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TASK PERFORMANCE AND OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS
IN COGNITIVELY ANXIOUS STUDENTS

By

Ann M. Isenberg

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partiaT fquiTTment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of PsychoTogy

1985

‘32;EQ/175°e3

ABSTRACT

TASK PERFORMANCE AND OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS
IN COGNITIVELY ANXIOUS STUDENTS

By

Ann M. Isenberg

Theory suggests that an individual who experiences a large
number of cognitive intrusions when anxious will also evidence a
high level of distraction during task performance when made
highly self-aware (by use of a mirror). This study investigated
hypothesized performance decrement resulting from these conditions.
One hundred female undergraduates completed measures of trait and
state-cognitive anxiety, worry, and cognitive interference. As
hypothesized, subjects high in trait-cognitive anxiety scored
higher in these areas than those low in such anxiety. Subjects
also copied Swedish prose for five minutes. The prediction that
those high in trait cognitive anxiety, performing the task in a
condition of high objective self-awareness, would evidence the
greatest performance decrement of all groups was not supported.
Lack of observed performance decrement may be related to the level
of absolute anxiety evidenced in the sample. Further considerations

and implications for future research was outlined.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Norman
Abeles, Chairperson, Dr. Dozier Thornton, and Dr. Elaine Donelson,
for their consideration, guidance, and valuable contributions to
this study. My thanks, as well, go to Dr. John E. Hunter for his
time and much appreciated suggestions concerning the study design
and statistical analysis of my data.

I also wish to express my deepest appreciation to my family,
especially to my mother, Edna Isenberg, friends, and colleagues who
have provided ideas, support, encouragement, and at times, a much
needed listening ear. They have been and will continue to be a
greatly valued part of my life.

This study necessitated the use of the following undergraduates
who put in long hours to learn the experimental procedure, to run
subjects for eight weeks, and to score the copying task - my thanks
to Deb Norton, Sherri Szuch, Rhonda McDaniel, and Karen Albosta.

Finally, special thanks go to the typists: Jeanne Gray,
University Park, Pennsylvania, for battling the flu and the ending of
term-break to finish the final thesis draft (pre-orals) and Suzy
Pavick, East Lansing, Michigan, who has spent many hours over the
past two years helping to prepare proposal drafts, thesis drafts,

and - at last - the final copy.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES ....................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES ...................... v
INTRODUCTION ....................... l
Cognitive Anxiety ................... 3
Worry ......................... 9
Objective Self-Awareness ............... l5
Structure of the Study ................ Zl
Hypotheses ...................... 25
METHOD ........................... 28
Subjects ....................... 28
Materials ....................... 29
Instruments ...................... 29
Procedure ....................... 32
RESULTS .......................... 39
Reliability of Measures ................ 4T
Hypotheses ...................... 4l
Post Hoc Analysis ................... 50
DISCUSSION ......................... 53
APPENDIX A ......................... 66
APPENDIX B ......................... 71
APPENDIX C ......................... 82
APPENDIX D ......................... 84
APPENDIX E ......................... 87
APPENDIX F ......................... 89
APPENDIX G ......................... 92
REFERENCES ......................... 95

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

l Analysis of Variance Results for Dependent
Measures ....................... 4O

2 Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Task
State-Cognitive Anxiety Scores ............ 42

3 Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Task Worry
Scores ........................ 43

4 Means and Standard Deviations of Copying Task
(Performance) Scores ................. 44

5 Means and Standard Deviations of Post-Task State-
Cognitive Anxiety Scores ............... 45

6 Means and Standard Deviations of Post-Task Worry
Scores ........................ 45

7 Means and Standard Deviations of Cognitive
Interference Scores . ................ 47

8 Means and Standard Deviations of Mirror/Plywood
Presence Scores ................... 48

9 Means and Standard Deviations of Mirror/Plywood
Distraction Scores .................. 48

lo Means and Standard Deviations of Copying Task

(Performance) Scores Using Post Hoc Sample
Distribution ..................... Sl

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

I. Procedural diagram of study, subject selection
through experimental phase .............. 35

INTRODUCTION

A multitude of variables exist which may be included within
the term "individual differences." This study will investigate one
specific way in which an individual difference may be manifested:
the predominant mode of experiencing anxiety. The crucial
question to be examined is this: do individuals react differently
under given circumstances based on differences in the modality
of the experience of anxiety?

Cognitive anxiety can be described as the presence of
cognitive intrusions, thoughts or images, which distract an
individual from desired focus of attention. When anxious, varying
amounts of attention are those divided between the internal
concerns brought about by the cognitive intrusions and what is
taking place in the environment.

"Worry" may also be described as a cognitive activity, one
which is generally concentrated on anticipated negative consequences
of an activity: failing, not doing as well as others, future
ramifications of doing poorly, etc.

Objective self-awareness is theoretically present whenever an
individual becomes increasingly aware of himself or herself as an
object in the world. Attention is focused within on any intraself

discrepancy perceived to be salient at that moment.

2

Thus, an individual who experiences a large number of
cognitive intrusions when anxious and who tends to be concerned
with the prospect of negative consequences of a personal activity
should become even more internally focused and aware of
perceived intraself discrepancies when placed in circumstances
which increase self-awareness. A person who has difficulty
concentrating on a task and experiences self-doubt regarding
performance should then become increasingly distracted by these
concerns within the objective self-awareness paradigm and should
experience more performance decrement as a result.

Although applicable to an infinite variety of circumstances,
the problem just described is one which may have great significance
in a clinical setting. Individuals will become increasingly
self-aware whenever they are reminded of themselves as objects in
the world. This may include situations where they feel the object
of any sort of personal attention, especially those in which there
may be elements of perceived evaluation or judgment. In many ways,
then, the therapy process, with its focus on introspection and the
process of change, will increase an individual's sense of objective
self-awareness.

Clients bring into therapy a host of individual differences
which can affect the change process. Individuals prone to
rumination and disruptions in concentration when anxious will at
times react to the therapeutic process differently than those
persons whose concentration and attention are not disrupted or

distracted. Because the experience of anxiety may be considered

3
nearly universal within the therapeutic setting at some point, it
is important that clinicians be aware of the differential aspects
of anxiety experience.

Cognitive Anxiety

 

Traditionally, most anxiety questionnaires have reflected the
assumption that internal states may be considered as global and
undifferentiated (Davidson, l978). More recently, converging lines
of evidence from both the clinical-personality sphere and from
peripheral psychophysiology have suggested that anxiety should more
properly be viewed as multidimensional in nature.

Investigation of the nature and reduction of fear has found
that intercorrelations among measures of fear employed in
desensitization are typically low. It was suggested that specific
behavioral systems may thus be separately manipulated (Lang, 1969).
Psychophysiological research conducted on fear reduction has also
revealed a multidimensionality in anxiety. Hodgson and Rachman
(l974) observed desynchrony in different physiological measures,
all having great face validity. Further research suggested that
it might be possible for different subsystems involved in
dysfunctional states to be separately manipulated. Lazarus (1973)
called for therapeutic regimes to be individually constructed to
reduce distressing symptoms in specific modes and systems
evidencing difficulties.

The existence of a multidimensional anxiety has been established
psychometrically through factor analytic studies of traditional

anxiety questionnaires. Barrett (in Schwartz, Davidson, & Coleman,

4

l978, p. 322) conducted an item analysis of anxiety items from a
large number of commonly used scales. Results "'indicated two
major subsets: (a) awareness of somatic changes...(and) (b)
conscious awareness of unpleasant feelings about self or external
stimuli.'" In factor analytic studies of self-rating, Hamilton
and Buss (in Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman, p. 322) found that two
factors, which were labeled psychic and somatic anxiety, could
account for the majority of the variance in test performance.

Borkovec (T976) has used the multiple measurement of three
separate but interacting response components (cognitive, overt
behavior, and physiological) to operationally define anxiety. He
also suggested that each system might be separately influenced by
different environmental conditions and individual differences.

Psychophysiological studies have investigated the specific
patterning of physiological processes that are associated with
particular behavioral states. Schwartz, Davidson, and Maer (1975)
studied hemispheric activation using lateral eye movements as an
index. It was found that the complex cognitive tasks employed
could be meaningfully differentiated on the basis of underlying
hemispheric substrates. Data suggested that the manner in which
the verbal-spatial dimension interacts with cerebral asymmetry is
different from that of the affective-nonaffective dimension.

A study by Davidson and Schwartz (l977, in Davidson, l978,
p. 432) asked subjects to generate images in different modalities
(visual, kinesthetic). Data from EEG measurement of sensorimotor

activation reflected a pattern of activation between the two

5
unimodel imagery conditions. Findings suggest that attention to
or the imaging of a stimulus in a particular modality is associated
with specific activation in the cortical region specialized to
process information in that modality.

Davidson and Schwartz (l976) developed a psychobiological
model of subcomponents involved in anxiety and its reduction. The
initial assumption was that there exist two relatively independent
types of anxiety: cognitive and somatic. It was proposed that
different procedures utilized in the reduction of anxiety would
differ in the degree to which they affected the cognitive as
Opposed to the somatic system.

Mode-specific manifestations of anxiety were suggested as also
appearing across individuals or within the same person at different
times (Davidson & Schwartz, l976, p. 402). In addition, the
presence of subsystems within each mode would tend to determine the
particular type of cognitive or somatic symptom. The authors
pr0posed that the direction of the differentiated response to
relaxation procedures would depend on asymmetrical activation of
either the right or left hemisphere in the given technique employed
(p. 402). It was further hypothesized that a process occurring in
a given mode would not only strongly affect the same mode, but
would also influence other modes to a lesser degree (p. 420).

Following principles of psychobiological specificity, Davidson
and Schwartz (l976) conceptualized the systems underlying each mode
as having a "fixed" channel capacity. It might be assumed that
anxiety in a particular mode will place limits on further processing

in that mode more than in others (p. 424).

6

Schwartz, Davidson, and Goleman (1978) reported a study
utilizing adult volunteers, in which it was predicted that physical
exercise would lead specifically to reduction primarily in somatic
activity with less effect upon cognitive activity. It was also
hypothesized that a technique requiring the self-generation of
cognitive versus somatic activity would specifically attenuate
anxiety in the cognitive system. Data supporting these hypotheses
suggested that specific subcomponents of anxiety may be
differentially associated with relaxation techniques engaging
primarily cognitive as opposed to somatic subsystems (p. 324).

A l4-item self-report measure of cognitive and somatic trait
anxiety, the Cognitive Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (CSAQ), was
developed in conjunction with the just-mentioned study. Items were
selected from well-known questionnaires and subjected to the
agreement of three independent judges. Subjects were asked to
rate the degree to which they generally or typically experience the
given symptom when feeling anxious (Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman,
1978, p. 325).

Davidson and Schwartz (1976) described a condition of low
cognitive anxiety as representing a lack of unwanted cognitive
intrusions. Because of the absence of such intrusions, attention
is not distracted by activity in the cognitive sphere.

A high degree of cognitive anxiety would represent a
distraction by activity in the cognitive sphere, such as images
or thoughts of failing at a task or about an upcoming event

irrelevant to the moment in question.

7

Some Specific examples of cognitive anxiety, as reflected by

statements on the CSAQ are as follows. For example, when about to

speak before an audience and feeling anxious, an individual might

experience:

1) uncontrollable thoughts, such as:

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

What if they think my remarks are stupid?
worries over irrelevant matters, such as:

I wonder if Mary ever found someone to sit for her kids?
trouble keeping_anxietyprovokingpictures out of mind,
such as:

Picturing the way in which you are standing as

awkward and tense.
experiencingunimportant thoughts causinggbother, such as:

Thinking about the upcoming workday and having

trouble concentrating on the speech.
trouble keepihg anxiety provoking thoughts out of mind,
such as:

What if my ending doesn't go over as I've planned?

terrifying scenes, such as:

 

Imagining that suddenly you have forgotten what you
are about to say and you stand in front of everyone
in total silence.

experiencing indecision, such as:

 

Should I tell this joke or leave it out?

Individuals exhibiting a high level of cognitive anxiety will

tend to have attention focused inward, to their own thoughts and

8
images. This will divert attention from external objects and
events, including any sort of performance task. It has been noted
that generally anxious individuals tend to manifest both high
cognitive and high somatic anxiety (pp. 426-427).

There is, of course, the question of the accuracy of self-report
measures in assessing what is actually being experienced by the
subject. In addition, subjects are certainly aware that they are
being assessed and respond accordingly. Distortion on the part of
subjects may be due to such processes as denial, defensiveness,
social desirability, and the subjects' own perceptions (i.e.,
what personal meaning "anxiety" has for the subject - for example,
if anxiety is perceived as a "negative" state, a subject may
intentionally reduce the amount of anxiety self-reported).

