, it is Smith's contention that it arose as a
function of the Hebrew's perceptions of the nature of Yahweh, rather
than via their perceptions of the ontic status of foreign gods.

The view that the provenance of Hebraic monotheism is to be
discovered in the beliefs of the ninth century prophets claims a
number of adherents. Foremost among these is Th. C. Vriezen:

With Elijah we stand, from a historical viewpoint, on the

threshold of a new era. His creed ought not perhaps to be
called in a theoretical sense monotheistic; but it sets the
divinity of Yahweh so sharply over against Baal's that it does
present monotheism as being, for Israel, the only right and
prOper thing.
Vriezen's move not to overstate his case by denying that Elijah's
creed should be considered, "in a theoretical sense monotheistic,"
clearly contradicts his assertion that Elijah's creed does "present
monotheism as being, for Israel, the only right and proper thing."
Further, it is to be wondered, precisely what "new era," if not one
which clearly establishes Hebraic monotheism, Vriezen holds Elijah to
have stood on the "threshold" of.
Vriezen's timidity in asserting in an unequivocal manner that

the origin of Hebraic monotheism is to be found in the creed of Elijah,

if this is truly his view, apparently springs from his cognizance of

 

29Th. C. Vriezen, The Religion of Ancient Israel (Philadelphia:
The Westminister Press, 1967), p. 191.

 

14
the fact that there exists a correct usage of the term "monotheism"
when applied in its "theoretical sense." But how this "theoretical
sense" of the term differs from its common, accepted sense is not at
all clear. For if, as Vriezen asserts, Elijah's creed presents "mono-
theism" to the Hebrews as "the only right and proper thing," it would
appear that Vriezen is hardly in any position to maintain that
Elijah's creed contained any views which could be construed as his
allowing for a belief in the existence of any god other than Yahweh.
Nor is it the case that Vriezen wishes to do so. However, Vriezen
fails to Offer a new definition of monotheism, taken in its "theoreti-

cal sense,‘ and it must be concluded that he is using the term with

its accepted definition. Consequently, Vriezen is forced into the
position of maintaining that while Elijah is not to be considered a
theoretical monotheist, he is to be considered a monotheist.

Walther Eichrodt has expressed a view, concerning the creative
role played by Elijah in the development of the Hebraic religion, quite
similar to that espoused by Vriezen:

The struggle of Elijah against the Tyrian Baal marks an epoch.
The memorable words which have been handed down as uttered by
him at the climax of the conflict--"If the Lord be God, follow
him"--as also the prayer, "Hear me, O Lord . . . that this
people may know that the Lord art God" (I Kings 18:21, 37) show
clearly that more is at stake than merely a trial of strength
between two deities over the extent of their respective domains.
This outlook, which was still very much alive in Jephthah's
words in Judg. 11:24, is here completely superseded. The ques-
tion is whether Yahweh or Baal is "God." Elijah's words embody
the certainty, that apart from the God of Israel there are in
reality no gods worthy of the name; in other words we are mani—
festly at the stage Of practical monotheism.30

 

30Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament (Phila-
delphia: The Westminister Press, 1961), pp. 227-225.

 

15
Clearly, Eichrodt has set forth the view, implicit in the position of
Vriezen, that the efforts of Elijah were aimed at eradicating from the
faith of the Hebrews of his time every trace of the notion that there
truly does exist any god other than Yahweh. Given the accepted

definition of the term "monotheism,"

one would have expected Eichrodt
to have unequivocally declared Elijah to have been the founder of
Hebraic monotheism. Such was not the case. Rather, Eichrodt has
elected to temper his claim concerning the nature of the faith of
Elijah claiming it merely represented what he has called "practical
monotheism."

While it is not the intent of the present section to discuss
the views of Old Testament scholars concerning the nature of Hebraic
monotheism, Eichrodt's designation of the creed of Elijah as repre-
senting the "stage of practical monotheism" calls for some considera-
tion for it raises a very serious question; to wit, Is there a valid
philosophical distinction of a qualitative nature to be drawn between
an individual who practices a monotheistic religion, without conceptu—
alizing it in theoretical terms, and another individual who does? If
it is possible to draw such a distinction such that the faith of the
theoretician is held to be in any way superior to or more monotheistic
than that of the simple practitioner of a monotheistic religion, the
consequences of such a distinction would be disastrous. For it is un—
doubtedly the case that the majority of practitioners Of any one of the
contemporary self avowed monotheistic religions, i.e., Judaism,

Christianity or Islam, are not theologians and have not conceptualized

their faith in theoretical terms. Consequently, the number of true

16
monotheists presently existing in the world, must be very small
indeed.

Eichrodt's labeling the faith of Elijah a "practical mono-
theism" is merely one instance of the somewhat doubtful practice Of
Old Testament scholars of generating types of monotheisms to account
for phenomena which do not readily fall into one of their preexistent
categories of thought. A fuller treatment of this confusion result-
ing from this practice will be deferred to a later section of this
chapter.

Ignoring the question concerning the provenance of Hebraic
monotheism as it relates to Elijah, Robert Gordis, nonetheless, asserts:

He (Elijah) emerged suddenly from the wilderness and disappeared
in a heavenly chariot. His meteoric career symbolized the two
greatest Hebrew contributions to civilization, two that really
are one: the faith in the One God and the passion for
righteousness.31
It is one thing to "symbolize" something and quite another to create
it. Gordis is of the Opinion that Elijah's creed "symbolized" the
"faith in the One God" irrespective of whether or not he created it.
In any event, it is clearly Gordis' view that by the time of Elijah,
Hebraic monotheism was a reality.

A straightforward assertion that the Hebraic religiOn of the

ninth century was monotheistic may be found in J. Kenneth Kuntz's

Observation concerning the nature of the faith of the prophet Micaiah:

It (Micaiah 22:21-23) attests that by the ninth century B.C.
Yahweh was conceived as a heavenly being surrounded by a court

 

31Robert Gordis, Poets, Prophets, and Sages: Essays in
Biblical Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1971), p. 20.

 

 

 

17
of ministering spirits. This pluralism was a part of Israel's
brand of monotheism, which embraced both the one and the
3

many.
Although Kuntz's apparent view that there exists various "brands" of
monotheism, Of which Israel's is but one example, may be somewhat un-
settling, he is firm in his conviction that by the ninth century

Hebraic monotheism had become "part and parcel" Of the Hebraic

Weltanschauung.

 

Monotheism of the Literary Prophets
and the Authors of Deuteronomy

 

It is the view of the majority of Old Testament scholars,
both early and recent, that the provenance of Hebraic monotheism is to
be found somewhere between 755 and 539 B.C., in the writings of the
literary prophets. Although there does exist a certain amount of
controversy concerning which prophet is to be identified as the creator
of Hebraic monotheism, there is a consensus of scholarly opinion, which
holds that monotheism, of one type or another, was at the very least,
an implicit aspect of the faith of each of the prophets found within
the time period noted above.

Concerning the contribution Of the literary prophets to the
development of the religion of the Hebrews, Julius Wellhausen has
noted:

Thus, although the prophets were far from originating a new
conception of God, they nonetheless were the founders of what

has been called "ethical monotheism." But with them this
ethical monotheism was no product of the "self-evolution of

 

32J. Kenneth Kuntz, The People of Ancient Israel (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1974), pp. 250-251.

 

18

dogma," but a progressive step which had been called forth
simply by the course of events. The providence of God brought
it about that Shis call came at an opportune period, and not
too suddenly.3

Taking to heart Wellhausen's claim that the development of
"ethical monotheism" was a creation of the prophets, a creation which
occurred "not too suddenly," C. G. Montefiore has constructed the
following developmental scheme, initially deferring to the view Of
Kuenen:

When in the consciousness of the prophets, the central place was
taken, not by the might, but by the holiness of Yahweh, the con-
ception of God was carried up into another and higher sphere.

From that moment it ceased to be a question of "more" or "less"
between Yahweh and the other gods, for he stood not only above
them, but in very distinct opposition to them. If Yahweh, the

Holy One, was God, if he was God a§_the Holy One, then the

others were not. In a word, the belief that Yahweh was the only
God sprang out of the ethical conception of his being. Mono-
theism was the gradual, not the sudden result of this conception.34

 

In his own words, Montefiore has asserted, concerning the role of the
eighth century prophets in this developmental scheme:

. . . monotheism in explicit terms was not taught til the last
quarter of the seventh century in Deuteronomy and Jeremiah, but
that implicitly it is to be found with unmistakable distinctness
in the writings of our eighth century prophets.35

Expanding his View of the role of Jeremiah and the authors of
Deuteronomy in this developmental process, Montefiore maintains:

. . . it would appear that at the close of the seventh century

or at the opening of the sixth the monotheistic position had been
finally achieved . . . . Yet as the dates Of great achievements,
whether in material discovery or spiritual revelation, have a
peculiar interest, it is worth remarking that the prophecies of
Jeremiah and the writings of the later Deuteronomists scarcely

 

33Julius Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 474.

3['C. G. Montefiore, op. cit., p. 135.

BSIbid.

19

admit of any other interpretation than that their writings had
reached, though they may not have realized, the pure monotheis-
tic conception.

Finally, concerning the role of the post-exilic prophet, Deutero-
Isaiah, in this process, Montefiore concludes:

Deutero—Isaiah cannot justly be regarded as the first exponent
of that unqualified and absolute monotheism which from his time
became and remained the fundamental dogma of Judaism. In the
last lecture we saw how an earlier writer had proclaimed the
doctrine that ”Yahweh is God in heaven above and upon the earth
beneath." (Deut. IV:39) But Deutero-Isaiah was the first to
emphasize and make use of this plenary and unconditional mono-
theism. And as an integral position, or as the inevitable con-
sequence, Of his monotheistic doctrine, he adopts a novel
attitude towards idolatry.37

It is Montefiore's view, therefore, that the provenance of Hebraic

monotheism is to be found in the writings of Jeremiah and those of the

later Deuteronomists.
Adolphe Lods is in general agreement with the developmental
views thus far expressed by Wellhausen and Montefiore:
It is to the prophets Of the eighth and the following centuries
that Judaism owes that unique and profoundly original element

in the history of humanity: its ethical monotheism. Before
they appeared the religion of Israel was an ancient religion,

similar in all essential respects to the other national religions

of the ancient world.

However, he refrains from identifying which particular prophet is to be

considered the founder of Hebraic monotheism.

H. H. Rowley, while holding an essentially developmental View

concerning the inception and subsequent refinement of Hebraic

 

36Ibid., p. 214.
37Ibid., pp. 268-269.

38Adolphe Lods, Op. cit., p. 3.

20
monotheism, offers the following observation concerning the role Of
the literary prophets in his overall scheme:
With the eighth and seventh century prOphets we find

incipient monotheism giving place increasingly to a more

specific belief, and in Deutero-Isaiah we find the explicit

formulation of monotheism with undeniable clarity. The

antiquity of monotheism in Israel may therefore be dated from

the time of Moses, provided it is recognized that it was but

the germ of monotheism in his day, when a new impulse of in-

calculable significance to the world came into religion.
Though it is not clear whether or not Rowley subscribes to a position
that maintains that the "germs" of monotheism are scattered generally
throughout henotheistic faiths, for this is his earlier description
of the faith of Moses,40 or rather that these "germs" are found only
in the faith of Moses, it is, nonetheless, the case that Rowley
embraces the view that it was through the efforts of the literary
prophets, and especially those of Deutero—Isaiah, that the conception
of Hebraic monotheism was forged.

The developmental thesis of Wellhausen finds another adherent

in the person of Theophile Meek:

Hebrew monotheism grew up in its own way with the Hebrew prophets,

in and out of its own environment, influenced no doubt by world

thought, but largely independent of it . . . . It was not until

the time of Jeremiah and Second Isaiah that a thoroughgoing

monotheism was possible with the Hebrews.
In identifying which prophet is to be given credit for casting Hebraic

monotheism in its final form, Meek is of the opinion that this under—

taking was accomplished mainly through the efforts of Deutero-Isaiah.42

 

39H. H. Rowley, Op. cit., pp. 62-63.

40For Rowley's views concerning the nature Of the faith of
Moses see above p. 11.

AlMeek, Hebrew Origins, op. cit., p. 227.

 

42Ibid.

21
Breaking somewhat with the developmental position of

Wellhausen concerning the provenance of Hebraic monotheism, George
IA. Barton has stated:

The insight of four great men, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah,

who lived and preached between 755 and 690 B.C., carried the

work begun by Elijah to much higher levels. While they

presented no philosophical theory Of monotheism, each one of

them was a practical monotheist. 3
The validity of the distinction sometimes drawn by Old Testament schol—
ars between the "practical monotheist" and the theoretical monotheist,
having been discussed above, it is enough merely to state Barton's
view concerning the nature of the faith of these prophets. It is
somewhat curious, however, while it is Barton's contention that the
works of these four prophets "carried the work begun by Elijah to much
higher levels" he nonetheless designates these prophets "practical

' a term which Eichrodt held to be accurately descriptive

monotheists,’
of Elijah and his creed.

Without further belaboring the point that the views of Old
Testament scholars concerning when Hebraic monotheism came to exist are
divisive, it should only be necessary to point out that some Old Testa-

ment scholars have identified Amos as the founder of Hebraic monotheism,44

while others have given the credit to Jeremiah.4S At least one Old

 

43George A. Barton, The Religions of the World (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1919), pp. 66-67.

44See, J. M. Powis Smith, The Prophets and Their Times (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 204-205; Louis Wallis, Socio-
logical Study of the Bible (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1913),
p. 204.

45John Punnett Peters, The Religion of the Hebrews (Boston:
Ginn and Company, 1914), p. 278; William Frederic Bade, The Old Testa-
ment in the Light of To-Day (Boston: Houghton Mifflin CO., 1915),
p. 217.

 

 

 

 

 

 

22

Testament scholar has advanced the view that the source of Hebraic
monotheism derives from Deutero—Isaiah's extension and refinement of
the thought of Job.46 By far and way, however, it is undoubtedly the
case that there is a general consensus of opinion among Old Testament
scholars who embrace the developmental position of Wellhausen concern-
ing the inception and subsequent development of Hebraic monotheism,
that this concept attains complete fruition in the writings of
Deutero—Isaiah.47 In an effort to round Off this section it should be
noted that one Old Testament scholar holds the View that the literary
prophets ". . . did not give expression to a philosophical doctrine
of monotheism, even if we qualify it by the word 'ethical.'"48 Further,
that it is the view of William Frederic Bade

. . . that Deuteronomic theology has not advanced to the point

of absolute monotheism is proved by the crass particularism of

supplementary parts of Deuteronomy, like the fourth chapter.

It has been the intent of this section to establish the posi-

tion that the views of Old Testament scholars concerning the provenance
of Hebraic monotheism are divisive. It has also been pointed out that

where a few Old Testament scholars have declined to identify a particu-

lar person or period with the inception of Hebraic monotheism, their

 

46See, Robert H. Pfeiffer, Introduction to the Old Testament
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), pp. 474-475; Robert H. Pfeiffer,
"The Dual Origin of Hebrew Monotheism," Journal of Biblical Literature,
XLVI (1927), 193ff.

 

 

47See, Gerhard von Rad, Op. cit., p. 212; R. B. Y. Scott, Th3
Relevance of the Prophets (New York: Macmillan and CO., 1947), p. 106;
George Moore, History of Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1919), p. 28; Gerald A. Larve, Old Testament Life and Literature
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), p. 310.

 

 

 

48Norman W. Porteous in Record and Revelation, ed. by H.
Wheeler Robinson (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 242.

 

49William Frederic Bade, op. cit., p. 217.

23
hesitancy was founded on their concern that the problem was essentially
one of definition.

However, the majority Of Old Testament scholars have confi-
dently utilized the term "monotheism" with its accepted definition to
draw their conclusions concerning the provenance of Hebraic monotheism.
The employment of the term "monotheism" along with its accepted defi-
nition by Old Testament scholars has led to the creation of a diversity
of opinions which would place the provenance of Hebraic monotheism
anywhere from the time of Abraham up to and including that of Deutero-
Isaiah.

Clearly the value of the accepted definition of the term
"monotheism," as it has been utilized by Old Testament scholars as an
analytical tool, is highly questionable. And the need for a new
definition should be somewhat apparent.

The following section attempts to further substantiate this
need by establishing the position that where Old Testament scholars
have been faced with the problem of describing various systems of
belief, which they have Observed contain monotheistic tendencies, the
lack of an adequate nomenclature has forced these scholars to generate
novel variations on the monotheism theme. However, the task of creat-
ing and giving meaning to these new terms has been left to the indi-
vidual scholar. Consequently, there is no general conformity in the
use and meaning of these terms in the field of Old Testament studies
generally. What is not needed in the field of Old Testament studies is
a plethora of terms based on a term which is already vague and ambigu-
Ous. What is needed is a new and precise definition of the term

"monotheism" itself.

24
MONOTHEISTIC TENDENCIES IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE LITERARY PROPHETS

Theophile James Meek has asserted:

If a belief is not monotheistic in the strict sense of the word,

I do not see what we have gained by calling it monotheistic,

unless we do this as a sop to orthodoxy.50
This assertion would seem to imply that theistic beliefs, by the nature
of their content, should be classifiable under one of the major head-
ings, pantheism, polytheism, atheism, monotheism, monolatry or heno—
theism. However, there seems to exist, especially from the perspec-
tive of the Old Testament scholar, a body of beliefs which defy being
classified under any of these recognized headings. These are the
collective beliefs of the literary prophets, with the possible excep-
tion of the beliefs of Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah.

It was pointed out in the previous section that it is the view
of a number of Old Testament scholars that the work of Elijah ushered
in a new era in the development of the religion of Israel. Elijah's
beliefs were held to constitute a break with the earlier monolatry or
henotheism of the Hebraic religion, and at the very least to have laid
the groundwork for the subsequent development of Hebraic monotheism.51

The further position was established that it is the view of

another group of Old Testament scholars that the complete and final

expression of that monotheistic religion was formulated by

 

50Meek, "Monotheism and the Religion of Israel," Op. cit.,

p. 23.

51See above, Monotheism of the Monarchy and the Former
Prophets, pp. 12-17.

 

25

Deutero-Isaiah.52

However, the period beginning with the writings of
Amos and ending with those of Jeremiah, has generally been charac-
terized by the majority of Old Testament scholars as embodying mono-
theistic tendencies.

Each of the prophets present in this period was held to have
contributed some ingredient essential to the formation of a monotheis—
tic faith, but, for the most part, none was credited with the absolute
formation of such a faith. Consequently, Old Testament scholars have
encountered great difficulties in describing and classifying the faith
of these prophets.

In an attempt to describe the nature of the faiths of these

prophets, Old Testament scholars have resorted to the practice of

generating a plethora of supposedly descriptive terms, e.g., "incipient

monotheism, speculative monotheism, implicit monotheism,"
"empirical monotheism," etc. Though these terms have found their way
into the literature of Old Testament studies, they have neither been
standardized nor has their meaning been generally agreed upon by Old
Testament scholars. Rather, every Old Testament scholar has been free
to coin a new term and endow it with whatever meaning he has chosen.

The unfortunate result of this practice has been to ground the
belief that each of the writings of the prophets constitutes a special
case, virtually indescribable through the nomenclature which has

developed in the field of Old Testament studies. A belief which does

not bear close examination.

 

52See above, Monotheism of the Literary Prophets, pp. 17—23,

 

26

It is the intent of this section, then, to critically examine
the nature of the types of monotheisms, generated by a few Old
Testament scholars, in order to determine their value in terms of
their descriptive and discriminative functions. In undertaking this
analysis it is important to keep one fact in mind that often seems to
escape certain Old Testament scholars, viz., the Hebrew prophets were
not philosophers, nor did they consider themselves as such; conse-
quently, it would be ludicruous to expect their writings to resemble
a philosophical work or to examine them as if they were. The writings
of our contemporaries, on the other hand, and especially those
approaching the present tOpic in a scholarly manner, may be treated in
no other manner.