Also, and of great interest in this study, Kazdin (1980)
has commented that depending upon the assessment device and
response format, individuals have shown a tendency to check
extreme values on rating scales, give cautious answers, and to
be inconsistent across items.

Self-report measures, including the CSAQ, will be utilized
exclusively in this study. Despite their limitations, the instruments
which will attempt to measure the constructs of interest are felt to
be the most appropriate existing at this time.

As measured by the CSAQ, the subdividing of anxiety into
cognitive and somatic components can be considered an
over-simplification. However, authors Schwartz, Davidson, and
Goleman (1978) feel that it is a useful starting point for

stimulating theory and research (p. 326).

9

A relatively small amount of literature has reported work with
adults and children utilizing the cognitive-somatic anxiety
distinction. In addition to the Schwartz, Davidson, and Goleman
(1978) study previously mentioned, Kirkland and Hollandsworth (1980)
used the CSAQ in a treatment study involving college students.
Measures of frequency and intensity (interpreted by the authors as
measures of "trait“ and "state" anxiety, respectively) of cognitive
and somatic anxiety were used in another treatment study for college
students by Thompson, Griebstein, and Kuhlenschmidt (1980). A
state version of the CSAQ was developed by Heide (1981) in his
investigation of relaxation-induced anxiety involving adult
volunteers (college students, faculty, and community members).
Recently, Fox and Houston (1983) reported the development of
self-report measures of cognitive and somatic state and trait
anxiety fOr children. Results of this study indicated a
relationship between cognitive trait anxiety and task performance.
High cognitive state and/or trait anxiety was also found to be
associated with more preoccupation and perfbrmance designation.
Overall, the authors indicated that results supported the construct
validity of the measures developed.
m

The multidimensional nature of anxiety has also been reported
in the considerable literature concerning test (and evaluation)
anxiety. In 1952, Mandler and S. Sarason (in Holroyd & Appel,
1980, pp. 129-130) first attempted to differentiate test anxiety

from general anxiety theory. They hypothesized that test anxiety

10
consisted of both cognitive (feelings of inadequacy and helplessness,
anticipation of punishment or loss of self-esteem) and physiological
(autonomic arousal) components. This theory was one of a "learned
anxiety drive." Evaluative exam situations elicit higher levels of
anxiety drive from test-anxious individuals than from the
non-test-anxious. As a result, individuals experience higher
levels of autonomic arousal and worry. Mandler and Sarason
hypothesized that poor test performance resulted because cognitive
and autonomic responses elicited by the anxiety drive were
incompatible with responses necessary for effective test
performance.

Other researchers noted that highly test-anxious individuals
tend "to be generally negatively self-preoccupied" and "describ(e)
themselves in self-devaluing terms on other paper and pencil
measures" (I. Sarason, 1960, in Wine, 1980, p. 355). Sarason
suggested that under evaluative stress, such persons respond to
heightened autonomic arousal with personalized, self-oriented
responses. Attention is directed away from the task and performance
suffers (Deffenbacher, 1980, pp. 355-356).

Wine (1980) suggested that test-anxious individuals are likely
to interpret a wide range of situations as evaluative and to be
tuned to cues from other persons which are interpreted as reflecting
evaluatively upon them, typically in a negative way. Self-statements
often involve a preoccupation with failures in the past or
future negative consequences (p. 376).

Test anxiety is generally viewed by more recent theory as a

primarily cognitive response (I. Sarason, 1975, in 1.6. Sarason,

11
1980, p. 131), a typically self-critical response (Mandler, 1975,
in I.G. Sarason, 1980, p. 131) which is to be emphasized over
individual differences in autonomic arousal when distinguishing
the test-anxious from the nontest-anxious. In Mandler's view,
all individuals are aroused physiologically by examination
situations, but only the test-anxious are preoccupied with
self-critical ruminations.

Wine's direction of attention hypothesis (1971; 1982) has also
emphasized the significance of the cognitive element in test and
evaluation anxiety. She observed that during task performance
and under evaluative testing conditions, the attention of highly
test-anxious persons is divided between task-relevant variables
and internally focused, self-depreciating thinking and perception
of autonomic reactivity. Wine (1982) has also suggested that
"evaluation anxiety“ cuts across state/trait distinctions.
Individuals scoring high on self-report measures of trait anxiety,
"whether general or situationally specific, are prone to becoming
worried and tense" (p. 208). Thus they will tend to report high
levels of state anxiety given appropriate situational circumstances.

Although Mandler and S. Sarason (1952) had suggested the dual
component nature of test anxiety, it was not until 1967 that
research of Liebert and Morris began to oppose the existing trend
toward a lack of operationalism and the treatment of state anxiety
as a uniform condition. Components of Mandler and Sarason's Test
Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ) were examined by factor analytic
techniques. Two classes of factors appeared to emerge: cognitive

("worry") or lack of confidence, and factors which referred to

12
various indices of autonomic arousal ("emotionality"). The
Liebert and Morris lO-item worry-emotionality questionnaire was
then utilized in a study of university undergraduates which
suggested the inverse relationship of worry to performance
expectancy (Liebert & Morris, 1967). The scale reflected
momentary state anxiety and was expected to fluctuate with conditions
related to any given situation.

"Worry" has been described as primarily a cognitive concern
regarding the consequences of failing, the ability of others as
opposed to one's own ability, etc. Examples of "worry" might
include:

1) consequence of failing, such as:

If I fail this exam, I know I'll fail the entire
course and never make it in this major.

2) ability of others, such as:

I feel so stupid. I know that everyone else is

getting these problems so easily.
Wine (1971; 1982) suggested that it was this cognitive (1982) or
"worry" (1971) component of evaluation or test anxiety which
interferes most directly with cognitive performance (1982, p. 209).
It also appears closely related to the attentional interpretation
previously described (1971, p. 99). .Wine also believed this
cognitive component to be the more stable, serving as a "trigger"
for heightened physiological activity (1982, p. 209).

"Worry" appears to be the anxiety component most consistently
and most strongly related (inversely) to academic performance.

There appears to be a weak or no overall relationship between

13
performance and the "emotionality" component (Deffenbacher, 1980;
Doctor & Altman, 1969; Morris & Liebert, 1970).

In all studies involving evaluative stress, "worry" has been
found at higher levels than "emotionality." Highly trait-anxious
individuals have reported significantly more "worry" than
"emotionality." Thus, evaluative stress appears to elicit a
tendency for the highly test-anxious to become preoccupied with
worrisome cognitions and only secondarily with self-perceived
affective-autonomic arousal (Deffenbacher, 1980, p. 123).
Physiological arousal may at some point begin to interfere with
performance, but in the sense that an individual's attention may
be directed toward the arousal and away from the task (p. 123).

The discovery that highly test-anxious persons report significantly
more "worry" than "emotionality" thus suggests that previously
mentioned characteristics of the test-anxious will also apply to
those scoring in the higher range of the "worry" dimension of this
measure.

"Worry" and "emotionality" appear to be different response
classes elicited by different conditions. Not only does the
presence or absence of evaluative stress seem associated with
varying levels of worry, but a temporal relationship has also been
suggested. "Emotionality" is elicited primarily by cues associated
with the beginning of evaluation and peaks at its initiation.
"Worry" appears elicited by cues which make evaluation and possible
failure salient and covaries with input or feedback related to

possible failure (Deffenbacher, in I. Sarason, 1981, pp. 122-123).

14
Therefore, in addition to efficiacy performance during exams or
other tasks, "worry" should be significantly elevated prior to
such situations, making it more likely to interfere with
preparation (including learning and rehearsal Ep. 121]).

In summary, "worry" appears to be a stable disposition, with
scores which are fairly constant across time, that interferes
directly with cognitive performance, triggers autonomic activity,
and plays a major role in the maintenance of test and evaluation
anxiety (Wine, 1982, p. 212). It is possible that worry, as a
particular kind of cognitive intrusion, may constitute a subtype
of cognitive anxiety.

The "worry-emotionality" measure to be used in this study was
developed by Morris, Davis, and Hutchings (1981) as a combination-
revision of 40-items from previous scales (Liebert & Morris, 1967;
Spielberger et al., 1970; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970;
Osterhouse, 1972). "Worry" items chosen reflected specific negative
expectations as well as preoccupation with performance, self-
evaluation, and a concern about the perceptions of others.
"Emotionality" items involved specific physiological and somatic
reactions as well as the use of terms which suggested overarousal,
nervousness, and general affective discomfort. All of the original
(1967) "emotionality" items from the Liebert and Morris
questionnaire were retained, while only two of the original "worry"
items were judged as "satisfactory" (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings,
1981, p. 549). This study, as in the 1967 Liebert and Morris work

and nearly all other mentioned studies, involved university

15

undergraduates. It was conducted for the purpose of producing
the revised scale and exploring further theoretical considerations.

In addition to the studies mentioned above, the use of a
dual-component theory of test or evaluation anxiety, involving
cognitive (worry) and emotionality distinctions has been reported
in investigations of feedback and test perfbrmance (Morris &
Fulmer, 1976), sources of interference while performing under
evaluative stress (Deffenbacher, 1978), effects of timed and
untimed testing conditions on high-worry subjects (Morris &
Liebert, 1969), and in treatment studies, such as those of
Kirkland and Hollandsworth (1980) and Finger and Galassi (1977).

Objective Self-Awareness

 

The same cognitive processes labeled as anxious
self-preoccupation or self-focusing in test anxiety theory (Wine,
1971) "(appear) to be labelled objective self-awareness or
self-focused attention" in objective self-awareness theory (Holroyd,
Westbrook, Wolf, & Badhorn, 1978, p. 443).

In 1972, Duval and Wicklund defined the state of objective
self-awareness as one in which persons take themselves to be objects
(Holroyd et al., 1978, p. 233) in the world. In this state of
"self-focused attention," it was postulated that as a result of
events which focus attention inward, an individual would
concentrate specifically on an intraself discrepancy. Theory
assumed that negative affect, with self-criticism appearing to be
the most likely (Hull & Levy, 1974, p. 245), will result because

the individual will presumably find shortcomings within him/herself.

16
These shortcomings will be the consequence of perceived
discrepancies between aspiration and attainment. Originally,
Duval and Wicklund thus believed that objective self-awareness
would be aversive condition.

However, conscious attention focused on self or on external
events (subjective self-awareness) was not seen as a dichotomous
situation. It was allowed that attention could oscillate between
the self and the non-self. Therefore, it is more accurate to
speak of proportionate "increased" or "decreased" objective
self-awareness (Hull & Levy, 1974, p. 234).

In their original statement of self-awareness theory, Duval
and Wicklund (1972) suggested that following the development of
negative affect, individuals would first attempt to avoid the
self-focus stimulus by finding distractions. If such avoidance
were impossible, they would then engage in some sort of
discrepancy reduction. Typically, this would involve "efforts to
bring a trait or behavior in line with a (personal) standard or
aspiration" (Hull & Levy, 1974, p. 236). If no behavioral standard
is salient at that moment, self-attentive persons may simply
become more conscious of their own present attribution or feelings.
They will tend to be more aware of dominant affect and more
responsive to that affect (Carver & Scheier, 1978, p. 324).

Later expansion of objective self-awareness theory suggested
that it is possible fer either negative or positive affect to
result depending upon whether attention is directed toward a
negative or positive discrepancy. Although evidence from the area

of achievement motivation has suggested that virtually all

l7
naturally occurring discrepancies are negative, they may be
rendered positive by “regent? success experiences (Hull & Levy,
1979).

Such self-focused attention may also be thought of as a type
of self-confrontation. Sackheim and Gur (1978) have stated that
feedback of self will lead to autonomic arousal, negative
self-evaluations, defensive reactions, and constriction of
ideational content. Subjects' phenomenological reports of their
experience during self-confrontation generally describe negative
affective states of increased anxiety. Self-confrontation may thus
be described as aversive (p. 159).

Any stimulus which reminds individuals of their object status
will increase objective self-awareness. In theory, "any symbol or
reflection of a person will cause a shift of (his/her) focus
inward" (Wicklund, 1975, p. 234). The mirror has become the "clear
favorite" among researchers as a means of heightening self-focus
because of its simplicity and ease of manipulation (Carver &
Scheier, 1978, p. 325).

Numerous studies utilizing a mirror to produce objective

self-awareness have been conducted with university undergraduates

(Davis & Brocke, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Holroyd, Westbrook,
Wolf, & Badhorn, 1978; Hull & Levy, 1979; Ickes, Wicklund, &
Ferris, 1973; Paulus, Annis, & Risner, l978).

Contrary to original predictions, Wicklund and Duval (1971)
observed that subjects' performance on a prose-capying task was

facilitated in the presence of a mirror. The same experimental

l8
task was repeated by Liebling and Shaver (1973), varying levels of
evaluation. The authors suggested that there appeared to be an
inverse relationship between level of evaluation and performance
facilitation. When subjects were placed in a highly evaluative
situation, objective self-awareness was related to a decrement in
performance.