Incipient, Implicit, and Speculative
Monotheisms of H. H. Rowley

 

H. H. Rowley has correlated different levels of Hebraic
theological development with the concepts of "incipient monotheism,"

' and "speculative monotheism." One would expect,

"implicit monotheism,’
in the face of such a clear delineation, three distinct sets of

criteria by which their respective construct is identifiable. Iowever,
it appears to be the case that the first two concepts are defined by

the absence of certain criteria, and it will, consequently, be necessary
to start with the fullest concept, i.e., "speculative monotheism" and
work our way backwards in order to get a "handle" on all three concepts.
It is Rowley's Opinion that "speculative monotheism" is a phenomenon
which is found soley in the writings of Deutero—Isaiah, and precisely

what constitutes speculative monotheism may be gleaned from the

following:

27
Repeatedly it is declared here that Yahweh alone is God, and
all other gods are nonexistent and their idols symbols of un-
reality. Moreover, the same prophet taught the corollary of
monotheism in universalism. If there is but one God, then he
must be the God of all men.53
Three necessary assertions emerge from this passage which may
be explicitly formulated: (l) Yahweh is the only God; (2) there are
no gods other than Yahweh; (3) Yahweh is the God of all peoples.
These assertions then represent actual statements which must be ex-
pressed either verbally or in written form, repeatedly, by anyone who
would like to consider himself a monotheist. And this is to say that
"speculative monotheism" may be operationally defined by the verbali-
zation Of a few simple sentences. And although criteria two and three
seem a bit gratuitous, given the overall structure of Rowley's
scheme, discussion of this will be deferred to a later point.
"Implicit monotheism" is held by Rowley to be descriptive of
the period and writings of the prophets from Amos to Jeremiah and may
be said to exhibit the three criteria made manifest in "speculative

monotheism,"

only in implicit form. Without going into an exhaustive
analysis of this position, by way of repudiation, it should be
generally noted that the criterion felt to be lacking in the writings
of the prophets, prior to Deutero-Isaiah, is, first and foremost, the
explicit and repeated denial of the existence of other gods, while
secondarily, it is felt that the notion of universalism is not

stressed to the degree it should be. However, Albright makes the

following points concerning these drawbacks in the pre-exilic prophets:

 

53H. H. Rowley, The Faith Of Israel (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1956). P. 72.

 

 

28
Unmistakable claims of world-power and uniqueness for Yahweh
appear with the earliest known rhapsodist prophets, Amos and
Hosea, and become frequent in Isaiah and Jeremiah. Along with
them appears outspoken repudiation of pagan deities and their
claims. For instance, Amos and Jeremiah call pagan deities
"lies" and "falsehood"; Isaiah and Jeremiah call them "vanities"
and "illusions"; Jeremiah and the Deuteronomic school call them
"no-gods"; Ezekiel, the Deuteronomists, and Jeremiah call them
gillulim, which seems to mean properly "pellets of dung." This
list is surely opposed to the idea that ngan deities were
conceded real existence by the prophets.

In the Meno, Plato draws the distinction between true Opinion
and knowledge, that while both relate to the same Object to the same
degree of correspondence of truth, the former is held to be a weaker
form of the latter for the want of a tether.55 This is to say that
true opinion may shift its locus, whereas as knowledge is secure and
not subject to change. Unless Rowley is equating "implicit monotheism"
with the concept of true Opinion it is difficult to see exactly what
he means by that term. However, it would be hard to believe that he
holds the position that the views of the prophets were of such an
unstable nature that they would have been subject to radical revision,
for whatever reason.

All in all, his tri-partite formula for "speculative monotheism"
seems a bit lacking even in its internal composition. For instance,
criteria one and two appear to assert the same thing, and from either
criterion, one or two, the remaining two criteria are easily inferred.

Only criterion three does not allow one to infer the necessity of

criteria one and two. With this criticism in mind, let us turn to the

 

54w. F. Albright, op. cit., p. 32.

553. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I (New York: Random
House, 1937), pp. 377-378.

 

 

 

 

29
notion of "incipient monotheism" to see how it differs from the first
two types.
Although one might expect that the term "incipient monotheism"
would apply to what has earlier been referred to as the Mosaic period,
such is not the case. Rowley is quick to point out and quite firm in

his conviction that Moses was a henotheist and that the era prior to

56

So the term "in-

the literary prophets was immersed in henotheism.
cipient monotheism" relates, once again, specifically to the works of
the literary prophets. But beyond referring to the process of certain
"seeds" having been sown, which come to maturity in Deutero-Isaiah,
Rowley gives the term no distinct and intelligible meaning.57
What, then, constitutes, for Rowley, the essence of monotheism,
apart from his delineation and subdivision of that concept, which
result mainly in vague and euphemistic imagery coupled with what
appears to be a somewhat sympathetic-magical recitation of vituperative
remarks aimed at the disparagement of the deities of other nations?
The answer to this question is found in his attack on the criteria
offered by Albright and is stated simply and bluntly:
Most of the elements of this definition are irrelevant to the
question of monotheism and of the one vital element there is no
evidence. For nowhere in the Pentateuch is Moses credited with the
formal denial that any other gods exist, such as we find in Deutero-

Isaiah, save in passages such as Dt. 4:35, 39; 32:39, which quite
certainly did not issue from Moses.58

 

56Rowley, Op. cit., p. 43.

57Ibid., p. 72.

581b1d., p. 42.

30
It is finally clear, then, that one of the most, if not the
most important criterion, necessary for a system of beliefs to be
designated as constituting a monotheism, is that it contain an
explicit "formal denial" of the existence of all other gods. Which
may, and perhaps should take the form, "of the class of potential
gods A, B, C . . . X, Y, Z, X is the only god and the gods A, B, C

' The initial and most obvious drawback

. . W, Y, Z, are non-gods.'
of this approach is that it is ultimately grounded on the negation Of
a class of objects the existence of which it must first presuppose, in
order to express the class negation in the ritualistic "formal denial"
statement.59 Nonetheless this criterion is the well spring from
which contemporary scholarship draws its dictums concerning the
monotheistic status of various world views.60

Empirical and Philosophical
Monotheisms of Ivan Engnell

 

The set of beliefs expressed by the prophets has been held by

Ivan Engnell to constitute what he has labeled "empirical monotheism."61

 

59Raffaele Pettazzoni, op. cit., p. 8, defends this activity,
for he maintains, "The affirmation of monotheism always is expressed
by the negation of polytheism, and this negation is never anything but
the verbal symbol of a combat in which no quarter is given, the combat
between a faith in its death-agonies and a new religious conscious-
ness affirming itself." But Pettazzoni is also quick to add, "The
verbal formula is not in itself a sufficient indication of monotheism,"
p. 8.

60Meek, "MOnotheism and the Religion of Israel," op. cit.,
p. 38, expresses the view that once monotheism is an established fact,
it is quite acceptable to speak of the "gods" "as if they existed."

61Ivan Engnell, A Rigid Scrutiny (Nashville: Vanderbilt Uni-
versity Press, 1969), p. 144.

 

31
And he contrasts this prophetic "empirical monotheism" with what he
calls, ". . . thought-out, well-reasoned, rationalistic, philosophi-
cal monotheism."62 While the former is dependent upon "(the prophets)
own affective experience with God,"63 the latter may be said to rest on
a system of thought, philosophical or otherwise, which attempts to
systematize divergent or disparate facts or statements, into a co-
hesive system which accounts for the apparent phenomenon. The real
difference may reduce to the difference between the modes of inductive
versus deductive inquiry. Consequently, Engnell is not denying that
the heart of prophetic thought is at root monotheistic but affirms
rather that it rests on individual experience, which, while being per-
suasive for the individual concerned, is not readily expressible and
cogent for the bulk of individuals, who have not had the experience.
The chief benefit of a "philosophical monotheism" is that it is under-
standable by anyone capable of reasoning, and its conclusions,
supposedly, are inescapable. Had, then, the prophets been aware of
Aristotle's theology, in spite of the fact that it too was grounded in
empirical observation, they could have ensconced their views within
philosophical verbage, adding to their value immeasurably.

The main problem with Engnell's position is that it rests upon
an incorrect conception of the nature of what it means to be philosoph-
ical. Although it is true that philosophical systems generally, which
is to say not always, are characterized by a certain degree of system-

aticity, their thrust is characterized by a probing dialectic, e.g.,

 

6ZIbid.

631bid.

 

32
Plato's early dialogues, which are as much geared at the uprooting of
incorrect views as offering new ones. That the prophets may be said
to have taken both these tasks to heart, and that their mode of ex-
pression embodied a certain urgency are only to their credit, and are
in no way an indication of an inability to conceptualize and formulate
their messages in any other than a personal manner. The prophetic
message was geared to action and not simple reflection. Their
success was gauged by their ability to motivate individuals to act, and
not by their acceptance by the prevailing intellectual community. And
the truth is that the desired and of all philosophical thought has been
action, of one sort or another. In the final analysis, where truth is
the Object most sought, the different modes of the expression of that
truth may, at best, represent esthetic predilections.

Engnell's dichotomy, then, seems to lack any instructive
qualities, and the only new criterion he Offers concerning a definition
of monotheism generally, i.e., "(an) affective experience of God," is
Of such a highly subjective nature as to be of no use in an analytical
definition Of monotheism.

Theoretical and Practical Mono-
theism of Theophile Meek

 

Theophile Meek distinguishes between "theoretical monotheism"
on the one hand, and "practical, thoroughgoing monotheism" on the

64

other. "Theoretical monotheism," he maintains, best describes
prophetic thought, prior to Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah. The nature

of this thought he holds to be as follows:

 

6('Meek, Hebrew Origins, op. cit., p. 226.

 

 

33

So far as we can discover Amos was the first to regard Yahweh

as the god of peoples other than the Hebrews, but he nowhere

denies the existence of other gods nor does he say anywhere that

Yahweh alone is god in the world. Neither does Hosea, nor Micah,

nor First Isaiah nor Zephaniah. More and more, however, the

prophets were underrating the alien gods, . . . . To save Yahweh

from the Oblivion of his people the prophets had to liberate

Yahweh from his people and make him the god of the world, who for

his own beneficent purpose exalts, now this people, now that

people, to the end that all may know him and Obey him. To Isaiah,

accordingly, the rival gods were but "elilim, worthless creatures,

vain and unavailing" (Is. 2:8, 18, 20; 10:10 f.; 19:1, 3; 31:7).

This was theoretical monotheism . .65
There are two criteria present, then, in Meek's conception of
"theoretical monotheism" which are deemed as necessary but not
sufficient for the production of a "practical, thoroughgoing monotheism."
The first is the notion Of universalism, the idea that Yahweh is the god
of all peoples. The second involves the demotion, but not the eradi-
cation, of pagan deities to the status of "worthless creatures." And
beyond the fact that Meek's view of the degree to which the prophets
held that Yahweh was universal and alone in the world differs from that
of Albright,66 it is curious that Meek would call their positions even
theoretically monotheistic when they allow for the existence of com—
peting deities regardless of the latter's inability to compete success-
fully. According to Meek, the prophets, whose systems he has labeled
theoretically monotheistic, have drawn a quantitative rather than a
qualitative distinction between Yahweh and other gods, certainly along
the existence continuum. That is to say that for all of their worth-

lessness, they still exist and must be taken into account. And it

would seem that this mere taking into account of other gods is, prima

 

6SIbid., pp. 225-226.

66Albright, Op. cit., pp. 10-11.

 

34
facie, an admission of polytheism, which ultimately reduces to an
admission that massive differences exist between peoples and that the
needs of the separate groups, being unique and distinct, can only be
satisfied by each group's special god or gods. This sort of admission
would, however, conflict with the first criterion, i.e., universalism
of Yahweh, which is held to be a necessary condition of a monotheistic
system. However, the question arises, to what degree and what sort
of universalism is a necessary part of a monotheistic system? If it
is Meek's contention that Yahweh was considered universal by the
prophets, in that he had a vested interest in all peoples, then there
is some doubt that the prophets held truly universalistic views con-
cerning the nature of Yahweh. If, on the other hand, Meek's claims
rest on the perception by the prophets of Yahweh's claim to absolute
might as sole creator and ruler of the universe, the construct of
universalism takes on a more theoretical and abstract nature.

Kaufmann clarifies this distinction in the following manner:
Universalism in religion may mean either that the dominion and
power of the deity are world wide, or that his favor and self-
revelation are world wide. The first meaning involves the essence
and nature of the deity; the second involves his manifestation
among men. Since monotheism asserts that there is but one creator
and ruler Of the universe, it is perforce universalistic in the
first sense. But there is no inner necessity that compels it to
distribute the favor of the one God equally among all men. That
one God creates and governs all does not of itself imply that all
are equal in his sight. Nothing prohibits his choosing a particu-
lar group among men as his elect. Indeed the monotheistic religious
have always assumed that he does just that. This idea circumscribes
the realm in which God's favor is manifested without, however,
affecting the universality of his dominion.

The type of universalism Meek attributes to the prophets whose system

he holds to be indicative of "practical, thoroughgoing monotheism," is

 

67Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

 

35
evident from the following:

It was not until the time of Jeremiah and Second Isaiah that a
thoroughgoing monotheism was possible with the Hebrews.
Imperialism was in the air, and "monotheism is but imperialism
in religion." There had been a succession of world empires--
first the Assyrian, then the Babylonian, and now the Persian.
Was there likewise a succession of World Gods? Or was there

one World God directing the course of world history? It was
left to Second Isaiah to answer this and he did so in no un-
certain terms, particularly in chapters 41 to 48. Over and over
again he ridicules the idea that there can be more gods than one
and for the first time in history we have a man preaching the
religious solidarity of mankind, as mggh interested in the well-
being of other peoples as in his own.

And although it is clear that Meek holds that Deutero-Isaiah was con-
cerned with the welfare of other peoples, it is not Obvious that
Deutero-Isaiah held that Yahweh shared this concern. However Yahweh's
concern for all peoples may be viewed as secondary to his holding the
position of sole God of the Universe. And it is the serving in this
position of preeminence for Yahweh that separates "thoroughgoing
monotheism" from all other types, for it would seem to be easier to
reason from the idea that there is but one god to the idea that that god
has a vested interest in all peoples, than vice versa. And that it is
upon this notion that "thoroughgoing monotheism" stands or falls, for
Meek, is clear from his assertion:

. . . Jeremiah and Second Isaiah, . . . declared in most emphatic

terms that Yahweh alone was God and all the so-called gods had no

real existence at all; they were merely figments of the imagina-

tion, the creation of man himself (see, e.g., Jer. 5:7; 10:2 ff.;
16:20; Is. 41:21 ff.; 44:9 ff.).69

 

68Meek: Hebrew Origins, op. cit., p. 227.
69

 

Ibid.

 

36

The primary difference, then, between "theoretical mono-
theism" and "thoroughgoing monotheism" is that where the former seems
to concede some minimal degree of existence to a number of gods the
latter explicitly denies their existence, whereas both embody ten-
dencies towards universalism. Meek's criteria for "thoroughgoing
monotheism" appear to be identical with those which constitute Rowley's
conception of "speculative monotheism."70 And the objection voiced
concerning the validity of Rowley's criteria apply with equal force to

those offered by Meek.71

The true significance of this denial has
been brought into question by T. E. Peet, who points out, concerning

the meaningfulness of the denial statement:

'Sole God beside whom there is no other' proves nothing, this being
used quite impartially of various deities in polytheistic Egypt.

Furthermore, examples of denial and exclusivity statements are common
in Assyrian and Babylonian prayers:

Lord, who surpasses thee? Who can equal thee?

Great Hero, who surpasses thee? Who can equal thee?

Lord Nanna, who surpasses thee? Who can equal thee?73

and

In heaven, who is exalted? Thou, thou alone are exalted.
On earth, who is exalted? Thou, thou alone are exalted.7

 

70See Chapter 1, p. 27.

7lIbid., p. 30.

72T. E. Peet, Cambridge Ancient History Vol. II (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1931), p. 206.

73

 

Labuschagne, Op. cit., p. 34.

74Ibid.

37

It should be clear, then, that the denial statement was not
the unique possession of the Hebrews, and its inclusion in certain
prophetic books does not prove nor necessarily imply the existence of
a monotheistic world view. As pointed out above, the presence Of
monotheism in the prophetic conceptual schemes is only to be dis-
covered through the examination Of the internal structure of the
views contained in their works.

However, to examine the works of the literary prophets using
the term "monotheism" with its accepted definition would hardly be a
profitable endeavor, as was shown in the first section of this
chapter. Likewise, to examine the views of the prophets with an eye
toward the creation of a new term which would apply in some unique way
to the prophetic works would also constitute a task with little merit.
Consequently, before the works of the prophets are analyzed, a new
definition of the term "monotheism" must be forged, and this is the
task of the following chapter.

This is not to say that the views and conclusions of those
Old Testament scholars thus far examined are without merit. Indeed,
each has offered a valuable contribution not only to the clarifica-
tion of the concept monotheism, but further to our general understand—
ing of the thought of the ancient Hebrews. Thus, the new definition
of the term "monotheism" which is attempted in the following chapter
must be viewed as extending rather than replacing the cumulative

efforts which have come before it.

Chapter 2

TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF MONOTHEISM

THE NATURE OF THE MAN/GOD RELATIONSHIP

A number of philOSOphers and theologians, throughout history,
have been intensely aware of the pervasive tendency among different
groups, and indeed among men collectively, to create either a number
of gods or a single god, in their own image. The earliest recorded
protest against such a practice is found in Xenophanes' reductio pd
absurdum:

But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able

to draw with their hands and do the works that men do, horses
would draw the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like
cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had
themselves.1
Xenophanes' contempt for anthropomorphizing the gods is offset by
his positive hypostatization of "One god, greatest among gods and
men, in no way similar to mortals either in body or in thought."2
And although there is a certain epistemological naivete inherent in
any position which initially posits an entity which is "in no way

similar" to man, and then goes on to explain that entity in terms

which are considered intelligible to human ways of thinking, it was

 

1G. 8. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 169.

 

2Ibid.

38

 

39

Xenophanes' intention to glorify his god rather than to derogate the
collective nature of mortals.

Another early Greek philosopher, Protagoras of Abdera (e.c.
490 B.C.-421 B.C.), was also surely aware of the egotism involved in
any anthropomorphic approach to the world at large. However, his
response to this tendency is quite the reverse of that expressed by
Xenophanes, as is apparent from his Observation that "man is the
measure of all things, of things that are that (or "how") they are and
of things that are not that (or "how") they are not."3

The combination of these two positions, as antithetical as
they may appear, has given rise to the thesis postulated in this
dissertation which states: Man, naturally, fashions his gods or god
in his own image, and that it is man's perception of his own essential
nature which determines the essential nature of his gods or god. One
refinement of this rather general position, which will be examined
most closely in this chapter, holds that monotheism is possible only
where man's essential nature is perceived as simple and a unity. This
is to say that the current definition of monotheism as the belief that
there is only one god is found wanting in that it deals only with the
notion of numerical status, rather than also with the notion of
essential nature.

It is contended here that where man's essential nature has
been perceived as manifold and fragmented, the consequent god derived,

in the case where one god has been derived, is also perceived as

 

3G. B. Kerferd, The Enoyclopgdia of Philosophy, Vol. VI (New
York: Macmillan Publishing CO., 1972), p. 505.