Questions of mirror validity have generally not been dealt
with in the studies mentioned. Wicklund (1975) explained this lack
of examination of manipulation checks and validity issues by stating
that attempted manipulation checks are “probably worthless in
objective self-awareness paradigms" (p. 267). Wicklund's
reasoning was as follows. Ideally, a manipulation check should
investigate whether a subject's attention has moved to some salient
dimension within the self. After the primary dependent measure is
completed, an individual might be asked to rate the degree of
self-consciousness with respect to that dimension. However,
objective self-awareness theory would also predict that any direct
question of this kind would, in itself, bring the individual's
attention directly to bear on the dimension of interest. As a
result, there will be "a washing-out“ of the prior manipulation.

In describing the extent of self-consciousness, it would be highly
probable that a subject might be using the experimental
manipulation as a cue for an appropriate answer (p. 268).

One attempt at validation of the mirror was conducted by

Carver and Scheier (1978). The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)

(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) was used to measure chronic

19
dispositions to be self-attentive. Results indicated that the
"mirror does manipulate, and the private self-consciousness
subscale of the 505 does measure, self-attention" (p. 324). A
person high in private self-consciousness would be very cognizant
of his or her own thoughts, feelings, and motives.

Duval and Wicklund (1972) have argued that when individuals are
in a state of objective self-awareness, they will evaluate
perceptions of self and their behavior in terms of individual
standards of correctness (in Sachkeim & Gur, 1978). However, the
Duval and Wicklund theory as a whole places little emphasis on
the role of individual differences in predicting reactions to
self-focus or self-confrontation. Sackheim and Our (1978) have
contended that if individuals differ to the degree to which
they hold discrepant cognitions regarding the self or in the way
in which they assess the evaluative nature of situations, “one
would expect that they would also differ in their reactions to
self-confrontation" (p. 164). Evidence has suggested that when
self-confronted, individuals perceive aspects of themselves they
do not like. The perception of such discrepancies is suggested to
be aversive and reflected in heightened anxiety. This position
would be congruent with the findings of Sackheim (in Sackheim &
Gur, 1978, p. 167) which have indicated that individual differences
in cognitive discrepancy, a measure of the degree of internal
conflict, "predicted individual differences in the magnitude of
psychophysiological reactivity to self-confrontation and the type

of self-evaluations subjects made after such a confrontation" (p. 167).

20

In a similar conclusion to the Liebling and Shaver findings,
Sackheim and Our have suggested that the anxiety engendered by
self-confrontation at first facilitates task performance, but at
"high levels" produces decrements (p. 169).

An individual's tendency to exhibit trait and state-cognitive
anxiety and worry to varying degrees certainly constitutes an example
of individual differences which may prove to be important
variables affecting individual reactions to a state of objective
self-awareness. Cognitive anxiety usually involves worrisome,
preoccupying thoughts or unpleasant feelings about self or external
stimuli. "Worry," as described in the test anxiety literature,
generally involves cognitive concern about the consequences of
performance (Fox a Houston, 1983, p. 862). An individual possessing
a high amount of cognitive anxiety and worry should, as a result of
this predisposition toward self-concern, react differently from
those lower in such tendencies when made self-aware.

This study investigated the effects of the state of objective
self-awareness or self-focus on the task perfbrmance of subjects
high in cognitive anxiety. Because the cognitively anxious tend
to experience more preoccupying thoughts or unpleasant feelings
about self or external stimuli, it was hypothesized that the state
of high objective self-awareness will interact with and exacerbate
this tendency, lead to an increasing amount of distraction away
from the task, and thus result in a larger decrement in performance
when compared to the low cognitively anxious.

As previously mentioned, objective self-awareness, especially

for individuals prone to cognitive anxiety and worry, may also be

21
considered a self-confrontation situation. The clinical importance
of individual differences in reaction to such a state rests with
the fact that objective self—awareness/self-confrontation may be
produced by a variety of situations. In addition to mirrors,
cameras, videotape equipment, or a tape recorder (the last two
often used in certain clinical settings) may have the same effects.
As mentioned, a situation in which individuals feel that they are
being significantly evaluated will also lead to a state of
objective self-awareness. The therapy experience, in general, may
be viewed in this way by certain clients. Certain techniques within
the therapy process, such as role-play, or merely the disclosure of
difficult and painful material, may also produce an intensely
heightened state of self-focus.

Predominant mode of experiencing anxiety is but one of
countless individual differences which may affect an individual's
reactions to objective self-awareness/self-confrontation. Once
again it is vital that clinicians be aware of these possible
differences in situation perception and situational changes in
attitudes toward self and others' perceptions of self as a result
of therapeutic techniques or the clinical setting as a whole.

Structure of the Study

 

The diagram on page 35 describes the administration of the
measures in this study.

Measures of state-cognitive somatic anxiety and worry-
emotionality were completed prior to the introduction of the

copying task. It was predicted that those subjects high in trait-

22
cognitive anxiety should not only score more highly in such state
anxiety, but also reflect more situational worry, basically a
cognitive concern. While it was possible that subjects in the
extreme high range of both cognitive anxiety and worry would
also evidence high scores in somatic anxiety and emotionality, it
was felt that any decrement in performance would result chiefly
from cognitively-based anxiety. This interpretation has been
covered particularly well in the theoretical aspects of the
worry-emotionality and direction of attention hypothesis literature
(refer to those sections of the Introduction).

Cognitive-somatic and worry-emotionality measures have
occasionally been used within the same study (Kirkland &
Hollandsworth, 1980), with both cognitive anxiety and worry scales
utilized as "cognitive attentional measures." However, it must
again be stressed that cognitive anxiety, as measured by the CSAQ,
and "worry," as described in the Revised Questionnaire," while
similar in their cognitive orientation, are not to be considered the
"same" measure. Another purpose of this study was the statistical
investigation of the relationship between these two measures. It
initially appeared that cognitive anxiety was a more general concept
involving a wide variety of different cognitive intrusions, while
"worry" appeared to be a more specific concern regarding the
anticipated negative consequences of an evaluative or perceived
evaluative situation.

A second administration of the State-CSAQ and Worry-
Emotionality Questionnaire followed the (post-task) Cognitive

Interference Questionnaire. As reflections of situational anxiety,

23
it was predicted that for subjects high in trait-cognitive
anxiety, scores of state-cagnitive anxiety and worry would
increase by a greater amount pre- to post-task than scores of
those low in such trait anxiety. As noted on page 14, it has
been demonstrated that worry appears to be a more constant,
stable tendency throughout the period of evaluation/performance,
while emotionality peaks at the beginning of this period, then
generally declines. Therefore, those subjects evidencing a high
worry score (those subjects also predicted to score "high" in
trait, then in state-cognitive anxiety prior to the introduction
of the task) should have retained this cognitive state through to
the administration of the final (Post-Task) measure. Investigation
of any similar pattern for state-cognitive anxiety became an
additional hypothesis.

Because the use of direct questions, themselves, would tend to
produce a state of objective self-awareness, inquiries concerning
subject awareness of distraction during the task (specifically the
notice of the mirror and perception as a distraction) could not be
used as validation of the effectiveness of this manipulation. Yet
it was felt that such information on an informal basis would add
to further understanding of subject experience. It was predicted
that those high in trait and state-cognitive anxiety would report
more environmental distraction while performing the task.
Specifically, those subjects high in trait-cognitive anxiety and
those in the mirror condition would more often acknowledge notice
of the mirror and perceive it as a distraction during the c0pying

task.

24

A final consideration in structuring this study involved the
choice of rationale and the relationship between experimenter and
subject during the experimental phase of the study (copying task).
It was noted that evaluation apprehension by itself would increase
objective self-awareness. An individual concerned about whether
his or her performance would be judged favorably would also be aware
of possible discrepancies between his or her present state and the
goal desired (i.e., performing well). Therefore, the rationale
given to subjects stressed the cooperative nature of the study and
no indications were given in the instructions that subject
performance was to be evaluated (refer to Rationales and Instructions
in the Appendices).

In addition, the subject-experimenter relationship generally
involves experimenter control of the subject, behavior implying that
the subject is an object in the world (Duval & Wicklund, 1973).

This would provide a strong stimulus for heightened objective
self-awareness. Experimenter presence or communication that the
subject will be otherwise monitored may also be an additional such
stimulus (p. 30). It was therefore necessary to attempt to
diminish nonmanipulated sources of objective self-awareness,
leaving the mirror as much as possible its major source. For this
reason, the experimenter remained outside of the room and with the
exception of the copying task, itself, the subjects were able to
work at their own speed.

Finally, no direct mention was made to the subjects of the

mirror or its plywood back when turned to face away from the

25
subject. In this way, it was hoped that subjects' attention
would not be drawn to the mirror by direction of the experimenter.
Instead, the subject would notice her reflection (or the plywood
back) in a natural fashion as she sat down at the desk.

Hypotheses

 

In summary form, the following are the hypotheses investigated
in this study. To aid in the understanding of the hypotheses, the
diagrams of the measures used and of the four groups of subjects

are presented here.

Cognitive Anxiety (trait-CSAQ)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

High Low
. "high" = upper
;::}:::1X$ Yes high/ low/ half of subject
the mirror mirror mirror distribution
(i.e., high or high/no low/no " u =
low objective No reflective reflective hag¥'of lfigjgct
self-awareness mirror mirror distribution
produced)
Copying
Screening phase Pre-task task Post-task
Measures: CSAQ-trait —————+CSAQ-state-———+(performance ——+cognitive
worry- measure) interference
emotionality questionnaire,
mood check CSAQ-state
(emotion wheel) worry-
emotionality,
Post-task
questionnaire

Note. Data was analyzed in terms of mean scores for each group.

26
Hypotheses:

1. Those "high" in trait-cognitive anxiety (scoring in the
upper half of the trait-CSAQ distribution)* will also score higher
in (a) statgycognitive anxiety and higher in (b) "worry” than those
"low" (lower half of distribution) in trait-cognitive anxiety.

2. Those "high" in trait-cognitive anxiety will evidence
greater performance decrement than those "low" (scoring in the
lower half) in cognitive anxiety.

Note: performance on the copying task will be analyzed by taking
the mean number of letters c0pied correctly for each group.

3. Those “high" in trait-cognitive anxiety, performing the
task in a condition of high objective self-awareness (i.e., before
the reflective surface of the mirror) will experience the greatest
performance decrement of the four groups.

Using the results of the post-task measures:

4. Those "high" in trait-cognitive anxiety will evidence
higher (a) state-cognitive anxiety and higher (b) worry scores in
both pre- and post-task measurements than those ”low" in trait-
cognitive anxiety.

5. Those in the high trait-cognitive anxiety/"high“ objective
self-awareness group will evidence the highest (a) state-CSAQ and
(b) worry scores of all four groups after completing the c0pying
task and (c) state-CSAQ and worry scores will increase pre- to
post-task by a greater amount than other groups in terms of mean

increase.

 

*Mean trait-cognitive anxiety scores and trait-CSAQ ranges for "high"
and "low" groups appear in the Appendix for the 2 x 2 design.

27

6. Those "high" in trait-cognitive anxiety (and state-cognitive
anxiety and worry) will evidence a higher amount of cognitive
interference during the experiment than those "low" in trait- and
state-cognitive anxiety, and

7. Those in the "high" cognitive anxiety/"high" objective
self-awareness group will evidence the highest cognitive interference
scores of all groups.

8. Those "high" in trait-cognitive anxiety (and state-cognitive
anxiety and worry) will (a) report noticing the presence of the
mirror (both reflective surface and nonreflective back) more
frequently and (b) more often claim that it was a distraction than
those "low“ in trait-cognitive anxiety, ghg_

9. Those in the "high" trait-cognitive anxiety/"high" objective
self-awareness group will report (a) noticing the presence of the
mirror and (b) seeing it as a distraction more often than any other

group.

METHOD

Subjects

One hundred female undergraduates at a large midwestern
university were given the trait version of the Cognitive Somatic
Anxiety Questionnaire (Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman, 1978) and at
a later date participated in the experimental phase (copying task)
of the study. All subjects were currently enrolled in one of six
different courses (introductory psychology, personality psychology,
and abnormal psychology). Students in the introductory classes
participated in this study for extra credit. Students from
personality and abnormal psychology classes were not part of the
official subject pool and received no extra credit. The number of

subjects from each class was as follows:

Introductory Psychology I (Section 1) = N = 56
Introductory Psychology I (Section 2) = N = 3
Introductory Psychology II (Section 1) = N = 4*
Introductory Psychology II (Section 2) = N = 1

Personality Psychology = N = 25

Abnormal Psychology = N = 11*
Following administration of the trait-CSAQ, all subjects were
randomly assigned a number l-lOO. Subjects receiving an odd number

(fl_= 50) performed the experimental task before the plywood back of

 

*One case excluded for data analysis.

28

29

the mirror. Subjects receiving an even number (g_= 50) were
assigned to the mirror-present condition. Following the completion
of data collection, subjects' cognitive anxiety scores from the
trait-CSAQ were tabulated, a median split conducted, and subjects
thus assigned to "high" and "low“ trait-cognitive anxiety groups.
Materials

The experimental (copying) task was performed in front of a
large mirror (35%" x 47%"). One side was the usual reflecting
surface and the other side a nonreflecting, plywood back. The
experiment was conducted in a small windowless room (8'6" x 12').
Other objects in the room included a desk on which students worked,
a mirror prepped on top of the desk against the wall at an
angle of approximately 70°, a straight-back chair, and a filing
cabinet. Paper and pencils for the subjects' participation had
been placed on the desk top before the subject entered the room.
Instruments

The Cognitive Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (Schwartz,
Davidson, & Goleman, 1978) was administered in its trait form for
the purpose of dividing the subject population into groups of
"high" and "low" trait-cognitive anxiety. Both cognitive and
somatic scores were recorded for each subject, but only the cognitive
score was utilized for subject division and for analyses to
address the specified hypotheses.

A State version of the Cognitive Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire
(Heide, 1981) was administered to all subjects both prior to and

following the completion of the capying task. The purpose of this

30
instrument was to assess the level of cognitive and somatic
anxiety currently being experienced. Once again, only cognitive
anxiety scores were used in the statistical analysis. The
State-CSAQ was originally developed as part of a study concerning
relaxation-induced anxiety. Therefore, a number of the items were
worded to assess the amount of relaxation experienced. For purposes
of this study, all such items worded to reflect amount of current

relaxation were scored in reverse. For example, if a subject gave

 

a rating of "2" for the statement: my mind feels calm, a "6" was
recorded as the amount of anxiety being experienced. In this way,
scoring was consistent with the statements designed to measure
state anxiety on a 1 (NOT AT ALL) through 7 (VERY MUCH SO) scale.

The Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire (Morris, Davis, &
Hutchings, 1981) was also administered before and after the
experimental task for the purpose of ascertaining the degree of
worry currently being experienced. Emotionality scores were
recorded, but not used in data analysis.

Following the pre-task administration of the State-CSAQ and
Worry-Emotionality Questionnaires, subjects were asked to indicate

by setting a pointer on an "emotion wheel" what they felt to be

 

their predominant mood at that moment. The instrument used was a

 

 

modification of the "emotion wheel" developed by Plutchik (1980).
For this study, the emotions included on the "wheel" were confined
to Plutchik's "eight primary emotions" (a diagram of the "wheel"
used appears in the Appendices).

In addition to the presence of anxiety affecting performance

on a copying task, depression may also produce differences in

31
outcome. The copying task in this study was felt to be similar
to the Digit Symbol subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale (WAIS). Both tasks ask individuals to copy as much
material (letters in this study or symbols in the Digit Symbol
subtest) as they can in a given amount of time. As in the Digit
Symbol test, this copying task primarily measured a subject's
capacity to utilize energy in a simple task. A high level of
anxiety might cause difficulties in concentration and the ability
to focus energy on the task, alone. Poor performance on such a
task may also reflect a depressive lack of energy output (Blatt &
Allison, 1981).

The purpose of using the “emotion wheel" in this study was to
provide some exploratory information concerning any possible
depressive affect ("sadness" on the Plutchik "wheel") among
individual subjects. It was felt that this and other information
regarding subjects' affective states might contribute valuable
information for the overall analysis and interpretation of study
data. In addition, studies by Scheier and Carver (1977) and
Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons (1981) both indicate that self-focused
attention heightens an individual's awareness of and responsivity
to affect.

All subjects were asked to copy a sample of Swedish prose for
a period of five minutes. Performance scores were based on the
number of letters, marks of accent, and punctuation copied
correctly during that time period.

Following the copying task, subjects were asked to complete

the Cognitive Interference Questionnaire (Sarason & Stoops, 1978)

32
to assess the types and frequencies of thoughts which they may have
experienced while working on the task. The use of the Cognitive
Interference Questionnaire (CIQ) was reported in a study with
female university undergraduates. Data indicated that highly
anxious persons under stress experience cognitive interference
and preoccupation which result in poor performance (Sarason &
Stoops, 1978). The CIQ, which results in a single, global score,
also requests a self-report of the degree to which subjects'
minds "wandered" during the task.

The final measure presented to the subjects was a short
questionnaire (Post-Task Questionnaire) designed to investigate
especially the degree to which the presence of the mirror or
plywood backing was recognized and then perceived as a distraction
by subjects in their appropriate groups.

The "emotion wheel," Cognitive Interference Questionnaire,
and Post-Task Questionnaire were presented at the same points
during the study for all subjects. The State-CSAQ and the
Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire were presented in counterbalanced
order.

Procedure

A procedural diagram of the study appears in Figure 1.

The screening and experimental phases of this study were
conducted by a total of five persons, this writer and four female
undergraduates (three psychology majors, one speech and audiology
major) who had undergone a training period of approximately five
weeks to become familiar with the instruments and with the

experimental procedure. In this way, it was possible to include

33
more subjects in the study, as well as to deal with the issue of
experimenter bias. During that time, they had been familiarized
with the experimental procedure and had the opportunity to work
with pilot subjects. Although these four undergraduates had
knowledge of the general topics involved in this study and to
which experimental condition each subject had been assigned, they
remained unaware of the subject's trait-cognitive anxiety
grouping (as did this writer at that time) and of the specific
hypotheses to be tested.

Volunteers for this study were solicited from the six classes
previously Specified. Those who wished to participate for credit
(from the four sections of the two introductory classes) signed up
for the initially scheduled screening sessions, at which time they
were administered the trait-CSAQ. These subjects had been informed
that the screening session would be the first part of a two-phase
study. They received credit for participation in each phase.
After arriving at the screening session, subjects were given the
following rationale:

We are conducting a pilot study for a project
in which subjects will copy written material
of graded difficulty. Before we begin the
study, we need to know just how similar
subjects will be on certain variables.
Therefore, we are asking you to take the
next few minutes to complete first the
consent form, then the questionnaire being
distributed.
Subjects were told that the times listed on the consent form

(refer to Appendix) for each phase of the study might vary, but

that they would receive appropriate credit for all participation.

34

It was also mentioned verbally (as well as included on the consent
form) that subjects' signatures did not commit them to
participation in the second phase of the study, should they be
recontacted, although it was hoped that they would choose to
continue. Only six of the originally-screened subjects later
decided not to participate in the copying task (second) phase.

Following completion of the trait-CSAQ, subjects were told
that they might possibly be recontacted within the next week to
arrange a time to participate in the next phase of the study.

Subjects who had signed up for a specified screening time,
but missed their session, were rescheduled. Screening times had
been scheduled fOr only one week due to time pressures. If
rescheduling was not possible during that week, subjects were given
a copy of the consent form and trait-CSAQ to complete prior to
returning for the experimental phase. By the end of the scheduled
week of formal screening, it had become apparent that there was a
severe lack of available subjects from the introductory (credit)
classes. To achieve the power desired for statistical analysis, a
sample of at least 100 subjects was strongly preferred. For this
reason, it was necessary to look beyond introductory psychology
(subject pool) courses and use volunteers from other psychology
classes. This same procedure of having subjects complete the
consent form and CSAQ outside of a formal screening session was
also followed for subjects from the two classes not participating
for credit. In all cases, however, subjects were given the same

rationale and basic instructions.

35

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36

Following completion of all trait-CSAQ questionnaires, either
in formal screening sessions or outside, subjects were assigned
a number from l-lOO, contacted by phone, and scheduled for
participation in the second phase of the study.

Prior to the start of the experimental phase, five pilot
subjects had been conducted through the experimental procedure by
all five experimenters. As a result of information gained from this
pilot, experimental instructions were altered slightly and the
time frame for this second phase shortened from 45-60 minutes to a
maximum of 30 minutes, a change of which subjects were informed when
scheduled for the experimental phase.

This experimental phase involved subject participation of
approximately 20 minutes. Upon subjects' arrival at the specified
location, the experimenter gave the following rationale:

As we mentioned before, this is a pilot study
for a project in which subjects will capy written
materials of graded difficulty.

Before we can perform any study on the effects of
varying levels of difficulty, we must establish

a scale to measure the difficulty of written
material. This is what you will be helping us

do in this pilot study.

By measuring how much of a given written material
a random sample of people can copy accurately,

we can not only rank order different materials

by difficulty, but we can see how much harder one
passage is to copy than another. (Liebling &
Shaver, 1973). You will be copying material of
one level of difficulty and other subjects will
be capying material of other levels.

Because this is a study to establish a scale of
measurement, we need to find out just how similar
participating individuals are in certain ways.
Therefore, we will also be asking you to complete
some questionnaires before and after the copying
task, itself.

37
The subject was then given the instructions for completion of
this phase of the experiment.

To prevent distraction, I will be outside the
room throughout the experiment. I will be
giving you the first measure as you enter the
room. Please sit at the desk to your left.

You will find pencils and paper for the
copying task on the desk. When you finish the
first questionnaire, slip it under the door and
I will slide the next measure in to you
(Experimenter demonstrates). Follow this
procedure for the first three measures. All
instructions for completing these measures also
appear on the instruments, themselves.

After the third measure, I will slide the
copying task under the door. Please read the
instructions carefully. When you are

finished and are ready to begin, knock twice on
the door (Experimenter demonstrates). When you
have two knocks in return, you may begin
copying the Swedish prose, by printing, on

the paper you will find on the desk. When you
hear a second double-knock (Experimenter
demonstrates), stop copying immediately and
slide all materials under the door. I will
then slide the next measures in to you.

Following the copying task, there will be four
short questionnaires for you to complete.
Please follow the same procedure of sliding the
completed measures under the door. After the
fourth questionnaire is completed, I will come
into the room and you will be able to ask any
questions you might have.

Once the instructions were given to the subject, the experimenter
handed her the first measure, opened the door and gestured to the
desk at the left. The experimental procedure then proceeded as
outlined. Pre-copying task measures were: State-CSAQ,
Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire (these two instruments were
presented in counterbalanced order both pre- and post-task), and

"Emotion-Wheel." Post-task measures were: Cognitive Interference

38

Questionnaire, State-CSAQ, Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire, and
the appropriate Post-Task Questionnaire (either "mirror" or
"plywood").

Following completion of the final (Post-Task) questionnaire,
the experimenter entered the room. It was explained that a
complete, written debriefing would be sent to each subject after
all data was collected, but that the subject could ask questions or
make comments at that time if she wished (it was stressed that
since many subjects were enrolled in the same classes, certain
aspects of the experiment could not be explained until completion
of data collection). A written debriefing (refer to Appendix)
was mailed to all subjects during the eighth week of the term.
Subjects were also told that if they would like a capy of the
study abstract, they should either indicate so at that time or

contact this writer during the following two terms.

RESULTS

Initial frequency data were obtained for all variables prior to
statistical analyses. At this time it was noted that two perfbrmance
scores appeared to be in the upper extreme of a distribution ranging
from 238 to 710. (Subjects had been given two pages of Swedish prose.
The high score of 710 represents less than one (the first) page
copied during the five-minute period.) Two scores of 703 and 710
were felt to be "outlyers" and the data sets for these two subjects
were discarded. The highest score then became 650. Both sets
belonged to the same group (high cognitive anxiety/plywood) and
these two performance scores proved to be at least three standard
deviations above the mean for that group. All further analyses were
conducted with a total sample N_= 98. A breakdown of all subject
numbers will be presented on each table of means and standard
deviations.

Before conducting the a priori contrasts used to test hypotheses
one through nine, a series of analyses of variance were computed to
investigate any presence of statistically significant differences
between groups overall. Variables included in these analyses were:
trait-cognitive anxiety; state-cognitive anxiety (pre- and post-task);
worry (pre- and post-task); the performance (copying) task; cognitive
interference; and pre-post-task difference scores for state-cognitive

anxiety and worry. Results of these analyses appear in Table l.

39

40

Table 1

Analysis of Variance Results

for Dependent Measures

 

 

 

 

Measure df f
Trait-Cognitive Anxiety 3,94 58.537 p .01*
State-Cognitive Anxiety 3,94 4.574 p .01*
(pre-task)

Worry (pre-task) 3,94 2.966 p .05*
Performance (Copying) Task 3,94 1.922 p .10
Cognitive Interference 3,94 4.471 p .01*
State-Cognitive Anxiety 3,94 5.922 p .01*
(post-task)

Worry (post-task) 3,94 3.606 p .05*
State-Cognitive Anxiety - 3,94 1.062 p .30
Difference pre- to post-task

Worry - Difference pre- to 3,94 .617 p .60
post-task

Note. *denotes statistical significance.