 

 

 

40

having a manifold and fragmented essential nature, each is called
"one" as a function of syncretism. On the other hand, where man has
identified his essential nature with the totality of "being," while
it seems to be the case if his essential nature is held to be simple
and a unity, as would the essential nature of everything be held to
be in terms of this position, that a monotheism would appear as a
necessary consequent. However, it is more likely that this position

collapses into a monism, as in the case Of Parmenides' conception of

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, a number of
thinkers have commented on the relationship which has existed between
man's conception of his own essential nature and the essential nature
of his gods or god. However, few have dealt with the subject as

candidly as Ludwig Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity.

 

Feuerbach has characterized the man-god relation in the following
manner:

. . the Object of any subject is nothing else than the
subject's own nature taken objectively. Such are a man's
thoughts and dispositions, such is his God; so much worth as a
man has, so much and no more has his God. Consciousness of God
is self consciousness, knowledge of God is self-knowledge. By
his God thou knowest the man, and by the man his God; the two
are identical. Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and
soul; and conversely, God is the manifested inward nature, the
expressed self of a man.

And although Feuerbach's analysis may ultimately speak to the sub-
jectivism of each individual, taken as a creator of his own concep-

tion of god, there is, perhaps, a larger arena or collective within

 

4Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957), p. 12.

 

 

 

 

41
which there is some expressed consensus as to what constitutes the
essential nature of man and consequently the essential nature of god.
The remainder of this chapter, then, aimes at exploring the
positions of three distinct schools of thought, all of which have at

one time or another been held to be expressions of monotheism.
IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM

The first form Of monotheism to be considered is that which
may be gleaned from the early books of the Pentateuch. And although
there has been sufficient controversy over whether or not Mosaic
monotheism was indeed truly monotheistic, the bulk of criticism con-
cerning the affirmation Of Mosaic monotheism has centered on the lack
of an explicit denial, either clearly on the part of Moses himself or
the presence of such a denial, which could be shown to be Of suffi-
cient antiquity as to be present within the general Mosaic conceptual
scheme, of the existence of other gods.5 This Objection is felt to
be somewhat simplistic and perhaps a bit arbitrary. For the notion
of an explicit denial of the existence of other gods, on the part of
a monotheist, may be, at best, gratuitous. And Gregory Vlastos has
maintained as much by asserting:

. . a monotheist would express his faith by saying that he
believes in "one god," and would have no reason for saying "just

one God," unless he were addressing persons who he thought might
suspect that polytheism remained a live option for him.

 

5R. J. Christen and H. E. Hazelton, Monotheism and Moses
(Lexington: D. C. Heath and CO., 1969), pp. 68-77, 79-87.

 

6G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1973), p. 356.

 

 

 

 

 

42

It is the contention, then, of this chapter that Mosaic
monotheism, expressly as put forth and understood by William Albright,
is predicated upon a conception of man which is diverse and frag-
mented. And that, in terms of the general thesis stated earlier,
this fragmented conception of man can give rise only to a fragmented
and diverse conception of god. Consequently, the essential nature of
the Hebraic deity is not simple and a unity, but rather is divided
into or comprised of idealized attributes which find their counter-
parts in the self-perceived essential nature of the Hebrews as a
collective. And this multiplicity of idealized attributes which
comprises the essential nature of the deity gives rise, at best, to
a monotheism by syncretism or rather a parsimonious polytheism.

The second form Of monotheism to be examined in this analysis
is the radical monotheism of H. Richard Niebuhr. This position
offered by Niebuhr is of interest because it posits a simple and
unitary essential nature of man. As one would initially suspect,
Niebuhr's conception of the essential nature of his God is also
simple and a unit. The problem with his position is that it predi-
cates the same essential nature of everything which comprises the uni-
verse. Which is to say that for Niebuhr "being" constitutes the
essential nature of everything, with the only distinction drawn
between his God, which is the idealized cause of "being," and all
other things, which when taken individually are instantiations of
"being" or the "principle of being." It seems that the universe of
apparent diversity collapses on that predicate, giving rise to a

Parmenidean monism rather than a monotheism.

43

The third and final position to be examined here deals with
Aristotle's functional analysis of man by which he isolates man's
essential nature and then goes on to identify it with the essential
nature of his God. Even though Aristotle recognizes that man func-
tions within a variety of contexts and suffers from a number of
emotions and dispositions, his form/matter distinction allows him to
identify man's essential nature with his form. And beyond simply
positing the existence of a single deity whose essential nature he
arbitrarily identifies with the essential nature of man, Aristotle
illustrates the necessity of such a deity, given his overall view Of

the universe.

Mosaic Monotheism

 

William Foxwell Albright, in his From the Stone Age to

 

Christianity, has attempted to make a case for the relative antiquity

 

of Hebraic monotheism generally and Mosaic monotheism specifically.

It is curious that Albright seems to feel that "monotheism" is a

rather elastic term, for he admits that the position Of Moses, when
contrasted with the views of "Philo Judaeus or Rabbi Akiba, of St.

Paul or St. Augustine, Of Mohammed or Maimonides, of St. Thomas . ."7
would not qualify the former to be classed with the latter given the
accepted definition of monotheism. On the other hand, this class
exclusion does not necessarily preclude Moses from being a mono-

theist if that term is simply recast to fit the particular position

of Moses. This recasting, for Albright, entails the following:

 

7W. F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity_(Balti-
more: The Johns HOpkins Press, 1940), p. 271.

 

 

44

If . . . the term "monotheist" means one who teaches the
existence of only one God, the creator of everything, the source
of justice, who is equally powerful in Egypt, in the desert and
in Palestine, who has no sexuality and no mythology, who is
human in form and cannot be represented in any form--then the
founder of Yahwism was certainly a monotheist.

Albright's reworked or enlarged definition of a "monotheist," at
least in the case of Moses, involves the predication of at least four
attributes to the Hebraic deity. These are: (1) the creator of
everything; (2) the source of justice; (3) who is universally power-
ful; and (4) human in form. The three negative predicates--asexu-
ality, the lack of a mythology, and unrepresentable in any form-dwill
not concern us here.

The first three positive predicates may be seen as serving
the function of setting the stage for the fourth and, from the human
point Of view, most critical predicate. For by predicating a human
form of their deity, the Hebrews insured their connection with that
deity. Before examining the human form predicate, let us first re-
create the scenario within which the fourth predicate is made
intelligible.

The two creation stories in Genesis serve the primary function
Of attributing the existence of everything to the deliberate and in-
tentional act of a divine creator. Their further function is to
define man's relatively superior place among the universe of objects
created. A variation on this theme is heard in Exodus 3:14 where it
is pointed out that the Hebraic deity's very name is indicative of its

causal role in the ongoing history of the universe. Albright makes

this point by asserting:

 

81bid.

45
Many different meanings have been attributed to YAHWEH by
scholars who recognized its relative antiquity but only one
yields any suitable sense: "He causes to be."9

This recognition and consequent affirmation of their deity's causal
role in the history of the universe, on the part of the Hebrews, may
be seen to have initially instituted a type of reciprocity which was
grounded in the relational context of created to creator. However,
implicit in the notion of a deliberate creation is the notion of a
teleology. While the creation stories tend to make it clear that the
universe was, at least for the most part, created to serve the end or
ends of man, what is critical to ferret out is how man is to serve
the end or ends of God. That their deity created men to serve its
end, and what that end is, are brought out in Gen. 3:23, where it is
seen that conformity to God's will is the very reason for man's
existence. However, conformity to God's will must be grounded in the
firm conviction that that will is not at root capricious, but rather
that it is the well spring of justice itself. The combination Of the
affirmation that that will is the ultimate cause of justice serves to
engender a certain confidence in subjugating one's personal will to
that of his deity as a function of choice. However, these two con-
cepts, coupled with the notion that the deity is also universally
powerful and is not above bringing its power to bear on those that do
not willingly subjugate their will to its own, are, indeed, convinc-
ing arguments for bringing one's personal will in line with the

divine will.

 

91bid., p. 259.

46

This complex of teleology and equity, then, determined the
arena into which the Hebrews were thrust to examine their own
essential nature, and then develop an appropriate conceptualization
of the essential nature of their deity. And this is where the
predication of a human form to their deity becomes important.

There is nowhere in the Pentateuch, to the best of my
knowledge, any concise statement concerning the essential nature of
man. Rather, the work as a whole may be considered a composite
depiction of the multifaceted essential nature of man as it relates
to the multifaceted essential nature of the Hebraic deity. Man is
cast in a variety of unique roles and placed in a variety of differ-
ent ways, as a function of his multifaceted essential nature. God
then responds to man by adjudicating the correctness of man's
actions, in terms of their degree of correspondence to the divine
will. The degree of diversity of human activity found in the Penta-
teuch led Nietzsche to comment:

I have the highest respect for that book. I find in

it great men, a heroic landscape, and one Of the rarest

things on earth, the Taivete of a strong heart. What is

more I find a people.
What exactly, then, this "people" held to constitute the essential
nature of man is woven within the larger tapestry of the Man/God re-
lationship. Any attempt to extricate a complete and readily under—

standable conception of man, as man, is, at best, a task in its own

right. Suffice it to say, then, that man manifests a manifold nature

 

10F. Nietzsche, The Birthpof Tragedy and the Geneology of
Morals (New York: Doubleday and CO., 1956), p. 281.

 

47
in the Pentateuch and, further, that this manifold nature is projected
onto or becomes embodied in his conception of his God. That this is
the case is substantiated by Albright's claim that:

. . . it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the anthro—
pomorphic conception of Yahweh was absolutely necessary if the
God of Israel was to remain a God of the individual Israelite as
well as of the people as a whole . . . . For the average wor-
shiper . . . it is very essential that his God be a divinity who
can sympathize with his human feelings and emotions, a being
whom he can love and fear alternately, and to whom he can trans-
fer the holiest emotions connected with memories of father and
mother and friend. In other words, it was precisely the anthro-
pomorphism of Yahweh which was essential to the initial success
Of Israel's religion. Like man at his noblest the God of Israel
might be in form and affective reactions, . . . All of the human
characteristics of Israel's deity were exalted.

This phenomenon of "exalting all the human characteristics

of Israel's deity" speaks initially to the manifold essential nature
of Israel's deity and secondly makes somewhat suspect the intention
motivating such an exaltation. In terms of the latter, it is
Feuerbach's contention that:

The Homeric gods eat and drink;—-that implies eating and
drinking is a divine pleasure. Physical strength is an attri-
bute of the Homeric gods: Zeus is the strongest of the gods.
Why? Because physical strength, in and by itself, was regarded
as something glorious, divine. To the ancient Germans the
highest virtues were those of the warrior; therefore their
supreme god was the god of war, Odin,--war "the original or
Oldest law." Not the attribute of the divinity, but the divine-
ness or deity of the attribute, is the first true Divine Being.

Feuerbach essentially identifies the human with the divine. And

Albright has correctly noted that the "average worshiper,‘ among the

Hebrews, perceived his deity as a manifestation of "man at his

 

llAlbright, op. cit., p. 265.

12Feuerbach, Op. cit., p. 21.

48

noblest." Whereas, however, in the case of an obviously polytheistic
system, individual human attributes are seen to be embodied in their
respective divine beings, the situation becomes somewhat hazy where
all of these attributes are manifested by or are embodied within a
single deity. In truth, the question may be seriously asked—-what is
the significant difference between one system in which the complex of
human attributes is distributed among a number of deities, and another
system which simply merges these attributes into a single deity? If
the obvious answer, that where you once had many you now have one, is
also the only answer, it would seem a bit premature to assume that the
latter system is truly monotheistic in design. For even in the shift
to the one embodiment of these attributes, you still have the many.

It is my contention, then, that there is no really signifi-
cant difference between a monotheism by syncretism and outright poly-
theism. Consequently, the former, rather than representing monotheism
at all, is simply a variation on the polytheism theme. The ease with
which the Hebrews collectively slipped into Obvious polytheism at
various times, may indeed simply point to the inability of the charac-
ter of Yahweh to assimilate new attributes which the Hebrews wished
to "exalt." Rather than denying the value of the attribute, the
Hebrews would adopt, in addition to Yahweh, whatever god happened to
embody the particular attribute in question. For, as Feuerbach has
pointed out, what is primarily important is the attribute and of less
consequence is the divine being within which it is embodied.

Mosaic monotheism, then, appears to be actually a conglom-
eration of human attributes stuck on to or located within one persona

ality. Albright's contention that Moses taught "the existence of only

49

one God,"13 does not allow him to claim that Moses was a monotheist
or put forth a monotheistic system, given the manifold essential
nature Of that one God, Yahweh. Let us now turn to an examination

of the "radical monotheism" of H. Richard Niebuhr.

Radical Monotheism

 

In his book Radical Monotheism and Western Civilization, H.

 

Richard Neibuhr has made the following observation:

It is very questionable, despite many protestations to the
contrary, despite the prevalence of self pity among some modern
men because "God is dead" that anyone has ever yearned for
radical faith in the One God.14

Rather, it is Niebuhr's contention that collectively men have
instituted closed systems of society and thought which have been
productive of:

. . henotheism or the social faith which makes a finite
society whether cultural or religious, the object of trust and
loyalty, and which tends to subvert even officially monotheis-
tic institutions such as the churches.15

Niebuhr has isolated one Of the causes of this behavior by illustrat-
ing that men have traditionally perceived the apparent diversity in
the universe and set about cataloging this diversity into more or

less manageable groups. This myopic delight in diversity has, for the

most part, prevented any universal synthesis grounded in the similar-

ity which exists among all things.

 

13Albright, op. cit., p. 271.

14H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Civili—
zation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), p. 14.

 

151b1d., p. 1.

50

The extent or degree to which one forms "value centers" as a
function of extricating a certain part of the universe from the
totality is the extent or degree to which one expresses a "henotheis-
tic or social faith." Conversely, the degree to which one is able
completely to identify his "value center" with the totality is also
the degree to which one expresses a monotheistic faith. That this is
Niebuhr's position is apparent from his assertion:

For radical monotheism is no closed society or the principle
of such a society, but the principle of being itself; its
reference is to no one reality among the many, but to the One
beyond the many, whence all the many derive their being, and by
participation in which they exist.1

Monotheism, or radical monotheism, then is defined by Niebuhr as the
belief in the "principle of being" which refers to the "one," which,

although it is beyond the "many,' is nonetheless causally productive

' By the "many" it is safe to assume that Niebuhr means

of the "many.'
the collection of individual instantiations of "being."

The question which arises here is what does Niebuhr feel
constitutes the essential nature of man and how does he identify it
with the essential nature of God? If he maintains that the essential
nature of man is simple and a unity, it follows that his God also
possesses an essential nature which is simple and a unity. Conse~
quently, his system fulfills the criterion set down at the beginning
of this chapter and qualifies as a monotheistic system. Perhaps the
best way to get a "handle" on his position concerning man's essential

nature is to examine how he thinks an individual should be perceived

by fellow individuals. To this end he draws the following conclusion:

 

16Ibid., p. 27.

51

Love of the neighbor is required of every morality formed by
a faith; but in a polytheistic faith the neighbor is defined as
the one who is near me in my interest group, when he is near me
in that passing association. In henotheistic social faith my
neighbor is my fellow in the closed society. Hence in both
instances the counterpart of the law of neighbor love is the
requirement to hate the enemy. But in radical monotheism my
neighbor is my companion in being.

Man's essential nature, then, may be said to be comprised Of
"being" alone, which is indeed a simple and unitary construct. This
is to say that man as man is an instantiation of "being." Niebuhr,
having isolated this predicate, has made it qualitatively distinct
from all of the other predicates which potentially could comprise
man's essential nature. It only follows that his God, as an idealized
man, should manifest this predicate in an ideal fashion. This is the
case, for Niebuhr identifies his God as the cause of the "being" of
the many.

As far as we have explored Niebuhr's system, it seems to be an
almost ideal form Of monotheism. And if he had stopped at this point,
it could indeed stand as a model system. However, rather than stop-
ping here, he extends the use Of his concept of "being" as comprising
both man and God's essential nature to include the essential nature of
the totality of the many. From his point Of view this is not only a
logical but a necessary extension in that, perhaps, his main motiva-
tion in undertaking his project was to undermine the perpetuation of
henotheistically based systems and world views. This is clear from

the following:

A radical monotheism would include reverence for the dead and
that not simply because they were once alive; it would include

 

17Ibid., p. 30.

52
reverence for beings, inorganic, perhaps ideal, that though not
living, claim the wondering and not exploitative attention of us
other creatures that have the will to live.
Clearly, then, Niebuhr seems to have no vested interest in
man as man, that is, apart from his general participation in the

' Even if he feels that man possesses any

larger community of "being.'
substantial characteristics which are peculiar to him, they would
undoubtedly have second order importance in determining his essential
nature; for ultimately man is held to be at one with the totality
simply as a function of his participation in "being."

It will be remembered that the major difficulty confronting
the question of Mosaic monotheism was its fragmented approach to man
and consequently to God. The difficulty which Niebuhr faces is the
antithesis of the Hebrew difficulty. Although it is not entirely
clear what Niebuhr means by either "being" or the "principle of
"being," it does seem to be the case that where one predicate is not
only shared by the component parts of the totality but also comprises
the essential nature of each component, a complete collapse of
diversity ensues, and one is left with a simple monism. This is to
say that all that is, is being and being is all that is, which is
perhaps meaningful from a Parmenidean point of view, but such a view
entails the virtual dismissal of the simply phenomenal as illusion.
Aristotle makes this point when he asserts:

Again, if there is to be absolute Being and absolute Unity,

it is very hard to see how there can be anything else besides
these; I mean how things can be more than one. For that which

 

18Ibid., p. 34.

53

is other than what it is, is not; and so by Parmenides argument
it must follow that all things are one, i.e. Being.

Niebuhr's radical monotheism seems to collapse into a monism of "being."
This is undoubtedly due to his radical rejection of the apparent
diversity inherent in the universe. For to deny that man is unique
among the manifold objects which constitute the totality is simply to
deny man. And to deny man is to deny man's God and to replace it
with the meaningless concept of "being": meaningless because it in-
cludes everything and lacks any discriminative function; it may serve
simply the ends of man as theoretician but not necessarily the ends
of man as man.

Aristotle's theology is seen to represent a synthesis between
the Hebraic system and the system of Niebuhr; so let us now turn to an

examination of that system:

Aristotelian Monotheism

 

Aristotle begins his analysis Of man with the following
question:

. . . the goodness or efficiency of a flute player or
sculptor or craftsman of any sort, and in general of anybody who
has some function or business to perform, is thought to reside in
that function; and similarly it may be held that the good of man
resides in the function of man if he has a function.

Are we then to assume that, while the carpenter and shoemaker
have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man as
such has none, and is not designed by nature to fulfill any
function?

 

19Aristotle, Metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1968), p. 135.

 

20 , Nichomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968), p. 31.

54
By way of answering this question it becomes clear that Aristotle is

searching for that "function" which is "peculiar to man." This leads

him to reject the simple "act of living,‘ which plants also partake

in, and the "sentient life" as it is shared by all animals. He goes
on to answer his question as follows:

There remains therefore what may be called the practical life
of the rational part of man . . . . Rational life again has two
meanings; let us assume that we are here concerned with the
active exercise of the rational faculty, since this seems to be
the more proper sense of the term. If then the function of man
is the active exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity with
rational principle, . . . (and) if this is so, and if we declare
that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define
that form of life as the exercise of the soul's faculties and
activities in association with rational principle, and say that
the function of a good man is to perform these activities well
and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is per-
formed in accordance with its own proper excellence--from these
premises it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise
of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue,
or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in con-
formity with the best and most perfect among them.21

For Artistotle, then, man's essential nature is known through his
function, and that function turns out to be an activity of the soul
in accordance with the "best or most perfect" of the human virtues.

He goes on in Book X Of the Nichomachean Ethics to isolate the most

 

perfect activity, of which man is capable, when he asserts:

. . . the activity Of philosophic wisdom is the pleasantest
of virtuous activities . . . . And this activity alone would seem
to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart
from the contemplating.

Man as man, therefore, or man's essential nature is comprised

of an activity, and this activity is the act of contemplating. This

 

211bid., p. 33.

22R. McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random
House, 1971), p. 1104.

 

55
is, indeed, the case; for Aristotle flatly states, "reason more than

"23 And while it is true that Aristotle distin—

anything else is man.
guishes between the moral and intellectual virtues, he clearly
considers the former to be of secondary importance when one is con-
sidering the essential nature and, hence, function of man as man. For
he draws a distinction between simply human activities, to which the
moral virtues attend, and divine activity. Even though man, for the
most part, partakes of the former, due to his composite nature, it is

towards the latter which man should strive. He drives this point !

home by asserting:

 

If reason is divine, then in comparison with man, the life
according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we
must not follow those who advise us being men, to think of human
things and being mortal, of mortal things, but must so far as we
can make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in
accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in
bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.
This would seem, too, to be each man himself since it is the
authoritative and better part of him.

And if it may be made any more explicit what one predicate describes
man as man, we may refer back to Feuerbach's claim that "not the
attribute of the divinity; but the divineness or deity of the attri—
bute, is the first true Divine Being." And then note what Aristotle
says about the activities associated with the moral virtues, to the
effect that:
For the moral activities are purely human: Justice, I mean,
Courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with

our fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and
services and in our various actions, and in our emotions also;

 

23Ibid., p. 1105.

ZAIbid.

56

and all of these things seem to be purely human affairs . . .
now the virtues of our composite nature are purely human.

Many predicates pertain to man as a composite, but man as man

' and consequently man's essential nature is

is identified as "reason,'
simple and a unity.

The task which remains is to illustrate that Aristotle held
the position not only that God is numerically one and comprised of an
essential nature which is simple and a unity, but also that its simple

and unitary essential nature embodies the single idealized predicate

which comprises man's essential nature.26

 

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Aristotle
does not simply posit the existence of a Supreme deity, but rather
argues for the necessary existence of such a deity as well as the
simplicity and unity of that deity's essential nature. Aristotle's
argument for the necessary existence of his God is grounded in his
conception of motion, and it is essentially a reductio §d_absurdum
argument which begins with the inductively derived observation that
things move. In an attempt to trace to its beginning the origin of
movement, he declares that this process must not regress infinitely.
Consequently, there must be a first mover, which itself is not moved
nor be moveable by its very nature. For if it were moveable, it

would be potentially other than it is, but as pure actuality it

 

25Aristotle, Metaphysics, Op. cit., p. 619.

26W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1975), p. 159, has maintained the following con-
cerning the nature of the relationship which exists between the
essential nature of man and that of Aristotle's God, "the difference
lies in this, that the best in him (man)--that which is in the full—
est sense his own true nature-~15 identical with the nature of that
which is above him, with the nature of God."

 

 

57

possesses no potentiality. Also if it were moved, something prior to
it must move it, and it would not then be the first mover.

Also it must move things without itself moving. This end is
accomplished in that the prime mover "produces motion as being loved."27
And although this is a rather cursory examination, it is Aristotle's
conviction that "the first mover, then, exists of necessity."28

Concerning the prime mover's essential nature, given that it
is pure actuality, it will manifest itself in activity- Aristotle
identifies that activity by maintaining, "therefore the activity of
God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contempla—
tive."29 One could conceptualize, then, Aristotle's God as--thought
thinking thought. In order to insure the simplicity and unity of the
essential nature of his God, Aristotle asserts: "Therefore it must be
of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excel-
lent Of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking,"30 and
finally,

A further question is left--whether the Object of the divine
thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in
passing from part to part of the whole. g? answer that every-
thing that has not matter is indivisible.

Aristotle's conception of God, then, coupled with his views

concerning the essential nature of man, appear to be productive of a

 

27McKeon, op. cit., p. 879.

281bid., p. 880.
291bid., p. 1107.
3OIbid., p. 885.

311bid.

 

58
truly monotheistic system. And his approach to the problem seems to
have avoided the pitfalls one encounters in the Hebraic system and
the system of Niebuhr.

The intention of this chapter has been to illustrate that the
traditional definition of "monotheism" is too narrow in that it speaks
simply to the numerical status of any given deity. It has been
suggested that the meaning of "monotheism" be expanded to include
also the essential nature of the deity. Also the task was under—
taken to show that man's formulation of the essential nature of his
deity is a reflection of his self-perceived essential nature. As a
consequence of this last assumption, the question concerning the
nature of God in himself, has been purposely avoided. Perhaps it is
fitting to end this chapter with an observation, on the meaningful—
ness of this question, offered by Feuerbach:

If God were an object to the bird, he would be a winged being:
the bird knows nothing higher, nothing more blissful, than the
winged condition. How ludicrous would it be if this bird pro-
nounced: To me God appears as a bird, but what he is in himself
I know not. To the bird the highest nature is the bird nature;
take from him the conception of this, and you take from him the
conception of the highest being. How then, could he ask whether
God in himself were winged? To asked whether God is in himself

what he is for me is to ask whether God is Gogz is to lift one—
self above one's God, to rise up against him.

 

32Feuerbach, op. cit., p. 17.

 

Chapter 3

THE NATURE OF THE TASK

The task of isolating and describing the essential nature of
the eighth through the sixth centuries B.C. Hebrews, let alone that
of their god, may, on the one hand, be viewed, initially, as an in-
surmountable project, due simply enough to the plethora of predicates
utilized by the prophets to describe their fellow man and their god,
present in the prophetic literature of the period.

THE PROPHETIC CONCEPTION OF THE
ESSENTIAL NATURE OF MAN

Taking, collectively, these descriptions of their fellow man
and combining them with the list of attributes predicated of Yahweh
by the prophets would certainly yield an unwieldy conglomerate, which
by its very size and apparent lack of homogeneity should cause con-
siderable anxiety and no small degree of perplexity for the scholar
who attempts to identify and isolate a single predicate, which is uni-
vocally predicable of both man and god; and who further wishes to
assert that it is this one predicate which is responsible for deter-
mining the essential nature of each.

The alternative to the successful completion of this task
would involve denying that both the people of this period and their
faith were monotheistic, at least as far as that concept has been put

59

60
forth and is understood here. Methodological considerations seem
further to cloud the issue when one attempts to justify the approp-
riate starting point for such an investigation. That is to say, that
it is not obvious whether the investigation should begin with an
examination of the essential nature of Yahweh, as espoused by the
prophets Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah, and descend to that
of man, or vice versa. Feuerbach's contention, "By his God thou know-
est the man, and by the man his God; the two are identical,"1 would
seem to be of little or no help in adjudicating the more appropriate

starting point. Aristotle, on the other hand, Offers a solution to

 

this problem when he states:

There are two senses in which things are prior and more
knowable. That which is prior in nature is not the same as that
which is prior in relation to us, and that which is (naturally)
more knowable is not the same as that which is more knowable by
us. By "prior" or "more knowable" in relation to us I mean that
which is nearer to our perception, and by "prior" or "more
knowable" in the absolute sense I mean that which is further
from it. The most universal concepts are furthest from our per-
ception, and particulars are nearest to it; and these are
opposite to one another.

While it may certainly be argued that both the essential natures of

god and man constitute "universal concepts,"

the relative proximity of
our neighbor coupled with our individual capacities for reflection
would seem to provide a quite plausible rationale for initiating the

analysis with an examination of the essential nature of the latter,

ascending to that of the former.

 

1See Chapter 2, p. 40.

2Aristotle, PosteriorTAnalytics (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1966), pp. 31-32.

 

61

The task of ascertaining the essential nature of the Hebrews
of the eighth through the sixth centuries B.C., as described by the
prophets of the period, may be greatly facilitated by reasking the
question earlier offered by Aristotle:

Are we then to assume that, while the carpenter and shoemaker

have definite functions or businesses belonging to them, man

as such has none, and is not designed by nature to fulfill any

function?3
For the sake of clarity, this question may be paraphrased as follows
--Given that the eighth through sixth centuries Hebrews recognized
that a number of arenas existed within which various utilitarian and
social functions of man were displayed (e.g., man as shepherd cared
for his flock, man as priest maintained the temple and the rituals
associated with it), did they not also recognize an arena wherein the
activities, associated with this particular arena, made manifest the
peculiar function of man as man? And if this question is answered in
the affirmative, as it is contended here that it must be, the further
question arises--Who, either individually or as a group, took the
responsibility for elucidating the nature of man's peculiar function
and instructed the people in how best to fulfill this function?

Just as the task fell to the master craftsmen of various
trades to instruct the novices by relating the activities associated
with their particular trade, so it fell to the prophets to instruct
the people, collectively, in the field which most truly dealt with

developing and refining their peculiarly human function. For,

whereas the priests dealt with man in his relation to temple ritual,

 

3See Chapter 2, p. 53,

 

62

or man as worshiper, the prophets dealt with man in his relation to
his god. And for the ancient Hebrews, it was most surely the case
that there Was no other arena within which the human drama revealed
more truly the absolute essence of the essential nature of man.

This is to say that the possible objection, that the human/divine
relationship deals primarily with man as worshiper, is dispelled due
to the contention here that the ancient Hebrews' relation to Yahweh
is not only best understood as, but in reality consisted of man's

relation to man as well as man's relation to himself. In other words

 

the locus of the divine for the ancient Hebrew had shifted from its b
heavenly abode to his neighbor, and, in a very real sense, to him-
self.

It is the further contention Of this chapter, support of
which is the substance of the following chapter, that the literary
prophets, especially Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah, held
and developed the position that man as man had one unique function
which was grounded in a single attribute. This one attribute was
held to comprise the essential natures of both man and Yahweh. And
in the most simple terms this attribute may be called the Ethical.

The justification for this position depends primarily on the
confirmation of the following two hypotheses: (1) that the prophets,
listed above, maintained that the most important activity their fellow
Hebrews could engage in, involved the acquisition of a knowledge Of
Yahweh; and (2) that, at least for these prophets, the concept of
Yahweh, as the Object of an epistemological inquiry, was isomorphi-

cally related to a knowledge of the Ethical. This is to say that

63

knowledge of Yahweh did not manifest itself through achieving a
cognitive state wherein the Ethical was reflected upon or contem-
plated in an abstract or theoretical form. Rather, knowledge of
Yahweh was manifested through the active display of ethical behavior.4
All Of which reduces to the straight-forward position that, for the
ancient Hebrew, to know Yahweh was to act ethically, and conversely,
to act ethically was to know Yahweh. This position may become
clearer through a brief sketching of the four prophets who will be
dealt with more fully in the following chapter.

By and large, the combined works of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and
Deutero-Isaiah have been historically, and may so still today, viewed
as scathing indictments of a people who, though continuously having
been nurtured and supported by their deity, nonetheless have returned
evil for good and injustice for justice. Of these four prophets two,
Amos and Jeremiah, lament the sins the rich perpetrate against the
poor and the evil against the righteous. In other words, they seem
particularly concerned with the injustices men commit against one
another. On the other hand, Hosea and Deutero-Isaiah seem most con-

cerned with the sins man commits against Yahweh, the foremost of which

is that of idolatry.

 

4Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. I
(Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1961), p. 359, where Eichrodt
expresses a view which is quite close to the view Offered here:

 

The strong emphasis which we find in Hosea and Jeremiah on
the "knowledge of God" does not, according to the generally
agreed opinion, equate this da'at thh with intellectual con-
templation or theoretical knowledge of the divine will, but with
the act whereby man admits the nature and will of God as these
have been revealed into his inmost spiritual self, with the

 

64

Amos (5:12) clearly isolates those who sin against their

fellow man:

For I know how many are your
transgressions
and how great are your sins--
you who afflict the righteous, who
take a bribe,
and turn aside the needy in the
gate.

and further:

Hear this, you who trample upon the

needy,

and bring the poor of the land to
an end,

saying, "When will the new moon
be over,

that we may sell grain?
And the Sabbath

that we may Offer wheat for sale,

that we may make the ephah small
and the Shekel great,

and deal deceitfully with false
balances,

that we may buy the poor for silver

and the needy for a pair of
sandals,

and sell the refuse of the wheat?

(8:4—6)

 

result that that self now seems permeated and conditioned by the
essential character of God. Again Amos, even though he has no
word for "ingratitude," is able to make the idea clear enough
(2:9-12), and to characterize the essential nature Of sin against
God as precisely this utter insensitivity to all benefits. But
what does all this mean, if not that the knowledge of God can
only be achieved by a real act on the part of man?-—an act, more-
over, which is something quite different from mere cerebration,
namely a real personal decision and acknowledgement, and not
knowledge in the ordinary, neutral sense of the word.

For a further examination of Eichrodt's position, see Walther Eichrodt,
Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. II (Philadelphia: The Westminis-
ter Press, 1961), pp. 291-293. For the Opinions of other Old Testament
scholars concerning the meaning of the prophetic concept "knowledge of
God," see: James Luther Mays, Hosea (Philadelphia: The Westminister
Press, 1969), pp. 62-64; James Luther Mays, Amos (Philadelphia: The
Westminister Press, 1969), pp. 56-67; Erling Hammershaimb, The Book

65

However, the identification of those who sin against man is only half
the task which Amos sets for himself. His primary mission lies in
instructing the people how to avoid these pitfalls. And it is with
Amos that the first inkling of the belief that sin springs essentially
from ignorance becomes apparent. Amos' development and treatment of
this theme is at best, however, brief.

Implicit in Hosea's characterization of the people as a
harlot is the notion that the sin of adultery is most truly a crime
against the individual who commits the act and only in some secondary
way against the person who finds himself associated with that indi—
vidual. And as adultery is essentially the product of ignorance of
what is truly the good, idolatry is seen as even more pathetic for
its object, in reality, does not even exist. And there is a certain
sorrow, rather than wrath, contained in Hosea's Observation of the
frivolity of his people, as is apparent in his statement:

Wine and new wine
take away the understanding.
My people inquire of a thing of
wood,
and their staff gives them oracles.
(4:11-12)
However, it is quite clear that Hosea is not seeking simply to alter
the object of the people's worship. Rather, his goal is to alter the

people's relationship to the divine altogether as is apparent from

his assertion of Yahweh's plea:

 

of Amos (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 56—57; James M.
Ward, Hosea: A Theological Commentary (New York: Harper and Row,
1966), pp. 85-87; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 142-143; Joseph
Jensen, God's Word to Israel (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp.
201-202.

 

 

 

66
For I desire steadfast love and not
sacrifice,
the knowledge of God, rather
than burnt Offerings.
(6:6)
It is with Hosea, as is apparent from the above, that the concept of
acquiring knowledge of Yahweh, actually "gets off the ground." And,
as will be seen in the following chapter, Hosea treats this concept
in a rather full manner.

The strongest support for the above stated thesis is found
in the book of Jeremiah. With remarkable clarity and untiring
persistence he drives home, repeatedly, the message that an acquisi-
tion of knowledge of Yahweh constitutes the proper and most perfect
function of man. He further asserts that knowledge of Yahweh is
irrevocably tied to and absolutely identified with knowledge of the
Ethical, manifested through the display of ethical behavior.
Jeremiah's teaching represents the complete fruition of this con-
cept. And the thesis espoused in this chapter stands or falls on
the work of this prophet.

The work of Deutero-Isaiah appears at first somewhat ana—
chronistic. For, rather than being an extension of the position put
forth by Jeremiah, it hearkens back to Amos in outlook and Hosea in
content. This is to say that while being almost completely Obsessed
with the idolatry of the people, his basic response to that idolatry
is first to deny the existence Of other gods, time and time again,
and secondarily to threaten a mighty display of the wrath of Yahweh.
There is further, in Deutero-Isaiah, the initially complete usurpation,

by Yahweh, of the attributes, divine sexuality being noticeably ab—

sent, of the gods of the Hebrews' neighbors. This excessive

67

anthropomorphization of Yahweh is a drastic departure from the subtle
ethical position present in the works of his predecessors. And it is
almost with a certain resignation toward the incorrigible nature of
the people that Deutero-Isaiah reverts to earlier and more graphic
modes of expression. There is, however, a small continuing thread of
the ethical position offered by his predecessors, and this must be
examined.

Aside from these various indictments, found in the collected
writings of these prophets, there exists a body of literature come
prised of commands to practice justice, display righteousness, practice
steadfast loyalty, etc. And the question arises—-if the Hebrews were
specifically commanded to practice justice, why is it not, taken as a
separate attribute, identified with their essential nature? And
further why not the attributes of righteousness, loyalty, charity,
etc. In other words, why is not the total complex of ethical concepts
identified as comprising, as a collective, the essential nature of the
ancient Hebrew? This is, indeed, a pertinent question which at the
very least raises the suspicion that the essential nature of man, as
viewed by these prophets, was indeed multifaceted. The only correct
answer to this question is that supplied by the prophets themselves,
that each instance of ethical behavior is held to be a manifestation
of knowledge of Yahweh. And where the appropriate ethical behavior is
absent from a given situation, they hold that it is due to an ignor-
ance of Yahweh. The point here is that numerous individual commands
to be just, righteous, loyal, etc., ultimately reduce to the over—

riding command to know Yahweh.

68

It would be tempting to argue that the prophets were advanc-
ing a philosophical argument which held that the individual virtues
Of justice, righteousness, loyalty, etc. are so called not as a
function of representing individual and discrete human capacities,
but rather as a function of representing a manifestation of knowledge
of Yahweh, i.e., the Ethical. It is, however, assuredly the case
that their perceptions of Ethics as an abstract, theoretical
discipline had not reached the level of Plato's, for whom such an
argument was quite feasible.5

This is not to say, however, that an apparent effort,
conscious or not, is not present in their combined writings to collapse
the various, so called, virtues under the rubric, knowledge of Yahweh.
This effort seems to issue less from a zeal for parsimony, itself,
than from their rigorous insistence that knowledge of Yahweh is not
only a sufficient condition for insuring man's position as an ethical
being, but also a necessary condition for bringing to perfection his

essential nature.
A DETERMINANT THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The English word "philosophy" is made up of the combination
of the two Greek words "philos" and "sophia" and may be rendered liter-
ally into English as "love of wisdom." A philosopher, in the broadest
sense of the term, is any individual who loves and seeks wisdom. As

a scholarly discipline, the field of philosophy may be roughly

 

5See especially the Protagoras, 360 d.

 

 

69
divided into three major areas of study; namely, logic, ethics, and
metaphysics. Metaphysics, in turn, may be further subdivided into
the areas of ontology and epistemology. While ontological questions
deal primarily with the problem of existence or being, epistemologi-
cal questions are addressed to the problem of knowledge. Thus,
ontologies may be thought of as categories or lists of entities which
are held to exist while epistemological theories attempt to supply a
rational account of the meaning present in the statement--I know R,
where §_is understood as a given entity held to be present in any
given ontology.

Rarely have the practitioners of any of the special fields of
philosophy attempted to isolate themselves through the development of
a unique and restricted subject matter. Rather philosophy, perhaps
best understood as a critical methodology, has been broadly concep—
tualized and utilized by philosophers to critically examine quite
diverse fields of study which has subsequently given rise to a
plethora of special types Of philosophy; e.g., philosophy of religion,
philosophy of law, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, etc.
In a very real sense, then, it may be maintained that philosophy does
not contain its own unique subject matter for there does not exist a
field of study which may be aptly described as philosophy of philos-
ophy. Consequently, if one is willing to grant the view that a
philosopher is essentially one who loves wisdom and searches for truth,
and that those individuals who, historically, have addressed them-
selves to the problem of existence and have attempted to discover and

describe how knowledge is related to ethics, are lovers of wisdom, the

70

conclusion that the literary prophets were, in a very real sense,
philosophers is inescapable.