41
Reliability of Measures

Reliabilities were obtained for each measure used in this study.
A complete listing can be found in the Appendix. Reliabilities
ranged from a high of .89 (Pre-Task Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire)
to a low of .78 (Cognitive Interference Questionnaire). Item 11 of
the Cognitive Interference Questionnaire had a corrected item-total
correlation of -.O99 and was omitted from the subsequent analysis.
The reliability of .78 for this instrument reflects this omission.

A reliability was also obtained for the Post-Task Questionnaire
(.42). This measure was never used as a whole, however. Two items
(Items 1 and 2) were considered as separate variables intended to
produce information regarding frequency and intensity and analyses
(Hypotheses 8 and 9) were conducted for these variables separately.

Hypotheses

 

Hypotheses one through nine were evaluated by a priori contrasts

and one-way analyses of variance using the following 2 x 2 factorial

 

 

design.

Trait-Cognitive

Anxiety
High Low
Mirror 1 3
Objective
Self-Awareness Plywood 2 4
Back

 

 

 

 

Objective self-awareness refers to the experimental condition
which was hypothesized to produce such self-awareness at either
high (mirror) or low (plywood back) levels. Each cell is numbered

for the reader's convenience to correspond to the groups which are

42
compared in the hypotheses. Means and standard deviations for
trait-cognitive anxiety scores for this design are presented in
the Appendix. Means and standard deviations for each variable tested
in the hypotheses are presented in Tables 2-9.

1) Hypothesis 1(a) predicted that those subjects high in trait-
cognitive anxiety (groups 1 and 2) will evidence higher state-
cognitive anxiety scores (pre-task) than those subjects low in trait-
cognitive anxiety (groups 3 and 4). Means and standard deviations
are presented in Table 2, indicating higher mean state-cognitive

anxiety scores for the predicted group.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Task
State-Cognitive Anxiety Scores

 

 

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

 

 

Objective High ‘Low

Self-Awareness M SD M SD

Mirror 20.54 7.54 16.95 5.64
N=28 N=22

Plywood Back 18.50 6.02 14.50 5.10
N=20 N=28

 

Evaluation of significance was conducted by comparing high vs.
low groups (groups 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4). Results were significant
as follows: t(94) = 3.002, p < .01.

Hypothesis 1(b) stated that subjects high in trait-cognitive
anxiety will score higher in worry (pre-task) than those in the low

trait-cognitive anxiety group. Means and standard deviations appear

43
in Table 3. Once again high scores are evidenced for the predicted
group. A comparison of high vs. low groups (1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4)

resulted in: t(94) = 2.951, p < .01.

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Task Worry Scores

 

 

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

 

 

Objective .
_ ngh Low
Self Awareness M SD M SD
Mirror 9.75 4.42 7.50 2.13
N=28 N=22
Plywood Back 10.05 3.93 8.25 2.41
N=20 N=28

 

Although this data is significant, tests for homogeneity of variances
(Cochran's C and Bartlett-Box F) indicated that this assumption had
not been met. Because this influences the interpretation of the
data, the results of this hypothesis must be considered less
conclusive.

2) Hypothesis 2, that those high in trait cognitive anxiety
will evidence greater performance decrement than those low in such
anxiety was not supported by the data. Table 4 presents means and
standard deviations for each group.

Neither the omnibus F (3, 94) = 1.922, p > .10 nor the
comparison of high vs. low groups (1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4) t(94) =

.0541, p > .90 were significant.

44
Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of Copying Task
(Performance) Scores

 

 

 

 

 

Objective Hi9Emit-Cognitive AnxietyLow

Self-Awareness M SD M SD

Mirror 470.72 74.87 466.36 52.58
N=28 N=22

Plywood Back 430.85 90.15 433.54 79.32
N=20 N=28

 

3) As evidenced in Table 4, those in the high cognitive
anxiety/mirror group (group 1) had the highest mean performance
score of all groups. Hypothesis 3 had predicted that this group
would show the greatest perfbrmance decrement of the fbur groups.
However, comparison of this group vs. the other three groups
(1 vs. 2, 3, 4) did not yield significant results for this highest
mean score: t(94) = 1.605, p > .10.

4) Hypothesis 4(a), those high in trait-cognitive anxiety,
will evidence higher state-cognitive anxiety scores post-task (as
well as pre-task) was supported by the data. Means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 5. The higher mean scores for
the high trait-cognitive anxiety group proved significant in the
following comparison: t(94) = 3.997, p < .01.

Hypothesis 4(b) predicted that subjects high in trait-
cognitive anxiety would score higher in worry post-task (as well as
pre-task) than those low in trait-cognitive anxiety. Means and

standard deviations are presented in Table 6. Although mean scores

45
Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations of Post-Task State-Cognitive
Anxiety Scores

 

 

. . Trait-Cognitive Anxiety
Objective High

 

 

 

 

Low
Self-Awareness M’ SD M SD
Mirror 19.36 8.05 14.91 5.37
N=28 N=22
Plywood Back 19.35 6.40 13.25 5.41
N=20 N=28
Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations of Post-Task Worry Scores

 

 

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

 

 

Objective .
Htgh *Eow
Self-Awareness 11 SD M* SD
Mirror 10.04 4.41 7.05 1.46
N=28 N=22
Plywood Back 10.10 4.56 8.86 2.98
N=20 N=28

 

were higher for the predicted group and data from the comparison of
high vs. low groups (groups 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4) yielded significant
results (t(94) = 2.894, p < .01), once again tests for homogeneity
of variances did not support the homogeneity of variance assumption.
Therefore results for this hypothesis must be considered less

conclusive.

46

5) The fifth hypothesis consisted of three parts. The first,
that subjects in the high trait-cognitive anxiety/mirror group
(group 1) would evidence the highest mean state-cognitive anxiety
scores (post-task), was only partially supported by the data.

Table 5 indicates that this group mean was the highest. Despite the
significance of the comparison result (t(94) = 2.431, p < .05), a
one-way analysis of variance of the other three groups (groups 2, 3,

4) also revealed differences among these groups significant at p < .05.
Thus it is not possible to make a definitive statement concerning the
difference between the first group vs. the other three (1 vs. 2, 3, 4).

The second part of Hypothesis 5 predicted that the high trait-
cognitive anxiety/mirror group would also evidence the highest worry
scores (post-task) of all groups. Both the data presented in Table 6
and the results of a group 1 vs. 2, 3, 4 comparison (t(94) = 1.704,

p > .10) do not support this hypothesis.

The final part of Hypothesis 5, that the mean change (predicted
increase), pre- to post-task, in both state-cognitive anxiety and
worry, will be greatest for the high trait-cognitive anxiety/mirror
group (group 1) was not supported by the data.

6) It was predicted in Hypothesis 6 that those high in trait-
cognitive anxiety will experience a greater amount of cognitive
interference during the performance task than those low in such anxiety.
Table 7 presents the means and standard deviations for this data.
Comparisons of high vs. low groups (groups 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4)

yielded a significant result of t(94) = 3.350, p < .01.

47
Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations of Cognitive
Interference Scores

 

 

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

 

 

Objective .
_ High Low
Self Awareness M SD M SD
Mirror 22.61 5.53 19.77 4.26
N=28 N=22
Plywood Back 25.70 7.15 20.68 5.83
N=20 N=28

 

7) It was further predicted that subjects in the high trait-
cognitive anxiety/mirror group (group 1) would experience the
greatest amount of cognitive interference. In the 1 vs. 2, 3, 4
group comparison, this hypothesis was not supported.

8) The first part of Hypothesis 8 refers to statement #1 on the
Post-Task Questionnaire (for both mirror and plywood conditions).

It was predicted that subjects high in trait-cognitive anxiety would
report noticing the presence of the mirror/plywood back more
frequently than those low in trait-cognitive anxiety. Means and
standard deviations are presented in Table 8. A comparison of high
vs. low groups (groups 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4) did not support this
prediction: t(94) = .713, p > .40.

It was further predicted that those in the high trait-cognitive
anxiety group would more often perceive the mirror/plywood back as
a distraction during the experiment (this hypothesis refers to
statement #2 on the Post-Task Questionnaire). Means and standard

deviations are presented in Table 9. Once again comparison of high

48
Table 8

Means and Standard Deviations of Mirror/Plywood
Presence Scores

 

 

Trait-ngfiitive Anxiety

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Objective .
_ Htgh Low

Self Awareness M SD M SD

Mirror 3.39 .92 2.29 1.19
N=28 N=22

Plywood Back 1.95 1.19 2.10 1.20
N=20 N=28

Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations of Mirror/Plywood
Distraction Scores

Objective H‘iT’r‘ait-Cognitive Anxietlyow

Self-Awareness *M 449—9 SD M SD

Mirror 1.36 .68 1.23 .53
N=28 N=22

Plywood Back 1.15 .67 1.14 .45
N=20 N=28

 

vs. low groups (groups 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4) did not yield significant

results for this prediction: t(94) = .572, p > .50.

49

9) Subjects in the high trait-cognitive anxiety/mirror group
(group 1) were expected to report noticing the presence of the mirror
more frequently than the other groups (groups 2, 3, 4). Results of
t(94) = 4.259, p < .01 were significant for this groups 1 vs. 2, 3,
4 comparison. However, a one-way analysis of variance of groups 2,
3, 4 indicated significant differences between those groups as well:
F(2, 67) = 4.085, p < .05. Thus it is difficult to make a more
definitive statement concerning the specified hypothesis.

In the second part of Hypothesis 9, that this same group (high
trait-cognitive anxiety/mirror) would more often perceive the mirror
to be a distraction, results were not significant: t(94) = 1.40,

p > .10. This hypothesis was therefore not supported by the data.

The final statistical analysis specified in the pr0posa1 for
this study was a comparison of the Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire
and the state version of the CSAQ. In a sense, this was to be an
exploratory analysis to investigate the similarity of the constructs
involved, both believed to relate to types of state "anxiety."

Two items, one "worry" and one "emotionality" (as suggested by
the authors of the measure) were added to the Worry—Emotionality
Questionnaire to bring the total number of items to 12. The
addition of the two items was for the purpose of increasing
reliability in the analysis.

The two measures (pre- and postatask) were compared using a
Pearson correlation (one-tailed) corrected for attenuation with the

following formula:

SO

 

c xy where: rxy = Pearson correlation
rxx J ryy rxx = reliability of x
ryy = reliability of y

Results were as follows:

1) Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire and state CSAQ (pre-task) =
rc = .615.

2) Worry-Emotionality and state CSAQ (post-task) = rc = .647.

Only about 35% of the variance is accounted for in both cases,

suggesting that there is substantial difference between the two

measures. A table of Pearson correlations for measures (with the

exception of Cognitive Interference Questionnaire and Post-Task

Questionnaire) used in this study are presented in the Appendix.

Post Hoc Analysis

 

In addition to the analysis performed to address each stated
hypothesis using a 2 x 2 factorial design, a previously unstated
exploratory analysis was conducted with a division of the subject
sample into three trait-cognitive anxiety groups (thirds of the
subject distribution): high, medium, and low. This was an attempt

to conduct an analysis of performance task results using more

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

 

High Medium Low
Objective Mirror 1 2 3
Self-
Awareness Plywood ,
Back 4 5 6

 

 

 

 

 

51
homogeneous groups. Means and standard deviations for trait-

cognitive anxiety scores are presented in the Appendix.

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations of Copying Task (Performance)
Scores Using Post Hoc Sample Distribution

 

 

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

Objective

 

 

High MediUm *Low
Self-Awareness M SD *TM 50 M SD
Mirror 485.37 80.70 449.91 46.65 477.00 62.79
N=l9 N=21 N=1O
Plywood Back 439.07 85.21 416.27 96.54 436.09 77.75
N=14 N=1l N=23

 

Means and standard deviations for the perfbrmance task scores
are presented in Table 10. Although the omnibus F was still not
significant (F(5, 92) = 1.766, p > .10), results of a priori contrasts
began to reveal some patterns in this data. Significant results were
obtained for the following comparisons:

1) mirror vs. plywood groups (1, 2, 3 vs. 4, 5, 6): p < .05.

2) mirror vs. plywood in the high and low anxiety groups

(1 and 3 vs. 4 and 6): p < .05.
3) high anxiety/mirror group vs. other groups (1 vs. 2-6):
p < .05.
When doing similar contrasts using the 2 x 2 design, only the mirror
vs. plywood groups comparison resulted in a finding of significance

(p < .05).