That these prophets, historically, have not been described as
such may be due primarily to the fact that they held their God and
the welfare of their fellow man to be of far greater importance than,
from their point of view, the pale products of a life devoted simply
to reason. Their apparent disdain for natural philosophy or science,

6 coupled with their com-

which was later to be shared by Socrates,
plete obsession with their task of bringing to their fellow man a
heightened awareness of the nature of his relationship to his God,
may seem to lead to the conclusion that they are best described as
quasi-theologians. However, if only through a consideration of their
ethical views, these prophets would easily find their way into the
company of philosophers such as Socrates7 and Plato. Beyond the
construction of an ethical doctrine, although inextricably bound to
it, these prophets must be credited with the formation of a unique

theory of knowledge, from which they derived their basic conclusions

concerning the nature of the Man/God relationship.

 

6Plato, The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971),
pp. 5-6, 78-79.

 

7Ibid., pp. 16-17, where the comparison between the prophets
and Socrates is highly instructive:

For this reason, gentlemen, so far from pleading on my own
behalf, as might be supposed, I am really pleading on yours, to
save you from misusing the gift of God by condemning me. If you
put me to death, you will not easily find anyone to take my
place. It is literally true, even if it sounds rather comical,
that God has specially appointed me to this city, as though it
were a large thoroughbred horse which because of its great size

 

71

The elucidation of the prophetic usage of the concept
"knowledge of God" will depend primarily on discovering the meaning
of the word "knowledge" when Yahweh was held to be the entity to be
known. It is the contention here that the prophets gave a new conno-
tation to the verb "yada" and the noun "da'at" when Yahweh was the
object of knowledge. The verb "yada" is most Often translated in
English as "to perceive, to understand, to know; to be acquainted
with."8 However, none of these meanings approach the sense of action
or doing found in the prophets' declaration to man--to know the Lord.
Likewise, the noun "da'at" when translated as "knowledge, insight"9
lacks the notion of the causal role such knowledge, when taken as
knowledge of God, plays in determining the actions of man.

Simply stated, it is being maintained here that the new

connotation which the prophets gave to "yada" and "da'at" may best be

 

is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging
fly. It seems to me that God has attached me tO this city to
perform the office of such a fly, and all day long I never cease
to settle here, there, and everywhere, rousing, persuading, re-
proving everyone of you.

and further, p. 68:

I (Socrates) believe that the swans, belonging as they do to
Apollo, have prophetic powers and sing because they know the good
things that await them in the unseen world, and they are happier
on that day (the day of their death) than they have ever been
before. Now I consider that I am in the same service as the
swans, and dedicated to the same god, and that I am no worse en-
dowed with prophetic powers by my master than they are, and no
more disconsolate at leaving this life.

8Karl Feyerabend, Langenscheidt Pocket Hebrew Dictionary to
the Old Testament (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 122.

9

 

Ibid., p. 72.

72

10

described as representing a determinant theory of knowledge, where

the force of the term "determinant" is closely associated with

" "the primary source of

Aristotle's conception of "efficient cause,
the change or coming to rest . . . generally what makes of what is
made and what causes change of what is changed."11 This is to say
that the view is derivable from the writings of Amos, Hosea, Jere-
miah, and Deutero-Isaiah that, for man, a "knowledge of God" was held
to be absolutely determinant and causally productive of man's per—
formance of acts of an ethical nature. Or, in other words, that for
these prophets "knowledge of God" is identified with an indwelling
ethical principle which both constituted man's essential nature and
was deemed the absolute cause of his living an ethically-based life.
An important consequence of this position, if it is the case
that the prophets held such a view concerning the nature and role
man's "knowledge of God" played in determining his actions, is that
the prophets must have necessarily rejected any notion of a dual
potentiality of action which could arise from such knowledge, such
that a man may be said tO truly possess "knowledge of God" and yet

act in an unethical manner. Essentially this view reduces to the

position that evil or sin is the product of man's ignorance of God,

 

10The label Determinant Theory of Knowledge has been chosen to
avoid any confusion with the current epistemological theory known as
"A Causal Theory of Knowing." For a treatment of the latter theory,
see Alvin I. Goldman, Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge,
eds. Michael D. Roth and Leon Galis (New York: Random House, Inc.,
1970). pp. 67-88.

11Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York:
Random House, 1971), p. 241.

 

 

73
and culpability attaches to man's rejection of knowledge rather than
his conscious desire for evil.

The proof for the position that the prophets Amos, Hosea,
Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah embraced the View that the highest good
for man resided in his acquiring a "knowledge of God" which would
enable him to live an ethical life and the further view that Yahweh
was to be identified with the Ethical itself, is only to be gained
from an examination of the writings of these prophets. This, however,
is the task of the following chapter. Theoretical justification for

the positing of a determinant theory of knowledge is to be gained

 

from an examination of the ethical views of both Plato and Aristotle.
For there exists a high degree of similarity between the position

here ascribed to the prophets concerning the nature and function of
man's "knowledge of God" and Plato's views concerning the role played
by knowledge in determining that man act in an ethical manner.
Aristotle's ethical views offer added support for the general position
here attributed to the prophets.

Plato is credited with the refinement of the position, the
origin of which has been attributed to Socrates, that it is impos—
sible for man to know the right and yet do the wrong. The cornerstone
of his ethical system, however, is contained in his view that all men
desire the good and that man's doing of evil is grounded in his
ignorance of that which truly constitutes the good. While it is true
that Plato's Ethics does not contain a specific theory of action
which clearly defines the relationship of knowledge to action, it is
his general view that the just man, ruled by reason and in possession

of knowledge of what constitutes the good, will act accordingly.

74
Which is to say that for Plato, reason is held sufficient to deter-
mine the just man's actions. Aristotle, while voicing general agree-
ment with the position.of Plato, reinforces the view that man's
knowledge of the good will determine his acting on the basis of that
knowledge.

Although the position has been stated above that the prophets
conceptualized Yahweh as an indwelling ethical principle which they
identified with the Ethical itself, it is the view of Abraham
Heschel that the prophets were not concerned with discovering that
which constituted Yahweh's essential nature:

Overwhelmingly, mysteriously different from man, God was not the
object of imagination. He could not be captured in a myth or
comprehended in a concept or a symbol. Challenging, involved,
and concerned, His presence pierced the impregnable walls of His
otherness. The dilemma was overcome by abstaining from any claim
to comprehend God's essence, His inmost being, or even to appre-
hend His inscrutable thoughts, unrelated to history, and by
insisting upon the ability to understand His presence, expression
or manifestation. The prophets experience what He utters, not
what He ig,

Ontologically, the distinction between being and expression
is rooted in the distinction between essence and relation. The
theme of prophetic understanding is not the mystery of God's
essence, but rather the mystery of His relation to man. The
prophet does not speculate about God in Himself; in thinking about
Him, the world is always present. His message does not seek to
disclose or to impart new truth concerning the divine Being.
What the prophet knows about God is His pathos, His relation to
Israel and to mankind. God can be understood by man only in
conjunction with the human situation.

In his remarks, Heschel has addressed himself to the issue briefly
dealt with at the end of the preceding chapter; namely, adjudicating

the appropriateness of man's attempt to discover the nature of God's

 

12Abraham Heschel, The Prophets, Vol. II (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 264—265.

 

 

75

essence. Clearly, Heschel has taken the position that the prophets
did not endeavor to discover what God is in Himself.

Stressing the prophetic concern for illuminating the nature
of the Man/God relationship, Heschel has apparently overlooked the
fact that the nature of that relationship may be rendered intelligible
only after the essential natures of both man and God have been endowed
with some common form; some common or shared basis upon which a re~
lationship may be seen to exist. The discovery of this common or
shared basis, as pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, must
first issue from man's self perception and recognition of his own
essential nature. Only after man has recognized that part of him-
self which truly constitutes his essential nature, only then may he
grapple with the problem of discovering how he is related to his God.
It is only within this context of man's heightened self awareness of
that which comprises his own essential nature that the prophetic
command--know the Lord--acquires its true significance. For this
"knowledge of God" was held by the prophets not only to determine
man's actions, but also was held to constitute his essential nature,
thereby securing the common basis upon the Man/God relationship could

be firmly founded.

Plato's and Aristotle's Ethics

 

Any system of Ethics which is predicated upon a determinant
theory Of knowledge would hold the following proposition to be true:
If P knows X to be the right thing to do in situation Y, P's knowl-
edge will determine that P perform X. Though this proposition is not

present in the works of either Plato or Aristotle, certain Of their

76

ethical positions approach it to the degree of offering historical
and philosophical justification for the development of such an
epistemological theory to account for the epistemological views
present in the writings of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah.
Plato's views concerning man's attempt to live an ethical life
are best summed up in his claim that it is impossible for a man to
know the right and yet do the wrong. This claim represents, for
Plato, a conclusion which is derived from a number of his thoughts

concerning the nature of man and the relationship which exists be-

 

tween knowledge and right action. Plato holds, as fundamental, the
position that man, as man, has a unique function. Man's unique
function is seen to reside in his living a life which will lead to
his gaining happiness. Just as man has a unique function, so, too,
does he possess the peculiarly human virtue--justice--which enables
him to fulfill his function well. Plato is firm in his conviction
that all men desire the good and that man's evil is due to his
ignorance of what truly constitutes the good. By combining these
aspects of Plato's thought, the position emerges, to wit: If a man
is living a just life which is determined through his use of reason
and is cognizant of that which constitutes the good, he will act
accordingly. This position should become clearer after Plato's
thoughts have been examined more closely.

In Book I (352e-353e) of his Republic, Plato poses.the
question that if horses, eyes, and pruning knives may each be said to
have a proper work or function, is it not also the case that man, as

man, must not also be said to have a proper work or function? And

77

if it may be agreed that man, as man, has a proper work or function,
does he not also possess a unique virtue which enables him to per-
form his function well? Francis MacDonald Cornford has Offered the
following observation concerning Plato's answer to these questions:
The argument (found in the Republic, Book I, pp. 352e-353e)
turns on the doctrine (adopted as fundamental in Aristotle's
Ethics) that man, like any other living species, has a peculiar
work or function or activity, in the satisfactory exercise of
which his well-being or happiness will consist; and also a
peculiar excellence or virtue, namely a state of his soul from
which that satisfactory activity will result.
If Cornford's remarks were applied to the works of the prophets,
clearly the prophets' exhortations for man to do that which is
ethical would seem to support the view that the ancient Hebrews were
deemed, by these prOphets, to have a peculiar work or function. Also
the point may be made that the ancient Hebrews' successful performr
ance of their ethical activities depended directly on the state of
their souls. This is to say that when the "soul" of the ancient
Hebrew was illuminated with "knowledge of God," then, and only then,
could he perform his function in a satisfactory manner.

It is undoubtedly the case that the product derived from man's
satisfactory performance of his work or function is held to be the
same for both Plato and the prophets; namely, man's securing his
"well-being or happiness." While the prophets would identify man's

specific "excellence" with "knowledge of God," Plato claims that it

is justice:

 

13Francis MacDonald Cornford, The Republic of Plato (London:
Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 36.

 

 

78

Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you
couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for
example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like? Is there
anything else than the soul to which you could rightly assign
these and say that they were its peculiar work?

Nothing else.

And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of
the soul?

Most certainly, he said.

And do we not also say that there is an excellence or virtue
of the soul?

We do.

Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived
of its own virtue, or is this impossible?

It is impossible.

Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things
badly while the good soul will in all things do well.

Of necessity.

And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul
is justice and its defect injustice?

Yes, we did.

The just soul and the just man then will live well and the
unjust ill?

So it appears, he said, by your reasoning.

But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and
he who does not the contrary.

Of course.

Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.14

Clearly, Plato's conception of justice transcends the common view in

which justice is understood in terms of interpersonal relationships.

 

1['Plato, Op. cit., p. 604.

 

79
When describing a just individual, Plato utilizes his tri-partite
conception of the soul. Plato divided the soul into three parts:
the rational part, the spirited part, and the appetitative part.
Plato understands the just man to possess a soul in which each of
the three parts is performing its own function:

Then it applies to justice: we shall conclude that a man
is just in the same way that a state was just. And we have
surely not forgotten that justice in the state meant that
each of the three orders in it was doing its own proper work.
So we may henceforth bear in mind that each one of us likewise
will be a just person, fulfilling his proper function, only if
the several parts of our nature fulfill theirs.

Certainly,

And it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom
and forethought on behalf of the entire soul.1

The just man, then, for Plato, is one in whom the three parts of his
soul are performing their proper functions. The soul of the just
man is one in which reason is held dominant.
Earlier in his Republic (Book I, 350d), Plato identifies

justice with wisdom and injustice with ignorance:

But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue

and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, Good, said I,

let this be taken as established.16
In identifying justice with wisdom and vice with ignorance, Plato
broaches the issue concerning the relationship which exists between
knowledge and action. Clearly Plato's conclusion sets the stage for
asking the question--Is it possible that a man knowing X to be an

evil, nonetheless desires X? In his dialogue, the Meno, Plato offers

the following answer to this question:

 

ISCOrnford, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

16Plato, op. cit., p. 600.

80

Socrates: Then do you think some men desire evil and others
good? Doesn't everyone, in your opinion, desire good things?

Meno: NO.

Socrates: And would you say that the others suppose evils to
be good, or do they still desire them although they recognize
them as evil?

Meno: Both, I should say.

Socrates: What? Do you really think that anyone who recog-
nizes evils for what they are, nevertheless desires them?

Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Desires in what way? To possess them?
Meno: Of course.

Socrates: In the belief that evil things bring advantage to
their possessor, or harm?

Meno: Some in the first belief, but some also in the
second.

Socrates: And do you believe that those who suppose evil
things bring advantage understand that they are evil?

Meno: NO, that I cannot really believe.

Socrates: Isn't it clear then that this class, who don't
recognize evils for what they are, don't desire evil but what
they think is good, though in fact it is evil; those who through
ignorance mistake bad things for good obviously desire the good?

Meno: For them I suppose that is true.

Socrates: Now as for those whom you speak of as desiring
evils in the belief that they do harm to their possessor, these
presumably know that they will be injured by them?

Meno: They must.

Socrates: And don't they believe that whoever is injured
is, insofar as he is injured, unhappy?

Meno: That too they must believe.
Socrates: And unfortunate?

Meno: Yes

81

Socrates: Well, does anybody want to be unhappy and
unfortunate?

Meno: I suppose not.
Socrates: Then if not, nobody desires what is evil, for
what else is unhappiness but desiring evil things and getting

them?

Meno: It looks as if you are right, Socrates, and nobody
desires what is evil.

Plato's position thus far examined, illustrates the view that when
man possesses knowledge of the good, he will desire it and it is only
due to ignorance that man chooses evil. However, Plato has yet to
make clear that action is the direct result of man's possession of
this knowledge of the good.

Plato expands his view concerning the relationship of

knowledge to action in his work the Protagoras:

 

What is your attitude to knowledge? Do you share the common
View about that also? Most people think, in general terms,
that it is nothing strong, no leading or ruling element. They
don't see it like that. They hold that it is not the knowledge
that a man possesses which governs him, but something else~~
now passion, now pleasure, now pain, sometimes love, and
frequently fear. They just think of knowledge as a slave,
pushed around by all other affections. Is this your view, too,
or would you rather say that knowledge is a fine thing quite
capable of ruling a man, and that if he can distinguish good from
evil, nothing will force him to act otherwise than as knowledge
dictates, since wisdom is all the reinforcement he needs?

Not only is this my view, replied Protagoras, but I above
all men should think it shame to speak of wisdom and knowledge

as anything but the most powerful elements in human life.

Well and truly answered8 said I. But I expect you know that
most men don't believe us.

In this passage Plato declares that knowledge of the good is all a man

needs in order to do the good. Indeed the just man who is ruled by

 

17Ibid., pp. 360-361.

131b1d., p. 344.

82

I H

reason and who 'can distinguish good from evil" will act as

knowledge dictates.’ The question may now be raised--If a man is

performing his unique function, guided through the use of reason, is
it possible that he may err and choose evil in the place of good?
The following line of reasoning, expressed by Thrasymachus in the
Republic, may suggest Plato's response to this question:

Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is
mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake
or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he
goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we
say literally--we say that the physician erred, and the cal-
culator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is,
that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle
him never errs, so that, speaking precisely, since you are
such a stickler for precision, no craftsman errs. For it is
when his knowledge abandons him thffi he who goes wrong goes
wrong-dwhen he is not a craftsman.

Just then, as Plato has Thrasymachus assert that the craftsman errs
"only when his knowledge abandons him" and that when his special
knowledge abandons him that he is not really a craftsman, so too is
man something less than man when bereft of that special knowledge
which enables him to perform his function well.

Aristotle's reaction to Plato's line of reasoning concerning
the relationship of knowledge to action at first appears to be
negative:

How can a man fail in self-restraint when believing correctly
that what he does is wrong? Some people say that he cannot do so
when he knows the act to be wrong; since, as Socrates held, it
would be strange if, when a man possessed knowledge, some other
thing should overpower it, and "drag it about like a slave." In
fact Socrates used to combat the view (that a man may know the

right and do the wrong) altogether, implying that there is no
such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts contrary

 

'9Ibid., p. 590.

83

to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only
through ignorance. Now this theory is manifestly at variance
with plain facts.

However, after a discussion of the various senses in which the word

”know" is used21 and the various ways in which a man may be said to

have knowledge,22 Aristotle states that the cause of Unrestraint may

be studied "scientifically":

and

Again, one may study the cause of Unrestraint scientifi-
cally, thus: In a practical syllogism, the major premise is an
Opinion, while the minor premise deals with particular things,
which are the province of perception. Now when the two premises
are combined, just as in theoretic reasoning the mind is com-
pelled to affirm the resulting conclusion, so in the case of
practical premises you are forced at once to do it.2

further,

But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action,
is an Opinion as to some object of sense, and it is this opinion
which the unrestrained man when under the influence of passion
either does not possess, or only possesses in a way which as we
saw does not amount to knowing it but only makes him repeat it as
the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles, and since the
ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an Ob-
ject of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term
is, we do seem to be led to the conclusion which Socrates sought
to establish. For the knowledge which is present when failure of
self-restraint occurs is not held to be knowledge in the true
sense, nor is it true knowledge which is dragged about by passion,
but knowledge derived from sense-perception.

Clearly, Aristotle's views support those of Plato concerning the nature

of the relationship of knowledge to action. Exactly what constitutes,

 

20Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge:

 

Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 379.

211bid., p. 387.
221bid., p. 389.
231bid., p. 391.

241818., p. 393.

84
for Aristotle, an Object of "scientific knowledge," however, is made
clear when he states:

We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically
cannot vary; when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of
our Observation, we do not know whether it exists or not. An
object of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity.
It is therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute
necessity is eternal’ and what is eternal does not come into
existence or perish)5

Although Aristotle did not wish to identify his Objects of
"Scientific Knowledge" with Plato's Forms, there is a striking

resemblance between the two. And though Plato initially speaks of

the "Human Good" as "the most important object of knowledge,"26

later in the Republic Cornford Observes:

He held that man's happiness consists in the full realiza-
tion of his characteristic virtue and function, and that his
virtue, as a rational being, is a clear insight into the true
end Of life, ”knowledge of the Good." Such knowledge, once
attained, cannot fail to determine will and action. 7

and concerning the nature of the "Good" Cornford continues:

In Greek "the Good" is normally synonymous with "Goodness
itself." This is the supreme Form or Essence manifested not
only in the special kinds of moral goodness, Justice, Courage,
etc., but throughout all Nature and especially in the beautiv
ful and harmonious order of the heavenly bodies. The knowledge
of the Good, on which well-being depends, is now to include an
understanding of the moral and physical order of the whole
universe.