52

In addition, a non-monotonic U-shaped pattern was noted - higher
mean scores in high and low groups, with the lowest score in the
middle or medium group. This pattern was evident in bgth_
experimental conditions, a situation considered not as likely to
have occurred by chance. In summary, although the presence of a
nonsignificant omnibus F suggests that any experimental effects may
be weak, the combination of several significant group comparisons,
as well as the presence of the U-shaped pattern in both experimental
conditions, is worthy of note in this study.

Two other exploratory analyses were conducted using the original
2 x 2 design. In the first, an analysis of variance was conducted
for pre-task state-cognitive anxiety and worry by class. Because
subjects were drawn from both credit and noncredit classes and
because there was reason to believe that one instructor's comments
may have affected subject perceptions of their participation, it
was believed that it would be important to conduct such analysis.

The data revealed no significant differences between classes on either
variable.

A second post hoc analysis was performed to explore the
composition of the subject sample for the 2 x 2 design. As noted in
Table 1, the omnibus F for trait-cognitive anxiety was significant
at p < .01. A comparison of high vs. low groups specifically
(groups 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4) also evidenced significant difference:
t(94) = 13.01, p < .01. However, the homogeneity of variance
assumption was not met, introducing a note of caution in the
interpretation of these results. These same trends were also found

in the tests for the post hoc 3 x 2 design.

DISCUSSION

The focus of this study was the differential performance on
a copying task of individuals scoring in a "high" or "low" range
of trait-cognitive anxiety. It was further predicted that individuals
"high" in trait anxiety would score higher in state-cognitive anxiety
and in worry. It was assumed that a high level of cognitive
anxiety would distract a subject from concentration on the task.
Further, a high level of cognitive anxiety and worry should have
interacted with a high level of objective self-awareness (the mirror
condition) to produce even greater performance decrement.

As seen in Hypotheses 2 and 3, the predicted performance decrement
for those high in cognitive anxiety was not supported by the data.
In particular, the group of most interest in this study, the high
cognitively anxious performing the task in front of the mirror (high
objective self-awareness), not only did not suffer the greatest
perfbrmance decrement, but actually achieved the highest mean
performance source of the four groups. Although a comparison of
high vs. low groups did not achieve statistical significance, a
comparison of mirror vs. plywood (low objective self-awareness)
groups was statistically significant at p <:.05. As shown in
Table 4, the mean performance scores of both mirror groups were

higher than those of both plywood groups.

53

54

Several issues are involved in the interpretation of these
results. It must be noted that the composition of the subject
sample did not provide particularly homogeneous groupings nor as
much statistical power for investigation of treatment effects as
would have an upper-lower quartile selection. In this study, all
individuals volunteering for the project were included as subjects
and a median split divided high and low groups. The Appendix table
showing trait-cognitive anxiety mean scores for the 2 x 2 design notes
the range of trait-cognitive anxiety scores for each group. There
is no numerical separation between the lowest score of the "high"
group and the highest score of the "low" group. Future research
attempting to divide a subject population on the basis of trait-CSAQ
scores should plan for the screening of as large a group of potential
subjects as possible. In this way, a division into upper and lower
quartiles of the distribution (and possibly of the CSAQ cognitive
scale, as well) would be a more likely occurrence.

In addition, and what is probably more important for
interpretation of the findings, only four of the 100 subjects
scored in the 29-35 range of the trait-CSAQ cognitive scale (this
roughly corresponds to the upper quartile of the scale). Only ten
subjects scored in the 25-35 point range. The implications of such
numbers in terms of the absolute level of anxiety as measured by
this scale may be crucial in attempting to explain subject
performance. It appears that most subjects simply did not admit
to a tendency to experience a great deal of cognitive anxiety.

Whether this result reflected a genuine perception of lower anxiety

55
or a desire to appear less anxious to others cannot be interpreted
from this data.

What level of cognitive anxiety is necessary for certain
interactions to occur and performance decrement to be evidenced?
This study predicted an interaction in some fashion between high
cognitive anxiety (trait and state) and a high level of objective
self-awareness to produce conditions leading to a worsening of
performance on the task. The tendency to experience and the
experiencing of a high number of cognitive intrusions (acting as
distraction of attention) should have been exacerbated by a heightening
of self-awareness. It is possible that those subjects in the high
cognitive anxiety group as defined by this distribution median split
were simply "not anxious enough." That is, a higher level of anxiety
would have been necessary to lead to the sequence of reactions
predicted.

The results of this study appear similar to those of Wicklund
and Duval (1971), in which the presence of a mirror increased the
number of words of German prose copied in a specified period of time.
Leibling and Shaver (1973) obtained the same results for the copying
of Swedish prose when subjects were performing in a low evaluation
situation. In both of these studies, then, the presence of the
mirror facilitated performance on simple tasks when evaluation
apprehension was low.

Leibling and Shaver (1973) suggested a motivational explanation
for this improvement in performance. If an attentional decrement

(discussed by Wine, 1971) is compensated for by an arousal increment,

56
the result may be a situation in which an individual is simply
"'trying harder'" (Wicklund and Duval, 1971, p. 304). In the
present study, cognitive anxiety did not seem debilitatingly high;
yet for the "high" group, enough of such anxiety may have been
present for subjects to use the cues of that anxiety (and possibly of
worry, as well) as a motivation to "try harder."

Cognitive interference was another variable investigated for
contribution to performance decrement. Comparison of high vs. low
groups for cognitive interference did reveal a statistically
significant difference between these groups. Yet as in the case
of trait-and state-cognitive anxiety, the level of interference (of
task-irrelevant thoughts) may not have been great enough to result
in more performance decrement. Nor did the presence of the mirror
seem to appreciably heighten such interference.

In addition, the fact that the high anxiety/mirror group reported
noticing the mirror but did not perceive it as a distraction from the
task lends support to the hypothesis that absolute anxiety was not
”high enough."

Although the high trait-cognitive anxiety groups did evidence
greater worry scores (both pre- and post-task), the high cognitive
anxiety/mirror group (group 1) did not score higher than the other
three groups (pre- and post-task). [Post hoc investigation of the
pre-task results for worry (group 1 vs. 2, 3, 4) did not yield
statistically significant findings, p > .13.] This result suggests
that the predicted interaction between high trait-cognitive anxiety
and a high level of objective self-awareness leading to higher levels

of worry, as well as of performance decrement, was not present.

57

As has been stated, in the present study every attempt was
made to reduce evaluation apprehension. Thus, this study came to
resemble both that of Wicklund and Duval (1971) and the low-evaluation
condition of Leibling and Shaver (1973). Unfortunately this
resemblance was unintentional. While efforts were made to keep
externally-produced evaluation apprehension at a minimum, it was
felt that high levels of cognitive anxiety and worry would introduce
an internal sense of apprehension. This should have created concern
for achieving a certain level of performance and anxiety regarding
a possible negative outcome. This writer believes that individuals
who experience high degrees of cognitive anxiety and worry will
interpret many different situations as evaluative, including
participation in an experiment and many sorts of performance tasks.

The concept of worry is a factor which may have an even more
direct relationship to evaluation apprehension, per se, As noted
in the Results section, the statistically significant data fbr pre-
and post-task worry scores must be considered less conclusive.
However, they still suggest the possibility that higher levels of
trait-and state-cognitive anxiety will also imply higher levels of
worry. As a construct, worry, with its emphasis of performance
concerns and apprehension about negative consequences, thus seems to
tap into the concept of evaluation apprehension. As mentioned in the
Results section, worry-emotionality appears to an extent to be a
different type of dimension than cognitive-somatic anxiety. Worry
may actually be a special type of both evaluation anxiety (Wine, 1982)

and in a broader sense, of cognitive anxiety.

58

Although the results of this study suggest that individuals
experiencing higher levels of cognitive anxiety also experienced
similar levels of worry, this may not always be the case. Cognitive
anxiety deals with a number of types of cognitive intrusion. For some
individuals, focus on anxiety in the form of cognitive intrusion may
not be specifically related to concern about negative consequences or
evaluation issues. Thus if the concept of evaluation apprehension
may be closer in intent to worry than to cognitive anxiety, a similar
study using worry as a focal construct might be worthwhile.

Another possibility for future study would be the deliberate
introduction of different levels of evaluation apprehension within
the cognitive anxiety-objective self-awareness paradigm. It is
possible, as with the Leibling and Shaver (1973) and Paulus, Annis,
and Risner (1978) studies, that evaluation apprehension as introduced
external to the individual is a crucial mediating variable. A related
question is whether all evaluation is seen as aversive. To what extent
do individual differences in internal tendencies toward evaluation
anxiety and perceptions of external situations as evaluative affect
response to manipulation of high-low evaluation conditions in this
type of study?

Although this study predicted an interaction between cognitive
anxiety (and probably worry) and a state of high objective self-awareness
to produce performance decrement, it is possible that other variables
such as current life situation and mood state, not considered in
this work or particularly emphasized, might be vital ingredients in
such a response. This study was conducted during a four-week period

in which most subjects had at least one set of midterm exams

59
scheduled. Such factors might have a certain influence on
sensitivity to performance issues-either a temporary increase in
apprehension or a sense of relief concerning the ending of the
exam period and a possible increase in self-confidence if the
individual did well.

The second variable mentioned, mood state, was the focus of an
exploratory aspect of the study. Interest was chiefly in terms of
a screening of some sort for depression or depression-like symptoms
("sadness" on the Emotion Wheel) which might provide an alternative
explanation for performance decrement. Over 90 of the 100 subjects
reported their mood prior to the copying task as being either
"acceptance" or "anticipation." No further analysis was conducted.
No attempt had been made to obtain a rating of affect intensity or
post-task mood.

A more intensive investigation might be recommended for future
research. According to Scheier and Carver (1977), self-focused
attention heightens a person's awareness and responsivity to affect,
regardless of the nature of the affect (positive or negative). Any
effects on performance of mood/affect on this study are difficult to
assess due in part to both a lack of intensity ratings and a lack
of operational definitions of "acceptance" and "anticipation." Were
these mood states positive or aversive and for which subjects? Just
what is "acceptance," "anticipation"? Future work may be advised to
investigate the use of a different instrument, along with ratings of
intensity.

Another variable which may affect copying task performance is

subjects' differential ability to print letters rapidly. Many subjects

60
used script even though they were instructed to print. All data sets
were considered valid as long as each letter was distinguishable
for purposes of observing correctness of letter, accent, and
punctuation. It is possible that some individuals did attempt to
follow the instructions faithfully. If printing were for any reason
Tawkward for some subjects or more preferable for others, the speed
of copying the prose may have been affected for this reason alone.
The problem of subject adherence to these particular instructions is
difficult within this paradigm. To reduce self-awareness from
sources other than the mirror and to reduce evaluation apprehension,
the experimenter was outside the room and could thus not monitor
subjects' behavior. And from a practical standpoint, it was simply
not possible to exclude all data sets in which a subject had written
rather than printed the Swedish prose. Nevertheless, this individual
difference variable should be considered in any research involving a
c0pying task.

The results of the post hoc exploratory analysis of the
performance data lend support to the importance of creating more
homogeneous groupings. When the subject sample was divided into three
groupings of trait-cognitive anxiety level (high, medium, and low),

a greater number of the same a priori comparisons evidenced
statistically significant results.

The results of this exploratory analysis also reveal an
interesting pattern which, while again not supporting the hypothesis
of performance decrement, is nevertheless worth noting. A non-monotonic,
U-shaped pattern was evidenced for both mirror and plywood

experimental conditions. High and low groups achieved mean scores

61
in each case higher than the "Medium" group. And those higher scores
were more so in the mirror than in the plywood condition. As noted
in the Results section, comparisons of all mirror vs. plywood
groups and high vs. low groups in the mirror condition proved
statistically significant.

Interpretation of higher performance scores in mirror as Opposed
to plywood conditions has been suggested previously in this section.
It is felt that such interpretations apply equally to this 3 x 2
design.

Possible explanations for the U-shaped scoring pattern and a
statistically significant difference between high and low groups in
the mirror condition are more problematic and suggested interpretations
not readily available in the self-awareness literature. It is
possible that individuals in the low group, not experiencing much
distraction, were able to focus well on the task and achieve a higher
level of performance. In the high cognitive anxiety group, there may
have been a sufficient amount of internal cues of anxiety to provide
some additional motivation to "try harder," also resulting in
higher performance scores. For this group, the condition of high
objective self-awareness may have then interacted with the higher
level of cognitive anxiety to provide stronger anxiety cues and an
even greater instance of "trying harder." Thus, in the‘mirror
condition, the higher cognitive anxiety group evidenced even higher
scores than the low anxiety group.

In the case of the medium group, there may'have been "just
enough" anxiety experienced to not allow these individuals to be in the

same internal circumstances as the low group, yet "not enough" anxiety

62
felt to provide that additional motivation. The condition of high
objective self-awareness produced a higher performance mean in the
mirror as opposed to plywood condition, yet scores in both conditions
remained depressed below those of both high and low groups.

Although such a non-monotonic pattern is not often seen in both
experimental conditions by chance, it must be noted that the omnibus
F for performance task for this design did not achieve statistical
significance. Treatment effects, if existing, are most probably weak.
The importance of this exploratory analysis may rest more in the
changes evidenced when groups were made more homogeneous, introducing
more statistical power into the analysis.

Results of this study lend support to the conclusion that
self-attention is not necessary phenomenologically aversive (Carver &
Scheier, 1978). This work was an attempt to investigate one possible
variable which might lead to an aversive reaction: the interaction
of a high level of objective self-awareness with a high level of
cognitive anxiety. It was hypothesized that such an interaction might
produce an internal state very similar to that of evaluation apprehension.
It was further predicted that such an aversive reaction would be
evidenced in an increased number and/or intensity of cognitive
intrusions, worry, and cognitive interference, leading to increased
distraction of attention and performance decrement.

In a clinical setting, all of these variables will be involved
at various times: perceptions of possible evaluation by the
therapist on the part of the client; increased self-awareness as the
client is asked to become more introspective and possibly to focus

on experiences of anxiety, fear, and other emotion; the use of audio

63
and video tapes, note-taking (the former often the case when the
therapist is in training); and certainly high levels of cognitive
anxiety and worry for many clients at some points at least.

As this anxiety increases, what might happen to the client's
ability to focus and concentrate on any point of thought and
discussion? The performance task in this study was a simple one,
but demanding of an individual's ability to concentrate and focus
her energy on such a task for a given period of time. Client
anxiety levels within a clinical setting will often be far higher
than those of high group in this study. Would the level of anxiety
in the clinical setting be the level "high enough? to trigger the
mentioned interaction? In addition, the concept of "clinical" as
opposed to "normal" anxiety may play a role in the clinical setting.
Clients entering therapy with anxiety-related disorders or unusually
high levels of anxiety (especially cognitive; often high levels of
both somatic and cognitive) may experience such interaction on a
continual basis during therapeutic intervention.

In conclusion, while this study generally supported the
prediction that a higher level of trait-cognitive anxiety would
suggest higher levels of state-cognitive anxiety, worry, and cognitive
interference during a simple performance task, the data failed to
support the focal hypothesis: that these higher levels of anxiety
and worry would interact with a high level of objective self-awareness
to produce the greatest observable performance decrement among all
groups.

The most prominent explanation for the failure to observe

statistically significant differences in task performance appears to

64
be the lack of a "high enough" level of cognitive anxiety among
subjects to produce the predicted interaction. Also, as noted, the
concept of evaluation apprehension is an important factor in
performance decrement in other objective self-awareness research.
It was predicted that the above mentioned interaction would produce
an internal state similar to that of evaluation apprehension, providing
a mechanism by which performance level should decrease. Yet because
cognitive anxiety, consisting of a variety of cognitive intrusions,
is a broad concept, individuals experiencing this type of anxiety
may or may not experience it in more directly "evaluative" terms.

Mood state is a third variable which may have implications for
task performance. While an effort was made to assess each subject's
pre-task mood, these "moods" (as listed on the Emotion Wheel) were
not well-defined, nor was any attempt made to assess intensity of
mood or post-task change.

Any attempt to replicate this study should include the following
changes: first, the screening of a large enough group of potential
subjects to allow division of "high" and "low" trait-cognitive
anxiety groups by quartiles (preferably including a high level of
"absolute" anxiety on the CSAQ scale, itself). As noted in the
post hoc exploratory analysis, more homogeneous groupings of subjects
will create more statistical power for analysis. And by creating a
more genuinely "high" anxiety group, the probability of the predicted
interaction leading to performance task differences should increase.

Second, a more thorough investigation of subject mood or affect

would help to focus on alternative explanations for any observed

65
performance decrement. Clear, operationally-defined terms and the
addition of affect intensity ratings and post-task assessment
should be included.

Third, an additional analysis might be considered, utilizing
state-cognitive anxiety and worry scores. This suggestion follows
the same reasoning as that of intensity of mood state. A subject's
present mood and its intensity may have a more direct bearing upon
performance than a more general tendency toward a given experience
(although it would still be predicted that a high level of trait-
cognitive anxiety would suggest a higher level of state-cognitive
anxiety and worry, as well).

Finally, a change in design of this study, allowing for inclusion
of high and low levels of evaluation apprehension, might also help
to more specifically focus on a source of performance difference.
Evaluation levels could be produced by alteration of instructions
to the subject, suggesting a much greater evaluative component to

task performance.

APPENDICES

 

 

 

APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL TABLES

 

APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL TABLES

Reliabilities of Measures

 

 

 

N=lOO N=98
Trait-CSAQ .807 .815
State-CSAQ (pre-task) .866 .865
Worry-Emotionality (pre-task) .887 .893
Cognitive Interference .779 .778
Questionnaire*
State-CSAQ (post-task) .887 _ .887
Worry-Emotionality (post-task) .870 .873
Post-Task Questionnaire .416 .422

 

*With item #11 deleted.

66

67

Pearson Correlations of Selected Measures*

 

 

 

 

 

Pre-task Post-task

Trait-CSAQ State-CSAQ WE State-CSAQ WE
Trait-CSAQ 1.000 .460 .443 .470 .391
State-CSAQ .459 1.000 .541 .764 .553
(pre-task) -
Worry-Emotionality .443 .541 1.000 .339 .751
(pre-task)
State-CSAQ .470 .764 .339 1.000 .572
(post-task)
Worry-Emotionality .391 .553 .751 .572 1.000

(post-task)

 

*N=98.

68

Means and Standard Deviations of Trait-
Cognitive Anxiety Scores for Exploratory Analysis

 

 

Trait-Cognitive Anxiety

 

 

 

Objective . .
High Medium Low
Mirror 24.32 3.42 17.95 1.40 13.00 2.71
N=l9 N=21 N=lO

Plywood Back 25.00 3.76 18.00 1.67 13.48 1.78
N=14 N=11 N=23

 

Scoring ranges were as follows:
High anxiety between 21-35.
Medium anxiety between 16-20.

Low anxiety between 8-16.

69

Means and Standard Deviations of Trait-
Cognitive Anxiety Scores for 2 x 2 Design

 

 

 

 

 

Objective Hi9wait-Cognitive Anxietyw

Self-Awareness M’ SD M SD

Mirror 22.71 3.68 15.14 2.71
N=28 N=22

Plywood Back 23.30 4.42 14.00 1.98
N=20 N=28

 

Note. "High" anxiety scores ranged between 18-35.

"Low" anxiety scores ranged between 8-18.

70

Performance Raw Scores by Group*

Group 1 High Trait Cognitive Anxiety/Mirror N=28

311 617 400 419
542 550 492 510
458 483 384 510
530 426 483 371
578 427 361 607
432 493 489 415
510 492 392 498

Group 2 High Trait Cognitive Anxiety/Plywood Back N=22**

521 419 377 374
452 710** 238 383
501 431 540 517
366 404 703** 532
566 374 489
243 452 438

Group 3 Low Trait ngnitive Anxiety/Mirror N=22

497 534 489 438
422 470 472 532
335 468 413 601
507 443 522 475
476 391 406
446 454 414

Group 4 Low Trait Cognitive Anxiety/Plywood Back N=28

511 463 281 401
476 454 409 381
374 328 510 315
562 416 334 650
417 492 458 485
454 510 358 374
469 399 431 427

*2 x 2 design.

**Includes "outlyers" indicated by**.

 

APPENDIX B
INSTRUMENTS

APPENDIX B
INSTRUMENTS

(attached to CSAQ)
If you have a reading, speaking, and/or writing knowledge of

Swedish, Norwegian, cn~ Danish, do not go on to complete this

questionnaire. Please return this copy to the experimenter.

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72

CSAQ

Please rate the degree to which you generally or typically experience
the following symptoms when you are feeling anxious. Use the following

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

scale:
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Very much so
______j. I find it difficult to concentrate because of uncontrollable
thoughts.
2. I worry too much over something that doesn't really matter.
3. My heart beats faster.
4. I feel jittery in my body.
5. I imagine terrifying scenes.
6. I feel like I am losing out on things because I can't make
up my mind soon enough.
7. I can't keep anxiety provoking pictures out of my mind.
8. I get diarrhea.
9. I become immobilized.
_____JO. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me.
_____11. I feel tense in my stomach.
_____l2. 1 can't keep anxiety provoking thoughts out of my mind.
_____l3. I nervously pace.
14. I perspire.

73

(attached to the first pre-task questionnaire the subject received)

As we have mentioned, in this pilot study, we need to know to
the extent possible just how similar subjects are on several
dimensions. Therefore, in addition to the copying tasks, we will
be asking you to complete a series of self-report measures.

Please complete the questionnaire attached to this sheet. When
you have finished, slide it under the door and wait for the next
measure to be passed in to you.

Follow this same procedure for all measures.

74

CSAQ-STATE

Please circle one number to the left of each statement to indicate how
you feel right now, that is, at this moment. 00 not spend too much
time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe
your present feelings best.

 

Not Very

at much

all Somewhat so

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 My mind feels calm.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2. My muscles are tense.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3. I am jittery.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4. My mind is at peace.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 5. I feel distracted by thoughts.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6. My heartbeat is calm and regular.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7. I am worried.

l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. My body feels relaxed.

l 2 3 4 5 6 7 9. My breathing is calm and regular.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10. I am having pleasant thoughts and
images.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11. My body feels restless.

l 2 3 4 5 6 7 12. I am presently worrying over

possible misfortunes.

75

N-E

Directions: To the left of each of the following statements, indicate
your feelings, attitudes, or thoughts as they are right now in relation
to this study. Use the following numerical scale.

1. The statement does not describe my present condition.
The condition is barely noticeable.
The condition is moderate.

The condition is strong.

0'1th

The condition is very strong; the statement describes
my present condition very well.

I feel my heart beating fast.

I feel regretful.

I am so tense that my stomach is upset.

I am concerned about the possibility of doing poorly.

I have an uneasy, upset feeling.

I feel that others will be disappointed in me.

I am nervous.

I feel I may not do as well in this study as I could.

I feel panicky.

I do not feel very confident about my performance in this study.
I feel high strung.

I am afraid that other subjects will be able to do a better job
in this study.

76

(attached to the first post-task questionnaire given)

Now we need some additional information concerning the
similarities of the subjects participating in this study. Once
again, please complete the attached questionnaire. When you have
finished, slide it under the door and wait for the next measure
to be passed in to you. Follow this same procedure for all

post-task instruments.

77

C10

I. We are interested in learning about the kinds of thoughts that go
through people's heads while they are working on a task. The
following is a list of thoughts some of which you might have had
while doing the task on which you have just worked. Please indicate
approximately how often each thought occurred to you while working
on it placing the appropriate number in the blank provided to the
left of each question.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Example: 1 = never

2 = once

3 = a few times

4 = often

5 = very often
1. I thought about how poorly I was doing.
2. I wondered what the experimenter would think of me.
3. I thought about how I should work more carefully.
4. I thought about how much time I had left.
5. I thought about how others have done on this task.
6. I thought about the difficulty of the task.
7. I thought about my level of ability.
8. I thought about the purpose of the experiment.
9. I thought about how I would feel if I were told how I performed.
10. I thought about how often I got confused.
11. I thought about things completely unrelated to the experiment.

11. Please circle the number of the following scale which best
represents the degree to which you felt your mind wandered during
the taskgyou have just completed.

 

Not at all 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 Very much

78

Post-Task Questionnaire-M

(Given to the subjects in the "mirror" condition)

79

Post-Task Questionnaire-M

Please answer the following questions concerning your experience
during this experiment. Use the following numerical scale.

l.

#00“)

This statement does not describe my experience.
This statement describes my experience only slightly.
This statement describes my experience somewhat.

This statement describes my experience very well.

I was aware of the presence of the mirror.

I found that the presence of the mirror distracted me from
concentrating on the tasks.

I was aware of the presence of the experimenter outside
the room.

I found that the passing of materials under the door
distracted me from concentrating on the tasks.

Please answer "yes" or "no" to the following questions.

Yes

Yes

No If currently enrolled in PSY 160, you have also
taken PSY 170.

No If currently enrolled in PSY 170, you have also
taken PSY 160.

 

80

Post-Task Questionnaire-P

(given to the subjects in the "no mirror" (i.e., plywood back

facing subject) condition)

81

Post-Task Questionnaire-P

Please answer the following questions concerning your experience
during this experiment. Use the following numerical scale.

1.

2
3.
4

This statement does not describe my experience.
This statement describes my experience only slightly.
This statement describes my experience somewhat.

This statement describes my experience very well.

I was aware of the presence of the plywood board.

I found that the presence of the plywood board distracted
me from concentrating on the tasks.