Plato firmly refused to offer a definition of the "Good" but

maintained that it was known through direct apprehension.29 Norman

 

251818.

26Cornford, Op. cit., p. 211.

27Ibid., p. 212.

28Ibid.

29:818.

 

85
Gottwald, cognizant of the similarity existing between the thought of
Plato and that of Hosea has maintained:
SO far Hosea stands close in his insight to the view of

Plato that to know the right is to do the right, for knowledge
of the good has an intrinsically attractive and self—
authenticating quality. Political chaos, social disintegration,
moral laxity, and religious defection—-all these have at their
core the failure to see the nature of reality. Not to know God
is not to know one's own welfare.30

Gottwald's assertion, to wit: "Not to know God is not to know one's

own welfare,"

may be viewed as the cornerstone of the religious
thought of the prophets Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah.

As noted above, only an examination of the writings of these prophets
will divulge the exact nature of their views concerning the nature of
the relationship which exists between man's "knowledge of God" and his
subsequent actions. Nonetheless, it should be clear that the views of
both Plato and Aristotle lay a philosophical foundation for utilizing
a determinant theory of knowledge to account for and help explain the
views of these prophets.

It is hoped that the above remarks may serve as a sufficient
propaedeutic for the task which remains; namely, the explication of
the concept, knowledge of Yahweh, through which the two hypotheses
stated above should garner their support. The method to be employed
involves examining the concept as it is found in the relevant passages
located in the works of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah. To

restate simply, these hypotheses maintain that: (1) from the prophe-

tic point of view, man's unique and peculiar function resides in his

 

 

30Norman K. Gottwald, A Light to the Nations (New York:
Harper and Row, 1959): P. 303.

86

acquiring a knowledge of Yahweh; and (2) that knowledge of Yahweh is
identified with knowledge of the Ethical. The conclusion to be drawn
from these hypotheses is that what causes man most truly to be man,
or comprises his essential nature, is his acquisition of knowledge of
Yahweh; i.e., the Ethical, combined with his display of that knowl-
edge. The further conclusion is that Yahweh's essential nature is
comprised wholly of the Ethical. In sum, the essential nature of

man is identical to that of Yahweh. This is a conclusion which, if

supported by the evidence, qualifies the Judaism of the eighth through

 

the sixth centuries B.C., at least as put forth by the prophets Amos,
Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah, to be considered truly mono—

theistic.

Chapter 4

THE MAN/GOD RELATIONSHIP

Within the combined works of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and
Deutero-Isaiah there are thirty-one passages which deal with the
prophetic position that man's acquisition and display of knowledge

of Yahweh constitutes his summum bonum. Of these thirty-one

 

passages, sixteen deal with the subject explictly, whereas the

 

remaining fifteen handle the topic in a more circumspect manner. NO
less than one half of these passages are located in the writings of

Jeremiah. The remaining sixteen passages are scattered through the

combined writings of Amos, Hosea and Deutero—Isaiah.

If an evolutionary view were to be posited concerning the
development of this concept, it would run roughly as follows. The
concept of acquiring knowledge of Yahweh, or the Ethical, is initially
developed quite tentatively in the book of Amos, where only two of the
thirty-one passages are found. However, the concept seems well
grounded in the work of Hosea, where one-third of the passages are
found. Hosea first clearly states that the doing of right, or the
right thing, is dependent absolutely, upon the prior procurement of
knowledge. It is not only the presence of fifteen passages in the
book of Jeremiah that leads to the undeniable conclusion that it is
with this prophet that the concept attains fulfillment. For it is in

the work Of Jeremiah that the essential nature of Yahweh is laid bare

87

88

through Jeremiah's identification of it, unequivocally, with the
Ethical. And further, man's essential nature is shown to be com-
prised totally-Of the Ethical and his proper function, to reside in
the doing of ethical activities. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the
treatment of the concept in the writings of Deutero-Isaiah, where
four of the passages are found, is at best cursory. Deutero-Isaiah
directs the majority of his energy to securing the aloneness of
Yahweh, a concept which lacks not only the subtlety of knowledge of

Yahweh, but also contains ramifications which are difficult to apply

 

not only to man, but to Yahweh himself. That is to say, that once k
Deutero-Isaiah has succeeded in localizing the totality of the divine I
in one being, beyond having secured a single Object of worship, it
is difficult to see what he has achieved. Indeed, if Deutero-Isaiah
55:8-9 is seen as the culmination of his efforts, what he has truly
wrought is the complete and utter separation of the Hebrew from his
God, a conclusion of at least questionable value. Given, however,
that there are vestigial elements of the concept knowledge of Yahweh
present in his writings, his work will be examined in the present
analysis of that concept.
What follows is not an in depth analysis of each of the four
prophets, dealing to any great extent with their personal circumr
stances or the unique situations within which they found themselves.
Neither will the vast bulk of their writings be analyzed in an
attempt to present their combined works as a systematized, unified
whole. Rather the thread of the concept knowledge of Yahweh and its
relation to knowledge of the Ethical is to be traced through each of

the four prophets. Consequently, where passages have been lifted

89
from their context, this has been done with neither a lack of
appreciation of the importance of context nor with an unawareness of
the pitfalls inherent in such a process, but rather with the convic-
tion that such a line of thought is present in the combined writings
of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah, and deserves to be
studied in its own right. While the specific claim is not being
advanced here that the passages taken from the combined works of
these prophets, constitute a conscious effort on the part of these
prophets to develop, systematize and promulgate a coherent, unified

philosophical doctrine, this fact, nonetheless, does not detract from

 

the position that such a doctrine is present. And while it is un-
doubtedly true that virtually all philosophical and historical
reconstructions impose a certain artificial order on ideas and events
that may well find their provenance in quite disparate surroundings,
the works of the Hebrew prophets, taken collectively, may generally
suffer less from this condition in that their aim, by and large, was
common and shared; viz., to bring to the ancient Hebrew a greater

awareness of his relation to his God.

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SOURCES

There remains but one task to which we must turn our efforts
before proceeding to the analysis of the thoughts of the prophets.
This task deals with determining the authenticity of those passages
which have been lifted from the writings of the prophets to develop
the general prophetic position concerning the nature of the Man/God

relationship. For if it is shown that these passages do not derive

90
from and consequently do not embody the views of whichever prophet
is being considered, clearly, the validity of the entire argument,
which is developed in the following section, will become, at the
very least, Open to question.

On the other hand, where it is clearly demonstrated that a
given passage must be ascribed to an author other than the prophet
in whose writings the passage is found, it is difficult to imagine
that a later redactor would feel completely free to either change or I
add to a particular body of prophetic thought any material which may I

be seen to be antithetical either in content or form to the general

 

views of that prophet. Also, the point must be stressed that the
determination of the authenticity of these passages is founded upon
the conclusions of Old Testament scholars rather than upon sources
which could supply a completely definitive answer to the question of
whether or not this or that statement sprung directly from this or
that prophet.

This Observation is not meant to detract in any way from the
scholarly efforts of those Old Testament researchers who have
grappled with this extremely difficult problem. Rather it is intended
to draw attention to the fact that the verasity of the conclusions
arrived at by those Old Testament scholars must be viewed as state-
ments expressing relative probability rather than absolute certainty.

Further, it should be noted, that any attempt to determine the
authenticity of the entire text of each of the prophets Amos, Hosea,
Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah, is not undertaken in that which follows.
A determination of the authenticity of only those passages which have

been employed to develop the argument found in the following section

91
is being sought. These passages are: Amos 3:2, 3:10; Hosea 2:8,
2:19-20, 4:12, 4:4-6, 4:11—12, 5:3-4, 6:6, 8:2-3, 13:4, 14:9;
Jeremiah 2:8, 3:15, 4:22, 5:4-5, 7:9~10, 8:7-9, 9:6, 9:23-24, 10:23,
10:25, 13:23-25, 16:21, 19:4-6, 22:15-16, 31:31-34; Deutero—Isaiah
44:19, 44:21-22, 45:4—6, 51:7.

Only two passages have been taken from the book of Amos

and determining their authenticity represents a relatively simple
task. James Luther Mays has stated:

The book of Amos is composed primarily of material of three
distinct types: (1) sayings spoken by a prophet in carrying out
his commission; (2) first-person narratives told by the prophet;
(3) a third-person narrative about the prophet. In the present
form of the book these major types of material are distributed
in this fashion. True to its title, "The words of Amos" (1.1),
the book begins with a large block of sayings (1.3-6.14). Then
comes a section composed of four vision reports in first-person
style (7.1-3, 4-6, 7-9; 8.1-3) with the only third-person
narrative about Amos set between the third and fourth vision
reports (7.10-17). The sayings resume in 8.4-14, then comes a
fifth first-person vision report (9.1-6), and a final sequence
of sayings closes the book (9.7-15). The three major types of
material do not quite exhaust the book; there are a few bits of
material scattered through the book which belong to other
categories: the title (1.1), sections of hymnic poetry (1.2;
4.13; 5.8f; 9.5f; 8.8?), an Observation of the kind character-
istic of wisdom (5.13).

The larger part of the material can be attributed with con—
fidence to Amos. Most of the sayings and the five autobiograph—
ical narratives fit appropriately into a choherent picture of his
prophetic activity in Israel just before the turn Of the eighth
century.

In a similar vein Erling Hammershaimb has commented concerning the
general integrity of the book of Amos: "The text is one of the best

preserved among the prophetic books, and in only very few passages are

there good reasons to assume a textual corruption."2

 

1James Luther Mays, Amos (Philadelphia: The Westminister
Press, 1969), p. 12.

2
Erling Hammershaimb, The Book of Amos (New York: Schocken
Books, Inc., 1970), p. 15.

 

92

Verses 3:2 and 3:10, however, have not been cited by Hammershaimb as

3

having suffered from this "textual corruption." Also, Otto Eissfeldt

has failed to include these two passages in that group of passages
generally held to be "secondary additions."4 Consequently, it may be

assumed that these two passages truly express the thoughts of Amos.

5 6

It is the position of both Eissfeldt and Mays that there

are very few passages present in the book of Hosea which are to be
considered secondary additions. None of the ten passages, which are

utilized in the following section, have been identified as belonging

to that group of material which "did not originate with Hosea."7

Fifteen passages have been taken from the book of Jeremiah
and the findings of Old Testament scholars attest to the fact that
only three of these passages did not issue directly from Jeremiah.
These passages are Jer. 7:9-10, 19:4-6, and 31:31-34. Concerning the
authenticity of Jet. 7:9-10, Gerhard von Rad has Observed:

A relatively large strand of the Jeremiah tradition bears
the marks of the influence of Deuteronomy and the Deuterono—
mists; i.e., it is dependent on the Deuteronomistic terminology
and is in prose. For prophetic diction, the latter suggests in
principle secondary redaction. The passages in question are
(according to Rudolph, H.A.T., p. xvi) the following passages:
Jer. VII.VIII.3, XI.1-14, XVI.1-13, XVII.l9-27 XVIII.l-12,
XXI.1-10, XXII.1-5, XV.1-14, XXXIV.8-22, XXXV.8

 

31bid.

4Otto Eissfeldt, The Old Testament (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1965): P. 400.

 

51bid., pp. 387-391.

6James Luther Mays, Hosea (Philadelphia: The Westminister
Press, 1969), p. 16.

7Ibid.

8Gerhard von Rad, Old Testamenthheology, Vol. II (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 193.

 

 

93
Otto Eissfeldt has expressed a similar view concerning the authenti—
city Of Jer. 7:9-10:
We may reckon with it (the original scroll of Jeremiah)
as a clearly demonstrated entity which at least in very large
measure actually goes back to Jeremiah himself. Its genuine—
ness is suspect particularly in the prohibition of the dese-
cration of the sabbath in xvii, 19-27, and in various parts of
the Temple sermon in vii, I-viii, 3.9
Jer. 7:9-10 expresses the View that idolatry is primarily an
impediment to man's acquiring a "knowledge of Yahweh." It is the ”p

first of three passages utilized to reconstruct Jeremiah's per—

ceptions dealing with idolatry. Although its authenticity is suspect,

 

it has been retained in the general argument on the grounds that it b
is not at all improbable that it truly expresses Jeremiah's position
concerning the detrimental effects idolatry has on preventing the
people of Israel from correctly perceiving how they are related to
their God.
Jer. 19:4-6, like Jer. 7:9-10, is utilized in the argument
found in the following section to develop further Jeremiah's stand on
the problem of idolatry. Concerning the authenticity of Jet. 19:4-6,
von Rad asserts "Vss. 2b-9 and 12-13 can be seen to be later addi—
tions."10
The intent of Jer. 19:4-6 is to threaten the Israelites, for
their practice of idolatry, with the wrath of Yahweh. Like Jer. 7:9-

10, the retention of Jer. 19:4-6 is not held to be absolutely criti-

cal to preserve the integrity of the argument found in the following

 

9Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 353.

10von Rad, op. cit., p. 198.

94

section. Nonetheless, it has been retained in the body of that
argument for the same reasons given for the retention of Jer. 7:9-10.

The dispute concerning the authenticity of the material found
in Jer. 31:31-34 is held to constitute a somewhat more serious matter.
For it is held to be precisely in this passage that Jeremiah es-
pouses the view that man's "knowledge of God" is to be placed
directly into man by God himself, consequently bringing to fruition
man's essential nature and determining absolutely the very nature of
the Man/God relationship.

Concerning the authenticity of the material found in Jer.

31:31-34, von Rad has contended:

Furthermore, even Jer. XXXI.31ff. can hardly be the form of
the oracle as it was originally spoken by Jeremiah, for he, like
the other prophets, usually gave his oracles a verse form.

Jer. XXXI.31ff. is, however, prose, though there are one or two
places where the outlines of an original verse form can still be
recognized. The best explanation is therefore that Jeremiah
spoke of the new covenant on two different occasions (Jer.
XXXI.34-4 and Jer. XXXII.37-41), both times in a different way,
and that each of the passages as we now have them has been sub-
sequently worked over.11
He goes on to note that S. Herrmann denies that even the content Of
Jer. 31:31-34 may be attributed to Jeremiah.12
Otto Eissfeldt, however, has maintained the following con-
cerning the "content" of Jer. 31:31-34:

Jeremiah's authorship has also not been unquestioned for the
beautiful saying concerning the new covenant in xxxi, 31-4, a
saying which nevertheless has its own intrinsic value. As far
as content is concerned, it certainly could be put into the mouth

of Jeremiah. The narrative of xxxii makes it quite certain that
in a cheerless contemporary situation, which apparently left no

 

111bid., p. 214.

121818., p. 215.

 

95

room for hope, he believed in a new age of salvation and also

proclaimed it. It also corresponds entirely to the rest of his

message that the most precious value of this time of salvation

wouldee a personal communion between the individual man and his

God.
Aside from the question of "content" Eissfeldt concedes that Jeremiah
was not responsible for the "present form" of this passage.14 Con-
sequently, Jer. 31:31-34 has been retained in the argument which
follows, not simply because it is viewed as a critical element in that
argument, but because there are sufficient grounds for believing that
its "content" truly expresses Jeremiah's views concerning the new
covenant God is to make with man.

Of the four passages taken from the writings of Deutero-

Isaiah, Claus Westermann is of the opinion that only Is. 45:4—6 is to
be attributed to that prophet.15 Is. 44:19 is considered by Wester-
mann to be a "homogeneous addition" by which he means that it was

"inspired by Deutero-Isaiah."16 Both Is. 44:21, 22b and Is. 51:1-8,

it is claimed by Westermann, are additions to the original text and

"17

"very reminiscent of Trito-Isaiah.

are
Concerning the general integrity of the text of Deutero-
Isaiah, Eissfeldt has asserted:

The sections, however, which many scholars assign to someone
other than the main compiler of XI-IV, i.e. Deutero-Isaiah, are

 

13Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 362.

lalbid.

15Claus Westermann, Isaiah 40-66 (Philadelphia: The
Westminister Press, 1969), p. 29.

16Ibid.

 

17Ibid., p. 30.

96
primarily the "Ebed-Yahweh songs," and in addition smaller or
larger passages outside these songs which are regarded as
additions made by the collector of Deutero-Isaiah's sayings,
namely one of his disciples, perhaps identical with Trito-
Isaiah.l

And in relating the conclusions of one Old Testament scholar concern-
ing which parts of Deutero-Isaiah are non-genuine, Eissfeldt has
noted:

On the other hand, Elliger sees in Trito-Isaiah, the
disciple of Deutero-Isaiah, the collector of his master's
sayings. The latter had only to a small extent put together
as larger units his speeches, sayings and songs, so that the
disciple had almost everywhere a free hand in their arranging.
In this he was guided by principles Of content, and, conscious
that he was working entirely in the spirit of his master, felt
himself justified too in working over what had been left to him
and in completing it, and did this not only in respect of the
"Ebed-songs." According to Elliger, xlii, 19-23; xlv, 9-10;
xlvi, 12-13; xlvii; xlviii, 8b-10, 16b-19; xlix, 22-6; 1, 1-3;
li, 4-5 10b, 12-14; lii, 3; liv-lv come from the pen of Trito—
Isaiah.19

 

Clearly, none of the three passages identified by Westermann as
secondary additions is present in the list Offered by Elliger.
Eissfeldt concludes that although it is perhaps more likely the case
that the "form" of the writings of Deutero-Isaiah is due to the efforts
of a later compiler,20 it is by far and away the overwhelming con-
sensus of opinion of Old Testament scholars that the "main body of
xl-lv" is to be ascribed to a single prophet, namely Deutero-Isaiah.21
However, as noted above and in Chapter 3, the contribution of

Deutero-Isaiah to the further development of Hebraic monotheism,

 

18Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 333.
191bid., pp. 336-337.
201bid., p. 338.

211bid., p. 332.

97
understood as having arisen in response to the efforts of the
prophets to identify the essential nature of man with that of Yahweh,
is, at best, meagre. And regardless of whether the four passages
taken from the writings of Deutero-Isaiah actually reflect his own
views or those of a disciple, they, nonetheless, clearly attest to
the fact that the line of reasoning formulated by Amos, Hosea, and

Jeremiah had been all but abandoned by the year 539 B.C.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPHETIC MONOTHEISM

Agog
As pointed out above, there are only two passages in the
writings of Amos which deal with the concept "knowledge of Yahweh."
And while it may be contended that such a paucity of evidence could
hardly hope to substantiate the two hypotheses advanced in Chapter 3,
it is, nonetheless, precisely here, in the book of Amos, that the
concept "knowledge of Yahweh" is identified with knowledge of the
Ethical, and further, that man's proper function is, though incipiently,
identified with the pursuit of ethical activities. As meagre as the
initial evidence may be deemed, it is held here to be sufficient to
lay the foundation for the position that the essential nature of
Yahweh is perceived as being comprised wholly of the Ethical, as is
the essential nature of man.
Amos states the rationale upon which his mission is founded
when he claims that Yahweh said:
You only have I known
of all the families of the earth:
therefore I will punish you

for all your iniquities.
(3:2)

 

T»!

98

The intent of this assertion goes well beyond the justification of acts
of reprisal against the Israelites by Yahweh, due to the presence of a
special relationship he has with them. That Yahweh freely punishes
all peoples for their sins, irrespective of any special relationship,
is readily apparent from the statements of Amos 1:1-15; 2:1-5. The
universal nature of this punishment gives rise to an interesting
question, to wit--On what grounds does Yahweh punish peoples whom he
has not specifically known, and who, it may be inferred, have not
known him? For it would, at least in part, seem to be the thrust of
Amos 3:2 that a certain reciprocity of knowledge is being posited by
which Yahweh has known the Israelites, and they have known him. And
if the justification for Yahweh's punishment of the Israelites springs
from the fact that they have known him and are, consequently, expected
also to know and do what is right, as a function of this unique knowl-
edge, what then constitutes the basis for the punishment of non—
Israelites, who have not had the advantage of any such special knowl—
edge?