I was aware of the presence of the experimenter outside the
room.

I found that the passing of materials under the door
distracted me from concentrating on the tasks.

Please answer "yes" or "no" to the following questions.

Yes

Yes

No If currently enrolled in PSY 160, you have also
taken PSY 170.

No If currently enrolled in PSY 170, you have also
taken PSY 160.

APPENDIX C
SUBJECT DEBRIEFING

APPENDIX C
SUBJECT DEBRIEFING

Written debriefing mailed to all subjects.

The experiment in which you participated was actually an
investigation of performance differences between subjects "high" in
cognitive anxiety vs. those subjects "low" in such anxiety under
conditions of "high" objective self-awareness.

Cognitive anxiety was initially measured during the screening phase
of the study. Half of the questions on this first questionnaire
determined each individual's score in this type of anxiety.

Cognitive anxiety refers to the tendency of an individual, when
anxious, to experience various kinds of cognitive intrusions - thoughts
and images - which often distract the attention of the individual away
from the task at hand. For instance: you are giving a speech in front
of a group and suddenly experience the thought: what if I can't
remember what I'm going to say next? This is an example of cognitive
anxiety. Individuals experiencing a great deal of cognitive anxiety
tend to be more self-focused in these thoughts and images. Somatic
anxiety (the physical manifestations of the anxiety experience) scores
were recorded but not used in the experiment itself.

Objective self-awareness refers to the tendency of an individual
to see him or herself as an object in the world. The mirror used in
this experiment was a way of manipulating this experience, increasing
a subject's objective self-awareness, making it much more likely that
she would become more self-focused. Often when individuals become
highly self-aware, they also focus on any intra-self discrepancies
existing at the moment, something (5) that they are dissatisfied with
about themselves. Those subjects who performed the experiment in
front of the mirror's plywood backing were in a state of 19w objective
self-awareness, not being reminded of themselves as objects in the
world and thus not becoming more self-focused. Any cognitive anxiety
and/or tendency at that moment to be highly self-focused would not be
heightened by this condition.

Many situations will produce an increase in objective self-
awareness, including the experience of being a subject in an experiment
and any concern the subject may have that he or she is being (or is
about to be) evaluated. For this reason, in this experiment we
attempted to reduce all other sources of objective self-awareness
aside from the mirror. This would make it possible to more accurately
isolate the mirror as the chief source of such self-awareness in this
study.

Thus we set up the experiment as if it were a pilot study in
which subjects would be helping future research efforts in an area which

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83

was not personally threatening to any subject (i.e., overall,
reducing evaluation apprehension). Also, the experimenter was not in
the room with the subject, once again reducing the possibility of
evaluation apprehension as well as reducing distraction for the
subject. The mirror was not mentioned until the Post-Task
Questionnaire-M to avoid directing the subjects' attention to it in

a more artificial way.

For those subjects who scored in the "high" range of cognitive
anxiety on the initial screening measure, it was hypothesized that
because of the increased tendency to be cognitively distracted and
most probably self-focused, such tendencies would be reatly heightened
in a state of "high" objective self-awareness (mirror?. The chief
hypothesis of this study is that subjects in this group (high cognitive
anxiety/high objective self-awareness) will do less well on the c0pying
task than subjects in any of the other three groups.

In addition to performance scores on the Swedish cap ing task
(# of correct letters and marks of punctuation and accent , other
post-task measures investigated the degree to which cognitive
interference and various other types of distraction were experienced
during the experiment. In addition, two measures assessing the
experience of cognitive anxiety and worry at that moment (state measures)
were administered both before and after the copying task to investigate
possible changes in the level of anxiety and worry during that period.
Somatic anxiety and emotionality (similar to somatic anxiety) scores
were once again recorded but not used in the study for analysis.

The recording of the subjects' predominant mood involved an
exploratory aspect of the study. Because such a mood as a "depressed"
feeling or sadness may result in a decrease of energy output, such
a mood might be an alternative explanation for a poorer perfbrmance
on the copying task, and such infbrmation is thus important for an
overall discussion of the study results.

This study should be completed over the course of the next two
terms. If you would like an abstract of the study results, please
either give me an SASE this term and I will mail you a copy as soon
as the study is completed or contact me c/o the Department of
Psychology. 135 Snyder Hall next Fall.

If you have any additional questions concerning the study and/or

your participation, please contact me at 353-5193, 19 Snyder, or by
mail c/o 135 Snyder.

Ann M. Isenberg

APPENDIX D
RATIONALES AND INSTRUCTIONS
TO SUBJECTS

APPENDIX D

RATIONALES AND INSTRUCTIONS
TO SUBJECTS

Rationale given to subjects prior to administration of the
trait-CSAQ.

We are conducting a pilot study for a project
in which subjects will copy written material of
graded difficulty. Before we begin the study,
we need to know just how similar subjects will
be on certain variables.

Therefore, we are asking you to take the next

few minutes to complete first the consent form,
then the questionnaire being distributed.

84

85

Rationale given to subjects upon arrival for the second (copying
task) phase of the study.

As we mentioned before, this is a pilot study
for a project in which subjects will copy
written materials of graded difficulty.

Before we can perform any study on the effects

of varying levels of difficulty, we must establish
a scale to measure the difficulty of written
material. This is what you will be helping us

do in this pilot study.

By measuring how much of a given written material
a random sample of people can c0py accurately,

we can not only rank order different materials

by difficulty, but we can see how much harder one
passage is to copy than another. You will be
copying material of one level of difficulty and
other subjects will be copying material of

other levels.

Because this is a study to establish a scale of
measurement, we need to find out just how similar
participating individuals are in certain ways.
Therefore, we will also be asking you to complete
some questionnaires before and after the copying
task, itself.

APPENDIX E

CONSENT FORM '

86

Instructions for experimental procedure verbally given to each
subject before the start of the experiment.

To prevent distraction, I will be outside the
room throughout the experiment. I will be
giving you the first measure as you enter the
room. Please sit at the desk to your left.
You will find pencils and paper for the copying
task on the desk. When you finish the first
questionnaire, slip it under the door and I
will slide the next measure in to you.
(Experimenter demonstrates). Follow this
procedure for the first three measures. All
instructions for completing these measures
also appear on the instruments, themselves.

After the third measure, I will slide the
copying task under the door. Please read the
instructions carefully. When you are finished
and are ready to begin, knock twice on the

door (Experimenter demonstrates). When you

have two knocks in return, you may begin copying
the Swedish prose, by printing, on the paper you
will find on the desk. When you hear a second
double-knock (Experimenter demonstrates), stop
copying immediately and slide all materials
under the door. I will then slide the next
measures in to you.

Following the c0pying task, there will be four
short questionnaires for you to complete. Please
follow the same procedure of sliding the completed
measures under the door. After the fourth
questionnaire is completed, I will come into the
room and you will be able to ask any questions

you might have.

APPENDIX E
CONSENT FORM

This study involves two stages. You have volunteered for this
first phase in which we will ask you to complete a questionnaire
after you have read and signed this form. If you have reading, writing,
or speaking knowledge of Norwegian, Swedish, or Danish, you will not
be eligible to participate. In such a case, please return this form
to the experimenter immediately.

In this study, it is necessary for us to know how similar subjects
are on a number of variables. During this first phase, you will be
providing us with some of that information. We would like you to answer
the statements on the questionnaire as truthfully as possible. All
information provided during this study will be coded to protect
subject confidentiality. This first phase of the project will last
between 15 and 30 minutes. You may ask the experimenter any
questions you like and you are free to terminate your involvement in
the study at any point.

We will be selecting a number of you to return to participate
in the second stage of this project, the copying of written materials.
At this point, we do not know how many subjects this will involve.
Therefore, once again we emphasize that we would like as truthful a
sample as possible when completing this first questionnaire. Those
subjects selected to participate in the second phase of the study will
be recontacted by the experimenter and asked to return to a specified
location at a mutually arranged time. The second phase of the study

will involve the copying task, itself, as well as a series of

87

88

self-report questionnaires before and after the task which will
provide additional information concerning similarity of the subject
sample.

The second stage of the project will last from 30-45 minutes.

A written explanation of the details of the study will be provided to
all subjects as soon as project data collection is completed. At
that time, subjects may also arrange to meet with an experimenter to
ask for any further information desired. Once again, all information
you provide will be coded to maintain confidentiality. You may also
ask the experimenter any questions you might have and you are free to
terminate your involvement with the project at any time during this
second phase.

You will receive credit for all participation in this project if
outlined by your course instructor.

Please read this information carefully and feel free to ask the
experimenter any questions you might have. At this point, we are
asking you to provide your written consent to participate in the first
phase of the study (completing the initial questionnaire) and
willingness to participate in the second phase (copying task and
additional questionnaires) should be recontacted. Once you have
read this form carefully, please indicate your consent to participate

by signing and dating this form on the lines immediately below.

 

 

volunteeris signature Date

 

 

Experimenter's signature Date

APPENDIX F
EMOTION WHEEL

APPENDIX F
EMOTION WHEEL

Note on the construction of the "Emotion Wheel"

The "Emotion Wheel" was drawn on a square of posterboard
measuring 10" x 11". A movable pointer of a contrasting color was
then attached to the "Wheel's" center (refer to the artist's

illustration of the instrument).

89

90

(attached to the "Emotion Wheel")

Please indicate by means of the pointer what you feel your

predominant mood to be AT THIS MOMENT.

 

When you have set the pointer, please pass the instrument

under the door and wait for the next task.

91

Emotion Wheel

 

. a
co

.5?

‘3 I:
Q to
.9 9.
55”

”a .2»

9 'c

8
a”
”4'9

 

APPENDIX G
COPYING TASK

APPENDIX G
COPYING TASK

(instructions for copying task)

Now we are going to ask you to copy a sample of some written

material.

Read the instructions carefully. When you have finished,

KNOCK TWICE on the door, then return to your seat.

 

When you hear TWO KNOCKS in return, begin copying the

material.

Please PRINT all letters as they appear and

INCLUDE punctuation and ALL marks of accent (i.e.,

' 0, etc., above letters).

When you hear TWO KNOCKS once again, STOP and slip the copying

task and your c0py under the door.

Return to your seat and wait for the next questionnaire to be

passed in to you.

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pldjs upp h6gst avsevart at mitten av tegen, medan bagge
sidorna beeras mer och mer av den, 85 att kanterna blir
nastan nakna berget. Deras svangda form 1 bagge andar
hindrar vattnet att passera, medan dréneringen i ett
sadant klimat borde vara ett av de fornamsta ankemalen.
Den obrukade mark som skall tagas i ansprak far odling
rensas frfin skog medelst eld, som ibland sprider sig
alltfar langt och kring den odlade biten lamnar en bred
och fdga inbjudande Edemark, som 3r ogastvanlig met all
vegetation. Fdrstdringen av skogen 5r otvivelaktigt
orsaken till att vissa omraden inte langre producerar
samma sadesslag eller samma kvantiteter som.tidigare.

Spar efter akrar, som nu 5r overvuxna med ljung eller
mossa patraffas overallt p5 hedar och bergssluttningar
i Skottland, Wales och norra England och likasa i Sverige,

Norge och p3 Island. Det f5ref611 anmarkningsvart, att

94

de vildaste stallen vi passerade p5 vagen Eran Halsingborg
till Gateborg och darifran till huvudstaden inte var bevuxna
med ljung utan med mossa eller ett slags grovt gras. Den
sad och det ha som finns i Sverige brukar hassjas pa trara-
mar, som fir resta flera fot Ever marken. Sadeskarvar som
sattes upp far att torka pa akrarna 5r inte stallda i tvé
parallella rader, som lutar sig mot och mater varandra i
toppen med tv§ karvar som hatt eller huva, utan 1 en rundel
och tackta med en hattkarve, som breds ut far att skydda
mot regn.

Herdarna i Sverige liksom p5 Island har lurar av bjark.
Tva urholkade bitar av bjdrktra laggs tatt tillsammans och
bindes om med naver av samma tradslag, sa att det bildas
ett runt tar. Det ljud man astadkommer med denna lur fir
gallt och vilt men inte obehagligt. Far och kor samlas
p5 vissa tider och stallen med hjalp av dessa lockrop.
Det a: pa samma satt korna kallas samman av herdarna i
Alperna. Vad jag sag av sodra Sverige var ingenting
sarskilt lockande far 5gat, men eftersom.1andskapet
5vera11t fir angenamt omvaxlande och ur andra synpunkter
erbjuder mycket nytt f6r iakttagaren, 5r det intressant
for en resande. Hela Sveriges paradis 3r Skane, dar
manga av adeln och de f6rm5gna slar sig ned om sommaren.
Man mater dar vackra alléer och andra f3rsk5nande inslag.

Men eftersom det inte 5r min avsikt att beskriva de sBdra

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