If the justification of this punishment is predicated upon the
position that the sins, catalogued in Amos 1:1-15; 2:1-5, are sins
against Yahweh, it must be in some secondary sense that this is so,
for the immediate object of their iniquitous acts are the sinners'
fellow man. And given that these sinners act out of an ignorance of
Yahweh, what special sort of knowledge are they presumed to have
which would enable them to act Otherwise?

It would seem that Amos is developing an idea Of a special
type of knowledge of the Ethical, itself, which although it is

apparently facilitated by a direct knowledge of Yahweh, is, nonetheless,

 

99
sufficiently universal in nature, as to hold all men responsible for
their acts. And the true intent of Amos 3:2 may well be to express
a certain dismay, on the part of Yahweh, with a people to whom this
tacit notion of the Ethical had been made, more or less, explicitly,
and yet who continue to sin.

If, indeed, this is the case, then the position may be
advanced that Amos was the first of the Hebrew prophets to attempt to
universalize the uniquely Hebraic conception of Yahweh, by identify-
ing it with an impersonal, yet universal conception of the Ethical

itself, which all men are expected to be conversant with. However,

 

this attempt at universalizing the concept of Yahweh, must not be
viewed primarily as an attempt to proselytize Israel's neighbors, but
rather as an attempt to expand and refine the Israelite's own con-
ception of their God. It would seem, then, to be the aim of Amos
1:1-15; 2:1-5, to explain to the Israelite that Yahweh is already a
universal, if tacit, concept, but that the intelligibility of that
concept lies in the identification of the nationalistic, Hebraic
concept with the Ethical itself. Generally considered, then, Amos'
task lay in lifting, to a higher ethical plane, this uniquely Hebraic
conception of Yahweh, by identifying him with the Ethical itself, so
that man's proper function generally, and the Israelites' specifi—
cally, attained completion through the acquisition, and consequent
display of "knowledge of Yahweh," for the latter, and the Ethical
itself, for the former.

While it would be going too far to maintain that Amos had
personally rejected the view of Yahweh as uniquely concerned with

the Hebrews specifically, there is a perceptible move, on his part,

100
to extend the sphere of Yahweh's domain through his identification
with the Ethical itself. This move may be most readily apparent
from his assertion:
"They do not know how to do
right," says the Lord,
"those who store up violence and
robbery in their stronghold."
(3:10)
As noted above, there is at least the implicit notion, present in the
position of Amos, that Yahweh's knowledge of the Israelites entailed
their possessing a knowledge of him. With Amos' assertion that
"they do not know how to do right . . . those who store up violence

' comes a reformulation of the view

and robbery in their strongholds,‘
that the knowledge of "how to do right" is equivalent to knowledge of
Yahweh. This is to say that whereas the dictum, DO right, speaks

to the display of ethical behavior, the special knowledge of the
Israelites is a knowledge of Yahweh; and yet it must be through this
knowledge that an objective and universal standard of ethical behavior
emerges. Further support for this contention may be furnished by

Amos 3:9, where it is pointed out that Israel's neighbors are

summoned to witness the corruption present among those who, supposedly,
know Yahweh. For without making an appeal to an apparent Ethical
itself, such a witnessing would be meaningless.

It is, most probably, the further intent of this passage to
begin the development of the position that man's proper function
resides in doing that which is right. For it is upon this basis, as
is pointed out in Amos 3:11, that man's ultimate well being is predi-
cated. That is to say that through the fulfillment of his proper

function, viz. doing that which is right, man secures his well being,

101

while the perverting of that proper function, causes him to reap
disaster.

The criticism that too much has been made of too little is,
at this point in the analysis, somewhat justified. However, I believe
that Amos anticipates a view, developed more fully by the later
prophets, in such a manner that virtually each of the conclusions
to be drawn from an analysis of the work of these later prophets

is, at least, hinted at in his writings. E

Hosea

 

In forming the general historical context within which the
message of Hosea is delivered to the people of Israel, one may view it,
on the one hand, as the logical result of the earlier prophesies of
Amos. This is to say that Yahweh has punished the people of Israel
for their "iniquities." On the other hand, one may see it as
representing suitable conditions for Hosea to extend and refine the
position put forth by the earlier prophet. It is to this task that
Hosea directs his efforts.

Hosea's efforts to develop further the position espoused by
Amos is accompanied by a few shifts in emphasis. The most obvious
shift of emphasis present in the writings of Hosea is his apparent
abandonment of the universal theme developed by Amos. Whereas idol-
atry did not cause much concern to Amos, it is dealt with extensively
by Hosea. However, the topic of idolatry, as dealt with by Hosea,
must be approached with the utmost caution, for his intent, as per-
ceived here, transcends the mere chastisement of a people who are

desperately searching for stability and tranquility in their lives.

102

It is the contention here that for Hosea, the so-called sin
of idolatry did not truly represent a sin of the Israelites committed
against Yahweh, for the question may be seriously asked--How may mere
man truly sin against his God?--but did represent an impediment in
man's acquiring an awareness of his unique relation to his God.
From Hosea's point of view, the continued practice of idolatry by the
people of Israel would insure their continued state of ignorance con-
cerning their unique relation to their God. And given that it was I
this initial state Of ignorance, and more specifically their ignor-

ance of how to do "right," which was the cause of the Israelites'

 

present plight, for Hosea to observe their seeking knowledge from
false ideas gave rise to his heart-felt sorrow, rather than his use
Of invective. It was the task of enlightening the people of Israel
concerning man's proper function and the intimate nature of the re—
lationship man shares with his God that Hosea set for himself.

Hosea begins his task by drawing the Israelites' attention to
the fact that while the goods, which had in times past accrued to them,
had issued from Yahweh, the people had apparently forgotten that.
This is clear from his Observation:

And she did not know
that it was I who gave her
the grain, the wine, and the oil
and who lavished upon her silver
and gold which they used for
Ba'al.
(2:8)

It would seem, from this passage, that Hosea is arguing for a con-
ception of Yahweh in which he is depicted as a divine being who was

directly reponsible for the actual procurement of the goods which the

people had previously enjoyed. Were this the case, it would do little

103

to advance the position, espoused by Amos, in which Yahweh is seen
primarily as an ethical ideal. There is the further possibility that
Hosea is maintaining that while the people are essentially correct in
assuming that some divine being is directly responsible for procuring
the goods they prize so highly, they have gone astray in placing the
locus of that function in Ba'al, rather than in Yahweh. And indeed
Hosea (2:9) would seem to support this view of Hosea's intent by
depicting a selfish Yahweh taking back the goods he had previously
given to the people.

However, such an interpretation of Hosea's intent, is quite
unacceptable. The position that Hosea attempts to win the people
back to Yahweh by imbuing him with predicates which they found
attractive in the gods of their neighbors, must also be rejected.
Just what constitutes Hosea's position is clear from his assertion:

And I will betroth you to me forever; I will betroth you

to me in righteousness, in steadfast love, and in mercy. And

I will betroth you to me in faithfulness; and you shall know

the Lord.

(2:19-20)
Hosea, in this passage, is reaffirming the position that Yahweh has
a special relationship with the people of Israel. And the intimate
nature of that relationship is expressed through his utilization of
the marriage motif. However, the "upshot" of that relationship is
that the people of Israel "shall know the Lord." It may be assumed
that it will be this knowledge of the Lord which will enable the
people to do that which is right. For Hosea continues:
Hear the word of the Lord, 0
people of Israel;

for the Lord has a controversy
with the inhabitants of the land.

104
There is no faithfulness or kindness
and no knowledge of God in the
land;
there is swearing, lying, killing,
stealing and committing
adultery;
they break all bounds and murder

follows murder.
(4:1—2)

From this passage it would seem that "swearing, lying, killing . . ."
etc., are manifestations of an ignorance, on the part of the people,
of Yahweh. Conversely, doing "right" is a manifestation of a knowl-
edge of Yahweh.
Hosea drives this point home when he asserts:
My people are destroyed for lack
of knowledge;
because you have rejected
knowledge,
I reject you from being a priest
to me.
(4:4—6)
This assertion makes quite clear the importance of knowledge for
man and that his survival is predicated upon his possession of it.
The emphatic manner in which Hosea makes this point leaves little
doubt that he believes that man's proper function lies in his acquir-
ing and possessing a certain type of knowledge. Having made this
point, Hosea is in a position to deal with idolatry as an impediment
to the people's acquisition of the particular type of knowledge he has
in mind, namely, Of how to do right.
Rather than launching into a tirade dealing with the idola-

trous hearts of the Israelites, he seeks to illustrate to them the

absurdity involved in seeking knowledge from dead idols, as is evident

when he states:

 

105
Wine and new wine
take away the understanding,
My people inquire of a thing of
wood,
and their staff gives them
oracles.
(4:11-12)
Just, then, as alcohol may rob a man of his understanding, so too
does idolatry lead astray a man seeking knowledge about how best to
prosper. And just as it would be foolish to seek knowledge from a
man intoxicated with wine, it would be equally foolish to seek
knowledge from a stick. Yet the point must be stressed that Hosea

is advocating the seeking of knowledge not from Yahweh, but rather,

 

of Yahweh.

Continuing his argument that knowledge is made manifest
through action, Hosea develops the view that the actions associated
with idolatry are antithetical and counter—productive to acquiring
knowledge of Yahweh, as is clear from his statement:

I know Ephraim,
and Israel is not hid from me;
for now, 0 Ephraim, you have
played the harlot,
Israel is defiled.
Their deeds do not permit them
to return to their God.
For the spirit of harlotry is within
them,
and they know not the Lord.
(5:3—4)
By drawing particular attention to the fact that it is because of
their deeds that Israel is not allowed "to return to their God," and
by maintaining that their deeds were predicated upon an ignorance,
on the part of the people, of Yahweh, Hosea is basing the doing of
that which is right on the possessing of knowledge Yahweh. This is

to say that knowledge of Yahweh and knowledge of the ethical are, for

106

Hosea, highly related concepts. In an attempt to clarify this re—
lation of knowledge of Yahweh with knowledge of the ethical, the
question may be asked: What activity or activities should a man
pursue in order to acquire the ability to act in an ethical manner?
Hosea supplies the following answer to this question:
For I desire steadfast love and
not sacrifice,
the knowledge of God, rather
than burnt offerings.
(6:6)
While it is assuredly not the intention of Hosea to derogate the
value of the temple cultus, what he is intending to make clear is
that man has a peculiar function, which he identifies as man's
acquisition, of a "knowledge of Yahweh." Yahweh is understood or
characterized not as a divine being, comparable in any way to
foreign deities, but rather he is seen as the prime instantiation Of
the Ethical, itself. Yahweh desires that men acquire knowledge of
Yahweh himself, or knowledge of the Ethical, for the two, at this
point in the analysis appear to be closely related, if not identical.
In an effort to illustrate the shallow nature of Israel's
perception of its special relation to Yahweh, Hosea states:
To me they cry,
My God, we Israel know thee,
Israel has spurned the good;
the enemy shall pursue him.
(8:2-3)
Hosea's intent in claiming that "Israel has spurned the good," is to
point out that due to their actions, the Israelites'claim to having
a knowledge of Yahweh is without grounds.

Hosea (13:4) reiterates the theme of the special relation-

ship Israel finds itself in with Yahweh while attempting further to

107
dissuade the people from the practice of idolatry:
I am the Lord your God
from the land of Egypt;
you know no God but me
and beside me there is no
saviour.
While this passage does not contain an explicit statement to the effect
that there is no god other than Yahweh, if Yahweh is identified with
the Ethical itself, then the passage may be interpreted to read--
There is no activity beyond acting in an ethically correct manner,
which truly represents the function peculiar to man. And, consequently
it is the knowledge of Yahweh, or knowledge of the Ethical, as mani-
fested through the display of ethically correct behaviors, which is
identified with man's essential nature, and is the ultimate saviour
of the people. And it is along these lines that Hosea brings his work
to an end, as is clear when he states:
Whoever is wise, let him understand
these things;
whoever is discerning, let him
know them;
for the ways of the Lord are right
and the upright walk in them
but the transgressors stumble in
them.
(14:9)
Jeremiah
Jeremiah's treatment of the concept, knowledge of Yahweh,
advances through four stages of conceptual development. Though the
boundaries of these stages are at best rough, the process of analysis
is greatly facilitated by viewing the development of that concept, as

it proceeds through these stages. In the interest of organization,

these stages may best be viewed as depicting four minor themes which

 

108

ultimately intertwine to render Jeremiah's position concerning the
essential nature of man and its relation to that of Yahweh truly
intelligible. These minor themes, along with the passages through
which they are developed, are as follows: (1) Jeremiah's position
concerning idolatry, where it is viewed as an impediment to acquir-
ing "knowledge of Yahweh," 7:9-10, 13:23-25, 19:4-6; (2) Jeremiah's
position that the essential nature of man is identified through the
isolation of the highest good of man, which is held to be the pos—
session of "knowledge of Yahweh," 4:22, 5:4-5, 8:7-9, 9:23-24,

10:23; (3) Jeremiah's contention that knowledge of Yahweh is ineffable

 

and consequently not to be identified, absolutely, with the Torah,

2:8, 3:15, 16:21, 31:31-34; and finally, (4) Jeremiah's conclusion

that knowledge Of Yahweh is truly knowledge of the Ethical, which he

maintains comprises both the essential nature of man and that of

God, 9:6, 10:25, 22:15-16. That is to say that the ancient Hebrew

found himself inextricably bound to his God on the basis of sharing

a common essential nature, comprised wholly of the Ethical.
Jeremiah's perception of idolatry as an impediment to acquir-

ing and displaying a knowledge of Yahweh, a view embraced also by

Hosea, is expressed in his assertion:

"Behold you trust in deceptive words to no avail. Will you
steal, murder, commit adultery, swear falsely, burn incense to
Ba'al, and go after other gods that you have not known, and
then come and stand before me in this house, which is called
by my name, and say 'We are deliveredI'--0nly to go on doing

these abominations."
(7:9—10)

Initially, it is apparent that there is a certain sense of utility
present in the phrase, "trust in deceptive words to no avail."

Jeremiah's intent is Obviously to point out that the practice of

109
idolatry by the Judeans in truth, does not profit them. However,
beyond simply not profiting the Judeans, their indulgence in the
practice of idolatry, actually results in their performing acts which
are to their detriment. While at this point Jeremiah does not flatly
state that these "other gods" whom the Judeans "have not known" simply
do not exist, and consequently are unknowable by their very nature,
this position is derivable from his expressed view that no utility
attends the Judeans' worship of them. There is the further implica- E
tion, present in this passage, that where a deity exists, a certain

knowledge is attached to that deity. However, the very acts of the

 

Judeans make apparent the fact that they possess no special knowledge
whatsoever.

If the above passage leaves room for doubt concerning
Jeremiah's position dealing with the ontic status of these "other
gods," the following dispels it:

Can the Ethiopian change his skin
or the leopard his spots?

Then also you can do good
who are accustomed to do evil.

I will scatter you like chaff
driven by the wind from the
desert.

This is your lot,
the position I have measured out
to you, says the Lord,

Because you have forgotten me
and trusted in lies.
(13:23-25)

The equating, by Jeremiah, of "other gods" with "lies" clearly
demonstrates his View that "other gods" simply do not exist. However,
his overriding concern in this passage is to impress upon the Judeans
that there is an inherent degeneracy associated with the worship of

these "lies," such that, if a man trusts in them and yet attempts to

110
do good, just as easily may, "the leopard change his spots." In
other words, the doing of good by the Judeans is first and foremost
contingent upon their abandoning their beliefs in the existence of
"other gods."
Jeremiah, not contenting himself with the belief that his
first two arguments will prove efficacious in eradicating the prac-

tice of idolatry in Judah, resorts to his final argument that the

- '1

continued practice Of idolatry by the Judeans will reap, in the final
analysis, their incurring the wrath of Yahweh. And what this argu-

ment lacks in subtlety it compensates for in intensity, as is

 

evident from the following:
"Because the people have forsaken me, and have profaned
this place by burning incense in it to other gods whom neither
they nor their fathers nor the kings of Judah have known; and
because they have filled the place with the blood of innocents,
and have built the high places of Ba'al, which I did not command
or decree, nor did it come into my mind; therefore, behold, days
are coming, says the Lord, when this place shall no more be
called Topheth, or the valley of the son of Hinnom, but the
valley of Slaughter."
(19:4-6)
Jeremiah's position concerning idolatry may be summed up as
follows. He attempts first to illustrate the point that its practice
is attended by a certain futility. Beyond being a study in futility,
it is actually counter-productive in helping the Judeans secure their
own well being. The notion that it is an expression of the Judeans'
ignorance derives from his assertion that it is predicated on worship
of non-existent beings. And finally he argues for a rejection of it
on the grounds that all it will truly produce is the wrath of Yahweh.

The second theme Jeremiah develops follows naturally from the first in

that it concerns either the inability or unwillingness on the part of

111
the Judeans to recognize and pursue that which constitutes man's
highest good, viz. knowledge of Yahweh.
Jeremiah initiates his analysis of this problem, with the
following Observation:
"For my people are foolish
they know me not;
they are stupid children
they have no understanding;

They are skilled in doing evil,
but how to do good they know F

not." I

(4:22) I

Jeremiah's depiction Of the Judeans as "stupid children" is very I
enlightening. For it carries with it the notion that like "children" 1
the Judeans know precisely what they want, but they do not necessarily
know what is best for them. In other words, they suffer from an under-
developed sense of knowing which, out of a number of apparent goods,
is truly the highest good. Also, like children, he contends, the
Judeans are quite clever and skillful at Obtaining those things they
desire, and are willing to employ any means at their disposal to in-
sure this. And it appears to be the case that the Judeans' inability
to perceive the highest good for man invariably results in their
adopting means to secure the goods which they do prize, which results
in their perpetuating evil after evil.

That Jeremiah possesses an acute social awareness, but is
maintaining that the evil present in Judah is not due to, nor solely
attached to the economically deprived and less educated inhabitants
of the land, is apparent from his assertion:

Then I said, "These are only the

poor,
they have no sense;

112

for they do not know the way of the
Lord,
the law of their God.
I will go to the great
and will speak to them;
for they know the way of the Lord
the law of their God."
But they all alike had broken the
yoke,
they had burst the bonds.
(5:4-5)

While in part this passage anticipates the third theme, which
attempts to illustrate that the Law, itself, is not to be identified
with knowledge of Yahweh, it serves here to illustrate Jeremiah's
contention that all the Judeans have misperceived the highest good
of man, irrespective of an individual's relative acquaintance with
the Law itself. It would, indeed, seem to be his intention to
denigrate the idea of wisdom generally considered attainable by man,
as is clear from his statement:

. but my people know not
the ordinance of the Lord.
"How can you say, 'We are wise,
and the law of the Lord is
with us?'
But, behold, the false pen of the
scribes
has made it into a lie.
The wise men shall be put to shame
they shall be dismayed and taken;
10, they have rejected the word of
the Lord,
and what wisdom is in them?
(8:7-9)

Clearly the question has been asked--What is the value of wisdom, for
man as man, which is not wisdom of God? And the point may be pressed
by inquiring--Is there a body of knowledge which may aptly be
designated as wisdom, which is not wholly comprised of a knowledge

of God? to wit, Jeremiah's query, "what wisdom is in them?"

I am...‘

 

113

Surely it is not Jeremiah's contention that man's knowledge
is completely without value. Nor is he attempting to denigrate the
other goods which help a man to secure a happy life. His aim is to
shift man's attention to that which constitutes his highest good.
And though his treatment of these other goods which man pursues is, at
times, high handed, his intention is self evident, as is apparent
from the following:

Thus says the Lord: "Let not the wise man glory in his

wisdom, let not the mighty man glory in his might, let not

the rich man glory in his riches; but let him who glories

glory in this, that he understands and knows me . . .

(9:23-24)

It is with this statement, at one stroke, that Jeremiah discloses
both the highest good for man and the means necessary to acquire it,
which when combined may be expressed simply as the acquisition and
glorying in knowledge of Yahweh.

The task remains for Jeremiah to communicate how man is to
acquire this knowledge of Yahweh, and that this process is somewhat
unique is, perhaps, foreshadowed by his declaration:

I know, 0 Lord, that the way of
man is not in himself,
that it is not in man who walks
to direct his steps.
(10:23)

The third theme taken up by Jeremiah, while dealing primarily
with the problem of how man is to acquire knowledge of Yahweh, also
deals with the problem of the composition of man's essential nature.
It has been alluded to above (Amos 1:1-15, 2:1-5; Jeremiah 5:4-5),
that it was not the intention of the Hebrew prophets to identify

knowledge of Yahweh with knowledge of the Law. And it is, further,

the specific position of Jeremiah that the nature of knowledge of

114

Yahweh is such that its acquisition lies beyond the efforts of man
alone. Dealing specifically with Jeremiah's denial that knowledge
of the Law is to be equated with knowledge of Yahweh is his assertion:
The priests did not say, "Where is
the Lord?"
Those who handle the law did not
know me.
(2:8)
And though this statement may be interpreted, on the one hand, as an
indictment of the corruption of the "Priests," it is the view espoused
here that Jeremiah is contending that knowledge Of Yahweh transcends
knowledge of the Law, which is to say that it is qualitatively dis—
tinct from it. However, though Jeremiah is not disparaging the study
and consequent knowledge of Law, he recognizes that this process is
reserved for a select few, namely, the Priests. And in that he holds
that knowledge of Yahweh represents the highest good for all men, he
asserts that a few individuals, undoubtedly the prophets, have been
selected by Yahweh, to disseminate generally this unique knowledge:
"And I will give you shepherds
after my own heart, who will feed
you with knowledge and understanding."
(3:15)
However, this "knowledge and understanding" do not constitute knowl-
edge of Yahweh, per pg. They are rather to be considered as propaedu-
tic to the acquisition of this knowledge. They are meant to turn the
people's attention away from the goods they now hold so dear, and
refocus it on their relation to their God. For where it is the

prophet's task to awaken in man his awareness of his relation to God,

it is the task of God to bring this awareness to fruition. And where

 

115
Jeremiah holds that Yahweh's initial response to this task will
manifest itself through a show of might:

"Therefore, behold, I will make
them know, this once I will make them
know my power and my might, and they
shall know that my name is the Lord.

(16:21)

his tone quickly softens. For Yahweh is ultimately to place a
knowledge of himself directly within man:

"Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will

make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of
Judah, not like the covenant which I made with their fathers
when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of
Egypt, my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband,
says the Lord. But this is the covenant which I will make with
the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put
my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and
I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer
shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying,
'Know the Lord,‘ for they shall all know me, from the least of
them to the greatest, says the Lord; . . ."
(31:31-34)
It is from this passage that Jeremiah relates precisely how the
Hebrew is to acquire his "knowledge of Yahweh," and further that his
essence, or that which causes him to be, most truly, man, is comprised
wholly of this knowledge.

The problem which arises concerning the exclusivistic nature
of this "new covenant" such that it takes into account only the "house
of Israel" is undoubtedly due to Jeremiah's preoccupation with his own
people. For it is clear from his position, stated above (Jeremiah
13:23-25), that he holds that "other gods" do not exist, not simply
for the Hebrews, but rather that they simply do not exist. The

natural consequence of that position is that Yahweh's "new covenant"

116

must extend to all peoples, whether this is or is not explicitly
stated. The point here is that Yahweh's "new covenant" is meaning-
ful only where a people's awareness has been heightened by the
preparatory work of the prophets.

The final theme which Jeremiah undertakes to develop involves
his attempt to universalize the uniquely Hebraic concept of Yahweh
by identifying it with the concept of the Ethical, itself. And the
position he embraces is that, though knowledge of Yahweh is ineffable,
its presence in man is manifested through his display of ethical
behavior. That is to say that where an individual display of ethi-
cally correct behavior is, itself, not held, by Jeremiah, to derive
from some specific bit of knowledge of Yahweh. Rather, all ethical
activities are seen to issue from an indwelling sense of the Ethical,
universally conceived, and identified with man's essential nature,
which is intimately related to a transcendent embodiment of the
Ethical, identified by the Hebrews as Yahweh.

Jeremiah, tentatively, begins his deveIOpment of this posi—
tion by asserting:

Heaping Oppression upon
Oppression, and deceit upon
deceit,
they refuse to know me, says
the Lord.
(9:6)
It would seem, from an examination of this passage, that Jeremiah is
positing that the manifestation of unethical acts derives from an un-
willingness, on the part of the people, to know Yahweh. It would

seem to follow that a knowledge of Yahweh would make itself manifest

through the display of acts which were of an ethical nature. And

117
while the passage does not identify, absolutely, knowledge of Yahweh
with knowledge of the Ethical, it, nonetheless, makes the point that
knowledge of that which is the ethically correct behavior, at the
very least, issues from this "knowledge of Yahweh." This is to say
that "knowledge of Yahweh" is depicted as the source of that which
constitutes ethically correct behavior.

Jeremiah's attempt to expand his conception of knowledge of
Yahweh into a truly universal source of knowledge of the Ethical,
may best be illustrated through his plea, directed at Yahweh, to:

Pour out thy wrath upon the nations
that know thee not,
and upon the peoples that call not
on thy name;
for they have devoured Jacob;
they have devoured and
consumed him,
and laid waste his habitation.
(10:25)
Jeremiah's intent in this passage lies not in his desire simply to
gain revenge upon the enemies of Judah, but rather to call for an
accounting of the actions of Judah's enemies on the grounds that
there is a conception of the Ethical, universally recognizable by all
peoples, in accordance with which their actions may be judged.

The further development of the universal nature of knowledge
of Yahweh, along with Jeremiah's concise description of the essential
nature of Yahweh and his subsequent identification of it with the
Ethical itself, is found in the following:

DO you think you are a king
because you compete in cedar?

Did not your father eat and drink

and do justice and righteousness?
Then it was well with him.

118

He judged the cause of the poor and
needy;
then it was well.
Is not this to know me?
(22:15-16)

Clearly, the activities which Jeremiah has identified with knowledge
(of Yahweh are not to be considered, in any way, uniquely Hebraic in
nature. They are, rather, activities which all men everywhere may
display, without the benefit of any direct association with any
specific religion. And yet, it is Jeremiah's view that the display
of these activities is to be identified with the possession of knowl—
edge of Yahweh. It is through answering, in the affirmative, the
question which is posed "Is not this to know me?" that the absolute
identification of Yahweh with the Ethical is carried out.

The concept of Yahweh, as conceived of by Jeremiah, has
broken the constricting bonds of nationalism, through its identifica-
tion with the Ethical itself. And this concept gains supremacy, not
primarily through the simplistic process of denying the existence of
other gods, but through bringing to man an awareness of that which
is best in himself and relating it intimately with that which con-
stitutes the highest good, absolutely. In a very real sense, it may
be asserted that Jeremiah's efforts were productive not only of

securing for all men a common and shared essential nature, but also

of bringing men, collectively, to a oneness with their God.

Deutero-Isaiah

 

The writings of Deutero-Isaiah, for the most part, exhibit
the virtually complete abandonment of the concept "knowledge of

Yahweh" and its relation to the larger, universally conceived concept

119

of the Ethical itself. And, as noted above, there is a distinct
anachrostic flavor present in his work. That he has been selected,
by the majority of contemporary scholars, as the prophet whose
writings display an absolutely monotheistic nature is due to his utter
rejection of the notion that there exist any gods other than Yahweh.
While the question of the number of gods believed to exist figures
prominently in any discussion concerning the monotheistic nature of
any given set of beliefs, its happy resolution, that only one god is
held to exist, is not sufficient for determining whether or not that
set of beliefs truly constitutes a monotheistic faith. Indeed, the
process utilized by Deutero-Isaiah for securing the aloneness of
Yahweh, based as it is on the assimilation, on the part of the
essential nature of Yahweh, of attributes and functions contained
originally in the natures Of foreign deities, would seem counter—
productive to his attaining his goal. In that this process is
responsible for the dissolution of an essential nature, held to be
simple and a unity by his predecessors, and the consequent recon-
struction Of that essential nature, through combining a host of
predicates within the framework Of a single personality.

The causes responsible for Deutero-Isaiah's abandonment of the
concept of Yahweh, derivable from the combined writings of Amos, Hosea
and Jeremiah, may only be guessed at. This is hardly a worthwhile
activity. That his conception and depiction of Yahweh may, in one
sense, be considered rich and full is undoubtedly true. However, in
a more meaningful sense, just what he holds to constitute the essential
nature of Yahweh is vague and ill defined. And while his view of Yah-

weh, as comprised of a multiplicity of attributes and functions, may

120

have held a more general appeal for the populace at large, it clearly
confuses the nature of the Man/God relationship. This is to say that
it is not self-evident from an examination of his writings just how
he feels man relates to his God. For there are innumerable predi-
cates, from Deutero-Isaiah's point of View which, although they
combine to make up his conception of Yahweh, have no counterpart in
the general makeup of man. There is, however, present in the writings
of Deutero-Isaiah the vestigal remains of the earlier position de-
rived from the combined writings of Amos, Hosea and Jeremiah. It is
to an examination of these remains that this analysis must now turn.
One of the earliest characterizations of Yahweh to be found
in Deutero-Isaiah ascribes to him the attribute of knowledge,
specifically knowledge of the Ethical, as is evident from his query:
Whom did he consult for his
enlightenment,
and who taught him the path of
justice,
and taught him knowledge,
and showed him the way Of
understanding?
(40:14)

The nature of this query seems to imply that, while knowledge of the
Ethical is not to be identified, absolutely, with the essential
nature of Yahweh, he is, nonetheless, cognizant of it. That is to say
that from Deutero-Isaiah's point of view, there exists, independently
of Yahweh, a body of knowledge which is ethical in nature. Further,
it is implied that while this knowledge is available to man, he,
unlike Yahweh, must expend an effort to acquire it. This is to say

that it is not intimately related to his essential nature. It would

appear that at one stroke Deutero-Isaiah has destroyed the basis,

121
formulated by his predecessors, upon which man claims his intimate
assocation with his God.

In his attempt to dissuade the people from the practice of
idolatry, Deutero-Isaiah employs the idea, present in the writings of
Hosea and Jeremiah, that it represents a certain foolishness. He
maintains the position that no knowledge attends the construction
and worship of idols. However, his efforts fall short of identi-
fying this knowledge with knowledge of the Ethical. And he predi—
cates his argument on the position that the Hebrews owe their loyalty
to Yahweh, because he has treated them well in the past, as is clear
from his Observation:

NO one considers, nor is there knowledge or discernment

to say, "Half of it I burned in the fire, I also baked bread
on its coals, I roasted flesh and have eaten, and shall I
make the residue of it an abomination? Shall I fall down
before a block of wood?"
(44:19)
and further:
Remember these things, 0 Jacob,
and Israel, for you are my
servant;
I formed you, you are my servant;
O Israel, you will not be
forgotten by me.
I have swept away your transgressions
like a cloud,
and your sins like mist;
return to me, for I have redeemed
you.
(44:21-22)
Deutero—Isaiah develops the theme that the Man/God relationship is
essentially like that of the servant/master relation, where the former
is held bound to the latter due to his inherent superiority. The

Hebrews, then, owe their loyalty to Yahweh, not because they share a

similar essential nature thought which one recognizes and appreciates

122
the other, but rather because they are so radically different. This
view, rather than representing the continued development Of the
earlier prophetic position, appears quite similar to the views,
concerning the Man/God relation, expressed by the majority of
ancient Near Eastern religions, where man is depicted as being at the
complete mercy of deities to whom he is not related in any essential
manner.
Deutero-Isaiah continues in this vein, when he asserts:
For the sake of my servant Jacob,
and Israel my chosen,
I call you by your name,
I surname you, though you do
not know me.
I am the Lord, and there is no other,
besides me there is no God;
I gird you, though you do not
know me,
that men may know, from the rising
of the sun
and from the west, that there is
none besides me;

I am the Lord, and there is no
other.

(45:4-6)
Yahweh's intention to "gird" or strengthen his people, in spite of
the fact that they do not "know" him, is a direct consequence of the
view held by Israel's neighbors, that the strength and viability of
a God were primarily visible through the strength of its people.
Apparently, Deutero-Isaiah feels that even though Yahweh is not about
to enlighten his people, so that they will "know" him, he will vindi-
cate his contention of supremacy through strengthening the Israelites.
An act whose meaning appeals to the "Might makes right!" argument
clearly illustrates Deutero-Isaiah's obsession with securing for

Yahweh the position of sole God, besides whom "there is no other."

123
That Deutero-Isaiah was familiar with the position developed
by his predecessors is clear from his statement:
"Hearken to me, you who know
righteousness,
the people in whose heart is
my law;
fear not the reproach of men
and be not dismayed at their
revilings."
(51:7)
In this passage, Deutero-Isaiah seems to hold that the Man/God
relation may be based on man's internalization Of the law of Yahweh,
which is further equated with his knowledge of "righteousness." If
this, indeed, was his intention, it would represent, at least in part,
a return to the position espoused by his predecessors. However,
this does not appear to be the case. For inherent in the process of
securing the absolute aloneness of Yahweh is the need to separate
him from man, so that he may stand alone and supreme. In closing his
work, Deutero-Isaiah makes this perfectly clear by predicating the
following position of Yahweh:
For my thoughts are not your
thoughts,
neither are your ways my ways,

says the Lord.
For as the heavens are higher than

the earth,

so are my ways higher than your
ways

and my thoughts than your
thoughts.

(55:8—9)
Man, then, for Deutero-Isaiah, is related to Yahweh as is a
servant to his master. And if he obeys and honors his master, he
shall profit. However, if he does not obey and honor his master, he

shall suffer. And man's function, for Deutero—Isaiah, is identified

124
as praising the power and might of Yahweh, not because he knows him
and, as a result of this knowledge, loves him, but simply because
there is in fact no other deity he may direct these activities
towards. Deutero-Isaiah's efforts to secure the absolute aloneness
of Yahweh may represent, at best, a Pyrrhic victory, for it comes at
the cost of irrevocably alienating man from his God. And the command

--Let us praise the Lord--rings hollow.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It has been the intention Of this dissertation to Offer a new
and expanded definition of the term monotheism. For it has been
maintained that the present definition, to wit, "The doctrine or
belief that there is but one God," falls short of being truly meaning—
ful. Rather, it has been recommended that a complete definition of
that term should include, along with conveying the notion of oneness
in terms of the number of deities in question, a description of the
essential nature of that one deity. The expanded definition would
read-~Monotheism is the belief in one God whose essential nature is
simple and a unity. It has been further proposed that in a truly
monotheistic system of beliefs there will be an isomorphic relation
between the essential nature of man and that of his God.

A reconstruction of Aristotle's theology has been utilized
as the paradigm by which all other systems are to be evaluated. For
while he did not deal specifically with the problem of monotheism,
his theology posits the existence of one deity whose essential nature
is completely composed Of one predicate, and he says further that
this same predicate was responsible for comprising, in its totality,
the essential nature of man. Consequently, his deity is called one,
not due simply to its being numerically one, but also due to the fact
that its essential nature is simple and a unity. And his theology

125

126
has been designated as constituting a monotheism in that it posits
the existence of one God whose essential nature is comprised of one
attribute, which is further held to constitute the essential nature
of man.

The process of analysis has been grounded in the conviction
of Ludwig Feuerbach that the nature of man is isomorphically related
to that of his God. Consequently, it has been maintained that by
analyzing the essential nature of man, along the lines of discover-
ing what he holds to be his unique and peculiar function, a correct
view of the essential nature of his God would be forthcoming. It has
been suggested that this analysis be performed with an eye towards
the view that where man's essential nature is perceived as being
comprised of a single attribute, so would that of his God.

In an attempt to illustrate the relative lack of consistency
with which contemporary scholars have applied the term "monotheism,"
an extensive survey of the recent literature has been performed. It
has been shown that, while there is no clear consensus as to how the
term is to be applied, contemporary scholars have generated numerous
mutated forms of it, with which they have attempted to characterize
various special cases. Where there is more consensus than not, schol-
ars have isolated, as a major criterion, the presence of statements
which claim sole existence for the deity in question, as being of
prime importance for identifying monotheistic systems of belief.
However, evidence has been supplied to illustrate that such state-
ments may be present in obviously polytheistic systems of belief.

And this evidence has been supplied, not with the sole intention of

127
negating, completely, the relative importance of such statements, but
to illustrate that while they represent a necessary condition for a
system of belief to be designated a monotheism, they do not represent
sufficient conditions for such a characterization.

Given that it is the consensus of the majority of contemporary
scholars that monotheism of some sort is present in the writing of the
literary prophets, the task has been undertaken to substantiate that
view. Specifically, the combined writings of Amos, Hosea, Jeremiah
and Deutero-Isaiah have been analyzed to see if a truly monotheistic
system Of beliefs may be derived from them. The analysis involved
gathering support for two hypotheses. The first hypothesis maintained
that the prophets held the position that man, as man, had a peculiar
and unique function, and further that this function would be manifest
through a certain activity. It was found that, for the prophets,
man as such does have a proper function, made manifest through the
activity of acquiring a knowledge of Yahweh. The second hypothesis
held that the notion of Yahweh, for these prophets, was identified
with a universal conception of the Ethical, rather than characterized
as some divine being comprised of certain attributes and functions,
similar in any way to the deities of the Hebrews' neighbors. It was
determined that the characterization Of man's essential nature, as
comprised wholly of knowledge of Yahweh, coupled with the further
identification of this knowledge with knowledge of the Ethical, would
result in allowing the system of beliefs espoused by these prophets,
to be accurately termed, "monotheistic."

The position was stated that if an evolutionary view, concern-

ing the development of this system of beliefs, were to be maintained,

128

it would be characterized as follows. The recognition of the ethical
makeup of man's essential nature begins slowly to emerge in the
writings of Amos. The theme is expanded by Hosea, and reaches full
maturity in the writings of Jeremiah. And although Deutero-Isaiah
displays a certain familiarity with it, its further development is
completed precluded by his unceasing efforts to secure the complete
aloneness of Yahweh. That is to say that the real support for the
two hypotheses is to be gleaned from the combined works of Amos,
Hosea, and Jeremiah. And considering that it is only in the writings
of Jeremiah that full support for these hypotheses is to be found,

it would be less than accurate to state that monotheism, as it is
understood here, was truly "part and parcel" of literary prophets'

Weltanschauung, generally considered. It would, at the same time,

 

be misleading to maintain that it comes full blown in the writings of
Jeremiah, and represents solely the product of his individual efforts.
Rather, the view must be expressed, without falling into the trap of
generating various types of monotheisms, that the literary prophets,
collectively, were concerned with unraveling the nature of the Man/
God relationship. And these combined efforts to heighten man's
awareness of his own essential nature and the nature of his relation
to his God may be seen as an expression of their conviction that truly
to know God is to become one with him.

The value, then, of this dissertation may lie in the fact that
it represents the forging of a new tool, an analytical tool which may
be employed by scholars to examine various theological and philosophi-
cal systems of belief. For it is believed that the careful utiliza-

tion of this tool will help to keep scholars from falling into the

 

129
trap of generating a plethora of novel concepts in order to explain

away the presence of what they perceive to be special cases.

 

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